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THE STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES OF HOSTAGE/CRISIS NEGOTIATION UNITS IN U.S. POLICE ORGANIZATIONS

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
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Abstract

THE STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES OF HOSTAGE/CRISIS NEGOTIATION UNITS IN U.S. POLICE ORGANIZATIONS

by

Robert Joseph Louden

Adviser: Professor Warren Benton

Hostage/Crisis negotiation was formally developed as a police function in the United States by the New York City Police Department in 1972-1973. The procedure has saved countless lives. There have also been many hostage/barricade situations which ended in disaster.

This study is an analysis of the hostage/crisis negotiation practices of 276 local, county and state police agencies in the U.S. which employ at least 100 sworn officers and utilize some standard system of negotiation for response to hostage and barricade situations. A four-page questionnaire developed specifically for the project provided data about policy matters, organizational configurations, and about the selection and training of negotiators. Respondents were also requested to provide a copy of their agency policy and to react to a series of opinion items about hostage/crisis negotiation. In addition to the data collected through the survey instrument, additional variables were obtained from the 1995 LEMAS report for local police departments employing at least 100 sworn officers, issued by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics in 1995.

The study first briefly reviews several of the negative incidents which occurred between 1974 and 1993. Included in the literature review is an examination of the historical development of the first hostage negotiation team in the U.S. Nine hypotheses were developed and tested. Several scales were devised to assist in testing the hypotheses including, an innovation scale, scales for mechanistic orientation, organic orientation, tactical (SWAT) orientation, and negotiation orientation, and a written policy scale. Two hypotheses related the year an agency first adopted its hostage negotiation policy to agency size and degree of innovation. The administrative and operational organizational configuration and chain of command for the negotiation team was measured against the four orientation scales. Opinion scales to determine negotiator satisfaction and perception of effectiveness were also compared to mechanistic and organic orientation. Written hostage negotiation policy was compared to the written policy scale. Four of the hypotheses were supported, four were determined not to be significant and one was significant but in the direction opposite than predicted.

In addition to the hypotheses tested, valuable additional descriptive data was obtained including hostage/crisis team deployments and results for the years 1995- 1997.

The study concludes that the majority of police agencies have adopted a part-time specialized unit to negotiate at hostage and barricade incidents. They utilize a variety of organizational arrangements to accomplish their objectives. The findings tend to support a caution that police chief executive officers and incident commanders may receive filtered information and advice when the negotiation function reports through the tactical element rather than directly to the decision maker.

Acknowledgments and Dedication

I gratefully acknowledge with love and appreciation the understanding, support and encouragement of my wife, Verna Cassetti-Louden, who put her professional career on hold for me and our family. She and of our children Coleen and Rob have backed me in all that I have accomplished in policing and in my role as a once again student. And to my mother, Ann Regele-Louden (1908-1997), who quit school at age fifteen to help support her widowed mother and her siblings, but never stopped reading, learning and teaching. Of course, sincere thanks are in order for my official dissertation committee, Professors Ned Benton, Bob Panzarella and Barry Spunt, and to my ex-officio 'Jiminy Cricket' member, Professor Ron McVey. I am also in long term debt to the heart and soul leadership team of the City University of New York - John Jay College, Criminal Justice Doctoral Program, Dean Jim Levine and Ms. Christina Czechowicz.

This study is dedicated to all police hostage/crisis negotiators and tactical officers who daily perform a most difficult and dangerous job in the interest of saving lives. In particular, Police Officer Steve Gilroy (1973) and Police Officer Joe McCormick (1983) who as Emergency Service Officers in the New York City Police Department made the supreme sacrifice at hostage/barricade situations, so that others may live.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

During the past two decades law enforcement responses to several criminal incidents in the U.S. involving armed adversaries resulted in siege events which ended in what may be termed disastrous results. Episodes such as these were often subjected to extensive media attention as well as post incident inquiries and reports. The lack of a negotiation posture as a preferred tactic that police might have employed, or the positive value of police negotiation with subjects in such events, was noted in various accounts, including some government documents.

However, there had not been a systematic collection and analysis of data about the structure and procedures of hostage/crisis negotiation units in U.S. police organizations. There was a need to examine department size, organizational structure, staffing and administrative issues related to hostage/crisis negotiation. Similarly, there was a lack of information about the selection, training and self-expectation of negotiating unit members and their role in such events. This research was designed to gather data about the formation and current status of hostage/crisis negotiation in U.S. policing. This study examined hostage/crisis negotiation unit relationships to variables such as agency size, the tactical (SWAT) and negotiation orientation of the agency, written hostage/crisis policy, chain of command, and personal satisfaction and perceived effectiveness.

Some highly publicized siege incidents over a twenty-year period and in different geographical areas of the country have had very similar results. One highly publicized event was the attempted apprehension of members of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in Los Angeles, California in May 1974. Three months earlier The SLA, a Marxist revolutionary group, had kidnapped Patty Hearst, a nineteen-year-old woman who was an heir to a publishing fortune. She was still missing when the authorities located a safe house occupied by her abductors and possibly her. A Los Angeles Police Department SWAT team and the FBI surrounded the building, announced their presence, demanded surrender, and eight minutes later fired tear gas into the house. The authorities fired more than five thousand rounds of ammunition during the next hour (Payne, et al. 1976). In the fire, which was probably started by police tear gas canisters, six members of the SLA died (Gurr in Reich, 1990). Vetter and Perlstein(1991) noted that there was an "absence of coordination among various law enforcement agencies particularly the FBI and the police" (p.77). Hacker, in Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies (1976) was more explicit in his criticism: "(I)n this instance, it was the good guys, widely divergent in their views about appropriate methods, in their aims, and in their image-making interests, who had no consistent command structure"(p.147).

In her autobiography, Every Secret Thing (1982), Patty Hearst observed, "If I had been in that house at that time, Cin [Donald DeFreeze 'Cinque' was the SLA leader] would have walked me outside as a hostage" (p. 230). She believed that the police would have shot her. According to Payne (1976), "(I)t was apparent that the SLA was given no

more than a perfunctory chance to surrender" (p. 289). This apparent decision by law enforcement not to negotiate was curious since the FBI had been subjecting various audio tapes, provided by the SLA after the abduction, to psycholinguistic analysis in order to speculate about "the personalities of the SLA members and [make] suggestions for negotiation strategies"(Miron & Goldstein, 1978, p.75).

In 1978 and again in 1985 there were significant negative interactions between the Philadelphia Police Department and a group called MOVE. Both incidents resulted in death. The MOVE organization was predominantly African-American, anarchistic and back to nature in philosophy, and adhered to an absolute refusal to cooperate with the organized government of Philadelphia (Nagel, 1991). They made it a practice to harass and harangue their neighbors and the local government, particularly the police. In August 1978, after more than a yearlong stalemate the Police Commissioner "directed a carefully planned operation to drive the occupants from the house. Announcing each action in advance in order to protect MOVE women and children, whom they regarded as hostages, the police used a bulldozer, ram, and armored truck to breach the walls of the compound" (Nagel, 1991, p.319). Next, Nagel reported that "gunfire erupted, killing Officer James Ramp and wounding eight other policemen and firefighters" (p.319). Assefa and Wahrhaftig (1990) concluded in a study of the event that even though it would have been difficult to engage in negotiation with MOVE it was possible to "expect that MOVE members would be able to understand and engage in rational processes such as dialogue and problem solving" (p. 145).

Wilson Goode, the Mayor of Philadelphia during the period immediately prior to the 1985 confrontation, had termed MOVE actions and activities "psychological warfare against their neighbors, holding the block hostage" (Nagel, 1991, p.320). MOVE members had been involved in harassing practices and were alleged to have violated numerous city ordinances. Warrants were obtained for the arrest of several of the MOVE group. A police plan was devised and on May 13, 1985 an ultimatum was read over a bullhorn which demanded surrender within fifteen minutes (Nagel, p.322). Wagner-Pacifici (1994) reported that the Police Commissioner began his demand for surrender with the statement: "Attention MOVE, this is America. You have to abide by the laws of the United States" (p. 42). "When the fifteen minutes had expired, authorities directed water, tear gas, and smoke at the house and its roof. According to the police, MOVE responded with gunfire, and officers retaliated massively, firing many thousands of rounds in the next ninety minutes" (Nagel, 1991, p.322). Wagner-Pacifici (1994) speculated that due to intensified pressure from the neighbors, the governments prior policy of non-confrontation and avoidance was replaced with "a strategy for resolving the problem quickly" (p.87). In the 1985 encounter sixty-one homes owned by non-participants were burned to the ground when the police dropped an improvised explosive device on the roof of the siege house. The fire department then failed to fight the ensuing fire. That strategy resulted in a massive fire which destroyed 61 homes and left 250 people homeless. "Of the occupants of the MOVE house, one adult and one child fled through the flames into police custody. In the ashes were found the bodies of six

adults and five children" (Nagel, p. 318).

According to Wagner-Pacifici (1994) the Mayor noted that once a decision to arrest individuals was made, "some form of armed confrontation was inevitable" (p. 97). The police commissioner believed that hostage negotiation "was not a tactic or consideration at that time" (p.115). Yet a Commission which Mayor Goode appointed to investigate this debacle concluded, among other things, that the police had "(f) ailed to consider alternative strategies and deprived themselves of expertise - such as the use of trained hostage negotiators - that might have resulted in better implementation of their plan" (Nagel, p.322).

During August 1992 the U.S. Marshals Service, and subsequently the FBI, attempted to apprehend Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Randy Weaver was a self proclaimed survivalist and white supremacist who was wanted on a federal warrant for failure to appear in court for a weapon related violation originally filed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). While the U.S. Marshals were conducting a surveillance operation in order to take him into custody, a confrontation ensued, resulting in the shooting death of a Deputy U.S. Marshall and one of Weaver's followers. During the subsequent siege, Randy Weaver was wounded and his wife was killed by FBI sniper fire (Johnston, July 13, 1995).

A Lexis Counsel Connect Internet report, The Shooting at Ruby Ridge (1996), contained extensive excerpts from U.S. Congressional Hearings and trial transcripts about the incident which had occurred during the period August 21 to 31, 1992. This on-line

service for attorneys provided the following information: Soon after the U.S. Marshals Service contacted the FBI about the incident a decision was made to deploy the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) to the scene. Initially, FBI headquarters rejected an operational plan because it did not contain a negotiation component. Prior to that the FBI and local police negotiators had played no role in developing the plan. In fact, the HRT leader was quoted as having said that this "would be no long siege." This led the lead FBI negotiator at the scene to believe that a tactical solution would be sought without negotiations. The negotiator reported no interest in negotiation on the part of the HRT commander, and, "available records reflect insufficient consideration of negotiations strategy as compared to tactical approaches." After ten days Randy Weaver surrendered to authorities based on the intervention of a third-party non-government negotiator. A report on the incident in the New York Times, noted that "A 1994 Justice Department report on the incident which has never been made public . . . shows that the FBI fought to keep its files closed to outsiders, even Federal prosecutors" (Johnston, July 19, 1995, p.14).

The Branch Davidian compound, Mount Carmel, near Waco, Texas was the scene of a fifty-one-day siege in 1993 which began on February 28 when ATF agents attempted to serve search and arrest warrants based on a year long investigation into federal firearms violations. During the initial encounter four ATF agents were killed and an additional twenty agents were wounded. An unknown number of suspects within the compound were killed and others, including their leader, David Koresh, were wounded. Although

negotiations were somewhat successful during the siege, the event ended in the death of more than seventy additional individuals inside the compound on April 19. (Dennis, Jr., 1993)

During the standoff thirty-five individuals were negotiated out including twenty-one children. Two additional people who breached the perimeters and entered the compound subsequently exited safely. Numerous other Koresh sympathizers tried to join him but were repelled by the surrounding authorities. In an internal memorandum dated March 22, 1993 the FBI negotiating team stated that "the long-term prospect for a peaceful resolution remains good." As it turned-out, no Davidian members were negotiated out after March 23 (Dennis, Jr., 1993, p.18, p.28).

Alan A. Stone (1993), a Harvard professor of Psychiatry and Law, conducted a review of the incident for the federal government and noted that "During the first phase of the FBI's engagement at Waco, a period of days, the agents on the ground proceeded with a strategy of conciliatory negotiation, which had the approval and understanding of the entire chain of command" (p.8). However, Stone also reported that a little more than a month into the siege the FBI first "took a more aggressive approach to negotiation" and later "gave up the process of negotiation" and "was concentrating on tactical pressure alone" (p. 10). Stone subsequently concluded that "the FBI command failed to give adequate consideration to their own behavioral science and negotiation experts" (p. 1).

Another government reviewer, Ariel Merari (1993) of the University of Tel Aviv, noted that FBI agents reported that political considerations and embarrassment did not

influence their decisions to change tactics. Merari believed that such factors were relevant and legitimate and that they should have been acknowledged and discussed (p. 7). Finally, Nancy T. Ammerman (1993) of Princeton University observed that the advice of the FBI negotiators was not heeded in part because "there was an understandable desire among many agents in Waco to make Koresh and the Davidians pay for the harm they had caused. Arguments for patience and unconventional tactics fell on deaf ears" (p. 4).

Three of the incidents, SLA and both MOVE incidents, were initiated by and the responsibility of local police authorities. Federal law enforcement support is generally common in such events and was an integral part of the SLA action. Of interest, the U.S. Attorney for Philadelphia decided that federal agencies had no jurisdiction to participate in the 1985 MOVE crisis. The Ruby Ridge and Branch Davidian incidents were primarily the responsibility of federal agencies; the assistance and support of local law enforcement were well documented during each of them.

These incidents illustrated that many people inside law enforcement, as well as academic advisers to incident reviews, believe that a strategy of formal negotiation may be useful in reducing violent outcomes. These incidents also illustrated that a strategy of formal negotiation was not fully accepted within the law enforcement community and was often set aside in favor of more traditional tactics. In each of the above described incidents the effective, if not actual, police agency control was in the domain of the SWAT team or of incident commanders who apparently were more oriented toward use of force than negotiation. This was not necessarily the norm since other organizational

configurations exist. including a direct reporting line from the head of hostage negotiation to the incident commander. Also. there have been siege events in which local police or federal agents have engaged in hostage/crisis negotiation and the outcome was the preservation of the lives of hostages, law enforcement personnel and perpetrators.

This research examines hostage/crisis negotiation within the context of local policing in the United States, including the extent and rate of adoption of negotiating teams. The study investigates the position of such teams within the administrative and operational divisions of the overall police department and relates the placement to organic or mechanistic organizational models. Agencies are also characterized as predominantly SWAT or negotiation oriented and their orientation is also correlated with organic or mechanistic styles of organization. A variety of descriptive data is utilized in order to provide a composite illustration of team characteristics. Finally, respondent opinions about negotiation effectiveness and their satisfaction with negotiation related work is examined.

A Definition of Hostage/Crisis Negotiation

Negotiation is a transaction between two parties, representing themselves or others, which is designed to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution. A dictionary definition of negotiation (American Heritage, 1983) includes, "to confer with another in order to come to terms." Negotiation does not automatically presuppose equality between

parties but does recognize the relative strength or power of each side. Implied in the negotiation process is that each side has something that the other wants, that there is no better mutually acceptable solution immediately available, and that there is a willingness to communicate and to discuss compromise.

Police officers engage in the practice of negotiation throughout their daily assignments, especially in these times of community policing and collaborative approaches to problem solving. They negotiate events such as noise complaints, neighborhood disputes, situations with disorderly youth, and parking conditions. The concept of negotiation which is the subject of this research is somewhat more complex because issues of safety, life and death, are always present, and these situations typically involve the response of a large number of law enforcement personnel, a potentially confusing command structure and adherence to special procedures. Media attention is a given at virtually every hostage/crisis negotiation scene.

According to Crelinsten and Szabo (1979) "Hostage-taking is a very ancient form of criminal activity. In fact, it was even an accepted tool of diplomacy when used by legitimate authority"(p. ix). Levitt (1988) stated that hostage-taking is defined by the United Nations as "the seizing or detaining and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain another person to compel a third party to do or abstain from doing any act as a condition for the release of the hostage"(p.14). Rogan, et al (1997) reported that "hostage takers act to create an extortionate transaction with the police"(p. 3).

Hostage/crisis negotiation is a police strategy that consists of responding to a

situation that involves imminent danger to the life or limb of a person(s) being held against their will. There is not necessarily an immediately apparent connection between captor and victim, as Buhite (1995) noted, individuals are often "taken hostage [only] because they were available and vulnerable"(p.xv).

A law enforcement organization designates an individual as the negotiator to engage the hostage holder in a dialogue in an effort to find a peaceful resolution to the instant problem. Criminal intent, emotional crisis or politics may originally motivate the hostage holding. The negotiator will attempt to persuade the holder to release the hostage(s) unharmed in return for a pledge that the captor will not be harmed and may be assisted in resolving problems in a legitimate way. In this way "negotiation is thought of as the process of discussion engaged in by two or more parties, each of which wants to achieve a desired aim" (Edleman and Crain, 1993, p. xii). For situations where negotiation does not seem to be effective, the process will attempt to facilitate the rescue of the victim and apprehension of the perpetrator by distracting the hostage holder. In a discussion on siege management, Bahn (1987) observed that a common element in hostage and barricaded subject incidents is defiance by the subject to orders of the authorities to come out peacefully. He noted that "a standoff develops between the overwhelming power -- manpower, firepower and legal authority -- of the police, military or other authorities and the defiant, trapped offender" (p. 1).

The negotiation process that was the subject of this research involved "law enforcement officers who are selected and trained for the task and who are acting on

behalf of their employing agency" (Volpe & Louden, 1990, p.308). For many years the commonly used term was 'hostage negotiation' and in many jurisdictions it still is. Since approximately 1989 (Kaiser, 1990) the FBI switched to 'crisis negotiation' and many agencies have followed suit. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (1991) utilizes the term hostage communicator. The term hostage/crisis negotiation was utilized throughout this study.

Police hostage/crisis negotiators view "the negotiation of substantive and nonsubstantive wants or demands in similar terms: agreement making through bargaining or problem solving, typically via quid pro quo" (Rogan, et al, 1997, p.11). Police hostage/crisis negotiation involves bargaining for the life of an innocent person, or may involve dealing with a non-hostage holding barricaded criminal, or dealing with individuals who may be emotionally disturbed or mentally ill. Police generally engage in hostage/crisis negotiation in order to save hostage lives, without unnecessarily endangering the lives of the helpers. Captors and other subjects engage in negotiation for these same hostages for a variety of reasons, initially defined by the original motivation for the event, whether criminal, political or emotional.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of Literature

Development of Hostage/Crisis Negotiation as a Strategy in U.S. Police Organizations

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, Morton Bard (1974) conducted pioneering research which contributed to major shifts in the way police reacted to domestic violence, sexual assault and hostage holding. Each of these areas involved a wide range of dispute, conflict and crisis intervention issues. Bard acknowledged that "considerable gaps" still existed between police and academics but stressed their "commonality of interest." His work sought to establish the "development of a mechanism for coupling the practitioner and the researcher " (Bard, 1974, p.20). His applied research during the period 1967 to 1969 employed crisis intervention techniques for police officers in dealing with domestic violence. He was also a significant contributor to the original application of similar practices for investigators responding to rape and other sexual assault. His work in domestic violence and sex crime was well received by many in the New York City Police Department. His research findings were integrated into the Police Academy curriculum. Bard's work with sex crime victims was contemporaneous with the development of the new hostage negotiation program. Since both activities were functions of the Detective

Bureau, a serendipitous expansion of Bard's interest and techniques was realized. He became an early advocate and adviser of the innovative specialty of hostage/crisis negotiation (Bard, 1975; 1976; 1978; Donovan & Sullivan, 1974).

Two hostage events which occurred in New York State, one in 1971 and the other in 1972, are often referred to in the literature of hostage situations but did not at the time prompt any changes in law enforcement policy. The September 1971 Attica prison riot and hostage holding in northwest New York State resulted in death for twenty-eight correction officers and ten inmates during a rescue attempt. This tragedy prompted controversy in criminal justice and social science circles over force versus restraint in approaching hostage incidents (Garson, 1972; Wicker, 1975; Useem & Kimball, 1989: Shelton, 1994; Strollo and Wills-Raftery, 1994). It did not, however, prompt interest by the New York City Police Department; perhaps because it involved prisoners and was contained within the walls of a correctional facility located hundreds of miles away. Similarly, almost one year later, in August 1972, a bank robbery hostage situation in Brooklyn, New York which has been perpetuated in a fictionalized account in the popular movie Dog Day Afternoon (1975) did not immediately result in seeing a need for change in situations involving hostages. However Attica and Dog-Day as well as additional examples were examined later, when negotiation came to be seen as a viable strategy for dealing with hostage situations (Bolz & Hershey, 1979; Moorehead, 1980).

It was not until 1975 that the topic of hostage situations was considered separately in standard police texts in the United States. An examination by this researcher of the

indices of numerous textbooks used in criminal justice education programs and for police civil service promotion purposes, published between 1970 and 1980, revealed only one, Supervision of Police Personnel (Iannone, 1975) which included a section on hostage situations.

Cooper (1985) noted that there was a shift in official responses to hostage situations following the 1972 Munich Olympics incident, and Welch (1984) included in his historical treatment of hostage negotiations a reference to the influence of the crisis at the 1972 Munich Olympics. In the Munich Olympic hostage situation two members of the Israeli Olympic team were killed in the original takeover. Additionally, one West German police officer, five PLO terrorists and eight Israeli hostages died during an attempt to free the hostages by force (Schreiber, 1973; Moorehead, 1980; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986).

The Munich event alerted the New York City Police Department that their jurisdiction could provide a similar opportunity for some group to engage in terroristic diplomacy. The fact that the hostage holding occurred during the International Olympics, involved American allies, Israel and West Germany, and was broadcast live by the media was enough to prompt an immediate study of the issues (Gelb, 1977; Bolz and Hershey, 1979; Gettinger, 1983).

A literature search consisting of four social science data bases, NCJRS, Criminal Justice Abstracts, Sociofile, and PsychLit, revealed that the first two published articles about police hostage negotiation in the U.S. were separately authored by two New York

City Police Department commanders who had a role in the early formulation of the policy. Donald F. Cawley (1974) was the Chief of Patrol during the post-Munich policy study period and the first field-test, albeit spontaneous, of the new Recommended Guidelines: Incidents Involving Hostages (1973). These contingency plans stressed that "the primary consideration in such circumstances is to secure the lives and safety of the threatened hostages, the police officers, innocent bystanders, and the criminals themselves"(p.1). John A. Culley (1974), a Detective Bureau lieutenant, referring to the same document, noted that Chief Inspector Michael J. Codd had recently "reviewed and approved plans for hostage situations, plans which [Codd] had been working on with various units of the police department since September 1972"(p.1). This original plan did not specifically mention hostage negotiators.

In a then far-reaching review of hostage incident responses Gettinger (1983) noted that "Shortly after the Munich incident [1972], Patrick Murphy, then New York City Police Commissioner gave the order that New York should prepare itself for terrorist hostage-taking" (p.14). His Chief of Special Operations, Simon Eisendorfer, formed a committee consisting of patrol, detective, training and psychological service representatives. Gettinger further reported that the FBI followed suit in 1973 when it initiated research and training in hostage negotiation. One of the original FBI negotiators, Conrad Hassel, noted that this specialty was not even conceived until 1972 and that it soon spread across the country (see Gettinger, 1983). Soskis (1983), in an article which discussed behavioral scientists and law enforcement personnel working together,

reviewed various possible collaborations and noted that the "new discipline of hostage negotiations . . . had its beginning in the New York City Police Department"(p.49).

Evolution of the Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team and its Relationship to Other New York City Police Department Units

In January 1973 a significant event in the evolution of hostage negotiation took place over a two-day period in Brooklyn, New York at a location known as John & Al□s Sporting Goods Store. The local precinct police had responded to a silent alarm call of a possible robbery in progress and were met with gunfire from within the store. Reenforcements arrived, including Emergency Service Unit (ESU) tactical officers, which is the equivalent of SWAT Team personnel in some other jurisdictions. One ESU officer was killed and two other officers wounded in the quickly unfolding event. One of four suspects was also wounded and eight hostages were held in the store. The new operational plan for incidents involving hostages, which Chief Eisendorfer had organized a few months earlier at Commissioner Murphy's direction, was implemented for the first time. Its primary concerns were with containment of the scene, control of personnel and resources and communication with the captors (Cawley, 1974). Forty-seven hours after the incident began, all of the hostages were safe, the four perpetrators were in custody and there was no further injury to police officers or other responders.

A comprehensive critique of the incident at John & Al's was undertaken. Although, according to Welch (1984), the plan had not been eagerly received throughout the Department, its basic principles were validated by the activities surrounding the forty-seven-hour siege at John & Al's. Even though the original plan had stressed the importance of communicating with hostage holders, there had been no prior indication as to who the negotiator would be. The critique made commanders aware of "negotiation deficits" (Welch, p. 66). A wide variety of police and non-police had 'negotiated' during the forty-seven hours, largely without measurable success. As a result of the incident, the idea of having specific individuals designated as hostage negotiators was introduced into the New York City Police Department for the first time. By April 1973 a team of negotiators had been selected from the ranks of the Detective Bureau and put through a four week training program (Welch, p.66).

Police Commissioner Michael J. Codd (1977) in a report on police preparedness for terrorist events indicated that the hostage situation guide had been designed to "focus on functional team work, effective communications, and skilled coordination of tactics, under the management of a high ranking police commander" (p.3). A major change to the original draft of the plan, following John & Al's, was the establishment of "a group of specially trained negotiators responsible for communicating with barricaded suspects" in place of "the more traditional response of unconditional assault" (Taylor, 1983, p.64).

The first formal practice of police hostage negotiation was established in New York City during the period between September 1972 and April 1973 (Bell, 1978; Moorehead,

1980: Bolz and Hershey, 1979; Schlossberg and Freeman, 1974; Douglas & Olshaker, 1995). In 1974, the New York City Police Department received a grant from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services to support the efforts that had been initiated post-Munich and revised as a result of John & Al□s. A hostage confrontation response system, utilizing Detective Bureau investigators and Emergency Service Unit tactical specialists, was formalized. The investigators and the tactical officers were trained to "meet the problem of hostage negotiating and rescue" under the direction of an incident commander, according to a Police Department document Terrorism Control in New York City (1979). The recommended guidelines had evolved into a Tactical Manual for Hostage Situations (1974).

The Emergency Service Unit of the New York City Police Department was a highly diverse mobile force of uniformed officers with full-time citywide responsibility. The members of this all volunteer group had to have extensive uniformed patrol experience before applying for a transfer into the Emergency Service Unit. The members were rescue oriented and performed a wide range of specialized tasks. According to their Operational Policies and Tactics (1977), among other tasks, they were certified Emergency Medical Technicians, took potential jumpers off bridges and buildings, handled radiation accidents, searched for and transported improvised explosive devices and operated the Emergency Rescue Vehicle (a tank). "They are the [New York City Police] Department's Firearms Battalion. They are the only members qualified to use tear gas. They are also skilled in the use of anti-sniper rifles, carbines, machine guns, and the shotgun, their most

basic weapon" (p. 1). One chapter of their Operational Policies and Tactics manual was devoted to confrontations, which included "sniper, barricaded criminal/hostage, disorderly group/mob, civilian clothed member [and] dangerous psychotic" (p. 20). The Emergency Service Unit was selected to be the tactical [SWAT] component of the new hostage confrontation program because of its involvement in closely related activities for many years.

It was an Emergency Service Police Officer, Steve Gilroy, who was killed in the early stages of the siege at John & Al's. It was not surprising that officers assigned to Emergency Service might resent, if not resist, creation of a new team of officers to perform part of their [ESU] jobs as described by Welch (1984).

The newly created Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team was an all volunteer function mostly performed as needed by full-time New York City Police Investigators, primarily Detectives and Sergeants. This was an example of a shift to an organic operational function within the context of a primarily mechanistic organization. (see Burns & Stalker, 1961; Kuykendall & Roberg, 1982).

The decision to house the negotiator component of the new program in the Detective Bureau rather than Patrol or Special Operations was based on a variety of personnel factors which Schlossberg and Freeman (1974), Bard (1978) and Symonds (1980) had suggested as appropriate criteria for candidates to become successful hostage/crisis negotiators.

Since a range of other policing experiences had preceded assignment to the Detective

Bureau, the investigator would be chronologically and experientially mature. Investigators worked in civilian clothes, which fit with the crisis intervention notion of non-hostile representation of authority. Detective assignments were normally case driven as compared to uniformed patrol officers who were often radio-run-incident driven, so investigators did not have to be readily available for the next routine radio-run. Investigators were also expected to be competent in gathering and analysis of intelligence as well as in conducting interviews and interrogations. These skills were deemed necessary for success in hostage/crisis negotiation.

To have been accepted as a negotiator, the volunteer investigator needed a positive recommendation from his commander, participated in a paper and pencil psychological examination and a follow-up interview with a police department psychologist, and had to be favorably interviewed by the Hostage Team Coordinator. Those chosen were then assigned to a four week training program, designed specifically for the purpose and including: psychology, physical fitness, firearms, electronic equipment, and liaison (Culley, 1974, p.3). Assigned full time in civilian clothes to various Detective Squads, a number of trained negotiators, based on geographic area of assignment, scheduled work time and any special qualifications, were called together for an incident. After the incident, the negotiators returned to their regular investigative duties. These individuals performed the additional duties of hostage/crisis negotiator, without additional pay, although their base investigator's salary was higher than the base pay of the uniformed Emergency Service Officers.

