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**DEVELOPMENT OF AND IN THE GROUP: AN OBJECT RELATIONS
PERSPECTIVE**

City University of New York

PH.D. 1985

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**DEVELOPMENT OF AND IN THE GROUP:
AN OBJECT RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE**

by

LAWRENCE JACOBSON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Psychology in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of
New York.

1985

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

**DEVELOPMENT OF AND IN THE GROUP:
AN OBJECT RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE**

by

Lawrence Jacobson

Sponsor: Professor Laurence J. Gould

The dissertation presents an account of small group dynamics in terms of object relations theory. The general aim is to refine and clarify the theory of group dynamics which originates in the work of Wilfred Bion by understanding its terminology in terms of object relations theory. The particular aim is to use that clarification to explore the relationship between group development and the development of the individual in the group.

The link between development of and development in the group is made by focusing on two modes of group relations: that of the individual to the group as a whole, and that of the individual to other individuals in the group. Object relations theory provides the conceptual framework within which both of these modes are elucidated,

and the differences and connections between them explored. Examples are used to illustrate the implications of the account, and attention is given to the precision of the terms used and the criteria for their application.

Two theses are presented: Firstly, these two modes--the individual's relation to the group as a whole, and the individual's relation to the other individuals in the group--entail two distinct tracks of development which do not necessarily progress in tandem, though some correlation can be expected. The nature of this correlation is explored and some predictions are made about the developmental course of small groups. Secondly, the individual's representation of the group as a whole in important respects resembles that of a transitional object: an object which is neither self nor other but both. This second thesis is investigated for the light it throws on the individual's relation to the group as a whole in both its defensive and developmental aspects.

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INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation I will present an account of small group dynamics in terms of object relations theory. The general aim is to refine and clarify the theory of group dynamics which originates in Bion's work (1961) by understanding its terminology in terms of object relations theory. The particular aim is to use that clarification to explore the relationship between group development and the development of the individual in the group.

Presently, there are great differences between writers on groups with respect to whether groups develop at all, and if so what develops in groups and in what way. Does group development recapitulate that of the family of an oedipal child, or pre-oedipal development of psychological boundaries? Are we to look for development in individuals' relationships within the group to the leader or to peers; or in the individual's relationship to the group as a whole; or in the relationship of the group as a whole to its leader or to its external environment or to its members as individuals? None, some, or all of the above, and how are they related? How often are different

writers with seemingly different views even writing about the same thing, especially when they are using comparatively unfamiliar phrases like "group as a whole"? When, for example, Scheidlinger (1974/1982a) writes that the group as a whole is a comfortable and need-satisfying maternal object, and Slater (1966) writes that for much of its life the group is organized to ward off individuals' merger with a terrifying enveloping group-mother, should we aim to decide between them or understand them to be referring to different levels of group functioning?

One purpose of clarifying group theory is that these different kinds of questions and observations can be understood in relation to each other. Though we seem far from a general theory of group development, my aim is to put forward a framework in which the manifold empirical observations in and of groups can be organized in a comprehensible and useful way--useful towards further theoretical development and towards a clearer sense of how groups can be used and of how we can be used by groups. If I am successful it will clarify foci for empirical study. It will indicate where we should look to confirm or disconfirm a set of observations and the theory that is put forward to account for them.

Fundamentally, my perspective is that of the individual, not the group. I seek to understand the group in terms of the experience of the individuals who make it up.

That group members are not only group members but also individuals is a notion that infuses the whole of this work, and a good deal of it serves the purpose of delineating and thus preserving the area in which they are not group members. This undoubtedly reflects cultural values and the conceptual world in which we live, which is not a universal one. However, this last statement is itself an illustration of the fact that one cannot understand the individual outside of the collectivity. Bion (1961) noted that one cannot even understand the hermit except in the context of the group he hermits himself away from.

Psychoanalysis is here taken as offering the most fruitful, rich and complete understanding of the individual. Within psychoanalysis I take the object relations perspective as the most suitable to the task at hand--i.e. the aim of understanding the nature of the individual's relations to his objects. In this the individual's self- and object-representations; the relations between them; their affective loading; their level of differentiation, organization and abstraction; and the degree to which some or other kinds of representations dominate psychological functioning, are crucial terms and issues. The psychic systems--ego, id, superego--are less central; and the instinctual developmental levels--oral, anal, phallic, genital--will be peripheral terms at most.

This brings us to another frame in which this work

can be seen. We now have a situation where we can give a fairly sophisticated account of how any two individuals are relating to each other, which would include a good working explanation of how they come to be relating in this way in terms of the psychological history of each. We could reproduce this account many times to describe all such interrelations in a small group. We also have a somewhat less sophisticated description of how a small group is functioning. But though the phenomena are the same the language of each is different: displacement, projection, denial, self- and object-representations, etc., on the one hand, and basic assumption and work, secular and sacred, etc., on the other. Some attempts have been made to integrate the languages, but typically these have been more suggestive than systematic. Sometimes there has been an appropriation of psychoanalytic terms without very much attention to the meaning of the term within psychoanalysis. Hence one aspect of the general aim of this work is towards an integration of psychoanalytic, primarily two-person, and group languages, in such a way that the specificity and integrity of both are maintained.

The link between development of and development in the group will be made by focusing on two modes of group relations: that of the individual to the group as a whole, and that of the individual to other individuals in

the group. The relation between these two modes has not often been focused on, but certain traditions have nevertheless coalesced. It was Bion (1961) who, from a psychoanalytic tradition, first introduced the notion of the group as a unitary entity, and explored the different patterns that it takes--the "basic assumptions". He found that no matter what the basic assumption, this fantasy of the unitary group worked to hinder individuals' development in groups and the task-oriented functioning of the aggregate. Individual development does take place (the "work group" does tend to win out in the end), but this is despite the individual's relation to the group as a whole. Though the basic assumptions change, they are equally marked by "the absence of any process of development" (p. 159).

A second stream of thought, however, dominated by Slater (1966), has conceived the different patterns of the group as a whole as in a linearly developmental continuum. Different basic assumptions belong to different stages in the individuals' progressive differentiation of themselves from the group as a whole. However, at this point we find a certain obscurity: Whereas this development in the individual's relation to the group is related to development in the individual's relations to other individuals in the group, and to their ability to work together on the group task, adherents of this view have taken pains to

point out that such development has no clear or necessary connection to the development of the individual group members.

One way of understanding the differences between these views is to see the individual's relation to other individuals and his relation to the group as a whole as in a figure-ground relationship. Thus, Bion could be said to have discovered and elucidated the dynamics of the ground on which individual development must take place. But in his writings on groups he was not directly concerned with the development of individual-to-individual relations, which he thought was well taken care of by Freud (1921/1959). In contrast, Slater was especially interested in showing how figure and ground progress in tandem. But in doing this he blurred the figure-ground distinction, one consequence of which was that it became unclear how the development of individual-to-individual relations in the group is related to individual development.

My aim in this work is to restore this figure-ground distinction, in such a way as to get a clear view of the connections as well as the differences between them. In this respect, my approach is first to elaborate the basic assumptions (the ground) from a more individually-oriented perspective than that of Bion, and to see what the changes in basic assumption involve for the individual and in what sense these changes do, and in what sense they do not,

involve individual development. From that will emerge a clear view of what else must happen for there to be a more fully-fledged individual development in the group (the figure), and of how that proceeds. It is on this basis of clarity about the differences that I will go on to discuss connections between the development of individuals' relations to the group as a unitary entity and their relations to each other.

I will begin, in chapter 1, by presenting four modes of group functioning, and delineating them in the context of a review of the relevant literature on groups. Though we will mainly be concerned with only the second and third of them, all four need to be considered in an adequate picture of a group's functioning.

The second chapter is a discussion towards definition of the major psychoanalytic concepts which I use in the account of the group. I ground each term in the psychoanalytic (object relations) literature, including in cases where it is important their developmental aspects. The main aim of this chapter is that when I use a term like 'projection' or 'self' the reader knows what I mean, and from where in the psychoanalytic literature the term derives.

In chapter 3, I will give an account of the early stages of the group, elucidating the developing group processes from the perspective of the individual's experi-

ence of the group situation and the mechanisms used to deal with it. I thus build an account of group processes in the terms of object relations theory, up to the point at which group processes have reached full play. In particular, the distinction between individuals' relations to the group as a whole and their relations to each other as individuals will have been made in the context of the development of group processes; and I will here first present the thesis that the group as a unitary entity should be understood as a primary process presence with indeterminate or shifting localization (Schafer, 1968), or as resembling in important ways a transitional object (Winnicott, 1953/1975h).

It is in the fourth chapter that the forms and functions of the basic assumptions will be explored in some depth. I will argue that whereas shifts in basic assumption may mark a sort of development of the group--which I will call developmental track one--the relation to the group as a unitary entity continues to foreclose the possibility for development in the individual's engagement with other individuals. I will then argue that what is necessary for this latter development is a process which is similar to that of reality testing a transitional phenomenon, and this I will term developmental track two. I will elaborate the distinctions between these tracks (between figure and ground, in the above analogy), includ-

ing the different criteria for saying that the group has moved along one or the other.

The final chapter is a further elaboration of some aspects of this account, and an exploration of some of its implications. The first section addresses the connections between the developmental tracks and discusses some predictions as to the course of group development. The second section reviews the definitions of modes 2 and 3 and focuses on how the group as unitary entity serves both a defensive and transitional-phenomenon role. Finally, in the third section I will reconsider the notion of development that I have used in this account.

This work is one of theory-building. Its aim is a more perspicuous view of groups, by which is meant a view which organizes and explicates the data more clearly and richly than was previously possible, and facilitates further work towards greater breadth, depth and clarity of understanding. The data is that of other writers, already organized by them as they saw most useful to their purposes. Their purposes, of course, were manifold, ranging from group psychotherapy to exploration of and training in group dynamics to therapy of the group with only instrumental concern about the individuals within it. I hope that what emerges from this work will be applicable to all of these--i.e. a fairly general theory.

But there are limitations to its applicability, which

might best be expressed in an assumption of an 'ideal' group. This is one of between about seven and fifteen members. If less than this number then there may be insufficient play for a number of the processes described, in part because the defection of even one member would be too great a threat to the group's security (Miller and Rice, 1967; Gosling, 1981). Larger groups tend to either split into sub-groups or be very short-lived, for they present an especially great threat to the integrity of the individuals within them (Miller and Rice, 1967; Kreeger, 1975). Within this range, however, though it can only be approximately specified, the whole group falls fairly easily into the range of vision of each of its members and there are not so many of them that they cannot maintain close and continuous personal relationships. The group does not need its every member to sustain its status as a group, yet there is limited scope for sub-grouping. A further assumption is that on the whole the members do not know each other when the group is formed, and that they consist of adults of averagely expectable psychological development.

The purpose of this 'ideal' group is to study its own dynamics, but this is one of the more flexible of the parameters. It is important that the external environment is not often impressing itself upon the group in the form of demands that it produce this or that for export from

the group, for that would obscure the development of some of the dynamics described. However, it is firmly maintained that such dynamics would be operating, though less apparently. Actually I would expect that stretching any of these parameters to some extent would do no great harm to the theory's applicability, and the theory itself would predict some of the effects. But the point at which the group dynamics would qualitatively change will not be a major focus. Indeed, I will not even be testing the theory against 'raw' data of the ideal kind. However, it is my aim to be attentive to the precision of terms and to the criteria for their application. Though I will not aim for operationalizability, it will be a 'background' concern. My aim is that what is put forward is as much as possible open to confirmation and disconfirmation, and where that is problematic that the difficulty is explicit.

One further assumption is that there is also in the group one or two consultants, whose role is to interpret the group's dynamics. They may have other roles as well, such as therapist, recorder of the events in the group for the sponsoring institution, etc.. They are a convenient assumption because many groups have them in some form, and because by assuming their presence we can more systematically consider how groups make use of information about themselves and of the persons who have that information. This account of groups does not depend on their presence,

but it is important that, if present, their statements do not emphasize individual differences between members. For that would obstruct several aspects of group development which depend on allowing some scope to the group's tendency to ignore differences. But this parameter, too, is malleable, for it is by no means the norm for what the consultant emphasizes to affect the other members. At any rate, I will use for them the generic term 'consultant'. It involves leadership of one, but not the only, kind.

CHAPTER ONE

TERMINOLOGY I: GROUP FUNCTIONING

In this chapter I offer four modes of group functioning, and review the relevant literature on groups in the context of this four-mode scheme. The four modes refer to the nature of the individual's relations to his objects. I present them, at this point, as an a priori conceptual scheme, the value of which for a perspicuous view of groups will be investigated in subsequent chapters.

Nevertheless, a few introductory words on the basis of the four modes are in order. Mode 1 (merger, fusion) and mode 4 (bounded and separate, non-transferential) represent extremes in the level of differentiation in object relations. Fear of mode 1 may be quite prominent in groups, but to see it as an active mode of object relating in groups takes some inferring. Its status as such rests on its value in explaining mode 2 phenomena and I therefore deal with it after mode 2. Mode 4--bounded and separate, non-transferential object relating--is

always, I take it, significantly infused with one or more of the other modes. It is, though, a necessary aspect of individual functioning, and a prominent one in mature, rational, task-oriented functioning.

Most of what follows this chapter will be involved with modes 2 and 3, especially 2, and the interrelation between them. Mode 2 is the relationship to the group as a unitary entity, i.e. to all or nearly all the members in the same fantasy, by all or nearly all members. Mode 3 covers transferential relations to individuals in the group, and includes patterns of such relationships. Other members are differentiated from each other, which they are not in mode 2, but any individual relationship with an other may be relatively undifferentiated. Hence modes 1 through 4 do not by definition constitute a continuum of self-object differentiation in the individual's relations in the group.

My naming mode 2 "the 'group' fantasy", or "the relationship to the group as a unitary entity" does not mean that the group cannot be seen as a whole in terms of the other modes. Foulkes (1964) has suggested that at mode 1 Jungian archetypes might be useful in describing the group, at mode 3 the group can be seen as the family, and at mode 4 as the community, or public opinion. What it does mean is that insofar as the individual experiences the 'archetype', 'family' or 'community' as a unitary

entity with which he is in a relation, and not merely as an abstraction from multiple interpersonal relations, then the phenomenon belongs to mode 2.

This chapter has the dual aim of reviewing the relevant literature on groups, and that it be organized as a beginning delineation of the four modes. A certain 'woolliness' must be tolerated at this stage for two reasons. Firstly, none of the writers had quite the same distinctions in mind as I present, and I must steer a balance between showing the body of knowledge and theory with respect to each of them, and doing gross injustices to the internal and aesthetic coherence of others' contributions. I have not, then, rigidly kept out of my discussion of one mode all references to others.

Secondly, this is a beginning clarification, which will become clearer as we go on. Though at any time one mode may be predominant, a full understanding of a moment in group life would involve placing the phenomenon on all four modes. They interact, though, and it would often be difficult to distinguish the influence of one mode from that of another--especially with respect to the second and third modes, which it is my main purpose to study. Compare 'id' and 'ego': It is not possible to understand one without an understanding of the other; a phenomenon may have aspects of both; they interact; and it is sometimes difficult to separate the influence of each. Never-

theless, the distinction has been most useful.

Mode 2

This is the relationship to the group as a unitary entity, distinct from the aggregate of individuals who make up the group. I shall refer to it as the 'group', or the 'group' fantasy, when it is necessary to distinguish it from the group (no apostrophes) which is the aggregate of individuals, and the source of our data concerning the 'group'. The distinction thus far is Bion's (1961). Also following Bion, it is my contention that a full understanding of the group requires an understanding of the 'group'; it will emerge at various points through this work that to a considerable degree the converse is also true, which Bion did not believe to be the case. I use the term 'fantasy' in a broad sense, as an idea or set of ideas which may be conscious or unconscious, implying only that the reality of the idea is at least arguable.

It is a relationship to all or nearly all group members at the same time, in the same fantasy. Hence, in this mode there is no differentiation between other members. Also, differentiation between the individual and the 'group' is tenuous at best (more on this below) but this cannot be a criterial issue because, as noted above, poor self-object differentiation may characterize relations in mode 3. By the same token, it is a relation by

all or nearly all individuals, but this too may characterize relations in mode 3. The crucial and defining factor is that it is to all or nearly all individuals at the same time, in the same process. It is a relation to one object, not an agglomeration of relations to a collection of individual group members.

This definition puts much pressure on the "nearly all": To follow it through I must be very specific about the exceptions. It is important that all such non-`group` entities are in this mode experienced by the `group` member only in terms of their relation to the `group` and not to the individual qua individual. The non-`group` is experienced through the prism of the `group`, and any other experience of the non-`group` belongs to mode 3 or 4.

This constitutes a strong definition, which it will be necessary to qualify, for some differentiation within the `group` is made by `group` members. This problem centers particularly around leadership, which is important in mode 2 and mode 3, and sometimes resides in the same individual in both modes and sometimes does not. A fuller discussion of what leadership involves in mode 2 will have to wait until chapters 4 and 5.

Freud does not explicitly discuss the `group`, but his account of group psychology (1921/1959) is in several respects relevant to this mode. Members identify with

each other by virtue of their common affective relation to the leader and their common transference to him as their "ego-ideal". This cross-identification contributes to the rapid emotional oscillations, the "emotional contagion", of the group. It is motivated also by the unworkability of the unrestrained mutual jealousy of each others' relations to the leader which would otherwise follow from the transference to the leader (see 'mode 3' section). Freud notes the similarity of this solution by cross-identification to that of the primal horde brothers (1912-13/1950). Because, though, the group's leader has not been overthrown, the mutual identification in the group embodies a "passive-masochistic" attitude to the enormously powerful leader.

Freud goes on to discuss the nature of identification as the most primitive relation, prior to object-choice; as a regression from and replacement of object-choice; and as a process confined to a part of the ego, in conjunction with object libido--but he left open the precise nature of the inter-member identification in groups.

Bion's (1961) description of group processes begins with the observation that the individual must make contact with the emotional life of the group. The difficulty of this task and the anxiety elicited by it is revealed in regression, an important element of which is the fantasy that a 'group' exists, distinct from the perception of the

aggregate of individuals sitting in the room. A split occurs in each individual whereby a certain part of his personality and functioning is given over to this "group mentality", and so the individual experiences a loss of his sense of individual distinctiveness. This experience, itself anxiety-arousing, further obscures the observation that there is present an aggregate of individuals and so reinforces the 'group' fantasy.

Because the individuals' contributions to the group mentality are split off from their sense of self as an individual, they are anonymous; and the possibility of the expression and gratification of such impulses in anonymity is crucial to the individuals' readiness to join the group. However, any contributions must be in accordance with the other anonymous contributions: The group mentality is characterized by uniformity, in contrast to the diversity of thought of individuals. Furthermore, it is opposed to the avowed aims of the individual members, because it is constituted of split off, disavowed, parts of the individuals, unrelated to their sense of individual identity. Any expressions of individual distinctiveness threaten the group mentality, and the group's response will be such as to ensure that that will not happen.

Thus, while contact with the group is essential to the individual, the consequent group mentality is also the cause of the group's failure to provide the individual

with a full life, and of considerable anxiety to him as well. The group meets this challenge by elaborating a "group culture", by which Bion means the particular structure, occupations and organization of the group. The operative group culture at any time is always a function of the conflict between the individuals' needs as individuals (including particularly a sense of individual identity) and the group mentality. It therefore always shows evidence of the underlying group mentality, and is the data for Bion's elaboration of the forms the group mentality takes.

These forms are the three "basic assumptions": fight-flight, dependence and pairing. Each is an emotionally laden tacit assumption which the group seems to have about its purpose, and which is deducible from its emotional state and the group culture. The active assumption may not be overtly expressed in the group, but articulating it gives meaning to--and in that sense serves to explain--group behavior that otherwise appears obscure and chaotic.

Under basic assumption fight-flight the 'group' has joined together in order to fight or flee from a common enemy. The group is characterized by rage at or fear of some entity or idea which is perceived as foreign to it. Either response--fight or panic--could equally be evoked by the situation as the group experiences it, and the

group may shift rapidly from one to the other. Bion emphasizes that flight is not the same as disintegration of the group: It is the common enemy which threatens that, against which fight and flight both serve to maintain cohesion. The group will loyally follow any leader who shows himself to be efficient at mobilizing the group to fight or flight, and ignore--or treat as a common enemy--any who attempt to elicit a more sophisticated response to the situation.

The group operating under basic assumption dependency behaves as if it has agreed that the group has met in order to obtain security and nurturance from a leader, whose function it is to provide that sustenance. All problems are felt to be resolvable only by the leader, in a magical way. The group often takes on a religious quality in which the leader serves as the deity, and the only relations felt to be worth developing are with the leader. The group thus makes of the basic assumption dependency leader the repository of all the group's abilities and responsibilities to resolve members' own anxieties and conflicts, difficulties of intra-group relations, and the problems of the group vis-à-vis the world external to it. The leader's failure to fulfil these expectations results in the group becoming withdrawn and depressed, and tolerating long periods of desultory conversation or none at all. Such a group may resort to

the "dual" of basic assumption dependency, in which if the leader does not nourish and sustain the group, then the group takes its primary purpose to be to nourish and sustain the leader. Thus the roles are reallocated, but it remains that the group is split into one segment which is needy and incapable of resolving any problems or tasks, and another which is repository of all the group's skills.

Under basic assumption pairing the group is characterized by a diffuse feeling of hope as it leaves the group stage to the interaction of two individuals. The operative fantasy is that the pairing is of a sexual nature, and the hope is that from it will be born the leader or leading idea which will save the group from the hatred, destructiveness and despair arising in the other basic assumptions. This messianic leader, or idea, is very similar to the basic assumption dependency leader, with the important exception that it remains unborn. In maintaining the feeling of hope, it is crucial that anything that does emerge is either something about the future or unexceptionable and not new at all; for otherwise the group would be threatened with the awareness that nevertheless there remains aggression and despair in the group.

Bion conceived of individuals' combination in basic assumption functioning as something more akin to tropism in plants than any purposive behavior. He used the delib-

erately neutral term "valency" to denote it, distinct from Freud's 'libido'. He saw valency as having a prominently libidinous component when the group is operating under basic assumption pairing, but as having a different complexion under basic assumptions dependency and fight-flight. He defined it as "the individual's readiness to enter into combination with the group in making and acting on the basic assumptions", and distinguished it from "cooperation", which is associated with the rational mode of group functioning altogether different from basic assumption activity. Bion did not discuss valency in relation to identification, nor in relation to projective identification, which he saw as prominent in basic assumption relations.

All the basic assumptions include the existence of a leader, though in basic assumption pairing the leader is unborn. Leadership in the 'group', for Bion, is a function. It need not be identified with any individual in the group, and indeed it may be an inanimate object or an idea. An example of this which Bion frequently observed was that under basic assumption dependency the history of the group may become a 'bible' of group precedents which must be followed.

While Freud saw the leader as a kind of group hypnotist, as one who can impose his will on the group and on whom the group depends, for Bion the basic assumption

leader, when personified, is as much a creature of the 'group' as any other member. He is leader by virtue of his capacity, not for rational cooperation, but for valency, and is allowed to be leader because the 'group' needs one for its defensive purposes. Hence also he experiences as much loss of individual identity as any other member. Indeed, his capacity for valency implies an ease in sacrificing his individual identity for the group. (Compare Kernberg, 1980, on the ascendance of narcissistic personalities in unstructured groups).

This different notion of leadership corresponds to a different conception of the processes of identification which occur in the group. Freud saw identification in the group as almost entirely a process of introjection--of the leader as collective 'ego-ideal' and of other members in their common wishes vis-à-vis the leader and common dependence on him. For Bion, the predominant process is not introjection alone but the simultaneous process of projective identification. The defensive group structuring of the basic assumptions requires a leader as repository of unwanted parts of members' capacities and experiences, which are projected onto him. The leader's acceptance of the projections gives credibility and support to the fantasy of the leader's leadership, and it is this partly fantastic, projected leader who may in turn be internalized.

The basic assumptions differ in the ideas associated with each--to fight or flee a common enemy, to gain nurturance and protection from an all-powerful leader, or to conceive such an all-powerful entity--but they hold in common a hatred of learning by experience, of the hard process of development. Each assumption involves the fantasy of an event or process which brings about a perfectly satisfying group without any change or development on the part of members. Basic assumption functioning bears a resemblance to primary process thinking in that time plays no part. Thus, frustration and development cannot be tolerated or even conceived of. All activities that require awareness of time are imperfectly comprehended and tend to arouse feelings of persecution.

Also in common is that a feeling of security is associated with each of the basic assumptions; and anxiety when the basic assumption is threatened. But the emotional state of the group is different in each because of the other feelings which compose the respective basic assumptions: anger and hatred in fight-flight, guilt and depression in dependency, and messianic hope in pairing. Bion contended that, while the basic assumptions cannot be said to conflict, the emotional state associated with each excludes that associated with the others. Hence only one basic assumption can be operative at any one time.

Each basic assumption, though, comes to elicit

characteristic anxieties which tend to lead to a shift to another assumption. Specifically, the individual comes to suffer conflict with that part of his self which is engaged with the specific 'group' fantasy.

Thus, after a time under basic assumption fight-flight, the feeling of security becomes tempered by the constant need for courage and self-sacrifice and the emergence of guilt and/or shame at the hatred and fear that has been elicited. There is a particularly sharp clash between basic assumption dependency and the needs of the individual as a mature adult. There arise feelings of anger, resentment, inadequacy and frustration at being in a dependent position; jealousy of others' perceived gaining of the leader's nurturance; and a sense of being cheated or starved which may be all the more uncomfortable because associated with guilt about being greedy and giving too little. Anxiety under basic assumption pairing derives from the feeling that both the group and the individual are subservient to the unborn leader, from jealousy of the pairing couple, and from disillusionment as each potentially Messianic person or idea is necessarily destroyed.

But there is also a more fundamental source of anxiety. For Bion, the task of making contact with the group evokes the task of making contact with a primitive mother. Specifically, this is the mother who is just

beginning to be experienced as a whole rather than separate part-objects, just as the 'group' is constructed as a unitary entity to relate to out of the 'part-objects', as it were, of its members. Each of the basic assumptions correspond to defensive fantasies pertaining to the infant's difficulties in making the developmental step of the depressive position integration of good and bad part-objects (M. Klein, 1935/1975a, 1940/1975c). Bion, however, was suggestive rather than specific in discussing this. Carsky, in her elaboration of Bion's ideas (1978), suggested that basic assumption dependency is derivable from the infant's sharing in the mother's fantasied omnipotence; that basic assumption fight-flight corresponds to more purely projective processes (rather than projective identification) and splitting of good and bad aspects of the 'mother-group' and self to maintain wholeness of and control over sources of goodness; and that the basic assumption pairing fantasy is of a blissful symbiotic future of shared omnipotence or merging with a powerful good mother-'group', but one which has been recognized as more separate and independent and hence needs more to be controlled than under basic assumption dependency.

It is this regressive evaluation of the 'group', then, that in itself arouses deep anxiety. According to Bion, these include paranoid-schizoid anxieties (M. Klein, 1946/1975e). "The group approximates too closely, in the

minds of the individuals composing it, to very primitive phantasies about the contents of the mother's body" (Bion, 1961, p. 162), and so it is only a matter of time before anxiety becomes intolerable and a new defense, a different basic assumption, must be found. Hence, also, the dread with which the consultant's interpretations or questions are met, for they are experienced as if invitations to explore the primitive mother-'group's body.

At first, individuals attempt to maintain the good feelings of the basic assumption 'group' by a further split. The good 'group', and the individual's security, is preserved by attributing the bad feelings to some cause other than the 'group': perhaps to membership of some other less important group, to an external event, or for patients to their illness.

But eventually this too cannot be maintained. If the group members were prepared then to suffer its pains, the group may develop. But the fact that the wish remains for an effortless solution to the problems of group life, and for an easy emotional vitality, means that there is a pull towards one of the other basic assumptions.

The operative assumption may change in one of three ways. The simplest is a shift in which the group simply ceases to act as if it has one assumption and begins to act as if it has another. In a resentfully and sullenly silent basic assumption dependency group, for example, two

people begin to talk to each other with increasing engagement and are increasingly watched with interest by the other members. The mood of the group changes from resentful depression to a hopeful contentment. From suffering the unpleasant affects of basic assumption dependency this group has shifted, with no other discernible stimulus, to functioning under basic assumption pairing.

The other, "aberrant", forms of change tend to be associated with a greater degree of hostility in the group. Bion found these the more typical when the change is in response to interpretations, or the emergence of any new idea which implies the need for development. For under basic assumption functioning any stimuli to development meet with a hostile response.

One kind of aberrant change involves the attempt to use an extraneous group to absorb the tensions within the present group. In an organization, for example, one task group, under basic assumption fight-flight, might attempt to take over the personnel and function of another. The fantasy is that the larger group may better contain and manage the tensions of basic assumption fight-flight. Another example would be the frustrated basic assumption dependency therapy group which complains to the institution employing or sponsoring the therapist, with the hope that they may intervene to give a better dependency leader.

The second type of aberrant change involves an internal schism. Two sub-groups form, one of which opposes the new idea by appealing to basic assumption dependency, often a group 'bible' of established ideas and precedents, such that adhering to their view requires no painful effort and so is popular. The reciprocal sub-group overtly supports the new idea but interprets it in such an exacting way that it fails to gain support. In this way the schismatic group conspires to avoid bringing the new idea to bear on the basic assumption until the argument subsides to another assumption.

The individuals' functioning as members of the basic assumption 'group' is, as noted above, opposed to learning by experience and the process of development. But there is an exception to this, which Bion terms "specialized work-groups". I will discuss work-group functioning as in general a mode 4 phenomenon; but 'specialized work-groups' involve individuals' relations to a 'group' entity in the same sense as does basic assumption functioning. They are equally mode 2 phenomena, though their effect on the developmental and task-oriented functioning of the group is altogether different.

'Specialized work-groups' (which refers, as does 'basic assumption groups', to a mode of functioning rather than to the individuals who manifest it) are 'budded off' in order to satisfy the needs which are expressed in the

basic assumptions while minimizing their obstruction of the group's developmentally-oriented functioning. They do this by translating the rational action of the group into the terms of the basic assumptions. Thus, the group's actions might be interpreted as if it were the action not of the group but of a basic assumption dependency leader; if basic assumption fight-flight is predominant then the group's performance will be reinterpreted, if necessary, as the consequence of having attacked or successfully avoided some common enemy. A basic assumption pairing specialized work group will help the group understand that a new idea is really a familiar one, so that any really new idea remains unborn. In this way, the group's tacit involvement in the basic assumption may be fortified, but it is not acted on, nor is the fear of action allowed to interfere with the work of the group.

The distinction between the group's rational and its irrational functioning is central to Bion's approach to the group. Basic assumption functioning is compared to primary process, and he emphasized that psychotic mechanisms are at work in it; work group functioning corresponds to the group's secondary process, and Bion emphasized the rational, development- and reality-oriented processes at work. It is in this context that he conceptualized 'specialized work groups' as a work-group function: because it serves, overall, the group's

development- and reality-oriented purposes. In Slater's scheme (1966), on the other hand, 'specialized work groups' would better be described as 'delineated basic assumption groups'. Indeed, though Slater uses neither of these terms (preferring 'sacred area' for basic assumption functioning, and 'secular area' for rational and conscious functioning) it would be accurate to paraphrase him as claiming that basic assumption pairing is precisely a specialized work group: one that satisfies basic assumption dependency needs while minimizing their contamination of the group's reality- and development-orientation. This will be clearer after I outline Slater's scheme, to which we now turn.

For Slater as well as Bion, the basic assumptions are 'group' fantasies which serve to mediate between the individuals' needs to belong to the group and their needs to maintain a sense of their individual distinctiveness. But Slater formulates a developmental scheme for the basic assumptions, in which the 'group' fantasy shifts over time. He draws attention to Bion's observation that basic assumptions "may not be fundamental phenomena, but rather expressions of, or reactions against, some state more worthy of being regarded as primary" (1961, p. 163). For Slater, what underlies them is the continuum of increasing awareness of individual and group identity and separateness. Specific basic assumptions about the 'group' are

especially appropriate to points on this continuum.

More precisely, Slater sees the active basic assumption as determined by the group's position along two continua. The first is the extent to which the group is dominated by unconscious or conscious bonds between members. Conscious attachments are based on an awareness of differences, of boundaries between individuals and the individual and the group. Unconscious bonds, on the other hand, according to Slater always entail mystical fusion, some merger of the individuals with each other and the group. Thus, group development, "the encroachment of light on shadow", involves "attempting to substitute conscious bonds for unconscious ones" (p. 176).

The second continuum is the degree of members' personal involvement in the group. Slater does not go into much detail on this continuum, but the best way of reading him, I think, is to see this as interacting with the unconscious-conscious bonds continuum in that over time as members come to allow more personal involvement in the group they come to engage progressively less conscious and less differentiated layers of their personality. This may then result in reversion to a more 'primitive' basic assumption until members become more conscious of their bondings in the group, and hence also their differences, around the newly engaged issue. Thus, the fact that the basic assumptions recur is because the crucial factor is

the degree of consciousness of individual boundaries with respect to the particular issue uppermost in the group, and this is different at different times. However, in reading Slater this way, I am attempting to make sense of a part of his account which is unclear.

In this scheme, basic assumption fight-flight works to mediate the individuals' relationship to the 'group' entity when they have difficulty feeling differentiated from it. It is directed primarily against a feared loss of individuality. Fighting achieves this as members experience something like "this is me, I am different (in fact opposite) from you", or "I hurt, therefore I am" (p. 179). Flight removes the individual from the 'group' altogether, not through contradiction but through distance from the impulse which threatens boundary loss. At the same time, there is a certain amount--a safe amount--of merging and the sense of vitality that comes with it in the collective and united fighting or fleeing.

But Slater only hypothesized the activity of basic assumption fight-flight, as occurring in the early and unclear stages of group life; unclear because of the as yet only tentative involvement of the group members. Compared to Bion's notion of fight-flight, Slater puts less emphasis on the 'group' as a unitary entity to which individuals are in some relation, and less emphasis on the group's united and collective action. It is individual

aggressions and flights which are emphasized, and the 'group' is equated with the feeling of loss of identity and individual boundaries. (Thus, what Slater refers to as "fight-flight basic assumption" belongs in mode 1, not 2, and we will return to it in that context.) What Bion means by the fight-flight basic assumption--in which the group is not fragmented but united and cohesive in fighting or fleeing some person or idea perceived as external to the 'group'--does occur in Slater's account. But it is considered by him as precursor to, or failed attempt at, a revolt against the consultant, and hence as a manifestation of a frustrated basic assumption dependency group or of the decay of basic assumption dependency.

In basic assumption dependency, individuality is at once acknowledged and denied through an attempt at symbiotic union with the leader. Slater emphasizes the oscillation in individuals' boundary maintenance in relation to the 'group'. At one time there is passionate involvement in the 'group' against the derogated failed dependent leader (and it is this which in Slater's description seems sometimes to fit Bion's notion of the fight-flight culture). At another there is readiness to betray the 'group' for the hoped-for special favor from the deified leader.

Slater highlights a particular basic assumption dependency pattern. The 'group' becomes a primitive

mother that threatens to envelop the individuals, and it is this merger with a 'bad mother' which the group (as aggregate of individuals) aims to ward off by symbiotic union with the dependent leader. At the same time, it is the role of the dependent leader to be a "male hero" and wrestle with and fight off the bad 'group' mother, while the members watch helplessly. Slater relates this bad mother-male hero relationship to primal scene experiences and a range of anthropological and mythological material.

With increasing experience of inter-member interaction, members become better able to differentiate amongst themselves, and so the image of the 'group' as a potentially devouring and acutely identity-threatening entity begins to decay, and with it basic assumption dependency. The leader as omnipotent male hero therefore gradually becomes loosened from his struggle and members' dependence on him comes increasingly to be felt as itself a threat.

This ushers in the process which leads to the revolt: a symbolic or actual expulsion of the leader. For example, the group may insist that the leader leaves for a session, or it meets elsewhere apart from the consultant, or it ensures the consultant has nowhere to sit except, perhaps, outside the circle, or someone is delegated to sit in the consultant's chair. Such revolts have been noted by other writers on groups (eg. Bennis & Shepard, 1956/1974; Hartman & Gibbard, 1974a; Gibbard & Hartman,

1973) but they do not invariably occur. According to Slater, if it does occur then the event of the revolt is a ritual expression, a testing and consolidation, of an already existent and more quietly attained emancipation of the group from its dependent stance to a deified leader. Moreover, the emancipation is still not yet complete and the process continues after the event of the revolt.

Because of these three factors--that it often does not occur, that it is an expression of something previously attained, and that it marks a moment in a continuing process--there is a strong case for considering the revolt as more significant as a process than an event. But it is important not to pass over the event of revolts. It presents us with a conundrum we will return to: What must be described in Bion's terms as a particularly noisy manifestation of basic assumption fight-flight is observed by Slater to be not a regressive stage, avoidant of development, but a milepost in the development of those groups in which it occurs.

At the level of the 'group' entity, the meaning of the revolt (or revolt process) is threefold. It is a proof that the 'group' can survive without the basic assumption dependency leader; indeed it is a triumph over the dependency leader in its depriving him of the 'group' which he, it is felt, has deprived of his nurturance and protection. It is also a projection onto the leader, and

an expulsion with him, of the badness of the 'group', which previously was experienced as belonging to the envelopment-threatening 'group'-mother. Finally, it is a making of a good 'group' by thus expelling the bad, or, more specifically, it is winning it from the leader who in failing to fulfil his nurturant and protective role has been experienced as withholding the good 'group'.

