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**THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESS AND THE FRAMING
OF U.S. MILITARY ACTION
IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD**

by

William K. Friedman

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctorate of Philosophy, The City University of New York.**

1999

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
William K. Friedman

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
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Abstract**THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESS AND THE FRAMING
OF U.S. MILITARY ACTION
IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD**

by

William K. Friedman**Advisor: Professor Stanley Renshon**

This study examines three major military actions under President Bush (Panama, Iraq, Somalia) and three under President Clinton (Iraq, Somalia, Haiti). In each case it analyzes the president's nationally televised address and the news coverage immediately following in Time, Newsweek and The New York Times.

On the theory that the public benefits from a vital marketplace of ideas, the research maps the diversity of basic policy perspectives, or "frames," presented to the American people via the president and the press during these six episodes. The analysis is conducted within the context of a model of "news frame deliberativeness" developed for this study, which views public discourse from the standpoint of its usefulness for citizens wishing to understand the situation and engage the issue. The research also tests Bennett's indexing hypothesis and several forms of bias, and discusses the results in terms of their implications for American democratic process.

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**THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESS AND THE FRAMING OF U.S.
MILITARY ACTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD**

Introduction

This study examines how the president and the press have framed military action during critical junctures in recent public debates over foreign policy: during and immediately following six nationally televised presidential speeches since the Cold War's end. The new age signaled by the Berlin Wall's collapse and the "new world order" promised by President Bush have not diminished the use of U.S. military force in the world. This study begins with the invasion of Panama in 1989 -- the cusp of the post-Cold War period -- and ends with President Clinton's military intervention in Haiti in 1994. Overall, it covers three major use-of-force situations under Bush (Panama, Iraq, Somalia) and three under Clinton (Iraq, Somalia, Haiti). In each case there was a major, nationally televised speech by the president followed, inevitably, by news coverage on the foreign policy situation and the administration's policy response to it.

On the theory that the public benefits from a reasonably vital marketplace of ideas, the research maps the diversity of basic policy perspectives, or "frames," presented to the American people through the six presidential speeches and a sampling of the news media (Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times)

appearing immediately after each speech. Moreover, the analysis is conducted within the context of a model of news frame deliberativeness, the development of which is a major project of this study. By deliberativeness I mean the usefulness of the media's framing the issue for citizens wishing to understand and judge the situation for themselves.

The model formulated here integrates two typically separate strands of the framing literature into a single coherent perspective, that of deliberativeness. The two types of framing brought together under this conceptual umbrella are “contextual frames” -- or cues that influence *how* information is processed -- and “substantive policy frames” -- or interpretative perspectives that provide contrasting analyses of the policy situation and thus give people things to think *about*. In a nutshell, the model suggests that contextual cues can be more or less open and encouraging of citizen deliberation, while the breadth of the diversity of policy frames provides citizens with either a richer or poorer array of alternatives to ponder. Media presentations that are more open and more diverse are considered more deliberative.

The model thus offers a means for systematically analyzing the usefulness of news framing from the standpoint of the hypothetical citizen wishing to engage the issue at hand. As a result, the research is able to determine if the news sample studied here was more or less deliberative during one military crisis or another. It also is able to compare the deliberativeness of the three publications to one another.

Subsequent to such mapping of the data, the research is in a position to explore several general questions and test several specific hypotheses. Among the former: How do Bush and Clinton, the two post-Cold War presidents, compare in their framing of military action, as well in as in other aspects of their rhetorical approach? How have the news media framed the same events? How do the three news outlets compare with the president and with one another? And, have certain frames for military action begun to dominate presidential rhetoric and/or news discourse, replacing the Cold War frame as a dominant perspective on the projection of American military power?

More specifically, the research tests the concept of indexing and its relation to the substance, diversity and deliberativeness of news framing. A proposition put forth most clearly as a formal research agenda by Bennett (1990), the model suggests that journalists tend to index their coverage to the views of the mainstream political elites who serve as the primary sources in the construction of stories, foreign policy stories in particular. In this view, media diversity will be lower when consensus prevails among mainstream political elites, and higher when they disagree.

The research design also permits a consideration (less conclusive than its test of indexing, but suggestive nevertheless) of several types of bias. Specifically, it considers:

- Liberal bias: The proposition that the media favor liberal views.
- Conservative bias: The reverse proposition.

- **Presidential bias:** The proposition that the media are typically dominated by the president's views.
- **Anti-presidential bias:** The reverse proposition.

Each of these views has its proponents, and the research will examine each in relation to the data. The results will then be discussed in terms of their implications for understanding the news and its relevance to citizen deliberation.

The study also makes a number of contributions to news media scholarship. As noted, the study develops a deliberativeness model of news framing that integrates two, typically separate strands of the framing literature into a unitary approach. It also develops a distinction between "dominant" and "secondary" policy frames that adds significant texture to the analysis of news discourse and clarifies the fundamental political question: Which policy viewpoints are "winning" when? The testing of the indexing and bias models of news performance, meanwhile, lends insight into constraints on the news' deliberativeness.

A distinction is also drawn between "deep" foreign policy frames that organize foreign policy overall (such as the Cold War frame that until recently dominated media discourse on military affairs) and "shallow" policy frames that pertain to the immediate policy situation and help describe and explain the breaking story. The study focuses especially on the latter, but comments at times on the former as well. Finally, the study develops an innovative means for assessing political elite consensus and "dissensus" -- the independent variable in the indexing model -- through the coverage of congressional opinion and debate in

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.

Among the study's major findings are the following:

- Strong support is found for the indexing model of news coverage. In most cases, when elite political discord is high, so is the frame diversity and "contextual openness" of the news coverage.
- The results also suggest the need to reconceptualize the way in which the independent variable in this model is typically operationalized to go beyond congressional opinion alone and include congressional-executive relations.
- The conservative bias model finds some support in the data, while the liberal, presidential and anti-presidential bias models do not.
- No deep "meta-frame" has clearly emerged to replace the Cold War frame, but the data suggest that something in the realm of *Containing Chaos* might be the closest contender so far as a deep organizing frame for American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

No study proceeds without limits. This one is bound by concentrating on one issue area (the use of military force) and, primarily, one time period (post-Cold War. While the study contains some comparisons to earlier military interventions, the relationship of these results to other time periods and other issue areas is beyond the scope of this research.) Moreover, in focusing on the theme of the deliberativeness of media discourse, I am concentrating on only one key element of

journalistic ideals in a democracy.¹ And all media research picks and chooses the sources to study. This one focuses on three important news outlets, Time, Newsweek and The New York Times -- chosen because, among other reasons, they are influential news sources in their own rights, have served well in other studies, and are often viewed as providing good overall reflections of the mainstream news in general.

Chapter One offers a fuller discussion of the problems the study is addressing and its relation to the existing literature. Chapter Two develops the deliberativeness model of news framing and the research questions it will help the study address. How this model will be applied to the task at hand is covered in Chapter Three, in which I discuss the specifics of the research strategies employed. Chapters Four and Five are devoted to mapping the study's main body of data: the ways in which presidents and the news media have been framing military action since the Cold War's end. Chapter Six summarizes and analyzes the presidential and media framing data and explores, among other questions, whether a deep foreign policy frame may be emerging in the post-Cold War era. Chapter Seven concentrates on the question of media deliberativeness. The final chapter (Eight) broadens the discussion in terms of the study's significance for American democratic process.

¹ Questions of accuracy, timeliness, readability, etc., are also pertinent. Cf. Entman's comment that what he terms "accountability news requires proper historical context, diverse perspectives, and explicit linkages to the officials responsible for policy outcomes" (1989, p. 21).

Chapter One

Military Intervention and the Deliberative Needs of Citizens

Military interventions are dramatic moments in American public life, "critical discourse moments" (as the literature sometimes puts it) when public attention and debate swirl around a highly visible, inherently high-stakes, public policy. When the United States applies military force, are citizens getting the information they need in the way that they need it? The typical citizen who wishes to consider the situation -- the "breaking story" -- will have most readily available two primary sources of information: official policy statements (most typically a presidential speech) and mass media coverage (here, Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times.) How adequate is this information for the citizen who wishes to engage the issues at hand?

The argument I make in this chapter is, in a nutshell, that the president's policy rhetoric *by itself* is insufficient for meaningful citizen deliberation, that the news media can do a better or worse job of compensating for these limitations, and that the concept of media diversity, particularly with respect to media frames, is one key to understanding how well the media do that. The latter point is then expanded upon in the following chapter, which integrates the concepts of frame diversity and contextual cuing within the study's deliberative model of news discourse.

Presidential Rhetoric, Media Discourse, and Military Action

A president will, in the natural course of events, try to make his version of events matter most in the mind of his audience. He is a political leader of public opinion, not a nonpartisan civic educator and will typically seek to dominate debate, not to stimulate it; to persuade and, in a sense, to end thought, not to engage and provoke it. In the formulation of one student of the presidency, he seeks to be -- and often is -- the "interpreter-in-chief" (Stuckey, 1991).

The argument here is not that the President is wrong to seek to dominate public discourse on his administration's policies. It is natural that he do so and it would in most cases be odd and a failure of leadership if he did not. ("Elites who want to succeed politically cannot afford to debate complicated truths in a marketplace of ideas" -- Entman, 1989, p. 20.) The paradox is that while the policy success of a president will often depend on his ability to prevail rhetorically, should he succeed in dominating public debate too well and too often, it will tend to diminish the quality of that public debate by limiting the "marketplace of ideas."¹

That an overly strong presidency can weaken and endanger democracy is a concern as old as the Republic. It was a major theme of the Federalist Papers, and was given significant treatment more recently in such works as Schlesinger's Imperial Presidency. The concern here is not that the president will harm democracy by rhetorically

¹There are instances when a president does seek to open up debate. President Clinton, for example, recently took this approach to Social Security, suggesting that the nation begin thinking and talking about it and considering different approaches to the problem. But this stance toward the public is rare, particularly on the part of a sitting president sending troops into battle.

prevailing, but that if he not only prevails but *dominates the very process of debate* so powerfully that contrasting ideas are unable to receive a hearing, *then* there is a danger of enfeebling the democratic process. The argument is thus for competition and against monopoly.

This brings us to the news media, who not only transmit the president's official policy rhetoric but are the only ones in a position to place the president's words in context and offer the public alternative interpretations to consider. A number of factors combine to make coverage of foreign policy problematic for the press. Reporters are always in danger of becoming overly dependent on their official sources -- and therefore vulnerable to manipulation by them -- and this is particularly so in foreign affairs (e.g., Cohen, 1963). Issues of geography, journalistic resources and the use and abuse of secrecy allow for tighter information gate-keeping than in other policy areas. And the social psychology of patriotism further narrows the media's intellectual elbow room. Many of these factors were obvious in the Gulf War, from the attacks on CNN's Peter Arnett to the herding of reporters in tightly controlled settings (see, e.g., Kalb, 1994).

Beyond such problems specific to the coverage of foreign affairs, there are also the foreign policy versions of more profound and pervasive problems of official-press relations involving modern public relations and mass communications (cf. Corcoran, 1979; Ginsberg, 1986; Tulis, 1987; Barnet, 1990; Stuckey, 1991; Manhiem, 1994). In foreign affairs, major institutionalized domestic public relations efforts began with World War I - "...the first modern industrial war requiring a total mobilization of popular effort on the home front for military production" (Ginsberg, 1986, p.225; cf. Barnet, 1990, pp.

220-245). A more modern example is offered by Wise's description of the Nixon administration's public diplomacy efforts:

Under Nixon, government pressure and attempted pressure on the news media reached new levels of intensity. For fifteen days in 1971, until the Supreme Court acted, *The New York Times* was prevented by a federal court order from publishing the Pentagon Papers. The *Washington Post* and two other newspapers were similarly restrained. It was the first time in the nation's history that newspapers had been barred in advance from printing information that the government found objectionable. And under the Nixon administration, the public was openly encouraged to distrust and to criticize the news media. (Wise, 1973)

Such formal, institutionalized efforts to control the public debate over foreign policy were once primarily confined to wartime. According to Parry and Kornblub, a new precedent was set when "in January 1983 Reagan formally authorized a public diplomacy apparatus by signing National Security Directive 77, entitled "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security" (1988, p. 9). Under the supervision of then CIA Director Casey the effort was headed by CIA propaganda expert Walter Raymond, Jr. (a psychological warfare expert) assigned to the National Security Council in order to sidestep the prohibition of the CIA in domestic politics (Parry and Kornblub, 1988, p. 4. Cf. Steel, 1984)

All of the above adds up to distinct challenges for accurate, insightful, independent coverage of military action by the press. This would present little problem for democracy if we could expect policymakers to be so forthcoming in their public rhetoric that simply reporting what different officials had to say would amount to a stimulating, informative political context for public opinion formation.

Of course, we cannot have such an expectation. Schlesinger explains one of the

reasons:

The prime historic function of the secrecy system has not been to protect national security. In this respect, it has done rather badly....The real function of the secrecy system is to protect the executive branch from accountability for its incompetence and its venality, its errors and on occasion its crimes. The secrecy system, moreover, emboldens government to undertake rash and mindless adventures. (Schlesinger, 1986, pp. 299-300. cf. Rourke, 1961)

And the issue goes beyond the gross abuses and their consequences that Schlesinger describes, into subtler and more pervasive political dynamics. In matters of national security, the executive branch's immediate concern is the execution of policy. For this either public quiescence or public support are often useful, while a vigorous public debate examining various sides of a policy question is rarely viewed as such, at least in any immediate sense within the high-pressure world of politics and policymaking.

In Murray Edelman's view, the problem has grown worse in recent years. He argues that, with the advent of single interest groups and the electronic media, "Both the incentive to take positions opportunistically and the means of dishonest public presentations of self have grown markedly in this century" (1988, p. 57). For example, consider the problem of "political ambiguity," as pursued by Page:

Politicians are notoriously reluctant to take clear stands on the issues of the day. In the United States, congressmen often avoid roll-call votes, and bury bills in committee; presidents conceal their positions on legislation with hazy statements and quiet lobbying; candidates make vague appeals to the voters. (Page, 1976, p. 742)

Political ambiguity is generally taken to be harmful from the point of view of public enlightenment and democratic social choice. Where ambiguity is widespread, we can hardly hope that political leaders will educate their citizens about the workings of government or the merits of contending policy proposals. (Page, 1976, p. 750; also, cf. Edelman, 1988, p. 50)

The catch-22 for democracy is that without such "education" and public debate, how is public opinion to evolve beyond knee-jerk reaction? Without an adequate system of public information and deliberation, how are citizens to fulfill even a minimal democratic role? Even for those who shy away from much public participation in policy and toward a strong version of representative democracy, *some* measure of public assessment of policy decisions remains fundamental to democracy. And surely this goes for foreign as well as domestic policy, where enormous amounts of national investment and sacrifice are required. As Schlesinger puts it, "If decisions of war and peace [are] not subject to popular control, how much scope does democracy really have?" (1986, p. 274).

Furthermore, the argument that pure policy considerations -- of timeliness, secrecy, and the like -- must in matters of national security be put above democratic norms has not held up well to historical scrutiny. Ambrose, for instance, believes that, "The [foreign] policies that have failed have tended to be those adopted...without meaningful [public] debate" (Ambrose, 1991, p. 136. Cf. Schlesinger, 1986, pp. 299-300). In a related vein, Janis (1982) has shown that an overly insulated policy debate can lead to "groupthink" and fiasco. It seems possible that a broad policy and public debate can offset groupthink and, at times at least, lead to greater rigor of policy thinking. In any event, it is certainly not established that cutting the public out of the process is the key to policy wisdom.

It is left, then, to the media not only to convey official policy positions, but to provide citizens with the context and contrast they need to deliberate effectively. A core theme for examining the media's fulfillment of *their* role so that citizens can fulfill *theirs* is

captured in the question of media diversity.

Media Diversity and the Deliberative Needs of Citizens

If one starting assumption is that the president, quite naturally, seeks to dominate public debate, another is that the media can best provide the public with *diverse points of view* to ponder in its democratic deliberations. Research on media diversity has its theoretical roots in political thought on deliberative democracy and the problems of political communication that such deliberation implies. In Dewey's view, for instance:

The essential need...is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is *the* problem of the public. (Dewey, 1927, p. 184)

In a democracy as large and complex as our own, the media's role in "*the* problem of the public" is inescapable, for:

It follows that as the number of persons in the aggregate increases, valid knowledge of what the common interest or the general good might be in specific situations must necessarily depend less and less on one's own direct experience and perceptions of others, and more and more on images and abstractions. (Dahl, 1982, p. 144)

Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion... When the public is large, this kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence; today, newspapers and periodicals, radio and television are the media of the public sphere. (Habermas, 1973, p. 231)²

And if media become essential to democratic process in any large polity, it does so especially for foreign policy, which is further outside the "direct experience and

²Cf., e.g., Garnham, 1986; Thompson, 1987; Bohman, 1990.

perception" of citizens than are many other issues.

Given the media's central role in the democratic process of a large nation, the significance of media diversity is straightforward: a poverty of political alternatives diminishes democracy. This has been among the classic concerns of American political science, as in Key's (1949) study of single-party state politics in the American South and Schattschneider's (1960) Semi-Sovereign People, not to mention the vast literatures on political participation by disenfranchised groups. Schattschneider's conceptualization of the issue is particularly trenchant. He writes:

He who determines what politics is about runs the country because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power. (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 68)

Above everything, the people are powerless if the political enterprise is not competitive....Democracy is a political system in which the people have a choice among the alternatives created by competing political organizations and leaders. (Schattschneider, 1960, pp. 140-141)

Entman ties this basic point directly to news media research in pointing out:

Receivers' responses are clearly affected if they perceive and process information about one interpretation and possess little or incommensurable data about alternatives. This is why exclusion of interpretations ... [in the media] is as significant to outcomes as inclusion. (Entman, 1993, p. 54).

It is a straightforward proposition then that a condition essential to productive democratic process is an array of news media open to a reasonable amount of diversity, so that citizens can sample and consider a variety of perspectives on, and

approaches to, pressing policy problems.

The connection between media diversity and effective democratic process is also made evident in the underappreciated concept of the *quality* of public opinion, particularly as conceptualized by Yankelovich (1991). Yankelovich contends that under favorable conditions public opinion on complex policy issues goes through a number of stages, from knee-jerk, superficial opinions early on to much more stable and responsible attitudes, which Yankelovich terms “public judgment.” These are the views that a majority settle on after they work through the pros and cons of various approaches to an issue and are willing to accept the tradeoffs involved in going in a particular direction. An example is the shift in American opinion this century on the legitimacy of women in the work force. While not all issues surrounding women's participation in the work force are completely resolved, the fundamental question of women working is dramatically different today than it was 60 or 70 years ago (Yankelovich, 1991, pp. 126-132). And, in Yankelovich's estimation, one of the conditions that most helps the public proceed from superficial, unstable opinions to “public judgment” is the availability once the public's concern has been aroused by events of a fair sampling of alternatives to stimulate debate and deliberation.

... The single best mechanism for advancing public deliberation is to give people real choices to mull over.... presenting choices is a far better method for advancing deliberation than merely laying out the arguments for a single solution: [It] gives people a systematic way to consider the consequences of alternative solutions so that they can be weighed against each other.... (Yankelovich and Immerwahr, 1994)

Or, as Edelman has it, “Political understanding lies in awareness of the *range* of

meanings political phenomena present and in appreciation of their potentialities for generating change in actions and beliefs" (1988, p. 123, italics added).

Conceptualizing Media Diversity

Clarifications and starting assumption

Research on media diversity (for overviews, see McQuail, 1986; Entman and Wildman, 1992) is closely related to studies of balance, media independence, and bias. Studies of news balance ask whether the media treat various sources of information according to the professional norm of giving a fair hearing to "both sides" of an issue. Independence asks whether journalism is overly dependent on, or effectively independent of, news sources, particularly official ones. Both are meant to purge news reports of the journalistic sin of bias, sometimes explored under the headings of ideology (e.g., Rothman and Lichter, 1987; Bohman, 1990) or "hegemony" (e.g., Hallin, 1987). The study of diversity pinpoints concerns with the news media's adequacy for public deliberation better than these related concepts for a number of reasons.

Balance leads thought and research toward dichotomies. For instance, Entman discusses "standard news values, which usually emphasizes a two-person contest" (1989, p. 37), and Lacy (1991) provides an example in a study that asks whether "prestige newspapers are more likely to cover *both* sides of community controversy" (p. 363, italics added).

This tendency to see issues as dichotomies, perhaps a product of the

two-party system (or a hidden Hegelian influence within American political thought), is an unnecessary restriction on both political debate and media studies.

Consider Edelman's argument in his classic 1964 study, The Symbolic Uses of Politics:

When, on the issues that arouse men emotionally, there is a bimodal value structuring [a dichotomous public opinion and debate], threat and insecurity are maximized. Those who hold the other value become the enemy. Under these circumstances condensation symbolism and mental rigidity become key factors in social interaction... Under this kind of value patterning, mass responses are more manipulable than under [multimodal patterns] because responses are chiefly to threat perceptions and can be readily changed by making it appear that new threats are now dominant.

A multimodal scattering of values is the opposite extreme. In this situation a very large part of the population is likely to see some merit in both sides of the argument: to be ambivalent and at the same time free to explore the possibilities of alternative courses of action. Rather than fear of an enemy, there is stimulating tension....alternative possibilities can be recognized and pluralistic politics supported. The preconditions exist for cognitive planning, negotiation, and logrolling.

Edelman, 1964, pp. 175-176

Granted, students of comparative politics who specialize in "multimodal" political cultures are liable to dispute the idea that more voices automatically lead to a more productive debate, and they are undoubtedly correct -- there's the diversity that fosters Edelman's open-mindedness and "stimulating tension" and then there's chaos. But it is also likely that a reasonable range of diversity -- more than one or two views, but not so many that the discussion becomes impossible to follow -- is more often going to be productive and stimulating than the classic for-against

dichotomies of American politics.³

Moving on to a related concept, many studies of bias start from a concern with the degree to which the media favor some viewpoints and exclude others, thus skewing or constricting public debate. Schlesinger (et al., 1983), for example, examines the dominance of official policy positions in television coverage of terrorism, while Rothman and Lichter (1987) are concerned with liberal bias by journalists. (See also Lichter, 1996). Some researchers begin with the assumption that the media are, for all practical purposes, closed, as in Hermann's (1985) thesis that official government positions dominate media coverage of major foreign policy issues. Others feel that the media are less open than would be ideal but that the amount of diversity that exists is significant, and it is the variance -- and the conditions that encourage or constrain that variance -- that should be studied. Thus, Schlesinger and his colleagues find most useful an approach that "enumerate[s] distinct television forms and ..[sees].. them as contested spaces" (p. 164). Similarly, Bruck (1989) and Shapiro (1990) are both concerned with the occasions when greater diversity occurs: "News analysis can identify the constraints [on media discourse], show how they work, and indicate their tightness or looseness in culturally and historically specific terms" (Bruck, 1989, p. 127).

The latter assumption -- that the news media are sometimes more open

³ Cf., again, Yankelovich (1991). Also, cf. Bennett, 1993, who suggests that the increased voter satisfaction with the 1992 presidential election was probably due to the *presence* (not necessarily the substance) of a third voice (Perot). The proposition that a "multimodal" political debate can be more productive than a dichotomous one could be researched with the tools of "cognitive complexity" (e.g., Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977).

than at other times -- is more useful, for the interesting thing is to explore the patterns of, and reasons for, both the dominance of certain views and actors and the overall range of diversity that occurs. This opens the research to various possibilities, and is consistent with the common observation that officials have *various* experiences with the media. Sometimes they seem to clearly dominate the media (the early Vietnam War, the Gulf War). At other times they find themselves skewered by an overwhelmingly negative media consensus (the late Vietnam War, Iran-Contra), and at other times appear as part of a larger, uncertain and open debate, and there appears to be no consistent dominance of either left-of-center or right-of-center viewpoint (the humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Haiti). Furthermore, we may still appreciate Richard Hofstadter's comment that while American political conflict and debate has not been as dramatic or ideologically diverse as in other nations, we have still been arguing over issues of great import to us as a people.

Hallin captures the present study's concerns in a report on media coverage of the Reagan administration's Central America foreign policy in the early '80s. He concludes that after Vietnam the "Cold War news frame" had become "contested." That is, it was no longer *assumed*; it no longer automatically organized the vast majority of foreign affairs reporting. However, Hallin also points out that little that was coherent had taken the place of the Cold War frame: "What is perhaps most important about the limits we have explored in Central America coverage is the *relative exclusion of alternatives*" (Hallin, 1987, p. 23). One of the questions the

present research asks is: What, if any, coherent alternatives for framing foreign policy crises have evolved *since* the Cold War's end?

To complete this review of close cousins to diversity research, media independence has recently gained currency as a research concept. "The question of independence refers to the extent to which the press becomes an active agent in a given conflict rather than a passive conveyer of political information" (Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 4). "Paradoxically, the media's effectiveness as vehicles for the popularization of free-flowing political and policy discussion largely depends upon their independence from the very same elite sources on which they rely to get information" (Peer and Chestnut, 1995, p. 81; cf. Entman and Page, 1994). While I will be assessing diversity by comparing the media's perspectives with official policy rhetoric (specifically presidential speeches), I treat this as a research strategy not a normative assumption. As Althus, et al., explain, "Researchers should resist the temptation to equate independence with rationality" (1994, p. 36). In other words, just because the media exercise independence and initiative doesn't mean that they have come up with anything important for the public to consider. That is why I prefer to view the issue in the following terms: Do the media offer a reasonable *array* of policy interpretations and options for public debate and deliberation?

Types of media diversity

Practically, the attempt to translate the theoretical concern for media diversity into empirical research has proceeded along a number of tracks. Entman and Wildman (1992), for example, distribute diversity research among three emphases:

- *Access diversity* involves the degree to which the views of various groups and segments of society are represented in the media.
- *Product diversity* refers to the types of news products/outlets available to the public.
- *Idea diversity* concerns the question of whether the ideas expressed in the media represent a fair sampling of society's political thought.

In this triptych, idea diversity most closely captures the present concern with the range of interpretations and options offered the public on complex policy problems. Access diversity is certainly related, in that inclusion of different types of voices are more likely to lead to different points of view. However, knowing *who* is "sourced" in a news report is no more than a clue to *what* is actually said. How full an airing is given to a particular voice, and how prominently is it displayed in the news text? For questions such as these one has to dig in to the content and explore the ideas and their presentation.

In one sense product diversity would also seem to have the potential to address this concern, for if at least some news outlets exist that represent contending views, the interested public could find its way to them. As much is

suggested in another discussion of media diversity by McQuail (1986), who makes a distinction is made between "horizontal" and "vertical" news media diversity. (Horizontal diversity being many publications with narrow points of view, and vertical diversity many points of view within a single publication). An implication of McQuail's discussion is that horizontal diversity would serve well the deliberative needs of citizens.

Such horizontal diversity, however, while important, is an insufficient response to the problem of a democratically adequate news media, for by itself it places unrealistic demands on citizenship. We cannot expect most citizens to track down contending arguments in myriad publications, for unlike "policy wonks," politicians, and researchers, they have other things to do with their time.⁴

My own view is along the lines of Gans, who proposes an ideal of a "modest degree of multiperspectivism" (or "idea diversity") within the mainstream press, "complemented by a second tier of...media, each reporting the news to specific, fairly homogeneous audiences" (1980, p. 318; cf. ch. 10, *passim*). From this perspective, the mainstream mass media should present, in a simplified but representative way, a reasonably broad spectrum of opinion. While the more attentive public, or the temporarily inspired citizen, can augment this with more specialized media that present in greater depth a particular interpretive slant and

⁴ Cf. Gans, 1980, pp. 317-318. And see Entman and Wildman, 1992 for political communications arguments on this theme. Also cf. Popkin's (1991) for a good discussion of the "low-information rationality" that citizens bring to bear on political reasoning. Or, again consider Schattschneider's "realist's" view of democracy in America: "The compulsion to know everything is the road to insanity" (1960, 137).

set of values, it is assumed that most citizens do not have the time or training to canvas specialized sources to explore competing interpretations of events and policies. Particularly for issues such as foreign affairs that are distant from their personal experience, it is up to the mainstream media to expose citizens to the kind of diversity that allows them to sort through the pros, cons and tradeoffs involved in different approaches to a complex policy situation and, therefore, have an opportunity to deliberate reasonably effectively.

Exactly how large the mass media's sampling of ideas should be is problematic. As Gans points out, "Philosophers and social scientists have given much thought to how scarce resources are best allocated, but their solutions are difficult to transfer to the news..." (1980, p. 319), and simple formulae regarding "balance and fairness" or "objectivity" do not adequately address the issue (cf. Entman, 1989, ch. 2; Schudson, 1978). According to McQuail, "The content of political communication should stem from the real political divisions in society and give voice to them, and should expose and carry forward debate" (1986, p. 136). Similarly, Gans writes that, "Ideally, then, the news should be omniperspectival; it should present and represent all perspectives in and on America" (1980, p. 312)

However, while the idea of indexing diversity to society's political divisions has a political logic to it, in practice we cannot expect, nor would we desire, that *all* sectors of society be represented in *every* instance. Gans himself goes on to conclude that:

This ideal [of representing all perspectives] however, is unachievable, for it is only another way of saying that all questions are right. It is possible to

suggest, however, that the news, and the news media, be multiperspectival, presenting and representing as many perspectives as possible -- and at the very least, more than today. (Gans, 1980, p. 312-313)

Gans' ideal notwithstanding, news diversity must certainly be weighed against other news criteria, such as relevance judgments, readability, common sense (cf. Entman and Wildman, 1992). For citizens, as processors of political information, can only deal with so many of society's "real political divisions" at a time. The essential news question remains: Which perspectives ought to be included in a given instance?

Bennett, in contrast to McQuail, attempts to ground criteria for diversity in the pragmatic realities of journalistic practice, as well as in traditional norms of American political culture.

Culturally speaking, it is generally reasonable for journalists to grant government officials a privileged voice in the news, unless the range of official debate on a given topic excludes or "marginalizes" stable majority opinion in society, and unless official actions raise doubts about political propriety. In these "exceptional" circumstances, it is reasonable for the press to foreground other social voices (polls, opposition groups, academics, political analysts) in news stories and editorials as checks against unrepresentative or otherwise irresponsible governments. (Bennett, 1990, p. 104).

Bennett's criteria are more realistic than McQuail's, but his guideline for inclusion of nonofficial viewpoints is overly narrow. He cites Federalist #10 to illustrate the "strong and enduring belief that government ought to be buffered from direct popular accountability in order to protect the political process from the whims and passions of an often ignorant...mass public" (1990, p. 104). Fair enough, but one could as well cite #10 to illustrate the traditional concern with the tyranny of the

majority, and ask whether only majority public opinion should be considered for inclusion. Some criteria for important minority perspectives also need development, analogous, in electoral politics, to the requirements for a minimal number of petitions to add a name to the ballot as an independent or third party candidate. Furthermore, there ought to be room for the relevant, innovative idea to find expression, even if it does not represent a significant political bloc. Finally, how is a fair and informed "stable majority opinion" to form if not on the foundation of vital public deliberation of real policy options based on diverse interpretations of the issue at hand?

Fortunately, the present research does not require that this question be resolved in advance, for I am not asking how well the media meet a precisely pre-specified ideal, but exploring the nature and degree of mainstream news media diversity in a given time period on a given issue, such as it is. This said, it does seem to me reasonable to begin with the assumption that more than one or two perspectives will virtually always be relevant to the public debate of important, complex policy questions. This is not to say that the public is capable of processing the technical details of myriad policy options in the same way as experts, but that the public can deal with *some* technical detail, and it can and should assess the broad political *values and political implications* of important policy alternatives.⁵

⁵ In conducting focus groups with the general public on foreign policy, the capacity for ordinary people to sort through foreign policy issues is impressive *provided* they are framed in broad terms with ordinary language, shorn of technical detail and jargon. See Friedman and Immerwahr, 1996.

Thus, with the possible exception of pressing national security emergencies (which are themselves matters of interpretation -- cf. Edelman, 1988, p. 31) my initial working position is that in a democracy the public should be exposed to a number of competing policy perspectives, rather than to a presentation of official policy rhetoric that simply conveys the interpretive constructs embedded within it as if they were givens, or that provides competing information and interpretation in a manner that cuts away at its credibility, or that offers only extremes of either excessive support and excessive cynicism while providing little in the way of cogent alternatives for the public to consider.

So far, the argument has stressed the importance of *idea diversity* ("multi-perspectivism") within mainstream news coverage of public policy issues. In this view, the task of journalists is not simply to tell the story well (although this is certainly part of what they should try to do), but to help citizens in their democratic deliberation appreciate important *diverse perspectives* on the story and how the story and its political meaning and significance changes as the perspective does. Researchers interested in studying idea diversity in the news have employed a number of strategies. For example, a recent study of media of Gulf War news mapped several policy positions as they appeared in the coverage (Althus et al., 1994). In Bennett's influential 1990 paper on press-state relations, "results were generated by measuring the *frequency, direction, and source* of all opinions voiced in the Times in all Nicaragua-related stories and editorials during the period" studied (p. 114). And Entman developed a diversity index based on "the number of

times two actors express different points of view. The higher the score, the more diversity of news" (1989, p. 198).

Each of the above is an example of research that explores the theme of media diversity by examining a rather narrow element of media discourse. While undoubtedly useful, such studies are also limited. Measuring, for example, "the number of times two actors express different points of view," only begins to indicate the degree to which there is true diversity of perspective in the story. How well developed are the points of view? How prominently is one portrayed vs. another? Do they highlight trivial or significant differences of viewpoint?

Media frames, by contrast, offer a richer approach to news analysis that can better determine the political significance of the coverage -- and, in this study's terms, its deliberativeness. Thus Entman notes (in a work after that in which his "diversity index" appeared): "Content analysis informed by a theory of framing would avoid treating all negative and positive terms or utterance as equally salient and influential" (1993, p. 57). Furthermore,

Framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text....[F]raming has important implications for political communication. Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions. (1993, pp. 51 and 55)

Framing thus speaks to the potential political impact of the media because of the way frames highlight, obscure and organize political narratives. The following chapter describes the study's approach to conceptualizing and analyzing

idea diversity via the concept of *framing*. It develops a model of public policy framing from a *deliberative* point of view (i.e., as it is meaningful to public judgment by citizens). This model integrates major strands of the framing literature into, it is hoped, a more powerful concept than currently exists.

Chapter Two
A Model of News Frame Deliberativeness
and the Study's Research Objectives

News Framing

Framing has become one of the guiding concepts in the study of public discourse, especially media discourse. While there is some inconsistency in its usage, news framing inevitably involves the manner in which a story is organized and presented and the effects that different presentations can have on the news' social and political impact. Despite a degree of ambiguity, the concept has generated a great deal of useful research and insight.¹

The purpose of this chapter is to bring greater clarity to the concept of framing and to develop a model of deliberative news framing for this study of presidential rhetoric and news discourse on post-Cold War military action. The research model of news framing here described integrates typically distinct types of framing into a coherent approach that speaks to the theme of the news' *deliberativeness*. That is, the model speaks to how well the framing of particular news stories meets the deliberative needs of citizens. In the words of one recent study, the model asks how well the news "positions the reader/viewer as a ...*citizen* with the tools to deliberate on the wisdom of policy decisions" (Mermin,

¹"Media sociologists have come to rely increasingly on the concept of frame....As a concept, it seems both indispensable and elusive" (Gamson, 1992, p. 384). The news frame is, of course, not the first theoretical construct in the social sciences to be simultaneously somewhat elusive and powerful -- cf. "the national interest" and the "ego."

1996, p. 183).

Two Modes of Framing and Their Integration in a Model of News Deliberativeness

Iyengar (1991) points out that at least two approaches to media framing have taken root, spawning distinct streams of research. One is primarily associated with psychological disciplines and involves the effects of contextual cues on judgments and choices. The other is primarily associated with sociology and involves fundamental perspectives that organize -- provide an "angle" for -- news stories. In Iyengar's terms, "This literature defines news frames in terms of ideological or values perspectives" (Iyengar, 1991, p. 163).²

Contextual cues

The discussion will begin with contextual cues as a form of framing. This line of research examines the impact different cues can have on individual information-processing (Kahneman and Tversky, 1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 1990; Iyengar, 1991). For example, framing the same choice with the same consequences in terms of gain vs. loss tends to lead to different decision-making results. And Iyengar's work distinguishes between what he terms "episodic" and "thematic" frames. Episodic framing presents news stories in terms of "specific events or particular cases," while thematic frames place

² While the psychology/sociology distinction fits the disciplines of the main scholars involved, I view both streams as relevant to, and part of, political psychology: They both concern psychological variables (e.g., cues, beliefs, values) *and* their relevance to political behavior and phenomena.

"political issues and events in some general context" (1991, p. 2). Iyengar demonstrates that thematic frames can increase "attributions of responsibility to government and society," while "episodic reports [that predominate on TV news have] the opposite effect" (1991, p. 3; see also Iyengar and Simon, 1994).

One way to look at the kind of framing with which Tversky and Kahneman and Iyengar are concerned is that it is *contextual*, not *substantive*. In these studies, the substance of the issue is held constant, while the context within which that substance is portrayed varies, and that variance has demonstrable political effects. Iyengar explains:

Converging evidence from several behavioral sciences indicates that people are exquisitely sensitive to contextual cues when they make decisions, formulate judgments, or express opinions. The manner in which a problem of choice is "framed" is a contextual cue that may profoundly influence decision outcomes. (Iyengar, 1991, p. 11)

Presently, I will be developing a concept of contextual framing relevant to my interest in the deliberative quality of news discourse. To avoid confusion, I will refer to this form of framing as "contextual cues," or just "cues" or "cuing" for short, and reserve the term "frame" and "framing" for substantive news framing, to which the discussion will now turn.

Substantive frames

Substantive news frames (or, in this study's terminology, just "frames") are fundamental interpretative perspectives that organize stories. (Cf. Goffman, 1974; Gitlin, 1980; Gamson and Lasch, 1983; Gamson and Modigliani, 1987; Entman, 1991, 1993). This type of media framing relates to the political cognition concept of political schema --

an individual's organizing principle for political information processing.³ Gamson describes such a frame as a "central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning" (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). Frames do so by indicating the importance of events and placing them in a cognitive framework that makes them understandable and manageable.

Frames, then, organize the news coverage into a coherent narrative, a meaningful "story." As Entman explains, they typically do so because they serve to "diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe..."