During approximately the first ten years of existence, the New York City Police Department Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team was a function without a permanent home. When the hostage confrontation program was formally launched, as a result of the critique of the John & Al's siege, the newly designated Hostage Coordinator, a Lieutenant assigned to the Brooklyn Detective command, was placed in charge and transferred into the Major Crimes Section of the citywide Special Investigation Division. In 1974 the function was moved to the Office of Chief of Detectives; the coordinator then reported directly to the Deputy Chief of Detectives. One year later the function and coordinator were shifted to a support staff of the Detective Bureau, the Management Control Division. Approximately three years later the coordinator was promoted to Captain and the Management Control Division was divided into two functional commands, Management Control and Technical Support in order to justify retention of the newly promoted Captain in the Detective Bureau. The hostage function became the responsibility of the new Technical Support Unit. In 1979 the Captain and activities related to hostage/crisis negotiation were transferred back to the Special Investigation Division, reporting directly to the Inspector-in-command. Non-hostage related responsibilities were retained in the reconstituted Management Control Division. In the fall of 1981 the Captain was transferred to a Detective Borough command but retained as the Department's Senior Hostage Negotiator. Command of the Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team was assigned to a Lieutenant, who had been second-in-command of the team since approximately 1978, and the functions remained in

the Special Investigation Division. The Lieutenant was also responsible for various aspects of kidnap and extortion investigations.

In 1983, the Lieutenant and hostage/crisis negotiation function were transferred to a primarily staff unit in the Detective Bureau, the Central Investigation and Resource Division. In addition to coordination of the hostage team the Lieutenant continued to be responsible for supervision of kidnap and extortion investigations, and was also accountable for various other activities including the unit that provided technical support and surveillance at hostage situations. In April 1983 the then coordinator was formally promoted to Commander of Detective Squad, informally referred to as Detective Lieutenant. As of January 1999, the hostage/crisis negotiation function and current Detective Lieutenant in-command was still assigned to the Central Investigation and Resource Division of the Detective Bureau, but only responsible for hostage related duties. The other duties, which had been assigned as complementary to the hostage function in 1983, had since been assigned to other units and supervisors.

Most of these changes, which occurred during 1973 to 1983, were due to resistance or a lack of acceptance on the part of some senior police commanders during a period of adjustment for a new function. The personality of the hostage team coordinator and positive media attention to early successes of the team also created resentment. The original team coordinator was an extremely out going individual who was also active in many social organizations within the Department. The New York media provided extensive coverage to the highly successful operational activities of the hostage

negotiators and the coordinator made himself available to a variety of interviewers. This was with the approval of the press office of the Police Department but yet engendered negative reaction by other commanders. This is consistent with Welch's (1984) observation about organizational resistance in his examination of hostage situations.

Another change, which took place during this same time period, was in the types of incidents to which hostage/crisis negotiators were dispatched. Originally they responded only to confirmed hostage holdings and the request for hostage/crisis negotiators was initiated by the Emergency Service Unit supervisor at the scene. Gradually, based on hostage/crisis negotiation success, and accompanying positive media attention, they were dispatched to some non-hostage crisis situation such as barricaded criminals and people threatening suicide. Both of these functions previously had been the exclusive purview of the Emergency Service Unit. Contemporaneous with these expanded duties hostage/crisis negotiation personnel were also being utilized in kidnap and extortion cases, and in operational planning for high risk raid and warrant execution. A significant change took place with the publication of the Police Department's Interim Order # 51 (1984) when for the first time it was mandated that negotiators be dispatched to certain situations involving non-hostage holding emotionally disturbed persons. These situations were previously handled by the Emergency Service Unit. Likewise, prior to this, calls for the immediate services of hostage/crisis negotiators had been initiated by the Emergency Service Unit Supervisor. However, the new Interim Order specified that the requesting authority was to be the Incident Commander, normally the on-scene Duty Captain, who

was usually the highest-ranking uniformed officer at the incident.

Previous Research on Police Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Units

Three bibliographies published by the U.S. Department of Justice encompassing certain aspects of policing that may be related to hostage negotiation were reviewed, i.e., Police Discretion (1978a) contained 138 items; Police Management (1978b) contained 123 items; and Police Crisis Intervention (1978c) contained 63 items. These three bibliographies did not contain references on organization and policy issues related to hostage/crisis negotiation. Three additional U.S. Department of Justice bibliographies, each entitled Topical Search: SWAT and Hostage Negotiations (1983; 1987; 1992), contained a total of 297 entries. Valuable references were obtained but none of the entries addressed the organization and procedures of hostage/crisis negotiation teams.

Bristow (1977) conducted one of the earliest research projects about police involvement in hostage situations, in connection with curriculum development for a college level police management course. He examined a five-year period (1970-1975), using newspaper and periodical indexes, to eventually identify media accounts of 185 cases for examination through content analysis. Bristow's report did not discuss police organizational or management issues, but two of his findings were of interest to this research. In 110 hostage negotiation incidents, 87 (79%) resulted in the unharmed release of the hostages. In 100% (13) of the cases in which trained negotiators were used no

hostages were harmed. Bristow advised that this finding be viewed with caution due to the small number of cases (13) involving trained negotiators.

In June 1983 the Houston, Texas Police Department released the results of a survey of major police departments regarding hostage negotiation polices and procedures. They had mailed a thirty-one-item questionnaire to twenty-six agencies during February 1983. Twenty-two (85%) useful responses were received. The report, Houston Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team Survey 1983, did not describe the criteria for selection of the sample or characteristics of the agencies. Twenty-one (95%) of the departments reported having a hostage negotiation team. The hostage negotiation function was assigned to the SWAT team in thirteen (59%) of the agencies. In addition to hostage negotiation duties, twenty (91%) also responded to barricaded suspects in which no hostages were being held, and sixteen (73%) responded to suicide attempts. The median number of years a team had been existence was six years. Three agencies listed 1972 as the year in which their team was formed. However, the literature cited above (e.g., Schlossberg & Freeman, 1974; Bell, 1978, Bolz & Hershey, 1979) had indicated that the first team in the U.S. was formed in New York City in 1973. The submission to the survey from New York City indicated 1973 as the year that their team was formed. The present research has helped to clarify when the first hostage negotiation team was established in the U.S.

In January 1983 a Memphis, Tennessee Police Officer was held hostage and murdered. Subsequently, the Memphis Police Department mailed a seventeen-page

questionnaire to 230 agencies throughout the U.S. requesting detailed information about police officers that may have been held hostage in their jurisdiction. They received 156 responses (68%). Neither the original survey nor the results indicated the criteria for selection of the sample or organizational characteristics of the responding agencies. Thirty-one (20%) of the responses contained extensive information about police officers who had been held hostage. There was only one question in the survey about response to these incidents by hostage negotiators, but this item was not tabulated in their Results of Analysis of Research from Hostage Officer Data (1984). Two survey items that were included in the summary of the results dealt with hostage negotiation training. Thirteen (41%) of the responses indicated that officers who had been held hostage had received recruit level academy training about hostage situations. Ten individuals (32%) had received in-service training about hostage situations.

One of the original FBI behavioral scientists and hostage negotiators, Thomas Strentz (1985), reported an analysis of 245 Hostage Incident Reports collected by the FBI from throughout the country concerning incidents that had occurred between 1976 and early 1985. Two of his research questions were of interest to this project: The role of incident commanders and negotiation, and the effect of time in negotiation situations. Strentz found that during incidents, in which commanders also decided to negotiate, the subjects were shot 63% of the time. The commanders had themselves negotiated in only 14% of the cases and were accountable for 25 of the subjects being killed or wounded. Strentz also noted that non-command, untrained negotiators decided to shoot in a total of 27 out

of 54 cases (50%). Trained negotiators were credited with taking into custody 193 (85%) of the subjects who were apprehended unharmed. Strentz also reported that there was a correlation between the length of time elapsed and a nonviolent solution to a hostage situation. "The longer a hostage situation continues, the more likely it is that it will be successfully resolved" (p. 13). For example, in 63 cases lasting up to four hours only 36 (57%) of the subjects were negotiated out, while in 80 situations lasting between seven and nine hours, 76 (95%) ended peacefully.

Koleas (1985) conducted an analysis of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of six police agencies in order to assess their ability to resolve hostage incidents. The agencies were not identified by name. The difference in the length of the published orders received and reviewed from each department ranged from a minimum of one page to a maximum of nineteen pages; the later was obtained from an unidentified East Coast department. Only the East Coast department's procedure discussed chain of command sufficiently to determine if the negotiation function was part of or separate from the SWAT team. In that plan the hostage commander and the SWAT commander are separately accountable to the incident commander. Similarly, there was not sufficient information from the six departments to determine common features about selection or training of negotiators. There was a chart comparing the nature of events responded to, which Koleas called Department Adaptability, i.e., political, trapped criminal, mentally disturbed and domestic (p. 30). He concluded "that police agency response to hostage incident resolution is not the same everywhere. The Sop's reviewed show a wide range of

disparity in terms of specificity, adaptability, and awareness of state of the art techniques" (p. 43).

Head (1989) examined U.S. law enforcement practices about hostage incidents for his doctoral dissertation at the State University of New York at Albany. His research was primarily concerned with characteristics of the situations and their outcomes. He examined 801 cases obtained from various databases over a ten-year period. His analysis utilized twenty-eight independent variables and three dependent variables. One independent variable, use of negotiators, revealed that 269 (34%) of the incidents were negotiated by trained law enforcement negotiators, another 70 (9%) were negotiated by untrained law enforcement personnel and in 270 cases (34%) hostages were released without negotiation. In 192 (23%) of the cases the use of negotiators was not clearly determined (p. 112a). One dependent variable dealt with the fate of hostages. In those cases in which hostages were safely recovered, 309 (40%) of the releases were with demands not being met and 192 (24%) were after demands were complied with. Another 82 (10%) were safely rescued during a police tactical assault, 54 (7%) escaped, and 19 (2%) were wounded by their captors. Finally 50 (6%) were killed by their captors and six(<1%) were killed or wounded during the police assault to rescue (p. 114c). Another dependent variable, final fate of hostage takers demonstrated that for the 801 cases, 485 (60%) were arrested, 67 (8%) were killed or wounded by the police and 16 (2%) committed suicide. The fate of the remaining 233 (30%) was unknown or categorized as other (p. 115b). There were no data or discussion concerning organization, policy,

selection, training, and workload or negotiator satisfaction.

For a dissertation submitted to the University of Iowa, Powell (1989) conducted research on the negotiation procedure involved in hostage and barricaded incidents. This was a sociological investigation designed to identify the processes involved in the incidents. His study was concerned with the social conduct of negotiations. However, of interest to this research, he noted that:

> "In the last fifteen years, police at local, state and national levels have become well schooled in the techniques of enforcing policy through negotiation. Hostage-takers are met with trained negotiators, and barricaded incidents are almost always resolved by voice appeals alone. Although weapons forces secure the surrounding turf, and tactical solutions are considered necessary under extreme conditions, negotiation is the policy and practice of first resort" (p. 6).

Many other areas of sociological research also had relevance for examining diverse aspects of activity likely to have been linked to hostage/crisis negotiation situations. For example, Spunt, et.al. (1994) reported on the nexus between substance abuse and violence; research issues like this informed the development of training topics, the use of third party intermediaries, and whether or not it was appropriate to permit negotiators to bargain for alcohol or other drugs.

The first study aimed at "collecting and disseminating information on hostage negotiation team characteristics and crisis incidents" was claimed by Hammer, Van Zandt and Rogan (1994). The authors undertook the task because "little comprehensive data exist concerning crisis negotiation activities in the United States" (p. 8). For their study 100-hostage unit team leaders from across the country completed a forty-four-item questionnaire in 1992. Among the issues of concern to the researchers were team

demographics, selection and training, and workload.

The survey revealed that the majority of negotiators were white and male and assigned to investigative or patrol duties. Approximately 55% of the teams did not have a written negotiator selection policy. Seventy-four percent stated that initial negotiator training was ten days or less in duration and 61% received five days or less in service training. The FBI had provided the initial training for 40% of the teams. During 1991 most teams negotiated less than ten times in actual situations. The team leaders surveyed also believed that there was a considerable need for additional information about the operations and functions of hostage/crisis negotiation teams.

Rogan, Hammer and Van Zandt (1994) revised the questionnaire for a follow-up study. They decreased the number of items to thirty-two. The new questionnaire was distributed late in 1992 to 142 individuals from twenty-six states, each representing a separate hostage/crisis team. The majority, 62%, reported that their team did not have written guidelines for selecting team members. They also did not spend much time between incidents involved in coordinating efforts or training with SWAT teams; 90% spent five or fewer days in such activities annually. Demographic, training and workload findings were consistent with their earlier study.

CHAPTER THREE

Research Issues Concerning Hostage/Crisis Negotiation in U.S. Police Organizations

Goddard and Stanley (1994) reported that the literature on theories of hostage taking are at an early stage of scientific development, and that authors vary in their views on the relative importance of certain features. A need existed to examine various issues in order to advance the development of a functional body of knowledge about hostage/crisis negotiation. This study focused especially on several issues including (1) the placement of a hostage/crisis negotiation unit within the chain of command and organizational structure of a police department, (2) the development of written policies related to hostage/crisis negotiation, (3) the potential for tension between hostage/crisis negotiation tactics and the direct action orientation of traditional law enforcement, and (4) the selection and training of hostage/crisis negotiators. These issues could be viewed within the framework of mechanistic or organic police department organizational structures.

Organizational Structure. There was a lack of systematized knowledge about the organization and functions of negotiating units. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (1991) and the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (1996) has published models and standards for hostage/crisis negotiation related activity.

They have not specified the appropriate organizational configuration, routine procedures, or ideal selection and training needs.

Burns and Stalker (1961) attempted to determine the type of organizational design and management practices that were most appropriate under different environmental conditions. Langworthy (1994) in noting that there is an "illusion of simplicity when complexity is generally the case"(p.166) could well have been speaking about hostage/crisis negotiation teams which must satisfy a host of demands simultaneously. These demands include concern for victim and officer safety under close observation by commanders, the media and the public. Langworthy observed that organizational goals are complex and often contradictory and speculated about the most appropriate organizational form in various circumstances. He reported that "police organizations are highly varied in hierarchical structure and in the degree to which they functionally divide the task of policing"(p.178). Panzarella and Shapiro (1988) commented on the dilemmas faced by the police when faced with conflicting demands within the organization. Incidents which involve hostages draw so much public attention that the need to pinpoint responsibility and circumscribe liability for any negative outcomes may result in pressures to create a functional specialization under the command of a high ranking superior, even when the superior personally lacks appropriate expertise. The fixing of responsibility and accountability, coupled with the traditional paramilitary orientation of police organizations in the U.S., are characteristic of a mechanistic organizational orientation.

While prepared and justified to use force, a hostage/crisis negotiation posture attempts resolution without resorting to violence. In a democracy police work by necessity focuses a great deal of attention on means as opposed to ends, which has an important impact on how the job is to be performed (Kuykendall & Roberg, 1982). Current discussions in policing dealing with concepts such as zero tolerance, pursuit driving and dealing with emotionally disturbed or mentally ill people may be related to justification for the use of force in a given incident. In each of these types of incidents an officer is faced with a choice of a means in order to achieve a desired end. The discussion of ends-means is a persistent dilemma in law enforcement and may be pertinent to the positioning of hostage/crisis negotiators in SWAT or non-SWAT components of an agency. The SWAT concept is action oriented, mostly associated with physical activities and specialized equipment. The negotiation concept is communications oriented, chiefly associated with patience and persuasion. Both concepts have the same end in sight, resolution of a situation, but each emphasizes a different means.

There are numerous organizational arrangements possible for the assignment of hostage negotiators. Some agencies assign their negotiation function to the special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. However, Severn (1993) noted that many small to medium-sized law enforcement agencies have created tactical and negotiation teams but that situations are often managed in ways which do not follow accepted tactical procedures. The value of SWAT teams throughout the country has been questioned. He

observed that some believe that there is no evidence that they are always used properly or even essential in some situations. An objective of this study was to gather data that may suggest the most appropriate placement of the hostage/crisis function within the organizational structure of a police department, especially its relation to SWAT teams.

Development of Written Policies. Borum and Strentz (1992) emphasized that a planned and tested response was required due to the volatility and complexity of hostage incidents. Ochberg and Soskis (1982) indicated that only techniques that have demonstrably worked in the past should be used. MacWillson (1992) stressed that incident management, response planning, and strategic and tactical decision making help to determine the effectiveness of government in crisis management, which is often the responsibility of a police department. Whittle (1988) discussed issues which must be considered in planning policies and procedures including resources, personnel and training. Friedland (1983) noted the need for constituent support for policy and public confidence in the soundness of government's [the police] decisions. Public support and confidence are more likely if policies are in writing. Cooper (1985) explored the feasibility of developing uniform standards for dealing with hostage situations. Policies cannot be effective over time if they are not formally written. As Severn (1993) noted the most important asset for a situation commander is a clear policy or standard operating procedure manual that defines the chain of command and lays out the agency's tactical principles, mission, and philosophy.

Direct Action Orientation vs. Negotiation. Noesner and Dolan (1992), both FBI

hostage negotiators, have noted that from the first day of training and throughout their careers, police officers are taught to take the initiative to resolve situations that threaten life or property. They also cautioned that immediate, aggressive response might not be an appropriate course of action in every situation. Davis (1993) believed that law enforcement officers were generally action-oriented in a hostage crisis and that negotiation was underutilized. Wargo (1989) noted concern with the knowledge of the police officers on the scene about hostage/crisis policy. He was also interested in how to most effectively use personnel. Klein (1995) reported that hostage/crisis technique was very successful because of the ability of the police or military to contain and negotiate, but that most experts had focused on the negotiations within such operations.

Nudell and Antokol (1991) noted that although hostage taking is only a small part of a greater problem it often had impact out of proportion to its actual threat. They recommended a strategy of 'firm flexibility' in dealing with such incidents. This concept, which involves communication without substantial compromise, seems to mesh with the notion of 'dynamic inactivity' introduced by Schlossberg (Law Enforcement News, 1977). His 'dynamic inactivity' referred to a negotiation posture in which no overt activity appears to be taking place, but in reality, in addition to preparation for physical force maneuvers, there are also planning and calculation of alternatives designed to maximize a nonviolent outcome. (Schlossberg, 1996).

Selection and Training of Negotiators. There was a lack of information on the selection, preparation and self-expectation of negotiating unit members and their role in

such events, which in turn makes it difficult to recommend the development of a standard to measure the readiness and competence of negotiating units and personnel. Benton (1988) discussed selection and training standards in the context of personnel development as a prerequisite for successful operations in a criminal justice agency. Hammer, et al. (1994) and Rogan, et al. (1994) reported that the majority of police departments did not have written guidelines for the selection of hostage/crisis negotiators. Hammer also noted that initial hostage/crisis negotiator training consisted of up to ten days of training for 74% of the departments reporting. Culley (1974) reported that the first hostage negotiation team training was one month long.

Mechanistic vs. Organic Organization. The examination of how an organization, or part of an organization, is structured, particularly how it dealt with specialization, departmentalization and the coordination and control of specialized units, was essential in determining how an organization functions (Shafritz and Ott, 1996). Burns and Stalker (1961) outlined two management systems, mechanistic and organic, which they described as forms which an organization can take when that organization reacts to change. These organizational forms are not a dichotomy but a polarity, with intermediate and elastic relationships between them. Nor is there a "suggestion that either system is superior under all circumstances to the other" (Kuykendall and Roberg, 1982, p. 213).

The following depicts five polar constructs which Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) described as basic to mechanistic and organic models of organization (pp. 243-244):

mechanistic	**organic**
1. Specialization	Generalization
2. Hierarchical	Collegial
3. Authority	Power
4. Rule Oriented	Situation Oriented
5. Position Oriented	Goal Oriented

Police Departments in the U.S. are often referred to as military type organizations, which in many ways is analogous to mechanistic organizations. Pintrich (1996) in discussing the work of Burns and Stalker in relation to a criminal justice agency noted:

> The mechanistic form is seen when there are "stable" conditions, and it is characterized by a traditional pattern of hierarchy, reliance on formal rules and regulations, accompanied by standard decision-making. In more dynamic conditions, where the environment changes rapidly, there is less rigidity, more participation by staff, and more reliance on workers to define problems. This form is known as the organic form of organization. While organic systems are not hierarchic in the same manner as are mechanistic, they remain stratified. Positions are differentiated according to seniority -, i.e., and greater expertise (p.8).

Building on the work of Burns and Stalker and others, Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) noted that since the 1960's police departments have been "emphasizing a movement away from a mechanistic to more of an organic approach" (p. 241).

The present study contributes to the field of police management and operations by collecting and analyzing data about management orientation for hostage/crisis negotiation teams as well as by compiling and reporting on hostage/crisis negotiator satisfaction and subjective expectations of effectiveness of negotiation as a police tactic. A futures study by the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training examined the

current status and future requirements of barricade and hostage situations in California and recommended proactive research and development (Gildea, 1992). Police related research by Langworthy (1983, 1986, 1994) dealt with a variety of factors such as agency size, specialization, reward structures, and community standards. These issues were relevant to this research because with little exception, there had not been a systematic collection and analysis of data about the formation and practices of hostage/crisis negotiation units in U.S. policing. There was a need to examine department size, organizational design, and staffing and administrative issues relative to hostage/crisis negotiation.

Police agencies in the U.S. are generally thought of as mechanistic, even quasi-military organizations. There are, however, functions within an agency, which are more organic than mechanistic in nature. With the five polar constructs noted above in mind, the actual negotiation process of a hostage/crisis team, which was not the subject of this research, would likely be determined to be organic in nature. On the other hand, the substantive activities of the tactical/SWAT component of a police agency would probably be described as mechanistic. This research is concerned with a mix of elements in an agency, which impact on the functioning of the hostage/crisis negotiation process. Variables examined in this research, including assignment, reporting lines, the recording of incidents, selection process, written policy, and use of untrained officers to negotiate, allowed for an estimate of the degree of mechanistic or organic orientation of the agency.

When hostage/crisis negotiation was first introduced into the New York City

Police Department there was some resentment and resistance. A police department that was viewed as a mechanistic organization abruptly had an organic function thrust upon it without an appropriate foundation for change. This research may demonstrate how the hostage/crisis negotiation function in U.S. police organization fits between the extremes noted for each of the five constructs.

It is also important to study the organizational structure of an agency or a function within that agency in an attempt to ascertain the effect that the organizational structure has on the negotiators' perception of their role. In relating the agency chain of command for hostage/crisis incidents and the opinions of negotiators about effectiveness to organic and mechanistic attributes, the influence of the structure on the attitudes of negotiators may become apparent.

CHAPTER FOUR

Hypotheses

The following hostage/crisis negotiations related hypotheses were tested in this study. These hypotheses are related to the size of the agency and the timing of team formation, whether the organizational structure is mechanistic or organic, whether the agency is tactical/SWAT oriented or negotiation oriented, the relationship of having various written policy guidelines and the presence of written hostage/crisis negotiation policy guidelines, the relationship between innovation and hostage/crisis negotiation team formation, the degree of hostage/crisis negotiator satisfaction, and the perceived effectiveness of hostage/crisis negotiation.

Hypothesis related to department size:

Larger police departments are more likely to have formed a hostage/crisis negotiation team earlier than smaller police departments. Larger police departments are generally considered more likely to have a greater number of specialized units and a clearer chain of command. This is in keeping with the mechanistic characteristics of an agency's need to exercise control over their personnel. However, Langworthy's (1986) discussion of differentiation in organizations noted that an examination of the relationship between agency size and structure was often inconclusive. The size of the agency and the year during which the agency hostage/crisis negotiation team was formed was obtained from the questionnaire.

Hypothesis related to mechanistic orientation:

In a mechanistic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team will be a part of the tactical team. Burns and Stalker (1961) and Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) reported on various aspects of the conventional elements present in organizations and the management orientation of those organizations, including specialization, hierarchy, authority, rule orientation and position orientation. The degree of mechanistic orientation was determined for each agency by assigning a score of between zero and five, based on the following factors from the questionnaire. There were specific reasons for considering each of the items as indication that an organization was mechanistic. In a mechanistic organization the patrol function is considered the backbone and specialists would be drawn from the patrol ranks. In keeping with a hierarchical orientation the unit commander must devote all of their working time to the function. Audio and video recordings permit greater control over the personnel and procedures. Mechanistic organizational adherence to rule orientation encourages adoption of written policy. And, only individuals selected and trained for a task are considered suitable for activities related to that position in mechanistic organizations. One point for each item present:

1. The usual assignment for hostage/crisis negotiators is patrol or SWAT.
2. The hostage/crisis negotiation team commander/leader is a full time position.
3. Audio or video recordings are usually made of hostage/crisis negotiation incidents.
4. The hostage/crisis negotiator selection process is contained in a written policy.
5. Officers not trained as hostage/crisis negotiators are not permitted to negotiate.

Hypothesis related to organic orientation:

In an organic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team will not be a part of the tactical team. Burns and Stalker (1961) and Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) reported on various aspects of the conventional elements present in organizations and the management orientation of those organizations including generalization, collegiality, power, situation orientation and goal orientation. The degree of organic orientation will be determined for each agency by assigning a score of between zero and five, based on the following items from the questionnaire. The items on the organic orientation scale are largely the inverse of the items on the mechanistic orientation scale. One point for each item present:

1. The usual assignment for hostage/crisis negotiators is investigative or other duties.
2. The hostage/crisis negotiation team commander/leader is a part time position.
3. Audio or video recordings are usually not made of hostage/crisis negotiation incidents.
4. The hostage/crisis negotiator selection process is not contained in a written policy.
5. Officers not trained as hostage/crisis negotiators are permitted to negotiate.

Hypothesis related to Tactical (SWAT) Orientation:

The hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report to the tactical team leader during an incident in SWAT oriented agencies. Kolman (1982) reported on the development of SWAT teams in the U.S. and listed common characteristics. The Houston Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team Survey (1983) noted that the hostage/crisis negotiation team was assigned to the SWAT unit in 59% of the agencies that responded to their survey. The degree of tactical (SWAT) orientation was determined by assigning a score of between zero and five for each agency based on the presence of the following factors, obtained from the questionnaire, one point for each item present:

1. The agency maintains an armored vehicle.

2. The agency sets time limits for hostage/crisis negotiation prior to initiating a tactical solution.

3. The agency provides hazardous duty pay for officers in the hostage/crisis negotiation team.

4. Policy forbids movement of the hostage/crisis situation to a different location.

5. Hostage/crisis negotiators are usually deployed only to actual hostage situations and not to a variety of assignments.

Hypothesis related to Negotiation Orientation.

The hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report directly to the incident commander during hostage/crisis negotiation team deployments in negotiation oriented agencies. In the Koleas (1985) study the direct reporting line from hostage/crisis negotiation team leader to incident commander could only be determined for one of the six agencies studied. Gettinger (1983) reported on characteristics of hostage/crisis negotiation teams from several different jurisdictions. Degree of negotiation orientation was determined by assigning a score between zero and five based on the presence of the following factors, obtained from the questionnaire, one point for each item:

1. The agency has a variety of response assignments for hostage/crisis negotiation team members in addition to incidents in which hostages are actually being held.
2. The agency hostage/crisis plan permits movement of a situation to another site.
3. The agency provides merit pay for officers in the hostage/crisis negotiation unit.
4. Policy does not set time limits for negotiation prior to initiating a tactical solution.
5. The agency does not maintain an armored vehicle.

Hypothesis related to written policies.

The more an agency has written policies to cover various other operational incidents, the more likely it is to have a written policy on hostage/crisis incidents. Severn (1993) noted the importance of a clear written policy or a standard operating procedure manual. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (1991) and the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (1996) both recommend that police policy be written in order to be effective. Mechanistic organizations are more likely to have written policy about hostage/crisis negotiation. A written policy scale was constructed by determining if the agency has a written policy to deal with various issues. Each of these items is contained in the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 1993: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 or More Officers (1995). The percentage of reporting agencies is noted after each item. Since some agencies have developed written policies pertaining to these items, they may also have a written policy related to hostage/crisis negotiation. Each item present will yield a numerical score of one point, so that each agency's total score will have a possible range from zero to five.

1. Excessive force complaints are investigated outside the chain of command (57%)
2. Repeat offenders (40%)
3. Homeless persons (28%)
4. Private security firms (28%)
5. Environmental crimes (23%)

Hypothesis related to innovation:

Innovative departments are more likely than non-innovative departments to have established a hostage/crisis negotiation team at an earlier date. Zhao and Thurman (1996) discussed "ends and means of police innovations" and reported that there is a need to reprioritize the core mission or 'ends' of policing and create a new means to achieve the ends (p. 1). An innovation scale was constructed based on the degree to which an agency has adopted certain procedures or activities. Each of these items is contained in the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 1993: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 or More Officers (1995). The percentage of reporting agencies is noted after each item. The majority of agencies have not adopted these procedures or activities. Each item present will yield a numerical score of one point resulting in a total range of zero to seven. The year during which the agency hostage/crisis negotiation team was formed was obtained from the questionnaire.

1. Citizens have a right to an administrative appeal in excessive force cases (46%)
2. Established a special unit for victim assistance (44%)
3. Operates car-mounted digital computer terminals (32%)
4. Established a special unit for environmental crime (23%)
5. Has educational requirements above high school or GED for new officers (17%)
6. Operates hand-held digital computer terminals (11%)
7. Authorizes the use of at least one nonlethal weapon, including Stun Gun (16%), Rubber Bullets (10%) or Soft Projectiles (8%)

Hypothesis related to Negotiator Satisfaction:

Hostage/crisis negotiation team members are likely to report more personal satisfaction in their negotiation related work in organic oriented agencies than in mechanistic oriented agencies. Several authors (see e.g.. Schlossberg & Freeman, 1974; Bolz & Hershey, 1979; Gettinger, 1983) have commented on the satisfying nature of hostage/crisis negotiation work for participating police officers. Negotiator satisfaction was determined by responses to the first three opinion items (A, B, C) on page 3 of the questionnaire. These items inquire about personal satisfaction, career enhancement and recognition. The possible scores will range from three to18. The scale for measuring mechanistic or organic orientation is described on pages 38-39 supra.

