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**The impact of the Jesse Jackson campaigns on local black
political mobilization in New York City, Atlanta, and Oakland**

Thompson, James Phillip, III, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1990

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THE IMPACT OF THE JESSE JACKSON CAMPAIGNS ON
LOCAL BLACK POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN
NEW YORK CITY, ATLANTA, AND OAKLAND

BY

JAMES PHILLIP THOMPSON, III

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
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of New York.

1990

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Abstract

THE IMPACT OF THE JACKSON CAMPAIGNS ON BLACK POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY, OAKLAND, AND ATLANTA

by

JAMES PHILLIP THOMPSON, III

Adviser: Professor John Mollenkopf

This dissertation analyzes the impact of the 1984 and 1988 Jesse Jackson presidential campaigns on local black political development in New York City, Atlanta, and Oakland. The dissertation asks if these campaigns achieved the goals Jackson's rhetoric suggested he sought, namely a) increased voter registration, b) increased black turnout, and c) new black candidates running in local races. The study finds that the 1984 Jackson campaign did not generally increase voter registration, but only provided some added momentum for it where local activists already had it under way. This was even more true in 1988, when the Jackson campaign was more mainstream and less protest-oriented. The study finds that the Jackson candidacies increased voter turnouts in black areas of New York City, but has a much weaker effect in Atlanta and Oakland. This is attributed to the fact that the latter cities have achieved black predominance in electoral politics, and the black mayors in those cities have become more conservative, and did not favor Jackson. In New York, Jackson's campaign served as a lightning rod for long-delayed city-wide black political mobilization. Finally, the study finds that the Jackson candidacies, with a few minor exceptions, did not generate new local black candidacies. Part of the reason lies in the separation of local and national elections, and the decentralization of American political parties. The other part lies in Jackson's drift away from a protest-oriented grassroots campaign, and in mistakes committed during the 1984 campaign. The study notes that in the two cities where racial transitions took place over a decade ago in mayoral politics, problems in poor black neighborhoods have gotten worse rather than better. Oakland's Mayor Lionel Wilson and Atlanta's Mayor Andrew Young have both forged alliances with white downtown business elites, but not poor neighborhoods and community organizations. Thus, class tensions within the black community are beginning to challenge black political leadership, and these tensions affected the local Jackson campaigns.

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Introduction

Early Theories of Black Electoral Participation

Although black electoral participation has been studied often, there are few comprehensive treatments of the subject. Some authors have written about blacks in third parties and black activism within the Democratic and Republican parties, but much of the literature on black electoral participation narrowly focuses on black voting.¹ Few comprehensive theoretical frameworks of black electoral participation have been put forward, and these are seldom debated.

The path-breaking studies on American voting virtually ignored black voting behavior. To the extent they dealt with the subject, these studies generally concluded that black voting behavior was similar to white voting behavior, and that the major causal variables were socio-economic. The small sample sizes used in these studies limits the inferences they can draw regarding black voting behavior. Verba and Nie's Participation in America, for example, draws on a raw national sample of 2,260 whites and only 261 blacks. Based on such a small sample, theories regarding black political participation in United States have only

limited reliability.²

Matthews and Prothro undertook the most comprehensive early study of black voting behavior in their study of voting patterns in the South. Matthews and Prothro concluded that, "most Negroes have low social status, relatively small incomes and limited education received in inferior schools...The low voting rates of Negroes in the South are, to perhaps a large extent, a result of these factors rather than of direct political discrimination by the white community."³ Matthews and Prothro argued that socio-economic change, not political and legal rights, were the key to increasing black electoral participation. "If the vote has not solved the Negro problem in the North," they asked, "why should we expect it in the South?"⁴

Interestingly, Matthews and Prothro had slightly different conclusions in an earlier study of Southern black voter registration patterns that included political variables, such as state registration laws. They found in their earlier study that, "political variables are nearly as important as socio-economic factors in explaining Negro registration in the South."⁵

Socio-economic status (SES) models, such as Matthews and Prothro's, have difficulty explaining the rapid increase

in black low-income electoral participation in the 1960's, despite still low socio-economic levels.⁶ This dilemma was answered by the development of the "group consciousness model." Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie explained, "if blacks participate more than one would expect of a group with similar socioeconomic status (SES), the explanation may lie in the fact that they have, over time, developed an awareness of their own status as a deprived group, and this self-consciousness has led them to be more politically active than members of society who have similar socioeconomic levels but do not share the group identity."⁷ More recently, Richard Shingles' study of "black consciousness" and political participation concluded that black consciousness explains nearly as much about black political participation as do socio-economic variables, and the key variable in black consciousness was not race per se, "but the existence of a counterculture [movement] which politicizes the community by having its members transfer responsibility for their deprivation from themselves to the political system."⁸

The SES index model has been criticized for ignoring structural factors such as voting, election laws, and how political systems are organized. Structural factors have been shown historically to have a major impact on black electoral participation.⁹ The black consciousness model

has been criticized on similar grounds. The model does not explain why a black "counter-culture" arises at a given time and place. Studies of black voting in Georgia, for example, found significant differences between black voting in urban and rural areas during the 1980 Presidential election, but not in the 1976 election.¹⁰ Similarly, black support for the 1984 Jackson candidacy ranged from 30 percent in some regions to 95 percent of in other areas. Why such vast differences can be found among blacks is left unexplained by racial consciousness models. Race consciousness does not explain why black voters may sometimes overwhelmingly support a black candidate against a white candidate in one election, and support a white candidate over a black candidate in another election a short time later.^a

Another oft cited weakness in national voting studies has been their focus on nation-wide general elections. Black voting in primaries, local, and state elections has received little attention. One is left to assume that black voting patterns on the local level are similar to those on the national level. This is a specious assumption. Blacks are more likely to have black candidates to vote for in local elections; hence they may vote more in some local

^a This happened in New York when black voters overwhelmingly supported Jackson in the 1984 Democratic primary, but gave only lukewarm support to black candidates for Brooklyn Borough President and Mayor the next year (see Chapter Three).

elections than national elections.

Pluralism

A prominent theme in the discussion of ethnic voting has been pluralist analysis. Pluralists often discuss the relationship between ethnic voting and the ethnic group's socio-economic development. Robert Dahl asserted, in his classic study of New Haven politics, that there is a direct relationship between an ethnic group's socio-economic status and its political homogeneity.¹¹ Dahl maintains that ethnic politics go through three stages. In the first stage the newly arrived immigrant group is almost entirely working-class, and there is a high degree of ethnic voting. In the second stage, the middle-class of the ethnic group diversifies and the working class is no longer predominant. In this stage the middle-class of the ethnic group is torn between ethnic loyalty and its own class interests. The middle-class lives in a broader social environment that reduces ethnic salience to it. In this second stage ethnic voting continues, but it is weaker than in the first stage. In the third stage, the ethnic group is fully assimilated into the mainstream culture. It's socio-economic status is similar to that of white protestants and members of the group inter-marry with members of other ethnic groups.

Members of the group no longer identify themselves ethnically, their identity is defined more by their class and social environment. In this stage ethnic voting disappears.

A staunch pluralist, Dahl believed that all ethnic groups are gradually integrated into mainstream society through judicious use of the organizational, economic, and political resources at their disposal. Pluralists maintain that ethnic groups bargain over incremental demands, and are integrated into society in a non-confrontational manner.

Raymond Wolfinger criticized Dahl's three stage assimilation paradigm as being overly simplistic.¹² Although Wolfinger agreed that ethnic group voting would decline over time, he claimed that it takes much longer than Dahl described for ethnic groups to assimilate. Wolfinger's "mobilization" theory holds that not until the ethnic middle-class learns communication and organization skills is it able to mobilize the ethnic group, to make major and important demands on political parties. Wolfinger also maintains that ethnic voting varies with the level of ethnic relevance to the election. He states that the "bigotry that often accompanies a 'first' candidacy are likely to make those elections especially relevant for ethnic groups."¹³ He further states that the ethnic voter cohesiveness

resulting from such an election will carry over into subsequent elections.

Michael Parenti argues against Dahl and Wolfinger. Parenti posits that both Dahl and Wolfinger confuse ethnic "acculturation" with "assimilation" into mainstream society.¹⁴ Parenti contends that ethnic groups develop sub-cultures, such as churches and social groups, that persist long after ethnic groups acculturate themselves to America. Ethnic sub-cultures, according to Parenti, may actually be strengthened (socially and politically) by increased affluence of the ethnic group. Especially in cases where the ethnic group faces discrimination from the larger society, as in the case of blacks, the ethnic group may develop parallel sub-institutions that maintain or increase ethnic voting.

Dahl's argument is too simplistic. Using the same data on New Haven, Wolfinger was able to show actual increases in ethnic voting that corresponded to increases in middle-class status for the ethnic group.¹⁵ However, if the caveats to Dahl's argument introduced by Wolfinger are included -- the middle class develops an increased capacity for ethnic mobilization and makes increased demands on the political party; bigotry associated with "first time" candidacies and ethnically relevant elections increase

ethnic voting for extended periods -- Dahl's argument is considerably strengthened.

Even with modification, however, the views of Dahl and Wolfinger share similar weaknesses. Wolfinger's mobilization theory does not explain why the same ethnic group, with similar socio-economic status, might have uneven levels of success in different cities in their attempts to mobilize the ethnic group vote. Martin Kilson and Charles Hamilton have noted that ethnic voting by blacks has varied significantly among cities with similar demographic characteristics.¹⁶ Wolfinger likewise does not explain what forces permit or obstruct "ethnically relevant" elections from arising in the first place, or whether they are likely to have a more lasting effect in some cities than in others.

Although Parenti observes that ethnic sub-institutions may strengthen ethnic political action as ethnic groups become more affluent, like Wolfinger, he does not explain why the same ethnic group (with identical sub-culture) might vote more strongly along ethnic lines in one city than in another. Noting that discrimination may reinforce ethnic group identity, Parenti also fails to make a qualitative distinction between blacks and other ethnic groups. With a history of forced immigration, slavery, and legal

segregation, black Americans occupy a unique position among American ethnic groups. Parenti suggests simply that American society is composed of numerous segregated ethnic groups, and that politicians use ethnic appeals to win political support from these groups.

