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"SCOTLAND'S HIDDEN POWERS": HISTORY, NATION, AND JUSTICE
IN THE SCOTTISH AUTONOMIST MOVEMENT

by

JONATHAN SCOTT HEARN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

"SCOTLAND'S HIDDEN POWERS": HISTORY, NATION AND JUSTICE IN THE SCOTTISH AUTONOMIST MOVEMENT

by

Jonathan Scott Hearn

Adviser: Professor Jane Schneider

This study, based on ethnographic research, examines the current social movement in Scotland for greater political autonomy, whether in the form of a parliament within the UK or independent nationhood. This movement is multivalent, but can be characterized overall as a defense of the idea of the activist, social democratic welfare state, confronting Thatcherism and the New Right. The study focuses on the moral discourse that pervades the movement, representations of community and social justice, and how these relate to Scottish history. It explores both the structural and institutional history that underpins the current movement (e.g., developments of state, civil society, and economy), and the ways in which participants construct and mobilize Scottish history, symbolically and rhetorically, in behalf of present goals. Findings are situated within anthropological

discussions of culture, history and power, relating these to current debates in political theory around conceptions of liberalism, communitarianism, and the social contract. The thesis offers a critical alternative to familiar discussions of the resurgence of ethnicity and nationalism in Europe by showing how notions of culture and history are linked in this case to basic social conflicts over the purpose of the state.

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INTRODUCTION

I. Introduction:

...there's a lot of talk, made about national debts, though you may not have realized it, but Scotland has a massive national debt, and it's not measured in money. It's a debt to the generations of people, who out of hard and bitter lives, generated decency. And who learned, because they had nothing--'I know what I'll do, I'll get as much as I can'--no--what they learned is 'I know what I'll do, I'll share, wi' those wi' as little as I have. [applause/cheers] And I once said, if there was to be a Scottish motto, you'd have the saltire, and the lion rampant, and you wouldn't have across the bottom 'vho daur meddle wi' me,'--"take another step and I'll bash your head in"--no--I said you'd have a very simple motto: 'Hey wait a minute--that's no' fair!' [laughter/applause] Because Scottish history I think demonstrates constantly, a terrible desire for fairness....

These words were part of a speech given by the Scottish novelist William McIlvanney on March 19th, 1994, at a rally held by the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Glasgow's George Square in preparation for the coming District, Regional and Euro-parliamentary elections. McIlvanney's was one of a set of speeches from a familiar cast of party leaders and publicly supportive celebrities. The novelist is not a member of any party, but he voices his political views regularly in public speeches and writings, views at once ensconced in the Labour/socialist tradition, and passionate about Scottish self-determination. His message was designed for his audience, and anticipates their expectations. The tone struck is representative of the language that permeates Scottish nationalism, or what I prefer to call more

generally, the Scottish autonomist movement.¹ McIlvanney invokes a national identity historically rooted in egalitarian values, and opposed (implicitly here, explicitly elsewhere in the speech) to the values of the Conservative Party and the unbridled free market. This study seeks to put utterances like this in context, by examining the larger social processes that generate them.

The modern, party-based nationalist movement in Scotland first arose in the 1920s, and has become an increasingly significant factor in Scottish electoral politics in the last 35 years. In recent general elections, 75% of Scots have voted for political parties that support constitutional change, either in the form of a parliament within the UK, or national independence. This movement is complex and often contradictory in terms of politics understood along a left-right axis, but it has a long association with the Scottish labor movement, and with calls for Scottish and Irish home rule from around the turn of the century. In the middle of the century however, the Labour Party's increasing access to power at Westminster, the growth of the Keynesian welfare state, and the reinforcement of British identity resulting from the experiences of World War II, all served to marginalize the call for home rule. But the movement has been gradually revitalized--in the 1960s by rising economic

¹ I will use this term, or simply "the movement," throughout to denote the broad social movement for constitutional change, whether in the form of a parliament within the UK, or full, independent nationhood. The term "nationalism" will generally be used to refer to the cause of national independence.

expectations, in the 1970s by the vision of underwriting an independent Scotland with revenues from newly discovered North Sea oil, and in the 1980s and 1990s by a defensive stance in regard to the welfare state, seen as a cultural tradition under attack by a Tory government elected by English constituencies. Meanwhile, the steady growth of the European Union (EU) has eroded the idea of British sovereignty, to the benefit of autonomist politics.

II. Making Political Claims: Justice, Nation and History:

The concept of nationalism is prone to reification. A term best used to designate a complex and little understood web of social processes easily appears to refer to some unitary historical force, or innate disposition of the human heart and mind. This study is critical of this tendency, and seeks to help correct it by treating nationalism as a particular variation on the more basic social process of making political claims about just distribution. The idea of the moral economy (Booth 1994)--that economic relations are embedded within cultural expectations about justice--provides a guiding perspective for rethinking what nationalism is about.

If politics is about "...who gets what, when, and how..." (Lasswell 1950), it is also about how people make competing claims to the same--and once claims are made explicit, the idea of justice is invoked. This study takes

justice as a central concept, but with a distinction. This term usually calls to mind highly abstract theories, ideologies, or philosophies about the definition of social goods and their just distribution. My main concern, however, is to examine and analyze the social process of contestation and negotiation over what is just, a process that is by definition conflicted and unresolved, but nonetheless is structured by assumptions about justice. I view the Scottish autonomist movement as an example of this claim-making process, as an historically situated call for justice.

This is an ethnography of a political movement in the context of a liberal democratic state, and the process of making claims about justice is my analytic starting point. Other sociological processes such as class and ethnicity are also important to this study, but I structure my analysis around what I experienced most directly while doing fieldwork--organized and mobilized social networks of people using autonomist politics to make claims about justice. This focus points to an initial set of basic questions which I try to answer: What claims are being made? What is their form and content? What is their history? Who is making these claims? Who are they directed toward or against? What rules and contexts frame the process of claim-making? The rest of this section outlines how I pursue these questions and build my argument about the centrality of the idea of justice.

The Scottish autonomist movement is far from monolithic. Rather, it is encountered as a field of arguments about

justice which, while unified in some respects, also involves tensions, conflicts and divisions. After a brief overview of the subject and research methods in Chapter 1, I focus on a single ethnographic event in Chapter 2, the "Rally to Recall Scotland's Parliament out of Adjournment," as a way of laying out the main tendencies of movement discourse. I argue that the idea of the moral economy (Booth 1994; Polanyi 1957; Thompson 1971), if engaged critically, can help us analyze the style, tone and structure of the political claims being made. This moral economic perspective becomes a central motif throughout the rest of the study.

According to Ernest Gellner, "...[i]t is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round... (1983:55). I would add that nationalism is a matter of making claims. Moreover, if the nation is an "imagined community," as Benedict Anderson (1991) has called it, it is also an imagined claimant, a community of common grievance. Nations are bound to states which provide the institutional channels that structure the process of claim-making. Scotland is a nation within a multinational state (cf. Osmond 1988), a nation which articulates with that larger state through an historically created, enchained network of sociopolitical, quasi-state institutions, including political parties, unions, churches, and autonomous systems of law and education. Chapter 3 lays out the basic social organization of the Scottish autonomist movement, its anatomy and history in the 20th century. The concept of "civil society" (Bobbio

1989:22-43; Kumar 1993; Seligman 1992; Walzer 1991) is introduced here and critically discussed as a way of examining how this movement inhabits and articulates with the larger structures of society and the state.

Of crucial importance in Scotland's history, especially from the 17th to the 19th century, is the national Presbyterian Church (The Kirk). Since the latter part of the 19th century and up to the present, the modern welfare state has become increasingly central to the political process (Paterson 1994). The middle chapters of this study (4 and 5) address the *long durée*, the formation of modernity in Scotland, describing the changing relationships between institutions of civil society and the state. Chapter 4 also explores the history of the civil society concept itself, and its roots in the Scottish Enlightenment. Chapter 5 argues that the current Scottish autonomist movement can only be understood within the context of the so-called "crisis" of the welfare state (Pierson 1991, 1995), and that the concept of nationalism alone is not analytically sufficient.

"History" is notorious for its double meaning, as both *what happened*, and *how the story gets told*. Chapters 4 and 5 try to convey what happened, while showing that just as the process of claim-making is shaped by the institutions through which it is conducted, so those institutions are shaped by claim-making. Chapter 6 turns to the question of how the story gets told--to the social construction of history (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1984). It focuses on the role of the

"covenant" as a key metaphor or analogy (Guthrie 1995; Ortony 1993; Sahlins 1981) in Scotland's political history, one which rhetorically links the past to the present, giving a unique sense of continuity to Scotland's history of claim-making. The latter part of Chapter 6 addresses questions of historiography and historical narrative, examining how representations of Scottish history, particularly in relation to England and the UK, are shaped by the context of political possibilities within which they are produced (Ash 1980; Donnachie and Whatley 1992). Chapter 7 explores the Scottish "myth of egalitarianism," the idea, pervasive in the movement's milieu, that in contrast to the English, Scots have a peculiar egalitarian ethos, which informs their politics (McCrone 1992:88-120). The chapter looks at how informants draw on Scottish history to both justify and scrutinize this idea.

Jürgen Habermas suggests that we cannot argue against the possibility of mutual understanding and reasoned agreement, without being caught in a "pragmatic contradiction" (1990:95), because the very act of arguing assumes the possibility (and value) of agreement. The last two chapters (6 and 7) are increasingly concerned with pragmatic contradictions of this kind, in regard to the process of claim-making. Two interpenetrating rhetorical contradictions, or tensions, are central. One is between making claims to justice based on particularistic versus universalistic principles, the other is between legitimating

claims via historical inevitability versus collective will formation and agency. I discuss these in turn.

The claims made by people in the Scottish autonomist movement, to greater political self determination, to more equitable distributions of wealth, to active state intervention in social welfare, are portrayed as grounded in long-standing cultural traditions and values, particular to Scotland. At the same time, these claims are grounded in universal Enlightenment ideals of democracy, equality, and citizenship. While in practice these two modes of rhetorical justification are often fused, they rest on fundamentally different assumptions about the context of making political claims, who should acknowledge them, and why. Pragmatically, when political claims are articulated by the vanguard of a movement, they have two audiences: those who are part of the movement and will identify these claims as their own, and those outside the movement from whom redress is sought. Justification by merit of particularity is generally directed inward toward movement participants, while justification according to universal principles is directed outward toward the encompassing political system. But political movements must avoid the appearance of duplicity, and so the tension between these two tasks is often obscured.

This tension relates to two major tendencies in the study of nationalism. One is to stress the origins of nationalism in the industrial revolution, the rise of capitalism and the modern state, and ideas of the

Enlightenment and the French Revolution (Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992). The other is to treat ethnicity as a primary and much older process, and the nation-state and nationalism as secondary effects of ethnic formation (Connor 1994:196-209; Llobera 1994; Smith 1986).

Theorists have tried to integrate these two conceptions of nationalism through various typological distinctions between civic versus ethnic, or political versus cultural forms of nationalism (Chatterjee 1993; Hutchinson 1987; Smith 1986). Civic/political nationalism is usually described in terms of ideas of citizenship and equality before the law, while ethnic/cultural nationalism is seen as involving notions of common blood ties, religion, language, and other traditions. The former is often identified with nationalism in Western Europe, while the latter is associated with the same in Central and Eastern Europe (Kohn 1945). Similarly, this distinction has also been historicized along a traditional-modern continuum. Geertz (1963) has argued that post-colonial nationalisms simultaneously mobilize both primordial ethnic identities and desires for modern civic (democratic, constitutional) politics. More recently Chatterjee (1993) has argued that in India the political nationalism of the postcolonial period was prepared by an earlier cultural nationalism within the colonial state. The present study suggests that this opposition is not so much a question of historical types (East and West), or of contrary tendencies at a given moment of historical transition

(Traditional to Modern), nor of the sequential conquest of separate spheres within the same society (Cultural and Political). It is rather a question of tensions internal to the very process of claim making--a result of pragmatic rhetorical constraints.

Chapter 7 attempts to show how this tension is deeply encoded in the language of the Scottish autonomist movement. Furthermore, this same tension provides the main axis of recent debates in political theory between liberal contractarianism (Habermas 1993; Rawls 1971), which seeks to formulate universalizable principles on which politics can be based, and communitarianism (MacIntyre 1984; Sandel 1982), which seeks to argue for the irreducibly historical and particularistic nature of the formation of social values. I argue that these parallels are not accidental, but rather due to the fact that this tension is fundamental to the process of politics in the modern age. The language of the Scottish autonomist movement is a specific, historically situated variation on a much larger theme. The contradiction between particularistic and universalistic justifications of political projects is not simply a philosophical puzzle or an ideological divide, it is constitutive of the political process. In this way I view the field of arguments about justice found in the Scottish case as embedded within ever larger fields of argument about justice, comprising an entire process subject to the same pragmatic, discursive constraints throughout.

The other, closely related contradiction that is important here (dealt with in the last two chapters), concerns how we understand our relationship to history. Political movements are often caught between a need to justify themselves in terms of historical necessity versus historical agency. On the one hand, the force of claims made is strengthened if presented as carried forward by a certain inevitable historical trajectory. On the other hand, if politics is the pursuit of self determination, then the goal must be to break free of history in order to intervene in it. I argue that the complex tension between these two rhetorical strategies can both propel and impede the process of making claims, and that this is demonstrated in the Scottish autonomist movement.

III. Theoretical Perspective:

This political movement must be understood within the context of larger political-economic forces and tendencies (Nash 1981; Roseberry 1988; Vincent 1986; Wolf 1982). The constant push of capitalism to build and consolidate new markets, and to create, reconstitute, and control sources of labor, define the major trends of world history. Political movements such as Scottish autonomism however, relate to these processes in complicated and indirect ways. This movement involves a broad alliance between middle and working classes, which stems from an historically specific convergence of interests created by the interconnections

between an interventionist welfare state at the level of the UK, and an historically rooted network of institutions in Scottish civil society. What brings these people together is not their common involvement in a particular form of production, but rather their common expectations about how the state should intervene in the economy. When strong and active, the modern state can reorient and even merge class interests.

The modern state however, has a hard time maintaining its grip on the modern economy. When relations of production and consumption are primarily internal to the state, the state logically becomes the focus for negotiating and regulating conflict between classes. But as an increasingly global capitalism creates ever more and new relations of production and consumption that happen across and beyond state boundaries, the lines of conflict, negotiation, and claim making become correspondingly remote and obscure. In this process some states are steadily losing control over their economies, while others are powerful enough to intervene in the global economy transnationally through institutions such as GATT, NAFTA, the World Bank, and the European Union. But these interventions at the supra-state level are made primarily in the interests of business and commerce, and are relatively isolated from the process of making political claims from below, within particular nation-states. The present period is characterized by deep anxieties about the loss of sovereignty and the general

impotence of the nation-state in the global context. The Scottish autonomist movement is a creature of this environment. The steady weakening of Britain, and fading of the dream of empire, and the growing power and influence of the European Union frame the movement, which is predominantly pro-Europe. Scots increasingly see the EU as the context within which their claims must ultimately be made, and their fate negotiated.

Our capacity to think about and analyze the economic processes of capitalism is well developed in comparison to our ability to do the same with institutionalized political processes. Perhaps if Marx had lived long enough to complete his mature work and write the projected volumes that would deal with law and the state, the tradition of social analysis that comes out of his work would be better developed in this respect (cf. Miliband 1965; O'Malley 1994). As it is, there is a chronic tendency to either downplay the role of the state, or treat it as a phenomenon largely subordinate to, rather than partially constitutive of, capitalism (Poulantzas 1978, is a notable exception).

One of the aims of this study is to explore ways to develop an approach to politics that will strengthen a marxian economic analysis. Marx's critique of political economy began with the dominant terms and ideas of the political economy of his day (land, labor, capital, classes, etc.), by reorienting them to create new conceptual relationships and a new analysis. It was an "immanent

critique" (Avineri 1968:8-40) which recognized that capitalism is, in part, made out of these concepts. Rather than attempting to stand outside of this field of ideas, Marx related them to historical material and sought to critique them from within. In taking up debates within modern liberal political philosophy in the last chapter I am not applying these ideas as strait-forward explanations. I am trying to enter into that language, searching out the ruptures, contradictions, and tensions that exist there, as they do in the thoughts and lives of the people in this study. Whether we view categories such as justice, rights, democracy, community, "the good," to name just a few, as illusory or real, they are concepts through which people make sense of and create their reality, through which people make claims and political struggle. These ideas cannot be simply dispensed with in order to get at the realities of politics and class conflict--they are constitutive of the political process and must be engaged. The ideas of liberalism are hegemonic in the modern world, and the world can only be changed, and new ideas created, by mastering those that are given in the present.

CHAPTER ONE

OVERVIEW OF SUBJECT AND METHODS

This first chapter outlines some of the issues of the Scottish autonomist movement, and of UK and European politics more generally, that help frame this study. It concludes with a discussion of research design and methods.

I. The Scottish Autonomist Movement

The range of constitutional options under discussion in this social movement is complex, as are the ways in which people relate to those options through the party system. There are four basic options: (1) the status quo, or "unionism," the official position of the Conservative (or Tory) Party; (2) devolution, i.e., a parliament within the UK, the official position of the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats¹ (as well as most of the minor parties such as the Greens, Communists, and Scottish Militant Labour); (3)

¹ The Liberal Democrats, a minority party in this century, have a long history of advocating a federal system of national and regional parliaments throughout the UK.

independence with membership in the European Union (EU)², the official position of the SNP; and (4) independence without membership in the EU, a position not endorsed by any party (Kellas 1990). Since the 1970s public support for these options has fluctuated in the general ranges indicated in Table 1:

Table 1: Levels of Support for Constitutional Options:

<u>Constitutional Option</u>	<u>Level of Support</u>	<u>Associated Party</u>
Status Quo	15-20%	Conservatives
Devolution	40-50%	Labour and the Liberal Democrats
Independence in EU	25-35%	SNP
Independence ex EU	5-10%	-----

Allowing for variations reflecting the political and economic climate at the time of polling and voting, around 75-80% of Scots routinely indicate a desire for some form of constitutional change. However, attitudes toward the constitutional question do not correspond neatly with voting patterns. One poll from 1987, not unique, indicated that 11% of Scots voting for the Conservatives wanted a "completely independent Scottish Assembly [i.e., parliament] separate from England," while 41% voting for the SNP wanted a "Scottish Assembly as a part of Britain but with substantial powers" (Kellas 1989:266). Such poll results reflect the fact that voting is often strategic, such as voting for the SNP in order to pressure Labour into a strong devolutionist

² Formerly the European Community, or EC.

position, and that voters sometimes prefer a combination of constitutional options and economic policies that are not offered by any party (e.g., an independent Scotland pursuing neoliberal economic policies).

Labour is the dominant party in Scotland, and this reflects the fact that Scotland is generally more working class than England, and that the Scottish working class is generally much less inclined to support the Conservatives than the English working class (Kellas 1989:108-109). This difference is partly due to Scotland's large Catholic population in the central belt which strongly supports Labour, and "... are only a third to half as likely to support the SNP as Scots as a whole" (Ibid.:109-110). Still, the sheer breadth of support for constitutional change in Scotland clearly indicates that it is an idea that has cross-class appeal, particularly in the working to middle class spectrum. Survey data shows that the SNP has broad cross-class support, doing especially well "...among skilled manual and routine non-manual workers, those groups who had become electorally detached from traditional social bases" (McCrone 1992:165). Further, non-manual workers whose fathers were manual workers, i.e., the upwardly mobile working to middle class, are particularly drawn to the SNP, and the SNP has always had strong youth appeal, with an age structure of support that is almost a mirror image of the Conservatives (Ibid.:166).

II. The Broader Political Context

The Scottish movement must be viewed in its wider British and European contexts. At the UK level, the movement coincides with what is known as the "North-South divide"--the pronounced polarization of Conservative and Labour Party support since the 1970s, the former being strong in the southeast (London and the Home Counties), and the latter from the industrial midlands to the west (Wales) and north (Taylor 1991:335-38). Since the 1950s, support for the Tories in Scotland has steadily declined from its peak of 50.1% of the general election vote in 1955 to its current level in the mid-teens. During this same period support for the Tories in England has fluctuated in the 40-50% range. Meanwhile electoral support for Labour in Scotland has remained strong since the 1970s, in the 35-45% range, with poorer showings reflecting surges in SNP support (McCrone 1992:153-54)

In short, since its peak in the mid-1950s, the Conservatives have seen a steady decline in Scotland, precipitous in recent years, while Labour, despite the erratic successes of the SNP, has maintained its position as the dominant political party. Surveys suggest that this divergence in voting patterns reflects a less easily quantified divergence in social values. For example, a 1989 poll comparing attitudes in Scotland with those in England and Wales, which asked: "Which of these comes closest to the ideal country for you and your family?" produced the results in Table 2:

Table 2: Social Attitudes in Scotland, England and Wales:

<u>Question</u>	<u>Scots</u>	<u>English/Welsh</u>
A country in which private interests and a free market economy are more important	21%	30%
A country in which public interests and a more managed economy are more important	71%	61%
A country which emphasizes the social and collective provision of welfare	60%	54%
A country in which the individual is encouraged to look after himself/herself	33%	38%

(from: Midwinter, et al. 1991:210).

These different responses are striking. It should be noted however, that it may well be possible to find a similar divergence within England, between the north and south, and between England and Wales when treated separately.

In addition to being intertwined with the center-left parties, the Scottish autonomist movement also dovetails with calls for constitutional reform found on both sides of the border, including calls for a written constitution with entrenched powers (i.e., not revocable by a simple majority in parliament), a Bill of Rights, and a more decentralized, federal governmental structure employing such devices as proportional representation and a mandated gender balance in parliament. The UK-wide, cross-party campaigning group known

as Charter 88 (est. 1988), which tends to draw its support from the Labour and Liberal Democrat range of the political spectrum, has played a leading role in advocating such reforms, and these same issues have been central to Scottish discussions about what a parliament should look like.

Finally, in a larger geopolitical frame, while the Scottish movement involves a "pull" away from the British unitary state, it simultaneously involves a "push" toward Europe and the European Union. While unionists have often accused the movement of "isolationism," activists are generally pro-Europe, and opposed to the reticent approach to participation taken by the Tory government. "Independence in Europe" has been a key slogan for the SNP since the mid 80s, and the party now holds two of Scotland's eight seats on the European Parliament. This corresponds to a general shift toward pro-Europeanism on the British left, notwithstanding some skeptical voices (e.g., Foster 1991; Lindsay 1991) who warn of the mixed blessings the EU offers.

III. Research Design and Methods

Nationalism is, by definition, not a "local" phenomenon. This is a study of a variegated social movement within a liberal democratic state with a highly modernized economy. The unit of analysis is not a relatively bounded village or cultural group, but rather a range of social organizations, the social milieu they occupy, and the discourses generated within this milieu. Such a unit of analysis is always

difficult to define at the margins. Social movements are social forces which confront a spectrum of responses--support, sympathy, ambivalence, indifference, resistance--in their broader social context. Accordingly, caution should be exercised in extrapolating from the beliefs, views and attitudes examined in this study, i.e., from the movement discourse, to the same in Scotland as a whole. The larger frame involves substantial variations along dimensions of geography, class, gender, and culture, that cannot be adequately encompassed within a single ethnographic study. Still, as the opinion surveys cited above indicate, there is broad support (of varying degrees) in Scotland for the movement, and focusing primarily and closely on movement language and social organization is an important and necessary part of understanding the larger whole.

This study is shaped by the fact that I lived in Edinburgh, and made most of my contacts among a predominantly urban, middle to working class, central belt (i.e., Edinburgh-Glasgow) population. The research is primarily oriented toward the movement activism in this region, by far the most populous part of Scotland. Nonetheless, I made an effort to include contrasting points of reference to check, if not "balance," this bias. Toward this end I traveled and did interviews in more rural areas outside the central belt of Scotland, e.g., in the southwest (Dumfries), the northeast (Inverness), and in the highlands (Assynt) and islands (Lewis), where Gaelic language and culture are a more

important issue. I also did interviews with members of the Tory party, some of whom supported moderate forms of home rule, and others strongly opposed to constitutional change, to provide further points of reference outside the core of the movement.

This study is also shaped by the historical moment of the research (September 1993-September 1994). As the movement is an ongoing process, with cycles, ebbs, and flows, the biases of the ethnographic present should be born in mind. Hopefully, the historical dimension of this study will help put the research period in context.

As I have said, the research (participation, observation, interviews, see below) was structured around a range of organizations, from the more formal to the informal, and the more explicitly to implicitly political in purpose. Chapters 2 and 3 attempt to explicate this social field, but I will outline the basic categories here to provide an initial sense:

(1) Political Parties. The main parties are the Scottish National Party, the Labour Party, and the Conservatives. This includes internal sections and pressure groups, such as the Young Scottish Nationalists (SNP), Scottish Labour Action (Labour), and the Scottish Tory Reform Group (Conservatives).

(2) Campaigning Bodies. These are generally cross-party in membership (though some seem to have affinities with certain parties), aiming at mobilizing a broader public and

overcoming the fundamental conflicts that exist between the competing political parties. These groups can be seen as reflecting a polarization between more civic/political forms of nationalism and more ethnic/cultural forms, as discussed in the Introduction, although bearing in mind the argument that this distinction is itself, ultimately, highly problematic. Important examples of the former are the Coalition for Scottish Democracy and the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament; the latter would include more politically marginal and ephemeral groups such as Siol Nan Gaidheal and Scottish Watch.

(3) The Adult Learning Project (ALP). This organization constitutes a unique category in the research. It is a community education project partly funded by Labour-controlled local government and based on the educational philosophy of Paulo Freire. In it adult students and staff organize study-groups which meet regularly to explore topics of interest. These include such things as writing and photography, Gaelic language, Scottish music and dance, and Scottish land use and reform. I worked closely with two groups--the History Group, which examined Scotland's present situation in light of its (18th-20th century) social history, and the Democracy Group, which considered Scotland's "democratic deficit" and sought to collectively design a parliament for Scotland. While not an explicitly political organization, ALP groups are frequently involved in politics, in such ways as organizing hustings (public meetings where

candidates speak and debate) prior to local elections. During the time of my fieldwork ALP also helped to organize public campaigns against a Criminal Justice Bill that would have put new limitations on public access to land and legal public assembly, and against government plans to impose new a Value Added Tax on heating fuel, seen as an unfair burden on the poor and elderly in the colder north of the UK.

(4) The Intelligentsia. I use this term loosely. There is a social sphere of artists, journalists, and academics who participate in the movement and publicly promote its ideas. Many are affiliated with the parties or campaigning bodies listed above, but I tend to view them as a category in their own right, being key shapers of the public discourse. In other words, I made contacts and conducted interviews with some of these figures not so much because of their organizational memberships, as because of their widely recognized public personas.

The research methods used were varied and somewhat eclectic. Participant-observation was employed in a range of contexts. In some settings, such as rallies, marches, and political meetings, I was primarily an observer. In others the level of participation was much higher. For instance at ALP, I participated in classes, did presentations, and went on study trips. At one point I helped go door to door picking up ballots in a mini-referendum on constitutional change organized by the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament and conducted in the town of Falkirk.

One of the main bodies of data used in this study comes from over 100 interviews conducted with individuals from across the spectrum of organizations and categories discussed above. These interviews were semi-structured and (almost always) tape recorded, usually lasting between one and two hours. The flexible interview schedule began with biographical questions (family background, employment, education, political and religious orientation), moved to questions about motives for participation in the movement (since when, how, why), then asked the informant to discuss three key themes in the movement discourse: that Scots are more egalitarian than the English; that Scotland is a colony of England; and the notion that there is a peculiar tension between head and heart, reason and passion, in Scottish culture. These questions were used as a way of generating discussions around Scottish history in relation to the movement. Because I believe it is the most central and important theme, I have devoted an entire chapter (Chapter 7) to responses to the first question regarding a peculiar egalitarian ethos in Scotland. The question of Scotland having a colonial relationship to England comes up throughout this study, and especially in Chapter 6.³ I closed the interview by asking the informant to describe what kind of society and government they would wish to see in Scotland. Within this general frame I allowed myself room to pursue interesting avenues that arose in the course of the

³ For a treatment of this topic which focuses on interview data, see Hearn 1996.

interview, and more informal, unrecorded, but relevant conversations often preceded and followed the interview proper.

I also conducted two "focus group" style interviews (also tape recorded) using the two ALP study groups I worked closely with. These were designed, in consultation with Vernon Galloway, one of the main coordinators of the project, to follow a format called "decoding" often used in ALP classes. In this procedure, an image, picture, or brief quotation is treated as a focal point of discussion, with the group leader or interviewer asking questions that move the group from more surface to deeper issues of interpretation (cf. Kirkwood and Kirkwood 1989:10-12). I found this a very rich method for generating collective discussions, and would consider using it in further research.

Library/archival research, primarily at the National Library in Edinburgh, helped to broaden my understanding of the movement. This included surveying major secondary sources on Scottish nationalism, and reading various primary sources--e.g., pamphlets and documents published by the political parties and campaigning bodies. I also surveyed selected journals and periodicals that have been central to the movement, such as the Scots Independent (published since 1926), and Radical Scotland, a major journal of the 1980s and early 90s. These sources helped develop my understanding of shifts in style and tone in movement discourse, as well as in concrete aims, over the years. Current newspapers, radio and

television, while not utilized in any methodical way, were another valuable source for gauging how the movement is presented in public discourse.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MORAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSE OF THE AUTONOMIST MOVEMENT

I. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the range and style of popular political discourse that exists in and around the Scottish autonomist movement, and some of the key actors, organizations and institutions that provide an infrastructure for the movement and help shape its discourse. I do this through an account of the "Rally to Recall Scotland's Parliament out of Adjournment," because many central issues and tensions in the movement were nicely encoded in the symbolism and dramas of that event. The Rally also provides us with an initial view into the central themes of the movement discourse--calls for democratic reform and self-determination, for social justice and wealth redistribution, and a conception of Scotland as a kind of moral community which is under attack.

After describing this event I will attempt an initial characterization of the movement discourse as one involving a notion of a "moral economy" of the modern welfare state, i.e., a defense of a threatened system of social and political norms that once sought to safeguard members of the political community (i.e., British citizens) against the vagaries and ravages of an unregulated market. The next three chapters will attempt to build a fuller argument about

the structural and historical reasons why Scottish culture and politics have taken on this corporatist and, in the current political-economic environment, defensive stance. For now though, I simply want to suggest the communal/defensive tone of the movement, as well as the rifts and lines of tension that provide much of its dynamic. I will conclude with an expanded discussion of the usefulness of the moral economy concept, taking into account critiques, for understanding this case.

II. The Recall Rally

The Recall Rally took place on November 27, 1993, a little over two months after I had arrived in Edinburgh. It was a relatively minor, even disappointing event in the history of the movement as a whole, yet many of the fundamental dynamics of the movement were in evidence, perhaps even more clearly in this case than in more successful events, precisely because central tensions between key organizations were not overcome. I intend this first hand account to provide an initial point of entry, from which to work out toward broader discussions.

A leading role in the Rally's planning and promotion was taken by the highly informal group, Democracy for Scotland (DFS), also known as "the Vigil." The primary purpose of this group has been to keep a constant vigil, in the name of the Scottish demand for a parliament, across the street from the Scottish Office, the seat of British government in

Scotland. This site also stands next to the Old Royal High School building, which had been outfitted in 1979 to house an anticipated Scottish Parliament which, however, never materialized, because the popular referendum on establishing parliaments in Scotland and Wales failed to pass in that year. Instead, Britain got Margaret Thatcher.

The Scottish Office and the Royal High School, imposing stone structures in a classical style, stand diagonally across from each other along Regent Road on the side of Calton Hill, which rises over the north-eastern end of central Edinburgh, starkly capped with stone monuments to Nelson and the Scottish dead of the Napoleonic Wars. During my stay I was a lodger in a flat off of Easter Road, an old Catholic neighborhood, stable, working/middle class, that lies where Edinburgh meets Leith, the contiguous port town to the north-east. My almost daily walk into the "Old Town" to meet people and use the libraries took me along Regent Road, past the site of the Vigil, so I quickly came into the habit of stopping by to chat with whoever was around, standing around the brazier made from a rusted 55 gallon drum (often reverently referred to as "the flame of democracy" by core members), having a cup of instant coffee. The smell of wood smoke that clung to one's clothes and hair was a sure sign of time recently spent at the Vigil. The furnishings were modest: the brazier, a few folding chairs and benches, wood piles that grew and shrank according to the resourcefulness of the group and the charity of the general public, and the

construction site porta-cabin, about 10 x 5 feet, and 8 feet tall, painted white with blue trim. A saltire (the Scottish flag with the St. Andrews cross) was kept waving during the day on a free standing pole, there was also a table with literature and a can for donations in front of the porta-cabin, and a whimsical road sign pointing to other small but self-governing European countries such as Norway and Denmark. It was policy that in the spirit of a true vigil, someone should be at the site at all times, which meant taking turns spending the long winter nights bundled up inside the porta-cabin.

The membership at that time was an odd assortment, young and old, a fairly even mix of women and men, from working to middle class backgrounds. Few had a full 4 years of university, if any. There were students and unemployed young people, some on the dole, some drifting in and out. There was also a stable core of people with jobs or family members with jobs ranging from civil service and clerical work, to lab work, carpentry, bus driving, and building maintenance. Several core members, who had earlier been involved together in the short-lived Scottish Socialist Party, lived in a single large household made up of two extended families. Some of the more educated members were also involved in the Scottish Green Party, and seemed to view the Scottish movement as interdependent with that commitment.

A brief profile of a couple of core members will help give a sense of the group. Rosalind (pseudonym) was born in

1959, and is a civil servant in a government department, with a degree in Secretarial Studies. Her parents were middle class Tories, her father an area manager for a construction firm, her mother working briefly as an "air hostess" before marrying and becoming a homemaker. She had not been politically active, but joined Labour about three months before the 1992 general election. Afterward, she became disillusioned, doubting whether Labour could ever come to power again, and she now feels the party has moved too far to the right. She got involved in the Vigil in the weeks following the general election defeat, and it gradually became a more important commitment. When I asked her in an interview "...do you have a sense of what kind of Scotland you'd like to see, what kind of government, what kind of society?" she responded:

I'd like to see a more "fair shares for all" Scotland...and the Tory government as you're well aware, they push this low tax thing which is not really happening because of VAT on fuel coming up,¹ changes in national insurance, things that have happened in the past. They're not really the party of low taxation, but they do project themselves as this. To me people that are in work are very lucky, there's a world-wide recession and we're never going to get back to full employment. I mean if Scotland got independence tomorrow, I don't think everybody in Scotland would have a job in five years time, times have moved on too far, there's new technology, one machine can do hundred's of men's jobs, so many industries have been decimated, things could be a lot better. You could make, you could bring in a lot more social...type jobs, you could have more nurses on the ward, you could have smaller classes,

¹ A major campaigning issue during my field work, "VAT on fuel" refers to a proposed Tory policy to levee a Value Added Tax on domestic fuel consumption. This was widely seen as discriminatory against those who lived in colder climates that required higher heating bills, i.e., Scotland, and as a real threat to old age pensioners on fixed income, some of whom die due to exposure to the cold every year.

but we're never gonna get full employment, I accept that. So I think that work, like anything else, is a resource. People that have work are lucky, they should be willing to pay more tax, more direct taxation, partly to fund the jobs which aren't producing anything...[of an estimable form?]. I've just spoken about, [e.g.] home helps, so that there's more money going into the central belt so that these jobs might be available, and also so that there could be a better welfare system...the welfare system to me is absolutely bloody horrendous. That Archbishop that spoke at St. Mary's Cathedral last week, I thought he had a splendid quote, all about "target poverty, not the poor." And that is what this government is doing just now....

Bob was born in 1941; his parents were radicals, trade unionists, and Labour voters. His mother's mother was a suffragette and trade union organizer at a rubber mill, a tradition Bob's mother carried on. His father was a shop steward (a "Father of the Chapel") in the printing and book binding trade, once a major industry in Edinburgh. He was raised in a working class tenement. He worked in the book binding trade where he had his City and Guild certification, until the industry collapsed in the late 1960s. Since then he has worked in the Stationary Department of Edinburgh University, as a bus driver for Lothian Region, and recently as a manager/maintenance person of a church, despite being an agnostic. After a brief flirtation with nationalism in his teens, he became an active member of the Labour Party. Disillusioned, he left Labour a few years ago, however, and has since joined the SNP, where he is somewhat active in his local branch. Toward the end of an interview, I asked him about "...the whole question of socialism...what does that word mean to you today, considering all the changes that it's gone through?":

Yeah...I don't think Scotland's been a particularly socialist nation. [sigh] I suppose as I've always believed, [I'm] just a socialist...I've never, I've never had any high flown creeds or "isms" that I've pursued...I've always called myself a socialist cause it seems the only fair and reasonable style of government that I've seen. I never thought that the eastern bloc countries were socialist [by the] wildest stretch of the imagination, they were just dictatorships. Ahh...I guess it's just livin' in a society...I still believe in...the wealth created, should be owned by the people who create it. I suppose I have to call myself a socialist. I don't think we would run things badly at all...

I then remarked that "...for some people socialism and nationalism are really antithetical things. Is that something that you puzzle over?" He seemed to wrestle with this answer even more.

No, not at all, I don't see any reason why they cannae go hand in hand, there's...it's...national..it depends on...there we go, 'what is nationalism?' it's...I see nothing wrong with that, a grouping of people that appear to, well, we've got a very definite geographical boundary...so were slightly different, we're not in the middle of a large continent, we're a small group of people, surrounded by the sea...with a hugely strong Celtic background, and Nordic background, and then a hundred, two hundred miles away there's a huge Anglo-Saxon/Norman group of people. I see no reason why we shouldnae...we are different... both in our appearances and our language. And I see no reason why we shouldnae, now it were a necessity I think we should be separate. 'Cause I think we're just being dragged down the tube, with Britain as a whole, and... I don't particularly look upon myself as a nationalist. I would prefer to think that I was an internationalist that thought Scotland could contribute to international understanding. I think that we've got something to say here, I think that the way people vote says that they don't like what's been happening for the past fifteen years ... I'm no' saying that all the changes that took place over the past fifteen years or whatever, uh...necessarily wrong...eh...there's always a way of doing things, you know. You don't just kill one of your children cause the rest of 'em are going hungry, you

find another way of feeding all the children.² That, in particular is why Scotland now wants to be separate...I mean, Thatcher created that.

The Vigil grew out of a demonstration that took place outside the gates of the Royal High School on the evening of Friday, April 10th, 1992, in response to the general election of that day, which had once again returned the Tories to power in Westminster. The Conservative (or Tory) Party is the only party in Scotland that does not support the idea of a Scottish parliament--75% of the Scottish electorate had voted for other parties (primarily Labour and the SNP). Prior to the election there had been high hopes in some quarters that the Tories would be swept from power, or at least reduced to such a rump in Scotland that a constitutional crisis would ensue. The realization that there would be continued deadlock on the issue created an air of frustration, but also hardened resolve. In the first few weeks and months after the general election the Vigil provided a site for focusing a general spirit of protest in the form of various meetings, rallies and marches. By the time I encountered the group, things had become more routinized, with a fluctuating cast of around 40 core participants, any regular Sunday night meeting drawing around 20 people. The enthusiasm had died down, and most people with a long term active commitment to the cause felt that their time and energies were better spent elsewhere. Such

² I believe this metaphor was directed against the laissez-faire system in general, and not meant to characterize Scotland in particular as a starving child.

activists sometimes characterized the people who had stuck by the Vigil as admirable, endearing, but perhaps unrealistic in their commitment to DFS's political potential. In my view some members of DFS saw the Vigil as a symbolic gesture worth sustaining, and as a meaningful focus for their social life, while others did have somewhat overblown notions of its political efficacy.

The Recall Rally grew out of a seed planted in another, more important event, the "Scotland Demands Democracy" march and rally which was held on the occasion of the European Summit held in Edinburgh on December 11th and 12th 1992, and which drew over 25,000 people. The idea was to use this event to draw the attention of Europe to Scotland's complaint. At that rally a statement called the Democracy Declaration of Scotland, drafted by members of Common Cause (discussed further in Chapter 3), was read and endorsed by all the opposition parties and various civic organizations such as churches, unions, and other voluntary organizations. A passage from that document provides a sense of its purpose and tone; speaking of the Tory government, it argues:

This government now imposes its minority policies on Scotland through an executive Scottish Office with more civil servants than Brussels, yet with no Scottish legislature to examine or pass such policies. The people of Scotland face problems and opportunities which can best be dealt with by our own Scottish Parliament. We know of no other nation placed in such a predicament and you can surely understand why we are calling for a constitutional referendum to enable democratic renewal within our country.

Five months later, at a Vigil meeting in May of 1993, it was decided to capitalize on the public commitment made to

this statement by seizing upon a fairly literal reading of one rather rhetorical passage:

Today, the majority in Scotland demand the recall of our own Parliament as a modern and democratic body empowering all our citizens.

It was argued that all those endorsing the original statement, which included all the opposition parties, had made a public commitment to reconstituting the actual Scottish Parliament, which in fact, had never been dissolved, but only "adjourned" in 1707, when the new combined parliament of Great Britain was formed.

Based on this somewhat farfetched reading, the event was planned and a Recall Committee formed, which included representatives from DFS, the SNP, the Scottish Liberal Democrats, and the Scottish Green Party. Despite attempts to both woo and shame them into participation, the Labour Party kept its distance, deeming the pretense of establishing an alternate Scottish government outside of the British constitutional process unacceptable for a party of its stature. In fact, I doubt whether anyone other than some members of DFS ever took the idea of actually forming a new parliament very seriously. Rather, I think most of those involved simply saw it as another symbolic event to help keep the issue in the public eye, during the time between general elections, which have, over the last 15 years, come to be perceived as shadow referendums on the constitutional issue.

Furthermore, it must be understood that the major players in this scenario were Labour and the SNP; despite

their initiative, DFS and the smaller parties were only the supporting cast. Labour is the dominant party in Scotland, the SNP seeks to capture votes where it can, and most of those to be captured belong to Labour. Thus these two parties, despite strong similarities in their middle of the road social democratic policies, are always in direct and heated competition. It has been the constant frustration of key activists in the movement (whether party members or not), that attempts to foster cooperation on the constitutional question between these two major players always seem to lead to divisiveness and posturing--especially when general elections are pending and the competition becomes fiercer. In short, the Recall Rally, as a public drama of the home rule issue, was fundamentally shaped by the fact that these two parties publicly define themselves in opposition to each other, and cannot afford to share the same stage as equals. In practice, the Rally became the SNP's show--yet another opportunity to shame Labour and argue that their claims to be committed to home rule are not genuine.

These tensions were in evidence at two events during the week leading up to the rally, which was held on a Saturday. On the Wednesday before, the Recall Committee held a press conference. Lined up behind a long table facing eight or so rows of sparsely occupied folding chairs, four representatives from DFS and the three parties each spoke briefly. Beyond offering general information about the event, their remarks offered praise for the folks at the

Vigil and disparaged Labour for not participating (but noting the exception of the renegade Labour MP Dennis Canavan, whose strong commitment to devolution led him to buck party discipline and attend the event). The media's interest seemed tepid--no TV cameras and only a handful of newspaper reporters, whose vaguely hostile questions revolved around the inability of the SNP and Labour to cooperate, and the anticipated turn out. The organizers tried discretely to lower expectation about attendance, emphasizing the symbolic importance of the Rally.

On the following Friday, the day before the Rally, there was a public meeting of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, a diverse civic body which had been formed in 1989 to help thrash out ideas about what a Scottish parliament would/could look like (discussed further in Chapter 3). After a lot of initial notoriety, and then the disappointment of the 1992 general election, the Convention faded from public view, although its various committees remained active, hammering out details of the plan. The purpose of this public meeting was to remind active supporters and the general public that the Convention was still alive and hard at work. It is important to know that while the SNP was initially involved in the Convention, it backed out early-on due to intra-party disagreements about whether the SNP, committed by its constitution to a program of national independence, could legitimately work with an organization committed only to devolution. Many key

activists in the broader movement (and some members of the SNP) saw this withdrawal as an unfortunate and counter-productive move. In the eyes of many of the pro-parliament intelligentsia the SNP has been seen as an uncooperative spoiler ever since. In this light, it becomes clear that the SNP's use of the Recall Rally to shame Labour was a kind of counter-move, an attempt to turn the tables in this ongoing argument about just who is failing to cooperate.

The meeting was held in the opulent surroundings of the Signet Library in Parliament Square. The speakers included major figures from Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA--the largely Labour controlled coordinating body of local government), the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC), the Church of Scotland, the Democratic Left (an offshoot of the more moderate ranks of the fragmented Communist Party), and the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament (CSP), the pivotal campaigning body that had provided the initial impetus behind the creation of the Convention. The speakers tried to convey a sense of the steady labors of the Convention, with several emphasizing the familiar theme of Scotland's strong moral traditions, and how these are at odds with current Tory policies and their conception of morality (the Tories had recently held a party conference stressing the theme of "back to basics" morality). During the speech by Labour's Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson,³ two members of DFS who

³ In the British political system, the major opposition party (i.e., Labour) forms a cabinet-in-waiting which parallels the Prime Minister's

had quietly slipped in and taken front row seats, stood up and unfurled a banner promoting the Recall Rally in front of Robertson and in view of the TV cameras. Some tried to yank the banner down, and voices of disapproval fell from the speakers platform. Campbell Christie, General Secretary of the STUC, and a key leader and broker between various groups in the movement, expressed dismay and said he now doubted whether he would attend the Rally. Robertson's stock retort to the rally organizers, offered on more than one occasion, was that he believed in looking forward for a parliament, not to the past.

Fortunately, it was not raining the day of the Rally, but it was cold and windy at the site where it was held, among the stone monuments on the grassy summit of Calton Hill. The plan was for an afternoon of music from noon on, with the ceremonies and speeches beginning around 4:30 PM. The day started off slowly. Police were present, but fairly inconspicuous. At the top of the hill there were three food wagons, a toilet wagon and a stage made of three flat bed trucks. As the bands played, some people listened, some danced, some wandered around the monuments and visited the Vigil site below. A couple of fellows who were friends of the Vigil folk showed up in full traditional highland garb--rough woven kilts, belts, buckles and pouches with silver-work with inlaid stones, their long frizzy red hair tied

cabinet. These "shadow" officers make a political career of formulating alternate policies and critiquing the work of the officer they are hoping to replace.

back. Ronnie Moffat, a familiar peripheral figure in this milieu, was handing out copies of a Scottish Constitution he had illustrated and published himself (based on one drawn up by some activists back in the 1950s). He also seemed to have had a hand in bringing a replica of the Stone of Destiny,⁴ and placing it on a stone slab located on the south side of the summit.

The newspapers put the attendance at around 2000, which seems accurate taking the whole day into account. My estimate is that for most of the afternoon there were around 200-400 people coming and going on the hill, and that most showed up between 4 and 5 PM, when the number rose to well over 1000. It is likely that an anti-racism rally in Glasgow that day, held on the last Saturday in November for the last four years, cut into attendance. Although people were putting a good face on it, and had lowered their expectations in the final weeks, the sparse turn out was a bit of a let down. Even so, the DFSers seemed happy and relieved to have pulled it off and covered costs, with perhaps a couple hundred quid (around \$300) left over to help support the Vigil.

A little after 4 PM, several members of DFS and miscellaneous supporters met at Parliament Square in the Old

⁴ The Stone of Destiny, traditionally associated with the coronation of Scottish kings at Scone, was taken by Edward I during the medieval wars with England and has sat in Westminster Abbey ever since, except for when it was briefly liberated in 1951 by a plucky bunch of young Scottish nationalists. Ever since then rumours have abounded that the stone returned was a replica, and the real one is hiding in safe hands until the appropriate day....

Town. A small party of about 50-60, with banners, bagpipes, and a mounted police escort, marched down the High Street, across the North Bridge, and up to the top of Calton Hill. This took about thirty minutes. After circling through the crowd on top of the hill, the marchers doubled back to the southeastern side of the summit to the site of the "Democracy Cairn," to hold an official dedication before the speeches began on the flat bed trucks. The Cairn had been made by Vigil member Ian Thompson, a semi-retired carpenter from the Inverness area up north, who had been involved in anti-nuclear protests at the Dounreay power station prior to his involvement with DFS. It was a round stone pedestal about 5 feet in diameter at the base, about three feet at the top, and around six feet tall. Another 55 gallon drum brazier was perched on top--there were plans for a more decorative one to be made later. The Cairn incorporated stones that had been brought to the site from the four corners of Scotland during the "Destiny Marches," another movement event of the previous April.