Hypothesis related to perceived effectiveness:

Hostage/crisis negotiation teams in organic oriented agencies are likely to be perceived as more effective than hostage/crisis negotiation teams in mechanistic oriented agencies. Literature of police management generally cites quantitative factors when reporting on agency effectiveness, e.g., reported crime, arrests, clearance rates, overtime. Hostage/crisis events are not normally reported separately in such statistics. Brady (1996) noted that there is a need to assess police performance in useful and innovative ways. The questionnaire asks respondents several questions related to their perception of hostage/crisis negotiation effectiveness. These questions inquire about death or injury during an incident, the need for a tactical solution, repeat calls for the same subject, bystander reaction, citizen reaction and media reaction to hostage/crisis negotiation activities. An effectiveness score was determined by assigning a numerical value to each agency based on the answers to six of these questions (D, E, F, G, H, I) on page three of the questionnaire. The possible scores will range from six to 36. The scale for measuring mechanistic or organic orientation is described on pages 38-39 supra. .

CHAPTER FIVE

The Study

Method

This is a descriptive study which was designed to gather data about the formation and current status of hostage/crisis negotiation in U.S. policing. The study examined hostage/crisis negotiation and variables such as agency size, organizational structure, chain of command, written policy, and innovation. The opinions of respondents about satisfaction in hostage/crisis negotiation and about the effectiveness of negotiation were also examined. This study did not examine the inner workings of a hostage/crisis negotiation unit but focused on its relationship to the larger police organization.

Sample. Data was collected from police agencies in the U.S. which employ at least 100 officers. There were six hundred sixty one state and local law enforcement agencies that responded to the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics:1993 (1995) (LEMAS) survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics which employed at least 100 officers. Langworthy had noted that "LEMAS data is an incredibly valuable vehicle for providing information about policing" (see Brady, 1996, p15). The selection of the 661 agencies to receive the questionnaire was based primarily on two factors. One factor was agency size, there were

approximately 17,000 police agencies in the U.S. with department size varying from one individual to more than 35,000 sworn officers. However, Murphy & Plate (1977) have suggested that small agencies probably did not have the resources to have their own hostage negotiation teams.

The second factor in the sample selection was geographical diversity. The mailing included all fifty states and the District of Columbia. It included municipal, county, sheriff, special police and state police agencies. Federal law enforcement agencies and U.S. military agencies which may have hostage/crisis negotiation teams were not included. Based on the response rates noted for the various studies in my literature review, it was envisioned that this research project would yield a return rate of approximately 50% (331).

An analysis of certain characteristics of police agencies in the United States as they pertain to hostage/crisis negotiation was the focus of this study. This research project yielded a return rate of approximately 48% (315), including 39 (6%) which were not useable because they did not contain sufficient information (16) or indicated that the agency did not have a hostage/crisis negotiation team (23). Data from 276 (42%) returned questionnaires were utilized for testing the hypotheses. Two hundred seventy-five of the respondents indicated that their agency had formed a hostage/crisis negotiation team and one agency did not organizationally have a team but had answered the questionnaire to a high degree of specificity. This was an adequate number of respondents for the purpose of data analysis and in order to provide a descriptive

presentation of hostage/crisis negotiation units in U.S. police agencies (see Babbie, 1995).

Instrument. Data collection for this research project utilized a four-page questionnaire which was designed specifically for this study. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix A. This survey instrument was constructed based on prior professional knowledge, a review of the hostage negotiation literature, and interviews with Frank Bolz and Harvey Schlossberg. Frank Bolz was the first commander of the New York City Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team. Harvey Schlossberg was a psychologist who assisted in the formulation of the original principles. The author of this research was a hostage negotiator for the New York City Police Department for thirteen years. For six of those years he was the team commander and chief negotiator. The questionnaire was reviewed by the current commander of the New York City Police Department hostage negotiation team and by the coordinator of hostage negotiation for the New Jersey State Police. Appropriate suggestions were incorporated into the final version. This technique strengthened face validity.

The four page questionnaire was designed to collect maximum information while being minimally intrusive. The time required to complete the items was approximately 30 minutes. It was divided into four parts. First were agency specific demographics, hostage/crisis incident workload, chain of command and operating policy. The second section was related to hostage/crisis negotiation training. Third, there was a series of statements designed to elicit the opinions of respondents about hostage/crisis negotiation.

Last there was a series of biographical and operational questions about the individual completing the questionnaire, including the process they followed to be selected as a hostage/crisis negotiator. At the end of the agency related questions was a request for a copy of that organization's policy. At the end of the fourth section was an open-ended question about the questionnaire and about hostage/crisis negotiation in general. One hundred eight variables were contained in the questionnaire. Most of the information obtained from completed questionnaires was not available in the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics: 1993 (1995) report.

An additional fourteen variables were obtained from the LEMAS data. This data base provides a standardized source of valid information related to U.S. policing which is not otherwise readily available. LEMAS data has been in existence in one form or another for approximately ten years, and is updated periodically, i.e., 1993, 1990, 1987. I decided not to include the LEMAS items in the questionnaire because the instrument would have had to be more complicated, potentially resulting in an increase in the amount of time required for completion and a subsequent decrease in the response rate.

Scales to determine the degree of mechanistic orientation and organic orientation were constructed by combining individual variables. Several other scales were similarly constructed from the data: written policy; innovation; negotiation orientation; SWAT orientation; negotiator satisfaction; and perceived effectiveness. The year in which the agency first formed a hostage/crisis negotiation team was also obtained from the questionnaire.

The scales which determined the agency orientation, mechanistic or organic, were compared to the placement of the hostage/crisis negotiation team within the organization. Mechanistic and organic orientation was also compared to the personal satisfaction of negotiators and to their perception of effectiveness. Negotiation orientation and SWAT orientation was compared to the chain of command during actual team deployments. The written policy scale was compared to the presence or absence of a written policy for hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. The year of hostage/crisis negotiation team formation was related to agency innovation and to the size of the agency.

Procedure. The questionnaire was mailed the Chief Executive Officer of the agency in each of the 661 identified departments. The list of agencies was obtained from the LEMAS data, and the current Chief and mailing address was obtained from an industry publication, National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators (1997). A one page cover letter explaining the research project and soliciting cooperation accompanied the questionnaire. The Chief was requested to designate the person in the agency who was responsible for the activities of the hostage/crisis negotiation unit to complete the questionnaire. A self-addressed stamped envelope was included for return of completed questionnaires. Respondents were not asked to identify themselves. They were assured individual anonymity. The aggregate results of the study were offered to contributing agencies. This process was designed to assure that responses would be prepared by knowledgeable individuals who were motivated to cooperate. Greene (see Brady, 1996, p.15) discussing information that might be helpful to police chiefs and

researchers noted that data must be collected "in fairly unobtrusive ways." A master check list was maintained to account for a response from each agency. If a completed questionnaire was not received from an agency, an effort was made to contact potential respondents by e-mail or FAX and urge them to respond.

Human Subjects. The possibility of physical harm to anyone involved in this research was nonexistent and the probability of emotional harm was virtually nil. All questionnaires were prefaced with a complete disclosure of the research plan. Individual identifiers were not used. Participation was completely voluntary and anonymous.

CHAPTER SIX

Results

Nine hypotheses were constructed and tested. As a result of an analysis of the data four hypotheses were supported and four were found to be not significant. One additional hypothesis was found to be significant but opposite to the prediction. The frequencies, range, mean and standard deviation for each of the variables are contained in Appendix B.

Hypothesis I. Larger police departments are more likely to have formed a hostage/crisis negotiation team earlier than smaller police departments. A correlation was used to assess the relationship between agency size and the age of the negotiation team. Larger police departments formed hostage/crisis negotiation teams earlier than smaller police departments ($r = -.26$, $p = .001$). (see Table 6-1)

Correlations

table 6-1

Correlations

		Number of sworn officers	Age of unit
Pearson Correlation	Number of sworn officers	1.000	-.255**
	Age of unit	-.255**	1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)	Number of sworn officers	.	.000
	Age of unit	.000	.
N	Number of sworn officers	264	243
	Age of unit	243	254

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Hypothesis II. In a mechanistic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team will be part of the tactical team. A five item mechanistic organization scale was constructed based on the five polar constructs which Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) described as basic to mechanistic models of organization. The variables which were selected for this scale and their corresponding constructs were: (1) nature of current uniformed assignment, whether patrol or SWAT (specialization); (2) whether the job of the hostage/crisis negotiation team commander is a full time position (hierarchy); (3) whether audio or video recordings are usually made of hostage/crisis incidents (authority); (4) whether there is a written policy reflecting hostage/crisis negotiator selection (rule orientation); (5) and to what extent are untrained officers permitted to engage in hostage/crisis negotiation (position orientation). Data to determine the degree of mechanistic orientation was obtained from 245 responses. The mean scale score was 1.58.

A t-test was used to compare agencies in which the hostage/crisis team was part of the tactical team with agencies in which it was not part of the tactical team. Agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team was part of the tactical team scored significantly higher on the mechanistic organization variable ($t = -2.19$, $p = .03$). (see Table 6-2).

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T-Test

TABLE 6-2

Group Statistics

	Is part of SWAT	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
mechanistic organization	no	111	1.41	1.10	.10
	yes	133	1.72	1.08	9.39E-02

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
mechanistic organization	Equal variances assumed	.888	.347
	Equal variances not assumed		

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
							Lower	Upper
mechanistic organization	Equal variances assumed	-2.193	242	.029	-.31	.14	-.58	-3.13E-02
	Equal variances not assumed	-2.190	232.952	.030	-.31	.14	-.58	-3.09E-02

Hypothesis III. In an organic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team will not be part of the tactical team. A five item organic organization scale was constructed based on the five polar constructs which Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) described as basic to organic models of organization. The variables which were selected for this scale and their corresponding constructs were: (1) nature of current assignment, investigative or other (generalization); (2) whether the job of the hostage/crisis negotiation team commander is a part time position (collegiality); (3) whether audio or video recordings are usually made of hostage/crisis incidents (power); (4) whether there is a written policy reflecting hostage/crisis negotiator selection (situation orientation); and (5) to what extent are untrained officers permitted to engage in hostage/crisis negotiation (goal orientation). Data to determine the degree of organic orientation were obtained from 252 responses. The mean scale score was 3.41.

A t-test was used to compare agencies in which the hostage/crisis team was not part of the tactical team with agencies in which it was part of the tactical team. Agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team was not part of the tactical team scored significantly higher on the organic organization variable ($t = 2.37$, $p = .02$). (see Table 6-3)

Table 6-3

T-Test

Group Statistics

	Is part of SWAT	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
organic orientation	no	113	3.58	1.09	.10
	yes	139	3.26	1.07	9.10E-02

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
organic orientation	Equal variances assumed	1.036	.310
	Equal variances not assumed		

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
							Lower	Upper
organic orientation	Equal variances assumed	2.374	250	.018	.33	.14	5.54E-02	.59
	Equal variances not assumed	2.370	237.853	.019	.33	.14	5.48E-02	.60

Hypothesis IV. The hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report to the tactical team leader during an incident in SWAT oriented agencies. A scale was constructed to determine the degree of SWAT (tactical) orientation of the each responding agency. It was envisioned that five items from the questionnaire would be used to determine SWAT orientation. The five items were: (1) the agency maintains an armored car; (2) the agency sets time limits for hostage/crisis negotiation prior to initiating an assault; (3) the agency provides hazardous duty pay for officers in the hostage/crisis negotiation team; (4) policy forbids movement of the hostage/crisis situation to a different location; (5) and hostage/crisis negotiators are usually deployed only to actual hostage situations and not to a variety of assignments.

In constructing the SWAT orientation scale it was discovered that one item, number 5, hostage/crisis negotiators are usually deployed only to actual hostage situations and not to a variety of assignments, was not useful. There were no responding agencies in which hostage/crisis negotiation team members were utilized only for actual hostage situations. All responding agencies reported that hostage/crisis negotiators responded to a variety of negotiation assignments. Data to determine the degree of SWAT orientation were received from 87 respondents.

A t-test was used to compare agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the tactical team leader with agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader did not report to the tactical team leader. As far as SWAT orientation is concerned, there was no significant difference between agencies in which

the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the incident commander and agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the SWAT commander ($t = .39$, $p = .70$). (see Table 6-4)

TABLE 6-4

T-Test

Group Statistics

	Negotiator reports to	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
SWATORI	incident commander	53	1.53	.67	9.18E-02
	swat commander	28	1.46	.74	.14

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
SWATORI	Equal variances assumed	.391	.534
	Equal variances not assumed		

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
							Lower	Upper
SWATORI	Equal variances assumed	.394	79	.695	6.40E-02	.16	-.26	.39
	Equal variances not assumed	.381	50.147	.705	6.40E-02	.17	-.27	.40

Hypothesis V. The hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report directly to the incident commander during hostage/crisis negotiation team deployments in negotiation oriented agencies. A scale was constructed to determine the degree of negotiation orientation for each of the responding agencies. It was envisioned that five items from the questionnaire would be used to determine negotiation orientation. The five items were: (1) the agency has a variety of response assignments for hostage/crisis negotiation team members in addition to incidents in which hostages are actually being held; (2) the agency hostage/crisis plan permits movement of a situation to another site; (3) the agency provides merit pay for officers in the hostage/crisis negotiation unit; (4) policy does not set time limits for negotiation prior to initiating a tactical solution; (5) and the agency does not maintain an armored car.

In constructing the negotiation orientation scale it was discovered that one item, number 1, the agency has a variety of response assignments for hostage/crisis negotiation team members in addition to incidents in which hostages are actually being held, was not useful. There were no responding agencies in which hostage/crisis negotiation team members were utilized only for hostage situations. All responding agencies reported that hostage/crisis negotiators respond to a variety of negotiation assignments. Data to determine the degree of negotiation orientation were received from 87 respondents.

A t-test was used to compare agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation

team leader reported to the incident commander with agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader did not report directly to the incident commander. As far as negotiation orientation is concerned, there was no significant difference between agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the incident commander and agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the SWAT commander ($t = 88$, $p = .38$). (see Table 6-5)

TABLE 6-5

T-Test

Group Statistics

	Negotiator reports to	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
NEGORIE	incident commander	54	1.43	.74	.10
	swat commander	28	1.29	.66	.12

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
NEGORIE	Equal variances assumed	.475	.493
	Equal variances not assumed		

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
							Lower	Upper
NEGORIE	Equal variances assumed	.842	80	.402	.14	.17	-.19	.47
	Equal variances not assumed	.875	60.831	.385	.14	.16	-.18	.46

Hypothesis VI. The more an agency has written policies to cover various other operational incidents, the more likely it is to have a written policy on hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. A written policy scale was constructed based on the degree to which an agency had adopted written policies for certain procedures or activities. Five items were obtained from the LEMAS data for use in constructing the scale. A variety of the agencies included in LEMAS had adopted written policy for these procedures or activities. The items and percentages of agencies with written policies were: (1) excessive force complaints are investigated outside the chain of command where the incident occurred (57%); (2) processing of repeat offenders (40%); (3) dealing with homeless persons (28%); (4) liaison with private security firms (28%); (5) and investigation of environmental crimes (23%). Since the items were derived from the LEMAS data all 276 agencies were used in creating the written policy scale. Only three agencies (0.01%) scored the maximum, which was 5. Approximately 14% (39) scored zero indicating that they have not adopted written policy for any of these items. 151 (55%) agencies may be identified as moderate in their adoption of written policy and 30% (83) may be characterized as high in their adoption of written policy.

A t- test was used to determine whether there was a difference between agencies having a written policy on hostage/crisis negotiation incidents and agencies which do not have a written policy on hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. There was no significant difference between the score on the written policy scale and whether the agency had a written policy for negotiation ($t = .64$, $p = .53$).

TABLE 6-6

T-Test

Group Statistics

	WRITSCAL	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Written policy	0	38	1.84	.37	5.99E-02
	1	77	1.79	.41	4.65E-02

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
Written policy	Equal variances assumed	1.721	.192
	Equal variances not assumed		

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
							Lower	Upper
Written policy	Equal variances assumed	.635	113	.526	4.99E-02	7.85E-02	-.11	.21
	Equal variances not assumed	.657	80.760	.513	4.99E-02	7.59E-02	-.10	.20

Hypothesis VII. Innovative departments are more likely than non-innovative departments to have established a hostage/crisis negotiation team at an earlier date. An innovation scale was constructed based on the degree to which an agency had adopted certain procedures, activities or equipment. Seven items were obtained from the LEMAS data for use in constructing this scale. The majority of the agencies contained in LEMAS had not adopted these procedures, activities or equipment. The items and percentages of agencies utilizing them were: (1) citizens have a right to an administrative appeal in excessive force cases (46%); (2) a special unit was established for victim assistance (44%); (3) car-mounted digital computer terminal were used (32%); (4) a special unit was established for environmental crimes (23%); (5) entry requirements for new officers was above high school or GED (17%); (6) hand-held digital computers were used (11%); (7) and at least one of three nonlethal weapons was in use, stun gun (16%), rubber bullets (10%) or soft projectiles (8%). Since the items were derived from the LEMAS data all 276 agencies were used in creating the innovation scale. No agency scored the maximum, which was 7. Approximately 10% (28) scored zero and were considered not to be innovative.

A correlation was used to assess the relationship between agency innovation and the age of the hostage/crisis negotiation team. The higher an agency scored on the innovation scale, the more likely it was that the agency established a hostage/crisis negotiation team at an earlier date ($r = -.15$, $p = .02$). (see Table 6-7)

TABLE 6-7

Correlations

Correlations

		Age of unit	innovation scale
Pearson Correlation	Age of unit	1.000	-.145*
	innovation scale	-.145*	1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)	Age of unit	.	.021
	innovation scale	.021	.
N	Age of unit	254	254
	innovation scale	254	276

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Hypothesis VIII. Hostage/crisis negotiation team members are likely to report more personal satisfaction in their negotiation related work in organic oriented agencies than in mechanistic oriented agencies. A scale was constructed to reflect the personal satisfaction of hostage/crisis negotiation team members in their negotiator related work. The third section of the questionnaire contained eleven opinion items which requested respondents to select the most appropriate of six choices ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The first three of the opinion items (A,B,C) dealt with aspects of personal satisfaction: (A) hostage/crisis negotiation team work is personally satisfying; (B) hostage/crisis negotiation team work has enhanced my career; and (C) I have received appropriate recognition/acknowledgement for my hostage/crisis negotiation team work. Data to determine the degree of negotiator satisfaction were received from 256 respondents. Approximately 11% (27) of those respondents did not believe that hostage/crisis negotiation team work was personally beneficial, although no individuals indicated strong disagreement with the personal satisfaction items. A total of 229 (89%) reported varying degrees of positive satisfaction, including 102 (40%) reported being slightly satisfied and another 98 (38%) were moderately satisfied. Twenty nine (11%) reported strong agreement with the personal satisfaction items.

A t-test was used to compare the personal satisfaction of hostage/crisis negotiation team members in mechanistic and in organic organizations. Negotiators in more mechanistic agencies had a higher mean score for personal satisfaction than negotiators in more organic agencies (means of 15.01 and 13.86, $t = 3.73$, $p = .001$). (see Table 6-8)

TABLE 6-8

T-Test

Group Statistics

	mech v org	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
negotiator satisfaction	more mechanistic	133	15.01	2.32	.20
	more organic	107	13.86	2.42	.23

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
negotiator satisfaction	Equal variances assumed	.057	.812
	Equal variances not assumed		

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
							Lower	Upper
negotiator satisfaction	Equal variances assumed	3.733	238	.000	1.15	.31	.54	1.75
	Equal variances not assumed	3.715	222.718	.000	1.15	.31	.54	1.76

Hypothesis IX. Hostage/crisis negotiation teams in organic oriented agencies are likely to be perceived as more effective than hostage/crisis negotiation teams in mechanistic oriented agencies. A scale was constructed to reflect the perceived effectiveness of hostage/crisis negotiation by team members. The third section of the questionnaire contained eleven opinion items which requested respondents to select the most appropriate of six choices ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The fourth through ninth opinion items (D,E,F,G,H,I) dealt with aspects of effectiveness: (D) reduced chance of death or serious physical injury; (E) resolution is through negotiation rather than tactics; (F) there are fewer repeat calls for service; (G) bystanders are positive about negotiation team efforts; (H) citizens initiate positive phone calls or letters about an incident; (I) and there is an increased chance of positive media attention. Data to determine the degree of negotiator perception of effectiveness were received from 256 respondents. Eleven (4%) of those respondents did not agree that hostage/crisis negotiation team work was effective. However, the majority 245 (96%) reported varying degrees of perceived effectiveness, including 89 (35%) who reported believing slightly that hostage/crisis negotiation team efforts were effective and another 149 (58%) were moderately sure that such efforts were effective. Seven (3%) reported strong agreement that hostage/crisis negotiation team work was effective.

A t-test was used to compare the perceived effectiveness of agencies in hostage/crisis negotiation team work in mechanistic organizations and in organic organizations. There were no significant differences between mechanistic and organic

organizations with regard to perceived effectiveness of the hostage/crisis negotiation team ($t = .78$, $p = .44$). (see Table 6-9)

TABLE 6-9

T-Test

Group Statistics

	mech v org	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
effectiveness scale	more mechanistic	130	30.09	3.00	.26
	more organic	108	29.77	3.45	.33

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
effectiveness scale	Equal variances assumed	2.173	.142
	Equal variances not assumed		

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means						
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
							Lower	Upper
effectiveness scale	Equal variances assumed	.775	236	.439	.32	.42	-.50	1.15
	Equal variances not assumed	.765	213.707	.445	.32	.42	-.51	1.16

Descriptive Data About the Agencies and Responents:

In addition to the analysis of variables which tested the nine hypotheses, a variety of deiptive data was obtained from the questionnaire. Some of these items provided a profile of the contributing agencies, including 1997 hostage/crisis negotiation team related workload and results. Other items provided a profile of individual respondents, their 1997 hostage/crisis negotiation workload and selected opinions about hostage/crisis negotiation. The letter to the agency Chief Executive which accompanied the questionnaire requested that the person responsible for the activities of the hostage/crisis negotiation unit be the individual who completed the questionnaire. Ninety-two percent (254) of useable questionnaires were completed by trained negotiators; seventy-five percent (204) identified themselves as the hostage/crisis negotiation team commander.

The groupings of some of the information requested in the questionnaire was based on the categories utilized by the U.S. Department of Justice (1996), i.e., geographical area of country, size of population served and number of sworn officers in the agency. This would allow for future correlation of data obtained from this research and other facets of police practices in the United States.

Useful responses were received from throughout the country. Forty-eight (17%) were from the Northeast, 107 (39%) from the South, 51 (19%) from the Midwest, and 70 (25%) from the West. Twenty (7%) of them represented state police agencies, 72 (26%) came from county level agencies, and 184 (67%) were from local police departments. Seven agencies (3%) serviced a population of less than 50,000 people. Fifty-eight (22%)

were from communities between 50,000 and 99,999, 103 (39%) represented between 100,000 and 249,999 people and 96 (36%) serviced a population greater than 250,000. The agencies reported that some hostage/crisis negotiation units were less than one year old (2%) and some were more than 25 years old (3%). Basically, 51% of the units were formed at least fifteen years ago, and 49% were formed between 1983 and 1997.

Two hundred sixty four agencies reported on the number of sworn officers which they employed. The largest number of agencies, 124 (47%), employed between 100 and 249 sworn officers. Another 61 (23%) had 250 - 499 officers and 31 (12%) over 500 but less than one thousand. Forty-eight (18%) of the responding police agencies employed more than 1,000 sworn police officers.

The number of hostage/crisis negotiators in the 275 agencies which had teams ranged from four (2%) agencies reporting one negotiator to one agency (0.4%) reporting 103 negotiators. Seventy-five percent (206) had up to ten trained negotiators. Fifty-six agencies (20%) had between 11 and 25 negotiators , and 5% (13) of the agencies maintained a roster of between 26 and 103 trained negotiators. The mean number of negotiators per agency was ten. Not all trained negotiators were dispatched to every incident. Forty-seven percent of the agencies deploy one, two or three negotiators. The greatest number of negotiators normally deployed, 11, was reported by only one agency. The average deployment was approximately four negotiators per incident.

Eighty-one percent of the responding agencies (222) had adopted a written policy for hostage/crisis negotiation incidents; only 19% (51) had not. Fifty-six percent (153) of

the agencies reported that their hostage/crisis negotiation team was organizationally a component of the SWAT team while the other 122 (44%) operated under some other organizational arrangement. Even though the negotiators in the majority of agencies (56%) were part of the SWAT team, 61% (168) of responding agencies reported that during an incident the negotiators did not report to the SWAT commander but directly to the incident commander. Only 33% (91) of the agencies had the negotiation commander reporting through the SWAT commander. In the remaining 17 agencies (6%) the negotiator component reported directly to the chief of the agency. In the majority of agencies (93%) the rank of the incident commander was lieutenant, captain or major (or equivalent). In 96% of the agencies the SWAT commander was a corporal or sergeant, a lieutenant or a captain. For 86% of the agencies the rank of the hostage/crisis negotiation team commander was a corporal or sergeant or a lieutenant.

As noted above, the majority of agencies had a written policy for hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. However 56% (150) did not have a written policy for the selection of negotiators. Even without such a policy, 271 agencies did provide training to those individuals who had been chosen. The range in the number of hours of initial hostage/crisis negotiation training was from a low of two hours, one agency (0.4%), to a high of 250 hours, again one agency (0.4%). The mean was 47 hours. Sixty agencies (22%) reported that they provided their own initial hostage/crisis negotiator training. In 40 agencies (14%) the training was provided by a regional academy and in 35 agencies (13%) the state academy provided the training. Ninety-seven (35%) local, county and

state police agencies obtained initial hostage/crisis negotiator training from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Forty-four agencies (16%) received such training from a non-law enforcement agency, usually a college or university. Further, 204 agencies also provided in-service hostage/crisis negotiation training. The range was from four hours reported by 3 agencies (1%) to 210 hours reported by one agency (0.4%). The mean was 32 hours.

Among other reported facts related to hostage/crisis negotiation policy were: (1) In 84% of the agencies a first responding police officer who had not been trained as a hostage/crisis negotiation could initiate discussion with a subject prior to the arrival of trained negotiators. That officer might even continue negotiating indefinitely in 3% of the agencies. In 16% (44) of the agencies the first responder would be replaced immediately. (2) Two-thirds (183) of the agencies did not maintain an armored car to assist in these incidents. (3) A prosecutor almost never (84%) responded to ongoing situations; one occasionally responded in 13% and usually responded in only three percent of the agencies. (4) Negotiators from 236 (86%) of the agencies did not receive any extra compensation, except perhaps situational overtime, for assuming the additional responsibility of being members of a hostage/crisis negotiation team. Six percent (17) did receive hazardous duty pay and 23 agencies (8%) provide merit pay or other special compensation. (5) After an incident mandatory stress debriefing was provided to negotiators in 166 agencies (43%); in an additional 137 agencies (50%) it was offered but not required. Seven percent (20) of the agencies did not provide post incident stress debriefing. Two hundred fifty three responding

agencies reported 2,887 deployments at hostage/crisis negotiation incidents during 1997, an average of 11 incidents per agency. Sixty-eight percent (1967) of those incidents were concluded through negotiation and 920 (32%) required tactical intervention by a SWAT team. That was approximately 8 situations per agency being solved through negotiation and 3 per agency requiring SWAT intercession. Interestingly, the median time elapsed in all situations was 3.5 hours.

Ninety-three percent (254) of the individuals who completed the questionnaire were male and seven percent (20) were female. The vast majority, 245 (89%) were white, while four percent (12) were black, five percent (14) were of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, one individual (0.4%) was Asian and two (0.7%) chose other; one of those was a native-American. Only 53 (20%) of the respondents indicated their age. The range of reported ages was 32 to 63; the mean reported age was 44. The education level was reported by all respondents (275) from agencies that had a hostage/crisis negotiation team: seventy-seven percent (212) had some college or had obtained a bachelor's degree; 18% (49) had earned a master's degree; three percent (7) did not attain education beyond high school. A Ph.D. or JD degree had been acquired by seven individuals (3%).

The rank of the 275 individual respondents was from basic officer through chief executive officer. The largest number, 103 (38%), were corporals or sergeants, another 101 (37%) were lieutenants, and 35 (13%) were captains. Ten percent (27) were police officers or deputies, or troopers. Nine individuals (3%) were above the rank of captain or were not sworn officers. Law enforcement experience for the respondents ranged from

seven years to 37 years; the mean was 20 years. Two hundred fifty-six individuals reported that they were hostage/crisis negotiators; six percent (16) were full time in that role and (90%) performed those duties on a part-time basis. The usual current assignment for the respondents was patrol, 84 (31%), investigative, 72 (26%), SWAT, 14 (5%). One hundred five individuals (38%) reported that they were assigned to a variety of other duties other than the three noted.

The process of becoming a hostage/crisis negotiator was initiated in different ways: 32% (85) responded to a departmental posting or notice; 79 (30%) were encouraged to apply by someone in the agency; and 32% (85) presented themselves as volunteers without being prompted. The number of years experience as a hostage/crisis negotiator was reported by 234 individuals; the range was from less than one year to more than eight years; each of these categories accounted for three people (1%). The mean was nine years. Two hundred four respondents (75%) reported that they were the commander of their agency hostage/crisis negotiation team.

The two hundred thirty-four respondents reported that they were deployed a hostage/crisis negotiation incidents a total of 1,734 times during 1997. The range was from zero deployments for 23 individuals (9%) to one individual (0.4%) being deployed 100 times; the mean was seven situations. Two hundred forty-eight negotiators reported the approximate elapsed time since they were deployed at a situation. One individual had been deployed the same month that the research questionnaire was completed; another individual had not been deployed for ninety-six months. Fifty-five percent (137) were

deployed within the prior three months; another 18% (45) had negotiated within the prior six months, and an additional 15% (36) had been active as negotiators within nine months. Ninety percent had been deployed within one year and 95% within the prior two years.

