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**The fight for space: An urban social history of the Upper West
Side**

Becker, Leonard Robert, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1989

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7

THE FIGHT FOR SPACE: AN URBAN SOCIAL HISTORY OF
THE UPPER WEST SIDE.

BY

LEONARD R. BECKER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, the City University of New York.

1989

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1989

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
The Park Community and Its Interest Groups.....	4
Interest Groups.....	5
Sociology And Urban Planning.....	10
Urban Planning On Manhattan's West Side.....	22
CHAPTER	
1. POPULATION AND HOUSING OF THE UPPER WEST SIDE.....	34
Completion of The Plan.....	35
The New Look On The Upper West Side.....	37
A Historical Overview.....	38
Population Trends In New York City And The	
The Upper West Side	43
Class, Ethnicity and Housing On The Upper West	
West Side.....	44
The Elderly.....	49
City Wide Residential Arrangements.....	55
Economic Situation.....	56
The Elderly Population.....	56
Sources Of Demographic Change.....	57
City Wide Community Board #7 Economic Situat-	

ion Of the Elderly And The Poor.....	60
Real Estate Investment.....	64
City Tax Revenue.....	67
Planning On The Upper West Side.....	68
Post World War II Housing Construction On The Upper West Side.....	69
 2. NATIONAL URBAN POLITICS.....	77
City Politics: 1945-1965.....	80
City Politics: 1965-1975.....	85
City Politics: 1975-Present.....	88
Changing Urban Priorities At The National Level..	94
Political Priorities And Policies Of National Administrations.....	100
 3. THE POLITICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITY INTEREST GROUPS...	115
Community Boards.....	118
Demographic Changes.....	126
Continue.....	128
Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association.....	129
Community Board #7 Membership And Appointment Procedure.....	130
Community Conflict.....	134

4. SITE 30.....	152
Stages Of Development.....	155
Squatter Movement.....	157
The Designation of Site 30.....	158
Community Questions And Reactions.....	163
Opposition To Public Housing.....	164
The Politics Of Housing.....	168
The Final Plan.....	178
5. APPEAL TO THE COURTS.....	183
Background Of The Court Case.....	184
Statement Of The Case By The Defendants.....	187
Court Decisions.....	194
6. CONCLUSIONS.....	202
APPENDIX 1. PLANNING AND REVISIONS TO THE PLAN.....	244
The Preliminary Plan Of 1958.....	246
Early Local Organizations.....	254
The Final Plan.....	257
Program For Relocation.....	260
Summary Of Amendments And Revisions To	
The West Side Urban Redevelopment Plan..	265

Changes After The Fourth Amendment And Before the Submission Of The Fifth Amendment.....	266
The Fifth Amendment Revisions.	269
The Fifth Amendment.....	274
The Public Hearings.....	275
Revision Of The Plan-5-11 and 23,1979...	281
The Report Of the City Planning Commiss- ion.....	281
Historical Summary.....	290
 APPENDIX 2. METHODS.....	 295
APPENDIX 3. HOUSING LEGISLATION.....	301
APPENDIX 4. NAMES AND POSITIONS OF INTERVIEW RESPOND- ents.....	306
 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	 308

LIST OF TABLES

1.Total And Aged Population Of New York City...	49
2.Aged Population By Subgroup,New York City 1900-1980.....	51
3.New York City Aged Population, By Age 1980 Population and 1990.....	53
4.Bank Effective Interest Rate For Construction And Land Development Loans, And Farm Loans By Size Of Loans. 1977-1985.....	222
5.Total Buildings In The Area 1956.....	248
6.Buildings To Be Cleared With And Without Deficiencies.....	249
7.Expected Proposed Rehousing.....	260
8.Estimated Population Changes Through Stage II.....	263
9.Dwelling Units Proposed In The Fifth Amend- ment.....	288
10.Reduced Densities In Fifth Amendment Compared To The 1962 Plan: Projected Dwelling Units For The Remaining Undeveloped Residential Sites In West Side Urban Renewal Area.....	289

INTRODUCTION

In June, 1985, the Board of Estimate of New York City, in a public session at City Hall, voted to divide Site 30, a site on the Upper West Side between 90th and 91st streets and between Columbus Avenue and Amsterdam Avenue into two sites-- 30 and 30 A.

This vote ended a process which began in 1955 as an effort to plan the growth and "renewal" of Manhattan's Upper West Side. The 1985 vote, however also signaled the end of a thirty year process of compromises, broken promises, trade-offs, misunderstandings, bitter conflicts, political exigencies, the gyrations of an unplanned external economy and a lack of continuity in personnel on a federal, state and local level. One of the worst outcomes of this planning process for the Upper West Side was that the needs of the elderly were largely neglected, almost as if these Westsiders had lost the right to remain in this gentrifying area of the City.

This study describes the political, economic and social processes involved in the ambitious and ultimately flawed West Side Urban Renewal Plan. Exploration for development and renewal of the twenty block area, began in 1950, but these blocks were actually certified for renewal in 1956. What this study seeks to explain, in particular, is how, over the next thirty years of planning, the housing needs of the elderly and the poor residents of the area were subordinated in the conflict among the real estate developers, public housing advocates and local neighborhood groups.

It is our contention that planning is intrinsically part of the political process. This process reflects, in part, the ideology of the changing national, state and municipal administrations' leadership and policy emphasis shifts due to economic conditions, the electoral politics of conflicting interests and the degree of involvement of local community groups. Intrinsic, in the democratic political process, is the lack of continuity in policy formulation and policy continuity due to an electoral system which is subject to the capriciousness of an electorate.

We do not have a Civil Service in the English sense which provides a continuity and stability in terms of long range planning. By constitutional design administrations are limited to eight years and many are turned out after four years. Thus there is no Master Plan and instead ideology is of course subject to electoral politics, which entails compromises and alliances in order to win elections. These groupings are temporary and as a result elected officials resolve problems on a piece meal basis. Since planners are not elected officials they are at best advisors to elected officials and at worst purely technicians who become instruments of a changing political ideology. Throughout the period of 1950 to the present economic problems of inflation and recession have influenced the development of housing policy. The Cold War, World War II, and the Viet Nam War provided a rationale for cutbacks in public housing allocations.

Housing legislation, since 1930, has enabled the Federal government to take an active and influential role in the financing, insuring, regulating and planning of public and private

housing. In this context, we have asked the questions: how did the political process, as reflected in housing legislation influence the development and subsequent revisions of the the "Master" Plan over a thirty year period? What was the effect of National and State legislation on public housing for the poor and the elderly? How did the availability of Federal funding influence the perceptions of city housing and planning administrators in regard to the issue of redevelopment versus renewal in the area under study? How did these perceptions influence the final designation of Site 30 after ten years of court litigation between the City and Strykers Bay on one side and Continue on the other side. Lastly, on the local level, how crucial was the inability of local interest groups to unite and take political action in opposing programs which were seen as inimical to community interests.

THE PARK WEST COMMUNITY AND ITS INTEREST GROUPS

The West Side of Manhattan sometimes known as Park West, is situated between 59th Street and 125th Street. Roughly, the eastern boundary is Central Park West at 59th Street and the western

boundary is Riverside Park. The southern boundary lies between Columbus Circle and Central Park running west to the Hudson River at 59th street. On the north is Morningside Heights which ends at 125th street. This area encompasses the subcommunities of Lincoln Square, the Upper West Side, Park West and Morningside Heights.

The West Side Urban Renewal Plan was a preliminary study made by the Urban Renewal Board of the City of New York in 1958. The study area, the Upper West Side, is part of the area later designated as Community Board # 7. The Upper West Side is a twenty block area bounded east and west by Central Park West and Amsterdam Avenues and north and south by 97th and 86th streets. This twenty block area while not a separate community is physically separated from the rest of Park West by wide crosstown thoroughfares at 86th and 96th streets.¹

INTEREST GROUPS

The main interest groups activated by plans for land site designation and use ranged from the "local" developers and contractors to volunteer organizations and professionals whose clientele

was made up, in part by the poor and the elderly. The membership and political participation of the aforementioned was both local and city wide.

The "local" developers appear to be interested in the "maximization of feasible profit". Their interests are tempered by their ingenuity in finding opportunities within the law, the alliances they can form on the local and city wide level and the degree of focused cooperation or hostility which is expressed, politically, in neighborhood public forums and aroused interest groups.

The neighborhood interest groups were made up of various volunteer organizations which from time to time express individual apathy, disinterest, hostility and ideology of aroused community members. These attitudes resulted in various degrees of cooperation with the City Administration, represented by the City Planning Commission (CPC) and the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development (HPD). The degree of the local community's political participation is, in part, based upon the various interest groups' perception of past promises by the City Planning

Commission in regard to West Side renewal. Local brownstone owners felt threatened because of the perceived threat to property values due to broken City promises, a "siege mentality", ethnic neighborhood imbalance, overcrowding and its concomitant, competition for services and transportation.

The City and its bureaucracy had a primary interest in completing the plan as expeditiously as possible. This would reward contributors to City political campaigns and increase City tax revenues. This is not to deny that the City Planning Commission(CPC) wasn't also motivated by humanitarian instincts and problems of social control.

Lastly, there are governmental, quasi-governmental, voluntary and professional organizations whose memberships and bases are not necessarily local. These include social workers, religious officials, planners and civil servants. They provide services and speak for a clientele made up, in part, of the elderly and the poor.

Central to this study is the confrontation between market forces presumably governed by "laws of supply and demand" and the demand for social justice by Public Housing advocates who wish to provide in the community for the poor and the elderly. The developers drive for profit and the "big chance"² and the brownstone owners understandable wish to protect their investments against the presumed threat to property values was irreconcilably opposed to the array of community groups who militantly advocated the interests of the poor, the elderly and the dislocated whose apartments would be razed as a result of the urban "renewal plan".

Although the area under study is not a community in sociological terms, that is natural and well defined boundaries, its designation as such by the City Planning Commission gave its inhabitants a legitimate claim to participate in the political arena which would determine the shaping of a community. However, decisions in the political arena are shaped by forces of money, influence and outside agendas which usually weigh heavily against arguments for social justice. The

ability of the decision makers to set the agendas in which the debate will occur limits and often vitiates the attempt of the poor and the elderly to achieve their goals. This process excludes groups with legitimate claims and results in political apathy and nonparticipation.

We will examine the role of planning as the functional use of resources for present and future use. However, planning is an integral part of the political process. Therefore, we are concerned with the role of planning in widening the process of community interest groups participation in determining the designation and use of sites for housing development in a democratic society. Our study attempts to describe the ensuing political conflict between the market forces and the Public housing advocates. It is our hypothesis that the resources of the contending parties are shaped in a particular historical-time frame, political-power or influence of the contending forces and social context -the values and beliefs which the society adheres to at a particular moment in time. This analysis must take into account the wider political interests, the means and process of

activation, the governmental level of entry into the political process by the participants and the cultural level of values and norms which circumscribe and sanction the solutions which result from the process.

Fundamental to our study are the following questions: 1.is it possible for the City to play a technical and mediating political role in the attempt to provide adequate housing for the poor and the elderly in a market economy; 2.is it possible to have rational planning-the functional use of resources for a stated goal; 3.is it possible to have rational planning in a democratic society where the contending forces have unequal resources and access to the decision makers;4.can planning succeed on the City and local level unencumbered by the changing priorities of elected officials on all levels of government who are subject to the pressures of electoral politics?

SOCIOLOGY AND URBAN PLANNING

Planning had its origins in the United States in the late 19th and early twentieth century. Most of the planners were graduates of Schools of Architecture and as such they were influenced by

architectural theory. Since planning was also identified with Civic Reforms, the theory produced by the universities and the reformers took two directions: (1) the function of the planner was physical planning in order to beautify and make the environment conducive to "good living" and the amenities of middle class sensibilities and (2) a reform movement stressing efficient government through a rational and independent planning process.³

Paralleling to a degree the theories of Robert Park and Louis Wirth, the physical planners believed that changing the environment was decisive in changing society. As a result the main function of planners was to pass zoning regulations designed to prohibit and control population influx into urban centers. Concomitantly they hoped to control density and urban sprawl through the regulation of land allocation and land use by setting up zones for different kinds of development. The advocates and clientele of the planner and the reform movement were downtown business and property interests and civic organizations. They were interested in

efficiency, the elimination of graft and corruption, the reduction of taxes and the wise use of capital investment to improve the quality of city life. As early as 1909, the First Conference on Population Congestion stated "that physical environment was a major determinant of social behavior and a direct contributor to individual behavior".⁴

Ideologically the Reform Movement's emphasis was on the negative aspects of slums and ghettos and by extension all large cities. Implicit was a nostalgia for a rural past and the threatening aspects of the urban poor.

The reformers envisioned politics and administration as an inseparable means of carrying out public policy in the public interest. The capture of political office would allow the independence of the planner from politics and private interests through the formation of independent authorities and commissions. By 1914 the task of the Planning Authority was seen as the responsibility for a Master Plan as an integral part of the decision making process.*

Theoretically, "planning" may be defined as an attempt to replace or supplement market mechanisms for allocating resources by decisions which are dictated by a rational process of drawing up explicitly plans and systematically carrying them out.⁵

Joseph Schumpeter, author of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, assumed three conditions necessary for planning. They are a central planning agency staffed by a technically competent, incorruptible staff, a manageable set of choices whose goals will be clearly defined and whose means will be rationally ascertained, and a planning agency with an effective means of enforcing its plans.⁶ This approach emphasizes the technical and rational process in resolving planning problems.

Mannheim, in Ideology and Utopia, saw the problem of democratic mass society as the enfranchisement of new interest groups and their incorporation into the planning process. Mannheim assumed that a form of social planning would have equal ranking with technical economic planning.⁷ Mannheim suggested that the social, encompassing

the ethical and the moral, are integral parts of the planning process.

Ideally, Joseph A. Schumpeter and Karl Mannheim suggest that planning has four requirements: (1) the independence of the planning institution from political influence must be insured in order to make rational decisions; (2) the planner must have access to all pertinent information; (3) the planner must be competent, depersonalized ideologically and capable of reducing alternatives to rationalized thinking; and (4) planners must have complete control over the process and the individuals, who execute the policy.

Alan Altschuler found that planners could not carry out their plans without aid from groups outside government. Planners were forced to make their proposals to potential constituencies. The goals and means were shaped by the assumption that planners had no way of enforcing their plans since they were appointed rather than elected

8
officials. Planners can fulfill the role of technicians, mediators or advocates depending on the historical context in which they operate.

The underlying themes of these theorists is that planning must be rational, based on complete information and the ability to make independent decisions in order to insure goals in the Public Interest. One of the premises of this study is that planning rationality is at best good intentions and at worst can be treated as ideology because it assumes that the values underlying the planning process are orthogonal that is, it is possible to resolve differences in values by discovering a common dimension that underlies all disparate values. This is to say that interest groups involved in the planning process may have conflicting interests which may be resolvable at a political level but not at a rational (linear single dimension) level of individual interests.⁹ Furthermore, rational planning implies a technically competent staff with complete access to all essential information, complete decision-making and executive powers and clearly demarcated areas of jurisdiction, which disallow competition from political, economic, civic and bureaucratic interests with conflicting interests and goals.

In the context of the planning process the general theoretical framework of two schools, the Pluralists and the Structuralists, are central to urban studies of interest groups, power and the political process of urban politics. For the sake of brevity I have telescoped the theories of Robert A. Dahl, Nelson W. Polsby, and Kaufmann and Sayre as representative of Pluralist theory and John A. Mollenkopf, Roger Friedland and Molotch as representative of Structuralist theory.

For Pluralists power and influence are based mainly on the political organization of voluntary associations, but also are a function of personality in so far as personality affects the political strategies of party and group leaders. Nelson Polsby suggests that the distribution of power is essentially dispersed since interest alliances are typically short-lived and new groups and coalitions are constantly being created and organized as old ones decline. The fluidity of the process permits the State to operate as broker or balancing agent among the competing groups. With the growth of mass parties, popularity has been
10
split off from wealth and social standing.

Sayre and Kaufman observe in reference to New York politics

New York's huge and diverse system of government and politics is a loose-knit and multi-centered network in which decisions are reached by ceaseless bargaining and fluctuating alliances among the major categories of participants in each [formal, governmental decision making] center and in which the centers are partially but strikingly
11
isolated from each other.

The pluralist model suggests the following corollaries: (1) power is widely dispersed; (2) groups are activated when their primary interests are threatened; (3) participants in the political process participate in narrow functional islands of decision making; (4) politicians act as mediators since they are the only interest groups capable of arranging compromises and trade-offs between conflicting interests. In this context public policy is the result of bargaining and compromise with veto power in the hands of other leaders or by those they lead. As a result each group usually receives something from the process. In the words of Kaufman and Sayres

..if there is any single feature of the system of government and politics...that may be called ubiquitous and invariant, it would seem to be the prevalence of mutual accommodation..... among the interested

12

participants.

The Pluralists argue, further that Floyd Hunter, in his use of the reputational model, and other Elitist theorists, have erred because "elites" are limited by historical forces that they cannot control, for example: technology, cultural values and false consciousness- the failure to recognize

13

their own interests.

The Structuralists, in turn, applaud Polsby's insistence that one must study empirically the actual decision making process, but argue that Pluralists do not go far enough. They charge that Dahl, in his New Haven study Who Governs failed to account for outside influences. The Structuralists maintain that decisions made by private groups and individuals and that boundaries between public and private are established by struggles between

14

groups.

Mollenkopf argues that politics and government are independent driving forces which can override economic functional necessities.

Few of the actors involved were aware of the systematic consequences of their actions and when they were; it was the political consequences they most often had in mind. They were searching for concrete solutions to pressing problems. They developed a pro-growth programmatic framework with a jumbled character because they had to accommodate and log roll among many different interests; none of whom, even the most powerful corporate chieftains could control the entire process or even assume that its interest would be fully

15

taken into account.

Although Mollenkopf conceptualizes the economic and the political as separate, he notes that the structural and cultural values tend to bias the political process in favor of business interests, if only because they are the source of governmental taxes and the private enterprise mentality.

However, central to the argument of the Structuralists is Roger Friedland's theory that the source of political influence are participation, structure and system. Participation expresses the preference and the electoral powers of those who wish to decide public issues. Governmental structures condition the

accessibility of participants to the points of greatest public authority; and system denoted those social relationships which generate the participants, the problems and interests which motivate their perceptions and the solutions they are likely to choose.¹⁶

Implicit in this approach are the problems of activation and participation; the level at which interest groups can intervene; and the ability to formulate the agendas and the solutions which are culturally acceptable. Lastly, the Structuralists ask what are the outcomes? What were the benefits or losses over the long run, for the social groups involved in the process?

The organizing proposition in this study is that City plans for development are the public announcement of informal understandings, deals, compromises and accommodations with groups, individuals or entities whose interests may be threatened or abetted . In this vein Lowi states

...urban controversies would be marked by participation limited to the leaders of organized, by the absence of the involvement of the mass of the citizenry, and by the use of covert

17

processes of communication.

The public announcement of policy activates both the participants in the informal process and new interest groups and advocates who wish to press their claims through the political process. In the ensuing conflict, coalitions rise and fall, positions have to be reassessed in terms of the breakdown of informal arrangements, old and new misunderstandings and new conditions. At the conclusion of the maneuvering, media and "politicking" on a formal and informal level, the final plan may be unrecognizable in terms of the original arrangements.

The theorists I have cited agree that those interests groups who have superior resources, organization, leadership and money will usually be successful in achieving their goals. Although I do not quarrel with the methodology advocated by the Pluralists and their contention that all parties

usually get something from the political process of compromise and mediation, I feel their observation is only partially true and does not go far enough. Methodologically, this study follows Polsby's broad outline of research in the field: (1) issue areas are the focus; (2) the issues chosen must be important to the life of the community; (3) the actual behavior must be studied, either at first hand or from documents, informants, newspapers and other appropriate sources; and (4) ...researchers should study the outcomes of actual decisions within the

18
community.

URBAN PLANNING ON MANHATTAN'S WESTSIDE

This study will attempt⁵ to show that although planning is a necessary and integral part of the democratic political process, the final results were unrecognizable in terms of the original plan. The rush of events made planning difficult except in terms of trends. Electoral politics on the City, State and Federal level created an instability which made forecasting and planning difficult due to the changing agendas and priorities of elected administrations. Furthermore

international events, such as the Korean War, the Viet Nam War and economic "regressions" afforded the organized national Real Estate lobby interests the opportunity to cut back and delay urban housing legislation. Immigration and emigration subject to international crisis and national economic conditions made long range planning unreliable. Locally, the City's financial crisis, the collapse of the Democratic Party Clubs' dominance fostered by its links to the City Administration created a vacuum. The effective Community Boards, by default, achieved recognition as the spokesman for the community. They ,also, gained the status of a quasi-governmental agency of the City. Although the Administration foresaw a purely advisory role for the Community Boards, the Urban land Utilization Redevelopment Plan procedure provided a stage where exceptionally able and highly motivated members of Community Boards could become recognized voices of their communities and an influence on City urban housing policy. Lastly, the City Planning Commission didn't foresee the rise of a "mass" movement under the leadership of the charismatic Father Brown who

wrested control of the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Coalition and became the recognized legitimate spokesman of the public housing advocates.

In this context the mere announcement of the intention to plan activated foreseen and unforeseen interest groups on all levels of the political, economic and social arenas. The ensuing conflicts over the scope, direction and content of the plan were resolved through formal, informal and internal bureaucratic procedures. Compromises and consensus were dependent on the degree of influence and resources available to the contending forces, on public activism and passivity, on interest group alignments in the historically specific context of international, national, state, City and local politics.

Struggles for power and influence over the decision making process were, and are activated, between various constituencies and clients. Each group was affected by policies on urban development and housing which were decided on levels removed from local politics. Temporary alliances were made and broken among politically sophisticated interest groups. The elderly were

usually excluded from the process because of political passivity, the non-spatial community pattern of elderly housing and an inability to implement a cohesive policy due to conflicting definitions of their own and the "Public Interest". We will see, for example, that when the elderly are members of an ethnic or other status group, they may act in ways that reduce their influence as citizens.

Within this broader area of the elderly, the elderly poor and the ethnic elderly the study is concerned with the subsidiary issues of power and influence in the areas of planning and political participation which are crucial in the controversies between the Pluralists and Structuralists.

Community participation in the decision making process is crucial to a democratic society. Historically, gains for the underprivileged have

19
been cyclical. The Upper West Side was composed of a diversity of peoples in terms of class, culture and ethnic composition. A multitude of issues divided the community. The proposed solutions threatened the perceived interests, real

or imagined, which ranged from brownstone owners, storekeepers, renters and the poor. The ensuing conflict and unforeseen economic conditions of the market place contributed to a delay in the completion of the Plan which was scheduled to be completed over an eight year period. In actuality, due to ideology and myriad other causes, highlighted by a court action which lasted eight years, the West Side Plan will be completed thirty years after it was first announced.

The rationale for the chapters on the history and demography, the political process, housing legislation, site 30, the court case, local interest groups, external forces and conclusions will allow us to critically examine the theoretical issues raised by the Pluralists and the Structuralists. We will use empirical data based on interviews, original and secondary sources, newspapers and periodicals. The aforementioned chapters will describe the critical role of power and influence on the planning process in a democratic society. Hopefully, this study will provide a basis for further exploration of the factors, external and internal, foreseen

and unforeseen which focused attention on social injustice.

The original plan recognized that ninety-five per cent of the buildings in the area were certifiable as subject to demolition. The City originally proposed to build 400 low-income, 2,400 middle-income and 5,000 "luxury" apartments. The Plan envisioned that 4,300 families and 1,500 single persons would have to be relocated to make way for new construction. Successively, due to political pressure and the market place the amended plan called for an increase to 2,500 low-income, 4900 for middle-income and a and a decrease in luxury units to 2,000 apartments. The Plan recognized the special problems of the elderly in Manhattan and particularly in the Upper West Side. However the total number of designated units for the elderly at this time is 186 units. Although none of the contending forces achieved their stated or unstated agendas, the elderly and the poor, whose needs were the most urgent, lost the most.

Chapter 1 is a chronology of the physical and social historical changes which affected the Upper West Side. This chronicle describes the flux of external and internal forces--political, social, economic and demographic--which have played a major role in the City's ability to meet its housing needs, especially for its poor and elderly. The chapter describe the social exchange and demography which characterized the area. It traces the effect of planning and political representation in neighborhood creation and land use patterns in the Upper West Side. The period, from 1945 to 1965, depicts the changing effects of immigration and emigration on the needs of the new inhabitants. Changes in racial and ethnic composition of the Upper West Side created housing needs which were recognized but inadequately resolved. It also contributed to the rising emigration of middle class residents to the suburbs. The period, from 1965 to the present is characterized by gentrification as a result of the development and renewal of new construction and the conversion of old buildings into cooperatives coops and condominiums.

Chapter 2 delineates the role of external forces and the dominant character of the Federal government. Within this setting we have divided the time frame from 1940 to the present into three periods ranging from large scale development projects under the Federal government to a diminished emphasis on public housing and a heightened interest in commercial development and luxury housing on the Upper West Side.

Chapter 3 demonstrates the ability of Continue, a sophisticated interest group with superior resources, to achieve its goals through the employment of the legal process to delay and frustrate the political process. Ultimately, Continue, an organization of the brownstone owners, won a victory in the political arena which they were unable to achieve in the courts.

Chapter 4 describes the politics of community interest groups. Precisely the community residents inability to cooperate and compromise provided an opportunity for the City to dictate a solution which fell far short of the premises and promises of the original plan.

Chapter 5 describes the struggle over Site 30 as the lightning rod which underlined the basic struggle between the proponents of Public Housing versus the proponents of "integrated" housing and gentrification. The designation of site 30 and final resolution of the Site 30 issue was prophetic in terms of the future development of the Upper West Side.

Chapter 6 conceptualizes planning as an intrinsic part of the political process. This mechanism reflects, in part, the ideology of the changing national, state and municipal administrative leadership and policy emphasis. These shifts are subject to economic conditions, the electoral politics of conflicting interest groups and the degree of involvement, conflict and the ensuing disunity and organizational resources and leadership of local community groups.

Chapter 7 evaluates the data of the study in the light of the theoreticians cited and the propositions which we have propounded as motivating forces for our study.

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CHAPTER 1POPULATION AND HOUSING OF THE UPPER WEST SIDE

The physical and human face of the City and the Upper West Side has vastly changed in the last one hundred and fifty years, so that it would no longer be recognizable to earlier generations of inhabitants. Due to waves of immigrants and emigrants the needs of the City's population, with respect to housing have been in a state of constant change. External forces, political, social and economic, have played a major role in the City's ability to meet its housing needs, especially of its poor and elderly. In these contexts, planning, i.e. rational decision making over the use of present and future resources has been attempted; but plans are subject to modification, neglect and alteration as available resources, opportunities, social costs and resistances undergo changes. The reaction to unpredictable and unmanageable events is compounded in a society wherein market forces and short term profit motives have played important roles in the decision-making process of the

35

entrepreneurs who provide housing as well as in the social, ideological and political contexts within which planning takes place.

The study area is the West Side Urban Renewal district, a twenty block area under census tracts #173, 177 and 183. We will portray the population make-up of the area under study in terms of age, ethnic, race, sex and income from 1950 to 1980. In this and subsequent sections we will attempt to picture the effect of a continuous flow of immigration and emigration on the housing needs of the City's changing ethnic minorities and, in particular, on the aged and the poor of the Upper West Side. What, if any, was the response of the political, economic and social institutions to the changing citizenry of New York City and the Upper West Side? How did the "planning" revisions affect the housing supply and change the population mix of the area under study?

COMPLETION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

There are at present six remaining sites which are in the final stages of construction originally initiated under the 1962 Upper West Side Renewal Plan. Two of these, Site 41 situated

36

on Columbus Avenue between 88th and 89TH Street, has been completed as a one hundred and eight unit luxury apartment condominium; and Site 9, located on Columbus avenue between 95th and 96th street is in the final stages of construction as a one hundred and sixty-two units of market rate housing with a twenty percent component of low-income units. The other four sites are in various stages of construction.

Site 30 located between 90th and 91st street on Columbus Avenue, played a crucial role in the struggle to determine the pattern of site designation and the allocation of apartments to meet the needs of the poor and the elderly. In retrospect that struggle delayed the completion of the plan for 25 years. A court case instituted by Trinity Church and Continue which necessitated a Supreme Court decision in 1980 divided the community irreparably between the public housing advocates and the brownstone owners and the developers. All Community Board # 7 discussions and decisions were defined in relation to one's stand on site 30. The City, as a friend of the court, supported the Strykers Bay Neighborhood

37

Council advocacy of public housing. However, its real thrust, borne out by future events was to defend its future housing policy decisions from court interference. The long delay, the rift in the community, the Reagan Administration, the cutback of Federal funds and inflation permitted the City to realize its goals of added revenues through the private development of market rate housing. As of this writing, the focus of future development on the Upper West Side has shifted to Broadway, and in the foreseeable future, to Amsterdam Avenue.