An example is the "cold war" frame that dominated U.S. news of foreign affairs until recently. The cold war frame highlighted certain foreign events - say civil wars - as problems, identified their source (communist rebels), offered moral judgments (atheistic aggression), and commended particular solutions (U.S. support for the other side). (Entman, 1993, p. 52)

In my view, the *diagnostic* component of Entman's recipe -- or, as Gamson puts it, "suggesting what is at issue" (1989, p. 3) -- is the most crucial for distinguishing one frame from another. The reason is that two frames can have the same evaluation or prescription, but they can't have the same diagnosis. (They will *often* lead to different evaluations of a policy situation and prescription for addressing it -- and this is much of the reason why they are politically important -- but not in every instance). For instance, a news account could have condemned Saddam Hussein in 1991 and recommended a military intervention from either a *democracy is sacred* or a *stability in the Middle East* is

³Frame plays the same role in analyzing media discourse that schema does in cognitive psychology -- a central organizing principle that holds together and gives coherence and meaning to a diverse array of symbols" (Gamson, 1992, p. 384). Cf. Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 56.

crucial to American national interests framing perspective. These different ways of explaining "what is at issue" could lead to very different news accounts and lessons drawn to apply to future policy situations.

Furthermore, a single frame "typically implies a range of positions, rather than any single one, allowing for a degree of controversy among those who share a common frame." (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 3). Thus, the simple *existence* of controversy and multiple policy options does not *necessarily* indicate real frame diversity, without a deeper analysis of the world view/values/ideological perspective at the root of substantive frames. For instance, in the latter phases of the Vietnam War, there were those who felt we should remain and prevail and those who felt we should withdraw. Among the latter, however, were those who thought that "what was at issue" had more to do with *strategic and tactical* questions (an *intraframe* controversy) and those who viewed the policy from an entirely different perspective (an *interframe* controversy). In the first case, there were those arguing for withdrawal who felt that though original official analysis of a communist threat was correct, practically, the war could not be won, at least at an acceptable price, and that other means of battling world communism would need to be employed. *And* there were those who disagreed with the domino theory in the first place and viewed Ho Chi Min's movement as a nationalist revolution and not as a crucial Cold War battle ground. Therefore, while the evaluative and prescriptive dimensions of news frames are important and flesh out the account, the crucial, core component is the diagnostic dimension, a point to which we'll return in the methodological discussion of frame analysis.

An example of a sophisticated approach to substantive frame analysis is found in

the work of Gamson and associates (e.g., Gamson and Lasch, 1983; Gamson and Modigliani, 1987 and 1989; and Gamson, 1993). Gamson examines what he terms "media discourse packages" which is a rich way to describe a substantive news frame, along with the content that, he argues, characteristically goes along with it. As Gamson explains, a discourse package

...has an internal structure. At its core is a central organizing idea, or *frame*, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue... [A] package offers a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole with a deft metaphor, catchphrase, or other symbolic device. (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 3)

In my view, such elaborate "discourse packages" are characteristic of what I would term "mature frames" -- those that have been around a while, and have therefore accumulated the rhetorical baggage that Gamson describes (catchphrases, metaphors...). "Emerging frames," on the other hand, may not have all of these accouterments, but they nevertheless may be organizing the news discourse. Be that as it may, Gamson and Modigliani's (1989) analysis of a variety of news sources found the following news frames about nuclear energy: *Progress*, which "frames the nuclear energy issue in terms of the society's commitment to technological development and economic growth" (p. 4); *Energy Independence*, which "drew a pro nuclear meaning from the Arab oil embargo of 1973 (p. 15); *Soft Paths*, an environmentalist package that "raised the safety issue" (p. 16); *Public Accountability*, "a more populist, anti-corporate package" (p. 16), and *Not Cost Effective*, which offered a "more pragmatic, cost-benefit" analysis (p. 16).

Substantive frames cannot help but have important impacts on public opinion and

deliberation, for:

To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described. (Entman, 1993, p. 52)

These impacts are recognized by news professionals (whether or not the term "frame" is used) as illustrated by this excerpt from a New Yorker piece on the 1996 presidential campaign:

Reporters write "within paradigms," the presidential assistant Rahm Emanuel said. "Bob Dole said he took positions in the primary that he totally disagreed with. Nobody picked that up. The reason nobody picked it up is that the paradigm is that 'Bob Dole is a principled person, who only operates on principle.' Had Bill Clinton taken similar positions, I think reporters would have grabbed on to it."

It was another sort of paradigm -- a belief among many reporters that the President has something to hide -- that led to one of McCurry's more surreal encounters with the press.... (Auletta, 1996, p. 49)

Another journalistic example:

"It's absolutely correct to say that there are objectively occurring events," says Cole Campbell, of the Virginian-Pilot. "Speeches are made, volcanoes erupt, trees fall. But *news* is not a scientifically observable event. News is a choice, an extraction process, saying that one event is more meaningful than another event. The very act of saying that means making judgments that are based on values and based on frames." (Fallows, 1996, p. 262)

Numerous studies have demonstrated the impact framing can have. Some examples: Gamson and Modigliani (1989) find that media framing helps to account for public attitudes toward nuclear power since 1950; a study by Jasperson et al. (1998) concludes that media framing is essential to understanding "effects on public opinion on

the issue of the federal budget" (p. 205); and Entman and Rojecki (1993) argue that the manner in which the nuclear freeze movement was framed by the news media affected its level of public support.⁴

The question for this research is how *deliberative* news framing is, specifically the framing of a military intervention when the president has focused the nation's attention on it and attempted to persuade Americans of his own policy frame. The model developed in the next section is an attempt at a systematic means for answering this question.

Toward a Model of Deliberative News Framing

In the last chapter, when I argued for the importance of news frame diversity, I was referring to substantive news frames. (The "policy frames" alluded to in the Introduction and Chapter 1 are, in this scheme, substantive frames about public policies). I was suggesting that the news ought to offer citizens a spectrum of policy frames to consider in their deliberations. The *deliberative model of news framing* developed here takes this argument a step further and suggests that contextual cuing can interact with substantive framing in such a way as to amplify or depress the "deliberativeness" of the news. This model thus combines the two types of framing (contextual and substantive) within an overarching concept of news deliberativeness, meaning the degree to which the news coverage is useful from the standpoint of the hypothetical citizen wishing to reflect

⁴If such studies as these are not enough to convince that the manner in which the media frame issues is important, consider the untold sums that are spent trying to control this variable in the corporate and government sectors. All of that money and energy are funneled toward having a particular frame dominate the news for a reason.

on the matter at hand.⁵

The deliberative model of media framing that this research develops is based on the idea that contextual cuing leads one to think in particular ways, while substantive framing gives one something (or numerous things) to think about. Alternatively, *open* contextual framing encourages deliberation, while *diverse* substantive framing provides the raw material with which to do so. Put differently, one could say that more open contextual cuing plus more diverse substantive framing equals more deliberative news discourse.

Theoretically, the model is based on the nature of (substantive) framing and its relation to cognition. As Goffman (1974) and others have argued, framing is a necessary means to organize experience, and thought and knowledge about experience. Much in the spirit of Kuhn's paradigms, frames both aid and limit thought. They aid thought by organizing it into manageable bundles of meaning. They limit it by the cognitive equivalent of inertia: Frames create zones of familiarity beyond which it takes a special effort to venture.⁶

⁵This argument is made here on theoretical grounds. In future research I hope to test the proposition empirically that the model's variables have a measurable impact on citizen deliberation.

⁶A passage in the remarkable novel The God of Small Things by Arundati Roy gives what seems to me an astute rendering of personal perception without organizing frames. Describing the state of her main characters after a cataclysmic personal tragedy, she writes:

At the time, there would be only incoherence. As though meaning had slunk out of things and left them fragmented. Disconnected. The glint of Ammu's needle. The color of a ribbon. The weave of the cross-stitch counterpane. A door slowly breaking. Isolated things that didn't *mean* anything. As though the intelligence that decodes life's hidden patterns -- that connects reflections to images, glints to light,

Deliberation is the process by which we reflect upon frames and their implications for our lives, as individuals and as part of a political collective. As such, deliberation requires critical distance — one can't reflect upon a frame unless one can somehow, cognitively speaking, step back from it and consider or reconsider its meaning, appropriateness, usefulness, value and so on. And, I would argue, in public discourse critical distance is achieved primarily through (a) questions *about* frames and (b) comparisons *between* them. Recall, in this context, Hallin's study, mentioned in the previous chapter, in which he concluded that as of the 1980s the Cold War frame had become *contested* (it was no longer simply assumed and unquestioned, in a literal sense it had become "questionable"), but that no real *alternatives* had come to the fore. So, one element of deliberativeness had come into play, according to Hallin, but not the other.

Deliberative news framing is news discourse in which questions are prominently raised, serving as contextual cues to readers to pay attention and think about the problem of the appropriate policy frame for the situation at hand, and that all is not known, obvious, and in accordance with "common sense." It is, further, discourse in which an *array* of substantive frames are offered for consideration, ideally with some clarification of the pros and cons involved if the different frames suggest moving down different policy paths. In other words, the discourse will, in effect, communicate that (a) there are important questions to decide and (b) here are some of the major ways people are looking at these questions.

weaves to fabrics, needles to thread, walls to rooms, love to fear to anger to remorse -- was suddenly lost.

So far, the deliberative model of news framing offers two, interrelated concepts: contextual cuing (signals given the reader that important questions exist regarding the framing of the policy situation) and substantive framing (fundamental interpretive perspectives that, in Entman's handy formulation, "diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe"). Now let me elaborate, and add several further elements that will make the model a more sensitive instrument for framing analysis.

The place of contextual cues in the deliberative model

In developing my concept of open contextual framing, I build on the work of Schlesinger, et al., who make a distinction between "tight" and "loose" media presentations. The latter, they argue, create a context that sets the stage for greater media diversity and reader deliberation:

A tight format is one in which the images, arguments and evidence offered by the [television news] programme are organized to converge upon a single preferred interpretation and where other possible conclusions are marginalized or closed-off. A loose format in contrast, is one where the ambiguities, contradictions, and loose ends generated within the programme are never fully resolved, leaving the viewer with a choice of interpretation. (Schlesinger, et al., 1983)

The deliberative model developed here includes a concept of "open" vs. "closed" contextual cuing that is closely related to Schlesinger's tight/loose distinction, but a little easier to apply in a systematic manner across cases and types of news outlets. This approach identifies prominent cues at the outset of news presentations that signal openness, in the sense that the news about to be considered involves questions and issues that are "open to consideration" "open to discussion," and "open to interpretation."

In Chapter Two I operationalize this concept for application to the media sample studied here. Suffice it to say that an *open* contextual frame is a signal to readers to think through the issues for themselves while a *closed* contextual frame is a signal that the hard work of deliberation is unnecessary because the conclusions are already clear. I take as an indicator of open contextual cuing the presence or absence of prominent questions. As an example, consider the covers of Time and Newsweek immediately after Bush's speech on

the Somalia intervention in December of 1992. In the case of Time, the cover depicts a starving Somalian child sadly staring into the distance, with the words "The U.S. to the Rescue" imprinted over it. The suggestion is clearly that America's policy in Somalia is about a rescue mission, a mission of mercy. No questions are raised and no other possibilities are suggested. The heart-rending photo precludes the possibility of any hint of irony in the title.

Newsweek by contrast, shows a soldier, his duffle bag hefted on his shoulder, marching beneath the words, "Going In: Should America Be the World's Policeman?" The cover thus asks a very large question and in doing so signals the reader that there are important things to think about and seems to promise that food for thought will be found within. Time's cover (in this simplified example) portrays a relatively closed contextual cuing, while Newsweek's is more open. In a very real sense, the first invites the reader to *receive* a particular interpretation, the second to make his or her *own*.⁷

⁷I was tempted to also incorporate Iyengar's distinction between episodic and thematic contextual cues into my deliberative model, in that there is something inherently deliberative in his notion of thematic news discourse. (Thematic frames include "coverage of...background and context, of...complexities...", and so on.) Two factors have led me to hold back. One is that Iyengar's research on television news is tricky to replicate for the print media. Second, Iyengar's project demonstrated that thematic framing tends to lead people toward attributing responsibility to society rather than to individuals. In my view, a deliberative model that predicts in advance the kind of opinion that will result is questionable. (This is no comment on Iyengar's first-rate work, just on its potential relationship to the deliberativeness model).

I suspect that these methodological and theoretical conundrums may resolve themselves over time. It seems likely to me that as more research and theoretical work are done on episodic and thematic framing, on the one hand, and the deliberative model, on the other, some manner of integration could occur, but at this point it seems premature to force them together.

Inviting deliberation through open framing does little good if there's nothing much to sink one's teeth into, and that's where substantive frames come into play. As we will see, such frames are where the politics most clearly enter the picture.

The place of substantive frames in the deliberative model

The significance of diverse substantive framing should be straightforward given the earlier discussion of media diversity. It is simply saying that exposing citizens to a *spectrum* of ideas, interpretations and policy options helps them deliberate more effectively than simply promoting a single point of view. The model developed for this study concentrates on substantive frame analysis in something of the spirit of Gamson's work, although within the project's deliberative model.

Moreover, the research model incorporates another dimension of substantive media frames by building on a suggestion by Entman that distinguishes "major frames" which organize and dominate a piece of reportage and competing "minor frames" that may be found within it, contending with the major frame (Entman, 1993, p. 55). This is extremely useful in that it brings politics more clearly into frame analysis:

Politicians seeking support are thus compelled to compete with each other and with journalists over news frames.... Framing in this light plays a major role in the exertion of political power, and the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power -- it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text.

Reflecting the play of power and boundaries of discourse over an issue, many news texts exhibit *homogeneous framing at one level of analysis, yet competing frames at another*. (Entman, 1993, p. 55, italics added)

Similarly, Gamson holds:

For many events, there may be more than one frame suggested [in a news account], and one needs to ask questions about the prominence of competing frames in the same news report. (Gamson, 1989, p. 158)

This project gives life to this important, relatively unexplored abstraction by examining both major and minor frames -- or, in my terminology, *dominant and secondary frames* -- in news coverage on post-Cold War military action. This perspective on framing allows the research to map the "battle" of *contending* frames for prominence within news coverage, examining which fade and which come to the fore over time. As will be shown, this allows for a more subtle accounting of media diversity, and, as well, engages clearly the traditional political question of which frames are "winning" (gaining prominence) and which are not.

Thus far, I've attempted to develop a concept of open vs. closed contextual framing and more vs. less diverse substantive framing. Further, an analytic distinction has been made between dominant and secondary substantive framing, the former being the substantive frame that most powerfully organizes the overall news narrative. The latter are the less prominent frames that might be found at points within the text, perhaps suggested through an interview with an international observer, a congressional critic of the administration's policy or an academic expert, or pegged to the results of a public opinion poll.

Finally, an analytic distinction should be made with regard to shallow vs. deep substantive policy frames. Shallow frames speak to the immediate policy situation. A deep frame applies to foreign policy more broadly, and is a guiding force behind the immediate

(shallow) policy frame. Thus, thinking back to the Grenada intervention, a shallow frame suggested by the president might have been *Imminent Danger to American Lives* as President Reagan stressed in his speech, "My own concern for our citizens dictated my decision" to intervene (Reagan, 1983, p. 1521). There was, however, also a deep frame behind *Imminent Danger* that explained more fundamentally "what was at issue," why the imminent danger had occurred in the first place, and what lessons for foreign policy ought to be drawn for the future. I refer, of course, to the Cold War frame:

Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism. Well, it wasn't. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy... Today, our national security can be threatened in faraway places. It's up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such place and be able to identify them. (Reagan, 1983, p. 1521)

This study of post-Cold War presidential rhetoric and media discourse about military action focuses first on shallow frames. How is the "battle" over the action's framing "fought" in the public discourse across six incidents at one of the most decisive moments of the battle -- during and immediately after a major presidential speech, when a great number of people are paying a great deal of attention? A secondary analysis will address the question of deep frames, for one of the questions that the study seeks to contribute to is whether a new deep frame is emerging to replace the now-defunct Cold War frame. Do the shallow frames of the six interventions -- the immediate explanatory frames applied by Bush and Clinton and the study's news sample -- suggest the emergence of a new deep foreign policy frame taking the place of the Cold War frame? Or do we remain in a phase of situational and ad hoc policy making?

Pseudo vs. real deliberativeness

An analytic distinction should also be drawn between *pseudo* and *real* deliberativeness, for news treatments can, and do, present hollow versions of all the elements of the deliberativeness model that have been discussed. In other words, not all openness cues and not all alternative frames are equally valid. There are a number of rhetorical techniques through which news discourse can create a pseudo deliberativeness rather than a real one, and I'll describe some of the most important ones. With regard to contextual cuing (essentially, operationalized as questions prominently raised about the story and its dominant frame), *pseudo cues* include:

- Rhetorical, "self-destructive" questions that are meant to close down reflection rather than stimulate it.
- Trivial questions (from a framing point of view) that neither challenge dominant frames nor suggest alternative ones.

With regard to substantive framing, a pseudo frame diversity can occur under the following conditions (among others):

- "Stillborn" alternative frames are offered in a strongly delegitimized fashion.
- "Splitting hairs" are the equivalent of the trivial cuing questions -- they offer no real alternative of any significance even though they are presented as if they fulfill the journalistic obligation of balance.
- "Fantasy frames" are unrealistic alternatives -- a scenario where the dominant frame lies within the realm of political reality and the alternative(s) are so far beyond the likelihood of having a practical impact that they are, in effect,

meaningless except as, again, a pseudo fulfillment of the obligation to offer some form of balance.

As one example of such pseudo-deliberative elements of news discourse -- in this case, stillborn contending frames -- consider the following from Newsweek's coverage of the Panama invasion under Bush:

As expected, the reaction from Latin America was mostly negative. Diatribes from the likes of Cuba and Nicaragua arrived on schedule...." (Newsweek, 1/1/90, p. 22).

As expected, diatribes, on schedule -- all of these terms serve to delegitimize the negative reactions alluded to from Latin America. As it turns out, no substance is offered the reader as to the nature of the critiques, so in this case we cannot say that an alternative frame is actually offered. We are simply told that the critical comments exist and, by implication, that they are knee-jerk and unimportant. But if a frame *were* offered here -- a different view of "what is at issue" and how to respond to it -- its salience as a significant consideration would have been diminished by its context. Such a reference to a different frame cannot be considered true news diversity even though a superficial counting of sources and countries cited might incorrectly give that impression.

By contrast, the Times carried an article after Bush's speech on Panama that begins as follows:

From Mexico to Argentina, Latin American governments today roundly condemned the use of force by the United States....Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Peru criticized the action as interference in the sovereign affairs of a fellow American nation... (NYT, 12/21/89, p. 24)

Here a critical view from Latin American governments are presented not as "diatribes from the likes of..." but as broadly held views that at least have some sort of argument, grounded in principle, attached to it. Whether or not one is persuaded by the critique is not, at the moment, the point. It is that this rendering signals that these views are at least worthy of consideration.⁶

To provide a feel for the application of the deliberative model, assume that the most important contextual frames and the most dominant substantive frames will be expressed in the most textually strategic positions in an instance of news coverage. For example, the important contextual framing and the dominant substantive frame will appear on the cover of a newsmagazine and the front-page headlines of a newspaper, and in such strategic textual locations as subheading and lead paragraphs. (In the newsmagazines especially -- and less so in the Times -- *concluding paragraphs* often offer summaries and final judgments that also reflect on framing.)

Now imagine that in the news coverage of a U.S. military action against Country X, the covers of Time and Newsweek and the front page headline of The New York Times convey a closed contextual framing (indicating that there is not much to think about, the answers are known and the interpretation is obvious). Imagine as well these

⁶As the data analysis unfolds, other examples of the such "pseudo-deliberative elements" will be highlighted. Such pseudo cues or frames are not counted toward a news treatments' deliberativeness. As the next chapter, on method, discusses, this implies the need for judgment calls and argues against simple, empirical content analyses that are apt to count pseudo-deliberative elements as real ones.

three news outlets apply the same dominant frame to the story (let's say they all agree that the story is at its core about protecting democracy). Furthermore, imagine that no real alternative secondary frames are contained in the text, except one or two flimsy allusions to competing views that are strongly delegitimized by the surrounding contextual cues (e.g., "stillborn"). This would clearly be a scenario of low openness and diversity, and therefore of low news deliberativeness.

Now imagine the application of American military force in Country Y. In this instance, the contextual cues are relatively open (signaling that there are important questions to think about), and there are multiple substantive frames (both dominant frames *across* news outlets and secondary ones *within* them). Here deliberativeness is high. This scenario is depicted schematically in Table 2-1.

TABLE 2-1
A MODEL OF NEWS MEDIA DELIBERATIVENESS
Comparing Collective Media Coverage of Different Interventions

Contextual Openness	Framing Diversity⁹	
	<i>Lower Diversity</i>	<i>Higher Diversity</i>
<i>More Closed</i>	Country X	
<i>More Open</i>		Country Y

This grid is a means for organizing the deliberativeness of news coverage across different interventions. Contextual cuing signaling overall openness is indicated on the vertical column to the left, with two levels of openness possible. (These will be operationalized in the next chapter). Horizontally across the top are two levels of substantive frame diversity, based on an analysis of both dominant and minor substantive frames. (Again, more in Chapter Three). The lowest level of deliberativeness finds its home in the upper left corner of the grid, where we find our news samples' treatment of America's hypothetical confrontation with Country X. The highest level of deliberativeness, with the most contextual openness and frame diversity, is in the lower right corner, where we find Country Y.

The grid can also be used to compare how different *news outlets* cover the *same* incident. Thus, the deliberativeness of the framing in the coverage of Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times with regard to Country Z could be placed on the grid, to depict

⁹Substantive frames are weighted according to whether they appear on the dominant and secondary levels of the news discourse. This point will be discussed further in Chapter Three.

how they compare with one another. If, with regard to a hypothetical American military intervention in Country Z, Time had a relatively low level of cuing openness and relatively few secondary substantive frames, Newsweek had a high level of cuing openness and many secondary substantive frames, and The New York Times had a low level of cuing openness and many secondary substantive frames, they would map out as follows. (Table 2-2).

TABLE 2-2
A MODEL OF NEWS MEDIA DELIBERATIVENESS
Comparing News Outlets

Contextual Openness	Framing Diversity	
	<i>Lower Diversity</i>	<i>Higher Diversity</i>
<i>More Closed</i>	<u>Time</u>	<u>NYT</u>
<i>More Open</i>		<u>Newsweek</u>

Summary and Research Agenda

The study examines how the president and the press have framed post-Cold War military action during critical junctures in the policy and opinion-formation process during and immediately following nationally televised presidential speeches. It maps the diversity of substantive policy frames presented to the American people through presidential speeches and through the news coverage by Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times with regard to six recent applications of military force.

Moreover, the study develops a deliberative model of news discourse that integrates contextual cuing and substantive framing, the two major -- and typically separate -- strands of research on news framing. In brief, the model addresses how *open* the contextual cuing is, and how diverse the substantive framing is. The model holds that more open and diverse news framing is more deliberative -- i.e., more useful to citizens who wish to engage the issues.

On one level, the study is exploratory. It seeks to develop a model involving several theoretical and methodological innovations, apply it, map data, and see what can be learned and what hypotheses can be generated as a result. For instance:

- How are the post-Cold War presidents similar and how are they different in the ways in which they've framed military action in their speeches?
- Are there patterns *within* presidential terms and *across* the post-Cold War period that the data reveal and that suggest hypotheses for further research? (For instance, have certain frames become more dominant in presidential speech as time passed, and is a new deep frame suggested by the various examples studied?)

- How have the news media (as represented by the sample employed here) framed post-Cold War military action? Has a single, deep policy frame begun to emerge over time in the media?
- How do the media frames compare to the president's, and how do the three media outlets (Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times) compare with one another?

The study also has a more specific research agenda: to test the indexing model of news performance, which holds that the range of opinion reflected in the news is dependent on the degree of consensus or discord in mainstream political debate. Additionally, the study tests four commonly held concepts of news bias. Doing so will help clarify some of the major stimulants to, and constraints on, news media deliberativeness. Thus, whereas the research model developed for this study assesses the quality of news presentations in terms of their deliberativeness, these five models of media performance can help explain those results and help identify those variables that tend to encourage or inhibit news deliberativeness.

Indexing and the four bias models are introduced below, and their operationalization for purposes of the study will be developed in the next chapter.

Indexing

Many factors have been posited as influences on the media diversity that is at the core of my model's notion of deliberativeness.¹⁰ Among the models of media performance

¹⁰ Entman, 1989 covers much of the literature. See also McQuail, 1986.

that this research will test is Bennett's indexing thesis, the most influential thesis on media performance in recent years in political science. Because it is relatively new and extremely influential, I will spend more time on it than on the other four models to be tested.

Indexing is an extension of one of the most consistent findings in media research: that a strong tendency exists for journalists to be highly dependent on official sources for much of their news (e.g., Sigal, 1973, 1987; Gans, 1980; Fishman, 1980; Hallin, 1984, 1987; Kwitney, 1984, ch. 13; Brown, et al, 1987; Hertsgaard, 1989; Entman, 1989, ch. 1; Bennett, 1990).¹¹ As the discussion in the previous chapter indicated, this tendency is likely to be particularly strong in the arena of national security policy.

A finding of an overdependence on official sources raises difficulties for a democratically adequate news media. As Entman puts it, "Elites who want to succeed politically cannot afford to debate complicated truths in a marketplace of ideas...So news organizations wind up depending upon elites whose primary goal when talking with reporters is to manage publicity rather than illuminate the truth." (1989, p. 20. Or, as Russell Baker has put it: "There are good reasons why everybody should heed politicians' advice not to believe the media. One of the best is that the media report what politicians say".)

Bennett's thesis is that, "Mass media news professionals, from the board room to the beat, tend to 'index' the range of news expressed to mainstream government debate

¹¹ One scholar goes so far as to write, "For the past ten or fifteen years, every social-scientific study of the press has found that the Fourth Estate over-represents the view of government officials" (Schudson, 1984, p. 49).

about a given topic" (1990, p. 106). Support for this hypothesis was found in a test involving four years of Times reportage on U.S. funding for the Nicaraguan Contras during the 1980s. The results showed a strong dominance of governmental officials as sources, and a range of debate on administration policy that did indeed reflect the ebb and flow of governmental consensus and "dissensus," a finding that held across news and editorial articles. Bennett concluded, "By exploring different cases we may begin to see the general tendencies of press-state relations and thus a profile of the operation of U.S. democracy across different issue areas, as well as the role of the press in ensuring its quality. It is a long way from a single case study to a body of evidence strong enough to support a general theory" (p. 122).

Not only does this study offer a new test of the indexing thesis, it does so in a new, important context. Typically, indexing has been tested through narrower aspects of media content than frames. For example, Althaus et al. (1996) examine indexing during the Libya confrontation during the Reagan presidency in terms of the appearance of various policy options ("negotiations," "sanctions," "espionage" and "force") as well as the more procedural theme, "war powers." They note, however, that

Readers should be aware that the policy options we identify carry with them a constellation of related ideas about the nature and cause of the problem, the efficacy of the government's response, and the desired outcome. (1996, p. 410)

By this, they mean that the policy options are presented in the context of substantive policy frames. The present study thus breaks ground by testing indexing against a *framing* analysis, and, furthermore, a more refined model of media framing than currently exists,

one that distinguishes between open vs. closed contextual cuing and dominant and secondary substantive framing. It is also designed to address more specific research questions on Bennett's influential indexing thesis.¹²

Indexing *should* apply to what this study terms substantive frame diversity as it does to those narrower aspects of news content to which it has been applied in the past. This study will test that supposition. It will also examine whether indexing affects both dominant *and* secondary substantive frame, and whether it applies to what I'm terming media openness as well as media diversity. Does greater elite consensus lead to a relatively closed contextual cuing of the news? Thus, the complex model of deliberative news framing developed here will allow for the sort of nuanced examination of the indexing thesis that can refine as well as test it.

Furthermore, the study will allow for a comparison of how the three different news outlets under consideration index. Are all three equally sensitive to dynamics of elite consensus, or do they react differently? Perhaps one tends to be more sensitive to elite signals than the others, or more sensitive on the dominant frame level rather than on the secondary. The study will *combine* the media framing across the six cases, comparing the *overall* media deliberativeness of, for example, the intervention in Panama with that in Haiti. It will also disaggregate the data so the three news sources can be compared. In this manner, the indexing model will receive a thorough examination.

¹²Other recent applications of Bennett's indexing thesis include Livingston and Eachus, 1996; Mermin, 1996; Zaller and Chiu, 1996.

Liberal vs. conservative bias

The study also offers some perspective on how liberal and conservative bias play out in the data. Arguments and accusations that the media are politically biased -- whether in the liberal or conservative direction -- are commonplace in American political discourse. Lichter makes the argument for those who see a liberal bias dominating the press when he writes,

A poll shows that 89% of key Washington journalists voted for Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992, while only 7 percent backed Republican George Bush. Previous studies of journalists' voting patterns and political beliefs have also found a pre-Democratic or liberal tilt. It would be naive to think this inclinations does not affect news stories. (Lichter, 1996, p. 26; cf., e.g., Rothman and Lichter, 1987)

The opposing view, that conservative views dominate, is often made along the lines of the following:

In sum, the mass media are owned by large corporate conglomerates whose financial dominance gives them the means to control news content and limit the range of acceptable media opinion, injecting a bias against organized labor, antiwar protesters, socialists, environmentalists, feminists, ethnic minorities, Third World liberation struggles, and all progressive causes. (Parenti, 1993).

This debate has gone on for years and will certainly not be resolved in this study.

The data, however, do speak to it at least indirectly, in that they show how media frames and presidential frames compare in the case of both a liberal/Democratic and a conservative/Republican president. Further, in several instances, the same adversary is involved (Somalia and Iraq). It would seem to follow that a liberal, Democratic president's frame ought to dominate the media's coverage more often than a conservative, Republican president's *if* the media do, indeed, have a liberal bias, and vice versa if the bias is

conservative. If an ideological bias *is* found, those results will then be discussed in terms of their implications for the deliberative utility of the news.

There, is, however, another layer of argument that must be contended with here. Some would hold that there is not enough difference between Republicans and Democrats for a valid test of ideological bias, and that the real issue is whether *government* dominates the discourse, whatever the party. (E.g., Herman and Chomsky's , 1988, would tend to take this position¹³). Therefore, the study also asks whether the media exhibit a bias for or against the positions of officials.

¹³This relates to the point made earlier that within a single frame there can be a degree of controversy. In this instance, the position is that the different parties are expressions of, in a sense, *intraframe* controversies, not significant alternatives.

Anti-presidential bias vs. presidential bias

In addition to ideological bias, media observers also make contradictory claims about the press' relation to government power more generally. On the one hand, some have argued that, with the exemplar of Watergate before them, journalists have become increasingly contrary and aggressive. For example,

In the past twenty years, the American press has undergone a transformation from an access culture to an aggression culture: the tradition, developed after the Civil War, in which a journalist's advancement depended on his intimacy with power, has mutated into one in which his success can also depend on a willingness to stage visible, ritualized displays of aggression. The reporter used to gain status by dining with his subjects; now he gains status by dining on them. (Gopnik, 1994, p. 86; cf., e.g., Patterson, 1993)

Others have argued just the opposite, that the media are essentially the lapdog of the president, who, in the modern age of PR and media events, has great power to influence how reporters frame their stories. Hart explains that this view "holds that the mass media are powerless in comparison to a sitting president and that, despite their protestations, modern journalists have little choice but to do the ultimate bidding of the nations' chief executive" (Hart, 1987, p. 116). Parenti fills out the picture:

The president obtains prime-time exposure to address the nation almost anytime he desires and exercises a daily built-in control over journalists. "You're locked into this little press room," lamented Washington Post reporter Austin Scott, "with only a telephone connecting you to the rest of the White House, and they have the option of taking your calls or not. All you get is staged events -- press conferences, briefings, photo opportunities." (Parenti, 1993, pp. 63-63; cf., e.g., Senter, et. al, 1986; Hertgaard, 1989; Grossman and Kumar, 1981)

The research predictions associated with each of these models of the press is outlined in Table 2-3, below.

**Table 2-3
Research Hypotheses**

Model:	Research Hypotheses
Indexing	<p>H1: News deliberativeness (contextual openness and frame diversity) will <i>increase</i> when elite political dissensus increases.</p> <p>H2: New deliberativeness will <i>decrease</i> when elite political dissensus decreases.</p>
Liberal Bias	<p>H3: Clinton will dominate the media's framing of events more than Bush, particularly on the level of the media's dominant framing.</p> <p>H4: Frames hostile to Clinton or his position will appear only on the level of secondary news frames to provide a measure of "balance."</p>
Conservative Bias	<p>H5: Bush will dominate the media's framing of events more than Clinton, particularly on the level of the media's dominant framing.</p> <p>H6: Frames hostile to Bush or his position will appear only on the level of secondary news frames to provide a measure of "balance."</p>
Presidential Bias	<p>H7: The president's frame will dominate the media's coverage, particularly on the level of the media's dominant framing.</p> <p>H8: Alternative frames will only be offered on the level of secondary news frames to provide a measure of "balance."</p>
Anti-Presidential Bias	<p>H9: Frames hostile to the president or his policy will dominate the news coverage.</p> <p>H10: The President's position will only be offered on the level of secondary news frames to provide a measure of "balance."</p>

The next chapter will discuss the variables involved in these research hypotheses in greater detail and describe the methodology for addressing them.

Chapter Three

Research Strategies

The research strategy, detailed in this chapter, may be summarized as follows: The study employs a case study approach that concentrates on presidential and news framing at those "critical discourse moments" when the president makes a nationally televised speech and the country's attention is focused on the military intervention at hand. A framing analysis (more below) is then applied, first to the president's speech, and then to the issues of Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times that immediately followed it, to determine the substantive policy frames presented to the American people about the intervention via the presidency and the press.

The news framing is then further analyzed via the deliberative model discussed in the last chapter to assess the relative deliberativeness of the news media after each speech. (Again, this model distinguishes dominant and secondary substantive frames and also incorporates a concept of contextual cues). For this purpose, the three news outlets are treated in aggregate, as a more or less representative sample of the overall, mainstream national news media. (I will argue that there are reasons to view these news outlets as a good sample, but even if they are not a perfect one, they are powerful enough news sources in their own right to warrant their study.) This element of the analysis will (qualitatively) indicate if the news was more deliberative during one intervention than another. (The data will

also be disaggregated to permit analysis of the relative deliberativeness of *each* of the three news outlets, thus determining if one is consistently more or less deliberative than the others, and in what ways.)

Subsequent to this data mapping phase of the project, the research models and questions described at the close of the previous chapter (the indexing model, etc.) will be analyzed against the data to clarify and explore those factors that contribute to, and those that inhibit, the deliberativeness of the news. In order to test the indexing model, an analysis of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review will be undertaken to assess the state of congressional opinion at the time of the intervention.

A "Structured, Focused Case Study" Approach

The research employs a case study method, along the lines of George's (1979) "structured, focused comparison." Such an approach forgoes the benefits and avoids the limitations of statistical analysis of many cases in favor of the greater depth and subtlety permitted by qualitative study. The "structured, focused" qualifiers mean that it also attempts to minimize the weaknesses of qualitative research by systematically analyzing a number of well-chosen cases, rather than simply describing a few in detail that happen to illustrate one's point. Structured, focused case study research attempts to marry a systematic analytic, "scientific" attitude with one that brings to bear a qualitative judgment and analysis. As George explains,

If it is hazardous to draw lessons for broader applicability from single historical cases, how then can historical experience be utilized to understand better and to deal effectively with contemporary situations that bear a certain resemblance to past historical cases? The answer lies in stating lessons in a *systematic and differentiated way* from a *broader range* of experience that deliberately draws upon a variety of historical cases. (George, 1979, p. 43)

Just so, the present research attempts to systematically examine and differentiate a series of (recent) historical instances of press and presidency discourse to build political and theoretical insight. While it has its quantitative aspect -- I do some counting and build some tables -- there is no attempt to analyze or generalize via statistics: a disciplined, systematic qualitative approach is better suited to the sorts of depth and description that makes discourse analysis come alive and bear insight. Moreover, as argued in the last chapter, the media discourse can be deceptive, with pseudo instances of openness and diversity that require judgment rather than mechanical counting. The approach employed here, therefore, is to be as systematic and explicit in identifying frames as possible, and to illustrate the judgments made with ample quotes to allow readers to decide for themselves if interpretations and judgments are being appropriately made. Like Gamson in his work, "I attempt to present enough rich textual material so that readers can form their own independent judgments on the validity of any interpretation" (Gamson, 1992, p. 198).

Which cases are chosen? The research concentrates on those moments when the media tend to have their greatest impact on the public and policy agenda. Such intensifications of the public debate are sometimes referred to in the literature

as "critical discourse moments" (Chilton, quoted in Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 11). Critical discourse moments,

Stimulate commentary in the media by sponsors [of particular positions] and journalists. With continuing issues...journalists look for "pegs" - that is, topical events that provide an opportunity for broader, more long-term coverage and commentary. These pegs provide us with a way of identifying those time periods in which issue packages [basic interpretive positions] are especially likely to be displayed. (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 11. Cf. Gamson and Lasch, 1983, p. 398 on "events.")

The "peg" in the present instance is a military action and the president's speech about it. The critical moment approach, then, not only tells us about the media discourse with regard to a historically specific crisis and policy response, but it often reveals ("displays") ongoing modes of thought and explanation by which policy is conceived and/or conveyed. Thus, while the research is limited to snapshots of media diversity and press-presidency relations, they are particularly important and revealing ones.¹

On the minus side of the strategy of organizing the research around critical discourse moments is a loss of attention to two related issues: How are less dramatic foreign policy issues dealt with? And what foreign policy questions are ignored altogether, and why?² While these questions are beyond the scope of the

1 Cf. Althus, et al.: "The Administration's ability to frame the problem, set the agenda of options, and define criteria for success during *critical moments* as the policy unfolds seems more politically significant than its ability to dominate the aggregate total of assertions.... [R]esearch should not treat each media assertion as if it were equivalent no matter when it appears" (1994, p. 34, italics added).

2 An interesting example of research relevant to this issue is Shoemaker, et al.'s 1991 study entitled "Deviant Acts, Risky Business and U.S. Interests: The Newsworthiness of World Events."

present research, it does potentially provide a basis for their exploration in follow-up study by providing a point of comparison in examining less dramatic news coverage or events that are omitted altogether.

Data

The set of research materials consists of:

- a. Presidential speech*, specifically six nationally televised presidential addresses on the use of force after the Cold War, three by Bush and three by Clinton.
- b. News media coverage*, immediately following each speech in Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times (all intervention-related news stories, including editorials and commentary).
- c. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review*, which will serve as an indicator of congressional consensus/dissensus to test the indexing thesis.

Presidential speeches

The speeches studied are all major, nationally televised presidential addresses on military action, three by Bush and three by Clinton, as listed in Table 3-1, below. They are the only nationally televised presidential military speeches in the time period they encompass, aside from the fact that more than one speech was devoted to the situation leading up to the Gulf War.³ The speeches were obtained

3 Of the several speeches given by Bush over the protracted buildup to and aftermath of the Gulf War, only the actual war speech announcing military action is included. This gives the best comparison with the other speeches in this set, which all involve imminent or

from the Public Papers of the President series, or from full-text versions in The New York Times.