Sixty-six percent (180) of the respondents agreed with the statement that the hostage/crisis negotiation team should be part of the SWAT team: 7% (20) agreed slightly; 14% (38) were in moderate agreement; and 45% (122) strongly agreed with the statement. Ninety-seven percent (258) of the respondents also agreed that no time limit should be set in hostage/crisis negotiation incidents before a tactical solution is attempted, including 222 (84%) who strongly believed that time limits should not be set.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Discussion

This research first sought to determine the extent to which hostage/crisis negotiation has been adopted as a formal practice in U.S. police organizations. Next, within the agencies which have incorporated such teams into their structure, the research attempted to assess organizational components related to administrative and operational chain of command for negotiator related activity. Finally, the opinions of respondents were sought concerning their satisfaction in being hostage/crisis negotiators and in their perception of the effectiveness of negotiation as a police tactic. This discussion considers the results of analyzed data across hypotheses and comments on implications for additional research.

Response rate

A total of 276 completed questionnaires were returned. The rate of return was sufficient for the purposes of statistical analysis of the hypotheses and also for additional descriptive information. The cover letter suggested that the questionnaire be completed by the individual in the agency who was responsible for the hostage/crisis negotiation function. Ninety-two percent of the respondents indicated that they were knowledgeable

about the subject; 76% were the agency hostage/crisis negotiation team leaders; an additional 16% were trained negotiators but not the team leaders.

There was no easy way to determine why many agencies did not choose to respond. However, some agencies did indicate by mail or FAX the reason why they chose not to participate. A few stated that they simply did not have the time. One of the 50 agencies that employed at least 1,000 sworn officers indicated that because they are one of the largest police departments in the US, they receive many requests for information and therefore it is their practice to participate only in surveys or questionnaires from governmental agencies. However, the agencies that were the next highest and next lowest in size returned completed questionnaires. All three of these agencies were among the five largest in the country. Another agency wrote that if the researcher wanted statistics on the subject, the FBI should be contacted, since they collect such data. Indeed, the FBI has been conducting research and writing about hostage negotiation for many years; but they had not collected the data sought in this study. The FBI Crisis Management Unit has been engaged in an open ended data collection effort on the subject since approximately 1996 (FBI, 1998) but only a few of the items in their study matched the variables in this study. Among those items which were consistent with this research, they reported that 62% of the situations ended through negotiation and 38% through tactical intervention. Further, 56% of the negotiated situations lasted less than four hours. The FBI study reported three negotiators per incident and this study determined that on average four negotiators were deployed at each incident. The

consistency of findings between this study and the FBI study further strengthened the validity of this research project.

The cover letter which accompanied the questionnaire for this research was on the letter-head of a well known criminal justice college. Perhaps future research efforts could obtain prior endorsement of a government agency in order to increase the response rate. Also, the letter could clearly indicate that the researcher was seeking data which were not otherwise available.

Discussion of Hypotheses:

As the results of the analysis of each of the nine hypotheses has been reported separately; this discussion will also treat each hypothesis in the same manner. However, this discussion will alter the sequence of some of the hypotheses in order to facilitate discussion based on the presence of common factors which were involved in their analysis.

The first hypothesis (I) in this study postulated that larger police departments were more likely to have formed a hostage/crisis negotiation team earlier than smaller departments. This hypothesis was supported. Several factors may explain this finding. Larger police agencies may have had the capacity to create specialized units, such as a hostage/crisis negotiation team, in part because they had a large pool of personnel from which to solicit candidates for the new function. Similarly, individuals could be selected and trained for such tasks without negatively impacting on short term operational

strength. This would be especially true when the assignment was not full time. Consistent with prior research, the majority of responding agencies (87%) indicated that the hostage/crisis negotiation function was part time. Larger agencies also networked with other large police agencies through organizations such as the Police Executive Research Forum and the Major City Chiefs. These associations, which have qualifying criteria for membership, provided an arena for information sharing and review of new practices. Most police departments in the country, including the larger ones, also belonged to the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Larger police agencies also tended to be located within major metropolitan areas or were responsible for a wide geographic area and thus were more likely to experience more hostage and hostage type incidents. These factors may have contributed to information sharing which resulted in adoption of hostage/crisis negotiation as a police practice.

Another hypothesis (VII) was also concerned with the year in which an agency had formed its hostage/crisis negotiation team. The hypothesis stated that innovative departments are more likely than non-innovative departments to have established a hostage/crisis negotiation team at an earlier date. An innovation scale was created from LEMAS data. Less than half of the agencies had adopted any of the policies, practices or equipment represented in the scale; most items had been adopted by less than one-third of the agencies. This tended to validate the innovative nature of the agencies scoring higher on the scale. Formation of a hostage/crisis negotiation team correlated positively with the degree of innovation, as predicted. The professional organizations noted in the discussion

of Hypothesis I may have also contributed to a diffusion of ideas and adoption of practices through annual conferences, training programs and a variety of publications. Further, networking among agencies through meetings and published sources provided agency heads with a mechanism to study best practices in other agencies. These methods were consistent with the manner in which innovations were adopted by agencies. Even though police organizations are versatile and appear to careen from crisis to crisis (Meyer & Zucker, 1989), they have also proven to be remarkably stable institutions which are capable of systematic change, often accommodating opposing attitudes, in effect providing for the acceptance of new structure and operations.

All pertinent references in the literature on hostage negotiation credit New York City with forming the first hostage/crisis negotiation team in the United States. The New York City Police Department formed its hostage/crisis negotiation team in 1973 based on in-house studies begun in the fall of 1972. Two of the agencies which responded to this survey had reported formation dates, 1971 and 1972, earlier than New York City. A letter was sent to both agencies requesting verification, such as copies of internal documentation or media accounts; they both responded. The agency which had originally reported a 1971date indicated that that date was a typographical error; they had started their team in approximately 1975. The agency which had reported a 1972 formation date forwarded documentation concerning the initiation of a tactical patrol type unit, but none of the several items provided which included agency memorandum and newspaper stories mentioned the hostage/crisis negotiation function.

Four of the nine hypotheses (II, III,VIII, IX) analyzed in this study examined issues related to the mechanistic or organic orientation of the police organization. Burns and Stalker (1961) and Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) reported on various aspects of the conventional elements present in organizations and the management orientation of those organizations. Elements including specialization, hierarchy, authority, rule orientation and position orientation were associated with mechanistic organizations and those including generalization, collegiality, power, situation orientation and goal orientation were associated with organic organizations. Mechanistic and organic scales which each consisted of five items were derived from the questionnaire. The scales were designed to reflect the polar constructs of mechanistic and organic models of organizations. The first item in each scale dealt with the usual assignment of hostage/crisis negotiators. This was meaningful since most of the respondents were part-time in their negotiator role. The other four items in each scale were envisioned as mirror opposites so that the degree of contrast between them would be evident. The overall findings suggested that the majority of police departments were still operating as quasi-military or mechanistic organizations, 55% of the agencies were mechanistic and in 56% of the agencies the hostage/crisis negotiation team was subordinate to the SWAT team. Traditionally, most American police departments had been organized similar to the military since soon after the 1829 creation of the London Metropolitan Police. The quasi-military model has been associated with classical organization theory; it is analogous to bureaucratic structure and control. A SWAT or tactical team is probably the epitome of the quasi-military aspects

of policing and it is logical that in such organizations the hostage/crisis negotiation team would report to the SWAT team.

The second hypothesis (II) in this study stated that in a mechanistic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team would be part of the tactical team in the administrative organization of police departments. The hypothesis was confirmed by the data. This finding tended to support the view that most police agencies (55%) were mechanistic, quasi-military, in organizational structure. An important component of mechanistic organization was hierarchical ordering or chain of command; one aspect of chain of command is the concept of unity of command. In agencies which adhered to the management principle of unity of command each employee, or function, received direction from only one supervisor (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997). It was anticipated that in mechanistic organizations the hostage/crisis negotiation function would be placed in a clear chain of command; the hostage commander reported to the tactical commander.

The third hypothesis (III) in this study stated that in an organic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team would not be part of the tactical team in the administrative organization of police departments. This hypothesis was also supported by the analysis. Although this hypothesis was substantially the opposite of the second hypothesis, the mechanistic and organic scales were not comprised of entirely the same items, so that a separate analysis was necessary. Less than half (45%) of the agencies were found to be organic organizations. The majority of organic agencies did not have the hostage/crisis negotiation function as part of the tactical team but assigned it to some other part of the

agency. Organic organizations were more likely to be concerned with a collegial approach to reporting lines than to a strict hierarchical ordering. This finding indicated that there were police agencies which paid less attention to an assumed chain of command, and hence were less quasi-military. Such agencies had various degrees of organizational flexibility for specialized functions such as hostage/crisis negotiation.

The next hypothesis (VIII) concerned with mechanistic or organic organizational structure stated that hostage/crisis negotiation team members were likely to report more personal satisfaction in their negotiation related work in organic agencies than in mechanistic agencies. Contrary to the predicted outcome, this hypothesis was not supported by the data. This hypothesis was based in part on the notion that by having the hostage/crisis negotiation team placed in a more autonomous position within the overall organization, the hostage/crisis negotiator would report more satisfaction. But higher satisfaction was reported by negotiators in mechanistic oriented organizations than by negotiators in organic oriented organizations.

All of the negotiators (100%) reported positively (71% strongly agree, 25% moderately agree, 4% slightly agree) on one of the items in the satisfaction scale regardless of organizational orientation. This item stated that hostage/crisis negotiation team work is personally satisfying. Differentiation became apparent when the other two items in the satisfaction scale were weighed. These items dealt with career enhancement and recognition for hostage/crisis negotiation work. The reward and recognition system of the mechanistic police agencies apparently rewarded the traditional or formally organized

units more than the more ambiguous or less formal units. While hostage/crisis negotiators in organic organizations reported that they were more satisfied with their hostage/crisis negotiation activities, they were less likely to report that their agency had appropriately recognized or rewarded their contributions to the agency. This finding may in fact support the perception noted above that police agencies were primarily mechanistic even though some agencies may allow for limited structural variations. Hostage/crisis negotiators in mechanistic organizations reported negotiation related satisfaction and they also reported organizational recognition. Those officers were probably identified within the organization as being part of an elite quasi-military unit and so their hostage/crisis negotiation work was recognized. It was apparent that negotiators in organic organizations did not believe that they were appropriately recognized for their negotiator work. This finding tends to reinforce the concern noted in the introduction to this research about the control of an incident being the domain of individuals who are not oriented toward hostage/crisis negotiation. If the negotiators believe that reward, recognition or career enhancement may not be forthcoming or possibly even negatively affected, will they be able to properly articulate their concerns and suggestions during an incident? Additional research, consisting in part of separate scales to measure career satisfaction and to measure intrinsic job satisfaction for hostage/crisis negotiators, is required.

The next hypothesis (IX) which dealt with mechanistic or organic orientation stated that hostage/crisis negotiation teams in organic oriented agencies are likely to be

perceived as more effective than hostage/crisis negotiation teams in mechanistic agencies. Regardless of whether the organization was determined to be mechanistic or organic, no significant difference was found in hostage/crisis negotiator perception of team effectiveness. Contrary to the predicted outcome, there was no significant difference between mechanistic oriented and organic oriented organizations. This was consistent with the finding that negotiators in both types of organizations were individually satisfied with their negotiation work; seventy-one percent strongly agreed with the statement that hostage/crisis negotiation team work was personally satisfying. Individuals who were satisfied with their work would most likely report that such work was effective. Contributing effective work to an organization is an element of satisfaction. The key to perception of effectiveness may have been the way that the incident ended rather than the organizational nature of the agency. This was another example of dissonance between the means and ends of a function. The means was associated with either mechanistic or organic organizational structure. The end result, peaceful resolution, was more important to the negotiators than the organizational structure which they worked under.

The literature on the organizational structure of police departments has traditionally been normative, advocating particular types of structures to achieve organizational goals. However, police practices and organizational structures cannot be understood merely in terms of efficiency or effectiveness. As noted, mechanistic or organic orientations were considered polar opposites of a continuum which did not preclude incorporating disparate elements into the organization to serve potentially

conflicting demands simultaneously. The organizational structure which a police department adopts is influenced in part by its institutional environment, including elite functions such as SWAT teams and hostage/crisis negotiation units. A new organizational grouping becomes an intersection for previously unconnected activities, or it increases the level of activity between linked specialties. For example, prior to the formation of the first New York City Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team any hostage related activities had been the responsibility of the tactical unit, the Emergency Service Unit. The creation of negotiators in 1973 forged an intersection of previously unconnected activities. As the duties of the hostage/crisis negotiation function expanded, there was an increased level of activity between the linked specialties. The effect was a new organizational construct (see Crank and Langworthy, 1992) which was composed of the Detective Bureau negotiators working in tandem with the Patrol Bureau tactical officers. This was consistent with the concept that mechanistic or organic organizations are not dichotomous but that they were part of a continuum between organizational extremes.

The above discussions about mechanistic or organic orientation was concerned with the organizational placement of the hostage/crisis negotiation function on a day to day administrative basis. Two additional organizational hypotheses (IV, V) were concerned with whether the agency was SWAT oriented or negotiation oriented and the chain of command during an actual hostage/crisis negotiation team deployment. Police organizations which have created specialized part-time units must be concerned with a

least two working arrangements for the unit, the administrative arrangement and the deployment arrangement. The attempt to categorize an agency as SWAT or negotiation oriented was a recognition that the administrative tasks of providing for a unit on a daily basis may have been different than overseeing the deployment and operation of a unit at an incident. It was common that a unit might be placed under the day to day administration of the SWAT team but operated separately from the SWAT team at the scene of incidents. This adaptation resulted in the hostage/crisis negotiation function being placed at an equal or higher level in the chain of command when compared to the SWAT commander. The hostage/crisis negotiation leader reported to the same commander as the SWAT leader did and in some cases operationally reported to the Chief of Police. The attempt to go beyond mechanistic and organic orientations and to characterize agencies as SWAT or negotiation oriented was an attempt to more clearly define the role and placement of hostage/crisis negotiation teams within the police agency.

The first of these hypotheses (IV) stated that the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report to the tactical team leader during an incident in SWAT oriented agencies. The related hypothesis (V) stated that the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report directly to the incident commander during hostage/crisis negotiation team deployments in negotiation oriented agencies. Contrary to the predicted outcomes there were no significant differences found for operational chain of command during actual incident deployment in SWAT oriented agencies when compared to negotiation oriented

agencies.

One explanation for this finding may be the relatively small number of cases available for analysis. When examining the relationship between SWAT orientation or negotiation orientation and to whom the negotiation team commander/leader reported during a typical hostage/crisis negotiation deployment, only 87 cases were available for analysis. The scales which were created to determine SWAT or negotiation orientation were derived from the questionnaire. Two of the items, hazardous duty pay and use of an armored vehicle, were also contained in the LEMAS data which provided a way to assess the validity of the responses. Twenty-eight percent of the LEMAS agencies provided hazardous duty pay for any function within the department compared with six percent of the agencies in this research which provided hazardous duty pay for hostage/crisis negotiators. Fourteen percent of the LEMAS agencies operated an armored vehicle compared with 34% of the agencies in this study. These factors may have contributed to the scale yielding a relatively small number of cases.

Another factor may be that there were only four items available to determine whether the agency was SWAT or negotiation oriented. Originally, five items from the questionnaire were to be used in construction of the SWAT oriented scale and the negotiation oriented scale. One of the items, which was to be part of both scales, was whether the hostage/crisis negotiators responded only to confirmed hostage situations or were utilized in a variety of assignments. The hostage negotiators of the original New York City Police Department team were dispatched only to confirmed hostage situations.

The data of this study revealed that no agency assigned hostage/crisis negotiators exclusively to hostage situations but assigned them to numerous activities. Perhaps a four-point scale was not sufficient to provide for the variation needed in order to have properly tested these two hypotheses.

Only 33% of respondents indicated that the hostage/crisis negotiation team commander/leader reported to the SWAT leader during an incident even though administratively the hostage/crisis negotiation team was part of the SWAT unit in 55% of the agencies. This finding supported an assumption that police departments may manage day-to-day activities one way but manage operational deployments another way. Similar to the concerns about reward, recognition and career enhancement noted in the discussion of hypothesis XIII and the issue of dissonance raised in the discussion of hypothesis XI, this split management arrangement may make sense organizationally, but may have the unintended end result of hostage/crisis negotiators experiencing contradictory loyalty in their hostage/crisis negotiation performance, thereby potentially depriving the chief executive or incident commander of unbiased input and advice.

There is potential in most organizational configurations for differences in the agency's internal culture and its response pattern for a given task. Dissimilarity between SWAT team members and hostage/crisis negotiators provides a fitting illustration of this phenomenon. Vizzard (1998) noted that they may be viewed as "surrogates for two very diverse cultures within most large law enforcement agencies." (p.116) Future research into organizational features of organic and mechanistic structures is appropriate in order

to continue to identify other implications for this division in police agencies.

The final hypothesis (VI) stated that the more an agency has written policies to cover various other operational incidents, the more likely it is to have a written policy on operational aspects of hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. A five item written policy scale was developed from LEMAS data to test this hypothesis. Contrary to the predicted outcome, there was no significant association between the written policy scale scores and the presence of a written policy related to the operation of hostage/crisis negotiation teams. Apparently, many agencies did not believe that the practice of a particular operational activity required the adoption of written policy about that activity. Unless an agency voluntarily submitted to a process of review and accreditation, either by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (1996) or by one of the states which have adopted a similar process, there was no mandate that written policy be adopted. This position was contrary to previous studies which recommended the adoption of written policies for most police procedures and operations.

Sixty written police protocols concerning hostage/crisis negotiation operations were provided to this researcher. There was a wide range in degree of specificity. Two agencies provided a single page policy statement. Another agency provided a comprehensive document which exceeded 60 pages. Some policy documents contained revision dates during 1997 and 1998; one agency provided a three page item dated 1975. An undated and untitled ten-page checklist, which was apparently obtained from a different agency, was submitted by one responding agency. In 33 (55%) of the

documents the hostage/crisis negotiators reported to the incident commander; this was consistent with organic orientation. Twenty-three (38%) of the documents indicated that the reporting line was to the SWAT team commander, consistent with mechanistic orientation. In four (7%) cases there was insufficient information to determine chain of command. The Koleas' (1985) examination of six written hostage/crisis negotiation policies had contained only one (17%) example of clear chain of command, to the incident commander. The other five were not detailed enough to make a determination. The findings of this study tended to support the perception that written operational policies, although not completely accepted, were more widespread and comprehensive than in the earlier days of adoption of hostage/crisis negotiation as a police practice.

Discussion of Descriptive Findings: In addition to the variables analyzed in connection with the nine hypotheses, additional descriptive data were obtained. Comparison of selected aspects of those data with some of the earlier research cited in the literature review is relevant.

One area requiring review was whether agencies had written policies specifically related to the selection of personnel for hostage/crisis negotiators. Consistent with the findings of Hammer, et.al.(1994) which reported that 55% of agencies did not have a written negotiator selection policy and Rogan, et.al.(1994) which reported 62% of agencies without such a written policy, this research determined that 56% of the respondents did not have a written policy for selecting hostage/crisis negotiators even

though 82% did have a written operational policy for hostage/crisis negotiation. Both of the 1994 studies also reported that most hostage/crisis negotiation commanders were white males; this too was consistent with the findings of this research project. The LEMAS data had reported 90% of sworn officers in their data base were male and 80% were white.

The Hammer, et.al. (1994) study also reported that initial negotiator training was ten days or less for 74% of the cases studied; sixty-one percent received five days or less of inservice training. The FBI had provided the initial training for 40% of the agencies. This study, again consistent with prior research, found a mean of 47 hours, approximately six days, for initial negotiator training and 32 hours, approximately four days, for inservice. The FBI was the initial training provider in 35% of the cases.

Another area of interest involved whether or not the hostage/crisis negotiation function was part of the SWAT team. The Houston Police Department (1983) study had reported that the hostage negotiation function was assigned to the SWAT team in 59% of the cases. This research resulted in a similar finding; 56% were part of the SWAT team..

Previous research had also reported on the relative effectiveness of negotiation as a police tactic. Strentz (1985) had reported that 85% of the subjects who had been taken into custody unharmed were talked out by trained negotiators, while Head (1989) determined that 34% of the cases he studied credited a trained negotiator with peaceful resolution. The current study found that 68% of 1997 cases reported were concluded

through negotiation. Strentz (1985) had also reported that in 63 cases lasting up to four hours only 36 (57%) of the subjects were negotiated out, while in 80 situations lasting between seven and nine hours, 76 (95%) ended peacefully. The research reported here determined that for almost 3,000 team deployments during 1997, approximately 68% were concluded through negotiation and 32% utilized tactical intervention by a SWAT team after some period of negotiation. The mean time elapsed in both types of resolutions was 3.5 hours.

The finding that both negotiated solutions and tactical solutions, on average, were accomplished in the same time frame makes it important to consider issues of the means and ends of policing. Emphasis on SWAT tactics after a given period of time could become a self fulfilling prophecy. Average time experiences should not become more important than deciding whether negotiation or SWAT intervention contributed to the safest police response.

In the United States a variety of policing agencies are among the principle elements of government that may legitimately use force to accomplish their mission. This might engender a military mind-set which stressed strict adherence to a chain of command and the use of force as the appropriate means to solve problems. The essence of the police function could be reduced to a threat to use force, not only as an option of last resort (see Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). Bittner (1975) noted that the police are a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society. A skeptical view of this characterization is that the most expedient police route to solving problems is

operationalized through military-style tactics which focus on either the threatened or the actual use of force. A more open-minded interpretation might be that the constitutional authority of policing is, in and of itself, a use of force and from that a continuum starts, beginning with verbal suggestion and can ultimately conclude in justifiable deadly physical force. This continuum was one way to express the range of action available to the police when weighing the means and ends of their activity.

Conclusion

This research has determined whether a responding agency organizational structure was more mechanistic or more organic. It also identified whether an agency hostage recovery program appeared to place more emphasis on SWAT activities or on negotiation oriented practices. It has also established the extent to which responding police negotiators are personally satisfied in their hostage/crisis negotiation related work and that they believe that hostage/crisis negotiation is an effective police practice. The work of Burns and Stalker (1961) which examined organizational designs and practices in different environmental conditions provided the foundation for many of the issues in this study. Their emphasis on the importance of considering differing work place atmospheres is well noted, especially when estimating whether a mostly classic bureaucratic approach (mechanistic) may be more appropriate for the placement of a hostage/crisis negotiation team than an approach which tends to stress collegiality and shared decision making (organic). Because policing in the United States is an extremely complex subject

which exhibits a high degree of variety in size of agencies, of hierarchy in structure and in division of functional tasks, a determination of an agency being fully mechanistic or fully organic will seldom be made. But, as stressed by Burns and Stalker, the attributes which tend toward one or the other organizational structures are not polar opposites but are part of a continuum, involving various degrees of flexibility. A recognition and acceptance of organizational flexibility would appear to be in the best interest of the institutionalization of a hostage/crisis negotiation program. While U.S. policing continues to be primarily mechanistic, a more organic strategy of formal hostage negotiation has been demonstrated to be useful in reducing violence in such situations.

This research sought, in part, to determine if there was a best practice organizational arrangement for a hostage/crisis negotiation unit in American police agencies. The answer is still unknown. In a published book review about various aspects of the WACO incident, Vizzard (1998) noted that there is often a tendency to "over simplify the complex" (p.116), and he also suggested that consideration of organizational routines and cultures should probably be part of the review of "pragmatic problems in developing law enforcement strategies for dealing with armed groups" (p.118). He additionally stressed that "determining the proper response is no easy task." (p.118).

Twenty-five years ago hostage/crisis negotiation did not exist as an operational task in U.S. police departments. In 1972-3 the largest law enforcement agency in the U.S., NYPD, reacted to a critical hostage incident in Munich, West Germany, by beginning an examination of police operational responses to hostage situations. As a

result of their in-house studies hostage negotiators were created. Subsequently, agencies throughout the country studied the NYPD development and many adapted the concept to local requirements. Within ten years more than half of the agencies responding to this survey had adopted some form of the strategy. It is apparent that hostage/crisis negotiation is now an established tactic in American policing and that specially trained police negotiators have been recognized as most suited to carry out this function.

Although some unfortunate examples of the manner in which siege events had been handled in various parts of this country were referred to in the introduction to this research, also stressed was the fact that countless lives including hostages, police personnel and captors were protected by adherence to a posture which underscored the importance of coordinated negotiation over a potentially premature tactical intervention. Even if the number of negative incidents highlighted were the only examples of their kind, a review of organizational structure and reporting lines would be appropriate in an effort to better insure that these particular histories do not repeat themselves. The decision-making chief executive or incident commander should have available the best information from the potentially two extreme views of the incident. As Kuykendall and Roberg (1992) noted in their discussion of organic and mechanistic organizations, neither is superior to the other under all circumstances. So too, neither SWAT tactics nor negotiation tactics is the most appropriate response to all situations. An appreciation of the contribution of a more adaptable organizational structure which contains elements of the mechanistic and the organic should tend to provide for a more informed decision-

making process.

APPENDIX "A"

Questionnaire and Cover Letter

JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE / CUNY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER
Security Management Institute
899 Tenth Avenue, Suite 636T
New York, NY 10019-1029

(212) 237-8638 Fax: (212) 237-8637

January 1, 1998

Dear Chief,

The enclosed questionnaire is part of a project to gather data about hostage/crisis negotiation units in American policing. The results will provide a synthesis of organizational and procedural aspects of hostage/crisis negotiation and enable Chiefs to be more familiar with how similar agencies across the country handle this function.

My interest in this subject is not only academic. During my twenty-one-year police career I was a hostage negotiator for thirteen years and team commander and chief negotiator for six of those years.

It may be most practical if the person responsible for the activities of your hostage/crisis negotiation unit is the individual who completes the questionnaire. It should take approximately thirty (30) minutes to complete. All questions can be answered on the form. A postage-paid return envelope is provided.

Obviously, participation is voluntary. No identifier information about the officer who completes the questionnaire is required. The name of the agency is requested only to account for returned questionnaires but will not be used in reporting the results. The information provided will be collated and presented in the form of statistical summaries. A synopsis of the research findings will be sent to you.

Thank you for contributing to this project. If there are any questions I may be contacted as follows:

Robert J. Louden
Director, Criminal Justice Center
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
899 Tenth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Phone (212) 237 8639
Fax (212) 237 8637
E-mail: rjlouden@faculty.jjay.cuny.edu

Sincerely,

Robert J. Louden
Director

The following items are about your agency: *TODAY'S DATE:*_____

Your agency function is primarily: _____police / law enforcement _____corrections _____court

Agency level of government is : _____local / municipal _____county _____state _____federal _____military

What state is your agency located in ?_____Name of Agency_____

Size of population served _____ Number of sworn officers in agency_____

Does your agency have a Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team? _____no _____yes

What year did your agency first form a Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team ? _____

Is the Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team a part of the Tactical (SWAT) Team? _____no _____yes

How many trained Hostage/Crisis Negotiators are in your agency's team? _____

What is the usual number of Hostage/Crisis Negotiators deployed at a call-up?_____

For each type of incident which your Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team may respond to, please indicate approximately how many incidents of each type the Team was deployed at during 1997:
(Mark item **NA** if not included in team duties. Write **0** if included in duties but no deployments in 1997)

_____hostages being held [all reasons] _____barricaded criminal, no hostages

_____suicidal / jumper, no hostages _____planned high risk raid / warrant situations

_____kidnaping situations _____emotionally disturbed / mentally ill, no hostages

_____extortion situations _____other, namely_____

How many Hostage/Crisis Negotiation deployments did your agency team participate in during;
1995_____ 1996_____ 1997_____

How many of these incidents ended with the subject being negotiated-out without a need to resort to a tactical solution;
1995_____ 1996_____ 1997_____

What was the average elapsed time (hours) for these incidents during which the subject was negotiated-out;
1995_____ 1996_____ 1997_____

What was the average elapsed time (hours) for these incidents in which there was a need to resort to a tactical solution;
1995_____ 1996_____ 1997_____

The rank of the Incident Commander at a typical Hostage/Crisis Negotiation deployment is_____

The rank of the Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team commander / leader at a typical deployment is_____

The rank of the Tactical (SWAT) Team commander / leader at a typical deployment is _____

At a typical Hostage/Crisis Negotiation deployment the Negotiation Team commander / leader reports to: (check one)
_____Incident Commander _____Tactical (SWAT) Commander _Other,_____

Does a prosecutor usually respond to Hostage/Crisis situations?
_____no _____yes, occasionally _____ yes, usually

Do Hostage/Crisis Negotiators receive additional pay?
_____no _____yes, hazardous duty pay _____ yes, merit pay _____ yes, other pay

Does your agency maintain an armored vehicle? _____no _____yes

Does your agency have a written policy for Hostage/Crisis Negotiation situations? _____no _____yes

For each of the following activities indicate if your agency's policy for Hostage/Crisis Negotiation situations.
A = Allows; F = Forbids; N = Not Mentioned

_____movement to another site with hostages
_____movement to another site without hostages
_____providing **illegal** drugs / substances
_____providing **legal** drugs or alcohol
_____elected officials to negotiate
_____mental health professionals to negotiate
_____lawyers / attorneys to negotiate
_____sets a time limit for negotiation
_____exchange of hostages
_____exchange of weapons
_____amnesty for actions
_____release of prisoners
_____clergy to negotiate
_____media to negotiate
_____family / friends to negotiate
_____other,namely_____

Is each negotiator given a copy of the Hostage/Crisis Negotiation policy? ____ no ____ yes

If a police officer who is **not** a trained hostage/crisis negotiator is communicating with a subject prior to the arrival of a trained hostage/crisis negotiator, is he _____replaced immediately ____monitored _____kept talking indefinetly?