THE NEW LOOK ON THE UPPER WEST SIDE

Expensive, chic restaurants, stores, boutiques and side walk cafes have inched their way along Columbus Avenue up to 96th street and onto the Amsterdam Avenue area up to 86th Street. Many of the older buildings in this area are in the process of being converted into condominiums and cooperatives. As a result of upgrading and the changing character and class of the residents rents and condominium and cooperative prices have been skyrocketing. Brown-stones are being or have been rehabilitated and remodeled because they are

thought of as desirable places to live and raise a family. In addition brownstone owners have seen their properties rising in value over the past decade and a half because of the new demand for housing and the resultant scarcity of apartments. The Upper West Side has, once again, become a fashionable place to reside, both for its amenities and its slightly off-beat atmosphere which attracts young families and singles.

A Historical Overview

We will first attempt to describe the changing historical background of the structures and processes which influenced the physical and social composition of the City and the Upper West Side. This will, we hope, throw light on the City's "Master Plan" and its avowed goals, philosophy, achievements and failures. Our description of events in the political, economic and social arenas will depict the background from which planning began and the goals to which it aspired. The publication of the Plan for the West Side activated old and new interest groups. Informal understandings agreed to or understood in the informal process or planning stage were

subject to political considerations due to aroused local community groups. The ensuing conflict and the desire to begin the development of the Upper West Side were the base line for the revision of old understandings, compromises and trade-offs which constitute the continuous process of planning. The subsequent accommodations, we argue, may cause policy changes, revised goals and decisions which render the original objectives and plans unrecognizable and their fulfillment impossible.

The West Side Urban renewal Project Area is under the jurisdiction of Community Board # 7. The area encompassed by this Board lies between Central Park West on the east and the Hudson River on the west. It is bounded north and south by Cathedral Parkway and 110th Street and 59th Street. It encompasses the "West Side", Lincoln Square and the "Upper West Side".

The term "area" refers to a socially viable unit, neighborhood or portion thereof...consider area between west 59th and 110th a viable neighborhood...further subdivision is Central Park West and 87th and Broadway and 97th."

The Upper West Side developed rapidly in the second half of the 19th century. This development was spurred by the opening of Central Park, the extension of Amsterdam Avenue and Bloomingdale Road, the latter renamed Broadway in 1898. Amenities and services, such as, the paving of streets, the use of electricity in place of gas lighting and the development, in 1880, of the elevated railroad on Columbus Avenue enhanced the residential attractiveness of the West Side. The new transportation facilities resulted in a boom in the building of mansions and brownstones on Central Park West and the side streets leading into it. Tenements were, in addition, built on Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues. In 1880 an average lot twenty-five by one hundred feet near 72nd and Broadway sold for \$15,000. The Lincoln Square area, located between 59th and 72nd street, developed quickly with low-income housing following the completion of the Elevated Subway in 1880. By 1900 most of the area west of Broadway had become a slum. By contrast, the opening of Riverside Drive from 72nd to 96th Street contributed to the development of the area from

West End Avenue to the Hudson River into the most fashionable residential area for apartment dwellers in New York City.

Between 1880 and the turn of the century mass construction of single family brownstones took place on the East-West side streets between 87th and 97th street. Thus, the Dakota, built in 1883, was the first luxury apartment house built in New York City. Between 1885 and 1900 the pattern of development was three story brownstones on the east-west streets and six, eight and ten story apartment houses on the Avenues.

By 1880, the once largely rural Upper West Side became an urban area of one hundred thousand people, made up of row-houses, tenements and luxury apartments. Between 1910 and 1930, 12,000 row-houses were razed and replaced by large apartment houses. The population, by 1929, rose to 230,000.

In 1878, cable cars on Columbus avenue were replaced by a steam powered elevated system. The Ninth Avenue subway was extended northward to 145th Street. Riverside Drive was opened in 1900 and the Broadway IRT subway was completed in 1904.

Immediately, thereafter, land prices soared. In the pressure caused by the resultant demand, little attention was given to such environmental factors as light or air and the development of recreational space. In addition, the ensuing traffic and transportation problems would later cause grave problems resulting from the increased population density. The opening of the Eighth Avenue subway and the removal of the 9th avenue "El" tracks in 1941, however , had little or no effect on further development. The lack of interest on the part of developers and prospective tenants was largely attributable to the Great Depression and to restrictions due to the war effort in the decade of the forties.

Earlier, between 1910 and 1930, thirty-three apartment towers of sixteen or more stories of high quality housing were built on the Upper West Side. During this twenty year period, eleven thousand apartment buildings had been erected in Manhattan. By 1930 new construction in the area and the city was at a standstill. There were one thousand one hundred and thirteen parcels of real estate on the Upper West Side, of which three were

43

vacant lots. Over 1000 were residential. Of these 60% were brownstones, three percent were elevator fronted, and 37% were walk-up apartment houses. Ninety per cent of the structures were built before 1901; five percent, in addition were added in the immediate post W.W.11 period. The Upper West Side was thus a residential area consisting primarily of brownstones and tenements built before 1901. The occasional architectural relief was an elevated tower building on one of the avenues.

POPULATION TRENDS IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE UPPER WEST SIDE.

Greater New York was created in 1898, after a referendum which ratified the incorporation of Brooklyn into New York. As a result the City had a population of 3,500,000 in 1898. The City's populace doubled in the next thirty years. After 1970, the city's population declined ending 20 years of relative stability. Manhattan, which was and is the core of the city, had a population of nearly 2,000,000 in 1900. The citizenry peaked at 2,300,000 by 1910 and then began 70 years of slow decline.

Between 1925 and 1956 the population of the area later designated as Community Board # 7 increased from 24,950 to 38,950, an increase of fifty percent in a thirty years in the area, which was later designated as Community Board # 7.

CLASS, ETHNICITY AND HOUSING ON THE UPPER WEST SIDE

Until 1930 the UPPER West Side had a polyglot ethnic and racial origin. One-third were foreign born, mainly, Irish, German and Polish. It also contained an influx of Central and Eastern Europeans who were mostly Jewish. Between 1900 and 1930 waves of Jewish immigrants formed neighborhoods in luxury and middle-income apartment houses on West End and Riverside Drive. But after World War 11 the ethnic and racial composition of the West Side began to change due to the influx of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and still later of Haitians, Dominicans and Cubans.

After World War 11 the area between 86th and 97th bounded by Broadway on the west and Central Park West deteriorated into an overcrowded slum due, in part, to the density of populations. It was further destabilized by new waves of

45

unassimilated immigrants who settled there. Street crime, drug addiction, dilapidated housing and traffic congestion were part of its immediate social and economic milieu.

The census figures for 1960 contain the following relevant statistics. In a population of 254,000 in District # 7, almost three-fourths, (72%) were White, thirteen percent Blacks, and fifteen percent were Puerto Ricans. Half the residents of the West Side were foreign born or of foreign parentage. One-third of the families had incomes of less than \$4,000, relatively high as compared with the city average of \$2,500 dollars. The welfare load was below the city average, perhaps because there were more older residents and fewer children than in the city as a whole. A large number of unmarried, low-income dwellers lived in single room occupancy hotels; especially elderly single, widowed and couples living in West Side Single Room Occupancy hotels or in one room apartments

By 1945, most of the older brownstone structures had been converted into rooming houses. The Jewish population still resided primarily on

Columbus Avenue and the Irish on Amsterdam Avenue. During the next five years the Irish began to move out and Puerto Ricans and Negroes moved in. The area from 87th to 97th was rumored to have been designated as an "X" area by the police and social service departments of the city. An "X" area was a dumping ground for anti-social elements where a hands-off policy was maintained by the police and social workers as long as the denizens did not kill each other.²

After 1945 islands of stability remained in the large, rent controlled elevator apartment buildings built in the 1920's and which housed middle and upper middle class whites on the avenues of the area. Dwellers, in fashionable apartments on Central Park West and the Riverside Drive area, however, began to feel the pressure of a housing invasion on the area's northern boundaries. In addition, the formerly elegant townhouses, on the east-west streets were being sold and subdivided into one room and small apartments which housed Blacks and Latinos who paid high rents and received little or no services.

47

The development of a Title 1 project, in 1958, to be known as Manhattantown, and designating an area between 97th and 100th Streets and from Central Park West to Amsterdam avenue, increased these pressure upon housing in the Upper West Side as four thousand dwelling units were torn down and many former residents moved south of the site, proliferating crowded conditions in the area under study. The Columbus Circle and Lincoln Square redevelopment caused extensive relocation of, primarily, Puerto Ricans. The crowding was not ameliorated by the new replacements which were primarily non-residential and luxury housing.

Subdivision of living space, between 1934 and 1956, caused an increase in dwelling units of eighty percent, from 7,638 to 13,928 on the Upper West Side. In addition, there was a substantial shift in the distribution of types of ownership of plots between 1945 and 1956. Realty Corporation ownership rose from 25% to 30% of the total, while ownership by two or more individuals increased from 11 to 18 per cent. Overall individual ownership declined slightly. There was, thus, a movement away from owner-occupancy. Between 1945

48

and 1956 brownstones owned and occupied by owners declined from 30 to 28 per cent.

The population of the West Side, in 1950, was principally of German, Irish, Russian (mostly Jews) and Polish ancestry. There were 248 Blacks and 162 "others", out of 38,443, in the area under study. By 1970, there were 9,923 Blacks in a population of 22,216. The remaining inhabitants of the area were of Puerto Ricans, Russian Jewish, German, Irish and Polish descent. Whereas, in 1950, there were almost twice as many native born, as foreign born, the ratio had equalized by 1970.

Table # 1 indicates that New York City's population peaked in 1950 and remained relatively stable during the next thirty years. At the same time the population of the elderly, sixty-five and older, rose from 96,000 to 952,000 between 1900 and 1980. This was a spectacular rise from 2.8% to 13.5 percent of the total population of the city by 1980.

Table # 1:Total and Aged Population New York
City.³

YEAR	TOTAL	NUMBER	% 65 & OLDER
		65 & OLD.	

	(in 000's)	(in 000's)	OF TOTAL
1900	3,437	96	2.8
1910	4,767	135	2.8
1920	5,620	176	3.1
1930	6,930	265	3.8
1940	7,455	414	5.6
1950	7,892	605	7.7
1960	7,782	814	10.5
1970	7,895	948	12.0
1980	7,702	952	13.5

Source: U.S. Census of Population

THE ELDERLY

Emanuel Tobier suggests that by 1990 there will be 1,000,000 people, 65 and over, as compared to 100,000 at the turn of the century in New York City. Nationally, by 1980 the elderly were 11.3% of the nation's overall population, well below the city's figure of 13.5%. The City's elderly population will be one in seven in 1990; but the

composition of the aging subgroups will change.

" Increasing proportions of the New York's older residents are minority members, women living alone, and the older old the latter phenomenon representing the second phase of societies ongoing gerontological revolution, the aging of the aged. These are precisely the groups that are economically most vulnerable, socially most isolated, and as a practical matter, most dependent upon publicly funded community-based support systems".⁴

Table number two indicates that the City's over 65 increased by a 57% of the life-span. Three out of ten survived to 70 in 1885; while seven out of ten survived to 70 in 1985. The National Center for Health Statistics study notes that 57 out of 100 between 65 and 74 needed or received help in home management because of chronic health problems. In contrast 142/1000 in the 75 to 84 subgroup and 399/1000 in the 85 plus group needed or received home management care. In New York City one percent of New Yorkers 65 to 74 lived in residential health care facilities in 1980; five percent in the 75 to 84 group; and 19 percent in the eighty-five and over group.⁵ (Tobier)

TABLE # 2: AGED POPULATION BY SUBGROUP, NEW YORK
⁶

<u>CITY 1900-1980 (in 000's)</u>				
<u>YEAR</u>	<u>65+</u>	<u>65-74</u>	<u>75-84</u>	<u>85+</u>
1900	96	72	21	3
1910	135	102	29	4
1920	176	131	39	6
1930	265	205	52	7
1940	414	311	92	11
1950	605	445	139	21
1960	814	584	197	32
1970	948	626	265	57
1980	952	571	304	77

Source: Tobier: U. S. Census of Population

There was a significant increase in the number of women in proportion to men in all the elderly age brackets in 1980. In the age bracket of 65 to 74 the ratio of women to men was 148 women for every 100 men and 212 women for every 100 men in the eighty-five plus category. In 1950, 50% of the elderly were women and in 1980 62% percent were women . In 1900 the ratio heavily favored men due to higher female birth mortality rates and a greater proportion of male immigrants.

The population of the elderly increased dramatically in New York City between 1900 and 1980. Although, by 1980, the elderly were 11.3% of the nation's population, they were 13.5% of the city's census figures. Tiod, the population increased from twenty-five thousand to thirty-nine thousand of whom one-third were Puerto Ricans, five percent Negroes and three percent other non-whites. his figure, is an appreciable increase over the figure of 7.7 percent for New York City in 1950. During the same period the city's citizenry declined sharply. Significantly, senior citizens between 65 and 74 have been a decreasing proportion of the municipalities aged members. The elderly between 75 and 85 have increased slightly, while those 85 and older had increased approximately three and one half times to 77,000 by 1950. The City of New York Department of City Planning projected that, between 1980 and 1990, the total number of elderly sixty-five and over will remain approximately the same. However, those 85 and over will increase to 110,000 by 1990.

Table # 3: New York City Aged Population, By Age1980 POPULATION AND 1990PROJECTIONS (000'S)

<u>AGES</u>	<u>1980 POPULATION</u>	<u>1990 PROJECTIONS</u>	
		<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>
TOTAL	952	900	960
65-74	571	485	525
75-84	304	305	325
85+	77	110	110

*These projections based on the assumption that migration levels will be approximately the same as during the 1970-1980 decade, (low) or two-thirds that level (high).

U.S. Census of Population

Race and ETHNICITY

Non-minority whites were 93% of the elderly in 1960. It is projected that, in 1990, non-minority whites will decrease to 78%. The non-white elderly increased 74 percent from 1970 to 1980. Blacks made up three-quarters of this segment, Asians rose from 10,000 to 24,000 and Hispanics, who made up 20 percent of the city's population, account for only seven percent of the elderly, 65 and older. In part the tendency of older Hispanics is to return to the land of their birth. In contrast 20% of the Jewish population was 65 or over. 12 percent of the non-Jewish population was 65 or older.

The problems of the elderly population was exacerbated by the rapid changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the neighborhoods in which they were concentrated. The "aggravation" was increased by their inability to move to more desirable neighborhoods. Their estrangement and fear was heightened, on the one hand, by the changing ethnic, racial and age make-up of their neighborhoods and on the other by the growing dominance of the affluent and their consequent

influence on rents and the cost of living. The elderly felt insecure about their personal safety, social isolation and physical inability to use the support services which were available to them.

CITY WIDE RESIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS

In terms of living arrangements, under five percent of the 952,000 elderly lived in group quarters-mainly nursing homes. In 1970 three point five percent of the 948,000 senior citizens lived in such quarters. Three-fifths of the elderly lived in family households (most of these were married couples). 80 per cent of the total lived with children or relatives. Only one percent were lodged with non-related families and one third lived in non-family households. Nine out of ten of the latter group live alone and 75 percent of them are women-an increase of 22 percent between 1970 and 1980.

In 1980, 27 percent of all New York City households were headed by elderly persons who owned their own homes while 73 percent of the elderly lived in rented apartments. In the United States 70 of the aged occupied subsidized rental

56
units and two thirds of the aforementioned lived
in private rental housing protected by the
municipal rent regulation through a system of tax-
abatements and subsidies.

Economic Situation

Many of the elderly and certainly the elderly
poor depend upon public and private pensions.
Social services covered medicaid, medicare, food
stamps and subsidized housing. In 1980 18% of men
over 65 worked; whereas 48% percent labored in
1947. During the 1970's benefits for the elderly
increased three percent. Inflation during the
1970's was not a major factor in the economics of
the elderly. Their situation was largely

8
determined by the political process.

THE ELDERLY POPULATION

The municipality's elderly population has
grown since 1900 in both absolute numbers and as a
proportion of the City's overall population. As of
1980 "over" 65's made up 13.6 percent of the
City's recorded population, an increase from 7.7%

9
in 1950.

There was a 7.2 percent drop in population from 1,539,233 to 1,428,285 in the Borough of Manhattan, between 1970 and 1980. The number over 65 fell 4.9 percent from 214,973 to 204,437. The District # 7 area showed a drop from 212,400 to 206,600 of which 14.7% were 65 or over. The population of the three tracts which comprise the 20 block area of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan was 28,000, of which approximately 23% were elderly, far above the average for the City and the nation as a whole.

SOURCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

The proportion of the City's 65 and over increased 57% between 1950 and 1980. These figures were due, in large part, to the lengthening of the life span through improved medical care, life-style changes (diets, less smoking and more exercise).

10

The social composition of the elderly population has undergone radical change since the end of World War Two. In the first quarter of the twentieth century a disproportionate number of them came as immigrants. They were overwhelmingly white and southern or eastern European in origin.

Many of the early immigrants died or left New York and were not replaced by contingents of white newcomers due to the stringent immigration laws of

¹¹
the 1920's.>

The migration of Blacks and Puerto Ricans to the city became significant during and after World War II. These groups did not significantly expand the City's older population but are projected to do so in the 1990's. There was a net out-migration of elderly, city wide, between 1950 and 1980. The net out-migration rose from 36,000 to 127,000 in the last ten years. Many moved to the suburbs, but a greater proportion moved to

¹²
Florida.

The city wide out-migration of the elderly was influenced, in part by the end of their work career, the need for a warmer climate, the perceived and real menace of a hostile and dangerous environment(siege mentality). An additional impetus for leaving the city was the felt need for a homogeneous community tailored to the needs of the elderly, the availability of inexpensive housing and the lower cost of living in other areas . Since the late 1970's,

inexpensive housing was no longer available. In addition, most New Yorkers were and are renters, living in rent controlled or rent stabilized apartments and many of the elderly own modest homes in Queens, Brooklyn, Staten Island and the Bronx. However, most of the tenant group do not have the capital, acquired as a result of selling their apartments or homes. Therefore, it is unlikely that many New Yorkers will migrate to

13

other areas. Between 1950 and 1980 there has been a significant increase of elderly in the area under study, from 3,699 to 6,288, an increase in proportion to the population of 22% from the 1950 figure of 20%.

The elderly between 65 and 74 years of age increased by seven percent between 1960 and 1970 and then fell by seven percent in the 1970's. The 75 to 84 year old group rose by 54% from 1960 to 1980 and the comparable growth of the 85+ category was 14%. Thus the share of the City's population that was 75 and over advanced from 28 to 40% during the 28 year period. The growing longevity, is related to the sharp decline in the out-migration of the very old. " The trend to an older

population can be expected to continue and is bound to have a major consequence in New York City in terms of the nature and level of demands for health, housing and transportation".¹⁴

CITY WIDE AND COMMUNITY BOARD #7 ECONOMIC
SITUATION OF THE ELDERLY AND THE POOR.

. The 1980 census notes that Hispanic families had the lowest median incomes (\$10,415) in the City. The 1979 median of \$12,375 for Black families was also lower than the median for all families (\$16,818). In the area composing Community Board # 7, 34.9% made \$14,000 or less a year; 8.9% made under \$5,000; while 66% made \$15,000 or more. 18.6% of this number had yearly incomes of \$50,000 or over. In 1980 the poverty rate among the City's minority elderly households was two to two and one-half times that of white elderly households. Tobier predicts that the number of older New Yorkers, in the eighty's, adjusted for race and gender, would increase to 1,100,000, if there were no net migration on the part of this age group. National data suggests a stabilization of out-migration as the price of housing in the areas to which might be attractive to the elderly, have

61
been increasing rapidly. Coincidentally, gains were made in the standard of living of the elderly due to the growth in Social Security payments and in-kind benefit programs which encouraged many older

15
citizens to remain in urban centers.

Tobier states that the over seventy-five in New York City will increase by 75,000 from the 1980 level, and by 1990 they will represent 45% of the elderly population. The fastest growing groups, in relative terms, will be the over 85's, accounting for ten percent of the City's older population. The gender ratio will continue to tilt towards women. Racially and ethnically Tobier forecasts an expansion of the minority old. The white non-minority aged will decrease from 78% in 1980 to 66% in 1990. It, also, becomes apparent that the term low-income groups will become virtually synonymous with the elderly, as the Blacks and Hispanic cohorts approach 65. It will be increasingly necessary to distinguish between the elderly poor and the elderly who are able to live in comfortable circumstances.

There has been a dramatic downward shift in the number of elderly living in the Upper West Side and particularly in the three tracts under study. From 1960 to 1970 and, as construction gained renewed momentum in 1980, there was a sparsity of housing for the elderly poor. This was, in large measure, caused by the scarcity of apartments and soaring rents . In addition the eviction of tenants from buildings that were renovated or razed for new construction created a further scarcity of apartments for the elderly poor.

The senior citizens who moved into the district, after 1960, could afford luxury condos or high rents. Other newcomers and long time residents were protected by City and State subsidized tenant and tenant co-operative housing based on a maximum family income for admission called Mitchell-Lama housing, rent-control or rent-stabilization. Since new construction and renovated buildings were primarily luxury or cooperatives and condominiums, the communities' elderly poor will live out their days under the

63

questionable protection of the City's tenuous rent and eviction regulations.

Coincidentally the 1979 revisions of the Master Plan had changed the constituency of the area. Market-rate housing has attracted singles, young married couples, corporate executives and investors to the "in" Upper West Side. An unplanned atmosphere was created in which a declining elderly population became isolated, bewildered and insecure, as a result of the gentrification which featured cooperatives, condominiums and remodeled brownstones which made Columbus Avenue the new fashionable shopping area. The sidewalks obstructed by outdoor restaurants made walking on the street difficult. The real danger of mugging and robbery, on the side streets, discouraged the use of neighborhood facilities. The array of boutiques, service stores and large grocery chain stores, which catered to the new arrivals and replaced the "mom and pop" stores, made shopping a complex and

16

frightening experience. Finally the concentration of developer interest in the construction of luxury and middle-income

64

condominiums and cooperatives have relegated the poor and the elderly poor to the remaining Single Room Occupancy Hotels(S.R.O.) and rent controlled apartments too big for their needs. The economic revival of New York City, the disinterest and discontinuance of federal funds for public housing and the lure of increased tax revenue, due to the demand for market-rate housing and renewed developer interest, made it politically unfeasible to carry out the original intentions of the Master Plan. Instead the pattern which is discernible in the development of the remaining eleven sites, is one of unsubsidized and tax-abated luxury and middle-income housing. The latter will have a 20% component of low-income apartments with a \$21,000 income cutoff for subsidized apartments. This revised upper limit, from the former figure of \$11,000, will encourage the developer to rent at the break-off point at the expense of the poor since, presumably he bears the burden of the difference between the subsidy and the market price of the apartment.

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT

Indications of real estate activity and opportunities for rapid capital appreciation, due to the steady demand for apartments on the part of new immigrants was demonstrated by the upward volume of real estate transactions in the period between 1938 to 1955. There were only 50 ownership transfers of housing properties per year from 1938 to 1943. There was a steady rise to 149 transfers in 1946. But the number of transfers decreased to 95 after 1946 and spurted again to 127 after 1951. The spurt in transfer activity reflected, in part, the opportunity for speculative Realtors to make quick profits with minimal investments in service and maintenance due to the successive waves of

Blacks, Puerto Ricans and other Latino groups.

Rabkin suggests that the speculative subdivision of brownstones rather than renovation was accelerated by the difficulties in financing the new property purchases. Banks and lending institutions exhibited extreme caution in financing building transfers. Building purchasers were forced to turn to individual sources of funds and to seek second mortgages. The lack of funds hastened the physical deterioration of property,

66

since substantial premiums demanded by the banks discouraged improvements and caused further subdivision. In addition, there was a minimal flow of public or private institutional money for urban

18

renewal.

Since living space had remained constant since the mid-1930's, the increased demand encouraged subdivision. The subdivision of existing brownstone apartments, caused a 27% decline in the amount of mortgage money supporting the area. The owners' interest was in short term rather than long term gains and resulted in short term financing rather than long term mortgages. Short term gains limited and discouraged rehabilitation, in part, due to the high cost of renovating deteriorated housing and the whetted appetite of the housing speculators. Investors were unwilling to make long term investments, while short term profits were available.

In 1955-1956 the assessed value of real estate in the twenty block area, designated as the Upper West Side, was 725,000,000 dollars (an increase of 80% since 1926). In 1931 the value of real estate in this area had hit a record high of

100,000,000 dollars; but declined to \$28,000,000⁶⁷ in the 1931-'36 years. Real estate tax revenue in 1926 was \$1,700,000. It rose to 2,500,000 dollars in 1931, dropping again to 1,975,000 dollars in the next five years and rising slightly to 2,000,000 dollars in 1946.

CITY TAX REVENUE

Our twenty block renewal area contributes 1% of all tax revenue from Manhattan property. The decline, of the tax revenue, produced between 1931 and 1945, began at the same time as a rapid increase in population and the deterioration of the area, even as city services for the area increased in a greater proportion than did its population. This occurred despite an increase in the average income per capita, area wide, perhaps due to the large number of children, the different cultural origin of the immigrant population and the difficulties of " Americanization" which

caused increased welfare outlays.¹⁹ At the same time, tax abatements and low interest rates caused the tax burden on landed property to fall unevenly. The brown-stones, which occupied one-half the space, paid one-quarter of the taxes,

while one-half of the tax burden fell upon the relatively few elevated buildings which occupied one-quarter of the land area.

Planning on the Upper West Side

The planning of any area, including the City and the Upper West Side must inevitably take account of the overall structure of the real estate market of the city and the variety of factors that operate on it. Today, New York is an international center of financial capital and a major corporate headquarters of the world. It is in a period of development and change fostered, in part, by the influx of corporate headquarters, their executives and their white collar workers and clerical-administrative satellite service industries required to be close to these headquarters. Land now sells at premium prices on the West Side, as it does on most of Manhattan. The return of suburbanites and the demand for executive and corporate housing has caused an increasing pressure for housing at all levels. The renewed attractiveness of the West Side is due to its location, close to midtown and its excellent transportation facilities. The amenities which are

69
available, such as Lincoln Center, Carnegie Hall
and Central and Riverside Parks have made the West
Side an attractive residential area. The present
attractiveness of the Upper West Side took a long
time in coming.

A Manhattan-wide redevelopment process began
in the '50s with the development of Lower

20
Manhattan, the stabilization of the Morningside
Heights area around Columbia University and the
Lincoln Center Development in 1958. This activity,
especially at Lincoln Center, stimulated the
redevelopment of the Upper West Side. By then The
Upper East Side had become fully developed so that
there was an increasing overflow demand for luxury
housing which could be provided on the Upper West
Side. This resulted in pressures for the
construction of high rise luxury apartments which
made the Upper West Side a prime area for
development. This had, as we have indicated, not
always been the case.

Post World War Two Housing Construction On The
Upper West Side.

In 1948, the first attempt to combat blight on the West Side was the Amsterdam Houses, a Federal public housing project constructed between 63rd and 64th Street. Ten years later, the Frederick Douglas Houses were constructed between 100th and 104th Streets on Amsterdam Avenue. The project contained 2,0877 low-income apartments. An additional 137 units were added in 1965. During the same period housing for middle and luxury-income families were being constructed. The most notorious of these was the scandal-ridden Park West Village, formerly Manhattantown located between 96th and 100th Street between Central Park West and Columbus Avenues.

"The notoriety was caused by the revelation by the New York Times that a corporation to which the city (Robert Moses) had turned over 338 buildings worth \$15,000,000 for \$1,000,000 dollars [to a] corporation which didn't even bother to pay its city taxes, a corporation which had for five years been collecting rents on those buildings was now saying that it could not develop the site...."

Among the luxury developments was the Columbus Circle Renewal Project begun in 1951. In addition to the city-built but federally financed Coliseum Exhibition Hall, the Columbus Circle Park apartments were constructed consisting of 608 luxury units. This construction would form the basis for the renewal of the entire area bounded by Columbus Circle and Ninth Avenue between 58th and 60th Streets.

Finally, in 1957, the Board of Estimate approved a renewal plan for Lincoln Square between Broadway and Columbus Avenue from 60th to 70th Street. The Federal government allocated \$ 3,700,000 to enable the city, in 1958, to take title to a 50 acre site in 1958. The plan envisioned the construction of Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, several thousand luxury apartments, the Juilliard School of Music and the Manhattan campus of Fordham University. The project was undertaken and completed in 1970.

The original impetus for the development of the Upper West Side was the availability of Federal funds for urban renewal. The impetus for this development was mainly political. It afforded

the Democratic Party with an opportunity to form an urban coalition. The disparate elements of this coalition was made up of middle class groups interested in urban renewal, the housing industry and labor. This coalition would ensure victory for the Democratic Party in local and national elections.

