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The social uses of knowledge in contemporary Tanzania

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THE SOCIAL USES OF KNOWLEDGE IN CONTEMPORARY TANZANIA

by

DONNA O. KERNER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Abstract

THE SOCIAL USES OF KNOWLEDGE IN CONTEMPORARY TANZANIA

by

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This study examines how knowledge is created, institutionalized, distributed, and manipulated in Tanzania. Socially constituted knowledge is considered on several levels: hegemonic discourse expressed in state policies and public ceremonials, formal education, practical information/strategies, ironic folk motifs, and esoteric ritual knowledge. The temporal and spatial dimensions of how knowledge is generated and used are presented in two ways: (1) through an historical analysis of colonial and contemporary state policies; and (2) in a comparison of the evolution of social reproduction strategies in two contrasting regional arenas, Tabora and Kilimanjaro. The central focus of the study is the polarity between state-sponsored development programs and socioeconomic realities at the local political level.

In the 1980s Tanzania sustained a severe economic crisis which affected all levels of practical activity. This period is contextualized in terms of a series of crises from the nineteenth century onward which have punc-

tuated the development of capitalist relations in this world area. The strengths and limitations of Tanzania's postcolonial socialist development policy are also discussed with reference to other socialist formations. The resilience of informal sector exchange in these economies, and throughout the Third World generally, is impressive. Tanzania's shadow economy is not simply based on an alternative moral order resistant to state control; rather it is evidence of the failure of state redistributive mechanisms which would normally enable citizens to meet the cost of social reproduction within the legal exchange economy.

The postcolonial development crisis is manifest in state rhetoric concerning the use of formal education to engineer social transformation. The failure of society to respond to changes made in schools is considered in terms of the way state policies are locally understood and creatively managed by actors, who use the scarce resources of formal knowledge against alternative beliefs and practices to survive within a deteriorating economy. Educational and other resources are unevenly distributed among regions. Institutionalized and nonformal knowledge are part of the cultural capital of different classes within a local arena. Unequal possession of cultural capital extends opportunities for some, and at the same time initiates the potential for creative resistance and quasi-accommodation for others.

PREFACE

Two mountains can never meet. But people do.

A Chagga Proverb

My first encounter with Tanzanian village life seems in retrospect almost accidental, and I hesitate to admit this. Despite the covert acknowledgement among ethnographers that serendipity often plays a significant part in shaping the direction of fieldwork, I sense we fear our positivist credibility would suffer should we indulge ourselves by elaborating on this in print. My visit to Uduru, an ujamaa (African socialist) village, in the part of Kilimanjaro region known as Machame, coming as it did one month after my arrival in Tanzania and amidst a welter of emotional states ranging from curiosity to despair, left an indelible impression on me which served as a reference point for all I saw and did in the remainder of my 22-month stay. A brief description of this encounter illustrates a point. The conjuncture of the confusion of the ethnographer, the interests of one's informants, and the imagination of both, influences the organization and interpretation of another social world.

My arrival in Tanzania's capital, Dar es Salaam, was anticlimactic. Things were as I remembered them from the

year before, but also undefinably different. The airport and the people who came to greet my arrival were familiar, as was the university campus which was to be my temporary home, but there was an air of tension and guardedness which prevailed in all these initial contacts which I attributed to my anxiety surrounding what felt like an enormous undertaking.

I had not anticipated that the country would be undergoing an attempted coup which began the day before my arrival and lasted almost a full week until it was successfully suppressed. Only those directly involved knew it was taking place, and the expatriate community was first to get wind of the news as a result of their compulsion to tune their shortwave radios to the BBC. The first interpretations of the coup came not from local experts, but were rendered as hypotheses by analysts with clipped British accents sitting several thousand miles away. It was only then that the community took notice of the appearance of the British fleet in the Dar es Salaam harbor, the closure of the Lugalo Army Barracks, and a sort of haphazard curfew in the downtown area. The state-controlled press only noted that the president was "resting" at his home in Butiama. Sources within the military said otherwise; they claimed that he had been confronted by generals from an air force faction. Other rumors suggested that the revolt began among the Haya in Kagera region, the stage of the recently concluded war against Idi Amin. Such sources indicated that this coup attempt was only the latest in a

series of tribal hostilities within the military, the last involving a Chagga revolt the previous year. This view prevailed among the few Tanzanians inclined to discuss such matters with expatriates, despite the official rhetoric which denies the existence of ethnic factionalism in centers of power.

The revolt was rapidly suppressed and in due course reported on, rather incoherently, by the national media. Coups attempts are neither infrequent events, nor ones to which Tanzanians seem to direct their overt attention. Since the army mutiny of 1964, the British government has offered open or covert support in such reactive dramas to its former colony many times. The event impressed me on two counts. First, it illustrated the discrepancy between a closed form of official knowledge concerning matters of state legitimacy and the more open channels of local knowledge which circulated under a mask of indifference. Second, it provided an indicator of how difficult a task faced the expatriate who attempted to move beyond the official story and enter into the channels of folk communication.

While I had been struck by the degree of social segregation between the expatriate and local staff at the university, I could not comprehend why my efforts to establish visiting relations with my Tanzanian colleagues were so diplomatically avoided. A humanities professor was kind enough to explain the nature of the Tanzanian paranoia about the role of foreign intelligence agents. Two professors had recently been unmasked as operatives of the CIA.

Both had encouraged friendly relations with Tanzanian students and staff. Their deportation had been quickly followed by the dismissal of several students from the university and the relentless investigation of the loyalties of their friends among the staff. Clearly, careers were more important than cross-cultural exchanges. Such fears are perhaps more accentuated within the intellectual community, which is always under the watchful eye of the state for seeds of dissension, but they do not rest there. Almost every Tanzanian I encountered ventured to guess that up to 50% of the population operates at least part-time in an intelligence-gathering capacity for the state.

I fared no better in my efforts to gain information on the attempted coup from my contacts outside the university community. I was told not "to worry my head with such matters." One businessman suggested that I was inflating the coup's importance, I had only to go out into the countryside to see how "our peasants" were living, the day-to-day existence of a farming life pre-empted such concerns with official matters, and that "the people" just go on living pretty much the way they do and are contented with their lot. He was neither right nor wrong in his assessment.

My visit to Kilimanjaro one month later was, as I conceptualized it at the time, a form of escape from the confusing and anxiety-provoking situation I found in Dar. I was living at the university, occupying the spare bedroom in the rented apartment of a couple of Anglo-American

friends, but anxious to get to my "real" fieldsite. I had been employed in the frustrating round of official visits to various ministries to gain my regional research clearances, I had been working with a rather unreliable Swahili tutor, I had hired an assistant and had equipped myself for my upcountry trip to Tabora, and I was gradually learning how to negotiate the confusing strategies of "getting something done," which, I was to learn, involved the slow building of a network of useful contacts.

I had just been coerced into a public presentation of my research proposal at a university staff/student seminar. This peculiar ritual is a synthesis of the British form of colloquium (entailing the "fair game" of stiletto attacks on the presenter's intelligence and personality as a sideline to a critique of the work presented, followed by handshakes and several rounds of beer), and the Tanzanian content of rhetorical debates on the state, class, and the peasantry, which echo a lineage of factional disputes on which the participants have already taken sides before the presenter makes an appearance. I had no desire to subject myself to this ordeal at such an early stage of my residency. I argued, to no avail, with my host, the former head of the education department, that I would be much better prepared to make such a presentation once I had actually begun data collection. I was dismissed with the wave of a hand and the admonishment not to resort to the female diversion of dissolving into tears. I did not understand the full implications of this researcher's rite

of passage until the event was concluded. It was only then that I was regularly invited to join my colleagues in the mid-morning tea break at the faculty "lounge," a hodgepodge of metal chairs chained to a few palm trees adjacent to the administration building.

Shortly after this event I was invited to the engagement party given for our upstairs neighbor, an economist at the Economic Research Bureau. Perhaps our neighbors were only being kind. They knew there would be quite a racket, and figured they might as well have us there to avoid complaints. It turned out that we knew the "chairman" of the engagement, who introduced us to the "chairman" of the wedding. The engaged couple were from two tribal backgrounds, the bride from the south and the groom from Kilimanjaro in the north. As was often the custom among educated and urban Chagga, the groom had placed friends and colleagues from Kilimanjaro in charge of the festivities, and each event was organized by a chairman who took up a collection and made all the necessary arrangements. By the end of the engagement party, I, and my Anglo-American hosts, were invited to the wedding to be held a week later in Moshi, Kilimanjaro's regional capital. The chairman of the wedding offered to foot the bill to provide, as he put it, "an introduction to the customs of our people." I did not realize until I was 375 miles away from the safety of my university residence that my acceptance of the invitation signaled my agreement to a liaison with the chairman which all of the wedding participants assumed was an estab-

lished fact. Such was my embarrassing naiveté. The opportunity to escape from this situation presented itself the day after the wedding. An economist from the university, also a participant at the wedding, sensed my discomfort and asked me if I would like to accompany him on a visit home to his village 15 miles from Moshi town. I was all too happy to accept, though it meant hitching a number of rides in the back of pickup trucks.

The day of my visit was hot and clear. The mountain, rising majestically into the distance from the intersection of the Moshi-Machame road, drew startlingly near as we made our ascent. Its snowcapped twin peaks loomed like solid clouds over the tops of the groves of coffee and banana trees as we climbed away from the flat fields of sisal, maize, beans, and finger millet on the plain below.

Sunlight caught more shades of green than I knew existed, and contrasted with the rich red earth. Women wrapped in brightly colored Khanga cloth on their way to and from the fields and young girls bearing loads of cut grass on their heads for the stall-fed cattle stopped to wave greetings. Along the road were huts of mud and wattle roofed with banana palm leaves standing side by side with magnificent large modern homes enclosed within wrought iron fences.

The central road was paved with tarmac and supported considerable traffic of cars, trucks, motorcycles, and a form of local taxi which is something of a cross between a van and pickup. Transport is a lucrative occupation in

this area, even for private vehicle owners who charge a five shilling fee to hitchhikers, because many residents in this area are wage-earners in Moshi town or in the new machine tool factory built with Bulgarian aid located on the plain. Electric lines, a new installation provided with technical assistance and aid from the Japanese government, were connected to most of the modern houses halfway up the divisional road. Signs for schools and the Machame hospital (built by missionaries and staffed with expatriate doctors) dotted the road, as did Lutheran churches which seemed to appear with every mile.

If these contrasts were not enough to pique my curiosity, I had only to step off the main road to the tiny paths which snaked up and down through the forest to discover in the homesteads of my colleague's relatives another world of time, space, and etiquette. My journal entries on this day's visits have a hallucinatory quality. I learned a new geography that day in which near and far do not necessarily correspond to physical distance but affective familiarity and lineage relationship. The clan of my friend's father was not a large one nor particularly distinguished from an aristocratic standpoint, although I later discovered in the missionary records that it boasted one of the first Protestant converts on the mountain. The humble dignity of even the most impoverished relatives was striking, as were the contrasting levels of wealth within the clan, whose members ranged from the poorest peasants to middle-class professional households.

We were greeted affectionately at each stop, preceded with expressions of sympathy for the hardship of our journey. I did not fully comprehend these pole(s) (sorrows) until I had lived long enough in the rural areas to understand the endurance demanded by even the simplest travel arrangements. Other Tanzanian ethnic groups notice the aesthetic sense which the Chagga seem to possess and attribute this to the long association of the Chagga with western missionaries. Yet even the earliest western explorers' accounts of the region remark on the tidiness and sense of order in the homesteads. The Chagga had developed a complex irrigation system for diverting runoff water from the mountain into their banana groves at least two hundred years prior to western contact, and these ditches which criss-cross each homestead, covered by small plank bridges, are still in evidence today, although they are less frequently used since the introduction of central water taps. Thus each compact settlement, with its buildings for sleeping, cooking, cattle and goats, and grain storage, and neatly swept central courtyard, had a babbling brook to accompany children at play, the sounds of adults at work or in conversation, and the noise of livestock. Each house is banked with flowers in colorful profusion and clay pots out of which decorative vines are trained to the roof.

At each homestead my colleague warned that our agenda was heavy and our time short. The relatives expressed their understanding, yet each time a small child was sent off with several shillings and a plastic cooking oil con-

tainer to fetch some local beer made of bananas and finger millet. Many rounds would pass and gifts of food and flowers pressed upon us before we were allowed to move to our next site. These homesteads, springing up through the forest as if by magic, stood in contrast to the neatly clipped communal meadows which separate the villages. At the top of one such meadow, from a grand height which commands a view of the valley below, was the Machame hotel, built by Germans for a nonexistent tourist trade. Its rondavel lodges, topped by bright aluminum roofs, are as inconsistent with the landscape as a chance landing of spaceships. Its bar, I learned later, was the central watering hole of the local elite, which was of considerable size and importance in the region.

By the end of the day we had wound our way halfway down the mountain to the village of Uduru, where my colleague's parents resided. This was one of the poorer households I saw that day, but the one where I received the warmest reception. We had brought his father several Swahili newspapers, which he read with great interest. Although crippled in a building accident one year before, he insisted on giving me a tour of the homestead, pointing out with pride the foundation of the cement house my colleague was building for his family on his paltry assistant lecturer's wages. Gifts of oranges went to the children, whose school fees would also be the responsibility of my friend, the first-born. A basket of organ meats and vegetables went to

his mother who had just returned from a cooperative roof thatching party with several of her female affines.

I was warned to watch out for one aunt because she was "just too weird." A disheveled iconoclast who was never seen without a cigarette behind her ear (Chagga women are rarely seen to smoke unless they are educated and urban), she headed her own household with her four children. She was a tolerated oddball who I eventually grew to like and value for her ability to talk about the unspeakable. The inevitable rounds of beer appeared, and the parents were prepared to make speeches. The father's concentrated on the wonder and honor conferred by my visit to the household, and the mother's contained the pronouncement that I was a "girl who had been `truly born'." The translation of this was somewhat murky. It seemed to encompass something about my appearance and the grace God had bestowed upon me. In my own imagination I took it to mean that I was substantially present in this reality. If not born again, I at least felt I had been launched, but into what I was still uncertain.

That day there was little discussion of events in the capital. Local news and family projects occupied our attention, but inflated prices and the scarcity of resources laced the discussions. The severity of the economic crisis was deeply felt and resonated against my memory of how urban intellectuals explained the crisis of legitimate government as a matter of elite power struggles.

Uduru was, like other villages in Machame, a registered ujamaa village, yet none of them were resettled villages, or even communal villages, for that matter. Land was privately owned, which is, theoretically, not possible in Tanzania. There was a government and party structure in place, and it was while working on a corvée labor project that my friend's father had suffered his crippling accident. The practical necessities of everyday life occupied most of these villagers' time, yet they did read the newspaper when they could find one. Those who were not literate listened to the radio when batteries were available and affordable. News traveled and life went on, but not unchanged and not in ignorance.

I never conducted formal research in Machame, yet my impressions of it that first day and in the many that followed formed the basis by which I then compared the wide variety of rural living arrangements I encountered afterward. This was perhaps unfair since Machame is the most extreme example of an area which has known "development" and rural social stratification, both within the region and the country as a whole. I chose to settle in another district when I returned to conduct the second leg of my research, because Machame could not be considered in any way representative of the region. From an alternative standpoint, however, the fact that Machame had provided me such an important imprint was advantageous. If I had been looking for extremes on a scale of what intellectuals gauge as development, I embarked on my journey from the upper end

of such a spectrum and had it as a conceptual model from which to work.

Certainly it was a mixed blessing which brought me to Machame in the first place, and how much of this was intentional on the part of my guide I can only guess. It was clear to me later that Tanzanians weighed the risk of the potentially negative effects of engagement with expatriates against the potential benefits such connections might bring. My guide became a colleague in the true sense after that point, reading with insightful comments everything I wrote while in the country in exchange for a critique of his work. His next-door neighbor in Machame, a young secondary school leaver, became my second research assistant.

His family adopted me as their daughter, and I acquired the status of second-born, with the fiction that I had been the product of the marriage of the father on a long-ago trip to America. This family joke served a couple of purposes. First, the parents were amazed (and in fact almost horrified) that I was an only child (both first- and last-born) so far from home without the protection of family. Some form of incorporation seemed the kindly act to perform. Second, the constant, customary round of greetings necessitates terms of address relevant to a person's status (respect as well as stage in the development cycle), gender, and birth position in the family. First-born daughters in the Chagga language are named after the paternal grandmother and accorded the reference of "Ma,"

which is also the term of address politely used for a senior woman and/or woman who commands respect. By virtue of my status as a first-born, an adult woman, and a expatriate researcher, I should normally have been addressed as Ma, as I was by residents in the village who knew me less well. This family, however, was quick to assess my shortcomings. I could not speak a word of their language; even my Swahili was badly broken. I did not know the greetings, I could not cultivate maize, I was unaware of proper drinking etiquette, and I did not know how to cook bananas properly. In short, I was an unsocialized child in their society. "Nkwe" (the term for second-born daughter) felt more suitable to the mother of this family, and nkwe I remained.

Gaining a new name was only the first step in my incorporation into this family. I soon found myself tied into a web of obligations and expectations which simultaneously aided and impeded my ability to carry out my research project. When the father was confined to a tuberculosis hospital in the near-freezing altitudes, I drove the family half-way round the mountain each weekend to visit and bring him food and celebrated joyously with the clan when he was released. I helped out financially, along with the other children, when times were hard before the harvest. I spent a frustrating day trying to persuade the headmaster of a local seminary to accept the fourth son, a bright child who had twice failed his secondary school entrance examinations for government school. Only at the end of my appeal did I

learn that the Catholic seminary refused to admit Lutheran students, and I stood perplexed when the child's father insisted that he should be converted, despite their strong religious convictions. I was subjected to the endless demands of clan relations who now regarded me as one of their own.

I was an embarrassment to the entire family on more than one occasion. I engendered hurt and resentment the first time I drove through Machame to visit someone "not related" without stopping first to greet my family and eat whatever was thrust in front of me. The news of my indiscretion reached Dar es Salaam before I learned the gravity of my mistake. I was eventually even persuaded to drink kasuscio, a concoction of cow's blood I had strategically avoided by periodically claiming digestive disorders. In short, when in Machame I was not my own person but belonged to others, with all the joys, frustrations, anxieties, and insight such an arrangement implies.

Eight months into my fieldwork in Kilimanjaro I went into a Moshi hospital for an operation which I felt sure would end my life. It was a simple appendectomy. My fear was a mixture of self-pity and justifiable apprehension. The best hospital in the region had run out of its supply of oxygen, the scrub nurse was inebriated, the American gynecologist they brought in to reassure me told me that he would try to get away from his dinner party that evening right after dessert to watch them close me up, and the surgeon was assisted by the regional psychiatrist who had

once confessed to me that he hoped one day to be able to read Freud. His principal psychiatric text had been I'm OK, You're OK.

I awoke several days later to find my "mother" at my bedside, having just successfully negotiated the first trip in her lifetime to the regional capital, thirty minutes driving time from her village. I had asked her once why she had never been to Moshi, and she had responded, "Why should I go there? What would I do? Can I not get everything I need here in Machame?" When her neighbors asked her what she was doing boarding a local bus to go to Moshi, she had answered, "My second-born is sick. I am going to bring her eggs and flowers."

If the phrase "to be truly born" can be indexed as "born human," then I had received the most profound prestat-
tion at an early and critical phase in my stay in Tanzania. At the best of times I could never be more than an incorporated stranger, even in this homestead. Yet I was seen as human, both teachable and reachable. I came to understand all too quickly after this initial visit the vast leap of faith this simple expression entailed for this family, who tried to bridge the gap of our cultural differences with interest, patience, amusement, and affection.

One of the great ironies of initial ethnographic fieldwork is that the researcher begins to know or understand another culture by participating as an active subject, and

that such participation can be severely constrained by inadequate knowledge of cultural rules, language, and idiom. Because the process of enculturation is necessarily slow, gradual, and piecemeal it is difficult to gain all but the most rudimentary understanding of cultural meaning until the end of such an initial undertaking. Thus it is not surprising that the deeper meaning of the proverb quoted at the beginning of this preface was not revealed to me until the last month of my research in Kilimanjaro.

For the Chagga, proverbs are not quite riddles, and the dividing line between these two forms of speech is not distinct. They are linguistic forms and part of expressive culture. They are also a part of cultural (local) knowledge. They convey meaning which is purposively transmitted to reproduce a constellation of morally valued social relations. Riddles are consciously employed as educational devices. Like folktales, they have a moral. Unlike folktales, the moral in a riddle is assumed to be deeply submerged below the surface structure. Children are taught to guess the moral and memorize it. The hidden meaning of a folktale is not expressly taught. Children are expected to learn its meaning through the structure of performance. Proverbs are commonly used as regular features of speech to express parenthetically a range of intentions accomplished through the skillful use of double entendre. It is the insider's privilege to understand at least two mutually opposed levels of meaning at once. On the surface, "Two mountains can never meet. But people do" was frequently

employed in my presence (in public ceremonials and in private) to express a level of desire by informants to work at the mutual translation of cultural meaning. Privately, I was finally clued in to the deeper meaning of the proverb. It was: "Take everyone you meet seriously and treat them correctly. You may not know who they are and you never know when you will meet up with them again, no matter how great the distance between you. A person you treat badly today may come and cause you harm tomorrow."

Such a proverb stands for altruistic/empathic as well as self-protective impulses. At the same time it represents an extension and retraction of the self in relation to others. Such contradictory impulses are characteristic of social life everywhere, yet Chagga culture highlights this ambiguity with particular intensity. This leads other ethnic groups to stereotype the Chagga as both warmly hospitable and aggressively opportunistic. The changing cultural expression of ambivalence regarding inner- and other-directed intentions is one of the central motifs of Chagga society. How such culturally elaborated expressions compare to those found in another less ecologically and historically favored society, the Nyamwezi of Tabora, is one of the themes of this thesis.

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The stereotype of the isolated academic belies the cooperative endeavors of mentors, colleagues, and friends who help bring any work to fruition. It gives me tremendous pleasure to be able to acknowledge the support of the many people who have aided my work on this project. I am entirely responsible for any errors to be found in this study, but whatever insights it provides are in part due to the intellectual exchanges described below.

The conceptualization of this project began over ten years ago with an M.A. thesis supervised at New York University by T.O. Beidelman. He was the first to support and sustain my interest in sub-Saharan African research. His brilliance in teaching, scholarship, and fieldwork has provided a constant source of inspiration. His is the anthropological life where every encounter is a lesson, and I am delighted to remain a student in his many classrooms.

At the City University of New York I was given the opportunity to work with an outstanding thesis committee comprised of Vincent Crapanzano as Chair, Executive Officer Jane Schneider, and Eric Wolf. There is very little direct reference to their research in this dissertation. I believe it will be obvious to anyone familiar with their rich and varied work how much influence their thinking has had

on my own. Vincent Crapanzano is an inspirational teacher who has the uncanny ability to alter his pedagogical techniques depending on the needs and natures of individual students. This makes him an exceptional mentor. I am particularly appreciative of his perceptive attention to the questions posed in my research. Jane Schneider provided my initial introduction to theories of political economy through core courses and two years of program seminars. She has persistently encouraged my work in new directions, and her attention to detail, editorial, and organizational abilities were kindly lent to every major piece of work I have accomplished at the Graduate Center. Eric Wolf reminded me on the eve of my departure for the field that not all that constitutes knowledge is located in schools. I pondered this cryptic remark throughout my field stay, and the result of this musing significantly shaped the direction of the study. His critique of the original draft of the thesis was extremely valuable in helping to strengthen the argument as I defined it. Marcia Wright agreed to be more integrally involved in the production of the dissertation than is normally required of an outside reader. I am deeply appreciative of the attention she has given not only, the thesis, but to the entire project from its inception.

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The life of institutions revealed from the point of view of its inmates is often at odds with the official picture presented through a study of its administrative structure. I feel myself fortunate to have been initiated among the interesting and intellectually demanding inmates I found at CUNY. Among those to whom I have a special debt

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From, 1982 to 1984 I was a research associate at the University of Dar es Salaam attached to the Department of Education headed by Professor Abel Ishumi. I am grateful to Professor Ishumi and the staff of the department for agreeing to incorporate me into their midst in a fashion generally made impossible for external researchers by the limitations of time and resources imposed on the department. Particular thanks go to my colleagues Dr. Komba, who served as my field liaison, and Drs. Malekela, Mgulambwa, and Mosha for their critical attention to my work and their personal support. A number of students from the department were particularly helpful to me when I was conducting research in Tabora and they were conducting fourth term practicals. My thanks to all of them and especially Aloys Ngilli (now at the Institute of Adult Education) for their support. Functioning as it does, the University provided me with a number of cross-disciplinary exchanges during the periods when I was in Dar es Salaam. In particular Professor Majorie Mbilinyi (Institute for Development Studies), Drs. Grynberg, Lipumba, Rugumesa, Wagao, and M.O. Ndanshau (Department of Economics), Drs. Mbwiliza, Slater, and Wamba-dia-Wamba (Department of History), Drs. Campbell, Cooksey, and Chachage (Department of Sociology), Chambuli-Kazi (Faculty of Theater Arts), D. Iwissi (Faculty of

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document is now lost, but the memory remains of what was revealed in my first groping attempts to understand the effects of poverty and ethnic prejudice on values and behavior directed toward pursuit of the elusive American dream by my relatives. In the second generation my cousins and I followed a different path (from our parents and each other). Ties of blood drew us together as children, but bonds of friendship and respect link us as adults. My late paternal grandmother Becky, helped me to frame this kaleidoscope of experience in terms of both comedy and tragedy. She and my Aunt Sylvia pinch-hit as parents and added a measure of stability to my unpredictable world.

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In Memory of Fanny

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INTRODUCTION

The Research Problem

The subject of this thesis is how a political ideology, in this case, Tanzania's ujamaa (extended familyhood) socialism, operates as a theory of knowledge to constitute social reality, how it structures the discourse of social relations, defining the realm of what is questionable and what is answerable. The object of this analysis is to consider how such a political ideology is manipulated by those in power to dominate a range of institutions in which knowledge is generated, disseminated, and, more generally, located. There are two institutional settings which are the particular focus for the analysis: schools and local-level religious/political organizations. At first glance such widely divergent institutions would seem to have little in common. Why study both?

The Need for the Current Study

In complex societies, the subject of knowledge--its creation, organization, dissemination, and social implications--is most often confined to the institutional setting of the school. There are other institutional settings (the family, the legal system, the church, the media, and the workplace, to name only a few) which produce and distribute knowledge (in the sense of attaching meaning to behavior and/or physical phenomena, and formal and practical rules

for accomplishing certain acts). However, we most often equate knowledge with education, a process located in schools. This indicates the degree to which formal education has gained ascendancy as an ideological apparatus in modern state systems (Althusser 1971). It is hardly possible these days for researchers to view the school as a neutral institution which merely transmits knowledge. Critical theoretical approaches to education take the relationship between knowledge and power as a starting point for the analysis of the role of schools in society.

In developing countries, studies of formal knowledge are also inextricably linked to educational institutions. Knowledge, and more specifically, education, is seen as a necessary index of development. In Africa particularly, educational systems are accorded an almost omnipotent role in social transformation. The goal of educational research in contemporary African countries is to link educational policy to manpower and development targets and/or to understand the success or failure of such education policy to meet development goals. One focus of the best of these studies is how educational skills and credentials are linked to strategies for production (Berry 1985; Cooksey 1981; Heyneman 1975; Malekela 1983; Mbilinyi 1976; Peel 1978; Zolberg 1976). Another is the manner in which education serves to reproduce national elites (Clignet and Foster 1966; Cohen 1981; Goldthorpe 1965; Lloyd 1966; Prewitt 1971; Scudder and Colson 1980; Van den Berghe 1973;

Vincent 1971)). Yet another is the role educational policy plays in reinforcing the political ideology of state building (Ashby 1964; Carnoy 1974; Court and Ghai 1974; Foster 1965; Ishumi and Maliyamkono 1980; King 1976; Mazrui 1978; Morrison 1976; Resnick 1968). A common thread in all three approaches is an analysis of the discrepancies between the stated goals of educational policy and the objective results. Ultimately, the recommendations which emerge from these approaches focus on the necessity to reformulate failed policy.

Rarely, however, do such studies acknowledge their own failure to look beyond formal education to other arenas where the struggle to structure relations of production and to generate and manage knowledge also takes place.¹ Such arenas are typically the reserve of ethnologists: local-level political and religious institutions. For the colonial ethnologist it was the culture of the (now) loaded categories of the band, tribe, or chiefdom which provided the rules of proper conduct, skills oriented to production, categories of appropriate meaning, and esoteric understanding necessary for biological and social reproduction. The postcolonial ethnologist interested in such subjects faces a quandary: How does one account for local, culturally constituted institutions of knowledge which are undergoing a more or less rapid transformation due to urban migration, encapsulation within a capitalist exchange economy, and subsumption within state institutions such as schools? One

solution is to ignore, to a greater or lesser extent, the impact of such wider processes and to continue to concentrate on local tribal/ethnic institutions of knowledge. Another route is to pursue research within schools as though they constitute a culture (or subculture). The first solution places special attention on the internal structural and cultural dimensions of thought. How these dimensions are influenced by a wider field of social processes over time is left out. The second solution has essentially the same limitations. Durkheim, the first sociologist to pay serious attention to formal, institutionalized knowledge, abandoned a functionalist approach in his later work on secondary education in France (1977). In this work he indicated that the direction which educational institutions take must be understood within an historical context because the internal forces which motivate the institution are the result of cumulative changes over time.

A third strategy, as pursued here, is to study the cultures of which the schools are a part, in juxtaposition to the schools themselves. Such a project takes the state as a starting point for analysis and assumes that the state (influenced by a range of external constraints) has a broad impact, not only on the institutions it directly controls (such as marketing boards or schools), but also on local organizational forms which elude its complete control. Where alternative organizational forms exist which structure production and generate and manage knowledge to repro-

duce these relations, they exhibit some similarity with formal education or educational policy. They exist within the context of a national ideology concerning the state and the relations of people within it. An examination of such arenas is fruitful, however, because it reveals their potential to generate an alternate discourse concerning definitions of self, community, and society. Thus, as Gramsci (1971) points out, while the state can attempt to dominate national ideology, it does so in struggle against these alternative discourses which often contain another vision of society. It is this dynamic which is missing from studies which set out to gauge the effectiveness of educational policy by restricting the unit of analysis to the schools alone.

The Research Context

This thesis is not about what is actually taking place in Tanzanian schools at the moment or the sort of common culture which formal education provides. It is about how people get into school and tells something about what they do with that education when they finish. It is also about how knowledge obtained and transmitted outside the setting of formal educational and other state institutions is managed and controlled by individuals and wider groups to advance claims on scarce resources within a structure of deteriorating economic conditions.

Tanzania in the 1980s is one of the world's poorest countries, fourteenth on the World Bank's list of Least

Developed Countries. The nation's twenty million inhabitants are primarily rural peasants who live on the mainland, an area roughly the combined size of Texas and New Mexico, and on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. These peasants are divided into one hundred twenty ethnic groups, and have inherited the most varied ecology of any country in sub-Saharan Africa (Coulson 1982).

Tanzania has received the largest proportion of international aid in sub-Saharan Africa since it achieved independence in 1961, and has attracted worldwide attention for its experiments in the socialist transformation of its rural economy. These experiments are recognized for the laudable goals of increasing agricultural productivity while minimizing economic and political inequality and insuring the provision of basic services. Despite these efforts, since the mid 1970s Tanzania has experienced all the symptoms of economic crisis manifested by other non-petroleum-exporting, non-industrialized African countries.

The current economic crisis, traceable to both internal and exogenous events, is broadly felt in all sectors of society. Everyday and imported commodities are scarce, services are in a deteriorated condition, inflation rates are high, and a profitable shadow economy regulates public and private channels of distribution. Cash crop production has declined as farmers seek to offset low producer/high consumer prices by engaging in a mixed economic strategy of selling food crops, trading in parallel markets, and seek-

ing cash remittances from salaried relatives. In such a situation, the knowledge and material benefits derived from educating children enables an extended network of kin to initiate projects which have the potential to free them from a structure of economic dependency to one of relative (if illusory) autonomy.

How can the symbolic capital² of education be converted into real capital? Peel's analysis of Olaju (1978), applied by Berry (1985) to the Yoruba case, was helpful in understanding how formal education combines with local knowledge for new uses. Among Peel's Ijesa informants, olaju (enlightenment) was a local conception of social progress and derived from a desire to understand local conceptions of individual and communal success. In the precolonial period those who had olaju were primarily ritual specialists (diviners and blacksmiths) and chiefs. Such individuals were able to use their specialized esoteric and historical knowledge to effect social harmony and physical well-being in the community. The conceptualization of olaju broadened during the colonial period, when trade, travel, commercial farming, conversion to Christianity, and obtaining western education enabled other individuals to become enlightened so as to understand the operation of a much wider system (Berry 1985, 30). From this angle, formal education provides more than a certificate or knowledge gained from mastery of a syllabus. It widens the realm of experience and enables an individual to see a

range of possibilities and choices. It is this sort of reconnaissance which can be tapped by kin members to initiate local projects.

The Research Questions

The Regional Arena

The field project on which this study is based was conducted in two different regional (subnational) sites between 1982 and 1984, Tabora and Kilimanjaro (see Figure 1). The rationale for locating the study in two separate regions was to provide a comparative basis for analyzing how local-level political and economic realities (including parochial strategies and discourse) interact with state-sponsored development (including the ideologically guided production and distribution of knowledge). I discuss my conceptualization of region as a unit of analysis in the introduction to Part Two. At this point it is sufficient to note that in Tanzania, region of origin often correlates with ethnic group affiliation, to the degree that this is still held significant. In some contexts this aspect of identity is asserted and highly articulated to advance interests which might otherwise be seen as having a material base, providing an important window on how class action is culturally shaped. The two regions chosen for study contrasted in a number of ways aside from ethnic identity. Tabora and Kilimanjaro represent different ecological, social, and political settings. They have been

differentially affected by the historical processes which have shaped the modern state of Tanzania as a whole. As a broad contrast, Tabora is more peripheral, poor, and "peasant"-like, as its residents struggle to make a post-migrant transition. Kilimanjaro is more central, productive, and class stratified.

As I began to piece together a picture of how local-level communities receive and respond to state ideology, expressed in policy implementation, I became increasingly dissatisfied with the analytical distinction made in many studies of local-level politics which take either a "top-down" or "bottom-up" approach. I saw three problems with this analytical separation.

First, dominant state discourse is an extremely powerful means of extending hegemony, but to do this successfully the state is in constant struggle against local knowledge and practice. To capture the essence of this struggle requires viewing the interaction between the state and local-level political arenas in terms of a polarity of forces. Second, the state in Tanzania is politically decentralized. Agents of the state wear many hats. This, in and of itself, poses a set of peculiar problems for state agents in a local context when they are compelled to implement unpopular policies. The state in Tanzania is everywhere, reaching down to each unit, or "cell," of ten households. The Tanzanian state is not the abstraction which many debates about it would have it appear. Finally,

there is the argument, advanced by Karp (1980), Riesman (1986), Uchendu (1965), and many other Africanist ethnographers, that social theory in this part of the world is not so much thought (intellectualized) as it is lived and felt. To comprehend what this means entails attention to how cultural codes shape, define, and give value to action and how these codes are created and recreated by social actors. It was clear that in Tanzania authoritative state discourse about morality commanded the attention of individuals at all levels of practical activity. What emerged more slowly was a picture of how such a state moral code, often in conflict with local cultural imperatives and in conjunction with deteriorating life conditions, encouraged a set of shadow practices. These practices encompass: superficial conformity, as rules are partially followed, or bypassed altogether; rituals of resistance and rebellion; and reflexively ironic forms of identity assertion in language play and folklore. Such practices reflect how people manage the contradictory space between government fiat and on the ground political and economic realities.

The School/Community Field

Not all of what is constituted as knowledge (in the sense of understanding the social and material environment and the options people have to manipulate it) takes place within formal institutions. Yet the fact that the Tanzanian state has so actively attempted to encapsulate all domains of knowledge in state institutions raised the im-

portant question of how such institutions are perceived and used.

Educational issues are among the most hotly debated political concerns for Tanzanians in all walks of life, despite the fact that diplomas and certificates these days do not guarantee an individual direct salaried employment or a secure career. One of the questions posed in the original research design was, How do Tanzanians perceive the meaning of formal education, and how are educational credentials utilized in the context of high (salaried) unemployment? Briefly stated, informants from both regions defined opportunity and success in regional terms, usually glossed as culture and religion. That is to say, informants explained Chagga educational success in Kilimanjaro in terms of a progressive cultural outlook and Christian (monogamous) orientation, and the Nyamwezi/Sukuma lag in Tabora in terms of cultural conservatism and Islamic (polygynous) worldview. In one way this study attempts to document the real historical and culturally adaptive differences between people of these two areas which lie beneath such a gloss.

The doctrine of Tanzania's socialist educational policy is centered on the elimination of social inequality. This presents a major contradiction in a state where education beyond the primary level is available to so very few. The attempt to manage this contradiction emerges as a preoccupation with insuring equality of access to public

post-primary facilities, rather than equality of opportunity. To accomplish this the state has worked out an elaborate quota system for secondary school selection to allow educationally disadvantaged regions parity with advantaged ones. In combination with the quota system, a regional competitive examination system, administered to students who wish to attend secondary school, is designed to apply universalistic criteria to educational selection. I review in chapter 2 the extensive documentation which now indicates that these policies have not been successful. Although I originally conceived that my research would add to such documentation, I discovered that the more interesting question to pose was, Why were such policies a failure? In other words, what strategies were employed to circumvent meritocratic state procedures?

The Tanzanian state has also sought to structure the transmission of formal knowledge in such a way that the privileged few who do attend secondary school will be morally obliged to use this knowledge for the benefit of the many who do not receive higher training. That is, secondary schools should not produce an elite. Policy mechanisms to implement this include: an attempt to make each stage of education a terminal one, rather than a preparation for higher studies; the addition of practical (vocational) subjects to the academic curriculum; and tightening the integration between schools and the local community by making the schools self-supporting (to the

extent this is possible) and stressing school "projects" which would benefit the community. In both schools and their surrounding communities, I was interested to know (1) How were such policies implemented?; (2) What was the public perception of this implementation?; and (3) What did the outcome of the policies mean for students and their parents?

Methodology and Data Collection

The research questions discussed above took me into primary and secondary schools in the two regions for interviews with students, teachers, and administrators during the first phase of the research project. In both regions I worked with an assistant who was a resident of the area and was fluent in Swahili and the local language. In Tabora, interviews were conducted in either English or Swahili, depending on the informant's fluency in English. In Kili-manjaro, interviews were conducted in Swahili, English, and the Chagga language (by my assistant).

I visited all of the regional secondary schools in Tabora except for the Catholic seminary. These were located in the regional capital, Tabora Town, where I also conducted formal and informal interviews with a wide range of government, party, and religious personnel responsible for setting educational and development policy. Such interviews were also conducted in the capital town of the district where I conducted village research, Urambo. In

Kilimanjaro, with its numerous secondary schools, I conducted interviews in eleven schools and attempted to obtain a mix of government and private schools, older and newly opened schools, boarding and day institutions, and co-educational and single sex facilities in the districts of: Hai, Moshi Urban, and Moshi Rural. Interviews with regional and district education and development officials were conducted in the regional capital, Moshi Town, and in the district capital where I conducted village research, Moshi Rural.

Interviews and observations in the schools took at least one day, often more. Separate interviews were held with the headmaster/mistress, the careermaster/mistress, and classmasters/mistresses of Forms II and IV. Separate discussion groups were held with teachers from these two forms, and a survey questionnaire (in Swahili) was administered to ten students from each of these two forms.

Through interviews and observations I sought to determine the history of the school, the process of student selection, how the school was organized and administered, how the vocational, arts, and science streams operated, methods utilized for guiding students into vocational streams and academic subject combinations, what self-reliance projects were in operation, and the level of parental and community participation in the school.

Discussions with the teachers were initially oriented towards questions about the vocational streaming (bias)

program, but were eventually broadened to include a variety of topics of concern to them. The liveliness and depth of these discussions varied from school to school. In schools where the administrators provided strong leadership, teachers were observed to be more relaxed, objective, and open to debate. Topics discussed included: self-reliance projects; the controversy over the use of English as a medium of secondary school instruction; problems with syllabi; the impact of universal primary school legislation on Form I selection; the critical lack of educational materials; opportunities for in-service training; disciplinary problems; and complaints regarding the low pay, and low status, of teachers in general.

Questionnaires were administered to students who were residents of the region in which the school was located. In co-ed schools boys and girls were equally represented. The rationale for selecting Form II students was that it is this point in a student's career when a choice of vocational stream is made. I was interested to learn how much input students had in choosing a course of study and what influenced their decision. Students in Form IV develop what is called a "combination" of subjects which they will specialize in for their O-Level examinations, taken at the end of that year. These examinations determine whether they will be selected to continue for the final two years of high school (A-Level). I was interested to learn how they selected a combination of subjects and how this re-

lated to the further training and career goals they hoped to accomplish. Questions were also posed regarding the class background of the student, whether they were from a rural or urban background, the size of the household, the birth order of the student, the educational level of the parents, and the influence of relatives or friends on the educational and career aspirations of the student.

The second phase of the project was designed to uncover the strategies by which actors obtain and use formal knowledge and how this related to productive and distributive relations within the regional setting. I was concerned in each region with selecting a village location of typical size (about 3,000 residents), located in a central export crop zone, where I could administer a selected household and educational/career census to small, middle, and big farmers, evaluate the scope and limitations of primary school preparation at the village level, view the participation of parents in educational activities, and determine the types of opportunities open to primary school and Form IV graduates (school leavers) in the rural countryside. Sites in both regions were selected in consultation with district and local officials and after visiting a number of potential village locations. The villages in both regions were divisional (subdistrict) administrative headquarters, and I have given them pseudonyms in the text to protect the identity of my informants, who are also not named. The duration of the village com-

ponent of the study varied between the two regions: three months in Tabora and seven in Kilimanjaro. While in residence in the village, I visited a number of the villages in the surrounding area, which provided a comparative base for the materials I was collecting.

In total, forty-five household and educational/career census interviews were conducted. Questions posed in these interviews covered the following topics: the size and composition of the household; length of residence in the village; career and educational history of the household head; sources of income from farm and non-farm activities; size of landholding; how the land was acquired and the proportion of the farm devoted to cash and food crops; labor time expended on farming and communal projects; the division of labor within the household; the hiring in/out of labor; the borrowing/lending of tools and equipment; household expenses, particularly those relating to farming and education; the number of children currently in school and their educational level; the level of education and career desired for sons and daughters; educational activities in the home; participation of household members in community organizations and their roles; and, questions pertaining to the level of knowledge of, and attitudes towards, certain state education policies.

These census interviews were complemented by the collection of a number of life stories, and formal and informal interviews with government and party leaders and

village residents. In all areas formal research techniques were accompanied by participant observation which provided the case material on the two social movements analyzed in part 3 of the study. Some of the data presented for analysis were collected in the capital city, Dar es Salaam, where I resided at the university at the beginning and end of my research and between the fieldwork periods in the two regions. Here I had the opportunity to interact both with Tanzanian intellectuals and urban residents from the two regions where I conducted research. Whether the capital constitutes a research site in this study is a matter of semantics. I suggest in the introduction to part 3 that the capital, and what it represents, has entered into the public domain of discourse throughout the country, and that this seems not to be a new phenomenon.

Archival research filled out the picture of historical differences between the two regions; materials were obtained in mission archives located in the two areas, in the national capital, Dar es Salaam at the Tanzania National Archives, and in London at the Public Records Office. My intention, in both data collection and analysis, was to explore an issue of social importance to both Tanzanians and outsiders which would combine the tools of political economic argument with an ethnographic description and interpretation which places people at the center of the account.

Organization of the Study

The study is organized in three parts. Part 1 begins with an introduction which contextualizes the case of Tanzanian socialism by considering its part in the development of African socialism in general and by comparison with other socialist economies. I review some of the literature on the informal exchange sector in planned economies, and discuss what I see as the drawbacks in essentialist moral economy arguments. Chapter 1 concerns how a broadly conceived culture of accommodation (shadow practice) is the response to two processes--the exercise of state hegemony through explicit discourse and a severe economic crisis. I present the parameters of the economic crisis first and provide a framework for understanding how the impact of the crisis has affected distribution of resources. I then indicate how the constraints on exchange relations affect other spheres of social action and how people interpret their activities against the moral philosophy of the state. I identify one cathartic mode in which both knowing and unknowing intentionality are located in modern folklore about leadership, and I analyze one illustrative example as both text and performance.

Chapter 2 provides an historical background for understanding how explicit state discourse defines the role of intellectual labor in social reproduction. Specifically, I discuss the development of policies regarding education and social transformation against the backdrop of colonial and

postcolonial state formation and the nature of recurrent crises in production and labor relations. The case of the Tabora public schools, designed to train a vanguard leadership, in the British era and the present, illustrates the limits and unintended consequences of state investment in the ideological apparatus of the school. Such limits reveal the contradictions inherent in the colonial and post-colonial social formation.

Part 2 utilizes the subnational unit of the region as a socio-political arena to examine the organization of relations of production and social reproduction at the local level. The introduction sets up the conceptual framework for using the geopolitical artifact of the region as a unit of analysis. It then summarizes the contrast between the two regions where research was conducted, Tabora and Kilimanjaro. Chapters 3 and 4 lay out an historical picture of the development and intersection of culture and class, move to the present for a discussion of the impact of economic crisis and state policy as bounding the possibilities of regional development, and conclude with an analysis of how formal knowledge is used as a resource for individual and family mobility. The implications of strategies directed towards educational resources are interpreted from life history materials at the end of these chapters.

Part 3 illustrates how dramatic state policy (in Tanzania, referred to as campaigns) affects, and is trans-

formed by, local-level ritual resistance and interpretive schemes. An introduction to part 3 provides a background for understanding how national campaigns are used for local mobilization in Tanzania, and presents the theoretical model which is used to analyze the local responses to such campaigns in Tabora and Kilimanjaro. I also raise the issue of the spatial and temporal dimensions of popular culture which is germane to the last chapter. Chapters 5 and 6 are designed with two purposes: (1) to illuminate, through an analysis of expressive ritual, the nature of the discourse of familiarity pertaining to the collective identity of social groups in the two regions; and (2) to demonstrate the transformational possibilities of extraordinary (ritual) discourse in response to state ideology. Chapter 5 concerns the eruption of a social movement of charismatic vigilantes (Sungusungu, Tabora) in response to a national campaign against economic sabotage. I discuss the historical precedents of this movement, its current trajectory, and offer an explanation of why it developed at this historical conjuncture in the form that it did. I suggest that such extraordinary discourse illuminates the tension between government and party politics in the postcolonial state. Chapter 6 considers why certain clans on Kilimanjaro mountain risked excommunication from the Church and government censorship to reinstate rain sacrifice rituals in 1984. I explore this extraordinary discourse against another national campaign designed to resettle the urban

"jobless" in rural areas and rural resettlement to areas of minimal population density. I also argue that the revival of rain sacrifice, like the growth of the Sungusungu, highlights a reaction to redistribution tensions arising from a crisis in capitalist formation. If Sahlins (1985) is correct, in that transformation is failed social reproduction, these dramatic events are worthy of attention.

Chapter 7 considers the discourse of familiarity of Tanzania's contemporary generation of teenagers, captured through modern folklore. I begin by taking up the role of folklore in the modern world, thereby framing the Tanzanian emphasis on what I call the characterization of persona. I argue that this format communicates a real tension between the individual and wider groups of extended family and community. I then present a trilogy of such characterizations and illustrate how they are applied to individual biographies. How such folklore both relieves strain and heightens anxiety is discussed in the conclusion.

The conclusion discusses the theoretical implications of the case materials analyzed in the study. I suggest that local discourse and action are very much shaped with reference to a wider circulating discourse and set of coercive practices. Explicit state discourse and practice constrain and liberate action in a creative way, allowing it to transform both ideology and the real conditions of existence.

NOTES

1. Some of the studies of elites mentioned are not concerned with the role of schools per se, but how education affects social mobility. Berry's account of social mobility and accumulation in Nigeria is the most refreshing contribution to the literature on the transformative capacity of education for production.

2. Cf. Bourdieu 1977.

PART ONE
KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICE, AND THE STATE

PROLOGUE

Schumpeter (1942) remarked that every country has its own socialism. This would seem to be a central paradox in the historical development of socialist movements--that culture, even more than economic conditions, accounts for the varying forms of socialism throughout the world (Bell 1968). This paradox is resolved by considering that, within a Marxian framework, culture develops out of the social process of labor, which itself is an adaptation to the physical/social environment and subject to the historical conditions which preceded it.

The two chapters in part 1 of this study examine the growth and social impact of a particular type of socialist state, of a generic variety known as African Socialism. I am particularly concerned with the development of the apparatus of formal knowledge and therefore these chapters concentrate on the creation and use of a state ideology, ujamaa. The ideology of the Tanzanian state, like any ideology, is not only a system of ideas, but, "involves a series of material practices, embracing the customs and life-style of agents and setting like cement in the totality of social practices" (Poulantzas 1978, 28). Chapter 1 sketches a portrait of how the lived practice of ujamaa socialism intersected with severe economic crisis in the

1980s. The analysis in chapter 2 has a dual focus: (1) the colonial legacy of state attempts to control social reproduction through education; and (2) the development of the ideology of ujamaa, itself a theory of knowledge, and its impact on education.

As an introduction to these two chapters, which focus on the particular characteristics of Tanzanian socialism, it is worthwhile to consider what ujamaa has in common with other socialist movements in general.

What is African in African Socialism?

Between 1955 and 1965 thirty-one black African nations gained independence. Socialism, ranging from adherence to the philosophy of Marxist-Leninism to the more vague doctrine of African socialism, has had a very broad appeal for these postcolonial states. Friedland and Rosberg (1964) outline three central themes which are common to the socialist movements in Africa in the postindependence era.

The first is the problem of defining a continental identity. Nationalist movements in Africa were based on the unifying theme of anticolonialism. Postcolonial states needed to develop a new unifying theme to stimulate domestic support, both within their borders, and externally vis-à-vis the rest of the world. A critique of neocolonialism, an elaboration of Lenin's theory of imperialism, provided one such platform. Another unifying theme was sought in the African persona, portrayed as inherently communalistic.

A second theme concerns the problem of economic development. African socialism is linked to a particular form of modernization. The economic base of most of these states is agricultural, with the major portion of their development budgets deriving from the export of primary products. Few have chosen industrialization as the main development strategy. Instead, economic development is largely relegated to the public sector, with the government playing the major role in planning, and in providing and accumulating capital. Private enterprise, in such a scheme, is highly suspect, as it is seen as essentially self-interested and potentially exploitative. Internal class critiques focus on both private entrepreneurs and the exploitative tendencies of the bureaucratic elite, who control state redistribution. Because such states are highly bureaucratized and elite positions are few, it is not surprising that the credentials which endow the elite with state power, such as formal education, should become the focus of popular attention.

A third theme identified by Friedland and Rosberg is what they call the dilemma of control and class formation. The drive for independence and for economic development after independence created serious problems of social control for the leaders of new African nations. The most central issue is the need to obtain the cooperation of the populace for the sustained economic activity which will lead to capital accumulation, without creating new imbal-

ances in the distribution of wealth. Samoff outlines how such contradictions are reproduced in the Tanzanian case. The process of social reproduction entails,

...identifying and differentiating a new elite generation, reinforcing and legitimizing its claim to power and at the same time permitting sufficient social mobility to reinvigorate the ruling group and defuse potential discontent. The bulk of the citizenry must be equipped with basic skills in a manner which restrains their aspirations and reminds them of their largely rural agricultural future. There must be nurtured an ideology that promises extensive change, that attributes delays in those changes to external factors (both human and ecological), or to the inadequacy of citizens' own efforts, that certifies the leadership potential and responsibility of the new elite, and that, where those in power are largely drawn from and rely heavily on administration, portrays development as a technical process best managed by those with the relevant technical and administrative expertise (1983, 11-12).

Socialism, whatever its national context, is an ideology of protest against inequality. In Africa, however, Mazrui (1970) maintains, this protest was centered on the question of racial, rather than class, inequality. In the postindependence era, African socialist countries have turned to the problem of class inequality in framing their domestic policies, but in establishing a national and continental identity in the world order, the question of racial inequality is still linked in a salient way to neo-imperialism. In this sense, the historical development of African socialism is generically different from both European socialism and other socialisms of the Third World.

Covert Market Economies in Socialist States

Marxist scholars are divided over the definition of a "really existing socialist" society. Four different criteria may be delineated (Sweezy 1983, 444-446). One line of thinking defines only those countries which conform to Marxist theories as socialist (e.g., the Soviet Union and its close allies). Another approach is to view socialist societies, such as the Soviet bloc countries, as structurally socialist, but impeded by the rise of a bureaucracy. Due to the underdeveloped nature of the forces of production at the time of revolution, this bureaucracy has attained enormous power. As the forces of production strengthen, the position of the bureaucracy will weaken. A third approach suggests that capitalism has been restored to the Soviet Union and those "really existing socialist" countries which acknowledge its leadership. A final category of answers denies that capitalism has been restored to countries which proclaim themselves socialist, but argues that another form of class exploitation has risen in its place. The characteristics of this new type of social formation are: state ownership of the means of production, centralized economic planning, and the monopolization of political power by a single party with a highly developed security apparatus.

This fourth approach has generated a particularly fruitful set of questions for the comparative study of socialist societies, which have a bearing on the case

presented here. As an aside, I must confess that when I began working through my material on the Tanzanian shadow economy I was unaware that the phrase had already been employed in the analysis of the Soviet Union's second economy (Grossman 1977). The sorts of covert market practices which exist in Tanzania (the diversion of goods for private sale, the rendering of services outside of the state structure, private contracting, clientalism, and bribery) have been documented in other centrally planned economies (Eisenstadt and Roninger 1981; Mars and Altman 1983; O'Hearn 1980; Scott 1980), but the concept of shadow economy makes a theoretical leap from a view which characterizes such practices as dual and informal, to one which sees them as centrally embedded in the formal economy. The shadow economy relies on social networks which operate within a system of socially prescribed rules. Such practices are covert and depend, in the most fundamental way, on trust.

Lomnitz (1988) provides the clue as to why covert shadow economies are most likely to grow in socialist societies.

The more a social system is bureaucratically formalized, regulated, planned, and yet unable to fully satisfy social requirements, the more it tends to create informal mechanisms that escape the control of the system. Informal modes of exchange grow in the interstices of the formal system, thrive on its inefficiencies, and tend to perpetuate them by compensating for shortcomings and by generating factions and interest groups within the system (1988, 43).

Because the shadow economy is dependent on social networks and trust, Lomnitz suggests that an understanding of cultural rules governing relations among kin and friends is essential to provide insight into the counter-ideological logic of such practices. Such a research program is not to be confused with a moral economy paradigm which invokes an argument for the non-market mentality of the peasantry. In the Tanzanian case, the moral economy platform ignores the degree to which shadow practices are encapsulated into the formal economy.

The Fallacy of the Economy of Affection

Hyden (1980) invokes a Chayanovian model of peasant household reproduction to explain the apparent underdevelopment of Tanzanian agricultural production. In his view, the mass of the peasantry is characterized by a kin-ordered mode of production, a cultural form he describes as the economy of affection. The peasant household is so obsessed with meeting the costs of social reproduction that it cannot invest in the development of productive forces and the state cannot compel it to do so because the household has the "exit option" of reverting to subsistence production. Social reproduction requirements which cannot be directly met through production for subsistence are managed through kin and patronage, thus subverting universalistic state policies. There are several problems with his argument.