Stress debriefing after an incident for Negotiators is _____mandatory _____sometimes offered _____ never offered

Does the agency usually record (audio or video) Hostage/Crisis Negotiation incidents? _____no _____yes

The following items are about your agency's hostage/crisis negotiation training:

Approximate number of hours of **your agency's initial** Hostage/Crisis Negotiator training_____

Your agency's initial Hostage/Crisis Negotiator training is provided by: (select one)
_____your agency _____regional academy _____state academy _____FBI ___ other_____

Give the approximate number of hours for each item during initial hostage/crisis training (mark item N if not included);

A. active listening skills _____
B. communication skills _____
C. crisis intervention techniques _____
D. dealing with domestic disputes _____
E. dealing with emotionally aroused people____
F. dealing with mental illness_____
G. dealing with substance abusers_____
H. dealing with suicidal people _____
I. dealing with terrorists _____
J. empathy _____
K. firearms proficiency _____
L. first-aid / CPR _____

(Training items continued)

M. foreign language skills _____ N. history of hostage/crisis negotiation _____

O. interaction with media _____ P. interaction with the SWAT team_____

Q. legal considerations_____ R. liaison with other agencies _____

S. physical fitness _____ T. sign language_____

U. unarmed self-defense _____ V. other, namely _____

What is the average number of hours your agency requires annually as **in-service or refresher** training for Hostage/Crisis Negotiators? _____

Would it be possible to obtain a copy of the **non-confidential** components of your Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Policy / Plan to assist in this study?

____ yes, attached _____ yes, being forwarded separately _____ no, not permitted

____ yes, contact _____ at _____ to make arrangements.

The following items are your opinion: On a scale of 1= Strongly Disagree 2= Moderately Disagree 3= Slightly Disagree 4= Slightly Agree 5= Moderately Agree 6= Strongly Agree

A. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team work is personally satisfying.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

B. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team work has enhanced my career.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

C. I have received appropriate recognition / acknowledgment for my Hostage/Crisis Negotiation work.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

D. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation reduces the chance of death or serious physical injury during a contained incident.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

E. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation usually results in resolution through negotiation rather than a need for a tactical solution.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

F. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation results in fewer call-backs or repeat calls for the same person.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

G. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation results in bystanders at incidents being positive about negotiation team efforts.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

H. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation results in citizens initiating positive phone calls or letters about an incident.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

I. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation increases the chance of positive media attention after an incident.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

J. The Hostage/Crisis Negotiation team should be part of the Tactical (SWAT) team.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

K. There should be a pre-determined time limit set for negotiating during Hostage/Crisis situations.

Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 *Agree*

The following items are about you:

Rank/title: __PO / Dep / Trp __Cpl / Sgt ___Lt. ____ Capt. ___Above Capt.

Education: __HS / GED ____Some College ___Bachelor _____Master ____Ph.D./ JD

Gender: ____Female ____ Male Age: _____

Ethnicity: ____Asian ____Black ____Hispanic / Latin _____White ___Other_____

Are you currently a trained Hostage/Crisis Negotiator for your agency? _____no ____yes

If yes, Is your assignment as a Hostage/Crisis Negotiator considered full time? ____no ____yes

Number of years as a sworn officer_____ Number of years as a Hostage/Crisis Negotiator_____

Are you the Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team commander for your agency? _____no _____yes

Your usual current assignment is: _____patrol _____investigative _____SWAT ____other_____

Do you usually negotiate: _____in uniform _____in civilian clothes

If you usually negotiate in civilian clothes, do you wear?
_____suit / tie _____casual _____'raid' jacket _____'Jump' suit

Do you usually wear a ballistic vest when negotiating?
_____no _____yes, hidden _____yes, visible

Do you usually wear your handgun when negotiating?
_____no _____yes, hidden _____yes, visible

What is the approximate date of your last deployment as a negotiator? _____

Approximately how many Hostage/Crisis Negotiation incidents were you deployed at during:
1995_____ 1996_____ 1997_____

How did you initiate the process to become a trained Hostage/Crisis Negotiator? (check the main one only)
_____I responded to a posting or vacancy notice
_____I sought out the information and volunteered
_____I was encouraged to apply by someone in the agency

What selection steps did your agency use to pick you as a hostage/crisis negotiator? (Check all that apply)

_____ application form / packet
_____ review of departmental record
_____ one on one interview with team leader
_____ physical agility test
_____ interview with psychiatrist / psychologist
_____ recommendation of supervisor
_____ medical examination
_____ panel interview
_____ paper & pencil psychological test
_____ other, namely_____

Are these agency selection procedures included in a written document or policy? _____no _____yes

Please comment about this questionnaire or about anything related to Hostage/Crisis Negotiation_____
_____
_____
_____

APPENDIX "B"

Variables (Frequency, Mean, Range, Standard Deviation)

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Above high school	276	0	.18	.39	1
Comments added	275	1	1.39	.49	1
Age	53	223	44.87	6.40	31
Agility test	276	0	.38	1.57	8
Citizen appeal	276	0	.46	.50	1
Application	276	0	.73	1.57	8
Armored car	276	0	1.34	.47	1
Records incidents	274	2	1.55	.50	1
Civilian clothes	272	4	3.58	2.42	7
Wear negotiating	271	5	2.22	1.59	7
Computer car	276	0	.35	.48	1

Above high school

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	226	81.9	81.9	81.9
	1	50	18.1	18.1	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Comments added

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	168	60.9	61.1	61.1
	yes	107	38.8	38.9	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	32	1	4	1.9	1.9
	34	1	4	1.9	3.8
	35	2	.7	3.8	7.5
	38	4	1.4	7.5	15.1
	39	1	.4	1.9	17.0
	40	4	1.4	7.5	24.5
	41	4	1.4	7.5	32.1
	42	4	1.4	7.5	39.6
	43	4	1.4	7.5	47.2
	44	5	1.8	9.4	56.6
	45	2	.7	3.8	60.4
	46	2	.7	3.8	64.2
	47	2	.7	3.8	67.9
	48	2	.7	3.8	71.7
	49	1	.4	1.9	73.6
	50	5	1.8	9.4	83.0
	51	1	.4	1.9	84.9
	52	1	.4	1.9	86.8
	53	1	.4	1.9	88.7
	54	1	.4	1.9	90.6
	55	2	.7	3.8	94.3
	56	1	.4	1.9	96.2
	57	1	.4	1.9	98.1
	63	1	.4	1.9	100.0
	Total	53	19.2	100.0	
Missing	99	223	80.8		
	Total	223	80.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Agility test

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	249	90.2	90.2	90.2
	1	16	5.8	5.8	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Citizen appeal

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	148	53.6	53.6	53.6
	1	128	46.4	46.4	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Application

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	154	55.8	55.8	55.8
	1	109	39.5	39.5	95.3
	2	1	.4	.4	95.7
	3	1	.4	.4	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Armored car

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	183	66.3	66.3	66.3
	yes	93	33.7	33.7	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Records incidents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	123	44.6	44.9	44.9
	yes	151	54.7	55.1	100.0
	Total	274	99.3	100.0	
Missing	9	2	.7		
	Total	2	.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Civilian clothes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	suit/tie	18	6.5	6.6	6.6
	casual	114	41.3	41.9	48.5
	raid jacket	67	24.3	24.6	73.2
	jumpsuit	14	5.1	5.1	78.3
	not applicable	59	21.4	21.7	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Wear negotiating

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	uniform	48	17.4	17.7	17.7
	civilian clothes	205	74.3	75.6	93.4
	not a negotiator	18	6.5	6.6	100.0
	Total	271	98.2	100.0	
Missing	9	5	1.8		
	Total	5	1.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Computer car

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	179	64.9	64.9	64.9
	1	97	35.1	35.1	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Current assignment	275	1	2.51	1.28	3
deployments 1995	240	36	8.97	13.90	100
deployments 1996	246	30	9.70	14.21	109
deployments 1997	265	11	10.52	15.09	120
Education level	275	1	2.76	.86	4
effectiveness scale	256	20	29.91	3.24	16
Environmental crime	276	0	1.22	.42	1
Environmental unit	276	0	.23	.42	1
Ethnicity	274	2	3.86	.50	4

Current assignment

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	patrol	84	30.4	30.5	30.5
	investigative	72	26.1	26.2	56.7
	SWAT	14	5.1	5.1	61.8
	other	105	38.0	38.2	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

deployments 1995

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	33	12.0	13.8	13.8
	1	15	5.4	6.3	20.0
	2	26	9.4	10.8	30.8
	3	27	9.8	11.3	42.1
	4	15	5.4	6.3	48.3
	5	14	5.1	5.8	54.2
	6	17	6.2	7.1	61.3
	7	8	2.9	3.3	64.6
	8	8	2.9	3.3	67.9
	9	7	2.5	2.9	70.8
	10	10	3.6	4.2	75.0
	11	4	1.4	1.7	76.7
	12	8	2.9	3.3	80.0
	13	4	1.4	1.7	81.7
	14	5	1.8	2.1	83.8
	15	2	.7	.8	84.6
	16	4	1.4	1.7	86.3
	17	3	1.1	1.3	87.5
	18	4	1.4	1.7	89.2
	20	3	1.1	1.3	90.4
	23	1	.4	.4	90.8
	24	3	1.1	1.3	92.1
	25	6	2.2	2.5	94.6
	26	1	.4	.4	95.0
	28	1	.4	.4	95.4
	30	2	.7	.8	96.3
	34	1	.4	.4	96.7
	44	1	.4	.4	97.1
	48	1	.4	.4	97.5
	50	1	.4	.4	97.9
	52	1	.4	.4	98.3
	72	1	.4	.4	98.8
	91	1	.4	.4	99.2
	100	2	.7	.8	100.0
	Total	240	87.0	100.0	
Missing	999	36	13.0		
	Total	36	13.0		
Total		276	100.0		

deployments 1996

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	27	9.8	11.0	11.0
	1	7	2.5	2.8	13.8
	2	36	13.0	14.6	28.5
	3	27	9.8	11.0	39.4
	4	16	5.8	6.5	45.9
	5	14	5.1	5.7	51.6
	6	14	5.1	5.7	57.3
	7	8	2.9	3.3	60.6
	8	14	5.1	5.7	66.3
	9	5	1.8	2.0	68.3
	10	7	2.5	2.8	71.1
	11	8	2.9	3.3	74.4
	12	5	1.8	2.0	76.4
	13	4	1.4	1.6	78.0
	14	6	2.2	2.4	80.5
	15	9	3.3	3.7	84.1
	16	2	.7	.8	85.0
	17	3	1.1	1.2	86.2
	18	4	1.4	1.6	87.8
	20	1	.4	.4	88.2
	21	1	.4	.4	88.6
	22	2	.7	.8	89.4
	24	2	.7	.8	90.2
	25	4	1.4	1.6	91.9
	26	1	.4	.4	92.3
	29	3	1.1	1.2	93.5
	30	3	1.1	1.2	94.7
	31	1	.4	.4	95.1
	32	2	.7	.8	95.9
	33	1	.4	.4	96.3
	38	1	.4	.4	96.7
	45	3	1.1	1.2	98.0
	50	1	.4	.4	98.4
	56	1	.4	.4	98.8
	100	2	7	.8	99.6
	109	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	999	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

deployments 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	13	4.7	4.9	4.9
	1	21	7.6	7.9	12.8
	2	26	9.4	9.8	22.6
	3	27	9.8	10.2	32.8
	4	24	8.7	9.1	41.9
	5	14	5.1	5.3	47.2
	6	20	7.2	7.5	54.7
	7	13	4.7	4.9	59.6
	8	12	4.3	4.5	64.2
	9	7	2.5	2.6	66.8
	10	9	3.3	3.4	70.2
	11	7	2.5	2.6	72.8
	12	12	4.3	4.5	77.4
	13	2	.7	.8	78.1
	14	5	1.8	1.9	80.0
	15	3	1.1	1.1	81.1
	16	6	2.2	2.3	83.4
	17	2	.7	.8	84.2
	18	1	.4	.4	84.5
	19	3	1.1	1.1	85.7
	20	3	1.1	1.1	86.8
	21	2	.7	.8	87.5
	22	5	1.8	1.9	89.4
	23	2	.7	.8	90.2
	24	1	.4	.4	90.6
	25	2	.7	.8	91.3
	26	1	.4	.4	91.7
	27	1	.4	.4	92.1
	28	2	.7	.8	92.8
	30	3	1.1	1.1	94.0
	32	1	.4	.4	94.3
	33	1	.4	.4	94.7
	34	2	.7	.8	95.5
	38	1	.4	.4	95.8
	39	1	.4	.4	96.2
	40	1	.4	.4	96.6
	43	1	.4	.4	97.0
	50	2	.7	.8	97.7
	55	1	.4	.4	98.1
	60	1	.4	.4	98.5
	82	1	.4	.4	98.9
	100	2	.7	.8	99.6
	120	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	999	11	4.0		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Education level

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	hs/ged	7	2.5	2.5	2.5
	some college	115	41.7	41.8	44.4
	Bachelor	97	35.1	35.3	79.6
	Master	49	17.8	17.8	97.5
	PhD/JD	7	2.5	2.5	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

effectiveness scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	20	1	.4	.4	.4
	21	2	.7	.8	1.2
	22	3	1.1	1.2	2.3
	23	5	1.8	2.0	4.3
	24	6	2.2	2.3	6.6
	25	12	4.3	4.7	11.3
	26	11	4.0	4.3	15.6
	27	14	5.1	5.5	21.1
	28	20	7.2	7.8	28.9
	29	26	9.4	10.2	39.1
	30	35	12.7	13.7	52.7
	31	32	11.6	12.5	65.2
	32	36	13.0	14.1	79.3
	33	26	9.4	10.2	89.5
	34	12	4.3	4.7	94.1
	35	8	2.9	3.1	97.3
	36	7	2.5	2.7	100.0
	Total	256	92.8	100.0	
Missing	99	20	7.2		
	Total	20	7.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Environmental crime

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	214	77.5	77.5	77.5
	2	62	22.5	22.5	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Environmental unit

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	213	77.2	77.2	77.2
	1	63	22.8	22.8	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Ethnicity

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Asian	1	.4	.4	.4
	Black	12	4.3	4.4	4.7
	Hispanic/Latin	14	5.1	5.1	9.9
	White	245	88.8	89.4	99.3
	Other	2	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	274	99.3	100.0	
Missing	9	2	.7		
	Total	2	.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Full time negotiator	256	20	1.06	.24	1
Agency function	276	0	1.02	.19	2
Gender	274	2	1.93	.26	1
Geographic area	276	0	2.52	1.05	3
Get copy of policy	227	49	2.59	1.68	7
Level of government	276	0	1.41	.62	2
Gun negotiating	254	22	2.19	.51	2
Hand-held computers	276	0	.14	.35	1
Has negotiation team	276	0	2.00	6.02E-02	1
Hostage commander	269	7	1.76	.43	1
Homeless persons	276	0	1.30	.46	1

Full time negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	240	87.0	93.8	93.8
	yes	16	5.8	6.3	100.0
	Total	256	92.8	100.0	
Missing	8	12	4.3		
	9	8	2.9		
	Total	20	7.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Agency function

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	police	272	98.6	98.6	98.6
	corrections	2	.7	.7	99.3
	court	2	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	female	20	7.2	7.3	7.3
	male	254	92.0	92.7	100.0
	Total	274	99.3	100.0	
Missing	9	2	.7		
	Total	2	.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Geographic area

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Northeast	48	17.4	17.4	17.4
	South	107	38.8	38.8	56.2
	Midwest	51	18.5	18.5	74.6
	West	70	25.4	25.4	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Get copy of policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	75	27.2	33.0	33.0
	yes, attached	62	22.5	27.3	60.4
	yes, separately	12	4.3	5.3	65.6
	yes, contact	68	24.6	30.0	95.6
	no written policy	10	3.6	4.4	100.0
	Total	227	82.2	100.0	
Missing	9	49	17.8		
	Total	49	17.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Level of government

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	local	184	66.7	66.7	66.7
	county	72	26.1	26.1	92.8
	state	20	7.2	7.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Gun negotiating

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	14	5.1	5.5	5.5
	yes, hidden	178	64.5	70.1	75.6
	yes, visible	62	22.5	24.4	100.0
	Total	254	92.0	100.0	
Missing	8	19	6.9		
	9	3	1.1		
	Total	22	8.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Hand-held computers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	236	85.5	85.5	85.5
	1	40	14.5	14.5	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Has negotiation team

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	1	.4	.4	.4
	yes	275	99.6	99.6	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Hostage commander

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	65	23.6	24.2	24.2
	yes	204	73.9	75.8	100.0
	Total	269	97.5	100.0	
Missing	8	2	.7		
	9	5	1.8		
	Total	7	2.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Homeless persons

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	193	69.9	69.9	69.9
	2	83	30.1	30.1	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Hours of initial training	271	5	47.1993	26.8674	248.00

Hours of initial training

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2.00	1	.4	.4	.4
	5.00	1	.4	.4	.7
	8.00	4	1.4	1.5	2.2
	15.00	1	.4	.4	2.6
	16.00	3	1.1	1.1	3.7
	20.00	1	.4	.4	4.1
	24.00	27	9.8	10.0	14.0
	28.00	1	.4	.4	14.4
	30.00	1	.4	.4	14.8
	32.00	3	1.1	1.1	15.9
	40.00	158	57.2	58.3	74.2
	44.00	1	.4	.4	74.5
	46.00	1	.4	.4	74.9
	48.00	6	2.2	2.2	77.1
	50.00	5	1.8	1.8	79.0
	51.00	1	.4	.4	79.3
	56.00	3	1.1	1.1	80.4
	58.00	1	.4	.4	80.8
	60.00	5	1.8	1.8	82.7
	64.00	1	.4	.4	83.0
	68.00	1	.4	.4	83.4
	70.00	2	.7	.7	84.1
	72.00	2	.7	.7	84.9
	78.00	1	.4	.4	85.2
	80.00	28	10.1	10.3	95.6
	90.00	1	.4	.4	95.9
	96.00	1	.4	.4	96.3
	98.00	1	.4	.4	96.7
	100.00	2	.7	.7	97.4
	118.00	1	.4	.4	97.8
	120.00	3	1.1	1.1	98.9
	176.00	1	.4	.4	99.3
	220.00	1	.4	.4	99.6
	250.00	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	271	98.2	100.0	
Missing	999.00	5	1.8		
	Total	5	1.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
innovation scale	276	0	2.12	1.29	6
In-service training	263	13	31.5817	36.9187	210.00
Provider of training	275	1	3.09	1.42	4
Investigate force	276	0	1.57	.50	1
Last deployment	248	28	6.07	11.22	96
mechanistic organization	245	31	1.58	1.10	5
mech v org	253	23	1.45	.50	1
Medical exam	276	0	.36	1.57	8
MOVEMEN2	150	126	.32	.69	2
MOVEMENT	151	125	1.68	.69	2
Copy of policy	270	6	2.88	2.21	7
NEGORIE	87	189	1.37	.72	4
Negotiated out 1995	226	50	6.49	9.98	80
negotiated out 1996	237	39	6.91	10.28	97

innovation scale

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	28	10.1	10.1	10.1
	1	62	22.5	22.5	32.6
	2	89	32.2	32.2	64.9
	3	53	19.2	19.2	84.1
	4	34	12.3	12.3	96.4
	5	9	3.3	3.3	99.6
	6	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

In-service training

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	59	21.4	22.4	22.4
	4.00	3	1.1	1.1	23.6
	6.00	2	.7	.8	24.3
	8.00	25	9.1	9.5	33.8
	9.00	4	1.4	1.5	35.4
	10.00	6	2.2	2.3	37.6
	12.00	6	2.2	2.3	39.9
	15.00	2	.7	.8	40.7
	16.00	25	9.1	9.5	50.2
	20.00	8	2.9	3.0	53.2
	24.00	12	4.3	4.6	57.8
	25.00	2	.7	.8	58.6
	27.00	1	.4	.4	58.9
	28.00	1	.4	.4	59.3
	30.00	2	.7	.8	60.1
	32.00	11	4.0	4.2	64.3
	36.00	3	1.1	1.1	65.4
	40.00	40	14.5	15.2	80.6
	45.00	1	.4	.4	81.0
	48.00	3	1.1	1.1	82.1
	50.00	1	.4	.4	82.5
	56.00	4	1.4	1.5	84.0
	60.00	4	1.4	1.5	85.6
	80.00	4	1.4	1.5	87.1
	88.00	1	.4	.4	87.5
	96.00	18	6.5	6.8	94.3
	100.00	5	1.8	1.9	96.2
	104.00	1	.4	.4	96.6
	116.00	1	.4	.4	97.0
	120.00	1	.4	.4	97.3
	128.00	1	.4	.4	97.7
	136.00	1	.4	.4	98.1
	144.00	2	.7	.8	98.9
	180.00	1	.4	.4	99.2
	190.00	1	.4	.4	99.6
	210.00	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	263	95.3	100.0	
Missing	99.00	13	4.7		
	Total	13	4.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Provider of training

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	own agency	60	21.7	21.8	21.8
	regional academy	39	14.1	14.2	36.0
	state academy	35	12.7	12.7	48.7
	FBI	97	35.1	35.3	84.0
	other	44	15.9	16.0	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Investigate force

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	119	43.1	43.1	43.1
	2	157	56.9	56.9	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Last deployment

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	.4	.4	.4
	1	86	31.2	34.7	35.1
	2	29	10.5	11.7	46.8
	3	21	7.6	8.5	55.2
	4	25	9.1	10.1	65.3
	5	10	3.6	4.0	69.4
	6	14	5.1	5.6	75.0
	7	16	5.8	6.5	81.5
	8	9	3.3	3.6	85.1
	9	11	4.0	4.4	89.5
	10	2	.7	.8	90.3
	11	1	.4	.4	90.7
	12	1	.4	.4	91.1
	14	1	.4	.4	91.5
	15	1	.4	.4	91.9
	16	2	.7	.8	92.7
	17	1	.4	.4	93.1
	18	2	.7	.8	94.0
	19	1	.4	.4	94.4
	20	1	.4	.4	94.8
	24	3	1.1	1.2	96.0
	30	2	.7	.8	96.8
	36	3	1.1	1.2	98.0
	42	1	.4	.4	98.4
	60	2	.7	.8	99.2
	88	1	.4	.4	99.6
	96	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	248	89.9	100.0	
Missing	98	11	4.0		
	99	17	6.2		
	Total	28	10.1		
Total		276	100.0		

mechanistic organization

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	50	18.1	20.4	20.4
	1	61	22.1	24.9	45.3
	2	87	31.5	35.5	80.8
	3	38	13.8	15.5	96.3
	4	8	2.9	3.3	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	245	88.8	100.0	
Missing	9	31	11.2		
	Total	31	11.2		
Total		276	100.0		

mech v org

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	more mechanistic	140	50.7	55.3	55.3
	more organic	113	40.9	44.7	100.0
	Total	253	91.7	100.0	
Missing	9	23	8.3		
	Total	23	8.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Medical exam

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	255	92.4	92.4	92.4
	1	10	3.6	3.6	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

MOVEMEN2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	121	43.8	80.7	80.7
	1	10	3.6	6.7	87.3
	2	19	6.9	12.7	100.0
	Total	150	54.3	100.0	
Missing	9	126	45.7		
	Total	126	45.7		
Total		276	100.0		

MOVEMENT

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	19	6.9	12.6	12.6
	1	10	3.6	6.6	19.2
	2	122	44.2	80.8	100.0
	Total	151	54.7	100.0	
Missing	9	125	45.3		
	Total	125	45.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Copy of policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	15	5.4	5.6	5.6
	yes	213	77.2	78.9	84.4
	no written policy	42	15.2	15.6	100.0
	Total	270	97.8	100.0	
Missing	9	6	2.2		
	Total	6	2.2		
Total		276	100.0		

NEGORIE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	8	2.9	9.2	9.2
	1	42	15.2	48.3	57.5
	2	35	12.7	40.2	97.7
	3	1	.4	1.1	98.9
	4	1	.4	1.1	100.0
	Total	87	31.5	100.0	
Missing	9	189	68.5		
	Total	189	68.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiated out 1995

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	38	13.8	16.8	16.8
	1	18	6.5	8.0	24.8
	2	32	11.6	14.2	38.9
	3	29	10.5	12.8	51.8
	4	16	5.8	7.1	58.8
	5	14	5.1	6.2	65.0
	6	10	3.6	4.4	69.5
	7	6	2.2	2.7	72.1
	8	6	2.2	2.7	74.8
	9	7	2.5	3.1	77.9
	10	11	4.0	4.9	82.7
	11	7	2.5	3.1	85.8
	12	6	2.2	2.7	88.5
	13	4	1.4	1.8	90.3
	14	1	.4	.4	90.7
	15	3	1.1	1.3	92.0
	17	1	.4	.4	92.5
	18	1	.4	.4	92.9
	20	3	1.1	1.3	94.2
	21	1	.4	.4	94.7
	23	2	.7	.9	95.6
	24	2	.7	.9	96.5
	26	2	.7	.9	97.3
	29	1	.4	.4	97.8
	35	1	.4	.4	98.2
	41	1	.4	.4	98.7
	58	1	.4	.4	99.1
	75	1	.4	.4	99.6
	80	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	226	81.9	100.0	
Missing	99	50	18.1		
	Total	50	18.1		
Total		276	100.0		

negotiated out 1996

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	32	11.6	13.5	13.5
	1	19	6.9	8.0	21.5
	2	41	14.9	17.3	38.8
	3	20	7.2	8.4	47.3
	4	13	4.7	5.5	52.7
	5	22	8.0	9.3	62.0
	6	13	4.7	5.5	67.5
	7	4	1.4	1.7	69.2
	8	12	4.3	5.1	74.3
	9	7	2.5	3.0	77.2
	10	11	4.0	4.6	81.9
	11	4	1.4	1.7	83.5
	12	7	2.5	3.0	86.5
	13	3	1.1	1.3	87.8
	15	5	1.8	2.1	89.9
	16	2	.7	.8	90.7
	17	2	.7	.8	91.6
	18	1	.4	.4	92.0
	19	1	.4	.4	92.4
	20	4	1.4	1.7	94.1
	21	1	.4	.4	94.5
	23	2	.7	.8	95.4
	24	1	.4	.4	95.8
	25	1	.4	.4	96.2
	26	2	.7	.8	97.0
	28	1	.4	.4	97.5
	30	1	.4	.4	97.9
	32	1	.4	.4	98.3
	35	1	.4	.4	98.7
	50	1	.4	.4	99.2
	75	1	.4	.4	99.6
	97	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	237	85.9	100.0	
Missing	99	39	14.1		
	Total	39	14.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Media negotiate	246	30	1.93	.97	2
Family/freinds negotiate	246	30	2.07	.85	2
Other negotiate	38	238	2.13	.93	2
Movement without hostages	248	28	1.84	.93	2
Provide illegal drugs	249	27	1.45	.84	2
Provide legal drugs	247	29	1.73	.85	2
Elected officials negotiate	246	30	1.99	.98	2
Mental health negotiate	246	30	2.17	.79	2
Lawyers negotiate	246	30	2.14	.93	2
Time limit	248	28	2.14	.97	2
Exchange hostages	247	29	1.40	.79	2

Media negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	123	44.6	50.0	50.0
	yes, allows	16	5.8	6.5	56.5
	not mentioned	107	38.8	43.5	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Family/freinds negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	81	29.3	32.9	32.9
	yes, allows	68	24.6	27.6	60.6
	not mentioned	97	35.1	39.4	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Other negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	14	5.1	36.8	36.8
	yes, allows	5	1.8	13.2	50.0
	not mentioned	19	6.9	50.0	100.0
	Total	38	13.8	100.0	
Missing	9	238	86.2		
	Total	238	86.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Movement without hostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	130	47.1	52.4	52.4
	yes, allows	27	9.8	10.9	63.3
	not mentioned	91	33.0	36.7	100.0
	Total	248	89.9	100.0	
Missing	9	28	10.1		
	Total	28	10.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Provide illegal drugs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	192	69.6	77.1	77.1
	yes, allows	1	.4	.4	77.5
	not mentioned	56	20.3	22.5	100.0
	Total	249	90.2	100.0	
Missing	9	27	9.8		
	Total	27	9.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Provide legal drugs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	131	47.5	53.0	53.0
	yes, allows	52	18.8	21.1	74.1
	not mentioned	64	23.2	25.9	100.0
	Total	247	89.5	100.0	
Missing	9	29	10.5		
	Total	29	10.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Elected officials negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	119	43.1	48.4	48.4
	yes, allows	11	4.0	4.5	52.8
	not mentioned	116	42.0	47.2	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Mental health negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	59	21.4	24.0	24.0
	yes, allows	85	30.8	34.6	58.5
	not mentioned	102	37.0	41.5	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Lawyers negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	91	33.0	37.0	37.0
	yes, allows	30	10.9	12.2	49.2
	not mentioned	125	45.3	50.8	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Time limit

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	100	36.2	40.3	40.3
	yes, allows	13	4.7	5.2	45.6
	not mentioned	135	48.9	54.4	100.0
	Total	248	89.9	100.0	
Missing	9	28	10.1		
	Total	28	10.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Exchange hostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	194	70.3	78.5	78.5
	yes, allows	6	2.2	2.4	81.0
	not mentioned	47	17.0	19.0	100.0
	Total	247	89.5	100.0	
Missing	9	29	10.5		
	Total	29	10.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Population size	264	12	5.08	.88	5
Prosecutor responds	276	0	1.19	.46	2
Psychological interview	276	0	.53	1.58	8
Private security	276	0	1.33	.47	1
Rank of negotiate commander	272	4	2.58	.80	5
Rank of incident commander	275	1	3.87	.94	5
Respondent	275	1	2.62	.94	4
Rank of swat commander	272	4	2.92	.77	5
RARMEDVE	275	1	.34	.47	1
RAVERECO	273	3	.55	.50	1
assignment	275	1	.36	.48	1