The models advanced by Dahl, Wolfinger, and Parenti share a common emphasis on the internal self-mobilization of the ethnic group and they de-emphasize external (structural) constraints that face the ethnic group. This is a fatal error in light of the singular forms of oppression suffered by blacks in America. Whether and how political structures have been used to facilitate (or hinder) black political progress is an important variable in the study of black electoral participation.¹⁷

Modernization Theory

In an attempt to correct for the failure of pluralist theory to account for structural and cultural obstacles (racism) to black political progress and to explain the development of black social protest movements, modernization theorists have linked racism to pre-industrial stages in American socio-economic development. Harry Holloway, in his book The Politics of the Southern Negro, views racism as a reflection of the agrarian and traditionalist stage of

development in the South.¹⁸ With the advent of industry, urbanization, and modern communication, and a stronger interventionist federal government, Holloway theorized that racism will diminish and that blacks will assimilate as have other ethnic groups.

Martin Kilson argues that modernization gives rise to full political mobilization of the ethnic group, and that full political mobilization is in turn a symbol of modernization.¹⁹ The geographic re-concentration of blacks brought about by migration and urbanization is in Kilson's view a key component of modernization. Black modernization has been limited, according to Kilson, by racist practices of whites and by narrow self-interested practices of black middle-class leaders. Prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Kilson maintains that the vast majority of African Americans (almost entirely Southern) had no experience with democratic political institutions. The modernization process for most blacks thus began in the North. Kilson traces black's relationship with whites through several stages.²⁰ In the patron-client stage (early in this century), certain black middle-class professionals became "clients" of white political "patrons". In exchange for minor material benefits and "status" awarded the black client by the white patron, black client politicians promoted certain white politicians in the black community.

Because the benefits of the patron-client relationship to the masses of blacks were few, the black client politicians achieved limited black political mobilization. In the second stage blacks formed middle-class oriented interest groups, such as legal associations and the NAACP. These groups were more inclusive than the earlier patron-client relationships, and they achieved greater, though limited, mobilization in the black community. The third stage described by Kilson was the birth of political movements, starting in the 1920's with Marcus Garvey and Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.. These leaders mobilized masses of working-class blacks and marginally middle-class blacks. Both leaders were based in New York City. Political movements, united around the ideology of black nationalism, were a sign of growing (albeit limited) modernization.

Kilson predicted that racism perpetrated by non-modernized white ethnic political machines against blacks in the North would delay black integration into mainstream American life by "at least a generation" after white ethnic groups.

Modernization theory is an improvement over pluralist theory in that it discusses structural obstacles to black assimilation, and it thereby offers a positive rationale for

development of black political movements.^a The weakness of modernization theory is that it does not consider the possibility that new forms of racism may develop in the structure of the modern industrial and post-industrial society. Some analysts suggest that new forms of racism have already begun to supercede the old.²¹ In the final analysis, modernization theory (like pluralist theory) predicts eventual (albeit delayed) black assimilation into American society. It's timetable, however, was overly optimistic.

Recent Theories of Black Electoral Mobilization

Institutional Racism

Many students of black politics have sharply criticized pluralist theory for ignoring the effect of racism in American political and social life.²² They argue that the history of racism in America has precluded blacks from integrating into mainstream society for more than 250 years while the Irish, Italian, and other ethnic groups have made much more rapid progress. Others argue that the nature (non-incremental) and timing (too late) of black demands

^a. Since pluralism does not discuss structural obstacles to black assimilation, black protest movements are regarded as "deviant" behavior. See Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), Chapter 1.

make them unacceptable to pluralist bargaining. Some of these theorists suggest that a more accurate description of black political mobilization can be derived from an institutional racism analysis of black politics.²³

The institutional racism model helps explain why blacks have not integrated more rapidly and continue to maintain strong ethnic identification. It also demonstrates an inadequacy in elite theory, eg., that cities are governed by economic and political elites, but why have blacks historically not become members of the elite (?). Like the pluralists, there is an inevitable stress on internal group mobilization. Unlike the pluralists, they have little or no expectation of group acceptance or incorporation into dominant political structures. Rather than gradual integration into existing parties, institutional racism theorists often push for the establishment of separate black institutions or separate third parties. In the absence of strong black economic and political institutions, institutional racism theorists maintain that black politics has been a reflection of white control.

The most developed electoral argument using an institutional racism framework is that of Ronald Walters. In a summation of the experience of blacks in presidential

politics, Walters concludes that traditional black loyalty to the Democratic Party (and similar loyalty to the Republican Party early in the century) has generated few material gains for the black community. Walters suggests that the deprived and deteriorating status of blacks in America requires the independent political organization of the black community so that blacks can bargain effectively between the two major parties. Walters maintains that black electoral participation has long been depressed by the lack of adequate candidate choice on the presidential level, and that the creation of black-led independent (or third Party) organizations might increase black participation dramatically.²⁴ Walters contends that because of the winner-take-all majority rule system in the United States, and because blacks are a relatively small and unpopular minority, no national candidate is likely to win an election on a platform emphasizing black "special interests." The "permanent minority" status of blacks has led Walters to call for a new political strategy that de-aligns blacks from the Democratic Party in favor of independent political organization.²⁵ Walters interpreted Jackson's 1984 campaign as the first step in this direction.

The institutional racism approach has several pitfalls. The approach assumes that all blacks share a more or less common political exclusion. This may be true on the

national level, but it is not true of local politics. In some cities there are powerful black mayors, in other cities blacks hold no city-wide power. Blacks are not excluded from power in all cities, and black elites in cities with black mayors and city councils develop increased loyalties with local white business elites and national Democratic Party elites.²⁶ Lastly, these theories tend to overlook class polarization among blacks and the possibility that, at least in some areas, black collective action may be difficult to achieve.²⁷

Coalition Theories

Browning, Marshall and Tabb studied the process by which blacks and Latinos became "incorporated" into the dominant governing coalition in ten California cities. They do not view urban political systems as necessarily open to minorities (as do pluralists) or necessarily closed (as do institutional race theorists). Their analytical models include both SES variables and political variables, such as the nature of political coalition building in particular cities. They view minority political progress as a problematic process, dependent on a host of inter-related political and demographic factors. They posit ten components that may explain local levels of minority mobilization and eventual incorporation: 1) size of the

minority population; 2) socioeconomic resources of the minority population; 3) political resources outside the group (such as liberal white support); 4) organizational development through demand-protest; 6) group competition and modeling; 7) resistance of the dominant coalition; 8) size of the city; 9) socioeconomic inequality; 10) and structure of government (for example, mayoral vs. city manager).²⁸

They find that minority ethnic succession into the halls of power is by no means inevitable, and that political organization, strategy, ideology, and conflict are as important in understanding urban politics and black and Latino politics as in national politics.²⁹ They posit that liberal bi-racial electoral coalitions are a key element of black political advancement.³⁰

Clarence Stone has also developed a variant of coalition theory called the 'resource mobilization model.'³¹ Unlike pluralists, Stone argues that a power elite exists in Atlanta. Unlike power elite theorists, Stone argues that membership in the power elite has fluidity, and that it changes according to the project or issue. Stone studied the development of Atlanta's governing bi-racial coalition over time. He traces its development from a moderate, white business led coalition to a liberal black led coalition in the early 1970's, and its return to a

moderate, but black led, coalition in the late 1970's. Stone finds that the business elite was able to dominate urban policy agendas despite the election of black mayors. Stone maintains that major economic development requires the mobilization of financial resources, government approval, favorable public opinion, and legal and technical expertise. The mobilization of so many resources requires a coalition of forces including banks, developers, public officials, and media representatives, depending on the nature of the project. Only people who can mobilize and bring all these forces together can really exercise power, and since agreement is necessary for progress on any project, no one player possesses absolute power.

Stone states that in Atlanta, certain elements of the black middle-class are part of the governing coalition, due to their control of a critical resource - local government. blacks lack sufficient private resources, however, to dominate the local governing coalition. For this reason, perhaps, black elected officials have not used their position to advocate fundamental social change, but have fought mainly to ensure that a share of the benefits of development go to a handful of black middle-class contractors and professionals. The black middle-class beneficiaries of development finance the political campaigns of black politicians who support the development agenda of

the elite coalition.

Stone's description of Atlanta is analogous to a neo-colonial model of black political development, where the black elite works with the powerful white elite and together share the spoils of local development. An implication of Stone's analysis is that a small number of the black elite participate in the subjugation of the black majority. For progressive political change, Stone argues that new movements must either develop economic and technical resources prior to winning political power, or they will be forced to accomodate existing power elites.

Other students of black politics have address the "process/product" equation as the central issue in studying black political participation. Like institutional race theorists, these authors note that most blacks have received relatively few material benefits in exchange for their political participation. However, the problem is not attributed to racism. The problem is often posed as a one of external constraints, eg., whether or not fiscal limitations on cities prohibit black mayors and other elected officials from delivering to their constituents.³² Thus, Professor Charles Hamilton states:

Where the process (voting, marching, caucusing, lobbying) is perceived to be related to the products sought (eg., full employment, decent housing, good schools), participation will likely increase. If there is no such

perception, participation will likely decline. Thus people participate where, when, and how they think it matters...Is the political process capable of delivering the vast indivisible benefits needed by many people--decent housing, good medical care, good schools, decent jobs? This is the question the new black politics is posing, and the American political system must answer.³³

The question posed by Hamilton is sharpest in America's large urban centers, where most black Americans live. Many of these cities have elected black mayors, and usually, as Hamilton notes, blacks voted in high numbers to elect black mayors with the expectation that material benefits would accrue to the community.