Table 3-1
The Presidential Speech Data Set

President	Date	Speech
Bush	12/20/89	Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama
Bush	1/16/91	Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf
Bush	12/4/92	Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia
Clinton	6/26/93	Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters
Clinton	10/7/93	Address to the Nation on Somalia
Clinton	9/16/94	Address to the Nation on Haiti

current military action of one kind or another.

The Media Sample

The media sample for the study consists of two major newsmagazines, Time and Newsweek, and The New York Times, specifically the publications immediately after each presidential speech listed above in Table 3-1.⁴

The newsmagazines make a useful news sample for several reasons: First, they stand in the spectrum of national news media between television news and elite newspapers like the Times or the Post, and do so on a number of dimensions. Stylistically, they represent a middle ground between the sophisticated language and detail of the elite dailies and the less detailed discourse of TV news. In terms of audience exposure they are larger than the Times and smaller than the networks. And, while probably not as influential on public opinion as TV news, they are generally thought to have a significant impact:

Presidential assistants may call the Post and Times when their object is primarily to inform the Washington community, but when the objective is to resonate the message of the president's accomplishments throughout the land, they are more likely to go to the newsweeklies. (e.g., Grossman and Kumar, 1981, p. 62)

The national newsweeklies are important because their weekly publication forces them to emphasize analysis and features. Their leading stories, which interpret major news events, can influence public opinion about administrative policies because they are written for a mass popular audience. They provide the news background and analysis that are precluded by the brevity of television network news and that are more difficult for newspapers with daily deadline pressure. (Jamieson and Campbell, 1997, p. 187)

⁴References to the Times indicate, of course, The New York Times and not Time magazine. NYT will also be used on occasion, to save space or avoid confusion.

The newsmagazines also serve as reasonably good stand-ins for the mainstream news media in general. As Entman explains,

The newsmagazines arguably summarize the dominant news and editorial emphases of the national media in the United States; their less frequent deadlines usually allow them to canvass official sources (and other media) thoroughly, distilling the results in *a narrative reflecting the principal themes in the news*. (Entman, 1991, pp. 8 and 9, italics added).

Or, as A.J. Liebling more entertainingly overstates it (at least for more recent times):

Time... perform(s) the service of the waiter-captain who meets you in front of the *smorgasbord* table and says, "Let me help you make a selection." He then fills your plate with all the items the management particularly wants to get rid of. They specialize in *reshuffles* of newspaper dispatches, livened with sauces prepared on the premises." (Liebling, 1963, p. 160)

Whereas the newsmagazines tend to sum up the mainstream news, The New York Times tends to influence it in the first place, especially in the coverage of foreign affairs. According to Grossman and Kumar, "The New York Times is important as a subject of study because of its role in shaping the opinions of the political and journalistic elite" (1981, p. 254). Gans elaborates:

When editors and producers are uncertain about a selection decision, they will check whether, where, and how the Times has covered the story; and story selectors see to it that many of the Times's front-page stories find their way into television programs and magazines. (1980, p. 180)

So, the Times tends to influence the mainstream press and the newsmagazines tend to sum it all up. Moreover, these three news outlets will act as especially good indicators of *overall* mainstream, national news coverage when, as is the case in the present research, they are *combined* into one analytical unit: In

this study, the combined coverage of Time, Newsweek and the NYT during one military action (e.g., the Panama invasion under Bush) is compared with their combined coverage during another (e.g., the air strike against Iraq under Clinton) to speak to the issue of news media diversity and deliberativeness. This should make the results easier to generalize in that idiosyncratic editorial choices will tend to be less problematic than if only one outlet were used.⁵ Thus we should expect the combination of the three outlets to show us many, perhaps most, of the major interpretations floating about in the national mainstream news media on a major breaking story.

Beyond their usefulness as indicators of the media overall, it is worth reiterating that the two newsweeklies and The New York Times are important news forums in their own right, and are worthy objects of study even if they do not provide a perfect stand-in for the overall mainstream national news media. This is rather obvious for the "newspaper of record." With regard to Time and

Newsweek:

Before the advent of the national television networks and of such national newspapers as the Wall Street Journal and USA Today, the newsweeklies were the only mass circulation publications to bring news to the whole country. Although their impact has diminished, it is still great. (Jamieson and Campbell, 1997, p. 187)

Finally, all three news outlets have important bodies of media research devoted to them. This research will thus feed into streams of literature on the

⁵For an example of research that combines several news sources as a research variable, see Shoemaker, 1991, p. 786.

newsmagazines and the Times and can be compared with other studies.⁶

Elite political opinion: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review

A central object of this research is to test the indexing model, which predicts that media diversity will correlate with elite political consensus/dissensus, to which news journalists are thought to index their reporting. This obviously requires a source of elite political opinion, since it is elite consensus and discord that serves as the independent variable. There is no single, agreed upon method for conceptualizing and measuring this variable, and the general approach has most frequently been to use Congressional opinion and debate as the indicator. The

⁶Because most Americans get their news from network news broadcasts, an argument could certainly be made for including them, or at least one of them, in the study. A great many news studies do tackle television news. Most, however, appear to do so through the resource of the Vanderbilt television news abstracts. The Vanderbilt television news archive in Nashville has video tapes of the major network news broadcasts from the late 1960s. To obtain these is expensive -- beyond the resources available for this study -- but the abstracts are more readily available.

Even if I were comfortable resting my research on abstracts put together by graduate students, for my purposes the abstracts are close to useless. They might say, "President Bush explained his reasons for intervening in Somalia," but say nothing about what the president's *reasons* were. For a study of news sources, the *fact* that the president made an argument can be useful. For a study of agenda setting, the amount of time devoted to the story can be useful. For the kind of framing analysis I am engaged in here, these items are meaningless. I need to know *what* the president said and *how* that was portrayed in the context of the broadcast.

With the Vanderbilt tapes unavailable and the abstracts beside the point, the print media that I can get my hands on serve well for all the reasons discussed in this section. Even if Vanderbilt's tape collection were available to me, I would likely want to include some or all of the print sources that I'm using in the study.

present research continues this practice.⁷

The next question is how best to gauge congressional opinion. Bennett, in his original test of the indexing hypothesis, used the Times' own coverage of congressional debate as the indicator (see Bennett, 1990). This seems potentially problematic in that it asks the source of the dependent variable to serve as the source of the independent variable as well. (The Times was the object of study – Bennett was observing it to see if its coverage was indexed to consensus/ dissensus of congressional opinion). It seems safer to rely on an independent reading of the state of congressional debate. Some (e.g., Althus, et al., 1994, and Zaller, 1994) have turned directly to the Congressional Record for an independent indicator of elite debate, which seems reasonable, although there may be some problems here in separating smoke from substance. Rather than relying on the Congressional Record, studies by Brody (1994) and Mermin (1996) have used Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report as an indicator of congressional opinion. I do so as well, although in a more systematic manner than those authors employed. As will be explained further below, I use the coverage in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report after each presidential speech listed in Table 3-1 as an indicator of the amount of congressional consensus/dissensus that existed at the time of the president's speech.

⁷ Arguments could be made for other indexing referents, especially for other issue areas. For instance, for more purely economic issues, it would be interesting to see if such forums of corporate opinion as Fortune or The Wall Street Journal editorial page were a more powerful "indexer" than Congress. The data and analyses in this study could later be used as a benchmark to compare such other sources of indexing.

Data Analysis

Analysis of the presidential speeches

Procedurally, step one is an analysis of presidential speeches, which I began by assigning each line to one of the following categories:

1. The Policy Situation

a. **Description of the policy situation: What is it in the international environment that the U.S. is responding to or acting upon? ("This past April, the Kuwaiti Government uncovered what they suspected was a car bombing plot to assassinate former President George Bush while he was visiting Kuwait City."⁸)**

b. **Interpretation of the policy situation: Statements of explanation, motivation, implications, and political meaning relevant to the policy situation. ("We should not be surprised by such deeds, coming as they do from a regime like Saddam Hussein's, which is ruled by atrocity.")**

2. The Policy Response

a. **Description of the policy action: What action is the United States taking? ("Therefore, on Friday I ordered our forces to launch a cruise missile attack on the Iraqi intelligence service's principal command-and-control facility in Baghdad.")**

b. **Interpretation of the policy action: Statements of explanation,**

⁸All of the illustrations of speech elements in this section are from Clinton's June 26, 1993 speech on his military intervention in Iraq.

motivation, implications, and political meaning relevant to the policy action. ("Our intent was to target Iraq's capacity to support violence against the United States and other nations and to deter Saddam Hussein from supporting such outlaw behavior in the future.")

3. Misc., mostly pro forma remarks. ("Let me say to the men and women in our Armed Forces and law enforcement agencies who carried out the investigation and our military response: You have my gratitude...")

Then each speech statement is reviewed, and those that serve to explain to the American people *why* the United States is applying military action -- by explaining the U.S.'s motivation, goals, etc. -- are identified.⁹ These statements, collectively referred to here as "policy rationales," are then sorted into thematic clusters, as follows:

- *economic interests* -- for the U.S., regions important to the U.S., or the world economy generally
- *national security* -- including immediate short-term dangers and longer-term threats to U.S. security
- *stability* -- whether regional or international

⁹Recall the argument in the last chapter that whereas frames tend to diagnose, evaluate and prescribe, *diagnosis* is key to distinguishing one frame from another -- thus the emphasis on *why* rather than statements that tell us what, how, etc. The speech's policy rationales most typically fall under categories (1b) and (2b) in the analysis just described -- the more interpretive as opposed to descriptive statements -- about the policy situation and the policy itself. Occasionally (1a) or (2a) statements also serve as policy rationales, or at least help to illuminate them, because the *way* in which a policy situation or response is described can sometimes point toward a particular frame. E.g., is the policy a "police action," an "expedition," an "act of war," a "punitive action," etc.

- *humanitarianism* -- meaning a moral imperative to act based on atrocities or disasters, whether of natural or man-made causes
- *democracy/human rights* -- an imperative to act to protect, preserve or encourage democratic government and human rights abroad
- *credibility* -- honoring commitments to others and/or seeing that others honor commitments to the U.S.
- *protecting American lives* -- rescuing Americans threatened in situations abroad
- *miscellaneous* – policy rationales that do not fit into any of the above categories

These categories were created by examining all the speeches and abstracting the more frequently occurring types of rationales in the speeches. Readers will be privy to the raw data as well as their categorization, and can judge the appropriateness of the choices for themselves.

The final step in the speech analysis is the identification of the main policy frame in the president's speech. This analysis views the policy rationales discussed above as potential frame *fragments*. The policy frame itself is a fundamental position or argument that effectively sums up the most frequently used rationales in an attempt to legitimize the policy. As an example, in President Bush's speech on the Panama intervention, statements of policy rationale that fall under the "protecting American lives" category occurred more frequently than any other. (E.g., the situation in Panama represents "an imminent danger to the 35,000

American citizens in Panama," and, "I took this action only after reaching the conclusion...the lives of American citizens were in grave danger," etc.) "*Imminent danger*," a quote from the speech, captures this emphasis well, and is identified as the president's policy frame. The study thus identifies Bush's central policy frame as follows: the intervention was a necessary action to protect American lives, or *Imminent Danger* for short, and this becomes a comparative point of reference in the analysis of the media's substantive policy frames. In other words, the analysis proceeds by asking: If the President frames the intervention *thus*, how do the media frame it?

Analyzing the media sample

Whether to determine the openness of contextual cues or the diversity of substantive frames (the two dimensions of media deliberativeness that the research model incorporates) the *salience* of various positions within the text's narrative architecture is a fundamental factor. As Fallows explains, there are several "locations" (in this case in newspapers, but the same holds true for newsmagazines) that are of particular importance, locations within the text that signal the reader to pay special attention. "Newspapers have an amazingly nuanced set of signals," Fallows observes,

...for conveying both the importance and the urgency of an event. Whether an article is on the front page, how big the headline type is, how often the subject appeared in the paper -- these and other signs convey perspective to the reader in an instantly understood code. (Fallows, 1997, p. 130)

Pan and Kosicki explicitly relate framing analysis to the

...inverted pyramid structure of the classic news story. An inverted pyramid refers to a sequential organization of structural elements (i.e., headline, lead, episodes, background and closure). The signifying power of these elements varies in the same descending order. For example, a headline is the most salient cue to activate certain semantically related concepts in the readers' minds; it is thus the most powerful framing device of the syntactical structure. (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 59 cf. Gamson, 1992, p. 196; Goshorn and Gandy, 1995)

The procedures described below for analyzing substantive frames and contextual cues take this narrative architecture of the news into account.

Analyzing substantive news frames

a. Comparative methods. The analysis of news frames requires methods that allow the text's interpretive assumptions to be brought into focus. Generally this involves one form or another of qualitative, comparative methodology. For example, one technique compares the media coverage of a number of similar events:

Comparing media narratives of events that could have been reported similarly helps to reveal the critical textual choices that framed the story but would otherwise remain submerged in an undifferentiated text. Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably, because many of the framing devices can appear as "natural," unremarkable choices of words or images. Comparison reveals that such choices are not inevitable or unproblematic but rather are central to the way the news frame helps establish the literally "common sense" (i.e., widespread) interpretation of events. (Entman, 1990. Cf. Entman, 1989, ch. 3; Hermann, 1985)

Another comparative technique contrasts various media with one another on the treatment of the same issue. For example, some research has examined the treatment of issues in the press of a variety of countries (e.g., Said, 1981; Servaes, 1991). This can certainly be a useful strategy for traditional comparative politics purposes (e.g., for studying political culture and behavior across nations), and it can help to bring into relief the interpretive biases and assumptions of a given nation's media discourse, and thus speak to the question of media diversity in a way quite relevant to the present concerns. It also, however, introduces a number of tricky variables, some extraneous to the present project and some probably not, such as political cultural factors relating to language, political symbols, the press as

one institution among several, geopolitical considerations of foreign policy, and so on. These lie beyond the scope of the present study.

Another example of the technique of contrasting media on the same issue involves assessing a variety of ideologically distinct news outlets. For example, a study might compare mainstream mass media, such as Time magazine with a plainly left-wing publication like The Nation (cf. Rachlin, 1988). This can help to highlight the ideological implications of various news media. The results can be somewhat predictable, but still useful.

Yet another comparative strategy - and the one I pursue - compares media discourse to official policy rhetoric to identify the introduction of diverse interpretative frames (compare, e.g., Schlesinger, 1983). This strategy allows for the comparison of a number of thematically similar cases over time, and, by concentrating on the tension between the media and official policy rhetoric it addresses media diversity in a particularly politically meaningful way. Policy is where the political stakes lie, and the assessment of both policy and official policy rhetoric is at the heart of the information citizens need to hold officials accountable for governmental action. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 1, study after study has shown the reliance on governmental sources to be one of the prime factors contributing to constricted media discourse, so concentrating on media diversity by examining the relationship between official policy rhetoric and media discourse has a strong link to the literature. In addition to comparing the news coverage with the president's speech, the framing in each of the three outlets are compared *with one*

another, providing yet more comparative leverage for the task of identifying the ways in which the news was framed.

b. Procedure. To develop a comprehensive picture of frame diversity, this study requires a method that distinguishes between dominant and secondary frames. Entman points out that, "Framing essentially involves *selection and salience*. To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation...*" (1993, p. 52; cf. Entman, 1991, p. 9). Following this line of reasoning, *dominant frames* should, as the concept implies, be rather obvious, including in the sense of where to find them. They should dominate the news story in a way that lesser, secondary frames do not.

In analyzing dominant news frames in the newsmagazines, I concentrate on the cover, the contents page, and the opening and conclusion of the lead article as the important "locations" where the reader is more or less shown most obviously how to think about the issue at hand, and where framing is therefore particularly apparent.¹⁰ In the case of dominant frames in The New York Times, I concentrate

¹⁰Cf. the discussion of frame analysis in Jamieson and Campbell:

How was the news item introduced? (headline? prefatory statement by reporter or anchor?) What expectations did the introduction create about the story?

What other introduction could appropriately have been used? How would other introductions have reframed the report? Was there a summary statement at the end of the report? What interpretations, if any, did it impose on the report? (Jamieson and Campbell, 1997, p. 116)

primarily on the headline of the lead article (above the fold), as well as the lead article's subheading and lead paragraphs, and the summary of the lead article on the index page.¹¹

Secondary Frames are alternatives to the dominant news frame, and are found in less prominent "locations" within the news text than the dominant one. I divide them into major and minor types (because, again, the prominence with which frames are displayed is such a key factor – Entman, 1991; 1993). Major and minor secondary frames are distinguished by the presence or absence of a headline. *Major secondary frames*, then, include headlined articles, headlined boxed features, and headlined subsections of articles. *Minor secondary frames*, meanwhile, are alternatives to the dominant frame offered in the text without a heading to set them apart. They are at minimum one paragraph in length, anything shorter being considered too fleeting to be meaningful.

Frames are given weighted scores according to the principle that the more salient they are to readers, the more important they are. Dominant frames are thus given a score of four, major secondary frames a score of two, while minor secondary frames a score of one. The coverage after each speech can then be put on a relative footing, some having a relatively lower and some a relatively higher diversity score based on the numbers and the weights.

¹¹Note that this approach to analyzing *dominant* news frames corresponds to how other researchers, who do not make the dominant/secondary distinction, simply analyze news frames.

The deliberative model distinguishes between relatively open and relatively closed contextual cuing in the news presentation, meaning, "Does the news account invite reader deliberation or simply convey to the reader a single, preferred interpretation?" The presence or absence of questions in prominent locations in the text serves as the indicator of this dimension of the news' deliberativeness.

Procedurally, the presence of question marks is the obvious identifier, but *implied* questions are included as well. For example, in The New York Times after the Panama invasion during the Bush administration, the index read, "[President Bush's] actions may have big costs for the United States." The use of the word "may" implies that there are uncertainties and therefore questions about the "costs for the United States," and so this statement is included in the analysis.

The procedure begins by identifying questions (explicit or implicit) used in the following locations in the news text: *For the newsmagazines*, the locations where questions are identified are:

1. the cover
2. the contents page
3. the lead story headlines
4. the first page of text of the lead story

For The New York Times, the locations where questions indicating open contextual cuing are located are:

1. page one headline and subheadlines of the lead story
2. page one headline and subheadlines of secondary stories

3. page one text

4. the description of the coverage in the index on page two

Sometimes the same question appears in two locations. (For example, after Bush's Somalia intervention, Newsweek asked on both its cover and its index page "Should America Be the World's Policeman?") I only count the first time an identical question appears in the progression of textual locations listed above.

Again to account for the importance of prominence, questions are weighted according to the position in which they appear, as follows: In either the case of the newsmagazines or the Times, questions identified are given a score of between four and one, in reverse order to which they are listed above. For example, in the case of the Times, a question in a page one lead story headline is given a score of four, a question in a page one headline of a secondary story on the intervention is given a three, a question in the page one text is give a two, and a question in an index summary of the coverage is given a score of one. In this way, each news outlet's coverage can be accorded a contextual openness score. The higher the score, the higher the degree of contextual openness -- or, differently put, the more that news account signaled the reader to engage the material and deliberate on the matter at hand.

To sum up so far, procedurally, the comparative process progresses in this sequence:

1. The president's frame for the military action is identified through a systematic analysis of the policy rationales in his speech.

2. Using the president's frame as a referent, the dominant news frames of Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times are identified.
3. Within each news outlet's stories about the military action, any alternative (secondary) frames, in contrast to the dominant one, are identified. These are further categorized as *major* secondary frames (headlined stories or sub-stories, boxed features, etc.), or *minor* secondary frames (at least a paragraph in length, but without a headline to set it apart and grab the reader's attention).
4. The relative openness of the news' contextual cues is determined by using prominently placed questions as indicators.

Analyzing elite political consensus/dissensus

To test the indexing model's fit with the media data, the CO Weekly Report immediately after each presidential address is used to gain a reading on the degree of congressional consensus with regard to the intervention. Specifically, all statements about congressional opinion from the first page of each main article on congressional reaction to the intervention are coded in one of three ways:

- consensus (e.g., "President Bush received broad, bipartisan congressional backing...")
- dissensus (e.g., "But the invasion also drew vigorous objections.")
- ambiguous (e.g., "Even some members who supported the move warned that circumstances could soon sour public opinion.")

Statements are only included if they speak to the state of collective congressional opinion about the policy and its implications – the views of individual members are omitted. If a statement begins on the first page of the article and continues onto the next, it is included.

Once the total number of statements on the state of congressional opinion is collected and rated (consensus, dissensus, ambiguous), then a "dissensus score" is created by (a) setting aside the ambiguous statements, then (b) dividing the number of dissensus statements by the combined total consensus/dissensus statements. The higher the number that results, the higher the state of congressional dissensus.

Research Hypotheses and Analyses

In Chapter 2, five models of media performance were described, each of which suggested results that, if it is correct, ought to show up in the data. Here I elaborate on them with respect to how they will be tested against the data.

Indexing. Indexing's prediction for the data is that news deliberativeness (contextual openness and frame diversity) will increase when elite political consensus is low, while it will decrease when elite political consensus is high. Thus, in testing indexing, elite consensus/dissensus is the independent variable. As discussed above, the level of consensus of congressional opinion will be analyzed through the coverage of congressional opinion in CO Weekly Report. Media

deliberativeness is the dependent variable, which will be determined via the frame analysis and the application of the deliberative model. If the indexing model is correct, I expect the most deliberative of the six instances of news coverage to correspond to those times when there was the least consensus of congressional opinion and debate.

Liberal/Conservative bias. Here, the independent variable is the party of the president and the dependent variable is the degree to which the media's framing of the intervention is supportive of the president and his frame. The *liberal bias prediction* is that the media's dominant frames will support Clinton's position and will be antagonistic to Bush's. More conservative views, should they appear, will be on the level of secondary frames for purposes of journalistic balance. The *conservative bias prediction* is that the media's dominant frames will support Bush's positions and will be antagonistic to Clinton's. More liberal views, should they appear, will be on the level of secondary frames for purposes of journalistic balance. (Granted this is more precisely a test of partisanship, but it is closely enough related to ideology to warrant the test and the supposition that the data speak to the question of liberal and conservative bias).

Presidential/Anti-presidential bias. In this instance, the independent variable is the presumed bias itself, which, if it exists, ought to show itself in how the media's framing relates to that of the president's. If the *presidential bias* model holds true, the president's frame will dominate the media's coverage, particularly on the level of the media's dominant framing. Alternative frames will only be

offered on the secondary level of news discourse for purposes of journalistic balance. In the case of *anti-presidential bias*, the media's dominant frames will be consistently antagonistic to both presidents and their frames. More supportive frames, should they appear, will do so on the secondary level of news discourse for balance.

How these models play and what they mean for a theory of news deliberativeness will be analyzed and discussed in the latter sections of this study. Now, let us turn from procedural questions to the actual data and its analysis.

Chapter Four

Data, I:

Post-Cold War Military Action and Presidential and Media Framing: Three Examples from the Bush Presidency

This chapter examines three examples of how President Bush (in a major, televised speech) and Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times (in their coverage immediately after each speech) framed three military actions. Each case begins with an analysis of the president's speech, summarizing the story it tells the American people about the policy situation and the U.S. policy response, followed by the coverage in the media sample. Chapter Five will repeat this procedure for three examples from the Clinton years, and the two chapters together will offer a data set that subsequent chapters will analyze and discuss.

The speech analyses are introduced with comments on the political context in which the speech took place and general observations on the president's rhetorical approach. Then follows a systematic analysis of how the speech (1) describes the policy situation and (2) justifies the policy (i.e., what "policy rationales" does the speech offer?). Finally, (3) the speech's most prominent policy frame is identified.

The rhetorical analysis of each speech is followed by an examination of the media coverage of the issues of Time, Newsweek and The New York Times immediately after the speech. The focus is, in particular, on media framing -- as those research concepts were developed in the previous two chapters. Thus the research will examine both

substantive framing (on both the dominant and secondary levels of the media discourse), and *contextual cues* (specifically, how open or closed the news presentation is as indicated by the use of prominently placed questions to spur reader curiosity and deliberation).

In this manner, Chapter Four will describe a sampling of the diversity of perspective and overall media deliberativeness offered Americans through presidential speech and media discourse after the Panama, Iraq and Somalia military interventions during the Bush administration.

1. The 1989 Panama Intervention

The President's Speech¹

1. General Comments

The Bush administration's invasion of Panama came toward the end of the first year of his presidency. At the same time that Bush was becoming increasingly active in foreign affairs (for instance, discouraging a potential coup against Corazon Aquino through, in part, a show of air strength), tension was mounting between the United States and Panama, and between Bush and Noriega. The latter had grown increasingly belligerent and unpredictable, had been publicly linked to drug trafficking in the United States, and had rejected his recent loss at the polls to the more U.S.-friendly Guillermo Endara. Incidents were mounting between his military forces and those of Americans stationed in Panama. It was in this context that the U.S. sent in troops.

No president wants to appear trigger-happy, and Bush's speech paints a picture of the U.S. tirelessly working for peace, and only turning to armed conflict as a last resort. Noriega appears as the story's villain. In his second paragraph Bush says, "Many attempts have been made to resolve this crisis through diplomacy and negotiations. All were rejected by the dictator of Panama."

Not only is Noriega a dictator, but an "indicted drug trafficker," and one who

¹In each of the following sections on presidential rhetoric on a given military intervention, the speech under consideration -- always a major, nationally televised address -- will be cited at the outset of the discussion. All quotes from Bush, unless otherwise indicated, are from that speech. The Panama speech citation is George Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama," The Papers of the President, December 20, 1989.

issues "reckless threats and attacks upon Americans." These qualities, however, do not generalize to the Panamanian people. As is also typical of presidential speech on military action, care is taken to personalize the conflict in an individual or ruling cadre, focusing the conflict on the opposing leader or leadership, and separating his or their evil qualities from the ordinary people of that country. Parrying potential critics, Bush is careful to point out that, "We also regret and mourn the loss of innocent Panamanians." In contrast to the dictator Noriega, these are democrats who voted into office those "brave Panamanians" (Endara, et al.) who, thanks to the U.S. intervention, have once again "assumed the rightful leadership of their country."

Thus, the main actors in the speech (along with the president himself) are a criminal, evil dictator, the peace-loving Panamanians, and the altruistic United States. Bush ends the speech on a people-to-people note of reconciliation.

The Panamanian people want democracy, peace, and the chance for a better life in dignity and freedom. The people of the United States seek only to support them in pursuit of these noble goals.

What sort of a world, or at least region, do these actors inhabit? It is one in which well meaning and cooperative people are working together for the common good across national boundaries. Early in his speech Bush points out that, "For nearly 2 years, the United States, nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have worked together to resolve the crisis in Panama." And at the end he states that, "The United States is eager to work with the Panamanian people in partnership and friendship to rebuild their economy." Thus it is a world far from the Hobbesian vision of each against all. Rather is it one that is

more akin to an idealized domestic community, in which neighbor helps neighbor. This ideal state has been disrupted by a criminal element. The assertive action of the United States is only necessary now that peaceful attempts to resolve the crisis have been exhausted. This motif of quelling international unrest on behalf of an idealized world will find fuller expression in the "new world order" of the Gulf War addresses to come later in the Bush administration. (There, order is not just restored, it is transformed in the vision of a new global society.)

What does this speech say about Bush's rhetorical and leadership style? It is, first of all, a straight-ahead speech, relatively concise, with little in the way of flowery rhetoric or digression. Bush launches right in: "Last night I ordered a military action... This morning I want to tell you what I did and why." Such a style would seem to fit the man, or at least his public persona: practical and straightforward.

Of course, Bush does more than simply tell a story of foreign policy. Every presidential speech inevitably reflects back on the president himself. This speech portrayed Bush as a decisive and autonomous leader, and not as a conciliator or team player or some other image that could have been employed. Whether intentional or not on the part of a former vice president, saddled with the image of a "wimp" during his campaign and walking in the footsteps of a larger-than-life predecessor, qualities of strong, decisive and independent leadership were highlighted. Thus, while Bush began by identifying with his audience -- "My fellow citizens" -- he quickly set himself apart with the statement that only the president can make: "Last night I ordered U.S. military forces..."

Moreover, the theme of decisive, personal leadership was strong throughout. Bush

tells us, "I ordered" the action, not "my administration" or "the U.S. is now engaged." And he tells us that, "I informed" congress about it and "talked with leaders in Latin America, the Caribbean, and those of other U.S. allies," and makes clear that he did so only *after* decision and action had taken place, not before. The president, in other words, did not consult; he informed. Finally, toward the end of the address he reminds the audience once again, "I took this action only after reaching the conclusion that every other avenue was closed..." These are the words of a strong and decisive leader bearing the lonely burdens of office. As we will see later, this subtext was echoed in the media.

2. What the U.S. did

Bush informed America that he had "directed our Armed Forces to protect the lives of American citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States....At this moment," Bush announced, "U.S. forces...are engaged in action in Panama."

U.S. actions went beyond military confrontation, for now that the rightful democratic government, "elected by the people of Panama," was back in place, Bush announced he would "send our Ambassador back to Panama immediately." The speech thus signaled that democracy was on the mend and despite the present crisis, normal diplomacy was around the corner.

I have today... [lifted] the economic sanctions with respect to the democratically elected government of Panama and, in cooperation with that government, [taken] steps to effect an orderly unblocking of Panamanian Government assets in the United States... The actions we have taken and the cooperation of a new, democratic government in Panama will permit us to honor these commitments [to

the Panama Canal treaties].

Thus, the president listed a series of military and diplomatic actions aimed at righting the Panama situation. But why had it come to this? Why exactly were we, in the president's words, so "engaged?" How, in other words, did the president seek to explain and legitimize these official acts to the American people?

3. Why the U.S. did it

President Bush's arguments in his speech for the Panama intervention -- his "policy rationales" in the language of the study -- were multiple:

The goals of the United States have been to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty.

Unfortunately, Bush implied, these goals could not be resolved short of force, for, "Many attempts have been made to resolve this crisis through diplomacy and negotiations. All were rejected by the dictator of Panama, General Manuel Noriega, an indicted drug trafficker."

All in all, according to Bush, the situation was a crisis, and a dramatic one. He described a country out of control, rocked in its domestic and international relations by the criminal, if not demented, behavior of a desperate dictator determined to hang on to power despite his country's recent exercise in democracy. And, most immediately, "Noriega's reckless threats" posed a direct danger to American lives. The picture was of social breakdown and lawlessness, with the U.S. as the rescuer of the innocent -- especially innocent Americans -- the restorer of order and the rule of law, and the

champion of democracy. The latter comes even more clearly into focus as the domestic Panamanian context is added to the picture:

The brave Panamanians elected by the people of Panama in the elections last May, President Guillermo Endara and Vice Presidents Calderon and Ford, have assumed the rightful leadership of their country. You remember those horrible pictures of newly elected Vice President Ford, covered head to toe with blood, beaten mercilessly by so-called "dignity battalions." Well, the United States today recognizes the democratically elected government of President Endara.

Democracy (if with the U.S. as mentor) was thus one important subtheme of the episode, at least in Bush's telling. The president thus pointed out that "yesterday a dictator ruled Panama, and today constitutionally elected leaders govern." He also made the point that, "As soon as the new government recommends a qualified candidate - Panamanian - to be Administrator of the Canal, as called for in the treaties, I will submit this nominee to the Senate for expedited consideration." (Note the use of "qualified," the inclusion of which would seem to indicate that more specific aspects of the domestic arrangements of Panamanian politics than democracy broadly construed were of serious strategic concern to the United States).

Table 4-1, below, depicts more systematically the policy rationales given by Bush for the Panama intervention in his speech (within the analytic framework discussed in Chapter Three on methodology). It displays the major themes (and their frequencies) through which the president attempted to legitimize the military action.

Table 4-1 Bush and the Panama Intervention: Statements of Policy Rationale	
Economic	
Security	
Stability	
Humanitarian	
Democracy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "...to...defend democracy" 2. "The Panamanian people want democracy... The people of the United States seek only to support them in pursuit of these noble goals" 3. "...in defense of democracy"
Credibility	
American lives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "...to safeguard the lives of Americans..." 2. "Last Friday, Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama.... That was enough." 3. "an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama" 4. "Tragically, some Americans have lost their lives in defense of their fellow citizens" 5. "I took this action only after reaching the conclusion that every other avenue was closed and the lives of American citizens were in grave danger."
U.S. Leadership	
Misc.	<p>Combat drugs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "combat drug trafficking" <p>Protect Canal Treaty:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "protect integrity of the Panama Canal treaty" 2. "The actions we have taken...will permit us to honor these commitments [of the Canal Treaty]." <p>Contribute to domestic tranquility in Panama:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Panamanian people want only...peace, and the chance for a better life in dignity and freedom.

Thus, the president's speech told of a military action serving a series of important purposes. In order of their preponderance in Bush's texts, the rationales presented for the Panama invasion are first, to protect American lives, then to promote democracy and protect the canal treaty and finally, to fight drug smuggling and offer Panamanians a more peaceful and better life.

4. The President's Policy Frame: *Imminent Danger to American Lives*

What policy frame pulls the more oft-used rationales together to create a central thrust in Bush's speech and coherent call for action? The theme *Imminent Danger*, a quote from the speech, captures the most frequently used rationale, the danger to American lives by the situation on the ground in Panama. To revisit the relevant section:

Last Friday, Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama. The very next day, forces under his command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman; wounded another; arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman; and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That was enough.²

General Noriega's reckless threats and attacks upon American in Panama *created an imminent danger* to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama. As President, I have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our Armed Forces to protect the lives of American citizens in Panama... [italics added]

For most Americans, certainly those inclined to give Bush's version of events the benefit of the doubt, such "imminent danger" would indeed "be enough." If Bush framed the

²The decisive, high-noon-like "That was enough" stylistically foreshadows Bush's later use of "This will not stand" early in the Gulf crisis.

policy most prominently in terms of *Imminent Danger to American Lives*, did the media follow suit or offer other ways to look at the intervention?

Media Framing and the 1989 Panama Intervention³

1. Dominant Substantive Framing⁴

Time and Newsweek: Presidential Assertiveness. The two newsmagazines offered minor variations on a single dominant frame, as captured by the headlines on each magazine's title page. For Time, it was "Panama Points up Bush's Growing Boldness in Foreign Affairs." Newsweek's version stressed the danger for Bush in its headline, "Bush's Big Gamble in Panama," but similarly conveyed that for Bush, Panama represented a departure toward a more activist foreign policy, a frame I'll dub *Presidential Assertiveness*. The Time magazine version was particularly dramatic in its description of a transformed president:

³Unless otherwise noted, all references in this section are to Time and Newsweek of 1/1/90 and The New York Times of 12/21/89.

⁴To review: substantive media frames represent fundamental explanations of the issue at hand, which implicitly or explicitly diagnose and evaluate what's happening and suggest action (sometimes a range of actions). They are categorized in this study in terms of their prominence. *Dominant frames* are the most prominent, reflected in the covers, contents, headlines, and lead paragraphs of all three news outlets studied here. In the newsmagazines, concluding paragraphs of the lead articles are often summary and interpretive, and reflect on the overall, dominant framing. In The New York Times, editorials often fill the same role. *Major secondary frames* are headlined articles (besides the lead) or boxed features within articles that clearly display another way to conceptualize the importance and meaning of the policy situation. *Minor secondary frames* are found only in the body of the text, with no headlines to set them off, but are at minimum a paragraph long.

The Panama invasion marks the latest stage in a monumental transformation of George Bush: From a President whose overriding imperative during his initial months in office was to avoid doing 'something dumb,' to a self-confident chief mapping a bold and individual - if not always prudent - foreign policy that he is quite willing to back with military force. (p. 21; see also p. 26: "...suddenly Bush seems bold and decisive...").

For Newsweek the drama of the *Presidential Assertiveness* frame had less to do with Bush's personality and statesmanship than with how it might play in the arena of domestic politics. Newsweek pointed out, for instance, "There also were political calculations. If Noriega's terrorism continued unchecked, Bush would be criticized for inaction.." (p. 20). And it concluded its lead article with a focus on potential political consequences for Bush: "If the American occupation of Panama turns out to be long and even a little bloody, if the light at the end of the tunnel keeps receding, Bush could pay a steep political price for Operation Just Cause." (p. 22).

Presidential Assertiveness may, of course, be an important way to think about the intervention. To the extent it is true, it was certainly of relevance to American and world politics that "Bush has been displaying a new vigor and assurance in foreign policy..." (Time, p. 22). It is also certainly not the *only* substantive frame to place on the events that were transpiring between the United States and its neighbor to the south. Rather than framing the action in terms of its meaning for Bush as statesman, politician, and individual (recall Time's personal-sounding comments on Bush's motivation to "avoid doing 'something dumb'") the intervention could instead have been viewed in terms of its significance for the United States, or Panama, or the region, or international law, or the history of U.S.-Latin American political-economic relations, or the moral imperative of

supporting democracy, or any of a host of other frames – some of which appear as secondary frames elsewhere in the news sample.

Again, this is not to say that the newsmagazine's *Presidential Assertiveness* frame is wrong, just that it, like all frames, is limited, and necessarily emphasizes some information, perspective and insight at the expense of others. By just listening to Bush's speech and scanning the covers, contents, and opening paragraphs of the two newsmagazines, the interested citizen would have been exposed to Bush's array of reasons roughly organized around the theme of imminent danger to American lives and the media framing of the action primarily in terms of Bush's growing assertiveness as a statesman and politician.

The New York Times: Imminent Danger. The *Presidential Assertiveness* theme shows up in the Times as well, but as a major secondary frame, not a dominant frame (more below). Instead, the dominant substantive framing is essentially Bush's. On page one, for example, in the lead article, the first interpretive statement concerning *what* the intervention is about is drawn from Bush's remarks: "Offering justification for the military action, President Bush said that Americans were placed in grave danger after the Noriega regime declared itself in a state of war with the United States on Friday" (p. A1). A little further down the story reads, "Mr. Bush acted after an unarmed American officer was shot and killed" (p. A1). Also, a major article on the origins of the crisis details the progression toward "imminent danger," or "Step by Step to a Violent Showdown," as the articles headline puts it (p. 22).

Finally, in the lead editorial, entitled, "Why the Invasion Was Justified, the Times

highlights the President's argument that the intervention was necessary "to safeguard the lives of Americans" (as well as to "protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties"). The president's *Imminent Danger* frame thus became the Times' own dominant (most prominent and rhetorically speaking, most "strategically placed") frame for the intervention.

2. Secondary Substantive Frames

Beyond the dominant frames identified in Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times, what secondary frames, if any, were offered within the overall coverage?

