ROLLING THE DICE IN ATLANTIC CITY: A STUDY OF PATRONS AS VICTIMS OF CRIME ON THE CASINO FLOOR

by

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Abstract

ROLLING THE DICE IN ATLANTIC CITY: A STUDY OF PATRONS AS VICTIMS OF CRIME ON THE CASINO FLOOR

by

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Crime committed in the casino has remained empirically unexamined chiefly because access to individual casino crime reports have been unobtainable by social scientists or have only appeared as part of the aggregate crime data for Uniform Crime Reporting purposes. Special permission by New Jersey casino regulatory officials permitted review of all crimes committed against casino patrons for 1999-2000 for all casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Though restricted by agreement from interviewing victims or offenders, analysis of crime reports, interviews of casino regulators, and discussion with casino security provided detailed description of the spatial and temporal distribution of crime on the casino floor. This study found strong support for the Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) and expanded the theoretical paradigm by examining a new milieu (casino floor) and new sub-population (casino patrons). Incidence of casino crime was exceedingly low suggesting the high number of capable guardians on the

casino floor was an effective deterrent. The crime data overwhelming indicated that of those who were victimized, that theft was the typical crime reported and the most likely targets were elderly women whose purses or coin-cups were stolen while wagering at the slot machines. Theft of this type suggests that the victims may have unwittingly abetted the crime through distraction or lack of vigilance. Nevertheless, the casino floor remains a safe place for visitors to enjoy an ever-burgeoning leisure time activity. When grounding policy, both the casino industry and the State can benefit when data are made accessible and subjected to empirical analysis.

Acknowledgements

An undertaking such as a doctoral dissertation is really a composite of conditions and a convergence of circumstances that align permitting a researcher to solely focus at the task at hand. Specifically, I was fortunate to have a loving and understanding spouse, Janice, of 32 years who never complained about the missed weekends, the shortened vacations, or my constant obsession to complete my dissertation. Equally grounding my focus, were our two sons, Gerard and Andrew, who in addition to acting as a source of constant encouragement, were instrumental in assisting me in the drudgery of entering the universe of crime data that was the basis for this dissertation. They also contributed through field observations at the casinos. Side-by-side with them was Jennette Bishop, a close family friend and a student of methodology whose knowledge and interest in the casino crime data brought the numbers to life. Life's endeavors, no matter how daunting, always seem reachable when those who love you and those whom you love surround you.

Having said that, there are those whom you meet and interact that are part of the dissertation journey that you hope remain friends long after the degree is awarded. The doctoral coordinator, Christina Czechowicz, was always available to help me

meander through the bureaucratic thicket of academia, and place, what I believed, were my emergent needs, in larger contexts and perspectives. The missteps along the process that I experienced resonated from my personal obstinacy of her well-guided suggestions.

As a former Ph.D. classmate and friend, and now my colleague and commander, New Jersey State Police Superintendent, Joseph "Rick" Fuentes, was always a paragon for the maxim, "theory with practice." Having the ability to blend these two concepts into a workable paradigm with the New Jersey State Police exemplifies the mission of the university that seeks to foster change in a criminal justice environment through evidence-based studies. Superintendent Fuentes has created units to foster academic research and make the New Jersey State Police more transparent, an accomplishment attributable to both his academic and professional training and experience. He encouraged me throughout the process by setting an example of how a doctoral education can foster positive change in a law enforcement environment.

This study, the first of its kind to examine crime on the casino floor, would not have been possible without the assistance and guidance of J.P. Suarez, the Director of the Division of Gaming Enforcement. His genuine desire to empirically scrutinize the casino domain to determine the nature and extent of

crime and ensure the safety of its patrons and employees was extraordinary. Director Suarez permitted me access to data maintained by state agencies and introduced me to key casino regulatory officials where I could seek practical explanations of the data as well as gain an understanding of the casino industry and how it ensures the integrity of the games.

Rick Santoro, Senior Vice President of Corporate Security for Trump properties, provided immeasurable insight and advice on understanding the practical implications of the data. Vice President Santoro was all too willing to accommodate my research needs both at the corporate and field levels. He granted me access to any location on the casino floor, its clandestine surveillance rooms, and all personnel to answer any of my questions. These accommodations were provided without any conditions or constraints and with I believe was the confidence in his knowing that Trump properties engaged in the best practices of casino security.

Captain Dan Kelly of the New Jersey State Police equally afforded me free rein relating to crime data that was maintained by those under his command. Always willing to assist me in explaining the investigative protocols and how the New Jersey State Police ensure the integrity of the entire casino industry, Captain Kelly was a constant source of information to discuss and confirm the particulars of the data.

Dan Heneghan, Director of Communications for the Casino Control Commission and Anthony Marino, Deputy Executive Director for the South Jersey Transportation Authority, provided elucidation on the intricate components of the casino industry and the state's response to casino gambling's effect on crime. Both provided in depth interviews and were always available for follow-up questions as the data were analyzed. Deputy Attorney General Ted Grove provided insight on how casino crime is treated from a prosecutorial perspective and how his office continues its efforts to ensure the casino remains free from criminal influences. Investigator Kerry Hand of the Division of Gaming Enforcement offered her detailed knowledge and expertise from the ground level of casino enforcement vigilance that protects the interests of the casino industry and the State.

My committee members Dr. Dennis Kenney and Dr. Andrew Karmen, assisted me in this academic endeavor by providing discerning comments on my findings and writings while also being available during the entire process for guidance and direction. Dr. Mary Eckert and her spouse Dr. Marcus Felson (Routine Activities Theory) found the time to read my draft, question my findings, and suggest a coherent order. Phyllis Schultze, information specialist, of the criminal justice library at Rutgers University, usually needed a one-word trigger to provide me with a plethora of statistical information and historical research on my chosen

topic. So much of my archival research was generously provided through her efforts that when I appeared at "her" library she immediately directed to the most current information on gambling and crime. I echo the sentiments of other doctoral students who I know were fortunate enough to conduct research there.

The final token of gratitude is to Dr. Barry Spunt, who as my mentor, suffered (my term) through the nascent stages of this dissertation and guided me in structuring and coalescing the data and the findings into a scholarly dissertation. We met often during the three years that I was under his mentorship, and though our meetings were interrupted by our competition in racquetball at the John Jay gym, this interaction and discussion about gambling in general and casino crime in particular made me realize how knowledgeable and astute Dr. Spunt was on the issue and how fortunate I was to be under his mentorship. This simple acknowledgment does not fully express the depth of my gratitude.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 The Problem of Crime on the Casino Floor

This research examines the nature and extent of crime in a new setting, the casino, typically referred to as the "casino floor." It is the location where all the gambling, or the preferred term "gaming" occurs. It is the money generator for the entire hotel and casino business, the draw for visitors, and the "cash cow" for many jurisdictions starved for new sources of revenue. Casinos and their host states have a vested interest to ensure that the casino environment provides personal security for its patrons, and is a safe haven for tourists; of least concern for anyone engaged in leisure activity should be a threat to his or her safety or the thought of becoming a crime victim. Casinos experience particular types of crime and criminal activity.

To examine the problem of casino crime, this study reviewed the universe of reportable crime data for Part 1 crimes of the Uniform Crime Report for 1999

and 2000 for all the casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Excluded from this review were crimes where the casino was the victim, as when a patron cheated in any of the games, used illegal devices, or colluded with an employee to secure an unfair advantage in any of the wagering opportunities.

Atlantic City was the second major land-based casino destination to be established after Las Vegas, and though often compared, it is distinguished by its history, geography, and statutory framework. A review of the published literature revealed that casino floor crime has never been previously subjected to any empirical analysis in any jurisdiction, nor have there been recorded studies that have focused on the victims of casino crime. Such statistics are closely guarded and are usually cloaked with all the other crime data for a particular geographic region. Unlike crime on college campuses that legislatively must be separately reported (Campus Awareness and Security Act of 1990), crime in the casino is merged, as is all other tourist area crime, within a jurisdiction's overall crime report. This study filled this gap in the knowledge base.

1.1 Research Objectives

The study examined the environmental and demographic factors associated with patrons who are victimized on the casino floor in all 12 of the Atlantic City casinos[1]. Specifically answering the following questions:

- What is the nature and extent of how casino patrons are victimized?
- Do victims vary by race, age or gender?
- Do the different types of wagering alternatives increase a patron's risk of victimization?
- Are specific areas on the casino floor more dangerous?
- How is casino crime distributed by square footage?

In addition to addressing the personal and place attributes of those who were victimized, this study analyzed how patrons came and went on the casino floor, how they interacted with each other and with casino personnel. Additionally:

- What activities were recurrent?
- How did crime vary by hour, day, and month?
- What type of crime was most prevalent?
- Did the characteristics of the casino floor contribute in some way to the crime committed there?
- How were the activities of patrons at casinos associated with their risk of becoming a crime victim?

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1. In July 2003, "The Borgata" which is one of three casinos located in the marina area away from the Boardwalk, was officially opened and became the 13th Atlantic City casino.

- Did victims share distinct traits?

By empirically looking at the frequency of offenses, the demographics of the victim, and the type and location of crime committed on the casino floor, policymakers, law enforcement officials, and industry representatives will better understand the factors associated with crime in the casino. This study's analysis of data on casino floor crime was guided by the propositions of the Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) which, explains crime by life's activities. These activities include time and patterns spent at work and *leisure*, and how these patterns may precipitate crime.

1.2 Scope of the Research

This study evolved from many discussions with Director J. P. Suarez of the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement ("DGE") concerning the contentious issue of crime and casinos. Originally, the researcher had planned to conduct a secondary analysis of the federal crime data for the crimes of forgery, fraud, and embezzlement and determine how the data correlated with the advent of casinos in Atlantic City. These crimes are typically associated with problem gamblers. Director Suarez suggested a study that focused on crime on the casino floor in Atlantic City as the State had a particular interest in the safety of those who work and visit the casino. Subsequent meetings crystallized the focus of this study.

Director Suarez arranged for interviews with casino industry officials and made the necessary crime data from the casinos available. The sample included all the crime reports prepared by each casino. After reviewing a crime report, it was obvious that it contained rich textual information that could easily be analyzed within the framework of the routine activities approach.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

On-site observation at the casinos confirmed that the routine activities of casino floor patrons were easily discernable as the casino floor was open to the public and patron behavior could easily be observed. The Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson 1979) has received much empirical attention and is grounded in the necessity of three elements to converge in time and space for a crime to occur: (1) motivated offenders, (2) suitable targets, and (3) the absence of capable guardians. More succinctly, according to Mier and Miethe (1993), "patterns of routine activities and lifestyles are assumed to create a criminal-opportunity structure by enhancing contact between potential offenders and victims...[the] subjective value of a target and its level of guardianship are assumed to determine the choice of the particular crime victim."

Leisure is one of the continual activities providing needs for individuals away from home (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The routine activities paradigm guided the examination of the different leisure settings (games) in the casino and asked why some patrons experienced crime and others did not, how the casino setting caused a motivated offender and a suitable target to intersect, and what had been the industry's response to discourage crime in the casino. This study contributed to the understanding of the Routine Activities Theory by examining a new measure of leisure time activity in the form of casino gaming and a new sub-population in the form of wagering patrons. It extended the Routine Activities Theory by examining a new domain, the casino, and how casino crime was spatially and temporally distributed.

1.4 Outline of the Study

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter One describes the problem of crime on the casino floor, establishes the need for the study, and how this study evolved. It also describes the extent of the research while placing gambling in historical context. Through its transformation from a "vice to virtue" (though some may suggest that may be an overreaching cliché, in that, gambling can never be virtuous) activity, it illustrates why and how gambling took on a "corporate face" and became a desired leisure activity for many, though not without consequence.

Chapter One also discusses the geography that is uniquely Atlantic City's, from its history at the turn of the 20th Century as a fashionable retreat to its downward spiraling example of urban decay that ushered in legalized gaming. Legalized gaming became the tool for urban redevelopment in Atlantic City. Additionally, this chapter describes the contextual setting for this research, which includes the casino floor, the different types of games, the social atmosphere, the physical structure, and the crime prevention mechanisms.

Chapter Two discusses the existing literature on leisure activity and crime; first in a larger dimension, then in Atlantic City. This chapter explores gambling's relationship to crime as it has been studied in different jurisdictions in the United States, and then how that relationship has appeared in the literature relating specifically to Atlantic City. It also examines the debate regarding how to accurately record crime rates in areas that are subjected to the swells of tourists.

Chapter Three provides the theoretical underpinnings and a detailed explanation of the elements of the Routine Activities Theory that will guide this research. This chapter also explains how the Routine Activities Theory has been subjected to empirical review through testing its applicability in different domains and sub-populations and why it is most appropriate for this research.

Chapter Four outlines the research framework examining the questions that are raised by routine activities and crime in the casino. These questions become

the grounding for the hypotheses that were tested addressing the routine activities of victims and places (casino locations). It summarizes the methodology used to gather the data, provides an in-depth description of the crime-reporting document, and discusses the statistical design to test the hypotheses. It concludes with the concept of "visit trips" and why this protocol to estimate the number of gaming patrons arriving in Atlantic City is a viable alternative absent a scientific figure on the number of patrons visiting particular casinos.

Chapter Five describes the functions and responsibilities of the New Jersey state regulatory agencies that serve as the casino industry's capable guardians, always vigilant to ensure integrity, from an individual game to an entire industry. Though enabled through distinct legislation, each agency works individually and in tandem as part of a well-oiled machine in protecting the State's and patrons' safety and interests. This chapter primarily presents the findings of this dissertation, and parses crime on the casino floor by demographical, temporal, and spatial distributions while outlining the theoretical and methodological expansion of the Routine Activities Theory with crime in the casino.

Chapter Six discusses public policy and industry implications, and areas for future research. Interspersed within all chapters for clarification and enhancement of the casino environment, are the results of interviews with

casino representatives, state officials, and personal observations on the casino floor and security areas.

1.5 The Casino Setting

Through observation on the casino floor, interviews with casino and regulatory officials, and a review of selected literature, the concepts of the Routine Activities Theory were operationalized for the casino floor setting. Using the elements of the Routine Activities Theory, this study addressed how the casinos and the routine activities of its patrons provided a context and environment for criminal opportunities.

Casinos are open and free to the public, and while some similar entertainment venues, like bars and clubs can charge an entrance fee (cover), or have an expenditure minimum or require patrons to be suitability dressed, no such constraints exist to enter a casino, except the minimum age requirement of 21. Casinos attract an influx of tourists and business visitors usually carrying significant sums of cash, which makes them more alluring to offenders and increases their target attractiveness. Similarly, casinos are attractive to offenders because crimes involving cash are not traceable.

Casinos are protected by secured parking areas or provide for the immediate discharge of bus passengers at casino front doors. The casinos also afford a

social setting for the elderly. Pulley (1998) reporting on casino gaming in a small city in Iowa, was told by an 87-year old casino patron, "When you get as old as I am, all your friends are gone and it is not easy to make new ones, especially in a small town." Another patron commented, "It's a little excitement in our mundane lives." Gaming has become a popular elderly pastime and a considerable source of casino revenue. One clinical psychologist commented that aging Americans are marginalized and isolated and have become part of the mainstream of casinos where they are treated receptively and with their possible medical conditions in mind, with bathrooms containing special receptacles for insulin needles (Pulley 1998).

The casinos, more than any other industry, have offered the elderly an environment where they can "socialize, seek companionship, and spend their time, and money." As one elderly patron remarked, (Pulley 1998), "After you reach a certain age, there is not a hell of a lot else to do." Casinos cater to the elderly by sending them birthday cards, arranging transportation, and providing free meals, and shows. "During the day, the busloads of seniors keep the dealers warmed up and the slot machines primed," ... [You're] at an age, you're over 60, you've got to get out of the house. You need a diversion. I can only garden so much. I can only fix the house so much," commented another elderly patron.

In Atlantic City, the elderly comprise the highest percentage of bus riders. At one casino, a line of older women wait at the water fountain to take their pills and for most, the much-needed day out includes the Boardwalk stroll (Wilgoren, 1999). Ben-Ali (1998) reported that in 1997, the Atlantic City casinos grossed $3.8 billion and experts estimated 65% were from the elderly.

The casino setting also enables potential offenders on the casino floor to enjoy anonymity, to be in close proximity, or often to be side-by-side with their potential victims. The casino floor provides an ideal environment for direct physical contact to steal or injure. If family members or other casino patrons who could also serve as potential guardians are nearby, they are engaged in gambling activities and are less watchful.

Motivated offenders, an element of the Routine Activities Theory, according to Cohen and Felson (1979, 1998), are "a given," and the "likely offender" has criminal inclinations but needs the proper conditions where suitable targets are present without capable guardians. The likely offender therefore, would appear most comfortable in an environment like casinos, where money is exposed and free flowing. Casinos draw offenders as animal watering holes draw predators. Considering that Atlantic City is second only to Las Vegas in the total number of casinos and money generated, it is a safe assumption that Atlantic City has an ample supply of motivated offenders, though it is very

difficult to estimate the sheer number of motivated offenders who might enter a casino.

The physical structure of the casino floor is in essence, similar for all casinos, in that all but one casino is accessed through the first floor level. Casinos contain a combination of slot machines and the traditional table games of Blackjack, Craps, Roulette, and Baccarat as well as some newly created games to provide variety for its gaming patrons. Included on the casino floor for some casinos are areas for televised simulcast wagering on thoroughbred and harness races. Sports wagering is not permitted in Atlantic City.

The casino floor seems to be designed so that the glitz and noise of the slot machines are strategically located near the entrances and exits, which also provide an irresistible lure to patrons in search of the "big win." The extravagance and vitality of the casino is open to all patrons 21 or older, free of charge, regardless of race, gender, and class. The only requirement is cash or a healthy line of credit; and if one is willing to risk that cash and credit, the casino offers free drinks, and for risking a substantial sum, free food, lodging, and entertainment. All this is available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. The only thing will not find on the casino floor is ...a clock. The last thing a casino wants is your gaming activity to be restricted by time. Patrons arrive by bus, rail, air, and for some, even a leisurely drive.

The empirical literature has examined the casino setting to a very limited extent. Mayer et al. (1998) in looking at "casino atmospherics" found that noise, lighting and décor influenced player satisfaction. In a larger study, Mayer (2003) acknowledged that though Las Vegas had themed landscapes in their hotels, Egyptian treasures (Luxor) or Venetian canals (The Venetian) there was little research on how these themes affected tourists. Friedman (2000) found that after geographic location, the interior design of a casino affected patrons' play and was a factor in a patron's decision to wager at the casino they were staying or to venture off to another casino. The casino floor design entailed arrangement of the gaming equipment, traffic flow patterns, signage, and lighting. A comfortable gambler remains longer and is likely to return; casinos always win in the long run.

In a recent study, Mayer and Johnson (2003) asked slot machine players about the casino atmosphere at a Las Vegas casino. They found that floor layout and theme were significant in terms of patron satisfaction, in keeping with the Las Vegas model. However, their study did not specify what patrons particularly liked about a particular theme.

1.6 Patron Safety

To thwart potential thieves on the casino floor, there is casino security mingling with patrons, some uniformed, some not, some visible, some not.

Through fixed or roving posts, security patrols the casino floor looking for irregularities while graciously assisting patrons. This is their "beat." Located above them are their security cohorts in the surveillance room constantly searching the casino floor, zooming in on suspicious movements or seeking to match casino patrons to the many photographs of casino cheats, organized crime associates, wanted criminals, and those on the exclusion list. This daunting "eye in the sky," is encased in a blackened bubbled domed cover visible to all on the casino floor who gaze upward. The cameras inside the dome remain invisible, suggestive of Bentham's *Panoptican,* which was a prison with a circular tower enabling a guard to watch all prisoners without being seen; a design to ensure obedient behavior by a sense of omnipresence.

During several tours of the security facilities, the researcher saw how the surveillance cameras monitored every inch of the casino floor with the ability to zoom in on the denomination of any casino chip. A suspicious move, an employee notification, or something out of the ordinary routine activities, and the cameras began to record. For a digital quality (in-person) look at those of interest, there were the "catwalks," those narrow channeled walkways with one-way mirrors surrounding the casino floor from above, giving security a face-to-face impression of all the casino floor patrons. Out on the catwalk one could view from directly overhead patrons engaged in play. Overhead viewing was all encompassing in that every movement by patrons, whether fidgeting with their chips, looking around, or attempting to peek at an adjoining player's

cards, was clearly visible and added another dimension to surveillance. There is tough policing at the casinos for one major reason, casinos want their customers to feel safe--- and come back.

1.7 Structural Design

The casino floor is designed and arranged so that the slot machines are on the perimeter of the floor closest to the entrances and exits. Slot players are more transient, moving from machine to machine to engage in play, while table game players typically remain at their games for longer periods. Perhaps this rests with the greater cognitive skills and concentration required for table games and the realization that jumping from table to table does not diminish the negative expectancy inherent in all casino play. All casino games (except poker, simulcast horseracing, and Blackjack for a professional card counter) have a negative expectation, meaning that the odds for the games will always favor the casino. The casino does not pay according to the true odds of a wager (except for some wagers in Craps) occurring, but has calculated the payout to accord them an advantage. In some games, the advantage can range from a single to a double-digit percentage.

Slot machine play requires fewer analytical skills and the glitz and the variety of different slot machines probably act as a magnet for those on a losing streak. There is always the potential that the next play on a different machine may be

the jackpot. The various table games are placed in the center of the casino floor. Patrons typically wager more money per bet on table games and are closer to the redemption windows to cash out.

According to Casino Control Commission regulations, (19:46-1-27) "slot machines are to be located and arranged in such a manner to promote optimum security for casino operation [and] each casino licensee shall be permitted to install and operate one slot machine for every 10 square feet of its casino floor space..." Additionally, mindful of the security of its patrons, " each casino licensee shall arrange the layout of its casino floor so that whenever one row of slot machines in a casino is lined up back-to-back with another row of machines, the two rows shall be separated by metal grating or other types of barriers, as approved by the Commission, that will prohibit a person from placing his or her hand between the rows of machines," (19:46-1.28I).

Casino security is always trying to stay one step ahead of the thievish schemes as well as enhance its guardianship responsibilities. To protect itself from theft, the casino redemption cage, where patrons exchange chips for cash, is in the interior of the casino. Additionally, there is a "panic alarm" at the table games that can be activated by casino personnel to immediately notify security if some thief believes he could just reach over and steal some chips and run away.

There are also telephones on the casino floor for security to call the surveillance section; likewise, surveillance can page security if they see anything suspicious or observe a crime in progress on the casino floor. The casinos attempt to "target harden" their games in the casino. Since the slot machines are situated in rows, back-to-back, a Plexiglass shield between the machines prevents anyone from reaching through and stealing another patron's belongings or coin-cup. Every slot machine also has a "call attendant" button and certain casino floor personnel are aware of the locations of all "holdup alarm buttons." (Richard Santoro, Senior Vice President, Corporate Security, Trump Hotel and Casino Resorts, personal communication, June 23, 2003).

The guardians on the casino floor are the wagering public, onlookers who are not involved in gaming activity, security guards both covert and uniformed, pit bosses, dealers, and a closed circuit surveillance department. The casino floor fits nicely into Bennett's (1991) categories of guardianship. He categorized guardians as structures of formal social control, informal social control, and target hardening. Generally, formal social control includes police, courts, and corrections; informal social control includes individuals and groups of citizens, that through surveillance and intervention, frustrate crime, and target hardening, which includes such items as alarms, closed circuit television, and locks.

During personal tours at various Trump casinos, and discussions with security officials and technicians, the researcher learned that there were over 1000 cameras for the entire casino floor that tilt, pan, zoom, and could view everything from all angles. Photographs of known violators and wanted criminals were also posted in the surveillance room and served as a constant reference point for casino camera operators. Each officer conducting surveillance had two monitors, one that roved and the other that fixated on specific areas, thereby shadowing the movement of suspicious patrons on the floor.

Experienced security observers were attuned to a typical thieving profile, a profile not of race, gender or age, but one of movement. Typical slot players moved up and down the slot machine aisles with their eyes gazed on the machine displays, such as fruit rows, numerals, or other types of glitzy icons. Patrons carrying purses who were wagering typically placed their purses on their laps, over their shoulder, or on the bottom of the slot machine so they had somewhat of a view of their purse while they played. Offenders, on the other hand, walked up and down the aisles looking between the slot machines where patrons would typically place a coin cup when not engaged in play, or downward where they may have placed their purse. It is this predatory body language of looking at areas that have nothing to do with deciding on which slot machine to play, which alerted security officers on the floor and the camera surveillance unit to a potential crime hazard. They referred to this

behavior as "rubbernecking" and surveillance was constantly monitoring these behavioral markers.

Formally, the New Jersey State Police, the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement, the Casino Prosecutions Bureau, the Casino Control Commission, and the entire uniformed and covert security personnel of each casino guard the casino floor. This will be described in greater detail in the next chapter. Target hardening is accomplished through the casinos' "eye-in-the-sky" (CCTV), cash drop boxes, and a sophisticated system of alarms and panic buttons. Additionally, the architectural design of the casino floor and the placement of its security personnel and devices, in tandem with Casino Control regulations, are intended to provide safety for the gaming patron. All these systems and controls relate to the element of guardianship of the Routine Activities Theory.

As Gushin & Callnin (1999) observed, communication from the casino floor to the surveillance room is integral in protecting patrons. Pit bosses, supervisors, and other casino floor employees should be the first to become suspicious of improper procedures and betting patterns, as well as becoming apprehensive when a patron's body language and movements appear not to be routine. Finally, there are informal social control structures by patrons on the casino floor that also serve as guardians. Some patrons may have a greater social bond through familial association, or through membership in special groups that may

have chartered buses to visit Atlantic City; greater social cohesion is associated with greater opportunity for intervention for those that may be victimized.

The blueprint of the casino floor is obvious...create an environment where the patrons feel safe to engage in their leisure time routine activity while at the same time increase the casinos' bottom line. This is accomplished through the casinos' overt capable guardians (dealers, pit bosses, uniformed security) and covert capable guardians (undercover officers, and closed circuit television surveillance). The State has contributed to the target hardening of the casino setting by mandating mechanical requirements and placement locations of games on the casino floor and the introduction of barriers to protect patrons. Typically, when activities become routine, the element of danger is usually marginalized and patrons can concentrate on their primary reason for coming to the casino...to wager in comfort.

1.8 America's Passion with Gambling

"Americans love to gamble," so concluded a congressionally funded national task force in 1998, studying the impact of gambling in the United States (National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report, 1999). All but two states (Utah & Hawaii) have some form of legalized wagering. Currently, there are 432 commercial casinos in 11 states, a distinction 15 years ago that was reserved for Nevada and Atlantic City, New Jersey alone (Casino Player,

2003). States with lotteries and casinos annually raise $20 billion (Berenson, 2003) in gaming revenue.

The gambling fervor encompasses not only land-based casinos, but also has expanded to include marine-based gaming, with ships out at sea and in port, providing for the total casino experience. Rapidly increasing in popularity is Internet gaming, which grossed an estimated $5.69 billion in 2002 and was expected to double by 2006 (Eichelberger, 2004). Nestor (2003) estimates there are 1800 online outlets and the typical gaming patron "is likely to be a woman older than 50."

Historically, gambling was just slightly less unsavory than prostitution. During the twentieth century gambling bred corruption and affiliation with the Mafia (Moran, 1997). A convergence of circumstances altered the public's perception and led to an increase in popularity of gaming. A shift in public attitudes changed and elevated gambling from the status of "vice to virtue," or at least to a legitimate industry. This change was brought about initially when New Hampshire began operating a state lottery in 1964, thus legitimizing a form of gambling and providing a possibility of a winning ticket for the 'American Dream' for mainstream citizens. Additionally, changes in Nevada law in 1967 and 1969 permitted corporations (Corporate Gaming Act), in addition to individuals, to own casinos, (Nestor, 2003; Meyer-Arendt, & Hartmann, 1998).

An additional change occurred in 1970 when casino stocks began to become publicly listed on the stock market. With public offerings came all the oversight of the federal government and its revenue reporting requirements. Public accountants were now required to issue formal reports to stockholders. Also, the infusion of public capital as a result of the public listing of casinos provided the means for large multi-million dollar casino projects virtually eliminating direct involvement by any illegitimate individual investor, let alone the Mafia (Tanioka, 2000).

The public now insisted on some form of games of chance, a sentiment that was bolstered by a 1974 survey from the University of Michigan's Institute of Social Research, which indicated that 80% of all adult Americans favored some form of legalized gambling. The study concluded that the motivation to gamble could be part of "cultural values, reasoning, ingenuity, and competition" rather than an activity that fostered family disruption and poverty, (Moran, 1997). This enabled gambling to shed its seedy past. As characterized by Henderson (2003), "Gambling once considered evil, lost a few letters and renamed [it] "gaming" and became respectable."

Another major factor that had a positive effect and contributed to gaming as a leisure activity was that in the 1990's most people had higher discretionary incomes and there were lower transportation costs. Tourist attractions

developed an infrastructure that made the attraction more hospitable for tourists. There was also greater life expectancy and earlier retirement, (Smith & Eadington, 1992) which increased tourism.

In terms of leisure expenditures, gambling surpasses what Americans spend on movies, videos, music and books combined (Berenson, 2003). Las Vegas began to market casinos as vacation alternatives for the entire family. Building elaborate theme park hotels with rides for children, the Las Vegas marketing strategy was designed to create opportunities for family enjoyment. To be sure, their primary concern was to keep the adults occupied with gaming, but engaging children in activities created a fun-for-all environment. Conversely, Atlantic City catered to a much older and more gaming-engaged clientele as evidenced by their promotions for day-trippers, and free flowing "comps" for their high rollers. Whether, the conversion by Las Vegas to a family-themed destination has been successful, may be questionable. Recent slogans as, "What happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas," and "The sin is back in sin city," is hardly a premise that conveys family vacationing. Similarly, the MGM has closed its amusement park.

To be sure, the gambling expansion has not been entirely positive. Coupled with a softer image of gambling, casinos began offering more and different types of games. The traditional table games of Blackjack, Roulette, and Craps, were soon competing for the gambling dollar with Caribbean Stud Poker, Let it

Ride and various other games that catered to specific ethnic groups, especially Asians. The expansion of different wagering forms at a casino only enhanced a casino's capacity to attract new patrons. If a particular game was unsuccessful, which the revenue it produces could easily determine, it could always be eliminated.

A number of researchers have reported disturbing evidence between gambling and substance abuse. Lesieur et al. (1998) found that when gambling and substance abuse "overlap, the dually addicted" have more serious psychiatric problems and longer criminal histories. Spunt (2002) notes the similarities between gambling and substance abuse. Both pathologies seek "action" develop a "tolerance" and experience "withdrawal" and have "similar patterns of abstinence and relapse." Both activities are further interwoven, in that some gamblers use cocaine to remain awake and continue gambling, while other gamblers consume the free alcohol that casinos provide to its patrons; up to approximately one-third of substance abusers have gambling related issues (Spunt 2002).

In a sample of methadone patients Spunt (2002) found that 21% were pathological gamblers, most of whom gambled in an attempt to support their drug habit. Welte et al. (2004) found that casino gambling was associated with a higher risk of gambling pathology than were lottery, cards, and bingo. Greater participation in varied types of gambling, alcohol abuse and low socio-

economic status also predicted gambling pathology. Regarding slot machine wagering, gambling treatment centers indicate they are attending to people who are experiencing "telescoping---a shortening of the time period it takes for someone to get in trouble," and then requesting treatment. It is not yet known to what extent slot machine play or its players contribute to telescoping, but women tend to experience telescoping more, and are quicker to seek treatment (Rivlin, 2004).

According to Howard Shaffer from the Harvard Medical School, Division of Addictions, widely regarded as an authority on disordered gambling, "Slot machines have a different impact on the brain than other forms of gambling. Unlike table games, which are played in groups, slots are played in isolation and therefore lack the same safeguards that social situations provide. Because the video form of slot play is faster than the mechanical form, they hold the potential to behave in the fashion of psycho stimulants, like cocaine or amphetamines. They energize and de-energize the brain at faster cycles." Shaffer found similarities in brain scans with those high on cocaine and those who gambled (Rivlin, 2004). The mechanical form of slot machines employ spinning reels in determining the winner, while the video form uses video images on a computerized machine (Royer, 2003).