By the time the marchers reached the Cairn it was passing dusk. An amorphous circle of perhaps 150 people gathered around it, a few holding torches, as plaintive tunes were piped. Vigil member Jackie Wilkes had been nominated by the rest of the group to draft and read a dedication. She stressed the "democratic deficit" in Scotland, and how greater local control would empower women and allow a greater concern for the environment. These are all standard themes

in the DFS milieu. She also threw in a call for the reinvigoration of socialism, and I noted that one leading figure at the Vigil with Green Party affiliations grumbled, feeling that this was too explicitly partisan for a supposedly non-party organization like DFS. The dedication culminated in the lighting of the brazier ("the flame of democracy"), and was capped off by reading the inscription on the granite plaque set in at the base of the Cairn. It was a passage from the well known poet/nationalist Hugh MacDiarmid's (AKA Christopher Grieve) "The Flyting of Dunbar and Kennedie":

For we ha'e faith
in Scotland's hidden poo'ers,
The present's theirs,
but a' the past and future's oors.⁵

Born in Middlesex in England, Jackie had only moved to Scotland with her daughters in 1989, and was somewhat self-conscious about her rendition of MacDiarmid in an English accent. So after she finished, she asked Ian Thompson to step in and repeat it in a good, gravel-ly Scots.

After this, the circle around the Cairn slowly dissolved, and people wandered back to the flat beds, joining the bulk of the crowd to hear the politicians speak. Judging from the banners I saw, the faces I recognized, and the audience response to the speakers, it seems clear that the swell in turn-out that began around dusk was largely due to SNP ranks turning out to cheer and support their party leader, Alex Salmond, as well as to the late arrival of some

⁵ Poo'ers = powers; oors = ours.

people who had just attended the anti-racism rally in Glasgow. Several speakers decrying Scotland's political and economic situation were heckled with shouts of "if you don't like it then vote SNP," and the lone Labour MP Dennis Canavan was booed by a few. Some excerpts from the various speeches, where the rhetoric is undeniably in full tilt, provide a nice sampling of movement discourse.

The first speaker was Helen Allen who, like Thompson and Wilkes, is also a core member of the Vigil. She began by describing the formation of the Vigil/DFS, and concluded with an effort to drum up practical support. In between she stressed themes similar to those in Jackie's dedication of the Cairn:

...You know the last fifteen years, have seen a massive increase, in unemployment, poverty and homelessness. Scotland's industrial base has been decimated. We all remember Ravenscraig and Rosyth [a steel mill and shipyard, respectively, recently shut down], and who can ever forget the Poll Tax, and now the carve-up of local government. Sometimes I wonder how much more the Scottish people can take! [cheers/applause]...

...Another elderly friend...[unclear]...in the Poll Tax fiasco, was too ashamed to share his problems with his family and friends, is again worrying about how he will manage to pay his fuel bills. He has trouble with high blood pressure, and he's in hospital at the moment. Last week he said to me, at least while I'm in here, I can keep warm, without having to worry about my bills. What an indictment! what a terrible indictment against the policies of this *British* government!...

...DFS does not want to see a replica of Westminster. We would like to see new forms of democratic representation, some form of alternative to the first-past-the-post system, with representation of women guaranteed to [their rights and...?] numerical strength in Scotland. We would like representatives in the Scottish parliament to be representative of Scottish society as a whole, and not dominated by lawyers,

accountants and businessmen, as Westminster is
[cheers/applause]...

After her there was a woman from the Scottish Green
Party, who stressed the themes of political decentralization,
ecologically sound economics, and the revitalization of
community:

It's our belief that there's an overwhelming consensus
amongst the people of Scotland--a consensus for social
justice, fairness and equality, a consensus of belief in
the community. We look at what this government is doing
on health, education, and welfare, to rail, to all of
our industry, to all of our futures. VAT on fuel, on
domestic fuel, in a country so rich in energy, instead
of a proper program in energy efficiency and energy
conservation. It's a waste and it's a
tragedy...[cheers]...and that consensus, that consensus
of the Scottish people, that's bound up with our view of
"society"--that thing that our government says doesn't
exist⁶--but we believe in society, we believe in
community, and our concept of sovereignty, Scottish
sovereignty, the sovereignty of the people, it's not
parliament that sovereign, it's not the monarch, they
get their power from us, from the people of Scotland...
[cheers/applause]

The Communist speaker drew a long parallel between
Scotland and Cuba (which did not play all that well with some
of the audience). His point of departure was a response to a
book review he had read that day which was critical of the
idea of "utopian thinking." He began with a quote from the
reviewer:

'...a once fertile country like Cuba, has been destroyed
by economic basket-cases...'..now Cuba, there's a number
of similarities between Cuba and Scotland...[some
derisive laughter in background]...A small country,
wanting independence, a small country dominated by
another country only a few miles away, much bigger

⁶ The reference here is to a remark made by Margaret Thatcher, which is
often referred to in anti-Thatcherite discourse. In 1987 she is reported
to have said: "There is no such thing as society. There are individual
men and women, and there are families" (see footnote in Mitchell
1990:141).

economically, and politically, than they are. What we're arguing here for is the right of small countries, to determine their own future, without the interference of big countries in their affairs. Now to argue that Cuba, that the Cuban economy has failed--and that's open to debate--because of utopianism, without taking into consideration the fact, that the largest economic and military power in the world, has drawn a net round Cuba for the past thirty years, and attempted to strangle it, is a failure, is a failure to understand the situation...[more laughter and jeers]... In Scotland, we have a similar situation, dominated by a larger power, a net drawn around us...the ...failure of us to break that stranglehold, and establish a right to our own affairs...

Alex Salmond, leader of the SNP, gave his usual skillful and charismatic performance. He thanked the members of DFS for their efforts and in the middle of his speech addressed the major campaign issues of the moment--reorganization of local government (widely viewed as Tory gerrymandering), impending privatization of water services, and VAT on domestic fuel--asserting that a Scottish Parliament would take action on these issues. But a large portion of his speech was taken up with criticism of those who did not participate--namely Labour:

Now I've been listening to the radio and the television over the last few days, and I'm told of course, this recalled parliament business, is just, "historical abstraction," a historical abstraction, is what's been said. It's no historical abstraction, it's about the modern reality of what's happening to Scotland--that's why we need a recalled parliament. [cheers] Because...the concept of "recall," encapsulates the principle of Scottish sovereignty. Sovereignty in Scotland lies not in the palace of Westminster, but in the streets of Scotland... [cheers/applause; a few words drowned out]...a recall should have been a vehicle for unity in Scotland, it should have been the principle behind which political forces could have united, but political forces can only unite if political leaders accept their responsibility, to go forward with declarations that they endorsed just a year ago... [cheers/applause]...

In conclusion, Salmond took one last shot at Labour, and then reconnected the parliament recall issue to the choice of voting for the SNP rather than Labour:

I've got one last message for George Robertson [Labour's Shadow Scottish Secretary]. George is a very clever debater, in the Westminster parliament, and that's been recently recognized. But there is no point, no point whatsoever, in covering yourself in glory, in a debating chamber at Westminster, when the Tory government is covering the Scottish people *in poverty*, and that's the reality, of what's happening now...[cheers/applause]... Some people, have chosen to present themselves as an obstacle, a stumbling block to progress, towards self-government, towards self-determination, towards a recalled parliament. That's their choice. But let us say to them and present a warning this evening--that stumbling blocks and roadblocks can be removed, and there's a ballot box opportunity next year, to start that process. For one way or another, the Scottish parliament is going to be recalled, the democracy declaration is going to be honored, and Scotland's going to step forward, to freedom--thank you. [cheers/applause].

This was supposed to have been the final speech, but Dennis Canavan, the renegade Scottish Labour MP had shown up late from the anti-racism rally in Glasgow, and stepped up to say a few words, arguing for a more unified front on the home rule issue:

As Alex Salmond said previously, many people, thousands of people, marched through the streets of Glasgow this morning, for a good cause. They were people of different parties, different beliefs, some of them perhaps of no political party membership at all, and it was for a good cause, the campaign against racism. And the reason why we marched together was quite simple. It was because we all agreed that that campaign, stood a much greater chance of success, if the people of Scotland were as united as possible, irrespective of their party political persuasion. And so it's the same, its just the same, with the campaign for a Scottish parliament. There may be, there may be genuine differences of opinion about the composition and powers of a Scottish parliament, but surely it would...require somebody with no political noose [i.e., savvy] at all, who would fail to realize that by maximizing the unity

of the people of Scotland, they would've got a better chance of achieving that Scottish parliament...

After the speeches, the speakers representing the participating parties and DFS each signed the Recall Declaration:

We the undersigned, hereby declare our continued support for the Democracy Declaration of the 12th of December, 1992 and solemnly pledge ourselves to the Recall of Scotland's Parliament from adjournment as a modern and democratic body empowering all our citizens.

Leaflets with the above text on one side had been passed out, and the crowd collectively recited it after the signing. The crowd was led, phrase by phrase, by a speaker from the platform, giving the recitation the feel of a collective church confession. On the other side of the leaflet was the text of the song "Freedom Come-All-Ye" written by Hamish Henderson. Henderson, in his mid-70s, and something of a cult icon in Scotland, is a poet, folklorist, critic, co-founder of the School of Scottish Studies at Edinburgh, Communist, and early translator of Gramsci. He was present and led the crowd in singing the song, which paints images of 1920s marxist-nationalist John Maclean leading the freedom loving Scottish people to throw off the racism and war-mongering of their capitalist masters. It is one of a few unofficial Scottish anthems, particularly popular with the younger, more Labour/left leaning wing of the movement:

Roch the wind in the clear days dawin
 Blaws the clouds heelster gowdy ow'r the bay
 But there's mair nor a roch wind blawin'
 Through the great glen o' the warld the day
 It's a thocht that will gar oor rottans-
 A' they rogues that gang gallus, fresh and gay-

Tak' the road an' seek ither loanins
For their ill ploys tae sport an' play.

Nae mair will the bonnie callants
Mairch tae war, when oor braggarts crouselly craw
Nor wee weans frae pit-heid an' clachan
Mourn the ships sailin' doon the Broomielaw
Broken families in lands we've harriet
Will curse Scotland the Brave nae mair, nae mair
Black an' white, ane til ither marriet
Mak' the vile barracks o' their maisters bare.

O come all ye at hame wi' freedom
Never heed whit the hoodies croak for doom;
In your hoose a' the bairns o' Adar
Can find breid, barley bree an' painted room
When Maclean meets wi's freens in Springburn
A' the roses an' geans will turn tae bloom,
And a black boy frae yont Nyanga
Dings the fell gallows o' the burghers doon.⁷

This concluded the formal event, and while there was an open mike afterwards for people to say whatever they felt, the crowd dispersed fairly quickly, leaving sound crews and vendors to break down their equipment with the help of Vigil

⁷ Rough the wind in the clear day's dawning
Blows the clouds head over heels across the bay
But there's more than a rough wind blowing
Through the Great Glen of the world today
It's a thought that will make our rodents/rats (?)
All those rogues that go (...?...), fresh and gay
Take the road and seek other lodgings
for their ill ploys to sport and play

No more will the handsome boys
March to war when our braggarts boldly crow
Nor tiny babes from pit-head and hamlet
Mourn the ships sailing down the Broomielaw (the Clyde in Glasgow)
Broken families in lands we've harried
Will curse Scotland the Brave no more, no more
Black and white, one to the other married
Make the vile barracks of their masters bare

O come all you at home with freedom
Never listen when the hooded crows croak for doom
In your house all the children of Adam
Can find bread, drink (alcoholic), and a painted room
When (John) Maclean meets with his friends in Springburn
All the roses and (?) will turn to bloom
And a black boy from beyond Nyanga
Knocks the very gallows of the burgers (bourgeoisie) down

folk and their friends. Later I went by the Ceilidh (pron. "kay-lee") House, a popular pub, where I ran into various young SNP activists and members of other nationalist organizations, digesting the event over a few pints. Another act in the long, sometimes plodding drama of Scottish home rule was over.

To this account I would simply add a few interpretive remarks. It struck me at the time, and I raised this in later conversations with folks at the Vigil, some of whom seemed to agree, that it was as though there were two separate events. The march and the dedication of the Cairn, wholly organized by DFS, had a loose, spontaneous, and popular feel. The marchers wound their way through the streets, with no clear internal structure, ending up in an unorganized cluster around the Cairn and its flame. The speeches and the Declaration Signing on the other hand, displayed the usual sense of hierarchy, between organizations on the platform, and between party/group leaders and followers in the crowd. This was primarily the SNP's showcase. In all, the event revealed many of the classic differences and tensions between informal, small, face to face social groups, and larger formal organizations. The tensions between the mobilization of diffuse public sentiments, and organized political action, were inscribed in the days events.

III. Discussion: The Moral Economy of the Modern Welfare State

At this point we can attempt a general characterization of, and theoretical perspective on, the movement discourse. Certain themes occur again and again in the preceding account, and will be further examined in the next chapter. They run along two main lines. On the one hand, there is a call for democratic reform, for more direct, grassroots participation in government, for the entrenchment of basic political rights, and for self-determination (an interestingly ambiguous term which casts "polities" as "selves"). On the other hand, there is a call for a more just distribution of social goods, for the publicly managed investment of resources in society as a whole. These two lines obviously intersect, in that distributive justice is widely seen as the business of democratic government. Furthermore, there is also a distinct "tone" to the discourse--one of righteous indignation, moral protest, at times highly defensive. And connected to all of this is a portrayal of Scotland as somehow exemplifying, even personifying, precisely those qualities and values which are being defended--democracy, egalitarianism, fairness, social concern, and even basic conviviality.

Let me propose a way of looking at this. The term "moral economy" has become a commonplace in anthropology in recent years. It is implicated in the substantivist economic theories developed first by Polanyi (1957), which, put

broadly, argued that "...historically the provisioning of humans--the securing of their livelihood--was located in, or integrated through, non-economic institutions...before modernity, the securing of human livelihood had no separateness--no boundary line that marked it out as distinct from the enveloping society's institutions and values..." (Booth 1994:653). But the term "moral economy" itself arose out of more specific discussions of the responses of peasant communities to the encroachments of externally driven market economies. Thus when E.P. Thompson first coined the term (1971), he was attempting a finer analysis of eighteenth-century food riots in England, trying to show that beneath the dynamics of crowd behavior lay a set cultural assumptions about how in times of scarcity the subsistence needs of the local producing community should take precedence over the demands of laissez-faire markets. While this relatively simple formulation has been elaborated, most notably by James Scott (1976) who has emphasized the role of expectations built around local patron-client relations, it provides the crux of the idea of the moral economy.

So what do the beliefs and behavior of peasants confronting capitalism have to do with those of citizens of a modern democratic welfare state well into a transition from an economy driven by heavy industry and state managed investment to one driven by a combination light industries, the service sector, and international finance? And how does this relate to a popular critique of neoliberal social

policies intermixed with a quasi-nationalist call for greater political autonomy? If we consider the idea of the moral economy at a higher level of abstraction, I think the answer is--quite a lot. Beyond the specifics of peasants vs. markets, there is a more fundamental argument involved here about interdependent conceptions of community, membership and provisioning, and what happens when these become threatened and unstable. Michael Walzer, playing loosely on the notion of a "social contract" which will be examined more closely in Chapter 7, offers us a useful characterization of this nexus: community, membership and provisioning, are focal concepts in his *Spheres of Justice* (1983):

Here, then, is a more precise account of the social contract: it is an agreement to redistribute the resources of the members in accordance with some shared understanding of their needs, subject to ongoing political determination in detail. The contract is a moral bond. It connects the strong and the weak, the lucky and the unlucky, the rich and the poor, creating a union that transcends all differences of interest, drawing its strength from history, culture, religion, language, and so on. Arguments about communal provision are, at the deepest level, interpretations of that union (1983:82-83).

It is also important to consider that when this "social contract" is threatened, whatever its historical specificities, an unstable, and ideologically (we might also say culturally) generative situation is reached, where assumed norms become visible, contested, and recast. I agree with Wuthnow when he maintains that

[i]deologies always contain propositions about moral obligations--obligations of patrons to clients, of clients to patrons, of members to communities, of citizens to states and state representatives to citizens, of persons to one another in their basic

dealings....These propositions specify how social relations should be conducted and therefore affect how social resources may be distributed. Insofar as ideologies also require social resources in order to be maintained, any disturbance of social resources that results in uncertainties about the nature of moral obligations is likely to result in some modification at the level of ideology itself. In other words, disturbances in the moral order are likely to be a factor in the production of new ideological forms (Wuthnow 1987:154)

Under such conditions of contestation, one likely aspect of "new ideological forms" is that they will involve redefinitions of the relevant dimensions of community and membership. In essence the moral economists say that people who view themselves as members of a common community with common interests in mutual provision, are likely to raise a protest when the means of provisioning are threatened. And that is precisely the predicament that those committed to the idea of the Keynesian welfare state, with its centrally managed economy, have found themselves in, in a world where, since the 1970s, laissez-faire economics has found a new lease on life. In few places in Europe, the historical root of the modern welfare state, has this shift been more pronounced than in Britain under the revolution of Margaret Thatcher and her successors. Thatcherism is a radical ideological movement, and a key part of its rhetoric in regard to Scotland has been to decry the effects of a paternalistic state (note the parallel to the paternalistic patron-client relations of peasant moral economies), arguing that a "dependency culture" needed to be replaced by an "enterprise culture" which would harken back to the spirit of

Adam Smith. Ironically Scottish autonomism, with its conceptual opposition of Scotland to England and Britain, is in many ways a conservative defense the classic mid-century conception of community, membership, and provisioning at the British level.

So the UK is a nation-state that has, in response to global economic processes, democratically elected to reverse many of its commitments to collective provisioning from within. (I am assuming here the serious shortfall of democracy in class-based, technical elite, media driven regimes.) The result has been a strong ideological polarization, made manifest in the north-south divide between the Labour and Tory constituencies I discussed in the introduction. In this context Scottish people of a left/social democratic persuasion, arguably the majority, are confronted by two major options for conceptualizing and mobilizing the community whose principles of provisioning are under threat: on the one hand they can struggle for the heart and mind of Britain as a whole, where the Conservatives command strong support and seem to hold decisive power; on the other hand they can struggle to at least partly disengage the Scottish political community, where there is (or at least appears to be) a much closer consensus around issues of provisioning, from the larger political community of Britain. Support for the Scottish autonomist movement has grown in recent years because a significant portion of those politically active have leaned toward the latter

interpretation of the situation as the appropriate strategic response.

It is worth considering some of the criticisms that have been made of the moral economy literature in order to sharpen this attempt to transfer the concept from one domain to another. Desan has noted that

Thompson's concept of communal consensus ... may at times suggest a more cohesive and united community than in fact existed... [and he] ...does not seem to recognize that the "moral economy" might have different meanings or levels of significance for various members of the community... (1989:57, 59).

This certainly applies to the modern Scottish case. The material in this and the next chapter is intended to illustrate the range of interests and motives involved. While a certain attitude of discontent and complaint pervades the movement, actors are differentially situated. Political careers are being made and unmade in the process. Members of the intelligentsia have an interest in treating Scotland as an object of concern, study, and discussion. And, as comes out quite clearly in the account of the Recall Rally, there is a complex process of competition and alliance going on--between the political parties, between these and the civic activists involved in campaigning bodies--to claim the role of true representatives of the Scottish cause. And while the political norm in Scotland is to the left of that in England, there are diverse and diverging conceptions of what should be done--creating government support for small businesses; re-nationalizing industries; strengthening unions; capturing North Sea oil revenues; eliminating nuclear energy and

military forces; increasing the role of Gaelic, Scots, and Scottish history in education; decentralizing government while at the same time making it a more active force in the economy. The list, not entirely incoherent, but encompassing contradictory tendencies, goes on.

Roseberry has also addressed problems in the moral economy literature (1989:55-59). Following Raymond Williams' critique, he notes that supposedly pre-market peasant economies were hardly "natural" and involved their own forms of brutality and exploitation. But he observes that this does not undo the usefulness of the concept, because

the "moral economy" need not have existed in the past; it may be *perceived* in the past from the perspective of a disordered present. The images [sic] of a moral economy may be a *meaningful* image even if "what actually happened" was less idyllic (1989:57; emphasis in original).

Forging a link between the moral economy literature and that on the "invention of tradition" (cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1984), Roseberry suggests that the moral economy be viewed not so much as an actual historical formation, but as an active and creative interpretation of the past in present circumstances. He further suggests that rather than think in terms of an ordered social universe being displaced by a disordered one, we think in terms of one system of disorder being replaced by another.

Again, these observations are salutary for the Scottish movement. For while I have said it is a defense of the modern welfare state, it simultaneously idealizes and critiques that social order. Criticisms of the welfare

state, e.g., from the perspectives of gender, race, economically and ecologically sustainable economies, and resistance to bureaucratic control of daily life (cf. Pierson 1991:40-101), are not lost on movement activists. Still, the movement discourse involves a strange blend of resistance to state centralization, a long-standing theme in Scottish nationalism at least since the 1920s, along with a yearning for a pre-Thatcherite past in which there was, apparently, a strong sense of community and mutual support, underwritten by the centralized state. While the actual problem that confronts this movement is how to sustain old and create new standards of communal provisioning under radically altered political economic circumstances, the sheer radicalism of the neoliberal agenda has in some sense dictated a conservative, backward-looking stance in the Scottish movement, even while it contains its own alternate progressive visions of Scotland's future, e.g., as a Scandinavian style social democracy and full and economically viable member of the developing European Union. In my experience, the more perceptive movement activists are alive to (and somewhat bemused by) the contradictions involved here, caught between aspirations for a better and more just social order in Scotland, and the realities of the present political economic environment in which a small country has very limited control over its own destiny.

To restate the argument thus far, I hold that before engaging such questions as: (1) can this truly be

nationalism, now that the heyday of nationalism is past? (cf. Hobsbawm 1992); (2) what kind of nationalism is this? (cf. Kellas 1991); or (3) why is nationalism happening here, now? (cf. Hechter 1975; Nairn 1981)--questions I have touched on in the introduction and will treat further in later chapters--it is necessary to return to more basic questions of economics and politics. Following Walzer (1983), as discussed above, I think we should begin with questions of how political communities, and memberships in those communities, are conceptualized, and how the members of such communities generate arguments about matters of mutual provisioning, which is the basis of community in the first place. This is why many of my research questions revolved around what kind of government and policies, and more broadly what kind of value system, the people I spoke with wanted to see realized in Scotland, rather than around Scottish identity and nationhood per se. As one would expect, the answers people gave were diverse and complex, involving many uncertainties and contrary motives, often within individuals. Nonetheless I think that this chapter, and the one that follows, give a fair sense of the central tendencies of the aspirations I encountered--aspirations which revolve around a defense of the threatened idea of communal provision within the context of the modern democratic state. Thus I somewhat aphoristically characterize this study as concerned with the "moral economy of the modern welfare state," seeing it as a case study during a period when the very idea of the welfare

state is in global retreat. Only when we have mapped out the movement's social organization and discourse (the aim of this and the next chapter) and drawn out linkages between its driving motives and key themes, and ongoing historical transformations in the nexus of civil society, the state, and the global economy (the aim of Chapters 4 and 5), can we adequately address why this movement has taken the *form* of nationalism, and the implications of that fact.

CHAPTER THREE

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE AUTONOMIST MOVEMENT

I. Introduction

This chapter puts the previous one in a broader context by providing a fuller description of the central organizations, the forms of participation, and the array of arguments found in the Scottish autonomist movement. This includes central players--e.g., the SNP, Labour, The Scottish Constitutional Convention, and the defunct political magazine *Radical Scotland*--as well as more minor ones included to suggest the broader milieu of the movement, which is too ephemeral and diffuse at the margins to be strictly demarcated. Together I hope these will provide a general (though by no means exhaustive) map of the social and political landscape of the movement. Dealing generally with the post-1960s rise of the movement, this chapter begins to develop the historical background to the previous chapter, but the fullest treatment of the historical and political economic context will come in the next two chapters.

The material is organized in terms of the categories put forth under "methods" in the introduction: (1) political parties; (2) campaigning bodies; (3) the "intelligentsia"; and (4) The Adult Learning Project (ALP--as a focus for sampling participation and interest at the margins of the movement). These categories can be viewed as parts of what is frequently referred to as "civil society," a term both

fashionable in recent political theory, and part of common parlance in the Scottish movement. However, civil society is a complex, and at times vague, concept that has been given a wide range of meanings by diverse thinkers (cf. Bobbio 1989:22-43; Hall 1995; Kumar 1993), and which I intend to treat critically in this and the following chapters. But I will begin here with a preliminary definition.

Leaving aside its history for now, the modern concept of civil society, i.e., associated with Hegel, Marx and especially Gramsci, is usually related to that of the state, a relationship of opposition, complementarity, or collusion, depending on the theorist's position. At times it seems to include everything in society "beyond" or "below" the state. For some it involves primarily public life, for others it also subsumes the private sphere. It is sometimes conceptualized as a kind of generalized social space, but often an interlocking network of institutions and organizations is emphasized. I turn to Norberto Bobbio to round out a definition. He asks:

What is civil society? As a first approximation we can say that civil society is the place where economic, social, ideological and religious conflicts originate and occur and that state institutions have a task of solving them either by mediating or preventing or repressing them. The agents of these conflicts and therefore of civil society proper, in so far as it is contrasted with the state, are social classes (or, more broadly, the groups, movements, associations and organizations that represent them or declare themselves their representatives); as well as class organizations there are interest groups, associations of various types with social and indirectly political ends, ethnic emancipation movements, civil rights groups, women's liberation, youth movements and so on. Parties...in

reality do not entirely belong either in civil society or the state. In fact, one of the most frequent ways of defining political parties is to show that they perform the functions of selecting, aggregating and transmitting demands originating in civil society and which will become objects of political decision.... Civil society is the place where, especially in periods of institutional crisis, *de facto* powers are formed that aim at obtaining their own legitimacy even at the expense of legitimate power; where, in other words, the processes of delegitimation and relegitimation take place. This forms the basis of the frequent assertion that the solution of a grave crisis threatening the survival of a political system must be sought first and foremost in civil society where it is possible to find new sources of legitimation and therefore new sources of consensus. Finally, the sphere of civil society is generally taken to include the phenomenon of public opinion (understood as the public expression of agreement or dissent concerning institutions) which circulate through the press, radio, television and so on. Moreover, public opinion and social movements develop together and influence each other (1989:25-26).

I quote at length simply to capture and emphasize the relevance of this complex concept for what has been presented so far, and what follows. We will proceed, keeping this characterization in mind, and after surveying the social anatomy of the autonomist movement, return to consider more precisely how it fits into Scottish civil society.

II. The Social Anatomy of the Movement

A. The Political Parties

The Scottish National Party: The SNP's first electoral success came in the 1945 Motherwell by-election, but that seat was subsequently lost in the next general election.¹ Nonetheless it was a symbolic milestone. SNP

¹ By-elections occur between general elections when a parliamentary seat is vacated due to death, resignation, etc.. In general elections, held

support and membership grew gradually in the 50s and 60s, reaching a membership around of 16,000 in 1965, and peaking in another dramatic by-election victory in Hamilton in 1967. Then, in the context of rising expectations generated by North Sea oil, support surged, and in two general elections in 1974 the SNP jumped from 22% to 30% of the vote, sending 11 MPs to parliament. In terms of electoral politics, this is still the SNP's high-water mark. In the late 70s and 80s the party was again marginalized by upheavals in British Labour politics, a temporary alliance between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, and an initial receptivity in some quarters for the neo-conservatism of Thatcher. By the 1983 general election support had fallen to 11.7% of the vote, but since then it has climbed back. It was 21.5% at the last general election in 1992. During the last ten years the SNP has also made steady advances in local elections, capturing 26.7% of the vote and 73 out of 453 seats in the Regional Council elections of May 1994 (their main rival, Labour, took 220 seats). The Party now has four MPs and 2 Ministers to the European Parliament (MEPs)

There are two central axes of strategy in the autonomist movement that heavily shape the dynamics and internal conflicts of the SNP, as suggested by political scientist James Mitchell's analysis of the party's two major divisions. According to Jones, summarizing Mitchell,

at least every 5 years, all parliamentary seats are contested. By-elections are more likely to serve as outlets for discontent and protest votes, while general elections tend to pull people back into the party fold, and more accurately reflect the political tenor of the period.

One is the movement-party division. The movement position would have the SNP bereft of policies other than those which are directed at achieving independence, and would envisage the SNP acting in an umbrella or catalytic role trying to persuade other parties to move down the independence road....The other divide is the gradualist-fundamentalist division. In general terms, the gradualist believes that independence is achievable in a number of steps including devolution. But the fundamentalist sees devolution as a device to prevent independence and therefore to be resisted (Jones 1992a:387).

More positively, SNP fundamentalists see the call for national independence as a primary issue that takes precedence over traditional left-right differences within the party. Since the late 60s there has been a new push in the SNP toward a party/fundamentalist approach, especially in the wake of the defeated Devolution Referendum in 1979, which many felt was scuppered by Labour's ambivalent support and false promises of "a better plan" from the Tories. The shift has generated tensions, in that a political party requires a more or less clearly defined position along a left-right spectrum, while fundamentalism treats these issues as secondary. The general result has been a more clearly left-of-center set of policies. Major pressure to move in this direction came from the left-wing "79 Group," which included some of the keenest thinkers and ablest politicians in the party who had, however, been briefly proscribed in 1983.

A few profiles of core 79ers will give a sense of the group. Stephen Maxwell is a social democratic decentralist, who helped mastermind the "It's Scotland's Oil" campaign which contributed to the successes of 1974, but has since

distanced himself from the Party partly over its withdrawal from the Constitutional Convention. Rosseanna Cunningham is a lawyer with strong socialist convictions who recently became the fourth SNP MP in a by-election in the traditionally Tory-voting rural district of Perthshire. Jim Sillars is a socialist/pro-Europeanist. Originally a Labour devolutionist, he formed the short-lived Scottish Labour Party in 1976, later joining the SNP and converting it at a 1988 party conference to its present policy of "Independence in Europe," thus helping to counter popular fears of SNP isolationism. Sillars has been a central charismatic figure in the party, presenting an unusual combination of extreme leftism with extreme fundamentalism, the latter being more often associated with the center-right of the SNP. Alex Salmond is an economist by training and middle-of-the-road social democrat, presently the party leader and showing skill in negotiating between factions. Like many of the 79ers he is a gradualist at heart, but he does not press the point in the interest of party unity.

SNP political rhetoric is full of indictments of what the Tories (and other "unionist" parties such as Labour through their inaction) have done to the Scottish economy. The SNP is the defender of Scotland. Thus in 1987, despite internal qualms, it took a vocal stance against paying Thatcher's ill-conceived and abortive Poll Tax, which was introduced a year earlier in Scotland than in the rest of the

UK. And currently there is an SNP campaign against the new Value Added Tax (VAT) on fuel.

SNP rhetoric abounds with images of the energy and economic potential that would be released upon independence. But the data for concrete projections of economic recovery programs is unavoidably speculative, especially since revenues from North Sea oil would be a fundamental part of any program, and exactly what agreements on oil might be reached with the UK given independence is difficult to determine. Still an overview of the contents of recent policy documents gives a sense of the ambitions and ideological orientation of the Party, if not necessarily the real possibilities of an independent Scotland (see Scottish National Party 1992a, 1992b). Key points include:

(1) A written Constitution with a Bill of Rights. These would grant citizenship to everyone resident and/or born in Scotland (and others at the parliament's discretion), and legislate against discrimination on the basis of sex, race ethnicity, sexual orientation, and physical disability. The Queen and her successors would be maintained as Head of State in a constitutional monarchy, "...until such time as the people decide otherwise..." (Scottish National Party 1992a:4). The party is divided on this last question, with the younger members having a decidedly republican bias.

(2) Membership in the European Union, subject to confirmation by referendum. Though some on the anti-independence side have suggested that Scotland's UK

membership in the EU would not carry over, there seems little evidence to support this argument, nor reason to believe that the EU would want to keep Scotland out.

(3) A four year "Medium Term Recovery Strategy" which puts forth a broad program for job creation, poverty relief, and tax reform. (3.1) To improve employment and industry the SNP anticipates increased investment in rail and other infrastructure areas; a National Apprenticeship Scheme; an Industrial and Equity Investment Fund; a Scottish Steel Corporation (i.e., re-nationalizing the Scottish branch of British Steel); creating a Research and Development Programme and higher investment in the Scottish Tourist Board; and fighting for favorable treatment of Scottish agriculture and fishing industries within the EU by pursuing structural funds and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms. (3.2) The SNP will bolster the cornerstones of the welfare state by insuring free education and creating free nursery care for 3-4 year olds; retaining and rebuilding the ailing National Health Service; increased investment in public housing and mortgage tax relief for home buyers; increasing unemployment and welfare benefits and senior citizen pensions.

(4) The SNP Manifesto also calls for government support for the Arts and Media, and the removal of nuclear weapons such as the Trident submarines docked near Glasgow, as well as the rejection of nuclear waste processing and dumping schemes. They also call for investment in tidal and wind energy technologies.

As this review suggests, the policy documents of the SNP combine principled positions regarding constitutional and democratic issues with economic agendas that not only read like a wish list, but indicate the social democratic, left-of-center orientation that the majority of party members (and movement activists as a whole) gravitate toward. Even so it is worth bearing in mind that the SNP remains a "broad church" with a peculiar combination of rural, conservative support and more urban left-wing support. As mentioned in Chapter 1, research indicates that the party attracts defectors from other parties across the political spectrum, and has a strong cross-class (or non-class based) appeal, with some concentration among the "new" working class (technicians and craftsmen) and professionals and intermediate non-manual workers such as teachers and nurses. Upward social mobility and, more generally, geographic mobility also appear to be factors, and the SNP has always had an appeal for the young and first time voters (McCrone 1992:164-69; see also Kendrick 1989; Kellas 1989:138-141).

As might be expected, older SNPers are often more conservative, younger ones more left and radical. There is a general impression (with which I'm inclined to agree) that it now attracts younger left leaning activists who a generation earlier would have joined Labour, but are disillusioned with a moderating Labour Party, and more confident of the SNP's socialist credentials. Still, conversations I had with various members at the Party conference in September of 1993

confirmed the common perception in Scotland that it is a party of strange bedfellows. I recall speaking in a pub with one group of fairly young members from a branch in Aberdeen, where no bones were made about the fact that under other conditions, while most would probably be Labour, at least one would have been a Conservative. More than once I was assured that after an initial transition to independence, many would defect to new parties reflecting the usual left-right spectrum, the SNP having served its purpose.

The Labour Party: During the first two decades of this century, home rule was a central tenet of the Scottish socialist movement. But with the rise of the mid-century Keynesian consensus, this idea was pushed to the political margins. While there was always a pro-home rule minority within the Labour Party, it was only with the rising fortunes of the SNP in the mid 1970s that the Party had to seriously address the issue again. During the weak minority Labour governments of 1974-79 there were strong splits within the party over the question of devolution, as home rule was then popularly called. (It was in this context that Jim Sillars formed his break-away Scottish Labour Party.) Unable to internally agree on the issue, the Party created The Scotland and Wales Act in 1978, which called for popular referendums on the establishment of regional assemblies in those two countries. Immediately, opposing factions formed rival campaigns: "Labour Vote No" vs. "Labour Movement Yes." Members of the "No" contingent joined forces with Tories to

append the infamous 40% Rule to the Bill, which required that in order for the Bill to be put into effect, those voting "yes" had to comprise at least 40% of the total Scottish/Wales electorates. In the event, 51.6% of those voting in Scotland said "yes" to a devolved assembly, but as turnout had been 63.8%, this was only 32.9% of the electorate, so the Bill failed.

There are many reasons why the Bill failed, beyond dissension within the ranks of the Labour Party. Those opposed in both the Labour and Tory camps stimulated strong (and justifiable) fears of the costs of creating and supporting assemblies, and evoked the possibility that devolution would be the first step down a slippery slope to the break up of the UK, for which there is much less popular support. Add to this the general vagueness of the plans for what an assembly would look like, and intimations by some Scottish Tories that if the Conservatives were to win power some form of assembly, more thoroughly thought through, would be on offer, and it is not surprising that many declined their support, either by voting no, or staying home.

Since the referendum debacle and rise to power of the Tories in 1979, Labour, at least in Scotland, has been converted to the idea of a Scottish Parliament, which it currently promises to deliver within a year of being elected. This appears to be a real possibility at the time of writing, given the faltering of John Major's internally riven government, and the new popularity in England of Tony Blair's

modernized, reformed, business-friendly Labour Party. In effect, due to the north-south polarization of Labour and Tory support since the 1950s, and especially over the past 16 years, Labour has become the de facto party of Scotland, and home rule has now become a basic part of that mantle. A significant factor in effecting the party's conversion on the home rule issue has been the formation of the internal pressure group Scottish Labour Action (SLA) in 1988 under the adroit leadership of Bob McLean. One sign of this shift was the SLA's success at the 1994 Labour Party Conference in Dundee in having the name of the Party organization in Scotland changed from Labour Party Scotland to the Scottish Labour Party, a name which has some bitter associations with Sillar's renegade SLP of the 1970s.

The Liberal Democrats: The Liberal Democrats grew out of the nineteenth century Liberal Party which had become politically marginalized around the turn of the century. In the 1960s their fortunes began to revive, and in 1987 the Liberals and the short-lived Social Democratic Party (SDP) formed an Alliance Party. The SDP, which broke away from Labour in 1981, has been described as the "...a 'quiche and claret' party of the London suburbs..." (noted in Jones 1992a:386). In 1988 these two merged to form the Liberal Democrats of today. The Party has advocated federalism in the UK, or "home rule all around" (i.e., in Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and England), since the days of Gladstone in the 1880s. But as Jones observes, "...[t]he Scottish party

is passionately committed to Scottish home rule...whereas the party in England has been rather more concerned with civil rights issues than with regional government for England..." (Ibid.).

The Conservative Party: The Conservative Party of the 19th century had always had limited success in Scotland, and in 1912 it merged with a large break-away faction of the old Liberal Party that was fiercely opposed to Irish Home Rule. The party fared better in Scotland under its new unionist banner, managing to capture the Protestant, Orange Order portion of the working class vote, and even managing to be the only party to ever capture a majority of the Scottish vote (50.1%) in 1955. On balance however, the Labour party has fared much better, and support for the Tories collapsed in the 1987 general election, where they only held 10 out of Scotland's 72 Parliamentary seats. At the local level, where Labour is strongest, they are doing even worse. As Table 3 indicates, in the 1994 Regional Council elections they held only 31 out of 453 seats, taking a distant third place to the SNP in terms of share of the vote:

Table 3: 1994 Voting Results, Scottish Regional Council Elections:

<u>Party</u>	<u>% of Vote</u>	<u>Seats Won/Held</u>
Labour	41.2	220
SNP	26.7	73
Conservative	13.7	31
Liberal Democrat	12.3	62
Independent	4.7	65
Other	1.4	<u>2</u>
		453

(NB: 45.6% turnout of electorate; note also the discrepancy between vote share and seats taken, which is part of why most home rulers call for a system of proportional representation.)

While there were flirtations in the Party with the idea of mild forms of devolution in the 1970s, philosophically in keeping with the neoliberal ideology of smaller central government, the actual trend has been the opposite, toward a centralization of political power in Westminster. A central tenet of Tory ideology is that true power, in the form of political sovereignty, is intrinsically indivisible. This idea is often summed up in the aphorism coined by Enoch Powell: "power devolved is power retained," i.e., only an absolute power can grant provisional powers. Thus one of the sticking points regarding the establishment of a parliament is whether it would have entrenched powers that could not be later revoked by Westminster. Such an arrangement would be antithetical to the Tory philosophy. This unitary conception of power is evident in Westminster's frequent restructuring of local government, as well as the abolition of the Assembly in Northern Ireland (1972), and the Greater London Council (1985), which was a left wing thorn in Thatcher's side.

In the current political atmosphere in Scotland, where the Tories appear as lone unionists pitted against all the leading parties and the vast majority of the electorate favoring some form of constitutional change, it is easy to miss the muted, pro-devolution voices among the Tories. The Scottish Tory Reform Group, a branch of the UK-wide Tory

Reform Group which represents the left-wing of the Party, was formed to help articulate a distinctively Scottish take on Conservatism and devise ways to counter further erosion of the Party's Scottish base. I interviewed one leading member who is not alone in advocating the creation of some form of assembly/parliament, believing that this would actually help revive Tory fortunes in Scotland by providing a Scottish context for the articulation of Conservative ideas and interests.

The Communist Party: By the 1950s the Communist Party (CP) had 10,000 members in Scotland, a quarter of the party's UK total despite Scotland only having a tenth of the UK's population (Harvie 1981:109). During the middle of this century, when Labour was turning away from the idea of home rule, the CP still carried the autonomist flame on the left. While its electoral success was largely limited to the Communist MP Willie Gallacher in the mining district of West Fife (1935-50), by the late 1950s and 1960s the CP had become important to the internal workings of the Labour movement through its influence on key industrial organizations, specifically the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), and to a lesser extent, the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC). Defections from the CP to Labour in the 50s over Stalin and Hungary also influenced the general flow of ideas on the left. In 1964, the CP officially adopted support for home rule, and in 1969 it became part of the STUC's program.

Thus, while the Labour Party in Scotland did not clearly turn toward support for a Scottish Parliament until after the 1979 referendum, the Communists early on played a key role in solidifying support for the cause within the institutional infrastructure of the Labour movement (Harvie 1981:109-10; Jones 1992a:384; Marr 1992:182-3).

The CP remained critical to the autonomist movement through the 80s and early 90s, particularly by lending active support to the Scottish Constitutional Convention. With the collapse of the Soviet Union came the fragmentation of the Communist Party. At present there are three major products of this convoluted story. First, a continuing Communist Party of Britain (the "Great" seems to have been discretely dropped), preserving the more hard-line, Stalinist tradition and still supporting a parliament, although wary of the European Union in some quarters (cf. Foster 1991). Second, the Democratic Left (DL), formed in 1991 as a party, but reconfigured itself as an "organization" in 1993. This group has attracted a large portion of the support for the old CP in Scotland, and has a "eurocommunist" orientation with a strong concern for new social movements and the importance of identities other than those based on class. Dougie Chalmers, raised in a CP household and Convener of the Democratic Left, was originally the CP representative to the Constitutional Convention, and now is an active participant as a rep from the DL. And third, there is the small and young but active Communist Party of Scotland, formed in 1992, whose ideology

falls somewhere between the other two (i.e., not hardline, but preserving the marxist primacy of class analysis), and voices strong support for a parliament in the old tradition.

Finally, it is worth noting the widespread reputation of the Communists in Scotland, which can almost be summed up in a word--respectable. With the exception of some of the hard right, across parties and classes, the Communists were widely viewed to have been exceptionally decent, disciplined and hardworking people, almost the paradigm of the Protestant ethic, though put to a different end. In keeping with this perception, they were often seen as the moral keel of the Labour movement--a stabilizer for the Labour Party and the unions which were prone to corruption and Labourism (i.e., "old boy-ism") within their ranks. As a result their participation in the home rule movement is widely seen as giving it a stamp of respectability, not as marking it as a fringe endeavor. Another side of this respectable role in Scottish politics is that the CP tended to be "...bitterly hostile to Trotskyism and...ultra-leftism..." (Marr 1992:183), of the kind espoused by groups like Scottish Militant Labour, which I discuss next.

Scottish Militant Labour: Scottish Militant Labour (SML), one of the more dramatic elements in recent Scottish politics, grew out of the Trotskyist-hard-left Militant Tendency which developed in the British Labour Party in the stormy 1970s. Under the charismatic leadership of Tommy Sheridan, SML has had some striking successes in the

impoverished public housing projects of Glasgow. Sheridan, who campaigned while serving a jail sentence for refusing to pay his Poll Tax, pulled 20% of the vote when he stood for parliament in the 1992 general election, and since then the SML has won four District seats (including one for Sheridan) and two Regional seats. Nonetheless, the Party shows little potential for expanding its base beyond a small fraction of intellectuals and the deeply disenfranchised urban poor in Glasgow, who feel abandoned by Labour.

The Party program is one of strong marxist socialism/anti-capitalism, and it has benefited strategically from its militant opposition to the Poll Tax, which has been the springboard of its success. Just as the SNP's hypotheses about the prosperity of an independent Scotland are difficult to substantiate, SML's vision of a socialist Scotland tends to filter out the encompassing hostile capitalist context in which it would have to be realized. The Party supports the idea of a Scottish Parliament (if approved by a new popular referendum on the constitutional question) as an instrument of its socialist program, but parliamentary self-government is not central to its ideology. One gets the impression that its position on the parliament is mainly due to a pragmatic acceptance of the realities of politics in contemporary Scotland, where support for a such a body is overwhelming (cf. Wood 1989:127-8).

The Green Party: The Greens are relatively small with almost no electoral presence. But Scottish autonomists

generally want to defend Scotland's natural resources against exploitation and promote more ecologically sound forms of resource management and the development of wind and wave power technologies. This is obviously compatible with the Green philosophy, as is the general idea of more decentralized forms of democracy and greater local control over production and consumption. Thus the Greens have naturally gravitated toward the autonomist movement, and it in turn has provided a platform for promoting the Party's ideas. It is worth noting that at the time I got to know the people at the Vigil, several key members had Green Party affiliations, and between some of these there appeared to be a minor power struggle going on over the informal leadership of DFS. During the time of the Recall Rally this process came to a head. My interpretation is that this was partially due to the extreme limitation of public platforms for the Greens, thus making leadership of DFS a limited valuable resource for those with broader political ambitions. In the end this minor struggle seemed to extinguish itself due to a combination of personality factors, and leadership at the Vigil fell to a looser group without any primary party political commitments.

Conclusion: As this review of political parties in Scotland suggests, autonomist politics is pervasive, and not simply the preserve of the SNP. The dynamic of electoral competition makes it imperative for the parties to stake out positions on the issue of Scotland's constitutional future.

The three major parties take the three clearly contrasting positions in this field of arguments: the SNP for independence, Labour for a parliament within the UK, and the Conservatives for the status quo. It is worth remembering that the SNP only has to take into account a Scottish constituency, while Labour and the Conservatives are ultimately UK-wide parties, although having unique forms and traditions of organization at the Scottish level. It is also worth remembering that within each of these parties there are debates and members who dissent from their own party's official position.

Within this major frame the smaller parties take particular positions along the pro-parliament part of the spectrum, with the numerically small but venerable and respectable Liberal Democrats representing the desire for UK-wide federalism. The next section reviews the major pro-parliament campaigning bodies, and as we have seen and shall see, members of the smaller parties have been particularly active in this arena. The network of campaigning bodies provides a context in which conceptions of autonomist politics and potential parliaments can be articulated somewhat outside the direct pressures of party politics, and has also provided a meeting ground for pro-parliament politicians and intellectuals who might otherwise stay aloof from party politics. The campaigning bodies serve as a zone of negotiation (at times tenuous) between the parties, while at the same time substantiating the fact that autonomist

politics and desires transcend the party system. It is to the evolution of the campaigning bodies that we now turn.

B. The Campaigning Bodies

The Offspring of 1979:

The Campaign for a Scottish Parliament: The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, or CSA (now the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament, or CSP), was formed in 1979 as a response to the demoralizing failure of the referendum on the Scotland and Wales Act.² The CSP is a cross-party organization whose membership includes both individuals from across the party spectrum (although Liberal Democrats are disproportionately represented among its key activists), and organizations including local authorities (i.e., local government councils), trade unions, professional organizations and church organizations. Its day-to-day activities include such things as sponsoring public meetings on home rule related issues, running stalls at events, and larger projects generating publicity--for example, organizing the mini referendum on the constitutional issue in Falkirk, an "average" town in central Scotland, in December of 1993.

² The name change itself is significant, reflecting a general shift of opinion in the movement. "Assembly" is the softer term, suggesting a body with fairly limited and revocable powers, while the harder term "parliament" suggests a stronger institution with more entrenched powers--more on a par with the "other" parliament in London. Similarly, the term "devolution," which became popular in the 1970s, has connotations of decentralizing administration, while retaining power at the center. In current nomenclature it is often avoided, with terms like "self government," "home rule," (both rather ambiguous) and "a parliament within the UK" being used instead.

A thumbnail biography of the current Convener of the CSP is instructive concerning its inter-party function. Isobel Lindsay joined the SNP in the 1960s as a part of a new generation of young activists who, while politically to the left, were disenchanted with Labourism (establishment, male centered, bureaucratic, democratic-centralism), and attracted to the openness of the SNP's political agenda, as allowing a space for other concerns--she has a strong commitment to the peace and anti-nuclear movement. She originally participated in the CSA as a member of the SNP, having been the Party's vice-president in charge of policy and publicity, but fell out with the Party over its withdrawal from the Constitutional Convention (see Chapter 2 and below). In fact she was made the object of vitriolic scorn by some members of the fundamentalist wing, who saw her as subverting the SNP's cause. After a few years of not being a member of any party and simply focusing on CSP work, she announced in July of 1994 that she was joining the Labour Party, believing that a Labour Government has now become the most likely vehicle for delivering a parliament. Among key activists in the autonomist movement, political biographies like this, in which people move in and out of, and tarry in between opposing parties, is not at all uncommon.