We Created a Monster. Newsweek offered a "major" (i.e., headlined) secondary frame coming on a page-long article entitled, "For Bush, the Best of a Bad Bargain" (p. 23). According to the piece, "[Panama] should never have come to this," for the operation was "a product of failure," of past policy that "built up Noriega all the while ignoring his drug dealing and power-playing, all in the cause of single-minded anti-communism." Now, according to this view, the United States was left with little choice but to clean up the mess:

However serious, the incidents cited [by officials as the reason for the invasion] were mostly pretext. At bottom, a large part of the rationale was simple frustration and embarrassment at being bested by a thug. This war may be messy, but it wipes the historical slate clean. When a government blows a policy for many years, sometimes it feels obliged to blow it up. (p. 23)

Clearly, this is another, more historical and critical way of looking at the situation, one in which Bush's assertiveness is not the core of the story.

Time echoed the *We Created a Monster* frame in a couple of paragraphs that amount, in the analytical framework of this study, to a "minor secondary frame":

...In retrospect, though, the invasion looks inevitable. The U.S. through two Administrations built Noriega into a menacing monster -- instead of what he was, the tin-pot dictator of a not very important country -- and put its credibility on the line in declaring that he had to go... (Time, p. 23)

Superpower Status. An additional minor secondary frame came in Time's suggestion that the intervention's significance lay in its symbolism as a post-Cold War assertion of America's superpower status:

The Washington *Post* has quoted Joint Chiefs Chairman Powell as telling colleagues that "we have to put a shingle outside our door saying SUPERPOWER LIVES HERE, no matter what the Soviets do, even if they evacuate from Eastern Europe." That may be a better summary of the reasoning behind the invasion than any other. (Time, p. 23).

The New York Times, meanwhile, gave considerable coverage to the intervention, within which a number of secondary substantive frames were portrayed. They were:

Presidential Assertiveness (the dominant frame for the two newsmagazines) appeared as a major secondary frame in the Times, in a below-the-fold front page article entitled "War: Bush's Presidential Rite of Passage." The Time version placed the intervention in a historical context, arguing that many presidents have "acted in the belief American political culture required them to show the world promptly that they carried big sticks" (p. A1). The theme is given a more critical twist in another article on the congressional reaction: "Many Democrats...seemed to feel that the Panama operation was, to some extent, an attempt by the President to display political fortitude and military muscle against a target that was in no way central to American foreign policy interests" (p. A21).

Gunboat Diplomacy describes another secondary substantive frame, appearing in an article entitled "U.S. Denounced by Nations Touchy About Intervention." This article

described Latin America's interpretation of the intervention as "interference in the sovereign affairs of a fellow American nation," "a step backward in international relations," and "an issue that cuts across ideological lines in the region" (p. 28).

Drug War. Another Times article played up the angle of the intervention as a drug operation. "A major goal of the strike in Panama was not just to oust Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, but to eliminate the nation as a haven for illicit narcotics traffickers, Bush Administration officials said today" (p. 25). This frame was challenged in the article by one of Noriega's lawyers, quoted as saying, "If they find him, it's going to be a kidnaping, not an extradition."⁵ The *Drug War* frame also came up in a paragraph in a Time's op-ed, in which the author argues, "Today, we face a new international phenomenon – the drug crisis and narco-militarism. It can only be solved with multinational action..." (p. 31)

We Created a Monster. This frame shows up in a paragraph of an op-ed piece, as follows: "The U.S. helped create and nurture Panama's monstrous military, which became a narco-military machine..." (p. 31)

All in all, a hypothetical citizen who not only listened to the president's address on television and not only scanned the headlines and lead articles of Time, Newsweek and The New York Times, but carefully read on, would have encountered the following array of media framing, summarized in the Table 4-2 (below).

⁵Here is an example of how editorial choices in *describing* what's taking place reflect particular frames. Would the arrest and deportation of Noriega be a "kidnaping" or an "extradition?"

**Table 4-2: Media Framing, 1989 Panama Intervention
(President's Frame: *Imminent Danger to American Lives*)**

Media Outlet	Substantive Media Frames		
	Dominant	Major Secondary	Minor Secondary
Time	<i>Presidential Assertiveness</i> "Panama points up Bush's growing boldness in foreign affairs" (p. 3)	<i>We Created a Monster</i> "The futility of all approaches short of a full-scale invasion testifies not just to Noriega's canniness but to more than two decades of clumsy American handling of him" (p. 23)	<i>We Created a Monster</i> "The U.S. through two Administrations built Noriega into a menacing monster..." (p. 23) <i>Superpower Status</i> "... we have to put a shingle outside our door saying SUPERPOWER LIVES HERE " (p. 23)
Newsweek	<i>Presidential Assertiveness</i> "Bush's big gamble in Panama" (p. 1)		

Table 4-2, continued

<p>NYT</p>	<p><i>Imminent Danger</i> "Mr. Bush acted after an unarmed American officer was shot and killed" (p. A1)</p>	<p><i>Presidential Assertiveness</i> "For President Bush... showing his steel had a particular significance" (p. A1)</p> <p><i>Gunboat Diplomacy</i> "...interference in the sovereign affairs of a fellow American nation" (p. A24)</p> <p><i>Drug War</i> "A major goal... was to eliminate... a haven for illicit narcotics.." (p. A25)</p>	<p><i>We Created a Monster</i> "The U.S. helped create and nurture Panama's monstrous military" (p. A31)</p>
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3. The Media's Contextual Cues

To review, the contextual framing with which this study is concerned refers to the signals that media presentations give readers regarding the need for deliberation. Does the presentation indicate to the reader that there are important things to think about and alternative perspectives worth considering, or does it convey a closed context, communicating instead, "here's the obvious answer, you need think about it no further?"

The research analyzes such contextual framing by mapping explicit or implicit questions that appear in key textual locations. Such strategically located questions are considered as indicators of contextual openness. As Chapter Three explained, for the newsmagazines these locations are the (1) cover, (2) the contents page, (3) the lead story headlines and (4) the first page of text of the lead story. For the Times these locations are (1) the main front page article headlines and subheadings (2) headlines or sub-headlines of any secondary front page articles (3) front page story content, and (4) index page entries.

Time asked only one question in any of these strategic locations: "Can Panama's new U.S.-installed leaders run the country?" The New York Times, as is frequently the case, *implied* a couple of questions rather than asking them directly. (E.g., "...Americans *may* face urban warfare" -- italics added -- the "may" implies a question). Only Newsweek asked many questions on a number of themes, as can be seen in the following tables, which summarize the contextual framing data. (See Tables 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5, below.)

Table 4-3: Panama, 1989 and Media Openness: Time

Cover	None
Contents	"Can Panama's new U.S.-installed leaders run the country?"
Lead story headlines	None
Lead story page 1 contents	None

Table 4-4: Panama, 1989 and Media Openness: Newsweek

Cover	"How High a Price?" "How Long a Stay?"
Contents	"Noriega on trial?" "Was there another option?"
Lead story headlines	"The largest U.S. military airlift since Vietnam targets strongman and accused drug dealer Manuel Antonio Noreiga -- at a cost that could prove high."
Lead story page 1 contents	None

Table 4-5: Panama, 1989 and Media Openness: NYT

Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (main story)	None
Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (other stories)	None
Page 1 story text	"After initial successes, Americans may face urban warfare."
Index	"[President Bush's] actions may have big costs for the United States."

2. The Iraq Intervention

The President's Speech⁶

1. General Comments

The speech finally announcing military action in Iraq came after the long, tense buildup in tensions that most readers will undoubtedly remember rather vividly. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in early August 1990, Bush called for its withdrawal and the United States built up, over several months, considerable troop strength in the region and an international coalition to pressure Hussein. Bush sought and achieved sanction in both the U.N. and the U.S. Congress for military action, the latter voting after an unusually serious and vigorous debate to support the president should he decide to use force.⁷

Bush had made several speeches already at various stages of the buildup.⁸ In the speech announcing the commencement of hostilities, on January 16th, 1991, Bush brought his case once again to the American people as the bombs were falling on Iraq.

In certain key respects, Iraq was, rhetorically speaking, Panama writ large. Once again a sort of mad dog of international relations -- now Hussein rather than Noriega --

⁶Bush, George, "Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf," Papers of the President, January 16, 1991.

⁷ Authorization for Use of Military Force (Joint Congressional Resolution of January 12, 1991). The vote was 52-47 in favor of the resolution in the Senate and 250-183 in favor in the House.

⁸Prior to the January 16th speech, Bush had made nationally televised speeches on the Gulf War on August 8, 1990 and on September 11, 1990. Bush also devoted a good portion of the State of the Union Address to it (January 29, 1991), and the celebratory "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict" took place on March 6th, 1991.

had upset the legitimate order of things. Kuwait was portrayed as a member in good standing in the international order, "a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations." And Kuwait was not just a member, but a "neighbor" in need, for this "small and helpless neighbor" was "crushed" and "brutalized" by the "dictator of Iraq."

Once again, diplomacy had been exhausted and nothing was left but the (therefore legitimized) use of force. Military action had taken place only after "months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States, and many, many other countries." As in the Panama speech, all peaceful means had been exhausted and the U.S. was doing what now had to be done.

In contrast to the Panama speech, however, which portrayed Bush as a powerful, autonomous actor, the Iraq address emphasized collaboration with both domestic and international power centers. Perhaps in part because his assertiveness had been well established by the Panama invasion itself, and likely because of the higher stakes involved, the president took care to present the decision-making and the intervention itself as a shared enterprise.

This military action, taken in accord with the United Nations resolution and with the consent of the United States Congress...

Tonight, 28 nations -- countries from 5 continents, Europe and Asia, Africa, and the Arab League -- have forces in the Gulf area standing shoulder to shoulder against Saddam Hussein.

Historical analogies are often elements of presidential rhetoric on military action, and the post-Cold War speeches allude, for instance, to the dangers of appeasement and the experience of Vietnam. Bush, in his first national address on Iraq (8/8/90), made the

parallel between Saddam Hussein and Hitler. In this one he assured America that "this will not be another Vietnam." Vietnam is, of course, ever open to interpretation, so one must look to see which lessons are being alluded to. In the case of Bush's reference at the outset of the fighting with Iraq, his point was, "Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back..."

Stylistically, there were similarities to and contrasts with the Panama speech. As with Panama the President began his speech with a straightforward statement of what was happening and an explanation of why it was so. This speech, however, also employed a somewhat higher style than the Panama address: Early on, for instance, Bush declared rather dramatically, "Tonight, the battle has been joined." And he soon launched into a series of statements of what Saddam had been up to "while the world waited." Bush here comes off as confident as both statesmen and speaker.

2. What the U.S. did

Bush's highly dramatic speech began with the announcement: "Just 2 hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak." America, in other words, was at war.

Bush offered some specificity about the military actions, more than was the case in the Panama speech. Whereas only broad policy goals were discussed in the former, in the latter Bush spelled out military goals as well.

As I report to you, air attacks are underway against military targets in Iraq. We

are determined to knock out Saddam's Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed.... Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait.

Finally, Bush emphasized the magnitude of the action. Not only did it involve nations "from five continents," but Bush pointed out that he had "instructed our military commanders to take very necessary steps to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of protection for American and allied service men and women." In short, Bush told the nation America and its allies were at war to drive Saddam from Kuwait, and that we meant business.

3. Why the U.S. did it

Following the pattern of his Panama speech, Bush immediately followed his statement of policy -- "Just 2 hours ago, allied air forces..." -- with a statement of explanation. "This conflict started August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor."

The president conveyed his interpretation of the situation in grave, moral terms that described the depraved nature of the enemy:

Kuwait...was crushed; its people, brutalized... While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities - and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children.... While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war."

As Bush unfolded his argument for military action, he offered a steady stream of reasons for the military confrontation, summarized in Table 4-6.

Table 4-6 Bush and the Gulf War: Summary of Policy Rationales	
Economic	1. "...more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own economy."
Security	1. "... Saddam sought to add...weapon(s) of mass destruction."
Stability	<p>1. "Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait...when peace is restored it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of the Gulf."</p> <p>2. "We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order - a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations."</p> <p>3. "...out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor."</p> <p>4. "What we're doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years."</p> <p>5. "If we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next?"</p>
Humanitarian	<p>1. "This conflict started...when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait...was crushed; its people, brutalized."</p> <p>2. "... Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities..."</p> <p>3. "The terrible crimes and tortures committed by Saddam's henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an affront to mankind..."</p> <p>4. "A world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to live in."</p>
Misc.	<p>Freedom:</p> <p>1. "Kuwait will once again be free."</p> <p>2. "Our goal is...the liberation of Kuwait."</p> <p>3. "...a challenge to the freedom of all."</p>

4. The President's Policy Frame: *Forging a New World Order*

As Table 4-6 shows, the speech, more complex than the one on Panama, placed its greatest emphasis on the themes of stability and humanitarianism. In the president's version of events, Iraq's action is primarily an unacceptable challenge to the international political and moral order, a challenge that must be met.

The speech also makes much of the notion that meeting this challenge is an occasion for human progress. It is not about power alone, not a reactionary wielding of the club, more than a return to the old order. It is, rather, part of the creation of a something new and better than the old Cold War power politics. "This is an historic moment," Bush tells us, for,

We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order -- a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.

The idea of restoring stability and order is thus vivified and given moral force through the imagery of the post-Cold War emergence of a true "family of nations," another phrase employed in Bush's speech.

Bush's *New World Order* phrase thus frames the conflict in terms of a new kind of international stability, grounded in legal and moral norms. In traditional international relations terms, the speech is clearly imbued with more idealism than realism. It is, in fact, closely akin to Wilson's "war to end all wars," for, according to Bush, "Out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor." He added, "What we're doing is

going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years."

Media Framing and the Iraq Intervention⁹

1. Dominant Policy Frames

The headlines on the covers of Time, Newsweek and The New York Times were dramatic pronouncements of the step the United States had taken: "America AT WAR," thundered Newsweek above a fighter pilot's determined visage and thumbs up sign. On the cover of Time, "WAR in the Gulf," over a soon-to-be-familiar shot of rocket streaks and flares over Baghdad at night. And in The New York Times, "U.S. AND ALLIES OPEN AIR WAR ON IRAQ; BOMB BAGHDAD AND KUWAITI TARGETS; NO CHOICE' BUT FORCE, BUSH DECLARES."

How did the three news outlets frame this dramatic military action to the American people?

Newsweek: Modern Techno-War. In its dominant frame, Newsweek chose to highlight the technological dimension of the situation, entitling its lead article, "A New Kind of Warfare." To Newsweek, the core of the story concerned how "war technology seems to cross a threshold to a new generation." (p. 15). The major perspective was that a new level of war technology had arrived, with unknowable implications, as the concluding paragraph to the lead article implies: "The improved accuracy of high-tech

⁹All references to Time and Newsweek in this section refer to the 1/28/91 publications, unless otherwise noted. All references to NYT are to 1/17/91.

weapons may take warfare into a new era of truly surgical air strikes....In the regional conflicts to come, smart bombs and missiles may be the weapons of choice for any country that can afford them" (p. 23).¹⁰

Newsweek occasionally sought to subvert the antiseptic version of the technological warfare story the administration was offering in tightly managed news briefings: "It seemed effortless, antiseptic and surreal: casualties were very light, and all the high-tech gadgets in the U.S. arsenal seemed to work with surgical lethality. 'Like a day at the office,' one pilot said - but Scud missiles were falling on Tel Aviv, and the ground war lay ahead" (p. 3). And:

At home, millions of Americans tuned in to watch the high-tech sequel to The Living Room War. Washington fought euphoria, and the nation, swallowing its misgivings, rallied 'round the commander in chief. But there was foreboding, too - an intuition that this war, like Vietnam, would sooner or later go horribly wrong, or that the Scud missiles crashing down on Tel Aviv were omens of some larger Armageddon. In the chill wastes of Saudi Arabia, the troops of Desert Storm waited for the great land battle that seemed all but inevitable. Barring a miracle, they knew, the true face of war would be revealed in terror and blood. (p. 13)

Thus, there was a dash of a "war is still hell" subtheme in Newsweek's *Modern Techno-War* frame, but the central thrust was more "war is new" than "war is hell."

Time: Realism. Newsweek's frame did not directly challenge Bush's stability

¹⁰ Newsweek's dominant techno-war frame is also evident in the descriptors it employs in its content page summary: "thunderous razzle-dazzle," "modern warfare," and "high-tech gadgets." And it is echoed in the magazine's end-piece by George Will, "From Bayonets to Tomahawks." Cf. Allen, et al., 1994, for a discussion of the heavy use of technological framing in media coverage of the Gulf War.

theme, it simply offered another, parallel dimension of the story. Time managed to support and challenge the President's stability theme at once, suggesting that the battle was being joined to restore order and stability, major themes in Bush's speech, but offering as well a realist's challenge to Bush's idealistic *New World Order* frame.

Thus, in its contents page teaser, Time described events as "Shaking the new world order" and characterized the war as "the use of force in the name of law-and-order" (p. 3). This *Realist* frame, and its distinction from Bush's *New World Order* frame, comes across in the subheading of the lead article, "...hopes for a new world order gave way to familiar disorder" (p. 14). And in the lead article's first paragraph is offered nearly a poetry of Realist analysis.

Force. Derived from the Latin *fortis*, meaning "strong," it was the watchword of an extraordinary week.

I am stronger than you: therefore you will do what I say. Obey, or I will use force. That was what George Bush said to Saddam Hussein. (p. 15)

Moreover,

It [Bush's speech] was the right rhetoric on behalf of the right policy. But no one should be under an illusion that the much vaunted new world order is in place or even at hand.

The resort to force - no matter how necessary under the circumstances - was an admission that the preferred and defining methods for making a better world had failed. Talk of a *pax Americana* was not just premature but out of place. There was plenty of *Americana* but too little *pax*. It was the same old world last week, and a not very orderly one at that. (Time, p. 17)

Thus, both Bush and Time agreed that the policy was in essence a more or less appropriate restoration of international order by the use of force. In contrast to the more

idealist elements of Bush's frame encompassing humanitarianism and a new world order -- a theme of force on behalf of idealism -- Time framed the policy in more traditional realist terms of force against force on behalf of America's (and incidentally, the world's) interests. Despite the internationalist rhetoric, Time points out, "The U.S. went to war against Adolf Hitler...as part of an alliance and on behalf of principles similar to those at stake today.... Desert Storm is very much an American Operation" (p. 17).

NYT: No Choice But Force. The New York Times' dominant framing of the war is well summarized in a quote from Bush's speech that appears in its main page one headline: "No Choice But Force." Throughout the Times' most prominent coverage -- on the front page, in the page two index, in its main editorial -- the message is consistently sent that the period for patience and diplomacy had come to an end and that the time to act had arrived.

For example, early in the lead article's text, the Times elaborated on the "No Choice But Force" quote in the lead headline:

...in a televised address to the nation from the Oval Office, a somber Mr. Bush said that after months of continuous diplomatic overtures had failed to produce movement by Iraq, the United States and its allies "have no choice but to force Saddam from Kuwait by force." (p. A1).

And later in the same article: "Some may ask, why act now? Why not wait?" the President said. "The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer" (p. A14). The lead article's concluding paragraph echoed this framing emphasis: "The United States had expressed growing impatience with the sanctions, however, and planning for war was

stepped up sharply after Nov. 29..." (p. A14).¹¹

In sum, The New York Times' *No Choice But Force* frame communicated that the time for diplomacy had played itself out, and the time for military action had unavoidably arrived. In one brief instance, this frame was challenged in the text, or at least rendered with an ironic and critical edge:

Too late for peace, I guess," said Corporal Troy Sundeen, 24 years old, of St. Helen's, Oregon, chewing a wad of tobacco and staring down at the desert sand as he spoke with a reporter.... "It's easier for politicians to order a war than sit down and talk. (A18)

And in a highly buried mini-article entitled "Castro Criticizes U.N.," Castro is said to argue that:

There could have been other economic measures. There could have been isolation. There could have been more political condemnation. There were a broad range of measures that they could have taken without resorting to weapons. From the beginning to the end, they had only a declaration to war, not to peace. (p. A19)

But in general, the *No Choice But Force* frame was frequently echoed and rarely challenged in the Times' coverage. It accepted the subtheme in Bush's speech that Hussein's intransigence had created a diplomatic impasse, that the only appropriate solution was force, and that the time to act with force had arrived.

¹¹Other front-page headlines added to the impression of a mounting, somehow irresistible pressure to act militarily: "A Tense Wait Ends," "Rumble in the Sky Ends a 5-month Wait." And in the Quotation of the Day box that is part of the Times' page two News Summary section, Bush is quoted to read, "*Some may ask, why act now. Why not wait? The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer.*" "Finally, in the lead editorial, the Times writes, "The use of force could not finally be avoided."

2. Secondary frames

Adding to its *Modern Techno-War* dominant frame, Newsweek offered the following secondary frames:

Realism. Two articles in Newsweek echoed Time's dominant *Realist* frame. One, by Henry Kissinger entitled "A Post-War Agenda" undermined Bush's new world order imagery and rhetoric and replaced it with a balance of power *realpolitik* analysis of the crisis.

Over the long run, our biggest challenge will be to preserve the new balance of power that will emerge from this conflict. And that will not prove easy, given conventional American thinking about foreign policy. Today, it translates into the notion of a "new world order," which would emerge from a set of legal arrangements and be safeguarded by collective security. The problem with such an approach is that it assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way, and is prepared to run the same risk to preserve it..... (Newsweek, 1/28/96, p. 44)

This assumption, it is implied, is "unrealistic." It fails to view the international system as it really is, which is better understood via a realist's "balance of power" lens than any fanciful "notion" of an impending "new world order" that would treat international problems as if they were domestic ones.

Whereas the Kissinger piece gave a kind of realist overview of the conflict that challenged the idealist new world order imagery of Bush's speech, another article "The Road to War: A behind-the-scenes account of gross errors and deft maneuvers," gives a closer to the ground, decision-making version of a *Realist* frame. The article explains the war in terms of the strategic decision-making of Iraq and the United States. It emphasizes how Saddam's aggressiveness "had thrown everyone off balance," and the failed but

"earnest efforts of President Bush to cultivate Saddam as a force for peace in the gulf at the very moment the dictator was nurturing his aggressive designs" as well as the president's "enormously delicate campaign on three fronts -- military, diplomatic and political.." (p. 54). Bush receives some criticism, for had not "a bright veil of wishful thinking descended over American analysis of Saddam's dark designs" (p. 54), events may have turned out differently.

The article thus emphasizes the role of perception, misperception and strategic judgment in the power plays of international relations. The connection to traditional Realist notions of "national interests" is made clear in its description of the president's response to Iraq's "challenge to the post-Cold War leadership of the United States" (p. 58).

...the president convened the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room. "What are our interests?" he asked. One by one his counselors reviewed the main ones: The danger to oil supplies, Saddam's program to develop nuclear weapons, the security of Israel, the threat to the credibility of American leadership now that only one superpower was left on its feet. The dangers were real. The most intelligent way to confront them was harder. (Newsweek, p. 58)

Time magazine, which led with a *Realist* dominant frame, also offered readers the following secondary frames:

The Arab view: This secondary frame followed up on a theme sounded after the first Bush speech back in August, when Time devoted significant space to attempting an Arab view of Saddam, and his importance as a symbol of strength and independence to many Arabs (Time, 8/10/90). In the 1/28/91 Time, following Bush's war speech, this perspective was given another treatment:

Iraq's leader may be a blood-drenched tyrant, but for many he is nonetheless a symbol of dignity, unity and self reliance. But Saddam also represents the yearning of the Arab people: a defiant assertion of dignity, unity and honor.... To cast Saddam merely as a gangster is to misunderstand not only why he invaded Kuwait but also why he has gained so much popular support among the "Arab masses." ... Centuries of foreign domination have left Arabs with a sense of violation, of second-class status.... (Time, 1/28/91, p. 64)¹²

Superpower Status. In Time's end-essay, Charles Krauthammer argued that the war may turn out to be less about the international balance of power than about a kind of national catharsis that would allow us to once again take our rightful, great-power place in the world. (This theme, it will be recalled, showed in the Panama coverage discussed earlier). The successful resolution of the conflict, he writes, could create an American foreign policy attitude in which "we will no longer speak of post-Vietnam America. A new, post-gulf America will emerge, its self-image, sense of history, even its political discourse transformed.... What is at stake in the Gulf War is the Vietnam legacy..." (p. 100).

Vietnam was not just a feeling. It became an argument.... Vietnam will be retired as the defining American experience of this age... What is at stake in the gulf war is the Vietnam legacy... A post-gulf America might even see itself in perspective: as the planet's dominant power, afflicted with problems but able nonetheless, by

¹² In Newsweek, a related article ("Caught in the Cross-fire: As usual, Palestinians will be among the losers") raised the question of the Palestinians' fate as a result of the war, though without developing an alternate frame. That is, it simply pointed out that Palestinians would suffer, it did not give us a Palestinian analysis or suggest that this suffering was somehow the real point and rationale of the policy. As we shall see, the NYT coverage offered a related frame in presenting an article depicting Saddam Hussein's public response to the war.

prodigious acts of will, to turn history. (Time, p. 100)¹³

Presidential Assertiveness. In an article entitled "Bush's Biggest Gamble," Time offered another rendition of the policy frame it had employed during the Panama intervention. The article holds that Bush's foreign policy assertiveness was the result of his having found a cause worth fighting for -- the "new world order" of his speech. The article thus takes Bush at his word -- Bush really believes that the battle being fought in the sands of Kuwait and Iraq really is about the establishment of a new world order -- and suggests that his *conviction* is a new variable at work in American foreign affairs.

"There was little sense of drama," says a senior official who was present. "There was more a sense of inevitability."

Inevitable because George Bush, who in a long political career had seldom held any inconvenient opinion for very long, had finally found something that he was willing to defend in the face of withering criticism and at a terrible cost in human life. It was the belief that reversing Iraq's aggression could usher in a new world order, one in which the U.S. and its allies would work with a newly cooperative Soviet Union to promote international peace. (p. 32)

Turning to The New York Times, the secondary frames added to its *No Choice*

But Force dominant frame were the following:

¹³Interestingly, a Nation editorial at the time made the same point as Krauthammer, but, of course, with a very different spin.

Part of the purpose of Bush's action was to destroy the "post-Vietnam syndrome," to show America that war need not be costly, either in lives or treasure. The job of the peace movement now is to expose all the expense of the military/imperial project... (Nation, 1/28/91, p. 113).

Forging a New World Order. As usual, the president's remarks are reproduced in the Times. The Times seems to agree with my rendering of the President's policy frame, in that the following is the only boxed and headlined excerpt from the speech that the Times chose to highlight:

A New World Order: *"We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new worlds order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations."*

A Clash Between Believers and Infidels. Closely related to one of Time magazine's secondary frames (*Arab View*), "a clash between believers and infidels" is a quote from Saddam Hussein in an article titled, "Hussein Urges Unity Against 'The Invaders'" (p. A18). The article thus offers Hussein's counter-frame, to Bush in his speech -- and not incidentally to most of the American coverage as well.

A clash of personalities. In Anna Quindlen's "Public and Private Column," here entitled, "Personally," the conflict is analyzed in terms of the personalities of Saddam and Bush. She argues,

It's personal for Saddam Hussein. This war is a career move. His psychology has been dissected like a biology class frog, but it seems to me that he suffers from a lethal dose of that craziness that afflicts anyone audacious enough to lead a nation, egomania" (p. A23).

And:

For George Bush this is personal, too, I don't think the wimp factor is the only thing at work here. But I think that the sled of public positioning always stands at the top of a slippery slope, and when it begins to move, it is difficult to stop it or slow it down, even when half the electorate are yelling, "Wait a minute!" (p. A23)

All of the dominant and secondary substantive policy frames presented in the coverage of Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times are summarized in Table 4-7, on the following two pages.

**Table 4-7: Media Framing, 1991 Iraq Intervention
(President's Frame: *Forging a New World Order*)**

Media Outlet	Substantive Media Frames		
	Dominant	Major Secondary	Minor Secondary
Time	<p><i>Realism</i> "...hopes for a new world order gave way to familiar disorder." (p. 14)</p>	<p><i>Arab View</i> "To cast Saddam merely as a gangster is to misunderstand not only why he invaded Kuwait but also why he has gained so much popular support among the 'Arab masses.'" (p. 64)</p> <p><i>Modern Techno-War</i> "High-Tech Payoff: Costly arms face their first combat use -- and prove their worth." (p. 30)</p> <p><i>Superpower Status</i> "A post-gulf America might even see itself in perspective: as the planet's dominant power." (p. 100)</p>	<p><i>Presidential Assertiveness</i> "...Bush...had finally found something that he was willing to defend in the face of withering criticism... the belief that reversing Iraq's aggression could usher in a new world order." (p. 32)</p>

Table 4-7, continued

<p>Newweek</p>	<p><i>Modern Techno-War</i> " ... war technology seems to cross a threshold to a new generation" (p. 15)</p>	<p><i>Realism</i> 1. Balance of Power emphasis: "Over the long run, our biggest challenge will be to preserve the new balance of power that will emerge from this conflict." (p. 44) 2. Decision-Making emphasis: "What are our interests?" (p. 58)</p>	
<p>NYT</p>	<p><i>No Choice But Force</i> "The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer." (p. 2)</p>	<p><i>Forging New World Order</i> "We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order..." (p. 14) <i>Clash Between Believers and Infidels</i> "President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in a broadcast early this morning said 'a fateful duel has begun -- a clash between believers and infidels.'" (p. A18) <i>Clash of Personalities</i> "It's personal for Saddam Hussein...For George Bush this is personal, too. (p. A23)</p>	

3. The Media's Contextual Cues

Prominently placed questions indicating media openness are summarized in Tables 4-8, - 9, and -10.

Table 4-8: Iraq, 1991, and Media Openness: Time

Cover	None
Contents	None
Lead story headlines	None
Lead story page 1 contents	None

Table 4-9: Iraq, 1991, and Media Openness: Newsweek

Cover	None
Contents	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The gulf conflict raises new questions about the future of the Middle East. 2. Will Israelis retaliate? 3. A recovery as early as spring?
Lead story headlines	None
Lead story page 1 contents	None

Table 4-10: Iraq, 1991, and Media Openness: NYT

Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (main story)	None
Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (other stories)	None
Page 1 text	None
Index	None ¹⁴

¹⁴The index does contain, in its Quotation of the Day box, rhetorical questions from Bush's speech. ("Some may ask, why act now. Why not wait? The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer.") Because they are rhetorical questions, and because Bush answers them so decisively, these are not counted as questions meant to elicit deliberative behavior on the part of readers.

3. The Somalia Intervention¹⁵

1. General Comments

Dubbed "Operation Restore Hope," the Somalia intervention came in the latter days of the Bush presidency, after his loss to Clinton in the general election. By the time of the U.S. action, Somalia had been spiraling ever more deeply into drought, starvation, and misery for some time, and graphic news coverage had aroused public opinion in the United States.

In contrast to the enemies of the Panama and Iraq speeches, Somalia lacked the rhetorical convenience of a mad dog figure subverting the proper order of things (at least until the Clinton administration episode to be discussed in Chapter Five). Instead, the president described a situation of societal breakdown and general criminality. "There is no government in Somalia," Bush asserted, "Law and order have broken down. Anarchy prevails." As a result, "armed gangs" and "outlaw elements" were preventing the needed humanitarian relief efforts. The animating power of the speech was therefore not so much focused, personalized villainy but the suffering of innocents from more diffuse natural and social causes.

Whereas Panama had been presented as a largely unilateral action and Iraq as a largely multilateral one, the Somalia operation existed somewhere inbetween. Bush acted after "consulting with my advisers, with world leaders, and the congressional leadership," and not before, as in Panama. Bush acknowledged that "the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs." But he also posited a special leadership role for the United

¹⁵Bush, George, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia" (12/4/92).

States, for:

...some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.

Stylistically, the Somalia speech was shorn of the flourishes of the Iraq address.

There were no "while the world waited" recitations. It was straight-ahead, like the Panama address, although a little more intimate and personal in tone as the president began, "I want to talk to you today about a tragedy..." Where the Panama speech reflected back on Bush the aura of decisive leader and the Iraq speech world statesman, this speech had a decidedly moralistic theme that came through most clearly right at the end when Bush said, "So, to every sailor, soldier, airman and marine who is involved in this mission let me say, you're doing God's work." Bush joined himself to that blessing in the very next sentence, "We will not fail." Thus Bush approached the end of his presidency in the arena of his greatest success, foreign policy, doing "God's work."

2. What the U.S. did

Bush described the mission as a straightforward, two-step affair: In order to "provide more help to enable relief to be delivered....," Bush reported, "I have given the order.. to move a substantial force into Somalia....First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia, so that food can move from ships over land to the people in the countryside... Second, once we have created that secure

environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular U.N. peacekeeping force..."

Significantly in light of the charge of "mission creep" later leveled at Clinton when army rangers incurred losses during an ambush in Somalia, Bush made clear that the mission was circumscribed.

Our mission has a limited objective: To open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended.

3. Why the U.S. did it

The rationale for, and significance of, the mission were posed in largely humanitarian terms: a horribly suffering people desperately needed help -- *our* help. Bush described the involvement as an extension of ongoing humanitarian work that the United States had already begun with the U.N. However, "the security situation has grown worse..." for, "Anarchy prevails." So the most capable actor must act responsibly:

The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them. We must give them hope. America must act.

In taking this action, I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs. But we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.

The U.S. mission was to stabilize the situation, feed the starving, right the U.N. mission, and get out. Table 4-11 summarizes the explicit explanations for the intervention contained in Bush's speech.

Table 4-11 Bush and Somalia: Summary of Policy Rationales	
Economic	
Security	
Stability	
Humanitarian	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "...a mission that can ease suffering and save lives." 2. "...military support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of food Somalis need to survive." 3. "The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help...America must act." 4. "Our mission is humanitarian." 5. "We come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed." 6. "...and thus save thousands of innocents from death."
Democracy	
Credibility	
Am. lives	
U.S. Leadership	1. "...some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, ...American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations...."
Misc.	

4. The President's Frame: *Humanitarian Imperative*

Bush's speech framed the Somalia mission as a humanitarian response to human tragedy caused by societal breakdown, one that the United States ought to respond to because it is right and because we can. Moreover, he portrayed it as one we could not

morally refused, as a kind of humanitarian imperative to act. "We're able to ease their suffering," the president said, "We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act."

Media Framing and the 1992 Somalia Intervention¹⁶

1. Dominant Policy Frames

Both newsmagazines and the Times accepted as their dominant frames for the intervention the president's argument that the mission was essentially a *humanitarian* one, to stabilize and set right a chaotic and suffering corner of the world. Time's lead article was entitled, "Taking on the Thugs;" Newsweek's was, "Mission of Mercy." The Times front page announced that "Bush Declares goal in Somalia is to 'Save Thousands.'"

All three news outlets were not only unified on the basic humanitarian nature of the intervention, they all emphasized that it represented a break from the past. It was a "precedent-setting humanitarian operation" (Time, p. 3); it "set a new standard for military action" (Newsweek, p. 3); and:

"The decision to intervene in Somalia marks a turning point in American foreign policy: for the first time American troops are entering a country uninvited, not to shore up an anti-Communist regime, protect American wealth or stifle a strategic threat, but simply to feed starving people. (NYT, p. 1)

There were some stylistic distinctions. Time communicated the humanitarian perspective dramatically with heart-rending shots of emaciated Somali youngsters. The New York Times took a more hardheaded, unsentimental approach, with a shot of General Powell at a diagram explaining the military operation. Also unlike Time, both The New York Times' front page and Newsweek's cover attempted to put the issue in a larger, more thematic perspective. The former had a "News Analysis" piece titled "Crossing the

¹⁶All references in this section are to Time and Newsweek of 12/14/92, and The New York Times of 12/5/92.

Line, and Redrawing It," that raised questions about making humanitarianism a primary impetus for foreign intervention. Somewhat similarly, Newsweek's cover depicted an American soldier shipping out for duty under the caption "Going In: Should America Be the World's Policeman?"

The three news outlets also set up similar tensions vis-a-vis the president's rhetoric by raising concerns about policy execution, with an emphasis on the danger of becoming ensnared in a "quagmire" -- again, the shadow of Vietnam.¹⁷ For instance, Time concluded its lead article by pointing out that "If the U.S. gets stuck in the anarchy of Somalia, or if it departs in haste, leaving renewed chaos and starvation behind, such principled actions will look much less acceptable in the future." Similarly Newsweek noted that, "With the cold war over, missions of mercy provide a worthwhile use for America's military muscle. But the rules for compassionate intervention have not been spelled out with enough clarity" (p. 31). And it concluded its major piece by noting that, "If the United States gets bogged down in just one blood-soaked quagmire, other, more realistic rescue missions might be called off" (Newsweek, p. 35). Finally, the Times notes in one of its articles that, "The disclosure that the Pentagon may leave a small force in Somalia to provide logistical support for the United Nations peacekeepers....suggests that the American military intervention may not end as cleanly as President Bush suggested today. (p. 5).

Thus, for the three news publications, the mission was pretty much as the

¹⁷Evidently, Krauthammer's hope during the Gulf War that "Vietnam will be retired during as the defining American experience" (Time, 1/28/91, p. 100) had not completely been realized. These warnings are particularly noteworthy as a forewarning of the Clinton administration's travails not only in Somalia but in the Yugoslav engagement and entanglement of 1999.

president said it was -- a humanitarian mission of mercy. They did not, however, quite go so far as to frame it as an *imperative*. And they suggested it could turn out worse than the president said it might, with problematic consequences for public support for humanitarianism in America's post-Cold War foreign policy.

Were there any other options for framing the operation? Without arguing that they would have been more appropriate, it is important to keep reminding ourselves that the offered frame, even the obvious one, is never the only possibility. For instance, there is the political-psychological angle of a president whose most prominent accomplishments had come in foreign affairs, making one more statement for the history books while he still had power in his hands. There is the desire of a superpower to establish its post-Cold War forcefulness and credibility. And there is the question of media imagery driving public opinion and thus foreign policy.

Reviewing a news outlet's later reconsideration of a story helps one appreciate that the framing choices originally made were just that -- necessary news judgments in response to a breaking story, and not the obvious truth they can appear to be at the time. Consider Time's more complex reflections on Bush's Somalia policy in its 10/18/93 issue, about 10 months later:

The exact mix of motives that prompted George Bush to launch the Somali intervention is still not altogether clear. The immediate causes were, of course, ghastly TV pictures of famine in that country and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's pleas for help to get food past the guns of armed gangs into the hands of the starving in a country that had no real government and practically no order of any sort. In addition, Bush no doubt wanted to go out in a blaze of glory as a world statesman, and subordinates were glad that the move served as a sort of therapy for the funk he was in after his election defeat. Some other possible motives: to prove to Muslims, outraged by U.S. unwillingness to stop the

slaughter of their co-religionists in Bosnia, that the U.S. could come to their aid, and at the same time to reduce pressure on the Pentagon to get more involved in Bosnia. (Time, 10/18/93, p. 44-45)

These are just a few of the possibilities, but of course there is only one magazine cover and few headlines and other decisive framing opportunities in the text, and so editors must make a choice.

2. Secondary Frames

What secondary frames, if any, were offered within the body of the reportage?