The Internet casino is the newest gambling craze and the United States Department of Justice estimates that in 2003 there were 1800 illegal gambling

sites generating $5 billion annually. Though illegal in the United States, Internet gambling sites are commonly based in countries where it is permitted, thus there are no attempts by the host country to discourage participation. However, it is illegal for anyone in the United States to wager online.

According to the National Council on Problem Gambling, Internet gambling poses a serious risk factor because of its "accessibility, anonymity, and speed...[and] people who develop problems on the Internet may compress the normal cycle of addiction." About 10% of the 5 million Americans who illegally gamble online are between 14-18 (Wilson, 2004).

In 1977, Atlantic City became the second state to legalize casinos and though the price has been an increase in disordered gambling, many Americans have accepted casinos as a harmless and enjoyable tourist attraction where they wish to exercise their option to gamble and vacation.

1.9 Atlantic City: Past and Present

In the 19th and early 20th Centuries, Atlantic City was a magnet for wealthy tourists seeking relief from the heat of the city and the therapeutic effects of its salt-water beaches. Later, Atlantic City lost its stature as the resort of choice and became economically depressed. The blight of the city ushered in legalized gaming that served as a catalyst in Atlantic City's road to economic recovery.

In 1854, trains began to arrive in Atlantic City where people came for picnics and to enjoy the beach. Food stands followed by hotels began to appear. One hotel owner told a group of other hotelmen that they should construct a walkway of boards on the beach so sand would not be carried by beachgoers into the hotels. As the bigger hotels were built, the boards were increased and became a permanent fixture. The Boardwalk soon created its signature items, saltwater taffy, when a high tide accidentally dampened a candymaker's batch of taffy; and wicker chairs, conceived by a hardware dealer who started renting them on the Boardwalk. The Boardwalk soon stretched for seven miles along the shoreline. Outside shows, restaurants, penny arcades, horses diving into tubs of water, and sparkling fireworks soon became part of the Atlantic City landscape. The building boom was so prolific that it inspired a game, Monopoly, which was premised on buying land in Atlantic City (Demaris, 1986).

In 1885, since Atlantic City was attracting millions of bathers, a "constable of the surf" was appointed to protect them, and the first public beach lifeguard service was born; and to tell everyone back home just how much fun one was having at Atlantic City, vacationers sent a photo landscape imprinted on a card with a written message on the back; hence, the birth of picture postcards. (Nestor, 2004)

At the turn of the 20th Century, Atlantic City was the country's most famous resort with trains conveying visitors to its 1000 hotels, rooming houses, and theatres. However, after World War II, Miami became the tourist magnet, as air travel became more affordable and incomes rose (Teske & Sur, 1991). But in 1978, when Miami initiated a referendum to permit casino gambling, it was soundly defeated (Dombrink & Thompson, 1990).

By 1964, the Democratic National Convention showcased Atlantic City to the nation. "The spotlight that was supposed to breathe life into a vanishing resort economy, instead exposed its agonizing decline"...[b]oarding houses once filled by working class families, now housed vagrants, drug addicts, and prostitutes; swanky Boardwalk boutiques had been replaced by tacky souvenir shops and musty arcades" (Orr, 2004). By now, Atlantic City was experiencing a decline in tourism and also lost many of its hotels. In the 1970s, there was an increase in unemployment and flight of the city's population that also blighted Atlantic City. Federal aid could not help the Atlantic City plight and the thought of casino gaming as a cure became palatable. Approved by referendum in 1976, casino gaming was the State's "great experiment in urban redevelopment," (Nelson, 1999).

Atlantic City even suffered from growing pains in the form of public corruption that may be experienced by any new resort area requiring considerable construction and services. In 1982, Atlantic City Mayor Michael

Matthews was convicted and jailed in an FBI bribery investigation involving labor unions and organized crime. He was voted out of office by a recall election alleging voter fraud. The new mayor, James Usry, a former school commissioner, championed reforms to restore government integrity to Atlantic City. By 1989, Usry and three councilmen were arrested for misusing their official position and accepting bribes from contractors. By 1990, "four of the last seven mayors of Atlantic City had been indicted" (Teske & Sur, 1991). However, none of the political scandals in Atlantic City have ever directly involved the casinos.

Understandably, the casinos were the engine spurring the growth of new construction and the need for other goods and services. The casinos were able to maintain a pristine reputation for integrity through their regulatory guardians that were instituted when the casinos were first developed. The casino industry had, and continues to have, continual oversight by these regulatory guardians, which will be outlined in further detail in Chapter Five.

Though Atlantic City may boast of its beach and Boardwalk with its renowned salt-water taffy, in reality, the magnet for tourists is the casino. It has very few local restaurants and entertainment is basically within the confines of the hotel. By regulation, there are no freestanding casinos; all casinos are included within a hotel. There are no nearby golf courses, or tennis courts, and other than the convention center, there is very little to do or sightsee in Atlantic City once one

removes the casinos. Even the shopping is basically limited to the casino, whose items are priced outside the range of a true bargain hunter. A check of the local telephone book found no movie theatres or major supermarkets. A review of the calendar of events for the Atlantic City Convention Center for 2004 disclosed that during June, July, and August, the typical family traveling period, there was only one public show scheduled and that was a celebrity car show, which is not exactly family oriented. According to Bary (2003) today's image of Atlantic City has been characterized as an "uninviting place for all but hard core gamblers and aging day trippers," and while in Atlantic City 90% of casino operations revenue come from gaming activities, in Las Vegas, more than half of the revenues come from rooms and food

To be sure, the advent of gaming has been a boon for Atlantic City resulting in 45,000 casino jobs with a $1.1 billion payroll, adding 1500 new homes financed by $280 million in casino taxes, and a capital investment of $8 billion. Additionally, since 1978, gaming has generated $5.4 billion to the state, and annually has provided $60 million in local property taxes (Rosenberg, 2003). Before legalized gaming, Atlantic City was best described as "South Bronx by the Sea, rather than Queen of the Coast" (Teske & Sur, 1991).

For the investor, all is not bleak in Atlantic City. The return on investment for Atlantic City properties is over 20% while Las Vegas is under 15% (Bary,

2003). The property values have experienced an economic renaissance enabling the city to shed its nickname as "Newark by the Sea" due to previous property deterioration and poverty (Moran, 1997).

To be sure, Atlantic City realizes that it has to garner a new image if it ever hopes to equal Las Vegas in non-gaming revenue and be a welcoming tourist attraction where people vacation and not just visit for a day. In July of this year, Pennsylvania authorized 61,000 new slot machines to be placed in horse tracks, slot parlors, and other resorts throughout the state. Authorities estimate that this will result in an additional $1billion in revenue to Pennsylvania. However, some experts feel that Atlantic City which is only a one hour drive from Philadelphia will be most effected, (Dao, 2004)). Faced with encroaching competition for the gaming dollar not only from Pennsylvania but also from Delaware, West Virginia, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New York, who recently approved the opening of three Indian casinos, Atlantic City and the State have not sat idly by. Atlantic City and New Jersey are spending $1 billion into a shopping, entertainment, and gaming attraction. Atlantic City realizes it has to do more to attract other than the "day trippers" commonly referred to as "shoobies," a derogatory term dating back to when visitors carried their lunches in shoe boxes; (Peterson, 2004). Shoobies were one-day visitors,"[who] would change clothes in the car, sit on the beach all day, and never visit a restaurant, stay in a hotel, or patronize the more expensive shops

on the Boardwalk," (Pollock, 1987). Atlantic City has to encourage longer vacation stays.

Though Atlantic City's casinos earn as much as the Las Vegas casinos in gambling revenue, $4.5 billion a year, they earn only $300 million from non-gaming revenue like shopping and dining , which some even feel may even be an exaggerated figure; Las Vegas, on the other hand, earns $9.5 billion in non-gaming revenue. In re-creating the new Atlantic City image, the Sands Hotel is planning an expansion with more shopping and entertainment space; Caesars Hotel will create high-end dining and shops on a portion of the Atlantic City pier, while Harrah's and the Tropicana are also expanding with new shopping and spa facilities. As Caesars Hotel claims, "If you liked the desert, you'll love the ocean," (Peterson, 2004). A Rutgers University study (2003) that compared Atlantic City of the 1990s, estimated that by 2008, Atlantic City would realize a 71% increase in gaming revenue to over $5 billion, and a 98% increase in capital investments to almost $9 billion. This infusion of capital surely will make Atlantic City competitive in its attempt to portray its resort's changing image.

The restoration of Atlantic City has not been limited to shopping and casino expansion. Its famed beaches are also enjoying a renaissance. After years of erosion, a $24 million reclamation project directed by the Army Corp of Engineers is replenishing sand and dunes to its beaches, a project that will

continue every three years for 50 years. Coupled with the beach improvement is the addition of casino beach bars, previously banned in Atlantic City. Caesars, Sands, Hilton, Trump Plaza, and Borgata have created themed beach bars complete with musical entertainment, creating an image that there is more to do in Atlantic City than just gaming. For the family, new restaurants have dotted Atlantic City complete with child menus. The Rainforest Café with its Mayan theme offers a walk through a rain forest complete with the sounds, smell, forest vegetation, animated butterflies, elephants, crocodiles, and other rain forest creatures, Applebees Neighborhood Grill, always a family treat, has also opened on the Boardwalk with its moderate prices and children's environment in the form of balloons and coloring books, (Venutolo, 2004; Haussman, 2004; Casino Player, July, 2004). For the sports fan there is the professional minor league baseball team, the Atlantic City Surf and in 2004 the Atlantic City Cardsharks, of the National Indoor Football League, will begin playing their games at the Historic Boardwalk Hall (Legato, 2004).

Once a year in September, Atlantic City plays host to the Miss America pageant and other than that period, the routine activities of the guests of Atlantic City are usually centered on each hotel and casino; everything and everyone appears oriented toward gaming. The South Jersey Transportation Authority that monitors arrivals to Atlantic City annually, estimates on average 33 million visitors travel to Atlantic City.

Visitors to Atlantic City have a choice of 13 casinos that eagerly wait to provide a comfortable and safe environment for them to challenge "Lady Luck." Readily apparent are the uniformed security guards who rove the casino floor creating an omnipresence that comforts the players who are exposing their cash. The casino industry has served Atlantic City well. Second only to Las Vegas in yearly gaming revenue, the economic recovery of a city once blighted is clearly obvious. The engine that propelled this revitalization, which will be further discussed in Chapter Four, is the casino industry. It is the casino that is the magnet that encourages leisure time activity in Atlantic City. The design of the casino floor is not haphazard, but reflects a marketing and security strategy and perspective. Hence, the casino floor setting has enabled patrons to spend their leisure time and money and to engage in routine activities free from serious crime.

Chapter Two will illustrate that routine leisure activities, other entertainment, and tourist locations other than Atlantic City, also create an environment ready-made for the intersection of criminal and offender. Empirical studies specific to crime in Atlantic City will also be reviewed and compared to this study.

CHAPTER TWO

LEISURE ACTIVITY AND CRIME: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.0 Tourism and Crime

The effect of tourism has been examined in assessing the impact of casinos on crime in communities. However, there is very little empirical work because it is a sensitive topic to the industry. Often much of the direct reporting of crime at a tourist location is co-mingled with other crime for the city where a particular tourist attraction is located. Data for crime committed at Disney World is part of the crime reporting statistics for Orange County, Florida. Similarly, crimes in the Atlantic City casinos are reported along with crime in Atlantic City. Resort areas may run the risk of creating an unwarranted fear of crime by disclosing crime levels at tourist attractions, which in turn could affect tourism.

Much of the tourist literature points to the element of the burgeoning tourist population that contributes to crime rather than specifically labeling a particular attraction (casinos) as the cause, (Miller & Schwartz, 1998). A second element often discussed is the behavior patterns of tourists that enhance their likelihood of becoming victims. Specifically, tourists carry portable

wealth, are unknown in the community, and as temporary visitors are unfamiliar with the surrounding community (Chesney-Lind & Lind, 1986). Tourists "[are] relaxed and off guard and are less likely to press charges should the criminal be caught," thus increasing their likelihood for becoming a victim (Ryan, 1993). Albuquerque and McElroy (1999) studied tourism and crime in the Caribbean for a five-year period (1989-1993) by examining crime reports specifically against tourists prepared by the Royal Barbados Police Force. They found that hotel guests were disproportionately victims of theft and robbery. Tourists were four to six times more likely to be robbed than residents, and more likely to have their wallets and handbags stolen from their person and rooms.

A profile of the casino resort vacationer (Morrison et al., 1996) compared to beach, ski, and country resort vacationers found that those favoring casino vacations were considerably older; one-fourth of the casino vacationers were 65 or older, and more likely female. Additionally, these vacationers participated in fewer activities outside of the casino; their main attraction was gambling. They typically spent less time in rooms or other available casino hotel activities; a significant number of patrons were retired.

In assessing some police safety programs effective for tourists, Pizam (1997) noted that tourists " are often sitting ducks for criminals." Police require

training on comforting victims and learning methods to decrease the probability that tourists will be victimized.

Of course, at Atlantic City, the bulk of the tourist activity (casino gaming, or shows) is inside a building and away from the outside element that may increase a tourist's vulnerability to crime. It is very difficult to stray into an unfamiliar and unsafe area on the casino floor, as it would be if one were attending an outside tourist attraction. Though alcohol is permitted on the casino floor, it is only dispensed by the casino, and public intoxication and its accompanying behavior is not tolerated. There is a higher degree of order inside the casino. However, casinos increase the population of suitable targets, namely, patrons and their possessions, usually in the form of cash. By contrast, the population of outside tourist attractions may be transient and the environment may lend itself to a variety of different crimes.

The next section explores the effect of gaming on crime within the community and the difficulty in establishing a true gambling-crime nexus. Conflicting studies have proved problematic in arriving at a consensus on the true effect of gaming.

2.1 Gambling and Crime

Empirical studies to determine the effect of crime in communities where gaming is permitted, have found mixed results. Gaming's popularity and attractiveness as a 'quick fix' for communities in search of financial resources have resulted in growing bodies of literature on the interrelationship between gambling, casinos, and crime. Advocates look to gambling as an economic elixir for communities, while opponents counter that these benefits exact punishing social costs, including an increase in crime. Some studies have confirmed that casinos have no direct effect on serious crime, (Albanese, 1985, 1999) while others have reached opposite conclusions, (Grinols et al., 1999; Hakim, & Buck, 1989; Friedman, Hakim, & Weinblatt, 1989) or reflected that certain crimes rose while others decreased (Giacopassi & Stitt, 1993). The National Gambling Impact Study Commission's Report in 1999 concluded that there was no significant violent crime increase as a result of casinos. However, they acknowledged the need for further research of the casino-crime nexus because certain minor and white-collar offenses were excluded from the study.

Some studies typically seek to measure the community impact of casinos by using aggregate Uniform Crime Report ("UCR") statistics. Such studies are usually undertaken when communities are seeking to introduce casino gambling and want data on what economic and social impacts that they can

anticipate. By looking at locations where such gambling has been legalized and comparing the pre and post casino crime data, elected administrators believe they are better equipped to make a correct decision on whether to permit casinos in their communities.

Since gambling is "big business," proponents argue that when the data control for the increase in the tourist population ("boom town effect"), casinos have no additive effect on crime. By contrast, adversaries claim their analyses of similar crime data suggest that the incidence of crime has risen causing more police, health, and other community services to be taxed. Included in the aggregate crime data are crimes that are committed on the "casino floor," the actual gaming (gambling) area.

Wilson (2001) examined riverboat gambling and crime in Hammond and Rising Sun, Indiana. He concluded that the casinos did not have an overall impact on crime in general in either city. However, thefts and aggravated assaults did occur more frequently in Rising Sun, but the police there indicated this was a result of local residents committing local crimes, and not tourists committing crimes or residents victimizing tourists.

Giacopassi et al., (2000) analyzed the effect of tourism on crime at seven new casinos by factoring in the average number of visitors, instead of using the resident population as the denominator, the protocol used by the UCR. They

concluded there was no significant gain in serious crime, but there was a considerable rise in the lesser offenses that are included in the Part II offenses of the UCR.

Studies of the impact of casinos in Illinois, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Mississippi all concluded that there were no statistically significant increases in crime by itself, or when the population was adjusted to include tourists, (Margolis, 1997). Similarly, Reuter (1997) examined the impact of 20 different casino cities in the United States for the Greater Baltimore Committee that was considering the legalization of casino gambling in Maryland and concluded that casinos had a minimal effect on crime.

Grinols et al. (1999) criticized previous gambling-crime studies because of small populations. The Grinols' study incorporated county-level index crime reports from every county (N=3,165) in the United States from 1977-1996. They concluded that casinos increased all crimes but murder, and that the increase was something demonstrated over time. Their study did not control for the at-risk population, regarded by most researchers as the most contentious variable.

One recent study (Stitt, Nichols, & Giacopassi, 2003) analyzed crime in six new casino cities and compared the crime rate with six non-casino control

communities matching both with 15 socioeconomic variables. The crime rates controlled for the population at risk as well as the general population analyzing data before and after casinos were permitted. Crime rates increased in some communities, decreased in some, and remained stable in others. In their summary and conclusions, they indicated their findings "weakened the linkage between Routine Activities Theory, casinos, and crime." They offered two explanations. One, their data were at the community level and were not able to identify crimes specific to the casino and its environment; and, second the casino may not actually be a hot-spot for crime because the casino camera technology did not satisfy the absence of guardianship element of the Routine Activities Theory; cameras discouraged offenders from predatory crime.

Stitt et al. (2003) commented that most reviews of the casino crime relationship were "data dredging" with too many studies assuming that casinos were different from other tourist attractions. They complained that the research was without theoretical grounding explaining the differences, and believed the Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) was "best suited to distinguish between casino-related crime and most other crime." Because money forms the basis of entertainment in casinos, Stitt says it is different from theme parks, sporting events, and concerts. In fact, the bells and whistles of winning slot machines make it easier "to assess an individual's suitability as a potential crime target." Additionally, casinos draw compulsive gamblers who are significantly involved in crime as well as provide an environment for other

motivated offenders who might avail themselves of the unique crime opportunity the casino provides to recoup an evening's losses.

The studies of the gambling-crime nexus have provided no bright line with which to firmly establish legalized gaming as a causative factor in victimization. Conversely, tourist attractions result in substantial increases in transient populations from across the globe carrying portable wealth and who are less cognizant of their environment. Tourists are more focused on having an enjoyable vacation than becoming a crime victim.

2.2 Casinos, Crime, and Atlantic City

The advent of gambling to Atlantic City in 1978 generated systematic studies of a casino-crime relationship and how law enforcement data were analyzed in reaching safety conclusions for casino-placed communities. Jay Albanese (1985) analyzed index crime in Atlantic City from 1978-1982. He found that though index crime significantly increased during this period, more police were hired to whom crime could be reported and detected. Additionally, the daily population rose, adding to those at risk for victimization. Finally, crime spiked upward nationally, thus questioning whether the Atlantic City rise was a general reflection of crime nationwide. Using correlation statistics, and controlling for increased police and population and statewide index crime,

Albanese reported that casinos had "no direct effect on serious crime" in Atlantic City.

In 1999, Albanese once again examined the casino-crime relationship. Instead of reviewing reported crime as he did in his earlier study, he concentrated on white-collar crime arrests. He noted that most police departments report arrests for 27 different offenses, three of which are classified as white-collar crime, embezzlement, forgery, and fraud. Arrest data from nine of the largest casino markets were reviewed and no pattern emerged where casinos caused these specific crimes to surge.

Some studies specific to Atlantic City, New Jersey have examined the tourism and crime relationship. Albanese (1985) criticized earlier studies by the New York Attorney General's Office (1981), and the Twentieth Century Fund (1983), which reported rises in index crime with the advent of casino gambling in Atlantic City. He noted that these studies suffered from serious methodological flaws by not controlling for the rise in the population of tourists to the casinos. When he examined index crimes from 1978 to 1982 in Atlantic City, and compared it to the entire state, controlling for tourism, he found that the increase in the crime rate was not attributable to casinos.

Hakim and Buck (1989) demonstrated a possible "casino related export of crime" to surrounding vicinities of Atlantic City, while noting a greater

increase in violent and property crime in Atlantic City in the post casino years; the tourism effect was not considered. Buck et al., (1991) also examined the effect of casino-related crime on real estate values and concluded that all crime, except larceny, depressed property values. The crime cost was highest in the most accessible localities to Atlantic City. Friedman et al., (1989) reported that crime, in adjacent communities and non-toll routes to Philadelphia and New York City, rose significantly after casinos came to Atlantic City. This study did not account for the transient population.

Ochrym (1990, 1988) looked at crime rates in tourist and non-tourist areas in New Jersey and compared them to Atlantic City. Ochrym concluded that tourist areas had higher mean crime rates because of increased tourism, regardless of the presence of casinos. This expanded on previous research he conducted in 1988 that found that an increase in street crime was due in part to growth in tourism; however, for Atlantic City, casino gaming was the "catalyst."

In 1996, another special New York State Task force examined the crime data for Atlantic City and several other casino locations to assess the impact of casino gaming throughout New York State. They concluded that most communities saw a rise in crime after casinos. The increase, however, was for minor offenses that were effectively managed with proper security (New York State Department of Law, 1996).

Only one recorded study has examined data relating to crime on the casino floor in Atlantic City. However, this study may have identified a limitation in that study. Curran and Scarpitti (1991) aggregated casino floor crime with crimes committed in the casino hotel and away from the gaming area in assessing the gambling-crime relationship. That study arrived at a "casino based" crime figure, which included crimes on the casino floor. In their study, Curran and Scarpitti compared Atlantic City index crimes with the rest of the state and determined that legalized gambling did not result in significant increases of index crime rates. More specifically, by looking at the Atlantic City Police Department (ACPD) crime reports they found that most crimes within close proximity of the casino hotels victimized non-community residents. They used aggregate data of combined crimes committed on the hotel grounds and casino floor. Those data were obtained from the Atlantic City Police Department in cooperation with casino security who prepared the crime report and for which the Atlantic City Police department received a copy. Additionally, it appears their data included crime reports when the hotel or casino was the victim.

During the period for which the data were collected for the Curran & Scarpitti study, the New Jersey State Police and not the Atlantic City Police Department had sole investigative responsibility and jurisdiction for casino floor crime. Casino security did not prepare crime reports if the State Police were asked to

respond to a crime or made an arrest; the State Police prepared the reports and forwarded their reports directly to the State Police Records and Identification Bureau for inclusion in the Uniform Crime Report. According to the New Jersey State Police, since the inception of casino gaming, they have had primary and total responsibility for all casino floor crime data (Captain, Dan Kelly, Commanding Office Casino Investigations Bureau New Jersey State Police, personal communication, December 15, 2003, July 7, 2004). Accordingly, it is possible that a percentage of casino floor crime that was solely investigated by the State Police may be missing from the ACPD data, since the casinos were the source of ACPD crime reports that were used in the Curran & Scarpitti review.

This study was not similarly limited. This research reviewed the entire universe of crime reports that the casinos were required to prepare and submit to the New Jersey State Police, who in turn, provided the data for this study. Additionally, crimes committed on the casino floor were not aggregated with crimes committed in the vicinity of the casino, in the hotel, or within close proximity outside. The data for this study solely related to crime in the casino that impacted on its patrons; also excluded in this study were crimes where the casino or the State had been the victim. This study's data also included those instances where casino patrons requested that a police officer respond, in which case that would have been the New Jersey State Police as the casino floor was their exclusive jurisdiction. Similarly, this study used data pertaining

to egregious reports of crime included in Part 1 of the UCR Reports, (robbery), serious injury (aggravated assault), or where especially large amounts of money were stolen; only data that would have been maintained by the New Jersey State Police. Those data were captured in New Jersey State Police Investigative Reports and for which no report would have been prepared by casino security.

Discussion with casino security revealed that patrons are never pressured to refrain from filing any reports. Quite the contrary, Trump properties Security Director Santoro stated that casino security usually are passive recipients of information when it comes to the desire of patrons to report crime.

The Investigation Reports prepared by the State Police did not contain all the elements of similar reports prepared by casino security and will be missing data for those elements in this study. Specifically, unless written in the narrative portion by the investigating detective, exact location on the casino floor where a patron was victimized, a patron's reason for visiting Atlantic City, and where a patron was previously victimized may not be included in the State Police report but are part of all casino security reports. The State Police reports do include the critical elements that speak to the safety of the casino floor and the victim's characteristics. Specifically, these reports include which casino, year, month, day, time, gender, race, residence, and age of the victims, as well as the items stolen and their value. There were 78 instances for 1999-

2000 where the State Police were directly and solely involved with investigations of the type of crimes pertaining to this study; all have been reviewed and are included in the aggregate data reported in this dissertation that comprise the universe of crime on the casino floor.

The current study expanded the routine activity approach and addressed the concerns of the earlier (Stitt et al., 2003) study that acknowledged that the Routine Activities Theory "was best suited to distinguish between casino-related crime and most other crime," but which lacked particular data relating to crimes specific to the casino and its environment. By examining crime specific to the casino and its victims, this study better understood the theoretical implications of the Routine Activities Theory and further described the nature and extent of casino crime victimization. These findings added to the previous research on the gambling-victimization relationship.

Through an analysis of crime reports for offenses committed on the casino floor, this study examined the circumstances preceding an offense. Assuming crime on the casino floor was not random or accidental, but was part of a calculus an offender considered when deciding to offend, the casino's characteristics, in tandem with patron demographics, may have played a significant role in determining victimization. This study identified victimization by subpopulations, temporal and spatial casino patron activities, and major crime types.

Chapter Three outlines the theoretical underpinnings and why the Routine Activities Theory was well suited for this study. It will make clear that oftentimes victimization will occur from legitimate activities, in this case the routine activities of patrons on the casino floor. The theoretical questions relating to criminal behavior on the casino floor is most appropriately answered by an understanding of the Routine Activities Theory, how the casino brings together offender and victim, and how the activities of casino patrons may determine their victimization.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.0 The Routine Activities Theory

Cohen and Felson (1979) attempted to explain crime trends by examining the "routine activities" of everyday life and how these activities created criminal opportunities. The routine activities of individuals determine their exposure and value to offenders and the extent that their property is guarded. For a crime to occur, three elements needed to converge in time and space; motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of capable guardians.

Cohen and Felson (1979) defined "routine activities" as continual activities providing individual needs such as work, social interaction, *and leisure* that may occur in or away from home. Cohen and Felson (1979) assumed motivated offenders as a given, and that it was the activity patterns of individuals that influenced victimization. Suitable targets, they said, can be an object (purse, car, wallet) or a human, (for personal attack). Offenders determine a target's value depending on their wants, access, and the ability to complete the task. Offenders were anyone predisposed to committing a crime drawn to a more visible target. Felson (1998; Cohen & Felson, 1980), using the

acronym VIVA to measure target suitability, said offenders are influenced by *value, inertia, visibility, and access.*

They indicated that universally valued is of course, cash. It is not traceable and readily transferable. Other items may have a high value, like console televisions or washing machines, but their weight and bulk alone are enough to dissuade someone from just stealing them and walking away, or the physical capability of a human target to thwart a crime may make them a less likely choice (inertia). Targets can become visible and affect their risk of discovery just by flashing money or not securing valuables, or if in a dangerous area, making themselves ostentatious through dress or behavior. Access enables an offender to commit an act and flee the scene; a suitable site. The ease with which a safe departure from a criminal act is likely creates the ideal environment when offenders decide on targets. Though getting access to targets may be easy enough, the ability to carry away their stolen goods is critical.

Capable guardians are the means, human or mechanical, that frustrate crime or in some way protect the victim. In addition to victims acting as guardians for themselves, capable guardians can be either in the form of police or private security, family members, friends, or mechanical security devices (locks, alarms).

The Routine Activities Theory stresses how crime risks relate to the activities of peoples' lives. Felson (2001) emphasizes that the routine activities model "is suitable for making comparisons at various levels of analysis." In more densely populated areas, auto theft increases, while in populations less dense, burglary rises. Weather produces crime cycles; increased beer consumption in summer month's leads to increased victimization. Finally, crime rates vary with the hour of the day, reflective of one's daily routine activities (Felson, M. 2001).

Karmen (2001) also underscores the need to consider broad-based explanations when determining varying risks of victimization. Specifically, offenders judge their targets along several dimensions: attractiveness, proximity, deviant place, and vulnerability. Attractiveness refers to the value of the item and the ease in taking it. Proximity describes the ease to approach a target without detection. Deviant places act as magnets for specific "hot spots" that attract offenders. These locations may include crowded public places or desolate areas. Vulnerability pertains to a target's ability to ward off victimization.

These concepts in combination with ones' lifestyle and routine activities are the formula to determine the likelihood of victimization. Where and how money and time are expended, and the pursuit of amusement and excitement, all help to determine how people place themselves in harms' way. Karmen

(2001) adds that in addition to lifestyles, the routine activities of individuals that include, working, shopping, commuting, and attending school determine who, when, where, and in what manner people will be victimized.

The elements of the Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979, Felson, 2002) are most appropriate for this study that examines the ecology of crime at a specific location, the casino, floor, while concentrating on the activities of the players. The casino floor environment lends itself to examine the lifestyles and activities of its wagering patrons. The theory's elements - motivated offenders, suitable targets, and absence of capable guardians - can be tested through an analysis of reported crimes and their location in the gaming area, interviews of key casino security personnel, interviews of officials of the casino regulatory and criminal prosecutorial sections, and on-site observations. Additionally, a review of the Casino Control Act, and the relating New Jersey Administrative Code governing casinos, provides the statutory requirements for the minimum mandated security features for all casinos.

The activity patterns of patrons place them, and their valuables (targets), at various specific locations on the casino floor in different months, days, and at different times. The casino area relates to either the many different table games (Craps, Roulette, Blackjack etc.) or the slot machine area. Patrons' leisure activity movements dictate the "place" of victimization. The casino floor is specifically defined by regulation to include the entire gaming area. Through

field observation, this study determined that the routine activities for slot machine and table game players differed, and answered questions as:

- Did the manner in which patrons place wagers, guard their coin-cups, chips, purses and other possessions precipitate victimization?
- To what extent were patrons capable guardians?
- What effect did passive and active security measures taken by the casino have on mitigating victimization by providing capable guardianship?

In the seminal work on crime victims, *The Criminal and His Victim,(1948)* von Hentig claimed that victims encouraged their victimization from a motivational (attracting, inducing) and functional (precipitating, facilitating) perspective. He advocated studying victim characteristics and behavior and their interaction with offenders. The casino environment is an ideal background to analyze this dimension outlined by von Hentig and examine to what extent, by their routine activities, do casino patrons precipitate personal offenses against themselves.

Motivated offenders and suitable targets, since they are derived from the same population, can be measured by the number of visitors to the Atlantic City casino area in a given year as well as government statistics on the aggregate amount of money wagered at all casinos. In selecting a target, what can be more attractive to a thief than the casino floor, where coin cups are highly

visible and at times, out of direct control of a patron when the cup is laid to the side of a slot machine, or where the multi-denominational chips of other players are within easy grasp at the table games? In fact, the exposure of cash by gaming patrons makes them desirable targets.

Similarly, coats or purses strewed over a slot machine chair or table game chair create greater visibility for offenders. Most important, is that in the casino setting, cash or chips, which are easily converted to cash, are everywhere as they are the medium of exchange to wager. Felson (1998) notes cash, unlike goods, do not have to be traded, unloaded, or converted. Untraceable and immediately usable, cash requires no middleman to discount it. Additionally, there are many distractions at the casino to lessen a patron's vigilance of their valuables, not the least of which is free alcohol.

Not only does visibility of targets and its value invite victimization, but casino access is free and basically unscreened, thus, the ease of victimizing a target and fleeing through the casino's multiple entrances or exits becomes readily apparent. Alternatively, the high patron density on the casino floor provides an ideal opportunity for offenders to blend in with other patrons after committing a crime without exiting the casino.