First, while my own small sample of peasant households in two regions indicates that farmers have responded to negative market incentives by switching from export to food crop production, they do so with the strategic aim of selling their surplus food crops within the shadow economy. My data supports Rubin's (1986) research conclusions from Tanga region. It is not necessarily the case that production per se is falling off, rather, the surplus over which the state has direct control is declining.

Second, the notion that the peasant household can retreat entirely to subsistence is a romantic fantasy. This has certainly not been true from the colonial period onward, although Mbilinyi (1985) points out how the colonial ideology of the "self-sufficient" peasant household was utilized as a rationale to force farmers to meet the social reproduction costs of state and private agribusiness. The peasant families in both of my research sites were creatively engaged in initiating "projects" (Swahili: miradi) to expand production for exchange. It would be difficult to envision individuals who are more active in this regard, given the constraints of resources, weather, and chronic illness.

Third, Hyden's concept of the economy of affection is embedded in an essentialist argument about the nature of peasant culture. Like Nyerere's Ujamaa socialist ideology, this argument revolves around the idea of a communalistic, egalitarian family. While such an ideology may have per-

suasive symbolic value, it ignores both asymmetrical age and gender relations, structurally magnified through lineage organization, and the extent to which access to education and other resources has exacerbated these oppositions.

An economy of affection is empirically persuasive as an ideology, however. Thus Tanzanians manipulate kin to meet their family obligations in arenas such as education, medical attention, job patronage, or resources to initiate a business. Strategic attempts to tap kin resources were a regular feature of daily life in the two research sites where I was located. Such attempts involved reconnaissance and planning, defined as part of the "project," prior to pressing a request. What we might see as a process, my informants objectified as a thing, a project. The outcome was never certain, the distribution of assistance unevenly distributed. In other words, people press a lot of claims, but many go unfulfilled, a fact Hyden overlooks.

As a final note, it is important to stress that Tanzanian socialism, and indeed all socialist formations, exists within the broader system of world capitalism. Much of its development budget derives from overseas aid. Despite what Mazrui (1970) calls Tanzania's Doctrine of Equal Benefaction (accepting aid from all quarters in order to remain unaligned), the state's autonomy with regard to domestic planning is still constrained by the lending policies of bilateral and multilateral donors. The current

restructuring of the Tanzanian economy must be contextualized in terms of the liberalization requirements of the IMF. Although I will not develop the argument here, it can also be pointed out that many of these liberalization policies bear a striking resemblance to the current restructuring programs of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (e.g., modification of central planning, price reform, limited encouragement of private business, democratization, and a tolerance for ideological debate). Such reforms are often evaluated by researchers in purely domestic terms. An assessment of how the restructuring of socialist economies is linked to capitalist expansion on a world scale poses an intriguing problem for future research.

CHAPTER I

SHADOW PRACTICE: INFORMATION AND THE RANGE OF TRUST

Introduction

This chapter is about how hegemony works to create a culture of accommodation. Hegemony operates through a combination of direct coercion and indirect control through an explicit state ideology which attempts to define reality and shape responses to it. In Tanzania, the culture of accommodation is not just a response to domination (working on all individuals), it has also been generated by severe economic crisis. This crisis affected market relations initially and then begins to pervade all other domains of social interaction.

In the following pages I just draw the parameters of a crisis situation, then suggest how it has created multiple spheres of exchange. I explore how the intersection of day-to-day lived crisis and the orthodox discourse of state morality affect individuals' perception of their own action and that of others in a range of social encounters. The role of heightened ambiguity with respect to sanctions and mutually shared interpretive schemes, when combined with continuous surveillance, creates a number of dividing practices (dividing individuals from each other and within themselves) which enhance internal stress. One way such

stress is alleviated is by satirical folklore which highlights how both hegemony and crisis constrain political elites. One such satirical text is examined in the concluding section of this chapter.

The Postcolonial Crisis in Tanzania

Tanzania began its socialist development program, ujamaa, six years after gaining independence in 1961. By the early 1980s the country was in severe economic crisis. Warning signals of this crisis had been apparent to those observing the economic progress of the country (e.g., Green, Rwegasira, and Van Arkadie 1980) throughout the 1970s. The general outline of the crisis was clear. Long-term declining trends in agricultural production, with accompanying low export earnings, had restricted the availability of foreign exchange which contributed to Balance of Payments problems (Ellis 1980; Lofchie 1978). The bulk of Tanzania's foreign exchange earnings (eighty percent) derives from agricultural exports of commodities such as cashews, cloves, coffee, cotton, sisal, tea, and tobacco. By 1980 the total volume of export commodities had fallen twenty-eight percent below levels achieved in 1973. As a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product, export earnings dropped from twenty-five percent in 1966 to eleven percent in 1979 (World Bank 1981, 23). Tanzania, a country which had essentially been self-sufficient in food production, with periodic exportable surpluses, became a consistent net importer of food in 1979, thus joining the list of African

countries dependent upon emergency shipments of cereals from international aid donors.

By the late 1970s the country had become increasingly dependent on external aid inflows for domestic capital formation. In contradiction to the national goal of self-reliance, Tanzania has received more aid from western bilateral and multilateral aid donors than any other sub-Saharan African country and is dependent upon these loans for the bulk of its recurrent development budget. Development projects sponsored by foreign lenders frequently subvert the egalitarian goals embodied in Tanzania's socialist development policies (Campbell 1984; Kleemeier 1985).

Observers agree that a number of external shocks in the 1970s contributed to the macroeconomic problems of the country. These shocks include: a drop in world market prices in real terms for many of Tanzania's export commodities; rising prices for imported oil and petroleum-dependent products beginning in 1973; several years of recurrent drought; and a large domestic debt incurred during the 1979 war against Idi Amin's regime in Uganda. A matter of contention concerns how much of the blame for the country's economic woes should fall on the country's socialist rural development policies.

The ideology of ujamaa socialism is discussed in some detail in the next chapter. It is important to note here that the trademark of the development policy which pertains

to this state discourse is the concept of self-reliance. At the broadest level, self-reliance translates as the nationalist goal of self-determination. Ideally, Tanzania was to remain nonaligned and accept external aid from only those donors sympathetic to its egalitarian rural development policies. Banks and most private businesses and estates were nationalized (with the state retaining the majority of shares).¹

On another dimension, the concept of self-reliance placed the responsibility for national progress on the individual and local community. Ujamaa socialism is first and foremost a "state of mind," a matter of correct values. Leaders are not supposed to exploit, but to serve. To this end, all bureaucrats at middle management and higher levels are forbidden to engage in private businesses, particularly as landlords. The hiring of labor was strongly discouraged. Private land-ownership was prohibited and the state retained the sole right to allocate land for cultivation and housing by allotment. A program of "socialism in the villages" resettled five million Tanzanian peasants into 8,000 registered villages. These were designated as co-operative entities, collectively responsible for agricultural and other forms of credit (United Republic of Tanzania 1975). Producer cooperatives were abolished to curb the exploitative tendencies of a nascent rural capitalist class and were replaced with state crop authorities respon-

sible for the provision of inputs and extension services and control over marketing.

The public sector continued to expand throughout the 1970s without gaining in efficiency or contributing directly to production (Ellis 1980; Nellis 1986). A policy of fiscal centralization was combined with a program of administrative decentralization. Regional (and below these, district) budgets are determined at the national level.² The institution of the Native Authorities (chiefs) was abolished and replaced with a parallel government and party bureaucracy which operates down to the village level. Village decision-making and management are handled by a village chairman acting in conjunction with a number of elected and appointed government and party leaders who work within a committee structure. Every ten households forms a party cell, which is headed by a leader (usually a respected elder or man of influence [see figures 2 through 4]).

Numerous studies have detailed the major disruptions to rural economic and social patterns, brought about by the kinds of changes in political and economic institutions described above (e.g., Boesen, Madsen, and Moody 1977; Brain 1977; Hill 1977; Kim, Mabele, and Schulthesis 1979; McHenry 1979 and 1981; Procter 1971; Rubin 1986; Rudengren 1981). Generally, agricultural producers have adapted to government policies and changes in the institutional environment occurring during the past two decades by changing

rural cropping patterns and altering their income earning activities. A decline in real agricultural prices and returns has discouraged production of export crops and encouraged the substitution of a range of new exchange relations: smuggling crops over borders to get higher real prices, urban migration, a diversification of business and trading activity, and educational investment. Through a combination of these and other strategies, producers cope with the declining terms of rural-urban trade.

The government responded to the severity of the economic crisis through increasing regulation of the economy. This occurred precisely at the time when multilateral aid donors were pressing for deregulation (International Labor Organization 1982). Several years of stalemate in structural readjustment negotiations with the IMF led to dwindling overseas investment in a range of Tanzania's development programs. Import restrictions were imposed but, coupled with an overvalued exchange rate, produced a severe shortage of even basic consumption items and an active black market where prices were extremely high in relation to the basic wage. The production of manufactured items fell, and capacity utilization reached all-time lows due to lack of raw inputs, shortage of spare parts, and inadequate maintenance in the industrial sector. Those items which were produced were exported to neighboring countries to earn foreign exchange, thus creating severe domestic shortages. Rationing in urban areas necessitated networking and

queuing to obtain the few items available at official prices. Urban and rural inhabitants cope with basic shortages of consumer goods and even basic foods by supporting new channels of distribution.

The Three Spheres of Distribution

The Legal Sector

Legal channels of trade are highly regulated by the state. In 1983 and 1984 peasants were required to market their cash crops and a number of specified food crops through parastatal crop authorities. Producer prices were kept artificially low to raise foreign exchange revenue and to subsidize cheap cereal staples sold to urban consumers. Credit and extension services were available to peasants only through the crop authorities and the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank. Locally produced commodities were made available to urban workers and rural peasants at government-controlled prices through regional, district, and village government trading corporations and cooperative shops. Households held ration cards that specified the amount of each commodity that a family could purchase at one time. An additional legal distribution channel operated within parastatal corporations and factories. Each office or branch was allotted a range of commodities at regular intervals which were made available for purchase by employees at controlled prices.

The severity of Tanzania's economic crisis of the 1980s was apparent in the absence of virtually all essential

items (such as soap, cooking oil, sugar, kerosene, and batteries) in the government shops. When such items did arrive, long lines and grave shortages exacerbated consumer frustration. The reasons for such severe shortages are complex. Most of Tanzania's factories were operating at fifty percent below capacity due to a shortage of foreign currency necessary to finance the purchase of spare parts. Items which were produced were often sold to neighboring countries to earn foreign exchange, thus increasing internal shortages. Food crops subject to price control were regularly diverted to informal market channels where producer prices were higher than those paid through the crop authorities, thus increasing the shortage of certain basic staples in government markets and allocation centers. Tanzania earns the bulk of its foreign exchange in agricultural exports. The extent of the real decline in peasant cash crop production from the 1960s and 1970s was hotly debated but widely recognized. Many peasants were actively exiting from export crop production and switching to food crops for subsistence and sale in the traditional market sector. This contributed to Tanzania's foreign exchange deficit, which was already hampered by negative external terms of trade.

Two results of this economic crisis were clear. First, peasants could not be motivated to increase cash crop production because none of the items they needed were available at prices which were in line with farm wages.

Secondly, production in both the rural and urban sectors declined as workers and peasants devoted the better part of each working day to the search for necessary commodities and trading opportunities.

The Black Market Sector

Recently the Tanzanian government relaxed its restrictions on external trade. During the crisis of 1980-84, however, virtually no imported items were available through government trading centers. These restrictions, coupled with the acute shortages of locally produced commodities, laid the groundwork for the highly profitable black market network. The extent of Tanzania's black market (magendo) trade is discussed in chapter 6. It can be mentioned here that the campaign designed to eliminate it, "The War Against Economic Sabotage," was in every sense a real war. Former president Nyerere openly admitted that black market bosses had an economic stranglehold on the country, and declared that the aim of the campaign was to recapture the state from the government of the racketeers. "The War Against Economic Sabotage" had its own trajectory, beginning with the roundup and detention of several hundred large-scale black market entrepreneurs found hoarding private banks of foreign and local currency, spare parts, luxury imported items, and local commodities. In a short time this exercise devolved into the detention of distribution middlemen, who were often also government employees,

and petty traders peddling small amounts of illegally obtained goods in rural markets and on urban street corners.

The "Shadow Economy"

There is a third distribution sphere in Tanzania which I call Tanzania's "shadow economy." It is interstitial between legally regulated channels of trade and the black market. Unlicensed petty traders selling foodstuffs and locally produced items; vendors of cooked foods, soft drinks and newspapers; service operators such as cobblers, shoe shiners, barbers, tailors; and urban casual laborers and domestic workers--in other words, traders and service workers from whom the state receives no revenue--comprise the informal sector of most African economies. They are tolerated during times of prosperity and harassed and restricted when the economy is depressed. In Tanzania during the economic crisis of the first half of the 1980s, these traders and workers formed the lowest tier of black market distributors as well. For all intents and purposes, the informal sector had become contaminated by illegal trade. Tomato sellers peddled smuggled cans of Kenyan margarine, newspaper vendors exchanged foreign currency, shoe shiners sold flowered Ruandan shirts, and cassava vendors peddled cigarettes (which were unavailable in shops) by the piece.

The shadow economy extended beyond the traditional market or informal sector, however. It extended to what can only be termed an essential survival strategy adopted by everyone, from the highest level bureaucrat to the

poorest peasant and worker. Anyone who could manage to divert some essential goods or services from legal channels would do so. Commodities and services (including such services as communications, medicine, education, and transportation) were bought and sold at the inflated black market price or exchanged for other needed goods or services.

Those with access to foreign exchange (mainly bureaucrats approved for foreign travel) purchased both imported goods for trade and large-scale items such as pickup trucks, commercial freezers, chain saws, or sewing machines to operate unofficial businesses. The opportunity for study abroad was widely perceived as a significant opportunity to aid one's relatives in their various projects back home. University professors routinely operated enterprises in poultry and other farm products, thus earning the title of "banana and chicken petty bourgeoisie."

One report (Gargan, quoting Maliyamkono in the New York Times, October 14, 1985) estimated that many Tanzanians spend little more than forty percent of their working day at their jobs. The shadow economy is sometimes illegal, sometimes legal, and sometimes only hazily so. It is this distribution realm which dominates the practical strategies of everyday life for Tanzanians, and, contrary to official rhetoric, it is hard work, even though it is not overtly productive. Such strategies have profound consequences for how people organize their social relations and what they

feel about what they are doing. Old solidarities are strained and new ones created in their place. In Tanzania such changes take place in relation to a explicit state ideology about economic development.

The Range of Trust

There are no words to talk about the process of internal censorship which takes place as a person tries to mediate the official rules and the hali halisi (the real situation). Individuals in a relationship of trust will talk about the lack of correspondence and the limitations on freedom of action (e.g., the things they have to do to look like good citizens), but in discussing their plans for the future, people talk "as if" these limitations did not exist--clearly expressing a wish for freedom of action. Through observing how people implement the projects they have planned, it is possible to detect the compromises they have made (which they also recognize). Ideologically Tanzanians operate within the realm of hope (the verb kufikira in swahili means both to hope and to think; thus the statements "I think it will work" [I have a certain confidence that it will work] and "I hope it will work" [I wish it will work] have a consolidated meaning). In the practical realm Tanzanians use a range of connections to bring any project to fruition.

The political discourse of social transformation permeates the practical communication of everyday life in

Tanzania. The boundary of orthodox discourse is subtly delineated and difficult for an outsider to perceive. At its most superficial level this discourse represents Tanzania as a socialist egalitarian state. The media (newspapers, radio broadcasts) and public speeches by leaders note with pride the meeting of production targets or the good socialistic behavior of workers or peasants in this region or that, with the reiteration of the principles of African socialism represented as if the rules and the reality were in perfect correspondence. Yet the same newspapers run articles and editorials and the same leaders make speeches that appear to contradict this orthodox view.

Orthodox discourse on Tanzanian socialism also contains an incorporated closed critique: a page from the book of Mao on criticism-self-criticism. This heterodox-within-the-orthodox discourse suggests that things do not always work perfectly as planned because the country is still making the transition to socialism. Capitalist tendencies exist alongside socialist transformations. People must be persuaded to give up their individualistic interests. In cases where these individualistic interests directly sabotage the collective interests of the many, they should be eliminated by coercion. Leaders who appear to represent the state's openness to auto-critique are closely controlled. They must be backed by credentials of honor (an exemplary career/lifestyle as evidence of ascetic self-sacrifice), as well as the support of powerful patrons.

Then they can invoke the party guideline that when criticism is constructive it is not subversive. There are several brands of this heterodox-orthodoxy allowed, but within certain limits and certain forums (e.g., the university, but not the factory), and proponents of these views must take care not to provoke suspicion by proclaiming either a retrograde or too avant-garde a view.

True heterodoxy (illegitimate discourse) also exists, especially in relation to the unanticipated, and sometimes tragic, effects which national policies have had on practical matters of everyday life (for example the relocation of millions of villagers into isolated and arid regions). Also a target of heterodox discourse is the corruption of public figures or institutions which are currently in favor with the party elite. When these individuals or institutions fall out of favor it is orthodox discourse which criticizes them. Finally, heterodox critiques note the contradictions in the state's active promotion of certain aspects of tribal or "local" culture. Tribal songs, dances, and art forms are publicized and transformed with new themes promoting national integration and socialist policy, but the practice of witchcraft, clitoridectomy, or rituals involving formerly powerful chiefs challenge the state and provoke its condemnation. Heterodox discourse in this vein is generally a private matter. One risks detention, loss of position, or deportation for airing these concerns. Private discourse between trusted friends or relatives is

also risky business, because one is never certain who is an informer and at what time such information may be expediently revealed. Heterodox discourse in public and private is mainly relegated to veiled remarks, jokes, satirical plays, novels, poems, or short stories.

Between the arenas of orthodoxy and heterodoxy is what Bourdieu (1977) refers to as the realm of doxa: things taken so for granted that they are not spoken of or there is no vocabulary to speak of them. This is the realm of practical activity, the goals, decisions and information that people use to live out their daily lives. Tanzanians are aware that real life does not match either the orthodox or heterodox versions of it. These types of discourse are abstractions removed from reality. For example, heterodox discourse, by inverting the claims of orthodox views, fails to note that planned social change has provided benefits to some.

There is an amusing and theatrical use of orthodox ideology which provides a break from pragmatic daily routine. The best examples can be drawn from the numerous national holidays during which the elite visit remote areas "to get in touch with the real situation." The local planning that goes into such events may include a clean-up campaign, the sudden appearance of scarce commodities in the local markets and shops, the rehearsal of school children in local songs and dance routines whose content glorifies the state and its leadership, and the organiza-

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tion of parades, speeches, and feasting. The peasants and workers who are exhorted by leaders to abandon work and rally in support of these events enjoy not only a break from their drudgery but the shared, silent laughter that these farces provide.

Tanzanians who know that illegal strategies are part and parcel of survival will profess ignorance or confusion about how one individual or another manages to get by. Yet people are constantly observing one another, piecing together the frameworks of their respective strategies. "How has that man managed to afford beer on his salary?" "You can't imagine how people are managing," a favorite phrase goes. Part of the reason why such things are not spoken of is that they are illegal--illegal to do and illegal to acknowledge. Another reason is that the rules (often laws) are frequently changed and even changed retroactively, making what a person did yesterday (when it was legal or semilegal) illegal today. Given that there is a constant scarcity of basic commodities (such as soap, sugar, cooking oil, and rice), people tend to purchase them in bulk when they have the opportunity. They then hoard some of these items while distributing others to a network of kin and friends. Similarly, individuals whose occupation enables them to control the distribution of basic commodities use their leverage to give priority to people from whom they can obtain other scarce goods or services.

These practices are routine and not strictly legal. They go unmentioned and are social facts of existence until a government campaign dictates that they are illegal and punishable under newly created legislation. Thus most strategies are secret matters except to the people whose help is needed to implement them, and then only revealed piecemeal and gradually. In a situation where the rules concerning what is correct are so often in flux, people must constantly ascertain how much leeway is available to manipulate the rules so as to avoid jeopardy. In such situations, time-honored community patterns ("this is how we do things") may be radically transformed on the surface ("this is how we do things now") and go underground. They may also continue and be categorized as resistance, continue as functional strategies, be synthesized with old and new elements, or disappear altogether. In the process the range of trust may contract (one cannot even trust a brother), or it may expand beyond old limits (someone you would not want as a friend you may befriend in order to strike a deal).

The concept of a project is dependent upon relations of trust. The swahili word mradi (project) is a common figure of everyday speech. A project may be a goal (for example, attaining a secondary school education). It may also refer to a concrete thing (for example, a livestock business). Finally, it may denote a strategy necessary to initiate the plans to implement a goal, or engage in a particular activ-

ity. Under such conditions, the implementation of a project, or the strategy to attain a project, involves the individual in a collusive activity whereby he or she must act as if reality conformed to orthodox ideology, while at the same time using information on the rules governing "the real situation." A person may stand several hours in a queue to present a ration card to obtain soap, only to be told that there is no more soap available. Later the same person may be purchasing rounds of beer for the shop manager who will later "find" some soap which he had set aside for his "family." A man may order a beer in a bar and be told that beer is unavailable, only to then watch other patrons being served beer. If he questions why there is no beer available when other patrons are drinking it, he will be told again that beer is unavailable and what the other patrons are drinking is private beer. Outright bribery is not always the key to bringing about desired goods and services. It is imperative to know how, when, and what is to be offered and to whom. Such delicate negotiations are the result of constant reconnaissance missions carried out by every individual.

Reconnaissance and Meconnaissance

Distinguishable from the realm of doxa (or what Giddens [1979] refers to as practical consciousness) is the process which involves a symbolic transformation of a particular action so as to disguise the nature of it from oneself. Bourdieu's (1977) use of the word meconnaissance extends

the Marxian concept of mystification beyond the level of the social system writ large (lies society tells us which we believe, thereby hiding our real interests from ourselves). Meconnaissance, awkwardly translated as misrecognition, is really a process of misknowing. It is not simply ignorance, unknowing; it involves the individual first in the process of knowing something about an aspect of reality and then learning to know it on another level, one which is conscious and subject to articulation.

Reconnaissance entails more than knowing "the real situation." It involves determining the parameters of surveillance in order to shape a plan for action. This requires an extraordinary effort since it depends on maintaining old and new connections (e.g., in addition to family, past and present workmates, schoolmates, and national service comrades). As the rules fluctuate, so does the level of anxiety with regard to the necessary investments for maintaining a sufficient network. One of the cathartic releases for such tension is the use of satire.

National Ideology and Local Knowledge:
Presidential Folklore

The relationship between knowing and misknowing is perhaps most aptly illustrated in the modern performance of a traditional East African form of education and entertainment: the telling of morality tales. Consider this anecdote about a dilemma involving Tanzania's former president

Nyerere, held in high esteem by the majority as a leader who believes in and acts on the egalitarian principles by which he steered the country along its socialist path of development.

The president has a younger brother living in Mwanza (a region bordering Lake Victoria and close to Kenya and Uganda). It is said he is a "real man of the people." He lives in some furnished rooms, very plainly, and says, "Why should I capitalize on my brother's position? Tomorrow you could throw him out and I'd be nothing."

The brother had accepted a tender to refurbish the New Mwanza hotel (a state-run enterprise) which had been partially destroyed by fire. He got a lot of materials and furniture and hired a lot of laborers for the job and then didn't pay them. When the regional commissioner found out, he was very angry and had the hotel cordoned off by the police.

Now the president at that time was flying from Dar es Salaam to Musoma (a region bordering Mwanza which is his region of origin) for a vacation. When the president arrived he picked up the regional commissioner and some other officials and they drove to the president's village, Butiama. (Butiama is widely referred to as the "model" self-reliance village, with large communal farms supported with intensive mechanization, paved roads, electricity, running water, co-operative shops stocked with basic goods, well-supplied schools, and so on). The brother who was just returning to Mwanza found out that the police had cordoned off the hotel. He then rented a cab and drove 150 miles to Butiama.

When he arrived he first greeted his brother (the president) but then said, "I don't really want to talk to you. You're just my elder brother. I want to talk to this man here (the regional commissioner). What have you done to my hotel?" Nyerere's younger brother and the regional commissioner exchanged some unpleasant words and then Nyerere's older brother intervened and began to defend his younger brother. The president got angry and gave an order to have the two brothers detained. The police didn't know what to do. The brothers said, "You don't have to lead us away. This is our home. We'll just come to the police station." They walked to the older brother's house, got into his car, and drove to the police station with the police van in hot pursuit. At the police station everything was in confusion. The police were bewildered. The brothers said, "Now look here. We're

being detained," and they emptied their pockets and were taken to a cell.

In the morning word came that the older brother was to make an apology to the regional commissioner and he was set free. The president flew back to Dar es Salaam and the younger brother was transferred to a prison in Mwanza. Now when Nyerere arrived home his mother said, "I want to go home to Butiama for a visit." She was given the presidential jet, and when she arrived there she heard her son was being detained in Mwanza. She instructed the plane to fly to Mwanza. When she got there she went for lunch at the regional commissioner's house. After that she went to the prison. She showed her identity card and asked to be allowed to see her son. When the time came for the visit to be over, she said to the prison guard, "Look here. I am the mother. This is my son. Wherever he stays, I stay. If he sleeps on the floor tonight I also sleep on the floor." The police commissioner phoned the regional commissioner who then had no choice but to phone the president and say what had happened and request the brother's release. The brother was released and that night in Mwanza he was a hero. (Parenthetical explanations are mine.)

To unravel the rhetorical meaning of this story it is important to begin by understanding the context in which it was related. The story was told one Sunday afternoon during a leisurely conversation between two university students, with myself as an externalized outside third. My presence here is significant in that such anecdotes are in part intended to serve as an instructive device for the audience. The other listener, also a university student, may or may not have heard the story before; the storyteller was intent on relating it as a way to elaborate a point he was making in their already on-going friendly debate.

The wider context of this debate and the story was the national campaign against racketeering and the black market, then being conducted throughout the country. Many

individuals, particularly some prominent leaders who had fallen out of favor, were being detained without charge as economic saboteurs. One region that came under particular attention during this campaign was Mwanza, which borders on Uganda and Kenya and was a reputed center for smuggling activities.

The storyteller was from Mwanza. In the first weeks after the campaign was launched he was a zealous supporter of the government's anti-corruption activities, and vigorously debated with his friends and relatives the government's position, the president and the prime minister's honesty and integrity, and the predicted success of the campaign. On this day, however, he played devil's advocate. He argued with his colleague that certain racketeers have such powerful patrons ("godfathers") that they will never be caught ("netted") by government action. His motives for relating this particular story at this particular time would appear to be mixed, because he delighted in demolishing the arguments put forth by his earnest colleague, who proclaimed that the real obstacle to socialist development lay in the corrupt behavior of certain leaders who were finally to be displaced by the president and the few honest men he had left surrounding him. Only the night before the same storyteller had chortled to his nephew and the nephew's friends (who were all involved in illegal petty trade to supplement their low white collar salaries)

that they would finally be put out of business as this campaign weeded out the honest from the dishonest.

I was a relative newcomer to the community when this story-telling event took place. No one felt sure of my motives for carrying out my research project; I was still being "felt out" about my reaction to political events occurring in the country. The storyteller had already had several conversations with me in which he explained his concern that foreign researchers often portrayed Tanzania to the outside world in a negative light. University students, he explained, were indoctrinated from the beginning of their studies to beware of foreign intelligence agents, to try to remain objective about the theoretical material they would study which stood in contradiction to socialist models, and to regard it as their duty to report any suspicious action within the academic community to their local party leaders. I assume that the telling of this story, in which he reversed his customary position, was intended to elicit my reaction to ideas which had been expressed in my presence about the campaign. Telling the anecdote, in other words, was part of a reconnaissance/information-gathering strategy to determine how political discourse should be shaped in my presence.

The truth or validity of the story is of secondary importance to the multiple themes it expressed for the teller and the audience. Both the storyteller and his colleague laughingly summarized the theme of the anecdote

with the conclusion that Nyerere's mother was troublesome because she was "just too old." If there can be said to be a villain in this piece, they suggested, it was the president's mother, who used her private, domestic, affective position to circumvent state power.

The young brother, despite his reputation as a "man of the people," was not above compromising his egalitarian principles to bilk the government out of thousands of shillings with a phony renovation contract, cheating his laborers out of their wages for work already performed, presuming to refer to a government-owned enterprise as "his hotel," chastising the most important government officer in the region for blocking his nonexistent renovation program, and presumably counting on his familial relation to the president to provide immunity from the law. Yet he emerges as the hero of the tale, perhaps because, despite all that had taken place, he seemed unaffected and unconcerned.

The president, uncorrupted in this tale, is portrayed as grandly using his executive powers to punish his younger brother for his arrogant behavior towards the region's presidential designate, the regional commissioner, although not to punish him for his illegal actions. The Law, in the tale represented by the president, the regional commissioner, and the police commissioner, is circumvented by human frailty, the emotional/authoritarian tie between mother and son. The president is weak in this story, but in an endearing human way. The humorous theme of the story is

provided by the brothers' attitude toward their detention; they effectively detain themselves.

This farcical element contrasts with the fear widely expressed during the campaign. Residents of Tabora Town, for example, appeared obsessed with gathering the latest information about who had been detained each day, for what causes, the manner in which information regarding illegal activities had been leaked to the police, the evidence that had been obtained, and the manner in which the detainee had been arrested. The circumstances under which such suspects would be formally charged and brought to trial were kept secret for several months, thus leaving the populace to speculate about the prospects for those who had been arrested. The most widespread rumor, fostered by a remark made by the president in one of his speeches during this period, was that the detainees would be punished by relocating them in rural areas and giving them a hoe, thereby converting an urban-based bourgeoisie into a rural peasantry.

Many informants expressed fear of detention. Notwithstanding the rural peasant origins of most of the urban bourgeoisie, they also expressed fear about relocation. Yet the fact that people openly expressed a deeply felt fear of moving backward in time and space is both real and illusory. The misleading or illusory aspect of such expressions is that they mask the fluidity of movement (both physically and in terms of communication, exchange of goods

and personnel) between rural and urban areas and the fact that rural peasants are frequently engaged in urban trading networks and wage labor, while the urban workers and middle class must supplement their wages with peasant agriculture.

One final note, the farcical moral of the tale is that the punishment, not tailored to the crime, is meaningless. Arbitrarily imposed, it can be arbitrarily undone, showing that power is limited by human frailty. Tanzania is most frequently represented in the statues of the popular Makonde artists as a mother, bowed down by numerous small children pulling on her breasts, bending her head and neck. Ujamaa (extended familyhood) socialism projects the image of society as a family with a web of mutual ties, rights, and obligations. In this, the image of the mother, standing at the intersection of the spheres of production and reproduction, is the body politic writ large. The tale of the president and his brothers indicates that even while he exercises his patriarchal authority, he must himself answer to a higher authority, his mother, and ultimately his people.

The primary range of trust and first experience of hegemony is the domestic unit. In Tanzania, as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the extended family (clan) still mobilizes powerful sentiment in the combination of metaphors regarding life/spiritual force and practical action. In "African Gnosis" Mudimbe (1985) reviews a number of theories concerning the nature of Bantu philosophy. A

common thread of these theories can be expressed in the following way: (1) all elements of the universe contain an active force which is dependent upon all other active forces; (2) these forces operate in three interdependent spheres--the sky (where God dwells), the earth (the center of the universe and home of God and humans) and the world of the dead (ancestors); and (3) the perpetuation of the lineage through procreation is an affirmation of the immortal vital force. Therefore, blood filiation defines the Bantu community as a natural and social body. Two kinds of law regulate human action in this cosmology: laws made by people and adjudicated by them and taboo-laws adjudicated by God and the ancestors, whose vital force is immanent. Human law can be created and transformed. Transgression does not involve the individual conscience and circumvention of human law can be evidence of keen intelligence. Taboo-law, however, acts upon the transgressor (and by extension, the community linked through active force) through supernatural sanction (1985, 191).

Mudimbe (1985, 177) refers to Nyerere's program of ujamaa socialism as the "most pragmatic of all African socialisms." While there is a pragmatic side to ujamaa programs, this characterization misses the essential way that a social charter has been linked to a more pervasive ethos in which the vital force of the individual is interdependent with others. The relative durability of the idea of ujamaa socialism, despite the widespread bending and

breaking of laws designed in its name, should be seen as a testimony to its symbolic and affective valence. The tension between such sentiment, as manipulated in state ideology, and the current crisis in social reproduction is the subject of the next chapter.

NOTES

1. See Shivji's discussion, "Relations With International Capitalism II: Investments and Partnerships With Multinational Corporations" (1976, 163-178) for an analysis of why nationalization is not necessarily sufficient to produce a socialist economy.

2. In 1982 the Tanzanian government announced a set of changes in agricultural and rural development policies which took effect at the end of 1984 (United Republic of Tanzania 1982b and 1982c). In 1985 the government successfully negotiated a structural readjustment plan with the IMF. Some of the changes which have resulted are: limited encouragement of private estate development, a lessening on internal and external trade regulations, the reinstatement of producer cooperatives, a re-instatement of local district councils which manage their own budgets from tax revenues, and a devaluation of the currency.

3. The use of primary and secondary school students for such celebrations had provoked something of a crisis by 1980. This is indicated by a self-commissioned study conducted by the Educational Evaluation Unit of the Ministry of Education (Temu, Moshi, and Nchimbi 1985). The evaluation report indicated that primary schools lost an average of 100 school days (three and a half months) and secondary school students failed to cover forty-one percent of their syllabuses due to pupil and teacher participation in mass displays and parades.

CHAPTER II
FORMAL KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION CRISES
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

Three recurrent themes can be traced in the history of educational policy in Tanzania, from the earliest days of German colonization through to the breakdown of Education for Self-reliance reforms instituted by the independent socialist state. Taken together, these issues illuminate the major contradictions within which institutionalized knowledge had been formed and reformed in Tanzania. From the point of view of state administrators, these issues are: (1) the recognized need for educated people to serve as state functionaries, and the perception that some form of universal education is desirable to meet rational, material ends (variously defined as production or development); (2) a persistent fear of producing an educated elite which will become a threat, by challenging state authority; and (3) the problem of amalgamating the African and the Western, of constructing an educational system which will impart those aspects of "civilization" (from the colonizers' point of view) or "modernization" (from the point of view of the postcolonial state) which will have a broadly beneficial effect, without constituting a wholesale indoctrination of western values. This chapter will entail an ampli-

fication of each of these themes as they emerge in various historical periods.

The Institutionalization of
Knowledge in Historical Perspective

The problem of broad-scale cultural management begins in Tanzania with the extension of German colonial power over mainland Tanganyika in the late nineteenth century. The use of formal educational institutions, by both the German and British colonial regimes, to organize and direct culture change, was minimal compared to the use of overtly political institutions such as the legal system, the military, and taxation measures. For the most part, missionaries organized the ideological apparatus of schools in the colonial state. The colonial regime and the missionaries (both responsible to metropolitan centers) were not always aligned on the question of who should receive formal education and what form of selectively "adapted" western knowledge should be provided. Furthermore, denominational (within the missionary front) and factional (within the colonial administration) cleavages provided conflicting agendas for the colonial education initiative tied to gradual social transformation. This section examines how a number of such conflicting agendas were played out.

A brief overview of "native education" policy under the German and British colonial regimes is presented in the context of more general plans for social transformation and

social control. I discuss how institutionalized forms of knowledge were created and received by Africans themselves.

Native Education Policy in German East Africa

At the close of the First World War the colony of German East Africa became Tanganyika Territory, held in trust under a League of Nations Mandate by Great Britain. A reconnaissance report prepared by the Foreign Office at the close of the war gives the following assessment of this late addition to the British Empire:

Tanganyika can never be a white man's country. Before the war the European population was about 5,000 out of a total population of between seven and eight millions. It can never become an outlet for the surplus population of the mother country. The work of the colony will always have to be done by natives, and, since the agricultural resources of the country are very great, its trade might be greatly developed if native labour were properly stimulated and organized by Europeans (U.K. Foreign Office 1920, 105).

Elsewhere the report notes the advantageous position of the colony for controlling shipping and commerce along the Indian Ocean coast, and inland on the great lakes. The territory (German East Africa) was "clearly the most valuable German possession in Africa" (U.K. Foreign Office 1920, 40). Under the German regime, development of the colony proceeded in a way that was "mainly material... communications were the object of unremitting attention, railways being extended, roads and bridges constructed and steamers placed on the lakes. Experiments in every kind of crop were instituted, and every assistance was given to the [European] planters" (U.K. Foreign Office 1920, 36). The

Foreign Office, however, took a dim view of Germany's definition of its role as a colonial power. This definition, summed up for them in a number of German reports was that "colonization consists in the utilization of the soil, its products, and its men, for the economic profit of the colonizing nation" (U.K. Foreign Office 1920, 40). In the judgement of the Foreign Office, "the permanent improvement and civilization of the people was incompatible with it (the German view of its role), as it led to violence and cruelty on the part of the rulers and revolt or sullen depression among the natives" (U.K. Foreign Office 1920, 40).

As pointed out by Wright (1968), an objective assessment of the period of German overrule requires an exercise of caution when reviewing British propaganda statements about their predecessors. British atrocity reports on the German colonial regime served to rationalize a takeover which was part of the spoils of the First World War and to legitimize Britain's right to rule on the grounds that it was more humane. Thus such propaganda should not be confused with historical fact and it is important to understand the period of German colonization from the standpoint of its accomplishments, as well as its mistakes.

German economic interests in Tanganyika centered on control over the central African trade nexus (particularly in ivory and valuable hides), the exploitation of minerals, and the production of such agricultural exports as rubber,

cotton, and sisal. European settlement and plantation agriculture were encouraged and stimulated by the building of the central railroad and northern railway links, and an infrastructure in roads, bridges, and communications. Two central concerns for the German administration in matters of native policy were the maintenance of law and order and the insurance of a steady supply of native labor for settler plantations.

Educational policy under German rule was largely controlled by the missions. Such schools provided catechetical, vocational, and craft training and a rudimentary knowledge of the three R's. The few government schools sponsored by the Germans were primarily oriented toward training the sons of chiefs to form a small class of minor bureaucrats (Furley and Watson 1966). Foreign Office figures (1920, 39) from a German report issued in 1911 show government school attendance for natives as 4,312 (3,494 in elementary, 681 receiving higher education, and 137 receiving industrial training). At this time Roman Catholic and Protestant missions had 62,335 students in attendance. Of these, 60,990 were in elementary (many so-called "Bush") schools, 1,196 were enrolled in higher studies, and 149 were receiving industrial training. Conflicting figures for the same period make the extent of the German colonial educational endeavor difficult to define, but, in general, such inroads for a native population of some 4,145,000 (1921 census cited in U.K. Public Records Office 1923) were

modest indeed. Yet an assessment of German accomplishments in developing a secular state system of education can be made by comparing its efforts to those of Great Britain in the neighboring territories of Kenya and Uganda for the same period. The British administration in these territories admitted no responsibility for native education policy at this time (Wright 1968, 629). The tension between missions and the government over the direction of educational policy (which persists into the present day) began during the German regime. The educational policy of the German administration was a decentralized system in which the handful of government schools were developed to train the sons of chiefs and their relatives to operate as functionaries (akidas) of the colonial government. Life in these government schools was severe and flogging was common, even for native teachers charged with neglecting their duties. The apprenticeship training for the role of akida included weekly visits to the local magistrate's court to hear cases and witness public floggings. The technical aspect of the curriculum included the use of student labor to construct buildings, bridges, and roads. Trainees also worked in accountancy, stocktaking, and book-keeping, staffing government offices, banks, and libraries. Printing apprentices ran the government printing presses which were established at the Tanga school (Hirji 1979, 209-211). If life was severe in such schools, it was because the administration viewed them as socializing in-

stitutions for values and behavior appropriate for government service (e.g., loyalty, industry, and punctuality).

The central dispute between the administration and missions during this period concerned the question of language instruction. German administrators valued the cultured, urban, and entrepreneurial abilities of the Swahili traders they encountered on the coast and the interior. They also recognized the role of literate men of influence who served as teachers in Koranic centers. The decision to use the swahili language as a medium of instruction in government schools was partly a concession to the Swahili power base (from which the administration intended to draw recruits for government service), and was also designed to strengthen the use of swahili as a lingua franca. Such a decision did not sit well with the missionary societies who saw the use of the swahili language as strengthening the bulwark of Islam. This conflict erupted into the Reichstag budgetary debates at the turn of the century, when the Catholic Centrum Party obtained the concession that no new secular schools were to be established and supported by the colonial office. The government schools already established in Dar es Salaam, Tanga, and Bagamoyo were allowed to continue with a swahili curriculum as the "Muslim element" was recognized as central to the needs of the administration (Wright 1968, 627).

Missionary interests were not monolithic, however. Several Protestant and Catholic denominations competed for

territorial control through the establishment of mission centers in which elementary schools and catechetical centers constituted primary institutions for Christian conversion. Mission schools were unaided and unregulated by the German regime through a variety of tactics. While spreading the gospel was their central concern, the quality, content, and organization of missionary schools varied according to the denomination, and to the class and ethnic composition of the society in charge. Several missionary societies recognized the financial necessity of closer cooperation with the government in educational matters, although the educational aims of government and church were not uniform, and the possibility of government aid meant a surrender of complete control over matters of curriculum, teacher qualifications, and physical plant (Wright 1976, 57-59).

Indirect Rule During the British Regime

Tanganyika in the Sphere of British East Africa

Tanganyika may have been Germany's most prized possession, but it paled by comparison with Britain's possessions in southern Africa, the Middle East, and Malaysia. As described by Iliffe (1979, 261), "continuing poverty was British Tanganyika's leading characteristic." Its period of entry into the British sphere of influence was ill-timed in the sense that it coincided with the broadest expansion of empire and a depression in the metropolitan economy. In the view of the Foreign Office, the territory was an impor-

tant acquisition mainly in terms of its strategic value ("[it] is by far the most dangerous, in German hands, to the peace of Africa" [U.K. Foreign Office 1920, 40]).

By contrast with the German Mandate, which supported the financial monopoly of German capitalists, many more non-nationals were allowed to participate in the colonial economy of British Tanganyika. No single British company attained the degree of influence in the colony that had been held by the German charter company DOAG. Tanganyika entered into the colonial sphere in British East Africa as a peripheral territory subordinate to Kenya, its link to the metropolitan economy maintained through firms that had their central offices in Nairobi and Mombasa (Rodney 1979, 145). Settler interests remained underrepresented compared to Kenya, being confined to a few plantation estate centers.

A two-tiered economy of plantations and small-holder native peasant agriculture reflected two different systems of political control in British Tanganyika, neither of which was designed with African interests in mind (Rodney 1979). Control over commerce by Asian middlemen was encouraged to curb the growth of a nascent African petty bourgeoisie. By 1925 the government had disposed of some 1,092,470 "ex-enemy" (German) sisal, coffee, and rubber estates and had given long-term leases on 33,000 acres of land. Capital financing for the purchase of these estates

was 51.35 percent British and 29.82 percent Indian (U.K. Public Records Office 1926).

The territory's first British governor, Sir Horace Byatt (whose administration ran from 1916 until 1924), began to implement the intentions of the Colonial Office by discouraging European settlement and deporting the remaining German settlers and missionaries (Iliffe 1979, 262). Byatt was succeeded in 1925 by Sir Donald Cameron, whose Nigerian service under Lord Lugard firmly committed him to institute a native policy of indirect rule in Tanganyika. Some of Cameron's high ideals needed compromise given the extreme underdevelopment of the territory. He noted his surprise to find upon his arrival in Dar es Salaam that,

all the clerks and artisans and most of the primary school teachers in the Territory had been imported from abroad--from India, from Ceylon, from Nyasaland, from Mauritius: owing to lack of educational facilities the Territory could supply none of these for her own use (Cameron 1939, 127-8).

The Ideology of Native Education

The British policy of indirect rule called for a different sort of educational initiative than that developed under the Germans. Byatt and his counterparts in the Colonial Office had already determined that the problems of supplying sufficient native labor would discourage intensive European settlement. Part of the superficially liberal attitude taken by the British in matters of native policy can thus be explained by the decision to let the colony develop itself primarily on the basis of an indige-

nous small-holder peasant agriculture. According to Iliffe (1979, 273), one of the peculiarities of sub-Saharan Africa is that its peasantry was an outgrowth of capitalist penetration. In Tanganyika this transformation was not fully initiated until the 1920s. Thus it is not surprising that one of the earliest British Education Department reports from the territory (U.K. Public Records Office 1923) should state, "...it is intended that agriculture shall be the keynote of our educational programme."

Part of Cameron's dilemma (which persists into the present in the form of conflicting agendas for educational reform) was to design a basic educational system "most suitable to a country in which the great bulk of the population must remain peasants and small farmers" (1939, 129), while ensuring an adequate supply of trained artisans and clerks for the smooth functioning of the colony. The Education Department busied itself designing a curriculum for the government schools during the early years of Cameron's administration. At the same time they tried to ensure that the new bureaucratic functionaries would not become a de-tribalized elite, a potential political menace. Cameron's position on the development of higher education in Tanganyika, however, cannot be understood except by placing it within the context of lessons learned by the British Colonial Office in other parts of the empire.¹ Critics, both more radical and conservative than Cameron, plagued him

throughout his career on his position with regard to native education policy.

Under Cameron's administration the newly constituted Education Department in Tanganyika Territory began to set up an experimental educational infrastructure unparalleled for British colonial Africa. Much less was at stake for the administration of a colony which was likely to produce little profit. Cameron's administration appears to have taken advice from anywhere it was offered. The interwar years might be characterized by the importation of a variety of diverse adaptive models and a flexibility of institutional structure designed for different, and sometimes conflicting, outcomes. This point is of note because a similar scenario persists into the present postcolonial period. Tanzanian educational reform has preoccupied development specialists since the 1960s, and a disproportionate influx of foreign aid has underwritten experimental programs in education that have had extremely uneven results. The postcolonial regime has shown a unique willingness to modify existing educational structures on the basis of assessments and funding offers from external agencies. It is important to mention, however, that there is an historical continuity in the colonial and neocolonial view that one of the poorest countries in the world might usefully serve as a laboratory of social engineering.

The British Public School Model

In 1929 the British Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Native Education asked Julian Huxley to make a tour of the East African territories. Ostensibly the purpose of this tour was to report and advise on "certain aspects of native education." It becomes clear from reading Huxley's memoirs of this visit (1931) that his mandate was a broader one: to ruminate upon and judge questions of "native policy," particularly those pertaining to the issue of indirect rule.

In Huxley's mind, the fine distinction between a policy of direct rule (as imposed by the Germans in Tanganyika before the war and initially by the British in Kenya) and the system of indirect rule lay in the degree of centralized political power wielded by the colonial administration. In the case of direct rule, the central government administered native peoples through local headmen who were appointed for specific functions and are regarded as tax gatherers and tools of a remote and arbitrary power, "alien to the actual life of the people, their ideas and customs" (1931, 107). The weakness of such a system is that tribal organization, (as exemplified in customary laws and traditions) either atrophies or is forced underground and takes the form of antigovernment activity and secret societies. By comparison, indirect rule consisted of a policy of ruling through native chiefs and a council of elders (the native administration), who are recognized, not appointed,

by the central government. The technical distinction between recognition and appointment was sometimes blurred, as when small districts were consolidated, unsatisfactory chiefs removed and replaced by "progressive" ones, or one set of hereditary claims supported over rival factions by the central government.

The ideal of indirect rule was to impose change through gradually moulding existing institutions, using taxation policy, law, and the guidance of administrative officers. According to this policy, the agents of progressive change (district and provincial officers) were to accumulate a body of knowledge about the way native institutions worked in order to adapt them to new ends. Like the missionaries before them, many British administrators were engaged in the project of colonial ethnography, either directly or through government anthropologists, and collected materials on law, custom, and political organization. Some of the institutions they identified were adapted to colonial forms of governance, while those deemed incompatible with Britain's civilizing mission were winnowed out. Underlying the theory of gradual accommodation was the idea that transformation need not be disruptive and provoke resistance (overtly or covertly) if it were accomplished slowly and by selective replacement. The question of the legitimate exercise of power was not articulated on the grounds that the native people would not only submit to, but in fact

desire, the exercise of British authority once they were enlightened as to its benefits.

Etonian Traditions and Local Culture in the Tabora Schools

The enlightenment of native Tanganyikans to the superiority of British administration was to take place on many levels, but was nowhere more aptly illustrated than in the case of the Tabora schools which were established in 1925 to train the sons of chiefs and influential headmen (and later the daughters of the aristocracy) for leadership roles as native administrators. Huxley's observations concerning Tabora Boys School are worth examining at some length because they present an official (and oft-quoted) version of the exciting marriage of British and native institutions of leadership training. Huxley's authoritative version of indirect-rule-at-work ignores the complex issue of struggles among a variety of factions within the colonial state, and between these factions and local populations, to determine control over leadership recruitment, the selection of specific forms of knowledge to be transmitted within the context of formal institutions, moral codes for conduct, and the organizational structure of these hybrid institutions.

Huxley observed that the Government School at Tabora had been called the Eton of Tanganyika. This presented a problem in his mind. Eton produced a large number of the British Empire's statesmen, but it did not do so in an

official capacity. He questioned if it was possible to compare the two institutions. Eton, by coincidence of custom, had produced a fifth of the House of Commons, its Speaker, the Lord Mayor, the Lord Chancellor, the Governor of the Bank of England, the Head of the Police, the Dean of St. Pauls, and the Governor-General of every dominion. Tabora school was officially established for "the sons of chiefs." Beyond the matter of official intent, Huxley raised a question of financial doubt. Tabora school was the "spoilt darling of the Education Department." A sum of 30,000 pounds sterling had been raised to build the school and more funds voted. Was it wise, Huxley wondered, to spend such a relatively large sum of money on one institution when the need of educational expansion was so apparent? Finally he raised what he termed a "purely educational doubt." "Is it wise to put the boys in surroundings so different not merely from any to which they have been accustomed, but even from any which they can hope to build up for themselves when they inherit authority?" (1931, 101) This purely educational question had political ramifications. Would not such an arrangement lead to discontent rather than slow progressive change? His answer is illuminating:

...it is relevant to remember that to many English lads of the fourteenth century the grandeur of Winchester and New College must have been infinitely beyond anything they knew in the surroundings of their village homes; and that to have enjoyed for a spell of life a perfection otherwise out of reach may stabilize the growing mind, and, if it lead to discontent,

only to that divine discontent out of which development proceeds (1931, 102).

Huxley's description of life within the Tabora school is telling in its omission of any direct comparison between the sort of educational experience provided for the sons of English aristocrats and burghers at Eton with that provided for the sons of the native aristocracy in colonial Tanganyika.

Here at Tabora they are given the standard educational grounding, as well as a taste for football, a good deal of discipline, and a real esprit de corps. In addition, special attention is given to what may be useful to them later. For instance, they are taught the use of ploughs; and already an old boy of the school has introduced ploughing into his father's territory. They are given a course in accountancy and book-keeping so that they may understand the working of their Native Treasuries; and some instruction which will help them in their law-dispensing functions (1931, 100-101).

Another official picture of Tabora, drawn from a report to the Colonial Office by the first headmaster, Mr. A.T. Lacey, fills out Huxley's observations.

The internal organisation of the School has been based on the principles of tribal rule and authority. Outside the class-room this holds good in every activity of the day's round.

The boys are divided under the following "tribes" which are more strictly Geographical or administrative districts:--Tabora, Kahama, Nzega, Shinyanga, Kigoma and Mwanza (see figure 5). This division does not coincide exactly with the actual tribal divisions but it provides an extremely workable basis, and in the majority of cases a boy finds himself amongst boys of his real tribe.

The tribe elects its own chief, and two or more assistant chiefs according to the number of boys in the tribe. Through these chiefs all orders are given. Any offence against school rule and custom is tried before the School Court which meets daily.

The head Chief of the tribe on duty acts as judge and the remaining chiefs as councillors. The procedure is that of the local Native Courts. After the

witnesses have been heard and the accused has given his defence the councillors confer on the matter and pronounce the verdict and the sentence...

The tribes sleep each in its own dormitory, it eats at separate tables, it plays football as a side, it does physical drill and exercises as a unit.

The head chief is responsible for the good behavior of his tribe--punctuality, cleanliness in person, dress and dormitory, obedience, prowess in games, efficiency in work--all these are in his special care...

In a school of this nature internal organisation is in itself a most important part of the curriculum. A boy must begin to learn from his earliest day at the school the principles of obedience and authority, and he learns it in a way he can understand, for he has a chief (U.K. Public Records Office 1925, 51).

The curriculum at Tabora, laid out in Lacey's report, included an elementary background in Swahili, followed by a six-year course instructed in English. The literary instruction would follow a normal syllabus, with carpentry and tailoring taught as handicrafts, and courses in agriculture and cattle husbandry included as important subjects to be taught "scientifically and adapted to the country and its possibilities" (1925, 51). Bookkeeping and simple accountancy would form an important part of the instruction of senior boys. A school savings bank encouraged the boys to get used to the idea of saving their pocket money and money earned from the operation of a school shop and to prepare them to deal with the Post Office Savings Bank.

The rationale behind the decision to include agriculture and animal husbandry as important subjects in a curriculum designed to train future native administrators is not entirely clear from Lacey's report. School gardens are included in the curriculum at all government schools, he

notes, but at Tabora, agricultural subjects should be "among the foremost in the syllabus" (1925, 52). The economic wealth of the territory rests on its crops and its cattle, he observed, and the Department of Agriculture report from 1924 shows that fifty percent of the cattle of the territory were found in Tabora and neighboring Mwanza districts. The curriculum at Tabora was intended to "give the boys knowledge to deal with the everyday needs of their people and the knowledge to guide and direct them along new lines where necessary" (1925, 52). Lacey goes on to remark that "civilisation" for the ordinary native is presently a matter of following government orders which he follows without comprehension or enthusiasm. The ultimate goal in training the future generation of native administrators is to embody the civilized abstract order of government in the person of a chief, "the expressed wishes of his Sultan whom he follows with an enthusiasm and an understanding" (1925, 52).

Lacey's own enthusiasm for the Tabora experiment canceled out any expressed ambivalence about the potentially undesirable effects an exposure to the public school tradition might have on native life.

The people of Tanganyika will get 'civilised' whether we wish it or not. The danger which confronts them--and us--is not one of their mental starvation; it is that of an attempted assimilation of a foreign civilisation which will lead inevitably to acute mental indigestion. There is no doubt that the Sultans have guided and will continue to guide to a great extent the advance of their peoples and the direction of that advance. The work of this school includes the development of intelligence of all that

they see and hear, that they may be given a true idea of the relative values of customs and civilisations, that they may be fitted to become leaders in a country where much is changing for better and for worse. They must be able to choose the relevant and adapt to this country those ideals of Western advancement which will be of benefit to it.

I would like to say here that a few people have expressed the opinion that "The school will turn out a lot of little snobs," that "You can't run a School for Africans on English Public School lines," that "The African has not got a sense of class feeling--the Sultans' sons are the intimate playmates and friends of all the children of a village and you can't tell the difference between any of them." Such statements all contain half truths. Without a little care this School will turn out that un-native thing--a snob. But snobbery is not a native vice (as far as my experience goes) and can easily be kept out of a native school; it is perfectly true that taken in its entirety the Public School as we know it in England and in the West is inconceivable as occupied by the African; but the underlying principles of the Public School hold good over all the earth; finally, although it is often true that the Sultan's sons are indistinguishable from any other village child, it is not true that the African of these parts has no sense of class feeling. The Sultan grown up possesses a power and an influence which would surprise those who have not come into contact with it (1925, 50).

