IVES'S MULTIVERSE:

THE CONCORD SONATA AS AMERICAN COSMOLOGY

by

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Abstract

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In his Piano Sonata No. 2, "Concord, Mass., 1840-60," and the accompanying prose *Essays Before A Sonata*, Charles Ives sets forth a view of the universe that has much in common with a number of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century literary and philosophical works that, taken together, constitute a tradition of American cosmologies. This tradition finds a prototype in Ralph Waldo Emerson's *Nature* (1836), and achieves full flower in William James's dynamic vision of a continuously expanding "pluralistic universe," or "multiverse," of diverse yet intimately interrelated elements. James's vision is an outgrowth of his philosophical doctrine of pragmatism, the roots of which can be traced back at least as far as Emerson.

Both Emerson's and James's cosmological views resonate deeply with Ives's Concord Sonata. The genealogy of the sonata includes over a dozen unpublished versions of the work that Ives generated between the publication of the first (1921) and second (1947) editions, as well as the many Ives works to which the sonata is

related. This complex web of variants of and works related to the sonata can be interpreted as forming a musical Jamesian multiverse through which performers of the work must make their way. In an appropriately pragmatic spirit, the unpublished copy of the sonata made in the 1980s by John Kirkpatrick, the pianist who premiered the sonata in 1939, proposes one way to navigate this multiverse, while explicitly encouraging each performer of the work to find his or her own way through it.

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Introduction

Every American writing music today is the more independently and confidently himself because of the courage with which [Charles] Ives obeyed Thoreau's injunction:

> *Direct your eye right inward . . . and so be*
> *Expert in home-cosmography.*

To experiment and to explore has never been revolutionary for an American; he is unaffectedly at home in the unregulated and the untried. In a vast new country experience is direct, intense and various, and so grass-roots creative activity in the United States has been marked by an exuberance and a diversity that are shocking to sensibilities developed in older cultures whose essence is refinement and selectivity. In all the arts Americans quite naturally bring together elements that elsewhere appear as irreconcilable canons of radically opposed schools of thought. Inherited traditions, with all their subtleties, are necessarily pushed aside when the time comes to reinvigorate art with a transfusion from more immediate experience.

This is not because Americans are determined on iconoclasm or eccentricity. They are just anxious to be themselves, to establish their relation to life and art straight from within. Such an attitude is far from being the expression of a personal romanticism. It is rather a spiritual concept which stems from the gospel preached by the Transcendentalists at Concord, who believed that man, nature, and God are one, and that truth and integrity are attainable by man only to the degree that he perceives his own identity with the creative forces of the universe, on which alone he may depend. This is a philosophy of the Ideal whose emphasis is on what could be, on the intuitively sensed possibility that is illimitable, rather than on what has been or what other people are.

Charles Ives was still a boy when, early on a Memorial Day morning, a moment of revelation of 'an exultant something gleaming with the possibilities of this life, an assurance that nothing is impossible,' gave him a sense of the Universal lying behind the appearances of nature and all material things, and marked him for its search.…So he pondered the relations of things, testing out music by life and life by music, and building abstract musical structures like concrete events. This makes his particular kind of program music, in which the flow of musical relationships derives from the patterns of activity he saw around him. The music therefore records not a *thing* that happens but the *way* things happen. Because events don't move by singly, but carry memories and forecasts with them, colliding and conflicting with other events too, Ives's music moves in many directions at once and is built on many levels, in the way that experience comes to the mind.[1]

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[1] Henry and Sidney Cowell, *Charles Ives and His Music* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 5-7. Emphases in the original.

These paragraphs come from the first pages of *Charles Ives and His Music*, the first biography of Ives, written by Henry and Sidney Cowell and published in 1955. In my research on this project I have found its insights to be fresh and revealing fifty years later, particularly as they concern Ives's relation to American music, his exploration of the intersection of music and spirituality, and the raw expression of the American consciousness experiencing life as manifested in the complexities of Ives's music. The Cowells articulate all of these ideas in the passage cited above, and expand upon them throughout their groundbreaking text. These also happen to be three key concerns of this study, in which I shall attempt to understand Ives's Piano Sonata No. 2, "Concord, Mass., 1840-60," as a cosmology of a peculiarly American sort.

This project really began in 1998 when I undertook my study of the Concord Sonata. I performed the work on my recital for the Master of Arts degree at Hunter College, City University of New York, in May 1999. I had long been drawn to the Concord Sonata as a listener; initially, given my background as an undergraduate student of literature, perhaps, for its literary associations, but then quickly for its endlessly fascinating sound world. My scholarly research into the sonata began in the spring semester of 1999.

I must acknowledge at the outset two important sources of inspiration. The first is the essay "Ives's *Universe*," in which Philip Lambert situates Ives's unfinished Universe Symphony within a primarily classical European tradition of cosmologies.[2] Lambert occasionally refers to American cosmologies, as glimpsed through the lens

[2] Philip Lambert, "Ives's *Universe*," in *Ives Studies*, ed. Philip Lambert (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 233-259.

of A. D. Van Nostrand's 1968 volume *Everyman His Own Poet: Romantic Gospels in American Literature*.[3] I found these references to be especially tantalizing. I shall turn to Van Nostrand in Chapter 2, but note for now that in my experience with the Concord Sonata—both as a performer and as a music historian—the monumentality of this work has always struck me. It is an elaborate expression of the composer's vision, both in music and the prose *Essays Before a Sonata* (excerpts from which literally covered the jacket of the first LP recording of the sonata I owned, Gilbert Kalish on Nonesuch Records). Between the sonata and the essays, Ives seems to say everything possible about the universe and his place in it that he knew in 1921—in this way they strike me as constituting a cosmology. Ives's continued obsession with the music, manifested in the numerous revisions of the work he generated between 1921 and the publication of the second edition of the sonata in 1947, leaves no doubt that he had even more to say. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that the ways in which he modified what he had to say about the universe, and the process of modification itself, were meaningful, leaving the two published editions of the sonata as mere snapshots of a work that Ives conceived of as existing in a state of flux.[4]

This brings me to the second important influence, Sondra Rae Clark's 1974 article, "The Element of Choice in Ives's *Concord Sonata*," which is drawn from research for her 1971 doctoral dissertation at Stanford University, "The Evolving Concord Sonata: A Study of Choices and Variants in the Music of Charles Ives."

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[3] A. D. Van Nostrand, *Everyman His Own Poet: Romantic Gospels in American Literature* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

[4] Elliott Carter used the image of the snapshot in "The Case of Mr. Ives," in *Modern Music* 16 (March 1939), 172-76, reprinted in *Elliott Carter: Collected Essays and Lectures, 1937-1995*, ed. Jonathan W. Bernard (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 87-90: "In [Ives's] compositions, the notation of a work is only the basis for further improvisation, and the notation itself, frequently of music first conceived many years before, is a kind of snapshot of the way he played it at a certain period in his life" (88).

Clark reveals the significance of the range of available sources for the Concord Sonata, providing in her dissertation an exhaustive analysis of the multiple unpublished versions of the work. She sees the variants as opening out into a web of constantly "increasing diversity of inspiration rather than an ultimate resolution." She continues:

> While it cannot be claimed that the prolonged evolution of the "Concord Sonata" was paralleled in Ives's other works, the history and development of the Sonata nonetheless illustrate some compositional attitudes which were basic with Ives and hence were applicable in part to all of his compositions….The sketches…demonstrate the tendency of reworked versions to grow away from original ideas more as variations than ultimate solutions. More than once a comparison of original sketches with later versions displayed a growth away from and a turning back to earlier ideas, illuminating a kind of continuing validity for each version regardless of its placement in the evolution of the idea upon which it was based.[5]

To support her claims, Clark cites John Kirkpatrick, who premiered the sonata in 1939 and catalogued Ives's manuscripts after the composer's death in 1954, and who emphasized the importance of acknowledging—and, moreover, using—these variants. Kirkpatrick was at work on his own edition—he called it a "copy"—of the sonata at the time of his death in 1991, an edition that takes into account the full range of Ives's variants of the sonata as well as the composer's open spirit toward the contributions of the performer in the presentation of the work.

A relationship may be drawn between the concerns of these two influences: Clark's analysis of the largely concealed expansiveness of Ives's musical vision for the sonata, thoroughly revealed through Kirkpatrick's excavation of the source materials after Ives's death, and Lambert's consideration of Ives's music from a cosmological perspective. This relationship becomes clear if we view it against the

[5] Sondra Rae Clark, "The Evolving Concord Sonata: A Study of Choices and Variants in the Music of Charles Ives" (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1971), 344.

background of the philosophy of pragmatism, which was current and popular in the early decades of the twentieth century, particularly as expressed by the American philosopher William James. The doctrine of pragmatism recognized and responded to the great variety contained in the universe, a variety that must be acknowledged even at the level of our most mundane activities. It posited that the effectiveness with which we make our way in life can be measured by the results of the choices we make among the potentialities the universe offers to us at every moment. The pragmatic method—a process of surveying the possibilities, establishing a belief in one of those possibilities, and acting in accordance with our belief in that possibility—informs our every movement. James felt that this pluralistic view of the universe more accurately described a "multiverse" of interrelated elements, unfolding in a web-like pattern of ever-increasing complexity, in which each provisional moment of truth is immediately subject to further modification as new truths come to be known, and in which each element is inextricably interrelated.

In this light it becomes possible to see the range of variants of Ives's Concord Sonata as a kind of musical multiverse, and John Kirkpatrick's admonition that each performer ought to make his or her own way through that multiverse as an application of James's pragmatic method. These observations form the main core of my argument.

Another major theme that permeates this study is the idea of influence. It is impossible to talk about the music of Charles Ives without talking about influence. His music is notorious for its incorporation of elements "borrowed" from a broad range of sources, including European art music and an array of American vernacular

music. The precise identity of Ives's borrowings, however, is often difficult to assess clearly, because he uses various techniques to distort or disguise them. Scraps of Ives's music frequently sound somehow familiar, but cannot be traced with certainty to any particular source. I like to think of what Ives is doing as *refracting* the identity of the musical motives he borrows into a broad spectrum of possible meanings, as does a literary trope or metaphor.

I perceive the idea of refracting influences into a range of meanings to be a hallmark of American aesthetics. It is as if transplanting European—and, later, African and Asian—culture to America tore apart the roots of those influences, leading to unforeseen types of new growth in the New World. The cultivated European landscape was a far cry from the American wilderness, and the products of cultivated European aesthetics needed to adapt to their newly appropriated environment if they were to flourish.

In order to illuminate this idea of refracted influence, my investigation begins with a survey of Hindu and European cosmologies, the influence of which filtered down to William James, the subject of Chapter 3, through Ralph Waldo Emerson, the subject of Chapter 2. Foreshadowing my discussion of Emerson and James—and later of Ives and Kirkpatrick—these cosmologies will reveal certain shared characteristics: a recognition of the interrelationship of all things in the universe, in spite of the enormous diversity among those things; an emphasis on the continuous activity or process—and, therefore, change—in the unfolding of all life; the active symbiotic relationship between the parts and the whole of that universe; and an awareness of the cycles of life and death (and the promise, somehow, of regeneration)

experienced by everything in the universe (and, perhaps, the universe itself). These cosmologies exhibit a variety of perspectives on the identity of the prime mover of the universe, whether some kind of deity or a natural force of generation, as they trace how spiritual aspects of the cosmological enterprise eventually come to compete with the results of scientific observation. The role of sound, especially of language or of musical tones, in the creation and activity of the cosmos is also emphasized. Finally, in each case the overlap between humans' interest in the cosmos and our interest in human consciousness, the observed as well as the observer, will become clear.

By tracing a genealogy of influence and resonance among these cosmologies I wish to construct places for Ives's Concord Sonata and Kirkpatrick's "copy" of the sonata in which they too can be viewed as substantial texts that participate in and contribute to a cosmological tradition. And by focusing on their relation to the ideas of Emerson and James in particular, I aim to situate them in a specifically American branch of this tradition.

I begin Chapter 1 with a brief overview of Hindu cosmology, followed by an account of relevant passages in the *Bhagavad Gita*, the influence of early translations of which was significant in mid-nineteenth-century Concord, Massachusetts. Two cosmologies of Plato—from *Republic* and *Timaeus*—follow. Plato is the subject of one of Emerson's essays on *Representative Men*, as is Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, whose cosmological views are surveyed next. My general observations on Goethean cosmology are followed by selected excerpts from *Das italienische Reise*, a work of great importance to both Emerson and Thoreau. *Das italienische Reise* is especially important for its account of the revelation of the *Urpflanze*, or "primal plant," to

Goethe, an image of organicism that appears frequently in Emerson's writings. The cosmologies of two European Romantics round out this survey: Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *The Theory of Life* and Alexander von Humboldt's *Cosmos*.

In Chapter 2, the range of cosmological influences surveyed in Chapter 1 is revealed to inform cosmological writings by Ralph Waldo Emerson. I shall begin with a brief summary of A.D. Van Nostrand's general characteristics of American cosmologies. Van Nostrand treats Emerson's *Nature* (1836) as the prototypical American cosmology. I shall argue that Emerson is not merely appropriating the influences presented in Chapter 1 at face value; rather, Emerson's American imagination refracts them into a range of possible meanings. This idea is first suggested in a brief glance at the essay "Quotation and Originality" and expanded in readings of Emerson's essays on Plato and Goethe from *Representative Men*, before I offer a detailed analysis of *Nature*. Emerson's style of writing and lecturing, with its highly improvisational quality and internally self-contradictory syntax, is shown to reflect a way of thinking that is informed by life on the American continent. Rather than projecting European linearity, Emerson radiates in all directions at once, as does his universe of ever-spiraling circles. The chapter ends with a brief look at relevant themes presented in the cosmological writings of Emerson's protégé, friend, and close intellectual associate, Henry David Thoreau.

Chapter 3 is both the physical center and philosophical heart of this project. Chapters 1 and 2 point toward the ideas of William James, and his ideas, in turn, point toward my reading of Ives's Concord Sonata and Kirkpatrick's interpretation of the sonata, as set forth in Chapters 4 and 5 and in my Conclusion. The refraction of

influences in Emerson's imagination is revisited here in a discussion of the literary device of the trope, as set forth by Richard Poirier in his assessment of a group of American writers, including James, that he identifies as "Emersonian pragmatists." This sets the stage for a detailed exploration of major themes related to Jamesian pragmatism. I shall begin with an analysis of the idea of the stream of thought, first set forth in the *Principles of Psychology* in 1890, and the highly inter-relational constitution of that stream, in which each thought is imagined to be surrounded by a vague fringe so that there is a gradual shading of any given thought into the next. This will be followed by a description of the movement of the stream in an unpredictable sequence of what James calls "flights" and "perchings"—terms that I later find useful in discussing the Concord Sonata.

I shall then turn to James's cosmological idea of a pluralistic "multiverse." The features of this multiverse are better understood in light of some of the scientific and religious ideas that influenced him. The pragmatic method, James's approach to navigating the multiverse, is shown to recall the idea of flights and perchings from the *Psychology* and involves a process of establishing a sequence of provisional truths. James suggests that we make our way through the multiverse by surveying the ever-present range of available possibilities, selecting among those possibilities one possibility in which we feel we might fruitfully establish temporary belief, and acting upon that belief. The results of our action will determine our next move, to the next temporary belief (or perching), the next action (or flight). Much in the manner of the idea of natural selection set forth by Charles Darwin—whose influence on James we will have examined in the previous section of the chapter—the results of certain types

of actions will generate positive results and we will try to use them again; on the other hand, we may not wish to repeat certain types of actions that have negative results. Jacques Barzun's illuminating reflections on pragmatism and aesthetics will provide a transition to the next chapter.

I organize Chapters 4 and 5, on Ives and Kirkpatrick respectively, according to the same sequence of sub-sections into which the James chapter is divided in order to demonstrate the close relationship among these chapters, thereby allowing the reader to follow the argument point by point. As the James chapter began with a section on Poirier's notion of "Emersonian pragmatists," I shall begin the Ives chapter with a section treating the composer as an Emersonian pragmatist and the Concord Sonata as an extended trope on the famous motive that opens Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. This discussion leads into a consideration of Ives's awareness of himself historically in the Western art music tradition, and of his reputation for the use of musical quotation and borrowing. I shall critique the value of analyses devoted to tracing the appearance of melodic motives in Ives's music, as epitomized in J. Peter Burkholder's *All Made of Tunes*, arguing that it can be uninformative to devote all of one's attention to the search for possible borrowings when Ives's actual sources often seem to be quite vague. Moreover, I shall argue that this vagueness, a primary trait of Emersonian and Jamesian cosmology, is itself an important aspect of understanding Ives's aesthetics, and is best left to be given free play.

Continuing in my efforts to parallel my discussion of James with that of Ives, I shall begin my reflection upon Ives's stream of thought as presented in the Concord Sonata by considering his use of the word "vague" in the *Essays Before A Sonata.* I

shall then consider the kinds of musical devices that foster the flow of Ives's stream in the sonata, with a focus on identifying Jamesian "flights" and "perchings" in the score. In an effort to view the Concord Sonata itself as constituting a multiverse, I examine the genealogy of the work in detail—its relation to earlier works by Ives, its numerous revisions, and its relation to later works by Ives, particularly the Fourth Symphony and the Universe Symphony. This discussion will involve not only shared musical elements but shared philosophical and programmatic elements as well.

After having related so many elements of the music and program of the Concord Sonata to parallel notions in the psychology and philosophy of William James, I shall conclude the chapter on Ives with an extended consideration of his relation to the scientific and spiritual world in which he lived. Earlier studies have downplayed Ives's intellectual sophistication, largely in light of his unimpressive grades in courses he took at Yale and the perceived lack of academic rigor of the *Essays Before A Sonata.* While perpetuating such a view might contribute to the myth of Ives as isolated aesthetic primitive (which, however, has recently experienced some erosion), it seems that even a superficial reinterpretation of the evidence could easily be read from another point of view.

I wish, then, to salvage something of Ives's intellectual reputation. I shall begin by examining the content of Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I, a course Ives took at Yale University during the 1896-97 school year. Traces of the content of the course—which included a section on experimental psychology, the field in which William James was a pioneer—are reflected in concerns Ives expresses in the *Essays Before A Sonata,* as well as in the perceptually experimental quality of much of Ives's

music. The interests of his professors in the course bear a resemblance to the range of books that once did, and in some cases still do, occupy the shelves of Ives's summer house in West Redding, Connecticut. Ives's library contained a vast range of fiction and poetry, but also contemporary works on science, philosophy, religion, psychology, mysticism, and, of course, music, including many books that explored the intersection of these fields. With the influence of his wife, Harmony Twichell Ives, upon his reading list, Ives appears to have explored a number of these volumes and taken active interest in the issues they set forth. I offer as appendices to this study an index to persons and works Ives mentions in the *Essays Before A Sonata,* and a transcription of the list of books in the house at West Redding produced by Vivian Perlis's students at Yale in 1974, with addenda from my own recent visit to the house. Taken together, these lists reveal the extraordinary breadth of Ives's intellectual influences and interests.

The particulars of Ives's religious beliefs are extremely difficult to trace. As a church organist he was exposed to the traditions of a large number of Christian faiths, but his own personal sense of faith is much more elusive. Perhaps one day a detailed survey of Ives's correspondence, song texts, other writings, and an analysis of relevant programmatic works could help unlock this mystery, but such an investigation exceeds the boundaries of the present study. I do, however, briefly examine Ives biographer Jan Swafford's suggestion that Charles and Harmony Twichell Ives shared a kind of personal theology as an outgrowth of their relationship. Another clue to Ives's faith lies in his career in the life insurance industry: a real-

world manifestation of the intersection of faith, science, and economics, this reveals further insights into the personality of this most complicated character.

Chapter 5 begins with a continued examination of the impact of science and religion on a musical life, turning to the pianist John Kirkpatrick, who premiered the Concord Sonata in 1939. Kirkpatrick's correspondence and writings portray a young man who became caught up in the mystical beliefs of a circle of American expatriates in Paris, dabbled in Christian Science, and, through the influence of his wife's family, became involved in Theosophy. His concern with the relationship between spirituality and music is clearly revealed in several lectures he gave over the years, and these are considered here in some detail.

While I have discovered no direct evidence that Kirkpatrick read William James, there is evidence that James's ideas resonated with those of the Theosophists, who attempted to claim James as one of their own—at least in spirit—in light of his broadly ecumenical religious views and his sympathetic attitude toward the subject of mysticism, including the idea of reincarnation. The lack of evidence for a direct link between Kirkpatrick and James notwithstanding, Kirkpatrick's approach to the Concord Sonata advocates a process very much like that of the pragmatic method. The chapter concludes with an overview of Kirkpatrick's typewritten notes concerning his "copy" of the sonata, as well as an analysis of Kirkpatrick's version of the "Emerson" movement of the sonata, in which the editorial choices Kirkpatrick made—and the prejudices they reveal—in his approach to the sonata are brought to light. Against the background of our previous consideration of Kirkpatrick's spiritual beliefs, his "copy" of the sonata can be viewed not so much as a musical edition but

as a philosophical document, a cosmology, expressing Kirkpatrick's understanding of the universe as it resonates through Ives's musical work. These resonances have an impact on our understanding of Kirkpatrick, and also on our understanding of Ives's Concord Sonata itself.

It is not an exaggeration to say that this project would not have come to fruition without the initial encouragement of Professor Joan Richardson of the Departments of English and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center. During four semesters of seminars I explored with her a dazzling array of ideas—literary, philosophical, psychological, and scientific. I will always be grateful for the warmth and enthusiasm with which Joan greeted my musical perspective, and for the profound ways in which my studies with her enhanced that perspective.

Several years ago, while I was working for him as a research assistant, Distinguished Professor Emeritus H. Wiley Hitchcock shared with me his photocopy of the Kirkpatrick "copy" of the Concord Sonata, which has become a crucial element in my understanding of my topic and plays an important role in the final chapter of this study. Wiley's interest in and careful reading of my work over the past several years—not to mention his friendship—have been invaluable to me. I am extremely fortunate that he is part of my life.

My gratitude extends to the efforts of the remaining members of my committee—Professor Philip Lambert, Professor Ora Frishberg Saloman, Distinguished Professor Richard Kramer, and Professor Wayne Koestenbaum—for

their thoughtful interaction not only with this study, but with my work and ideas over the years.

Professor Sylvia Kahan guided me through my initial exploration of the Concord Sonata as a piano student. I am very lucky to have found such an amazing teacher. Sylvia gave me the courage to say yes to a daunting performance project, supported my progress every step of the way, and has continued to encourage my professional development as a musicologist.

Heading out on the New Haven line, I gratefully acknowledge the staff of the Irving S. Gilmore Music Library at Yale University, especially Suzanne Eggleston Lovejoy, who unfailingly provided cheerful assistance within her own domain and indispensable ideas for further exploration of the resources of the Sterling Memorial Library. I also thank James B. Sinclair for his many and varied efforts on my behalf, not the least of which was his orchestration of my visit to West Redding, and Vivian Perlis for her insights into Ives scholarship. A bit further afield, my gratitude reaches to the openness and generosity of spirit of the Reverend Daisy Kirkpatrick, and to Charles Ives Tyler.

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Chapter 1
The Cosmological Impulse

INDIAN COSMOLOGY: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR THEMES

In India, the cosmologies of the various schools of Hindu philosophy treat sound—the physical perception of vibration—as the primary sense. In Book X of the Rig Veda, the universe was portrayed as created through the expressive power of the word. This conception recalls the familiar creation myth of the Book of Genesis in the Bible, in which God's verbal utterances are made manifest in the physical world. In the Rig Veda, the structure and rhythms of the universe are said to resemble the linguistic structures of Sanskrit syntax and grammar. The linguistic properties of Sanskrit make possible utterances that are "potentially infinite in extension" such that "the history of the universe can be viewed as the utterance of one very long sentence."[1]

In Hindu cosmologies, the senses of sight, touch, taste, and smell are said to be derived from sound, and sound is considered to be the sense through which one can best understand the universe. Indeed, in Hindu tradition, the sacred Vedas are described as first having been heard, and then transmitted orally. The Hindi word describing the revelation of the Vedas, *shruti*, literally means "that which is heard." The authors of the Vedic hymns "did not so much compose [their texts] as 'tune into' the natural rhythms of the cosmos."[2]

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[1] Richard King, *Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1999), 48.
[2] Ibid., 201.

This idea is clearly illustrated in the production of the sacred Hindu syllable, "Om." The Chandogya Upanishad traces the essential derivation of "Om" in the following passages:

> 2. The essence of a person is speech.
> The essence of speech is the Rig (hymn).
> The essence of the Rig is the Saman (chant).
> The essence of the Saman is the Udgitha (loud singing).
>
> 5. The Rig is speech. The Saman is breath. The Udgitha is the syllable "Om."
>
> 3. …all speech is held together by Om. Verily, Om is the world-all.
>
> (I.i.2, 5; II.xxiii.3)[3]

The Mandukya Upanishad analyzes the three letters of the syllable—A, U, and M—as expressing past, present, and future, or waking, dreaming and sleeping. Samkara, a Hindu philosopher-mystic-poet of the eighth century C.E., describes the utterance of the syllable, from the open A to the closed M, as expressing the life cycle of the entire universe, from its creation to its eventual destruction. In each case, the totality of the utterance, revealed in the act of uttering it, is understood to transcend these individual elements—the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, if you will—producing the experience of a fourth, transcendent state of nondualism called *advaita.*

According to Hindu cosmology, sound plays a fundamental role in both the causal origins and the material composition of the universe. Sound, as vibration, is a manifestation of moving waves, and the Sanskrit word for "universe," *jagat*, literally means "that which moves." The vibrating Hindu cosmos, understood to be in constant motion, is therefore in a constant state of flux. The Hindu conception of the universe can be perceived as "a vibrational matrix issuing from the primordial,

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[3] Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, editors, *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 64-5.

'fundamental' vibration of creation," and the earthly elements as essentially "vibrational differentiations of ether."[4] Ether, the element corresponding to hearing in the Hindu scheme, is the primary element from which the others—air, fire, water, and earth—are derived. From this point of view, as Jocelyn Godwin notes, "Stones, made largely from the element of earth, could not even exist if ether had not congealed to the degree necessary to form them."[5]

If these images of a universe created and permeated by sound waves seem far-fetched, we must remember that modern physics accepts the notion that the entire universe and all the bodies that constitute it, down to the smallest particles, are constantly in motion, constantly vibrating. Adherents to superstring theory have found that "musical [cosmological] metaphors take on a startling reality [in this theory], for the theory suggests that the microscopic landscape is suffused with tiny strings whose vibrational patterns orchestrate the evolution of the cosmos. The winds of change, according to superstring theory, gust through an Aeolian universe."[6] And in a 16 September 2003 article in the *New York Times*, scientists at the Institute for Astronomy at Cambridge University reported that a black hole in the Perseus galaxy cluster was producing pressure waves that have been emitting a B-flat 57 octaves below middle C out into the universe for millions of years.

Among the schools of Hindu philosophy, the evolutionary cosmology of the Samkhya school (c. seventh century B.C.E.) resonates especially well with the Western cosmologies we shall consider presently. This school posits a dualism

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[4] Robert Simms, "Aspects of Cosmological Symbolism in Hindusthani Musical Forms," *Asian Music* 24 (1992), 69-70.
[5] Jocelyn Godwin, *Harmonies of Heaven and Earth: The Spiritual Dimensions of Music from Antiquity to the Avant-Garde* (Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1987), 6.
[6] Brian Greene, *The Elegant Universe* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 135.

between pure spirit or consciousness (*purusa*), which exists in a plurality of conscious beings, and primal materiality or nature (*prakrti*)—subject and object, two entities that nevertheless interact closely with one another. According to the Samkhya school, "The world is a multiplicity that has evolved from this primordial matter, but the motivating force behind the creation of the universe derives not from *prakrti* itself but from *purusa*."[7] *Purusa* does not actually participate in the act of creation, but is merely a witness to it. In its interactions with *prakrti*, however, *purusa* evolves to produce *ahamkara* ("the feeling of I am"), which in turn leads to the development of intelligence, the ego, and individuality. *Ahamkara* thus obscures *purusa*, the true self, causing *purusa* to forget "that it is a transcendent witness rather than an active participant in the activities of material existence."[8] The high degree of interaction between *purusa* and *prakrti* makes it possible for the Samkhya cosmology to be understood either as a description of the creation of the universe (as the evolution of matter) or the manifestation of psychological experience (as the evolution of pure consciousness).

Other schools of Hindu thought, such as the Vedantic school, embrace a nondualistic view of reality, in which the subject-object distinction is treated as an illusion. Even more radically, Indian schools of Buddhist philosophy, such as the Abhidharma school, do away with the subject altogether. In this conception, the being-as-subject is thought of as "a stream of evanescent *dharmas* [momentary events] following each other in such quick succession that the illusion of persistence is maintained so long as one observes with an uncritical and untrained mind. The flow

[7] King, 64.
[8] Ibid., 66.

of consciousness arises and ceases in every moment."[9] In the *Visuddhimagga*, a Buddhist text from around the fifth century C.E., this activity of consciousness is described as behaving "like the current of a river" (XIV: 114).[10] In other words, the momentary *dharmas* are real, the process of the flow is real, but the material existence of the subject is not. The subject is a process, an event. Moreover, the second-century C.E. philosopher Nagarjuna emphasized the interrelatedness of these *dharmas*, which "are causally dependent upon other *dharmas* for their arising. Emptiness, therefore, is a realization of inter-dependent origination—the mutual relativity of all things….There are no self-sufficient 'absolutes' anywhere."[11] Everything is relational, as Emerson will remind us.

INDIAN COSMOLOGY: THE *BHAGAVAD GITA*

Stephen Mitchell opens the introduction to his translation of the *Bhagavad Gita* by noting Emerson's and Thoreau's great "enthusiasm" for this text.[12] It is often referred to as the most-read book in mid-nineteenth-century Concord, Massachusetts, having first "arrived" there in 1845, as Emerson put it. In a 17 June 1845 letter to Elizabeth Hoar Emerson refers to it as "the much renowned book of Buddhism [sic!], extracts from which I have often admired, but never before held the book in my hands."[13]

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[9] Ibid., 117.
[10] Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa, *The Path of Purification: Visuddhimagga*, tr. Bhikkhu Nyaamoli (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1976), 515.
[11] King, 120.
[12] Stephen Mitchell, Introduction to *Bhagavad Gita* (New York: Harmony Books, 2000), 13.
[13] Ralph Waldo Emerson, *The Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Ralph L. Rusk (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), III, 290.

The *Gita* is an Indian tale that was eventually incorporated into the *Mahabharata* but had originally stood on its own. It was probably written in the fifth century B.C.E., and it has gone on to form "the philosophical basis of popular Hinduism."[14] In it, the warrior Arjuna experiences a crisis of conscience in the middle of a battlefield. Arjuna's charioteer, Krishna (who, it turns out, is the incarnation of God), essentially stops time and engages Arjuna in a lengthy dialogue in which Arjuna is taught, as Mitchell summarizes it, "about life and deathlessness, duty, nonattachment, the Self, love, spiritual practice, and the inconceivable depths of reality."[15] In the process, Krishna inspires Arjuna to engage in right action, which in this case means to return to battle.

In preparation for our discussion of American cosmology, several aspects of the *Gita* require our attention. Most important is the lesson that the *Gita* teaches with regard to right action. Action without regard for its consequences is central to the argument of the *Gita.* Arjuna need only concern himself with right action in what Krishna insists is a just war.[16] In Book III, Krishna specifies that which constitutes right action:

> Though the unwise cling to their actions,
> watching for results, the wise
> are free of attachments, and act
> for the well-being of the whole world. (3.25)[17]

The value of right action transcends its value to the doer, and can only be carried out by a selfless Self:

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[14] Radhakrishnan and Moore, 521.
[15] Mitchell, Introduction, 15.
[16] This assessment has remained problematic for many commentators on the *Gita*, including Thoreau, who, in *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, & Co., 1867), wrote that "Arjoon may be convinced but the reader is not" (182).
[17] This and other quotations from the *Bhagavad Gita* are from Mitchell's 2000 translation.

> Abandoning all desires,
> Acting without craving, free
> From all thoughts of "I" and "mine,"
> That man finds utter peace. (2.71)

Moreover, this Self participates in a kind of universal soul, an "imperishable, unchanging…vast embodied Self…[which] is ageless, fathomless, eternal" (2.17-18).

Krishna argues that since Arjuna's true self is timeless, he need not fear the death of his physical body on the battle field, or that of the bodies of his soldiers or of his opponents, since the spirit is immortal. Reflecting the Hindu belief in cycles of death and rebirth in the natural world, "death is certain for the born; / for the dead rebirth is certain" (2.27). This idea of reincarnation is fundamental to Hindu philosophy.

The second important aspect of the *Gita* for our discussion is the recognition that there are many paths to self-realization. These include the path of action, the path of knowledge or wisdom, the path of meditation, and the path of devotion or love. Krishna teaches Arjuna about each of these paths, and while the path of devotion (to Krishna himself) is presented as having a certain weight over the others, it remains for Arjuna (or anyone) to choose for himself.[18]

The third important aspect of the *Gita* is the poet's insistence upon "switching modes of reference, as our minds whirl, from one set of 'I am's to the next."[19] In presenting a variety of paths, Krishna assumes a variety of points of view, some seemingly contradictory. At the beginning of Book III, Arjuna complains that, "with words that seem inconsistent, / your teaching has bewildered my mind" (3.2). The effect is to disorient Arjuna, to place him in a state of not knowing, a situation from

[18] Mitchell, Introduction, 19-20.
[19] Ibid., 23.

which he will be required to make a choice in order to emerge into a state of at least provisional understanding. This is a mindset into which all of our American cosmologists will place us.

The fourth and final aspect of the *Gita* requiring comment here is the cosmological vision of Book XI, described by Mitchell as a "vision of God as elemental undifferentiated energy" that produces both creation and destruction, and thus embraces "the whole of reality."[20] It is also a vision of a unitary God whose "infinite body" enfolds the entire universe—encompassing "all things animate or inanimate" (11.7). Krishna actually transforms himself into an embodiment of the wonders of the universe before Arjuna's eyes. In astonishment Arjuna remarks repeatedly upon the "multitudes of beings" Krishna reveals to him, "beginningless, endless, / infinite in power, with a billion / arms … billions / of eyes, limbs, bellies, mouths, dreadful / fangs: seeing them the worlds / tremble, and so do I" (11.19-23).

PLATO AND COSMOLOGY: *REPUBLIC*, BOOK X—THE MYTH OF ER

The myth of Er concludes Plato's *Republic*. It comes at the end of Book X, which reads as a kind of appendix to the dialogue.[21] The topics of Book X are the relation of art to truth (through an exploration of the notion of *mimesis*); a critique of the appeal of art and poetry to the emotions, rather than to reason, thereby producing a negative moral effect; and a consideration of immortality and the rewards of good behavior. The myth of Er is an effort to describe what happens to the soul after death,

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[20] Ibid., 28.

[21] The point is made in the commentary accompanying the translations of *Republic* by both Francis MacDonald Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), 321, and H. D. P. Lee (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1955), 370.

a journey that ultimately leads to reincarnation. Its most striking feature is arguably the vision of the spindle of Necessity, in the shadow of which the process of reincarnation takes place.

In the myth, Er, a man killed in battle, is permitted to witness these events in "the other world" and then to return to the world of the living to tell about them. The departed souls first come before two chasms: one leading downward into the earth and one leading upward into the sky. A soul's entrance into one chasm or another is assigned by a panel of judges. As souls are directed into one of these chasms, other souls are simultaneously seen emerging from them. These emerging souls have been on long journeys of either penance or reward for their behavior in life.

Er continues his journey with these souls until "they could see a straight light, like a column, stretched from above through all of heaven and earth, most of all resembling the rainbow but brighter and purer" (616b).[22] A day later they reach the light. The complicated description of this "spindle" suggests a shaft, somehow hooked to heaven, upon which hangs a large hollow "whorl" within which eight consecutively smaller whorls are nested like bowls. These are understood to describe the fixed stars, the five known planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Saturn, and Jupiter), the sun, and the moon, with the earth at the center of the apparatus. A Siren stands upon each whorl, and each of the eight Sirens produces a single constant pitch; the eight pitches together produce "a single harmony" (617b). Seated upon these circles at regular intervals are the three Fates, "the daughters of Necessity," who "sing to the Sirens' harmony" while turning the spindle (617c).

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[22] Translations from *Republic* are by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

After being permitted to view the workings of the *kosmos*, the souls go before one of the Fates, Lachesis, from whose lap an "Interpreter" scatters a variety of lives. Each soul then chooses the life—animal or human—into which it will be reincarnated. It is noted that every mixture of varieties of life is transacted here: human souls choosing animal lives, animal souls choosing human lives, human souls choosing new lives quite unlike those they had previously led. The souls, with their new lives, then pass beneath the throne of Necessity, cross a scorching desert, and arrive at the River of Carelessness, from which they drink, "forget everything," and are reborn, "each in a different way…shooting like stars" (620e-621b).

PLATO AND COSMOLOGY: *TIMAEUS*

In his classic nineteenth-century commentary on *Timaeus*, first published in 1871, Benjamin Jowett notes that this much later dialogue "is a composite or eclectic work of imagination, in which Plato, without naming them, gathers up into a kind of system the various elements of philosophy which preceded him."[23] Pythagoras, in whose thought the idea of the music of the spheres originated, is one of those unnamed predecessors. The music of the spheres is an extrapolation from the Pythagoreans' determination that the tones produced on a plucked string divided according to certain whole number ratios provided an empirical demonstration of the relation between numbers and universal order. The Pythagoreans felt that the perfection of the natural world—indeed, of the entire universe—could be explained by means of numerical ratios and that the distances between the planets produced

[23] Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato* [1871], fourth edition, translated by Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 634.

harmonious sounds analogous to those plucked on the divided string. Heard together, the various sounds produced by the intervals between planets, reflecting the perfection of these numerical relations, were believed to produce a theoretically audible universal harmony.

The Pythagorean ratios, already suggested by the singing Sirens in the myth of Er, are given a prominent place in the cosmology contained in Plato's *Timaeus*. Timaeus, himself a Pythagorean philosopher, explains the determination of the ratios in some detail in order to illuminate the workings of the universal soul (Sections 35 and 36). These ratios are applied to the description of the movements of the sun, moon, and five planets, as a series of interlocking spheres that lie within a larger sphere in which they move unequally, "but all in due proportion" (Section 36).[24] The entire apparatus can be illustrated by the physical model of an armillary sphere, a somewhat more complicated scheme than that of the nested bowls of the myth of Er.

Timaeus is significant as the first philosophical work to suggest that the *kosmos* was created by, or had its *genesis* by means of, a *demiurgos*—some sort of divine intelligence, Mind, Reason, maker, or poet, according to various translations. In their analyses of *Timaeus*, both Cornford and Jowett are quick to point out, however, that Plato's demiurge is not to be equated with the Christian God—i.e., a religious figure to be worshipped.[25] Rather, it is some kind of entity (exactly what kind remains a subject for debate in philosophical circles) that sets the *kosmos* into being, into motion. By positing a creator, Plato rejects the possibility that the universe was created entirely by chance. He treats the *kosmos* as an internally

[24] The translations of *Timaeus* are Jowett's.
[25] See Cornford's commentary in *Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato* (London: Routledge, 1948), 35, and Jowett, 631.

cohesive, living being that is constituted of both a body and soul; a living whole whose very existence is profoundly dependent upon the interrelatedness of its parts, each of which is also a living being.[26] As the parts of Timaeus's *kosmos* reflect the whole, the whole reflects an eternal original Form previously conceived by the demiurge.

Of course, human beings are among the constituent elements of Timaeus's *kosmos*, and human beings therefore reflect the whole of which they are part. In a more recent commentary, Seth Benardete writes that in *Timaeus*, "on the one hand, man belongs to the earthly kind but is still a heavenly plant, and, on the other, the stars are the dwelling-place for man's soul but all other animals are his degenerate offspring."[27] He continues, "The *kosmos* retains three functions of the human animal: it thinks, it moves, it feeds. The bond between its thinking and its nutrition is its rotation: the circulation of its bodies in itself is like the self-completeness of thought."[28] Jowett notes that sometimes in *Timaeus* "we are uncertain whether we are reading a description of astronomical facts or contemplating processes of the human mind, or of that divine mind which in Plato is hardly separable from it."[29] We can experience such confusion for ourselves in the following passage, which immediately follows Timaeus's description of the interlocking spheres of the soul/solar system:

> When the Creator had made the soul he made the body within her; and the soul interfused everywhere from the centre to the circumference of heaven, herself turning in herself, [and] began a divine life of rational and everlasting motion. The body of heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of reason and harmony, and is the best of creations, being the work of the best. And being composed of the same, the other, and the essence, these three, and also divided and bound in harmonical proportion, and revolving within

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[26] Cornford, *Timaeus*, 41.
[27] Seth Benardete, "On Plato's Timaeus and Timaeus' Science Fiction," in *Interpretation* 2 (1971), 37.
[28] Ibid., 38.
[29] Jowett, 633.

> herself—the soul when touching anything which has essence, whether divided or undivided, is stirred to utter the sameness or diversity of that and some other thing, and to tell how and when and where individuals are affected or related, whether in the world of change or of essence. When reason is in the neighborhood of sense, and the circle of the other or diverse is moving truly, then arise true opinions and beliefs; when reason is in the sphere of thought, and the circle of the same runs smoothly, then intelligence is perfected. (643)

The soul, "turning in herself," activated by the demiurge, sets the universe in motion and provides the motivation for expression between beings, which is based upon the recognition of relations (of similarity or difference) between beings, much as the ratios governing the movements of the visible universe are based upon the calculation of relations between numbers. The rightness of universal motion is expressed in microcosm through the intelligent thought of the beings that populate the universe: when in right proportion, the thought of beings registers as intelligence. Thus the connection between the rational soul of the universe and the intelligence of the beings that populate it is fused, and in *Timaeus* it is clearly manifested in Pythagoras's numbers. It is this internal universal harmony that leads Plato to believe in the role of Reason in the creation and functioning of the universe.

The functioning of Timaeus's universe is best described as an incessant process of becoming and in it the best that can be hoped for in terms of truth is provisional belief—"being is to becoming what truth is to belief," Timaeus says (Section 29). Since nature is always in a process of becoming, Cornford notes, "[t]here can never be a final statement of exact truth about this changing object."[30] As a result, "there can be no exact, or even self-consistent, science of Nature."[31] In fact, Plato must eventually concede that this process-oriented universe was produced

[30] Cornford, *Timaeus*, 24.
[31] Ibid., 28.

through a combination of Reason and something called Necessity. The role of Necessity is a complicated issue that takes up much of the discussion of *Timaeus*, but Benardete describes it as that which "drive[s] living beings toward the best.…[I]t is compulsion itself that has been directed to the good."[32] Necessity manifests itself in incompleteness such that the *kosmos* is a "mixture of completeness and incompleteness"—it is the antagonism between the poles of Reason and Necessity that drives the universe forward.[33]

GOETHE AND COSMOLOGY

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749-1832) preoccupation with polarity comes from his careful observation of and experience with natural phenomena, both organic and inorganic. According to Goethe, everything in nature encompasses elements that express polar opposition; moreover, each natural object is itself a pole that seeks wholeness through establishing a relation with its polar opposite. The activity *between* polar opposites is the source of creativity in the universe, and in Goethe's universe, everything, from rocks to humans, expresses a creative urge. In his *Farbenlehre* (*Theory of Colors*), Goethe wrote:

> Das Geeinte zu entzweien, das Entzweite zu einigen, ist das Leben der Natur; die ist die ewige Systole und Diastole, die ewige Synkrisis und Diakrisis, das Ein- und Ausatmen der Welt, in der wir leben, weben und sind. (I, 23, pt. 1: 239, no. 739)[34]

> To make two of what is one, to unify what is divided—this is the life of nature, the eternal systole and diastole, the eternal syncrisis and diacrisis, the

[32] Benardete, 43.
[33] Ibid., 43.
[34] Goethe references in German are taken from *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Hendrik Birus et al, 40 vols. (Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985—).

> inhaling and exhaling of the world in which we live, weave, and exist. (12:274)[35]

Male and female coupling is perhaps the most obvious example of this; another, even more basic polarity is that of subject and object.

In two creation myths, Goethe portrays God as the initial cause of this polar creativity. In his autobiographical *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (*Poetry and Truth*), Goethe imagines God dividing himself into three parts to form the enclosure of the "Kreis der Gottheit" (I, 14: 382) ("the circle of divinity" [4:262]), a kind of dynamic Holy Trinity. Having taken on this divided yet complete form, God is able to create his polar opposite, Lucifer. The opposition between God and Lucifer sets in motion the creative impulse of the universe.

In his poem "Wiederfinden" ("Reunion"), from the cycle *West-Östlicher Divan* (*The Parliament of West and East*), God sets the universe in motion by uttering the phrase "Es werde!" ("It becomes!").[36] This utterance sets off a kind of big bang ("Als das All mit Machtgebärde / In die Wirklichkeiten brach"—"As the All with a vast motion / Was brought into reality") that separates light from darkness as well as all the elements of the universe from each other. God then creates the dawn in order to reconcile light and darkness, and this reconciliation of polarities makes it possible for everything that had been separated to be reunited ("Und nun konnte wieder lieben, / Was erst auseinander fiel"—"And now could love again / That which had fallen apart"). The poem is a paean to the craving for unity, and ends with a promise that

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[35] Goethe references in English are taken from *Goethe's Collected Works*, 12 vols. (New York: Suhrkamp, 1983-89).

[36] Goethe was exposed to Indian literature through his friend Johann Gottfried Herder, who was passionate about Indian culture. Several of Goethe's works refer to Indian poetry and mythology. See Friedrich Wilhelm, "The German Response to Indian Culture," in *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 81 (1961), 396-7.

subsequent acts of becoming will not result in such separation ("Und ein zweites Wort: Es werde! / Trennt uns nicht zum zweitenmal"—"And a second word: It becomes! / Shall not tear us apart again").

This polar force of creation infuses and animates every natural phenomenon in Goethe's universe, and in particular, it is a spiritual force that integrates human beings with all of nature. As a result, as Astrida Orle Tantillo notes, "For Goethe, scientific research was not only about discovering things about the objects but also about discovering things about ourselves."[37] Every act of discovery in the cosmos is also an act of discovery concerning human consciousness. Moreover, given that human consciousness is as changeable as nature itself, the truth value of the result of any scientific experiment must be highly provisional, as Goethe writes in the *Farbenlehre*:

> Denn da der Beobachter nie das reine Phänomen mit Augen sieht, sondern vieles von seiner Geistesstimmung, von der Stimmung des Organs im Augenblick, von Licht, Luft, Witterung, Körpern, Behandlung und tausend andern Umständen abhängt. (I, 25: 125)

> For the observer never sees the pure phenomenon with his own eyes; rather, much depends on his mood, the state of his senses, the light, air, weather, the physical object, how it is handled, and a thousand other points. (12:25)

Goethe would in fact report on environmental conditions and his state of mind in his scientific writings in an effort to acknowledge possible prejudices or inaccuracies in his findings.[38]

This emphasis on the influence of feeling in empirical formulations relates to Goethe's notion of *Steigerung*, a striving or intensification that takes place in all

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[37] Astrida Orle Tantillo, *The Will to Create: Goethe's Philosophy of Nature* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), 32.
[38] Ibid., 53.

natural phenomena, again both organic and inorganic, in Goethe's universe, and takes on spiritual dimensions. This concept is clearly articulated in the essay "Die Metamorphose der Pflänzen" ("The Metamorphosis of Plants"). Goethe's description of increasingly complicated forms in plants, from the first cotyledons to fully-developed flowers and fruits, depicts the process by which a growing plant ascends a ladder in a step-by-step metamorphosis toward increased complexity and perfection. The process is not only guided by the internal features contained within the seed from which the plant grows, but by the external effects of air, water, light, and earth: both organic and inorganic elements work together to produce the plant. Since this process is shown to reflect the perfection of the universe as a whole, it can also be read as a spiritual process.

