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YOUNG CHILDREN'S MORAL AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS: THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JUDGMENTS OF MATCHED PRACTICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL EVENTS

by

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Abstract

YOUNG CHILDREN'S MORAL AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS:

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JUDGMENTS OF

MATCHED PRACTICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL EVENTS

By

Tracey Weber Link

Advisor: Dr Herb Saltzstein

This study investigated moral reasoning about actual and hypothetical conflicts. Children aged 3 – 5 years were observed in naturally occurring conflicts and interviewed about what had happened and why, their judgments of intentionality, whether a rule applied, the ability to describe how both the self and other felt, and their moral judgments and justifications of the event. One month later, hypothetical stories constructed to match the child's prior conflict, in terms of content and context, were presented and the children were again interviewed, as in the practical condition. Results indicated both consistencies and differences in the children's construals of the two matched events, but general predictions regarding the methodological importance of matching hypothetical stories to familiar, real world events were supported. Contrary to predictions, role as an initiator or recipient did not influence judgments or event construals, except in causal attributions. In all analyses, events were significantly judged "not ok", regardless of condition or participant role. Results are discussed in relation to prior research on moral judgments of hypothetical vignettes and implications are drawn for theory and research on the relationship between practical and hypothetical moral reasoning.

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Chapter 1

The relationship between moral thought and action has long been a concern in moral development research. Yet, studies of the relationship have shown varied and at times, disparate findings (Blasi, 1980). "Consequently, consistencies and inconsistencies pervade past and current research" (Turiel & Smetana, 1984 p. 265) and studies do not yet form a solid, coherent body of work (Shantz, 1980).

A partial explanation for these inconsistent findings may lie in the primary method of investigating moral thought. Typically, studies of hypothetical and practical thought have been conducted separately, using widely variable methods. This approach was incomplete, given the interconnection between the two modes of thought (Damon, 1977; Piaget, 1965). Morality could not be investigated as separate systems, apart from one another or the moral and social action produced.

As a result of these methodologies, previous studies have been criticized for their lack of generalizability, due primarily to an exclusive reliance on hypothetical dilemmas, removed from practical thought and actions (Baumrind, 1978; Damon, 1977; Gilligan, 1977; Walker, Devries & Treventhan, 1987). Furthermore, by presenting dilemmas involving competing moral principles, rather than the familiar and cognitively simpler moral-nonmoral conflicts of everyday life, this research may have underestimated children's understanding of the moral and social world and merely elicited verbal sophistication rather than

moral rectitude. Early studies also failed to consider contextual variables such as setting, participant history, and perspective-taking skills, and therefore, may have missed critical components in the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought and action (Killen, 1989b; Turiel, Killen & Helwig, 1987).

Fortunately, a growing literature suggests that researchers have begun to recognize such limitations and to examine this relationship in more meaningful and unified ways (Blotner & Bearison, 1984; Chandler, Greenspan & Barenboim, 1973; Damon, 1977; Eisenberg & Hand, 1979; Smetana, Schlagman & Adams, 1993; Walker, Devries & Treventhan, 1987). In these studies, hypothetical thought has been investigated not only in relation to practical thought, but to real-world social action as well. Including actual events such as self-generated dilemmas and observed, real world conflicts have since become prevalent methods of moral development research and the child is now considered as both a "knower about the world", as well as "an actor within it" (Shantz, 1980, p. 492).

Selman and Damon (1975) have also written about the importance of viewing morality within the context of the child's world. Observations of behavior are ambiguous unless the meaning behind that behavior is probed through an interview, designed to assess the child's understanding and construal of the event. In reality, pragmatic factors often interfere with the full utilization of theoretical knowledge, and moral and nonmoral components are often commingled (Damon, 1977). With such a multifaceted approach, previous inconsistencies in thought and action have become better understood and the

difficulty in predicting behavior from thought, in a one to one relation, established.

Nonetheless, despite these theoretical and empirical advances, there still remain a number of unresolved issues. One dispute concerns the basis of the young child's practical and hypothetical moral judgments. Piaget's (1965) and Kohlberg's (1969) theories attributed children's reasoning to a heteronomous concept of duty in which there is a conceptual confusion between justice and obedience to authority. However, Turiel (1983) & his colleagues (Nucci & Killen, 1991; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Smetana, 1981; 1984) have recently conducted studies that challenge this notion and instead offer a differentiated domain approach to moral reasoning, constructed from real life experiences. These studies show children do have an intuitive understanding of moral concerns as involving the welfare of others, which is distinct from arbitrary, social conventional rules.

Turiel (1983) further asserts that research into the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought must consider some fundamental distinctions. One must differentiate between the construal of the situation leading to practical thought and action, and the child's moral theory or theoretical reasoning. As such, hypothetical judgments tend to elicit a child's moral theory: a verbalized, general moral rule or standard with no costs attached (Rest, 1983; Saltzstein, 1994).

In contrast, practical judgments are based on a construal of the situation that is influenced by specific contextual particulars (Damon, 1977; Gerson & Damon, 1978; Turiel, Killen & Helwig, 1987). This form of reasoning extracts a moral judgment or action with real consequences for the participants. As Haan (1975) states "Action actualize, while thoughts can always be taken back." p. 268).

Given this distinction, inconsistent findings between thought and action may be attributed in part, to this difference between theoretical, abstract judgments and practical judgments influenced by real world consequences (i.e., differing construals and costs). Some theorists (Chandler, Greenspan & Barenboim, 1973; Keasey, 1977; Saltzstein, 1994), argue that this inconsistency is due to self - other differences in the judgment task (i.e., influenced by different construals and perspective taking skills), while others (Shultz & Butkowsky, 1977) assert it is a function of the context (i.e., influenced by the difficulty in conceptualizing and attributing hypothetical behavior). At present, the debate concerning the relative contributions of the actor-observer perspective and the hypothetical-practical context is unresolved.

Another distinction between hypothetical and practical judgments lies in the nature of moral conflicts. Hypothetical dilemmas usually feature complex conflicts between moral duties, whereas practical judgments and behavior tend toward more moral-nonmoral conflicts. Haan (1975) and Gerson & Damon

(1978) also suggest moral and nonmoral components may interact differently when presented in a hypothetical format, than when experienced in reality.

Since hypothetical and practical judgments involve causal attribution processes, and include components such as intentions, consequences, setting and affect attributions, they too, are important considerations for any study (Berndt & Berndt, 1975; Damon, 1984; Killen, 1989b, 1990; Moran & O'Brien, 1983; Moran & McCullers, 1984; Perner, 1988; Selman & Damon, 1975). As a result, the value of a study linking practical and hypothetical judgments into one research project has been proposed (Smetana, Schlagman & Adams, 1993). Both forms of thought influence the child's moral and social actions and thus, necessitate a unified study of their relations.

Conceptually, this study has arisen in response to the dichotomies posited between practical and hypothetical thought and the moral and social domains. It is based on the interactionist assumption that thoughts and actions are embedded in social interactional contexts, "whereby it is necessary to consider the individual's interpretation and perception (i.e., meanings) of the situation, in order to understand how it influences behavior" (Turiel, Smetana & Killen, 1991, p. 317). To study thought removed from action and contextual meaning is to reduce it to isolated, general concepts with little ecological validity. Only when understanding is examined through responses to naturally occurring events, and interviews that probe implicit knowledge, will a clearer picture emerge (Kagan, 1987).

With this as a background, this study examined the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought, and their relationship to action, through the familiar, contextualized moral and social conflicts of childhood. This research had two main parts. In part one naturalistic encounters of young children engaged in free play were videotaped and the participants involved in the encounter were immediately interviewed after each conflict to assess their construals, judgments and knowledge of the event. This phase addressed the basis of the child's judgment and the contextual variables influencing their reasoning and actions.

In part two, written stories were constructed to parallel the prior, practical conflicts and match it for thematic details such as context, intentions, behaviors, friendship and participant outcomes. One month after the event, the child heard the story, matched to their prior conflict, and they were then interviewed, as in the actual conflict, about the parallel, but now hypothetically presented event. This yoked design allowed for comparison of practical and hypothetical judgments of a similar event, and consideration of the self-other/ hypothetical-actual dispute.

By using naturalistic observations in conjunction with familiar vignettes and standardized interviews, this study was able to address relevant questions regarding the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought. Moreover, by investigating how children interpret and construe their interactions, from a social and moral viewpoint, we can gain information about the meaning of the exchange and the nature of the relationship between thought and behavior.

"Meaning is essential, and judgment and action are inoperable components of knowledge, expressed in different contexts" (Damon, 1977 p. 19).

Therefore, while certain difficulties are endemic to research in morality, this research offers a novel approach whereby hypothetical thought, practical thought and real world action are included in a yoked design. While no study can be completely inclusive, this study attempted to capture these relationships in an integrated manner by examining some influential components of moral and social judgments. Given the diverse results and unresolved controversies of past research, this study was designed to address the following questions: 1) What is the nature of the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought when dilemma characteristics are matched for contexts (i.e., situational and personal details) and moral components? Are they consistent or disparate? How does the condition (hypothetical or practical) and perspective (self-other or initiator-recipient) of the dilemma interact to influence children's judgments of these parallel events? 2) How do practical judgments of perceived intention relate to action? 3) What are the contributions of certain components (i.e., event focus, attribution of responsibility or affect, knowledge of domain rules) in arriving at situation construals and moral judgments?

The methodology utilized in this experiment attempted to explore these questions and overcome prior problems and limitations in scope through the aforementioned yoked design in which: 1) Practical thought and action are assessed through observations of naturalistic events. 2) Meaningful components

in situation construals such as event focus, knowledge of moral and social conventional rules, causal/affect attributions and acceptability are probed through an interview phase, for practical and hypothetical events. 3) Hypothetical and practical reasoning and judgments are directly compared through contextualized stories reconstructed from actual events.

Such "matched" dilemmas avoid the previous criticisms of the unfamiliarity, complexity and irrelevance of early hypothetical investigations. Furthermore, by using behavioral codes, classifications and interview questions adapted from previous research, in a unique yoked design (Hay & Ross, 1982; Heider, 1958; Killen, 1989a; Killen & Turiel, 1991; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Killen, 1991; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Shantz, 1987; Smetana, 1981, 1984; Turiel, 1983), this study attempts to extend previous findings on the relationship between practical thought, hypothetical thought and action.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Theories of Moral Development

Although the past history of moral development was dominated by Kohlberg and Piaget, researchers have questioned the theoretical foundations of universal stage theory. Bearison (1991) states "insofar as morality constitutes a logic of values based on affective operations and predicted on the reciprocity of mutual intentions between self and others, there could not exist a system of abstract universal moral principles." (p. 2). Instead, he points out that children construct emergent moral principles by involvement in, and conscious awareness of, social interactions and events.

Gilligan (1977) further asserts that Kohlberg's dilemmas divest the moral players from the context of individual lives and eliminate the social contingencies defining the moral problem. Such vignettes are criticized as lacking familiarity and emotional involvement, typically present in real life conflictual dilemmas (Walker et. al., 1987), as well as obscuring influential considerations like past history and pragmatics (Smetana et. al., 1993). Consequently, Baumrind (1978) has noted that a more appropriate research path would explore social situations that actively involve the respondents, and rather than administering abstract, hypothetical dilemmas, make the object of investigation real world social interactions.

In fact, recent naturalistic studies have revealed a moral nature that differently explains the early egocentrism described by Kohlberg and Piaget. Gilligan (1977) has argued that children can perceive moral concerns and respond to the feelings and social expectations of others, as well as demonstrate the flexibility to present both care and justice orientations. Other research (Shantz, 1980; 1982; Berndt & Berndt, 1975; Keasey, 1977, 1979; Chandler et. al., 1973) has shown children can use motive and intentions in making judgments and distinguish between social and moral domains (Turiel et. al., 1987; Nucci & Killen, 1991).

The child is also now seen as bringing a capacity to each situation, based on prior experiences and social-cognitive capabilities (Gerson & Damon, 1978). This model includes the interaction of both moral and nonmoral components with context and individual capacities. Inherent in this framework is the expectation of inevitable inconsistencies, given the myriad of varying components, which must be brought to bear on each particular situation. As such, the child's moral judgments and behavior are specific to the particular context, but consistencies are expected when the situation is similar to prior experiences and conceptions (Gerson & Damon, 1978)

Thus, there appears to have been a global shift in theories of moral development: From viewing young children as premoral on the basis of their hypothetical judgments, to acknowledging the varied moral and social understandings children display in actuality (Turiel, 1983). While we cannot

deny the groundbreaking contributions of Kohlberg's and Piaget's theoretical frameworks, current and future studies need to recognize their limitations and move beyond their methodological shortcomings. Recent studies, to be discussed, have approached this challenge with more naturalistic designs, offering a new characterization of young children as moral, constructive and differentiated thinkers.

The Relationship Between Hypothetical Thought, Practical Thought and Behavior.

With the notable exception of Hartshorne and May (1928) and Piaget's research, early studies in moral development (e.g., Kohlberg) were largely based on verbal responses to hypothetical dilemmas. There was no systematic attempt to relate this reasoning to practical judgments and action, except for Piaget's (1965) research, which showed there were two parallel sequences of moral development and that theoretical judgments lagged behind practical ones.

Yet, Gerson and Damon (1978) note "as long as judgment and conduct are assessed in two different situations, one would expect only limited consistency, since in this case, judgment and conduct would be two components of different, specific understanding efforts" (p. 56). They argue that judgment and behavior be viewed instead, as two components of moral knowledge in a particular situation.

This interest in the examination of relationships, patterns, and whole systems is based on the premise that until moral judgment is understood, moral

action will not be understandable itself (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Since actions are based on individual interpretations, attributions and judgments about an event (Turiel et. al., 1991), morality cannot be studied as an isolated phenomenon. Thus, understanding thought and behavior necessitates an investigation "through the eyes of involved participants, at their level of conceptualization" (Selman, 1980 p. 17). Ultimately, the relationship between thought and action, in moral and social events, is a complex, variable system dependent on different elements and interactions.

Current research on the relationship between hypothetical and practical reasoning has centered around more comprehensive designs, better able to address theoretical and methodological concerns. Some studies have employed self-generated moral dilemmas combined with hypothetical vignettes (Gilligan, 1977; Walker et. al., 1987). Others (Bearison & Gass, 1979; Blotner & Bearison, 1984; Damon, 1977; Eisenberg & Hand, 1979; Gerson & Damon, 1978; Shultz & Butkowsky, 1977; Smetana et. al., 1993) have expanded the empirical scope and directly investigated hypothetical and practical reasoning and their relationship to real world action.

According to current theorists (Gerson & Damon, 1978; Rest, 1983; Saltzstein, 1994; Turiel et. al., 1987), thought-action ambiguities are due to a failure to make two relevant distinctions between judgment and behavior. First, between the interpretation of the situation and the moral principle applied to its interpretation and second, between cognitively simple moral-nonmoral conflicts

and complex moral-moral dilemmas. In this schematic, the initial step in any moral event involves the construal or interpretation of the situation, which in turn, involves social-cognitive processes like causal attributions (i.e., internal/external responsibility), perspective taking and inferring action costs. On this basis, a moral rule is selected and if required a moral action enacted. Thus, differences between moral judgments and moral actions may rest on different construals of the situation, not necessarily on different moral systems.

There is also a psychological difference between moral thoughts and actions in that a moral action has real life consequences. Moral judgments on the other hand, exist as assessments of moral choices, but typically lack personal costs. This is a fundamental difference that leads to difficulties in interpreting and relating judgments to actions.