We have depicted the changing demography, economic development and ethnic composition of the Upper West Side from 1890 to 1985. The Preliminary and the ensuing Master Plan recognized the need to address the housing needs of the estimated 5,000 displaced tenants, the housing needs of elderly, the elderly poor, the middle class and the proprietary fears of brownstone owners and prospective brownstone owners that property devaluation would not result from Public Housing in the area. In addition to satisfying these contradictory interests it was necessary to satisfy the requirements of the banking and the developers' interest in a profit that would justify the risks and profits available in other enterprises.

However, the final plan provided only 400 units for Public Housing which aroused conflict and disunity because everyone was sensitive to the housing needs of the elderly, the displaced and the poor.

However, in retrospect, the lack of unity among the different interest groups in the community, the changing priorities of the city and Federal administrations, the court case which lasted eight years and the apathy of the elderly tended to classify the needs of the elderly as part of the problem of the poor.

In the next chapter we will describe urban housing legislation on the Federal, State and local level in the light of electoral politics, political priorities and ideology.

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CHAPTER 2NATIONAL URBAN POLITICS

The history of urban planning on the Upper West Side supports the contention that planning cannot be rational i.e. the independence necessary to functionally allocate resources to achieve goals due to the influence of the political process on the local, state, national and international level. The best intentions in local planning inevitably falter as plans are shaped and re-shaped over time and conflicts are resolved by compromise and by power relationships. Temporary expediencies may allow the planning project to proceed but not in a rational fashion whereby the needs of the less powerful are met. Rather the compromises, conflicts, power expectations and expediencies are concealed in the plan and in its various revisions and execution. Due to the limited nature and scope of our inquiry, we have excluded, except in a cursory fashion, the international level of political influences and their interconnection, which affected the

development of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan. This may include the high value of the dollar and its effect on interest rates, the influx of foreign millionaires seeking housing in New York City and the effect of defense expenditures on the Federal Budget including housing.

The Fainsteins' typology¹ of urban housing development in New York City divides the time frame from 1940 to the present into three time periods. The 1940-1965 period emphasized large scale development projects under the sponsorship of the National government; 1965 to 1975-community participation as a recognition of community demands and unrest; 1975 to the present-a diminished influence of the public housing sector and a heightened interest in midtown commercial development and luxury housing on the Upper West Side. They suggest that the politics of urban development are relevant for a working perspective on events that shaped the Upper West Side, must encompass National, State and City politics which were independent of local community issues. Political forces at these levels set the stage, defined the situation and established the limits

of political discourse. The decisions, which influenced the development of the West Side Urban Development Plan were thus, in part, a result of unpredictable international events, fluctuating economic resources and conditions and an incoherent short range urban national policy subject to the changing electoral alliances and coalitions of national electoral politics.

The accelerating importance of the Federal government as the major source of funding for urban development and an ideology which predicated housing, primarily, as a tool for economic revival and growth was juxtaposed with the need of City politicians to create social peace in the City by balancing the interests of the business sector and the recognized needs of the ill-housed, low and moderate-income families. Additionally, City politicians were faced with the periodic practical necessity to win local elections and acquire federal funding.

During the 1930's the LaGuardia Administration sponsored slum clearance, public housing and major public works. At the same time The City Planning Commission laid out ambitious

plans for rebuilding mass transportation and reconstructing residential neighborhoods.

CITY POLITICS: 1945-1965

The twenty year period from 1945 to 1965 was dominated by Robert Moses who was the New York City Parks Commissioner, member of the City Planning Commission, Chairman of the Triborough Bridge Authority Chairman of the Mayor's Emergency Committee on Housing, and he controlled the New York State Postwar Public Works Commission. These positions enabled Robert Moses to dispense political patronage and float bond issues independent of normal City politics.

. His ascendancy and influence over urban development was possible because of his autonomous control over public authorities (Triborough Bridge Authority) and an astute use of Federal and State funds. His program featured housing developments for over 400,000 people, a large scale slum clearance program which caused the displacement of five hundred thousand people and, at another level, one hundred miles of highway transportation.²

These factors, combined with his close connections with the state legislators, and successive governors, and his unimpeachable record in the eyes of the media, allowed him to influence the administrations of O'Dwyer (1945-1950), Impellitteri (1950-1954), and Wagner (1954--1965). Moses decided how every dollar of Federal funds for public works in the City would be spent.

Moses envisioned and encouraged large scale development whose prototypes were Stuyvesant Town and the United Nations. These projects were implemented through matching the site with a publicly subsidized developer. He employed eminent domain to appropriate sites and standing buildings, both of which insured wholesale clearance and swift development.

The consequences of the Moses type development was minimal delay in construction. However this was achieved at the expense of the unplanned and the uncontrolled effects of displacement of former site residents, the elimination of much low-income housing and
3
increased levels of racial segregation.

His rationale was to arrest the decadence caused by the "ghettoization" of the city which was responsible for the exodus of the middle class to the suburbs. Though his highway program facilitated that exodus the Moses program promised a resurgence of city vigor and an improved tax base.

The Moses political strategy was based on a close alliance with Carmine DeSapio, who acted as a political broker between Moses and the local Democratic party. Thomas Shanahan, a banker, acted as his financial agent and dispenser of city

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favors to key City actors. His influence was also reinforced by Moses' close relationship with Governor Nelson Rockefeller (1950-1965).

In retrospect the overpowering dominance and achievements of Robert Moses set a pattern for urban policy in New York City which was featured by large projects and massive relocation. Moses' influence is discernible in the policies of development agencies in the planning and politics of the City and the Upper West Side. At the same time, there was a reaction against large scale development at the expense of local community

interests by Stanley Isaacs, ranking City Council
minority member.⁵ The original Master Plan, also,
rejected slum clearance and the wholesale
displacement of former tenants. Instead the Master
Plan recognized the moral responsibility to
relocate displaced tenants within the area, if
possible. In addition displaced tenants were
promised they would have the right to move back
into the area as development proceeded.

During the 1949 to 1956 period, the Moses
ideology recognized that "Title 1 was never
designed to produce housing for people of low-
income...(It) aimed solely at the elimination of
slums and substandard housing."⁶ Roger Starr noted
that 15,157 apartments were destroyed while 15,310
units were constructed during the 1940 to 1959
period.

It became apparent that the Moses' strategy
entailed speedy conceptualizing, development and
completion of large scale projects with a minimum
of local community, city and state political
interference or legal delay. This policy allowed
New York City to get the lion's share of Federal
and State funds for the development of middle

class housing for the City. Robert Caro suggests that the Moses' strategy had been carefully put in place by a system of patronage, the promise of increased city and state revenues, better living conditions for the middle class, highways to encourage suburban living and easy access to the city. This policy was furthered by the active encouragement of private urban development through a pragmatic marketing and political policy rather than a planning rationality.⁷

The negative reaction to the Robert Moses' policy was signaled in 1958 and forecast the decline of his influence. The Mayor by-passed the City Planning Commission whose chief member was Robert Moses. Mayor Wagner gave control of the West Side Renewal program to the Urban Renewal Board headed by James Felt, (an enemy of Moses) and the City Planning Commission under Clarence Davies.

The period from 1958 to 1965 was a clear departure from the tactics and goals of the Moses period. Although the Preliminary Plan emphasized a predominance of luxury housing, the Master Plan stated that rehabilitation and more low, moderate

and middle-income housing were to be the goals rather than massive clearance and the construction of luxury housing. The public was assured that the relocation of displaced tenants would be the responsibility of the City rather than the responsibility of the developer as it was under Moses. Displaced residents of razed buildings were promised that they had a guaranteed right to return to the community upon completion of low and middle-income-housing. During this period, mechanisms for Central Planning and Community representation in the planning process were made by Mayor Wagner through the creation of Community Advisory Boards.

CITY POLITICS: 1965-1975

The next administration headed by John Vliet Lindsay, delegated Budget Planning to the City Planning Commission. Access by the Local community to the planning process was made easier because of the reorganization of City administration, including administrative functions, procedures and services so that jurisdictions conformed more⁸ closely to geographic district boundaries. These

procedures facilitated local input, their monitoring of planning operations and political action all of which added political dimensions to the decision-making process. Politicians were forced to weigh the consequences of planning decisions on the electoral process.

On the West Side, the reorganization of the Community Boards and their incorporation as a semi-governmental advisory body participating in the Uniform Land Use Review Policy process enhanced its prestige and power as a rallying point for community interests. This was contrary to the City's original hope that the Community Boards and local organizations would serve as rallying points for the Master Plan. However the unforeseen development of a critical Community Board together with the successful emergence of the Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Association under the leadership of Father Brown served as an umbrella organization for those dissenting groups who favored primarily low and moderate-income housing. The immediacy of their program and its one issue orientation made its militant stand a salient organizing center for

9

the previously politically impotent. (Davies)

At the same time, the political know-how, strident button-holing tactics, ideological talk and the use of "street tactics" at public meetings frightened the small business men, professionals and especially the brownstone owners who seceded from the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association. They found refuge in the newly created organization, Continue, dedicated to halting "the unreasonable development of public housing which would "reghettoize" the Upper West Side."¹⁰ Furthermore they felt that the City had broken its promise to create a "balanced" community.

The Urban Renewal Board, under Felt, hoped that the Park West Hudson Association, made up of city notables,¹¹ would act as an intermediary between the City Administration and the Community both in a public relations capacity and as a mediating agency between the potentially competing groups.

However, the decision of the City administration not to fund the Park Hudson group in response to mass protest by the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association led to the emergence of Stryker's Bay, through its adroit politics, as the

salient spokesman of "local interests" and the demise of Park Hudson. Their position was strengthened through City funding which allowed Stryker's Bay to hire office help, finance local projects and gain direct access to bureaucrats and elected local and city-wide officials.

12

CITY POLITICS: 1975-PRESENT

After the election of Abraham Beame as Mayor in January 1974, the emphasis of City priorities shifted from urban development to fiscal problems and a shaky economy. Low-income housing and the possibility of racial explosions became secondary, in part due to a change in federal policy and the new constituency which had begun the process of gentrification and neighborhood renewal.

Nationally, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, established Community Block grants. The limited funds so provided allowed cities to set their own priorities and precluded the development of large scale low-income housing.

Roger Starr, the newly appointed head of the Housing and Development agency, introduced a "triage strategy", concentrating on salvageable

13

areas rather than the worst areas.

The fiscal crisis of 1975 ended the Urban Development Corporation's participation in subsidized housing. The severe cutbacks in the city's capital budget ended most public projects. Simultaneously private real estate development dropped from \$725,000,000 in 1972 to \$80,000,000 in 1975. During the same period office construction dropped from \$25,000,000 square feet to 2,000,000 square feet. The withdrawal of federal funds for new housing and the inflationary costs of building materials, labor and higher interest rates made rehabilitation and the conversion of rental buildings into co-ops and condominiums "the only housing game in town". The amended J-51 program extended tax abated subsidies, originally intended for the upgrading of "cold-water" flats to reconversion of condominiums and cooperatives. This resulted in a doubling of the number of mostly middle and upper income units subsidized between 1974 and 1975. Tax abatements totaled \$37,000,000 dollars in 1978 and over \$100,000,000 by 1983.

The revival of the city's economy in 1977, the use of various tax subsidy programs and the revival of office construction changed the emphasis in construction from housing development to commercial development. By 1982, large scale construction of the South Street Seaport, the West Side Convention Center, Battery Park City, the Merit Hotel and the reclamation of the Forty-Second Street area had become the major area of interest and investment.

Also in 1982 the Fifth Amendment to the West Side Urban Renewal Plan was finally passed concomitant with the resolution of the seven year old legal controversy over Site 30 by a Supreme Court decision that Public Housing on the Site was not an environmental hazard. This decision had removed the legal obstacles to completing the development of the Upper West Side which had been brought to a halt due to uncertainty about the status of Site 30 and the direction of future development of the Upper West Side.

It is our contention that the interplay of these economic and political forces, unpredictable and unplanned for, played the crucial role in the

development of the West Side Urban Development Plan far more than did the actual, formal planning process since no one in the City bureaucracy had a crystal ball which would allow planning over a thirty year period. In this context it is necessary to trace the development of national urban policy and its influence on city policy.

Mollenkopf states that in the late '30s domestic urban development programs became the principal means through which the modern Democratic party was created and subsequently torn
¹⁴
apart. The Roosevelt administration envisioned a pro-growth policy that would create a coalition of disparate interests, on a local and national level, that would ensure electoral victory. In this context public actors took the initiative in creating a political framework for a viable housing program. Later, perhaps the inevitable reaction against public housing programs resulted from the early successes of the program. The realities of a national Public Housing policy, skillfully played upon by national and local Real Estate lobbies fired fears of the urban middle

class that Public Housing would cause neighborhood ghettoization and depreciating property values.

The National Democratic Administrations political coalitions had a strong economic component due to the structural relationship between government spending and financial resources. Governments, of necessity, must finance their activities by means of tax revenues or borrowing. They must recruit, among others, supporters from powerful and propertied institutions who reap economic rewards. Political entrepreneurs search for ways to use government authority or government subsidies to build constituencies. However, since no one group has a hegemony over the political and economic arenas, politicians formed growth coalitions made up of disparate elements. The private sector actors were made up of large corporations, banks, insurance companies, developers and builders, merchants, department store owners and construction unions.¹⁵

By 1938 there were both rational and irrational components to this program which appealed and repelled elements in the coalition. The appeal to some sectors was the hoped for

economic revival of the economy which would enhance property values, provide new markets, new opportunities for investment and profit, a solution to the unemployment problem and housing relief for the low and middle-income constituency. Unforeseen consequences were the emphasis on large scale development at the expense of small business, neighborhood resistance to public housing and the inexorable drive of market conditions which dictated the terms of housing

16
development.

However, few of the actors or interested parties were aware of the consequences of their actions or all of the political or economic purport of their actions. Due to the nature of the American political system which is composed of a plurality of divergent interest groups and the almost continuous electoral process, there is a mandatory search for concrete solutions to specific problems that effect interest groups. The assemblage of coalitions often made up of conflicting interests is dependent on the process of temporary and long range log rolling and

compromise subject always to changing external
¹⁷
 conditions.

In this context, we will trace the changing policy and emphasis of both Republican and Democratic Administrations in terms of National housing legislation and urban development and the subsequent influence of these policies on the development of the West Side Urban Development Plan.

CHANGING URBAN PRIORITIES AT THE NATIONAL
 LEVEL

By 1920, one in four persons lived in a city with one hundred thousand residents or more. The national population had risen to one hundred and six million and industrial production jumped a thousand fold. Since 1920, the office building gradually replaced the factory as the primary work place and employer in a growing service oriented

¹⁸
 society. Since 1939 there has been a steady growth of service industries which were made up of office buildings, government centers, cultural

¹⁸
 complexes, hospitals and universities. These new institutions produced a new demography and

residential mix based, in part, on new highway systems and easy air travel access.

The process of suburbanization after World War 11 was accompanied by a migration of blacks

and other minorities to central cities.¹⁹

(Mollenkopf) The decline of the old central city of the Northeast featured after the 1970's which was succeeded by the more accessible suburban mall, a declining tax base, the breakdown of service essential to business prosperity, the rash of riots in the Northeast, the inequality of the tax burden and the decline of the basic amenities especially schools and safety encouraged the "flight to the suburbs". Beginning in 1940 and by 1980 there was a 112.3% increase in the population

of the Sunbelt area.²⁰ At the same time the private sector shifted its investments to decentralized locations in the Sun Belt and to suburban sites which offered tax incentives, weak unions and government, usually state and municipal, encouragement for investment in

industry oriented to military expenditures.²¹ This movement against the North Eastern cities gained impetus, partially, as a result of community

action that demanded increased social service programs and growth spending which would entail increased taxes to support these programs.

Historically, between 1850 and 1920 the two urban revolutions, first, the dominance of the factory and then the dominance of service, after 1920, industries, provided contrasting effects on urban development at the City's core,. The first concentrated urban development and the second diffused population growth. The former created an ethnically segmented population, where in work and residential order were based on industrial production while the second was based on administrative institutions. Finally, the first was based on laissez-faire and minimal governmental intervention while the latter featured government intervention through government regulation including that of urban development based on federal and state financing, subsidies and the funding of housing, commercial construction and the expansion and renovation of municipal transportation. These opportunities from the thirties on were eagerly seized upon by local politicians and economic interests to revive the

old central cities. Government largesse offered an attractive opportunity to satisfy the growing social demands for adequate housing, for the upgrading of services and for capital improvements. Housing, as a component of urban development, offered a partial solution which was attractive to the disparate elements of successive pro-growth coalitions. An economic revival based on federal funding for urban development would ameliorate housing conditions for low and middle income families, provide jobs for the construction industry, increase tax revenue for the city, and later, slow the movement of whites to the suburbs in the face of a growing component of Blacks and Puerto Ricans in central cities. It would also provide a conducive environment for commercial and service industries.

It is important to note that New York City never relinquished its role as the international and national corporate center for investment banking, corporate law and accounting. In the '60's and '70's New York contained 31.2% of all bank deposits, 53.9% of all foreign bank deposits and almost one lawyer out of ten in the nation.

Concomitant with the growth of corporate centers in Central cities was the growth in government employment. Mollenkopf states that by 1980, the Democratic Party had made the federal government a major source of funds for the urban infrastructure, a major force in the urban housing industry and a major revenue source for big city operating budgets.

By 1974 government employed one out of six New York workers. Between 1955 and 1975 federal spending was three times the growth rate of local government spending. By 1978 direct federal aid constituted 50.7% of locally raised revenue.²³

At the same time the growth of service industries brought a second population category into the central cities who vied for housing, services and living space with the newly arrived blacks, Puerto Ricans and other ethnic minorities. The revival of older cities as service centers resulted in both the employment of low paid, semi-skilled, ethnic workers and an influx of suburban based professionals, singles and the newly married middle class professionals. Beginning with the Roosevelt Administration the moneys available to

cities varied depending on the ideology, the perceived economic remedies for unemployment, inflation and the political realities of electoral politics at a national and local level. These factors were intertwined with the constantly changing balance between social needs and national security along with the shifting, unpredictable consequences of international politics. No one, least of all the local planners engrossed in the detailed mechanics of planning were able to predict the consequences of long population changes and mixes, the immigration caused by wars, revolutions and economic and natural disorders, which were international or national in scope. This was compounded by an ideological and media dialogue which invoked patriotism, sacrifice and

24
social welfare.

These invocations masked fundamental issues and interests which, in many cases, may have been unspoken but understood by the audience. The arousal of opposition groups around urban development and housing issues on the local and the national level reflected a distrust and opposition to the politics of redistribution. New

Public Housing construction was seen as a threat to property values, city services, city revenue and the City tax base and the ethnic and racial geographic distribution and its implications for

25
education.

POLITICAL PRIORITIES AND POLICIES OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIONS

Earlier, in 1935, the Roosevelt Administration envisioned the Works Progress Administration as an instrument that would create jobs for the unemployed. This was to be accomplished through the employment of 2,350,000 workers for each year from 1936 to 1940. The emphasis was on highways, water and sewer systems and public buildings. Expenditures were

26
concentrated in urban centers.

Secretary of Interior, Harold Ickes established a United States Housing Authority, as a subdivision of the Public Works Administration for slum clearance and public housing using as his instrument limited-dividend developers and later federal construction. By 1937 the Housing division had built 21,769 units at a cost of 136,000,000 dollars. The opposition to the use of eminent

domain led to the Housing Act of 1937. Senator Robert F. Wagner, the original sponsor of the bill, emphasized public or subsidized housing for the broadest range of urban residents. Slum clearance was a necessary requirement to secure sites for projects. In the face of organized resistance on the national and local levels the final Housing Act imposed strict income limits as well as quality and standards limitation. The Bill also mandated the destruction of one unsafe or unsanitary unit for every new public housing unit built. Housing proponents suggested that the Bill shifted the emphasis from housing production to

27
slum clearance.

By 1939, the United States Housing Authority committed 800,000,000 dollars in project loans to local authorities to build 169,451 units, again primarily in urban centers.

During the period from 1933 to 1939 the Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration, created by the 1934 Housing Act gained middle class backing through the guarantee of 20 year mortgages and ten percent down payments.

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Mayor LaGuardia who founded the United States Conference of Mayors in the late '30s was able to provide the money and political support from Washington that Robert Moses needed to carry through his plans for highway construction and slum clearance.

By 1938, the resistance to the New Deal and the emphasis on urban development and public housing was reinforced by the economics of World War II and the post war "flight" to the suburbs of the working class whites and middle class professionals. Their places were taken, to a degree, by black immigrants from the South and by

28

an increased influx of Puerto Ricans.

The reaction to the New Deal programs and the changing composition of the central cities was incorporated into the Truman Fair Deal Program. The emphasis changed from aid for low and moderate-income housing to eradicating slum and ghetto areas.

Title I of the Taft Ellender Wagner Housing Act of 1949 underlined the importance of the private sector. It provided for local redevelopment agencies and a one and a half

billion dollar Federal write off to private enterprise for land acquisition and clearance costs. Title 11 of the bill authorized 810,000 units over a six year period. However, by 1953, only 85,000 units were built. The Korean War, the organized anti-housing lobbies and three years of record housing production enabled the real estate interests to win victory after victory in local referenda against public housing.²⁹

Urban developers in the '50's concentrated most of their efforts on commercial building and on large scale middle-income housing. Robert Moses set the pace in New York City. In 1951 he proposed a Coliseum and a luxury housing project on Broadway and fifty-ninth Street. By including a few run down tenements containing less than 300 tenants, Moses gained control of two square blocks of choice commercial land. Its clearance, plus 26,000,000 in Federal funds, permitted the erection of an exhibition hall, a parking

structure and luxury housing on the site.³⁰ The urban themes of the Eisenhower Administration (1952-1960) stressed stringent oversight of public spending. The Republican Administration proposed a

cut-back in public housing and stated that the private sector was the proper instrument for housing and urban development. During this period Metropolitan (cities over 500,000) population grew 26.4 percent. Most of the population growth took place in the suburbs, where housing construction hit all time highs. The Housing Act of 1954 shifted urban renewal from a nationally directed program focusing on housing to a locally directed program which tended to favor commercial development, developers and organized opponents to public housing.³¹

The newly formed Urban Renewal Administration Act provided an escape clause which highlighted renewal and rehabilitation rather than the predominantly residential use requirement. The 1954 law required local advisory committees to develop programs. The Act provided 4,000,000 dollars to be made available for residential structures in renewal areas. At the discretion of local advisory boards Federal funds were available if the board exempted ten percent of the land designated for residential construction for other purposes. This was a change in emphasis from

public housing and slum clearance to a focus on commercial building, hospitals and educational and cultural institutions like Lincoln Center.

With the short-lived victory of Kennedy in 1960 and the election of Johnson in 1964 the Democrats returned to a policy of new housing and urban development primarily aimed at stimulating the economy. The years from 1960 to 1964 were also a period of increased pressure from urban civil rights organizations for jobs, urban renewal for housing for residents displaced in other housing developments. A wave of marches on Washington, sit-ins, campus turmoil and finally riots in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant spread to Chicago and Philadelphia. Many of these riots occurred near

32

urban renewal areas.

An attempt was made primarily by Robert Kennedy and later President Johnson to create a new coalition which would encompass not only big city mayors, developers, business leaders and agency professionals but also blacks and ethnic minorities. The political rhetoric supporting this effort emphasized community action, community participation and equal opportunity. These goals

were to be achieved through the newly created local community action administrations and little city halls made up and presumably involved in face-

33

to-face contact with local communities.

The Kennedy New Frontier and the Johnson Great Society programs increased Federal financing both for public subsidized non-profit housing in an enlarged and modified urban renewal emphasis. The Johnson Administration introduced the Community Action, Model Cities Program which bypassed local and State bureaucracies by funding local non-profit groups to deliver community services.

These, together with the Housing and Urban Development Acts of 1965 and 1968 set goals for housing production of 26,000,000 units over a ten year period. This was 60% more than the private market was constructing under sections 235 and 236 of the Housing and Development Act of 1965 which provided for the Federal government to subsidize the difference between market interest rates and a sponsor interest rate, often of one percent, for privately constructed single family and multi-

34

family units.

The Federal emphasis, after 1968 was on rehabilitation rather than slum clearance. The number of subsidized units constructed in renewal areas between 1966 and 1972 tripled to about 120,000 units. Before 1966 (1950-1956) 114,829 units were built on cleared land and only 45,860

³⁵
were subsidized.

The Nixon-Ford Administrations must be seen in the context of the war in Southeast Asia and Watergate. The reaction to the turbulent sixties, the resistance of the white middle class and "hard hat" elements fueled a resistance to social

³⁶
planning. Public Housing was viewed as housing for Blacks and the ethnic poor and a threat to newly revived areas and property values. In the context of the war, a sense of frustration and a reaction to the "Great Society". President Nixon was able to put brakes on the social programs based on Federal subsidies of public housing and on local community participation. The resistance to President Nixon's programs was weakened by recessions of 1969 to 1970 and 1974 -1975 which the Administration hoped would halt the

inflationary spiral.³⁷ The ensuing fiscal crisis in New York City and other urban centers further weakened local opposition to Nixon's bypassing of local government.

In this context President Nixon offered revenue sharing of \$3,100,000,000 in the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972 and a total of seven point nine billion in other urban programs. However this largesse to the cities was followed by the impounding of twelve million dollars of housing funds authorized by previous legislation.

In retrospect the Nixon Administration shifted the focus of urban development from an emphasis on neighborhood rehabilitation and subsidized housing construction sponsored by the Great Society to the development of commercial properties.

The Carter Administration stressed public capital investment and subsidies to private investment in the older cities. A 1979 study of Urban Direct Action Grant programs which had received totaling \$487,000,000 dollars of Federal funds was matched by 2.86 billion dollars in private funds. \$1,36,000,000 dollars went for

industrial projects, \$29,000,000 for new hotels and \$276,000,000 to residential projects while \$035,000,000 to commercial projects.

The Reagan Administration placed even more of its faith in private market forces and in a shift of power from the public to the private sector and state over federal intervention. Within the Federal sphere it stressed military spending over social programs. The key program was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. Drastic cuts from 286,000 to 142,000 in the Department of Housing and Urban Development subsidized housing program and a 25% increase in rents was authorized for public housing tenants.

As a result of changes in external factors and new policies, new actors entered the scene; brownstone owners, private developers, NAACP and Puerto Rican groups. At the same time old activists like the West Side business men, Goddard-Riverside which had achieved what it could, the Tenants Council, Hudson-Park West dropping out and the deaths of Father Brown and State Senator Leon Bogues eliminated two very powerful voices who championed the cause of public housing. New groups

were activated such as Continue, Strykers Bay and the Site Thirty Coalition. New political climates subject to the New Conservatism arose and evaporated activism and social consciousness. These all changed the ongoing West Side Urban Renewal plan so that the outcome was unrecognizable to the interested actors who participated in bringing the plan to fruition.

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CHAPTER 3THE POLITICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITY INTEREST GROUPS

Mannheim suggests that planning in a democratic mass society entails the enfranchisement of new interest groups and their incorporation into the planning process. Further he states that the social, encompassing the ethical and the moral are integral parts of the planning process. In this context adequate housing for all New Yorkers is an important dimension of an adequate plan for development of the West Side, New York City and the nation.

Both Mannheim and Schumpeter underline the importance of independence of the planning institution from political influence in order to insure complete control over the process.

In this context we will examine the Pluralist theoretical frame work which suggests that power is widely dispersed; that groups are activated when their primary interests are threatened and that politicians act as mediators between

conflicting groups. As a result each group usually receives something from the process.

The announcement of the Master Plan by the New York City Planning Board in 1955 aroused local interest groups and institutions who perceived that promises or understandings, real or imagined, made during and after the announcement of the Preliminary Plan by City officials had been broken. The brownstone owners felt betrayed because they were under the impression that the area would be developed for middle class residents which would insure their investment. The Public Housing advocates were equally aroused because the announced plan provided primarily luxury and middle class housing and provisions for 400 units of Public Housing. These perceptions-political, social and economic-divided the Upper West Side Community and resulted in bitter confrontations and court actions with each other and with the City. The ensuing conflict made compromise and dialog impossible. It paralyzed the City in its attempt to complete the plan. In retrospect the delay of approximately 32 years and the changing economic situation and climate of

opinion allowed the City to disregard the Community interest groups.

We will concentrate our analysis upon a representative group of interests centered in Community Board # 7. They are the Park-Hudson Association, the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council, Continue, St.Gregory's Church, the Woodrow Wilson-Democratic Club and local political and elected officials. We will attempt to delineate the origins, goals, interests and composition of the aforementioned groups.