Goethe's notion of *Steigerung* implies an infinite movement of striving toward complexity, perfection, and truth, a movement that he witnessed in his observation of nature and which he found reflected in human activity and life (at least his own):

> Die Uberzeugung unserer Fortdauer entspringt mir aus dem Begriff der Tätigkeit; denn wenn ich bis an mein Ende rastlos wirke, so ist die Natur verflichtet, mir eine andere Form des Daseins anzuweisen, wenn die jetzige meinem Geist nicht ferner auszuhalten vermag. (II, 12: 301)

> To me, the eternal existence of my soul is proved from my idea of activity; if I work on incessantly till my death, nature is bound to give me another form of existence when the present one can no longer sustain my spirit.[39]

Goethe's feeling for immortality, or for what seems here to be an image of reincarnation, again simply seems to reflect his experience observing the natural world. He had written of this feeling even a quarter century earlier:

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[39] Johann Peter Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe* [1823-32], tr. John Oxenford, ed. J. K. Moorhead (London: Dent, 1971), 287.

> Traurig ist es, wenn man das Vorhandne als fertig und abgeschlossen ansehen muss…[I]n der Kunst, wie im Leben, kein Abgeschlossenes beharre, sondern ein Unendliches in Bewegung sei. (I, 19: 198)

> It is sad to have to think of anything as final and complete….[I]n art, as in life, we have nothing that remains finished and at rest, but rather something infinite in constant motion. (3:113)

His belief in the infinitude and continuous unfolding of the natural world, like a kind of universal plant, in which each apparent end point becomes the node of a new beginning, is at odds with the teleological quality of the standard Judeo-Christian view of God's creation. Rather, Goethe suggests a finite God whose function was not to be an ongoing, active part of nature, but simply to set in motion the ongoing process of self-generating life already inherent in natural creation.[40]

Goethe nevertheless sees the fruits of God's creation everywhere in his observations of nature. Far from limiting the potential for religious feelings, he insists that nature's complexities can provide the inspiration for such feelings:

> Wird uns aber nicht schon die Urkraft der Natur die Weisheit eines denkenden Wesens welches wir derselben unterzulegen pflegen, respektabler, wenn wir selbst ihre Kraft bedingt annehmen, und einsehen lernen dass sei eben so gut von aussen als nach aussen, von innen als nach innen bildet. (I, 24: 212)

> But will we not show more regard for the primal force of nature, for the wisdom of the intelligent being usually presumed to underlie it, if we suppose that even its power is limited, and realize that its forms are created by something working from without as well as from within? (12:54)

Once again, the tension between the poles of "without" and "within" becomes the source for the ongoing creative urge, and its manifold fruits the very source of religious contemplation. This idea is neatly presented in the poem "Epirrhema" (c. 1819):

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[40] Tantillo, 100.

Müsset im Naturbetrachten
Immer eins wie alles achten;
Nichts ist drinnen, nichts is draussen:
Denn was innen das ist aussen.
So ergreifet ohne Säumnis
Heilig öffentlich Geheimnis.
#
Freuet euch des wahren Scheins
Euch des ernsten Spieles:
Kein Lebendiges ist ein Eins,
Immer ist's ein Vieles.
(I, 2: 498)

You must, when contemplating nature,
Attend to this, in each and every feature:
There's nought outside and nought within,
For she is inside out and outside in.
Thus will you grasp, with no delay,
The holy secret, clear as day.
#
Joy in true semblance take, in any
Earnest play:
No living thing is One, I say,
But always Many.
(1: 159)

Goethe encourages us to rejoice in the complexity of nature, whose secrets are contained in the twisting surface of a kind of Möbius strip and whose unities are always expressed in multiples, in pluralities.

Goethe himself provides a summary of this expression of the dynamism of nature, through polarities seeking union, the striving for increased complexity and spiritual perfection, and the endless urge to create, in his essay "Die Absicht eingeleitet" ("The Purpose Set Forth"):

> Dass eine Pflanze, ja ein Baum, die uns doch als Individuum erscheinen, aus lauter Einzelheiten bestehn, die sich untereinander und dem Ganzen gleich und ähnlich sind, daran ist wohl kein Zweifel. Wie viele Pflanzen werden durch Absenker fortgepflanzt. Das Auge der letzten Varietät eines Obstbaumes treibt einen Zweig, der wieder eine Anzahl gleicher Augen hervorbringt; und auf eben diesem Wege geht die Fortpflanzung durch Samen vor sich. Sie ist die Entwicklung einer unzähligen Menge gleicher Individuen aus dem Schosse der Mutterpflanze. (I, 24: 393)

> No living thing is unitary in nature; every such thing is a plurality. Even the organism which appears to us as individual exists as a collection of independent living entities. Although alike in idea and predisposition, these entities, as they materialize, grow to become alike or similar, unalike or dissimilar. In part these entities are joined from the outset, in part they find their way together to form a union. They diverge and then seek each other again; everywhere and in every way they thus work to produce a chain of creation without end. (12:64)

GOETHE: *ITALIAN JOURNEY*[41] AND THE *URPFLANZE*

> *8 September 1786, Brenner Pass.* I have gained some ideas for my cosmological theories, but none of them is entirely new or surprising. I have also kept dreaming of the model I have talked about for so long, with which I should like to demonstrate all the things which are running through my head but which I cannot make others see in nature. (30)
>
> *11 September, Trento*. At present I am preoccupied with sense-impressions to which no book or picture can do justice. The truth is that, in putting my powers of observation to the test, I have found a new interest in life. How far will my scientific and general knowledge take me? Can I learn to look at things with clear, fresh eyes? How much can I take in at a single glance? Can the grooves of old mental habits be effaced? This is what I am trying to discover. (38)
>
> From Bolzano to Trento one travels for nine miles through a country which grows ever more fertile…and one can believe again in a God. (38)
>
> *17 September, Verona.* My purpose in making this wonderful journey is not to delude myself but to discover myself in the objects I see. (57)
>
> *27 September, Padua, Botanical Garden.* Here, where I am confronted with a great variety of plants, my hypothesis that it might be possible to derive all plant forms from one original plant becomes clearer to me and more exciting. (71)
>
> *9 October, Venice*. What an amazing thing a living organism is! How adaptable! How there, and how itself! (99)
>
> *19 October, Bologna*. In spite of my state of confusion, I already feel that using my eyes, experience and curiosity are beginning to help me through these mazes. (111)

[41] All excerpts are from the 1962 translation by W. H. Auden and Elizabeth Mayer (London: Penguin Books, 2004).

1 November, Rome. …as soon as one sees with one's own eyes the whole which one had hitherto only known in fragments and chaotically, a new life begins….Wherever I walk, I come upon familiar objects in an unfamiliar world; everything is just as I imagined it, yet everything is new. It is the same with my observation and ideas. I have not had a single idea which was entirely new or surprising, but my old ideas have become so much more firm, vital and coherent that they could be called new. (129)

2 January 1787, Rome. One may say what one likes in praise of the written or the spoken word, but there are very few occasions when it suffices. It certainly cannot communicate the unique character of any experience, not even in matters of the mind. But when one has first taken a good look for oneself at an object, then it is a pleasure to read or hear about it, for now the word is related to the living image, and thought and judgement become possible. (155)

16 February, Rome. Everything is beginning to make a pattern. (171)

17 February, Rome. The more closely and precisely one observes particulars, the sooner one arrives at a perception of the whole….Everything in me is suddenly beginning to merge clearly. (173)

19 February, Rome. I am on the way to establishing important new relations and discovering the manner in which Nature, with incomparable power, develops the greatest complexity from the simple. (174)

21 February, Rome. I contradict myself….I feel myself being tossed about by tremendous powers and it is only to be expected that I do not always know where I stand. (176)

13 March, Naples. …things look quite different when seen in relation to each other. (204)

17 March, Naples. Every time I wish to write words, visual images come up…and I lack the mental organ which could describe them. (209)

22 March, Naples. I pray that my existence may develop further, the stem grow taller, the flowers blossom forth in greater abundance and beauty. If I cannot come back reborn, it would be much better not to come back at all. (216)

25 March, Naples. I took a walk along the seashore. I was feeling calm and happy. Suddenly I had a flash of insight concerning my botanical ideas….I am very near discovering the secret of the Primal Plant [*Urpflanze*]. I am only afraid that no one will recognize it in the rest of the plant world. (220)

17 April, Palermo, Public Gardens. Here where, instead of being grown in pots or under glass as they are with us, plants are allowed to grow freely in the open fresh air and fulfil their natural destiny, they become more intelligible. Seeing such a variety of new and renewed forms, my old fancy suddenly came back to mind: Among this multitude might I not discover the

Primal Plant [*Urpflanze*]? There certainly must be one. Otherwise, how could I recognize that this or that form *was* a plant if it all were not built upon the same basic model? (258-9)

20 April, Segesta. Examining a young fennel, I noticed a difference between the upper and the lower leaves; the organism is always one and the same, but it evolves from simplicity to multiplicity. (262-3)

26 April, Girgenti. I walked the roads of yesterday with my clerical guide, looking at the same objects from many different angles. (269)

8 May, On the seashore below Taormina. The purity of the sky, the tang of the sea air, the haze which, as it were, dissolved mountains, sky and sea into one element—all these were food for my thoughts. As I wandered about in the beautiful Public Gardens of Palermo, between hedges and oleander, through orange trees and lemon trees heavy with fruit, and other trees and bushes unknown to me, I took this blessed strangeness to my heart. (288)

17 May, Naples (to Herder). I must also tell you confidentially that I am very close to the secret of the reproduction and organization of plants, and that it is the simplest thing imaginable. This climate offers the best possible conditions for making observations. To the main question—where the germ is hidden—I am quite certain I have found the answer; to the others I already see a general solution, and only a few points have still to be formulated more precisely. The Primal Plant [*Urpflanze*] is going to be the strangest creature in the world, which Nature herself shall envy me. With this model and the key to it, it will be possible to go on for ever inventing plants and know that their existence is logical; that is to say, if they do not actually exist, they could, for they are not the shadowy phantoms of a vain imagination, but possess an inner necessity and truth. The same law will be applicable to all other living organisms. (310-11)

4, 5, 6 June, On the road. Man is an extraordinarily complex being, in whose nature absolutely contradictory elements coexist, the physical and the spiritual, the possible and the impossible, the attractive and the repellent, the bounded and the unbounded… (339)

16 June, Rome. I am…more and more finding out who I am, learning to distinguish between what is really me and what is not. I am working hard and absorbing all I can which comes to me on all sides from without, so that I may develop all the better from within. (345)

27 June, Rome. I shall never rest until I know that all my ideas are derived, not from hearsay or tradition, but from my real living contact with the things themselves. (347)

End of June, Rome. Here I feel like a fish in the water, or, rather, like the globule which floats on the surface of mercury, but would sink in any other fluid. (349)

> *24 July, Rome*. To take in even a small part of everything there is to see here would take a lifetime or, rather, the return of many human beings learning from each other in turn. (364)
>
> *31 July, Rome*. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT NATURE WHICH INTRIGUE AND PERPLEX ME: While walking in the Public Gardens of Palermo, it came to me in a flash that in the organ of the plant which we are accustomed to call the *leaf* lies the true Proteus who can hide or reveal himself in all vegetal forms. From first to last, the plant is nothing but leaf, which is so inseparable from the future germ that one cannot think of one without the other. (366)
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> *28 August, Rome (to Herder*). I believe I have come very close to the truth about the *how* of the organism. (379)

COLERIDGE AND COSMOLOGY: *THE THEORY OF LIFE*

The dynamic model of *The Theory of Life* by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), published posthumously in 1848, rejects the corpuscular or atomic understanding of the construction of the material world dominant in his day in favor of the creative forces generated by a kind of Goethean polarity. Ultimately, for Coleridge, "Life itself is not a *thing*—a self-subsistent *hypostasis*—but an *act* and *process*."[42] He finds himself able to witness this process at all levels of the natural world, from metals and crystals to human beings, in an ascent that, "as by a climax,…expands as the concentric circles on the lake from the point to which the stone in its fall had given the first impulse."[43] The rippling effect of this image illustrates the creation of the great variety of things in the natural world; life is "the principle of unity in *multeity*," Coleridge writes, and it is governed by what he calls the principle of individuation.[44]

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[42] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Miscellanies, Aesthetic and Literary, to which is added The Theory of Life* [1848], collected and arranged by T. Ashe (London: G. Bell, 1892), 430.
[43] Ibid., 384.
[44] Ibid., 385.

Coleridge's principle of individuation is "the power which unites a given *all* into a *whole* that is presupposed by all its parts."[45] He writes that "individuality is most intense where the greatest dependence of the parts on the whole is combined with the greatest dependence of the whole on its parts."[46] In other words, through this reflexive process, "the living power will be most intense in that individual which, as a whole, has the greatest number of integral parts, presupposed in it."[47] Coleridge finds this highest level of individuality to be expressed in human beings.

For Coleridge, as it was for Goethe, polarity, "the essential dualism of Nature," is the most general law of the tendency of life.[48] He asserts that it is through the synthesis of opposing forces—thesis and antithesis, systole and diastole, indifference and difference, inhaling and exhaling, space and time (the union of which Coleridge tells us produces motion)—as expressed in the natural processes of magnetism, electricity, and chemistry, that life is capable of expanding and producing itself:

> Thus, in the identity of the two counter-powers, Life *sub*sists; in their strife it *con*sists: and in their reconciliation it at once dies and is born again into a new form, either falling back into the life of the whole, or starting anew in the process of individuation.[49]

This cyclic process suggests a form of reincarnation. In Coleridge's model, the dynamism produced in the active conflict of opposing forces generates life; equilibrium produces stasis. Coleridge writes, "Physiologically contemplated, Nature

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[45] Ibid., 385.
[46] Ibid., 387.
[47] Ibid., 387.
[48] Ibid., 392.
[49] Ibid., 393.

begins, proceeds, and ends in contradiction."[50] Life is the product of the transitions between opposing states; it is what happens in the activity between the poles.

The ascent in nature that Coleridge identifies is made possible because the opposing forces, in their interaction, "actually interpenetrate each other, and generate a higher third, including both the former."[51] In Coleridge's universe, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, finally reaching its highest manifestation in human beings, in which:

> [t]he whole force of organic power has attained an inward and centripetal direction. He has the whole world within himself. Now, for the first time at the apex of the living pyramid, it is Man and Nature, but Man himself is a syllepsis, a compendium of Nature—the Microcosm![52]

This view explains the urge in the cosmological impulse to explain not only the external objects of the universe, but the inner workings of the consciousness that beholds the universe. To describe the universe is to describe human consciousness, and vice versa.

Very early in *The Theory of Life*, Coleridge states that "in the question of Life, I know no possible answer, but GOD."[53] Yet God makes but a couple of rare appearances in the remainder of the work, and seems not to have a significant role in Coleridge's self-generating vision of life. In fact, thirty pages later, Coleridge seems to have replaced the role of a deity in setting the workings of the universe in motion with a "primal fluid," of which "CHAOS [can be viewed as] one vast homogeneous

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[50] Ibid., 394.
[51] Ibid., 403.
[52] Ibid., 423.
[53] Ibid., 379.

drop [that] may be even justified, as an appropriate symbol of the great fundamental truth that all things spring from, and subsist in."[54]

In his preface to the 1848 edition of *The Theory of Life*, Dr. Seth B. Watson of St. John's College, Oxford, raises objections to Coleridge's argument that reflect the spirit of the times—and show how little has changed in some circles over the last 150 years. Watson maintains a traditionally Christian view in which humans are understood as separate from nature and as superior to all other forms of life on earth. His main objections concern Coleridge's use of the word "Life" to denote non-human, or at least non-animal, things, and Coleridge's personification of nature:

> As [human] existence was marked by actions, many of which were common to man with other animals, those animals also were said to "live:" but the extension of the notion of Life to the vegetable creation is comparatively a recent usage,--and hitherto (in this country at least) no writer before Mr. Coleridge, so far as I know, has maintained that rocks and mountains, nay, "the great globe itself," share with mankind the gift of Life….Now the word "Nature," in any intelligible sense, means nothing but that method and order by which the Almighty regulates the common course of things. Nature is not a person; it is not active; it neither creates nor performs actions.[55]

Action is the domain of human beings or, fundamentally, of God, but not, properly articulated, of Nature. Similarly, Watson objects to Coleridge's treatment of the forces of nature as expressing life, clearly limiting what he accepts as life-forces to those expressed in human life itself and what he understands as a universal belief in human immortality:

> Almost all nations…agree in the belief that individuals of the human race, after they have ceased to exist in this mortal life, will exist in another state, to which also the word Life is universally applied; but to this latter Mr. Coleridge's views of magnetism, electricity, &c., can hardly be thought applicable. Still less can they apply to "Life" in its spiritual sense.[56]

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[54] Ibid., 407.
[55] Seth B. Watson, Introduction to *The Theory of Life* (London: G. Bell, 1892), 356-7.
[56] Ibid., 357.

Watson expresses a hope that Coleridge might have been speaking figuratively in his personification of Nature but recognizes, disapprovingly, that the influence of Francis Bacon "has contributed, in no small degree, to the atheistical philosophy of recent times."[57] The role of God in the understanding of the natural world is slipping away, even, late in his life, for a theist like Coleridge.

HUMBOLDT AND COSMOLOGY: *COSMOS*

Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) undertook late in his long life his five-volume *Kosmos: Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung* (*Cosmos: A Sketch of the Physical Description of the Universe*). The first volume appeared in 1845 and the fifth, including a 1,200-page index, in 1862. Humboldt's "principal impulse," clearly stated in the Author's Preface to the first volume, "was the earnest endeavor to comprehend the phenomena of physical objects in their general connection, and to represent nature as one great whole, moved and animated by internal forces."[58] In his Introduction to the 1997 edition of Humboldt's *Cosmos*, Nicolaas Rupke noted that while that work, as a historical compendium of scientific ideas, became "the standard of science literacy" for its time, it "made no original contributions to any branch of modern science" and "its holistic-aesthetic philosophy had no impact on any scientific discipline during the mid- and late-nineteenth century."[59] That did not keep it from having an impact on Emerson and, especially, on Thoreau. Humboldt's *Cosmos* proved very popular with an international reading public. Translations began

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[57] Ibid., 357.
[58] Alexander von Humboldt, *Cosmos: A Sketch of the Physical Description of the Universe*, I [1845], translated by E.C. Ott (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 7.
[59] Nicolaas A. Rupke, Introduction to Alexander von Humboldt, *Cosmos: A Sketch of the Physical Description of the Universe*, I [1845] (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xxxii.

appearing immediately after the publication of the first volume, and there were translations into eleven languages by the time the fourth volume was published. The first English translation of the first volume appeared in 1845, right on the heels of the original German.

While German and French critical reviews were generally positive, the English response was notably cooler. First, English critics objected to the absence of the work of British scientists from Humboldt's account. Second, and of greater interest here, English critics objected to the omission of God from Humboldt's account. In *Quarterly Review* 77 (1845-46), J. D. Forbes wrote:

> We conceive it to be impossible for any well-constituted mind to contemplate the sum and totality of creation, to generalize its principles, to mark the curious relations of its parts, and especially the subtle chain of connexion and unity between beings and events apparently the most remote in space, time, and constitution, without referring more or less to the doctrine of final causes, and to the *design* of a superintending Providence. We call it the highest pedantry of intellect to put to silence suggestions which arise spontaneously in every mind, whether cultivated or not, when engaged in such contemplations; and we are sorry to observe in the work before us a silence on such topics so pointed as must attract the attention of at least every English reader.[60]

The American response was much more positive. James Davenport Welpley, writing in the *American Review* in 1846, praised Humboldt for "making common cause against ignorance and prejudice," and noted that "if the world is ever to be harmonized, it must be through a community of knowledge, for there is no other universal or non-exclusive principle in the nature of man."[61]

Humboldt's advocacy of the fostering of a sense of community among the branches of science is already made clear in his Introduction. "On being first examined," he wrote, "all phenomena appear to be isolated, and it is only by the result

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[60] J.D. Forbes, Review of *Cosmos, Quarterly Review* 77 (1845-6), 163-4, quoted by Rupke.
[61] James Davenport Welpley, Review of *Cosmos, American Review* 3 (1846), 608, quoted by Rupke.

of a multiplicity of observations, combined by reason, that we are able to trace the mutual relations existing between them."[62] These observations are to be "based upon a rational empiricism, that is to say, upon the results of the facts registered by science, and tested by the operations of the intellect."[63]

Humboldt's method may be rationally empirical but it is clearly guided by an intuition that "every where, the mind is penetrated by [a] sense of the grandeur and vast expanse of nature, revealing to the soul, by a mysterious inspiration, the existence of laws that regulate the forces of the universe."[64] The process of attempting to uncover those laws, led by the contemplation of the infinite variety of the universe, sends one down endlessly intriguing and endlessly bifurcating roads:

> It is certainly true that in the midst of the universal fluctuation of phenomena and vital forces—in that inextricable net-work of organisms by turns developed and destroyed—each step that we make in the more intimate knowledge of nature leads us to the entrance of new labyrinths; but the excitement produced by a presentiment of discovery, the vague intuition of the mysteries to be unfolded, and the multiplicity of the paths before us, all tend to stimulate the exercise of thought in every stage of knowledge.[65]

The challenge, then, lies in the contemplation of a constantly changing object by a subject that is itself constantly changing. Humboldt quotes the physiologist Julius Victor Carus's definition of nature as "that which is ever growing and ever unfolding itself in new forms."[66] He also reminds us—as William James will again fifty years later in *Principles of Psychology*, as we shall see in Chapter 3—that as observers our "impressions change with the varying movements of the mind."[67] In light of these circumstances, and despite his excitement at being part of the process, Humboldt's

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[62] Humboldt, I, 48-9.
[63] Ibid., 49.
[64] Ibid., 25.
[65] Ibid., 41.
[66] Ibid., 41.
[67] Ibid., 26.

hope for the discovery of a single law that will explain the unity in the diversity of nature is dim:

> Experimental sciences, based on the observation of the external world, can not aspire to completeness; the nature of things, and the imperfection of our organs, are alike opposed to it. We shall never succeed in exhausting the immeasurable riches of nature; and no generation of men will ever have cause to boast of having comprehended the total aggregation of phenomena.[68]

Our understanding, Humboldt is saying, will always be partial and provisional. Our efforts to understand the universe will never be complete.

In his dynamic understanding of nature, Humboldt is fully aware of the implications of what at one point he calls "the fruitful doctrine of evolution."[69] Certainly part of the key to the idea of unity in the diversity of natural phenomena is found in "the primordial mystery of all organic development, that same great problem of *metamorphosis* which Goethe has treated with more than common sagacity, and to the solution of which man is urged by his desire of reducing vital forms to the smallest number of fundamental types."[70] Humboldt notes that as a result of discoveries in his time, "Organic forms that had long remained isolated, both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, have been connected by the discovery of intermediate links or stages of transition."[71]

Humboldt briefly turns toward and then immediately rejects the idea that will make Darwinian evolution so radical. He wonders at the wide variety of plant life that can be found in certain localized areas and, at the same time, the wide dispersion of plants that, it would seem, should be found locally. He suggests that these plants

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[68] Ibid., 73.
[69] Ibid., 73.
[70] Ibid., 41.
[71] Ibid., 50.

seem to be "dispersed as if by chance"—but then at least partially retracts this idea, deeming the random dispersion "only apparent," while still allowing that it "seems to depend upon some inherent mysteries."[72] Thoreau will also take up the problem of the dispersion of plant life, but he will be led to embrace a much more chaotic—i.e., Darwinian—point of view.

Humboldt, given his background in geology, reads evolutionary complexity not only in the organic but the inorganic world. He understands the world to be very, very old, and he encourages us to learn from it historically:

> …if we would correctly comprehend nature, we must not entirely or absolutely separate the consideration of the present state of things from that of the successive phases through which they have passed. We can not form a just conception of their nature without looking back on the mode of their formation. It is not organic matter alone that is continually undergoing change, and being dissolved to form new combinations. The globe itself reveals at every phase of its existence the mystery of its former conditions.
>
> We can not survey the crust of our planet without recognizing the traces of the prior existence and destruction of an organic world. The sedimentary rocks present a succession of organic forms, associated in groups, which have successively displaced and succeeded each other. The different superimposed strata thus display to us the faunas and floras of different epochs. In this sense the description of nature is intimately connected with its history.[73]

Humboldt compares the situation in the natural world with that of etymology, the "successive development" of language, which itself exhibits aspects of natural evolution.[74]

In fact, for Humboldt, language expressly becomes the direct connection and animating force between human beings—human consciousness—and the external world:

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[72] Ibid., 62.
[73] Ibid., 72.
[74] Ibid., 72.

> If language, by its originality of structure and its native richness, can, in its delineations, interpret thought with grace and clearness, and if, by its happy flexibility, it can paint with vivid truthfulness the objects of the external world, it reacts at the same time upon thought, and animates it, as it were, with the breath of life. It is this mutual reaction which makes words more than mere signs and forms of thought.[75]

The relation between language and that which it signifies creates a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Ultimately, Humboldt's assessment of the relationship between human consciousness and the natural world explains the trait in the cosmological urge that these writings inevitably consider not only the objects of the universe but the human consciousness that is contemplating them:

> Science does not present itself to man until mind conquers matter in striving to subject the result of experimental investigation to rational combinations. Science is the labor of mind applied to nature, but the external world has no real existence for us beyond the image reflected within ourselves through the medium of the senses. As intelligence and forms of speech, thought and its verbal symbols, are united by secret and indissoluble links, so does the external world blend almost unconsciously to ourselves with our ideas and feelings.[76]

[75] Ibid., 56.
[76] Ibid., 76.

Chapter 2
Ralph Waldo Emerson and American Cosmology

AMERICAN COSMOLOGY

It is perhaps no wonder that a specifically American cosmological tradition emerged in the United States during the nineteenth century. Of course, the earliest settlers had struggled with trying to understand their place in the alien wilderness of the New World, and the details of the demands of their daily lives are accounted for in their extensive diaries. In the first third of the nineteenth century, however, with the rapid changes in Americans' understanding of human life—indeed, of all life—and their place in the universe, the world had once again become very strange. Technological advances were changing the way people lived and worked. Moreover, scientific developments were shattering the traditional comfort of religious belief, only to replace it with secular uncertainties that would continue to unveil a complex and increasingly unknowable universe. In an era of increasing uncertainty, the question of where one could confidently place one's belief became an urgent one.

In *Everyman His Own Poet: Romantic Gospels in American Literature*, A. D. Van Nostrand sets forth an expansive understanding of "cosmology" that accommodates a range of works as diverse as Emerson's *Nature* (1836), Edgar Allen Poe's *Eureka*, the late novels of Henry James, and William Carlos Williams's *Paterson*. He offers a fairly concise description of what he considers to be the distinguishing characteristics of these American romantic cosmologies:

> They all have a doctrine; they all pose some version of an ideal, organic cosmos, a universe of the mind in which all being is continuous and unseparated. It is a religious vision. But the vision is only a fraction of their

> meaning. These cosmologies are not about any given vision so much as they are about the attempt to express it: the attempt to bring it into being and indoctrinate us all. The dramatic value of these works (and the excitement for the reader) is each author's attempt to express himself, to find a language to convey what he cannot even comprehend without a language.[1]

Van Nostrand shows that these American romantic cosmologies differ from their European counterparts in three ways. First, he views them as fundamentally original, highly personal, and truly individual attempts to view the universe. They do more than merely dramatize existing theological doctrines, such as one finds in Dante's *Divine Comedy* or Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Second, he views them as having "domesticated a romantic world view to suit their own civilization. The domestication is what is particularly American; it is often a high-handed appropriation of literary forms and conventions for new and functional purposes." Third, he views them as being "more insistently about the *process* of making a metaphor than the fact of one. The speaker's subject is really his own attempt to construct a metaphorical system."[2] In this way, American romantic cosmologies can be seen as autobiographical works. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 3, this *functional* aspect of the American cosmology as somehow being about the process of the author's attempt to express his vision and thereby to "indoctrinate" the reader speaks directly to the active quality of Jamesian pragmatism.

Underlying these American cosmologies is the romantic notion of organicism which we have already seen explored in the works of Goethe, Coleridge, and Humboldt, and aspects of which, in turn, were already apparent in Plato and in the Hindu cosmologies. Van Nostrand identifies the fundamental internal contradiction

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[1] Van Nostrand, 7-8.
[2] Ibid., 19-22.

already contained within these earlier cosmologies, in which "an organic world is [considered to be] a whole entity comprised of a continuity of its parts; part and whole are one; and nothing is separable from the whole entity without destroying both the entity and the separated part."[3] As we shall see, William James expended considerable effort in tackling the logical problem of the part-to-whole and the many-to-one relationships in the formulation of his philosophy.

Van Nostrand suggests that in American cosmologies the highly idiosyncratic understandings of the external universe, each of which nevertheless maintains the romantic ideal of organic continuity, are mirrored in a "new and subjective order of the mind."[4] Such an order of the mind is clearly manifested in the essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82). Van Nostrand considers Emerson's first published work, *Nature* (1836), to be the archetype of the American romantic cosmology. He describes it as "a romantic *ars poetica* that argues in the form of a sermon."[5] Emerson biographer Robert Richardson calls it "a carefully constructed manifesto of philosophical idealism."[6] Frederick Ives Carpenter remarks that *Nature* contains "most of Emerson's philosophy in microcosm."[7] And Laura Dassow Walls describes it as "a cosmic progress report" in which Emerson responds to the condition of "American industrial man—by taking hold of nature's material means and scientific laws for his own purposes, [and] melding man, God, *and* nature into an exciting new

[3] Ibid., 25-26.
[4] Ibid., 27.
[5] Ibid., 29.
[6] Robert D. Richardson, *Emerson: The Mind on Fire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 232.
[7] Frederic Ives Carpenter, *Emerson and Asia* [1930] (New York: Haskell House, 1968), 67.

union."[8] The articulation of this union is made possible through Emerson's synthesis—or assimilation, as he would put it—of a global range of influences.

"QUOTATION AND ORIGINALITY"

In the epigraph at the beginning of his very late essay "Quotation and Originality" (1876), Emerson writes, "Every book is a quotation; and every house is a quotation out of all forests and mines and stone-quarries; and every man is a quotation from all his ancestors."[9] In the essay, Emerson expounds upon the ubiquity, the virtue, the pleasure—even the necessity for survival—of taking, borrowing, learning from others. In the opening sentences he immediately recognizes this as a natural process that applies equally to insects and humans:

> Whoever looks at the insect world, at flies, aphides, gnats and innumerable parasites, and even at the infant mammals, must have remarked the extreme content they take in suction, which constitutes the main business of their life. If we go into a library or newsroom, we see the same function on a higher plane, performed with like ardor, with equal impatience of interruption, indicating the sweetness of the act. In the highest civilization the book is still the highest delight.[10]

The remainder of the essay remains focused upon quotation and originality as they bear upon the human intellect. "All minds quote," Emerson writes. "Old and new make the warp and woof of every moment. There is no thread that is not a twist of these two strands."[11] As a result, Emerson argues that true originality is extremely difficult, but not impossible, to achieve. It is the real *assimilation* of something borrowed which points toward the possibility of originality. This is no simple task,

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[8] Laura Dassow Walls, *Emerson's Life in Science: The Culture of Truth* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 12.
[9] The epigraph comes from Emerson's earlier essay "Plato; or, the Philosopher," from *Representative Men* (1850).
[10] Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Letters and Social Aims* (New York: AMS, 1979), 177.
[11] Ibid., 178.

but once fully assimilated, the borrowing "will…tend always to form, not a partisan, but a possessor of truth."[12]

This process of assimilation is the province of Genius. "The profound apprehension of the Present is Genius, which makes the Past forgotten…[and] knows that facts are not ultimates, but that a state of mind is the ancestor of everything."[13] Originality, then, "is being, being one's self, and reporting accurately what we see and are."[14] It is living in and reporting on the active present. Embedded in this notion of living in the present is an awareness that "p??ta ?e?: all things are in flux."[15] This includes each perpetually unfolding present moment, which is instantly relegated to the past. In this light:

> The Past is for us; but the sole terms on which it can become ours are its subordination to the Present….This vast memory is only raw material. The divine gift is ever the instant life, which receives and uses and creates, and can well bury the old in the omnipotency with which Nature decomposes all her harvest for recomposition.[16]

EMERSON AND PLATO

By the time *Nature* appeared in 1836, Emerson's web of influences was vast and varied. Before sketching out this range of sources, however, reflections upon two of Emerson's most profound influences, Plato and Goethe, warrant special attention. He related these two figures closely to one another, calling Plato "this eldest Goethe," and both are among the subjects of *Representative Men* (1850).

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[12] Ibid., 201.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., 200.
[16] Ibid., 204.

Plato is the first figure discussed in *Representative Men*, in an essay entitled "Plato; or, the Philosopher." In the first paragraph of the essay, Emerson writes: "Out of Plato come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought. Great havoc makes he among our originalities."[17] Emerson points immediately to the universal appeal of Plato—"Plato is philosophy, and philosophy, Plato"—asserting that he contributed to both the Western and Eastern philosophical traditions.[18] He goes so far as to appropriate Plato, "to a reader in New England, an American genius."[19]

The primary quality Emerson finds in Plato is his modern ability to synthesize disparate elements—polarities, if you will—and it is this ability that Emerson believes lies at the foundation of the philosophical enterprise: to reconcile unity and variety, through an understanding of the relations between things. Emerson finds the most "sublime" expression of unity in the religious writings of the East, and quotes a musical image of this phenomenon from Krishna:

> As one diffusive air, passing through the perforations of a flute, is distinguished as the notes of a scale, so the nature of the Great Spirit is single, though its forms be manifold, arising from the consequences of acts.[20]

Emerson makes a distinction between what he sees as the unity of Asia and the active diversity of Europe, and then finds the reconciliation of the two in what he calls Plato's "balanced soul": "Plato came to join, and by contact, to enhance the energy

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[17] Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Essays & Lectures* (New York: Library of America, 1983), 633.
[18] Ibid. Frederic Ives Carpenter notes the influence of the Neoplatonists, especially Plotinus, on Emerson's version of Plato, as representing "the fusion of Greek Platonism with a mysticism brought from the Orient by way of Alexandria" (15). More recently, however, Russell B. Goodman, in "East-West Philosophy in Nineteenth-Century America: Emerson and Hinduism," in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51 (1990), notes that Emerson had been steeped in the *Visnu Purana* at the time of writing *Representative Men*, resulting in a Plato that "bears only some resemblance to the 'Plato' most twentieth-century students of philosophy would recognize" (640). He also points out that no evidence exists suggesting that Plato either visited India or studied any Indian texts (641).
[19] Emerson, *Essays*, 634.
[20] Ibid., 639.

of each. The excellence of Europe and Asia are in his brain."[21] Emerson locates this kind of synthesis also in the character of Socrates, and in the casting of Plato's works in the form of dialogues in which competing points of view are set forth.[22] Through the process of the dialogue, in the movement back and forth between the interlocutors, understanding emerges.

Emerson's Plato becomes a master of synthesis, whose "strength is transitional, alternating, or, shall I say, a thread of two strands," and whose "experience of poetic creativeness, which is not found in staying at home, nor yet in traveling, but in transitions from one to the other, which must therefore be adroitly managed to present as much transitional surface as possible."[23] Plato's genius lies *between* the one and the many, in the realm of *continuity*: "This eldest Goethe, hating varnish and falsehood, delighted in revealing the real at the base of the accidental; in discovering connection, continuity, and representation, everywhere."[24]

For all this, Emerson lauds Plato as "a great average man" possessed of "great common sense."[25] Resembling many firsthand accounts of Emerson's own public persona, his Plato "slopes his thought, however picturesque the precipice on one side, to an access from the plain."[26] From this vantage point, Emerson addresses two criticisms (by others) of Plato. First is that his expression is "literary, and never otherwise," a quality that weakens Plato's ability to achieve "the vital authority which the screams of prophets and the sermons of unlettered Arabs and Jews possess."[27]

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[21] Ibid., 640.
[22] Ibid., 653.
[23] Ibid., 641.
[24] Ibid., 657.
[25] Ibid., 644.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid., 652.

Emerson dismisses the critique out of hand: "I know not what can be said in reply to this criticism, but that we have come to a fact in the nature of things: an oak is not an orange."[28]

The second criticism Emerson addresses is Plato's lack of a system:

> He attempted a theory of the universe, and his theory is not complete or self-evident. One man thinks he means this; and another, that: he has said one thing in one place, and the reverse of it in another place. He is charged with having failed to make the transition from ideas to matter. Here is the world, sound as a nut, perfect, not the smallest piece of chaos left, never a stitch nor an end, not a mark of haste, or botching, or second thought; but the theory of the world is a thing of shreds and patches.[29]

Emerson responds that Plato's genius should not be discounted for his inability to generate a coherent theory of everything: "No power of genius has ever yet had the smallest success in explaining existence. The perfect enigma remains."[30] (Of course, this remains the situation at the dawn of the twenty-first century.) Emerson clearly admires Plato's effort, despite the trap that ultimately consumes him (as, Emerson argues, it would any great thinker):

> He has clapped copyright on the world. This is the ambition of individualism. But the mouthful proves too large. *Boa constrictor* has good will to eat it, but he is foiled. He falls abroad in the attempt; and biting, gets strangled: the bitten world holds the biter fast by his own teeth. There he perishes: unconquered nature lives on, and forgets him. So it fares with all: so must it fare with Plato.[31]

Perhaps Emerson felt some personal comfort in his depiction of Plato: a great common man, like Emerson himself, immersed in the mystery of nature and human being, and yet ultimately unable to lay out a coherent, unified explanation of the mysteries of existence. For the American Emerson, the beauty of Plato lies in the

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[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid., 652-3.
[30] Ibid., 653.
[31] Ibid.

poetry of his attempt, and the beauty is not compromised by the lack of concrete resolution.

EMERSON AND GOETHE

Goethe is the subject of the last essay in *Representative Men*. "Goethe; or, the Writer" is a substantial record of the influence of Goethe on Emerson's thinking. By casting Goethe as "the writer," Emerson suggests something of his direct kinship with his German forebear. It would serve neither Emerson nor Goethe, it seems, to be described as merely a philosopher, as he identifies Plato; a mystic, as he identifies Emanuel Swedenborg; a skeptic, as he identifies Montaigne; a poet, as he identifies Shakespeare; or a man of the world, as he identifies Napoleon. The function of a writer—through whose eyes "a man is the faculty of reporting, and the universe is the possibility of being reported"—seems to be more encompassing. It suggests the function of what Emerson also calls a scholar, "who see[s] connection where the multitude see fragments, and who [is] impelled to exhibit the facts in order, and so to supply the axis on which the frame of things turns."[32]

The source material for these fragments is the "multitude of things" that constitutes "modern life."[33] Emerson is clearly inspired by Goethe's ability to take on this potentially overwhelming abundance of ideas—philosophical, poetic, and scientific—fusing them, assimilating them, in exciting new ways, all the while remaining grounded in his profound relationship with nature:

> Goethe was the philosopher of this multiplicity; hundred-handed, Argus-eyed, able and happy to cope with this rolling miscellany of facts and sciences, and,

[32] Ibid., 747.
[33] Ibid., 751.

> by his own versatility, to dispose of them with ease; a manly mind, unembarrassed by the variety of coats of convention with which life had got encrusted, easily able by his subtlety to pierce these, and to draw his strength from nature, with which he lived in full communion.[34]

Indeed, Emerson paid Goethe the highest compliment when he wrote that Goethe "has said the best things about nature that ever were said."[35]

As we have seen, it is through Goethe's powers of visual observation that he was able to come to his deep understanding of nature. Emerson, as a fellow observer, praises this quality in Goethe, who "seems to see out of every pore of his skin."[36] Emerson takes the opportunity here to extol the power of natural vision, writing that "eyes are better, on the whole, than telescopes or microscopes."[37] He even manages to fuse imagery of the eye and the leaf in his assessment of Goethe's *Urpflanze*:

> Thus Goethe suggested the leading idea of modern botany, that a leaf, or the eye of a leaf, is the unit of botany, and that every part of the plant is only a transformed leaf to meet a new condition; and, by varying the conditions, a leaf may be converted into any other organ, and any other organ into a leaf.[38]

Images of leaves—as parts of plants, parts of books, and elements in the book of nature—also abound in Emerson's essays, offering an ongoing tribute to Goethe's influence.

After some commentary on Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meister* and his autobiography, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Emerson remarks—approvingly—upon the fragmentary "looseness" of many of Goethe's efforts:

> When he sits down to write a drama or a tale, he collects and sorts his observations from a hundred sides, and combines them into the body as fitly as he can. A great deal refuses to incorporate: this he adds loosely, as letters of the parties, leaves from their journals, or the like. A great deal still is left that will not find any place. This the bookbinder alone can give any cohesion

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[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 753.
[36] Ibid., 752.
[37] Ibid., 753.
[38] Ibid.

> to: and hence, notwithstanding the looseness of many of his works, we have volumes of detached paragraphs, aphorisms, *xenien*, &c.[39]

This quality of Goethe's work recalls Emerson's defense of the lack of system in Plato, and perhaps for similar reasons. Emerson is similarly untroubled by the unstructured methodology of both men. Richard Poirier refers to Emerson's own "superfluousness," by which he means "an effort to refloat the world, to make it less stationary and more transitional, to make descriptions of it correspondingly looser, less technical, more uncertain."[40]

Emerson's Goethe shares other qualities with his Plato, qualities which Emerson might also have seen reflected in himself. Despite his surface fragmentariness, Goethe is able to synthesize, to assimilate disparate elements. "He had a power to unite the detached atoms again by their own law," Emerson wrote.[41] It is this discovery of the unity in diversity that Emerson admired in Goethe's notion of the *Urpflanze*.

Just as Emerson admired Plato as "a great average man," he also admires Goethe for writing "in the plainest and lowest tone, omitting a great deal more than he writes, and putting ever a thing for a word."[42] As we shall soon see, Emerson was preoccupied with language and its reflection of and attachment to actual things and phenomena in nature, a preoccupation he first articulated in *Nature*. He reinforces his admiration of Goethe's use of language later in the essay, writing, "Goethe would have no word that does not cover a thing."[43]

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[39] Ibid., 760.
[40] Richard Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 40.
[41] Emerson, *Essays & Lectures*, 752.
[42] Ibid., 753.
[43] Ibid., 754.

Early in the essay Emerson remarks that Goethe "has a certain gravitation towards truth."[44] For Emerson, Goethe's relation to truth seems to be a function of his ability to be "entirely at home and happy in his century and the world. None was so fit to live."[45] To this end, "Goethe teaches courage, and the equivalence of all times; that the disadvantages of any epoch exist only to the faint-hearted."[46] Emerson concludes:

> We too must write Bibles, to unite again the heavens and the earthly world. The secret of genius is to suffer no fiction to exist for us; to realize all that we know; in the high refinement of modern life, in arts, in sciences, in books, in men, to exact good faith, reality, and a purpose; and first, last, midst, and without end, to honor every truth by use.[47]

It is Goethe's enthusiasm for living, as demonstrated in his passions for observing, acting, and using language in accordance with a deeply grounded relation to nature, that makes him one of Emerson's *Representative Men*.

ADDITIONAL INFLUENCES ON *NATURE*

Emerson was steeped in a Christian theological tradition but it was leavened with a range of competing ideas that led him to a break with his church in 1832. In 1829 Emerson read Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (*Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*), which, as Robert Richardson points out, "showed [Emerson] how one might reinstate the individual as the center and starting point of history and cosmology."[48] In 1830 he read Goethe's *Faust*. He also read Joseph de Gerando's three-volume *Histoire comparée des systèmes de*

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[44] Ibid., 753.
[45] Ibid., 760.
[46] Ibid., 761.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Richardson, *Emerson*, 92-3.

philosophie, which discusses Chinese, Hindu, and Persian philosophy, as well as the Western tradition from Pythagoras and Plato to Kant. In the same year, his friend James Marsh introduced Emerson to the works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, leading him to the idea of the importance of intuition in mental activity.[49] In 1831 Emerson read Victor Cousin's *Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie,* in which he was first exposed to the *Bhagavad-Gita* and began to take Indian philosophy seriously.[50]

In 1832, the year he left his post as minister of the Second Unitarian Church in Boston, Emerson read John Herschel's *Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*, the book that clearly established the modern scientific method. Laura Dassow Walls notes that it was through Herschel that Emerson came to view the "law" of nature as a metaphor that allowed "the natural, social, and spiritual worlds to merge, an elision basic to Emerson's enterprise."[51] Also in 1832 Emerson read Anguetil Duperron's "Exposition du système théologique des Perses" as well as his edition of the *Zend-Avesta*, the sacred text of Zoroastrianism, which was the first major non-Western scripture to be introduced to the West after the Quran.[52] Zoroaster, also known as Zarathustra, provides an important connection between West and East. Plotinus, the Neoplatonist whom Emerson had read widely, Pythagoras, and Goethe are all said to have been influenced by the teachings of Zoroaster.

His reading of Thomas Carlyle in 1832 led Emerson back to Goethe, whose *Italienische Reise* he read while traveling in Italy in December of that year. Emerson

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[49] Ibid., 104, and Walls, *Emerson*, 61.
[50] Richardson, *Emerson*, 114.
[51] Walls, *Emerson*, 14.
[52] Richardson, *Emerson*, 351.

had a moment of insight analogous to that of Goethe in the Palermo Public Gardens while visiting the Jardin des Plantes in Paris in July 1833 which led him to record in his journal, "I will be a naturalist." After leaving his ministry, and upon his return to America from Europe, Emerson investigated the Quaker faith in 1833. Richardson suggests that the Quaker notion of "inner light" had much in common with the idea of "reason" set forth by Coleridge and the German romantics, and formed "the fundamental basis, the necessary bottom rung, of Emerson's self-reliance. Coleridge and the Quakers both show why it is reasonable, indeed necessary, to trust the basic self."[53] In 1834 Emerson deepened his reading of Goethe, to include "Die Metamorphose der Pflänzen" and *Wilhelm Meister's Travels*, in his friend Carlyle's translation. Richardson suggests that at this time the importance of the notion of *Bildung*, as revealed through the works of Goethe, had an impact on Emerson—the idea that *process*, whether in plants or in human beings, was more important than product, which is always undergoing further metamorphoses, anyway.[54]

This is a dizzying array of ideas from around the globe and across millennia. The range of influences on Emerson's universe of the mind while he was writing *Nature* was nothing if not pluralistic.

NATURE (1836)

Emerson's perspective in *Nature* can be read as specifically American.[55] In fact, one can see that the seeds for "The American Scholar," his well-known 1837

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[53] Ibid., 167.
[54] Ibid., 173.
[55] Richardson disagrees with this point of view, writing: "[Emerson's] often quoted call, 'Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe?' is not a call for novelty or innovation, nor is it a

address to the Phi Beta Kappa Society in Cambridge, Massachusetts, are already planted in the very first paragraph of *Nature*:

> Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchers of the fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs?...There are new lands, new men, new thoughts. Let us demand our own works and laws and worship.[56]

Emerson's "we" is not only a temporal, historical entity, but one tied to a place: the American continent, whose transplanted inhabitants continue, in 1836, to behold nature face to face in the movement West, and find themselves in exactly the "original relation to the universe" he calls for. The call for a poetry and philosophy that reflect this relation to the universe as viewed from the New World—"our own works and laws and worship"—and not the history of Europe, anticipates the call to a "we" who "have listened too long to the courtly muses of Europe."[57] And the model for this American aesthetic is Americans' relationship to the natural world, beginning with their initial "errand into the wilderness," and the necessary attention to that wilderness that continued to define the American experience in the decades after Lewis and Clark reached Cape Disappointment in 1807. *Nature* therefore establishes a cosmology, an understanding of the universe as viewed from the New World that is suitable to its inhabitants and that reflects the American experience.

In the first chapter of *Nature*, entitled "Nature," Emerson famously describes the ideal condition for the navigation of his cosmos:

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claim for American exceptionalism. The stress is on the word 'also'" (226). Richardson offers no further explanation of this assertion.

[56] Emerson, *Essays & Lectures*, 7.

[57] Ibid., 70.