For Slater it is central that prior to the revolt three entities are bound together, which after the revolt are increasingly separated. These are (i) the person of the group consultant; (ii) the 'group' deity, i.e. the dependency leader; (iii) a set of abstract skills, powers or qualities desired by the members--specifically, wisdom, understanding and skills related to the group's task, which are mode 4 phenomena. After the revolt the 'group' deity and the desired attributes are separated from the group consultant but not each other--though it seems that we must qualify this, because Slater also writes that after the revolt the consultant is sometimes treated the same and sometimes differently from before, while sometimes he is ignored (p. 138).

Although he admits regressions and exceptions, Slater maintains that it is only after the revolt that there occur dependency leaders other than the group consultant, or leading-ideas such as the "group bibles" Bion describes, and that neither of these are as powerful as

the consultant was. These manifestations of basic assumption dependency are less powerful because there occurs after the revolt a gradual and ambivalent "secularization" of the group: The relationship to the 'group' as a unitary entity--the "sacred area"--recedes in importance for the members, replaced in prominence by relationships with individuals as individuals, in modes 3 and 4.

Basic assumption pairing, in Slater's scheme, becomes predominant in these later stages of group life. The pair functions as holder of the now delimited 'group' entity, and thus serves to make a more full individuation and separation in the group palatable by maintaining the disembodied fantasy of mystical unity and immortality in the form of a future messiah. This becomes an especially important function as the end of the group's life nears, and the reproductive pair represents the immortal 'group'. This availability of a delimited 'group' wards off the group's residual dependency needs, as do ritualized recapitulations of the revolt: remembering it (if it occurred) or acting it out in a more symbolic form. The continuing activity of earlier 'group' fantasies is also manifested in basic assumption pairing when the pair comes to represent at times the male hero wrestling with the dangerous mother. But Slater saw this too as far more modulated and ritualized than earlier stages in group life, often with the air of a group holiday. Members can

become involved in the recapitulations and pairings and then easily detach themselves to engage in "secular" life.

In their review of the literature on group development, Gibbard, Hartman and Mann (1974, pp.83-93) suggest that the group as a whole is experienced by members as an ever-waiting, potentially symbiotic mother, necessitating a continuous effort to establish and maintain personal boundary integrity. There is through the group's life a progression towards differentiation, broadly following Slater's scheme, from symbiosis with the 'group' to individuation; but this development is not a linear one because there is always a strong regressive pull as well. They wonder, also, whether groups are used primarily for "the kind of transitional experience that Winnicott (1953/1975h) describes" (p. 90). Eisold (1981) also notes similarities between the 'group' and transitional phenomena, but neither writer develops this notion. More recently, James (1982, 1984) has further discussed links between transitional phenomena and group processes, and it is a notion to which we shall return.

In three articles, Hartman and Gibbard (1974a, 1974b; Gibbard & Hartman, 1973) present an account of group evolution. Their perspective draws on Slater's reformulation of the basic assumptions in terms of increasing individuation in the group, but they emphasize also a pendular pattern of projective (individual) and exclusion-

ary (group) processes versus introjective and inclusionary processes. They postulate an underlying chronic "disequilibrium" in individual and group boundaries.

Their account is of four phases. The first is a stage of initial leaderlessness, strangeness and uncertainty, in which fear of chaos, violence and abandonment are prominent. The group's response to this is psychologically to place outside of it all that is experienced as anxiety-provoking, destructive and depressing, and to hold within all that is felt as supportive, safe and productive. Thus, the boundary of a good 'group' is formed by defining the bad as outside of it--most clearly the bad consultant, but also sometimes a scapegoat or bad subgroup. But good, idealized qualities (notably, power and competence) are also unavoidably projected onto the consultant, who is deified. The predominant processes of the first phase, then (covering basic assumptions flight-flight and dependency) are splitting and projection.

The second phase begins with a revolt, to recapture the good qualities projected onto the consultant. It is followed by guilt and, partly to deny the guilt and partly to deny the enveloping, bad-mother potential of the 'group', a period of a utopian group fantasy: a perfect, conflictless 'group', by which members are given nurturance and security, and in which there is a diffuse loving air. It differs from the dependency phase in that the

source of love and security is within the 'group'. There is splitting and projection, in that all the bad in the 'group' is projected onto the leader-who-has-been-attacked, but introjection and inclusion in the 'group' are predominant.

In the third phase, and in accord with Slater's scheme, the 'group' as unitary entity recedes. Individual competition and sexual rivalry emerges (which belongs in mode 3), and again scapegoating is frequent. The group boundary constantly shifts, and the predominant process is projection. The final phase, of termination, involves a last effort at creating the good 'group' by taking in all members. Inclusive processes again predominate.

Gibbard and Hartman's description of the group is an important and suggestive one. They postulate that the chronic disequilibrium in inclusive and exclusive, introjective and projective processes arises on the basis of ambivalence towards the mother-'group', which at the same time offers secure symbiosis and threatens dangerous envelopment. This is reminiscent of Bion's notion of the individual constantly at war with his groupishness. Each solution fails, according to Gibbard and Hartman, because it involves splitting the negative and positive sides of the ambivalence and thus violates reality; and is furthermore undercut by the consultant's interpretations.

Their account highlights the isomorphism between

individual and 'group' boundaries--an isomorphism which is noted also by E. B. Klein (1979)--but does not elucidate it. There is an assumption that if individuals are, predominantly, projecting then the 'group' is necessarily "excluding". They do not consider the possibility that members project onto each other, and that therefore the linkage to 'group' characteristics is not a simple one. The result is a confounding of the 'group' as unitary object for the individuals, and group as aggregate of individuals. The difference between these two entities, 'group' and group, is of course my concern and not necessarily Gibbard and Hartman's, but ignoring it leaves their account in a confusing state. It remains unclear whether the chronic disequilibrium really refers to individuals with respect to the group, or the group with respect to individuals--and if both what the relationship is between them. Thus, the mother-'group' "excludes members and then includes them in an evolving attempt at groupness" just as "the child introjects and projects objects and part-objects, which eventually fuse into... identity" (1974, p. 175). This notion of the group as mother and child simultaneously is intriguing but, as yet, obscure.

Quite different from Bion's, Slater's and Hartman and Gibbard's accounts of the group are those of what one might describe as the 'benign group-mother' school. For these observers, the mother-'group' does not have a

destructive or threatening aspect, but is only nurturant and protective. Thus, Schindler (1951, 1952, 1966) suggested that for members the 'group' is a supportive and benignly encompassing maternal object. Ruiz (1972) proposes that members maintain an unconscious image of an ideal, nurturing mother 'group'.

Let us take Scheidlinger (1964/1980, 1974/1982a) as representative of this vein, as he has explored in some depth his differences from Bion, Slater and others. He maintains that the relinquishing of personal identity and independence in members' identification with the 'group' is exceptional, provided that the consultant maintains a "democratic" climate and a "balance between permissiveness and control" (1964/1980, p. 221). But various points in his account further qualify this claim. Thus, "the result of an individual's group identification is that he reacts to the attributes of the group as if these attributes were also his own" (p.223); and there is at least transitory "giving up of some aspect of the individual's self...to the group-as-a-group" (p. 221). So it seems Scheidlinger is ambiguous about whether the individual finds his self and the 'group' interwoven or, at least in some aspects, merged. But he is clear that in his groups he found no anxiety about this, no fear of envelopment. The mother-'group' is perceived in purely positive, nonconflictual terms.

He maintains that the relationship between the individual and the 'group' is close to the "need-satisfying relationship" to the mother, as described by Anna Freud (1965). This is a relationship intermediate between primary narcissism and object constancy, still characterized by a symbiotic perception of the mother as gratifier of needs, but there is some differentiation between self and object representations. The maternal object is seen as separate from the self only at moments of need; at other times, the object ceases to exist as 'somewhere out there' (1974/1982a, pp. 79-80).

There are two problems with this account. Firstly, Anna Freud is clear in stating that at this stage failures in the mother will cause, amongst other things, breakdowns in individuation and, more important, that "the toddler's entire attitude toward the object world is dominated by ambivalence, i.e. by violent swings between love and hate" (1965, p. 67; p. 73). Whence the purely positive relation to the 'group' entity? Secondly, to be consistent Scheidlinger must maintain that if the mother-'group' is experienced as purely positive, then individuals experience symbiosis with the 'group'. The question arises of why this is a purely positive, nonconflictual experience for a collection of relatively mature adults.

He acknowledges the possibility that the good mother-'group' fantasy is a defensive one, warding off a sadis-

tic, engulfing 'group'-mother as in Gibbard and Hartman's Utopian phase, but suggests his account as the more parsimonious. But as it stands his account is less coherent and adequate: Why should individuals, with no defensive motivation, be "yearning for a return" (1974/1982a, p. 80) to a relationship characterized by extreme ambivalence, and why then should the relationship turn out to be in fact purely positive and nonconflictual?

Scheidlinger's answer to the latter question is that, rather than the 'group'-mother, it is the group consultant and other individuals who become objects of partially ambivalent but largely hostile and fearful attitudes. This suggests a much greater stability in group structuring in Scheidlinger's groups than has been observed by most other writers. I would suggest two possible reasons for this. The first, which Eisold also surmises (1981, p. 62), is that the "democratic" climate and "balance between permissiveness and control" reflects the consultant's willingness to manage the group and himself so that the hostile and frightening aspects of members' experiences of the 'group' can easily be split off and felt as pertaining only to him and/or a few other individuals. His account is consistent with his engendering, as far as individuals' experiences of the 'group' are concerned, a modulated and so fairly stable scapegoating of himself. It should be borne in mind that Scheidlinger's groups met

for psychotherapy, and it was not his primary purpose to facilitate the emergence of group dynamics. Indeed, he maintains that actively promoting a strong sense of identification with a nurturing mother-`group` is of therapeutic value (1974, p. 229). The second reason is also related to his groups being primarily aimed at therapy for the individual members, and was noted in the introduction: We do not know to what degree Scheidlinger's interventions emphasize individual differences, thus having the effect of modulating the threat of envelopment in the group.

Mode 1

The notion of a mode in which members are merged or fused in the group--or, by some perspectives, with the `group`--is a recurrent one. Even Scheidlinger, who maintains that loss of personal identity and independence is rarely an issue, has the wish for symbiosis and hence loss of the `group` object qua object as a central motivating influence in group formation. In Freud's writing too (1921/1959), it can be read as implicit, at least, in his account of inter-member identification and his reiteration of identification's status as prior to object choice; i.e., though he does not use the term in Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego, primary identification.

Bion's notion of the basic assumption `group` as

defensive compromise between the individuals' needs to experience themselves as individuals and their needs to join the group implies some phenomena underlying, as it were, the 'group' fantasy. In the earlier of his writings collected in Experiences in Groups he termed this the "group mentality", but later he shifted the meaning of this term to it being more like an aspect of basic assumption activity: "the unanimous expression of the will of the group....a machinery of intercommunication that is designed to ensure that group life is in accordance with the basic assumptions" (1961, p. 65). But this seems an incomplete notion. It is unclear what it means to describe a 'group' fantasy and group structure as a compromise between the need for individual distinctiveness and a mechanism of communication. The notion of the 'group' relationship as compromise between the need for individual distinctiveness and a state inconsistent with individual distinctiveness which that mechanism of communication implies--that, surely, is the more coherent notion. Furthermore, the notion of a more fundamental relational mode continues to preoccupy Bion, in the quotation to which Slater calls attention, and in his speculations about a "proto-mental system". The proto-mental system is a matrix from which physical and psychological phenomena emerge and in which they are undifferentiated, and where are confined the inoperative basic assumptions,

or prototypes thereof. I take it I am not alone in finding these speculations difficult to make use of, but they speak for Bion's sense of a level underlying the 'group' fantasies.

Hartman and Gibbard (1974a, 1974b; Gibbard & Hartman, 1973) posit a largely unconscious fantasy on the part of individuals of mystical fusion or frightening envelopment by the group-as-a-whole, which is most salient at the beginning and end of the group's life. They hypothesize that the fantasy is of an early mother-child symbiosis, corresponding to the primary narcissistic or autistic phase Mahler (1968) has described.

Their notions follow those of Slater, for whom the individuals' merger in the group is central. According to Slater, on joining the group the individuals perceive an undifferentiated mass. Though they may choose one or two individuals for special attention, because members are unknown this is done on the basis of transference fantasies. We may add projection or projective identification as alternative or concomitant mechanisms. At any rate, in so far as they discriminate, Slater goes on, they tend to distort, and in so far as they are empirical they are necessarily vague.

This perception of an undifferentiated mass is not a conscious one; nor is there an awareness that it is shared by all members. But when individuals act on the basis of

their vague or distorted perceptions of specific individuals, the outcome is likely an abortive or confused interaction. Any expression, though, of their experience of an undifferentiated mass results in a strong echo from others. All members thus experience an unnerving blurring of boundaries. And this, according to Slater, tends to arouse in the individuals infantile fantasies of merging with, or being enveloped by, the mother. The fact that they are unconscious, and reinforced by equally unconscious "echoes" from others, gives the fantasies a special potency. This account is eminently compatible with Bion's, especially as elaborated by Carsky (1978).

It is at this stage that what Slater refers to as basic assumption fight-flight is active. This is, as we noted above, a stage when no 'group' fantasy is perceptible. There is only a fear of merger and fragmented individual activity to ward it off, albeit undertaken by all or nearly all the individuals. In his claim that unconscious bonds of individuals always entail some degree of fusion Slater is, of course, claiming that this mode is active in later stages when individuals are in a relation to a 'group' entity. This is hypothesized by Slater to explain continuing manifestations of the group's fear of merger, and as a crucial motivation for the construction of the 'group' fantasies.

Kernberg, though he does not explore this aspect of

groups in detail, also suggests that group processes pose "a basic threat to personal identity". While he first especially linked this to the activation of primitive aggression (1980), more recently he has also emphasized the wish for the dissolution of self boundaries (1984). In both works he proposes that the group processes which Bion describes function as defense against a more thorough identity diffusion.

There is one reference in the literature to group states in which, it would seem, merger is the predominant and overriding fact of group life. This is Turquet's (1974) reference to what he terms the basic assumption oneness group, whose members "join in a powerful union with an omnipotent force, unobtainably high, to surrender self for passive participation, and thereby to feel existence, well-being, and wholeness....The group member is there to be lost in oceanic feelings of unity" (p. 357, p. 360). Turquet gives no further description of such states, and the notion of basic assumption oneness has neither gained acceptance nor been explicitly repudiated by subsequent writers on groups. Though he describes it as a basic assumption, he seems to be describing a state in which members are involved in an abandonment of individual identity of a degree against which the basic assumptions as Bion describes them serve as defense.

Mode 3

This refers to relationships to individuals in the group, and it includes patterns of such relationships. The relations are, furthermore, in a broad sense transferential. That is, they are an activation or reactivation of modes of object relating which characterized infantile or early childhood functioning. They may be transferential in a more strict sense, too, but a discussion of that is beyond our present purpose.

The crucial differentiating factor from mode 2 is that there is differentiation between other individuals in the group. It may be a pattern of relationships to and between other members that the individual is attempting to create, rather than a number of independent relationships. But it remains that the other members and their roles are differentiated in the mind of the individual, even if it is the pattern that is more salient than the relationship to any single other member. Thus, some writers' references to the "group as a whole", and in particular references to it as the family, are references to this mode and not that of the 'group' fantasy as I define it. Writers also sometimes refer to the group as an abstraction from these relationships: the "common denominator" or "common group tension" of Ezriel (1950/1980), for example. But unless it is claimed, firstly, that this abstraction of the observer corresponds to an object in the minds of the

members with which they are in a relation, and secondly, that this relation accounts for a significant part of the members' experience and behavior, then it is a discussion of mode 3 we are dealing with.

Freud (1921/1959) focuses on a regressive reactivation of oedipal conflicts centering on the leader, who becomes a paternal transference figure for the members. Due to the common status of this leader, previously unconscious aggressive wishes and fears, originating in individuals' oedipal stages, are reinforced and sanctioned in the group and emerge from repression. One consequence is a lower level of intellectual performance--which is closely related to inhibitory capacities--which in turn, in conjunction with the members' identification with each other which we noted under mode 2, results in the rapid emotional oscillations of group life.

As part of this paternal transference to him, the leader becomes also the collective "ego-ideal" of the group. Precisely what Freud meant by "ego-ideal" is somewhat problematic, as his work on groups precedes his formulation of the structural theory (1923/1962). He refers to all the functions of the superego, of which the ego-ideal, in his later formulations, is but a part. But he also refers to the function of "testing the reality of things" (p. 46) as given over by members to the leader, and this is an ego function. At any rate, as in the

family of the oedipal child, the leader as superego is evoked and submitted to in the face of the arousal of instinctual energies in the group. Thus the leader becomes enormously powerful, able to manipulate the group to his own ends, much as the hypnotist of the individual. The potential in this collective transference to the leader for unrestrained mutual jealousy is, as mentioned in the discussion of mode 2, controlled by the libidinally imbued inter-member identifications.

In Freud's account the members' identifications with each other, which pertains to mode 2, is based upon the collective transference to the leader, which is a mode 3 relationship to a specific individual in the group. By Slater's account, on the other hand, the consultant is focused on by the members in order to counterbalance the envelopment-threatening 'group' mother. It is the mode 2 phenomenon which has motivational priority, against which the first mode 3 relationship to the consultant serves as defense.

Slater's account of mode 3 development can be read as an elaboration of Freud's account of the primal horde (Freud, 1912-13/1950). The wish of members for a private and special relationship with the consultant as powerful father is frustrated, and there is a gradual emergence of members' fantasies in this regard, and renunciation of inter-member competition for his favor. Slater found a

liberation of sexual feelings between members to be concurrent with acknowledgements of previous sexual thralldom with the consultant.

In this mode the meaning of the revolt, or revolt process, is the winning of the group's women from the consultant-father, and it is followed by a further release of sexual interest between members and an emphasis on members' equality in authority. There are also expressions of guilt over what has been done to the consultant, alternating with what Hartman and Gibbard (1974b) term a "Utopian phase", where the fantasy of a conflictless group in which all members love each other equally serves to deny both guilt and intermember rivalries. There is also now an internalization by individuals of the consultant's competence and skills, which increases the productivity of the group.

Gibbard, Hartman and Mann's account (1974, pp. 83-93) also sees the group as an oedipal family. They too note a 'primal horde' type revolt, followed by guilt and the internalization of the paternal (consultant) superego, and then a more stable identification with the consultant's aims and a period of task orientation, including relatively mature and differentiated interaction between members. In their scheme, some female member or female subgroup or the 'group' as a whole (mode 2) serves as the mother.

Among the writers who focus on the more primitive

layers of individuals' relations to other individuals in the group is Jaques (1955), who sees the group as a forum in which to externalize those impulses and internal objects which would otherwise give rise to psychotic--paranoid-schizoid or depressive--anxieties. Most writers see the task of joining the group as resulting in regression and the reactivation of primitive object relations. Jaques, on the other hand, who based his observations on his study of and consultations to industrial and service organizations, posits an ever-active psychotic layer of anxieties, and hypothesizes that one of the primary purposes of people's associating in groups is to use them to reinforce individual defenses. Specifically, members project bad internal objects and impulses into particular members, who are unconsciously selected as particularly suitable, or who themselves choose--consciously or unconsciously--to absorb or deflect them. To deflect them means to reproject them but not onto the same members from whom the projections originated. Individuals may in this way put their internal conflicts into persons in the external world and unconsciously follow the course of the conflict by means of projective identification. They may then benefit by re-internalizing not only the now reorganized projected objects and impulses, but also the other members who have projected similar objects and impulses onto the same group figures, and this further legitimates

and reinforces the mechanism and its results.

Ezriel (1950/1980) also focuses on individuals' projection of their unconscious fantasy objects onto members of the group. And for him too there is no special feature of the group which evokes this, except the availability of other members as recipients of the projections. Ezriel, though, describes therapy groups, which are less structured than the institutional groups Jaques studied, and hence we find him emphasizing individual differences in the projected patterns of relationships more than Jaques does.

Ezriel adds that individuals actively manipulate the recipients of their projected internal objects, and in turn struggle to avoid any roles projected onto them except those that coincide with their own unconscious fantasies. Thus, they select, drop, support, reject, modify, distort, etc., each others' remarks, and push each other into different roles or let themselves be so pushed. The result is a complex network of projections and fantasy relationships. This group structure gives rise to a "common denominator" or "unconscious common group tension": a particular issue or conflict, or cluster of them, around which the group's interactions revolve. Manifest interactions between members are aimed at resolving or at least diminishing that aspect of their own individual unconscious conflicts which is contained in the

group tension. Each member seeks to adopt a role which corresponds to his specific way of defending himself against the unconscious fears evoked by this group problem. Members also differ in the degree to which they can tolerate the manifestation in the group of certain relationships. Thus, we have the group tension, and further conflicts in the attempts to manipulate others into and out of different roles.

One aspect of Eisold's contribution (1981) is an extension and elaboration of the network of inter-member relations which Ezriel describes. Eisold holds, though, that joining an unstructured group elicits regression in members which the fantasy relations--involving especially projective identification--serve to brake. He also gives an account of the use of denial when the network of projective identifications threatens to fail to halt the regression. We will return to Eisold's account of the regression on joining the group in chapter 3.

Eisold's account culminates in the hypothesis of an "archaic role definition": "the earliest defensive configuration of the self and object world available to the ego....the child's most basic sense of who he is in the world that is consistent with his defensive needs and the specific opportunities for recognition and relationship available within his family" (p. 200-201). Driven by anxiety, individuals attempt to reproduce this role in the

group as a kind of base level, halting their regression. Eisold goes on to explore the import of individual differences in the level of development at which the role definition was crystallized. If it derives from a pre-ambivalent stage and involves a split role definition, then the individual will tend to be more disoriented and confused in the group, and more open to being exploited by other group members as recipient of their more primitive projections. Thus Eisold carries Jaques' and Ezriel's kind of account of the group further, pointing to individuals' attempts to reproduce a pre-oedipal family in the group, and elaborating in terms of these conflicting archaic role definitions the projective network which gives rise to Ezriel's "common group tension".

Mode 4

Object relations in this mode are between bounded, separate and whole people, and they are not transferenceal even in the broad sense used in the previous section. From a psychoanalytic perspective, of course, all such relations if of any emotional import are infused with at least mode 3 phenomena. Therefore I include as belonging to this mode various accounts of group processes which we may readily see as manifesting mode 3 or mode 2 phenomena, but which are not conceived of in these terms.

For example, Bennis and Shepard (1956/1974) see the

group as developing in two phases, each of which has three subphases. In the first phase the group is involved in working out its orientation to authority, and goes through sub-phases of submission to the consultant; then of counterdependence and rebellion; and finally of resolution of the authority issue in the form of a revolt, which involves a rapid shift in perception after which the consultant is seen as having special skills but no more nor less responsibility than any other group member. The group can then pass to the second phase of working out their interdependence, their orientation to each other. This in turn has three subphases: one of "enchantment" with the group and its possibilities (resembling a utopian phase); one of "disenchantment" with the group and concern with the issue of individual identity; and a final resolution of the interdependence problem and of consensual validation of individuals' perceptions in the group.

In this account, similarities with Hartman and Gibbard's (1974a; Gibbard & Hartman, 1973), Slater's (1966) and the primal horde story (Freud, 1912-13/1950) are readily apparent. But group development is conceived in terms of "the overcoming of obstacles to valid communication among the members, or the development of methods of achieving and testing consensus" (1956/1974, p. 127-8). Among the principle obstacles are to be found "the orientations toward authority and intimacy that members bring

to the group", and present behavior is seen to be "characterized by behavior that has gained approval from authorities in the past" (1956/1974, p. 133), but this is seen in terms of the relatively mature past experiences (of the army, fraternities, etc.) which are the manifest content of the interactions, and not in terms of transference, displacement or any relatively infantile underlying levels of behavior or experience. In common with almost every discussion of groups, Freud is referred to, and they use expressions such as "omnipotence" and "identification", but it is difficult to see these as having more than a colloquial meaning. "Power", "authority", "intimacy", "interdependence", "solidarity" and "involvement" are the main terms of the discussion. The authors are particularly influenced by Sullivan and make self-esteem a central explanatory concept.

Similarly, Mills (1964) gives a more detailed and less schematic account of group development, and includes the termination of the group in his discussion. Within his focus comes boundary issues, and "projection" versus "displacement", but these refer to the group only, and Mills is not concerned with their relation to individual processes. Moreover, Mills uses the terms "projection" and "displacement" in a sense different from the psychoanalytic.

For our purposes, the import of this mode is as a

necessary aspect of individual functioning, and a prominent one in mature, rational, task-oriented functioning. It is thus implicit in Hartman and Gibbard's references to a productive phase, and in Slater's notion of the largely "secularized" group.

Bion is virtually alone, though, in articulating this mode of functioning, which he terms the "work group". This, as with the basic assumption group, refers only to mental activity of a certain kind, not to people conducting it. As basic assumption functioning resembles primary process thinking, so work group functioning corresponds to the secondary process, ego functioning of the group. The ideas which underlie it involve the value of a rational and scientific approach to issues, and the validity of learning by experience and development rather than a magical full equipment for group functioning by instinct.

The work group works towards the carrying out of the rational task which is the purpose of the group's meeting, and thus necessarily involves the translation of ideas, thoughts and feelings into behavior which is adapted to reality. The structure and organization of the group towards action are methods of work group functioning, as is the sophisticated and rational use of verbal communication. In contrast, the fact that action requires contact with reality makes it a threat to the basic assumption 'group'. Turquet (1974), drawing also on the ideas of

Rice (1963) and Miller and Rice (1967), draws attention to this difference by describing the work group as an 'open system' group: It is involved not only in differentiating what is in it from what is outside it, but also in differentiating elements inside it (particularly members' manifold task oriented skills) and in setting up processes of interaction with its environment. Hence the products of the work group are discernible in the external environment, be they automobile parts, skilled graduates, or better functioning individual members who have benefited from psychotherapy. Basic assumption groups, on the other hand, are self-contained, closed systems, in which the external environment is avoided as a threat to the 'group' fantasy.

It is part of the function of the work group to cope with the basic assumption fantasies so that they do not interfere with the task of the group. We have already, under mode 2, noted specialized work groups as one of the methods available to it. A second factor that the work group can use is that only one basic assumption can be operative at one time. The basic assumptions do not, according to Bion, conflict, but the emotional state associated with each excludes that associated with the others. While there is a conflict between reality-oriented and rationally cooperative work functioning and the fantasy-oriented emotionally laden valency of basic assumption

functioning, the emotions and attitudes of one of the basic assumptions may at a certain time, provided that it does not become too pervasive, be appropriate to the task at hand. (Miller and Rice [1967; Rice, 1969/1976] have also explored the implications of such convergences of task and basic assumption "sentience".) Thus, there are times when there is an external enemy which is best fought or fled, and dependency would be particularly inappropriate. Alternatively, at some point one group member may indeed hold the key to a problem and would best be followed. In a psychotherapy group, the optimism of the pairing assumption may be of great help not only in itself, but also in its staving off the helplessness of the dependency assumption. Thus, the work group may motivate the group to work by mobilizing the emotions of one fantasy 'group', and thereby also prevent the interference of the emotions and phenomena of another.

There is, then, the possibility of an equilibrium, in which work functioning predominates and does so by at any time using an optimal amount of the emotional arousal associated with an appropriate basic assumption, and hence simultaneously holding at bay other basic assumptions. Given that work functioning rests not on valency but on the cooperation of well-bounded individuals, who each have different skills and levels of expertise, then such an equilibrium is also an equilibrium of the group culture

between the group mentality (see mode 1) and the needs of the individual. For it is only, in Bion's scheme, in work functioning that the individual can give vent in the group to his individual distinctiveness, rather than his anonymous contributions to basic assumption life. This equilibrium, then, is also one in which the individual has the freedom to be an individual, while remaining also a member of, in emotional contact with, the group.

For Bion, the purpose of interpretations was to give members insight into group functioning so that as a group they may move towards attaining such an equilibrium. Interpretations, if accepted, are themselves interventions by the work group: The work group is the medium through which they affect basic assumption functioning. As Bion puts it, the successful interpretation brings the rational work functioning of the group to bear on the basic assumption. If it is the task of the group to study group functioning then the consultant functions as work group leader (though at times he will also be experienced as basic assumption leader). If the primary task of the group is something else, then the consultant could be said to be functioning, I would suggest, as a kind of specialized work group leader. Thus he works towards maintaining the ability of the main group to function without too much obstruction by the 'group' fantasy; but he is not--as in the strict definition of the term--doing this by transla-

ting rational action into basic assumption terms.

But there is always a tendency for the work organization to become suffused by the 'group' fantasy. For example, an early adaptive organization into patients and doctor will tend to become suffused with basic assumption dependency such that the passivity of the patients comes to obstruct the work of cure. In general, rational cooperation relies on a complex process of give and take that is difficult to maintain compared to the swift emotional responses of basic assumption functioning. There is an emotional vitality and sense of security in participating in the 'group' fantasy which stands in contrast to an experience of aridity in intellectual functioning in the group--which intellectuality, moreover, comes to be felt in its threat to basic assumption functioning as persecutory.

Bion does not attend to what we are here calling mode 3. He would assign it to the phenomena Freud was concerned with and to which he considered his own work to be supplemental. But to the conflict between work and basic assumption functioning we must add the conflict between work and mode 3 functioning. With the latter we are in an area familiar from psychoanalysis and individual psychoanalytic psychotherapy, perhaps visible in the multiple and simultaneous relationships of the group in a way it is not in the two-person situation (Foulkes, 1964).

Summary of the Modes

It is apparent that mode 2 involves some loss or renunciation of self-object differentiation with respect to the 'group'. By definition, other individuals are not differentiated in this mode (except with respect to leadership, which issue will be further elucidated). But also we are dealing with a relationship to an entity of which the individual is a part. Hence, to the extent that it is experienced as a unitary entity the individual cannot be altogether separate from it. Furthermore, all descriptions of the influence of the 'group' on the individual imply some loss of boundaries. Loss of contact with the 'group' involves a loss of vitality and sense of belonging, which are qualities pertaining to the sense of self; and, most importantly, this effect appears to be unmediated. That is, though there are descriptions of interpersonal mechanisms such as scapegoating, the loss of self-quality is often clearly independent of that, without the group behaving so that the individual experiences, say, rejection by it. Thus, there is an emphasis on the relationship with the 'group' as one of identification or projective identification, as "suggestion" (Freud, 1921/1959) or "disagreeable influence" (Bion, 1961). Merger is a threat (and an attraction); members may be "at one with" (Bion, 1961; Slater, 1966) the 'group'.

So why am I suggesting we see the experience of merger as in a different mode? Firstly, merger with the 'group' is a threat (and an attraction) but on the whole it is not complete. Only Turquet describes a state in which that is possibly the case. Being out of accord with the 'group' exerts a "disagreeable influence", and this influence is to a great degree experienced as an internal one, but such discord and its consequences remains a possibility for the individual, and the individual experiences the threat (anxiety, loss of vitality) and the attractiveness (vitality, safety) of the merger as pertaining to an entity which is not quite, or not yet, the self. To foreshadow later discussion, the 'group' object perhaps more resembles an introject than an identification (Schafer, 1968), or a transitional object (Winnicott, 1953/1975h) rather than a merged-with object.

A second reason is conceptual clarity. Our focus is, broadly, individual object relations in the group, one area of which is individuals' relations to the 'group' entity. It makes only an attenuated sense to describe individuals as in a relationship to an object with which they are merged. There is, rather, in mode 1 no relation, because there is no psychological individual. There is only, psychologically, a group. I am making the same argument here as does Winnicott (1960/1965f) when he says that in its earliest life it makes no sense to talk

psychologically of the infant but only of the mother-infant pair.

A final reason is the heuristic value for a dynamic theory of groups of making the distinction between modes 1 and 2. It will, below, enable us to focus on the 'group' fantasy's role as defense against merger. In which case, of course, I must say how the loss of self in relation to the 'group' is different.

The distinction between modes 2 and 3 is designed to highlight the difference and to give a clearer view of the relation between the individual's experience of the group as a unitary entity and his experience of other members and their interrelations as individuals. As noted above, the distinction is not one between degrees or kinds of self-object differentiation. Let me draw attention to my not attempting to approximate a cluster of distinctions which have been found valuable by other writers in the field: that between an oedipal and pre-oedipal level (Gibbard, Hartman, & Mann, 1974, pp. 83-93), or a whole-object and a part-object level (Foulkes, 1964), or between a neurotic and psychotic level (Bion, 1961). While the relationship to the 'group' does indeed derive from very early modes of object relating, it is too unclear to me that a distinction of sufficient clarity can be made by defining another level as involving only more advanced modes.

I would contend that, within the area of members' relations to other individuals in the group, 'primitive' fantasies and mechanisms of defense may be used: splitting, projection and projective identification, and not just displacement from introjects or from representations of external objects and other defenses characteristic of neurotic and normal functioning. One only needs to accept that many individuals function at least in part at the more 'primitive' levels in all their relationships for my contention to follow. I would contend, also, on the same evidential basis, that there is much scope for individual differences in this respect, notwithstanding interpersonal pressure in the group for complementarity of mode 3 fantasies. For example, if many members are experiencing the consultant as father of the group family, then there will be interpersonal pressure on any member who expresses an experience of the consultant which is inconsistent with this. Nevertheless, there is, it seems, much scope for individual differences in the details of the member-consultant fantasy relations. Some may be projecting onto him, or projectively identifying with him as container of, representations previously pertaining to their sense of self; for others he may be an object for displacement of a father image they have never identified with, and so on.

In the following chapters I will return to some of these factors. There is certainly a tendency for mode 3

relations to be more developmentally advanced, in general, than mode 2 relations. Moreover, I am not denying that there may be groups or long periods in a group's life in which inter-member relations fall into one or other cluster--pre-oedipal, part-object, psychotic, or oedipal, whole-object, neurotic--nor that exploring this may not be of great interest. But that is not my task in this work and, furthermore, it will emerge in passing in the next chapter that it is not an easy distinction to make in a group context. In particular, projection tends to be assumed as the predominant mechanism in groups, rather than displacement, yet to my knowledge no-one has presented criteria for making that distinction.

It is modes 3 and 4 in conjunction which contain the area of 'individual problems in fulfilling the task at hand'. A major advantage, though, of allowing mode 3 to include all from the more primitive to the more advanced modes of object relating is that then it alone contains the realm of 'individual therapeutic progress'. It is in terms of mode 3 that, given a psychodynamic perspective, the individual is seen to have psychological problems. It is in change in terms of mode 3 that the therapeutic value of a psychotherapy group must be assessed. In contrast, the therapeutic import to the individual of mode 2 is quite obscure. It is beyond the scope of this work to review in detail the vast literature on the subject of

group psychotherapy, but the major works (eg. Kellerman, 1979; Slavson, 1950; Wolf & Schwartz, 1962; Yalom, 1975) reveal a near-exclusive focus on what we are here terming mode 3 phenomena--the only exception being some of the many references to the cohesiveness of the group, which are in general not elaborated. With very few exceptions (eg. Whitaker & Lieberman, 1964) the discussions that there are of mode 2 with respect to therapeutic issues (eg. Scheidlinger, 1960/1982b; 1964/1980) see it as a background, therapy-enabling mode of object relating: as a potential source of security, comfort and cohesiveness so that mode 3 issues can be resolved with less anxiety than otherwise. Bion raised the question of the therapeutic value of his groups but said he could not answer it, and Slater explicitly detaches his scheme of group development from the issue of individual development.

It is clear that the different modes interact and influence each other; there is less consensus on the details of this. The various writers we have reviewed differ not only in the modes on which their accounts focus, and in whether there is development in those modes, but also in their giving motivational priority to different modes. For example, Bion and Slater agree in seeing the fear of merger (mode 1) as a major motivator for the 'group' fantasy (mode 2), while Scheidlinger does not. Bion focuses on mode 4 conflicting with mode 1, and he

proposes this conflict as the motivation for the mode 2 'group' fantasies of the basic assumptions. Mode 3 plays little explicit part in Bion's account, appearing only as the need to feel an individual distinctiveness--as a sort of appendage to mode 4, albeit a crucial one to the conflict with mode 1. Otherwise Bion effectively leaves the issues of mode 3 to Freud. For Slater, though, the individuals' failure to engage in mode 3 is a major cause of the emergence of the fear of merger, and the increasing ability of individuals to engage in mode 3 is emphasized as a determinant of development in mode 2.

But for Slater modes 2 and 3 become mutually influential: The dependent basic assumption, for example, greatly influences the relations individuals can have to each other in the group. By contrast, Freud (1921/1959) and Redl (1942/1980) give exclusive motivational priority to mode 3: It is because the individual members come to have the same or very similar father-transferential relations to the leader that the group inter-member identification occurs. Arsenian, Semrad, and Shapiro (1962) and Semrad, Kanter, Shapiro, and Arsenian (1963) give priority to mode 3 in a way similar to Freud and Redl, but they see a deeper regression in mode 3 in which it is not divisiveness in competition for the leader-as-father which motivates inter-member identification, but divisiveness in competition for an exclusive union or fusion with the

central figure. Saravay (1975/1980), too, has individuals' wishes for exclusive union with the leader (mode 3) resulting in a common identification in and with the group (mode 2), and hence a 'group' wish for union with the leader, to draw him into the body of the 'group'.