British Colonial Education Policy
in Tanganyika From 1920 to 1940:
The Impact of the Phelps-Stokes Commission Survey

In 1924 an educational commission from the United States made a survey of education in British East and Central Africa (Jones 1925), which had a major impact on the direction which colonial education was to take in Tanganyika. This commission was conducted under the auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and its director, Thomas Jesse Jones. The 1924 survey was prompted by a request from the American Baptist Foreign Missionary society for an African education survey. The society turned to the

Phelps-Stokes Fund as a result of their recently published survey on Negro education in the American South. Jones, the author of that survey, recommended that Negro schools should emphasize industrial and agricultural components of the curriculum, and any literary bias in the syllabus should be avoided. Although the British Colonial Office was not inclined to conduct such a survey at that time, it was very receptive to the proposal of the Phelps-Stokes Fund.

From the start, the underlying premise of the survey was that the educational policies which had been developed for freed slaves in the postbellum American South were relevant models for the education of colonized Africans. The idea that there was a particular type of education suited for the "darker races" stemmed largely from the teachings of Booker T. Washington. In 1912 Washington sponsored the International Conference on The Negro at Tuskegee, informing missionary and colonial educators of Tuskegee's educational methods and assessing their applicability to countries "peopled by the Darker Races" (King 1971, 16-17).

The report of the commission supported a stronger alliance between the administration and the missions, and favored the development of industrial education, agricultural training, and courses in hygiene and appreciation of the environment. Despite a number of criticisms of the report (DuBois 1925; Leys 1924; Murray 1929), the survey

was well-received by the British Advisory Commission on Native Education. The Ormsby-Gore Commission, touring East Africa at the same time, came out with similar recommendations (Ormsby-Gore Commission 1924-25).

In 1925 Cameron convened a landmark conference on native education in Dar es Salaam. Attending the conference were representatives of the government, several missions, commercial firms, European planters, and two Africans. Much attention was focused on the development of an educational program which would blend the spirit of the Phelps-Stokes recommendations with the concept of indirect rule. Rivers-Smith, then director of education, recommended that elementary school education remain in the vernacular so that education would not alienate the Africans from their communities. Sir Charles Dundas, provincial commissioner for the Northern Zone (Kilimanjaro), delivered a paper on the "Ideal of the African Citizen" in which he urged that tribal traditions and customs should be incorporated into the curriculum, and suggested a conflict between the spirit of indirect rule and an educational policy aimed at westernizing the African. The aspirations of Africans themselves for formal education were largely ignored during the conference. At one point Samuel Chiponde, one of the two Africans in attendance, felt pressed to remark,

It will be of no use to fight against the wave of civilization. People can say what they like, but to the African mind to imitate Europeans is civilization. I cannot explain the reason why, but there it is. And I believe, as far as my little knowledge of history goes, there is no colony in the British Empire where

they have convinced their subjects otherwise" (quoted in Furley and Watson 1966, 477).

The 1925 conference accomplished three goals: it set up a framework for cooperation between the government and the missions through an Advisory Committee on Education; a grants-in-aid code was drawn up; and a 1927 Native Education Ordinance outlined standards of proficiency to be attained with a routine system of inspection.

An important category of school to benefit from the newly organized colonial education policy was the Native Authority School. Forty-one of these were in operation by 1938. These were village schools, many of which were financed from local treasuries; the Native Authority schools in Kilimanjaro and the former Bakama (chiefs) schools in Bukoba were considered exemplary models (Furley and Watson 1966; Griffith 1930). They combined elementary education with school farming, tribal history, songs, dance, and etiquette, and were supervised by tribal elders. Government primary and secondary schools were fewer in number and offered a more advanced curriculum in both technical and clerical training than the village schools. During the 1920s and 1930s both the government and the missions remained concerned that formal education would produce a *déclassé* elite. To counteract this, government schools made an effort to blend formal education with tribal tradition. To a lesser extent the mission schools followed similar policies. Despite the widely held view that colonial education was aimed at the westernization of

Africans, "selective adaptation" provided a key framework for the colonial period until the Depression.

Adaptation to Modernization

Educationally progressive Africans began pressing for more literary education beginning in the 1920s. Tribal associations in several "progressive" communities (e.g., Chagga and Haya) utilized the local native councils to try to influence educational policy. The government's refusal to teach English, in addition to many standard academic subjects, at the primary level, combined with the closing of many village schools which had been funded by native treasuries, were policies that intensified African resentment over their lack of control of educational planning (Ranger 1975).

While educationally progressive Africans were pressing for more literary education, Tanganyika began to feel the effects of the world depression in the 1930s. The Education Department cut its budget and reduced grants-in-aid to mission schools. Government central schools were reduced in number from eight to three during this period, and secondary education was narrowed to a select few who might undertake clerical courses at Tabora or more senior secondary courses at Makerere (Furley and Watson 1966). In retrospect, these cuts were all too drastic and produced grave shortages in teaching and technical manpower by the time the economy picked up again. A change in direction is

evident in the educational reform policy by the late 1930s, when less was said of the blending of two cultures and the focus shifted to helping Africans cope with the "composite" conditions (part modern, part traditional) under which they lived. The new initiative, in other words, was modernization. This pattern of educational expansion, with the growth of English and literary subjects at the expense of industrial, agricultural, and tribal education, continued until independence. The earlier model schools, like the original Tabora, were largely forgotten until they were revived in a new form by the Arusha Declaration.

Educational Reform and the Crisis in Social Reproduction

Despite the post-World War II expansion of middle, technical, and secondary schools, the majority of Africans who attended school at all, went to primary school. A graduate from a middle or secondary school was therefore a member of the small, educated elite. In 1945, the following number of schools were in operation by the government and missions: one thousand primary schools, twenty-four teachers training colleges, and eighteen secondary schools. By 1956, 2,613 students were enrolled in secondary school courses, compared with 441,000 students in primary school (Mbilinyi 1979, 264-267). These figures mask the fact that educational facilities during the colonial period were racially segregated. In 1958, the eve of independence, approximately ten percent of the African school-age popula-

tion attended school, compared with sixty-eight percent of the Asian population and forty-eight percent of the European population (Hinkle 1969, 21). If these figures appear low for the European population, it was because many expatriates and settlers chose to send their children to boarding school outside the country.

For educated Africans, the promise of independence may be considered a crisis of opportunity. Africanization of the civil service suggested the promise of promotion for those in salaried employment, and lower-level entry positions for those who could obtain the educational credentials. Given the small number of Africans qualified to run the country and the impending departure of many Europeans, it appeared the educational expansion, particularly for institutions of higher learning, was imperative.

However, warning bells were sounded early in the post-independence era by UNESCO manpower planners. The projections were not reliable, as I will indicate later on in this chapter, but they were used as a rationale for educational reform. Between 1965 and 1968 UNESCO predicted an opening of 110,000 new wage labor positions (44,000 were in agricultural labor). New entrants into the job market were estimated at 1,150,000 and 231,520 of them would be primary school graduates (Hinkle 1969, 192). As I will show, such projections prompted public debate about how educational planning should be tied to labor market requirements.

At the time the Arusha Declaration was announced (1967), former president Nyerere indicated that the educational pyramid, which was developed during the British regime, had become so narrow at the top that only thirteen percent of the students who graduated from primary school could plan to go on for further studies. At this time the government was spending 30.6 percent of the recurrent budget on secondary education and 42.1 percent on primary education (Cooksey 1986, 184). The rationale for shifting expenditure to the primary level and setting curricula so that each stage of schooling would be a terminal one, was dressed in egalitarian rhetoric.

The debate concerning educational requirements, manpower planning, and egalitarian development policies continues to the present day. Since the Arusha Declaration period, recurrent government spending on primary education has increased by 27 percent, while secondary school expenditure has declined by over one-third (Cooksey 1986, 184). Government legislation passed in the 1970s made primary education compulsory (Universal Primary Education, UPE), with the consequence that the primary schools have swelled with students competing for secondary school selection. By 1984, only 1.2 percent of primary school graduates were selected to go on to government secondary schools (see figure 6). Educational scarcity (at the postprimary level) has increased since the beginning of the postcolonial era and so has the public perception of scarcity in the labor

market. The government claims that between 1980 and 1982, 19,692 secondary school graduates (about one-third) have not been allocated jobs by appropriate ministries (Daily News 4 February 1984). By the 1970s, the apparently sizable number of unemployed secondary school graduates was dubbed the "new problem" by the World Bank. Yet a tracer study, conducted by the Ministry of Manpower and Development, showed that in 1984 only five percent of Form IV students were unemployed two years after their graduation (Cooksey 1986, 198).

With decreasing government expenditure on secondary school education, the facilities and curriculum standards in the schools have suffered since independence. There is lively public debate in the schools, local communities, and the media about whether today's secondary school students are any match for graduates of the colonial educational system. Whatever their failings, most seem to obtain salaried employment in the large public and small private sector, despite government proclamations to the contrary. The mood in 1983 and 1984 was of a crisis of educational scarcity, and the mechanisms which led to this are explored throughout the rest of this chapter.

One of the central questions posed by political theory concerns the relationship between a set of ruling ideas and the structure of civil authority. The following sections consider how the evolution of Tanzania's ideology of ujamaa socialism during the twenty-five-year period following

independence both reflects and attempts to restructure emergent class relations in the postcolonial state. The crisis in social reproduction which culminated in the forceful use of ideology in Tanzania's post-independence development is the legacy of contradictions inherited during the colonial period (cf. Iliffe 1979; Kaniki 1979; Kimambo and Temu 1969; Mbilinyi 1985).

This next section provides a brief summary of political events which followed on the heels of independence and which point to a crisis of legitimate government. I consider the culmination of these events in the publication of the "Arusha Declaration" (Nyerere 1968a), along with a discussion of how ujamaa socialism as a theory of knowledge is shaped in reference to the ideology of Negritude and African socialism as developed elsewhere on the continent. The relationship between civil ideology and educational symbols is examined, and an analysis of why educational reform emerges as a central issue for social transformation is presented. The basic argument is that educational policies designed to promote socialist attitudes and practices have in fact further encapsulated the peasantry and rigidly controlled elite recruitment. They have done this by resurrecting colonial policies under the guise of populist rhetoric, in combination with specific production policies designed to "capture the peasantry" more successfully. The state has been able to accomplish this with a great deal of overseas aid from "friendly" donors and by drawing on the

technical expertise of a wide variety of liberal foreign intellectuals. What it has not managed to do is stave off a rising wave of discontent emerging in a variety of forms as opportunities diminish and the social cost of reproduction increases.

Ujamaa Socialism: The Arusha Phase

In the argument which follows, ujamaa socialism as a set of ruling ideas is considered from three vantage points: (1) as a mechanism designed to bolster and disguise the crisis of legitimacy of a weak state; (2) as the outgrowth of intellectual currents which have a pan-African referent, which originated in the West and which were made widely accessible by the charismatic leadership of Tanzania's former president, Julius Nyerere; and (3) as a theory of knowledge which embodies a profound concern with how knowledge should be controlled, disseminated and related to social action.

The Colonial Legacy and the Crisis of Legitimacy

Geertz (1963) points out that the transfer of sovereignty from a colonial to an independent regime implies more than a shift of power from foreign hands to indigenous ones. The attainment of self-rule requires a transformation in the whole pattern of political life as subjects are transformed into citizens. Legitimacy may be based at first on the ability to effect self-rule, but once this has been accomplished new problems of legitimacy arise, which

Geertz refers to as the conflict between primordial and civil sentiments (1963, 111). The sublimation of particularistic sentiments (variously referred to as regionalism, tribalism and parochialism) to the good of the nation as a whole poses a particular problem for postcolonial states.

As I illustrate in my analysis of the two regional cases presented in part 2, the basis for territorially-encompassing "national" administration was laid during the nineteenth century prior to German pacification. Tanzanian societies were not closed, but were differentially encapsulated into a wider exchange economy based on the coastal trade. The emergence of a nationalist movement which led to Tanganyikan independence has its roots both in nineteenth century precolonial trade and the colonial restructuring of the political economy, which transformed subsistence farmers into peasants and wage laborers (Atieno-Odhiambo 1985; Lonsdale 1968).

Colonial development of Tanganyika was uneven. Although tribalism did not constitute the sort of problem in early Tanzanian politics that it did in many other newly independent African countries, certain groups from relatively resource-rich regions which were subject to early and consistent missionary activity emerged early in leadership roles. The postindependence era can be seen as a period in which new opportunities arose to advance parochial claims. This, added to the overwhelming problems of economic planning and development and a lack of integrated

political organization, threatened the social legitimacy of the TANU regime (the independence party, The Tanganyika African Union),² at the earliest stages of its development. An army mutiny, following on the heels of the Zanzibar revolution in 1964, a series of contested local elections, and an uprising of university and secondary school students in 1966 underscored the weak consensus upon which TANU rested its claims to a monopolization of state power. Such problems may explain, in part, what some analysts (Bienen 1967; Nellis 1972) have characterized as the predominant role of ideology in state formation politics in the early postcolonial period.

Apter (1965) explores the limits of ideology in the context of postcolonial state formation. He argues that the modernization problems of newly independent states are so enormous, and the governments of new nations are so weakly legitimized, that ordinary ideology will not suffice. When the discrepancies between theory and practice become fully obvious, legitimacy is destroyed. A more powerful symbolic force, one that is less rational (although adapted to rational ends) is needed to bridge the gap between the ruler and the ruled, the individual and society. If primordial sentiments are to be destroyed, they must be replaced with something which will link people with a common interest through which their identity, sentiments, and beliefs are enlarged and strengthened. The

force which accomplishes this end is what Apter calls political religion.

According to Apter, political religion shares some commonalities with church religion. The state and the regime take on sacred characteristics. Legitimacy is established through a reliance on the ideology of a semi-mythical past. Continuity between past and present is emphasized, and a period of misfortune (colonialism) is explained. An earlier period of innocence and a golden society of the future are juxtaposed against a period of suffering and degradation through which the public passed to independence. The birth of the nation takes on the significance of a religious event. A prophet is needed to interpret identity and a sense of purpose through his own personal gifts of grace. The prophet is the father, teacher, and founder of the community. By following the prophet one joins a select group. Identity and group relationships are combined and the individual can define his place in the political scheme of development.

The authority of the prophet becomes routinized through effective organization. This is best accomplished through the mechanism of the single-party state where the leader, party, and state are identified as one. Individual motivation is rendered morally correct when it conforms to the moral ends defined by the state. Selflessness and egalitarianism become moral imperatives. Discipline in work and efficiency endow the individual with a sense of purpose and

self-worth in the service of the greater good. Apter concludes, however, that political religion is an unstable force in a new state because, unlike church religion, which promises transcendental rewards, political religion is adapted to rational ends. If recognizable development gains are not forthcoming, political religion is subject to swift disillusionment on the part of its adherents.

Apter provides a persuasive framework for understanding the formulation of ujamaa socialism, yet there are problems with this model, as Jinadu (1976) points out in a critique of his work. Apter views political religion as a distorted form of ideology, mainly on the grounds that it makes claims to an exclusive truth. Choice is suppressed in what becomes a totalitarian religion of the citizen. As a modernization theorist, Apter makes the fundamental and Eurocentric mistake of assuming that a liberal-democratic state ideology allows for the development of individual freedom of choice in a way that he says political religion does not, rather than understanding the role that ideology in general plays in the construction of hegemony.

Several events during Nyerere's early administration (1961-1966) may account for the formulation of the ideology of ujamaa socialism to cope with the postcolonial crisis in legitimacy. Nyerere's early regime was fraught with political, economic, and social difficulties. In colonial Tanganyika a dichotomy existed between local traditional systems and a central colonial administration. As the

colonial administration lacked real social legitimacy, it was viewed as an economic overlord that provided certain material goods and services while extracting wealth. Although the TANU regime possessed more social legitimacy than the colonial government, it inherited this same image. In other words, the emotional and popular support of the new government was short-lived once it appeared that it was, to a great extent, unable to fulfill the economic expectations of the populace (Nellis 1972).

Nyerere was aware of many of the problems facing his administration, among them a lack of trained administrators, a shortage of skilled manpower, and a governing party whose main previous experience had been antigovernment activity. In his 1962 presidential inaugural address, he stressed the need for agricultural and rural development.

Part of this early emphasis was translated into a village settlement scheme in 1963. Desire for rapid rural change on the part of the TANU government motivated the planning of numerous villages during the years 1964 to 1969, the first five year development plan period. In 1965, one year after the settlement plan went into effect, twenty-three settlements had been created, but all appeared to face overwhelming difficulties as a result of a shortage of skilled manpower, insufficient foreign aid, investment by the private sector, and settler underproductivity. Reports from 1964 to early 1966 indicate that absenteeism and underproductivity were critical problems, although in

their spare time settlers labored hard on their own subsistence plots. Through a variety of misunderstandings it became apparent that the settlers viewed the schemes as providing low-paid government employment. In April of 1966 the highly capitalized Village Settlement Scheme was terminated.

A glance at five year plan figures indicates that the TANU regime expected that the inherited economy, supported by foreign aid, would be capable of meeting many of the financial needs of the rural population in a relatively short period of time. The other purpose of the failed scheme was to stem the tide of migration to urban areas, where unemployment was increasingly high.

In other areas as well, the early TANU regime failed to deal effectively with the problems of production and distribution. The results of the September 1965 national elections demonstrated the disappointment of much of the Tanzanian electorate. In contested elections thirty-eight out of sixty-two TANU administrators were defeated by younger, educated, and previously unknown candidates. Local district council elections held in April 1963 illustrate the ambivalence of the electorate toward the TANU regime at an even earlier stage. The challenge to TANU rule was first taken up by teachers from two of the most progressive ethnic groups, the Bahaya and the Chagga. Cooperative associations in Chaggaland and Buhaya had served as important training grounds for political leader-

ship during the colonial period. Both groups had also recognized the value of qualified teachers to promote their economic and political interests, and had raised and invested considerable sums in support of local schools and of the education of their membership.

Following independence, elected members of the Bukoba District Council, particularly Catholic teachers, began to oppose government policy and declared that they wanted nothing to do with TANU. They claimed that they had been elected not with TANU aid but because of their own qualifications. To some extent, this attitude reflected the displacement of local leaders by the new TANU leadership, a substantial number of whom were Muslim. In the elections of 1963, twenty-five teachers, dissatisfied with TANU, ran against officially nominated TANU candidates as independents. Almost all the independent candidates were returned as members of the Council, where they then controlled about half of the fifty-one seats. This same situation was repeated in the district council elections in Chaggaland two months later. There, a quarter of the thirty-eight councilors were returned as independents.

Nyerere also faced challenges from labor, the military, and a nascent movement of young intelligentsia within the university and secondary schools. In their review of the history of student struggles against the state, Peter and Mvungi (1985) point to the confluence of the 1964 army mutiny over low pay and the slow rate of Africanization,

the clamp-down on the independent trade union, the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, and the 1966 student protest over a newly instituted national service (paramilitary) requirement after graduation. The mutiny was quelled by calling in the British armed forces, after which the trade union was nationalized, and over 300 students were dismissed from the university and secondary school. The protests had one theme in common: they represented a widespread challenge to the conspicuous accumulation tendencies of the weakly legitimated ruling elite. Nyerere's first countermeasure (aside from direct coercion) was a populist tactic of cutting his own salary and those of all elected officials. It can be argued that his second was the formulation of coherent ideology which clarified a new moral order, legitimated the coercive power of the state, and glossed the contradictions inherited from the colonial period.

African Socialism as a Theory of Knowledge

If the "Arusha Declaration" (Nyerere 1968a) marked a turning point in Tanzanian politics, Nyerere's "Education for Self-Reliance" (1968b) represented the first phase of a plan designed to implement the country's socialist goals, and provides Nyerere's most articulate statement of how ujamaa socialism is to operate as a theory of knowledge. "Education for Self-Reliance" functions as a charter in its explanation of cultural experience and manipulation of symbols. To understand fully the cultural meaning of

Nyerere's proposals and place them in historical context, I first summarize the content of the document and examine the assumptions which underlie it.

The first part of "Education for Self-Reliance" is a general analysis of the evolution of the Tanzanian educational system from British colonialism up to 1967. Nyerere begins by stating that the education provided by Britain for Tanganyika lacked the universal purpose of indigenous education common to all cultures. Colonial education was motivated instead by the desire to "inculcate the values of the Colonial society and to train individuals for the service of the Colonial state" (1968, 269).

The interest of the state, here defined, was a need for local clerks and junior officials, and the interest of the missions was to spread literacy to aid in the process of conversion. Contrary to promoting the transmission of Tanzanian knowledge and values (presumed to be universal among the 120 or so ethnic groups comprising the population), colonial education was based on a planned effort to replace these traditional values (which Nyerere characterizes as "cooperative instincts") with the values of a capitalist society. British colonial education emphasized "individualistic instincts" and "led to the possession of individual material wealth being the major criterion of social merit and worth" (1967, 269). British colonial educational policy failed, as Nyerere put it, in that it was both "inadequate and inappropriate" for the needs of

the Tanzanian state at independence. Tanzania at that time had too few educationally qualified people to run the government, and the school population was too small to correct this problem quickly. Furthermore, the British policy had been based on racial distinctions, whose rejection was central to the ideology of the independence movement.

Reviewing the changes in educational policy from independence (1961) to 1967, Nyerere claimed to have made three major educational reforms: (1) racial distinctions were abolished by an integration of the separate racial systems and discrimination on the basis of religion was eliminated; (2) a major expansion of educational facilities was undertaken particularly at the secondary and post-secondary levels; and (3) action was taken to provide much more Tanzanian content in the school curriculum. Yet despite these changes, Nyerere pointed to the educational crisis of 1966 as a turning point in his reconsideration of the purpose of Tanzanian education.

This brings us to the second portion of Nyerere's paper: his discussion of the goals of Tanzanian education in the light of the reforms proposed in the "Arusha Declaration." As a starting point, Nyerere reiterated the three principles upon which Tanzanian socialism is ideally based:

- (1) equality and respect for human dignity;
- (2) sharing of resources;
- (3) work by everyone and exploitation by none.

Nyerere then stated that these principles must be tempered by the realities of a poor, underdeveloped agricultural economy with little capital to invest in industry and a small pool of highly skilled or educated manpower. Thus, Nyerere concluded, Tanzania must be developed through agriculture and hard work. The broad goals of the educational system, then, as envisaged by Nyerere, are to prepare young people for village agricultural life and to promote equality and cooperation. Specifically, Nyerere states that education must encourage the development of the following:

An enquiring mind; an ability to learn from what others do, and reject or adapt it to his needs; and a basic confidence in his own position as a free and equal member of the society, who values others and is valued by them for what he does and not for what he obtains (1968b, 274)

The educational system impeded this development in several ways. One central problem for Nyerere was the elitist nature of the system which was designed at all levels to meet the interests of a very small proportion of the population. In 1967 only thirteen percent of those students in primary school were awarded secondary school places. This he felt promoted a sense of failure in the majority who did not go on to secondary school and a feeling of superiority in those thirteen percent who did.

...The other 13 per cent have a feeling of having deserved a prize--and the prize they and their parents now expect is high wages, comfortable employment in towns, and personal status in the society (1968b, 275).

Nyerere cited the hierarchical nature of the educational system as a major force in inducing the growth of a class structure in Tanzanian society (1968b, 276).

An equally important problem according to Nyerere was the fact that Tanzanian education divorced students from the society it was supposed to be preparing them to enter. This problem was glaring at the secondary school level where most schools were boarding schools, but it was most critical at the university level.

If they [students] are lucky enough to enter Dar es Salaam University College they live in comfortable quarters, feed well, and study hard for their degree. When they have been successful in obtaining it, they know immediately that they will receive a salary of something like L660 per annum. That is what they have been aiming for; it is what they have been encouraged to aim for. They may also have the desire to serve the community, but their idea of service is related to status and the salary which a university education is expected to confer on its recipient. The salary and the status have become a right automatically conferred by the degree (1968b, 276).

This dichotomy between school and community was exacerbated by the extraordinary value placed by the school system on knowledge obtained from books and on formal education in general. Although not excusing the educational system for setting up the dichotomy, Nyerere blamed the masses for further reinforcing it. Parents and relatives would often exempt students from agricultural labor during vacations and otherwise make them feel special or privileged. The educational system removed the youngest and healthiest component of the population from the work

force, and thus had unproductive students consuming the output of older and weaker people.

In the final portion of Education for Self-Reliance Nyerere set out the reforms he deemed necessary to correct the faults in the educational system which impeded the goals of socialist Tanzania. One of the pressing problems evident in the 1966 educational crisis was that of high unemployment among primary school leavers. Since it was economically unfeasible to implement universal primary education at that time, and since the majority who did receive primary education would not go on to secondary studies, Nyerere's solution involved a major change in the content and structure of primary education and a raising of primary school entry age so that a student would be more capable of learning quickly while in school, and older (and therefore more employable) when he left school.

The implication of this solution was that each educational level should become complete unto itself. Primary school should not become a preparation for university. The radical change which Nyerere proposed was that the schools should become fully integrated into the community and should, to the fullest extent possible, become self-supporting institutions. Changes in curriculum and syllabus should reflect the need to prepare students for life in the rural agricultural sector of the economy. Similarly, the examination system should be changed to test those skills which are taught in primary school and not aimed at

entrance to secondary school or university. Nyerere envisioned that the schools should also be farms; that the school community should consist of teachers, farmers, and pupils. A larger emphasis should be placed on learning by doing, and theoretical subjects such as science and mathematics should incorporate problems directly related to agricultural production. Other activities, such as cleaning, maintenance, and gardening, previously performed by paid, unskilled laborers, should become the responsibility of the students. Primary schools, although they would not become the entirely self-sufficient communities envisioned for the secondary schools, should be fully integrated into village life. The students should remain a part of the family unit, with school terms arranged so that they could participate on family farms. Furthermore, the students should participate more fully in village self-help projects and the community should become more involved in school activities.

Finally, school performance at the primary and secondary school level should not be evaluated merely in academic terms. Instead, a combination of the new examination system and teacher and pupil assessment would, in Nyerere's thinking, be a "more appropriate method of selecting entrants from secondary schools and university..."(1968b, 288).

Nyerere made little mention of postsecondary education except to say that students should be made to assume the

caretaking tasks of the institutions, and that they should be required as part of their professional training to spend a portion of their vacations working on community projects related to their studies. Compensation for such work would be at minimum wage, with the balance of their salary paid to the college or institution at which they are being trained.

To summarize, "Education for Self-reliance" represents a broad policy statement, with complete reform of the educational system, and the achievement of a widespread change in social values as its primary objective. Nyerere is not only aware of the important role of formal education in the inculcation of political and economic values; the educational system is in fact reified throughout this document as the primary agent to affect planned social change. This becomes apparent from the structure of the policy statement. Nyerere blames the educational system for the problems of the 1960s: the shortage of skilled manpower, the dissatisfaction with rural, agricultural life and the process of class formation, and points to educational reform as the method to correct these problems. Despite giving lipservice to the significance of practical consciousness as knowledge, he assigned formal knowledge the major role in social transformation. It is this knowledge, controlled (in theory) by the state, which he believed would transform not only the political economy, but other competing forms of knowledge as well.

Ujamaa socialism is a theory of knowledge, then, on a number of levels. It assigns a role to ideation. It provides a guide for understanding how ideas are related to political and economic reality at different historical conjunctures. It constructs a model of social reality and prescribes how ideas serve to transform or maintain that reality.

The Social Uses of Formal Knowledge

The instrumental meaning of education, as pointed out by Weber in his analysis of the Chinese literati (1946), often transcends the limits of credentials for office or career and takes on a symbolic quality. This mystical characteristic is, in part, the result of the training the graduate has received. The cultivation of certain values and deportment in life is just as much the object of educational institutions as the imparting of rational knowledge and skills. The difficulty in attaining access to, and completion of, educational credentials in Tanzania further endows graduates with a corporate feeling for their special role in society. It is this special status and the symbols attached to it which represented a threat to Nyerere's proposed egalitarian model of society.

Education, of course, has an integrative function as well, which Nyerere was quick to recognize. His criticisms of the colonial system of education are leveled at its differentiating consequences. Nyerere echoed Durkheim's concept of education as "an eminently social thing" (1956,

114) when he remarked that the universal purpose of education was,

to transmit from one generation to the next the accumulated wisdom and knowledge of the society, and to prepare the young people for their future membership of the society and their active participation in its maintenance or development (1968b, 268).

The model on which Nyerere's education reforms are based is essentially a Durkheimian one. The objective of education is the socialization of the egoistic individual into a social and moral being. The individual is constrained through a limitation of desires (a respect for rules), but he is able to accept these rules because they are rationally based. This presupposes an internal homogeneity of values in society.

To some extent, the educational system can level social differences by opening up recruitment to a variety of groups and individuals and by endowing them with a common set of values and a sense of purpose compatible with those of the elite. Wilkinson's (1964) study of British public schools illustrates this process. The educational system in Victorian England served to imbue individuals recruited from the commercial class with the "gentlemanly ideal" of the landed aristocracy (privilege was defended as a duty, etiquette preserved community loyalties), and the classical curriculum was tailored to civil service examinations to serve broader recruitment needs. By weeding out the individualistic values associated with the middle class, the Victorian public school ensured the production of leaders

whose values would not pose a threat to the status and power of the landed aristocracy.

The connection between the social values of the governing elite, the structure and content of educational institutions, and the political character of the state is a phenomenon which Nyerere clearly apprehended. His double effort to transform social values from the top down (by depriving the governing elite of some of their more visible symbols of status) and the bottom up (through sweeping changes in the structure of the educational system) was rationalized as necessary for the achievement of socialist, communitarian goals. Much of his effort, however, was directed towards change in the educational arena, and this can be explained in a number of ways.

On one level, the reforms proposed in Education for Self-reliance are aimed at rational materialistic ends. Development goals are outlined and the strategy of increasing agricultural production is held up as a reason for the reform of the schools into self-sufficient centers of agricultural innovation. Then, too, the educational system is the one state-controlled institution which has the most widespread ability to affect the socialization of individuals. It is in school that theoretically, people learn the principles of socialism, internalize egalitarian values, understand their role as citizens, and apprehend their function in the total scheme of development. Since the educational system is the main avenue of recruitment

for new leaders, the successful transformation of the governing elite into a cadre of socialist leaders is dependent upon the success of reforms in the educational arena.

Nyerere's educational reforms, however, also operate on the symbolic level. An examination of "Education for Self-reliance" reveals the significance of the historical meaning of education for Nyerere's purposes. The educational system as imported by the colonial administration is viewed as a major factor in the destruction of communalistic sentiment and traditional life in the mythical past. Nyerere stressed that through change in the educational sector the social goals of the new society can be accomplished and an alleged old harmony restored. His educational reforms thus also serve a legitimizing function; they are at once a plan of action based on truths revealed from the past and a millenarian promise. "Education for Self-reliance," taken as a document, a blueprint for reform, serves a similar purpose as the mythical charter observed by Malinowski in more primitive societies:

...it is a statement of primeval reality which still lives in present day life and as a justification by precedent, supplies a retrospective pattern of moral values, sociological order and magical belief...the function of myth, briefly, is to strengthen tradition and endow it with a greater value and prestige by tracing it back to a better, more supernatural reality of initial events (1948, 122).

The External Roots of Indigenous African Socialism

In his lengthy review article, "African Gnosis" (1985), Mudimbe refers to ujamaa as the most pragmatic of all African socialisms. Ujamaa, first and foremost, is concerned with the construction of a new society based on the model of the family. It claims purely indigenous roots and therefore rejects both capitalism (based on the exploitation of man by man) and scientific socialism (based on the philosophy of continuous conflict between men). African society was, and is, classless by nature. There is no need, therefore, to endure a class revolution to establish a classless society. Such a stance is clearly ideological and not grounded in ethnographic and historical fact, as has been pointed out by numerous authors, beginning with Foster's critique of "Education for Self-reliance" in 1969.

It is important to note that Nyerere's version of African socialism emerged within the more general philosophical climate of efforts to define the African worldview (Sartre 1965; Senghor 1964) through the concept of Negritude, a critique of the colonial construction of the African as "other" and the alienation which resulted (Fanon 1952), and a range of political uses of Marx in the politics of postcolonial state formation in Africa (Nkrumah 1962).

Nyerere's African socialism has European roots as well. Prior to entering political life, Nyerere was a teacher, trained at Tabora Secondary School, Makerere University,

and finally Edinburgh University. There, on a Roman Catholic mission scholarship, he joined the Fabian Colonial Bureau and wrote a polemical paper on East Africa's racial problems intended for publication (Coulson 1982, 115). The Fabian platform, which played a significant role in the formulation of Labour party politics, advocated a gradualist socialist transition through centralized planning. Such a model was perfectly suited for export to the neo-colonial environment of Nyerere's early regime. The pragmatic backbone of ujamaa socialism is wedded to this model of social engineering, formulated initially by Nyerere and developed by a cadre of foreign scholars at the Kivokoni Ideological College, the training ground for the new generation of socialist leaders in the post-Arusha phase. Coulson points out, in addition, that Nyerere's vision of the paternalistic state is just as compatible with the Christian thinking of Thomas Aquinas, in which the state is expected to be just and fair, to distribute services, and ensure freedom and justice for the poor (1982, 329), as it is with Fabian socialism and various versions of Leninism.

The Consequences of Ideology in the Post-Arusha Phase

What has been the outcome of this blend of ideological traditions and social engineering policy for social transformation, given the Tanzanian state's neocolonial position as a peripheral polity? A consideration of the educational

sphere, the realm of institutionalized knowledge, reveals depressing results.

In the two decades following the implementation of Education for Self-reliance, numerous studies (e.g., Carr-Hill 1985; Cooksey 1986; Kerner 1984; King 1984; Komba 1981; Malekela 1983; Mbilinyi 1976; Morrison 1976; Psacharopoulos and Loxley 1984; Samoff 1979; United Republic of Tanzania 1984) document the state's inability to produce and reproduce an adequate intellectual labor force, on the one hand, and to eliminate social inequities on the other hand.

The Elimination of Social Inequities and the Prevention of Class Formation

All Tanzanian children receive seven years of primary school education (Standards 1-7). These graduates (leavers) sit for competitive examination at the end of St. 7 to gain entrance to secondary school (Forms 1-IV, O-Level). At the end of Form IV they again sit for competitive examination to enter high school (Forms V and VI, A-Level). If they fail to gain entrance to Form V, they must spend one year in national service working on development projects and in paramilitary training. They attend national service at the end of Form VI if they are accepted into high school. Until 1984, Form VI graduates were compelled to work for at least two years prior to applying to the university. Most were required to work for the government bureaucracy, which then recommended them and sponsored them

for university studies. Upon graduation they were bonded to work for these government institutions for a number of years (see figure 7). In 1984 the mature-age entry requirement was abandoned, and the government instituted another competitive examination at the secondary level, Form II. Public secondary school fees were also introduced.

In the 1970s the government instituted universal primary education to insure access to a basic level of literacy and slowed the expansion of secondary school facilities which serve only a tiny fraction of the student population.³ A quota system for entrance to government secondary school was formulated to eliminate regional/ethnic inequities, and competitive entrance examinations for admittance to secondary were designed to eliminate a class bias. A mature-age entry requirement for entrance to university was instituted to allow older individuals an opportunity for higher education and to ensure that students selected to join the university would have had at least two years' work experience prior to studies. This requirement was lifted for women, who were underrepresented in the university student population.

In brief, the introduction of universal primary education strained an already severely limited education budget. There was a shortfall in the number of trained primary school teachers needed to cope with the sudden bulge in the primary school population. Crash courses for mature pri-

mary school graduates, who had failed their secondary school entrance examinations, provided bodies in the classroom, but not an adequately trained teaching force. The so-called UPE (universal primary education) teaching force is highly marginalized by fully qualified teachers, and it is in the more remote villages, in impoverished regions, where they exist as the dominant cadre of primary school teachers. Students from these schools have severely limited chances of covering the necessary syllabus to afford them secondary school entrance.

Selection quotas and competitive examinations designed to eliminate ethnic and class inequalities have proved inadequate to the task. The quota system works imperfectly at the entrance level (due to the mobility of primary school students who reside with relatives in impoverished regions with larger quotas, and corrupt practices in the examination procedure). Malekela's (1983) study indicates that the effect of regional quotas is almost nil at the second tier of the secondary school system (Form V).

Quotas and entrance examination procedures aside, there is another problem in the implementation of policies designed to eliminate ethnic and class inequality. The government, in making the decision to expand primary education at the expense of secondary education to meet public demand, allowed voluntary organizations to again fill the perceived gap in higher education by opening and reopening private secondary schools.

By 1982, almost half of the secondary schools in the country were private, fee-paying institutions, not subject to regional quotas (see figure 8). Such schools were concentrated in areas where historically the demand for secondary education has been high (e.g., Kilimanjaro, Kagera). Students from these areas have a much greater chance of affording and obtaining a secondary education than students in disadvantaged areas of the country. No quotas were established to eliminate gender inequities in postprimary education access, and the expansion of secondary school places for girls is not yet equal to boys. The decision to invest in a daughter's education is still largely influenced by the level of parental education (Malekela 1983; Mbilinyi 1973), and a girl's performance in school is constrained by the social expectations for women pervading school institutions and the society in general.

More intriguing, in a number of areas (Kerner 1984; King 1984) researchers have begun to note that communities have undertaken to privatize public school facilities. Regular day school facilities are turned into a shadow (jioni, evening) school at night. When the public day students depart, fee-paying evening students arrive, utilizing the same facilities (teachers, supplies) and curriculum. These students graduate with no certificate, but are still eligible to sit for higher education entrance examinations as private candidates. Many succeed in getting selected to join Form V while their public school col-

leagues do not, because the salaries of the teachers are paid on a daily basis, thereby providing a higher "commitment" to completing the syllabus. Such private-within-the-public schools operate under the auspices of the local Ministry of Adult Education, which is effectively in competition with the Ministry of National Education for qualified students.

Practical Knowledge and Formal Knowledge

One of the aims of the self-reliance legislation was to eliminate the distinction between formal and practical knowledge necessary for labor (particularly manual labor in the rural community). With this aim in mind, two measures were taken. First, schools were to maintain projects to raise revenue for their own operation, and these were to be fully integrated into the needs of the community. Second, a program of vocational streaming was introduced, called the "bias" system, to provide secondary school students with practical skills in the areas necessary for rural development: agriculture, commerce, technical skills, and domestic science (see figures 9 and 10).

Both measures have been fraught with problems. Self-reliance projects within the schools have generally failed to raise the expected revenue. Nor have they provided the basis for stronger integration of the school into the community (Kerner 1984; Komba 1981). The vocational streaming program, heavily capitalized by the World Bank,⁴ provided a range of scientific and technical inputs which

have proved unworkable in the Tanzanian educational environment (e.g., electrical engineering laboratories in regions where there is no electricity). The evaluation study of this program of vocational diversification (Psacharopoulos and Loxley 1984) concluded that it should be dismantled in favor of the expansion of day secondary school facilities.

With respect to the vocational bias program, an equally distressing finding was that the procedures for determining how students should be counseled to choose a vocational specialization seemed to work entirely on an ad hoc basis. The program was designed to graduate students who could take up self-employment in the rural areas after completing their studies, and it was supposed to gear students to viewing each educational level as terminal, and not as a preparation for higher levels of study. The outcome had the opposite effect. The programs neither prepared the students for self-employment (assuming they could raise the capital to begin a business or take up farming), nor were they realistically geared to the demands of the labor market. Vocational diversification programs also failed to change significantly the attitudes of either the students or their parents towards further studies. This represented a rational assessment of the labor market prospects for St. 7 and Form IV graduates, rather than an "elitist disdain" for manual labor, as the state often charged.

The Crisis in Intellectual Labor

A strong rationale driving many of the Education for Self-reliance measures was the necessity of linking educational policy to manpower projections. Cooksey (1986) concludes that the manpower planning rationale for containing secondary school expansion served fundamentally as a justification for the kinds of egalitarian development strategies ushered in with the Arusha Declaration. His review of joint government and UNESCO manpower forecasting indicates that poor methodology led to a serious underestimate of the total manpower needs of the country for at least a decade. This appears curious, given the consistent rumor, fueled by recurrent newspaper reports, that there is an excess of primary and secondary school graduates for the number of public sector jobs available. However, what becomes clear in his review, and also in the evaluation study conducted by the Tanzanian Ministry of Education itself, is that the curricular and organizational changes brought about in response to Education for Self-reliance guidelines has produced a generation of poorly prepared students, unequipped to take up occupations in precisely the most critically needed sectors of the labor market. The public sector bureaucracy may be saturated with lower-level clerks, but has wide gaps in the areas of technical services, science, and teaching.

The "End" of Educational Self-reliance

Current changes in educational policy in Tanzania recommended by the Ministry and international donors, such as the World Bank, are bringing about what some analysts refer to as the "end of educational self-reliance." These measures are consistent with conformity to the structural readjustment program of the IMF. If it is important to understand why many of these policies failed, it is perhaps more important to understand why anyone expected them to succeed in overcoming the contradictions inherent in the postcolonial social formation.

The real "truth" of Education for Self-reliance policy was that it was intended to extend the regime of truth encapsulated in ujamaa socialist ideology. That this was confused with rational, economic planning points to a division of interests within the state itself, and the external manipulation of this situation by international capital as manifest in the funding policies of the World Bank, UNESCO, and the Ford Foundation, not to mention a range of bilateral educational loan agreements. The educational arena, like other development sectors, has been subject to a kind of balkinization policy by international lenders. The contradictions in such development initiatives provided one of the platforms of student protest in the 1970s, pointing up the increasing ambivalence of the state to its new generation of intellectuals (Peter and Mvungi 1985).

Conclusion

The state is constructed and fought over. Central in this process are two historical practices: (1) the constant reworking of history to make "natural" an extremely changeable set of state relations, and (2) the marginalization of all alternative state forms (Corrigan, Ramsey, and Sayer 1980). Postcolonial states do not occur in a vacuum or with a blank historical screen. The reworking of history for the construction of a postcolonial social formation necessarily involves the creation of a national ideology of self-determination which draws on the "source" of social solidarity, a source which has been suppressed. Cabral puts this most eloquently:

A People who free themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally only if, without complexes and without underestimating the positive accretions from the oppressor and other cultures, they return to the upward paths of their own culture, which is nourished by the living reality of its environment, and which negates both harmful influences and any kind of subjection to foreign culture. Thus, it may be seen that if imperialist domination has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture (1973, 43).

In the creation of postcolonial nationalist ideologies there is an underlying assertion which disguises the fundamental connection of truth to power. This assertion can be expressed as an equation. Colonization involves the suppression of "traditional" culture. National liberation implies the usurpation of colonial power. Therefore, national liberation is an act of cultural assertion. Cultural assertion, in the context of national liberation,

implies freedom from foreign domination. Foreign domination implies an unequal sharing of power. Freedom from foreign domination thus implies that power will be equally shared.

The question of who defines (redefines) culture and how this bears on postcolonial structures of domination is omitted from this equation. Ujamaa socialism, like other ideologies of its type, does not concern the reassertion of "traditional," or the expression of new cultural values, as much as it provides a justification of authority and how the exercise of authority shall be conducted. The creation and continuous re-creation of such discourse is the work of intellectuals, not just in the party's central committee, or in the university, but at all levels of party and government bureaucracy as they operationalize policy. They are, by definition, the leaders (power-holders) of this society, and their recruitment is determined via the allocation and circulation of the scarce resources of formal knowledge.

While this chapter presents one side of the picture--how formal knowledge is institutionalized and reproduces both a system and its contradictions--there is another aspect of reality which is presented in the chapters which follow. This concerns how the system's contradictions are exacerbated as social actors manage and distribute the resources of formal knowledge in their own life projects. The imposition of a regime of truth is accomplished through

a struggle against alternative truths, and its trajectory has an historical dimension.

NOTES

1. Ashby (1966) traces how the British Colonial strategy of adapting western formal education to native "needs" in Africa was influenced by the consequences of introducing formal education in India. The sort of "go slow" educational policy in British Tanganyika which limited the number of government schools and influenced decisions regarding the use of a vernacular medium of instruction and emphasizing "tribal" and vocational subjects in the curriculum, were related to the recent experience of political rebellion in India, led by a western-educated elite.

2. In 1977 the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU, the national independence party of the mainland) merged with the Afro-Shirazi party on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba to form Chama cha Mapinduzi, the party of the Revolution. The discussion of educational reforms in this chapter refers to developments on the mainland alone. Educational planning on the islands has followed a somewhat different trajectory.

3. Selection for public secondary education in Tanzania in 1984 was 1.2 percent of the graduating primary school students (United Republic of Tanzania 1984). Partly, this is explained by the influx of Standard 7 leavers (primary school graduates) who represent the first generation to receive universal primary education.

4. Cooksey (1986, 193) shows a 2.3 billion dollar expenditure by the World Bank on diversification vocational bias programs between 1970 and 1980.

PART TWO

EDUCATION AND PRODUCTION IN THE REGIONAL ARENA:
A CONTRAST

PROLOGUE

The Tanzanian mainland is divided into twenty regions. Regions are geographically bounded, their constituents are represented in the national parliament, and they have government and party administrative structures responsible to national planning bodies in the capital. Budgetary planning for each region is determined at the national level; the region itself collects no revenue for its own use. Regions do not control the policy or financing of the government secondary schools within their borders, although they are responsible for primary education. Such decisions are made at the national level also. Government secondary schools recruit students from a national pool made up of students from all regions. Admissions policies, therefore, are controlled at the national level.

Regional government and party officials do control the allocation of regional resources to different districts within their borders. Until 1984, when legislation revived the apparatus of the district councils, regional elites, with their connections to the national center, had enormous influence at the local level. As a small example, in the early 1980s a Member of Parliament from Tabora withheld a single shilling from the national budget, and insisted that it not be passed until Parliament formed an emergency committee to investigate a controversy surrounding the

famous Tabora Boys and Tabora Girls schools, which were located in his district. Future research on the effect of the local district council legislation, which instituted the collection of district taxes, should reveal whether there is a new set of alignments emerging at the regional level.

The current composition of Tanzania's regions is an historical artifact, dating back to the colonial period, when administrative units were carved out by the Germans and later the British. The number of regions increased in the postcolonial period for the predictable reason that local groups sought greater representation at the national level. The administrative units created during the colonial period (provinces) altered the political domain of indigenous cultures. The contemporary region of Tabora, for example, is considerably smaller than the precolonial sphere of influence which was exercised by the majority of its residents, the Nyamwezi and Sukuma. Today, these ethnic groups reside in two other regions as well, and with a long history of migrant labor, they are found throughout the country. Region in Tanzania is, therefore, not synonymous with culture, although the origin of an ethnic group's members may be located in one or more regions, and a geographic location evokes a history and a set of traditions for its residents.

If a region is not synonymous with a culture and if regions have little autonomy with regard to the political

center, what is the significance of a region as an analytic unit? There are several ways a regional perspective is employed in anthropological analysis. Little (1987, 295-6) provides the following list: (1) historical/structural approaches which argue that significant historical patterns take on a strong spatial component; (2) an interactional approach which uses a regional model to understand relations between different ethnic groups; (3) an ecological approach which employs environmental criteria to define a regional resource base; and (4) a marketing perspective which defines regions according to economic and spatial relations between market centers and their hinterlands. All of these approaches might be usefully employed in understanding the contemporary meaning of a region within the Tanzanian state. To some extent, the chapters in part 2 touch on all four concerns. However, my own perspective, on the region as an analytic unit, owes more to the concepts of field and arena, developed by students of local-level politics, such as Swartz, Turner, and Tuden (1966).

The contributors to Swartz's classic volume, Local-level Politics (1968), explicitly recognized that the social dramas they subjected to analysis were instances of political action framed within a broader setting. Most of the contributors confined their analyses to partial systems: cliques, factions, networks, and coalitions. There was little attempt to redirect the focus to the interaction between the local and national administrative

levels. Political action in these essays was limited within a geographic location. However, the theoretical advance represented in this collective effort involved the deployment of a conceptual framework which extended beyond spatial boundaries.

The concepts of field and arena have moved into the common vocabulary of cultural anthropology and do not retain the analytic precision they might. Swartz defines a field as, "The values, meanings, resources, and relationships employed" by participants in a political process. An arena is a more inclusive reservoir of such values, meanings, resources, and relationships possessed by participants in a field, but which are not necessarily employed by them at any given moment. Arena and field have spatial and temporal dimensions.

The contents and organization, as well as the membership, of the field change over time as new participants become involved; former participants disengage; new resources, rules, meanings, or values are brought to bear or old ones withdrawn; and relations in the field change (1968, 9)

The Tanzanian regions in the next two contrasting chapters are presented as arenas for political discourse and action. They represent the socio-cultural dimension which actors draw from when they make claims on relationships, rules, and resources in smaller fields such as the village, the council, or the school. The concepts field and arena allow room for a perspective which places the region as a contemporary geopolitical entity, in the context of the

region as a socio-historical sphere of influence. In the chapters which follow I begin with a description of the socio-historical construction of the region as an arena, and then proceed to a discussion of a specific political field, spatially located within a district and a village. My concern in these chapters is to illustrate how the development of relations of production have influenced strategies to obtain and manipulate institutions of formal (school) knowledge. I am also concerned with how access to such knowledge affects productive relations. For this reason I have chosen to concentrate on spatial field locations in the center of export crop zones, where state intervention was most highly concentrated. I have indicated the way in which such locations might be considered representative of the larger arena and in what ways they are unusual. It is important to keep in mind that regions, particularly ones such as Kilimanjaro, are internally differentiated. It is a truism to say that Kilimanjaro is relatively well developed compared to other regions, but it is also true that some districts within the region, and some villages within each district, are disadvantaged compared to others.

As a final introductory note, a summary of the contrast between the two regions is presented in the paragraphs which follow.

Tabora and Kilimanjaro: A Summary of the Contrast

Both Tabora and Kilimanjaro are populated by Bantu-speaking peoples whose oral traditions suggest migration into sparsely settled locations roughly three hundred years ago. The contemporary ethnic groups which occupy these locations are a mixture of culturally disparate groups who came from a number of directions. These settler clans brought with them differing levels of administrative expertise, esoteric knowledge, and subsistence technologies which enabled them to fashion the precolonial political economy.

Large areas of Tabora were uninhabitable. This, and rainfall variability, favored shifting cultivation and dispersed settlements. Segmentary chiefdoms, organized around the ritual/political power of a matrilineal ruling dynasty, headed by a chief, framed local-level political fields. In these localized fields, patrilineages and age grades controlled the resources of land and livestock, and provided the organization for dispute settlement and defense.

By contrast, arable land on Kilimanjaro's mountain slopes was limited. Intensive production techniques were both the cause and effect of population expansion. Groups of densely settled homesteads, controlling rights to land and water, formed the basis for consolidated chiefdoms during the period before the nineteenth century. The presence of a perennial staple food crop and a cool highland

climate enabled Kilimanjaro's residents to escape the worst kinds of periodic famines which decimated Tabora. Differential access to land and livestock led to stratification based on wealth, as well as rank, at an earlier stage in Kilimanjaro.

Indigenous cultures in these two regions were not closed societies and were active in wider inter-regional trading networks. These trading patterns were significantly altered with the expansion of the coastal trade into the interior. Tabora's residents were more intensively affected because this region stood squarely in the middle of the central slave and ivory trading route. Young men made careers as caravan porters, the development of inland commercial trading centers introduced the urban entrepreneurial culture of the coastal Swahili and Islam, agricultural and crafts production intensified to meet the demands of the caravan trade and also of landless urban dwellers, and the political stakes of competition within and between chiefdoms were raised. The impetus to increase trade, along with the introduction of new weapons technology and other resources brought by foreigners into the interior, changed the political landscape to more highly centralized chiefdoms during the latter half of the nineteenth century in Tabora.

Involvement in the coastal trade of the nineteenth century had similar effects in Kilimanjaro, but on a lesser scale. Prior to the nineteenth century, Kilimanjaro served

as a provisioning point between the coastal ports of Malindi and Mombasa and Tanga and the southern Pangani valley. The coastal caravan trade provided new opportunities for Kilimanjaro's chiefs to obtain trade goods and weapons, agricultural production intensified to meet caravan and chiefly redistribution demands, and inter-chiefdom rivalries sharpened. As in Tabora, the presence of Swahili traders and European explorers introduced an alternative domain of knowledge, power, and technology. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, a Swahili court and scribe was in permanent residence in the Moshi chiefdom.

Similar processes affected the development of Tabora and Kilimanjaro in the nineteenth century, but the differential location of the two regions explains why Tabora's political economy underwent radical alteration on the eve of colonization. The permanent presence of Swahili traders and urban commercial entrepôts in Tabora fostered a climate for Islamic conversion. This, and internecine warfare, made the conditions for Christian missionary settlement problematic. By comparison, the cool highland climate and the receptiveness of Kilimanjaro's chiefs to Catholic and Lutheran missionaries (and the power of alliances, technology, and literary skills they promised), created a strong foothold for missionary involvement.

Missionaries were the most active change agents in Kilimanjaro. Their efforts extended beyond the introduction of Christianity, basic literacy, and European values.

The introduction of the cash crop coffee, grown in combination with the staple crop, bananas, provided Kilimanjaro farmers with a strong link to the exchange economy, without destroying a stable subsistence base. Exchange earnings from coffee gave Chagga farmers unprecedented opportunities during the colonial period. The Coffee Cooperative acted as a political field which undermined traditional authority structures, Chagga farmers were not forced into the colonial pattern of migrant and agricultural labor, and coffee earnings funded the means to advance Chagga claims within a new structure of opportunity: formal education. At independence, over 1000 Chagga students were pursuing studies abroad in east Africa and Europe on scholarships provided by the Cooperative. Increasing land scarcity fueled the drive for Chagga parents to educate their children and obtain salaried employment.

By contrast, Tabora residents entered the colonial era as a labor aristocracy. Continual outmigration undercut the agricultural base of the region. Agricultural schemes in Tabora introduced by the colonial and postcolonial regimes focused on capital intensive production of a single cash crop, rather than the development of a small-holder subsistence base. Capital accumulation opportunities for Tabora residents lay in wage labor outside the region in the plantation sector, construction, dock work, and trade, rather than agricultural earnings within the region. Apprenticeship for future careers was not organized in

institutions of formal education, as it was for Chagga youth. The schools in Tabora developed by missionaries and the colonial government catered to the aristocratic children of all the provinces. Islamic schools received no support from the colonial government, and Tabora's Muslim parents were wary of sending their children to Christian schools where they would be vulnerable to conversion. There were pockets of Moravian and Catholic activity in Tabora. The children of Christian converts in these areas received seminary and higher education. Such students, and their heirs, form the base of the small, highly educated elite from Tabora.

In the 1980s both regions were suffering under the impact of deteriorating economic conditions. Tabora, with an underdeveloped peasant economic base was struggling to find a strategy to cope with a post-migrant transition. Opportunities for peasant producers in Kilimanjaro were severely diminished, and the struggle in that arena involved a reorganization of productive and distributive relations, as class divisions within and between families sharpened.

The potential of formal education to transform the futures of children from these two arenas differs, both at the national and local level. The 1978 census shows a population of 817,906 for Tabora and 902,000 for Kilimanjaro. Out of the possible school-age cohort (ages five to twenty-five) of 668,867 Tabora residents, 123,511 were

attending school. By comparison, in Kilimanjaro the school-age cohort was 744,354 with 227,865 attending school (United Republic of Tanzania 1982a). Figures from the ministry of education indicate that nearly twice as many Kilimanjaro students attend primary school as Tabora students (225,278 in Kilimanjaro and 112,791 in Tabora) (United Republic of Tanzania 1980). Such figures represent both the difference in the number of schools in these two regions and the educational strategies of parents in these two arenas.