> Standing on the bare ground,—my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space,—all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God.[58]

It is a condition that is produced in the elimination of the subject/object distinction between human being and nature, from which the beauty of the cosmos may be fully experienced. "I"—the subject—"am nothing" but a "part or particle" adrift in "the currents of the Universal Being." Jonathan Levin writes that in this passage, "Emerson is not suggesting that the self somehow replaces or displaces nature, but rather that the ecstatic experience in nature renders the boundary between self and nature permeable."[59] Emerson as transparent eyeball is simply an element in the flow, the process, of nature.[60]

Emerson begins Chapter II, "Commodity," by laying out the subjects of the subsequent four chapters ("Commodity," "Beauty," "Language," and "Discipline") as what he calls, in a rather traditional Christian understanding of the relation between nature and human beings, the "uses" of nature that point toward "the final cause of the world."[61] Laura Walls notes that this trajectory spirals upward to a conclusion asserting man's dominion over nature.[62] The point of view expressed in "Commodity," that nature works "for the profit of man," may seem "low" or unenlightened, but it is still "perfect in its kind."[63]

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[58] Ibid., 10.
[59] Jonathan Levin, *The Poetics of Transition: Emerson, Pragmatism, and American Literary Modernism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 38.
[60] One is reminded of Krishna's Self in the *Bhagavad Gita*, "Acting without craving, free / From all thoughts of 'I' and 'mine'" (2.71).
[61] Emerson, *Essays & Lectures*, 12.
[62] Laura Dassow Walls, *Seeing New Worlds: Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-Century Natural Science* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 65.
[63] Emerson, *Essays & Lectures*, 12.

Emerson considers beauty to be the next highest use of nature. In Chapter III, "Beauty," he reminds us that one of the meanings of the Greek word *kosmos* is beauty. The word also encompasses the ideas of decoration, order, and the universe itself. In this light, our notion of cosmology can be understood not only as a description of the physical universe, but, more generally, of universal order and beauty, through the multitudinous ways in which that order and beauty can be witnessed. And primarily, as usual with Emerson, this beauty is appreciated through the sense of sight.

Emerson describes three aspects of beauty. First, that "the simple perception of natural forms is a delight"; second, that "[t]he presence of a…spiritual element is essential to [nature's] perfection"; and third, that nature's beauty may be treated as "an object of the intellect." Central to each aspect of beauty is action. In the first instance, nature reveals itself to be in a constant state of flux or change:

> To the attentive eye, each moment of the year has its own beauty, and in the same field, it beholds, every hour, a picture which was never seen before, and which shall never be seen again.[64]

In the second instance, actions—both of nature and of human beings—have the power to reveal the spiritual element in nature:

> Beauty is the mark God sets upon virtue. Every natural action is graceful. Every heroic act is also decent, and causes the place and the bystanders to shine. We are taught by great actions that the universe is the property of every individual in it.[65]

In the third instance, the relation between action and human intellect is shown to generate new acts of human creation:

> The intellectual and the active powers seem to succeed each other, and the exclusive activity of the one, generates the exclusive activity of the

[64] Ibid., 15.
[65] Ibid., 16.

> other….The beauty of nature reforms itself in the mind, and not for barren contemplation, but for new creation.[66]

The only appropriate human response to the beauty of nature is the *activity* of new creation, and this is epitomized through the production of works of art. For Emerson, beauty is generated through the relations among objects, not in their isolation; and its original source of inspiration lies in the relation between man and nature:

> The standard of beauty is the entire circuit of natural forms,—the totality of nature….Nothing is quite beautiful alone: nothing but is beautiful in the whole. A single object is only so far beautiful as it suggests this universe of grace.…Thus is Art, a nature passed through the alembic of man.[67]

In this way, in a sense all art becomes cosmology, an entirely natural response to and—in the spirit of Plato—reflection of the perfect order of the natural world.

Language is Emerson's next highest use of nature. It, too, becomes a cosmological expression for Emerson, an activity that illuminates the relation between human beings and the universe. He opens Chapter IV:

> Language is the third use which Nature subserves to man. Nature is the vehicle of thought, and in a simple, double, and threefold degree:
> 1. Words are signs of natural facts.
> 2. Particular natural facts are symbols of particular spiritual facts.
> 3. Nature is the symbol of spirit.[68]

In the first point, Emerson reminds us of the material roots of our words, that the etymology of our words always eventually points us back to things or phenomena that exist in nature. In this way, language is a force of nature.

In the second point, Emerson suggests the symbolic nature of both language and the natural world, which seem to exist in a kind of cosmic dance of reference to

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[66] Ibid., 18.
[67] Ibid., 18-19.
[68] Ibid., 20.

one another. This dance reveals itself through metaphor, or "analogy," as Emerson likes to say. He writes:

> It is not words only that are emblematic; it is things which are emblematic. Every natural fact is a symbol of some spiritual fact. Every appearance in nature corresponds to some state of the mind.[69]

Our languages, rich with analogies, reveal human beings constantly to be making references to, or drawing relations between, ourselves and the world around us. Such use of language is expressive of the Universal Soul, or Reason, of which all human beings are a part. Emerson defines Spirit as "[t]hat which, intellectually considered, we call Reason, considered in relation to nature. Spirit is the Creator."[70] Our use of language binds us to the universe and how we use it reflects our awareness of our relation to the environment around us:

> Hence, good writing and brilliant discourse are perpetual allegories. This imagery is spontaneous. It is the blending of experience with the present action of the mind. It is proper creation.[71]

The improper use of language, to immoral ends, on the other hand, separates language from its natural roots and causes language to become deficient in meaning. Thus the proper use of language puts us into a relationship with nature that is analogous to the intellectual apprehension of the beauty of nature that results in the creation of a new work of art.

Emerson expands this idea in the third point, which effectively closes the circuit of signification and sets this whole model in motion. He writes that, "Parts of speech are metaphors, because the whole of nature is a metaphor of the human

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[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid., 21.
[71] Ibid., 23.

mind."[72] Here Emerson is describing a situation in which the activity of language is charged with exhibiting the spiritual relation between human beings and the universe. For those in whom this relationship is fully made manifest, Emerson writes:

> …the universe becomes transparent, and the light of higher laws than its own, shines through it….A life in harmony with nature, the love of truth and of virtue, will purge the eyes to understand her text. By degrees we may come to know the primitive sense of the permanent objects of nature, so that the world shall be to us an open book, and every form significant of its hidden life and final cause.[73]

"Discipline," the subject of Chapter V, is Emerson's highest use of nature, and includes within it the prior three uses. In this chapter Emerson posits a central Unity that governs all of nature as well as all aspects of human expression—which, as we have seen, are interconnected. Perhaps Emerson was thinking of the difficulty involved in actually generating "good writing and brilliant discourse" when he writes, at the end of this chapter, that "words are finite organs of the infinite mind. They cannot cover the dimensions of what is in truth. They break, chop, and impoverish it."[74] Modern everyday language, when used for strictly utilitarian purposes, seldom achieves the metaphor-rich language of the poet. It seems to have become too easy, even in 1836, for people to forget to be attentive to the real meaning of their words. Emerson imagines the endless resonance of the Universal Spirit:

> Every universal truth which we express in words, implies or supposes every other truth. *Omne verum vero consonant.* It is like a great circle on a sphere, comprising all possible circles; which, however, may be drawn, and comprise it, in like manner. Every such truth is the absolute Ens seen from one side. But it has innumerable sides.[75]

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[72] Ibid., 24.
[73] Ibid., 25.
[74] Ibid., 30.
[75] Ibid.

Any text may be read in a multitude of diverse ways; no text can escape the relativity of interpretation.

Action, on the other hand, provides a clearer approximation of the expression of the truth than can verbal language. "An action," he writes, "is the perfection and publication of thought. A right action seems to fill the eye, and to be related to all nature."[76] Action eliminates the intermediate step between human beings and nature that leads to and expresses a complete and real feeling of understanding, bypassing the possible misunderstandings of language in favor of the direct clarity of the act.

In Chapter VI, "Idealism," Emerson is moving toward a radically empirical interpretation of the world. His transparent eye-ball of Reason or Spirit sees all things anew:

> When the eye of Reason opens, to outline and surface are at once added, grace and expression. These proceed from imagination and affection, and abate somewhat the angular distinctness of objects. If the Reason be stimulated to more earnest vision, outlines and surfaces become transparent, and are no longer seen; causes and spirits are seen through them. The best moments of life are these delicious awakenings of the higher powers.[77]

Emerson then outlines "the effects of culture" on changes in the way we see the world, moving from primitive technological advances to poetry to philosophy to metaphysics to religion and ethics. He ends the chapter with a pitch for the reconciliation of the doctrine of Idealism with a specifically Christian world view:

> For, seen in the light of thought, the world always is phenomenal; and virtue subordinates it to the mind. Idealism sees the world in God. It beholds the whole circle of persons and things, of actions and events, of country and religion, not as painfully accumulated, atom after atom, act after act, in an aged creeping Past, but as one vast picture, which God paints on the instant eternity, for the contemplation of the soul.[78]

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[76] Ibid. This again recalls Krishna's assertion in the *Bhagavad Gita* that right action is "for the well-being of the whole world" (3.25).
[77] Ibid., 33.
[78] Ibid., 39.

But Emerson appeals to an idealized Christianity, which "sees something more important in Christianity, than the scandals of ecclesiastical history, or the niceties of criticism; and [is] very incurious concerning persons or miracles, and not at all disturbed by chasms of historical evidence."[79]

In the brief seventh chapter on "Spirit," Emerson meditates on three "problems…put by nature to the mind; What is matter? Whence is it? and Whereto?"[80] His meditations urge him finally to "create my own world," in anticipation of the climax of the final chapter of *Nature*, "Prospects." Here, after attacking empirical science for encouraging a too-limited view of tiny bits of God's "vast picture," Emerson seems to recalibrate his mood concerning the possible uses of science. Thinking of Plato, and imagining science and poetry to be engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship of consilience, Emerson begins to consider the possibilities of scientific *activity*—the making and testing of hypotheses, striving for truth in an understanding of the workings of the universe, in which

> Every surmise and vaticination of the mind is entitled to a certain respect, and we learn to prefer imperfect theories, and sentences, which contain glimpses of truth, to digested systems which have no one valuable suggestion. A wise writer will feel that the ends of study and composition are best answered by announcing undiscovered regions of thought, and so communicating, through hope, new activity to the torpid spirit.[81]

In the concluding paragraphs of *Nature*, Emerson yearns for an ideal relation between human beings and nature that is lost, even in 1836 America, but perhaps not unrecoverable:

> The problem of restoring to the world original and eternal beauty, is solved by the redemption of the soul. The ruin or the blank, that we see when we

[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid., 40.
[81] Ibid., 45.

> look at nature, is in our own eye. The axis of vision is not coincident with the axis of things, and so they appear not transparent but opake [sic]. The reason why the world lacks unity, and lies broken and in heaps, is, because man is disunited with himself. He cannot be a naturalist, until he satisfies all the demands of the spirit. Love is as much its demand, as perception. Indeed, neither can be perfect without the other. In the uttermost meaning of the words, thought is devout, and devotion is thought. Deep calls unto deep. But in actual life the marriage is not celebrated.[82]

How, then, to awaken the soul from its stupor and reconnect it to the earth? For one thing, Emerson encourages the recognition of "the miraculous in the common":[83]

> To the wise, therefore, a fact is true poetry, and the most beautiful of fables. These wonders are brought to our own door. You also are a man. Man and woman, and their social life, poverty, labor, sleep, fear, fortune, are known to you. Learn that none of these things is superficial, but that each phenomenon has its roots in the faculties and affections of the mind.[84]

As in the chapter on "Idealism," then, Emerson concludes "Prospects" with an appeal to a new vision—"So shall we come to look at the world with new eyes"—and the effect of this will be to recognize the proper relation between human beings and the universe:

> Nature is not fixed but fluid. Spirit alters, moulds, makes it…Every spirit builds itself a house; and beyond its house a world; and beyond its world, a heaven. Know then, that the world exists for you. For you is the phenomenon perfect.[85]

The idea that each individual spirit or entity in that universe will construct its own picture of the universe becomes the basis for James's pluralistic cosmology—his multiverse that is still a universe by virtue of the overarching connectivity of an Emersonian universal spirit or, as he will express it in a later essay, "Over-Soul." At the end of *Nature*, Emerson sends his readers off to *act* on this knowledge:

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[82] Ibid., 47.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid., 48.
[85] Ibid.

> Build, therefore, your own world. As fast as you conform your life to the pure idea in your mind, that will unfold its great proportions. A correspondent revolution in things will attend the influx of the spirit.[86]

POSTSCRIPT: THOREAU AND COSMOLOGY

In 1842 Henry David Thoreau built his own world on the shore of Walden Pond. He lived in that world, centered upon a one-room cabin, for two years and reported his experiences, ten years later, in *Walden*. Like Emerson, Thoreau had a penchant for revision and between 1842 and 1854 *Walden* went through half a dozen drafts before it actually appeared in print. Material he added between 1852 and 1854 alone nearly doubled its length and realigned its focus toward scientific observation.[87] Laura Walls views *Walden* as a personalized, first-person rewriting of Humboldt's *Cosmos*, which Thoreau had read in 1850, the same year in which he had read Coleridge's *Theory of Life*.[88] In personalizing his cosmology, Thoreau emphasizes the possibility that each reader can internalize its lessons in an individual way. Walls suggests that Thoreau offers up Walden Pond as one of many possible centers, and that each reader's individual center should be uniquely determined by that reader according to his or her own personal experience. It is from each reader's center, then, that he or she can construct his or her own cosmos. Robert Richardson writes similarly that, ultimately, "*Walden* is a call to everyone, whatever their present position, whether living alone or in crowds, in the woods or in the city, to have the

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[86] Ibid.
[87] Walls, *Thoreau*, 156.
[88] Ibid., 160, and Robert D. Richardson, *Henry Thoreau: A Life of the Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 208-9.

courage to live a life according to the dictates of the imagination, to live the life one has dreamed."[89]

Richardson suggests that Thoreau lived in four worlds: Concord, Massachusetts, which Thoreau felt that he would never know completely; North America, which, over the course of his lifetime, he traveled from Maine to Minnesota; planet earth, which he got to know through books; and the world of ideas, which united all of these worlds.[90] Thoreau spent his lifetime closely observing his immediate environment. While Emerson's inspiration to become a naturalist occurred to him in a Parisian garden, Thoreau's flashes of insight mainly took place in his own backyard, or thereabouts. While living on Walden Pond he wrote up his reminiscences of *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* with his brother, in which he "explored the extent to which the laws of his own nature were akin to the laws governing streams, crystals, and leaves."[91]

Thoreau had taken four semesters of German at Harvard and had read his Goethe, whose *Italienische Reise* is the only book mentioned by name in *A Week*. Richardson goes so far as to suggest that "Goethe showed Thoreau the path to his own work."[92] Thoreau's unique perspective on the ubiquitous Goethean leaf is to fuse it with water, earth, and the sounds and etymology of language, as he does in the spectacular "Spring" chapter of *Walden*, with its ecstatic depictions of what Stanley Cavell calls "a crisis of foliation:"[93]

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[89] Richardson, *Thoreau*, 310.
[90] Ibid., 240-2.
[91] Ibid., 157.
[92] Ibid., 29.
[93] Stanley Cavell, *The Senses of Walden* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 26.

> Few phenomena gave me more delight that to observe the forms which thawing sand and clay assume in flowing down the sides of a deep cut on the railroad through which I passed on my way to the village….When the flowing mass reaches the drain at the foot of the bank it spreads out flatter into *strands*, the separate streams losing their semi-cylindrical form and gradually becoming more flat and broad, running together as they are more moist, till they form an almost flat *sand*, still variously and beautifully shaded, but in which you can trace the original forms of vegetation….You find thus in the very sands an anticipation of the vegetable leaf. No wonder that the earth expresses itself outwardly in leaves, it so labors with the idea inwardly. The atoms have already learned this law, and are pregnant by it. The overhanging leaf sees here its prototype. *Internally*, whether in the globe or animal body, it is a moist thick *lobe*, a word especially applicable to the liver and lungs and the leaves of fat, (?e?ß?, *labor*, *lapsus*, to flow or slip downward, a lapsing; ??ß??, *globus*, lobe, globe; also lap, flap, and many other words,) *externally* a dry thin *leaf*, even as the *f* and *v* are a pressed and dried *b*. The radicals of lobe are *lb*, the soft mass of the *b* (single lobed, or B, double lobed,) with a liquid *l* behind it pressing it forward. In globe, *glb*, the guttural *g* adds to the meaning the capacity of the throat. The feathers and wings of birds are still drier and thinner leaves….Even ice begins with delicate crystal leaves, as if it had flowed into moulds which the fronds of water plants have impressed on the watery mirror. The whole tree itself is but one leaf, and rivers are still vaster leaves whose pulp is intervening earth, and towns and cities are the ova of insects in their axils….Is not the [human] hand a spreading palm leaf with its lobes and veins? The ear may be regarded, fancifully, as a lichen, *umbilicaria*, on the side of the head, with its lobe or drop. The lip (*labium*, from *labor* (?)) laps or lapses from the sides of the cavernous mouth. The nose is a manifest congealed drop or stalactite. The chin is a still larger drop, the confluent dripping of the face. The cheeks are a slide from the brows into the valley of the face, opposed and diffused by the cheek bones. Each founded lobe of the vegetable leaf, too, is a thick and now loitering drop, larger or small; the lobes are the fingers of the leaf; and as many lobes as it has, in so many directions it tends to flow, and more heat or other genial influences would have caused it to flow yet farther.[94]

The entire earth is alive for Thoreau: "There is nothing inorganic.…The earth is not a mere fragment of dead history…but living poetry like the leaves of a tree, which precede flowers and fruit,--not a fossil earth, but a living earth."[95]

As *Walden*'s sand foliage melts into streams and streams flow into rivers, streams and rivers also become central metaphors for Thoreau. In the first draft of *A Week* Thoreau wrote:

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[94] Henry David Thoreau, *Walden* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1893), 469-75.
[95] Ibid., 475.

> …the hardest material obeys the same law with the most fluid. Trees are but rivers of sap and woody fibre flowing from the atmosphere and emptying into the earth by their trunks, as their roots on the other hand flow upward to the surface. And in the heavens there are rivers of stars and milky ways. There are rivers of rock in the surface of rivers of ore in the bowels of the earth. And our thoughts flow and circulate—and seasons lapse with the current year.[96]

Richardson suggests that *A Week* "is the first of the many American books shaped along a river trip, the first in which the river becomes a stream, not just of water or even of time, but of consciousness."[97]

Another rich source of metaphor for Thoreau is sound. As much as Thoreau was a keen observer of visual phenomena, he was a keen listener. Charles Ives began his essay on Thoreau by saying that "Thoreau was a great musician, not because he played the flute but because he did not have to go to Boston to hear 'the symphony.'"[98] For Thoreau, the symphony was all around him, since listening was an active part of his method of apprehending the world. In the "Sounds" chapter of *Walden*, for example, Thoreau writes of the sounds of manmade things (the railroad, church bells) and the sounds of animals (cows, owls, bullfrogs, roosters), and in the chapter entitled "The Pond in Winter" he makes "soundings" to study the depth of Walden Pond. This is in contrast to Emerson's method which almost exclusively privileges the sense of sight and seemed to have little use for sound or music.

Thoreau's sources of observation might have been limited in geographical scope, but the observations themselves were presented in a highly idiosyncratic manner. Like Goethe, Thoreau was sensitive to the role of the multitude of factors that influenced observation. "The objects I behold correspond to my mood," he wrote

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[96] Quoted in Richardson, *Thoreau*, 158.
[97] Ibid., 155.
[98] Charles Ives, *Essays Before A Sonata* [1920], ed. Howard Boatwright (New York: Norton, 1961), 51.

in his journal in 1853. As a result, he acknowledged that truly objective observation was difficult to achieve—and not necessarily even desirable:

> Your observation, to be interesting, i.e., to be significant, must be subjective. The sum of what the writer of whatever class has to report is simply some human experience, whether he be poet or philosopher or man of science. The man of most science is the man most alive, whose life is the greatest event. Senses that take cognizance of outward things merely are of no avail.

Thoreau's later writing style came to emphasize this kind of subjectivity.

Walls points to Thoreau's "mosaic method of quilting together thoughts and observations," rather than following a systematic plan of organization.[99] The reader is encouraged to participate actively in the reading process, forging relations among potentially disparate elements hanging together on a loose framework. This mosaic method or collage aesthetic points the way toward an open-ended, dynamic understanding of the universe that Walls describes as "hybrid." As we shall see in Chapter 3, William James will describe his similar view of the universe in terms of a "pluralistic" formulation of a "multiverse."[100]

Thoreau points out that human beings are not only the observers of nature, but that nature looks back. In the "Winter Animals" chapter of *Walden* he describes his interactions with the red squirrels around his house:

> All day long the red squirrels came and went, and afforded me much entertainment by their manoeuvres. One would approach…pausing with a ludicrous expression and a gratuitous somerset, as if all the eyes in the universe were fixed on him,--for all the motions of a squirrel, even in the most solitary recesses of the forest, imply spectators as much as those of a dancing girl…and then suddenly, before you could say Jack Robinson, he would be in the top of a young pitch-pine, winding up his clock and chiding all imaginary spectators, soliloquizing and talking to all the universe at the same time,--for no reason that I could ever detect, or he himself was aware of, I suspect. At length he would reach the corn, and selecting a suitable ear, frisk about in the same uncertain trigonometrical way to the topmost stick of

[99] Walls, *Thoreau*, 139.
[100] Ibid., 245.

> my wood-pile, before my window, *where he looked me in the face, and there sit for hours*, supplying himself with a new ear from time to time, nibbling at first voraciously and throwing the half-naked cobs about; till at length he grew more dainty still and played with his food, tasting only the inside of the kernel, and the ear, which was held balanced over the stick by one paw, slipped from his careless grasp and fell to the ground, when he would look over at it with a ludicrous expression of uncertainty, as if suspecting that it had life, with a mind not made up whether to get it again, or a new one, or be off; now thinking of corn, then listening to hear what was in the wind.[101]

In this view, since every being in the world is both a subject and an object, an observer and an observed, we can all be said to be living in multiple worlds.[102] Beyond our human worlds, "there are new worlds everywhere, concealed only by our ignorance," like the squirrel world, to be found throughout nature—presumably both terrestrial and cosmic.[103] Finally, this entire model is enfolded in history, both human and natural, "creating a hybrid landscape that mixes nature's design with layers of human purpose."[104]

Thoreau's hybrid view of nature differs from that of Emerson through its acceptance of increasing complexity and its Darwinian embrace of chaos as a key factor in the unfolding of life. Walls notes that, "Far from disregarding the anomalous, [Thoreau] cherishes it as a source of potential illumination…[and] exults in an infinitely expanding horizon."[105] In *Walden*, she notes, "Emerson's convergent single law disintegrates into an infinitely multiplying number, sliding into new outlines with every new viewpoint."[106] Thoreau embraces the anomaly and accepts variety through his interest in distribution and pattern, while Emerson seeks to neutralize diversity through his application of the concept of polarity. Thoreau comes

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[101] Thoreau, *Walden*, 423-25, emphasis added.
[102] Walls, *Thoreau*, 168.
[103] Ibid., 191.
[104] Ibid., 187.
[105] Ibid., 140.
[106] Ibid., 153.

to "a new insight into the imbrication of all order with disorder, disorder with the emergence of order, the self-organizing power of a chaotic nature quite apart from human desire or even presence."[107] In this scheme, creation—as Darwin will also set forth—is always taking place through the continuous dance between order and disorder. For Thoreau, as for Darwin, this interaction cannot be resolved in a mere reconciliation of polar opposites, but is further subject to the unpredictable intrusions of chance.

Thoreau's process-driven view of nature is reflected in his late writings, especially his *Journals*, which Walls describes as

> experiment[ing] with disconnection and patterning, creating minimally ordered forms which remain responsive to chaotic processes. The emphasis is no longer on the individual, or on the 'whole' (which in any case is no longer knowable), but on the generative equation.[108]

The "generative equation" is process. As we shall see in Chapter 4, Ives will engage in this emphasis on process, blurring any particular identity of the Concord Sonata as a work, replacing "it" with a matrix of possible works, numerous variants, each "responsive to [the] chaotic processes" of Ives's creative mind. First, however, we shall see how this idea is reflected in William James's notion of the multiverse.

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[107] Ibid., 238.
[108] Ibid., 245.

Chapter 3
William James, Pragmatism, and the Multiverse

EMERSONIAN PRAGMATISM

Much as Van Nostrand found in Emerson's *Nature* a prototype for American cosmologies to come, Richard Poirier explores a literary tradition of what he calls "Emersonian pragmatists." While our formal discussion of Jamesian pragmatism must wait until later in this chapter, for the moment let us only mention briefly the etymological roots of "pragmatism" as coming from the Greek *pragma* (thing, matter), after the verb *prattein* (to do, to perform). Some of the most prominent figures in Poirier's Emersonian pragmatist tradition are Robert Frost, Gertrude Stein, Wallace Stevens, and Henry and William James. All of these writers draw from an Emersonian literary aesthetic—or maybe philosophy is a better word—that acknowledges a debt to the past yet aims to reanimate that past in the present. This reanimation takes place through the act of troping: Poirier's Emersonian pragmatists are eager to keep language in motion, and thereby can be seen to value the multivalent relations among words, which are always in flux, and whose meaning must be thought of as indefinite. Moreover, Poirier finds that one important way to trace this indefiniteness, this vagueness in language, is through its sound.

We have already seen that Emerson considered all human expression and activity to be built upon past human expression and activities. He found the source of originality to lie in the fusion of borrowed ideas with an active awareness of the conditions of the living present. The result of this fusion is new creation. Poirier

notes that "The past is present in each of us as a spur, an incentive to actions that, while emulating actions taken in the past by persons like ourselves, are expected also to exceed them."[1] This moving beyond the past is achieved through troping or punning—the new inflection of an old idea. In short, Poirier writes, "Creation consists of repetition with a difference."[2]

Troping is an activity that keeps language constantly in motion and can have the effect of opening up possibilities of meaning in an utterance. By multiplying potential meanings, troping can also be said to blur the meaning of an utterance, to make it more vague. Poirier's Emersonian pragmatists, who are always seeking more flow, more transition, more activity, consider this to be a desirable quality in language:

> "Nothing," [Emerson] remarks in "Circles," "is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit." Rely, that is to say, not on anything fixed or stabilized in your vocabulary but only on the power that allows you to move away from these, movements precipitated by desire whose object is uncertain and which, if too certainly defined, could turn thinking into mere thought, activity into inertia.[3]

In his essay on "Experience," Emerson uses the metaphor of "skating" among "surfaces" to describe this kind of activity. Poirier reads both Emerson's "surfaces" and "circles" as images for the "discursive formations," such as ideas and texts, among which we are constantly moving.[4]

In propelling ourselves through this environment of discourse by means of the activity of troping, we are all, at our best, constantly in the act of creating, and this ubiquitous and constant creation animates our universe. As Poirier puts it:

> Emerson's faith in the power of invention is limitless; it expresses his conviction that as humans we participate in the whole of creation. Not only

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[1] Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism*, 19.
[2] Ibid., 17.
[3] Ibid., 28.
[4] Ibid., 65.

> are economic systems and the plays of Shakespeare invented; so is the human mind, so is nature. Because the possibilities are infinite, any particular thing or text is in itself superfluous, part of a nearly overwhelming excess of productivity which is the essence of the universe as he conceives of it. Any one of us assists, accelerates, tropes within this flow of things, and out of the profusion one invention easily becomes the casualty of another; nothing dares risk immobility.[5]

Poirier's final comment here reflects an Emersonian sense of urgency in the motion of language, as it reflects the constant motion of the natural universe: Keep moving or risk getting crushed in the flow. The best way to adapt to an ever-changing universe is to remain in motion oneself, and that includes keeping one's language and ideas in motion.

While troping is not a uniquely American phenomenon, Poirier does suggest that it might have a special meaning for Americans:

> Language is the one cultural infiltration from Europe that cannot be stopped, the one institution from which it is impossible ever to insulate the New World.[6]
>
> The proper activity envisioned from "intellectuals" is therefore a poetic one. It is to make sure that language is kept in a state of continuous troping, turning, transferring, transfiguring, even to the point of transparency.[7]

By keeping our appropriated language in motion, we can find ways to make it more our own as a culture, as Americans.[8] I am taking Poirier's "transparency" here to indicate something maximally vague, in the best possible spirit of Emersonian pragmatism—i.e., language that is troped to the point that all of its possible meanings can be seen through, perhaps like a multifaceted crystal or prism, refracting light into all of its constituent elements. This is language that, "if it is to represent the flow of

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[5] Ibid., 57-8.
[6] Those of us engaged in the study of the history of American music would have to add that it was similarly impossible to keep Old World musical traditions out of the New World. This notion will re-emerge in my discussion of Ives's Concord Sonata in Chapter 4.
[7] Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism*, 122.
[8] Henry Louis Gates, Jr., makes similar claims for the power of troping, in African-American culture, in *The Signifying Monkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

individual experience, ceases to be an instrument of clarification or of clarity and, instead, becomes the instrument of a saving uncertainty and vagueness."[9] The vagueness is "saving" by virtue of its ability to keep things in motion and to avoid stagnation. In a way, vagueness keeps us and our language alive.

Poirier's concern with the sound of language, as "heard" in the head of the reader or as articulated aloud, is also important to his account of Emersonian pragmatism. He asserts that in the world of literature and ideas, "the Americans simply *sound* different" from their European counterparts. "They sound altogether less rhetorically embattled, less culturally ambitious."[10] The Emersonian pragmatists' "philosophical heritage…is unique for the privileges it accords to casual, extemporized, ordinary idioms, to uses of language that translate into little more than sound."[11] It is in the way words are *used* that they become animated to exciting new ends:

> Familiar, homey words cannot, then, be dispensed with; they can, however, be reshaped, especially by alteration or in any written syntax designed to catch those tones or sounds of speech that can substantially inflect or even reverse the meanings normally assigned to the words. We must learn once again to hear sounds already deeply embedded in the caves of the human mouth and of the human ear. Such sounds have been relegated by philosophers and intellectualists to the inessential, to the fringes of human discourse, and it is time, James concludes [in the essay, "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth," in *Pragmatism*], to restore them to centrality.[12]

The reader is therefore encouraged to engage these texts actively in order to reap their full rewards. "We should listen to writing the way we listen caringly to one another in conversation, often catching more from the sounds we hear in the movements of

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[9] Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism*, 3.
[10] Ibid., 155.
[11] Ibid., 166.
[12] Ibid., 136.

sentences, or fragments of sentences, than from the actual words."[13] These sounds and movements, these inflections of language, "take the edge off words themselves, to blur and refract them," keeping them active, maximizing their potential meaning, their vagueness, their life.[14]

THE STREAM OF THOUGHT

In the chapter of *Principles of Psychology* entitled "The Stream of Thought," William James wrote that, "It is, in short, the re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the attention."[15] He notes that our thoughts are constituted not only of "definite images," but of the "consciousness that flows around [them]." With each definite image "goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it."[16] The fringe around images is what causes them to shade one into another, thus forming the uninterrupted flow of the stream of thought.[17]

The fringe is a vague zone in which a feeling of meaning is produced by the relations among all of the images in the stream. Through its fringe, an image pushes beyond its margins, beyond its limits, overflowing into a "more," and reaching towards its next neighbor. The fringe is the locus of transition between images. In "The Stream of Thought," James writes that to fill the gaps between images "is our

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[13] Ibid., 137.
[14] Ibid., 139.
[15] William James, *Principles of Psychology* [1890] (New York: Dover, 1950), I, 254.
[16] Ibid., 255.
[17] Ibid., 239.

thought's destiny."[18] This destiny is manifested in the flow of our speech and our thinking:

> Now I believe that in all cases where the words are *understood*, the total idea may be and usually is present not only before and after the phrase has been spoken, but also whilst each separate word is uttered. It is the overtone, halo, or fringe of the word, *as spoken in that sentence.* It is never absent; no word in an understood sentence comes to consciousness as mere noise. We feel its meaning as it passes….And in our feeling of each word there chimes an echo or foretaste of every other. The consciousness of the 'Idea' and that of the words are thus consubstantial. They are made of the same 'mind-stuff' and form an unbroken stream. Annihilate a mind at any instant, cut its thought through whilst yet uncompleted, and examine the object present to the cross-section thus suddenly made; you will find, not the bald word in process of utterance, but that word suffused with the whole idea.[19]

In this way, as Jonathan Levin notes, "An underlying continuity structures the perception of every particular discontinuity.…Consciousness is never reducible to any immediate perception or sensation. It always depends on what came before, as well as on the anticipation of what is to follow."[20]

The transitional, fundamentally relational, and emotional activity that takes place within the fringe pushes the stream of thought onward, creating a sense of flow in which there is always a feeling of more, of an "and." Beyond the image of the stream of thought, James used another metaphor from the natural world to explore the functioning of the flow of human consciousness in more detail:

> Like a bird's life, [the stream of thought] seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this, where every thought is expressed in a sentence, and every sentence closed by a period.[21] The resting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be held before the mind for an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; the places of flight are

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[18] Ibid., 259.
[19] Ibid., 281. The ramifications of this idea for the juxtapositions of musical fragments in the music of Charles Ives will be explored in Chapter 4.
[20] Levin, 47.
[21] The same could be applied to the structure of common-practice music, a point to which I will return in Chapter 4.

> filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest.[22]

He proposes calling the "perchings" the *substantive* and the "flights" the *transitive* parts of the stream, such that "the main use of the transitive parts is to lead us from one substantive conclusion to another."[23] Like the path of a bird in flight, the path of the stream of thought has no specific ultimate goal. Each perching is temporary, before the bird next takes flight; similarly, each substantive thought is provisional, susceptible to the effects of the changing world around it that will send it racing through the next mental transition.

As we may perceive the movements of a bird to be fitful and unpredictable, James makes yet another analogy to describe the movement of the stream of thought, this time comparing it to the jumble of bits of colored glass in a kaleidoscope:

> As in a kaleidoscope revolving at a uniform rate, although the figures are always rearranging themselves, there are instants during which the transformation seems minute and interstitial and almost absent, followed by others when it shoots with magical rapidity, relatively stable forms thus alternating with forms we should not distinguish if seen again; so in the brain the perpetual rearrangement must result in some forms of tension lingering relatively long, whilst others simply come and pass.[24]

Twenty years later, when James says in *A Pluralistic Universe* that "We realize this life as something always off its balance, something in transition," we are reminded of this earlier image of the kaleidoscope, the alternations between episodes of relative stasis and sudden bursts of activity.[25] The flow of the stream of thought has its own unpredictable rhythm.

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[22] James, *Psychology*, I, 243.
[23] Ibid., 243.
[24] Ibid., 246.
[25] William James, *A Pluralistic Universe* [1909] (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1996), 283.

In *Varieties of Religious Experience* James takes the idea of the fringe that flows beyond the margins of images in the stream of thought and expands it to describe the behavior of human consciousness in its interactions with the external world:

> [The margin] lies around us like a 'magnetic field,' inside of which our centre of energy turns like a compass-needle, as the present phase of consciousness alters into its successor. Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this margin, ready at a touch to come in; and the entire mass of residual powers, impulses, and knowledges that constitute our empirical self stretches continuously beyond it. So vaguely drawn are the outlines between what is actual and what is only potential at any moment of our conscious life, that it is always hard to say of certain mental elements whether we are conscious of them or not.[26]

It is our feelings about reality that animate the world around us, that make it real for us:

> A conscious field *plus* its object as felt or thought of *plus* an attitude towards the object *plus* the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs—such a concrete bit of personal experience…is a *full* fact.…[I]t is of the *kind* to which all realities whatsoever must belong; the motor currents of the world run through the like of it; it is on the line connecting real events with real events.[27]

The objective world itself, when considered solely from an intellectual standpoint, "is without solidity or life."[28] In this view, James writes, "the feeling of reality may be something more like a sensation than an intellectual operation."[29]

James gave the name "radical empiricism" to his philosophical view that what really matters are the relations, in all their polyvalent and multidimensional complexity, not only among things themselves but among various parts of experience:

> Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion.

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[26] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* [1902] (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 232.
[27] Ibid., 499.
[28] Ibid., 502.
[29] Ibid., 58.

> The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.
>
> The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves
>
> The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.[30]

Like thought, then, our experience in the world and with the things in it constitutes a continuous flow or stream. In his preface to a 1911 French translation of *Pragmatism*, Henri Bergson wrote that, according to James's radical empiricism, "reality no longer appears as finite or as infinite, but simply as indefinite. It flows without our being able to say whether it is in a single direction, or even whether it is always and throughout the same river flowing."[31]

With all these flows and over-flows, infused with emotions that will vary for each individual and change over each moment in time, it comes as no surprise that James eventually arrives at an increasingly messy picture of reality. In his last series of public lectures, *A Pluralistic Universe*, delivered in 1909, James posits a multilayered understanding of reality ("All real units of experience *overlap*"[32]) that cannot even be perceived as functioning in a logical fashion:

> I have finally found myself compelled *to give up the logic*, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably….Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it….I prefer bluntly to call reality if not irrational then at least non-rational in its constitution,--and by reality here I mean reality where things *happen*, all temporal reality without exception. I myself find no good warrant for even suspecting the existence of any reality of a higher denomination than that distributed and strung-along and flowing sort of reality which we finite

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[30] William James, *The Meaning of Truth* [1909], Preface (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 6-7.
[31] Henri Bergson, "On the Pragmatism of William James: Truth and Reality," in *The Creative Mind* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 250.
[32] James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, 287.

> beings swim in. That is the sort of reality given us, and that is the sort with which logic is so incommensurable.[33]

"The fact," he concludes, "is all shades and no boundaries."[34] Jonathan Levin notes that this "conception of consciousness and world that is all shades and no boundaries, everywhere in transition," can be viewed as consisting of "endlessly permeable boundaries" and leading to the dissolution of "any and all defined objects, subjective or objective."[35] Such a description of consciousness recalls Emerson's image of the transparent eyeball, a droplet in the flow of nature.

We are also reminded here of the interwoven relation between explorations of human consciousness and the universe that we have observed in the various cosmologies we have examined thus far. Poirier writes that, for James,

> the association of the vague with the essential is rooted, thanks to his having been a professor of medicine and a physiological psychologist, in his conviction that there is an unbridgeable gap between the flow of bodily sensations on the one hand, and on the other the language by which we try to represent this flow. He felt most keenly the anomaly that though we cannot adequately inform ourselves through language about most of what goes on in our bodies, we presume confidently to describe what is going on in the universe.[36]

These flows of human experience and language, sensation and observation, neatly summarize our primary cosmological concerns thus far, and William James takes them to new levels in his conception of the multiverse.

THE MULTIVERSE

In the preface to his 1897 collection of essays *The Will to Believe*, James wrote that "There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an

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[33] Ibid., 212-3.
[34] Ibid., 288.
[35] Levin, 58.
[36] Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism*, 41.

absolutely single fact."[37] In his 1881 essay, "Reflex Action and Theism," which is included in *The Will to Believe*, James already posits the idea of a pluralistic universe and asks how we should approach its meaning:

> The real world as it is given objectively at this moment is the sum total of all its beings and events now. But can we think of such a sum? Can we realize for an instant what a cross-section of all existence at a definite point of time would be? While I talk and the flies buzz, a sea-gull catches a fish at the mouth of the Amazon, a tree falls in the Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes in Germany, a horse dies in Tartary, and twins are born in France. What does that mean?[38]

Given human beings' penchant for seeking order, the only way to approach the chaos of experience is "to get away from it as fast as possible," and we do this by breaking it up into digestible pieces—as James suggests, into histories, arts, and sciences—and establishing relations among its various parts.[39]

In the chapter of the *Psychology* on "The Stream of Thought," James focuses on the processes in consciousness that make it possible for us to break up this "undistinguishable, swarming *continuum*," and allow us to establish relations within it.[40] In a word, the mind selects or chooses. James writes:

> The mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention.[41]

It is through our attention, which is motivated by our interest, that we each exercise our individual power to select—and, indeed, we do each select differently. "Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law," James writes. "It seems as if the

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[37] William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* [1897] (New York: Dover, 1956), ix.
[38] Ibid., 119.
[39] Ibid. In his fourth lecture in *Pragmatism*, James notes that, "If our intellect had been as much interested in disjunctive as it is in conjunctive relations, philosophy would have equally successfully celebrated the world's *disunion*" (95).
[40] James, *Psychology*, I, 284.
[41] Ibid., 288.

elementary psychic fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought*, but *my thought*, every thought being *owned*."[42] In a gesture reminiscent of Thoreau and his squirrel-world, James even extends the idea of consciousness to include non-human animals, noting, "My world is but one in a million alike embedded, alike real to those who may abstract them. How different must be the worlds in the consciousness of ant, cuttle-fish, or crab!"[43]

James offers another Thoreauvian reflection on nature twenty years later, in *A Pluralistic Universe*, describing it as being "more demonic than divine [and] above all things *multifarious*."[44] He launches into an ecstatic passage that connects his assessment of the flowing abundance of nature to the workings of the human mind, using language that recalls the sand foliage episode from the spring thaw in *Walden*:

> Nature is but a name for excess; every point in her opens out and runs into the more; and the only question, with reference to any point we may be considering, is how far into the rest of nature we may have to go in order to get entirely beyond its overflow. In the pulse of inner life immediately present now in each of us is a little past, a little future, a little awareness of our own body, of each other's persons, of these sublimities we are trying to talk about, of the earth's geography and the direction of history, of truth and error, of good and bad, and of who knows how much more? Feeling, however dimly and subconsciously, all these things, your pulse of inner life is continuous with them, belongs to them and they to it.[45]

In short, the excessive flows of nature are also manifested in the excessive flows of the human mind, as we have seen in our consideration of the fringe surrounding images that produces the stream of thought. The key point here is that, in the spirit of Emerson, the behavior of nature becomes a model for the behavior of human consciousness, and both are constantly in a state of flux.

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[42] Ibid., 226.
[43] Ibid., 289.
[44] James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, 22.
[45] Ibid., 286.

Much like the Romantic cosmologies of Goethe, Coleridge, and Humboldt, James's pluralistic universe is a self-generating, living organism:

> What really exists is not things but things in the making. Once made, they are dead, and an infinite number of alternative conceptual decompositions can be used in defining them. But put yourself in the making by a stroke of intuitive sympathy with the thing and, the whole range of possible decompositions coming at once into your possession, you are no longer troubled with the question which of them is the more absolutely true. Reality…mounts in living its own undivided life—it buds and burgeons, changes and creates.[46]

Its internal workings involve a dance between opposing forces that interact in order to create:

> There is partial decay and partial growth, and all the while a nucleus of relative constancy from which what decays drops off, and which takes into itself whatever is grafted on, until at length something wholly different has taken its place.[47]

Moreover, its constituent elements, though singly diverse, are inextricably interwoven:

> Without being one throughout, such a universe is continuous. Its members interdigitate with their next neighbors in manifold directions and there are no clean cuts between them anywhere.[48]

In *A Pluralistic Universe*, then, the transitive flights of the stream of thought, with their multidirectional and multidimensional relations, have taken on a cosmological aspect, so that in James's universe "there is literally nothing between."[49]

In *Pragmatism* James describes the universe as expressing "a sort of pluralistic monism," simultaneously including both the one and the many.[50] The elements of the pluralistic universe retain their "each"-ness but also participate in a greater unity or "with"-ness, articulated by the universe at large. As James had

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[46] Ibid., 263-4.
[47] Ibid., 258.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., 271.
[50] William James, *Pragmatism* [1907] *and four essays from The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism* [1909], ed. Ralph Barton Perry (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1967), 23.

already said in his essay "On Some Hegelisms," from 1882, "The things we meet are many, and yet are one; each is itself, and yet all belong together; continuity reigns, yet individuality is not lost."[51] By the time he has written *A Pluralistic Universe*, James is able to unravel this paradoxical feature of the universe in more detail:

> Our "multiverse" still makes a "universe"; for every part, tho it may not be in actual or immediate connexion, is nevertheless in some possible or mediated connexion, with every other part however remote, through the fact that each part hangs together with its very next neighbors in inextricable interfusion.[52]

James expends a good deal of effort trying to explain this.[53] In short, anything can be connected to anything else as long as an appropriate sequence of intermediary elements is followed, and the key to this is the *potentiality* of relations. While, as we have seen, any given thing is surrounded by its fringe of potential relations to other things, not all of those potential relations are activated at any given time. By activating various potential relations, connections may be forged. We have already seen that the pluralistic universe is an additive universe. "The word 'and,'" James says in *A Pluralistic Universe*, "trails along after every sentence."[54] There is always something more, something outside, something beyond. The potential for adding any element to another element is always waiting in the dormant relations of the fringe that surrounds any element.

This notion of the additive universe, or multiverse, has ramifications for the metaphysical aspect of James's cosmology. It offers a vision of the universe as fundamentally incomplete. If something can always be added to something else, if there is always an element external to any given element, then what about any sense

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[51] James, *Will to Believe*, 265.
[52] James, *A Pluralistic Universe*., 325.
[53] Ibid., 321-4.
[54] Ibid., 321.

of an absolute? What about any sense of God? In *Varieties of Religious Experience* James concludes that "The divine can mean no single quality, it must mean a group of qualities" that, like any image in the stream of thought, will carry different meaning for each individual. "Each attitude [of this polytheistic divinity] being a syllable in human nature's total message, it takes the whole of us to spell the meaning out completely."[55] In *A Pluralistic Universe*, James asserts that "the only God [of the multiverse] worthy of the name *must* be finite."[56] Beyond that,

> If the absolute exist in addition [to God]—and the hypothesis must, in spite of its irrational features, still be left open—then the absolute is only the wider cosmic whole of which our God is but the most ideal portion, and which in the more usual human sense is hardly to be termed a religious hypothesis at all. 'Cosmic emotion' is the better name for the reaction it may awaken.[57]

Therefore, in James's multiverse, "because God is not the absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other smaller parts,—as similar to our functions consequently."[58]

SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JAMES

William James's father, Henry James, Sr., had a certain amount of faith in the potential for harmony between science and religion. He derived this faith from his reading of the works of such figures as Michael Faraday, Emanuel Swedenborg, and Emerson, all of whom had a similar understanding of the relationship between the

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[55] James, *Varieties*, 487. The reader may be reminded here of the image of the Hindu idea of the history of the universe as the utterance of a very long sentence.
[56] James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, 125.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid., 318.

natural and spiritual worlds.[59] As Paul Jerome Croce notes, the elder James "welcomed science…only when it was treated according to his belief in the spiritual essence of material things."[60] We have already seen this kind of understanding of nature in the works of Emerson. Henry Sr. met Emerson in 1842. He had written Emerson a sort of fan letter after hearing Emerson speak in New York City; a meeting followed shortly thereafter, and a friendship began. On a visit to the James home during the first year of their friendship, Emerson visited the nursery and, according to the James family lore, gave his blessing to the infant William James.

Young William James was schooled at home under the tutelage of his father. Henry Sr. encouraged William's later scientific studies to the extent that he felt that they would support his spiritual understanding of the world, but, as Croce notes, the position "that scientific knowledge would inevitably support religion…was becoming increasingly implausible by the 1860s."[61] Instead, William's "scientific education sharply challenged the religious assumptions that the elder James had taught."[62] Specifically, in the 1860s the scientific world was reeling from the impact of Darwinian evolution.

Croce argues that the source of this impact was "the increasing persuasiveness of new scientific methods that looked only to nature for their theories and that replaced expectations of certainty and proof with persuasive and authoritative, yet

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[59] Faraday (1791-1867) was an English scientist famous for his work in electromagnetism and was deeply involved in Sandemanian Christianity. Swedenborg (1688-1772) was a Swedish scientist, theologian, and philosopher whose spiritual beliefs Henry James, Sr., came to champion. He was included in Emerson's *Representative Men*, as "Swedenborg, or, The Mystic."

[60] Paul Jerome Croce, *Science and Religion in the Era of William James* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 62.

[61] Ibid., 81.

[62] Ibid., 85.

probabilistic, explanations."[63] Once exposed to this new understanding of scientific inquiry, "James began to doubt the need to expect certainty in either his science or his religion."[64] This infusion of uncertainty into and acknowledgement of the role of chance in the behavior of the natural world unsettled both scientists and laypeople, as it has continued to do for the last 150 years. If science says that spontaneous and unpredictable forces are at work in the universe, what does that do to the idea of an omniscient, omnipotent God?

This became among the most vexing questions debated by the Metaphysical Club, a circle of young Cambridge intellectuals that James entered during the 1860s. The club was started by Charles Sanders Peirce, and its members included Chauncey Wright and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.[65] Croce posits that:

> The central issue of their inquiries was certainty. They saw that neither scientific theory nor religious faith could generate conventional forms of certainty, and they searchingly asked whether there could be any other basis for belief and action. They answered, in varying degrees and with different applications to religion, that scientific method approaches certainty and provides a modern model for belief and basis for action.[66]

As we shall soon see, pragmatism became for William James a scientific yet religious approach to navigating his uncertain multiverse.