The Scottish Constitutional Convention: From the beginning however, the CSA's main purpose was to create a forum for promoting the home rule cause and foster cooperation across often rancorous party lines. The founding

membership included people from Labour, the SNP, the Communists, the Scottish civil service, the trade union movement, and professional academics. The early 1980s were a low period for the movement, and the CSA's work was modest and gradual, but the idea of organizing some kind of Constitutional Convention early on became a central strategic goal. The CSA had some success in influencing the SNP, despite strong internal divisions, to take up the idea of an elected Convention as a way forward at the party's 1984 Conference. Late in 1987, two key CSA members--Jim Ross a former Under-Secretary from the Scottish Office under Labour in the 1970s, and Alan Lawson, editor of the political journal *Radical Scotland*--hit upon a plan:

To explain what the Convention was for, and to rally support for it, there needed to be a report 'by a representative group of people who are not enslaved to political parties but who carry political weight'--or, in other words, the leadership-in-waiting of a civil political movement (Marr 1992:197).

Thus the constitutional steering committee was formed, composed of eminent men, and some women, from the universities, the civil service, the churches and the voluntary sector. In 1988 this group issued "A Claim of Right for Scotland," a widely publicized report (largely drafted by Jim Ross) to the CSA, which offered an analysis of Scotland's historical and political situation, and outlined the possibilities for an Assembly, and how a Constitutional Convention could be organized to design such an Assembly. The title of the document is an explicit reference, recognizable to historically literate Scots, to the Claims of

Right of 1689 and 1842. The former had prohibited royal prerogative from overriding parliamentary law in Scotland, thus laying the groundwork for the accession of William and Mary. The latter was drawn up by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to voice objection to Westminster interference in Church matters, which had been nominally protected by the Treaty of Union in 1707. The 1988 document is lengthy, and provides one of the best available introductions to the issues involved. The prologue gives a sense of its mission:

Twice previously Scots have acted against misgovernment by issuing a Claim of Right; in 1689 and 1842. Circumstances may now be thought less stark and dramatic than on these previous occasions. But they are none the less serious.

Now, as then, vital questions arise about the constitution and powers of the state. Then it was clearly understood that constitution and powers were the issue. Now there is a danger that this will not be fully recognized; that symptoms, such as the Poll Tax, the Health Service, Education and the Economy, are mistaken for causes, which lie in the way in which Scotland is governed.

It is for a larger body than ourselves to set out in full the constitutional rights Scotland expects within the United Kingdom. That would be the true equivalent of the Claims made in 1689 and 1842. But we hold ourselves fully justified in registering a general Claim of Right on behalf of Scotland, namely that Scotland has the right to insist on articulating its own demands and grievances, rather than having them articulated for it by a Government utterly unrepresentative of Scots (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:10).

In early 1989 a meeting was held to put the CSA's proposals for a Convention before representatives of the parties and other interests. The Conservatives declined to participate and the SNP soon withdrew, responding to internal

pressure from its fundamentalist wing. On the 30th of March, the Convention held its first meeting, and its membership gives a sense of the project:

(1) Elected officials: 55 Scottish MPs, seven Scottish MEPs, and 59 representatives from local government councils across Scotland;

(2) Party representatives from: the Labour Party, the Scottish Liberal Democrats (especially heavily represented), the Social Democratic Party (now defunct), the Co-operative Party, the Communist Party, the Scottish Green Party, and the Orkney and Shetland Movement (representing another autonomist movement specific to those Scottish islands);

(3) Various institutional representatives from: the STUC, the Scottish Churches, the Scottish Council Development and Industry, the National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business, the Committee of University Principals, the Scottish Convention of Women, Dundee and Tayside Chamber of Commerce, An Comunn Gaidhealach, Comunn Na Gaidhlig (both working for Gaelic cultural preservation and rejuvenation in the Highlands and Islands), and representatives from five ethnic minorities;

(4) Three observers from the CSA.

The Convention "...unanimously adopted a Declaration acknowledging the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine its own form of government and pledging the Convention to work toward the preparation of a scheme for an Assembly or Parliament for Scotland which would be put to the

Scottish people for endorsement..." (Scottish Constitutional Convention 1990:4). Since then the Convention has occupied itself with refining its proposals, establishing working groups to hammer out thornier issues--such as whether to require sex parity among parliamentary membership in order to counter the strong male bias in Scottish political culture, with these groups reporting back to an Executive Committee. There have also been occasional publications and meetings--an example is described in Chapter 2--reporting on the Convention's progress.

While some autonomists have expressed concern that the Convention is running out of steam, or becoming bogged down in the details, there is also a general consensus that it has been crucially instrumental in effecting the Labour Party's shift toward strong support for home rule, and that this has been a major strategic advance for the movement. The participation of the SNP would have given the Convention a much stronger popular mandate, and their withdrawal has meant that many now see the Convention in much more partisan terms, as an instrument of Labour. It has also led several formerly active members of the SNP to distance themselves from the Party, and long term sympathizers in the broader movement to feel disenchanted with the SNP. Nonetheless, it is well known that the situation most likely to deliver a parliament (though by no means guaranteed to) is one in which Labour maintains a clear public commitment and an electorally strong SNP is breathing down their neck in Scotland's Labour

heartland in the central belt. In other words, the old SNP-Labour divisiveness, while often counter-productive to efforts to create movement solidarity, is also a part of a deeper logic of the movement in which the very antagonism between these parties is central to advancing the cause.

The Offspring of 1992:

The Coalition for Scottish Democracy: As mentioned above, the 1992 general election came as blow to the autonomist movement. Many people I spoke to described a feeling of shell-shock and disbelief, of being "gutted." Many thought at the time, partly due to rather shallow opinion poll analysis in the Scottish papers in the lead up to the election, that a Tory debacle was inevitable--either they would lose power in Westminster, or their electoral obliteration in Scotland would lead to a constitutional crisis. Instead, they not only won down south but gained one Scottish seat (from 10 to 11). The constitutional stalemate continued.

In the run up to and immediate wake of this event several new, smaller non- or cross-party organizations were formed. The Coalition for Scottish Democracy (CSD) emerged in March of 1993 as an umbrella organization to help integrate the efforts of this new generation of civic groups, and to capitalize on the momentum generated by the Scotland Demands Democracy March and Rally held during the European Summit in Edinburgh on December 12, 1992. A close

examination of the central cast of characters reveals the strong continuing presence of the CSP and various people instrumental to the Constitutional Convention. The CSD is Chaired by Campbell Christie, the well respected and influential General Secretary of the STUC.

To date the CSD has had two main projects. One was to design, circulate, and deliver a petition to the European Parliament to request its support for the right of the people of Scotland to self-determination. This was primarily a symbolic gesture, yet another move in what might be called the movement's "tradition of petition," to be discussed further in Chapter 6. The European Parliament is something of a talking shop, and its support, or lack of it, is of little political consequence, the real power lying in the Council of Ministers. This latter body is highly unlikely to pass any judgment that would appear to set a precedent for meddling in the internal affairs of territorial sovereignty of member nations.

The other project is what has come to be known as The Scottish Senate. This idea, developed primarily by members of the CSP, came out of a concern about the current low profile of Constitutional Convention, and a sense that what is needed is some kind of standing body, a kind of "shadow parliament," in which the people and institutions of Scottish civic life could come together and discuss Scottish problems and express their dissent from the UK government's handling of Scotland's affairs. This would achieve two ends. By not

relying on the political parties, it would by-pass the inter-party struggles that often derail cooperation in the movement, and it would create a permanent vehicle for publicizing the cause and strengthening the connection in the popular imagination between everyday practical concerns (e.g., jobs, housing, poverty, adequate health care) and self-government. On June 18, 1994 the CSD sponsored a "Consultative Conference on the Establishment of a Scottish Senate," symbolically held at the Royal High School in the chamber that had been outfitted for a parliament back in 1979.³

The Conference was attended by a wide variety of representatives from local governments, trade unions, churches, voluntary associations, political groups, and other home rule campaigning bodies. Some were dismayed however, by the poor representation of the Scottish business and finance community, arguing that these interests need to be involved in the process as well. The meeting was opened with a "civic welcome" by one of the Edinburgh District Councilors. This was followed by "three contributions from civic life," in which representatives from three voluntary associations, the Scottish Parent Teacher Council (education), Age Concern (for senior citizens), and Actions of Churches Together in Scotland (ACTS--addressing various aspects of poverty

³ It is also telling that while the Tory administration of the Scottish Office had announced plans to sell the building, the Edinburgh District Council had exercised its option to re-purchase the building, thus blocking this manoeuvre, and symbolically reasserting the fundamental opposition that now exists between the Scottish Local Government and the Tory Government on the home rule issue.

relief), spoke about the negative effects of the "democratic deficit" on the ability of these organizations to achieve their goals and serve their constituencies. The idea behind these interventions was to give a sense of the kinds of issues a Senate might discuss and issue public statements on. The rest of the meeting involved a presentation of proposals on how to organize the Senate, followed by open discussion. Participants addressed the need for broad and balanced representation of the populace, and grassroots, "bottom-up" forms of democracy. They debated whether a Senate might be confused with a parliament, being seen either as a substitution or as an unelected parliament-in-waiting. The organizers tried to allay these fears, although it is true that for some of them, the Senate could potentially evolve into a second chamber if a parliament were to be delivered. There was also a familiar skeptical refrain from those less integrated into the circle of "high profile" activists behind this project, that the entire affair might simply become another "central belt talking shop." i.e., another context in which politicians and civic leaders in the Glasgow-Edinburgh circuit get together to appear to be "doing something," while in effect doing little of consequence. This constant tension between a resurgent hope and optimism and a deep seated cynicism about politics is a defining feature of the movement discourse

Scotland United: I gave a general sense of Democracy for Scotland (the Vigil) in Chapter 2, here I discuss two

other contemporaneous groups. Scotland United (SU) was formed immediately after the 1992 general election in that brief period of inter-party cooperation between Labour and the SNP. In fact, it quickly became primarily a Labour party operation, as it and the STUC provided most of the organization and resources. The central purpose of SU is to organize and run a new popular multi-option referendum (status quo vs. parliament vs. independence) throughout Scotland. This is an extremely costly and complicated task, and so far SU has primarily dedicated itself to a fundraising drive, which appears to be moving very slowly. There is also an inside word that the Labour Party is not interested in making a heavy investment in the project, preferring to invest its energies in trying to win the next general election. Thus many people feel that the Labour Party, the only institution in Scotland with sufficient resources to carry off such a massive project, has rendered it dead in the water, by commandeering the project, and then putting it on the back burner. When I left the field, there continued to be nominal participation by members of all parties, but initial enthusiasm had been much dampened. Few in the SNP now seem to take the project very seriously.

Common Cause: Common Cause (CC) define themselves as "...a civic forum on the future of democracy in Scotland...founded to offer new ideas and initiatives to citizens calling for greater democracy through a Scottish Parliament..." (Common Cause 1992: back cover). Its primary

purpose has been to sponsor public meetings/forums/debates on the constitutional issue. The list of Trustees includes many of the "usual suspects" from the CSP orbit,⁴ but with an unusual weighting in favor of writers, journalists and academics who have become associated with the movement over the years (e.g. Tom Nairn, Joyce MacMillan, Neal Ascherson, and William McIlvanney).

The group came together in the lead up to the '92 election, out of conversations going on between the theologian/author Rev. Willie Storrar, and two lawyers, Allan Miller, Chair of the Scottish Council for Civil Liberties (and a key figure behind the Scottish Senate), and Bob McCreadie, one time vice-president of the Scottish Liberal Democrats. Their initial idea was that there needed to be some body to articulate arguments for a civic--as opposed to party--politics. Looking to the immediate future, they were concerned that if Labour won, there would need to be a voice arguing for innovative democratic reforms in a new parliament, not the same old politics as usual. If the Tories won, they would press for a new cross party approach, to call for an autonomous politics outside the party system, including the organizing of a referendum. As we have seen, this last initiative was quickly swallowed up by Scotland United and the Labour wing of the movement, and Common Cause has ended up actually focusing its energies on organizing

⁴ It is worth noting that there are many people in this circle who are also associated with Charter 88, a UK wide group organized in 1988 which advocates democratic and constitutional reform and the establishment and protection of civil rights.

public forums. One such forum occurred at the Royal High School in the afternoon after the Conference on the Senate, co-sponsored by Common Cause and Scotland on Sunday, a major Edinburgh weekly paper with a pro-devolution editorial stance.

The Cultural Nationalists:

Siol Nan Gaidheal: In the introduction I discussed the distinction between political (civic) vs. cultural (ethnic) nationalisms. The preceding I think amply demonstrates how the Scottish movement is weighted toward the political/civic end of the spectrum. Nonetheless, much to the chagrin of the political nationalists, especially the SNP, there is a distinct fringe of intense cultural nationalism in the movement. The story of this fringe could be given a much deeper treatment, going back to the cultural revival movements of the 1920s and 30s, which played a part in the founding of the SNP, and addressing the influence of Celtic-romantic authors like Fionn McColla and Peter Berresford-Ellis. But I will limit myself to what was going on while I was in the field, involving people in and around the rather shadowy "cultural and fraternal organization" Siol Nan Gaidheal (SNG--"Seed of the Gaels," pron. "sheel na gay-l").⁵

⁵ Britain's Secret War: Tartan Terrorism and the Anglo-American State (Scott and Macleay 1990) provides an interesting although sensationalistic view of the murky hodge-podge of revolutionary nationalism, letter-bombs, and quasi-secret societies that have inhabited the fringes of the movement since the 1960s. But considering that at least one of the authors has been intimately involved in Siol

The SNG has gone through two incarnations. The first ran roughly from 1979 to 1985, when the group was closely associated with the membership of the SNP, although not wholly an internal faction. Like the SNP's 79 Group, with its republican-socialist orientation, SNG was a product of the frustration that followed the failures of 1979. Its purpose however was one of cultural and moral revival; aimed especially at young men, SNG was politically vague, yet with a distinct anti-socialist/anti-left wing bias. In its early days, through its participation in marches, rallies and ceilidhs, it was quite successful in rallying morale among some nationalists, and attracted the support of some right-to-middle-of-the-road leading members in the SNP. The SNG was known for showing up at SNP marches, and marching separately with a color guard of young men in full highland gear waving black flags. Some found the image inspiring, others, ominous. In time SNG voiced an increasingly militant position, associating with other small, fringe militant groups advocating the use of violence. At the 1982 Conference the then fundamentalist leadership of the SNP killed two birds with one stone by expelling both SNG and the 79 Group.

By the mid 80s the first SNG had fizzled, and its successor, formed in 1988, disavowed violence. This second incarnation is, however, still inclined to produce posters

Nan Gaidheal, and founded Scottish Watch, this should not be taken as objective reporting. See Marr (1992:187-9) for a much briefer and deflating assessment of this militant milieu.

and literature that express extreme hostility and antagonism toward "the English." One familiar poster shows a person wearing military gear and balaclava, and brandishing a rifle. The text reads: "...so long as 100 of us remain alive we will never submit to English rule..." a passage from the famous Declaration of Arbroath written in 1320, which was a letter to the Pope from the Scottish nobility asking him to intercede in the ongoing conflicts with England at that time. SNG's "constitution" claims to eschew "...the divisive codes of party politics..." and "...economic expediency...":

In their place we advocate a foundation of Truth, Compassion and Common Sense. Our vision of the way ahead recognizes spiritual health rather than political creeds. We would thus by-pass the impenetrable bog-lands of party political manifestos, and in their place project a simple vision of a people on the march, fired with the excitement and adventure of rebuilding this ancient country and of endowing our children with qualities that stem from sound moral principles (Siol Nan Gaidheal 1990:6)

The harsh anti-English tone of the group's rhetoric also comes out in a statement of "...Aims and Principles of our Movement":

Our aim is to promote and reassert the historical sovereignty of the indigenous ethnic community which is Scotland, and in doing so rekindle the will of the Scots to take their political destiny into their own hands...We do not recognize the sovereignty of the English Parliament and therefore shall neither petition nor seek election to it. Rather, we shall unstintingly campaign against English imperialism in Scotland and highlight the insidious effects of its spiritual twin--Scottish Unionism (Siol Nan Gaidheal 1993:36).

The exact size and membership of the SNG is difficult to determine, due to its shadowy nature. I strongly suspect the core members exaggerate levels of participation. My own

speculation based on impressions is that the organizational work and publications are primarily produced by a fairly small and shifting core group, perhaps just over a dozen people, but there is a much larger floating/fluctuating membership of young people, mostly male recruits, who participate in occasional projects and events. Despite the continued ban on the group, some are active in the SNP, keeping their SNG membership a secret. Still, these would be a muted minority within the SNP. My attempts to meet core members generally involved a bit of skullduggery, and several chains of phone calls. Near the beginning of my fieldwork, the group appeared to go underground, partly in response to heat it was taking for the actions of two new splinter groups, Scottish Watch and Settler Watch, discussed below. It was also indicated to me that the leadership of the group was in flux, that the previous leader, Jackie Stokes, was pulling away from the group, and it appeared that one of the founders of the original SNG, Tom Moore, was again asserting greater influence.

Settler Watch and Scottish Watch: During October of 1993, shortly after I arrived in Scotland, a series of news stories began to break about the activities of two new organizations--Settler Watch and Scottish Watch. Both evolved out of the SNG milieu, the former being based in the north-east around Aberdeen, the latter in the south-west around Dumfries. Both are dedicated to exposing and opposing the impact of English incomers, often referred to as "English

settlers" or "white settlers." The "English problem" has many dimensions, but the three main areas are: competition for housing in rural areas, competition for places at Scottish universities, and disproportionate English presence in managerial and administrative positions, especially in the arts. The strongest feelings are for the first issue, and this is the main focus of Settler Watch and Scottish Watch. While these groups are prone to exaggeration, there are real problems of rural gentrification, as people from the south who prospered in the 1980s are able to buy vacation/retirement homes, driving rural housing prices out of the reach of locals in some areas. While the aggregate information on English immigration to Scotland does not seem to support the massive "invasion" these groups describe, it seems likely that there are many pockets in rural areas where this gentrification effect has been quite pronounced. Further research is needed on this point (cf. Dickson 1994).

Settler Watch is the more militant of the two groups, if they can indeed be called groups, and not just small circles of SNG-type activists. Its activities included posting threatening posters, leaving threatening packages with Celtic designs on doorsteps, and spray painting "English Out" and "Settler Watch" on houses with English occupants. I was surprised to find a flurry of news stories that revolved around a woman I had met briefly while on a preliminary research trip in the summer of 1992, who had helped me make my first contact with the leadership of SNG at that time.

She went by the name of Sonja Cameron, but she was from Germany and had changed her last name from Vathsjunker. She was working on a doctorate in Scottish medieval history, spoke fluent Gaelic, and was vice-Convener of the SNP's South Aberdeen association. She and a friend had been caught putting up Settler Watch posters--a major embarrassment to the SNP. The SNP eventually proscribed membership in both of the "watch" groups for all SNP members. By the beginning of 1994 there was also another response by the SNP--the formation of a group called New Scots for Independence, made up of SNP members from outside Scotland (primarily England), meant to counter the impression that the SNP is racist or unwelcoming to non-native Scots.

The main organizer of Scottish Watch is Iain Sutherland, a mild mannered history teacher from Dumfries, who also has long standing SNG associations. Sutherland has condemned Settler Watch's activities, but some of his co-organizers have expressed sympathy. Scottish Watch defines itself as a non-violent, anti-colonialist organization, its approach being to inform and persuade through publications and public meetings. An early flyer defines the group's aims as:

1. To investigate the extent of the English white settler exploitation of Scotland and inform our fellow Scots of what is happening in their own areas and in Scotland as a whole.
2. To create an organization to protest at the economic colonialism being inflicted upon the Scottish people and to defend them particularly in the areas of housing and employment.
3. To counter the English Tory generated climate of despair and fear, also to create a will to resist.

Toward this end Scottish Watch organized a series of public meetings around Scotland. The first one in March of 1994 drew around 100 people, some hostile and some receptive. I was unable to attend any of these meetings, but a fellow researcher reported to me that the one he went to had a fairly hostile audience, which seemed confirmed by the audiotape he played for me. The meeting I tried to attend was canceled due either to poor planning, or to second thoughts on the part of the person leasing the venue.

A small booklet published by the group is entitled The New Scottish Clearances, making a familiar reference to the Highland Clearances of c.1790-1830, in which Highland tenants were thrown off their traditional lands by ennobled and anglicized clan chiefs who sought to improve their lands by raising sheep.⁶ The statement on the inside cover of this booklet indicates the stance of the group (primarily of Sutherland I suspect) on political and economic issues, mixed with a kind of communitarian yearning characteristic of the Scottish autonomist movement as a whole:

Scottish Watch is a nationalist group which is positively anti-imperialist. We reject political ideologies which are based on economic dogma. Among these are international capitalism and socialism, the twin evils of the modern imperialist state. International capitalism is based on individual greed and results in exploitation of the weak. International socialism depends upon a divisive class-based analysis and has an inherently anti-social materialism at root. International socialism and capitalism are geared to

⁶ This is the typical scenario, though there was a whole range of economic "modernizing" processes at work, a continuation of the process of "improvement" begun in the lowlands a century earlier. The Highland Clearances provided case material for Marx's discussion of "the so-called primitive accumulation" in Vol. 1 of Capital.

exploit the environment and people to the maximum degree. This inhuman materialism contains the seeds of its own destruction. Scottish Watch adopts the concept of nationalism because only nationalism can unite a cultural or social group in the war against the imperialism of economic theories and dogma. We believe in people, not money. The cultural values of human society come first and financial matters must be subordinate to them. The false modern values of liberal cosmopolitanism are based on an essentially Anglo-Saxon mercantilism. The nonsense of so-called political correctness is a by-product of middle-income liberalism (Scottish Watch 1994:2).

While there is only limited public support for these "watch" groups, they tap into a widespread but poorly articulated discontent in Scotland, and many people I met, especially in the SNP, expressed a certain sympathy for them, even when they found their methods distasteful and wrongheaded. Passages such as the one above speak to a general distrust of "ideologies" and "systems" that are seen as external, remote, and inhuman. Something reminiscent of Weber's anxieties about the "iron cage" of the modern bureaucratized world comes through here. And while activists would tend to place themselves at either end of the polarized spectrum from civic to ethnic nationalism presented in this section, and the larger and more strategic share is at the "civic" end, it is important to acknowledge certain continuities. Across the board there is an understanding of Scotland as a real political community, oriented by common interests and values, which are in turn organically rooted in Scottish history and culture. Despite profound differences over the analysis of Scotland's situation, and strategies for improving it, these basic assumptions pervade the movement.

C. Popular/Public Discourse and the Broader Milieu

Intelligentsia, Media, and Popular Culture:

Another important part of the overall picture is the network of intellectuals, artists, writers, journalists and media figures through whom the ideas and attitudes of the movement are articulated. Alongside the rise of the autonomist movement since the 1970s there has been a cultural revival, placing new emphasis on Scottish language, culture, and politics in books and other publications (fiction, non-fiction, poetry), TV and radio shows, the plastic arts, theater, and popular music. The amount of work being produced is much too vast to attempt a comprehensive treatment here, so what follows is only a suggestive sampling, partly shaped by the particular contacts I made while in the field. My focus is on the kinds of work that reach a more general/popular audience, leaving aside the considerable growth in scholarly work, especially in the areas of history and historiography (e.g., Mitchison 1991; Donnachie and Whatley 1992; Beveridge and Turnbull 1989).

Many Scottish novelists, such as William McIlvanney, James Kelman, and Alasdair Gray have been particularly concerned with producing work that reflects and speaks to the Scottish experience, especially the central belt working class experience. A major part of this is writing in vernacular Scots. This in itself has certain cultural-

nationalist implications, although not necessarily of the sort discussed above. It is worth noting, moreover, that these authors also write explicitly on the issue of Scottish autonomism. Thus Gray has recently offered the booklet essay Why Scots Should Rule Scotland (1992), somewhat whimsically framed as an imaginary dialogue with his skeptical publisher, and McIlvanney has published various newspaper and journal essays under the title Surviving the Shipwreck (1991), his metaphor for the Tory assault on Scottish socialism.

As shown at the opening of the preface, McIlvanney is one of several writers/artists who frequently make public speeches at movement events. Another author who participates in this way is Billy Kay, whose extremely popular book on the structure and history of Scots, Scots: The Mither Tongue (1993), was made into a popular TV series in Scotland. That book concludes with the MacDairmid quote embedded in the Democracy Cairn described above, and I suspect that Kay's book is one reason why the Vigil folk remembered it, and selected it for this purpose.

Central Scotland abounds with journals that help sustain the movement discourse. *Cencrastus* (a mythical snake that consumes its tail, again a reference to the nationalist poet Hugh MacDairmid), is a glossy "magazine of Scottish and international arts, literature and affairs" that has been published since 1979. It contains a mixture of vernacular fiction and poetry, book and performance reviews, letters, and essays of political and social analysis. Autonomist

issues and debates are a recurring theme throughout. *Chapman*, also published since the 70s, is a literary magazine of fiction, poetry and essays. While less explicitly political, the central theme of the self definition and autonomy of the Scottish writer creates clear linkages to the broader autonomist discourse. Editor Joy Hendry is one of several founding members of Artists for Independence, another group formed in the wave of activism around the 1992 general election. *The Edinburgh Review*, a book-like journal published by the Edinburgh University Press, is a more eclectic mix of writings, interviews and reviews organized under headings like "works" and "ideas."⁷ Murdo MacDonald, one of the associate editors, runs the Centre for Continuing Education at the University of Edinburgh, and has organic social connections with the Adult Learning Project discussed below. All three of these journals receive significant support from the Scottish Arts Council, and *Chapman* also receives support from the Edinburgh District Council, the point being that such journals are notoriously hard to sustain economically, and their continued existence as vehicles for public discourse is due both to the demand for such intellectual outlets/forums, and to a system of substantial institutional provisioning.

Also worth noting is 20 year old Polygon Press which, although specializing in literature, is an important

⁷ This journal is a revived version of the original *Edinburgh Review*, an influential middle-class, Whig periodical founded in 1802 which helped to shape the political reform movements in the 19th century.

publisher of texts relevant to the autonomist movement (and thus is prominent in the bibliography to this study).

Polygon grew out of the student publications division of Edinburgh University Press, is also supported by the Scottish Arts Council, and now publishes the *Edinburgh Review*. It is another important component in the arts-publishing milieu that has evolved in Edinburgh since the 1970s.

Scottish Affairs, founded in 1993, is a quarterly journal published by the Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland at the University of Edinburgh. It grew out of the now defunct *Scottish Government Yearbook*, a major academic digest of materials relevant to Scottish politics that had been administered through various divisions of the University since 1978. While addressing a more professional/academic community, the *Yearbook* also served as a major forum for the autonomist debate. Broadening this forum is one of the main aims of the newer journal, which in the words of the editors "...takes up a position between informed journalism and academic analysis, and provides a forum for dialogue between the two. The readers and contributors include journalists, politicians, civil servants, business people, academics, and people in general who take an informed interest in current affairs...". Again it is worth noting that, as with Polygon and the *Edinburgh Review*, the institutional support of Edinburgh University helps make the journal possible. Lindsay Paterson, the Editor (he is also Convener for the Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland) has recently

published his own book The Autonomy of Modern Scotland (1994), itself a significant contribution to the debate. Paterson has been one of my "key informants" in Scotland, providing me with much feedback, many insights, and valuable contacts during my fieldwork.

There is broad agreement that the now defunct *Radical Scotland* was the most important journal for Scottish politics, autonomist or otherwise, throughout the 1980s. In fact, part of the motivation behind broadening the scope of *Scottish Affairs* when it succeeded the *Yearbook*, was to help compensate for the loss of *Radical Scotland*. The magazine published 51 issues between 1983 and 1991, and a list of its contributors over the years is both a "who's who" of the movement and a sound guide to the spectrum of ideological and strategic positions found there. For the latter half of its life, it was primarily organized and run by Alan Lawson, a key figure in the CSP and one of the initial instigators of the Constitutional Convention. Although highly respected, the journal was not well subsidized, just barely meeting production costs, and relying on the volunteered labor of its small staff. The editors' explanation in the final issue of their decision to close down is instructive; even if many on the scene would disagree:

After considering all relevant factors, the RS editorial board have reluctantly decided that this issue will be the last. The main reason for this is a positive one--namely, that the Scottish political situation has developed so much in the years of the magazine's existence that the uniqueness of RS and its line has [sic] been overtaken by events. Today, the case for self-government--and for a separate Scottish political

and cultural identity--has been accepted in all but the darkest corners of Scotland. Developments on the self-government front (and allied topics) are now taking place so rapidly that a bi-monthly magazine simply can't properly keep up with events. The much improved Scottish daily and weekly press and radio and television programmes are now producing new angles, new debates, and new analysis almost every day. Because of these developments, RS was enjoying less influence than it had done, and the future therefore held the prospect of declining relevance and (probably) declining sales. So we agreed that it would be better to quite whilst our reputation remained strong, believing that the magazine has played an important part in bringing Scotland to the stage where it now is (Lawson 1991:3).

The cover of this issue was a cartoon portraying Ian Lang, then Tory Secretary of State for Scotland, standing ankle deep in water on the beach and staring off into space uncomprehendingly as a huge wave labeled "Home Rule" looms up behind him. The coming year was one of high hopes for a Tory downfall in the 1992 general election which, as we have seen, did not materialize. Had the RS editors anticipated this they might have chosen to hang on a bit longer.

Still, there is substance to the general argument that the intelligentsia-media milieu had grown tremendously. One place this was reflected was in the editorial columnists for major newspapers. *The Scotsman*, the major Edinburgh daily (tabloids aside), now carried a regular Monday column by Tom Nairn, long a key observer, thinker and writer in the movement. Also new was the upscale weekly sister paper to the *Scotsman*, *Scotland on Sunday*. Here the regular editorial page column by Joyce MacMillan, theater critic and social commentator, provides a quintessential example of the

movement discourse I have been discussing⁸. The ravages of capitalism, the cynicism of the political parties (especially the Tories), the starvation of the democratic process, and the alienation from and erosion of community are her central themes. Her tone is frequently both moralistic and caustic. While she has particularly strong and developed views, the fact that she has a regular audience through a weekly paper with a broad middle-class readership shows that her basic outlook is widely shared. Some examples:

...sooner or later, British public opinion will have to get real again about the nature of capitalism, which is not some jolly nice show run by decent chaps from public schools, but a system which, in its nature, will exploit labour and discard burnt-out human lives unless people band together to regulate it and protect themselves...(MacMillan 1993a).

...For the paradox with which the right in Britain and America has not even begun to grapple is that economic internationalisation, if it is to proceed without provoking the most frightening kind of backlash, actually requires not less government, as the dominant market ideology suggests, but more government; enough government, in fact, at enough levels, to reassure people that whatever changes may sweep through the international market-place, their basic needs in terms of health, education, environment, income support, and the protection of cultural identity, will always, without fail, be met...(MacMillan 1993b).

...What I want is an international politics driven more by love and generosity than by hate and fear; a politics that "thinks highly of the soul", and expects the best, not the worst, from every person and every nation; a politics that finds a way to place real value on human beings, their feelings, affections, and needs; a politics that is prepared to fight to a standstill any system, any economic orthodoxy, that will not allow that basic decency. And so long as that kind of politics remains so far beyond our grasp, I think the men and

⁸ MacMillan is also a member of a commission set up by the Constitutional Convention to investigate the problems and alternatives involved in insuring balanced gender representation in a prospective parliament.

women at the party conferences had better keep quiet on the subject of "community". For if it sounds a harmless and easy word to us now, that is only because we have lost all sense of the demands real communities make, and the limitations they place on our freedom; so much so that if politicians truly began to think through the meaning of the term--for themselves, for our way of life, for economic growth and for the almighty markets--I suspect most of them would never dare to mention it again (MacMillan 1994).

MacMillan's commentaries can be taken as a kind of moral gauge of Scottish public opinion on these issues. Many might find her too idealistic and strident, but there would tend to be sympathy, if not always agreement, with her point of view.

A network of pro-autonomist opinion-formers exists in the non-print media as well. There has been a remarkable growth of theater dealing with relevant themes and politics, much of it in the various Scots dialects. For example John McGrath's "The Cheviot, The Stag, and the Black Black Oil," a darkly humorous synopsis of Scottish history done in a quasi-vaudevillian style, is immensely popular. The play focuses on three phases of exploitation of Scotland and the Scottish people: the expulsion of highland tenants to raise sheep (the cheviot) at greater profit; the transformation of highland estates into vacation game preserves (the stag) for the wealthy; and the derangement of local economies and lifestyles due the impact of North Sea (black, black) oil. One of the best known radical theater companies in Scotland today, "7:84", takes its name from the statistic that under Thatcher 84% of the wealth had come to be controlled by 7% of the population. Bill Findlay, one of my informants, had been a founding member of the journal *Cencrastus*, and now works

with a Canadian playwright translating plays about the Quebec experience into vernacular Scots.

Murial Gray is another well known figure who runs a production company (Gallus Bessom) that seeks to promote Scottish oriented TV and film projects. She used to write an opinion column that appeared opposite to Joyce Macmillan's in *Scotland on Sunday* where her autonomist sentiments were often in evidence. During my fieldwork she was producing and emceeing a short-lived, half-serious, half satirical game show on Scottish Television called "The Golden Cagoule" ("cagoule" = raincoat). On the show celebrity guests compete to answer questions pertaining to Scotland's culture, history, and natural environment--the winner mounting a platform at the back of the set to don the golden cagoule and be lightly drizzled upon from a shower nozzle.

One of the show's frequent guests, Donnie Munro, is the lead singer of the popular Scottish rock band "Runrig." The band hales from the Isle of Skye in the highlands, their original songs in both Gaelic and English revolving around the themes of lost tradition, cultural alienation, and political exploitation. Like many highlanders, Munro, a pro-parliament Labour supporter, has somewhat more reserved and cautious attitudes regarding autonomism than many central belt activists. Coming from a marginalized cultural and geographic background that represents what one highland informant called "a minority within a minority," highland

Gaelic speakers often show a more patient and pragmatic attitude toward the goals of autonomism.

Pat Kane is a member of the Glasgow based pop/rock band Hue and Cry, and also a public figure on TV and radio shows. He writes a regular newspaper column and recently publishing a book of essays on politics, culture, and the arts. Kane sees himself as both an artist and a social critic, and supports the SNP, fitting into its republican-socialist wing. Both Kane and Munro's bands are known for being supportive of the cause and playing at fundraising events.

All three--Gray, Munro and Kane--share something in common--they have all been Rectors of Scottish universities (at Edinburgh and Glasgow). An old custom in Scotland, the office of Rector is elected annually by the student bodies to represent student interests to the administrations. It is common for the electees to be popular and outspoken public figures, and the election of these three is a mark of the receptiveness of younger Scots to autonomist ideas. (Support for nationalism in the universities has a long history, however, ante-dating the post 1960s upswing in nationalist politics.) Iain Hamilton, SNP member, motorcycle riding lawyer, and key player as a young man in the temporary "liberation" of the Stone of Destiny back in 1951, was elected rector of Aberdeen University during my field stay.

The people mentioned in this section live in social circles that intersect and overlap--some know each other well, some are merely acquainted, but all would know of each

other. And as I have tried to indicate in regard to some of them, their social networks link up with those of the politicians and activists described above. I would maintain, and I know other observers of the scene would agree, that there are particularly dense and interconnected social networks around the movement. Although I cannot offer any operationalized measures, part of my objective throughout this chapter is to give a sense of this interconnectedness. As one SNP official observed to me, the style of Scottish politics is shaped by the fact that the players, even when on opposite sides of an issue, frequently know each other on a personal level, and have some mutual history.

The Adult Learning Project: This next section deals with one specific organization in which I did intensive participant-observation. Unlike the preceding, it is not so much an overview as an attempt to capture a "slice" of Scottish life. Rather than an organization in the autonomist movement, the Adult Learning Project (ALP) constitutes a context in which I could regularly discuss issues of culture and politics with everyday, non-activist, working-to-middle-class Scots.

ALP is an adult community education project located in the working class neighborhood of Gorgie/Dalry on the southwest side of central Edinburgh. It is a particularly successful case in the broader system of community education in Scotland, explicitly founded on the philosophy of Paulo Freire, the Brazilian theorist of critical socialist pedagogy

(Freire 1970; Kirkwood and Kirkwood 1989). ALP grew out of the efforts of a small group of neighborhood women working with a community education worker in 1977. They created a successful local program offering such things as preparation for English 'O' Grade exams and yoga.⁹ In 1979, the program was redefined as an Urban Aid project receiving combined central and regional government funds. After five more years it became wholly funded by Regional Government, in combination with its own fundraising efforts.

By the time I became involved ALP, was running courses on:

1. Scottish history, including women's history.
2. The environment and land ownership/laws/reforms.
3. Scottish politics, focusing on constitutional and democratic reform.
4. Photography.
5. Multi-culturalism in Scotland.
6. Gaelic language instruction.
7. Women's studies.
8. Writers workshops, including a women's writing group.
9. Traditional music and instrument instruction.
10. Traditional dance instruction.

ALP is run by the ALP Association, an organizing group of students and staff, which sets policy and plans curriculum, fees, and special projects and events. Individual study groups around the topics above collect minimal fees and rely on the collective efforts of the group. There is a core coordinating staff supported by regional funds who play a leading role, and most groups work with at least one of these instructors, but the direction of the

⁹ The 'O' or Ordinary Grade, is a general course of study leading to qualifying exams indicating the student's level of accomplishment at the secondary education level, and preparadeness for higher education.

project as a whole, and each study group, is highly cooperative. Some of the largest and most popular groups are those working on music, dance, and writing. Doubtless one reason for the centrality of music and dance in the curriculum is that full time Project Coordinators Stan Reeves and Vernon Galloway are accomplished musicians and members of the highly popular Edinburgh Ceilidh group, The Robert Fish Band--a key asset in fund-raising events.¹⁰

In February 1994 I began participating regularly in two groups, the History Group and the Democracy Group. The History Group was an ongoing project which had worked its way up to the latter half of the 19th century when I joined. Discussions revolved around the Dickensian conditions of the working poor, and the successes and failures of working class political organization during the period. An explicit concern of the group was to relate Scotland's past problems to its present ones. The orientation of the group as a whole was left, socialist, and autonomist if not nationalist. With the exception of one older man who quietly admitted to me that he voted Tory, the political sympathies fell along the Labour-SNP spectrum. Of the two staff coordinators, one was a specialist in local history who led tourists on Edinburgh history and was once active in Scottish Labour Action (see above), the other was a member of the young republican

¹⁰ Traditionally a ceilidh is an informal social gathering involving music, dance, story-telling, and lively conversation. But it has also come to refer to public dances in which traditional set dances are done to traditional (usually fiddle) tunes. Ceilidhs, like Scottish culture as a whole, are enjoying something of a revival, and are quite popular with young people.

socialist wing of the SNP and involved in that group's magazine *Liberation*. By the end of the term the group had produced, through the written contributions of members, the first volume of the ALP History Journal entitled "Reform and Revolution." The volume addressed topics such as housing and prostitution in 19th century Edinburgh, and the 18th century radical Thomas Muir.

The piece on Thomas Muir grew out of a small theatrical presentation put on in a nearby pub as part of a fund-raiser for the group. The "play," comprised of dramatic readings and minimal props, told the story of Muir, a radical lawyer agitating for the expansion of the suffrage, who was convicted on trumped up charges and transported to Botany Bay in 1794. Toward the end of the story one of the narrators (myself, in fact!) reads:

Yet today, 200 years after Thomas Muir's transportation, Scotland's political system is still dominated by patronage, and corruption. Just as in Muir's time, the opinion of the vast majority of Scots is not listened to by Government. Just as in Muir's time the taxation system is unfair to the poor and generous to the rich, just as in Muir's time, the system of government is full of unelected appointees who are chosen for their loyalty to the Tory Party.

The play ends with Muir speaking:

I was transported because I was found guilty of sedition, which was defined by the lawyers of the time as "a commotion of the people without authority." Therefore I urge you all to involve yourself in sedition. Make a huge commotion of the people, demand your natural rights. You do not have to face transportation so there is no need to be timid. We are a nation--we should start behaving like one.

In spite of the rousing and defiant tone here, the mood in the pub was actually quite light-hearted. It was a crowd

of ALP friends and members, out for an evening of drink and humor, and positively predisposed toward the spirit of the play.

The other group I worked with was the Democracy Group, whose central project was to study the range and types of constitutions around the world and then design its own for Scotland. Each meeting began with a brief discussion of news items of the week, especially those that seemed to mark outrageous infringements upon democratic principles. Of the two staff co-ordinators of this group, one was a fairly typical Labour supporter, the other an active member of the fledgling Communist Party of Scotland, having been a member of the CPB before its fragmentation. People took turns doing presentations; I did one on the American federal system of government. By the end of the term, some constitutional principles had been agreed upon, rough constitutional designs suggested and discussed, but nothing finalized. Ambiguity concerning whether what was being discussed was a parliament within the UK, or an independent state, sometimes led to confusion. The group was also active in trying to help foster a local Gorgie/Dalry community organization to participate in a general campaign taking shape to oppose Tory legislation for a Value Added Tax (VAT) on Fuel. These efforts failed, and it was felt that there would likely be more activism on the issue once the tax was imposed. Also, as part of the "civic life of Scotland" invitations were sent by the CSD to ALP to attend the Consultative Conference on

the Scottish Senate. Two members of the Democracy Group went as representatives (I attended under separate invitation).

While many of the students and staff of ALP have or have had memberships in some of the parties and campaigning bodies discussed above, it should be understood that ALP is not an instrument of any of these. The focus of the groups I worked with was a response to a genuine popular interest and demand. These issues are in the air, and while many people do not pay too much attention, cynically disinterested in politics, many are concerned enough to take a more active step by participating in the kinds of classes ALP offers. In short, I believe the ALP curriculum and activities provide a good gauge of matters of interest and concern in the popular imagination.

I would be remiss if I did not emphasize the broader social function of ALP. The weekly evening classes were usually followed by a visit to Ryries, a popular local pub, for a couple of pints and continued conversation on the themes of politics, history, and society (as well as lighter fare). I participated in several study trips to historical sites in Scotland and a two week long summer trip to Brittany, to stay at a Breton language and culture center and learn about and compare the situations between Scotland and Brittany, both regions within larger states with Celtic cultural roots. All these situations provided extended leisure time to get to know fellow ALPers and establish real friendships. My work with ALP was by far the most engaging

and rewarding part of fieldwork, where I felt I was most able to participate, and not simply observe.

III. Discussion: Civil Society, the State, and Hegemony

I return now to the question of civil society. The recent revival of this term is clearly related to movements in Eastern Europe to resist Soviet-Communist political domination and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union (Cohen and Arato 1994:15, 29-82; Hall 1995:1-2; Kumar 1993:375). The term has sprung up in many places. It is currently a preferred term of self-definition for political activists in a wide range of places--for example Chiapas, Mexico, among anti-PRI, Zapatista supporters (Christine Kovic: personal communication), and Palermo, Sicily, among anti-mafia activists (Jane Schneider: personal communication). It has also become a central term in the post-1989 discourse of the World Bank and NGO's, particularly in regard to new policies toward "development" in Africa that place a new emphasis on "reforming" political and social institutions (Williams and Young 1994). In these contexts, often characterized by the domination of a single-party state, civil society is strongly contrasted with, even defined in opposition to, the state. Although there are competing versions, this polarized conception has considerable currency in intellectual and academic circles

(cf. Cohen and Arato 1994:423; Gellner 1991). It does not work well for the Scottish case.

As we can see from the foregoing, competing political parties form a focal point, as well as a stumbling block, for movement energies. This is why the movement cannot be adequately understood simply by focusing on the history and dynamics of the SNP. There is a complex political ecology of competition, pressure, and maneuver between the parties, which is further manipulated and mediated by the various campaigning bodies. To understand the underlying trends, one has to see the chain of push-pull: the SNP emulates some Labour-style policies in order to compete for Labour votes; Labour moves toward a pro-parliament, quasi-nationalist position to hold ground against the SNP; and the Tories constantly float ideas about mild structural reforms, with some members occasionally hinting at the need for a devolved assembly, to deflect the image of English-centered aloofness. Meanwhile, smaller, more marginalized parties such as the Scottish Liberal Democrats, the Communists of various stripes, and the Greens, use the field of campaigning groups as a compatible venue for advancing their politics, practicing a kind of political entrepreneurship in terms of investing their limited energies and resources.

I think Bobbio (1989:25) is correct in conceiving of parties as mediating between, and linking, civil society and the state. Thus the Tory government does adjust to movement demands under the pressures of party politics, however

minimally and counter-strategically. Furthermore, as will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5, the Labour Party controls vast portions of Scottish local government especially in the populous central belt. While they are handicapped by the pronounced concentration of political power in Westminster, they represent a bulwark within the structures of government, that advocates for the movement. Thus there is no easy division, but rather enchainment, between civil society and the state in this case.

Turning to the field of campaigning groups, we must also remember to ask what parts of civil society are missing from this picture? As the discussion of the CSD's Consultative Conference for a Scottish Senate suggests, civic representatives of the financial and business communities are conspicuously lacking even though more economically oriented institutions such as banks, businesses, and chambers of commerce, are as much a part of civil society as churches and political, consumer, and social advocacy groups. One might even argue that the latter are particularly designed and predisposed to pressure the state, seeking its involvement, because they lack strong resource bases of their own and require state assistance. Relatively autonomous economic institutions and firms, although clearly lobbying the state in their own self-interest, are in many ways less directly dependent on it, and might be viewed as the sector of civil society that is truly opposed to the state. In fact, however, it is precisely their growing autonomy within an

increasingly neoliberal capitalist economy which allows them a certain privileged access to the state and influence on government policy. If anything their position has been strengthened by the current retrenchment of the welfare state.

Under capitalism, in the Hegel-Marx-Gramsci tradition at least (discussed further in Chapter 4), civil society, private property, contractual relations, and the economy in general are interwoven. The tendency to forget this in transferring (or rather returning) the civil society concept from the eastern bloc to western capitalist democracies has led to an oversimplification of the concept. In the latter context, it is much messier--representing a domain within which there is much tension and conflict between competing interests, both private and public, for access to and control over the state and its policies. Along these lines, we should avoid romanticizing civil society by remembering that it is also a place where politics becomes diffused and deadlocked. At the CSD's Consultative Conference on a Scottish Senate, several participants voiced the worry that the entire project was likely to become another ineffective "talking shop" where politicians and civic leaders grandstand, but little is concretely achieved. This skepticism bordering on cynicism is a recurring refrain in the movement, especially from more informal and politically marginal groups like DFS and SNG. Moreover, we must bear in mind that while the Scottish Constitutional Convention and

the Coalition for Scottish Democracy are in some sense quintessential examples of a civil society based politics (and many Scottish movement activists would argue this), the ethnic nationalist groups such as Siol Nan Gaidheal and Scottish Watch, however ineffective, are just as properly a part of civil society. To exclude them is to misunderstand the concept. Civil society does provide a base for political mobilization, but it can also absorb and defray those same energies, sending mobilization in various contrary directions.

This brings us to the question of hegemony. Following Raymond Williams, I would locate this concept somewhere between ideology and culture (1977:110), as signifying both power arrived at through consent, and consent backed by power (cf. Gramsci 1971:12). In anthropology in recent years, this concept has tended to become detached from that of civil society, to which it was intimately related for Gramsci. It has also increasingly been thought of in terms of a pairing with the notion of "counter-hegemony," i.e., emergent and opposing zones of consent within the larger hegemonic sphere (e.g., Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:257-60; cf. Williams 1977:121-27). In analyzing the Scottish case I am inclined to cast a skeptical eye on the idea of counter-hegemony and its utility. Gramsci, of course, offered no such concept, and was instead concerned with how hegemony was, or failed to be, generated. To be sure, he was concerned with the cultivation of "organic" intellectuals that could provide

leadership for the communist movement, but the presence of intellectuals does not lead directly to hegemony.¹¹ But more to the point, politics is not a question hegemony and counter-hegemony battling for control of some ideological or cultural sphere, rather, there are multiple efforts at hegemony, which all have the same objective, control of the state. I am arguing for a fairly restricted conception here, of hegemony as the realization of effective consent regarding a particular conception of the state. Labour and the idea of democratic socialism is hegemonic in regard to the state in Scotland, and the Conservatives and the idea of neoliberalism are hegemonic in regard to the state in the UK as a whole, and thus in Westminster. These are different spheres of hegemony: counter-hegemony does not illuminate matters. Where there is no purchase on the state, there is no hegemony of any sort. The very fact that socialism does exhibit continuing hegemony in Scotland, rather than merely aspiring to it, is part of what makes this case important to study.

My purpose here is not to deny the existence of various kinds of "resistance" to power and domination (cf. Scott 1985), nor the contradictions through which forms of resistance help create their own domination (Foucault 1980;

¹¹ "...Marxism...is still passing through its popularising stage; to develop a core of independent intellectuals is no simple task but a long process with actions and reactions, agreements and dissolutions and new formations, both numerous and complex; it is the creation of a subordinate social group, without historical initiative, which is constantly growing but in a disorganized manner, never being able to pass beyond a qualitative stage which always lies this side of the possession of State power, of real hegemony over all of society which alone permits a certain organic equilibrium in the development of the intellectual group..." (Gramsci 1957:87).