As Saltzstein (1994) has emphasized, most early childhood moral judgments are also based on conflicts involving moral and nonmoral considerations, where the "right thing to do" is clear but difficult to enact (i.e., involves personal cost). This is in contrast to the moral-moral dilemmas presented in most hypothetical studies, which require superordinate moral principles, and where the "right thing to do" is unclear. As a result, moral-nonmoral conflicts are cognitively simpler in that they don't require the subordination of principles, but instead, the ability to resist temptation and the emotional impulses of self-interest.

Given these differences, it is not surprising that children's hypothetical thought appears unrelated to practical thought and action. Inevitably, differences between judgments and actions will arise, based on different contexts, construals and the social cognitive capacities brought to bear on each task (Gerson & Damon, 1978).

In terms of empirical research, studies describing the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought and action are still varied and inconclusive. Yet, despite their individual drawbacks, they are beginning to offer insight into the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought, and action.

Walker et. al., (1987) compared levels, patterns and orientations of reasoning about hypothetical and self-generated dilemmas. Subjects ranging from 5 to 63 years of age were presented with hypothetical facts and asked to construct, resolve, and evaluate three conflictual dilemmas. Each dilemma was followed by a series of probe questions and an open-ended interview. In phase two, the subject was asked to define morality and describe a personal moral dilemma. This recollection was then followed up with the probe questions and an interview. Hypothetical and self-generated interviews were scored for moral development level, the relationship involved (i.e., personal or impersonal), and orientation (i.e., rights or caring). Data analyses showed a significant correlation between reasoning on both hypothetical and practical dilemmas. Although hypothetical dilemmas elicited slightly higher levels of moral reasoning than did real life conflicts, these researchers concluded that patterns of reasoning across dilemmas

confirmed "the structural integrity of the moral stages across differing contexts and contents" (p. 849).

Smetana et. al., (1993) also investigated preschool children's hypothetical and actual judgments by having children judge hypothetical transgressions and observations of actual transgressions. Smetana and her colleagues found that both hypothetical and practical moral events were judged as more wrong, deserving of punishment and independent of rules than conventional transgressions. However, hypothetical moral transgressions were also judged more wrong and independent of rules than actual moral transgressions. The explanation favored by these authors suggests that practical judgments involved pragmatic, psychological and personal components that needed to be coordinated and weighed in judgments, and this resulted in differences between the contexts. Unfortunately, the focus of this study was on domain distinctions and precluded direct evaluation of the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought in individuals.

Other studies too, have related practical and hypothetical thought, and action, into a unified design. In examining distributive justice reasoning and behavior, Damon (1977) placed children in both hypothetical and practical contexts. In the practical situation, children had to decide on the actual distribution of rewards. In this condition, there were three same aged subjects and one younger child. Three conditions of merit were presented for consideration in the distribution of rewards: prettiest and most bracelets made; biggest boy or girl; and nicest child.

Children's justifications of the final distribution were then analyzed for the consideration of the principles of need or merit. Damon found the highest correlation between hypothetical and practical reasoning in children with advanced levels of moral development. He concluded that both hypothetical and practical reasoning proceed through the same sequence of development, but hypothetical reasoning cannot predict practical reasoning due to the influence of self-interest and other, nonmoral factors. Thus, these two forms of reasoning are expected to differ depending upon how the child's interests are best served in each context and, understood at each developmental level. Damon contends that by accounting for this component and reasoning level, patterns of behavior may at times be predictable from hypothetical judgments.

Blotner and Bearison (1984) further investigated the development of consistencies between and within moral thought and behavior. First, four behavioral conditions were created to study reasoning stages in the context of helping and sharing behaviors. In each condition, subjects were given information about another hypothetical child and given the opportunity to act in an altruistic fashion. The four reciprocity conditions, in hypothetical and practical contexts were: past reciprocity, where the other child left something for them; merit, where the other child had worked hard and was thus, deserving; need, where the other child was poor; and coordinated reciprocity, where there were two children, one deserving and one needy. Perspective skills also assessed, were posited to be necessary but not sufficient for mature reasoning and behavior.

Following the practical (i.e., helping and sharing) tasks, subjects were interviewed about the justifications of their behaviors and assigned a level of practical reasoning, based on Damon's (1977) levels of positive justice. Then, Damon's positive justice interview was administered to assess hypothetical moral reasoning and the children were again classified into one of six levels.

Results indicated level of moral reasoning was significantly related to helping and sharing behaviors at higher levels of reasoning and inconsistent at lower levels. Only children at the higher level (2B) responded to claims of need and coordinated reciprocity. In contrast, children at the lowest level (0B) failed to differentiate between the control condition (i.e., no child information) and conditions of altruism, while children at level 1B understood the condition of past reciprocity and merit but did not respond altruistically to them. These results complement Damon's (1977) findings that with development comes greater consistency between thought and action.

Moreover, when patterns of reasoning were examined across levels, hypothetical reasoning scores were higher than practical scores. Like Damon's (1977) findings, Blotner and Bearison hypothesized this was due to the role of self-interest, which is in opposition to the reciprocity required by the tasks.

Alternately, when hypothetical and practical reasoning about interpersonal persuasion tasks was investigated by Bearison and Gass (1979) self-interest increased the level of reasoning. In this study, children were asked to hypothetically persuade another to give them some money. Then in another

condition, the same children were given the opportunity to persuade an investigator to really give them two dollars. The children were told that only those with the best persuasive arguments would receive the money.

Persuasive appeals were recorded and assigned to four levels of increasing coordination between the self and other. These levels were: simple requests, self interest, recognition of others and mutuality. Levels of appeals were found to be higher in the actual condition than in the hypothetical situation. Thus, conditions in which self-interest plays a role can be motivating or limiting, eliciting higher or lower levels or reasoning, depending upon situational demands.

Eisenberg and Hand (1979) too have found that underlying motivators of behavior influence the relationship of action to moral reasoning. They observed that sharing, which involves self-sacrifice, is related to moral reasoning, while helping, which may involve motivations like sociability, was unrelated.

In summary, much more remains to be known about the relationship between hypothetical and practical judgments and their relationship to actions. The content of hypothetical and practical moral judgments reflect personal history, culture, task setting and individual experiences, as well as the psychological processes that mediate the acquisition of moral and social knowledge. As a result, methods should not be limited to one context. Instead, what is needed is an adequate sampling of the child's judgments and behavior in a wide array of both practical and hypothetical contexts (Damon, 1977). Only by accounting for and mapping these disparities and the varying components, will it

be possible to predict patterns of thought and behavior and attain a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between them.

The Role of Perspective-Taking Skills

The ability to take another's perspective is thought to be influential in hypothetical and practical moral judgments (Blotner & Bearison, 1984), and the capacity to know and reflect upon this ability is a powerful, inference tool (Selman, 1980). Developmentally, evidence suggests perspective-taking skills are related to social opportunities and chronological age (Shantz, 1983). Around three years of age children begin to take the role of the other (i.e., acknowledging what information may appear to be like from another's point of view) and progress gradually, to the mutual perspective-taking skills of Selman's level 2 (six to twelve years).

Blotner and Bearison (1984) also found that perspective coordination, or being able to understand the relationship between one's own viewpoint and another's was essential to moral development. These authors reported a correlation between perspective coordination and moral reasoning in hypothetical dilemmas and action, which although small in magnitude, was of considerable interest, theoretically.

Nonetheless, Shantz (1983) has shown that one need not have fully developed perspective taking skills in order to have knowledge of other's thoughts, feelings or beliefs. Such knowledge can be derived from inferences

based on prior interactions or generalized from the self to others thought similar. As Shantz (1983) writes, there are many processes and much information that can result in correct other inferences aside from taking the role of the other, but "regardless of the processes, the important fact remains that significant increases in understanding other's emotions, and situations that elicit emotions, occurs between the ages of 3 and 6 years" (p. 517). Thus, while it appears preschool children can take the role of others and report their feelings in similar situations, due to a lack of true perspective-taking skills they remain limited in their ability to infer accurate knowledge of the psychological other, and to coordinate this information into a moral or social judgment (Selman, 1980).

Use of Intentions in Judgments

Like perspective taking, the theoretical construct of intentionality plays a role in judgments and actions and hence, is an area of interest for this study. Attributions of causal intentions have received a considerable amount of investigation in the fields of moral development (Piaget, 1965) and the child's theory of mind (Astington, 1988; Perner, 1988; Poulin-Dubois & Shultz, 1988; Wellman, 1988).

In the moral domain, Piaget (1965) found children referred to intentions and motives in hypothetical verbal interviews, but were highly influenced by the magnitude of action consequences and failed to weigh intentions accurately. To Piaget, this objective orientation reflected the outer, more concrete appearance of

an act and he reported that it was not until six or seven years that children's hypothetical judgments began to consider subjective responsibility, in the form of intention and motive.

These findings lead Piaget to conclude that subjective and objective responsibility (i.e., intentional vs. outcome orientations) were two distinct, but coexisting, modes of reasoning about moral situations. Piaget found a growing preference for using subjective responsibility or the intention criterion with age, beginning in real world events and later, extending to the hypothetical realm.

Others (Bearison & Issacs, 1979; Chandler, et. al., 1973; Karinol, 1978; Keasey, 1977) have criticized the validity of these findings based on Piaget's assessment strategy. By highlighting the saliency of action consequences and obscuring intentions, some hypothetical vignettes elicit judgments which more heavily weigh consequences. They note that Piagetian intent vs. outcome stories restrict the range of judgment considerations by offering an either/or response dimension that highlights the saliency of action consequences and obscures the intentions behind it. As Keasey (1979) states "consequences mask children's ability to differentiate accidental from intentional actions" (p. 238).

In support of this criticism, Keasey (1979) has shown children can consider intentions and motives, in both hypothetical and practical judgments, when events are familiar, contextualized and relevant to children's lives. Keasey believes that mode of presentation and severity of the consequences affect the

salience of the event components or the person being judged and hence, the focus on intentions or outcome.

Through a manipulation of story medium, Chandler et al., (1973) produced similar results. When the same stories were presented in hypothetical vignette context and by videotape, they found videotaped judgments focused on the criteria of intentionality, while hypothetical vignette judgments were largely based on consequences. Thus, when the assessment facilitates or prompts the consideration of intention, and intentional and accidental behaviors are clearly presented and contrasted, young children can in fact judge on the basis of subjective responsibility or the intentions criterion (Bearison & Issacs, 1979; Karinol, 1978).

Olthof et al., (1989) and others (Berndt & Berndt, 1975) have further found that children, as young as three years, can employ motive (i.e., the reason for behavior) as a component of practical judgments and by five years, consider intentions (i.e., describes the relationship between motive and actions or outcome) as well. Shantz (1983) too, reports that young children can recognize intention and use it in their practical judgments, but lag in their ability to infer accidents (i.e., unintended acts with bad outcomes).

Evidence of intention based judgments can also be seen in children's practical, verbal responses. Darby and Schlenker (1982) found kindergarten children employed a variety of reasons, including apologies and discounting, when the actor was clearly not responsible. They state " although younger

children may not always discern cues about an actor's internal state, even children can use such information when clearly presented" (p. 751). When the task is constructed so as to lend support to their immature inference abilities, even young children can consider motives and other unobservable, judgmental criteria (Berndt & Berndt, 1975, Keasey, 1979).

Children's ability to use intentions is also evident in the field of children's theory of mind (Astington, 1988; Perner, 1988; Poulin-Dubois & Shultz, 1988; Wellman, 1988). Theoretically, "children's theory of mind underlies their ability to give commonsense explanations and predictions of behavior, by retrospectively ascribing mental states such as intentions, to themselves and others." (Astington, 1988 p. 2). These meta-representations provide insight into why children behave as they do, in moral and social situations. Another result of this research is the discovery that preschool children utilize a wider variety of evaluative criteria in forming moral and social judgments than previously thought.

Shultz (1980) has shown 4-year-olds can differentiate between intended acts and mistakes, by employing the mental construct "on purpose". This represents the first inference rule (i.e., the perceived match between intentional state and outcome) children make in a determination of intentionality (Poulin-Dubois & Shultz, 1988). Later, this ability results in the 5-year-olds distinction between foreseeable and unforeseeable events and the 6-year-olds use of it in judgments (Perner, 1988).

Overall, these studies indicate that by five years, children can distinguish between intentions and accidents, as well as understand and use motive when evaluating behavior. However, the distinction between intentional and accidental actions may take years to be fully mastered (Berndt & Berndt, 1975; Shantz, 1983) and understood as necessary for accurate judgments (Bearison & Issacs, 1979).

Thus, past research with hypothetical situations which suggests children fail to consider the intentions underlying moral actions is often contradicted by observations of children's everyday interactions (Chandler et. al., 1973). Unintended actions are routinely responded to differently than intended ones and anyone who knows children knows how quickly they exculpate their own actions as not on purpose or accidental (Keasey, 1977). Prior findings of the tendency for young children to focus on outcome is now seen as a methodological artifact of a particular experimental design which emphasizes the saliency of consequences at the expense of intentions.

The Moral and Social Conventional Domains

Despite the undifferentiated premoral state Piaget and Kohlberg attributed to young children, current research has shown that experience in the social world is actively used to construct distinct domains of conceptual thought (Nucci & Killen, 1991; Nucci & Nucci, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Shantz, 1987; Smetana, 1981, 1985; Turiel et al., 1987). These separate domains of knowledge

depend upon the structure and content of the social environment and provide the basis for understanding thoughts and actions in the social world (Shantz, 1982; Turiel, 1983).

The social conventional domain is defined as consisting of arbitrary behavioral uniformities that serve to coordinate social interactions (Turiel, 1983). Meaning in this domain depends on actions, placed within a social system, and responses focus on social organizational components, like rules, sanctions and norms (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a; Nucci & Killen, 1991; Nucci & Turiel, 1978). Children acquire these concepts and shared expectations governing behavior through participation in the social system and interaction with peers and adults.

In contrast, the moral domain is defined by "consequences for other's rights and welfare" (Smetana et al., 1991; Turiel, 1983). That is, by inherent principles of justice and rights, independent of any particular social system. In this domain, concern is with how one "ought" to act and reactions tend to be emotional, focusing on intrinsic consequences (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). Turiel (1983) asserts children construct moral knowledge from their own experiences of harm and injustice, by deriving inherent principles from relevant social interactions.

Domain distinctions are also evident in children's practical, verbal judgments. In moral violations, seen as intrinsically wrong, young children often ignore intentions as irrelevant in evaluating an act. However, for social

conventional events, which lack this intrinsic status, intentions are more likely to become relevant to judgments. Practical moral events are also consistently judged more serious, independent of authority and deserving of punishment than consensually based, social events (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981, 1984; Smetana et al., 1984).

Accordingly, domain distinctions appear influenced by the quality and quantity of social interactions. Seigal and Storey (1985) have shown that daycare children made a greater conceptual distinction between moral and social conventional events than children not enrolled in a group setting. Killen and Turiel (1991) also found structured settings and classrooms had a greater percentage of social order conflicts, but fewer rights/harm disputes than unstructured settings.

Thus, while the acquisition process of this knowledge is largely unknown, Nucci & Killen (1991) assert these conceptual frameworks emerge in the early preschool years and extend into both peer and adult-child relations (Killen, 1991; Shantz & Hobart, 1987; Smetana, 1984). Smetana et al., (1993) has shown that by three years of age, preschool children can reliably distinguish between moral and social conventional domains in hypothetical vignettes, and by four years this distinction is firmly established in actual transgressions. Still, while it appears both children and adults distinguish between moral and social conventional domains, as of yet, there is no clear understanding of the differential roles they play in situation construals and real world actions.