In "The Dilemma of Determinism," a relatively early essay dating from 1884, James was able to encourage his readers to think of the role of probability in the

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[63] Ibid., 99.
[64] Ibid., 110.
[65] Peirce (1839-1914) was an American geodesist and logician who developed the modern study of semiotics. His friend William James credited Peirce with the invention of pragmatism, although Peirce's and James's understandings of pragmatism differed in important ways, eventually leading Peirce to call his variety of the philosophy "pragmaticism" in order to make it distinct. Wright (1830-75) was an American philosopher of science whose ideas had an influence on the development of pragmatism. Holmes (1809-1894) was an American scientist and poet. See also Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), especially chapter 9, 201-232.
[66] Croce, 154.

universe not as a specter of uncertainty but as offering "the *gift* of chance."[67] It means not necessarily a lawless, chaotic, amoral universe, but one which contains the possibility of goodness:

> Make as great an uproar about chance as you please, I know that chance means pluralism and nothing more.…And if I still wish to think of the world as a totality, it lets me feel that a world with a *chance* in it of being altogether good, even if the chance never come to pass, is better than a world with no such chance at all. That 'chance' whose very notion I am exhorted and conjured to banish from my view of the future as the suicide of reason concerning it, that 'chance' is—what? Just this,--the chance that in moral respects the future may be other and better than the past has been.[68]

He reinforces his sense of optimism concerning Darwinian evolution in *Varieties of Religious Experience*:

> In that "theory of evolution" which, gathering momentum for a century, has within the past twenty-five years swept so rapidly over Europe and America, we see the ground laid for a new sort of religion of Nature, which has entirely displaced Christianity from the thought of a large part of our generation. The idea of a universal evolution lends itself to a doctrine of general meliorism and progress.[69]

A few lectures later in *Varieties*, James's optimism is shown to derive from a willingness to embrace both science *and* religion as valid and necessary approaches to understanding the universe, rather than as two separate means:

> Evidently, then, the science and the religion are both of them genuine keys for unlocking the world's treasure house to him who can use either of them practically. Just as evidently neither is exhaustive or exclusive of the other's simultaneous use. And why, after all, may not the world be so complex as to consist of many interpenetrative spheres of reality, which we can thus approach in alternation by using different conceptions and assuming different attitudes…? On this view religion and science, each verified in its own way from hour to hour and from life to life, would be co-eternal.[70]

This is an extraordinary passage for two reasons. First, Henry Sr. would have been proud that in some way William, faced with the problem of the future of religion in

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[67] James, *Will to Believe*, 159; emphasis added.
[68] Ibid., 178.
[69] James, *Varieties*, 91.
[70] Ibid., 122-3.

light of the scientific developments of the late nineteenth century, would have found his way back to a point of view from which science and religion are best seen as working together to cosmological ends. Later in *Varieties*, James will note that "There is in the living act of perception always something that glimmers and twinkles and will not be caught, and for which reflection comes too late."[71] We *need* religion in order to account for that "something." Second, this image of a "complex" world consisting of "many interpenetrating spheres of reality" that demands a polyvalent approach in order to be thoroughly understood reinforces William James's idea of a multiverse. Science plus religion becomes a pluralistic analytical tool for plumbing the depths of the multiverse.

In the lectures on *Pragmatism*, James appears to be trying to sell his listeners on a single notion that will serve just this function. His language has the persuasive momentum of an advertising pitch or a religious sermon. In the first lecture, he reminds his listeners what the issues are, but couches them in the needs and desires of the listener:

> Never were as many men of a decidedly empiricist proclivity in existence as there are at the present day. Our children, one may say, are almost born scientific. But our esteem for facts has not neutralized in us all religiousness. It is itself almost religious. Our scientific temper is devout. Now take a man of this type, and let him be also a philosophic amateur, unwilling to mix a hodge-podge system after the fashion of a common layman, and what does he find his situation to be, in this blessed year of our Lord 1906? He wants facts; he wants science; but he also wants a religion.[72]

Just what does James mean by "religion," then? We get a clue in his assessment of "philosophy" in the same lecture:

> I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in

[71] Ibid., 456.
[72] James, *Pragmatism*, 23.

> which it determines the perspective in your several worlds. You know the same of me.…[But] the philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means. It is only partly got from books; it is our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos.[73]

James had spent one entire lecture of *Varieties* differentiating between philosophy and religion. "Philosophy lives in words," he wrote, "but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation.…In the religious sphere, in particular, belief that formulas are true can never wholly take the place of personal experience."[74] His assessment of philosophy in *Pragmatism*, however, has much in common with a particularly lively definition of religion he had offered earlier in *Varieties*:

> Religion, whatever it is, is a man's total reaction upon life, so why not say that any total reaction upon life is a religion?...To get at [this total reaction] you must go behind the foreground of existence and reach down to that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, which in some degree every one possesses. This sense of the world's presence…and our reaction, involuntary and inarticulate and often half unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our answers to the question, "What is the character of this universe in which we dwell?" It expresses our individual sense of it in the most definite way. Why then not call these reactions our religion…?[75]

It seems safe to suggest, then, that James's understanding of religion has cosmological resonances and that it is decidedly pluralistic, for it describes what each of us considers our relationship to the universe to be, and that relationship will be unique to each individual.

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[73] Ibid., 17-18.
[74] James, *Varieties*, 456.
[75] Ibid., 35.

THE PRAGMATIC METHOD

The pragmatic method is a way for each individual to navigate the overwhelming complexity of the multiverse, based upon each individual's personal experience. It suggests that each of us is continually choosing among options presented to us and then acting on those choices. We choose by establishing what James calls belief or faith in one of the myriad options:

> Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance.[76]

"Faith," James says a few pages later in more scientific terms, "is synonymous with working hypothesis."[77] Through our experience, the fruits of our actions reflect the effectiveness of our choices, and aid us in making future choices, in an ongoing and endless life process.

"The gods we stand by are the gods we need and can use," William James said in *Varieties of Religious Experience*.[78] In order for a religious belief to take hold, whatever that belief may be—and James's use of the word "gods," lower-case and in the plural, suggests that there could be many—it must be useful to its adherents, it must bear fruit, it must lead to productive activity. Moreover, as James argued in *The Will to Believe*, the same must hold for *any* belief, religious or otherwise. "Beliefs, in short, are rules for action; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of active habits."[79] Like poorly adapted species of animal life in the

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[76] James, *Will to Believe*, 90.
[77] Ibid., 95.
[78] James, *Varieties*, 331.
[79] Ibid., 444. "Belief is measured by action," he says in "The Will to Believe" (29).

Darwinian scheme, beliefs that are not useful, that do not bear fruit, that do not lead to productive activity, simply cannot survive:

> It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing a concrete consequence. There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere—no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one.[80]

Again, in its application to any kind of belief, and its reliance upon "concrete consequence" to demonstrate the "significance" of a belief, pragmatism can be taken as a scientific religion, or a religious science. "It can remain religious like the rationalisms," James said in the first lecture in *Pragmatism*, "but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts."[81]

The pragmatic method draws from James's earlier idea of the stream of thought to produce a process-driven approach to the navigation of the multiverse:

> If you follow the pragmatic method…you must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be *changed.*
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> *Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest*. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one at work.[82]

Here James treats language as a key element in the pragmatic method. Richard Poirier reads this bringing-out of the full "cash-value" of each word—maximizing its potential meaning, its "blur," in the act of troping, the making of metaphor—to be "in

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[80] James, *Pragmatism*, 44-5.
[81] Ibid., 33.
[82] Ibid., 46; emphasis in original.

essence the question at the very center of William James's pragmatism."[83] He writes that, "If pragmatism works, then it works the way poetry does—by effecting a change of language, a change carried out entirely *within* language, and for the benefit of those destined to inherit the language."[84] In this light, pragmatism can truly be seen to be a fundamentally Emersonian idea. The processes of nature, as reflected in the active use of language, continue to spur on linguistic and intellectual activity, and, more important for James, action upon the external world as we make our way through our lives. This has a real impact on us, not just experientially but also spiritually and morally. James writes that the pragmatist ultimately

> turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power. That means…the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth.[85]

This emphasis on process and change and activity, as based on the model of the behavior of the natural world, has serious ramifications for the pragmatic cosmological view. James's pragmatic universe "is still in the making, and awaits part of its completion from the future…It is still pursuing its adventures."[86]

Jacques Barzun helps us to link the idea of the stream of thought with James's pragmatic method in a somewhat different way, describing pragmatism as "the expanded description of how we natively think."[87] He describes James's pragmatic course of thinking in an effort to attain a sense of truth:

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[83] Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism*, 49.
[84] Ibid., 132.
[85] James, *Pragmatism*, 45.
[86] Ibid., 167.
[87] Jacques Barzun, *A Stroll with William James* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 100.

> When the natural purposiveness of the stream of mind is directed rationally for making sure that an idea is right, the search is "pragmatic" in the sense that it looks chiefly to what follows, not backwards to precedent or sideways to an "original." The mind perceives many bewildering things and frames many conceptions of them. To be called true, these ideas must correspond and must agree, as previous thinkers maintained, but with what? Agreement can only be found in the fitness of further experiences—objects seen or actions made possible.[88]

Barzun reinforces the idea that pragmatism is indeed "a program for more work" and that the pragmatic method is in fact a rigorous method, not a vague procedure. Yet Richard Poirier reminds us of the importance of staying loose while maintaining a sense of discipline. Poirier writes that in *Pragmatism* James

> proposes that the discovery of truth can occur with the advent of an object whose appearance was already signified or hinted at by previous experiences, but that if we too tightly control the flow of experience, if we do not remain open and flexible, then we will have missed these little pointers and therefore be unprepared to recognize the truth when it does appear.[89]

Poirier points to James's conclusion in "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth" that

> Truth, in these cases, meaning nothing but eventual verification, is manifestly incompatible with waywardness on our part. Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him nowhere or else make false connexions.[90]

The *successful* application of the pragmatic method, then, clearly makes demands on the pragmatist. "Pragmatism describes the way we think," writes Barzun, "but to think well is rare, precisely because it is not straight 'reasoning' or straight intuition, but a weaving together of all relevants—abstract and concrete, obvious or recalled, known or imagined."[91] It creates a net of unified yet multivalent experience that is at once strong yet malleable, not unlike a spider's web:

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[88] Ibid., 85-6.
[89] Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism*, 42-3.
[90] James, *Pragmatism*, 136.
[91] Barzun, 97.

> James expects the freshly perceived to generate new concepts, and these to be incorporated in the body of previous truths.
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> It is by this means that the unities are formed within the cosmos….And though always changing, these unities also furnish us with the manifold object of contemplation that the philosophic mind looks for. But for it to be an object, a spectacle, it has to be explained and seen as (for me) James sees and explains it. Actually, its parts ought not to be called a hierarchy of truths and facts, which would imply higher and lower as well as set in compartments. Rather, they form a grid, a flexible net with innumerable intersections, at which points we meet them as mental or physical events in our own lives.[92]

This net, this web, is the multiverse, and the pragmatic method—at once both rigorously and loosely applied—helps us to make our way through it.

TRUTH

Much as Emerson viewed human experience and literature as building upon and transforming the past, James's view of truth, an idea inevitably tied up in notions of belief and faith of both sacred and secular varieties, is built upon past truths. "Our faith is faith in someone else's faith," writes James. "Our belief in truth itself…what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up? We want to have a truth."[93] In this light, despite our communal, social need for some kind of truth, every truth must be understood as provisional, awaiting further modification in a continuous and endless process of deeper understanding. There is no absolute truth in James's universe.[94] In "Humanism and Truth," first published in

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[92] Ibid., 139-40.

[93] James, *The Will to Believe*, 9.

[94] This differs from the conception of truth in Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmatic universe, in which we are ever so gradually moving toward absolute truth.. In the 1891 article "The Architecture of Theories," which is reprinted in *The Essential Peirce, Vol. 1*, ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Koesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), for example, Peirce imagines a point at which "the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future" (297).

1904, James writes of "the great unpent and unstayed wilderness of truth."[95] Like nature itself, truth is an ongoing process of transition; truth, James tells us in *Pragmatism*, "*happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity *is* in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-*fication*. Its validity is the process of its valid-*ation*."[96] Levin reminds us that this notion, too, had its roots in Emerson, who "had insisted [that] no already adapted truth or ideal is more valuable than the unfolding process."[97] Poirier shows that this idea can be traced back specifically to the essay on "Experience," in which Emerson tells us

> that life is not so much present as prospective; that new ideas, to be accepted as such, must in their articulation pay deference to old beliefs or "previous truths"; and that *any* belief should be tolerated as part of what Emerson, in an italicized phrase which James could not have missed, calls "*the universal impulse to believe*."[98]

James's view of truth as constantly subject to modification, as new facts continually come to light, was rooted in his physiological understanding of thought, as articulated in his *Psychology*. Because modifications are constantly taking place in each human brain, our thoughts and feelings are constantly changing:

> Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a resemblance of a kind with our other thoughts of the same fact. When the identical fact recurs, we *must* think of it in a fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations from those in which it last appeared. And the thought by which we cognize it is the thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffused with the consciousness of all that dim context.[99]

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[95] James, *Pragmatism*, 243.
[96] Ibid., 133; emphasis in original.
[97] Levin, 59.
[98] Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism*, 41.
[99] James, *Psychology*, I, 233.

That "dim context" includes various environmental factors that affect our mood, and, in turn, our thinking. "We feel things differently," writes James, "according as we are sleepy or awake, hungry or full, fresh or tired; differently at night and in the morning, differently in summer and in winter, and above all things differently in childhood, manhood, and old age."[100] In short, the "dim context" is the accumulation of our personal experience:

> Experience is remoulding us every moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of our experience of the whole world up to that date….Each present brain-state is a record in which the eye of Omniscience might read all the foregone history of its owner. It is out of the question, then, that any total brain-state should identically recur.[101]

As Emerson noted in "Quotation and Originality," everything is in flux, p??ta ?e?. James tells us this is as true of our internal workings as it is of the workings of the external world.

James was already grappling with the notion of provisional truth in the 1870s. Croce quotes James in a notebook entry from the mid-1870s that, "Unless we find a way of conciliating the notion of truth and change, we must admit that there is no truth anywhere." Croce comments that "Toward the end of his scientific education James became committed to the vocation of philosophy in order to answer this theoretical dilemma and cultural paradox."[102] In the very early essay "The Sentiment of Rationality," from 1879, in which he ponders the question of whether the universe can be assumed to be moral, James posited the idea of a communally derived sense of truth that could never be ultimately and absolutely determined:

> In a question of this scope, the experience of the entire human race must make the verification, and…all the evidence will not be 'in' till the final

[100] Ibid., 232.
[101] Ibid., 234.
[102] Croce, 229.

> integration of things, when the last man has had his say and contributed his share to the still unfinished *x*.[103]

A quarter-century later, in the essay "Humanism and Truth," James still asked, "Why should anywhere the world be absolutely fixed and finished?"[104]

This attitude toward open-endedness recalls the quality of looseness that Poirier identified as an important aspect of the application of the pragmatic method. James articulates this idea in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*:

> The safe thing is surely to recognize that all the insights of creatures of a day like ourselves must be provisional. The wisest of critics is an altering being, subject to the better insight of tomorrow, and right at any moment, only "up to date" and "on the whole." When larger ranges of truth open, it is surely best to be able to open ourselves to their reception, unfettered by our previous pretensions.[105]

Like the fringe that surrounds images in the stream of thought, "Experience," James writes in *Pragmatism*, "has ways of *boiling over*, and making us correct our present formulas."[106] This idea recalls the additive quality, the feeling of *more*, which characterizes the Jamesian multiverse, which is all process and new growth:

> In our cognitive as well as in our active life we are creative. We *add*, both to the subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers human violence willingly. Man *engenders* truths upon it.[107]

Elsewhere in *Pragmatism*, James uses a metaphor from nature to describe this process of the growth of truth:

> When old truth grows, then, by now truth's addition, it is for subjective reasons. We are in the process and obey the reasons. That new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function of satisfying our double urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself classed as true, by the way it works;

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[103] James, *The Will to Believe*, 107.
[104] Ibid., 251.
[105] James, *Varieties*, 333.
[106] James, *Pragmatism*, 145.
[107] Ibid., 167. Emphases in the original.

> grafting itself then upon the ancient body of truth, which thus grows much as a tree grows by the activity of a new layer of cambium.[108]

As we saw in James's description of the functioning of consciousness, then, his conception of truth and the pragmatic method to which its continual modification is central follows a natural model that has cosmological implications. As Jacques Barzun puts it, James's universe, "like truth, is not unity ready made but, when worked at, progressively achieved. The incompleteness of both universe and truth is in fact one and the same incompleteness."[109]

ACTION AND BELIEF

We have seen that, according to William James, the process of verification or validation is what creates truth. "True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process," James says in *Pragmatism*:[110]

> Verification and validation lead us, namely, though the acts and other ideas which they instigate, into or up to, or towards, other parts of experience with which we feel all the while—such feeling being among our potentialities—that the original ideas remain in agreement. The connexions and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification.[111]

Truth, then, is revealed through a process of the establishment of relations among elements, not unlike the flow of elements in the stream of thought. There is a rightness, an inevitability, to the leading of elements one into the next in this flow of verification. Interruptions in the flow cause breakdowns in the verification process, therefore demanding further reflection.

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[108] Ibid., 52.
[109] Barzun, 112.
[110] James, *Pragmatism*, 135.
[111] Ibid., 134.

The activity of the verification of an idea causes that idea to exert an influence on its surroundings. "What is it to act?" James asks in *A Pluralistic Universe*. "Is it not to exert an influence?"[112] It will influence other ideas as well as other bodies receiving those ideas:

> To act on anything means to get into it somehow….My thoughts animate and actuate this very body which you see and hear, and thereby influence your thoughts. The dynamic current somehow does get from me to you, however numerous the intermediary conductors may have to be. Distinctions may be insulators in logic as much as they like, but in life distinct things can and do commune together every moment.[113]

It is this influence that generates the current that sets the flow of verification in motion, animating the potential relations among disparate ideas.

One's belief in an idea is demonstrated in one's willingness to act upon it, and this is the result of one's conviction with regard to its verifiability, a conviction that can be measured by the influence that that idea has over one. In other words, the successful activity of the verification of an idea will lead to someone believing in it and thus acting directly upon it. These observations led James early on to a decidedly optimistic view of the universe's potentiality, if only people would exercise their will to believe in the most positive manner possible and act in accordance with that belief. In "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" (1891), James wrote that "There is but one unconditional commandment, which is that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see."[114] Even earlier, in "The Sentiment of Rationality" (1879), he insisted, "This world *is* good, we must say, since it is what we

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[112] James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, 56.
[113] Ibid., 259.
[114] James, *Will to Believe*, 209. This point of view recalls Krishna's assessment of right action in the *Bhagavad Gita*, in which "the wise / are free of attachments, and act / for the well-being of the whole world" (3.25).

make it,--and we shall make it good."[115] Elsewhere in that essay he writes, "Believe, and you shall be right, for you shall save yourself; doubt, and you shall again be right, for you shall perish. The only difference is that to believe is greatly to your advantage."[116] One is reminded of Poirier's Emersonian pragmatists, who must act, remain in motion, or hesitate and risk getting crushed in the flow of the perpetual movement of the universe. Belief—no matter how provisional (and, remember, belief is always provisional, always subject to change, to modification, just like everything else in the universe)—saves, whether one is a religious person or a scientist, or, for that matter, an artist.

PRAGMATISM AND THE WORK OF ART

Thinking of William James, Jacques Barzun writes:

> Mind is the aboriginal artist. It works by selection, it fashions percepts and concepts charged with meanings and associations, it handles and recalls them by signs and symbols. Around each object of consciousness a fringe of feelings perpetually flows, which assigns to each pulse its quality and importance, the whole unrolling scene unified by the sense of self-identity and directed by attention and interest.[117]

Despite his early training in painting and drawing, James is largely mute on the subject of aesthetics in his philosophical writings. Jonathan Levin traces what he calls James's "resistance" to aesthetic philosophy to James's

> sense that lived experience depends on aesthetic feelings to interweave self and environment, orienting the self toward action in the world. This crucial aesthetic dimension of experience is, for James, just as it was for Emerson, a perfectly natural human function, integral to how we creatively position ourselves within the world and orient our present and future actions there….James insists that our cognitive lives are first and foremost creative. It is because James felt so strongly about this primary aesthetic function that

[115] Ibid., 102.
[116] Ibid., 97.
[117] Barzun, 65.

> he became agitated by what he saw as secondary, and therefore quite diminished, forms of aesthetic seduction, including the cultivation of any aesthetic theory.[118]

In other words, in James's view, theorizing about aesthetics would perhaps cheapen the fundamental—one might say organic—and in either case vital relationship between aesthetics and life. Levin writes that

> to a pragmatist, aesthetics never means anything like an interest in art as a separate, separable realm of experience. Unity is key to the Jamesian imagination. It is, however, never a reflection or realization of an external unity, but is instead a projection of an imagination feeling its way through the world.[119]

Indeed, Jacques Barzun reads James as suggesting that in its very conception the work of art becomes a manifestation of the full complexity, the pluralism, of the artist's experience:

> When James insisted at every turn that the mind naturally follows esthetic as well as practical interests, he was pointing out that in perceiving, doing, searching, building we prefer patterns to disorder and within pattern certain qualities. We call them balance, harmony, contrast, variety (and also repetition), unity, simplicity, and other such names, and we assume that they are fixed attributes—and so they are, as concepts. But things—sounds, words, colors—can be arranged in an infinity of different and opposite ways to produce those desired qualities, and nothing in the name "balance" or "order" can predict the new arrangements that are possible. They must be discovered, like truth, pragmatically.[120]

Through the activity of making art, the artist's imagination transforms his or her raw materials, which themselves are derived from the artist's lived experience, drawing from them a "more," by activating the potential relations embedded in their fringe.[121] Like James's additive, open-ended universe, the possibilities of every new work of art are endless in relation to what has come before it:

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[118] Levin, 78.
[119] Ibid, 65.
[120] Barzun, 101.
[121] In a direct reference to James's late-nineteenth-century artistic training in France, Barzun suggests that "[a]s a good Impressionist" James became "fond" of the idea of fringes and vagueness (78).

> In the pursuit of his purposes…the artist acknowledges no restraints; he claims and exercises the right to use any material, to treat any subject, to flout any rule or precedent. The history of art is a tale of violence done to set forms, moral and esthetic imperatives, and public expectations. And the only test of innovation for both creator and beholder is pragmatic.[122]

Indeed, for Barzun

> the artist is the pragmatist par excellence, the very model of unremitting practicality. His whole effort is to realize his aims, formal and intuitive. Art is fashioned for results and is judged by them: noble intentions, fine sentiments, studious technique do not count, only success—success, that is, in making a conception real, making it into an object perceptible to others as the artist wants it to be perceived. To that end, the work is tested at every step, modified part by part until all parts together form one working body full of meanings, intended and emergent.[123]

In this light, if the artist is the pragmatist par excellence, then the work of art itself can be viewed as the pragmatic object par excellence, a supreme manifestation of the philosophy of radical empiricism:

> Having learned that perception is fused sensation and thought, surrounded by a fringe of memories and fluid emotions, I realized that in looking at works of art, or hearing and reading them, the object cannot be seen "as it really is," no matter how familiar one may be with the technique of the art or the principles of criticism. The person, the moment, the mood, the past—the apperceptive mass, in short—are inseparable from "the object," as in every experience.[124]

The work of art becomes not only an expression of the artist's flow of experience, but it becomes an element in that of its perceiver, thereby subjecting the work to the effects of the full range of the perceiver's experience. Barzun writes:

> Because one can go on and on finding new aspects, the work seems to possess the inexhaustibility of experience itself. And for that reason the work changes with the passage of time—new findings, new takings—exactly as happens about life.[125]

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[122] Barzun, 101.
[123] Ibid., 100.
[124] Ibid., 71.
[125] Ibid., 100-01.

The work of art, therefore, is activated, actuated, in its becoming part of the flow of experience of the perceiver. As the perceiver's experience is constantly modified, so is his or her reception of the art work.

The art work, then, seems most properly to exist somewhere between the intention of the artist and the reception of the perceiver. It is influenced by the penumbra or halo or overtones or fringe of feelings and thoughts of the artist and all of the work's perceivers through history.[126] Much as truth happens to an idea through its verification and validation, so does a history of reception accumulate around a work of art:[127]

> Like thought, art does not copy reality but weaves in and out of it, now as sensation, now as idea. The best truthful thought and the best art are a fused product: we then "feel" the true, the work of art "moves" us—in contrast with those truths we repeat mechanically, or those artistic objects we admire for their skill or surface only, *pragma*, the thing done, being missing.[128]

As we shall see in Chapter 4, Charles Ives's conception of the Concord Sonata will be revealed to be all *pragma*, all movement, all trope.

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[126] This idea recalls Walter Benjamin's notion of the "aura" of the work of art, as articulated in his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." It also recalls Harold Bloom's suggestion in *A Map of Misreading* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), that "there are *no* texts, but only relationships *between* texts" (3).

[127] The larger cultural effect of this accumulation is the establishment of canons of works. The problem of the musical canon is addressed by Lydia Goehr in *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

[128] Levin, 103.

Chapter 4
Charles Ives and the Multiverse of the Concord Sonata

IVES AS EMERSONIAN PRAGMATIST

In his Piano Sonata No. 2, "Concord, Mass., 1840-60," Charles Ives engages in exactly the kind of "troping, transfiguring, even to the point of transparency" of an appropriated musical vocabulary that Richard Poirier observes in the verbal articulations of his Emersonian pragmatists. In their pioneering 1955 biography of Ives, Henry and Sidney Cowell already noted Ives's desire "to present many sides of the whole" in his music.[1] Much as Americans learn a language imported from England in which to express themselves verbally, American musical composers of Ives's generation tended to be schooled in the musical language of the German tradition. That tradition is epitomized in the legacy of and mythology surrounding Ludwig van Beethoven. [2] Much, then, as Emerson assimilated the ideas of his European precursors, so did Ives assimilate those of Beethoven. As we saw with Emerson in Chapter 2, this notion of assimilation reaches beyond the mere reflection of European ideas, and toward a *refraction* of the source material into a myriad of potential meanings. By reanimating his source materials, Ives's musical language, like Emerson's and James's verbal language, becomes, as Poirier suggested, "the instrument of a saving uncertainty and vagueness."

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[1] Cowell and Cowell, 163.
[2] See, for example, Kristin Marta Knittel, "The Construction of Beethoven," in *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 118-150.

Something of Emerson's organic understanding of history, by way of Goethe, is articulated in the growth of organic musical structures in Ives's music, by way of Beethoven. Geoffrey Block notes that Ives, a composer well-known for borrowing or quoting material from other composers (as well as recycling his own works) borrowed musical material from Beethoven more often than he did from any other classical composer.[3] Ives understood Beethoven to be a great composer, but one who remained limited by the vocabulary of the conventional harmony of his place and time. Ives wrote:

> I remember feeling towards Beethoven [that he's] a great man—but Oh for just one big strong chord not tied to any key.… The more the ears have learned to hear, use and love sounds that Beethoven didn't have, the more the lack of them is sensed naturally.[4]

He understood the German tradition through the American lens of Horatio Parker, his American-born teacher at Yale University. Parker had received his musical training in Germany, studying with Josef Rheinberger in Munich, and passed elements of that tradition down to his student. But Parker himself engaged in a certain amount of musical experimentation, and encouraged Ives's interest in the writings of the American Transcendentalists.[5]

Ives's engagement with Beethoven is especially evident in the Concord Sonata, which is, in essence, an extended trope on the familiar four-note motive

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[3] Geoffrey Block, "Ives and the 'Sounds that Beethoven Didn't Have,'" in *Charles Ives and the Classical Tradition*, ed. Geoffrey Block and J. Peter Burkholder (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 37.

[4] Charles Ives, *Memos*, ed. John Kirkpatrick (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 43-44.

[5] In spite of his German training, Parker's understanding of the musical craft was not nearly as much at odds with Ives's as one might imagine. See J. Peter Burkholder, *Charles Ives: The Ideas Behind the Music* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), especially Chapter 6, "Years of Apprenticeship (1894-1902): Yale and New York." A bit more recently Nicholas E. Tawa explicated this point in detail in "Ives and the New England School," in *Charles Ives and the Classical Tradition*, 51-72.

which opens Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Ives clearly articulated the importance of this motive in the "Emerson" essay from the *Essays Before A Sonata*:

> There is an "oracle" at the beginning of the Fifth Symphony; in those four notes lies one of Beethoven's greatest messages. We would place its translation above the relentlessness of fate knocking at the door, above the greater human message of destiny, and strive to bring it towards the spiritual message of Emerson's revelations, even to the "common heart" of Concord—the soul of humanity knocking at the door of the divine mysteries, radiant in the faith that it *will* be opened—and the human become the divine![6]

The programmatic association of Beethoven with the Transcendental celebration of human potential is clear in Ives's prose, and is strengthened through the construction of the so-called "human faith melody," the musical theme in which this notion is expressed.

In Ives's hands, the Fifth Symphony motive becomes a musical object—although admittedly a highly charged musical object, an object with a past (to say the least)—to be manipulated. Throughout the Concord Sonata, the listener hears the Beethoven motive in numerous octave registers, dynamic ranges, rhythmic diminutions and augmentations, and harmonic contexts, including the kinds of dissonances "not tied to any key" that Ives imagined for the German master. A few of these kinds of distortions are already apparent on the first page of the score, as shown in Example 4.1.[7] One gets the sense that Ives delights in experimenting with what the motive does, how it behaves, how it reads (or sounds) in a wide range of contexts. As the Cowells wrote, Ives used the Beethoven motive "out of no spirit of imitation or competition, but because he feels so great a theme is universal in nature,

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[6] Ives, *Essays*, 47.

[7] This and all musical excerpts from the Concord Sonata in this chapter reflect the 1947 Associated Music Publishers edition. Practicality dictates my use of this edition, the most readily available and most often performed version of the sonata.



Example 4.1: Page 1 of "Emerson," with Beethoven motive labeled

and that its implications should continue to grow and to be incorporated into new music."[8] Like Emerson in his essays, Ives seems to be engaging in some serious fun with a European precursor, constantly keeping the Beethoven motive in play—skating among various musical surfaces. Furthermore, in removing the motive from the context of the Fifth Symphony and inserting it into the Concord Sonata, Ives has made his dream for Beethoven come true. With Emerson as his spiritual guide, he has brought Beethoven's music, as a compositional model, together with the idea of Beethoven, to America and into the twentieth century. He has even caused Beethoven to sound in contexts without a tonal center. In this way, Geoffrey Block suggests that in the Concord Sonata Ives was writing the music that, to his ears, "Beethoven would have composed had he been composing in 1915 rather than 1815."[9]

Rather like Emerson's Goethian writer-scholar, who is able to make connections among fragments, one of Ives's favorite compositional techniques involved a process that J. Peter Burkholder has called *cumulative form*, "a thematic, non-repetitive form in which the principal theme is presented, not at the beginning [of a movement] as in traditional forms, but near the end, and is preceded, not followed, by its development."[10] This process has much in common with the "organic" growth of themes in Beethoven's music from small musical "cells."[11] In the Concord Sonata, a wide range of musical fragments—drawn, it should be noted, from both American and European influences, including the Beethoven motive, and from various time

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[8] Cowell and Cowell, 148.
[9] Block, "Ives and the 'Sounds that Beethoven Didn't Have,'" 50.
[10] J. Peter Burkholder, *All Made of Tunes: Charles Ives and the Uses of Musical Borrowing* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 137.
[11] A similar process in fact can be used to describe the unfolding of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. In each of the symphony's four movements, Beethoven recasts the opening motive, incorporating it into yet another new theme.

periods—are distilled into what Ives calls the "human faith melody," which is shown in Example 4.2.[12] This melody is not heard clearly and completely until the third movement of the sonata, "The Alcotts." Indeed, a "striving" is evident in the delayed articulation of the theme, through the expansive and tortuous musical territories of "Emerson" and "Hawthorne," that enhances the sense of "the divine" implicit in the much more direct, compact, and hymn-like character of "The Alcotts" when the theme finally bursts forth.[13] The theme returns as a kind of echo in the final movement, "Thoreau," played by a solo flute, wafting out over an imagined Walden Pond.



Example 4.2: "Human faith melody"

[12] I am accepting Geoffrey Block's identification of the "human faith melody" in *Ives: Concord Sonata*, Cambridge Music Handbooks (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 80. Burkholder points to a range of interpretations of the theme's precise identity in *All Made of Tunes*, 199 (with special attention to notes 78 and 79). The designation of the theme is derived from Ives's essay on "The Alcotts": "All around you, under the Concord sky, there still floats the influence of that human faith melody, transcendent and sentimental enough for the enthusiast or the cynic respectively, reflecting an innate hope—a common interest in common things and common men—a tune the Concord bards are ever playing, while they pound away at the immensities with a Beethovenlike sublimity, and with, may we say, a vehemence and perseverance—for that part of greatness is not so difficult to emulate" (*Essays*, 47-48).

[13] The reader may recall the notion of *Steigerung*, or striving, and its association with both organic processes and spiritual development, in the writings of Goethe, as discussed in Chapter 1.

Fragments of the human faith theme lie buried as early in the sonata as the dense textures of the opening page of "Emerson," as shown in Example 4.3. This page presents in microcosm the agenda of the entire sonata, in what Burkholder calls "a cadenza on the main themes" of the sonata which are "interwoven" in such a way that their "significance…is likely to be understood only in retrospect, after one has heard or played the movement often enough to become familiar with" them.[14] In this "cadenza" a fragment of the human faith melody is heard almost immediately in the right hand (C-D-E-A). Three iterations of the Beethoven motive follow in quick succession, after the second of which the C-D-E-A motive reappears in the left hand. In the third and fourth systems the left hand pounds out an extended fragment of the human faith melody that contains the Beethoven motive. A decrescendo containing fragmented echoes of the human faith melody in the right hand gradually brings all the activity of this page down to the material marked *slower* and *piano* at the bottom of the page.

Ultimately, then, the Concord Sonata becomes very much about the process of unpacking the musical materials of that first page and moving toward the statement of the "human faith" theme. The development, or troping, of thematic fragments, chief among them the Beethoven motive, sets that process in motion. By embedding the Beethoven motive within a melody of his own creation, Ives is not merely reflecting but *refracting* his understanding of the German master.

A larger point to be made here concerns Ives's acute awareness of his place in the Western musical tradition, and in particular of his conscious movement from a Eurocentric musical tradition toward a distinctively American musical voice. With

[14] Burkholder, *All Made of Tunes*, 351.



Example 4.3: Page 1 of "Emerson," with "human faith melody" fragments labeled

his American identity firmly in mind, Ives reveals himself to be fully cognizant of Beethoven's iconic status in the history of Western music, but also to believe in continued change through time and across geographical and cultural boundaries—and in himself as part of that change beyond Beethoven. Ives was unique among American composers of his generation for avoiding the lure of Europe for artistic validation, remaining instead in America for his musical education. Burkholder emphasizes, however, the manifestation of traits Ives nevertheless inherited, via Parker, from the German Romantic tradition.[15] These include Ives's use of European musical genres, such as symphony, sonata, and art song; his awareness of a musical canon that contains masterworks with which his own compositions must compete; his use of musical quotations from and allusions to other works; his interest in program music, and his use of literary, philosophical, and spiritual subjects in that music; the inclusion of apparently autobiographical instances in his works; the search for new means of expression while continuing to use traditional forms; and a spirit of nationalism.[16] As radical as Ives's music seems to be on the surface, Burkholder suggests that his "challenge is always from *within* the [German Romantic] tradition, not from outside it."[17]

Ives is aware of the tradition whence he comes, but he is also keenly aware of his own musical environment, a veritable musical wilderness of sounds and traditions circulating in the air about him in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and

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[15] J. Peter Burkholder, "Ives and the Nineteenth-Century European Tradition," in *Charles Ives and the Classical Tradition*, ed. Geoffrey Block and J. Peter Burkholder (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 11-33. See also Burkholder, *Ideas Behind the Music*, Chapter 7, "Innovation and Synthesis (1902-1908)."
[16] Ibid., 11-13.
[17] Ibid., 15.

the first two of the twentieth. Not only European art music, but American patriotic songs, church music, and ragtime music, with its African influences, resonate in Ives's inner ear. Ives's musical environment, compared with that of Beethoven, can be viewed as analogous to the difference in the understanding of "nature" between Emerson and Goethe. Beethoven's music takes on a different meaning for an early-twentieth-century composer positioned in America. In response to this American musical wilderness, Ives, like Emerson, and like Poirier's Emersonian pragmatists, rejects a static sense of history's past-ness, seeking instead to reanimate it in the present.

Listeners to Ives's music are often left in a vague space of being uncertain exactly what they are hearing. This is a function of Ives's effort to reanimate the past by troping his source materials. The Cowells observed that "Anything that presents many facets of an idea, musical or otherwise, is always eagerly seized on and built into [Ives's] thinking immediately."[18] In order to achieve this refraction of his musical sources, Ives's use of *direct* quotation is much less common than his deployment of somewhat altered versions of *possible* source tunes, which can be obscured through fragmentation, the addition of wrong notes and dissonant harmonies, or by being buried in dense polyphonic textures. The Cowells observed that:

> Since Ives has no feeling against training his concordant old sacred tunes to spread along dissonant chord lines, it may frequently happen that some old motifs (in themselves perfectly circumspect, falling along simple scales or chord lines) may grow into modern-sounding music with greatly widened outlines. His nineteenth-century motif then becomes a twentieth-century melody with a wide span and dissonant polyphonic or polytonal implications. When this practice is based on an underlying familiar tune, association illuminates the music and gives a basis for emotional understanding, even if the structure embraces new concepts as well as old ones.[19]

[18] Cowell and Cowell, 163.
[19] Ibid., 164.

An entire academic industry of trying to identify tunes in Ives's music has dominated Ives scholarship for decades, culminating in J. Peter Burkholder's 1995 *All Made of Tunes: Charles Ives and the Uses of Musical Borrowing*.[20] Burkholder identifies an array of no fewer than fourteen categories of musical borrowing at work in Ives's music, each of which is described and illustrated with copious musical examples.[21] Burkholder discusses the "human faith melody" of the Concord Sonata as an example of a cumulative setting, providing the following analysis of the use of borrowed material in the theme:

> The first half of the theme is apparently not based on borrowed material, but the second half is adapted from no fewer than four sources: two famous Beethoven tunes, the opening motives of the Fifth Symphony (transposed) and "Hammerklavier" Sonata, Op. 106 (at pitch), and two hymns that are motivically related to the Fifth Symphony motto, Charles Zeuner's *Missionary Chant* and Simeon B. Marsh's *Martyn*.[22]

All of these suggestions at least make programmatic sense. The "Hammerklavier" strengthens the Beethoven connection, as well as the image in the "Alcotts" essay of Beth Alcott playing Beethoven at the "little old spinet piano Sophia Thoreau gave to the Alcott children."[23] The association of specific hymn tunes with the Fifth Symphony motive strengthens the quality of the "divine" revelation of the theme in this movement.

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[20] See also Clayton W. Henderson, *The Charles Ives Tunebook* (Warren, Mich.: Harmonie Park Press, 1990). Other exercises in tune detection in Ives's music include Christopher Ballantine, "Charles Ives and the Meaning of Quotation in Music," in *Musical Quarterly* 65 (1979), 167-84; David Michael Hertz, *Angels of Reality: Emersonian Unfoldings in Wright, Stevens, and Ives* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), and "Ives's Concord Sonata and the Texture of Music," in *Charles Ives and His World*, ed. J. Peter Burkholder, 75-117; Timothy A. Johnson, "Chromatic Quotations of Diatonic Tunes in Songs of Charles Ives," in *Music Theory Spectrum* 18 (1996), 236-61; and Dennis Marshall, "Charles Ives's Quotations: Manner or Substance?" in *Perspectives of New Music* 6 (1968), 45-56.

[21] Burkholder provides an outline of the categories in *All Made of Tunes* (3-4).

[22] Burkholder, *Tunes*, 195.

[23] Ives, *Essays*, 47, although Ives specifies young Miss Alcott playing "at [a transcription of] the *Fifth Symphony*," not the "Hammerklavier."

A certain amount of poetic license, however, must be granted in order to accept these suggestions as musical "sources," as Burkholder identifies them—problematically without offering a clear definition of that term. Among the many definitions of "source" in the Oxford English Dictionary, most of which express the general idea of origination, one in particular captures the spirit of the kinds of images which have permeated our discussion thus far: "the fountain-head or origin of a river or stream; the spring or place from which a flow of water takes its beginning." It is far from clear that the "Hammerklavier," the *Missionary Chant*, and *Martyn* are the places from which the flow of Ives's "human faith melody" *takes its beginning*. Certainly, musical fragments in Ives's music often *suggest multiple meanings* to listeners after the fact, but this is different from their being *adapted from multiple sources* by the composer.

Each of the hymn tunes, which are shown in Example 4.4a and b, differs rhythmically from the Fifth Symphony motive to which Burkholder compares them.[24] The short-short-short-long of Beethoven registers very differently from the long-short-long-short of *Martyn* and the short-short-short-long-long of the *Missionary Chant* along side of which Burkholder places it. Discounting the rhythmic relationship among these "sources" leaves the much less spectacular shared melodic feature of a few (three, in the case of *Martyn*, or four, in the case of the *Missionary Chant*) repeated pitches followed by a descending major third.

[24] Geoffrey Block, however, arguing for these sources in "Ives and the 'Sounds that Beethoven Didn't Have,'" cites four criteria for quotation proposed by Allen Gimbel. The first criterion states that, "The pitch pattern corresponds to a preexisting pattern in the musical literature (rhythm need not reflect this correspondence)" (44).



Example 4.4a: Zeuner, *Missionary Chant*, opening phrase



Example 4.4b: Marsh, *Martyn*, opening phrase

The "Hammerklavier" suggestion is also problematic as a "source." The fanfare of stacked B-flat six-four chords, played *fortissimo*, that opens the Beethoven sonata, as shown in Example 4.5a, *resembles* Ives's first complete and most emphatic declamation of the "human faith melody" at the end of "The Alcotts" (p. 57, system 5), but Ives stacks C major root position triads, as shown in Example 4.5b. The melodic fragment from this "source," such as it is, consisting of a reiterated pitch followed by a pitch a half step higher, a return to the original pitch, and a descending major third, is indeed similar in both cases; however, the rhythmic pattern of the initial reiteration of the pitches differs, and in Ives is absorbed into the lengthier and



Example 4.5a: Opening of Beethoven's "Hammerklavier" Sonata



Example 4.5b: Excerpt from "The Alcotts" based upon the "Hammerklavier" (Burkholder)

more lyrical "human faith melody," thereby losing a good deal of its resemblance to the opening fanfare of the "Hammerklavier."[25]

Burkholder observes that the "Hammerklavier"-like passage agrees with its alleged source at pitch, but in order to do so, he needs to look at a different statement of the "human faith melody" than the one we have been considering. He turns to p. 55 of "The Alcotts," in systems 2 and 3, where the "human faith melody" is presented quietly, quickly, and with a harmonically distorting accompaniment in the left hand—in short, in a manner much less similar in character to the "Hammerklavier"—as shown in Example 4.6. At the end of "Thoreau" the theme is given once again at

[25] This, Block argues in "Ives and the 'Sounds that Beethoven Didn't Have'" (44-6), is in order to emphasize the relationship to the Fifth Symphony in the Concord Sonata. He considers the "Hammerklavier" case "tentative" but "strong."

Example 4.6: Excerpt from "The Alcotts" based upon "Hammerklavier" (Burkholder)

pitch, but again with a difference: it is played by the flute, quietly, in a different rhythm, and with a somewhat harmonically distorting accompaniment, as shown in Example 4.7. Once again, while Burkholder succeeds at finding moments in "The



Example 4.7: Excerpt from "Thoreau" based upon "Hammerklavier" (Burkholder)

Alcotts" that *resemble* the opening fanfare of the "Hammerklavier," in no case is the resemblance conclusive enough to suggest that the "human faith melody" *takes its beginning* from Beethoven's sonata as a *source*.

An endnote at the end of the passage from Burkholder alleging these "sources" leads us to the following complicated description of the genealogy—dare I say sources?—of his analysis:

> This analysis is similar to that of Geoffrey Block, "Ives and the 'Sounds Beethoven Didn't Have,'" to be published in *Charles Ives and the Classical Tradition*, ed. Geoffrey Block and J. Peter Burkholder (New Haven: Yale University Press, [1996]). Henderson, [*The Charles Ives*] *Tunebook*, 205, mentions only the Fifth Symphony and *Missionary Chant*. H. Wiley Hitchcock, *Ives*, 55-56, notes the role of *Missionary Chant* and *Martyn*. Fred Fisher, *Ives' Concord Sonata* (Denton, Texas: C/G Productions, 1981), 30-32, notes the "Hammerklavier" motive and suggests that the last part of Ives's melody is from the close of *Crusader's Hymn* ("Fairest Lord Jesus"), which has the same closing contour as *Martyn* with a rhythm closer to that of the Ives; however, given the prominent use of *Martyn* in the sonata's second movement ("Hawthorne") and the resemblance of its opening motive to that of the Fifth Symphony, it seems more likely that *Martyn* is the source. (To bolster his case, Fisher finds references to *Crusader's Hymn* elsewhere in the sonata; see pp. 33-35.) Fisher also suggests that the opening four notes of the melody, two rising whole steps and a descending perfect fifth, echo the similar motive in Brahms's Piano Sonata No. 2 in F# Minor, Op. 2; Fisher first offered this idea in "Ives's *Concord* Sonata," *Piano Quarterly* 92 (Winter 1975-76): 26. This seems less likely for the Brahms and Ives motives are quite different in rhythm and in their relation to the surrounding melodic context, and they are developed in very different ways.[26]

This cosmology of a multiverse of interpretations raises further unanswered questions concerning exactly how Burkholder defines "source" and what criteria a musical passage needs to meet in order for him to accept it as a "source." The endnote reveals Burkholder's determination of a "source" to have less to do with Ives than it does with a history of interpretation. Moreover, by inexplicably rejecting some of Fisher's suggestions while embracing others, this determination seems to have much to do

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[26] Burkholder, *All Made of Tunes*, fn 72, 458-59.

with what Burkholder himself hears. We are further away than ever from the fountain-head or origin of Ives's musical stream as the spring or place from which that flow takes its beginning.

A more productive way to identify a piece of music as a "source" might lie in trying to locate Ives's actual intentions. In his writings on the sonata Ives acknowledges only Beethoven's Fifth Symphony and the Stephen Foster tune "Massa's in da Cold Ground" (from which thematic material in "Thoreau" was derived) as consciously employed outside influences.[27] One is never certain, however, whether Ives's acknowledged influences can be trusted to deliver the complete picture; his stated intentions seldom turn out to be the authoritative word on *anything*. More often they seem calculated to tease, or even to distract from the matter at hand. In much the same way, Ives's musical oeuvre is characterized by the expert manipulation of musical fragments that seem to be testing our powers of perception, playing with our desire to hear something clearly that in reality is quite vague. There is often something familiar about these fragments, but less often something one can put one's finger on with certainty.

In this light, there is a kind of cognitive dissonance between the spirit of the truth claim in Burkholder's text—in which he unhesitatingly designates Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, the "Hammerklavier" Sonata, and the two hymn tunes as "sources" for the "human faith melody"—and the much messier, and more pluralistic, range of possible hearings that unfolds in his endnote. Burkholder's endnote successfully manages to demonstrate how Ives always seems to be slyly inviting the listener to

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[27] Geoffrey Block makes this observation in *Ives: Concord Sonata*, 48. Ives acknowledges Beethoven in *Essays*, 36, and Foster in notes to the second edition of the sonata ([New York:] Associated Music Publishers, 1947), [74].

read into his music—if sometimes at the listener's peril, as certain readings seem to be more successful than others—but his main text is much more bold. The fact is that many analyses which primarily focus upon attempting to identify quotations in Ives's music have limited value.[28] Such approaches are intriguing, and they offer a way in to a body of music that simply cannot be analyzed well in a traditional way, but they do not seem to be capable of telling the whole story.[29] Burkholder's claims for the "sources" of the "human faith melody" demonstrate an effort to hold Ives too firmly to specifics. In the final analysis, the best response—at least when one is engaging the work of an aesthetic descendant of Emerson—is to skate on the surfaces, to let them play, and to take pleasure in the vague.[30]

THE STREAM OF IVES'S THOUGHT: VAGUENESS

In the brief preface, "Prologue," and "Emerson" essay of the *Essays Before A Sonata*, Ives makes several references to vagueness that lead us to recall the very special function it has for William James. Those in the preface are a bit oblique,

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[28] Here I must include some of Burkholder's analyses in *All Made of Tunes*. For example, he attributes a fairly innocuous three-pitch stepwise descending motive in the song "The Last Reader" to no fewer than five "sources," pp. 301-305.