3.1 Empirical Testing of the Routine Activities Theory

The routine activities approach has received wide support, though not without its critics. Its analyses have included studies involving leisure activities, specific domains, crime 'hot spots,' and subpopulations. Analyzing the National Crime Victimization Survey, Miethe et al. (1987) found routine activities had a direct effect on property victimization, though less so for violent crimes. Stahura (1988) uncovered similar findings using the Uniform Crime Reports, and also discovered that routine activities also had a direct effect on arson rates.

Victimization during leisure activities has been well documented. Sampson and Woodredge (1987) reported high rates of victimization for youths out at night, as did Kennedy and Forde (1990). In two studies, Lasley and Rosenbaum (1988) and Lasley (1989) found multiple victimizations associated with high alcohol consumption and 'partying' on Friday or Saturday night; even ones' drinking routines increased the odds of predatory victimization. Miethe, Stafford, and Sloane (1990) determined that people who left their homes for evening activities were more likely to be victimized. Cohn and Rotton (2003) found that a change in the routine activities of individuals during holidays was associated with an increase in crime. Crimes of violence

were more likely to occur on major holidays, where more people were drawn together and alcohol used more frequently.

3.1.1 By Specific Domains

Some researchers have examined victimization by specific domains. Why, they ask, do certain places or neighborhoods experience higher crime rates? Mustaine and Tewksbury (1997) were critical of the Routine Activities Theory because they believed it lacked specific tests to examine the predictive abilities within certain domains. To remedy this, they suggested either comparing data across domains or accumulating domain-specific tests of the theory. They believed focusing on a domain facilitated the causal link between victimization and daily activities. It was critical to understand the settings where victimization occurs and the relating activities.

One study correlated the number of taverns on particular city blocks in Cleveland to the frequency of crime. The findings supported the "hot spots" concept in accounting for victimization. People, who shop, or go to bars, dances, and parties at night were more vulnerable to victimization. A by-product of bars is the possibility that patrons will become inebriated. Since bars attract offenders, such inebriated patrons create suitable targets. When patrons depart and are outside the watchful eye of guardians at the bar, they are more likely to be victimized, (Roncek & Maier, 1991). Similarly, in San

Diego, blocks that had more taverns had significantly more crime, (Roncek & Pravatiner, 1989).

Another bar room study by Fox and Sobol (2000) discovered that the extent of guardianship measured by the number of bouncers correlated with a lower amount of sexual offending and bar room disorder; more bouncers, fewer violations. Additionally, the routine activities of bar patrons increased neighborhood disorder outside the bars and in adjoining neighborhoods.

3.1.2 By Sub-populations

Mustaine and Tewksbury (1997) also noted that another weakness in routine activity assessments was the use of general populations. They felt research should be delineated by gender as women have different lifestyle options and constraints that were important when examining domain specific contexts. Sherman et al., (1989) found that certain areas were "hot spots" of crime because these areas reported a disproportionate number of crimes. Consequently, it was important not to limit observations to the routine activities of people, but also of places.

Robinson (2000) was able to operationalize routine activities as the volume and regularity of pedestrian and automotive traffic in residential areas on selected streets in Tallahassee, Florida. He demonstrated how burglary rates

were negatively related; the higher the street volume of routine activities, the lower the burglary rate. Hollinger & Dabney (1999) concluded that motivated offenders and the absence of capable guardians significantly affected motor-vehicle thefts at major shopping malls.

In recommending the examination of sub-populations, Gartner et al. (1990) suggested that one consequence of theoretical testing on the general population is to confuse differences in subpopulations, as males and females. As women engage in activities away from the safety of home, their victimization rates may parallel the rates for men.

Concerning gender and routine activities, Schwartz and Pitts' work (1995) directed attention to the "suitable targets" element of Cohen & Felson's (1979) theory. In examining sexual assault in the campus setting, they looked at what motivated an offender to select a particular target. They concluded that certain women's lifestyles, like going out drinking more often, or drinking with male friends (motivated offenders) who got them drunk in order to have sex, were more likely to be victimized. However, these women believed that they did not purposefully engage in such risky behavior because they did not initially recognize this behavior as risky. In effect, their supposed capable guardians, their friends, became motivated offenders.

Similarly, Mustaine (1997) commenting on general patterns of victimization, asked if "women are more likely to be victimized by persons they know, and men more likely by strangers or acquaintances, are women more likely to be victimized at home, and men at leisure?" Felson (1998) also observed lower victimization risks for females and the elderly who were likely to spend more time at home in a safe environment with others.

The focus of the above studies has been on the various types of social environments and its members. Applying the Routine Activities Theory as the analytical framework, this study explained crime in the casino and also expanded the theory by examining a novel crime location, (the casino floor) and its subpopulation (those who wager). Specifically addressing:

- How were routine activities on the casino floor related to its crime?
- Why did some locations in the casino experience crime?
- Who were the typical victims?
- What types of activities by patrons did casino security regard as routine?
- How did victimization vary by age, gender, or race?
- When are most patrons victimized?

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN

4.0 Introduction

The preceding chapters have outlined the theoretical context for this study, detailed general empirical studies of one aspect of the gambling-crime relationship (the usual approach is to examine whether gambling losses cause crime) and examined specific studies of crime and gambling relating to Atlantic City. How crimes relate to leisure time activities and tourists have also been discussed.

What is quite apparent is that there is an absence of evidence-based research of crime on the casino floor. This is probably attributable not to the fact that there is not an interest to examine this milieu, as there is ample literature that speaks to crime by domains, but more likely the difficulty in obtaining casino crime data which is well-guarded or meshed into general UCR statistics and cannot be disentangled.

Examine the 1999 crime reports for Florida by county (Appendix C). According to the Orange County Police Department (OCPD), crime committed inside Disney World is reportable to OCPD who also respond if a police

officer is needed (Orange County Police Department, personal communication December 3, 2004). The population for Orange County was 846,328, and it had a total index crime rate per 100,000 residents of 8.3% and a 5.0% rate for theft, the crime typically associated with tourism. By contrast, two of the most populated other counties, Miami-Dade (2,126,702) and Broward (1,490,289), had total index and theft rates of 9.1%, 5.1% (Miami-Dade), and 5.7%, 3.3% (Broward). Miami-Dade County was more than 2 ½ times more populated than Orange County, and Broward County was more than 1 ¾ times more populated. Orange County also includes the city of Orlando where additional crime may be exported to as a result of the tourism at Disney World (Uniform Crime Report 1999/Florida). Though the crime statistics are publicly unavailable delineating crime committed inside Disney World, it is probably safe to assume that the bourgeoning tourist population contributed to such a high rate.

As with any tourist attraction, including Atlantic City, the likelihood of an increase in crime is evident. It comports with the Routine Activities Theory as offenders are present and intersect with the legitimate activities of individuals. There is no evidence to suggest that tourist attractions attempt to report even lower rates of crime by discouraging reporting, though the nature and extent of crime occurring at a particular tourist attraction is not publicly reported except in aggregate statistics. This study is distinguished, in that, it was able to

disentangle and report casino crime from the aggregate crime statistics for New Jersey for 1999-2000.

As previously mentioned, this study evolved from discussions with J.P. Suarez, the Director of the Division of Gaming Enforcement who was responsible for the development, safety, and integrity of the casino industry and its patrons. As this was the first attempt that an empirical crime analysis of casinos was undertaken, Director Suarez ensured the researcher that the necessary data was accessible and arranged for interviews with key casino casino employees and with other State officials. This research is comprised of the results of these interviews, the researcher's personal observations at different casinos, the secondary data analysis from the crime reports of each casino, and from visitor data from officials of the New Jersey Transportation Authority.

Specifically, Director Suarez arranged for interviews with the Director of Security of Trump Properties, Richard M. Santoro ("Rick") and New Jersey Deputy Attorney General Ted Grove of the Casino Prosecutions Bureau. From there, the mere mention of his name was enough to provide a snowball type sampling of others integral to the casino industry. The researcher also interviewed officials from the Divisions of Gaming Enforcement, the Casino Control Commission, the New Jersey State Police, and the New Jersey Transportation Authority, as well as casino personnel.

The researcher was permitted free access on the casino floor and to any casino floor representative, a security officer or gaming supervisor; questioning was unencumbered. Oftentimes, the researcher observed the various patrons from either security rooms, or while wagering on the casino floor. The combination of interviews, observations, and data analysis were the sources that identified the routine activities of wagering patrons and the conditions contributing to their victimization. Other sources of information included, newspaper accounts, peer-reviewed journals, professional and trade literature, annual reports, New Jersey statutes and regulations, regulatory agency procedures, and information retrieved from the Internet.

4.1 Research Questions

Based on the literature review, and using the Routine Activities Theory as the framework for analysis, questions emerged that had not previously been studied in the casino-crime relationship. Specifically, were women equally victimized as men in the casino environment? Generally, research indicates male and female patterns of victimization may differ; women typically have lower rates of victimization because they usually take more precautions to limit exposure. As women attend casinos as part of their routine activities, which take them from home and place them in contact with strangers, would their victimization increase?

In addition to gender, do the general patterns of victimization vary by age? Literature suggests that the most vulnerable to personal assaults are young, unmarried males who frequent bars, go to the movies, or spend time out of the house walking or driving around (Kennedy & Forde, 1990). However, since there is a minimum age requirement to gamble, casino victimization should not support this literature for those under 21. However, the data could reflect that young men over 21 could be over-represented in both the victim and offender category for aggravated assaults, typically associated with young males over 21.

Some studies have attributed a lower victimization rate of the elderly because of their tendency to remain home and not go out alone (Mosher, Miethe & Phillips, 2002). With age comes the increased fear of crime. Other studies (Karmen, 1984) report that the elderly are more likely to be victims of non-violent crime like purse snatching and pocket picking, while Cohen and Cantor (1980) found age the strongest larceny determinant. Interestingly, Cohen and Cantor said the young would be victims of larceny more frequently, *but* they attributed this to the fact that they would spend more time than the elderly away from home.

Once again the current study is expanding our understanding of elderly victimization by recognizing that casinos have created an environment that the elderly feel safe to socialize and occupy their time. By sacrificing isolation to

wager at the casinos have the elderly removed themselves from the security of their home and guardians? Was there a relationship between the characteristics (gender, age, race) of patrons on the casino floor with their victimization? Additionally, it is likely that offenders view the elderly as more vulnerable, and for those over 75, who are disproportionately female and widowed, they may be at a greater disadvantage because they lack their closest guardian, their spouse, to watch over them.

The casinos, however, devote the greatest allotment of their floor space to slot machines, usually the play of choice for women and the elderly. Accordingly, sound marketing strategies would suggest casinos would attempt to encourage elderly females to visit Atlantic City for their leisure activity; will this result in an increase in their victimization?

Since the Routine Activities Theory is guiding this research, will the routine activities of casino patrons correlate with who gets victimized? Are men and women equally at risk at the casinos, at their type of wagering? Table games such as Craps or Blackjack require more analytical skills than do slot machines and as such, are usually reserved for the more practiced gambler. As the gambling explosion is a relatively recent phenomenon previously predominated by males, do table games intimidate women or would offenses be equally apportioned by gender and type of play? Are crimes more likely to be committed in the slots or table game area?

Miethe et al. (1987) reported strong support for routine activities and property crime, but not violent crime, the latter often involving interpersonal conflict or disagreement. What classes of offenses would occur on the casino floor? Would offenders opt for the offense where certainty of detection is least, as theft of a coin-cup or theft of coins from an unattended slot tray, or would they commit aggravated crimes that may afford them a greater financial reward?

Rational choice literature suggests that criminals engage in a calculus when deciding to commit a crime. Basically, they balance the certainty of detection and apprehension with their desire and opportunity for criminal gain. Criminals will desist from criminal activity if they believe the police amply protect a neighborhood (Rengert & Wasilchick, 1985). White (1990) found higher crime rates for "permeable neighborhoods"; those that provided greater access to streets from traffic. He concluded that criminals might select these areas because they are more open and provide greater escape routes.

Does the casino location facilitate crime? Are crime rates for those casinos located on the Boardwalk, where offenders upon leaving the casino can easily blend in with the neighborhood or Boardwalk strollers, similar to crime in the casinos located on the marina? Marina casinos are bound by water and a bridge, and are a considerable distance from the nearest neighborhood.

Architecturally, to what extent do casino executives design floor space solely with an eye toward security? If criminals always seek the optimum avenue of escape, are more crimes committed nearer to the exits and entrances to the casino floor? To what extent do regulations of the Casino Control Commission mandate a minimum-security standard?

Criminals choose their targets rationally and the Routine Activities Theory suggests that when capable guardians are present and evident, criminals will seek less protected targets. Overtly, the casinos attempt to frustrate crime by placing uniformed security guards on the casino floor, while covertly, video surveillance cameras continually scan the entire floor looking for potential problems. Perhaps attendance at the casino is not risky, and all who patronize casinos may not be at equal risk for victimization. The type of play one engages in at the casino, the time one enter and leaves, or even the day of the week, or month of year may all contribute to heightened opportunity for victimization.

Comparing the Routine Activities Theory with the casino crime data will establish empirical correlations on the nature, extent, and distribution of crime on the casino floor. Answers to these questions may suggest why individuals are more victim-prone and how they vary by gender, age, race, time, location, and type of play.

As Kenney (1996) points out, predictability enhances crime analysis and by focusing on time, location, and situational context, target hardening will be increased. This study examined among other variables, location, time, and situational context when patrons were victimized on the casino floor, and through predictability target hardening can be increased.

4.2 Hypotheses

Hypothesis One

The victimization rate for the ten casinos on the Boardwalk will be higher than the two casinos located on the Marina because the Marina is physically isolated, thus frustrating access and egress for offenders.

Hypothesis Two:

The intensity of crime will be directly related to the square footage of the casino floor.

Hypothesis Three:

The distribution of crime will be directly related to the number of gaming positions on the casino floor.

Hypothesis Four:

Though the casino floor may attract a significant number of motivated offenders, the density of patrons as well as casino security provide ample guardianship to minimize all index crimes except those requiring a high degree of stealth and victim facilitation. Thus, theft should have the highest frequency for all index crime.

Hypothesis Five:

Since coin-cups and cash are readily transferable and not traceable, they would be the items most often stolen.

Hypothesis Six:

The type of game will be inversely related to those who are victimized, i.e., games with more place managers (dealers, pit bosses, floor supervisors) will have lower reports of victimization.

Hypothesis Seven:

Since there are large numbers of patrons frequenting casinos, the likelihood that someone will be a repeat victim would be small.

Hypothesis Eight:

Since women are perceived as more vulnerable to crime, they will have a higher frequency of victimization.

Hypothesis Nine:

Those in the generation designated group identified as the *matures* (age 54 and older) will have a higher frequency of victimization than other age groups as they are perceived as more suitable targets.

Hypothesis Ten:

Since the casino floor has a multitude of capable guardians, both overtly and covertly, there will be fewer patrons reporting serious crimes of rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, as potential victims can easily alert the capable guardians to thwart the offense. The Routine Activities Theory suggests that an when more capable guardians are present the lesser the likelihood that this type of crime would occur.

Hypothesis Eleven:

Since most visitors to Atlantic City are day-trippers, of those who were victimized, the reason for their visit to Atlantic City will be to engage in gaming activities. This study suggested that casino gaming engendered a new type of leisure time routine activity causing motivated offenders and suitable targets to intersect.

Hypothesis Twelve:

Since the Atlantic City area is a summer tourist resort, there will be a greater incidence of crime in the casino during the months of June, July, and August than any other months. Consistent with the Routine Activities Theory one would expect that there would be greater motivated offenders and suitable targets at the casinos during the time of year that most people would visit Atlantic City.

Hypothesis Thirteen:

Since most leisure activity occurs on weekends, there will be higher reports of crime on Saturday and Sunday. Similarly, one would expect the weekends, when most people have free time, to cause a greater number of motivated offenders and suitable targets to be on the casino floor.

4.3 Sample

The most currently available casino crime data when this study began were for 1999 and 2000. This represented the universe of all reported crime, excluding those where the casino or the State was the victim, and for those less egregious crimes reported in Part II of the Uniform Crime Report. Such crimes included underage gaming, use of cheating devices for table games as marking cards, or slot machines, using shaved coins, bogus chips, credit card fraud, assaults on casino employees, theft or embezzlement by casino, employees, or attempted theft or robbery of a casino.

The Division of Gaming Enforcement, through the New Jersey State Police, made the crime reports for all the casinos for 1999 & 2000 available for this study with the caveat that the identity of the victims or offenders would not be disclosed nor would there be any attempt to contact or interview them; these parameters were acceptable for the dissertation.

This study was submitted to the C.U.N.Y. Graduate Center Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects for approval. The Committee concluded that the study was exempt review for IRB consideration under 45 CFR46.101b(4).

4.4 Data

The universe of crime data for this study was derived from two separate sources, all the casinos and the New Jersey State Police. Their respective crime reporting instruments were reviewed for 1999 and 2000. The New Jersey State Police has exclusive investigative jurisdiction for crimes committed on the casino floor. As previously mentioned, the Investigation Reports of the State Police may not show location on the casino floor where a patron was victimized, previous victimization, and reason for visiting Atlantic City, which are included in the investigation reports prepared by all the casinos.

The State Police reports include the critical elements that speak to the safety of the casino floor and the victim typology. Specifically, these reports include casino, year, month, day, time, gender, race, residence, and age of the victims, as well as the items stolen and their value.

After receiving approval to proceed with the study, the State copied all the crime reports for 1999 and 2000 prepared by the reporting casino where patrons were victimized on the casino floor. Crime reports in and around other locations of the hotel, as well as reports where the casino was the intended victim were not included. The crime reports were categorized in month order by each casino.

Each casino security report is numerically and chronologically controlled, and by regulation, must be maintained for three years by the casino. The report also provides a snapshot of the investigative status of the complaint by indicating whether the case remains under active investigation or has resulted in an arrest. The New Jersey State Police have a central office in Atlantic City as well as an office in each casino, but are not required to have a continual presence at each casino. Included in this study is where the New Jersey State Police responded to all thefts over $1000, aggravated assaults on patrons, or where the victim demanded that a police officer respond. As mentioned above, the New Jersey State Police as a matter of protocol also respond to other types of egregious crimes, but those crimes were excluded from this study as patrons were not the victims.

To record all crimes committed on the casino floor, each casino uses a generic document that identifies the casino, and who, where, when, and the circumstances of each crime occurrence. This form, as with the State Police is officially titled, "Investigation Report," and contains demographic and biographic information on the victim, and also describes the location on the casino floor where the crime occurred. It contains 82 separate elements of information that are used by the casino to report crime and is standard for all casinos, except for the casino identifier. The form also ensures uniformity and compliance in meeting the State and Federal Uniform Crime Reporting requirements.

The Investigation Report describes, with sufficient particularity, elements of the crime offense used to successfully test the Routine Activities Theory. Examine Appendix A (Investigation Report) prepared by security department at the Trump Marina Hotel & Casino. Item 5 describes the crime with the official title designated by the state and federal Uniform Crime Reporting requirements; in this case theft, an index crime.

Items 7-12 relate to when the crime occurred and relates to the routine activities of players. Item 13 describes the 'place' and usually the gaming activity the patron was engaged in when victimized. However, some of the reports (approximately 215, 2%) are not as specific as others, in that they may not include the area, the zone, or the asset number (slot machine identification number) of a particular slot machine, and would only indicate 'slot area.'

Items 6, and 14- 31, except for 24, 25, and 26, either are internal casino security control identifiers not essential for this study, or relate to the identity, social security number, address, and type and place of employment of the victim. By agreement with the State and the C.U.N.Y. Institutional Review Board, victim and offender information would remain confidential and not be part of this dissertation.

Items 24 (age), 25 (sex), and 26 (race), are recorded and included in this study. This information is critical to determine a victim-profile and to see how casino crime varies by each of these variables. Item 32 (modus operandi) is a narrative portion describing the circumstances of the event. It is useful in developing a criminal profile by the method used by an offender to commit a crime. It is included in this dissertation to identify emerging patterns to aid the industry and the State in protecting patrons. Items 33-39 refer to motor vehicle identity; variables related to the crime of motor vehicle theft, which are not included in this study for obvious reasons.

Items 40-45 reflect the type of property taken, (currency, jewelry, furs, clothing, miscellaneous) and in conjunction with items 46-7, provide a portrait of a theft profile by article and worth. These variables also speak to the capable guardianship element of the Routine Activities Theory in that, if most of the items stolen are coin-cups, or clothing, these are the types of offenses aided by the lack of vigilance by victims because these items are usually on or near them. If such an item is ripped away from a victim, or some other type of force or fear is used, the crime would be classified as a robbery...a classification that renders the casino floor a very different domain in terms of safety.

Items 48-50 are internal controls in the casino relating to a teletype about the crime, whether specialized police services, like a polygraph, or sketch artist was used, and the identity of the technician performing the services.

Item 51 (injuries) identifies with particularity, the degree, type of injury sustained, and weapon used. This also provides a picture of the dangerousness of the casino floor, the type of offender, and the extent to which the casino guardians proactively respond to this variable. By this I mean, if the data demonstrated that a substantively significant number of patrons were robbed, or that weapons were used, one would expect the industry response would be to have some type of physical security screening device upon entry, as do airports and government buildings. The fact that there is no metal detection or other screening device to enter the casino, demonstrates the safety of the casino floor from this type of victimization. Since screening devices are usually the first response where a threat of weaponry or explosives may be anticipated, it appears that the casino industry, through the intelligence gathering capability of the New Jersey State Police, believes such a threat is extremely unlikely. This does not demonstrate a lack of vigilance by the casino.

Item 52 (reason for visit) describes the lure of the casino. The options are: gambling, vacation, business, convention, or a combination of these choices. For those vacationing, they may be in a physical and mental state of not having to, or wanting to, be "on-guard" while at leisure. This condition would affect

the capable guardianship that patrons provide to themselves when they are less vigilant and more accepting of the environment, which translates into victim facilitation. An alternative explanation is that gaming, whether at a table game or slot machine, is a distraction from vigilance. Therefore, one would expect that the data would show that more patrons were victimized who came to Atlantic City to gamble than those who came to vacation.

Item 53 (victim-offender relationship) per agreement as noted above, was not included in this study. Item 54 (victim's residence, city county, state, out-of-state) is included and will add to the victim profile. Item 55, (offense location) refers to the casino, or the hotel, but for this study the only reports collected were for all crimes on the casino floor, and as such, this item was not used.

Item 56, (was the subject victimized of money won at the casino) was also eliminated because this was a variable that was difficult to triangulate and did not affect any element of the theory. This also assumes that a patron at any given time is aware of the won or loss figure, a situation unlikely until the culmination of play for the day or evening.

Item 57, (prior victimization in Atlantic City) is an interesting variable to measure if patrons are "once burned, twice shy." Victimization literature speaks of repeat victimization, and as part of the Routine Activities Theory, one would suspect that victims would increase their own capable guardianship

after involvement in a crime. Items 58-69 are internal controls not included in the study.

Items 70 –74 are most critical. Here, in the narrative portion is where the officer receiving the complaint has the opportunity to probe about the details of the occurrence. Officers can gain knowledge of, and become skilled at, developing victim and offender profiles. The narrative provides a descriptive account and is the bond that should link all the other crime elements. Item 75-82, once again are internal controls and supervisory review.

As is evident, the Investigation Report also examines crime by predictable places and predictable times. It shows where crime converges in space and time; it identifies "hot spots." It establishes offender profiles through 'modus operandi,' and victim profiles through demographics and personal characteristics. These findings can be used to educate casinos, patrons, and the industry to initiate situational changes where appropriate.

In describing the property stolen, its value, and the person victimized, the report clearly delineates the suitable target element of the Routine Activities Theory. Similarly, the narrative portion and crime incident location items on the report reveal what patrons were doing when they were victimized. That is, what were the routine activities of gaming in which they were engaged?

Each report is submitted to the New Jersey State Police. Basically, the New Jersey State Uniform Crime Reporting guide mirrors the federal Uniform Crime Report. All law enforcement agencies in the state submit crime reports to the NJSP who, thereafter, submit them to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for inclusion in their annual report, 'Crime in the United States.' The State also compiles their crime information to prepare the annual State equivalent, 'Crime in New Jersey.' A detailed discussion of the reporting requirements of the Uniform Crime Report and its limitations is provided below as a limitation in this study.

4.5 Data Analysis Plan

After reviewing the reports, the information was classified and coded and those variables that were to be used to test the Routine Activities Theory as well as to devise a victim profile were developed. The coding process accounted for the routine activities of the patrons by reporting the exact times and places of offense throughout the casino floor, as well as the items stolen. Descriptive statistics of the victims and the time, location, and type of gaming behavior they were engaged in when they were victimized were tabulated and cross-tabulated, for any relationships. After coding, the reported elements were entered into an Excel database and then imported into SAS for analysis.

An instrument was developed from the casino Investigation Report to test the Routine Activities Theory. Specifically, the researcher wanted to identify those patrons who were at high risk, not only by their activities and movements, but also by the location where they were wagering (place) on the casino floor.

After identifying the casino, (CASINO) the offense was noted and classified (CRIMTYPE), just as the manner in that it would be officially reported to the New Jersey State Police and FBI. The reportable crimes were murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and larceny (theft). The other index crimes of burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson were excluded because either the casino was the victim, or as in the case of motor vehicle theft, it could not occur on the casino floor.

The variable (CRIMTYPE), and a relating one, concerning type of injury (INJURY) established the egregiousness of the crime and whether the casino floor was generally a safe location for patrons. If the crime reports reflected that serious predatory crime was minimal at the casino or patrons received no serious injuries during the commission of crime, then generally, that would speak to the safety of the casino floor. Crime type was also something that was measured in terms of victimization. Those games that had more guardians attentive to the patrons and their money should have fewer victims. Hence, target attractiveness, an element of the Routine Activities Theory, could be

examined by looking at how victimization was distributed by which games patrons were playing.

The time, day, month, and year of occurrence (CRIMHOUR, CRIMDAY, CRIMMONTH, CRIMYEAR) were the variables detailing when patrons were victimized. This was compared to the vacationing months or other special events that may occurred in Atlantic City throughout the year and was associated with spikes in offenses. The victim's age, gender, and race, (VICAGE, VICGEND, VICRACE) were all variables determining how victimization varied by these categories as well as determining if they influenced the 'suitable targets' element of the theory.

The literature notes that in the aggregate, the social network composition of the elderly, their physical condition, and health status diminish the likelihood that their routine activities will intersect with those of potential offenders. Age is an important indicator of lifestyle, in that, usually there is an increased fear of crime. However, if the casinos have created an environment that the elderly find attractive to socialize and occupy their time without fear, there may be a change in their regularly performed events to include casino visits. Consequently, casinos may have removed the elderly from the security of their homes and increased their probability of meeting motivated offenders. These three variables, age, gender, and race examine the Routine Activities Theory by sub-populations.

The type and value of property taken (PROPTAKE, PROPVAL) also reflect target suitability, as Felson (1998) explains that a target can be a person or material object. The reason for visiting Atlantic City (REASONVST), and if the patron was previously victimized (PRIORVIC) are variables speaking to the capable guardianship element of the theory. Generally, individuals who are visiting Atlantic City on vacation are probably less attuned to becoming a victim of a crime than those who come for business or convention and venture to a casino in their free time. Rarely are vacation plans and a decision to spend such discretionary money made with heightened caution about becoming a victim; guardianship is relaxed.

Similarly, patrons who are previously victimized may acquire personal security measures, (not carrying purses or wallets), become more vigilant and circumspect as they play, or pay closer attention to the location of uniformed security when deciding where to play. Once victimized, patrons should become better guardians and it would be expected that repeat victimization would be minimal.

The residence of the victim (VICRES) is delineated on the report by Atlantic City, Atlantic County, and in or out-of-state. These choices speak to the perception of Atlantic City and an individual's fear of crime, and their coinciding feeling about guardianship. Residents and out-of-state visitors may

perceive the geographical area differently than those residing in proximity to Atlantic City and that may result in less concern for guardianship. Media accounts of crime in Atlantic City or Atlantic county make those who reside closer more aware of the potential for victimization. Additionally, by combining the reason for visiting Atlantic City with the victim's residence, it might be possible to predict who gets victimized, tourists or residents.

Finally, the crime location on the casino floor (CRIMLOC) not only identifies where the offense occurred but also identifies the type of play the victim was engaged in when victimized, and identifies the 'place' element of the theory. Through this variable, and with other casino figures, the density and distribution of crime by 'hot spot' can be measured. This is critical because it will identify the routine activities of patrons when they were victimized. Analysis of these variables will establish a personal, spatial, and temporal victim profile.

Initially, frequency tables were generated to determine which gaming activities patrons were engaged in when they are victimized, at what time, and on what day, week, and month. Additionally, a frequency distribution by type of crime, identified the most prevalent crime by classification and which objects (purses, wallets, coin-cups) were most often stolen. The attributes of these independent variables established the routine activities of those victimized. The independent observations of the casino floor, as well as interviews with casino

security confirmed the routine activities of patrons that may have contributed to their victimization. Contingency tables by age and gender also established a clearer victim profile. Finally, at one the largest casinos, Trump Taj Mahal, the data were analyzed by gaming zone to show exactly where on the casino floor patrons were victimized. This was accomplished because the Security Director provided a schematic layout of the casino floor delineated by zone, type of game, and asset (slot machine) number.

4.6 Limitations of the Study

Per agreement with the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement, there were no attempts to interview victims or offenders, and as such, was a limitation of this study. The study could not determine the calculus the offender used when deciding to select a particular target or casino; nor could the study determine why, with constant video surveillance, offenders would believe they could escape detection. Even if offenders succeeded in committing crimes, why they would believe that casino security could not review surveillance tapes for photograph identification for a subsequent lookout or arrest, would have been a viable and interesting issue to explore by interviewing them; why did not continual surveillance deter them?

Similarly, without interviewing the victim, the researcher could not corroborate field observations about the particular activities that a patron was engaged in,

that may have facilitated or encouraged an offender to identify them as a suitable target. Did the patron do anything to prevent the crime by making her/himself less inviting as a target? However, in Chapter 5, the researcher discusses victim and offender profiles, which provided some indication of why a particular patron was victimized.

Another limitation of this study is inherent in all studies relying on official crime reports. Data, comprising UCR reports, whether prepared at the state or federal level, suffer from well-established limitations. Foremost, is that most crimes remain hidden from the police. Only about 20% are cleared by arrest and because of the hierarchy rule which counts only the most serious offense in a single-scheme series of crimes, the prevalence of crime is undercounted, (Miethe & McCorkle, 2001).

The United States Department of Justice administers two statistical programs to measure the magnitude, nature, and impact of crime in the nation, the UCR and the National Crime Victimization Survey ("NCVS"). Both use different methods and focus on different aspects of crime and together they provide a better picture of the nation's crime problem.

The UCR for the nation is reported annually on January 1st for the previous year's crime and is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). The FBI collects crime data from each state through UCR state

coordinators. In New Jersey, the New Jersey State Police is the designated coordinator that receives the data from each municipality. The data are published yearly for in the nation in *Crime in the United States* and for New Jersey in *Crime in New Jersey.*

The data consist of eight separate crime categories commonly referred to as the "index crime": (1) murder and non-negligent manslaughter, (2) forcible rape, (3) robbery, (4) aggravated assault, (5) burglary, (6) larceny-theft, (7) motor vehicle theft, (8) arson. It is the number of actual offenses known or reported to the police regardless if anyone is arrested for the crime, property recovered, or prosecution initiated.

The UCR reports crime as aggregates, percentages, and rates. The crime rate is derived by dividing the number of reported crimes for a given location, (national, state, local) by the resident population. The UCR and its relating individual crime report is limited in that it details only reported crime, does not differentiate between attempted and completed offenses, and employs a "hierarchy rule" where the most egregious offense committed is the only recorded for each crime incident. Thus, if a suspect stole a vehicle, robbed and raped the driver in one incident, only the rape would get reported in official statistics. The index crimes are also referred to as Part I offenses, while the reporting of other offenses are Part II or non-index crimes (Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook).