Several authors have concluded that black elected officials have failed in delivering material benefits to the black community.³⁴ Some of these authors attribute the problem not so much to external fiscal constraints as to the weak accountability of black elected officials to their (mostly poor) black constituents. James Jennings writes that traditional black politicians currently serve as "buffers" between a needy black population and existing elites. Traditional black politicians, according to Jennings, campaign on the basis of being "better managers," but they do not challenge the current distribution of resources. Jennings maintains that black politics is entering a new stage where local activists and candidates increasingly challenge the traditional structure of urban

politics - demanding a substantive re-allocation of resources.³⁵

The Effect of Jackson's Campaign on Local Black Mobilization

The 1984 Jackson campaign had a national impact on Democratic Party politics, black political organization, and black voting.³⁶ There have been scores of articles in newspapers and magazines documenting aspects of the Jackson campaign or assessing its implications for the national Democratic Party. There have also been several books which offer a descriptive account of the national Jackson campaign in 1984, and one book that does so for the 1988 campaign.³⁷

Jackson's 1984 campaign arose out of an upsurge in black electoral mobilization in the Southern states and several Northern cities. The upsurge led to the victory of Harold Washington and Wilson Goode, Chicago's and Philadelphia's first black mayors. The upsurge in black electoral mobilization followed a general ebb in black movement activity in the 1970's, during the same period black economic progress ground to a halt.³⁸ The Jackson campaign was conceptualized as a means of re-awakening blacks to struggle for political and economic progress.

On the theory that a black Presidential campaign would

heighten black political consciousness and lead to increased voter registration, many observers predicted that the most significant outcome of the campaign would be the impact of increased turnout on subsequent local electoral contests.³⁹

Lucius Barker wrote in 1983:

Arousing black political consciousness and increasing voter registration through a presidential candidacy on a national basis portends very definite spillover effects that could well determine whether black progress can be solidified and enhanced at other levels--congressional, state, and local. A black presidential effort could very well spur the recruitment and election of black candidates at each of these levels.⁴⁰

The empirical question of whether the Jackson campaign helped black voter registration, voter turnout, or increased the number of black officials elected on the local level is unresolved in the literature. Ronald Walters cited the election of 31 black mayors and a sizable jump in the number of local black officials after the 1984 primary as evidence that the Jackson campaign "had wide coattails."⁴¹ On the other hand, Adolph Reed's The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon suggests that the campaign had short coattails.⁴² Reed states that although the campaign may have helped increased voter registration, it "more heavily" rode "on the backs" of partisan and non-partisan voter registration efforts before 1984.^a Reed believes that a 1984 Jackson campaign

^a For a critical review of The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon see Diane Pinderhughes, American Political Science Review 81 (1): 291.

impact on black voter turnout was "much more plausible" than an its having an impact on voter registration or new candidacies.⁴³ He gives examples from five congressional primaries where black candidates lost. Three of the five primaries, Newark, N.J., Queens, N.Y., and Atlanta, Ga., were in majority black districts.⁴⁴

While the Jackson campaign could impact on local black voter turnout without strong local organization, registering new voters and inducing new candidacies on the local level is more problematic. Voter registration procedures are notoriously, and deliberately, cumbersome in the United States.⁴⁵ Spillover effects from national campaigns are weak due to the separation of national and local elections. The Jackson campaigns thus faced structural political constraints that would limit any national campaign's impact on local political mobilization. To overcome these endemic structural obstacles, Jackson would have had to create organizations to register new voters, organize new political candidacies, or offer incentives for local organizations to do so.

1984 versus 1988 Jackson Campaigns

The 1984 and 1988 campaigns cannot be treated as the same phenomena. There were differences in the character,

tone, and political strategy of the 1984 and 1988 campaigns. The 1984 campaign was a protest mobilization in an electoral form.⁴⁶ It gave Jackson a national platform to put the issues of drugs, inner-city poverty, voting rights, and the bloated military budget in the national spotlight. The campaign was grassroots; it often by-passed local black elected officials; it utilized the black church, community organizations, and black media to mobilize black voters. It was militant; its strategy was to mobilize black voters to renegotiate their position in the Democratic Party.⁴⁷

The 1984 campaign alienated major black elected officials, white Democratic leaders, and conservative white Democratic voters. Nonetheless, Jackson's spoken rhetoric was that he wanted to win the Democratic nomination. The ambiguity of Jackson's ultimate aim: winning elections versus political protest and independent political organization, led to confusion and contradictions among Jackson supporters in 1984, and a rightward shift in his political strategy in 1988.

The 1988 campaign, in contrast to 1984, took pains to win the support of local black mayors and important local officials. It appointed recognized black (and white) elected officials to lead local campaigns. Jackson's rhetoric was noticeably restrained as he sought "common

ground" within the Democratic Party. Jackson's strategy aimed at winning a spot on the national presidential ticket.

The transition from protest mobilization to electoral politics has been only occasionally discussed in political science literature.⁴⁸ Lipsky's study of political movements in the 1960's found that the practical requirements of winning elections negate the aims of protest movements.⁴⁹ Where protest movements require militant rhetoric both to gain media attention and offer ideological incentives to movement followers, electoral coalition building requires moderate, compromising leaders.

Purpose of Study

Because analysts of urban politics have cogently argued that political structure, demographics, and the nature of the local dominant political coalition impact on black political participation, this study analyzes these variables in three cities.⁵⁰ New York has both a machine and a reform tradition.⁵¹ Oakland is a classic Western non-partisan reform city with a liberal governing coalition.⁵² Atlanta is a reform city but has a strong mayor. It also combines a segregationist past with elements of reform in a unique Southern "liberal" patron-client historical relationship between blacks and white political

elites. Atlanta is more than 60 percent African American, Oakland is more than 40 percent African American, and New York is less than 25 percent African American.

Because internal development of the ethnic group is crucial to political mobilization, this study will give an account of the history of black political organization, major black candidacies, and demographic background in each of the three cities prior to the 1984 Jackson campaign,

The core of the study examines the 1984 and 1988 Jackson campaigns and their impact on black voting and political organization of the three cities. The study assesses how political structure, black political development and leadership strategies, and the Jackson campaign interacted to influence black voting and political organization. The study concludes with a reflection on the implications of its findings for local and national black Democratic Party politics and suggesting directions for further research.

In particular, this study examines:

1. The effects of Jackson's campaigns on local black political mobilization. Did the Jackson campaigns increase black voter registration and turnout, or inspire black candidates to run for office? What is

the effect of national campaigns on local political mobilization generally? Did Jackson's protest oriented approach in 1984 have a different impact than his more conventional mainstream approach in 1988?

2. How did local political structure and demography affect the outcome of Jackson's campaign in local areas? Did political machines inhibit the impact of the campaigns? What effect did black mayors have on local political mobilization? Did the campaigns have a similar effect in majority black versus minority black cities?

3. Did the Jackson campaigns shed any new light on recent trends or differences in black politics in different cities?

Endnotes

1. For a discussion of black third parties, see Hanes Walton, Jr., Black Political Parties, (New York: The Free Press, 1972).
2. For criticism of the exclusion of blacks from "landmark" voting studies, see Hanes Walton, Jr., Invisible Politics, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 78-80.
3. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.), 12. Quoted in Walton, Invisible Politics, 74.
4. Matthews and Prothro, 12.
5. Matthews and Prothro, "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," American Political Science Review, 57 (June 1963), 355-367.
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7. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972) 157.
8. Richard D. Shingles, "Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link." American Political Science Review, 75 (March 1981): 90.
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10. Walton, Invisible Politics, 94-95.
11. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 35.
12. Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The development and persistence of ethnic voting." American Political Science Review 59 (December 1965), 896-908.
13. Ibid, 185.
14. Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the persistence of ethnic identification." In Harry A. Bailey and Ellis Katz (eds.), Ethnic Group Politics (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company), 267-283.
15. Wolfinger, 166.

16. See Martin Kilson, "The weakness of black politics: cursed by factions and feuds." Dissent (Fall 1987): 523-529, and Charles V. Hamilton, "The patron-recipient relationship and minority politics in New York City." Political Science Quarterly 94 (Summer 1979).

17. For a discussion of the effect of political structure on black voting, see Diane M. Pinderhughes, Race and Ethnicity in Chicago Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press), 91. For a discussion of racism in political machines and their affect on black political participation see Martin Kilson, "Political Change in the Negro Ghetto, 1900-1940's." In Nathan I. Huggins, Martin Kilson, and Daniel M. Fox, Key Issues in the Afro-American Experience, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch, Inc., 1971): 182-185.

18. See Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro, (New York: Random House, 1969).

19. Martin Kilson, "Black Politics: A New Power." Dissent 18 (August 1971a): 333-345.

20. Martin Kilson, "Political Change in the Negro Ghetto, 1900-1940's." In Nathan I. Huggins, Martin Kilson, and Daniel M. Fox, Key Issues in the Afro-American Experience, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch, Inc., 1971): 167-192.

21. For an analysis of new forms of racism in the post-industrial marketplace, see Thomas D. Boston, Race Class & Conservatism, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

22. See, for example, Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power, (New York: Random House, 1967).

23. For a summary of the literature on the "colonized people" approach, see Milton D. Morris, The Politics of Black America, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1975), 19-22. For a recent application of this approach see Harold Cruse, Plural But Equal, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987).

24. Walters, *ibid*.

25. Walters, 191.

26. See Adolph Reed, The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon (Yale University Press, 1986), p. 66.

27. Discussing sharpening class frictions among blacks, Martin Kilson wrote that there is, "fear and apprehension of elite blacks among lower-strata blacks, because there has risen within the black community bourgeoisie a viable, mainstream black political force - - nearly 6,000 elected officials and perhaps 20,000 administrative and policy technicians at the city, state, and federal levels."

28. Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, Protest Is Not Enough, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 81-84.

29. *ibid*, 242.