At the national level, quotas for secondary school selection (as discussed in chapter 2) should, theoretically, favor regions where fewer primary school students apply for admission. If such universalistic quotas worked effectively, competition for secondary school admission would be stiffer in Kilimanjaro than in Tabora, which it is. However, the outcome of the quota system is not that Tabora and Kilimanjaro students are equally represented in the public secondary schools. Kilimanjaro residents have found a number of strategies for circumventing the quota system. Furthermore, the quota system is abandoned by the government at the A-level for entrance examinations into Form V. Malekela's study shows that by 1982, 2.62 percent of Tabora students eligible for A-level studies were enrolled in government high schools, compared with 28.74 percent of Kilimanjaro's eligible cohort (1983, 154). While Tabora represents the lower end of the scale of

educational opportunity, it is not the most disadvantaged overall. Kilimanjaro is, however, the undisputed leader in the pursuit of public education.

These figures present only part of the picture of higher educational opportunities in these two arenas. Voluntary organizations, responding to community demand, with encouragement by the government, have promoted the growth of private secondary schools. In 1984 Tanzania's eighty-five government secondary schools enrolled 41,972 students. Sixty-three private institutions served 19,213 students (United Republic of Tanzania 1980). In 1983 Tabora had five public secondary institutions, which drew pupils from the entire country, and two private seminaries, which served the local Christian population. None of these public schools are located in Urambo district where I conducted research. The first private school in the district was under completion by the Moravian mission in a village nearby the one where I resided. The village parents seemed to take little notice of the new school, and the mission had concentrated its efforts on overseas funding.

The contrast with Kilimanjaro is striking. In the district where I conducted research, Moshi Rural, there were three government secondary schools, ten private schools, and two seminaries. As private institutions are permitted to admit the majority of students from the region in which they are located, it is clear that opportunities

to pursue postprimary education for students in Urambo and Moshi Rural districts vary widely. Last, a lively shadow economy of education was operating in Kilimanjaro, which made use of public facilities to educate fee-paying students. This shadow educational structure operated in both the rural and urban areas. Such structures were not observed in Tabora.

This brief contrast provides the background for an interpretation of the meaning and use of education as a resource in the political arenas of the two regions. Formal education is only part of a broader category of resource which can be understood as knowledge. Part 3 of this study shows how esoteric knowledge is manipulated as a resource, thus rounding out the analysis which is developed in the two chapters which follow here in part 2.

CHAPTER III

TABORA: THE "CENTER" OF THE PERIPHERY

Introduction

In this and the following chapters I trace the impact of national policy on cultural and class development at a regional level. The material in this chapter concerns Tabora, whereas chapter 4 is about Kilimanjaro.

The chapter begins with a brief demographic and geo-physical sketch of the region, followed by an overview of its historical development. I then move to an analysis of how the resources of formal knowledge are used by actors at the local level. Such use has unintended consequences, as I point out in the conclusion.

Regional Parameters

Tabora region lies astride a cultivated steppe plateau about 1,200 meters above sea level in Tanzania's central western zone. Occupying some 160,000 square kilometers, its primary residents, Nyamwezi farmers and Sukuma mixed farmer-pastoralists, numbered 817,906 in the 1978 census (United Republic of Tanzania 1982a). Tabora Town, the regional capital, has a population of 107,498 and is a central node in the railway line which connects the coast with regions to the north and south. The largest regiment of the Tanzanian army is housed in Tabora, as are a number

of refugee camps which are the home of southern African political refugees.

Farming is a precarious endeavor in many parts of the region, where rainfall is variable, the soil poor, and lowland areas uninhabitable during the rainy season, when malaria and sleeping sickness are endemic. The primary export crop is tobacco, and tobacco processing forms the largest industry. Food crops consist of maize, rice, cassava, finger millet, sorghum, and sugar cane for subsistence and sale. The most important livestock holdings are¹ in cattle (Abrahams 1981). Most of the region's residents are nominally Muslim. Differentiation in wealth and status is minimal, while critical infrastructural supports in transportation, communication, education, electricity, and medical facilities are lacking. Outmigration and encapsulation into a wider exchange economy began during the precolonial period.

Wealth, Status, and Labor in the History of Tabora

The Precolonial Landscape

The current occupants of Tabora region are an ethnically related mixture of Bantu-speaking groups with historical links to kingdoms in the north and west in present-day Uganda and Rwanda, the southern corridor chiefdoms in Malawi and southern Tanzania, and the Kamba people of Kenya to the north. Tanzania's two numerically largest ethnic groups, the Nyamwezi and Sukuma, possess a common language

in the territory where the two groups heavily overlap, although dialectical differences are more sharply apparent further from the central zone around Tabora Town. They are also culturally and politically similar to each other and to the Kimbu and Sumbwa (Abrahams 1970; Liebenow 1960; Shorter 1972). Unlike the Nyamwezi, the Sukuma had strongly developed commoner associations, the basumba batale, which will be discussed in chapter 5, and their productive base in cattle-keeping and cotton-growing was enhanced by the favorable ecological conditions surrounding Lake Victoria in the neighboring northern region of Shinyanga (Abrahams 1967). Tabora's Tusi residents are culturally and linguistically distinct, although they are integrated into village life and intermarry with other residents. Abrahams (1970, 101-102) indicates that the designation Tusi refers to settlers from the southern Ha territory and also Hima settlers from the northwestern Ankole, Buzinza, and Ruanda kingdoms.

In reconstructing the precolonial picture of Tabora, it is helpful to envision a number of interconnected ruling dynasties with a common cultural core surrounding the political institution of the ntemi chiefdom (Shorter 1972). The origin, character, and development of this institution through the nineteenth century has been a subject of critical historical and anthropological debate which I will summarize in the following two subsections. My summary of the revisionist ethnohistorical accounts developed in the

1970s draws heavily on the oral traditions and primary source materials analyzed by Bennett (1975), Kabeya (1976), Roberts (1968), Shorter (1972, 1973), Unomah (1970, 1976) and Wright (1985). This summary is periodized in two parts: the seventeenth through the eighteenth century and the nineteenth century up to the period of German conquest. It was during this latter period that the sphere of influence of the western chiefdoms extended and flourished, only to be ultimately constrained by increasing linkages with coastal and inland trading networks and the arrival of Europeans.

The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

A number of clans from different areas began to settle in the greater Unyamwezi area sometime during the seventeenth century, according to a variety of oral traditions. The name Nyamwezi (actually, WaNyamwezi, the people of the moon), referring collectively to these western chiefdoms, was provided by the first traders to come from the coast in the nineteenth century (Roberts 1968). It seems clear from the recently analyzed evidence that the original Bantu cultivators who settled in this area came from several centers of dispersal (Usagara to the southeast, Rwanda and Uganda to the northwest, the Pare and Ngulu mountains to the northeast), rather than representing an archaic offshoot of the Interlacustrine kingdoms, as was previously argued (Bosch 1930; Cory 1954; Oliver 1963). The traditions suggest that these immigrants moved into what was an

unpopulated territory, bringing with them the technical and ritual skills for extensive horticulture, hunting, and cattle-keeping.

Debate about the origin of these immigrants encompasses questions about the nature and scale of the political institutions they introduced. While the early western dynasties possessed certain symbolic/political institutions in common with the interlacustrine kingdoms (divine kingship, the use of royal insignia, the royal fire, and special rituals for the death and burial of the chief), Shorter (1973) argues that these symbols were widespread throughout east and central Africa. The special institutions of the ntemi chieftainship, particularly the conus-shell disc-emblem worn by the chief, suggests a diffusion from the dynasties of Usagara.

These western chiefdoms were not centralized proto-states like the Chwezi Ugandan kingdoms. Shorter (1972, 1973) explains their tendency to segment and proliferate as an adaptation to a woodland ecology based on a subsistence pattern of hunting and gathering and shifting horticulture. These settlers moved into relatively unoccupied territory where the need for land created the necessity for client chiefdoms. The sons of chiefs were sent ahead to hold a territory. These sons tended to replicate the structure of the parent chiefdom. Over time, and with the absorption of new immigrants, these segments could seek to detach themselves from the parent entity, particularly if they were

far enough removed from the founder's zone of influence. This, rather than conquest, population increase, or competition between princely contenders provides a sufficient explanation for the fissionary aspect of these early multi-chiefdom communities.

Shorter's Kimbu material indicates a limited political interdependence, based on kinship and ritual, between chiefdoms. In this respect they resemble Southall's description of the Alur segmentary state (1953), although the Kimbu chiefdoms were not as well integrated. Abrahams (1967) contends that political interdependence did not characterize traditional Nyamwezi chiefdoms, but Shorter (1972, 390) criticizes him for failure to provide dynastic genealogies for the northern chiefdoms where he conducted research. Unomah (1970), who does provide such information for the Nyanyembe zone surrounding the present-day Tabora Town and its western hinterland, shows extensive kinship connections between Nyamwezi dynasties. He argues that the Nyanyembe structure was borrowed from other Nyamwezi chiefdoms when the ruling dynasty staked its territorial claim in the middle of the eighteenth century.

The scale of these early western chiefdoms was small, usually comprised of fewer than a thousand people and less than one thousand square miles in area (Roberts 1968). The chief (ntemi) was a semi-divine ruler whose physical health and observance of special rituals preserved the well-being of the land and its people. The ntemi administered the

chiefdom in conjunction with a number of subordinate officials: a royal dresser and regalia keeper, a messenger/information officer, a minister in charge of the royal food stores, a retinue of bodyguard/pages, subordinate chiefs who administered local districts, collected tribute, organized the cultivation of the royal farm, participated in the election and installation of the ntemi, and were responsible for raising an army when the chief organized military campaigns or had to defend the chiefdom. These subordinate chiefs (vbanachalo) headed dispersed settlements (gunguli) made up of a number of homesteads (Unomah 1970).

The ntemi, as the mediating link between the royal ancestors and the living inhabitants of the chiefdom, was responsible for preventing droughts, epidemics, and other natural disasters. Through his role as chief grain keeper of the chiefdom, the ntemi exercised control over production and consumption. Grain tributes were paid to the ntemi by all male inhabitants out of a gunguli farm maintained specifically for this purpose. This revenue was redistributed during times of shortage. The ntemi's annual rituals concerning agricultural production (opening the annual planting season with a ritual haircut, bush burning, distribution of seeds, and provision of fire from the royal flame) and control over the production of grain beer complemented his administrative functions in formulating policy and conducting his court.

Rules of succession were somewhat loose until the nineteenth century. The western chiefdoms were largely patrilineal, although matrilineal succession to the ntemiship prevailed. Thus chiefly dynasties reckoned descent matrilineally and the patrilineal clans who married women of the royal clan were designated "fathers of the chief." These clans were structurally ambivalent. Men who married royal wives did not pay bridewealth or conduct brideservice. Their responsibility lay in keeping the royal clan fertile. In royal rituals the chief was symbolically compared to a woman (Shorter 1973). Women were occasionally elected to office when no suitable male heir was available.

Choice of a successor lay in the hands of the vbanachalo, along with the chief's councilors. A segment of these councilors were of slave descent and were therefore considered more likely to render unconditional support to the chief. Unlike the vbanachalo, who inherited their positions, the ritual office of slave councilors was not confined to particular families (Roberts 1968). Until the 1840s, succession was rarely a contested issue. Nyamwezi royal lineages were relatively small. The eldest of the sister's sons was generally recognized as the heir apparent and disputed claims to office generally resulted in the fissioning of the chiefdom and the establishment of a new entity.

The Nineteenth Century and the Impact of the Coastal Trade

An assessment of the complex effects of the coastal trade on the societies of the western interior necessitates a commitment to understanding the perspective of several categories of social actors: the Omani rulers of the coastal states, Swahili merchants, Nyamwezi chiefs, caravan porters, and an emergent local elite. Merchants from southern Arabia and Persia had been trading along the East African coast since the second century. By the fifteenth century a number of important Islamic city-states dotted the coastal ports and islands. The economy of these states depended upon commerce with Arabia, India, and the Far East. The coastal cities traded ivory, gold, and slaves for cloves, porcelain, and cloth. Merchants in these cities lived in considerable style, built domed mosques, and minted their own currency.

The population of these cities was comprised of Muslim immigrants who intermarried with Bantu inhabitants, creating both a new language and culture: Swahili (Unomah 1976). Many of the actors who became important in the inland trade network were not strictly Arabs, but Swahili traders. A particularly powerful subgroup among these inland traders were the wangwana who were of heterogenous origin. Many had become attached to the Swahili community as slaves who converted to Islam and emulated the cosmopolitan life-style of their Swahili masters (Cooper 1981; Wright and Lary 1971).

The lure of the gold trade brought Portuguese voyagers to the coast where they sought to control the Indian Ocean trade. From the 1500s to 1699 they established military hegemony over the coastal states. Resistance among the Swahili community was finally aided by Omani intervention and resulted in the Portuguese expulsion from the coast. Omani intervention, after the Portuguese expulsion in 1699, increased with the appointment of governors in these coastal cities. In 1940, the Omani ruler, Sayyid Said, moved his capital from Oman to Zanzibar in an effort to reorganize the economy of the coastal states. Sayyid Said developed a plantation economy on Zanzibar and Pemba based on the cultivation of cloves for export, and he also encouraged the involvement of Indian financial backers to strengthen commerce. The backbone of the plantation economy was slave labor, although slaves were also shipped north to the Arabian peninsula and south to the French plantation islands.

Until the nineteenth century, the main incursion into the interior was an extraction of gold from Sofala in the south. By the mid-nineteenth century, Bantu traders from the interior were responding to new opportunities opened up by the coastal demand for slaves and the precious export commodity, ivory. Nyamwezi traditions suggest that pioneer trader-princes, traveling east to sell iron in Ugogo, heard of the existence of the Indian Ocean and ventured to the coast. There they found beads and cloth and noticed the

high demand for ivory. Upon returning home, they set about collecting ivory for transport to the coastal markets, thus initiating the inland caravan trade (Unomah 1976, 273).

The people of the western chiefdoms had a central involvement in the regional trade of the interior prior to their involvement with the coastmen. Nyamwezi traders traveled long distances to trade iron hoes for salt in Uvinza and for copper wire in Katanga. Ivory was not considered a trading commodity, but was of considerable prestige value. Chiefs wore ivory bracelets and were sometimes buried between ivory tusks. They retained a monopoly on ivory hunted in their territory, as one tusk was always considered chiefly tribute (Roberts 1968).

The impact of the coastal demands for ivory greatly increased the scale of elephant hunting and the importance of hunting guilds. Swahili coastmen began employing Nyamwezi porters to carry goods into Unyanyembe in the 1830s. Sayyid Said seems to have clearly understood the importance of Nyanyembe cooperation for the success of inland trade, because he negotiated a treaty with Nyanyembe rulers to protect the security of caravans in 1839. The trade route through Unyanyembe to Ujiji was considered more expedient than the southern route, where Ngoni and Sangu attacks were causing periodic disruption. In 1840, the father of the powerful coastal trader Tippu Tip married into the Nyanyembe dynasty and around this time Swahili commercial entrepôts were established inland. Slaves, which had been

a trading commodity in western regional trade, were mainly of prestige value until the florescence of the coastal trade. Like cattle, they were used in marriage payments and in the creation of alliances. The demand for ivory, which brought Nyamwezi traders into contact with the coastal slave markets, now stimulated an accelerated local demand for slaves. Easy access to a new weapons technology exacerbated internal conflict, as powerful men launched military campaigns to obtain slaves through raiding and booty.

By the 1890s German figures estimate that one-third of the male Nyamwezi population was engaged in caravan trade and this was a period of decline, following the introduction of anti-slavery legislation in 1873 and 1876 (Unomah 1976, 284 quoting F. Stuhlmann). Caravan trade became a way of life and conferred prestige upon the successful. Many young men used the wages from portering to begin their own caravans, or to set up small-businesses in the inland commercial centers such as Kazeh (later, Tabora Town). The trip from the coast to Kazeh took about ten weeks, and during this time caravan porters were involved in a specialized culture, which included establishing protective links with other societies (utani). The caravan trade depopulated the local territory of young men during the dry season--a period traditionally reserved for such tasks as house-building, honey collecting, and beer brewing. Roberts (1968, 129) suggests that this shortage of young

male labor explains why the Nyamwezi eventually took to buying slaves (to help with cultivation and dry season tasks), rather than selling them.

Unomah's (1970) conclusions are more convincing. Long distance trade in ivory and slaves created an increased demand for other commodities, particularly in grain and livestock, to supply caravans and to feed the new landless population in the trading centers. The high price of provisions in the Kazeh market encouraged many families to employ laborers or purchase slaves to increase the cultivation of newly introduced crops such as rice, maize, and cassava.

A commercial elite, the wandewa, emerged in the Nyan-yembe zone during this period. The wandewa were men who had amassed wealth in commodities--cloth, beads, ivory, iron hoes, cattle, guns, and grains. They maintained a large following of servants and slaves, some of whom were armed and given military training to protect the walled compounds of their masters. Many members of this new elite were drawn from the ranks of the traditional aristocracy, the vbandachalo. In their traditional role as controllers of grain and ivory tribute for the chief, they were in the position to enter commercial trading at an earlier stage than most commoners. Some formed alliances and inter-married with the wangwana population in Kazeh.

As trading profits rose in the interior, so did the stakes of territorial control. Chiefs and their families

were in the forefront of organizing caravans and, through tribute and the collection of road tolls, were able to benefit from the fruits of trade. This ushered in an era of expanded power for the western chiefs, who were able to deploy tangible wealth as patrimony (Shorter 1973). Increased competition for succession resulted in several institutional changes in the western chiefdoms. First, a new stratum of lower-ranked ritual chiefs was created to care for the sacrificial needs of suppressed dynasties. Second, vbandachalo recruitment shifted from a hereditary basis to a patrimonial office bestowed upon favorites among the rising wandewa. Third, the matrilineal rule of chiefly succession was no longer strictly enforced. Both Shorter (1973) and Unomah (1970) take issue with Abrahams (1967), who contended that succession became necessarily patrilineal at this time. Rather, it appears that during the latter half of the nineteenth century, chiefly pretenders needed to build the support of a strong following, particularly among the wandewa, whose financial and military backing was essential to the maintenance and extension of territorial hegemony.

This new balance of power did not remain undisputed by chiefs such as the Nyanyembe ruler Mnywa Sele, who attempted to control the wandewa by establishing road taxes, among other measures. His downfall in 1860, attributed by Roberts (1968) to the punitive intervention of Arab traders, was actually the result of the cooperative efforts

of chiefly elders, the wandewa, and a number of local princes (Unomah 1970). Swahili traders played an ambiguous role in the shifting power game of the interior. As Wright and Lary explain,

the traders usually depended upon alliances to preserve their position. More than once the client-patron roles were reversed. Today's Swahili king-maker might on the morrow depend on an African chief to come to his rescue, or appeal for arbitration to a "neutral" to resolve a dispute. As settlements became more permanent, absorbing people from the surrounding area and constraining family units, a whole range of new contingencies emerged and the functions of a resident trader came more and more to approximate those of a chief (1971, 550).

The evolution of the standing army (ruga ruga) was another important constitutional innovation of this period. The traditional army of the chief was recruited from all able-bodied men in the chiefdom. In the case of the Nyan-yembe, the ruga ruga, as described by Unomah (1970), appears to have had the character of a state institution, organized by age sets. In other cases, the ruga ruga functioned as a mercenary army maintained by local warlords such as Mirambo and Ngungu ya Mawe. These mercenary armies were of heterogeneous origin and adopted the model provided by the Ngoni. They were renowned as merciless warriors, who smoked hemp and wore the skulls and genitals of their victims (Shorter 1972).

Mirambo, the most well-known warlord of this period, sought to bring Swahili traders in Unyanyembe under his control by coercing them to move from Kazeh to his own capital, Urambo. To accomplish this, he used the tactic of

disrupting the ivory trade from the coast, thereby driving up the price of the commodity in the Zanzibar market. Sultan Barghash, fearing permanent endangerment to his revenues, dispatched an expedition to negotiate a peace which was established in 1876 (Wright 1985). Mirambo's efforts thereafter focused on control of the western trade route between his chiefdom and the northern lake region. His success was due both to military genius and diplomacy. In the diplomatic arena, Mirambo had the opportunity, unique to an interior chief, of negotiating with a range of foreigners, including traders such as Tippu Tip, the Zanzibari sultan, European explorers such as Speke, Stanley, Livingstone, and Cameron, the missionaries Broyon and Southon, and Sir John Kirk, the British consul on the coast (Bennett 1971; Kabeya 1976; Roberts 1968; Wright 1985). He built a military empire through removing conquered chiefs, whom he replaced with members of the local royal lineage. These new chiefs became his clients, indebted through gratitude and fear of reprisal.

His exact contemporary, Nyungu ya Mawe (both died in December 1884) was an unsuccessful royal pretender to the Nyanyembe dynasty who fled south and established hegemony over the Kimbu. This area had been depopulated by famine and invasions by the Ngoni and Sangu. With a large and efficient army, Nyungu established a more efficient centralized chiefdom than Mirambo. The formula for his success was to turn his military commanders into territorial

governors in the chiefdoms he conquered. Local chiefs either submitted to the supervision of the governors, or were not replaced. Governors remained loyal to Nyungu because they were allowed to share in his booty and the profits from the ivory trade. By separating political and ritual power at the local level, Nyungu consolidated a centralized protostate which survived more than a decade after this death (Shorter 1968, 1972, 1973). To provide a sense of the increase of scale of interior settlements during this period, it is helpful to remember that through most of the eighteenth century chiefdoms were generally limited to a thousand followers. Mirambo's fort in Ulyankhulu was said to have held 10,000 people, with 5,000 more residing outside its walls. The population for Kazeh in the 1890s was estimated at 20,000 inhabitants (Unomah 1976, 301).

German Conquest

Europeans began to emerge as significant social actors in the western interior in the 1880s. As mentioned previously, Mirambo had contacts with a number of missionaries and explorers. Following the deaths of Mirambo and Nyungu in 1884, the Nyanyembe chief, Isike, became the most important of the Nyamwezi rulers (Bennett 1975). His hostile encounter with Europeans indicates the fragility of the Nyamwezi political structure in the face of the shifting balance of power which would eventually tip in favor of German pacification.

Isike's succession to the ntemiship was contested by his rival Nyaso, Tippu Tip's stepmother. Many of his own subchiefs were wandewa who had a large number of armed followers (Roberts 1968). Aside from internal factionalism, Isike had to cope with the increasing presence of missionary groups such as the German branch of the African International Association in Buganda, the White Fathers in Kipalapala, and the London Missionary Society in Urambo. The missions represented a potentially disruptive force in the region as the stations served as centers of refuge, reconnaissance, and diplomacy (Wright 1985, 561-62). Military and political tensions in the region partially explain the relative failure of these early missions to win converts. The White Fathers withdrew from Kipalapala in 1889 and were followed by the London Missionary Society, which withdrew from Urambo in 1898 without converting a single soul (Roberts 1968). The missionaries viewed their responsibility in terms of "battling the devil of Islam" for the conversion of pagan souls (Conferences Ordinaries of the Tanganyika Territories 1928-38), and failed to perceive that Islam was one of number of competing ritual systems in the region. Alliances between the chiefs, wandewa, and the wangwana merchants fostered the adoption of muslim ritual by some Nyamwezi leaders. Isike was said to have begun observing the Ramadan fast by the 1880s, a move clearly designed to shore up his connections with powerful Swahili traders in Tabora (Unomah 1976, 304).

Finally, Isike was troubled by the presence of competitive European traders. He drove out a French trader from his chiefdom in 1881 and possibly participated in the murder of a German ivory trader in 1886. Isike's situation became precarious in 1890 when Emin Pasha, leading an expedition to the far west in service of the Germans, disobeyed his orders and stopped in Tabora where he negotiated a treaty with the principal Arab leaders and declared Unyanyembe a German possession.

Several Nyamwezi chiefs welcomed the German military presence which followed. They viewed the Germans as potential allies against the Ngoni. By 1891 the Germans had obtained paper treaties with the chiefs of Usongo, Kahama, Ushirombo, and Urambo, who lent their ruga ruga to the German forces to fight Ngoni raiders. Isike's rival, Nyaso, threw her support to the Germans and was joined by a number of chiefs. However, the Arab and Nyamwezi communities were by no means convinced that a German victory was assured. Many chiefs sent ruga ruga to both the Germans and Isike. Despite continued resistance, Isike was eventually defeated in 1892 and Nyaso was formally declared ntemi in 1893. By 1896 the Germans had established a military outpost in Tabora Town and Ujiji and formed the region into administrative districts.

German occupation in the central western zone had several major effects: (1) the building of the western railway line destroyed the caravan inland trade to the coast; (2)

the pattern of labor exportation became firmly entrenched through the levying of taxes; (3) Asian shopkeepers became critical middlemen in the commercial activities of the interior; and (4) the ecological consequences of outmigration were manifest in epidemics of sleeping sickness and malaria, claiming the lives of humans and livestock and resulting in famine.

The completion of the railway line along the caravan route from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma in 1914 effectively captured inland trade, increased German military security, and made portage between the west and the north a thing of the past.² Local industries faltered in competition with the import of cheaper manufactured goods, and the position of Swahili traders declined against an immigration of Asian middlemen with better access to imported goods, export markets, credit, and information (Iliffe 1979, 141).

Taxation and the decline in caravan activities pressed Nyamwezi porters and businessmen to look for other cash-earning opportunities and relative to other groups they were well-positioned to do so. Despite the failure of the missions to secure a stronghold in the western zone, which would have provided the Nyamwezi with access to formal education, the nineteenth century involvement with the coastal trade had widened the horizons of the region's inhabitants. As Roberts points out, Nyamwezi elites showed remarkable initiative to seek new sources of wealth and increased their ability to exploit the resources of their

own country, gained knowledge of other cultures, and modified their own customs and institutions to take advantage of these new contacts. Nyamwezi social relations were increasingly governed by personal merit and wealth, rather than kinship and traditional status as the nineteenth century drew to a close (Roberts 1968). They were, in other words, encapsulated into the exchange economy.

The Germans appear to have recognized this. Nyamwezi and Sukuma experience as caravan porters marked these groups as disciplined laborers. They formed a labor aristocracy during the German regime, receiving the highest wages and other concessions. Nyamwezi and Swahili recruits also formed the elite of the armed forces, and members of these groups who formed the African business community in Tabora had the backing of the German government (Wright 1985).

While most preferred portering or railway work, by 1903 there were some 4,000 Nyamwezi engaged in plantation work in the northeast (mainly on sisal plantations). They also made up a large sector of the casual labor force in Dar es Salaam. By 1905 twenty-seven percent of casual laborers in the capital were Nyamwezi and were employed outside the territory, whether in Mombasa and Kisumu ports, the Ugandan railway, the Kenyan police, as seasonal laborers, or in the Zanzibar clove estates (Iliffe 1979, 160-162).

However, labor exportation had devastating ecological effects by the turn of the century. Extensive cultivation

practices which had formerly checked the balance between human and predator were disrupted by the outmigration of the majority of the region's young men. Cleared land reverted to bush, and the incidence of sleeping sickness, malaria, and the menace of predatory animals increased (Kjekshus 1977). Iliffe draws figures from the missionary health records. Between 1904 and 1908 the population of Tabora declined from 80,000 to 40,000, and only four tsetse-fly-free zones were left in the area (1979, 165). The famine conditions that resulted affected most strongly the women and children left behind to shoulder the costs of reproducing the colonial labor economy.

British Overrule

Unlike other parts of the Territory, the German administration in Tabora was largely conducted through native authorities. During the German period the number of chiefdoms increased. Many of the native authorities "recognized" by the Germans were legitimate heirs to office. Others were created to suit the needs of the colonial administration. Abrahams (1967, 47) notes an increase in secular over ritual functions of office during this period. This process continued under the British system of indirect rule.

In the arena of production, the development of Tabora continued to stagnate relative to other resource-endowed regions. Tabora was the major site of military operations during the First World War. The disruption connected with

these campaigns was exacerbated by an influenza epidemic in 1918 (Abrahams 1967, 48). Rodney (1979) estimates that from 1917 to 1919, between 50,000 and 80,000 lives were lost in the central regions from influenza. What Bowles calls "the major theme of British propaganda" (1979, 164-65) was an increase in economic activity. This was referred to as "development." The argument was that economic growth would raise individual levels of income and increase government revenue to provide necessary services. Given the theory of comparative advantage, development emphasized increased production of tropical export crops for the benefit of the native, the colony, the metropole, and the world at large. Mbilinyi (1985) goes even further to argue that the "development" of small-holder agriculture was a thinly veiled guise for real expenditure (in capital and extension services) in the foreign-controlled plantation sector.

The inter-war production targets of the British administration in Tabora were not successfully met, despite coercive measures to force small-holders to grow export crops under a "Grow More Crops" campaign. The production of food crops was variable as well. District agriculture reports mention intermittent drought and the necessity of providing famine relief in the area. It is important to note that the pattern of labor migration for young men continued during this period. A 1940 report to the League of Nations shows that out of a total 7,095 government native labor recruits, nearly one-half were from the West-

ern Province. These figures do not include the number of laborers who left their districts independently (voluntarily) in search of work and none were recruited for local employment. Instead, these laborers were recruited for work in Arusha, Tanga, and Morogoro districts for work as sisal cutters (U.K. Public Records Office 1940). The pattern of coercive labor recruitment was not confined to adults. The provincial commissioner's report for 1944 mentions a newly approved school for juvenile delinquents at Kazima where boys of up to age sixteen worked on school farms and road building projects, along with adult convicts from the prison. The only offense of several of these boys, remarked the commissioner, was that they had been found wandering without a proper home (U.K. Public Records Office 1944).

The continuing pattern of labor exportation and agricultural stagnation of the region bears consideration for an understanding of what was probably the most capital intensive undertaking and largest financial disaster of the British administration: the Groundnut Scheme. Iliffe provides a discussion of what he refers to as "Europe's last major attempt to restructure Tanganyika's economy" (1979, 440-442). During the post-World War II period a shortfall of fats and oils was predicted in the international market. In 1944, the British company Unilever, in conjunction with the Tanganyika Department of Agriculture, decided to invest 24,000,000 pounds sterling in the cultivation of 1,300,000

hectares of land for the production of groundnuts. Most of this land was located in Tabora and most of it was tsetse-fly infested. The scheme was heavily mechanized due to the "shortage of labor," but the ex-army surplus machinery used broke down quickly and was unserviceable. The hectarage chosen was difficult to clear and not suitable for cultivation. A drought compounded the problems of the scheme. By 1949 only 20,000 hectares had been cleared, and the total expenditure by the time the scheme was closed out was 35,870,000 pounds sterling, none of it benefiting the Nyamwezi small-holder.

Postcolonial Policy and the Current Economic Crisis

Today the majority of Tabora residents live in rural areas and are small-holder peasants with fewer than five acres of land. On this land they cultivate tobacco as a cash crop following a postcolonial agricultural policy to develop the former sites of the failed groundnut scheme through tobacco production (Boesen and Mohele 1979; Mueller³ 1980). They also grow a variety of food crops such as maize, cassava, rice, and vegetables for subsistence and sale. Each peasant household works its own fields, with men doing the bulk of the bush clearing and tobacco processing, and women, if they are not secluded, weeding, harvesting, and performing the majority of domestic chores. Marketing is the exclusive domain of men. Farming and processing technologies remain largely unmechanized and

irrigation is uncommon. In Tabora labor is the critical variable for the small peasant household, enabling it to expand the amount of land under cultivation and meet production targets.

In the past, Nyamwezi lineages practiced extensive horticulture, hunting, and gathering. Lineages held use rights to arable land and hunting territory in dispersed village settlements. Upon marriage, a young man could establish his own household as an adjunct to the larger homestead of his father, brothers, and uncles, and receive use-rights to the land held by his patrikin. Fathers were responsible for paying the bridewealth for the first marriages of their sons, and received the bridewealth of their daughters. Sons equally inherited the house property of the father on his death, while a man's junior brothers inherited his wives. Traditionally, the exchange of bride-wealth coincided with the obligation of the groom to perform brideservice (hunting) for his father-in-law until the birth of the first child.

Abrahams has argued (1981) that the main distinguishing feature of Nyamwezi kinship is not its corporate character but rather the differential rights in production and reproduction held by men and women. While each wife in a polygynous union maintained her own household within the compound of her husband and his patrikin, she would not inherit any property upon his death, nor inherit property from her natal lineage. Adultery was considered a divorce-

able offense for women but not for men, who had only to pay an adultery fine if they infringed upon the rights of another man. Bridewealth exchange established the ideal marriage arrangement for Nyamwezi men because it brought with it the right to a woman's domestic and productive labor, sexual relations, and the right to filiate all her children regardless of whether the husband was the biological genitor. Liaisons established without the exchange of bridewealth could be transformed into full marriages at any stage of the domestic cycle, or separate redemption payments for each child could legitimate the descent rights of the father. Only sons who were legitimized through bridewealth or related payments could hope to inherit from the father and his patrikin.

Patrilineages lost their control over use rights to land during 1975 as a result of the Tanzanian government's village resettlement scheme, which forced many Tabora peasants into consolidated village sites where land was allocated by newly established entities known as cooperative villages.

Superficially, Tabora peasants, who are particularly warm, hospitable, and courteous hosts to foreigners, appear passive in the face of deteriorating living standards. Many were forced to leave their old homes under armed guard to move into new communal villages. They say they have no incentive to invest in the land because they may be forced to move again. Many are actively retreating from tobacco

production as low returns to labor and mounting debts from the purchase of agricultural inputs reduce profits. Instead they have turned to the sale of subsistence crops such as maize and vegetables for a livelihood.

In 1983 an economic crisis further destabilized the villages in the tobacco production zone. Basic household commodities were nonexistent. Farmers, bureaucrats, and those in business were all engaged in shadow market activities. In the village where I conducted research, a factional dispute pitted older, established tobacco farmers, who were also the key local government and party officials, against younger tobacco farmers seeking to stop production of this export crop. By law, all farmers in the area were supposed to grow tobacco. The older farmer/leaders had prospered from tobacco production during the initial years of the tobacco boom, but had run up a large collective village debt to the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank. Younger farmers complained that because of low market prices paid for their crop and the extraction of a levy to repay the debt, they barely broke even when they sold their crops.

Another factional line was drawn between the older, influential male party leaders in the village and a younger generation of educated bureaucrats and teachers who were posted in the village from other regions. Visible markers of wealth and status (e.g., housing, diet, clothing, and imported goods such as watches, bicycles, and the like)

divided the village into stranger/bureaucrats (whose conspicuous consumption provoked envy) and residents (some of whom were party leaders). If the male village party leadership did not appear prosperous, this was a superficial impression. Many had investments in property (in business and housing) and most had invested in labor.

The Uses of Formal Knowledge

The Village Setting

In 1983 I conducted research in a village I will call Kiloleni Mjini, a divisional (subdistrict) headquarter located in Urambo district. This village is in the center of the tobacco zone and sits astride the central railway line linking Dar es Salaam to Ujiji on the coast of Lake Tanganyika. Research was conducted over a two-month period and entailed participant observation in a variety of settings (primary schools, village meetings, the market, the Tobacco Authority, shops, beer clubs, etc.), intensive household interviews regarding production, consumption, education, and labor histories, and interviews with teachers and village leaders.

Kiloleni Mjini is officially designated as a town, since it is an administrative center. It is an ujamaa village and in many ways is representative of the demographic and political changes which have taken place in Tabora since the 1970s. The town lies on the boundary of what had been the Nyanyembe chiefdom. The original settlement may have served as a minor trading entrep[^]ot for cara-

vans during the earlier part of the nineteenth century. Today, the town center reflects this earlier settlement pattern, in combination with the more recent block farm pattern established after 1975.

Kiloleni Mjini has about 3,000 residents (700 families). The central square of the town contains a market, a primary court, the railway station, an inoperative telephone, the party offices, a guesthouse/hotel, a cooperative beer club, a maize mill, lorry garage, the Tanzania Tobacco Authority offices and storage facilities, a dispensary, an inoperative deep well and central water taps, and several cooperative and two private shops. At either end of the town are two primary schools. A number of "unofficial" beer clubs, operating out of private homes, are located throughout the village. Transport links to Urambo (the district headquarter) and Tabora town are good, compared with more remote villages. In addition to the railroad, the village is located next to the main road and central bus route and villagers also travel to neighboring towns by a lorry owned by one of the village's businessmen.

The majority of village residents are peasants who produce both subsistence and cash crops. Other occupational specializations include: fishing, honey collecting, petty trade (including beer brewing, a woman's activity), casual farm labor, businesses (rental, transport, hotels, and shops), and salaried employment for the government and party.

Many of these occupational specializations overlap. Government and party leaders also operate farms. They may have relatives who peddle their produce, or work for them as seasonal laborers. They may rent homes or land and operate businesses. Most members of the village party committee are the largest tobacco growers. Tobacco production, which used to be the town's mainstay, has steadily declined since 1976. There are continuous attempts by the Tobacco Authority and the local government to involve more farmers in tobacco production, but local peasants cite the following reasons for refusing to grow this crop: disadvantageous credit arrangements, delays in receiving the necessary inputs, lack of available firewood for flue-curing, the unavailability and expense of transport to collect wood and bring crops to market, the shortage of wage laborers, the necessity of bribing tobacco graders to obtain a fair price, poor weather conditions, and the prevalence of tobacco diseases. Peasants are increasingly switching to food crops such as maize, cassava, rice, sunflowers, and sugar cane for subsistence and sale.

Social organization in Kiloleni Mjini is stratified along class, sex, age, and to a minor degree, ethnic lines. Owner/resident (mwenyeji) as opposed to settler/stranger (mgeni) status is also a factor and does not necessarily coincide with ethnicity.

The Big Men of Kiloleni Mjini are composed of major tobacco farmers, who operate non-farm businesses and occupy

influential roles in the local party committee, salaried government employees of the higher occupational grades (such as teachers with diplomas or training certificates, the Tobacco Authority managerial staff, and agricultural extension workers), and private businessmen. Big peasants cultivate more and better land and keep more livestock (particularly cattle) than poor peasants. As they are usually polygynous they have more household and farm labor and also employ seasonal laborers (although this practice is covert). Most are Muslim and live in traditional Swahili dwellings (see figure 11). Prosperous households are generally of the same mud and wattle construction as those of their neighbors, but are larger, whitewashed, roofed with corrugated iron, and portray the name of the owner and date of construction above the front door to indicate true *mwenyeji* status. Government employees and private full-time businessmen are the only residents who occupy the more modern cement houses, own a means of transport such as a bicycle or lorry, and possess western consumer items such as cassette recorders, wristwatches, and western clothing and furniture. Full-time merchants in the village are both Arab and Asian immigrants and constitute a distinctive minority in dress, language, and food preferences.

In this predominantly Muslim region men and women are highly segregated after adolescence. Even in the more progressive households of government employees, men and

women socialize and eat separately. The level of education of the wife is ususally considerably below that of her husband. Although patrilocal post-marital residence is preferred, forced resettlement and government posting has made neolocal residence common. Wives may or may not be secluded, depending on the farm labor needs of the household. While they do not wear the Swahili veil, common along the coast, they are generally covered head to foot in a pair of khanga cloths. In public women are always accompanied because a woman walking alone invites the vicious gossip of her neighbors. Marketing is the exclusive domain of men and married women have little in the way of direct control over the economic resources in the household.

Male village elders decry the breakdown of "traditional" Nyamwezi marriage patterns in Kiloleni Mjini. In the old days, they say, divorce was uncommon and it was not so easy to establish a free-union marriage. This would seem in contradiction to the male Nyamwezi option of contracting either big (with bridewealth) or little (without bride-wealth, with the potential to pay at a later date) marriages. However, the fragility of marriage for women under Koranic law, the decline in brideservice, and changing economic and educational opportunities may be contributing to the instability of marriage patterns. As I will illustrate, divorce and/or free-union liaisons represent certain economic advantages for women. The majority of female household heads in the town were widowed or divorced women.

Their educational level tended to be higher than their married cohort and they were allowed a much freer rein to socialize with men and appear alone in public. Competition by women (single and those in polygynous households) for the affection and potential income of men was ideologically and ritually expressed in witchcraft accusation and the use of love magic.

Lineages were broken up and geographically reshuffled during the government resettlement policy in 1975. In Kiloleni Mjini an influx of new settlers expanded the village boundaries and strained services. Newer residents occupy the outer village limits in neatly arranged block farms. Their allocated plots are neither as fertile nor as large as those of older residents, and they are located far from the town center. These settlers are reluctant to engage in tobacco production because they will then be held responsible for helping to pay off the collective village debt owed to the Tanzania Rural Development Bank.

The distinction between resident/owners and settler/strangers is not clear-cut, however. Some of the newer residents are not considered strangers because they have clan relatives in the village. They may not necessarily be of Nyamwezi origin, but may have married into a Nyamwezi lineage. One clearly defined category of stranger is composed of government employees posted in the village from other regions. Such men and women tend to socialize with each other in beer drinking circles (men only) and in each

other's homes. Patterns of socializing are also organized along age and educational lines. Bureaucrats will socialize with each other in distinctive age cohorts. Village teachers are distinguished by their educational level. Resident teachers tend to have only a primary school education and have attended an UPE qualifying course. Settler teachers have a secondary school certificate and have attended a Teachers Training College. Settler teachers tend to associate with other government employees and also with residents who have had post-primary education.

The Organization of Village Education

The village has two primary schools, one of which was opened in 1922. The two schools have similar facilities: several buildings for offices and classrooms, a carpentry workshop, and a domestic science workshop. There are no school farms, although the mandate to integrate the schools into the life of the community is carried out through the selling of furniture produced in the carpentry classes and provision of adult literacy classes conducted by the teachers. Universal primary education regulations passed in 1975 have made primary schooling free and compulsory, although not all school-age children attend school. Parents are supposed to provide basic school supplies and uniforms, although the teachers in the village complained that few of the children owned uniforms, notebooks, or pencils. The parents are also supposed to make regular contributions in cash to the maintenance of the schools, and the entire

community is responsible for supplying labor for the building and maintenance of school facilities. A major source of friction between settler teachers and local residents centered on the community's refusal to pay for or supply labor to maintain the school facilities and teacher's quarters. Local complaints aside, the schools are impressive in their tidiness and the fact that basic facilities such as blackboards are intact.

During the period when I conducted research, the students were completing their annual examinations. These tests are administered to each grade at the end of the school year and are theoretically designed as a dry run to prepare the students for their terminal examinations at the end of St. 7. These terminal examinations determine selection to government secondary school, which until 1984 was free.⁴ Regional quotas for secondary school recruitment are determined at the national level and depend upon the number of primary school students who sit for these examinations in the different districts. A passing grade which will qualify a student for government secondary school selection will vary from year to year depending upon the number of students in the competition.

In practice the annual dry run examinations have a different format from the terminal examinations. The educational officer for the ward admitted that they actually serve as a diagnostic device to determine how adequately teachers had covered, and students had mastered,

the syllabus (see figure 12). Aside from Siasa (civics), Swahili, and African History, there have been relatively few modifications in the curriculum from the colonial period. These examinations exclusively test book, as opposed to practical, knowledge and act to create an atmosphere in which the present stage of learning is nothing more than a preparation for a higher stage of study.

The students take these examinations quite seriously, despite the fact that performance does not affect their progress through primary school. Students are never left back. One consequence of these annual examinations is that poor performance may have a demoralizing effect on the students and the teachers. In 1983 the results of the terminal examinations were very disappointing. In one school's terminal St. 7 examination, out of a class of thirty-three, only nineteen students scored above the fifty percent mark. Of these, only six scored in the mid-range of seventy percent or better. With such a poor performance, the prospects that any of the St. 7 graduates would be accepted into secondary school were gloomy.

The divisional education officers blamed the poor performance of Kiloleni Mjini students on the teachers, who in turn blamed each other, the government, and the parents. The expansion of the village following resettlement, and the expansion of the primary school population with the introduction of UPE, necessitated the rapid training of local primary school graduates to fill the teaching ranks.

This cadre of teachers was given a six-week crash course at the town's party offices. Many had failed their secondary school entrance examinations and were now thrust into a teaching role, which they were poorly prepared to handle. The original government edict declared that UPE teachers were to be utilized in the upper-level grades only, where students were capable of more independent learning. Rapid expansion rendered this rule unfeasible. By 1983, UPE teachers were working at all grade levels with little supervision.

Despite these difficulties, the teachers were dedicated and complained bitterly of corruption in the national secondary school quota system. They believed this had to be responsible for the fact that none of their brightest students had been selected for government secondary school in the past three years. Their task of educating the village's young people was made even more difficult by a severe shortage of books and the attitude of the parents towards education. Evidence cited to support parental disinterest ran from the community's refusal to build adequate housing for the teachers or to complete additions to the school buildings, the apathetic response to adult literacy programs offered by the teachers, the lack of concern for the new private secondary school being completed by the Moravian mission in a neighboring village, and, most glaring, the withdrawal of female students from primary school prior to graduation. Most of the stranger-teachers took

such behavior as evidence of the conservative worldview of the villagers, but at second glance such strategies are not as irrational, or traditional, as they appear.

Educational Strategies at the Village Level

From a male point of view, young girls of school age fulfill two important roles: they are a critical part of the domestic labor force and their reproductive capacity represents a future source of income in bridewealth or adultery fines. Within the household young girls are continuously engaged in child care and domestic chores. Idleness is morally unthinkable and excused only in the case of illness. Intellectual labor for women here is defined as leisure because only manual labor provides a visible contribution to the domestic economy. Female child labor is of strategic value to the adult women, who manage key production and reproduction tasks within households. Thus mothers may provide even stronger negative sanctions against the intellectual labor of daughters than fathers. Parents regard their children as a form of old age investment, and hence view their daughters primarily in terms of their potential as wives and mothers. The payoff, in crude economic terms, from raising a daughter comes at the point of her marriage or pregnancy. Pregnancy rates for girls in primary school in this region were disproportionately high as many parents encouraged their daughters in premarital liaisons so as to incur bridewealth payments and adultery fines.

When a portion of the household budget is to be allocated for educational expenses, sons are heavily favored over daughters. While school-age boys also contribute to the labor needs of the peasant household (herding livestock, bush clearing, weeding, and selling garden vegetables in the local market), an investment in their education is viewed in terms of their potential earning capability as salaried workers whose remittances will supplement the household income. While land is no longer strictly partible by male lineage heirs (and is now subject to allocation by the state), businesses and livestock may be inherited by sons. As they form the future of the patrilineal descent group, sons are expected to provide future aid in terms of educational and job opportunities for their younger agnates. Clearly such strategies benefit the male head of the household and his patrilineage. What remains obscure is the motivation of the mother in discouraging the education of daughters. Daughters will not inherit any of the patrilineal wealth, and when they marry they most often move away and are subject to the constraints of the husband's agnates. In some cases the motivation of the mother may derive from a desire to establish a stable marriage for her daughter, as the male ideal of polygyny and ease of divorce under Koranic law contribute to the fragility of marriages in Tabora. In other cases, a mother's lack of direct influence over household

budgetary decisions may prevent her from overtly directing her daughter into educational or career alternatives.

Evidence from female teachers and entrepreneurs who headed their own households suggests that where women have direct control over their income, they tend to invest more heavily in the educational expenses of their children regardless of sex. In contrast to the more affluent peasant households headed by men who will tend to invest surplus in marrying an extra wife and thereby add to the domestic labor pool, female household heads encouraged their children to study and prepare for entrance examinations and saved their income to pay school fees and expenses. This lends support to the tentative conclusion that given an option, men in this region will tend to invest in women as labor, while women will tend to invest in children, who will possibly attain a salaried position and provide future aid in the form of remittances directly to the woman herself. In Tabora these strategies are reserved for women who are widowed or divorced, and through education or alternative means have managed to extricate themselves from household production.

For example, in Kiloleni Mjini, out of 700 households, ten female primary school teachers headed their own households or were the main salaried breadwinner in a conjugal household; eight managers of the village cooperative shops were all women who headed their own households; and six of the major village beer brewers who operated private estab-

lishments were single household heads. The concept female-headed household must be modified in the Tabora context to the extent that it does not always imply a separate and discrete residence from a patrilineally related extended kin network. The case of a woman I will call Bi Fatuma illustrates the complexity of this issue.

Bi Fatuma is a twenty-four-year old cooperative shop manager. Cooperative shops are run by village-elected boards and act as the main channels whereby nationally produced goods (e.g., clothing, household utensils) and commodities (e.g., sugar, cooking oil, kerosene) are made available to the peasantry. Proceeds from sales are reinvested in the shop and other village projects. Bi Fatuma's job consists of weekly trips to purchase shop supplies from the District Trading Corporation, keeping the shop's accounts, and acting as saleswoman. She draws half the minimum wage (325 shillings, or approximately \$32 per month) for her labor since the job is regarded as part-time work. Bi Fatuma was married in a religious and tribal ceremony five years ago involving the exchange of considerable brideweath, for she was judged by local standards to be of exceptional beauty and she is a Form IV graduate. She has one son by this marriage and another (it was rumored) by the manager of the cooperative shop where she works. She is now divorced. She claims to have initiated the divorce because her husband took a second wife who she accused of practicing witchcraft against her. In the mean-

time she established several other liaisons with village men.

She lives in a separate apartment with her two children within a larger family compound consisting of her brother, her uncle, and their wives and children. Her salary pays mainly for the living expenses of herself and her children, with occasional contributions to the larger household budget. Since she is divorced and the bridewealth was returned to her husband's kin, Bi Fatuma's family formally retains control over her and her children. Due to her age and appearance she is still considered a likely candidate for marriage and receives numerous proposals. She claims that she has no further plans to marry and prefers to remain single while bearing children from whose fathers she can extract child support. Her family does not seem inclined to pressure her towards marriage because she is self-supporting and able to help out with major cash purchases. At the conclusion of the research she was pregnant with her third child.

Bi Fatuma's case is not unique. Her closest friend and stiff competitor is twenty-five year old Kili, a primary school teacher. Kili's case is remarkable in the sense that she was born in the village, but has a Form IV education and a certificate from a teacher's training college. This sets her apart from the other resident teachers. Her mother, a widow, is one of the major village beer brewers. Her business savings were primarily invested in educating

her children. Kili is a divorced mother of two and resides with her mother. She has similar aspirations for her children and has turned down a number of eligible bachelors who proposed marriage. She is not above contracting liaisons with men and receiving presents from them. In this pursuit she has several advantages over Bi Fatuma. She has a higher salary and spends a portion of this on imported clothing. Although she lives in a compound residence, her mother places fewer restrictions on her movements than Bi Fatuma's family. Finally, Bi Fatuma's family has lived in the village for several years, but they are not yet considered real residents because they come from another region. By contrast, Kili has full resident status and an important position in the community.

These two cases reflect the changing norms in village social organization brought about by the economic and educational opportunities open to women, and the declining agricultural base of the region. Class differentiation in Tabora is less extreme than in more highly developed regions such as Kilimanjaro, Kagera, or southern highland Mbeya. The major divisions in wealth and status exist primarily among an urban-based government and party elite and commercial traders. Profitable investment in agriculture has declined as the costs of production have risen and the returns to labor have diminished. Educational resources are scarce, and the opportunities provided by attaining educational credentials are not immediately

apparent to those Nyamwezi who remain resident in the rural areas.

However, the strategic use of formal knowledge as a resource has at least potential consequences for cultural transformation, particularly in the arena most salient for social reproduction: the extended family. To uncover this transformative potential it is necessary to shift the anthropological focus on lineage arrangements as corporate groups holding rights in persons to one which considers how extended families (particularly female members) invest in persons (Guyer 1981).

A shift in focus from an analysis based on rights in persons to an analysis focused on investment in persons enables us to view how the obligations which underlie these rights differentially accrue to men and women within a patrilineal scenario. In the past, rights in the labor of junior males held by a lineage formed a redistributive nexus of exchange. Senior males granted or withheld use rights to land and bridewealth in exchange for the labor and loyalty of younger male members who would eventually occupy their position. Rights in women held by the lineage were determined by both their labor value and the exchange value of their reproductive capacity. Once the reproductive value of a female lineage member was exchanged for bridewealth, the lineage had no further rights in her or obligations to her other than the moral injunction to see that she was well provided for in her new home. Thus

traditionally, an investment in male lineage members in the form of land and livestock was an investment in members who would remain; whose birthright accorded them benefits in exchange for their cooperation. An investment in female members was an investment in terms of their potential exchange value.

Educational investment, however, radically reorders the nature of rights in persons because it represents an investment in an individual's potential income and economic capacity. As such it is a much riskier proposition and one fraught with the potential for intergenerational conflict. An educated salaried male worker will most often move away beyond the realm of the lineage and will be subject to a wider sphere of influences with competing claims on his income, patronage, and loyalty. For an extended network of kin to make an educational investment in a young man they must have sufficient evidence that he will view it as a gift of confidence (with a delayed exchange value). Investment decisions regarding the education of young men thus broaden traditional conceptualizations of rights and obligations since elders lack the direct means to coerce junior educated males into cooperative endeavors. Such decisions these days necessitate a concern with individualistic assessments of character and earning capacity. Educational investment, as one byproduct of the modernization process, has shifted the stake of the lineage away from concrete forms of property, such as land and live-

stock, towards a more abstract and individualized venture in a person's career and familial sentiment, a form of symbolic capital.

Educational investment for women, on the other hand, transforms the very nature of lineal claims to her exchange value. The direction of resources toward her future value for the lineage shifts as her value in the sphere of reproductive exchange changes to her value as a productive worker whose income and position can be tapped by lineage members. Initially, at least, investments in women's education continue to be mystified by male lineage members in terms of exchange value; educated daughters command higher bridewealth payments and are more likely to contract marriages to educated salaried employees who may provide economic assistance to father and brothers-in-law. As women increasingly receive education and become effective income earners in their own right, it is possible to detect a subtle change occurring in which the extended network of kin now begins to view investment in male and female education as similar projects.

Educational Strategies in the Towns

Sons and daughters of the urban-based elite in this region fare better in gaining access to postprimary education than their rural counterparts. In town, day secondary schools eliminate the heavy expenses of boarding education, the domestic labor requirements of the household are fewer, and primary school preparation for entrance examinations is

more thorough given the fact that supplies are more readily available and good teachers are rewarded by placement in urban areas. Entrance examination crash courses are available for children whose parents can afford them. The bureaucratic and business elite in urban centers have the position and leverage to insure that their children will win a secondary school place. For Christian parents these strategies include the possibility of paying private secondary school fees in the few institutions run by the Moravian or Catholic missions. Not many Muslim parents would choose this option because, historically, mission education has been closely connected to conversion. It should be emphasized, however, that the urban-based elite is extremely small, and many of its members are government employees whose extended families reside in other regions.

Conclusions

Wealth in Tabora tends to flow outside rather than to be invested within. It is a common axiom among residents that to become successful in Tabora means that you must leave. The ideological rationalization which supports outflow of capital is one familiar to anthropologists: fear of witchcraft. Residents say a person is wealthy at the expense of his neighbors and kin. He is either a witch or lives in fear of incurring the hostility of others and becoming bewitched. Such beliefs function as important wealth-leveling mechanisms. It is not only fear of witchcraft but, more significantly, the critical lack of infra-

structure (given the severe underdevelopment of the region) which makes it an unlikely site for capital investment.