Dahl and many of the Pluralists suggest that the politicians have a unique role wherein they can play a mediating role in urban political conflict. The conflict arouses groups whose interests are threatened. The City is able to impose solutions which benefit all parties through negotiations and compromise.

This chapter will test this thesis and asks the following questions: 1.what are the short range and long range benefits which accrue to groups who have unequal resources in the political arena; 2.does the City play the role of the "honest broker" or does the City have its own

agenda; and 3. How does Federal political policy influence the local decision making policy.

COMMUNITY BOARDS

The origin of the Community Boards lies in the twelve Community Planning Councils created by Mayor Wagner, in 1951 to advise the Borough President of Manhattan. The revised City Charter of 1975, which was implemented in 1977, created 59 city-wide community boards. Each Board was made up of 50 members. Twenty-five Board members were to be appointed by the Borough President, 19 by Congressmen and six by District Council persons. Board members were to be appointed for a two year period and were to be unsalaried. The Boards were given a staff of one paid permanent member, the board manager, and unspecified part-time personnel. The Board had the power to appoint or dismiss the "staff". The Board was granted \$65,000 a year for staff and expenses.

The original function of the boards was to monitor City services at the district level. Currently the Boards are seen as semi-official agencies of the City whose function is primarily advisory in the areas of local services delivery,

budget priorities and the review of real estate developers' proposals that require zoning changes or variances. As a result of the the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) which was part of the Charter Revision of 1977 the Community Boards became a part of the review policy process on all questions of land use involving zoning, charters and the disposition of municipally owned property. However, the functions were only advisory: they were excluded from vetoing the final disposition of land and its use. The review of a policy began its search for approval at the community board level, then proceeded to the City Planning Commission, the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development and then to the Board of Estimate for securing final approval.

Most local planning is done by individual local municipal governments within municipal areas. The development of plans and their subsequent implementation is expedited through the utilization of zoning, subdivision regulation and building codes.

The role played by the boards was and is uneven. The most effective boards appear to be those which are made up of middle-class member.¹ The composition of the most successful boards was and is usually made up of lawyers, architects, planners and others with specialized knowledge of the development process and sometimes a stake in local development.² Typically these members can commit considerable time, energy and commitment to community service. Board members are more active and effective on issues which affect every-policy, sanitation and parks than in soft services-public assistance, health care, education, day care and problems of the elderly.³

The successful boards have developed political "savvy" and have well developed contacts with political leaders on a district, administrative and City political level. This is the result of the cultivation of a constituency which board members have developed by volunteer community service which has gained them recognition in their respective communities. A record of community service is the accepted route for appointment to the Community Boards. It

results in local political experience, contact with people in other civic organizations and finally recognition by the local political leadership in the form of appointment to the Community Board.

The perception of individual Community Boards by City Administrators varies and runs the gamut from weak, unproductive and disorganized to political "know-how", commitment, hard work and respect for the knowledge, application and acumen of the Boards. Boards are also seen from contradictory angles of vision by the community, the administrators of agencies, developers and by politicians.

Developers see the Boards as having power because they are involved in the approval process. They can delay or speed-up the process, and time is money, especially to the developer. The community, those tenants, brownstone owners and storekeepers, living in the area, are usually not involved except when an issue arises that affects the perceived well-being of an aroused interest group in the community. The bureaucrats often have an overall disdain for the community boards

as unprofessional and unruly. They are regarded as parochial in their view of political realities and the city-wide problems of the city.⁴

As a result of City Hall and Agency perceptions the relationship between the Boards and City agencies is perfunctory. The information given out in Agency Service statements is usually bland and "basic" and does not address itself to concerns, priorities and the needs of neighborhood communities, especially when the conflicts which occur divide the community and become political issues subject to media attention. Additionally, Board members say they find it difficult to secure relevant information from city officials. The response of City Agencies to Community Board budget proposals is mixed. Some agencies send back form letters, partly due to lack of staff and money; others prepare detailed reports. Questions arise to Board members as to whether Agency decision-makers read proposals since, often the decisions do not seem to have taken into consideration the specific proposals submitted. It has been suggested by Board members that planning difficulties arise not because of their lack of

expertise or political power. Rather it is the lack of information, not knowing what is going on when decisions are being made. They do not know how agencies operate and what plans are being considered before the plan is a fait accompli.⁵

The demise of the "political" clubs as an avenue for local favors, solutions for local problems and an orderly process of using political power and electing public officials all helped to create a vacuum which was gradually and partly filled by the Community Boards. The effective power of the Boards is limited, however, because they are a quasi-official agency which serves in an advisory capacity. Moreover, they are not elected but appointees of Borough Presidents and City Council persons. However, Boards and other civic and local institutions are able to apply pressure through an aroused community which can be translated into media attention and election votes. The Boards acquired greater political leverage as City Agencies were made coterminous with council district boundaries and city budgets were divided geographically by the same boundaries.⁵

Community Boards were becoming political training grounds for future politicians and appointments to City administrative office. The District Manager is the only paid, full time person who administrates, serves as the Community Public Relations Officer and handles the day-to-day business with the city administration. As of this date, six District Managers have been hired for middle and high level jobs in the City bureaucracy. Two Community Board # 7 members were elected to political office. Leon Bagues was elected State Senator and Herbert Kramer was elected to the Civil Court. However, the politicians and administrators of City agencies see Community Board # 7 as an exceptional, hard working and intelligent group of people who have been of inestimable help in doing research, advance publicity in marshalling community resources and support and finding ingenious solutions to community problems. (Taped Interview).

Paradoxically, the hard won "professionalism" and dedication to detail has cast Community Board # 7 members in an adversarial role with City

administrators and policy-makers to the annoyance
and frustration of many city officials.⁷

Nevertheless Community Board # 7 was asked by Robert Reiss of the Housing, Development and Preservation Agency to develop a plan, later called the Fifth Amendment, which would give new impetus to the stalled renewal plan. Partly due to developer disinterest, community dissension and partly due to a change in national policy of the Nixon and the Ford Administrations in regard to funding urban development and public housing, development had been suspended on the Upper West Side.

Additionally, the city administrators have a healthy respect for the political know-how of the Board and Community leaders. The tactics of civic and elected officials ran the gamut from the colorful leadership of the charismatic Father Brown of the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association and his ability to arouse militant action on the part of the poor and the displaced to the more subtle approach of later board members which entailed phone calls to City Hall, to state offices, or to HUD; the skillful use of the legal

system; detailed study of proposals by City officials and the development of alternative or amended proposals which saved the City time and money.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

Historically the atmosphere of the Upper West Side has been influenced by the variety of lifestyles and the polyglot ethnic, racial and religious composition of the area served by the Community Board. During the Pre-World War II era, the area was inhabited by predominantly Irish and German ethnic groups. In the Post-war period, the population dramatically changed due to the attractiveness of suburban living for middle and upper middle class residents and the influx of Central European Jews, Blacks, Puerto Ricans and Haitians in the area.

Economically, with the full occupancy of land on the East Side, the Upper West Side became by the mid-sixties a desirable and fashionable area for young married, professionals and upward mobile single men and women. Many of the former, who had a Civil Rights background, lured in part by bargain-sale prices and low-interest Federal Housing

Administration loans, risked their savings and became brownstone owners. These groups were augmented by a white Jewish middle-class committed to civic voluntarism and a desire for social change which created an atmosphere wherein elected officials were forced to become responsive to innovative social planning.⁸(Tape interview with John Kowal, Board member) Politically the Upper West Side had a militant, organized constituency, and a core of dedicated civic-minded citizens. They were willing and able to devote time and energy to resolving community issues, struggling against perceived injustices and marshaling political forces to either fight or influence City Hall.

Yet, despite or because of their variegated life styles, the West Side has traditionally elected maverick, "liberal" Democratic Assemblymen, State Senators and City Council persons who were vigorous proponents of Community interests at the Borough, City, State legislative and National Level.

Traditionally the Upper Upper West Side has elected to office over the period covered by our study liberal representatives. Charles Rangel has been elected to the House of Representatives, the Late State Senator Leon Bogue and Theodore Weiss to the State Senate, Sullivan to the State Assembly and Ms. Ruth Messinger to the City Council.

CONTINUE (Committee Of Neighbors To Insure A Normal Urban Environment)

As development of the Upper West Side proceeded, the initial emphasis was on a minimum of 400 units of public housing and 7,200 units of luxury and middle-income housing. sharp differences developed between the brownstone owners who feared that, if the neighborhood declined, they would lose their investment were pitted those who were threatened or would be displaced as the plan progressed. Their "brownstoners" coalesced in Continue. The rhetoric was that the tradition of integration and the variety of social and economic groups, living in harmony, would preserve and safeguard the Upper West Side from "ghettoization". Their program

advocated moderate and middle-income housing with a 20 to 30% proportion of the apartments reserved for displaced and low-income former and future resident families instead of the ten per cent that had lived there before World War II.

STRYKERS BAY Neighborhood Association

The Strykers Bay members, led by Father Brown, of St. Gregory's Church, Doris Rosenblum and William Price, organized those designated families who would be displaced in a fight for public housing. They used political pressure, media, rent strikes and sit-ins. These tactics frightened and hardened the position of the brownstone owners.

Continue viewed the Board as radical and weak,

controlled by Council person Ruth Messinger.⁹

(Interviews with Continue members) She has been a controversial figure in local and City politics due to her outspoken, uncompromising stand in favor of displaced low-income former residents, rent control, public housing and her opposition to

¹⁰
the Viet Nam War.

It is relevant at this point to describe the composition and method of nomination and appointment to the Community Board.

COMMUNITY BOARD #7 MEMBERSHIP AND APPOINTMENT
PROCEDURE

Community Board # 7, as part of the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), was to consist of 50 members. However, there are and were usually four or five vacancies on the Board. Its membership, as noted, was appointed by local elected officials for a two year period. Reappointment was at the pleasure of these officials.

The criteria for appointment to the Board was attendance at Board meetings to demonstrate commitment and then applying for membership through a local political representative. The credentials which spoke the loudest were community volunteer work in established local institutions, wherein one performed creditably and became a spokesman for an established constituency. In most cases, an ideology compatible with that of the political appointees would insure appointment to

11
the Board.

The Board's membership made up of professionals, men and women, businessmen and women whose diminished family responsibilities

allowed them to participate in Community service. Historically, its membership consisted of lawyers whose clients were in real estate and allied fields; planners-city employed and private; architects, employed and self employed; educators, a few stock brokers and a sprinkling of representatives of neighborhood groups. Members tend to have fairly long tenures and have developed an in-group feeling based on "the initiation of fire" they experienced in the sixty's and seventy. Newcomers find it hard to learn "the rules of the game". New members have suggested and old members have affirmed that the in-group feeling is independent of ideology. New members must earn their spurs by attendance at Board meetings, hard work, a display of a preparedness at Board meetings and a willingness to volunteer for committee service. Most of the board members have lived on the West Side for 20 to thirty years. They have raised their children, either in brownstones they bought with Federal Housing Administration loans or they were fortunate in that their buildings went co-

operative when prices were modest on Central Park West, West End Avenue and Riverside Drive.

Ideologically members of the Board were defined by other members of the Board in light of their stand on Public Housing and tactics used to achieve their goals. "Radical members of the the Board characterized integration as Public Housing. They claimed that all other plans were disguised

forms of segregation;¹² statement)
 "Conservatives" on the Board defined integration as middle and luxury-income housing with a relative small component of low-income rentals in each development. All other alternatives were seen, by "conservatives", as forms of

ghettoization.¹³

Many of the original leaders of Continue were active in the Civil Rights movement in the 60's. The Continue people are proud of their Civil Rights record. However, they feel that the broken promises of the City in regard to the development of the Upper West Side, the excessive and unreasonable demands of the Strykers Bay Association adherents, their active dislike and fear of Ruth Messinger and their dread that the

West Side would be "ghettoized", because of City political expediency, made them opponents of Public Housing. Lastly they felt that the City had met its obligation to the former residents displaced by the plan. Continue advocates never had more than one member on the Board.

Interestingly, the present Continue member was appointed and reappointed by Ruth Messinger due, in part, to his expertise in transportation. The overwhelming majority of the Board was made up of "Liberals" dedicated to preserving the quality and style of life of the Upper West Side which had originally attracted them; that is its wide variety of ethnic and religious groups and life styles. They feared that a genuine revitalization of the Upper West Side was being eroded by poor planning, broken city promises and zoning regulations which were changing the physical and social character of the Upper West Side.¹⁴

The Public Housing Advocates perceived the "Liberals" as problem solvers on a piece-meal basis. However the latter saw their role as the overcoming each new threat to the community as they defined the threat. Their sentiment was best

characterized by the statement that it is better to fight and win a few symbolic victories than not to participate in the political process and get

¹⁵ nothing. To some members struggle was part of an ego trip, to others it was a crucial ideological struggle, and to still others it was primarily a social activity. Yet, to most, I sensed a dedication to civic service.

COMMUNITY CONFLICT

Continue saw the Board members as vacillating and succumbing to the tactics and pressure of the public housing advocates. The site 30 Coalition, a political off-shoot of the Strykers Bay advocates, did not view the Board as radical advocates for Community interests. Furthermore, they did not regard the Board as the basis for an urban political movement. They perceived the board as a means of insulating City Hall from the

¹⁶ neighborhoods and neighborhood pressure.

However, they realized that it was the only wheel in town. The moderates, not aligned to Continue or the Strykers Bay Association felt that the Board serves as a pragmatic means of providing civic

¹⁷ service, to the Community and it was a vehicle

for solving local problems through dissent,
compromise and political "no how".¹⁸ I observed in
conversations with Board members that solving
problems pragmatically with little overt,
conscious ideology was the modus vivendi of these
"do-gooders" and tired fighting liberals who could
then proceed to resolve new issues which face the
community. (For example, John Kowal, the newly
elected Board Chairman (1987, in a conversation on
a bus after a Community Board meeting said that in
30 years of fighting for social causes there were
innumerable disappointments and defeats and
possibly three significant victories. However, if
you don't become involved and fight there would be
no victories and the more powerful interests well-
done have to compromise. If we can finally resolve
the Site 30 issue and complete the West Side Plan
we can gird ourselves for the battle with Trump
over Trump City.)

Although the plan for the West Side Urban
Renewal was first proposed in 1955, the
controversy over public versus "integrated
housing" did not become a central issue until
1962. The 1949 Housing Act assumed that the land

condemned for renewal would be totally cleared. In addition, the original plan envisioned the development of luxury and middle-income housing with a throw-in of 400 low-income housing apartments. Promises were made to the prospective buyers of brownstones that the area would be developed as a predominately middle-income housing. The intent and the announced plan did not and could not envision the conflict which would result from the announcement of the plan and the political realities of electoral politics. With the demise of Robert Moses as a power in Urban renewal in 1950, forces which were disregarded by Moses came to the fore. Politicians, city legislative bodies and civic groups reentered the political arena with renewed vigor due to the Park West Village(Manhattantown) scandal and the 1949 Housing law prerequisites, there was a demand for citizen participation.

....A major city administration program in which, it was now revealed a \$15,000,000 slum had been turned over, for a mere fraction of its worth, to promoters who were milking it of hundreds of thousands of dollars, profits documented,

down to the dollar, by federal
¹⁹
 probers.....
 Moses loss of clout with Governor

Rockefeller and Mayor Wagner and the perception
 on the part of the media that Moses had become

²⁰
 "fair game". Finally, as a result of the
 Manhattan Project scandal and the 1949 Housing
 law prerequisites, there was a demand for
 citizen participation. The breakdown of the
 Democratic party and the decline of the
 Democratic Clubhouse, due to the reform
 movement, brought the Community Boards to the
 forefront as a mediating force between the city

²¹
 officials and the local community.

As noted on, in 1958, the study initiated
 by the architectural firm of Brown and Gunther
 was issued to the public which proposed between
 2,161 and 2,394 dwelling units in the first and
 second stage of development. 474 or 21% of the
 first figure and 19% of the second figure were
 to be low-income apartments. The favorable
 reaction of the local residents "was based
 largely on the conception that the plan would
 involve little displacement of residents and was

different from the "bulldozing" which
characterized Moses' Manhattan West project".²²

The publication of the preliminary plan came as a shock to the site area. It called, to repeat, for the construction of 7,800 new housing units, 400 of low-income, 2400 of middle-income and 5,000 high-income apartments. The plan also envisioned razing all the buildings on Columbus Avenue to widen the avenue. 4,300 families and an additional 1,500 single persons were to be relocated to make way for new construction. A large number of small businesses on Columbus Avenue would also have to be

²³
relocated.

Opposition first crystallized among the area's businessmen. They formed the West Side Business and Professional group to combat the plan. A tenant's organization was formed and named the West Side Tenants Committee with the aid of the business men. The Tenants Organization claimed that the plan didn't meet the needs of the local community tenants. They proposed more low and middle-income housing and less relocation. The pastors of the two Catholic

churches in the area, St. Gregory and Holy Name, representing the old Irish and the Puerto Rican parishioners of their church also opposed the plan. The City in an effort to halt the opposition held thirty public meetings over a two month period, all to no avail.²⁴

On June 29, 1959 the City Planning Commission held public hearings and on July 15th it approved the Preliminary Plan but increased the number of low-income housing by 200 and increased the number of middle-income units. The new figure was 600 low-income, 3,600 middle-income and 3,600 high income apartments. The attempt to satisfy local opposition only served to encourage the opposition in their efforts to

coordinate their attack.²⁵ The Brown and Gunther report had envisioned a neighborhood organization representing the area. "A method must be developed to bring the people in the twenty-block area designated for renewal into effective participation with the official agency in the renewal program ...A neighborhood organization, representative of the various

interests involved...is required".²⁶ With the

support of the Community Council under the direction of Michael Foley, a Provisional Council of Organizations in the West Side Urban Renewal Area was established in 1959 and the director of the Walden School, Milton Akers was named Provisional President. This action was supported by the local business men and the Tenant's Association. Their first action was to declare their independence from the Park-Hudson Committee, formed with the encouragement and support of James Felt and Mayor Wagner in 1959, which, in retrospect, spelled the demise of the Park-Hudson Committee. Stanley Lowell was appointed chairman and 30 prominent city-wide citizens were listed as members. The Mayor's announcement stated that citizen organizations formed in the area would become part of the Park-

27

Hudson Committee.

Hulan Jack, President of the Manhattan borough of New York, was approached by the Provisional Council. They stated that the number of apartments allocated for low-income housing was inadequate and unfair. The local business men expressed the fear that no adequate plan was

made for their relocation. After listening to their complaints and suggestions, Jack stated that he favored the Preliminary Plan, but he suggested to the Board of Estimate that they increase the low-income housing to 1,000 apartments. On October 22, 1959 the Board of Estimate increased the low-income apartments to 1,000 and the middle-income units to 4,100 units and the luxury apartments to 2,400. The Board of Estimate then unanimously approved the Preliminary Plan with these changes in it.

After much procrastination, the Provisional Council decided to become a permanent organization. In November of 1959 the Council was renamed the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council. Milton Akers, the Provisional President was elected President. The new council was composed of two delegates from each member group. The groups reached 43 at the zenith of participation. The business men, more interested in verbalizing discontent than in political

28
action, soon left the Council. No formal organization represented the large Puerto Rican population in the area and as a result two

individuals spoke in the name of the Puerto Rican community. However, the Holy Name and St. Gregory Churches were understood by the community to represent the interests of their church groups.

The leaders of the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association and the leaders of the FDR-Woodrow Wilson Democratic Club were united in a strategy to bring about the collapse of the Park-Hudson Committee, on the grounds that it was unrepresentative of the Community and that the Park-Hudson Committee favored the Preliminary Plan. In response, to these conflicts the City established the Relocation Advisory Committee and weighted it heavily in favor of Stryker Bay members.²⁹ Finally, The Housing and Redevelopment Board, in April 1961, informed Park-Hudson that it would no longer provide the committee with money for staff and that spelled the death knell of Park-Hudson.

On May 17, 1962, the City Planning Commission held its public hearing on the final plan. There was disagreement among ethnic minority groups. Mr. Gomez, of Strykers Bay, saw

the plan as a sellout of the Puerto Rican community while Jack E. Wood of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples suggested that to build only low-income housing would encourage racial and economic imbalance.

Although the FDR-Woodrow Wilson Democrats took no stand at the City Planning Commission hearings, at a late night meeting, after much maneuvering the club voted against the Plan on June 21, 1962. On June 19 Joseph Montserrat, the Director of the Puerto Rican Commonwealth Office called a meeting of representatives of about a dozen housing and civil rights organizations in the City. He accused the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples and the Mayor's Commission Against Discrimination of slighting the Puerto Ricans in favor of the Blacks.

ON June 21, the day before the Board of Estimate meeting, Mayor Wagner announced a

29

change in the plan. He ordered an increase in the number of low-income housing to 2,500, an increase in middle-income housing to 3,000 and a

decrease in luxury units to 2,000. Mayor Wagner, also, ordered the Bureau of Relocation to cancel all private relocation contracts for the West

30

Side projects.

Joseph Monserrat, and Percy Sutton, President of the New York City chapter of the NAACP, spoke against the plan and asked for minority representation on the City Planning Commission. However, the Reform Democrats spoke in favor of the plan, with, however, reservations while the Strykers Bay Association supported the plan. Continue was unalterably opposed to all increases. On June 26 the Board of Estimate voted for the plan. The plan had gone through many revisions since its inception by the Urban Renewal Board and was unrecognizable. It started out with the intention of building 400 hundred low-income, 2400 middle-income and 5,000 high-income apartments. The Final Plan was to have 400 low-income units, four thousand nine hundred middle-income and two thousand luxury apartments.

Initially, the Plan called for primarily middle-income and luxury housing. This led to rebellion by the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association and the Community ethnic groups. This pressure and the representations made by Badillo to Mayor Wagner increased the quota allotted to public housing from 400 units to 2500 units. The reaction to the implementation of the Final Plan led to the rebellion of brownstone owners represented by Continue. Continue began a legal battle in 1972 challenging the designation of site 30 as a low-income public housing development. The suit lasted eight years and effectively delayed the development of the eleven remaining sites. Although the Supreme Court declared in favor of the public housing advocates, the eight year delay, high interest rates, the rise in land prices, the desirability of West Side residency, the opportunity for the City to increase its revenue, and the felt need of the City to finish the West Side Development Plan made public housing unfeasible. This was a victory for Continue and a defeat for Strykers Bay and

public housing advocates. The resulting deadlock over site 30 provided the City Planners with an opportunity to get the plan moving by allocating the remaining sites as market rate and luxury housing which was a victory for the developers.

One of the functions of planning is for planners to assess and incorporate the various interest groups which would be aroused by the announcement of the plan. This can be accomplished by compromise, trade-offs and deals to insure the support of those members of the "establishment" whose vital interests may benefit or be threatened before the announcement of the plan. The next step of planners is to weigh the reaction after the announcement of the plan. They, then, reassess the strength and weakness of the accounted for and unaccounted for interest groups and strike new deals and compromises, sometimes at the expense of former understandings and plans. However, in our case it is apparent that the planners envisioned a Community Board which was purely advisory, an umbrella group (Park-Hudson) which would co-opt and mediate between the City and the local

community interests. Moreover, the Park Hudson-Committee would help them gain the willing cooperation of the Community and the Blacks and Puerto Ricans enabling the developers to build luxury housing.

Instead the Community groups perceived the Park-Hudson Committee as merely puppets of City Hall and top City Planners. The planners failed to account for the ability of the local ethnic and public housing advocates to unite behind the charismatic and militant leadership of Father Brown. Lastly the City planners did not assess the changing political realities on the National, State and City level which provided money for Public Housing as partly, a traditional short term solution for economic and ethnic problems; and partly, a tactic of good electoral politics.

NOTES: CHAPTER 3

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6 Taped Interview with Ms. Edith Schaffer,
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7 Taped Interview with Ms. Edith Schaffer

8 Taped interview with John Kowal, Board Member
and present Presidents.

9 Taped Interview with Mr. Eugene Halpern,
former President of Continue.

10 Based on listening to Continue members, opposition politicians and members of the West Side community who perceive her as a radical.

11 Taped interview with John Kowal.

12 Taped interview with Ms. Edith Schaffer.

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19 Caro, Robert A. The Power Broker. 1975.

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Deputy Mayor New York City.

CHAPTER 4SITE 30

The History of Site 30, located between 91st and 92nd street on Columbus Avenue can be viewed as a case of the manner in which three sets of political actors the Community Board, the local interest groups and the City (as represented by its bureaucracy) interacted. In this example the city bureaucracies are the City Planning Commission(CPC) and the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development (HPD).

Mannheim suggests that planning in a democratic mass society entails the enfranchisement of new interest groups and their incorporation into the planning process. Further he states that the social, encompassing the ethical and the moral are integral parts of the planning process. In this context adequate housing for all New Yorkers is an important dimension of an adequate plan for development of the West Side, New York City and the nation.

Both Mannheim and Schumpeter underline the importance of independence of the planning institution from political influence in order to insure complete control over the process.

In this context we will examine the Pluralist theoretical frame work which suggests that power is widely dispersed; that groups are activated when their primary interests are threatened and that politicians act as mediators between conflicting groups. As a result each group usually receives something from the process. Weber states that power is the ability to make an individual or a group act in a way which is inimical to their best interest. Although neither the Pluralists or the Structuralist argue with this premise the former asserts that in urban politics no one group has a hegemony in the political arena and all conflict is resolved by compromises in which all parties win, albeit some win more than others. The latter group suggest that influence and power are the result of superior resources, the ability to organize and access to the decision makers. The Structuralist further postulate that crucial to the political process is the ability to formulate the agenda over which the conflict and compromise will occur since the agenda sets the limits of the debate. Lastly this chapter will describe the role

154

of the proponents and opponents of Public Housing. The inability of these groups to resolve their differences led to a bitter court case which lasted for eight years and was finally resolved in the Supreme Court. The bitter struggle over Site 30 shattered community unity so that the Board members were unable to present a united front against City decisions which affected the interests of the community.

The Court Case which began in 1972 and was decided in 1980 by the Supreme Court was crucial in the development of the Upper West Side. The eight year delay covered a period of inflation and spiraling interest rates which made public housing unprofitable to developers. By 1980 the development of the East Side was nearly completed and the West Side was seen as the next area for "luxury" housing, condominiums and cooperatives. Market place housing would, at the same time, increase City revenue. However, it is our contention that the designation of Site 30 was the test in terms of the avowed promises of the City Administrations to thhe Public Housing advocates which contradicted the promises made to the prospective brownstone owners. Both sides recognized that the cutback in Federal funds, the devalued \$6,000,000, which due to inflation would

155

only buy 80 apartments instead of 160 allocated for site 30 as public housing and the long court case were crucial in deciding the future development of the Upper West Side. Finally the disunity created by the struggle over site 30 divided the community and allowed HPD to make pragmatic decisions which dissipated the expectations of the poor, the elderly and relocatees.

STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

Beginning around 1968, the City had been considering a proposal to construct 160 units of public housing on site 30 in order to accommodate the needs of displaced residents who desired to return to the area. In 1970 City officials and interested parties from the community conducted a review and reassessment of the low-income housing plans for the site. Previously, in 1963, during the first implementation of the plan, it was projected that the plan would be completed by 1969. However, by 1969, only 1,584 low-income units had been completed out of a projected 2,500. 1,230 were newly constructed public housing units and 354 low-income housing units were the allotted ratio (thirty percent) in middle-income Mitchell-Lama Developments. The approximately 1500 units completed were insufficient to meet the goals set

for relocation housing. These plans for public housing had been completed by 1969 even though four public housing projects had already been completed by 1966. Site 23, a fifth development, located on 92nd Street between Columbus and Central Park West, which would have provided 215 units of low-income public housing was altered in order to take advantage of the availability of a Federal moderate income program. (Section 221(d)(3). Apparently the needs of a substantial number of low-income relocatees might never be met, or at best, met only after years of delay. Therefore proposals were initiated to convert two of the sites, Site 4 and 30 to public housing. David Olonger, Deputy Commissioner of Housing, Development and Preservation, on June 4, 1971, stated, that due to rising costs, it was necessary to have more low-income housing. He proposed developing Site 30 as a "turn-key" (changing site from private development to public housing) public

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housing development. A plan for 270 units of public housing was approved by the City Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate on August 12, 1970 and September 17, 1970 respectively.

The need for more low-income housing was a recognition of the inability of the city to fulfill the promise to the dislocated within the

community. The designation of site 30 was a result of the inflationary spiral, the slow pace of redevelopment and the ability of the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association to mobilize community opinion by politicizing the issues of relocation of the poor, the lack of housing and public housing. At the same time it sharpened and created an irreparable breach between the brownstone owners and the proponents of public housing for the poor and the elderly.

The slowness of the redevelopment process and the desperation of those former tenants whose buildings were razed or were about to be razed led to street action in the form of a squatter movement which led to confrontation between the City, the brownstone owners and the Public Housing advocates.