[29] In her review of *All Made of Tunes* in the *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 53 (2000), 437-444, Carol Baron points to the limitations of exploring only melodic material, "which largely consists of 'identified' fragments, more or less related to existing tunes," at the exclusion of considering "other parameters," such as the tonal structure of a piece. As a result, she notes, "the conclusions reached may be contraindicative" (437-38).

[30] The recent efforts of some German musicologists, for example, seem to be especially fruitful, perhaps because they are free of the American bias and can move on to listening for things other than musical quotations. Two examples are Felix Meyer, *"The Art of Speaking Extravagantly": Eine vergleichende Studie der "Concord Sonata" und der "Essays Before a Sonata" von Charles Ives* (Berne and Stuttgart: Paul Haupt, 1991), and Wolfgang Rathert, *The Seen and Unseen: Studien zum Werk von Charles Ives*, Berliner musikwissenschaftliche Arbeiten 38 (Munich: Emil Katzbichler, 1991).

repeatedly emphasizing the notion of "impressions" or the "impressionistic" without using the word "vague," but the idea is clearly present. Ives describes the sonata as:

> an attempt to present (one person's) impression of the spirit of transcendentalism that is associated in the minds of many with Concord, Mass., of over a half century ago. This is undertaken in impressionistic pictures of Emerson and Thoreau, a sketch of the Alcotts, and a *scherzo* supposed to reflect a lighter quality which is often found in the fantastic side of Hawthorne. The first and last movements do not aim to give any programs of the life or of any particular work of either Emerson or Thoreau, but, rather, composite pictures or impressions. They are, however, so general in outline that, from some viewpoints, they may be as far from accepted impressions (from true conceptions, for that matter) as the valuation which they purport to be of the influence of the life, thought, and character of Emerson and Thoreau is inadequate.[31]

There are several striking elements in this passage. One is the emphasis on visual terminology to describe the sonata, through "impressionistic *pictures* of Emerson and Thoreau," "a *sketch* of the Alcotts," "a scherzo supposed to *reflect*" an aspect of Hawthorne. The aim, we are told, is to give "composite *pictures* or *impressions*" of these figures, "so general in *outline* that, from some *viewpoints*" they may not resemble a viewer's—i.e., listener's—idea of them at all. The visual emphasis recalls our earlier experience with Emerson, his emphasis on the importance of visual observation in understanding the universe, and his spiritually resonant image of the transparent eyeball.

The passage also demonstrates Ives's indirectness of verbal expression, which reappears in the score of the Concord Sonata in his instructions to the performer. Poirier wrote that Emerson's "essays find occasion to say anything that comes to mind so long as he can then find some way to unsay it."[32] In the passage just quoted from Ives's preface, two phrases are set in parentheses, visually suggesting a similar

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[31] Ives, *Essays*, xxv.
[32] Poirier, *Poetry & Pragmatism*, 73.

tentativeness, a reluctance to declaim in a straightforward manner. The insistence that he is offering mere impressions rather than attempting any more concrete "programs of the life or of any particular work" of his subjects further underlines Ives's tendency toward indirectness, his wish to keep the meaning of any particular musical gesture vague.

Finally, and not least, Ives has chosen to introduce the idea of vagueness using a term that has specific aesthetic connotations, for both visual art and music. We recall Jacques Barzun's assessment of William James the amateur painter as a "good Impressionist" with a fondness for fringes and vagueness. Ives himself had much to say about the music of the Impressionist composer Claude Debussy (1862-1918), a copy of the score of whose *The Children's Corner* sits in a drawer behind the piano in the music room at Ives's country house in West Redding. In the "Epilogue" to the *Essays* he acknowledges Debussy's feeling for nature as far as it goes, although he does wish that it "had been more the quality of Thoreau's. Debussy's attitude toward Nature seems to have a kind of sensual sensuousness underlying it, while Thoreau's is a kind of spiritual sensuousness."[33] Both Geoffrey Block and David Michael Hertz have identified possible borrowings from Debussy in the Concord Sonata.[34] Whether such instances should be read as homages or as irreverent jests shall remain an open question here. The answer may well be a vague "both."

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[33] Ibid., 82.

[34] Block, *Ives: Concord Sonata*, 55, and David Michael Hertz, "Ives's Concord Sonata and the Texture of Music," in *Charles Ives and His World*, ed. J. Peter Burkholder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 103-107.

Ives first uses the word "vague" in his *Essays* on the third page of the "Prologue." He is interrogating the notion of program music in the "Prologue," and suggests that a piece of music written

> by the sight of a mountain lake under moonlight…may have been influenced strongly, though subconsciously, by a vague remembrance of certain thoughts and feelings, perhaps of a deep religious or spiritual nature, which suddenly came to him upon realizing the beauty of the scene, and which overpowered the first sensuous pleasure—perhaps some such feeling as of the conviction of immortality that Thoreau experienced, and tells about in *Walden*.[35]

This passage incorporates several of James's familiar themes: the importance of feeling and association in determining how we think about things, a keen awareness of the power of nature that has a religious or spiritual quality, the notion of immortality, and the loose membrane of memory that holds the entire multivalent vision together.

Ives uses the word "vague" three times in as many sentences on the following page in a meditation on the source of artistic inspiration:

> Can an inspiration come from a blank mind? Well, [the composer] tries to explain and says that he was conscious of some emotional excitement and of a sense of something beautiful—he doesn't know exactly what—a vague feeling of exaltation, or perhaps of profound sadness. What is the source of these instinctive feelings, these vague intuitions and introspective sensations? The more we try to analyze, the more vague they become. To pull them apart and classify them as subjective or objective, or as this or that, means that they may be well classified and that is about all; it leaves us as far from the origin as ever.[36]

The question of origins has deeper, cosmological resonances for our thesis, in which the separation of the origins of the contemplative consciousness and the contemplated cosmos, as well as any really objective empirical analysis of either, or both, seems to be simply impossible:

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[35] Ives, *Essays*, 5.
[36] Ibid., 6. Could this be read as a caveat to the Burkholder school of musical analysis?

> Was there present, in the above instance, some kind of subconscious, instantaneous, composite image of all the mountain lakes this man had ever seen, blended as kind of overtones with the various traits of nobility of many of his friends embodied in one personality? Do all inspirational images, states, conditions, or whatever they may be truly called, have for a dominant part, if not for a source, some actual experience in life or of the social relation?[37]

Ives goes on to suggest that

> these so-called images…often arouse something that has not yet passed the border line between subconsciousness and consciousness—an artistic intuition (well named, but—object and cause unknown!) Here is a program!—conscious or subconscious, what does it matter? Why try to trace any *stream* that flows through the garden *of consciousness* to its source only to be confronted by another problem of tracing this source to its source?[38]

Why not just be a transparent eyeball, a droplet in the flow of nature, a consciousness in the flow of the Over-Soul, free of any ego craving for an answer to the question of origins?

The reader may have noticed the frequency with which Ives's prose is written in the form of questions. This is especially the case in the Prologue, which begins by quite literally interrogating the notion of program music by offering an extended litany of questions:

> How far is anyone justified, be he an authority or a layman, in expressing or trying to express in terms of music (in sounds, if you like) the value of anything, material, moral, intellectual, or spiritual, which is usually expressed in terms other than music? How far afield can music go and keep honest as well as reasonable or artistic? Is it a matter limited only by the composer's power of expressing what lies in his subjective or objective consciousness? Or is it limited by any limitations of the composer? Can a tune literally represent a stone wall with vines on it or even with nothing on it, though it (the tune) be made by a genius whose power of objective contemplation is in the highest state of development? Can it be done by anything short of an act of mesmerism on the part of the composer or an act of kindness on the part of the listener? Does the extreme materializing of music appeal strongly to anyone except to those without a sense of humor—or, rather, with a sense of humor?—or, except, possibly, to those who might excuse it, as Herbert Spencer might, by the theory that the sensational

[37] Ibid, 6-7.
[38] Ibid., 7, emphasis added.

> element (the sensations we hear so much about in experimental psychology) is the true pleasurable phenomenon in music and that the mind should not be allowed to interfere? Does the success of program music depend more upon the program than upon the music? If it does, what is the use of the music? If it does not, what is the use of the program?[39]

This opening lays out many concerns, the primary one being the relation of the verbal program to the musical work. But in only asking questions and not answering them, Ives's opinions on the matter of program music remain unclear. If Emerson sought to "unsettle all things," Ives seems to be attempting the same effect by avoiding declamatory sentences altogether. In fact, Ives's opening to the *Essays* emerges as the perfect complement to the music. We have already seen, on the first page of the "Emerson" score, that Ives begins the sonata with a highly fragmented musical surface, effectively raising musical questions that, through the process of cumulative form, will be answered only much later on, as Ives's musical intentions gradually come into focus. Ives's musical multiverse, as we shall see later in this chapter, begins in chaos and moves gradually toward a provisional sense of truth (only to move away from it once again).

Ives writes most directly about the vague in his essay on "Emerson":

> Emerson is more interested in what he perceives than in his expression of it.…To think hard and deeply and to say what is thought regardless of consequences may produce a first impression either of great translucence or of great muddiness—but in the latter there may be hidden possibilities. Some accuse Brahms' orchestration of being muddy. This may be a good name for a first impression of it. But if it should seem less so, he might not be saying what he thought. The mud may be a form of sincerity which demands that the heart be translated rather than handed around through the pit. A clearer scoring might have lowered the thought. Carlyle told Emerson that some of his paragraphs didn't cohere. Emerson wrote by sentences or phrases rather than by logical sequence. His underlying plan of work seems based on the large unity of a series of particular aspects of a subject rather than on the continuity of its expression. As thoughts surge to his mind, he fills the heavens with them, crowds them in, if necessary, but seldom arranges them

[39] Ives, *Essays,* 3-4.

> along the ground first.…His habit, often, in lecturing was to compile his ideas as they came to him on a general subject in scattered notes, and, when on the platform, to trust to the mood of the occasion to assemble them. This seems a specious explanation, though true to fact. Vagueness is at times an indication of nearness to a perfect truth.[40]

The idea that "great muddiness" may contain "hidden possibilities" resonates with Poirier's idea of a language that "ceases to be an instrument of clarification or of clarity and, instead, becomes the instrument of a saving uncertainty and vagueness." It further recalls James's notion of the "undistinguishable, swarming *continuum*" of the multiverse of experience from which the mind selects and selects again, drawing upon the infinite range of possible relations lying in the fringe, now dormant, and now, suddenly, activated. A "clearer scoring" of a Brahms orchestration "might have lowered the thought" by limiting the potentialities for interpretation that Brahms gives his interpreters. And in Ives's music, as the Cowells observed, his

> aim is not to make the form simple and clear, but rather to create an underlying unity out of a large number of diverse elements, used asymmetrically; he thus relates his music by analogy to the individual's experience of life. The sense of unity is not brought about through exact repetition, either of motifs or of sections, but is established through relationships. And Ives prefers that these relationships should not be too obvious. There must always be something for the mind and feeling to work on, some new aspect of relationship to be found. If everything is self-evident, that spiritual inactivity that Ives so abhors might be induced.[41]

Throughout the score of the Concord Sonata (not to mention many of Ives's other works), multiple layers of music demand that performers consciously select specific aspects of the music that they will bring out in performance. This selection, like Emerson's lecture notes, might change depending upon "the mood of the occasion." James told us that this is what we are *always* doing as we move through our lives, our feelings—"according as we are sleepy or awake, hungry or full, fresh or

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[40] Ives, *Essays,* 21-22.
[41] Cowell and Cowell, 173-4.

tired"—always influencing our thoughts and actions. Or, as Ives articulated his feelings in his *Memos* on the matter of playing the Concord Sonata:

Play	it	before	breakfast	like	—!
"	"	after	"	"	—!
"	"	"	digging potatoes	"	—![42]

In this light, the Concord Sonata would ideally become part of the stream of the performer's life experience.

Ives facilitates the unimpeded flow of his musical stream of thought throughout the score of the Concord Sonata. This is apparent in his exceedingly spare use of barlines, which gives much of the score the appearance of a run-on musical sentence. Similarly, time signatures are indicated only rarely. As a result, any determination of metric organization is almost entirely left up to the performer, and the results could vary depending upon one's point of view at any given moment. The Cowells suggest that the music without barlines communicates "a prose concept of rhythm; it is also related to the idea that different stresses may be given by different performers, all of them right."[43] As we shall see in Chapter 5, John Kirkpatrick added barlines and time signatures to the sonata as mnemonic devices to help him navigate the temporal wilderness of the sonata, but the location of his barlines changed over the years.

Ives's free-ranging harmonic excursions are given unimpeded play through the absence of key signatures through most of the Concord Sonata, with Ives preferring to write in accidentals on a case-by-case basis. This encourages the performer to think openly and flexibly about the harmonic environment of the work

[42] Ives, *Memos,* 191.
[43] Cowell and Cowell, 172.

from moment to moment. Key signatures appear only in portions of "The Alcotts," for reasons I will suggest presently. The middle section of the movement is written in E-flat major, and much of the first page is scored bitonally with the right hand written in B-flat and the left hand in A-flat major.

Ives engaged in a somewhat idiosyncratic use of accidentals that had more to do with emotional expression than with harmonic environment. He wrote that in the Concord Sonata:

> A B-sharp and a C-natural are not then the same—a B-sharp may help the ear-mind get higher up the mountain than a C-natural always. It has another use, perhaps a more important [use] than a nice little guide in a resolution—it makes a chord, in some cases, more a help and incentive for the ear and mind to say (nearer to) what it feels.[44]

We shall return to the subject of Ives's spelling of accidentals in our discussion of the Kirkpatrick "copy" of the sonata in Chapter 5.

The sense of flow of the Concord Sonata is accentuated by the way the movements of the sonata end. Only "Hawthorne" ends loudly, with a surprise burst of sound that follows a scrap of a hymn tune, marked triple *piano*, which anticipates the opening of "The Alcotts." "Emerson" and "The Alcotts" end anticlimactically, with whispered non-endings.[45] Once one movement fades out, the next begins, again emerging quietly from the silence. Similarly, "Thoreau" brings the entire sonata to a quiet and inconclusive conclusion, with a C-sharp added over a held D, a leading tone articulated after its own resolution, suspended at the edge of…what, exactly? Night on Walden Pond? The death of Ives's father? A metaphysical abyss? The Cowells offered the following description of this moment:

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[44] Ives, *Memos*, 189.

[45] Although "Emerson" ends with a crescendo on the final iteration of the Beethoven theme in the first edition.

> Never has the leading tone been fraught with so many implications. It will obviously resolve to the upper tonic eventually, and it now leads toward this point with yearning and intensity. But one is inescapably led to the realization that this suggestion of simultaneous tonic and dominant chords has only opened a new cycle of duality on a new plane of musico-philosophical existence. As the Sonata concludes, one senses that the ending is not final and that the music will continue to sound in the imagination and to grow.[46]

In this way, much of the Concord Sonata reveals itself, as Jonathan Levin said about William James, to be "all shades and no boundaries, everywhere in transition."

Ives blurs the musical objects in his stream with a Jamesian fringe, increasing the possibility of the activation of their relations by keeping their meanings vague and, thereby, in motion. The elements that contribute to this musical fringe include polyphonic textures, registral displacement of melodies, the inclusion of wrong notes in tunes that otherwise seem somehow familiar, the coloring of melodies with dissonant accompaniments, and the addition of overtones—written as tiny noteheads in the score—to decorate melodies with hauntingly resonant, shimmering pings. The irresolute feelings that the application of these techniques causes in the listener generates a Jamesian sense of a more, of an and, always present in Ives's music, thus contributing to the sense of flow. As that final C-sharp over D in "Thoreau" shows, activity continues to want to unfold in the cosmology of the Concord Sonata.

This point of view is an expression of Ives's understanding of the natural world, an understanding much like that of William James. The Cowells observed that "Ives concerns himself first of all with the forms of nature and their mysterious and complex behavior, rather than with any mathematically symmetrical and balanced repetition and permutation."[47] Ives himself wrote that "The continuity of this music

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[46] Cowell and Cowell, 201.
[47] Cowell and Cowell, 142.

is more a process of natural tonal diversification and distribution than of natural tonal repetition and resolution."[48] Ives's view of the universe is of continuously unfolding and increasing variety, of increasing complexity and pluralism, and this view plays out in his music.

THE STREAM OF IVES'S THOUGHT: FLIGHTS AND PERCHINGS

Like the rhythm of the flow of James's stream of thought, the moment-to-moment activity of the Concord Sonata can be very difficult to predict.[49] The work demonstrates kaleidoscopic periods of relatively smooth transition followed by instances of abrupt change, reminiscent of what William James called "perchings" and "flights." Relatively smooth transitions between episodes of musical material characterize the first few pages of "Emerson." In spite of the dense collage of musical fragments that fills the first page, unfolding in a multilayered texture, the surging activity of that page expresses a certain inevitability or logic. The decrescendo at the bottom of the page finally brings on a briefly quieter transitional passage, but the volume gradually increases at the top of page 2, as do the tempo and density of texture. Waves of activity and changes in dynamics, gradually ebbing and flowing, continue to characterize the second page as well as the first four systems of page 3. The musical surface remains complex and active—each system expanding

[48] Ives, *Memos,* 195.
[49] The reader will benefit from ready reference to the score of the 1947 edition of the sonata in the discussion that follows, as the inclusion of reproductions of every instance discussed would be impractical.

occasionally to three staves beginning on page 2 in order to accommodate all the layering—but there is a sense of continuous flow between events.

This situation changes for the first time in the fourth system of page 3 where a fast, loud repetition of the Beethoven theme, three times, louder each time, is suddenly cut off by a brief interpolation, "a little faster and broadly." Ives adds barlines here at regular intervals for the first time, and the interpolation is two bars long. It contains quieter material, marked *mp*, which has the easy swing of an old ragtime tune, but with a distinctly dissonant Ivesian harmony. This interpolation is suddenly cut off by four bars of loud, accented material, which again is abruptly replaced by a return to the lilting, if dissonant, ragtime tune, which continues into the top of page 4. This kind of abrupt juxtaposition of contrasting musical episodes is typical of much of the rest of the "Emerson" movement and occurs frequently in the remaining movements of the sonata as well.

Like James's stream of thought, the sonata is largely transitional, largely in flight, with relatively few and brief distinct, self-contained episodes ("substantives" or "perchings"). We may observe such oases within the relentless flow of the sonata as they occur within each movement. The first few pages of "Emerson," with their ebbing and flowing movement, as well as the sudden juxtapositions on page 3, are all flight. The first perching in the movement is probably at the top of page 5, but this simple theme quickly gains in momentum and complexity by the middle of the page. Perhaps the only substantial perching in "Emerson" is what the Cowells called the "Emerson" lyric theme on page 8 (marked "verse," as in the 1919/20 edition), but even that refuses to remain static, undergoing a series of variations through page 11.

Other perchings in "Emerson" include the section marked "prose" (also retained from the 1919/20 edition) on page 12, which is abruptly cut off at the bottom of the page; and the reiterations on pages 14 and 16 of the first perching material from page 5, each of which quickly grows in complexity like its counterpart on page 5.

Candidates for perchings in "Hawthorne" include the sequence on page 25 with the impressionistic pentatonic tone clusters, notoriously played by a 14 ¾-inch board; the ghostly hymn tunes emerging from dense cacophony—Burkholder calls it "a loud blur"—on pages 33 and 34, and the band tune on pages 35 and 36.[50] The rag that begins at the bottom of page 37, while in some sense a distinct episode, is constantly striving toward the chaos that erupts at the end of the second system on page 41, causing a complete musical breakdown. Similarly, the fantasy on "Columbia, the Gem of the Ocean" that emerges from the haze at the bottom of page 42, while in some sense readable as a discrete episode, is all transition, building toward the climax containing embedded fragments of the "human faith melody" in the left hand on pages 49-51.

The hymnlike opening of "The Alcotts" is perhaps the most solid perching in the sonata up to that point, with its diatonic harmony and homorhythmic texture. It gradually unravels toward the bottom of page 53, awakened from its stasis by the dissonant tolling of distant bells at the end of the third system. A very brief perching at the top of page 55 foreshadows the complete, bold articulation of the human faith melody that will bring the movement to a close. Before the arrival of that moment, however, the quiet "B"-section of the movement (marked with an E-flat key signature, a 4/4 time signature, and bar lines) beginning at the end of the third system of page 55

[50] Burkholder, *All Made of Tunes*, 355.

provides the longest perching we have yet experienced in the sonata, an oasis of calm that does not unravel until the fourth system of page 56. The triumphant statement of the human faith melody in the fourth and fifth systems of page 57 is perhaps the great perching of the entire sonata. It is no mistake that this briefest of movements in the sonata consists of a disproportionate number of perchings, a point to which I shall return presently.

"Thoreau" seems constantly to be emerging from and passing into transitory mists. The brief ritornello (and its echo) after the double bar at the end of the second system of page 60 offers the merest of perchings, repeating at the bottom of that page and again at the beginning of the third system of page 61. The "Massa's in da Cold Ground" theme, accompanied by a steady ostinato in the left hand, first heard in the first system of page 62, provides another aural anchor, repeating in the third system of page 65, and at the very end of the sonata beginning in the bottom system of page 67, at which point the ostinato accompanies the "human faith melody," played by the flute, or by the pianist as if imitating a flute.

This Jamesian idea of flights and perchings also provides a way to understand the lopsided construction of the sonata as a multi-movement work, if we trace the behavior of the "human faith melody" over the course of the entire sonata. We have already seen that in "Emerson" and "Hawthorne" the theme is heard only in fragments, and usually buried within other material, and that it is never heard clearly until "The Alcotts," a good thirty minutes into the sonata. In fact, the theme continues to struggle to be heard through the first few minutes of "The Alcotts," only bursting forth, boldly and distinctly, in the last two systems of the movement. "The

Alcotts" is only about five minutes long, and as quickly as the theme is heard, it vanishes into a cadence marked *pianissimo*. The theme comes back, played by the solo flute, ten minutes later, at the end of "Thoreau" (and of the entire sonata). The B-flat major tune floats above an A-centric accompaniment, the dissonance of the ostinato setting off overtones that envelop the tune in a haunting, nostalgic haze that evokes a memory of the bold articulation of the theme from "The Alcotts."

"Emerson" and "Hawthorne," the movements containing the fragmented "human faith melody," can be understood as the transitive flight of this larger-scale stream of thought, and "The Alcotts," in which the theme is clearly heard, can be understood as a substantive perching. "The Alcotts" is brief precisely *because* it is a perching. In James's pluralistic universe, a multiverse full of potentialities but without absolutes, a *moment* of "truth" is all we get, because the flow never stops moving; everything, as Emerson reminds us, is constantly changing. Using language that certainly makes Ives sound like a Jamesian pragmatist, the Cowells observed that:

> Ives's interest is in this *process toward* integration; with Emerson he abhors the spiritual inactivity that comes from the conviction that one possesses the truth in its final form. He envisages a series of integrations of dualities, each of which as it is achieved is seen as a sort of partial or temporary truth, a truth which then becomes only one aspect of another set of opposites which sooner or later must be resolved in its turn. This struggle toward truth and integration is the nearest man can come toward absolute truth, in Ives's view; but he feels the very effort required imparts a certain unity and coherence of its own.[51]

In this light, "The Alcotts" could be no longer than it is, it could not end *fortissimo*, and the Concord Sonata could never end with a thundering finale. Even before the theme has been completely articulated, it begins fading away, and yet another movement follows in which an echo of the theme is embedded—not a restatement,

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[51] Cowell and Cowell, 142-3; emphasis in original.

but an echo, presented by a completely different instrument, in a different key, with different accompaniment. Ives wrote:

> A natural procedure in a piece of music, be it a song or a week's symphony, may have something in common [with]—I won't say analogous to—a walk up a mountain. There's the mountain, its foot, its summit—there's the valley—the climber looks, turns, and looks down or up. He sees the valley, but not exactly the same angle he saw it at [in] the last look—and the summit is changing with every step—and the sky. Even if he stands on the same rock at the top and looks toward Heaven and Earth, he is not in just the same key he started in, or in the same moment of existence.[52]

In "Thoreau," the "human faith melody" is the same, only different—like the universe, like the natural world, like human consciousness, it could never be exactly the same. By the time we get to the end of "The Alcotts," everything has changed, and by the end of "Thoreau," everything has changed again.

A subtler clue to Ives's understanding of the constant change of the flow of life can be found in the gestures that begin and end "Thoreau," as shown in Examples 4.8a and b. In the "Thoreau" essay Ives tells us that the movement describes Thoreau's "thought on an autumn day of Indian summer at Walden."[53] This idea anticipates a cyclic musical structure that would describe a trajectory from dawn to a dusk in which Thoreau might have caught "a glimpse of the 'shadow-thought' he saw in the morning's mist and haze."[54] While the opening and closing gestures of the movement closely resemble each other, perhaps like two snapshots, one of a dawn and another one of a dusk, they are not exactly the same. The right hand's D-C sharp-E flat-C natural in the opening gesture becomes D sharp-D natural-E-C sharp in the last system of the sonata. Ives wrote:

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[52] Ives, *Memos*, 196. Bracketed words are Kirkpatrick's.
[53] Ives, *Essays*, 67.
[54] Ibid., 69.



Example 4.8a: Opening gesture of "Thoreau"



Example 4.8b: Closing gesture of "Thoreau"

> That a symphony, sonata or jig—that all nice music should end where it started, on the Doh key, is no more a natural law than that all men should die in the same town and street number in which they were born.[55]

Ives's dusk in "Thoreau" brings on a Jamesian *and*, a *more*, another day: the circle is really a spiral, propelling the forces of nature to continue to generate new life.

[55] Ives, *Memos,* 196.

IVES'S MULTIVERSE

The Concord Sonata expresses a Jamesian "pluralistic monism," as a single work whose identity is best understood as a multiverse that encompasses two printed editions, various sketches and revisions, and a collection of prose works. It functions as a pluralistic monism in its internal operations as well as in its external relations to other works. We have already considered a number of the internal elements, as they contribute to vague references to musical quotations, and to the highly transitive quality of the behavior of the sonata, the large- and small-scale flights and perchings that describe the flow of its musical stream. The Cowells wrote that:

> For most people the really baffling aspect of Ives's music is the multiplicity of simultaneous events and ideas in it.…Yet no matter how involved the use of musical materials may be, it is always possible to discover unifying factors, unfamiliar and unexpected as applied to music though these often are.[56]

By casting these characteristics of the sonata in light of Jamesian philosophy, we have already been able to glimpse ways in which the sonata can be read as a description of Ives's understanding of the universe, his cosmology.

We have also already remarked on the wide range of source materials from which Ives drew, including European and American, cultivated and vernacular genres, but one highly localized example will suggest Ives's ability to *fuse* such disparate elements into seamlessly transitory musical flights. Geoffrey Block argues that one phrase in the "B"-section of "The Alcotts," in the bottom system of page 55 and extending to the third system of 56, as shown in Example 4.9, elides materials from three very different kinds of sources into a single musical gesture.

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[56] Cowell and Cowell, 141.



Example 4.9: Elision of disparate quotations in "The Alcotts" (Block)

Block asserts that the phrase elides a fragment of the Scotch song "Loch Lomond" with one from the wedding march of Wagner's *Lohengrin* and yet another from the minstrel tune "Stop That Knockin' at My Door."[57] This reading fuses together three aspects of Ives's pluralistic musical multiverse—nineteenth-century parlor music (especially those tunes expressing nostalgia for Scotland), European art music, and American popular music (specifically of the "Ethiopian" variety)—in microcosm. This assortment reflects and extends Ives's prose program for "The Alcotts" (Beth Alcott playing "the old Scotch airs" at "the little old spinet piano Sophia Thoreau gave to the Alcott children"), suggesting the popularity not only of Scotch songs but also of opera transcriptions and minstrel tunes playable by amateurs at home in the mid-nineteenth century. Block suggests that through the seamless transitions of this

[57] Geoffrey Block, *Ives: Concord Sonata*, 50-52. The genealogy of hearings of this phrase is also traced by J. Peter Burkholder in *All Made of Tunes*, 199, with special attention to all footnotes contained therein.

phrase, the listener is teased with the possibility of musical meanings, the true intentions of which Ives nowhere clarifies. Block's analysis forces us to stop and consider the possibilities of what may be going on in this passage in terms of musical borrowing, once again suggesting Ives's celebration of the vague.

We have also seen, but not remarked specifically upon the idea, that Ives's cosmology requires articulation in two languages: English prose and music. Wolfgang Rathert writes that Ives's essays were "meant to clarify the compositional intentions at the unambiguous level of language."[58] That may or may not be what the essays accomplish, and there seems to be little that is certifiably "unambiguous" about written language, Ives's or anyone else's. Rathert is more accurate when he writes that

> Ives's annotations [he means in the score, but I would expand that to include the essays—in short, the entire verbal prose aspect of the work] become an integral part of the core of the work, as if trying to specify what the musical notes themselves can express only inadequately. That they do not in reality diminish but rather heighten ambiguity further exemplifies the intentional instability of Ives's concept of "the work."[59]

In other words, the vaguenesses contained in the music of the sonata, as set down in musical notation, vibrate against those of the verbal annotations in the score (and, I would add, the essays), as set down in English prose. Any complete sense of understanding the Concord Sonata, then, would seem to happen *between* the musical notations and the verbal texts, in a process of mediation between the two modes of expression. This relationship keeps the work active, in play.

The chronology of the genesis of the Concord Sonata, as with most of Ives's compositions, is notoriously difficult to trace. Beyond his actual changing of dates on

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[58] Wolfgang Rathert, "The Idea of Potentiality in the Music of Charles Ives," in *Ives Studies*, ed. Philip Lambert (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 108.
[59] Ibid., 118.

manuscripts, the intentions behind which have been the subject of heated scholarly debate, the difficulty stems largely from Ives's penchant for revision and the ways in which his compositions seem to grow out of one another.[60] In 1935 Ives recalled having "got the idea of a Concord sonata" in September 1911, and having completed "Emerson" in 1912, "Hawthorne" in October of 1911, and "The Alcotts" and "Thoreau" in 1915.[61] James Sinclair gives the dates for the sonata as "assembled/recomposed c1915 from music composed 1904-15; revised in 1920s-40s for 2nd ed[itio]n."[62] Sinclair traces the derivation of each movement from at least one earlier large work involving an orchestra. "Emerson" is related to an unfinished Emerson Overture for Piano and Orchestra (c. 1910-14), as well as portions of the Studies for Piano Nos. 1 (c. 1910-11), 2 (c. 1910-11), 9 (c. 1912-13), 11 (c. 1915-16), and 23 (c. 1920-22); "Hawthorne" to a lost Hawthorne Concerto for Piano and Orchestra and "at least two lost pieces" for piano, "The Slaves' Shuffle" and "Demons' Dance Around the Pipe"; "The Alcotts" to a lost orchestral Alcott Overture (1904?); and "Thoreau" from a lost work entitled "Walden Sounds" (1910?).[63]

The incarnation of each movement as part of the Concord Sonata can also be viewed as a perching after which the material reappears in later works. "Emerson" became the source material for the *Four Transcriptions from "Emerson"* for piano solo (c. 1923-4, 1926-7); "Hawthorne" became source material for the second

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[60] Concern over the implications of Ives's changed dates can be traced from Maynard Solomon's infamous article, "Charles Ives: Some Questions of Veracity," in *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 40/3 (1987), 443-70, and the ripples of response it generated among Ives scholars, including H. Wiley Hitchcock, Philip Lambert, Stuart Feder, Gayle Sherwood Magee, and Carol Baron, in a bibliography too lengthy to reproduce here.

[61] James B. Sinclair, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Music of Charles Ives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 193, from draft for a letter from Harmony Ives to John Kirkpatrick, 11 October 1935. The dates match the time frame Ives gives in *Memos*, 79.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid., 195. Ives mentions the lost piano pieces in his discussion of the Concord Sonata in *Memos*, 81.

movement of the Symphony No. 4 (c. 1912-18, 1921-5); "The Alcotts" and "Thoreau" were each arranged in lost organ transcriptions; and material from "Thoreau" appeared in a song with the same title (c. 1920). Perhaps, given the chronological ambiguities of these works, they are most fruitfully regarded as nodes on a web of musical influence, reaching out to one another in dynamic patterns of reference, rather than through a unidirectional temporal trajectory.

The Concord Sonata was first printed by G. Schirmer in 1921 at Ives's own expense, and while his original intention was to print the *Essays* and the score together, the length of the essays made this impractical and the score was published only with excerpts from the essays. A second edition was published in 1947. Overall this second edition is more dissonant than the first, and exhibits a thicker and less contrapuntal texture. Snapshots of the stream of Ives's thought about the sonata between the two printed editions can be glimpsed in the seventeen revisions of the sonata Ives made between 1921 and 1947, as well as ten sets of proof sheets for the second edition dating from the 1940s, 150 "patches," and various sketches and ink manuscripts.[64] Ives's penchant for revision is legendary, recalling a similar tendency in Emerson and Thoreau. Revision—and recycling material from the sonata into other works—bcame a way for Ives to keep the Concord Sonata in motion, and to avoid getting crushed in the flow. In light of these revisions, Ives can be viewed as constantly troping the Concord Sonata itself.

The revisions are pencil-marked copies of the printed first edition, many in their original textured burgundy red bindings (although most have been quite thoroughly torn apart). Each revision contains widely varying degrees of changes.

[64] Ives Papers, Box 13C/3A2.

Revisions 4, 6, 7, and 16, for example, contain changes to all four movements, while Revisions 10, 11, 12 and 17 contain changes only to "Thoreau." Revisions 14 and 15 contain heavy changes to "Emerson," "Hawthorne," and "Thoreau," but Revision 15 contains only minor changes to "The Alcotts," while Revision 14 omits "The Alcotts" altogether. Revisions 4 and 6 feature considerable verbal commentary. On page 22 of Revision 6, Ives suggests that an "assistant player" could be brought in to help with "Hawthorne," "in the dark—ad lib or off the sheet." The idea is reinforced visually by a cartoon caricature on page 48 of two players, one smiling, one with tears running down his cheeks, and the note that "ass't may help (ad lib to both) from here to end." Sondra Rae Clark writes that "a comparison of the sources indicates an evolution toward an increasing diversity of inspiration rather than an ultimate resolution," once again suggesting an ever-expanding web of associations among the variants of the work.[65]

The Concord Sonata may also be viewed as a substantial perching in a group of works that project a similarly cosmological agenda, including the Symphony No. 4 and the unfinished Universe Symphony. Ives biographer Jan Swafford suggests the possibility of taking these works together as expressing "the musical embodiment of Transcendental thought," but I would suggest that they even more accurately express elements of Poirier's broader understanding of Emersonian pragmatism. Swafford cites Ives, writing in the *Essays*, "The inactivity of permanence is what Emerson will

[65] Sondra Rae Clark, "The Evolving Concord Sonata: A Study of Choices and Variants in the Music of Charles Ives" (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1972), 344.

not permit. He will not accept repose against the activity of truth."[66] Seen in this light, the Concord Sonata can be understood as a node from which a gradual opening outward of its ideas, musical and philosophical, is set in motion.

Swafford describes Ives's Fourth Symphony as "one of the last examples of what late-Romantic composers conceived a *symphony* to be: loose in form but still in the standard four movements, with something resembling their familiar tempos and tones, and with the intention of evoking the highest mysteries of life in a unique and transforming way."[67] Swafford's notion of the Romantic symphony encompasses characteristics describing both the structure of the music and the ideas behind it. He notes that Ives's Fourth Symphony is cyclic, with themes recurring among various movements, and describes as "encyclopedic" its breadth of musical quotation, both within and outside of Ives's oeuvre. Swafford writes:

> The Fourth Symphony is [Ives's] attempt to say all he knew how to say, to fit in as much life, secular and spiritual, high and low, as he conceivably could.…Human experience contains Bach and New York and everything in between, and so should his symphony…As Mahler proclaimed at the end of the Romantic era, and Ives here approached closer than anyone else: *a symphony should be a world*.[68]

This symphony, this world, then, is itself a pluralistic multiverse. It can perhaps be viewed as a symphonic expansion of the Concord Sonata, which also follows the general four-movement sonata cycle outline, demonstrates considerable internal thematic cohesion, exhibits extensive use of musical quotation from both within and outside of Ives's oeuvre (including the re-use of material from "Hawthorne" in the second movement), and seems to fit in a great deal of what Ives had to say about the universe and his place in it. Ives was working on both the Concord Sonata and the

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[66] Jan Swafford, *Charles Ives: A Life with Music* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 294; *Essays*, 16.
[67] Swafford, 352; emphasis in original.
[68] Ibid., 360-1; emphasis in original.

Fourth Symphony at the same time, so perhaps it should not be surprising that the two works share structural, musical, and philosophical elements, which are simply writ large in the symphony.

In his program notes to a 1927 performance of the first two movements of the Fourth Symphony, Henry Bellamann described the first movement, or Prelude, of the work as posing "the searching questions of What? and Why? which the spirit of man asks of life."[69] A questioning stance is literally articulated by the chorus in the Prelude, which sings the hymn tune *Watchman*:

> Watchman, tell us of the night,
> What the signs of promise are:
> Traveller, o'er yon mountain's height,
> See that Glory-beaming star!
>
> Watchman, aught of joy or hope?
> Traveller, yes, it brings the day,
> Promised day of Israel.
> Dost thou see its beauteous ray?

The subsequent three movements, Bellamann suggests, provide "the diverse answers in which existence replies" to these questions.[70]

The first answer, which Jan Swafford describes as "a Puritan critique of urban life and materialism mixed with affection and nostalgia," uses musical material also found in the "Hawthorne" movement of the Concord Sonata.[71] Swafford describes the "basic gesture" of the symphonic movement as "a quiet Pilgrims' hymn (or a salon interlude) flattened by a roaring march."[72] The basic trajectory of the middle

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[69] Quoted in Swafford, 350.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid, 355. Thomas Brodhead explicates the musical relationship between "Hawthorne," the second movement of the Fourth Symphony, and the unpublished piano work "The Celestial Railroad," and their possible programmatic relationship to Nathaniel Hawthorne's short story "The Celestial Railroad," which is a satire on Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress*, in "Ives's Celestial Railroad and His Fourth Symphony," *American Music* 12 (1994), 389-424.
[72] Swafford 356.

section of "Hawthorne" could be described in similar terms. This section, on pages 33 and 34, in which deafening cacophonies suddenly fade to reveal *pianissimo* hymn tunes, which in turn are cut off by subsequent violent outbursts of sound, suggests the kind of layering of sound that characterizes the second movement of the Fourth Symphony. Swafford suggests that in this movement "Ives intended to leave out as little as possible of the reply [to the questions posed in the Prelude] of modern urban life: all the ears could hold, and more, of the great throbbing, marching, dancing, hymning, ragtiming, holidaying, incorrigibly secular city he knew from his bachelor days in New York."[73] A similar expanse of musical territory is covered in "Hawthorne," with its marching band tune (complete with characteristically Ivesian piano-drum chords), extended rag, Impressionistic tone clusters, and an extended fantasy on "Columbia, the Gem of the Ocean" that occupies the final third of the movement.

The second answer, a slow fugue, offers what Swafford describes as "the response of conventional religion."[74] This movement, which uses the tunes of *Missionary Hymn* ("From Greenland's Icy Mountains") and *Coronation*, is essentially an orchestration of the first movement of Ives's String Quartet No. 1, a student work Ives composed for Horatio Parker. It stands in marked contrast to the chaotic second movement of the Fourth Symphony, emphasizing contrapuntal order and, compared to the earlier movement, consonant harmonies. In this way, it bears a certain musical and functional resemblance to "The Alcotts" in the Concord Sonata: solemn and hymnlike, ending on a quietly articulated full cadence, and, despite its seemingly

[73] Ibid., 357.
[74] Ibid., 360.

resolute conclusion, not marking the end of the larger work as a whole. Like "The Alcotts" in the Concord Sonata, this formal religious ritual is but a perching in the pluralistic Fourth Symphony.

"The last movement," Ives wrote, "is an apotheosis of the preceding content, in terms that have something to do with the reality of existence and its religious experience."[75] As the orchestra emerges from out of the distant percussive pulse of the "Battery Unit," the movement gradually builds toward the entrance of the chorus, which wordlessly intones the melody of *Bethany*. Here Swafford finds an answer to the question, posed in *Watchman*, of the Pilgrim's destination: "Nearer, my God, to Thee." Significantly, this is not a conclusive arrival, but an approximate one: *nearer* to God, but not quite *at* or *with* God. This idea is played out musically, as the movement fades out, leaving behind only the quiet, somewhat irregular pulse of the Battery Unit.[76] "The last sounds are soft strokes of percussion," Swafford writes, "the cosmic rhythm fading from our ears but not concluding. The music has not found its full cadence yet, but it has accomplished a long journey and brought us Pilgrims perhaps a little Nearer."[77] The ethereal finale of the Fourth Symphony, in following the more harmonically grounded third movement, recalls the sequence in the Concord Sonata of the ethereal "Thoreau" movement following the more harmonically grounded "Alcotts" in the Concord Sonata. Moreover, the cyclic quality of the depiction of a day on Walden Pond in "Thoreau," with its closing gesture resembling but not quite duplicating exactly its opening gesture, is recalled in the cyclic quality

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[75] Ives, *Memos,* 66.
[76] Swafford writes of this pulse that, "Typically for Ives, in the finale the Battery Unit maintains its own tempo but never settles down to an unvaried pattern for the duration, though some patterns are repeated for several cycles after the initial gearing up" (495, n. 31).
[77] Ibid., 364.

of the Battery Unit in the finale of the Fourth Symphony, with its irregular pulse—repetition with a difference.

A similar but more elaborate percussive pulse begins Ives's unfinished Universe Symphony (c. 1911-28). In the *Memos*, Ives also referred to the work as "'The Universe, Past, Present, and Future' in tones."[78] This work is Ives's most overt effort at a musical cosmology; as he puts it in the manuscript:

> A striving to present and to contemplate in tones rather than in music as such, that is—not exactly within the general term or meaning as it is understood—to paint the creation, the mysterious beginnings of all things, known through God to man, to trace with tonal imprints the vastness, the evolution of all life, in nature of humanity from the great roots of life to the spiritual eternities from the great inknown to the great unknown.[79]

The highly fragmented materials relating to the work suggest the following overall structure that describes a process-driven cosmos—and beyond: Prelude #1 ("the eternal pulse & planetary motion & of the earth & universe"), Past ("Formation of the waters and mountains"), Prelude #2 ("Birth of the Ocean Waters"), Present ("Earth, evolution of nature and humanity"), and Future ("Heaven, the rise of all to the spiritual").

Since the musical materials related to the Universe Symphony are incomplete, it is difficult to talk about the music of the work in much detail.[80] We can, however, compare it generally with the Fourth Symphony and the Concord Sonata by observing its four-movement structure. Like the Fourth Symphony, the Universe Symphony

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[78] *Memos*, 106.
[79] Quoted in Larry Austin, "The Realization and First Complete Performances of Ives's *Universe Symphony*," in *Ives Studies*, ed. Philip Lambert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 185.
[80] Austin describes the source materials in detail in the essay cited in note 78. Philip Lambert evaluates recent efforts by Austin, Johnny Reinhard, and David G. Porter to "collaborate" on the completion of the Universe Symphony in "Charles Ives and His Universe Symphony," in *Posthumous Collaborations: Essays About Completions of Unfinished Compositions*, ed. James L. Zychowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, in press).

begins with a prelude to which the subsequent movements have a profound relationship. This prelude contains the most developed extant musical material from the Universe Symphony, in which a "Life Pulse" of gradually accumulating layers of percussion instruments forms increasingly complicated rhythmic patterns, eventually reaching thirty-one contrapuntal lines which slowly wax and wane in immense temporal cycles.[81] This material recalls—and outdoes, for sheer complexity—the Battery Unit that begins, concludes, and quietly underlies the finale of the Fourth Symphony.[82] The "Past" section of the Universe Symphony calls for enormous and complex forces: four "Heavens" orchestras, an "Earth" orchestra, and a "Rock Formations" orchestra, as well as the "Life Pulse" percussion. The complexity suggested by such forces recalls that of the second movement of the Fourth Symphony and of "Hawthorne." The materials related to the "Present" section of the Universe Symphony are the least complete among the various sections. At least functionally, however, they suggest a type of perching similar to the third movements of the Concord Sonata and the Fourth Symphony, in which an hour on a Sunday caught between the hedonistic materialism of the city and eternal transcendence parallels in some way the idea of the Present (the most provisional of all temporal states, caught fleetingly between past and future).[83] The fourth movement of each work follows with the most ecstatic, highly spiritual musical content.

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[81] The "Life Pulse" language is Austin's.

[82] It is not entirely clear whether the Battery Unit in the Universe Symphony is intended to be played only at the beginning of the symphony as a prelude or, as in the fourth movement of the Fourth Symphony, whether it might be intended to continue throughout the symphony. Austin raises the question, 210.

[83] By contrast, Swafford reads the Fourth Symphony temporally as Prelude—Present—Past—Future, with "modern secular life" representing the present and the formal ritual of the third movement representing the past (362).

Cyclic organization guides the behavior of pitches and chords throughout the Universe Symphony.[84] We have already considered Ives's use of cyclic musical material in the Fourth Symphony and the Concord Sonata. In the *Memos*, Ives describes two instrumental groups in the Universe Symphony that "come into relation harmonically only in cycles—that is, they go around their own orbit, and come to meet each other only where their circles eclipse."[85] In a footnote, John Kirkpatrick notes that "This idea of large musical orbits relating at cyclic points suggests a parallel with classic Hindu music, of which Ives would have disclaimed any knowledge or experience."[86]

By leaving the Universe Symphony unfinished it becomes in some sense Ives's ultimate cosmological statement. In the *Memos* he suggests that "in case I don't get to finishing this, somebody might like to try to work out the idea."[87] We shall see that Ives had a somewhat similar attitude at least toward the "Emerson" movement of the Concord Sonata, which, he wrote in the *Memos*, "is, as far as I know, the only piece which, every time I play it or turn to it, seems unfinished."[88] He goes on to write of "the daily pleasure of playing ['Emerson'] and seeing it grow and feeling that it is not finished. (I may always have the pleasure of not finishing it) and the hope that it never will be."[89] Jan Swafford may have been thinking of the actual incompleteness of the Universe Symphony, the irresolute conclusion of the Fourth Symphony, and Ives's comments on "Emerson" when he wrote:

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[84] See Philip Lambert, "Ives's *Universe*," in *Ives Studies*, ed. Philip Lambert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 246-7.
[85] Ives, *Memos*, 107-8.
[86] Ibid., 108, n. 10.
[87] Ibid., 108. The same could have been said for the rhythmic cycles of the "Life Pulse" in the Prelude #1.
[88] Ibid., 79. At that moment Ives must have forgotten about the Universe Symphony.
[89] Ibid., 80.

> In his greatest music Ives created, for the first time in Western history, a masterful art of suggestion, of ambiguity, of incompleteness. He created forms open, in process, incomplete and incompletable in the world he lived in. Rather than a circle, a closed system, he built arcs that imply the possibility of completion.[90]

In these musical compositions, Ives responded to the universe in which he lived by attempting to restore the proper place of the vague to our thinking, and by recognizing over and over that any sense of arrival is always provisional—or, as Emerson said in "Circles," "Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new series."[91]

SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE LIFE OF CHARLES IVES

In his biography of Ives, Jan Swafford spends a few pages suggesting similarities between the composer's ideas and those of William James and his fellow pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce. Swafford writes that, "as far as one can tell, Ives never read" either of the American philosophers.[92] Neither, for example, is mentioned by name in the *Essays Before A Sonata,* despite the fact that an impressive roster of other thinkers, music composers, and their various works *are*, as shown here in Appendix 1. In a footnote, Swafford suggests that "Ives's similarity to contemporary philosophers may have come from some combination of Emersonian extrapolations and the spirit of the age…Zeitgeist is a powerful presence in an artist, regardless of what books that artist has read."[93] It is possible, however, that the connection between Ives and James might have been more direct than Swafford believed. How else, one might wonder, could so much Jamesian language end up in the *Essays*? How else could so many Jamesian ideas seem to be manifested in the

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[90] Swafford, 365.
[91] Emerson, 405.
[92] Swafford, 299.
[93] Ibid., 484, n. 46.

conception and inner workings of the Concord Sonata? One clue lies in Ives's academic record at Yale University, and a second lies in the books contained in Ives's summer house in West Redding, Connecticut.