Chapter 3

Hypotheses

This study was designed to investigate hypothetical judgments, practical judgments and actual behavior in children's real life moral and social conflicts. In the process, this study attempted to extend and relate prior studies of moral development, which employ vignettes, with naturalistic, observational studies of children's social conflicts. Therefore, the goals of this study were twofold. First, to describe and code naturally occurring social conflicts (i.e., dynamic event sequences composed of initiating behaviors and ensuing responses) among preschool children and second, to interview participants, immediately after the event, about their (practical) judgments of the situation, their understanding of the thoughts and feelings of others involved, their beliefs regarding intentionality/causality, and the ability to distinguish among types of event rules. In part two of the study, approximately one-month after the naturalistic observations and interviews, the children were given a hypothetical vignette, reconstructed from the conflict in which they had been involved and interviewed (hypothetical judgment), as in part one, in order to assess the relationship between hypothetical and practical thought, judgments and behavior.

Hypotheses comprise three distinct areas: (1) The similarities and differences between hypothetical and practical judgments and construals, and for

initiators and recipients, (2) the relationship between practical judgments and actions and (3) the influence of friendship on moral judgments of acceptability.

1. Because practical and hypothetical conflicts are familiar, and matched in content and context, practical and hypothetical reasoning are expected to be correlated in event focus, reference to intentions and/or outcome, causal attributions, judgments of intentionality, rule responses, overall moral judgments and judgment justification reasons.

2. However, despite the expected similarity between practical and hypothetical construals and judgments, some differences are also predicted, due to nonmoral factors such as role (initiator or recipient) and context (the difficulty in conceptualizing hypothetical events or the demands of practical events).

B. Because of the different perspectives afforded and the kinds of self interest involved, evaluative judgments are hypothesized to differ based on the participant's role in the actual conflict:

-Initiators of the real conflict are expected to judge the hypothetical event "not ok" more often than the actual, practical event.

-The recipient is expected to judge the practical event "not ok" just as often or more often than the hypothetical conflict.

-Recipients will judge the event "not ok" more than initiators, especially in the practical condition.

3. Feelings will be more frequently attributed to both the self *and* the other in the hypothetical than practical conditions.

4. Moral conflicts judged by the child as intentional, in both practical and hypothetical contexts, are expected to be judged less acceptable than conflicts judged accidental.

5. Children's practical judgments of the events are expected to be related to action in the following way:

   - Events judged to be unintentional or accidents by the recipient will not be responded to by physical or retaliatory behaviors. In contrast, events judged by the recipient as intentional are expected to be responded to with physical and retaliatory actions, emotional reactions and appeals for teacher involvement.

6. Children rated by the teacher as frequent playmates will judge events "*ok*" more than children rated as occasional or infrequent playmates.

Chapter 4

Methods

Subjects

Forty-three children in two daycare preschools were observed. Both schools served a middle class population as worksite daycare centers. In school A, the children ranged in age from 3-4 to 5-2 years (M = 4-0). At school B, the children ranged in age from 3-9 to 6-1 years (M = 4-7). Both schools served a heterogeneous population of Caucasians, African-Americans, and others. In both preschool classes, the ratio of children to teachers was a maximum of ten children to one adult.

Conflict Definition

Like Hay (1984) and Shantz (1987) this study defined conflict as a form of social exchange between at least two people and comprised of event sequences of interpersonal behaviors in which one child protests or resists the initial actions of another (Hay & Ross, 1982). However, this definition of conflict was expanded include more mutual conflict interactions, whereby the initiator's second action and the recipient's second response were also coded. Consequently, each event sequence was coded for a total of four behaviors: two initiator actions and two recipient actions. In this capacity, conflicts served as the event to be judged by the children and as the thematic basis of the hypothetical story presented in part two. In addition, conflicts are seen as multidimensional social situations that

necessitate the coordination of different social, moral and personal components (Turiel & Smetana, 1984), to be detailed below.

Classification of Moral and Social Conventional Events.

This study's conception of morality was akin to that of Nucci & Killen (1991) and Turiel (1983) wherein it referred to issues inherent in interpersonal relations, and pertained to actions such as physical harm, individual rights, and welfare. In contrast, social conventions were defined as arbitrary behaviors, dependent on social context and consensus, and therefore, alterable.

Following Smetana (1981), social conventional conflicts were defined as acts that violated the social order, norms, customs or regulations (school and societal), whereas moral conflicts were defined as acts that violated principles of fairness/justice, the welfare of others or individual rights.

Participant History

Preschool friendships are the first significant extrafamilial attachments the child experiences and thus, are fundamental to understanding the child's thought and action. Following Shantz (1983), Hay (1984) and Slomkowski & Killen (1992), this study defined friendship as children who appear to enjoy being together and associate frequently; who share resources, play space and have fun together. This component is thought important to this study because children have been found to account for friendship in their judgments and the resolution of

conflicts (Killen, 1989b; 1990). Teachers were asked to complete a friendship rating for all the conflict participants (i.e., very frequent (1), occasional (2), or infrequent (3) playmates) and this information was later used as a thematic component in the hypothetical stories, in part two of the study.

Design and Procedure

Two different preschools were pilot tested prior to conducting this study in order to assess the validity of the coding schemes and comprehension of the interview questions (e.g., do children know what "on purpose" means?, how long can they be interviewed before losing attention?, what are the most frequent kinds of conflictual events?)

Prior to videotaping the children, the experimenter spent two weeks at the selected schools familiarizing the children with the camcorder and her presence. The children were told the experimenter would be taping them playing and asking them questions for her school project and most were eager to participate. Those who were not, or did not have parental consent were dropped from the study.

The observational part of the study employed individual focal sampling. With this methodology, each child was observed for a preset time period, as opposed to recording events randomly, as they occur (i.e., event sampling). Focal sampling has been shown to capture the quieter verbal conflicts characteristic of girls (Shantz & Hobart, 1987) and prevents a minority of children from contributing the majority of observed behaviors and events (Killen, 1991).

The order of the observations was randomly assigned. Children were observed for 30-minute time blocks. If their time ended and the child had still not experienced at least one conflict, the researcher moved onto the next child. After all the children had been observed, the videotaping round began again and continued until at least one event per child was recorded. Alternately, if more than one event was recorded for a target child, only the first event was used in the data analyses.

Audio-visual recordings of the conflictual events were conducted during the free play part of the day, indoors and outdoors. It was during this time that the children were free to choose where and with what/whom they played. It was also a time of varied play that afforded the opportunity to participate in many activities or one, for a prolonged period of time (Killen, 1989b; Killen & Turiel, 1991). This free activity occurred everyday, for two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon.

The researcher sat on the outskirts of the play area and recorded the designated child until a spontaneous conflict was observed or their time ended. If a conflict occurred, all observed events and behaviors (i.e., initiating and responses) were later coded into standardized checklist categories derived from prior research (Killen & Turiel, 1991; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1984).

After each child was observed in a conflictual event, the investigator approached the participants and separately interviewed them about what had

happened, their causal attributions, their judgments of intentionality, the ability to describe the feelings of the self and the other, their knowledge of domain rules and their judgments/justifications about the situation (based on interview questions adapted from Berndt & Berndt, 1975; Killen, 1989a; Nucci & Killen, 1991; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a; Smetana, 1981). All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed, for later coding based on previous judgment codes employed by Heider (1958), Killen (1989) and Rest (1983).

Approximately one month after the initial observation of a conflict, the participants were read a "story" about an event, matched to the one they (the target subject, either initiator or recipient, as defined by the sampling procedure) were involved in beforehand. Participants were asked to retell the story to ensure comprehension and then, interviewed using the same questions asked after the real life conflicts.

Story Format

Stories administered to each child were directly matched in terms of thematic content: play activity, participant roles and degree of friendship, setting, verbal/behavioral sequences, consequences and outcome, to the actual event in which that child was involved one month earlier (i.e., details extracted and reconstructed from video and event codes and ratings). In reconstructing the story, there was flexibility in including particular event variables, in order to match the real event, as closely as possible. The story was read to the child, who was then

asked to retell it, before being verbally interviewed. If the child appeared not to understand the story or any aspect of it, it was reread until the child could retell it with understanding and comprehension. Typically, children were able to retell the story after one or two readings.

Coding of Events and Behaviors

Only events that elicited an initial verbal or behavioral response were coded as a conflict. This was consistent with other studies of social interaction among young children (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978) and eliminated the coding of events where one child merely dominated or controlled the other with no resistance.

Data Description

The within-subjects design of this study yielded two types of data: (1) coded behavioral event sequences, and (2) coded verbal interview responses and scores for all practical and hypothetical events.

Behavioral Data

Conflict events were classified in regard to domain (Nucci & Turiel, 1978), the type of initial action (Killen & Turiel, 1991; Smetana, 1984), the recipient's response, and mutual child behaviors (Nucci & Nucci, 1982b). Conflicts were coded as one of six initiating types, in two domains:

1) Physical Harm (Moral) – One child hits, bites, kicks, punches, pulls hair or otherwise causes physical harm to another child.

2) Psychological Harm (Moral) – One child causes psychological harm to another such as excluding another or causing hurt feelings e.g., saying mean things.

3) Resource Violation (Moral) – One child attempts to take away an object in another's possession or succeeds in taking it. Disputes over object ownership.

4) Rights Issues (Moral) – One child makes a mess of or interferes with another's creation e.g., a drawing, blocks, a pretend setting, a toy layout.

5) Norm Deviations (Social conventional) – One child disrupts another's activity, interrupts someone talking, goes out of turn during a game, refuses to accept or deviates from a pretend role

6) Other (Moral or Social conventional) - Other actions not fitting into the above classifications. Described narratively.

Children's reactions were further coded into eleven behavioral categories:

1) Injury/Loss Statement – statements indicating pain/injury, loss of property, personal space, feelings (e.g., "You hurt me", "You ripped my book").

2) Emotional Reaction - Crying, yelling, expressing emotional state or exclamation of intense affect (e.g., "You made me sad/angry").

3) Rationale/Rules – Reasons given for doing/not doing the action or statement or rules for behavior or governing an action (e.g., "You should be nice to your friends because friends share and love each other" "You're not supposed to hit/take my toys" or "You need to say 5 minute timer" "You're not allowed that high".) Includes explanations of provocation or justification.

4) Rights Statement – Statement regarding or appealing to one's rights or fairness (e.g., "It's my turn now, you can have it next" "I had it first")

5) Retaliatory/Physical Response – Physical act directed at other child, hitting, biting, kicking, grabbing toys etc.

6) Involve Adult – Request for adult intervention or resolution by child, pointing out or describing the behavior of another.

7) Disorder Statement – Indication that the child's behavior is causing a mess, disorder, disruption, or that the behavior involves a deviation from what's expected (e.g., "That's not how a mommy acts" "You're messing up the lunch table I set")

8) Sanction/Threat/Command – Statement indicating that a sanction will be the response to a behavior (e.g., "If you do that again, I won't play with you or be your friend anymore"). Or, an indication that retribution will follow if behavior is continued (e.g., "Keep knocking down my blocks /bumping me and I'm telling/I'll hit you"). Also a statement to do or cease an act, without mention of a rule (e.g., "Stop that/No!").

9) Ridicule/ Teasing – Use of sarcasm or derisive labels directed at transgressor (e.g., "You big dummy, look what you did" "You're a baby").

10) Comforts / Sorry – Child apologizes or comforts the other.

11) Ignores other – Child ignores other or gives no response.

These coding categories were not mutually exclusive. That is, they were expected to occur in combination with each other in any one conflictual event. Therefore, in order to maintain a manageable amount of data, event sequences were only coded for the first four behaviors (two initiator and two recipient), in the interaction. Moreover, as deemed necessary, depending upon the theoretical and empirical considerations (frequency of code occurrence) these classifications were collapsed into a smaller set for data analysis.

Components in the Event Construals

There were seven components of the event construal assessed in the interview phase of this study: (1) event focus; (2) focus on intentions *and or* outcome; (3) causal attributions; (4) judgment of intentions; (5) affect attributions; (6) the child's use of domain rules; (7) moral judgments and (8) justifications for those judgments. Reasoning and judgments were also classified by participant role (e.g., initiator or recipient) and context (e.g., practical or hypothetical).

Interview Questions

In part one, after a conflict was recorded, and in part two, after the story was presented, a series of standardized interview questions were presented to both initiators and recipients:

1) What happened? (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a)

2) Why do "you" think it happened? Or, How come it happened? (Nucci & Turiel, 1978)

3) Did "you" (initiator) mean for _____ to happen? Was it on purpose? Do "you" (recipient) think he/she meant to _____? Why do "you" (recipient) think (initiator) did _____? (Berndt & Berndt, 1975)

4) How did "you" feel when _____ happened to you? How do "you" think (the other) felt about what happened?

5) Is there a rule about_____? (Nucci & Nucci, 1982b; Smetana, 1981)

6) Is it alright/ ok to _____or, for ____to happen? (Killen, 1989a)

7) Why? Why not?

Interview Coding

Interview responses were later coded into the following categories, which correspond to each question.

1) Event Focus (categorical data)

0. No focus
1. Physical welfare
2. Psychological welfare
3. Wrongful intentions
4. Fairness
5. Social order/ Rules
6. Personal relations or characteristics/Recounting
7. Self's needs or concerns/ Pragmatic reasons

2. Causal Attributions/Responsibility (0 – 5 points)
(Adapted from Heider, 1958)

A. Global Association: (1)
The individual is held responsible for all effects associated with them. (E.g., "He did it")

B. Causality or Objective Responsibility: (2)
The individual is deemed responsible for all actions and effects, without consideration of motives or intentions (e.g., "cause he fell into me and hurt me, and broke my truck")

C. Forseeability/Carelessness: (3)
The individual is held responsible for all actions producing foreseeable effects. Neither intentions nor motives are inferred. (e.g., "He knew not not to run in class or he might hurt someone".)

D. Intentionality or Subjective Responsibility: (4)
The individual is held responsible only if they intended to accomplish some action or effect. (e.g., "He hit and hurt me because he wanted my toy.")

E. Environmental /Situational Influence: (5)
The individual's ability and intentions are considered, but motives are

seen as originating in a coercive environment. (e.g., pressure from a larger child forces disobedience, blocks left by another child causes one child to fall and hurt a third child)

3. Intentionality of the Event: (categorical data)

A. Thinks act intentional (1)
B. Thinks act unintentional or accidental (2)

(The criterion for intentionality is the use of words such as: on purpose, accident, meant to, didn't mean to. Adapted from Keasey, 1977)

4. Affect Attributions (0 – 3 points)

A. Considers the self when asked (1)
Makes reference to own thoughts, physical feelings, or psychological /emotional well being

B. Considers others when asked: (2)
Makes reference to other's thoughts, physical feelings, or psychological/emotional well being

C. Considers both self and other's when asked: (3)
Makes reference to other's thoughts, physical feelings, or psychological well being.

5. Rule Domains: (categorical data)

A. There is a rule about _____. (1)
B. There is no rule about _____. (2)

A. Mentions rule but no domain (0)
B. Mentions universal moral rule (1)
C. Mentions social conventional rule (2)

6. Event Judgment: (categorical data)

A. Thinks act ok/alright (1)
B. Thinks act not ok/not alright (2)

7. Justification of Judgment (categorical data)
(Adapted from Turiel, 1983)

A. Inherent Explanations: (1)
Universal moral criteria
Physical/psychological focus
Issues of justice/fairness

B. External Explanations: (2)
General rules/ Social conventions
Specific school policies/regulations
Social expectations/Norms

Justification Focus (categorical data)

0. No justification
1. Physical welfare
2. Psychological welfare
3. Wrongful intentions
4. Fairness
5. Social order/ Rules
6. Personal relations or characteristics/Recounting
7. Self's needs or concerns/Pragmatic reasons

Interview Scoring

Interview responses were also scored for 3 separate components, for each participant, in each context (H or P):

1. Event Focus Score: Intentions and Outcome
(adapted from Rest, 1983)

The extent to which the child considers varied situation components:
No focus (0), Intentions *or* Outcome (1), Intentions *and* Outcome (2),
Intentions, Outcome and External/situational factors (3), as defined below

A. Intentions:
Child mentions intentions of self or other in describing the event. Focuses on self or other's feelings, wants or needs. Personal characteristics

B. Outcome:
Child mentions the participant's actions and consequences. Focuses on severity, value and effects of actions and statements. References to physical, objective consequences.