The earlier section of this chapter stressed several of the historical factors responsible for Tabora's regional underdevelopment. There is, however, a political factor which actors themselves identify as contributing to the area's economic hardship. The abolition of hereditary chiefdoms following independence was not well-received in Tabora. It is said that former president Nyerere greatly feared the military capabilities of Tabora's traditional rulers. During the establishment of the one-party system, Tabora leaders voiced their resistance through the nascent separatist Democratic party based on trade union support. If the Nyamwezi were formidable on the battlefield, they were even more threatening to the newly independent government in the arena of trade union politics. Active throughout East Africa in a variety of occupations, Nyamwezi workers were particularly sought after and comparatively well-paid. As mentioned previously, they were predominant in railway and dockwork and active in these two unions, which organized the general strike of 1947 which spread to the plantation sector (Iliffe 1979, 402-404). They were an organized community in the capital from 1936, when The New Nyamwezi Association--Dar es Salaam, headed by Juma Sultani, presided over the welfare of long-distance migrants from Tabora, including Sumbwa and Sukuma workers (Leslie 1963).

Government reprisals against the separatist party challenge were severe. Few Nyamwezi have since held important posts in the higher ranks of the party or government. It is both a region without a particular center or a significant voice in the political center. With few powerful advocates, the development of infrastructural supports has continued to stagnate in Tabora. Privately, Tabora residents say that they have been deliberately underdeveloped in contrast to other regions.

On the surface, government leaders blame the conservative ideology of Islam for the developmental backwardness of Tabora. Yet the disruption of the nineteenth century, which delayed the entry of missionary education into the region, and the legacy of a colonial education policy, which refused to help finance Islamic schools, is partly to blame for the lack of Nyamwezi advantage in moving into bureaucratic and other salaried occupations which would have given them greater voice in the postcolonial government. Although Tabora in the 1980s could be characterized as a post-migrant, peasant social formation, some intriguing questions for further research remain. If wealth has flowed and been generated outside the region, where has it been invested? What has happened to the remarkable entrepreneurial and political abilities developed during the widening opportunities which emerged during the nineteenth century? If such features are not readily apparent on the surface, have they disappeared, or merely been

forced underground? An exploration of some of these questions is provided in chapter 5.

NOTES

1. Abrahams (1981) estimates the cattle population of greater Unyamwezi at 1.5 million.

2. Illiffe (1979) cites the following statistics: in 1900, 35,000 porters arrived at Bagamoyo and 43,880 departed for the interior. By 1912 only 851 arrived and 193 departed.

3. Eoesen and Mohele (1979) and Mueller (1980) present separate critical accounts of the introduction of the tobacco schemes into the Tabora economy. Tobacco, as they demonstrate, is one of the most labor-intensive crops to grow and process prior to sale.

4. By 1984 the government resolved to begin charging a minimum fee to students selected for government boarding school.

CHAPTER IV

KILIMANJARO: THE POST-PEASANT TRANSITION

Introduction

This chapter gives an historical picture of cultural and class formation in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania's most highly differentiated region. As in the mirror chapter (5), a brief sketch of the demographic and geophysical features of the region is followed by a discussion of the changes in wealth, status, and labor relations characterizing the region from the precolonial period to the present. This section is followed by a village portrait and provides the context for a discussion of the uses of formal knowledge in the section which follows. A rather lengthy case history follows which illustrates the social reproduction strategies of elite families in this region. The conclusion explains how several features peculiar to local cultural organization have historically intersected with state policies to promote the development of rural social inequalities.

Regional Parameters

Kilimanjaro is located in northeast Tanzania, has an area of 13,200 square kilometers, and a population of 902,000 (approximately 5.3 percent of the country's total population [United Republic of Tanzania 1982a]). Most of

the region's inhabitants live on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro and the Pare Mountains at altitudes between 800 and 2,000 meters, where the population density is the highest in Tanzania (Schuler 1982).

The vertical ecology of Kilimanjaro's farming system, combined with population growth and density, gave rise in the precolonial period to a complex system of land use and land rights. These in turn were regulated by a combination of inheritance patterns and aristocratic control. The gradual transformation of customary patterns for gaining access to and control over land begins with involvement in the Arab coast exchange economy and has led to the situation of extreme land scarcity prevalent in the 1980s.

Wealth, Status, and Labor in the History of Kilimanjaro

The Precolonial Landscape

Precolonial patterns of land use, production and exchange relations, and political organization varied with the ecological zone occupied by recurrent waves of immigrants into what was to become German East Africa in the 1890s.

The historical account of Kilimanjaro begins about three hundred years ago. According to oral tradition, the agricultural Kamba and pastoralist Maasai ancestors of the present-day Chagga migrated to the well-watered, volcanic slopes of the mountain. There they subdued and displaced the Wakoningo (known to them as the "short people"), the

hunting and gathering occupants of the region, with whom they possibly intermarried. The contemporary ethnic group known as the Chagga are descendants of these people (and possibly other migrant groups from the eastern Usambaras and the southern Unyamwezi and Ngu hills) (Stahl 1964). Linguistically, the Chagga speak a cluster of dialects which are related to Kamba (spoken in Kenya to the north-east), languages such as Dabida and Pokomo (spoken by groups to the east), and a unique dialect spoken by a pocket of the Chagga living in Ngasseni which may be related to an archaic form of Maasai (Dundas 1968; Whiteley 1965).

Reports from nineteenth-century European travelers record the abundance and productivity of Chagga settlements supported by an elaborate irrigation system. Consolidated village settlements were never a feature of the Chagga landscape. Instead, contiguously located minimal lineage segments occupied homesteads consisting of sleeping quarters, granaries, cooking houses, and cattle stalls. The entire homestead was surrounded by banana groves and fenced in with dracaena hedges. (See figure 13 for a contemporary illustration.) The application of manure from stall-fed cattle and the maintenance of a permanent irrigation system afforded Chagga cultivators three cropping seasons instead of the normal two, which are connected to the short and long rainy seasons. Thus, during the precolonial period,

the Chagga were able to avoid the periodic food shortages which plagued other regions.

That bananas were significant as a staple is suggested by the concentration of religious life on the banana grove (kihamba, pl. vihamba) attached to the minimal lineage homestead (the compound headed by a senior male with his wife or wives and unmarried children). A complex of rituals and beliefs, including those concerned with burial and periodic sacrifices to lineage ancestors, focused on these groves (Dundas 1968; Marealle 1965). Inheritance of kihamba and cattle was determined patrilineally within the minimal lineage segment, and residence was virilocal.

There is some evidence to suggest that intensified agriculture, immigration, and natural population growth have contributed to increasing land pressure on the mountain since the nineteenth century. Kjerckshus (1977) points to the reports of early European travellers which note the prevalence of stall-fed cattle, indicating the absence of land for adequate pasture. The transformation of grazing land into agricultural land, when combined with innovations such as irrigation and fertilizer, expanded the potential of agricultural production and gave rise to a population density far exceeding horticultural zones on the plateau or coast. While Allan's (1965) calculated critical figure of four hundred people per square mile may be high, Kjerckshus (1977, 35) indicates that there is no reason to believe that normal population figures were much below this level.

One result of increasing land scarcity was that the corporate rights in land allocation held by patrilineages weakened in favor of redistribution within the minimal lineage segment. Another consequence of land pressure was that inheritance of land even within the minimal lineage had to be more strictly regulated so that plots would not be so severely fragmented that they would be inadequate to support the household unit.

Bananas, grown on the higher altitudes, were the staple food of the Chagga. Cereal crops and legumes were grown by each household on the plains at the foot of the mountain. The vertical ecology of this agricultural system resulted in two different land tenure patterns. The first, kihamba land, as discussed previously, surrounded the immediate homestead and was inherited through the patriline. The second pattern concerned rights to the fields on the plains, which were called shamba or poorini (bush/uncultivated land). Shamba fields were sometimes located miles away from the homestead, and were held by the chief to dispose of as he wished.

There are a number of court cases, decided on the basis of precedents in customary law, which concern disputes over land between lineages and chiefs (James and Fimbo 1973). A dispute over whether land was shamba or kihamba centered on evidence of settlement (presence of a house and dracaena border) and land use (existence of banana and, later, coffee trees). It seems clear from these court cases that

the nature of land allocation was a constant source of litigation because of land shortage, the courts seeking to resolve conflicting claims by establishing intent. If the grantee were forbidden to fence the land or plant permanent trees, it was assumed that permanent ownership was not intended. These cases also provide a picture of numerous transactions in land, the ownership by individual families residing in one chiefdom of vihamba located in another chiefdom, and the permanency of kihamba land titles despite the neglect or abuse of the land by the owner. It is reasonable to assume that such patterns were well in place before the colonial era, such that lineage histories reflect a picture of mobility and shifting alliances as political organization grew increasingly complex.

In the nineteenth century the Chagga were organized into at least two dozen autonomous chiefdoms. Internal affairs of each chiefdom were structured at three levels (Moore 1986). At the primary level was a group of agnatically related kinsmen and their wives who were settled in one locality and recognized the authority of the most senior male members of the lineage. A model of structural unity was contained in the ideology of lineage interests, the lineage providing a reference group identity for its members vis-a-vis other lineages in the community, and claiming historical continuity. This ideological realm also constituted a flexible arena within which individual claims could be contested and cooperative activities organ-

ized. It was within wider lineage segments that disputes over such things as inheritance, boundary rights, livestock ownership, and bridewealth payments were contested. It was also within these wider segments that food sharing, cooperative labor parties, and ritual events were organized and where water rights within the irrigation system were determined.

At the secondary level, each chiefdom was divided into geographical districts (mitaa) which functioned as administrative units. The district headmen (wachili) were responsible for interlineage affairs within these units. Wachili were appointed by, and responsible to, the chief alone. District heads and their councilors were not always relatives of the chief, but were also drawn from the "men who had wealth" (in vihamba and cattle).

At the tertiary level, the chief maintained a personal circle of councilors and bodyguards as well as an army recruited from the warrior age set, which crosscut clan lines within the chiefdom. The function of this age grade extended beyond guarding the chief and military service in civil and intertribal warfare. They also worked throughout the chiefdom as civil engineers, supervising the construction and maintenance of the irrigation system and military fortifications (Raum 1940). As territorial politics grew more intense, a landed aristocracy (masumba) became highly influential as chiefs grew to depend on them to finance wars and to maintain a lifestyle commensurate with chiefly

status. Such men used their wealth in cattle to influence chiefly politics. Poor commoners worked as tenants on the land of the masumba, paying annual rent in beer or meat or caring for their cattle (Rogers 1972). The Lutheran missionary Bruno Gutmann noted that richer households were able to turn poorer families into dependents by lending them cattle in return for services and gifts of agricultural produce, which in turn helped them to keep another group of clients in their large compounds. As cattle were kept in huts and tended exclusively by women, the larger number of cattle present in wealthy compounds encouraged polygyny. A large number of cattle called for more women to tend them and provided the means for contracting additional marriages. Finally, cattle-raiding provided an opportunity for taking female captives in marriage (Winter 1979).

Prior to the German conquest, the Chagga were drawn into the exchange economy of the Arab coastal trade. Chagga chiefs maintained a monopoly on transactions with outsiders in the long-distance trade of ivory and slaves, and in the provisioning of caravans. Ivory for trade was both locally harvested and bought with cattle from other tribes. Chiefs obtained cattle for trade from their subjects through tribute and fines, as well as through interchiefdom and intertribal warfare.

The effect of the expansion of nineteenth century long-distance trade was twofold. First, there was an increase in interchiefdom warfare and a consolidation of political

units. Second, local production and exchange were intensified (Moore 1986; Rogers 1972). An increase in food production for the provisioning of long-distance caravans was managed through corvée labor exacted by the chief. This intensified production by households, which traded food-stuffs with caravan leaders and within regional markets. Meat and beer were the favorite foods given by the chief to feast important guests. Chagga beer (mbege) is brewed by women from finger millet and bananas. Corvée labor was used to intensify the production of finger millet on shamba land. It is not clear which people were subject to corvée labor and whether men participated to the same extent as women. Women have traditionally marketed vegetable and cereal crops and bananas around the mountain in local markets. It seems likely that intensification of production at the household level, if not collectively in corvée as well, fell to women during this period.

German Conquest

German occupation in Kilimanjaro, beginning in the 1890s, transformed the precolonial economy in a number of ways. First, pacification brought an end to intertribal/interchiefdom warfare. The military age-grade system by which the chiefs exerted coercion over their subjects was dismantled. The cessation of raiding cut off a source by which chiefs formerly accumulated cattle.

Second, chiefs became paid functionaries of the colonial regime. The consolidation of political units enhanced

the power of some local leaders (such as Marealle of Marangu) while it diminished the importance of others. Chiefs continued to extract personal tribute and corvee labor, but also worked as tax collectors for the Germans. The imposition of a hut tax in rupees forced Chagga cultivators to engage more fully in the exchange economy, now dominated by the colonial regime, rather than the Arab coastal trade. It also provided an alternative means for the acquisition of cattle: cash purchase (Moore 1986).

Third, the presence of Europeans ushered in the threat of land alienation and resettlement, a threat which was never successfully realized but which retains its potency to the present day. The German regime established a dual primary export economy based on small-scale commodity production and settler plantations. Large-scale plantations were not developed in the northeast highlands as they were in the lowlands, where migrant laborers worked on sisal and rubber estates (Iliffe 1971). In Kilimanjaro, Catholic and Lutheran missionaries constituted the first settler class (Lema 1981; Rogers 1972). Land alienated to the mission stations was generally the best vihamba located in the most densely populated areas of the chiefdom, and was worked by converts. The introduction of coffee as a cash crop by the Holy Ghost Fathers at Kilema in 1893 was first intended for the commercial benefit of the mission. It was quickly adopted by the Chagga royal families and masumba as a means to accumulate wealth in cash (to be converted into wealth

in cattle). The growth of a large settler commercial farming class in Kilimanjaro was significantly curtailed by the problem of securing African labor. Chagga farmers saw that they could easily profit and retain their independence¹ by intercropping coffee with bananas on their own vihamba.

Finally, the active presence of the missions in the northeast introduced a morality of hard work, thrift, and material achievement (encapsulated within an ideal of Christian virtue) which reinforced precolonial processes of social differentiation. Christian conversion also offered an alternative route to worldly success: education. Initially the missionaries gained adherents from the outcasts and misfits of Chagga society. It did not take much time before those Chagga who had wealth and prestige, but lacked royal status, began to send their children to mission² schools. This first generation of literate Christians challenged chiefly authority in the arena of coffee politics during the British regime.

British Overrule

Effective British administration of mainland Tanganyika began at the end of World War I and ended with independence in 1961. As discussed in chapter 2, the British surveyed the mistakes of the German regime and concluded that the problem of securing native labor (the cause of numerous rebellions during German rule), coupled with the unhealthy climate, made Tanganyika unsuitable for large-scale Euro-

pean settlement (U.K. Foreign Office 1920). The West African "solution" of Indirect Rule left political control in the hands of native administrators who were supervised by a small European staff. Superficially, such a policy appeared to support a colonial economy dependent upon small-holder commodity production. A critical interpretation of the evolution of British agricultural policy in Tanganyika (Mbilinyi 1985) indicates that there was significant investment (made by multinationals and local capital) in the development of plantation agriculture during the colonial period. Such investments were unevenly distributed throughout the Territory. The apparent contradiction between the ideology of colonial development policy and practice was an expression of both unequal development within and between regions, and the attempts of the European administrative staff to mediate the competition between small-holders, a capitalist sector, and a small group³ of European commercial (settler) farmers.

Such a policy had a far-reaching effect in Kilimanjaro at a time when European planters were beginning to pressure the administration to introduce a European monopoly on coffee cultivation. The formation of the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association by the Chagga in 1925 was a direct response to the threat posed by the settlers' planter association formed two years before. While the settlers argued for extensive land alienation and the need for a secure supply of native labor (and finally for the

annexation of Kilimanjaro to neighboring Kenya), the colonial administration initially encouraged native growers to form a marketing cooperative and provided extension services.⁴

Court records (Maro 1974; Moore 1986) indicate that from the 1930s wealth in livestock began to shift to wealth in land. Cash purchases of vihamba begin to appear in court disputes during this period, and the subject of land alienation and allocation figured as a concern for both the local aristocracy and the colonial administration. Average kihamba holdings of .5 acres for this period mask the reality of a small minority (four percent) who maintained farms of 10,000 or more coffee trees, competed with settlers in hiring labor, and had begun to apply technological innovations (such as pesticides and pulpers) in cultivation and processing (Rodney 1980, 157). Uncultivated land thus took on new value, and population growth contributed to scarcity.

A number of transformations initiated during the pre-colonial period were accelerated by the growing importance of coffee as a cash crop. These were: (1) increasing enclosure of meadowland for cultivation; (2) the conversion of shamba into vihamba as wealthy Chagga were able to purchase land in scattered plots in different chiefdoms; (3) social differentiation within households as women participated in coffee cultivation but were excluded from access to the income generated by its sale, and between

households, as poor families began to supply labor to meet cash requirements; and (4) a shift in the political balance of power as an embryonic western-educated elite moved to challenge the traditional authority of chiefs and their colonial supporters in the exchange arena of the cooperatives.

Postcolonial Policy and the Current Economic Crisis

The prevailing view in Kilimanjaro appears to be that ujamaa policies have retarded Chagga development. The conceptualization of a precolonial, egalitarian natural economy (as celebrated in official rhetoric) has a certain ironic ring for the Chagga, whose paramount chief was received by the British crown, whose "competitive instincts" were encouraged by the colonial and missionary administration, and whose national/ethnic identity was enshrined by the right to have its own flag during the colonial era.

Two significant bases of Chagga political and economic power (the chiefdom and the coffee cooperatives) were dismantled in the postindependence era. Currently, many Chagga eschew a political career and there are very few Chagga politicians visible in the policy-making central executive committee of the party or in the national parliament. Yet the early legacy of mission education has enabled the Chagga to gain a disproportionate number of places in the salaried public sector (parastatal corporations and civil service) (McGowan and Wacirah 1974). The

infrastructural growth of the region (as measured by availability of running water, electricity, schools, dispensaries, paved roads, and telecommunication facilities) ensures a standard of living which is high relative to other areas, even though per capita income in the region has declined since 1967. This suggests that Chagga influence over national policy which affects their region continues to endure, albeit less visibly (Raikes 1982).

Despite the presence of a new government and party political structure, the social organization of local farming communities on the mountain has changed much less than official policies would suggest. In contrast to many other regions, very few Chagga families were relocated during the village resettlement scheme in the mid 1970s. Instead, new administrative boundaries were drawn around traditional mitaa. Traditional farming practices remain largely unaffected, although there is some evidence that the organization of communal labor projects within these mitaa has become more problematic. The village government has subsumed the former role of the chief in the right to command corvee labor for public projects. There is minor participation in this form of labor extraction, despite penalties levied on those who refuse to cooperate.

The effects of economic crisis on production and exchange relations are easier to discern. A 1983 German Development Institute study of five Kilimanjaro villages noted that few farmers expect to raise substantial income

from coffee production, owing to low (government fixed) farm-gate prices. However, almost all farming households still cultivate coffee for three reasons: (1) it is forbidden by law to uproot coffee trees because of the importance of coffee in foreign exchange earnings⁵; (2) revenue from coffee sales provides a stable, though low, income, and there is the hope that producer prices will rise; and (3) the cultivation of vihamba maintains a symbolic link to the continuity of lineage and land. An increasing fragmentation of kihamba plots, combined with local labor shortages (as young people migrate out of the region for education and to work in salaried occupations), works against the expansion of commercial export crop farming.

The average peasant household faces a number of constraints beyond shortages of land and labor. Most necessary commodities are in extremely scarce supply and must be purchased at inflated prices in the parallel market. A reduction in luxury consumption and investments in tools, house repairs, and redistributive ceremonial events is one response to low producer/high consumer prices. Another response entails devoting more land to the cultivation of food crops to meet household subsistence needs and for sale on the parallel market. A third response entails increased expenditure on the education and training of family members to insure nonfarm sources of income and cash remittances from town to village.

The Village Context

From December 1983 to July 1984 I conducted research in the village I will call Kibo, which is located in Moshi Rural district in the division called Vunjo East. Kibo, and its immediate neighboring villages, are part of the former Mamba chiefdom and are wedged between the former Marangu and Mwika chiefdoms. A peculiar feature of Mamba is that its territory does not descend to the plains below the mountain where cereal crops are grown. Thus, Mamba residents have long depended upon a variety of arrangements with their neighbors to secure access to shamba land.

One survival strategy which enabled Mamba residents to weather the political turmoils of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a specialization in artisanal trades. During this period, Mamba monopolized blacksmithing and weapons production in the region and its residents were renowned traders. The name Vunjo in the Chagga language means "to go hawking," a derogatory appellation the Mamba people are believed to have received from their eastern neighbors in Rombo, when Vunjo was conquered by Chief Orombo at the end of the eighteenth century (Stahl 1964, 284). Until that time, Mamba was an established and influential polity.

The neighboring chiefdom of Marangu rose to prominence in its place in the nineteenth century under the diplomacy of Chief Marealle who seized the new opportunities provided by European presence in Kilimanjaro. Marealle established

an alliance with the Germans and welcomed both Catholic and Lutheran missionaries into his midst. He offered half of his wives for conversion to each faith and provided land and labor for the building of mission facilities. Through a series of cunning plots, he utilized his connections with the German administration to bring about what he would never have been able to accomplish on his own: the submission of the Mamba, Kilema, and Rombo chiefdoms to his authority, and the downfall of the eminent chiefs of Kibosho and Moshi. The chiefly dynasties in Mamba and Marangu are linked by marriage, and under Marealle's fealty Mamba was provided shamba land from Mwika and Kilema.

The village of Kibo is roughly forty kilometers from Moshi Town and is located in the highland, just below the road which bisects the mountain east to west at the upper altitudes. Kibo has a population of 830 families, who live in contiguously occupied homesteads in clusters which roughly correspond to the traditional mitaa. Chagga villages do not appear as discrete entities to the observer. One village seems to blur into another, separated by streams, hills, paths, forest, and pasture land. Unlike Tabora villages, Kibo is not laid out around a village square. Its administrative center is the party headquarter building, where village meetings are held and the local council of elders convenes. This administrative center is adjacent to the cooperative village beer shop, a primary court, the Lutheran church, and a market. The village

manages several shops, a maize mill, a lorry, and two small industries. Along the main road, and close to the weekly market center, are a number of retail shops, hotels (restaurants and bars), the coffee cooperative headquarter, and a post office. The main road provides easy access to the larger regional markets in Mwika and Marangu, where Kibo residents routinely go to sell their crops, and to the Marangu hospital, where they seek medical treatment. Two private tourist hotels are located in Marangu, which has the entrance to the favorite climbing route for backpackers making the ascent to the peak of the mountain. An international presence pervades the area, although visitors cluster around the hotels and are rarely seen in the outlying villages.

Kibo residents are predominantly Lutheran, although a surprising number of the older men who were interviewed were polygynous. Many who married "in the church" took their vows at the time their children were grown. A religious wedding is difficult to achieve in Kibo, partly because the price of livestock is so high that bridewealth rates are inflated. Marrying in the church necessitates that the groom's family pay the total lump sum to the bride's family before the wedding, rather than in installments as in the past. The Lutheran church in the region did not permit divorce, and bridewealth exchanges still legitimize the birth of children and the rights of the father's clan over the children. A further reason for

delayed religious or civil marriage is the tradition which requires a man to obtain land and build a homestead before taking a wife. The severe shortage of land and expense of house-building requires that most men leave the region to accumulate funds before marriage. The older male village residents interviewed spent a period of ten to twenty years working in other regions and in Kenya before settling back in the village as farmers and/or entrepreneurs.

The majority of the thirty-five households in my survey were comprised of middle-aged and elderly couples residing with younger children and grandchildren. These older couples identified the increase of consensual unions as a significant social problem in Kibo. Some had real cause for complaint, as they were raising illegitimate grandchildren, while their daughters were working in Moshi and Dar es Salaam. For young Chagga women residing in the towns or capital, compulsory paid maternity leave and the extraction of financial support from the child's father represents a viable alternative to conjugal attachment. Young chagga women between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four were overrepresented in Swantz and Bryceson's 1974 survey of minimum wage-earners in Dar es Salaam (Swantz and Bryceson 1976). Cash and commodity remittances from sons and daughters working outside the region supplement the farming income of these village families, but for poorer peasants this did not offset the costs of replacing the

labor of the missing young adults with seasonal contract laborers.

My interviews and observations indicate that there are three main divisions between households in highland villages such as Kibo. The small peasant household is devoted exclusively to farming and raises coffee and food crops mainly for subsistence and sale. Land-holdings tend to be smaller (one acre or less) in these households which may not possess shamba land. Such households have no off-farm income, live in traditional mud and wattle homes, own few tools and no major consumer items, and potentially hire-out labor to wealthier farmers and government coffee estates. Although superficially such households appear to have limited involvement in the exchange economy, the fact that they are engaged in agricultural wage labor and are as actively engaged as middle and large peasants in parallel market activities suggests that their "exit" options are limited.

At the second tier are middle peasant farming households with more acreage to farm in the highland and lowland areas and substantial non-farm income. Many possess permanent or semi-permanent houses and one or more major consumer items (exclusive of vehicles). In middle peasant households the division of labor in the 1980s can be described in the following way. Men are responsible for the cultivation and sale of coffee and control the assets of cattle and goats. They are expected to plow (or arrange tractor

rental to plow) the fields for food crops, aid in harvesting food crops (or supply cash to hire day laborers), contribute to communal village labor projects organized by the government, and maintain the irrigation system. Major house and tool repairs are also their responsibility. Women cultivate the cereal and legume crops on the plains (generally located five to ten miles from their homesteads), cultivate and market bananas and garden vegetables, brew and sell beer, milk cows and control the milk sales, and raise chickens for sale. The labor of young girls is employed in a number of domestic and child-caring tasks which are the exclusive domain of women, and are also employed in cutting and head-loading grass from the plains to feed cattle which are kept in stalls in the homesteads.

At the third and highest level are households engaged in major off-farm businesses (transport, construction, mining, retail stores, and hotels). Such households may grow limited food crops for home consumption and some coffee, or may have used income from non-farm businesses to expand their land under cultivation for the sale of food crops. These non-farm business households can employ the labor of poor peasants to cultivate their fields and domestic labor in their homes while husbands, and increasingly, wives, pursue white-collar or business occupations in the Moshi Town. The wealthiest of these farmers possess tractors, improved inputs, and lorries to transport their crops to market where they will fetch the highest prices.

Theoretically, women are expected to provide for the subsistence needs of the household from their cultivation of food crops and marketing activities. Women in middle peasant households were more actively engaged in regular or seasonal non-farm work, particularly in commercial beer brewing, than small farming households. Men, who control the cash income from coffee and livestock, are expected to provide for necessary expenses such as clothing, house repair, and agricultural inputs and major expenses such as school and medical fees. In reality, the control over family assets, in land and livestock, and income, from the sale of food crops and beer, constitutes a domain of struggle between men and women.

Kristy Cook and I (1987) advance the tentative hypothesis that income from women's commercial activities not only characterizes middle peasant households in villages such as Kibo, but has the potential to enable them to expand agricultural and other non-farm enterprises. Husbands and wives are not always aligned about how such income should be invested or consumed. Evidence collected by other researchers in Kilimanjaro indicates surprisingly high levels of malnutrition in this region of relative abundance, with differential effects by age and gender. This suggests that, given the opportunity, men will seek to divert surplus income to expand their reciprocal obligations to kin and friends, often in the form of communal feasting and beer drinking (Attems et al. 1969; Howard 1980; Kreysler

1973; Swantz et al. 1975). In times of plenty, women seek to use such surplus to expand their income-earning opportunities (through vocational training courses or accumulating capital to start a small business) and to educate their children. When times are lean, as they were in 1983 and 1984, such income is viewed by wives as necessary to the survival of the family. Domestic and public disputes regarding the income of women were continuous throughout this period.

The effects of a deteriorating regional economy and deepening class divisions were also manifested in political struggles over education. Kibo parents were unanimous in their concern with providing education for their children and grandchildren and all were anxious for them to receive post-primary schooling. The degree to which this was viewed as important to the future of the family can be seen in the tragic case of a young man who committed suicide shortly before I arrived in the village to conduct research.

Both parents wept openly as they told his story and showed me photographs of his high school graduation and the pictures he sent home from the United States, where he received his undergraduate degree. He had been the first in the family to receive a college education, and after several years had saved enough money to bring home a tractor, truck, and photography equipment to start up a local business. Upon his return to Tanzania, he went home to the

village where he was greeted as a hero and he left a friend behind in Dar es Salaam to settle the customs arrangement at the port. His arrival back in the capital several weeks later was dismal, for he found that all of his equipment had been "stolen." He returned to the village and hung himself several days later. Friends of the family vigorously denied that the theft and subsequent fate of the doomed youth were the result of witchcraft, although fear of witchcraft from jealous neighbors and even clan members is so pervasive in this area that educational plans are usually only revealed to immediate family members.

Kibo parents were active in planning the education of their children. The two village primary schools were well attended and villagers were involved in maintaining and financing these institutions. The schools were overcrowded, but in contrast to Tabora, most of the teachers were certified. Because Kilimanjaro was the site of active missionary involvement, the region has a disproportionately high number of primary schools. District quotas for secondary school selection are determined by the number of St. 7 students who sit for the entrance examinations and therefore competition for secondary school entrance is extremely stiff here. The village primary school teachers held regular afternoon tutorials for children whose parents could afford the fees. Almost all parents who were interviewed made certain that their children devoted several hours in the evenings for study. Kibo middle and large peasant

farmers employed a variety of strategies to secure a secondary school place for their children. Such measures included: fostering children to relatives in other regions where entrance quotas were higher, tapping patronage ties to influential relatives or friends who sit on the school boards, developing and lubricating links with headmasters of the local schools and regional educational administrators, and attempting to purchase the regional entrance examination questions in advance. The opening of new government secondary schools is a hotly contested issue at the regional level, because districts compete with each other for schools to be located in their areas.

Given this image of educational scarcity, it was surprising to find that the village was sharply divided over the opening of a new private secondary school in Kibo. Private secondary schools are allowed to admit the majority of entrants from the region in which they are located and therefore can potentially serve the direct needs of a community. Private secondary schools must be sponsored by a voluntary organization (such as a church, the YMCA, or the parent's organization), although they may be registered (owned) by a local community. The dispute concerning the opening of Kibo's secondary school focused on the problem of how to resolve the question of registration and sponsorship. Beneath this issue lay the deeper problem of class divisions in the village, which would ultimately determine which students would gain access to the school.

The idea to open a private secondary school in Kibo was advanced by a group of influential entrepreneurs who are elders in the Lutheran Church. Their plan was to induce the Church to provide sponsorship for the school and to raise the funds for building the facility and hiring the staff out of voluntary contributions and a tax on beer sold in the village's cooperative beer shop. Land for the school would be provided by the village. The school would be registered as an agricultural school, although there was not enough extra land available for a farm which would justify this vocational bias.

The initial problem was to convince the Church to sponsor a school without allowing it to own the property through registration. Kibo villagers were adamant in their refusal to "give the land away to the Church." Furthermore, they were afraid that if the Church both sponsored and registered the school, the village would lose control over the admissions requirements, staffing decisions, and curriculum. The local leaders who proposed the school plan managed to negotiate the building and sponsorship of the school without actually resolving the registration matter. This coup left both church officers and the local parents uneasy.

Some of the local leaders on the new school board actually resided in a nearby village to the north of Kibo. This was a cause for concern for Kibo residents, who suspected that their land and beer tax revenues would go to

supporting a school which would cater to the needs of the surrounding community, rather than their own children. A faction of disgruntled villagers opposed the opening of the school on the grounds that it was an "elitist" institution. In their thinking, the land would be put to better use for the building of a primary school "which would help all of the children of the village, not just the children of the very rich who are not really village residents anyway." They were ultimately outvoted and, despite their fears, when the school opened, a substantial number of Kibo students were admitted. These students were, however, from middle and large peasant households.

By the spring of 1984, one year after the school opened, the village's contribution from beer revenues had dwindled to a trickle. Many facilities remained unbuilt and the staff complained that the villagers did not support their efforts. The teachers felt that Kibo residents were not as highly educated as their northern neighbors, they were poor and likely to be involved in petty trade, and therefore did not understand the importance of secondary school education. My interview material suggests another intention behind the lack of village support. Most parents were preoccupied with educating their children, but many felt that they would be unable to provide post-primary education because of the expense and the difficulty in securing admission. To many, the local secondary school

was nothing more than a cruel hoax, perpetrated by the elite to serve their own needs.

A cheaper and more effective manner of securing secondary school education for children was available to these unhappy parents. This was to send their children to the "evening" classes at the nearby public secondary school. In this evening school tuition (paid in cash, directly to the teachers) was roughly half that charged in the private school. The students had the benefit of the superior public facilities and books, and of working with the qualified teachers. In private schools the teachers are not necessarily graduates of a teacher's training college. Kibo's private school was staffed with a larger number of teachers who had not attended a college, in an effort to cut salary costs.

Evening classes were regularly supervised by personnel from the Ministry of Adult Education who ran this shadow institution. Many parents believed that night classes were more productive because of this supervision and the direct cash payments to the teachers. Evening students did not receive secondary school diplomas, but many successfully passed the A-level entrance examinations and were admitted to government high schools.

Village parents who made use of this option for their children felt that the success of the evening program was evidence of what the government could and should provide to the community. Private schools, like the one in Kibo, were

symbolic of what they most disliked in the government's education policy--that it represented socialism for the poor (who had to submit to universalistic selection procedures) and capitalism for the rich (who could buy their way around such procedures or pay high private school tuition fees). The following section describes how educational and other government policies are manipulated by an emergent entrepreneurial elite in this area. The family discussed below resides in Kibo.

Entrepreneurial Strategies and
the Formation of Kilimanjaro's Business Elite

Introduction

State socialist development policies and the factor of increasing land scarcity notwithstanding, an identifiable pattern shapes the possibilities for certain families to amass control over major portions of prime farmland in Kilimanjaro region. This pattern reflects both continuity and transformation. Its enduring aspect is marked by the manipulation of ties of kinship and patronage through involvement in the local ceremonial prestige sphere of exchange. Yet the accumulation of wealth in land is also accompanied by an increasing pauperization of small peasant households (Mbilinyi 1974). Deteriorating economic conditions press small peasant families to fragment further their land holdings, sell their labor to large peasant households, and engage in trade in the parallel market. At the other end of the spectrum, wealthy families are able to

invest heavily in the education and career advancement of many family members who now hold urban salaried and professional occupations and who transfer savings from this urban sector back into rural farming and business enterprises. Such a strategy (noted by Cowen in Kenya as "straddling" [1972]) depends upon the maintenance of personalistic ties in both the rural and urban sectors. What may be viewed as problematic in the Tanzanian case is the degree to which such a strategy contradicts outward compliance with universalistic rules of equitable distribution of the land and its products, as well as conformity to policies of equal access to other structures of opportunity such as education. This contradiction characterizes Kilimanjaro's "new elite," as illustrated by the following entrepreneurial family.

6

The man I will call Bwana Hela is a fifty-four-year-old Chagga entrepreneur. His influence extends beyond the local community on the mountain where he resides, to other districts in the region, where he maintains business and farming enterprises, to the nation's capital, Dar es Salaam, and several neighboring countries, where he is involved in commercial trading. Like other members of this class, Bwana Hela's business activities are diversified. He is, however, atypical in that (if even a portion of what he reports is correct) he appears to be converting the profits from commercial trading ventures into investment in commercial agriculture. His wealthy neighbors, by con-

trast, are switching (at least temporarily) from cash crop production to investment in service industry businesses (e.g., transport, construction, bar-hotel establishments).

Bwana Hela appears as a paradoxical figure in this regional picture in a number of ways. He is a burgeoning rural capitalist in a state which severely restricts private accumulation. While he is not substantially wealthy by Western standards (he reported his gross income to me for 1984 as roughly \$60,000), his standard of living appears remarkable, given the average rural income of less than \$280. He owns or controls 1,572 acres of prime farmland in the Kilimanjaro and Arusha regions--a reasonable but not excessive landholding for a Western commercial farmer, but a very substantial concentration by regional standards, where the average household works less than .5 acres of land. In our interviews he spoke quite freely about many (although by no means all) of his business activities. This was unusual in a political climate where members of the elite hide their assets and accumulation strategies for fear of government reprisal.

Our interviews took place in Bwana Hela's modern concrete house furnished with the requisite (for well-to-do Chagga) African Makonde carvings, locally manufactured Danish-modern furniture, hand-embroidered chair coverings, and large stereo cassette recorder. This home stands in stark contrast to the adjacent homes of his neighbors, whose dwellings still consist of the traditional mud and

wattle, thatched with banana palm. His house is soon to be connected to the electric power lines provided in this region by Japanese development aid. None of the roads in the village is paved. The dirt driveway where he parks his Peugeot and Land Rover connects to the path leading to his brother's house, a nearly completed, two-story luxury home. His brother resides in Dar es Salaam, where he is a successful entrepreneur, and this home will undoubtedly become a choice rental property.

Bwana Hela is the proud father of nine children. Four still reside at home, along with his wife, mother's brother, and two servants. Three more are attending secondary boarding schools, and two are secondary school graduates. The first-born, a son, works in a government parastatal as an accountant and owns a popular bar-hotel in the capital. The second-born, a daughter, is also an accountant with a government ministry. All of his own siblings have graduated from secondary school and several have earned higher degrees. The brothers, he says, assumed financial responsibility for their sisters' education. Education, as an asset, is of enduring importance to Bwana Hela. Every year he provides a number of secondary school scholarships to needy children in his district because, as he puts it, "this sort of thing brings everybody up." In addition to his luxury sedan and Land Rover, he owns a tractor, a truck, and a bus, and employs one hundred sixty

workers in his manufacturing, transport, and agricultural businesses.

There is a caricature of the Kilimanjaro nouveaux
⁷
 riches which parodies their penchant for boasting and snobbery. Yet Bwana Hela appeared both affable and humble. He was a hardy, successful, business and family man--optimistic about the future, unfazed by bureaucratic red tape. In short, he conveyed the image of a person who knew his way around the system and how to make it work for him. Local gossip alternatively held that he exaggerated the size of both his income and charitable donations or that he had accumulated far more than he was telling me and had obtained his original working capital from smuggling. He had been consolidating landholdings and investing in commercial food crop agriculture for several years at the time of these interviews, while others sought to diversify into nonagricultural activities. Yet he was widely respected within the community, enjoying a broad base of influence both laterally and vertically. Does Bwana Hela's economic strategy represent a covert present, or possible future, trend for Tanzania's rural capitalist elite?

Selection for Failure and Strategies for Success

Bwana Hela was born into a substantial (although not aristocratic) peasant household in the 1930s. He was a middle son, disfavored under a traditional inheritance system which rewards the eldest son with the father's cereal crop land and the youngest with the house property,

livestock, and coffee and banana plots. He thus belongs to the social category of persons described by Moore (1975) as structurally "selected for failure."

During the early colonial period middle sons, who customarily inherited none of the father's property, were forced to make a living by borrowing land from relatives or cultivating bush land. Within Bwana Hela's lifetime middle sons began to take up apprenticeship in artisanal trades of other regions or the neighboring colonies of Kenya and Uganda. In the case of wealthier peasants' sons, they obtained formal education and low-level salaried employment in the civil service bureaucracy. Proceeds from the sale of coffee by industrious Chagga farmers who could accumulate enough land to accrue surplus and afford the school fees underwrote this development, as did the pioneering educational efforts of the native-run Kilimanjaro Coffee Cooperative and the vigorous educational efforts of the Catholic and Lutheran missions in the region. Overall, a disproportionate number (compared to other ethnic groups) of Chagga men entered the small educated elite during the colonial period (McGowan and Wacirah 1974).

Today, Chagga parents aspire to educate all of their children beyond the primary school level. The eldest and youngest sons have the security of knowing that they have family property to fall back on, but this is rationalized as a retirement investment, and many go so far as to say that the cultivation of coffee has become largely a "sym-

bolic act." Despite the realization that coffee farming is no longer highly profitable, the ideology of land as wealth endures, so that obtaining a house and coffee farm on the mountain is still a virtual rite of passage prior to marriage for most Chagga men. This puts considerable pressure on middle sons to obtain land through purchase in a situation where private land ownership is morally restricted under traditional law and illegal under civil law. The construction of a modern house (preferably "self-contained," i.e., indoor plumbing and kitchen facilities) is an ideal for Chagga men beyond its value as a second or retirement home. Industrial expansion outward from the regional capital, Moshi, has driven up property values, and the housing shortage for middle-management executives provides an incentive to invest in construction for short-term rental. To this end many young Chagga men delay civil or religious marriage until their late thirties while they work outside the region to accumulate savings to purchase property. Bwana Hela's career trajectory only partially fits this pattern.

Knowledge as Capital

As a middle son from a relatively well-to-do peasant family, Bwana Hela was given two major advantages in his early years which significantly increased his adult career options. First, he was sent to school and educated to a Form IV level.⁸ In other words, for the colonial period,

he was a highly educated man. Second, his father provided the bridewealth for him to marry directly upon his graduation from secondary school at the age of twenty-five. The marriage was performed in the Lutheran Church, a matter of considerable expense. Throughout our interviews he continually credited the support and expertise of his wife as a key to his financial success, stating that she was a full partner in his agricultural enterprises. He was thus enabled to begin building his own family at an early stage of his career. Although he had no house or land of his own, his parents took in and cared for his wife while he embarked on a program of studying for a range of post-secondary-school certificates, thus relieving him of the burden of family responsibilities for several years.

The timing of his education and early career is important. Bwana Hela was graduated from secondary school in 1958, three years before Tanzania achieved its independence from Great Britain. During this lame-duck period of colonial administration, post-secondary-school education was in a phase of expansion as the government sought to make up for a pre-World War II period of educational retrenchment and to turn out a higher number of educationally qualified Africans who could fill civil service posts after independence (Mbilinyi 1979). A larger number of civil service career options awaited secondary school graduates during this period as well. In the three-year period after Bwana Hela was graduated from secondary school he took certifi-

cate courses in fields as diverse as health, accounting, administration, and law. He entered the white-collar labor market in the immediate postcolonial phase, and worked for approximately fifteen years in middle-executive and eventually managerial positions in the government civil service and voluntary agencies.

I have argued elsewhere (Kerner 1984) that in Tanzania's present economic climate, the attainment of post-primary-school education functions mainly to provide a fund of symbolic capital. The main salary-providing employer, the government bureaucracy, is saturated with low-level white-collar employees. Opportunities for employment in the few privately owned firms are scarce. Students graduating with a Form IV diploma are not guaranteed direct employment in the salaried jobs their families have been counting on; nor are they really qualified to do so. Few graduates have the requisite qualitative or quantitative skills for managerial or technical jobs. School ties, however, provide important connections; the experience of attending boarding institutions in different parts of the country provides students with a wider knowledge of the economic options available to them, and the paper credential, which is still a scarce resource,⁹ confers a type of prestige which can eventually be converted into material opportunities.

The situation for Bwana Hela twenty years ago was much more favorable. Not only were more opportunities open to him, but his employment experience afforded him both sym-

bolic prestige and concrete experience in legal and business domains. While he was never directly involved in political life, he made a number of important connections which enabled him to launch a second career in 1975 as an entrepreneur.

Pen and Hoe

Bwana Hela began to accumulate land even before leaving salaried employment. In 1973 he bought his first parcel of kihamba land (seven acres) in a neighboring subdistrict with the money from his savings. This land was worked by his wife¹⁰ until he left white-collar employment completely in 1975. At this time he entered a joint business venture with his brother (the luxury homeowner). Bwana Hela began to invest the profits from this business in land acquisition in 1978, the year it became apparent that there was going to be no quick recovery from the economic shocks which had rocked the Tanzanian economy since 1972. This second land purchase included a 280-acre parcel of land in a neighboring district on which he began to grow a high-yielding variety of beans.

By 1984 Bwana Hela controlled 1,572 acres of farm land and was applying to the government for water rights to 1,200 acres of land in nearby Arusha region, where mechanized wheat farms operating under the direction of a Canadian aid-development scheme have been highly profitable. Only twenty or so acres of the land he currently controls are devoted to growing the region's main cash

crop, coffee, which is interplanted with bananas. This is kihamba land located in the higher altitudes on the mountain slope and watered through the traditional irrigation system of furrows which capture runoff water from the melting snowcap at the mountain top. The remainder is devoted to the cultivation of high-yielding varieties of beans and maize, finger millet, and ground nuts, which are sold through regional markets and shipped to the capital. These cereal and legume crops are grown on the flat plains at the foot of the mountain in areas still referred to as shamba.

State crop marketing authorities exist for all major cash and many food crops, and inputs are available to the cooperative villages through loans in which payments are deducted from the purchase price. Tractors and trucks can be purchased communally by villages which qualify (if they cultivate communal farms) through the Rural Development Bank. However, reality departs from theory in a number of ways. Prices paid to peasant producers through state-operated crop authorities are far below prices which obtain in the "shadow" regional markets. In the case of cash crops, low farm-gate prices increase the net foreign exchange earnings of the state when these crops are auctioned in the international market. In the case of food crops, such as maize, low farm-gate prices subsidize staples sold in the urban areas at controlled prices. Low farm-gate prices substantially affected rural wages during the early

1980s when spiralling inflation and extreme shortages of basic commodities in the government price-controlled shops meant that the average peasant household could no longer socially reproduce itself through farming alone. A three-year period of intermittent drought did not help matters. Acute food shortages became common at least twice per year, and those peasants who were in a position to store staples (instead of selling them through legal channels) could profit by selling in the regional markets.

The rural credit structure had become hopelessly complicated and unworkable. Many cooperative villages ran up unmanageable debts for agricultural inputs. In some areas farmers did not break even when they sold their crops at harvest. Accusations abounded that poorer and less influential peasants did not receive their distribution of inputs and that village leaders were selling pesticides and fertilizers at inflated prices. Technically, at least, all farmers are eligible for extension services. Yet the rural extension service is heavily overworked and most field officers lack a means of transportation to reach remote farms. Educated and influential farmers thus have more ready access to information about hybrid seeds and modern cultivation techniques. Cooperative villages are eligible for loans for large equipment only if they qualify under government regulation. Bwana Hela's village, for example, did not qualify for a tractor loan because land was so intensively cultivated and fragmented that there was no

available plot for a communal farm. The village truck, purchased through a cooperative loan, was rented out and managed by a village committee. Many farmers complained that the rental prices were too high and that the proceeds did not return to the village cooperative fund but were kept by local leaders. In short, both poor and middle income peasants are forced to rent such facilities from wealthier families to clear land, harvest, and transport their crops.

Access to Land and Land Concentration

Bwana Hela's case, set within the regional and national context described above, serves to illustrate several points. First, concentration of land in a region such as Kilimanjaro is not the same thing as private land-ownership in the Western sense. I have deliberately used the verb to "control" rather than to "own" to describe Bwana Hela's economic strategies. He owns very little of the land he controls in the sense of having a legal title of purchase and the right to sell it. In those cases where he directly "purchased" vihamba or shamba from impoverished peasants, under customary law such land cannot be alienated and such claims can be contested by the maximal lineage. Water rights and right-of-way continue to be regulated through delicate negotiation. In some cases, the land is not worked by Bwana Hela's family or hired laborers, but by the original "owners" from whom he extracts a surplus. Where

land has been "purchased" from the government, which does not "sell" but only "allocates" land by application, it is clear from the purchase prices he quoted that more than a standard registration fee had changed hands. "Gifts" are customary to speed up the application process. Registered allocation plots theoretically cannot be sold, but they are as a common practice. Essentially, then, the control of land is extremely fragile and could be revoked if the "owner" did not possess the necessary economic and social capital to continually rework a redistributive exchange network.

Thus it is not surprising that a man in Bwana Hela's position should occupy some of the most prestigious voluntary organization posts in the community. Like many of the Chagga elite, Bwana Hela claims a disinterest in politics, by which he means that he does not work for the party or run for elected office. He is, however, a member of many of the most important regional and district committees, holds an important position in the Lutheran Church, and sits on the board of an important private secondary school. Owing to his connections in a number of government ministries, he is able to place many local youths in parastatal colleges, in addition to those supported by his yearly scholarship fund. For these voluntary contributions to community betterment he professes purely altruistic motives, but adds that the gratitude he receives for such donations is truly overwhelming.

Second, land concentration at one end of a continuum implies land fragmentation at the other end. The land controlled by Bwana Hela is spread over at least five districts in two regions. He gained it as the area's lineages underwent fragmentation, some families becoming increasingly impoverished. The government has attempted to restrict the inheritance of plots of one acre or less in an effort to retard land fragmentation and improve cash crop production. Yet land fragmentation appears to be increasing. Traditional inheritance rules are up for grabs these days as fathers attempt to provide middle sons and, increasingly, unwed daughters with children with land on which to build a house and maintain a small farm through pre-mortem inheritance.

Third, the concentration of land in major blocks for large-scale commercial agriculture is occurring (if Bwana Hela's case is suggestive) for food crops rather than export crops. This is because vertical cultivation in Kilimanjaro encourages the application of modern cultivation techniques and the use of contract labor on the plains where food crops are grown, rather than on the fragmented hilly slopes where coffee is cultivated. Food crops are also less subject to government control and can be profitably marketed in areas that are vulnerable to drought.

Capital Investment in Agriculture versus Business

At the outset of this case study I characterized Bwana Hela as a member of Kilimanjaro's new business elite and

have provided at least a partial picture of his economic strategy leading to investment in commercial agriculture. He is, however, a diversified entrepreneur, and only some of his other business endeavors are linked to agricultural enterprises (in marketing, storage, and transport). His income from nonagricultural enterprises is forty times more¹¹ profitable. At the time of my research he was investing the profits from these nonagricultural businesses in commercial farming endeavors. It is unclear whether he will continue this strategy. Shortly after our interviews the Tanzanian government announced a lessening of restrictions on both internal and external trade. Foreign exchange would be much more readily available to private investors, private businessmen would be allowed to market their products directly without having to go through parastatal middlemen, and much of the bureaucratic red tape involved in licensing and the like was to be eliminated. Bwana Hela was planning to sell most of his nonfarm businesses, and reconstitute them once the new trade policies went into effect. With an eye toward the future, he is educating all his sons and daughters to take up careers useful in both¹² industry and agriculture.

Conclusions

If Bwana Hela's economic strategies can be viewed as illustrative of a more general pattern currently being pursued by Kilimanjaro's elite, it is useful to locate this

pattern within both local and wider structures and the processes that have shaped such strategies. Therefore it is necessary to return momentarily to the interaction of Chagga social organization and historical process highlighted in chapter 2.

First, it is clear from a longitudinal view of Chagga social organization that the ability of certain families to concentrate large landholdings and accumulate wealth and prestige is not a recent transformation. Land scarcity, which promoted both fragmentation and concentration, dates back to the precolonial period and probably laid the groundwork for internal social differentiation and political complexity. Internal differentiation and political complexity were exacerbated by engagement in a wider exchange economy, first stemming from Arab coastal trade, followed by the colonial economy introduced by the Germans and later the British. Engagement in such wider exchange economies not only made land more valuable, but offered alternative routes for the accumulation of wealth and prestige, which could be converted into wealth in land.

Second, a continuous thread of ambivalence has pervaded state policies for the development of Kilimanjaro beginning in the colonial era. All three regimes have valued the area for its ecological suitability to generate revenue with the primary export commodity, coffee. All three have recognized the potential of its intensive cultivation practices, resulting from land scarcity, which gave rise to an

identifiable internal competitive pressure towards accumulation. All three administrations have accorded a measure of respect for the flexibility of Chagga social organization to respond to new marketing opportunities, to adopt technological innovations, and to "convert" to a modern (rational, bureaucratic) ideology via the Christian church and formal education. Yet development policies from all three state regimes reflect a deep-seated concern that the development of the region, if allowed to proceed unchecked, could produce a situation in which Chagga autonomy would pose a threat to centralized state power. This ambivalence on the part of the colonial and postcolonial state has both supported and restrained the ability of Chagga peasants to successfully develop commercial cash crop production. Currently, legal and bureaucratic restrictions make strategies (at least overt ones) for the organization of large-scale commercial farming difficult.

Third, if current state policies and traditional inheritance rules make overt strategies of land concentration and investment in private enterprise difficult, then the case of Bwana Hela's family suggests the creative ways that such rules can be manipulated within the arena of local social organization. Historically, certain features of Chagga social organization converged to encourage entrepreneurial activity, one of the five central features Iliffe (1971) suggests as a necessary condition for the development of commercial agriculture. In his view, an entrepre-

neur is by definition a person who makes changes in the existing mode of production for the purpose of filling a demand. Such a person must have unusual foresight (stemming from a detached, objective assessment of local conditions) and furthermore must either possess or be able to acquire the resources necessary to implement this vision. Iliffe suggests three categories of persons in early twentieth century Tanganyika who were likely to become entrepreneurs: (1) traditional leaders with astute political awareness and wider knowledge of the outside world; (2) persons who had traveled widely as traders and migrant laborers; and (3) those whose detachment from a local, moral community was the result of Christian conversion or western education. All three categories of person were present in Chaggaland during the colonial period, and in some people they converged. Children from chiefly families as well as children of the masumba began to convert to Christianity and obtain formal education after the 1920s.

With respect to Iliffe's second category, a particular feature of Chagga social structure--inheritance rules--helps to explain the prevalence of entrepreneurship in this region. Moore's (1975) discussion of Chagga inheritance rules focuses on how dispute (particularly the accusation that a brother is a bad character and responsible for his own plight) operates in the process of "selection for failure." Middle sons thus become transformed into persons "identified as losers in the long-term competition for

scarce resources" (particularly land) (1975, 136). For Moore, dispute works to select those who will have to leave and those who will remain. Alternatively, I suggest that what appears superficially to look like selection for failure may be a process which has contributed to the success of Chagga entrepreneurship. Those who were forced to leave and take up careers in trade, artisanal, or bureaucratic occupations gained the wider connections and knowledge necessary for objective detachment and the resources necessary to take advantage of the impoverishment of their kin and neighbors who remained in the local community. Through salaried remittances and periodic participation in ceremonial redistributive exchange networks, such persons, who appear on the surface to be forced outside the system, actually become its most significant actors. In the sense that they possess both the characteristics of social distance and nearness, middle sons in Kilimanjaro have the advantage of Simmel's (1950) (internal) stranger: they enjoy a kind of freedom of action denied to members of the community who have a much larger stake in its perpetuation. The hostility instigated by such freedom explains why such sons are frequently the subject of witchcraft accusation, gossip, and other local disputes.

Finally, it is important to note, particularly in Bwana Hela's case, that the conditions which encouraged Chagga entrepreneurship--participation in the Lutheran Church, formal education, and civil service--have grafted a concern

with individualistic accumulation onto a system of values and practices which are wealth-leveling. The extent to which Africa's postcolonial elites are "inner-directed" (an orientation social psychologists indicate is an essential component in the creation of the achievement motivation necessary for capitalist development) was discussed in Lloyd's early (1966) symposium, The New Elites of Tropical Africa. This issue has reappeared in its most recent guise in Hyden's (1980) conceptualization of the problem of the "economy of affection." In Hyden's view, the economy of affection (remittances to poor relatives, the payment of school fees for kinsmen, and job patronage) provides a welfare function and shelters poor individuals from the most negative effects of a capitalist economy. However, it also constitutes a cost to that economy and limits the possibility of its transformation. Because the economy of affection provides this sheltering function, it supports a precapitalist mode of (subsistence) production, into which Hyden believes it is possible for peasants to retreat. Poor peasants and workers thus remain incompletely "captured" by the state. Additionally, the economy of affection limits the ability of wealthy peasants to transform the economy because they are constrained to redistribute their surplus rather than to invest it. Strategies employed by members of the elite such as Bwana Hela, however, indicate that it is precisely the participation in such an economy of affection which provides the symbolic capital to

concentrate land and labor. The economy of affection works to promote agricultural transformation rather than to retard it in this case.