Population size

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	up to 10,000	1	.4	.4	.4
	10,000 - 24,999	2	.7	.8	1.1
	25,000 - 49,999	4	1.4	1.5	2.7
	50,000 - 99,999	58	21.0	22.0	24.6
	100,000 - 249,999	103	37.3	39.0	63.6
	250,000 +	96	34.8	36.4	100.0
	Total	264	95.7	100.0	
Missing	9	12	4.3		
	Total	12	4.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Prosecutor responds

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	232	84.1	84.1	84.1
	yes, ocassionally	36	13.0	13.0	97.1
	yes, usually	8	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Psychological interview

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	208	75.4	75.4	75.4
	1	57	20.7	20.7	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Private security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	186	67.4	67.4	67.4
	2	90	32.6	32.6	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Rank of negotiate commander

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	po/dep/tpr	12	4.3	4.4	4.4
	cpl/sgt	123	44.6	45.2	49.6
	lt	111	40.2	40.8	90.4
	capt	20	7.2	7.4	97.8
	maj/dc/ac/ltc	5	1.8	1.8	99.6
	chief/comm/supt/dir	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Rank of incident commander

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	po/dep/tpr	1	.4	.4	.4
	cpl/sgt	8	2.9	2.9	3.3
	lt	98	35.5	35.6	38.9
	capt	101	36.6	36.7	75.6
	maj/dc/ac/ltc	54	19.6	19.6	95.3
	chief/comm/supt/dir	13	4.7	4.7	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Respondent

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	po/dep/tpr	27	9.8	9.8	9.8
	cpl/sgt	103	37.3	37.5	47.3
	lt	101	36.6	36.7	84.0
	capt	35	12.7	12.7	96.7
	capt +	9	3.3	3.3	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Rank of swat commander

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	po/dep/tpr	4	1.4	1.5	1.5
	cpl/sgt	71	25.7	26.1	27.6
	lt	149	54.0	54.8	82.4
	capt	40	14.5	14.7	97.1
	maj/dc/ac/ltc	7	2.5	2.6	99.6
	chief/comm/supt/dir	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

RARMEDVE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no armored vehicle	182	65.9	66.2	66.2
	has armored vehicle	93	33.7	33.8	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

RAVERECO

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not record	123	44.6	45.1	45.1
	does record	150	54.3	54.9	100.0
	Total	273	98.9	100.0	
Missing	9	3	1.1		
	Total	3	1.1		
Total		276	100.0		

assignment

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	invest or other	177	64.1	64.4	64.4
	patrol or swat	98	35.5	35.6	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
REARMEDV	275	1	.34	.47	1
REAVEREC	273	3	.45	.50	1
RECURASG	275	1	.64	.48	1
REFULLTI	268	8	.90	.31	1
REMOVE2	150	126	.19	.40	1
RENEGPAY	276	0	7.25E-03	8.50E-02	1
RENOTTRA	272	4	.84	.37	1
RENVICRM	276	0	.22	.42	1
Repeat offender	276	0	1.44	.50	1
REPOLIC1	169	107	.15	.36	1
REPOLIC2	157	119	.17	.38	1

REARMEDV

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	182	65.9	66.2	66.2
	1	93	33.7	33.8	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

REAVEREC

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	records	150	54.3	54.9	54.9
	does not record	123	44.6	45.1	100.0
	Total	273	98.9	100.0	
Missing	9	2	.7		
	System Missing	1	.4		
	Total	3	1.1		
Total		276	100.0		

RECURASG

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	patrol or swat	98	35.5	35.6	35.6
	investigate or other	177	64.1	64.4	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

REFULLTI

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	full time	28	10.1	10.4	10.4
	part time	240	87.0	89.6	100.0
	Total	268	97.1	100.0	
Missing	9	8	2.9		
	Total	8	2.9		
Total		276	100.0		

REMOVE2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	121	43.8	80.7	80.7
	1	29	10.5	19.3	100.0
	Total	150	54.3	100.0	
Missing	9	126	45.7		
	Total	126	45.7		
Total		276	100.0		

RENEGPAY

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	274	99.3	99.3	99.3
	1	2	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

REPOLIC2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	130	47.1	82.8	82.8
	1	27	9.8	17.2	100.0
	Total	157	56.9	100.0	
Missing	9	119	43.1		
	Total	119	43.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
REPOLIC8	113	163	.88	.32	1
RESELECP	265	11	.57	.50	1
Record review	276	0	.94	1.51	8
full time leader	256	20	6.25E-02	.24	1
RHOMELES	276	0	.30	.46	1
RINVSFOR	276	0	.57	.50	1
RMOVE	151	125	.87	.33	1
RNEGPAY	276	0	6.16E-02	.24	1
untrained negotiator	272	4	.16	.37	1
forbids whostages	169	107	.85	.36	1
forbids wohostages	157	119	.83	.38	1

REPOLIC8

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	13	4.7	11.5	11.5
	1	100	36.2	88.5	100.0
	Total	113	40.9	100.0	
Missing	9	163	59.1		
	Total	163	59.1		
Total		276	100.0		

RESELECP

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	115	41.7	43.4	43.4
	no	150	54.3	56.6	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	9	8	2.9		
	System Missing	3	1.1		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Record review

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	93	33.7	33.7	33.7
	1	172	62.3	62.3	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

full time leader

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not full time	240	87.0	93.8	93.8
	full time	16	5.8	6.3	100.0
	Total	256	92.8	100.0	
Missing	8	12	4.3		
	9	8	2.9		
	Total	20	7.2		
Total		276	100.0		

RHOMELES

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	193	69.9	69.9	69.9
	1	83	30.1	30.1	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

RINVSFOR

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	119	43.1	43.1	43.1
	1	157	56.9	56.9	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

RMOVE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no movement	19	6.9	12.6	12.6
	movement	132	47.8	87.4	100.0
	Total	151	54.7	100.0	
Missing	9	125	45.3		
	Total	125	45.3		
Total		276	100.0		

RNEGPAY

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no extra pay	259	93.8	93.8	93.8
	hazardous pay	17	6.2	6.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

untrained negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	may negotiate	228	82.6	83.8	83.8
	not permitted	44	15.9	16.2	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

forbids whostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	movement	25	9.1	14.8	14.8
	no movement	144	52.2	85.2	100.0
	Total	169	61.2	100.0	
Missing	9	107	38.8		
	Total	107	38.8		
Total		276	100.0		

forbids wohostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	movement	27	9.8	17.2	17.2
	no movement	130	47.1	82.8	100.0
	Total	157	56.9	100.0	
Missing	9	119	43.1		
	Total	119	43.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
RPOLICY8	113	163	.12	.32	1
RPVTSCTY	276	0	.33	.47	1
RREPEAT	276	0	.44	.50	1
select policy	265	11	.43	.50	1
Rubber bullets	276	0	1.10	.30	1
negotiator satisfaction	256	20	14.44	2.43	12
Written selection policy	267	9	1.43	.50	1
Soft projectile	276	0	1.08	.27	1
Become negotiator	265	11	2.29	1.56	7
Stress debriefing	273	3	2.35	.61	2
Stun gun	276	0	1.17	.37	1

RPOLICY8

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no time limit	100	36.2	88.5	88.5
	has time limit	13	4.7	11.5	100.0
	Total	113	40.9	100.0	
Missing	9	163	59.1		
	Total	163	59.1		
Total		276	100.0		

RPVTSCTY

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	186	67.4	67.4	67.4
	1	90	32.6	32.6	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

RREPEAT

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
ılid	0	154	55.8	55.8	55.8
	1	122	44.2	44.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

select policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not written	150	54.3	56.6	56.6
	written	115	41.7	43.4	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	9	8	2.9		
	System Missing	3	1.1		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Rubber bullets

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	248	89.9	89.9	89.9
	2	28	10.1	10.1	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

negotiator satisfaction

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	6	1	.4	.4	.4
	7	2	.7	.8	1.2
	8	3	1.1	1.2	2.3
	9	3	1.1	1.2	3.5
	10	7	2.5	2.7	6.3
	11	11	4.0	4.3	10.5
	12	21	7.6	8.2	18.8
	13	32	11.6	12.5	31.3
	14	49	17.8	19.1	50.4
	15	37	13.4	14.5	64.8
	16	34	12.3	13.3	78.1
	17	27	9.8	10.5	88.7
	18	29	10.5	11.3	100.0
	Total	256	92.8	100.0	
Missing	99	20	7.2		
	Total	20	7.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Written selection policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	151	54.7	56.6	56.6
	yes	116	42.0	43.4	100.0
	Total	267	96.7	100.0	
Missing	9	9	3.3		
	Total	9	3.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Soft projectile

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	255	92.4	92.4	92.4
	2	21	7.6	7.6	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Become negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	posting / notice	85	30.8	32.1	32.1
	volunteered	87	31.5	32.8	64.9
	encouraged	79	28.6	29.8	94.7
	not a negotiator	14	5.1	5.3	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	9	11	4.0		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Stress debriefing

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, not offered	20	7.2	7.3	7.3
	yes, sometimes	137	49.6	50.2	57.5
	yes, mandatory	116	42.0	42.5	100.0
	Total	273	98.9	100.0	
Missing	9	3	1.1		
	Total	3	1.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Stun gun

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	230	83.3	83.3	83.3
	2	46	16.7	16.7	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Supervisor recommends	265	11	.72	.45	1
SWATORI	87	189	1.52	.73	4
Tactical hours 1995	198	78	2.4422	3.0416	12.00
Tactical hours 1996	211	65	2.6964	4.0808	36.00
Tactical hours 1997	235	41	3.4529	7.2569	96.00
Team leader interview	276	0	.62	1.57	8
Trained negotiator	276	0	1.92	.27	1
Active listening	200	76	6.0441	11.3946	150.00
Communication skills	199	77	6.2697	4.9920	50.00
Crisis intervention	200	76	6.6059	6.5985	53.00
Domestic disputes	197	79	2.9273	3.1292	30.00

Supervisor recommends

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	73	26.4	27.5	27.5
	1	192	69.6	72.5	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	8	11	4.0		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

SWATORI

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	4	1.4	4.6	4.6
	1	41	14.9	47.1	51.7
	2	36	13.0	41.4	93.1
	3	5	1.8	5.7	98.9
	4	1	.4	1.1	100.0
	Total	87	31.5	100.0	
Missing	9	189	68.5		
	Total	189	68.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Tactical hours 1995

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
alid	.00	100	36.2	50.5	50.5
	1.00	3	1.1	1.5	52.0
	1.50	2	.7	1.0	53.0
	1.75	1	.4	.5	53.5
	2.00	9	3.3	4.5	58.1
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	59.1
	2.75	1	.4	.5	59.6
	3.00	12	4.3	6.1	65.7
	3.25	2	.7	1.0	66.7
	3.50	2	.7	1.0	67.7
	4.00	15	5.4	7.6	75.3
	4.50	2	.7	1.0	76.3
	5.00	9	3.3	4.5	80.8
	5.25	1	.4	.5	81.3
	5.30	1	.4	.5	81.8
	5.50	1	.4	.5	82.3
	6.00	9	3.3	4.5	86.9
	6.50	2	.7	1.0	87.9
	7.00	6	2.2	3.0	90.9
	8.00	11	4.0	5.6	96.5
	8.50	1	.4	.5	97.0
	9.00	1	.4	.5	97.5
	10.00	2	.7	1.0	98.5
	12.00	3	1.1	1.5	100.0
	Total	198	71.7	100.0	
Missing	99.00	78	28.3		
	Total	78	28.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Tactical hours 1996

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	104	37.7	49.3	49.3
	.75	1	.4	.5	49.8
	1.00	3	1.1	1.4	51.2
	1.50	4	1.4	1.9	53.1
	2.00	12	4.3	5.7	58.8
	2.50	5	1.8	2.4	61.1
	2.75	1	.4	.5	61.6
	3.00	9	3.3	4.3	65.9
	3.25	1	.4	.5	66.4
	3.50	1	.4	.5	66.8
	4.00	20	7.2	9.5	76.3
	4.30	1	.4	.5	76.8
	4.40	1	.4	.5	77.3
	4.50	2	.7	.9	78.2
	5.00	10	3.6	4.7	82.9
	6.00	7	2.5	3.3	86.3
	6.50	2	.7	.9	87.2
	7.00	3	1.1	1.4	88.6
	8.00	10	3.6	4.7	93.4
	9.00	3	1.1	1.4	94.8
	10.00	5	1.8	2.4	97.2
	11.00	1	.4	.5	97.6
	12.00	1	.4	.5	98.1
	12.50	1	.4	.5	98.6
	14.00	1	.4	.5	99.1
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	36.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	211	76.4	100.0	
Missing	99.00	65	23.6		
	Total	65	23.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Tactical hours 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	95	34.4	40.4	40.4
	1.00	7	2.5	3.0	43.4
	1.50	3	1.1	1.3	44.7
	2.00	18	6.5	7.7	52.3
	2.50	3	1.1	1.3	53.6
	2.75	1	.4	.4	54.0
	3.00	18	6.5	7.7	61.7
	3.17	1	.4	.4	62.1
	3.50	3	1.1	1.3	63.4
	4.00	26	9.4	11.1	74.5
	4.50	2	.7	.9	75.3
	5.00	12	4.3	5.1	80.4
	5.50	1	.4	.4	80.9
	6.00	13	4.7	5.5	86.4
	6.50	3	1.1	1.3	87.7
	7.00	2	.7	.9	88.5
	7.50	1	.4	.4	88.9
	8.00	5	1.8	2.1	91.1
	9.00	6	2.2	2.6	93.6
	10.00	6	2.2	2.6	96.2
	12.00	1	.4	.4	96.6
	12.50	1	.4	.4	97.0
	13.00	1	.4	.4	97.4
	14.00	1	.4	.4	97.9
	16.00	1	.4	.4	98.3
	20.00	1	.4	.4	98.7
	22.00	1	.4	.4	99.1
	29.00	1	.4	.4	99.6
	96.00	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	235	85.1	100.0	
Missing	99.00	41	14.9		
	Total	41	14.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Team leader interview

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	183	66.3	66.3	66.3
	1	82	29.7	29.7	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Trained negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	22	8.0	8.0	8.0
	yes	254	92.0	92.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Active listening

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	3	1.1	1.5	1.5
	.33	1	.4	.5	2.0
	.50	2	.7	1.0	3.0
	1.00	16	5.8	8.0	11.0
	1.50	3	1.1	1.5	12.5
	2.00	33	12.0	16.5	29.0
	2.50	1	.4	.5	29.5
	3.00	13	4.7	6.5	36.0
	4.00	52	18.8	26.0	62.0
	5.00	11	4.0	5.5	67.5
	6.00	7	2.5	3.5	71.0
	6.50	1	.4	.5	71.5
	7.00	1	.4	.5	72.0
	8.00	28	10.1	14.0	86.0
	9.00	1	.4	.5	86.5
	10.00	11	4.0	5.5	92.0
	12.00	2	.7	1.0	93.0
	15.00	2	.7	1.0	94.0
	16.00	9	3.3	4.5	98.5
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.0
	50.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	150.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	200	72.5	100.0	
Missing	99.00	76	27.5		
	Total	76	27.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Communication skills

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	1	.4	.5	.5
	.17	1	.4	.5	1.0
	.50	1	.4	.5	1.5
	1.00	6	2.2	3.0	4.5
	1.50	1	.4	.5	5.0
	2.00	20	7.2	10.1	15.1
	2.50	4	1.4	2.0	17.1
	3.00	7	2.5	3.5	20.6
	4.00	52	18.8	26.1	46.7
	5.00	13	4.7	6.5	53.3
	6.00	18	6.5	9.0	62.3
	6.50	1	.4	.5	62.8
	7.00	1	.4	.5	63.3
	8.00	43	15.6	21.6	84.9
	9.00	3	1.1	1.5	86.4
	10.00	11	4.0	5.5	92.0
	11.00	1	.4	.5	92.5
	12.00	3	1.1	1.5	94.0
	16.00	6	2.2	3.0	97.0
	20.00	5	1.8	2.5	99.5
	50.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	199	72.1	100.0	
Missing	99.00	77	27.9		
	Total	77	27.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Crisis intervention

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	2	.7	1.0	1.0
	.17	1	.4	.5	1.5
	.50	1	.4	.5	2.0
	1.00	6	2.2	3.0	5.0
	2.00	28	10.1	14.0	19.0
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	20.0
	3.00	9	3.3	4.5	24.5
	4.00	55	19.9	27.5	52.0
	5.00	13	4.7	6.5	58.5
	6.00	8	2.9	4.0	62.5
	6.50	1	.4	.5	63.0
	7.00	1	.4	.5	63.5
	8.00	43	15.6	21.5	85.0
	10.00	9	3.3	4.5	89.5
	12.00	6	2.2	3.0	92.5
	16.00	5	1.8	2.5	95.0
	20.00	3	1.1	1.5	96.5
	21.00	1	.4	.5	97.0
	25.00	2	.7	1.0	98.0
	30.00	1	.4	.5	98.5
	40.00	2	.7	1.0	99.5
	53.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	200	72.5	100.0	
Missing	99.00	76	27.5		
	Total	76	27.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Domestic disputes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	26	9.4	13.2	13.2
	.17	1	.4	.5	13.7
	.50	1	.4	.5	14.2
	1.00	31	11.2	15.7	29.9
	2.00	53	19.2	26.9	56.9
	2.50	3	1.1	1.5	58.4
	3.00	10	3.6	5.1	63.5
	4.00	45	16.3	22.8	86.3
	5.00	8	2.9	4.1	90.4
	6.00	3	1.1	1.5	91.9
	6.50	1	.4	.5	92.4
	8.00	11	4.0	5.6	98.0
	9.00	1	.4	.5	98.5
	10.00	1	.4	.5	99.0
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	30.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	197	71.4	100.0	
Missing	99.00	79	28.6		
	Total	79	28.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Emotionally aroused	196	80	3.7075	2.5925	16.00
Mental illness	198	78	3.8140	3.3583	24.00
Substance abusers	196	80	2.3929	2.2789	20.00
Suicidal people	194	82	4.6847	5.4660	40.00
Terrorists	202	74	2.2360	2.2674	15.00
Empathy	191	85	2.3909	3.6497	40.00
Firearms	228	48	.4430	2.3576	24.00
First-aid / CPR	229	47	.2620	1.1274	8.00
Language	222	54	6.081E-02	.2888	2.00
Negotiation history	193	83	1.7876	1.9735	10.00
Media	202	74	.8243	1.1761	10.00

Emotionally aroused

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	8	2.9	4.1	4.1
	.17	1	.4	.5	4.6
	.50	2	.7	1.0	5.6
	1.00	19	6.9	9.7	15.3
	1.50	2	.7	1.0	16.3
	2.00	47	17.0	24.0	40.3
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	41.3
	3.00	12	4.3	6.1	47.4
	4.00	60	21.7	30.6	78.1
	5.00	9	3.3	4.6	82.7
	6.00	5	1.8	2.6	85.2
	6.50	1	.4	.5	85.7
	7.00	1	.4	.5	86.2
	8.00	19	6.9	9.7	95.9
	10.00	6	2.2	3.1	99.0
	12.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	16.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	196	71.0	100.0	
Missing	99.00	80	29.0		
	Total	80	29.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Mental illness

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	7	2.5	3.5	3.5
	.17	1	.4	.5	4.0
	.50	2	.7	1.0	5.1
	1.00	21	7.6	10.6	15.7
	1.50	2	.7	1.0	16.7
	2.00	57	20.7	28.8	45.5
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	46.5
	3.00	9	3.3	4.5	51.0
	3.50	1	.4	.5	51.5
	4.00	54	19.6	27.3	78.8
	5.00	8	2.9	4.0	82.8
	6.00	6	2.2	3.0	85.9
	6.50	1	.4	.5	86.4
	8.00	17	6.2	8.6	94.9
	10.00	3	1.1	1.5	96.5
	12.00	2	.7	1.0	97.5
	16.00	3	1.1	1.5	99.0
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	24.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	198	71.7	100.0	
Missing	99.00	78	28.3		
	Total	78	28.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Substance abusers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	21	7.6	10.7	10.7
	.50	7	2.5	3.6	14.3
	1.00	40	14.5	20.4	34.7
	1.50	1	.4	.5	35.2
	2.00	65	23.6	33.2	68.4
	2.50	3	1.1	1.5	69.9
	3.00	9	3.3	4.6	74.5
	4.00	37	13.4	18.9	93.4
	5.00	3	1.1	1.5	94.9
	6.50	1	.4	.5	95.4
	7.00	1	.4	.5	95.9
	8.00	3	1.1	1.5	97.4
	9.00	1	4	.5	98.0
	10.00	3	1.1	1.5	99.5
	20.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	196	71.0	100.0	
Missing	99.00	80	29.0		
	Total	80	29.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Suicidal people

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	2	.7	1.0	1.0
	.33	1	.4	.5	1.5
	.50	3	1.1	1.5	3.1
	1.00	17	6.2	8.8	11.9
	1.50	1	.4	.5	12.4
	2.00	46	16.7	23.7	36.1
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	37.1
	3.00	8	2.9	4.1	41.2
	4.00	65	23.6	33.5	74.7
	5.00	9	3.3	4.6	79.4
	6.00	6	2.2	3.1	82.5
	6.50	1	.4	.5	83.0
	7.00	1	.4	.5	83.5
	8.00	17	6.2	8.8	92.3
	9.00	2	.7	1.0	93.3
	10.00	4	1.4	2.1	95.4
	12.00	1	4	.5	95.9
	15.00	1	.4	.5	96.4
	16.00	3	1.1	1.5	97.9
	24.00	1	.4	.5	98.5
	40.00	3	1.1	1.5	100.0
	Total	194	70.3	100.0	
Missing	99.00	82	29.7		
	Total	82	29.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
negotiated out 1997	257	19	7.65	11.69	119
Negotiators get extra pay	276	0	1.30	.83	3
Negotiator reports to	276	0	1.45	.61	2
Negotiate hours 1995	217	59	3.2012	2.8932	24.00
Negotiate hours 1996	226	50	3.5842	3.1171	23.00
Negotiate hours 1997	251	25	3.5049	2.7446	20.00
uses nonlethal	276	0	.28	.45	1
Untrained cop negotiate	272	4	1.86	.41	2
Number of sworn officers	264	12	2.01	1.15	3
Negotiators at incident	274	2	3.97	1.89	10
Number of negotiators	274	2	9.96	11.12	102

negotiated out 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	24	8.7	9.3	9.3
	1	26	9.4	10.1	19.5
	2	33	12.0	12.8	32.3
	3	30	10.9	11.7	44.0
	4	22	8.0	8.6	52.5
	5	13	4.7	5.1	57.6
	6	17	6.2	6.6	64.2
	7	6	2.2	2.3	66.5
	8	10	3.6	3.9	70.4
	9	8	2.9	3.1	73.5
	10	15	5.4	5.8	79.4
	11	7	2.5	2.7	82.1
	12	9	3.3	3.5	85.6
	13	4	1.4	1.6	87.2
	14	2	.7	.8	87.9
	15	4	1.4	1.6	89.5
	16	2	.7	.8	90.3
	17	2	.7	.8	91.1
	18	2	.7	.8	91.8
	19	3	1.1	1.2	93.0
	20	1	.4	.4	93.4
	22	2	.7	.8	94.2
	24	2	.7	.8	94.9
	27	1	.4	.4	95.3
	28	2	.7	.8	96.1
	30	2	.7	.8	96.9
	31	1	.4	.4	97.3
	32	1	.4	.4	97.7
	35	1	.4	.4	98.1
	40	1	.4	.4	98.4
	42	1	.4	.4	98.8
	73	1	.4	.4	99.2
	75	1	.4	.4	99.6
	119	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	257	93.1	100.0	
Missing	99	19	6.9		
	Total	19	6.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiators get extra pay

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	236	85.5	85.5	85.5
	yes, hazardous	17	6.2	6.2	91.7
	yes, merit	2	.7	.7	92.4
	yes, other	21	7.6	7.6	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiator reports to

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	incident commander	168	60.9	60.9	60.9
	swat commander	91	33.0	33.0	93.8
	orther	17	6.2	6.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiate hours 1995

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	37	13.4	17.1	17.1
	.50	2	.7	.9	18.0
	.67	1	.4	.5	18.4
	1.00	15	5.4	6.9	25.3
	1.50	5	1.8	2.3	27.6
	1.75	1	.4	.5	28.1
	1.90	1	.4	.5	28.6
	2.00	32	11.6	14.7	43.3
	2.50	4	1.4	1.8	45.2
	3.00	31	11.2	14.3	59.4
	3.20	1	.4	.5	59.9
	3.50	7	2.5	3.2	63.1
	3.75	1	.4	.5	63.6
	3.90	1	.4	.5	64.1
	4.00	29	10.5	13.4	77.4
	4.50	1	.4	.5	77.9
	5.00	11	4.0	5.1	82.9
	5.50	1	.4	.5	83.4
	6.00	18	6.5	8.3	91.7
	6.50	1	.4	.5	92.2
	7.00	5	1.8	2.3	94.5
	8.00	2	.7	.9	95.4
	9.00	3	1.1	1.4	96.8
	10.00	4	1.4	1.8	98.6
	12.00	1	.4	.5	99.1
	15.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	24.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	217	78.6	100.0	
Missing	99.00	59	21.4		
	Total	59	21.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiate hours 1996

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	31	11.2	13.7	13.7
	.17	1	.4	.4	14.2
	.75	1	.4	.4	14.6
	1.00	10	3.6	4.4	19.0
	1.50	6	2.2	2.7	21.7
	1.75	2	.7	.9	22.6
	2.00	30	10.9	13.3	35.8
	2.50	8	2.9	3.5	39.4
	3.00	36	13.0	15.9	55.3
	3.50	7	2.5	3.1	58.4
	4.00	35	12.7	15.5	73.9
	4.50	1	.4	.4	74.3
	5.00	17	6.2	7.5	81.9
	5.10	1	.4	.4	82.3
	6.00	15	5.4	6.6	88.9
	7.00	8	2.9	3.5	92.5
	7.50	1	.4	.4	92.9
	8.00	4	1.4	1.8	94.7
	9.00	2	.7	.9	95.6
	10.00	4	1.4	1.8	97.3
	12.00	2	.7	.9	98.2
	13.00	1	.4	.4	98.7
	16.00	1	.4	.4	99.1
	20.00	1	.4	.4	99.6
	23.00	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	226	81.9	100.0	
Missing	99.00	50	18.1		
	Total	50	18.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiate hours 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	21	7.6	8.4	8.4
	.25	1	.4	.4	8.8
	.30	1	.4	.4	9.2
	.50	1	.4	.4	9.6
	1.00	12	4.3	4.8	14.3
	1.50	9	3.3	3.6	17.9
	1.67	1	.4	.4	18.3
	2.00	44	15.9	17.5	35.9
	2.25	1	.4	.4	36.3
	2.50	10	3.6	4.0	40.2
	3.00	46	16.7	18.3	58.6
	3.50	6	2.2	2.4	61.0
	3.75	1	.4	.4	61.4
	4.00	28	10.1	11.2	72.5
	4.50	4	1.4	1.6	74.1
	4.75	1	.4	.4	74.5
	5.00	22	8.0	8.8	83.3
	5.50	2	.7	.8	84.1
	6.00	22	8.0	8.8	92.8
	7.00	5	1.8	2.0	94.8
	7.25	1	.4	.4	95.2
	7.50	1	.4	.4	95.6
	8.00	3	1.1	1.2	96.8
	9.00	1	.4	.4	97.2
	10.00	1	.4	.4	97.6
	12.00	2	.7	.8	98.4
	13.00	1	.4	.4	98.8
	18.00	2	.7	.8	99.6
	20.00	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	251	90.9	100.0	
Missing	99.00	24	8.7		
	999.00	1	.4		
	Total	25	9.1		
Total		276	100.0		

uses nonlethal

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	does not use nonlethal	200	72.5	72.5	72.5
	does use nonlethal	76	27.5	27.5	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Untrained cop negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, replace	44	15.9	16.2	16.2
	yes, monitored	221	80.1	81.3	97.4
	yes, indefinetly	7	2.5	2.6	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Number of sworn officers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	100 - 249	124	44.9	47.0	47.0
	250 - 499	61	22.1	23.1	70.1
	500 - 999	31	11.2	11.7	81.8
	1,000 +	48	17.4	18.2	100.0
	Total	264	95.7	100.0	
Missing	9	12	4.3		
	Total	12	4.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiators at incident

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	9	3.3	3.3	3.3
	2	60	21.7	21.9	25.2
	3	59	21.4	21.5	46.7
	4	56	20.3	20.4	67.2
	5	37	13.4	13.5	80.7
	6	24	8.7	8.8	89.4
	7	14	5.1	5.1	94.5
	8	9	3.3	3.3	97.8
	9	3	1.1	1.1	98.9
	10	2	.7	.7	99.6
	11	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	274	99.3	100.0	
Missing	99	2	.7		
	Total	2	.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Number of negotiato.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	4	1.4	1.5	1.5
	2	10	3.6	3.6	5.1
	3	11	4.0	4.0	9.1
	4	30	10.9	10.9	20.1
	5	30	10.9	10.9	31.0
	6	43	15.6	15.7	46.7
	7	22	8.0	8.0	54.7
	8	22	8.0	8.0	62.8
	9	13	4.7	4.7	67.5
	10	21	7.6	7.7	75.2
	11	4	1.4	1.5	76.6
	12	14	5.1	5.1	81.8
	13	2	.7	.7	82.5
	14	4	1.4	1.5	83.9
	15	7	2.5	2.6	86.5
	16	8	2.9	2.9	89.4
	18	2	.7	.7	90.1
	20	8	2.9	2.9	93.1
	22	2	.7	.7	93.8
	23	1	.4	.4	94.2
	24	2	.7	.7	94.9
	25	2	.7	.7	95.6
	26	1	.4	.4	96.0
	27	1	.4	.4	96.4
	28	1	.4	.4	96.7
	33	1	.4	.4	97.1
	38	1	.4	.4	97.4
	40	1	.4	.4	97.8
	44	1	.4	.4	98.2
	49	1	.4	.4	98.5
	50	1	.4	.4	98.9
	60	1	.4	.4	99.3
	100	1	.4	.4	99.6
	103	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	274	99.3	100.0	
Missing	99	1	.4		
	999	1	.4		
	Total	2	.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
ONLYHOST	0	276			
Satisfaction	261	15	5.66	.56	2
Enhanced career	259	17	4.68	1.22	5
Recognition	259	17	4.08	1.36	5
Chance of death	266	10	5.88	.35	2
Negotiate resolution	266	10	5.50	.69	4
Call backs	260	16	4.46	1.07	5
Bystander reaction	264	12	4.88	1.01	5
Citizen reaction	259	17	4.07	1.14	5
Media reaction	266	10	5.13	.94	5
Part of SWAT	266	10	4.25	2.04	5