C. Environmental/Situational:
Child mentions external or internal, uncontrollable influences such as situational demands or peer pressure.

Range 0 – 3. The higher the score, the more components coordinated in the child's event focus. Based on the developmental paradigm (e.g., Piaget) that children first consider intentions *or* outcome before being able to coordinate and integrate the two components.

2. Causal Attribution Score
The type of attribution offered by the child, as defined by the interview codes: No attribution (0), Global association (1), Causality or Objective responsibility (2), Forseeability/Carelessness (3), Intentionality or Subjective Responsibility (4), Environmental/ Situational Influence (5), Coordinated Attributions (6).

Range 0 – 6. The higher the score, the more sophisticated the child's attribution of responsibility. Based on Heider's (1958) model of causal attribution

3. Affect Attribution Score
The child's ability to consider the feelings of the involved participants, as defined by the interview codes: Considers self only (1), Considers other only (2), Considers both self *and* other (3).

Range 0 – 3. The higher the score, the more coordinated the attribution. Based on the developmental theory (e.g., Piaget, 1965; Selman, 1980) that children first consider the perspective of the self before being able to take the perspective of the other.

Data Analysis

Two primary types of data analysis were conducted on each interview component: correlational tests and tests of differences. It was of interest to this

author whether (a) the practical and hypothetical construal components and scores were correlated between the conditions, and (b) whether the child's reasoning and construal changed from the practical event to the hypothetical story.

Initiator and recipient responses within the practical and hypothetical conditions were also compared by chi square analyses to determine if the child's role in the event made any difference in their construal and reasoning. Finally, friendship level and judgements of intentions were compared to the child's overall judgment of the event ("ok/not ok") to determine if either of these factors influenced the moral judgments.

Chapter 5

Results

Interrater Reliability

To assure the accuracy and integrity of the coding scheme employed by this study, an independent coder, blind to the hypotheses of the investigation also coded 21% of the conflicts. Cohen's Kappa was calculated and given the levels of agreement, the classifications employed, and the resultant codes were considered accurate summaries of the practical and hypothetical conflicts and responses. The coefficients for the behavioral codes were 1.00 for initiating behavior and 1.00, 1.00 and .85 for the three consecutive response behaviors.

Interrater agreement for the interview questions was also calculated by Cohen's Kappa coefficient and they were as follows for the practical events: Event focus .80; Intentions 1.00; Rules 1.00; Rule domain .90; Judgments 1.00; Justification domain .91; and Justification components .80, and the hypothetical events: Event focus .70; Intentions 1.00; Rules 1.00, Rule domain 1.00; Judgments 1.00; Justification domain 1.00; and Justification components .86.

Interrater agreement was also examined by Cohen's Kappa for interview scores: Practical Score 1 (focus) .89; Practical Score 2 (causal attributions) .70; and Practical Score 3 (affect attribution) 1.00, as well as for the hypothetical scores .71, .81 and .90 respectively.

Descriptions of the Actual Conflicts and Participants

While conflict descriptions and analyses of sex differences were not central to the hypotheses of this study, I believe it important to present descriptive data regarding the practical events, as the type of conflict and the children's role in them form the basis of the hypothetical stories, as well as, inform the moral judgments and construals. Moreover, such findings are relevant to current literature on the nature of children's conflicts.

The observed conflicts were all of a moral nature, except one, which was coded as social conventional. In the study were 51 male and 35 female participants. Sixty-five percent of the conflicts had same sex participants, with 42% involving two male subjects and 23% two female subjects. The remaining 35% of the conflicts were mixed, involving a male and female participant.

Of these mixed sex conflicts, 73% were male initiated. Overall, there were twice as many male initiators (67%) as female (33%). While this study did not hypothesize about any sex differences among the conflict participants, these results are consistent with prior findings whereby same sex playmates are more common than mixed sex dyads (Killen, 1990; Shantz & Shantz, 1985), and males may be more aggressive in instigating conflictual events than females, who tend to be more passive in play settings (Shantz & Shantz, 1985; Nucci & Nucci, 1982).

Coded Behaviors in Events

Initiating Actions. Of the 43 recorded initiating actions, Table 1 shows that the majority (53%) were coded as resource violations. In the remaining conflicts, 14% of the initiating actions were coded as physical/psychological harm, 19% were coded as disorder, rights violation or norm deviation and 14% were coded as other: command, request or teasing. Although no sex differences were hypothesized among initiating actions, it is interesting that no female initiator was involved in a conflict that started over physical or psychological harm, compared to 21% of the male initiators.

Table 1
Initiating Action by Sex of Participant

		INITIATING ACTION 1				Total
		PHYSICAL / PSYCH. HARM	DISORDER RIGHTS NORMS	RESOURCE VIOLATION	OTHER: COMMAND/ REQUEST/ TEASE	
MALE	Count	6	6	14	3	29
	% of Total	14.0%	14.0%	32.6%	7.0%	67.4%
FEMALE	Count		2	9	3	14
	% of Total		4.7%	20.9%	7.0%	32.6%
Total	Count	6	8	23	6	43
	% of Total	14.0%	18.6%	53.5%	14.0%	100.0%

Behavioral Responses. Events were further coded for the 3 consecutive

behavioral responses following the initiating action. This resulted in two coded behaviors for the recipients and one coded behavior for the initiator (e.g., recipient response to initiating action, initiator response, and recipient response). The recipient responses to the initiating actions are presented in Table 2. The majority of responses were sanctions, threats or commands (35%), followed by retaliatory responses (26%) and an injury loss statements (23%). No subject responded with ridicule/teasing or comforts/sorry and only one male ignored the initiator entirely. It is notable that among females, sanctions, threats and commands were a more common response (43%) while among males physical responses were slightly more common (32%) than sanctions, threats or commands (27%) or injury/loss statements (23%).

Table 2
Recipient Behavioral Response 2 by Sex of Participant

		BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE 2				
		INJURY / LOSS STATEM'T	EMOTIONAL REACTION	PHYSICAL RESPONSE	SANCTION / THREAT / COMMAND	Total
MALE	Count	5	3	7	6	22
	% of Total	11.6%	7.0%	16.3%	14.0%	51.2%
FEMALE	Count	5	3	4	9	21
	% of Total	11.6%	7.0%	9.3%	20.9%	48.8%
Total	Count	10	6	11	15	43
	% of Total	23.3%	14.0%	25.6%	34.9%	100.0%

The second behavioral response of the initiator was also coded into the same 8 categories and is displayed in Table 3. At this point in the interaction,

37% of the initiators responded to the recipients with a retaliatory response. Sanction, threat or command was the second most prevalent response, with 21% of the initiators in this category, and 14% made an injury/loss statement. Only one female child involved an adult at this stage of the conflict, while the plurality of males (35%) and females (43%) now physically retaliated.

Table 3
Initiator Behavioral Response 3 by Sex of Participant

		BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE 3							
		INJURY / LOSS STATE	EMOTIONAL REACTION	PHYSICAL RESP.	SANCT. THREAT COMM.	TEASING REQUEST	COMFORT APOLOGY	IGNORE OTHER	Total
MALE	Count	6	2	10	5	2	2	2	29
	% of Total	14.0%	4.7%	23.3%	11.6%	4.7%	4.7%	4.7%	67.4%
FEMALE	Count			6	4	1		2	14
	% of Total			14.0%	9.3%	2.3%		4.7%	32.6%
Total	Count	6	2	16	9	3	2	4	43
	% of Total	14.0%	4.7%	37.2%	20.9%	7.0%	4.7%	9.3%	100.0%

For the final recipient behavioral response, Table 4 shows that 26% of the recipients made a sanction, threat or command, 16% now displayed an emotional reaction and 14% both involved an adult and physically retaliated. Only one male child offered comfort/apology. At this point almost a quarter of both males and females resorted to a sanction, threat or command response, while 19% of the females made an emotional reaction and 18% of the males physically retaliated.

Table 4
Recipient Behavioral Response 4 by Sex of Participant

		BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE 4								
		NO RESPONSE	INJURY/ LOSS STATE	EMOTION REACTION	PHYSICAL RESP.	INVOLVE ADULT	SANCT. THREAT COMM.	COMFORT APOLOGy	IGNORE OTHER	Total
MALE	Count	3	2	3	4	2	6	1	1	22
	% of Total	7.0%	4.7%	7.0%	9.3%	4.7%	14.0%	2.3%	2.3%	51.2%
FEMALE	Count	1	3	4	2	4	5		2	21
	% of Total	2.3%	7.0%	9.3%	4.7%	9.3%	11.6%		4.7%	48.8%
Total	Count	4	5	7	6	6	11	1	3	43
	% of Total	9.3%	11.6%	16.3%	14.0%	14.0%	25.6%	2.3%	7.0%	100.0%

Intentions and Actions. In the practical events, 35% of the initiating actions judged intentional were followed by an injury/loss statement, or a sanction, threat or command. For events judged nonintentional, a sanction, threat or command was the dominant response (38%), followed closely by retaliatory actions (31%). The number and frequency of response behaviors for intentional/ not intentional judgments is displayed in Table 5.

Table 5
Practical Intentions Judgment by Recipient Behavioral Response 2

		BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE 2					
		INJURY LOSS STATEM'T	EMOTIONAL REACTION	PHYSICAL RESPONSE	SANCTION THREAT COMMAND	IGNORES OTHER	Total
THINKS ACT INTENTIONAL	Count	9	1	6	9	1	26
	% within INTENTIONS	34.6%	3.8%	23.1%	34.6%	3.8%	100.0%
THINKS ACT NOT INTENTIONAL	Count	1	4	5	6		16
	% within INTENTIONS	6.3%	25.0%	31.3%	37.5%		100.0%
Total	Count	10	5	11	15	1	42
	% within INTENTIONS	23.8%	11.9%	26.2%	35.7%	2.4%	100.0%

To test this study's hypothesis that there would be a relationship between the judgment of intentionality and the type of recipient response, a 2 x 5 (intentions judgment by behavioral response) chi-square was conducted, comparing the frequency of behavioral response types for "intentional" and "not intentional" judgments, and it was found to be not significant. Thus, retaliatory behaviors do not seem to be related to the judgment of intentions, in the manner hypothesized by this study. Contrary to predictions, events judged both "intentional" and "not intentional" were responded to with retaliatory actions, and events judged "intentional" did not elicit any appeals for teacher involvement or a higher percentage of emotional reactions. Instead as evident from Table 5, children responded to both "intentional" and "unintentional" actions in a variety of ways that included physical retaliation, sanctions, threats or commands, and injury/loss statements.

Therefore, these results indicate that behavioral responses may be linked more to individual differences than to the intention judgments. Males reacted more physically to events judged "not intentional" (50%) while females responded more often with sanctions, threats or commands (50%). Among events judged "intentional", 33% of the males made a sanction, threat or command, while 45% of the females made an injury/loss statement. Unfortunately, despite these findings, the results are not readily interpretable and require further investigation in order to determine how judgment of intentionality interacts with the child's behavioral response.

Interview Questions

Interview questions were designed to assess specific components of the event construal: event focus; focus on intentions and/or outcome; causal attributions, judgment of intentions; knowledge of rules and rule domains; affect attributions, overall evaluative judgments of the event; judgment justifications; and justification domains. The principal analyses of these variables were conducted to address the main hypothesis of this study: that matching familiar practical and hypothetical events would result in similar event construals and judgments, and that any evident differences between the conditions would be due to nonmoral factors such as context (the difficulty in conceptualizing hypothetical events or the demands of the practical events), role (initiator or recipient) or friendship factors.

Consequently, two types of analyses were performed on each of the above interview components: (1) a test of association between practical and hypothetical response frequencies and (2) when appropriate, tests of differences. In addition, the frequencies of initiator and recipient responses were compared within each condition to test for differences based on the child's role in the event.

Statistical tests used to investigate similarities included (1) the Cramer's v, a measure of association for related, nominal data consisting of more than two categories, (2) a phi-correlation coefficient, a measure of association for two (dichotomous) related, nominally coded data sets and (3) a Pearson r correlation, a measure of linear association between two variables.

To test for differences between practical and hypothetical responses, this study employed (1) a McNemar test, a nonparametric test for small samples of two related, dichotomous variables (useful for testing for changes in responses using the chi-square distribution), (2) a Pearson chi-square test which compared observed and expected counts of each cell and indicated how far it was from the model of independence and (3) paired t-tests used to compare the means of two variables for two related groups.

Components in the Event Construals:

Event Focus. After the conflict occurred, both the initiators and recipients were asked, "*what happened?*" in their event. Table 6 shows that in the practical condition, 6% of the subjects could not discuss or describe what had happened in the conflict or between the participants. More than one quarter of the children focused on wrongful intentions or actions (27%) and self needs (25%), while the remaining children focused on physical/ psychological welfare (16%) and relations or recounting (15%) when discussing their event.

In the hypothetical condition, more children (17%) could not provide an event focus, but similar numbers mentioned physical or psychological harm (15%), and focused on wrongful intentions or actions (29%). Understandably, given the hypothetical and impersonal nature of these vignettes, no child offered self needs as an event focus and 35% just recounted what had happened.

Table 6
Practical Event Focus by Hypothetical Event Focus

			HYPOTHETICAL EVENT FOCUS					
			NO FOCUS	PHYSICAL WELFARE	WRONG INTENT/ ACTS	FAIRNESS RIGHTS	RELATIONS RECOUNT	Total
PRACTICAL EVENT FOCUS	NO FOCUS	Count	2	1	2			5
		% of Total	2.4%	1.2%	2.4%			5.9%
	PHYSICAL WELFARE	Count	3	5	1		5	14
		% of Total	3.5%	5.9%	1.2%		5.9%	16.5%
	WRONGFUL INTENT/ACT	Count	4	1	9		9	23
		% of Total	4.7%	1.2%	10.6%		10.6%	27.1%
	FAIRNESS/ RIGHTS	Count		1	2	1	5	9
		% of Total		1.2%	2.4%	1.2%	5.9%	10.6%
	RELATIONS/ RECOUNT	Count	1	1	4		7	13
		% of Total	1.2%	1.2%	4.7%		8.2%	15.3%
	SELF NEEDS/ CONCERNS	Count	5	4	7	1	4	21
		% of Total	5.9%	4.7%	8.2%	1.2%	4.7%	24.7%
Total		Count	15	13	25	2	30	85
		% of Total	17.6%	15.3%	29.4%	2.4%	35.3%	100.0%

As evidenced by its omission in Table 6, in both the practical and hypothetical events, no child referred to the category of social order or rules, in their response to the event focus question. To address the hypothesis that event focus would be similar between practical and hypothetical conditions, a Cramer's v test of association was conducted between the frequency of practical and hypothetical event focus categories and found not to be significant. This lack of association between practical and hypothetical responses, to thematically the same event, suggests that other factors were influencing the child's construal of the situation and that the question "*what happened?*" did not elicit the same event focus for practical and hypothetical conditions.

Event Focus: Initiators and Recipients. Next, to test whether event focus was independent of participant role within the practical and hypothetical conditions, two 2 x 6 (role by event focus) chi-squares were performed comparing the frequency of event focus responses for initiators and recipients in each condition. This analysis proved not significant for both the practical and the hypothetical events and the results indicate that the participants' role in the event (being an initiator or recipient) was independent of their discussion of "*what happened?*" Figures 1 and 2 display the percentage of each event focus category by role and condition.