Hyden's version of an articulation of modes of production model is thus called into question by cases such as Bwana Hela's. Rubin (1984) further criticizes Hyden's model of the Tanzanian economy for failing to take into account the prevalence of black market exchange. What appears in Hyden's analysis to be withdrawal by peasants into subsistence activities is complete incorporation into an exchange economy, although it is not one which the state necessarily controls. Participation in the black (illegal) or shadow (partially illegal) exchange economy, both as a means of accumulation for investment in commercial cash crop production and as an outlet for marketing commodities, represents the limits of the state to control internal trade mechanisms. Such participation does not, however, suggest a totally primitive form of accumulation (as suggested by Green [1981]) in which profits are derived from, but never reinvested in, production. The extent of Bwana Hela's participation in the black market or shadow economy is unknown, but this case suggests that parallel market activities are not necessarily incompatible with strategies to concentrate and develop land.

It is possible to argue that specific cases of rural differentiation (i.e., Kilimanjaro), concerned with small areas and a few wealthy farmers, are exceptional rather

than representative of the country as a whole. Such an argument would overlook the fact that approximately two-thirds of Tanzania's peasants inhabit ten percent of the total available land in the country (Van Hekken and Van Velzen 1972). Access to viable land for cultivation is becoming increasingly problematic in all of these geographical zones. A brief review of the literature on peasant social differentiation (see Mbliniyi's 1974 summary) illustrates how the practices of Kilimanjaro's elite fit into the overall process of rural class formation.

Studies by Awiti (1972) for Ismani district, Boesen, Madsen, and Moody (1977) in Bukoba district, and Van Hekken and Van Velzen (1972) in Rungwe district indicate that there is an increasing commoditization of land in the rural areas (although access to land is still available through allotment and inheritance) and that wealthy peasants are concentrating landholdings. They are also renting out major technological items, such as tractors. They enjoy privileged access to inputs and credit and loan facilities. They are allied at the local level with political staff and/or form part of this staff, which controls significant organizations such as school committees, district councils, primary courts, and village development committees. Finally, Von Freyhold's (1972) comparison of workers and "nizers" (high income bureaucrats) suggests that both groups, which permanently reside in town and are differentially categorized by their urban occupations, have a high

degree of personal involvement in the rural areas. Such an involvement entails both remittances to family members and investment in farm production. This farm investment for both groups includes the hiring of labor. Thus town and country are not separate analytical spheres in Tanzania. The issue of land concentration and investment in commercial agriculture (who is involved, by what means, and for what ends) is significant precisely because it involves control over the circulation of resources and personnel between rural and urban domains, which are, from the Tanzanians' point of view, one continuous arena for social action.

This chapter has highlighted the upwardly mobile strategies of Kilimanjaro's elite. By comparison, the corresponding impoverishment of poor peasants has remained a background feature. This feature is brought into focus in chapter 6, which concerns how the extraordinary discourse of rain sacrifice registers a protest against failures in redistribution and the threat of resettlement by the state.

NOTES

1. A 1922 British Agriculture Department report to the Colonial Office indicates that during the German period Chagga cultivators owned 89,694 coffee trees and planted another 89,701 trees in 1922. In the same year (1922) settler planters owned about one million trees (U.K. Public Records Office 1922). Iliffe (1979, 274) suggests that several factors contributed to the rapid expansion of coffee cultivation in Kilimanjaro: fertile, volcanic soil in a highland climate, the availability of railway transport, the model of European plantations, and the fact that coffee is an "ideal" cash crop because its returns vary directly with the amount of labor invested in producing it.

2. Rogers (1972, 201) points out that after 1900 the missions began to take the initiative in seeking out candidates for conversion rather than simply accepting only those designated by the chiefs or those seeking to escape enforced labor under the German regime. This initiative fomented open hostility by the chiefs against the missions. This hostility was a reaction to the fact that the missions were gaining adherents among the "second level" of Chagga society, those families (the masumba) whose base of power, wealth, and prestige carried the potential seeds of competition with chiefly lineages.

3. Mbilinyi argues that, "Forty per cent of all land under cultivation was in the hands of non-African commercial and capitalist enterprise" (1985, 90-91), but that, "The usual statistic presented is one per cent based on the total land mass of the territory. This is totally misleading, in that only five per cent of the land mass was cultivated by anyone. Most of the territory was forests, semi-arid, mountains, swamps and unused arable land" (1985, 91). The British agriculture department report to the Colonial Office from 1926 indicates that the territory's estates were mainly in sisal, coffee, and rubber. By 1925 the government had disposed of some 1,092,470 acres of "ex-enemy" (German) estates and given 33,000 acres of land on long-lease. Capital to purchase the estates was 51.35 percent British and 29.82 percent Indian (U.K. Public Records Office 1926).

4. The Administration's intervention on behalf of Chagga cultivators (at certain points) against the interests of European commercial farmers defies simple explanation. On the one hand, the rise and demise of the Kiliman-

jaro Native Planters' Association (KNPA) at different periods can be interpreted as a clash between vigorous personalities and the administrative styles and class interests they represented. In this view, represented by Rogers (1972) and Iliffe (1979), District Officer Sir Charles Dundas, the sympathetic hero of the Chagga, who championed their right to produce and market their coffee in competition with European farmers and Asian middlemen, is pitted against his successor, Captain Hallier, an officer with a South African background, who viewed the KNPA as a corrupt institution which posed a grave political threat. Powerful chiefs, such as Shangali Ndeserua, with large landholdings are in competition with an emergent group of Christian educated farmers and salaried functionaries of the colonial government, represented by figures such as Joseph Merinyo. Another explanation for the contradictions inherent in colonial agricultural development policies directed towards Africans (sometimes supporting, sometimes restraining their activities) was that the Tanganyikan Administration had learned a valuable political lesson in Northern Rhodesia and Kenya. Tanganyikan administrators lacked the necessary European population to back up state force. Therefore, African agricultural policies "...depended in part on acceptance of the ideology of the subsistence peasants' non-problematic existence on the land under supervision of Native Authorities" (Mbilingi 1985, 91). Industrious Chagga cultivators constituted an excellent example of a self-sufficient peasant community, and thus it would have been in the best (ideological) interest of the Administration to demonstrate how efficient the Chagga might be if the production and exchange mechanisms for export crops could be organized along modern bureaucratic lines. Additionally, there was a sufficient pool of Chagga "modernizers" (progressive, western-educated farmers) to run such an organization. The "trouble" experienced by administrators such as Hallier at later stages can then be seen to have arisen when this group of modernizers began to usurp the authority of Native Authorities, thus undermining the structure of traditional power and posing a latent challenge to the colonial regime.

5. From 1976/77 to 1980/81 coffee exports averaged thirty-one percent of the country's total foreign exchange earnings (United Republic of Tanzania 1982b).

5. The case study was drawn from interviews with the informant during the spring of 1984. Interpretations of the case are based on participant observation, and formal and informal interviews conducted during my residence in a village in Kilimanjaro region during 1983 and 1984. The location of the village and district are unnamed, the identity of the informant is disguised, and several interesting details of his entrepreneurial activities are omitted in the analysis. Despite the fact that these

interviews were conducted in the presence of a number of other persons, including a government and party official, I have no desire to cause embarrassment to Bwana Hela. Nevertheless, the inevitable questions remain: How does the state allow such activities to persist, and why was the informant secure in revealing such information about his economic strategies? The state in Tanzania is represented at the local level by representatives with whom the informant has a range of connections. Such activities must be seen to represent the interests of both the informant and his patrons/clients. Bwana Hela is somewhat exceptional in the articulation of his career history, but he was by no means the only informant willing to discuss what Tanzanians call the hali halisi (the real situation). It is clear to Tanzanians, even if it is not to many Western observers, that the rhetoric of ujamaa socialism is but one of a number of structural variables at play which determine the practices which constitute local culture.

7. Regional folk slang juxtaposes two ideal types: a figure known as TX Kubwa (big TX, where TX stands for expatriate license plates) against the black market (magen-do) big boss. The former is an educated man who operates both legitimate and semilegitimate businesses, who is apolitical, and whose luxury consumption is constrained by the redistributive necessities of maintaining a large clientele. Magendo big bosses, by contrast, are uneducated, have used money and muscle to establish themselves, and their manners are a parody of colonial snobbery. This snobbery is most clearly reflected in their withdrawal from the redistributive, ceremonial exchange network at the local level (see chapter 9 for an elaboration of these types).

8. The British colonial education system in Tanganyika evolved along the pattern established in the metropole. Four years of elementary education (Standards I-IV) were followed by three years of central school (Standards V-VII; mainly vocational training). Higher education in secondary schools (Forms I-IV, O-level, and Forms V and VI, A-level) were followed by a postsecondary course at Makerere University. In 1945 the total secondary school enrollment for the territory was 1,000, and there were 27 students pursuing postsecondary courses at the university (Mbliniyi 1980). Then (and now) many students entered school at a later age than their European counterparts and/or spent a number of years between different educational stages to improve their performance on competitive terminal examinations sufficiently to be admitted to the next level.

9. By 1984 the promotion rate from primary to state secondary schools was less than three percent. Four out of five candidates failed the Form IV examination in the sense

that their grades were inadequate to ensure them a Form V place (Cooksey 1986).

10. Aside from the management of domestic and child-rearing tasks, Ewana Hela's wife oversees the production and marketing of their banana crop, which is shipped to Dar es Salaam. The income derived from the sale of bananas is hers alone. He stressed that she is also integrally involved in management decisions pertaining to the other food crops they cultivate.

11. Ewana Hela would not clarify why he chose to invest the profits from nonfarm businesses into commercial agriculture. The closest explanation he would provide was to say, "People here think there is no money to be made from farming. They are wrong and I am going to show them." Clearly he was aware of the profitability of his various businesses. There are two logical possibilities which might explain this investment in commercial food crop agriculture. First, Ewana Hela might be viewed as a shrewd entrepreneur who observes signals in the overall political economy and who thus is able to predict when future policy changes will benefit a marginal investment. He thus "buys" land rights cheaply, is able to sell cereals and legumes at a high price when there are shortages, and spreads risk (by not investing solely in agricultural enterprises) because he is able to take the long view. Second, Ewana Hela's investment in commercial agriculture may be a means to hide profits from nonfarm transactions in the black market or "shadow" economy. As I argue in chapter 2, the shadow economy, sometimes referred to variously as the informal economy, parallel market, or traditional market sector, currently dominates all other exchanges of goods and services. These transactions are sometimes illegal, sometimes legal, and sometimes only partially so.

12. Ewana Hela's vision for these reconstituted businesses was to establish complete family control, free from government partnership. He dreamt of a family-owned business with himself as the managing director, his younger brother as the chairman of the board, his first son as a manager and head accountant, and another son (still in secondary school) as head of the technical staff. While his strategy for educating his children (through secondary school and university) is focused on business and professional training (he claims he is "very strict" regarding their grade reports and study habits), he attempted to instill in them an appreciation for the land and for farming. All of his children were given plots at an early age and allowed to retain the profits from what they raised. "My children," he says, "will never sell the land. They know how important it is." This idealized vision of the future family business and this portrait of elite socialization provide an intimate glimpse into how the process of

"straddling" differentiates elites from middle peasants. Middle peasant sons do not have to "learn" to appreciate cash crop or subsistence farming by being coaxed into cultivating their own plots and allowed to keep the profits. They, too, would never sell the land (unless forced by economic hardship), because they know its importance to the survival of the family unit. Elite children are clearly being trained to regard farming as a commercial endeavor, and one which is an adjunct to the more important managerial role they will occupy in a family business or a profession. Socialization for managerial and professional roles is accompanied by strict supervision rather than coaxing. By contrast, middle peasant children are most strictly supervised in the performance of family farming activities and do not have their educational courses so carefully dictated by their families.

PART THREE
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND STATE DISCOURSE

PROLOGUE

The chapters in the third part of the study return to several of the issues raised in chapter 1. What is the broad impact of state discourse (which contains a theory of knowledge) on the discourse of familiarity in local-level arenas and more exclusive political fields? How can the effects of state discourse be analytically separated from other modes of action and ideation? Is it possible to determine the conditions under which such action and ideation takes the form of a resistance and challenge to hegemony?

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 examined the effect of state ideology on two processes: the development of productive relations and the organization of strategies to obtain institutionalized knowledge. State discourse defines truth (both historically and in the present) and provides a vision of what reality should be--what constitutes morally correct action and intentionality. Institutions of formal knowledge were designed to transmit the truth and vision of the state. Theoretically, the transmission of formal knowledge should transform productive relations to conform to state goals. Chapter 2 explored state attempts to change productive relations through formal education in historical perspective. On a broad scale, the failure of

such attempts reflects the contradictions inherent in the formation of the colonial and postcolonial state. Chapters 3 and 4 provided a localized view of how actors, within differing regional arenas, understand and utilize scarce resources of formal knowledge to further their own political and economic goals. As indicated in these chapters, such goals are shaped, and resources, personnel, and relationships are deployed to implement them, by the development of regional structures of opportunity.

Not all of what constitutes valued knowledge is confined to schools. Practical knowledge, in Gramsci's term, common sense, has an ideological component, but it is also part of successful strategies for survival. In chapter 1, I suggested why reconnaissance is critical to practical knowledge in contemporary Tanzania. Information gathering and practical knowledge may be necessary to survival, but these do not provide the means to make a person a significant player in a social field. As illustrated in chapters 3 and 4, the possession of esoteric knowledge was critical to the exercise of political authority in precolonial Tabora and Kilimanjaro. Esoteric knowledge combined with new sources of knowledge gained through travel, entrepreneurship, education, and/or conversion, to form valuable resources for political action within regional arenas during the colonial era.

Chapters 5 and 6 concern the use of esoteric knowledge in extraordinary public discourse. It was important to investigate the role of esoteric (ritual) knowledge in the 1980s, not because it is a quaint survival of custom, but because it represents an alternative moral vision; a vision often at odds with state ideology. Since the deployment of esoteric knowledge stands in ambiguous relation to state authority, acting as a sort of moral check, it was important to understand the connection between the particularly vigorous representations of hegemony, expressed in moral campaigns, and eruptions in the use of esoteric knowledge in public discourse. Such knowledge is usually kept hidden. When it emerges in extraordinary ritual discourse it commands public attention and acquires legitimacy. The questions posed by the two cases discussed in chapters 5 and 6 are: What sort of claims to legitimacy are being advanced? What elements in the political arena are being drawn upon in the organization of extraordinary discourse? What is the transformative potential of the deployment of esoteric knowledge?

The final chapter in part 3 (chapter 7) also returns to a theme presented in chapter 1, the use of modern folklore as a source of ironic self-reflection concerning the effects of hegemony on individual opportunity. The case material in chapter 7 relies on a type of folklore which has not received much attention in the literature--street slang, which coalesces into motifs which I describe as the

characterization of persona. These characterizations are used as a shorthand to communicate a number of symbolic themes about the opportunities and dangers of individual upward mobility. They are particularly potent when applied to individual biography and serve as both a warning and a catharsis. The characterizations described in chapter 7 illustrate a monitoring of the irony of state policies.

The characterization of persona forms part of what can be considered Tanzanian popular culture, and as such is not confined to a particular regional arena. The case material described in chapter 7 is drawn from Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro region. There are two reasons for this. The characterizations originated in the capital among dockworkers and casual laborers and were elaborated on and diffused throughout the countryside by young people. It was in Kilimanjaro that I had the sustained opportunity to spend time with adolescents and to collect such material. Such characterizations could easily be collected in other regions because they have entered into the popular media (short stories, novellas, radio dramas), and young people, boarding throughout the country in secondary schools and in national service, are highly mobile. For the analysis of modern folklore it is helpful to conceptualize the capital, with its links to the rest of the world, as an arena from which actors draw new meanings about relationships and resources for use in other political fields. The idea of

the capital and what it culturally represents is not confined to one spatial location. It enters into the discourse of familiarity in other locations and undergoes a transformation in the process.

In the introduction to his book on the development of the popular culture dance form known as Beni, Ranger suggests that there are two ways to grasp the impact of colonial policy in east Africa. One is deceptively simple. It entails filling in the details of how Europeans exercised military and technological power to extract resources for the developed world without creating the foundations of a developed economy.

It can be seen as an effort to proletarianize Africans without creating a working class; to make them peasants without creating a yeomanry; to equip them with a minimum of skills without equipping them with intellectual tools that could be used creatively (1975, 1).

Such a view renders the colonial experience tragic and understandable, but fails to grasp the meaning of the experience for actors moving between these levels and variations. Understanding the meaning of the colonial experience for Africans, Ranger indicates, necessitates an account which considers the movement of personnel and ideas between fields of uneven development. A view of African initiative requires an equal understanding of how such initiative was constrained by local tradition and colonial policy and practice. The same critique might be leveled at a number of contemporary studies of Tanzania, where the realities of underdevelopment are clarified, but the exper-

ience of state policies is relegated to the background.
The chapters presented in part 3 represent an attempt to
reconcile this research dilemma.

CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC SABOTAGE AND THE CHARISMATIC
MILITIA IN TABORA

Introduction

1

This chapter examines the growth of a social movement in Tabora and the neighboring regions of Shinyanga and Mwanza. I argue that Abrahams' (1987) recent interpretation of the movement as a localized phenomenon misses an essential point: that the florescence of this vigilante movement occurred within the wider context of the national political/ideological campaign against the black market. Indeed, the character and functioning of the Sungusungu movement changed in conjunction with the trajectory of this campaign. The extraordinary discourse displayed by the Sungusungu expresses more than the difficulty of the post-colonial state to manage center-periphery relations. It makes use of local knowledge to formulate a protest against a deeply felt set of inequalities--the region against the state, local culture against national hegemony, and the poor and powerless against the rich and powerful.

The first section of the chapter provides a general ethnographic description of the movement. Because the Sungusungu describe themselves and are described by the state as a "traditional" movement, the next section examines the historical precedents from which the movement

gains local legitimacy. The following section outlines the trajectory of the national campaign against economic sabotage and shows how the national discourse influenced the organizational development and spread of the movement. The concluding section analyzes the potential transformative capacity of such a movement as extraordinary discourse.

The Sungusungu as a Social Movement

Originating in Tabora and the neighboring Shinyanga regions, the Sungusungu achieved prominence in the national media when its numbers had grown to an estimated 6,000. They were described variously as a "traditional security group," a "tribal group," a "village defense group," and, in their own words, "the Army of the Party." As I show, the Sungusungu are neither traditional (in the sense of representing an anachronistic survival), tribal (in the sense of being organized by one ethnic group to promote its interests), confined to the local (village) level, nor singularly concerned with defense.

The exact derivation of the name Sungusungu is unclear. The Sungusungu and their companion group in Shinyanga region, the Wasalaama, claim that they are about defense and security. The word Wasalaama means "peaceful ones," while the Swahili word Sungusungu refers to a variety of large biting black ant. Both Abrahams and my own informants symbolically identified the movement with ants.² Masanja (1984) derives the name from the Nyamwezi word for

poison, busungu, and connects this with the widespread use of poison arrows by the movement's members. The Swahili word sungusungu also relates to the word chungu, both a generic term for ant and a common black cooking pot. As I discuss below, the groups organize feasts at which they perform ritual songs and dances, against a background of traditional instruments. One such instrument consists of an overturned cooking pot upon which sand is placed and then ground rhythmically by using a small three-legged stool. Chungu is also the adjective for something bitter, sharp, and painful--figuratively, a term for resentment, anger, offended feelings, and a grudge. The expression chungu meko denotes hand-to-mouth existence. Finally, the Nyamwezi word for cooking pot, nungu was also the personal name taken by the fierce nineteenth century warlord, Nyungu ya Mawe (Shorter 1972, 272).

Information on the origin and current numerical membership of the Sungusungu is scanty and vague. Articles appearing in the Daily News (Dar es Salaam) in the beginning of 1983 reported the formation of tribal defense groups in Shinyanga and Tabora regions organized to apprehend and punish cattle thieves. However, the existence of the Sungusungu predates these reports.³ It was reported that as early as August of 1982 former president Nyerere officially sanctioned the activities of the Sungusungu by saying that, "the groups (sic) activities were in line with the Party guidelines on defense."⁴ Informants in Tabora

Town (the regional capital) indicate that the Sungusungu's activities began to accelerate, with a marked increase in numbers, performances, and publicity following the initiation of the Campaign Against Economic Sabotage in March 1983. Apparently the group originally known as Wasalaama in Shinyanga region rapidly diffused to neighboring Tabora region, where statistics for cattle theft are similarly high.⁵ The Sungusungu are a decentralized movement, and therefore the diffusion of these groups from village to village took place in an ad hoc manner (Abrahams 1987, 184-85). The Sungusungu operate in localized groups of approximately twenty to forty male members, organized at the subdistrict (ward) level. There is little doubt that the subdistrict level groups were eventually coordinated and treated by the state as a mass movement.

My first encounter with the Sungusungu was in a lower-class suburb of Tabora Town where I took my meals twice a day at the home of my research assistant's relatives. This was during the initial phase of my research in Tabora (March-April 1983) when I resided in the center of the regional capital and spent my days conducting interviews in the secondary schools and with educational administrators. This peri-urban neighborhood where my assistant's relatives lived was known as a high crime area, and in fact I had a nightly escort of young men to accompany me to my lodgings three miles away in order to protect me from "hooligans." The Sungusungu provided evening entertainment several

nights a week when neighborhood residents turned out to support their ngoma (dance/musical performances).⁶ Superficially, at least, these ngomas are about livestock theft. Barefoot and barechested, carrying what are said to be poisoned arrows and spears, the Sungusungu dance and sing in a circle around the apprehended thief, who sits impassively in the center as if in a trance, until the wee hours of the morning when a feast is held and the thief is theoretically turned over to civil law enforcement officials.

Sungusungu groups are organized into regiments headed by local medicine men (waganga) who employ dawa (literally, "medicine," and refers to both modern medicine and traditional medicine which includes magic) to divine the whereabouts of a culprit when a theft has been committed. Initiation and training are conducted in "the bush," which is also where the mganga retires to apply his supernatural powers to insure the success of an ngoma. An ngoma is held to divine the location of the thief. Once he is caught he is taken to the place where the theft occurred, and punishment is carried out either prior to, or in order to produce, a confession of the crime. Another ngoma, the type at which I was a regular visitor, is then held adjacent to the ward party headquarters. This ngoma celebrates the restoration of neighborhood security and the public humiliation of the thief. Although the Sungusungu receive no observable wages, it is customary for the victim to present the regiment with a payment of three to five cows once the

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livestock have been recovered. In the villages scattered through the division where I was also a resident, it was gossiped that perhaps the thieves were actually Sungusungu who stole the livestock; then, betraying one of their own members, they recovered a portion of the booty for themselves.

Certainly it was curious how the Sungusungu always managed to capture the correct culprit. On nights when they were not engaged in an ngoma or practice drills, they could often be found in close consultation with party officials from the ward. Ten Cell Party leaders represented themselves as working in conjunction with the Sungusungu. According to them, when a theft or crime was committed they called in the Sungusungu and collaboratively determined a likely suspect. Only the Sungusungu's dawa, however, could divine if the alleged suspect was the true criminal, and the confession of the thief always verified their powers. What happened if the thief failed to confess? I was told that the Sungusungu would punish him until he confessed. Such ordeals are accomplished by beating the suspect rather than by poison or other means.

The operations of the Sungusungu underwent several significant changes during the spring months of 1983 when I was a resident in Tabora Town. One was that the frequency of ngoma performances began to increase. Another was that the Sungusungu began to be called in to act upon crimes unrelated to cattle theft. A third was that reported

lapses in the surrender of criminals to the police became
widespread.⁸ It was widely believed by leaders and residents alike that the Sungusungu aligned themselves with the security function of the party and against the government as represented by the police and the judiciary. Despite official state rhetoric which declares that the government and the party are one entity, public opinion tends to separate the two.

The state and the party have parallel organization down to the village level. The party is supposed to formulate policy and the government to operationalize it, but not infrequently these functions overlap while the agendas of the two institutions are not always aligned. Party leaders at the local level are generally respected residents and popular leaders, whereas government officials are often outsiders brought in as administrators. Whereas government leaders possess educational and training credentials, many party officials are semiliterate. In local disputes residents most often turn to ten cell leaders to mediate their problems. They also frequent ward, district, and even regional party headquarters with complaints regarding water, electricity, and secondary school selection rather than taking their grievances to the relevant government officials.

Theft of livestock and related homicides had reached epidemic proportions in greater Unyamwezi at the time the Sungusungu rose to prominence. Several observers have

suggested that this may have reflected a form of primitive capital accumulation, denied to the leadership under the party code which prohibits leaders from having any sources of income outside their salary. While reported cattle theft was higher in other areas such as Ugogo and the Maasai steppe, the gross inefficiency of government law enforcement officials in Unyamwezi had led popular opinion to suspect that the police and judiciary were working in conjunction with rings of livestock thieves. Cattle protection syndicates, a brand of local mafia, extorted dues against the threat of theft in this area in the 1960s and 1970s, and seem to be the historical precedent upon which the current Sungusungu are based. Yet, as previously mentioned, the Sungusungu are not only about livestock.

The claim to special supernatural power is the overt mechanism which legitimizes the operation of this movement. The mganga who heads the regiment plays the role of diviner, and an mganga is generally thought of as a healer, a restorer of harmony. Yet the line between using supernatural power for positive results as opposed to the negative effects of witchcraft and sorcery is a fine one. Powerful medicine men are also suspected of being powerful witches. Residents of Kiloleni Mjini where I conducted household-level research reported that while the general incidence of petty crime had been drastically reduced during the Sungusungu's florescence, they also abused their public trust by terrorizing the community and sometimes

publicly humiliating local leaders. Fear of negative consequences through witchcraft was reported to maintain the Sungusungu's grassroots support. The uneasy alliance between the Sungusungu and the local government would appear to revolve around the Sungusungu claims to supernatural power which lies outside the realm of rational bureaucratic mechanisms of law enforcement and dispute settlement. It is this status, strongly enforced by local belief, which brings the Sungusungu into potential conflict with the government and party, as it has untold potential for widespread grassroots support.

Local Knowledge vs. Formal Knowledge:
A Village Dispute

One case, occurring in Kiloleni Mjini in May 1983, may serve to illustrate the difficulties inherent in the alliance between the Sungusungu and the state. According to the ward education officer who became a mediator in the affair, the Sungusungu were practicing a drill one morning on the grounds of the local primary school. The weather was hot and sunny, and all of the windows to the classrooms were open. The headteacher came outside to ask the Sungusungu if they would practice elsewhere, as their singing and dancing was distracting the students from their studies. Following the request of the headteacher, the group moved to a nearby village where they engaged in training with the local peoples' militia (a party organization).

Late that afternoon the Sungusungu returned to the school where they called for the headteacher. When he appeared they accused him of interfering with their activities and denounced him as being in opposition to the president, who they claimed sanctioned their activities. The headteacher was ordered to take off his shirt and engage in running and a punishment drill in front of his students. In other versions of this story reported by teachers, he was stripped naked and beaten. He was then taken before the village party chairman who, by his silence on the matter, sanctioned the actions taken by the Sungusungu.

The following day, the headteacher sent a delegation of teachers to register a complaint against the Sungusungu with the divisional education officer and the divisional party secretary. The officer and secretary formed a committee to discuss the dispute with the village leaders and the Sungusungu. At this meeting the Sungusungu narrated their version of the incident, claimed that they were the "army of the party," and maintained that they had the sanction of the president. The headteacher retorted that in this case the Sungusungu were not performing security-related functions, that they were causing a disturbance on school grounds, and that he had been publicly humiliated in front of the students, for which he⁹ threatened to press the matter in the courts. The committee found in favor of the headteacher, and the Sungusungu

were instructed to tender a public apology and were given a severe warning not to "take the law into their own hands."

Residents in this village reported that as little as one year previously, it was considered unsafe to travel between villages, even a short distance on bicycle or on foot, or walk unaccompanied in the village at night. The village has its own "jobless corner," on the edge of the central square next to an abandoned lorry. Unemployed young men loiter here to sell petty commodities, and the villagers express concern that these unemployed primary school leavers might become a local "hooligan" threat to the peace of the community. The Sungusungu, in cooperation with the local peoples' militia, maintain regular patrol forces, which either through threat or actual use of force have contained criminal activity to a minimum. For this, the local residents express appreciation. Yet as this case illustrates, the Sungusungu do not always confine themselves to security activities and at times have used their claims to supernatural power and state sanction as a means to intimidate both residents and leaders. The incident described above defies easy explanation because the factional lines in the dispute are not entirely clear. On the one hand, the Sungusungu pose themselves in alliance with the state as represented by the party. The teachers in this case are government officials, also agents of the state. Yet many village teachers (and particularly in this case, the headteacher) are outsiders posted from other

regions, whereas party leaders are local notables. Teachers form part of the tiny bureaucratic elite within the village. They have little or no permanent investment in the local community. As already noted, alien residents who have little moral compulsion to redistribute are prime candidates for witchcraft accusation. Abrahams (1987) reports a florescence of witchkilling in the area since the 1970s, with a ban placed on witchfinding diviners in Shiyanga region in the 1980s where the police commissioner "alleged that an average of 19 people per month have been killed on suspicion that they were witches" (1987, 187). The Sungusungu are not the only actors involved in witch-divining, yet this is one key area into which their activities later expanded. This, and other aspects of their organization, invites historical comparison.

Historical Precedents

The Ruga ruga

To consolidate their public persona, the Sungusungu borrow heavily from symbols of the past. Before German pacification, Nyamwezi complex chiefdoms maintained large military regiments at the forefront of which were bands of fierce mercenaries known as ruga ruga. Their red garb, said to represent the blood of their adversaries and the mutilated body parts of their captives, and scary appearance inspired terror in the hearts of their enemies.

Shorter (1968, 241) draws from several eyewitness reports to provide a description of Nyungu ya Mawe's army.

They dressed in feathers and beads, carried bows and arrows and two or three spears, and beat drums and wore bell-anklets before going to war. Sympathetic magic was an essential part of their equipment. The chief and lieutenant of the regiment possessed a potent war medicine made up of the body parts of their victims, which the soldiers were made to imbibe. The lieutenant maintained an iron discipline over his troops and booty was awarded for bravery. Nyungu's ruga ruga were a heterogeneous crew of war captives, deserters from caravans, runaway slaves, and other displaced young men who were without family ties and owed allegiance to him alone (Shorter 1968, 241). As mentioned in chapter 3, the resiliency of Nyungu's chiefdom lay in the routinization of his magical/military authority. It seems he did this in two steps: first, by disciplining a faction of outcasts, and second, by recruiting his civil governors from these ranks. Although he was considered a terrifying brigand, the chiefdom he established endured until the colonial period and he initiated the separation of sacred and secular chiefly administrative functions.

A more striking parallel for the contemporary Sungusungu movement is provided by Unomah's description of the ruga ruga standing army of Unyanyembe (1970, 22-25). The Nyanyembe army was recruited from the chiefdom and maintained entirely at its own expense. Despite superficial similarities with the warlord organizations (in garb, hemp smoking, the use of ngoma, and iron-clad discip-

line), these soldiers were organized into age-sets with special functions. The youngest set consisted of boys from ten to eighteen years old, whose job it was to guard the chief when the older sets were on a campaign and to run his errands. As members of this set, they were given intensive military training in order to prepare them for entry into the middle group, composed of unmarried men from twenty to thirty-five years of age. The middle group comprised the main body of the army and was utilized in aggressive actions. Experienced married soldiers made up the older regiment. They were allowed to reside outside the chief's compound and were preferred in defensive actions, where skill counted more than fanatical bravery. The generals and lieutenants of the Nyanyembe ruga ruga were princes or members of the wandewa.

According to Unomah, the Nyanyembe ruga ruga performed the function of the former royal bodyguard, as well as serving as a standing army. They guarded the ntemi's fort and kept watch around the royal village and in road camps. A special detail acted as a nightly police force. When an alleged criminal or enemy of the chiefdom was arrested or killed at night,

the ntemi gave to them a cattle (sic) of about the age of the man killed, to encourage them. They were a coercive force, and were usually sent to arrest offenders or punish condemned criminals...They were not paid wages, but were maintained by the state. Some of them who brought in booty and captives were allowed to keep some of them for themselves (Unomah 1970, 24-25).

Unomah's materials, based on oral tradition, are of particular interest because, at the time when I was conducting research, historical analogies between the Sungusungu and the ruga ruga were vigorously denied in public (both by state officials and by intellectuals). It is possible that the parallels suggested by the Nyanyembe case were overlooked because of the popular notion that all of the ruga ruga of the nineteenth century Nyamwezi area resembled the alienated underclass which comprised the warlord armies. It is also possible that a perception of the Sungusungu as a revitalization of the ntemi's traditional army would pose a greater threat to state authority, than the view that they are a decentralized underclass.

The Basumba Batale of the Sukuma

The age-set character of the Nyanyembe ruga ruga suggests another analogy to the political function of the Sukuma young men's society, the elika. This age grade was one of a number of organizations among the Sukuma peasantry which acted to counterbalance the authority of the chief. In the Sukuma case, the elika had the opposite function of the Nyanyembe ruga ruga, since they operated independently of the chief. Liebenow (1960, 237) describes them as a young men's society, but then indicates that they were comprised of both males and females of each village. The elika were also organized into dance societies and their particular mission was to aid the aged and afflicted. They

were expected to maintain good order in the village by enforcing proper moral conduct. Although they operated independently of the chief, he relied on them for recruiting warriors, organizing collective labor, and assisting immigrants in building new settlements. The leaders of the elika, the basumba batale, were very influential at the village level. Liebenow indicates that they arranged labor contracts with the chiefs through a form of collective bargaining, they held the right to allocate land, and organized public demonstrations in front of the chief's compound to force his abdication when it was clear that his ritual powers had failed. Therefore, they occupied an ambivalent position vis-à-vis the chief, providing a youthful moral check on his power on one hand, and reinforcing the social code which maintained his authority among the peasantry on the other hand. As I will show, the Sungusungu occupy precisely such an ambiguous status when they act as agents of the state.

Hunting Cults and Long-distance Trade

Dr. Mbwiliza of the history department of the University of Dar es Salaam (Kerner and Mbwiliza 1984) points to the revitalization of hunting and agricultural guilds which operated as mutual aid societies while the Nyamwezi became dispersed during the 19th and 20th centuries. Guilds of elephant hunters and snake charmers exemplify these formations, their members consisting of free men whose loyalty

was ensured through initiations and oaths performed in spiritually powerful caves and rock shelters in the isolated bush. These societies offered mutual protection and, through the mediation of medicine men and diviners, invoked the magico-religious power of nature spirits to solve concrete problems in the everyday lives of Nyamwezi porters along caravan routes and in the urban centers of the coast.

Witch-cleansing Cults during the Colonial and Immediate Post-Independence Era

At least one of Abrahams' informants made a direct comparison between the Sungusungu and the Mcape movement, although Abrahams gives little attention to this analogy. The Mcape movement, originating in Mozambique and Nyasaland in 1933, swept northward into Ufipa, Tabora, and Manyoni (Iliffe 1979, 367-368), making a periodic reappearance under the name Kamcape every ten years (1943 to 1944, 1954, and 1963 to 1964 [Willis 1968]). As as described by Abrahams in the mid 1970s, it was a mass witch-cleansing cult in Shinyanga. Inspired by visionary prophecy in areas of intensive Christian missionary activity in Central Africa, the movement combined such modern symbolic devices as mirrors and whistles with an older form of magic ordeal, administered to entire villages, to weed out suspected sorcerers.

Willis's description of Kamcape provides some striking parallels with the rise of the Sungusungu. In Ufipa, as in

Tabora and Shinyanga, the boundary dividing a sorcerer and a magician-doctor is unclear. Sorcerers exhibit moral and physically inverted behavior characteristic of evildoers--a pattern noted elsewhere in East and Central Africa (Middleton and Winter 1963). They are able to harm their victims through direct means (poison) and by using their supernatural powers at a distance. The Kamcape movement was directed against such culprits, but in a particular way. The accusations were public events, and the entire community, by submitting to the cult's ordeal, participated in the divination of the alleged sorcerer. The difference between Kamcape witch-cleansing and ordinary witchcraft accusation led Willis to characterize this movement as one that coped with general social conflict, rather than interpersonal disputes and misfortunes (1968, 12-14).

The pattern of operation also indicates some parallels with the Sungusungu. Kamcape was decentralized and operated through localized cults in the more remote areas of the countryside. Several cult members would arrive at night at the hut of a village headman to persuade him that a witch-hunting ordeal was necessary. A fee would be agreed upon. After spending the night and leaving the next morning, these "scouts" would be followed several days or weeks later by a large number of cult members. Kamcape cult members required all villagers to drink a special potion and to have special "medicine" rubbed into incisions made in their foreheads as an inoculation against sorcery.

Those accused of sorcery were similarly treated and told that if they practiced sorcery in the future, the medicine would kill them. Evildoers thus were not cast out, but reincorporated into the community under supernatural penalty (Willis 1968, 4-6).

Sungusungu operations show some parallels. Like the Kamcape cult, they are decentralized and operate in consultation with local leaders, who undoubtedly provide insider information on troublesome members of the community. Alleged troublemakers are subject to public humiliation, but eventual reincorporation. Powerful medicine to counteract evil is administered through potions and rubbed into incisions (Abrahams 1987, 184), but in the Sungusungu case the medicine is not applied to the community as a whole, but to the movement's members. It is for this reason, supposedly, that each regiment is led by a powerful medicine-doctor. What makes the Sungusungu case so intriguing is, again, that it is never entirely clear to the community or the state whether such leaders are using their supernatural power for good or evil.

Ngoma and Modernity

One final well-spring of tradition from which the Sungusungu may draw their strength is the institution of dance societies. Dance societies have a long history in east and central Africa and serve a combination of therapeutic and political purposes. As can be seen in the case of the Sukuma elika, the two functions are inseparable when

the moral health of the community is linked to the charisma of its leader. Throughout the precolonial period in the western interior, dance societies organized youth and served as a recruiting base for collective labor, community services, and defense. The Nyanyembe ruga ruga was "notorious for being noisy and danced jubilantly for days after each campaign" (Unomah 1970, 24). Through movement and song, these dance societies expressed several contradictory themes: solidarity, competition, submission to authority rooted in age and office, and a challenge to the coercive or ineffective exercise of such authority.

The regimental character of these organizations and their appeal to youth has proved to be both enduring and flexible to changing political and economic circumstances. In the early twentieth century, dance societies along the east African coast began to adopt a form which both borrowed and parodied the military organization of European occupation. This institution, known as Beni, spread throughout the interior into central Africa where it gave rise to the urban Kalela dance detailed in Mitchell's (1956) classic study.

Beni, as described by Ranger (1975), was a dance/welfare society with a military brass band format. The Beni repertoire included swahili songs, whose lyrics were commentaries on public affairs; dance drills; parades; and an elaborate hierarchy of male and female officers who were uniformed and ranked with titles.

Beni flourished on the Tanganyikan coast and interior towns during the German colonial era. It was originally an urban institution and its members were young men who combined the wangwana prestige of swahili culture with a familiarity of the western world, gained through long distance trade and formal education. As mentioned in chapter 3, the German administration recruited clerks, policemen, and native army officers from among the wangwana and Nyamwezi. Such young men imported Beni to Tabora and Kigoma when they were posted upcountry. Ranger notes that when Beni took hold in the interior, it quickly came to be dominated by local dance societies. In Tabora Town, Beni may have provided a similar outlet for local tensions as it did in Ujiji, where free men, who moved from the towns into the countryside, faced competition from ex-slaves, who formed the original proletariat (Ranger 1975, 42).

Beni is said to have disappeared in the interior towns with the collapse of trade and the withdrawal of civil servants from the region during the First World War (Ranger 1975, 101), but it was quickly replaced with local "improvement" associations, described by colonial officials as having an ngoma component. Such societies announced "modern" intentions: self-help, economic enterprise, and an ascetic ethic. Smoking, drinking, gambling, and adultery were banned to members of these associations, which opened clubhouses, savings accounts, and cooperative shops.

During the 1930s, the overt assertion of modernity expressed in such associations made them targets for suspicion among missionaries and the native authorities. Because these associations performed ngoma, among other activities, the evangelical missions, in particular, viewed them as connected to pagan ritual practices and drinking. Yet the economic message of these associations also provoked a deeper fear, harbored by these same missionaries, that an alienated, educated native elite was emerging. In other words, Beni crystallized the fundamental contradictions of the missionary endeavor which Beidelman (1982, 127-152) describes so well for the C.M.S. case in Kilosa. The missionary image of the African projected a childlike innocence, unspoiled by the damaging influences of industrial Europe. Childish innocence demanded the restraining influence of adult supervision. True conversion, with socialization into European language, culture, and education, implied a dangerous exposure to secular temptation.

Additionally, these associations threatened chiefly authority. In several Tabora cases, Ranger documents how the reconstituted Beni associations, self-supporting and free of patronage links to community elders, expressed the tension between older, uneducated, traditional authority figures and a young, salaried, educated class (1975, 108-109).

An intriguing contemporary use of the Beni format is its incorporation by the state into the national service dance-choir groups. Such groups perform during national holidays. They are organized into ranks, parade and drill in uniform, dance, and sing swahili songs which glorify the state. I was able to observe one such performance, held in Tabora Town for the celebration of the National Parents' Organization Week, during the height of the Campaign Against Economic Sabotage. The songs performed were praise songs for the national leadership, yet through dance, gesture, and facial expression the performers conveyed how the superficial lyrical structure could serve as double entendre. The message conveyed was the opposite of what must have been intended by the composer. Through dance, the ngoma suggested that young people were not swayed by the smooth words of older politicians, who were lining their pockets with state funds. The movements conveyed a warning, as the dancers asserted their claims to be the guardians of public morality. The message was not lost on the regional and district officials who were in attendance and who laughed, not without some nervousness, throughout the performance.

Unlike Beni, the Sungusungu assert authority on the basis of "traditional" knowledge and practice. However, the history of east African dance societies suggests that superficial differences in form belie similarities in purpose. Ngoma takes its original meaning from the drum, a

chiefly symbol. Ngoma is an institution which stands in an ambiguous relation to authority, has the capacity for the recruitment of heterogeneous groups of young people at a grass-roots level, and provides a means of commanding popular attention through ironic reflection on the abuse of power.

Political Organization in the Postcolonial Era

Despite the valorization of traditional symbols and supernatural claims, the Sungusungu must be seen in terms of the threat they represented to organized state authority as they operated within the cracks of the system, the point of weak articulation between the government and the party. The state initially welcomed their efforts as an adjunct to the local people's militia. The president and the prime minister gave them public sanction, the impetus for their claim that they are the army of the party. One may question, in a territory which houses the largest regiment of the state military, why the party needs an army. State officials soon became queasy about the reported abuses of the Sungusungu. The turning point came when the government launched its national campaign called the "War Against Economic Saboteurs."

The National Campaign Against Economic Sabotage

The ideological campaign of 1983 was variously referred to as a crackdown and an ongoing war. War motifs were employed in describing the enemies of socialism and the

state. Special procedures--the suspension of normal regulations governing detention and prosecution--also suggested a battle between the CCM government and the racketeers regime. In its initial phase, the campaign was overtly aimed at breaking the stranglehold of the black market. Therefore, it is important to outline how this distorted form of distribution operated.

In a provocative working paper on the extreme East African case of Ugandan magendo, Green (1981) makes the argument that the ascendancy of black market control over the structure of distribution has its origin in the deterioration of a legal economic order and weak state political control. He suggests a parallel in form and organization between the rise of East African magendo-- "a distorted form of capitalism"--and the development of fourteenth- to eighteenth-century European capitalism. As in early European capitalism, magendo operates most strongly in areas such as transport, long distance trade, and finance, with food magendo dependent upon transport magendo. It has evolved its own internal hierarchy and security force. Magendo operations in some respects mirror the medieval practices of forestalling, engrossing, and regrating.¹⁰ The exploitative nature of its methods of primitive accumulation are openly recognized and deplored. In its virtual monopoly over the forces of distribution, magendo begins to dominate the organization of production.

In order to buy on the black market, producers are compelled to sell on it.

Although both Tanzania and Uganda were negatively affected by the radical shifts in terms of trade beginning in 1973,¹¹ the two economies cannot be strictly compared. Tanzania has had a relatively stable regime since its independence in 1961 and, despite economic hardship, has managed to provide a range of basic services to its citizens, although these are in a deteriorating state.¹² In the eyes of the majority of its citizens the government is still a legitimate authority, although each wave of economic shocks threatens to undermine its control. A thwarted coup attempt in late 1982 preceded the initiation of the "War Against Economic Sabotage," suggesting a link between the two events.

The Tanzanian state is, in any case, not the Ugandan state, and neither is it strictly comparable to early European states. Where magendo exists, it does so at the periphery of international capitalism. It is unlikely to evolve in a way that will benefit relations of production, since its goal is accumulation by redistribution rather than the creation of wealth. The permeation of magendo into the everyday sphere of legal distribution in Tanzania appeared almost complete in 1984. The state's first response was to attack both the black market and shadow distributors.

Decentralized government had led to a weak linkage of command from the center to the periphery of the system. This had become increasingly troublesome given the economic conditions outlined elsewhere in this thesis. Tabora houses the Western division of the army and was considered a particularly sensitive area. Additionally, although it is not a border region (which are reputedly the hotbeds of smuggling), Tabora with its critical position along the central railway line in the middle of the country made it a crossroads for interregional magendo trade.

Officials concerned with the distribution of essential goods and services were thrust into a precariously ambivalent position. On the one hand, they were increasingly frustrated in their attempts to curb illicit activities. On the other hand, they were sorely tempted to engage in schemes to divert normal channels of distribution to supplement their own diminishing wages. Anxiety about the extent to which this situation was growing beyond official control was symbolically manifested in the crackdown against economic sabotage. When the campaign was launched in March 1983 it was publicized as an exercise to flush out large-scale magendo racketeers. However, since many peasants and workers were involved in extralegal trade as well, the campaign soon began to affect their activities.

Local definitions of economic sabotage ranged from large-scale black market operations, to peddling, loitering, and failing to run a productive farm. Rallies were

organized around the country by the government to support the campaign. In Tabora Town one such rally was disrupted by protests and a mass exodus. The protestors carried banners accusing the government. "We suspect," read one poster, "that the leaders conducting the campaign are themselves saboteurs." To deflect the concern of the average citizen that the campaign was directed against him, the crackdown quickly expanded to include a purge of corrupt leadership. All citizens were called upon to inform on saboteurs, large and small. Numerous leaders were fired, demoted, or shifted during this period for failing to comply faithfully with the crackdown procedures. Former president Nyerere complained that, "Some leaders purposefully delayed actions on tips from members of the public to enable culprits to destroy evidence while others alerted them to impending arrest." He contended that racketeering seemed too fully established for it to be running on its own accord, and he promised that necessary measures would be taken to ensure a clean and responsible government. "We are going to overthrow the racketeers regime. We have only one government--the CCM government" (Daily News, 9 April 1983). Suspects were detained without charge and tried subsequently by specially constituted tribunals. Charges of police and judicial corruption flourished.

The Army of the Party

It was during this period that the Sungungu's activities increased and expanded, and this was also the turning

point at which the state publicly attempted to co-opt them. They were praised by government leaders in their efforts to "fight crime and build socialism," but were repeatedly warned not to take the law into their own hands. At the same time they were to be integrated fully into the local party militia, to be given military training, political education, and to be armed. They were widely deployed throughout the campaign to other regions to weed out corrupt leaders and inform on racketeers. In October of 1983 the late prime minister Sokoine directed regional officials in Mwanza Town to deploy the Sungusungu to weed out racketeers. While he warned the Sungusungu to cooperate with the police and to refrain from molesting law-abiding citizens, he also commended them for carrying out a "cultural revolution in the country." He directed the Sungusungu to identify "racketeers, saboteurs, loiterers, and prostitutes." "There are some people," the late prime minister contended, "who feared the Sungusungu because such people had something too bad to hide." The Sungusungu were not to fear anybody, "including those holding top posts in the party and government. In the rural areas," he continued, "criminals, including witches, would be deported to other parts of the country where special villages would be established for them" (Daily News, 27 October 1983).

One month later Party Secretary General Kawawa addressed Sungusungu members in a rally in Shinyanga region and urged them to be vigilant against "people bent on

sabotaging the country's economy," and cautioned them against what he described as "corrupt elements used by Tanzania's enemies to disrupt the country's industrial, transport, and communications systems" (Daily News 13 November 1983). Despite official attempts to co-opt their activities, continued reports indicated a persistent resistance to integrating the Sungusungu within the state structure of authority. While they invented their organization on the traditions of the past, they are not above invoking the constitutional clause which rests security and defense with "the People," and which declares that the logistics of combat will be determined on the battlefield. In the moral equivalent of war, the Sungusungu have been capable of promoting themselves as divinely empowered moral warriors, whose army is the people and whose enemy is the state.

The Meaning of Extraordinary Discourse

The extraordinary discourse represented in the Sungusungu movement combines metaphors of both peace and war. In one way, the formation of the Sungusungu may be seen to represent a variety of ngoma. As it is not uncommon for healing practitioners to be ex-patients, cured of the disease they now heal, so it is not particularly surprising that former cattle thieves may become ritual cattle catchers. Certainly the Sungusungu originated during a period and in an area where the mediation of criminal activity was particularly ineffective, and whatever their initial motivation, they were remarkably effective in

apprehending and prosecuting criminals and deterring crime. Their successful performance in this arena stemmed, in part, from their ability to mobilize symbols borrowed from the past which still carry affective meaning for the populations where they originated. The motif of tribe, evoking kinship and community; the notion of tradition, as a referent to time-honored ways of dealing with social disruption; and the manipulation of magic, to convey the impression that the divination and correction of social disequilibrium requires esoteric knowledge, have served to reinforce the belief that the Sungusungu are the agents most capable of containing crime.

Yet their spears, headdresses, and affiliation with the peoples' militia suggests another vision, that of warriors. They are compared to the *ruqa ruqa*. Their name variously means "those of peace" and those organized as a fighting regiment, with a bitter grudge. Like the cult members of Mcape and Kamcape before them, their activities are viewed as potentially competing with the power of the state. Willis (1968) concluded that the revolutionary potential of Kamcape was limited to the cathartic function of harmonizing the tensions caused by stresses of modernization at the local level. Beidelman (1970), studying a vigilante group in the Morogoro Region that resembled the Sungusungu, focuses on the disruptive aspect of "tribalistic" revivalism. This vigilante group, *Umwano*, the Kaguru word for war cry, was also organized ostensibly for the purposes of

security and defense against livestock theft, and provoked government sanctions against taking the law into their own hands. Yet the leaders of Umwano were agents of the colonial government themselves. Abrahams (1987) prefers the designation "vigilante," as opposed to "social bandits," for the Sungusungu because it connotes a kind of frontier, grass-roots law and order organization which takes up the slack in a weak state system and runs into the danger of operating in opposition to the state. Social bandits¹³ refer, at least potentially, to a more transformative capacity. A social bandit is concerned more broadly with social inequity and commits crime to reverse an immoral order. For Abrahams, the activities of the Sungusungu are not directed against the unjustly privileged, but against ordinary citizens whom they judge as criminals.

While I do not want to claim that the Sungusungu are a revolutionary movement, I believe that by considering the transformation of the movement, in conjunction with wider state discourse which orders the morality of accumulation, it is possible to see the extraordinary discourse of the Sungusungu as an expression of local resistance to the distortion of state policies which have allowed an exploitative black market to flourish. This would partly explain why there is dissension among the party and the government as to whether Sungusungu operations should be encouraged, expanded and integrated, or curtailed and suppressed.

NOTES

1. Masanja (1984) justifies the application of this term to the Sungusungu in several ways. They are a decentralized, grassroots organization and they "form a collective endeavour to promote or resist change in the society of which they form a part" (as quoted in Abrahams 1987).

2. Abrahams (1987, 182) suggests that the connection of Sungusungu with ants may derive from what Nyamwezi informants call the groups' "biting power," combined with a reference to the black cloths which Sukuma pastoralists sometimes wear.

3. Sabasaba and Rweyemamu (1984) and Masanja (1984) indicate that the group originated in Kahama ya Nhalanga in 1982 and that a seer called Kishosha Mang'ombe ("returner of the cattle") was its founder.

4. Daily News, 28 July 1983.

5. The Daily News (10 August 1983) reported 11,453 cattle thefts and 15 murders related to cattle thefts in Shinyanga, Maswa, Kahama, and Bariadi districts in 1981. In 1982, 21,922 cattle thefts and eight murders related to cattle thefts were reported in the same districts. A total of 52,786 cattle were stolen throughout the country in 1982.

6. Ngoma translates as a drum, a dance, and a performance group invested with ritual, social solidarity functions and supported by a magico-religious ideology. I am grateful to John Janzen for delineating the aspects of ngoma which relate to the Sungusungu (Janzen personal communication).

7. My informants regularly employed Swahili terms for the leadership structure of the Sungusungu. Abrahams' informants utilized Nyamwezi terms which refer to the traditional structure of the chiefdom (e.g., ntemi for the leader/chief, nfumu for the diviner). His informants also report that each localized group has a secretary and that the groups collect "subscriptions" from the membership.

8. Inspector General of Police Liani reported that between August 1982 and October 1983 the Sungusungu had not

reported a single case to the police in Geita district (Daily News, 29 November 1983).

9. The headteacher in this case seemed to have been particularly confident of the correctness of his position and his backing by education department officials. I was privately told that a number of similar incidents had occurred in which citizens had been too afraid to publicly confront Sungusungu members who abused them. For some, this fear stemmed from a belief that the Sungusungu and the village leadership were too strongly aligned to expect a just hearing. For others, anxiety about confrontation was related to their belief in the supernatural powers of the Sungusungu, which were said to scare even the elders (wazee).

10. forestalling (taking control of goods between the initial supplier and market); engrossing (buying up the whole supply to manipulate prices); regrating (selling retail at extortionate prices)

11. Green's 1981 estimate: radical negative terms of trade shifts from 1972 to 1980 are perhaps as drastic as forty percent, meaning a loss of ten to twelve percent in real national purchasing power (1981, 1).

12. See International Labor Organization 1982 report "Basic Needs in Danger" for a discussion of the current economic crisis and its effect on basic services such as medical care, education, housing, transport, and energy.

13. Hobsbawm (1963) makes use of Marx's focus on the role of property law in the primary accumulation of capital. Resistance to such law, then, although viewed as criminal by the state, marks a stage in the development of class in an agrarian society. Social bandits, of the Robin Hood type, are, in his view, actually primitive rebels. The application of Hobsbawm's category of social bandit is explored in Crummey's collected volume, Banditry, Rebellion, and Social Protest (1986).

CHAPTER VI

HARD WORK AND SACRIFICES MADE FOR RAIN IN KILIMANJARO

Introduction

In March of 1984 a group of Chagga men and two women climbed to the "hill of their ancestors" and performed an act of rain sacrifice which they claimed had last been performed in 1936. In carrying out this act they risked excommunication from their church and government penalties. The motivation to conduct this performance and the multiple meanings collapsed into this extraordinary form of discourse is the subject of this chapter.

As in the previous interpretation of extraordinary discourse (chapter 5), the rain sacrifice event is analyzed both in terms of regional political and economic processes and the wider national context of ideological control manifested in a government campaign. The first section provides a description of the event itself and then links its performance to several regional concerns: a three-year drought and subsequent famine, a breakdown in old patterns of reciprocity and redistribution, the reascendancy of chiefly power through reconstituted local district council elections, and state measures to resettle land-poor Chagga in other areas of the country. This last set of measures is then discussed in reference to a government campaign,

launched earlier that year, called the Human Resources Deployment Act. This campaign and its impact on the city and countryside is examined in the following section. The conclusion considers the meaning of this extraordinary ritual performance from the point of view of participants, the wider local community and, objectively, as a form of protest and construction of an alternative social reality.