Ives took two courses of interest to us at Yale: Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I in his junior year (1896-97), and Philosophy 4 in his senior year (1897-98). Typical of his academic record at Yale, Ives barely passed either class, earning a 68% in the first term of Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I, and 60% in the second term; and 66% in each term of Philosophy 4.[94]

Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I was taught by four professors: George T. Ladd, George M. Duncan, Elias H. Sneath, and Edward W. Scripture. The Yale University course catalogue for the 1896-97 school year describes Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I as follows:

> In this course systematic instruction is given in the elements of logic, general psychology, and practical ethics. Professor Ladd lectures on the structure and functions of the nervous system, the end-organs of sense, and selected topics in general psychology; and Dr. Scripture on the experimental treatment of psychology.[95]

We do not have Ives's notes from the course, but the Yale Lectures Collection has notes taken by one Henry Killam Murphy, class of 1899, who took Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I in the spring of 1898.[96] If it is safe to assume that the content of the course did not change radically from one year to the next, then Murphy's notes can provide valuable insight into the content of the course. In spring 1898, Prof. Ladd

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[94] Kirkpatrick's Appendix 6 to Ives's *Memos,* 180-84.
[95] *Catalogue of Yale University (1896-97)* (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1896), 56.
[96] Murphy (1877-1954) became an architect, perhaps best known for various projects in China, including Yale-in-China in Changsha. All references to his class notes for Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I are from the Yale Lectures Collection of the Yale University Manuscripts and Archives Collection, YRG 47, Box 64, Folder 329.

taught the portion of the course on Ethics. Murphy's notes from a lecture on Saturday, March 5, include the following:

> "That certain changes which we may observe & estimate objectively, in the environment & functions of the bodily organism, are connected in a more or less uniform way, with changes in the stream of consciousness."
>
> (a) Our conscious life, & we ourselves are & must be always subject to change. Also changes in external world. You can't have any theory of statics that isn't based on a theory of dynamics. To do the same thing all the time, would be to do nothing.[97]

And later in the same lecture:

> "These connections between the two kinds of changes, so far as it appears to us, take place in both of the two possible directions: i.e., changes in the bodily organism are uniformly followed by changes in the stream of consciousness, or the reverse order in the change takes place."

Murphy's notes from Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I do not mention William James by name, but clearly James's notion of the stream of consciousness and his awareness of constant change, both in thought and in the body, inform the content of Ladd's lecture.

Prof. Scripture begins his portion of the course, concerning experimental psychology, on March 26. The topics he covers are time, rhythm, space (including acoustic space), energy, color, tone, and feeling (the last in a discussion of the emotional effects of colors). A few of Murphy's notes resonate with Ives's writings about music. In the lecture on rhythm, dated April 16, for example, Murphy noted that "Constant repetition of sensation is pleasant up to a certain limit, but beyond, brain becomes tired, & absolute paralysis of brain cell. Something like writer's cramp." One can imagine Ives's attention perking up at Scripture's comparison of lazy listening habits to a paralysis of the brain, a mental writer's cramp. In the April 23 lecture on space, Murphy recorded Scripture as having said, "What do we mean by

[97] Murphy's use of quotation marks in these notebooks is frequently idiosyncratic and unclear.

here? I say I *know* I am *here*, & not *there*. But a man in constant revolving motion doesn't know he is revolving at all. Thinks he is still. So we don't know where we are in the universe." Such an observation would seem to appeal to someone like Ives, with his attraction to large, unanswerable questions. Scripture's lecture on acoustic space focuses on the use of the intensity of sound to judge distance, and how the faculty of that judgment differs when one and two ears are used. Ives's frequent experimentation with the spatiality of sound sources in his music comes to mind here, including instances in the Fourth and Universe Symphonies we have just discussed. Finally, Ladd's May 28 lecture on tone discussed pitch, the range of pitches audible to humans and some other creatures, the combination of pitches to yield major and minor tones, and the production of overtones. Ives engaged in a great deal of experimentation with combinations of tones for their varied effects, including overtones.

I do not intend to imply here that Ives got these ideas from Ladd or Scripture; rather, I merely wish to point out that Murphy's notes do suggest aspects of Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I that could have held Ives's interest, at the very least reinforcing some of the musical ideas to which his father had introduced him as a boy. After all, Ives, a composer whose oeuvre is full of works that experiment with sonic effects and unusual musical resources, mentioned "the sensations we hear so much about in experimental psychology" in the very first paragraph of the prologue to the *Essays*.[98]

The hybrid content of Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I makes apparent that the formal study of psychology as its own field was still in its early stages of separation

[98] Ives, *Essays,* 3-4.

from the field of philosophy, which in turn was closely connected with the study of religion. This interrelationship between the two fields is also suggested by the fact that George Duncan (1857-1928) taught not only some unspecified portion of Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I, but Philosophy 4, a history of speculative thought from Descartes to Kant, which Ives took in his senior year (1897-98), and a course in Advanced Psychology, which Ives did not take, but which Henry Killam Murphy did. In the syllabus for Advanced Psychology, Duncan states that he will be making "constant reference" to William James's *Principles of Psychology*, as well as to Professor Ladd's 1894 *Psychology: Descriptive and Explanatory*. Murphy's notes from the advanced course do mention James by name, particularly in lectures on the development of sense-perception, in which the human being's earliest encounters with a vague, undiscriminated world are shown to move increasingly toward one that can be subdivided and measured.[99] These direct mentions of James suggest that Jamesian thought could have been transmitted to Ives by Duncan either in Logic, Psychology, and Ethics I or in Philosophy 4.

The Yale University Archive holds no papers from George Duncan, and he seems to have published only one book, a translation of philosophical works of Leibniz published in 1908. He is acknowledged in the preface to Ladd's *Psychology*, for having "read the entire volume and…made several helpful suggestions, chiefly looking toward increased clearness and consistency of statement; and, therefore, of course, its better adaptation to the teacher's use."[100]

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[99] Yale Lectures Collection, YRG 47, Box 64, Folder 330.
[100] Ladd, *Psychology*, ix.

George Trumbull Ladd (1842-1921), on the other hand, produced over forty titles. Ladd taught philosophy and psychology at Yale from 1881 to 1905, and was the founder of the Yale psychological laboratory. He graduated from the Andover Theological Seminary in 1869 and was a preacher from 1869-79. His earliest published work was the two-volume *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture: A Critical, Historical, and Dogmatic Inquiry into the Origin and Nature of the Old and New Testaments* (1883). Beyond this hermeneutical text, most of Ladd's writings appear to deal in philosophical and psychological topics, including several textbooks designed for use in college classrooms. His 1897 *Elements of Psychology: A Treatise of the Activities and Nature of the Mind, from the Physical and Experimental Points of View*, was given a positive review by William James in *The Nation*.[101] An interest in religion and metaphysics never seems to have abandoned Ladd, however. In 1899 he published *A Theory of Reality: An Essay in Metaphysical System upon the Basis of Human Cognitive Experience*; in 1915 *What Should I Believe? An Inquiry into the Nature, Grounds, and Value of the Faiths of Science, Society, Morals, and Religion*; and in 1918 *The Secret of Personality: The Problem of Man's Personal Life as Viewed in the Light of an Hypothesis of Man's Religious Faith.* Ladd's travels in the Orient led to three volumes: *In Korea with Marquis Ito* (1908), *Rare Days in Japan* (1910), and *Intimate Glimpses of Life in India: A Narrative of Observations, Educational, Social, and Religious, in the Winter of 1899-1900* (1919).

[101] James wrote that Ladd's "volume will probably, for many years to come, be the standard work of reference on the subject," according to an undated advertisement in the back of the third edition of Ladd's *Outlines of Physiological Psychology: A Text-Book of Mental Science for Academies*, third edition (New York: Scribner, 1893).

Elias Hershey Sneath (1857-1935) also published widely, especially on the subjects of literature, religion, and ethics. His earliest published volume was *The Ethics of Hobbes as Contained in Selections from his Works* (1898), followed by studies of Tennyson and Wordsworth. Later he wrote *Moral Training in the School and Home: A Manual for Teachers and Parents* (1914). Finally, in the 1920s, he turned his attention toward religion, editing *At One with the Invisible: Studies in Mysticism* (1921) and producing three monographs, *Religion and the Future Life: The Development of the Belief in Life After Death* (1922), *Shall We Have a Creed?* (1925), and *The Evolution of Ethics, as Revealed in the Great Religions* (1927).

Edward Wheeler Scripture (1864-1945) taught at Yale from 1892 to 1903, served as the director of the Yale Psychological Laboratory, and was a co-founder of the American Psychological Association. His oeuvre is the most consistently scientific of the four, beginning with *Thinking, Feeling, Doing* (1895), the title of which seems to summarize the essence of the pragmatic method. Scripture claims that his was the first book on experimental psychology in English that was written *"expressly for the people"* in the hopes that it will "be taken as evidence of the attitude of the science in its desire to serve humanity."[102] Scripture describes the hard methodology of "the new psychology" to his reader:

> The old psychologist, like Locke, Hamilton, and many of the present day, sits at his desk and writes volumes of vague observation, endless speculation, and flimsy guesswork. The psychologist of the new dispensation must see every statement proven by experiment and measurement before he will commit himself in regard to it.[103]

[102] Edward W. Scripture, *Thinking, Feeling, Doing* (Meadville, PA: Flood & Vincent, 1895), iii.
[103] Ibid., 282.

His substantial 1897 *The New Psychology* is a detailed explanation of experimental psychology. Speech was Scripture's specific area of interest, and he produced several monographs between 1902 and 1912 on phonetics, vocal physiology, speech defects, stuttering, and lisping.

Scripture considered Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894) to be one of the great figures in the history of experimental psychology.[104] A copy of one of Helmholtz's great works, *Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen* (*On the Sensations of Tone*), can be found in the music room at the Ives's summer house in West Redding, Connecticut.[105] The range of books in the library at West Redding reflects a breadth of interests reminiscent of that of Ives's psychology professors at Yale, but includes none of those professors' works. An alphabetized transcription of the list of books at West Redding compiled by students of Vivian Perlis at Yale University in 1974, with additional volumes discovered on a visit there in August 2005, can be found in Appendix 2. There are plenty of books on music, but also on science, psychology, philosophy, religion, mysticism, history, and the intersections of these areas. There is not a single volume by William James, although brother Henry's novels are well-represented.[106] There are references to William James in two books: George Holmes Howison's *The Limits of Evolution, and Other Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism* (New York: Macmillan, 1901), in which James's doctrine of pluralism is distinguished from personal idealism and James's

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[104] Edward W. Scripture, *The New Psychology* (London and New York: Scribner's, 1897), 457-60. Helmholtz's work had a great influence on William James. The index to *Principles of Psychology* cites twenty-five references to Helmholtz.

[105] In his introduction to Ives's essay, "Some 'Quarter-Tone' Impressions," Howard Boatwright suggests that Ives's references to Helmholtz in that essay come from William Pole's *Philosophy of Music*, but notes that the Cowells, in their biography of Ives, said that "one of Helmholtz's books was in the family library" during Ives's youth (Cowell and Cowell, 19, Boatwright 106).

[106] Ives wrote respectfully of Henry James in the *Essays* that he "knows almost everything" (52).

consideration of the possibility of immortality is discussed, and Burnett Hillmann Streeter's *Reality: A New Correlation of Science and Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), in a chapter on "Religion and the New Psychology" (the reference is to James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*).[107] The Streeter book is inscribed by Harmony Ives, as are a couple of volumes on nursing and several others on religion and philosophy: Lowrie's *The Church and its Organization* (1904), Encken's *The Problem of Human Life as Viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time* (1914), McGiffert's *The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas* (1915), and Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture* (1940), as well as a copy of Thoreau's *Walden.*[108]

A trained nurse and the daughter of a preacher, Harmony herself embodied the intersection of science and religion. The origins of this intersection can be found in light of her father's religious views. Jan Swafford asserts that "Neither she nor her father had been interested in fancy theories about religion or divinity," given the influence of Twichell's mentor, Horace Bushnell.[109] Bushnell's progressive religious ideas included the notion that God was immanent, having a deeply integrated, organic relation with the world. In "Christian Nurture," of 1847, Bushnell said, "All society is organic, the Church, the State, the school, the family.…We possess only a mixed

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[107] Howison used the term "personal idealism" to put forth a way of thinking that was pluralistic but "absolutely public and universal," rather than "individualistic in the bad sense, whose dogmatic ideal is the dissolution of reality into a radically disjunct and wild 'multiverse,'—to borrow Professor James's expressive coinage,--instead of the universe of final harmony which is the ideal of our reason" (xi). In the *Essays* Ives quotes Prof. Henry Sturt, an Oxford philosopher who edited a volume of essays entitled *Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford*, in 1902. In his preface to the collection Sturt acknowledges Howison's use of the term in his 1901 book. Howison was a professor of philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, and seems to have had no professional connection with either the Oxford personal idealists or yet another, Boston-based school of personal idealism, despite the nominal similarity. How Ives came to know of Henry Sturt remains an open question.

[108] Harmony was briefly engaged to Rev. Walter Lowrie in 1904 (*Memos*, 276), and her copy of his book bears an inscription from the author.

[109] Swafford, 188.

individuality all our life long. A pure, separate, individual man, living wholly within himself and from himself, is a mere fiction." Here once again is the Emersonian interrelationship of all things, and all people. "And it is really because God is in his world," writes Washington Gladden in an essay on Bushnell, "in the human world, the life of every part of the social organism, working in all men to will and to do according to his good pleasure, that this doctrine of Christian nurture is justified."[110] Twichell expanded upon that kind of organicism, reflecting the organic process of evolution, in his sermon "The Coming Man":

> It is the testimony of revelations and of science alike that the crowning product of the creative energy is man.…Both agree, also, that though created he is still incomplete; still the forethought of the universal world process.…And his perfection is to be wrought out along the lines of his spiritual nature…whereas the soul has long been an appendage of the body, the body will become the vehicle and appendage of the soul.[111]

The idea of a never-completed, "universal world process" is reflected both in the Jamesian notion of provisional truth and Ives's conception of works such as the Universe Symphony and the "Emerson" movement of the Concord Sonata.

In the *Memos*, John Kirkpatrick suggests that the fusion of Charles Ives's and Harmony Twichell's personalities led to a powerful, one might say cosmic, union:

> Having unusual capacities in different ways—but being alike in setting devotion to ideals above convenience or expedience—their own devotion to each other enlarged their perceptions into what amounted to a mystical vision of reality. The exalted perorations of the Second String Quartet and the Fourth Symphony are probably not more from transcendental sources than from this source.[112]

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[110] Washington Gladden, "Horace Bushnell and Progressive Orthodoxy," in *Pioneers of Religious Liberty in America* (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1903), 240-1.
[111] Quoted in Swafford, 172, and Leah H. Strong, *Joseph Hopkins Twichell* (Athens: University of Georgia, 1966), 121.
[112] Kirkpatrick, *Memos*, 277-8.

Swafford expands on this idea, quoting at length several love letters from Harmony to Charlie written in 1907, in order to suggest that they developed a "private theology" (Swafford's term) that incorporated their personal relationship and Charlie's music. Swafford suggests that Charlie and Harmony "began to see their love as an adumbration of divine love, and it was their duty and joy to reflect it into the world."[113] In a letter from 30 December 1907 Harmony wrote:

> May I live to guard & grow more worthy of the love you give me…always, darling, we will give God thanks & praise for revealing Himself as much as he has in each of us to the other—I dare to love you so fully, so utterly because it is all just God & religion…in fact I feel as if I'd just really begun to experience the meaning of religion in my life.[114]

There are no extant written replies from Charlie to these letters, but Swafford suggests that Ives's music itself can be read as his replies. Charlie and Harmony's "love was a reflection of God's love," writes Swafford; "his music would be their way of spreading that love into the world."[115] Indeed, the ten years or so after their marriage became Ives's richest period of music composition, and included most of the work on the "cosmic" Concord Sonata and Universe Symphony, as well as the Fourth Symphony.

However cosmic the personal theology of Charlie and Harmony Ives, though, it seems always to have had its deepest roots in their New England Protestant faith. Carol Baron notes that "Ives's religious and creative life drew on a rich amalgam of [William Ellery] Channing's Unitarian intellectualism, Emerson's transcendentalist

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[113] Swafford, 189.
[114] Quoted in Swafford, 189. Carol Baron recently observed that "the mixture of passionate marital love and religious fervor expressed in Harmony's letters is not dissimilar to metaphors found in [Henry Ward] Beecher's sermons [some of which Ives had read] and in some religiously oriented nineteenth-century novels." See "Efforts on Behalf of Democracy by Charles Ives and His Family: Their Religious Contexts," in *Musical Quarterly* 87 (2004), 6-43.
[115] Swafford, 190.

idealism…and Bushnell's interpretation of Christian mysteries through analogy and symbolism."[116] In February 1908 Harmony wrote to Charlie, "dearest, we must grow in our perception of the spiritual and unseen things thro our religion—and we can only do that by exercise in religion—by observance."[117] Swafford points out that the Iveses "would be regular churchgoers. They were believers, Harmony more conventionally than her husband, but they had also grown up in churches; they were comfortable amidst the old hymns and inspiring words. Whatever meaning they would find in life and love and music, for them it naturally grew from a foundation in religion."[118]

Whatever the specific nature of his religious beliefs, a point that remains murky, faith was integral to Charles Ives's world view. This included religious faith, but also a more secular faith in humanity, as expressed in Ives's faith in performers to make their way through the Concord Sonata or for future composers to complete the Universe Symphony. The Cowells noted that Ives was "always a deeply religious man," and that for him "composition was…a kind of spiritual practice even when it was not based on hymn melodies or connected in some way with church services. To go his own way, to write what he most honestly could believe to be beautiful and meaningful, was therefore a matter of conscience."[119]

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[116] Baron, "Efforts on Behalf of Democracy," 11. She goes on to explore the Ives family's history with radical theology, especially the influence of Sandemanianism, to which Ives's great-grandfather Ebenezer White had been an adherent.
[117] Quoted in Swafford, 191.
[118] Swafford, 191. Charles Ives certainly spent a good deal of time in churches from his teenage through his college years, working as an organist. Carol Baron notes that he was exposed to the Baptist, Methodist, Congregational, Catholic, Episcopal, and Presbyterian traditions in "Efforts on Behalf of Democracy," 37, n. 46.
[119] Cowell and Cowell, 43.

Ives's sense of faith is further manifested in his professional career in the life insurance industry, in which faith in humanity, community, and science intersect. One pays one's premiums into a communal fund as an act of faith that, in case of personal calamity, one's family will be protected. The determination of the amount of insurance one should buy is made through mathematical calculations. In 1910 Ives published an article entitled "The Amount to Carry—Measuring the Prospect" in the insurance trade journal *The Eastern Underwriter* in September 1920. In it, this intersection of the chaotic universe, the combined strength of a community with a common interest, and the use of science to reinforce faith clearly come together. The article begins:

> There is an innate quality in human nature which gives man the power to sense the deeper causes, or at least to be conscious that there are organic and primal laws (or whatever you care to call the fundamental values of existence) underlying all progress. Especially is this so in the social, economic, and other essential relations between men.
>
> This intuitive and vague appreciation has apparently been more in evidence than the ability and quickness of men to analyze, or the interest to make sustained effort to discover and then in practical ways to benefit by, the lessons that can be learned from this intuition….
>
> But…as the truer premises are becoming more widely distributed, the intellect—the majority intellect—grows in power to appreciate them; superstition is giving way to science, and…the influence of science will continue to help mankind realize more fully, the greater moral and spiritual values. As Voltaire suggests, "a little science takes us away from religion, and a great deal brings us back to it."[120]

Ives's business practices, then, were as much an expression of his personal philosophy as his musical compositions. The Cowells wrote, "He was at home with [the insurance business] from the first because his devotion to Emersonian doctrine led him to see, in the truths revealed by statistical averages, the expression of the

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[120] Charles Ives, "The Amount to Carry," in *Essays Before a Sonata and Other Writings*, ed. Howard Boatwright (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), 235-6.

Universal Mind, operating in the experience of many individuals."[121] Moreover, he may have felt that his efforts at innovation were embraced more enthusiastically in the business world than the musical. This is clearly expressed in the following letter to Henry Bellaman, written in the early 1930s and quoted in the Cowells' biography:

> It is my impression that there is more open-mindedness and willingness to examine carefully the premises underlying a new or unfamiliar thing, in the world of business than the world of music.
>
> It is not even uncommon in business intercourse to sense a reflection of a philosophy—a depth of something fine—akin to a strong sense of beauty in art. To assume that business is a material process, and only that, is to undervalue the average mind and heart. To an insurance man there *is* an 'average man' and he is humanity.
>
> I have experienced a great fullness of life in business. The fabric of existence weaves itself whole. You cannot set an art off in the corner and hope for it to have vitality, reality and substance. There can be nothing *exclusive* about a substantial art. It comes directly out of the heart of experience of life and thinking about life and living life. My work in music helped my business and work in business helped my music.[122]

In the wide range of experiences each of those facets of Ives's career encompasses in the life of this immensely complicated figure, Ives emerges here as one living fully in the spirit of a Jamesian radical empiricist, fully aware that the relations between the various parts of his experience "possess," as James had expressed it, "a concatenated or continuous structure."

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[121] Cowell and Cowell, 39.
[122] Ibid., 96; emphasis in original.

Chapter 5
John Kirkpatrick's Pragmatic Approach to Ives's Multiverse

SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE LIFE OF JOHN KIRKPATRICK

On 21 January 1939 the pianist John Kirkpatrick gave the first complete public performance of the Concord Sonata at Town Hall in New York City. Kirkpatrick was born in New York City in 1905. After a private school education, he enrolled at Princeton University but did not complete his degree. He had spent the summer of 1925, between his junior and senior years, studying with Nadia Boulanger at the Conservatoire Américain at Fontainebleau, and returned to Paris in June 1926, where he remained for the most part until 1931. During this period he continued his studies with Boulanger and studied piano with Camille Decreus, Isidore Philipp, and Louta Nouneberg, in addition to pursuing music studies at the École Normale de Musique. His circle in Paris included the composers Virgil Thomson, Aaron Copland, Roy Harris, and Igor Stravinsky, studying with the last-named in 1929 and 1931.

Kirkpatrick first encountered the score of the Concord Sonata in Paris in 1927 in the home of Katherine Ruth Heyman. Heyman was a pianist who was primarily known as a specialist in the music of Alexander Scriabin, and became part of what Ives biographer Jan Swafford calls the "Scriabin/occult faction [that] formed among the early associates of Charles Ives."[1] This group included Henry Cowell, Elliott Carter, and Kirkpatrick himself. In a 17 February 1930 letter to his mother, Kirkpatrick suggests something of this Scriabin/occult aspect of Heyman:

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[1] Swafford, 323-4.

> I see a lot of Miss Heyman. She gets slightly more slightly mad as time goes on, but not at all objectionably. She played me over fragments of the eighth sonata of Skryabin t'other day—told me she had been having a lesson on it (spiritistically of course) and said sadly that she couldn't do in some places what they wanted her to do. I am not prepared to comment on the veracity or directness of her spiritual revelations (which I am inclined to believe wholeheartedly)—but anyway it was some of the most miraculous piano playing I have ever heard.[2]

Heyman's 1924 performances of Ives introduced young Elliott Carter to Ives's music, and in 1928 she played and spoke about the "Emerson" movement of the Concord Sonata on a French radio broadcast.[3] At Heyman's encouragement, Kirkpatrick wrote to Ives requesting a copy of the sonata. By 1932 Kirkpatrick was playing "The Alcotts," which he performed in 1933 during a recital in the home of the new-music patron Alma Wertheim in New York City, his first performance of any of Ives's music.[4] He began studying the entire sonata in earnest in 1934, first performing "Emerson" publicly at his Town Hall debut recital in 1936.[5]

While preparing the sonata, Kirkpatrick wrote to Ives in September 1935 with a number of questions concerning the performance of the work. Ives's response, as dictated to Harmony, includes the advice that would color Kirkpatrick's approach to the sonata for decades to come:

> Do whatever seems natural or best to *you*, though not necessarily the same way each time. The music, in its playing as well as in its substance, should have some of Emerson's freedom in action and thought—of the explorer "taking the ultimate of today as the first of tomorrow's new series." [A paraphrase of Emerson's "Circles."] It is said that Emerson seldom gave any of his lectures in exactly the same way, and that the published essays were not kept to literally. Sometime in the 1850s my grandmother heard Emerson lecture on the New England Reformers. I remember her saying that she was startled (perhaps somewhat put out) to find that the printed text, which she knew almost by heart, was hardly more than an outline in his lecture.

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[2] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 20, Folder 231.
[3] Swafford, 371.
[4] For more on Wertheim, see Carol J. Oja, "Women Patrons and Activists for Modernist Music: New York in the 1920s," in Modernism/Modernity 4 (1997), 129-155.
[5] Swafford, 371.

> Apparently Emerson liked to trust to the mood of the moment—perhaps too much.[6]

Ives roots this advice in his understanding of Emerson, but it may also be viewed as advocating a Jamesian pragmatic approach to the sonata that acknowledges the constant flux and flow of experience. The specific experience in question here is the constantly fluctuating relationship between the performer (and all the constantly shifting variables that constitute the performer at any given moment) and the work (the precise definition of which we have seen to become increasingly complicated for Ives after 1921). The challenge, then, is for the performer to make his way through the work, to choose a path through Ives's musical multiverse. Clearly, Ives is providing Kirkpatrick with very little specific guidance. Ives is leaving it up to Kirkpatrick to establish some sense of the truth of the work, to understand what the work means to him, and to establish a belief in how the work should go. Truth, as we recall from William James, is what happens to an idea. Kirkpatrick, as we shall see, adopted a very fluid relationship with the Concord Sonata, and encouraged other performers to adopt a similar approach to it.

If Ives planted the seed, then, for what would become Kirkpatrick's understanding of the sonata, it was planted in the rich medium of a musician who appears to have had an inner predisposition toward such Ivesian, or Emersonian, or pragmatic, or radically empiricist ideas. We have already caught a glimpse of Kirkpatrick's fascination with the "Scriabin/occult faction" of Parisian expatriates in the late 1920s. His correspondence with his mother around 1930 expands this view.

Marguerite Haviland Kirkpatrick was, by her own admission, "a chronic

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[6] Ives, *Memos,* 200-01; emphasis in the original.

worrier."[7] Her correspondence with "Jack" reveals a doting mother given to considerable concern for her son's health in Paris, an environment she considered to be a filthy hotbed of germs and disease. Apparently Jack's health was always precarious, so to a certain extent Marguerite's concerns were probably valid. She repeatedly urged Jack to drink some kind of special milk, probably to strengthen his overall constitution; to gargle with Lavoris daily as a preventative measure against sore throats and colds; and to use eye drops and eye wash, and to wear his glasses. Excerpts from three letters written within less than a week's time shortly after Jack had returned to Paris after a visit home suggest Marguerite's level of preoccupation with Jack's health:

> (23 September 1929) Your leaving was so hurried that I did not have time to say the usual chant—be sure to order the fine milk if you have not done so, do it now—If you did not buy Lavoris on the steamer buy that now. Remember your eye drops and the alcohol eye mask solution. You will need an eye cup for this. Buy one to-day.
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> (1 October 1929) Have you ordered the precious milk are you using eye drops and wearing glasses faithfully and looking after yourself generally?
>
> (3 October 1929) Use nasal spray & Remember—Lavoris every night a great preventive against tonsillitis & colds—use—eye drops—use—eye wash—Drink milk—If you have not ordered it do it now!!!—Wear new glasses

Sometime during 1930 while in Paris, Kirkpatrick turned to Christian Science, the faith established in 1879 by Mary Baker Eddy in Boston, Massachusetts. The church teachings include a rejection of traditional medicine in favor of a kind of mind-cure or faith-healing approach to medical problems. This news apparently got to Marguerite second-hand, through her sister-in-law, John's aunt Jean Kirkpatrick Townsend ("Nini"):

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[7] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 20, Folder 231.

> Beloved—
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> Your letter to Nini…naturally reached her promptly and she was overjoyed, both to hear from you and to know that you were so encouraged with your first study of Science. It made me very happy too that you had at last found something that might benefit your dear eyes for, as Dr. [illegible] told you, the trouble is not entirely with the eye but possibly a condition which you can control yourself. It no doubt began with eye strain but on no account put aside your glasses and forget your eye drops, for Christian Science while it will help the nervous trouble, cannot magnify the written notes to save your eyes.[8]

In spite of his mother's cautions, Jack went his own way as he got deeper into Christian Science. On 7 December 1930 he wrote:

> I continue to study Mrs. Eddy with the greatest interest. It is quite difficult and I have not anywhere near got to the point where I might feel I could call myself a scientist, but certain results seem interesting: I haven't worn my glasses or used the eye drops or indulged in vapex Lavoris or pinoleum since, and my eyes can do loads of work without tiring and my throad is never sore for more than the time it takes to notice it. Generally I feel fine. All this however quite exemplifies the truth that it is much easier to change a physical or material condition than a mental or spiritual one; the former seems to require only belief and faith, while the latter necessitates what she terms spiritual understanding.[9]

On 24 December 1930, Marguerite responded with concern, urging Jack to resume his cleansing regimen (not, apparently, to be confused with the use of medicine, to which Christian Scientists would object), and curiously admits to her own personal experience with the faith:

> Your taking up Science interests me greatly, but please for my sake and your own do not overdo it—so many become fanatical about it. When reading manuscript music always put on your glasses. The Lord did not make our eyes to read pin point dots for hours at a time and please cleanse your throat nightly with Lavoris. This is only cleanliness and the Bible says that is next to Godliness. I have a terror of sore throats. They can be so fata. You remember little Gladys Radway passed away with just this and all the science ["Science"?] in the world could not save her….Please do this for me—glasses when reading or writing music and Lavoris at night. For all else Science is wonderful. It has sustained me through many rough places in my troubled life.[10]

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[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] The particulars of Marguerite's "troubled life" await further investigation.

On 27 January 1931, Jack replies impatiently:

> Please do stop worrying about my eyes—there's nothing the matter with them—also about my throat—in which connection:—one of science's latest discoveries (from a purely material basis) is that mental states affect not only the functionings of the body but even the constituency and texture of many parts. This is most noticeable in the normal excretions and experiments that have been carried out on the basis of the changes in the same man's perspiration and breath when in different moods of hate, benevolence, irritation, envy, calm, etc. with the subsequent isolation of the differentiating part. It seems that envy made a guinea pig deathly ill but love didn't hurt it, while hate killed it. Specifically it was found that most sore throats start from having your feelings hurt.[11]

On 3 July 1931, Jack writes of his "first considerable problem in Science"—the common cold:

> It went on for some time but finally stopped, and I feel fine now. It seems an ordinary cold is the hardest thing to treat, because it is so familiar that it is almost impossible to disbelieve. For instance at one stage it thought it wanted to develop some what's called intestinal grippe. I had never had that so it was much easier to unbelieve it, and with the help of a [Christian Science] practitioner it disappeared after 2 days. (2 days after its apparition, ½ day after the visit.) But in its more usual aspect it hung on for some time until it just got ridiculous and couldn't be put up with any longer. I imagine often the truth is believed only when one's patience is at an end of being annoyed with untruth.[12]

There is no extant reply from Marguerite to this incident.

Jack also used Christian Science to attempt to solve a musical performance problem:

> Along about the last week Louta [Nouneberg] got a bit anxious about the Chopin Etudes. (I had put down on the programme numbers: 1, 25, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 15, & 17.) She thought I ought to omit 1 and 12. [Marc] Pincherle heard most of the program and thought 12 would to in a pinch but that I should omit 1 and 15. I rather felt that as long as I had announced all 9, I really ought to play all 9 and see what happened. Louta of course was thinking of what people would think of her teaching if they weren't too good. I rather felt that when people come to a debut recital, they usually give one a

[11] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 20, Folder 231. One wonders whether the final line of this excerpt was intended as a barb directed toward Marguerite's disparaging remarks concerning Kirkpatrick's reliance upon his new-found faith. The extent of Kirkpatrick's familiarity with any specific studies concerning the mind-body connection awaits further research, although the notion certainly would have been in the air at the time.

[12] Ibid.

> handicap of one or two so what the hell. I asked Mrs. Barnard (my practitioner—she's been one for 22 years) what she thought and she was encouraging so I said no more to Louta about it (told her I would decide at the last minute) and prepared to play them on faith. I couldn't quite achieve a perfect enough faith to cope with 1, but 12 & 15 went off grand.[13]

There is no further mention of Christian Science in Kirkpatrick's correspondence with his mother.

Questions of a metaphysical nature continued to interest Kirkpatrick. This is reflected in correspondence with Mary Crovatt Hambidge, a friend of the Kirkpatrick family who was a weaver and who founded the Hambidge Center for Creative Arts and Sciences in Rabun Gap, Georgia, in 1934.[14] Hambidge's letters are lively and colorfully written documents, often sprawling across many pages without paragraph breaks. There is plenty of family news, but occasional turns toward the philosophical, such as in this excerpt from a letter of 23 June 1936:

> Listen to Kant:
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> "The basis of all religion is the freedom of the Will, (caps not mine!) and the sum of religion is morality—there is no place for love, nor must we be actuated by fear or hope—Law must be supreme." (underlining mine) Is this conclusion the result of his personal experience and feelings or does it spring from inner reasoning? It's in the right direction provided he means by love the old fashioned biological urge or its debasement, sentimental left overs—of course by Law he means the great inner coordinating principle—
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> Listen to a modern—Alexis Carrell—"More virile habits should be substituted for the uniformity and softness of life in schools and universities—the adaptation of the individual to a physiological, intellectual, and moral discipline determines defninte changes in the nervous system, the endocrine glands, and the mind—the organism acquires, in this way, a better

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Hambidge's husband, Jay Hambidge, was an art theorist who developed the notion of dynamic symmetry, in which laws of symmetry observed in nature were also discovered in Greek art. According to a 1959 brochure from what was then called the Jay Hambidge Art Foundation, "all true art is inspired by Nature and the use of her raw materials; [and] the beauty and perfection in them are essential for the highest expression of man's own art. Yet the external copying of these natural creations does not produce similar results. There must then be something *within* animating this raw material, something directing Nature herself. And so there is. Back of this outer perfection is a highly intelligent, mathematical Law of Symmetry, proportion and relationship, controlling and directing all natural growth, so that it is rightly balanced, with every part related to every other part, producing that harmony of the whole we see in all natural forms. This Law also governs the growth of man so that in working with Nature, he is perfecting himself."

> integration, greater vigor, and more ability to overcome the difficulties and dangers of existence."[15]

The letter included a newspaper clipping advertising a hay fever remedy involving the application by electricity of a coating of ionized zinc to the nostrils, intended for Kirkpatrick's friend, the composer Roy Harris. In her letters, Hambidge always takes interest in Kirkpatrick's musical life. While she missed the premiere of the Concord Sonata due to illness, she wrote to Kirkpatrick on 6 June 1943, "I always see you as a monk or priest sitting at the piano. You always seemed dedicated to music, even though the temptations of the world and the flesh would now and then creep in! I must see the <u>past</u> as I look at people and maybe you were a priest in your last incarnation."[16]

With Mary Hambidge's mention of reincarnation, we must turn to John Kirkpatrick's lengthy and serious involvement with the Theosophical Society. In a letter to his Aunt Jean written between 26 March and 4 April 1938, Kirkpatrick wrote:

> I've just started to look a bit into Theosophy via Annie Besant. It clears up a whole lot of points. One thing for instance that I could never understand:—that Jesus apparently never mentioned the principle of reincarnation. But it seems he called attention twice to John the Baptist's being Elijah—Matt. XI.14 & XVII.12, referring to Malachi IV.5. What I would like very much to know is some of the sequences in the great composers. I suspect Pergolesi (1710-1736)—Mozart (1756-1791)—Chopin (1810-1849)—Skryabin (1871-1915) (each astral life in between would be about 20 years which seems plausible)—except that from Pergolesi to Mozart is too big a jump (Judge Hatch (who died in 1912), writing through the hand of Elsa Barker, said that it takes several incarnations to develop a real mastery of the arts.) Annie Besant mentions Sir Thomas More as the last earthly life of that soul (look him up in the Encyclopedia—just the sort of person who would be ready to "graduate")—I imagine several composers may have been "last lives" in that same way—Bach, Victoria, Beethoven, perhaps Skryabin, perhaps Franck.[17]

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[15] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 16, Folder 179.
[16] Ibid.
[17] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 35, Folder 391.

While this passage mentions Kirkpatrick's early exposure to Annie Besan't later branch of the Theosophical Movement, the Theosophical Society was originally established in 1875 in New York City by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, a Russian immigrant, and Henry Steel Olcott, an American lawyer and journalist. The Society describes itself in simplest terms as "a nonsectarian, undogmatic, worldwide organization devoted to human solidarity, cultural understanding, and self-development. It seeks to bring people together; to reconcile the religions, philosophies, and sciences of both East and West; and to increase awareness of the inner reality inherent in every human being."[18] In its effort to merge mystical Eastern and the most esoteric branches of Western thought with science, particularly Darwinian evolution, into one over-arching ideology, Theosophy resembles in some ways other religious sects that emerged in late-nineteenth-century America such as Christian Science and various manifestations of the New Thought movement.[19]

William James mentions Theosophy in the "Mysticism" lecture of *Varieties of Religious Experience*. James quotes from Mme Blavatsky's book, The Voice of the Silence, a passage that he feels illustrates the paradoxical nature of mysticism, whose truths are better expressed through music than through "conceptual speech":

> When he has ceased to hear the many, he may discern the ONE—the inner sound which kills the outer….For then the soul will hear, and will remember. And then to the inner ear will speak THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE….And now thy *Self* is lost in SELF, *thyself* unto THYSELF, merged in that SELF from which thou first did radiate.…Behold! Thou has become the Light, thou hast become the Sound, thou art thy Master and thy God. Thou art THYSELF the object of thy search: the VOICE unbroken, that resounds throughout eternities,

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[18] "Introduction to the Theosophical Society" (Accessed [21 August 2004]), http://www.theosophical.org/society/intro/index.html.

[19] See Charles H. Lippy, *Being Religious, American Style: A History of Popular Religiosity in the United States* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), especially Chapter 6, 140-165.

> exempt from change, from sin exempt, the seven sounds in one, THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE.[20]

The images here recall the earliest Hindu cosmologies in which sound plays a primary role, as well as those of Plato in which the division of the octave into seven pitches according to the Pythagorean ratios is given a functional role in the mechanics of the universe. In this passage, the merging of the self into some primary Self recalls the rejection of "mean egotism" by Emerson's transparent eyeball in *Nature* (1836), but here expressed through the image of the "unbroken," eternal voice of silence. The Theosophical Society makes some effort to align itself explicitly with Emerson in its literature, which states that "The human consciousness (also called spirit or soul) is in essence identical with the one supreme Reality, which Ralph Waldo Emerson called the 'Oversoul,' including each of our particular beings and uniting us with one another."[21]

The merging of the one and the many, the inner and outer, into a pluralistic monism anticipates the structure of James's multiverse. Theosophy in fact affirms that:

> Matter and consciousness (or spirit) are the two polar aspects of that ultimate Reality, from whose interplay proceed innumerable universes in an endless cycle of manifestation and dissolution….The human pilgrimage takes us from our source in the One through experience of the many, back to union with the One Divine Reality. Our goal is thus to complete the cosmic cycle of manifestation with full conscious realization of ourselves, no longer polarized between consciousness and matter or divided into self and other, but unified within and united with all other beings through our common Source. This realization is enlightenment.[22]

In his analysis of the quotation from Mme Blavatsky in *Varieties*, James writes:

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[20] Quoted in James, *Varieties*, 421.
[21] "Introduction to the Theosophical Society."
[22] Ibid.

> These words, if they do not awaken laughter as you receive them, probably stir chords within you which music and language touch in common. Music gives us ontological messages which non-musical criticism is unable to contradict, though it may laugh at our foolishness in minding them. There is a verge of the mind which these things haunt; and whispers therefrom mingle with the operations of our understanding, even as the waters of the infinite ocean send their waves to break among the pebbles that lie upon our shores.[23]

As we have seen, James's attentiveness to the "verge of the mind," the fringe, the desire to reinstate the proper place of the vague in our thinking, might have made the mystical tenets set forth in the Theosophical view quite attractive to him. Indeed, the Theosophists attempt to claim him as one of their own, at least in spirit, for his belief

> that the common nucleus of doctrine and the common essence of the religious experience was the foundation of the Science of Religions. This idea, that a body of knowledge which is scientific, philosophical and religious in scope underlies and is the essence and source of all religions, is a central Theosophical teaching.[24]

By the early 1940s, Kirkpatrick had become influenced by the teachings of the Theosophical movement, by way of his wife, Hope Miller, whom he met in 1940, and her family. He sought membership in the Theosophical Society in 1942 but was turned down, as the movement had deliberately begun keeping a low public profile since 1938, undergoing what it called an "indrawal"—a "passage from the outer world to the inner"—and was no longer accepting new members.[25] According to H. B. Mitchell's report of the Executive Committee in the minutes of the Theosophical Society's final annual convention in New York in 1943, the "indrawal" was the result of infighting within the organization—particularly under the influence of the second president of the organization, Annie Besant, who was controversial in some circles—and a lack of the emergence of new *chelas*, or disciples considered suitable for higher

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[23] James, *Varieties*, 421.
[24] "Ancient and Modern Philosophy: Part V—Pragmatism," an unauthored article in *Theosophy* 84 (1996), 362.
[25] Kirkpatrick Papers, 34/383.

level positions in the movement. Mitchell blamed this state of affairs on a global tendency toward moral decay:

> Everywhere standards are being lowered. Everywhere what were forged as instruments for good are being perverted to instruments for evil,--often in all innocence by those who are blinded and deluded by the shifting lights and currents of the world….[*The movement] must be led underground, where, unpolluted by contact with the decay of what has been, it will nourish the roots of what is and is to be.*[26]

Although he was denied the opportunity to join the organization formally, Kirkpatrick was encouraged in an 18 March 1942 letter from Mitchell that while "all *formal* outer activities should be suspended for the time being…the *inner* path is always open."[27] In fact, Kirkpatrick seems to have taken to heart Mitchell's final admonishment to the Theosophical Society in their underground state: "Read, study, meditate, live, *be* Theosophy."[28] He immediately set about acquiring a complete set of the run of the *Theosophical Quarterly*, which was published from 1903 to 1938, and prepared a meticulous typewritten, single-spaced, 37-page authors' index of its contents which he presented to the Millers as a Christmas present in 1943.[29]

Kirkpatrick's concern with the relationship between music and spirituality is reflected in the titles of talks such as "Religion and Music" (given at Cornell University, 1953), "The Religious Perspective of a Musician" (given at Cornell University, 1960), and "Ives as Prophet" (given at the University of Miami, 1975).[30] "Religion and Music" was delivered as part of a series of lectures called Religion and the Arts, sponsored by Cornell United Religious Work. Kirkpatrick tells his audience

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[26] Ibid; emphasis in original.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 66, Folder 594.
[30] "Religion and Music" is in the John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 62, Folder 571, "The Religious Perspective of a Musician" in Box 62, Folder 572, and "Ives as Prophet" in Box 61, Folder 568.

that the talk was meant to be about Handel's *Messiah*, "But I find that I want to tell you all sorts of other things too." Chief among these is a general commentary on the relation between music and language, and the kinds of things that can happen when music and text come together. He cites the musical cosmology of C. S. Lewis's *The Magician's Nephew*, from the *Chronicles of Narnia*, as an example of the potential power of wordless music, and goes on to discuss the ability of wordless music to suggest symbolic imagery, especially in religious contexts.[31] When music is added to words, he says, there is not only "an identifying or a transfiguring" effect but one that "is also in the direction of the general or the universal" when considered in a religious light, opening up the potential for meaning of a text through the universalizing power of music capable of generating an appeal not just to adherents of one particular religion but to those of any religion. On the other hand, Kirkpatrick feels that great literature—including the King James version of the Bible, which Handel sets in *Messiah*—"*is* music" and is best left alone. "Have you ever heard of a great composer setting Keats?" he asks. "He would have absolutely nothing left to do." He also comments briefly on the musicalization of speech in the mouths of talented orators, bringing his account of the relation between music and language full circle. Finally, he writes, "whether the words be said or sung, whichever best accomplishes this purpose will turn out to be also the best music."

In a passage that recalls in spirit Ives's distinction between "substance" and "manner" in the Epilogue to the *Essays Before a Sonata*, Kirkpatrick goes on at some length about a distinction between what he calls "imitation" and "real" music. He is

[31] Kirkpatrick was deeply interested in the works of C. S. Lewis and of one of Lewis's students, the American poet Richard Selig. Both John and Hope Kirkpatrick became actively involved in the C. S. Lewis Society in New York.

concerned about an age in which people already "are constantly bombarded with" imitation music, such as that found in "singing commercials" and movies. Real music, on the other hand, "is one of our most convincing images of spirit, and, if you pay attention, it will tell you some very worth-while things, and a lot of them have to do either directly or indirectly with religion." It is difficult for Kirkpatrick to describe the specific difference between the two—"on[e] can sort of smell it…like the way you can smell flattery"—and while he points to the "curved movement" of the melody lines of real music and its rhythmic variety, he concedes that this determination is finally best left to one's own "inner response" to the music.

Ultimately, for Kirkpatrick, music's ability to communicate spiritually with a listener establishes its level of realness. He offers numerous examples of real hymns, anthems, and listening experiences before offering that:

> Insofar as all life is spiritual in essence, whether revered or defiled,—and insofar as all human thought and impulse has a core of spirit, whether fulfilled or perverted,—it seems to me that what real music does in its gesture is to sing the inner essence of a thought or an impulse, and thereby to sing something of the spirit that breathed life into the thought…If the music is real, it will always mean more than the composer meant.

Kirkpatrick's specific description of the distinction between real and imitation music, then, is left intentionally vague. The purpose of his discussion of the distinction raises the awareness of his audience to make their own decisions about their own responses to the music surrounding them, thus demanding that they take an active role in their perception of their own musical multiverses. He avoids telling the audience what to believe, but simply points to a set of problems of which they should be aware in their own experience. Similarly, he notes that from the perspective of the performer's interpretational role, "In most great music, there is so much

approximation that the true way it goes can be the search of a lifetime." And here, as we shall soon see, Kirkpatrick could be summarizing his experience with the Concord Sonata.

In "The Religious Perspective of a Musician," Kirkpatrick continues to explore the theme of the role of the spiritual in music. The talk is particularly striking for its cosmological character. Kirkpatrick begins by noting that:

> somewhat to my surprise, all my deepest convections [sic] (not only about music, not only about all the other arts, but even about all life) turned out to be corollaries of the principle that all existence, all matter, all energy, all thought—emanate from spirit,—and further, that the spirit that created the universe, and the spirit that is the core of every human soul, and the spirit that was and is the inspiration for every work of art that we habitually call "inspired"—all these are, in some way, one.

He goes on to observe that music is "a witness of the indwelling of the spirit in the human soul," and that its component parts reflect the larger working of the universe. He views rhythm, for example, as:

> a character of movement, and is more akin to the whirlings of atoms or planets or galaxies, or more like the pulsatings that are so familiar to us as by-products of these whirlings: day and night, flood-tide and ebb-tide, wave-crest and wave-trough. I mean that the articulations of musical rhythm are not points in time but nodes or areas of intensity, so that rhythmic periodicity is not something that repeats or duplicates, but something that pulses or circles or rounds out or even spirals.

Clearly at work here is a manifestation of Emerson's idea of the transitional: not the regular ticking of a metronome, but a manifestation of the pulsings of an Ivesian universal "life beat," with all the complex rhythmic layerings Ives indicates for the opening of the Universe Symphony, layerings that generate the kinds of "nodes of intensity" that Kirkpatrick describes.