The inherent problem with crime rates in tourist areas like Atlantic City, Las Vegas, or even Disney World, is that at specific times of the year, or perhaps year-round, a burgeoning tourist population adds to an "at risk" potential of becoming a crime victim. Tourist attractions also employ considerable workers who too, must be factored in as potential victims. The conundrum is that the resident population is used to calculate the crime rate. When the influx of tourists adds to the at-risk population, and this figure is not adjusted with the resident population for all reported crime, an upward spike in the crime rate results.

Another UCR limitation is the reluctance of victims and witnesses to report crime because they feel it is too trivial and the police will not be responsive; or an officer's decision not to record minor crimes; or an administrator's decision to downgrade offenses, all adding to the *dark figure* (unreported) of crime (Mosher, Miethe and Phillips, 2002). These limitations may also apply to crime reporting on the casino floor.

There is no reason to assume that casino floor crime neutralizes any of the UCR limitations. In fact, there may be a higher "darker" figure of crime if casino patrons are unwilling to report thefts if they feel the amount is nominal (because they delude themselves in thinking that their coin-cup was not full, nor will accept that coin-cups can hold considerable amounts of coins) or

because they feel that their own neglect abetted the offense; embarrassment motivates non-reporting.

As mentioned previously, this study analyzed the universe of reported casino crime data for two years, 1999-2000, in which patrons were victims. During this period about 4200 incidents per year were reported for all casinos. A review of the aggregate number of casino related crimes for the years 1994-1998 reflect on average 4990 were reported, though included in these figures, are incidents where the casino was the victim that account for the higher average. This comparison would suggest that data for 1999 and 2000 were consistent with the preceding years and not an anomaly.

Crimes against tourists are also empirically underrepresented in the victimization literature because entertainment attractions and the tourist industry are reluctant to report crime for fear of the effect it would have potential future tourists, (Schiebler et al. 1996). The ideal data set would include the number of patrons that visit each casino during the year and how these patrons vary by age, gender, race, type of play, and frequency of visits. An exhaustive literature review, discussion with New Jersey regulatory officials and casino industry representatives, revealed that those types of data were not maintained. Though certain casinos may maintain figures on their patrons that apply for casino incentive cards, that information is proprietary and clearly does not include all who visit the casino floor; that data has its own

limitations. An alternative methodology to arrive at those visiting the casino will be discussed later in this chapter.

Finally, though the study commented on the characteristics of those who were victimized, the data limitation prevented any assertions about those characteristics or traits, either individually or in-tandem, concerning which patron either by race, gender, or age were disproportionately at risk for victimization at the casino. Though the data may safely conclude that a profile *of those victimized* on the casino floor exists, without knowing the total number of such victims who visit the casino and how they vary by race and gender, there is no way to determine if any particular sub-population has a greater chance of becoming a crime victim.

4.7 The Victimization Rate and the Concept of "Visitor Trips"

Elements of this study examined the victimization rate on the casino floor. To obtain the rate, requires a comparison of those who are victimized with those who are not. Without an aggregate figure for those not victimized, the current study could only identify a victim profile from its finite universe of victims, which has been identified from all the casino crime reports. As mentioned previously, one limitation of the study was the unknown figure of the type and number of patrons who frequented casinos.

Comparatively speaking, it is difficult to assess victim risk and safety on the casino floor if only the victims are known. For instance, to what extent (percentage) are patrons placing themselves and valuables at risk can only be determined if the denominator of total visitors to the casino floor is established. However, without such a denominator, examining who is victimized is still a worthy endeavor because through frequency and contingency tables a victim profile will emerge.

Through an exhaustive literature review, interviews with public officials who regulate the casino, and casino executives, this study established that there is no public source document or other type of information that describes the total number or makeup of patrons who visit the casinos in Atlantic City for any given period. The casinos do employ, as a marketing strategy, various promotional incentives to encourage patrons to visit their particular casino. Casinos may offer tournaments for patrons wagering on slot machines or particular table games; the most common offered are Blackjack and Texas hold-'em poker. The poker tournaments are popular televised events where the winner walks away with hundreds of thousands of dollars. There are slot machine clubs, gaming junkets, and even the entertainment that is complimentarily offered are all attached to identifying and marketing patrons. (Rudd & Marshall, 2000). But once again, what is known are only those types of patrons who avail themselves of these promotions, and not the total population of casino floor visitors. The denominator is skewed. Additionally,

casinos regard their promotional players and information about their loyal patrons as proprietary and guard it accordingly.

The popularly televised Poker Hold 'em tournaments serve as an ideal marketing tool to identify players and encourage casino loyalty. A tournament in June 2004 required entry fees for players to have a chance to win millions. What was of greater interest to Harrah's, the sponsoring casino, was having the players complete an entry form containing biographical and other information that was fed directly into Harrah's database of potential customers. Harrah's realized that any future incentives were reaching serious gamblers. Harrah's had even teamed up with Coca-Cola by having special cans in a Coke 12-pack contain a $25,000 prize in sponsoring a treasure hunt during the summer Olympics (Fitch, 2004).

Since neither the State nor its regulatory, or enforcement agencies, nor the casinos, knew the total number of visitors to the casinos, the task was to identify the best available methodology that estimated the total number of casino patrons and from there, measure the intensity of crime on the casino floor. The challenge was to create a credible "benchmark."

One such method to arrive at the victimization rate for the Atlantic City casinos was to use the formula that New Jersey used to arrive at the number of "at risk" individuals who were potential victims. This was a critical calculation

because Atlantic City and its casinos, at one point in the past, had become the brunt of negative publicity when crime spiked after the advent of casinos.

4.7.1 Calculating the Visitors to Atlantic City

The South Jersey Transportation Authority ("SJTA") monitors the visitor flow to Atlantic City through a series of sophisticated measurements with an end result of producing a visitor adjusted rate that is calculated to explain the figures contained in the Uniform Crime Report. The inherent problem with crime rates in tourist areas like Atlantic City, Las Vegas, or even Disney World is that at specific times of the year, or perhaps year-round, a burgeoning tourist population adds to the "at risk" potential of becoming a crime victim.

Tourist attractions also employ considerable workers who also, must be factored in as potential victims. The conundrum is that the resident population is used to calculate the crime rate without regard to tourists or workers of the tourist attraction, most of whom probably do not reside within the attraction's jurisdiction.

To calculate the crime rate, the total reported crime is divided by the total resident population. When the influx of tourists adds to the at-risk population, and this figure is not adjusted with the resident population, an upward spike in the crime rate results.

The SJTA attempted to adjust the crime rate by conducting studies on the number of tourists to Atlantic City and to arrive at a true "at-risk" population. The Casino Control Commission ("CCC") requires all casinos to report the number, and under certain circumstances, the identity to whom they give a "complimentary" ("comp") offering. Complimentary offerings can be free meals, lodging, or wagering chips, the purpose of which is to instill loyalty, have patrons wager larger amounts, or increase their playing time.

Officials at the SJTA shared the methodology for this study in a series of interviews. To arrive at the visitor statistics, SJTA uses the transportation modes to Atlantic City. Basically, there are five transportation modes, two types of bus transportation (casino and franchise), air, rail, and automobile.

4.7.2 Bus Arrivals

All casino bus passengers receive a "comp" as they arrive in the bus garage at the casino where a representative from the casino boards the bus, counts the passengers, distributes a complimentary coupon, and reports the exact number of "comps" to the Casino Control Commission and to the SJTA. A casino bus is one that travels directly to the casino and is required to report their passenger counts.

In theory, not everyone who arrives by bus is required to enter the casino. There may be passengers who have availed themselves of the bus trip only, and continued on with other personal business or activities that did not include a visit to the casino or the hotel. However, these passengers still receive the "comp," cash it at the casino reception center, leave the casino and may take a bus to visit relatives or conduct non-casino business. The SJTA believes that this is an inconsequential number of passengers, approximately 2000 per year.

The casino bus passenger represents 25-30% of the total visitors to Atlantic City. The casino bus consists of two types of bus transportation, charter and line. A line bus is a regularly scheduled bus operated by a private company with schedules starting anywhere within 500 miles of Atlantic City. A charter is a bus for some specially organized group, typically a church group or rotary club. Sometimes, bus companies or a particular casino may organize charters, but in these cases a particular group arranges the bus for its members and guests. Both types of bus arrangements are grouped together for statistical purposes.

A franchise bus is yet a third type of bus arrangement, which for Atlantic City, only two operate, Greyhound Bus Lines and New Jersey Transit ("NJT"). The NJT is the public bus transportation for New Jersey while Greyhound is private. All Greyhound buses, wherever their origin, first go to a casino and then to the Greyhound station in Atlantic City. Once again at the casino, a

representative boards the bus and asks who is exiting for the casino, provides a coupon for food, or cash (comp) and reports that to the Casino Control Commission.

For reporting purposes, Greyhound buses meet the same requirements as the line and charter bus, with the exception that those passengers who indicate they are not getting off at the casino, are then taken directly to the Atlantic City Greyhound station; they are not included in the statistical casino count reported to the CCC. Greyhound decides and advertises to its passengers, when they purchase their tickets, exactly at which casinos they will stop before arriving at the Atlantic City bus terminal; some buses may even stop at two casinos.

All New Jersey Transit buses go back and forth to the Atlantic City bus terminal. New Jersey Transit buses emanate from five destinations: Cape May, NJ, Cumberland County, NJ, Newark, NJ, Philadelphia thru Lakewood, NJ, and the Port Authority bus terminal in New York City.

After obtaining the passenger counts from NJT, the SJTA calculates what percentage of those riders are visitors to Atlantic City. In recent years, SJTA estimates that approximately eight riders of a total of 34 passengers per bus are visitors and potential casino patrons.

4.7.3 Air Arrivals

The second category is air, and SJTA receives those numbers from the two airports, Bader Field, and Atlantic City International Airport ("ACIA"). For Bader Field, the smaller of the two airports, estimates are achieved by speaking to those who refuel the aircraft to arrive at an approximate number of air arrivals. The SJTA estimates about two passengers per aircraft are destined for Atlantic City for a total of about 12,000 per year.

Atlantic City International Airport is required under federal regulations to account for every passenger getting on and off any aircraft. The contentious issue of course, is how many of these passengers are visitors to Atlantic City and the casinos. The SJTA estimates that 30% of arriving passengers are visitors to Atlantic City. They have arrived at this percentage based upon surveys conducted by private firms that SJTA contracted, and surveys by Spirit Airline that now controls about 85% of the arriving flights, and more recently by Delta Airlines that currently has three flights from Cincinnati. These figures are for scheduled passengers.

Chartered flight passengers are a separate category that also arrives at ACIA and for whom SJTA considers 95% to be visitors to Atlantic City. The visitor count has been declining in recent years with the advent of Indian gaming establishments in Connecticut. Connecticut has siphoned off the Boston

market, the casinos in Windsor Ontario took the Midwest market, and finally, the Indian casinos in northern New York and Ontario eroded the northern New York and Canadian markets.

A smaller category of air passengers arrives on private planes. The tower at ACIA records private plane arrivals and departures. Many private planes are corporate jets and usually arrive when there are special events like big concerts, highly promoted boxing contests, or top entertainers.

Any arriving flights into Philadelphia Airport or Newark International Airport, whose passengers subsequently want to come to Atlantic City, must either come by bus, rail, or automobile, since both airports are a considerable distance away from Atlantic City. That passenger count would be captured from those respective conveyances. Air travel accounts for less than 1% of the total Atlantic City visitors. The casino appears unsuccessful in enticing visitors from the Midwest to fly east into the Atlantic City casinos, since Las Vegas is equally available in the opposite direction.

4.7.4 Rail Arrivals

Concerning rail passengers, New Jersey Transit use ridership surveys and has told SJTA that approximately 13% of its passengers are going to Atlantic City for social and recreational purposes, a figure adopted by the SJTA in its

official reports. There are no "comps" attached to rail passengers, and most who use the train are casino employees.

4.7.5 Automobile Arrivals

The final category, and most critical, is motor vehicle passengers. The methodology that SJTA employs is to create an imaginary "trip line" when vehicles pass through a given geographical point. The Atlantic City Expressway, one of the various routes into Atlantic City, and operated by the SJTA, maintains accurate statistics of its riders through payment of tolls at the Pleasantville Plaza. The other two main roads into Atlantic City are the Blackhorse and Whitehorse Turnpikes for which the New Jersey Department of Transportation maintains accurate statistics. The issue of course is, to determine the number of riders in each vehicle and how many will at least visit a casino.

In 1983, SJTA conducted a massive survey of 40,000 vehicles from which SJTA developed factors to determine the percentage of tourist vehicles. The survey consisted of stopping vehicles, counting the occupants, and asking them the reason for their visit to Atlantic City. Their findings reflected that approximately one third of all vehicles came to Atlantic City for recreational purposes. Similar smaller follow-up studies with similar results were conducted on the Atlantic City Expressway in the late 1980s and in the

summer of 1999. Additionally, the New Jersey Division of Taxation instituted a tax on all vehicles going in and out of casino garages and their count of vehicles closely approximated the number SJTA had been using.

In the summer of 1994, SJTA conducted a written survey of passengers arriving on a particular weekend at ACIA. One purpose of the survey was to measure the reasons for travel to Atlantic City. Overwhelmingly, (95%) of these visitors indicated that their sole purpose was to visit casinos, though most (55%) of the arriving passengers did not stay overnight. Similarly, the age of most of the arriving passengers (53%) were 55 and over (URS Consultants, 1995).

Though technically there is a sixth mode of transportation, private boat arrivals that park at the marina, SJTA believe these visits are insignificant, accounting for only 2000 visitors a year (Anthony Marino, Deputy Executive Director, South Jersey Transportation Authority, personal communication, August 1, 2003). There are no data maintained by SJTA that delineates visit trips by race, gender, or age.

The SJTA data (see Table 5-1) was used to create a usable denominator representing the total number of visitors to the casinos for the relevant years of the study. The reported casino crime data determined the number of victims (the numerator) divided by the total number of visitors to the casino

(denominator) to arrive at the proportion of the casino patrons who became crime victims in a given year. This is an overarching view of the safety of the casino. As mentioned above, when some researchers examined the casino-crime relationship, they controlled for the added influx of tourists in their calculations to adjust the UCR crime rate which always has the resident population as the baseline denominator.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter begins with an in-depth description of how the casino industry and the State of New Jersey have combined their resources to protect casino patrons as well as the integrity of casino gaming. These individual entities comprise one of the elements of the Routine Activities Theory, (capable guardians), and play a vital role in minimizing victimization.

The casino industry's capable guardians ensure, through their multiple tasks and responsibilities, that the casino industry generally remains free from any nefarious influence, while at the same type protect the safety and well being of gaming patrons. This joint effort is the reason legalized gaming in New Jersey enjoys its reputation for integrity and has been impervious to the various scandals that have plagued Atlantic City government. As Curran (2003) commented, "Atlantic City showed you could have a clean industry."

5.1 Atlantic City Casinos' Capable Guardians

Casinos are confronted with a barrage of internal and external hazards that could easily damage their reputation and credibility...and more importantly, their "bottom line." Their vulnerability may lie with the corrupt or compromised employee, the ever-present motivated offender, or even the seemingly legitimate business that supplies goods or services to the casino or hotel. To combat these threats, four distinct entities with separate tasks and responsibilities serve as a Praetorian Guard to ensure the integrity of the entire gaming industry. The Division of Gaming Enforcement, the Casino Control Commission, the New Jersey State Police, and the Casino Prosecutions Bureau work in tandem to fulfill their obligation in protecting hotel guests, wagering patrons, the State, and the industry. Complimenting this assemblage are the individual security forces for each casino as well as municipal and county law enforcement.

5.2 The Division of Gaming Enforcement

Information in this section was obtained through interviews of various officials of the Division of Gaming Enforcement ("DGE") (personal communication Kerry Hand, Investigator; J.P. Suarez, Director) as well as a review of public source documents. The Division of Gaming Enforcement reports to the Department of Law and Public Safety of the Attorney General's office. The

DGE was established by statute in 1977 with the passage of the Casino Control Act. The first casino, Resorts International, opened in May of 1978.

The Division of Gaming Enforcement, through its licensing and investigative responsibilities, protects the public interest by ensuring that the casino environment, which includes ancillary private companies conducting business with the casinos, is free from criminal influence. The Division of Gaming Enforcement is also responsible for the integrity and legitimacy of casino owners, operators, employees, and vendors. They accomplish this task with oversight, inspection, and audits through its investigative and prosecutorial efforts. The bureaus within the Division of Gaming Enforcement are responsible for employee licensing, service vendor licensing, and casino entity licensing. The Records and Identification Bureau within DGE fingerprints and conducts background investigations for all licensing applicants.

There are different levels of licensing and though hotel workers require no license, all employees on the casino floor must be licensed. The lowest level is the 'casino service registrant license' and is issued to such workers on the casino floor as waitresses, janitorial personnel, and restroom attendants, all of whom play no part in the actual running of a gaming operation. Casino floor dealers or cashiers or other titles involved in actual play, must have a "gaming license." A "key license" is reserved for upper staff positions in the casino like

the pit bosses and supervisory staff. Finally, a 'service industry license' is required for all who conduct business with a casino and hotel.

The type of business is divided into "service related," which may include providing silverware and linens to the hotel, and "gaming related," which relates to items used on the casino floor; the gaming related business having the greater impact and significance on the integrity of the casino. The higher the volume of business a vendor conducts with a casino, the more in-depth the background investigation. A key license requires an extremely detailed background investigation, while the other employee license background investigations are basic.

If negative information is discovered during the key license background investigation, the Division of Gaming Enforcement evaluates the nature and extent of the negative event, and issues a recommendation to the Casino Control Commission to disqualify or approve the applicant. Though the Division of Gaming Enforcement can recommend against issuance of a license or revocation of an existing license, the Casino Control Commission is the ultimate arbiter.

Events or reasons that impugn the 'honesty, integrity, and good character' of an applicant are the typical reasons for an adverse recommendation. Though an arrest or incarceration does not mandate disqualification, usually drug or

weapons violations bar eligibility as does membership or association with organized crime. In fact, with the different types of licenses awarded, the Division of Gaming Enforcement has always strived to remove the slightest scintilla of organized crime association. As such, key type licenses are held to a much higher standard.

There are almost 400 employees in the Division of Gaming Enforcement, which include investigators, attorneys, and technical experts. One of the main tools of the DGE is their statutory authority granting them unfettered access to all records and machinery in the casino. In addition to financial documents, the DGE can remove slot machines or table games from the casino floor without notice for examination and inspection.

The Technical Services Bureau of DGE controls everything related to the slot machines through slot laboratories, electrical engineers, and statisticians. It is probably the 'premier' slot laboratory in the world. Not only must the Division of Gaming Enforcement approve all prototypes of slot machines before they are placed on the casino floor, but also, once on the floor, all slot machines are constantly inspected.

There are approximately 42,000 slots machines in Atlantic City and as long as the casinos remain open, which is 24 hours a day, seven days a week, the Technical Services Bureau is on duty verifying large jackpot wins and

conducting machine inspections. Additionally, every casino has at least one DGE investigator assigned to that casino.

The Division of Gaming Enforcement maintains an 'exclusion list' commonly referred to as the 'black book.' Through a series of law enforcement contacts, city, state, and federal, a DGE investigator accumulates known or suspected individuals who may be 'inimical to the best interests of the casino industry.' These individuals are compared to casino databases to determine if they have any type of play or are known to frequent particular casinos.

Someone who has committed a crime and frequents the casinos is not necessarily added to the exclusion list. It is the crime, in conjunction with the ability to impact on the integrity of the casino that is the controlling factor. The fact that someone has been placed on the exclusion list is not only shared with all casinos, but is public and appears on the web sites for the Division of Gaming Enforcement and the Las Vegas Gaming Bureau, complete with the classification of offense and photographs. In effect, this procedure serves to limit the number of motivated offenders.

Membership on the exclusion list is indefinite, and when there is a proposal to place someone on the list, there is a due process right to contest inclusion. It is a balancing act to maintain a workable list, so every criminal is not automatically included. In addition, the photographs are distributed to the

casino surveillance unit to identify anyone on the list who attempts entry. It is a criminal offense to enter a casino when on the exclusion list. On average, there are two or three casino entries per year per casino by those on the list. The casinos have no control on who is added to the list, though they may raise a voice for their biggest players. Someone's amount of play is not part of the formula on who gets added to or removed from the list.

In New Jersey, as in Las Vegas, gambling debts are legally enforceable. Casinos issue a player credit up front as any credit card company would after submitting an application. The casinos as well as the New Jersey Treasury have an interest in collecting casino losses. The Division of Gaming Enforcement ensures that the casinos are vigilant in the credit granting and collection process, which is also statutorily regulated.

For instance, if a patron was to receive $10,000 in chips, a 'counter check' is prepared for that amount. The player has 45 days to repay the casino. If the player fails to repay, the casino deposits that counter check into the checking account the patron provided to the casino as part of the application process. If there are insufficient funds for the check to clear, in essence, that patron has "bounced" the check, a State violation. Though the casino can initiate criminal proceedings, this is rarely done, and more often, the casino follows the usual civil debt collection process.

Another form of guardianship employed and monitored by DGE, involves the 'suspicious activity reports.' Basically, any suspicious financial activity over $5,000 must be reported. The reports can be generated by pit bosses after observing a player's activity, or by a cashier, when players redeem their chips for currency. Players are usually identified through the various 'preferred player' programs offered by the casino that require players to identify themselves through a casino card before engaging in play. Players do this to earn credits or other type of complimentary offerings, ("comps") as meals or lodging for extended play.

Casinos train their employees to observe patrons purchasing large amounts of chips, playing very little, and then walking away with chips to redeem them at the cashier's cage. Suspicious Activity Reports are a direct effort to combat schemes for using the casino as a facilitator for criminal enterprises and launder money. After March 2003, the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports by casinos became a federal regulation. Previously, the casinos had the option of filing the report to the federal government, though it always had, and still is, required to file a copy with New Jersey.

Also arousing suspicion are patron attempts to circumvent the Currency Transaction Report ("CTR") requirements by cashing in chips valued just under $10,000. The federal government requires a CTR to be prepared by any business dealing in cash, such as a casino, car dealership, or bank, anytime

there is a cash transaction totaling more than $10,000. However, it is also a violation to purposely attempt to evade this requirement by engaging in a transaction just below the monetary threshold. Hypothetically, one may see Mr. Smith handing over to Mrs. Smith $2000 of the $10,000 he has just won so these two separate cash outs would intentionally be under the threshold amount ($10,000), with no CTR required, which is a violation.

If a player receives $10,000 in chips as part of a line of credit, and at the end of the night repays the casino with chips, no report is required. Similarly, if a patron won $20,000, and returned all the chips to the casino without cashing out, no report would be prepared. A report is only required when the transaction is in cash. Though the Division of Gaming Enforcement monitors the reporting, the federal government through the Internal Revenue Service has assumed the investigative responsibility for all such violations.

In Las Vegas, there recently was a significant case resulting in one of the largest regulatory fines ever assessed. The violation resulted from the action of one rogue employee and was not part of a major conspiracy. For a period of approximately 18 months the employee responsible for submitting to the federal government all the completed CTRs, failed to do so; some 14,000 CTRs remained in a box at the casino and were not forwarded to the federal government. The employee was criminally prosecuted and the hotel received a $5,000,000 fine.

All fines in New Jersey are given to the New Jersey Council for Compulsive Gambling. The Council's budget is about $600,000 and if their revenue falls short of that figure, the casinos contribute the difference. Recently, Atlantic City instituted 'jackpot forfeiture regulations' that provide for forfeiture of the amount won by a patron who was not permitted to enter and play, which. would include underage players, individuals on the exclusion list, and players, typically compulsive gamblers, who placed themselves on the exclusion list.

Any criminal violation uncovered by DGE is referred to the New Jersey State Police for investigation. They, with the Casino Prosecutions Bureau of the Division of Criminal Justice, prepare cases for prosecution. Administrative regulatory infractions are referred to the Casino Control Commission for adjudication.

The Regulatory Enforcement Bureau of the Division of Gaming Enforcement enforces the laws and regulations of the Casino Control Act. Among their tasks, investigators ensure the proper use and storage of gaming equipment, application of accounting and internal controls, monitoring of exclusion list violations, addressing of patron complaints, security and CCTV surveillance, and other matters related to the daily operation of the casino. Penalties for violations may include civil fines as well as revocation of casino licenses, (New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety, 2000).

5.3 The Casino Control Commission

The New Jersey Casino Control Commission is an independent entity responsible for ensuring regulatory compliance by the casino industry. On a larger scale, the Commission also assists in redeveloping Atlantic City by encouraging investment. It is divided into four major divisions: administration, compliance, financial evaluation, and licensing.

In addition to providing the Commissions' 354 employees with administrative support, the Administrative Division arranges public meetings, oversees the publication of agency regulations and rulings, and ensures the Commission remains on the 'cutting edge' of information technology. The Compliance Division is the 'hands-on' connection between the Commission and the casinos. They maintain a 24-hour presence at each casino and monitor all gaming activities and certify revenues. They must approve all gaming equipment and monitor casino games. This is accomplished through their interaction with all levels of casino personnel. The Commission holds each casino responsible for providing effective integrity controls and ensures that the casinos comply with these controls.

New technologies that the casinos may wish to use, such as the EZ Pay slot voucher system...a cashless method of wagering... must first receive Commission approval. Casino floor modifications, rearrangement, or movement of slot machines and table games, and the processing of citizen complaints complete the multitude of tasks for the Compliance Division. The Commission engages in a balancing act to make casino systems secure and safe to the public, while at the same time encouraging casinos to avail themselves of the newest technology and innovations to compete in the ever-burgeoning gaming market.

The Financial Evaluation Division guarantees that New Jersey receives the appropriate fees and taxes from the casino industry. Through auditing, the Financial Evaluation Division certifies the accuracy of revenue for new technological advances as, 'gaming vouchers for slot machines (EZ Pay), and automatic cash dispensing machines (ATM). They make certain that casinos have the appropriate internal financial controls in place to comply with State guidelines, and ensure that the casinos are continually adhering to these guidelines.

In fiscal year 2002, the Financial Evaluation Division collected $348 million in Gross Revenue Tax and $62 million in licensing fees. They also collected $412,000. in fines that assisted the budget of the New Jersey Council on Compulsive Gambling.

The responsibility for all licensing of casino employees, alcoholic beverages, and vendors conducting business with the casino industry lies with Division of Licensing. They are also charged with managing contested case hearings and settlements. Applicants for a license undergo a review and investigation by the Division of Gaming Enforcement and their recommendations are forwarded to the Commission for acceptance, denial, or revocation.

By acting as the "eyes and ears" of the casino, the Commission ensures the financial stability of the casino, and for those employed or interacting with the casino, the Commission ensures that the casino remains free from all nefarious influences. By never lowering its vigilance against conditions that spawn organized crime manipulation, the New Jersey casino industry, through the Commission, continues to enjoy its image of infallibility.

Dan Heneghan, the Director of Communications for the Casino Control Commission since 1996, was interviewed about the changing guardianship role of the Commission. Prior to joining the Commission, Director Heneghan was a journalist for 21 years in Atlantic City writing about regulations and issues affecting the casinos.

When the casinos were first legalized, New Jersey set up an all-encompassing regulatory apparatus that was very strict. The Commission had to approve all advertising, apparatus, convention space, and components of each hotel in

advance. Additionally, casinos and hotels had such stringent requirements with all facets of regulatory compliance that it was not unusual to task Commission staff members with measuring the amount of space in all hotel ballrooms. If the casinos wanted to introduce new cards games, they needed approval from the legislature. The rules were strict and the Commission wanted them that way- "it was far easier to loosen up something that was strict, than to tighten up something that was loose, said Heneghan."

Director Heneghan said the casinos were legalized in New Jersey as a "unique tool of urban redevelopment." The purpose of legalizing casinos was to develop Atlantic City. In that way, the State ensured they knew who was investing in Atlantic City and that the investors were not of ill repute. At the time Atlantic City was being developed, Las Vegas was undergoing a major scandal that involved theft of casino profits.

Known as "skimming," certain Las Vegas casinos were diverting legitimate casino funds to organized crime members. The skimming scheme involved the casino scales that counted the coins. These scales were rewired to reduce the count by 1/3, reflecting a smaller total count. Thus, the scale would show for instance, that particular batches of silver dollars totaled $2000 when in fact they totaled $3000.

After the coins were loaded onto the trucks for delivery to the bank, but before they arrived at the bank, the extra $1000 was removed. Those responsible to transport the coins had no idea of any wrongdoing---they were told to deliver the extra money to a different bank. One of the agents who uncovered the scheme currently works for a casino in Atlantic City. This scheme later became the genesis for the movie, "Casino."

New Jersey recognized that organized crime wanted "in the casinos," so New Jersey set up a strict regulatory structure. So strict were the regulations, that there came a time that the Commission deemed the chairmen of the board of two major hotels as unsuitable. The Commission told the hotels that if they wanted to keep the hotel and casino in Atlantic City, they had to remove the chairman...both hotels complied.

One notable case involved Hugh Heffner, the magnate of Playboy Enterprises. The Commission did not believe Heffner's testimony about an incident that occurred over 20 years earlier involving corruption in the New York State Liquor Authority. In that case, Playboy was seeking a liquor license and the New York governor, as part of a larger inquiry, said anybody who was being "shaken down" (extorted) by the Liquor Authority would be granted immunity to testify before the grand jury.

Though Heffner testified before the New York grand jury, when the Commission questioned him about his grand jury testimony, he claimed he did not recall if he was granted immunity...a claim the Commission found incredulous... The Commission found him unsuitable and Playboy was given the ultimatum to either divest itself from the hotel and casino business or remove Heffner...Playboy sold their Atlantic City interests.

The actions against Playboy demonstrated how licensing was used to regulate and preserve the integrity of the casino industry. The famed Playboy Corporation with all its resources could not prevail against Atlantic City casino regulators when it came to evidence of its corporate wrongdoing. New Jersey rendered a decision that recognized integrity over potential economic growth (Lehne, 1986). However, the Commission is not a 'rubber stamp' of the State law enforcement and regulatory agencies seeking to bar companies from engaging in business with the casinos. Recently, the Commission granted licenses to two brothers whose companies the State alleged had associates with organized crime. Though the State argued that the license approval was opening the door to organized crime, the Commission stated they would not be "intimidated" by the State in the Commission's decision-making process. The Commission contended that the State did not prove that the companies had "mob ties strong enough for disqualification,"...the Commission reasoned that [some] business contacts between honest builders and mob-connected

businesses were all but inevitable in the region's construction industry," (Peterson, 2004).

Another responsibility of the Commission is to ensure the financial stability of the casino. Director Heneghan explained that Commission inspectors who are at casinos 24 hours a day throughout the year, must accompany any money that has not been counted. The casino cannot gain access to uncounted money without a Commission inspector.

In all the slot machines there are two locks. The casino has one key, and the Commission the other. For table games, the box in which the paper currency is placed has two separate locks with two separate keys. The room where the money is counted has two keys and also has very specific structural requirements. The table where money is counted is made of clear Plexiglass; hands are visible at all times.

The count room where currency is counted is videotaped. There are two types of count rooms, soft (paper currency) and hard (coin). The soft-count room is not only videotaped, but also audio-taped. In the soft count room after the boxes containing the bills are emptied, they are shown to a camera verifying their emptiness. In the hard count room, the coin buckets have bar codes that are scanned in and shown to the camera also verifying that it is empty. If someone has done something out of the ordinary, it stands out.

Often one may see dealers clap their hands when they move from table to table. The purpose is to show to the camera that they have nothing in their hand. The casino, unlike a bank, does not have paper transaction histories for their money. Casinos have no way to individually account for the many bets that go back and forth between player and casino.

Director Heneghan also characterized the systems of control in the casino as "people watching people, watching people, watching people." The dealer is being watched by a floor man, a floor man being watched by a pit boss, a pit boss being watched by a table game's manager...surveillance above watches everybody. Undercover New Jersey State Police watch, Commission inspectors watch, casino security watch...an endless circle of people watching people.