ONLYHOST

		Frequency	Percent
Missing	System Missing	276	100.0
	Total	276	100.0
Total		276	100.0

Satisfaction

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	slightly agree	11	4.0	4.2	4.2
	moderately agree	66	23.9	25.3	29.5
	strongly agree	184	66.7	70.5	100.0
	Total	261	94.6	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	9	3.3		
	9	6	2.2		
	Total	15	5.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Enhanced career

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	8	2.9	3.1	3.1
	moderately disagree	6	2.2	2.3	5.4
	slightly disagree	18	6.5	6.9	12.4
	slightly agree	76	27.5	29.3	41.7
	moderately agree	71	25.7	27.4	69.1
	strongly agree	80	29.0	30.9	100.0
	Total	259	93.8	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	9	3.3		
	9	8	2.9		
	Total	17	6.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Recognition

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	17	6.2	6.6	6.6
	moderately disagree	18	6.5	6.9	13.5
	slightly disagree	31	11.2	12.0	25.5
	slightly agree	95	34.4	36.7	62.2
	moderately agree	57	20.7	22.0	84.2
	strongly agree	41	14.9	15.8	100.0
	Total	259	93.8	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	9	3.3		
	9	8	2.9		
	Total	17	6.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Chance of death

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	slightly agree	3	1.1	1.1	1.1
	moderately agree	25	9.1	9.4	10.5
	strongly agree	238	86.2	89.5	100.0
	Total	266	96.4	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	8	2.9		
	9	2	.7		
	Total	10	3.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiate resolution

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	moderately disagree	1	.4	.4	4
	slightly disagree	3	1.1	1.1	1.5
	slightly agree	14	5.1	5.3	6.8
	moderately agree	93	33.7	35.0	41.7
	strongly agree	155	56.2	58.3	100.0
	Total	266	96.4	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	8	2.9		
	9	2	.7		
	Total	10	3.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Call backs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	2	7	.8	.8
	moderately disagree	10	3.6	3.8	4.6
	slightly disagree	27	9.8	10.4	15.0
	slightly agree	95	34.4	36.5	51.5
	moderately agree	79	28.6	30.4	81.9
	strongly agree	47	17.0	18.1	100.0
	Total	260	94.2	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	8	2.9		
	9	8	2.9		
	Total	16	5.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Bystander reaction

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	2	.7	.8	.8
	moderately disagree	6	2.2	2.3	3.0
	slightly disagree	14	5.1	5.3	8.3
	slightly agree	56	20.3	21.2	29.5
	moderately agree	109	39.5	41.3	70.8
	strongly agree	77	27.9	29.2	100.0
	Total	264	95.7	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	8	2.9		
	9	4	1.4		
	Total	12	4.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Citizen reaction

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	7	2.5	2.7	2.7
	moderately disagree	17	6.2	6.6	9.3
	slightly disagree	41	14.9	15.8	25.1
	slightly agree	103	37.3	39.8	64.9
	moderately agree	67	24.3	25.9	90.7
	strongly agree	24	8.7	9.3	100.0
	Total	259	93.8	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	8	2.9		
	9	9	3.3		
	Total	17	6.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Media reaction

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	1	.4	.4	.4
	moderately disagree	5	1.8	1.9	2.3
	slightly disagree	5	1.8	1.9	4.1
	slightly agree	48	17.4	18.0	22.2
	moderately agree	96	34.8	36.1	58.3
	strongly agree	111	40.2	41.7	100.0
	Total	266	96.4	100.0	
Missing	not a negotiator	8	2.9		
	9	2	.7		
	Total	10	3.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Part of SWAT

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	56	20.3	21.1	21.1
	moderately disagree	18	6.5	6.8	27.8
	slightly disagree	12	4.3	4.5	32.3
	slightly agree	20	7.2	7.5	39.8
	moderately agree	38	13.8	14.3	54.1
	strongly agree	122	44.2	45.9	100.0
	Total	266	96.4	100.0	
Missing	8	8	2.9		
	9	2	.7		
	Total	10	3.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Time limit	273	3	1.47	1.37	7
organic orientation	253	23	3.41	1.09	5
Other selection	265	11	.17	.37	1
Panel interview	265	11	.42	.49	1
Psychological test	276	0	.44	1.58	8
Is part of SWAT	275	1	1.56	.50	1
Movement with hostages	248	28	1.74	.91	2
Exchange weapons	246	30	1.34	.74	2
Amnesty	246	30	2.13	.95	2
Release prisoners	246	30	1.96	.94	2
Clergy negotiate	247	29	2.20	.85	2

Time limit

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	222	80.4	81.3	81.3
	moderately disagree	28	10.1	10.3	91.6
	slightly disagree	8	2.9	2.9	94.5
	slightly agree	3	1.1	1.1	95.6
	moderately agree	1	.4	.4	96.0
	strongly agree	3	1.1	1.1	97.1
	8	8	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	273	98.9	100.0	
Missing	9	3	1.1		
	Total	3	1.1		
Total		276	100.0		

organic orientation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	.4	4	.4
	1	8	2.9	3.2	3.6
	2	40	14.5	15.8	19.4
	3	91	33.0	36.0	55.3
	4	63	22.8	24.9	80.2
	5	50	18.1	19.8	100.0
	Total	253	91.7	100.0	
Missing	9	23	8.3		
	Total	23	8.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Other selection

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	221	80.1	83.4	83.4
	1	44	15.9	16.6	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	8	11	4.0		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Panel interview

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	155	56.2	58.5	58.5
	1	110	39.9	41.5	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	8	11	4.0		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Psychological test

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	231	83.7	83.7	83.7
	1	34	12.3	12.3	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Is part of SWAT

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	122	44.2	44.4	44.4
	yes	153	55.4	55.6	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Movement with hostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	144	52.2	58.1	58.1
	yes, allows	25	9.1	10.1	68.1
	not mentioned	79	28.6	31.9	100.0
	Total	248	89.9	100.0	
Missing	9	28	10.1		
	Total	28	10.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Exchange weapons

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	203	73.6	82.5	82.5
	yes, allows	3	1.1	1.2	83.7
	not mentioned	40	14.5	16.3	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Amnesty

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	97	35.1	39.4	39.4
	yes, allows	20	7.2	8.1	47.6
	not mentioned	129	46.7	52.4	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Release prisoners

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	112	40.6	45.5	45.5
	yes, allows	31	11.2	12.6	58.1
	not mentioned	103	37.3	41.9	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Clergy negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	69	25.0	27.9	27.9
	yes, allows	60	21.7	24.3	52.2
	not mentioned	118	42.8	47.8	100.0
	Total	247	89.5	100.0	
Missing	9	29	10.5		
	Total	29	10.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Media negotiate	246	30	1.93	.97	2
Family/freinds negotiate	246	30	2.07	85	2
Other negotiate	38	238	2.13	93	2
Movement without hostages	248	28	1.84	.93	2
Provide illegal drugs	249	27	1.45	84	2
Provide legal drugs	247	29	1.73	.85	2
Elected officials negotiate	246	30	1.99	.98	2
Mental health negotiate	246	30	2.17	.79	2
Lawyers negotiate	246	30	2.14	.93	2
Time limit	248	28	2.14	.97	2
Exchange hostages	247	29	1.40	.79	2

Media negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	123	44.6	50.0	50.0
	yes, allows	16	5.8	6.5	56.5
	not mentioned	107	38.8	43.5	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Family/freinds negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	81	29.3	32.9	32.9
	yes, allows	68	24.6	27.6	60.6
	not mentioned	97	35.1	39.4	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Other negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	14	5.1	36.8	36.8
	yes, allows	5	1.8	13.2	50.0
	not mentioned	19	6.9	50.0	100.0
	Total	38	13.8	100.0	
Missing	9	238	86.2		
	Total	238	86.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Movement without hostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	130	47.1	52.4	52.4
	yes, allows	27	9.8	10.9	63.3
	not mentioned	91	33.0	36.7	100.0
	Total	248	89.9	100.0	
Missing	9	28	10.1		
	Total	28	10.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Provide illegal drugs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	192	69.6	77.1	77.1
	yes, allows	1	.4	.4	77.5
	not mentioned	56	20.3	22.5	100.0
	Total	249	90.2	100.0	
Missing	9	27	9.8		
	Total	27	9.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Provide legal drugs

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	131	47.5	53.0	53.0
	yes, allows	52	18.8	21.1	74.1
	not mentioned	64	23.2	25.9	100.0
	Total	247	89.5	100.0	
Missing	9	29	10.5		
	Total	29	10.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Elected officials negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	119	43.1	48.4	48.4
	yes, allows	11	4.0	4.5	52.8
	not mentioned	116	42.0	47.2	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Mental health negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	59	21.4	24.0	24.0
	yes, allows	85	30.8	34.6	58.5
	not mentioned	102	37.0	41.5	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Lawyers negotiate

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	91	33.0	37.0	37.0
	yes, allows	30	10.9	12.2	49.2
	not mentioned	125	45.3	50.8	100.0
	Total	246	89.1	100.0	
Missing	9	30	10.9		
	Total	30	10.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Time limit

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	100	36.2	40.3	40.3
	yes, allows	13	4.7	5.2	45.6
	not mentioned	135	48.9	54.4	100.0
	Total	248	89.9	100.0	
Missing	9	28	10.1		
	Total	28	10.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Exchange hostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, forbids	194	70.3	78.5	78.5
	yes, allows	6	2.2	2.4	81.0
	not mentioned	47	17.0	19.0	100.0
	Total	247	89.5	100.0	
Missing	9	29	10.5		
	Total	29	10.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Population size	264	12	5.08	.88	5
Prosecutor responds	276	0	1.19	.46	2
Psychological interview	276	0	.53	1.58	8
Private security	276	0	1.33	.47	1
Rank of negotiate commander	272	4	2.58	.80	5
Rank of incident commander	275	1	3.87	.94	5
Respondent	275	1	2.62	.94	4
Rank of swat commander	272	4	2.92	.77	5
RARMEDVE	275	1	.34	.47	1
RAVERECO	273	3	.55	.50	1
assignment	275	1	.36	.48	1

Population size

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	up to 10,000	1	.4	.4	.4
	10,000 - 24,999	2	.7	.8	1.1
	25,000 - 49,999	4	1.4	1.5	2.7
	50,000 - 99,999	58	21.0	22.0	24.6
	100,000 - 249,999	103	37.3	39.0	63.6
	250,000 +	96	34.8	36.4	100.0
	Total	264	95.7	100.0	
Missing	9	12	4.3		
	Total	12	4.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Prosecutor responds

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	232	84.1	84.1	84.1
	yes, ocassionally	36	13.0	13.0	97.1
	yes, usually	8	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Psychological interview

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	208	75.4	75.4	75.4
	1	57	20.7	20.7	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Private security

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	186	67.4	67.4	67.4
	2	90	32.6	32.6	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Rank of negotiate commander

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	po/dep/tpr	12	4.3	4.4	4.4
	cpl/sgt	123	44.6	45.2	49.6
	lt	111	40.2	40.8	90.4
	capt	20	7.2	7.4	97.8
	maj/dc/ac/ltc	5	1.8	1.8	99.6
	chief/comm/supt/dir	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Rank of incident commander

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	po/dep/tpr	1	.4	.4	.4
	cpl/sgt	8	2.9	2.9	3.3
	lt	98	35.5	35.6	38.9
	capt	101	36.6	36.7	75.6
	maj/dc/ac/ltc	54	19.6	19.6	95.3
	chief/comm/supt/dir	13	4.7	4.7	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Respondent

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	po/dep/tpr	27	9.8	9.8	9.8
	cpl/sgt	103	37.3	37.5	47.3
	lt	101	36.6	36.7	84.0
	capt	35	12.7	12.7	96.7
	capt +	9	3.3	3.3	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Rank of swat commander

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	po/dep/tpr	4	1.4	1.5	1.5
	cpl/sgt	71	25.7	26.1	27.6
	lt	149	54.0	54.8	82.4
	capt	40	14.5	14.7	97.1
	maj/dc/ac/ltc	7	2.5	2.6	99.6
	chief/comm/supt/dir	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

RARMEDVE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no armored vehicle	182	65.9	66.2	66.2
	has armored vehicle	93	33.7	33.8	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

RAVERECO

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not record	123	44.6	45.1	45.1
	does record	150	54.3	54.9	100.0
	Total	273	98.9	100.0	
Missing	9	3	1.1		
	Total	3	1.1		
Total		276	100.0		

assignment

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	invest or other	177	64.1	64.4	64.4
	patrol or swat	98	35.5	35.6	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
REARMEDV	275	1	.34	.47	1
REAVEREC	273	3	.45	.50	1
RECURASG	275	1	.64	.48	1
REFULLTI	268	8	.90	.31	1
REMOVE2	150	126	.19	.40	1
RENEGPAY	276	0	7.25E-03	8.50E-02	1
RENOTTRA	272	4	.84	.37	1
RENVICRM	276	0	.22	.42	1
Repeat offender	276	0	1.44	.50	1
REPOLIC1	169	107	.15	.36	1
REPOLIC2	157	119	.17	.38	1

REARMEDV

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	182	65.9	66.2	66.2
	1	93	33.7	33.8	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

REAVEREC

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	records	150	54.3	54.9	54.9
	does not record	123	44.6	45.1	100.0
	Total	273	98.9	100.0	
Missing	9	2	.7		
	System Missing	1	.4		
	Total	3	1.1		
Total		276	100.0		

RECURASG

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
alid	patrol or swat	98	35.5	35.6	35.6
	investigate or other	177	64.1	64.4	100.0
	Total	275	99.6	100.0	
Missing	9	1	.4		
	Total	1	.4		
Total		276	100.0		

REFULLTI

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	full time	28	10.1	10.4	10.4
	part time	240	87.0	89.6	100.0
	Total	268	97.1	100.0	
Missing	9	8	2.9		
	Total	8	2.9		
Total		276	100.0		

REMOVE2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	121	43.8	80.7	80.7
	1	29	10.5	19.3	100.0
	Total	150	54.3	100.0	
Missing	9	126	45.7		
	Total	126	45.7		
Total		276	100.0		

RENEGPAY

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	274	99.3	99.3	99.3
	1	2	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

REPOLIC2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
alid	0	130	47.1	82.8	82.8
	1	27	9.8	17.2	100.0
	Total	157	56.9	100.0	
Missing	9	119	43.1		
	Total	119	43.1		
Total		276	100.0		

RENOTTRA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not negotiate	44	15.9	16.2	16.2
	can negiotiate	228	82.6	83.8	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

RENVICRM

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	214	77.5	77.5	77.5
	1	62	22.5	22.5	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Repeat offender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	154	55.8	55.8	55.8
	2	122	44.2	44.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

REPOLIC1

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	144	52.2	85.2	85.2
	1	25	9.1	14.8	100.0
	Total	169	61.2	100.0	
Missing	9	107	38.8		
	Total	107	38.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
REPOLIC8	113	163	.88	.32	1
RESELECP	265	11	.57	.50	1
Record review	276	0	.94	1.51	8
full time leader	256	20	6.25E-02	.24	1
RHOMELES	276	0	.30	.46	1
RINVSFOR	276	0	.57	.50	1
RMOVE	151	125	.87	.33	1
RNEGPAY	276	0	6.16E-02	.24	1
untrained negotiator	272	4	.16	.37	1
forbids whostages	169	107	.85	.36	1
forbids wohostages	157	119	.83	.38	1

REPOLIC8

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	13	4.7	11.5	11.5
	1	100	36.2	88.5	100.0
	Total	113	40.9	100.0	
Missing	9	163	59.1		
	Total	163	59.1		
Total		276	100.0		

RESELECP

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	115	41.7	43.4	43.4
	no	150	54.3	56.6	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	9	8	2.9		
	System Missing	3	1.1		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Record review

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	93	33.7	33.7	33.7
	1	172	62.3	62.3	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

full time leader

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not full time	240	87.0	93.8	93.8
	full time	16	5.8	6.3	100.0
	Total	256	92.8	100.0	
Missing	8	12	4.3		
	9	8	2.9		
	Total	20	7.2		
Total		276	100.0		

RHOMELES

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	193	69.9	69.9	69.9
	1	83	30.1	30.1	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

RINVSFOR

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	119	43.1	43.1	43.1
	1	157	56.9	56.9	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

RMOVE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no movement	19	6.9	12.6	12.6
	movement	132	47.8	87.4	100.0
	Total	151	54.7	100.0	
Missing	9	125	45.3		
	Total	125	45.3		
Total		276	100.0		

RNEGPAY

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no extra pay	259	93.8	93.8	93.8
	hazardous pay	17	6.2	6.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

untrained negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	may negotiate	228	82.6	83.8	83.8
	not permitted	44	15.9	16.2	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	9	4	1.4		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

forbids whostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	movement	25	9.1	14.8	14.8
	no movement	144	52.2	85.2	100.0
	Total	169	61.2	100.0	
Missing	9	107	38.8		
	Total	107	38.8		
Total		276	100.0		

forbids wohostages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	movement	27	9.8	17.2	17.2
	no movement	130	47.1	82.8	100.0
	Total	157	56.9	100.0	
Missing	9	119	43.1		
	Total	119	43.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
RPOLICY8	113	163	.12	.32	1
RPVTSCTY	276	0	.33	.47	1
RREPEAT	276	0	.44	.50	1
select policy	265	11	.43	.50	1
Rubber bullets	276	0	1.10	.30	1
negotiator satisfaction	256	20	14.44	2.43	12
Written selection policy	267	9	1.43	.50	1
Soft projectile	276	0	1.08	.27	1
Become negotiator	265	11	2.29	1.56	7
Stress debriefing	273	3	2.35	.61	2
Stun gun	276	0	1.17	.37	1

RPOLICY8

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no time limit	100	36.2	88.5	88.5
	has time limit	13	4.7	11.5	100.0
	Total	113	40.9	100.0	
Missing	9	163	59.1		
	Total	163	59.1		
Total		276	100.0		

RPVTSCTY

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	186	67.4	67.4	67.4
	1	90	32.6	32.6	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

RREPEAT

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
alid	0	154	55.8	55.8	55.8
	1	122	44.2	44.2	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

select policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	not written	150	54.3	56.6	56.6
	written	115	41.7	43.4	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	9	8	2.9		
	System Missing	3	1.1		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Rubber bullets

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	248	89.9	89.9	89.9
	2	28	10.1	10.1	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

negotiator satisfaction

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	6	1	.4	.4	.4
	7	2	.7	.8	1.2
	8	3	1.1	1.2	2.3
	9	3	1.1	1.2	3.5
	10	7	2.5	2.7	6.3
	11	11	4.0	4.3	10.5
	12	21	7.6	8.2	18.8
	13	32	11.6	12.5	31.3
	14	49	17.8	19.1	50.4
	15	37	13.4	14.5	64.8
	16	34	12.3	13.3	78.1
	17	27	9.8	10.5	88.7
	18	29	10.5	11.3	100.0
	Total	256	92.8	100.0	
Missing	99	20	7.2		
	Total	20	7.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Written selection policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	151	54.7	56.6	56.6
	yes	116	42.0	43.4	100.0
	Total	267	96.7	100.0	
Missing	9	9	3.3		
	Total	9	3.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Soft projectile

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	255	92.4	92.4	92.4
	2	21	7.6	7.6	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Become negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	posting / notice	85	30.8	32.1	32.1
	volunteered	87	31.5	32.8	64.9
	encouraged	79	28.6	29.8	94.7
	not a negotiator	14	5.1	5.3	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	9	11	4.0		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Stress debriefing

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no, not offered	20	7.2	7.3	7.3
	yes, sometimes	137	49.6	50.2	57.5
	yes, mandatory	116	42.0	42.5	100.0
	Total	273	98.9	100.0	
Missing	9	3	1.1		
	Total	3	1.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Stun gun

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	230	83.3	83.3	83.3
	2	46	16.7	16.7	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Supervisor recommends	265	11	.72	.45	1
SWATORI	87	189	1.52	.73	4
Tactical hours 1995	198	78	2.4422	3.0416	12.00
Tactical hours 1996	211	65	2.6964	4.0808	36.00
Tactical hours 1997	235	41	3.4529	7.2569	96.00
Team leader interview	276	0	.62	1.57	8
Trained negotiator	276	0	1.92	.27	1
Active listening	200	76	6.0441	11.3946	150.00
Communication skills	199	77	6.2697	4.9920	50.00
Crisis intervention	200	76	6.6059	6.5985	53.00
Domestic disputes	197	79	2.9273	3.1292	30.00

Supervisor recommends

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	73	26.4	27.5	27.5
	1	192	69.6	72.5	100.0
	Total	265	96.0	100.0	
Missing	8	11	4.0		
	Total	11	4.0		
Total		276	100.0		

SWATORI

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	4	1.4	4.6	4.6
	1	41	14.9	47.1	51.7
	2	36	13.0	41.4	93.1
	3	5	1.8	5.7	98.9
	4	1	.4	1.1	100.0
	Total	87	31.5	100.0	
Missing	9	189	68.5		
	Total	189	68.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Tactical hours 1995

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
alid	.00	100	36.2	50.5	50.5
	1.00	3	1.1	1.5	52.0
	1.50	2	.7	1.0	53.0
	1.75	1	.4	.5	53.5
	2.00	9	3.3	4.5	58.1
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	59.1
	2.75	1	.4	.5	59.6
	3.00	12	4.3	6.1	65.7
	3.25	2	.7	1.0	66.7
	3.50	2	.7	1.0	67.7
	4.00	15	5.4	7.6	75.3
	4.50	2	.7	1.0	76.3
	5.00	9	3.3	4.5	80.8
	5.25	1	.4	.5	81.3
	5.30	1	.4	.5	81.8
	5.50	1	.4	.5	82.3
	6.00	9	3.3	4.5	86.9
	6.50	2	.7	1.0	87.9
	7.00	6	2.2	3.0	90.9
	8.00	11	4.0	5.6	96.5
	8.50	1	.4	.5	97.0
	9.00	1	.4	.5	97.5
	10.00	2	.7	1.0	98.5
	12.00	3	1.1	1.5	100.0
	Total	198	71.7	100.0	
Missing	99.00	78	28.3		
	Total	78	28.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Tactical hours 1996

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	104	37.7	49.3	49.3
	.75	1	.4	.5	49.8
	1.00	3	1.1	1.4	51.2
	1.50	4	1.4	1.9	53.1
	2.00	12	4.3	5.7	58.8
	2.50	5	1.8	2.4	61.1
	2.75	1	.4	.5	61.6
	3.00	9	3.3	4.3	65.9
	3.25	1	.4	.5	66.4
	3.50	1	.4	.5	66.8
	4.00	20	7.2	9.5	76.3
	4.30	1	.4	.5	76.8
	4.40	1	.4	.5	77.3
	4.50	2	.7	.9	78.2
	5.00	10	3.6	4.7	82.9
	6.00	7	2.5	3.3	86.3
	6.50	2	.7	.9	87.2
	7.00	3	1.1	1.4	88.6
	8.00	10	3.6	4.7	93.4
	9.00	3	1.1	1.4	94.8
	10.00	5	1.8	2.4	97.2
	11.00	1	.4	.5	97.6
	12.00	1	.4	.5	98.1
	12.50	1	.4	.5	98.6
	14.00	1	.4	.5	99.1
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	36.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	211	76.4	100.0	
Missing	99.00	65	23.6		
	Total	65	23.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Tactical hours 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	95	34.4	40.4	40.4
	1.00	7	2.5	3.0	43.4
	1.50	3	1.1	1.3	44.7
	2.00	18	6.5	7.7	52.3
	2.50	3	1.1	1.3	53.6
	2.75	1	.4	.4	54.0
	3.00	18	6.5	7.7	61.7
	3.17	1	.4	.4	62.1
	3.50	3	1.1	1.3	63.4
	4.00	26	9.4	11.1	74.5
	4.50	2	.7	.9	75.3
	5.00	12	4.3	5.1	80.4
	5.50	1	.4	.4	80.9
	6.00	13	4.7	5.5	86.4
	6.50	3	1.1	1.3	87.7
	7.00	2	.7	.9	88.5
	7.50	1	.4	.4	88.9
	8.00	5	1.8	2.1	91.1
	9.00	6	2.2	2.6	93.6
	10.00	6	2.2	2.6	96.2
	12.00	1	.4	.4	96.6
	12.50	1	.4	.4	97.0
	13.00	1	.4	.4	97.4
	14.00	1	.4	.4	97.9
	16.00	1	.4	.4	98.3
	20.00	1	.4	.4	98.7
	22.00	1	.4	.4	99.1
	29.00	1	.4	.4	99.6
	96.00	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	235	85.1	100.0	
Missing	99.00	41	14.9		
	Total	41	14.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Team leader interview

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	183	66.3	66.3	66.3
	1	82	29.7	29.7	96.0
	8	11	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Trained negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	22	8.0	8.0	8.0
	yes	254	92.0	92.0	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Active listening

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	3	1.1	1.5	1.5
	.33	1	.4	.5	2.0
	.50	2	.7	1.0	3.0
	1.00	16	5.8	8.0	11.0
	1.50	3	1.1	1.5	12.5
	2.00	33	12.0	16.5	29.0
	2.50	1	.4	.5	29.5
	3.00	13	4.7	6.5	36.0
	4.00	52	18.8	26.0	62.0
	5.00	11	4.0	5.5	67.5
	6.00	7	2.5	3.5	71.0
	6.50	1	.4	.5	71.5
	7.00	1	.4	.5	72.0
	8.00	28	10.1	14.0	86.0
	9.00	1	.4	.5	86.5
	10.00	11	4.0	5.5	92.0
	12.00	2	.7	1.0	93.0
	15.00	2	.7	1.0	94.0
	16.00	9	3.3	4.5	98.5
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.0
	50.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	150.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	200	72.5	100.0	
Missing	99.00	76	27.5		
	Total	76	27.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Communication skills

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
alid	.00	1	.4	.5	.5
	.17	1	.4	.5	1.0
	.50	1	.4	.5	1.5
	1.00	6	2.2	3.0	4.5
	1.50	1	.4	.5	5.0
	2.00	20	7.2	10.1	15.1
	2.50	4	1.4	2.0	17.1
	3.00	7	2.5	3.5	20.6
	4.00	52	18.8	26.1	46.7
	5.00	13	4.7	6.5	53.3
	6.00	18	6.5	9.0	62.3
	6.50	1	.4	.5	62.8
	7.00	1	.4	.5	63.3
	8.00	43	15.6	21.6	84.9
	9.00	3	1.1	1.5	86.4
	10.00	11	4.0	5.5	92.0
	11.00	1	.4	.5	92.5
	12.00	3	1.1	1.5	94.0
	16.00	6	2.2	3.0	97.0
	20.00	5	1.8	2.5	99.5
	50.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	199	72.1	100.0	
Missing	99.00	77	27.9		
	Total	77	27.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Crisis intervention

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	2	.7	1.0	1.0
	.17	1	.4	.5	1.5
	.50	1	.4	.5	2.0
	1.00	6	2.2	3.0	5.0
	2.00	28	10.1	14.0	19.0
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	20.0
	3.00	9	3.3	4.5	24.5
	4.00	55	19.9	27.5	52.0
	5.00	13	4.7	6.5	58.5
	6.00	8	2.9	4.0	62.5
	6.50	1	.4	.5	63.0
	7.00	1	.4	.5	63.5
	8.00	43	15.6	21.5	85.0
	10.00	9	3.3	4.5	89.5
	12.00	6	2.2	3.0	92.5
	16.00	5	1.8	2.5	95.0
	20.00	3	1.1	1.5	96.5
	21.00	1	.4	.5	97.0
	25.00	2	.7	1.0	98.0
	30.00	1	.4	.5	98.5
	40.00	2	.7	1.0	99.5
	53.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	200	72.5	100.0	
Missing	99.00	76	27.5		
	Total	76	27.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Domestic disputes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	26	9.4	13.2	13.2
	.17	1	.4	.5	13.7
	.50	1	.4	.5	14.2
	1.00	31	11.2	15.7	29.9
	2.00	53	19.2	26.9	56.9
	2.50	3	1.1	1.5	58.4
	3.00	10	3.6	5.1	63.5
	4.00	45	16.3	22.8	86.3
	5.00	8	2.9	4.1	90.4
	6.00	3	1.1	1.5	91.9
	6.50	1	.4	.5	92.4
	8.00	11	4.0	5.6	98.0
	9.00	1	.4	.5	98.5
	10.00	1	.4	.5	99.0
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	30.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	197	71.4	100.0	
Missing	99.00	79	28.6		
	Total	79	28.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
Emotionally aroused	196	80	3.7075	2.5925	16.00
Mental illness	198	78	3.8140	3.3583	24.00
Substance abusers	196	80	2.3929	2.2789	20.00
Suicidal people	194	82	4.6847	5.4660	40.00
Terrorists	202	74	2.2360	2.2674	15.00
Empathy	191	85	2.3909	3.6497	40.00
Firearms	228	48	.4430	2.3576	24.00
First-aid / CPR	229	47	.2620	1.1274	8.00
Language	222	54	6.081E-02	.2888	2.00
Negotiation history	193	83	1.7876	1.9735	10.00
Media	202	74	.8243	1.1761	10.00