Figure 1

Practical Event Focus by Participant Role



Figure 2

Hypothetical Event Focus by Participant Role



Overall, between the practical and hypothetical conditions, children did not focus on similar aspects of the event in responding to the question "*what happened*?" but within the practical and hypothetical conditions, chi-squares between initiator and recipient responses indicated no significant differences. Thus these findings fail to support the expectations of correlated practical and hypothetical event focus responses and that there would be significant differences in event focus within each condition, depending on the child's role in the event.

Event Focus Score: Intentions and Outcome. Children's responses to the event focus question "*what happened*?" were also scored for their ability to discuss intentions *or* outcome (1), intentions *and* outcome (2), or intentions, outcome and situational factors (3). In the practical conflicts ($\underline{M}$ = .872), 19% of

the children scored a "0" for no focus, 76% scored a "1" for focusing on intentions *or* outcome and 5% scored a "2" for focusing on intentions *and* outcome. In the hypothetical condition (M = .824), 29% had no focus "0", 59% scored a "1", and 12% scored a "2". Since no subject focused on intentions, outcome and situational factors, it was dropped from the analyses.

Table 7 shows the scored event focus categories and percentage of each type in the practical and hypothetical conditions, with the majority of practical and hypothetical responses being focused on intentions *or* outcome. A Pearson r correlation was then conducted between the practical and hypothetical event focus scores and it was significant r = .253, p. < .02. Then a paired sample t-test was conducted to further examine the hypothesized relationship between practical and hypothetical event focus means and it found no significant differences between

Table 7
Practical Event Focus Score by Hypothetical Event Focus Score

			HYPOTHETICAL FOCUS SCORE			
			NO FOCUS (0)	FOCUS ON INTENT OR OUTCOME (1)	FOCUS ON INTENT & OUTCOME (2)	Total
PRACTICAL FOCUS SCORE	NO FOCUS (0)	Count	8	7		15
		% of Total	9.4%	8.2%		17.6%
	FOCUS ON INTENT OR OUTCOME (1)	Count	16	40	9	65
		% of Total	18.8%	47.1%	10.6%	76.5%
	FOCUS ON INTENT & OUTCOME (2)	Count	1	3	1	5
		% of Total	1.2%	3.5%	1.2%	5.9%
Total		Count	25	50	10	85
		% of Total	29.4%	58.8%	11.8%	100.0%

the conditions. This outcome supported the hypothesis that practical and hypothetical responses would be correlated and that the mean scores would not systematically differ, due to the familiar and contextualized nature of the hypothetical vignettes.

Event Focus Score: Initiators and Recipients. Next, the event focus scores were examined for differences by participant role and the results are displayed in Table 8. In the practical domain results were consistent for both the initiators (M = .857), and recipients (M = .907), who focused more than 70% on intentions *or* outcome in their responses, and differed very little in the other categories.

Table 8
Practical Event Focus Score by Participant Role

			PARTICIPANT ROLE		
			INITIATOR	RECIPIENT	Total
PRACTICAL EVENT FOCUS SCORE	NO FOCUS (0)	Count	9	7	16
		% within ROLE	20.9%	16.3%	18.6%
	FOCUS ON INTENTIONS OR OUTCOME (1)	Count	32	33	65
		% within ROLE	74.4%	76.7%	75.6%
	FOCUS ON INTENTIONS & OUTCOME (2)	Count	2	3	5
		% within ROLE	4.7%	7.0%	5.8%
Total		Count	43	43	86
		% within ROLE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Similarly, in the hypothetical domain, Table 9 shows that more than half of the initiators (M = .762) and recipients (M = .884) focused on either intentions

or outcome. However, in this context, more recipients (16%) than initiators (7%) evidenced coordinated reasoning by combining both intention *and* outcome components in their focus.

Table 9
Hypothetical Event Focus Score by Participant Role

			PARTICIPANT ROLE		
			INITIATOR	RECIPIENT	Total
HYPOTHETICAL EVENT FOCUS SCORE	NO FOCUS (0)	Count	13	12	25
		% within ROLE	31.0%	27.9%	29.4%
	FOCUS ON INTENTIONS OR OUTCOME (1)	Count	26	24	50
		% within ROLE	61.9%	55.8%	58.8%
	FOCUS ON INTENTIONS & OUTCOME (2)	Count	3	7	10
		% within ROLE	7.1%	16.3%	11.8%
Total		Count	42	43	85
		% within ROLE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In both conditions, 2 x 3 (role by event focus) chi squares compared the frequency of initiator and recipient intention *and/or* outcome responses and results indicated there were no significant differences between the initiator and recipient responses in each condition. The majority of children in this study tended to focus on intentions *or* outcome when discussing both the practical and hypothetical events, regardless of whether one was an initiator or recipient, and the prediction that there would be no significant differences between or within the conditions was confirmed.

Causal Attribution Score. Children were next asked in the interview, "*Why do you think the event act happened?*" and scored for their level of causal attribution, as defined in the methods section. In the practical conflicts (M = 2.27), 21% of the subjects made no causal attributions, while subjective responsibility was offered by 38% of the children. Only 2% of the children displayed coordinated attributions. In the hypothetical condition (M = 2.29), 21% of the children made no attributions of responsibility, yet the majority of children (42%) reasoned in terms of subjective responsibility. Unlike the practical condition, no subject mentioned forseeability or coordinated attributions.

Table 10 is a crosstabulation of the number and percentage of each attribution type, in each condition. While the distribution of causal attributions for practical and hypothetical conditions appears very similar, a Pearson r correlation failed to show a significant association. However, a paired sample t-test conducted between practical and hypothetical conditions indicated no significant differences in mean scores. Thus, while causal attribution means were similar between the practical and hypothetical conditions, children's practical and hypothetical causal attributions were not correlated, as expected by this study.

Table 10
Practical Causal Attribution Score by Hypothetical Causal Attribution Score

			HYPOTHETICAL ATTRIBUTION SCORE 2				
			NO ATTRIB. (0)	GLOBAL ATTRIB (1)	OBJECTIVE RESP. (2)	SUBJECT RESP. (4)	Total
PRACTICAL ATTRIBUTION SCORE	NO ATTRIB. (0)	Count	6	1	2	9	18
		% of Total	7.1%	1.2%	2.4%	10.6%	21.2%
	GLOBAL ATTRIBUTION (1)	Count	2	3	3	3	11
		% of Total	2.4%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	12.9%
	OBJECTIVE RESP (2)	Count	5	3	4	8	20
		% of Total	5.9%	3.5%	4.7%	9.4%	23.5%
	FORSEE/ CARELESS (3)	Count			2		2
		% of Total			2.4%		2.4%
	SUBJECTIVE RESP (4)	Count	5	4	8	15	32
		% of Total	5.9%	4.7%	9.4%	17.6%	37.6%
	COORDINATED (5)	Count			1	1	2
		% of Total			1.2%	1.2%	2.4%
Total		Count	18	11	20	36	85
		% of Total	21.2%	12.9%	23.5%	42.4%	100.0%

Causal Attribution Score: Initiators and Recipients. Causal attribution scores were also analyzed within each condition for differences in causal attributions based on participant role. In Table 11, it is notable that practical initiators made twice as many subjective attributions as the recipients, who mostly displayed objective reasoning. However, in Table 12, hypothetical responses change from the practical responses, with the recipients now displaying more subjective attributions and initiators more objective attributions.

Table 11
Practical Causal Attribution Score by Participant Role

			PARTICIPANT ROLE		
			INITIATOR	RECIPIENT	Total
PRACTICAL ATTRIBUTION SCORE	NO ATTRIBUTION (0)	Count	10	9	19
		% within ROLE	23.3%	20.9%	22.1%
	GLOBAL ATTRIBUTION (1)	Count	4	7	11
		% within ROLE	9.3%	16.3%	12.8%
	OBJECTIVE RESP (2)	Count	6	14	20
		% within ROLE	14.0%	32.6%	23.3%
	FORSEEABILITY / CARELESS (3)	Count		2	2
		% within ROLE		4.7%	2.3%
	SUBJECTIVE RESP. (4)	Count	21	11	32
		% within ROLE	48.8%	25.6%	37.2%
	COORDINATED (5)	Count	2		2
		% within ROLE	4.7%		2.3%
Total		Count	43	43	86
		% within ROLE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 12
Hypothetical Causal Attribution Score by Participant Role

			PARTICIPANT ROLE		
			INITIATOR	RECIPIENT	Total
HYPOTHETICAL ATTRIBUTION SCORE	NO ATTRIBUTION (0)	Count	9	9	18
		% within ROLE	21.4%	20.9%	21.2%
	GLOBAL ATTRIB. (1)	Count	6	5	11
		% within ROLE	14.3%	11.6%	12.9%
	OBJECTIVE RESP. (2)	Count	12	8	20
		% within ROLE	28.6%	18.6%	23.5%
	SUBJECTIVE RESP. (4)	Count	15	21	36
		% within ROLE	35.7%	48.8%	42.4%
Total		Count	42	43	85
		% within ROLE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

These apparent variations were then analyzed by a 2 x 6 and 2 x 4 (role by causal attribution) chi square analysis comparing the frequency of causal attribution types made by initiators and recipients, in the practical and hypothetical conditions respectively. Results indicated there were significant differences between initiator and recipient practical attributions, X^2 (5, N = 86) = 11.96, $p < .05$, but not between initiator and recipient hypothetical attributions. To then further examine the relationship between practical initiator and recipient causal attributions a 2 x 2 (role by causal attribution) chi square was conducted between the frequency of initiator and recipient subjective and objective attributions. This analysis was not significant, but it is thought due to the small sample size and empirical demands for a higher level of significance.

Consequently, the prediction that causal attributions would be correlated between practical and hypothetical conditions was not confirmed, despite finding no significant differences between the mean scores. Furthermore, there were significant differences in practical causal attribution responses according to the role of the person making the attribution. While this study hypothesizes that self interest may have influenced the practical causal attributions and resulted in initiators making more intention based attributions and recipients focusing more on personal outcomes, it was unable to statistically confirm this hypothesis.

Intentions. The third question in the interview asked children if they thought that the initiator (or they themselves if they initiated) had "*meant to do it*" (action) or caused the conflict "*on purpose*". Table 13 shows that 62% and 58%

respectively judged the practical and hypothetical events "intentional". To measure the hypothesized association between hypothetical and practical responses, a phi-correlation test was performed on the frequency of "intentional" and "not intentional" judgments in the two conditions and was found significant, $r = .232$, $p < .03$. Then, a 2 x 2 (condition by intention judgment) McNemar test compared the frequency of practical and hypothetical "intentional" and "not intentional" judgments, and it further indicated there were no significant differences between the conditions. These results support the hypothesized similarity that was expected between practical and hypothetical intention judgments and suggest that whether an event is judged intentional or not, is not influenced by the condition in which it is made. That is, practical and hypothetical intention judgments are correlated and do not significantly change between the conditions.

Table 13
Practical Intentions Judgment by Hypothetical Intentions Judgment

			HYPOTHETICAL JUDGED INTENTION		
			THINKS ACT INTENTIONAL	THINKS ACT NOT INTENTIONAL	Total
PRACTICAL JUDGED INTENTION	THINKS ACT INTENTIONAL	Count	35	17	52
		% of Total	41.7%	20.2%	61.9%
	THINKS ACT NOT INTENTIONAL	Count	14	18	32
		% of Total	16.7%	21.4%	38.1%
Total		Count	49	35	84
		% of Total	58.3%	41.7%	100.0%

Intentions: Initiators and Recipients. Initiator and recipient intention responses were also compared within each condition to determine if there were differences in intention judgments based on the child's role in the event and the results are displayed in Figures 3 and 4. Two 2 x 2 (intention judgment by role) chi-squares were conducted for the practical and hypothetical conditions comparing the frequency of "intentional" and "not intentional" judgments for initiators and recipients in each condition. Both tests were not significant, showing that regardless of role, children overwhelmingly judged the practical and hypothetical events "intentional".

Figure 3

Practical Intentions Judgment by Role



Figure 4

Hypothetical Intentions Judgment by Role



Therefore, in summary, intention judgments do not appear to be influenced by participant role and as hypothesized, children's practical and hypothetical responses to "*was it meant on purpose?*" were correlated and remained consistent between the conditions.

Affect Attribution Score. All the participants, in each condition, were scored for the ability to consider the feelings of the self (1), the other (2), and both self *and* other (3) in response to the question "*how did you the other feel about what happened?*" In the practical conflicts ($\underline{M}$ = 1.84), 22% of the subjects scored "0", with no affect attributions, while more than half of the subjects (51%) scored a "3", attributing the feelings of both the self *and* the other.

In the hypothetical condition ($\underline{M}$ = 2.22), 21% of the children made no affect attributions, yet in this condition, 71% succeeded in attributing feelings to both the self *and* the other. Table 14 shows the number and percentage of affect attributions in the practical and hypothetical conditions.

Table 14
Practical Affect Attribution Score by Hypothetical Affect Attribution Score

			HYPOTHETICAL AFFECT ATTRIBUTION SCORE				
			NO AFFECT ATTRIB. (0)	SELF ONLY (1)	OTHER ONLY (2)	SELF AND OTHER (3)	Total
PRACTICAL AFFECT ATTRIB. SCORE	NO AFFECT ATTRIB. (0)	Count	10		1	8	19
		% of Total	11.8%		1.2%	9.4%	22.4%
	SELF ONLY (1)	Count	3	4	1	12	20
		% of Total	3.5%	4.7%	1.2%	14.1%	23.5%
	OTHER ONLY (2)	Count				3	3
		% of Total				3.5%	3.5%
	SELF AND OTHER (3)	Count	5	1		37	43
		% of Total	5.9%	1.2%		43.5%	50.6%
Total		Count	18	5	2	60	85
		% of Total	21.2%	5.9%	2.4%	70.6%	100.0%

To investigate the hypothesized relationship between practical and hypothetical affect attribution means, a paired sample $\underline{t}$-test was conducted and found to be significant $\underline{t}(85) = 2.62$, $\underline{p} < .01$. This result and Table 14 confirm the hypothesis that children would more often attribute affect to the self and other in

the hypothetical condition (resulting in a higher mean score), where the component of self interest and the emotions of the conflict were not present. However, a Pearson r correlation, $r = .385$, $p < .001$ also showed that there was a significant correlation between the practical and hypothetical attributions, with the majority of both practical and hypothetical responses attributing feelings to self and other, despite its greater frequency in the hypothetical events.

Affect Attribution Score: Initiators and Recipients. Finally, to investigate the influence of the child's role in the conflict, two 2 x 3 (role by affect attribution) Pearson chi-squares were conducted on the frequency of affect attributions (no, self, other and both) for initiators and recipients in each condition. Both analyses proved not significant and it was concluded that within the practical and hypothetical conditions, being an initiator or a recipient did not influence the kinds of affect attributions made by the child. Tables 15 and 16 confirm that responses were similar between initiators and recipients in each condition.