SQUATTER MOVEMENT

A squatter movement was supported by the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association. There is disagreement as to the origin and composition of the squatters. The Public Housing advocates stated the squatters were primarily former residents of the community whose apartment buildings were razed. The brownstone owners maintained they were disreputable outsiders motivated by opportunism and the encouragement of radical elements in the

community. They took possession of buildings located on Site 30. The squatters protested the planned razing of the buildings they had

² occupied. Mr. Chadbourne stated that he feared there would be bloodshed if there was a confrontation between the squatters and the police). Elliot, in a letter to Joseph J. Christian, Chairman of the New York City Housing Authority(NYCHA), stated that the Authority pursuant to Section 150 of the Public Housing Law should apply for approval of the "Plan" and "Project" relative to Federal Aided Public Housing projects.

THE DESIGNATION OF SITE 30

The proposal for 160 publicly financed low-income units on Site 30 was approved by the City Planning Commission on August 11, 1971 and by the Board of Estimates on November 11, 1971. According to Doris Rosenblum, Executive Director of Board Community # 7, it was agreed to make an exchange between Turin House located at Columbus Avenue and 90th Street and Site 30. Turin House was originally designated as Public Housing and Site 30 was designated as moderate income housing. .³

An A-95 review request was made to change the site designation. It was approved by Dr.J.Douglas Carroll of the Tri-State Regional Planning

159

Commission. The Project was then approved by the City Planning Commission on August 11, 1971 and by the Board of Estimates on September 16, 1971. The Flood Gibbons Post 500 of the Veterans of Foreign Wars(VFW) was the sponsor and the Lefrak Organization was designated as the developer of site 30. "The use designation (of Site 30) was changed from partially tax-exempt housing at moderate rental or etc. to Public Housing. On December 11, 1971, the Board of Estimates approved the "plan " and "Project" for Site 30.

Early in the following year the developer Lefrak, in answer to a request from J.Christian, Chairman of the New York City Housing Administration, produced a price breakdown its development. The total came to \$6,975,000, almost \$1,000,000 more than the \$6,000,000 originally allotted for the development of Site 30. The total included \$1,050,000 for"other costs"which were not enumerated.

On December 5,1972 Reverend Thomas Farrelly wrote to Administrator Albert Walsh that rumor had it that Lefrak was unwilling or unable to adapt the plans for site 30 to meet the prototype for Turnkey Public Housing. He also sent a telegram to Mayor Lindsay, the same day, stating he had "...received shocking news that Site 30 has been

dropped from its first position on [a] list of ¹⁶⁰
priorities for construction of Public Housing in
New York City". Lindsay replied on the 17th "Let
me assure you unequivocally that Site 30 remains
our number one priority for Public Housing in New
York. I am advised that the developer of the site
has unexpectedly revised his price".⁴

On May 28, 1971 Albert Walsh of Housing,
Development and Preservation, in a news release
announced the completion of plans for the final
stage of the West Side Urban Renewal Area
containing sites on which 22,000 apartments would
be built. This would bring to a close, the news
release continued, the most ambitious urban
renewal plan in the history of the nation.⁵ Of
the remaining 2,096 apartments to be built on the
remaining sites, 946 would be low-income and 1,117
would be moderate-income with federal subsidy
under Sections 236 and 35 for conventional
Mitchell-Lama development. Three sites would be
set aside, for 18 months, and used as temporary
relocation holding sites. The news release
explained the rising costs

"Since the cost of housing has escalated since the inception of the plan well beyond the original projection. ..In the city's Mitchell-Lama program the thirty dollar per room ceiling of the early sixties has more than doubled. Yet, family income in the West Side area has decidedly not kept pace. The third phase now being implemented reflects these conditions...The West Side area is often cited nationally as a prime example of the constructive use of urban renewal to achieve an exciting, varied ethnically and economically integrated community. This last phase is being implemented in

6

that spirit.

The release further stated that site 30 would lead the way in the third phase. The Lefrak organization, which was originally scheduled to build a Mitchell-Lama project on the site, would undertake construction of the 160 unit "turnkey" public housing project, which had already been approved by Chairman Simon Golar of the New York City Housing Authority.

Construction on the remaining sites would begin within eighteen months. Except for Site 4, located at Columbus Avenue and 97th Street which would remain a public housing project, the remaining sites would house City Mitchell-Lama projects under Section 236 of the National Housing Act. Thirty per cent of the apartments would be rented to low-income families. Walsh promised that full relocation assistance would be available to all legal tenants who must be replaced. "...Such families will have first priority rights for housing under construction on a renewal site. By next month 300 families will have been relocated in the area".⁷

David Olinger, of the Housing Development Administration, notified Donald H. Elliot chairman of the City Planning Commission that the New York City Housing Administration had submitted a minor change. He requested a change in designation of site 30 from development as a partially tax exempt housing site at moderate rentals to public housing on June 4, 1971. The change was submitted in a letter dated June 9, 1971. The request was calendared on June 9th for public hearing on June 23, 1971. The Housing Development Administration concluded that the change in current plans was necessary after several months of discussion

with Community groups. Olinger noted that a favorable decision was necessary at the City Planning Commission public hearings because the Lefrak Construction Company has reached an agreement with the Housing Authority on costs for the project based on construction costs at the end of July. He further cautioned that a delay of approval of the minor changes and the "Plan" and "Project" could hold up other processing including the Writ of Assistance necessary to relocate tenants on the site with the approval of the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.

COMMUNITY QUESTIONS AND REACTIONS

At the public hearing, William Price of Community Action, Inc., a neighborhood organization allied with the Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Association, opposed the plan for demolition of Site 30 because this would mean dislocation of families already living on the site. Mr. Price asked the following questions: " Why, if turnkey public housing is possible, can't it be built on Columbus Avenue and 96th Street designated as site 9, for instance, where it could not be part of one solid block of public housing or on site 28 between 90th and 91st street on Amsterdam Avenue which is almost cleared? What happened to the City's offer of

164
September 22, 1970 of using a local community group as co-sponsor on a combined site 34 and 35 ? Why wasn't a community group proposed as a co-sponsor on site 30?"

Squatters on Site 30 were notified that they must vacate the premises by June 30, 1971 in exchange for other apartments. This was conditioned on the squatters signing rental agreements agreeing to pay rents by July 1, 1971. If they did not, they would be evicted. Squatters on other sites would be required to sign rental agreements by June 15, 1971 and begin to pay rent on July 1, 1971. Any new squatters would be evicted forthwith.

Continue, the association of brownstone owners, labelled the decision to make site 30 a turnkey public housing development as a bribe to the squatters designed to insure a peaceful political solution. Continue was convinced that the housing bureaucrats had succumbed to a noisy, violent minority and that the politicians had suffered a loss of political nerve.⁸

OPPOSITION TO PUBLIC HOUSING

In 1979 Continue was to argue that all the progress of the preceding eight years had been reversed. The trend, according to Continue was triggered by the illegal entry into an unfinished

section of the site 30 area by squatters who forcibly took possession of a number of buildings that were vacated and ready for demolition and who refused to leave. Continue claimed that the city bowed to this pressure by agreeing to convert site 4, located at 97th and Columbus Avenue, and 30 from middle to low-income housing. The city prepared to begin construction in 1972.

Trinity School located on 90th Street and Columbus Avenue, sued (Trinity Episcopal School vs Romney) in Federal Court to stop the construction. The suit was based on the plea that the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) could be applied not only to problems of sewage, air pollution and other aspects of the environment, but also to people. Trinity claimed that low-income people would "destroy the fabric of the community". On December 15, 1974 the court rejected the claims of Trinity School. The Court decided that site 30 could be public housing without endangering the community and "that the case was fraught with perilous overtones". On July 24, 1975 the Court of Appeals upheld Judge Cooper's findings that an environmental impact statement was not required. The City and Strykers Bay, acting as friends of the Court, in their

brief, stated that the Plaintiffs suggested that "the Plan" is a single document, a detailed blueprint setting forth exact numbers and quotas which the City arbitrarily violated after 1971 in response to political pressure, was invalid. In fact the history of redevelopment of the area is one marked by constant revisions in planning in order to adjust to changing circumstances and to take advantage of new housing

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programs._ Continue joined the suit after Trinity dropped out in 1975. In an affidavit David Kornbluh, Chairman of Community Board # 7 denied the testimony by Eugene Halpern, president of Continue, that compromise was impossible; the Board was at an impasse; and, as a result, the area was deteriorating. This to Kornbluh was, at least, misleading. He stated that Community Board #7 began a process, in the Spring of 1977, which resulted in the replanning of the nine uncompleted sites in the West Side Urban Renewal Area (WSURA). Site 30 and site 4, specifically, were not included in this replanning process and thus were not among these nine sites. The Community Board's preferred scheme for the development of the nine sites was for low-rise construction with a resident income distribution of 30 percent low-income and 70 percent moderate to middle-

income. However, completion of the aforementioned sites¹⁶⁷
is dependent on the construction of low rent housing on
site 30. The above, plus completion of the nine sites
would fulfill the city's commitment to provide 2,500
units of low-rent housing (Continue Vs Patricia Roberts

¹⁰
Harris, Secty; HUD, Dec. 1977)

A decision in the nine year legal battle, which
began in 1972, was prevented by the Federal Appeals
Court in New York City in 1978. Twice the Federal
District Court upheld the site 30 plan and twice that
court was reversed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on the grounds that the
the Federal government had not properly considered the
environmental implications of the plan.

The City, the Federal Government and Stryker's Bay, a
neighborhood group, appealed the latest reversal in
1979. On January 8, 1980 the Supreme Court granted a
request by New York City clearing the way for
construction of a low-income housing project on
Columbus Avenue and 90th Street in the West Side Urban
Renewal Area. The Supreme Court summarily reversed the
Appeals Court without requesting briefs or oral
arguments. In a five page unsigned opinion it stated
that the court cannot challenge the substantive

168

decisions of the policy making body. The sole role of the courts is to make sure that the rules, legal and administrative, of that agency are conformed to by the agency in question. The requirements have been fulfilled in this case. The decision was a victory for the city in that it stated that policy decisions of the City were not within the purview of the Courts.

THE POLITICS OF HOUSING

However, the decision of the courts created a problem for the Koch administration which was known to have serious doubts about using valuable land, now cleared and ready for development, for low-income housing. "I don't think there will ever be a low-income project on that site." said a City Hall source

11

requesting anonymity. (NYT:1-91980.) In addition, by 1980, at the cases conclusion, the \$6,000,000 which had been in the pipeline to build the project was no longer, sufficient to cover costs due to inflation, (inflation statistics) It was agreed, by all parties, that the \$6,000,000 would buy, approximately, 80 units due to inflation.

The New York Times interpreted the Supreme Court's decision as upholding the City's legal position. The editorial stated that New York City could build 160

units of low-rent housing adjacent to the Stephen Wise low-income project. However, now that its position has been sustained, the City, in all its wisdom, should not build the project. The concentration of five hundred and sixty low-rent units on a single block would threaten the social environment that an imaginative renewal plan has struggled to build for two decades.

During the period when site 30 was under litigation various alternatives were considered, and decisions and agreements were made in expectation of alternative decisions for the City. Some community reaction was that to use site 41 for public housing would arouse opposition of the residents of 88th Street. One might suspect that a proposal to transfer the project to their block might be even more strongly opposed, although it appears to be a rational decision, within the context of the Plan and its objectives. Consequently, it is doubtful that the single social environmental problem associated with site 30-the potentially negative perceptual image of the proposed site 30 to a public housing project would be ameliorated by transfer of the project to site 41.

A letter from Joseph Monticiollo, Director of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the New York City Area, to the City Planning Commission requested consideration of alternatives to site 30 as low-income public housing in accordance with the Appeals Courts recommendation. The City Planning Commission considered the suggestion that the Site 30 commitment be transferred to site 4 between 96th and 97th Street on Columbus Avenue.

Although Site 4 was already designated for low-income housing, this was not considered a suitable solution. Site 4 is one-third larger than site 30 and was programmed for a new 270 unit low-income development combined with a 640 forty seat public school facility. Considerable expense had been incurred by the legally designated co-sponsors for relocation of site tenants under the Title 1 Urban Renewal Contract with the Federal government. The transfer of additional low cost public housing to that site would result in a net loss of 110 low-income units, the elimination of the school, the need for additional funds for the relocation of site tenants and the demolition of the remaining buildings; all of this made the transfer unfeasible.

171
Finally, the current unavailability of housing and government funds had interrupted current relocation and clearance activity by the Department of Relocation. This had resulted in the illegal reoccupation of the remaining buildings by non-vested households on site 4

12
supported by some community groups.

In an appended section Thomas Appleby, Housing Development Administration, Joseph J. Christian, Chairman of the New York City Housing Administration and Victor Marrero, Chairman of the City Planning Commission stated "we also feel that proceeding with the development of site 30 is the best way to meet the commitments to the West Side Urban Renewal Area

13
(WSURA).

Continue's appeal to the Circuit Court was based on the environmental issue, the impropriety of having a low-income development on the same block with the low-income Stephen Weiss development and that Community Board #7 was on record as opposing anymore high rise low-income housing. An excerpt from the brief of the Community Action for Legal Services submitted to Peter Salerno, Assistant United States Attorney, stated that relocation of low cost public housing to another site would increase fear, hostility and opposition of others

which might lead to new litigation delaying the completion of the Plan.

On June 12, 1975 the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development (HPD) notified Mr. Monticiollo, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, that Lefrak had delivered a revised proposal in the agreed upon sum of \$6,975,000 to develop site 30. The original figure was \$6,000.090. The breakdown of apartments was 72 one bedroom units; 56 two bedroom units; 24 three bedroom and eight four bedroom units.

In 1979 due to escalating land values, it became clear that the city could make 2,700,000 dollars by selling part of site 30 to Lefrak. As presented, the developer would agree to subsidize 40 apartments out of 160, for ten years, or half the duration of the bond used to finance the project (5-20 years). The remainder of the apartments would be rented or sold at market rate.

Ironically, Continue offered a last minute compromise plan in 1979 whereby they would agree to 160 sixty units of Senior Citizen housing for the elderly which the proponents of low-income housing had refused.

Due to the site 30 court case, the economic uncertainties of the 1980's mortgage rates, the inability of the conflicting groups to come to an acceptable compromise, the threat of Continue to institute a new suit, the indecisive role of HUD and the increasing demand for apartments on the West Side, all these enabled the City to offer its own plan to facilitate the completion of the West Side Urban Renewal Area. Robert Reach, of Housing, Development and Preservation explained "the city can no longer afford one hundred and sixty units of subsidized housing,.. the value of land has increased tremendously making it attractive to develop to developers."¹⁴

The Site 30 issue had remained dormant until early 1984 when City Council member, Ruth Messinger suggested that commercial space designation as part of the site 30 development could result in spin-offs of sufficient money to increase the number of units of low-income housing. Charles Reiss of Housing, Development and Preservation, replied that commercial rentals for the purpose of subsidizing rentals had become uncompetitive. As if to provide an alternative on the May, 23, 1984, the Department of Housing, Development and Preservation submitted to H. J. Sturz "minor

174

changes" to the urban renewal plan to permit 87 units to be developed by the New York City Housing Administration "Turnkey Project" for the elderly on Site 30A and approximately 200 dwelling units of "80-20" housing with commercial space and enclosed parking in Site 30. The Board, represented by Ethel Sheffer, Doris Rosenblum and and J. Rhea met with the Site 30 Coalition on December 7, 1984.

Ethel Sheffer, member of the Community Board and its former Chairperson, expressed concern over the possible loss of the \$6,000,000 which would close out subsidized housing since no other money was available from the Federal government. She expressed the fear that inflation was eating up what remained of the money's buying power. The Board asked Leon Bagues, State Senator and former chairman of the Community Board # 7, to intercede with the Mayor. The Coalition position was that the \$6,000,000 should be used to buy as many low-income housing units as possible and leave the development of the remainder of the site in abeyance until more money was available. At subsequent meetings of Board members with Mr. Anthony Gliedman, Commissioner of Housing, Development and Preservation,

the latter suggested that new options were possible ¹⁷⁵

after hearing the different factions on the Board. ¹⁵

In late December of 1984 the Senior Citizen's Committee of Community Board # 7 reacted to the Housing, Development and Preservation's expressed fears that the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) would withdraw the \$6,000,000. The withdrawal of funds would effectively halt the Housing, Development and Preservation's plan to build 87 one bedroom units. The committee expressed the fear that the money would be lost and requested a mixture of one bedroom and studio apartments for the elderly. All expressed concern about the method of choosing tenants on the basis of income levels since they were aware that the City would not build elevators for low-income housing.

In early 1985 the Department of Housing, Development and Preservation notified the City Planning Commission that Site 30 had been divided into two sections, site 30A and 30B, because the New York City Housing Administration had been designated as the sponsor of the elderly development on site 30A.

At the same time Congressman Charles Rangel notified Gliedman that a temporary site approval was granted by HUD on February 3, 1984. This insured the Board that the money allocated to site 30 had been given an automatic extension until February, 1985.

Paul Ketterer and Robert Reach of Housing, Development and Preservation attended the Board meeting on the first Tuesday of January, 1985. Ketterer stated that after the mandatory subsidy period expired, the City would provide a tax incentive to continue subsidizing the apartments for low-income tenants. But if the developers discontinued the subsidy, the tenants would have to pay market rate rentals. The faction, of which Edith Sheffer was an important voice, within the Board that wanted a compromise seemed to accept the breakup of site 30. They made a last try and asked why the city couldn't guarantee the subsidy for the life of the building. Reach suggested that this was not city policy and to make the developer guarantee a subsidy for the life of the building was economically unfeasible for the developer. Further it might make the city subject to a new suit instituted by Lefrak, the developer, that would delay finishing the remaining sites. The delay might also cause Housing and Urban

Development to withdraw the \$6,000,000 as HUD was under increasing pressure to spend the \$6,000,000.

The Site 30 Coalition was formed in 1984. It was made up of district politicians and public housing advocates who were against the proffered plan. Prominent members of the coalition were Ruth Messinger, who represented the Upper West Side on the City Council, United States Representative Rangel, State Senator Ted Weiss, State Senator Franz Leichter, the late State Senator Leon Bogues, State Assemblyman Edward Sullivan, and Board member William Price. State Senator Bogues asked for time to see if he could get additional funding from Governor Cuomo's three point five billion housing program. In the meantime Bogues suggested that the City go ahead with the development of Site 30 B for the 87 units of elderly housing, leaving Site 30A vacant until more money was available.

Continue found the development of Site 30 B acceptable, but expressed reservations about the 40 subsidized units, wherein a family of four was required to have an income of \$21,000 or less. Continue labeled this part of the proposal discriminatory towards middle-income families.

On January 16, 1985 Community Board # 7 called a meeting to amend and then approve a plan for developing site 30. The Housing, Development and Preservation plan proposed that the New York City Housing Administration was to build an 11 story structure to house 87 senior citizen apartments, a private developer (Lefrak) would build three town houses with 11 market rate units and a 21 story building with 190 market rate apartments. The amended plan required the developer to subsidize 40 units in perpetuity so that they would be affordable for low and moderate income families. The Housing Committee of the Board endorsed the housing for the elderly by a vote of 13 to 1 with one abstention. The 21 story building plus the three town houses were approved by a seven to four vote with four abstentions. It was necessary for the full Board and the Board of Estimate to approve the committee vote.

THE FINAL PLAN

In the February full Board meeting, at which the Lefrak representative plus Paul Ketterer were present, the City's final plan was presented. The presentation made by Ketterer was for 87 units of elderly housing and 201 units of predominantly "luxury" housing with 42 units set aside for low and moderate-income families.

An additional three town houses containing 11 market rate apartments were to be built on 90th Street. The Lefrak organization could not say how long the subsidy would be guaranteed beyond the life of the ten year tax-exempt bond. J. S. Simon, the General Manager of the Housing Authority, emphasized in support of the plan the "dire need" of the elderly, the fact the designation was less controversial and that housing for the elderly "was an easier, faster sell". The Community Board voted for the development of site 30B and rejected the City's plans for Site 30A.

Public hearings at the City Planning Commission were mandatory under the Urban Land Use Redevelopment Procedure and were held in May, 1985. There was a mix-up in the designated hour that the item on site 30 would be heard and voted on by City Planning Commission. No one was present from the Community Board, the Site 30 Coalition or Continue. In any case position papers were made available to the City Planning Commission. The Commission voted to accept the plan as offered by the Department of Housing, Development and Preservation.

The Board of Estimate held a public hearing in June, 1985 and after a meeting which lasted from 10 A.M. to 4.30 P.M. voted to accept the plan offered by the Department of Housing, Development and Preservation with only Carol Bellamy dissenting.

It would appear that in the final analysis, the desire of City officials and the moderates on the Community group to beat the deadlines for funding to keep the planning process and building process going and to complete the plan had become more significant than its outcome. One can legitimately speculate that the City's objective in joining the Court case was to defend administrative policy prerogatives rather than to defend public housing. Due to the completion of East Side development, the fear of another "Queens episode" and the opportunity to increase city revenues through increased real estate taxes, the Koch Administration by encouraged the development of luxury and market rate housing.

Notes: Chapter 4

1 Letter to the City Planning Commission.

2 Letter dated 6-25-71 from Christopher Chadbourne to Donald Elliot.

3 Letter from Donald Elliot to D. Ollinger of the Department of Housing, Development and Preservation dated 8-16-71.

4 Letter from Mayor Lindsay to Reverend Farrelly.

5 New York City. HPD News Release by Albert Walsh, May 28, 1971, p.1.

6 New York City. HPD News release May 28, 1971, p.1.

7 New York City. HPD News Release May 28, 1971, p.2.

8 Taped interview with Eugene Halpern.

9 Trinity Episcopal Vs Romney.

10 Continue VS Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary, Hud,
Dec. 1977.

11 New York Times, Late City Ed., 19 Sept. 1980, Sec. .

12 Taped Interview with William Price, Board member.

13 Letter dated June 2, 1978.

14 Taped interview with Doris Rosenbium.

CHAPTER 5APPEAL TO THE COURTS

The recourse to the Courts by Trinity and later by Continue was another dimension of the political process. It made Site 30 a symbolic rallying point for opposing pro and anti-public housing proponents. Both sides perceived that the designation of Site 30 would be crucial in the development of the Upper West Side Renewal Plan. Paramount in the minds of the public housing advocates was the relocatees and the housing needs of low-income peoples. The opposing forces feared that public housing was a form of segregation and would reghettoize the area. They favored market rate housing with a 20% component of low-income housing. This would be a form of integration, would replenish the city revenues, fulfill the promises to those who were dislocated by the redevelopment process and safeguard the investments and property values of the brownstone owners.

Both sides perceived, rightly or wrongly, that the designation of Site 30 would be crucial in the development of the Upper West Side. The designation of Site 30 as public housing precipitated the court action in an attempt to forestall, delay and defeat public housing. The anti-housing forces hoped that successful court action would achieve a victory which was unachieveable in the political arena.

BACKGROUND Of The Court Case: In 1972 the Trinity Episcopal School Corporation, located on Columbus Avenue between 91st and 92nd Street, instituted legal action in the State Supreme Court to block construction of 160 units of low-income housing on Site 30. Ironically, Trinity was founded 261 years before to educate the poor. The suit was based on "tipping the area balance"; which alluded to the contention that the continuation of a public housing policy would reach a point, in the schools and the neighborhood, wherein middle-class buyers and potential new residents would be discouraged from moving into the area and old time residents, fearing a new ghettoization of the West Side would leave the area. These factors would accelerate the

process. In 1962, Trinity seriously considered moving its school out of New York City, due to racial unrest and a growing imbalance in racial mix. Trinity maintained that the area was designated as an Urban Renewal area calling for middle-income housing with specified (*italics authors*) amounts of low-income and luxury housing in an integrated community.¹ Trinity, with this understanding acquired additional property from the City to build a housing development over a previously erected new school addition. The Suit, initiated by Trinity, stated that the City broke a written agreement with respect to the development of an integrated community and that the Urban Renewal Plan formed part of the agreement between the City and Trinity.

The suit, Trinity v the Department of Housing and Urban Development, was heard by Judge Cooper in the United States Southern Federal District Court from October, 1973 through May, 1974. Trinity's case was denied by Judge Cooper. Following are the list of complaints and Judge Cooper's findings: (1) The plaintiff claimed that the purpose of the Urban Renewal Plan was to

create a new community. Instead the community was rapidly deteriorating, due in part to the squatters who were a disruptive element in the community; (2) Trinity charged that the City had made binding oral representations about the number of low-income dislocated residents who would be relocated; and (3) the Department of Housing and Urban Development had committed an error pursuant to the National Environment Protection ACT (NEPA) of 1969 and that the designation of Sites 4 and 30, as low-income development sites, was improper. Trinity sought relief under the Otero doctrine. Judge Cooper's decision was an integral part of the defendants case, on appeal. I will include Judge Cooper's findings in the defendants' presentations during subsequent appeals of the case.

In 1974 Trinity was denied court costs and attorney fees. Continue joined Trinity in 1975 and hired and paid Eugene J. Morris as their attorney. Continue effectively became the main plaintiff. The City was an active participant in the case relating to Site 30. Continue appealed the case

in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in 1975.²

STATEMENT OF THE CASE BY THE DEFENDANTS

The plaintiffs enjoined the defendants from constructing 160 of low-income housing on Site 30. They also requested the forcible removal of about 250 families of the community whom the plaintiff classified as illegal squatters. They sought an order that no more than 30% of the rental units in the new middle income buildings would be allocated to low-income families. The plaintiff filed notice of appeal on the last day available to them. They requested a conference with the staff counsel of this court for the purpose of expediting this case which the defendants labeled as a delaying tactic.

The defendants submitted an affidavit from Chairman Christian of the New York City Housing Administration stating that the Housing Authority's private contractor for Site 30 would not proceed until this litigation was completely finished. Lefrak noted that the \$6,000,090 committed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1972 was now sufficient for only 130 units. For the time being the plaintiff has

enjoyed the practical effect of an injunction against Site 30 which they were not entitled to have. Further, the plaintiff agreed that every factual finding was supported by the evidence, but they contended that the factual issues could have been determined differently.

In a letter to the Department of Housing and Urban Development dated April 14, 1972 the plaintiff suggested that their objective was to insure that "communities absorb a full share of low-income families. " At the trial before Judge Cooper, the author, Dr. Jerome Fine testified that "fair share": was between 15 to 20%, but closer to 15% and that other communities "fair share" should be as much as 30%. The underlying dispute is with the policy of the Federal, State and the City governments. We, the defendants, contend that an otherwise sound central city, with spots of deterioration should be preserved to meet the needs of the entire community, including the needs of their low-income and minority residents. Therefore, to reverse Judge Coopers' decision would deprive certain people of their equal rights

to decent housing and concentrate them within the ghettos of the city.

The plaintiff claimed that the community is becoming a ghetto and that construction of Site 30, due to the pressure of squatters, would contribute to "ghettoization". Judge Cooper found that there are three factors which determine whether a community would become a ghetto. They are statistical, community facilities and the communities view of itself. Judge Cooper found that the community had a smaller percentage of minorities, single and poverty families and a greater median income than larger West Side Communities in Manhattan and New York City. A Witness for the plaintiff, Dr. Frank Kristoff, sociologist stated that the community was and is strong and stable and among the upper twenty-five percent of New York Communities.

The community has good public parks, transportation, cultural activities, a variety of commercial and retail stores, plentiful amount of luxury housing on Central Park West, public and private schools and the climate of a racially and economically sound community. As to crime, the

police captain noted a marked decline in crime since 1971. Contrary to claims, public education is outstanding and the quality of the Juinor High Schools is improving.

Continue's witnesses represented a small proportion of the community. The community was safe and free of any noticeable degree of anti-social behavior.

The city's 2,500 figure was the City's estimate of low-income families in need of housing. Continue's contention that the community could not accommodate more than the aforementioned figure for low-income housing is an arbitrary number and has no correlation to factors that make a community a ghetto. The plaintiff's complaint that the presence of social problems was due to welfare and single parents is nullified by the courts decision that low-income cannot be associated with ghettos. (legal decision of the courts) Judge Cooper stated that the community could accept 4,000 low-income households without deterioration. Site 30 and 2.500 low-income tenants would not "tip the balance".

Trinity claims that its representative, Eliot Lumbard, received oral representation of 2,500 units of low-income housing and that no more than 30% of middle-income housing would be allocated for low-income housing. Judge Cooper found that the Honorable Milton A. Mollen, Chairman of the Housing and Redevelopment Board never made a commitment to a fixed and immutable number or percent of low-income units. (testimony of Mollen, Congressman Badillo and Roger Starr supported this finding) In any case changes were to be expected due to the magnitude of the plan. In addition, the parol evidence rule does not permit oral representations to govern plaintiffs contracts since they were not approved by the Board of

³
Estimates. Continue contended that the Squatters were the cause of the problem of ghettoization. Their homes "are deplorable and not fit for human habitation." Judge Cooper found there were no police complaints. Furthermore the complaints that the squatters "forcibly" took possession of their buildings and that they were "instigated by a group of radicals" as part of an organized movement supported by Strykers Bay, Operation Move-

In and El Comite were unsupported by cited evidence.