As we have seen, Scheidlinger gives a different account, in which mode 2 engagement is seen as the catalyst of mode 3 involvement--though we have also seen that his account has difficulty in explaining the motivation for the mode 2 engagement in the first place. Durkin (1964) also puts forward the mode 2 relationship to the 'group' as the motivator for mode 3 relationships to the leader. Her account is similar to Slater's in her suggesting that the 'group' is experienced as a harsh pre-oedipal mother which threatens envelopment, but differs from his in her seeing the leader as representing the good mother rather than a male hero.

We could go on to schematically compare each of the accounts of group processes in terms of the motivational role they give to each of the modes. After a great deal of effort we may--despite the poverty of 'raw' data--be able to surmise that in some cases the root of the differences lies in different data, and in others it lies in a different theoretical approach to similar data. Changes in the structure or parameters of the group can bring one or other mode to the fore. (In particular, an active

consultant will bring members' relationships to him to the fore, and one who in his statements emphasizes individual differences will lessen the prominence of modes 1 and 2.) But it seems already apparent that it should be at least a working assumption that phenomena of any mode may be sufficient to motivate change in that mode and/or any of the other three. This is not to deny that a conceptual choice must be made in beginning an account of the group at one mode rather than another, and this may lend to that mode a conceptual priority. We should be aware when we do this, though, for it does not necessarily speak to the issue of motivational priority.

CHAPTER 2

TERMINOLOGY II: INDIVIDUAL FUNCTIONING

In the previous chapter, many psychoanalytic terms appeared, with little discussion of their meaning. With some exceptions, this reflects the state of the literature on group processes. The purpose of this chapter is to define the major psychoanalytic concepts used in this account of group development. I ground each concept in the major psychoanalytic (object relations) literature, including where it is important some of its developmental aspects. The main aim is that when a term like 'projection' or 'self' is used, the reader knows what it means, and where it comes from.

In psychoanalysis these sorts of terms are often used to mean different things by different writers, which reflects the present stage of the field's conceptual development. I do not pretend to answer the question of how these differences should be resolved within psychoanalysis; I merely intend to be clear about what defini-

tion is here being used. My choice between different definitions is influenced by what is helpful in accounting for group processes, but only when the specific interests of psychoanalysis (e.g. accounting for two-person processes and individual development) allow that choice to be made. In other words, the rule is that there be no damage to the specificity and integrity of the psychoanalytic terms.

This chapter is a necessary step towards developing criteria for placing a phenomenon on one mode of group functioning rather than another, and thus also towards a further delineation of the four modes of group functioning. There are two further problems, however, that we then come up against. Firstly, even where the definition of and criteria for the operation of a particular process is relatively clear, the necessary data, which may be forthcoming in the psychoanalytic situation, may not be available in the group. Thus, while my attempt for maximal clarity has the aim that my central claims ultimately be operationalizable, were we to follow that task through to the end it may emerge that an adequate test of some of them would need a conjoint group-individual study of some complexity. Though I do not in this work aim for operationalizability, it is a continuing 'background' concern, and problems connected to it will surface at various points in the following chapters.

The second problem arises from the fact that, though the four modes are defined in terms eminently comprehensible to the psychoanalyst, the distinctions between them do not closely follow the stratifications of the psychoanalytic vocabulary of psychological processes. For example, if the criteria for the psychoanalytic concept of projection were very clear, and if the necessary data were available in the group, we may then be able to say with some certainty that projection was a prominent part of a particular group phenomenon. But that would still not tell us in which mode to understand the phenomenon, for projection may be involved in both modes 2 and 3. A relatively simple step from psychoanalytic terms to group concepts would be the virtue, of course, of making the distinction between oedipal and pre-oedipal, or neurotic and psychotic, a central distinction in the group. However, it will emerge, especially in the final chapters, that there remain some significant parallels between areas of study in object relations theory and the modes of group functioning as I have drawn them--at less cost, I think, to the complexity of the group. At any rate, it is appropriate to reiterate at this juncture that there is not necessarily a simple step from psychoanalytic concepts to the four modes.

The first section begins with a summary of Kernberg's account of development and his definitions of internaliza-

tion and representations, as presented in his three books (1975, 1976, 1980). It then goes on to the somewhat different notions of Schafer (1968), and I present the points on which we will be using his definitions rather than Kernberg's. As Schafer is not as explicit on the developmental aspects of his terms as Kernberg is, I will then developmentally ground some relevant parts of Schafer's account; and finally go on to define terms such as 'self', 'self-concept', and 'subjective self'. Thus this section will also be a basis for the discussions of the following sections, which are concerned with projection and displacement, projection and projective identification, and splitting.

Self and Object Representations, Internalization, and the Self

I will begin by summarizing Kernberg's (1976) five-stage account of psychological development, as that of a prominent object relations theorist who also puts a strong emphasis on consistency with psychoanalytic ego psychology. It will serve well for a reference point for what follows, and I can elaborate on parts of it where necessary.

Kernberg's first stage of development, the "primary undifferentiated stage", covering about the first month of life, is marked by the gradual introjective building of the 'good' undifferentiated self-object constellation

under the influence of pleasurable gratifying experiences in interaction with the mother. At the same time, under the influences of painful and frustrating experiences, the 'bad' self-object representation is being built up. At this stage, these good and bad constellations are kept apart simply because they happen separately and the ego-forerunner is incapable of integrating introjections of opposite valence. It is only in the following stage that the ego maintains introjections of different valences split from each other for defensive reasons: to prevent the anxiety arising from negative introjections being generalized through the ego, and hence protecting the positive introjections which form the core of the primitive ego. This process of active splitting marks the birth of the ego as a differentiated psychic structure (Freud, 1923/1962). The primary undifferentiated stage ends with the consolidation of the 'good' and 'bad' self-object constellations.

Kernberg terms the second stage "normal symbiosis", or "the stage of the primary undifferentiated self-object representations". It covers Mahler's symbiotic phase and the differentiation subphase of separation-individuation (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975), and includes a growing differentiation of self and object representations within the core 'good' self-object constellation. It is marked by the relative incompleteness of this differentiation and

a persisting tendency for defensive regressive refusion of 'good' self and object images, and ends when the differentiation is maintained in a stable way.

Experiences which activate the gratifying self-object representation activate also attention and learning, as does limited frustration. Such experiences, supported by perceptual and cognitive development, contribute to self-object differentiation. At the same time, self-object differentiation in turn contributes to perceptual and cognitive development. On the other hand, excessive activation of the 'bad' self-object constellation gives rise to generalized anxiety with a disorganizing effect on differentiation, and indeed engenders defensive refusion of the all-good self-object representation.

At this stage the infant attempts to eject the bad self-object constellation onto, initially, the periphery of his psychic experience, which gradually becomes a dimly perceived 'out there' or 'not-me'.

Thus, in contrast to the early undifferentiated two-part situation of good internal object and bad internal object, there develops a tripartite situation. Firstly, there is an ego organized around positive introjections; secondly, a positive, libidinally-invested aspect of reality acknowledged as external though in intimate relation with the ego. Self and object images are being differentiated in the interaction of these two elements.

At the same time, there is in this 'good' realm the beginning of reality testing: an early awareness of the difference between the good external object and the good object representation, and modification of the latter in the light of experience with the former. The third element is an entity of 'bad external objects', representing both realistically frustrating or threatening external objects and the projected negative introjections. In this realm, self and object images are undifferentiated but experienced as not-self, this experience being maintained by splitting and projection.

The third stage, of "differentiation of self- from object-representations", begins with the completion of this differentiation within the core 'good' self-object representation; it includes the later differentiation within the 'bad' self-object representation; and it ends with the beginning integration of 'good' and 'bad' self representations into an integrated self-concept, and the beginning integration of 'good' and 'bad' object representations into total" object representations. It thus corresponds to the last three of Mahler's separation-individuation subphases, and culminates in the attainment of object constancy (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975).

Self-object differentiation in the 'bad' realm begins with the infant perceiving his own hostility as naturally justified by an experienced 'bad' external mother. As

this differentiation takes place, though, active splitting reaches a height, in order to protect the ideal, good relationship with mother from contamination by bad self representations and bad representations of her. But the maturation of autonomous ego functions and the increasing delimitation of ego boundaries makes splitting increasingly difficult to maintain, as the reality of negative interactions and their contamination of positive ones can no longer be kept from the synthetic processes of the ego.

In other words, the child becomes forced to recognize that the 'bad' and 'good' mother, and his own 'bad' and 'good' self, are connected, and begins the task of integrating the positive and negative introjections. This process, which signifies the passage to Kernberg's fourth developmental stage, is not a simple progression, but rather is characterized by a tendency to fusion and defusion of positive and negative introjections. Thus it is marked by regression with strong splitting alternating with progression to more advanced integrated states which reflect reality testing and the synthetic function of the ego. Excessive strong splitting may interfere with the integration of object relations, even if there is adequate cognitive integration of external objects; that is, the child--or the adult to the degree that he is functioning at this level--may relate to his objects pre-ambivalently (as either good or bad but never both) even though he is

cognitively aware that only one person is involved.

The fourth stage--of integration of self representations and of object representations, and of the development of higher level intrapsychic structures--begins in the latter part of the third year and covers the entire oedipal period. It includes the appearance of the new affective constellations, and the deepening self- and object-knowledge of Klein's depressive position (1935/1975a, 1940/1975c; Winnicott, 1954/1975c); and the consolidation of the ego, superego and id as overall psychic structures. Predominant conflicts become typically those between the ego and a relatively well-integrated but still strict and primitive superego.

Until this stage, the earliest primitive superego structure has been constituted of projected and reintegrated all-bad self and object representations, split off from the all-good self-object relationship. But at this point, as all-good and all-bad aspects become integrated, there emerges the 'ideal self image', representing a self which has repaired the guilt-evoking damage to the good object and re-established the lost ideal relationship between self and object. There also emerges the 'ideal object image', representing the lost unharmed, all-loving and all-forgiving object. Fusions between the ideal self and ideal object representations come to constitute the ego ideal, and this is then integrated with the sadisti-

cally determined superego forerunners. The consequent toning down of the absolute and fantastic 'goodness' and 'badness' allows a decrease in the projection of each which was formerly necessary to protect against excessive pressures and conflicts. Hence a more stable internalization is possible of more realistic parental demands and the prohibitions of the oedipal period.

At all points in this process, parts of the fused identification systems become integrated into the ego while parts are organized and synthesized as the distinct structure of the superego. Intense guilt feelings--deriving from tensions between the real self and ideal self images and from pressures on the ego from the fused ideal object and prohibitive parental images--may be projected (eg. as accusations or threats attributed to parental figures) and reintrojected directly into the superego.

A crucial development in this stage is the emergence of repression as the main defense of the ego, rather than the earlier predominant splitting and projection. Synthetic and integrative processes of the ego accelerate, ego boundaries are further delimited, and the ego's control over perception and motility are extended. Hence the ego becomes able to dissociate pockets of intolerable, severely negative introjections, and deny them access to perception and motility: i.e. repression. The id as a

psychic structure comes into existence at this point, as a system composed of these rejected introjections and identification systems, which previously existed as mutually split systems available to consciousness. The id thus consists of specific structures composed of self image, object image and unacceptable affective components, in a relatively undifferentiated state and unintegrated into the personality. But Kernberg differs from some theorists (e.g. M. Klein, 1946/1975e) in emphasizing that even the least "metabolized" (Langs, 1976) of these internal objects are likely to undergo significant modification under the influence of later object relations.

The fifth developmental stage is of consolidation of the superego and ego integration. Gradually, the sharp opposition between superego and ego decreases, and the superego becomes abstracted and depersonified (Jacobson, 1964). Superego integration and the interaction between the internal and external object worlds foster reshaping and further integrating of the self-concept, and the consolidation of ego identity.

Given this account of development of the inner world, let us turn to consider the more basic units and processes that make it up.

For Kernberg (1975, 1976, 1980) all processes of internalization of object relations refer to the basic units of psychological structure, or constellations of

such units, each of which consist of three components; an object representation, a self representation, and an affective state. There are three levels of internalization: introjections, identifications, and ego identity. Introjection and identification refer both to the process and to the structures which the process brings about. Kernberg uses 'identification systems' as a generic term for the structures.

Kernberg uses "introjection" to refer to the most primitive level of internalization. He defines it as "the reproduction and fixation of an interaction with the environment by means of an organized cluster of memory traces implying at least three components: (i) the image of an object, (ii) the image of the self in interaction with that object, and (iii) the affective coloring of both the object-image and the self-image under the influence of the drive representative present at the time of the interaction" (1976, p. 29). Actually, because in early introjections object images and self images are not yet differentiated, the definition can strictly only apply to later ones. In contrast to Klein (1946/1975e), Kernberg sees introjection as growing not from an oral metabolic principle, but from the primary autonomous ego functions (Hartmann, 1939/1958) of perception and memory.

The affective coloring of introjections is crucial. Those taking place under positive, gratifying conditions

tend to fuse and become organized into the 'good internal object' constellation, while those that take place under frustrating, anxiety arousing conditions tend to fuse and be organized into the 'bad internal object'. It is only in the second and third stages that, within the respective 'good' and 'bad' realms, self images tend to cluster with other self images, and object images with other object images.

Kernberg uses "identification" to refer to higher level forms of introjection. Their three components are: "(i) the image of an object adopting a role in an interaction with the self, (ii) the image of the self more clearly differentiated from the object than in the case of introjection (and possibly playing a complementary role), and (iii) an affective coloring of a more differentiated, less intense quality than in the case of introjection' (1976, p. 31).

Thus, compared to introjection as Kernberg uses the term, identification involves the further perceptual and cognitive development necessary to grasp the role functions of an interaction, but unfortunately he does not elaborate what he means by "role". Identification also implies a more elaborate and modified affective life. Furthermore, because self and object representations are more clearly differentiated, identifications involve a modification of the self representation under the influ-

ence of the object representation, rather than the relatively undifferentiated fusions characteristic of introjections. That is, in identification the new self representation modifies a relatively well bounded self-concept; with introjection, the new self-object-affect unit, itself poorly differentiated, is agglomerated to an equally poorly differentiated internal self-object.

Introjections form the core of similar and related identifications, and identifications tend to fuse in the same way as introjections: positive to positive and aggressively laden ones to aggressively laden ones, and object-images to object-images and self-images to self-images. Both identification and introjection are mechanisms of growth of the psychic apparatus which may be used for defensive purposes.

"Ego identity" is for Kernberg the highest level of internalization, referring to "the overall organization of identifications and introjections under the guiding principle of the synthetic function of the ego" (1976, p. 32). The attainment of ego identity implies (i) the consolidation of ego structures connected with a sense of the continuity of the self--the self being the organization of the self-image components of introjections and identifications; (ii) a consistent overall conception of the world of objects derived from the organization of the object-image components of introjections and identifica-

tions and a sense of consistency in the person's own interpersonal interactions; and (iii) recognition by the environment of the person's interactive consistency as characteristic, and the individual's perception of this recognition by the environment.

Ego identity is an ego structure, while introjections and identifications are structures of the psychic apparatus in general (including id and superego as well). It is under the influence of a developing ego identity that development is normally marked by a shift from highly personified, global identifications to partial, sublimated identifications; and by the progressive integration of introjections and identifications into higher level ego and superego structures. At the same time, though, primitive and distorted identification systems, less affected by differentiation and integration, continue to exist in the unconscious mind.

This brings us to a certain terminological ambiguity, implicit through Kernberg's and other object relations theorist's writings. It follows from the notion that some identification systems, which include self image components, are not integrated within the self concept, or the relatively organized collection of self images which corresponds to the "I" of discourse. Thus an identification system, with a self image component, may be experienced as not-self (hence the Kleinian tableau of feeling

attacked by internal objects) and even, with projection, as belonging to an external object. The "self" in "self representation" does not necessarily refer to an experienced selfness, even at an unconscious level, while the "self" in "self concept", or as implied in "ego identity", does.

Similarly, according to Kernberg's definitions, object representations are components of all internalizations, including those that are most central to the self concept. Now, there is a significant virtue to this conceptual arrangement, for maintaining that there is no representation of the self except in intimate relation to an object representation is not only a convincing psychological claim, but it captures the logical truth that one can only ascribe experiences to oneself if one can identify other subjects of experience (Strawson, 1959). To the degree that one cannot identify others as others, one cannot experience something as pertaining to one's self.

To describe representations in which such clear distinctions between self and other are not yet made, Kernberg has the notion of a continuum of self-object differentiation. But some important experiences and elements of the internal world are not well captured in this scheme. One needs terms in which to describe object representations which are neither independent of the self, nor undifferentiated from it. In a person's (or child's)

realm of omnipotence, for example, are object representations experienced as if the person can manipulate the external object in the same process as he manipulates the representation. The internalized object representation is poorly differentiated from the external object, yet may be well differentiated from the self representation. Kernberg can describe such phenomena in terms of good self-object differentiation but poor reality testing; but that fails to capture the quality of the experience in which the object is experienced as within the realm of the self, though it is not confused with the self.

Schafer's conceptual work (1968) provides us, I think, with a way of understanding processes of internalization which more richly captures the range of possible experiences with perhaps greater definitional clarity than Kernberg. At the same time, a few changes and remarks will preserve the most valuable of Kernberg's contributions.

First, some of Schafer's definitions. A self representation "may be defined as an idea that the subject has about his own person....It may be organized on any level of abstractness; for example, a self representation may be as specific and concrete as the idea of a minor detail of the subject's body and as abstract as the idea of his general type of personality. Also, large-scale representations include small-scale ones....The existence and the

specific content of some self representations can only be inferred [because of] the obscuring effect of resistances or archaic modes of expression....[They] may be unconscious, preconscious, or conscious, and its content may express dynamic or structural aspects of the id, ego, or superego systems, or more likely some combination or resultant of these aspects. The temporal referent of self representations may be past, present, future, or, in the case of deeply unconscious representations, apparently nonexistent. The representation may range from the highly realistic to the autistic, from the highly organized (differentiated and synthesized) to the amorphous and fluid, from the intensely physical or emotional to the abstractly contemplative, from the self-aggrandizing to the self-abasing, and from the conditional and hypothetical (e.g., the positive ideal to strive toward or the negative ideal to avoid) to the actually experienced...The subject has a definite need to maintain some clarity, consistency, and organization of his self representations" (1968, pp. 25-27).

Precisely the same characteristics apply to object representations, which "may be defined as an idea that the subject has about another person, creature, or thing", actual or possible, conditional, or hypothetical. "Object representations are always involved, at least by implication, in feelings about, and attitudes toward, the other

person and one's own person"--thus maintaining Kernberg's point that self representations always imply an object representation. Also, "the subject needs to maintain some clarity, consistency, and organization of his representations of other persons (object constancy)" (1968, pp. 28-29).

Schafer defines internalization as follows: "Internalization refers to all those processes by which the subject transforms real or imagined regulatory interactions with his environment, and real or imagined characteristics of his environment, into inner regulations and characteristics...."inner" indicates, first of all, that the stimulation and impact of the regulation does not depend on the actual presence, action, or emotional position of the external object that was once party to the original interactions. Second, "inner" indicates that the subject locates the previously external regulatory agent within some self-boundary....Third, "inner" describes the essential direction or location of the subject's response to this regulating influence: except when he externalizes the regulation, he is in commerce with himself; the regulatory interaction has been interiorized" (pp. 9-11). The term "regulation", he adds, "will be used here to refer to motives that influence or control behavior patterns, mental representations, and other motives" (p. 12).

Schafer's distinction between introjection and identification is very different from Kernberg's. I will present Schafer's definition of identification with a few remarks, for its details do not concern us as directly as do those of his discussion of introjects and other primary process presences, to which I will then turn.

Schafer defines: "In its fullest sense, the process of identifying with an object is unconscious, though it may also have prominent and significant preconscious and conscious components; in this process the subject modifies his motives and behavior patterns, and the self representations corresponding to them, in such a way as to experience being like, the same as, and merged with one or more representations of that object; through identification, the subject both represents as his own one or more regulatory influences or characteristics of the object that have become important to him and continues his tie to the object; the subject may wish to bring about this change for various reasons; an identification may acquire relative autonomy from its origins in the subject's relations with dynamically significant objects" (p. 140).

Identification may involve a fundamental systemic change; or there may be a passing identification, with little change. The modification in motives and behavior patterns may not easily be apparent; "behavior" refers to any psychological activity, so the behavior may be

expressed only in fantasy, in which case the identification is limited but not necessarily transient or insignificant (eg. empathy). But the very least that is involved in identification is change in the subject's self representations. With respect to "like, the same as, and merged with", Schafer maintains that there is simultaneous participation of all three levels in most identifications, though they differ with respect to the level they represent most prominently and the level that engenders the most conflict.

Introjection, on the other hand, does not aim at likeness, sameness or merging, but to continue a relationship to an object, displaced from the outer to the inner world--though the object may be transformed in the process. Identification aims to transform the self; the object is implied in it, and thus carried into the inner world too, but not as an altogether separate object. Hence, identification involves a higher degree of internalization in that it alters the subject himself, but--contra Kernberg (1976) and Jacobson (1964)--this is not related to primitiveness, for the earliest merging experiences must precede introjections. Indeed, though introjections are often turned into identifications, and identifications may be built out of introjects and so may regressively decompose into introjects, Schafer insists that identification and introjection should be recognized

as two distinct types of internalization, with no necessary temporal relation between them (pp. 19-20). By contrast, Kernberg's distinction, outlined above, in many respects resembles a developmental continuum: of more or less self-object differentiation, of more or less cognitive development (regarding the role aspect of identification as Kernberg defines it), and of more or less affective modulation.

An introject, Schafer writes, "is an inner presence with which one feels in a continuous or intermittent dynamic relationship. The subject conceives of this presence as a person, a physical or psychological part of a person...or a person-like thing or creature. He experiences it as existing within the confines of his body or mind or both, but not as an aspect or expression of his subjective self. The topographic quality of this internal presence may be unconscious, preconscious, or conscious, and it may change" (p. 72).

Relations with introjects can be as various as those with any external person. Introjects are usually modeled after aspects of significant external objects, as they are experienced, i.e. they may be shaped by fantasies, projections, idealizations, depreciations, etc.. Relations with introjects need not fully replace those with the external object, but they will influence aspects of the external relations and may even overwhelm them. Introjection

reflects the wish to do without (aspects of) the external object; it continues the person's attachment to the object --and in many cases the attachment to the external object --but under a new set of conditions.

A central element in Schafer's account of introjects --and of the 'primary process presences' of which they are one type--is his suggestion that recognition of objects as objects precedes and is partly independent from their differentiation from the self and hence their location as inside or outside. With reality testing and the development of logical thinking the child locates the representation of the external object inside and the object to which the representation pertains outside: The representation comes to have an "index of externality". But the first objects are experienced "without location in psychological space" (p. 75), and this experience may persist behind later, more articulated and sophisticated ones, as well as replace them in prominence with regression.

"Inside" and "outside" refer to what Schafer terms the "subjective self", an experiential term meaning what the subject refers to when speaking of "I", "me", and "myself". The internal object is located within the subjective self, yet it is not part of that self. Schafer compares it to the experience of food as inside the mouth or stomach but part of neither.

He further elaborates three kinds of subjective self:

the self-as-agent (the "I"), the self-as-object (the "me"), and the self-as-place (which has no specific pronoun). They are neither synonymous nor necessarily congruent. The distinction between self-as-place and self-as-agent will be particularly important to us. But self-as-agent and self-as-object are more frequently congruent, and the distinction is less important for our purposes. It will not be a focus for us (nor was it for Schafer).

The self-as-place (also termed the "self-as-bounded-space") has implicit, if not explicit, bodily referents. (Schafer maintains that it is closely related to the body ego or body self, but does not develop the connection.) The self-as-agent is usually experienced as within the self-as-place, but separate from it. The self-as-agent does also usually include bodily representations, but compared to the self-as-place they are much more limited in both area (eg. often the head) and in their centrality (eg. without much difficulty most people can imagine themselves disembodied). It is outside the self-as-agent but inside the self-as-place that internal object representations exist. It is identification, not introjection, that involves change in representations within the self-as-agent.

Internal object representations also, as a distinct quality, may be "localized". That is, they may be experi-

enced as pertaining to an object of a certain location: inside the self-as-place (as in the case of an introject); or outside that self (as in the case of a mental representation of an object which is experienced as external); or they may be unlocalized, of indeterminate location (as in the case of transitional objects). The localization of the object may change: What is located inside may be externalized; what is located outside may be internalized; and an object representation's index of location may disappear or reappear. Also, an object may be simultaneously represented at more than one level of organization (primary and secondary process) and in more than one place.

Thus far we have two elements in the development of object relations. First is the representation of objects as objects, i.e. as distinct from the self-as-agent. Second is the experience of these object representations as localized with respect to the self-as-place.

Reality testing is crucial to this second element. Schafer goes on to present, as a prerequisite to reality testing, the notion of the "reflective self representation": the "representation of the oneself as thinker of the thought" (p. 91). The reflective self representation is necessary for awareness that the thought is a thought, that the memory is a memory, etc., i.e. that the representation is a representation of--and is not itself--an

object. It is only if that awareness is there that the internal representation can be compared to the object and adjusted accordingly. Normally, we are only conscious of it when our representation of reality is challenged; but it is implicit in all secondary process thought. However, the reflective self representation may be suspended, because of repression or a split or a more generalized regression, in the service of the ego (Kris, 1952) or otherwise. Then the idea may lose its status as idea only, and be experienced as a presence. The sense of time, too, is suspended, as even memories and ideas about the future are not distinguished from actual objects and so experienced as presences.

Thus Schafer makes a distinction between primary process and secondary process object representations (pp. 126-127). A secondary process object representation is a thought about another person or thing which combines (i) a reasonably faithful rendering of the object's pertinent essentials over objectively perceived time; (ii) an at least implicit and correct index of externality; and (iii) an at least implicit reflective self representation. Primary process object representations are (i) inaccurate, unstable and timeless; (ii) incorrectly internal, external, or indeterminate in location; and (iii) unreflectively processed. These constitute poles, not only in that most object representations are transitional between these

two extremes, but also in that several forms of the same object representation may coexist, and in different circumstances different forms may predominate.

Introjects are one kind of primary process presence: those which are localized inside the self-as-place. Projection provides an example of primary process object representations being located as external. As an example of primary process presences of indeterminate location we have transitional objects (Winnicott, 1953/1975h). Because localization of objects genetically follows recognition of objects as distinct from self-as-agent, the first object representations are primary process presences of indeterminate location.

It will be helpful, both to summarize and to further explicate some of these notions, to integrate them within a broader developmental view. I will do this with a more detailed view of early development in object relations, which derives largely from Winnicott's writings (1965e, 1971b, 1975g), and which parallels the first three phases of Kernberg's account.

The differentiation between self-as-agent and self-as-place can be made only when there is a beginning representation of objects. Earlier stages of formation and integration of a rudimentary self, based on bodily schemata (Mahler & McDevitt, 1982), might, indeed, be more clearly described as the development of "being" or a

"sense of being", rather than of "self" or "sense of self". The contrary of the experience of "self" at this stage is the experience of annihilation, of not-being; "not-self" suggests a rudimentary sense of object which is at this stage meaningless (cf. Winnicott, 1962/1965d).

The beginning representation of objects does, though, presuppose prior development. There is an integration of body schemata, based on proprioception followed by a shift in emphasis to enteroproprioception which brings stimuli from the outside world (not experienced as such) to a perceptual ascendancy (Mahler & McDevitt, 1982). This integration is at the beginning absolutely dependent on the mother's adaptation and functioning as protective shield (Khan, 1963/1974a; Winnicott, 1945/1975e, 1948/1975f, 1960/1965f). Provided this goes well enough, all (or nearly all) impingements--whether internal-instinctual-bodily or external in origin--are experienced as within the infant's area of omnipotence. (At this stage we should be careful in using "omnipotence" too, for the feeling state of power over objects is not a part of it [Balint, 1969; Winnicott, 1962/1965d].) A most important part of this is that, provided again that things go well enough, impingements--or, rather, potential impingements--can then be integrated into the infant's sense of being. One might say that the stimulus is experienced by the infant with a feeling that "this is mine", except that

there is no 'not-mine' to give "mine" sense (Winnicott, 1958/1965a).

It is within this matrix that there is the beginning of object representation. The mother, when the infant is ready to have something he wants--but is as yet unable to hallucinate it because he has no representation of it--produces the nipple, and the infant is able to feel that he hallucinated it. Thus the infant can make a spontaneous movement and find the environment just as if he had brought it into being. Thus, the first and most rudimentary differentiation of the object out of the infant's global and diffuse sense of being is engendered in the experience that "I did that" or "I created that". It is this rudimentary "I" which I suggest is what Schafer calls the "self-as-agent" before the self-as-place has been differentiated from an area of external and independent reality.

In this earlier differentiation the mother's slight delay in meeting the infant's needs is crucial, so that there can be an experience of the inarticulate wish before the wish is met. Winnicott and Khan have discussed this in terms of a "period of hesitation", which is the matrix for the emergence of the capacity to operate in the area of illusion (the area of illusion being for Schafer an area of primary process presences). Khan has also pointed out that an important aspect of this delay is to allow for

aggression to be felt and integrated, and hence later to be available in further differentiation (Khan, 1963/1979b, 1969/1979c, 1971/1974c; Winnicott, 1941/1975d).

Thus at this stage of object relating there is a differentiation of self from object, but all objects are experienced "without location in psychological space" (Schafer, 1968, p. 75), or in the "area of illusion" (Winnicott, 1953/1975h). In the sense that there is also no differentiation between the thought or hallucination of an object and the object itself, this is also an area of omnipotence. This experience may persist unconsciously behind later more sophisticated ones, and be consciously revived in regression, dreams, or 'altered states of consciousness' such as daydreams (Schafer, 1968); and also in some religious, patriotic and artistic experiences (Fuller, 1980; Rizzuto, 1979; Winnicott, 1967/1971a). It is the predominant experience of objects in certain pathological areas of functioning, and in other pathological cases even this primitive relation to objects may be lacking (Khan, 1974b, 1979a).

Once this differentiation has been attained, the processes of reality testing and differentiation of the object representation from the external object can begin, facilitated by the mother's increasing adaptational frustration of the infant's omnipotence. Transitional objects may be formed and used (Winnicott, 1953/1975h),

and the infant comes to be able to relate to objects as external to and independent of his self (Winnicott, 1963/1965b, 1969/1971c). This is the integration and differentiation of what Schafer calls the "self-as-place": between ideas about objects, which are inside it, and external objects, which are outside it and independent of it. Now introjection becomes possible and in certain circumstances desirable, because there is now an external realm in which objects are often undesirably independent of the self-as-agent, and also a psychological space in which to maintain the introject where it is neither independent of the self-as-agent nor a part of it (Schafer, 1968; Winnicott, 1963/1965b).

"Place" in "self-as-place" refers to psychological rather than physical space, but as Schafer points out it is closely related to bodily referents. To say that it is only at this stage that it is differentiated out from the external world is not to deny that all rudimentary senses of self, including that which I suggest may be better termed "being" or "sense of being", have been largely based on physiological sensations, augmented by sight. The point is that before the differentiation of objects as independent these bodily referents have been the content of the infant's sense of being and integration, but not the coordinates of a psychological space usable in the psychological process of localization of experience.

An important concomitant of reality testing and the differentiation of inside self-as-place from outside self-as-place is the increasing articulation, or representational complexity, of the self-as-agent. The child builds an increasingly sophisticated representation of what he can and cannot do. Reflective self representations (as thinker of the thought, rememberer of the memory, wisher of the wish, etc.) become differentiated from the earlier representations of self-as-agent as omnipotent. In aspects of experience where this differentiation has been achieved, the experience of primary process presences from now on implies a suspension of the reflective self representation.

There are two things remaining to be done in this section. First I want to make explicit some points of Kernberg's theory which I think it is important to maintain, but which Schafer either places in the background or disagrees with. Then I will turn to discuss some terms such as 'self', 'self-concept', etc., some of which have already been used without much attention to their definition.

We have noted above that Kernberg emphasizes the intimate connection between object- and self-representations, and in my reference to Strawson's work in philosophy (1959) I have emphasized that this is a necessary connection if we are to maintain conceptual clarity. The

link is only in the background of Schafer's work, though above I pointed out one place where he makes the connection explicit. In most of what follows in this work also, the connection will only be implicit, but it is nevertheless a central one. Self representations always imply object representations, and vice versa, even if for convenience we are referring to only one or other. The coming to the fore in a person's functioning of a particular self representation will tend to also bring to the fore particular object representations, and vice versa. The link may be by genetic origin, by similarity of affect, etc., and is an integral part of the familiar psychoanalytic notion of 'association'.

Kernberg also emphasizes that an equally essential part of the "basic units" of internalization is an affective loading. This constitutes a major difference from Schafer, and one where I will be adopting Kernberg's view. (Given this point and the previous one, I can also allow myself to use Kernberg's term 'identification system' as a generic term referring to self-object-affect units or organizations of them.) Schafer, on the other hand, confines motives and aims to the systems id, ego and superego, and insists that representations provide only their content and the indicators by which we infer such mental activity. It is a long and multi-faceted argument that he presents, but the difference is at its basis

related to broad theoretical issues within psychoanalysis about the conceptual priority that should be given to object relations and the organization of the internal representational world as against structural dynamics and the organization of the systems id, ego and superego. It is an issue which is well beyond the scope of this work to wrestle with (but see, for example, Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).

By giving affective loading to representations, Kernberg effectively grants them motivational power. Representations move us: the coming to the fore of a representation in itself brings to the fore a feeling about the self and object and so in itself can motivate further psychological and behavioral activity. (In detail this would, of course, be more complex: for example, a real self representation in conjunction with an ideal self representation results in a representation of the difference together with an unpleasant affect, which with further representational work results in the idea of what to do.) In this scheme, then--and here I am not insisting that I speak also for Kernberg--ego, id and superego, and also motive and aim and wish, are simply of a higher order of inference than representations and refer to structural, functional and energetic aspects of particular representations, or ways in which they are organized, or conditions in which they come to the fore. I would take, for

example, the phrase 'stable ego motive' to be referring to a network of representations with multiple mutual associations and compatible affective loading (i.e. well integrated); with multiple associative links to contemporary realistic representations and a continuing openness to new ones; in which the character of the representations is predominantly that of the secondary process; and in which are included the representations of a high level of abstraction which regulate secondary process, logical thought. This does not necessarily cover every characteristic, but I trust the direction is clear. Equally clearly, discourse at this level would be extremely clumsy, and some kinds of understanding thoroughly obscured.

I am not assuming, then, that other terminologies are redundant, and I will at times be using systems terms. I will sometimes refer, for example, to a representation as 'in' the ego, but I will be assuming that this ultimately refers to certain characteristics of that and other representations and their interrelations. This is not, I think, an assumption which is ultimately necessary to the coherence and validity of the account of the group set forth in this work. It is an assumption which is implicit in some of its language, so that I can write, for example, in terms of characteristics of representations and leave aside discussion of their systemic aspects except when

those are especially pertinent. But I would maintain that what is here presented is translatable into a 'language' in which the psychic systems are given greater conceptual priority.

We have thus far considered two dimensions of the representational world: self-object differentiation, and the localization of representations; and the relation between these has been given some attention in a developmental context. I will now turn to the definition of some other aspects of my terminology.

I will use the terms 'subjective self' or 'self concept' or, simply, the 'self' to refer to the synthesis or integration of a subset of all the person's self representations. It is 'situated in' the ego (with concomitant merging and vagueness at superego and id boundaries), depends closely on the ego functions of self-awareness and consciousness, and tends to be oriented to the future as much as to the past or present. It is also closely related to 'ego identity', which is the ego-function aspect of the self-concept; i.e. the ego-identity is an organizational principle and an ego-function and -structure which forms and consists of the self-concept. The subjective self can shift over time, so that self representations may become integrated into it that previously could not, and on the other hand self representations which were previously part of the subjective self may have

to be dis-integrated from it. In the same way, the self concept can shift over time; but I will use 'self concept' rather than 'subjective self' when a fair degree of continuity over time is implied.

The self, subjective self or self-concept normally involves both self-as-agent and self-as-place aspects, though it is the self-as-agent aspects which are predominant. It can itself best be seen as a self representation of a high level of abstraction; it does not refer to any distinct theoretical entity. However, it is very important as a motivational entity; maintaining and improving its consistency and positive affective loading are high priorities for the individual (cf. Schafer, 1968, pp. 193-194). If a representation that is inconsistent with the subjective self emerges into consciousness, either some representational work will have to be done so as to render the conflict innocuous, or the representation will have to be actively dissociated (split off, projected, or kept out of consciousness except in some distorted way such that it is no longer inconsistent). So when referring to motivation we will often be speaking of the subjective self that is dominant at the particular time.

Self representations, being one of the elements of the basic units of the psyche, are all over the psychic apparatus, as it were, including those parts of the id and superego which are least related to the ego: the least

integrated into and by ego functioning, the least accessible to consciousness, or the least integrated into the self-concept or subjective self. 'Integration' here refers to the representation being multiply linked to other representations, so that it becomes active in the person's functioning in response to many states other than that which originally led to its internalization. (Hence, integration is closely linked to relative autonomy--cf. Schafer, 1968, pp. 181-219.) Self representations may be undifferentiated or poorly differentiated from object representations, repressed, split off, projected or otherwise defended against and distorted. These unintegrated (into the self concept) self representations may be variously organized and modified, in varying degrees of complexity and integration. There is a certain degree of such complexity, integration and internal consistency at which it becomes less meaningful to talk of them as split off from the self and more valid to describe the situation as one of multiple selves. By the same token, if fragmentation extends to the degree that there is hardly an integrated self concept, a psychotic state of no self could be said to exist.