Table 15
Practical Affect Attribution Score by Role

			PARTICIPANT ROLE		
			INITIATOR	RECIPIENT	Total
PRACTICAL AFFECT ATTRIBUTION SCORE	NO AFFECT ATTRIBUTION (0)	Count	7	12	19
		% within ROLE	16.3%	27.9%	22.1%
	CONSIDERS SELF ONLY (1)	Count	9	11	20
		% within ROLE	20.9%	25.6%	23.3%
	CONSIDERS OTHER ONLY (2)	Count	2	1	3
		% within ROLE	4.7%	2.3%	3.5%
	CONSIDERS SELF & OTHER (3)	Count	25	19	44
		% within ROLE	58.1%	44.2%	51.2%
Total		Count	43	43	86
		% within ROLE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 16
Hypothetical Affect Attribution Score by Role

			PARTICIPANT ROLE		
			INITIATOR	RECIPIENT	Total
HYPOTHETICAL AFFECT ATTRIBUTION SCORE	NO AFFECT ATTRIBUTION (0)	Count	7	11	18
		% within ROLE	16.7%	25.6%	21.2%
	CONSIDERS SELF ONLY (1)	Count	3	2	5
		% within ROLE	7.1%	4.7%	5.9%
	CONSIDERS OTHER ONLY (2)	Count	1	1	2
		% within ROLE	2.4%	2.3%	2.4%
	CONSIDERS SELF & OTHER (3)	Count	31	29	60
		% within ROLE	73.8%	67.4%	70.6%
Total		Count	42	43	85
		% within ROLE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Therefore, to summarize the component of affect attributions: Within the practical and hypothetical conditions, being an initiator or a recipient did not influence the kinds of affect attributions made by the child. However, there were, as hypothesized, differences between the conditions in affect attribution scores, with hypothetical scores being significantly higher than practical scores. Nevertheless, children's practical and hypothetical affect attributions were also correlated, with most answers to the question "*How did you the other feel about what happened?*" reflecting both self *and* other feelings, despite its greater frequency in the hypothetical condition.

Rules and Rule Domains. Next, children were asked, "*if there was a rule about what happened?*". Table 17 shows that in the practical condition, 57% of the children said there was a rule about their event and in the hypothetical condition, slightly more children (65%) stated there was a rule.

Table 17
Practical Rule Knowledge by Hypothetical Rule Knowledge

			HYPOTHETICAL KNOWLEDGE OF EVENT RULES		
			THERE IS A RULE	THERE IS NO RULE	Total
PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE OF EVENT RULES	THERE IS A RULE	Count	41	7	48
		% of Total	48.2%	8.2%	56.5%
	THERE IS NO RULE	Count	14	23	37
		% of Total	16.5%	27.1%	43.5%
Total		Count	55	30	85
		% of Total	64.7%	35.3%	100.0%

To test the hypothesis that children's rule responses would be similar in both practical and hypothetical conditions, rule response frequencies ("yes rule" and "no rule") were correlated by a phi coefficient and found to be significantly associated, $r = 494$, $p < .001$. This component was then examined for differences in practical and hypothetical "yes/no rule" responses by a 2 x 2 (condition by rule response) McNemar test and no significant differences were found. Thus, this study concluded that, as hypothesized, there was both an association between practical and hypothetical rule responses, and no significant changes from practical to hypothetical conditions.

If the child answered that there was a rule about their event, the interviewer then asked "*what rule?*" in an effort to get the child to state a specific rule applying to their conflict. In the practical condition, of the children who said rules were associated with the conflicts, Table 18 shows that 66% could not state the rule that applied. Similarly, in the hypothetical condition, of participants who said the event had a rule, 52% could not state the rule itself.

Table 18
Practical Rule Domain by Hypothetical Rule Domain

			HYPOTHETICAL DOMAIN OF RULE			
			MENTIONS RULE BUT NO DOMAIN	MENTIONS MORAL RULE	MENTIONS SOCIAL CONV. RULE	Total
PRACTICAL DOMAIN OF RULE	MENTIONS RULE BUT NO DOMAIN	Count	38	10	8	56
		% of Total	44.7%	11.8%	9.4%	65.9%
	MENTIONS MORAL RULE	Count	4	12	2	18
		% of Total	4.7%	14.1%	2.4%	21.2%
	MENTIONS SOCIAL CONV. RULE	Count	2	2	7	11
		% of Total	2.4%	2.4%	8.2%	12.9%
Total		Count	44	24	17	85
		% of Total	51.8%	28.2%	20.0%	100.0%

Based on empirical considerations, rule responses were then collapsed into rule domain (referring to a moral or social-conventional rule) and no rule domain (not being able to state an actual rule) to investigate if there was a difference between the conditions in being able to state an actual rule (not just that there was a rule). A 2 x 2 (condition by rule domain) McNemar was then conducted comparing the frequency of practical and hypothetical rule domain and no rule domain responses, and significant differences X^2 (1, N = 85) = 17.02, $p < .02$ were found between the two conditions. This result suggests that while children were equally likely to state there was a rule in both conditions, it was more difficult for the children to specify the actual rule in the practical condition than in the hypothetical.

Rules: Initiators and Recipients. The frequency of initiator and recipient rule responses were also compared in each condition to see if participant status made a difference in saying there "was" or "was not" a rule about the event, and the results are displayed in Figures 5 and 6. Two-by-two (role by rule response) chi-squares comparing the frequency of saying there "was" or "was not" a rule for initiators and recipients in each condition confirmed that there were no significant differences between the two participants, within the practical or the hypothetical conditions.

Figure 5

Practical Rule Knowledge by Role



Figure 6

Hypothetical Rule Knowledge by Role



Therefore, while there were no significant differences between rule responses in the practical or hypothetical conditions, or between initiators and recipients, when it came to state an actual rule, statistical analyses showed it was significantly more difficult to do so in the practical, than the hypothetical, condition.

Judgments. Children were also asked in the interview for their moral judgment of the event. That is, if what happened "*was ok or not ok*?". Table 19 shows the number of practical and hypothetical events judged "ok" and "not ok" and that more children (21%) judged the event "ok" in the practical condition, than in the hypothetical condition, (12%). In order to test the prediction that evaluative judgments would be similar between practical and hypothetical

conditions, a phi-correlation was conducted between the frequency of practical and hypothetical "ok' and "not ok" judgments and failed to attain significance. A McNemar test was then performed to test for differences between the frequency of practical and hypothetical "ok" and "not ok" judgments and it too, was found to be not significant. These results suggest, as evidenced by Table 19, that despite the lack of correlation between practical and hypothetical judgments, the majority of participants judged events overwhelmingly "not ok" and this response did not significantly change from the practical to hypothetical conditions.

Table 19
Practical Judgment of Event by Hypothetical Judgment of Event

			HYPOTHETICAL JUDGEMENT OF EVENT		
			THINKS ACT OK	THINKS ACT NOT OK	Total
PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF EVENT	THINKS ACT OK	Count	4	14	18
		% of Total	4.7%	16.5%	21.2%
	THINKS ACT NOT OK	Count	6	61	67
		% of Total	7.1%	71.8%	78.8%
Total		Count	10	75	85
		% of Total	11.8%	88.2%	100.0%

Judgments: Initiators and Recipients. This study further hypothesized that judgments between the conditions would differ based on the participant's role in the event, with initiators judging the practical event "ok" more often than the hypothetical, and the recipients judging the practical conflict "not ok" as often or

more than the hypothetical event. Tables 20 and 21 illustrate that the majority of initiators and recipients said both the practical and the hypothetical events were "not ok". To test the hypothesis that initiator practical judgments would differ from their hypothetical judgments, a 2 x 2 (condition by judgment) McNemar test was calculated on the frequencies of initiator practical and hypothetical "ok" and "not ok" responses, but no significant differences were found between the conditions. This test was then run on the recipient judgments in the two conditions with the same conclusions. Thus, the overwhelming tendency toward a "not ok" judgment was statistically confirmed across role and condition and this study's prediction of the influence of self-interest on moral judgments was not upheld.

Table 20
Initiators Practical Judgment of Event by Hypothetical Judgment of Event

			HYPOTHETICAL JUDGEMENT OF EVENT / ACT		
			THINKS ACT OK	THINKS ACT NOT OK	Total
PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF EVENT	THINKS ACT OK	Count	2	9	11
		% of Total	4.8%	21.4%	26.2%
	THINKS ACT NOT OK	Count	3	28	31
		% of Total	7.1%	66.7%	73.8%
Total		Count	5	37	42
		% of Total	11.9%	88.1%	100.0%

Table 21
Recipients Practical Judgment of Event by Hypothetical Judgment of Event

			HYPOTHETICAL JUDGEMENT OF EVENT / ACT		
			THINKS ACT OK	THINKS ACT NOT OK	Total
PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF EVENT	THINKS ACT OK	Count	2	5	7
		% of Total	4.7%	11.6%	16.3%
	THINKS ACT NOT OK	Count	3	33	36
		% of Total	7.0%	76.7%	83.7%
Total		Count	5	38	43
		% of Total	11.6%	88.4%	100.0%

The next set of analyses addressed whether evaluative judgments differed according to role (i.e., being an initiator or a recipient), within each condition. When the two groups were compared, 26% of the initiator's practical judgments were "ok", while 16% of the practical recipients judged the act "ok". Figure 7 charts the number of practical "ok" and "not ok" judgments for each group. A 2 x 2 (role by judgment) chi-square was performed, comparing the frequency of initiator and recipient "ok" and "not ok" practical judgments and contrary to expectations, no significant differences were found.

In the hypothetical condition, Figure 8 shows that results were identical for both initiators and recipients with the majority of both groups (88%) judging the acts "not ok". Again, a 2 x 2 (role by judgment) chi-square comparing the frequency of "ok" and "not ok" hypothetical judgments for initiators and recipients was conducted and no significant differences were found.

Figure 7

Practical Judgment by Role



Figure 8

Hypothetical Judgment by Role



Thus the expectation of judgment differences based on participant role, and the condition in which the judgment was made, were not confirmed by actual results. Children tended to judge events "not ok" regardless of whether one was an initiator or a recipient and the evaluative judgments did not significantly change between practical and hypothetical conditions. Therefore this study's hypothesis of self-interest as a mediating factor in the practical judgments was not confirmed. Even the initiators were willing to admit a practical event was "not ok", despite the consequences, and this judgment remained consistent, regardless of the practical or hypothetical nature of the task.

Justification Components. After children judged the conflict, they were asked "*why why not is that ok not ok?*" in an effort to elicit the justifications for their judgments. In the practical events, 21% of the children could not provide a justification for their judgment. Twenty-eight percent offered reasons that referred to physical or psychological welfare and 19% stated self's needs/ concerns or pragmatics as their justification. No subjects offered relations/ recounting in support of their judgment.

In the hypothetical condition, a quarter of the children could not justify their judgments, but more (35%) stated physical or psychological welfare as a factor. Social order/rules and fairness/rights were cited as justifications by 20% and 11% of the subjects respectively. Only 2% of the participants referred to relations/recounting and only one child mentioned self's needs.

Given the low frequency of occurrence for some of the judgment justifications, categories were collapsed for empirical purposes, based upon this study's theoretical considerations. This resulted in 4 main justification groupings presented in Table 22: (1) No justification; (2) Moral concerns, including physical and psychological welfare, wrongful intentions, and fairness and rights; (3) Social order or rules and: (4) Personal concerns encompassing relations, self needs and pragmatics.

Table 22
Practical Justification Components by Hypothetical Justification Components

			PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATION COMPONENT				
			NO JUSTIF.	MORAL CONCERNS	SOCIAL ORDER / RULES	PERSONAL CONCERNS	Total
HYPOTHETICAL JUSTIFICATION COMPONENTS	NO JUSTIF.	Count	10	7	2	2	21
		% of Total	11.8%	8.2%	2.4%	2.4%	24.7%
	MORAL CONCERNS	Count	5	22	8	9	44
		% of Total	5.9%	25.9%	9.4%	10.6%	51.8%
	SOCIAL ORDER / RULES	Count	3	6	5	3	17
		% of Total	3.5%	7.1%	5.9%	3.5%	20.0%
	PERSONAL CONCERNS	Count		1		2	3
		% of Total		1.2%		2.4%	3.5%
Total		Count	18	36	15	16	85
		% of Total	21.2%	42.4%	17.6%	18.8%	100.0%

To test for the expected relationship between practical and hypothetical justifications, a Cramer's v test of association was conducted between the frequencies of practical and hypothetical justification types and found to be significant, $r = .268$, $p < .05$. This finding supports this study's hypothesis that

children would similarly justify their judgments in practical and hypothetical contexts, when the events were familiar and matched.

Justification Components: Initiators and recipients. Next, to test the hypothesis that there would be differences between initiator and recipient justification types, within each condition, justifications were again collapsed on empirical and theoretical considerations into the same 4 categories: No justification; Moral concerns; Social order or rules and; Personal concerns. A 2 x 5 (role by justification) chi-square was then calculated for the practical condition and hypothetical condition between initiator and recipient justifications, and both were not significant. As Figures 9 & 10 show, initiator and recipient reasoning did not systematically differ within the practical or hypothetical conditions.

Figure 9

Practical Justification Components by Role



Figure 10

Hypothetical Justification Components by Role



From these findings, it appears that children employ a generalized group of inherent justifications focusing around welfare, fairness, and rights, along with personal concerns and social rules, in their construals and judgments. In addition, these justifications were used regardless of whether one was an initiator or a recipient, in practical and hypothetical conditions.

Justification Domain. Judgment justifications were further coded in Table 23 for domain. In the practical events, 58% were coded as reflecting a moral or intrinsic orientation, while 17% were coded as having a social or external basis. The remaining 25% did not fall into either category. In the hypothetical

condition, 52% of the justifications were coded as moral and 21% were coded as social or external justifications. Twenty-seven percent referred to neither domain.

Table 23
Practical Justification Domain by Hypothetical Justification Domain

			HYPOTHETICAL JUSTIFICATION DOMAIN			
			NO JUSTIF. DOMAIN	INHERENT / MORAL JUSTIF.	EXTERNAL / SOCIAL JUSTIF.	Total
PRACTICAL JUSTIF. DOMAIN	NO JUSTIF. DOMAIN	Count	11	8	2	21
		% of Total	12.9%	9.4%	2.4%	24.7%
	INHERENT / MORAL JUSTIF.	Count	10	28	11	49
		% of Total	11.8%	32.9%	12.9%	57.6%
	EXTERNAL / SOCIAL JUSTIF.	Count	2	8	5	15
		% of Total	2.4%	9.4%	5.9%	17.6%
Total		Count	23	44	18	85
		% of Total	27.1%	51.8%	21.2%	100.0%

To examine the relationship between practical and hypothetical justification domains, a Cramer's v was calculated between the frequencies of moral, social and no domain categories in each condition, and showed a significant association between them $r = .246$, $p < .04$. This result suggests that along with justification components being correlated, there was also a significant association between practical and hypothetical conditions in the domain of the child's justification. It is also worthwhile noting that consistent with the moral nature of the conflicts, more than half of the justification domains were coded as morally or intrinsically based.

Justification domains: Initiators and Recipients. Initiators and recipients were then compared within each condition and the results are displayed in Figures 11 & 12. A 2 x 3 (role by justification domain) chi-square was conducted to compare the frequency of initiator and recipient moral, social and no justification domains in the practical condition, and the hypothetical condition, and both analyses showed no significant differences. These results indicate that within the practical and hypothetical conditions, participant role did not influence the child's type of justification domain, nor did the condition in which the justification was made.

Figure 11

Practical Justification Domain by Role



Figure 12

Hypothetical Justification Domain by Role



Intentions and Judgments.

This study also hypothesized that judgments of intentionality would be related to the overall moral judgment of the event. That is, events judged as "intentional" would also more often be judged "not ok". As Table 24 shows, 61% of the events were judged "intentional" and as predicted, within these "intentional" events, the majority (75%) were judged "not ok". Yet, of the practical conflicts judged "unintentional" (39%), even more were judged "not ok" (85%).