Concerning the newly constructed Borgata Hotel and Casino, the Director commented that a new casino creates a sudden new capacity, and though the Borgata may initially tap into existing market share, generally within 18 months, the market expands enough to accommodate the new addition. The market will expand by at least the gaming capacity, which is the number of new gaming positions on the casino floor.

Director Heneghan noted that revenue in Atlantic City has never decreased. To attract patrons, casinos usually provide about two-thirds of its rooms free of charge. Atlantic City is not a destination resort, as Las Vegas, but it does have its version of the Las Vegas "strip" in its famed "Boardwalk," which has recently been characterized as "scenic not seedy" (Barrett, 2003). There are no free standing casinos in Atlantic City as in Las Vegas; all casinos are attached to Atlantic City hotels.

5.4 The New Jersey State Police

The New Jersey State Police ("State Police") has the sole jurisdiction and responsibility for all crimes committed on the casino floor. The State Police meet their casino responsibilities through task specific units within the Casino Gaming Bureau. Included in the bureau is the Casino Investigations Unit, Financial Crimes Unit, Special Investigations Unit, and Casino Intelligence Unit. The Atlantic City Police Department is responsible for the other sections of the hotel, rooms, grounds, restaurants, and nightclubs.

The Casino Investigation Unit is the primary response team for all reported crimes on the floor. With a staff of detectives and ranking officers, this unit interviews victims, gathers evidence, and apprehends offenders accused of crimes committed on the floor. They also are responsible for crimes where the casino may be the victim such as robbery, casino cheating, or theft by corrupt

casino employees. They maintain a presence for the casinos 24 hours a day throughout the year, respond to emergencies or catastrophes, and coordinate first responder needs with other local and county enforcement agencies.

The Financial Crimes Unit of the State Police initiates investigations into casino related financial crimes and is trained to detect organized credit card frauds, money laundering, and counterfeiting. They work with the Division of Gaming Enforcement in evaluating Currency Transactions Reports and Suspicious (Financial) Activity Reports.

The Special Investigation Unit typically investigates attempts by organized crime to infiltrate the casino industry, corruption by corporate or casino officials, and sophisticated attempts to defraud the casino through slot and table game cheating devices. The State Police is the only entity that is permitted to carry weapons on the casino floor with full police powers.

The Casino Intelligence Unit collects, analyzes, and dispenses information concerning the casino industry as it relates to organized crime and other individuals inimical to the gaming industry. It accomplishes this task through mutual informal and formal agreements with all other law enforcement and regulatory agencies.

The Intelligence Unit in the past has uncovered information on individuals closely associated with organized crime that have attempted to infiltrate the casino industry. The Atlantic City casino industry's pristine reputation for keeping out organized crime, and the reputation that serves as a paradigm for jurisdictions considering casinos, is due in no small part to the State Police's constant vigilance.

5.5 The Casino Prosecutions Bureau

Completing the casino guardian role is the Casino Prosecutions Bureau, responsible for prosecuting all crimes committed in the casino where either the patrons or the casinos are the victims. Working side-by-side with the Division of Gaming Enforcement, the New Jersey State Police, or the various other local, state, or federal agencies, the Prosecutions Bureau is the charging entity that prepares cases for court and prosecutes criminal violations.

The Prosecutions Bureau is under the direction of a Supervising Deputy Attorney General (DAG), Ted Grove who was interviewed for this study. DAG Grove's staff includes five Deputies Attorney General and seven State Investigators. The State Investigators assist the Deputies in prosecution as well as locate fugitives and manage the extradition process. Typically, the Prosecutions Bureau provides a prosecutive opinion before an arrest is made,

unless, of course the criminal conduct is so patently obvious, as in the case of assault or theft where the offender is immediately captured and arrested. The Prosecutions Bureau then prepares the case for prosecution by reviewing the arrest reports, interviewing witnesses, presenting the case before a grand jury, and preparing the charging document. If the offender elects to plead guilty, the Prosecutions Bureau prepares the plea agreement with the relating statutory criminal violation to which the offender will plead guilty.

The Prosecutions Bureau has the authority to decide if the State will accept a lesser charge in lieu of trial, or conversely, decide to take the case to trial on a more egregious charge even if the defendant is willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Similarly, the Prosecutions Bureau will aggressively prosecute a persistent offender, and if warranted, may petition the court for a longer sentence upon conviction.

The Prosecutions Bureau may decide to remand less egregious charges, like disorderly persons offenses, or first time offenders, to the Atlantic City municipal court for adjudication. However, the Prosecutions Bureau always retains the authority and discretion to prosecute cases at the municipal level, as in the case of a persistent offender.

The Prosecutions Bureau prosecutes those cases when patrons are victimized or when the casinos experience attempts to compromise the integrity of their

games. Specifically, if a patron uses slugs or shaved quarters to wager at slot machines, or acts in collusion with a casino employee to provide unauthorized payouts, the Prosecutions Bureau will aggressively prosecute. Shaving the edges of quarters permits credits to be recorded on a slot machine, but will return the quarter. Other types of crimes include underage gambling, improper touching or harassment of waitresses, or patron attempts to enter a casino after having been placed on the "exclusion list."

The exclusion list permanently bars a person from entering the casino and is accomplished when the Division of Gaming Enforcement files a petition with the Casino Control Commission. In New Jersey, not only are organized crime members included on the exclusion list, but also recidivistic petty thieves. In fact, one egregious act can get someone placed on the list.

An appeal process to the Casino Control Commission permits individuals to have their names removed from the exclusion list. As an alternative to the exclusion list, the Prosecutions Bureau, upon conviction, may recommend, as part of probation, that an offender not enter a casino.

Theft, by far, is the most frequent index crime committed in the casino. New Jersey criminal statute, 2C:20-2 grades theft offenses by degrees, the lower the offense level, the more egregious, entailing a more severe penalty; the value of the property is an element fixing the degree of an offense. For example, a theft

involving $75,000 or more, is a second-degree crime, a third degree exceeds $500, but less than $75,000, at fourth degree if the amount is at least $200, but not over $500, and any monetary amount under $200 is considered a disorderly persons offense and may be remanded to a municipal court to adjudicate. The various degree crimes are all tried in a New Jersey Superior court. New Jersey does not grade crimes by felonies and misdemeanors.

Garden-variety thefts of purses or coin-cups are usually a fourth degree crime, as they normally are under $500. However, when a patron attempts to defraud the casino through deception by using slugs, there is no monetary threshold for prosecution. Additionally, when sentencing, judges consider aggravating and mitigating factors. Typically, if the victim is elderly, age is an aggravating factor where an offender may receive a harsher penalty or be ineligible for parole. For second degree crimes, the court may sentence between five and ten years; for a third degree crime, between three and five years; and for fourth, a specified term not to exceed 18 months (New Jersey Statute, 2C:43-6).

According to DAG Grove, the Prosecutions Bureau has seen their share of exotic criminal schemes. In one case, a would-be-thief, threw quarters at a slot player's legs to get her attention and distract her while a co-conspirator attempted to steal her coin-cup. The surveillance tape revealed, the offender ran out of quarters, went to the exchange area to cash in bills for more quarters until finally he succeeded in distracting the player and stealing her cup. Casino

security immediately arrested him and he was subsequently prosecuted and incarcerated.

In another unusual case, someone dressed up in a suit and tie and was telling slot players that he worked for the casino as an expediter to change their tokens and chips into cash so the patrons would not have to wait in line. It was not until some patrons contacted security asking about the employee with the suit and tie did they realize he was an imposter who made off with their chips (Ted Grove, Supervisory Deputy Attorney General, Casino Prosecutions Bureau, personal communication, June 23, 2003).

The Casino Prosecutions Bureau is the last cog in the wheel guaranteeing that public confidence remains high. By aggressively pursuing prosecutions that impact on the integrity of the casinos, by working side-by-side- with the Casino Control Commission, the citizens of New Jersey and the gaming industry as a whole will be assured that the "keepers of the gate" remain attentive and on guard.

It is clear that the official capable guardians monitoring the casino industry serve to protect patrons, the industry, and the State. Each entity in fulfilling its guardian role has distinct tasks, responsibilities, and the same ultimate goal, to ensure casinos remain vibrant and free from crime or criminal influence. They have a vested interest in protecting the public and guaranteeing a worry-free

environment for casino and hotel patrons to engage in their leisure routine activities

5.6 Observations- The Routine Activities of the Casino Floor

This section of the chapter also discusses the findings from the study and illustrates these findings in textual analysis, tables, figures, and relationships to empirical literature. It also describes the descriptive and quantitative data, and details how patrons engaged in their routine activities that included their wagering choices and their interaction with the casino personnel's capable guardians. Finally, tables, figures, and textual analyses will be presented and interpreted from the routine activities perspective to answer the questions posed in the hypotheses. Some tables, analyses, and descriptive data, though not part of any hypotheses, will also be presented because of its inherent general interest and importance in understanding the casino floor setting, a previously unstudied milieu.

On numerous occasions, over the course a two-year period at varying hours and days, at different casinos, the researcher observed the behavior of casino patrons. Subsequently, the researcher interviewed casino security directors, New Jersey casino regulators, and law enforcement officials to gain knowledge of the research setting. The researcher assumed the role of "observer-as-participant" with the patrons never knowing identity or purpose, (Tewksbury &

Ehrdardt-Mustaine, 2004), while mingling with patrons and wagered on the various table games and slot machines next to them. Though aware of personal wagers, the researcher usually made the minimum bet, and focused on how patrons guarded either their chips or other coin receptacles, narrowing the issue of victimization on the floor.

To assist the researcher in recording observations a pen-sized digital recorder complete with a voice-activated built-in external microphone was secreted in the researcher's clothing enabling a contemporaneous recording of observations without being conspicuous. Additionally, the Director of Security for three of the casinos in Atlantic City permitted the researcher access to freely speak to security personnel should any questions on the activities of patrons or employees arise. The recordings were later transcribed into narrative form. This procedure was easier and provided more in-depth detail and complete recollection of the observations than would be permissible if the researcher had to record observations using field notes. When interviewing casino regulators and officials, the researcher took notes or openly tape-recorded conversations after receiving permission from the interviewee.

Since at times the researcher was also wagering, no one questioned the reason for being on the casino floor. Similarly, when walking through and around the casino, the researcher was engaged in the routine activities of other patrons. Though the researcher in effect served as a decoy, the researcher did not observe anyone being victimized nor was he. The researcher observed patron

interactions and the effect of the nearby sound of cascading coins of a winning slot machine. People had their eyes peeled on the winning patron, and the sounds of the winning slot machine, both of which caused them to be less vigilant of their possessions. Interwoven in the findings were interviews with key New Jersey state public officials whose tasks and responsibilities impacted on the successful operation of the casinos and who provided invaluable information on the technicalities and workings of the public and private sector of the casino industry.

This study expanded the Routine Activities Theory by examining victimization in a new milieu, the casino floor. The casino floor is comprised of different types of wagering activities generally delineated by either table games or slot machines. Each type must be approved by the Division of Gaming Enforcement, as does any addition or removal of any game. The type of game usually dictated the routine activities of the wagering patrons. Their movement provided ample opportunity to roam the entire floor in deciding what type of game to play or exactly where on the floor they wished to play it. The entrances and exits of the casino floor were usually guarded by uniformed security who would challenge anyone they believed to be under 21. Patrons did not seek to play those slot machines nearer the guards, as if safety was not their concern. Though patrons probably realized that they would depart the casino with less money than when they entered, there was an uncanny gaiety on the casino floor and becoming a victim seemed the last thing on their minds.

In all the table games, such as Blackjack, Roulette, or Craps, the dealers were always facing the patrons. This position enabled them to have an unobstructed view of patrons while they wagered. It appeared extremely difficult to purloin chips from the next patron. The physical structure of the Craps tables included chip trays that are embedded in the table enabling patrons and the dealers to view the chips. Patrons would always stack their chips in front, or slightly to the side, for the other table games without chip trays; and a player could always request a movable chip tray. These observations were also supported by the data that reflected much lower rates of victimization at craps and the other table games than slot machines.

The women observed who were sitting, held their purses on their laps, while those standing at the Craps table had their purses on their shoulder toward the front of their body. Pick pocketing a man's wallet also seemed difficult, as those games with seats provided ample back protection from someone reaching over to a pant's pocket. When not playing, the researcher would walk around the entire casino floor observing the routine activities of the patrons.

On the casino floor, coin cups were highly visible and at times out of direct control of a patron when the cup was laid to the side of the slot machine. This exposure of cash was also evident in the various table games; Blackjack, Craps, and Roulette. Here, players' chips usually in minimum denominations

of five dollars, and oftentimes much more, were not in the security of their pockets, but openly exposed either in front or to their side while wagering. It became readily apparent that patrons felt they were in a safe environment. A gaming decision usually took less than a minute, as in Craps, or at most, a couple of minutes for Blackjack, Roulette or the other card games, because the dealer would take additional time in dealing out additional hands, or in Roulette the patrons used time in placing wagers on the various numbers. Before the decision, chips were being placed throughout the table by multiple patrons, and except for the watchful eye of the dealers and pit bosses, the patrons seemed less occupied with the security of their funds than the outcome of their wager. Similarly, coats or purses strewed over the back seat of a slot machine or table game chair created greater opportunity for offenders to steal.

Most of the bus patrons appeared to arrive in waves usually between 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. After departing from the bus, they went to the casino's redemption center where they either handed in a coupon, or some other form of identification, and usually received $10.00 in quarters, an incentive paid by the casino for arriving on a particular bus company.

Some patrons checked their coats, while others carried them, probably anticipating a stroll on Atlantic City's famed Boardwalk. It was also evident that after receiving their compensation, they appeared to wager in the same general vicinity, perhaps to feel more secure, or to be more sociable. On every

occasion that the researcher observed, it appeared the majority of the arriving patrons were over age 50 and largely Caucasian; an unscientific estimation, but based on an eye for this group, as the researcher was 56 and 30 years of professional police training and experience honed an observational prowess. The men usually walked over to the table games while the women remained at the various slot machines, seeming to decide which jackpot potentials caught their eye, or which particular motif was displayed on the spinning reels.

Interestingly, there were different methods women used to secure their purses. Some appeared to hold on to them for "dear life" and wagered with one hand, while removing a coin from the cup and placing it in the coin slot with the same hand. Others had their purse strap over their necks so that their purse was directly in front of them, or off to their side, where a quick tuck of the arm assured them that the purse was still there. Most women, however, either placed their purses at their feet or just to the side of the slot machine, always in view.

These methods appeared intrinsic for all those who were playing the slot machines. It was a rote activity; take the coin from the cup and place it in the coin slot...over and over, until someone won. When patrons did win, whether it was the big jackpot or simply the random payoff short of the jackpot, their vigilance appeared relaxed and their concentration focused on the lights, noise,

and cascading coins as they filled the slot machine's collection tray or "hopper."

Here, amidst the excitement and glistening coins, patrons would either stand up and look around, or converse with a friend at the next machine, but it was clear that what they were not doing, were watching that purse on the floor as they did prior to the excitement of the win. This activity appeared common whether they won the jackpot, or someone within their close proximity was as lucky.

Other observations were also consistent with Rudd and Marshall's, (2000) who characterized slot machine players as very "territorial," in that, once they began playing a machine, they believed they enjoyed exclusive ownership rights until they departed the area or casino. If they walked away, a coin cup strategically placed on the slot machine handle "marked" their ownership of the machine and was a signal to other patrons to refrain from wagering on this machine. This may be true no matter how many machines that they were simultaneously wagering and marked with cups. Rudd and Marshall (2000) observed that, "many altercations have taken place over the legality of territorial marking of slot machines." They even noted that on one of their trips to a casino in Windsor, Canada a patron had placed a note on two machines when he went to the rest room, "touch this machine and you die."

Between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. the arrival procedure reversed itself as a bulk of those wagering headed to the casino's bus depot. For those arriving there ahead of time, there were enough machines near the exit of the bus terminal to make some last minute wagers for that elusive jackpot.

5.7 The Design of the Games

By design, the table games are situated on the casino floor near the redemption or cash exchange areas, which have heightened security. However, the very nature of some of the games provides a built-in vigilance. Craps for instance, where players typically wager that particular numbers will come up before the number seven, can accommodate up to eighteen players who can wager on each roll of the dice.

Craps is played on a wooden framed oblong table with built in trays where players place their chips. The number rolled is decided in seconds, after which hundreds of dollars exchange hands between the casino and players. Prior to the dice being placed in the shooter's hand, players are placing chips on their desired numbers, asking dealers to move chips from number to number, or requesting to cash out their chips (leave the game) or drop money on the table to request chips to play.

All this happens simultaneously for several minutes before the dice are returned to the shooter. It is a fast action game, providing multiple exchanges

of chips and quick multiple wagering decisions. Four employees usually run the game. The "boxman" who is in a suit and tie, sits in the center of the oblong craps table, watches the dice, settles disputes, handles the money which he stuffs in a "box," and generally oversees the entire game; two "Craps dealers," who stand on both sides of the boxman, arrange the bets, collect the loses, and pay the winners; and the "stickman" who stands opposite the boxman, and uses a wooden "dice stick" hooked at the end to retrieve and return the dice to the shooter, as well as to place specialty bets.

It is usually in this game that the roar of the crowd can be heard over the bells and noise of the slot machines (Rudd & Marshall, 2000). Though the activity is constant and fast paced and chips are exposed, the employees controlling and supervising the games are vigilant to any attempts by players to purloin chips from other players, or to cheat the casino. Beyond that, a "floor supervisor" and a "pit boss" watch the Craps table. All the casino formal guardians at the Craps table are always on guard for patrons who may be "railbirds"; players in close proximity to other players who surreptitiously try to steal their chips.

The other table games are much slower and usually up to six players face a dealer who controls the tempo of the game by his dealing. It is a stop-and-go process where the standing dealer has clear view of the players and their chips. Once again, a floor supervisor and pit boss also watch these games. Slot machine players do not enjoy these extra layers of guardians. The various table

games and Craps afford more safety to casino patrons, as there are more capable guardians in the form of casino employees directly observing patrons and their chips. Patrons' valuables are less exposed.

Some of the findings, though not directly testing a hypothesis, were nevertheless an integral part of this study as it highlighted the routine activities of casino patrons and provided a victim profile. Such a victim profile is not only interesting, but will have important implications by educating regulatory agencies as well as industry personnel on issues of public safety. The crime statistics in this study were complemented by interviews with security personnel, police officials, regulatory agencies, and personal observations at various casinos.

5. 8 The Victimization Rate

Chapter Four discussed how the South Jersey Transportation Authority arrived at the number of tourists. Previous chapters described that the lure for tourists to Atlantic City was entertainment in the form of casino activities. Additionally, there are no data on the number of visitors to each casino in Atlantic City. Thus, the SJTA methodology and its resulting aggregate calculations enable us to arrive at the number of casino visitors to Atlantic City, which will become the denominator to calculate the victimization rate. The reason Table 5-1 is examined first is to establish a baseline in our attempt

to arrive at a reliable figure of the number of visitors to Atlantic City, a critical figure to calculate the victimization rate.

Examining Table 5-1 (Annual Visit Trips to Atlantic City, In Thousands, by Transportation Mode) prepared by the SJTA reporting on the annual visit trips to Atlantic City, the data show that for years 1999-2000, the number of visitors to Atlantic City was approximately 33 million, (33,188,000 & 32,423,000) a figure that remained relatively constant since 1992. For the years 2001 and 2002, they were 32,423,000 and 33,188,000 visitors respectively. To use this figure as the number of casino floor visitors may be a quantum jump, but as previously mentioned, Atlantic City offers very little to draw visitors away from the gaming tables and slot machines. No existing literature parses out visitors to Atlantic City more definitively, (South Jersey Transportation Authority, 2002).

ANNUAL VISIT-TRIPS TO ATLANTIC CITY (IN THOUSANDS)
BY TRANSPORTATION MODE

Year	Automobile	Casino Bus	Franchise Bus	Air	Rail	Total
2002	24,676	7,586	514	268	143	33,188
2001	23,501	7,986	519	277	140	32,423
2000	23,177	9,015	536	323	133	33,184
1999	23,247	9,342	539	396	128	33,652
1998	23,293	9,903	530	447	127	34,300
1997	23,368	9,640	512	426	124	34,070
1996	23,023	10,011	515	395	98	34,042
1995	23,162	9,079	517	386	128	33,272
1994	21,803	8,352	518	433	215	31,321
1993	20,303	8,728	513	462	219	30,225
1992	19,734	9,768	512	496	195	30,705
1991	19,281	10,286	494	483	244	30,788
1990	19,310	11,201	528	544	230	31,813
1989	18,257	12,447	685	523	90	32,002
1988	17,769	14,184	745	440	-	33,138
1987	17,218	13,495	754	378	-	31,845
1986	16,360	12,453	748	371	-	29,932
1985	15,702	12,589	758	277	-	29,326
1984	15,448	12,041	720	257	-	28,466
1983	14,347	11,036	643	335	-	26,361
1982	13,086	9,051	595	223	-	22,955
1981	11,475	6,770	658	181	-	19,084
1980	9,891	3,298	613	20	-	13,822
1979	7,909	1,000	536	20	-	9,465
1978	6,445	200	353	10	-	7,008

Source: South Jersey Transportation Authority

Accordingly, to estimate the general safety of all casinos, requires dividing the total number of reported crimes for 1999 & 2000, which is 8306, (see Table 5-2, Crime by Casino) by the total number of visitors for both years, 66,836,000 (8,306/66,836,000= 000124274), to arrive at a casino victimization rate of approximately 1/10000 of a percent. This is a remarkably low probability of becoming a casino crime victim, if one is willing to assume a significant number of travelers to Atlantic City visit the casino..

Table 5-2

CRIME BY CASINO, 1999-2000

Casino	Frequency	Percent
Bally's Park Place	1321	15.90
Caesars	458	5.51
Claridge	252	3.03
Harrah's Marina	459	5.53
Hilton	257	3.09
Resorts	490	5.90
Sands	1025	12.34
Showboat	648	7.80
Taj Mahal	974	11.73
Tropicana	497	5.98
Trump Marina	230	2.77
Trump Plaza	1695	20.41
Totals	8306	100.00

Table 5-2 (Crime by Casino) also permits the calculation of victimization risk by casino. Accordingly, the data do not support Hypothesis One: **The victimization rate for the ten casinos on the Boardwalk will be higher than the two casinos located on the Marina because the Marina is physically isolated, thus frustrating access and egress for offenders.** Though Trump

Marina enjoys the lowest frequency of victimization, Harrah's Marina ranks fifth in frequency of victimization; both casinos are designated as the Marina area of Atlantic City. Both casinos are accessed by escalator and are near each other. They required transportation to their location from the Boardwalk. As Cohen and Felson (1979) point out, one aspect motivating an offender is the ease with which an offender believes escape is possible and committing a criminal act. Accordingly, not being able to just exit from a casino and blend into the community would affect target suitability an element of the Routine Activities Theory. Without knowing the number of patrons visiting each casino the likelihood of determining one's risk at each casino cannot be calculated. The study can only determine which casino experienced the most frequent crime reporting.

One would assume that since the Marina casinos are isolated from the Boardwalk and the general population of the city that reported crime at both casinos would be the lowest of all casinos. This isolation should frustrate crime, in that access to and from casinos on the Marina is not as easy as they are on the Boardwalk where entrances and exits abut the casino floor. Similarly, it is easier for offenders to blend in with the population after committing a crime at any of the Boardwalk casinos. Additionally, there is no access to the Trump Marina from the ground floor. The proximity of the Trump Plaza to a walkway garage from the casino floor, and the closeness of that garage to the Atlantic City Expressway for escape, are the dimensions also

operating creating the variance. Yet, the data demonstrated that one of the Marina casinos, Harrah's, was not one of the two lowest in reported crime. A phenomena that remains unexplained in this study, and one that should be explored in depth by future researchers interviewing offenders.

5.9 Victimization Rate by Square Footage of the Casino Floor

Another method to estimate a patron's risk of victimization is to examine each casino by its square footage to arrive at a crime density figure. Hypothesis Two: **The intensity of crime will be directly related to the square footage of the casino floor,** is not supported by the data. Examine Table 5-3, (New Jersey Casino Industry Facility Statistics Year End 2000/1999) prepared by the Casino Control Commission), for the relevant years, and compare that to the frequency of victimization which is reported in Table 5-2 (Crime by Casino). The resulting figure, derived by dividing the crime frequency of crime at each casino by its square footage, will establish the "intensity" of crime at a particular casino. This process is captured in Table 5-4 (Intensity of Crime Reports by Casino Square Footage) below that lists each casino's intensity of crime and its resulting risk of victimization.

Table 5-3

NEW JERSEY CASINO INDUSTRY FACILITY STATISTICS YEAR END 2000/1999

	AC HILTON		BALLY'S PARK PLACE		CAESARS		CLARIDGE		HARRAH'S		RESORTS	
	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999
TABLE GAMES:												
Blackjack	36	46	78	76	70	64	26	32	40	42	35	41
Craps	11	10	14	14	13	12	6	8	8	8	7	8
Roulette	11	10	18	18	16	16	4	5	9	8	8	8
Big Six	-	-	2	3	2	2	1	1	-	-	1	1
Baccarat	2	3	2	2	2	3	1	2	-	-	3	3
Minibaccarat	5	7	3	2	4	4	5	3	1	1	2	2
Sic Bo	-	-	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pai Gow Poker	4	4	6	5	5	5	4	3	2	2	2	2
Pai Gow	3	3	2	2	1	1	3	2	-	-	-	-
Poker	-	-	11	15	6	6	-	-	8	8	-	-
Caribbean Stud Poker	5	6	8	6	5	5	4	3	4	4	4	4
Let It Ride Poker	5	4	8	8	8	8	3	2	6	6	5	4
Mini-Craps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Mini-Dice	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Casino War	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spanish 21	-	2	5	4	5	4	2	2	-	-	3	2
Three Card Poker (a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	3	-
Colorado Hold 'Em (a)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Table Games	**82**	**95**	**158**	**156**	**139**	**132**	**63**	**64**	**78**	**79**	**73**	**75**
KENO WINDOWS	-	-	4	4	6	6	-	-	4	4	-	-
SLOT MACHINES:												
Nickel	336	134	886	431	324	171	136	60	490	169	284	124
Quarter	1,103	1,053	2,224	2,291	1,966	1,938	1,251	1,296	1,738	1,705	1,481	1,483
Fifty Cents	187	197	421	420	451	503	127	139	222	218	207	213
Dollars	312	337	532	537	548	678	223	221	567	577	327	304
Five Dollars	60	54	96	94	104	112	36	33	107	103	53	45
Twenty-Five Dollars	8	12	14	13	16	16	4	4	7	8	4	5
One Hundred Dollars	6	8	9	9	8	8	-	-	5	4	4	2
Other Slot Machines	14	25	129	214	148	140	-	-	110	42	7	7
Total Slot Machines	**2,026**	**1,820**	**4,311**	**4,009**	**3,565**	**3,566**	**1,777**	**1,753**	**3,246**	**2,826**	**2,367**	**2,183**
Casino Sq. Ft	59,832	59,832	128,220	120,284	110,540	110,540	59,071	58,932	94,622	86,131	60,039	67,655
Simulcast Sq. Ft.	-	-	35,453	34,550	9,691	9,691	-	-	-	-	17,905	8,058
# of Hotel Rooms	804	804	1,246	1,246	1,148	1,148	507	507	1,174	1,174	644	644
#Parking Spaces	1,583	1,583	2,280	2,280	2,508	2,198	1,460	1,460	2,401	3,085	1,092	1,485
Property & Equipment Gross ($Millions) (b)	521.9	512.3	1,051.5	1,008.9	813.3	801.0	42.4	39.8	543.7	526.6	298.5	290.3
Number of Employees	3,389	3,285	5,611	5,393	4,432	4,474	2,379	2,379	3,550	3,461	3,038	3,185

(a) Three Card Poker and Colorado Hold 'Em Poker commenced operations in July and September 2000, respectively.

(b) Represents property and equipment before accumulated depreciation. Since Claridge leases its hotel property and non-gaming equipment, property and equipment for Claridge primarily represents gaming equipment and the parking garage.



New Jersey Casino Control Commission

Table 5-3 (cont.)

SANDS		SHOWBOAT		TROPICANA		TRUMP MARINA		TRUMP PLAZA		TRUMP TAJ MAHAL		INDUSTRY	
2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999
36	44	32	42	63	56	31	35	49	51	68	64	564	593
7	8	5	6	14	14	10	11	8	8	10	11	113	118
11	11	8	9	13	13	9	9	10	11	15	17	132	135
2	2	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	13	15
4	4	3	3	3	5	3	3	4	2	5	5	32	35
4	3	3	1	6	6	2	2	7	6	4	5	46	42
1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	2	1	8	7
2	2	3	2	6	6	3	3	4	3	11	12	52	49
2	2	2	1	6	6	3	2	3	1	7	7	32	27
9	12	-	-	43	43	-	-	-	-	67	67	144	151
4	6	5	6	6	6	4	5	5	5	8	8	62	64
4	4	5	4	6	5	5	6	5	5	6	6	66	62
-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
2	-	2	-	2	-	2	1	-	-	5	4	28	19
3	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	12	-
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
92	**100**	**68**	**75**	**170**	**162**	**76**	**79**	**97**	**94**	**210**	**210**	**1,306**	**1,321**
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	24	24
300	112	651	150	407	247	276	148	458	160	589	449	5,137	2,355
1,068	1,224	2,048	2,731	1,893	2,051	1,457	1,301	1,629	1,459	2,952	2,925	20,810	21,457
188	220	142	227	445	427	205	228	271	264	310	322	3,176	3,378
327	349	423	541	634	712	432	408	385	383	604	600	5,314	5,647
69	65	68	63	120	121	86	77	72	75	102	104	973	946
5	4	4	-	13	13	13	13	12	14	15	13	115	115
5	5	2	-	10	10	7	7	6	4	6	4	68	61
25	22	7	32	128	128	50	50	34	34	33	65	685	759
1,987	**2,001**	**3,345**	**3,744**	**3,650**	**3,709**	**2,526**	**2,232**	**2,867**	**2,393**	**4,611**	**4,482**	**36,278**	**34,718**
57,602	57,968	79,485	83,901	118,917	117,453	79,997	73,734	85,738	85,912	113,481	120,829	1,047,544	1,043,171
19,492	15,291	16,056	17,804	8,380	8,380	2,135	2,150	-	-	41,390	31,521	150,502	127,445
532	532	800	800	1,624	1,624	728	728	904	904	1,250	1,250	11,361	11,361
1,684	1,732	3,051	3,051	3,265	3,265	2,986	2,986	2,818	2,778	7,180	7,180	32,308	33,083
159.0	346.8	501.2	480.8	723.6	724.8	543.6	536.3	624.6	622.0	1,067.8	1,056.3	6,891.1	6,945.9
3,079	3,069	3,194	3,278	5,181	5,141	3,484	3,428	3,929	4,323	6,160	5,950	47,426	47,366

Table 5-4

INTENSITY OF CRIME BY CASINO SQUARE FOOTAGE, 1999-2000

Casino	Frequency	Average Square Footage	Crime Intensity[2]
Bally's Park Place	1321	124,252	.0106
Caesers	458	110,540	.0041
Claridge	252	59,001	.0043
Harrah's	459	90,376	.0051
Hilton	257	59,832	.0043
Resorts	490	63,847	.0077
Sands	1025	57,785	.0177
Showboat	648	81,693	.0079
Taj Mahal	974	117,155	.0083
Tropicana	497	118,185	.0042
Trump Marina	230	78,865	.0029
Trump Plaza	1695	85,825	.0197

[2] Crime intensity I
s calculated by dividing the crime frequency for each casino by the square footage of their respective casino floor.

Though the Trump Marina and Harrah's are the only casinos located away from the Boardwalk, Harrah's is not the second lowest in terms of crime intensity which is a conclusion that would be expected if it is assumed that

crime would be less in the Marina area because the casino locations of access and egress are limited. Both Marina casinos are bordered by water on one side, a bridge leading to another city (Brigantine) and are almost two miles away from any residential neighborhood. Additionally, the Trump Marina is on the second floor. If an offender attempted to escape, he would have to go down an escalator to the exit door and then run on foot for two miles to the nearest neighborhood. Harrah's does have a walk-in entrance but there is no drive-up permanent parking at either casino. Both casinos have attached parking garages but they do not directly access the casino floor through a walkway.