The crux of the case was the plaintiffs contention that as more low income people find permanent residence within this community, the middle class will flee and the community will become a ghetto. This claim was based on Otero v the New York City Housing Administration(NYCHA) which gave the community the right to bar low-income people from becoming community residents. However, Otero dealt with racial imbalance and therefore it is not applicable.

Judge Cooper found that the economic range of low-income families (including a \$17,200 dollar annual income) precluded equating persons of low-income with minority status; low -income, per se, could not be associated with anti-social behavior. Fewer people are selling brownstones than buying in recent years and, in fact, prices were increasing; the middle class was definitely not fleeing; and there is no proof of racial imbalance. Furthermore, the question of whether site 30 would create a pocket ghetto is not relevant. The question should be, does Site 30

create a community ghetto? The relevant community is balanced ethnically. There has been a shift of ten per cent in the last five years. The Berman v Parker decision (1954) states "we do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable."

The Plaintiff's complained that the Department of Housing and Urban Development didn't comply with the requirements of the National Environment Protection Act by not considering alternatives both within and outside the community. Judge Cooper's findings were that HUD's role was to consider whether federal expenditures were to be used properly.

Continue complained that no formal change to the Urban Renewal Plan, as required by Article 15 of the General Municipal Law, was conducted. However the record indicated that the City Housing Development Administration requested the approval of the City Planning Commission for the conversion of Site 30 and Site 4 to low-income housing. Separate public hearings, on each site, were held on Site 4 in 1970 and site 30 in 1971. Both were approved by the City Planning Commission and

submitted to the Board of Estimate in 1971. Both the Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate found the changes "to be consistent with the overall development of the area." Moreover, the New York State Commission of Housing and Community Renewal approved the changes.

COURT DECISIONS

On December 14, 1978 the United States Court of Appeals issued a permanent injunction on environmental grounds. The Appeals Court held that the Special Environment Clearance prepared by the Department of Housing and Urban Development with respect to Site 30 in the West Side Urban Renewal Area was inadequate; in that, it failed to consider alternatives under Section 102(2)(d) of the National Environment Protection Act. In the second appeal by the defendants the Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "delay was not to be regarded as an overriding factor..environmental factors, such as crowding, low income-housing into a concentrated area should be given determinative weight"⁴

The Court offered two possible solutions, a project with " a reasonable percentage" of moderate income residents; and to study the thinking behind recent trends away from high rise apartments. The Defendants decided not to appeal the second decision of the Appeals Court. The Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development requested the City Planning Commission to implement the order by September 23,1975.

At the same time the defendants took the case to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Appeals decision set a precedent in regard to housing. Judge Cooper's decision was upheld in January,1980. The Court noted the protracted nature of the litigation in that the original defendant was George Romney, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

As originally written, the plan required a mix of seventy percent middle income and thirty percent low-income housing. It designated the site at issue here as the location of one of the middle-income projects. In 1969, after substantial progress toward completion of the plan, local agencies in New York recognized that there were an

insufficient number of low-income units proposed in the West Side Urban Renewal Plan to satisfy the increased needs for such units. Due to this shortage the City amended the plan and designated Site 30 as the future location of a high rise building containing one hundred and sixty units of low-income housing. The Department of Housing and Urban Development approved this amendment in 1972. Trinity sued and the District Court concluded that the defendants had violated the National Environmental Act of 1969. On respondents appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed all but the District Courts treatment of the National Environment Protection Act claim. The Court of Appeals agreed that the aforementioned Department was not required to prepare a full scale environmental statement. However, it held that HUD had not complied with 102(2) (D) which requires an agency to "study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available

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resources . The Appeals Court concluded that any consideration by HUD of alternatives to placing

low-income HOUSING on the site "were either highly limited or nonexistent"⁶. It required HUD to prepare a statement of possible alternatives, the consequences thereof and the facts and the reasons for and against..."⁷ p.3)The Court believed "the agencies in cooperation with interested parties should be able to arrive at an equitable solution".⁸

On remand, The Department of Housing and Urban Development found that although the location of Site 30 created valid questions, these problems were not serious enough to require inexhaustibility. Further HUD stated that any relocation of the units would entail an unacceptable delay of two years or more. According to HUD "measured against the environmental costs associated with the minimum two year delay, the benefits seem insufficient to justify a mandated substitution of sites".⁹

The District Court entered judgement in favor of petitioners.(Trinity Episcopal Corp. v Harris,1978) On Appeal, the Court remanded again, on the grounds of the Administrative Procedure Act that decisions should be set aside if they were

found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the

law...".¹⁰ The Court felt that delay wasn't an overriding factor. Instead environmental factors should be given determinative weight.

The case went to the Supreme Court in 1979. Their decision was that low-income housing and its inhabitants were not an ecological danger to the environment.. The Supreme Court decided that once an agency has made a decision subject to the National Environment Protection Act's procedural requirements, the only role of the courts was to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences. It cannot "interject itself within the area of the discretion of the executive as to choice of the action to be

taken".¹¹ Ostensibly the City could go ahead and build Public Housing on Site 30.

The paramount fear of the anti-public housing interest groups was that the City was breaking its promise to upgrade the Upper west Side. They feared that public housing would endanger the gentrification of the area. They feared that public housing would endanger their investment,

threaten the quality of the schools and result in the "reghettoization" of the area. The above led to the formation of Continue, which represented the interests of the brownstone owners. However, it is fair to recognize that many of the Continue officials and some Continue members were former Civil Rights advocates during the sixty's and recognized the obligation to relocate former tenants within the area.

Continue and the anti-public housing interest group feared that Site 30 was the forerunner of City policy to build more public housing. Continue saw the appeal to the Courts as a legitimate avenue for halting and nullifying political decisions a political decision made by the City Administration. In retrospect the appeal to the courts resulted in a seven year delay in the completion of the Plan. A crucial result of the delay was that the ongoing inflationary spiral the six million dollars allotted for Site 30 was only able to buy one half the units the funding could buy in 1972. Further the City Administration was able to change its position on Site 30 by stating that the money was insufficient to designate Site

30 as public housing. Finally, the struggle over Site 30 divided the Community and allowed the City to impose a solution which satisfied no one.

Notes: Chapter 5

1 Trinity Eppiscopal Corporation v Hud, Docket (U.S.C.A.), 1973.

2 Karlen v Hud, Docket 75-7061 (U.S.C.A.), 1955.

3 (Citizens Committee for Faraday; Wood v Lindsay, (U.S.C.A.), Dec.5, 1974

4 Karlin v Harris, (U.S.C.A.), 1978.

5 Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council v Karlen, U.S.C.A.), 1972, p.2).

6 Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council v Karlen, p.3.

7 Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council v Karlen, p.

8 Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council v Karlen, p.3

9 Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council v Karlen, p.
3

10 Trinity Episcopal Corporation v Harris,
(U.S.C.A.), 1978, p.4.

11 Trinity Episcopal Corporation v Harris,
(U.S.C.A.), 1978.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Our primary focus has been, in our exploratory, descriptive study, on the political, economic and social processes and structures involved in the investigation, certification, planning, funding and subsequent development of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan. That Plan encompassed a twenty block area bounded south and north by 87th and 97th Streets and east and west by Central Park West and Amsterdam Avenue. Exploration for development and renewal began in 1950. The area was certified for renewal in 1956.

An important theme of our study is the description of the attempt to create a gerontological subcommunity within an urban context. The central issue that has emerged is the struggle for space between real estate developers interested in market-price middle and upper income housing, public housing advocates, the City Administration which has its own agenda and a variety of neighborhood groups.

Crucial to these issues of Urban Renewal on the Upper West Side was, of course, land use and the allocation of sites. The announcement of the intention to plan activated foreseen and unforeseen interest groups on a wide spectrum of political, economic and social spheres. The ensuing conflicts over the scope, direction and content of the plan were resolved through formal, informal and internal processes which made the original statement of the plan, in many cases, unrecognizable. No one interest group had total power over the planning process. But a continuous series of compromises and temporary consensuses were dependent on the degree of influence and resources available to the contending forces, their public activism and passivity, interest group alignments, in the historically specific context of international, national, state, city and local politics.

Within this context struggles for power and influence over the decision making process were activated between various clients, constituencies and the City priorities. Each group was affected by proposed and on-going policies on urban renewal

and housing which, however, were often decided on the Federal, State and City level. The elderly were usually excluded from the planning and political process because of their political passivity, the non-spatial community pattern of elderly housing (they usually do not live in the area where the housing is to be built) and their fragmentation due to conflicting definitions of their own and the "Public Interest". Thus when the elderly are members of an ethnic or other social group, they may define themselves as members of one group, both or neither.

We have sought to investigate the planning process by examining the background of groups and institutions which were primarily interested in benefiting from urban renewal and redevelopment. Therefore we have asked the following questions which provided the guidelines for our study. What were the seen and unforeseen consequences of economic interests in relation to the elderly, neighborhood subcommunities, the poor, the dislocated and the relocated? How was the Goddard Riverside Development Fund Company, along with other advocates of the elderly, able to gain City

Planning Commission designation of Site 41, on 88th Street and Columbus Avenues, primarily, as a senior citizen housing project? Furthermore, in the light of the competitive search for private sites, how was Goddard Riverside able to gain the right to build for the elderly? What are the possibilities for the approval of senior citizen housing in the on-going struggle for designation? What are the possibilities for the approval of housing for the elderly in the four sites that remained available for some combination of public and private housing under the West Side Urban Renewal Plan? Finally, in the struggles for housing, "Who gets what?" and in the light of victory and defeat over the potentialities available in planning, who bears the consequences of defeat? Necessarily our conclusions will take into account the meaning of the over-all planning process as it is related to the Upper West Side and the social purposes of Federal, State and City planning legislation.

Policy was stated and authority was delegated wherein subsidies, allotments and rights to condemn land were bestowed by planning commissions

to public and private authorities, agencies and entrepreneurs. Each decision affects the public and private interests groups within and outside the City in relation to the political, economic and social gains and costs. In this context Lasswell states "We think of politics in terms of participants, (with identifications, demands, expectations; with control over base values) interacting in arenas (situations in which decision outcomes are expected) employing strategies to maximize value indulgences over deprivations by influencing decision outcomes and hence effects" (Italics author's)¹ Advocates of planning have advanced the thesis that planning is a rational means of discovering the needs and goals of a political entity. These goals are formalized in a master plan. After the acceptance of the plan by relevant parties and constituencies, the planner brings the plan to fruition.

The process of urban planning, at least at the formal stage, attempts to gain rational control over resources, priorities and time. In urban development these are implicit with regard to a

city or particular areas of the city. At a theoretical level, legislation, zoning and condemnation can be justified by a wide variety of specific goals and purposes; but planning is the rational means of achieving these goals.

The West Side Urban Renewal Plan provided "...a variety of renewal actions including clearance, redevelopment, rehabilitation and the provision of public improvement".² The goals of the plan were (1) amenities to its citizens; a pleasant environment, parks, clean air and freedom from noise and traffic; (2) higher social purposes such as housing for the elderly, the poor, special status groups, artists, dancers, ethnic or racial groups and the handicapped (which appealed to voluntary organizations and associations, ideological groups, church and civic groups); (3) economic growth to the neighborhood, city and the region by providing sites for industrial and commercial enterprises; and (4) economic opportunities to banks, developers, insurance companies, land owners, architects, builders, industrial suppliers and members of the building trade unions.

In this context agencies of planning became media through which formal and informal interest groups based on some combination of these goals and purposes acted in the political arena as they attempted to define their goals in terms of the "public interest". Therefore planning and planners plays and played an important role in the political process.

Planning had its origins in the United States in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. Most of the planners were graduates of Schools of Architecture and as such, they were influenced by architectural theory. Planning was also identified with Civic Reform. Planning theory produced by the universities branched in two directions. One school perceived the function of the planner as ecological planning. The goal was to make the environment more conducive to "good living" and the amenities of middle class sensibilities. Intimately associated with ecological planning was the reform movement which was interested in efficient government through a rational and
3
independent planning process.

Physical planners believed that changing the environment would be decisive in changing society. M. Christine Boyer states that "thus the environmental chaos of the American city became linked in the minds of the improvers to the social pathology of urban life. Long before poverty, poor housing and slums were thought of as economic and political symptoms, improvers saw a link between environmental conditions and the social order, between physical and moral contagion."⁴ As a result the main function of planners became zoning regulations to control and prohibit the population influx into the urban centers. Concomitantly they hoped to control density and urban sprawl through the regulation of land allocation and land use by setting up zones for different kinds of development. Boyer suggests that the planning literature and the Reform Movement had an antipathy to the influx of immigrants to the urban centers and viewed them as the seed beds of urban congestion, crime and the decline of neighborhoods.

The advocates and clientele of the planner and the reform movement were downtown business property interests and civic organizations. They were interested in efficient government, the elimination of graft and corruption, the reduction of taxes and an emphasis on capital investment to improve the quality of city life. As early as 1909, the First Conference on Population Congestion stated "...that physical environment was a major determinant of social behavior and a direct contributor to individual behavior."⁵

Ideologically its emphasis was on the negative aspects of slums and ghettos and by extension all large cities. Implicit was a nostalgia for a rural past invoked, in part, by the threatening aspects of the urban poor.

The reformers envisioned politics as an inseparable means of carrying out public policy in the public interest. The capture of political office by the reformers would ensure independence for the planners from politics and private interests through the formation of independent authorities and commissions. By 1914 the task of the City Planning Authority was seen as a

responsibility to create a Master Plan as an integral part of the decision making process.

Theoretically "planning" may be defined as an attempt to replace or supplement market mechanisms for allocating scarce resources which are dictated by a" .. .rational process of drawing up explicit

plans and systematically carrying them out".⁶

Ideally, Schumpeter and Mannheim suggested that planning has four requirements: the independence of the planning institution from political influence must be insured in order to make rational decisions; the planner must have access to all pertinent information; the planner must be competent, depersonalized and capable of reducing alternatives to rationalized thinking and planners must have complete control over the process and the individuals who execute the policy. These proposals would discourage competition from political, economic, civic and bureaucratic interests which, often, have conflicting goals and interests.

Our study suggests that planning, in the context of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan was, at best, good intentions and at worst ideology,

which expressed the interests of groups with a special agenda, because it assumed that the values underlying the planning process are orthogonal, that is, it is possible to resolve differences in values by discovering a common dimension that underlies disparate beliefs. This is to say that interest groups involved in the planning process may have conflicting interests which may be resolvable at a political level but not at a rational level.⁷

In contrast Alan Altschuler found, in his study of ST. Paul and Minneapolis, that planners could not carry out their plans without aid from groups outside government. Planners were forced to make their proposals to potential constituencies. The goals and means were shaped by the assumption that planners didn't have the power to enact their plans since they were appointed rather than elected officials. Our study supports Altschuler's conclusion that planners can fulfill the role of technicians, mediators or advocates depending on the historical context in which they operate. Altschuler's findings were similar to the observations made by Martin Gallent, member of

the New York City Planning Commission over an

eighteen year period and other planners.⁸

Gallent suggested that planners must be moderate, taking into account the power of important interest groups. He defined planning as recognizing trends and making rational advisory decisions in an irrational world. In this role planners could present alternative solutions, but the power to make decisions lie in the hands of the Koch Administration and the Board of Estimate. At best the Master Plan serves as a guide line which is subject to unpredictable events and political decisions on the Federal level over which the City has no control.

The West Side Urban Renewal Plan was announced in 1955 and it is in the last stages of development of the four sites which will complete the plan. The expected completion of the plan in 1986 has covered 31 years of largely unpredictable events on all levels of the political, economic and the social life of the city, state, nation and the world. These events ranged from the pre and Post World War II demographic influx of refugees from war torn Europe, the changing racial balance

of New York City and other urban centers to the flight to and from suburbia, the Korean War, the New York fiscal crisis, the Vietnamese War, the rise of a charismatic leader, Father Brown, the conflicting promises made by the City to both the brownstone owners and the Public housing advocates, the struggle over the designation of Site 30, the court case which lasted eight years and the Presidential and local elections. Unpredictable demographic changes ranged from an influx of refugees from Europe to a post war influx of Puerto Ricans and Blacks which triggered the flight to suburbia. Locally these demographic changes led to an influx of blacks and Latin Americans to the area. This influx plus the flight of the Irish and German Ethnic groups and the shortage of apartments in Manhattan led to a change in the ethnic composition of the area. The ensuing instability and ghettoization was abetted by market conditions which encouraged landlords to neglect upkeep of their buildings and led to further deterioration. Furthermore the exodus to the Suburbs was further encouraged by national policy and Robert E. Moses' road building program.

The post war international scene was one of "Cold War" and an uninterrupted policy of strength through rebuilding the armed forces. The emphasis on nuclear defense resulted in a constantly increasing defense budget at the expense of a social policy of housing and redistributive politics.

The world economy, during this thirty year period was notable for its instability and recurring unbalanced budgets. The dramatic revival of the Japanese and the European economies created new competitors for the industrial markets of the world. The success of our rivals was due in part to the cheaper sources of labor, the unwillingness of American management to make capital investments in the productive sector and the allotment of an increasing share of government resources to the defense sector. Symptomatic, nationally, were the "recessions" of the 1970's and the fiscal crisis of New York City. The United States, in the post World War II world became increasingly oriented and dependent on service related industries. In like manner, New York City was engaged in a gradual but dramatic transformation of its work

place into the international corporate and financial center of the world.

Politically, the Democratic Party whose political strategy was based on a system of urban alliances made up of disparate forces suffered a "temporary" decline. Paradoxically, the Middle Class elements who supported the New Deal policy of urban renewal through redistributive housing politics became increasingly disenchanted with the fruits of victory embodied in urban redevelopment policy. The breakdown of coalition politics made Republican victories in National politics inevitable. Republican electoral policy was based on the revitalization of the South and Southwest through the allocation of government funds for defense related industry and an emphasis on rural housing needs over urban housing needs. Republican electoral politics made "Sun Belt" cities centers of growth and expansion at the expense of the older urban centers of the Northeast and the Midwest.

Within this context, housing programs for the elderly and the poor and urban redevelopment policies of New York City and the Nation were

intimately entwined and influenced by forces which at best, policy makers recognized but were unable to change or at worst discounted or were unaware of decisions and policies enacted at higher levels of government.

Although City Planners had more information than the average citizen they were unable to predict events which decisively influenced the development of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan. Due to their position in the administrative bureaucracy information about the gyrations of city policy were available in the form of "hand me downs" to middle-level bureaucrats from higher level administrative planners who, themselves, were unable to make planning policy. This inertia and the attendant temporizing was aggravated by the cut-off of Federal funds by Republican Administrations which made City and State governments unwilling or unable to continue urban development and public housing.

The Manes scandal and the questionable designation of land sites, in New York City, seems to corroborate the role assigned to the bureaucracy by Altschuler as technicians who carry

out the political decisions and policies of elected officials. A repeated theme of Administrative Planners was that policy making was intimately related to access and influence over the capital budget. It was suggested that Planners, during the Lindsay administration, reached their zenith of power over the planning process due to their designation as initiators of the capital budget. This short-lived influence over the capital budget, terminated by the Koch Administration, weakened the perceived power of the City Planning Commission in the eyes of other departments.

At the same time housing policy, since the 1930's, increasingly became, the province of the Federal government as a result of Federal financing and subsidies.⁹ Urban development and housing became subject to government rules and regulations which hampered, encouraged and channeled city policy and local politics in unforeseen directions. National political decisions were increasingly influenced by reactions to international events, electoral politics and the instability of an economy subject

to the strains of prosperity and recession, war and peace, "Cold War" and co-existence. The lack of continuity in National electoral politics led to piece meal decisions and compromises rather than a "Master Plan". Policy-making, on the local level, to a large extent became a reactive process dependent on the largesse of the Federal government and the limiting perimeters of policy decisions and regulations which were based on a different set of rationalities and priorities.

New York City, as the strategic and prestigious center of corporative headquarters and national and international banking and finance, had a unique position in terms of urban developmental policy and Federal money. In addition, due to the political acuity of men like Robert Moses, New York City was able to get a major share of Federal funding for housing during Democratic Administrations of Roosevelt, Kennedy and Johnson. However, this funding was uneven and depended on the ideology and political decisions of the Party in power.

The Preliminary Plan for the development of the Upper West Side was presented to the Public, in 1955, by Mayor Wagner. The completion will occur under the aegis of the Koch Administration in 1986 or early 1987. The City Planning Commission, during this thirty-one year period has been subject to the discontinuity of six mayoral administrations and eight Presidential administrations. During this period there has been a constant flow of appointed Planning Commission members. The longest serving member was Martin Gallent, real estate lawyer and public servant, who served for eighteen years and recently retired. The middle and lower echelons were subject to more radical discontinuity due to death, opportunities in fields related to and unrelated to their government positions and retirement. (A. Wiener-from HUD to Integrated Resources and, R. Reiss-HPD to Lefrak. Anthony Gliedman-from HPD to Lefrak).

The "Master Plan" called for 400 low-income units, 2400 middle-income units and 5,000 "luxury" units. The final major revision called for 2,500 low-income, 3,000 moderate-income and 2,000 "luxury" units.

The changes which occurred made the original plan unrecognizable in terms of the goals, amenities and numbers. The changes were, in part, a result of imponderables and reactions to the plan. New forces were created which planners could not have foreseen. Court actions, the breakdown of urban alliances in National and Local politics, the militant street tactics and political "Know how" of an aroused ethnic community and the support and resources of a traditionally liberal, maverick constituency represented by local elected politicians and board members made compromises, trade-offs and revisions inevitable.

However, during the 1950 to 1986 period, the
10
changing economic conditions of market supply and demand made developers sensitive to inflation, high interest rates, labor and material costs and the incentives which the Federal government was willing to supply; in order to encourage the

investment of capital in housing instead of the more lucrative investment areas.

TABLE #1: BANK EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE FOR CONSTRUCTION AND LAND DEVELOPMENT LOANS, AND FARM LOANS BY SIZE OF LOANS. 1977-1985. (IN %) *

		<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
SIZE OF LOAN	\$500,000	7.97	9.56	12.28	16.99
		<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	
		10.91	13.19	11.01	

*STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF U.S. 1986.106TH EDITION.

It is apparent that planning was necessary but irrational because it was part of the political process. This process is subject to the unforeseen consequences of domestic and international relations. The irrationality was compounded by the discontinuity of policy decisions and personnel who were subject to electoral politics based on the institutional requirements of periodic four year elections and an electorate made up of disparate interests and unequal resources. In this context goals and interests were promoted and achieved by compromises, trade-offs and influence subject to

the contingencies dictated by the historical context of the development of the Upper West Side.

An examination of the amendments to the West Side Urban Renewal Plan suggests that the plan was subject to the changing political climate, the demands of market supply and demand and the use of the resources of the local interest groups to delay or change the original plan to fulfill the agenda of the contending forces. Continue resorted to the courts which resulted in an eight year delay in completing the plan. By 1980 As a result of the delay and the change in the political climate and economic conditions, the City perceived that private development would be more advantageous in terms of taxes and the cities rising expenditures.

The five amendments present a picture wherein the accent changed from private development of luxury housing to limited subsidy in terms of tax abatements in the second amendment to an expansion of tax abatements to encourage public housing in the third amendment to an emphasis in 1980, in the fourth and fifth amendments on condos and cooperatives through a continuation of tax

abatements as the economy recovered and the Federal government deemphasized public housing.

Planning, at best, serves as a means of arousing interest groups not privy to the original understandings to enter the political arena. Planning subjects the compromises and implied understandings to public scrutiny. The results are new compromises, trade-offs and revised understandings. Although the array of forces are unequal in terms of resources, manpower and influence our study suggests that the needs of the elderly and the poor were addressed if not adequately resolved in terms of their needs. Gallent asserted that the City built 175,000 units of Public Housing and yet there were 175,000 on
11
the waiting list.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF HOUSING

The politics of housing was intimately associated with the politics of urban development and urban renewal on a national and local level. Increasingly, during the thirty year period we have described, the role of the Federal government became a central factor in the decision making process. All decisions were weighed in terms of

the availability of Federal financing, rules and regulations.

Implicit in our study is an analysis of the Pluralist and Structuralist approach to urban politics. Sayres and Kaufman observe in reference to New York politics, "New York's huge and diverse system of government and politics is a loose-knit and multi-centered network in which decisions are reached by ceaseless bargaining and fluctuating alliances among the major categories of participants in each (formal governmental decision making) center and in which the centers are partially but strikingly isolated from each

¹² other". The Pluralist model suggests the following corollaries: power is widely dispersed; groups are activated when their primary interests are threatened; participants in the political process participate in narrow functional islands of decision; politicians act as mediators since they are the only interest group capable of arranging compromises and trade-offs between conflicting interests. In this context public policy is the result of bargaining and compromise with veto power in the hands of other leaders or

by those they lead. As a result each group usually receives something from the process. "...if there is any single feature of the system of government and politics...that may be called ubiquitous and invariant, it would seem to be the prevalence of mutual accommodation. Every program and policy represents a compromise among the interested

13
participants"

Although our study confirmed most of these observations, Sayre and Kaufman did not address the problem of those who were unable to participate in agenda formation, either through lack of influence or passivity. Sayres and Kaufman used the phrase mutual accommodation based on compromise. Mutual accommodation is usually the result of equality or near equality in influence and resources. Precisely the inequality of financial resources, the relative non participation of Latin and Black participation in the local and national electoral process and the non-negotiating stances of Continue and the Site 30 Coalition permitted the City Administration to dictate a solution, to a divided community, which recognized the new market conditions of supply and

demand which pleased no one except the developers. Our study suggests that the Pluralists do not go far enough. It is evident that Continue and the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association had no role in the negotiations preceding the "Master Plan". However both groups employed tactics which effectively delayed the completion of the plan and forced the Koch Administration and the City Planning Commission to attempt to work out a

¹⁴
compromise. The inflexibility of both sides gave the city the opportunity to dictate a solution "which gave something to all the contending forces."

We found that outside influences played an important role in the planning process, setting parameters to what was possible. The planner was limited to discovering trends and settling for short term gains which made him and the City reactivistic rather than creative in the policy

¹⁵
area.

Opposed to the Pluralist model are the structural theories of Mollenkopf, Friedland and Molotch. Mollenkopf argues that politics and government are independent driving forces which

can override economic functional necessities. He states, "Few of the actors involved were aware of the systematic consequences of their actions and when they were; it was the political consequences they most often had in mind. They were searching for concrete solutions to pressing problems. They developed a pro growth programmatic frame work with a jumbled character because they had to accommodate and log roll among many different interests; none of whom, even the most powerful corporate chieftains could control the entire process or even assume that its interests would be

fully taken into account."¹⁶ Mollenkopf suggests that the economic and political are separate. However the structural and cultural values tend to bias the political process in favor of business interests, if only because they are the source of taxes and the private enterprise mentality .

Central to the Structuralist argument is Friedland's theory that the source of political power and influence are participation, structure and system. Implicit in this approach is the problem of activation and participation; the level at which groups can intervene; and the ability to

formulate the agenda and the solutions which are culturally acceptable. Lastly, the Structuralists suggest that we must weigh the benefits and losses over the long run rather than the short run, for the social groups involved in the process.

It is evident that the brownstone owners and the Trinity School had the talent and financial resources to wage an eight year campaign in the courts while the public housing advocates resorted to street tactics (sit-ins, public meetings). It is true that the City bore the financial burden of the court case as a friend of the court and later as a defendant. At the same time the City's interest in the case was not public housing. Its primary interest was to defend the right of the Administration to formulate and enact policy without the interference of the courts and private interest groups.

It is important to delineate some of the ideological beliefs and concerns which pervaded the political atmosphere. It was difficult, if not impossible for the planning process to enact a rational solution to the housing needs of New York

City and in particular, the community needs addressed in the West Side Urban Renewal Plan.

Historically, housing and health care were left to, mainly, commercial and philanthropic agencies until the New Deal Administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Housing was considered a vital social good in whose allocation government must play a role. However, public housing programs, lagged behind Social Security programs. Social Security per capita benefit payments increased from \$3.15 in 1935 to \$59.00 in 1955, to \$121.00 in 1961 and to \$401.00 in 1973. For the same years American public housing expended per capita increased from \$.10 to \$.53 to \$1.06 and finally to \$6.65. All public housing and low-income housing expenditures constituted one half of one percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) in 1936. The proportion for public and low-income Housing remained the same in 1965.¹⁷

Socioeconomic trends caused an expansion of government involvement in housing. This was caused, in part, by the increase of the elderly population and an increase in the marriage rate after World War II. The wide spread prosperity

led to an increase in separate households. Economic expansion drew people to the industrial centers.