There is also, similarly 'in' the ego, an 'inner object world' or 'internal object world', which is an inner representational map of the external world, and which orients the person in the external world. It is an

integration of a subset of all the person's object representations. I will follow Rapaport (1957/1967, pp. 696-697), in turn following Hartmann (1939/1958, p. 57), in maintaining a distinction between this term and 'inner world' or 'internal world' (no "object"), meaning the psychic apparatus in general. The internal object world also constitutes a major motivational entity. Its constancy and many aspects of its relation to the self, for example, are of great importance. As with self representations, object representations may be more or less unintegrated into the internal object world.

'Self-object differentiation' refers to the degree of differentiation between a self representation and the object representation it implies; as a process it refers to the formation and maintenance of a boundary between them. Reflecting the fact that conceptually and experientially the individual's past, present and future experiences with respect to his self are inseparable from his experiences of his external world, a self representation always implies something about an object, and vice versa. The notion of self-object differentiation can be applied at as many different levels of abstraction as the notion of representation, from the very concrete and specific, to that as broad as the self-concept. At the broader levels, processes of internalization and projection, for example, refer to (i) vicissitudes in this self-object boundary;

(ii) agglomerations to (or losses from) the self-concept and inner object world, deriving from present experiences in relation to the external world or the new integration (or dis-integration) of representations from past experiences; and (iii) reorganization within the self-concept and inner object world.

Projection and Displacement

The distinction between projection and displacement can be made, at a conceptual level, quite clearly: Displacement refers to an object representation (or collection of them) being experienced unrealistically as pertaining to a certain object, i.e. over and above any degree to which the content of the representation does in fact fit the object. Hence we have the paradigmatic case of displacement in the transference in the psychoanalytic situation where an object representation pertaining to a past object is experienced as pertaining to the analyst in the present. Projection, on the other hand, refers to a self representation (or collection of them) being experienced as pertaining to a certain external object (again, over and above the degree to which relevant aspects of the subject are in fact the same as those of the object). Hence we have cases of projection in the transference where the analyst becomes experienced as the patient's superego and/or of his id strivings. (These definitions

are based on Jacobson, 1964.)

Developing criteria for making this distinction is more problematic. First, let us link it to the scheme presented in the previous section. Displacement between object representations is a process that takes place 'in' the self-as-place; and can apply to object representations localized inside or outside, or indeterminately localized --for the process of displacement should be seen as distinct from that of localization. Localizing out is a necessary part of projection as defined above. What is localized out is a self representation, and so the boundary of self-as-agent is a crucial one in projection. To completely follow the above definition, projection involves, first, the change of a self representation into an object representation, which implies the 'passage' of the representation from the self-as-agent to the self-as-place; and, second, that the object representation be localized out, or at least indeterminately localized, so that it be experienced as pertaining to an external object. But we do need to allow for processes in which the second of the above processes is not completed: where the self representation is experienced as pertaining to an internal object experienced as internal, i.e. an introject. It is arguable whether we should call that projection; perhaps we should consider projection onto an introject as the limiting case of projection. Schafer

seems to do so (1968, pp. 129-130) though he is not explicit.

In this scheme, while generally poor self-object differentiation is not necessary to projection, it would clearly facilitate it; and a certain 'porousness' (cf. M. Klein, 1952/1975g), or momentary diffusion of self-object boundaries in a limited area, is implied in the transformation of a self representation into an object representation. On the other hand, some ability to maintain self-object boundaries is implied if the representation is to continue to be experienced as pertaining to other than the self. If the representation is localized out then there is the further implication that there is some area in which differentiation between inside and outside self-as-place is clearly maintained.

The situation is now more complex but still, I think, quite clear. Displacement refers to vicissitudes of object representations. Projection refers to vicissitudes of self representations, which were, in fact or potentially (i.e. if there had been no motivation for transforming them and maintaining them elsewhere) part of the self-as-agent. Such self representations derive from identification or directly from self-observation. By these definitions, the dual process of projection and then displacement is possible.

But here we come up against the formidable problem of

differentiating self representations from object representations in vivo, particularly--to take the most frequent instances--identifications from introjects or other primary process presences. Schafer listed four reasons why this may be difficult (1968, pp. 17-18). Firstly, because many introjects are unconscious, their initial manifestations may appear to be issuing from the subjective self. Secondly, the subject's compliance with the demands of his introjects may superficially suggest he has identified with them. Thus, what appears to be projection may in fact be displacement. On the other hand, what comes to attention as an introject may be a regressive restoration of an introject with which the subject had in fact gone on to identify, so that the identification aspect is obscured. Also, identifications may conflict with each other and, in any given set of circumstances, one may be experienced as alien to the currently dominant subjective self and appear much as an introject would. In these cases, what appears at first to be projection may be displacement.

One part of the problem is that not only may the initial manifestations of representations be deceptive, but representations themselves tend to be layered: Identifications may prove to have originally been introjects, which may in turn prove to have been shaped by projection of earlier identifications, and so on. If one

were to seek to resolve these sorts of problems through a continuing analysis of the genetic roots of the representations then one might ultimately arrive at the point when self and object representations were not differentiated, but that differentiation--and the differentiation between inside and outside self-as-place--was being made through processes of internalization, projection and reality testing. Thus, what could be described as a rigorously genetic basis for the distinction between displacement and projection might be very difficult to make. In many cases of emotional importance the answer will be that both processes are involved.

One might, however, consider the question, "Is it displacement or projection?", as requiring an answer which refers back only to the psychological state of affairs immediately preceding the phenomenon it is asked about. Without denying the great interest and import of further analysis of the motivation and genesis of the phenomenon, it makes for a more workable distinction. Thus, beginning criteria for projection might be: (i) the subject does not experience the content as pertaining to his subjective self, but experiences it as pertaining to some object or primary process presence; (ii) we can infer a motivation for his not wanting to experience it as pertaining to himself; and (iii) we have good reason to believe that the content would otherwise (barring the above or other

motivations, and taking into account other possible defense mechanisms) be experienced as pertaining to the subjective self. As beginning criteria for displacement we might have: (i) the subject experiences the content as pertaining to an external object or primary process presence; (ii) we can infer a motivation for his wanting the content to pertain to (only) that external object or primary process presence, rather than his experiencing it as pertaining to (also) some other external object or primary process presence or as absent; and (iii) we have good reason to believe that the content would otherwise (barring the above and other motivations, etc.) be experienced as pertaining to some other external object or primary process presence or as absent.

No claim is made that the above criteria are sufficiently developed. One major further difficulty would lie in conflict being the most significant of the relevant motivations, yet even such a central psychoanalytic concept as conflict has not been systematically discussed with a view to developing criteria for its application.

For our purposes here it is sufficient to note the problem and indicate the direction in which it might be further explicated. But it is also worth noting that even such a beginning criterial statement would already require a good deal of data that may take some time to gather in the psychoanalytic situation. In a group situation it may

be close to impossible, though it may be that sometimes sufficient data is at hand to make a good enough determination. It is, though, very common for writers on groups to claim that one or other process occurs without saying how they distinguish them. And this is not a trivial distinction, for the 're-owning' interpretation is different in each case, whether the group's purpose is therapy for the individual or therapy for the group or the study of group dynamics. Is it most helpful, for example, to describe members as inducing others to be a certain way instead of them, thus relieving them of being the way they are, or as inducing others to be a certain way because they need that sort of figure around to allow them to be the way they are?

Projection and Projective Identification

According to Freud (1911/1963d), in projection, "an internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a certain kind of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external perception" (p. 66). It is this that in the preceding section we have described as experiencing a self representation as belonging to, coming from, or as an attribute or quality of an object--perhaps, in the limiting case, within the self, but not as a part of the self.

The term 'projective identification' has been

variously used, and criticized for that reason (eg. Meissner, 1980). Klein introduced the term to describe projecting bad parts which are then fantasied as not only injuring but as taking possession of the object and controlling it from within. The mother is then "not felt to be a separate individual but is felt to be the bad self" (1946/1975e, p. 8). The infant may similarly treat his good parts, as precious gifts or so that they may be protected from the infant's aggressive fantasies and bad internal objects. But Klein often slipped from referring to the interaction of projection and introjection to referring to projective identification, implying there to be no distinction, and at some points she writes that projection necessarily involves an identification with the projected-into object (eg. 1959/1975f, p. 252).

Kernberg uses projective identification to describe an early (or severely regressed) form of projection, while ego boundaries are still frail, so that what is projected outside is still, in part, felt inside. Slightly altering Klein's original formulation, he holds that exerting control over the object is an additional need, arising because of projective identification's inefficiency in completely getting rid of the unwanted part (1976, p. 49).

Meissner (1980), consistently with Kernberg, maintains that if the term 'projective identification' is to be of any use at all, and not just a redundant term for

'projection and introjection', it would best be confined to the basically psychotic mechanism which involves diffusion of ego boundaries; loss of self-object differentiation, and a taking of the object as part of the self, which is then experienced as part of the self. Projection, on the other hand, is used in a wide variety of object relationships, including relatively sophisticated forms such as empathy. But Meissner's argument rests on two definitional restrictions with which we may take issue. Firstly, he restricts 'identification' to internalizations which involve structural change, thus excluding the temporary and 'smaller scale' processes which many writers emphasize in their discussions of projective identification (eg. Jaques, 1955). Secondly, he sees self-object merger as in all cases implying a psychotic level of functioning. Schafer's notion, on the other hand, which we are adopting, is that merger is at some level, even if not the most prominent one, a factor in all identification--or, in Meissner's rather loaded terms, we are holding that most people function, in some part at least, at a 'psychotic' level.

If we do not accept these restrictions, then Meissner's account begins to look rather different. For projection involves at least a 'porousness' (cf. M. Klein, 1952/1975g) or momentary diffusion of self-object boundaries; a re-placing of that boundary such that from the

perspective of consensual reality it would be called misplaced; and an experiencing of part of the self as part of an object (though its part-of-selfness is not experienced). The only factor that seems to qualitatively distinguish projection from projective identification is that, in the case of projection, the part-of-selfness of the projected part is not experienced. Then Meissner's account would be open to precisely the kind of claim that he wants to disallow, that all projection is merely projective identification in conjunction with some kind of disavowal of the part-of-selfness of the projected part. In any case, Meissner advocates abandoning the term 'projective identification' altogether.

On the other hand, there have been attempts to confine pure projection to a relatively small realm, and see projective identification as the major mechanism used in a wide variety of forms of object relationship. At this extreme is the account of Malin and Grotstein (1966; Grotstein, 1981), in which "all identification includes projection, and all projection includes identification" (Malin & Grotstein, 1966, p.27). Their claim is in two parts, the first of which is presented as an empirical one: Projection enables "the ego to discharge, for instance, unwanted or disclaimed parts of the self. The external object now receives the projected parts, and then this alloy--external object plus newly arrived projected

part--is re-introjected to complete the cycle" (p. 26). That this describes the purpose and events of all incidences of projection is highly arguable.

The second part of their claim could be described as a mixed conceptual and existential one: "When we start with the projection it is necessary that there be some process of identification or internalization in general, or else we can never be aware of the projection. That is, what is projected would be lost like a satellite rocketed out of the gravitational pull of the earth. Eventually, all contact with the satellite will be lost. Although the satellite has left Earth, it must remain under the influence of Earth's gravitational pull to remain in orbit in order for it to maintain some contact with Earth. A projection, of itself, seems meaningless unless the individual can retain some contact with what is projected" (p. 27). At what could be described as the opposite pole to Meissner, this involves such an extended definition of identification that it threatens conceptual confusion. Even if we allow that 'identification' in 'projective identification' is a loose term for 'internalization', their notion also implies--I think untenably--that all forms of cognitive or affective contact are internalizations. Eisold (1981) uses this notion of projective identification in his investigation of groups, but is explicit that he means 'identification' in only an attenu-

ated sense, ranging from mere maintenance of contact to internalization.

Between the positions of Meissner and Malin and Grotstein a viable and valuable conceptual place for projective identification can, I think, be found. Jaffe (1968) has distinguished two modes of projection, which constitute extremes of a continuum. At one pole is "identification with the object by projection", in which the projected part is not split off, but rather the self is extended or externalized to include at least some aspects of the projected-onto object. I will refer to this as 'externalization'. Conflicting self representations is not directly a feature in this process. The motivation is to be at one with, or merged with, an aspect of the object, and this is achieved not by transforming a self representation into an object representation, but by transforming an object representation into a self representation. This is a mode of identification as we are using the term, but it has the particular feature that the spacial coordinates of the subjective self are extended. Those representations of the self-as-place that are included in the subjective self representation now pertain to a larger geographical space than before. What is implied is that among the aspects of the object which are identified with are some spacial coordinates. Clearly, primitive identifications are among these externaliza-

tions. In its more mature forms, there would be a split in the self and ego, which enables seeing the object simultaneously in its real light, distinct from the self. With this split there is the potential for conflict, but this is not necessary: empathy, for example, can be seen as having externalization as a constituent process. We will turn to consider splitting in the next section.

Jaffe's other pole is "projection in the sense of the annihilating tendency", aiming at a complete riddance of an intolerable identification system. In this mode the projected part is split off, and there may be an additional split in so far as there is simultaneous awareness or undoing of the projective distortion. Given some degree of modification of the all-bad quality of the projected part, there will arise a conflict between the wish to annihilate the object and a wish to preserve it. In other words, at some level the destruction of the object would be experienced as an impoverishment of the self (cf. Freud, 1911/1963d; Fenichel, 1945). Nevertheless, we might consider the possibility of the kind of projection which is motivated by a severe degree of conflict, with the aim of a near-complete riddance of the projected part. Once again, we must accept the issue of criteria for conflict as beyond our scope.

I take 'projective identification' to refer to some area around the middle of this continuum. There may be

some degree of conflict around the projected part, which is ameliorated by the self representation being transformed into an object representation; but this is not so great that the object must be destroyed or completely gotten rid of. At some level, perhaps unconsciously, the subject experiences a connectedness with the object; merger is not a prominent aspect of this connectedness, but 'the same as' or 'like' (Schafer, 1968) may be. I think this notion points to an important intermediate area which is not essentially psychotic but may involve distancing the subjective self from a conflict. The meaning of 'identification' is preserved, but the experience of connectedness may be part of the motivation for the conceptually distinct process of maintaining cognitive and affective contact. This account does not, though, make a hard and fast distinction between projective identification and externalization (the latter may be an--albeit minor--aspect of the former) nor between projective identification and projection. Projective identification is a form of projection. What it does is to point to two parameters of projective processes. The first is the degree of connectedness experienced with the projected-onto object; the second is the projector's feelings about the projected part. The two parameters are clearly related.

Projective identification can be further elaborated.

Ogden (1978, 1979) has emphasized its value as a concept dealing with the interplay of the intrapsychic and interpersonal realms (cf. Zinner & Shapiro, 1972). He conceptualizes it as having three aspects. Firstly, there is the fantasy of projecting a part of oneself into another person and of that part taking over the person from within. At least in part, the subject is operating at a level at which there is a blurring of boundaries between self and object representations, so that the projector feels that the recipient experiences his own feeling, not just a feeling like his own. This is close to Klein's conception, and Meissner's and Kernberg's, and we might describe it as projection near the externalized self end of the continuum.

The second aspect is that the projector exerts pressure via the interpersonal interaction such that the recipient experiences pressure to think, feel and behave in a manner congruent with the projection. Such pressure might not be obvious but extremely subtle, especially if the recipient is in close empathic contact with the projector (Grotstein, 1981; Grinberg, 1962, 1973). Racker (1957/1968) discusses the processes of the recipient in the analytic situation in terms of 'concordant' and 'complementary' identifications. Concordant identification, where the analyst experiences the central emotion that the patient is experiencing at the same time, is the

basis for empathy--provided that the analyst overall maintains his mature identity. In complementary identification, reciprocal parts of the analyst are activated, often in accord with the patient's experience of his archaic objects: criticalness and attempts to control the patient, for example, in response to the patient's rebelliousness or submissiveness. Brodey (1965) studied this mode of interaction between two family members, and Shapiro and Zinner (1976; Shapiro, Zinner, Shapiro, & Berkowitz, 1975) have described it as a family function in families of adolescent and borderline patients. They use the term 'delineation' to describe the recipient's induction to accept the projections as the price of family membership. This is suggestive of people's predispositions to use and be recipients of similar projections in groups (Eisold, 1981).

By means of such interpersonal pressure, two aspects of the projective fantasy, according to Ogden, are verified. The recipient indeed has the characteristics of the projected part; and the recipient is being controlled by the projector--though the latter is an external influence and not the fantasied omnipotent control by an inhabiting self-part.

This distinction between and clarification of the intrapsychic and interpersonal elements is an important one. Indeed, it enables us to question an assumption

Ogden makes about their relation. There seems no reason why it is only when there is intrapsychic blurring of self-object boundaries that there is interpersonal pressure on the other to feel and behave in accord with the projective fantasy. Even in the case of projection with minimal self-object blurring, behaving as if the recipient indeed has the projected characteristic may constitute precisely the interpersonal pressure Ogden describes. Furthermore, the same can surely be said of displacement. As far as defensive motivation is concerned, successful projection or projective identification or displacement equally require the recipients to behave accordingly.

However, we certainly have here a third parameter for projection: what the projector interpersonally does to the external object who is, in fantasy, the recipient of the projected part.

The third of Ogden's aspects is that the projected part, after being psychologically processed by the recipient, is reinternalized by the projector. While the reality is that the recipient's feelings are not transplanted from the projector, if the interpersonal pressure is successful and/or the recipient is suitable then the recipient's feelings may be close to those of the projector. Then the feelings may be handled differently from the manner in which the projector has been able to handle them: 'metabolized' (Langs, 1976) or 'contained'

(Bion, 1961), or integrated with other aspects of the personality, mastered through understanding, or sublimated. Thus a new set of feelings and experiences may be available for internalization. This is the aspect of projective identification in groups which Jaques (1955) emphasized. The nature of the reinternalization will depend on the developmental level of the projector, and may range from the primitive to the mature, or involve introjection or identification.

Let me now summarize this discussion of projection and projective identification in terms of four parameters of projective processes. I am not attempting to make a firm distinction between the two terms, but if this were to be done it might proceed by giving criteria for distinguishing them on each of these parameters. For our purposes, the proposal is merely that if one places the individual phenomenon on each of the four parameters then one has given an adequate account of the individual projective phenomenon.

The first parameter is the degree to which the subject experiences connectedness with the projected self-aspect and hence the object of the projection. At one extreme is Jaffe's 'externalization of the ego', where the projector may feel at one with the recipient of the projection. At this extreme, projection comes to mean little more than self-object merger, and it may be

clearest to speak of projection only when some greater degree of distance from the projected part and its recipient is involved. The merged experience may be due to a lack of integration of the remaining self and poor self-object boundaries, as in projective identification as referred to by Meissner and Kernberg. But such self-object merger may be limited in scope. One example is the 'regression in the service of the ego' (Kris, 1952) involved in empathy. Such a delimited projective merger implies a split between a relatively de-differentiated self-and-object realm (i.e. the externalized self) and a well-differentiated self. In the case of empathy the split (and the projection or externalization) may be predominantly adaptive, in the case of the analyst serving the analyzing ego (cf. Sterba, 1934), and in the more general case enriching one's relatedness to one's external world.

At the other extreme the projected part is experienced as completely estranged from the remaining self. Paradigmatically (eg. Freud, 1911/1963d) the experience may be of the external object of the projection threatening the self, and the projector wishing to annihilate the object. Alternatively, the perception of the projected part may be denied by means of 'screen perceptions' (Fenichel, 1939/1954; Greenacre, 1949; Greenson, 1958/1978), which constitutes a kind of psychic annihi-

lation.

At this extreme there is a complete dissociation of the projected part: After the momentary diffusion of the self-object boundary which is implied in projection, the boundary is firmly re-erected. In between is the range of momentary or partial de-differentiations of self and object by virtue of intrapsychic or external pressures. Empathy is an example of this, as is 'altruistic surrender' (A. Freud, 1936/1966), where the projector vicariously experiences the gratifications or frustrations of his projected part in the person of the object. Experiences such as 'there but for the grace of God go I' may also reflect a momentary projective fantasy.

An important aspect of this parameter is that defensive mechanisms other than splitting and projection may be brought to bear to minimize the experience of connectedness with (reinforce the dissociation from) the projected-onto object. Clearly the level of ego functioning of the remaining self has a bearing here. A poorly integrated ego may need to deny perception of the now externally-experienced part. On the other hand, a defensive identification with the aggressor into a more coherent self may operate in concert with the projection of a guilt-imbued part, and hence reinforce the experience of being not the guilty one (A. Freud, 1936/1966). Projection of an intolerable identification system may serve to maintain

the repression of related parts of the self, and the repression in turn ensures there is no feeling of similarity to the object of the projection.

The second parameter is how the person (remaining self) feels about, and what attitude he has towards, the projected part, as an attribute, now, of someone else. Someone who has projected and then denied the attribute may have no conscious feelings about it. Alternatively, or unconsciously, he might fear it, be comforted by it, or be interested in it. In cases such as altruistic surrender, he may feel vicariously gratified or frustrated according to whether the projected-onto object achieves satisfaction with respect to the projected part. In projective identification in Klein's original sense, he may feel he controls the object by means of the projected part.

The third parameter differs from the previous ones in that it refers to the interpersonal rather than the intrapsychic realm: It is what the projector interpersonally does about or to the object of his projection. He might aggress against it or seek out closeness to it, aid it or flee it. Such behavior may be carried out consciously or unconsciously. An important subcategory of such behavior is activity to encourage or coerce the object of the projection to behave so as to confirm and maintain the projection, i.e. as if the intrapsychic projective fantasy

were an objective fact (Ogden, 1978, 1979). This purpose is most likely supporting the projector's initial choice of an object who has already indicated a propensity to behave congruently, on the basis of "perceptual material which betrays unconscious impulses of the same kind in the partner" (Freud, 1922/1955, p. 224; see also A. Freud, 1936/1966, p.130), or, in Fenichel's words, where "reality meets it half way" (1945, p. 433). In addition to the examples described by Ogden (1978), Brodey (1965), Shapiro and Zinner (1976; Shapiro et al., 1975), and Eisold (1981), one might compare Mahler's observations of the toddler's coercion of the mother, especially during the rapprochement subphase, to act as an extension of the child's omnipotent self (Mahler, Pine & Bergman, 1975; Mahler & McDevitt, 1982).

The fourth parameter refers again to an intrapsychic event or state, but differs from the first two in that the process it refers to is not necessarily, though it may be, simultaneous with them. It is what one intrapsychically does with the now externalized part. One might maintain the relationships described on the first two parameters, or deny it, repress it, or otherwise change it. The possibilities are limited by the level of ego functioning, and motivated by the range of possible intrapsychic or external pressures. Removal of repression of related identification systems may facilitate an increased feeling

of similarity to the projected-onto object, and be a precursor to a 're-owning' of the projection; aggression against the object may arouse guilt and feelings of concern. On this parameter belongs the maintenance of affective and cognitive contact with the projected part and with the recipient of the projection, so that the projection, now perhaps integrated with aspects of the recipient, may be reinternalized (Ogden, 1978, 1979). Finally, such a reinternalization, varying according to the developmental level of the projector, is another possibility within this parameter.

Splitting

Freud used the term 'splitting' in, broadly, three senses (cf. Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967/1973). The first referred to the coexistence within the psyche of two groups of phenomena, revealed in alternating states of consciousness in certain hysterical patients or as a consequence of hypnosis (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1974). With his further development of psychoanalysis, Freud came to use the term, still descriptively and quite colloquially rather than as a conceptual tool, to refer to the psychic apparatus being 'split' into the Unconscious and Preconscious-Conscious systems, or the agencies of id, ego and superego (Freud, 1909/1957a, 1914/1957b, 1923/1962). In the New Introductory Lectures, he used the term to

describe the essentially normal ego as comprising at times a part that observes and a part that is observed (Freud, 1933/1965, p. 52). This intrasystemic, rather than inter-systemic, splitting forms a bridge to his third sense: of splitting of the ego.

‘Splitting of the ego’ (Freud, 1927/1963a, 1938/1963e, 1940/1964) refers to the specific phenomenon in which two mental attitudes coexist within the ego without influencing each other, one of which denies reality, while the other takes account of it and draws the correct conclusions. The context in which he discussed this at greatest length was fetishism, in which the denial of the perception of no penis in the female genitals is expressed by the formation of a fetish, the object of which represents the woman’s penis--and yet the individual on the other hand recognizes that females have no penis. Even in the most extreme psychoses, two mental attitudes are to be found: "one, the normal one, which takes account of reality, and another which under the influence of instincts detaches the ego from reality" (1940/1964, p. 202). But this type of splitting, like that Freud refers to in New Introductory Lectures, is not limited to fetishism and psychosis, but rather is "a universal characteristic of neuroses" (1940/1964, p. 204).

Unlike Freud, Klein made splitting a central concept in her work. In the paranoid-schizoid position, the bad

part-object, including by projective identification the infant's hatred and persecutory anxiety, is kept apart from the good part-object, which includes, also by projective identification, the infant's own love and gratitude (1946/1975e). Klein distinguished splitting of objects from splitting of the ego--which underlies states of disintegration--though she did not develop the distinction (eg. 1952/1975g, p. 66, 1957/1975b, p. 191). At any rate, splitting achieves a "dispersal of the destructive impulses and of internal persecutory anxieties" (1957/1975b, p. 191) and thus allows the build-up of the good object as the core of the ego. This process varies in strength, and excessive envy will interfere with the building of a good object and engender a more extreme and pathogenic split between an idealized and an extremely bad object. Even in the paranoid-schizoid position, splitting is not complete, for integrative tendencies, the foundation for the later synthesis of the depressive position, are at work (1952/1975g).

During the depressive position, the infant continues to have recourse to splitting of good and bad. Each step of synthesis of good and bad part-objects tends to lead again to a renewed splitting of the images, but the splitting is carried out on planes which gradually become closer to reality, as whole objects become synthesized and trust in them established. For Klein, splitting shades

into ambivalence as the split inner images come to resemble each other more and more, to be experienced as aspects of a whole object rather than as distinct part-objects; and at the same time the inner object representations come to more accurately resemble the external objects (1935/1975a). At this stage, although earlier methods of splitting continue to some degree, splitting becomes not of part-objects (all-good versus all-bad) but of whole objects: for example, into an uninjured live object and an injured and endangered, perhaps dead or dying, one. Thus splitting becomes largely a defense against depressive rather than persecutory anxiety.

Later forms of splitting, furthermore, do not tend to engender disintegration of the self. Indeed, for Klein repression is a form of splitting: one that predominantly effects a division between conscious and unconscious and thus allows for integration within each. In this context, the extent to which early extreme splitting mechanisms have been overcome, and splitting has become more "porous" (1952/1975g, p. 66), is directly related to later access to the unconscious, rather than a rigid barrier against it (1952/1975g, pp. 86-87).

Thus, for Klein, splitting--a central concept in her account of development--may be of part-objects, of whole objects, and/or of the ego and self. It may serve, in its different forms, as defense against persecutory or depres-

sive anxieties, in the context of psychotic or neurotic difficulties. It shades into ambivalence, and underlies repression--which is a developmentally advanced, delimited form of splitting--and it may at any stage in development be relatively 'porous' or rigid.

Rosenfeld (1965) further developed Klein's distinction between normal and abnormal splitting. Normal splitting is necessary to the infant's differentiation of his loving and destructive impulses, to his differentiation of his body zones and those of his objects, and to such differentiations as internal versus external, meaningful versus irrelevant, and so on. This normal splitting ultimately develops into repression on the one hand, and cognitive discrimination on the other. But if normal splitting, and hence love-hate differentiation, fails, secondary abnormal splitting becomes highly polarized and results in splintering and fragmentation of ego and objects and confusion between them in abnormal projective identification. Such confusional states further reinforce tendencies to split in the search for an unambiguous internal and external environment.

Bion (1967a) further investigated the minute splitting and fragmentation of the paranoid-schizoid position and psychosis, drawing particular attention to the role of part-objects (especially breast and penis) as "linking objects", representing relationships between objects and

between self and object. Thus, primitive splitting and attacks on these objects constitute attacks on the ability for symbol formation: Words are used as things or split off parts of the self. But Bion also maintained a distinction between primitive, minute splitting and the non-psychotic splitting of whole objects along "natural lines of demarcation". He distinguishes this "benign" process from splitting, and refers to it as "dissociation", which presupposes attainment of the depressive position (1967a, p. 69). This notion of dissociation is not, however, central in Bion's writings.

The term 'dissociation' has been used by Glover (1943/1956) to refer specifically to the relatively autonomous functioning of 'ego-nuclei', which may at times occupy the approaches to consciousness and thus modify the conscious apperception of other mental representations. Thus, it is a splitting of the ego which Glover describes. His scheme is in some respects similar to Kernberg's: From precipitates of reactions between the primitive psyche and the objects of its instincts (irrespective of whether the objects are recognized as such) early nuclei form, which attain some degree of inner differentiation before they merge into the more coherent and complicated structures of ego and superego. The ego may develop weakly and/or regress so that early nuclei retain or regain energy and a degree of autonomic functioning.

Glover anticipates Kernberg by emphasizing a topographic aspect of dissociation: that these relatively isolated (from the rest of the ego) elements occupy access to consciousness. Hence, he maintains that dissociation is not merely a by-product of repression, but repression and reaction-formation are both cited as "favoring" dissociation (p. 320). The implication, indeed, is that dissociation as a clinical phenomenon is often a form of return of the repressed. Glover's notion is quite consistent with Freud's earliest sense of splitting (Breuer and Freud, 1895/1974)

Winnicott was not much concerned with the relation between splitting or dissociation--terms which he used interchangeably--and neurotic defense mechanisms. But he too saw dissociation as arising from a primary state of unintegration, owing to integration being incomplete or partial (1945/1975e). Such splitting is of the ego or self, also terms which Winnicott never clearly distinguished. He refers to splitting of objects into good and bad, similarly to Klein (eg. Winnicott, 1950/1975a), but his focus was on splitting of ego states and self-experiences--such as quiet versus excited, asleep versus awake, intellectual activity versus psychosomatic existence, etc.. Thus it is splitting of the ego and hence of its relation to objects, rather than vice versa, which was his emphasis. A major later elaboration was his hypothesis of

the true and false self, in which there develops a basic split between a reality oriented false self based on compliance, and an inner-fantasy oriented non-communicating true self (1960/1965c). This split, and splitting in general, operates on a continuum of greater or lesser degree of dissociation. Access to consciousness is not, for Winnicott, related to the issue of dissociation (see also Khan, 1971/1974d).

A more detailed look at Kernberg's discussion will help us clarify what splitting is and its role in psychic functioning. Kernberg puts a great deal of emphasis on the distinction between splitting and repression. While the distinction is important, I would suggest that his emphasis on it, and hence his restricted definition of splitting, arises from the specific context of his presentation--distinguishing characteristics of borderline and narcissistic disorders from each other and from neurotic and psychotic disorders--and that for our purposes a different perspective, though consistent with Kernberg's, is more useful.

Kernberg defines repression as the rejection of an impulse or its ideational representative, or both (i.e. part or all of an identification system) from the conscious ego (1976, p. 45). The identification system is revealed, if at all, only in derivatives which have been highly distorted by associated defenses (eg. displacement,

isolation) or in those very mechanisms or inhibitions the ego uses to reinforce the repression.

Splitting, however, "consists in dissociating or maintaining apart identification systems with opposite valences (conflicting identification systems) without regard to access to consciousness or to perceptual or motor control. The drive derivative attains full emotional, ideational, and motor consciousness but is completely separated from other segments of the conscious psychic experience" (1976, p. 45). A little further on, though, he states that while splitting is predominant before the self has differentiated within the ego and so involves splitting of the ego, in later splitting--when the self has consolidated as a definite structure--what is typically split is the self and no longer the ego (p. 46). There is an incoherence here: He cannot maintain that the split-off part is both fully separated from other segments of psychic experience and it has full access to perceptual consciousness and motor control, while maintaining also that the ego is not split. Furthermore, if Kernberg is to maintain that the consolidated self is an ego structure, then a split in the self implies a split in the ego. (Kernberg's later elaboration [1982] that the self evolves into a "supraordinate" structure that incorporates certain ego functions, does not resolve this conundrum.)

A few pages earlier, Kernberg himself points to a

resolution of the contradiction in implying that actually a continuum is involved: "In...later stages of development, the integrity of the ego is less interfered with by splitting mechanisms; secondary autonomy is partially maintained even with severe regression and with splitting of the self and the representational world" (p. 38). So more primitive splitting involves a significant threat to ego integrity, while with later development splitting may be confined to a delimited part of the ego, a significant part of which remains intact.

He makes a further important distinction: Splitting, at least at the more primitive end of the continuum, involves a regressive ego-nucleation, and is therefore easily fallen back on by a weak ego. Hence, a vicious circle may set in, in which ego weakness and splitting are mutually reinforcing. In particular, excessive primitive splitting will arrest ego development so that repression is not available to it. Kernberg presents this in terms of the energetic requirements for repression: the synthesis of aggressively-invested and libidinally-invested introjections and identifications modifies the affect components and neutralizes aggression (cf. Hartmann, 1955/1964c; Menninger, 1938), and it is the availability of neutralized aggression which allows the ego to maintain the counter-cathexis of repression. Alternatively, an argument on structural grounds can be made that failure in

ego integration and differentiation implies an inability to maintain identification systems outside of it.

Thus repression presupposes ego development beyond that which splitting presupposes, and it requires an extra effort on the part of the ego which splitting does not. But it does not follow from this that a person whose ego has the capacity for repression would always do so rather than use splitting. Kernberg claims that splitting is a less effective defense in that it necessarily extracts a higher price on the ego's synthetic functions and reality testing. It is beyond the scope of this work to investigate the complex of possible relations between repression and the ego's synthetic function (see Hartmann, 1939/1958, 1950/1964a; Kris, 1950/1975a, 1956/1975b). But while primitive splitting of the ego would clearly be detrimental to the ego's synthesizing capacity, what is repressed is equally unavailable for integration, and a delimited split may leave the ego's synthetic abilities only marginally affected. Furthermore, while a certain level of integration of the personality and of the representational world is crucial to optimal psychological functioning, the synthetic function is by no means an overriding principle for the ego. In particular, a split in the ego may be temporary, as in self-observation, where one part of the ego treats the other as an object (Freud, 1933/1965, p. 52). Sterba (1934) and Kris (1956/1975b, p.

266-267) refer to a split of this kind as a crucial element in insight in psychoanalysis, Kris emphasizing that the synthetic functioning of the ego, which remains intact, here has the role of limiting the regression.

These considerations point to a continuum of dissociation rather than Kernberg's "completely separated", and this continuum is related to that of how much the ego is split. For a considerable intact, autonomous ego will continue to exercise (or restrain itself from exercising) its synthetic function. The synthetic functioning may be exercised in the maintenance of affective and cognitive contact with the split-off part, or in the temporariness of the split and its reintegration. Such a synthesizing umbrella will hold over object- as well as self-representations.

It is important to note that this kind of developmentally advanced splitting is not splitting the all-good from the all-bad. The affective components of the identification systems will have been modified and toned down. It is also important that it remains the case that splitting is intrinsically anti-synthetic or, better, disintegrative. The point is that at one end of a continuum splits may (i) only marginally affect the synthetic ego function, and (ii) be only conditionally and partially split from the ego and self, which may maintain some contact with the split system and be able to 'retrieve'

and reintegrate it.

With respect to reality testing, a detailed investigation is equally beyond the scope of this work. But it is sufficient for our purposes to note that the predominant social norms are an important aspect (Frosch, 1964; Kernberg, 1977). That is, reality testing is a question not merely of internalized object relations, but of the relation between internalized object relations and the relation between external objects and between external objects and the self. Therefore, it may well occur that the projection of a split off part onto a suitable recipient may resolve the potential conflict between the ego's defensive and reality testing functions (Hartmann, 1950/1964a, 1951/1964d).

I will now clarify the senses in which I will be using the some of the terms we have reviewed. I think it is most useful to use 'dissociation' in its ordinary language sense. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, to dissociate means "to cut off from association or society; to sever, disunite". In the context of this work a dissociation will refer to the state of a representation, or organization of representations, as lacking association with another organization of representations, most often the ego and/or self. Thus, we can speak of a greater or lesser degree of dissociation.

In this sense, dissociation is not a specific defense

mechanism but is implicit in any defense mechanism. In particular, it is a process or state common to both repression and splitting. This is in accord with Kernberg's own reference to repression as involving identification systems being "dissociated from the ego core" (1976, p. 41), and splitting as "dissociating... identification systems" (p. 44). It also accords with his describing "split-up ego states, [persisting] dangerously close to consciousness" (p. 50), which clearly describes splitting (I would prefer 'dissociating') and repression, albeit a tenuous repression. Also by this use of the term, the degree of dissociation in projection is intimately connected with the degree of connectedness experienced with the projected part.

Though others have used it differently, this use of 'dissociation' fits well with Freud's use of "association", and also with Glover's (1943/1956) use of the term. The term points us to the question, given dissociation, what else?