Basically, very few. None of the three news outlets analyzed here, for instance, put forward the "going-out-with-a-blaze-of-glory" or "show-the-Muslim-world-we-do-care" themes suggested by the retrospective piece in Time quoted above.

The Times offers no secondary frames, it only reports on, elaborates on, and raises questions about the application of, the *Humanitarianism* frame. The newsmagazines came close to offering secondary frames in a couple of instances, but the ideas were too equivocal and peripheral to stand as secondary frames. For instance, Newsweek suggested at one point that:

The force's acknowledged task is to get the relief operation back on track. Pentagon sources say its unacknowledged assignment is to break the grip of the warlords and tilt the political balance of power back toward the more peaceable tribal elders. Those jobs require substantial disarmament of Somali society, which emerged from the cold war (and periods of patronage by both superpowers) armed to the teeth. (p. 34)

During the Cold War one could imagine that this thread of reportage could have expanded into an alternative, secondary frame for the intervention -- the conflict is really a

geopolitical jostling for position and an expression of containment (or of imperialism or neocolonialism), not a primarily humanitarian one. Or, it could have been developed into a *We Created a Monster* frame of the sort we saw in relation to the Panama intervention. But here, it is only suggesting that the situation has historical roots and that the mission is somewhat more complex and dangerous than Bush is letting on, not that it is different in any fundamental sense. Elsewhere, Newsweek suggests that the U.N. is a "fig leaf" and not the central element of the operation that Bush suggests, but this is hardly the core of Bush's rhetorical position in the first place and so constitutes no serious alternative for citizens to consider.

Time also offered an elaboration of the dominant humanitarian frame by noting its "doability."

...It is, as Bush said, a purely humanitarian action. But then why in Somalia and not in Bosnia?.... The short answer is because Somalia is doable.... "Saying we're doing it here because it's easier isn't a very good answer," admits a senior official. But it is the truth. (p. 29)

Likewise, in a one-page end-essay in Newsweek entitled "When Everyone's an Amateur," Joe Klein offered an elaboration of the dominant frame by placing the intervention in the context of a necessarily ad hoc post-Cold War foreign policy.

No one has figured out the ground rules of this new era; there may not be many. But here's one: the president of the United States calls the shots. No leader in history has ever been so powerful. (p. 42)

The only true secondary frame, that does more than elaborate but contends with the dominant frame as an interpretation of the policy and the policy situation, is Talbott's

"America Abroad" column in Time titled "Dealing with Anti-Countries," in which a *Stability* frame is applied.

Somalia is not just a humanitarian disaster but a threat to peace in the region... Somalia is humanity's burden. In addition to being an immense tragedy in its own right, the situation there is a paradigm of the tribal divisions that are proving to be the bane of the post-cold war era, and a challenge to our ability to cope with similar situations elsewhere. (p. 35)

With this one exception, the newsmagazines and the Times questioned and embellished Bush's rhetorical frame without offering alternatives to them in the form of secondary frames. Table 4-12, below, summarizes the media's framing on the Somalia intervention.

**Table 4-12: Media Framing, 1992 Somalia Intervention
(President's Frame: *Humanitarian Imperative*)**

Media Outlet	Substantive Media Frames		
	Dominant	Major Secondary	Minor Secondary
Time	<i>Humanitarianism</i> "In a precedent-setting humanitarian intervention" (p. 3)		
Newsweek	<i>Humanitarianism</i> "Mission of Mercy" (p. 26)	<i>Stability</i> "...the tribal divisions that are proving to be the bane of the post-cold war era" (p. 35)	
NYT	<i>Humanitarianism</i> "President Bush ordered troops into Somalia to save thousands of starving people" (p. 2)		

3. The Media's Contextual Framing

The media's contextual framing during the Somalia intervention is summarized in the following tables.

Table 4-13: Somalia, 1993 and Media Openness: Time

Cover	None
Contents	"But Bush's military mission could be the wrong way to do the right thing."
Lead story headlines	
Lead story page 1 contents	"...the decision to intervene raises important questions about what it will really take to restore hope in Somalia."

Table 4-14: Somalia, 1993 and Media Openness: Newsweek

Cover	"Should America Be the World's Policeman?"
Contents	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What precisely is the objective in Somalia? 2. When will it be time to leave...? 3. ...and how hard will it be to get out? 4. If outsiders can interfere in Somalia, where else can they, or must they, act?
Lead story headlines	What are the new rules of intervention?
Lead story page 1 contents	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. It may not be enough just to police the Somalis and feed them. 2. Should the world intervene only in nations like Somalia, where peacemaking is relatively easy? 3. Or is there also a moral obligation to use force in horror-struck counties like Bosnia, where intervention would be bloodier and success for less certain?

Table 4-15: Somalia, 1993 and Media Openness: NYT

Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (main story)	None
Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (other stories)	U.S. faces a Test; Others may Follow
Page 1 text	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The problem is that if halting starvation and upholding human rights are now legitimate criteria for American intervention abroad, as compelling as protecting traditional strategic interests, where does President-elect Clinton draw the new red line? 2. How much starvation is necessary, or how bad does the human-rights situation have to become, to justify American action? 3. If Somalia, why not Bosnia, and if Bosnia, why not Kurdistan, and if Kurdistan, why not Haiti?
Index	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ...the United States has crossed a red line in foreign policy. The question is, where will Bill Clinton redraw it? 2. General Powell says a "residual" force may need to stay longer.

Chapter Five

Data, II:

Post-Cold War Military Action, Presidential Rhetoric, and Media Framing:

Three Examples from the Clinton Presidency

1. The Iraq Intervention

The President's Speech¹

1. General Comments

Coming only a few months into his administration, President Clinton's first military address to the nation continued the U.S. "dialogue" with Saddam Hussein. The speech told the American people of a U.S. air strike against military targets in Iraq in response to a reported Iraqi assassination plot against former President Bush during a celebratory visit to Kuwait.

Clinton began to forge foreign policy credentials within the aura of policy legitimacy established by his predecessor. The enemy was already established and the use-of-force against that enemy was seen by many as Bush's crowning achievement. The path into the political communication environment of the media and public opinion was, one might say, already cleared and paved.

This reality made Clinton's policy legitimization task easier in some respects, but also had a potential downside in that the speech displays a rhetorical dependence on his

¹Clinton, Bill "Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters," The Papers of the President, 6/26/93.

Republican predecessors. Clinton frequently refers to Bush and sometimes to Reagan in his military speeches. These references were clearly meant to buttress the president's arguments about the case in hand: "Not only do *I* say it is in the national interest, but so did my predecessors." In terms of its political-psychology this rhetorical gambit was likely taken with some ambivalence. That's not to say that presidents never refer back to predecessors when speaking to the nation of military action, but they do not do it every day -- it is a rhetorical choice and strategy. Bush did not use Reagan or earlier presidents to buttress his own foreign policy in any of the speeches studied here.

While Clinton positioned himself within the leadership aura of his predecessor, he was also busy presenting himself as a credible leader in his own right: He said: "I ordered our forces..." and "I have discussed this action with the congressional leadership and with our allies and friends in the region," and "called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council..." In other words, he was calling the shots, portraying himself as clearly in charge.

While the enemy was, as noted, more or less the same as that faced by the U.S. under Bush -- the familiar "tyrant" from the Gulf War -- Clinton was more apt than Bush to speak of the Iraqi enemy in a generalized manner. He depersonalized the conflict a notch in comparison to Bush's approach, when, for instance, the speech begins with reference to "an attack by the Government of Iraq." Later Clinton describes "a regime like Saddam Hussein's, which is ruled by atrocity...." and, "These actions were directed against the Iraqi Government..." Clinton also depersonalizes his own role a bit, at least at the outset where he speaks of "the actions *we* have taken" (italics added).

Finally, Clinton began to stake out his own world view, beyond Bush's "new world order" rhetoric, by ending with the message to Americans that, "While the cold war has ended, the world is not free of danger." And he assures us he is up to the task presented to America by the still dangerous world.

And I am determined to take the steps necessary to keep our Nation secure. We will keep our forces ready to fight. We will work to head off emerging threats, and we will take action when action is required. That is precisely what we have done tonight.

2. What the U.S. did

Before describing the military action to the American people, the president assured his audience, "There is compelling evidence that there was, in fact, a plot to assassinate former President Bush and that this plot... was directed and pursued by the Iraqi intelligence service." The action, he was careful to note, was circumscribed and proportional: "Therefore, on Friday I ordered our forces to launch a cruise missile attack on the Iraqi intelligence service's principal command-and-control facility in Baghdad.... we directed our actions against the facility associated with Iraq's support of terrorism, while making every effort to minimize the loss of innocent life."

3. Why the U.S. did it

Clinton described the Iraqi plot as "an attack by the Government of Iraq against the United States," and termed the action against Iraq a punishment and a deterrent. He explained the military action in such a way as to encourage the American people to take

the threat from Iraq personally in a speech designed to elicit a unified, patriotic response.

The Iraqi attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans.... From the first days of our Revolution, America's security has depended on the clarity of this message: Don't tread on us. A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations.

Upon analysis, Clinton's rationales for the intervention fall almost solely into the *Security* category, with a few rationales falling within the related *Protecting American Lives* category, and one nod at the principle of *Stability* (see Table 5-1, below).

Table 5-1 Clinton and Iraq: Summary of Policy Rationales	
Economic	
Security	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "...an attack by the Government of Iraq against the United States and the actions we have just taken to respond." 2. "...an attack against our country and against all Americans. We could not and have not let such action against our Nation go unanswered." 3. "A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism..." 4. Our intent was to target Iraq's capacity to support violence against the United States and other nations and to deter Saddam Hussein from supporting such outlaw behavior in the future. 5. "We will combat terrorism. We will deter aggression." 6. While the cold war has ended, the world is not free of danger. And I am determined to take the steps necessary to keep our Nation secure...That is precisely what we have done today.
Stability	1. "...to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations."
Humanitarian	
Democracy	
Credibility	
American Lives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "...to deter further violence against our people." 2. "We will protect our people."
US Leadership	
Misc.	

4. The President's Policy Frame: *"Don't Tread on Us (Deterring Aggression)"*

The president's speech spoke of the military action as both a punishment for a specific act ("We could not and have not let such action against our Nation go unanswered") and, more broadly, as a deterrent against future incidents ("We will deter aggression."). The president's most colorful remark tied the air strike to deep American tradition and the very roots of the nation's sovereignty. "From the first days of our Revolution," the president said, "America's security has depended on the clarity of this message: Don't tread on us." *Don't Tread on Us* captures the policy frame -- and the tone -- of the speech overall, and the consistent emphasis on punishing and deterring aggression.

Media Framing and the Iraq Intervention²

1. Dominant Substantive Frames: *Retaliation/Deterrence*

In their dominant news frames, neither of the newsmagazines nor The New York Times offered an alternative to Clinton's *Don't Tread on Us* framing of the military action. In each case, the intervention was framed as a retaliation against Iraq and an attempt (effective or not) to deter future terrorist aggression.

Time placed the event in the larger context of "Hitting Back at Terrorists," as its cover proclaimed. (It was a busy week for anti-terrorism: The air strike shared coverage with the arrest of followers of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who were allegedly plotting

²All quotes in this section are from Time and Newsweek (7/5/93 issues) and from The New York Times (6/26/93).

terrorist bombings in New York City.) While never departing from the official view of events, Time did offer a few strategic "ifs" and "buts" in its concluding paragraph to lend a bit of an edge to its reporting:

The surgical strike on the Iraqi intelligence facility, if it proves as precise as planned, may indeed send a signal to Saddam's intelligence officers that their continued good health depends on future restraint. But while it may indirectly (and temporarily) moderate his behavior, it won't change Saddam's attitude. As administration policymakers have observed, the Iraqi dictator is incapable of responding in a militarily threatening manner to the U.S. Strike. But he has proven capable of absorbing such blows in the past - including last January's attack against a suspected nuclear components facility in the dying days of the Bush Administration. As long as he is in power, Saddam will be probing for vulnerabilities in the U.S.'s armor and exploiting them whenever opportunities arise. (Time, 7/5/93, p. 21).

Thus, while Time raised the possibility that the air strike might prove less effective than Clinton's speech suggested, it accepted the administration's *Retaliation/Deterrence* frame.

Newsweek's cover diminished the air strike's importance even more than did Time's, placing mention of it behind a picture of Tina Turner. Still, its overall approach was quite similar to Time's. On its contents page, it summarized the story by quoting Clinton: "'Don't tread on us,' warned Bill Clinton after Washington launched a missile strike against Baghdad last weekend" (p. 3). And the subtitle of its lead story called the strike a "blow against terror" (p. 16). Newsweek raised questions about the effectiveness of the strike as a deterrent, but never tried to reframe the policy as something else.

Clinton had little choice but to respond with force. But in avenging an attempt on the life of the man who led the allied liberation of Kuwait, he has done precisely what he wished to avoid: personalize the conflict. Now Bill Clinton finds himself in the same predicament as his predecessor, locked in a scorpions' embrace with

Saddam. (Newsweek, 7/5/93, p. 17)³

The New York Times' dominant frame ran in the same track. Its first article's lead sentence reads, "The United States launched a missile attack against Iraq tonight *in retaliation* for what President Clinton described as a "loathsome and cowardly attempt to assassinate former President George Bush..." (p. A1, italics added). The sentence is repeated as a synopsis of the situation in the paper's page two News Summary. The conclusion to the lead article echoes this *Retaliation/Deterrence* frame shared across all three news outlets:

The decision to act came after meetings on Wednesday and Thursday with his national security advisers. One senior official said that after the results of the investigation [into the alleged assassination attempt against Bush] were presented, "there was absolutely no question about whether to respond." All that remained to be resolved, the official said was the nature of the response. (p. A12)

2. Secondary frames

Domestic politics. While both Time and Newsweek raised the domestic political implications of both the successful military action and the successful speech that Clinton

³A subtle difference between the two newsmagazines' treatments was a shade more support by Newsweek on the crucial question of the administration's position that the evidence of a plot emanating from Iraq's government was indeed persuasive. Whereas Time was careful to use neutral language -- e.g., "Persuaded that Saddam Hussein ordered the assassination of George Bush, Bill Clinton orders a missile attack..." (7/5/96, p. 3) -- Newsweek proclaimed more boldly that the "evidence...is compelling" (7/5/93, p. 16). Such subtlety aside, the fundamental approach was to report descriptively, with little editorial comment, and operate under the assumptions of the official rhetoric that the military action was a blow for U.S. security and a deterrence to future terrorist activity.

had given, only Newsweek developed this theme enough to count it as a minor secondary frame that offered an alternative perspective on the rationale and meaning of the action. That Newsweek took this point seriously is signaled in its lead story subheadline, which read: "In a blow against terror *and a bid to reassert his leadership*, Bill Clinton orders a missile strike against Iraq" (p. 16, italics added). Later, this idea was developed into a (minor) secondary frame:

The missile strike...is unlikely to deter Saddam Hussein from mischief or menace. If anything, he was sure to use any casualties for anti-Western propaganda....But there was little doubt that the operation was potent domestic politics, coming at the end of a week in which many Americans were feeling a heightened vulnerability to terror at home... Clinton's muscular and confident performance in his Saturday-evening address is a stature injection that may well help allay lingering doubts about his ability to lead decisively in critical situations. When White House Communications Director Mark Gearan told presidential advisor David Gergen that the networks had carried the president's address live, Gergen flashed a triumphant thumbs up. (Newsweek, p. 16)

The New York Times *almost* offered a minor secondary frame suggesting an anti-Muslim bias in the United States' campaign against terrorism. A paragraph in an article on the trial in Kuwait of the men accused of the attempted assassination read:

But the attack is certain to feed a widespread sentiment among Muslim militants that the United States is picking on poor Muslim adversaries like Somalia warlords and Iraqis while refraining from taking action against Christian Orthodox Serbs killing Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (p. A12)

However, note this is a "sentiment" (not an analysis or argument) among "militants" (never the most trustworthy of sources). The idea of anti-Muslim bias is presented not as an alternative policy *frame* so much as a possible policy *effect*, and therefore should not count toward an assessment of media diversity.

The overall media framing of the air strike against Iraq is summarized in Table 5-2.

**Table 5-2: Media Framing, 1993 Iraq Intervention
(President's Frame: *Don't Tread On Us [Deterring Aggression]*)**

Substantive Media Frames			
Media Outlet	Dominant	Major Secondary	Minor Secondary
Time	<i>Retaliation/Deterrence</i> "The surgical strike...may indeed send a signal to Saddam's intelligence officers that their continued good health depends on future restraint." (p. 21)		
Newsweek	<i>Retaliation/Deterrence</i> "Don't tread on us,' warned Bill Clinton after Washington launched a missile strike against Baghdad last weekend." (p. 3)		<i>Domestic politics</i> " ...the operation was potent domestic politics" (p. 16)
NYT	<i>Retaliation/Deterrence</i> "The United States launched a missile attack against Iraq tonight in retaliation..." (p. A1)		

The Media's Contextual Cues

Tables 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5 summarize the (very few) contextual cues indicating media openness in the three news outlets after Clinton's speech about the air strike against Iraq.

Table 5-3: Iraq, 1993 and Media Openness: Time

Cover	None
Contents	None
Lead story headlines	None
Lead story page 1 contents	None

Table 5-4: Iraq, 1993 and Media Openness: Newsweek

Cover	None
Contents	None
Lead story headlines	None
Lead story page 1 contents	Yet questions remain about why Clinton chose to strike when he did.

Table 5-5: Iraq, 1993 and Media Openness: NYT

Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (main story)	None
Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (other stories)	None
Page 1 text	None
Index	None

2. The Somalia Intervention

The President's Speech⁴

1. General Comments

As with Iraq, Clinton inherited the Somalia situation from the Bush administration. (As we have seen, Bush's speech explaining his administration's commitment of American soldiers to Somalia was one of the last rhetorical acts of his presidency). Troops had remained in Somalia across the two administrations, so Clinton's speech was not, like Bush's, the *announcement* of a military intervention. It was, rather, occasioned by the sudden loss of American lives as the United States became ensnared in the local fighting on the ground.

The enemy in this speech was the "drought," "anarchy," and "chaos" that created the humanitarian catastrophe that drew the United States overseas in the first place, as well as the "armed gangs," especially those that attacked and "desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers..." As he had done with Iraq, Clinton avoided personalizing the situation, and says so explicitly: The action, he explains, is meant to "keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attack our people, not to personalize the conflict but to prevent a return to anarchy." He also points out that "Most Somalis are not hostile to us, but grateful, and they want to use this opportunity to rebuild their country."

The picture painted of the United States, meanwhile, is one of righteous power: "Only the United States," we are told, "could help stop one of the great human tragedies

⁴Clinton, Bill "Address to the Nation on Somalia," The Papers of the President, 10/7/93.

of this time." We act because it is right to do so, because, "Our consciences said 'enough.'" We are those, in other words, who must bear the burdens of leadership.

And make no mistake about it, if we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume, the relief effort would stop and starvation soon would return. That knowledge has led us to continue our mission.

If this moral rationale is not enough, our own security is implicated as well, for if we are not resolute when attacked, "All around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people." It sounds more like pre-World War I than a post-Cold War "new world order." Indeed, rather than referring to such a new "order," Clinton's speech is laced with references to chaos, anarchy, and "the new problems of a new era."

Stylistically, Clinton's speech took the dramatic tone of tragedy: Sometimes, in trying to do good, one suffers -- it's the way of the world, but with unity, resolve, and competent leadership, we can still accomplish what we set out to do, and bring our soldiers home with pride. He also attempted to appeal to America's "can do spirit," challenging the nation to stay the course. Thus, the issue isn't inept leadership, but facing up to the challenges that life throws our way and, shoulder to shoulder, triumphing. "So, now, we face a choice. Do we leave when the job gets tough or when the job is well done. Do we invite the return of mass suffering, or do we leave in a way that gives the Somalis a decent chance to survive?"

Here again, Clinton buttresses his argument by connecting his rhetoric to those whose military and leadership credentials are less suspect. In addition to noting Bush's role

in creating the American presence in Somalia, he also said, "Recently, Gen. Colin Powell said this about our choices in Somalia: 'Because things get difficult, you don't cut and run. You work the problem and try to find a correct solution.'"

Clinton came off here as a somewhat humbled, but still determined, leader. Perhaps because of the non-triumphant nature of the situation, in this instance Clinton is less the autonomous decision-maker, stressing instead that the action was taken with "bipartisan support."

2. What the U.S. did

Early on, the president explained both the larger context and the immediate circumstances for his speech:

A year ago we all watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands, dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country. This past weekend we all reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers and displayed a captured American pilot, all of them soldiers who were taking part in an international effort to end the starvation of the Somali people themselves.

The mission that had begun under Bush was described as largely successful to date, despite the tragic setback that marked the occasion of the speech.

Our troops created a secure environment so that food and medicine could get through. We saved close to 1 million lives. And throughout most of Somalia -- everywhere but in Mogadishu -- life began returning to normal...

Nearly a million Somalis still depend completely on relief supplies... at least the starvation is gone. And none of this would have happened without American leadership and America's troops.

This speech, then, did not mark a new initiative, but the reconfiguration of an existing one. The question now was how to rebound from the attack on our troops and resolve the mission successfully.

I want to bring our troops home from Somalia. Before the events of this week... we had already reduced the number of our troops from 28,000 to less than 5,000. We must complete that withdrawal soon, and I will. But we must also leave on our terms. We must do it right. And here is what I intend to do.

Clinton then tried to calm the public's fears of slipping into a foreign policy quagmire by, paradoxically, sounding very much as presidents did during Vietnam, marrying an increase in troop strength with a timetable for troop withdrawal. "This past week's events make it clear," he said, that even as we prepare to withdraw from Somalia, we need more strength there." He then described the additional personnel and equipment he was ordering to the scene, noting, "These forces will be under American command."

Toward the end of his speech he summed up the action as follows: "Our mission from this day forward is to increase our strength, do our job, bring our soldiers out and bring them home."

3. Why the U.S. did it

This section is nicely introduced by Clinton himself early in his speech. "These tragic events raise hard questions about our effort in Somalia," he said. "Why are we still there? What are we trying to accomplish? How did a humanitarian mission turn violent?... These questions deserve straight answers."

Clinton returned to the picture painted by Bush of a humanitarian crisis in which

"Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands." He then argued for a steady U.S. response in the face of the immediate tragedy:

We went because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time....Our consciences said enough. In our Nation's best tradition, we took action with bipartisan support....We saved close to one million lives.....And none of this would have happened without America's troops.

If we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume. The relief effort would stop, and starvation soon would return.

Table 5-6 summarizes the rationales Clinton gave for a continuing American military effort in Somalia, showing a strong emphasis on humanitarian concerns.

Table 5-6 Clinton and Somalia: Summary of Policy Rationales	
Humanitarian	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "How did a humanitarian mission turn violent?" 2. "... help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time." 3. "Our consciences said, enough." 4. "...at least the starvation is gone. And none of this would have happened without American leadership and America's troops." 5. "...if we were to leave Somalia tomorrow...Chaos would resume...and starvation would return." 6. "In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house." 7. "They are there.... so that starvation and anarchy do not return." 8. "They are there to...prevent a return to anarchy." 9. "...our troops will help make it possible for the Somali people...[to] survive when we leave." 10. "...Somali children again would be dying in the streets."
Credibility	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged."
Am. lives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "...we cannot leave now and still have all our troops present and accounted for." 2. "...they are there to protect our troops and our bases." 3. "And all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans."
U.S. Leadership	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "We went because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time." 2. "...none of this would have happened without American leadership and America's troops." 3. "... if we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would leave, too." 4. "Our leadership role in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-Cold War world." 5. "the responsibility of American leadership in the world.."

4. The President's Frame: *Finish the (Humanitarian) Job*

President Clinton was not, in this speech, so much explaining the nature of the mission -- he simply alluded back to Bush's *Humanitarian* frame to do that -- but rather he was making an argument for *continuing* it. The message was, We came to Somalia on a humanitarian mission, and now we must finish the job, and we must do so "on our terms."

The president's *Finish the Job* frame was a challenge to Americans. "So, now, we face a choice," he said. "Do we leave when the job gets tough or when the job is well done?" And toward the end of the speech: "Let us demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right." As we will see, the news publications that had been in such harmony with Bush's Somalia rhetoric and policy, decided now that the president's story needed serious editing.

The Media's Framing⁵

1. Dominant Frames

Time and *Newsweek*: *Inept Leadership*. In contrast to Clinton's tragic tone, the two newsmagazines described the operation as something more akin to farce. *Time*'s cover asked, "WHAT IN THE WORLD ARE WE DOING?" while *Newsweek* announced we were, "TRAPPED IN SOMALIA." Both *Time* and *Newsweek* offered a common front in their dominant news frames that contrasted with the president's speech. Where Clinton's main theme involved the need for a steady U.S. response in tragic circumstances so that our humanitarian mission could be completed, the newsmagazines dominant frames may be described as *Inept Leadership*, a view of the Somalian situation that pinned blame less on the chaotic state of Somali society or the evil actions of particular Somalis, but on U.S. policy makers, military planners, and, especially, the president.

The *Inept Leadership* dominant framing comes across clearly on the contents page teasers in each magazine: *Time* asked, "In responding to the chaos in the world, is America using its heart but not its head?" *Newsweek*, meanwhile, referred to a "botched mercy mission." It continues in the article titles: "The Trouble with Good Intentions" (*Time*); "The Cold War is Over. Can America Manage the Peace" (*Time*); "What Went Wrong: The Making of a Fiasco" (*Newsweek*); and "An inside look at how Washington blundered into a misguided 'two track' policy" (*Newsweek*).

This *Inept Leadership* frame was elaborated in the articles, in which each magazine

⁵All quotes from *Time* and *Newsweek* in this section are from the 10/18/93 issues; quotes from *The New York Times* are from 10/8/93.

identified the process by which humanitarian good intentions seemed to become something else:

American officials now point to [the resolution in which the U.N. Security Council authorized the arrest of Somalian warlord Adid in retaliation for his attack on Pakistani peacekeepers] the moment when the humanitarian mission began to turn into a mini-war against Adid. (Time, p. 46)

The United States blundered into the disaster by accident. There was no clear policy and... apparently no one in the Clinton administration who was in charge of making foreign policy. In a miserable tale of missed signals, a mission to feed the starving turned into an urban guerilla war of the kind that was once the exclusive province of colonial powers... In a grandiloquent gesture that horrified the Pentagon - where officers were beginning to worry about "mission creep" - [retired U.S. Admiral Johanthan] Howe [Boutros-Ghali's chief deputy in Somalia] put a bounty on Adid's head.... [T]he United States was roaring down a military path and neglecting diplomacy." (Newsweek, pp. 34, 35, 36)

Clinton went on, in his usual fashion, to try to have it both ways. Rather than pulling out of Somalia, he doubled America's troop presence... At the same time the president promised that all troops would leave the country by March 31. (Newsweek, p. 34)

Finally, the newsmagazines described a number of contributing factors that helped explain the inept leadership that it had been describing.

Part of the answer lies in a basic confusion... in places like modern Somalia, there is no such thing as a 'pure' humanitarian mission. You can't feed the hungry or heal the sick if you don't tame the gunmen first." (Newsweek, 10/18/93, p. 35)

The aid effort in Somalia displays an attractive American tendency: the impulse to construct idealistic policy out of generous feelings. The danger is that such international idealism may be shallow and short-lived, a sort of sentimentality of the privileged. (Time, 10/18/93, p. 37)

In Somalia, the U.S. Army brass was guilty of violating some basic war-fighting principles... It took almost 400,000 dead and wounded in Vietnam before we admitted our error there. In Somalia, let's reclaim hostages and go home... (Newsweek, 10/18/93, p. 43)

Powerful images have a tendency to stir people to bursts of indignation that flare briefly and ineffectually" (Time, 10/18/93, p. 3).

The atmosphere in some parts of the country and on Capitol Hill has been near panic.... We are really the victims in many ways of instant communications, instant polling.... (Warren Christopher, Time, 10/18/93, p. 46)

These last two quotes are interesting in that they implicate, if somewhat indirectly, the news media in the Somalia "fiasco." Time, however, does not connect the dots and refer back to its September 7, 1992 issue, whose cover story, "The Agony of Africa" was replete with the most heart-rending pictures of starving Somalian children.

The New York Times, in contrast to the newsmagazines, simply incorporated the president's frame as its dominant frame. (As we shall see, the Times did express questions and criticisms as secondary frames). The Times' lead headline announced, "Clinton Doubling U.S. Force in Somalia, Vowing Troops Will Come Home in 6 Months," and its lead paragraphs similarly described Clinton's policy moves as the president did. The president's frame was quoted early as well:

"Let us finish the work we set out to do," Mr. Clinton said. "Let us demonstrate to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us, that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right." (p. A1)

It is not unusual that the Times' tradition and style of reporting, which tends to lead with presidential pronouncements and is less obviously interpretive than the newsmagazines', has the effect of making the president's dominant frame its own, and that is the case here.

2. Secondary framing

Of the three news outlets under consideration, only The New York Times offered any secondary frames: two, complementary, secondary frames that challenged the president's frame and echoed the newsmagazines' dominant frames.

Time to Get Out. First, the Times' lead editorial, "Somalia: Time to Get Out," argued:

Americans need feel no shame in withdrawing now. The mission to Somalia was undertaken as a humanitarian gesture, to get food to starving people . The American public did not sign on to armed intervention in the clan politics of a chaotic country that poses no international threat. (p. A34)

It offered this analysis of what had gone wrong:

The heart of the problem remains the highly personalized vendetta that has developed between the U.N. Secretary General...and a single Somali warlord....

The original humanitarian mission, though it continues, has now been overshadowed by the deadly urban warfare in Mogadishu. (p. A34)

This *Time to Get Out* frame was thus the mirror image of Clinton's *Finish the Job* frame.

Inept Leadership. Another secondary frame (this one of the "minor" variety), focuses on the role that lapses in leadership played in the situation. It compares Clinton's faulty leadership to the more adept Bush.

Before sending American troops to Saudi Arabia for the war in the Persian Gulf, George Bush talked constantly about the need to get Congress and the nation on board, to define the mission and stick to it and to use overwhelming force. He did most of that, and things worked out remarkably well.

Mr. Clinton, on the other hand, inherited a mission that Mr. Bush had limited and allowed it to be widened, largely by the United Nations, to include political and military aims.

Nor did he sell his policy to Capitol Hill or to the public. (p. A14)

Thus, whereas Clinton speaks of a tragic event in the midst of a noble, still-manageable humanitarian mission that ought to be completed before we withdraw, Time, Newsweek, and, to some extent, The New York Times often paint a picture of *Inept Leadership*. (See framing summary in Table 5-7, below).

**Table 5-7: Media Substantive Framing, 1993 Somalia Intervention
(President's Frame: *Finish the [Humanitarian] Job*)**

Media Outlet	Substantive Media Frames		
	Dominant	Major Secondary	Minor Secondary
Time	<i>Inept Leadership</i> "...the moment when the humanitarian mission began to turn into a mini-war..." (p. 46)		
Newsweek	<i>Inept Leadership</i> "The United States blundered into the disaster..." (p. 34)		
NYT	<i>Finish the Job</i> "Let us finish the work we set out to do," Mr. Clinton said." (p. A1)	<i>Time to Get Out</i> "Americans need feel no shame in withdrawing now." (p. A34)	<i>Inept Leadership</i> "Mr. Clinton...allowed [the mission] to be widened..." (p. A14)

The Media's Contextual Cues

The contextual cues signaling media openness are summarized in the tables, below.

Table 5-8: Somalia, 1993 and Media Openness: Time

Cover	What in the world are we doing?
Contents	In responding to the chaos in the world, is America using its heart but not its head?
Lead story headlines	None
Lead story page 1 contents	None

Table 5-9: Somalia, 1993 and Media Openness: Newsweek

Cover	None
Contents	None
Lead story headlines	What went wrong?
Lead story page 1 contents	None

Table 5-10: Somalia, 1993 and Media Openness: NYT

Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (main story)	None
Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (other stories)	Critics Question Clinton Policy on Somalia, Asking About Risk to Vital Interests of U.S.
Page 1 text	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What signal? 2. To whom, now that local conflicts no longer threaten to turn into East-West showdowns? 3. Does it matter enough to continue risking American soldiers' lives on a murkily defined mission in a region where no one believes that nation's vital interests are at stake?
Index	None

3. The Haiti Intervention⁶

The President's Speech

1. General Comments

Haiti was yet a third post-Cold War U.S. involvement that had bridged from the Bush to the Clinton administration. Haitian refugees had become a problem for the Bush administration, and Clinton had made an issue of U.S. rejection of them during the 1992 presidential campaign. The continuing refugee problem and the refusal of Haiti's leadership (Cedras and company) to cede power to the popularly elected Aristide antagonized the situation further.

Clinton's speech was given on the eve of the intervention, not after the military fact, as had been the case with his Iraq speech, or during the course of a long-term involvement, as in Somalia. It was, in the president's words, an explanation of "why the United States is leading the international effort to restore democratic Government in Haiti."

The description of the enemy and the crisis were offered in particularly stark and dramatic terms, with Clinton going to great lengths to evoke painful images in the minds of those hearing his words.

International observers uncovered a terrifying pattern of soldiers and policemen raping the wives and daughters of suspected political dissidents -- young girls, 13, 16 years old. People slain and mutilated, with body parts left as warnings to terrify others. Children forced to watch as their mothers' faces are slashed with machetes.

In this instance Clinton was more willing than in the other two speeches we've examined

10. All quotes in this section are from "In the Words of the President: The Reasons Why we May Invade Haiti," The New York Times, 9/16/94, p. A10.

to "personalize" the conflict and name names. In the third line of the speech he said the problem was that "Haiti's dictators, led by Gen. Raoul Cedras, control the most violent regime in our hemisphere." These recalcitrant and evil men had

For three years...rejected every peaceful solution that the international community has proposed. They have broken an agreement that they made to give up power. They have brutalized their people and destroyed their economy.

Indeed, the situation was focalized on the ruling cadre to such an extent that it became, virtually, ahistorical and shorn of context: "Let me be clear: General Cedras and his accomplices alone are responsible for this suffering and terrible human tragedy. It is their actions that have isolated Haiti."

The United States, meanwhile, was portrayed as working vigilantly for good.

Clinton reassured his viewers that

Neither the international community nor the United States has sought a confrontation. For nearly three years we've worked hard on diplomatic efforts....We have tried everything -- persuasion and negotiation, mediation and condemnation.

This tireless effort for good derived from a character and commitment forged in our early history:

...they were a stubborn bunch, a people who fought for their freedoms and appealed to all those who believed in democracy to help their cause. And their cries were answered. And a new nation was born, a nation that ever since has believed that the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness should be denied to none.

As is the norm in post-Vietnam military speeches, Clinton stressed that the mission

was both internationally legitimate ("the United States has agreed to lead a multinational force to carry out the will of the United Nations") and virtually quagmire-proof ("Our mission in Haiti, as it was in Panama and Grenada, will be limited and specific").

The confrontation between the U.S. and the evil regime so close to our shores was occurring, according to President Clinton, in a "post-cold-war world" in which "democracy has spread throughout our hemisphere." Unfortunately, "Haiti has been left behind." They are, in other words, an anomaly, and require action so the tide of history can flow unobstructed toward democratic stability and prosperity for all.

Once again Clinton buttressed his case through the invocation of his predecessor: "At [the time of the Cedras coup] President Bush declared the situation posed, and I quote, 'an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States.'" But the president, perhaps feeling more confident after weathering a number of foreign policy crises, now portrayed himself more fully as the man in charge: "Earlier today I ordered..." Moreover, perhaps also attempting to show resolve rather than the policy meandering for which he had often been known, he also positioned himself as a principled leader unwilling to pander to popular sentiments.

I know many people believe that we shouldn't help the Haitian people recover their democracy.... that the Haitian people should accept the violence and repression as their fate.

But remember, the same was said of a people who more than 200 years ago took up arms against a tyrant...

2. What the U.S. did

The president told the nation that "the military reserve" along with "two aircraft carriers" had been called up "to support United States troops in any action we might undertake in Haiti." (Noting the big guns was probably to remove thoughts of the embarrassment that ensued when a U.S. Navy ship had earlier been chased from Haiti's shores by a local mob.) He didn't tell people exactly what was going to happen, but he was quite clear that *something* was going to happen, for he was speaking to inform the nation "why we must act now."

3. Why the U.S. did it

The rhetorical approach was reminiscent of Bush's statement on Panama and Noriega, the inaugural post-Cold War presidential war speech: A rogue regime was in power, inflicting terrible suffering on an innocent population, mocking the ideal of democracy and threatening vital interests of the United States. The President acknowledged that the U.S. cannot solve all the world's ills:

I know that the United States cannot, indeed we should not be the world's policeman. And I know that this is a time, with the cold war over, that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our borders.

But he argued that there comes a time when we must act:

But when brutality occurs close to our shores it affects our national interest and we have a responsibility to act. Thousands of Haitians have already fled toward the United States, risking their lives to escape the reign of terror.

This and the speech's other rationales for action are summarized in Table 5-11, below.

Table 5-11: Clinton on Haiti: Summary of Policy Rationales	
Economic	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ...preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America's ... prosperity. 2. Democracies here are more likely to.....create free markets and economic opportunity and to be come strong, reliable trading partners. 3. Restoring Haiti's democracy will help lead to more...prosperity in our region...
Security	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ...what has happened there affects our national security interests. 2. ...preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America's ... security. 3. But it's my job as President and Commander in Chief to take those actions that I believe best protect our national security interests.
Stability	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ...to secure our borders and to preserve stability....in our hemisphere 2. ...when brutality occurs close to your shores, it affects our national interest and we have a responsibility to act. Thousands of Haitians have already fled toward the United States... 3. As long as Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. 4. If we don't act, they could be the next wave of refugees at our door. We will continue to face the threat of a mass exodus of refugees and its constant threat to stability in or region and control of our borders. 5. Democracies here are more likely to keep the peace and to stabilize our region. 6. Democracies here are more likely to..... encourage them to stay in their nations... 7. Restoring Haiti's democracy will help lead to more stability.. 8. Beyond the....immigration problems...
Humanitarian	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ...stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians 2. ...with atrocities arising, the United States has agreed to lead.... 3. Beyond the human rights violations... 4. ... act...to remove stubborn and cruel dictators...
Democracy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ...to....promote democracy in our hemisphere. 2. Beyond the...importance of democracy.... 3. ...act ...to give democracy a chance...
Credibility	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ...to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us. 2. ...the United States also has a strong interest in not letting dictators, especially in our own region, break their word to the United States and the United Nations. 3. ...act to honor our commitment

Table 5-11, continued

Leadership	1. In the face of this continued defiance.... the United States has agreed to lead...
Misc.	<p>1. <i>Achievability</i>: In Haiti we have a case in whichthe mission is achievable and limited.... We must act.</p> <p>2. <i>Moral imperative</i>: In Haiti we have a case in which the right is clear.... We must act.</p> <p>3. <i>Sphere of influence/responsibility</i>: In Haiti we have a case in which the country in question is nearby.... We must act.</p>

4. The President's Frame: *Protecting Our Many Regional Interests*

While the stability theme was the most frequently mentioned, this was a more complex speech (or, depending on your point of view, a less focused one) than any of the others examined, offering the American people a rather wide range of reasons for the intervention. Stability, humanitarian concern, prosperity, democracy, credibility and more - in making his case, the president clearly set out to cover a lot of bases.