30. Political scientist Diane Pinderhughes developed a similar model of ethnic political mobilization she calls the "political participation model." According to Pinderhughes, ethnic group behavior is determined by a combination of demographics, external and internal variables. External variables include economic and political variables. Economic variables include the labor market and housing patterns. Political variables include the character of political interaction, the political structure, and partisan competition. Internal variables include leadership institutions, political socialization, partisan identification, and political issues. Pinderhughes's study is confined to Chicago, where she finds that external variables severely constrained and altered Black political progress compared to Italians and Poles. Pinderhughes suggests, in terms of external variables, that racial hierarchy is as strong in the North as the South, and that the election of Black mayors will probably have a dramatic impact in big cities. Unlike Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, Pinderhughes views racism as a continuing limitation in the formation of stable bi-racial coalitions. (Pinderhughes, 79).

31. Clarence N. Stone, "Political Change and Regime Continuity in Postwar Atlanta." Unpublished paper, prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 1988.

32. For an extensive argument on the limitations of city governments, and constraints against liberal urban social policy, see Paul E. Paterson, City Limits, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

33. Charles Hamilton, forward to Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul Peryear (eds.), The New Black Politics (New York: Longman Inc., 1982).

34. Martin Kilson declared that the failure of the "black political class" to give serious attention to urgent problems in the black community, such as crime and education, is "scandalous." See Martin Kilson, "Problems in Black Politics," Dissent (Fall 1989): 531-532. For a quantitative analysis of black mayoral performance, that also concludes black mayors have had little effect on urban policy, see Kenneth r. Mladenka, "Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics," American Political Science Review, 83 (March 1989): 172-175, 185.

35. James Jennings, "Blacks and Progressive Politics," in Rod Bush (ed.), The New Black Vote (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1984), 291-314.

36. Many political observers of the 1984 Jackson campaign place it squarely in the context of the shift of the Democratic Party away from its support of civil rights and social welfare programs important to black Americans, see Manning Marable, "Jackson and the rise of the Rainbow Coalition." New Left Review, 149. and Hanes Walton, Invisible Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985). A notable exception is Adolph Reed, The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), which argues that the 1984 Jackson campaign was, "tangential to the critical debate over reorganization of American capitalism's governing consensus."

37. For a journalistic account of the 1984 Jackson campaign, see Bob Faw and Nancy Skelton, Thunder in America (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, Inc., 1986). Jesse Jackson and the Politics of Race by Thomas Landess and Richard Quinn (Ottawa, Il.: Jemeson Books, 1985) traces Jackson's development from the civil rights movement to presidential candidate. For a compilation of Jackson speeches, see Roger D. Hatch and Frank E. Watkins, Straight from the Heart (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987). For an account of the 1988 campaign from his former campaign press secretary, see Elizabeth O. Colton, The Jackson Phenomenon (New York: Doubleday, 1989).

38. In an overall optimistic account of black economic progress in the 1970's, Reynolds Farley noted that black male unemployment remained at a level double that of whites, and that a "high and growing" proportion of black families have incomes below the poverty line. See Reynolds Farley, Blacks and Whites, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

39. Barker, Lucius J.. 1983. Black Americans and the politics of inclusion. PS (Summer). See also Barnett, Margaret Ross. 1983. The strategic debate over a black political candidacy. PS (Summer).

40. Barker, Lucius J.. "Black Americans and the politics of inclusion." PS (Summer 1983), 500-507.

41. Walters, 182.

42. Reed, Adolph. 1986. The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon. New Haven: Yale University Press.

43. Reed, 19.

44. Reed, 22.

45. See Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

46. See Ronald W. Walters, Black Presidential Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 183.

47. Ibid, 176. Walters maintains that Jackson was unsuccessful in achieving a bargaining position with either Mondale or Hart at the 1984 Democratic National Convention.

48. In what could be an apt description of the dilemma facing the 1984 Jackson campaign, Michael Lipsky wrote, "...the leader whose organizing appeal requires militant rhetoric may obtain eager press coverage only to find that his inflammatory statements lead to alienation of potential allies and exclusion from the explicit bargaining process." See Michael Lipsky, "Protest As A Political Resource," American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 1152. In general, however, the relationship between protest mobilization and electoral politics is, as James W. Button states, an "unanswered question." In a study of six Florida communities, Button finds that, contrary to Lipsky, "conventional and unconventional strategies did not usually negate or interfere with each other, but tended rather to complement and reinforce each other." See James W. Button, Blacks and Social Change, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989): 233-234.

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50. Karnig and Welch found that, "...the chief conditions in determining the level of black council representation or the likelihood of electing a black mayor, however, are neither political and election rules, characteristics of the white population, nor antipoverty efforts. To the contrary, the principal factors are characteristics of the black population--what we have referred to as black resources, including socioeconomic characteristics and organizational, media, and other resources. Among these resources, indicators of black population [size] and

socioeconomic resources are the most powerful in their influence." See Karnig and Welch, 149.

51. For a description of machine and reform in New York City, see John Mollenkopf, "The Great Anomaly" PS (Summer 1986).

52. For a description of Oakland's political tradition and structure, see Rod Bush, "Oakland: Grassroots Organizing Against Reagan," in Rod Bush (ed.), The New Black Vote (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1984).

Chapter 1

Black Politics in New York

The most notable feature of New York City's political system is its decentralized, confederated nature. The city is divided into five boroughs, each of which is a separate county having its own independent party organizations. New York also has a natural Democratic majority, 65 percent of registered voters in the city are registered Democrats.

Regular Democratic Organizations

Political machines are distinguished in political science literature by their longevity, their ability to control elections, and their hierarchical structure.¹ They are also distinguished by their use of material incentives versus purposive or solidary incentives to retain membership. In other words, machines or regular party organizations tend to be non-ideological and non-issue oriented. Political machines in New York have historically drawn their membership from the ranks of working class ethnics, finding fertile ground among the waves of Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants.²

than through patronage. County organizations historically controlled a large number of patronage jobs through the offices of the Borough Presidents, Surrogate Court judges, appointments at the Board of Elections, and appointments within Mayoral agencies. Reform of the City charter in 1963 took away most of the transportation and sanitation functions of the Borough Presidents, but county organizations continued to control patronage jobs through the offices of various elected officials.³

Depending on the relationship of the Mayor to the various county leaders, county organizations have also been able to secure patronage through agencies under the control of the mayor. In "How Koch Handed Over City Hall," Village Voice reporters Wayne Barrett, William Bastone, and Jack Newfield recounted how Mayor Koch, in exchange for political support, handed over patronage jobs in various City departments to county machine leaders:

The continuation of clubhouse patronage was a clause in the Faustian compact that Koch made with much of the city's old line political leadership during the runoff campaign of 1977, when he got Esposito [Brooklyn county leader], Friedman [Bronx county leader], and others to back him against Mario Cuomo. He's renewed that pact every time he's run, always with the support of every county leader but Manhattan's.⁴

The system of political pay-offs came under critical scrutiny in 1986 when several prominent county political officials were convicted of illegalities in the distribution

of city contracts.⁵ Michael Oreskes, of the New York Times, reported:

"The power of political patronage" is a phrase used repeatedly in the racketeering indictment, and the United States Attorney in Manhattan, Rudolph W. Giuliani, stressed the point at a news conference in his office....those words--the power of political patronage--dramatize what has become the central issue in the municipal corruption scandal: to what extent did Mayor Koch cede control of city agencies to political party leaders?⁶

New York City has many of the characteristics described by V.O. Key in the 1940's as typical of the one-party South. The city is a one-party town, there is no viable Republican Party or Third Party. New York has no city-wide political organization, but a multitude of political factions. Mayoral primaries seldom feature principled debate and frequently take on a demagogic character. They have increasingly degenerated into ethnic and religious rivalries, and sometimes outright race-baiting.⁷

Key argued that such undisciplined one-party systems favor those groups which are most organized, or who have the most to protect (usually the wealthy). In the New York context, where state law allows for five independent county political organizations, those counties which are the most tightly organized can deliver the most votes for a city-wide or state candidate. The more organized county

organizations gain the most patronage following elections.

Since the county organizations receive city and state patronage based on their ability to deliver votes for city-wide or state-wide candidates, it is important for machines to tightly control their political organization, and keep insurgent candidates out of office, broke, and disorganized. Organizational loyalty was easier to maintain in by-gone days when county organizations directly controlled thousands of patronage jobs. However, although patronage has been weakened by various reform efforts, the county organizations have retained an important weapon, control over ballot access.⁸ Thus, declining patronage has not caused political clubs and machine organizations to "wither away."

Because New York City is a one-party town, getting on the Democratic ballot is usually a pre-requisite to getting elected. In order to get on the ballot a candidate for office must submit petitions that contain a designated number of valid signatures from registered voters residing in the political district. The petition process is officially handled by the Board of Elections. The Board of Elections is in turn controlled by the Democratic and Republican county party leaders, who appoint 10

commissioners. The commissioners then select an executive director, who runs the Board on a day-to-day basis.⁹ The county organizations exercise indirect, but effective control over the petition process.

Because county organizations control appointments to the Board of Elections, third parties, insurgents, and independents have a tough time getting on the ballot. Former Manhattan county leader J. Raymond Jones described the process this way:

The election laws specified the color of the paper on which a petition must be drawn. It specifies how it must be drawn. It specifies an affidavit. Rules abound as to how the voter signing the affidavit is to be identified, not only by name and address, but also by his Election and Assembly District numbers. All of this is supposedly for the purpose of checking the authenticity of the petition, how the petition should be numbered in filing, etc.. Various sections of the election law covered these procedures, and every one of these sections was a booby trap for the uninitiated. When a petition is filed with the Board of Elections, it is assigned to a team of a Democrat and a Republican, who go through the petition with the enrollment book, and check everything....Of course, this team is never very meticulous about the regular organizations' petitions.¹⁰

Although Jones described the petition process as it operated in the 1930's, similar conditions still apply. Rules governing the collection of petitions, such as the color of the petition, still change from election to election. It is the responsibility of the county leader to inform district leaders on changes in the rules. Needless

to say, political opponents of the county leader may not discover the new rules until it is too late, that is, until they are ruled off the ballot.¹¹ A high premium is therefore placed on lawyers who are confidants of the county leader, or on lawyers who are very experienced in fighting the county in election law cases.