The content of the term 'splitting' is little more than that of the ordinary language word 'dissociation'. It refers to the specific defense mechanism in which the dissociation is actively maintained because of some conflict, and the dissociated part retains access to consciousness and motility. But differently from Kernberg, I will take 'splitting' as referring to a range

of degree of dissociation; "complete separation" may not characterize it. For example, a part may be split off from the self, but affective and cognitive contact is still maintained, or the continuing command over the split-off part by the ego's synthetic functioning may become immediately apparent in its rapid reintegration into the self.

Splitting refers to the active maintenance of the dissociation, motivated by conflict; the term we will use when the dissociation is not actively maintained is 'unintegration', and in this we will be following Winnicott (1945/1975e). There may be dissociation which is not actively motivated by conflict either because there has not previously been the capacity and/or the motivation for greater integration--in which case regression is not a factor--or because there is regression but it is nonconflictually in the service of the ego (eg. empathy). Of course, where there was no conflict, conflict may arise, and an area of unintegration may become a split.

Once again, we have arrived at a point when the lack of criteria for conflict would become a major impairment to more adequate criteria for the application of our terms, specifically when distinctions are made on the basis of different motivations for what otherwise may look quite similar processes. It befits us, then, to give as complete a motivational account as possible for those

processes that we ascribe to group members.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FORMATIVE STAGES OF THE GROUP

In his unpublished dissertation, Kenneth Eisold (1981) has made a significant contribution to an understanding of the regression in groups, and the mechanisms used to brake the regression, in terms of object relations theory. As my own account of this stage in group life is to a great degree indebted to his, I will present his account in some detail before turning to some considerations I would add to his and thence to the mode 2 fantasy of the 'group'.

Joining the Group

According to Eisold, the "paradox" of the group--that it is (in what I term its 'group' aspect) an object which exists and acts on its own and which members must establish some relation to, and yet it is also nothing more than the aggregate of members and what each one wants to make of it--rests on a split in the ego of each member.

The ego retains its perceptual abilities, its conscious memory and self image, and its rational thought processes. But at the same time the task of adaptation evokes the image of a group entity, as a useful fiction to synthesize the separate, unknown group members. This "regressive-adaptive process" (cf. 'regression in the service of the ego', Kris, 1952) calls upon the early maternal object that first loosely linked the separate mother-parts together within one boundary. As soon as this 'group' is produced, the member's ego is functioning at two disparate levels. This split may be verbally expressed by, for example, members speaking of their hopes to fulfil personal goals and of their hopes to become good group members, without consciousness of the conflict between the two; or by expressing the wish to learn about group membership, while implying they have no role in determining the nature of that membership.

The task of adaptation to the group provokes a split between, broadly, the self as individual and the self as 'group' member. The self as individual is well bounded and separate from others--though often interacting with others, as presently in the group--with consciousness of itself as continuous with its past, and an image of itself which is entwined with its self esteem. The self as 'group' member, on the other hand, is in the 'group' and not separate from it: to be precise, as tenuously sepa-

rate from the 'group' as the infant is from his mother when the mother is experienced as loosely linked part-images--before, that is, the culmination of Kernberg's third stage of development.

A collective fantasy of the 'group' emerges as members give expression to their feelings and perceptions of the entity each is attempting to join, and attempts are made to integrate them with those of other members. With further articulation the collective fantasy becomes a confirmed, consensual reality in which all the members are operating. As group life continues they face the need, largely unconsciously, to make collective agreements about the 'group', its purpose and its boundaries, each attempting to make of it something comfortable for them. One of the earliest such agreements, for example, is whether the consultant is to be seen as within or outside its boundary; another is whether there is any hostility in the 'group' or whether, rather, all hostility is outside its boundary and a threat to it.

Turning to account for members' anxiety in the group, Eisold notes that at the beginning there is anxiety simply due to the task of adapting to a new, unknown situation and set of demands. This anxiety varies considerably from person to person, depending on their previous group experiences and current expectations. But once the adaptive-regressive process sets in as the 'group' fantasy emerges,

members face a far deeper source of anxiety. In the terms I am using, the initial split brings to the forefront of functioning a representation of an object loosely linking together constituent parts, and this in turn also activates related identification systems, specifically those linked to the loosely organized maternal object. Amongst these are representations which are relatively unintegrated into the subjective self; in which self and object components may be relatively undifferentiated, the object representations variously localized, and the affective components relatively unmodified or toned down. Thus members experience the emergence of impulses and self and object representations in disconnected and disorganized ways. For example, the persecutory anxiety and violently destructive impulses originally felt toward a shadowy, vague and unreliable maternal object is now threatening to emerge in relation to the 'group'. A self representation of desperate weakness and vulnerability is intolerable for the individual, and may be for the other members as well (who are all attempting to make of the 'group' something comfortable, and so make of each member a person who appreciates and contributes to its comfort). As each member faces the same task of adaptation, there is often an 'echo' (Slater, 1966) from other members, and 'emotional contagion' (Freud, 1921/1959) comes to characterize the group, so that repression or containment of

these feelings and representations is undermined. Members experience the anxiety of "chaotic disintegration of accustomed, mature self and object representations" (Eisold, 1981, p. 89); and varying amounts of encouragement or hostility to the emergent feelings and fantasies from other members further add to the individuals' confusion, depersonalization and anxiety.

It is a characteristic of the small, relatively unstructured groups which are the focus of this work and Eisold's, that there is maximal scope for play of the 'group': It comes to the forefront of group functioning, and the activation of 'group'-devoted parts of the members is facilitated. To the extent that this is not the case in other groups of which individuals are members, it is due to the defensive value of organization. Organization (a 'work-group' function in Bion's scheme) functions to sustain members' contact with a well bounded reality separate from the individual. It does this, to the extent that it is successful, by keeping an unambiguous work task, and the outside world that requires that the work be done, clearly in focus; and by maintaining differentiated work roles for each member. Secondary process, differentiated and differentiating ego functioning must be predominant for the individual if he is to be a successful member.

In fact, no task group can completely maintain this

level of rational differentiated functioning. Members are invariably to some degree pulled in to constructing a 'group' entity with which they can make contact and feel a sense of belonging, in contrast to the isolation engendered by the hypothetical completely rational and differentiated group. In this light, organization can be seen to be maintaining a compromise between the regressive, 'group'-oriented split and rational work-oriented functioning, such that the former is kept subordinate to the latter. This defense of organization is even in the best of circumstances difficult to maintain (eg. Jaques, 1955; Menzies, 1967/1975), and in self-study groups particularly so. The task and its relation to the outside world is difficult to maintain clearly in view, and there is no obvious differentiation of roles which would facilitate the task. Therefore, as Bion described, attempts to develop and maintain organization are rapidly subordinated to the need to make a comfortable-enough 'group' with which to make contact. And this, as we have seen, draws on quite different aspects of the individuals from those which engender rational, differentiated functioning.

Eisold goes on to show how, given the failure of attempts to use rational organization to defend against individuals' chaotic experience of intolerable affects and self- and object-representations, the group falls back on a projective structuring of itself in the attempt to brake

the regression. Members aim to relieve their anxiety by projecting the most unacceptable of the emerging representations, seeking out suitable recipients in the group. 'Suitable' here means group members who are relatively comfortable behaving in accord with the projective fantasy, or at least who may be relatively easily coerced into doing so. And when several members select one as object of similar projective fantasies, the aggregate of subtle unconscious coercive pressures on that individual can be very powerful indeed.

Another aspect of projective structuring is that members who function as recipients of projections often have restored to them a familiar way of being used by others. The role they are induced to take on may be relatively comfortable for them, either because it is in itself relatively concordant with their self concept or because they have relatively stable and accustomed defenses against its anxieties.

These processes of seeking out recipients for and accepting projections are a major part of the largely unconscious negotiation of a comfortable-enough 'group'. When successful, the extremely anxiety-arousing split which each member has brought about is healed. Each member has projected the most threatening emergent affects and self representations; and in turn members have accepted others' projections which they find at least

acceptable to their self concept and so need no longer dissociate. The struggle between the self as individual, continuous with his history and experiences of himself outside the group, and the self as 'group' member, is resolved. The basic assumptions of Bion are, indeed, constituted from such relatively stable projective structurings. However, there is a cost to members: They are now restricted in their functioning by the role each is permitted to serve on behalf of the 'group'--that is, on behalf of others' defensive needs.

Eisold goes on to point out that this projective structuring of the group in turn proves inadequate to its defensive needs. Not only does the restriction in functioning it imposes become increasingly uncomfortable to many members, but the consultant does not collude in accepting or reinforcing the projections, but rather insists on interpreting the defense and uncovering the fantasies and the anxieties that underlie it. The group then has a third level of defense on which it may fall back, of denial: blotting out the portion of reality that threatens to arouse instinctual pressure or conflict (Freud, 1924/1963b, 1924/1963c; A.Freud. 1936/1966).

Denial may be used with respect to 'objective' reality, or with respect to identification systems which have been projected onto reality: that is, to further dissociate the projected parts, ensuring they are no

threat to the self as they are not there at all. In any case, denial implies relatively neutral substitute memories or perceptions--'screens' (Fenichel, 1939/1954, 1945; Greenacre, 1949; Greenson, 1958/1978)--and this implies once again a dissociation of the ego: between the conscious observing part, including the self concept, which is convinced by the screen; and the part which provides the screen, unconsciously guards against the reemergence of the denied aspects, and forges the necessary compromises between its memories or perceptions of reality and its wish to obliterate it. Let me add here that to deny a projected identification system implies rendering it--while the denial is maintained--even less available for reintegration into the subjective self. This point will be important in considering development in groups.

Eisold describes two forms which the use of denial can take in groups. In the first, when in moments of extreme anxiety the group wishes to deny the very existence of the 'group'--the entity they have been struggling to find a comfortable way of maintaining contact with--members may collectively take flight from the group to personal reminiscences and fantasies, which function as a screen, blotting out experience of the 'group'. Thus group members do in fact bring about a fragmentation of the 'group', which is, for as long as the personal isola-

tion which it engenders can be maintained, actually no longer there. (Incidentally, this could be said to correspond to a paranoid-schizoid response of and to the 'group': Members have indeed fled, and hence destroyed, the 'group', though they remain physically in the room.)

In the second form of denial, not only is the turning to a screen reality a collective and mutually reinforcing manoeuvre on the part of all members, but the very screen reality to which they turn is a collective and mutually reinforcing one. The group may, for example, use as a screen a perception of itself as a collection of pairs, and in this way deny the 'group' (cf. Kernberg, 1980).

At this point Eisold turns to the concept of role identity, and hypothesizes and develops the notion of an 'archaic role definition': the most basic sense of himself in a group to which members, driven by anxiety, can regress, deriving from the child's earliest successful defensive configuration in his family. We will now go back over his account of the early stages of group life, adding to and refining some aspects.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the person who enters the first session of the group has a multiplicity of identification systems with varying degrees of integratedness with each other, of differentiation of self and object components, and of localization of object representations. The self concept constitutes an integrated

cluster of these; but not all parts are equally integrated. There is no clear line dividing what belongs to the self concept from what does not, and the dominant subjective self can shift over time. The self-concept is on the whole available to consciousness, but even apart from any elements of it which are for psychodynamic reasons unconscious it is too vast and complex to be ever completely maintained in consciousness at any one time.

The emergence into consciousness of a representation which is greatly inconsistent with the self-concept is acutely anxiety arousing. But a certain level of inconsistency is tolerable, maintained by a mild splitting. On a phenomenological level this often involves never bringing to the forefront of consciousness two inconsistent notions about oneself, and arranging one's life that one never need do so. (As the degree of conflict which underlies this increases, this 'arranging one's life' aspect would present more and more as an inhibition.) The ego's synthetic function is not then, as it were, ever overly upset by this. In the terms of the previous chapter, it is more an unintegration than a split; though because conflict can arise where none was apparent before, this may be indistinguishable from what we might call an 'incipient split'. To use a geological metaphor, it is a fault, not a chasm, and many faults in the absence of other geological pressures can lie dormant indefinitely.

But, as Schafer noted, "critical situations will indicate the degree to which identifications have been integrated" (1968, p. 18). An unstructured group is just such a critical situation.

That is to say, the need to adapt to the group--to make sense of a cognitively and emotionally complex situation by making of it a unitary entity with which one can make emotional contact and which one can begin to cognitively grasp--necessarily brings an incipient split to the forefront of the individual's functioning. This then develops into a far more problematic split: that between the 'self as separate' and the 'self as part of a larger object'.

From time to time in what follows we shall be using expressions such as the above, similarly to Eisold and Bion (1961): 'individual self', 'individuated self', 'well-differentiated self', etc., versus "'group' self", 'self as part of a larger object', and so on. In this we will be referring to different sets of identification systems, i.e. different sets of self representations which are associated with, and imply or are implied by, different kinds of object representations. In the case of the 'individual self', self and object representations are well differentiated and object representations are relatively clearly and consistently localized. In the case of the 'self as part of a larger object', one or both of

these characteristics do not hold. In particular, representations associated with the 'group' self include identifications in which merger with the object is a prominent part (i.e. the self-as-agent and 'group' are not differentiated), and primary process presences with indeterminate or shifting localization (i.e. the self-as-agent is differentiated from the 'group', but the 'group' is experienced as neither clearly inside nor clearly outside the subjective self).

I would maintain that the averagely expectable self concept includes both of these kinds of self representations. I assume that it is not contentious to claim that in all relatively normal people, and in all non-psychotic people to some degree, central to the self concept are identification systems in which self and object components are well differentiated. But neither should it be contentious to say that also central to the self concept are identification systems in which one is not altogether separate from the object. These are systems which are typically most active with respect to one's family, close friends, and in religious, patriotic and some artistic experiences (Fuller, 1980; Kernberg, 1980; Rizzuto, 1979; Winnicott, 1967/1971a). The tension between these two kinds of representations is one which is familiar to psychoanalysts, but tends to be a prominent issue only in the treatment of borderline patients.

Kernberg uses the expression "activation" to refer to the emergence of primitive identification systems in unstructured groups (1980, p. 217), which raises the question of the sense in which they have previously been 'inactive'. That at least some of them are active, but less obviously and disturbingly so, in many other situations has been widely discussed (see, eg., Fuller, 1980; Jaques, 1955; Menzies, 1967/1975; Rizzuto, 1979; Winnicott, 1967/1971a) and many of these situations and activities (work, religion, cultural and artistic experiences) are central to the self concept of the vast majority of people. Bion (1961) is explicit in claiming that unstructured groups are merely the best occasions to observe basic assumption functioning, just as the psychoanalytic situation is the best one in which to observe transference manifestations. Kernberg (1980) wonders if it is only the organization of the groups to which individuals belong, and the socially determined role aspects of their dyadic and triadic relations, which keep in check the regressive potentials which emerge in unstructured groups.

My claim is that a fissure, a 'demarcation' (Bion, 1967a) in the normal self concept, is greatly emphasized in unstructured groups because the self as part of a larger object is so strongly activated. Under normal conditions there is not such a need to integrate the self as part of a larger object with the individuated self.

The problem is normally covered over by the adequacy of autonomic social-convention functioning, and by the degree of organization in all the other groups of which the individual is member (including the family, though here projective structuring often also plays a large role in the individual's relative comfort).

It is only when this unintegration is brought to the fore in the group situation that the need to integrate the two parts becomes urgent, and the person must encounter the great difficulties of this task. Indeed, people don't succeed, in coming into an unstructured group, in increasingly integrating the two parts. Rather, first, the anxiety of encountering the problem results in a defensive widening of the demarcation: an active splitting. Secondly, the coming to the forefront of functioning of the self as part of a larger object (even if it is split off as it emerges) brings with it some really troubling representations. These archaic representations were previously repressed, but what leads to their emergence now is not only the weakness of repression in the group (which should be distinguished from this process, and seen as as much a consequence as cause of it) but the strong need for an activated self as part of a larger object.

One implication of this view is a reformulation of Eisold's account of the initial split on joining the group. The initial split is a split in the self concept--

which is not, then, completely retained in the individual self. What is retained by the individual self is secondary process functioning, which rests on self-object differentiation; higher order defenses such as repression, which rest on a well-bounded ego; and the sense of oneself as a separate individual, including one's self esteem about differentiated functioning. The constituents of the self as part of a larger object will be explored as we go on.

The initial split quickly, as Eisold described, becomes increasingly disturbing as the emergence of primitive self- and object-representations threatens to extend the split to fragmentation of the mature, well-bounded 'individual' self. The danger arises from representations associated with the self as member of a larger object (ultimately the mother) which are markedly inconsistent with the mature self concept, and which as they increasingly threaten to emerge into consciousness must be in some way dissociated.

There are intrapsychic and interpersonal aspects to this process. Among the former is the fear that the self as part of a larger object will dominate the subjective self: that the regression per se will get out of hand. Also implicated in this is the wish--as well as the fear of the wish--to be part of the larger object, which has been activated by, sort of insidiously provoked by, the

patently innocuous need to cognitively master the group situation and to develop an affective and attitudinal stance to this complex situation. This aspect of the threat is a threat to the sense of boundedness and separateness of the mature subjective self.

Another intrapsychic aspect is that the activation of archaic representations involves also the activation of primitive affects. Apart from anxiety, these include extreme hatred of the situation. But with no clear object of the hatred or cause of the fear, there is a sense of persecution in search of, as it were, a persecuting object or objects. Extremely negative self and object representations threaten to emerge into consciousness and overwhelm the mature sense of self which rests on relatively affectively fused, predominantly positive, representations of self and object. In so far as these representations require further splitting, they threaten increasing fragmentation of the self.

Among the interpersonal aspects is the 'echo' Slater (1966) described. Talking and acting on the basis of the group as an undifferentiated mass results in an echo of agreement and reinforcement from other members. Talking and acting on the basis of one's mature sense of oneself as individual receives no such encouragement and most likely conflicts with others' necessarily fantastic (because based on minimal data) sense of what the person

is. Thus not only does the echo in itself evoke poorly differentiated representations, but the response to one's expression of an individuated self is disturbingly 'off'. Others don't seem to perceive one as one feels one is, and this further undermines one's sense of mature identity.

This is compounded by the negotiation for recipients of projections of the emergent representations and affects which are least acceptable to members' self concepts. Projection becomes increasingly the mechanism members fall back on to preserve their individuated self from fragmentation, i.e. by ridding themselves of the emergent parts which are least integratable into their mature self. So members search each other for suitable recipients for their projections: someone or several people who will best and most easily confirm the validity of their projective fantasy. Thus, 'suitable' particularly includes--as per Freud (1922/1955), A. Freud (1936/1966) and Fenichel (1945)--those who betray unconscious characteristics of the kind the projector wishes to see in the recipient rather than himself, and so who can most easily be induced to manifest those characteristics. These characteristics are then selectively responded to by others, and this can further undermine mature identity.

These processes undermine individuals' higher order defenses based on repression, as members selectively respond to each others' manifestations of representations

and affects which they often would rather maintain unconscious. As this occurs a vicious circle sets in: The weakening of repression further allows associated identification systems to emerge into consciousness, and the consequent fragmentation of the ego further threatens the repressive barrier. While early attempts at organization and shifting projective fantasies may momentarily ameliorate the situation, members may acutely experience being pulled and pushed and chaotically battered by powerful affects and anxieties. These feelings, in addition to losing one's sense of one's mature individuated self, contribute to the threat of being pulled in by the group, enveloped by it, of disintegrating into it. When other defenses offer insufficient relief, members may respond by intensified splitting, attempting to maintain the integrity of a differentiated self by strongly dissociating a 'group' self. This may account for experiences of depersonalization (Arlow, 1964; Hunter, 1966) accompanied by an unconscious defensive fantasy of the order of "this terrible experience is not really being experienced by me, but by a 'group-person'. I am an individual, not a 'group-person'; therefore I need not worry" (cf. Bradlow, 1973).

In the group, members have in common an attractive venue for particular defenses. Projection is already facilitated simply by the presence of a number of poten-

tial recipients. The group is also an easy forum for splitting internal objects and displacing parts of them onto different external objects. Cooperation in the group is often obtainable for consensual validation of these fantasies. By contrast, only under special conditions is consensual validation so easily forthcoming for the kind of primitive splitting Kernberg describes, in which markedly different feelings and attitudes are held towards the same external object. In general, such shifts are experienced by other members as undermining whatever stability--including stability in projective structuring--they have managed to achieve.

In focusing on the more primitive aspects of group life, we should not pass over the more 'normal' defenses. The group is also a very favorable forum for displacement, and this tends to be neglected. Scapegoating, for example, is very often understood as a form of projection (eg. Slater, 1966). Notwithstanding the difficulty in distinguishing projection from displacement in the group, this is almost certainly an incomplete account. Given the prominence of the consultant, and the inevitability of angry disappointment with him, it is nearly certain that scapegoats are not only victims of projection but of displacement from the consultant as well. To the degree that displacement is being engaged in, this too, as I argued in the previous chapter, may involve, like projec-

tion, a seeking out of suitable recipients and inducing them to behave accordingly--whether the recipient wishes to have those characteristics or not. So its undermining effect on members' sense of their selves and on their use of repressive defenses may be very similar.

But this is not to say that defenses based on repression do not take place. They are weakened: intrapsychically by the emergence of splitting; and externally by other members focusing on manifestations of characteristics they wish to project or displace, and by the easy forum the group provides for more archaic defenses. But that is not to say that they do not operate. Indeed, repression of some representations may be consensually validated and so reinforced when what is repressed is what other members do not want to see for their own reasons. Such a shoring up of repressive defenses is part of the motivation for seeking to negotiate one kind of projective structuring of the group rather than another.

Before we turn to projective structuring and the 'group', I would like to add a few comments to Eisold's account of denial in the group. Eisold describes it in the context of the failure of organization and projective structuring to allay members' anxiety. He presents denial as a third level of defense, though he notes that in reality the levels overlap. I would give denial a somewhat larger role in the group, adding to Eisold's descrip-

tion of it as a group defense--enabling joint and unanimous emotional detachment from the 'group'--that denial may also be an individual defense and not just a collective one, and is observable in differences in the degree of individuals' detachment from group life. There are individual differences in members' abilities and needs to maintain denial of the 'group', though in any case to do so for long is difficult. It involves both the ability to tolerate loneliness and isolation, and the ability to make of oneself a suitable recipient for projections which do not undermine the denial or overly threaten the 'screen' one is maintaining.

An individual may, for example, wish to deny the 'group' entity, using personal reminiscences and fantasies as a screen. Such a denial of any experience of the group other than being in the presence of an aggregate of people in a room may actually make of that individual a suitable recipient of projections, for his denial of the 'group' may be experienced by others, not inaccurately, as an attack on the 'group'. Such a denial, then, does not preclude the individual being used by the group in projective structuring, and for that reason may be very difficult to maintain. In this example, it would involve maintaining the denial of an entity while others are accusing you of attacking it. To maintain it for long also requires tolerating a loneliness and isolation which

is difficult even for those with the richest resources of personal reminiscences and fantasies. Denial of limited aspects of the 'group' may be more sustainable, but in general the group's propensity to make of its members recipients of projections--its propensity to use members in the construction of a 'group' culture whether they wish to be so used or not--constantly presents members with the fact of the 'group' and of their having a role in it, and thus constantly undermines its denial by any individual.

Two particular aspects of individuals' denial of the 'group' can be indicated. The first is its involving a clinging to higher order defenses which reinforce the individual self, such as isolation and intellectualization. Thus one may seek to deny the 'group' to make contact with by intensely focusing on a screen group to observe and make comments on--by a 'flight to mode 4', one might say. It is this, though, which in particular results in the loneliness and feeling of isolation which Bion emphasizes as the result of clinging to rational differentiated functioning, while all the processes of others' involvement and projections described above put further pressure on maintaining such detachment.

Secondly, the personal reminiscences and fantasies the individual turns to may embody membership of an alternative 'group' in which the person is comfortable. This may be involved in the collective defense when the group

as a whole turns away and takes flight from the 'group'; when there are, as it were, as many 'groups' in the room as individuals. But there is no reason to assume that this too is not possible, to varying degrees, for individuals. It embodies an attempt to contradict Bion's statement that one must make contact with the group, by insisting on making contact with a screen 'group' rather than the 'group' in the room.

Projective Structuring and the 'Group'

Until now, we have been describing the earliest stages of the group, before any relatively stable, and stabilizing, projective structuring has been found, and before a 'group' which is comfortable enough even for a few minutes has been negotiated. The group has been in flux, and the 'group' as yet ill-formed and also in flux. One might make an analogy to the analysand who presents fleeting transference manifestations which have not yet crystallized into a relatively stable transference neurosis; and this analogy is also instructive in its pointing to the fact that no firm line can be drawn between the two states, and that in different cases relative stability is reached more or less quickly.

For the group, an easy presentation of suitable recipients for projections will facilitate projective structuring, and stabilize the regression. The particular

roles that need to be relatively easily inducible to facilitate the development of the basic assumptions will emerge in the next chapter. At this point it is worth noting--with Bion, Slater and Eisold--that the consultant, being already relatively easily differentiable from the rest of the group, becomes a particular focus. Whether he colludes with the group's defensive fantasies or not, and how he does so, will greatly affect the ease and the kind of those fantasies. Also, the environment outside the group can become a container of projections (or object of displacement) and have a considerable effect on what is experienced as remaining to be handled within the group.

But the earliest situation in the group is a disorganized one. There is no stable 'group' with which the members are in a relation. A representation, or collection of representations, of the self as part of a larger object, is activated, and the results are dire. In particular, members feel their sense of themselves as individuals to be becoming disorganized and dis-integrating; the threat of being pulled into and enveloped by the group is acutely felt.

Projective structuring is simultaneously directed towards resolving problems of mode 2 and mode 3 relations. From the perspective of the individual self, threatening elements (both self- and object-representations) are 'placed elsewhere', such that a comfortable, even invigo-

rating, internal relation between the individual self and the self-as-part-of-`group` is possible. This internal relation, which Eisold describes as the split being healed, is indeed one of integration--individual and `group` selves do not need to be dissociated from each other--though it rests on other parts being projected, and the integration proves to be a tentative one because difficulties reemerge.

As a simple example of projective structuring's action in both modes 2 and 3, we might have this situation. Member W feels, and can say to himself, "There is P, an individual who is rather angry with the situation, while I am not, and neither are X, Y and Z; we enjoy, feel vital, in our common connectedness, even including our connectedness with P, who we will help. Indeed, one of the great things about this group [`group`] is we can contain and allow for the likes of P, poor soul". P, meanwhile, may be feeling, and saying to himself, "I see, I understand, the meanness, the refusal to do his job, of the consultant, and I will confront him with that, shame him into changing that; W, X, Y and Z--well, they don't feel that way--they don't have the strength and clarity of vision to see it, but I will put forward the interests of all of us--look after them, in a way. I'm used to that, it's my role often, and I'm sure they appreciate it. It's one of the things I like about this group [`group`] that

we can contain all sorts, the strong and the weak". Thus, this kind of collection of monologues, by and about differentiated individuated selves, expresses a certain defensive structuring in mode 3, while at the same time it implies a common mode 2 fantasy of a 'group' in which all are, for the moment, comfortable.

The negotiating of a defensive structuring of the group involves also the negotiating of a 'group'. As members, threatened by the morass that the group has become, defensively structure themselves so as to be rid of what most threatens their subjective self and to have consensual validation for a vision of themselves which is acceptable, they at the same time construct an object, the 'group', of which they are a part, such that they are comfortable being a part of it.

Eisold focuses on the dynamics of projective (or projective and displacing) structuring in its mode 3 aspects, and the mode 2 aspects, though ever-present, drop out of his view. In the above very simple (and benign) example, one can see already that such an investigation can tell us a great deal about the individuals involved: about their personality patterns and difficulties, and about the relation between their individual development and the roles in which they find themselves in groups. Here we focus more closely on the mode 2 fantasy, and the mode 3 aspects of the defensive structuring of the group

will not be attended to in detail. What will be attended to is the relationship between certain mode 2 fantasies which are very frequently observed--the basic assumptions --and the kind of mode 3 fantasies, and the scope for change and development in mode 3 fantasies, which are implied.

At this point we can summarize what we can already say about the 'group' in terms of some general statements, which will serve as a frame for the next chapter. There, where we will look at the particular structures of the basic assumptions, the general statements will be given more specific demonstration.

According to this account the potential for mode 2 group functioning is always present in each individual, and indeed it is very likely operating--though less prominently and less problematically--in other areas of the individual's relations. At any rate, it is strongly activated by the need to make cognitive and emotional sense of the group situation. The groundwork is provided by two factors which together give the experience of the group a formless quality. Firstly, the potential organizing functions of mode 4 are enormously hindered by the lack of guidelines by which to define or information with which to allocate appropriate differentiated roles. Secondly, the difficulties in mode 3 relating, much as Slater described them, prevent the application of the sets

of accustomed transferential relationships with which each individual is already equipped. These two factors contribute to a process in which the first attempts to relate to the collectivity fail: representations of the self as part of a larger object are brought to bear but this only provokes a regression in which the fear of merger, mode 1 functioning, becomes a major element. It is specifically in response to this regression, and this fear of mode 1, that the 'group' fantasy is negotiated. The 'group' is a common fantasy object of which the individuals can be a part, at the same time as having enough of a sense of themselves as individuals to keep the merger of mode 1 in abeyance.

There is nothing mystical about this notion of the 'group', or of the 'group's' power. Any statements which imply the 'group' to be an agent are reducible to terms of individuals' representations and their motivational power. The strength of the 'group' lies in the strong motivation that members have in constructing a comfortable 'group', so that if anyone implies the wrong thing about it then the interpersonal pressure on that person will be considerable.

The 'group' takes the place of the morass of the group which members were failing to comfortably be a part of. The 'group' mediates the individuals' connection to the members as a whole. Members relate to the aggregate,

to the group, through their relationship to the 'group'. As Bion noted, the task of developing a relationship to the group proves extremely difficult; so the group drops out of consideration, and is replaced by the 'group'. Indeed, it is only in our capacity as observers that we can make the distinction between the individual as part of the 'group' and the individual as part of the group; for the participant there is no such distinction.

Given a comfortable enough 'group', members are comfortable with, and not needing to dissociate, a part of their self in a state approximating merger with corresponding aspects of the other members. What is crucial is that this is a delimited state of merger which does not envelop or threaten to envelop their whole subjective self. A part of their self is given over to the 'group'; the rest of their self is relatively well bounded, and relatively comfortable with the situation. The boundary between these parts may be, of course, in constant flux, with the individual at one moment threatened with too great a sense of merger and loss of self into the 'group', and at another suffering feelings of isolation and impoverishment as he dissociates himself from the 'group'. The extremely disturbing experiences encountered in trying to develop a relation to the group are not completely banished once a 'group' is formed. But while a successful 'group' persists, these oscillations are kept within

tolerable bounds.

Members are not completely lost in the 'group', isolation and detachment from it is at least an option--even if an unpleasant one--and the 'group' is often spoken of in the group as an object distinct from the individual speaker. These factors suggest that the 'group' should be seen as, for each individual, an object representation. As such, it is, as much as other individuals in the group, a recipient of projections or displacements--indeed it is constructed of nothing else. But if the structuring is successful, then the degree of connectedness experienced with respect to the 'group' object is great--which is not necessarily so of the recipients of other projections at the time. No very great degree of dissociation can be achieved by projecting onto the 'group' object. Projection onto the 'group' must be near the 'externalization of the ego' pole of Jaffe's (1968) continuum--i.e. projective identification. This implies that the nature of the 'group' object, in a stably comfortable situation, must be such that closely associated representations which may at any time become conscious are comfortable and not threatening to the individual self, and so not needing to be split off. For this to be the case, any such threatening associated representations must be already dissociated and stably placed onto recipients which (or whom) must be outside the 'group'

boundaries.

We can also reiterate that this 'group' bears some close relation to an early maternal object. This was not only widely observed by the writers reviewed in chapter 1, but is further supported here by the similarity of the task facing members in the group to the task of constructing an early maternal representation. Specifically, there is a need to construct out of parts an entity to which one can relate, and which will provide a comfortable-enough environment in which to function. In doing this, members have, on the one hand, far more resources than they had as infants, but on the other hand there are now all the other members with whom the 'group' must be negotiated.

I will try to say as much as we can about the 'group's' status as object representation. There clearly are aspects in which merger with the 'group' is experienced, yet this is, if the 'group' is successful, securely delimited in its extent. Hence, the 'group' is predominantly represented outside of the self-as-agent. But it is certainly not experienced as pertaining to an object which is clearly outside the subjective self: the individual feels a part of it, and feels it to some degree to be influencing him from within and not merely through interpersonal mechanisms. In general the experience of connectedness with it is great, and members' connectedness to the 'group' becomes a part of their sense of their self in

the group. Yet it is not experienced as an object only existing within the self-as-place: the 'group' is experienced not as pertaining only to the individual, but to "all of us". It seems to be localized both inside and outside the self-as-place, experienced sometimes as more inside, and sometimes as more outside.

The implication is that the 'group' is experienced as a primary process presence. This is further supported by a most peculiar status of the reflective self representation with respect to the 'group'. If members choose to transform their representation of the 'group', then the 'group's' transformation necessarily follows. This is fitting, and not in itself a regression, because the 'group' is no more than a negotiated idea, albeit an influential one. But this appropriate inapplicability of the reflective self representation only pertains to the individual who is 'in tune' with the other members; if only one individual transforms his idea of the 'group' and gives expression to it, he is likely to quickly realize that his idea of the 'group' was only an idea, and not true of the 'group' at all. The reflective self representation is experienced only if a member expresses something contrary to the 'group' culture, and thus places himself--at least momentarily--outside its membership.

These considerations suggest, I think, that while the individual is a good member of a successful 'group', the

'group' must function as a primary process presence--mostly distinct from the self-as-agent yet within his subjective self--either unlocalized or with a shifting index of localization. As has been noted by others (Eisold, 1981; Gibbard et al., 1974, pp. 83-93; James, 1982, 1984), in some respects at least it resembles a transitional object; yet it is one that is jointly negotiated. We will return to this observation in chapter 5, when we can add to it the next chapter's observations on the basic assumptions and development.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter we will look at the members' relations to the 'group' entity, and explore their import for individual development in the group. I will first consider each of the basic assumption 'group' fantasies, and extrapolate what we can about the nature of the 'group' and how it is functioning to preserve members' senses of themselves. Initially, I will consider them as if the group structurings were stable and successful, and were prominent in the group rather than functioning in a limited way as in specialized work groups. I will compare them in this 'pure' state before going on to discuss breakdowns and shifts in the 'group' fantasies. I will then discuss the ways in which these different mode 2 structures mark a development in the group, which will be termed track one development. This approach will highlight how such track one shifts in mode 2 fantasies, though they engender a certain kind of development,

nevertheless cannot provide individual development in the group. What is necessary for that, and how it can be achieved, will then be discussed as track two development.

The Fight-Flight 'Group'

First, let us note that there seems to be two phenomena to which writers refer as the fight-flight group. One is a schismatic or fragmented 'fight' group, when the group seems to be splitting or fragmenting into warring parties, none of which predominate enough to be usefully called a main group wrestling with subgroups. Mutual hostility, suspicion and bickering predominate and prevent any rational, constructive work. The group, indeed, is not functioning in any sense as a unit. Though several writers describe such group states as basic assumption fight-flight and refer to Bion in doing so (eg. Slater, 1966; Bennis & Shepard, 1956/1974), for Bion this is not basic assumption fight-flight because the group is not functioning as a unit. For Bion these states are a form of "aberrant" change from one basic assumption to another. Later, I will suggest that they indicate members seeking to maintain detachment from the group, or to deny the 'group', but that is not our present task.

The other phenomenon does constitute basic assumption functioning in Bion's sense. It is when the group is united in fighting or fleeing from some person or idea

which is perceived as external to the 'group'. Often this is the work-functioning consultant, whose interventions demand development from the group members. It also might be a member or subgroup which functions as a scapegoat for the main group; or a perceived threat which is external to the group in the room. Often one or a couple of members of the main group may be seen to be taking the forefront and leading the group in its fighting or fleeing. When the group is functioning in these ways, a manifest fragmentation or in-fighting can always be seen on a closer, or longer, look to be reflecting a latent unity in fleeing from a stimulus. The in-fighting serves to distract and avoid facing the threatening idea, as in Bion's description of the schismatic group.

(This may perhaps seem a distinction that is presented more clearly than the data can ever be. Of course, at any particular moment it may not be possible to say whether a manifest in-fighting reflects a fight-flight 'group' or the turmoil of an aberrant change to another 'group' structure, and one may have to await what emerges.)

The predominant fact of fight-flight structuring is that members rid themselves of the most destructive representations which are threatening the integrity of their subjective self, and furthermore that they place them outside the boundary of the 'group'. Thus they maintain

as individuals a relatively comfortable membership of a good but threatened and embattled 'group'. Members--excepting scapegoated ones--are emotionally and vitally connected to, and parts of, a 'group' which is functioning, in Bion's words, as if it has met in order to flee or fight something.

A look at the recipients of these parts--or, more precisely, at how they are 'received'--allows us to further delineate the 'group'. Bear in mind that how the projections (and/or displacements) are received is, as outlined in chapter 2, a complex function of the personality and activity of the recipient; how that is experienced by--and perhaps distorted in the experience of--the members; and the interpersonal pressures on the recipient to behave thus and so. Recipients who deflect the projections by attacks on entities outside the 'group' are thereby included within the 'group'. Indeed, these are in Bion's terms the leaders of the fight-flight 'group'. Recipients who, by contrast, absorb the projections by turning to attack the projectors are thereby placed outside the 'group'. These may be scapegoats, but in particular it is the consultant, whose interpretive activities reminding members of their aggression are particularly prone to be experienced as attacks, who is very likely to be thus cast out of the 'group' (cf. Jaques, 1955).