Table 24
Practical Judgment of Intentions by Practical Judgment of Event

			PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT OF EVENT		
			THINKS ACT OK	THINKS ACT NOT OK	Total
PRACTICAL JUDGED INTENTIONS	THINKS ACT INTENTIONAL	Count	13	39	52
		% within INTENTIONS	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
	THINKS ACT NOT INTENTIONAL	Count	5	28	33
		% within INTENTIONS	15.2%	84.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	18	67	85
		% within INTENTIONS	21.2%	78.8%	100.0%

A phi-correlation was conducted to measure the hypothesized association between practical intentions and evaluative judgments and found to be not significant. Then, to test if event judgments differed based on the child's judgment of intentions, a 2 x 2 (intentions by evaluative judgment) chi square comparing the frequency of practical "intentional" and "not intentional" judgments with the frequency of 'ok' and "not ok" judgments was conducted and failed to show differences in the expected direction. These results indicate that there is a lack of association between practical intentions and judgments, with the majority of events being judged "not ok" (78%), regardless of whether they were considered "intentional" or not. Therefore, contrary to this study's hypothesis, intentionality does not appear to be a necessary criterion for judging an event "not ok" in the practical condition.

In the hypothetical condition, Table 25 shows a similar pattern with 59% of the events judged "intentional". Of those judgments, 82% were judged "not ok". For the events judged "unintentional", (41%), almost all, (97%), were judged "not ok". A phi-correlation was conducted between the frequencies of hypothetical intention responses and hypothetical evaluative judgments and found to be significant, $r = .231$, $p < .03$, indicating an association between hypothetical intention judgments and judgments of acceptability. Again, a 2 x 2 (intentions by evaluative judgment) chi-square was performed on the frequency of "intentional/not intentional" and "ok/not ok" response judgments and it was also significant X^2 (1, N = 85) = 4.54, $p < .03$.

Table 25
Hypothetical Judgment of Intentions by Hypothetical Judgment of Event

			HYPOTHETICAL JUDGEMENT OF EVENT		
			THINKS ACT OK	THINKS ACT NOT OK	Total
HYPOTHETICAL JUDGED INTENTIONS	THINKS ACT INTENTIONAL	Count	9	41	50
		% within INTENTIONS	18.0%	82.0%	100.0%
	THINKS ACT NOT INTENTIONAL	Count	1	34	35
		% within INTENTIONS	2.9%	97.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	10	75	85
		% within INTENTIONS	11.8%	88.2%	100.0%

Therefore, in contrast to the prediction that acts judged "intentional" would be more likely to be judged "not ok", there appears to be an opposite relationship between hypothetical intentions and judgments, with surprisingly almost all events judged "not intentional" also judged "not ok". Yet, despite the lack of significance for the practical analysis, Tables 24 & 25 show similar patterns of response with a tendency toward "not ok" judgments regardless of perceived intentions. Unfortunately, given the small sample size, it was not possible to further test the interaction between intentions and acceptability in the two conditions.

Friendship Ratings.

Finally, conflict participants were rated for their level of friendship by their teachers: (1) frequent playmates; (2) occasional playmates; and (3) infrequent playmates, based on the hypothesis that friendship would play a mediating role in the event judgments. Out of the 43 conflict pairs, 42% were rated by teachers as frequent playmates, 30% were rated as occasional playmates and 28% were rated as infrequent playmates.

Friendship and judgments. These friendship ratings were then crosstabulated with evaluative judgments to see if the level of friendship influenced judgments of the event (i.e., "ok/not ok"). Figure 13 shows the number of "ok" and "not ok" judgments for each friendship group, with the majority in each of the three groups, frequent (78%), occasional (85%) and infrequent (75%)

judging the events "not ok". To assess the relationship between friendship and practical judgments, a 3 x 2 (friendship level by event judgment) chi-square test was performed on the frequency of "ok" and "not ok" judgments for frequent, occasional and infrequent playmates and found to be not significant. These results failed to support the hypothesis that friends would be more accepting and hence, more likely to judge events "ok". Instead, contrary to this study's hypothesis, statistical analyses showed no significant differences in event judgments based on the participants' level of friendship, with the majority of all three friendship groups judging the events "not ok".

Figure 13

Friendship Rating by Practical Judgment



In the hypothetical condition, Figure 14 displays the number of "ok" and "not ok" judgments for each friendship group. The "not ok" judgments for frequent, occasional and infrequent playgroups were 91%, 92%, and 79% respectively. Again, a 3 x 2 (friendship level by judgment) chi square test on the frequency of "ok" and "not ok" responses for each friendship group was not significant, thus disputing the hypothesized, mediating effect of friendship on hypothetical judgments as well.

Figure 14

Friendship Rating by Hypothetical Judgment



Therefore, in summary, this study's hypothesis regarding the mediating effects of friendship on practical and hypothetical moral judgments was not supported. Chi square analyses of "ok/not ok" judgments indicated no significant differences between friendship groups for either condition. In fact, patterns of response showed the exact opposite distribution than was expected, with all friendship groups making a majority of "not ok" judgments in both practical and hypothetical conditions.

Chapter 6

Discussion

The results of this study can be divided into two groups: the nature of the conflicts, and the similarities and differences between practical and hypothetical reasoning. First, a description of the conflicts themselves will be presented, followed by a general discussion of the findings and then, a consideration of this study's specific hypotheses.

Conflict Descriptions

While I did not hypothesize any sex differences in the types of conflicts and behavioral responses expected, given the immense research in this area, it seems appropriate to briefly discuss the sex patterns that emerged. These patterns support prior findings on the type of conflicts experienced by males and females, as well as the kinds of behavioral reactions common to early childhood events.

The conflicts observed in this study were consistent with prior findings whereby most conflicts involved same sex participants (Killen, 1990; Hay, 1984) and males were more frequent initiators, in both same and mixed sex dyads (Shantz & Shantz, 1985; Killen, 1989). Overall, male children initiated two thirds of the conflicts and 20% of the male initiated conflicts involved physical or psychological harm, although the most frequent conflicts tended to involve struggles over resources and social control (Hay & Ross, 1982; Killen & Turiel, 1991; Shantz, 1987; Shantz & Hobart, 1987; Shantz & Shantz, 1985).

Despite the overall pattern of males being more physical than females in response to the initiating action, (Nucci & Nucci, 1982b; Shantz & Shantz, 1985), recipients also employed verbal strategies like sanction, threats, commands or injury/loss statements. While no definitive conclusions can be drawn from these results, previous findings whereby children employed a variety of responses in their conflict negotiations were supported (Much & Shweder, 1978; Nucci & Killen, 1991; Nucci & Turiel, 1978).

However, by the next coded behavioral response (of the initiator), more males and females made retaliatory responses than any other kind of reaction. It is hypothesized that at this point in the conflict, children may have exhausted their limited abilities for verbal negotiations and resorted to a more primitive, physical response. Nonetheless, it is consistent with the finding that conflicts and struggles tend to escalate over time (Hay & Ross, 1982).

Finally, in the last coded response of the recipient, few children involved adults, exhibited emotional reactions or ignored the other entirely, while a quarter of males and females reverted back to sanction, threats and commands. At this point, males still made slightly more retaliatory responses (9%) than females (5%) and again, this is consistent with prior findings (Nucci & Nucci, 1982b; Shantz & Shantz, 1985).

It is important to note that the strategies employed by children in this study may not be generalizable to all children. Moran & O'Brien (1983) and Shantz (1982) have noted that daycare children may be more inferential and

differentiated in their responses, due to the unique, reciprocal nature of the daycare setting, which confronts children with differences between self and other perspectives. It is common practice, in moral transgressions, for teachers to ask how children thought the other felt or point out event consequences to the transgressor and Piaget (1965) hypothesized that this knowledge should result in less egocentric judgments and more advanced reasoning. This may be a partial explanation for the varied responses displayed by children in the practical events, and this idea is the favored explanation for children's abilities to articulate how both the self and other felt in the affect score (to be discussed below). Children are hypothesized to construct their moral knowledge and conflict strategies from adult feedback and subtle messages about interactions, although such knowledge may not always be employed (Selman, 1980).

This study also hypothesized that actual events judged "intentional" would be responded to by physical, retaliatory behaviors, whereas those judged "unintentional" would not elicit as many physical responses. Contrary to this prediction, both events judged "intentional" and "unintentional" were responded to with retaliatory behaviors, and events judged "intentional" did not elicit more teacher involvement or emotional reactions.

Overall, males judged events "intentional" more than twice as much as they judged them "unintentional" (15 vs. 6) while females were almost equal in their determination of "intentional" and "unintentional" events (11 and 10 respectively). To events judged "not intentional", 50% of the male participants

displayed physical responses, while females displayed more sanctions, threats and commands (50%). Alternately, in response to events judged "intentional", males most often made a sanction, threat or command (33%), followed closely by physical retaliation or injury/loss statement (27%), while females predominantly made an injury/loss statement (45%). While uncovering the reasons behind these choices is beyond this analysis, there appear to be variations in how males and females construe similar events and the types of responses such construals evoke. It is suggested that future research emphasize and investigate how both males and females construe and respond to a variety of events, because clearly, the effect of gender in both social interactions and moral reasoning remains unsettled (Blasi, 1980; Gilligan, 1978; Shantz & Hobart, 1987; Shantz & Shantz, 1985).

General Findings: The Relationship Between Practical and Hypothetical Reasoning.

The main hypothesis of this study is that when hypothetical vignettes are relevant to children's lives, and contextually match practical events in the nature of the conflict details, reasoning will be similar in regard to evaluative judgments ("ok/not ok") and in the construal of the events (e.g., event focus, intentions, causal and affect attributions, rules, justifications). Moreover, this consistency is expected to frequently occur despite the differences arising from the pragmatic, nonmoral issues involved in the actual events. Therefore, these findings demonstrate that while there are some differences in construing and weighing

certain event components, there are also significant similarities between practical and hypothetical reasoning, (Blasi, 1980; Gerson & Damon, 1978; Rest, 1983; Saltzstein, 1994).

First, children overwhelmingly judged the practical and hypothetical events both "intentional" and "not ok". Statistical analyses found no significant differences between children's practical and hypothetical intention judgments or judgments of acceptability. These results suggest that whether an event is judged "intentional" or "unacceptable" is unrelated to the condition in which it is made and the perspective of the person making it. Contrary to expectations, even most initiators were willing to admit their practical actions were "intentional" and "not ok"

The overwhelming frequency of "intentional" and "not ok" judgments for both initiators and recipients, within the practical and hypothetical conditions, also suggests that the hypothesized mediating factor of self-interest was not interacting with role to influence the child's judgment. While self-interest does seem to influence construals under certain circumstances, it does not seem to affect the overall judgments of the act or the actor's intentions. In this study, children may have tried to rationalize or exonerate their behavior using other components, but morally wrong appears to be morally wrong no matter who is judging or being judged, confirming prior social-cognitive domain theories (Killen, 1989b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1983).

This conclusion is further supported by the overwhelmingly number of "not ok" judgments, for all levels of participant friendship, in both the practical and hypothetical conditions. Thus, the factors hypothesized to influence the moral judgments (i.e., role, condition and friendship) do not appear to be related to the child's evaluative response. Instead, as Hay (1984) observed, children have definite beliefs about the appropriateness of certain behaviors and they evaluate such acts accordingly, regardless of other mediating factors.

Second, further confirming children's abilities to comparably weigh components in construing practical and hypothetical events, children showed no significant differences on the event focus score for intentions *and or* outcome, and practical and hypothetical scores were significantly correlated. This finding supports the hypothesis that reasoning about practical and hypothetical conflicts would be similar when the content of the hypothetical vignettes more closely matched familiar real world events (Baumrind, 1977; Saltzstein, 1994). Thus, discussing oneself (in actual events) or the other (in hypothetical events) did not significantly influence reasoning about "*what happened?*" regardless of whether one was an initiator or a recipient. While the specifics of the event focus response may have varied between conditions, the basis of the child's discussion (i.e., their focus on intentions *and/or* outcome) remained consistent.

While these results complement developmental theories and Piaget's (1965) finding that children tend to focus on only one dimension of the event, this study also shows that when presented with familiar events, children can in fact

consider not only intentions, but can also at times, coordinate both intentions *and* outcome in their construal. While this category was substantially less frequent than the *either or* category, this study nonetheless, confirms previous findings that when intentions are clearly presented or experienced, children can articulate such factors in addition to outcomes and consequences (Chandler, et. al., 1973; Shantz, 1982; Miller & Aloise, 1989).

Third, practical and hypothetical judgment justifications were shown to be significantly associated and responses frequently displayed a concern for moral issues. Physical/psychological harm was the most frequently cited justification to the moral events and the responses did not differ according to participant role. This study therefore concludes that children have a consistent, generalized group of inherent justifications focusing around welfare, fairness/rights and needs that they employ in their daily construals and interactions (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Smetana, 1981). This hypothesis is further supported by the significant correlation between practical and hypothetical justification domains and the intrinsic nature of the justifications, consistent with the moral nature of the conflicts. Such domain consistent reasoning has been documented in other studies (Nucci & Killen, 1991; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Seigal & Storey, 1985; Smetana, 1981, 1984), which all found justifications concordant with the nature of the event being judged.

Further support for children considering moral issues in their event construals and judgments can be seen in their practical and hypothetical event

focus responses. Despite the overall lack of statistical association between the practical and hypothetical conditions, equal numbers of initiators and recipients referred to welfare and wrongful intentions when discussing "*what happened?*" It is hypothesized that while all children did not use these emerging moral concepts, they are in fact available to them in interpreting and construing situations that are familiar and contextualized (Chandler et. al, 1973; Keasey, 1979; Turiel, et. al., 1991; Nucci & Killen, 1991).

Therefore, contrary to the early characterization of children as premoral, this research has shown that children can construe conflicts on the basis of moral considerations. Together, these findings show that welfare, rights and intentions are familiar moral concepts that children employ in their practical and hypothetical reasoning, although their use may not yet be fully mastered. Other researchers (Damon, 1977; Killen, 1991; Turiel 1983 among others) in presenting simple events, like this study's familiar, contextualized stories, have drawn similar conclusions which have led to the characterization of children as moral judgers, whose criteria, although simpler, parallel adult moral judgments. That is, basing their judgments on issues of welfare and intrinsic consequences and actively using intentions to construe the events.

Fourth, causal attribution scores somewhat supported the expectation of similarity between the conditions, with analyses showing no significant differences between practical and hypothetical means. However, upon further examination practical and hypothetical responses were not significantly correlated

and significant differences between initiator and recipient responses were found in the practical condition.

Statistical analyses indicted that practical initiators made significantly more subjective attributions (50%) than practical recipients (26%), who made more objective attributions (33%). It is hypothesized that practical initiators may have used the intentions orientation to justify their behavior or discount intentions in self defense, whereas for recipients practical outcomes were the more salient feature. Alternately, when self-interest or personal involvement was removed, as in the hypothetical condition, differences in causal attributions based on role were not found. Unfortunately, the way in which children used the intentions orientation was not directly investigated, so this hypothesis remains to be tested. Yet, concordant with all these findings, this measure supported Piaget's (1965) original idea that subjective and objective orientations are two coexisting modes of reasoning about moral situations.

Nevertheless, despite the overall consistency between practical and hypothetical conditions, there were a few, other notable differences. Children seemed to employ a variety of explanations when discussing "*what happened*" in the practical and hypothetical conditions. No significant association was found between the practical and hypothetical event focus responses, suggesting that in terms of "*what happened*", children were not similarly construing the practical and hypothetical events. In the hypothetical condition, children's construals were more often coded as no focus or just recounting what happened, than in the

practical condition. Such results are consistent with the impersonal (albeit familiarized) nature of the hypothetical events and hence, result in a tendency to just recount what occurred and who was involved. As for children who were unable to discuss the event at all, this finding illustrates to young children's difficulty in conceptualizing and communicating about hypothetical vignettes, even familiar ones. By relying on methodologies dependent on children's linguistic and communicative abilities, researchers may underestimate their tacit knowledge, which may be unavailable to reflection or verbal expression (Piaget, 1965; Shantz, 1982; Shultz & Butkowsky, 1977)

Children also cited self-needs and fairness/rights more frequently in their discussion of the practical, than hypothetical event focus. While fairness has been operationalized as a way of rectifying the tendency to lean towards the self's needs or wants (Damon, 1977; Damon & Killen, 1982; Gerson & Damon, 1978), this pattern held true for both the initiators and the recipients so it cannot be considered as solely the initiator's way of exonerating their role in what happened. On the other hand, it was not possible to analyze the way in which initiators and recipients used "fairness", so it is possible that this moral concept could have been used to justify behavior or express a moral focus, depending on who was speaking.