Trump Plaza has the highest intensity, almost 2%, yet, it is sixth in total square footage and is one of 10 casinos located on the Boardwalk. On site observations for all the Boardwalk casinos did not provide any particular phenomena for the Trump Plaza casino floor. Basically, the 10 Boardwalk casinos are located in oceanfront casinos and are readily accessible to the public from Atlantic City's famed Boardwalk. The glitz and noise of clattering coins are never too far from the entrance door. A leisurely stroll on the Boardwalk can easily be interrupted if a patron wishes to resume wagering.

However, the Trump Plaza can be distinguished from the others, as it is the casino that is at the end of the Atlantic City Expressway, the route usually used by visitors driving to Atlantic City. Additionally, the layout of this casino includes direct access to a walk-way garage, thus, it is not difficult to exit the

casino so close to the garage; certainly, an ideal path of egress for those contemplating a crime. None of the other casinos have a walkway garage as close to the gaming area.

The higher frequency of victimization because of the existing parking condition for the Trump Plaza is merely speculation. This study is limited by an agreement with the Division of Gaming Enforcement of not speaking with offenders. Offender motivation for choosing a particular casino would be an area for future research.

In the first half of 2002, according to the South Jersey Transportation Authority, bus traffic clustered around the casinos closest to the Atlantic City Expressway; Bally's Park Place, Hilton, Trump Taj Mahal and Trump Plaza, (Strauss, 2002). Looking at Table 10-4, Ballys, Taj Mahal, and Trump Plaza are three of the top four of the casinos reporting the highest frequency of reported crimes.

5.10 Victimization Rate by Gaming Positions

Another method to establish a patron's risk of becoming a victim is to compare the frequency of crime by casino with the number of gaming positions available: Hypothesis Three: **The frequency of crime will be directly related to the number of gaming positions on the casino floor.** This calculation will

identify by game type, where the greatest exposure for becoming a crime victim on the casino floor exists. Table 5-5, (Intensity of Crime Reports by Casino and Gaming Type) below, examines crime at each casino by the category of the major table games (Blackjack, Craps, Roulette) and slot machines. Each table game has a maximum number of players that may wager at one time. The slot machines have only a one-player capacity.

The Casino Control Commission publishes yearly statistics for each casino's facility that include the number and type of table games for each casino, as well as the number of slot machines for each casino (see Table 5-3). Multiplying the number of maximum available players per table, and adding the number of slot machines can provide a credible estimate of the potential patrons on the casino floor if it is assumed that each available gaming position is continually occupied for 24 hours. The researcher determined the number of maximum players per game through discussion with Trump officials while touring their facility as well as during the interview of Dan Heneghan of the Casino Control Commission.

To arrive at a patron's risk of becoming a victim by gaming position figure, it was hypothetically assumed that every available gaming position was occupied 24 hours per day, seven days per week. By multiplying the player capacity for each game by the total number of games available at each casino, a figure was derived of the total playing position capacity. That figure became the

denominator; all reported offenses by casino became the numerator. The resulting calculation, dividing the crime incidents at all the casinos by the number of gaming positions, then provided the intensity of crime distributed by gaming position.

Of course this method is not without its limitations. There may be patrons on the floor who are not wagering, each table game and slot machine may not be occupied, and some table games may not be fully occupied. However, those data shortcomings apply to each casino. To use this methodology realizes that there are no figures maintained by the casino or the regulatory agencies recording the number of casino patrons at any given time or even an aggregate number of patrons for a particular period that visit casinos.

Even a claim by one casino that there were approximately 466,000 patrons in 2002 who applied for new or replacement player activity cards, does not reflect to any comparative degree, the number of actual patrons that year that visited the casino. Player activity cards look and feel like credit cards and are inserted into slot machines permitting the casino to rate the player by time, date, location, amount wagered, game preference, and duration of play. This accounting permits the casino to better use marketing strategies to increase their return-on-investment and also enables the player to earn points toward complimentary rewards offered by the hotel and casino. This synergistic relationship builds patron loyalty while rewarding players.

The data in Table 5-5 reflect which casinos had the highest crime intensity by available player capacity. The three highest casinos in player capacity, Bally's Park Place, Sands, and Trump Plaza also reported the highest crime frequency, thus supporting Hypothesis Three. This is expected as the tourism and casino literature suggest, and discussion with security officials and regulatory agencies confirm, that the more floor space that is occupied with a table game or slot machine, the greater the profit margin. It is a balancing act for the casino in deciding, after considering the regulatory casino floor requirements of the Casino Control Commission, just exactly which games will be on the floor. Some games have a higher return on investment, but casinos must decide how much gaming variety is the correct formula to ensure even competition with other casinos in attracting patrons.

Table 5-5

INTENSITY OF CRIME BY CASINO AND GAMING TYPE 1999-2000

CASINO	CRIME FREQ	CRIME FREQ (PER DAY)	TOTAL SLOT MACH.	TOTAL TABLE GAMES w/o craps	CRAPS TABLES	TOTAL PLAYING POSITIONS	CRIME INTENSITY
Bally's Park Place	1321	3.62	4160	143	14	5270	0.0687%
Caesars	458	1.25	3565	122	13	4531	0.0277%
Claridge	252	0.69	1765	56	7	2227	0.0310%
Harrah's	459	1.26	3036	70	8	3600	0.0349%
Hilton	257	0.70	1923	77	11	2583	0.0273%
Resorts	490	1.34	2275	67	7	2803	0.0479%
Sands	1025	2.81	1994	89	7	2654	0.1058%
Showboat	648	1.78	3544	66	5	4030	0.0441%
Taj Mahal	974	2.67	4546	200	10	5926	0.0450%
Tropicana	497	1.36	3679	152	14	4843	0.0281%
Trump Marina	230	0.63	2379	68	10	2967	0.0212%
Trump Plaza	1695	4.64	2630	88	8	3302	0.1406%

Note: According to Dan Heneghan, the director of Casino Control Commission, on average there are six (6) positions available for each table game; except for craps where there are eighteen (18) positions and one (1) position per slot machine

Those data suggest that the number of games coupled with their closeness to each other may be a proxy for victimization. On the one hand while such an environment may appear to create confusion that facilitates criminal activity, conversely, the routine activities would suggest that there would be more capable guardians within a closer proximity to each other to frustrate crime.

The Trump Marina has the lowest figures in both categories of crime intensity while the Trump Plaza is the highest. Both of these casinos are owned and operated by Trump Hotel and Casino Resorts. One Senior Vice President for Corporate Security is responsible for security for these and a third Trump Casino, the Taj Mahal, in Atlantic City.

During this study, the security for 25% of all hotels and casinos in Atlantic City were under his direction and supervision. He advised that the Taj Mahal has approximately 300, Trump Marina, 200, and Trump Plaza, 240 security personnel assigned. These numbers are increased by 10% during their busy summer season. Estimating the victimization rate per 100 security personnel, not including the summer increase, reflects that all Trump casinos (Taj Mahal, Trump Marina and Trump Plaza) experienced two crime incidents for each security officer. All three casinos possess the same security technology and receive the same training, and the differences in their security personnel would not account for the variance in intensity, when at most only 40 more officers are at Trump Plaza than Trump Marina. The fewer number of officers at

Trump Marina are more of a response to crime than some formulaic propensity by square footage or player positions.

5.11 Victimization by Crime Classification

In examining Table 5-6 (Victimization by Crime Classification) below, the data show that theft is the crime of choice. This finding supports Hypothesis Four: **Though the casino floor may attract a significant number of motivated offenders, the density of patrons as well as casino security provide ample guardianship to minimize all Index Crimes (UCR) except those requiring a high degree of stealth and victim facilitation. Theft should have the highest frequency for all index crime.**

Theft is also the most common form of crime in society, (Uniform Crime Report, 2002). In New Jersey, for the years 1999-2000, personal theft (larceny) represented approximately 60% of all reported index crimes excluding motor vehicle theft, (Crime in New Jersey, Uniform Crime Report). Though New Jersey reports its theft in degrees, 1-4, and disorderly persons offense, based upon monetary value, for UCR reporting purposes, any theft, felony or misdemeanor are recorded as a Part 1 offense.

If one is willing to assume the New Jersey Transportation Authority's visitor data to Atlantic City (33 million) represents potential casino patrons, then, as

the Routine Activities Theory suggests, the number of capable guardians is so large as to discourage serious crime; except those types of crime completed by stealth and victim facilitation. This also comports with Felson's (1998) expectation that larceny would rise with population density as crowds make it easier to pick pockets and grab purses. Harper (2001) also noted that larceny was higher for tourists than residents in Honolulu and Kauai Hawaii, Malaga, Spain, Barbados, New Orleans, supporting the notion of tourist areas as crime "hot spots."

Robbery requires the taking, or attempt, of something of value by force or threat of force or violence, or by placing someone in fear, while aggravated assault is an unlawful attack for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury (Uniform Crime Reports, 1984). Both of these crimes require direct confrontation of the victim who may be aware and able to identify the assailant. The offender not only risks detection but also physical injury by the victim or other casino capable guardians, as well as the possibility of future arrest through identification. Additionally, robbery has enhanced criminal penalties and the reward of forcefully robbing patrons of a coin-cup or chips, may not outweigh the added risk of detection and almost assured incarceration. This would account for the low frequency of reported robberies and aggravated assaults.

Table 5-6

VICTIMIZATION BY CRIME CLASSIFICATION, 1999-2000

Crime	Frequency	Percent
Robbery	10	0.11
Aggravated Assault	12	0.15
Theft	8284	99.74

5.12 Theft by Property Type

The data only partially support Hypothesis Five: **Since coin-cups and cash are readily transferable and not traceable, they would be the items most often stolen.** The difficulty with this hypothesis, as discussed below, is that though purses, wallets, and other clothing were the type of property most often taken, without interviewing the offender, one can only assume those items were chosen for their contents.

In examining Table 5-7 (Theft by Property Type) below, the data were delineated by type of property taken, which ranged from currency that included casino chips, and coin-cups, to clothing, jewelry, and electronic equipment. Coin-cups and chips are readily transferable to cash. The manner the data were categorized was to default to currency if a victim reported their purse or wallet was stolen but was later recovered without the currency assuming the victim estimated the amount of money that was in the purse or wallet. Purses or

wallets were recorded as the type of item stolen, while the value of their contents was recorded in a separate table reflecting property value.

The 41.8% of currency taken represents that which was reported stolen usually in the form of a coin-cup theft, and in rare instances in the form of credits that remained on a machine the original player neglected to cash out. There was no double recording of the data, in that, if a purse was stolen containing $100.00, the default was to report the currency and not the purse. This method was more quantifiable without consideration of the actual value of the purse.

As would be expected, purses and wallets were the items of choice, 49.3%, followed by currency, 42.0%. Clearly, the currency and clothing category, which represent 91.3% of the items stolen, represent the ease on the casino floor that "suitable targets" in the form of objects are selected by thieves, and one for which victim facilitation contributes to the crime's success. It is axiomatic that thieves steal objects for their value, and though in the case of a purse that may be a Louis Vuitton or a wallet by Gucci, or an item of clothing by Versace, which may have their own inherent value, it is the contents, or perceived contents of these items that increase their target attractiveness.

On-site observation at the casinos revealed that slot machine players, who were mostly women, would typically carry their purses with them. They and other players would have their coats and jackets strewed over chairs, even though

coatrooms were available. On one tour of the Trump properties, the security director observed a patron at the slot machine with her purse on the next vacant slot machine chair. He approached the patron, identified himself, and suggested that she should secure her purse on her lap, or arm, and to generally be more cognizant of her purse. He also reminded her that just as he was talking to her about the safety of her possessions, so too could someone similarly distract her and remove her purse: she thanked the director, and secured her purse.

Additionally, the director believed that women would not typically check-in their purses in the hotel safe, or other type lockers if available, because women carry other personal items, wallet, keys, make-up, etc in their purse and it would create too much of an inconvenience. The idea of placing some type of hook on the slot machine to hang the purse, was also negated as such a device would protrude from the machine creating a potential liability for the casino. For those patrons staying at the hotel, the hotel reminds them that safety deposit boxes are available for their possessions.

Table 5-7

THEFT BY PROPERTY TYPE, 1999-2000

Property	Frequency	Percent
Currency/casino chips/ coin-cups	3492	42.04
Jewelry	287	3.46
Clothing/purse/wallet	4098	49.34
Other/items of lesser value	60	0.72
Electronic/pager/cell phone/camera	171	2.06
Credit cards/social security cards/other identification	27	0.33

5.13 Crime by Casino Floor Location

The data support Hypothesis Six: **The type of game will be inversely related to those who are victimized i.e., games with more capable guardians, (dealers, pit bosses, floor supervisors) will have fewer reports of victimization.**

Table 5-8 (Crime by Casino Floor Location) below, demonstrates that more patrons (71.1%) were victimized while playing the slot machines than any other type of game. This statistic is not very surprising since most who were victimized were females and the type of victimization entailed theft of either a coin-cup or purse. It is important to understand that though the data are delineated by casino floor location, it could have equally been sub-titled by type of wager. Each game is located within a specific zone on the casino floor. In a subsequent table, victimization by zone is reported at a particular casino because the researcher was given the architectural scheme of the zone layout by game. In this table, the data are reported by location, which means those types of games in which patrons were engaged in when they were victimized. Consistently, most casinos position their slot machines on the perimeter of the casino floor, which are closer to exits and entrances as an attraction to patrons. The proximity of the entrances and exits makes slot machine patrons and slot machine locations more suitable as targets.

Coin-cups are only used when playing slot machines. The other types of table games or Craps have stationary money trays available to players and where the chips are in front of the player in constant view. Though there have been instances where thieves simply reached over and grabbed chips and ran, such occurrences were rare. Additionally, the routine activities of slot machine players result in more situations where coin-cups and purses become less guarded and more vulnerable to theft. However, there must be caution with this conclusion because the data were not available on the game of choice for all casino patrons. As noted above, if it was assumed that a substantively significant number of Atlantic City visitors at some point visit the casino and thus were at risk for being victimized, the rate of exposure by type of game could not be measured since there was no way of knowing at which games the patrons were wagering. The data could only demonstrate a victim profile. That is, which game patrons were playing when they were victimized.

As Felson (1995) noted, criminal activity is "least when targets are directly supervised by guardians; [and] places, by managers." In the previous description of the casino setting, the researcher discussed how Blackjack, Roulette, Craps, and variations of other table games, at minimum have a dealer and other casino floor supervisors and personnel watching as patrons wager. These place managers are capable guardians that frustrate crime and these games are unlike slot machines that are only under the watchful eye of surveillance and covert security. The routine activity of table games, by their

very nature, adds mandatory layers of capable guardians making crime at these games less frequent.

As Appendix B (Slot Machine Win Comparison For Two Years Ending December 31, 2000) below, prepared by the New Jersey Casino Control Commission demonstrates, slot machines were much higher revenue producers for the casino than table games. In 2000, slot machines almost tripled the total net revenue for table games ($3,087,986 to $1,223,850), and in 1999 more than doubled ($2,955,886 to $1,220,094) the total table revenue.

The 25-cent slot machine produced net revenue of three times the highest table game (Blackjack) for both reporting years, while for the $1.00 machines, it was almost one and one-half times the Blackjack figure. The "win," as noted in the title of the graph is not the sum of money wagered in all the slot machines, but rather the net profit for the casinos. The casinos use the term "churn" to mean the amount of wins by a patron that is replayed or reinvested into slot play (D. Heneghan, Casino Control Commission, personal communication, January 13, 2004). The casinos usually keep from 4% to 10% as profit (Casino Player, 2004). Another interesting finding, is that in examining Table 5-8 in tandem with Appendix B, the data demonstrate that the 71.7% of crime occurred while patrons were engaged in slot play, and slot play represents 71.2% of the total churn.

According to Parke and Griffiths (2002), the psychology of slot machine gamblers is that they are so engrossed in play that they "tune out" to the outside environment. This suggests that the psychological state of slot players contributes to their victimization. Slot machines have appealing qualities to a large segment of patrons for a variety of reasons. There is no person-to-person contact to intimidate players, slot machine play has very few rules, and usually the play is self-taught. Patrons may feel uncomfortable playing other table games as Blackjack, and Craps since they have intricate rules that usually are applied with some variance during each wagering decision. Some patrons may feel anxious and hurried if they feel their lack of knowledge about the rules of the game is slowing play affecting other players. Slot machines can be played for a minimal investment: a nickel, dime, quarter, or a dollar. Finally, slot play with their mega-jackpots, offers the opportunity for the casino's highest payoffs (Parke and Griffiths, 2002).

Frank Fahrenkopf, head of the American Gaming Association views "the transition from table games to slots as symptomatic of the "dumbing down" of American life." Craps and Blackjack have rules and require concentration and skill; and when Fahrenkopf asked one elderly man why he played slots, he was told, "I don't have to think," (Rivlin, 2004).

Slot machine play may be addictive according to some behavioral psychologists, who claim that reinforcement is most effective when it is intermittent; that is, when there is never an extended period of continual loss. The eventual probability of a

player losing is interrupted with an occasional win. For slot players, the occasional win encourages continued play (Rudd & Marshall, 2000). Slot machines typically return over 90% of coins played, (Casino Player, October 2003). Professional slot machine designers refer to intermittent payout slot machines as "cherry dribblers; a machine that dispenses lots of small payouts while it nibbles at your stash rather than biting off large chunks of it...[You] want to give the newbie lots of positive reinforcement- to keep 'em playing" (Rivlin, 2004).

According to University of Connecticut psychiatrist, Nancy Petry: "The slot machine is brilliantly designed from a behavioral psychology perspective," employing [all] the behavioral techniques to increase the probability that the behavior of gambling will reoccur...intermittent reward and second-order conditioning--- the lights and sounds that go off when a player wins, or the two cherries in a row that convinces people they're getting closer," (Rivlin, 2004).

According to Harrah's Entertainment Inc. (2002) who conducted face-to-face interviews with 200 adult casino gamblers and also mailed questionnaires to an additional 100,000 adults, "slot machine wagering was the game of choice for 74% of the respondents," and slightly more popular with the elderly, 76% for ages 51-65, and 78% for patrons 66 and older.

In the United States, 70% of casino revenue is from slot machines. The most profitable machines are those that tap into a cavalcade of recognizable past

celebrities, their names, voices, and images. Recognized celebrities like Lucille Ball, Barbara Eden ("I Dream of Jeannie"), Gilligan's Island theme song and Frank Sinatra, are among the themes, caricatures, and icons used to replace the old fruited spinning reel machines. Despite the greater development costs for these types of machines, there is a greater profit for the casino. " Consumers want comfort, security, and a gaming experience with brands they know and trust"; all this for the over 50 year old slot players to go in their pockets and play, (Rivlin, 2003).

By contrast however, the nostalgic intent of slot machine manufacturers has also raised the ire of Nevada regulators when the themes changed. Certain manufacturers were making slot machines featuring icons and themes of Betty Boop, the Addams Family, Pink Panther, and the Munsters. Regulators claimed that such themes appeal to children and contribute to underage gambling. The gaming industry countered that the machines were not for children, but for the "nostalgic adult." Though children are not permitted to play slot machines, in Nevada such machines are in supermarkets, convenience stores, and restaurants where children could be exposed to them. There are an estimated 450,000 slot machines in the United States and the Nevada situation will resonate to other states that currently authorize slot machine wagering (Pollack, 1999).

The popularity of slot machines is also driven by the economics of casino management. It is easy to use, does not intimidate fellow players, and most patrons

are familiar with video technology. Additionally, the casinos aggressively market slot play, as they are more profitable than table games (Braunlich, 1996).

In 2003, the average daily wagers for slot machines was $1 billion, and though most of that figure is returned to the players, casinos in North America did realize $30 billion from slot machines. Half the states that have casino gambling do not permit Craps, Roulette, and Baccarat, but politicians view slot machines as a more acceptable way to generate revenue, (Rivlin, 2004).

Casino marketing strategy may take the form of additional monetary incentives for slot players, conducting slot tournaments throughout the year, or offering food and lodging enticements for players to visit their casinos. Slot machine players outnumber table game players three to one according to officials of Trump's Taj Mahal hotel and casino. About 75% of their revenue is from slot machines, which was what casinos earned from table games 20 years ago. Other Atlantic City casinos have also realized the slot potential. Harrah's 3.7 billion dollar business caters to slot players, and the Sands has decreased its table games from 71 to 28. Additionally, 80% of hotel rooms at Trump properties are complimentary, up from 59% a few years ago, to accommodate slot players. Slot machines are more consistent in generating profits (DeHaven, 2002).

DeHaven (2002) also noted that historically during the 1970's the 50-year-old male who learned Craps and Blackjack while in World War II was the typical casino

gambler. While he played his favorite games, the slot machines accommodated his female companion. Today, "the average gambler is more likely to be a women in her 50s; and a slot player."

As gambling became more popular outside the boundaries of Las Vegas and Atlantic City, novice players—men and women---were intimidated by table games, but not slots. This is consistent with a 2002 Harrah's survey profiling the American casino gambler that found that the popularity of casino gambling "peaks in the empty nester group," those 51-65. This group also tends to have more available time and income to spend on leisure activities like gambling, (Harrah's Survey, 2002).

For casinos, slots are less costly to operate and manage, no dealers or pit bosses are required, security is less demanding, and slot machines "never call in sick." When Atlantic City's first casino, Resorts International, first opened in 1978 there was a 10 to 1 ratio of slot machines to table games, though table games consisted of 56% of the revenue. Today, slots outnumber table games 30 to 1 and account for 72% of Atlantic City's $4.3 billion casino revenue (DeHaven, 2002).

Table 5-8

CRIME BY CASINO FLOOR LOCATION, 1999-2000

GENERAL LOCATION	Frequency	Percent
Slot Machine	**5848**	**71.07**
Craps Table	**164**	**1.99**
Blackjack Table	**275**	**3.34**
Other Card Table	**166**	**2.02**
Roulette Wheel	**197**	**2.39**
Restroom	**290**	**3.52**
Redemption Window	**110**	**1.34**
Stairwell	**5**	**0.06**
General Walking Area	**216**	**2.62**
Exchange Area	**26**	**0.32**
Card Center	**4**	**0.05**
ATM Machine	**21**	**0.26**
Bar or Other Liquor Area	**44**	**0.53**

5.14 Prior Victimization in Atlantic City

In Table 5-9 (Prior Victimization in Atlantic City) below, the data show that there were few patrons who were previously victimized, thus, supporting Hypothesis Seven: **Since there are large numbers of patrons frequenting casinos, the likelihood that someone will be a repeat victim would be small.**

Casino floor patrons, it would appear do not conform to some of the repeat victimization literature claiming that " a small percentage of victims account for a disproportionate number of victimizations," or ones previous victimization best predicts future occurrences (Glensor et. al., 2004).

Perhaps, "once bitten, twice shy," as patrons became more vigilant and cognizant of their surroundings, or were more careful with their personal belongings, this may have accounted for such a low percentage of repeat victims. The large numbers of visitors to Atlantic City make their opportunity for repeat victimization small. In the casino, repeat victimization probably, more appropriately, lies with the location on the floor rather than the individual patron; the unit of analysis is the place rather than the person.

Of course, what is significant with the data collected and demonstrated by this table, is that the "not available" choice represented an inordinately high frequency. What would appear as a simple dichotomous answer (yes or no) to a question if a person was previously victimized, is confounded by a "not available" check-off choice, which represents 33.7% of the total responses.

The crime report question concerning repeat victimization consisted of five potential responses: (0) no prior victimization (1) more serious (2) less serious (3) same crime (4) not available. Choices 1, 2, and 3 were collapsed into the yes category. Perhaps, patrons who indicated "not available" were too embarrassed to answer the question because of a feeling that their inattention in some way contributed to the crime; or as the literature points out, they viewed their victimization as too trivial, and the police would be unsuccessful in locating a suspect or recovering the item stolen, (Mosher, Miethe & Phillips, 2002).

The fact that the reporting officers did check off "not available" on the crime report would indicate that they asked the victim the question. If the security officers did not check off a response to this question it would have been recorded as missing data in the analysis.

In exploring why security officers would check off "not available" on the crime report while speaking to the complainant, casino security officials opined that the reporting officer just did not check off the box containing the responses to the question "if a patron was previously victimized." This procedure results from the circumstances usually attendant in completing the crime report. For example, when a patron reports a loss or theft, the officer usually is interviewing the patron at a vacant table or slot machine recording the circumstances of the theft. It is not the usual interview and interrogation room as in many police precincts.

The patrons, most of whom are one-day visitors, are eager to make the report and catch their awaiting bus or continue gambling; not an ideal situation for an in-depth recording of events. The fact that this is the last question on the reporting document may also contribute to the "not available" check off.

To seek a practical explanation to the empirical data contained in this study, the researcher interviewed key security personnel at Trump properties, which comprised 25% of the operating hotels in Atlantic City. Access to these individuals

were possible with the assistance and introduction of Division of Gaming Enforcement Director, J.P. Suarez, a fourth reader on this dissertation.

Based upon interviews with casino officials and the New Jersey State Police bureau who oversee casino crime reporting, the reporting process begins with the casino security officer who receives the complaint and prepares the Investigation Report. This report is reviewed for accuracy and completeness by two levels of supervision at the casino, the Security Supervisor and the Shift Manager. The Senior Vice-President of Corporate Security, or a titular equivalent at different casinos (Director of Security), usually the highest in the chain-of-command, reviews all reports of egregious crimes, those indicative of a continual systemic nature, or those that, perhaps by its uniqueness, would indicate a future potential integrity hazard for the casino.

Of particular importance to the Director, is the 'modus operandi' question on the form. Here new or unique methods used by offenders are screened and identified to compare with the physicality of the casino floor to determine if the structure itself may have abetted the completion of the crime. If a structural deficiency or procedural security practice unknowingly facilitated a crime, there is an immediate notification to all security personnel and the deficiency or procedure corrected. It is incumbent on the officer receiving and preparing the investigative report to sufficiently probe the victim about the circumstances of each incident.

Though uncommon, there have been occasions where patrons intentionally file false theft reports to cover gaming losses or to generate a police report for insurance purposes. In this dimension, officers usually are passive recipients of the information and rarely attempt to discourage reporting regardless of their personal belief about the motivation of the victim. After each report of a crime, the casino security officer, using his personal notes, has two days to prepare the official report, unless the crime is egregious, in which case the officer must prepare the report immediately.

Thereafter, the report is forwarded to the New Jersey State Police who determine if there are sufficient leads to further the investigation that will result in an arrest. If so, they pursue the investigation as they would other criminal investigations in tandem with the Casino Prosecutions Bureau. An investigation is either cleared through arrest or closed, pending additional information to reopen it. All the data are aggregated and used to compile an annual report of all crime in New Jersey that is eventually forwarded to the FBI as part of the Uniform Crime Reporting process.

Table 5-9

PRIOR VICTIMIZATION IN ATLANTIC CITY, 1999-2000

PRIOR VICTIM	Frequency	Percent
Yes	187	2.27
No	4832	58.73
Not Available	2775	33.73

5.15 Victimization by Race

As Table 5-10 (Victimization by Race) below demonstrates, white patrons are overwhelmingly represented as victims (68.8%). Once again the limitations of the data prevent this study from determining their actual rate. There is no way to determine the denominator of casino patrons by race, as those statistics are not captured in any format.

What is unusual is the frequency of missing data where the race was not indicated on the crime report form. According to one security official, when the report is prepared by the security officer taking the complaint, the victim's race is not determined through questioning, but through observation and judgment of the reporting officer (Patrick Burgel Trump Marina Security Department, personal communication November 11, 2003). This informal protocol is also often practiced by police departments who also refrain from asking the race of drivers they stop for vehicle infractions, for fear that such questioning may antagonize motorists.

Race may also play a role from a marketing perspective. Casinos striving to attract Asians to their tables have opened special Asian gaming rooms with Asian names as the "Dragon Room and Jade Palace." Trump hotels in Atlantic City even removed ornamental Chinese lions from their casinos after learning that Chinese gamblers considered them a sign of bad luck. Additionally, many casinos have

hired Chinese marketing executives and hosts to encourage Chinese customers to their casinos (Rabinovitz, 1998).

Asian patrons naturally over-attend Chinese specialty rooms and games. Non-Asians who enter and watch those at play for any extended period might arouse the suspicion of the patrons as well as the casino's capable guardians. Additionally, there is probably more social cohesion in these areas of the casino, if it is assumed, that casino buses servicing Asian neighborhoods have more passengers of similar language and culture, and are more likely to remain closer to each other on the casino floor. The cohesion among the Asian customers increases their guardianship, while the play of non-Asian in a gaming area, when there are similar games on the general casino floor, might also increase their guardianship by arousing suspicion of surveillance officers; both social cohesion and security interest serve to frustrate crime.

Table 5-10

VICTIMIZATION BY RACE, 1999-2000

Race	Frequency	Percent
White	5714	68.79
Black	845	10.17
Hispanic	392	4.72
Asian	341	4.11
Other	106	1.28
Missing Data	908	10.93
Total	8306	100.00

5.16 Victimization by Age and Gender

According to Table 5-11 (Victimization by Age and Gender) below, of those who were victimized, women were more than three times as likely as men, thus supporting Hypothesis Eight: **Since women are perceived as more vulnerable to crime, they will have a higher frequency of victimization.** In addition to the general perception that women are more suitable as targets, on-site observation on the casino floor, and analysis of the data confirmed, that women typically engaged in slot machine play which the data have already shown are over-represented as the type of game patrons were engaging in when they were victimized.

Table 5-11

VICTIMIZATION BY AGE AND GENDER[3]

Gender	Ages 21-34	Ages 35-53	Ages 54 & Over	Total
Female	445	1132	4407	5984
Male	250	470	1013	1733

[3]The discrepancies in the numerical data in the tables are attributable to missing data and that there were 6 victims under 21.



Figure 5-11.1

A four-year study by Gemni Research found that gambling increased among women from 61% in 1975 to 83% in 1998, while men during the same period experienced only a minor increase. Clearly, there was a change in the leisure routine activities of women during this period. Additionally, the study found while men preferred wagering against one another, women sought less competitive gaming in the form of slot machines, lotteries, and scratch-off cards. Furthermore, the machines, when placed in convenience stores and hotels, provided a physically and emotionally comforting environment to women, making them more likely to accept gambling behavior, (Svoboda, 2004). A Harrah's survey (2002) found that 80% of women vs. 66% of men played slot machines and other electronic games, while men were more than twice as likely to play table games. Casino gambling "peaks in the empty nester group," those 51-65, who have more available time and income to spend on leisure activities like gambling.

Table 5-11 (Victimization by Age and Gender) above, also demonstrates that those 54 and older were the victims of choice; victimization was closely associated with age. This supports Hypothesis Nine: **The elderly (age 54 or older) will have a higher frequency of victimization than other age groups, as they are perceived as suitable targets.**

According to Patterson (2004) the 'generational divides' are divided into four groups. The *DotNets*, born after 1976, *Generation X, or GenXers,* born between 1965 and 1976, the *Baby Boomers,* born between 1946 and 1964, and the *Matures,* born before 1946. There are 1.6 million Matures currently in New Jersey, and for data collecting purposes of this study (1999 & 2000) the elderly comport with the definition of the Matures and would have been 54 or older for reporting purposes.

Notwithstanding the data limitations mentioned above concerning the unavailability of data of all casino patrons, it is probably safe to assume that the elderly comprise a significant portion of casino patrons. More workers are retiring at earlier ages, have more discretionary income, and are marketed by casinos for their patronage. A further explanation why women are more frequent victims may be that women generally have longer life expectancies than men, and as they age, their likelihood of becoming widowed increases. At a casino some women may not have the advantage of having a spouse as one of their capable guardians, and one

who would be more vigilant and more likely to intervene in a potential crime situation.

As Director of Security for Trump properties Rick Santoro indicated, the casinos in Atlantic City currently cater more to the transient tourist engaged in daily play compared to destinations like Las Vegas or the Caribbean that typically require travel arrangements at a considerably higher cost. As such, Atlantic City typically attracts more elderly patrons who have modest or fixed governmental or retirement incomes.