Sider 1987), but simply to caution against confusing these processes with that of hegemony, thus blurring the latter's focus. The more the concept of hegemony becomes detached from the institutions and organizations that realize and reproduce it, and the primary issue of state power, the weaker the concept becomes. It is worth pondering the odd fact that while for Gramsci, hegemony was contrasted with "rule" or domination by direct coercive force (1971:12), in current anthropological analysis hegemony is often found in social contexts where the degree of domination through the state (law, violence) and relations of production is extremely high. Clearly hegemony is most highly developed and elaborated in political systems where the use of domination is normally more restricted--i.e., within the civil societies, and especially among the middle classes, of modern liberal democratic states.

The differences between the Scottish case and the context of Gramsci's own political thought should be pointed out here (cf. Bellamy 1994:x). Gramsci pursued the idea of The Party as a state-within-the-state that would come to power (hegemony and rule) amid the rising tide of the socialist labor movement in early 20th century Italy. In Scotland, as we said toward the end of Chapter 2, the autonomist movement is an odd combination of conservatism in regard to Keynesian socialism, and a progressive but somewhat vaguely defined Europeanism. If something is being prepared in Scottish civil society, it is not a socialist take-over of

either Scotland or the UK (despite the aspirations of Scottish Militant Labour), but a left-of-center, as Scandinavian-style as feasible, small state in the European Union. Due to economic integration, the EU is now the relevant context within which struggles between socialism and state management on the one hand, versus economic liberalism and corporate freedom on the other, will be fought out. Civil society still plays a key role in this process, but the specific strategic goals are vastly different from those Gramsci had in mind when formulating his conceptions of hegemony and civil society.

It is also worth considering differences in the basic infrastructures of civil society in Gramsci's Italy and modern Scotland. Ultimately, hegemony needs broad and deep roots to flourish, and this requires an extensive organic system of social "cells" in which it is generated and reproduced. That is why Gramsci was so concerned with the role of Factory Councils in his conception of proletarian revolution (Gramsci 1994:163-67). There is nothing that exactly corresponds to this in the present Scottish movement. There are political parties, but party-branch membership has fallen across the board in the last fifteen years, and the old system of Labour clubs and unions has been drastically undermined. Church membership is also down, and membership in the various campaigning bodies is clearly limited. Although under the right circumstances, rallies and marches can turn out large supportive crowds, this does not translate

easily into steady activity and participation through the social structures of daily life.

This seems to point toward a fundamental, familiar and widespread shift in how hegemony is produced in modern states, from community based social institutions, print media, and face-to-face communication, to newer forms of mass consumption and mass media. Scotland has retained many organs of the earlier forms of hegemony production, in terms of print media, a lively pub-culture where politics is discussed, and a range of civic organization like ALP and those that participated in the Consultative Conference. But while these organizations occupy a relatively supportive environment generated by Labour dominated Local Government, and share a social democratic philosophy, they are differentiated and thus fragmented in their primary aims and interests (e.g., community education, helping the poor, senior citizen concerns, etc.). In other words, they lack the more or less uniform cell-like structure that Gramsci was attracted to in the Factory Councils (his version of the soviet), and that characterized the institutions of mid-century Labour-culture.

Regarding newer organs of mass media and mass consumption in Scotland, it is significant that these exhibit a Scottish orientation (despite incessant cultural Americanization). Scotland has its own Radio and TV stations, which beyond giving time to autonomist issues, treat Scotland and Scottish culture as an important reality,

a defining feature of social life, and this approach is actively promoted in the Scottish broadcasting industry (cf. Linklater 1992; MacInnes 1994). Of course, these modes of disseminating information and ideas have their familiar isolating and fragmenting social effects, yet they do this within an explicitly and self-consciously Scottish national framework.

As I suggested above, there are several pop bands (Hue and Cry, Runrig, Capercaillie, The Proclaimers) who emphasize Scottish themes and sometimes autonomist politics. These also generate products for consumption in the forms of tapes, CDs, and concerts. More generally, there is a specifically Scottish framework of mass consumption, however un- or only subliminally political. Thus there is the national soft drink Irn Bru, as well as Scottish ales and lagers such as Tenants and McEwans, not to mention other foods. I would argue that football, which is a major pastime (for some a preoccupation) in Scotland, should also be viewed in the context of modern mass consumption. But the story here is also more complex, in that football in Scotland is deeply connected with national (especially masculine) identity, as well as Protestant-Catholic rivalry. During the mid-1970s surge of the SNP, nationalist sentiments became heavily invested in Scottish football teams and their performance abroad, including England. It is widely suggested in Scotland that the blow delivered to the national psyche by the loss of Scotland to Argentina in the 1978 World Cup is

causally related to the failure of nerve in passing the 1979 referendum on a parliament (cf. Forsythe 1992:352-53).

What I am generally suggesting here is that although strong community based channels of hegemony have undoubtedly weakened, newer channels have taken hold at a distinctively Scottish national level, thus reinforcing the construction of political conflict along Scottish versus English/British axes. I would also argue, and here I am anticipating the issues of Chapter 5, that developments in the organs of hegemony in Scotland have been shaped by the creation of a corporate middle-class out of the former working-class, via the institutions and standards of the Keynesian welfare state. Theorists of the welfare state sometimes refer to "decommodification," i.e., the management and regulation of consumption and demand by the state rather than the free market (Keane 1984:14-18; Offe 1984). Scotland is, in a sense, simultaneously constituted as a framework for both commodified and decommodified consumption. These are not entirely separate social processes, because national identity and community are shaped through patterns of consumption in their entirety, from nationalized health care and rail services, to pop music, soft drinks, tourism and TV shows. Although relatively depoliticized, this national context of consumption seems to provide a frame of reference which at least latently supports the more politicized conceptions of Scotland generated by the autonomist movement. In other words, due to the peculiarities of history, these newer media

of hegemony have braced rather than defused this particular movement.

CHAPTER FOUR

MODERNITY AND THE MAKING OF MODERN SCOTLAND

I. Introduction

In this chapter we turn to a deeper history of Scotland, to trace out its development as a modern nation, and examine more closely historical transformations in relations between the state and civil society. Although the massive changes of the 20th century, treated in the next chapter, constitute the most immediate social forces shaping the contemporary movement, these have worked upon other more longstanding social processes and tendencies. Here I try to lay these out and give a sense of how the corporate, national identity of Scotland today has concrete roots in the structures of Scottish history. More specifically, these are structures of modernity that emerged with the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism, in the making of the modern period. It is the period in which the categories of the state and civil society as we understand them, however contentiously, today, took shape.

It is important to pay attention to the balance of autonomy versus incorporation between Scotland and Britain during this period in which the two are unified first under the same Crown in 1603, and then under the same Parliament in 1707. Central in this account is the role of the reformed, Protestant, Presbyterian Church (the Kirk)--which has been a crucial institution spanning and fusing the domains of state

and civil society. The Kirk operated as a kind of state-within-a-state, especially with regard to domestic affairs after 1707, a role it fulfilled until the mid-19th century when the pressures of that era led to a major schism that permanently weakened it as a hegemonic and integrative social institution. The decline of the Kirk was then paralleled by the growing importance of modern party-based politics, thus setting the stage for the labor movement and the 20th century welfare state.

After offering an overview of Scottish history from the 16th to the 19th centuries, I return again to the notion of civil society to consider how it can help us understand this particular history. I will also go more deeply into the history of the concept itself, which has important origins in the Scottish Enlightenment with writers such as Francis Hutchinson, David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith. The 18th century Scottish version of this idea is heavily imbued with notions of an inherent self-regulating moral order in human society, which sheds light on how these thinkers tried to make sense of the changing political and economic circumstances of their own society and times. I will further trace the development of this concept in the 19th century in the work of Hegel, and Marx's critique of Hegel--showing how their treatments of civil society laid the groundwork for Gramsci's conception in which hegemony comes to replace morality as a central concern. The writings of these last three--Hegel, Marx, and Gramsci--form the basis of most

current thinking on civil society and its relationship to the state, but the more ethical conception of the Scottish Enlightenment persists to varying degrees in modern applications (cf. Gellner 1991; Seligman 1992:6-7). Thus I hope to reconstruct some of the underlying connections between the civil society concept as it is commonly used in the social sciences and humanities today, and as it was developed during the Scottish Enlightenment in response to the profound social changes going on in that period.

II: A Synopsis of Scottish History From the Reformation Through the Nineteenth Century¹

The Reformation: The Reformation in Scotland grew out of the changing fates of the medieval Catholic Church and the network of burghs established by the King and his noble vassals. During the period of Scotland's normanization in the 12th and 13th centuries the church had become a dynamic economic and cultural force, but over the next two centuries it became a decaying institutional redoubt of monarchs and nobles, who filled higher church offices with their (often illegitimate) offspring and extracted the material resources of monasteries, cathedrals, and church lands, allowing many local parishes to fall into decline. In contrast, the years after 1450 had seen steady growth of wealth and trade in the

¹ Key sources for this section include: Checkland and Checkland 1989; Lenman 1981; Lynch et al. 1993; Marshall 1992; Mitchison 1983; Smout 1972, 1987; Withers 1988; and Wormald 1981. My thinking here is particularly indebted to Lindsay Paterson (1991, 1994), who argues convincingly for a greater recognition of the relative political autonomy of Scotland during this period.

larger royal burghs of the east coast, and the establishment of many new, smaller baronial burghs, thus strengthening networks for the influx European goods and ideas. Together these processes altered the balance of power between an older established aristocracy, and a new developing class of burgesses, lawyers, and junior nobility.

Beyond urban growth and church decline, two other factors were key. First, through a combination of dynastic accidents and machinations, Scotland was heading toward monarchal union with France, a situation which grew out of a history of political and military alliances made during many years of war and conflict with England since the late 13th century. Many Scots resented this. Second, at the same time that the burghs were becoming stronger, noble power was being overtaken by the rising class of lairds. Many of these substantial landholders enjoyed tenancy agreements whereby they paid fixed rents to their lords in money, while extracting rents in kind from their tenants. Over the troubled times of the 14th to 16th centuries, this process of subinfeudation had become a common means for the nobility to generate much needed cash. In the context of rampant inflation due to the arrival of New World gold and silver, this meant the lairds now found themselves in an advantageous position, paying out relatively cheap fixed rents, while generating revenues from the productivity of their tenants (Makey 1979:3).

Scotland actually had two Reformations. The first, in 1560, was led by a large faction of the nobility and was a relatively moderate expression of resistance to the possibility of political absorption by France. The second, in 1567, was much more radical and Calvinist, bringing together the forces of a new class alliance between parts of the nobility, the upwardly mobile lairds, the burgesses, and the growing elite of clergy and lawyers. The new Kirk that came out of this was expansionist and proselytizing in outlook, quickly taking hold of the lowland burghs and steadily expanding into the towns and countryside (the highlands tended to remain Catholic until much later). The Kirk leaders saw their role as one of overseeing and instructing the civil authorities, and the Kirk itself, through the system of parishes, took responsibility for poor relief, a widespread system of education so that all parishoners could be literate and read the bible, and often harsh social and moral discipline. The result, especially for the first hundred or so years, was a theocratic society intensely concerned with piety and godly discipline (Smout 1972:65-93).

The Union of Crowns: After a period of struggle between this new church/class and the Catholic Mary "Queen of Scots" (1561-67) there existed an uneasy balance of forces as the alliance developed, and the minority of King James VI was managed by a series of Regencies. Then dynastic dilemmas in England intervened. After ruling Scotland since 1587, James

VI became also James I of England, with the Union of the Crowns in 1603. Inevitably, James moved his court to London, and ruled the realm with his dramatically expanded powers from there. This began a trend toward anglicizing the reformed Kirk's organizational structure and liturgical practices on the one hand, and toward absolutist government on the other, that reached a breaking point under the rule of his son Charles I (1625-49). A key point of tension was the Crown's efforts to extend and integrate its administrative powers by grafting the Episcopal (i.e., English) form of church organization, based on a hierarchy of appointed Bishops, on top of the new Presbyterian system. The latter was, in principle, more democratic, composed of embedded levels of elected representation from the Parish Kirk Sessions, through the Presbyteries, and up to the national level of the General Assembly.

Charles' reign was toppled by a complex mixture of English parliamentary struggles between its nobility and developing bourgeoisie, and the rebellion of the alliance of new Scottish classes under the banner of the Presbyterian Church. The Scots elites who banded together to pressure Charles to change his policies, and the armies they eventually led in their part of the "English Civil War," were known as Covenanters, because of their practice of using covenants to formulate and present their religious and political demands. Crucial during this period were the National Covenant of 1638, which bound the signatories, the

members of Scotland's new class alliance, to mutually defend Presbyterianism and oppose Catholicism,² and the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, which pledged mutual support between the Covenanters and the English Parliament in the same cause. The former was intended as a device to compell Charles (through his signature) to recognize the Covenanter's demands; the latter was in fact an expedient device for the English Parliament to enlist the Scottish armies in their cause. Although the Scots vainly hoped that the outcome of this alliance would be a humbled King Charles, administering his kingdoms through a unified Presbyterian Church, they got instead a beheaded king and the harsh military government of Cromwell's occupying army of puritan independents during the interregnum of 1650 to 1660 (Chapter 6 discusses the cultural roots and ramifications of the covenanting practice in more detail).

Politics in Britian became more stable in the second half of the 17th century, especially when the new royal line of William and Mary was established in 1689, thus making the various forms of Protestantism in England and Scotland, and the powers of parliaments, more secure. In the lowlands this greater stability led to some intensification of agricultural production. Where there had long been a gradient of mixed agro-pastoralism from the lowlands to the highlands, by this

² More specifically, the Covenanters opposed "papacy" and "prelacy" (administration by bishops); in other words, their objections were directed at the "Catholic" practices of the Anglican Church that were being grafted on to the more decentralized Presbyterian system from above.

time there had developed a pronounced split between the agricultural lowlands and the pastoral highlands, where cattle were raised, driven to the lowlands to be sold and fattened, and then driven further south for final sale. But there were also problems. After the Reformation, trade with Catholic France declined, and Scotland was largely shut out of the New World circuits. Its wealthy class lost huge investments in a failed scheme to establish a colony at Darien (Panama) in 1698, which was actively obstructed by both the English merchants and the Crown for economic and political reasons. Combined with a series of disastrous crop failures and famines, Scotland's position by the end of the century looked precarious. After a century of monarchical union, parliamentary union was soon to follow.

The Union of Parliaments: In the lore of modern Scottish nationalism, the Act of Union of 1707 is portrayed as a dark and sordid episode--a deal struck by a venal Scottish nobility under the influence of personal bribes and military and economic coercion (cf. Scott 1979). There is some truth to this picture, but as Paterson has argued, it may well have been the best deal possible under the circumstances (1994:27-31). It was a deal between unequals, with the Scottish ruling class seeking economic security and opportunities, and the English elites seeking political and military security of the northern border against their rivals in France and Spain. In order to survive amid these European superpowers of the time, Scotland had to make alliances, and

here, the common Protestantism of Scotland and England was decisive. Indeed, Scottish Presbyterians since the Reformation had often argued for stronger ties between the two countries in order to consolidate and defend the reformed faith, and since the agreements reached under the Revolution Settlement of 1689-90 protected the Presbyterian Church from royal interference, many Scots felt able to pursue this path without threatening this most basic of Scottish institutions (Paterson 1994:30). Thus, although Scotland lost its parliament in the Treaty of Union of 1707, it retained its own legal system, its church, including the extensive educational system it administered, and its system of local government. It was this nexus of institutions that shaped daily politics in Scotland, and its preservation meant that a significant degree of political autonomy was retained, despite the Union.

The Eighteenth-Century: Mercantilism: The initial economic effects of the Union were rough, as protectionist tariffs, recently built up, were removed, causing Scottish manufacturers, and the economy as a whole, to suffer. Widespread rioting in lowland Scotland at the time of Union, especially in burghs like Edinburgh, seem to indicate that the populace anticipated these hardships. But by the middle of the century, as Scotland's role in British and then global markets grew, as old exports of raw materials (cattle, wool, leather) were augmented by manufactured exports, and as opportunities for indigenous capital accumulation and

reinvestment opened up, the lowland economy began to flourish. Crucial to this process was the growth of the tobacco trade, which was dominated from the 1740s to the American Revolution by a network of Glasgow merchants that came to be known as the Tobacco Lords (Devine 1990). From this point on Scotland's economic center shifted from Edinburgh in the east, to Glasgow in the west. Participating merchants reinvested their profits in lowland agricultural improvements and industries, such as linen weaving, which grew dramatically during the century from a domestic system of production that had been well established in the 17th century to more mechanized factory production. Significantly, the highland economy remained anchored in the export of cattle, accentuating its role as a kind of internal colony, which fed into the profound disruptions that came at the turn of the century (Macinnes 1988:85).

The political system that emerged in the 18th century was one in which a Scottish elite managed Scottish affairs, negotiating with London in Scotland's interest (or at least their conception of it). Thus a series of political managers such as the Earl of Seafield, the Duke of Argyll and, most importantly in the latter half of the century, Viscount Henry Dundas (the 'uncrowned king of Scotland'), were powerful figures, coordinating the votes of Scottish MPs and governing by patronage. The fact that the right to vote was controlled by an extremely small portion of society (as compared to England) made it all the easier for this system of narrow

elite control to work. At the local level the key agents of government were the Sherrifs who administered and enforced the law and regularly convened the Commisioners of Supply-- the local landowning electors of the countryside and towns who managed the collection and expenditure of taxes. The Royal Burghs, the larger towns, were relatively autonomous from this system, being governed by councils that while elected, were in effect self-selecting (Paterson 1994:35).

The most important component of this system was the church and its parishes, which played a direct role in people's daily lives, and provided the major forum for ideas on what we would today call social policy. The parishes handled poor relief and education, as well as matters of morality and social discipline. Each parish was administered by a Kirk Session, a body of church elders in principle democratically elected by the male members of the congregation, though in practice tending to become a self reproducing oligarchy of the locally powerful.³ The parishes were united into regional presbyteries, which in turn came together as the General Assembly, which as Paterson observes,

was Scotland's parliament for domestic matters in the eighteenth-century. It was much more democratic than the parliament at Westminster, or than the episcopalian Church in England. The general assembly consisted of ministers, elders, and representatives of the burghs, the universities and other bodies. In theory, the ministers and elders were elected by all the male

³ In the urban context kirk sessions sometimes came into direct conflict with burgh councils, as competing centers of power and opinion formation.

members of local congregations, and at the very least they were more closely in touch with local opinion than the members of parliament or than any of the other personnel of the state. In theory also, the representatives had equal voices in the assembly, although in practice the Edinburgh-based academics and others were able to exercise undue influence (Paterson 1994:38).

Indicative of the role of the Kirk as a mediating body between the elites and the broader populace was its internal division into Moderates (the men of 'undue influence' Paterson refers to) and Evangelicals--a rift that eventually led to a major schism in 1843 (discussed below). The central issue here was the objection of many congregations to the principle of patronage, the right of local landowners to appoint ministers in their parishes, as opposed to these minister's selection by the kirk session. Moderates tended to tolerate this situation, while Evangelicals opposed it. Such powers of patronage not only ran afoul of strong calvinist views about the separation of secular and divine authority; it also suggested the point where the system of government by patronage which characterized the century began to reach its limits of legitimacy at the grassroots level.

Resistance to the new regime also appeared on two other, and very different fronts: from the Jacobites during the first half of the century, and the Radicals toward the end of the century. The Jacobites,⁴ led mainly by factions of the highland nobility that held to the Episcopal and/or Catholic religion and the legitimacy of the succession of the House of

⁴ "Jacobite" comes from "Jacobus," latin for James, namely James VIII, son of James VII, exiled in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688-90.

Stuart, was undoubtedly partly a response to the weakening political and economic position of rural, and especially highland Scotland. The first Jacobite Rebellion in 1715, led by James VIII, was unfortunate, poorly planned, and abortive. The second in 1745, led by James' son "Bonnie Prince Charlie," had French support; its adherents managed to occupy the lowlands and invade England. They did not elicit widespread support, however, and were driven back by government forces, ending in the disastrous and decisive battle of Culloden. The vast majority of Scottish lowlanders were hostile to the Jacobite cause, and the aftermath of "the Forty-Five" was the decimation of what remained of the traditional highland socio-political system. Rebel leaders were executed or escaped to the continent, estates were seized and forfeited, legal powers of clan chiefs were abolished, and draconian laws banning the bearing of arms and wearing of traditional highland dress were imposed. This was in effect the last and hardest blow in a long history of efforts by Britain's political center, ever since James VI/I moved his court to London in 1603, to break the political autonomy of the highlands.

Also worth noting is the Radical movement, supported by artisan and middle classes, which began in the 1790's and grew to be central to 19th century politics. Inspired by the French Revolution and secular/social scientific ideas of the Enlightenment, Radical figures such as the lawyer Thomas Muir (1765-99) (mentioned in Chapter 3), and the societies they

helped to found such as the Scottish Friends of the People, advocated political reforms, in particular universal male suffrage and annual parliaments. In the context of war with France this was seen as especially subversive, and Muir and many fellow Radicals, now remembered as the "Scottish Martyrs," were transported to Botany Bay.

Finally, this was the century of the Scottish Enlightenment. Economic growth, political patronage, and the various forms of rebellion, reform and resistance they generated, developed amid an increasingly hegemonic ideology in which freedom of religion, freedom of thought, and freedom of trade, were bound together and elevated in the overarching notion of *liberty*--and the British Union was seen as the the main guarantor of that liberty. The Union came to be seen as the context and agent of progress, even while conceptions of that progress were already beginning to diverge within that ideological framework (Paterson 1994:40-41). The key thinkers of the period were involved in various attempts to restructure their ideological maps of the world and the social order. The main task was to explain in naturalistic, as opposed to theological, terms how a social and moral order was even possible in a world where traditional anchors life had become unmoored, and communication in every sense of the word was expanding geometrically. What was the new form of social order which vouchsafed this new found freedom from despotic government? It was in this process of ideological remapping that the idea of civil society acquired new

significance--a process that I will examine more closely below.

The Nineteenth-Century: Capitalism: The years spanning the latter 18th and early 19th centuries were ones of rapid and traumatic economic transformation, compared to England where the shift to industrialization had been more gradual (Devine 1988:3-4). Despite the growth of the tobacco trade and linen weaving, in 1760 Scotland was still primarily a peasant society, the characteristic class of landless urban wage laborers not yet created. Demographic changes were profound. In 1700 the Scottish population was around 1 million, in 1800 just over 1.5 million, and in 1900 just under 4.5 million (Donnachie and Hewitt 1989:152-53). Meanwhile the new industrial center of Glasgow which contained about 5% of the Scottish population in 1801 held 20% by 1891.

Weaving was central to the industrial transformation that helped drive this demographic explosion. The expansion of cotton textile production that began in the latter 18th century (surpassing linen), continued until the 1860s. Then as the cotton industry declined, the next 20 years saw a trebling of employment in the woolen industries. Meanwhile, in the 1830s, the newer "heavy industries" that revolved around coal and iron mining, railways, and especially shipbuilding, developed, becoming the heart of the Scottish economy by the end of the century. These industries were mutually reinforcing, driven by technological innovations in

ship designs (e.g., shifts from wood, to iron, to steel hulls), and creating satellites in locomotives, girders, bridges, rails, textile machinery and machine tools. The second half of the 1800s saw the rise of the great industrial manufacturing companies of the central belt which nearly all owned coal mines and furnaces. At the same time, lowland agriculture became much more rationalized and productive, replacing human labor with steam power, so that agricultural employment dropped from around 500,000 to around 200,000 over the course of the century.

This rapid expansion in productivity was made possible by the British Empire. In addition to underwriting vast markets, the Empire created new overseas career opportunities, and functioned as a kind of release valve, feeding upper and middle-class Scots into the colonial, administrative and diplomatic services, and working class Scots into the army and navy. Scotland provided a large portion of professionals, bureaucrats, and adventurers to the cause of Empire--for the most part with great patriotism and enthusiasm.

In the highlands the effects of the new economy were the most rapid and traumatic of all. The highland peasant economy, based on potatoes, turnips, and the cattle trade, was aggressively dismantled in the years of 1790-1830, during the "highland clearances." Arguing along malthusian lines that their lands were over populated and underproductive, the absentee landowning nobility, descendants of clan chiefs,

through the factors and middlemen who managed their estates, removed huge numbers of tenants from their lands, often by force. The highland tenants emigrated either to the burgeoning central belt, or to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent South Africa, and the United States. The initial strategy was to raise sheep (the new Cheviot breed) on the depopulated lands. This turned out not to be as economically profitable as hoped, because the sheep often over-grazed and degraded the land and, ironically, the Australian sheep industry became more competitive. Another part of this program of "improvement" was the establishing of coastal villages, with attendant industries, to which some of the tenants were relocated. The short-lived kelp industry on the west coast collapsed after the Napoleonic Wars, but herring fishing (men) and processing (women) became a key industry in the highlands, eventually to be controlled by large companies by the end of the century. After the 1880s, amid the Victorian era, many highland estates were turned into hunting and fishing retreats, catering to the upper classes from the lowlands and England.

In keeping with all these changes, control over the system of political management and patronage shifted from the old landowning aristocracy to the new urban industrial bourgeoisie. The periods of political mobilization and party formation in Scotland (and Britain as a whole) are clearly linked to the three Reform Acts that expanded the franchise in 1832, 1868 and 1884. The first half of the century saw

diverse forms of radicalism and early socialist experimentation, such as Robert Owen's innovative, although authoritarian, industrial weaving town at New Lanark (1813-1821). Most notable during this period was the "Radical War" of 1820 which involved marches on industrial sites and a well coordinated week-long general strike of some 60,000 workers in the west of Scotland. Extending the right to vote was central to their demands. This action was brought on especially by the recession that followed the Napoleonic War and by the rapidly worsening position of handloom weavers as factory production forced them out of the market; small tradespeople such as shoe makers and tailors were also key participants. The insurrection was put down by government troops and three leaders were executed, but political agitation continued and in 1832 the franchise was increased from 5,000 to 60,000, incorporating a significant portion of the artisan middle class. Further pressure for extension of the franchise, of a more moderate and reformist variety, came from this same sector of society in the form of Chartism in the 1840s.

The middle years saw the rise of the Whigs and their transformation into the Liberal Party which managed to absorb radical energies during this period. The nomenclature has a long and shifting history, but in short, the Tories represented the older, more conservative landed elite, while the Whigs represented a more urban commercial elite which fused progressive political ideas inspired by the French

Revolution with a strong commitment to the developing system of capitalism. The Liberals were the hegemonic party in Scotland in the 19th century, rising to dominance with the First Reform Act of 1832. During its heyday the party was comprised of three major factions: "...the paternalist land-owning Whigs; the new middle-class Liberals of the towns and cities; and the working-class Radicals..." (Donnachie and Hewitt 1989:118).

Politics was relatively quiescent in Scotland during this mid-century period of "Victorian Liberalism," with a further increase of the middle class franchise with the 1868 Reform Act. The Liberal Party managed to contain both the reformist tendencies of the commercial/middle classes and the radical tendencies of the working class up to the 1880's. But the latter's advocacy of unions, factory acts, and further extensions of the franchise tended to push the limits of the party's moderate center, and after the Reform Act of 1884 its grip on Scotland began to slip, as a series of new parties were formed, in particular the Crofters' Party (1885), the Scottish Labour Party (1888), and the Independent Labour Party (1893), the last two merging in 1895. Thus the stage was set for a modern class based politics featuring a Labour movement. The Liberals were further weakened when they split over Gladstone's introduction of the Irish Home Rule Bill in 1886, the seceders forming the Liberal Unionists under Chamberlain and taking nearly a third of the Scottish Liberal seats in a forced general election that year. The

remaining Liberal Party, now with a more coherent social reformist (but anti-class struggle) program, briefly swept to power again in 1906, only to head into a long decline after WW I that did not begin to reverse until the 1960s.

The Conservative Party was established in the 1830s in response to the growing success of the Liberal Party. It was an attempt by the older Tory land-owning class to counter the new political hegemony of the Whig commercial class. The Party had limited success in 19th century Scotland, except in a few rural counties where land owners still had considerable control over tenants and voters. But in 1912 the Conservatives and the break-away Liberal Unionists in Scotland merged to form the Scottish Unionist Association, which created new strength for the Party in Scotland in the mid-20th century.⁵

The major radical event of this period was the Crofters' War, a series of riots and land raids on the Isles of Skye, Lewis and Tiree that led to the formation of the Highland Land League of 1882, apparently modeled on the Irish Land League. These crofters, small holding tenant farmers and fishers in the highlands and islands, were responding to extremely precarious conditions, and were suppressed by a contingent of police sent from Glasgow. Public outcry led to the formation of the Crofter's Commission, which in turn produced the Crofter's Holding Act in 1886, which guaranteed

⁵ They campaigned under that name in Scotland until 1966, when they became the Scottish Conservative Party, although the local or "voluntary" level of party organization still goes by the name The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association (SCUA).

fixity of tenure, fair rents, and freedom to inherit holdings. A significant victory on one level, the Act nevertheless fixed croft sizes in such a way that they normally could not support tenants year round, thus producing a class of small holders who were compelled to periodically sell their labor in order to maintain their way of life (cf. Hunter 1976).

Not surprisingly, many of the political factions and tensions described above were paralleled within the Kirk, which became more intensely divided between the Moderates, social conservatives, often lawyers and landlords, who subscribed to the sober and cautious values of the Edinburgh Enlightenment milieu, and the Evangelicals, who held "...a much more strenuous view of religion and the social responsibilities it imposed on the more fortunate..." (Checkland and Checkland 1989:68). These latter, more from the lower middle class, while still subscribing to notions of the sanctity of property and the need for industriousness, felt compelled to respond to the social upheaval and profound urban poverty being created by industrialization. In 1834, the Evangelicals won control over the General Assembly, leading to ten years of struggle between the two factions. Matters came to a head in 1842 when the General Assembly issued a Claim of Right to parliament protesting the right of lay patrons (i.e., landowners, who were often Episcopalian in rural areas) to appoint ministers in their parishes. This privilege, granted by Westminster in 1712, had overturned the

right of the local Kirk Session to appoint ministers--the established practice at the time of the Treaty of Union in 1707. When parliament refused to acknowledge the Claim of Right, it precipitated the "Great Disruption" of 1843 in which close to half the ministers of the General Assembly withdrew in protest, establishing the Free Church of Scotland.

Within a decade, Scotland had two parallel Presbyterian Churches, along with some smaller secessionist sects that had broken away over similar issues in the 18th century. On the one hand this released a flurry of religious energy and activity as new churches and schools were established across the country. But on the other it marked the fragmentation and decline of the Kirk as an integrated and hegemonic social institution, and opened the way for a greater role for the secular state. For instance, whereas poor laws had always been administered at the parish level by the kirk sessions, the divided kirk was ill-equipped to keep pace with growing poverty, and thus the Poor Law Act of 1845 established a new secular system of Parochial Boards under a national level Board of Supervision. Still, despite the schisms, the latter 19th century saw a florescence of middle class philanthropic activity that was informed by the Calvinist/Presbyterian ethos and the social gospel, a world view which also greatly influenced the early socialists around the turn of the century (cf. Knox 1988).

As the institutional structure of the church fragmented and lost some of its more direct influence on daily life, secular state structures correspondingly began to grow. As Paterson points out:

Scottish social policy was governed by the system of supervisory boards that grew from the 1840s onwards-- local and national committees of lawyers, other professionals, and aristocrats who were put in charge of administering all the subsequent social legislation that parliament produced in the nineteenth century. They ran the poor law, the rudimentary system of public health, and the lunatic asylums. They managed the prisons and industrial schools for young offenders. They were in charge of registering births, marriages and deaths; and they oversaw the provision of burial grounds. Later they took charge of elementary schools, agriculture and the development of the highlands (Paterson 1994:51).

This burgeoning system of middle-class and elite management, which relied for the most part on locally raised tax revenues, dovetailed with other developments. In the rural counties the powers of Sheriffs expanded as they played a key role in implementing the policies of the local boards. In the meantime burghal government became more independent, and the stronghold of the Evangelicals and the Liberal Party. Thus the medieval Convention of Royal Burghs became newly influential, paralleling the powers of the church and the boards. At the national level the latter half of the century saw a dramatic increase in the creation of Royal Commissions (e.g., the Crofter's Commission mentioned above) to address specific social problems. With this rapid expansion of bureaucratic bodies responding to the incredible growth and social displacement of the 19th century, it is not surprising that the post of Secretary for Scotland was established in

1885, with a Scottish Office in Whitehall soon to follow in 1887, in order to coordinate the new governmental system that Liberal hegemony had wrought.

The creation of the Scottish Office and Secretary is a prime example of UK level responses to what has been called "unionist nationalism" (Morton 1993). Though modern Scottish nationalists often speak of a 19th century bereft of nationalism, it is more accurate to say that the nationalist sentiments of the dominant middle-class were commonly seen as compatible with, and even complementary and necessary to the larger project of Britain and the Empire. Such sentiments have been symbolically preserved in structures such as the monuments to William Wallace in Stirling and Walter Scott in Edinburgh, built largely through subscriptions from pro-union elites and middle classes. This dual Scottish/British nationalism was possible because the UK was still a very decentralized, locally managed, laissez faire based political system, and many Scots saw Scotland as a distinct and important partner in the project of Empire. While middle class Scots freely appropriated English forms of speech and manners, and even ideas on matters such as education (Paterson 1994:66-70), these were seen as the rational choices of an active modernizing nation, not as the erasure of Scottishness.

III. Discussion: The Strange History of the Civil Society Concept

The idea of civil society discussed in the last chapter owes much to Antonio Gramsci. His version is one which tends to view civil society as a strategic terrain in the instrumental struggle to achieve hegemony and state power (Kumar 1993:382). I wish to argue that, within Gramsci's conception of civil society, and in contrast to the Scottish 18th century conception, hegemony replaces morality, as a way of thinking about ideological, value-making processes. Historically the civil society concept, which developed with the formation of modernity, the period with which this chapter is concerned, has been intimately involved in questions of the relationship between morality and the social order. It arose out of the stresses and strains of the shift from feudalism to capitalism, from "traditional" to "modern" society, and stems from attempts to make sense of the new moral and social order that was developing--to figure out how a stable normative system was even possible in a world which was changing so rapidly. The notion of civil society that was articulated in this period can be viewed as the flip side of Thompson's moral economy which, instead of defending the old order, tries to comprehend the new (cf. Seligman 1992:32).

Before discussing how civil society was adapted and developed by 18th century Scottish thinkers, let us review the main themes of the foregoing history, treating civil

society in the basically Gramscian terms laid out in the previous chapter. Following Lindsay Paterson (1994), I have tried to show that the Scottish autonomist movement, far from being a sudden, anomolous and historically retrograde phenomenon, is a coherent, comprehensible outgrowth of Scotland's modern history. Despite the Unions of Crowns and Parliaments, Scotland has endured as a sphere of governance and moral discourse, negotiating its position within the larger British political system through its own political elites. This was possible because of a strong indigenous network of (often clientelistic) institutions that gave form and focus to Scottish civil society.

The British state of the 18th and 19th centuries was highly decentralized, the first and ultimate example of the laissez-faire system. This was no doubt partly made possible by the outward focus of an expanding Empire which absorbed internal political pressures and brought in substantial wealth to defray the costs. In this context Scotland's institutional nexus of church, schools, universities, law, and local government, operated with a remarkable degree of autonomy as the domestic side of the state, managing social relations in daily life. The Kirk was the key institution in this mix, cutting across spectrums of class, profession, and regional and local affiliations, and exhibiting precisely that pervasive presence and cell-like structure that Gramsci considered crucial to the production of hegemony. But as we said in the last chapter, civil society is also the site of

competition and division, even within its core institutions. The Kirk contained ideological contradictions, simultaneously generating support for a Calvinist ethic that honored work and private property and scorned indigence, complimenting the developing capitalist system, while also allowing room for social critique of the effects of industrialization and ideas of liberal reform. The peculiar tension between Moderate caution and conformism, and Evangelical indignation and reformism, and the attempt to accomodate both these tendencies under the rubric of 19th century liberalism, is somehow quintessentially Scottish. The Kirk seemed to strain to face in two directions at once, to both accomodate and criticize the social changes going on around it, until it finally split in 1843.

In the 18th century, the Kirk clearly stood as a mediating body between the state and civil society, controlling such things as poor laws and social discipline, and guiding information back and forth along the social hierarchy. With the 19th century expansion of the franchise, modern political parties increasingly filled this mediating role, with the Kirk, especially after the Disruption, becoming more of an adjunct in this process--more of a moral voice and conscience, and less of an opinion forming and decision taking and decision administering body. This is a posture that continues to this day, some sections of the Kirk having taken an active role in criticizing Thatcher and the Conservative government, and supporting the call for

parliamentary self-government. Today, thanks to this shift, and to secularization in general, the Kirk is more purely "of" civil society and not "of" the state. Thus Kirk minister and theologian Rev. Willie Storrar, a driving force behind the campaigning body Common Cause discussed in the last chapter, sees that group's project as one of reviving Scottish civil society, and monitoring the behavior of the political parties from that position.

The creation of the Scottish Office in 1887 amid the precipitous growth of secular governmental bodies in the latter 19th century, can be seen as the culmination of this process of transferring the role of political mediator from Kirk to State (and the Party system). And correspondingly this period also saw the growth of non-governmental voluntary associations such as trade unions and cooperatives, that further "filled in" this more secular version of civil society. It is also important to remember the massive growth of economic firms and corporations, in manufacturing, trading and finance. Tobacco Lords, linen firms, banks and ship building enterprises, and their control of capital and social power, were a central aspect of this evolving civil society. As we shall see, these were its defining institutions for Marx, which led him to view civil society almost wholly negatively. What might appear as simply the political-economic backdrop in the preceding historical synopsis was integral to the development of Scottish civil society.

It is important however to note the continuities as well as the differences in this shift, how new forms carried on older functions (cf. Steward 1972:91). The party system in Scotland was in many ways incubated and hatched within the Kirk--the major lines of ideological division already articulated within this institution. Further, the geneologies of Evangelicalism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Scotland are tightly interwoven and cannot be neatly separated. Together they feed into a larger tradition of political and moral protest (Brotherstone 1989a; Walker and Gallagher 1990), which often positioned itself in opposition to the external power at Westminster.

I would sum up this history by stressing two main points. First, while Scotland became part of the larger British project, it remained just that--a part within the whole--with its own internal foci of conflict and community, of struggles over the distribution of wealth and power. Moreover, its external relations to Britain as a whole evolved and changed. Manichean debates that seem to oppose absolute absorption to absolute autonomy obscure the actual historical process: an evolving web of social institutions that negotiated political, economic and moral relations, and shaped the linkages between civil society and the state. Secondly, civil society should not be loosely treated as a self-evident social category (Kumar 1993:390), but rather needs to be investigated in terms of its historical particularities and transformations, the specific relations

between the state, the economy and moral discourse that it helps constitute. Rather than proffering blanket designations of civil society as an inherently positive (as in the current revival literature) or negative (as in classic marxism) aspect of modern social process, we need, after establishing definitions suited to our purposes, to look at what it does--when, where, and how.

Civil society is more than just an effective tool for sociohistorical analysis, it is intimately bound up with questions of morality and justice. In what follows I will try to show that over the course of its history, the concept of civil society has been reconceptualized, from a site of the production of moral order, to a site of the production of hegemony. But beneath this shift is a constant concern for how social values are created, sustained, and changed. The following section reviews the genealogy of the concept, focusing first on the nexus of ideas articulated by David Hume, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith in the Scottish Enlightenment, and then on the conception put forth by G. W. F. Hegel and then critiqued by Karl Marx in the 19th century. This is by no means an exhaustive treatment, leaving aside in particular Immanuel Kant who, while not as strongly associated with the concept, played a pivotal role in the history of philosophical ideas by responding to Hume and provoking Hegel (see MacIntyre 1966:190-98; Seligman 1992:41-44). Nonetheless, within these limits I hope to provide an

overall sense of the concept's complexity, and the underlying social and philosophical problems that inspired it.

The use of the term "civil society" by Hobbes and Locke in the 17th century was a fairly literal translation of the latin of Cicero: *societas civilis*, and the Greek of Aritotle: *koinonia politike*, both of which designated the public or political sphere of the city or polis, as opposed to a private domestic sphere of the family (Bobbio 1989:34-35; Kumar 1993:376). With the 18th century Scots however, and Adam Ferguson in particular, this term underwent two shifts in meaning. First, the original implication that civil society arose out of the family was extended to create an early stage theory of social evolution in which it was the highest stage in a sequence of developments of such things as the division of labor, property, and the state (cf. Brewer 1989:16). The domestic-public distinction was being replaced by a primitive-modern one. Second, and more subtly, "civil" was increasingly equated with "civilized" and "polished," denoting not simply a particular sphere of society in general, but a state of refinement in manners and morals (Bobbio 1989:37-38). Before we can fully understand this shift, we need to take a wider view.

Alasdair MacIntyre provides a succinct summary of the cultural-ideological rupture at work in this period, which I quote at length:

Traditional European society inherited from the Greeks and from Christianity a moral vocabulary in which to judge an action good was to judge it to be the action of a good man, and to judge a man good was to judge him as

manifesting dispositions (virtues) which enabled him to play a certain kind of role in a certain kind of social life. The acceptance of this kind of social life as the norm by which actions are judged is not something asserted within the moral system. It is the presupposition of there being moral judgements at all. Actual social life did in fact always diverge widely from the norms; but not so widely that it could not be seen as an imperfect reflection of the norms. But that break up of the traditional forms of social life which was produced by the rise of individualism, begotten partly by Protestantism and capitalism, made the reality of social life so divergent from the norms implied in the traditional vocabulary that all the links between duty and happiness were gradually broken. The consequence was a redefinition of moral terms. Happiness is no longer defined in terms of satisfactions which are understood in the light of the criteria governing a form of social life; it is defined in terms of individual psychology. Since such a psychology does not yet exist, it has to be invented. Hence the whole apparatus of appetites, passions, inclinations, principles, which is found in every eighteenth-century moral philosopher. Yet in spite of all this psychological construction, *happiness* remains a difficult key term for moral philosophy, if only because all too often what would in an obvious sense make us happy is what in an obvious sense we ought not to do. Consequently there is an instability in the history of the moral argument, exhibited in an oscillation between attempts to define morality in terms of consequences leading to happiness and attempts to define morality in terms that have nothing to do with consequences or happiness at all. So long as theology survives as a socially influential force it can be called in to connect virtue with happiness in a world other than this. But theology itself became more and more the victim of its environment (1966:166-67, emphasis in original).

The political upheavals of the Reformation and the regnant Protestant view of a direct relationship between persons and God necessitated a new understanding of the political, social, and moral order. Moreover, with the growing successes of the sciences that accompanied the expansion of global exploration, technological innovation, and a re-orientation toward the natural world, the powers of

human reason, understood in universal terms, were elevated in importance for justifying any new normative order, and divine will became correspondingly more remote.

It was in this context in the 17th century that Hobbes, inspired by Galileo and Euclid's geometry, put forth his rationalist mechanico-physical model of the moral and political order, in which a social compact between subject and almighty sovereign was logically deduced from the primary principle of self-preservation in an inherently hostile world. Locke on the other hand treated civil society (i.e., the form of mixed government he advocated) and its laws as rational extensions of God's natural law in the state of nature. By the 18th century new arguments, even further removed from theological underpinnings, had developed. The moral-sense school of the Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson proffered an aesthetic theory which posited a moral faculty that directly distinguished good from evil, much as we distinguish bitter from sweet. Included in this moral sense was an innate preference for benevolence and social harmony. Thus the rational pursuit of our natural preferences would inevitably lead to the greatest good, a position foreshadowing utilitarianism in the next century (MacIntyre 1966:163). The devil's advocate for the moral-sense school was Bernard de Mandeville with his notorious *Fable of the Bees*, in which he argued that, under the guidance of wise leaders and sound institutions, the egoistical pursuit of self-interest, by promoting economic

enterprise and general prosperity, would naturally lead to the greater good of society. For Mandeville there was a kind of rational calculus that could be perceived directly in the workings of self-interest.

It was into these particular debates that David Hume (1711-1776) intervened. Hume's entire skeptical-empirical philosophy was built on a rigorous critique and analysis of how we determine truth. For him all questions of truth fell into two great categories: matters of fact (e.g., our sense of touch confirms that the stove is hot) and matters of reason (e.g., our knowledge of the rules of mathematics confirms that $2 + 2 = 4$ is a properly formed statement). Hume argued that moral judgements can only concern human conduct, and that our actions arise out of our passions (sentiments, desires, feelings); they are not matters of reason. Reason for Hume is passive, informing, but never instigating action, and thus morality, by process of elimination, must be concerned with matters of fact. Moreover, Hume locates the facts of morality in our feelings of approval or disapproval toward certain actions, not in the actions themselves. Thus he maintains that,

when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling of sentiment or blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat, and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects but perceptions in the mind: and this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; though, like that too, it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our

own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favorable to virtue, and unfavorable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behavior (Hume 1978[1740]:469).

This argument indicates Hume's debt to Hutchinson and the moral-sense school, but the latter saw good and evil as external objects that are inwardly perceived, whereas Hume locates these in the mind, external events being morally neutral. However, he did not see this as implying a radical moral relativism, because he assumed that humans everywhere are basically share the same needs, motives, and desires, and tend toward similar moral judgements, just as they are physiologically similar and tend toward similar experiences of, for instance, heat and cold. Moral sentiments for Hume are natural facts that occur in the mind, and thus morality is best studied the same way we would study other natural phenomena, through observation and comparison, in search of general rules and patterns, but not deductively.⁶

Given this foundation, when Hume turned his attention to social institutions such as law and government he spoke of them as "social artifices," i.e., pragmatic human inventions, and not as reflections of some divine or natural law, as with Locke and Hobbes. For Hume, these institutions served to cultivate "artificial virtue," namely justice, but they did this by being modeled on the natural institutions and natural virtues found in the family. He saw us as biological creatures with a high level of investment of parental care in

⁶ The key texts for the preceding discussion are Book III, Part I, of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1978[1740]:455-76), and Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals (1975[1777]:169-267).

the young and relying on cooperation to survive. As the philosopher Annette Baier comments: "Hume's account of the artifices is a story of the enlargement and proliferation of forms of trust and cooperation, and its linchpin is some initial trust, some experience of the advantages of sustaining trust" (1988:770), and this he discerned in the natural family.

Thus while not particularly concerned with the notion of civil society, Hume nonetheless articulated a key philosophical problem of modernity, the rupture of passion and reason, and advocated a naturalistic, empirico-historical approach to the study of government, law and morals. It was his influence that led Ferguson and Smith, both friends of Hume's in Edinburgh, to view civil society in the naturalistic way that they did--i.e., as the necessary ground of normative order.

The difference between these two is instructive. Ferguson (1723-1816), a Presbyterian minister's son from the highlands, published An Essay on the History of Civil Society in 1767. It begins with an account of human nature, including the moral sentiments, treated very much in Humean terms (Ferguson 1966:31-40). Then it charts a kind of macro-history, from the "rude nations" and origins of private property, to the growth of the state, social classes and the division of labor (especially the separation of mental and manual labor), in the "polished and commercial nations." In a characteristically pessimistic turn, the last portion of

the *Essay* considers the causes of the "decline of nations," through corruption and the "relaxation of national spirit." Throughout, in tones reminiscent of Rousseau's Second Discourse, Ferguson conveys a certain anxiety about the debilitating effects of civilization on civic virtue, or public spiritedness. Foreshadowing Tönnies' *gemeinschaft-gesellschaft* distinction, he worries that as nations/societies become larger, more complex, and stratified, social bonds will weaken or recede to the kinship and local community level, and civic virtue will languish (Ferguson 1966[1767]:217-20; Brewer 1989; Seligman 1992:27-40). Thus for Ferguson a crucial concern is whether a developed civil society (bearing in mind that for him this concept still includes the state) can generate moral bonds sufficient to sustain society.

In contrast, Adam Smith (1723-1790) comes across as an optimist, who distilled his analysis of civil society into two great parts. Smith is of course best remembered for The Wealth of Nations (1976[1776]) in which he critiqued theories of mercantilism and argued for the ability of the marketplace to regulate and adjust production to human needs, and create constant economic growth. But this economic analysis of civil society was preceded by a moral one in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1984[1759]), which was explicitly based on Hume's ideas (Cropsey 1987:636). Here, Smith argues that our feelings of approval and disapproval are rooted in a basic human need for recognition, respect, and praise from others,

which in turn is the mainspring of all human endeavor-- including the economic (Seligman 1992:27, 32-33). Further, these sentiments are regulated by a principle of sympathy which, when generalized, enables us to see ourselves through the eyes of others. Through this capacity for sympathy, we learn to judge our actions and those of others from the perspective of an imagined "impartial observer," a kind of neutral third party (Davie 1994:142-43; Cropsey 1987:639). Just as the invisible hand regulates the market, Smith optimistically assumed that the impartial observer regulates human desires, offsetting the partialities of pure self interest (Ignatieff 1986:203). In fact, Smith's idea of an "invisible hand" appears to be based on his notions of self discipline derived from reading the Stoics as a young student, and is thus tied to individual conduct. The idea of the economy as a natural, self regulating system is closer to Bernard de Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*, than to Smith's more complex social psychology (Muller 1993:39-60). In short, civil society, as the realm of the satisfaction of needs, included a fundamental need for the recognition and approval of others.