How does the president's speech pull these many threads together? By simply proclaiming them all U.S. "interests," and, in particular, interests "in our region" and "in our hemisphere." Here's how he does this: In his first paragraph he begins by saying, "I want to speak to you about why" the U.S. is intervening in Haiti. In his second paragraph he describes "Haiti's dictators" and "the most violent regime in our hemisphere." And in the third he states:

Now the United States must protect our *interests*, to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians; to secure our borders and to preserve stability and promote democracy *in our hemisphere*. (italics added)

The rest of the speech elaborates, offering, as noted, a large number of reasons (something for everyone, one might say). The only really integrative thread is the notion that these are all U.S. "interests" and the frequent reference to "our region" and "our hemisphere" and "a country that is nearby" and "close to your shores." Thus, *Protecting Our Many Regional Interests* captures the policy framing put forth in Clinton's complex speech.

The Media's Framing⁷

1. Dominant Frames

Time: Imposing Order. *Time* portrayed the mission as a risky effort to create order out of chaos. The cover announced that the U.S. was "Taking Over Haiti" and did so over a picture of a number of anxious and unhappy looking young soldiers. The idea that we were about to become deeply involved in the affairs of the island nation is elaborated upon on the contents page summary of the cover story:

Whether or not last minute diplomacy could turn a hostile invasion into a friendly takeover, U.S. troops prepared to pave the way for Aristide's return. Ahead lay the tough job of imposing and keeping order while allowing democracy to take root. (p. 3)

This theme is elaborated further on the first page of the lead story:

Sweeping aside the Haitian army was the least difficult, least important part of [the] mission. Ahead loomed the far tougher job of imposing and keeping order in a country ripe for mayhem, then laying the ground for a self-sustaining democracy to take root in a land that for centuries has known little but grinding poverty and bloody dictatorship. (p. 21)

And the article's concluding sentence warns that "...there will be many opportunities over the next year or so for things to go badly wrong." *Time's Imposing Order* frame thus had an anxious slant.

Newsweek: Inept Leadership. Whereas *Time's* frame emphasized the danger of a deep involvement in a chaotic situation, *Newsweek's* dominant frame offered a different

⁷All *Time* and *Newsweek* quotes are from the 9/26/94 issues. The *NYT* quotes are from 9/16/94.

kind of challenge to the president's version of events. As in the Somalia situation, Newsweek's dominant frame was *Inept Leadership*. This becomes clear as the cover is taken in. Pictured is an Air Force carrier at sea behind a quote from Clinton's speech, "Your Time is Up." The first subheading, "Getting the Generals Out and the Risks of Restoring Order," was in the spirit of Time's approach, but the second subheading, "The Inside Story of How Clinton Stumbled Into a Crisis," represented a distinct view of the situation. This critical, leadership-oriented perspective continues in the individual story headlines. Where Time's first story was headlined fairly neutrally, "Destination Haiti," Newsweek's opening story had a skeptical edge: "Here we Go Again."

How had the U.S. come to this involvement in the Newsweek view? Not, as the president said, because of an evil regime that had denied the beleaguered Haitian people their chance at democracy and threatened to destabilize the region. Rather, it was "three years of mixed signals, diplomatic waffling and Haitian suffering..." that had combined to bring things to a head (p. 22). It is not that Clinton's themes were wholly rejected, but they were held in the context of Clinton's bungling.

Clinton worked himself into a box on Haiti. For such a consummate politician, it was a remarkable performance. Until last week, the administration had barely appealed to the public for support. But Clinton had already put his credibility on the line. (p. 27)

Furthermore, Newsweek held, a kind of liberal-internationalist policy coup within the White House was at work, humanitarian internationalism run amok by Carteresque ideologues, giving the *Inept Leadership* frame a specific spin. Here, the president is described as dominated by "liberal activists" who, "by appealing to the president's

humanitarian instincts," exerted evidently undue influence over policy (p. 26). The piece

paints a picture of a runaway policy pushed by a small group of liberal activists ['a band of liberals;' 'an all-out offensive by the left' (p. 28)] in and out of the White House... Clinton's zigzag Haiti policy came to be dominated by a group of moralists who form a liberal web knotted together during the administration of President Jimmy Carter (p. 26).

Newsweek did not hesitate to get personal with this slant on things, and to translate it into quickie political-psychology analyses, such as, "An Africa specialist, Lake is imbued with Yankee guilt. Haiti was his kind of cause" (p. 27).

Thus, the very meaning of the policy, and along with it the implications for American interests and foreign policy, are questioned in fundamental ways. The tone of Newsweek's reportage was considerably more skeptical and judgmental than that of Time, which asked, essentially, what were the implications for U.S. foreign policy of a risky U.S. intervention. In Newsweek's narrative, the U.S. had taken on the role of "globo-cop" (p. 23), an overreaching stance provoked by liberal-internationalist do-gooders.

The New York Times: Diplomacy Has Been Exhausted. The Times' frame turned out to be a very close cousin to the *No Choice But Force* frame it had employed during the Persian Gulf War. The first subheadline of the lead article quotes Clinton, "Your Time Is Up," and the second, "He Asserts Diplomacy Has Been Exhausted." The opening paragraph of text repeats, "President Clinton said tonight that he had exhausted diplomacy and was ready to send in ground troops," as does the synopsis in the page two News Summary.

As often occurs with the Times style of reporting these sorts of stories, the

president's argument goes first and thus becomes the dominant frame presented to readers.⁸ What was left to the Times was to find the slant *within* the president's speech to emphasize as the "lead" with which they most prominently framed the story, and here they chose "diplomacy has been exhausted."

2. Secondary Frames

Humanitarian Imperative. Michael Kramer's "The Political Interest" column in Time offers a secondary frame by arguing that a humanitarian, morally based foreign policy is compelling and that the costs can be acceptable, including in Haiti. He writes, "Why remove tyrants if they won't go quickly and quietly? Because the cause is just and the costs can be reasonably predicted as acceptably low" (p. 29). Moreover,

... The case for sending troops to Haiti, whether as a hostile force or as a friendly one after the dictators leave, is stronger than the rationale Bill Clinton articulated last week, which was mostly specious... If Clinton's speech last week was wanting, the underlying idealism of his stance was eroded when he emphasized the mission's limits....; the nation building Clinton forswears because he fears too many in the U.S. would oppose the time, effort and risk involved is a defensible, even a mandatory task. (p. 29)

This is different from Time magazine's *Imposing Order* dominant frame, which did not emphasize humanitarian concern and which looked more anxiously at "nation building" than does Kramer, implying that it could very easily involve too high a price. Kramer concludes, "...the nation should debate the wisdom of humanitarian interventions. Defining America's role in the new world order - weighing the benefits and costs of a moralistic

⁸"The executive branch tends to be 'privileged' in the Times' narrative by inevitably 'making page one'" (Althaus, et al., 1996, p. 416).

foreign policy - is a discussion that already has been left for too long to academics, politicians and pundits."

Inept Leadership. Both Time and the New York Times offered secondary frames that echoed Newsweek's dominant frame of *Inept Leadership*.

In Haiti, the credibility gap the President seeks to close is largely the result of his own dithering. Indeed, more than anything else, the current crisis can be traced to the President's capitulation to an unarmed rent-a-mob protesting the arrival of a U.S. warship last October... (Time, p. 28)

[Clinton's] speech came after months of notably unsteady policy-making on Haiti, and some wondered whether the President's underlying motive was the preservation of his own credibility after threatening military action so often. (NYT, p. A1 and A2)

Gunboat Diplomacy. The New York Times offered another secondary policy frame that might be characterized as *Gunboat Diplomacy* in its lead editorial, "To the Shores of Port-au-Prince." It argues:

Mr. Clinton rightly characterized the Haitian regime as the "most violent in our hemisphere." But the Administration has long tolerated even grimmer human rights violations in Bosnia. If the difference is that Haiti is "in our backyard," so is Cuba. *Arguments of this nature mark a disturbing return to the old U.S. pattern of treating Western Hemisphere neighbors as something less than sovereign states.* (p. A30, italics added)

Inept Leadership (Cedras). Finally, the Times reportage suggested another view. Rather than Clinton's inept leadership this time, it was Cedras', a view put forth by Haitian military officers, who argued that Cedras's strategic lapses were at the root of the policy. The view here (amazingly, I feel it is safe to say, to most American ears) was that Cedras was too soft.

Many high-ranking military officers also blame General Cedras for misjudgments that have led to a situation in which an invasion appears imminent. The officers particularly resent his decision not to kill Father Aristide during the military coup on Sept. 30, 1991, allowing the deposed President to go into exile. (A. 11)

No secondary frames were evident in Newsweek's reporting. A summary of the framing of the Haiti intervention overall may be found in Table 5-12.

**Table 5-12: Media Framing, 1994 Haiti Intervention
(President's Frame: *Protecting Our Many Regional Interests*)**

Media Outlet	Substantive Media Frames		
	Dominant	Major Secondary	Minor Secondary
Time	<p><i>Taking Over Haiti</i> "Ahead lay the tough job of imposing and keeping order while democracy could take root" (p. 3)</p>	<p><i>Humanitarian Imperative</i> "The oppression of innocents offends humanity..." (p. 28)</p>	<p><i>Inept Leadership</i> "...more than anything else, the current crisis can be traced to the President's capitulation to an unarmed rent-a-mob protesting the arrival of a U.S. warship last October." (p. 28)</p>
Newsweek	<p><i>Inept Leadership</i> "The inside story of how Clinton stumbled into a crisis" (Cover)</p>		

Table 5-12, continued

<p>NYT</p>	<p><i>Diplomacy has been exhausted</i> "President Clinton said tonight that he had exhausted diplomacy and was ready to send in ground troops." (p. A1)</p>	<p><i>Gun Boat Diplomacy</i> "...a disturbing return to the old U.S. pattern of treating Western Hemisphere neighbors as something less than sovereign states. (p. A30)</p>	<p><i>Inept Leadership (Clinton)</i> "...some wondered whether the President's underlying motive was the preservation of his own credibility..." (p. A1)</p> <p><i>Inept Leadership (Cedras)</i> "Many high-ranking military officers also blame General Cedras for misjudgments that have led to a situation in which an invasion appears imminent." (A1)</p>
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3. The Media's Contextual Cues

The media's contextual cues after President Clinton's Haiti speech are summarized in the following tables:

Table 5-13: Haiti, 1994 and Media Openness: Time

Cover	None
Contents	None
Lead story headlines	None
Lead story page 1 contents	1. Ahead as well lay the uncertain prospect of American casualties. 2. It also touched on a perennial national anxiety: when and under what circumstances the U.S. should ever use military force abroad.

Table 5-14: Haiti, 1994 and Media Openness: Newsweek

Cover	None
Contents	Haiti: Another Messy Occupation?
Lead story headlines	None
Lead story page 1 contents	"Had Gen. Raoul Cedras gotten the message?" ⁹

⁹There are some other questions on the first page of the lead story, but they do not bear on framing the policy and are omitted. They come in a paragraph that ironically describes the attempt to persuade the ruling junta to leave prior to an invasion. (E.g., "Would the general's mistress travel alone, or with his wife"?)

Table 5-15: Haiti, 1994 and Media Openness: NYT

Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (main story)	None
Page 1 headline and sub-headlines (other stories)	None
Page 1 text	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "...some wonder whether President Clinton is calling for an invasion so he can preserve his credibility." 2. "...Why invade Haiti in an effort to implant democracy in soil where it has never flourished, any more than invade Cuba in an attempt to cultivate democracy there?"
Index	None

Chapter Six
Presidential and Media Framing of Military Action
in the Post-Cold War Period

This chapter summarizes, synthesizes and discusses the data in the last two. It begins with a consideration of the policy frames put forth by Clinton and Bush in the six speeches, adds the news framing data to the discussion, and ends with a consideration of whether or not the immediate policy frames of the new foreign policy era are suggesting a deep foreign policy frame. Chapter Seven will follow with an analysis and discussion of news media deliberativeness.

Bush, Clinton and the Framing of Post-Cold War Military Action

Vietnam shook the foundations of the Cold War policy frame, but it did not break it up entirely. Along with the Bay of Pigs and other prominent policy failures, it made plain that the Cold War interpretation could be overdone and could lead to group think and fiasco. Nevertheless, the world remained one in which the face-off between two superpowers was a defining reality. Even if one viewed the revolution in Vietnam as more a nationalist than a world communist affair, the superpower face-off remained, along with its almost inevitable tensions and dangers and the order it imposed on an anxious world. Thus, Hallin's observation that Vietnam led to the Cold War frame becoming *contested* but not *replaced* (Hallin, 1987).

With the passing of the dual superpower system, policymakers are faced not with

the *refinement* of Cold War foreign policy (as was the case after Vietnam), but with its *replacement*. As Maynes (1995) puts it, this means that policymakers must "re-learn intervention."

For most American decision-makers, the relevant paradigm for the use of force is the Cold War, with whose rules and regulations they are most familiar....Does that model for the use of force fit the situations American decision makers face today in places like Bosnia or Georgia or Somalia? (Maynes, 1995, pp. 109-110)

No less important than relearning intervention has been the relearning of the *legitimation* of intervention. For the Cold War frame has not only been an organizing concept in the making of foreign policy but a device with which to persuade the public, and has been since the new era began.

The procedure through which the Truman administration effected this remarkable transformation of public opinion contained two basic elements: the articulation of an interpretive framework within which international events could be explained so as to imply American policies of the kind to which the Administration was committed, and the cultivation of the broadest possible acceptance of this interpretive framework by the voting population of the country. (Freeland, 1985, p. 9)

Much of the task of legitimizing policy thus comes down to its public framing, to "an interpretive framework." As Trout has it, "Legitimation deals with political signals. Its distinguishing characteristic is the presentation of a structured reality to accompany policy" (1975, p. 258.). Melanson (1991) links such legitimation needs to presidential leadership, speaking of "the self-conscious efforts of presidents to *legitimate* -- or "sell" -- their foreign policies" (p. 23).¹ In the analysis that follows, attention will be paid to

¹Cf. George (1980) and Smoke (1994) for further comments on "legitimation" as it relates to foreign policy. On the importance of presidential rhetoric more generally to presidential

attempts by Presidents Bush and Clinton to create a "structured reality" via the policy rationales and framing choices in their speeches. This will, in turn, set the stage for the section that follows on news framing.

Policy Rationales and Frames in Post-Cold War Presidential Speech

As we saw in the previous chapters, since the end of the Cold War the United States has, in the words of the two post-Cold War presidents, taken military action for sundry reasons. Table 6-1, below, shows the frequency with which various rationales are employed by Bush and Clinton in the six speeches analyzed in Chapters Four and Five. It shows as well the policy frames that organized each speech.

leadership, cf. Kernell, 1986; Hart, 1987; and Tulis, 1987.

Table 6-1
Summary of Policy Rationales and Frames Across the Six Presidential Speeches

Type of Policy Rationale:	Bush/ Panama	Bush/ Iraq	Bush/ Somalia	Clinton/ Iraq	Clinton/ Somalia	Clinton/ Haiti	Total
Economic		1				3	4
Security		1		6		3	10
Stability		5		1		8	14
Humanitarian		4	6		10	4	24
Democracy	3					3	6
Credibility					1	3	4
American Lives	5			2	3		10
U.S. Leadership			1		5	1	7
Misc.	3	3				3	9
Policy Frames	Imminent Danger to American Lives	Forging a New World Order	Humanitarian Imperative	Don't Tread on Us (Deterring Aggression)	Finish the (Humanitarian) Job	Protecting Our Many Regional Interests	

As a note on methodology and speech analysis, this table illustrates the relationship between a speech's individual policy rationales and the policy frame that pulls them, or at least most of them, into a more or less coherent story line. With the exception of the Haiti intervention, the most frequently seen policy rationale is clearly reflected in the policy frame. (In the case of the Haiti speech, it is the multiplicity of the rationales rather than their substance that is captured in the frame.) The president's rhetorical frame is the glue that holds his various arguments more or less together.

How do the two presidents compare in the rationales and framing they employ? Table 6-1 shows that each president has one particularly straightforward speech with a main thrust and relatively little "clutter." (For Bush, it is the Somalia speech and the *Humanitarian Imperative* frame; for Clinton, it is the Iraq speech and the national security, *Don't Tread on Us* frame). As befits their reputations, Bush is the more reticent, Clinton the more loquacious, offering almost twice as many rationales for public consideration over the course of the speeches, as table 6-2, below, makes clear.

Table 6-2
Frequency of Rationales, Total by Each President

Type of Rationale	Total	Bush's use only	Clinton's use only
Humanitarianism	24	10	14
Stability	14	5	9
Security	10	1	9
American Lives	10	5	5
U.S. Leadership	7	1	6
Democracy	6	3	3
Economics	4	1	3
Credibility	4	0	4
Misc.	9	6	3
TOTAL	88	32	56

Table 6-2 also shows the predominance of the humanitarian rationale in these post-Cold War military speeches, accounting for 27% of the total. This was partly a result of the two Somalia speeches, but humanitarian rationales also played large roles in Bush's Iraq speech and Clinton's Haiti speech. Table 6-3, below, shows the usage by each president of the different categories of policy rationale.

Table 6-3
Rationales in Descending Order
of Each President's Frequency of Use

Type of Rationale	Bush	Type of Rationale	Clinton
Humanitarianism	10	Humanitarian	14
Stability	5	Stability	9
American Lives	5	Security	9
Democracy	3	U.S. Leadership	6
U.S. Leadership	1	American Lives	5
Security	1	Credibility	4
Economics	1	Democracy	3
Credibility	0	Economics	3
Misc.	6	Misc.	3
TOTAL	32	TOTAL	56

The table shows both presidents following humanitarian rationales with stability, and then going their separate ways. It is noteworthy that relatively little use is made of national security rationales, which account for only 10% of the total. Bush uses them only once, during the Iraq speech. Clinton gives us nine, and six of them came during *his* Iraq speech. Minus those last, there is truly little resort to the notion of military action as an act of national self-defense in a direct, national security sense.

Table 6-4 turns our attention from discrete policy rationales to more overarching policy frames put forth by the two presidents in their military-action speeches.

Table 6-4
Summary of Frames Across the Six Presidential Speeches

BUSH			CLINTON		
Panama	Iraq	Somalia	Iraq	Somalia	Haiti
Imminent Danger to American Lives	Forging a New World Order	Humanitarian Imperative	Don't Tread on Us (Deterring Aggression)	Finish the (Humanitarian) Job	Protecting Our Many Regional Interests

I will return to these policy frames from the Bush and Clinton presidencies at the end of the chapter in looking for indications of a possible deep foreign policy frame that may or may not be emerging as we move further into the post-Cold War era. First, how did the media frame these same military actions?

News Framing of Post-Cold War Military Action

This section examines the content and range of the frame diversity offered by Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times. Table 6-5, below, contrasts the president's rhetorical frame in each of the six presidential speeches examined with the *dominant media frames* in the three news outlets after each speech.

Table 6-5
Summary of Presidential Rhetorical Frames and Dominant Media Frames

President/ Intervention	President's Rhetorical Frame	Dominant Media Frames
Bush/ Panama	Imminent Danger to American Lives	T: Presidential Assertiveness NW: Presidential Assertiveness NYT: Imminent Danger to American Lives
Bush/ Iraq	Forging a New World Order	T: Realism NW: Modern Techno-War NYT: No Choice But Force
Bush/ Somalia	Humanitarian Imperative	T: Humanitarianism NW: Humanitarianism NYT: Humanitarianism
Clinton/ Iraq	Don't Tread on Us (Deterring Aggression)	T: Retaliation/Deterrence NW: Retaliation/Deterrence NYT: Retaliation/Deterrence
Clinton/ Somalia	Finish the (Humanitarian) Job	T: Inept Leadership NW: Inept Leadership NYT: Finish the Job
Clinton/ Haiti	Protecting Our Many Regional Interests	T: Imposing Order NW: Inept Leadership NYT: Diplomacy Has Been Exhausted

Abbreviations: T=Time; NW=Newsweek; NYT=New York Times

These are the stories that, according to this sample of presidential and media discourse, Americans heard most loudly in the immediate post-Cold War period. They do touch on a number of important foreign policy dimensions, from leadership to technology to realist vs. idealist grounds for military action. They certainly do not exhaust the possibilities, and we are not able to see whether these ideas and themes are raised *well*, but

we are able to see that at least a range of alternative perspectives has come up, and come up prominently over the course of the post-Cold War period. (The list will grow when secondary frames are added presently.) On the other hand, the list is certainly not exhaustive of the plausible possibilities, and, as we will see later, the range of diversity is often rather limited *for a given intervention*.

Is anything conspicuous by its absence? The threat of communism, while still on the minds of some foreign policy specialists and political groups with an eye toward China, North Korea, Cuba, or a resurgent Russia, is gone. In a somewhat related vein, economic analyses are absent as well, although economic arguments for foreign policy were sometimes mentioned by presidents, as when Bush noted in his Iraq speech that "...more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World... [and] to our own economy." And it is subsumed within the media's coverage of the Gulf War, which occasionally contained discussions of the potential economic *consequences* of the action, without distinctly *framing* the action in economic terms. In general, however, it is the case that little in the way of in-depth discussions of economics show up in the presidential statements on post-Cold War military actions or the news content sampled here, and economics are not being applied as a core organizing principle (frame) for conceptualizing military action. This despite the growing emphasis on economic interdependence in recent years, a particular focus of the Clinton administration. Also, it was mentioned earlier that there was relatively little use of traditional national security rationales in the six speeches under consideration, and this holds true for the dominant media frames as well, perhaps reflecting the U.S.'s new status as lone superpower.

Looking beyond the content of the presidential and news frames to their implications for press-presidency relations, we can see at a glance that neither president has been consistently able to *dominate* the news coverage in the most concrete sense that only occasionally is a dominant media frame the same as the president's dominant rhetorical theme. At the same time, the dominant media frames are rarely in direct tension with the president's speech's frame. In some instances they have the effect of offering *elaborative*, rather than *alternative*, perspectives. For instance, the *Presidential Assertiveness* frame that dominated the newsmagazines' coverage of the Panama intervention does not contradict, or even create serious tension with, Bush's explanation that the meaning of the event could be summed up as a U.S. action to protect American lives. Rather, it is *another* dimension of the story, it *elaborates* rather than creates tension vis-a-vis the president's rhetoric. The same goes for the *Techno-War* frame in relation to Bush's *New World Order* theme in explaining the Gulf War to the American people as the battle was joined.

There are also examples of dominant frames that more directly opposed the president's speech. While the *Realism* frame in Time during the Gulf War did not challenge the legitimacy of the intervention, it did challenge Bush's more idealist, "new world order" version of the stability theme. *Inept Leadership* was clearly a hard-hitting critique of Clinton and his policies, in direct tension with the president's words.²

Adding the secondary media frame dimension of the analysis -- that is, frames

²This and other points from this section will be developed further in the next chapter when the presidential/anti-presidential and liberal/conservative bias news models are discussed.

distinct from the dominant frame that occur throughout the media coverage -- somewhat expands the picture. Table 6-6 (the Bush interventions) and Table 6-7 (the Clinton interventions) adds major and minor *secondary* frames to the discussion. (To minimize clutter, these tables do not identify the news outlet associated with each frame. A later table will).

**Table 6-6:
Summary of Presidential and All Media Frames Across the Three Bush Interventions**

Intervention	President's Rhetorical Frame	Dominant Media Frame	Major Secondary Media Frame	Minor Secondary Media Frame
Panama	Imminent Danger to American Lives	Presidential Assertiveness Imminent Danger	We Created a Monster Presidential Assertiveness Gun Boat Diplomacy Drug War	We Created a Monster Superpower Status
Iraq	Forging a New World Order	Realism Modern Techno-War	Arab View Modern Techno-War Superpower Status Realism New World Order Clash: Infidels/Believers Clash: Personalities	Presidential Assertiveness
Somalia	Humanitarian Imperative	Humanitarian	Stability	None

**Table 6-7:
Summary of Presidential and All Media Frames Across the Three Clinton Interventions**

Intervention	President's Rhetorical frame	Dominant Media Frame	Major Secondary Media Frame	Minor Secondary Media Frame
Iraq	Don't Tread on Us (Deterring Aggression)	Retaliation/ Deterrence	None	Domestic Politics
Somalia	Finish the (Humanitarian) Job	Inept Leadership Finish the Job	Time to Get Out	Inept Leadership
Haiti	Protecting Our Many Regional Interests	Imposing Order Inept Leadership Diplomacy Has Been Exhausted	Humanitarian Imperative Gun Boat Diplomacy	Inept Leadership (Clinton) Inept Leadership (Cedras)

A number of new themes are evident on the level of secondary frames that do not appear at all on the level of dominant news frames:

- *Arab View*
- *Cedras' Inept Leadership*
- *Clash Between Infidels and Believers*
- *Clash of Personalities*
- *Domestic Politics*
- *Drug War*
- *Gun Boat Diplomacy*

- *Humanitarian Imperative*
- *Idealism*
- *New World Order*
- *Realism*
- *Time to Get Out*
- *Stability*
- *Superpower Status*
- *We Created a Monster*

So we do add a significant number of new conceptual prisms on the level of secondary frames with which to view international conflict. Conflict can be viewed now from the "other's" perspective, as it is in *Arab View*. It can be thought about from the standpoint of *America's Superpower Status*, etc. As was the case for the dominant frames, anti-communism and economic analyses remain off the table.

Is the amount of diversity identified significant? The data show that while the diversity of themes and frames across the entire post-Cold War period is considerable, the diversity of perspective brought to bear on any particular incident is, of course, considerably smaller. That, however, does not make the variance within each incident of no importance. Arguably, it *is* important that eight distinct ways of framing the situation were evident in the media sample during the Gulf War while only two (one of which is a minor secondary frame described in only a couple of paragraphs) surfaced during the air strike against Iraq early in Clinton's first term. Citizens can only be expected to deal with a handful of alternative views anyway -- a dozen would surely overload most people's ability

to sort out their views. So whether there are seven frames or three or only one -- and what they are about -- is quite to the point of the study.

The presidential and media frames (dominant and secondary, disaggregated by media outlet) are displayed in their entirety in Tables 6-8 and 6-9, below.

**Table 6-8:
Media Frames by News Outlet, Bush Interventions**

Speech Frame	Media Outlet	Dominant Frame	Major Secondary Frames	Minor Secondary Frames
Bush/Panama: Imminent Danger to American Lives	T	Presidential Assertiveness	We Created a Monster	We Created a Monster Superpower Status
	NW	Presidential Assertiveness		
	NYT	Imminent Danger	Presidential Assertiveness Gun Boat Diplomacy Drug War	We Created a Monster
Bush/Iraq: Forging a New World Order	T	Realism	Arab View Modern Techno-War Superpower Status	Presidential Assertiveness
	NW	Modern Techno-War	Realism	
	NYT	No Choice But Force	New World Order Clash of Infidels Clash of Personalities	
Bush/Somalia: Humanitarian Imperative	T	Humanitarianism		
	NW	Humanitarianism	Stability	
	NYT	Humanitarianism		

Abbreviations: T=Time; NW=Newsweek; NYT=New York Times

**Table 6-9:
Media Frames by News Outlet, Clinton Interventions**

Speech Frame	Media Outlet	Dominant Frame	Major Secondary Frames	Minor Secondary Frames
Clinton/Iraq Don't Tread on Us (Deterring Aggression)	T	Retaliation/ Deterrence		
	NW	Retaliation/ Deterrence		Domestic Politics
	NYT	Retaliation/ Deterrence		
Clinton/ Somalia Finish the (Humanitarian) Job	T	Inept Leadership		
	NW	Inept Leadership		
	NYT	Finish the Job	Time to Get Out	Inept Leadership
Clinton/Haiti Protecting Our Many Regional Interests	T	Imposing Order		
	NW	Inept Leadership		
	NYT	Diplomacy Exhausted		

Abbreviations: T=Time; NW=Newsweek; NYT=New York Times

Shallow vs. Deep Frames

Have certain themes come more clearly into focus as the post-Cold War period progressed, or has the public discourse reflected an uncertain, ad hoc quality as the organizing principle of global communism continues to recede? In other words, is a deep frame emerging as a replacement to the old Cold War frame that dominated foreign policy discourse in the previous era?

To gain leverage on the question, it is useful to look back on how the Cold War organized public discourse, and as an example I will turn to the last presidential cold warrior and his speech on the Grenada intervention. Readers may recall that the Grenada intervention took place toward in the latter half of Reagan's first term, in October of 1983, when battleships were dispatched in response to a communist coup that the island-nation was undergoing. Table 6-10 outlines Reagan's speech on the intervention in Grenada in the same manner that the six Bush and Clinton speeches were analyzed in the previous chapters.

Table 6-10 Reagan and the Grenada Intervention: Summary of Policy Rationales³	
Economic	
Security	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Grenada "was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror..." 2. "Today, our national security can be threatened in faraway places."
Stability	
Humanitarian	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "...so that a nearly defenseless people in a region of great strategic importance to the free world will have a chance to someday live lives free of murder and mayhem and terrorism."
Democracy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "an urgent request that we join...a military operation to restore order and democracy" 2. Grenada "was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to ... undermine democracy."
Credibility	
Protecting American lives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "I ordered a flotilla of ships...in case there should be a need to evacuate our people" 2. "Concerned that [American citizens] would be harmed or held as hostages, I ordered...." 3. "I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened. The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated."
U.S. Leadership	
Misc.	

³Analysis of Reagan's "Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada," October 27, 1983, concentrating on the second half, the Grenada portions of the speech. (The speech was actually about both the bombing of American troops stationed in Lebanon and the Grenada intervention. Only the portion pertaining to the latter is analyzed here.)

The policy frame of the speech is one we saw Bush apply in the case of the Panama intervention, *Imminent Danger to American Lives*. This is the theme most frequently evoked in the speech and tied most closely to the intervention. Later, it was given a punctuation point when one of the rescued American medical students kissed the ground upon landing in America. (I do not know if this was somehow orchestrated by the Reagan team, but they were certainly masterful at feeding media machines that seem to run, more and more, on potent visual imagery).

In some respects, this speech is not radically different from those of Clinton and Bush examined in this study. *Stability, Security, and American Lives* were all common elements of the post-Cold War speeches as well as here, as Table 6-1 shows. And as noted, there is a parallel to Bush's speech on Panama which shared the *Imminent Danger* frame.

There are also larger resonances in Reagan's speech that are lacking in the more recent ones, involving the deep frame of the Cold War that hovers behind Reagan's arguments. Grenada was portrayed as a particular instance of a larger pattern of grave concern to America's future, in "...a region of great *strategic* importance to the free world..." (emphasis added). The Bush and Clinton speeches are less clearly and explicitly tied to larger international dynamics, beyond the immediate policy situation. There were some lessons and abstractions --- we must show dictators that they cannot act with impunity, we must help those in dire need when we can, and so on. Thus, some broad purposes have been suggested in the framing of the post-Cold War interventions to help make sense of the events at hand. But a tight, dramatic narrative tied to a coherent vision

of international relations and the challenges and goals for American foreign policy suggested by that vision is lacking. With the Cold War no longer available as an organizing principle - or master, rhetorical frame - for foreign policy thinking or rhetoric, we are less likely to hear the sort of "lessons" in world politics that Reagan gave to the nation as an important part of his Grenada speech:

The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were 30 Soviet advisers and hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island...

You know, there was a time when our national security was based on a standing army here within our own borders and shore batteries of artillery along our coasts, and, of course, a navy to keep the sea lanes open for the shipping of things necessary to our well-being. The world has changed. Today our national security can be threatened in faraway places. It's up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such places and to be able to identify them.

This deeper-level Cold War frame was evident in the media coverage as well as in Reagan's words. For example, soon after Reagan's speech Time described the intervention as "rescuing hundreds of American students and bringing down a chaotic Marxist regime" (Time, 11/ 7/83, p. 3). This framing captures and forwards both the *immediate* (shallow) and the *deep* frames in the President's speech: The intervention was an action to save American lives and, at the same time, it was a blow against world communism.

Turning to the post-Cold War discourse, Bush and Clinton do remind us from time to time that we are in a new world, and the Cold War itself has become a historical reference in some of their speeches. In his Iraq speech, for example, Bush contrasted the Cold War era of international relations to the "new world order" that he claimed to see

opening before America. And Clinton referred to a "new era" of international relations in his speech on Somalia.

The news media noted as well the disjuncture between the Cold War and the dawning of the new era. This was evident, for example, in the coverage of Bush's intervention in Somalia, which, as noted in Chapter 4, The New York Times termed "a turning point in American foreign policy: for the first time American troops are entering a country uninvited, not to shore up an anti-Communist regime, protect American wealth or stifle a strategic threat, but simply to feed starving people" (NYT, 12/5/92, p. 1). So both the presidents and the press marked the new era for us. The question is, have they told us what the new world means for American foreign policy in general and for military intervention in particular?

At first glance, it might be thought from the data that *humanitarianism* could be an emerging foreign policy "paradigm." It was the most frequently invoked policy rationale in the speeches, and was employed by the news media in a number of instances. It is also the frame to strike the newest chord as an analytic lens for military intervention, as the media coverage made clear (see above and Chapter Four's discussion of the news framing after Bush's speech on Somalia).⁴ However, the humanitarian frame has shared the stage with many other frames in both the speeches and the news coverage, as Table 6-8 (above) shows. And *behind* the humanitarian and many of the other frames and

⁴Humanitarian rationales for foreign policy actions certainly are not new. In Table 6-9 we saw that Reagan employed a humanitarian rationale in his Grenada speech. And Carter had made an emphasis on human rights a hallmark of his administration. However, neither Reagan nor Carter were applying a humanitarian frame to military actions, employing military force primarily on behalf of humanitarian ideals.

discourse is an image that suggests that the immediate policy situation is but an instance in a larger dynamic of post-Cold War world affairs, an image of mounting instability and chaos.

There are hints, in other words, that something along the lines of *containing chaos* may be the heir to *containing communism*, that the prime danger has shifted from, in a sense, too much *order* (totalitarianism) to too much *disorder* (global instability and chaos). These clues come across in the images of world in which the interventions are taking place, according to the presidents and the news media.

The early post-Cold War rhetoric that Bush employed as he moved toward the conflict with Iraq spoke hopefully of the new and better world order that could come from the assertion of military power, as if any temptation for things to get out of hand could be nipped in the post-Cold War bud by a firm hand. "We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment...[an] opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation..." (9/11/90); "...[an] opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order - a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs conflict between nations" (1/16/91). By the time of Clinton's presidential confrontation with world events, the rhetoric had become somewhat less optimistic: "While the cold war has ended, the world is not free of danger" (Clinton, 6/26/93).

In many instances, the post-Cold War United States has appeared, in the presidential rhetoric, as the very source of order in a new, unpredictable world, a kind of international sheriff in a globalized Wild West where the threat of lawlessness and chaos seems to increasingly demand our response. (This despite the American public's view that

it was time to shift the balance back somewhat from foreign toward domestic concerns and priorities.) The presidents have spoken of two forms of threatening disorder: regional (Iraq, Haiti) and societal (Somalia, Panama, Haiti again). Bush, for example, argued with respect to Iraq, "If we let [Saddam] get away with this, who knows what's going to be next?"⁵ Clinton, in the aftermath of his own administration's military action against Iraq added, "A firm and commensurate response was essential to... affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations" (6/26/93). And Bush captured the "societal" version of chaos/outlaw rhetoric in referring to the Somalian clans that were stealing or disrupting humanitarian aid as "armed gangs" and "outlaw elements" (12/4/92). Clinton added that if the U.S. were to leave Somalia too abruptly, "chaos would resume" (10/7/93). And in Haiti, Clinton offered the regime one last chance to "reduce the chaos and disorder" (9/16/94), before we would come in and do it for them.

And the *enemies* in the speeches are often portrayed as sources of chaos and lawlessness in a world that, if not for them, would achieve the peace and prosperity that good people yearn for. They are, in the words of recent presidents, "dictators," "criminals," or both. The latter was the case with the first military enemy of the post-Cold War period, Manuel Noriega. He was both a "dictator" *and* an "indicted drug trafficker" (Bush, 12/20/89) -- a combination simultaneously resonant of the 1930s and the 1980s. Hussein was cast as an old enemy - he was like Hitler, "an aggressive dictator" (Bush,

⁵In other speeches during the period leading up to and following the Gulf War, Bush amplified the stability/instability theme: "No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors" (Bush, 9/11/90), "America and the world must support the rule of law" (Bush, 9/11/90), and "our vital interests depend on a stable and secure Gulf" (Bush, 3/6/91).

8/8/90). He was also described as "ruthless" (Bush, 9/11/90) and "His promises mean nothing" (Bush, 8/8/90). In Haiti, Clinton and America faced "Haiti's dictators... the most violent regime in our hemisphere" (9/6/94). In some instances, the criminal element is primary. Our Somali opponents were, again, "armed gangs" (Bush, 12/4/92; Clinton, 10/7/93), giving the conflict the cast of a domestic riot rather than a conflict between nations.

The news media have likewise tended to describe the world in which these six interventions have occurred as an out-of-control place. A New York Times editorial on the Gulf War, for instance, entitled "What the Bombs Said," interpreted the war's message as, to a great extent, about post-Cold War stability:

[The bombs are] a powerful message on behalf of honorable goals.... They are to liberate Kuwait and restore its legitimate rulers...; to insure stability in the region; to keep Saddam Hussein from seizing a chokehold on the world's energy lifeline, and to emerge from the crisis in a way that establishes a resolute, decent precedent for guaranteeing collective security in the post-cold-war world. (NYT, 1/17/91, p. A22)

And Time, as discussed earlier, termed the Gulf War "...the use of force in the name of law-and-order." (Time, 1/28,91, p. 3).

For Newsweek, the defining characteristic about Somalia during the Clinton administration, was not its humanitarian crisis but its internal chaos. (Again, imagery of chaos appears to stand *behind* the immediate policy frame.) *This* was its chief lesson for American foreign policy, for "...in places like modern Somalia, there is no such thing as a 'pure' humanitarian mission. You can't feed the hungry or heal the sick if you don't tame the gunmen first... Some in the Pentagon had always thought that order could not be

imposed in Somalia...in less than six months. And they were right" (Newsweek, 10/18/93, p. 35). The article concludes with this grim portrait of the emerging world disorder:

Somalia remains a glimpse of what the post-cold-war world may look like. The factions are not riven by ideology, religion or ethnic group -- just by loyalty to clan. It is as if bands of brigands have returned from the pages of cheap melodrama, able to face down the political and military might of the world's civilized nations. (Newsweek, 10/18/93, p. 38)

One more example is Time's portrayal of the intervention in Haiti as "...imposing and keeping order in a country *ripe for mayhem*" (Time, 9/26/94, p. 21, italics added).