The role of the government in providing housing, both in the United States and Europe became the focus of attention for many of the interest groups directly or indirectly affected by government policy. Policy formulation, in Europe, followed two paths; "comprehensive" whose goals were the planning and controlling of the total volume of house building in the economy; or "supplementary" which aimed at bolstering the private housing market and providing housing for those groups that couldn't be served by private builders.

The pattern of housing programs in the past was that the building industry and the private credit market sustained almost all construction. (FHA Mortgage Guarantee Program) Historically, American Public housing was not competitive with the private rental market. The 1937 Housing Legislation had an "equivalent elimination provision". The law stated that for every public housing unit built, a substandard dwelling must be

removed within five years via condemnation or demolition.

Robert Moses was an early advocate of what Jane Jacobs calls "cataclysmic" urban planning.¹⁸ This approach concentrated investment into particular areas for short periods. This direct type of intervention was a result of "unlimited power" in regard to public investment and housing allocation. She notes "with scarcely any exceptions they believe their role is to demolish and replace the transitional zones by

comprehensive bulldozing methods".¹⁹ This approach proved impossible in the case of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan due to the waning magic of the Robert Moses mystique and the intense, aroused commitment and involvement of public and private citizens.

In the United States, since the turn of the century, the proportion of housing investment has continuously decreased in relation to capital

investment.²⁰ As the market economy grew, after World War II housing attracted less and less of business investment since the rates of return were much greater in other sectors of the economy. This

is partly due to the relatively slow development of building technology and costly manual labor in this labor intensive industry. Individual investments may pay for themselves in 5 to 10 years while housing investments take 25 to 40 years to provide an acceptable return. As a result housing developers were unwilling to risk capital except in the limited luxury market. The Preliminary Plan for the West Side Urban Renewal Plan took into account the economic logic of developer investment policy by its emphasis on luxury housing.

Public housing, in the United States, is subject to a means test unlike social security. As such it is subject to stigma and, therefore, public housing has a limited clientele made up, primarily, of the minority poor. As a result public housing is not seen as part of the whole social system of income distribution and social reward. A means test mentality, in the political arena, tends to make the role of government in public housing an arena for the struggle between the Public Housing advocates, neighborhood property interests, the private developer and

associated financial interests. The West Side was no exception and the ensuing conflicts delayed and changed the West Side Urban Renewal Plan beyond recognition.

The Housing Act of 1949 ordered that priorities be given to families displaced by urban renewal and prohibiting local authorities from refusing to accept families merely because their income derived from public assistance. The Brooke Amendment of 1960 stated that public housing tenants could not be required to pay more than twenty-five percent of their monthly incomes for rent. These laws tended to restrict Public Housing to Blacks and other minority low-income groups and excluded higher income groups. The effect was either a segregation in place or segregation in higher income neighborhoods. As a result popular support for public housing shrunk and the fragile alliances of disparate local and national interest groups was weakened.

Housing policy was the concern of State and City government. The primary concern of planners, historically, was with zoning and building codes. Minimal public housing was the province of philanthropic organizations and unions.

Beginning with the New Deal Administration, political strategy for reviving the economy revolved around the alternatives of a policy of subsidizing producers or subsidizing consumers. The New Deal motivated, in part, by a humanitarianism which recognized the degeneration and need for housing stock advocated Public Housing, chiefly, as a means of creating employment in the construction industry and creating a viable political alliance based on urban centers. The success of this strategy helped insure victory until the election of Eisenhower and the Republican Administrations of Nixon and Reagan which followed; interrupted briefly by the Kennedy, Johnson and Carter Administration. The Republicans favored block grants and local administration of diminished housing funds subject to stringent means tests. These policies served to weaken national organizations based on the

advocacy of public housing. As of this writing the Reagan Administration is providing virtually no funds for public housing for the poor or the elderly.

The reliance on the market as the decisive factor in housing development and the overt withdrawal of the Federal government from the market place offers no solution to the housing problem since " ...the play of demand and supply doesn't offer solutions because of the unbalance between income distribution and building costs which excludes two-thirds of the population from

the effective demand for new housing".²² City planners were subjected to forces over which they had little influence. Due to The Charter Revision of 1977 the initiating of the Capital Budget was no longer under the aegis of the City Planning Commission. The subsequent perception of the political actors and other bureaucrats was that the planners were powerless in terms of policy

formulation.²³ The Department of Housing, Preservation and Development under Anthony Gleidman assumed a more central role in the

process.²⁴ The planner had been reduced to an

advisory role to the Mayor. This allowed the planner, in some cases, to play a low-keyed advocacy role for community groups.

Our study suggests that the needs of the elderly were addressed but not adequately resolved. The inability of the elderly to form a spatial political and environmental community is and was, in part, due to conditions inherent in old age. Passivity, age, physical well being, the segmentation of the elderly into interest groups with disparate interests which are based on differing class, life style and ethnicity tend to vitiate the influence of the elderly in the political arena. At best the elderly become clients of other interest groups with other agendas and priorities. Increasingly the political arena tended to perceive the poor and the elderly poor as a clientele whose needs could be met through low-income housing subject to a means test.

Manhattan had a higher concentration of elderly than the other boroughs of the City. The "Master Plan" noted this problem but never addressed it in terms of the fears and needs of

the elderly. Site 41, Phelps House, as a senior citizens development, containing 106 units was a grudging compromise to forestall the designation of the site as a low-income public housing development. Although Continue opposed the designation of site 41 for the elderly, Continue felt it was preferable to have the site designated for the senior citizens than for public housing.

The Site 30 controversy was a central issue in the delay of the development of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan. The City was determined not to have a repeat of the Forest Hills controversy. Local brownstone owners feared that the designation of Site 30, in 1972, as Public Housing, would open the floodgates for low-income housing on the remaining sites. Continue, as the spokesman for the brownstone owners, feared the inevitable "reghettoization" of the Upper West Side and the subsequent devaluation of property values. They also warned of a diminution of city revenue if market rate housing was replaced by low-income housing.

Continue exercised the option of court litigation which delayed the development process for eight years. Although the Supreme Court ruled against Continue, the inflationary spiral, the deadlock between Continue and public housing advocates and market demand effectively killed the designation of Site 30 as low-income Housing. A City imposed decision supported by the Board of Estimate provided 80 units for the elderly on Site 30A and 240 units of market housing on Site 30 with a 20% component for tenants whose incomes didn't exceed \$21,000.

As of this date the four remaining sites have been designated as market rate housing with a ratio of eighty/twenty. The Elderly, as stated in the proceeding paragraph, will have an 80 unit development under the auspices of the New York City Housing Authority. The total number of units specifically designated for the elderly since the inception of the plan was 186 units. In the remaining sites they will be grouped as part of the 20% reserved for those applicants whose income is below \$21,000.

Our study suggests that none of the contending forces achieved their agendas. However, the elderly and the poor, whose needs were the most urgent lost the most.

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APPENDIX 1

PLANNING AND REVISIONS TO THE PLAN

An important dimension of my thesis is that although planning is necessary, it is irrational because it is part of the political process. Weber stated that due to man's irrationality we live in an Iron Cage. Yet within this cage of irrationality we must use science and rationality in order to survive. Therefore it is essential to examine the original plan, the causes of the changes which occurred and the final plan in light of the unforeseen political, social and economic changes which made the plan unrecognizable over a 30 year period.

The planning process undertaken by the City's administrative departments of Housing, Preservation and Development and the City Planning Commission envisioned a plan for the development of the Upper West Side which would be completed over an eight year period. However, the planners were unable to foresee the economic, social and political problems which would arise as a result

of an unpredictable political process. The expediency of electoral politics, changing national administrations with growing power and influence in local politics, subject to pragmatic rather than long range solutions and the unforeseen opposition of organized local community interest delayed the completion of the plan for twenty-five years.

Between 1962 and 1979, the world, the nation and New York City and its inhabitants were troubled by war in Southeast Asia. Due to economic conditions and civil strife in Latin America and other parts of the world there was an influx of immigrants and refugees. The City beset, during this period, by recession and near economic collapse, the demise of the Democratic Clubs and the unending need for City revenue, produced five revisions to the original plan. However the irreparable divisions within the local community caused by the disposition of the site 30 designation and the ensuing court case permitted the City to impose a solution which satisfied no one- neither the developers, the brownstone

owners, the public housing advocates, or the poor and the elderly.

THE PRELIMINARY PLAN OF 1958

On October 5, 1955 Mayor Wagner was scheduled to appear before the Housing Subcommittee of the House Banking and Currency Committee in Washington to testify for urban renewal. The Mayor was looking for something spectacular he could include in his testimony. Samuel Ratensky, the Planning Director for the New York City Housing Authority urged him to announce to the Congressional subcommittee that the two hundred blocks between 59th and 125th Streets and between Central Park West and Morningside Park and the Hudson River would be declared an urban renewal area for conservation and rehabilitation. Wagner agreed since Ratensky believed that the magnitude of a West Side project of these dimensions would be an ideal place to test the provisions of the 1954 Housing Act. The Committee was favorably disposed¹ to Mayor Wagner's plan.

Once the proposal became public, it was subjected to the differing viewpoints and criticisms of the people and agencies who would be

affected by the plan and those who would have to administer it. The Wagner Administration decided to undertake a pilot rehabilitation study of the twenty-block area from 87th to 97th Streets between Central Park West and Amsterdam Avenue. On February 24th, 1956 the Board of Estimate approved the expenditure of \$150,000 in Federal funds for a Pilot Rehabilitation Study of the twenty block area.

In June, 1956 the City Planning Commission certified the area as "deteriorated" and thus suitable for renewal. The City Planning Commission based its findings on an assessment of environmental deficiencies due to the overcrowding characteristic of the area's Old-Law tenements. Excessive dwelling unit density in the rehabilitation area is particularly prevalent in class "B" rooming houses. Included in the assessment were the incompatible conversion of brownstones to rooming houses; obsolete building types made up of Old-Law tenements, especially along 89th Street; and a lack of adequate open space prevalent through out much of the area.

The City Planning Commission presented its justification (See Table # 1) for characterizing the area as "deteriorating" in its plan to acquire almost one quarter of the total acreage in the area. Almost two-thirds of the buildings in the area had been designated as containing one or more deficiencies.

TABLE # 1:TOTAL BUILDINGS IN THE AREA* 1956 **

TOTAL BUILDINGS IN AREA	1110.0
BUILDINGS WITH DEFICIENCIES	701.0
BUILDINGS WITHOUT DEFICIENCIES	409.0
TOTAL ACREAGE IN AREA	115.8
ACREAGE TO BE ACQUIRED	31.7
ACREAGE NOT TO BE ACQUIRED	84.1

* Area designated as Upper West Side development area

**ADAPTED FROM N.Y.C.PUBLICATION (Department of Housing, Preservation and Development.)

Table # 2 indicates that the built-up area was almost ninety-seven percent of the total area. The expectation in the Preliminary Plan of 1956 was that, minimally, one half the buildings and almost all the businesses would be levelled prior to reconstruction of new housing or for the provision of open space. This would, of course, create hardships for evicted tenants and small business operators in the area.

TABLE # 2:BUILDINGS TO BE CLEARED WITH AND WITHOUT DEFICIENCIES

		<u>KNOTTY BE</u>	<u>NOT DETERMINED</u>
		<u>CLEARED</u>	
ALL BUILDINGS	1,110	560	350
RESIDENTIAL	1,070	524	546
NONRESIDENTIAL	40	36	4
ALL DWELLING UNITS	13,886	6,613	7,273
IN BLDGS. WITH DEFIC.	7,974	6,053	1,921
IN STANDARD BLDGS.	5,912	580	5,352

The area was predominately residential as 99.8% of the acreage was residential. 701 of the 1,110 deteriorating residential structures were substandard (63.2%) and not economically feasible targets for rehabilitation. The report justified levelling in stating :". . wholesale rehabilitation of old-law tenements generally cannot be recommended. .. buildings in obsolescence not easily remedied even by costly alterations".²

The Preliminary Plan consisted of two sub plans, one for the possible but not recommended rehabilitation of old housing, the other for new construction. The time span of the plan was broken down into a three stage program . Each stage would take two and one-half years; but the stages were overlapping. Depending on which plan and financing were used, 2,161 or 2,394 dwelling units were to be rehabilitated in the first and second stages. Of these 474 were to be low-income housing. These plans would cover 40 sites. It was hoped that the completion of stages one and two would generate an atmosphere in which private development of the remaining 13 sites would take place in the area.

The number of new dwelling units in stage three approximated 1800 dwelling units. Brown and Guenther, the architects and developers of the plan suggested a minimum of public subsidies because "What is proposed for the Study area must be of such a nature that it can be repeated again and again in the constant modernization and reconstruction which must take place in every city".³ The intention of the proposal was that the development of the Upper West Side would serve as a model for private sector development .

On June 12, 1958 City officials proposed to use \$1,500,000 to \$2,000,000 in Federal slum clearance funds to help buy and rehabilitate brownstone houses on the Upper West Side. Albert M. B. Cole, National Housing Administrator, gave his endorsement of the project. Robert Moses agreed to forego his use of Federal money already allocated for demolition and construction under Title 1 of the Housing Acts of 1954 and 1956. The Federal government agencies agreed, on September 10, 1958, to reserve \$4,000,000 for the West Side Urban Renewal Plan. Two million dollars in additional grants were to be made for each of the next three years, to serve as seed money. At the end of that time it was expected that private capital could

complete the project aided by contributions by the City of \$50,000,000. The twenty block project envisioned the conservation and modernization of those older buildings worth saving and the demolition of only the old-law tenements and those hopelessly run down brownstones.

On June 18, 1956 the City Planning Commission designated the area as a deteriorating area. This would justify the appropriation of Federal funds under the National Housing Act of 1949. Most of the proposed slum clearance was warranted because of the functional inadequacy, layout, light, ventilation, excessive land coverage and the structural conditions of nearly all the old-law tenements proposed for clearance. Of the 562 structures slated for clearance, 445 or approximately 81 percent were rated as substandard. Brownstones were not designated for acquisition in the rehabilitation project.

In addition, the proposed plan called for community participation in its planning and execution in three levels of citizen activity. The participants were to be made up, respectively, of groups in the site area, members of groups in the West Park area and consultant groups who would advise the city agencies.

In January, 1959, James Felt, head of the City Planning Commission, announced that qualified sponsors were ready to bid for designated sites. The City Housing Authority submitted to The City Planning Commission blue prints for a 400 unit low-income apartment project between 90th and 91st. Street on Columbus Avenue.

In the same month The Park Hudson Committee was formed with the blessings of Felt. The function of the Committee was to organize and explain the West Side Plan to the community and act in a consultative capacity in regard to development on the West Side and in the City. The Committee appointed Stanley Lowell, former Deputy Mayor, as its chairman. In June of 1959, Jane Wahlberg, a social worker, and 150 other citizens formed the West Side Tenants Committee in conjunction with the Pastors of St. Gregory and the Holy Name Society churches to oppose the Plan. Their objections were based on the lack of consideration of adequate housing for low and middle-income housing.

On June 29, 1959 the City Planning Commission held public hearings on the project and agreement was reached that the amount of low and middle-income housing was inadequate. The City Planning Commission

then increased the number of proposed low-income apartments from 400 to 600. Middle-income dwellings were increased from 2400 to 3600 and upper income apartments were decreased from 5,000 to 3,600 dwelling units. The Board of Estimate held public hearings and approved this Preliminary Plan. On September 22, 1959 Hulan Jack, Borough President of Manhattan requested that the low-income housing units be increased to 1,000 and middle-income housing to 4,200 . This request was⁴ unanimously approved by the Board of Estimate.

EARLY LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

The origins of the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council lie in the study and recommendations for the development of the Upper West Side made by Brown and Gunther, architectural consultants. The report recommended an independent neighborhood organization which would represent the twenty block area. The proposal stated in part, that "....a method must be developed in the twenty block area designated for renewal into effective participation with the official agency in the renewal program....A neighborhood organization, representative of the various interests involved....is required".⁵ In August, 1959, a Provisional Council of Organizations in the West Side

Urban Renewal Area was established by neighborhood groups and interested local business men. This organization was made up of 17 organizations which were represented on the Council. Milton Adders, Director of the Walden School, was named the Provisional President. The Council emphasized their independence from the Park-Hudson Committee which had been formed on January 26, 1959 in an official announcement made by Mayor Wagner. The committee was made up of distinguished citizens who would act as buffers between the city and the local community. Their function was to mediate community conflict and to serve as a educative instrument of city policy.

On December 16, 1959 the Provisional Council held a "constitutional convention" and renamed their organization the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council. It eventually consisted of representatives of 43 neighborhood groups, ten churches and synagogues, eight schools, eight block associations, six political clubs, five PTA's, two Puerto Rican Groups and four other

⁶ organizations. The first elected slate of officers had three Vice Presidents who served under Milton Akers. They were Dr. Matthew of the Business and Professional Groups, the Reverend Henry J. Brown of St. Gregory

Catholic Church and Aramis Gomez representing the "unorganized" Puerto Ricans in the community. A year later Father Brown, pastor of the St. Gregory Church, emerged as its charismatic personality. He was an eloquent speaker (some described him as a rabble rouser). All agreed that he had great organizing ability, was a politically wise and tireless worker.

The business group, formed to protect the local store owners, withdrew in 1960 due to internal and a dislike of the militancy of the Council. Coincidentally militant minority groups joined the Council as voting members and Aramis Gomez and Efrain Rosa became the effective spokesmen for the local Puerto Rican Community. The leaders of The Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council embarked on a strategy to make the Park-Hudson Committee ineffective. They charged that Park-Hudson didn't represent the local community and that Strykers Bay represented the legitimate concerns of the total community. They were committed from the start to revising the "preliminary plan" in order to increase the amount of low-income construction. Out-maneuvered on the meeting floor, the representatives of Park Hudson, Trinity House and many business members of the

Council left the organization and formed their own group.

At the January 11, 1960 meeting of the Park-Hudson Committee, Lowell moved that Park-Hudson should vote itself out of existence. The membership refused and Lowell resigned in September, 1960. In April, 1961 the Housing and Redevelopment Board, formed in 1960 to replace the Urban Renewal Board informed Park-Hudson that it would no longer provide funds for their paid help. A short time later Park-Hudson ceased to exist.

THE FINAL PLAN

The Final Urban Renewal Plan was presented in March, 1961. It proposed the following renewal actions: clearance and redevelopment of old-law tenements; rehabilitation of brownstones and rooming houses; and conservation and public improvements of the area. Through the use of special Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance and tax abatements, the City would acquire 36 brownstones, in addition to the nine acquired in the Pilot Project Area, for rehabilitation by the New York City Housing Authority. These buildings were to be designated for additional low-rent housing. The City Planning Commission cited the Redevelopment Companies Law, the Limited Profit

Housing Company law and the Public Housing Law as legislative authority for granting tax abatements to builders.

Site 30 located between 90th and 91st Streets on Columbus Avenue, the focus of this study, was designated as the site of a tax abated residential building with moderate rentals or carrying charges. It would consist of 680 rooms, 300 apartments, and commercial retail stores. Site 41, on Columbus Avenue between 88th and 89th streets, was designated for 300 subsidized, middle-income apartments consisting of 1,120 rooms, with a Plaza on its site of 12,000 square feet in area. The duration of controls on subsidized buildings would be 40 years from the date of approval of the plan by the City of New York.

The developer's obligations were that: construction would begin within twelve months of designation; he would not sell, lease or transfer such land prior to completion of the construction without prior written consent of the City of New York; he could not permit racial barriers to occupancy; and he must submit architectural and site plans to the Community Board and to the Planning Commission.

The Plan proposed the redevelopment of 7,700 units, revised from a figure of 7,800 in the Preliminary Plan. Five hundred of the new dwellings were to be Public Housing (originally 800) with rentals from \$14 to \$18 per room per month. Moderate and middle-income apartment rentals would be from \$22 to \$45 to \$50 per room with a limited number of rooms at \$60 per room. The total number of units was revised upward to 4,900 from the 1963 figure of 4,200. The revised total would be tax-abated housing at moderate rental or carrying charges. The remainder, approximately, 2800 dwelling units were to be fully taxed, market rate apartments.

The Plan envisioned the rehabilitation of 3,100 units. These units would have an estimated average of six dwelling units per brownstone and 300 units in other structures, adding up to approximately 150 to 160 dwelling units per acre. The Plan estimated that two-thirds of the cost would be paid for by the Federal government, one-sixth by New York State and one-sixth by New York City.

PROGRAM FOR RELOCATION

It was estimated that 10,479 households would be subject to rehabilitation. Of these 4,088 would be single persons and 6,399 would be for households of two or more persons. Since some tenants had already been relocated, the total number of relocated tenants would actually entail 5,418 households of two or more persons and single persons living in dwelling units and 3,767 single persons living in rooming houses.

Table # 3 indicates the hope that three-fourths of the development would be handled by the private sector devoted, primarily to middle-income housing. It also indicates how the relocatees would be phased into the three stage plan.

TABLE # 3: EXPECTED PROPOSED REHOUSING*

	TOTAL(OLD APTS.)	% OF TOTAL
PRIVATE RENTAL HOUSING	3,630	67
PRIVATE SALES RENTAL	542	10
RENT-PUBLIC HOUSING	866	16
CITY-NO CASH SUBSIDY HSG.	380	7

*Department of Housing, Preservation and Development

It was, optimistically, expected that the three stage rehousing program would be completed over a ten year period aided by tenants leaving the area and by affordable new and rehabilitated housing. During Phase one 251 apartments would be private rental; 140 to 150 would be middle-income and 237 would be public housing. These newly constructed units would be supplemented by the 329,900 private rental market apartments already in the area. The Department of Real Estate estimated that 38,000 of the tenants would require relocation. The proposed time schedule for execution of the Plan would be completed in eight years commencing July, 1962.

The Plan suggests that, in respect to land use, the area is well located. It had deteriorated rapidly as a result of blight and other factors which we have previously mentioned. This had discouraged investment in the area. Only one new apartment house was constructed in the 20 block area since 1933. A total addition of 7,800 dwelling units were now contemplated. The final mix would be 800 public housing units, 4,200 middle income and 2,800 luxury apartments. The

objective was to maintain a total population approximate in size to the areas current population. It was expected that the densities on Columbus Avenue and Amsterdam Avenue would increase, and there would be lower densities on the side streets and intermediate densities on West 96th and 97th Streets.⁷

The Board of Estimate held a Public Hearing on June 22, 1962 to which Deputy Commissioners made presentations relating to the West Side Urban Renewal Plan. Herman Badillo, then deputy Commissioner of Relocation, outlined the problem of displacement and a program of planned relocation.⁸

TABLE # 4: ESTIMATED POPULATION CHANGES THROUGH STAGE 11

(NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS)* (PILOT AREA)

POPULATION RELOCATED TO MAKE WAY FOR:

PRIVATE NEW RENTAL HOUSING.....	1,265
PRIVATE HOUSING, REHAB.	1,369
MIDDLE-INCOME, HOUSING	899
LOW RENT(PUBLIC) HOUSING.....	1,334
PUBLIC OPEN SPACES.....	412
TOTAL	5,279

POPULATION CAPACITY AFTER RENEWAL:

PRIVATE NEW RENTAL HOUSING.....	2,121 TO..2,469
REHABILITATED STRUCTURE.....	9611
MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING	1,330
LOW-RENT (PUBLIC) HOUSING	1,800
TOTAL	6,212 TO..6,500
POPULATION INCREASE	933 TO..1,281

* New York City Department of Housing, Preservation and
Development

He stated that there would be three stages of development and three stages of relocation which would require the displacement of 6,345 tenants. The redevelopment stages entailed the demolition of existing structures, the erection of new buildings and other development, as well as the improvement of the land by private or public developers. Rehabilitation entailed the restoration to good condition of deteriorated structures. This would require repair, conversion or reconstruction, and of course, attendant displacement. Badillo also noted that Mayor Wagner had announced on the previous day that 2,500 low-rent housing units would be provided in the site area. These would include apartments in rehabilitated brownstones and new public and middle-income housing. The mandate that 15% of the apartments have rents comparable to public housing was raised to 20%. In addition, displaced families would have first priority for relocation in the area.

SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS TO THE WEST SIDE
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT PLAN.

The first Amendment revision, in 1963, of the 1958 West Side Urban Development Plan designated six areas for the New York City Housing Authority rehabilitation project consisting of an addition of a total of 36 buildings and 236 dwelling units. In 1964, the Second Amendment included changes in land-use design. Those sites that had been completed and occupied (Sites 12 and 13), were changed from fully tax-paying to partially tax-exempt. A year later the Third Amendment made Site 23 smaller. Minor changes in sidewalks were allowed and minor zoning changes were made. The Fourth Amendment (1966) was concerned with changes in land use designation. Site 5 and 10 were changed from being fully tax-paying to partially tax exempt. Site 24 was changed from providing a residential and an office building to a residential and school site. Site 36 was changed from public housing to partially tax-exempt status. Site 18 and 37 which had been designated as fully tax-paying became redevelopment sites. Both sites were to be rehabilitated, and sites 5, 10, 24 and 36 were completed. The Board of Estimate approved the

amendment on October 27, 1966. Site 36 was changed from being fully tax-paying to a public housing site; and, as part of the Fourth Amendment, it was placed in the partially tax-exempt category. Site 36 is the only project using the 221 (d)(3) program of the West Side Urban Renewal Area which encouraged large scale efforts by private developers to build and and rehabilitate apartments for low and moderate-income families. (See section on Housing Legislation)

CHANGES AFTER THE 4TH AMENDMENT AND BEFORE THE
SUBMISSION OF THE 5TH AMENDMENT.

Site 27 was changed administratively from "fully tax-paying" to "moderate rental" by the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development on February 24, 1969 and approved by the City Planning Commission. Site 4 was also changed from " fully " tax-paying to low-income. This was designated as a New York City Housing Authority(NYCHA) project to be built in conjunction with a public school. Construction was approved by The City Planning Commission on August 12, 1970 and by the Board of Estimate on September 17, 1970. As of 1970 it was designated for "residential unspecified", i. e. its final determination was unspecified. Site 30 was approved by the The City Planning Commission and

changed from partially tax-abated housing to a low-

income housing site.⁹ The Board of Estimate approved these changes for Site 30 on November 11, 1971; but as of 1979, due to litigation, it remained as "residential unspecified".

Site 41 was changed from fully tax-paying to partially tax-exempt on February 11, 1976. The City Planning Commission approved the reduction of this site from 48,844 to 30,716 to facilitate the sale of nine brownstones to private parties

During the period of these changes inflation and interest rates were increasing. Developers were not easily able to get financing which would make private luxury housing a profitable area for investment. Mitchell-Lama subsidization had been brought to a halt and National legislation, beginning with the Eisenhower Administration, discouraged low-income public housing through a policy of cut-backs in the number of authorized units to be constructed with federal subsidies. Opportunities for commercial development, the pressure of national and local real estate lobby groups and the vocal pressure of community groups against public housing encouraged Congress and legislators on the state and municipal level to place a

renewed emphasis on the construction of private housing at market rates. However, the completion of East Side development and the desire of the City, the West Side Community Board and all interested parties resulted in pressures to complete the plan which was then twenty-four years old. The decision was to encourage private market housing construction by changing designated sites from fully tax-paying to partially tax-exempt status. This approach, together with increased subsidies, tax abatements and easements encouraged the erection of and conversion to middle income and luxury housing. The developer would take out his investment and profits with the sale of the co-ops and condominiums.

Szelenyi states that in the United States since the turn of the century, the proportion of housing investment has continuously decreased in relation to capital investment. As the market economy grew, after WW 11, housing attracted less and less of business investment since the rates of return were much greater in other sectors of the economy. This was partly due to the relatively slow development of building technology and costly manual labor in this labor intensive industry. Business investments may pay for themselves

in five to ten years while housing investments take twenty to forty years to provide an acceptable return. As a result housing developers were unwilling to risk capital except in the limited luxury market. Coincidentally, the increased demand for condominiums and cooperatives provided opportunities for a relatively quick turnover of capital. As a result of all these pressures the Community Board in December of 1977 appointed a Review Committee for the revision of the "Master" plan.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT REVISIONS OF THE MASTER PLAN

The two most vocal groups involved in the controversy were Continue and the Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association. Continue believed that all legitimate former tenants could be relocated in the area, as the City had originally promised. This would become a reality if all new construction were integrated on a basis of 80% moderate and middle-income and 20% low-income housing. This formula would prevent "tipping" in the area. Not only would this save the neighborhood and be fair to former tenants who had been evicted in the relocation process, but the character of the community would be preserved. New construction would be permitted but the community would be

integrated. Continue contended that public housing, consisting primarily of low-income housing would, on the other hand be, a form of segregation and would result in a further deterioration of the area. The key individuals in the organization were Eugene Halpern, Marine Albert and her husband, Andrew Albert. The latter is a member of the Community Board, appointed by Ruth Messinger, the City Councilwoman representing the West Side. The Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council was formed in 1959 in response to the designation of the twenty square block area of the West Side as the West Side Urban Renewal area. Among its founding members and still active in West Side politics are Doris Rosenbloom, the present Executive Director of Community Board # 7 and William Price, spokesman for the Site Thirty Coalition, a present member of the Community Board who was appointed by Borough President Percy Sutton.