This is how the 18th century Scots of enlightenment Edinburgh tried to make sense of the "new world order" that was rapidly coming their way, by relocating and reconstituting the moral order in the emotional and psychological fabric of civil society. In the 19th century, intellectual energies and their institutional channels in

Scotland seemed to take a more immediately practical turn, confronted by the massive problems and disruptions of industrialization. Philosophy and speculations about civil society were overtaken by science and technology on the one hand, and politico-religious debates over social policy within that civil society on the other. In the meantime, the notion of civil society was becoming prominent in German philosophy, where it was commonly translated as *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, which also carries the additional meaning of "bourgeois society," and tends to highlight the concept's private as opposed to public, and social as opposed to political connotations, as well as its associations with the burgher class (Bobbio 1989:23).

For Hegel, the state was the subject of universal history, the concrete manifestation of Objective Spirit, in which the ethical life of the community/society is fully realized. Civil society, in contrast, stands midway between the family and the state, as an extension of the former, and incomplete formation of the latter. It is a realm where the private and the public, the particular and the universal, meet, but do not attain unity (Bobbio 1989:30-34). Hegel divided civil society into three moments: (1) "the system of needs" where individuals pursue their private satisfaction through the market and its mechanisms; (2) "the administration of justice" which regulates this process through principles of law and property; and (3) "the police and the corporations" (i.e., public authorities and

professional and craft guilds), which enforce peace and attend to the common interest and welfare. Hegel viewed these corporations as "second families" that would look after their members' interests in the rough and tumble of civil society. He also saw property as serving the function in civil society that love does in the family, i.e., as the primary medium for coming to know and recognize others (Hegel 1967[1821]:122-55).

Thus for Hegel, civil society, like all other aspects of human social life, was an historically emergent sphere in the quest for mutual recognition. But it was ultimately incomplete, achieving its mediation of human needs and desires in a piecemeal, ad hoc way. Instead, the state and its constitution are necessary to make explicit and fully realize the ethical unity of the community (society, nation). It is with this formulation that civil society and the state become clearly separate conceptual entities. Although no-one, to my knowledge, argues for any direct borrowing, it is striking to note the continuities between the Scots' conception of "sympathy" and being seen through the eyes of others, and Hegel's notion of the quest for mutual recognition. Both provide an ethical matrix that binds together their respective conceptions of civil society (Davie 1994:142-43; Seligman 1992:50-51). This is in severe contrast to Marx, for whom civil society is evacuated of almost any ethical content.

Marx clearly emphasized the "system of needs" in his reading of Hegel's civil society concept, blending it with the work of the British political economists. For him, post-feudal, bourgeois society was defined by crass materialism, economic competition, and the egoistical struggle of individuals against one another. Against Hegel's integrated triadic model in which civil society is a zone of mediation between family and state, Marx offered a bifurcated model of civil society as the concrete base of bourgeois society, which was abstractly mirrored in, and justified by, bourgeois political society, i.e., the state, law, and private property relations. In his view civil society and the modern state represented twin forms of alienation made necessary by the regime of bourgeois class rule. Underneath the stasis of these models lay very different conceptions of the socio-political dynamics at work. Whereas Hegel saw the struggles and conflicts of civil society as giving rise to a higher form of mediation in the state, Marx saw these as leading to the inevitable overthrow of the entire civil society/state system. Central here is their different analyses of class. Hegel saw three great classes based on agriculture, business/commerce, and the state, i.e., civil servants, each fulfilling its proper role, but with the last taking a leading role as the "universal class" which was, by its nature and position, concerned with the well being of the social whole. Marx by contrast, saw the central historical dynamic played out within Hegel's business/commerce class, in

the struggle between the two great classes of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, with Hegel's agricultural and civil service classes being at most potential adjuncts to these two, respectively, depending on the historical circumstances. For Marx, the proletariat was the "universal class" that pointed the historical way forward (see Marx in O'Malley 1994:1-27, 57-70).

So for Marx and Hegel both, civil society was something to be overcome, but for Hegel this meant subordination to the state, while for Marx it meant the utter abolition of civil society and its principles of property and competition. In this light it becomes clear that with Marx we come to a turning point in the ethical conception of civil society that runs through the Enlightenment Scots and Hegel. For them, civil society had been a realm for the expansion of human power and freedom, however problematic and fraught with conflict. For Marx it was a realm of ultimate misery and unfreedom for the universal class of the proletariat. Where there is no freedom, there can be no morality. Thus for him, the fully ethical life lay in the post-capitalist future; in the meantime, the ethical was only that which served to bring about this future by building the workers' movement and opposing the capitalist class (cf. Trotsky 1973). It was the practical and strategic questions about how to do this which led Gramsci to re-evaluate the civil society/state relationship as articulated by Marx, and to advocate treating civil society not as a profane process doomed to self

destruction, but as a social terrain that must be occupied via hegemony, in the conquest of the state. For Gramsci, civil society could be re-ethicalized, but since there was only one final ethical purpose--the coming to power of the proletariat--this did not involve treating it as a "public sphere" for moral debate, but rather as an instrument for furthering the proletarian ideology.

My point here has not been to give a primer in the basics of hegelianism and marxism, which are well known, but rather to trace out the winding path of articulations of the civil society concept. Despite the roots of the term in antiquity, civil society is a crucial and characteristic concept of modernity, which is particularly concerned with, and arises out of, a call for a non-divine, non-metaphysical basis for moral order. In this century up to the present, especially through Marx and Gramsci, it has come to function as a relatively neutral sociological category designating a sphere of practices and institutions outside the state and/or in a mediating relationship to the state. In the Gramscian tradition, it is a terrain in which the generating and spreading hegemony takes place, but one which is not essentially or necessarily tied to any specific normative system. Otherwise attempts to comander it would be, by definition, futile. But following the earlier tradition that runs from Hume to Hegel, it is also seen as the place where a certain inherent, natural moral order, whether benign or malevolent, is grounded.

To borrow Tom Nairn's metaphor (1981:329-363), civil society is "Janus-faced," with one side value-neutral, the other value bearing. Exactly what values are borne by the morally charged version is highly contested. Some, such as Francis Fukuyama (1995), and the policy makers of the World Bank (Williams and Young 1994), see it in Smithian terms, as a context where market oriented behavior and institutions will, if left unfettered, naturally cultivate an ethical social life. Others, such as Michael Walzer (1983), and the Scottish autonomist movement on the whole, carry on, perhaps unwittingly, in a Hegelian mode, seeing civil society as a sphere where consciousness of the need for social welfare is first explored, prior to becoming more fully secured through the state itself.

We are left with a certain irony--that today, the ideas of Hegel on civil society may seem more attuned to the discourse of the Scottish autonomist movement than those of the native son Adam Smith. This seems to be due to the fact that Hegel was remarkably prescient when it came to the modern state and its growing significance (cf. Avineri 1972:239-41), while Smith did not adequately anticipate this trend.⁷ It is doubtless that differences in their respective national political-economic contexts, the enduring presence of feudal corporatism for Hegel versus the expanding market-

⁷ It should be noted however that Smith is often misrepresented as being uniformly hostile to the state and state expenditure. In fact he advocated state support of such things as material infrastructure and public education, and expected the costs of the state to steadily increase as nations became wealthier (Muller 1993:198-99).

empire for Smith, shaped thier expectations. But the bottom line is that the hegelian view seems more attuned to the present reality of the bureaucratic-legal state. In the next chapter we turn to the 20th century rise, crisis, and retrenchment of the welfare state, and its relevance to the fortunes of Scottish nationalism.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE
MAKING OF CONTEMPORARY SCOTLAND

I. Introduction

Just as the rise of mercantilism defined the 18th century, and industrialism the 19th century, the rise of the welfare state defined the 20th century in the UK, and has changed the political landscape. Logically, with this massive growth of the state, the civil society/state relationship we have been discussing was fundamentally altered: the state became more and more enmeshed in the reproduction of everyday life. This shift was the combined result of changes in the political system, especially with the rise of a strong labor movement, and changes in Britain's place in the world economy. I have already given an account of the origins of the Liberal and Conservative Parties. Since the formation of the parties that are central to our story--Labour, the SNP, and to a lesser degree the Communists--began around the turn of the century, I start with an account of the origins and developments of these parties. Then I move on to a more general account of the relevant economic transformations, and the growing importance of the bureaucratic management structures of the welfare state, up to the present period of contention over the future of this system. I would call attention to the fact that the trend toward state growth discussed in this chapter was, as

we saw in the last chapter, already well under way at the end of the 19th century.

After a synoptic treatment of these historical trends I will offer a critical discussion of the various theoretical attempts to make sense of the post-1960s rise of Scottish nationalism, leading into considerations of the relevance of the literature on the "crisis"¹ of the welfare state. I will argue that we must look at the interaction of an enduring Scottish civil society with its peculiarly intimate relationship to the state, and the general political economic roots of the crisis, to understand this phenomenon. To put it in the starkest terms, citizens and capital have conflicting and often opposing interests in the modern state, and Scottish autonomism and the retrenchment of the welfare state are overlapping expressions of this conflict of interests.

II. A Synopsis of Scottish History in the Twentieth Century

By the turn of the twentieth century Scotland's heavily industrialized economy was beginning to flag as markets were increasingly lost to Germany, France and the United States, and ownership and control over Scottish manufacturers

¹ I put "crisis" in quotes because, though this has become a common way of labeling recent debates, I am in agreement with those who argue that due to matters of scale and complexity, the modern state will necessarily continue to play a redistributive role. What is at issue is not the future of the welfare state, but its form, the current trend being toward less, and/or more regressive forms, of redistribution (cf. Pierson 1991:216-17).

increasingly moved to London and overseas, thus decreasing indigenous sources of new capital (Paterson 1994:117). The opening decades were marked by loss of imperial markets, growing protectionism, high unemployment, and industrial actions culminating in the "Red Clydeside" unrest of 1919 (see below). The brief economic stimulation created by World War I was followed by a steady decline. It was in this context that the labor movement, socialism, and nationalism, already nascent in the previous century, coalesced into their 20th century forms.

Labor: In terms of party politics, the story of the decades around the turn of the century in Scotland is the story of the formation of the Labour Party and its eclipsing of the old Liberal Party. Various Scottish streams fed into the growth of Labour. The Highland Land League of the 1880s was formed to provide better representation for the highland crofters. Key figures such as James Kier Hardie, for whom "...socialism...was the industrial expression of Christianity..." (Checkland and Checkland 1989:80), organized the founding of the Scottish Labour Party in 1888 and its merger with the Independent Labour Party in 1893. These fledgling parties took shape amid the growing disaffection of the radical wing of the Liberal Party, and the the growth of the trade union movement. By 1906 the Labour Party in Scotland was established.

Communists: Between 1914 and 1922, in the years surrounding WW I, there was a series of industrial strikes in

the heavy industries along the River Clyde in Glasgow, which became known as "the Red Clydeside." In 1919, at the peak of these strikes, the government sent out troops and tanks to prevent what it saw as a possible Bolshevik uprising. In Scottish leftist lore, for which this event is central, Bolshevism was indeed on the threshold. In fact however, most of the major organizers had more limited goals around securing certain conditions for labor (wage levels, preventing 'dilution' from less skilled workers, etc.), and it was the somewhat better paid tradesmen, for example, engineers, who spearheaded of the action (Harvie 1981:15-23).

This event fed into the development of communism in Scotland:

On the formation of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), in 1920, the Scottish elements of the Socialist Labour Party, originally founded on Clydeside, and the Scottish Workers' Committee, successor to the Clyde Workers' Committee, tended to stay aloof. After Willie Gallacher, on Lenin's advice, had, in 1921, persuaded the majority of them to join the CPGB, a minority, under the leadership of John MacLean, remained outside, demanding a separate Scottish party. This deprived the Communist Party of its most nationalist elements and for a long time it showed no interest in the national issue. MacLean, a figure of legendary stature in Scottish socialist folklore, had gained considerable support for his stand against the war, which had cost him his job as a school-teacher and several spells in prison. He now moved in an increasingly nationalist direction and, impressed by the example of Sinn Fein and the Celtic nationalism of Erskine of Marr, saw the ferment on the Clyde, the land agitation in the Highlands and the clamour for Home Rule as creating the conditions for the declaration of a Scottish Workers' Republic (Keating and Bleiman 1979:65-66).

MacLean campaigned as a Scottish Workers' Republican candidate in 1923, but he died during the campaign, physically depleted by the rigors of prison and politics. I

quote this long passage because it gives a feel for the passionate mixture of equally intense nationalism and socialism that has endured in Scotland to this day. MacLean is a major icon of, and martyr to, the cause (recall the song "Freedom Come-All-Ye" quoted in Chapter 2).

During the first two decades of this century home rule was a central tenet of the Scottish labor/socialist movement. In 1918 Labour in Scotland fought the general election on a program of "self-determination for the Scottish people," and in 1924 and 1927 Labour put Home Rule Bills before Parliament, but these were "talked out" at their Second Readings--this was one of the more immediate spurs to the formation of the National Party of Scotland in 1928. From that time Labour support for home rule began to wane.

The SNP: The Scottish National Party's genealogy illustrates two tensions that have endured in the autonomist movement to the present, between those who envision a broad based movement, and those who advocate party politics as the main route to power, and between those who would accept a path to independence via a devolved parliament ("gradualists"), and those who demand a direct move to independence ("fundamentalists") (see Finlay 1994a). The Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), which called for a parliament within the UK, went through two incarnations. The first, founded in 1886, had strong ties to the old Liberal Party; the second, founded in 1918 after the war, drew support from across the Liberal-Labour spectrum. In 1920 the

Scots National League was founded, with a more radical program of Gaelic revival and national independence. This group, characteristic of the period in Europe, attracted a strange mix including the poet Hugh MacDairmid, the novelist Compton Mackenzie, and the Lord Erskine of Marr, with his dubious and romantic notions of a racially based "Celtic communism." They also argued that a political party had to be established in order to fight for the cause through electoral politics, and in 1928 the National Party of Scotland was formed for this purpose, bringing together elements from the SHRA, the National League, and the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association, led by the young and able John MacCormick, who came from an Independent Labour Party background. The National Party was an eclectic left-of-center party, but in order to unify forces and garner financial support, MacCormick, who had quickly gravitated to a leadership position in the Party, negotiated a merger with the smaller right-of center Scottish Self-Government Party (est. 1932), and thus the Scottish National Party (SNP) was finally born in 1934.

Meanwhile, in 1935 the Communist Party adopted a Popular Front policy which opened the doors to cooperation with the home rule movement. On May Day 1938, now numbering just under 3000, "...the Communists paraded in tartan, carrying banners of Bruce and Wallace, Burns, Calgacus and (rather oddly, in view of his high toryism) R. L. Stevenson..." (Harvie 1981:102). Adamant anti-war beliefs shared by some

nationalists and the communists further connected these strains. But this rapprochement on the nationalist left was paralleled by the growing strength of the Labour Party and the marginalization of the home rule issue. Both the harsh realities of the Depression and the strengthening of British level solidarity in World War II were major factors in this shift. In 1941 Churchill appointed long time Labour home-ruler Tom Johnston to the post of Secretary of State. Under Johnston there was a substantial degree of administrative devolution to Scotland, which he ably used to guide war industries and infrastructural investment to Scotland. By the time of the 1945-50 Labour governments, the predominant view was that administration of the regions of the UK from a strong center was the best way to rebuild after the war and lay the foundations for a modern welfare state.

Within the SNP MacCormick, who favored "movement" and "gradualist" approaches, had struggled to guide the young SNP along this path (see MacCormick's autobiography, 1955). Eventually however, factionalism led to an internal power struggle, and MacCormick and a handful of followers broke from the SNP in 1942. His next move was to form the Scottish Convention, which called a Scottish National Assembly in March of 1947, composed of some 400 delegates "...from churches, trade unions, chambers of commerce and co-operative societies. There was also a smattering of peers and MPs" (McLean 1988:5). The key objective of this campaigning group was to pressure the Labour government to take the home rule

issue seriously. At its third meeting in 1949 the National Assembly launched a large scale public petition which came to be known the Scottish Covenant. The Covenant, pledged its signatories

in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom, to do everything within our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs.

This finely crafted piece of broad-church politics attracted wide support: 50,000 signatures in the first week, and more than a million in six months. By 1952 the figure had reached two million, although it is suspected that this included repeat signatures and a few Micky Mouses and Winston Churchills. But strong Labour Party resistance to these pressures amid the growing concerns of the newly expanding post-war welfare state, meant that the Covenant failed to effectively advance the issue, and by the early 1950s it had lost its momentum (McLean 1988:5-11).

The Growth of the Welfare State: Increasingly in the 1930s, in response to the failures of the free market, the politicians and managerial-professional elites across the UK political spectrum began to converge on a "middle opinion" (Paterson 1994:104-5) which advocated a mixed economy with greater state intervention in public welfare. This shift had been foreshadowed by the moderate reforms of the last major Liberal governments of 1906-1914, such as old age pensions and the National Insurance Act. But after the collective hardships of WW II, which also furthered the intervention of government in the economy, this middle opinion came into its

own with the Labour government of 1945-51, and the modern British welfare state was truly established. Guided by the influential Beveridge Report of 1942, the new Labour government's program led to: the nationalization of key industries such as coal and steel; the contributory National Insurance Act of 1946, to provide pensions and sickness and unemployment benefits; the National Assistance Act of 1948 providing relief to "non-contributors"; and the creation of the national Health Service, a cornerstone of the welfare system, in 1948 (Bryson 1992:83).

This agenda grew out of an attitude which sought to "...solve social and economic problems by removing them from politics and placing them in the hands of experts..." (Paterson 1994:130), resulting in a form of government that has frequently been called "technocracy." Also basic to this middle opinion was the pervasive influence of Keynesian economic theories, which questioned the self-regulating properties of the market, and instead sought to maintain full employment through government regulation of consumption and investment by manipulating such things as interest rates, taxation and monetary policy, and public works (Pierson 1991:27). Despite shifts between Labour and Conservative governments, this basic technocratic/Keynesian consensus around the functions of the state remained stable down to the 1970s.²

² It should be noted that Britain's mediating role between the US, USSR, and Europe during the Cold War likely played a part in this peculiar balance of internal political forces.

From the 1930s On, the new UK political order was paralleled at the Scottish level by the establishment of new problem-solving political bodies such as the Scottish National Development Council (1930), the Scottish Economic Committee (1936), and the Scottish Council Development and Industry (1946); all became basic to how Scottish economic problems were addressed. This new political and ideological environment fostered substantial growth in the powers of the Scottish Office (which moved from London to Edinburgh in 1930) and the Scottish Secretary of State. The Leadership of Secretary Tom Johnson (Coalition Labour Government, 1941-45) who promoted major infrastructural investments such as the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board (est. 1943), exemplifies this trend. Meanwhile, the Barlow Commission of the late 1930s led to the formation of the Council on Industry by 1942, its purpose being to coordinate industrial investment through out the UK. Policies of regional planning evolved that treated Scotland, like other parts of Britain, as a distinct unit of economic management. With the institutions of the Scottish Office, local government, and Scottish civil society already well entrenched, this conception of Scotland found fertile ground (McCrone 1993). One key outgrowth of this regional planning perspective was the establishment of five New Towns (a UK-wide program) between 1949 and 1966. Designed to relieve urban population/housing pressure and provide sites for new industries, especially branch plants from outside Scotland,

these were relatively successful, although perhaps also hastening the urban decay of places like Glasgow.

Interestingly, students of Scottish nationalism have often noted greater levels of support for the SNP in the New Towns, attributing this to the relative social detachment from well established local traditions of politics and voting (usually for Labour) (McCrone 1992:164-69).

The system of government that developed in Scotland has been described by Moore and Booth as a form of "meso-corporatism" with a "negotiated order" (1989). By this they mean a system in which the Scottish Office and its various departments brought together representatives from both public and private interest groups (business firms, unions, financial institutions, etc.), creating policy networks for negotiating political exchanges, thereby guiding and shaping the realization of central government policy. Within the larger context of UK regional planning, this gave Scotland an exceptional degree of autonomy, fostering a sense of distinctively national interest, and sustaining a broad based, policy-making elite with a sense of its own right to participate in political decisions (Paterson 1994:118-22).

This relative autonomy is revealed in various policy areas. Scotland has historically suffered from very poor housing stock, and through Scottish Office policies has shown a stronger support for state subsidies and house-building by public authorities than in the rest of the UK. Similarly, the Scottish Education Department (SED) played a key role in

implementing the UK-wide shift from specialized to comprehensive secondary education in the 1960s in such a way that major partisan struggles experienced in England over this Labour initiative were avoided. Later in the 1980s when a new Tory push for more vocational training seemed to threaten comprehensive education, the SED policy networks found ways to redirect central government mandates, thus protecting the Scottish preference for more generalized education.³

So the degree of Scottish political autonomy within the UK was exceptional. Nonetheless, bureaucratic growth and the centralization of power and domestic policy-making in the UK led to efforts to rationalize local government to keep pace with these changes. In 1973, under the Conservatives, Scottish local government was reorganized, abolishing the patchwork of district, county, and small and large burgh councils that had been in place since an earlier reorganization in 1929. The new two-tiered system was made up of nine Regions administering planning, transport, social work and education, and 53 Districts dealing primarily with housing.⁴ This attempt to make local government more

³ There is a common argument in Scotland which asserts that Scots, due to cultural temperament, prefer a generalized and philosophical approach to education (cf. Davie 1981). This ideal is more true of the university system in the 18th and 19th centuries than of 20th century secondary education. Still, the recent defense of "Scottish generalism" has often been seen as a defense of a deeply rooted Scottish tradition, that contrasts with the narrow particularism of the "English" worldview.

⁴ In the less populous and more remote islands of Shetland, Orkney, and the Western coast all functions were combined in a single tier.

efficient cut the number of local councillors by around two thirds.

Although Labour has clearly dominated Scottish politics in this century, local government had tended to reflect the spirit of cross-party consensus. Somewhat paradoxically however, this new system of local government has become a power base for the Labour Party, which increasingly came to control the Regional and District Councils after it was forced into opposition in 1979. The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), the new coordinating body of local government since 1973, and in a sense the descendent of the medieval Convention of Royal Burghs, has become a Labour stronghold, often articulating opposition to Tory policies coming from the Scottish Office (cf. Jones 1992b:180-203). Since 1979 Scottish politics has been increasingly shaped by this structured opposition between the Scottish Secretary of State, appointed by a Conservative Prime Minister and controlling the Scottish Office, and Labour dominated Regions and Districts organized by COSLA. Here the north-south divide in UK voting preferences for Labour and the Tories (respectively) takes on a very concrete form. Meanwhile the meso-corporatist policy networks, somewhat beleaguered, continue to buffer and negotiate this institutionalized conflict.

Nonetheless the ideological divergence and break-down of "consensus" since the 1970s has been profound. Conservative policies, based on the New Right philosophy articulated by

such figures as Fredrick Hayek, Milton Freidman, and the Adam Smith Institute, have emphasized shrinking government, primarily through a shift from public to private provisioning in the areas of education, health, housing, social work, and public transport. The Scottish public has been generally unreceptive and/or resistant to these initiatives. This tension has been exacerbated by the patronizing political rhetoric of Thatcher and her cohort, which characterizes the Scots as suffering from a debilitating "dependency culture," relying on a "nanny state," and ignorant of their own intellectual heritage in Adam Smith (Mitchell 1990:119-31). Thatcher's introduction of the regressive Poll Tax to fund local government a year earlier in Scotland (1987) than in the rest of the UK was deeply resented, and resistance to this policy in the south was instrumental in her ultimate political downfall. John Major's Conservative government has tried to at least appear more consultative, through such efforts as the ironically titled White Paper report Scotland in the Union: a partnership for good (HMSO:1993), which considers ways of making the existing system of government more "responsive" to Scottish concerns. Although Major has professed some minimal commitment to social welfare, there is now a deep pattern of distrust and resistance to Tory policies. This is recently exemplified by popular campaigns to oppose the imposition of the Value Added Tax on domestic fuel, and plans to reorganize the administration of the Scottish water supply industry, shifting administration from

local government to a non-elected body appointed by the Tory Secretary of State. Many see this as the first step toward the privatization of water services, following the English model. Autonomists point to these government initiatives as further reasons why a parliament is needed.

So far the New Right can only claim qualified success in achieving its goals of rolling back the state: while government budgets are in surplus this is due to income from privatization and tax increases--government expenditure has continued to grow (Midwinter et al. 1991:167). Furthermore, the paradoxical result of the policies of the Tory Party is that they under-cut its pro-union stance. During the middle of this century public welfare provisioning and regional planning came to be major integrating forces in the UK state, especially as the ideological "glue" of Protestantism, the monarchy, and World War II solidarity and anti-fascism slowly weakened (cf. Colley 1992). As the Tories take apart the coordinating role of central government, they simultaneously dismantle the very integrative processes they claim to uphold (cf. McCrone 1993).

Finally, another factor must be considered--the European Union (EU). The EU also grew out of the post-World War II initiatives to rebuild, and to coordinate, the industrial policies of the more highly industrialized European countries to help prevent the occurrence of outright war. It has grown to become one of the three major competing world zones of capital-labor mobility. It has also grown to become a

competing center for sovereignty in a Europe that appears to be edging toward a kind of quasi-federalism. Within it the leading economic powers, namely Germany and to a lesser degree France tend to set the tone of economic and social policy. Although the overall thrust of EU policies is toward open markets and greater freedom for capital, nonetheless,

the harmonization of social policy throughout the European Community [now the EU], the adjudications of the European Court and the enactment of the European Social Charter will force certain member states to *increase* their welfare provision (Pierson 1991:188, *emphasis in original*).

This is exactly the position that recent Conservative British governments have found themselves in, accounting for their demands for opt-outs from, and slower schedules of conformity to, EU policies. Correspondingly, the SNP, and Labour and Scottish autonomistst in general, have tended to be increasingly pro-Europe since the 1970s, seeing the EU (perhaps over-optimistically) as a context for rebuilding a social democratic consensus (cf. Paterson 1994:179).

At the end of a century of vast governmental expansion, and 15 years of Conservative rule, Scotland is a considerably changed place. Overall, Scottish economic trends follow those of the UK as a whole--the decline of heavy industries, capital flight, and growth of foreign owned branch plants. The goal of full employment slipped away in the 1960s and 70s, with unemployment as a percentage of the workforce in Scotland climbing to just over 13% in 1986 (it has since fallen back to the 7-8% range). In the south of England, around the London core, this same trajectory peaked at around

8% unemployment in 1986, falling back to around 4-5% (Aitken 1992:244). Who is employed, and where and how, has also dramatically changed. The heavy industries, including coal, steel, and especially shipbuilding, once a defining symbol of the Scottish economy as a whole, have drastically declined in importance and share of employment. Economic decline has been offset, though not reversed, by other industries. North Sea oil and gas, has caused substantial growth in the Aberdeen area and the Shetland Island economy since the 1970s, reaching peak production in the mid-1980s. It is, however, a volatile industry, susceptible to global market fluctuations, with relatively weak labor organization and its support industries sub-contracted out and likewise heavily exposed to market uncertainties. New "light industries" such as electronics and computer wafer manufactures largely owned by US and Japanese corporations, have grown substantially since the 1940s, but do not create new employment on the same scale as the older heavy industries once did.⁵ Meanwhile the whisky industry underwent deep restructuring in the 1980s, and is fighting hard to maintain its export market share. Agriculture and especially fishing are more important in Scotland than England, but are highly technologized, employing relatively few people.

But perhaps more important has been the massive shift away from industrial and toward service sector employment, accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number of women in

⁵ It is worth noting that a good portion of this industry is driven by the larger global defense industry (cf. Henderson 1989:118-38).

the paid workforce. This includes tourism, which is a major and growing part of the Scottish economy, and Scotland's highly developed financial sector (banking and insurance) which generates around 15% of Scottish GDP. But the largest number of service sector employees are in the public sector, e.g., teachers, nurses, civil servants, etc., which is not surprising considering the growth of the state we have been discussing (cf. McCrone 1992:62-87). It is often noted, I think rightly, that Scotland's high level of public sector employment, combined with higher levels of public sector housing, no doubt help account for the tendency to vote Labour and stand by the basic principles of the welfare state (e.g., Kendrick and McCrone 1989; Midwinter et al. 1991:18-19; McCrone and Bechhofer 1993). But these factors should also be seen in combination with the enduring pattern of meso-corporatism discussed above--i.e., as another dimension of the remarkable interpenetration, by current British standards, of public and private life and institutions. A relatively integrated, bureaucratic-corporateness permeates this small country, setting it off from its neighbor to the south.

III. Discussion: Scottish Nationalism and the "Crisis" of the Welfare State

Overview: It is in this broad context of the growth and current retrenchment of the welfare state that shifting attitudes toward 20th century Scottish nationalism should be viewed. During the 1920s and 30s nationalism expressed a diverse array of anxieties about Scotland's weakening economy, and the encroaching centralization of power that seemed to undermine the considerable managerial autonomy that Scotland had enjoyed in the previous century. By the middle of the century Labour had arrived as a strong advocate of Scottish interests in the process of centralization, in a sense continuing the Liberal tradition of seeing Scottish and British level nationalisms as distinct yet compatible, at the same time dampening more separatist sentiments. Meanwhile the sense of a common set of British concerns and a common fate was consolidated by the entire welfare state project and the experiences of W.W. II. Ironically, Scottish members of the Conservative Party, distrusting big government, sometimes flirted with devolutionist ideas during the years of Labour's ascendancy (1940s-1970s). Since the 1960s, a revived nationalism/autonomism has coalesced around a continuing distrust of powerful centralized government, newly informed by post-1968 radical and green politics, while at the same time holding to a belief in a collective responsibility for social welfare, in ways that harken back simultaneously to Presbyterian, liberal, and socialist traditions. Since 1979

this new brand of autonomism has intensified, becoming a key element in the political and ideological polarization between Scotland and the UK core of London and south-east England.

Arguments Within Scottish Nationalism: Attempts to understand the rise of the autonomist movement have tended to pursue two main themes: the economic forces of capitalism, and the peculiar institutional infrastructure of Scottish civil society.⁶ And from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s there has been some shift in emphasis from the former to the latter. I will review these arguments, adopting what I think are their most useful elements, then present my own analysis, emphasizing the role of the welfare state.

Although the debates about the cause and future of Scottish nationalism have changed, they still revolve around the arguments set out in Tom Nairn's seminal work The Break-Up of Britain (1981). Nairn's approach was novel for taking the renegade marxist position that nationalism is not unalterably opposed to socialism, and could indeed become a progressive force--the "grave-digger of the British State." Drawing on Gellner (1964), his theory is rooted in the economic concept of uneven development, the idea that nationalism is typically a peripheral response to expansionist centers of modernization, industrialization, and capital accumulation--namely France and England in the classic period of European nationalisms in the 19th century.

⁶ The most comprehensive review to date of the issues addressed in this section can be found in McCrone (1992). This summary treatment is substantially influenced by his own.

For Nairn, the possibility of Scottish nationalism rests on two factors. On the one hand, Scotland's enduring national identity is due to its relatively late incorporation into the British state in 1707, having already developed by that point into an early-modern nation-state on its own terms. More to the point, rather than having been conquered and subsumed during the pre-modern period, Scotland, or rather its elites, opted to become a part of the expanding core in 1707, directly participating in the rise of mercantilism that would evolve into capitalism. On the other hand, as the Empire has faded and the British economy has gone into a long slow decline, Scotland's fundamentally peripheral relationship to the English core has been more and more revealed. Add to this the wild card of Scottish claims to North Sea oil discovered in the 1960s, and we have all the ingredients of a revived, neo-nationalism. Thus while classic nationalisms were defensive responses generated by the tide of capitalism coming in, Scotland's was co-opted and forestalled, and is only now being actualized as the tide goes out.

This analysis fits within another thesis developed by both Nairn (1981:11-91) and Perry Anderson (1987) in the 1960s and 70s, which grew out of broad debates in the UK at that time over how to explain the failings of the British economy. In a nutshell, they asserted that the UK is the product of a peculiar and incomplete transition from feudalism to capitalism, being precocious in its economic transformation, but thereby preserving antiquated, quasi-

feudal political institutions and ideology. Unlike France, Britain never had a full-fledged bourgeois, republican revolution, and is still trying to make do with the antiquated political arrangements of 1688 in the late 20th century. Thus British elites are seen as having an immature and inadequate relationship to the British capital they pretend to control. In this light the Scottish movement can be seen as part of a long overdue push to modernize the political structures in the UK. Ellen Wood (1991) has countered what she calls "the Nairn-Anderson thesis" by arguing that in fact, the UK's economic woes are simply due to what one would expect from capital at its furthest stages of development, i.e., a high degree of autonomy and disengagement from the nation-state in which it was first formed. I am sympathetic to Wood's argument, and shall return to the issue in the conclusion.⁷

Nairn's uneven development thesis has been taken up by many students of Scottish nationalism in varying forms. Its best known antecedent is Michael Hechter's Internal Colonialism (1975), which, following Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), argued that Scotland, Wales and Ireland formed a Celtic fringe of underdevelopment on the English periphery. In short, he argued that the British economy was internally unevenly developed, and that this took the form of a "cultural division of labor." This thesis, however, works better for Ireland and the Scottish highlands than it does

⁷ The Nairn-Anderson approach was first critiqued by E. P. Thompson (1978[1965]).

for the Scottish lowlands, which was both considerably anglicized, and industrialized on a massive scale (cf. McCrone 1992:57-62).⁸

Responding to critics, Hechter later reformulated his thesis to argue that the Scottish lowlands were, on the contrary, over-developed and over-specialized in the heavy industries, but still functionally subordinated to the British state (1982). This hypothesis resembles that put forward by a group of marxist thinkers represented in Scottish Capitalism (1980), edited by Tony Dickson. There the term used is "client capitalism," the argument being that the British state allowed Scotland to develop industries that were "complimentary" but not "competitive" with those of England. McCrone has countered that "...[i]n what was perhaps the quintessential free market economy, there is little need to import the notion that economic activity was managed by the state..." (1992:64), i.e., what specialization there was is the logical outcome of capitalism itself. Developing the earlier work of Kendrick, Bechhofer and McCrone (1985), he shows that on the whole economic trends in Scotland, including the current deindustrialization and economic depression, have been similar and parallel to those of the rest of Britain rather than divergent. Thus economic differences in themselves do not seem sufficient to explain

⁸ More successful attempts to apply world systems and underdevelopment models exclusively to the highlands can be found in Carter (1974) and Hunter (1976). For a classic exchange on the applicability of such theories to Scotland see Wallerstein (1980) and Smout (1980a, 1980b).

the current rise of nationalism. It is significant, however, that the implicit comparison that is often being made by movement supporters and activists is not with England as a whole, but with the south-eastern, London-centered economy, which is indeed more contrastive.

The difficulty with these arguments is that they tend to treat nationalism either as a relatively direct by-product of economic forces, or as something latent and already given, that is either inhibited or promoted by the prevailing economic conditions. What is needed is more attention to the shifting axes of negotiation and conflict involved. John Foster (1989) has outlined an alternative marxist reading to Nairn's which begins to take us in this direction. He argues that Nairn places too much weight on macro-economic processes, and not enough on the indigenous class dynamics. He holds to the thesis of client capitalism, arguing that the Scottish economy was sufficiently structurally distinctive that "...there did emerge in Scotland an anti-capitalist trend of British identity..." (1989:48). His core arguments are that: a) in the 1960s and 70s "...[l]arge-scale Scottish capital detached itself from the productive economy, and, in so far as it maintained a separate existence, did so as a broker for external capital..." (Ibid.:50); and b) because of this, Scottish working class identity ceased to be structured by class relations internal to Scotland, and took on the new structural role of representing opposition to "external" economic and political control primarily in the form of

London-based capital. Thus Scottish working class identity became fused with a more generic national identity.

The critical role of the institutions of Scottish civil society have long been acknowledged, and have recieved more attention in recent years. Nairn stressed early on the importance of the preservation of the indigenous lowland bourgeoisie and the institutions through which they governed—church, law, education, Royal Burghs and other forms of local government (1981:132-48). And in The National Movement in Scotland (1978), Jack Brand, although agreeing with Nairn's uneven development thesis, argued that this was not sufficient to explain why nationalism and not some other movement arose to address the situation. He suggested that there had been "...a gradual restructuring of the political consciousness of the Scottish electorate in such a way that they began to see themselves as Scots in terms of their political interests, rather than as, for example, members of the working class..." (1978:301). While this perhaps suggests a false dichotomy between Scottish and working class identities, Brand perceptively points to 20th century structural developments in Scotland, including a more national press and TV, and increasing articulation of specifically Scottish economic problems with the rise of regional economic management, exemplified by such projects as the New Towns discussed above. He saw these changes as providing the basis for rising confidence and expectations that have not always been adequately fulfilled by the

programs of UK-wide political parties--and thus stimulating a regionally based form of politics.

In response to criticisms of the thesis of "client capitalism" Dickson (1989) has recently argued that this must be seen in combination with the contradiction that exists between Scotland's retention of the civil institutions of education, law and religion, and its loss of political and economic decision making to Westminster. Compounded by deindustrialization and the limited replacement of older state-owned heavy industries by externally owned "branch factories," this frustrating disjuncture has simultaneously fanned the flames of nationalist and anti-Thatcher sentiments. Hechter's reformulations have also involved greater attention to this institutional infrastructure, leading him to make a distinction between "hierarchical" vs. "segmental" cultural divisions of labor. He now describes Scotland's indigenous institutions, elites, and class structure, as a specialized vertical segment, rather than a marginalized lower layer, of Britain's political, economic, and cultural system (Hechter and Levi 1979).

Perhaps the best general statement of this sharper focus on civil society and social structure is Lindsay Paterson's article Ane End of Ane Auld Sang: Sovereignty and the Re-Negotiation of the Union (1991; elaborated in 1994). He criticizes commentators on the Scottish situation for exaggerating Scotland's traumatic loss of sovereignty in 1707, arguing that in fact Scotland's elites and middle

classes long retained a high degree of autonomy within the decentralized system of the 18th and 19th centuries, and effective UK representation through the Labour movement in this century. Since World War I there has developed a kind of middle class managerial autonomy, based on a network of institutions including the old triumvirate of law, church, and schools, and crucially involving such bodies as the Scottish office itself, the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC), and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA). The political and economic changes discussed above have meant that "...[f]aced with near exclusion from even a peripheral access to sovereignty, the Scottish institutions have found that their legitimacy can no longer derive from above: they must trust the people, or die..." (1991:113); i.e., the continued viability of these institutions to manage Scottish affairs now rests on their ability to rally popular support.

Considered in combination, I think Foster's and Paterson's arguments begin to show the fundamental picture in a clearer way. Scotland possesses strong, longstanding indigenous institutional structures of both formal and informal government, i.e., of civil society, that have become marginalized by shifts in both the political and economic distributions of power. Capital has become disengaged and political power is monopolized by a right wing party whose base is in south-east England and London. It remains to locate this situation within the encompassing political

economic process that is marked by the current "crisis" and retrenchment of the welfare state.

The Centrality of the Welfare State: The synopsis of welfare state development in Scotland presented in this and the previous chapter fits well within most standard accounts of this transnational process. Such accounts generally chart initial experiments with welfare provisions from the latter 19th century up to W.W. I, consolidation of support for the idea between the wars, dramatic expansion after W.W. II up to the mid 1970s, and crisis and retrenchment after that time (e.g., Bryson 1992:69-120; Heclo 1981; Pierson 1991:102-40).

Explanations for the rise of the welfare state have varied. Some have seen it as primarily a natural result of functional requirements of industrialized society and its demographic and bureaucratic effects (Wilensky 1975). For others it was a necessary response by the state, compensating for the corrosive effects of capitalist markets on social reproduction (Therborn 1987). Still others have placed greater emphasis on the political process, seeing the welfare state as primarily the result of gains won by strong labor movements and class based left political parties (Esping-Anderson and Korpi 1987; Korpi 1989; Stephens 1979). A similar but divergent explanation treats these "gains" as also a means of defusing left political mobilization and subsidizing capital accumulation (Gough 1979; Thane 1984). As Gough observes, there is truth in both of the last two

positions: the welfare state is inherently a product of contradictory tendencies (1979:153; cf. Poulantzas 1978).

During the heyday of the welfare state from the mid 1940s to the mid 1970s, when a more progressive-evolutionary paradigm prevailed, there was often a tendency to talk in terms of the gradual extension of citizens rights. Thus T. H. Marshall (focusing primarily on England) outlined an unfolding sequence: of civil rights in the 18th century, to freedom of thought, speech, and to form contracts; of political rights in the 19th century, to participation in the political process; and finally of social rights in the 20th century, to the basic conditions for health, economic welfare, and full participation in society (Marshall 1983 [1950]). In a similar vein, C. B. Macpherson (1973) argued that the growth of the welfare state represented a shift in the very conception of property, from a principle of exclusion, to one of inclusion. In other words, as property becomes less associated with rights over material things, and more associated with rights to forms of revenue (e.g., rents, stock dividends, etc.), this will become generalized to the idea that all citizens in a democracy have basic rights to a share of revenue, and ultimately to participate in decision-making regarding social resources. From our present vantage point these may seem like naively optimistic projections, but at the time they were presented as commonsense extrapolations from the given tendencies of the 20th century welfare states. My point is that they emphasize the fundamental link that had

been forged between the ideas of welfare provisioning and citizens rights. Even if those rights were won through processes of class struggle, they are constituted as citizens rights, not working class rights, and this goes some way towards explaining the infusion of class identities into national/citizenship identities (cf. Bryson 1992:65-66; Hasenfeld, Rafferty and Zald 1987:395-97; Pierson 1991:22-24).

Comparative historical research on the development of welfare states may offer some clues to the strength of this paradigm in Scotland. Esping-Anderson and Van Kersbergen cite the work of D. R. Cameron who has argued that

the vulnerability that small, open economies face favors the expansion of the public economy so as to reduce uncertainty via social guarantees, full employment, and more active government management of the economy...Since small open economies tend to be industrially concentrated, they also tend to develop strong and unified interest organizations. The capacity to forge broad consensus and to mobilize power is further helped by the homogeneity and concentration of the labor force (Esping-Anderson and Van Kersbergen 1992:192).

Perhaps the Scottish case is one that fits particularly well within this model, a fit that is obscured by its being embedded within the UK state and economy. These same authors also note Tilton's (1990) argument that Swedish social democracy, often seen as the type-case of the welfare state, may have more to do with "...a radical-liberal commitment to freedom of choice rather than to socialism..." (Esping-Anderson and Van Kersbergen 1992:191), an argument which is suggestive for the Scottish case when we recall the roots Scotland's 20th century socialism in its 19th century

liberalism. More specifically, as we have seen, McCrone has focused on the rise and fall of regional economic planning and management in the UK during this century (1993). He argues that this aspect of the centralized Keynesian state became one of the major integrating factors in Britain, and that in their neo-liberal campaign to disassemble this dimension of the state, the Tories have been unwittingly contributing to the process of political disintegration.

This leads us to how the welfare state has been critiqued in recent years, especially in light of its failing health. In discussing the causes of the welfare state we have already mentioned the fairly orthodox neo-marxist critique that it is a creature of capitalism, managing the social reproduction of necessary labor power (Ginsburg 1979). Others have focused on issues of inequality and exclusion in the provisions offered by welfare states. There are of course substantial variations between such states, but overall the lion's share of social entitlements tend to go to white, middle-class men, with systems of provisioning being biased against women and ethnic minorities (Bryson 1992:121-225; Goodin and Le Grand 1987; Pierson 1991:69-92).

There has also been a range of critiques from across the political spectrum which question the very feasibility of the welfare state. Those coming from an ecologically informed socialism have criticized the welfare state as part of a larger modernist paradigm of unlimited growth potential in the economy, which they argue is unsustainable (Gorz 1985).

The currently ascendent neo-liberal political right of course has its own critique, rooted in this century, especially in the work of Fredrick Hayek (1976[1944]) and public choice theory. The central arguments here are that free markets, based on conditions of private property and contract enforced by the minimal state, are the only effective, efficient and just means of meeting individual demands, and that the state inevitably has a deranging effect when it intervenes in the dynamics of the marketplace, thereby generating bloated, self-serving bureaucracies, and structurally and psychologically dependent and unproductive populations (Pierson 1991:40-48). Curiously, another strain of neo-marxism has also come to the conclusion of the basic unworkability of the welfare state, though for very different reasons. These theorists have focused on the basic contradictions that the welfare state encounters in providing a basis for legitimation of the capitalist state as a whole (Gough 1979; O'Connor 1973; Offe 1984). Thus Offe argues that the Keynesian welfare state is a form of permanent "crisis management" which is itself now in crisis (1984:57-61). Offe's thesis is complex but, in short, he argues that the state's effort to guarantee legitimacy for itself and the capitalist economy by securing welfare services and full employment tends to undermine the very conditions for that economy by removing ("decommodifying") large portions of the economy from market pressures. The result is a chain reaction in which the economy fails to produce the revenue

necessary to support the welfare state, while the state promises more welfare than it can deliver, and the entire system, but especially the state, tends to lose legitimacy. Habermas, who draws heavily on Offe, sees another contradiction, this time between the goals and methods of the welfare state, citing as another basis for the loss of legitimacy--the "colonization of the lifeworld." By this he means the intrusion of the political-administrative system into everyday life, thus undermining the basic autonomy necessary to be a full participant in society (1989:291-92; see also Hasenfeld, Rafferty and Zald 1987).

It is worth noting that many attempts to provide an overview of the literature on the "crisis" of the welfare state end up, almost as an afterthought, by observing the impact of the changing global political economy (e.g., Bryson 1992:230; Esping-Anderson and van Kerbergen 1992:203). When asking comparative questions about the relative fates of welfare states it is perhaps natural to focus on endogeneous factors that can then be compared, but this tends to draw our attention away from the larger, encompassing picture. As Pierson has observed,

[i]t is above all changes in the international political economy that have undermined the circumstances for the promotion of national Keynesian institutions. The powers of national governments, national labour movements and nationally based capital--between whom agreements about economic and social policy were typically constructed--have been undermined by the greater internationalization and deregulation of the modern world economy. Even the domestic difficulties of Keynesian social democracy must often be understood as the local expression of international processes. At the risk of some oversimplification, one could say that

Keynesianism and its characteristic welfare state form are increasingly incompatible with the new international political economy (1995:49).

Pierson goes on to note that the international system of post W.W. II Keynesian welfare states was underwritten by the global strength of the United States economy, and the stable exchange rates based on the reserve currency status of the US dollar, which have declined and collapsed, respectively, since the early 1970s. This has made it much more difficult to use the traditional Keynesian monetary policies to control inflation and interest rates within domestic economies. Combined with the growth of multinational corporations, the heightened mobility of capital, and the deregulation of financial institutions, national economies, especially of small nations, have become much more open and vulnerable. Lash and Urry (1987) attribute this process to a new stage of "disorganized capitalism" in contrast to the "organized capitalism" of mid-century, based on fordist production techniques, Keynesian regulations, and the welfare state compromise between capital and labor. Developing this thesis, Offe sees various effects: fragmentation of the work force and working class organization; middle-class defection from the ideal of the welfare state; an individualistic self-survival ethos; and general declining faith in the state (1987:529-34). David Harvey has succinctly posed the central paradox:

The state is now in a much more problematic position. It is called upon to regulate the activities of corporate capital in the national interest at the same time as it is forced, also in the national interest, to

create a 'good business climate' to act as an inducement to trans-national and global finance capital, and to deter (by means other than exchange controls) capital flight to greener and more profitable pastures (Harvey 1989:170; see also Jessop 1988; Pierson 1991:61-68).

Harvey also directs our attention to the effects of capitalism, with its hyper-mobility, on the social construction of space and time as sources of social power. He argues that capital, with its tendencies toward ever greater expansion and acceleration, dominates global "space" in general, and that working class and other social movements that resist capital correspondingly tend to take opposing stands in specific "places" (1989:236-39). This argument again seems to confirm what I have suggested above about the Scottish case. As the social contract between capital and labor under the welfare state regime, which is at the same time a contract between a state and its citizens, has become weakened and threatened, that contract/conflict has tended to become reconfigured in terms of places: Scotland and England or, more precisely, Scotland and the London-centered core of the UK economy. It is intriguing to note that Harvey offers as an example of the bourgeoisie's need to dominate empowered spaces Thatcher's abolition of the Greater London Council, controlled by the marxist left during 1981-85 (1989:237). In this light the Greater London Council and the Scottish autonomist movement appear as reciprocal weights, the one located at the spatial heart of the current left-right conflict, the other on the northern third of the island,

giving shape, as we have said, to what is called the "north-south divide."