The hostile environment which the group thus creates plays a crucial role for the members not only of confirming the fantasy of having rid themselves of their destructiveness, but also of justifying the aggression of the fight-flight 'group', led by its deflectors of aggressive projections. The good 'group' is by no means lacking in aggression--indeed, by choosing deflecting recipients (fight-flight leaders) it has negotiated a distribution of aggression which facilitates its expression, for those individuals least comfortable with it can have the leaders express it on their behalf. But it is an essential feature that, though there is indeed aggression in the 'group', it is guiltless aggression, because it is experienced as fully justified by its hostile environment.

We see two kinds of projective phenomena going on in a fight-flight group. The most destructive representations are projected to outside the 'group', where these elements are experienced as completely separate from and hostile and dangerous to the 'group' and the 'group' self. They are there fought with the unconscious aim of destroying them, or fled. ('Unconscious' in that the aim of destroying them once and for all is unconscious to members. It makes no sense to ascribe consciousness or unconsciousness to the 'group': The issue is the consciousness of members of the 'group'.) Flight, in this context, means denial of the threatening element, usually

to a jointly constructed 'screen' issue or idea and only in extreme circumstances, when fight-flight structuring threatens to break down, to individual screen fantasies or thoughts. The equivalence of flight to fighting, which Bion emphasized, rests on such a denial involving an equivalent annihilation of the threatening situation (Klein, 1946/1975e).

The second kind of projective phenomenon is the placing of destructive parts onto the fight-flight leader or leaders, within the 'group'. The first projective fantasy does not completely rid members of destructive impulses and representations. Indeed, these are further evoked by the hostile environment which members have created for themselves, and continue for many of them to threaten their mature subjective self. These are then by further defensive fantasy distributed within the 'group' to suitable recipients. 'Suitable' means those who are relatively comfortable as individuals with living in a hostile environment, fighting or fleeing it, and, partly because of that, empathic with the 'group' in leading it into fight or flight. Thus, the fight-flight leader preserves the comfort, goodness and guiltlessness of the 'group' by both taking on a degree of aggression intolerable to other members, and then by deflecting it onto the external enemy and so supporting the first type of projection. Thus we have the prerequisite for fight-flight

leadership of a skill in attributing one's own aggressive-ness to some other entity.

But this second kind of projective fantasy within the 'group' does not involve the degree of dissociation and the aim of destroying the projected-onto object which the first does. The projection involved here is near the 'externalization of the ego' pole of Jaffe's (1968) continuum. Within the 'group', or from the individual's perspectives as part of the 'group', members are relatively undifferentiated. Members experience a high degree of connectedness with their projections within the 'group'. It is projective identification we are dealing with here.

This implies a relative comfort of members with their projections, and this is partly because they are not the most intolerable representations, which are ascribed to factors external to the 'group', and partly due to the fight-flight leaders' success in leading the 'group' in creating an environment which justifies the aggression and persecutory fears remaining with the 'group's' members. Thus, when fight-flight structuring is successful, the degree of aggression distributed within the 'group'--rather than directly or via the leader projected outside of it--is relatively modulated, and rendered innocent and justified by the hostile world in which it strives to preserve itself.

The fight-flight resolution is one in which the original group, to which members failed to find a remotely comfortable relation, has effectively been split into two: a 'group' which is good and a non-'group' which is bad. The 'group' constitutes itself as up against this non-'group', and is wholly dependent on it. In fight-flight structuring, if there were no non-'group', there would be no 'group'; it is not possible to understand the latter except in reference to its experience of and relations to the former. The hostile environment, created anonymously and unconsciously, with no sense of responsibility on the part of its members, constitutes the return in the guise of reality of the projected destructive parts which previously threatened to induce fragmentation of the selves of the members. And, of course, reality, unlike representations which are experienced as such, can be fought or fled.

So the fight-flight 'group' must maintain its boundaries rigidly, especially against any stimuli that suggest that the 'group' may not be completely good, correct and adequate in their relations to each other and to the non-'group'. Ambiguous stimuli must be sorted out into elements that accord with the 'group' vision and those that do not.

What scope is there in this situation for the individual to engage in mode 3 relations? We can assume that

some relations to other individuals as well differentiated entities are crucial to the comfort of the 'group', and we can expect the fight-flight leader to be a particular focus of mode 3 relations in order for members to feel comfortable following him. It may also be that the fight-flight leader needs to see some member or other as representing some significant figure or other in order to justify to his individual self his responses; and various non-'group' elements may have various transferential meanings to different members.

In detail, the possibilities are manifold, but there are general specifications which are strict. One risks expulsion from the 'group', with its intrapsychic and interpersonal consequences, unless one's experience of 'group' members is predominantly good, and of the non-'group' predominantly bad. Also, any stimulus must either be considered as of no importance or else assigned to one or other category. I use the word "predominantly" because some realm of secrecy, or privacy, must be allowed to the individuals. But that realm is small for two reasons. Firstly, it carries with it the intrapsychic experience of isolation from the vitality of the 'group'. Secondly, any rise in the level of aggression within the 'group' results in a search for objects on which to get rid of it, and members who have not been expressing loyalty are at risk of being scapegoated. Thus, even secret dissent risks

interpersonal consequences.

Hence, the individual must experience other individuals through the prism of the 'group', in accord with the 'group' structuring. One might want to say that, according to the view presented here, all that has to happen is that the individual must experience other individuals-as-'group'-members through the prism of the 'group', but he is free to experience the same individual as an individual, i.e. distinct from his role as 'group' member, quite differently. But this would involve the kind of splitting that Kernberg describes, with very different feelings and attitudes towards the same external object, which is unlikely to receive validation in the group because it undermines the very stability which all the members have been striving to maintain. Furthermore, for the individual who might be tempted to split in that way, it would deprive him of precisely the sense of personal integration which the 'group' fantasy is designed to maintain. It is important that because the 'group' fantasy serves to maintain the integrity of the self against fragmentation, it is (its members are) intolerant of such manifestations of inconsistency (except in certain special instances such as when there is a need for a group patient--see below.)

So, while in the previous chapter we noted that the 'group' is formed to mediate the individuals' relation to the collectivity of the group, we may add here that it

comes also to mediate his relation to other individuals. Given the rigidity of the fight-flight 'group's' boundaries--the quality of either good and in or bad and out, and nothing in between--the individuals are highly limited in the scope and flexibility of mode 3 relations they can engage in. In particular, any experience of the consultant except one of hatred and fear is strongly excluded, while the fight-flight leader is a prominent focus of benign mode 3 relations.

The Dependency 'Group'

The predominant fact of the dependency 'group' is that members construct a powerful entity that will save them from the threatening quagmire of the group. This entity of the dependency leader is clearly different from both the fight-flight leader and the non-'group' of fight-flight structuring. The 'group' needs something from him, not for him to get rid of something for them or to be gotten rid of or destroyed. Members create him from representations involving strength and potency in the unconscious hope that he can protect the 'group' in a way they alone cannot protect themselves. Strength and potency carry significant aggressive components, but these are more modified in their aggressiveness than the projections of fight-flight structuring, less destructive and more benign. At least this is the initial fantasy, and in

discussing successful dependency structuring I will assume that at least the hope and expectation of its being fulfilled has not been given up.

Some writers (eg. Slater, 1966) emphasize the protective, warder-off of the danger of envelopment, security-giving quality that the dependency leader has for the 'group' members, his status as "deity"--implying to some degree a paternal quality. Others (eg. Bion, 1961) emphasize the nurturant, feeding, ultimately milk-providing function that the 'group' expects him to fulfil, implying a maternal function. Though in the group at any particular time one or other quality may be predominant, for our present purposes I will consider them as essentially equivalent. The kind of completely adequate security-providing capacities that members experience as belonging to the deity tends to evoke a relationship unknown since they were held and fed by their mother. The representation of the leader evokes self representations involving a feeding relationship, an oral taking-in of security, though it may evoke other things too.

The dependency leader is experienced as having, and the 'group' members as completely lacking, aspects of competence, power and knowledge, at least some portion of which must pertain to members' self-as-agency, and not only to their internal objects or introjects. These often include, for example, their ability to recall manifold

items of knowledge which are normally readily accessible to consciousness and the content of which provides no hint of prior motivation for dissociation. Bion emphasized the significant impairment in members' ability to communicate through language. All these abilities, and more, the leader is felt to contain par excellence. Elements of the superego seem particularly to be involved; but also aspects of the ego, i.e. identification proper. (At least in this respect, contra Bion, it is dependency rather than pairing that most closely resembles Freud's [1921/1959] picture.) And when he does not display them, attempts are made to deny that fact, often by interpreting what the leader does say or his silence as indeed reflecting his greater wisdom and strength--as knowing better than they, for example, when they should be 'fed'. It seems, then, that the best way to account for these phenomena is to see them as including projective identification in a sense close to one of Klein's original uses of the term: with the aim that these aspects can be preserved and serve better to protect members from the group situation if they are contained in the dependency leader. In this way, the badness of the group--its threat of envelopment and fragmentation--is transformed into the weakness and dependency of the 'group'.

It is this projective creation of the non-'group' dependency leader which permits the experience of being a

part of, and not quite separate from, the 'group'. He serves to define the 'group' for its members, in a way analogous to that in which the non-'group' defines the fight-flight 'group'. Just as the hostile and embattled but good 'group' can only exist in the context of the hostile and destructive non-'group', so the helplessly weak and dependent and needy 'group' can only exist in the context of the all-powerful, all-providing, benign dependency leader.

Activity in mode 2 is limited to attempts to induce the leader to deliver on his potential, by expressing praise, loyalty and faith in him, and displaying members' patent inability to handle the group situation and task. The cost of 'group' membership is being weak, helpless and dependent, but that is alright as members feel they can rely completely on the leader's resources and benignity. To the extent that the weakness is nevertheless less tolerable to some individuals than others (and the weakness increases as the wished-for help does not arrive), there arises a focus for mode 3 structuring within the 'group's' membership, to place what might be described as "excess weakness" on particular recipients. The role of 'group' "patient" may arise, fulfilled by a person or subgroup whose individual characteristics make them particularly suitable for becoming especially needy, weak and dependent. They become recipients of projections from

others, and are accordingly pressured as necessary, subtly or not so subtly, by the rest of the 'group'. The aim is to induce the leader to fulfil the 'group' fantasy, and thus sustain it, by nurturing, saving, curing, or in some relevant manner rescuing, the "patient"--and with him the projected parts of the other 'group' members.

The role of "patient" is analogous to that of the fight-flight leader. In both cases, the role is to contain and deflect (Jaques, 1955) any excess of the feelings arising from the group structuring, to aid and support the rest of the 'group' in experiencing the non-'group' as the cause and only possible source of alleviation of the problem, and at the same time to induce the non-'group' to behave so as to confirm the 'group' fantasy.

The kind of relations going on within the dependency 'group' are closely analogous to, though very different in content from, those within the fight-flight 'group'. The relations to the non-'group' are quite different, and this is reflected in the vocabulary, begun by Bion and maintained since, of ascribing dependency leadership to the non-'group' entity, rather than to the "patient" role. The parts projected to outside the 'group' boundary--which allows the 'group' to constitute itself--are not further dissociated by fighting or fleeing the non-'group' entity. They are, rather, earnestly yearned for. The parts are

projected because while they are experienced as belonging to the individuals the individuals have been acutely suffering with a group morass, and placing them in a dependency leader carries the hope that they will be more effective there. (This is not to deny that displacement is not also a mechanism used in constructing the leader.)

The boundary of the dependency 'group' must be maintained in particular against stimuli which suggest that the 'group' does have within it the capacities and skills that it situates in the dependency leader. But this boundary of the 'group' is far less rigid than that of the fight-flight 'group'. When the dependency leader is experienced as frustrating and withholding of his omnicompetent skills--and especially if he suggests that the 'group' also has competence, which it is choosing to attribute to him--then the 'group's' boundary must be more firmly maintained against him. He is still earnestly yearned for, and depression and despondency may infuse the group, but the representations of strength projected onto him have become less benign and must be more strongly dissociated. On the other hand, when the leader is experienced as indeed nurturing and protecting the 'group', this is experienced as a satisfying union, as his being almost in the 'group'. The projections onto the leader approach more closely the "externalization of the ego" pole. He is at most "almost in the 'group'", though,

because the gratification can be no more than momentary: even if the leader wished to fulfil them, the expectations of him are unrealistic and the apparent immediate magical solution to the group's problems is seen as illusory--he still has not saved the 'group'. The typical situation is that of the leader hovering on the boundary of the 'group', now more "in" as the hope of his fulfilling his role as deity increases, and now more "out" as frustration increases. There can be a good deal of tension with respect to this shifting position.

One role of the 'group' remains, as with fight-flight structuring, that of mediating the individual members' relation to the non-'group'. Any expression by an individual of a relation to the dependency leader inconsistent with his being savior of the 'group' will be met with interpersonal pressures to conform in addition to the intrapsychic experience of isolation. This limits mode 3 relations to the non-'group' entity, analogously with the fight-flight situation. But just as the mode 2 relations are now very different, so are the limits to mode 3 relations.

Individuals as 'group' members, in mode 2, are focused on the dependency leader, who is extremely likely to be the consultant--at least until he has thoroughly proved his inadequacy for the task. As Slater noted, the very ease with which the consultant is differentiated from

the mass of the 'group', especially when it is that mass from which the dependency leader is to save them, argues for choosing him; this is in addition to the fact that the consultant does presumably have special skills which warrant a degree of dependence on him, though not as a magical deity. These same qualities also make the consultant a natural focus for the individual to fantasize mode 3, individual to individual, relations, independently from the 'group'. This functions as a counterbalance for the potential loss of sense of individuality which, we noted in the previous chapter, remains with membership of even a successful 'group'--though within much more tolerable bounds than before the 'group' was formed. In the fight-flight 'group', all which could be expressed without losing contact with the 'group' was hatred or fear of the consultant. But with the dependency 'group' it is expressions of dependency that are allowed--even encouraged. This not only gives scope for more modulated mode 3 fantasies about the consultant--more likely to be acceptable to the mature self concept--but also expresses the truth that the individual is depending on these fantasies as support for his sense of individual distinctiveness.

The realm of privacy for the individual, then, is far greater in the dependency 'group' than in the fight-flight 'group'. The individual can give loyal expression to the 'group' fantasy, yet at the same time "smuggle under" it a

mode 3, individual to individual, special relationship with the consultant. To put this in other words, with respect to the 'group' mediating the members' relation to the non-'group', the member is also able to step away and "peek" at the consultant directly, as well as experience him through the 'group'. There is scope for the individual to have his leader as well as share him.

Typically, in dependency structuring, the consultant is thus split, and this is a situation with which each member must wrestle in his own way, for the mode 3 relationships are not necessarily similar for everyone. They are almost certainly transferential, the consultant being probably in important respects experienced as an object that the individual used in the past to similarly counter-balance another relationship (or another aspect of the same relationship) which threatened merger and loss of a still vulnerable sense of individuality. But this area of private fantasied relationships with the leader is greatly affected by individual differences in their specific meanings, in their defensive value and in the mechanisms used in them by each individual.

The 'group' members are aware of the potential for special secret relationships, and rivalry for the dependency leader becomes an ever-present danger for the 'group'. Slater has described how the group sometimes displays a predominance of 'group' solidarity and united

attempts to induce the leader to give the 'group' what it expects, and sometimes a possible private relationship with the leader must be exposed and the individual or individuals concerned induced to renounce it. The 'group' may become suspicious: Even a member's silence, for example, may be experienced by others as an expression of such a relationship.

If these private relationships and the competition inherent in them become too prominent, then the dependency 'group' is breaking down. While it is successful, they remain private and secondary. One risk of their exposure is loss of the fantasied relationship which, it is here assumed, is not a relationship which in fact pertains--at least not as the individual fantasizes. When the leader fails to behave in accord with an individual's private transferential fantasy, he is experienced by the individual as reasserting his loyalty to the 'group' as against the individual, leaving the individual exposed and vulnerable, lacking contact both with the 'group' and with the private figure who may compensate. A further risk is that the 'group' will not only heap contempt on the individual concerned, but will in doing so particularly emphasize the dependent aspects of the special relationship and make of the individual a 'group' "patient". The danger is not so much expulsion from the 'group', as it is in flight. The punishment for attempting too much outside

the 'group's' bounds is, rather, being given the dubious honor of being "patient" and most needy one, and of thus being pressed into representing the 'group' in its 'groupness'.

Nevertheless, it is important that in dependency structuring there is scope for the individual to be "in and out" of the 'group' at the same time, and to wrestle--albeit secretly--with that experience. And the consultant, then, is "in and out" in two ways: firstly, to the degree that he is experienced to be fulfilling the 'group's' wishes from him as savior and sustainer; and secondly, to the degree that he is being experienced as 'group' deity (performing his duties or not) or as individual transference figure.

The Pairing 'Group'

In the pairing structure the group gives overriding attention to the interaction between two of its members, while the rest are more than content to leave the group stage to the pair. There is an air of hopefulness and expectancy, as if the interaction of the pair will surely produce something that will save, protect and nurture the group: something, that is, which is very much like the dependency leader, but not embodied in any present person or entity, unless we reify the pair's generative capacity to the status of entity.

The group is enthralled with the activities of the pair. Any rivalry for the group's attention which may have been apparent before is in abeyance. Even the consultant, unless he allows himself to become one of the pair, drops out of members' consideration. Nothing else is of interest, except the pair and hope of its as yet unborn offspring.

I will distinguish two elements of the pair, though members do not make any such clear distinction. Firstly, there is something very similar to the dependency leader function, which does not strictly belong to the pair, but to the messiah to which it will give birth. The object of the dependency is in the future, and it is the potential for its ultimate arrival which is contained in the pair. Secondly, there is the 'group', which not only belongs to the pair--it is the pair, and the pair is the 'group'.

The statement, that the pair is the 'group', needs some explanation. As members are enthralled with the pair, and interactions among other members drop out of consideration, there is no loss in the sense of cohesion in the group, no manifestations of the non-pair members experiencing a loss of contact with each other. They are, rather, linked through the medium of the pair. The sense is often palpable in the group of the pair's representing something of the other members, in their strong investment in the pair's interaction as it progresses, in their

vicarious enjoyment of the interaction or their tense watchfulness for its outcome. The content of the interaction is sometimes responded to with "we" statements by other members, as if it is they as much as the pairing members who are interacting.

The pair may be variable in its behavior, and so also, we can assume, in the precise balance of aspects that it contains in the fantasy of other members. It certainly contains representations involving sexuality and procreation, and both Bion and Slater noted that even if the manifest content of the interaction is relatively abstruse, it is watched by other members as if it were a veritable primal scene. It is not, though, a scene of violence, but neither is it shorn of aggression, and the amount of tension manifested between the pairing members can vary considerably. This is in contrast to the relations between the other members, in which competition is markedly lacking--not at all, for example, the danger it is in the dependency 'group'. Indeed, a major element in what the pair seems to contain instead of the other members is the potential for rivalry that arises with relatively affectively fused interactions.

The pairing 'group', then, seems to function as repository for a mix of aggressively and libidinally infused representations, which is variable with respect to the degree of prominence of one affect over the other, and

the degree of fusion of the affects. The degree of dissociation involved in this structuring need not be great because the representations are relatively compatible with members' mature sense of self; what members do not experience, though, and the pair does, is the competitiveness and mutual hostility which would be experienced if the qualities of the pair-`group` were instead distributed around all the group members.

What is invariable in the pairing `group` is that the combination of the pair is felt to be productive and creative. No matter that it takes the group nowhere--if for no other reason, because all the other members are merely enthralled by but not moved to do anything in response to it--for it will inevitably produce something approximating the dependency leader. Therefore, the lack of a nurturing and protecting entity is not experienced with weakness and despondency; hope and optimism prevail. Members experience the messianic entity or idea not as tantalizingly and frustratingly on the boundary of the `group`, but as already within it. It is not yet manifest, but it will at any moment be born.

If one compares the stance towards the messiah to the stance towards the dependency leader, one might say that it is no longer necessary for the `group` to praise it and display its need for it, for it has it immanently within it and can create it; but the `group` delegates its

magical procreative power to two of its members and their interaction while the rest remain merely enthralled and attentive. This is not only no more productive of magical saviors than the dependency stance, but is also unproductive with respect to any practically relevant aspects of the pair's interaction.

The messianic entity is not quite the same as an unborn dependency leader. The representations which in the dependency situation are experienced as pertaining to the dependency leader are in the pairing situation redistributed. Enough of his creative and imaginative strengths, which include some of his knowledge and power, are now experienced--with a high degree of connectedness--as situated in the pair. This is sufficient to ensure the creation of the messianic entity, so the rest of the members can sit back and watch and wait. The rest is experienced as pertaining to the unborn messiah, with not much less of an experience of connectedness because, firstly, the pair constitutes its seed; and, secondly, it is soon to be manifest.

In pairing structuring there is no significant equivalent of the non-`group` entities that needed to be more strongly dissociated in fight-flight and dependency structuring. The messianic entity is within the `group`, and furthermore, it is not this which becomes contaminated and needs to be further dissociated because of its failure to

appear, as is the case when the dependency deity fails to live up to expectations. It is, rather, the pair which risks blame for its failure to produce the messiah. The group will ultimately have to give up the pairing assumption, which we will discuss later, but before that occurs other pairs of members can serve as 'group' pair in the hope that they will succeed.

In order to preserve the 'group' the messianic entity must not actually be born, for the expectations of it are no less impossible to fulfil than those made of the dependency leader. What non-'group' realm there is is constituted of any stimuli which imply that the messianic entity either will not arrive or has done already, or jealousy or belittlement of the pair. These are, as with the other 'group' structures, experienced through the prism of the 'group'. New ideas are either experienced as not new and unimportant, or as heralding the imminence--but not yet the birth--of the messianic entity. Jealousy or belittlement of the pair is either shrugged off or else the individual who expresses it is engaged with by one of the pair or some other member and quickly becomes involved as one of a new 'group' pair. In either case, and whichever course is taken, as far as any action on their basis is concerned, they are ignored. This, indeed, marks the central manner in which the pairing 'group' deals with the non-'group'. In the general enthrallment with the pair

and mood of optimism and expectancy, no attention is given to anything else--except in so far as the stimulus, and the person who expresses it, is pulled into a new pairing interaction. Then, the pairing 'group' is restored, and the group can return to its hopeful, attentive but inactive, waiting.

As far as mode 3 relations are concerned, the members who are making up the pair are clearly central figures, and provided the above characteristics are maintained, there is scope for individual differences in the details of the fantasy. Note that what is particularly pulled for are fantasies involving two figures and generativity, and relatively modulated affects. On the face of it, a richer and more mature set of fantasies are given scope than is the case in either fight-flight or dependency structuring.

Furthermore, with respect to other individuals in the group, no limits are placed on mode 3 interrelations, except that they are not overtly competitive with the pair. And this includes relations to the consultant. No more is demanded of 'group' members in mode 2, except for the members of the pair, than hopeful silence. This gives members in the pairing structure a wider scope for private transferential individual-to-individual fantasies than in either of the other structurings. The cost of too great a private involvement in these relations is an internal sense of isolation from the 'group' and its vitality and

hopefulness, but not interpersonal pressures. But if mode 3 relations are expressed, they are handled like all elements of the non-`group` realm: they are either ignored, or enlisted with the person who expresses them into a new mode 2 pair. So the pairing `group` is relatively generous in allowing mode 3 fantasies, but work on them in the group, or attempting to have the group work on their basis (which would involve testing their reality, having other individuals respond to them, etc.), turns out to be no less problematic.

Breakdowns and Shifts in `Group` Structures

Each of the `group` structurings, while temporarily enabling a contact with and in the group without becoming lost in a morass, becomes problematic in itself. Each, after a period of being comfortable enough, becomes an increasingly unpleasant presence to be a part of. These difficulties have been explored at some length, in different aspects, by Bion (1961), Slater (1966) and Carsky (1978). I will be brief where I do not think I can add anything to what they have said, part of which I summarized in chapter 1.

The fight-flight `group` becomes a rather frightening and nasty place to be, in which the member is constantly under threat, both as member of a `group` under threat and as an individual who has to watch he does not become

scapegoated. The state and the direction of the 'group' itself has to be constantly monitored lest it turn on the member. Even if one is successful in avoiding scapegoating, each member comes to feel increasing guilt and shame (in his individual self) at the ruthlessness of the 'group' (at his behavior and feelings as 'group' member).

What this involves is a beginning awareness that the 'group' is not as good, as innocent, as guiltless, as members have fantasized. At first this is handled by means of the fantasy--by ascribing the badness and the aggression to the non-'group'--but the members cannot forever ward off the sense that the fantasy is a lie. (This process can be retarded, though, to the extent that those who are assigned to the non-'group' realm attempt to retaliate, or behave in ways that can easily be interpreted that way.) A stunned silence or a frenzied desperation can become manifest in the group, as it dawns on members that each expression of the 'group' fantasy disaffirms it. The hostile and frightening non-'group' can no longer be kept apart from the 'group', and the original frightening morass of the group threatens to re-emerge.

One can distinguish, then, two aspects of the individual's discomfort with the fight-flight 'group': his guilt and shame at behaving so badly, and the primary process presence of the 'group' coming to be an evil and threatening one.

One can also distinguish two corresponding aspects of the individual's discomfort with the dependency 'group' when that comes under strain: his discomfort with being so dependent, and his discomfort with his dependency being unfulfilled.

With respect to the discomfort with being so dependent, shame is clearly an element, and often guilt at one's greediness. It is relevant that, while mode 3 fantasies about the dependency leader are to some degree a possible counterbalance to the relation to him via the 'group', dependency tends to characterize that relation as well. And with these individual-to-individual fantasies, rivalry and jealousy enter as further unpleasantnesses.

Frustration and anger are a more central problem in the second aspect: dependency is unrewarded and the 'group' fantasy not fulfilled. Within the dependency structure ways of handling this problem include finding alternative dependency leaders--another group member, a 'bible' of the sort Bion described, the sponsoring institution which will replace the inadequate consultant--but these options in turn prove unsuccessful. Dependency and depression and an ambivalent relation to a withholding deity (withholding, because the fantasy is that he has the power to save the 'group' if only he wished to) can only be tolerated for so long before frustration and anger with the dependency leader builds to the degree that his power

is felt to be less benign and more potentially dangerous.

As this situation mounts there is increasing tension in localizing the leader around the boundary of the 'group'. He is still yearned for, and indeed needed all the more, yet he is increasingly felt as cause of an anger and frustration which is threatening the comfort of the 'group'. The 'group' in turn is (the members are) tempted to rid itself of the aggressive and greedy representations which are emerging by projecting them onto the leader--and this is one way the dependency 'group' can break down, by thoroughly expelling the leader and transforming itself into a fight-flight 'group'.

We can now see a particular importance to the guiltlessness of the fight-flight 'group'. It must be the case especially now, for otherwise the 'group' would have to face having 'killed off' its deity.

One way of warding off such a step is the particular dependency structure which Slater highlights. The 'group' itself can be split, and the aggressive and greedy representations which were making the 'group' uncomfortable and threatening the benignity of the leader are placed in a foreboding and dangerous "shadow group". In many respects, this "shadow group" resembles the original morass of the group which threatened to fragment and envelop the members. This account differs from Slater's, though, in claiming that there remains a comfortable

'group' fantasy at the same time, through which members are connected; it is not merely that individuals dissociate themselves from a 'group' that is now bad. What the 'group' members can now do, though, is feel renewed faith in their dependency leader, whose role is to save them from the "shadow group", i.e. from their own dissociated greed and aggression. Of course, the dependency leader fails to perform this task too, and frustration with and ambivalence towards him cannot indefinitely be managed by projection onto the "shadow group" lest it comes to be felt as too great a threat to both the 'group' and its leader. Hence the leader's failure to fulfil his role again becomes a problem.

Another way of warding off the breakdown of the dependency 'group' lies in splitting the deity rather than the 'group'. It is possible to locate the frustrating and withholding aspects of the deity in another member and scapegoat him. Particularly suitable recipients include an alternative dependency leader (other than the consultant) who has been tried and found lacking, and any member who moves too quickly for the 'group' in suggesting some alternative to a dependency structure. I am suggesting, then, that at least some instances of scapegoating indicate a dependency 'group' under pressure rather than an active fight-flight 'group'.

Anger with the deity is not always the dominant

factor in the breakdown of a dependency structure. Despondency, depression and loss may be the more prominent affects, and anger may be less prominent overall and manifested less directly towards the deity than in jealousy and rivalry with respect to each others' perceived gaining of the leader's nurturance. In this situation a shift to a pairing 'group' is the more likely one, involving a taking the deity in to the 'group' and a containing of rivalry and competition.

The causes of breakdowns of pairing 'groups' are twofold. Firstly, jealousy of the pairing couple and rivalry for the 'group's' attention does again re-emerge; and, secondly, disillusionment erodes the feeling of hope and optimism, as no messianic idea or person is born. It is relevant that the pairing 'group', unlike the others, is not constituted as up against any non-'group' entity which can function as the entity responsible for the 'group's' discomfort. This means that, although at first when frustration and aggression arises replacement pairs can be found, the pairing structure is not as resilient as the others. The 'group' itself must contain it, or find a responsible non-'group' entity on which it can be more strongly dissociated: i.e. one of the other 'group' structures.

Before we turn to discuss whether these breakdowns and shifts in 'group' structures may involve development,

and if so in what sense, we need to mention what Bion called the "aberrant changes", when there is no predominant 'group' structure. For Bion these include the attempt to use a part of the environment outside the group as an entity in the 'group' fantasy (typically as a non-'group' entity) to contain the tensions; and schismatic groups (see chapter 1). (Strictly, in the former case it is not that there is no predominant 'group' structure, but that the elements in the 'group' structure are no longer predominantly elements of the group.)

I would also include in this category three further kinds of phenomena. First is the group's denial of the 'group' in favor of personal fantasies and reminiscences, or a screen perception of itself as merely a collection of pairs, as Eisold described. The group's denial of the 'group' in favor of a collection of pairs is distinguishable from the pairing 'group' in that no-one but the pair itself shows much interest in what transpires between each pair (and often even the pairs themselves are fairly listless in their interaction, as if they are merely passing time); and the air of hope and optimism is absent. The second phenomenon is what Slater describes as fight-flight, when the group is fragmented and bickering. What seems to be involved here are individuals' attempts to maintain their sense of themselves (and their sense of themselves as good) against a fragmented bad group. The

'group' as an entity with which they may be in contact (or with which they were in contact but it ceased to be comfortable enough) is thus denied--or, if it seems peculiar to speak of denying a fantasy entity, one might say it is foreclosed as a presence. This is really a very similar process to the denying of the 'group' in favor of a collection of pairs, but is marked by a greater amount of aggression in the group. It is not unlikely that it follows the breakdown of the fight-flight 'group' (especially as an extension of the "frenzied desperation" mentioned above).

Finally, and more speculatively, one might see Turquet's (1974) "basic assumption Oneness" as a type of aberrant change, in which denial of bad aspects of the 'group' temporarily allows a good model merger experience. Such a state is a possibility when the 'group' members succeed in quite completely denying aggression in the group; i.e. in a fight-flight context when in flight the non-'group' entity is denied, and in a dependency context (or especially in the shift from a dependency to a pairing 'group') when it can be felt that the dependency leader has just done the perfectly satisfying thing for the 'group'. But it is not clear to me how such states could be anything but momentary, and I reiterate that the phenomenon has not often been described.

These last three kinds of aberrant changes rely on

the group's use of denial. The particular 'group' structure is under pressure, and the group responds with a period of denial of the 'group' before it is able to create another 'group' structure. This is a point of concordance with Eisold's (1981) account, in which denial was seen as a third level of defense on which the group could fall back when projective structuring was proving inadequate in dealing with members' anxieties. By seeing this in terms of aberrant changes we focus on its mutative role in shifts between 'group' structures.

Comparing the 'Groups': Development Track One

One difference between the three group structures lies in the kind and degree of members' dissociation from the non-'group' figures; that is, in how members keep elements out of the primary process presence of the 'group' that they are a part of; in how the boundaries of the 'group' are maintained. In fight-flight, parts--self and object representations, for let us assume that projection and displacement may be involved--are kept strongly dissociated, a great deal of hostility is felt towards them, and members aim to destroy them or deny their existence, which amounts to the same. In dependency, an affectively more moderate stance is felt towards affectively more modulated parts, and it is dependency and ambivalence that characterizes the relationship. The

degree of dissociation is less, and there is more flexibility in it, with the dependency leader maintained as sometimes more and sometimes less far from the 'group'--and, via the 'group', from the subjective self of its members. In pairing, the degree of dissociation is least: The deity is within the 'group' and felt as an element of the primary process presence; though a part of the deity is somewhat dissociated by maintaining it as an object of the future, this is still experienced as closer than the dependency leader was.

Now this tells us about the boundaries of the 'group', but it also tells us about the boundaries of the individual members--in so far as they are 'group' members, but we have seen how strong are the combination of intrapsychic and interpersonal pressures to be a 'group' member. If we look at fight-flight, dependency, and pairing as a sequence, then it is a sequence of progressive localizing of the non-'group' entity closer in to a primary process presence. It passes from being maintained firmly outside the subjective self and self-as-place, and being hated and feared there; to what I have described as "hovering on the boundary", alternately more worshipped and yearned for (loved, in a way) and more felt as frustrating and withholding (hated, in a way); to being experienced as almost within the primary process presence --not yet manifest there but very soon to be--and enjoyed

there with hope and optimism--in other words as not clearly localized as either in or out of the self-as-place, or localized both in and out.

I will leave for later the question of whether groups actually do pass through these structurings in a more or less sequential manner, and just consider whether and in what sense, if they do, this might constitute development.

What we have here is an increasing enrichment and complexity of the 'group'; of, for its members, a primary process presence with indeterminate localization. This is 'group' development, certainly, but its status as development of the individual members is equivocal. The 'group' object becomes more complex, but the relation to it is unchanged. The relation to the non-'group' entities of the hostile fight-flight world, the dependency deity and the pairing messiah, has shifted from a strong dissociation and wish to destroy or deny it, to a taking it in to a primary process presence. What I suggest is that, if we see individual development as an increasing re-internalization and correct localization of what has been projected and displaced onto the 'group' and non-'group' entities, then the different 'group' structures do not show individual development. They do show, though, differences in the possibility for such development.

Specifically, while the aim is to destroy or deny projected or displaced parts, as it is in fight-flight,

there is little possibility for their re-ownership. While the relationship is that of dependency and ambivalence, the opportunity is much greater, as is the motivation. With dependency, frustration and despondency replace hatred and fear. At first sight it appears that the pairing structure implies a loss of at least the motivation for development: The non-`group` is now disembodied and close contact with it is experienced. It seems that this stance involves a resolution of the dependency problem by members' introjection of the non-`group` into the primary process presence of the `group`, and once it is there its failure to appear is handled by switching pairs. But the advance in pairing over dependency lies precisely in the fact that it is the failure of the pairs which arouses frustration, and not the failure of a non-`group` entity. For that means the individuals begin to have an incentive to reality test the `group` itself. Here is the significance of the pairing `group` not being defined as up against, or dependent on, a non-`group` entity: frustration can be blamed only on the `group` itself.

To summarize, development in a sequence of fight-flight to dependency to pairing can be seen in three respects: firstly, in a lessening degree of dissociation of the representations experienced as pertaining to the non-`group` entity; secondly, in an increasing potential

for richness and complexity of the representations experienced as pertaining to the primary process presence of the 'group'; and thirdly, a shift in the localization of responsibility for the problems of group life from an entity strongly localized outside of the subjective self to a primary process presence with indeterminate localization, or localized inside as well as outside.

To these we can add a fourth, which I traced in some detail in describing each of the 'group' structures: the increasing realm of privacy in which mode 3, individual to individual, fantasied relations can be entertained. But here too, it seems that as far as the individual is concerned it is a potential for development that we are talking about. For even in the pairing 'group', as described above, no one will engage with the individual to test the reality of his mode 3 relations from any perspective but that of the 'group'. The greater scope for mode 3 relations may facilitate the individual's development outside of the group (which depends on his internal and external resources outside the group) but we have yet to account for the possibility for individual development within the group.

I will call the fight-flight - dependency - pairing sequence developmental track one. We can say that it is development of a sort, but there is nothing much in it yet for the individual. In the next section we will look at

what needs to happen for individual development in the group to occur.

Development Track Two

The broad statement of our question in this section is how the potential for development that we saw in the last section can become actual, or how members can come to use that potential to achieve development in the group.

The problem is one of individuated engagement with the issues of the group, i.e. for the individual to be able to test the reality of his representations by expressing them in the group and comparing them to the way in which other individuals experience the same objects (including himself). This is a problem for the individual in both his mode 2 relation to the 'group' entity and in his mode 3 relations to other individuals in the group. And it is a problem because the 'group' mediates the member's relation to the group and to other individuals, and because, one might say, the 'group' has its own reality, its own consensual validation, which it powerfully enforces.