Emotionally aroused

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	8	2.9	4.1	4.1
	.17	1	.4	.5	4.6
	.50	2	.7	1.0	5.6
	1.00	19	6.9	9.7	15.3
	1.50	2	.7	1.0	16.3
	2.00	47	17.0	24.0	40.3
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	41.3
	3.00	12	4.3	6.1	47.4
	4.00	60	21.7	30.6	78.1
	5.00	9	3.3	4.6	82.7
	6.00	5	1.8	2.6	85.2
	6.50	1	.4	.5	85.7
	7.00	1	.4	.5	86.2
	8.00	19	6.9	9.7	95.9
	10.00	6	2.2	3.1	99.0
	12.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	16.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	196	71.0	100.0	
Missing	99.00	80	29.0		
	Total	80	29.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Mental illness

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	7	2.5	3.5	3.5
	.17	1	.4	.5	4.0
	.50	2	.7	1.0	5.1
	1.00	21	7.6	10.6	15.7
	1.50	2	.7	1.0	16.7
	2.00	57	20.7	28.8	45.5
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	46.5
	3.00	9	3.3	4.5	51.0
	3.50	1	.4	.5	51.5
	4.00	54	19.6	27.3	78.8
	5.00	8	2.9	4.0	82.8
	6.00	6	2.2	3.0	85.9
	6.50	1	.4	.5	86.4
	8.00	17	6.2	8.6	94.9
	10.00	3	1.1	1.5	96.5
	12.00	2	.7	1.0	97.5
	16.00	3	1.1	1.5	99.0
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	24.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	198	71.7	100.0	
Missing	99.00	78	28.3		
	Total	78	28.3		
Total		276	100.0		

Substance abusers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	21	7.6	10.7	10.7
	.50	7	2.5	3.6	14.3
	1.00	40	14.5	20.4	34.7
	1.50	1	.4	.5	35.2
	2.00	65	23.6	33.2	68.4
	2.50	3	1.1	1.5	69.9
	3.00	9	3.3	4.6	74.5
	4.00	37	13.4	18.9	93.4
	5.00	3	1.1	1.5	94.9
	6.50	1	.4	.5	95.4
	7.00	1	.4	.5	95.9
	8.00	3	1.1	1.5	97.4
	9.00	1	.4	.5	98.0
	10.00	3	1.1	1.5	99.5
	20.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	196	71.0	100.0	
Missing	99.00	80	29.0		
	Total	80	29.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Suicidal people

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	2	.7	1.0	1.0
	.33	1	.4	.5	1.5
	.50	3	1.1	1.5	3.1
	1.00	17	6.2	8.8	11.9
	1.50	1	.4	.5	12.4
	2.00	46	16.7	23.7	36.1
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	37.1
	3.00	8	2.9	4.1	41.2
	4.00	65	23.6	33.5	74.7
	5.00	9	3.3	4.6	79.4
	6.00	6	2.2	3.1	82.5
	6.50	1	.4	.5	83.0
	7.00	1	.4	.5	83.5
	8.00	17	6.2	8.8	92.3
	9.00	2	.7	1.0	93.3
	10.00	4	1.4	2.1	95.4
	12.00	1	.4	.5	95.9
	15.00	1	.4	.5	96.4
	16.00	3	1.1	1.5	97.9
	24.00	1	.4	.5	98.5
	40.00	3	1.1	1.5	100.0
	Total	194	70.3	100.0	
Missing	99.00	82	29.7		
	Total	82	29.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Terrorists

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	29	10.5	14.4	14.4
	.17	1	.4	.5	14.9
	.50	8	2.9	4.0	18.8
	1.00	42	15.2	20.8	39.6
	1.50	1	.4	.5	40.1
	2.00	67	24.3	33.2	73.3
	2.50	3	1.1	1.5	74.8
	3.00	11	4.0	5.4	80.2
	4.00	24	8.7	11.9	92.1
	5.00	3	1.1	1.5	93.6
	6.50	1	.4	.5	94.1
	7.00	1	.4	.5	94.6
	8.00	7	2.5	3.5	98.0
	10.00	1	.4	.5	98.5
	12.00	2	.7	1.0	99.5
	15.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	202	73.2	100.0	
Missing	99.00	74	26.8		
	Total	74	26.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Empathy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	31	11.2	16.2	16.2
	.17	1	.4	.5	16.8
	.50	4	1.4	2.1	18.8
	1.00	55	19.9	28.8	47.6
	2.00	47	17.0	24.6	72.3
	2.50	2	.7	1.0	73.3
	3.00	7	2.5	3.7	77.0
	4.00	25	9.1	13.1	90.1
	5.00	5	1.8	2.6	92.7
	6.00	3	1.1	1.6	94.2
	6.50	1	.4	.5	94.8
	8.00	6	2.2	3.1	97.9
	10.00	1	.4	.5	98.4
	12.00	1	.4	.5	99.0
	20.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	40.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	191	69.2	100.0	
Missing	99.00	85	30.8		
	Total	85	30.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Firearms

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	209	75.7	91.7	91.7
	.50	1	.4	.4	92.1
	1.00	6	2.2	2.6	94.7
	2.00	2	.7	.9	95.6
	2.50	1	.4	.4	96.1
	3.00	2	.7	.9	96.9
	4.00	1	.4	.4	97.4
	6.00	1	.4	.4	97.8
	8.00	2	.7	.9	98.7
	16.00	2	.7	.9	99.6
	24.00	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	228	82.6	100.0	
Missing	99.00	48	17.4		
	Total	48	17.4		
Total		276	100.0		

First-aid / CPR

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	210	76.1	91.7	91.7
	.50	2	.7	.9	92.6
	1.00	5	1.8	2.2	94.8
	2.00	3	1.1	1.3	96.1
	4.00	6	2.2	2.6	98.7
	8.00	3	1.1	1.3	100.0
	Total	229	83.0	100.0	
Missing	99.00	47	17.0		
	Total	47	17.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Language

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	211	76.4	95.0	95.0
	.50	1	.4	.5	95.5
	1.00	7	2.5	3.2	98.6
	2.00	3	1.1	1.4	100.0
	Total	222	80.4	100.0	
Missing	99.00	54	19.6		
	Total	54	19.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Negotiation history

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	27	9.8	14.0	14.0
	.50	10	3.6	5.2	19.2
	1.00	79	28.6	40.9	60.1
	1.50	3	1.1	1.6	61.7
	2.00	43	15.6	22.3	83.9
	2.50	1	.4	.5	84.5
	3.00	3	1.1	1.6	86.0
	4.00	15	5.4	7.8	93.8
	6.00	1	.4	.5	94.3
	7.00	1	.4	.5	94.8
	8.00	6	2.2	3.1	97.9
	9.00	2	.7	1.0	99.0
	10.00	2	.7	1.0	100.0
	Total	193	69.9	100.0	
Missing	99.00	83	30.1		
	Total	83	30.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Media

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	93	33.7	46.0	46.0
	.50	12	4.3	5.9	52.0
	1.00	59	21.4	29.2	81.2
	2.00	27	9.8	13.4	94.6
	2.50	1	.4	.5	95.0
	3.00	2	.7	1.0	96.0
	4.00	6	2.2	3.0	99.0
	5.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	10.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	202	73.2	100.0	
Missing	99.00	74	26.8		
	Total	74	26.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N				
	Valid	Missing	Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
SWAT	188	88	2.4282	2.6120	16.00
Legal	189	87	1.7566	1.6732	10.00
Agency liason	183	93	.8862	1.6279	12.00
Physical fitness	215	61	.2116	.6138	4.00
Sign language	222	54	.1374	.7057	8.00
Self-defense	218	58	.2064	.9301	8.00
Other topics	89	187	3.8090	8.4240	40.00
hostage incidents 1997	243	33	1.39	2.99	39
suicide/jumper 1997	243	33	3.44	4.20	26
kidnaping 1997	210	66	.12	.40	3
extortion 1997	190	86	5.79E-02	.39	3

SWAT

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	25	9.1	13.3	13.3
	.50	12	4.3	6.4	19.7
	1.00	47	17.0	25.0	44.7
	1.50	1	.4	.5	45.2
	2.00	50	18.1	26.6	71.8
	3.00	9	3.3	4.8	76.6
	4.00	21	7.6	11.2	87.8
	5.00	3	1.1	1.6	89.4
	6.00	2	.7	1.1	90.4
	8.00	12	4.3	6.4	96.8
	10.00	4	1.4	2.1	98.9
	12.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	16.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	188	68.1	100.0	
Missing	99.00	88	31.9		
	Total	88	31.9		
Total		276	100.0		

Legal

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	31	11.2	16.4	16.4
	.50	8	2.9	4.2	20.6
	1.00	60	21.7	31.7	52.4
	2.00	55	19.9	29.1	81.5
	2.50	2	.7	1.1	82.5
	3.00	5	1.8	2.6	85.2
	4.00	20	7.2	10.6	95.8
	5.00	2	.7	1.1	96.8
	6.00	2	.7	1.1	97.9
	8.00	2	.7	1.1	98.9
	10.00	2	.7	1.1	100.0
	Total	189	68.5	100.0	
Missing	99.00	87	31.5		
	Total	87	31.5		
Total		276	100.0		

Agency liason

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	95	34.4	51.9	51.9
	.17	1	.4	.5	52.5
	.50	7	2.5	3.8	56.3
	1.00	47	17.0	25.7	82.0
	2.00	19	6.9	10.4	92.3
	2.50	1	.4	.5	92.9
	3.00	3	1.1	1.6	94.5
	4.00	6	2.2	3.3	97.8
	8.00	2	.7	1.1	98.9
	10.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	12.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	183	66.3	100.0	
Missing	99.00	93	33.7		
	Total	93	33.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Physical fitness

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	184	66.7	85.6	85.6
	.50	4	1.4	1.9	87.4
	1.00	15	5.4	7.0	94.4
	2.00	9	3.3	4.2	98.6
	2.50	1	.4	.5	99.1
	4.00	2	.7	.9	100.0
	Total	215	77.9	100.0	
Missing	99.00	61	22.1		
	Total	61	22.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Sign language

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	208	75.4	93.7	93.7
	.50	1	.4	.5	94.1
	1.00	5	1.8	2.3	96.4
	2.00	5	1.8	2.3	98.6
	3.00	1	.4	.5	99.1
	4.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	8.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	222	80.4	100.0	
Missing	99.00	54	19.6		
	Total	54	19.6		
Total		276	100.0		

Self-defense

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	203	73.6	93.1	93.1
	1.00	5	1.8	2.3	95.4
	2.00	3	1.1	1.4	96.8
	4.00	5	1.8	2.3	99.1
	6.00	1	.4	.5	99.5
	8.00	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	218	79.0	100.0	
Missing	99.00	58	21.0		
	Total	58	21.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Other topics

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	57	20.7	64.0	64.0
	1.00	3	1.1	3.4	67.4
	1.50	2	.7	2.2	69.7
	2.00	8	2.9	9.0	78.7
	3.00	1	.4	1.1	79.8
	3.50	1	.4	1.1	80.9
	5.00	2	.7	2.2	83.1
	8.00	2	.7	2.2	85.4
	14.00	3	1.1	3.4	88.8
	15.00	2	.7	2.2	91.0
	16.00	1	.4	1.1	92.1
	17.50	1	.4	1.1	93.3
	18.00	1	.4	1.1	94.4
	24.00	1	.4	1.1	95.5
	26.00	1	.4	1.1	96.6
	35.00	1	.4	1.1	97.8
	36.00	1	.4	1.1	98.9
	40.00	1	.4	1.1	100.0
	Total	89	32.2	100.0	
Missing	99.00	187	67.8		
	Total	187	67.8		
Total		276	100.0		

hostage incidents 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	113	40.9	46.5	46.5
	1	56	20.3	23.0	69.5
	2	34	12.3	14.0	83.5
	3	17	6.2	7.0	90.5
	4	8	2.9	3.3	93.8
	5	6	2.2	2.5	96.3
	6	2	.7	.8	97.1
	7	3	1.1	1.2	98.4
	8	1	.4	.4	98.8
	10	2	.7	.8	99.6
	39	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	243	88.0	100.0	
Missing	88	3	1.1		
	99	30	10.9		
	Total	33	12.0		
Total		276	100.0		

suicide/jumper 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	46	16.7	18.9	18.9
	1	45	16.3	18.5	37.4
	2	47	17.0	19.3	56.8
	3	24	8.7	9.9	66.7
	4	24	8.7	9.9	76.5
	5	15	5.4	6.2	82.7
	6	8	2.9	3.3	86.0
	7	6	2.2	2.5	88.5
	8	5	1.8	2.1	90.5
	9	1	.4	.4	90.9
	10	8	2.9	3.3	94.2
	12	2	.7	.8	95.1
	14	3	1.1	1.2	96.3
	15	3	1.1	1.2	97.5
	18	1	.4	.4	97.9
	20	4	1.4	1.6	99.6
	26	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	243	88.0	100.0	
Missing	88	8	2.9		
	99	25	9.1		
	Total	33	12.0		
Total		276	100.0		

kidnaping 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	188	68.1	89.5	89.5
	1	19	6.9	9.0	98.6
	2	2	.7	1.0	99.5
	3	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	210	76.1	100.0	
Missing	88	19	6.9		
	99	47	17.0		
	Total	66	23.9		
Total		276	100.0		

extortion 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	185	67.0	97.4	97.4
	1	2	.7	1.1	98.4
	3	3	1.1	1.6	100.0
	Total	190	68.8	100.0	
Missing	88	34	12.3		
	99	52	18.8		
	Total	86	31.2		
Total		276	100.0		

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
barricade 1997	249	27	3.17	4.79	52
raid/warrant 1997	189	87	6.79	19.59	164
EDP/Mental 1997	228	48	2.47	5.12	50
other incidents 1997	78	198	1.53	4.82	28
Age of unit	254	22	1983.09	6.62	26
Ballistic vest	252	24	1.88	.63	2
Victim assistance	276	0	.48	.50	1
WRITSCAL	276	0	1.86	1.24	5
Written policy	273	3	1.81	.39	1
Years negotiator	238	38	10.82	12.43	98
Years sworn officer	272	4	20.45	5.10	30

barricade 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	49	17.8	19.7	19.7
	1	54	19.6	21.7	41.4
	2	49	17.8	19.7	61.0
	3	28	10.1	11.2	72.3
	4	20	7.2	8.0	80.3
	5	13	4.7	5.2	85.5
	6	7	2.5	2.8	88.4
	7	7	2.5	2.8	91.2
	8	4	1.4	1.6	92.8
	9	3	1.1	1.2	94.0
	10	3	1.1	1.2	95.2
	11	1	.4	.4	95.6
	12	1	.4	.4	96.0
	14	1	.4	.4	96.4
	15	4	1.4	1.6	98.0
	16	1	.4	.4	98.4
	20	2	.7	.8	99.2
	23	1	.4	.4	99.6
	52	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	249	90.2	100.0	
Missing	88	3	1.1		
	99	24	8.7		
	Total	27	9.8		
Total		276	100.0		

raid/warrant 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	89	32.2	47.1	47.1
	1	17	6.2	9.0	56.1
	2	17	6.2	9.0	65.1
	3	11	4.0	5.8	70.9
	4	6	2.2	3.2	74.1
	5	7	2.5	3.7	77.8
	6	8	2.9	4.2	82.0
	8	3	1.1	1.6	83.6
	9	3	1.1	1.6	85.2
	10	5	1.8	2.6	87.8
	12	2	.7	1.1	88.9
	13	2	.7	1.1	89.9
	14	1	.4	.5	90.5
	15	1	.4	.5	91.0
	20	2	.7	1.1	92.1
	21	1	.4	.5	92.6
	25	1	.4	.5	93.1
	30	2	.7	1.1	94.2
	35	1	.4	.5	94.7
	40	3	1.1	1.6	96.3
	44	1	.4	.5	96.8
	46	1	.4	.5	97.4
	50	1	.4	.5	97.9
	63	1	.4	.5	98.4
	100	1	.4	.5	98.9
	145	1	.4	.5	99.5
	164	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	189	68.5	100.0	
Missing	88	44	15.9		
	99	43	15.6		
	Total	87	31.5		
Total		276	100.0		

EDP/Mental 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	92	33.3	40.4	40.4
	1	43	15.6	18.9	59.2
	2	38	13.8	16.7	75.9
	3	13	4.7	5.7	81.6
	4	11	4.0	4.8	86.4
	5	8	2.9	3.5	89.9
	6	3	1.1	1.3	91.2
	7	2	.7	.9	92.1
	8	2	.7	.9	93.0
	10	6	2.2	2.6	95.6
	11	1	.4	.4	96.1
	12	1	.4	.4	96.5
	15	2	.7	.9	97.4
	20	3	1.1	1.3	98.7
	25	1	.4	.4	99.1
	26	1	.4	.4	99.6
	50	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	228	82.6	100.0	
Missing	88	11	4.0		
	99	37	13.4		
	Total	48	17.4		
Total		276	100.0		

other incidents 1997

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	58	21.0	74.4	74.4
	1	5	1.8	6.4	80.8
	2	4	1.4	5.1	85.9
	3	4	1.4	5.1	91.0
	5	3	1.1	3.8	94.9
	6	1	.4	1.3	96.2
	21	1	.4	1.3	97.4
	24	1	.4	1.3	98.7
	28	1	.4	1.3	100.0
	Total	78	28.3	100.0	
Missing	88	15	5.4		
	99	183	66.3		
	Total	198	71.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Age of unit

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1971	1	.4	.4	4
	1972	1	.4	.4	.8
	1973	6	2.2	2.4	3.1
	1974	14	5.1	5.5	8.7
	1975	15	5.4	5.9	14.6
	1976	14	5.1	5.5	20.1
	1977	4	1.4	1.6	21.7
	1978	22	8.0	8.7	30.3
	1979	8	2.9	3.1	33.5
	1980	29	10.5	11.4	44.9
	1981	7	2.5	2.8	47.6
	1982	8	2.9	3.1	50.8
	1983	8	2.9	3.1	53.9
	1984	10	3.6	3.9	57.9
	1985	18	6.5	7.1	65.0
	1986	14	5.1	5.5	70.5
	1987	7	2.5	2.8	73.2
	1988	10	3.6	3.9	77.2
	1989	6	2.2	2.4	79.5
	1990	9	3.3	3.5	83.1
	1991	5	1.8	2.0	85.0
	1992	8	2.9	3.1	88.2
	1993	8	2.9	3.1	91.3
	1994	9	3.3	3.5	94.9
	1995	4	1.4	1.6	96.5
	1996	4	1.4	1.6	98.0
	1997	5	1.8	2.0	100.0
	Total	254	92.0	100.0	
Missing	9999	22	8.0		
	Total	22	8.0		
Total		276	100.0		

Ballistic vest

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	67	24.3	26.6	26.6
	yes, hidden	148	53.6	58.7	85.3
	yes, visible	37	13.4	14.7	100.0
	Total	252	91.3	100.0	
Missing	8	20	7.2		
	9	4	1.4		
	Total	24	8.7		
Total		276	100.0		

Victim assistance

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	144	52.2	52.2	52.2
	1	132	47.8	47.8	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

WRITSCAL

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	39	14.1	14.1	14.1
	1	79	28.6	28.6	42.8
	2	72	26.1	26.1	68.8
	3	56	20.3	20.3	89.1
	4	27	9.8	9.8	98.9
	5	3	1.1	1.1	100.0
	Total	276	100.0	100.0	
Total		276	100.0		

Written policy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no	51	18.5	18.7	18.7
	yes	222	80.4	81.3	100.0
	Total	273	98.9	100.0	
Missing	9	3	1.1		
	Total	3	1.1		
Total		276	100.0		

Years negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	3	1.1	1.3	1.3
	1	8	2.9	3.4	4.6
	2	17	6.2	7.1	11.8
	3	12	4.3	5.0	16.8
	4	18	6.5	7.6	24.4
	5	20	7.2	8.4	32.8
	6	9	3.3	3.8	36.6
	7	15	5.4	6.3	42.9
	9	13	4.7	5.5	48.3
	10	25	9.1	10.5	58.8
	11	11	4.0	4.6	63.4
	12	14	5.1	5.9	69.3
	13	8	2.9	3.4	72.7
	14	11	4.0	4.6	77.3
	15	18	6.5	7.6	84.9
	16	6	2.2	2.5	87.4
	17	7	2.5	2.9	90.3
	18	6	2.2	2.5	92.9
	19	2	.7	.8	93.7
	20	4	1.4	1.7	95.4
	21	2	.7	.8	96.2
	22	1	.4	.4	96.6
	23	2	.7	.8	97.5
	24	1	.4	.4	97.9
	25	1	.4	.4	98.3
	88	1	.4	.4	98.7
	98	3	1.1	1.3	100.0
	Total	238	86.2	100.0	
Missing	8	28	10.1		
	99	10	3.6		
	Total	38	13.8		
Total		276	100.0		

Years sworn officer

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	7	1	.4	.4	4
	9	3	1.1	1.1	1.5
	10	3	1.1	1.1	2.6
	11	1	.4	.4	2.9
	12	3	1.1	1.1	4.0
	13	12	4.3	4.4	8.5
	14	8	2.9	2.9	11.4
	15	15	5.4	5.5	16.9
	16	14	5.1	5.1	22.1
	17	15	5.4	5.5	27.6
	18	23	8.3	8.5	36.0
	19	14	5.1	5.1	41.2
	20	40	14.5	14.7	55.9
	21	16	5.8	5.9	61.8
	22	15	5.4	5.5	67.3
	23	12	4.3	4.4	71.7
	24	17	6.2	6.3	77.9
	25	19	6.9	7.0	84.9
	26	8	2.9	2.9	87.9
	27	12	4.3	4.4	92.3
	28	5	1.8	1.8	94.1
	29	5	1.8	1.8	96.0
	30	3	1.1	1.1	97.1
	31	1	.4	.4	97.4
	32	3	1.1	1.1	98.5
	33	1	.4	.4	98.9
	34	1	.4	.4	99.3
	36	1	.4	.4	99.6
	37	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	272	98.6	100.0	
Missing	8	2	.7		
	99	2	.7		
	Total	4	1.4		
Total		276	100.0		

Frequencies

Statistics

	N		Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
	Valid	Missing			
1995 Incidents	218	58	6.62	11.19	100
1996 Incidents	222	54	7.11	11.81	105
1997 Incidents	234	42	7.31	10.83	100

1995 Incidents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	49	17.8	22.5	22.5
	1	18	6.5	8.3	30.7
	2	25	9.1	11.5	42.2
	3	23	8.3	10.6	52.8
	4	17	6.2	7.8	60.6
	5	10	3.6	4.6	65.1
	6	13	4.7	6.0	71.1
	7	6	2.2	2.8	73.9
	8	4	1.4	1.8	75.7
	9	6	2.2	2.8	78.4
	10	7	2.5	3.2	81.7
	11	3	1.1	1.4	83.0
	12	6	2.2	2.8	85.8
	14	4	1.4	1.8	87.6
	15	2	.7	.9	88.5
	16	2	.7	.9	89.4
	17	2	.7	.9	90.4
	18	3	1.1	1.4	91.7
	20	4	1.4	1.8	93.6
	22	1	.4	.5	94.0
	24	2	.7	.9	95.0
	25	5	1.8	2.3	97.2
	27	1	.4	.5	97.7
	30	1	.4	.5	98.2
	35	1	.4	.5	98.6
	45	1	.4	.5	99.1
	89	1	.4	.5	99.5
	100	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	218	79.0	100.0	
Missing	98	12	4.3		
	99	46	16.7		
	Total	58	21.0		
Total		276	100.0		

1996 Incidents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	39	14.1	17.6	17.6
	1	14	5.1	6.3	23.9
	2	28	10.1	12.6	36.5
	3	26	9.4	11.7	48.2
	4	15	5.4	6.8	55.0
	5	14	5.1	6.3	61.3
	6	15	5.4	6.8	68.0
	7	8	2.9	3.6	71.6
	8	8	2.9	3.6	75.2
	9	7	2.5	3.2	78.4
	10	11	4.0	5.0	83.3
	11	4	1.4	1.8	85.1
	12	3	1.1	1.4	86.5
	13	4	1.4	1.8	88.3
	14	1	.4	.5	88.7
	15	3	1.1	1.4	90.1
	16	1	.4	.5	90.5
	18	2	.7	.9	91.4
	20	2	.7	.9	92.3
	21	1	.4	.5	92.8
	22	2	.7	.9	93.7
	23	1	.4	.5	94.1
	25	3	1.1	1.4	95.5
	29	1	.4	.5	95.9
	30	2	.7	.9	96.8
	31	1	.4	.5	97.3
	33	1	.4	.5	97.7
	35	1	.4	.5	98.2
	38	1	.4	.5	98.6
	40	1	.4	.5	99.1
	100	1	.4	.5	99.5
	105	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	222	80.4	100.0	
Missing	98	12	4.3		
	99	42	15.2		
	Total	54	19.6		
Total		276	100.0		

1997 Incidents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	23	8.3	9.8	9.8
	1	30	10.9	12.8	22.6
	2	28	10.1	12.0	34.6
	3	21	7.6	9.0	43.6
	4	21	7.6	9.0	52.6
	5	19	6.9	8.1	60.7
	6	11	4.0	4.7	65.4
	7	9	3.3	3.8	69.2
	8	9	3.3	3.8	73.1
	9	6	2.2	2.6	75.6
	10	13	4.7	5.6	81.2
	11	6	2.2	2.6	83.8
	12	5	1.8	2.1	85.9
	13	1	.4	.4	86.3
	14	3	1.1	1.3	87.6
	15	6	2.2	2.6	90.2
	16	1	.4	.4	90.6
	17	1	.4	.4	91.0
	19	3	1.1	1.3	92.3
	20	1	.4	.4	92.7
	22	4	1.4	1.7	94.4
	23	1	.4	.4	94.9
	24	1	.4	.4	95.3
	25	1	.4	.4	95.7
	28	1	.4	.4	96.2
	30	2	.7	.9	97.0
	32	1	.4	.4	97.4
	34	1	.4	.4	97.9
	35	1	.4	.4	98.3
	43	1	.4	.4	98.7
	45	1	.4	.4	99.1
	80	1	.4	.4	99.6
	100	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	234	84.8	100.0	
Missing	98	12	4.3		
	99	30	10.9		
	Total	42	15.2		
Total		276	100.0		

APPENDIX "C"

LEMAS Abstract - ICPSR

STUDYNO = 6708;

DATE-ADDED = Sep. 30, 1996;

DATE-UPDATED = Sep. 30, 1996;

INVESTIGATOR = United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics.;

TITLE = LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS), 1993;

SUMMARY = This survey, the third in the Bureau of Justice Statistics' program on Law Enforcement and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS), presents information on five types of general-purpose law enforcement agencies: state police, county police, special police (state and local), municipal police, and sheriff's departments. Variables include size of the population served by the police or sheriff's department, levels of employment and spending, various functions of the department, average salary levels for uniformed officers, policies and programs, and other matters related to management and personnel.;

EXTENT.COLLECT = 1 data file + machine-readable documentation (text) + SAS data definition statements + SPSS data definition statements + data collection instruments (PDF);

EXTENT.PROCESS = CDBK.ICPSR/ CONCHK.ICPSR/ DDEF.ICPSR/ MDATA.ICPSR/ FREQ.ICPSR/ UNDOCCHK.ICPSR/ RECODE/ SCAN;

DATA.TYPE = survey data;

TIME.PERIOD = 1993;

DATE.OF.COLLECT = June 1992-June 1993;

DATA.SOURCE = self-enumerated questionnaires;

DATA.FORMAT = LRECL with SAS and SPSS data definition statements;

COLLECT.NOTE = The data collection instruments are provided as Portable Document Format (PDF) files. The PDF file format was developed by Adobe Systems Incorporated and can be accessed using the Adobe Acrobat reader. Information on how to obtain a copy of the Acrobat Reader is provided through the ICPSR Website on the Internet. Additional documentation available for this collection includes Attachments L (Crosstabulation charts by agency: Weighting and Imputation Cell Collapsing SR: 1993 LEMAS Response File), M (Crosstabulation chart by agency: Weighting and Imputation Cell Collapsing NSR: 1993 LEMAS Response File), X (Crosstabulation charts by agency: Variance Estimation Cell Collapsing SR: 1993 LEMAS Response File), and Y (Crosstabulation chart by agency: Variance Estimation Cell Collapsing NSR: 1993 LEMAS Response File). These charts are available only in hardcopy form upon request from ICPSR. SAMPLING = A nationally representative sample of the nearly 17,000 publicly funded state and local law enforcement agencies with 100 or more sworn officers. The survey also included a nationally representative sample of agencies that employed fewer than 100 officers. A stratified random sampling method was used in selecting the smaller agencies.;

UNIVERSE = All state, county, municipal, special, and sheriff's law enforcement agencies in the United States.;

RELATED.PUBS = Reaves, Brian A. "A LEMAS Report: Local Police Departments, 1993." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics.;

RELATED.PUBS = Reaves, Brian A., and Pheny Z. Smith. "A LEMAS Report: Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 1993: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 or More Officers." Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics.;

RELATED.PUBS = Reaves, Brian A., and Pheny Z. Smith. "A LEMAS Report: Sheriffs' Departments, 1993." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics.;

PART;

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VARIABLE.COUNT = inap.
LRECL = 75
RECORDS.PER.CASE = inap.

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VARIABLE.COUNT = inap.
LRECL = inap.
RECORDS.PER.CASE = inap.

PART;

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VARIABLE.COUNT = inap.

LRECL = inap.
RECORDS.PER.CASE = inap.

KEYWORDS = Law enforcement, police, employment;

CITATION = United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS), 1993 [Computer file]. Conducted by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1996.;

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IMAGE EVALUATION
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









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