Children also displayed disparate results on the rule domain component. As hypothesized, practical and hypothetical rule responses were statistically associated and did not change between conditions, with more than half of the

respondents saying there "*was a rule*" about the event. But, despite finding no significant differences in stating there "*was/was not a rule*" in both conditions, when it came time to produce an actual rule, it was statistically more difficult for children to do so in the practical condition. This suggests that children may be accessing generalized moral rules in the hypothetical conditions and that these "rules" may be more difficult to match or apply to the real world events (Saltzstein, 1994). Unfortunately, this study was unable to directly test this observation, but it is a worthwhile consideration for future investigations.

Affirming the saliency of nonmoral components involved in reasoning about practical events (Gerson & Damon, 1978; Saltzstein, 1994), children also showed significant differences in mean scores for practical and hypothetical affect attributions, despite the prevalence of self-other attributions in both conditions. These results confirm that children more often identified the feelings of the self *and* the other in the impersonal, hypothetical condition, where the components of self-interest and the saliency (emotions) of the conflicts were presumably obscured.

Statistical analyses also indicated there was a difference in the relationship between intentions and judgments, according to the condition in which the events were experienced, although both practical and hypothetical response patterns were in the same direction. In the practical events, the majority of conflicts were judged "not ok" regardless of whether they were considered intentional or not. In fact, 75% of intentional judgments were considered "not ok"

and 85% of the not intentional judgments were judged "not ok". This suggests that intentionality was not a necessary criterion for judging the actual event unacceptable and it is consistent with prior findings of the inherent wrongness of moral transgressions and the irrelevance of intentions in their judgments (Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983).

As in the practical condition, most hypothetical events were also judged "not ok" regardless of whether they were considered intentional or not. In this condition, 82% of the events were judged both "intentional" and "not ok", but an overwhelming 97% of the events were judged "not intentional" and "not ok". However, in this condition, a statistical analysis showed a significant association between "not intentional" and "not ok" judgments. Thus like the practical condition, hypothetical judgments were predominantly "not ok" for both "intentional" and "unintentional" acts, but here children were even more likely to judge an "unintentional" event "not ok" than "ok". In fact, only one hypothetical event was judged "not intentional" and "ok", as compared to 5 in the practical condition.

Summary of Hypotheses

In regard to hypothesis one, these findings support the integrated nature of practical and hypothetical thought and also demonstrate how prior hypothetical vignette studies may have been limited in revealing how young children reason about, and construe, moral events. Despite certain inconsistencies in the

judgments, children's practical and hypothetical reasoning was statistically related in their consideration of intentions *or* outcome, and their mean causal attribution scores. Children also displayed similar reasoning about the intentionality and acceptability of acts, their event justifications and domains, and their knowledge of rules in practical and hypothetical events. Consistent with prior studies, this study found that when hypothetical vignettes do not exceed their capabilities or obscure relevant details like internal and external causes, children can recognize and use motives, intentions and other familiar moral and social concepts (Keasey, 1979) and judge events accordingly (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1983; Hay, 1984). Moreover, this reasoning remains consistent regardless of the practical or hypothetical nature of the task or the self-other perspective of the judgments.

However, as expected not all components of the event construals were comparable for practical and hypothetical conflicts. Children did show differences between the conditions in the specifics of their event focus and their ability to cite an actual rule, which proved more difficult in the practical condition. In addition, affect attributions were influenced by the condition in which the attribution was made.

Therefore to summarize the findings for hypothesis one, this study concludes that children do demonstrate consistency in their practical and hypothetical reasoning when the two events are familiar, contextualized and relevant to their lives. Moreover, this study has added to the growing social-cognitive literature that suggests children can actively use moral concepts, like

welfare, rights and intentions in construing both practical and hypothetical events. Nonetheless, it is inevitable that some differences will arise between the practical and hypothetical construals due to the differential nature of the tasks. That is, the emotional and personal involvement in the practical events and the impersonal, theoretical context of the hypothetical stories.

Hypothesis two, which predicted that children would differently judge the events (i.e., "ok/not ok"), based on their role in the conflict (i.e., initiator or recipient), or the condition in which the event was judged (i.e., practical or hypothetical), was not statistically supported. The findings evidenced no overall judgment differences based on the participants' role in the event or the condition in which it was made.

In addition, there were also no statistical differences between practical and hypothetical responses for initiators and recipients separately (i.e., self-other judgments). Therefore, in all analyses, events were overwhelmingly judged "not ok", contradicting the hypothesized influence of self-interest in the initiator practical judgments and the saliency of being an actual recipient. Again, as Hay (1984) has observed, children have definite beliefs about the acceptability of acts and they judge people (including themselves) accordingly, in spite of other mediating factors like self-interest or real world consequences.

Hypothesis three predicted that there would be more self *and* other affect attributions in the hypothetical than practical condition, due to the absence of real world emotions and personal involvement, and this was statistically confirmed.

Children were more likely to attribute feelings to both the self *and* other in the hypothetical condition, where the component of self-interest and the saliency of emotions were presumably not present.

However, aside from differences between practical and hypothetical affect attributions, this study agrees with Piaget's (1965) idea that confronting the child with self-other perspectives, as has been found in studies of daycare settings (Moran & O'Brien, 1983; Selman, 1980), should result in less egocentric judgments. This idea was supported by more than half of the children, in correlated practical and hypothetical conditions, being able to articulate how *both* participants felt, regardless of other mediating factors.

Hypothesis four predicted that events judged "intentional" would be judged less acceptable ("not ok") than those judged "accidental". This prediction was not statistically supported in the practical condition, where the majority of events were judged "not ok" regardless of perceived intentionality. However, in the hypothetical condition, a relationship did exist between intentions and judgments, but it was opposite to the hypothesis that events judged "intentional" would be judged "not ok" more often than events judged "unintentional". Instead, hypothetical events judged "not intentional" were significantly more likely to be judged "not ok". Unfortunately, due to the small sample size this finding could not be investigated further. But, it is clear that children overwhelmingly judged the practical and hypothetical events "not ok", regardless of whether or not they judged it "intentional". Thus, even though self-interest appeared to play some

role in the children's judgments and reasoning, the overwhelming prevalence of "not ok" judgments, regardless of intentions, suggest that "even when self interest is a guiding force, its' effect is constrained by what the child thinks is right and justifiable" (Gerson & Damon, 1978 p. 32). This finding is consistent with developmental theories which suggest children are aware of intentions and will refer to them in their construals, but at this age, it is not integrated and weighed in the final moral judgment. But, also consistent with theories of social-cognitive development, children do appear top differently structure the moral domain and see moral events as inherently wrong, regardless of the intentions behind the actions.

Hypothesis five involved the relation of perceived intentions to real world reactions. While there were no significant associations between intentions and actions, both male and female responses contradicted the hypothesis that "intentional" judgments would elicit more physical responses. Among events judged "intentional", males most often made sanctions, threats or commands, but surprisingly tended to display more physical retaliation to events judged "not intentional".

Females on the other hand, were overall less physical, responding primarily to "unintentional" events with sanctions, threats or commands and to "intentional" events with injury/loss statements. It is hypothesized that these responses may reflect predisposed modes of interacting for males and females and as a result, this research both extends prior findings on children's conflict

interactions (Nucci & Nucci, 1982b; Shantz & Shantz, 1985) and at the same time, suggests the need for further investigation.

Finally, hypothesis six predicted that frequent playmates would judge the events "ok" more often than occasional or infrequent playmates, but it was not statistically upheld. In contrast to previous findings (Killen, 1989b; Slomkowski & Killen, 1992) and as hypothesized by this study, friendship level did not appear to influence the judgment of the event. There were no statistically significant differences between the friendship levels, with all groups judging the practical and hypothetical acts overwhelmingly "not ok".

Thus, it is speculated that while friendship level may be associated with conflict resolution, (Killen, 1989; Slomkowski & Killen, 1992) it does not seem to mediate overall moral judgments made by preschool children. It is possible that these beginning, early attachments do not yet have the same influence as they do in later years. In any case, determining the reasons behind these unexpected findings was beyond the goals of this study, although it does offer up some interesting avenues for further research.

In summary, despite some variations in children's reasoning about practical and hypothetical events, there were also significant and observed patterns of consistency. Gerson & Damon (1978) point out that since a child constructs an understanding specific to each particular context, consistencies will be due to continuities in the child's knowledge and capabilities, as well as event similarities, like this study's matched conditions. Still, inconsistencies are

inevitable given the myriad of varying moral and nonmoral components in each context (Gerson & Damon, 1978; Saltzstein, 1994). This general theory was upheld by the variations between practical and hypothetical conditions in discussing what happened, stating an actual rule, and attributing feelings to the self and other, as well as, by the consistencies in "not ok" judgments, judgments of intentionality, focus on intentions *or* outcome, causal attribution scores, rule knowledge, and judgment justifications and domains.

Thus, these results affirm that previous discrepancies between practical and hypothetical judgments may have been due, in part, to differences in nonmoral factors such as contextual or task differences more than self-other differences. Like Shultz & Butkowsky (1977) I argue that prior hypothetical studies may have underestimated children's abilities due to the nature of the task and performance factors (e.g., the mention of self's needs only in the practical events, the greater frequency of no focus/ no justification and recounting in the hypothetical conditions and the ability to better describe self and other affect in impersonal hypothetical presentations). Yet, when behavior described or presented hypothetically is familiar and contextualized, matching relevant, real world events, practical-hypothetical differences decrease (Baumrind, 1977; Saltzstein, 1994).

Furthermore, role as an initiator or recipient did not seem to affect judgments as predicted by this study, although the findings did suggest that there are times when self-interest and emotional demands relevant to the child's role

will have a distinct effect. Statistical analyses within the conditions confirmed there were no significant differences due to role, as an initiator or recipient, on any of the event components (i.e., event focus, focus on intentions *or* outcome, intentions, rule knowledge, judgments of acceptability, justification reasons and justification domains), except practical causal attributions. Therefore, this study concludes that moral judgments are not necessarily influenced by the child's actual role (as the initiator or recipient) in the event, but they are at times, influenced by nonmoral factors such as self-interest or emotions, in the practical conditions and the difficulties associated with construing the hypothetical task.

Theoretical Implications

This study offers a new methodology based on social cognitive and developmental research paradigms. By utilizing naturalistic methods and previously established, age-appropriate interview questions and codes, this study is an example of how an interactionist perspective can be applied to understanding complex moral reasoning in the practical and hypothetical domains. The assumption that an individual attributes different meanings to different situations necessitates an approach that simultaneously considers context, personal involvement, and participant history. This study further assumes that there is an underlying, wholistic structure of moral knowledge that may manifest itself differently in different contexts, but that in certain conditions (i.e., familiar and

relevant situations) young children will demonstrate consistency in the development of practical and hypothetical moral reasoning.

Therefore, this research supports Gerson and Damon's (1978) modified "doctrine of specificity" which asserts that reasoning and actions are specific to contexts in interaction with the child's developmental capabilities, interpretations, and personal objectives. This model posits that many types of moral and nonmoral knowledge interact in a way to influence both practical and hypothetical moral judgments.

The idea that self-interest and context influence moral judgments and actions is not novel to this study. However, what is novel is the methodology in which individual construals, judgments and actions are considered in relation to the context (practical or hypothetical), participant role (initiator or recipient) and participant history (friendship). Like Killen's (1989) discussion on social development, moral development invokes the processes of interpretation, evaluation and the coordination of components, and I believe this study shows that to some extent, these processes are active in the preschool years.

These findings also hold implications for Piaget's (1965) idea that reasoning in the theoretical realm, in general lags behind reasoning in the practical world. Piaget hypothesized that subjective and objective responsibility coexisted from 3-4 years until around 10 years, when subjective responsibility replaced objective responsibility. He explained the tendency for young children

to focus more on consequences, than intentions, in hypothetical judgments was due to this developmental course.

Yet, while Piaget found that children first only referred to intentions in the practical realm, this study has found that children do attribute intentions and other moral concepts in both practical and hypothetical conditions. This type of parallel reasoning was also evident on the causal attributions measure and while these findings do not discount Piaget's theory, they do show that children can reason in regard to intentions in hypothetical events, as well as practical events, when the stories describe relevant real world situations. Thus, it would be useful to relate stage theories of moral development to the types of practical and hypothetical reasoning displayed in this study's matched conditions. This type of bridge between past and current research methodologies would help address developmental questions regarding the relationship between practical and hypothetical moral reasoning.

One also needs to keep in mind that the children's responses to the interview questions were all after-the-fact judgments and reasoning was made in public. One can argue that the question "*what happened?*" implies that something of concern to the adult supervisor did in fact occur. While it is not certain that young children spontaneously construe and evaluate conflicts in this way, it is clear that preschool age children, when prompted, are capable of interpreting and evaluating conflicts in a variety of ways.

However, there is no obvious way of knowing whether the child's judgment of an event is based on a coordination of components or one single pertinent issue. For example, one surprising finding from this study was that intentional construals did not appear related to practical and hypothetical moral judgments of "ok/not ok". Social-cognitive domain theorists would predict this result due to their assumption of the inherent wrongness of moral transgressions and the irrelevance of intentions in the judgments, (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Smetana, 1981, 1984; Turiel, 1983).

This finding also has implications for theories of causal attribution and morality. Causal attribution theories (Heider, 1958; Rest, 1983) posit moral actions and judgments are based on the consideration of attributional processes, such as the construal of intentions. Yet in this study, children judged the events overwhelmingly "not ok", regardless of their judgements of intentions. It is possible that young children can consider intentions when prompted, but don't yet coordinate and integrate this factor into their final judgments. Therefore, it is important that future investigations examine a variety of age groups and contexts which provide varying degrees of peer and adult-child interactions (e.g., schools, homes, neighborhood playgrounds etc), in order to understand how children's construals influence judgments and actions, and whether the patterns of reasoning found in this study are evident under other circumstances.

While this study has attempted to resolve prior inconsistencies in the research on practical and hypothetical moral reasoning, like most scientific

investigations, it has produced as many questions as it has answers. These findings show the need for more in-depth investigations, using new methodologies, and drawing from a variety of compatible theoretical frameworks. Such research would address the importance of considering the interaction of nonmoral components such as contextual factors, the nature of the task, and the child's personal goals in construing, interpreting and judging moral events. However, such studies are time consuming and far more complex than the isolated, experimental designs of yesteryear. But, if we are to understand the relationship between practical thought, hypothetical thought and action, they are essential.

Current research has begun to piece together the relationships between construals, judgments and actions and while there may never be a one- to-one mapping of practical and hypothetical thought, I believe that by investigating a variety of domains, issues and situations we can better predict what kinds of factors will influence reasoning and how, in turn, this influences actions. It is within the structural consistencies of moral knowledge that we can then talk about stages and development. But we will also need to consider and allow for the factors that influence reasoning about different events. Only by investigating a variety of interpersonal domains, and the coordination of components within them, can we derive general principles that explicate the relationships among different modes of thought and behavior.

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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)











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