We have seen that the 'group' fantasies themselves (mode 2) are irrational, but that the different 'group' structures are designed such that they validate themselves. Furthermore, we have seen that when one breaks down, when its 'reality' becomes too uncomfortable and its

validation of that reality may threaten to become unconvincing, it may shift to another 'group' structure. This involves no testing of the unsatisfactory 'group' reality, but a transforming of it to another kind. And in this new 'group', there is a new way in which it validates itself.

(One can compare this to Hartmann's comments on the "pleasure premia" which are in store for the child who conforms to the "erroneous and biased views which the parents hold of reality", and Hartmann goes on to link such parental views of reality to "the picture commonly accepted in the culture to which [the individual] belongs" [1956/1964b, pp. 256-257]. The 'group' is such a culture, in which there are, in a similar way, premia for belonging.)

We have also seen that with respect to mode 3 relations, even when there is significant scope for entertaining them, no relevant validation can be forthcoming. They are either ignored, or else interpreted in terms of the 'group' fantasy.

Not only is reality testing in the group impaired by the 'erroneous validation' of the 'group' culture, but the individual is rendered especially vulnerable to this by what, I think, can be usefully described as the poor reality constancy that 'group' membership engenders. What I mean by this is rather a central point--more important than whether the problem should strictly be called one of

reality constancy. It is, that issues are represented by group members in modes 2 and 3 at the same time, and the prominence of one or other mode shifts.

That the self and objects can be represented at more than one level of organization (on a primary to secondary process continuum) and that it can be more active and influential at sometimes one and sometimes another level, is a central idea in Schafer's work (1968), which was noted in chapter 2. "Issue" I take in (one of) its ordinary language sense(s): "a matter or point that remains to be decided" (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). When one considers an issue, one is working with an abstract, secondary process representation of self, objects and the relations between them. It also can be represented at different levels of organization, though at some point we may want to say that this representation of the issue is so different (at such a different level of organization) from that one that it has really become a different issue. At any rate, we can gather together all the evidence of the group members' representations which are being expressed in the group and do the necessary representational work of our own to be able to say, "That is the issue that is uppermost in the group". Ezriel's (1950/1980) "common group tension" is such an issue. (If this involves gathering data over a certain amount of time, then one might call it the "theme".) This, though, is our repre-

sentation--and, we hope, the consultant's--but it is symptomatic of the members' problem that they cannot stand sufficiently far back from the 'group' to reach it.

For example, let us say that the issue for the group is that of sexual attraction and rivalry. Part of our evidence for this is that we have seen the following, though not necessarily understood it in such detail. A man, A, feels that an interaction was problematic when another man, B, intervened in A's interaction with a woman in such a way as to emphasize interpersonal conflict between A and the woman, thus 'sabotaging' a good interaction. A experiences this problem in transferential, individual to individual, terms (i.e. the interaction is represented in mode 3). A says what he felt happened, and thus the issue is opened up for the group to work on it, if it wants to. The opportunity is there for work on mode 3 relations: the individuals getting together to discuss the different experiences of the individuals concerned and those who were watching and listening, and to give a consensually validated view of what happened. Was the woman feeling it was a good interaction? Did B 'sabotage' it, or did A seem to others to have just opted out? How is all this connected to the group's task--therapy, self-study, or whatever? And so on.

Let us say that the situation is that of a dependency 'group'; so A is challenging the dependency structure by

not directly appealing to the consultant. (Feeling hard done by, he is not at the moment feeling connected to the 'group'.) What happens is that nothing happens except agreement that the group's members cannot figure things out--there may be increasing confusion about what the "things" are--and that only the consultant can. The protagonist, A, may become a 'group' patient. Hence, the content of the mode 2 fantasy at this point is that issues of sexual interaction and rivalry are problematic for the 'group' as a whole, and that the dependency leader is the only one who has the capacity to handle them. But the problem is not clearly experienced, the issue cannot be clearly conceptualized, by any individual, because it is not felt as pertaining to any individual in particular (except the patient, but this is a distortion) but to a primary process presence of unclear or shifting localization (to everyone, but no-one in particular); and also because the capacity to understand pertains exclusively to the dependency leader. There is now considerable pressure for everyone to be representing the issue in mode 2, and for that representation to be more influential than its representation in mode 3.

If the group structure was that of a pairing 'group', then any two of the three (A, B and the woman) may end up as the pair, in discussion, argument, agreement, or whatever. But they are both parties involved in the

conflict, and they must do without substantive input from anyone else. The hope is that they will solve the issue, but in fact they are deprived of the tools (validation or refutation from others from their standpoint as distinct individuals) by which to do so. If one of the three (let us say it is A) stays out of the pair, then he can use the relatively large realm of privacy of the pairing 'group' to maintain a distinctive individual view of the situation. But he will progressively lose any hope of testing his view against those of other individuals with their distinctive views--and then his disillusionment may restore him to greater contact with the 'group', as he will not be alone in feeling frustrated with the lack of progress. Again, there is good reason for A's representation of the issue as a mode 3 problem to become less prominent than his representation of the issue as a 'group' problem.

If frustration and hopelessness builds, then the group may shift to a fight-flight structure. Though we might recognize the same issue (if, for example, the consultant is expelled and attacked for wanting to destroy the 'group' out of jealousy) it is now more likely that it is so transformed that we may not call it the same issue at all.

To give a sense of the full richness and texture of group life I would have to give many examples of this

kind. I hope that this one will suffice, though, to illustrate that the issues of the group can be represented by its members in the individual-to-individual mode (3) and in the mode of the primary process presence of the 'group'. The difference between modes 2 and 3 is not necessarily one of content, even when we are reluctant to say they are involved with the same "issue". It is a problem of the 'group' (of the strength of the motivations to maintain it) that if an individual seeks to engage the group (the collection of individuals) on his mode 3 relations, then his attempt will tend to be derailed towards a representation of the issue and its potential resolution in the 'group' mode. It is in this sense that there can be said to be a problem of object constancy in the 'group'. To test the reality of a mode 3 relation one needs to maintain with some constancy the representation of the issue in that mode, but with membership of the 'group' one is instead pulled towards abandoning that representation in favor of increasing the prominence of its representation as pertaining to a primary process presence. It is not only that the 'group' validates its own 'reality', but that the individual is rendered especially vulnerable to that by the 'group' undermining the constancy of other modes of representation of the issue.

We can say that the 'group', the jointly negotiated

mode 2 fantasy presence, serves to prevent the group's engagement with mode 3 relations and their difficulties. This derives from its function as mediating the individuals' relations to each other and the group. The point is connected to Bion's insight that the 'group' fantasy obstructs work functioning, that it seeks to (members seek that it does) maintain a balance between the morass of the group and the expression of distinctive individualities. It is also another aspect of Eisold's statement that the cost of 'group' membership is restriction in the role of the individual.

We have seen in the discussion of projective (and/or displacing) structuring in chapter 3 that the mode 3 relations may themselves involve a good deal of distortion, and that this may be very important to the individuals' comfort in the group (as well as their comfort in the 'group'). It is not that the 'group' obstructs the experience of an undistorted state of affairs, but that it obstructs the testing of the reality of that state of affairs. This is a different statement from Bion's, who saw mode 2 as mediating modes 1 and 4, but left mode 3 aside. It also adds something to what Ezriel says about the "common group tension", viz. that what could be called a common 'group' tension derails members' engagement with the common group tension.

So the question of how individuals can develop in the

group, rather than merely use the group experience as material for development which takes place outside of it, is the problem of how the group (the collection of individuals) can engage on mode 3 relations and test their reality. It is a question of how the group emerges from (behind) the 'group'. In some way it must involve at least a partial renunciation of the 'group', or perhaps a testing of the reality of the 'group' fantasy, and a sorting out of at least some elements (those which constitute the issue which can be engaged with) of the primary process presence of the 'group' into parts which are clearly (though perhaps inaccurately) experienced as pertaining to the self and parts which are clearly (though perhaps inaccurately) experienced as pertaining to specific others.

We are here in the realm of one part of Slater's contribution: the "secularization" of the group, or the progressive narrowing of the group's "sacred" area. This is what I want to call the second track of development. What can we say about how it proceeds?

If we take as a cue how Slater's emphasis on the 'revolt' contrasts with Bion's statement that the 'work group' gradually wins out in the end, we might consider two possibilities, or two polarities. Roughly, the 'group' may be 'reconquered', as it were, attacked as an obstruction and frustration and its parts redistributed

among the individuals; or it may be 'decathected', simply abandoned as it becomes progressively less necessary to individuals who are becoming more resilient in their sense of themselves as individuals who are members of the group (perhaps via the consultant's consistent analysis of the 'group'). The process may be a variable combination of these two modes, or the difference between them may be more apparent than real: what looks like a relatively smooth and quiet abandonment of the 'group' fantasy may with a "twist of the lense", to use Bion's image, be seen to be a series of smaller attacks; or a grand 'revolt' may be, as Slater surmised, merely a symbolic episode marking a real achievement already gained in imperceptible increments.

Slater's account is the only one which addresses this question in any detail, and it suggests that the answer is all of the above. He proposes that as the members come to have more experience of each other the fear of merger recedes, and it is this that enables the group to emancipate itself from the "sacred area". In our terms, as model becomes less of a threat the 'group' fantasy becomes less necessary as mediator of the individual's relation to the aggregate of the group. This happens gradually and imperceptibly. However, the interpersonal pressures for conformity to the 'group' fantasy do not just wither away, nor does its effectiveness in confirming its own reality.

By Slater's account, the force of the 'group' fantasy is broken in a revolt against the dependency leader. More precisely, however, Slater says that this does not always happen, but he does not go into detail about those of his groups which had no revolt; perhaps these did fit a withering away or decathecting picture.

However, there is a good deal of variability in the phenomena which Slater includes under the rubric of 'revolt'. In particular, he says that sometimes the dependency leader is afterwards treated the same, sometimes differently, and sometimes he is ignored. Not all such outcomes are consistent with seeing the event as marking development on what I am calling track two. Furthermore, sometimes he writes of the consultant's task orientation being identified with through the revolt (p. 68), and sometimes of it still being experienced in magical terms as pertaining to a new 'group' deity or pair (p. 147). And if it is only the person of the consultant which is separated from the 'group' then, while this may be associated with emancipation from the 'group', it is still not quite the step I am looking for.

Slater's notion of the revolt is too broad for our present purpose, perhaps because while he was trying to show that the two tracks of development tend to run in parallel (a point which I do not seek to dispute and to which we will turn below) I want to look at them sepa-

rately so that we can see each--in their interaction and in their independence--more clearly.

We might expect that the step I am looking for is the same as that involved in the reality testing of, or development beyond the prominence of, any primary process presence with indeterminate localization. That is, that this developmental process in the group is essentially the same as that part of the process of individuation which involves the reality testing of a transitional object.

In The Use of an Object and Relating Through Identifications (1969/1971c), Winnicott describes this process as one in which "it is the destruction of the object that places the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control" (p. 106). Placing it outside the subject's omnipotent control means "the subject's perception of the object as an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact recognition of it as an entity in its own right" (p. 105). He goes on: "this experience depends on the object's capacity to survive. (It is important that 'survive', in this context, means 'not retaliate'.) If it is in an analysis that these matters are taking place, then the analyst, the analytic technique, and the analytic setting all come in as surviving or not surviving the patient's destructive attacks. This destructive activity is the patient's attempt to place the analyst outside the area of omnipotent control, that is,

out in the world" (p. 107).

The whole issue of transitional phenomena has many facets and it is well beyond the scope of this work to discuss them all in relation to the 'group'. In particular, we are going to have to leave aside the complex question of precisely what notion of aggression or destructiveness Winnicott was using, and assume that if he could describe the destructiveness of the infant and of the adult patient as equivalent in the necessary respects, then we can hypothesize that a similar equivalence pertains with respect to the destructiveness of the group. At this point, what I want to distill from his account can be summarized thus: if the subject finds that the object which he has just destroyed has in fact survived intact, then that object is now experienced as independent of him; its representation is localized outside of his subjective self. The individual is now aware that though he has ideas about the object the object itself is outside of him, so he can test the reality of his ideas, which he could not before.

Let us look at that a little closer. The object that is attacked is the transitional object, or the object that exists in the transitional area, i.e. the primary process presence. The object that survives is the actual object which exists in external reality. In Winnicott's example above, it is the analyst as transitional object who is

attacked, and the analyst as independent person who survives. It is not the analyst as transitional object who survives; it is that object representation--or the aspect of it which was attacked--which is now superseded by the representation of the analyst as independent object. In our terms, the representation of the analyst as primary process presence is now replaced in prominence by a newly influential and importantly different representation of the analyst as localized outside.

I propose that this is how the group (mode 3) emerges from the 'group'. An aspect of the 'group' is attacked, and those parts of it which survive are clearly experienced as localized outside the subjective selves of the members, while those that do not remain indeterminately localized. What is important is that the aspect of the 'group' which is attacked does not survive, but it is that aspect as an aspect of the group which is found to have survived. Those localizations may not bear up when their reality is tested, for they may be influenced by any variety of defenses. But it is only now possible to test their reality. The 'group' fantasy may continue to be active and powerful, but not with respect to this issue.

It is crucial that such an attack is made in unison by most of the 'group' members. As I noted towards the end of chapter 3, if only one person challenges the 'group' fantasy then the 'group' will be experienced as

powerfully independent of him. The 'group' survives, and that individual experiences great pressure to rejoin it. Emancipation from an aspect of the 'group' can only be attained when it is attacked from a position of contact with the 'group', when it is experienced as a primary process presence. Dissociating from the 'group', as for example by emphasizing one's experiences in what I have called the realm of privacy, results in a feeling of loss of vitality, the possible suffering of considerable interpersonal pressure, and--most importantly in this context--in the continued inability to engage other individuals with (and so test the reality of) one's mode 3 relations.

An example of the problems of the individual in challenging the 'group' alone was given above, when we saw how the mode 3 representation of the problem tends to be derailed towards its representation in mode 2 terms. But the members may together attack a dependency leader in his capacity as container of the magical key to the 'group's' problems with sexual interaction and rivalry, which is at the same time an attack on the fantasy of the 'group' as hopelessly enmeshed in that problem. This aspect of the dependency leader is found not to survive, but a consultant with certain real skills does. He may be felt to have magical powers in other respects, but not with regard to this issue. Similarly, the 'group' fantasy no longer envelops this issue, though it does continue in other

aspects.

If the situation were one of a pairing 'group', then the attack is more directly against the relevant aspect of the 'group' itself. The members jointly attack (overtly challenge) the representation of the pair as containing their (each individual's own and all the other individuals', so that it also involves its status as joint primary process presence) problems of sexual attraction and rivalry, and the solution to them. This representation of the pair does not survive. What does survive is a representation of the pair as two individuals who have problems in this respect, and who are members of a group whose other members have similar problems. The details of each individual's notion of precisely who has what problems may be quite distorted, but it is only once they are experienced by the members as pertaining to separate individuals (only once the group experiences them as pertaining to the group, and not the 'group') that steps towards testing their reality can proceed.

In the case of fight-flight, the destructiveness shown towards the non-'group' has the purpose of maintaining it rigidly and completely apart from the 'group', so that track two development with respect to what has been placed onto the non-'group' is not possible. It is possible, though, through an attack on the fight-flight leader, whom we saw at the beginning of this chapter to be

the recipient of more modulated but otherwise not dissimilar parts as the non-`group`, which he deflects onto the non-`group`. For example, let us say again that the issue is that of sexual rivalry, and the fight-flight non-`group` figure--most likely the consultant--is felt to be container of all the hostility arising from it; the fight-flight leader is leading by virtue of his skill in attributing all manifestations of rivalrous differences between `group` members to the consultant and his pernicious interpretations. Track two development here would involve a unified challenge not of the consultant's role as container of all rivalrous hostility, for that would be too threatening, but of the fight-flight leader's capacity of attributing all such hostility to the consultant. Say the consultant makes some interpretation to the effect that the group is seeking to get rid of members' mutual hostility; and the fight-flight leader responds by accusing the consultant of jealously trying to disrupt a friendly group. But instead of accepting or supporting that, some of the members challenge the fight-flight leader's move, and other members go along with the challenge. In this way the representation of the fight-flight leader as `ascriber of our sexual rivalry elsewhere` is attacked and found not to survive; what survives is the notion of he and others doing that for themselves, to differing degrees. The non-`group` figure is thus only

indirectly relieved of his role as container of that particular badness, and he may still be experienced as container of other badnesses.

The examples illustrate that track two development can occur in the context of any of the 'group' fantasies. The difference that the particular 'group' structure makes is in the specific figure in the 'group' fantasy which is challenged. In the case of fight-flight, it is the fight-flight leader who is challenged, and part of his function newly experienced as pertaining in different degrees to the individuals as individuals. It is via this challenge that the fight-flight 'group' is contracted in its scope, and the non-'group' relieved of a part of the badness it is experienced as containing. In the case of the dependency 'group' it is the non-'group' figure of the dependency leader, who has been maintained on the boundary of the 'group', who is challenged, and who (or which) is newly experienced in the relevant aspects independently from the 'group' fantasy. Although the process is concurrent, it is via the attack on the deity that the realm of the 'group' is contracted--i.e. it is via the attack on the deity as sole and magical solver of the problem that the 'group' as hopelessly enmeshed in it is attacked. It is only in the context of the pairing structure that the 'group' itself can be directly challenged.

Such attacks are not necessarily dramatically acted

out, as in Slater's account of revolts. All that is necessary is a joint challenge of the 'group' fantasy: an event of significance and, one might expect, palpably so, but not necessarily noisily so. It is in a sense a destructive or aggressive act, but not necessarily a violent one. The person or persons who have been containing the relevant representations for the 'group' may, indeed, be more than slightly relieved.

A shift in the 'group' fantasy (e.g dependency to pairing) does not necessarily follow. Most importantly, a shift in the 'group' fantasy is a different kind of event: It involves an interchange of elements of the primary process presence with elements of the non-'group' entity, while this kind of development involves a new importance of those elements as pertaining to neither the 'group' nor the non-'group', but to the group as a collection of individuals. A shift in the 'group' fantasy may involve an increased area of privacy, but not an increased engagement with the mode 3 issues. This is not to say that these two kinds of events cannot happen concurrently, but that they should not be confused with each other.

One can see how a shift in the 'group' fantasy might be mistaken for track two development, especially when the dependency leader is expelled in a shift to fight-flight or is taken in to the 'group' in a shift to pairing. (This is where I think Slater's notion of revolts is too

broad for our purposes, where it does not make an adequate distinction.) The criterion for saying that track two development has taken place is that there is an increased engagement with some issue in terms in which individuals are differentiated from each other. Firstly, one would expect a decrease in "we" statements and in "you" statements which refer to a dependency leader or a 'group' pair, and an increase in "I" statements and a wider range of objects of "you" statements. (Of course, things are not quite so tangible: "we" statements can greatly vary in the differentiation of what they are referring to, and some "I"s are speaking for the 'group'.) Different views of the issue are tolerated, and may be discussed and compared. Secondly, there is a decrease in emotional contagion around the issue: expressions of affect are more variable between individuals, and overall more modulated, and there is not the phenomenon where one person's expression of fear or optimism or hostility immediately infects the others.

There is a further factor that would distinguish such a developmental attack from a mere shift to a fight-flight structure. Only in so far as the former was the case would one expect manifestations of guilt, and perhaps reparation. An attack on the dependency leader which is associated with development on track two may, for example, be followed with a period of being "good boys and girls".

by being awfully nice to the consultant or concentrating especially hard on the task. This would be very different from being a good 'group' fighting a bad non-'group'.

In this development, it is not only that the members must be in contact with the 'group'. So must the object which is attacked in its status as 'group' figure. (This is in part why the fight-flight non-'group' figure cannot be attacked in this way.) Here the isomorphism with Winnicott's account breaks down, for in The Use of an Object it is given as a precondition that the patient has allowed the analyst to function as a transitional object (i.e has regressed in that way) and that the independent and external analyst has allowed himself to be experienced as such (has not challenged the paradox in which the analyst is experienced as neither self nor other but both); and similarly for the independent and external mother. (Winnicott discusses these preconditions as far as the infant is concerned in several papers [1945/1975e, 1958/1965a, 1960/1965f, 1963/1965b] and as far as the adult patient is concerned in some others [1954/1975c, 1969/1971c; see also Khan, 1969/1979c, 1971/1974c].) There is no clear equivalent of this analyst or mother in the group. The consultant as dependency leader looks closest to it, but compared to the analyst or mother he is relatively powerless as to whether he is experienced as fulfilling the role or not. Members create the 'group'

and the non-`group`, and it is they who thus obscure the group or create it by these attacks.

For the `group` is very different from transitional objects or transitional areas between two individuals, in that for the individual the `group` mediates his relation to a collection of individuals (both as an agglomeration and as individuals) of which he is one. For each individual, it mediates not only his relation to others, but also in part to himself. This distinguishes it from transitional objects such as the infant's teddy bear or blanket, but is characteristic of objects in the "cultural field", which refers to the transitional area of those who have advanced beyond infantile or borderline functioning (Winnicott, 1953/1975h, 1967/1971a). In the next chapter, we will return to this question of the `group` as a transitional phenomenon.

CHAPTER FIVE

IMPLICATIONS

Thus far, I have presented a view of the group as developing along two tracks, and spelled out how they involve different processes and result in different kinds of gains for the individual members. It is only the latter which can be said to constitute a basis for individual development in the group. This final chapter is a further elaboration of some aspects of this account, and an exploration of some of its implications.

The first section addresses the relation between the developmental tracks, supplementing the previous chapter with a discussion of their interconnections as well as their independence. It also, following up the commitment that this account be as much as possible open to confirmation or disconfirmation, discusses some predictions as to the course of a group's development. In the second section I will review the definitions of modes 2 and 3 which were given in the first chapter, and focus on the

role of the 'group' as serving at one and the same time a defensive and transitional-phenomenon role. I will go on to offer some further, but necessarily incomplete, connections with Winnicott's notions of play and the cultural field. These connections must be considered more suggestive than systematic. Finally, in the third section I will reconsider the notion of development that I have used in this account, make some connections between group development and some typical tasks for which unstructured groups meet, and end by considering whether there may not be something to be gained from experiences in unstructured groups which is not itself individual development.

The Relation Between the Tracks

In the previous chapter we looked first at changes in the relation of the individual member to the group as a unitary entity (mode 2); and then at development in the individual's engagement in relations with other individuals in the group (engagement with mode 3). We arrived at two distinct tracks of development--distinct in the following ways.

In discussing track one, we saw that shifts in 'group' fantasies may occur with no accompanying increase in individuals' ability to engage on or test the reality of their mode 3 fantasies in the group--i.e. with no accompanying development on track two. In discussing

track two, we saw that development--an increase in engagement on mode 3 relations and a decrease in the realm of the 'group'--may occur in the context of any of the 'group' fantasies and without any shift in that fantasy--i.e without any shift on track one. In other words, the two tracks may proceed independently.

Furthermore, the two tracks refer to different kinds of changes in members' object relations. Track one refers to the interchange of elements of the primary process presence of the 'group' with elements of the non-'group' entity; track two refers to a reduction in the prominence of either of those elements in favor of their being represented as pertaining to particular individuals independently from the 'group' fantasy.

Finally, the criteria for a shift on each track are mutually independent. For track one it involves a change in the nature of the predominant affect, in the localization of the non-'group' entity, and in the assumption that the group embodies. For track two it involves an increased engagement with some issue in terms in which individuals are differentiated from each other, and a decrease in emotional contagion.

The claim that track one development does not imply track two development (nor vice versa) implies that at least sometimes it will occur that a group displays the opposite extremes of each track simultaneously. That is,

we might see a group with a pairing 'group' structure which is nevertheless allowing minimal engagement on mode 3 (or 4) relations--and this was described in chapter 4. We also might see a group with a high degree of engagement on mode 3 (and 4) relations which nevertheless has a fight-flight 'group' structure. What would such a contained fight-flight 'group' look like?

In general, track two development without a shift in the 'group' fantasy (change on track one) involves a decrease in the degree to which issues that arise are contaminated with 'group' fantasy elements--i.e a decrease in the degree to which the representation of issues in terms of mode 3 relations is derailed towards representing the issues and their solutions in terms of mode 2 relations. A group's progression on track two appears as a progressively increasing degree to which issues are handled without distortion by mode 2 fantasies. A contained fight-flight 'group', then, can take two forms.

Firstly, there may be a group in which, on the whole, issues are discussed in a task oriented manner in terms in which individuals are differentiated from each other, with different strengths and kinds of feelings tolerated--except with respect to a certain issue (or a limited collection of issues). A therapy group, for example, which is well advanced on track two, due to some ruling by the sponsoring institution must change the time or loca-

tion at which it meets--and it responds to this with a fight-flight structure. The sponsoring institution is experienced most irrationally as dangerous and hostile; anger and fear of it is the predominant--and contagious--affect; attempts by the therapist to explain the change are met by an equal rage and fear as he is identified with the institution. At subsequent sessions the group may return to its previous constructive ways, with a high degree of engagement with mode 3 and 4 relations, but it emerges that this is based on denial of (flight from) the fact of the change--for when that issue is again brought up the group again prominently manifests the cognitive and affective phenomena of the fight-flight 'group'. This sort of contained fight-flight 'group' would be most dramatically seen when a new issue is thrust on the group from outside, but one can easily surmise that 'change in time or location' does not completely describe the issue at hand. One would guess that the threatened change has brought to the forefront some broader issue which is still dealt with in predominantly mode 2 fight-flight terms.

The second form of contained fight-flight 'group' is more common, and is related to what Bion termed a "specialized work group". Instead of only a certain issue being dealt with in fight-flight terms, any issue is liable to be so handled, but only temporarily. At certain times, certain members of the group (the individuals may

change) interpret achievements of the group in fight-flight terms: not as the consequence of its members differentiated functioning--their putting together of their skills as different individuals and arriving at some resolution of an issue--but as the triumph of a unitary 'group' over some entity outside its boundary. For a while members bask in this triumph, and differences between members are denied, after which there is a return to the predominance of mode 3 and 4 functioning. The obverse of this is when a failure or a problem is interpreted as a defeat or victimization at the hands of a non-'group' entity, and only after a while of expression of utter hatred and fear of that entity can the group return to a more differentiated engagement with its problems. Such an activation of a fight-flight structure may serve an important role in maintaining a group's cohesiveness around and motivation to progress on its task, while its temporary nature minimizes its obstruction of mode 3 or 4 engagement.

A variation of this second form arises when issues are liable to be handled in a more lasting but more modulated fight-flight fantasy. The above kind of interpretations of the group's achievements and failures is made more frequently, but as a kind of 'sub-theme' of the group. Members feel themselves to be connected via a 'group' which is seen to be fighting or fleeing from some

entity, but this representation subsists alongside rather than derails the mode 3 and 4 representations of the issue. It may never predominate over mode 3 and 4 functioning, and indeed one might say that its frequent but mild expression serves to ensure that it does not predominate.

While it is a major thesis of this work that modes 2 and 3 entail two distinct tracks of development which may proceed independently, there are good reasons to expect direct correlation in their progress. For there are three ways in which development on track one and on track two are connected.

In a fight-flight structure, the 'group' is felt as unmitigatedly good, and the non-'group' as unmitigatedly bad and a danger to the 'group'. Though emancipation from this fantasy with respect to some issue will provide some relief from a difficult situation, it is less likely to be broken out of than if the 'group' and non-'group' elements were already experienced with some ambivalence, as in a dependency or pairing situation. The situation is felt as more dangerous, the risks higher. The more the non-'group' entity is dissociated and experienced as bad and dangerous, the less likely is track two development--even if track two proceeds indirectly by challenges to another entity, such as the fight-flight leader.

In an inverse relation to the degree of dissociation

of the non-`group` entity is the localization of responsibility for problems in group life closer to the subjective self. The more members feel it is they--even they as an undifferentiated `group`--where responsibility lies, rather than with a non-`group` entity, the more their assumptions about themselves are thrown into relief and finally likely to be challenged. In a pairing `group` it is they who fail to give birth to the messianic entity, and no entity clearly apart from the `group` can be blamed, so with disillusionment the question can only be what they are doing wrong.

The third factor is most central to our exploration of the relation between modes 2 and 3. Track one development is marked by an increasing realm of privacy in which individuals can entertain mode 3 relations. I have emphasized that this is not the same as the increasing possibility of public engagement with--and so ability to test the reality of--mode 3 relations, which is what track two development involves. But there is an important connection.

The kind of attack or challenge that marks development track two must be made in unison. That is, though one member may express the challenge, most of the others must support or at least go along with it (exact proportions cannot be specified, and both amount and quality of support is of importance). Otherwise the `group` survives

and reasserts itself. This act, then, rests on members having some idea that the requisite support is likely to be forthcoming. Furthermore, for the 'group' to be in part renounced, there must have already been some lessening of the fear of mode 1 merger which the 'group' had been working to keep in abeyance. At least this must be true with respect to the issue which the group is going to free from the 'group' fantasy, and which it is going to be able to engage on in terms of mode 3 relations. So there must not be the fear that everyone suffers the issue in the same way: If the attempt to use others as differentiated individuals to find a resolution of the issue will only reproduce the problem as something that envelops them all, then it would be better to continue to handle it in terms of a 'group' fantasy. There must be an awareness that with respect to the issue they are not an undifferentiated mass.

What the track two challenge presupposes, then, is that there has been some expression of idiosyncratic views of the issue, and it is only from members' realms of privacy that such statements can be made. There has not yet, of course, been any public engagement by the group with such statements, but members have been able to risk giving expression to them nevertheless. And this is more likely in so far as the group has previously handled the issue in the context of the more advanced (on track one)

'group' fantasies. For in the fight-flight, dependency, pairing sequence, the 'group' fantasy becomes more complex, so that more individual difference can be 'smuggled under' its expression; and the consequences of being caught out expressing too much of one's private mode 3 fantasies become less dire.

Furthermore, the realm of privacy is important regardless of whether individuals give expression to it. In a fight-flight, dependency, pairing development, the increased realm of privacy provides an increasing psychological space in which each individual can develop his own individual stance towards the 'group' (and/or non-'group'), while still not losing contact with it. The three 'group' structures provide an increasing level of confidence that the 'group' will be available for the member after he spends time working over, in privacy, his own individual sense of what is transpiring; and in this way they afford an increasing opportunity to move from dependence on the 'group' towards readiness for the steps of autonomy from it that mark track two development.

To this we might add that awareness of one's own individual stance towards the 'group's' issues in itself tends to carry with it (by projective and identificatory processes) the assumption that others also have individual stances. And this assumption alone may be a first step towards testing it out publicly in the group.

We will need to discuss what degree of correlation between the two tracks of development these connections suggest. When I found a developmental track in the sequence from fight-flight to dependency to pairing, I left open the question of whether groups actually do move in that sequence. What does this theory predict about that? Before turning to that question, though, I want to consider that Bion (1961), as we saw in the review of the literature in chapter 1, saw no track of development at all in groups' shifting from one basic assumption to another. On the other hand, Slater (1966), followed by Gibbard and Hartman (1973; Gibbard, Hartman, & Mann, 1974, pp. 83-93; Hartman, & Gibbard, 1974a, 1974b), wrote of a strong tendency in their groups for a shift over time, in at least the predominant 'group' fantasy, which fitted a fight-flight, dependency, pairing sequence--though they also noted that there were regressions and progressions within this overall pattern. Furthermore, Slater (again, followed by Gibbard and Hartman) proposed that this relatively clearly seen developmental track one was closely correlated with increasingly differentiated functioning within the group. How does this account fit with these different views?

The claim that the two tracks are not necessarily linked is a major parallel with Bion's conclusion that the basic assumption 'groups' are equally marked by "the

absence of any process of development" (1961, p. 159). We have in this account articulated distinctions between the basic assumption 'groups' which Bion did not, and gathered some of these differences together and called it 'development track one'; but we have also noted that as far as the ability to engage on and test the reality of the group's relations is concerned (i.e. for the group to learn by experience), track one gives no development at all. This latter kind of development--track two--is quite different, and independent of the former.

However, with respect to the group's ability to engage with what we here term mode 3 and 4 relations, Bion held that the only difference between the basic assumptions is that contained versions of particular basic assumptions may be used by the work-group as more appropriate than the others to carrying through with a particular task. Here we differ from Bion: In addition to any greater appropriateness of a particular basic assumption 'group' structure to a particular task, this account holds that the basic assumption 'groups' differ in how inimicable they are to development in general. They are marked by differing degrees of tolerance of and motivation for the intrapsychic (private) and interpersonal processes which are prerequisites for track two development with respect to any issue.

It is more difficult to make a precise comparison

between Slater's account and the one presented here. His notion of the revolt, or revolt process, does not speak with precision to the distinction between track one and two. Furthermore, he leaned more towards relating small group processes to social and anthropological data than towards relating them to the experiences of the individual, with the result that he never defined some of his central terms--especially "individuation", "conscious and unconscious bonds" and "development"--clearly enough for us to be precise about their relation to the distinctions which are central in this account.

Two points of difference, though, are worth wrestling with. First, Slater's predominant view through his work is that "secularization" and development of the group involves "rescuing more and more pieces of reality" from fantasy (1966, p. 144; but he implies a different view on p. 256). It thus remains somewhat obscure why he so firmly detaches this from individual development. I think the account presented here is rather clearer in our noting that it is not so much pieces of reality that are rescued in track two development as it is the possibility of testing reality. If we understand individual development in the group to involve the re-internalizing and correct localization of what has been placed onto other group members, then even track two only constitutes the groundwork for individual development (or for psychotherapy, or

for engagement with whatever is the task of the group). It is not itself (or not necessarily) individual development, because the mode 3 fantasies which can then be engaged with may themselves involve a good deal of distortion.

It seems to me that Slater's vagueness about the ways in which "secularization" affects members' relation to reality is significant. He confounds (i) different 'group' structures allowing different realms of privacy for entertainment of the range of object relations, with (ii) different 'group' structures involving different degrees of engagement with the range of object relations. Where this account says that "a greater realm of privacy to entertain mode 3 relations is allowed", Slater would say that "a greater realm of engagement with mode 3 relations is allowed".

The second point has been noted earlier: Whereas Slater places fight-flight as the first 'group' structure in his developmental scheme, he does not mean the same as what we, with Bion, mean by the term. By this account, what Slater describes as typical of the earliest stages of his group's lives were probably periods when no 'group' had yet been formed. Fight-flight in our sense of the term Slater understands only as a manifestation of the breakdown of a dependency 'group'. Indeed, he criticizes Bion's notion of basic assumption fight-flight as being a

different order of construct from dependency and pairing. "What is the "something" that it is oriented against?", he asks, "The other assumptions are substantive as well as procedural--the group is to do something in relation to the leader or a Messiah" (p. 132).

This account elucidates a notion of fight-flight which is not a construct of a different order. It hypothesizes that the substance of the fight-flight non-`group` is the most intolerable of the representations that are evoked by the task of finding a relation to the group and its members, and that it is treated by members with the aim of annihilation, by destruction or by denial. The other `group` structures do not involve that degree of fear and dissociation of the non-`group`, and with more contact allowed there is more articulation of it in the group. In dependency the non-`group` entity has more texture and complexity in its leading function, but we have seen that the fight-flight `group` is no less dependent on--constituted and defined as up against--its own non-`group`.

Slater might want to reply that this isomorphism is still one of procedure and not substance. In which case our question would have to be: What is the "substance" of the dependency leader except something like `holder of the `group's` powers and solver of its problems`, and of the messiah except `holder of the `group's` future and solver

of its problems`; and in what sense do these involve some "substance" which 'holder of the 'group's` badness` does not, when in a fight-flight context to hold the 'group's` badness is precisely to solve its problems? In other words, Slater would need to say a good deal more about his substance-procedure distinction than he does.

At any rate, we have two ways in which any correlation between developmental tracks one and two which follows from this account would be different from Slater's developmental continuum. One of the 'group` terms on his continuum does not correspond to one of mine, and he does not see one of mine as warranting the status here given to it; and what in his account corresponds to track two is importantly different from it, or at least its relation to track two is unclear.

Even if we must give up a close comparison to Slater's, what sort of correlation between the tracks is implied by this theory? Track two developmental attacks are more likely in the context of a pairing or dependency 'group` than a fight-flight one, because the lesser degree of dissociation of what is placed onto the non-'group` entity implies less danger and risk in relieving it of what it holds. It is less clear that there is any such difference between dependency and pairing. There may seem more danger in challenging a deity embodied in the consultant than a messianic entity which is not yet born, but it

is only the latter which involves attacking the 'group'-- the source of feelings of vitality and belongingness-- directly. Pairing is less resilient to frustration than is dependency because of the lack of any non-'group' entity that can be blamed and then further dissociated from the 'group'. While this may make a track two challenge to the 'group' fantasy more likely, it may simply imply that there will more quickly be a shift to another 'group' fantasy.

As far as the realm of privacy is concerned, it is the history of the handling of the issue that is most important. What is crucial is that individual stances towards the issue have been developed, and have been hinted at in the group, and it is only of this that the members must have a sense before the track two challenge can take place. The implication is that issues have been active in a dependency or pairing context before track two development can be taken with respect to them. But there is little additional reason for the 'group' structure not to be fight-flight at the moment when it is taken.

So, with respect to any particular issue, we expect it to be handled in a dependency or pairing structure before track two development takes place. Can we further expect that an issue (or "group tension") will tend to be handled in any particular sequence of 'group' fantasies; specifically, fight-flight - dependency - pairing?