I would like to conclude by considering some ideas put forth by Jürgen Habermas on this subject. He attempts to place the welfare state crisis within an analysis of the contemporary zeitgeist, which he describes as "the new obscurity" (1989:288). By this he means a fading of the utopian vision based on the idea of humanity's mastery of its own productive powers and nature, which has inspired and guided left-socialist politics over the last 200 years, as well as the building of the welfare state in this century. This stems from the failings and contradictions of the Keynesian compromise as we have discussed them above, but perhaps more profoundly, from the realization of the vastly destructive potential, for both human freedom and nature, that our productive powers have attained (Ibid.:286). The result is an "exhaustion of utopian energies," a period of ideological uncertainty and unclarity, which Habermas suggests has taken the form of three main types of responses. The first tries to defend the legitimacy of the welfare state and industrial society. As he puts it: "...[t]oday the legitimists are the true conservatives, who want to stabilize what has been achieved..." (Ibid.:293). The second response is that of the neoconservatives, who pursue a roll back of the state and greater freedom for capital, bolstered by a return to "...traditional culture and the stabilizing forces of conventional morality, patriotism, bourgeois religion, and

folk culture..." (Ibid.:294). The third response he labels "...the *dissidence of the critics of growth*, who have an ambivalent attitude toward the welfare state..." (Ibid.: emphasis in original). Here he includes what are generally called new social movements, i.e., those based on identities and interests not directly tied to relations of production and class. He argues that although the first two responses represent continuing commitments to the productivist paradigm, the first seeking to stabilize the situation through the political power of the state, the second through the economic power of the market, the last response seeks to reassert the autonomy of the "lifeworld," Habermas's term for the "...dense network of shared meanings that individuals draw from to construct identities, to negotiate situational definitions, or to create social solidarities..." (Seidman 1989:18). Thus the "critics of growth," for the most part partially and inarticulately, reject the "colonization" of daily life by both the state and the market driven economy (Habermas 1989:295).

While clearly schematic, and somewhat influenced by the German political context (particularly in the characterization of new social movements as universally "antiproduktivist"), I think Habermas's portrayal of the situation helps us to further characterize the Scottish autonomist movement, which I would cast as a unique mixture of his first and third responses, i.e., as merging both a conservative defense of the welfare state, and a reassertion

of the "lifeworld" in a Scottish mode. This merging is facilitated by the fact that the "utopian vision" in this case is focused not only on competing futures for the state/society currently in existence, but also on a hypothetical "state/society-to-be," an imagined alternative, or new beginning. Likewise, the blurring of state and society that I have just implied, and that is characteristic of movement discourse, is also made possible by this idealized conception, in which the normal tensions, ruptures, and condition of alienation that characterize the society-state relationship, are elided in imagination. As I have tried to suggest, the quasi-state-like nature of Scottish civil society further facilitates this peculiar intimacy and interpenetration of the very ideas of state and society in Scotland.

To re-trace the argument thus far: our present moment is one in which the mid-century compromise between capital and labor, which was necessarily also a kind of social contract between modern industrialized states and their citizens, has become severely stressed, and those arrangements are undergoing crisis and retrenchment. In Scotland, a unique conjunction of a strong, quasi-state-like civil society (although, as we have seen, by no means univocal), and strong, intertwined public traditions of socialism, liberal reformism, and politico-religious resistance to the state, have provided a de facto context for grounding a vision of an alternative and less alienated future, in the form of greater

Scottish autonomy. But there is a real tension here, between a hopeful vision of the future and a pragmatic defense of a present connected to an idealized past. The moral economic discourse with which we began has arisen out of this tension, because a key means of communal provision, the Keynesian, redistributive welfare state, is under threat, and time does not stand still. This discourse is defensive and conservative in the senses we have pointed out, but it is also an attempt to convey chosen aspects of the past and present into the future--to argue for a certain kind of future by arguing from a certain kind of past. It is the rhetoric through which visions of past, present and future are woven together into an integrated, narrative argument that will be the central concern of the rest of this study.

CHAPTER SIX
THE COVENANT TRADITION AND
THE MAKING OF HISTORY IN THE AUTONOMIST MOVEMENT

I. Introduction

The "Rally to Recall Scotland's Parliament out of Adjournment," described in Chapter 2, culminated in a ritual enactment that was deeply rooted in Scottish political traditions. After the speeches were over, the representatives of political parties and campaigning groups present on the platform all signed the Recall Declaration, which pledged the signatories to continue to work for a Scottish parliament and was explicitly cast as a reaffirmation of the Democracy Declaration of the December 12 Demonstration almost a year before. After the signing, all those present on Calton Hill were led in a collective recitation of the declaration.

In one respect, this political ritual would seem to have little significance beyond reaffirming a sense of solidarity among those variously bound together in a common cause. The act itself constituted no concrete political leverage; it did not alter the political landscape. But it takes on richer meanings when we regard it as one small moment in a much deeper political tradition, a tradition which is alive, and which bears upon and frames autonomist politics in Scotland. I will call this the "covenant tradition."

This recurring image of the covenant is, I think, quite apparent in the foregoing chapters. Here I want to isolate it analytically to examine it more closely. I will start by defining terms, namely "tradition" and "covenant," then I will examine the parallels between the covenants of the 20th century autonomist movement and those of earlier periods, and conclude by trying to account for the covenant's continuing salience in the present political context.

II. Defining Terms

Probably the most influential attempt to relate the idea of tradition to nationalism and the nation-state remains Hobsbawm and Ranger's The Invention of Tradition (1984). The contributors to this volume explored myriad ways in which national identity has been consolidated through the creation of rituals, iconographies, and practices that, while appearing to have great historical depth, were often of relatively recent invention (i.e., after the industrial revolution). As Hobsbawm points out in his introduction, these invented traditions

seem to belong to three overlapping types: a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behavior (1984:9).

The emphasis here is clearly on ways of consolidating a state-sanctioned social order in the interest of national elites. While I have no difficulty with this approach, it is

inadequate for the present purpose for two reasons. First, it simply fails to capture the double-edged quality of the covenant, which on the one hand consolidates political and ideological alliances, but on the other, has often been used to contest state-level authority. Secondly, the gravity and importance of the covenant in Scotland lies precisely in the fact that, no matter how changed over time, it is not a recent invention. The approach of Hobsbawm and Ranger is not suited to dealing with these dimensions.

What is needed here is a somewhat less ironic notion of tradition. In an earlier attempt to develop a marxist conception, Raymond Williams has suggested that

[w]hat we have to see is not just 'a tradition' but a *selective tradition*: an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped present, which is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and identification (1977:115, emphasis in original).

It should be acknowledged that Williams was locating this more organic notion of tradition within a concern for processes of hegemony and cultural dominance similar to that of Hobsbawm and Ranger, and he primarily had in mind a broader sense of tradition as a way of life, or a set of norms, rather than as a specific historical chain of practice, which is my present concern. Still this passage comes closer to capturing the process I have in mind in which an idiomatic, almost stylized way of doing something, manages to endure over a long period of time, even as it evolves to serve an array of historically situated purposes. A tradition in this sense connects the present with the past

not simply through an evocation of historical rootedness, but through a continuing practical relevance. I suggested in Chapter 3, and reiterate here, that the theoretical counterposing of hegemony and counter-hegemony is not terribly useful, and that instead we should think in terms of multiple efforts at hegemony, some more successful, some less, some compatible, some not. In this regard I see the covenant tradition as feeding into and reinforcing the present hegemony in Scotland of the idea of the basic soundness social democracy and the corporatist welfare state, while at the same time articulating dissent from the larger hegemony of neoliberal thinking in the UK and abroad. In current Scottish autonomist politics, the covenant tradition helps define the friction between these two hegemonies.

A fuller explication of the idea of the covenant will come through a discussion of various historical instances. But it is useful to begin with some basic principles. Minimally, covenants create or reaffirm social bonds of common membership in a community, and mutual expectations for community members. In the history of Scottish politics, covenants are not entered into constantly, but usually at certain junctures that are defined by uncertainty, anxiety, risk and conflict. Covenants are made when solidarity and common purpose are threatened, and are often concerned with articulating those threats, with voicing concern for an untenable state of affairs. And sometimes already existing covenants are broken. So, to thoroughly consider this

tradition we have to look both at explicit acts of testifying to bonds of membership in a common cause, and at acts of protest and petition framed within contexts that are understood by the social actors as, in some sense, already covenanted. In other words, some of the covenant events we will consider emphasize creating and consolidating new ties, but others, perhaps less immediately recognizable as part of the same tradition, emphasize the betrayal of agreements, and the assertion of neglected rights. These are two sides of the same social form; the fundamental form of the covenant is that of a community asserting its terms of membership within a larger community. One of my main goals in what follows is to pose a convincing argument for this twofold conception of the covenant tradition, in which agreement and disagreement, consent and dissent, continually implicate each other.

III. The Covenant Tradition

My approach here will be to identify three types of covenant events found in the 20th century autonomist movement, and relate them to the historical covenant events to which they refer. These are: a) Covenants, b) Claims of Right, and c) Declarations. This division of the subject will help highlight the specific historical allusions being made in each case. I would stress however, that I see these as particular variations on a common theme: the broader, "double" sense of covenant outlined above. Most of these covenant-events have already been mentioned or discussed in

their historical context in earlier chapters, so I will keep a fairly narrow focus here on the basic aims and structuring of the covenants in question.

Covenants: As described in the last chapter, the Scottish Covenant, drafted in 1949, came out of ex-SNP leader John MacCormick's efforts to organize a national, non-party political movement in favor of the establishment of a Scottish parliament. In other words, he and the others involved in this effort sought to both broaden the consensus around the issue of constitutional change, and create a testament to that consensus. The full text of the Scottish Covenant read:

We the people of Scotland who subscribe this Engagement, declare our belief that reform in the constitution of our country is necessary to secure good government in accordance with our Scottish traditions and to promote the spiritual and economic welfare of our nation.

We affirm that the desire for such reform is both deep and widespread through the whole community, transcending all political differences and sectional interests, and we undertake to continue united in purpose for this achievement.

With that end in view we solemnly enter into this Covenant whereby we pledge ourselves, in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of the United Kingdom, to do everything within our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs.

This effort was notable both for its broad appeal, and its minimal impact on Westminster politics. In a parliamentary system where the electoral success of a party organization is the key to influence, the Covenant was easily ignored. More generally, the time was not ripe for such a radical alteration of the UK constitution. Still, it was a

national affair actively remembered by many of my older informants, some of whom related vivid impressions of the drama and seriousness of the movement.

The style, language, and name of the Scottish Covenant explicitly refers to the famous covenants of 1638 and (to a lesser degree) 1643. As I related in Chapter 4, these were responses to the absolutist and anglicizing tendencies of King Charles I's government in London, and more particularly to the power of Anglican bishops grafted onto the Presbyterian church structure from above and the threat of royal reappropriation of church lands acquired by the nobility in the Reformation. However, it was Charles' 1637 attempt to impose a new common prayer book, which basically prescribed Anglican liturgical forms, that triggered the making of the National Covenant in 1638. Stevenson describes the event:

The national covenant was first signed in Greyfriars kirk on 28 February. The lairds assembled there were addressed by Loudoun [a noble] and Alexander Henderson [a minister], after which Johnston of Warriston [a lawyer] read out the covenant. A few doubts raised by some of the lairds having been answered, the nobles arrived and signed, followed by the lairds. The next day three hundred ministers and commissioners for the burghs signed, followed on the two succeeding days by the people of Edinburgh. It was decided that copies of the covenant should be provided for 'ilk shire, balzierie, stewartry, or distinct judicatorie' to be signed by the principal persons of the area, while copies for each parish should be signed by all who were admitted to the sacrament there. John Livingston rode to London with letters and copies of the covenant which were delivered to friends of the covenanters at court by Eleazer Borthwick. After the signing of the covenant most of the covenanters who had gathered in Edinburgh returned home, many of them taking copies of the covenant with them for signature locally. Before they dispersed it was arranged that six nobles and a few

commissioners from each shire should remain to await the king's reaction to the covenant, and that elections should be held to chose commissioners for future meetings. Each parish or burgh was ordered to keep lists of those who signed the covenant and those who refused to do so (Stevenson 1973:83-84).

Although initiated by the nobility and the developing Kirk-based elite, who no doubt used coercive measures in some cases to gain support, the National Covenant clearly had a base of popular support (Stevenson 1988:2). This Covenant was an amplification of an earlier document instigated by the young King James I in 1581 known as the Negative Confession, "...the signatories of which bound themselves to uphold the true religion of the church of Scotland and oppose popery and superstition..." (Stevenson 1973:82). That document, which members of James's royal household had been required to sign, responded to fears of plots by noble factions to align with France and Spain for the restoration of Roman Catholicism. The National Covenant, quoting this earlier document in full, and citing numerous acts of parliament, called upon Charles to follow his father's established precedent, while also insisting that the signatories were still loyal to the Crown, and asserting that any changes in worship must be approved by free assmblies and parliaments. Thus Charles was presented with an earnest and urgent request to enter into this covenant with the ruling class and the people of Scotland for the common defense of the "...true Reformed religion..." but the document to be signed clearly sought to demarcate limits to his powers, especially in regard to the Presbyterian Church.

The ensuing battle of wills and power was complex--at first Charles outlawed the signatories, then he recanted and agreed to call the first General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in almost twenty years, which struck back by abolishing bishops. From there the situation quickly slid into civil war. The Solemn League and Covenant of 1643 was basically a tactical move in this war. Although its stated purpose was a pledge of mutual support between the Scottish Covenanters and the English parliament (largely Presbyterian but not nearly as zealous as the Scots) in the cause of preserving the reformed religion and opposing "popery" and "prelacy" (i.e., the bishops) throughout the three kingdoms of England, Ireland and Scotland it was in fact an expedient device for the English parliament to enlist the Scottish armies in their struggle against Charles and his faction of noble supporters. Many of the Covenanters had vainly seen this alliance as one that would lead to a humbled king Charles administering his kingdoms through a unified Presbyterian Church, and were sorely dissappointed to see Charles beheaded by the English parliament, and their own country subsequently pacified by Cromwell's army.

The covenanting tradition continued after the Cromwellian interregnum (1650-1660), and some of the best remembered folk heroes of the covenanting period come from the latter half of the 17th century. But by this time it was a substantially transformed phenomenon. The last band of Covenanters still fighting against the English in 1649 (the

Remonstrants) was a kind of extremist sect with its own church and army, committed to struggle against all odds while royalist sympathizers and defeated Covenanters adjusted to the new political reality. The Restoration under Charles II after 1660 brought with it new attempts to impose religious conformity on Scotland, often under harsh military discipline. The later covenanting uprisings of 1666 and 1679, responding to these pressures, had a decidedly populist base of marginalized and sectarian groups from the most disempowered segments of society which often engaged in conflicts not just with the state but with their more immediate social superiors (Stevenson 1988:59-69; Kiernan 1989).

The striking feature here is the way in which allegiances to church and crown, God and king, were played off of one another, and the way the covenants were used to assert the authority of religion, church, and God over the king, while at the same time trying to forswear rebellion. The space and voice for the sovereignty of a Scottish elite, representing (for better or worse) a Scottish populace, was created and opened up by exploiting the tensions between divine and royal sovereignty. In the same vein, the Scottish Covenant of the late 1940s stressed loyalty to the Crown and "...the framework of the United Kingdom..." while also asserting the sovereignty of popular opinion in Scotland, and raising a challenge to the constitutional status quo. It is this pattern of asserting a social (political, religious,

moral) bond, while in the same stroke rendering it problematic and in need of re-negotiation, that is so characteristic of the covenant.

An Excursus on Bonds and Devils Pacts: These 17th century covenants were "sewn together" out of an older and broader sociocultural fabric of custom and conventions that I will briefly elaborate here. Of particular importance is the custom of bonding (or banding), which flourished from the middle of the 15th century to the beginning of the 17th century. Bonds were signed agreements or contracts, written in the vernacular (Scots), sometimes regarding debts or commercial transactions, but more often establishing rights and duties between parties, either clientelistically between lords and lesser men, or horizonatally between peers, such as nobles, lairds and burgesses.

The former type of bond is clearly similar to the standard feudal relationship of fealty. But bonding is distinguished by certain features--its written form and its relatively late development (1442 is the year of the earliest surviving document). Such bonds, usually between lords and heads of leading families within the lord's domain, were called "bonds of manrent" in which the lesser man pledged "manrent"--good counsel, military service, and any other services or tributes particular to the relationship--in exchange for "maintenance" from the lord, i.e., legal and political protection and other forms of support in times of need. Although the point was not explicitly stated in the

bonds until the 16th century, the lesser man apparently had the power to commit his subordinate kin and his descendants in the bond (Wormald 1985:52-55).

But it is the "horizontal" type of bond, which helped create and maintain a diverse array of social arrangements, that most clearly diverges from the normative model of feudalism. These might likely involve alliances in response to some political or economic threat or opportunity--such as a political faction of nobles backing a particular contender to the throne, or a coalition of burgesses responding to a threat of economic competition. Furthermore, bonds could either be between two individuals, or among a collectivity of signatories. Thus there were "bonds of friendship" which "...were made between two people, or sometimes a small group, and were concerned with local affairs..." (Wormald 1985:374), and this form shaded into another that involved larger numbers of people, and was usually concerned with addressing or staving off some political or religious crisis (Ibid.:402-412). For instance between 1556 and 1562 there was a rash of religious bonds among various nobles, gentry, and congregations, in support of the new reformed religion. And in fact, the Negative Confession that made up the first portion of the National Covenant is commonly viewed as a bond of this type (Burrell 1964:11).

Wormald argues that in Scottish historiography an exaggerated dichotomy has been set up between private/kin based and public/state-based modes of law. She rejects the

conventional notion of lawless highland clans engaged in endless bloodfeuds on the one hand, and state-making lowland calvinists and kings, bringing godly discipline and absolutist government on the other. She suggests that what these latter state-making forces in fact encountered was a complex mixing of feudal and kin-based relations throughout the highlands and lowlands, and that bloodfeuds and bonds were a part of a working system for the local regulation and constant re-negotiation social relations (cf. also Stevenson 1980:9-10, 20). Drawing on Max Gluckman's notion of the "peace in the feud" (1973[1956]:1-26) Wormald argues that bonding was a major part of the indigenous politico-jural system, which grew up in the chronic absence of a strong centralized monarchy in Scotland from the late 13th century onwards. This system presented a serious obstacle to new attempts at centralization, once the requisite forces were at work in the century following the Reformation, and particularly after the union of crowns under James I/IV in 1603 (Wormald 1980:55-56; 1981:35-36; 1985:115-136).

In the latter half of the 16th century, both the kirk and crown were evidently attuned to the importance of this idiom. James I seems to have seen the practice as both a threat and a useful tool of statecraft. Thus Stevenson observes that

[p]ublicly the covenanters refused to acknowledge this double character of the covenant, in binding individuals to each other as well as to God; they denied that it was in any way 'a private league of any degree of subjects among themselves.' The reason for this insistence was to avoid their covenant falling within the scope of an

act of parliament of 1585 [i.e., under James I] *forbidding private bands*. They admitted that it was more than a covenant of individuals with God and defined it as 'a publict covenant of the collective bodie of the kingdom with God for God and the King (Stevenson 1973:86, emphasis added).

Conversely, James also used banding to further his political program. The most striking example of this is the "Band and Statute of Incolmkill (Iona)" of 1609, a part of the broader effort to pacify and subdue the Gaelic political and cultural networks which spanned the Irish Sea, including the plantation of Ulster. This band was targeted at the the highland clans in the western regions of Scotland in and around Argyllshire. Mackie provides a nice vignette:

A powerful army appeared in Mull under Andrew Stewart, Lord Ochiltree, who enjoyed the cooperation of Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles. The chiefs were invited to a conference in the Castle of Aros, lured aboard ship to hear a sermon, kidnapped, and confined to various prisons. Under this compulsion they accepted next year from the Bishop 'the band and Statutes of Incolmkill (Iona)' which, though largely concerned with the establishment of the church and the improvement of morality, made each chief responsible for the conduct of his own clan (Mackie 1978:190).

More specifically, the band prohibited the support of bards, a hereditary office among the clans which carried with it the responsibility for maintaining historical and genealogical records (Mitchison 1983:15-16), and also "...tried to insist that highland chiefs should come to the lowlands at regular intervals, and (in the re-issue of 1616) learn English as a qualification for inheritance..." (Wormald 1981:164). Thus we find James imposing a band from above, as part of a program of coercive social engineering, in which bonds are disengaged from their more embedded social

function, and reintroduced in an altered form, in the project of state-making and consolidation.

It remains to describe one more, dark facet of this pattern of transformation of the bonding idiom. Along with the growing concern with covenants with God, there developed a preoccupation with witches' pacts with the devil. The latter 16th and 17th centuries were punctuated by periodic and extremely virulent witch-hunts with major peaks or "national panics" in 1591, 1597, 1629, 1649-50, 1661-62, 1607, and 1700, and with a rate of execution ten times higher than in England. Although there is some correspondence to other upheavals of the time--plague, famine, war--there is no simple correlation. The period was one of constant dislocation, and the hunts appear not to have been predicatable reactions to specific social stimuli, but rather a part of the ongoing political processes and the general atmosphere of anxiety and unrest (Larner 1981:60-79).

The variety of confessions suggests that those accused of being witches, about 80 percent women, included hapless village marginals scapegoated for the misfortunes of others, active practitioners of folk-medicine/magic, and some who may have been involved in an ideology that was consciously oppositional to the kirk and crown. In any case, all were caught up in the Scottish legal mechanism which, because of its heritage from roman law of provisions for extracting confessions and further accusations through torture, was particularly prone to oppressive brutality when placed in the

hands of the king and the kirk elders in their efforts to consolidate their respective power bases. James I/VI gave this process a major boost with his book Daemonologie (1597), a scholarly proof of the existence of witches. In addition, Newes From Scotland (1591, authorship uncertain), a glorifying account of James's brush with death at North Berwick in 1590 at the hands of a conspiratorial coven of witches, seems to have functioned as propaganda to help justify his often strong-armed political tactics. The North Berwick witch trial stimulated the first major panic in 1591, and lent legitimacy to the kirk's intensified efforts to seek out witches in subsequent decades (Wormald 1981:168-69; Smout 1972:184-92).

Larner points out that the demonic pact early on was regarded by the Scottish judiciary as the single most essential element in indictment. In the confessions, repeatedly, it is the making of the pact, and the naming of other members of the pact, that is central (Larner 1981:145). Thus one indictment from 1661 of five women and one man reads:

ilk and ane of you have shaken off all fear of God, Reverence and regard to the Lawes of this kingdome, hes betaken yourselves to the service of Satan, the enimie of your salvations entered in a Covenant and paction with him whairby you renounced you baptismes and interest in jesus Christ engaged yourselves to be the devills servants, and suffered your bodies quike aught to have been temples to the Holie ghost to be polluted defiled by suffering him to have carnall copulation with you (Larner 1981:146-47).

As this passage suggests, there was often a mixing of the idioms of covenants and pacts, and Larner points out that

[a] feature of the witch-beliefs that was particularly strong in Calvinism was the idea of Covenant. Scottish theology which was strongly rooted in the Old Testament made the idea of a covenanted people peculiarly its own. It was reflected elsewhere in Europe in the rising secular concept of the social compact, but in Scottish hands it was firmly theocratic. The covenanted people were God's people, firmly bound to him in a special relationship by a special promise.... The Demonic Pact was therefore, for the Scots, a particularly horrific inversion. The term 'covenant' was frequently used in the final indictments and the confessions as a synonym for the Pact (Ibid.:172).

I would suggest that if popular conceptions of the covenant were indebted to popular conceptions of bonds, and conceptions of covenants and demonic pacts were also interrelated, at least as promulgated by the kirk, then it is likely that the demonic pact also, at least implicitly, resonated with the notion of bonding (cf. Ibid.:148). Apart from whatever threat, real or imagined, that witches may have posed for the authority of kirk and crown, they were portrayed as people involved in a subaltern version of bonding (normally a male preserve) entering into contracts with the devil, rendering services to him in exchange for relief from chronic conditions of poverty and want, i.e., in exchange for "maintenance."

Claims of Right: In Chapter 3 I described how the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) organized the group of eminent Scots who drafted and published a report to the CSA called the Claim of Right in 1988, as a way of publicizing and furthering the cause of a Scottish Constitutional Convention. In 1989 the document was published by Polygon Press (see Chapter 3) in an edited volume along with articles

of commentary written from various perspectives on the issue.¹ Parts of the Claim were photocopied from this book and used as a focus of discussion in the Adult Learning Project's Democracy Group (also described in Chapter 3), and many of the basic arguments and "debating points" it sets out are heard frequently in movement circles. In other words it is a document which has been disseminated and I believe has had a significant influence on the discourse of the movement, or at least effectively summarizes much of that discourse.

The Claim is organized into three parts composed of numbered paragraphs, the last two outlining the mechanics of setting up a constitutional convention and how it might work. The first part entitled "The Need for Change in Scottish Government," carries the main thrust of the document's argument justifying the entire pro-parliamentary project. It is worth examining in some detail.

In the Introduction the authors point out that they "...frequently use the word "English" where the word "British" is conventionally used..." (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:13), precisely to highlight the English bias of the UK constitution, so easily obscured by the term British. Section Two discusses the "...essential facts of Scottish history..." (Ibid.), asserting the unambiguous continuity of Scottish nationhood and culture from before the

¹ In 1991 Polygon published A Woman's Claim of Right in Scotland: Women, Representation and Politics (Women's Claim of Right Group 1991), edited by a group of women involved in Scottish politics and concerned with demonstrating and analyzing the serious gender inequality there.

time of Union down to the present. But the Treaty of Union of 1707 is seen as inherently flawed:

2.6 The matters on which the Treaty guaranteed the Scots their own institutions and policies represented the bulk of civil life and government at the time; the Church, the Law and Education. However, there was never any mechanism for enforcing respect for the terms of the Treaty of Union [i.e., the terms are not entrenched, and can be and have been altered by subsequent parliaments]. Many of its major provisions have been violated, and its spirit has never affected the huge areas of government which have evolved since. The say of Scotland in its own government has diminished, is diminishing and ought to be increased (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:15).

Anticipating the counter-argument that Scotland has an entire governmental office and a Secretary of State devoted to it, they suggest that:

2.7 ...The Secretary of State may be either Scotland's man in the Cabinet or the Cabinet's man in Scotland, but in the last resort, he is invariably the latter. Today, he can be little else, since he must impose on Scotland policies against which an overwhelming majority have voted (Ibid.)

Having shifted to the present situation in the third section, they argue that the various offices and procedures designed to deal with Scottish business via Westminster are ineffective. The most fundamental issue here is that if they want to have any input into Westminster, Scots are obliged to vote for political parties whose agendas are framed by British rather than Scottish concerns. Furthermore,

3.2 ...the political arithmetic of the United Kingdom means that Scots are constantly exposed to the risk of having matters of concern only to them prescribed by a government against which they have voted not narrowly but overwhelmingly (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:16).

[.....]

3.8 We are not aware of any other instance, at least in what is regarded as the democratic world, of a territory which has a distinctive corpus of law and an acknowledged right to distinctive policies but yet has no body expressly elected to safeguard and supervise these. The existing machinery of Scottish government is an attempt either to create an illusion or to achieve the impossible (Ibid:17).

The fourth section moves from Scotland's political frustrations to the root of the problem: "The English Constitution--An Illusion of Democracy." Here the widely held view that the English/British constitution is dangerously antiquated and backward (cf. the discussion of the "Nairn-Anderson Thesis" in the last chapter) is trenchantly expressed in the opening paragraphs:

4.1 The English constitution provides for only one source of power; the Crown-in-Parliament. That one source is now mainly embodied in the Prime Minister, who has appropriated almost all the royal prerogatives. She/he appoints Ministers who, with rare exceptions, can be dismissed at will, and has further formidable powers of patronage. Because of party discipline and the personal ambition of members the consequence is that, so far from Parliament controlling the Executive (which is the constitutional theory) it is the Prime Minister as head of the Executive who controls Parliament.

4.2 Historically, the power of Parliament evolved as a means of curbing the arbitrary power of Monarchs. We have now reached the point where the Prime Minister has in practice a degree of arbitrary power few, if any, English and no Scottish Monarchs have rivalled. Yet he or she still hides behind the fiction of royal sanction and the pretence of deference to Parliament to give legitimacy to a concentration of power without parallel in western society. The American constitution was framed largely with a view to making such a development impossible. Even the centralised and Executive biased French constitution distributes power, demonstrated by the recent balance between the President and the Prime Minister there (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:18).

Section Five confronts the most fundamental objections that are often raised to the idea of an assembly/parliament.

To the standard complaint that an assembly would put Scotland, like it or not, on a slippery-slope toward independence, the authors reply that this line of reasoning is an insult to the Scots, who will be perfectly able to democratically decide once they have a parliament whether they want more, or are satisfied (Ibid.:20-21). The next point is perhaps the most serious, and too lightly dismissed by the authors (cf. Fry 1989:96). It addresses the "West Lothian Question," so named because first raised in parliament in the 1970's by the anti-devolutionist Labour MP for West Lothian (in Scotland), Tam Dalyell. In short, it points out the anomaly of a system where Scots would continue to have representation in the UK parliament, with Scottish MPs voting on matters affecting England, while the English MPs would have no input into the Scottish parliament. The only way to restore symmetry to the political system would be all-around federalism, for which there is little impetus in England. The authors' rejoinder:

5.3.3 The United Kingdom is a political artefact put together at English insistence. If it is to continue, it must work for its living and justify its existence. It is for the English to decide how to govern themselves, but they must allow the continuing improvement of Scottish government. If they dislike the Parliamentary anomaly created by a Scottish Assembly, the remedy is in their own hands--a federal system. But the anomaly would be of practical effect only occasionally and temporarily. The defects of Scottish government are fundamental and continuing (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:21).

To the charges that a parliament would simply add another tier of government that would require more money from tax payers they counter that "...[t]his is a

misunderstanding. An Assembly would not add to government, it would transfer from London to Scotland that part of government affecting Scotland only..." (Ibid.:22). They further point out that the organs and costs of an administration already exist in the Scottish Office.

5.5.6 ...The purpose of an Assembly is to give this administration better and more thorough political supervision, and to create policies based on Scottish needs rather than cosmetically adapted from London dictates. Only the elected members and their immediate staff would be additional to present administrative costs (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:23).

Regarding the more general affects of an assembly on the economy, the authors suggest that it would be more attuned to micro-economic needs that get submerged in the larger British economy. To the charge that such an assembly would drive away business (presumably because it would, in keeping with the socialist bent in Scotland, impose higher taxes and more regulations) they counter that:

5.6.9 ... [l]arger businesses will stay in Scotland if the conditions for a healthy economy prevail. Smaller businesses, with stronger roots in the local economy have a greater incentive to stay (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:25).

[.....]

5.6.12 ... In general, business congregates where it can find politicians to lend it an ear and fight its cause. Scottish Assembly Members would know that their prospects of re-election depended at least in part on what they were judged to have done for the Scottish economy. If the close propinquity of politicians frightened off business the City of London [a term analogous to "Wallstreet"] would have decamped long ago (Ibid.:26).

This is possibly the least convincing section of the Claim, which seems to put a brave face on genuinely thorny

matters. It would probably be more accurate to say that larger businesses will stay in Scotland if the conditions for realizing profit prevail, and the health of smaller businesses tends to depend on the presence of larger ones. One could also argue that the Tory party is so resented in Scotland precisely because it has lent an ear and fought the cause of business. In short, given the current world economy, for a Scottish parliament to create an economic atmosphere that is "business friendly" without simply echoing neoliberal policies, may be a serious challenge. Be that as it may, Part One of the Claim ends on a more philosophical note, making a keen point:

7.2 The Government claims to act in the name of freedom and choice [i.e., the free market]. There are two kinds of choice; choice from what is offered, and choice of what is to be offered. Only the latter is effective choice. The crucial question is, "Who edits the choices that are to be offered?" The ordinary citizen's power to edit the choices that are to be offered can be exercised better through elective institutions than in any other way (Constitutional Steering Committee 1989:28).

Part One concludes:

7.5 There is a profound hypocrisy in saying that the Scots should stand on their own two feet [a reference to Conservative accusations of a "dependency culture" in Scotland] while simultaneously denying them the management of their own political affairs, and that denial is clear deprivation of choice for Scots. Scots can stand on their own feet only by refusing to accept the constitution which denies them the power to do so (Ibid.:29).

I have discussed this portion of the Claim at length because it is one of the most comprehensive statements on the whole subject. Unlike the Scottish Covenant, this is an elaborated yet succinct critique of the present situation;

closer to a call to arms (speaking figuratively), and less of a rallying of the troops. Let us turn now to the earlier Claims of Right.

The Claim of Right of 1689 stated the terms under which the "estates of the kingdom of Scotland" would accept William (of Orange) and Mary, already made King and Queen of England in the "Glorious Revolution," as Scottish monarchs. Much of the document is taken up with listing the faults of the recently deposed Catholic king James VII, concluding that

Therefore the Estates of the Kingdom of Scotland, Find and Declare that King James the Seventh being a professed Papist, did assume the Regal power, and acted as King, without ever taking the oath required by law, and hath by the advice of evil and wicked counsellors, invaded the fundamental constitution of the Kingdom, and altered it from a legal limited Monarchy, to an arbitrary despotick Power, and hath exercised the same, to the subversion of the Protestant religion, and the violation of the laws and liberties of the Kingdom, inverting all the ends of Government, whereby he hath forefaulted the right to the Crown, and the Throne is become vacant (Donaldson 1970:255).

The rest of the document states what the Scots require of their king: that he be Protestant, that he cannot impose taxes without the parliament's consent, that the royal powers are not absolute but limited, and that "...for the redress of all grievances, and for the amending and preserving of the laws, Parliaments ought to be frequently called, and allowed to sit, and the freedom of speech and debate secured to the members..." (Ibid.:257). These conditions being met, the Claim of 1689 resolves that William and Mary be declared king and queen of Scotland.

The Claim of Right of 1842 was an episode in the Great Disruption that split the Church of Scotland in two. As related in Chapter 4, this Claim was drafted by the General Assembly of the Kirk, then dominated by the Evangelical faction, and was addressed to Parliament. The immediate spur to the Claim was the Court of Session's overturning of the General Assembly's Veto Act of 1834, which gave the adult male members of the congregations the right to reject ministers appointed by local patrons--usually landlords. The Kirk then appealed to the House of Lords, which declared the Veto Act illegal. This issue had been a point of conflict since the Union of 1707, and before that between the Scottish Parliament and several kings. At the base of the conflict was the right of the state to interfere in Church affairs, a Church which I have argued functioned very much as the domestic wing of the state in Scotland. The document, which obviously harkened back to the Claim of Right of 1689, was "...an intemperate document..." (Checkland and Checkland 1989:121) and "...a tremendous denunciation of patronage and the actions of Parliament and the Court of Sessions... [which] demanded in effect that the General Assembly and not the civil courts be the arbiter of the terms on which the Kirk held her rights and property..." (Mitchison 1970:385). This was more than the British state could concede, and instead led to the dividing and political weakening of the Kirk when the most ardent Evangelicals made the dramatic

gesture of withdrawing from the Established Kirk and setting up the Free Church of Scotland in 1843.

As we can see, all three Claims of Right explicitly address basic constitutional issues, with varying degrees of success. In contrast to the Covenants discussed above, they do not seek so much to constitute a religious and/or political community as to speak and negotiate for one that is unambiguously established. But their assertion of rights for those communities (Scotland, the Kirk) takes place in a framework which assumes a larger community (Britain, the UK) in which the former are embedded. Taken together, chronologically (1638, 1643, 1688, 1842, 1949, 1988), these Covenants and Claims also highlight the shift of focus in conflicts over sovereignty, from one between Kirk and Crown, to one between the modern managerial elite, ensconced in Scottish local government and civil society, and the UK parliament, dominated by the Prime Minister and the ruling party.

Obviously the referential links between recent events and those in a more distant past help produce a rhetoric of historical continuity, giving modern grievances a sense of historical depth and weight. But it is important not to infer that rhetoric replaces reality. There really is a history of ongoing, episodic conflicts and negotiations between Scotland and England, or Scotland and Britain--one that has been recurringly expressed in culturally patterned

ways. Before elaborating this point, I will consider one more example in the covenant tradition.

Declarations: As we have seen, the text which was signed and invoked at the Rally to Recall Scotland's Parliament was based upon an earlier one, called the "Democracy Declaration of Scotland on the Occasion of the Holding of the European Summit at Edinburgh." Drafted by the group Common Cause (and especially Tom Nairn; see Chapter 3) it was read at a rally held in Edinburgh, scheduled to coincide with the presence of representatives from the EU member states attending the European Summit on December 11 and 12, 1992. The Democracy Declaration briefly outlines the argument of the 1988 Claim of Right, but is addressed to the European visitors:

A warm welcome to Scotland, one of Europe's oldest nations. The Edinburgh Summit is the latest in a long history binding Scotland to its European neighbors...

...We recognize that on the Summit Agenda is the issue of the definition and implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. Let it be brought to your attention that subsidiarity--decision-making at the level closest to the people concerned--is being denied to the people of Scotland by the British state. It limits subsidiarity to relations between London and Brussels and seeks to remain the most centralized state in the European Community...

...Therefore, we call upon the people of Europe and the Government leaders at the Summit to recognise Scotland's right to national self-determination--the right to our own Parliament. We have voted for this right, we have asked for a referendum--now we appeal to you to raise our claim with the British Government as a matter of principle.

We have now an historic opportunity of a peaceful and democratic assertion of our national right. There is no issue of violence or ethnicity. For us rights are a means as well as an end in itself. The recognition of

our right causes no harm to any other nation or people. We invite the President of the European Council to consider our case by meeting a representative delegation from Scotland.

At the heart of our nation's history, at the centre of Europe's future, lies rule by consent of the people. The call of our times is that of democratic renewal. When the eyes of the world are upon our capital, Edinburgh, we are confident that the peoples and governments of Europe will recognise the appeal of its host nation. We therefore raise our demand without fear or favor--SCOTLAND DEMANDS DEMOCRACY.

The striking aspect here is that this statement operates within a still larger framework than the Claims of Right. It attempts an "end run" around UK level politics by taking the complaint to the European Union, as a kind of higher court of appeals. It does this by stressing a sense of shared history and community throughout Europe. Once again it both "imagines" the community while at the same time articulating grievances within that community. The Coalition for Scottish Democracy reinforced this declaration by delivering a petition to the European Parliament that made the same request for recognition. But as I have already suggested, both the Declaration and the petition have had little effect, member states being reluctant to interfere in each other's internal politics, and the the European Parliament being a relatively weak body in relation to the Council of Ministers. Nonetheless, the symbolism deployed in this event indicates the growing tendency to think about and address the problem of Scottish autonomy in a European framework, as not simply detaching from Britian, but "getting on board" Europe.²

² In the field I attended a talk given by Winnie Ewing, the Grand Dame of the SNP (especially its center-right), and MEP for the Highlands and

While the term "declaration" is certainly less distinctive than either the Covenants or the Claims of Right, there is one other well known declaration in Scottish history that I believe is being invoked here, at least implicitly. Moreover, although it is by far the oldest, and thus in some sense most remote event I have discussed so far, there are intriguing parallels. This is the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320.

A brief background is necessary. After a couple of centuries of growth and consolidation under Norman influence, the Scottish kingdom entered a period of political instability and fragmentation in the late 13th century. When the Scottish royal line died without a clear heir in 1290, the rulership of Scotland was contested from all sides. Thus the years from 1286 to 1371 have been styled the "Wars of Independence," a period of protracted warfare and negotiation when the kings of England and rival Scottish noble houses all competed for overlordship. This process was complicated by the fact that the competing noble families often held lands on both sides of the border, creating ambivalent and shifting alligences. Many key icons of Scottish nationalism come from this period, such as: William Wallace the rebel military leader from the lesser nobility and temporary "guardian of the realm" (when factions of greater nobles could not agree on leadership); the defender king Robert the Bruce and his

Islands, in which she likened Europe to a train leaving the station, and Scots as eager passengers being held back by a foot-dragging British government.

victory against the English at Bannockburn in 1314; and the Declaration of Arbroath, written in 1320.

The Declaration was actually a letter to Pope John XXII from the "barons and freeholders" of Scotland, petitioning him to intercede on their behalf in the ongoing war with England. The Papacy desired peace within Christendom so that military energies could be directed against Islam, and tended to side with the greater power--England--in prosecuting a resolution of the conflict. A masterful work of diplomatic rhetoric, the Declaration does several things. First it asserts Scotland's antiquity and long-standing sovereignty as a Christian nation "called to faith" by the apostle Saint Andrew. Then it recounts Scotland's depredations and unfair treatment at the hands of the English kings Edward I and his son Edward II. This is followed by the most frequently quoted section, in which the noblemen praise their Lord and protector King Robert the Bruce, and assert their allegiance to him, while at the same time declaring that if he were to betray their cause and surrender to the English, they would depose him and replace him with another:

for, as long as but a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any conditions be brought under English rule. It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom--for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself (Fergusson 1970:9).

The letter concludes by beseeching the Pope to intercede and urge the covetous and bullying English to desist, so that all parties may be more able to devote themselves to the Crusades. They do not hesitate to remind the Pontiff that

posterity will remember him according to his success in securing the frontiers of Christendom. The Declaration in fact had little effect on the Pope's position on the conflict with England, but has been remembered and kept alive by later generations as an early testament to Scottish political consciousness.

The document, with its assertion of the right of "the community of the realm" to choose its own king, is sometimes cited as a precocious example of notions of popular sovereignty and the nation-state in Europe, emerging, as it did, well before the period of royal absolutism. This interpretation is problematic, however, both because similarly early declarations can be found elsewhere in Europe, and because the document was produced by a feudal elite which claimed to represent the "realm," but not through any process resembling modern mass democracy. Properly speaking it was simply a diplomatic letter, the term "declaration" becoming attached to it at a later date. And yet, it fits into our covenant paradigm. It is reasonable to assume that those who participated in or sanctioned its drafting, many of whom signed it, considered themselves thereby bound to the other members of the group who helped produce the letter, and obligated to live up to its claims as far as possible. Moreover, as with the Democracy Declaration's appeals to the European Union, this letter addresses itself to another kind of covenant at a higher level, that of all medieval Christendom under the authority

of the Pope. The signatories of the letter are bound one to another in protest, while simultaneously assuming the legitimacy of the larger world of the Church within which their complaint is being expressed. Thus the twofold nature of the covenant that I have laid out is again evident in this case.

IV. Discussion: Historical Metaphors and Historiographic Narratives

Overview: What comes through in all of this is a long historical trajectory of struggles over sovereignty, sometimes quiescent, sometimes not, but always punctuated by strikingly similar covenant events. Let us briefly review the chronology:

1320	The Declaration of Arbroath
c.1400-1600	The Major Period of Bonding
1638	The National Covenant
1643	The Solemn League and Covenant
1689	The Claim of Right (I)
1707	The Treaty of Union
1842	The Claim of Right (II)
1949	The Scottish Covenant
1988	The Claim of Right (III)
1992	The Democracy Declaration

The last three are unambiguously a part of the 20th century autonomist movement. The second Claim of Right of 1842 is the first instance which obviously refers back to an earlier one. This event is sometimes viewed as a forerunner of the current movement, a kind of proto-nationalism of the 19th century. But whatever the intentions, it actually led

to the political weakening of what had been the core national institution since the Reformation--the Kirk (Paterson 1994:56). And this in turn helps explain the conspicuous absence of major covenant examples between 1689 and 1842. During these years the Scottish political elites, for whom the Kirk was a bulwark, sought to consolidate the most central "covenant" of all--the Treaty of Union of 1707. The Treaty of Union was created through two Acts of Parliament: the Articles of Union, and the Act for Security of Church of Scotland. Both are detailed expositions of the terms of treaty, and are devoid of the strident language of protest and covenant that we have been examining. This is why I have set it apart in the list above.

This of course is not to say that there were no conflicts over the form and legitimacy of the state in 18th century Scotland--the Jacobite Rebellions (1715, 1745) were clearly just that. Furthermore, while less was produced along the lines of the historic documents we have been examining, the idea of the covenant and the memory of the Covenanters remained strong, shaping especially the smaller church secession (perhaps 10% of the population) of 1733, which involved reaffirmations of the original covenants of 1638 and 1642, and which, like the Great Disruption a century later, was in protest of lay patronage (Brims 1989:51). The appeal of the covenant in that century was basically a conservative one that resisted change and outside interference, and was often divisive within Scotland. Thus

it is not suprising that the more politically progressive movements oriented toward parliamentary reform, such as the Radicals and the Friends of the People of the 1790s, avoided the sectarian and backward looking imagery of the covenant (Ibid.:58). And again the Scottish Chartists of the 1830s and 40s held moderate goals of reform which they shared with English Chartists. They were concerned with increasing the representation of lower-middle, working, and artisan classes in parliament, not with challanging its constitutional authority. In other words the obvious parallel between covenant and charter did not come into play. It was not until the labor movement early in this century, epitomized by the Red Clydesiders, that the image of the Covenanters was reconnected to a progressive politics, being sufficiently "historical" by this time to constitute a kind of non-literal symbol, evocative, but not in itself controversial (Brotherstone 1989b:1; Harvie 1990; Knox 1989:92-95).

Historical Metaphors: Let us take a closer look at how these events have become symbolically inter-connected. The chain of explicit historical references that we find evoked in this tradition suggests metaphorical and/or analogical processes whereby new events and situations are made sense of, articulated, and engaged, by emphasizing parallels with earlier events. This is a complex and obscure process which I think must be considered in at least two dimensions.³ On the one hand, perception is always prefigured

³ For major collections of essays addressing various aspects of the theory of metaphor, see Ortony (1993) and Sacks (1979). For a

by our expectations, causing past and present events to appear to "fit together" in a more or less coherent way (cf. Guthrie 1995:39-61; Lakoff and Johnson 1980:3-6; Miller 1993). On the other hand, metaphor and analogy are used consciously, deliberately, and rhetorically to frame situations and achieve particular ends (Fernandez 1986:3-70; Schön 1993). In the actual social process of the covenant tradition I have been describing it would be extremely difficult to say exactly where the one dimension picks up and the other leaves off, but both are undoubtedly at work. In covenant events of the 20th century autonomist movement, it is clear that leaders deliberately use rhetorical references to add potency to their messages, likening struggles of the present to those of the past. But the matter goes deeper than this. These historical references are not cryptic, but blatant; they do not do their rhetorical work by guile, appealing to some collective subconscious, but rather by appealing to and reinforcing a certain common sense. These messages and metaphors make sense to those for whom it is already evident that Scotland has a long legacy of struggling with Britain/England over sovereignty, a struggle that is still going on. They lend weight to an argument that is already partially won.

I am arguing that the force of these metaphors lies in the fact that they provide not just striking and inspiring

collection of anthropological essays on the theory of metaphor, see Fernandez (1991). For anthropological case studies using the concept of metaphor, see Sahlins (1981) and Ohnuki-Tierney (1990).

images, but compelling analogies, rich with parallels. They "make" sense. It must be allowed that the sensitivity to these parallels depends on the degree of historical literacy one commands, and clearly there is a gradient here between a more highly educated and history-immersed intelligentsia and a broader public. But the very persistence of this idiomatic tradition implies that the messages being generated by those employing these metaphors are not falling on deaf ears, and my own experience in the field indicates that there is a rather high level of interest in history among movement activists, and more generally, there is a widespread respect for historical literacy about Scotland in Scotland (recall the ALP History Group), even if people do not all have the same command of (let alone the same opinions on) that history. The richness of meaning may be "thicker" for some and "thinner" for others, but these degrees of understanding are in contact with one another, and influence one another.

Let me try to elaborate what I mean by "analogical parallels" that tie together the various instances in this covenant tradition. I have already outlined the most basic parallels in the twofold definition of covenants we began with, i.e., as the act of a community asserting its terms of membership within a larger community. These terms appear especially in the form of the assertion of two kinds of rights: 1) the right of Scots to choose their own leaders; and 2) the right of Scots to control their own domestic policies.

Regarding the first, we have seen that many Scots today view the power of Westminster to govern Scotland without a Scottish mandate as an illegitimate power. This situation is only exacerbated by the direct administration by a Secretary of State appointed by the unelected ruling party. The complaint resonates strongly with that of the Scottish barons asserting their right to choose their own king in 1320, and with the Covenanters objections to the imposition of bishops on the Presbyterian system. And the purpose of the original Claim of Right in 1689 was to establish the terms under which the incoming monarch would be acceptable. Finally, the conflict over church patronage that provoked the 1842 Claim of Right again deals with the right to appoint one's leaders, i.e., parish ministers, though on a more local level.

Regarding control over domestic policies, we have seen how the current preference in Scotland for a more social democratic approach diverges sharply from the policies imposed by London. The kinds of economic and infrastructural matters that are the focus of modern conflicts simply did not exist in the 17th century. But the religious conflicts of that time revolved around control over one of the major domestic issues of the day--forms of worship in Scotland. Remember that the initial trigger of these conflicts was the ill-considered imposition of an Episcopally oriented prayer book. Again, the terms of the original Claim of Right set out the boundaries between monarchical versus parliamentary and church power in Scotland, and the conflict over patronage

in the 19th century clearly combines issues of responsiveness to community by Kirk ministers and the General Assembly's control over this domestic concern.