Certain empirical studies have also confirmed an increase in senior citizens and gambling. A February 1999 University of Chicago National Opinion Research Center study found that since 1974, the largest increase in gambling has been among those 65 and older. Another University of Chicago study similarly concluded that the elderly were disproportionately represented in the gambling population, and in that group "women tend to play the slots and veg out, sometimes for hours." By surveying activity directors for elderly facilities in Omaha and Nebraska, McNeilly and Burke (2001) found that casino gambling was the most frequented day trip activity for the elderly.

According to Rivlin (2004) slot machines... "[are] for those well into the second half of life. Manufacturers design games primarily for women over 55 with lots of time and disposable income...as a come-on, one casino advertises free oxygen tank

refills for its players, and heart defibrillators are increasingly becoming standard equipment inside casinos." Several U.S. health organizations have used casinos to conduct flu and immunization programs for elderly patrons. The casino environment is ideal for spreading the flu virus. The Visiting Nurse Association of Central Connecticut administered flu shots at the Mohegan Sun Casino and even accepted the $18 cost per shot as unused casino credits, (Casinos Promote Flu Shots, 2004)

Brenner (1990) said older women gamble because "upward mobility in their career has ended, because of insecurity after retirement, and insecurity after the death of their partner." Tokarski (1993) said the elderly want social contacts and to be with others in seeking activity, though Tarras et al. (2000) said the fact that elderly women play the slot machine, a solo activity, countered the socialization argument. Perhaps, Tarras did not consider the Atlantic City phenomena of day–trippers, free meals, socializing on the bus ride to Atlantic City, and strolls on the Boardwalk that may all be part of a typical Atlantic City visit for the elderly; social interaction is an integral component.

Tarras et al. (2000) randomly conducted a mail survey of 2000 elderly (over 60) females heads of household, residing in Michigan and found that 56% had visited a casino, though a majority were not regular patrons. Only 4% went to a casino alone and 82% said slot machines were their favorite game. It appears that though the game is played in isolation, visits to the casino provide an avenue for social

activity. The number one reason they gambled was because the casino was entertaining. Once again the casino setting is viewed favorably in a social context.

Pfaffenberg and Costello (2001) found in their study of riverboat casino patrons at two distinct locations that the riverboat casino, *as a safe place to go,* was the most important consideration in deciding where to gamble. Pfaffenberg and Costello explained that this concern was attributable to the fact that the riverboat patrons were older and over 65% were female. Additionally, the riverboat sites were in urban areas and these patrons brought higher budgets for each casino visit. On the attribute of visible security in the measuring instrument, the riverboat patrons said they wanted to be able to see the security measures in effect on the riverboat to feel safe.

The elderly are also beginning to increasingly appear at treatment programs for disordered gambling. The executive director for the Compulsive Gambling Center in Baltimore notes that slot machines are preferred by seniors where they can play for hours and not be intimidated by face-to-face competition and where there is no need for them to learn the mechanics of a new game with the simplicity of slot wagering (Kennedy, 1999). Understandably, time is the ally of casinos; the longer a patron wagers, the greater the probability of losing.

However, the fact that more elderly may be linked to disordered gambling may have more to do with the emptiness accompanying retirement than how they elect

to spend their leisure time. A 2002 national survey found that over 6 million people 55 and older admitted to binge drinking in the prior 30 days. Older adults once led productive lives, constantly challenged by making important decisions; once retired, no one has even asked them for minor decisions, "[there] was nothing to do but read and drink, and gradually the drinking took precedence over the reading." The 2002 survey also found that 3.8% of those 55 to 59, and 4.7% of those 60 to 64, were by definition, heavy users of alcohol (Morris, 2004). Gaming, whether in Atlantic City or other locations, may afford seniors an alternative to binge drinking and fill their time void. Though this form of recreation can also be abused, if occupying time is a major concern, the casinos still offer penny and nickel slot machines, which can minimize abuse.

As on-site observations confirmed, slot machine play is rote and depending on the cost to play a particular machine, it would be easy to lose money quickly, depending on the speed with which one feeds the machine with coins. Additionally, as this study's interviews have established, most bus trips average six-hour stays which affords an energetic slot machine player more than ample time to garner considerable losses; a simple formula to increase gambling's pathology. Cohen and Cantor (1980) found age "the strongest determinant of larceny victimization." Tables 5-6 (Victimization by Crime Classification) and 5-11 (Victimization by Age and Gender) supported Cohen and Cantor's findings.

5.17 Victimization by Seriousness of Injury

Table 5-12

VICTIMIZATION BY SERIOUSNESS OF INJURY, 1999-2000

INJURY	Frequency	Percent
Knife wound	**1**	**0.01**
Serious injury requiring medical attention	**3**	**0.04**
Minor injury	**34**	**0.41**
No injury	**8088**	**99.50**

It is clear from Table 5-12 (Victimization by Seriousness of Injury) above, that the casino floor is a safe location in terms of seriousness of injury and that the data strongly support Hypothesis Ten: **Since the casino floor has a large number of capable guardians, both overtly and covertly, there will be few reports of injuries associated with the crimes of rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, (contact) as potential victims and other patrons can easily alert capable guardians (others, formal security) to thwart the offense.**

This finding could be attributable to a number of influences. As on-site observations have confirmed, when patrons are wagering they tend to interact very little with each other. In comparison to the theft, where the inattention of the victim may be contributory, offenses resulting in injuries of all types, especially

aggravated assault or robbery, draw the attention of the various capable guardians (other patrons, casino security) on the floor.

Except for the 'dark figure' of casino crime, this study can provide some conclusions in terms of safety. If one was willing to assume that those who visit Atlantic City (33 million per year according to the SJTA) are at some point at risk of a crime in the casino, then the chance of serious injury at the casino for the two-year period is (4/66,000,000= .000000061), an infinitesimal risk; and for minor injuries (34/66,000,000= .00000052) slightly less infinitesimal. If the risk of victimization is calculated using a smaller denominator, because it is assumed that not everyone on the casino floor is at risk, as some patrons may just be walking through, or simply watching and more cognizant of their belongings, the resulting figure would still be substantively insignificant.

Those data are also what would be expected when applying the capable guardian element of the Routine Activities Theory. Namely, in addition to the patrons themselves, capable guardians on the casino floor are the other patrons as well as the covert and visible security mechanisms.

As Table 5-13 (Victimization by Reason for Visiting Atlantic City) below, demonstrates, for those who were victimized, Atlantic City's main attraction was gambling; 86% of the victims indicated gaming was their sole purpose for their visit, while 92.6% designated gambling as one of their choices for their visit. Those data support Hypothesis Eleven: **Since most visitors to Atlantic City are**

day-trippers, of those who were victimized the reason for their visit to Atlantic City was to engage in gaming activities.

5.18 Victimization by Reason for Visiting Atlantic City

Table 5-13

VICTIMIZATION BY REASON FOR VISITING ATLANTIC CITY, 1999-2000

Reason	Frequency	Percent
Gambling	7119	86.52
Vacation	218	2.65
Business	134	1.63
Convention	192	2.33
All of the above	492	5.98

If one is willing to assume that those who are victimized are a microcosm of all Atlantic City visitors, then the reason for coming to Atlantic City would be to gamble. Accordingly, when one examines the visitor data from the South Jersey Transportation Company that show that approximately 33 million people take trips to Atlantic City, to conclude that a substantively significant number of these individuals come to Atlantic City to visit casinos would be a logical conclusion. Accordingly, all visitors would at some time be at risk of becoming a victim in a casino and this premise would ground the victimization rate as we previously calculated it, and speak to the safety of the casino floor.

According to Trump Properties Security Director Rick Sanotoro, the typical visitor stay in Las Vegas is 1.9 days, while in Atlantic City it is six hours. Atlantic City draws from New York City, northern New Jersey, Philadelphia, and the Washington, DC regions, all well within a day-trip driving distance. The addition of the new Borgata casino, and the continual upgrading and refurbishment of the existing casinos, supports the data showing Atlantic City as a gaming mecca (Richard Santoro, Senior Vice President, Corporate Security, Trump Hotel and Casino Resorts, personal communication, June 23, 2003).

5.19 Victimization by Residence of Victim

Table 5-14

VICTIMIZATION BY RESIDENCE OF VICTIM, 1999-2000

Residence	Frequency	Percent
New Jersey	2542	30.60
Atlantic City	151	1.81
Atlantic County	149	1.81
Out of State	5338	64.31

Table 5-14, (Victimization by Residence of Victim) above, shows the residential distribution of those victimized: 1.8% resided in Atlantic City. One casino security director speculated that Atlantic City residents are cognizant of the type of crimes typically perpetrated in the casino, and are generally more suspicious of out-of-

character actions in the casino; this may also be true for county residents who are more familiar with the casino environment.

As the Routine Activity Theory illustrates, an individual's behavior influences target suitability, and in addition to their value, access, inertia, and other visibility factors, (out-of-state) tourists are more favorable as crime targets than their local counterparts. Additionally, some tourists lower their security consciousness on holidays while touring or enter strange environments adding to their risk of becoming a victim (Barker, Page and Meyer, 2002).

This is a qualitative reason to consider in adjusting crime rates in tourist populations. The Atlantic City Transportation Authority has provided New Jersey with adjusted crime rates based on the influx of tourists. As previously mentioned, for UCR crime reporting purposes, the crime rate is calculated by dividing the *resident* population into the number of offenses in a given year without regard to a large number of victims that resulted from a concentration of tourist activities and attractions in a particular area. If one is willing to assume that leisure time behavior is more relaxed as suggested by Barker et al., (2002), then offenders will be afforded an easier opportunity to victimize patrons on the casino floor. Though the victimization rate is substantively insignificant, the tourist behavior should also be factored when examining crime data at tourist attractions.

5.20 Victimization by Month

Table 5-15

VICTIMIZATION BY MONTH, 1999-2000

Crime Month	Frequency	Percent
January	580	6.98
February	575	6.92
March	713	8.58
April	685	8.25
May	712	8.57
June	687	8.27
July	795	0.96
August	839	10.10
September	677	8.15
October	836	10.07
November	688	8.28
December	518	6.24

The data in Table 5-15 (Victimization by Month) above, and illustrated in Figure 5-15.1 (Crime by Month) below, show that victimization was highest in August and October. The data do not support Hypothesis Twelve: **Since the Atlantic City area is a summer tourist resort, there should be a greater incidence of crime in the casino during the months of July or August than any other month.**



Figure 5-15.1

The highest victimization figure for August is somewhat understandable, as it is the time of year that contingent beach resort areas within approximately fifty miles of Atlantic City are burgeoning with vacationers who also visit Atlantic City; a factors that should also make July equally high.

The Director of Security of Trump Properties explained why October would have the second highest frequency of victimization. October is the peak convention season for Atlantic City. Beginning shortly after Labor Day and into the end of September, at the culmination of the Miss America pageant, the total casino staff is downsized with the release of the summer seasonal employees, which include the security staff. Additionally, during October, the casino bus companies 'sweeten'

the patron incentives by increasing the value of monetary vouchers for bus riders visiting casinos.

During the summer months, the casinos may return to each rider a $5.00 voucher, while in October, it escalates to $15.00 because business at the casinos is slower, notwithstanding that there may be increase in conventions. Lucas & Bowen (2002) also found that casinos often employ promotions to increase business during slower periods. The crime spike in October is consistent with the Routine Activities Theory as there are fewer formal capable guardians available in the form of security and informal capable guardians in the form of patrons. (Richard Santoro, Senior Vice President, Corporate Security, Trump Hotel and Casino Resorts, personal communication, June 23, 2003).

5.21 Victimization by Day

Table 5-16 (Victimization by Day) below, reflects the weekend, as the days most patrons are victimized, thus supporting Hypothesis Thirteen: **Since most leisure activity occurs on weekends, there will be higher reports of crime on Saturday and Sunday.** According to casino officials, this would be attributable to the higher bus volumes, the usual 100% hotel occupancy, and the increase in drive-in traffic. From the routine activity perspective, an alternative explanation would be that the increase in traffic on the casino floor creates more confusion, which is an ally to crime. Additionally, on the weekends most tables may be occupied during peak playing time hours, and with the increase in patrons, it is safe to assume there will

be a concurrent increase in offenders as the routine activities literature suggests that crime feeds off legitimate activities.

In addition to the confusion, there are multitudes of people on the floor who may be naturally standing within exceptionally close proximity to those playing, waiting to occupy their seat when they leave. This innocent condition for most, presents an ideal situation for offenders to appear innocuous while trolling the casino floor for victims.

Table 5-16

VICTIMIZATION BY DAY, 1999-2000

DAY	Frequency	Percent
Sunday	1624	19.55
Monday	1019	12.27
Tuesday	1013	12.20
Wednesday	991	11.93
Thursday	1074	12.93
Friday	1013	12.20
Saturday	1546	18.61

5.22 Victimization by Hour

Table 5-17 and Figure 5-17.1 (Victimization by Hour) below, show that most victimization occurs between 1:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Casino destined buses typically arrive between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. According to casino officials, most patrons play slot machines between 1:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., which is

deduced by examining the "slot handle." The slot handle is the number of coins in a slot machine at any given time period, and is part of the financial accounting system used by the casino. The slot handle is comprised of the total number of coins, credits, tokens, and complimentary coins that a casino patron uses to play the slot machines and is only publicly reported in the aggregate.

Table 5-17

VICTIMIZATION BY HOUR, 1999-2000

Hours	Total Number of Victims
12:00AM – 12:59AM	331
1:00AM – 1:59AM	277
2:00AM – 2:59AM	202
3:00AM – 3:59AM	147
4:00AM – 4:59AM	121
5:00AM – 5:59AM	69
6:00AM – 6:59AM	59
7:00AM – 7:59AM	43
8:00AM – 8:59AM	52
9:00AM – 9:59AM	72
10:00AM – 10:59AM	122
11:00AM – 11:59AM	372
12:00PM – 12:59PM	497
1:00PM – 1:59PM	605
2:00PM – 2:59PM	732
3:00PM – 3:59PM	811
4:00PM – 4:59PM	792
5:00PM – 5:59PM	582
6:00PM – 6:59PM	462
7:00PM – 7:59PM	414
8:00PM – 8:59PM	401
9:00PM – 9:59PM	381
10:00PM – 10:59PM	313
11:00PM – 11:59PM	375

Figure 5-17.1



Figure 5-18



Note: All Pits encompass 10 separately numbered pits; none of which represented over 2% victimization

5.23 Victimization by Zone at the Trump Taj Mahal, 2000

During site visits at the Trump Taj Majal and later in discussions with the Security Director, the data were compared to the exact location on the casino floor where most patrons were victimized, see (Figure 5-18, Victimization by Zone) above. On an earlier visit, the Director provided the researcher with a schematic of the entire casino floor that included the location of all the slot machines, table games, and areas of access and egress. The diagram delineated the gaming activities by zone and an asset number individualized the slot machines. Zone A was the most frequent place of victimization. The casino slot area is delineated by a Zone letters, A to Z. Each slot machine is numbered and referred to as an "asset." At the Trump Taj Mahal, the Director explained that Zone A is located at the bus entrance, and has the highest density of players. Zone A players were the most frequent victims. Zone A is closest to the Boardwalk where access and egress to the casino floor is easier. Directly adjoining A, was Zone C, whose players were the next most victimized, followed by Zone G, closest to the front door.

According to Trump officials, Zone G is nearest a door that leads to a bus pick-up. Oftentimes, patrons while waiting for the bus to arrive will play the nearest slot machines. With one eye on the bus entrance and the other on the machine, their personal valuables are of less concern, and they are also less vigilant. Additionally, it is an ideal location for means of egress for offenders.

The routine activities of the patrons were centered closest to the exits in anticipation of their return trip home. Attempting to play the machines on one hand,

yet watching for the arrival of their bus on the other hand, split their awareness of their immediate surrounding and made them more vulnerable to becoming a victim. It was safe to assume that thieves were feeding off the casino patrons' activities at this particular place at this particular time. It is clear that Zones A, C, and G represent the cluster of where crime disproportionately occurred supporting the "hot spot" model. According to Schiebler et al. (1996) the elements of the Routine Activities Theory (motivated offenders, suitable targets, and absence of capable guardians) are examined in-tandem to explain crime, the hot spot theory looks at particular types of physical locations that place victims and offenders closer to one another increasing the crime opportunity.

The Director also commented that currently uniformed officers patrol the casino floor from 'roving' instead of 'fixed posts.' Fixed post officers were usually placed at entrances and exits of the casino floor and are rarely moved from that location. Since 1997, the casino instituted roving posts to create a greater perception of police presence, as the officers would patrol the entire casino floor.

Fixed post security required more officers and since they were the first casino personnel that patrons saw upon entry, they were usually asked more of the innocuous questions unrelated to security or protecting the public. Roving patrol officers, however, would inform patrons if they observed purses or coin-cups unattended, and since they walked the entire floor, they had a greater opportunity to

observe aberrations in the routine activities of patrons, who in fact may be potential offenders, and alert the surveillance room for closer monitoring.

5.24 Victim and Offender Profiles

In examining casino-crime literature, it was obvious that there was a dearth of information from the official records of victims and offenders who were interviewed by police after an arrest. This section of the study adds to the knowledge base by reviewing New Jersey State Police completed investigation reports, interviewing State Police officials and speaking to casino security personnel. These findings examined the characteristics of offenders and victims to the extent that they were officially reported. This descriptive analysis, beyond the testing of the hypotheses, was undertaken because of the intrinsic interest value in understanding crime on the casino floor. Added to these findings are related empirical literature accounts of thieves and thievery having applicability to the casino setting.

In one particular case, a victim contacted the police alleging her cup was stolen. When questioned, the suspect said, "He saw the cup sitting there with no one around, picked it up, started to walk away, when the victim yelled." Casino security later questioned the man, but not before he immediately replaced the cup to its original position. The police did not refer the case for prosecution as they accepted the explanation of the alleged offender who believed the cup was abandoned. Alternatively, credits that remain on a slot machine because a patron neglected to

use them or cash out, by regulation, remain property of the casino and cannot be abandoned. A patron who attempted to use or cash out such credits could be charged with theft.

In another case with a different twist, the victim readily acknowledged that she had walked away from her coin-cup, but immediately returned to the slot machine when she realized what she had done, though a little late, as she saw someone walking away with her cup. The victim alerted security who detained the suspect as he attempted to cash in the tokens at the redemption center. The victim later told the State Police she had $500.00 in her cup. When questioned, the suspect said he saw an unattended cup, took it, but that the victim was lying about the amount on money in the cup. The cup was returned to the victim that now contained only $150.00. In this case, however, the suspect was charged with theft.

A similar case with similar results occurred when a patron reported a theft in which casino security detained the suspect for coin-cup theft. The suspect, when interviewed by the State Police said he was playing next to the victim and picked up her cup by mistake. The money was returned and no charges were filed. These particular cases underscore the possibility of victim facilitation. Was this particular coin-cup merely unattended, or was the suspect thief just 'caught in the act'?

There were more definitive cases involving victim facilitation where patrons would leave their coats and jackets unattended to place wagers on a horse race at the

betting windows in the Simulcast Section; when they returned to their seats, they realized someone had stolen their valuables from their clothing.

In another case, the typical theft method of "distraction" was employed. The offender, who was standing behind a patron playing the slot machines, gained her attention by pointing out a few quarters that were on the floor. While the victim was picking up the quarters, the offender searched her handbag and removed a wallet. In this case, however, the victim's sister who was at the next machine, and who observed the theft, pursued the offender and alerted security who detained him.

The State Police then accompanied the victim and her sister to the surveillance room that had captured the theft on tape; the State Police signed the complaint and the suspect was arrested. Capable guardians are in many forms; in this case the victim's sister frustrated the crime. In a separate case, a total stranger alerted a woman who had placed her purse on the floor between her legs, that she observed someone remove her purse from the floor. Security was notified, and the suspect was arrested.

When thieves work in pairs, casino victims become easier prey. In this particular case, two suspects sat on both sides of a slot machine player. Depending on where the victim places the coin-cup, the suspect on the opposite side will engage the player in conversation, while the other steals the cup. The conversing thief engages

the conversation long enough for his cohort in crime to steal the cup and walk off. When the patron realizes the cup has been stolen, she alerts the person to whom she was speaking, never realizing that he was the partner-in-crime.

Often victims are unwilling to file complaints or even notify security of a theft either because they believe the amount of money stolen was insignificant, the likelihood of the police catching the thief is remote, or that they are too embarrassed because they believe in some way their own negligence contributed to the crime, like leave their purse or coin-cup unattended. However, in one ironic case, a patron claimed she realized that her purse, which she had placed on the floor underneath her slot machine chair, was missing. Though her purse was eventually located, the patron complained that $20,000.00 worth of jewelry was taken. When asked why she was carrying so much jewelry she responded, " I came up here from Virginia on a bus trip. The reason I had all my jewelry with me is because my husband and I are having marital problems and I wasn't comfortable leaving my jewelry at home with him. He doesn't even know I came to Atlantic City today." Perhaps, this patron would have not notified security if the amount stolen was insignificant, and to report it may have caused her to confront her spouse about her Atlantic City sojourn. Fortunately, her purse and jewelry were recovered.

To combat theft, the State Police in conjunction with casino security will initiate covert or 'sting' operations that are video-taped to catch thieves 'in the act.' In one

instance, a security officer was seated at a slot machine acting as if he was a sleeping patron. As the accused walked by, he removed the officer's coin cup located next to the officer. The accused was immediately arrested.

Though rare, there are also the brazen thieves who, notwithstanding, surrounding guardians in the form of patrons, dealers, and cameras, just reach over while a patron is playing, steal their chips and run. In one such endeavor, a thief stole $700. in chips, and security was notified. The thief did not even get beyond the casino floor before he was arrested. When asked why he assumed such a risk, he responded, "[he] lost a lot of money gambling, and he was broke."

The ingenuity of the offender often penetrates the guardianship of casino patrons. Specifically, working in teams, the first offender, after planting currency on the floor near a target, would distract a slot player by pointing to the currency asking about ownership. When the patron would lean over to retrieve the money, the second offender would steal either the cup or purse. In another instance, the offender with a jacket over his arm backed up to a woman's purse near a slot machine. He covered the purse with his jacket and slowly walked away with the purse. This was witnessed on camera, and when confronted by the security guard, the offender engaged in violent confrontation. This escalated from a simple theft to a robbery charge for which he was convicted and sentenced to incarceration.

Perhaps the most ingenuous theft scheme involved the women's restroom. The stalls in the restroom were first equipped with hooks to hang purses. While women were attending to their undergarments, a thief in the next stall would reach over and steal their purses. After a series of thefts, casino security removed the purse hooks. Shortly thereafter, all the hooks were replaced not by the casino, but by a would-be thief. Apparently, the thief was not going to permit a 'target hardening' by security to thwart such a scheme. It was not until the casino plugged the hook holes did the recurring hooks cease and these schemes disappeared.

According to Trump Security Director Santoro, if a particular theft pattern emerges that is continual, casino security will initiate a proactive investigation and run "sting operations" mimicking the crime pattern. Eventually, a theft pattern that for a time was undetected, soon is identified and situation devised where thieves are ultimately caught. To assist with overall security, Trump properties employ a bicycle, motor vehicle, and foot patrol, security mechanisms that are common in most casinos.

Frustrating the detection and apprehension of offenders is the typical two-minute time allotment that the security officer has to prepare the investigative report. Most victims want to get on the bus and forget about the occurrence. In this short period, security departments must blend theft patterns, offender characteristics and details of the incident to fine tune or develop the casino floor "hot spots." When the victim does not know any particulars about the offender, the likelihood of any future

prosecution for the case is quite remote. However, if a particular item was stolen, such as jewelry, and it was distinctive enough and could later be identified by the victim, the police would attempt to prosecute if they later identified an offender and recovered the jewelry.

Since the security department has a plainclothes and a uniformed section, the safety of the casino floor is enhanced. Though other casino patrons act as guardians, casino security realizes that the larger the number of patrons, the less vigilant the patrons become; the greater the bustle in the casino, the more confusion, the easier the theft.

Another method the casino uses to address the theft profile is by strictly enforcing an anti-loitering regulation. If individuals are identified as just continually walking through the casino floor, exhibiting suspicious behavior like "rubbernecking" (looking at areas where patrons place their valuables) or "sea gulling" (patrons who roam the casino floor looking for unused slot machine credits) which are unrelated to gaming, the casino can take protective action for its other patrons, by asking them to leave the casino floor. In this way the casino's request, based upon a (movement) profile, is grounded in law without regard to race or gender. According to casino officials, thefts from slot machines also occur when a slot player walks away from a machine with remaining credits. The casino's position, which is grounded in regulation, is that the credits belong to the casino and not to

patron who happens to notice that a particular machine has remaining playable credits and elects to use them.

The empirical literature on theft often parallels the crime situations and offender characteristics seen on the casino floor. Specifically, Barlow and Kauzlarich, (2002) reported that some thieves strive to remain generalists rather than specialists. When thieves are said to "have a line," they specialize in theft of certain merchandise or a particular type of theft---picking pockets, forgery, or con games. Such thieves believe a specialty diminishes anonymity and risks the chance their style of theft will increase their chances of suspicion. Generally, what distinguishes amateur from professional thieves is that the amateurs are more likely to be arrested and convicted, the rewards of a theft are likely to higher for professionals, who are more adept at technical skills, and who realize and plan for appropriate 'fencing' arrangements. According to Steffensmeier (1986) the "fence...is a dealer in stolen goods." Simply, fences buy stolen property from thieves and sell it to secondary purchasers. The purpose of fences is to aid thieves in converting goods to cash. The casino floor, however, probably would not require a fence's services since most items stolen are already in the form of cash, except for *expensive* purses, wallets, jewelry, or credit cards, all of which the data show are not the items usually targeted for theft.

Sutherland's *Professional Thief* also spoke about the highly technical skills needed, how they are learned, the careful planning required, and the prohibition of

specializing in a particular type of theft. Pruis and Irini's (1980) "rounders," were described as thieves with "street smarts and hustling skills who advanced until they possessed a "criminal skill, a larceny sense, and a dedication to career theft." Based on the casino crime data of this study where the average theft is usually of purses and coin cups averaging small sums of cash, it is apparent that the casino floor environment is for the amateur, not the "rounder or professional thief."

Inciardi (1984), in describing professional thieves included among their typical habitats, gambling halls, that would include, "the games, the women, the gaiety, the drugs, the sex, and the excitement that attract the victims of the swindler and the pickpocket." For Inciardi's thief, the casino floor is the ideal environment.

Inciardi (1984) also notes that in the victim-offender relationship in violent crime, the act involves physical contact between them, and as such, a victim is in a better position to identify the offender. Conversely, thieves strive to distract attention from the act and rarely leave a trail of indicators to aid in their detection. This clearly relates to the casino setting in which there is an incredibly small number of aggravated assaults, because of the easy identification of offenders, and the large number of capable guardians present.

Terzola (1976) speaking of different role patterns of thieves noted that shoplifting which is easier to commit, involved little skill and talent. He described how teams of thieves use "boosters" which are devices that make it easier for thieves to steal

and conceal their crime. A booster may be a coat, box, or bag rigged with extra compartments or materials to shield from detection and hold items stolen from stores. Thus, a "booster coat" was bulky outside with reinforced lining and large inside pockets in which it was easy to place stolen items. Either by blocking the view of the victim, or diverting the victim's attention, the theft is easily accomplished. Casino floor thieves exhibit similar methods of distraction after stalking their prey. Whether the shield is in the form of a coat or innocent conversation, the result is the same...steal the patron's money.

Even a French study (Dusquene, 1995) of pick pocketing recognized the tourist population as most vulnerable. Tourists were the easiest victims because they had the most money and were less vigilant. Additionally, elderly tourists employed fewer means of resistance, and women, since they carried purses, made both groups the most suitable targets. Offenders looked at the behavior of the victims (routine activities), the degree of access of the objects desired, and the capacity of resistance in determining if a suitable target was approachable.

Lamborn (1968) said victims were culpable in three ways: *invitation, provocation and facilitation.* By knowingly entering a dangerous place or situation, a victim was "inviting" attack. Purposely visiting high crime areas, entering public parks late at night are such examples. Then there is provocation, where the victim induces a crime through words (sarcastic remark), actions (insulting gesture) or direct threats. When a victim does not take reasonable precautions to prevent crime, as

installing locks, walking with someone at night, or in the case of the casino patron, where a slot machine player does not safeguard her purse, or a table game player hangs a coat over a chair containing his wallet while playing are all situations where facilitation has abetted a crime. The typical casino patron neither invites nor provokes crime. Quite to the contrary, anyone engaged in leisure activity has provocation and invitation furthest from consideration. Facilitation, however, is likely as patrons are so engrossed in play, and the casino has so many visible capable guardians, that becoming a victim is unthinkable to them.

Finally, Karmen (2004) underscores "shared responsibility" whereby victims facilitate, precipitate and provoke crimes; precipitation and provocation usually reserved for violent crimes as murder and rape. As the theft profiles described above demonstrate, facilitation is the operative concept for most crime committed on the casino floor. Here, as Karmen describes, the victims "carelessly, negligently, foolishly, and unwillingly" make it easier for offenders to succeed.

Frank Scoblete (2000) has offered suggestions on how casino patrons can take steps to frustrate the likelihood that they will become victims of crime on the casino floor.

- *Pocket Watch:* For men, either keep your wallet or cash in a front pocket that buttons.

- *Purse Position:* For women, keep your purse wrapped on your shoulder, on your lap, or in your hands; never place it on the floor. Force the potential thief to realize the effort it will take to seize your purse without notice.
- *Chip Arrangements:* For Craps players, arrange your chips so that smaller denominations are at the extreme ends of your chip rack, which is located on the Craps table; even if you must change some chip values to have $1 chips on the ends. It is more difficult for the "railbird" who steals chips from the unwary, to get at the middle of a stack when a player is engaged in the game and not concentrating on the location of his chips. Dollar chips are not worth the risk of detection. If onlookers at the table are tool close, ask the casino floorperson to back them off. Similarly, for Blackjack players, the smaller valued chips should be atop the larger denominations.
- *Hand to Money:* If someone bumps or jostles you, or spills a drink in your vicinity, immediately grab your purse or pocket containing the money. If something is awry call for security immediately.
- *Security Escort:* If staying in the hotel and you have won a considerable amount, ask security to escort you to your room, or if you are not staying ask for an escort to your vehicle, or even an escort to the chip redemption area.
- *Alternatives to Cash:* Establishing a credit line with a casino permits patrons to ask for markers (credit lines) which can be exchanged without redemption immediately after play, and which will add to your marker until you decide to cash in. If you do not wish a credit line, then travelers checks offer security in case they are stolen, as the amounts stolen are fully recoverable.

5.25 Typology of Other Casino Floor Crime

This study examined crime on the casino floor with specific qualifications. The crime had to be reportable as a Part 1 Index Crime in the Uniform Crime Reports, and the victim was someone who was either a gaming patron or if not, was someone who at minimum was physically present on the casino floor. There are many hotel guests and other visitors not engaged in any wagering activities but who do visit the casino floor and are therefore subjected to becoming a crime victim. However, the State, and its enforcement and regulatory agencies do investigate other crimes that occur on the casino floor that are either not reportable as Index crimes or where the intended victim was the casino. To place casino floor crime in a larger context, the researcher had discussions with State officials and reviewed police data that reflected that there is a myriad of crimes that fall into this category all of which are investigated by the New Jersey State Police or the Division of Gaming Enforcement and if warranted presented to the Casino Prosecutions Bureau for prosecution or other judicial action.

As previously mentioned, the State may bar anyone from entering a casino, which typically occurs for past criminal or organized crime involvement or because of prior evictions. Accordingly, when someone who has been barred is found in the casino, or is one the "exclusion list" for some other reason, the State may elect to charge him or her with criminal or defiant trespass. As patrons in the casino must

be 21, those underage caught wagering are subject to arrest and prosecution. There are also the general disorderly persons offenses that are experienced whenever large numbers of people gather and interact. The usual offenses are harassment, where a patron may threaten a casino employee over a wagering decision or another patron over some inconsequential action that may have been to a losing player's disadvantage, or where a patron becomes loud and disorderly on the casino floor, or even where these situations may escalate from a verbal dispute to a simple assault, and since alcohol is free to casino floor patrons, there is ample representation of those who are intoxicated, disturb the gaming activity, and create problems for security.