In anticipation of having many, if not most, signatures on a petition ruled invalid, serious anti-county organization candidates collect a minimum of three times the required number of signatures, itself a large number (50,000 in mayoral primaries). Collecting signatures is a grueling and labor intensive process. Even after taking painstaking precautions it is important to remember, J. Raymond Jones states, "that hardly any petition [comes] before the Board without some little defect." Brooklyn election lawyer Ella Salins said:

It's a maze that a candidate has to go through, that's full of snares that no person in their sane mind would believe. And [it's full of] technicalities that, even as an election lawyer, shock me at times, the new things that they [judges] come up with. Or their interpretations of the same old thing that people have been doing for 20 years, "Now we interpret it differently, and you should have known we were going to interpret it differently and prepared yourself accordingly."¹²

The judges on the State Supreme Court are elected, often with county support, and some are known to regularly side with the county on petition challenges.¹³

Having the right lawyer often makes the difference on whether a candidate can stay on the ballot. Since the number of lawyers familiar with the inner workings and connivance of the county organization is small, they are expensive to retain. Knowing this, the county organization may challenge the petitions of an opponent simply to force them to spend their resources on court attorney fees, as opposed to using their resources "in the street." Intimidation tactics are also frequently employed. If an insurgent, or independent, candidate has recruited volunteers to collect petitions, these volunteers may be subpoenaed to appear in court to testify as to the manner the petitions were collected. For the inexperienced volunteer, receiving an order to appear in court often causes considerable fear, or the belief that the candidate has done something wrong. Insurgent candidates must sometimes even go to the extraordinary lengths of sending key petitioners out of town during crucial court hearings to avoid their being ordered to appear in court.¹⁴ Political machines have been able to prolong their existence by manipulating New York's complicated election laws and controlling the judicial nomination process.

Reform Democrats

Various anti-machine campaigns have been initiated throughout the twentieth century by reformers. Describing the "reform vanguard," political scientist Martin Shefter said:

The founders, directors, and financial backers of the organizations through which this vanguard has operated during most of the twentieth century--the City Club and the Citizens Union--were drawn from the city's upper classes, especially from among wealthy New Yorkers who financed organized charity. But the most numerous and active members of this vanguard were young practitioners of professions that produce, disseminate, and implement respectable opinion on political and social issues--social scientists, social workers, clergyman, and journalists.¹⁵

The ranks of the reformers swelled with the influx of post-war professionals into Manhattan following the World War II.¹⁶ There has been a strong Reform element in the Manhattan Democratic party since the 1950's, although it waned in the 1970's.

Manhattan Reformers managed to overthrow Tammany Hall and take control of the county leadership in 1961.¹⁷ The Queens, Bronx and Brooklyn county organizations have insurgent reform elements, but they have yet to threaten the regular organizations.

Black Politics in New York

Black politicians have found contentment neither in the machine nor among reformers. To a large extent, black/Reform relations is a reflection of black/Jewish relations in New York. Norman Adler and Blanche Davis Blank, in their study of political clubs in New York, found that 75 percent of Reform clubs were preponderantly Jewish. "Reform politics is basically Jewish politics," they said.

Machines have a long history of racism, or what Kilson calls "clientage" politics, where the white machine leaders sponsor African-American politicians as subservient clients.¹⁸ Manhattan has been the only borough to elect a black borough president, and then only because the machine was weakened by the growth of the reform element and sought black votes to bolster its position.

The uneasy relationship between African-Americans and machines is mirrored in the rocky relationship between African-Americans and reformers. Regular organizations, despite their hierarchical structure and racism, are geared towards delivery of material benefits. They have problems with the African-American community not because of their patronage orientation, but because they delivered little of it to the African-American community. The problem was compounded in the post World War II era because they had less patronage to offer. As Martin Shefter has noted,

members of ethnic groups that control county organizations have historically been, "reluctant to share the fruits of power with outsiders."¹⁹ Writing in 1970, political scientist Joyce Gelb similarly found that:

In each party and borough, Negroes complain of lack of consideration when patronage is allocated and lack of consultation when policies regarding their communities are decided upon.²⁰

On the other hand, the issues of concern to Reform Democrats, such the elimination of patronage, are mainly middle-class and upper-class concerns having little relation to the urgent needs of the African-American community.²¹

Political scientist Edwin Lewinson wrote:

Although Negroes had responded to charges of bossism against DiSapio when the charges were put in racial terms, the abstract questions of political democracy and of honest and efficient government were issues to which they could not easily relate. The Reform Democrats aimed their appeal at middle-class voters, but the percentage of middle-class Negro voters is small. To most black people, politics means the politics of recognition as it did to the Irish, Italians, Jews and other ethnic groups before they moved into the middle-class in large numbers....Under this philosophy the purpose of politics is to get jobs which result from group power and which in turn increase group power.²²

The African-American community has tended to see politics as an avenue towards fulfilling group demands. Patronage has been perceived as a problem mainly because African-American people don't get a fair share of it. Reform Democrats have had the greatest success in gaining

African-American support when they couch their appeals to African-American people as a fight against white bossism, and when they promise to support African-Americans for high positions in government.

While divisions between African-Americans and white machine or white Reform Democrats may be expected, internal black politics in New York has also often been characterized as "cursed by factions and feuds."²³ Political scientists and journalists have repeatedly commented on both the inability of African-American candidates to win city-wide office in New York and the weak influence of African-American politicians on City policy.

Black political figures interviewed in the course of this study suggest three reasons for the lack of greater black political success in New York: blacks have been at a numeric disadvantage, the county party organizations have hampered black unity and effectiveness, and black political clubs have, like white clubs, been on the decline.

New York Political Demography

The most obvious factor hampering black progress in city-wide politics is demographic. The 1980 census found that New York City was 25.3 percent black. This compares

with 39.8 percent in Chicago, 37.8 percent in Philadelphia, 43.8 percent in Cleveland, and 66.6 percent in Atlanta.²⁴ In highly racially polarized elections, as occurred in all of these cities, black New Yorkers have the greatest numerical disadvantage.

Demographic factors do not explain, however, why African-American mayoral candidates have failed to attain higher levels of African-American support. In 1977, Percy Sutton, then Borough President of Manhattan and an African-American, gained barely fifty percent of the black vote and hardly any white votes.²⁵ Herman (Denny) Farrell, an Afro-American candidate for Mayor in 1985, won only 40 percent of the black vote.^a

Black Politics in the Boroughs

Throughout the last fifty years, the white-led county organizations in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens have

^a Farrell's percentage of the Black vote in the 1985 primary is an estimate based on a regression model using racial breakdowns of New York's more than 5,400 election districts (derived from the 1980 census) and 1985 election district returns. The standard error of the estimate is 3 percent.

dominated black politics in each of those boroughs.^a

Political scientist Martin Kilson wrote:

In dealing with blacks, the typical New York white power group (or politician) frequently circumvents the politically tested and viable sectors of the black community and its leadership, and instead deals with a marginal leadership sector composed essentially of client-politicians--untested newcomers, flamboyant self-starters, etc.. The power structure thereby creates within the black community a faction beholden to it.²⁶

Kilson's attribution of white racism as a cause for weakness in black politics is not a unique criticism of New York's political machines, nor does it capture the unique obstacles to black political advancement in New York. There are many cities in which white-led political machines have minimized African-American political participation. Only in New York, however, are there multiple white-led machines, each of which have a vested interest in keeping African-American politicians loyal not just to the machine, but loyal to their particular county machine. There is no single white power structure, as Kilson states, that creates a African-American faction beholden to it. Several white power structures have created several black factions, each beholden to a different county organization. This division of the city into competing county organizations fosters a narrow county orientation and division between the black

^a Staten Island has never had a large black population, and it has never elected a black person to political office. Therefore it is excluded from this analysis.

"client" politicians in different boroughs. This "borough" identity has been an additional obstacle to black political progress.

White-led county organizations have had two logical requirements in relation to black politics. The first has been to ensure that black politicians work for the city-wide candidates supported by the county organization. The second requirement has been to minimize the black vote and restrict it to loyal machine voters.

The high degree of organization, legal skill, and money needed to survive the petition process has made it very difficult for black candidates to run against county organization (machine) candidates. Even experienced anti-machine politicians have difficulty staying on the ballot. In 1986, the New York Times reported that:

Albert Vann, a six-term Brooklyn Assemblyman and one of the city's most prominent black politicians, was removed from the Sept. 9 Democratic primary ballot yesterday by a State Supreme Court justice because of errors on his nominating petition....Roger L. Green, who is running for his fourth term for the Assembly from the Fort Greene section of Brooklyn, was also ordered off the ballot by a state judge....Mr. Vann, who ran against Howard Golden for borough president last year, charged that the Kings county Democratic organization, of which Mr. Golden is the leader, was behind the challenge.²⁷

Similarly, in 1987 the New York City Board of Elections invalidated the petitions of four Democratic

candidates in Bronx borough-wide races, "thus reducing," stated the New York Times, "the prospects for a civil war in the Bronx Democratic organization after a year of scandals. The board, acting on petition challenges by the organization, removed four anti-organization candidates...."²⁸

The different rates of success of insurgent black candidates running against county organizations, and the pattern of alliances black politicians rely upon to get elected, determine the character and style of black electoral politics in a particular borough. A better understanding of the differences in black politics within the various boroughs will help explain why divisions between black politicians in New York persist.

Black Politics in Manhattan

African-Americans in Harlem have the longest history of involvement in New York politics, beginning with involvement in the Republican Party in the early part of this century. African-American people began to vote Democratic in the 1930's, led by Democratic party activists such as J. Raymond Jones.^a By 1945, the African-American

^a The term "African American" is used in this study to mean native-born Americans of African descent. The term "Black" is used to mean all non-Spanish speaking persons of African

vote in Manhattan was so strong Jones declared that no one could win the Democratic mayoral primary that year without it.²⁹

From the 1940's to the 1960's, two forces co-existed in Harlem electoral politics. The first was the Tammany black politicians led by J. Raymond Jones. The second consisted of radical nationalists, who were mainly supporters of Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr..