Analysis of the Event

Description

Shortly before the rains and planting season were due to commence in 1984, I was invited to attend a rain sacrifice ritual to be conducted by several male elders in the village where I had been conducting research. The ceremony would follow the "traditional Chagga way," and had not been performed in the years since it had been outlawed by the colonial government and the church. I was strongly encouraged to attend because I was an anthropologist, and, "We know you are interested in culture. If you want to know about our culture then you must ask the elders. They are the holders of knowledge."

Community opinion was divided regarding the impending ceremony. Several educated businessmen scoffed that the ritual was of no importance: "You see how these old men time such things--right before the rains? All they want is to sacrifice so they can eat meat at our expense." I checked for permission with the divisional party chairman. He seemed dubious. Yes, I could attend if I wished, and

yes, the elders had been granted a government parade permit for the occasion, but only after a heated debate with local officials. Perhaps he would send the party secretary to accompany me "in case anything went wrong," and to prevent me from interfering by "seeing the things women were not allowed to see" (the actual sacrifices). Such rituals were "traditional" in his view, but many members of the community were "not happy with how this is being done." Members of the nine clans (the village has some thirty clans) who were to perform the ritual spent the better part of the week collecting money to purchase the sacrificial animals and making other preparations, including consultation with a diviner to determine an auspicious day for the performance. A sense of anticipatory uneasiness pervaded the village. The bishop of the Lutheran Church warned that any villagers who participated in the ceremony would be excom-¹municated.

As an overview, the ritual performance consisted of three stages: the entry, the sacrifice, and the closure/²return. I will briefly describe each stage in turn.

The Entry

Several hours of the ceremony were taken up with a trek to the place of major sacrifice, during which minor sacrifices, prayers, and the revelation of mytho-historical knowledge occurred. Elders from the nine clans in charge of the ritual led the trek, wearing Maasai cloaks, carrying

spears, and intoning prayers in the Maasai language. These clans, as the myth of origin goes, are descended from Maasai ancestors who migrated up from the plains below the mountain, bringing wealth (in cattle) and superior knowledge (in the political sphere as well as the supernatural, as manifested in their ability to control rain). They were therefore empowered to subdue the horticultural and foraging people who were the original residents, killing them in some cases, incorporating them in others, and absorbing their knowledge and skills in agriculture and in the preparation of beer and honey. The trek to the "hill of the ancestors" represents a reversal of time and space. The starting point of the trek is the place of final ancestral settlement, and the ceremony moves backward progressively until it reaches the point of the ancestors' original settlement.

Throughout the entry phase the myth of settlement was repeated in a piecemeal fashion, and several minor sacrifices of goats were performed in Maasai fashion. These sacrifices were accompanied by prayers for rain and the use³ of plants which are believed to have restorative power. The entry phase ended with a communal meal of roasted goat meat and a period of contemplation before proceeding to the⁴ point of major sacrifice.

The Sacrifice

At the hill of the ancestors a pantomime of market barter was carried out by the only two female participants

in the ceremony. These should be "a very young girl who has not yet known a man and an old woman." The women in this pantomime were dressed in Maasai garb and they acted out a barter of Chagga staples: beans, finger millet, bananas, and maize. This was followed by prayer and the sacrifice of a black ox, after which the intestines of the sacrificed animals were plunged into a "sacred pool" in the ravine below. Libations of beer and honey were poured at the base of the tree where the sacrifice was conducted, and irimbi songs and dance "in praise of the living dead" were performed as the ox was butchered, roasted, and finally eaten. Ablutions were performed in anticipation of the exit.

Closure/Return

The final stage of the ceremony commenced with the return trek to the starting point in the central market square. The participants were warned by the elders to run and not look back. The danger unleashed by the power of the ritual would harm those who looked at the sacrificial spot, and it was necessary to run to return home before the rain fell. Several kilometers from the hill of the ancestors the pace slowed and again several stops were made as the elders pointed out places of settlement and historical importance. Upon return to the central market, the participants disbanded in groups and were welcomed by the village residents into several beer clubs.

A light rain fell late that night. The leaders of the ceremony received word the next day that they were no longer welcome in church.

I have given only the barest outline of the complex action and rich symbolic material presented in this ceremony. A structural (internal) analysis merits separate attention. In the next three subsections I analyze this ritual event within the wider social context in which it was performed.

Drought, Famine, and the Failure in Redistribution

To begin with the most obvious explanation, the performance of this ritual was connected to a three-year recurrent drought. The ritual was timed auspiciously to coincide with the beginning of the rainy season, yet the participants had no reason to count on the rains which had failed them over the past years. Drought conditions, in combination with economic crisis, had produced a severe food shortage in Kilimanjaro by 1984. Famine, njaa, was a word on every villager's lips. Thus a literal interpretation of this extraordinary discourse, as a means to correct some supernatural/social imbalance causing grave misfortune, cannot be easily dismissed. Kristy Cook and I have presented a detailed analysis of the effects of food shortage in the region during this period (Cook and Kerner 1987), and I will only briefly recapitulate our argument here.

We do not contend that the drought or the effect of economic crisis was more severe in Kilimanjaro than other regions, only that its impact was striking given the relative prosperity of the area. The outcome of the progressive commercialization of agriculture, increasing land scarcity, lowering prices for export crops, and outmigration to pursue salaried occupations had intensified class differentiation between households in the region. Small and middle peasant households particularly felt the squeeze of the inflationary market and labor shortage. Prior to the drought, middle peasant households were able to cope with increasing shortages primarily through the commercial activities of women (particularly in beer brewing), while poor peasants had no choice but to sell both their land and labor.

During the drought, such commercial strategies in middle peasant households were no longer sufficient. Off-farm income was insufficient to pay for the grain needed by these households which had sold off much of their own food crops early in the season. It was impossible to find grain at the government subsidized price, and black market rates fluctuated between four and five times the government rate. Finally, the distribution of emergency grain supplies shipped from the United States did nothing to alleviate the pressure on small and middle peasant households. The local women's organization (UWT) was particularly vocal in charging the local leadership with holding up the distribution

of maize, selling the bulk of it in the black market. The failure to redistribute food and the income necessary to purchase food erupted in a series of disputes in the public arena of village politics and in the domestic realm between husbands and wives.

Local leaders who argued against the performance of the rain sacrifice contended that supernatural intervention in natural conditions was already organized within the Lutheran Church. Having given up the Chagga god Ruwa upon conversion to Christianity, the only proper deity to propitiate was Jesus Christ. Prayers for rain were a regular component of the church service every Sunday at the end of the dry season. The performance of this pagan ritual was therefore an act of blasphemy. The participants in the sacrifice were quick to point out that these same community leaders were important elders in the church, that poor peasants were expected to bring gifts of food and livestock to support the church hierarchy on a regular basis, and that their prayers to Jesus, and their expectations of customary redistribution from more well-to-do community residents, had gone unanswered. These community leaders were strongly aligned with both the church and the new government district council.

Political "Weather"

It is not my intention to present the factional lines of dispute over this ritual as a matter of confrontation between "traditionalists" and "modernizers." Nor do I see

it as a generational confrontation. Elders from the nine clans led the sacrifice ceremony, but many young men were in attendance, eager, they said, "to learn about our culture before it disappears." Many of these young men were educated at the secondary school level and beyond. Most of the leaders who opposed the ritual were middle-aged and older, and a number were from chiefly families.

In 1984 the state reinstituted local district councils. These councils would be composed of elected and appointed officials and would be responsible for levying local taxes to pay for district roads, primary schools, and other public projects. A new house tax was imposed to raise revenue and further individual levies imposed to raise money for the National SabaSaba (independence) Day celebrations to be held that year in Kilimanjaro. Each year the national holiday is celebrated in a different region. The regional authorities are responsible for raising considerable revenue from the districts to pay for a week of mass public displays and to make a significant contribution to the national budget.

The timing of the district council elections and the imposition of the new tax and celebration levy, in conjunction with the effects of drought and famine, raised the ire of community residents. In all of the district elections in this region, council leaders were sons of chiefly families. In the area where the sacrifice was conducted, the major (overt) complaint from the council leader and his

supporters was that the sacrifice had been "improperly performed." Only the chief himself can properly lead such a sacrifice as the living representative of the ancestors. The leader of this sacrifice was merely the descendant of the chief's messenger. How could such a man know the correct prayers or have the power to appeal to the ancestors? In his words, the entire ceremony was "an insult." He himself did not lead the sacrifice, because "to do so would be to go against the church."

Thus, in one way, such a ceremony can be seen not as a protest against the chiefdom itself, but how such aristocratic powers are currently aligned within the structure of a state which ignores the severe economic plight of its citizens at the local level. However, the district council was responsible for more than raising taxes. It was charged with the local implementation of a national campaign concerned with resettlement.

The Threat of Resettlement

I discuss the organization and impact of the "Hard Work" campaign in the section which follows. Regional translations of this national campaign differed. In Kili-manjaro (as I discuss below) the impact of this new legislation was seen in an initiative to resettle land-poor peasants to other, less intensively cultivated regions. A district council committee was expressly formed for this purpose.

Chagga farmers have a sound historical basis for a collective fear of resettlement. The founding of the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association in 1925 was a direct response to the organization of settler farmers into an association which lobbied for land alienation beginning in 1923. In the 1930s the enclosures of land on neighboring Mt. Meru again raised the threat of resettlement. If the extraordinary discourse of rain sacrifice is juxtaposed against this contemporary resettlement fear, then it is possible to understand why the myth of original clan settlement figures so prominently in the ceremony. Mythical verification in this ceremony communicates claims to land and control over its productive and reproductive powers through supernatural sanction. If the owners of such power (the descendants of the chiefly families) have abdicated their possessive privilege on behalf of the rest of the community, then it is the community which must intervene to stake their continuing claim to land and the right to the fruits which hard work brings. The impact of the Hard Work campaign was first seen in the urban areas, and I describe its trajectory in the next section.

The Hard Work Campaign (Nguvu Kazi)

Background to the Campaign

Nguvu Kazi was not initially aimed at the harassment of small-scale traders and service sector operators. Nguvu Kazi was implemented with the simple aim of relocating the urban unemployed back to the rural sector where they could

be gainfully engaged in agricultural production. In theory, at least, land is neither a commodity nor scarce in Tanzania, and everyone who is motivated to do so can obtain access to a plot and be a self-employed, small-scale farmer. However, as my description will show, the development of this campaign entailed the detention, registration, and attempted resettlement to rural areas dominated by government-owned plantations of thousands of urban jobless persons along with traders, vendors, workers, and housewives. This was supposed to alleviate reputed rural labor shortages during the 1983/84 planting season. Furthermore, certain regional responses to this campaign indicate an attempt to redress urban/rural labor imbalances internal to regions and served as an impetus to recapture the labor of landless peasants where population pressure on intensively cultivated plots was particularly acute.

It is apparent that multiple definitions of productive labor were at stake here in this campaign. The phrase kila mtu afanye kazi (every person must do work) has served as a slogan of Tanzania's commitment to socialist development through an emphasis on agricultural production since the Arusha Declaration days (1967). Yet the definition of work centered primarily on peasant cash crop production has precedent in Tanzania's colonial history. Boserup (1970) refers to the "Lazy African" thesis, the belief that those who refuse to, or only lackadaisically engage in, commer-

cial agriculture should be redefined as parasitical at best and as troublesome, even criminal, at worst.

In this chapter, the rhetorical meaning of the Nguvu Kazi legislation is discussed on two levels. A description of the campaign, conducted in town and country from 1983 to 1984, is followed by an analysis of its relationship to the structural contradictions of the Tanzanian economy. In my conclusion I suggest why restrictions on urban informal sector traders cannot be treated separately from an analysis of the rural crisis in production.

The Organization of Nguvu Kazi

The City

The Human Resources Deployment Act, passed by the Tanzanian Parliament in October 1983, was broadly aimed at ensuring that every able-bodied citizen would be engaged in productive labor. It was a politically inspired piece of legislation designed by party architects to bring about a number of symbolically potent ends, but its translation into policy and effective implementation was in the hands of government officials.

The immediate impact of this act was most broadly felt in the capital, Dar es Salaam, where those designated by the police, army, and national service militia as "jobless loiterers" were given notice to return to their regions of origin. In the initial or "netting" phase of the exercise, the treatment of jobless loiterers ranged from chasing and harassing, to registration, temporary detainment, and

forcible removal from the city under armed guard. Those designated as unemployed were compelled to pay their own repatriation expenses or, if unable to afford the train or bus fare, they were to be provided transportation to rural areas where government-owned sisal, tea, and sugar plantations were suffering acute labor shortages.⁵

But who were these "jobless loiterers"? By the end of the second week of the campaign the government reported that 5,724 people had been rounded up in the capital and taken to interrogation centers for failure to produce identity documents or presenting documents which appeared suspicious; 889 of these were detained and 559 repatriated to their home regions. Three months into the campaign in January 1984 random arrests had netted 15,611 people (Daily News, 23 October 1983 and 4 January 1984). In the initial phase, loitering and joblessness were defined by the absence of a government-issued identity card (kitambulisho) which designated both legal address and registered employment status. Unlicensed petty traders and casual laborers became obvious targets. Locating such individuals was not a demanding task for the police and militia charged with the implementation of this act. Not surprisingly, the so-called jobless corners, where petty traders, vendors, and casual laborers congregated, were near the central commercial district and port as well as in the immediate satellite core areas.⁶ One 1979 enumeration reported some 329 groups of "unemployed" comprised of 3,800 individuals

within the total city population of 769,445 (United Republic of Tanzania 1982a) operating out of the core urban center in the capital. Interrogation centers set up in Temeke, Kinodoni, and Ilala districts were aimed at dismantling these core and satellite urban targets.

Individual informal sector operators, however, were not the only targets. Early on, numerous reports began to document the closure of small restaurants and hotels and the roundup of housewives and domestic laborers (Daily News, 23 October 1983 and 23 December 1983). By November the exercise began to extend to blue- and white-collar urban workers who risked temporary detention if discovered "loitering" in the streets between the working hours of 7:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. This amounted to a curfew during the working day for the entire capital. Workers on errands for their employers, housewives en route to market, and schoolgirls waiting for buses or hitching lifts were subjected to interrogation until their identity status could be verified by an employer, a husband, or a parent. A two-pronged debate about the productive status of domestic labor ensued. Housewives were required to carry government marriage certificates to substantiate their status as wives and not as informal sector traders or prostitutes. Domestic workers were mandated to carry letters from their employers, although this ruling launched a series of angry letters questioning why government bureaucrats saw fit to define their housegirls and houseboys as productive workers

while denying the same rights to shoe shiners and cassava sellers.⁷ Children, it seems, were subject to scrutiny because, in the words of one district commissioner, "some people kept and exploited school-age children mainly from Dodoma and Singida regions [two particularly impoverished areas]. The children are (then) sent out to sell sweets and ground nuts for them in return for food" (Daily News, 7 January 1984). By the first of the year 1984, a country-wide registration process was underway. Special forms were issued to party leaders of each cell of ten households, who were required to fill them out after verifying the employment status of each able-bodied member. These forms were again verified by local boards and new identity cards were issued to each resident.

The campaign thus involved three simultaneous processes: netting, repatriation, and registration. Repatriation proved to be the most highly symbolic of the three processes. Very few of the citizens who were shipped to sisal and tea estates at the government's expense ever completed the journey to their final destinations. Thus the real effect of repatriation was negligible. In fact, the western conceptualization of a rural-urban dichotomy, implicit in many migration studies, glosses the continuous exchange of personnel and commodities between town and countryside in Tanzania. However, a change in status, from rural peasant or agricultural laborer (heavily dependent upon exchange relations determined by the state) to urban

trader in the unregulated informal sector, represents a real shift in economic mobility. It is this movement, symbolized by the government in spatial terms (exit from the city and return to the country), which was the object of the repatriation exercise.

Some of the designated jobless were allowed to remain in urban centers if they promised to cultivate allocated plots in the city's periphery where lack of transportation and water made farming untenable. At one point in the campaign party leaders debated whether all urban workers should be required to farm as well. This plan was abandoned following the widespread complaint that factory and white-collar efficiency would suffer an increased decline if workers were simultaneously expected to be farmers. Such popular protest belied the fact that most urban workers who could afford to employ casual laborers or who could depend on the labor of kin for cultivation in urban areas were already doing so, since only the highest-level members of the bureaucratic elite were able to make ends meet on their official wage.

The Country

8

Regional manifestations of the Nguvu Kazi exercise outside of the capital differed along the fault line of uneven development. Local district councils were required to maintain standing Nguvu Kazi committees to handle employment registration, to manage repatriated persons, and to make regular reports regarding the implementation of the

campaign. Regions such as Kagera in the northwest, where large government sugar and tea plantations were located, were strongly motivated to implement the campaign in Bukoba urban and rural districts to meet a shortfall of 2,000 seasonal laborers necessary for the 1983/84 planting season. Informal sector traders in urban areas and landless laborers in rural districts were deployed to meet production targets. In Tanzania's northeast, the highly stratified Kilimanjaro region, efforts were directed toward: (1) netting urban petty traders in Moshi Town; (2) the harassment of rural market women operating in regional market centers and suspected of smuggling scarce commodities across the border from Kenya; and (3) mobilizing landless peasants. Nguvu Kazi was interpreted in at least one rural district in Kilimanjaro as a method of resettling landless peasants to other regions (Dodoma and Morogoro) in order to alleviate population pressure in intensively cultivated zones. Such landless peasants, working as seasonal laborers on large peasant farms and engaged in informal sector trade, were shipped to less densely populated areas where they were to be allocated government land in resettled ujamaa villages. According to the district council leader, none of these resettled persons completed his or her journey. Finally, regions characterized primarily by small-holder peasant production broadly interpreted the Nguvu Kazi exercise as a means to exhort farmers to increase cash crop production. Former

president Julius Nyerere, touring the impoverished western-central Tabora region, reminded government and party leaders that Nguvu Kazi "...would not necessarily increase production of cotton or tobacco if people did not work." He estimated that some four million rural residents were "unprepared" to farm at the beginning of the cultivation season (Daily News, 22 October 1983).⁹ In town and country alike, the debate surrounding definitions of productive work conflated the categories of informal sector trade and casual labor with black market activities.

What can be said about the real impact of Nguvu Kazi on the Tanzanian economy? For a brief period of time shoe shiners and food sellers disappeared from the streets, clerks stayed at their desks, housewives carried marriage certificates, and schoolgirls rode buses in clusters. A rapid underground trade in the new identity cards flourished, so that almost everyone was able to produce the new document, whether it was legally obtained or not. Casual laborers who were sent to estates and who actually arrived at their destinations worked a short season, and left after several weeks. District committees continued to file reports, while the Ministry of Labor wrestled with the question of which categories within the informal sector could be considered legal and beneficial to the nation. The actual material changes brought about by this campaign were so few that perhaps it is questionable as to whether the exercise merits such detailed discussion.

I argue that legislation such as *Nguvu Kazi*, recurring historically at regular intervals since the British colonial era, is worth considering for what it reveals about the structural weakness of the colonial and postcolonial state's attempt to extract surplus value from the rural producer. It is not a mere symbolic coincidence that legislation designed to capture the urban unemployed and underemployed should be linked to a program to convert poor peasants and petty traders into rural casual laborers. Also it is not accidental that there should be a rhetorical attempt to redefine work as "agricultural labor" and the failure to work "hard enough" to meet state cash crop production targets as a "criminal offense." In a recent analysis of sex differentials in employment and income, Mbilinyi (1986) raises the question of whether a rural labor shortage really existed during the economic crisis years of the 1980s. She suggests instead that the alarm raised about labor shortages represented the interests of employers (in the case of plantations, the state in combination with agribusinesses) in reducing wages and securing an assured source of casual labor. Her data on female banana traders in the southern Rungwe area, which is also dominated by tea estates, indicate that these women enjoy greater mobility and a more secure income from petty trade than they do by working either as family laborers or as seasonal tea pluckers. Labor shortage, in Mbilinyi's view, is at least partly an expression of competition between

capital's labor requirements and the requirements of petty commodity production/trade which lies "outside of" capital/wage and capital/nonwage labor relationships. Finally, the repatriation process symbolically enacted in Nguvu Kazi is not discontinuous with the more wide-scale resettlement policy begun during the 1970s which moved several million farmers living in dispersed settlements into consolidated ujamaa (extended family/socialist) villages. The overt goal of such resettlement was to provide basic services in transport, water, medical, and educational facilities and modern agricultural extension services more efficiently. This was supposed to improve both the quality of life and the level of agricultural production. While at one level the aim of such a massive scheme was economically rational and humanitarian, the aspect of state coercion was not lost on the peasants (such as many in Tabora) whose old villages were burnt behind them as they were removed to new settlements under armed guard. Nor is the lesson lost on Chagga cultivators who have been allowed to remain on their land, but are subject to governmental regulation which threatens their right to control and utilize it.

The Meaning of Extraordinary Discourse

The ceremony described at the beginning of this chapter communicates the moral necessity of sacrifice, the giving up of a thing of value to establish connection. Viewed in this light, the performance of rain ritual is more than a revival of tradition aimed at socially reproducing the

internal relations of a community. It is more than a protest against local big men who control the distribution nexus and carry out state policies which threaten the very livelihood of average residents. The participants in the ceremony sacrificed their belief in Christianity and their right to participate in the church (an extremely important community political organization). They sacrificed their money and time, and almost risked government intervention to communicate an alternative vision of reality. In the act of performance this vision became legitimate. It was no longer hidden and could not be ignored. The rains fell, and those deported to other regions returned. Such a performance was not revolutionary, but it indicated to the participants and the community at large the limits of hegemony.

Resistance can take a variety of forms. As indicated in chapter 1, the worldview of a group can be shaped and anxiety relieved or accentuated through a more common form of discourse such as folklore. The chapter which follows examines the interpretive schemes of Tanzania's contemporary generation of teenagers, as portrayed in modern folklore types.

NOTES

1. Informants in Kilimanjaro consistently claimed that the Lutheran Church held the power of excommunication. Such an act could be permanent (as practiced in the Catholic Church) or temporary. Cases of temporary excommunication varied to up to five years, during which members who wished to rejoin the Church were given separate instruction.

2. Here I am following the structural scheme set out by Hubert and Mauss (1899). They argue that the essential characteristic of the entry phase is the transformation of profane people and objects into a sacred/ritually pure state.

3. Leaves of the manyonywe plant were used to wipe the face of the goat before the prayer to Ruwa was intoned. This plant is commonly employed to cure illness (Marealle 1965). It grows along the irrigation ditches which water the coffee and banana fields and sacrifices to familial ancestors are commonly carried out in such banana groves (cf. Moore 1977 for an analysis of Gutmann's material on reproductive sacrifice). The other plant employed was the masale, which is a border plant utilized to mark the boundaries between a homestead and its neighbors. Such leaves signify friendship and cooperation. Prayers during the sacrifice reflect the place of God as both remote and immediate in the Chagga cosmology. Four praise names were invoked: Ruwa, signifying universality, that which is felt all over the world like the sun and from which nothing is hidden; Matengera, the one who cares for all his creatures in a peaceful way; molunga soka na mndo, through his great powers there is a mysterious arrangement by which every living creature finds a mate and reproduction is assured; and fumvu lya mku, the mountain of ages. This final praise name is also translated as "hill of the ancestors" (warumu, the living dead) who provide an intermediary between God and the human community (Lema 1981). Goats were sacrificed after invoking God, spitting into the air, and stabbing into its heart with a spear.

4. Lema (1981) describes this critical point at which old grievances are to be aired and settled. People are urged to reconsider their past lives, and if they discover any offense which would make them ritually unfit to participate in the sacrifice, they are advised to turn back. Customarily, such a sacrifice was to be performed only by

the clan elders of the original settlers and were to be men who were past the age of fertility and thought to be the most ritually pure. Ritual purity is also a consideration in choosing the two female participants in the ceremony (a virgin and a woman past the age of child-bearing).

5. "Shortage of casual workers in sisal estates, tea and sugar cane plantations, among others, is a recurring problem which needs to be viewed seriously by all of us... the problem, which is common throughout the country where major cash crops are grown, has greatly undermined the performance of the agricultural sector....It was reported at the week end that tea processing at Malangali in Njombe District is headed for big trouble because of acute shortage of casual workers. The plantation, which is owned by the Tanzania Tea Authority (TTA), is currently operating with only 50 workers of the required 300....Similarly, the Tanzania Sisal Authority (TSA) has time and again said that the leading problem facing the sisal industry is the non-availability of committed sisal cutters..." (Editorial comment, Daily News, 11 November 1984 [quoted in Mbilinyi 1986].)

6. The methodological difficulties involved in enumerating the urban un- and under-employed are discussed by the author (Ishumi 1984) at some length. While this is an innovative study in its use of a variety of research techniques to analyze the sources and reason for rural-urban migration, urban survival strategies in the capital and regional urban centers, and the characteristics of the "urban jobless," it does not center this analysis within a broader understanding of developments in the Tanzanian economy which have substantially increased the gains to be made in nonwage petty commodity trade.

7. One irate letter to the editor summarized some of the contradictions in the operationalization of Nguvu Kazi: "I would like to question those in authority if their indiscriminate arrests of pedestrians and cyclists in the streets between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. is legal and constitutional. I wonder if someone can legally be arrested if he holds a valid identity card simply because he is in the streets during the work hours in Dar es Salaam, as if we are in a curfew or state of emergency. Is this not abuse of power and threaten (sic) people's freedom and liberty by unnecessary harassment to workers and married women? Why arrest married women? Does this country not recognize the role of married women? One more surprising thing is that people using cars and trucks during the so-called work hours are not harassed. Why? Can't someone loiter with his car for petty personal business during work hours? Are we creating two classes of citizens in this country--the oppressed and the privileged?" (People's Forum, Daily News, 10 November 1983)

The harassment of women (married and school age) has to be deconstructed, because it is not fully articulated in this or any other text published during the campaign. Women form a significant component of the informal sector as foodstuff and illegal liquor traders and prostitutes. The restriction that women carry government marriage certificates not only discriminated against unmarried working women but those women married under tribal law, which is recognized, although not registered, by the state. Female domestic workers are often young girls fostered by poor relations and clients to elite families in the urban centers, and they frequently have ambivalent relations with their patrons/employers. The implicit "sexualization" of Nguvu Kazi in the attack on unaccompanied women was acknowledged by female informants who claim to have been raped by police or militiamen who detained them or told that they would be released (with no questions asked) in return for sexual favors.

8. Tanzania is politically divided into twenty regions, which are further subdivided into districts, divisions, wards, and villages. The government and party structure operates parallel structures from the regional level down, with the party reaching to the most minimal village unit of a set of ten households (the cell).

9. The former president was ambiguous about what he meant to construe in the phrase "unprepared to farm." He indicated that such peasants did not have farms and had not been prepared by the regional authorities for "meaningful farming." Whether he was referring to landless peasants in population-dense areas or peasants who were actively retreating from cash crop production is unclear.

CHAPTER VII
THE FOLKLORE OF UPWARD MOBILITY

Introduction

This chapter returns to the problem raised in chapter 1, how individuals experience the tension between the morality of state ideology and the reality of economic crisis which creates its own. The illustrative device I employ to interpret this tension is also similar, the medium of modern folklore. The subject of this chapter is the use of a set of characterizations by the contemporary generation of Tanzania's adolescents.

The chapter begins with a brief summary of how I use the concept of folklore in the modern context. I then outline the particular part of folk knowledge I encountered throughout my visits to secondary schools and in a range of other settings. This aspect of folk wisdom I refer to as the "characterization of personna," and I describe how this is used performatively and structurally. The next section of the chapter illustrates how these characterizations are applied to individual biographies. The three cases presented for illustrative purposes are drawn from life history interviews, although the names and several details have been altered to protect the anonymity of the subjects. The concluding section places these characterizations

within the wider regional and national political discourse discussed throughout this thesis.

Unofficial Culture: The Folklore of Modernization

The Function of Folklore in the Context of Modernization

Recent research concerning what constitutes folklore and what it does in the context of the modern world has expanded earlier definitions, theoretical models, and research methods, transcending earlier schools of thought.

Beginning in the mid 1960s studies of contemporary folklore began to widen the definition of folklore from the narrow category called verbal art (Bascom 1965; Utley 1961) to a broader range of subjects including such topics as folk speech, folk medicine and belief, and written epitaph (see Dundas 1966, p. 11, for an exhaustive list). The social context of the performance of oral tradition gained increasing attention and modified earlier research based on the collection, presentation, and analysis of static texts. An emphasis on the social actors who create, revitalize, and manipulate oral tradition complimented a previous "superorganic" assumption about the universal laws of oral narrative. The previously limited conceptualization of "folk," as defined in terms of the rural, pristine, and primitive, gave way to a characterization which now included "anonymous masses of tradition-oriented people" (Dorson 1976), many of whom were caught up in the process of rapid social change. The "lore" in folklore similarly was extended to reflect aspects of unofficial culture (jux-

taposed against culture which is high, visible, and institutional).

A negative valence attached to the problem of social change, which was previously apparent in assumptions about the function of folklore in maintaining the stability and integrity of society, is shifting to a positive emphasis on change as a stimulus for creative production by actors seeking to adapt to changing circumstances (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1978; Reich 1971). A lively debate concentrates on whether folklore which is written down or otherwise media-created is "fakelore," or whether all expressions of unofficial verbalized culture constitute folklore (Dorson 1959; Reich 1971). Amidst the flurry of current debate about what folklore is and does, there is a continuity of emphasis on the idea that folklore, however constituted, is a projective system which reflects tensions, fears, desires, and contradictions, acting as a mediating mechanism for the reduction of stress. Folklore is also still largely perceived as knowledge, and its transmission serves not only the function of communicating shared meanings, but of educating the uninitiated into this universe of common perceptions about the world.

The Characterization of Personna as an Expressive Mediation

Among the broad range of subjects which constitute the modern category known as folklore there appears no reference to the types represented by Check Rap, Check Bob, and

¹
 TX Kubwa. These types are terms of linguistic reference, only rarely and always jokingly used as terms of address. They arise out of street slang (folk speech), but they are more than slang. They are not culture heroes, although they possess heroic (and pathetic) attributes. They are not narratives, legends, or tales, and they are not based on real people or mythical characters. Yet stories about real people's biographies (when they are designated as one of these types) can illustrate a number of themes to an audience.

To the extent that Check Rap, Check Bob, and TX Kubwa represent several roles, they resemble what Berger and Luckman (1966) call typifications. Berger and Luckman suggest that everyday life contains typificatory schemes by which others are apprehended in face-to-face encounters. Reality is negotiated through such typificatory schemes which are, in themselves, the predictable characteristics attached to particular roles. The role of teacher, for example, calls to mind a range of probable behaviors on which people in a particular society feel they can depend. Institutionalization is the outcome of a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. Check Rap, Check Bob, and TX Kubwa resemble Berger and Luckman's typifications in the sense that they denote typical or predictable characteristics attached to particular social roles. Yet they are a different class of phenomena because they do not designate roles per se, but only special attri-

butes of certain roles. In fact, they represent an anti-institutional stance, and might be classed more usefully as a part of unofficial social organization.

Check Rap, Check Bob, and TX Kubwa are a way to characterize persona.² Yet they are not idealized roles because they are not representations to which members of a group aspire. Rather, they characterize strategies of upward mobility; stories concerning persons referenced as one of these types convey a message about the rewards and drawbacks of engaging in this process.

To the extent that they focus on youth, they imply a motif of shifting self-definition which necessarily involves making new connections and affiliations. Such characterizations speak to the newly emergent sense of persona and provide a recognizable shorthand which obviates the need for elaborate explanation. This shorthand constitutes the expressive means by which such new affiliations are asserted as both promising and dangerous.³ It is worth stressing that these characterizations concern individuals who are striving to change or improve their class status in a society which is similarly in a state of flux. The value of the characterizations in parody may be to alleviate stress or anxiety, but their referential application to real biography raises the temperature of anxiety in an audience. They represent elements of both resistance and conformity. As I will suggest, these characterizations of

personna reflect an essential mechanism in the culture of accommodation.

The Subculture of Adolescence

Although the oral tradition presented here is created by adolescents, the urban slang in the narratives suggests origins in the capital city, Dar es Salaam, among dockworkers and petty traders. These folklore characters are particularly elaborated in the popular subculture of Tanzanian teenagers in urban areas, but they make their appearance in jokes and stories in district towns and villages, aided by the mobility of secondary school students who often board in schools far from their homes and then spend one month in national (paramilitary) service throughout the country. Despite a trend towards homogeneity in the narratives, furthered by their use in short stories and novellas, there is reason to suspect regional variation in the way the oral tradition is translated into the local context. The analysis presented here examines how this tradition serves as a discourse about practical strategies of upward mobility from two perspectives: (1) what is revealed about the constraints on elite capital accumulation within Tanzania's current state of economic crisis; and (2) how it reflects regionally specific structures of class formation.

Two points should be noted from the outset. The first is that this oral tradition is an adolescent construction. As such it presents a form of counterculture which both reflects and parodies the dominant political culture of the

adult world. Tanzanian youth were singled out following the country's postcolonial commitment to socialism in 1967 as the vanguard of the social revolution and organized into party youth leagues. Considerable attention has been devoted to their political and academic education so as to instill in them attitudes and values compatible with the ideology of African socialism. They are heavily involved in nation-building projects through educational institutions and compulsory paramilitary training which they receive after graduation. Young people are central to the performance of "traditional" ethnic folk dances, songs, and narratives which have been infused with nationalistic content and resurrected for important holidays and celebrations. Yet the power of this adolescent segment to significantly influence the course of national politics was demonstrated clearly in a series of university and secondary school demonstrations against the National Service Act in 1968, and in demonstrations in the 1970s--both harshly repressed. Much of the zealous enthusiasm for their role in socialist nation-building seems to have waned following this series of student arrests and school dismissals, and their critique of the status quo has been submerged from active demonstration into narrative parody.

The Use of Political Satire

The second issue concerns the more general use of political satire in Tanzanian popular culture by people of all generations. The mockery which concerns conditions of

adversity is part and parcel of ordinary discourse and is highly elaborated in plays, fiction, poetry, and even short stories, films, essays, and cartoons carried in the government-controlled media. This is a gentle protest, one which flirts with the boundaries of orthodox rhetoric.

The pathos contained within this satiric protest concerns the hard lot of Tanzania's workers and peasants who live in one of the world's poorest countries and earn an average income of less than \$250 per year. Despite relative political stability and a powerful nationalist ideology of egalitarianism, disparities of wealth, power, and privilege continue to persist and are strengthened by a highly inflationary economy. As we will see, Check Rap, Check Bob, and TX Kubwa bring home the necessity of operating within a shadow economy as state institutions consistently fail to deliver the promised protection from exploitation.

Check Rap, Check Bob, and TX Kubwa:
The Stresses of Upward Mobility

The Characterizations

Youth in Tanzania's northeastern Kilimanjaro region symbolically represent elite culture through a range of contemporary folklore characters who are in varying stages of upward mobility. Check Rap, at the lowest end of the scale, is a figure without any steady income, engaged in low-level petty trade such as peddling black market cigarettes, radio batteries, or tubes of Colgate toothpaste.

Whatever profit Check Rap makes he turns into at least one item of fancy clothing, usually an imported T-shirt or a pair of shoes. He hangs onto the fringe of a wealthier, more stylish crowd, trying to impress young women and his colleagues with his "cool" demeanor and his likely prospects. He can "rap" well but his talk is bigger than his wallet. Check Rap's central dilemma concerns how to accumulate enough capital to establish himself as a middleman-entrepreneur. One highly attractive strategy which has gained recent currency in popular fiction is to become a seaman on a foreign-owned shipping line. In addition to exciting travel prospects, a seaman earns his wages in foreign exchange and can turn these wages into substantial overnight profits by purchasing large quantities of scarce imported items and selling them on the parallel market. He can use these profits to start a small business or reinvest them in more trade goods.

Check Bob, a senior associate, is well-established in a white collar occupation, business, and/or parallel market activities. Although he is not yet in a real middleman position, he earns enough income from parallel market projects to be well-attired in imported goods. He is a master of street slang and KiDar (Dar es Salaam language), which involves elaborate code switching from Swahili into English, complete with British accentuation. He knows all the latest reggae, disco, and Zairian musical hits and can negotiate the latest steps in Tanzania's version of break

dancing, called the Robot. He is characterized, somewhat disparagingly, as a "lifeist"--a person whose main priority is living the good life, whose obsession with conspicuous consumption mitigates against saving his profits and reinvesting them.

At the apex of this system is the figure TX K (kubwa)--Big TX, where TX stands as the prefix for European-owned expatriate car license plates. TX K has everything worth striving for, first and foremost a car. Everything he owns is imported, including his liquor and cigarettes. He can afford to go to the latest discos and fanciest tourist hotels. He is a member of the best clubs. He is powerful in business and has influence in political circles, although he is not directly involved in the political sphere. He can afford to have the most desirable young girls because he can buy them anything they want. He has no financial worries and can spend without anxiety, and he does so frequently on his important clients and partners. He is, in short, a Tanzanian youth emulation of what they believe comprises European elite culture.

The female youth model of upward mobility does not seem to be symbolized by comparable folklore figures and has as its goal attachment to a wealthy and powerful man. It is also generationally asymmetrical: young, upwardly mobile girls striving to attach themselves to already established older males. Although their long-term goal or fantasy involves civil or religious marriage, many of these young

women will settle for being a second "wife" with access to imported or locally produced scarce goods, a salaried job, exciting dates, and eventually child support and capital to finance a small business enterprise. Culturally, it is symbolically similar to male youth subculture in its concern with taste and style which are congruent with western standards of wealth and prestige.

Biographical Applications:
The DJ, the Chief, and the Prospective Seaman

Check Bob: DJ Mohammed Mushi

Mohammed Mushi is a young Big Man in Moshi, the regional capital town of Kilimanjaro region. On the occasion of his 25th birthday, seventy-five of his friends, clients, and patrons were invited to a private party held for him at the Paradise Hotel where he manages a weekend disco.

The Paradise is a white elephant left over from the colonial era, dilapidated but not without charm, with a wide, screened-in veranda encircling the main drinking and dancing area where patrons can relax between sets, sipping whatever bottled beer and fruit juice is available, in comfortable but fraying lounge chairs. Like many other "hotels," the Paradise does not house overnight guests but operates mainly as an eating and drinking establishment, although these days business is meager during the week and the place only comes alive on the weekends when the disco is in full operation.

The main feature of the Paradise is its conspicuous distance from the town center (roughly seven miles), far from any public transport route. This feature insures that, de facto, the club is off limits to any one without a private means of transport or the means to hire a taxi.

The guests, arriving around 8:00 p.m. in taxis, private cars, and a hired van, were all dressed in high-fashion imported clothing, and most were young aspiring professionals and entrepreneurs, the nucleus of the Motown Social Group. The Motown (Moshi Town) Social Group, organized in 1983, is comprised of the young elite strata of Moshi (25-35 age range). These are men and women who are well-educated by Tanzanian standards, having attained some secondary school education. They are primarily Chagga, the dominant ethnic group in this region, and they work in white-collar occupations and professions in parastatal organizations and private companies, supplementing their salaries with a variety of miradi (small business, livestock or farming enterprises). They pay an annual membership fee of 500/= (about \$50) in addition to social activity fees for the gatherings the club organizes. The Motown Social Group is primarily a social club which sponsors dinner dances and similar outings with other regional clubs like the Arusha Get Together Club. It is distinctively different from groups like the Roundtable, Lions, and Y's Men's clubs which are internationally based, organ-

ized (ostensibly) for charitable purposes and heavily dominated by the Tanzanian Asian community.

Mohammed's birthday party reflected the Chagga flair for synthesizing the elements of a formal "European" structured dinner gathering with more traditional styles of speech making, gift exchange, and sociability. If not for the absence of elders and children, it would have had all the appearances of a wedding. Guests were ushered into predetermined seats and brought beverages by a cadre of young girls acting as hostesses. The guest of honor, sporting a three-piece suit, bow tie, and boutonniere, sat with his brothers, girlfriend, and her sisters at a special spotlighted dais decorated with flowers.

A master of ceremonies presided over the occasion, speaking in English, Swahili, and KiDar from a microphone. In between his introductions of a variety of toastmasters, the emcee lavishly praised the accomplishments of DJ Mohammed as disk jockey, businessman, friend, brother, and upstanding citizen. Those guests who brought birthday presents were formally announced and welcomed to the dais, where they greeted the guest of honor amidst the ululations of the hostesses. The speeches and gift-giving were followed by the presentation of the cake, which had been prepared and decorated by Mohammed's girlfriend, Grace, a student at the catering and hotel management school run by the Moshi YMCA.

The YMCA hotel school, one of two in the country, is highly selective and accepts only twelve students each year who can afford its high tuition fees (roughly \$1,000). When students graduate from the two-year course, in which they learn culinary arts and management which are completely inappropriate to Tanzanian materials, tastes, and organizational styles, they are virtually assured of beginning at a middle management position in one of the country's state or privately run tourist hotels.

Grace's three-tiered cake, decorated with green and red buttercream rosettes, was highly admired but hardly touched: the concept of dessert has yet to assume importance in the customary diet. When the cake was cut Grace fed Mohammed and Mohammed fed Grace (again with ululations from the bystanders), and the couple danced a solo spotlight dance to a romantic American soul-blues record. Thus ended the formal part of the event, which was followed by the eating of roasted meat passed by the hostesses on platters, drinking, dancing, and merry-making.

Mohammed comes from a village in the nearby division of Machame, a highly stratified area of Kilimanjaro region which is comparatively well-developed. Machame, with its good roads, electrification scheme implemented by the Japanese, private hospital staffed with German doctors, tourist hotel, good water supply, and fertile land, has attracted considerable light industry in recent years and is undergoing a transformation from a peasant economy based

on coffee cultivation to a suburban community whose bread-winners commute to white-collar jobs in the Moshi area by day and return to their farms at night. The most conservative stronghold of German Lutheran missionary influence in the region, Machame is also home to the very small African Muslim community in Kilimanjaro, of which Mohammed and his family are members.

Mohammed's father is a well-to-do peasant and entrepreneur. All of his children are well-educated. Mohammed's current popularity began several years ago during his star-crossed career as an amateur karate competitor. After winning several title matches, he was involved in an argument with another young man over a woman and his opponent was killed. Popular opinion sided with Mohammed, but nevertheless he was sentenced to two years in prison, after which he decided to take up a career as a disk jockey. While he still coaches teenage boxers several afternoons a week at the YMCA, he says his experience in prison greatly affected him. "I decided that music is my life, it's the thing I love most. It's a gift to be able to give music to people to make them happy." Lacking the initial working capital to launch his career, Mohammed began as an apprentice disk jockey working in nearby regions. When he felt he had enough experience he returned to Moshi where he sought out a patron-partner for the disco he envisioned.

TX Kubwa: William Njau

William, Mohammed's patron, is the 37-year-old heir to a divisional chiefdom in Kilimanjaro. He is a sales manager in a joint state- and foreign-owned company. His pivotal role as a distribution manager and winning personality make him a popular figure in Kilimanjaro region. At the time of my fieldwork, the product manufactured by William's company was in extremely short supply in the region. Special clients and friends of William's, however, were given a ration of the product each week, purchased at wholesale prices, one of the perquisites allowed him in his managerial position. He utilized these special rations to fulfill social obligations to his kin and business partners and as exchange favors for other scarce commodities which he himself needed.

William's father, the last official chief of the division before the chiefdom was dissolved following independence, still has considerable influence and investments in the area. His status has been highly beneficial to William's career, beginning in childhood when he was selected to join one of the most prestigious secondary schools, followed by a diploma course in business administration. With his father's help he has bought land, built a modern house, and operates a number of businesses, of which the Paradise Hotel disco is a minor one.

William drives a Datsun equipped with a stereo cassette player and recently bought a newer model station wagon for

his father. He is one of the few African members of the Lion's Club and is also a member of the board of the Moshi Club, the formerly whites-only sports/country club in the town. The Moshi Club is the domain of Kilimanjaro's rich and powerful, and it is unusual for a man of William's age to be a member of the board of directors. He attained this role by virtue of his royal status and his economic position in the community. When he was later transferred to Dar es Salaam he was automatically asked to become a member of the board of the prestigious Selenda Bridge Club, the refuge of Tanzania's national-level political and business elite. He wears only European-cut imported clothing, shunning the currently popular Tanzanian-made Mao suits which most managers wear. He eats most often in tourist hotels where he is the center of conviviality and is jokingly greeted as "Chief."

A Lutheran, William was married not in the church, but in a traditional Chagga ceremony and has two sons. His wife has a primary school education and a teacher's training certificate. She teaches primary school but spends a considerable amount of time helping William's father with his various miradi. When William was transferred to Dar es Salaam he left her in his father's homestead to help oversee the construction of a new house and some of his business operations. He took his sons with him to the capital, because "they would miss me too much." When asked why he has not finalized his marriage in a religious or legal

ceremony, he is vague. "I am really married, you see. My wife and I work together, as partners like in business. She does not really enjoy going out much in public or socializing at parties. She enjoys going for dinner at the Moshi Club. I take her there sometimes. Mostly she enjoys being at home with her girlfriends and relatives."

Under customary law, William, as the youngest son, stands to inherit most of his father's wealth and property. Yet as in most Chagga families, there is no small amount of competition among brothers over the inheritance of property. "My father is getting old, you see. We have to be there to support him in his projects; otherwise he can leave his property to one of my brothers or even sell it." William has a reputation as a ladies' man, particularly among young women whom he favors with expensive presents and extravagant outings. If he and his wife divorce under customary law, he will retain custody of the children and she will not be able to make a claim on the assets he has invested in his family's holdings.

According to the contract which Mohammed and William set up to run the Paradise disco, William supplied the working capital for the stereo equipment and lights, financed and operated (with his brother-in-law) the food and beverage concession, and paid for the hotel rental and advertising costs. Mohammed and his brother were to manage the entrance gate, run the disco, and obtain the music tapes (bootlegged and flown in by airline pilots). William

estimated that a cut of the entrance fees and half the net profit from the food and beverage concession would pay back William's initial investment within six months. He was enthusiastic, knowing that many of his friends and clients would be there on weekends and become regular members of the club. This, combined with Mohammed's charismatic following among the Motown Social Group, made the disco an early success despite its out-of-the-way location. In fact, the hotel overflowed each weekend with Moshi's young and aspiring elite who had temporarily "eloped" from nearby secondary schools.

William had reason to be optimistic about the future of the club. He had operated a very successful disco in another region before his transfer to Moshi, although he was forced to remain a silent partner (then and now) by virtue of his managerial position. As a manager, William was automatically categorized as a leader, bound by the Tanzanian leadership code to divest himself of his non-salaried sources of income. Most club regulars knew of his partnership in the disco, and they knew of his partnership in other hotels, bars, shops, and businesses, but the matter was rarely discussed. Considering his social and financial success, William was remarkably competent in defusing the normal envy and animosity his position would have aroused. One of the keys to his popularity was in the tremendous amount of time and energy he devoted to maintaining reciprocal relationships and in doing favors for

people from whom no immediate return could be anticipated. "Even strangers come to me and I help them. I tell them to come in groups, let's say in a group of ten, and I give them what they need. They each pay their part and divide it into portions. After all, I could be the one in need of such a favor one day."

William's reputation for fairness, diplomacy, and equal treatment of people of all classes contrasts strongly with the stereotype of a TX Kubwa who by the nature of his position keeps exclusive company with people of his own class. This parody of British colonial class distinctions is best illustrated in the behavior of one of the top regional elites, a magendo big boss who refused to greet or recognize in public political officials of a class rank below his own. William's behavior reflects a shrewd appraisal of the current state of affairs in Tanzania, where commodity shortages are common and the political climate is constantly in flux.

Businessmen and leaders (political or otherwise) are particularly vulnerable under these conditions, and a major anti-corruption campaign conducted by the government that year was carried out by tips from informers among the general population. Routine business practices were retroactively redefined as illegal. To achieve and maintain a position of power one had to maintain a low profile, while at the same time investing heavily in social networks which

would lubricate the flow of goods, services, information, and loyalty.

As time went on William had to devote more and more of his time to other more important and lucrative projects and failed to oversee the regular operation of the disco. Mohammed and his brother absorbed more and more of the cut on the entrance fees, and William's brother-in-law began raking in the profits of the food and beverage concession for himself. To make matters worse, the brother-in-law turned out to be an ineffective manager who did not have the necessary connections to guarantee the regular supply of beer, soda, and juice. Frequent shortages on the week-ends caused attendance to drop among the disgruntled patrons of the club. When William was transferred to Dar es Salaam he reclaimed the disco equipment and Mohammed was forced to seek another partner and location for the business. At the conclusion of my fieldwork period he was in the process of negotiating with another partner, this time the wealthy and influential heir to another Kilimanjaro chiefdom.

Mohammed is a Check Bob aspiring to be a TX Kubwa, a capitalist and not merely a middleman. The process by which he is attempting to make this transition takes a peculiarly Tanzanian form. He did not reinvest his profits from the disco in the business or even in capital equipment that would have led to his greater independence. Despite his interest in music and his success as a disk jockey,

Mohammed views the disco as a means to an end and not an end in itself. Rather, he invested the profits from the business in buying land in his home village in Machame and in purchasing a house in Moshi Town. Building a modern house in one's village in Kilimanjaro is the first prerequisite for marriage, even if one does not intend to live there. These days a house is easily rented, thus serving as a source of working capital, and represents a form of retirement fund. A farm, a house in town, a wife and children, a car, and projects which will enable him to live a privileged western lifestyle--these are the things to which Mohammed aspires. Popularity, influence, and the right connections are the first steps in attaining this trajectory.

Check Rap: Peter Lyimo, the Prospective Seaman

I first met Peter while I was having a Sunday afternoon beer with a colleague from the University of Dar es Salaam at the UFI (Ubungu Farm Implements) Club. Peter had a Sony Walkman strapped to his waist and was wearing khaki shorts, Tanzanian-made running shoes, and a pair of sunglasses with a small rhinestone heart in the left-hand corner. He bopped to the music while he walked and shook hands with my colleague (Black-Power style), formally greeting him in their mutual local language, followed by greetings in KiDar.

"Mambo," he said (which literally means 'word' or 'thoughts').

"Degree," my colleague answered (which means "things are fine, cool, couldn't be better").

"Who is that?," I asked as he bopped away.

"Oh, that's the son of a family very close to mine in my home place," responded my colleague.

"Does he live in Kilimanjaro, then?"

"Part of the year; he's a secondary school student."

"Would he be interested in working for me part-time as my assistant, do you think?," I asked.

"He's not for you--not that Check Rap."

As it turned out, over the course of the year I had a number of occasions to interact with Peter in his secondary school, his home village in Kilimanjaro, and his parent's home in Dar es Salaam. Peter is the third child in a family of four (two girls, two boys). He is twenty-two years old and has just graduated from Form IV in a private school in Kilimanjaro region. His father is a fundi (literally, an artisan; actually he is a mechanic) with the water institute, and the family is solidly middle class. Peter's mother, uneducated but smart in business, runs the family's livestock enterprise. The father received an elementary school education during the colonial period and speaks English as well as Swahili and his native language. The family owns its own house in Dar es Salaam where the parents live, a farm in the suburb of the city where they keep their livestock, and a modern house in Kilimanjaro

(Machame), which they rent to an engineer at the Kilimanjaro Machine tools factory.

In Machame they also own considerable land which is under cultivation (coffee and bananas). The house in Machame and its adjacent farm will be inherited by Peter because he is the youngest son. Richard, the older son, will be given some inherited land further up the mountain on which to build his house, although the time he devotes to helping his parents manage their livestock industry in Dar es Salaam may be part of a strategy to inherit the Dar es Salaam farm and house. The two girls (the eldest and the youngest) will not inherit any property; their prospects will depend upon contracting a good marriage. The eldest is already married to a man working abroad in Europe, has had her first child (a boy), and is considered to be doing well. She regularly sends imported items home to her parents and siblings, which is how Peter obtains his imported clothes, Walkman, and cassette tapes.

Peter's father has managed to provide a Form IV education for all his children, and has paid their tuition fees at private school when they failed to gain entrance to government secondary schools. Richard, who had been accepted to join a (tuition-free) government school, managed to convince his father to transfer him to a private school where he believed the facilities and teacher's qualifications were superior. Peter and the youngest child,

Mary, graduated while I was conducting fieldwork in Kilimanjaro.

Peter attended a private boys' boarding secondary school in Kilimanjaro, where he was officially registered as Miko (Michael) Lema. He had changed his name to disguise his identity because he had illegally taken the secondary school entrance exams several times (failing consistently to be accepted into a government school). This practice is widespread, particularly among students from this region.

The school Peter attended has a reputation as a secondary school for the not-so-intelligent sons of middle- and upper-class parents who, by providing chakula (literally, food; a bribe) to the headmaster, can get their sons accepted into a four-year course which will provide them with a secondary school leaving certificate, if nothing else. A secondary school leaving certificate is a necessary qualification for most entry-level white-collar occupations in government firms, although the grade level one achieves in the terminal examination at the end of Form IV is an important criterion for direct employment and selection for the final two years of secondary school or further education at a teacher's training college, business, or technical institute. There are four categories of grades on this terminal examination, with Division I ranking highest and Division Zero (failing all examination subjects) ranking lowest. One can rank Division Zero and still

receive a secondary school leaving certificate, which is really nothing more than a material reminder that you spent four years in secondary school.

Students in Peter's school jokingly referred to Division Zero as "seaman's division." Students who receive Division Zero are seen to be not diligent, lifeists (people who are interested in leading the good life; involved in consumption, unable to save and invest in the future), and most apt to go in for a job as a seaman (with foreign shipping lines). Seamen and dockworkers in the Dar es Salaam port are central middlemen in the distribution of black market imported items such as clothing, liquor, stereo equipment, and vehicle spare parts.

Becoming a seaman is viewed as an easy and attractive way for a young man without prospects to accumulate startup capital for a business. The physical labor and degrading working conditions of a seaman's life are considered minor when compared to the opportunity to purchase imported goods in bulk and sell them at a huge profit on the black market. Furthermore, seamen are considered to be middlemen with a degree of independence. They turn their wages into purchases and their purchases into profits. They are attractive to young women who are impressed by their worldly style, extravagant spending, and access to imported goods. A relationship with a seaman is often likely to pay off in petty trading profits. A number of undergraduate women at the University of Dar es Salaam had seamen "uncles" who

provided them with imported underwear, shoes, and dresses which they utilized in black market trade conducted within their dormitory. In fact, the women's dormitory, Hall Three, is jokingly known as "Third World," in part because housing conditions there were so deplorable and also for its thriving parallel market. Indeed it was famous in the capital as the most expensive but most reliable outlet for imported clothing.

The romantic image of the seaman-entrepreneur belies the hopeless life stories of many of these erstwhile budding capitalists. Few were prepared for the hard work, cultural alienation, and low wages. Few had the business acumen to net the sort of profits needed to expand into another business after their tour of duty. Most spent their profits on conspicuous consumption and reciprocal obligations to kin and friends upon their return. One ex-seaman, a hired hand and part-time employee in a beer shop in a Machame village, bitterly described his disillusionment. "In the West, people are only out for themselves. No free lunch, no free anything. Here at least if I'm hungry or in need of a beer I can always find someone to lend me 50/= (\$5)." He entertained beer club patrons for hours with his descriptions of western individualism, but all he had left of his seaman's profits was a fraying Italian T-shirt. He committed suicide while I was conducting fieldwork.