A similarly cosmic degree of complexity lies at the heart of harmonic vibrations, which project "a global expansion from a center" in which "waves of all

sizes combin[e] and recombine[e] in a constant dance." Kirkpatrick reminds his audience that because we adjust for the Pythagorean comma in the Western system of pitch, the circle of fifths is really a spiral of fifths, and that, strictly speaking, "nearly all the music we hear is out of tune."

Finally, recalling his thoughts n the potential generalizing and universalizing power of the addition of music to text expressed in "Religion and Music," Kirkpatrick considers melody to be an "international language" because it "is a singing of something of the spirit in whoever or whatever brought the music forth, and appeals to something of the spirit in whoever might hear it. Only on the level of the spirit is it true that 'all men are created equal.'" For Kirkpatrick, then, as it was for Ives, music becomes a great equalizing force, an ideal medium for forging the connections capable of creating the Emersonian "Oversoul" or the Jamesian superhuman consciousness.

Kirkpatrick picks up this idea fifteen years later in "Ives as Prophet." In the last sentence of the Prologue to the *Essays* Ives wrote "that music is beyond any analogy to word language and that the time is coming, but not in our lifetime, when it will develop possibilities unconceivable now,—a language so transcendent that its heights and depths will be common to all mankind."[32] Kirkpatrick suggests that this belief was prophetic, actually having been manifested in the international responses to Ives's music expressed during the 1974 Ives Centennial Festival-Conference.[33] Additionally, Kirkpatrick cites as "prophetic" Ives's uses of polytonality, polyrhythm,

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[32] Ives, *Essays*, 8.
[33] See Appendix I, "Essays by Foreign Participants," in *An Ives Celebration: Papers and Panels of the Charles Ives Centennial Festival-Conference*, ed. H. Wiley Hitchcock and Vivian Perlis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 227-256.

polytexture, and quotation (a way of "sharing a common vocabulary") in his music; Ives's development of estate planning in the field of life insurance; and Ives's overtly cosmological meditations as expressed in the unfinished Universe Symphony. Finally, Ives's preoccupation with the distinction between "substance" and "manner" in music, as articulated in the Epilogue of the *Essays Before a Sonata,* resonates for Kirkpatrick as a constant reminder of "the spiritual nature of musical communication."

A Pragmatic Approach to Ives's Multiverse

As we have seen, Kirkpatrick's relationship with the Concord Sonata had begun more than a decade before its premiere—he first encountered the score in 1927—and continued up to his death in 1991. After Ives's death in 1954, Kirkpatrick sorted through and catalogued Ives's manuscripts. This experience allowed Kirkpatrick to become intimately acquainted with the web-like multiverse of sketches and revisions of the sonata that we explored in Chapter 4.

Late in his life Kirkpatrick began writing down a way to perform the work in a handwritten score he referred to as a "copy" of the sonata—"it is not an 'edition,'" he insisted in his accompanying typewritten notes.[34] Kirkpatrick explicitly states his intention that his "copy" of the sonata serve merely as one way to approach a work through which, he felt, different performers should ideally forge their own paths. In this way, Kirkpatrick's recommendation to interpreters of the Concord Sonata recalls

[34] The "copy" and musical materials pertaining to it are located in the John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 75, Folder 719, while the typewritten notes are located in Box 75, Folder 718.

James's application of the pragmatic method to one's navigation of the multiverse. Kirkpatrick's recommendation certainly creates "a program for more work," as James described the pragmatic method, for the performer. During a panel discussion of editors' experiences with Ives's works during the 1974 Ives Centennial Festival-Conference, Kirkpatrick said:

> I think it is the implicit duty of anybody setting out to learn Concord to just see [the multiplicity of sources] for himself. Of course, that may be geographically a difficult and expensive thing to do—to support oneself in New Haven if your home base happens to be someplace like Spokane. It is something to have the luxury of operating like a library bookworm and going through these things and seeing what's what, but, in the ideal picture, it's the only thing to do.[35]

Kirkpatrick's "copy" of the Concord Sonata, then, offers his own provisional understanding of the truth of Ives's work, while encouraging each performer of the sonata to apply the pragmatic method in order to establish his or her own equally provisional truth of the work. Kirkpatrick does this by suggesting that each performer survey the full range of possibilities in Ives's multiverse, as he himself had done, and select among those possibilities, establishing a sense of belief in a particular choice, and finally acting on that choice. In this way, each interpreter's determination of the truth of the Concord Sonata becomes an ongoing and endless process, different for every one, from now until the end of human history, and fulfills Ives's vision for (at least) the "Emerson" movement of the sonata that it might never be finished. Like James's pragmatic method, the approach that Kirkpatrick suggests is loose yet rigorous; it is based upon Ives's suggestion that Kirkpatrick do whatever seems natural or best to him, while simultaneously presenting him with one of the most dauntingly difficult scores in the piano repertoire. Ultimately, the level of interaction

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[35] "Editors' Experiences," in Hitchcock and Perlis, *An Ives Celebration*, 71.

with the work that Kirkpatrick recommends would truly make the Concord Sonata into part of the life process of the interpreter, turning the interpreter toward what James, in *Pragmatism*, had called "the open air and possibilities of nature," which we understand to be constantly unfolding, constantly evolving, "as against dogma," a single edition or interpretation, "artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth."

TRUTH

As a justification for his approach to the work, Kirkpatrick repeatedly cited Ives's advice to him, while preparing the sonata in 1935, to "do whatever seems natural or best to you, though not necessarily the same way each time." Over the years, as Kirkpatrick became aware of Ives's unpublished variants of the music of the sonata, doing what was natural or best to him meant drawing upon this full range of sources, and his approach to the work became what he described as "a shamelessly personal batch of choices."[36] As we have already seen, Ives remarked in his *Memos* on his "daily pleasure of playing this music and seeing it grow and feeling that it is not finished," and Kirkpatrick's approach to the sonata follows in this spirit, treating the 1921 and 1947 editions as snapshots of the myriad potentialities of Ives's larger and more fluid sense of the work.

Given that Kirkpatrick had labored to learn the 1921 edition of the Concord Sonata during the 1930s, his lingering preference for that edition is not surprising. In the 1940s, when Ives invited Kirkpatrick to help edit what would become the 1947 edition, Kirkpatrick "procrastinated," as he put it—that is to say, he resisted active

[36] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 75, Folder 718.

involvement in the project.[37] This seems to have been due to his inability to overcome his preference for the first edition. Ives eventually took on the task of editing the score himself, but the difference in aesthetics between Ives and Kirkpatrick placed a strain on their relationship. This bit of history casts a curious light upon a letter that Kirkpatrick wrote to Ives on July 28, 1950, addressed to "Uncle Charlie (if I may so address you)." In the letter, Kirkpatrick says that in his recent efforts to play the Concord Sonata again after a period of some years, he had been re-examining the available sources and was

> filled with shame at how much I find I had misread or misunderstood. As you remember, you wrote me that I must do it my own way, and having gone at it at first from the first edition, I got so fond of many of those details that I'm afraid I was slow to the point of Scotch stubbornness at accepting many of your revisions [in the second edition]. So many of them now appear to me as real improvements, which I couldn't seem to accept [in the 1940s]. Stupid!!!
>
> Of course there are some touches in the revision, to which I still prefer the simpler versions, but they become less and less.[38]

Perhaps Kirkpatrick's self-flagellating assessment of his "stupid" "misreading" of Ives's reworkings of the sonata can be interpreted as an effort to redress his guilty feelings for not having accepted Ives's invitation to help edit the 1947 edition. But beyond a certain amount of sweet-talking, especially concerning that second edition, to which Kirkpatrick never seems to have warmed up, the letter is also significant for showing signs of Kirkpatrick's developing interest in considering a wider range of materials that increasingly came to define his understanding of Ives's work.

Kirkpatrick's approach to the Concord Sonata weighed on his mind at the time of Ives's death. In a letter to Carl Ruggles dated 22 May 1954, just three days after Ives had died, Kirkpatrick wrote:

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[37] Ibid.
[38] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 18, Folder 203.

> I play Concord very differently from the way Charlie would have.…I've always wondered if I regularized it too much. But I've tried to do it (as far as I could imagine) more from the point of view of eternity (or perhaps the eternal qualities of his soul), and minimizing the accident of the rebellious character of his personality. I don't think he would have been content with that.[39]

Once again Kirkpatrick conveys a good deal of discomfort about how he has chosen to do what is natural or best to him with the Concord Sonata.

The memory of the impasse with Ives around the editing of the second edition haunted Kirkpatrick even decades later, when he was actively at work on his own copy of the sonata. In a talk he gave at the Yale Graduate Club on 30 March 1985, Kirkpatrick articulated his editorial strategy:

> the way I'm going at Concord is to take the first edition of 1921 as the central text, and choose, from earlier sketches and later variants, what fits with the original concept. Of course that's what I've been doing whenever I've played it over forty years, '38-78, but I wouldn't have had the nerve to formulate it in just that way—I had too much love, reverence, and gratitude for Ives himself.[40]

More than a shade of guilt for his true feelings about how the work should go emerges when Kirkpatrick says he "wouldn't have had the nerve" to admit to his preference for the first edition in Ives's presence. This guilt is reinforced by what Kirkpatrick designated a "P.S." to the notes for this talk, added a few days after having given it, in which he takes note of a slip in the grammar of the previous passage ("I *had* too much love, reverence, and gratitude for Ives…"):

> I see that I've referred to my deep affection for Ives in the past tense—not true at all. My love and reverence for him is now stronger than ever. Though I'm aiming at a "purified" Concord, it need not involve horse-blinders…[41]

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[39] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 30, Folder 333.
[40] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 61, Folder 568.
[41] Ibid.

Kirkpatrick most often understood his vision of a "'purified' Concord" as a *simplified* Concord, thinning out the dense textures and smoothing out the dissonances of Ives's second edition. He clearly held this point of view during the 1974 Ives Centennial Festival-Conference when he remarked:

> I do often find that Ives's first idea was best. Painters often say that a sketch, even a pencil sketch toward a painting, is apt to have a freshness that somehow the painting never quite preserves. I think the first state of a musical idea is apt to have that freshness, too, even if it's that kind of simplicity that Ives had no use for subsequently.[42]

In the notes for his "copy" of the sonata, Kirkpatrick makes no effort to excuse his tendency toward simplicity. He even admits that this preference had gotten him into trouble with Ives:

> Around 1940, in New York, my using the word "simplicity" touched him off into a long tirade mostly about "cloak for mental laziness," ending with "GOD DAMN simplic ity!"
>
> Arriving at West Redding around 1942, I told him, "I've been thinking that, every time anybody tries to make something clear to somebody else, whatever it might lose of its unique individual stamp, it would more than gain in universality." Quickly Harmony said, "Charlie, you can put that in your pipe and smoke it." But Charlie muttered, "When you're older, you'll understand these things better."[43]

Yet Kirkpatrick never lost his preference for simplicity. His notes point to the devices Ives used intentionally to complicate potentially simple passages, such as "added dissonances, metric dislocation, and sheer mis-spelling," many instances of which Kirkpatrick expunges from his "copy" of the sonata. He announces his intent to "fight shy of the gospel of avoidance where it might interfere with thematic integrity or with a natural unfolding of the contrapuntal flow."[44]

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[42] Hitchcock and Perlis, *An Ives Celebration*, 73.
[43] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 75, Folder 718.
[44] Ibid.

Kirkpatrick had addressed this point about "natural unfolding" in a bit more detail during the 1974 Ives Centennial Festival-Conference:

> Sometimes, those added touches of his are real touches of genius, but sometimes they are getting in his own way. You have to sort of tread lightly to find out which is which, but you can only do this when you know your sources pretty thoroughly and have done perhaps the inner equivalent of a conscientious and systematic comparison of sources. Then you have a right to try to see behind the notes and, as I naively say, "try to make like Charlie."[45]

Naively or not, Kirkpatrick exercises his "right to try to see behind the notes" and "make like Charlie," but the difficult question always seems to be, *which* Charlie? With the Concord Sonata, at least, one always seems to have a choice.

ACTION AND BELIEF: THE KIRKPATRICK "COPY" OF THE CONCORD SONATA

The Kirkpatrick "copy" essentially uses Ives's 1921 edition as a framework upon which he superimposes gestures derived from a range of Ives's variants. The choice to privilege Ives's first edition reveals Kirkpatrick's personal taste for clarity and simplicity, as well as the fact that it was the 1921 edition that Kirkpatrick had studied for five years in painstaking preparation for his premiere of the work. His preference for the first edition also helped Kirkpatrick to play the sonata at astonishing speed, even if the clarity and simplicity required to achieve that speed were at odds with the way Ives had come to hear the work after 1921. Kirkpatrick's

[45] Hitchcock and Perlis, *An Ives Celebration*, 68.

1968 recording clocks in at thirty-eight minutes, while many performers take closer to fifty.[46]

The first two pages of notes that accompany the Kirkpatrick "copy" of the Concord Sonata, numbered "1a" and "1b", are identical except that 1b bears the title, "The Player's Apology," and their first paragraphs differ. The first paragraph of 1a reads:

> This edition has two aims: (1) a complex of (a) the way I used to play *Concord*, 1938-78, always changing as the sources clarified, (b) after a stroke of 1981, the way I wish I'd played it, as light dawned on details I'd never appreciated, and (c) since Christmastime 1984, when I saw why the old first printing was the best central text; and (2) to make the textual notes complete enough to give any future player the essentials of what the sources offer, so that he could choose for himself.[47]

The first paragraph of 1b reads:

> This copy is not an "edition". It is merely one way to communicate a work which will always be, for its performers as it was for its composer, an endless experiment. But the notes describe every one of the sources, which could provide each player with his own introduction or springboard.[48]

In either case, Kirkpatrick makes clear his conviction that each performer should make his or her own way through the work—a process that should ideally involve as thorough an exploration of the source materials as possible.

It is important to keep in mind that Kirkpatrick insists that his approach is entirely based upon his close engagement with Ives's two editions and the unpublished variants. His "copy" of the Concord Sonata is neither an improvisational riff on Ives's work nor does it provide license for aleatory interpretations of Ives's score. The proof for his claim lies in his documentation of the extensive list of

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[46] The Kirkpatrick recording is Columbia MS 7192. Gilbert Kalish's 1976 Nonesuch recording (reissued on Electra/Nonesuch CD 71337-2) and a recent recording by Pierre-Laurent Aimard on Warner Classics each take just over 48 minutes.
[47] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 75, Folder 718.
[48] Ibid.

Table 5.1
Kirkpatrick's List of Materials Bearing on His "Copy" of the Concord Sonata

Prototypes:

V = *Orchard House Overture* (1904, fragment, mostly lost) < *The Alcotts*
Emerson Overture or piano concerto (1907, incomplete) < *Emerson*
Hawthorne Ov.? Or concerto? (1907? Or 10?, unf., Lost) < *Hawthorne*
W = *Walden Sounds* (1910, unfinished fragments, lost) < *Thoreau*

The Sonata:

s = preliminary sketches (1911-12?), not always continuous, incomplete
S = continuous sketches (1911-12?), incomplete
M = ink manuscripts (1911-19), often very slightly simplified from VWsS
p = 151 patches toward VM? , NnHh, rPR—later many by Roberts for PR
p = first private printing (prepared 1919, engraved 1920, printed 1921)
(? for [*protos*, first]—Ives had studied Greek)
r^{1-17} = copies of ? revised by Ives (1921-41), r^{16} prepared by Roberts for PR
K = disks recorded by Ives (c.1930-43)—(Columbia M32508, side 1, 1974)
q^{1-17} = lists of corrections to be made in P (1940-47)
P^{0-7} = proofs toward R (1940-47), with many patches in Roberts's hand
zZ^{1-11} = mss. (z) & typings (Z) of Playing Memoranda at end of R (1940-47)
R = revised ed. (Arrow Music Press 1947, Associated Music Publishers 1964)

Derivatives:

N = *Four Transcriptions from Emerson* (1916-23?), Ives's ink ms (sk in r^7)
n = copyist copy from N (by Reis?)
H = copyist copy from Nn by Emil Hanke
h^{1-5} = photostat copies of H revised by Ives, h^5 prepared by Roberts for PR
Y = Fourth Symphony, 2nd movement > *Hawthorne*
U = *Thoreau*, adapted 1915 from *Walden*, Ch. 4, in *114 Songs* (1922) > *Thoreau*
X = *Smoke* (Thoreau, *Walden*, Ch. 13), unfinished song (1923?) > *Thoreau*
RR = *The Celestial Railroad*, piano fantasy (1925?) > *Hawthorne* and Y
(sources are described more fully before each movement)

"prototypes" toward, music for, and "derivatives" from the sonata, which is reproduced, exactly as in his manuscript, in Table 5.1. Each item is assigned an abbreviation, and these appear in his handwritten score above each stave to indicate the source of each specific choice he has made.

Two editorial features permeate Kirkpatrick's "copy" and are pure Kirkpatrick. First, Kirkpatrick has divided the entire sonata into measures with editorial time signatures. The measure numbers are located beneath each stave. While Ives's use of barlines is often sporadic, Kirkpatrick found metrical analysis necessary as a mnemonic device in order to learn the work. In his notes for the edition he writes, "Ives was amazed at my metric analysis of the whole sonata, so unnecessary for him. But for me to memorize it, the flow of rhythms had to relate to clearly understood metres."[49] He explores this facet of his understanding of the sonata in more detail in the transcription of his oral history in *Charles Ives Remembered*:

> In order to learn *Concord*, I copied out the whole thing and made a kind of metrical interpretation of it, just as an aid to memory. I don't have the kind of musical intelligence that could swim around in this kind of prose rhythm with no bar lines at all. I had to explain to myself very clearly just where all the main first beats were—not that I was going to emphasize them like a ton of bricks—but so that I could act freely in respect to them.[50]

Nevertheless, Kirkpatrick seems to have maintained a rather Ivesian (or Jamesian) approach to his metrical analysis. In his typewritten notes, he reports that, "Over the years (1933-83), many of my measures have vacillated between smaller and larger."[51]

Another difference, less immediately obvious, but ubiquitous, difference is Kirkpatrick's liberal respellings of Ives's accidentals. In his notes, he writes:

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[49] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 75, Folder 718.
[50] Vivian Perlis, *Charles Ives Remembered: An Oral History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 215.
[51] John Kirkpatrick Papers, Box 75, Folder 718.

> [Ives's] spelling is often syntactic, more often symbolic: sharp to suggest aspiring or optimistic, flat relaxing or pessimistic (*Memos*, p. 195, where he ignores the polytonal basis of mush [sic] of his dissonance, recalled in *Memos*, p. 46). His free spellings meaning unfamiliar tunings (*Memos*, p. 190) deserve great respect, especially when written for instruments that can tune freely. But in the piano part of the *First Violin Sonata*, his transposition of the original G+B-flat+d to A-flat+B natural+d-sharp is mere non-conformism, and justifies respelling where needed for memorizing (for me, polytonal memorizing is far more natural than memorizing a notation of off-tunings which the ear is not actually hearing).[52]

Much as his metric divisions function as an aide-mémoire, then, so are Kirkpatrick's respellings largely designed to serve a practical function to assist the performer.

Given Kirkpatrick's metrical division of the sonata—in which, Kirkpatrick tells us, many note "values have been either halved or doubled from Ives's values"[53]—a rhythmic analysis of his edition would warrant a separate study, and will not be my focus here. Similarly, attempting a comprehensive understanding of Kirkpatrick's rationale for individual respellings would be a large-scale undertaking beyond the concerns of the present study. We may, however, get an idea of Kirkpatrick's feel for the sonata by tracing a limited set of editorial changes through a single movement, "Emerson." Recalling that Kirkpatrick's orientation is always fundamentally toward the 1921 edition, I have set out to compare the Kirkpatrick "copy" with Ives's generally more familiar and easier-to-obtain 1947 edition. Appendix 3 provides a comprehensive bar-by-bar analysis of my findings, which I summarize in the discussion that follows here.

Table 5.2 outlines the general types of variance between Kirkpatrick's and Ives's 1947 editions of "Emerson" and the number of bars in which each occurs. I shall comment briefly on each of them in the paragraphs that follow. I will begin my

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[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

commentary, however, by considering the sources of these differences. They are summarized in Table 5.3 in the order of their frequency.

Table 5.2
Summary of Types of Differences in Kirkpatrick's "Copy" of "Emerson" Compared with Ives's 1947 Edition

Type	Number of bars in which each type of difference appears
Articulation	
Arpeggiation	4
Breath mark	5
Octave doubling	22
"Pizzicato" attack	11
Repeated pitch	3
Rolled chord	30
Staccato attack	8
Tied note	5
Dynamics	34
Pitches	
General alteration	66
Alteration to create octaves	10
"Prose" and "Verse" designations added	7
Tempo	33
Texture	
Thicker	5
Thinner	42

Only sixty-nine of the 272 bars of Kirkpatrick agree with Ives's 1947 edition. The greatest number of bars of "Emerson" which differ between Kirkpatrick and Ives's 1947 edition—eighty-seven—reflect the corresponding passages in Ives's first edition. This analysis substantiates the claim that Kirkpatrick's point of reference is the first edition, and that he has a preference for Ives's originally published conception of the work.

Significantly, the second most frequent source for differences appears to be John Kirkpatrick himself. In these measures, Kirkpatrick differs from both of Ives's

edition, and no source is given for the variance. Table 5.4 summarizes the types of variance that fall into this category. The vast majority of the eighty-three bars containing his own editorial changes lie in the realm of articulation (especially rolled chords, pizzicato and staccato attacks). Kirkpatrick's editorial license—expressing

Table 5.3
Sources of Differences in Kirkpatrick's "Copy" of "Emerson" Compared with Ives's 1947 Edition (in order of frequency)

First Edition	87
John Kirkpatrick	83
Ink MS	36
Emerson Overture	15
Revision 7	14
Sketch 8	9
Revision 14	7
Sketch 4	7
Revision 6	6
Sketch 9	6
Revision 4	5
Sketch 1	5
Revision 3	4
Sketch 3	3
Patch 32	2
Patch 73	2
Photostat 5	2
Revision 15	2
Sketch 2	2
Sketch 6	2
p	1
Four Transcriptions from "Emerson"	1
Patch 13	1
Photostat 2	1
Photostat 3	1
Photostat 4	1
Preliminary sketch	1
Revision 16	1
Sketch 10	1

Table 5.4
Summary of Types of Variances in Kirkpatrick's "Copy" of "Emerson" Attributed to John Kirkpatrick Himself

Type	Number of Bars	Number of Variants of this Type (from Table 5.2)
Articulation		
Breath mark	3	5
Octave doubling	5	22
"Pizzicato" attack	11	11
Rolled chord	17	30
Staccato attack	8	8
Dynamics	18	34
Pitches		
General alteration	3	66
Alteration to create octaves	2	10
"Prose" and "Verse" designations added	2	7
Tempo	9	33

his right, as bequeathed by the composer himself, to play the sonata in the most "natural or best way" possible for him by drawing upon his own years of personal experience—also seems to be the source for many specific choices of tempo and dynamics.

Table 5.3 also shows us that Kirkpatrick uses a rather limited selection of revisions (seven of the possible seventeen), a selection of sketches (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10), a selection of photostat copies of Hanke's copyist copy (Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5), and only three of the 151 patches (Nos. 13, 32, and 73). Given that Kirkpatrick's point of reference seems to be the 1921 edition, it is noteworthy that in one spot in "Emerson" Kirkpatrick indicates p, the 1921 edition, as a source. The reference details a discrepancy in tempo between Sketch 8 and the first edition at the beginning of the lyric theme-and-variations that lies at the center of the movement (Kirkpatrick's m. 123/p. 8, first system, in Ives's 1947 edition).

I shall turn now to a brief description of the varieties of difference I traced between the two editions. Seventy-six bars of the Kirkpatrick "copy" contain pitches that are different from those in Ives's 1947 edition. These are not simply re-spelled pitches, but entirely different pitches. In many cases, flats or sharps are altered to become naturals, or vice versa, often in order to soften a dissonance. In ten bars, pitches are altered specifically in order to transform the dissonances of major sevenths or minor ninths into perfect octaves, reflecting Kirkpatrick's feeling that "the plain octave is much preferable to the stepped-up dissonance." On rare occasions Kirkpatrick favors an added dissonance compared to Ives's second edition. I located examples in two consecutive bars: Kirkpatrick's preference for tritons rather than perfect fifths at mm. 162 and 163 (compare with p. 12, second system, in Ives's 1947 edition), which agree with the first edition and the ink manuscripts, respectively. These, however, are anomalous, greatly outnumbered by instances of removed dissonances.

Differences in articulation between the two editions are very common. Of these, rolled chords are the most predominant. I noted thirty bars in which Kirkpatrick specified rolled articulation. He probably takes his cue from Ives's note on page 6 of the first edition that reads: "Throughout this and the other movements, there are many chords, the notes of which obviously cannot be struck together, though the roll or arpeggio mark is not used." Kirkpatrick applied seventeen of the thirty instances himself. Only three instances are drawn from the first edition. Twenty-two bars of Kirkpatrick's "Emerson" contain octave doubling that is not present in the second edition, either providing extra emphasis to a melody line or

deepening a bass line. These instances, not unlike Kirkpatrick's preference for rolled chords, produce a kind of romantic, virtuosic flourish. Less common variations in articulation include staccato and what Kirkpatrick calls pizzicato attacks, all products of his editorial imagination, as well as various breath marks, tied notes, arpeggiations, and grace notes, for most of which Kirkpatrick provides sources from Ives's variants.

Textural variance is another common difference between the two editions. I noted forty-two bars in Kirkpatrick that have a thinner texture than the corresponding places in the second edition, and only five in which Kirkpatrick's texture was thicker than Ives's. This is in keeping with Kirkpatrick's general tendency to agree with Ives's 1921 edition, which overall has a more transparent texture than the 1947 edition. Indeed, more than half (twenty-eight out of forty-two) of the bars with thinner texture agree with Ives's first edition; the rest come from a range of sources.

Variations in tempo and dynamics between the two editions are abundant. Differences in tempo appear in thirty-three bars of Kirkpatrick, who tends to want to specify tempo markings far more often than did Ives in either of his published editions. In this case, Kirkpatrick can rely on the first edition for only five of the differences noted. He draws from a wide variety of sketches and revisions, and uses his own imagination for nine of the differences noted. Among the variations in dynamics, less than half—nine out of thirty-four—come from the first edition, but eighteen of the others come from Kirkpatrick himself.

Finally, Kirkpatrick restores the "Prose" and "Verse" designations from the first edition to his own. Only one such designation survives in Ives's second edition. Inexplicably, Kirkpatrick moves two "Prose" designations—one from m. 91 (p. 5,

end of system 4, in Ives's second edition) to m. 94 (p. 5, end of system 5, in Ives's second edition), and the other from m. 158 (p. 12, top system, the one surviving instance in Ives's second edition) to m. 172 (p. 12, bottom system, in Ives's second edition)—without providing sources for the changes.

It may be fruitful to look at just one compact excerpt from the movement, the first page of Kirkpatrick's "Emerson," as shown in Example 5.1, to witness multiple instances of Kirkpatrick's "shamelessly personal batch of choices" in action. Immediately in the first bar we see the designation "(Prose)," which restores Ives's 1921 alternating sections of "Emerson" as either "Prose" or "Verse," only one of which survived in the 1947 edition. Again, Kirkpatrick indicates no source for the "(Prose)" designation, because it comes from the first edition, which is the foundation for his "copy."

Kirkpatrick aims for as transparent a texture as possible throughout his "copy" of the Concord Sonata. Seven of the first fifteen bars of Kirkpatrick's "Emerson" reflect the thinner texture of Ives's first edition, compared to the second—mm. 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17. The thinner texture in m. 6 is drawn from Revision 7, and that of m. 10 reflects variants derived from the Emerson Overture, the ink manuscript, and Patch 32, as indicated by the symbols written above the stave. The thinner texture at m. 11 is derived from the Emerson Overture, and that of m. 12 from Sketch 3.

As an example of Kirkpatrick's use of octave doubling to provide a fuller sound without adding additional pitch classes or increasing the dissonance level, as Ives tends to do in the second edition, in m. 4 Kirkpatrick doubles at the octave the



Example 5.1: Page 1 of Kirkpatrick's "copy" of "Emerson"

pitches in the right hand of the first edition. This idea is drawn from the Emerson Overture, as indicated by the "V" over each instance.

There are also examples of how Kirkpatrick frequently alters Ives's major sevenths and minor ninths by rounding them up or down to create perfect octaves. In his m. 3 on the last beat in the right hand, the C-sharp—G-sharp—C-sharp followed by C-natural—G-natural—C-natural comes from the Emerson Overture, smoothing out the C-sharp—G-sharp—D, C-natural—G-natural—D-flat dissonances of both Ives's first and second editions. In his m. 9, octave B-flats drawn from Ives's Revision 4 remove the B-flat—B-natural dissonances in the analogous spot in both of Ives's editions.

As an example of Kirkpatrick's modification of articulation in Ives's published scores, the arpeggiation at the end of Kirkpatrick's m. 5, replacing the less elegant ascending triplet chords of the 1947 edition, comes from Patch 13 in Ives's ink manuscript. Kirkpatrick favors such gestures a number of times in "Emerson," thus adding an air of romantic virtuosity to Ives's score.

There are three differences in tempo on the first page of Kirkpatrick's score. In m. 8, "faster, poco marcato" is added from Revision 4; in m. 14 the "faster and faster" from Ives's 1947 edition is omitted, agreeing with the 1921 edition; and Kirkpatrick himself seems to have added the designation "slightly slower" at m. 15. Kirkpatrick also removes a crescendo through mm. 12-14, in agreement with the 1921 edition.

Obviously, a thorough and meticulous analysis of the Kirkpatrick edition and the application of its sources would be an enormous task. Attempting to understand

all of Kirkpatrick's choices may be entirely impossible and, as his notes suggest, being able to do so is probably not the point: they are meant merely as one possible way of navigating the variety of source materials related to the Concord Sonata. In this light, I have attempted only to generate a few categories to aid in tracing some of Kirkpatrick's editorial tendencies. Perhaps the categories I have set forth suggest my own "shamelessly personal batch of choices," emphasizing those aspects of the Kirkpatrick edition that have most directly captured my interest and attention. Like the length of Kirkpatrick's metric divisions of the sonata, some of my observations have been subject to modification each time I have looked at these immensely complicated scores. In short, my analysis of Kirkpatrick's highly provisional score is itself highly provisional, but an effort, nevertheless, in the direction of understanding some of the choices Kirkpatrick made.

ACTION AND BELIEF: THE EVOLVING CONCORD SONATA

In "Remembrance of Dissonances Past: The Two Published Editions of Ives's Concord Sonata," Geoffrey Block is critical of Sondra Rae Clark, whose dissertation on the "evolving" Concord Sonata I discussed in the Introduction to this project, and what he calls, in a rather derisive tone, her "pro-choice" point of view.[54] He argues that:

> While he may have advocated rhythmic flexibility and freedom of tempo, and may have changed his mind on numerous details on the seven sets of proofs he worked on in the 1940s, the compositional record clearly suggests that Ives was not a proto-Cagean composer imagining indeterminate or

[54] Geoffrey Block, "Remembrance of Dissonances Past: The Two Published Editions of Ives's Concord Sonata," in *Ives Studies*, ed. Philip Lambert, 42, n. 31.

> improvisatory scores, but a Romantic composer in the nineteenth-century tradition of performance options. After he tried a number of variants, before and after the first edition, he settled on a preferred version for the most part within a few years of the first edition [probably, Block asserts in the essay, by 1926]. The second edition is his definitive version and the one we should play.[55]

These are strong words, and I think Block is missing Clark's point; she is hardly advocating Cagean indeterminacy in her approach to playing the Concord Sonata, but she is stressing the importance of acknowledging the depth of available resources, including and beyond the first and second editions, as they reveal important aspects of Ives's imagination, creative process, and philosophy. Clark's personal interactions with Kirkpatrick informed her point of view, which we have revisited in our consideration of Kirkpatrick's "copy" of the sonata.

Toward the end of his essay, Block, in search of some physical documentation to substantiate his claims, turns to recordings by Ives and Kirkpatrick to see what *they* do. He maintains that in Ives's 1943 recordings of "The Alcotts" and excerpts from "Emerson," Ives is truer to the second edition.[56] Block observes that in performance Kirkpatrick preferred "to mingle old and new versions" of the sonata.[57] He points to only one specific example from "Emerson" in which Kirkpatrick follows the second edition in both his 1945 and 1968 recordings, although he claims that the 1945 recording most closely follows the yet-unpublished second edition, and that the 1968 recording uses a mixture of the two, "but," he insists, "mainly the new."[58]

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[55] Ibid., 43.
[56] Block fails to mention, however, that the first and second edition versions of "The Alcotts" are essentially identical, except for a few accent marks, a couple of rolled chords, a couple of filled-in octaves, and the inclusion of several "overtones" in the second edition.
[57] Block, "Remembrance," 45.
[58] Ibid. Transcribing and analyzing these recordings would be yet another fascinating task in light of the present argument and the examination of the Kirkpatrick "copy."

We have seen the extent to which Kirkpatrick was hard-pressed to shake his preference for the first edition, even when considering all the evidence in attempting to create his own. Block struggles to keep Kirkpatrick in his camp:

> Although in later years he espoused a preference for the first version ("I do often find that Ives's first idea was best"), and his recordings incorporate more of the first edition than those of any other pianist including Ives, the second edition remained the central text for both of Kirkpatrick's recordings. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, however, Kirkpatrick turned his predilections into concrete action in a new edition that was left unpublished at the time of his death in 1991…He was now operating under the premise that the first edition corresponded more faithfully to Ives's original intentions.[59]

The suggestion here is that Kirkpatrick had changed his mind about the first edition toward the end of his life, although we have seen that Kirkpatrick never seems to have diverged from that position, from his avoidance of Ives's request for help with the second edition in the 1940s, through his published remarks on the subject during the 1974 Ives Centennial Festival-Conference, and to the edition he was preparing at the end of his life. Block concludes his article by calling for a third edition, despite the "daunting" problems facing the future editor:

> Unfortunately, although it represents Ives's considered afterthoughts about the work, the second edition not only presents new errors of rhythm and pitch and omits performance notes, it fails to distinguish from among the various sources in an accessible yet scholarly way that would benefit future performers and musicologists alike. An edition that addresses and resolves these issues would be most welcome. Such an edition should be based on the second edition.[60]

Certainly, Kirkpatrick's first-edition-based effort would not have appealed to Block's sensibilities.

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[59] Ibid., 45-6.
[60] Ibid., 48.

At the end of the appendix concerning "Editing Ives" in his biography, Jan Swafford asks, "What does a pianist do with Concord?" His answer suggests a middle ground between the Block and Kirkpatrick/Clark camps:

> Like everything else, the answer must be judgment calls, case by case. To me it makes sense for a performer to compare the two published editions and try to make some consistent choices. Going back to the sketches, other than to correct mistakes, seems over the line.…One should keep in mind, though, that in all versions the Concord is the same piece.[61]

This observation, that the sonata is in all versions the same piece, at least in what Ives would call its "substance," keeps open the door to interpretation, while seeming to mollify the Blockian terror of a "proto-Cagean" Concord Sonata.

The twentieth-century German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer stressed the importance of acknowledging our personal prejudices, both in terms of time and of cultural circumstances, when approaching a historical object.[62] Given the history of his experience with the Concord Sonata, John Kirkpatrick clearly had a prejudice toward the first edition. My own orientation toward the sonata, as a listener and as a pianist, is rooted in the second. This is the version we most often hear, and the only one to which most performers have access these days. I suspect Block's prejudice may be similarly rooted. I've tried to warm up to the first edition and to Kirkpatrick's meditation on the work with varying degrees of success. I miss the handfuls of notes that were so painstakingly made part of *my* effort to learn the sonata, the dissonances that make Kirkpatrick's preference for octaves sound so mundane. To his credit, however, Kirkpatrick does not pretend that his "edition," his "way to communicate the work," is anything other than entirely subjective. It is nothing like the cool,

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[61] Swafford, 438.

[62] See the sub-section "The principle of history of effect" in Section B ("Prejudices as conditions of understanding") of Part II, Chapter II of *Truth and Method*, Second Edition, tr. and revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum Publishing Co., 1994), 300-307.

scholarly edition Block had in mind; it is much more personal than that, much more Kirkpatrick. Yet regardless of how one feels about the music in it, the Kirkpatrick "copy" at least seems to be a very honest document, a document of what I think Ives would call "substance."

Gadamer's radically subjective approach to history, in which each individual is constantly mediating between one's own point of view and that which the object under consideration is presenting to one, grows directly out of the Heideggerian tradition, but more important for us here, it has much in common with Emerson's approach to history:

> We are always coming up with the emphatic facts of history in our private experience, and verifying them here. All history becomes subjective; in other words, there is properly no history; only biography. Every mind must know the whole lesson for itself,—must go over the whole ground. What it does not see, what it does not live, it will not know.[63]

This brings me back to John Kirkpatrick's directive that the only responsible way for one to approach the Concord Sonata is to spend time with the multiplicity of its sources. The directive is pure Emerson, as strongly reinforced by the evidence that both Kirkpatrick and Clark cite from Ives. Kirkpatrick seems to understand that ultimately his effort is but another node on the web of Concord references, another snapshot of the sonata's potential, another stage in this "endless experiment." It is inherent in his personal understanding of the work to encourage future performers to engage the Concord Sonata as intimately as he did, so that they may find their own path through it. And this, I think, is the most important lesson of what Kirkpatrick has left us.

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[63] Emerson, *Essays and Lectures*, 240.

Conclusion
Pragmatism and the Work of Art

One question that has hovered silently around this project is whether—and if so, how—the Concord Sonata is different from other musical works in its demands upon its interpreters. Ives is not the only composer to have left behind multiple drafts of a work, and the Concord Sonata is not the only musical work one can think of that requires the active engagement of its interpreters in its realization in performance; indeed, the active engagement of an interpreter in the realization of a work must be considered a prerequisite of any performance of any musical work. What does seem to be different about the Concord Sonata is what we have seen of Ives's self-consciousness about his relationship to the work, as revealed in his writings on the subject and his reluctance to finish it, and the ways in which these observations resonate against Jamesian pragmatism and the doctrine of pluralism. These ideas resonate further in the Kirkpatrick "copy" of the sonata.

In the Introduction to his early collection of essays, *The Performing Self*, Richard Poirier reflects on the nature of performance, an activity he thinks of in broad terms that include the production and consumption of literature:

> Performance may, in its self-assertiveness, be radical in impulse, but it is also conservative in its recognition that the self is of necessity, if unwillingly, inclusive of all kinds of versions, absorbed from whatever source, of what that self might be. Performance in literature, life, or politics is allusive, and therefore historical. . . . [It] is an action which must go through passages that both impede the action and give it form, much as a sculptor not only is impelled to shape his material but is in turn shaped by it, his impulse to mastery always chastened, sometimes made tender and possibly witty by the recalcitrance of what he is working on. Performance comes to fruition at precisely the point where the potentially destructive impulse to mastery

> brings forth from the material its most essential, irreducible, clarified, and therefore beautiful nature.[1]

We can certainly think of Ives and Kirkpatrick as selves "inclusive of all kinds of versions, absorbed from whatever source, of what [those selves] might be." Moreover, we can think of their performances—as revealed in their musical scores, their prose writings, their recordings—as similarly inclusive, similarly allusive, similarly historical. (We recall Emerson here: "Every mind must know the whole lesson for itself,--must go over the whole ground. What it does not see, what it does not live, it will not know.")

But it is the idea of the mind in performance, both shaping and being shaped by its material, releasing its idea only at "the point where the potentially destructive impulse to mastery brings forth from the material its most essential, irreducible, clarified, and therefore beautiful nature," that gives us pause in our consideration of Ives and Kirkpatrick. Poirier is describing a Zen-like moment of a mind on the brink, at the edge of the abyss, embracing the void—a potentially terrifying yet profoundly liberating moment. Perhaps it is the perilous aspect of this moment that caused Ives to be so uneasy about letting go of the Concord Sonata.[2] If indeed, as I have proposed, the work can be read as a cosmology—Ives packing into it what Poirier would call performances of everything he knew about the German romantic musical

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[1] Richard Poirier, *The Performing Self* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), xiv.

[2] This may be the place to mention Stuart Feder's *Charles Ives: "My Father's Song"—A Psychoanalytic Biography* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), especially Chapter 17, "Concord." Feder considers at some length "the discordant elements in [Ives's] mental life" (258), his apparent struggle with depression and anxiety, and suggests that the designation *Concord* "has many determinants, among them [Ives's] search, ultimately fruitless, for freedom from conflict and for inner peace" (260). "Concord," Feder concludes, "was for [Ives] a place in the mind" (272). See also Gayle Sherwood's article, "Charles Ives and 'Our National Malady,'" which considers the nature of the "attack" that curtailed Ives's creative productivity in 1918, Feder's response ("Heard Maladies Are Sweet ('But Those Unheard Are Sweeter')"), and Sherwood's response to Feder ("Ives and Neurasthenia"), all in the *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 54/3 (Fall 2001).

tradition, the American musical tradition, American literature, philosophy, religious tendencies, and, arguably, experimental psychology—then it is no wonder that Ives was anxious about finishing it, and that he expressed a "hope" that at least the "Emerson" movement never be finished. Like the American *cosmoi* of Emerson and William James, Ives's cosmos yearns not to achieve some final goal, but to go on expanding into a matrix of ever-increasing complexity. Ives is unable to let go at Poirier's moment at the abyss; instead, he side-steps the release by refracting that moment into a myriad of possible outcomes. In light of our discussion of the genealogy of the Concord Sonata in Chapter 4, then, it is by no means clear that the 1947 edition represents the point at which Ives achieves the sonata's "most essential, irreducible, clarified, and therefore beautiful nature"; instead, it is but one node on the web of Ives's conception of the work.

John Kirkpatrick's "copy" of the sonata seems to have brought him dangerously close to "the point [of] the potentially destructive impulse to mastery" of the work, and he seems to have felt that his long-term engagement with it provided him with unique access to its "most essential, irreducible, clarified, and therefore beautiful nature." Much like Ives, faced with the prospect of completing the 1947 edition of the sonata, however, Kirkpatrick ultimately side-steps the moment of release, denying that he has produced an "edition." He has left us with a most intriguing yet peculiar document: Not an "edition," in the sense of an effort at an objective, scholarly version of the sonata, but an admittedly highly personal "copy" of one way to perform the work. The Kirkpatrick "copy," with its accompanying typewritten notes, becomes a kind of cosmology itself, revealing a map of a mind at

work, a stream of consciousness. It provides a clear demonstration of Kirkpatrick's thought processes as he attempted to navigate the immensely complicated multiverse of Ives's musical scores, while simultaneously providing the raw materials for future interpreters of the sonata to make their own way through it. Kirkpatrick is both shaping and being shaped by his long-term experience with Ives's music and ideas.

Ives's Concord Sonata and Kirkpatrick's "copy" of it, along with the issues raised by this matrix of musical manuscripts, bring to mind a perennial problem for those of us who write about music: Where exactly can one locate a musical work? Is it in the notes of the score? If so, of *which* score? An autograph manuscript? A particular published edition? A scholarly edition? Or is it in the performance of the work? If so, in *which* performance? One played, conducted, or otherwise supervised by the composer? Or one played, conducted or otherwise supervised by some later scholar of the composer and/or his or her works? In this light, to what extent is the Kirkpatrick "copy" of the Concord Sonata a work by Charles Ives, and to what extent is it better understood as a work by John Kirkpatrick? I turn to Poirier once again; here he is writing about ways of approaching a work of literature, but his observations are perhaps even more easily applied to music:

> The gap between the completed work, which is supposed to constitute the writer's vision, and the multiple acts of performance that went into it is an image of the gap between the artist's self as he discovered it in performance and the self, altogether less grimy, discovered afterward in the final shape and the world reception of it. The question . . . is simply this: which kind of power—of performance or of the contemplatable visions that can be deduced from their end results—is the more illusory when it comes to understanding a literary work? There is no answer to this question. Rather, it posits a condition within which any writer, and any critic, finds himself working. It is a question not of belief in meanings but of belief in one kind of power and

> energy or another—one kind in the supposed act of doing, the other in the supposed result.[3]

Poirier's vague non-answer, in raising questions of belief concerning supposed actions and their supposed results, recalls our encounters with Jamesian pragmatism and, earlier, with the blurry consideration of that which constitutes right action in the *Bhagavad Gita.* The Kirkpatrick "copy" of the Concord Sonata is certainly a diagram of a performance, of an act of interpretation on Kirkpatrick's part. It is an image of a process explicitly declared to be a "shamelessly personal batch of [Kirkpatrick's] choices" that in some sense represents another snapshot in the continuously unfolding life of Ives's sonata, but in another is difficult not to read as a kind of result, something more concrete than the trace of a process, authored by John Kirkpatrick.

The firmer, result-like character of the Kirkpatrick "copy" is made even more complicated if we consider a peculiarity of the history of this document. A photocopy of Kirkpatrick's handwritten score is available from G. Schirmer/Associated Music Publishers as what they call a "manuscript edition sales item." Offered as *Piano Sonata No. 2, "Concord, Mass., 1840-1860," by Charles Ives, edited by John Kirkpatrick*, the Schirmer/AMP publication includes none of Kirkpatrick's explanatory notes, thereby omitting any indication of Kirkpatrick's stated intentions behind this document. It is given simply, for all practical purposes, as Kirkpatrick's edition of the sonata. But the user of the Schirmer/AMP publication would have no idea how to interpret the symbols above the staves of Kirkpatrick's "copy," and would therefore not know that Kirkpatrick had assembled his "copy" as a

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[3] Poirier, *Performing Self*, 88. It is important to note here, however, that for Ives and the Concord Sonata, the artist's self is hardly "less grimy" after the 1921 edition than before, that edition not being the "final shape" of the sonata at all—nor do we get the sense that Ives was much less grimy after 1947, the second edition being an exceedingly messy undertaking.

kind of patchwork of Ives's variants. Stranger still, the Schirmer/AMP publication bears a copyright date of 1947—the date of Ives's second edition, published by AMP more than forty years earlier than the time during which Kirkpatrick was working on this document. AMP explained that "the registration for the underlying copyright was taken out in 1947; subsequent editions retain the underlying date."[4] As far as the publisher is concerned, then, the Kirkpatrick "copy" is legally a work by Ives most accurately understood as fundamentally related to the 1947 edition, a position that we would find very difficult to sustain in light of our analysis in Chapter 5.

In its captive state, as defined by the Schirmer/AMP document, then, Kirkpatrick's "copy" of the Concord Sonata loses much of its life, its idiosyncratic character as a performance viewed by Kirkpatrick as a "springboard" to further explorations of the work. Poirier writes:

> Efforts to institutionalize the study of literature, to find order and design within particular works and to expand these into the larger designs of literary traditions, or literary communities, or of literature as a field of knowledge, have all had the result of suppressing the kind of energy I try to locate in the word "performance." It is an energy in motion, an energy which is its own shape, and it seldom fits the explanatory efforts either of most readers or even of most writers.[5]

The Schirmer/AMP publication denies the Kirkpatrick "copy" its distinctive shape, restricting it within the confines of an institutional box, suppressing the flow of its energy, the flow of Kirkpatrick's stream of thought, and actually withholding crucial components of Kirkpatrick's vision that would enhance its usefulness, its pragmatic value, its liveliness. The Schirmer/AMP publication may be an effort to make the document more widely accessible (otherwise residing only in the music library of

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[4] Letter from Susan Feder, 27 August 2004.
[5] Poirier, *Performing Self*, xiv-xv.

Yale University), but in omitting its crucial context, it ultimately nullifies this accessibility.

Our assessment of the Concord Sonata—as a Jamesian multiverse of works authored by Charles Ives and as re-examined by John Kirkpatrick—has consistently employed language that treats the work as a living being that moves and flows and changes, a constellation of potentialities that means differently as it passes among various contexts and modes of interpretation. Poirier, again meditating on the writing and reading of literature, could be writing of the way many of us are thinking of the study of music today:

> What is literary criticism to do with something so wonderful with writing as an act of keeping alive rather than an image of life or living? Or let's forget literary criticism and ask what in the teaching of literature one can do with the phenomenon of performance. It seems to me that one way literature can and should be taught is in conjunction with other kinds of performance—with dance, music, film, sports—and that a comparative analysis of modes of performance may indeed keep literary study alive in the face of the competition now before it. We must begin to begin again with the most elementary and therefore the toughest question: what must it have felt like to do this—not to mean anything, but to do it.[6]

Here again it is the *life* of the work of art that is of utmost importance, from its earliest conception as an *activity* on the part of the artist, to its eventual release as a performance, into a milieu that is both characterized and shaped by a context, a multiverse of other performances, and finally to its reception within that milieu, which is the point at which meaning begins to accrue around the work. By proposing that literature, dance, music, film, and sports be actively encouraged to speak to each other, Poirier is suggesting that each of these performance genres be kept in *motion*; after all, as we have seen from the earliest cosmologies explored in this investigation,

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[6] Ibid., 111.

it is the stasis of a performance, an idea, a critique, an organism, that leads to stagnation, that restricts its liveliness. To live is to act.