Jones began his career as a loyal worker for the Tammany Hall Democratic machine. Because of his work for the county organization, Jones received a job at the city Board of Elections, where he learned the complexities of election law and filing petitions. He later called this job one of the most important of his career. Through his support of Mayor William O'Dwyer, Jones became O'Dwyer's personal secretary in 1946, Secretary to the Board of Elections in 1947, and later that year Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Housing and Buildings. Jones was probably the most powerful black Democrat in New York.

When William O'Dwyer resigned as Mayor in 1950, he was replaced by Vincent Impelliteri, the President of the City

descent, including African-Caribbean immigrants and African Americans.

Council and a reform Democrat. Jones had opposed Impelliteri in the past. At the same time, Carmine DiSapio replaced Hugo Rogers (a Jones ally) as county "Tammany" leader. Jones consequently was fired from his position at the Department of Housing and Buildings, and he rapidly developed a poor relationship with Carmine DiSapio. Jones also became disillusioned with the polarization of the Manhattan county organization between reformers, who Jones considered "too sanctimonious," and DiSapio, who Jones described as tainted with "gangsterism" and "too crude for my tastes."³⁰ Jones decided to retire from politics in 1953.

Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was first elected to Congress from Harlem in 1944. Powell was a former city councilmember, and the minister of the powerful Abyssinian Baptist church, that at the time had a larger membership than any Protestant church in the United States.³¹ Powell was a protest leader; he created a personal political organization around his church, wholly outside the Tammany machine. Powell was a fervent orator and a passionate black nationalist. By all accounts he was extremely popular among Harlem's masses.

Jones was initially afraid of Powell's radicalism. Jones recalled that, "black Democrats of Harlem, me

included, feared [Powell] because his entire thrust was to the radical left, some of whom were Communists, like [Congressman] Vito Marcantonio. For a while Adam put us in a quandary."³² Jones pointed out that Powell's appeal was class-oriented, and that he made frequent attacks on the black middle and upper classes.^a Nonetheless, Jones realized that there was a danger of conflict between those black Democrats who received patronage and the masses of black people who did not. Powell arose within a period of mass unemployment and revolutionary ferment in Harlem.^b He tapped into a well of discontent among the poor that could not be sapped by patronage.

Jones concluded that black machine Democrats should not oppose Powell, but support him. Said Jones:

For myself, I decided very soon that our political group should work with what I called the popular group, that is, Powell's. People thought members of the [Tammany] political group worked solely and specifically for their own interests rather than for the general population. While this was not true, it seemed credible on the face of it, because party workers and friends received priority in the

^a Jones' shows that class divisions between blacks who received patronage and those who did not was a source of political division in Harlem as early as the 1930's. Martin Kilson's observation in 1983 that black electoral success in the 1970's has given rise to political divisions and mistrust among blacks was pre-dated in Harlem by almost 50 years.

^b Harlem experienced destructive riots in 1935 and 1943. Black communists played a leading role in community struggles at the time. See Charles Green and Basil Wilson, The Struggle for Black Empowerment in New York City (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), p. 19.

distribution of patronage. I thought that a combination of the politicians and what we might call the popular or civil rights group would have an encompassing appeal to the people of Harlem and other parts of New York....³³

In his study of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., James Q. Wilson argued that Powell gained power because Tammany failed, in part due to unwillingness and in part due to resources, to build a strong African-American leadership in Harlem, thereby allowing Powell to fill the vacuum.³⁴

Wilson's own data, however, revealed that blacks in New York received substantially more patronage than did African-Americans in Chicago. Wilson had difficulty explaining how, if the Tammany machine dispensed so much patronage to blacks, the machine was not able to oust Powell in 1958-59, a period of machine strength. Wilson never considered that black "machine" Democrats could have "played a game" on the white political machine leaders: united with radical African-American insurgents, such as Powell, and together attempted to leverage their combined political strength to wrest greater patronage from the Democratic organization.^a

^a Wilson speculates that the black vote was so uncertain, and black machine leaders of so little value, that white political leaders by-passed black political organizations and appealed directly to black civic leaders:

Negro political organization does not necessarily contribute to the placement of Negroes in important public offices; it may actually work against it. The

Unlike Wilson, J. Raymond Jones' autobiography and black participants interviewed in the course of this study argue that it was not political dis-organization but the ability of Harlem machine politicians to break with Tammany at key junctures that allowed them to extract major patronage posts. Far-sighted machine politicians, such as Jones, saw that by combining with protest leaders like Powell they could expand their own power and influence within the machine.³⁵

Jones said:

...what Powell brought to our struggle for black leadership in Harlem was a revolutionary approach we were not capable of, being committed to the normal processes of the Democratic Party machinery. In fact, Adam had built a popular organization along revolutionary line outside Tammany and the Republican organizations...his timing was perfect because we now

Mayor of New York may believe, for example, that the civic leaders actually speak "for" the Negro community with greater authority and political power than do the politicians, and thus it becomes necessary to gratify them by co-opting some into the administration and by paying heed to the recommendations of others.

Wilson's error lies in his assumption that once black machine politicians received patronage, they would remain loyal to the machine. Thus, when Wilson discovers that a large number of patronage jobs were dispensed to blacks, he concludes that those jobs could not have come through black political clubs. His assumption is that if black clubs could dispense with so much patronage, they would have been strong enough to stop insurgents such as Adam Clayton Powell. Wilson concludes with the dubious proposition that blacks actually benefitted from weak political organization in Harlem; the weaker the black political organization, the greater the patronage. See James Q. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpolation" Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 (November 1960).

had a few district leaders, a few magistrates here and there, and an assemblyman or two. But what we needed was to make a push of strength and vigor, to take advantage of the social and political ferment caused by the ongoing war. Powell's timing and bold manner of his attack could not have been better designed.³⁶

Jones strongly supported Powell in his race for Congress in 1944, and in 1945 he capitalized on his support of Powell to secure Powell's endorsement of William O'Dwyer for Mayor. In exchange for Powell and Jones's support, O'Dwyer committed himself to appoint a black person as magistrate of Harlem.³⁷ According to long-time activist Judge William Jones, Jones and Powell worked out an agreement to divide patronage jobs evenly amongst themselves.^a

The first black Borough President, Hulan Jack, was elected in 1953 and took office in 1954. His election was facilitated by divisions within the Manhattan Democrat county organization, and divisions between the Democrats and Republicans. All of the factions competed for black votes. The Republican Party, hoping to attract black voters, had

^a Judge Jones noted that supporters of J. Raymond Jones, himself a native of the Virgin Islands, included many West Indian professionals who had immigrated to New York. Adam Clayton Powell's supporters were native born African-Americans, most of whom immigrated to New York from the Southern States. As a result, judicial and other types of appointments tended to be divided equally between West Indians and native born African-Americans. See Jones, William. Interview by author. xx of XX, 1988, New York. Tape recording.

nominated a black candidate to run for Borough President. The Democrats were split between the Reformers and the machine Democrats. The Reformers supported Impelleteri for Mayor, while the Regulars supported Robert Wagner.

Two black Harlem district leaders then worked out a deal with the Reformers. The district leaders supported Impelleteri for Mayor, and the Impelleteri forces supported Chauncey Hooper, a black lawyer, for Borough President. DiSapio initially supported a white Assemblyman for Borough President, but when every other political faction (including the Liberal Party) nominated a black candidate, DiSapio withdrew his initial candidate and supported Hulan Jack.³⁸ Hulan Jack was a loyal machine Democrat, considered by Jones and many Harlemites of the time to be a subservient stooge to DiSapio.³⁹

By 1958 DiSapio felt strong enough to challenge Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. for the undisputed leadership of Harlem. As mentioned earlier, J. Raymond Jones had retired from politics in 1953, in large part due to his inability to get along with DiSapio. In 1953, DiSapio and Borough President Hulan Jack felt that Adam Clayton Powell had become intolerable. They decided to run a candidate against him. This caused Jones to re-enter politics. "Helping Adam was important," Jones said, " but of much more

importance was the chance to rid Harlem of condescending absentee rulers. I decided early that if I ever returned to politics, one goal would be to make Harlem independent."⁴⁰

Of key importance was getting Powell on the ballot. The united front between Powell and Jones, Lloyd Dickens, and other Tammany politicians schooled in the electoral shenanigans of the machine was critical to Powell's success in the election. Jones wrote, "The key element was not whether Adam could be reelected or not, because once he was on the ballot he would be, but that we had to get him on the ballot. The petitions had to be absolutely in order, not to be tampered with in any way."⁴¹ Powell won the election, and his supporters defeated all but one of the district leaders who opposed him in the election. Six years later, in 1964, Jones ran for Manhattan County Democratic Leader. With Powell's support and a black united front, Jones won.

The relationship between Adam Powell and J. Raymond Jones shows that black politicians have been able to unify for common ends in New York. Jones and Powell were radically different in ideology, style, and organization. They nonetheless united at critical junctures for what they perceived as the common interests of the black community. Their alliance allowed Powell to become one of the most

powerful Congressmen in Washington and allowed Jones to become one of the most important Democratic leaders in New York in the mid-1960's.

From his position as county leader, Jones was instrumental in electing Constance Baker Motley, a black attorney, to replace Hulan Jack as Manhattan Borough president. Motley resigned as Borough President in 1966 upon her appointment to a Federal judgeship. Largely through Jones's influence, the Manhattan delegation of the City Council selected Assemblyman Percy Sutton to fulfill Motley's term.⁴² Sutton, besides having good ties with regular Democrats such as Jones, was the founder of the only Reform Democratic club in Harlem. As such he also had the support of white reform Democrats in the Borough.⁴³

Sutton remained Borough President of Manhattan until 1977, when he decided to run for mayor against the incumbent, Abe Beame. By 1977, however, all semblances of a Tammany machine had long broken down. This was evidenced by the fact that three liberal candidates from Manhattan entered the race. In addition to Sutton, Bella Abzug, a liberal West Side Reform Democrat, and Ed Koch, then a liberal Democrat from the Village, ran for mayor. The inability of Sutton to form an alliance with white liberal Reform Democrats, despite his own reform background,

limited his white support.