Finally, there is another aspect that is important here--the appeal to higher authority. I have pointed out the peculiar parallels between the Declaration of Arbroath and the Democracy Declaration in their appeals to pan-European levels of authority. In 1320 Scotland and England were separate warring kingdoms (albeit with their nobilities intertwined via a patchwork of overlordships that ranged across both kingdoms). The Pope was the only higher level available to appeal to. In contrast, appealing to the European Parliament in 1992 meant attempting to circumvent a hierarchy of embedded levels of political sovereignty in which the British state is the middle term. More interesting, however, is the appeal not to concrete persons and institutions, but to supernatural or transcendental authority. After the Reformation (1560) and the Union of Crowns (1603) there developed a complex process of "triangulation" of authority, wherein the Scottish elites repeatedly tried to frame the political situation so that while the king's authority was affirmed it was clearly subordinated to that of God, and the Kirk had a privileged position in articulating the will of God (Mitchison and Leneman 1989:25-26). This classic device of Reformation politics (cf. Walzer 1985), this particular way of addressing matters of sovereignty, held sway in Scotland right down to

the Great Disruption. Modern nationalists rarely make appeals to the authority of God, but as we have seen, they often evoke a certain ideal conception of constitutional democracy, which the British system is seen as having betrayed, or at least failed to live up to. Thus there is still a transcendent realm against which London leadership is measured, a higher authority that rests not in Brussels, but in the popular imagination.

Over the period we have covered, conceptions of leadership, of what constitutes domestic policy, and of what constitutes the largest relevant arena of politics have changed profoundly. But as I attempted to show in Chapters 4 and 5, there has been a remarkable underlying continuity of institutions in Scotland, that have evolved into the 20th century civil society that undergirds the autonomist movement today. The agencies involved have shifted, from Popes, kings, and the Godly elect, to civil society and parliaments at both the UK and European level; and the conceptions of legitimate government have shifted, from a relatively decentralized feudalism, to a theocratic state, to a Scandinavian style social democracy. But the cultural form of the covenant remains remarkably constant. In short, I am arguing that the present conflict over the strained union between Scotland and England that expresses itself in autonomism/nationalism, and which I have argued is intimately bound up with the current retrenchment of the welfare state, is the latest permutation of a long history of varied and

historically situated conflicts over Scottish sovereignty. The metaphor of the covenant has endured, and remains salient, because Scotland has retained a significant degree of structural and cultural autonomy, and its elites are still called upon to re-negotiate their/its position in a changing world.

That "Other" Tradition: At this point one might ask: what has become of the Jacobites and the Highlands? Surely no discussion of the traditions surrounding Scottish nationalism can be complete without them? Perhaps not, but I would like to argue that the importance of this tradition has been over-stressed. Hugh Trevor-Roper began his well known essay on the "Highland Tradition of Scotland" thus:

Today, whenever Scotchmen [sic] gather together to celebrate their national identity, they assert it openly by certain distinctive national apparatus. They wear the kilt, woven in tartan whose colour and pattern indicates their 'clan'; and if they indulge in music, their instrument is the bagpipe. This apparatus, to which they ascribe great antiquity, is in fact largely modern (1984:15).

This assertion is seriously misleading, and borders on a racist stereotype. Most people I encountered in the autonomist movement are not heavily invested in tartan imagery, and indeed, view it with some hostility or ambivalence. The major significance of the kilt for most modern Scots is as a kind of standard male formal wear (e.g. at weddings), and as a culturally marked option for special occasions, such as ceilidhs. Scots tend to have a sophisticated and ironic understanding of the meanings surrounding tartanry, as both a symbol of national and

cultural defiance, and as a fabrication for tourists--many of them English, or descendants of expatriots. They are not nearly as "taken in" by their own symbolism as Trevor-Roper would have us believe.

Trevor-Roper's tartan essay does an adequate job of outlining the development in the lowlands in the 18th and 19th centuries of a romantic highland tradition, including the modern kilt and system of clan tartans. Yet he misleadingly casts the highlands as a kind of cultural backwater: "...simply the overflow of Ireland..." (Ibid.). Although it is true that there were strong cultural and political connections linking the northern part of Ireland and the Scottish highlands across the Irish Sea up to the 17th century, the highlands and lowlands within Scotland were, despite their linguistic divide, also interdependent. The highland economy was largely based on cattle, which were sold to the lowlands, and Scottish political history often hinged on feudal lords who constantly played both ends against the middle, as highland clan chiefs in one situation, and as lowland nobility in another. In short, Trevor-Roper's account is marred by an essentialist view of nationality and culture, which cannot confront the peculiar interstitial nature of the Gaidhealtachd on its own terms.⁴

Be that as it may, the cultural history of the highlands as a whole is largely a separate issue from the history of Scottish nationalism. More relevant to the latter is the

⁴ For correctives one can begin with: Hunter (1976); Smout (1972:39-46); and Withers (1988, 1992).

specific lore of the Stuarts and the Jacobites. Murray Pittock (1991) has recently offered an lengthy analysis of the "Stuart Myth." The crux of his argument is that the loss of the Stuart dynasty in 1688 has come to symbolically stand for the loss of independence and national agency in 1707. From the 18th century on the mythology/ideology of the Stuarts, as "mythic deliverers," has become a "protest history" in Scotland (1991:2-5). The bulk of the text analyzes, through literature, songs and poems, the development of the Jacobite myth, its cooptation and romanticization in the Victorian period, and finally, its relevance to 20th century nationalism. He stresses the fact that the Jacobite myth took alternate forms: left/radical, and right/conservative, along with the more politically neutral popular stereotype. Toward the end he discusses the SNP, arguing that it has been too oriented toward single issues ("Scotland's Oil," fighting the Poll Tax, joining Europe), deploying a kind of pressure group politics. He suggests that they have neglected cultural and national identity (*pace* Trevor-Roper!), and should do more to cultivate the liberatory message of the Stuart mythology if they want to create the necessary unity of purpose.

Here again I take issue. First, it seems to me that it is the tragic-heroic struggles of the Jacobite highlanders, more than the Stuarts themselves, that are fondly remembered. Support for monarchy as an element of government is weaker in Scotland than in England and as we have seen, autonomists are

generally motivated by a vision of a more modern form of government. Secondly, while there is no doubt that Jacobite symbolism, in dress, songs, and literature has an emotional appeal, it is also well known to be a somewhat melancholy one as well. It is a story told in an "elegaic mode" (McArthur 1994:98), because the Jacobites lost their historical struggle, utterly. That is why it was possible in the latter 18th and 19th centuries for them to become potent symbols of Scotland as a whole within the British Empire--because they no longer posed a real threat to the political system. It seems to me that Pittock seriously underplays the paradoxical unionist meanings of the "Stuart Myth." It is my argument that the covenant tradition, is the "key metaphor;" because of the strong analogical parallels it encodes, it is of a much deeper importance to modern Scottish autonomism and its links with the Scottish past than the trappings of tartanry. Although more obvious and symbolically loud, tartan symbols are perhaps by that same measure more superficial in regard to the actual complex of inherited meanings that are drawn upon to make sense of the present situation.

The Strange Revival of Scottish History: Let me conclude by attempting to place the covenant tradition in the general context of Scottish historiography. The theme of the covenant is just one of many in Scottish history, but I suggest that it is being increasingly foregrounded in the autonomist movement since W.W. II because it provides an apt metaphor for the present situation. I believe a review of

the paradigmatic narratives dominant in Scottish historiography since the Union, and recent shifts in those narratives, will help clarify why this covenant metaphor has become newly relevant. My thesis is that Scottish historiography has been dominated by an "organicist" narrative since the 18th century, a narrative that, despite transformations, continues up to the present. This organicist narrative presents Scotland's constitutional history of the last 300 years as largely inevitable and predetermined. But this narrative is starting to be challenged by an emergent "contractualist" narrative which emphasizes collective historical agency and a greater degree of room for political action and maneuver, and this shift can be attributed to underlying changes in the larger geopolitical context.

The classic example of the organicist narrative is Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1969 [1790]), where he argues that the strength and superiority of the British state lies in its long, organic evolution, unbroken by radical revolution (i.e., as in France). But this text fits within a longer historiographic tradition that the Tory, pro-devolution, Scottish historian Michael Fry has called in a recent essay *The Whig Interpretation of Scottish History* (1992; cf. Butterfield 1978[1932]). The Whig version of Scotland's history coalesced in the 19th century out of two earlier strands. There had already existed a mytho-history in England (associated with Sir Edward Coke in the

early 17th century) which praised England's "ancient constitution" and longstanding defense of Anglo-Saxon liberties. To this Scots such as Hume, in the mode of the "conjectural history" of the Scottish Enlightenment, countered that it was rapid social and economic progress that had in fact secured greater liberty in England and subsequently Scotland (Fry 1992:73). Nonetheless, by the early 19th century these themes of constitutional evolution and socio-economic progress had become fused into the classic Whig narrative, exemplified by such historians as Macaulay (1849), Cockburn (1852) and Buckle (1964[1861]). In this narrative, constitutionalism, democracy, and economic progress--i.e., all things good--seemed to flow from England to Scotland and, via the empire, to the rest of the world. It is in many of its essentials the antecedent of modernization theory in the 20th century.

This new historiographic hegemony was underwritten by the political-economic processes at work--specifically the rise to power of the Whigs, and later the Liberal Party, and its program of constitutional reform in the 19th century. As we saw in Chapter 4, Scotland had retained significant autonomy in the 18th century under its system of political patronage, but the strains and upheavals of the 19th century (including the Great Disruption) drew it much further into the orbit of the British state. It was through the increase in the franchise, especially in 1832 in Scotland, that the Liberals managed to out-maneuver the conservative, landed

Tories, politically eclipsing them for the rest of the century.

Meanwhile, although Walter Scott (1771-1832) had done much to generate popular interest in Scottish history through his novels and the fostering of historical publishing clubs, this did not result in a substantial and enduring Scottish historiography. Instead it yielded a couthy antiquarianism in regard to Scotland; serious history concerned England, or England's impact on Scotland after the Union (Ash 1980; Fry 1992:82-84; Nairn 1981:114-16). It was this peculiar marginalization of Scottish history which led the late Marinell Ash to title her seminal study of Scott and his influence The Strange Death of Scottish History (1980).

While many have blamed Scott's supposed backward looking romanticism, Ash argues that larger social forces were at work:

The spirit of Scott's historical revolution was deeply utilitarian and initially his revolution fulfilled a national need. But when his conception was no longer useful to the Scots they abandoned it, speaking as usual in terms of liberation and freedom. The Reformation was freedom, the Union was freedom, the Disruption was freedom, and the death of Scottish history was freedom. Perhaps. (Ash 1980:150).

This profound bias, which affected both Scottish and English historians, has lasted well into this century (cf. Beveridge and Turnbull 1989:16-61). As Fry put it:

Here, in the consensus reached by all Scottish historians and political scientists of note by about the time of the First World War, was the answer to the question I had posed myself 20 years ago. There were no books on Scottish political history because Scottish political history did not exist. What was more, it ought not to exist, at least so long as Scotland

expected to continue enjoying the benefits bestowed on her when the Whigs had set out, a century previously, to arrange her final and irrevocable assimilation to England. By this means, among others, civilization was advancing and I, or anybody else with a mind to diligent inquiry, should content myself with that and kindly keep my doubts to myself (1992:86).

In this century, the Whig/modernization paradigm has continued, but with a change in content. Perhaps the most widely read social historian of Scotland, T.C. Smout, explicitly draws comparisons between the transformation of the Scottish economy after the Union and 20th century theories of economic development in the Third World, using W.W. Rostow's language of the necessary conditions for economic "take-off" (1972:223-230). This narrative also continued to inform understandings of contemporary developments in the UK state itself. As the empire shrank, the modern welfare state grew to become the new expression of this steady organic growth toward (now social) democracy (cf. Marshall 1983 [1950], as discussed in the last chapter). In the process British socialism and the Labour Party became heavily invested in this paradigm as well. Thus an historical discourse which has its roots in Tory conservatism and traditionalism in the 18th century, and then developed into the justification of Whig/Liberal parliamentarianism in the 19th century, has mutated to become the vessel of progressive democratic socialism in Britain. For all three political projects, the story of an organic and inevitable historical development into a unitary British state that guarantees freedom supplies a legitimating narrative.

I described in the last chapter how marxist and world-systems theory were brought to bear on the Scottish situation in the 1970s and 80s. This clearly represented a kind of historiographic rupture, a peculiar local wrinkle of the broader marxist counter-argument against modernization theory. But while this new interpretive trend, especially as presented by Nairn (1981), put forth a different theory of the direction and major forces at work in Scotland's historical development, it still fits within what I have called an organicist narrative (this is perhaps just another way of stating that the marxist paradigm is quintessentially a modernist paradigm). Inexorable historical forces continue to work toward their conclusion, it is just that the forces and conclusions have changed.⁵ However, there has been a significant shift in the narrative construction. The incorporation of Scotland into Britian, while still treated as relatively predetermined by historical forces, is no longer seen as irreversible, nor as an unqualified good, and the basic terminology has been altered. The debate is sometimes couched in terms of whether Scotland was an "internal colony" of England (cf. Hechter 1977), or a "Junior Partner" in empire. Unlike something that has been organically absorbed, colonies can revolt in search of independence, and economic and political partnerships can be dissolved. In other words the fundamental terms through which the historical relationship between Scotland and

⁵ For a debate which helps illustrate this historiographic shift see Immanuel Wallerstein (1980) and T.C. Smout (1980a; 1980b).

England is constructed have crossed a threshold into uncertainty.

All told, the marxist historiographic turn, combined with the political rise of Scottish autonomism, has helped open up the interpretive possibilities and lay the groundwork for more recent critiques of Scottish historiography. There has been a renaissance in Scottish history in recent years, characterized by much critical reappraisal (e.g., Donnachie and Whatley 1992; Mitchison 1991). A new generation of Scottish historians and other scholars have dedicated themselves to rehabilitating Scotland's past, and the growing desire for greater political autonomy, and belief in its possibility, is undoubtedly a part of this renewed interest. Below I focus briefly on three examples of critical reinterpretations of Scottish historiography (cf. Finlay 1994b).

Beveridge and Turnbull's The Eclipse of Scottish Culture (1989) borrows Fanon's concept of "inferiorization" and applies it to Scotland, arguing that Scottish intellectuals have been socialized to denigrate Scottish culture, seeing it as inherently inferior to English culture. Toward this end they analyze the anglophile whig historiography described above, showing how polarized tropes are recurringly used to describe the relationship between Scotland ("dark, backward, fanatical, violent, barbaric..." etc.) and England ("enlightened, advanced, reasonable, decent, civilised..." etc.) (1989:7); and how Scottish history has constantly been

made to pivot on the Union of 1707, which allowed England's good qualities to flow into Scotland, displacing its bad ones (Ibid.:16-50). As a prime example of this enduring cooptation of the intelligentsia they take Tom Nairn to task for his characterization of Scotland's "cultural sub-nationalism," which revolves around tartanry and the kailyard literature, as "neurotic" and "deformed" (Ibid.:51-61; cf. Nairn 1981:148-69). The authors see this as a metropolitan influenced revulsion for Nairn's own culture, suggesting that in the final analysis, Nairn's Scottish nationalism is subordinated to the project of British socialism, and thus something less than genuine. The authors are ultimately engaged in a polemic, arguing for the need to evaluate Scottish history and culture (the latter understood in a rather non-anthropological sense as its intellectual and philosophical traditions) on their own terms, and not in terms of their conformity to an English standard. Thus while the first half of the book is taken up with critique, the latter half discusses and revalorizes the contributions of Scottish political philosophers and thinkers such as George Davie, Alasdair MacIntyre, and R.D. Laing, suggesting a clear preference for Scottish traditions of thought which, following Davie, emphasize "...commitment to philosophical reasoning, or debate about first principles..." (1989:63), over the English tradition with its emphasis on arid empiricism and atomizing analysis.

Colin Kidd has recently tackled our central theme in Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689-c.1830 (1993).

Kidd begins from the fact that both Scotland and England had traditions of constitutional theory, and their own respective versions of whig historiography prior to the Union. But after the Union, rather than fusing into a combined whiggism that was truly British, the English tradition came to dominate--and thus British conceptions of constitutionalism have come to be seen as rooted in England's history. He points to the Scottish tradition, rooted in the Reformation and the Covenanters, and shaped by such church scholars as George Buchanan who argued, largely on theological grounds, in favor of a strong nobility able to check monarchical power. In the century after the Union this Scottish tradition was portrayed by both Scottish and English theorists as mired in feudal practice:

Instead they contrasted this narrow definition of political liberty with what they viewed as a more authentic standard: the liberty of all men to enjoy security in their property and persons on a level footing under the rule of law... It was on this basis that the history of liberty in Scotland was completely overhauled, and rewritten in terms which denegated the native achievement of preserving freedoms against external enemies and bridling tyrannical kings. The new history of liberty in Scotland was based on the insight that true liberty was a by-product of modernity--part of a complex web of reliable legal institutions, economic improvement and refined (or less martial) manners--and that Scottish society had historically been more backward and benighted than England's (1993:269-70).

Kidd's goal of course is not simply to reconstruct this Scottish-Calvinist whig tradition and its marginalization

(which he does in great detail), but rather to contribute to the rehabilitation of a Scottish tradition of constitutional thought, the very one which I have been arguing is encoded in the centuries long production of covenants.

Finally, I return to the work of Lindsay Paterson (1991, 1994), who has attempted an academic intervention into the political debates between nationalists and unionists, and the prevalent rhetoric of Scotland's colonization and loss of sovereignty. In *Ane End of Ane Auld Sang: Sovereignty and the Re-Negotiation of the Union* (1991) he argues that

for a small nation like Scotland, sovereignty is a negotiated process, not a condition that is acquired or lost in one cataclysmic event. This was as true before the Union of parliaments, or indeed the Union of Crowns, as after. Scotland as a country has never, in modern times, been simply oppressed. By and large it--or rather that part of the society which has been enfranchised at any particular time--has chosen its fate, even if that choice has been not to push for more than a limited degree of managerial autonomy. If this is not understood, than the otherwise anomolous persistence of Scotland as an apparently state-less nation is incomprehensible. Likewise incomprehensible is the emergence in the past twenty years of a strong political movement for parliamentary self-government (1991:104).

Paterson's reading of the history of the Scotland-Britain/England relationship appears to rest on a crucial strategic insight: if Scots in the present want to change their constitutional arrangements, then it is debilitating to embed their arguments in deterministic constructions of history, whether of a whig/modernization or marxist/world systems variety. What is needed is an understanding of this history that emphasizes its voluntaristic, rather than predetermined, aspects--and that is what he offers.

These three examples can be taken as indexes, admittedly academically oriented, of broader trends of thought in the autonomist movement regarding Scotland's history and future possibilities. The key themes are a revalorization of Scotland's distinctive history and traditions of thought, and an assertion of a kind of national agency, in contrast to one of passive submission to the forces of history represented by England and Britain. I have implied three phases of historiographic narrative: the long whig/modernization narrative running from the 18th to the 20th century; the marxist/world systems narrative that developed in the 1970s and 80s; and the emergent contractualist narrative that has been developing since the 1980s. This is of course schematic and oversimplified--for instance a more thorough treatment would have to consider the early role of George Davie's influential study of Scottish education, The Democratic Intellect (1981 [1961]), in the most recent historiographic developments. Still, these trends parallel and are bound up with the autonomist movement. I usually found in interviews and conversations that people who were skeptical about devolution and independence tended to evoke classic whig themes to justify their views--that such a move would be retrograde, that Scots are by nature too combative and would be unable to govern themselves. Pro-autonomy Scots are very familiar with these views, seeing them as a basic stumbling block to the furtherance of their cause. On the other hand, among those in favor of greater autonomy, I encountered

either or both of the more recent narratives I have been describing. Looking more closely at how various autonomists represent Scottish history in relation to the present situation is the object of the next and last chapter.

On a more general level, I am arguing that increasingly the Union is no longer accepted as a natural fact, an inevitable outgrowth of history, but instead is viewed as a social arrangement that requires justification. Even the Tory government's official statement on the topic, arguing against the need for a Scottish parliament, let alone independence, has adopted a more contractualist language, with its rather ironic title: *Scotland in the Union: a partnership for good* (HMSO 1993).

Let me sum up by stressing an underlying point in all of this, regarding deterministic versus voluntaristic versions of history. Clearly human social action always involves a dialectic of choice and constraint, agency and structure, and in certain historical situations and conjunctures, one or the other may predominate. It appears that in the Scottish case, there is a correspondence between the development of relatively determinisitic versus voluntaristic historical narratives, and the structure of political opportunitites and strategic possibilities the country (and its opinion forming elites) encounters. During the long period of 18th and 19th century growth and empire followed by the 20th century welfare state, there was a dominant organicist, deterministic historiography of Scotland-in-Britain, casting the history of

the British state as one of steady progress. In the 1970s, due to the global economic crisis, to a period of radicalism and factionalism on the British left, and to the dramatic boost in electoral support for the SNP in 1974, things suddenly looked very different. One reaction to this was the plotting of an alternative deterministic reading of British history, exemplified by Nairn's The Break-Up of Britain (1981), which posited the immanent fragmentation of the British state, offering an alternative (and by many preferred) order and direction to Scottish-British history. There is a correspondence here between the actual political uncertainty of the period, and the historical and political-economic necessity of national break-up that this new narrative posited. History itself would supply the new direction of things.

Then, in 1979, this vision was severely wounded, when the popular referendum on the establishment of a Scottish assembly failed to pass, and Thatcher came to power, instituting a hegemonic neoliberal agenda that seemed to re-order and re-direct British society. Correspondingly, among autonomists in Scotland the 1980s was a period of retrenchment, of gradual coalition building in the movement, and of reinforcing an alternative social democratic and nationalist hegemony. Meanwhile, the relevance of the European Union to Scotland's fortunes has become increasingly apparent, and Soviet communism, long the implicit underwriter of the possibility (if not the form) of left political

visions, has collapsed. The emergent "contractualist" narrative I have outlined is an outgrowth of this new situation, in which a decisive historical shift to the left and against capitalism seems much less plausible, but a strategic re-positioning within the British-European axis, makes more and more sense. The uncertainties of the 1970s have been supplanted by a situation in which the gradual subordination of the British economy to the growing strength of the European Union, despite resistance from the British ruling class, seems fairly clear. In this context of steady, and fairly "readable" political-economic transformations, and in which constitutional changes for Scotland will most likely involve many stages of piecemeal adjustments and negotiations, an historical narrative which emphasizes Scotland's historical agency, rather than its destiny, is more useful. The revival of the covenant tradition by the autonomist movement feeds into this new perspective on the historical situation in Scotland.

As I have said, the truth of any situation is of course never completely deterministic or voluntaristic. The crucial point is that things have changed, the sun has set on the British Empire, and is rising on a new one, centered in Brussels.⁶ Scotland is a small country which tied its fortunes to those of the rest of the UK in 1707 partly because it was militarily and economically coerced, partly

⁶ At least one of my informants, a key activist in one of the pro-parliament organizations on the early 1990s, was very explicit about the analogy between the British and the coming European "empires."

because of the opportunism of its political elites, and partly because in a world increasingly defined by mercantilism, there was no other practical choice. Today, the rationale for that union has been eroded by the decline of the British economy, the internationalization of capital, the Tories' aggressive dismantling of an integrated and managed UK economic infrastructure, and the growing coordination of political and economic interests among the national elites of Europe culminating in the European Union. If my assessment of the historiographic processes involved here is correct, we might expect that *if* (and not a small *if*) fifty years from now, Scotland is a small country in a relatively stable, quasi-federal European super-state, *then* there will be a new Scottish-European historiography emphasizing the organic inevitability of that development.

CHAPTER SEVEN

UNIVERSALISM VERSUS PARTICULARISM IN THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE AUTONOMIST MOVEMENT

I. Introduction

I have described Scottish autonomism as a moral economic discourse which is grounded in historical institutional structures that span civil society and the state, and which expresses the current divergence of attitudes in Britain toward the proper role of the state in provisioning public welfare. I have tried to show that there is an historically informed sense among Scottish autonomists of being part of a community bound by shared core values, which are now unjustly threatened by Tory/English government. Over the centuries, the Scotland-England relationship has functioned as a major framework for working through an evolving array of political and economic conflicts and negotiations, lending a sense of historical depth and continuity to the present conflict.

In this final chapter I want to explore this "sense" by examining the prevalent idea in Scotland that its people can be characterized as having an egalitarian ethos and democratic spirit, which contrasts with England and the English. McCrone calls this idea "the Scottish Myth" (1992:88).¹ In my fieldwork in the Scottish movement I

¹ I would like to echo Paterson's (1994:25) discomfort with the "false consciousness" connotations of the term myth in this context. I have preserved it, however, precisely because the term is often used by Scottish commentators, and many of my informants, indicating a complex attitude of self-questioning that I think it is important to highlight.

encountered a complicated mixture of belief in, and questioning of, this "myth." After giving a general account of it, drawing on both texts and interviews, I will offer an interpretation. McCrone describes the myth as a "...reservoir of legitimation for belief and action..." (Ibid.:90), and more generally as a marker of Scottish identity (Ibid.:115-120). I would agree, but want to go further to argue that its current manifestations also serve as a medium for addressing the problem of justice. This problem is always fundamentally shaped by the dialectical tension between universalizing conceptions, and the particular historical and cultural experiences out of which such conceptions are generated, and in which they are grounded. I will conclude by relating this dilemma to attempts to apply a distinction between "civic" (i.e., "universalist") and "ethnic" (i.e., "particularist") variants of nationalism to the Scottish case, and more importantly, to the recent revival of debates in political theory over the problem of justice, that run along these same lines (e.g., Rawls 1971; Walzer 1983; Nozick 1974; MacIntyre 1984; Sandel 1982).

II. The Scottish Myth of Egalitarianism

Texts: The idea of an egalitarian ethos in Scotland is so widespread that most recent major texts on Scottish culture and politics address it at the outset (e.g.: Linklater and Denniston 1992:4-5; McCrone, Kendrick and Straw

1989:3-4; Midwinter, Keating and Mitchell 1991:7-9; Paterson 1994:25). Peter Jones' introduction to The Anatomy of Scotland: How Scotland Works (1992c) summarizes the myth concisely:

the so-called 'democratic intellect' [is] a national perception that all Scots share skills and opportunities to an extent not widely echoed elsewhere. It is perhaps part of a wider myth, that of egalitarian Scotland, which has its clearest expression in the Presbyterian church and the Scottish education system. The democracy of the Kirk, governed not by bishops but by locally chosen kirk sessions, presbyteries, synods and the General Assembly, contributes strongly to the idea of an egalitarian state, while the tradition that Scottish education offers every pupil, irrespective of class or wealth, the potential to attain the highest academic standards, informs policy-making right across the political spectrum and is widely accepted south as well as north of the border.

The egalitarian myth permeates political debate and underpins much of Scotland's institutional structures. The Scottish Nationalist leader, Alex Salmond, put it thus in September 1990: 'I think that people are looking for a political party which is collectivist in terms of its view of social provision. In terms of how society looks after the disadvantaged, people want to see a collective ethos. That has a very keen response in Scottish society. [There is] great resonance and support for the health services, and a state led comprehensive education system' (Jones 1992c:4, second insertion in original).

The myth is not without its Scottish critics (see especially Maxwell 1976; McCrone, Bechhofer and Kendrick 1982). To further flesh it out and identify its fallacies, I focus on the most thorough recent critical assessment I know of, by David McCrone (1992:88-120). McCrone, a Scottish sociologist, tackles the myth in a chapter on social mobility in Scotland quickly pointing out its simultaneously radical and conservative import. At times the claim appears to be that Scots have a stronger yearning for equality, to set

right social inequity; but in other contexts the assertion seems to be that there is a real underlying equality of social status in Scotland, that egalitarianism is a condition that actually exists (Ibid.:90, 115). This latter version of the myth rests especially on the notion of equality of opportunity--that Scotland is an effectively meritocratic society. It is this version of the myth that McCrone targets.

Equality of opportunity depends upon levels of literacy and education. There is a longstanding belief among Scots that their society has benefitted historically from higher than usual levels of literacy, particularly in the lowlands, resulting from the reformed Kirk's policy of establishing a school in every parish, so that the faithful could read the Bible. Taking the ability to sign one's name on a marriage register as evidence scholars have offered support for this belief, arguing that, already in the 17th century, the Scottish peasantry was comparatively advanced in terms of literacy in Europe. With the dislocations of increasing industrialization in the 18th and 19th centuries, Scotland's exceptional literacy increasingly became a conceit of the Scottish middle class, most strenuously argued from the latter 19th century as Scottish educational institutions, traditionally controlled by this class, were under pressure to assimilate to English models. Still, data as late as 1855 show higher levels of literacy for both men and women in

Scotland than in England and Wales (in each country male literacy is higher than female) (McCrone 1992:94).

The latter 19th century also saw the development of what is known as the Kailyard literature (roughly 1880-1914), named after the cabbage gardens characteristic of Scotland's rural villages. The Kailyard school defined Scotland

as wholly consisting of small towns full of small-town 'characters' given to bucolic intrigue and wise sayings. At first the central figures were usually Ministers of the Kirk (as were most of the authors) but later on schoolteachers and doctors got into the act. Their housekeepers always have a shrewd insight into human nature. Offspring who leave for the big city frequently come to grief, and are glad to get home again (peching and hosting to hide their feelings) (Nairn, quoted in McCrone 1992:96).

A stock character in these stories was the "lad o' pairs," i.e., the boy of exceptional skill and talent. Conventionally, this boy from a peasant family of modest means is spotted by the local Kirk Minister or School teacher (often the same person), who then takes a hand in promoting the boy's career by winning support for him from the local well-to-do so he can go to university and pursue a professional career as a doctor, lawyer, or minister. Glorifying an indigenous system of meritocracy is the central idea here. However, rooted as it is in a rural, pre-industrial, paternalist vision of Scotland, it is a prime example of McCrone's "conservative" version of the Scottish myth, which ultimately validates social hierarchy by asserting the possibility to transcend it when appropriate.

The partial reality behind this myth appears to have been a genuine structure of opportunity for the rural middle

class and some of the urban skilled artisan class, to go to university and enter the educated professions. But this system of meritocracy had little relevance to the vast majority of peasants and laborers. McCrone notes two studies of post W.W. II Scotland that suggest greater educational opportunity there than in the US (Hope 1984), and that educational opportunities for the skilled working class are similar to those found in mainland Europe, significantly exceeding their counterparts in England. The offspring of the Scottish petit bourgeoisie also fares unusually well in the educational system when compared with England (Mueller and Karl 1990).

Considering the large proportion of my informants who were in the first generation of their family to go to university, and who tended to attribute this to the opportunities created by the post 1945 welfare state, I would suggest that the lad o' pairts myth survives in part because the welfare state in some measure echoes the opportunity structures created by the Kirk and its school system in earlier centuries. Egalitarianism, and the cultural validation of education, appear to endure in a way that over-arches the specific historical institutional mechanisms at work.

Analyzing large-scale survey research done on social mobility in Scotland, England and Wales in the 1970s and 80s, McCrone argues that apart from an unusually high continuity (from father to son) within the petit bourgeoisie (small

proprietors, self-employed artisans, own account workers) in Scotland, patterns of mobility are substantially similar throughout the UK. He concludes that the basic facts on social mobility in Scotland as compared with England do not account for the presence of the Scottish myth, nor the absence of any corollary myth in England. The origins and function of the myth appear to be more ideological than social structural.

McCrone suggests that the explanation for the myth lies primarily in two areas. First, to echo Geertz (1973:448), it is a story Scots tell themselves about themselves, which has been sustained and given shape by two literary movements. One romanticized the Gaidheltachd--the culture of the Gaelic speaking highlands. Here the "sturdy communalism" (McCrone 1992:117) of the clan system was taken as a metonym for Scotland as a whole. The other, the Kailyard school described above, where the calvinist communalism and paternalism of rural lowland Scotland is taken as the representation of the whole, seems to have appealed and been marketed especially to expatriate Scots living abroad. Both these literary movements have contributed to the Scottish myth, although they tell us more about *how* it was created and sustained, than *why*.

Secondly, McCrone asserts that "...institutional and social arrangements within Scotland cannot be ignored..." (Ibid.:120). While patterns of social mobility are not all that different from the rest of the UK, it does appear that

the Kirk and educational system, as pervasive social institutions, have played a central role in the history of social mobility in Scotland. Although opportunity and egalitarianism in Scotland lack the mythic proportions often attributed to them, to the extent that they do exist, their long association with these extensive and dominant social institutions is quite real. Moreover, the Presbyterian emphasis on civic duties, communal values, and social responsibility lives on in a secular form, influencing other areas of Scottish life, such as the trade union movement (cf. Walker and Gallagher 1990).

Interview Data: The major thrust of McCrone's analysis is to show that the Scottish myth has no simple, direct basis in Scottish social structure. I now look more closely at how my informants tried to explain Scotland's "egalitarian ethos." The people I interviewed often cited the standard explanations mentioned above, some enthusiastically, and some in a rather perfunctory manner, as though rehearsing a familiar, well-worn argument. The influence of the Kirk, the working class solidarity of the Labour movement, and to a lesser extent the clan system, were the main recurring themes. But these were often offered with an air of perplexity. Informants sometimes puzzled over whether Scottish social institutions generated egalitarian values, or vice versa. Many seemed to feel that Scottish egalitarianism was a self-evident fact, difficult to explain simply in terms of historical causes. But overall the

standard arguments were reproduced, although with critical elaborations that one does not normally find in the encapsulated versions of the myth presented by McCrone and others. On the presumption that such "myths" are constantly evolving and being adapted to new contexts and purposes, and that the version I encountered reflects especially the attitudes of autonomist minded Scots, I suggest that an overview of these critical elaborations of the standard myth can provide clues as to how it is currently being reinterpreted and redirected to meet the needs of the autonomist movement.

The Kirk: The role of the Kirk was diversely interpreted. The two main themes were the idea of the Kirk as an institution with proto-democratic structures, and the psychological impact of Calvinist theology. George Rosie, a journalist who has produced several television shows in Scotland about Scottish history and politics, argued

Presbyterianism is usually blamed for all this... it's said that it produced this authoritarian, therefore deferential view of things etc., etc., etc.... but, what Knox was talking about in the First Book of Discipline, was a school in every parish, and a college in every town [town]. Yeah? That was an essential sort of aim of the First Book of Discipline. But not only that, but that every congregation, or at least the male members of the congregation, had the right to elect their own minister, elect, now your talking about rough democracy here in the sixteenth century. This was not reactionary, this was revolutionary. The reason that the English took a nasty turn against the Scots in the end of the sixteenth century was that they were seen as such a...ach... a threat from the left, this was a kind of radicalism that they didn't want to cope with...

Rosie is very much arguing against one conventional trend among the intelligentsia, which has been to emphasize

the oppressive and stultifying effects of Calvinism. And he is clearly drawing a deep parallel between the Reformed Kirk's impetus toward democratic organization, and the current Scottish complaint about a democratic deficit within the UK. Alasdair McCallum, a graphic designer in Glasgow from a "respectable working class" (his words) background, and Labour oriented in his own politics, offered a similar, but more double-edged assessment of the impact of the Kirk:

You've got to look at the Reformation here. I mean, lets face it, Scotland was the Iran of its day. There are democratic things about the Ayatollah's revolution, I mean there were democratic things, some of them are still there...If you think of the Reformation in those kinds of terms, there was tremendous democratic things about it. Even with the "school in every parish," they never really managed to come out with it. I read in this book [....] about the seventeen years after the reformation, and it was about the Knoxian... the Kirk Session, which again, think about it, the Kirk Session is like the Revolutionary Committee, or Street Committee in China, or something like that, except they had, well, they're very puritanical in the Street Committee in China [...] but these puritanical bodies were democratic. They were also tremendously powerful on a local level, they set up [word unclear] they banned drinking, dancing, and all the rest of it. All the socially, sexually, and psychologically repressive things were allowed to go on, but they also at the same time said "wealth is a sin, we must do everything we can over the next few decades to take wealth away from rich people." They never got that one through, because it was a compromise between them on the ground, and the kind of landed, which they were at the time, ruling class...now them on the ground filled a kind of democratic, [bonar?]-based, workshop, early capitalism, didn't they? Not very successful, Scotland was a dreadfully poor country. And they spent the next century having doctrinal arguments and fighting to defend what... So I think if you go back it does come out of, in the lowlands it comes out of that Presbyterian kind of, the good aspects of the Calvinist revolution... which we did, like, you know, lots of terrible things... grim, you know, your heart was filled when you were part of the elect and all of that, but it must have been pretty turgid, eh? But I mean it comes out of the poverty of Scotland and the climate and all

the rest of it. No wonder people thought they were sinners.

The tension between the democratic and authoritarian aspects of early Calvinism are paralleled by Islamic fundamentalism and Communism, suggesting a basic underlying problematic of political revolution. As with Rosie there is an explicit parallel to 20th century politics, but with the further suggestion that there is not an "either/or" choice in positive versus negative evaluations of the historical impact of the Kirk.

Andrew Morton, a Church of Scotland minister active in Charter 88, Common Cause, and the Coalition for Scottish Democracy, comes from a more rural working class background, and described his political orientation as socialist and globalist, with emphasis on the decentralization of political power. I asked him about the Kirk's role in the egalitarian ethos. Once again the approach to the Kirk is mixed and cautious:

Well, I think that is an element [...] but I think that is overdone. It's often said that the Church of Scotland is democratic, it's not, it's oligarchic. So yes there is a significant difference between the monarchism of the Church of England, and the oligarchism of the Church of Scotland. And of course that is an extension, there certainly is, within the Church of Scotland, a strong emphasis on...parity. But if you look more closely it is first of all the parity among ministers, and secondly, at least in [class] position, a parity, near parity, between ministers and elders. But there is quite a marked distance between ministers and elders on the one hand, and ordinary members, the people, on the other. [...] o.k., so, within the limits, ...of that broad group of people, and its quite a broad band of people, ...there is that strong [word unclear] of parity. The other thing again, if we can take the contrast with the Church of England, which is quite helpful, is, there are not grades of ministers--

rector, dean, bishop, archbishop--there's just the Church ministers. Now there may be all sorts of informal, hierarchies, but they're not structured. And there's not that sense, which I have detected in the Church of England, of promotion. And, if you look at the eldership, the elders are drawn widely, from the community. I mean in the early days of course, the elders were the people who were leaders in the community, with a strong bias to the well to do, the professionals [...] people who were figures of some standing in the community.

Morton is drawing here on his experiences working on the British Council of Churches in the 1970s and 1980s, which enhanced his comparative view of the differences between the Scottish and English Churches. The major tendency among my informants on this point was for those more closely involved in what I have called the intelligentsia, and the milieu of the CSP and the Constitutional Convention, to put the influence of the Kirk in a positive light. This is partly due to a high level of participation by ministers of the Kirk and other churches in these circles. But it also reflects the strong orientation of this segment of the movement toward the fundamental reform of the constitution and political institutions. I would suggest that this legal-institutional orientation in the present conflict logically inclines activists in these circles to anchor their critiques in the major quasi-state institution of Scotland's modern history. Portrayals of the Kirk as a grassroots, democratic institution, often presented in tandem with the historical weakness of the Scottish royalty in relation to the nobility and the Kirk, create an historical precedent for the present complaint about the overweening power of the Prime Minister

and Westminster as a whole, and the illegitimacy of the present Tory government in Scotland.

Another argument I encountered, especially in Labour Party circles, sought to synthesize the roles of both the Presbyterian Kirk and the Catholic Church. Bob Maclean, a key organizer behind Scottish Labor Action, and author of an historical study of Labour and the home rule movement, offered this response to my general query about the differences between Scotland and England in terms of support for the welfare state:

One of the current theories is, eh, is that there's a synthesis between a Presbyterian form of Protestantism, which has got a very egalitarian ethos, right? And at the same time the Catholic tradition--which is much larger in Scotland than it is in England 'cause of the Irish immigration--and the communal nature, of that culture. And a lot of sociologists would say, Scottish sociologists would say it was a marrying of those two cultures, which produced the eh, that kind of, attitude...

I asked Maclean about the relative importance of the Churches on this point when compared to the general history of the socialist movement in Scotland:

I think the socialist movement in Scotland benefited from the kind of value background that was created by religion in Scotland, because, Scotland is one of the very, very few countries in the world where the Party of the left is associated with the Roman Catholic Church. Equally, having said that, if you go back in the movement, to the 1920s and early 30s, and look at the role of the ILP [Independent Labour Party] as the pioneer of the Labour movement, the number of either Church of Scotland ministers or Free Church of Scotland ministers that were actually ILP MPs or leading figures in the ILP, is really quite phenomenal, in a way in which I think the clergy and religion have never had that association with the socialist movement in England.

This argument reflects the strong historical relationship between the Scottish Catholic community and the Scottish Labour Party, which has been a major force in integrating Catholics into Scottish society, despite persistent sectarianism in some areas. It also reflects an awareness of the need to counter an underlying tendency in movement rhetoric to assimilate Scottishness, Presbyterianism, and autonomism in ways that would seem to exclude the Catholic community. It constitutes a kind of inclusive, "broad church" gesture.

Clans, Kinship, and Class: The modern significance of the clan system was generally approached more cautiously, with most informants conceding the difficulty of tracing connections between contemporary social relations the old clan structures, seriously weakened in the highlands after 1745, and eroded in the lowlands long before that. However, this issue tends to blend into a more general question about the role of kinship and social networks in a relatively small country. Informants frequently cited the likelihood of cross-class encounters within the same extended family, as well as the likelihood of having long-term personal acquaintances with one's political opponents. Chris Mclean joined the SNP in 1978, eventually becoming part of the 79 Group. He was raised in London by working class Scottish parents, and came north at 18 to study law at Edinburgh University. Talking about the tendency of middle class voters in Scotland to view as unfair and oppose such things

as the Poll Tax and water privatization, even though these might be to their economic advantage, he argued:

It is because of a sense of community, it's not just, you know, a sort of abstract concern with the poor at large. It's because, you know, there has been a fair bit of social mobility, a lot of geographic mobility in Scotland, and you know virtually everyone in Scotland, even if they're a middle class lawyer living in Glasgow, they'll have a granny living in a croft in the Western Isles, or they'll have a grandfather who's a miner a Ayershire... You know, they'll be concerned about them. It's not that it's completely unselfish and... altruistic, for its own sake, its that, you know, Scottish society is such that, we're a small nation, there are lots of cross overs, the divide, the class divide is not nearly so great, and that, you know, people actually come in contact with... You know, if you're living in the stockbroker belt around London... its quite unusual to meet, poor people... and you know, you talk about people living in council houses, lot of them have probably never seen a council house apart from on television, or on the train into central London...

McLean's argument is that a rather dense interlacing of social networks fosters a corporatist attitude in Scotland, such that people see their fortunes as interdependent. Another aspect of this which came up frequently is a strong tendency toward social levelling in interpersonal discourse-- a strong contempt for any one who pretends to disassociate themselves from their social origins. The satirical poetry of Robert Burns was frequently offered as a prime example of this attitude. Informants noted that this tendency is summed up in the common, cutting expression "I kent his faither," i.e., "I knew his father" (he doesn't fool me, I know where he comes from, etc..). Isobel Lindsay, once a leading figure in the SNP and now Convener of the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament, touched on many of the central themes of the Scotland-as-egalitarian-myth. After pointing up the stronger

tradition of rural radicalism and anti-landordism in Scotland as compared with England, she recalled:

And certainly the Scots on the whole have always had, and this is something I can remember very strongly from childhood, they have had a very strong dislike of pretension, of people putting on airs and graces, no matter how important their position, it was always something that was viewed very critically... And part of it was the idea of people getting above themselves, it was a mechanism for maintaining social equality, or at least for limiting social distance, and I think that's always been very powerful in Scotland, both through satire, [and] through ordinary language....

I mentioned that many people had pointed out the phrase "I kent his faither" to me:

Oh yes, and that was very much a way of saying that "this person, in order to, whatever his pretentiousness now may be, was really one of us, so there's no need for a change in accent." [laughter] But that's something people always used to listen very carefully for... When people had been away from Scotland, migrated and come home, people would listen carefully to their accents, and talk about it later, and they approved people who had kept their accent exactly as it was, and there was a definite disapproval of people who had altered their accents... You would hear, I can still hear my aunt, or other people saying "you'd never know she'd been away for thirty years"...

Obviously this levelling discourse would not be an issue if there were not real anxieties surrounding the possibility of abandoning one's social origins. And it seems certain that the opportunities for careers in the Empire and emigration to England and abroad have provided a real basis for these anxieties. In any case, this appears as the other side of corporatist interdependence, a distrust of anyone who attempts to leave. My informants were generally attuned to the two-edged quality of this practice, as both evidence for an egalitarian ethos, and as representing a somewhat stifling

and defensive worldview. The parallels to tendencies toward symbolic levelling in corporate peasant communities described by ethnographers are striking, prompting me to suggest that this social form further supports the argument made in the second chapter for a correspondence in moral economic discourse between peasant communities and welfare states.

I would also note that the theme of a tradition of levelling, together with the smallness of Scotland and density of its social networks argument, was brought up more often by activists in the SNP than by others. I am not sure how to account for this, but part of the appeal of the SNP to active participants is its smaller scale and more informal style when compared to the much larger and more bureacrized Labour Party, which of course exists at both the Scottish and British levels, unlike the SNP. Participation in the SNP, beyond being an expression of political convictions about Scotland's fate as a nation, is probably also an expression of a preference for a more small-scale, grassroots, local style of politics. In this light it is perhaps not surprising that questions of social scale might loom larger in the minds of SNP participants.

My informants frequently linked Scottish egalitarianism to the Labour and trade union movements, though often in combination with the themes discussed above. As one might expect, I found these connections were stressed especially by those active in a the Labour/trade union wing of the home rule movement, but many in the SNP, especially of the

younger, post 1979, left-leaning generation, also highlighted this theme. Gordon MacDougal is a Labour Party member who has been a key organizer in Scotland United, the cross party (but Labour dominated) campaign for a new national referendum on the home rule issue. His response to the question:

...one of the factors must be size... but I think there has been a relatively strong Labour and trade union movement and tradition in Scotland...which has probably survived maybe a bit better than our friends in England...from the attacks of the Thatcher movement... [word unclear] I think people are more used to being involved, it's not such a surprise, I think, we'd be involved in the trade union, the Miner's Gala, and May Day, or the [anti-] Poll Tax campaign [....] and that's fostered by the fact that we've got a lot of representatives in local government and regional government, and a lot of MPs. But I think generally there is a feeling that we should look after each other. ... I don't know if you were sitting in the south-east of England, that people would necessarily say differently... 'cause though the Tories get in, they probably only get in with, what's their vote? maybe 42 or 43 percent. You're still talking about an electoral system where 60 percent don't want to vote for them... I don't know if you can say they [the Tories] accurately reflect people's egalitarianism in England. I tend not to get into debates that argue, well, we're more egalitarian, or we're more into collectivism, or more socialist, or more left, or more radical... I don't think that's a productive road to go down. I think we have to say, well, is this what we are? Is this what we're about? [....] I don't know if a comparison... would be accurate.

At this point I prompted him, asking if he would see whatever egalitarian values there are in Scotland as coming out of the Labour/socialist tradition:

Yeah...yeah... the nationalist tradition as well has grown up a lot in the last few years in my opinion, I think you've got...a kind of Labour hegemony I suppose in Scotland... and the nationalists have kind of swung from earlier on being a relatively right wing nationalism to a kind of central belt, kind of urban nationalism, which is...I mean... you probably couldn't even fit a razor blade between a lot of my friends that are in the SNP's policies and my policies, and my ideas

about a Labour Party in Scotland... not an awful lot of difference, apart from they're bigger on the national question than Labour is and Labour's bigger on the whole economics question, but I mean the two are kind of developing...

A characteristic reluctance of those with a Labour pro-parliament perspective to draw strong invidious comparisons between the Scots and the English comes across here. It should also be noted that as a key organizer in Scotland United, which sought to foster Labour-SNP cooperation, MacDougal would be more inclined than some Labour members to stress the common ground between SNP and Labour. Still, many people in the movement would agree with his comparison on this point. Shirley-Ann Somerville is a member of the SNP and the Young Scottish Nationalists, an example of the young, more left generation in the Party. She had been involved in Scotland United at the start, but dropped out feeling that the moment for that initiative had been lost. She is the first in her family to go to university, where she studies economics and politics. Her response to the egalitarianism question indicates both uncertainty about how to account for it, and a strong inclination to place it within a kind of socialist history and iconography:

It's very difficult to explain actually...we'd done this in the first year of university, we couldn't come up with an answer, we all believed Scotland's more egalitarian, but we couldn't really decide why... I think it is, we seem to have a more left-of-center tendency, and a more egalitarian attitude than England, and I think our views against the poll tax, and our views against Thatcher kind of demonstrated that. As to why that is, it may be partly due to our kind of defeated... our kind of "Scotland we all feel sorry for ourselves" stage. That might have partly to do with why we stick together more, we see ourselves as kind of in

an embattled corner. But again, nobody does anything about it.

I prompt: the lack of political power in Scotland creates a sense of commonality?