This is not a simple question, and some digression will be necessary before returning to answer it. The difficulty was exemplified above, when I gave the illustrative issue of sexual rivalry and attraction, and showed how this issue might be (derailed as a mode 3 issue and) handled as a problem of a dependency 'group' or of a pairing 'group'. I also pointed out that if frustration or hopelessness built then it might be transformed into a problem of a fight-flight 'group', but that it is then unlikely that it would look much like the same issue. The difficulty is, if something is being handled in one 'group' structure, and then another, in what way is it the same issue?

When we refer to a group "issue" we use an abstract and secondary process representation to summarize (and indicate a commonality within) a complex of members' representations at various levels of organization, and with various degrees of association to other representations. Any issue, then, is multiply layered and is connected more or less closely to other issues, a fact we are familiar with from any psychodynamically oriented therapy. This is as true for group issues as it is for the issues of an individual patient, though what would emerge as aspects of group issues will be a compromise of the aspects which are most prominent for the individuals, as a result of the sort of negotiation which Ezriel

(1950/1980) and Eisold (1981) described. And these aspects will vary in their level of organization, the kind and strength of affect evoked, in their connection to other aspects and to aspects of other issues, and in many other details.

Clearly, some of these aspects are more suitably handled in one 'group' structure than the others. And this is the sense in which a shift in the 'group' fantasy, which may then appear to be dealing with a different issue from the previous one, may be said to be dealing with the same issue. To use Bion's image again, with a twist of the lense two different though related issues may be seen to be aspects of one.

For example, one can take 'aggression and survival', 'dependency and competence', and 'rivalry and generativity' to be three different (clusters of) issues, and easily see that each is more likely to be handled in one 'group' structure rather than the others. The affective qualities, number and complexity of objects, degrees of dissociation evoked, and so on, fit. Twist the lense, though, and they can equally be seen as aspects of issues --of any general or specific issue of sexual or work relations, for example, or of action towards any ambition or ideal. Indeed, is it not the case that almost any issue of much interest has the above-mentioned three aspects?

(One might complain that I am using the term "issue"

in a too flexible way, saying you can track an issue in the group over time, and yet saying that one needs often to see that two different issues are aspects of the same one. I want to say that though it is not useful to define the issue too narrowly or too broadly, we need "issue" to be that malleable. We need to be able to notice how much things are connected to other things, at the same time as noting that some things are more connected than others, and some things are connected to others in different ways.

(The useful breadth of the term depends on the context of its application--whether one wants to draw attention to differences or similarities. When I use the term broadly [saying these different though related issues are aspects of the same issue] I want to say: "Look at that dependency 'group', and look [a time later] at that fight-flight 'group', and see them as handling the same thing, even if many things look very different". This is somewhat like, "Look at that person who used to be so ambitious, and is now so self-effacing and concerned only for others' welfare, and see these as different ways of handling the same wish--and not just as different wishes".

(How can one at some other time legitimately say: "Now they are dealing with a different issue"? Clearly one needs some independent standard for distinguishing between issues, but we cannot go further into that question here.)

If group issues have multiple aspects in the same way as do individuals' issues, and if these different aspects may be more suitably handled in some 'group' structures than others, then there is an implication that the different 'group' structures might correspond with the different levels of organization, kinds and strength of affects, etc., which are associated with different stages of individual development.

One way to approach this question is to follow Bion's (1961) hint that the basic assumptions correspond to primitive defensive fantasies of the infant attempting to make the developmental step of the depressive position. When Carsky (1978) more systematically explored the relation between Bion's and Melanie Klein's developmental theories, she concluded that fight-flight, dependency and pairing each respectively correspond to a slightly more developmentally advanced infantile defensive fantasy (summarized in chapter 1).

Part of the problem that the 'group' solves is indeed that of how to find a relation to an object which is made of parts, which does suggest that in some central way the problem is that of the depressive position. In such a correspondence, it is the group which is equivalent to the mother; to find what corresponds to the 'group' would involve connecting the notion of transitional object or primary process presence to Klein's theory, which would be

no mean task. The fight-flight 'group' is marked by a great degree of splitting and projection by its members, and the dependency 'group' by the need to find a way to have its leader contain somewhat more modulated extremes of goodness and badness, without falling back on fight-flight. There does on the face of it seem to be a link here with the depressive position and regression to paranoid-schizoid mechanisms. Periods of denial of the group as anything needing to be related to--the group as a collection of pairs or in the state of in-fighting which Slater refers to as fight-flight--would be parallel to a more thorough-going paranoid-schizoid annihilation of the group. Pairing seems to me more difficult to place: It too is a fantasy the dependency 'group' may fall back on, yet it also seems designed to manage issues in triangular oedipal terms, which surely marks an advance on the dependency structure. If a group's handling of an issue shifts from dependency to pairing, it is not clear to me on any prima facie basis whether this would, in Kleinian terms, correspond to development to oedipal complexities or a manic incorporation of the deity with a denial of his badness (his failure to perform as an all-giving deity). Perhaps this is a problem with the concept of the pairing 'group', and with further refinement a further distinction can be made--perhaps between pairing 'groups' in which enthrallment with the pairing is very prominent and those

in which it is the hope and enthusiasm (which can take on a manic quality) which is most outstanding.

These observations are necessarily schematic, for it is well beyond the scope of this work to link developmental track one to Klein's account of development. Indeed, we are going to have to leave open the question of whether group developmental track one corresponds in detail to any specific account of individual development. The link to Klein, though, will serve as an illustration of the ways in which the handling of an issue in terms of different 'group' fantasies may correspond to the individual patient's exploration of an issue in a psychoanalysis. It is not typical for an issue of any complexity to be retrieved from the 'group' fantasy in one step--for there to be just one track two challenge, after which the issue in all its aspects is predominantly represented in terms of mode 3 and 4 relations. In a sense, one may speak of an issue having to be "worked through" by a group, with each step of "working through" enabling members as individuals to engage with a new aspect of the issue. The parallel is at least close enough to indicate an answer to the question of whether we can expect a group issue to be handled in any particular track one sequence.

What determines whether the next aspect of an issue to emerge is a more or less 'primitive' one is a complex interaction of the fate of the previous aspect (the degree

to which track two development took place versus frustration forcing a shift in 'group' structure); the personalities of the individuals in their interaction and combination; the specific issues that emerge as group, and hence 'group', issues; and the environment external to the group (for even if the environment leaves the group quite alone the members bring with them issues which derive from their life in that environment). So no strong prediction can be made as to the sequence of 'group' structures in which single issues are handled. The problem is analogous to that of whether in an individual treatment an issue will tend to be worked through from its more 'primitive' layers to its more sophisticated ones, or vice versa, or in no very clear order. Not only may non-analytic interventions be influential, but the more 'primitive' layers can be a defense against sophisticated ones as much as the more sophisticated ones may overlay issues which derive their strength from its more 'primitive' forms (Stolorow and Lachmann, 1980).

But it is possible to say more than that. In general, the aspects of an issue which are being represented in terms of mode 2 rather than 3 relations are those around which members fear being an undifferentiated mass. The fear is that all will feel the same around this particular problem. In the early stages of the emergence of an issue--when there has been little chance of enter-

tainment or expression of private individual stances towards it--the fear of being an undifferentiated mass around it is likely to be great. And the greater fear implies the evoking of more intolerable self and object representations, with a greater need to split and more dissociatively project. So the fight-flight 'group' is relatively likely. Later on, when track two development has been achieved with respect to some aspects of the issue, there still remain aspects which can only be dealt with in mode 2 terms. For the reasons given in the above paragraph one cannot say whether the next of these aspects to emerge will in itself be more or less fearful, fit one or other 'group' structure best. But, other things being equal, one can say that the fact of differentiation around some aspects imply less of a threat of being an undifferentiated mass around others. This is so as long as one assumes that whatever the links between the aspects that resulted in their emerging one after the other in the group, those same links are equally associative links for many of the individual members. This implies less of a likelihood that the emergence of later aspects of an issue will evoke representations of such an intolerable nature that they need be dealt with in fight-flight, and more of a likelihood that they will be handled in dependency or pairing 'groups'.

It is now only a small step to deal with my last

question about the correlation between the tracks: Can we expect that over a group's life, as it progressively engages with more and more issues in terms of modes 3 and 4 rather than 2, it will tend to shift along developmental track one with respect to whatever issues remain within the 'group' realm? That is, in so far as the group continues to function in mode 2, will the most common mode 2 fantasy, regardless of the specific issue or how much the issue changes, tend to shift from fight-flight to dependency to pairing?

The same can be said about this as about the vicissitudes of a specific issue. The more there has been track two development in general, the less will there be the fear of being an undifferentiated mass around whatever next emerges, and so the less is the likelihood of it being dealt with in a fight-flight structure--though, again, it is not only the fear of being an undifferentiated mass which evokes the threatening representations which need to be handled in fight-flight terms. That is also determined by what the issue is, the characteristics of the individuals, and so on.

We can see that the answer to this question is the same as the answer to the previous one by seeing that this question can be reformulated as referring to the specific issue of 'being oneself and yet part of the group' or 'being able to work in/as a group'. The possibility of

this reformulation is not merely an artifice of my use of the term 'issue'. The general point can be made, that the more closely what emerges--whether it is seen as an issue or an aspect of an issue--is related to, or associated in the minds of members with, what has previously emerged and been emancipated from the 'group' realm, the less fear there will be of being an undifferentiated mass with respect to it. And the longer the history of the group, the more likely it is that what emerges is closely related to what has previously emerged.

I see no clear ground for predicting any systematic tendency for groups to shift in the predominance of dependency to pairing 'group' structures. If there is such a correlation, it has not yielded its secrets to this analysis. My sense is that this may reflect a relative lack of precision in the notion of the pairing 'group'. Note the problem mentioned above in making the link between the pairing 'group' and Kleinian theory; and we can add to that Bion's equivocation in which, though he defined pairing very much as I do, he was later (1961, p. 151) inclined to make the feeling of hope and optimism as itself sufficient evidence for the pairing basic assumption, even if no enthrallment with a pair (implying triangular features) or other evidence was apparent.

The question concerns the import of the pairing 'group' fantasy as a more complex and hence a more

'sophisticated layer' than the dependency fantasy, with a greater realm of privacy and the greater complexity of the 'group' object which allows triangular and oedipal issues to be "worked through"; as against the import of the pairing 'group' as oriented to the future and containing the imminent birth of the messiah, which implies a (manic?) form of denial of the dependency problem that there is no entity with magical powers who will save the group. On a closer look, will we find that what is here subsumed under "pairing 'group'" really contains two kinds of group structure which would best be considered separately? Looking at groups with this question in mind is called for.

The Relation Between the Modes, and the 'Group' as a Transitional Phenomenon

We began this account with an a priori definition of mode 2 as the relationship to the group as a unitary entity, involving no differentiation between the other members. We found that the best way to describe this object of the 'group' was as a primary process presence with indeterminate or shifting localization. We should, though, revise the statement that in this mode there is no differentiation between other group members.

To be precise, we found differentiations between 'group' functions, which may or may not closely correspond

to distinctions between individuals (i.e. one individual may serve more than one function, and more than one individual may be undifferentiated from each other with respect to their fulfilling the same function). There are two kinds of differentiation which may be made, both of which correspond to different kinds of 'group' leadership. There is the differentiation between the 'group' and the non-'group', with the latter being maintained in some structures more strongly dissociated from the primary process presence of the 'group' than in others. We have seen that in all cases the 'group' fantasy is dependent on and directed towards the non-'group', though they differ in the form, articulation, and visibility of this. In this sense, I think the non-'group' warrants a label of leadership of the 'group', and indeed the dependency leader and the pairing messiah are typically referred to as such.

The second kind of differentiation is that between the body of the 'group' and the fight-flight leader, the dependency "patient", or the pairing pair. Only the first and last of these three are typically referred to as leading the 'group', but they equally seem to warrant a label of leadership. However, this is leadership of a different kind: These entities serve to represent the 'group' to a special degree, to lead the 'group' in their followership of the first kind of leader. Though the

primary process presence of the 'group' is of indeterminate localization--neither self nor other but both (or sometimes more one and sometimes more the other)--it is experienced as particularly pertaining to any members who are fulfilling these functions.

Leadership of the group has not been a focus of this work, and I have followed its well-worn vocabulary. But it is worth noting that this vocabulary passes over these differences, and tends to conflate these two kinds of leadership. While this is perhaps not of great import in the case of the pairing 'group', where the pair and the messiah are experienced as intimately connected, what is typically termed fight-flight and dependency leadership refer to quite different functions in relation to the 'group'.

Mode 3 was defined as the relations to other individuals in the group which are, in a broad sense, transferential. It also refers to patterns of such relationships, even if it is the pattern which is most salient, as long as the other individuals are differentiated from each other. I emphasized that it is not necessarily the case that mode 3 relations involve greater self-object differentiation than mode 2 relations, for individuals may greatly differ in the developmental level of their mode 3 relations. An individual may have a very primitive mode 3 relation with one other member, but not with the rest;

hence he may be differentiating between individuals even if he is not differentiating between himself and the one other. If it is a psychotherapy group which we are dealing with, we may hope that he is able to work in the group on his propensity to lose his differentiation from this transference figure; but this is quite different from his work on emancipating himself, in and with the group, from the 'group' fantasy.

But clearly there is a tendency for mode 3 relations to derive from a later stage of development than mode 2 relations, even if they overlap. If other individuals are differentiated from each other, then it is more likely that they (or at least some of them) are also differentiated from the self to a greater degree than is a primary process presence of indeterminate location. We can say that, except in so far as the members are as individuals functioning at a borderline level or lower, mode 3 relations are at a higher level of development than mode 2. We are thus fundamentally in agreement with Kernberg (1976, chap. 9), who suggested that unstructured groups tend to activate a more primitive level of object relations more quickly than in two-person therapy situations, and in such a way that recovery from the regression is also quick once the individual is outside the group.

Kernberg went on to suggest this as the basis for an integrated hospital treatment. He proposed that patients

attend a group in which group level interpretations are made of what transpires, and patients also have a "hospital therapy" in which the therapist--using data from the group and elsewhere--helps the patient gain insight into and command over his place in the whole social system of the ward and hospital. In addition, patients have a distinct individual therapy in which dyadic transference relations can be worked on. Kernberg saw these three elements of the treatment as covering the two overlapping levels of object relations which are evoked in unstructured groups and two-person situations. It is interesting that his notion of the hospital therapy is that of a two-person situation in which the individual can develop with respect to problems arising in group contexts. This reflects what we would term his pessimism about the group's ability to achieve significant track two development and to use that groundwork for individual development in the group.

Of course, Kernberg was dealing with hospitalized borderline, and in some cases schizophrenic, patients, who tend to function even in their mode 3 relations at a primitive level. They can be expected to have a high propensity to relate to others via primary process presences; for various individual reasons they can be expected to be relatively comfortable with mode 2 functioning, and have a great deal of difficulty in testing

the reality of their mode 3 fantasies. Such groups should be expected to move more slowly (if at all) in their track two development, and equally slowly in using any such progress to further achieve individual development in the group.

These considerations are relevant to Bion's notion of valency: the propensity to combine in basic assumption functioning. We may venture a further definitional statement: Valency involves the propensity to relate to others via primary process presences with indeterminate localization, or via transitional phenomena. The more that this is the case for the group's members, the more difficult will be track two development. But the correlation will not be complete, for mode 3 relations to specific individuals may also involve experiencing them as transitional objects; hence it is possible that such mode 3 relations may come to replace mode 2 relations in prominence.

We have seen that the 'group' functions to mediate the individuals' relations to the group as a whole, and their relations to each other as individuals. This can be stated in terms of defenses: The 'group' functions as a defense against the experience of merger and envelopment by the group (mode 1); and it functions as a way to avoid engaging with mode 3 relations with the other individuals, or to avoid engaging with issues as issues between oneself

and differentiated others. We have also seen the ways in which the 'group' resembles a commonly held transitional object or, more accurately, an object in the cultural field. It remains for us to elucidate this dual defensive and transitional-phenomenon role.

In the simplest general sense, we have seen that the 'group' is transitional in its being a medium between merger and isolation. More specifically, the use of the 'group' derives from the infant's use of transitional phenomena in developing from the infant-mother unit to being able to use the mother as a separate object. The process is no longer exactly the same, of course, as the 'group' is jointly constructed by several people, and these are now adults of "averagely expectable development" whom we are considering. Whether we should conceptualize the prior development through which the person has been able to use transitional phenomena as that of a "spreading out...over the whole cultural field" (Winnicott, 1953/1975h), or as an internalization of its function or its retention as a "psychic organizer" which can be called upon in other circumstances (Metcalf & Spitz, 1978; Tolpin, 1972), it is beyond the present scope to consider. But at any rate, the 'group' can in general be seen as providing a soothing sense of belongingness and vitality to its members.

In less general terms, the different 'group' struc-

tures can be seen as embodying different ways of warding off envelopment by the group; along Bion's lines, the different fantasies may derive from specific primitive fantasies which originated in the attempt to find a relation to a mother from whom one is separating. Even if we here refrain from firmly linking them to specific Kleinian positions, we have seen that they do involve engaging in primitive defensive fantasies and constructing primitive objects. I have maintained that these events go on less obviously all the time in members' lives outside of unstructured groups, but it is certainly important that in unstructured groups they happen very baldly and openly, and when this is pointed out by the consultant it often completely fails to have any modulating effect. There is a simple question of how mature adults manage to tolerate themselves--to the considerable degree that they do--feeling and behaving in such a primitive manner. A high degree of dissociation between 'group' membership and mature adulthood would seem to be implied, yet the 'group' has been that way precisely because and in so far as it has been comfortable enough to allow the split between the self as individual and the self as 'group' member to be healed. Furthermore, individuals recover from this state very quickly at the end of the group session, yet there is usually no onrush of shame at what has transpired.

Now, much of what this work has been amounts to an

explanation of why the individuals should behave this way, of how the mode 2 fantasies validate themselves but nevertheless do become acutely uncomfortable, and so on. But to this I think we can add that by experiencing the prominent group entities and his own responses to them through the prism of the 'group', the individual is able to experience something like: "This outrageous behavior and feeling is not mine, though it is not only others' either, but it is both". Thus the experience of the 'group' as a transitional phenomenon provides a specific additional easing of individual responsibility. This facilitates the toleration of primitive defensive processes in the group, while at the same time the primitive defensive fantasies maintain the 'group' structures.

The 'group' also functions to ward off engagement on mode 3 relations with other individuals in the group. This is related to its function as defense against mode 1. Much of the fear of engaging with issues in mode 3 terms is the fear that the group is an undifferentiated mass around the issue (just as at the beginning the group could not engage with mode 3 relations at all, for whatever the issue that was broached, all that the attempt elicited was the undifferentiated mass). Issues of mode 3 relations become group issues (or "common group tensions") because and in so far as they are felt in common, and this is the basis of a fear that the problem is everywhere, formless,

chaotic, nameless. This is as true of the first great issue that immediately arises on joining a group --finding a comfortable enough relation as an individual to the relatively undifferentiated group of which one is a part-- as well as of the more specific issues which may emerge in the group's life. Until idiosyncratic stances have been elaborated in privacy and expressed, the fear is that all the individuals will feel the problem in the same way, so to renounce the 'group' defense and seek to engage on them in mode 3 terms raises the danger of finding that no resolution is possible, and all that will emerge is the morass of the group. What the 'group' does is to provide some structure, form, predictability and reliability where it would otherwise be lacking.

Though we cannot here be much more than suggestive, it is worth noting some ways in which this function of the 'group' can be elaborated in terms of both Bion's and Winnicott's writings. Carsky (1978) and James (1981, 1984) have explored this with respect to Bion's theories, though, of course, not in the context of this account of group processes. Briefly, one can make the connection to Bion's work (1962/1967b, 1963) by considering the individuals to have projected formless "unnameable" thoughts (which are therefore experienced as things in themselves and hence liable to be projected) into the 'group' and non-'group' entities, which function to "contain" them.

That is, they are given by the 'group' structures a form and psychic meaning which can be elaborated by the individuals (beta elements transformed into alpha elements) in the realm of privacy which members are able to have while still being connected to the 'group'. Finally, with track two development they can be reinternalized, and the development of thinking--the individuals as individuals modifying the issue by testing its reality and learning by experience--can proceed. The isomorphism here is that just as sense data have to be worked on by the maternal container's alpha function before they can be available as material for dream thoughts, elaboration, symbolization, and so on; so do the issues that the individuals hold in common have to be worked on in the mode 2 container before they can be available as material for the individuals themselves (as individuals together in a group) to think, act and learn about them. It must be pointed out, however, that this brief statement passes over a great number of difficulties that would have to be dealt with in developing this link with Bion's complex theory.

Though there are certain striking similarities, there is no easy equivalency between Bion's "containing" and Winnicott's "holding" (James, 1984). The two concepts are grounded in very different theoretical contexts; and Winnicott mainly wrote on the physical, or psychosomatic, aspects of holding, which facilitate development of the

body ego. He was clear, though, that holding refers to the whole environmental provision, both physical and psychological, which implies its role in the development of the precursors of ideas or thoughts (Winnicott, 1960/1965f). At any rate, I take it that two aspects of this holding function are, first, the mother's not challenging the paradox of the transitional object--that it is neither self nor other, but both (1953/1975h)--and later, her availability for the infant's destructiveness so that the infant becomes able to use the mother as an objective object (1969/1971c). The latter is associated with the ending of the mother's holding function as the child develops towards independence.

What I want to suggest is that in creating the 'group' the members create an entity which provides something approximating these elements of the holding function. The primitive mechanisms of splitting and projection which with a process of negotiation create the different 'group' structures, their capacity to validate themselves, and when that is under pressure their ability to be transformed into one of the other 'groups', all these amount to a formidable defense against any attempts to challenge the paradox of the 'group', which remains constant whatever the form of the specific mode 2 fantasy. That is, the 'group' is, for each member, neither self nor other but both, whether it has a fight-flight, a depen-

dency, or a pairing structure. In this way, the 'group' manages not only to give a form to the potentially inchoate issues of the group, but to give them a form which the individual can 'sit alongside of', neither out of contact with them nor confronting them as an individual among other individuals. In the same process, issues are maintained as available for the members as individuals to confront them (in terms of mode 3 relations) when the members are ready for track two development with respect to them.

So the potentially chaotic, formless, insoluble issue, once it is represented in mode 2 terms, is psychologically situated where each member can come to feel some privacy, some individuality, with respect to it, can exist alongside it. He can begin to entertain the issue, privately, in terms of mode 3 relations. On this basis he can come to express some pieces of his private stance, grasp that others have also done so, and at some point join with the others in track two development with respect to it.

This is the way in which the 'group', in defending against engagement with mode 3 relations yet maintaining within it the potential for doing so, functions like a transitional object. A crucial difference from the case of the infant is that the infant has no alternative realm of privacy, and it is the fact of this realm of privacy--

which amounts to an already existing capacity for mode 3 relations--which makes the group's use of this transitional phenomenon a defensive one. The group members do not have to create the capacity to see the other individuals and themselves as separate around the issue: they already have the capacity for that experience, and are defending themselves against it.

The 'group' is not a transitional phenomenon of infancy, but an object in the cultural field. Of the differences, we have taken into consideration that the members are adults, and that the 'group' is negotiated jointly, so that it in part mediates the individual's relation to himself. There are two other special features that we can elucidate.

The 'group' takes on different structures, and different aspects of an issue may be handled in different 'group' structures. Of this additional factor two things can be said. First, the 'group' structures differ in the degree to which they allow a realm of privacy to the member. It is to the second that I want to draw attention: To the extent that a realm of privacy is allowed, we can speak of individuals 'sitting alongside' the issue in different forms--different in the degree of dissociation between its elements and in their degree of complexity, which we have seen to be probably in turn linked to different developmental levels in the represen-

tation of the issue. Thus, the individual is able to elaborate private stances, in terms of mode 3 relations, towards different aspects of the group issues. This is especially clear if we take the broader issues, such as the issue of finding a comfortable relation to the group.

This adds another dimension to what we described in the previous section as the group "working through" an issue as it handles it in different 'group' structures before track two development takes place. But as far as the individual is concerned we cannot apply the metaphor of "working through", for it is not until track two development takes place that the individual can in the group engage on and test the reality of his mode 3 relations. I think the best analogy here is to say that representing the issue as a mode 2 'group' issue (avoiding it as a mode 3 issue pertaining to the members as individuals) allows the members to play with it in different forms. Thus, the material for the play is the common issues of the group; the people being played with are the members of the group (or the group as a whole), which includes the individual himself; and the location of the play is the shared transitional areas of the individual members. In this respect, what the 'group' involves is, in Winnicott's (1971b) terms, "shared play".

The use of the term "play" here must be considered suggestive, for it is well beyond the scope of this work

to make a systematic comparison between the term as Winnicott used it and the sense in which it is developed here. But one factor that this can throw light on is the good deal of excitement with which individuals tend to approach unstructured group events, and the sense of satisfaction with which they often leave them. For, on the basis of personal and reported experience of group relations conferences, that is to a remarkable degree the case, notwithstanding the dreadful and anxious experiences that members have. Bion postulated a similar role to the anonymous expression and gratification of impulses that can only be achieved through participation in 'group' life. What I am suggesting is that the transitional phenomenon aspect of the 'group' not only makes that gratification more acceptable to the mature adult, but also contributes a pleasure (an ego rather than id pleasure) of its own.

It is in the nature of play in this sense that it has the excitement, as Winnicott put it, of "the precariousness that belongs to the interplay...of that which is subjective...and that which is objectively perceived" (1971b, p. 61). Too much anxiety, though, destroys play, and we must not ignore the high degree of anxiety that the 'group' fantasies come to evoke. Then, perhaps after an aberrant change or period of denial of the 'group', there is a change to another 'group' structure, and the play can

resume. And, as one would expect in the play of a child, the new play material may be a different issue, or it may be an aspect of that which had just caused too much anxiety.

The second special feature of the 'group' is that it ceases to be experienced as a transitional phenomenon when the individual is 'out of tune' with it. Then it is felt as powerfully independent, and the comparison can be made with an impingement which induces compliance (Winnicott 1960/1965c, 1960/1965f), if we take into consideration the greater resources that the adult has in comparison with the child. Each member is liable to find himself in this situation many times, and because it is unpleasant there is good reason for him to learn, as best he can, how to stay in tune with the 'group' through its vicissitudes. In other words, there is good reason for the individual to learn how to be compliant, when the alternative is isolation and sometimes brutal interpersonal pressures. On the other hand, between these two poles, there is the fact that when one is in tune with the 'group', one is especially able to influence its nature. This is part of the continuing negotiation of the comfortable-enough 'group'.

Each individual has to struggle with this conflict. The central point here is that each individual has to do this in his own realm of privacy. This is certainly a common group issue like any other, which can be emanci-

pated from the 'group' realm so that it is engaged on as something felt differently by the different individuals. But the 'group' itself does not go away for as long as there are individuals with common issues which have not yet been explored. Hence the struggle around compliance with it can never be fully emancipated from the 'group' realm. The issue forever remains as a private issue between the individual and the 'group'.

This is, of course, the original problem of finding a comfortable relation with the group, restated in terms of the 'group' through which the relation to the group is made.

I want now to make four connections to our experiences of objects in the cultural field, or our cultural experiences. I must ask to be excused from defining those terms, except to say that they refer to the experience of those things--such as a work of art, religion, a body of tradition, a patriotic symbol or national holiday--through which we experience our link to others, to the group of which we are a part, though we are single individuals. And that, of course, is the first connection to the 'group'. The second connection is that it is not possible to influence that cultural field--that body of tradition, religion, or medium of art--except from a position of being 'in tune' with it, of experiencing it as such a link. As with the 'group' one may be used by it, but not

engage in its negotiation. (This is surely related to Winnicott's observation that it is not possible to be creative except on a basis of tradition.) Thirdly, the issue of one's relation to objects in the cultural field is very much one of compliance versus isolation, in the middle of which lies contribution and a process much like negotiation. Finally, objects in the cultural field have that status in so far as they refer to those aspects of our common experience which have not been explored from the perspective of individuals as individuals. Hence, the cultural field, and the issues of finding a comfortable relation to objects within it, began when there were, and last as long as there are, individuals with common issues that have not yet been explored.

Development Re-Visited

"Development of and in the group" has been the title of this work, though development in itself--the notion of development in isolation of the context--has not been a major focus. This approach, rather, has been to look at group processes--through the accounts given in the tradition originating with Bion, and in the light of object relations theory--and to arrive from that at a notion of what kinds of development are implied. I have taken as a working notion of individual development the reinternalization and correct localization of what has been placed

onto other entities in the group. Implicit in this notion is that achieving it and working it through in the group will involve a new mastery of what the individual tends to do in the other groups of which he is a member, which is a significant development as all interpersonal relations go on in the context of multiple and interacting groups.

If we accept this working definition of individual development then, strictly speaking, what this work has explored is the relation between group development and the grounds for individual development in the group. Though we have considered how and why track two development is necessary before individual development can take place in the group, it would take another work of a different kind to discuss the factors and techniques that would facilitate the reinternalization and correct localization which we have seen can now follow. That would be a discussion of what facilitates the reality testing of mode 3 relations and the individuals' integration of the conclusions. While we have been able to point out that the individuals' propensities to relate through transitional phenomena may place special obstacles in the face of gaining the ground on which individual development can take place, it would take an investigation of the latter kind to consider how far-reaching (or deep) an individual development may be achieved in group psychotherapy in comparison, say, to individual therapy, and what factors will affect that.

This account is intended as a general one, and does not speak only, or even particularly, to psychotherapy groups. As noted early on, the carrying out of any task by a group of individuals with individual differences in skills must involve a predominance in functioning in mode 3 and 4 terms, and any consultation to a task group should facilitate engagement on those levels. One may assume that 'releasing' mode 3 and 4 relations will allow the testing of their reality and an improved functioning in mode 4 terms. One may, of course, find that what emerges is the special difficulties of some individuals in mode 3 or 4 functioning which call for specific individually-oriented action. This account is intended to allow a clearer view of the degree to which it is the 'group' culture or individual mode 3 or 4 problems which are problematic, and hence of where appropriate remediation should be directed. It also allows a clearer view of how individual differences in mode 3 and 4 functioning and individual roles in the context of specific mode 2 fantasies are mutually affecting each other.

One may see the group's fulfilment of a task as involving an import-processing-export procedure, which rests on the group's having a good grasp of the reality of the environment from which it imports and to which it exports, and a good grasp of its boundary with its environment (Miller & Rice, 1967; Rice, 1963; Turquet,

1974). By this account one can also see that while individuals' mode 3 issues may engender certain difficulties in reality testing and boundary awareness, mode 2 fantasies place special difficulties in the way. Mode 2 fantasies rest on a 'group' boundary which bears no necessary or even likely relation to the boundary of the group, and on a systematic and self-validating distortion of what lies both inside and outside the 'group'. They are intrinsically averse to encountering, and hence to acting on, what from outside the 'group' perspective is consensual reality. It is from a mode 4 perspective that group functioning involves action in the public realm with differentiated roles allocated according to each member's individual skills. Mode 2 functioning is completely inconsistent with this --it conflicts, as Bion noted. Mode 3 relations from this aspect lie in between: they may be more or less differentiated, involve more or less inconsistency with consensual reality, and be more or less open to reality testing.

But we have seen that modulated mode 2 functioning--with a good deal of track two development, in the form of what Bion termed "specialized work groups"--may aid the group's overall functioning. And this is not only because it staves off a still more inappropriate 'group' fantasy. One here arrives at the issue of individual fulfilment in the group. Mode 2 functioning, we have seen, provides the

feeling of vitality and safety which come from a sense of belongingness and cohesiveness, and the excitement of play. On the other hand, it is only mode 4 functioning that can give the vitality which derives from the encounter with and triumph over reality. These are different kinds of fulfilment: no amount of one can replace the other. I would suggest that the individual wishes for--even needs--both, with individual differences in the emphasis. Again, from this aspect we must place mode 3 in the middle, with individual differences with respect to how much mode 3 relations engender differentiation or joining.

If the relation to the 'group' provides an irreplaceable sense of fulfilment and excitement to the individuals' experience, then we cannot expect there to be the motivation for a full renunciation of it, even if we could conceive what that would look like. This notion of individual fulfilment is distinct from that of individual development as we have been using that term. From the perspective of individual reinternalization and correct localization, this fulfilment is essentially a primitive one, even if it is the necessary basis on which development--even of mature adults--takes place. This brings us to the final point which I want to consider: whether the members of an unstructured group may achieve something of developmental value which is not itself individual devel-

opment.

In the previous section, when discussing the 'group' as an object in the cultural field, we saw that there is an issue for each individual that can never be fully emancipated from the 'group' (if, indeed, any issue can) but always remains a private issue between the individual and the 'group': that of the individual's relation to the 'group'. But it is not only that this issue can never be fully emancipated from the 'group', there is a sense in which it can never be emancipated from it at all. For to the extent that it has become an issue between individuals as individuals it is not the same issue. (I am now using the term "issue" narrowly, to emphasize a difference.) What I am referring to is that every connection with the cultural field carries with it the issue of compliance versus isolation with contribution in the middle, and this experience cannot be represented in terms of the individual's relation to other individuals who are differentiated from each other.

Here, reinternalizing and correctly localizing is not the point at all. What speaks to the needs of the individual in this area is an increased facility in relation to objects in the cultural field. This means an increased ability to 'sit alongside' the object in the cultural field and the issues contained in it, and to be both 'in tune' with it and able to elaborate it in one's own realm

of privacy, in such a way as to be able to contribute in to it and/or to facilitate one's own together with others' track two development with respect to it.

Such a facility lies in the individuals' use of his realm of privacy, and this is distinct from his ability to engage with others on its basis, at least in the context of the group in the cultural field of which the object subsists. For in any given group the possibility of engagement on the content of one's realm of privacy is determined to a great degree by the other members of that group, on what they are ready for track two development around. If one transcribes this to the 'real' world, which is made of interlocking groups with differing cultures and differing levels of track two development, one may see its developmental value more clearly. For one can always seek out another group whose culture, and state of track two development, is such that what was in the former necessarily private can become public, and then individual development can take place on its basis. And it is possible for the latter group to then influence the former. (This is surely one of the purposes provided by the staff group in a group relations conference, where issues around which track two development cannot be achieved in the respective group events can be discussed and worked on from a more individuated perspective.) But even in the latter group, it is not the facility in using

the object in the cultural field which can become public, but merely the material gained in privacy from the exercise of that facility.

To the degree that experiences in unstructured groups foster this facility, it seems possible to talk of something of developmental value which is gained, though it does not itself engender individual development in the group. More speculatively, one might call this the better use of the private elaborative or creative space, between the individual and the particular kind of primary process presence with indeterminate location which is the object in the cultural field. And there seems no reason to believe that this kind of facility cannot be carried by the individual from the present group to others.

We might end on this note of optimism for the individual, speculating on a facility which can be fostered in unstructured groups, which even if it is not itself individual development is of potential developmental value. For though there is no reason to suggest that this facility can be expanded only in unstructured groups, such events do seem an especially efficient forum in which to develop it. On the other hand, in any particular group such progress is essentially a lonely struggle. Each individual must strive alone, in his or her realm of privacy, to find their way between compliance and isolation. Indeed, the entire question of the relation between

development of and development in the group must be understood in a context which I hope this work has not obscured: a context of difficulty.

This account of group dynamics has focused on how, and in what sense, group processes should be understood in relation to individual development. Thus there is a risk of seeming to overstate, merely through the balance of our attention, the degree of developmental thrust which group processes engender. It is appropriate to recall at this point how powerful are the motivations to construct the mode 2 'group' entity and to represent one's experience in its terms, how each of the fantasies are self-validating and when under pressure may merely shift to another, and how much more than track one shifts in 'group' fantasies is necessary for track two development to take place. Furthermore, we have seen that even track two development itself constitutes only the necessary ground on which individual development can take place. I hope, then, that this account of the group in terms of modes 2 and 3 and the two developmental tracks shows not only how and in what direction development in groups must proceed, but also allows a clear view of the powerful odds against which development must be won.

The modes and the developmental tracks and the relationships between them constitute one of the two major theses of this work. The other is that the mode 2 'group'

entity should be seen as an object in the cultural field, and as resembling in important ways a transitional phenomenon. There is a particular danger here of implying an overly sanguine view of group development, for the notion of transitional phenomena evokes images of infants' teddy bears and security blankets and of healthy development. It certainly is the view of this work that this aspect of the 'group' has a crucial developmental role, and that it is of great importance in sustaining (soothing and exciting) the individual in an otherwise painful and anxious situation. But a certain tension between these developmental and sustaining roles should be noted: The pleasure and invigoration of relating through the object in the cultural field can be important in seducing members away from development towards a more individuated engagement. The transitional role of the 'group' is not unequivocal as far as individual development is concerned.

Though transitional phenomena have often been discussed in the context of patients whose object relations are also characterized by hatred and terror and primitive defensive mechanisms (see, for example, the review in Volkan, 1976, pp. 201-237), the very notion of transitional phenomena has nevertheless maintained a sort of patina of benignity. It is as if it has been assigned to a different place from the nastinesses of primitive experience, and tends to be understood as an island of

hope. Though this expresses a certain truth, I am wary of having made the group seem a nicer place merely by bringing the notion of the transitional object to bear on it. To the degree that this wariness is justified, I can hope that just as the notion of transitional phenomena can give a richer view of the group, so can looking at groups with that notion in mind give a fuller view of transitional phenomena.

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