Martin Kilson wrote that Sutton's candidacy, in which he won slightly more than 50% of the black vote, showed the inability of New York's black politicians to unite in their common interests.⁴⁴ As noted earlier, however, blacks in Harlem had united in their common interests to elect a black congressman and to elect black borough presidents in Manhattan. Sutton's major problem was that he was unable to use the multi-racial coalition that elected him Manhattan Borough President as the stepping Stone for a broader city-wide campaign. Sutton could have won if blacks, liberal whites, and Puerto Ricans had been united. Sutton came in fifth behind Ed Koch, Mario Cuomo, Abe Beame, and Bella Abzug. He won only 16 percent of the vote in Manhattan, even though he was the Manhattan Borough President. Sutton trailed frontrunner Koch by 49,051 votes, but Sutton lost 83,486 votes to Bella Abzug and Herman Badillo in Manhattan alone. Had Sutton been able to pick up a majority of Badillo's and Abzug's vote in Manhattan, he would have had a good chance of beating Cuomo - who won 170,560 votes. He would have entered a run-off with Ed Koch.^a

^a In New York City, if no candidate in the Democratic Mayoral primary wins more than forty percent of the vote, the two candidates with the highest number of votes in the primary enter into a run-off (second) primary.

Sutton's candidacy revealed another major problem. When Sutton ran for Mayor, black City Clerk David Dinkins ran to fill his seat as Manhattan Borough President. Dinkins reasoned that should Sutton lose, it was important for a black person to maintain a seat on the Board of Estimate.^a But Sutton and Dinkins both were tapping the same limited sources of financial support. As the New York Times has noted: "It is generally more difficult for blacks to raise money than whites. blacks rarely have independent wealth, and it is more difficult for them to be accepted by developers, investment bankers, and others who are most heavily involved in financing campaigns..."⁴⁵ Dinkins and Sutton worked at cross purposes, both campaigns were strapped for money.⁴⁶ And, since Dinkins was running for Borough President, Sutton could not support a white Reformer for the Manhattan Borough President's seat in exchange for liberal white support for his campaign. Likewise, Dinkins could not offer to support a white reformer for Mayor to gain white liberal support for his campaign. Neither

^a New York City is unique in that it has had a special quasi-legislative body called the Board of Estimate. The Board of Estimate votes on city contracts, approves zoning changes and exceptions, and votes on the city budget. As such it is the body to which real estate developers and others who do business with the city must lobby. The Board consists of the Mayor, City Council President, and the comptroller, each of whom have two votes, and the five Borough Presidents, each of whom have one vote. Because of the power of the Board of Estimate, elections are hotly contested, and they can be expensive.

Dinkins nor Sutton had much political capital to extend in making a deal with liberal whites. As it turned out, they both lost.

The Board of Estimate offers an alternative for black politicians seeking city-wide influence but lacking the funds (or support) for a city-wide political campaign. Without it, however, black politicians might have been forced early on to seek greater city-wide black unity and political organization to gain city-wide influence. Since the election of Hulan Jack in the 1950's, the Board of Estimate has served as a half-way house between black disenfranchisement and occupation of the mayor's office. With a fractured county machine in Manhattan, the path of least resistance for the borough's black politicians was to build an alliance with Manhattan's white Democrats to gain a seat on the Board of Estimate. It would have been much more difficult, although arguably more rewarding, for black Manhattan politicians to organize African-Americans city-wide to fight the four white-led county machines simultaneously.

Kilson has criticized Sutton for relying on white liberal support. Kilson quotes Sutton, who said, "I was rather unprepared for the isolation of me as a candidate on the grounds of race."⁴⁷ Sutton, however, was utilizing a

coalition strategy that had worked to elect him Manhattan Borough President.⁴⁸

Dinkins ran a second time for Manhattan Borough President in 1981. Influential liberal Manhattan Democrats, such as Councilwoman Ruth Messinger, again refused to support him. He lost the election to incumbent Borough President Andrew Stein by a single percentage point. In 1985, Stein ran for City Council President and Dinkins handily won the election for Borough President, this time with strong white liberal and Puerto Rican support. Dinkins's election, however, was clouded by a controversy concerning his alleged role in undermining the potential 1985 mayoral candidacy of Herman Badillo.

Brooklyn

The first black office holder in Brooklyn was Bertram Baker, who took a seat in the State Assembly in 1948. His election was the result of the increase in the Brooklyn black population from 2.7 percent (68,921) in 1930, to 7.6 percent (210,570) in 1950.⁴⁹ black Brooklynites, then as now, were concentrated in the Bedford Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn. In 1931, Baker formed a club called the United Action Democratic Association. Blacks were segregated from white clubs at the time, but Baker closely aligned himself

to the Brooklyn machine.⁵⁰ Baker remained Brooklyn's only black elected official until 1962.

By 1960 Brooklyn's black population had increased to 11 percent (363,719) of the total. In 1962, a black lawyer from Barbados, Thomas R. Jones, successfully ran for district leader and State Assembly against Samuel Berman, the white incumbent for both positions in the Assembly District. Jones was leader of the Unity Democratic Club, that had been formed to gain representation in a 50 percent black district adjoining Baker's district. Jones was aligned with white Reform Democrats, who had supported Mayor Wagner for re-election against the machine candidate, Arthur Levitt, in 1961. Rather than face Jones, Berman withdrew from the Assembly race in favor of Wesley McD. Holder, a black politician aligned with the Brooklyn machine.⁵¹

The Unity Democratic Club's insurgence was short lived. Soon after Jones's election, the club negotiated a settlement with county leader Stanley Steingut, and became a regular Democratic organization. In 1964, Steingut offered Jones a civil court judgeship, which he accepted.⁵² Jones was replaced by Shirley Chisholm, who received the support of both Jones and Steingut. In what soon became a pattern, blacks had allied with white reformers to win office against machine incumbents, once in office they made alliances with

the machine and discarded their reform allies.

Soon thereafter, friction developed in the county organization between the Jewish and Italian factions, led by Steingut and Meade Esposito, respectively. Chisholm sided with the Esposito group. Therefore, when a majority black Congressional district was created in 1967 - in response to a lawsuit filed against the gerrymandering of Bedford Stuyvesant's 370,000 black residents into five Congressional districts - Chisholm's successful candidacy for the office was opposed by county leader Steingut. The only district leader to openly support Chisholm was Tom Fortune, a district leader from Chisholm's Unity Democratic Club. Chisholm's eventual victory was indirectly aided by the weak effort mounted for her opponent, Willie Thompson, and by Dominick Corso, an Esposito ally and district leader, whose district included a large section of Chisholm's Congressional district.⁵³

Voice columnists Andy Cooper and Wayne Barrett wrote in 1984 that Chisholm's 1968 Congressional race was, "her only independent political campaign." When Esposito succeeded Steingut as county leader in 1968, they continue, "Chisholm's brief career as a pseudo-independent was over."⁵⁴ Repeating Jones' the Unity Club's pattern, Chisholm then became a loyal machine politician, and she

actively opposed black candidates running for office against the machine. By supporting the machine, Chisholm was spared expensive and time-consuming primary battles to maintain her seat.

Opposing Chisholm's machine politics was Al Vann. Vann is the former president of the Afro-American Teachers' Association, a group of public school teachers who united in the 1960's to improve black school education. Educational reform was a focal point of a powerful black community protest movement in the 1960's. "The election of Al Vann to the Assembly in 1974," Basil Wilson and Charles Green wrote, "marked a new stage in the development of the insurgency movement in New York City."⁵⁵ Vann was heavily involved in the confrontation between community residents in the Oceanhill-Brownsville school district and the United Federation of Teachers over community control of the schools. The confrontation polarized the city and resulted in New York's peculiar form of school decentralization.⁵⁶ Vann's political development came as an outgrowth of the black nationalist and community control movement of the 1960's.

Vann was defeated when he first ran for the State Assembly on an Independent line in 1972. He won a seat in the Assembly representing Bedford Stuyvesant in 1974. Vann

was a threat to machine control of black politics in Brooklyn and he continued to face strong opposition from county sponsored candidates. A political activist and former staff worker for Vann said:

We were forced every year to register at least 2,500 people because the books were constantly being purged. At that time the requirements were that you had to vote once every 2 years in a general election and most of our people were geared up in that community to vote in the Democratic primary. So that once they voted in the Democratic primary they failed to vote in a general election, and that disqualified large numbers of them. So we had to do a lot of door-to-door organizing and voter registration, and that helped us....Meade Esposito was then county leader and he constantly just pummeled us.⁵⁷

By 1980, Brooklyn's black population had risen by 70,000 while the white population had decreased by almost 300,000. black people composed 30 percent of the borough and were twice as numerous as in the Bronx - the borough with the second largest black population. Following the 1980 census, the State Legislature formed a new Congressional district to reflect these changes. Brooklyn activist James Farmer, who sought to influence legislative re-apportionment at the time, said the Congressional district was deliberately designed to minimize a potential Vann candidacy. "They cut a congressional district," Farmer said, "ultimately to split Vann's assembly district in half."⁵⁸ Vann and his political organization, "Vanguard", countered by attempting to pick up as many of the newly created districts as possible. Said Farmer:

What we decided, when I say "we" I'll say Vann/Vanguard, was that [what] we should go after was the big picture and try to pick up many of these new districts that were being created with "progressive" candidates, insurgent candidates, as opposed to just going after our own little agenda, which would be to re-elect Al Vann...our thinking was [expletive] fine - we get elected but we're surrounded - we're on a damn bantustan - just how far are we going.⁵⁹

The Vanguard organization trained an array of "technicians" to meticulously gather petitions able to withstand the inevitable legal challenges from the county. Said Farmer, "I was the chief technician for putting all of that together, and I trained technicians for each one of those candidates and supervised them...all the campaigns, the literature." Vann's political club was joined by community organizations to the east of his district, in Brownsville, led by State Senator Major Owens. The combined effort was ultimately quite successful. During the 1980's, it elected two Congressmen, Ed Townes and Major Owens, a State Senator, Velmanette Montgomery, and four Assemblymembers, Roger Green, William Boyland, Al Vann, and Clarence Norman, Jr..^a Two insurgent candidates for city council lost to regular councilmembers Enoch Williams and

^a Ed Townes had a history of working within the county organization, but he ran against the county-supported incumbent Fred Richmond in 1982 and lost. Richmond was a White incumbent in a district specially designed to elect a Black representative to Congress. Richmond resigned his seat the following term and Townes successfully ran against a Koch supported Hispanic candidate. Even though Townes was deputy Brooklyn Borough President at the time, the county organization was neutral in the latter race. Townes was bitterly resentful of this fact.