Then there are the swindlers and cheats against whom the casino must be constantly vigilant. Their typical schemes involve using shaved coins when playing slot machine, or using smaller denominations coins in a larger denomination slot machine; forcing $1.00 tokens in a $5.00 machine, a practice that probably would not succeed as most modern slot machines have machine readable computer chips embedded in them. At table games, they may pull back or remove a losing bet after it has been placed, or they may place down a bet after a decision has been reached, a scheme referred to as "past posting." In Craps, they may shift a bet to a winning number after the dice have been thrown, or in Roulette and some other games where stacks of chips are used, cheats may "cap" a bet, which refers to illegally adding chips to the stack after a winning decision. Casinos will rearrange stacks of chips on bets containing different denominations by placing the larger

denomination chips on the bottom in an effort to frustrate capping. All of the above scams are violations of New Jersey law and are subject to prosecution.

There are also serious crimes that are felonies that occasionally take place at the casino. There are felons who would rob the casino by passing robbery notes to the redemption cage, and in some cases they are armed; those who use counterfeit United States currency to wager; those who use fraudulent credit cards or forgery to obtain cash to wager, or to bilk an ATM; those who write bad checks or fail to repay markers; and those who would avoid the Currency Transaction Report requirement by purposely cashing in chips just under the $10,000 requirement or use the casino to launder ill-gotten monies; and, the terroristic threats of those who call the casino threatening to "blow it up." In these instances the casino, the state, or the federal government is the intended victim. The Casino Prosecutions Bureau aggressively prosecutes all state offenses and refers federal offenses to the United States Attorney's Office.

Other violations that are also categorized as thefts include instances where someone attempts to use complimentary offerings that have been issued in someone else's name; where a patron has been overpaid by the casino on a particular wager and refuses to return the overage; where a patron "punches out" or otherwise presses a button or icon causing a machine that has abandoned credits on its meter to pay out, as the casinos and the law consider abandoned credits as casino property; and, where a patron simply steals chips at a gaming table that do not belong to another

patron but are part of the casino's chips used to pay winning wagers. Finally, the State Police have also investigated instances of soliciting prostitution, domestic violence, and possession and sale of various controlled dangerous substances, all of which have occurred on the casino floor.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

6.0 Summary and Discussion

According to Frank Scoblete (2000) best selling author on casino strategies, "There are two ways to lose money in a casino. You can have bad luck, when the casino defeats you, or you can have even worse luck when some criminal steals whatever money you might have won after you had good luck... [gambling] attracts those of *us* who wish to fleece Fortune and those of *them* that wish to fleece us." This study has examined the second premise of Scoblete's claim by examining the spatial and temporal distribution of crime on the casino floor, a location where the public is invited to enter and remain 24 hours a day, all year long.

An assessment of "crime in the casino" was possible because of the availability of the data and the genuine cooperativeness of all parties who are impacted by legalized gaming in Atlantic City, New Jersey. This study was important not only because there had been no previous published reports specifically examining casino crime, but also because it expanded the much-tested Routine Activities Theory by analyzing data within a new milieu, the casino floor, and a new sub-population, casino patrons.

The casino floor is used interchangeably with the term casino, which defines the location where patrons wager. Atlantic City, unlike other gaming resort areas, has no freestanding casinos, and by regulation they must be attached to hotels. Additionally, a new leisure time activity, casino wagering, has expanded the routine activities model for examination. The aim of this study was simply to determine what people do as they wager and interact with each other on the casino floor, and, by examining the incidence of crime, how that interaction may have contributed to them becoming a crime victim.

America's appetite for gambling continues to increase according to the American Gaming Association, a casino trade group. In 2003, 53.4 million people made a total of 310 million trips to the 443 commercial casinos generating about $27 billion in gambling revenue, doubling the figure of 10 years ago, and up 2% from last year. The $27 billion does not include money spent on casino related expenses like hotels, meals, and entertainment. Nevada earned $9.6 billion, followed by New Jersey with $4.5 billion (U.S. appetite for gambling, 2004). It is clear that with such a burgeoning industry, the need for evidence-based studies that relate not only to the economics of legalized gaming, but also its social consequence in the form of crime, should be undertaken.

Because of the general secrecy of tourist crime data, the tourist industry's desire not to alarm potential visitors, and the unavailability of any researcher to

have been in a position to be granted access to, and report on, casino crime, the casino floor has remained empirically unexamined from a crime perspective. Though the victimization literature associates becoming a crime victim with nighttime leisure activities, this study expanded that premise by studying a specific group of individuals (casino patrons) and their leisure activities at all hours of the day and evening.

The findings of this study identified the determinants of crime on the casino floor. It showed that crime was more likely to occur in particular areas typically while patrons were engaged in playing the various wagering opportunities offered by the casino. Principal among these findings was a victim typology: elderly, white women, who played slot machines, whose purses or coin-cups were stolen, most often occurring between 2:00 pm and 5:00 pm, on weekends, during the months of August and October.

Discussions with casino and State security officials, on-site observations, and reviews of the literature offered explanations for these findings. Slot machine play is an activity that is played between patron and machine. There are no casino personnel observing patrons and their cash or other belongings during play as there is when patrons are wagering at table games. Having fewer watchers than table games, slot machines present more opportunity for stealth. Purses hung over chairs or otherwise not secured, are easy marks for offenders, as are coin-cups placed to the side of a machine or left unattended even for a

short while; both items are easily purloined by purposeful distracters of thieves working in pairs.

All places on the casino floor were not equally vulnerable to crime. Certain wagering opportunities, (Craps, Blackjack) had more "place managers" and consequently had more capable guardians directly watching patrons and their funds. It was obvious that tourists were not averse to visiting Atlantic City casinos, because there was a low incidence of predatory crime and it is a non-threatening environment. The overwhelming type of crime that did occur there (theft) is small in terms of frequency and injury, unnoticed, and did not draw a lot of police attention.

This study also identified the nature and extent of crime in the Atlantic City casinos for 1999-2000 while describing the socio-demographic characteristics of the victim population; it detailed the social environment in which those crimes occurred and how that setting may have caused victims and offenders to converge. In fact, the casino is the ideal background for the elements of the Routine Activities Theory. The casino brings together a lot of people, with a lot of money, all wanting to have a good time...and where the alcohol is free. However, the security at the casinos has made the casino floor an area of high surveillability, with omnipresent guardians, and a reputation for tough enforcement, all of which contribute to a safe environment.

The typical hours of victimization opined by some casino security personnel were attributable to less vigilance of patrons who were more concerned with ensuring they were on time for their bus ride home. Though the summer months of July and August would be expected to experience spikes in victimization because of the burgeoning beach population within Atlantic City's proximity, the data showed August and October as the months having the most crime reports. Once again, casino security explained October by the typical downsizing of summer security employees, and the increase in visitors resulting from bus companies offering higher incentives for anticipated slower activity periods.

Most of whom were victimized were from out-of-state and almost all experienced no serious injury as a result of being a crime victim. Perhaps, state residents, which were typically day-trippers, do not possess the same tourist traits, were more familiar with their surroundings, and generally more cognizant of behaviors that may precipitate crime. As would be expected, crimes necessitating stealth were not associated with injuries, as injuries would escalate a larceny to robbery, as would the use of weapons.

The victimization data of this study was driven by multiple variables that reflected the activities of wagering patrons. The data were location driven because the data reflected that most crime was committed at certain places (slot machine zones, entrances and exits); the data were also object driven, as

there was a definitive choice of exactly what was stolen (coin-cups, purses). The study also identified who was victimized and how that victimization was distributed by race, gender, age, time, location and type of play; a victim profile emerged. The casino with its constant movement of patrons, the clanking sounds of falling coins, bells and whistles of winning slot machines, and yells of the crowds enjoying themselves, creates an aura of confusion that is an ally to crime.

The largest portion of the casino floor is devoted to slot machine play, which is a type of routine activity that creates an opportunity for theft. Players are engaging in a rote activity, not fully cognizant of their surroundings, and unlike the table games, there are no casino employees directly observing patrons at play or their valuables. Additionally, the crowds in the slot area create a heard defense affording protection and giving players sometimes a false sense of security. Elderly women may be the more likely victims because of their routine activity of engaging in slot play because it is less cognitive and inhibiting.

6.1 Industry and Public Policy Implications

The industry should modify their crime reporting document ("Investigation Report") and design one that not only satisfies the Uniform Crime Reporting requirements, but one that addresses the concerns specifically relating to the

casino. The current form has a series of questions relating to motor vehicle theft, teletypes, technical services, all of which appear to be unrelated to casino floor crime. Some of the reports delineated the location of where a patron was victimized with sufficient particularity by identifying the slot zone and slot machine (asset number), while others just indicated an area or zone. If that was the victim's description of the place of occurrence, it is understandable, if it was so described because it was not sufficiently probed by the officer, then a training intervention by security can at minimum, ensure standardization in responses.

The question on the Investigation Report relating to prior victimization, and one of the response choices, "not available," should be removed because the answer to that question, ("Prior Victimization in Atlantic City") cannot be "unavailable" if the security officer is interviewing the victim. Additionally, does prior victimization in Atlantic City mean any location in the city, or is the question designed to learn if someone was previously victimized in any casino? A prior question asks, "Was Subject(s) Victimized of Monies Won at a Casino." In this instance, the question is casino specific.

Additionally, the Investigation Report appears adaptable to database technology and could be designed to provide an instant snapshot of aggregated offenses by all the variables examined in this study. If the industry has not availed itself of this technology a small investment may yield immeasurable

results in quickly identifying crime "hot spots" and emerging areas of vulnerability on the casino floor. It would be ideal, from a social science perspective, if an Investigation Report prepared by law enforcement for law enforcement, could contain some social science insight. Specifically, directed questions about whether a patron had consumed alcohol prior to become victimized may measure the effect of alcohol on their target selection; whether they just had won a significant jackpot or sum of money might correlate to their target selection; and finally for those whose purses were stolen, asking if the casino provided a receptacle for their coin cup or had cashless wagering, would have the free hand that usually held their coin-cup and better secured their purse.

The data indicated that theft was the most prevalent crime reported with patrons acting as unwitting accomplices. This suggests that offenders are non-descript and arouse little suspicion. From the State's perspective, it may do well to educate patrons on just how vulnerable they are to this type of crime. Training in the form of video presentations on bus rides en route to Atlantic City may make patrons more vigilant of their surroundings as well as alert them to the various schemes employed to victimize them. The State and the casino should encourage outreach programs with the various senior citizen clubs and educate them through presentations or literature on safety concerns while at the casino. Such educational alerts are common in the airline and cruise industry without any apparent detrimental effect on passengers. The

decision to switch from fixed security posts on the casino floor to roving patrols should be subjected to empirical analysis to determine which enforcement strategy best meet the safety needs of the casino patrons.

The State as well as the casino industry should consider funding empirical research and make the industry more transparent as it relates to crime; both have a vested interest in the well being of its patrons.

6.2 Directions for Future Research

The previous section discussed this study's findings included the determinants of casino crime. It is equally important to understand exactly what future research should try to also determine. Since data are not collected either by the State or the casino industry on the number of visitors to all the casinos, and how they vary by race, age, or gender, there is no way to determine which sub-groups were disproportionately likely to become a victim. If future research could be sufficiently funded, stratified on-site observations for all entering patrons could provide a denominator with which to gauge the percentage of risk facing each group of patrons. Such a study then could predict whether the profile of those who were victimized that did emerge from this study, (elderly, white women, playing slot machines), represented the greater likelihood of all potential victims on the casino floor. Notwithstanding this limitation, this study

expanded the knowledge base relating to crime at a specific place, the casino floor, which had been previously unexamined.

This dissertation has raised a wide spectrum of new questions, as this was the first time such a setting was used to test the Routine Activities Theory. Most of the areas of future research were generated because of the principal limitation of the study that prevented interviews of victims or offenders. The foremost question is, why were offenders motivated to commit crime on the casino floor knowing that they were being continually surveilled, and that often the security force at many of the casinos was larger than some small or medium-sized municipal police departments? How did offenders see patrons at particular games, as more suitable targets? What was an offender's target selection process? What cues did offenders get from the casino floor to select a particular target? Did offenders perceive casino security and other patrons as capable guardians?

Interviews of offenders can detail their motivation and rationale on why they believed some victims were more vulnerable than others and enable future researchers to understand their decision making process. As most patrons on the casino floor were carrying cash, what actions of patrons caused offenders to believe that certain patrons were easier targets? Conducting an analysis of crime reports to determine if other patrons in some way assisted in the arrest, detection, and location of offenders, will determine how patrons, who only

have a general responsibility as guardians, were effective. Additionally, researchers can arrive at a better offender profile, and know how that profile varies by age, race, gender, occupation and previous encounters with law enforcement. An offender typology will also enhance the capacity of law enforcement to forecast crime patterns and enable better use of public and industry security resources to address crime.

Another advantage of interviewing the offender would be to understand to what extent that crime was a function of the environment. According to Fattah (1989), alcohol consumption may enhance a state of vulnerability—future researchers may ask victims or offenders if they consumed alcohol prior to a crime, or if an offender observed a casino patron drinking alcohol was there a belief the patron would be less vigilant. Offender interviews might also determine which crimes were precipitated by situational opportunities of the casino floor, and where the floor structure may have presented an integrity hazard abetting crime. As most of the reported crime occurred in the slot machine area, were the slot machines or the area criminogenic in some way? Does the proximity of each slot machine, or the type of machine, assist offenders?

It would also be interesting to examine if an offender's intention to commit a crime was preconceived or merely opportunistic because of a losing day at the casino? Offenders often mimic activities of victims in the casino setting, so

they will not draw attention to their actions, and since most patrons have relaxed attitudes, it is easy to steal from them. How do offenders locate and select their victims, and what is their response when they are caught in the act? What calculus do offenders use when considering which casino provides the most conventional access and area of escape?

Concerning victim interviews, knowing their routine activities immediately before they were victimized, would expand the understanding of the type of activity that may be more victim-prone. The characteristics of crime victims discovered in this study, were that victims were elderly, white women, engaging in slot play, who either had their purse or coin-cup stolen; or that this group was more likely to report crime.

Contributing to their victimization may be that patrons were lulled into a false sense of security because the typical offender (thief) is non-descript and does not arouse suspicion. It would also be interesting to speak to victims to determine if they visited Atlantic City casinos as part of a larger group. Some literature points to the social bonds of tourists who are accompanied by family members or who are part of a chartered tour. Did such closer bonds provide for increased guardianship? It was apparent that the activities of gaming patrons fell into predictable patterns that perhaps offenders could discern when considering criminal targets.

Of those patrons who were victimized, only 2.3% indicated this occurred more than once. Though such repeat victimization is low, the characteristics of this sub-population, may, compared to the data relating to total crime victims, show an activity trait that increased their likelihood of becoming a repeat victim.

Of greater interest, would be to further examine the crime data over time for the new Borgata Hotel and Casino, which by introducing cashless slots machines, has reduced the vulnerability of certain targets. All of the Borgata's 3,650 machines use "ticket in ticket out technology; they accept cash but pay out winning wagers in the form of voucher tickets." The bar-coded vouchers can be used in other machines as credits to play. Players no longer need to carry coin-cups or be distracted by the clanking sounds of coins hitting coin trays after a jackpot win (Venutolo, 2003).

A preliminary review of the crime data for the Borgata Casino since it opened in July 2003, until July 2004, reflected that there were 12 crime incidents in which the New Jersey State Police were called in to conduct an investigation; four in which a patron's purse was stolen, four in which someone took a patron's chips while at a table game, three instances where someone cashed out a patron's remaining credits on a slot machine, and one where someone stole a patron's identification. Of the crime reports for the same period, prepared by security at the Borgata Casino in which the State Police were not summoned, 17 involved theft of a purse or wallet and 7 involved cashing out a patron's

credits on a slot machine. These preliminary data demonstrate a significant drop in crime and are promising in terms of the ability of the casino to "target harden" crime opportunities on the casino floor generally, and the slot machine area particularly. Assuming the cashless voucher concept does not have a significant effect in reducing slot machine income for the Borgata, the voucher system may be a method that should be adopted by other casinos. Additionally, patrons do not have to handle coins or carry coin-cups and are free to use that hand to further secure their valuables.

It appears that Borgata's new slot technology may soon be obsolete. Detroit's Motor City Casino has tied in patrons' slot play to their player's club card. Once inserted, a patron may choose from, "Transfer Cash to Game," Transfer Cash to Card," or "Check Account Balance." After entering a personal identifier, cash goes either to or from the card to the machine, which can later be redeemed for cash or credit (True Cashless, 2004). This recent advance in technology suggests that crime during slot play will further be reduced.

This study should be replicated in other casino resorts; ideally ones that do not cater to day-trippers. Would tourists who vacation for longer periods at casino resorts have a higher frequency of victimization? Notwithstanding that most patrons were single-day visitors, this study examined the residential distribution of known victims and found that of those victimized, most resided out-of-state.

The data clearly showed the safety of the casino floor, as there were only 22 reports of serious crime for the two-year period. Additionally, as Fattah (1989) points out, a crime of violence has an interpersonal dimension, in that those who know each other through family, business, or friendship ties, commit these crimes. Casino floor patrons usually lack the interpersonal relationship that would precipitate violent offenses and their preoccupation with gaming activities would appear to negate opportunities for violent interactions to develop.

What is patently obvious after discussion with casino personnel, law enforcement responsible for casino security, and analysis of the crime data, is that there is no passivity when it comes to ensuring the safety of casino patrons. Perhaps, your odds of not becoming a crime victim on the casino floor are your safest bet!

Appendix A

Casino Investigation Report

TRUMP MARINA
HOTEL - CASINO

I054

A.C.P.D. No. 1022

INVESTIGATION REPOR

1. HOTEL/CASINO CASE NO.	2. CASINO CODE	3. PHONE NUMBER	4. UCR	21. PROSECUTOR'S CASE NO.	22. A.C.P.D. CASE NUMBER
C00-03-002	142200	441-2000			

5. CRIME/INCIDENT	6. NJS	23. VICTIM	24. AGE	25. SEX	26. RACE
THEFT		SS NO. / ADDITIONAL VICTIMS IN NARRATIVE: / D.O.B. 1-6-27	83	F	W

DATE AND TIME	7. BETWEEN	8. HOUR	9. DAY	10. MONTH	11. DATE	12. YEAR
	XXXXX	1410	4	3	1	00
	At XXXXX	1418	4	3	1	00

27. VICTIM — HOME ADDRESS — PHONE

27 A. VICTIM — LOCAL ADDRESS — PHONE

13. CRIME/INCIDENT LOCATION			13 A. CODE	28. EMPLOYER	
SLOT MACHINE#AL-02				RETIRED	
14. MUNICIPALITY	**15. COUNTY**		**16. CODE**	**29. PERSON REPORTING CRIME/INCIDENT**	**30. DATE & TIME**
Atlantic City	Atlantic		0102	SAME AS#23	3-1-00 1418
17. TYPE OF PREMISES	**18. CODE**	**19. WEAPONS - TOOLS**	**20. CODE**	**31. ADDRESS**	**PHONE**
HOTEL/CASINO		OTHER ACTION		SAME AS#27	

32. MODUS OPERANDI

PERSON(S)UNKNOWN REMOVE COIN BUCKET(APPROXIMATELY $300.00)FROM SLOT MACHINE#AL-02.

33. VEHICLE	34. YEAR	35. MAKE	36. BODY TYPE	37. COLOR	38. REGISTRATION NO. and STATE	39. SERIAL NO. or IDENTIFICATION
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Value of Stolen Property	40. CURRENCY	41. JEWELRY	42. FURS	43. CLOTHING	44. AUTO	45. MISCELLANEOUS
	$300.00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

46. TOTAL VALUE OF STOLEN	47. TOTAL VALUE RECOVERED	48. TELETYPE ALARM	49. TECHNICAL SERVICES	50. TECHNICIAN - AGENCY
$300.00	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-

51. INJURIES	52. REASON FOR VISIT	53. VICTIM/OFFENDER RELATION	54. VICTIM'S RESIDENCE	55. OFFENSE LOCATION
1. Knife/Gunshot Wound 2. Serious Injury 3. Minor Injury 4. No Injury 9. Other/Unknown	1. Gambling 2. Vacation 3. Business 4. Convention 5. No. 2, No. 3 or No. 4 & Gambling 6. Atlantic City Resident 7. Security Officer 8. Other/Unknown	1. Relative 2. Neighbor 3. Friend Acquaintance 4. Co-Worker 5. Stranger 9. Other/Unknown	1. Atlantic City 2. Atlantic County 3. New Jersey 4. Out-of-State 9. Other/Unknown	1. Casino 2. Immediate area of Hotel/Casino 3. With-in Hotel/Casino Complex 9. Other/Unknown
4	1 -a	9	3	1

56. WAS SUBJECT(S) VICTIMIZED OF MONIES WON AT CASINO? 1. YES 2. NO 9. N/A — 1

57. PRIOR VICTIMIZATION IN ATLANTIC CITY — 0. No Prior Victimization 1. More Serious 2. Less Serious 3. Same Crime 4. Not Available — 0

58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

List Accused - List and Identify additional victims - Describe Perpetrators or Suspects - Action Taken, Include Findings and Observations of Investigator - Physical Evidence found - Where by Whom - Disposition and Technical Services Performed - Interview of Victims - Witnesses - Persons Contacted - Accused Suspects - List - Describe Stolen Property Value- Court Action - Attach Statements.

63. NO. OF ACCUSED	64. ADULT	65. JUVENILE	66. STATUS CRIME	67. STATUS CASE	68. UCR STATUS	69. DATE CLEARED
-0-	-0-	-0-	ACTIVE	INVESTIGATION	Month ___ Year ___	

70. NAME — Address — 71. Age — 72. Sex — 73. Race — 74. D.O.B.

ON WEDNESDAY 3-1-00 AT APPROXIMATELY 1418 HRS, I DR/SUPERVISOR B PIERCE#13393 WAS DISPATCHED BY PODIUM TO SLOT MACHINE#AL-02 FOR A REPORT OF A THEFT. UPON MY ARRIVAL I MET WITH #23 WHO STATED THAT WHILE PLAYING SLOT MACHINE#AL-02 A UNKNOWN BLACK MALE WEARING A GREEN JACKET TAPPED HER SHOULDER AND TOLD HER THERE WAS A COIN ON THE FLOOR. AFTER SHE HAD PICKED UP THE COIN FROM THE FLOOR SHE NOTICED HER BUCKET OF COINS VALUE$300.00 WAS MISSING CHECKED AREA FOR COIN CUP NEGATIVE RESULTS. CCTV JOE NOTIFIED NO TAPING OF AREA

75. NAME	76. EMPLOYEE BADGE NO.	77. PAGE	78. DATE REPORT	79. REVIEWED BY
Signature THERESA A. SIMINSKI	13393	1 of 1 Pages	3-1-00	
		80. OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: B Pierce 13180-21		81. PROPERTY: YES / NO

TR-30105 WHITE: Security CANARY: D.G.E PINK: A.C.P.D.

Appendix B

Slot Machine and Table Game Win Comparison for Two Years Ending December 31, 2000

SLOT MACHINE WIN COMPARISON
FOR TWO YEARS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2000
($ IN THOUSANDS)



TABLE GAME WIN COMPARISON
FOR TWO YEARS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2000
($ IN THOUSANDS)



Appendix C

Florida's Crime Rate at a Glance (1999)

Total Index Crime by County, 1999

Florida's Crime Rate at a Glance

Total Index Crime by County, 1999
(Click here to download this table in .pdf format.)

County	Population	Murder	Forcible Sex Offenses	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Motor Vehicle Theft	Total Index Crime	% Index change 98/99*	Index Rate Per 100,000	Rate Change 98/99*
ALACHUA	216,249	8	267	371	1,409	3,041	9,836	1,091	16,023	-16.4	7,409.5	-18.3
BAKER	21,879	2	15	3	61	95	318	49	543	-14.6	2,481.8	-17.5
BAY	150,119	11	102	97	532	1,427	4,679	347	7,195	-17.0	4,792.9	-18.4
BRADFORD	25,500	3	10	18	143	245	518	40	977	-0.3	3,831.4	-0.9
BREVARD	474,803	21	515	480	2,654	4,662	13,138	1,232	22,702	-4.2	4,781.4	-6.1
BROWARD	1,490,289	69	846	2,929	5,874	14,971	49,080	11,073	84,842	-11.6	5,693.0	-13.4
CALHOUN	14,117	0	2	0	14	17	78	3	114	-63.0	807.5	-64.4
CHARLOTTE	136,773	2	14	38	158	698	2,086	222	3,218	-17.9	2,352.8	-19.8
CITRUS	114,898	2	112	20	282	693	1,651	143	2,903	-10.8	2,526.6	-12.7
CLAY	139,631	2	114	56	287	492	3,559	258	4,768	-5.0	3,414.7	-8.4
COLLIER	219,685	7	158	224	968	2,269	5,743	598	9,967	-5.0	4,537.0	-9.2
COLUMBIA	56,514	1	79	59	443	642	1,908	174	3,306	-1.5	5,849.9	-3.5
DESOTO	28,438	3	23	30	240	397	556	74	1,323	-13.8	4,652.2	-15.3
DIXIE	13,478	6	10	1	53	198	203	26	497	-12.3	3,687.5	-14.2
DUVAL	762,846	84	831	1,775	4,870	10,100	30,287	4,372	52,319	-9.7	6,858.4	-10.7
ESCAMBIA	301,613	8	311	449	1,520	2,922	8,533	682	14,425	-10.7	4,782.6	-12.3
FLAGLER	45,911	2	18	10	86	220	787	49	1,172	-16.0	2,552.8	-20.5
FRANKLIN	10,872	0	9	0	16	47	284	29	385	-22.7	3,541.2	-23.6
GADSDEN	51,478	4	34	65	303	479	903	98	1,886	-19.3	3,663.7	-20.4
GILCHRIST	13,406	0	15	0	39	151	159	30	394	34.9	2,939.0	32.3
GLADES	9,867	0	15	6	31	120	216	19	407	6.5	4,124.9	6.6
GULF	14,403	1	17	3	86	104	213	20	444	5.5	3,082.7	4.4
HAMILTON	14,376	2	9	3	62	119	196	28	419	-22.6	2,914.6	-23.9
HARDEE	22,594	2	3	22	74	360	527	106	1,094	-3.5	4,842.0	-2.6
HENDRY	30,552	2	27	54	127	428	804	153	1,595	-27.8	5,220.6	-28.2
HERNANDO	127,392	1	103	71	574	1,296	2,834	234	5,113	13.6	4,013.6	11.5
HIGHLANDS	81,143	3	47	79	258	1,394	1,803	153	3,737	-16.9	4,605.4	-17.6
HILLSBOROUGH	967,511	63	896	3,359	6,939	12,699	40,005	10,056	74,017	-2.4	7,650.2	-4.9
HOLMES	18,899	0	8	2	31	71	68	16	196	-41.7	1,037.1	-44.6
INDIAN RIVER	109,579	6	81	67	365	1,025	3,247	251	5,042	-9.0	4,601.2	-11.4
JACKSON	49,469	2	36	35	296	283	762	76	1,490	30.5	3,012.0	31.0
JEFFERSON	14,424	0	6	9	86	82	147	14	344	-37.7	2,384.9	-38.6
LAFAYETTE	6,961	0	3	5	9	8	0	1	26	-23.5	373.5	-23.1
LAKE	203,863	9	204	158	1,643	2,138	4,032	483	8,667	2.0	4,251.4	-1.9
LEE	417,114	24	375	762	1,473	4,456	11,106	2,467	20,663	-0.5	4,953.8	-3.3
LEON	237,637	5	305	566	1,751	3,234	9,799	1,307	16,967	-7.1	7,139.9	-8.8

Total Index Crime by County, 1999

LEVY	33,408	1	60	15	123	421	994	78	1,894	4.8	5,669.3	1.6
LIBERTY	8,048	0	5	3	19	26	60	10	123	-6.1	1,528.3	-10.1
MADISON	19,632	1	4	9	120	256	720	23	1,133	12.8	5,771.2	10.5
MANATEE	257,255	17	174	387	1,486	3,249	7,604	1,005	13,922	-1.0	5,411.8	-3.4
MARION	249,433	11	260	259	1,422	2,592	6,819	501	11,864	0.7	4,756.4	-2.2
MARTIN	121,514	2	54	98	335	960	2,898	203	4,550	-7.0	3,744.4	-8.6
MIAMI-DADE	2,126,702	200	1,670	9,149	16,762	31,634	108,138	25,859	193,412	-9.4	9,094.5	-10.9
MONROE	87,030	1	34	35	282	570	2,071	124	3,117	-50.4	3,581.5	-51.2
NASSAU	57,381	2	59	32	290	702	1,435	160	2,680	22.5	4,670.5	16.4
OKALOOSA	179,589	4	121	96	342	1,429	2,825	183	5,000	-23.8	2,784.1	-25.5
OKEECHOBEE	35,510	1	43	29	195	372	736	61	1,437	222.2	4,046.7	218.1
ORANGE	846,328	50	760	2,539	6,625	12,327	42,138	6,185	70,624	-1.7	8,344.8	-4.3
OSCEOLA	157,376	14	159	219	777	2,698	6,024	684	10,575	-1.6	6,719.6	-7.0
PALM BEACH	1,042,196	58	733	2,551	5,453	14,870	42,876	8,754	75,295	-13.1	7,224.6	-14.9
PASCO	326,494	14	190	231	1,162	3,585	7,777	985	13,944	-7.7	4,270.8	-9.3
PINELLAS	898,784	42	880	1,759	4,932	10,191	30,365	3,898	52,067	-7.8	5,793.0	-8.5
POLK	474,704	18	509	712	1,769	6,639	15,334	2,249	27,230	-25.0	5,736.2	-26.4
PUTNAM	72,883	4	61	90	593	1,310	2,126	208	4,392	3.9	6,026.1	1.9
ST. JOHNS	113,941	2	52	65	441	856	2,828	232	4,476	-3.7	3,928.3	-7.2
ST. LUCIE	186,905	8	161	278	1,028	1,836	4,617	560	8,488	-15.4	4,541.3	-17.0
SANTA ROSA	112,631	3	100	23	289	536	1,789	103	2,843	-29.2	2,524.2	-32.2
SARASOTA	316,996	8	129	274	912	2,393	8,206	659	12,581	-10.9	3,968.8	-12.4
SEMINOLE	354,148	6	231	412	1,264	2,938	9,009	1,484	15,344	-0.2	4,332.7	-2.7
SUMTER	50,823	3	33	39	219	295	577	122	1,288	-12.1	2,534.3	-17.2
SUWANNEE	34,386	1	32	34	162	359	735	77	1,400	-10.8	4,071.4	-12.5
TAYLOR	19,836	1	16	16	120	281	406	34	874	-5.2	4,406.1	-6.7
UNION	13,833	0	11	3	41	39	27	26	147	-12.5	1,062.7	-14.9
VOLUSIA	426,722	24	393	793	2,066	5,404	12,200	1,688	22,568	-13.1	5,288.7	-14.4
WAKULLA	20,648	1	11	11	137	121	373	46	700	-4.6	3,390.2	-8.4
WALTON	40,466	1	18	7	76	257	594	50	1,003	-16.9	2,478.6	-21.3
WASHINGTON	22,155	1	0	2	25	56	96	18	198	86.8	893.7	79.7
State Total	15,322,040	856	12,583	31,996	83,424	180,785	532,462	92,243	934,349	-8.9	6,098.1	-10.8

* Percent changes in number and rate should be interpreted with caution. In small counties with low numbers of crime, a small increase in crime
can produce a large percent change.

SOURCE: Statistical Analysis Center: FDLE, Florida uniform crime report, 1999. Tallahassee, FL.



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