Strykers Bay was organized for the purpose of uniting the people of the neighborhood through the existing organization and institutions. It was hoped that a common strategy would evolve relating to the City's urban renewal plans and any issues affecting the welfare of the people in the community. It is now

located in a store front on 88th Street and Columbus Avenue.

The urgency of a compromise between the conflicting groups was underlined by a letter sent to Community Board # 7 by Commissioner Heiman, of the New York State Department Housing in February of 1977. He stated that the Section 8 subsidy for 227 units had been withdrawn from the West Side Urban Renewal Area. He notified Thomas Appleby, administrator for the Housing and Development Administration, that the West Side would receive first priority when the next offering of Section 8 subsidies was made by Housing and Urban Development. However, priority would depend on what action was taken toward finishing the Urban Renewal Plan. A Review Board composed of seven members, including two Continue members, two Stryker Bay members, Leon Bogue and two "neutral" members were appointed by the Housing Committee of Community Board # 7 to discuss and formulate the Fifth Amendment. Heiman thus held a gun to the head of Continue and Stryker's Bay by demanding that they resolve their differences under the penalty of losing the state subsidies for housing. The Housing Committee of the Community Board # 7 formed a West Side Urban Renewal Committee to discuss

and formulate the revision to the Master Plan.

Membership on the sub-committee was open to interested applicants from the community. The members were chosen from those present at the Housing Committee meeting.

They met with Barry Light, Deputy Commissioner of the Housing, Preservation and Development Department and Thomas Appleby of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

Barry Light suggested that the Board take the initiative and start the process to complete the nine

remaining sites¹⁰. The New York City Department of Housing, Preservation and Development was in complete agreement to retain enough Section 8 subsidized units to complete the West Side program. Peter Abeles, architect, chosen as a consultant, presented a developer package on September 15, 1977 with a time limit for potential developers to respond. By October 15, 1977 they received 28 proposals for the nine sites.

Goddard -Riverside Neighborhood Association, the oldest Settlement Housing Foundation on the West Side which had a city wide Board of Directors was chosen as the sponsor of Site 41. Goddard Riverside submitted plans to construct a 12 story Senior Citizen's Center which would have 160 units; all would be subsidized under Section 8 of the Housing and Community

Development Act of 1974. The conditions for designation were that the proposal must be scaled down because the Board had decided to retain the standing buildings at 74 and 76 W.89th Street instead of levelling them. Interested persons first broached the idea of a Senior Citizen's Housing project as early as 1973. (Taped

interview)¹¹ The proposal was discussed at two separate Board meetings. There was disagreement, as to whether there was a need for elderly housing in the area and if so, whether new construction was the way to fill that need. An alternative suggestion was that residential hotels could be converted into housing for the elderly. It was noted that hotels were increasing in value and they soon would be priced too high for senior citizen housing. Another criticism of the Goddard-Riverside proposal was that the proposed building was inappropriate for the area as it was too high and large. Finally, the Housing Committee decided to ask

Goddard Riverside for a new construction proposal).¹²

A new proposal was presented to the Board in February of 1979. The building was scaled down to conform to the dimensions of the block; a co-sponsor would have to be found and the standing building at 74 West 89th would

be retained.¹³ The Housing Committee voted 16-0-0 to

designate Goddard Riverside as the sponsor. All nine brownstones, on 89th Street, have subsequently been sold to private parties under the tax abatement plan and the balance of the site 41 was designated for 160 dwelling units for Senior Citizens. Construction was completed in 1983.

The Fifth Amendment

On May 23, 1979 The City Planning Commission certified the application by Community Board # 7 for the Fifth Amendment to the Urban Renewal Plan. Board # 7 held public hearings on June 20, 1979 in accordance with the newly passed City Urban Land Use Review Policy procedure (ULURP). The review policy mandated public hearings on all changes in the West Side Urban Renewal Plan. The Urban Land Use Review Policy process would begin at the Community Board and would have to be approved by the City Planning Commission and the Board of Estimate after public hearings. The previous policy, applying to the first four amendments was to certify changes as "minor changes" in the original plan. This allowed changes to be made jointly by the City Planning Commission and the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development on an interdepartmental basis without public discussion.

THE PUBLIC HEARINGS ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:Community Board # 7 approved the Fifth Amendment revision of the plan, 31-3, with no abstentions on July 10, 1979. However, the Renewal Plan for large scale residential housing attached reservations subject to requirements embodied in its resolutions: that the commitment for 2,500 low-income housing units be reaffirmed and that the City would agree to assure the Board that there shall be at least 2,500 low-income units within the West Side Urban Renewal Area during the forty year life of the Urban Renewal Plan; relocated tenants have to be relocated within the West Side Urban Renewal Area; the Board would appoint a committee that would act as a monitoring agency to assure the two thousand five hundred units of low-income housing; maximum allowable units, with respect to each site, should not exceed fifteen per cent above the number of units proposed by the Community Board. The developer would have to show that the increase requested within the fifteen percent was for good and economic reasons. The board opposed any change in the original designation of Site 4 and 30. Finally among others Sites 9,9R,32A,33,35A,35,40 and 44 were to be developed for a combination of market rate and low and moderate income subsidized housing

under appropriate public assistance programs. Senior Citizen housing was planned for site 41 under the Section 202 program of the National Housing Act of 1959." Under Section 202 direct government loans were made available exclusively to nonprofit sponsors for the full costs of housing constructed for the aged and disabled at a reduced interest rate of three percent annually.¹⁴)

Nathan Leventhal, then Commissioner of the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development, in a letter dated August 20, 1979 to Community Board # 7 stated "Historically the city has supported an economically integrated community on the West Side. Although the revised plan represents a considerable change, in scale from the original plan, our support of the goal of 2,500 low-income units remained unchanged."...."It is important", he said," to note this agency is reliant on Federal programs to provide subsidies..."

At the public hearings conducted by the Board, the conflict between Continue (owners of brownstones) and the Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Association (proponents of low-income housing) was joined. It split the community into a never to be repaired rift. The Ad

Hoc Committee To Preserve two thousand five hundred Units of Low-Income Housing in the West Side Urban Renewal Area contended that the plan fell four hundred units short of the promised two thousand five hundred. This was caused by litigation on Site 30, brought by the Trinity Episcopal School Corporation, located on Columbus Avenue between 91st and 92nd Streets. The suit was heard by Judge Cooper in the United States Southern Federal District Court against HUD, from October, 1973 through May, 1974. Trinity challenged the legality of the City's procedures in converting the two sites to public housing. Trinity charged that the study conducted by the City was inadequate and illegal under the requirements of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the National Environment Protection Act (NEPA). The Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council argued that the City should withdraw the Fifth Amendment until the suit was settled or change the Amendment to meet the promised 2,500d. It wanted in effect to permit low-income housing on site 35A, 40 and 44 which had been designated for quota rate housing consisting of eighty percent for middle-income housing and twenty percent for low-income housing.

In rebuttal Eugene J. Morris the attorney for Continue, stated that the purpose of the Plan had been accomplished and there was no need for more low-income housing. Further changes would endanger the West Side's economic mix. In light of the City's fiscal problems, the attorney Mr. Moires argued that the remaining sites should be developed privately without government subsidy since there were no longer any need to house relocatees. Additionally, the figure of 2,500 low-income housing was never meant as a maximum or a minimum. Finally, Mr. Eugene Halpern, President of Continue threatened that Continue would bring legal action against the City if the Amendment was adopted.

Planning officials claimed they had taken into consideration a number of facts in their assessment of the Development Plan. The Fifth Amendment carried forward the original goals of comprehensive social and economic development. In the meantime, the ethnic-economic diversity of the 1950's was being enhanced through public and private investment. City planning officials, also, recognized that there were limited public resources, and other parts of the city also had legitimate needs for additional housing. In light of new demands for housing that could not be met by

private construction, The Department of Housing, Preservation and Development questioned the necessity of giving the West Side public financial support allocations after it had become attractive to private developers. However, City officials decided that continued support was the key to retaining and strengthening a balanced community. Lastly, in regard to the low-income controversy, they had repeatedly assured the Community that 2,500 units would be built or rehabilitated. This figure had been established in the announcement of the plan by Mayor Wagner on February 21, 1962. The Board had acquiesced, and included 2,500 units as subsidized housing for low-income people. These units were then planned to be new construction on Public Housing sites and rehabilitation units under New York City Public Housing Authority jurisdiction. In addition a twenty percent share of publicly assisted middle and moderate-income housing would be built".¹⁵ Therefore the City Planning Commission agreed to honor the 2500 figure and promised that the four hundred units in the pending plan would be built.

By 1981 due to increased private market demand, unsubsidized market priced housing became an important consideration to City officials. The impact of low density, rising property values and developer interest caused them to question the appropriateness of Community management programs or Public Housing in an area which now had great potential for private development even if the development was no longer the originally promised low cost housing for the poor and the elderly. Vacant land was now selling for an average of ten dollars per square foot. The added cost of financing, high interest rates and building materials for the construction of subsidized low-income and low rental housing made the costs of their construction prohibitive. Renewal appeared to be more profitable and dovetailed with the emphasis on private rehabilitation under the Fifth Amendment. Deputy Commissioner Reiss of Housing Preservation and Redevelopment stated " At this point we are relying primarily on the developers reputation and influence and experience...the developers are committing substantial resources to these projects and will stand to suffer the greatest loss should the project not be successfully completed and rented and sold".

The 5th Amendment: Revision OF THE Plan- 5, 11 AND
5,23, 1979:

The Department of Housing, Preservation and Development submitted the Fifth Amendment, after a long series of meetings between the Continue and the Strykers Bay forces, together with a mediating group made up of those who favored some form of

¹⁶
compromise. It was a complex compromise for supplementing the final stages of the plan. In a review of the past history, Barry Light stated that Mayor Wagner established the Urban Renewal Board in 1958. The emphasis of the New Board was a rejection of the Moses wide sweep style of clearing an entire area. Moses rejected rehabilitation and cleared an entire area and then rebuilt with large scale housing construction. This Board proposed brownstone reclamation, judicious use of government subsidies and community participation in a partnership of government, private enterprise and the local community.

THE REPORT OF THE CITY PLANNING COMMISSION

The 1979 report of the City Planning Report on the Fifth Amendment consisted of a review of the "Preliminary Plan", and its accomplishments and failures. It included the revised goals and major

changes announced in the Fifth Revision to the "Master" Plan.

It claimed that the "Preliminary Plan" for the community was the first attempt to preserve its structure by retaining old edifices and developing new ones. It sought community participation and attempted to carry out relocation under direct city supervision before additional sites would be cleared for development. This was contrary to the Moses' practices which required massive relocation outside the area under development. City policy combined spot clearance and redevelopment with rehabilitation and conservation. It combined various categories of tax-abated and full tax-paying rentals, cooperative housing and low-income rentals. Lastly, it employed all the housing and renewal tools under City, State and Federal programs. The Plan combined Federal Title one provisions with the State's Limited Profits Housing programs. The plan, it claimed, was a definitive break from past development plans both in the philosophy of the planners and comprehensiveness of the plan. The original plan stated that the plan's purpose was the development of an integrated comprehensive plan for renewal dealing with

social and economic aspects as well as physical

17

treatment of structures and streets.

In this context renewal was seen as a means of accomplishing social, racial and economic integration, as well as a spur to the regeneration of a neighborhood. At the same time it cautioned that it was necessary to weigh economic factors such as the possibility of market rate housing for the remaining sites and questioned the fairness of concentrating scarce public resources in one area at the expense of other parts of the city.

The stated goals of the Master Plan were thus: the elimination of substandard housing which would feature new residential development that would serve a broad cross-section of the population and the preservation and improvement of commercial facilities. The plan would encourage permanent residency and the creation of an harmonious balance of low and high structures and of open spaces. The restatement of the goals of the original "plan" and its reformulation was a compromise allowing for the accommodation of Continue and Strykers Bay Neighborhood Association. It would serve the interests of established brownstone owners while it allowed for some low-income development. The

revised plan permitted private and commercial development, middle and upper-income housing along with a limited supply of housing for the elderly. It took into account the rising market for real estate and the interests of developers in new construction.

The City Planning Commission, in its review of the accomplishments of the "Plan" and its endorsement of the Fifth Amendment before the Board of Estimate claimed that the area would be transformed by a \$25,000,000 investment in non-construction activity. This would include the widening of Columbus and Amsterdam Avenue, construction of Plazas, improvements in amenities, sewers and pipe lines. Excessive over-crowding in 5,400 sub-standard apartments had been eliminated and 7,700 new and rehabilitated dwelling units had been built. Of the above, 25 government assisted projects provided 5,177 units for middle, moderate and low-income housing. The Federal Housing Administration financed and insured 2,551 standard units; and 3,623 dwelling units were upgraded through minor renovation, primarily along Central Park West and the abutting side streets. However, the last two achievements were not the result of planning but of the new prosperity on the Upper West Side.

Unstated in this record of accomplishments was the fifteen year delay in completing what would have been the original plan, the elimination of Plazas, as an amenity, due to rising real estate costs and the fear that the Plazas were breeding grounds for crime. Implicit in the revised plan was the inability or lack of desire to provide previously promised low-income housing for the poor and elderly relocatees. In addition, the virtual stoppage of new construction due to high interest rates in the early eighties, the New York City fiscal crisis in the mid-seventies, the cut back of Federal funds and developer disinterest, all caused a virtual stoppage of construction of moderate and middle-income housing.

Major changes were proposed in the Fifth Amendment in order to complete the eleven remaining sites. Nine hundred dwellings for the remaining sites(excluding Sites 4 and 30) were one-half the number originally proposed; and a number of buildings on six sites formerly designated for full clearance were now proposed for rehabilitation only. Site 32 was subdivided into sites 32A, 32B, 32 R1 32 R2, 32 R3 and 32 R4. Site 32 R1 and 32B would be designated as the location of the new riding academy stable. On site 32

R2 two five story buildings were designated for rehabilitation to give the Ballet Hispanico increased space for their school training facility. A portion of site 32, now called Site 32A, would be combined with site 33 for the purpose of constructing 180 units of market-rate, Section 8 housing and a church facility. Site 32 was originally designated for partially tax-abated moderate and middle-income housing. Under the Fifth Amendment market-rate housing, would be for the first time, a part of the West Side Urban Renewal plan. The Department of Housing, Preservation and Development projected a combination of new sites and the rehabilitation of 457 dwelling units at market rates on seven sites. The "Final" Plan of 1962 had contemplated the construction of 2,800 hundred fully tax-paying dwelling units on fourteen sites, but no housing has been built in that category by this date.

Site 35, located on Columbus Avenue between 88th and 89th on Columbus Avenue, the largest remaining site in the urban renewal area, was designated as a 365 unit partially tax-exempt development in the Final Plan of 1962. The Fifth Amendment proposed dividing the site into two parcels, Site 35A and 35B. Each site would now have a three story luxury town house. Site 35A was to

have 77 market-rate units and site 35B would have Section 8 units. Lastly, a portion of Site 23, previously designed for market-rate residence would, instead accept Columbia Grammar School's proposal for new school facilities. The balance of the site which contained residential buildings, previously designated for clearance, would now be retained. In total, 916 units would be completed. One-Half were to be market-rental and one-half subsidized, excluding Site 4 and 30.

TABLE # 5: DWELLING UNITS PROPOSED IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPARED
WITH UNITS APPROVED IN THE 1962 PLAN AND COMPLETED:

	<u>PROPOSED</u>	<u>COMPLY.</u> <u>D/U*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>D/I* APPROVED</u> <u>IN 1962</u>
NEW CONSTRUCTION	689	5,177	5,866	7,800
REHABILITATION:				
FHA/CONVEYING.		2,241		
N.Y.C.H.A.		276		
TENANT AND COMM.				
MNGMENT CORP.		34		
TOTAL REHAB.	227	2,551	2,778	3,100
CONSERVATION		<u>3,623</u>	<u>3,623</u>	<u>3,600</u>
 TOTAL	 916	 11,351	 12,2677	 14,500

* DWELLING UNITS (HPD)

There would be reduced density under the 5th Amendment. The original plan proposed 1866 additional units and the 1979 proposal of 916, a reduction of 49%.

TABLE # 6: REDUCED DENSITIES IN FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPARED TO THE 1962 PLAN: PROJECTED DWELLING UNITS FOR THE REMAINING UNDEVELOPED RESIDENTIAL SITES IN WEST SIDE URBAN RENEWAL AREA

SITE NO.2	UNITS PROPOSED IN ORIG.1962 PLAN	UNITS PRO- POSED IN 5TH AMENDMENT:1979	REDUCT- ION
9	210	83	127
23	190	76	114
32	250	210	40
35	365	110	255
40	215	133	82
41	300	161	139
44	216	103	113
45/46	<u>120</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>80</u>
	1866	916	950

Excludes Site 30 which is under litigation and Site 4.

1

Many of the sites have been sub-divided but for comparisons sake

2

the original site numbers have been retained.

These numbers include rehabilitation as well as new construction

3

units.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY: Due to unforeseen circumstances and events the Fifth Amendment and its subsequent application entailed an abandonment of public and subsidized housing at the expense of the poor, the elderly and moderate-income tenants. The change in national administrative policy, beginning with the Nixon Administration in 1968, the high cost of financing and building material due to inflation, the city fiscal crisis and the subsequent recovery, all favored market price middle and luxury apartment construction in planning policy.

The recovery of New York City, in some measure, was facilitated by Federal, State and City encouragement of commercial development, in the midtown business area, by national and international corporations. Perhaps as a result, if not as intention, tax abatements and allowances by the City Administration encouraged the private development of luxury housing condominiums and cooperatives. At the same time decreasing opportunities on the East Side due to full land occupancy and increased demand for housing enhanced the Upper West Side as a prime area for construction of new housing. Its location, transportation facilities and off-beat charm made it attractive to young professionals and executives.

The resulting constituency of the West Side and the desire of brownstone owners to preserve their windfall equity caused a change in the climate of opinion wherein low cost public housing was no longer as strongly favored. The lure of fully taxed housing which would increase revenue for the city, the political expediencies of electoral politics, the cut-off of Federal subsidies and the ever increasing demand of middle and upper income housing all made the market place the decisive factor. As a result, the eleven remaining sites on the Upper West Side were developed as non-subsidized luxury housing with an 80/20 % component in two of the sites.(Site 30 and Site 4). In these circumstances the elderly would be included in the twenty per cent allotted to low-income tenants.

NOTES: APPENDIX 1.

1 Davies, J. Clarence 111. Neighborhood Groups and Urban Development. 1966.

2 New York City. Department of Housing, Preservation and Deelopment. West Side Urban Renewal Project N.Y. R-43. April, 1979.

3 Davies, J. Clarence 111. Neighborhood Groups and Urban Development. 1966, p.??

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7 Davies, J. Clarence 111. Neighborhood Groups and Urban Development. 1966.

8 Davies, J. Clarence 111. Neighborhood groups and Urban Development. 1966

9 Taped interview with Ms. Doris Rosenblum, executive Director, Community Board # 7.

10 Taped Interview with Ms. Rosenblum, Community Bd. # 7.

11 Taped interview with John Kowal.

12 Taped interview with Doris Rosenblum.

13 Taped interview with Martin Gallent

14 Olson, Laura Katz. The Political Economy of Aging. 1982, p. 183.

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APPENDIX 1

METHODS

This research is a sociological and historical exploratory study which describes the political, economic and social processes and structures involved in the exploration, certification, planning, funding and subsequent development of the West Side Urban Renewal Plan. The exploration for development and renewal began in 1950 and thhe area was certified for renewal in 1956.

Specifically, the central issue is the fight for space between the real estate interests, public housing advocates, neighborhood groups and the City administration and bureaucracy.

Central to the problem of Urban Renewal is land use and allocation of sites. The announcement of the intention to plan activates interest groups on all levels of the political, economic and social arenas. The ensuing conflicts over the scope, direction and content are resolved through formal and informal processes which make the

original statement of the plan, in many cases unrecognizable. Since one party usually, does not have total power over the planning process, the continuous compromises and consensuses are dependent on the control over resources and influence, public passivity and activism, interest group alignments and the historically specific context of international, national, state, city and local relationships and legislation. Within this context, struggles for power and influence over the decision making process were and are activated between various constituencies and clients.

The West Side Urban Renewal Plan lends itself admirably to a study of the renewal and development of a neighborhood and a community formed by natural, geographic and social boundaries. The delineation of the area's geographic boundaries- 96th street and 86th street on the north and south and Central Park West and Amsterdam Avenue on the east and west coincided with the political boundaries described in the West Side Urban Renewal Plan.

We immediately recognized that although decision related to redevelopment and renewal were the result of community, city-wide and national priorities and policies; it was also influenced by personality, local community and City interest groups and institutions who played important roles in the formal and informal political process. Complicating the problem further was the realization that international events played an important role and yet was beyond the scope of this study. A further complication was our inability to interview the most important players in this unfolding drama due to unavailability because of disinterest, unwillingness to be interviewed, or death.

In light of the above we tried to reconstruct the history of the Upper West Side by reviewing the index and articles in the New York Times beginning in the mid-40's. The Westsider, a local newspaper, was invaluable because of its emphasis on local political personalities, local board developments and city political decisions which affected the Upper West Side. Due to the generosity of the staff the morgue and an index of

298
newspapers dating back to 1960 was available for study.

Another source of information was the files of City and local offices of national agencies. Some files of the Department of Housing, Development and Preservation, the City Planning Commission and the Regional Office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development were made available to me. The latter provided material related to the Court Cases. HPD and the Planning Commission allowed me to read documents relating to the planning and processing of plans for the development of the West Side. Correspondence, both intradepartmental and interdepartmental was available to aid in establishing a historical context for our study. The community Board provided me with access to their files for data relating to public community board meetings relating to both the past and the present, correspondence between the Community Board and the relevant City Agencies.

The most important source of information was interviews. Approximately 50 interviews were conducted between 1983-1985. A list of respondents

are listed at the end of the bibliography. The purpose of the interviews was to gather historical material about the West Side before and during development process and to attempt to evoke the ideas, values and perspective of the actors in the process.

Since many of the most prominent actors declined to be interviewed the study concentrated on Community Board members, the director of Community Board # 7, State Senators and Assemblymen who are representatives of the area and former department heads and higher level administrative members of HPD, the Planning Commission and the Law Division of the Regional Office of HUD in New York City.

The interviews were conducted at the residences, business offices, restaurants and City department offices. Most respondents expressed a degree of reticence about expressing opinions about an ongoing process. In addition many of the figures are still active in the business and political arena. The interviewed requested that I promise not to quote them directly and I agreed. In some cases they requested that I shut my tape

recorder during parts of the interview. In other cases I was allowed to take notes and in one case a request was made not to take notes.

I began the open ended interview process with questions designed to give the respondent the opportunity to relax and afford the questioner an insight into the attitudes and perspective of the former. An example of opening questions were, " what is the relationship between the development of Lower Manhattan, Lincoln Center and the Upper West Side" and " Can you describe the informal process which led to the public announcement of a planning program?"

The question of reliability was analyzed in terms of consistency with other interviews and with the chronological data available in newspapers, periodicals and books.

APPENDIX 2

HOUSING LEGISLATION1933 The National Recovery Act of 1933.

1. Title 11-Authorize public works administration grants and loans to local jurisdictions for large public works.

1933 Home Owner's Loan Corporation (HOLC).

1. 20 year repayment on defaulted mortgages and loans of up to 900% of value.

1934 National Housing Act of 1934.

1. Legislate a Federal Housing Administration

2. For every public housing unit built at least one " unsafe or unsanitary" housing unit must be demolished.

1935 Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 1935.

1. Congressional creation of the Work Progress Administration (WPA).

2. Local public work projects.

1937 Housing Act of 1937.

1. Formation of of U.S. Housing Authority (USHA).
2. Public housing program.
3. Developer operated rental units for low income families.

1944 Community Facility Act.

1. Aid war boom communities with housing and nursery schools, child-care centers, clinics, and schools with Federal funds.
2. Section 4 all defense housing units to be demolished immediately after the war.
3. \$ 1.3 billion for public defense housing construction and \$ 300 million to insure private financed defense housing.

1949 Taft-Ellender-Wagner Housing Act of 1949.

1. Title 10-Creation of local redevelopment agencies.
2. 1.5 billion Federal write-down of the land and acquisition and clearance costs.

3. Title 11- authorized 810,000 public housing units over a 6 year period.

1954 Housing Act of 1954.

1. Urban renewal program to be independent of other housing programs.

2. Decentralized program into 7 regional offices.

3. 10 % exception from " predominantly residential" requirements.

4. Local advisory committees.

1959 National Housing Act of 1959.

1. Section 202 Direct government loans to nonprofit sponsors for the full costs of housing constructed for the aged at a reduced interest rate of 3 %.

1961 Housing Act of 1961.

1. Tripled previous authorization for public housing to 100,000 units.

2. \$ 2.5 billion for urban renewal.

3. New below market interest rate subsidy program for private, limited-dividend, multifamily housing production.

4. Section 221 (d) (3) provided mortgage money at the Federal funds rate (3 1/8% at that time) to subsidize housing for families with incomes below the median but above public housing eligibility limits.

1964 Housing Act of 1964.

1. Title 11- \$ 1 billion into central city "target areas" neighborhoods.

1965 Housing and Urban Development Act.

1. An Additional 240,000 public housing units over 4 years.

2. \$ 2.9 billion additional funded.

3. Public (local) grant program for local construction.

4. Communities program.

5. Matching grants program for community centers.

6. A rent supplement to put public housing families into subsidized housing units.

7. Section 23 permitted local public housing authorities to lease privately developed new housing.

1968 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.

1. 10 year goal of 26 million units.
2. Six million were to be new and rehabilitated units produced with public assistance.
3. Subsidized payments on home mortgages.
4. Federal assistance directly to private market.

1974 Community Development Block Grant Program.

1. \$ 8.4 billion over a three year period.
2. Ten programs into one single "pot" distributed to the states according to formula.
3. Neighborhood rehabilitation and subsidized housing rather than commercial construction.
4. Private interests to build, own and manage housing intended for the poor.
5. Subsidy to be based on tenants income.

APPENDIX 3NAMES AND POSITIONS OF INTERVIEW RESPONDENTSPRESENT AND FORMER MEMBERS OF COMMUNITY BOARD # 7

Albert Andrew
 Stella B. Alien
 Richard M. Asche
 David Finn
 Rina Garst
 Ludwig Gelobter (Former Chairmen)
 Sally Goodgeld
 Laura Jarvis (Minister)
 Robert Kagan (Former Chairman)
 David Kornbluh
 John Kowal (former Chairman)
 Barbara Kellerman
 Jan Levy
 Miriam Lieber
 William Lubic
 William Price
 Ana Pereira
 Jean Rigg
 Philip Rudd
 Donald Shea
 Ethel Sheffer
 Shirley Silverberg
 Roni Wattman
 Bernard Wohl (Director of Goddard Riverside)
 Doris Rosenblum: District Manager, Community Board
 # 7

Department of Housing, Preservation and Development

Barry Light: Former Dep. Director. Employed by
 Lefrak
 Ron Marino: Deputy
 Paul Ketterer: Deputy Director
 Charles Reiss: Former Deputy Director
 Robert Candel: Former Deputy Director. Employed
 by Lefrak.
 Robert Reach: Former Deputy Director

Department of City Planning.

Jittar Bhatarager
 Shelley Fine
 Jack Collins
 Douglas Woodward

City Planning Commission

Martin Gallent: Vice Chairman

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Allen Wiener: Regional Director

Elected Political Officials And Aides.

Andrew Stein: President of the City Council,
former President of Borough of
Manhattan.

Leon Bogues: New York State Senator, one time
Chairman of Community Board # 7.

Jerry Nadler: New York State Assemblyman.

Edward Sullivan: New York State Assemblyman.

Ruth Messinger: New York City Councilwoman.

Representative Theodore Weiss, House of
Representatives.

Norma Herman: Aide to Representative Weiss.

Ross Graham: Aide to State Senator Ohrenstein.

Herman Badillo: Former Deputy Mayor

Miscellaneous.

Roger Starr: Former Member of City Housing and
Planning Council, Editorial Staff, The New York
Times.

Florence Weissman: West Side Federation for Senior
Housing.

Anita Altman: City Planner

Carol Tripodi: New York Bank for Savings. Loan
Department.

Eugene Halpern: Long Time Former President of
Continue.

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