A deep frame having to do with instability and chaos as danger and stability as objective fits not only with post-Cold War military affairs, but with economics as well, as indicated in recent anxieties about out-of-control "contagions" in global markets.

According to Fallows, TV news coverage of foreign affairs in general is no different:

"The cumulative message on TV today is that the rest of the world is a confusing and dangerous place filled with civil war and ethnic and nationalist hatreds," Tom Rosenstiel wrote in the *Los Angeles Times* in 1994... [Y]ear-by-year coverage has become shorter and more violence-driven as if what is going on in the world outside were one big drive-by shooting.... Ten years earlier... most [international news] stories were about economics, social developments, and political or diplomatic trends, rather than the natural disasters or bloodshed that provide a "news peg" for most foreign stories on TV now. The world events that appear on American TV mainly involve famine, warfare, shellings, communal violence, and other spasmodic episodes that evoke an all-or-nothing response from the United States -- short-term humanitarian or even military intervention, or simply forgetting about it. (Fallows, 1997, p. 199)⁶

⁶This tendency to frame the world as dangerously out-of-control resonates with domestic society and politics as well as the international scene, for there is a tendency for many Americans to feel these days that things at home are out of control, particularly regarding the moral and social order. Fallows also makes a connection between TV news' framing of foreign and domestic issues, and the impact it can have on citizens: "The standard coverage of urban affairs has been strangely parallel to foreign reporting. Both convey the message that the world being described is inexplicable and uncontrollably perilous. The

It is too soon to say that a deep foreign policy frame, comparable in potency to the previous era's Cold War frame, is emerging. But the presidential and media discourse examined here suggest something in the realm of chaos as the danger and stability as the need. "Containing chaos" may end up being as good a way as any to describe the closest thing we now have to a deep post-Cold War foreign policy frame.

logical conclusion in either case is that the individual citizen can do nothing at all about the dangers except to avoid any entanglement in them" (1997, p. 199).

Chapter Seven

News Deliberativeness and Post-Cold War Military Action

I now turn to the question of the news media's "deliberativeness" and the research questions outlined in the introductory chapters. To review, the model of news deliberativeness integrates two strands of the news framing literature: one concerns the diversity of substantive news frames, the other, the openness of contextual cues. This chapter will walk through the analysis of each as it applies to the study's media sample, then integrate them via the concept of the news' deliberativeness. The data will also be applied to an examination of the indexing, liberal/conservative bias, and presidential/anti-presidential bias models of the news, and these results will then be discussed in terms of their significance for the deliberativeness of the news.

Media Deliberativeness

Frame diversity

I will begin by assessing the frame diversity of the news sample (Time, Newsweek, and The New York Times) during each of the six interventions. The last chapter showed that a single frame can appear several times across the coverage of a single intervention. As my aim here is to assess the *breadth* of different frames, not the number of times a given frame is echoed; frames are counted only once. That is, repetitions of frames during a given incident are removed, and the first, most prominent appearance of the frame is the only one counted for purposes of the analysis. Thus, for example, during the Bush/Panama

intervention the *Presidential Assertiveness* frame appeared twice as a dominant frame and once as a minor frame, but is only counted once as a dominant frame for purposes of the analysis.

Next, each intervention is scored for the amount of diversity in the combined media coverage in Time, Newsweek, and NYT. As discussed in Chapter Three, dominant frames are given a score of four, major secondary frames a score of two and minor secondary frames a score of one. Since *every* case will have at minimum one dominant frame, four is the minimum score possible, with the upper limit depending on the number of different frames appearing in the coverage. Table 7-1, on the following page, shows the results:

Table 7-1: News Frame Diversity by Intervention

President/ Interven- tion	Dominant Media Frame(s)	Major Secondary Media Frame(s)	Minor Secondary Media Frame(s)	Frame Diversity Score
Bush/ Panama	Presidential Assertiveness Imminent Danger to American Lives	We Created a Monster Gun Boat Diplomacy Drug War	Superpower Status	15
Bush/ Iraq	Realism Modern Techno-war No Choice But Force	Arab View Superpower Status New World Order Clash of Infidels Clash of Personalities	Presidential Assertiveness	23
Bush/ Somalia	Humanitarianism	Stability		6
Clinton/ Iraq	Retaliation/ Deterrence		Domestic Politics	5
Clinton/ Somalia	Inept Leadership Finish the Job	Time to Get Out		10
Clinton/ Haiti	Inept Leadership (Clinton) Diplomacy Has Been Exhausted	Humanitarian Imperative Gun Boat Diplomacy	Inept Leadership (Cedras)	13

Table 7-2 places the six interventions in the order of their diversity scores, beginning with the coverage of the Iraq intervention during the Bush administration and concluding with the coverage of the Iraq intervention during the Clinton administration.

Table 7-2
Diversity Scores in Descending Order

Intervention	Frame Diversity Score
Bush/Iraq	23
Bush/Panama	15
Clinton/Haiti	13
Clinton/Somalia	10
Bush/Somalia	6
Clinton/Iraq	5

The table makes clear that the overall news frame diversity was greater during Bush's administration than during Clinton's. The diversity scores during Bush's three interventions total 44 and average 15, while those during Clinton's total 28 and average nine.

There was also variance *among the several news outlets*, as Table 7-3, below, makes clear.

Table 7-3: Diversity Scores by Media Outlet

Speech Frame	Media Outlet	Dominant Frame	Major Secondary Frame	Minor Secondary Frames	Diversity Score
Bush/Panama: Imminent Danger to American Lives	<u>Time</u>	Presidential Assertiveness	We Created a Monster	We Created a Monster Superpower Status	8
	<u>News-week</u>	Presidential Assertiveness			4
	<u>NYT</u>	Imminent Danger	Presidential Assertiveness Gun Boat Diplomacy Drug War	We Created a Monster	11
Bush/Iraq: Forging a New World Order	<u>Time</u>	Realism	Arab View Modern Techno-War Superpower Status	Presidential Assertiveness	11
	<u>News-week</u>	Modern Techno-War	Realism		6
	<u>NYT</u>	No Choice But Force	New World Order Clash of Infidels Clash of Personalities		10
Bush/Somalia: Humanitarian Imperative	<u>Time</u>	Humanitarianism			4
	<u>News-week</u>	Humanitarianism	Stability		6
	<u>NYT</u>	Humanitarianism			4

Table 7-3, continued

Clinton/Iraq Don't Tread on Us (Deterring Aggression)	<u>Time</u>	Retaliation/ Deterrence			4
	<u>News- week</u>	Retaliation/ Deterrence		Domestic Politics	5
	<u>NYT</u>	Retaliation/ Deterrence			4
Clinton/ Somalia: Finish the (Human- itarian) Job	<u>Time</u>	Inept Leadership			4
	<u>News- week</u>	Inept Leadership			4
	<u>NYT</u>	Finish the Job	Time to Get Out	Inept Leadership	7
Clinton/ Haiti: Protecting Our Many Regional Interests	<u>Time</u>	Imposing Order	Humanitarian Imperative	Inept Leadership	7
	<u>News- week</u>	Inept Leadership			4
	<u>NYT</u>	Diplomacy Exhausted	Gun Boat Diplomacy	Inept Leadership: Clinton Inept Leadership: Cedras	8

Table 7-3 shows that during a given intervention a particular news outlet may offer considerably more frame diversity than during another -- e.g., during the Panama intervention, The New York Times offered significantly more news frame diversity than Newsweek (a framing diversity score of 11 for the Times vs. Newsweek's score of 4). Overall, however, they tend to even out, and on average the NYT coverage is only slightly

more diverse than that of Time, which is only slightly more diverse than that of Newsweek, as table 7-4 shows.

Table 7-4
Average Diversity Score Across the Six Interventions by News Outlet

<i>News Outlet</i>	<i>Average Diversity Score</i>
<u>Time</u>	6
<u>Newsweek</u>	5
<u>NYT</u>	7

Thus far, I have examined the diversity of substantive news frames during the six interventions, with the following results:

- There is variance in news frame diversity across the six interventions, with the Bush/Iraq intervention receiving a diversity score of 23 (representing three different dominant news frames, five major secondary frames, and one minor secondary frame) and a low score of five appearing during the Clinton/Iraq intervention (only one dominant news frame, shared by the three news outlets, and one minor secondary frame).
- On average, the three Bush interventions were more diverse than the three Clinton interventions. The average diversity score during the former was 15, while it was nine during the latter.
- There was also variance among the three news outlets on this dimension of news frame diversity. The highest score for a single outlet during a single intervention

was 11 (NYT during the Bush/Panama intervention, and Time during the Bush/Iraq intervention), while the lowest score was four (Newsweek, Bush/Panama; Time, Bush/Somalia; Time, Clinton/Iraq; NYT, Clinton/Iraq; Time, Clinton/Somalia, Newsweek, Clinton/Somalia, and Newsweek, Clinton/Haiti). *On average*, however, over the six interventions, the three news outlets performed similarly.

These findings will be returned to presently. (For example, if the indexing thesis is correct, we should find a greater degree of dissensus among mainstream political elites during the Bush years, a question that will be examined later in this chapter). The discussion will turn now to the other dimension of the deliberative model, contextual openness, after which the two threads will be brought together via the deliberativeness grid developed in Chapter Two.

Contextual openness

This dimension of news deliberativeness involves contextual cues that, it is assumed, can either encourage readers to deliberate on the matter at hand or signal readers to simply receive a single, dominant interpretation. While some researchers have attempted to get at this dimension through analyzing the extent to which the news presentation overall points toward a definite conclusion (a kind of gestalt approach), this research focuses on the use of questions up front, in prominent places early in the news presentation, as indicators and signals to readers that the issue before them is open to interpretation and that a deliberative reading is in order. Those news presentations that contain the greatest number of prominently placed questions about the policy are considered the most open and encouraging of deliberation, while those with the fewest are considered the most closed.

Table 7-5, below, describes the contextual cue scores for each of the three news outlets during each intervention, as well as their totals.

Table 7-5
Contextual Openness Scores by Intervention

Intervention	Contextual Cue Score	
Bush/Panama	<u>Time</u>	3
	<u>Newsweek</u>	16
	<u>NYT</u>	3
	Total	22
Bush/Iraq	<u>Time</u>	0
	<u>Newsweek</u>	9
	<u>NYT</u>	0
	Total	9
Bush/Somalia	<u>Time</u>	4
	<u>Newsweek</u>	21
	<u>NYT</u>	11
	Total	36
Clinton/Iraq	<u>Time</u>	0
	<u>Newsweek</u>	1
	<u>NYT</u>	0
	Total	1
Clinton/Somalia	<u>Time</u>	7
	<u>Newsweek</u>	2
	<u>NYT</u>	9
	Total	18
Clinton/Haiti	<u>Time</u>	2
	<u>Newsweek</u>	4
	<u>NYT</u>	4
	Total	10

Table 7-6 lists the overall contextual cue score (the total score for each intervention), beginning with the highest and proceeding to the lowest.

Table 7-6
Contextual Openness Scores in Descending Order

Intervention	Contextual Openness Score
Bush/Somalia	36
Bush/Panama	22
Clinton/Somalia	18
Clinton/Haiti	10
Bush/Iraq	9
Clinton/Iraq	1

The average of these scores is 16, and just as we saw greater diversity during the Bush administration, we also see greater openness here as well. The average openness score for the news coverage during Bush's three interventions is 22, while during Clinton's it is 10.

If the diversity *and* the openness were on average greater during the Bush interventions, then, in the terms of this study, so was the news' deliberativeness, a point to which I will return shortly. But first, Table 7-7 breaks the openness data down by news outlet, with Newsweek on average, the most open across the six interventions.

Table 7-7
Average Openness Score Across the Six Interventions by News Outlet

<i>News Outlet</i>	<i>Average Openness Score</i>
<u>Time</u>	3
<u>Newsweek</u>	9
<u>NYT</u>	5

News deliberativeness

The final step is to see how the two kinds of framing fit together, the theory being that the most deliberative news discourse will first signal the need for deliberation and then provides multiple perspectives to weigh. Table 7-8 places the six interventions in the "deliberativeness grid" developed in Chapter Two to better display the most and least deliberative news coverage across the six interventions.

TABLE 7-8
News Media Deliberativeness Across the Six Interventions

Contextual Openness	Framing Diversity	
	<i>Lower Diversity</i>	<i>Higher Diversity</i>
<i>More Closed</i>	Clinton/Iraq	Bush/Iraq Clinton/Haiti
<i>More Open</i>	Clinton/Somalia Bush/Somalia	Bush/Panama

Thus, the Panama coverage is the most highly deliberative, signaling relatively more openness (via contextual cues) and offering relatively more diversity (via substantive news frames). The Clinton/Iraq intervention coverage represents the opposite. The rest fall in between, some (Clinton/Somalia and Bush/Somalia) showing greater deliberativeness in terms of contextual cues, and others (Bush/Iraq, Clinton/Haiti) showing greater deliberativeness in terms of substantive frame diversity.

In the discussions that follow, the predictions flowing from the five models of news performance discussed in Chapters Two and Three are examined in relation to the above data.

Five Models of News Performance and the Deliberativeness of the News

This section examines five influential theoretical models of the news: the indexing model, the liberal and conservative bias models, and the presidential and anti-presidential bias models. The predictions derived from the five news models were discussed in Chapter Three and are reproduced below, in Table 7-9.

Table 7-9: Research Hypotheses

Model:	Research Hypotheses
Indexing	H1: News deliberativeness (contextual openness and frame diversity) will <i>increase</i> when elite political dissensus increases. H2: News deliberativeness will <i>decrease</i> when elite political dissensus decreases.
Liberal Bias	H3: Clinton will dominate the media's framing of events more than Bush, particularly on the level of the media's dominant framing. H4: Frames hostile to Clinton or his position will appear only on the level of secondary news frames to provide a measure of "balance."
Conservative Bias	H5: Bush will dominate the media's framing of events more than Clinton, particularly on the level of the media's dominant framing. H6: Frames hostile to Bush or his position will appear only on the level of secondary news frames to provide a measure of "balance."
Presidential Bias	H7: The president's frame will dominate the media's coverage, particularly on the level of the media's dominant framing. H8: Alternative frames will only be offered on the level of secondary news frames to provide a measure of "balance."
Anti-Presidential Bias	H9: Frames hostile to the president or his policy will dominate the news coverage. H10: The president's position will only be offered on the level of secondary news frames to provide a measure of "balance."

Indexing

The indexing thesis speaks directly to news diversity, although it has not, to my knowledge, been tested in relation to *news frames*, as will be the case here, nor in relation to a concept of contextual cue openness. As explained in Chapter Three, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review is used as a guide to elite political consensus/dissensus for purposes of testing the indexing model of media performance. Table 7-10, below, offers an analysis of the major story on congressional response to the military action – and the president's speech – in question.

Table 7-10: Congressional Dissensus Scores by Intervention¹

President/ Intervention	Congressional Consensus/Dissensus		
	Consensus Statements	Dissensus Statements	Dissensus Score
Bush/Panama	3	1	25
Bush/Iraq	4	3	43
Bush/Somalia	1	0	0
Clinton/Iraq	3	0	0
Clinton/Somalia	12	2	14
Clinton/Haiti	3	0	0

¹As explained in Chapter Three and Appendix A, the score is created by analyzing the first page of the main article on the military action in the CQ Weekly Report coverage, then dividing the number of “dissensus” statements by the total number of consensus and dissensus statements. The higher the score, the higher the amount of congressional dissensus. The scale runs from a low of 0 to a high of 1. For convenience, scores are multiplied by 100 to remove decimal points.

At a glance, it is obvious that none of the incidents produced a tremendous amount of congressional dissensus: The scores are all below 50, indicating there were never more dissensus than consensus statements in the CQ data. This, however, needs to be viewed in light of the rally effect that tends to elicit support for the president among both the general public and Congress when American troops have been, or are about to be, engaged. Given that, one ought to expect fairly depressed dissensus ratios overall, and that is what we have. However, all that is needed to test the indexing thesis are cases for which there is clearly more cleavage within elite political opinion than in others, and the data give us that, with three scores of zero, and three between 14 and 43.

Earlier in this thesis I established that on average the level of deliberativeness was greater during the Bush interventions than during Clinton's. (Both the diversity and the openness of the three news outlets were greater, on average, during the Bush interventions). How do the "dissensus data" compare? Table 7-11, below, lays out the relevant data for inspection.

**Table 7-11:
Average Indexing, Diversity and Openness Scores
During the Three Bush and Three Clinton Administration Interventions**

Administration	Average Dissensus Score	Average Diversity Score	Average Openness Score
Bush	23	15	22
Clinton	5	9	10

These data support the indexing thesis: There is more discord in elite political opinion during the Bush administration, and there is more frame diversity and contextual openness as well.

Table 7-12 breaks the data down further, providing the dissensus and frame diversity data for each intervention.

Table 7-12
Highest-to-Lowest Interventions
Based on Dissensus and Diversity Scores

Congressional Dissensus Highest to Lowest (Score in Parentheses)	Frame Diversity Highest to Lowest (Score in Parentheses)
Bush/Iraq (43)	Bush/Iraq (23)
Bush/Panama (25)	Bush/Panama (15)
<i>Clinton/Somalia (14)</i>	CLINTON/HAITI (13)
CLINTON/HAITI (0)	<i>Clinton/Somalia (10)</i>
<u>Bush/Somalia (0)</u>	<u>Bush/Somalia (6)</u>
<u>Clinton/Iraq (0)</u>	<u>Clinton/Iraq (5)</u>

The data continue to show considerable support for the indexing thesis. When congressional dissensus is high, the frame diversity is always high as well. (The Clinton/Somalia data are not as perfect an ordinal fit as the Bush/Iraq or Bush/Panama

data, but it is in the right neighborhood: A mid-level dissensus score matches up with a mid-level frame diversity score). And the lowest cases of congressional dissensus (the three zero-score cases) correspond to the cases of lowest frame diversity in two out of three cases. The one exception is associated with the Clinton/Haiti intervention, to which I will return after adding the contextual openness data to the mix.

Indexing suggests that media diversity will increase when congressional dissensus increases. While this has not, to my knowledge, been tested against the unit of analysis of media frames, it made perfect sense that it would hold true and it turned out to be the case. (It was the case in five out of the six cases, and the one exception may be less exceptional than it looks on the surface, as will be discussed presently). It also makes some intuitive sense that media openness ought also to be indexed to elite political dissensus as well. For journalists writing about something where official sources are highly divided would logically be more likely to frame (in the contextual cue sense of the term) the situation as undecided and open to question. This, however, has never been tested and the research question is: Is it the case? Table 7-13 displays the data that speak to this question.

Table 7-13
Highest-to-Lowest Interventions Based on Dissensus and Openness Scores

Congressional Dissensus Highest to Lowest (Score in Parentheses)	Contextual Openness Highest to Lowest (Score in Parentheses)
Bush/Iraq (43)	<u>Bush/Somalia (36)</u>
Bush/Panama (25)	Bush/Panama (22)
<i>Clinton/Somalia (14)</i>	<i>Clinton/Somalia (18)</i>
CLINTON/HAITI (0)	CLINTON/HAITI (10)
<u>Bush/Somalia (0)</u>	Bush/Iraq (9)
<u>Clinton/Iraq (0)</u>	<u>Clinton/Iraq (1)</u>

In general the data do suggest a correlation between the congressional dissensus and the news' contextual openness. In four out of the six cases, where the former is higher, so is the latter. One exception is Bush/Iraq, a case of very high relative dissensus and very low relative openness. The other is Bush/Somalia, which displays exactly the reverse situation.

To summarize so far, the data offer solid support for the indexing thesis as a factor in the deliberativeness of the news as far as the frame diversity dimension is concerned. It seems to support as well an indexing connection with the news' contextual openness. Examining the cases that do not conform to the indexing thesis (highlighted in Table 7-15, below) may offer some further insights.

Table 7-14
Highest-to-Lowest Interventions Based on Congressional Dissensus, Frame Diversity
and Contextual Openness Scores – “Non-indexing” Cases in Bolded Cells

Congressional Dissensus Highest to Lowest (Score in Parentheses)	Diversity Highest to Lowest (Score in Parentheses)	Openness Highest to Lowest (Score in Parentheses)
Bush/Iraq (43)	Bush/Iraq (23)	<u>Bush/Somalia (36)</u>
Bush/Panama (25)	Bush/Panama (15)	Bush/Panama (22)
<i>Clinton/Somalia (14)</i>	CLINTON/HAITI (13)	<i>Clinton/Somalia (18)</i>
CLINTON/HAITI (0)	<i>Clinton/Somalia (10)</i>	CLINTON/HAITI (10)
<u>Bush/Somalia (0)</u>	<u>Bush/Somalia (6)</u>	Bush/Iraq (9)
<u>Clinton/Iraq (0)</u>	<u>Clinton/Iraq (5)</u>	<u>Clinton/Iraq (1)</u>

I will first examine the case of the higher-than-expected frame diversity during the Clinton/Haiti intervention. Is this finding a fluke, the result of an idiosyncratic editor at a single news outlet doing something unusual? Table 7-15, below, suggests that this is not the case.

Table 7-15
News Diversity by News Outlet, Comparing the Clinton/Haiti Case
With the Average Overall Diversity Across the Six Cases

Intervention (Dissensus Score in Parentheses)	News Outlet	Frame Diversity Score (Clinton/Haiti)	Average Frame Diversity Score (Overall)
Clinton/Haiti (0)	<u>TIME</u>	7	6
	<u>NEWSWEEK</u>	4	5
	<u>NYT</u>	8	7

The table shows that all three news outlets were near or above average in their frame diversity. Had two been very low and one very high (thus bringing up the average) the fluke-editor theory would be a more likely candidate as an explanation for why the coverage here does not conform well to the indexing model. As it is, the three news outlets showed greater diversity than indexing would predict based on the state of congressional opinion at the time, so the question remains: Why is there a significant amount of frame diversity in the Clinton/Haiti coverage when there is a zero dissensus score?

Of course many answers are possible -- no one ever said that indexing overrides every other influence on news diversity, and many forces might inhibit or amplify its effects. The factor that might be at work here suggests a refinement in the indexing thesis that future research should explore. It turns out that the Clinton/Haiti case was one of the more difficult to code with respect to the CQ data. To make clear why this was so, examples of the data from Appendix A are reproduced below, in Table 7-16, for the three

interventions with the lowest dissensus scores.

Table 7-16
Examples of CQ Consensus Statements During the Three Interventions
With the Lowest Dissensus Scores²

Intervention	Example of <u>CQ</u> Consensus Statements
Bush/Somalia	Most congressional leaders also backed the deployment.
Clinton/Iraq	[Clinton's argument that "the Iraq attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans.... We could not, and have not, let such action against our nation go unanswered"] was eagerly endorsed by most lawmakers.
Clinton/Haiti	.. a majority of members in both parties clearly opposed an invasion.

The struggle I had coding the Haiti statements is that as surely as they indicate *congressional consensus*, they indicate as well substantial *elite political dissensus*, for in that case the CQ statements all concern congressional-executive tensions. Therefore, during that intervention there was *both* congressional consensus *and* elite political dissensus. Put differently, there was a congressional consensus that the administration was wrong. Now, as most studies of indexing in the past have concentrated on congressional opinion as the indicator of elite political dissensus, this finding suggests that it might be worth distinguishing three cases:

²See Appendix A for more detail on these data.

- (1) those in which there is congressional consensus that is consonant with the administration's position;
- (2) those in which there is congressional consensus that is dissonant with the administration's position; and
- (3) those in which there is congressional dissensus, some consonant and some dissonant with the administration's position.³

To the extent that this is a valid expansion and refinement of the independent variable in the indexing model, then all six cases support the indexing model, suggesting that indexing is a powerful factor influencing the diversity of the news.

There was one other case in which the data showed a pattern of congressional-executive discord, the Clinton/Somalia intervention. This instance, however, *also* showed a greater measure of congressional dissensus than was evident in the case of the Haiti intervention, and it fell into place in the array of cases where it “should” have from the standpoint of indexing. So a further hypothesis might be that *if* congressional dissensus is lacking, congressional-executive discord can have an impact on indexing, while *if* congressional dissensus is present, the usual mode of indexing prevails. Again, further research can explore these ideas.

I now turn to the two exceptional cases with respect to contextual openness -- Bush/Somalia, which had a high openness score despite having a low dissensus score, and Bush/Iraq, the reverse scenario. As this dimension of news deliberativeness is in an early,

³ There are other possibilities as well. For example, cleavages *within* the administration were probably as important to the opening of the news coverage of the Vietnam War as was congressional dissensus.

more formative stage (this being the first research on it that I know of), any speculations are *particularly* speculative. More research is warranted to confirm, and likely to refine, this dimension of the news and its relation to indexing. That said, it is nevertheless worth reflecting on these two cases as a spur to further theory and testing.

First, to rule out a distorted view of the data because of the idiosyncratic performance of a single news outlet, Table 7-17 compares the openness of each of the three news outlets during the two odd-case interventions to their average openness overall.

Table 7-17
Contextual Openness by News Outlet, Comparing the Bush/Iraq and Bush/Somalia Cases with the Overall Diversity Average Over the Six Cases

Intervention (Dissensus Score in Parentheses)	News Outlet	Contextual Openness Score (by each intervention)	Average Frame Openness Score (overall)
Bush/Iraq (43)	<u>TIME</u>	0	3
	<u>NEWSWEEK</u>	9	9
	<u>NYT</u>	0	5
Bush/Somalia (0)	<u>TIME</u>	4	3
	<u>NEWSWEEK</u>	21	9
	<u>NYT</u>	11	5

The table shows that *all three* news outlets score at or well below their average for contextual openness during the high dissensus Bush/Iraq intervention, where indexing

would lead us to expect higher than average scores instead. And *all three* news outlets score above average during the low-congressional dissensus Bush/Somalia intervention, where we would have expected lower than average scores. This suggests that it was not the idiosyncratic actions of a particular editor at a particular outlet that accounts for the results in these two cases, but rather something systemic.

Two thoughts suggest themselves. Both the Bush/Somalia and Bush/Iraq cases are unique among the data set in ways that logically could mitigate the impact that elite political dissensus is here presumed to have on contextual openness in the news. First, readers will recall that much was made in the news coverage during the Bush/Somalia intervention about the *precedent-setting nature* of a primarily humanitarian intervention. It may well be that any military action that is viewed as fundamentally *new and different* in nature will be presented with greater contextual openness, whether political elites are in agreement or not. In other words, a *new or unusual* political phenomenon by its very nature will have many unknowns and questions associated with it, and it is thus likely to be presented in a more open, questioning manner than usual.

As for the low openness during the Bush/Iraq intervention, it seems possible that the *scope and drama* of the event overwhelmed the media's "ability" to present the material in a contextually sensitive manner. The news outlets seemed so anxious to acknowledge the gravity of events that all they could do was shout, "WAR!" (The specific versions can be found in Chapter Four, but this sums up the headlines of the three news outlets.) There was no room for raising questions in the face of that fundamental event, even though the very diversity within the three publications suggested that there was more

than one way to look at what was happening and that citizens would do well to deliberate, rather than simply receive, the press' most prominently displayed interpretation.

These possibilities suggest that contextual openness, at least as conceptualized and measured in this study, may be more sensitive to non-indexing variables (such as the intrinsic nature of the news story: Is it very new and different? Is it overwhelmingly dramatic?) than is the case with diversity.

Thus, the indexing thesis stands up well in relation to the data. It seems strongly correlated with news frame diversity, a finding consistent with past research on indexing -- even if it has never (or rarely) been tested in relation to substantive news frames. The one case of the five that does not seem on its face to fit with the indexing thesis suggests that the independent variable (elite political dissensus) may need to be operationalized differently than it typically is. Rather than relying on *congressional* dissensus as the measure of elite political dissensus, the larger congressional-executive matrix of elite political opinion may provide a more sensitive measure, at least under certain conditions. This is a question that future research should examine.

The indexing thesis seems to apply as well to the contextual openness dimension of news deliberativeness, a new finding in the field. However, the data suggest that intervening variables may have a stronger mitigating effect here than in the case of frame diversity -- another question for future research.

In conclusion, the deliberativeness of the news appears to be affected by the state of elite political opinion. The above data and analysis support the idea that the news tends to be more deliberative under conditions of elite political dissensus and less deliberative

under conditions of elite political consensus. This, of course, has normative implications for the news and democratic process, which will be discussed in the final chapter. First, this chapter will conclude with a consideration of the four bias models of the news and the effects and implication they have on the deliberative qualities of the news.

Liberal/conservative and presidential/anti-presidential bias models

The research hypotheses concerning conservative and liberal political bias involve the president's ability to dominate the news discourse. The working assumption is that if the liberal bias thesis is accurate a relatively liberal president of the Democratic Party ought to better dominate a liberal news media than a Republican, relatively conservative one. The opposite ought to be the case if the conservative bias thesis is more accurate. I also posit that opposing tendencies would show up only on the level of secondary frames. That is, the journalistic principle of balance would show up in the framing analysis such that, for the conservative bias model, *dominant frames* would support the conservative president while offering a measure of liberal balance on the level of secondary frames. And the reverse ought to be the case if the liberal bias model holds true. (This is an illustration of the potential usefulness, for theoretical and research purposes, of making the dominant/secondary distinction).

How do these predictions line up with the evidence? Table 7-18, which reproduce the presidential and media framing data (first presented in Tables 6-6 and 6-7 in the previous chapter), will allow for an examination of the evidence.

Table 7-18
Overview of Presidential and Media Frames Across the Six Interventions

Inter-vention	President's Rhetorical Frame	Dominant Media Frame	Major Secondary Media Frame	Minor Secondary Media Frame
Bush/ Panama	Imminent Danger to American Lives	Presidential Assertiveness Imminent Danger	We Created a Monster Presidential Assertiveness Gun Boat Diplomacy Drug War	We Created a Monster Superpower Status
Bush/ Iraq	Forging a New World Order	Realism Modern Techno-War	Arab View Modern Techno-War Superpower Status Realism New World Order Clash of Infidels/Believers Clash of Personalities	Presidential Assertiveness
Bush/ Somalia	Humanitarian Imperative	Humanitarian	Stability	None
Clinton/ Iraq	Don't Tread on Us (Deterring Aggression)	Retaliation/ Deterrence	None	Domestic Politics
Clinton/ Somalia	Finish the (Humanitarian) Job	Inept Leadership Finish the Job	Time to Get Out	Inept Leadership
Clinton/ Haiti	Protecting Our Many Regional Interests	Imposing Order Inept Leadership Diplomacy Has Been Exhausted	Humanitarian Imperative Gun Boat Diplomacy	Inept Leadership (Clinton) Inept Leadership (Cedras)

The first step in examining the ideological bias models -- in the case of this research design -- is to compare the presidential and dominant news frames, where we find that only Clinton is blatantly challenged by the Time/Newsweek/NYT coverage. Not at first: During the first intervention, the air strike against Iraq, the media echoed Clinton's position that U.S. security was at issue and what the situation was most crucially about, with only a hint of tension in the *Domestic Politics* minor secondary frame.⁴ But after that, Clinton cannot be said to have dominated the coverage, with the *Inept Leadership* frame dogging him during both the Somalia and Haiti interventions.⁵

In contrast, Bush is rarely challenged, and never is there serious tension on the level of the dominant frame. The closest the newsmagazines come to challenging Bush in their dominant news frames was in Time's emphasis (not its central thrust) in its *Realism* frame, during the Gulf War. As pointed out earlier, whereas Bush framed the intervention in idealist terms with his "new world order" rhetoric, Time's version had a more realist slant to it, holding that, "It was the same old world last week, and a not very orderly one at that." But overall, Bush was essentially supported, while his rhetoric received a bracing

⁴Recall that the suggestion there was, "The missile strike...is unlikely to deter Saddam Hussein from mischief or menace. If anything, he was sure to use any casualties for anti-Western propaganda....But there was little doubt that the operation was potent domestic politics, coming at the end of a week in which many Americans were feeling a heightened vulnerability to terror at home... "

⁵And, as the data analysis in Chapter Five showed, in the case of Newsweek the *Inept Leadership* frame was embellished with the notion of a kind of policy coup by staff liberals. Thus, far from showing bias *toward* liberalism, Newsweek took a version of foreign policy liberalism to task as a cause of policy foolishness and an object of ridicule. Obviously, then, Clinton -- and liberalism itself -- is far from dominating the press, and is treated, across these examples, harshly.

splash of "reality." The other dominant frames are supportive of Bush even when they depart from his major themes -- as was pointed out earlier with regard to *Presidential Assertiveness* during the Panama intervention. Or they match Bush almost perfectly, as with *Humanitarianism* during the Bush administration's actions in Somalia.

The data set thus lends support to the conservative bias model of the news. What about the secondary prediction, that there would be "counter-framing" on the secondary frame level of analysis, to provide a measure of balance? There is a little of this, but not much, leaving an even stronger version of the conservative bias model. Bush comes close to taking a knock in the *We Created a Monster* secondary frame after the Panama speech, which in a sense referred to ancient history and, politically, pales next to Clinton's taking it on the chin in several instances on the magazine's covers and within their and the Times' pages. This *could* have been more damaging if more had been made of Bush's *own* past history with Noriega. But as it was presented, Bush was simply cleaning up an old dirty business of American foreign affairs, not necessarily of (at least partly) his own making. And there is some balancing of the Bush view in the *Gun Boat Diplomacy* and *Clash of Personalities* secondary frames, but, again, they are not very hard-hitting.

Overall, then, there was no significant balancing during the Bush presidency that compares to the *Inept Leadership* during Clinton's tenure. And the *Inept Leadership* frame shows up repeatedly during the Clinton interventions on the secondary, as well as the dominant, news frames. This experiment, then, supports the conservative bias model over the liberal counterpart.

The data make short work of the presidential/anti-presidential bias models. If one

of the presidents received significantly more support than the other, than neither the pro- nor anti-presidential bias models holds up in light of this data set. Of course, there is another explanation for these results: Bush's foreign policy leadership was objectively better, Clinton's objectively more "inept." The review of more cases -- and more presidents -- would help to sort this out. But based on the cases examined here, the conservative bias model receives some support while the liberal, presidential and anti-presidential bias models do not.

Sum

The deliberativeness of news coverage of post-Cold War military action thus appears constrained by a tendency to diminish under conditions of elite political consensus, and by a tendency to favor conservative leadership on foreign affairs. In the final chapter I will discuss the material more speculatively, including a consideration of the research's political and normative implications, and outline a number of theoretical and empirical questions suggested by the project.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion:

The Deliberative Needs of Citizens, the Paradox of Democratic Leadership, and the Potential Role of the Press

The employment of language to sanctify action is exactly what makes politics different from other methods of allocating values.

Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964, p. 114)

The definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power.

E. E. Shattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (1960, p. 68)

A president concerned for leeway inside government must try to shape the thoughts of men outside.

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (1986, p. 73)

The birth of political reporting is part of the creation of those values that made politics, as America knows it, legitimate: the notions that competing points of view benefit a community and that the press exists to offer varied perspectives.

Thomas C. Leonard, The Power of the Press (1986, p. 5)

On the occasion of a U.S. military action against Mexican rebels in 1916, President Wilson gave an address to Congress in many ways characteristic of presidents putting a public face on the use of American force abroad: "...[T]he expedition into Mexico was ordered under an agreement with the de facto government of Mexico for the single purpose of taking the bandit Villa, whose forces had actually invaded the territory of the United States, and is in no sense intended as an invasion of the Republic or as an infringement of its sovereignty" (Wilson, 1916, p. 101). In other words, this exercise of military power is legitimate and appropriate to the task at hand. With the next sentences,

however, we see something of how the rhetorical context of the presidency, has changed:

I have therefore asked the several news services to be good enough to assist the Administration in keeping this view of the expedition constantly before both the people of this country and the distressed and sensitive people of Mexico.... In order to avoid the creation of erroneous and dangerous impressions in this way, I have called upon the several news agencies to use the utmost care not to give news stories regarding this expedition the color of war. (Wilson, 1916, p. 101)

What a simpler time it was for presidents, who could feel comfortable and justified in requesting of news agencies what they now spend untold tax dollars to effect: their own slant on the story.

Wilson was, of course, applying a fundamental tenet of presidential leadership in taking the rhetorical initiative and attempting to set the terms of debate. The action was an "expedition," not an act of war. While this may be a perfectly defensible characterization, the point here is that it is an *interpretation*, one among many possibilities, a particular "view," as Wilson has it, with a particular "color," and not a fact. Calling the action an expedition is no more indisputable than is characterizing Korea as a "police action." Certainly, had the Mexican government sent a comparable force into the United States on a comparable mission it is unimaginable that the president, or most any other American, would have termed it an "expedition."

Wilson continued his speech with a tribute to the crucial role of the press in forming public attitudes toward official policy, beginning with a touching concern for those "sensitive" souls south of the border, who, Wilson tells us,

...are very susceptible indeed to impressions received from the American press not only, but also very ready to believe that those impressions proceed from the views and objects of our government itself. Such conclusions, it must be said, are not unnatural, because the main, if not the only source of information for the people on

both sides of the border is the public press of the United States. (Wilson, 1916, p. 101 italics added)

Wilson, while focusing primarily on the press as a direct instrument of foreign policy, with a very real potential to affect attitudes, politics and policies across the border, is paying attention as well to *domestic* opinion. He asks the press to keep the view he is putting forth "constantly...before the people of this country [the U.S.]." The president is seeking, and making no bones about it, to dominate public thought on the policy, and using the news media as his instrument. Should this interpretation sound overly strong, let me let Wilson continue explaining to Congress that he had asked "the several news agencies..."

...to withhold stories of troop movements and military preparations which might be given that interpretation [i.e., war]... I feel it is most desirable to impress upon both our own people and the people of Mexico the fact that the expedition is simply a necessary punitive measure. (Wilson, 1916, p. 102)

The plot thickens as Wilson alludes to the kinds of thinking that he is afraid an overly independent (or, in the context of the speech, irresponsible) press might elicit, particularly if they were to publish the dangerous views of "persons all along the border who are actively engaged in originating and giving as wide currency as they can to rumors of the most sensational and disturbing sort..."

The object of this trade in falsehood is obvious. It is to create intolerable friction between the Government of the United States and the *de facto* Government of Mexico, for the purpose of bringing about intervention in the interests of certain American owners of Mexican properties. (Wilson, 1916, p. 102)

So, one begins to see the contours of other stories that the press might tell, other interpretations that might be offered the American people, in contrast to the official line

promoted by Wilson. The president ends his remarks by turning the screws another notch or two: "Those who disseminate the news should make it a matter of patriotism and of conscience to test the source and authenticity of every report they receive from that quarter" (1916, p. 102).