I think it does in a way really. I think we have a kind of common identity, which I think...English people seem to have a confused identity, they don't know whether they're talking about England, or they're talking about the UK, or what they're talking about... I think Scottish people have an identity which they all relate to, even although they might not support independence, and I think that helps them to kind of, have a common feeling, a common attitude, towards certain problems. I think you can also look at historical things as well...[JH: such as?] like the rise of John MacLean in 1915, the rent strikes, anti-conscription for World War One.... Maybe, we've also been very strong in heavy industries, which does have a tendency to be more trade unionized. It was before, in anyway the case, [i.e., before] I was born, that you were in your union, and you were loyal to your union, and you had an identity with the people in that, and you would then campaign, to help the community, and to help the union...

This passage brings out two points. First, perhaps a greater willingness than one might find among most Labour activists to draw a strong distinction between the Scots and the English on the question of egalitarianism (e.g., as compared to MacDougal). And secondly, a pronounced tendency to root this egalitarianism in the history of trade unionism and socialism, and not in the mythic themes focussed on by McCrone. The repertoire of historical referents for the Scottish myth are not neatly parcelled out, so that Labour devolutionists draw on Labour movement history, and nationalists draw on some other stock on national imagery. This can work both ways. An interesting tendency is the tradition within the Scottish Communist Party, with its long history of support for home rule, to construct a very long

history of class struggle in Scotland. Harry McLevy, a major trade union leader from Dundee who had been in the CP for many years, provides an example. When I put the question of egalitarianism to him, he began not with John MacLean, but with the Reformation and the Kirk explored above, this time viewed from a marxist, class analysis perspective:

Well, there's the Reformation in Scotland. The Church of Scotland is a very democratic church... it's part of.. it reflects... The Church of England is often described as "the Tory Party at Prayer" --it's created from above. By Henry the Eighth it was convenient, and all that carry on, it created divorces, it created a landed aristocracy [...] they took all the church lands and created a new church, called it the Church of England. But Scotland was entirely different... more community based after the Reformation. There certainly was a deal done with the aristocracy. The deal was that they would get the land if they supported the Reformation. The Lords of the Congregation. As Burns said "what a parcel o' rousers in a nation." And you can see it in the structures of the Church of Scotland. The congregation actually decides whether the minister shall be the minister or not. You know? The Kirk Session, the elders of the Church, who are drawn from the congregation, they have a lot of say. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland is a very democratic body/forum which is open to resolutions from churches... and I think that that reflects part of the difference. Plus, the Scots have had to stick together. There's been a requirement for a certain national unity, in Scotland, that didn't exist, certainly in England. And that was all about defending... the fight for a Scottish King, the fight for a Scottish Church, ... all parts of the fight for a Scottish nation.

JH: Which is distinct from the English who didn't have the same...?

They didn't have the same need. I mean, they were the big nation. They were the big imperialist power... you know? The Scots were a small nation, and they had to have this degree of unity to defend themselves. And the only people who ever broke ranks were the aristocracy...that's why, in a sense, they're excluded from any rights within the debate. I mean the Lord Caithness wouldn't dare suggest, he wouldn't be taken seriously....or any of these people, the old aristocracy, they wouldn't be...Lord Elgin, the

thought.... I mean these guys were responsible for the highland clearances. I mean I doubt if there's ever been an aristocracy that's committed such heinous crimes, against its own people. And the question of the highland clearances is still a burning issue in Scotland, you know? It was only a couple of years ago when the Duke of Sutherland's² wife, attempted to front the Gaelic festival the MOD. There was an absolute uproar all over Scotland, that this relic of the dim and distant murky past, where they actually drove their own people beneath the bloody, well, sea line, on the beaches...you know?

McLevy's account is intriguing, in that it offers many of the older and more romantic images from Scotland's history--the Kirk, the clearances--while implying a clear historical lineage of class conflict and imperialist domination running from these events on up to the present struggle over a parliament, which he sees in class terms as well.

Many would argue that there is a distinct and separate myth of a socialist and radical Scotland, often summed up in the specific myth of the "Red Clyde," the period of labor unrest (c.1914-1922) on the Clyde which was mistakenly viewed as a potential Bolshevik uprising by the government of the time, and helped lead to a strong Scottish Labour showing in the general election of 1922. Judging from my interviews, it appears to me that the traditional myth of egalitarianism and this other tradition of Labour/socialist lore are presently beginning to fuse into one larger myth. This is not surprising in a political environment in which opposition parties, trade unions, and the churches are being drawn

² The Sutherlands are historically associated with the most violent and brutal episodes in the clearances.

together in a stance of opposition to the the current government and political economic trends. And, as I've already observed, Scottish socialism has strong roots in Scottish Calvinism. Furthermore, the present situation of the autonomist movement is one of political opposition to, and struggle against, the effects of both global capitalism and Westminster government. In fact the movement's greatest liability is a tendency to collapse these into one another. Just as the struggles with Westminster and capital become combined, the Scottish myth is tending to integrate the histories of the Kirk's struggles with Westminster and kings, and the Labour movement's struggles with capital, into a larger history of egalitarian traditions in Scotland.

Although comparisons of class in Scotland and England were often quite subtle, I was surprised more than once in interviews by jarring references to "the English class system," as though class were a peculiar English invention or cultural trait. There seem to be two factors at work here. First, Britain is a land that maintains a system of peerage, of inherited class statuses. Despite generations of marxist class analysis disseminated via the labor movement, this still provides a powerful image of what class is all about. Secondly, there is the pronounced tendency of working and middle class Scots to perceive the Scottish aristocracy as in fact English or at least thoroughly anglicized. In terms of speech, education, and general socialization, the Scottish nobility does strongly resemble the English nobility, to

which it has assimilated for centuries. Thus to the extent that class is conceived in terms of inherited social rank, rather than relations of production (leaving aside the fact that these often coincide), the egalitarian myth is further bolstered, because a portion of Scotland's elite is, almost by definition, non-Scottish. Moreover, the perception of the peerage-based class system as external and alien (i.e., English), and the reality of increasing control of the Scottish economy by external capital, sets up a reinforcing parallel, in which sources of inequality are located outside of Scotland. The need to examine internal causes of inequality is obviated by the strong perception that the major causes of inequality are external. When pressed, I am sure many of my informants would offer this same critique, but the notion of Scotland as a bulwark of egalitarian values under attack from outside is nonetheless persistently present as an over-arching, background assumption that shapes movement discourse at a pre-critical level.

Still, it must be conceded that in comparison to England as a whole, Scotland does show stronger support for Labour, and a marked tendency to support higher levels of taxation in order to maintain the redistributive functions and key institutions of the welfare state. Middle class voting districts such as Bearsden in Glasgow, which would normally produce Tory majorities in the south, are safe Labour seats. To some extent these can be considered indices of egalitarianism. But they also reflect a corporatist

conception of Scotland's welfare, stemming from the strong integrative role of dominant bureaucratic institutions throughout modern history, and the tendency of these institutions to define and address social problems within a Scottish context.

Finally, I must note that the notion of Scottish egalitarianism was frequently confirmed to me by informants involved in the movement who were English or otherwise not Scottish by origin. In some cases this seemed to me to indicate a process of "going native," acquiring the perspective of one's adoptive community. But this "outside confirmation" happened frequently enough that I am inclined to give it some weight. It would seem that, even if the actual distributions of wealth and opportunity are as unequal in Scotland as they are in England, the hegemony of the Scottish ideal of the redistributive welfare state is palpable, and appealing to those from England and elsewhere who share that ideal. This, indeed, is basic to my own interest in this movement.

The ALP History Focus Group: Before offering a more theoretical discussion, I would like to conclude this account of the Scottish myth by broadening it. Toward the end of my fieldwork I arranged a couple of focus group interviews with the two Adult Learning Project (ALP) groups that I had been working with for several months, the Democracy Group and the History Group. These interviews were designed, with the help of ALP Coordinator Vernon Galloway, to follow a format

regularly used by ALP called "decoding," based on the pedagogical ideas of Paulo Freire (see Kirkwood and Kirkwood 1989:10-12). The basic method is to open up critical discussions by presenting some symbolic element, such as a picture or a brief quote, and prompting a group through levels of interpretation from surface description, to attempts to identify with the image and relate it to one's own life. With the Democracy Group, I used a photographic slide of a small group of pro-union, pro-Thatcher demonstrators at a rally during one of the initial meetings of the Scottish Constitutional Convention. With the History Group, I used the quote from MacDairmid that appears at the base of the Democracy Cairn described in Chapter 2:

For we hae faith
in Scotland's hidden poo'ers
the present's theirs
but a' the past and future's oors.

I concentrate here on a segment from this latter focus group interview. Questions about what are "Scotland's hidden powers?" and how do Scotland's past, present, and future relate to each other, elicited many of the Scottish myth themes explored above. The general interpretation that came out was that "we" and "ours" referred primarily to the Scottish working class, and not to the Tories and the Scottish aristocracy, and that Scotland's hidden powers lay in the fact that Scotland is a "caring society" unlike the selfish individualistic ethos that dominates in England. Toward the middle of the interview Tim, a tutor for the History Group, began raising the importance of the study of

Scottish history. For a while the interview was dominated by exchanges between him and Vernon, a tutor and key staff member, as they tried to sort through the aims of their pro-parliament politics, and its relationship to the study of Scottish history and culture. Vernon was finishing up a degree in community education, and Tim was going to start working on one in the following fall. Both had been active in the Labour Party in the past, Tim having been involved in Scottish Labour Action, the home rule pressure group within the Party. I have reproduced their rather lengthy exchange below (omitting tangential interjections from other participants), because it lays out some of the key dilemmas of the Scottish autonomist movement that I want to focus on in the rest of this chapter.

Tim: We're probably about, just about the only nation in Europe that constantly has to justify our nationhood...we always sit down and say, "well, what do you mean by Scottish then?," and go through this tortured process of what do we mean by Scottish, do we mean this, do we mean that ...and I think nationhood is a combination of history and culture, of people feeling together, of current things, of historical things, of a sense of togetherness in different ways, and many different nations can have that without question, and the reason they have that without question is it's all bound together by a political structure that gives them nationhood in some ways. And there are exceptions to that obviously, but I mean in general that's the case. Whereas here, because we don't have a democratic structure that actually represents...we don't have a parliament, we are the governed rather than the governors... When we express our desire for a parliament we have to somehow go through a tortured process of justifying that and finding reasons why we're a nation, and I think that the study of history, it makes it so self-evident, that we are a nation. And the historical part then compliments a sense of togetherness and community and sense of society that exists today as well. And that's where I think history comes in... I've been in this situation so often before where we've sat

'round and talked about what do we mean about being Scottish, and it's all different things, we've always got to have to try and justify ourselves, persuade someone else that we're a nation, and we know that we are, you know, but we're always having to do that because we don't have a parliament, because we don't have a political structure that other nations have...

Vernon: I think like Tim says, this is not like a recent thing, this preoccupation with what does it mean to be Scottish, I was talking about the Jacobites, and Walter Scott, and so on and so on, every generation it seems has had to ask itself that question and come up with a different solution to the problem... It seems to me the point is that whenever that has come about it has been because people have been scared of losing their sense of difference, you know, their sense of what makes them different from other folk, their Scottishness if you like, their identity, that has been their inspiration all along... And I think what we're going through now is another period of that, I think it is different this time, because its not quite as simple, the solutions people are coming up with aren't quite as simple. In the past I think it was, we're Scottish because "well, we're no' English eh?"--that was basically what defined you, you know. And I think people have been more thoughtful about it this time, but it seems to me that's why we do it. It's not, the question is I'll pose back to you is, or to everyone is, once you've got your parliament, would that, is that gonna solve this problem? Because, here's my point, I don't think this is a problem between Scotland and England, I think this is a problem with, if you want to put it back in John MacLean's terms, it's a problem of international capital. It's not centered in London, it's not centered in Brussels, this is global this thing, this culture is spreading right across the globe you know... you can use the same adverts in just about half the world now, you just change the language underneath them, but they sell their product with the same image to the whole of the world basically, and eh... its a global thing that's trying to make culture be the same everywhere, and I think that's... a parliament alone, a parliament alone ain't the answer, because you then have to say what... how you gonna keep all that out, what are you gonna do about that. It's just like what the French are doin' just now, isn't it... trying to cut out all the English and Americanization of the language, trying to promote their own film industries, their own indigenous culture, is that what you're saying, that that allows you to do that?

Tim: I'd say a parliament alone is not the answer, I would agree with that, but I would say a parliament, a powerful parliament--recently I'm coming to believe that a separate, an independent parliament as well--is the essential first step. Because it creates a structure and a process by which we as a people can then participate in the process of deciding what we want, and you know, being part of that process, 'cause at the moment we're not, we're acted upon. It doesn't matter what we think, what we say, the way we vote, how we feel, we are acted upon by political processes over which we have no control... in the same way that the people of Nicaragua were acted upon by the United States of America, I see the relationship as practically the same, almost imperialist. And so by creating a structure whereby we can actually participate and fight back is an essential precondition for whatever else will follow... The trouble we have, it's not just a political thing. Scots, the Scottish people, we're fightin' against many many generations... ehm...of cultural put down, we've been put down culturally for so many... I mean I remember, I mean o.k., my parents are English and that right, but at school, being punished at school by Scottish teachers for speaking a certain way [i.e., Scots]... When I was at university British history was English history...you know you're struggling against the tide all the way, and I think that's why we turn around and we flagellate ourselves and say "oh why do we put up with it?"--it's because we're still trying to break the chains of this cultural put down, and this is why this place [ALP] has been important for me, you know...

Vernon: I just, here's an example from this week. I just ehm, wrote a thing for the university, for this course I was doing. And, for the first time ever someone's written about Scotland and my job, community education, I'm writing about all that stuff. And, ehm, one of the first comments I got back was "you're nothin' but a crypto-nationalist, that's what this is, that's what you're projects about"... And this from another, a socialist colleague of mine, who's lookin' at that and saying, "that's what your project is." I said I'm writing about my culture, you know, the place where I come from, where I work, you know it's not... but there's a problem that's runnin' through all of this stuff you know, all of this stuff. And that's why there's no monuments to John MacLean in Glasgow, by the way [referring to an earlier point in the discussion], is he was a socialist republican, that was his platform.... But I think there's another thing there, I mean I agree with you, a parliament, or some kind of legislature, that would be the thing, that would make a big difference, make a huge difference, it wouldn't be the

whole answer but it would make a big difference. But the question is why not? It's your point you know, and what was it Francis [another ALPer] used to say--"how can we have been so stupid for so long"--and eh, it's... why not? that's what you're gettin' at, cultural put down, but, why not? if everyone thinks that's the case [that Scotland should have a parliament] why not?

Tim's and Vernon's exchange brings up many issues: the difficulty of defining national identity, especially in today's context of global capital; the relationship between nationhood and statehood; the effects of a long-standing devalorization of Scottish history and culture; and the suspicion with which this kind of nationalism is often regarded by those on the traditional left, despite the general socialist tendencies of nationalism in Scotland. But there are also deeper dilemmas at work here, that get to the heart of Vernon's query, "why not"? Why are such strong feelings and convictions so often mixed with such ambivalence? There are of course legitimate questions about the effectiveness of autonomism as a political strategy--how much real self-determination can a parliament or an independent state have in the modern world? Moreover, compared to much of the world, conditions in Scotland are not that dire, and we should perhaps not be surprised if conservatism and caution tend to hold the widespread desire for change in an uneasy check. Preferring "the devil you know to the devil you don't know" is not a peculiar Scottish trait. But this movement is caught in other contradictions that come from the very structure of its argument. As a supposedly modern and progressive political movement, it is

organized around the core universalizing concepts of democracy and socialism³. These are ideas that are generally regarded as ultimate goods by those who believe in them, as first principles that should be valued and promoted by all people everywhere. They are not particularistic cultural traits. And yet, the Scottish myth described above seems to suggest precisely this, a peculiar cultural affinity between Scots and democracy and socialism, and one not shared by the English. The following discussion aims to elaborate this way of framing the Scottish movement.

III Discussion: Contractarianism, Communitarianism, and Conceptions of Justice

Historical Versus Conventional Validation:

The Scottish autonomist movement is caught between two modes of validation: historical versus conventional, i.e., whether it is validated in terms of the internal reason of an historical logic, or in terms of an agreed upon consensus among the present political community. This tension is reflected in that between ethnic versus civic conceptions of nationalism, a distinction which, despite the efforts of both theorists and practitioners of nationalism, is difficult to maintain in the final analysis. I have tried to illustrate through the material above on the Scottish myth of egalitarianism how, in practice, arguments in favor of

³ For the present argument "socialism" is broadly understood to mean a philosophical belief in the primacy of human interdependence over individualism, and not reduced to specific political programs.

classic liberal notions of civic politics based on conceptions of rights and democracy interpenetrate with arguments about the need to recuperate, realize, and sustain a particular, organic, historical and cultural identity. Although participants tend to align themselves in one direction or another, with groups like Common Cause and the Constitutional Convention typifying the civic end of the spectrum, and groups like Scottish Watch and Siol Nan Gaidheal typifying the ethnic end, the ethnic and the civic tend to meet in the middle and become fused. The purpose of this final discussion is to come to a fuller understanding of why this happens.

The Contractarian/Communitarian Field of Arguments:

Up to this point I have, along the way, discussed the literature on nationalism where it seemed relevant. Here I will turn to a more philosophical set of debates regarding political and moral theory. I do this because the arguments found in these debates reflect those found in the Scottish movement, and in modern politics as a whole. There is an isomorphism between the terms of debate in the Scottish movement and those found in this philosophical literature that is worth mapping out and examining, because doing so will clarify how "their" arguments are a part of "our" arguments, regardless of their local transformations.

The literature considered here is large and sophisticated, and I claim only to outline its major themes,

and to highlight one of particular relevance to this study, namely the tension between historical and conventional modes of justifying values and political orders⁴. This field of arguments can be seen as composed of three major positions. There is a "neo-contractarian" literature grounded in the intellectual tradition of political liberalism, which is itself polarized into "left-liberal" versus "right-libertarian" arguments. The former seeks to justify an active role for the state in providing for the basic welfare of citizens (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1978), while the latter argues for a minimal state based on the protection of property rights (Nozick 1974; Buchanan 1975). The third position is often called "communitarian." Although tending to share with the left-liberal position a vision of society as requiring extensive consensus and cooperation, it nonetheless dissents, often radically, in its understanding of how such common norms are (or should be) arrived at. I will elaborate these positions by introducing some major representatives within these debates, emphasizing along the way the connections between these basic philosophical postures and those that inform the debates around Scottish autonomism.

The seminal text in the neo-contractarian literature is John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971). In this influential book Rawls tried to formulate and defend a conception of

⁴ For general introductions see: Bobbio (1987:118-137); Habermas (1993:1-18); Horton and Mendus (1994); Kukathas and Pettit (1990); Sandel (1984); Walzer (1990).

"justice as fairness." He begins by asking us to imagine what kind of socio-political arrangements we would chose to live in if we had all the general knowledge about human nature and possibilities at our disposal, but were ignorant of what our own position in that chosen arrangement would be. This is his version of the social contract, which he calls the "original position," in which judgements are made under a "veil of ignorance." Rawls assumes that under such a veil, all reasoning subjects would reach the same or similar choices. Moreover, he hypothesizes that people deliberating from such a position would hedge their bets as to what position they might end up in by choosing an arrangement in which

[a]ll social primary goods--liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self respect--are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored (1971:303).

The institutions and policies that Rawls argues would result from this process are: full employment, a social minimum income, equal educational and cultural opportunities through subsidized public schools, regulation of capitalist firms, and the prevention of monopolies (cf. Kukathas and Pettit 1990:51).

It is worth noting two points here. First, while Rawls's method of justifying this vision of justice relies on a highly abstract heuristic model, the kind of society he sees as being justified is very familiar--the liberal welfare state that was the central tendency in all industrialized

democracies through the middle of this century. Considering that A Theory of Justice was first published in 1971, we can see it as an attempt to justify what was thought by many to be the inherent tendency of the modern democratic state at that time--very much in the tradition of T.H. Marshall discussed in Chapter 5. Secondly, we should note that despite the label of contractarianism, the framework of debate that Rawls sets up is actually quite different from the classic social contract literature of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant (cf. Barker 1962; Lessnoff 1990). Whereas these early theorists were concerned with fundamental justifications of the state's existence and authority, the current debates about contract revolve primarily around questions of distributive justice (Bobbio 1987:131-32). While this distinction can be overdrawn, the legitimacy and inevitability of some sort of state is generally taken for granted in the recent debates, its size and role in the redistribution of wealth and power being the main things at issue.

If Rawls is the prime example of left-liberal contractarianism, Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) has been the key statement of the right-libertarian version. Working in a Lockean mode, Nozick is closer to the original ideas of the social contract tradition. He is especially concerned with defending a notion of individual rights that respects the "separateness of persons." Toward this end he endorses a minimal state, arguing that social

goods should be distributed according to historically established entitlements, as long as these are justly acquired and passed on, rather than through the constant "interference" of Rawlsian principles of fair distribution. Thus in the tradition of classic liberalism a minimal state defending strong principles of private property is advocated by Nozick. His analysis is in the same mold as those of earlier theorists such as Frederick Hayek, and the neoliberalism of the Conservative Party in the UK and the Republican Party in the United States.

The communitarians have criticized Rawls from a different angle, arguing that he fails to comprehend that the formation of norms, of conceptions of right and wrong, good and bad, fair and unfair, is a socially embedded process that cannot be arrived at or reconstructed through the abstractions of his "original position" and "veil of ignorance." They argue instead that such judgements can only be made by concrete, situated subjects from within given normative orders and traditions, and that there will inevitably be historical and cultural variation among these, which cannot be encompassed by any universal set of principles proposed by Rawls's liberalism (MacIntyre 1984; Sandel 1982; Taylor 1989; Walzer 1983).

Perhaps the most prominent advocate of this position has been Alasdair MacIntyre, beginning with his influential book After Virtue (1984).⁵ MacIntyre puts forth a strong critique

⁵ It should be noted that although he is often labelled as such, MacIntyre does not exactly identify himself as a communitarian.

of post-enlightenment liberal individualism and the quest for a universal-rational basis for morality (and thus politics). He characterizes modern moral philosophy and popular political debate more generally as the product of an unworkable assortment of remnants from various earlier ethical traditions. These are bound together by the pretense of an over-arching, universal, objective rationality, but one which is more apparent than real, and cannot effectively mediate between worldviews grounded in incompatible premises. In this and subsequent works (1988; 1990) MacIntyre develops the argument that rationalities are specific to traditions (intellectual, ethical, philosophical), that they always have histories, and that they must be understood in terms of their particular unfolding development. There is no empyrean point outside of these historical traditions of reasoning from which to assess them.⁶

Aware that this argument invites charges of extreme relativism, MacIntyre stresses a conception of traditions as dynamic, living, developing social processes, not as static, unchanging creeds. Furthermore, he maintains that moral-rational traditions evolve because they generate their own internal contradictions which they must resolve. At certain critical junctures these internal tensions may become so accute that one tradition may turn to and borrow from others, or new, larger traditions may be synthesized out of prior and

⁶ What I have called the covenant tradition in Chapter 5 is a symbolic form that has undergone transformations, and not a continuous tradition of rational inquiry. Thus I have not tried to relate it to MacIntyre's ideas.

conflicting traditions, thus developing the rational resources needed for maintaining a coherent and workable moral outlook (MacIntyre 1988:164-182; and *passim*). Although MacIntyre questions the idea of a monological rationality that can be articulated and referred to as a final authority, he suggests that actual historical traditions can exhibit a dynamic that allows them to expand and incorporate other traditions. He thus implies an ecology of rational traditions in which those traditions that are the most able to adapt to the moral dilemmas that they confront will expand and thrive, and those less able will decline and wither away.

At base in the differences between Rawls and MacIntyre is the difference between Kantian deontological ethics and an Aristotelean ethic of virtues, respectively. In short, the former understands morality to be a question of establishing right by measuring conduct against a set of norms or rules, while the latter roots morality in the ability to recognize and actualize what is good. Whereas Rawls's system hinges on the social contract of the original position as an authoritative source of valid social norms, MacIntyre focuses on the traditions through which people learn to understand what is good.

MacIntyre's notion of tradition is built up out of the classic Aristotelean concern with virtue. Thus he places a strong emphasis on the narrative self, on the idea that individual wants and preferences do not exist *sui generis*, but only make sense within the context of a particular life,

within a particular narrative trajectory, within a telos (1984:204-225). The question "what do I want?" comes after "who am I? where have I been? where am I going?" Similarly, "the good" is understood not simply as what is preferred or needed, whether by few or many, but rather as excellence within a given social practice, judged in terms internal to that practice. Social practices include such things as football, fishing, painting, child rearing, medical healing, and politics--all ongoing human endeavors. In Aristotelean terms each of these practices is understood as oriented toward particular ends, and is best evaluated by those engaged in the practice, particularly by those who excel in realizing the practice's given ends. To clarify, economic profit could be a result of any one of these practices, but it is not a good internal to them. In some cases the value of the internal good is more obvious than others. A good doctor keeps the patient well. A good fisher successfully catches fish--but presumably so that people may eat, a good not internal to fishing. Nor is it clear that fishing at levels sustainable over the long term is a good internal to fishing; and if the practice is subordinated to these external goods, why not to profitability? This idea of an ethical singularity of practices seems to obscure the way social practices in reality can interpenetrate and be interdependent. Clearly the Aristotelean tradition, like the Kantian, raises its own problematic. But more generally I am trying to show that MacIntyre's concern with historical

justification works at several levels--of the narrative self, of social practices, and of moral-rational traditions (cf. Horton and Mendus 1994:8-14). At each level, conduct is evaluated in terms of its ability to realize a certain telos that makes the life, the practice, the tradition coherent and valuable overall.

In his most recent work, Rawls has tried to take into account the criticisms of the communitarians and others. Thus he has recently reformulated his theory of justice, which tended to assume a commonality of basic moral beliefs, to consider the pluralism of modern democratic societies (Rawls 1996). He presents a concept of "political liberalism," which is understood as a domain of overlapping consensus between reasonable but incompatible political and moral doctrines. In this way he meets the communitarian assertion of the irreducibility of a multiplicity of traditions by reasserting the classical liberal principle of toleration as the basis for the idea of justice as fairness. According to his argument, the agreements reached in the original position still define the most likely common ground to be found between conflicting religious, philosophical, political and moral traditions, while allowing that these are likely to diverge on many issues as well.

Jürgen Habermas is also an important figure in these debates. In recent years he has developed out of his theory of communicative action what he calls discourse ethics (1990:43-115; 1993:19-111). Though he distances himself from

Rawls's contractarianism, he remains primarily in the Kantian tradition. But rather than positing a categorical imperative or an original position, Habermas argues that all morality and politics are generated by the process of communication, and bound by its pragmatics. He begins from the premise that the very acts of disagreement, argument and debate assume a belief in the possibility of rationally achieved mutual understanding, and thus rest on an implicit agreement that a common ground of rationality exists.

Habermas proposes the basic moral principle that the validity of social norms rests on whether those affected by their observance are able to freely and openly participate in their formulation. In a way somewhat parallel to Rawls's recent move, he makes a distinction between ethical (i.e., Aristotelean) questions about the good, and moral (i.e., Kantian) questions about right (1993:1-17). He acknowledges that concrete persons and communities, or lifeworlds to use his term, will have to generate their own conceptions of the good, but he argues that once norms and actions impinge on larger communities, they should become subject to his universal principle of validation.

Let us consider how the positions outlined above correspond to those found in the Scottish autonomist movement. Two basic axes of disagreement are apparent in both these debates and the Scottish movement. First, there is the polarized conception of the role of the state in articulating and realizing distributive justice. By and

large participants in the Scottish movement would side with Rawls's notion that there is an extensive set of fundamental rights that should in principle be supported, and would oppose Nozick's notion of the minimal state in which justice is primarily a question of rights to ownership. These two positions are, in short, justifications of the social democratic and neoliberal/free market positions, respectively, and are inscribed in Britain's current electoral landscape as the "north-south divide."

Secondly, there is the tension between Rawls's and Habermas's liberal/Kantian notions that social arrangements can be measured against a universalizable conception of conventional agreements, and MacIntyre's and the communitarian's claim that conceptions of justice are the socially embedded creations of particular histories. The Scottish movement, like all social movements, is justified, ad hoc, through an unsystematic mixture of these two kinds of argument. On the one hand it is argued that Scots are being "shut out" from participating in conventionally held values of democratic representation and self determination (cf. the 1988 Claim of Right discussed in Chapter 6). The assumption is that effective democratic participation, and at least a modicum of wealth redistribution, is a commonly believed in good. The complaint is that this good is not being realized. On the other hand there is a sense that these values are peculiarly Scottish, and that what is being asserted is

simply the right to be Scottish, to live according to the Scottish moral tradition (cf. the "Scottish myth").

The conundrum here is one of the basis of claims. The net effect of the Scottish movement's arguments is to make a particular claim into a universal good. But if the "goods" of political self-determination and a more social democratic form of social organization are universal, what do the particularities of Scottish history and culture have to do with the validity of this claim? And if this is simply an assertion of what is uniquely good for Scotland, why should anyone outside of Scotland be concerned with these claims? There are those, such as the traditional socialist readers of Vernon who detected a kind of "crypto-nationalism" in his paper and who reject the Scottish movement precisely because it is mired in the particularism of Scottish culture, unlike, supposedly, the international labor movement. And there are those more ethnic and essentialist nationalists, such as one of the leading figures in Siol Nan Gaidheal whom I interviewed, who maintain that all "isms" (capitalism, socialism, imperialism, etc.) are "foreign ideologies" that must be removed so that the unique, indigenous Scottish culture can reassert itself. But the vast majority of movement participants are faced with the much messier task of arguing that the demands of the movement seek to make manifest within a particular national and cultural history a universalizable conception of the good.

Finally, I would add that there is a point at which right-libertarian and communitarian perspectives tend to become entangled in practice. The former, with its strong emphasis on the autonomy of the individual from societal interference, often needs to be compensated in political practice with more communitarian style arguments about the need for shared values and conceptions of the good. The parties of the right in both the UK and the United States exhibit internal tensions among their supporters between those oriented primarily toward the liberalization of economic policies and those oriented toward moral conservatism sustained by a religious and patriarchal social order. Similarly, there is a point where the more ethnic nationalisms of groups like Siol Nan Gaidheal strongly resemble this conservative brand of communitarianism.

The fact that these two kinds of argument become fused in practice in the Scottish movement may be a mark of inconsistency within the discourse of that movement, but it also suggests that what I am calling conventional versus historical modes of justification cannot be fully disarticulated in practice. Consider the respective roles of social description versus normative prescription found in the positions outlined above. There is an understandable tendency to view the theories of Rawls and Habermas as highly idealized normative arguments with only a tenuous relationship to actual social practice. But the fact remains that the kind of social order that Rawls's model prescribes

bears a striking resemblance to the modern liberal welfare state as it was developing in the middle of this century. It is precisely this correspondence to a widely recognized reality that helped make his work influential--he seemed to be providing a normative justification for what was actually happening. The Italian political theorist Norberto Bobbio has argued that the revival of contractarian theories is due to the fact that modern democratic politics actually does take the form of bargaining and negotiation between plural (although often unequal) centers of power under the rubric of the state (1987:116-119). Thus the general language of contractuality is descriptively useful, particularly in the context of multi-party political systems. The "keynesian consensus" itself is often referred to as a kind of "social contract" between capital and labor, the point being that it was a product of an historical process of conflict and power bargaining, not that it constituted some ultimate justification of the state.

There is also a reasonable inclination to view the work of the communitarians, especially MacIntyre (1984) and Walzer (1983), as emphasizing description over prescription, with their argument that peoples' values can only be made sense of within a given, concrete social context. But these authors do not passively describe human social life, they actively advocate a general vision of society as based on the mutual definition of social goods. What we have in fact are two different sorts of argument, that combine the normative and

the descriptive in different ways. Whereas Rawls's social contract can be viewed as a highly abstract *description* of how liberal democracies actually work, and as an organic product of the liberal tradition, MacIntyre's argument in favor of the Aristotelean/Thomist tradition can be seen as an historically rooted *prescription* for how humanity as a whole is to advance beyond the malaise of modernity.

The tension between the prescriptive and the descriptive dimensions of these politico-moral theories is particularly accute in the work of Habermas. It is important to bear in mind that although his work in discourse ethics is primarily normative, he is aware that human society does not live up to the standards he proposes. Still, grounding his theory in universal communicative behavior brings out the profound discontinuity between his prescriptions and reality. The ways in which people communicate with and affect one another across the globe do not correspond closely to the distribution of social institutions and governments that actually do the mediating and regulating of social conflict. Between the "is," that we are a communicatively inclined species with a predisposition toward cooperation, convention, and agreement, and the "ought," that this observation should inform our political and moral arrangements, lies a profound gap of actual social practice. But I think it is partly an awareness of this gap that is being expressed in the Scottish movement, a sense that the political channels of communication that once served in the negotiation of the

political order have become obstructed, or irrelevant to the workings of political and economic power. I will return to this matter in the conclusion.

Let me be clear. The interpenetration of description and prescription, of "is" and "ought," in the making of political and moral arguments is unavoidable. In that such arguments are oriented toward guiding future actions, to gain support they must propose possibilities that are both discernably different from the way things are, and plausibly derived from the way things are. I am not trying to take to task either the parties to the communitarian-contractarian debates, or the various participants in the Scottish movement. But I am trying to argue two things. First, that a distinction between ethnic nationalism based on historical particularity, and civic nationalism based on universal principles of liberalism, begins to break down in this case, and should probably be questioned as a general hypothesis. My sense from doing this research is that the more basic questions to be asked in each case of a social movement aiming toward some degree of national autonomy are: what kinds of new social arrangements are being argued for? how are these prescribed visions being related to the history of the social context in which they are taking place? what is the array, continuity, or diversity of visions being articulated within a given movement? and how do these map on to the field of organizations and institutions (i.e., civil society/state) that structure the movement? In other words,

we should start by taking such arguments seriously and investigating how they are put together, not by typing them as either retrograde or progressive. And we should assume that formulating a creative narrative connection between the envisioned future and the given past is part of the inherent problematic of political mobilization, not a pathology peculiar to nationalism. Such narratives may be deceptive, manipulative, enlightening, or liberating--but I doubt that they can be avoided.

Secondly, I would argue that conflicts and struggles over justice, over the distribution of power and resources, should be treated as analytically primary to conceptions of history and nationhood, even when the object of study is nationalism. Although ideas of justice may be shaped by particular historical and cultural resources, it is the specific historical conflicts around actual distributions of resources and power which generate conceptions of a *nation* or a *culture with a history*. It is my belief in the analytic primacy of justice that has led me to relate the Scottish movement's "field of arguments" to the contractarian-communitarian debate, because the latter arguments are the former arguments in a more generalized form.⁷

⁷ To anyone interested in the debates on justice discussed here, especially when cast in terms of Rawls versus MacIntyre, I recommend Brian Barry's Justice as Impartiality (1995). Unfortunately I became familiar with his work too late to incorporate it here, but there are interesting parallels between his arguments and mine.

Anthropological Connections:

Let me conclude this discussion by trying to connect the idea of justice to the intellectual tradition of anthropology. The term "justice" rarely appears in anthropological literature, even when this literature is focused on the topics of politics and law. This is no doubt partly due to an unarticulated sense that "justice" is a peculiarly European/western concept that is not easily applied cross-culturally (although for that same reason perhaps easier to apply in this study). This may be true, but the field of arguments engaged above are discernable in the idea of the moral economy, an anthropological mainstay with which this work began. While anthropologists may eschew the term justice, the centrality of the concepts of reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange to economic and political anthropology (e.g., Fried 1967; Polanyi 1957; Mauss 1967; Wolf 1982) clearly imply a concern with the notion of distributive justice, at least in descriptive if not evaluative terms. But it seems that we associate the term "justice" especially with the kinds of universalizing, liberal/Kantian arguments outlined above. The arguments of theorist such as MacIntyre and Walzer are more likely to appeal to anthropologists precisely because they emphasize particularism in regard to questions of value. Their approach has been to assert the plurality and embeddedness of concepts of justice, and to question, or at least problematize, a universal standard.

William Booth (1994) has pointed out the parallels between the arguments of the communitarians and the moral economists, understood as including the tradition of substantivist economic anthropology. Two ideas have been central to the moral economic approach. First, that in the past, and in "traditional" societies, economic behavior was/is embedded within and regulated by other value bearing institutions of kinship, religion, and politics. And second, that the formal economic concepts generated by "modern" market-based societies are not appropriate for the analysis of non-market/embedded economies.⁸ But the moral economic/substantivist position clearly transcends proposals for the proper analysis of "non-western" societies, it also involves a critique of the disembedding of the modern economy. Thus Polanyi's The Great Transformation concludes with the image of a titanic struggle between the needs of society and the economy (1957:249-58). Polanyi's point was that the economy needed to be re-embedded within the institutional articulation of social needs and values (cf. also Mauss 1967:69-81). The liberal conception of justice is clearly bound up with the liberal conception of a market-based economy, and it would seem that anthropological unease (at least on the left) with formal, neo-classical economics and Kantian universal justice are of a piece. Both would seem to occlude or erase particular cultural systems of

⁸ See Donham (1981) and Kaplan (1968), as well as Booth (1994), for critical discussions of some of the confusions, particularly regarding confusing theory and method, involved in the formalist-substantivist debates.

value. But we should note that Polanyi's assertion of the need to subordinate the economy to society is not particularistic, but rather an assertion of a universal human need. It is not simply a question of respecting the particularity of other cultures; the dominance of the disembedded market economy is treated as an aberration from the normal human state of economic embeddedness, which needs to be re-established at a global level. In other words, the question of a universal conception of justice is implied, not avoided, by the moral economic, substantivist, and often marxist approaches to economics and politics in anthropology.

There is another way in which we are likely, especially as anthropologists, to feel dissatisfied with the treatment of justice found in the communitarian-contractarian debates. The feminist philosopher and Hume scholar Annette Baier (1995) has argued that the intense preoccupation with rational justification fails to capture what we already know to be the case--that human society takes place within unsystematic, primarily felt networks of trust, that seem to precede, rather than follow from, any explicit articulation of the good or the right. While her remarks are primarily aimed at Kantian ethics,⁹ they also raise problems for

⁹ More particularly Baier's work is inspired by Carol Gilligan's (1982) critical studies of Lawrence Kohlberg's Kantian theories of stages of moral development in individuals, which suggest that women tend to be "stuck" at a pre-Kantian level of "conventional" moral development, unable to formulate "post-conventional" or "universal" understandings of morality. While Baier is similar to Habermas in seeing human communication as offering a basis for a theory of rights and obligations (Baier 1995:224-246), her criticisms also apply to him, in that Habermas draws heavily on Kohlberg, suggesting by analogy stages of moral development for societies as a whole.

MacIntyre's notion of rational traditions, which does not capture this un-thought substrate of caring, fairness, and trust.

Drawing on and elaborating the work of Hume, Baier argues that we are a particular kind of animal, with a long period of childhood dependency on parents/care givers, and a heavy reliance on cooperation for our basic survival. She suggests that Hume was on the right track when, taking a more naturalistic approach to the study of human history, he argued against the original contractarians, objecting that their hypothetical social contracts were implausible as explanations of human cooperation and feelings of moral obligation. Believing that reason is a "slave to the passions," i.e., that needs, feelings, desires, stand outside and prior to our capacity to reason about them, Hume argued that justice, i.e., government and laws, is an "artificial virtue" (Hume 1978[1740]:477-484), a human invention built up out of the natural virtues of caring and trust cultivated within the family. In other words, he saw law and political institutions as particular conventional arrangements, not validated by any higher principles of reason, that arise naturally through the course of history as particular communities expand upon the natural core of familial cooperation and trust.

Hume argued that systems of justice exist because human experience has proven them to be practically useful (Hume 1975[1777]:183-204; 303-311). For this reason he is

generally regarded as a utilitarian when it comes to questions of ethics. But it is perhaps more accurate to view Hume as anticipating ideas of evolutionism and functionalism that would become central to anthropological theory and social science in general. For Hume, justice and the social institutions that create it are a result of beneficial cultural adaptation. Furthermore, we should recognize that Hume was articulating the idea that values are socially constructed, but under concrete historical conditions--and it is the tension between social construction and historical specificity that defines the contractarian-communitarian debates.

This study as a whole lends some credence to the approach advocated by Baier and Hume. I believe the debates about justice engaged above are important, unavoidable, and need to be confronted (cf. Baier 1995:19). But I also think that the advantage of an ethnographic approach is that it yields a much stronger sense of how these debates are ultimately derived from an actual social fabric of feelings of justice and injustice, righteousness and indignation, of trust gained and trust broken. I have tried to show through cumulative presentation that the sense of being wronged, treated unfairly, found in the Scottish movement is not simply the outcome of deliberations about justice and good government, but also of a deeply felt threat to that basic ability to cultivate trust and cooperation at a communal and interpersonal level. There is a kind of wisdom encoded in

these passions--there *is* such a thing as society, and it needs to be a caring society--which should be respected and taken seriously, even if at some level it is intractable to reasoned analysis.

CONCLUSION
ON THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
LIBERALISM, HISTORY, AND AGENCY

This study began with William McIlvanney's assertion that the appropriate national motto for Scotland today would be "hey, that's no fair." The intervening pages have tried to come to some understanding of what he meant by that. I have attempted to map out a field of arguments associated with the Scottish autonomist movement that swirl around this assertion of a sense of fairness; to provide a sense of the institutional and organizational infrastructure of the movement that generates these arguments; to show how historical, political, and economic conditions have led to the present movement; and to show how this movement and its argument unavoidably create a rhetorical, multivocalic, historical narrative suited to its various purposes. By way of conclusion I will expand briefly on the discussion offered in the last chapter.

The Contradictions of Liberalism:

Let me offer one last elaboration of my assertion that the Scottish movement should be understood in terms of a more general field of human conflicts and arguments. The concerns of the Scottish movement do not simply well up from the particularities of the Scottish past. They are a specific, national/local engagement with the dominant contradictions of

the modern era, i.e., of the epoch of modern liberalism. Most basic here, I would argue, is the tension between *economic liberalism*, the rationale of capitalism, and *political liberalism*, the rationale of representative democracy. I am, in short, posing a conflict between between capitalism and democracy. Here I dissent from that tradition of the left that sees democracy as simply the bourgeois rationale for capitalism (cf. Pierson 1986). The historical interdependence of the development of parliamentary democracy and capitalism is undeniable, but their relationship is one of conflict and tension, as much as of agreement and justification.

This contradiction is characterized by conflicts between the idea of rights based on membership in a political community, whether conceived in communitarian or contractarian terms, versus rights based on principles of ownership. Under the conditions of modern, globalizing capitalism, these two principles are increasingly in conflict. First, there are unresolved contradictions within liberalism between the ideas of negative versus positive rights, i.e., between protection from infringements on one's person from others, and the right to participate fully in the benefits of the society of which one is a member (cf. Berlin 1984; Held 1987:36-104). But there are also deep contradictions between public versus private claims on resources and the right to make decisions regarding their deployment (Bobbio 1989:1-21). The role of the state and

government in mediating the conflicts between public and private claims on resources (between citizenship and ownership), becomes less and less tenable as political and economic power is siphoned off from government and invested in private economic firms, and these become increasingly detached from their national contexts in terms of the structure of political decision-making. As many have observed (e.g., McCrone 1992:171-72), this is not a matter of the simple "withering" or weakening of the state, but rather a question of the subordination of its functions to the needs of powerful economic interests which are insulated from its authority by strong principles of private property. This situation is of course not new, but for much of this century it was somewhat modulated and obscured in the industrialized western democracies by the expansion of the welfare state, which in turn functioned as a legitimating counter-balance in the western capitalist countries to the promise/threat of communism.

Scotland is undergoing these same processes, experiencing the effects of this same basic contradiction within liberalism between public and private interests, contradictions that are expressed in the neo-contractarian literature. But the experience is taking place within a particular historical trajectory, in which these processes began earlier and have been more protracted than in many parts of the west. Here the siphoning off of economic power has become tangled up with the siphoning off of political

power. In the 18th and 19th centuries British government was relatively remote, and capital was being realized and reinvested in Scotland. But with the decline of the Empire, capital increasingly was invested elsewhere, and the British state grew and took a stronger hand in the domestic economy. In Scotland the elusive and intractable nature of power based on private capital, the frustrating dependence on governmental intervention in the economy, and finally the post 1970s turn away from an economic philosophy of intervention (however unrealized), have become linked into a single narrative of national disempowerment. This history in turn segues backwards into the deeper national history of Scotland's conflicts with England and integration into the British state. But I would maintain that it is the immediate conflict between private economic power based on capital, and public political power based on the state, that brings this deeper history to life. And this is why the Scottish movement takes the fundamental form of a call for an increasing role for the state, as an attempt to rein in the power of private capital.

Whether with a parliament, or as an independent state, what lies ahead for Scotland is at best a defensive posture within a global environment hostile to the cultivation of effective public democratic power. And there will be enormous and coercive pressures on any form of Scottish government to simply "play ball" according to the regnant rules of international capitalism. But perhaps through

alliances with like-minded social democratic movements and governments within Europe and elsewhere, energized by the tendency of private interests within the environment of capitalism to over-reach, Scottish exceptionalism to the new world order can be augmented and find some success at the level of European and global political-economic agreements.

The reassertion of the social democratic welfare state paradigm at an inter/supra-national level, given all its failings, may seem little to hope for. However, it may be the most achievable goal for the near future, and it is worth considering that the fundamental dynamic may be different from the past, given the absence of a strong polarization of communist and anti-communist geopolitical blocs. One of Adam Smith's favorite themes was the unintended consequences of human action (Miller 1993:84-92). The Scottish case and the European welfare states in general seem to illustrate this point, in that regardless of the original motives and the current political climate, once basic expectations about the role of government in provisioning the general public have been raised, it becomes very difficult, even with the most intense anti-government and pro-free market rhetoric, to lower those expectations (cf. Taylor-Gooby 1993). Promises can be made about capitalism's ability to meet those expectations, but the expectations themselves are not easily abandoned. Those on the left with the courage of their convictions, who believe that unbridled capitalism cannot deliver in the long run, and that democratic socialism can,

should take heart in this basically conservative aspect of human nature. And I would here point out that this again returns us to our initial discussion of the relevance of moral economic arguments, with their inherently conservative tendencies, to the Scottish case.

The Contradictions of History and Human Agency:

A final point. The dilemma of historical versus conventional legitimations of political projects is also encountered in the problems of anthropological and historical analysis when they become concerned with questions of human agency. It is one thing to show how people have played an active role in shaping historical events, but another to validate present political projects in terms of history. Human agency is ephemeral. Once its moment has passed it simply becomes a part of the historical conditions shaping present human behavior and choices. If there is a permanent, fundamental demand for the realization of human agency, then the political and structural conditions for fostering and maintaining, or at least philosophically justifying that agency, must be viewed as, in some sense, outside of history.

The oft quoted aphorism of Milan Kundera "the struggle of man [sic] against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting," leaves much aside. While it may be true that those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it, this is no guarantee that those who do know history will not be similarly doomed. For as Marx said, history often weighs on

the living like an inescapable nightmare, that must be re-enacted, regardless of the actors' intentions (Marx in Carver 1996:31-32). My point is neither to cast history as a vicious trap, nor to recommend historical ignorance, but rather to emphasize a strange but familiar paradox: we study our history to be free of it. Not to forget it, but to know its extension and limits, how it has both constrained and equipped us. To explore our history merely to answer who we are and where we came from is to stop short of the basic human project--to keep going, in new directions, under changed circumstances. If we want to take seriously that other well-known thesis of Marx, that the point is not only to interpret the world, but also to change it (Marx in O'Malley 1994:118), then we must allow that history can only provide so much guidance, and must at some point be subordinated to the realization of human wills understood as in some sense free of history.

The dilemma that Tim and Vernon are working with in the passage in the last chapter lies in our paradoxical need to both recuperate and escape our histories at the same time. Apart from the political strength of those who are opposed, the answer to Vernon's question "so why not?" why not establish a parliament if that is what the majority wants? lies partly in this paradox. For there is good reason for thinking that Scotland's history is as discouraging as encouraging on this point, and to the extent that Scots turn to Scotland's history for answers, they will never get a full

one. Collective political decisions, like all decisions, are not prescribed by the past, but weighed between an assessment of what resources (material, ideological, cultural, etc.) the past has provided, and what resources an anticipated future will demand. The later does not simply follow from the former. Instead, the two are brought into relation by acts of creative collective will formation, at the point where people enter into their own histories. Sometimes the relations created are liberating, and sometimes they are profoundly miscalculated, leading to catastrophe and suffering. I take Vernon to be expressing a common theme I heard many times over in the movement, a sense of a failure of nerve, an inability to muster the necessary will, to face down the doubts and skepticism of others. This may be accurate, but if so, it is not only a question of Scots not having adequately plumbed the depths of their own history, but more fundamentally, it is a question of weighing carefully understandings of the past against visions of the future. What often appears to dedicated autonomists as indecision and fear may, at the same time, be a mark of prudence and political maturity.

These ruminations have opened up a host of perennial philosophical questions, about history, determinism, and freewill, the pursuit of which is beyond the scope of this study. But perhaps, by focusing on a single instance, I have at least provided a sense of how these large and inescapable

questions permeate political life in particular ways, at particular times, in particular places.

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