It is in light of the self-consciousness of its author's relationship to the work, then, that we may view the Concord Sonata as an American cosmology. It is a work whose internal mechanisms are a product of the author's movement among multiple fields (music, literature, philosophy, religion, psychology, business), and whose outward character is manifested in a multiplicity of modes of expression (both musical and verbal) through a multiplicity of versions (including the Kirkpatrick "copy") that ultimately serve to neutralize or at least to postpone its identity as a completed work. Ives's Concord Sonata refuses to stand still, internally and externally moving between flights and perchings, thereby mimicking the unpredictable and ever-expanding motions of human consciousness and of the universe at large.

Appendix 1:
Index of Persons and Works Mentioned in Ives's *Essays Before a Sonata*

Appendix 2:
A Transcription of the Inventory of Books at the Summer Home of Charles Ives in West Redding, Connecticut, as Compiled by Students of Vivian Perlis in 1974
Charles Ives Papers, Box 70, Folder 3

Items in bold type were discovered on the shelves of the music room in August 2005 and not accounted for in the 1974 inventory.

Key to abbreviations in "Inscription or other notes" column:
CEI=Charles Edward Ives
EOI=Edith Osborne Ives (Charles's daughter)
GWI=George White Ives (Charles's father)
HTI=Harmony Twichell Ives (Charles's wife)
JHT=Joseph Hopkins Twichell (Harmony's father)

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
	5000 Quotations for All Occasions	
	A Guidebook of Rome	
	Academy Papers, II	
Addams	*The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets*	HTI
Almadingen	*Frossia*	HTI
Amory, Cleveland	*Proper Bostonians*	
Amoto	*Poems, I*	
Antcliff	*Living Music*	("Mostly DEAD," Ives wrote in cover)
Anthon	*Sallust*	Lyman Brewster
Archibald, Warren	*7 sermons*	
Aristotle	*Nicomachean Ethics*	Lyman Brewster
Armstrong	*The Gift Shop*	
Arnold, Matthew	*Selected Poems*	
Arnold	*Poems, I and II*	
	Art Treasures of the Metropolitan	
Aspinall-Oglander	*Admiral's Wife*	
Austen, Jane	*Works, 8 vol.*	
Avivile	*Sketches of London, II*	
Baedeker	*Italy: Handbook for Travelers*	
Baillie	*The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul*	CEI
Balzac	*Works, 4 vol.*	
Balzac	*Works, 6 vol.*	
Baring, Maurice	*My End is My Beginning*	EOI
Barnes	*The Man Who Lived Twice*	
Barthelemy	*Voyage du Jeune Anacharsis*	GWI
Baskerville	*English Monks*	
Battiscombe	*Mrs. Gladstone*	
Bedford	*A Legacy*	
Beecham	*Gettysburg: The Pivotal Battle of the Civil War*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Beecher	*Prayers from Plymouth Pulpit*	
Bellamann	*Two Sides of a Poem*	To HTI from author
Bellow	*Mosby's Memories and other stories*	
	Bible (4 copies)	
	Bible	Margaret McGregor Tyler
	Bible Year-Book for Children	
Birkenhead	*Against Oblivion*	CEI
Birrell	*Obiter Dicta*	
Bishop	*The Day Kennedy Was Shot*	
Bixby	***The New World and the New Thought (1902)***	**Author of *The Ethics of Evolution*, and *Religion and Science as Allies*; page turned down in chapter on "The Validity of our Religious Instincts"**
Black	*Works, 6 vols.*	CEI (vol. I)
Blackmore	*Lorna Doone*	3 copies
Blanc	*The Yellow Villa*	
Blashfield	*Italian Cities*	
Blunden	*Leigh Hunt*	
	Book of Psalms	To JHT from CEI and HTI on fiftieth wedding anniversary
Borrow	*The Zincali*	
Borrow	*Works I, II, III*	
Bosco	*Farm in Provence*	
Boswell	*Life of Samuel Johnson*	CEI
Bowen	*Bowen's Court*	HTI
Boyesen	*Tales from Two Hemispheres*	JHT
Brink	*Harps in the Wind*	
Brogan	*The American Character*	
Bronte	*Works, 6 vol.*	
Brown, John, MD	*Rab and Marjorie*	
Brown	*One Gentle Tamers*	
Browning, Robert, and Elizabeth Barrett	*Letters, 2 vol.*	HTI
Bruce	*In Clover and Heather*	
Bryer	*The Princes Boy*	CEI
Bugby	*Mysteriouser and Mysteriouser*	
Bulwer	*Siamese Twins*	
Bunyan	*Pilgrim's Progress*	GWI
Bunyan	*Works*	
Burke, Edmund	*Works, 6 vol.*	2 copies
Burney	*Evelina*	
Burns, Robert	*Poetical Works*	
Burpee	*The Story of Connecticut*	
Bushnell, Frances	*Poems*	
Busoni	*A New Esthetic of Music*	
Byron	*Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Byron	*Fourth Canto*	
Byron	*Works, I, V*	
Byron	*Poems*	
Cable	*Old Creole Days*	2 copies
Caffin	*How to Study Pictures*	
Caldwell and Eikenberry	***Elements of General Science (1918)***	**Note in cover, Ch. XVI, which is on "Mechanical Energy and Heat"**
Cardigan	*I Walked Alone*	
Carlyle	*French Revolution, 2 vol.*	
Carlyle	*Works, 10 vol.*	
Cecil	*The Stricken Deer*	CEI
Chapin	*Mountaineering in Colorado*	To JHT from author, 1889
Chase	*America's Music*	
Chesebrough	*The Culture of Child Piety*	
Cheever	*Bullet Park*	
Chesterton	*St. Francis of Assisi*	
Chesterton	*St. Thomas Aquinas*	
Churchill	*A History of English Speaking Peoples*	2 copies
Clough	*A Century of American Life Insurance*	
Cobbett	*The Progress of a Ploughboy*	CEI
Cochrane	*Christianity and Classical Culture*	HTI
Coffin	*The Story of Liberty*	
Colburn	*Sequel*	
Collins/La Pierre	*O Jerusalem*	
	Commemorative Tributes of the American Academy of Arts & Letters, 1942-51	
Compton-Burnett	*Bullivant and the Lambs*	
Compton-Burnett	*Daughters & Sons*	
Compton-Burnett	*Parents & Children*	
Comstock, Joseph	***The Tongue of Time, and Star of the States: A System of Human Nature, with the Phenomena of the Heavens and Earth, with An account of persons with two souls, and of five persons who told colors by the touch (1838)***	
	Consensus, The (May 1933)	
Cooke	*Somebody's Neighbors*	
Cooper	*Works, 9 vols.*	
Corbett	*My India*	
Coulton	*Four Score Years*	
Couper, William	*Poems*	GWI
Couper, William	*Poetical Works*	
Cowell	*Charles Ives and His Music*	
Cowell	*New Musical Resources*	
Cozzens	*Mourning Noon and Night*	
Craven	*A Treasury of Art Masterpieces*	
Crawford	*Ave Roma*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Croce	*History*	CEI
Cronin	*A Pocketful of Rye*	
Crossley	*The English Abbey*	CEI
Cunningham	*Shirley*	
	Current Biography, 1947	
D'Indy	*Beethoven*	
D'Indy	*Cesar Franck*	
Darling	*A Naturalist on Rona*	
Darwin	*Naturalist's Voyage Round the World*	
	Das Neue Testament und Psalmen	CEI
Dawson, Christopher	***Christianity & the New Age (1931)***	
De Noiy	*Human Destiny*	CEI
Deland	*Old Chester Tales*	
Dickens	*Works, 15 vol.*	
Dickinson, Emily	*Further Poems*	
Dickinson, G. Lowes, ed.	*A Modern Symposium*	
	Dictionary of World Biography (1948)	
Dinesen	*Out of Africa*	
Djulas	*Conversations with Stalin*	
Donaldson	*Walt Whitman: The Man*	
Dos Passos	*The Men Who Made the Nation*	
Dostoevsky	*Poor People*	
Dunbar, Janet	*Golden Interlude*	
	Early Italian Poets	CEI
Eckert	*Edward Thomas*	
Edgeworth, Maria	*Novels and Tales, II, IV*	GWI
Edgeworth	*Novels and Tales, 6 vol.*	
Edman	*The Mind of Paul*	
Edmunds	*Sound and Rhythm*	
Edwards, Jonathan	*A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections (1746)*	Joseph Peck
Edwards	*Works, 7 of 8 vol. (1808)*	JHT
Eliot, George	*Works, 10 vol.*	
Eliot, George	*Works, 2 vol.*	
Eliot, John, and Samuel Johnson Jr.	*Dictionary*	H.C. White (1803)
Eliot, T.S.	*Poems*	
Emerson	*Works, 12 vol.*	
Encken	***The Problem of Human Life as viewed by the great thinkers from Plato to the present time (1914)***	**HTI; Section on "The American View of Life" mentions Pragmatists and Transcendentalists**
Ewen	*Complete Twentieth Century Music*	
Ewen	*Composers of Today*	
Ewen	*The Year in American Music, 1948*	
la Fontaine	*Fables*	
Fairbetter	*An English Year*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Fallodon	*Fallodon Papers*	HTI
Fane	*Morning*	
Fields	*Charles Dudley Warner*	
Fiske, John	*The Destiny of Man Viewed in Light of his Origin (1884)*	CEI
Fiske	*The American Revolution, 4 vol.*	
Flavius Josephus	*Works, I and II*	
Foster	*Where Angels Fear to Tread*	
	French and English Pronouncing Dictionary	
Funk & Wagnall	*New Standard Encyclopedia, 25 vol.*	
Furnas, T. Chalmers	*The Hills of God and other pieces*	
Furness	*Genteel Female*	To CEI and HTI from author
Gallaudet	*Life of Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet*	JHT
Gannett	*Cream Hill*	
Gannett	*Dreamers of the American Dream*	Eleanor Tyler
Gaskell	*Life of Charlotte Bronte*	
	Genealogy of the Twichell Family	
Gibbings	*Coming Down the Wye*	
Gibbings	*Sweet Thames*	
Gibbings	*Till I End My Song*	
Gibson	*Human Economics*	
Goddard	*A Leave of Absence, and Other Leaves*	JHT
Goethe	*Works, 5 vol. (Household Edition)*	
	Golden Treasure Series, 15 vol.	
Goldsmith	*Miscellaneous Works, 4 vol.*	
Goldsmith, Oliver	*Poems*	GWI
Goodrich	*Analytical Harmony*	
Gordon, George	*Letters*	
Gordon, George	*Ultimate Conceptions of Faith*	2 copies
Gosse	*St. Helena*	
Goudge	*A Child from the Sea*	
Grant	*Our Common Birds and How to Know Them*	
Gray	*Poems & Letters*	
	Great True Stories of Crime, Mystery, and Detection	
Griffis	*The Japanese Nation in Evolution*	JHT
Guizot	*History of France*	
Guizot	*History of France I, III, IV, VI, VIII*	
Hadley, Arthur Twining	***Some Influences in Modern Philosophic Thought (1913)***	**Author was President of Yale University; lectures on "Changed Conceptions of Science" and "The Influence of Charles Darwin on Historical and Political Science"**
Hailey	*The Final Diagnosis*	
Hale	*A New England Girlhood*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Hale	*Ten Times One is Ten*	
Hamilton	***Sound and its Relation to Music (1912)***	
Hamsun	*Growth of the Soul*	2 copies; one CEI
Hancock	*And After This*	
Hannan	*Iona and Some Satellites*	
Hardy	*The Dynasts*	
Hare	*Walks in Rome, 2 vols.*	
Harmon	*The Candid Impostor*	
Harris	*Uncle Remus*	
Harte	*In a Hollow of the Hills*	JHT
Hartog	*Peaceable Kingdom*	
Harweis, Rev. H.R.	***Music and Morals (1871)***	
Hastings	*The Spirit of the Cycling Parson*	JHT
Haweis, Rev. Thomas	*The Communicant's Spiritual Companion*	GWI
Hawley	*Hurricane Years*	
Hawthorne	*Works, 8 vol.*	
	Heart of Emerson's Journals, The	CEI
	Heart of Thoreau's Journals, The	CEI
Helmholtz	*On the Sensations of Tone*	
Hemingway	*By-Line*	
Herold	*Mistress to an Age*	
Hervey	*Meditations and Contemplations*	GWI
Hill, S.B.	*The History of Danbury*	To CEI from L.D. Brewster
	History of Charles XII	
	History of German Literature, 2 vol.	
Holcombe	*Lectures on Life Insurance*	
Homer, ed. Pope	*Iliad and Odyssey, 6 vol.*	
Hopkins	*Poems*	
Horton	*Talks with Lay Preachers*	
	Hospital Notes	HTI (a nurse's handbook)
Houff	*Die Karavane*	
House	*Japanese Episodes*	JHT
Howard	*Our American Music*	
Howells	*My Year in a Log Cabin*	
Howells	*The Albany Depot*	
Howison	***The Limits of Evolution, and other essays illustrating the metaphysical theory of personal idealism (1901)***	**William James in index, with reference to his ideas of pluralism and immortality**
Hughes	*Roman Roads*	
Hugo	*Works, 6 vol.*	
Hunt, Leigh	*Essays*	
Hutchinson	*Interim*	
Hutchinson	*The Fire and the Wood*	
Hute	*Greenwillow*	
Hutton	*Literary Landmarks of London*	
Huxley, T.H.	*Darwiniana*	
Huxley, T.H.	*Essays, Discourses*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Huxley, T.H.	*Hume with Helps to the Study of Berkeley*	
Huxley, T.H.	*Man's Place in Nature*	
Huxley, T.H.	*Method and Results*	
Huxley, T.H.	*Science and Education*	
	Hymns and Spiritual Songs	
	Hymns of Faith and Life	
Irving	*Works, 16 vols.*	
Irving	*Works, 7 vols.*	
Ives, Charles	*Essays Before a Sonata*	HTI
Ives, Isaac	Handwritten book, 1789	
Ives, J. Moss	***The Art & the Dove: The Beginning of Civil and Religious Liberties in America* (1936)**	
Jackson	*Sudan Days and Ways*	
Jaggar	*Union Through the Ages*	
James, Henry	*The Ambassadors*	
James, Henry	*Tale of Three Cities*	
James, Henry	*The Outcry*	
James, Henry	*The Private Life and other stories*	
James, Henry	*Transatlantic Sketches*	
James, Henry	*Traveling Companions*	
James, Henry	*Works, 6 vol.*	
James	*Lone Cowboy*	EOI
James, P.D.	*A Mind to Murder*	
James	*Seige of London*	
James	*Spoils of Poynton*	
James	*The Fine Grain*	
Jameson	*The Journal of May Hervey Russell*	
Jebb	*Greek Literature*	
Jewett	*The Tory Lover*	
Johnson	*Heroes, Children & Fun*	
Johnson	*Works, 6 vol.*	
Jones	*Christ's Alternative to Communism*	
Kauffman	*"Universal Law and the Democratic Principle"*	Pamphlet, published 1943, dedicated to CEI and Charles C. Reid
Kaufman	*The Story of 100 Great Composers*	
Keats	*Poems*	
Keep	*School Stories and Questions*	Preface by JHT
Kelly	*Eleanor of Aquitaine*	
Kempis	*Imitation of Christ*	GWI
Kemelman	*The Day the Rabbi Stayed Home*	
Kidd, Benjamin	***Social Evolution (1895)***	**"Given to me by Aunt Sarah, 1920, CEI"—on p. 263, "*The evolution which is slowly proceeding in human society is not primarily intellectual but religious in character*"and Ives adds in pencil, "Both Father and Uncle Joe said grandfather felt this way"**
Kipling	*Works, 2 vols.*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Kipling	*Rewards and Fairies*	
Kipling	*Works, 18 vols.*	HTI
Kirby	*Golden Dog*	
Klein	*Unmusical New York*	
Knebel	*Trespass*	
Knef	*The Gift Horse*	
Knickerbocker	*Free Minds: John Morley and his Friends*	
	Knowing our Trees	
Lamb, Charles	*Works, 12 vol.*	
Langdon Davies	*Gatherings from Catalonia*	
Lanier, Sidney	*Poems*	To HTI from author
Lashington	*Portrait of a Young Man*	CEI
Law	*An Humble, Earnest, and Affectionate Address to the Clergy*	
	Le Brun's French Primer	GWI
Lee	*When I was a Boy in China*	To JHT from author
Leigh	*Highland Homespun*	
Leighton, Clare	*Country Matters*	
Lestair	*The Three Edwards*	
Lever	*Harry Lorrequer*	
Levi	*Christ Stopped at Eboli*	
Lewis, C.S.	*The Case for Christianity*	CEI
Lewis, C.S.	*The Problem of Pain*	CEI
	Life of G.A. Selwyn, I	
	Lightning Express	
Lipskey	*The Devil's Daughter*	
	Literary Digest 1927 Atlas of the World and Gazeteer	CEI
	Lives of John Ribault, Sebastian Rule, and William Patfrey	
	Locke and Bacon	
Locke, John	*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*	GWI
Lomax, John	*Cowboy Songs*	To HTI from CEI and EOI
London	*Call of the Wild*	
Longfellow	*Works*	JHT
Longfellow	*Complete Works*	
Longfellow	*Dante, 3 vol.*	
Longman	*Summary of English History*	HTI
Lonsdale	*Sister Dora*	
Loven	*Handy Andy*	
Lowell	*Works, 8 vols.*	
Lowones	*I, Too, Have Been In Arcadia*	
Lowrie	*The Church and its Organization*	To HTI from author
Lyman	*Christian Epic*	
Lynch	*Civil War Diary*	
Macaulay	*History of England*	
Macdonald	*Adela Cathcart*	
Macdonald	*David Elginbred*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Macdonald	*Robert Falconer*	
Mackenzie	*Nationalism and Education in Australia*	
Mackenzie	*Planned Society: Symposium on Social and Economic Change*	
Maeterlinck	*The Miracle of Stanton*	
Manzoni	*The Betrothed*	
Mariani	*Meeting with Japan*	
Maritaine, Jacques	***Religion and Culture***	
Marois	*Aspects of Biography*	
Marsh	*Killer Dolphin*	
Marshall, Archibald	*Novels*	
Martens	*Leo Ornstein*	
Masefield	*Everlasting Mercy*	
Mason	*Zanzibar Intrigue*	
	Materia Medica for Nurses	
Maugham	*Short Stories*	
Maugham	*The Link*	
Maxwell	*Ring of Bright Water*	
McDonald	*My Mission in Israel*	
McGiffert	***The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas (1915)***	**HTI**
Melville	*Moby Dick*	CEI
	Memories of a Friend	CEI
Meredith	*The Egoist*	
Miller, Dayton Clarence	***The Science of Musical Sounds (1922)***	
Milton	*Poetical Works, II*	GWI
	Missional Hymnal	To EOI from CEI and HTI
Mitchell	*Dream Life*	
Moliere	*Works, 6 vol.*	
Montague	*Home to Him's Muvver*	
Montaigne	*Works, 4 vol.*	
Montesquieu	*Esprit des lois*	
Moorhouse	*Nelson's Lady Hamilton*	
Morley	*Critical Miscellanies*	
Morris	*Historical Tales, 8 vol.*	
Morris	*The Story of the Glittering Plane*	HTI
Motley	*The Rise of the Dutch Republic*	CEI
Motley	*The Rise of the Dutch Republic, 2 vol.*	CEI
Munjoro	*Values*	CEI
Murray	*The Forsaken Fountain*	
	Murray's Introduction	
	National Cyclopedia of American Biography	
	National Encyclopedia of American Biography, 1939-42	
	National Institute of Arts and Letters (1946)	
	National Institute of Arts and Letters/American Academy of Arts and Letters (1949)	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
	National Institute of Arts and Letters/American Academy of Arts and Letters (1951)	
Nevinson	*Fire of Life*	CEI
Newton, R. Heber	***The Mysticism of Music (1915)***	
Nietzsche	*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*	
O'Flaherty	*The Informer*	
Oldham	*A Devotional Diary*	
Oliphant, Mrs.	*The Makers of Venice*	
Page	*In Ole Virginia or Marse Chan and other stories*	
Papiri	*Life of Christ*	CEI
Parker	*An Adventurer in the North*	
Parkhurst	*The Birds Calendar*	
Parkman	*Pioneers of France in the New World*	
Pater, Walter	*Works, 7 vol.*	
Patmore	*The Angel in the House*	JHT to CEI
Patt	*Comparative Vertebrate Histology*	
Payne	*The Gold of Troy*	
Peacock	*Novels*	
Pearson	*Sir Walter Scott*	
Pellowe	*Lamps of Liberty*	
Pellowe	*Mark Twain: Pilgrim from Hannibal*	
Percy	*Reliquies*	
Perse	*Elegies and Poems*	
Peterson, R.E.	***Familiar Science, or, The Scientific Explanation of Common Things (1851)***	**Chapters on Musical Sounds and Echo**
Philips	*Ulysses*	
Phillips	*Herod: A Tragedy*	
	Physicians Desk Reference (1966)	
Plato	*Works, 4 vol.*	
Plomer, William	*Kilvert's Diary, 2 vol.*	
	Plymouth Collection of Hymns and Tunes	
Poe	*Works, 4 vol.*	
Pole	*Philosophy of Music*	
Porter	*American Colleges and the American Public*	To JHT from author
Potwin, Rev. Thomas Stroughton	*The Triumph of Life*	JHT
	Practical Morality: Lord Chesterton's Advice to his Son	GWI
Prime	*I Go a' Fishing*	To JHT from author
	Principles and Practice	Nursing textbook, HTI
	Proceedings, American Academy of Arts and Letters/National Institute of Arts and Letters, 2 vol.	
	Psalms and Hymns	
	Psalms of David	2 copies
Quick	*Doctrines of the Creed*	CEI

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Quiller-Couch	*On the Art of Reading*	
Rawlings	*South Moon Under*	
Rawlings	*The Yearling*	
	Reader's Digest Great Encyclopedia Dictionary	
	Reader's Digest Condensed Books, 4 vols.	
	Records of Tennyson, Ruskin & Browning	To HTI from JHT
Reid	*Peter Waring*	
Rinault	*Far from Heaven*	
Ripley	*Bank of Faith*	GWI
Robinson, James Harvey	***The Mind in the Making: The Relation of Intelligence to Social Reform (1921)***	**CEI; contains chapter on "How Creative Thought Transforms the World"**
Roby	*Still as the Grave*	
Roche	*Children of the Abbey, 2 vol.*	
Rosenfeld	*Discoveries of a Music Critic*	
Rosenfeld	*Voyage in the Arts*	
Rostand	*Cyrano de Bergerac*	
Rourke	*Audubon*	
Rowse	*Cornish Waif's Story*	
Rudhyar	*Faith That Gives Meaning to Victory*	
Rudhyar	*Modern Man's Conflicts*	To CEI from author
Rudhyar	*Release of Power*	
	Rule of Life in Select Sentences	GWI
Ruskin	*Works, 15 vols.*	
Ruskin	*Ethics of the Dust*	
Rutledge	*Home by the River*	
	Sacred Songs for Family and Social Worship	
Sadleir	*Excursions in Victorian Biography*	
Sanborn	*Recollections of Seventy Years, Vol. 2*	JHT
Satoh	*Agitated Japan*	JHT
Sayers	*Begin Here: A Statement of Faith*	
Scherer	*Essays on English Literature*	
Schmitz	*The Capture of Inspiration*	
Schweitzer	***The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle (1931)***	
Scott	*Lessons in Elocution*	
Scott, Sir Walter	*Journal*	JHT
	Scripture Club of Valley Rest	JHT
Seager	*And Tyler Too*	
Sergyenko	*How Count L.N. Tolstoy Lives and Works*	
Shakespeare	*Works (Oxford)*	
Shaw	*Castle Blair*	
Shelley	*Poems*	
Shepard	*Connecticut Past and Present*	
Sherwood, Mrs.	*Works, V, VI*	GWI
Shutter	*Applied Evolution (1900)*	
Sitwell	*Works, 5 vols.*	
Slonimsky	*A Thing or Two About Music*	

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
Slonimsky	*Music Since 1900*	
Slosson	*A Little Shepard of Bethlehem*	
Slosson	*Story-Tell Ad Lib*	
	Smith's Definer's Manual	
Smollett	*Works, 6 vol.*	
Smythe	*Valley of Flowers*	
Snider	***Feeling Psychologically Treated, and Prolegomenon to Psychology (1905)***	
	Songs for Little Ones at Home	
	Souvenirs of Madame Vigée Le Brun	
Spaeth	*Read 'em and Weep*	
Spaeth	*Weep some More*	
Spenser	*Faerie Queene, I*	
Spenser	*Poetical Works*	
Sprague	*Frank J. Sprague and the Edison Myth*	
Stanford	*Studies and Memories*	
Stanwell-Fletcher	*Driftwood Valley*	
Steiner	*The Mediator*	
Sterne	*Works, 6 vol.*	
Stevenson, R.L.	*Works, 7 vol.*	
Stewart	*The Crystal Cave*	
Storm	*Immensee*	In German
Stowe	*Uncle Tom's Cabin*	
Streeter	***Reality: A New Correlation of Science and Religion (1927)***	**HTI, includes references to William James in chapter on "Religion and the New Psychology"**
Stuart	*Tales from the Plum Grove Hills*	
Sue	*The Mysteries of Paris*	
Swift	*Robinson Crusoius*	GWI, in Latin
Swift	*Works*	
Swift	*Works, 3 vol.*	
Taggao	*The Life and Mind of Emily Dickinson*	
Taine	*History of English Literature*	CEI
	Tales of My Landlord	
Tapper & Goetschius	*Essentials in Music History*	
Taubes	*Oil Painting for the Beginner*	
Taylor, Alistair & Henrietta	*1715: The Story of the Rising*	
Taylor	*Roger Ludlow*	
Teale	*North With the Spring*	
	Techniques of Painting	
Tennyson	*Death of Oenone*	
Tennyson	*Works, II*	
Tennyson	*Tiresias and other poems*	
Tennyson	*Works, 11 vols.*	
Thackeray	*Works, 24 vols.*	
Tharp	*Peabody Sisters of Salem*	CEI

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
	Think Well On't: Reflections (London, 1744)	
Thomas	*The Dark Philosophers*	
Thomas	*The Heart of England*	
Thompson	*Green Mountain Boys*	
Thompson	*Life in a Noble Household*	
Thoreau	*Works, 11 vol.*	
Thoreau	*The Cosmic Yankee*	To CEI from Edith
Thoreau	*Walden*	HTI
Todd, Charles Burr	*In Olde Connecticut*	
Toynbee	*Civilization on Trial*	
Trebor	*A Story of American Life and Character*	
Tremain	*Sectionalism Unmasked*	
Trevelyan	*Grey of Fallodon*	
Trevor	*Bury Him Among Kings*	
Trotter and York	*Music and Mind*	References to William James
Trumball	*A Christmas Accident*	To JHT from author
Trumbell	*Old Time Student Volunteers*	
Trumbull	*Life's Common Way*	
Trumbull	*Names and Portraits of Birds*	To JHT from author
Trumbull	*Rod's Salvation*	JHT
Tucker	*The Sound of Summer Voices*	
Turgenieff	*Works, 6 vols.*	
Turner	*Liber Fluvorium*	
Turner	*No Fiction or the Test of Friendship*	GWI
Twain, Mark	*Selections from American Humour*	
	Twice A Year, 1940-41	
Twichell	*Some Old Puritan Love Letters*	2 copies
Twining	*Travels in America 100 Years Ago (1894)*	
Untermeyer, ed.	*Modern American Poetry*	CEI
	Vie de George Washington	
Vigny	*Cinq mars ou une conjuration sous Louis XIII*	
Vining	*Friend of Life*	
Voltaire	*Works, 22 vols.*	
Walsh	*Behold the Glory*	
Warner	*Fashions in Literature*	JHT
Warner	*In the Wilderness*	
Warner	*The Golden Horse*	To JHT from author
Warner	*Washington Irving*	
Washington, George	*Letters and Addresses*	CEI
Watters	*How to Talk with Practically Anybody about Practically Anything*	
Waverly	*Novels, 12 vols.*	
Weatherhead, Leslie	*Psychology, Religion, and Healing*	
Welty	*Delta Wedding*	
Wessely	*French Dictionary*	
Wessex	*Poems*	
West	*Except for Me and Thee*	
West	*Pepita*	CEI

Author	Title	Inscription or other notes
West, Sackville	*The Land*	HTI
West	*The Eagle and the Dove*	
White	*England Have My Bones*	CEI
White	*The View from the Fortieth Floor*	
Whitehead	*The FBI Story*	
Whitman	*Leaves of Grass and Autobiography*	
Whitney	*American Presidents*	
Whittier	*Poems, 2 vols.*	
Whittier	*Poetical Works*	
	Who's Who in America, 1946-53	
	Who's Who in Music	
	Who's Who in New England	
	Who's Who in the East, 1942-3	
Wilkins	*Clarence King*	
Wilson	*A History of the American People, II-V*	
Wilson	*George Washington*	HTI
Winbolt	*Sussex*	
Winter, William	*Wanderers*	
Wister	*The Virginian*	
Woodress	*A Yankee's Odyssey*	
Woods	*Sermon in Remembrance of Harriet Newell*	GWI
Woolcott	*Long, Long Ago*	
Woolf	*To the Lighthouse*	
Worcester	*History*	
Wordsworth	*Poetical Works*	
	World Biography	
Worthington, Marjorie	*Miss Alcott of Concord*	
Wren	*Kith and Kin*	
Wren	*Yorkshire Hill-Folk*	
Wrench	*Uphill*	
Wust, Peter	***Crisis in the West***	
Wyman	*American Chivalry*	
Wyman	*Poverty Grass*	
	Yale Alumni Directory, 1948	
Yeats	*Essays*	
	You and the Law (Reader's Digest book)	
Young	*A Good Man*	CEI
Zhigalova	*Across the Green Post*	HTI

Appendix 3:
A Provisional Description of Differences Between Kirkpatrick's "Copy" of "Emerson" and Ives's 1947 "Emerson" and their Sources

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
1	(Prose)	Added	First Edition
2			
3	Pitch	Octave replaces minor ninth, beat 3	Emerson Overture
4	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand	JK
5	Articulation	Rapid arpeggio replaces ascending triplet chords	Patch 13/Ink MS
6	Texture	Thinner in right hand	Revision 7
7	Texture	Thinner texture (CEI squeezes in Beethoven motive in left hand in Second Edition)	First Edition
8	Tempo	"Faster, poco marcato" added	Revision 4
9	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition
	Pitch	Octave replaces major seventh, beat 1	Revision 4
10	Texture	Thinner in right hand	Emerson Overture/Ink MS/Patch 32
	Pitches	In right hand on third beat	Emerson Overture
11	Texture	Thinner in right hand	Emerson Overture
12	Texture	Thinner in right hand	Sketch 3
	Dynamics	No crescendo	First Edition
13	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition
	Dynamics	No crescendo	First Edition
14	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition
	Dynamics	No crescendo	First Edition
	Tempo	No "faster and faster"	First Edition
15	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition/Emerson Overture
	Tempo	"Slightly slower" added	JK
16	Texture	Thinner	First Edition
17	Texture	Thinner	First Edition
18	Articulation	Rolled chord from left to right hand, beat 3	JK
	Pitch	A-flat replaces A-natural on beat 1 in left hand	Ink MS
19			
20			
21	Tempo	"A little faster but firmly" moved from m. 22 in Second Edition	First Edition
22	Pitch	B-natural changed to B-flat on beat 3 in right hand	Ink MS
23	Tempo	"Faster, as an alla breve" added	Revision 14
	Articulation	Octave doubling added in left hand	JK
24			
25	Articulation	Octave doubling added in left hand	JK
26	Articulation	Octave doubling added in left hand	JK
27			
28			
29	Articulation	Tripled octave removed from left hand	JK
	Articulation	Note from CEI added: "I play octs. lower," but this is not reflected in JK's score, as indicated on	Revision 15

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
		line above	
30	Articulation	Octave tripling removed from left hand	Revision 15
31			
32			
33			
34	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	Revision 6
35	Articulation	B in right hand tied to bar 36	Ink MS
36	Pitch	D-natural in left hand on beat 1 replaces D-sharp	Revision 3
37			
38			
39			
40			
41	Texture	Thicker in right hand	Revision 6
	Dynamics	Decrescendo from *mp* added	Revision 6
	Articulation	Breath mark added end of bar	JK
42			
43	Articulation	Rolled chords added in left hand	Revision 6
44			
45			
46	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
47	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
48	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
49	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
	Dynamics	Descrescendo and crescendo added in right hand	Revision 16
50	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
51			
52	Pitches	Pitches changed in right hand	First Edition
53	Articulation	Pizzicato attack added	JK
	Tempo	"A little faster (broadly but not heavily)" added	JK
	Dynamics	Crescendo in left hand added	JK
54	Articulation	Pizzicato attack added	JK
	Dynamics	Crescendo and decrescendo in left hand added	JK
55	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
56	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
57	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
58	Pitches	D added to held chord in right hand, beat 1	Ink MS
59	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	JK
60	Pitches	Octaves replace minor ninths on beats 3 and 4 in right hand	JK
61	Articulation	Pizzicato attack	JK
62	Articulation	Pizzicato attack	JK
	Pitches	Pitches altered in chords in right hand on beats 1 and 4	JK
	Pitches	F-sharp, top note in left hand on beat 2, replaces F-natural	Ink manuscript
63	Texture	Thinner on last beat	Sketch 8
64	Articulation	Pizzicato attack	JK
65			
66	Pitch	Perfect fifth replaces tritone in left hand, beat 2	Ink MS
67			
68	Articulation	Pizzicato attack	JK

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
69			
70			
71	Articulation	Pizzicato attack	JK
72	Articulation	Pizzicato attack	JK
73	Texture	Thinner in right hand	Ink MS
74	Articulation	Pizzicato attack	JK
75			
76	Texture	Thicker in right hand	Sketch 8/Ink MS
77	Articulation	Pizzicato attack	JK
78	(Verse)	Added	First Edition
	Tempo	"Quietly, slowly, but faster than preceding rit." added	Ink MS
79	Dynamics	Crescendo from *pp* to *p* added	Sketch 3
80	Articulation	Rolled chord added from left to right hand, beat 3	Ink MS
81			
82			
83			
84			
85	Pitch	C-natural replaces C-sharp in middle voice	Revision 4
	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition
86	Tempo	"Faster" added	Revision 3
	Articulation	Octave doubling added in left hand on beat 3	Ink MS
87			
88	Articulation	D not repeated in right hand	Ink MS
89			
90			
91	Texture	Thinner in left hand	First Edition
92			
93	Articulation	Rolled chords in both hands	JK
	Dynamics	Crescendo added	Sketch 1
94	(Prose)	Moved from m. 91 in First Edition	JK
	Tempo	"Maestoso (ma in tempo)" added	Sketch 1
95			
96	Pitches	Change of pitch, beats 4 and 5 in right hand	Sketch 1/Ink MS
97	Pitches	Octave replaces major seventh in right hand on beat 4	Sketch 1/Ink MS
98	Articulation	Ascending doubled octaves replace more complicated figuration	Revision 7
99	Articulation	Ascending arpeggio replaces more complicated figuration	Ink MS
	Pitches	Seventh chords replace denser dissonances on last 3 chords	Ink MS
	Tempo	No "very fast"	JK
	Dynamics	No *ff*	JK
100	Pitches	Seventh chord replaces denser dissonance on beat 3	Ink MS
101	Pitches	Less dissonant throughout measure	Ink MS
102	Articulation	Rolled grace chord replaces ascending 64th-note figure in left hand leading into m. 103	Revision 7/Ink MS
	Pitches	Less dissonance	Revision 7/Ink MS

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
103			
104	Texture	Octaves replace dissonant chords in right hand	Revision 7
	Dynamics	Sustained *ff* replaces *ff* to *pp*	JK
105	Dynamics	Decrescendo added	Patch 73
106	Dynamics	Decrescendo added (continued)	Patch 73
107			
108	Dynamics	*mp* replaces *p* to *ff*	JK
109	Dynamics	JK starts with *f* chord, then *mp*; CEI starts at *ff*, then *pp*	JK
	Articulation	No grace dyad on beat 1	First Edition
110	Articulation	Octave displacement, with low G-sharps in left hand on beat 3	Photostat 3
111	Pitches	Low E's held throughout measure	JK
	Texture	Thinner in right hand	Sketch 6
	Articulation	Middle voice chords struck three times without changing	Sketch 6
112	Pitches	C-natural replaces C-sharp in right hand, beat 1	First Edition
	Articulation	Octave doubling on F-sharps in right hand, beat 2	Ink MS
	Pitches	G-sharp replaces G-natural in right hand on beat 4	Sketch 6
113			
114	Texture	Thinner in right hand	Ink MS
	Articulation	Breath mark added end of bar	JK
115	Tempo	"Faster, as a kind of cadenza" added	Revision 4
116	Tempo	"In tempo" added	JK
117	Texture	Thinner in right hand, beat 3	First Edition
118			
119	Pitch	B replaces A in right hand, beat 1, to create octave	First Edition
120	Tempo / Dynamics	"Poco accel. e cresc." added	JK
121			
122	Dynamics	Crescendo from *f* to *ff* and decrescendo added	JK
	Articulation	Breath mark added end of bar	JK
123	Tempo	"Moderate (later: Allegro, quite fast)" added	Sketch 8/p
	(Verse)	Added	First Edition
124			
125			
126			
127	Articulation	Breath mark added	Revision 7
	Tempo	"(non rit.)" added	JK
	Articulation	Rolled chords added in left hand	Ink MS
128	Articulation	Staccato attack added in melody line	JK
129	Articulation	Staccato attack added in melody line	JK
130	Articulation	Staccato attack added in melody line	JK
131	Articulation	Staccato attack added in melody line	JK
132	Articulation	Rolled chords added in left hand	JK
	Articulation	Staccato attack added in melody line	JK
133	Tempo	"faster again" added	Revision 7
134	Articulation	Quasi pizzicato attack	JK

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
	Texture	Thicker, with alternate notes for thumb added in right hand	Revision 14
	Pitches	Altered in left hand figuration	Sketch 8
135	Dynamics	*mp* replaces *f*	First Edition
136	Texture	Thicker, with alternate notes for thumb added in right hand	Revision 14
	Pitches	Altered in left hand figuration	Sketch 8
	Dynamics	Crescendo to *mp* added	First Edition
137	Texture	Thicker, with alternate notes for thumb added in right hand	Revision 14
	Dynamics	Crescendo to *mp* added	JK
	Pitches	Altered in left hand figuration	Sketch 8
138	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	First Edition
	Tempo	"let 'er roll" added	Revision 6
	Tempo	"as a kind of a ballad" added	Four Transcriptions
	Articulation	Staccato attack added in left hand	JK
139	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	First Edition
	Articulation	Staccato attack added in left hand	JK
140	Articulation	Rolled chords added in right hand	First Edition
	Articulation	Staccato attack added in left hand	
141	Dynamics	Crescendo added	JK
	Articulation	Rolled chords in right hand	First Edition
	Pitch	C major triad replaces major seventh, beat 7	Sketch 8
142	Pitches	F-sharps removed in right hand, beats 1 and 6	Sketches 2 and 8
	Articulation	Rolled chords in right hand	First Edition
143	Pitches	F-sharp removed in right hand, beat 1	Sketches 2 and 8
	Articulation	Rolled chords in right hand	First Edition
	Tempo	No *rit*.	JK
144	Dynamics	No change	JK
145			
146	Pitch	Low A-flat replaces low G	First Edition
147	Pitches	F replaces F-sharp on beat 1; B-flat replaces B on beat 3	First Edition
148			
149	Pitches	In left hand	First Edition
150	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand	Sketch 9
151	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand	Sketch 9
152	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand	Sketch 9
	Dynamics	*Mf* replaces *f*	First Edition
153	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand	Sketch 9
	Tempo / Dynamics	No "cresc. e accel."	First Edition
154	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand	Sketch 9
	Pitches	Altered in right hand chord, beat 1	Revision 14
155	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand	Sketch 9
	Pitches	Altered in right hand chord on beat 1	Revision 14
156			
157	Dynamics	No decrescendo	First Edition
158			
159	Articulation	A in right hand tied from m. 158	First Edition
160			

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
161	Articulation	A in right hand tied from m. 160	First Edition
	Dynamics	Hairpin in left hand	JK
162	Pitch	E in right hand, middle voice, beat 2, replaces E-flat and creates tritone	First Edition
163	Pitch	D-sharp in right hand, beat 1, replaces E and creates tritone	Ink MS
164	Pitch	Octave replaces major seventh in right hand	First Edition
165	Articulation	Rolled chord in left hand	First Edition
166	Pitch	C-natural replaces C-sharp in inner voice, right hand	Ink MS
	Articulation	Rolled chord in left hand	First Edition
167	Pitch	C-natural replaces C-sharp in inner voice, right hand	Ink MS
168	Pitch	Triplet figure in right hand (E-D-C) replaces D-C	Revision 3
169			
170	Tempo	Rallentando added	JK
	Dynamics	*p* added	JK
171	Tempo	Ritardando added	JK
	Dynamics	*pp* added	JK
172	(Prose)	Moved from m. 158 in First and Second Editions	JK
173			
174			
175			
176			
177			
178			
179	Pitch	D-flat-E-flat dyad in left hand, beat 1, replaces D-natural-E-natural	Ink MS
180	Pitches	D-flat-E-flat dyad in left hand, beat 1, replaces D-natural-E-natural; F-natural-B-flat dyad in left hand, beat 4, replaces F-sharp-B-flat; F-sharp in right hand, beat 4, replaces F-natural	Ink MS and First Edition
181	Tempo	"broaden" added	JK
	Pitches	Right hand, beat 1	Preliminary sketch ("?")
	Articulation	Rolled chord, both hands, beat 1	JK
182	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition
183	Pitches	In right hand chords	Revision 14
	Tempo	Adds "poco rit."	JK
184	Tempo	Adds "più rit."	JK
185	Tempo	"a little faster but with even rhythm"	Ink MS
186	Articulation	Octave doubling removed left hand, beat 6	Sketch 3
187	Texture	Thinner both hands; octave doubling removed in left hand and lowest voice removed in right hand	First Edition
188	Texture	Thinner in left hand	First Edition
189	Texture	Thinner in both hands	First Edition
	Articulation	Octave displacement, with middle voice lowered	Sketch 4
190	Texture	Thinner in both hands	First Edition
191			
192	Pitches	In right hand, beats 1 and 2	Sketch 4/Ink MS

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
193	Pitches	B-natural octaves replace B-flat octaves	First Edition
194			
195	Tempo	"somewhat slower" removed	First Edition
196	Articulation	Rolled chord in right hand	JK
197	Pitch	F-sharp replaces F-natural in left hand, beat 2	Sketch 1
198	Articulation	Rolled chord in right hand	JK
199	Tempo	"stretto" added	Sketch 4
200	Texture	Thinner, both hands, first three beats	Sketch 4
201	Pitch	F-sharp replaces D-sharp, left hand, beat 4	Sketch 4
202	Articulation	E in left hand held, beats 3 and 4	Sketch 4
	Pitch	F in left hand, beat 5, becomes F-sharp	Sketch 4
203	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition
	Dynamics	Adds *poco cresc*. in right hand	JK
204	Pitch	E-sharp replaces E-natural, left hand, beat 8	First Edition
205	Dynamics	*p* replaces *ff*	First Edition
	Tempo	"a tempo but decisively" replaces "decisively and freely"	First Edition
206	Texture	Thinner in both hands	First Edition
207	Texture	Thinner in both hands	First Edition
	Pitch	Octave C's replace minor ninth in left hand	First Edition
208	Pitches / Texture	No fast descending passages	First Edition/Ink MS/Revision 3
209	Pitches / Texture	No fast descending passages	First Edition
210	Tempo	"more broadly but only a little slower" removed	JK
211			
212	Pitches	Chords in top register	Ink MS
213			
214	Pitches	Triplets in both hands removed	Photostats 2 and 4
215	Pitches	Chords in right hand	First Edition/Revision 4
	Dynamics	*mp* replaces *ff*	JK
	Articulation	Breath mark added, end of bar	JK
	Articulation	Rolled chord left hand, beat 1	JK
216	(Verse)	Added	First Edition
	Pitches	Left hand, beat 1	First Edition
217			
218			
219			
220			
221			
222			
223			
224	Pitches	Octaves replace minor ninths in left hand	First Edition
225	Pitches	Altered on beat 3	First edition
	Articulation	Octave doubling in left hand removed	First Edition
226	Pitches	F-sharp octaves vs G-natural octaves in left hand, beat 3	Ink MS
	(Prose)	Added	First Edition
227			
228	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition
229	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
230	Texture	Thinner, both hands	First Edition
231	Texture	Thinner, both hands	First Edition
232	Texture	Thinner, both hands	First Edition
233	Texture	Thinner, both hands	First Edition
234	Texture	Thinner, both hands	First Edition
235	Texture	Thinner, both hands	Ink MS/Revision 6
236	Pitches	Altered in right hand (dissonant grace chords replaced with octaves)	First Edition/Revision 7/Sketch 10
237	Texture	Thinner, both hands	Revision 7
238	Texture	Thinner, both hands	First Edition/Revision 7
239	Texture	Thinner, both hands	
240	Pitches	No grace octave in left hand	First Edition
241	Pitches	F-E in left hand, beat 3, replaces G-flat-F	Photostat 5
242			
243	Pitches	Altered in both hands	First Edition
244	Pitch	E-flat in left hand, beat 1, replaces E-natural	First Edition
	Articulation	G repeated in left hand	Emerson Overture
245	Texture	Thinner in chords in both hands	Emerson Overture
	Tempo	"rit., sometimes" added	Photostat 5
246	Tempo	"maestoso" added	JK
	Pitches	Altered in right hand chords	Emerson Overture
247	Pitches	Altered in right hand chords	First Edition
248	Texture	Thinner	First Edition/Emerson Overture/Ink MS
	Articulation	Ascending 32nd-note figure in right hand added	Emerson Overture
249	Pitches	In right hand chords	Revision 7/First Edition
250	Pitches	In right hand chords	Revision 7
	Articulation	Grace dyads in both hands added, beat 1	JK
251	Pitches	In right hand chords	Revision 7
	Tempo	"loco" added	JK
252	Pitches	Octaves replace	Revision 7
253	Dynamics	*mf* replaces *f* (with *pp* overtones)	JK
	Pitches	Overtones omitted	First Edition
	Articulation	Rolled chord, left hand, beat 1	JK
254			
255	Articulation	Octave doubling added beats 1-2 in right hand	Emerson Overture
256	Articulation	Octave doubling added beats 2-3 in right hand	Emerson Overture
257	Articulation	Arpeggiation in left hand	Emerson Overture
	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand, beat 1	Emerson Overture
	Pitches	Octaves replace in right hand	JK
258	Articulation	Octave doubling added in right hand, beats 2 and 5	JK/Emerson Overture
259		[Viola part in Second Edition only]	
260		[Viola part in Second Edition only]	
261			
262			
263			
264			
265		[Small notes in Second Edition only]	
266	Texture	Thinner in right hand	First Edition
267	Texture	Thinner in left hand, with A-sharps added in	First Edition

m.	General Category	Detailed Notes	Kirkpatrick's Sources
		middle voice	
268	Pitches	E-flats in left hand replace F-sharps	First Edition
	Articulation	Silent chord added in middle voice	JK
269			
270	Pitches	C-D dyad in middle voice, beat 3, removed	First Edition
271	Pitches	E-flat octave in left hand, beat 2, replaces F-sharps	First Edition
	Dynamics	Crescendo to *f* in left hand	JK
272	Dynamics	*f* in left hand, then decrescendo to *pp*	JK

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