Today, of course, a president could not possibly make such a direct appeal to the media, especially in a semi-public forum as did Wilson. (The president was speaking before congress, but the address was, of course, not broadcast to the nation). Grossman and Kumar (1981) aptly describe the modern relationship of the press and the presidency as one that fluctuates between a norm of cooperation and regular outbreaks of tension and hostility. While the journalists may not always be as independent as they act, the very pose of "independence" is such a point of pride and identity that Wilson's words would today likely create a backlash that the president would soon regret.

This study argues -- like Wilson -- that *how* political problems and policies are portrayed and understood is of manifest political importance. It is, of course, important to political leaders who must create and implement policy in a complex, rapidly changing, politically precarious environment. And it is important as well -- and this is to the heart of this study -- to the democratic process as citizens respond and public opinion evolves in relation to the words and images used to portray policies.

Those words and images are always chosen, never inevitable. They are chosen by various actors for various reasons: to persuade, inform, stimulate, please, pacify, generate profits, indirectly signal second or third audiences, and on and on. Out of this myriad of purposes -- some undoubtedly unknown even to the author -- emerge the stories that

describe and explain the policy situation and legitimize or delegitimize particular policy options. In the more technical language of the study, these stories provide the American people with one or several policy frames with which to try to make sense of it all.

Battles in the press over how policy and politics ought to be framed are as old as the Republic. Writing of the news coverage in 1767 of the Townshend Revenue Acts, "which taxed tea, lead, paper, and paint imported into the colonies," Leonard (1986) observes, "It was the way information was presented" -- via John Dickinson's "Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania" columns -- "not the news itself, that moved the public" (p. 36). Leonard points out that "News of the British measures did not stir the colonies in 1767" until the widely published Farmer letters placed them in a politically potent news frame, that of "taxation without consent" and an early step down a slippery slope to servitude:

Throughout the colonies... the Farmer unmasked the deception: "UNLESS THE MOST WATCHFUL ATTENTION BE EXERTED, A NEW SERVITUDE MAY BE SLIPPED UPON US, UNDER THE SANCTION OF USUAL AND RESPECTABLE TERMS." ...The Townshend Acts were not the "external" duties regulating trade that Americans expected from Parliament but rather the same sort of taxation without consent that the colonies had fought in the Stamp Act during the mid-1760s. "External" was the camouflage of an administration bent on imposing a tyrannical British establishment on the New World. (Leonard, 1986, p. 37)

The tension between political authority and the news media over how policy ought to be framed is thus part of the story of America's beginnings and at the heart of our democratic experiment. One of the underlying questions that lurk beneath the surface of this tension concerns the extent to which citizens are capable of true deliberation.

Is Citizen Deliberation an Oxymoron?

Much political thought divides around the question of whether citizens are capable, under favorable conditions, of true deliberation. The question can also be posed on the collective rather than the individual level: Can public opinion and political culture, under favorable circumstances, mature?

That citizens can deliberate and that public opinion can mature is an idea embedded in the constitutional protection of free speech, behind which is the notion that the citizenry is well served by a vital marketplace of ideas. But since the nation's founding, its validity has been debated. It seems that for every Jefferson who held,

I am persuaded myself that the good sense of the people will always be found to be the best army. They may be led astray for a moment, but will soon correct themselves. (Jefferson, p. 414)

there has been a Hamilton who argued,

It has been observed by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for every enormity. (Hamilton, 1985, p. 208)

For every Dewey who took the position:

Until secrecy, prejudice, bias, misrepresentation, and propaganda as well as sheer ignorance are replaced by inquiry and publicity, we have no way of telling how apt for judgment of social policies the existing intelligence of the masses may be. It would certainly go much further than at present (1927, p. 209)

there has been a Lippmann:

Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this century. It has shown itself to

be a dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and death. (Lippmann, 1955, p. 20)

In the field of political science, for every Page and Shapiro, holding that:

The result of this process of collective deliberation, when all works well, is that the general public receives accurate information and helpful interpretations that enable it to form policy preferences in accord with its needs and values. That is, Dewey's "organized articulate Public," a truly public opinion, is formed... through public debate that creates a public opinion worthy of democratic responsiveness. (1992, p. 365)

there has been a Converse:

[T]he unfamiliarity of broader and more abstract ideological frames of references among the less sophisticated is more than a problem of mere articulation.. (1964, p. 231)

This study is clearly in the camp that believes that, under favorable conditions at least, citizens can deliberate and public opinion can mature. But even if this proposition is accepted as a given -- if it is accepted that citizen deliberation is not an oxymoron -- does it matter? Why not simply delegate decision-making to duly-elected representatives and leave to citizens the role of deciding whom those representatives ought to be come election time?

Certainly, a democracy on the scale of the American republic could not exist without a large measure of delegation of public affairs to elected leaders, as the Federalist Papers point out. But there are degrees of delegation, and for a number of reasons citizen engagement remains important once elected leadership is established. First, representative democracy requires citizens to judge the job done by the elected, and even if they employ "low-information rationality" and shortcuts to make their judgments come election time

(Popkin, 1991), at least *some* measure of awareness and deliberation of leadership actions *between* elections surely remain important.

Moreover, democracy requires more of citizens than judging leaders and voting accordingly. They often play important roles in the solution to public problems and the execution of public policy. Not only can the moral support of citizens be important for policy success, their financial and, often, active involvement can be crucial as well. In the case of military action, moral support shores up political consensus and troop morale, the tax burden must be borne if the military is to be prepared, and soldiers must be willing to serve -- all factors that came into play as the Vietnam War dragged on and the consensus broke down. Another policy example: Successful education reform requires general acceptance (so that popular resistance does not derail policy), tax support and, usually, active participation by parents and other community members working in concert with the schools.

Representative democracy thus can only be a partial delegation of the management of public affairs, and the ongoing judgment and actions of citizens remain key to the health and success of public policy and the political process. This does not mean that a highly engaged and deliberative citizenry is practical, possible or desirable with regard to every policy decision, the requirement of which would surely result in paralysis. But it does imply a need to maintain a balance between *delegation to leaders* on the one hand and *deliberation by citizens* on the other in democratic decision-making.

There is, of course, no simple formula for what the perfect balance between the delegation of decisions to leadership and the need for citizen deliberation and participation

is. It can nevertheless be argued that the balance has shifted too far *away* from the citizenry at this point in time and that the political system is not conducive to meeting the deliberative needs of citizens. The symptoms are familiar: low voter turnout, sound-bites from politicians increasingly nasty, brutish and short, political campaigns increasingly nasty, brutish and long, the ascent of PR over substance in political argument, horse-race rather than substantive reporting, and on and on across the litany of complaints concerning the modern American political process.

Undoubtedly, myriad interlocking causes are behind these symptoms. Frequently mentioned are the democratic distortions created by single-interest politics, campaign finance, and an ultra-competitive, quick-hit media environment. A less frequently noted factor is the paradox of democratic leadership itself, which I will discuss primarily in terms of the study's concern with the presidency.

The Democratic Paradox of Presidential Leadership

Literary criticism has developed the concept of the "unreliable narrator" for instances in which the narrator's voice is not omniscient but instead somehow limited or flawed. This project proceeded in part from the assumption that the Executive Branch is, in the natural course of events, an unreliable narrator of foreign policy for the American public. In other words, one cannot assume that the executive's story line is the only one worthy of consideration. Alternative narratives, which can only be widely conveyed by the news media, are therefore needed if citizens are to deliberate effectively.

The most obvious instances in which the president's policy rhetoric is problematic are those in which the public is told outright lies on behalf of flawed policies. With regard to military action, the prototype in recent times is, of course, Vietnam. The president's rhetoric is democratically limited, however, even when he is not lying outright and his policy, while inevitably imperfect, is not profoundly flawed. "Inevitably imperfect" is to the point, for citizens will always be presented with imperfect policy in an imperfect world -- the best course of action is rarely, if ever, a clear-cut matter. Given that, citizens seeking to understand and deliberate effectively will benefit from exposure to multiple perspectives, even when the president honestly portrays a well-reasoned policy.

It is one of the many paradoxes of politics that the exigencies of leadership often *demand* that the president attempt to short-circuit and otherwise *dominate* the public debate about policies that are of immediate concern to him. Rarely does he have what would typically appear to him as the luxury of offering the public a variety of policy options to choose from. Indeed, a president who regularly did so would almost certainly

be seen as weak and ineffectual.

Thus, paradoxically, the president, in fulfilling his leadership role by attempting to persuade people that his way is the right way (by acting as "interpreter-in-chief" -- Stuckey, 1991) can constrict the democratic process and subvert the ability of citizens to deliberate effectively. The president, who is the only leader voted into office by (potentially) the whole electorate, can constrict the democratic process and debate by performing his duly elected duty, because of a natural tension between the exigencies of policy leadership and those of the deliberating citizen.

There are, of course, checks on the president's ability to forward his view as *the* view. Institutionally, Congress and partisanship act as balancing forces. That is, one of Congress' job is to check presidential power, which means that it must take a position itself vis-a-vis the President's policy, and partisanship increases the odds that at least some members of Congress will raise challenging questions about it. However, Congress is rarely able to command the public's attention as the president can, and so, as this study has argued throughout, it is the media that can best bring both institutional and other checks to bear to compensate for the natural tendency of the president to "sell" citizens rather than to educate them and foster their deliberations.

Can Presidents Provide More Deliberative Leadership?

The previous section argued that presidential speech by itself will not, in the normal course of affairs, tend to provide an adequate context for citizen deliberation. Nevertheless, presidential speech can play a more or less helpful role in this regard. Put in the language of this study, it can be more or less deliberative. For if citizens can only reasonably expect the president to provide a single point of view (or a single substantive frame) this can be done in a more or less useful (i.e., deliberative) manner.

For example, consider Tulis' (1987) argument that:

Lyndon Johnson's campaign for the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 reversed the rhetorical practices of Woodrow Wilson's League fight. Instead of working out the merits of a technically complex program and then facing the difficult task of explaining it to the public in different, easily comprehended language, Johnson developed his popular rhetoric first. (Tulis, 1987, p. 161)¹

This is not to say that inspirational rhetoric is always ill advised, but that its prominence and dominance can affect the ensuing debate. According to Tulis, "This popular rhetoric, well known as the "War on Poverty," contributed to the structuring of the legislation in the executive branch and served as *a surrogate for deliberation* at crucial junctures in the congressional process" (1987, p. 161, italics added).

By contrast, "working out the merits of a technically complex program and then...explaining it to the public" is precisely what the president can do that is of use to the public's deliberations. Moreover, if Tulis' point is that a speech can be more oriented

¹Compare Chang's (1988) distinction between "referential symbols" that "are economical, concrete, and not prone to attract emotional baggage" and "condensational symbols," which appear in contexts with abstractions that are often ambiguous in meaning or have a history of powerful emotional concerns for the audience" (Chang, 1988, p. 320).

toward substantive argument or more toward slogans, it can also *explain* its substantive position in ways that are more or less useful to citizens.

For example, the president's substantive rendering of a point of view will obviously be less than useful to citizens engaged in deliberation on the policy situation if it is basically dishonest. Not that every secret ought to be revealed, but if the president's presentation says one thing while he is doing and thinking another, the speech would seem to offer little help to citizens.

As another example, Tulis distinguishes four types of presidential speech that differ in the coherence of their arguments. The first, and most deliberative, he terms "*developed arguments*," in which a "discernible argument...moved logically from beginning to end" of the address. The second is a "*series of arguments*," a speech containing "several arguments but not...an overall argument." The third, "*a list of points*," often conveyed in "single-sentence paragraphs, a structure that permits rearrangement almost at random without alteration of the 'argument' of the speech." Finally, there are "*mixed*" cases, combining a list of points and a series of arguments (Tulis, 1987, p. 141).

According to Tulis' research, presidential speeches in the last century were cast often as the more deliberative "developed arguments," whereas nowadays they tend to be presented as a "series of arguments," "lists of points" or the "mixed" types. (And the speeches reviewed for this study did tend to be presented in this style.) But the point is that there is variance, and it is possible to imagine presidents whose speeches present relatively honest and coherent arguments that rely more on substance and less on slogan.

The question then becomes, in a political environment that, as Tulis' research

shows, is encouraging presidents to be *less deliberative*, is there hope for a counter-trend? The answer is not clear, but is probably in large part dependent on the press' willingness to report the news, and the president's position, in a more deliberative manner. That is, if the press were to demand coherent positions from officials rather than sound bites, they would be more likely to get them. So, again, our discussion moves back to the media.

On Media Deliberativeness

While presidents are constrained by the incentives of their position from providing the kind of diversity and context that help citizens deliberate effectively, the media are in a better position to do so. Obviously, the media do not always do an exemplary job in this regard, and the study found considerable variance in the deliberativeness of the news sample across the six interventions.

The study also showed strong support for the indexing thesis, the news media tends to be more open and diverse (more deliberative) when elite political opinion is divided, and less so when political elites are in agreement. What are the implications of this finding from the standpoint of the deliberative needs of citizens?

It is possible that through indexing the rhetorical interplay of leadership can offer the public an adequate variety of viewpoints -- and that is the argument for a competitive political environment and a free press with the potential to generate a vibrant marketplace of ideas. In this way, indexing can serve the public's needs reasonably well -- assuming, of course, that the media do a good job of not only reflecting a vibrant policy debate but of conveying it in an engaging and user-friendly fashion.

Most would agree, however, that the reality falls far short of the ideal. A core question raised by the study is this: if the political debate is relatively tame and therefore indexing will only produce a very modest amount of diversity, should the media search out diverse views to create a richer array of alternatives for the public to consider? As I argued in Chapter One, while it is hard to say exactly where to draw the line, it is reasonable to expect the media to do more than simply reflect the contours of the official debate -- or lack of one. If important ideas and viewpoints exist in the politics of the country at large, it seems overly limiting to allow the *official* debate to set the parameters. Vietnam serves as a case in point, for had the news media been more deliberative earlier in that conflict, it is possible that the worst might have been avoided.

Vietnam and Media Deliberativeness

That fresh thinking early in the U.S.-Vietnam conflict would have been a good thing is hardly news, but Gaddis makes the point in a manner closely related to the concerns of this study.

The American defeat ...[in Vietnam] grew out of assumptions derived quite logically from that strategy [of containment through "flexible response"]: that the defense of Southeast Asia was crucial to the maintenance of world order; that force could be applied in Vietnam with precision and discrimination; that means existed accurately to evaluate performance; and that the effects would be to enhance American power, prestige, and credibility in the world. These assumptions in turn reflected a curiously myopic preoccupation with process -- a disproportionate fascination with means at the expense of ends -- with the result that a strategy designed to produce a precise correspondence between intentions and accomplishments in fact produced just the opposite. (Gaddis, 1982, p. 238)

The ways in which policymakers were framing the conflict in their own deliberations, in other words, were faulty. The "flexible response" adaptation of the Cold War containment strategy led the Kennedy administration to a highly problematic involvement in Vietnam. And Gaddis does not even bring up the perhaps even more fundamental framing question for that time: Ought the Vietnam conflict to be viewed as a nationalist revolution or as an expression of world communism? (And if as both, then how ought the first to affect American actions in relation to the second?)

Importantly, it seems likely that Kennedy was not wholly the prisoner of the assumptions Gaddis enumerates. While it remains a point of conjecture whether Kennedy would have actually pulled the U.S. out of Vietnam had he lived, it has become clear that Kennedy was at least thinking about it and that his mind was to some degree open on the topic. Consider Reeves' balanced assessment of this debate:

It now seems highly likely that in November 1963 Jack had not reached a firm conclusion about the nation's future conduct in Vietnam. He did not think in long-range terms; he had not developed any sort of sophisticated intellectual or moral framework around his pragmatic and reflexive anti-communism. He told two insiders that after the next presidential election, he was going to order a complete review of American policy toward Vietnam...

Kennedy was clearly getting restless about the growing number of American troops in Vietnam. (Reeves, 1991, pp. 410-411)

The question I wish to entertain here is, what was the media environment in which Kennedy had these questions and doubts, and had it been different could it have led to a change in policy before he died?

The news media at the time echoed the mainstream consensus, not the inward doubts that some policymakers had and that a nascent protest movement was just beginning to articulate. Ultimately, it is true, much of the news media were critical of U.S. policy in Vietnam. But at this early phase press coverage was mostly consonant with the official line, and to the extent the media did offer criticism of administration actions, they focused on matters of *execution* and not on the wisdom of the policy itself.

In other words, while some tension between the government and the press on Vietnam had begun by 1963, the focus was on Gaddis' "myopic preoccupation with process," on means, not ends, and the Cold War frame remained intact. As Hallin explains:

The consensus on America's "global commitment" was so powerful in the early 1960s that as long as the Vietnam War remained small, the administration had little trouble with the press. With the security of the Free World in the balance — as none doubted it was — who could quibble about sending a few hundred advisors to assist a pro-Western government threatened by Communist guerrillas. The decisions of November 1961 [to provide military supplies and advisors], as the authors of the Pentagon Papers put it, "stirred very little fuss and (considering their

retrospective importance), not even much interest." (Hallin, 1987, p. 28)

Hallin goes on to offer an early version of the indexing thesis: "Even if journalists had been skeptical about the emerging policy, which they were not, *with no significant debate about it either in Congress or the administration*, it simply was not 'news'" (1986, p. 28, emphasis added). Moreover, "As the war became more costly and its conduct more controversial," the press' stances "would begin to change." But, to make the point again, the tension that began to emerge between the press and the administration comprised,

...a conflict over tactics, not principles. It threatened neither the Cold War consensus itself nor the premise that American intervention in Vietnam was a 'legitimate part of that global commitment.'" (Hallin, 1987, p. 28, emphasis added)

The reflections of Vietnam era reporters support Hallin's point, for even journalists known for their ultimate opposition to the war tended, in the early 1960s, to frame the issues very much according to the terms of the official debate. For instance, Hallin's quote above concerning "a legitimate part of that global commitment" is from David Halberstam's 1965 book, The Making of a Quagmire, in which he wrote:

I believe that Vietnam is a legitimate part of that global commitment, a strategic country in a key area. It is, perhaps one of only five or six nations in the world that is truly vital to U.S. interests. (Halberstam, 1965, quoted in Hallin, 1987, p. 26).

And Neal Sheehan, another American journalist who covered the war, viewed his and his colleague's thinking in this way:

The American reporters shared the [military] advisors' sense of commitment to this war. Our ideological prism and cultural biases were in no way different. We regarded the conflict as our war too. We believed in what our government said it

was trying to accomplish in Vietnam, and we wanted our country to win this war just as passionately... (Sheehan, 1988, p. 271).

Now, while a matter of conjecture, it seems at least possible that a more open and diverse -- i.e., a more *deliberative* -- media discourse in those early years of America's involvement could have given Kennedy the psychological support and political space to start the ball rolling on an exit policy prior to his death. And had the Kennedy administration *set in motion* an exit strategy prior to the president's death, Johnson would have had to *change* the direction of policy rather than go along with it. Moreover, all the voices of early doubt and alternative thinking would have been strengthened, not only in the nation but among each president's advisers. Arguably, a more deliberative press could have helped all the Vietnam administrations avoid the "groupthink" that led to so many bad decisions with regard to Vietnam (Janis, 1982). In this context, an early exit strategy could conceivably have taken hold and many years of tragically flawed policy avoided.

Returning to Reeves' account:

At the time he left for Dallas, the president had apparently not made up his mind about Vietnam. William J. Rust has noted the "absence of a clear direction to Kennedy's policy." Still Jack had significantly expanded America's role and commitment in Vietnam. Most of the tragedy that followed under Lyndon Johnson can be traced to assumptions and actions pursued during the Kennedy administration. (Reeves, 1991, pp. 412-413)

Avoiding Alternatives

The study shows that the news media often restrict themselves to a bland and narrow official debate and therefore present few real alternatives for public consideration. (And, as the Vietnam case argues, it may also discourage official consideration of alternatives as well.) It is interesting that at times the news seem almost to go out of their way to avoid developing alternative frames even when this seems inherently logical to the story itself.

For example, during the Gulf War Newsweek provided coverage of antiwar protest, which would seem a natural place to develop and offer alternatives to the official policy frame (Newsweek, 1/28/91, pp. 36-39). The newsmagazine offered a description of the peace movement, showing through visuals that significant opposition to the war existed, and that it was not made up solely of ranting radical, fringe types. It never, however, gave a coherent alternative viewpoint, concentrating on the *fact* of opposition, not the views of opponents. It seemed from this coverage that either no alternative views existed on the part of the protestors -- their actions were, from the evidence presented, predicated strictly on slogans -- or that their presence was far more significant than their opinions, except for such fragmentary, insubstantial assertions as, "They just see the war as stupid," or "The unifying principle of the protests is the same one Jane Fonda (who has not been heard from in this conflict) enunciated back in the '60s: that a political fight on the other side of the world isn't worth a lot of American lives" (pp. 38-39). The rather arbitrary association with Jane Fonda -- not grounded in a quote or a source, evidently more a free association than anything else -- could only have the effect of delegitimizing

the protest and signaling that no serious analysis stood behind it.

And yet, despite this often narrow media discourse, journalists view themselves as "watchdogs," and officials view them as loose cannons with the potential to knock the legs out from under policy at any moment. How can one reconcile these competing images of the news? Mermin (1996) provides a useful perspective that is consistent with Hallin's account of the Vietnam press questioning policy *process* rather than policy itself. And it speaks to this question in a way that is of particular relevance to this study's concern with citizen deliberation:

When conflict is not found among official sources, reporters try to fulfill the ideal of independent, balanced coverage by finding conflicting possibilities in the efforts of officials to achieve the goals they have set.

Focusing on the effectiveness of government policy, however, differs fundamentally from focusing on its formulation. The first approach views government policy as exogenous, stipulated from the outset, and frames public affairs as a struggle between the president and the forces that could deny him the achievement of his goals. The second approach views government policy as endogenous and open to questions, and views not just the president's prospects for success, but the decisions the president makes, as subject to critical analysis and debate. One approach stipulates the content of government policy and focuses on whether it is likely to work; the other views the content of government policy as contested and focuses on the decisions that set it. One approach positions the reader/viewer as a spectator to the political game, with the tools to predict whether the president is likely to win or lose his gamble; the other positions the reader/viewers as citizen, with the tools to deliberate on the soundness of the president's decisions. (Mermin, 1996, p. 191)

In this study's media sample there were numerous instances in which the focus was on questions of policy *execution* rather on the meaning of the policy itself, exactly as Mermin describes. For instance, Time's response to the 1989 invasion of Panama reviewed the Bush administration's stated goals. The article then focused more on the impact of

success or failure, than on the purpose of the policy in the first place:

But if the invasion turned out to be less than fully successful, the Administration would be running grave dangers. At the extreme, it could bog down in a Viet Nam-style guerilla war.... (Time, 1/1/90, p. 21).

As with Mermin's thesis, the policy itself is treated as a given. Indeed, later Time became fatalistic, stating, "In retrospect, though, the invasion looks inevitable..." (p. 23), as if these things just happen and policy analysis is therefore almost pointless.

This focus on *efficacy* appears to be one of the most common ways in which news coverage is given a bit of an edge in the absence of some more overarching tension on the level of the alternative interpretations of the situation. A variation on this theme is to focus on *domestic political* ramifications rather than the policy itself. Such "horserace reporting" asks who will profit politically from the policy and its success or failure and avoids dealing with the policy directly. Fallows terms this the "process bias of the press" (1997, p. 281):

The natural instinct of newspapers and TV [news] is to present every public issue as if its "real" meaning were political in the narrowest and most operational sense of that term -- the attempt by parties and candidates to gain an advantage over their rivals. (Fallows, 1997, pp. 26-27)

For example, reaching back to the Reagan administration's intervention in Grenada soon after American marines were killed in a suicide bombing in Lebanon, Time commented:

Although the hazardous situation of U.S. forces in Lebanon caused widespread dismay, the anger and frustration over the Beirut bombings seemed counterbalanced by the relatively clean strike in the Caribbean. New Hampshire Democrat Robert Stephen, a state senator whose son took part in the Grenada invasion, describes the impression he got from talking to his constituents and customers at his Manchester restaurant: "The Presidents might have been hurt by what happened in Beirut, but he made that up in Grenada." (Time, 11/14/83, p. 37)

Yet another technique for creating dramatic tension in a news piece without necessarily doing so through presenting alternative frames is through *personalization*. Newsweek's coverage of the Clinton/Iraq intervention offered an example, in which the main article concluded that Clinton had, through the intervention, placed himself in "a scorpion's embrace with Saddam" (Newsweek, 7/5/93, p. 17). This is particularly noteworthy in that Clinton appeared to be going out of his way to depersonalize the conflict in his rhetoric, where he referred to "a regime like Saddam Hussein's" rather than taking an approach that focused more directly on Hussein himself. Another example occurred in The New York Times' Somalia coverage after Clinton's speech, which held, "The heart of the problem remains the highly personalized vendetta that has developed between the U.N. Secretary General...and a single Somali warlord... (10/8/93, p. A34).

In sum, by focusing on efficacy, domestic "horse race" dynamics, and personalization, dramatic tension can be built into news stories while tension on the level of ideas and real policy analysis can be avoided.

Toward a More Deliberative Media Discourse

This study shows variance in the deliberativeness of the news: At times the news is presented in a relatively open and questioning manner and offers citizens a greater variety of frames to consider, and at other times, less so. The study also shows the news' deliberativeness can be constrained by indexing, tending to be more deliberative when mainstream political consensus is low and less so when it is high. The question this poses for American democratic process is, can the news be made more deliberative, even when a mainstream political consensus prevails?

The normal state of affairs obviously conspires against this, or the pattern of indexing would not prevail. As discussed in Chapter Three, indexing relates to the nature of journalistic routines. It relates, for example, to the organization of reporting according to "beats" with their usual official sources, sources which come, in the natural course of events, to influence journalists as much as they are influenced by them. This means that it will take special efforts to go against the institutional grain. Consider Fallows' comments about the Clinton administration's air strike against Iraq:

When, for example, Bill Clinton ordered a punitive raid against Iraq in September 1996, the public might have wanted to have a variety of questions answered. Why was Saddam Hussein still in power? Were these new raids likely to inconvenience him in a serious way? Should the United States think again about its self-imposed prohibition on assassination as a tool of foreign policy? Should it think about relying so heavily on Middle Eastern oil? But in the minds of the most prominent commentators, a different sort of question seemed more intriguing. How will the raids affect the elections? How will Dole and Clinton "handle" the foreign policy issue in the campaign? (Fallows, 1996, pp. 280-281)

According to Fallows, "We will know when habits have changed when different questions pique commentators' interest -- questions more like those on the typical viewer's or

reader's mind" (Fallows, 1996, p. 281).

Some journalists, usually under the banner of "public journalism," are attempting to break out of the sorts of habits that minimize news deliberativeness, to offer a more engaging and democratically useful brand of reportage (see, e.g., Fallows, 1996, Chapter Six; Rosen and Merritt, 1994). These efforts have raised some controversy among journalists, and have undoubtedly been uneven in their quality. The point is that it will take such purposeful efforts to break with those routines that limit the news' deliberativeness, particularly when cleavages among mainstream political elites are not present to stimulate a more vital and varied media discourse. In that the audience for news is declining and the public expresses frustration with the news media as they are, the media ought to have incentives to try new approaches. An engaged public, after, would seem to be good for the news business.

The Question of Bias

The data tend to support the conservative bias model with regard to post-Cold War reporting on military action, and not support the liberal, presidential or anti-presidential bias models. However, it should be noted that the study does not test any of the bias models as persuasively as it does indexing, offering results that are suggestive rather than convincing.

With regard to indexing, the study examined the media content directly, worked the data in numerous ways and found consistent results supportive of the thesis. With regard to bias, it tested the media's treatment of the president's rhetoric rather than the media content itself, and in only one way. And, as noted in Chapter Seven, it is fair to posit alternative theories, such as the possibility that Clinton objectively deserved the criticism he received. (Still, even if this alternative interpretation were true, the data do seem to argue against a liberal bias powerful enough to overcome such a "reality.")

The question for this conclusion thus becomes, what are the implications if future research supports these results suggesting a conservative bias? Obviously, media discourse is deliberately deficient to the extent it is biased toward providing more operating room for conservative than for liberal leadership of the policy debate, and corrective efforts ought to be made. On the hopeful side, such efforts would have the media's own objectivity ethic working for them. Thus, to the extent the case can be made that bias exists, journalism's professional norms would help create an internal pressure to correct it. On the other hand, bias is a slippery topic and it seems that for every test that finds one sort of bias there is another finding yet another. So the evidence would have to be

compelling indeed before the objectivity norm is likely to become a factor in moving the field toward a corrective.

Given that reality, the best hope for rectifying any biases that may exist and that may be distorting the news is the very concept of deliberativeness itself to which this study has attempted to contribute: To the extent the media are reasonably open and diverse it will minimize any tendencies toward bias by offering citizens a fair sampling of ideas and by encouraging their deliberations.

Other Theoretical Questions Raised by the Study

The deliberativeness model and its application in this study raise a number of theoretical questions, in addition to those already discussed in this chapter, that future efforts might tackle. For example:

1) How much diversity is enough? Normatively, the study implies that more deliberativeness in the news media is a good thing, which means, in part, one that offers a greater diversity of substantive frames to consider. But how much diversity is enough, and when does it get to be too much?

This is both a political *psychological* question of information processing, and a *political* question of the boundaries of acceptable discourse. That is, a news discourse that offered dozens of perspectives (if such exist) would overwhelm the public. And then the question of "fringe" views comes into play. Beyond the official discourse, the press must make less easily guided judgments (likely another reason why indexing holds sway) about what views are valid and ought to be included in the public debate.

2. The independent variable in the indexing model. One conclusion of the study was that not just *congressional*, but *congressional-executive* consensus and dissensus may be relevant to indexing, and this hypothesis should be further tested. Moreover, what variables stand *behind* "mainstream political consensus/dissensus?" It would be interesting to see if, prior to a military conflict, such factors as presidential popularity or the majority congressional party (is it the same as the president's or not?) were good predictors of the

independent variable itself and therefore of media behavior. Possible hypotheses here are:

- (1) When the congressional party in power is the same as the president's, and/or when presidential popularity is high, mainstream political consensus is more likely and therefore lower media deliberativeness is more likely as well.
- (2) When the congressional party in power is different from the president's and/or when the president's popularity is low, mainstream political consensus is less likely and therefore higher media deliberativeness is likely as well.

Moreover, will other indexing referents be more influential for issue areas other than foreign policy than is congressional opinion? For instance, when it comes to economic policy, might the state of corporate opinion prove a more powerful indexing referent than Congress?

3. *Other issue areas.* The overall approach could be applied to any policy of broad public concern, not just to military interventions. Does indexing prevail in domestic politics? Equally well across various issues?

4. *Is a dominant post-Cold War frame desirable?*

At the very early stage of the post-Cold War era Time pointed out that

Bush has militarily intervened for the most part where communism was not an issue... officials affirm that Bush is showing a new willingness to use American military power to further U.S. interests that have little or nothing to do with communism – suppressing drug traffic or terrorism, for example " (Time, 1/1/90, p. 23)

Communism is obviously no longer the dominant organizing principle. Is a new dominant

frame desirable? It would seem that either the United States should develop a new master frame to replace communism (and Chapter Six suggests that the closest we now have is something along the lines of “containing chaos”) *or* it should develop ways to assess foreign policy threats and opportunities effectively on a case by case basis. Is one more desirable than the other?

Conclusion

At the inaugural presidential speech of the Cold War, Truman defended aid to Greece by commenting on the virtues of democracy. “No government is perfect,” the president told the nation. “One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected” (Truman, 1947). True, no government is perfect, and yes, among the chief virtues of democracy is that defects can be corrected. But Truman’s “democratic processes” are not infallible, and a democracy’s defects, or for that matter, its strengths, are *not* always visible. In particular the media can highlight, ignore, or obscure the alternative interpretations that citizens need in order to deliberate effectively, and a democracy’s health is surely affected by the job the media do in this respect.

Appendix A

Degree of Congressional "Dissensus"

as Indicated by Coverage in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review

The following tables display the analysis of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review and the resulting "dissensus scores" discussed in Chapter Seven. They are based on statements about congressional opinion from the first page of text of the main story devoted to each of the six interventions. If a sentence commenting on the state of congressional opinion continued onto page two it was included. In all cases, the analysis is from the issue immediately following the president's speech on the military action (as is the case for the issues of Time, Newsweek and The New York Times analyzed as well). For each of these statements, the tables note whether the statement is best categorized as indicating:

1. Congressional consensus (e.g., "a broad bipartisan congressional backing")
2. Congressional dissensus (exceptions to the prevailing view, or generally ambivalent or split opinion among Congress)
3. Statements that are ambiguous as to congressional consensus or dissensus

The degree of elite political consensus or dissensus is reflected by a "dissensus ratio" created by dividing the number of dissensus statements in a given CQ page by the total number of consensus and dissensus statements. The higher the ratio, the more dissensus is indicated.

Table A-1			
Bush/Panama Intervention: <u>CQ</u> Statements on the State of Congressional Opinion			
<u>CQ</u> Statements (lead article, p. 1)	Consensus	Dissensus	Ambiguous
1. Noriega Ouster Wins Support on Hill	x		
2. President Bush received broad, bipartisan congressional backing...	x		
3. But the support was mixed with warnings that the operation could become a political liability for Bush...			x
4. ...the prevailing congressional view, endorsing Bush's contention that Noriega's war of words had created a political climate in which the 35,000 U.S. citizens in Panama faced a significant risk of harm.	x		
5. But the invasion also drew vigorous objections.		x	
6. Even some members who supported the move warned that circumstances could soon sour public opinion.			x

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (12/23/89, p. 3532)

Table A-2: Bush/Iraq Intervention: CQ Statements on the State of Congressional Opinion			
CQ Statements (lead article, p. 1)	Consensus	Dissensus	Ambiguous
1. Congress Applauds President From Sidelines of War			x
2. Both chambers pass resolutions supporting Bush, but have to paper over Democratic differences		x	
4. Congress rushed to support President Bush after he sent U.S. forces into battle against Iraq.	x		
5.leaders of Congress voiced support, and the Senate unanimously approved a resolution backing Bush.	x		
6. The concurrent resolution.. passed 98-0....	x		
7. The House approved the resolution 399-6 the next day, with six members voting "present."	x		
8. Yet lawmakers sensed that all of their resolutions and statements would make little difference in the end. Having already authorized Bush to begin a war, members were well aware that they were reduced...to the role of bystanders.			x
9. As events rapidly progressed, members moved from cautious optimism to gloom in a matter of hours.			x
10. That legislation [empowering Bush to use force against Saddam Hussein] passed by only five votes in the Senate... The doubts and divisions did not magically disappear after the war began.		x	
11. Some Democrats continued to balk at voting Bush their unconditional support. Despite the overwhelming margins, the sense of Congress resolutions were approved only after hours of bickering over precise language.		x	

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (1/19/91, p. 176)

Table A-3			
Bush/Somalia Intervention: <u>CQ</u> Statements on the State of Congressional Opinion			
<u>CQ</u> Statements (lead article, p. 1)	Consensus	Dissensus	Ambiguous
Most congressional leaders also backed the deployment.	x		

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (12/5/92, p. 3759)

Table A-4			
Clinton/Iraq Intervention: <u>CQ</u> Statements on the State of Congressional Opinion			
<u>CQ</u> Statements (lead article, p. 2)	Consensus	Dissensus	Ambiguous
Bombing Widely Backed on Hill, Reopens War Powers Debate	x		
President Clinton's decision to send cruise missiles slamming into an intelligence center in Baghdad won wide support from lawmakers, but it also reopened a long-running debate over White House consultations with Congress.	x		
[Clinton's argument that "The Iraqi attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans.... We could not, and have not, let such action against our nation go unanswered"] was eagerly endorsed by most lawmakers.	x		
Some liberals saluted the president for the restraint involved in the attack.			x
Some members said the attack on Iraq underscored the need to revamp the widely disputed War Powers act....			x

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (7/3/93, p. 1750)

Table A-5: CQ Statements on the State of Congressional Opinion			
CQ Statements (lead article, p. 1)	Consensus	Dissent	Ambiguous
1. Clinton Calms Rebellion on Hill By Retooling Somalia Mission.	x		
2. But opponents in Senate push for speedier withdrawal as administration's credibility takes a beating.	x		
3. ...appears to have temporarily quelled a fractious rebellion in Congress against his policy...	x		
4. But the support among congressional leaders for Clinton's revamped policy belied the deep skepticism of many lawmakers over any involvement...	x		
5. And for a president still struggling to build trust in his ability to manage foreign policy and the military, the furor over Somalia created new doubts over his administration's credibility and competence.	x		
6. Facing new calls from Congress for an immediate withdrawal from Somalia	x		
7. In a bow to Congressional critics who charged that the United Nations had become preoccupied with capturing Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid...	x		
8. ...some key senators...rejected Clinton's retooled policy.	x		
9. The early indications were that Congress, which had seemed destined for a messy showdown with Clinton over Somalia, would accept the new policy. But the outrage ruled by a bloody engagement...is not likely to fade soon.	x		
10. Congress, which already had grown weary of the Somalia mission, was galvanized by graphic television pictures...	x		
11. With fury that neither administration officials nor their own leaders seemed able to control, lawmakers angrily clamored for Clinton to bring home all U.S. forces immediately.	x	x	
12. Yet the opposition to Clinton's policy, while broad and bipartisan, was also divided. There was no consensus as to whether the United States should pull out instantly or within months or whether troops should come home even if that meant leaving one or more hostages in Aidid's hands.		x	
13. Although Clinton's new policy will probably undercut Byrd's amendment [aimed at forcing a quick withdrawal] some senators were predicting a close vote and a debate that would touch on an array of questions involving the use of force.			
14. ...the doubts about the Somalia involvement that have been building in Congress for months.	x		

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (10/2/93, p. 2655)

Table A-6 Clinton/Haiti Intervention: CQ Statements on the State of Congressional Opinion			
CQ Statements (lead article, p. 1)	Consensus	Dissensus	Ambiguous
1. President, Rebuffing Congress, Prepares to Launch Invasion.	x		
2. In a sweeping assertion of presidential authority, Bill Clinton moved inexorably toward military intervention... and essentially dared a skeptical Congress to try to stop him.	x		
3.... a majority of members in both parties clearly opposed an invasion.	x		

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (9/17/94, p.2578)

Table A-7: Summary of Congressional Dissensus Scores

President/ Intervention	Congressional Consensus/Dissensus			
	Consensus	Dissensus	Ambiguous	Dissensus Score
Bush/Panama	3	1	2	$1/4 = .25$
Bush/Iraq	4	3	3	$3/7 = .43$
Bush/Somalia	1	0	0	$0/1 = 0$
Clinton/Iraq	3	0	2	$0/3 = 0$
Clinton/Somalia	12	2	0	$2/14 = .14$
Clinton/Haiti	3	0	0	$0/3 = 0$

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





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