Peter scored Division Zero and was actively "looking after" (trying to bribe someone to provide) a passport so he could launch his career as a seaman. He left his brother to collect his secondary school leaving certificate. Why should Peter, whose father was a hardworking mechanic, whose parents owned their own business, who stood to inherit both a house and farm, choose such an alternative? He could, for example, have worked harder in school and perhaps succeeded in being selected for further studies which would have insured better employment prospects. Failing that, he could have secured wage employment through one of his family's contacts. Or, he could have invested his energy in working in his father's business. Peter's motivation has to be reconstructed within the context of a number of personal and socioeconomic factors.

As the youngest son he was highly indulged by his mother and given very little responsibility in the home. Kilimanjaro students from well-to-do homes, particularly those who stand to inherit the parents' property, are stereotyped by their teachers as spoiled, lazy, and apt to be troublemakers because of access to spending money which draws them to the "town life" (e.g., cinemas, discos, premarital affairs, and petty business).

Peter lived up to this stereotype. He was a handsome, dreamy boy, easy to get along with, popular with his colleagues and young women. He never seemed to have a care in the world and was a frequent marijuana smoker. More than

once he had been caught using his secondary school tuition money to buy bhang (locally grown marijuana) or to engage in petty trade. His father finally resorted to sending the tuition money with his brother to be paid directly to the headmaster. He admitted to spending little of his time and energy on his studies. Instead he escaped as often as possible off school grounds to the town of Moshi, where he loitered at the edge of groups of other Check Raps and established Check Bobs. (One of his Check Rap friends, an assistant to DJ Mohammed, regularly supplied him with free passes to the Paradise disco.)

His friends jokingly nicknamed him "Sama Do" because one of his heros was Samuel Doe, the young leader of Liberia who had come to power in a coup. Sama Do is actually a culture hero category above Check Bob status. No one seriously considered Peter to be in this category since despite his Walkman, fancy sunglasses, "cool rap," and nonchalant demeanor, he was still a secondary school student with little money in his pocket. Giving him the nickname of his idol was more a matter of indulging his fantasy--an overnight leap to charismatic power.

Peter's parents seemed disinclined to reprimand him or influence his choice of career. It is well within the experience of Kilimanjaro families for a young man to work abroad to accumulate the capital to set up a career in farming and/or business. This is particularly true for artisans, and Peter's father had spent a number of years in

Kenya before returning to set up his livestock projects and build his houses in Tanzania. Furthermore, as his brother Richard explained it, "My parents are not well-educated. For them, to send the children to school is enough. They don't know how to provide career guidance. They leave that to the school."

The school Peter attended did little to provide a restraining influence on his behavior. The school was seriously understaffed, with its teachers constantly threatening to strike against the administration for failure to pay their meager salaries. A number of them had no teacher's training qualifications. The headmaster, from a chiefly family, was a frustrated politician who lived way above his salary on the profits of bribes and other projects. Aside from the chakula he received in conjunction with the school's entrance fees, he was known to extract bribes from the students themselves. Peter explained it this way: "He knows roughly what your parents' income is and how much spending money you have. If you are caught illegally off school grounds he will call you to his office and tell you that you are suspended. He can give you suspension for one to five days. If you are suspended for one day you must come after one day and bring him 100/=; if you are suspended two days, you must bring him 200/= and so on. One rich boy was suspended 10 days (1000/=). He can make several thousand shillings a week this way."

The headmaster is also a notorious womanizer, having tried to seduce a number of his female teachers and staff. "What good is it to send Peter to a school like that?," Richard questioned. "He learns nothing there except how to increase his bad habits. Also he is influenced by students from very rich families who have much more money and can afford to drink beer and go to discos all the time."

Peter's behavior and choice to become a seaman must also be examined in terms of the objective economic realities prevailing in Tanzania at this time. One alternative open to Peter would have been to invest his energy in academic achievement in the hope that this would pay off in further education and direct employment. It has already been pointed out that the home and school climate did not provide an inducement for this alternative, and Peter, having failed his public secondary school entrance exams a number of times, was unlikely to view himself as an academic achiever. Beyond that, he is aware that chances of selection for further study are offered to roughly half of those students who are successful on their Form IV examinations and that further education does not guarantee employment. The newspapers regularly carried reports of job shortages for secondary school graduates. Between 1980 and 1982, 19,692 pupils who completed Forms IV and VI were not given jobs by the government, the country's largest salary employer.

Opportunities for further education are most plentiful in the teacher training colleges, yet with his underpaid and disillusioned teachers as models, this could hardly be considered an attractive alternative. Headmasters complain about not being able to fill all the teacher's training places allocated to them. Students cite the low pay and loss of autonomy as main reasons for not accepting teacher's training college placement. The student is bonded by the government following the training course to teach for a number of years in any location that needs teachers. Few teachers want to live in remote village sites.

A second alternative open to Peter would have been to find salaried employment in either the public or private sector through family contacts. With a Division Zero examination pass he would have had to accept a very low entry position, possibly performing errands or doing manual labor. Salaries are far below the cost of living rate due to inflation these days. Such an entry-level position would probably pay his cost of living expenses if Peter lived at home with his parents, but would hardly allow him to accumulate much in the way of savings or for participation in the town life he enjoys so much.

Working in the family business is one final alternative open to him, but his structural position in the family may be an obstacle to this. He is aware that his brother's future is tied to the operation of the family business

since he will not directly inherit the family property under conditions of customary law. Richard has a close identification with his father and is considered to be of similar character: hardworking, quiet, and responsible. Peter, on the other hand, already has a reputation for being undependable and somewhat unscrupulous. The financial independence he longs for, which is an important component of the definition of Chagga success, is something he wants to achieve relatively quickly and without much effort.

Symbolic Domains of Elite Status
in National and Regional Perspective

In order to understand these symbols for strategies of upward mobility they must be set within the conditions of power and prestige currently prevailing in Kilimanjaro. The youth model of elite status attainment may be seen to reflect only one domain of elite power within Tanzania's complicated organization of class relations. This domain is locally (regionally) based, and has historical antecedents for the importance of trade as a means to amass wealth and power. It has a capitalist referent: externally to Kenya on its border and internally to the penetration of international capital within its boundaries, as represented by the growth of tourist trade, industrial investment, and numerous aid development projects. The obsession with imported items, the attainment of western status markers, popularly known as vidudu wa mtoni (literally, in Swahili,

"insects from across the river"), is prevalent among youth all over Tanzania but is more pronounced in this region where Europeans are more highly visible and these items are most available. Possession of western status markers signifies both an alignment with western values of consumption and the successful attainment of things that are scarce, which must be obtained through a network of connections, and which are virtually inaccessible through regular channels.

Contradicting this regionally based symbolic domain of elite status is the nationally defined political sphere. In addition to Tanzania's postcolonial socialist policies, the contradictions include government measures to limit the bourgeois tendencies of the leadership. Under Tanzanian Leadership Code guidelines, leaders (whether they are politically elected or appointed, middle/upper management employees in government firms) must divest themselves of nonsalaried sources of income. Strong social pressure induces them to limit public display of their privileged status. As overt symbols of conformity to the government code of asceticism and public service, employees wear Tanzanian-made Mao-style leisure suits and use government firm Land Rovers as a means of transport. Where the wabenzi (people of the Mercedes Benz) exist in Tanzania, they are not to be found, the way they are in Kenya, among the prominent political leadership.

Critiques, as evidenced in recurrent anticorruption/clean-government campaigns, focus on the precarious position of the political elite as holders of the public trust and as pivotal figures in the distribution nexus. This elite, sometimes referred to as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, is at least superficially divorced from its links to the production sphere. By law, it is barred from ownership of the means of production. Its political power and elite status are seen to derive from its management of the state, which controls the forces of production, and from the distribution of scarce resources.

Because government regulations have redirected the elite consumption of valuable resources into the private sphere (the home, exclusive clubs, overseas business travel, and study tours), politicians are constantly under suspicion of hiding resources that rightfully belong to the peasants and workers. The public use of ascetic symbols and the privatization of elite consumption has the effect of distancing the political leadership from its popular base, rather than the intended outcome of forging an empathic tie between the elite and the people. As pointed out so congenitally by Mazrui (1972), the problem for the East African postcolonial elite is not its social distance from its constituency but its social nearness. The problem of social nearness is crystallized in the popular pastime of judging which political leaders are putting on a "diplomatic front"--a full stomach indicative of eating and drink-

ing well. As one political leader put it, "Do you see how thin I am? I cannot afford to grow fat or allow my wife to become sleek. Otherwise my constituency would think that I am eating their taxes!" The political elite are keenly aware that the wanachi (the children of the nation) refer to their leaders as the walanchi (the eaters of the nation). Eating well has become the metaphor both for elite consumption and for elite corruption in Tanzania's current state of economic crisis.

Who are Check Rap, Check Bob, and TX Kubwa in this scenario? Check Rap and Check Bob, in their struggle for elite status recognition, signify an element of pathos. Check Rap has no real means of support. There is a very incomplete correspondence between what he is and what he wishes to appear. He has no independence, a critical factor in Chagga definitions of success. This definition of success is ambiguous, for while one strives to be financially independent, one can only become successful through the help of patrons, and success is measured by the ability to maintain and draw clients. Traditionally such patron-client ties were expressed at the simplest level through attainment of a respected position in one's lineage and clan. At the uppermost level stood the model of the chief, whose political and economic influence was expressed in the drawing of tribute and the display of largess. Reciprocal exchanges with kin, and to a lesser extent subethnic (territorially and linguistically defined) group-

ings, still persist, regulating the trajectory of successful careers today. However, despite what Hyden (1980) refers to as the resilience of the "economy of affection," one can view in these representations of elite culture a noticeable shift in patterns of investment toward individual consumption as a display of power and a means to draw supporters. While Check Rap and Check Bob portray a kind of pathos, they also symbolize the moral dangers of Western individualism. As "lifeists" they consume rather than invest and generate new forms of capital.

While Check Rap is a young man with few prospects, subsisting almost entirely through petty trade, his senior associates Check Bob and TX K are educated and represent advancing stages of modernization. They hold legitimate jobs, although their involvement in magendo business affords them access to luxury items which distinguish them. They are self-consciously western in orientation. As they are not operating directly in the political sphere, they are not as subject to public codes of asceticism as politicians. They consume freely in public. Their consumption patterns, which are individualized, are also shared with associates and clients whose dependency on them consolidates their status.

It is perhaps no accident that the symbolic reference "TX K" was most often applied to the sons of now deposed regional aristocrats. These are young men whose privileges under the colonial administration allowed them the finest

in regional and overseas education; whose tastes and manners were shaped by metropolitan ideals; whose privilege of rank still affords them a measure of deference. Their economic base has provided them the means to establish legitimate businesses or the educational credentials to pursue careers in management. While they must resort to extralegal means to support their elite lifestyle, they stand in contrast to the racketeer model of the magendo big boss who is caricatured as a man needing money and muscle to establish himself. Uneducated and a parody of colonial snobbery, his manners reveal his peasant origins.

While traditional rank affords the privileges associated with TX K status, it also constrains these privileges. TX K represents an uneasy alliance between a traditional bwana mkubwa (big man) and a western-oriented capitalist. In the current political environment his sphere of elite influence is limited and regionally oriented.

This discussion has delineated three competing domains of elite power and privilege which serve as models for upward mobility among young people in Kilimanjaro. Symbolically the political domain and the magendo domain stand in opposition to each other, with the arena of postcolonial aristocracy as a mediating category. These categories, however, are ideal models. As folklore characters they serve both as models of emulation and objects of ridicule. As models of emulation they express the desire for class fluidity, the salience of patron-client ties, the belief

that western values of consumerism are both politically dangerous and personally powerful, and the recognition that extralegal trade is essential to financial success. As objects of ridicule these symbolic domains convey the political and financial hazards of western individualism, a resentment of private consumption, the opposition of the nouveaux riches to the aristocracy, and the exploitative nature of patron-client ties within a situation of extreme scarcity. As symbolic domains these elite categories serve to exemplify both wishes and reality in a guide to social action. Taken as analytically separate, these domains represent competing models of the state, the anti-state, and the region. It has been the aim of this discussion, however, to suggest how an analysis of the linkages which connect these arenas may reveal something about the nature of Tanzania's postcolonial ruling class.

Conclusions

The characterization of persona, performatively applied to individual life stories, is part of the interpretive scheme which structures the social interaction of a generation of Tanzanian youths. This parcel of interpretive scheme speaks not only of strategy, but also of the positive and negative sanctions which relate to strategy. As satirical expression, the characterization of persona may be seen as a cathartic mechanism which directs stress outward and dissolves it in humor. As an expression of pathos and danger, these characterizations accentuate the

tension aroused by examples of individualistic accumulation strategies. This heightened anxiety may be one element of the more general reconnaissance projects conducted within the culture of accommodation. Reconnaissance requires not only monitoring the behavior of others, but also of the self in relation to others. Such characterizations are a symbolic expression of this not-completely-conscious dual aspect of the information-gathering mission, which is an integral aspect of everyday practice.

NOTES

1. I find the closest approximation to the types I describe in Basso's Portraits of the "Whiteman" (1979). Basso illustrates the folk use of Whiteman in Native American speech as a social category and cultural symbol. In his analysis, Whiteman is an unformalized model which defines a social category and communicates rules for how to deal with individuals in this category. I thank Deborah Winslow for calling his work to my attention, and Dan Santoro and Christy Hammer for helping me to delineate the differences between characterizations and typifications.

2. I am indebted to Solomon Poll for creating this phrase to cover the phenomena I describe. He points out that such characterizations are also common figures of Yiddish folk speech (e.g., schlemeil, schmendrek, knocker).

3. I am grateful to Lee Haring for his extensive discussion of this material with me and for pointing out the ambivalent nature of new boundaries of possibility.

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

This study was theoretically oriented by a hybrid of research initiatives. Some of the issues raised in the analysis fall within the domain of political and symbolic anthropology and the sociology of knowledge. The analysis also combines some of the conventional concerns over power, meaning, and ideology with conceptual approaches developed by social thinkers outside the anthropological discipline. Rather than recapitulate the arguments made throughout the study, I intend to use the conclusion to discuss the theoretical implications raised by the data which I have presented. This discussion is organized around a set of working concepts which I have found particularly helpful in thinking through the research problem. These core concepts are: ideology, consciousness, social reproduction, and resistance. I address the problem of culture for the analysis of the Tanzanian case in the final section of this conclusion.

Ideology

Historically, studies of knowledge and power converge on the issue of ideology (Fardon 1985, 5). The production of knowledge, particularly those ideas which symbolically order the principles of social reality, are a central dimension in the state's construction of political power.

Gramsci (1971) divides the state into two realms: political society and civil society. Political society (law, administration) operates on the basis of force and repression. Civil society (what Althusser refers to as "ideological apparatuses"--schools, the media) operates through the manipulation of symbols and meaning to make ruling class ideologies appear universal and to shape and limit oppositional discourse and practice (Giroux 1983). There are obvious limits to force and repression. The state works most effectively when it can "win the active consent over whom it rules" (Gramsci 1971, 244). For Gramsci, the nature of hegemony¹ lies in the dual use of force and ideology by the dominant classes to shape the "common sense" (uncritical and largely unconscious way of perceiving and understanding the world) of subordinate classes. Philosophy (or, more broadly, a theory of knowledge) exists for all classes, even though it may be in the embryonic form of common sense. The exercise of hegemony converts common sense (of dominant classes) to the status of ideology. Simply put, this is why a theory of knowledge cannot be separated from political theory.

In Tanzania, the ideology of African socialism emphasizes the innate "Africanness" of a set of ruling ideas.² These are portrayed as natural,³ or rooted in traditional African social life. Ideological conversion is unnecessary because the nature of the African experience is both socialist and democratic.

The true African socialist does not look on one class as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the "brethren" for the extermination of "non brethren." He regards all men as his brethren- as members of his ever-extending family. Ujamaa, then, or "familyhood describes our socialism (Nyerere 1968, 27).

The charter of ujamaa socialism, as expressed in the 1967 Arusha Declaration (Nyerere 1968), lays out a basic creed, a set of programs (how the creed is to be operationalized through self-reliance), a philosophy of membership and leadership, and a theory of knowledge. This theory of knowledge defines the social reality of Tanzanian life (e.g., classes are not a reality, egalitarian communalism is) and describes how values and ideas can be used to transform behavior (e.g., that behavior anomalous to the definition of social reality such as capitalistic instincts).

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Modernization/nation-building studies examine the extent to which ideology, "a specific kind of belief characterized by a high degree of explicitness of formulation over a very wide range of subjects" (Shils 1968), is limited as a state formation device. The issue of investigation here is whether, by sleight of hand, a representation of gemeinschaft writ large can weld together a disparate range of local communities into a cohesive national polity (Zeitlin 1984). Such studies beg the important questions. The issue is not whether ideology can succeed, but where it comes from and how it works. Studies which are confined to the limits of ideology reveal something

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about how ruling ideas work through symbols and the charismatic exercise of symbolic power, but they do not go far enough. The vast terrain of how individuals experience the effects of ideology as limiting the boundaries of possibility (Aronowitz 1977) is left unexplored. Such studies also assume and describe resistance by local actors to ideological control by the state, but offer no explicit theory which explains why resistance occurs by some groups, to some policies, at some conjunctures, but not others. The creative and transformative use of state ideology by actors to mediate fluctuating life conditions is also unexplored.

The limits of African socialism have been extensively explored elsewhere (Babu 1981; Bienen 1967; Coulson 1982; Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Hyden 1980; Kitching 1982; Mwansasu and Pratt 1979; Nellis 1972; Saul 1979). There are also several accounts which detail the correspondence of state ideology to ruling class interests (e.g., Bernstein 1977; Shivji 1976). The conclusions of such work, particularly at a time when Tanzania is undergoing its own version of glasnost and perestroika,⁶ appear overly mechanistic. My goal has been to provide an actor-centered account of how hegemony, particularly its ideological arm, operates in Tanzania. I was especially concerned with how the cultural/class location of individuals structures their world view, life chances, and course of probable action.⁷ To determine how a state ideology intersects with cultural/class location requires an understanding of how theory is

put into practice. This entails a concern with consciousness.

Consciousness

The conceptualization of ideology in relation to social action raises the question of intentionality. The thorny problem of attaching motivation (interests and meaning) to behavior and to ideas and beliefs, calls for an extension of the conventional sociology of knowledge position, namely, that ideology is merely a distorted form of belief (Abercrombie 1980).⁸ For Foucault, the assumption that ideology "always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as the truth" (1980, 118) is problematic. The important line of investigation for Foucault centers on the relationship of truth to power.

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Foucault restores an interactional approach to the investigation of knowledge and dimensions of power. To paraphrase: Knowledge does not stand in a superstructural relationship to power, but rather is an essential condition for the growth and formation of state capitalism (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). The subject which becomes critical is the analysis of a "regime of truth":

"Truth" is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to the effects of power which it induces and which extend it (Foucault 1980, 133).

It is not possible to confine an analysis of power to political institutions alone (or their economic base) because power is mobile and multidirectional. In Foucault's

analysis of power, the field of investigation centers on the modes of objectification which turn people into subjects (of study and ultimately, social control). Although power sets up the basis of asymmetrical relations, it affects not only those who are dominated, but also those who dominate (through a process he calls "autocolonization").¹⁰

Foucault tells us that power is expressed intentionally (with a series of aims and objectives), yet his analysis of power is curiously unsatisfying on the question of how intentionality is organized or what it means to social actors (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 187). Foucault does indicate that "the subject," rather than power per se, is the object of his analysis. Foucault's use of the word "subject" differs from the general sociological application of this concept to the individual. The rhetorical use of subject in his work refers to the historical and socially constituted location within which structural elements of a system can be identified. The problem of individual intentionality in such a structural framework is not a critical issue. Instead, what he advocates is a study of "dividing practices"--which divide the subject inside himself or divide him from others. These dividing practices derive from normalizing (political/disciplinary) technologies. One intriguing way such normalizing technologies operate as societies become increasingly complex is through the organization of surveillance.

The "regime of truth" established in Tanzania since 1967 under ujamaa socialism works through the extensive use of surveillance/dividing practices as a means of turning citizens into subjects for the purpose of social control. Prior to independence in 1961, some 120 societies in Tanganyika were transitionally encapsulated into a capitalist exchange economy. The strains of such transition were manifest in the accentuation of "traditional" wealth-leveling and social control mechanisms such as gossip and witchcraft accusation. The postcolonial state has incorporated such control mechanisms into a surveillance system in which, to paraphrase Jeremy Bentham (as quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982), every comrade becomes a guardian. Personal behavior is checked against a state ideology in which a moral code is explicit, but vague and fluctuating enough to be open to a wide variety of interpretations. Such surveillance works upon individuals at all levels of the system. It entails two counterstrategies: hiding and reconnaissance.

I argued in chapter 1 that information-gathering activities are a fundamental part of Tanzanian social life and are the outcome of the invasion of state ideology into all domains of social relations. People are, in other words, extensively engaged in watching each other and watching themselves as a means of continuously reformulating how to organize behavior in outward conformity with fluctuating structural rules. A preoccupation with recon-

naissance has at least two outcomes. First, it affects--both negatively and positively--relations of trust. In an essential way it raises the temperature of anxiety. The second outcome is related to the first. Surveillance/reconnaissance entails an extraordinary integration of "conscious and unconscious" intention,¹¹ the ultimate dividing practice. Between the extremes of outward resistance (through hiding or defiance) and outward compliance to a regime of truth, Tanzanians exhibit a range of accommodating behaviors which combine both extremes and, in the process, creatively transform "truth" to mediate the economic and political realities of everyday life.

There are several ways to analyze such activity. One is to focus on what Mannheim (1952) calls objective meaning--that which is grasped by the observer without any prior knowledge of the participants' intentions. A strict analytical separation of real as opposed to expressed interests assumes ideational distortion (how agents are mystified). A second, hermeneutic approach is what Mannheim calls subjective meaning. This entails insider understanding of actors' intentions and assumes a degree of logic and lucidity in the actors' understanding of how they behave. At a third level, documentary meaning combines both subjective and objective understanding and goes beyond these approaches to incorporate meaning which is documented in a particular action, sometimes unintentionally. As Foucault points out, "People know what they do; they frequently know

why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does" (Foucault as quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 187). A more useful paraphrase of the problem would modify the concluding thought in the following way: people do not always understand or anticipate the full implications of their action.

In rendering an interpretation of documentary meaning of particular practices in this study I have found the approaches of Bourdieu (An Outline of a Theory of Practice 1977) and Giddens (Central Problems in Social Theory 1979) useful. Both attempt to generate models which account for the complex interaction of social structure (formal systemic rules which are explicated in ideology), social institutions (which are the outcome of collective practices mediating formal structural rules), and the universe of meaning which social agents generate in their activity.

Giddens is helpful in the way he isolates interpretive schemes from social norms. Interpretive schemes are "standardized stocks of knowledge, applied by actors in the process of interaction. Interpretive schemes form the core of mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is sustained through and in the process of interaction" (1979, 83). Interpretive schemes are essential components of social practice because they constitute meaning which is communicated. However, social practices are also regulated by rule-following with respect to sanctions. A practice cannot be understood with respect to a single

rule or resource. Practices are situated within intersecting sets of rules and resources (1979, 82).

Structure, in Giddens model, has a dual capacity: to communicate meaning and delineate normative sanctions. Resources (and here I take him to mean more than those which are strictly economic) are the medium by which the meaningful and normative content of interaction is actualized. Power is a relational concept in this model. It has a transformative capacity and it also has the capacity to dominate. Whether power is harnessed to transform interaction or to dominate the actions of others depends on the way resources are utilized.

Giddens aims to restore a focus on actors and action within a theory of structure. He also provides an illuminating explication of power by pointing out that strategic action consists of more than intentional action and can just as often consist of "non-decision-making." In my view, what is problematic in his model is that he separates power from intention or motivation (promoting "agency" in its place), but provides no systematic way to discern the role of consciousness in agents' behavior.¹² Here, Bourdieu offers a possible solution.

Bourdieu takes as a starting point the idea that, "Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the naturalization of its own arbitrariness" (1977, 164). The most important mechanism which achieves this effect is the con-

cealing of the "dialectic of the objective chances and the agents' aspirations, out of which arises the sense of limits, commonly called the sense of reality" (1977, 164). In effect, a censorship of consciousness is operating throughout the social system, invading particularly what Bourdieu calls habitus, structured dispositions to a particular environment. Habitus (or what we may call culture) provides the scheme of a "discourse of familiarity" (also referred to as doxa) which "leaves unsaid all that goes without saying" (1977, 18). Doxa is powerful precisely because it operates most extensively through symbolic modes attached to primary physical/sensory awareness (e.g., the classification of the body and its functions, the organization of time and space).

Practical knowledge, then, entails a form of learned ignorance, both an intentional learning of the cultural order and an amnesia that such rules were apprehended in the first place. The result is a misrecognition (meconnaissance) that there is a possibility of antagonistic, or at least different, sets of beliefs and actions.

In stable social formations, objective structures are reproduced in the dispositions of social agents, and doxa operates over a very wide social field. Crisis, particularly in class societies, initiates the questioning of doxa, a struggle for the imposition of dominant systems of classification. What is at stake for subordinated classes in such crisis is the exposure of the arbitrariness of what

is taken for granted. The opposing interest of dominant classes is the defense of doxa, or "short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, orthodoxy"--the official way of thinking and speaking the world (1977, 169). The boundary between the doxa and orthodox (and conversely, heterodox) discourse provides for Bourdieu, "the dividing line between the most radical form of misrecognition and the awakening of political consciousness" (1977, 170).

We have in Bourdieu's model, then, a schema which incorporates structure (and ideology as discourse) on the one hand, and habitus/culture (and the internalization of structure in agents' dispositions) on the other hand. Social actors have an awareness of what they know and do which only becomes fully reflexive in situations of crisis. Additionally, Bourdieu provides a possible solution for understanding how ideology as structural discourse is differentiated in transitional systems and how this might impinge on the consciousness of actors in the strategies they initiate. Unfortunately, Bourdieu stops short of providing a theory of how reflexivity, brought into existence by transitional crisis, transforms structure. He comes closest when he touches on "extraordinary discourse," charismatic responses to crisis situations. In cases of extraordinary discourse, previously "private" experiences undergo a change of state when they are recognized in the public objectivity of an already constituted discourse.

Any language that commands attention is invested in the authority of a group. The things it designates are not only expressed, but authorized and legitimated (1977, 170).

In chapters 5 and 6 I was concerned with the confrontation of national ideology and local knowledge in extraordinary discourse. National ideology in these two cases is explicitly concentrated in two state campaigns, one against economic sabotage and one for hard work. The extraordinary discourse of local response to these campaigns concerned the rise of a social movement of vigilante witch doctors and the revival of rain sacrifice. To locate the documentary meaning of extraordinary discourse in relation to practical discourse calls for a theoretical model of social reproduction and resistance.

Social Reproduction and Resistance

There are three levels on which I consider the role of ideas in relation to practice in this study. The first level consists of a highly explicit state (orthodox) discourse. Generically, this level refers to what the state attempts to present as neutral: policy. Two kinds of policies were brought into focus: one, the structuring of knowledge in formal institutions, the other, the economic policies which simultaneously target production and distribution. In the first type of policy, state ideology (itself a theory of knowledge) attempts to organize the production, transmission, and distribution of knowledge to meet economic, political, and more broadly, social goals.

Contained in such policy are specific ideas about change and continuity through social transmission. In the second type of policy, ideas about change are harnessed to a concern with labor and the redistribution of the products of labor. These two types of policy form two ends of a continuum. Schools, in conjunction with other state-controlled institutions, are supposed to transform the dominant mode of production. As these institutions work imperfectly, other types of interventions are called into play.

At the second level, I wanted to consider the discourse of familiarity inherent in two cultural spheres. Here I present an historical account of how such discourse has shifted in relation to the changing political and economic environment of these two locales. The types of policies mentioned above, which structure new limits and opportunities, are part of what I mean by the word environment. Ideation in the discourse of familiarity is identified in a number of ways: the practices which people perform in the course of everyday life, the goals they articulate in formulating strategies for action, and the expressive mode of language, particularly modern folklore.

At a third level, I was concerned with extraordinary discourse captured in expressive dramatic rituals. Such rituals carry the label "traditional" by social actors and the state. They mobilize local (cultural) symbols and expressive modes to communicate a shared meaning, combining

this with modern modes of expression, technology, and belief. They occur in a particular modern moment of historical time, and are in one salient way an expression of resistance to state domination. Yet to collapse all these elements into the concept "invention of tradition" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) poses a problem.

The critical dynamic of ritual is that it accomplishes a number of ends at once, not only for different segments of a group, but also for individuals on multiple levels of experience. Thus it is possible to interpret the extraordinary discourse of the two cases presented here as both resistance and social reproduction. To take such a view calls for a rethinking of the relationship between ideology as explicit discourse and as lived experience along the lines suggested by Comaroff (1985). Several recent critiques of the application of Marx's concept of social reproduction in cultural and educational analysis provide a fruitful direction (Apple 1982; Giddens 1979; MacLeod 1987; Williams 1973; Willis 1977).

The most general complaint contained in these critiques is that Marx's proposition,

Every social process of production is, at the same time, a process of reproduction...capitalist production...produces not only commodities, not only surplus value, but also produces and reproduces the capitalist relation, on the one side the capitalist, on the other the wage laborer (1961, 531-532),

has been interpreted too narrowly. The correspondence approach (e.g., Althusser 1971 on ideological apparatuses in general, Bowles and Gintis 1976 on education in particu-

lar) takes a functionalist stance on the relation of base to superstructure. Ideological apparatuses work to reproduce relations of production with more or less complete correspondence. Where the fit is imperfect, time lags are introduced as explanatory devices. There are four problems with correspondence approaches. The first is that the base is viewed as a strictly economic/technical abstraction. This distorts Marx's broad conceptualization of mode of production which entails a wide variety of relations by which people create their social life. In other words, we need to "revalue the base" (Williams 1973, 6). The second is that correspondence accounts are overly deterministic and provide little or no autonomy to superstructure. A third problem is that Marx's conceptualization of social formation includes a set of inherent contradictions. The concept of social reproduction therefore implies a dynamic in which certain elements of the social formation are regenerated against the resistance of opposing forces. This dynamic is missing in correspondence models. Finally, the absence of the dynamic of struggle or contestation leads to an abstract formulation of social reproduction in which social actors are reduced to passive transmitters of dominant structures. Gramsci's account of hegemony, which emphasizes the need for dominant classes to continuously create, re-create, and exercise control over the consciousness of subordinate classes, has important implications for the development of social reproduction analysis.

There is a danger, however, in overemphasizing the role of struggle and resistance in social reproduction analysis (Giroux 1983). Recent critiques of Willis's (1977) favorably received account of British working-class schoolboys (e.g., Apple 1982; Giroux 1983; Macleod 1987) suggest that by considering all forms of rule-breaking defiance as resistance, we may miss the fact that such acts can just as often work to entrench relations of domination and subordination. While researchers who take resistance as a focus restore a degree of reflexive agency and particularly emphasize the role of cultural/symbolic production in the self-formation of classes in their accounts, they miss both conformity and the conditions which promote contradictory modes of resistance (Giroux 1983, 283).

The three levels of discourse discussed in the study (orthodox, familiar, and extraordinary) all rely to some degree on invention of tradition. They tap and/or express a range of dispositions from the lived, historical experience of actors. Yet this lived experience is constantly unfolding. Alternate practices (some reified as customary, some new) are called into play to meet fluctuating political and economic realities.

As an example, I have argued that at the point in time when I conducted research (1982 to 1984), the clue to understanding a wide variety of social practices was the privatization of the public sector. Virtually all spheres of social interaction had been invaded by the black market.

This created not a parallel or informal system, but a dominant shadow economy in which illegal practices were embedded in the legal. Privatization practices resist state control, yet use state agents and institutions. They are also not consciously transformative. For most people they represent short-term strategies to "get by," rather than collective strategies aimed at changing the system. However, the problem of interpreting such privatization practices is complex for the very reason that such behavior has had the unintended consequence of changing productive and exchange relations. Such relations are at the heart of both class and culture.

The Problem of Culture

The concept of culture as an analytic device is viewed as problematic by Tanzanian intellectuals. This became clear to me by the reaction my research proposal elicited when I arrived at the University of Dar es Salaam. The issues which were raised then are salient to the analysis I have presented, so I will summarize them briefly.

Culture as a descriptive concept, covering a range of practices and beliefs which are learned, shared, geographically located, and considered "traditional," is viewed as particular to the research paradigm employed by anthropologists, folklorists, and ethnohistorians. Anthropology does not exist as a discipline in Tanzania. The few anthropologists in residence are housed within the Department of Sociology, where the British intellectual legacy conven-

iently combines the two separate American disciplines. It is not surprising that British structural-functionalist anthropology is viewed within the Tanzanian political climate as a reactionary colonial artifact. Tribe is a politically taboo word. The Swahili word kabila (nationality) is more acceptable. Yet here also, when kabila is employed to analytically explain a set of integrated values and practices which organize group identity, it fails to incorporate the salient features of class.

Social scientists (Tanzanians and expatriates alike) are more comfortable with applying a descriptive use of the concept of culture to the past, when the state did not exist. It is possible to analyze the range of tribes which existed on a continuum of egalitarian to stratified societies, to consider how such societies became internally more complex or decentralized in response to capitalist incursion, or to speak of expressive culture as a form of resistance to internal or external domination. Such research has important implications for the recovery of a past which places Africans at the center of the analysis. The ethnographic materials collected by anthropologists are utilized, but with caution. A first generation of Tanzanian scholars, trained in the Dar es Salaam historical tradition, are making a valuable contribution to Africanist history by combining research on written accounts with oral history and archeological findings.

The imperative of contemporary social science research in Tanzania is to combine theory and practice. A theoretical understanding of contemporary behavior must be applicable to the social problems of a new state which is making the (self-defined) transition to socialism. Studies of inequality (particularly economic and political), utilizing the Marxian framework of class analysis, dominate the research environment. Studies of gender inequality pose more of a problem, because there the issue of cultural beliefs and practices will not disappear. In studies of unequal regional development within the state, the problem posed by Lenin as the "national question" (how to subsume a wide variety of nationalities within one centralized polity) is difficult to resolve analytically without using the culture concept.

Put simply, my own research provoked discussion because methodologically it straddled secondary schools (which allocate formal knowledge on a national basis) and two local communities in different regions (each with a dominant ethnic group allocating informal, practical knowledge). Because I was trained in anthropology it was anticipated that the concept of culture would somehow figure predominantly in my analysis. Yet the questions I raised were, from my local sponsors' point of view, more readily understood from a class perspective. I was therefore asked to account for my position on the national question, that is, to explain how I would account for the intersection of

culture, class, and state in my analysis. This proved an important step in my rethinking of the research problem, and my answer, though not so well-formulated at the time, was as follows.

Culture in this thesis is not synonymous with class, ethnicity, or ideology. It is a relational concept which finds expression in all three. Culture, as I understand it, is the outcome of practical consciousness. As elucidated by Marx and Engels,

Consciousness is...from the very beginning a social product...at first, of course, merely consciousness of the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual (1947, 51).

Practical consciousness is realized in the labor process, organized within a specific mode of production. Mode of production is more than the technology used to transform nature and the organization of work. It entails "the social relations that govern the deployment of social labor and the allocation of the social product that labor creates" (Wolf 1981, 45). However, I find it problematic to dispense with the concept of culture altogether in favor of the concept of mode of production for the analysis of a social formation such as Tanzania, where more than one mode exists.

Part 2 of this study presented a contrast between subnational societies (kabila) at the regional level. In the precolonial period both societies were differentially involved in a wider capitalist exchange economy, a process

which was extended throughout the colonial and postcolonial period. This process has significantly modified their mode of production based on gradual adaptation to the social and natural environment. It makes little sense, therefore, to speak of these societies as timeless entities, or as if they exist autonomously from state policy. Alternatively, it would be a distortion to pretend that what Williams calls "residual culture" (1973, 11) does not remain salient in their interpretive schemes of social interaction.

Such interpretive schemes are frequently discussed as components of ethnicity in the academic literature. Yet a focus on interpretive/ethnic schemes as culture glosses the importance of emergent class differentiation within these groups. Disposition, knowledge, and skills form the "cultural capital" of various classes (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). Cultural capital is reproduced generationally, but also within a number of institutions beyond the family, such as schools, the workplace, and voluntary organizations. The culture of class intersects with residual ethnic/interpretive schemes in a complex way. Finally, because rapid social change has exacerbated the internal contradictions within residual and class cultures, it is possible to speak, to a limited extent, of differences between generations in these two cultural locations.

There is an alternative way around this nesting-box problem of conceptualizing culture which I have employed in this study. That is to think of culture in its overt and

covert patterns and processes (Kluckhohn 1943) in dynamic interaction with the dominant culture of the state. Both residual and emergent values, meanings, and practices organize social life against the backdrop of hegemony. The outcome in Tanzania by 1984 was an elaborate culture of accommodation.

NOTES

1. Sassoon (1983, 201-203) provides a useful summary of the contemporary debate about the nature of hegemony and the applicability of this concept. Scholars are divided over the question of the extent to which the consciousness of the working class must be developed before state power is transformed, the extent to which the socialist state or revolutionary party should play a central role in the development of working class power, whether the character of hegemony is homogeneous/totalizing or comprised of diverse elements, and the extent to which the concept can serve as an analytical tool to analyze, not only bourgeois societies, but the achievements and limits of socialist societies.

2. Cf. Pareto 1935, 1423 on ruling ideas and residual sentiment.

3. Cf. Marx and Engels 1947, 65 on the universalizing characteristics of ruling ideas.

4. Apter's The Politics of Modernization (1965) and Geertz's edited collection Old Societies and New States (1963) are outstanding examples.

5. To this list could be added, whose interests does an ideology serve? It is important to note that this question assumes that an ideology can serve only one set of real (as opposed to expressed) interests. Such an assumption presumes the inflexibility of ideology as it is practiced. Put another way, an ideology may be formulated by a ruling elite to serve its own real interests, but have unanticipated consequences. These arise out of contradictions with the social formation as a whole, which a national ideology attempts to gloss as a unified entity.

6. Current world interest in what appear to be changes in the Soviet social formation, signaled by a recent openness to questioning communist ideology (glasnost) and economic restructuring (perestroika) described by Gorbachev (1987), indicates how western observers have overestimated the extent to which orthodox state discourse achieves complete domination in "socialist" countries. This issue is exceedingly complex, as I have described in part 1. By the mid 1980s Tanzania began to comply with the structural readjustment program set as a precondition for IMF funding and had begun to alter state ideological discourse in line

with these new economic structures. The limits of orthodox socialist discourse must be viewed, therefore, in the light of both internal and external (world system) constraints.

7. Cf. Lukacs History and Class Consciousness (1971) on relationship between class and world view.

8. Abercrombie (1980, 11-31) elucidates the conventional sociology of knowledge position on ideology as distortion and traces its roots to Mannheim's particular reading of Marx.

9. I say restore because mechanistic readings of Marx and Engels on the relationship of base and superstructure place extreme emphasis on the base and assign little autonomy to superstructure. Abercrombie (1980) provides an alternative reading of their work.

10. Strathern, in an intriguing but complicated argument about the relationship of knowledge to power in three Melanesian societies (1985), places a twist on Foucault's concept of domination. Power is by nature equivocal, that is, those who really have power, as opposed to those who appear to exercise it, are not necessarily identical.

11. What I mean here by the phrase "unconscious intention" is related to my understanding of Bourdieu's use of habitus (unconscious, culturally generated predispositions which motivate action). A certain action is intended because it "feels right," but is not discursively conscious. The concept of habitus is similar to Kluckhohn's reformulation of Ralph Linton's concept of covert culture (1943).

12. Giddens (1979, 120-130) draws on Lacan's reading of Freud on the unconscious to understand tacit and discursively available knowledge. Consciousness is the outcome of social reproduction (through continuous socialization) with the function of reducing potential sources of anxiety in the security system of the personality.

13. I am indebted to Elizabeth Brusco for having coined this phrase to cover the process I had been describing in numerous conversations since my return from Tanzania in 1984.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Map of Tanzania with Research Locations




Figure 2. Tanzanian Government and Party Structure 1984

	<u>Government</u>	<u>Party</u>
Nation	Parliament/Cabinet (President, Vice-president, Prime Minister)	National Executive Committee (Party Chair)
Region	Regional Commissioner (staff of regional officers, Area Commissioner)	Regional Executive Committee (Chair and Secretary)
District	District Councils (Chair and Vice-Chair)	District Executive Committee (Chair and Secretary)
Division	Divisional Secretaries	Branch Executive Committees
Ward	Ward Development Committees (Secretary and staff, Village Chairs)	
Village	Village Councils (Village Chair and Secretary)	Village Party Committee (Village Chair and Secretary)
Household	Each ten households= one cell (Cell Leader)	Ten cell units

Figure 3. Local-level Political Structures

<u>Village Government</u>	<u>Village CCM</u>
Chair (elected)-----	Village CCM Chair
Secretary (appointed)-----	CCM Secretary
23 Members	12 Members
25 Total	14 Total

Village Committees: Composition

<u>Committee</u>	<u>Members</u>
1. Defense and Security (5 Members, includes Chair and Secretary)	8 Village CCM Members 2 Representatives to the Branch Executive Committee
2. Finance and Planning (5 Members)	1 Representative to the Regional Executive Committee
3. Education, Social Welfare, and Culture (5 Members)	1 Member each of: Youth, Women's, Parent's, Peasants, Workers Organizations
4. Production and Sales (5 Members)	
5. Construction (5 Members)	

SubCommittees: shop, schools,
adult education, sports

District Council

Chair (elected at-large) and Vice-chair (elected within
council)

1 Member representing each ward in district
3 Members appointed by Minister
any Members of Parliament representing constituencies in
district
any Members of Parliament who are residents of the district
1 Chairman of a Village Council in the district

Committees: Finance and Planning, Administration and
Establishment, Social Services, Educational Affairs,
Economic Services

Figure 4.





Figure 5. Tribal Emblems of Tabora Boys School




District: Ujiji
Totem: Ulagaa

A small fish very prolific in Lake Tanganyika.



District: Shinyanga
Totem: Simba (Lion)



District: Ntega
Totem: Nyoka (Snake)

Badges adopted as their Tribal or House Totems by the boys of the Tabora School. The School is indebted to Capt. C. S. Scarth, M.C., 2nd K.A.R., for the designs.




District: Kahama
Totem: Kifaru (Rhinoceros)

Badges adopted as their Tribal or House Totems by the boys of the Tabora School. The School is indebted to Capt. C. S. Scarth, M.C., 2nd K.A.R., for the designs.

Source: U.K. Public Records Office, 1925 (CO 736/4).

Figure 6.


TANZANIA EDUCATIONAL PYRAMID
COMPARATIVE DATA
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
1961, 1971 & 1979



Source: Ministry of Education, 1980.

Figure 7.

The Structure of Education in Mainland Tanzania—1979



Source: Ministry of Education, 1980.

Figure 8.

Summary of Statistics in Education 1978*

Type of Inst.	No. of Institutions	No. of Learners	No. of Teachers	Teacher-Pupil Ratio
Primary (Public)	9,549	2,990,361	63,740	1:47
Secondary (Public)	85	41,972	2,392	1:17
Secondary (Private)	63	19,213	803	1:24
Adult Education Centres ...	70,000 %	5,800,000	100,000 %	
Folk Dev. (FDC)	51	n.a.	192	
Teacher's Colleges	35	9,934	728	1:15
Teachers (Distance Teaching Approach)	1,955	45,634	2,400	1:19
University	1	2,281	514	1:4
University (East Africa & Abroad)		1,069	—	—

*SOURCE: MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION: STATISTICS SECTION.

Figure 9.

Subjects and Periods for Forms 1-4

Forms 1 & 2

SUBJECTS, PERIODS AND BIASES					
GROUP	SUBJECT	AGRICUL- TURE	HOME ECONOMICS	COMMERCE	TECHNI- CAL
COMPUL- SORY SUBJECTS	Political Education	2	2	2	2
	Kiswahili	3	3	3	3
	English	5	5	5	5
	Mathematics	6	6	6	6
	Biology	3	3	3	3
	Health				
	Science				
	Geography	3	3	3	3
	History	2	2	2	2
	Chemistry		3	3	3
	Physics	3	3	3	3
	Religion	2	2	2	2
	Home Economics		8		
	Agricultural Science	8			
	Commerce			8	
	Technical Subjects				12
Total number of Subjects per week		40	40	40	44
OPTIONAL SUBJECTS	Physical Education	3	3	3	
	Foreign Languages	3	3	3	
	Music	3	3	3	3
	Art/Wood work/Metal work etc.	3	3	3	3
	*Home Economics	3	3	3	3
SELF RELIANCE PRO- JECTS		10 HOURS	10 HOURS	10 HOURS	10 HOURS
GAMES & SPORTS		2 HOURS	2 HOURS	2 HOURS	2 HOURS

*Home Economics is compulsory to girls in forms 1 and 2 but optional to boys

Source: Ministry of Education, 1980.

Source: Ministry of Education, 1980.

Agriculture Bias for forms 3 and 4

SUBJECTS		PERIODS
GROUP	SUBJECT	
COMPULSORY SUBJECTS	AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE	10
	Political Education	2
	Kiswahili	3
	English	
	Mathematics	6
	Chemistry	4
	Biology	4
	Religion	2
	Total number of periods per week	36
OPTIONAL SUBJECTS	Additional Mathematics	4
	Physics	4
	Geography	3
	History	3
	Home Economics	4
	Foreign Languages	3
	Teaching Methods	2
	Art	3
	Music	3
	Physical Education	3
SELF RELIANCE PROJECTS		10 Hours
GAMES & SPORTS		2 Hours

Home Economics Bias for forms 3 and 4

SUBJECTS		PERIODS
GROUP	SUBJECT	
COMPULSORY SUBJECTS	Home Economics	10
	Political Education	2
	Kiswahili	3
	English	5
	Mathematics	6
	Chemistry	4
	Biology	4
	Religion	2
	Total number of periods per week	36
OPTIONAL SUBJECTS	Additional Mathematics	
	Physics	
	Geography	
	History	
	Foreign Languages	
	Teaching Methods	
	Art	
	Music	
SELF RELIANCE PROJECTS		10 hours
GAMES & SPORTS		2 hours

Technical Bias for forms 3 and 4

SUBJECTS		PERIODS
GROUP	SUBJECT	
COMPULSORY SUBJECTS	Technical Subjects	19
	Political Education	2
	Kiswahili	3
	English	5
	Mathematics	6
	Physics/Engineering Science	4
	Chemistry	4
	Religion	2
	Total number of periods per week	45
OPTIONAL SUBJECTS	Biology	4
	Art	3
	Teaching Methods	2
	Music	3
	Physical Education	3
SELF RELIANCE PROJECTS		8 hours
PHYSICAL EDUCATION		2 hours

A student must take one of the following courses

COURSE	SUBJECTS
A. Mechanical Engineering	1. Auto Mechanics 2. Fitting, and Turning 3. Welding, Metal Fabrication and Foundry
B. Civil Engineering	1. Plumbing 2. Blockwork Mansory 3. Carpentry and Joinery
C. Electrical Engineering	Electrical Installation

Figure 10. Curriculum for the Vocational Bias Program

Figure 11.





Figure 12. Primary School Syllabus

Subjects and Allocation of Periods—1980

PERIOD	CLASSES AND ALLOCATION OF PERIODS			
	I—II	III—V	V—VI	VII
1. Kiswahili	12	9	7	6
2. Mathematics	8	7	7	8
3. Art	4	3	3	3
4. Home Economics/ Health Science	1	2	2	2
5. Physical Education	2	2	2	2
6. Handi craft, ...	1	1	2	2
7. Religion	2	2	2	2
8. Science/Agricultural Science	—	2	4	4
9. English	—	4	4	4
10. Political Education	—	2	2	2
11. Geography	—	2	2	2
12. History	—	—	2	2
Total	30	35	40	40
Total number of periods per week	6	7	8	8

Source: Ministry of Education, 1980.

Figure 13.



GLOSSARY

Unless otherwise noted, the terms listed are Swahili.

akida. An administrative functionary during the German colonial regime. Often of coastal or wangwana origin.

basumba batale. (Sukuma) Leaders of the young men's age grade who were influential as organizers of collective labor and community security forces.

Beni. Regimental dance societies; colonial era (ngoma).

bhang. Hemp and marijuana.

busungu. (Nyamwezi) Poison.

bwana mkubwa. Big man.

CCM. Chama cha Mapinduzi, the party of the revolution. Formed by the integration of the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar with the party of mainland Tanganyika (TANU). Each unit of ten households constitutes a party cell, headed by a leader (balozi).

Chagga. Ethnic group from which the majority of residents in Kilimanjaro originate. They are Bantu-speaking, intensive agriculturalists who grow coffee as a main export crop.

chakula. Food. Ironically used to refer to a bribe.

chungu. A common black cooking pot. Uchungu means pain, bitterness, anger, a grudge. Chungu meko means a hand-to-mouth existence. Nungu (Nyamwezi) and Nyungu (Kimbundu) also refer to a cooking pot. The famous Kimbundu chief, Nyungu ya Mawe, took this as a nickname.

dawa. Medicine (traditional and modern). Includes charms, spells, fetishes.

doxa. (Greek) The realm of implicit cultural knowledge.

elika. (Sukuma) Young men's age grade. One of the nine age grades into which males and females of the community were organized.

fundi. Artisan.

glasnost. (Russian) Openness, tolerance.

- gunguli. (Nyamwezi) Dispersed settlements.
- hali halisi. The real situation.
- irimbi. Dance and songs in praise of the ancestors.
- jioni. Evening.
- kabila. Nationality, tribe.
- Kamcape. See Mcape.
- kasucio. (Chagga) Drink prepared from heated cow's blood.
- kihamba; pl. vihamba. (Chagga) Fertile agricultural land surrounding the Chagga homestead where bananas and coffee are cultivated. Generally inherited by the youngest son, along with the house property.
- kitambulisho. Identity card.
- kufikira. To think, meditate, reflect, hope.
- Ma. (Chagga) Term of address for a mother, first-born daughter, elder woman.
- magendo. Black market.
- Makonde. An ethnic group living in the southern coastal zone. Well known for commercial ebony and ivory carving.
- mambo. Word. In colloquial speech, a shorthand for "What's the word?" or "What's happening?"
- manyonywe. (Chagga) A plant which grows along irrigation ditches which water banana groves where ancestral sacrifice was performed.
- masale. (Chagga). Dracaena plants which mark the boundaries between homesteads. Thought to signify friendship and peaceful relations.
- masumba. (Chagga) An indigenous elite whose wealth was based on cattle and vihamba possession.
- mbege. (Chagga) Beer brewed from finger millet and bananas.
- Mcape. A witch-cleansing movement which originated in Central Africa in the 1930s and has appeared in one guise or another every decade since the colonial ban on the poison ordeal was enforced.

mchili; pl. wachili. (Chagga) District headman appointed by, and responsible to, the chief.

meconnaissance. (French) Misrecognition. The process by which something which was implicitly learned is understood in another way.

mganga; pl. waganga. A native doctor, medicine man.

mgeni; pl. wageni. Stranger, newcomer, foreigner.

mitaa. (Chagga) Traditional geographic units.

mradi; pl. miradi. Project. May be an actual enterprise or a plan to initiate an enterprise.

mwenyeji. Resident, inhabitant.

mzee; pl. wazee. Old man, elder, man who deserves respect.

nfumu. (Nyamwezi) Diviner.

ngoma. Drum, dance, music, dance society. Dance societies have a long history of performing political, economic, healing, and ritual functions in East and Central Africa. The drum was a symbol of chiefly status in many parts of the region.

nguvu kazi. Hard work. The colloquial name for the Human Resources Deployment Act of 1984. The phrase "kila mtu afanye kazi" means "everyone must work."

njaa. Hunger, famine.

Nkwe. (Chagga) Term of address for a second-born daughter.

ntemi. (Nyamwezi) Semi-divine ruler in greater Tabora region who was vested with broad social, ritual, and political powers.

Nyamwezi. The ethnic group which predominates in Tabora region. Bantu-speaking, mixed horticulturalists, who were renowned as caravan traders during the nineteenth century and became migrant workers during the colonial period. They are highly involved in the production of the export crop tobacco.

Nyanyembe. Nyamwezi chiefdom located around the present regional capital, Tabora Town (formerly, Kazeh).

perestroika. (Russian) Economic, social, and political restructuring.

pole. Slowly, gently, quietly. Used to soothe, express sorrow or condolence.

poorini. Bush, uncultivated land. An uncivilized place. Used jokingly to refer to remote rural settlements.

Ruga ruga. (Nyamwezi) Standing armies maintained by Tabora's chiefs and warlords during the nineteenth century.

Ruwa. (Chagga) One of the four praise names of God which signifies universality. The other three praise names are: matengera, the one who cares for creatures in a peaceful way; molunga soka na mndo, the mystery by which reproduction is insured; and fumvu lya mku, the mountain of ages.

shamba. Garden land.

shilling. The official rate of exchange in 1984 was eight to ten Tanzanian shillings to one U.S. dollar. At unofficial rates, one dollar could be exchanged for sixty to one hundred shillings.

siasa. Politics, political action and agitation, the study of politics (civics or political science). As an adverb, means orderly, carefully.

Sukuma. The largest of Tanzania's ethnic groups whose members reside mainly in Tabora, Shinyanga, and Mwanza regions. Originally pastoralist/mixed horticulturalists, they have successfully adapted to agricultural production of the export crop cotton. Their Bantu language is similar in many respects to Nyamwezi and where the two groups overlap, these languages represent a dialectical variation only.

Sungusungu. A social movement originating in Shinyanga (called Wasalaama) and Tabora regions in the early 1980s. The literal meaning of the name refers to a species of black ants. See also chungu and busungu.

TANU. Tanganyika African National Union, the independence party.

ujamaa. Extended family, collectivity, society, assembly, gathering, meeting, community. The trademark of Tanzania's ideology of African socialism which emphasizes a return to earlier, precapitalist values. Ujamaa villages are officially registered by the state, collectively responsible for government loans, and must have communal projects.

utani. Joking relationship, from verb tania, to be familiar with, to treat as very near kin, or with great friendship. Utani fictive kinship networks linked different clans and tribes to provide mutual aid,

protection, and burial services throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

vbanachalo. (Nyamwezi) Subordinate chiefs in Nyanyembe who were in charge of the administration of local districts.

vidudu wa mtoni. Literally means insects from across the river. Colloquial usage refers to imported (western) luxury items, particularly clothing. Kidudu (sing.) literally refers to a small insect and also to a parasitical disease caused by insects. In precolonial Tabora, the youngest male age set was named after a species of small insects which fly together in masses.

wabenzi. People of the Mercedes Benz. Refers to the conspicuous consumption tendencies of Africa's post-colonial elite.

Wakoningo. The hunting and gathering bands which were the original inhabitants of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Displaced by Bantu immigrants who referred to them as the "short people."

walanchi. The eaters of the nation. Ironic reference to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

wananchi. The owners of the nation, the residents.

wandewa. (in Nyamwezi, vbandevba) Indigenous merchant class in nineteenth century.

wangwana. Nineteenth century commercial traders of heterogeneous origin. Originally many were slaves who converted to Islam and adapted to Swahili coastal culture. They were significant actors in the commercial caravan trade and often indistinguishable from the coastmen.

warumu. (Chagga) The living dead, ancestors.

Wasalaama. The peaceful ones. See Sungusungu.

wazee. See mzee.

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