Mary Pinkett. The success of Vann's effort led the Village Voice to credit Vann for breaking machine control of black politics in Brooklyn.⁶⁰

The successes outlined above led to the formation of a coalition of the elected officials - the Coalition for Community Empowerment (CCE). CCE is composed of 'executive committee members', composed of the elected politicians from central Brooklyn, and 'associate members', composed of persons recommended for membership by executive committee members.⁶¹ CCE had two purposes, and two ideological currents within it. Many of the "young turks" were inspired by the community protest movement of the 1960's. They joined CCE to create a vehicle for the expression of what Farmer calls, "[a] collective political agenda...not just political, but a social, economic, and political agenda...[to] give politicians an agenda and a script they should all move in sync on."⁶² Others joined CCE for "pragmatic" reasons, eg., CCE was a means of getting the technical and manpower assistance needed to get elected and re-elected. Said Farmer, "When they first got into office everybody needed each other to get elected and everybody had to collectively share resources."⁶³

After a strong beginning CCE has gradually declined in cohesion and influence. Over time the material glue of the

Coalition, the sharing of resources and expertise, became less important. Within a few years, individual CCE politicians were able to develop their own technicians and resources to get re-elected. Said Farmer, "you just have individuals now who've become more self-centered...in terms of their own political futures and destinies and districts, so its harder to get them to think collectively across district lines."⁶⁴

Second, the ideology of black nationalism only united black insurgents against the white machine candidates. It never evolved into a political agenda that would go beyond the replacement of the machine politicians. CCE never developed a pragmatic political strategy that would allow it to win allies and extend its influence. Latinos were not allowed in the Coalition, even though African-American and Latino districts are heavily integrated. Nor did CCE attempt to win over African-American machine politicians or educate them on important issues facing African-Americans in Brooklyn--such as the billion dollar Metro-Tech/Atlantic Terminal development project planned for downtown Brooklyn. White politicians in Brooklyn districts with African-American majorities were not approached. As the Village Voice wrote, "Vann committed errors during the years of building the coalition that would later cause him trouble. Issues had been too narrowly focused, without the kind of

research needed to formulate the broad program black progressives needed."⁶⁵ The result was that CCE members did not work together, or they worked at cross purposes on some issues.⁶⁶

CCE also has not been successful in cementing ties between Brooklyn's African-American and its West Indian population. Brooklyn activist Bob Boswell, himself of mixed West Indian and African-American heritage said:

What's happening is that we have not breached the gap...between American blacks, Southern blacks, who came up for a variety of reasons and the Caribbean blacks, who came up from the Caribbean. All black people don't have the same mores, objectives, goals and things....Everybody, I think, is responsible that we never have really reached out and said, 'Hey, what do we have in common, what don't we have in common,' so we can collectively work towards the betterment of our people....That was a major downfall for Vann...the seat that [State Senator] Marty Markowitz has could have been won by a Caribbean back in 1980. Former Senator Waldaba Stewart still was running, but because Waldaba was seen as a regular, Vann's people said 'we're not gonna support a regular.' They didn't take into consideration he was a Caribbean. So they ran a gentleman who was a very nice guy [Carl Andrews,]...so he split the black vote, when the chance was for a black to take that seat, which is 85 percent black.⁶⁷

Many West Indian politicians feel they have been excluded by the CCE. In an examination of the "African-American/Caribbean dialectic" Charles Green and Basil Wilson wrote that, "African-American politicians like Assemblyman Al Vann have not been sensitive to the nationalist concerns of the Caribbean community."⁶⁸ Interviews of West Indian

activists conducted for this study also suggest that West Indians, coming from all-black Caribbean nations, were less attracted to the black nationalism of CCE than are African-Americans.⁶⁹ One interviewee said that Caribbean blacks are more interested in things like "businesses and home ownership" than a heavy focus on race.⁷⁰

Finally, churches in the central Brooklyn area were not incorporated into CCE. In fact, CCE was conceived to include only politicians, which did not allow for church and community organization participation.^a Congressman Major Owens said, "The failure of the leadership in other quarters, including the church, to accept Al Vann's leadership, has crippled the momentum of the empowerment movement."⁷¹ It is easy to understand why church and community leaders would not accept Vann's leadership when CCE would not allow their membership in was considered the most important political decision-making body in central Brooklyn. While some of the most prominent church leaders, such as Rev. Gardner Taylor, have a long history of involvement with the Brooklyn machine, others, such as Rev. Bill Jones, pastor of the influential Bethany Baptist Church, have a long history of political independence and community activism. Even ministers such as Rev. Jones,

^a Although the by-laws of CCE allow for the inclusion of 'associate members,' who are not elected officials, there were only two associate members in as of early 1988.

however, have become alienated from the Coalition, and refuse to accept its leadership.⁷²

Some former CCE members blame Vann for the ascension of Howard Golden to the position of county leader. In 1984 Democratic County Leader Meade Esposito resigned from his position amid a corruption scandal. A familiar fight within the Brooklyn organization erupted for county leadership. Two white factions, one led by Howard Golden and another by Canarsie district leader Tony Genovese, emerged. There were also two black factions, one affiliated with the machine, the other insurgent. Bob Boswell explained what took place at the county organization meeting at which the district leaders elected a new county leader:

I tried to orchestrate [a black county leader selection] but couldn't pull it off...in Brooklyn County there are 19 assembly districts [with] 2 district leaders for every district. So you have 38 district leaders - 19 male and 19 female...I had done a count with some people and we had approximately 12 minority district leaders that we could line up and had a possibility of getting about 4 or 6 other so-called reform district leaders who are always against the county, against the organization. But there was a fight among ourselves. You know this was one of the few times the Puerto Ricans came down and said, "Look, we're down with the blacks." But the blacks couldn't make a decision whether they were going to go with Al Vann or Tom Fortune and they decided to go with Tom Fortune because Tom Fortune had seniority. And then some of the blacks like Al [Vann], thought he's [Fortune] more of the organization [and] there aren't going to be any changes. so we got to fighting among ourselves and we lost our voting power.⁷³

Borough President Howard Golden was elected to the

additional post of County Leader. Golden immediately realized that if his opponent, Esposito protege Tony Genovese, built a coalition with African-American district leaders they would have the votes to oust him. As soon as he was elected, Golden made overtures to other members of CCE seeking to isolate Vann. He had notable success. Bob Boswell commented that "he [Golden] got most of the black district leaders and Puerto Rican district leaders to work with him with the exception of Al Vann and Ed Robertson."⁷⁴

Golden's efforts to win black support created tensions within CCE. Vann's 1985 Borough President race provided a litmus test for CCE unity. CCE members offered only token support for Vann's badly losing candidacy. Because he supported Golden, CCE kicked out Congressman Ed Townes. Vann's 1985 candidacy will be further discussed in the next chapter.

In sum, black politicians in Brooklyn have had both large numbers of black voters and the opportunity to exercise broad political power - even the possibility of capturing control of the county Democratic organization. But internal divisions between machine and insurgent black politicians, and between African-American and West Indian blacks, have largely negated this potential. In contrast to

Manhattan, black politicians in Brooklyn have been unable to bridge their differences at key moments to take advantage of splits within the county Democratic organization.

Queens

In 1960, the black population in Queens was 142,087, only 8 percent of the total.^a In 1970, the white population had grown by 60,000, but the black population increased by more than 115,000 to 257,873, or 13 percent of the total. By 1980, blacks again increased by nearly 100,000 to 355,010, or 18 percent.⁷⁵

Black residents are concentrated in the southeast section of Queens, in the St. Albans, Cambria Heights, Queens village, South Jamaica, and Rochdale Village areas. In recent years, more black people have moved north into the East Elmhurst, Corona, Jackson Heights Woodside area, and south into Far Rockaway. Black residents of Queens tend to be more affluent, and more likely to be homeowners, than are black people elsewhere in the city. The New York Voice, a black-oriented weekly, stated that, "The median family income of the 341,000 Afro-Americans in Queens of \$15,770 is almost equal to that of the \$16,954 median income of white

^a A separate category for persons of Hispanic origin was not available.

families in Manhattan. The black community in Queens also owns roughly 40 percent of the approximately 108,342 black-owned homes in the city, despite totaling less than 20 percent of its black population."⁷⁶

Queens has a black "ghetto" in South Jamaica, but it is small in comparison to black ghettos of Brooklyn, Manhattan, or the Bronx. The area of high drug transactions and drug related murders in Queens is mostly contained within one police precinct - the 103rd.⁷⁷

Black residents of Queens are considered by some to be the most conservative blacks in the city. Black activist and Assistant District Attorney Dick Hayes said:

People generally live somewhere else before they move to Southeast Queens and they generally have a stake. People are more conservative in Southeast Queens. They own their property, or they work, and the black person in Southeast Queens is incredibly conservative. When I was a prosecutor, I would laugh when my colleagues, my white colleagues, would throw black people from Queens off the juries. I would say, you know, if you want to convict somebody, these black folks in Queens would convict their own mothers...These people are incredibly conservative in every area, and I was just reading this in Newsday but in every area except civil rights black people in Southeast Queens are incredibly conservative. They've bought into that whole home owner mentality.⁷⁸

The first African-American to win elected office in Queens was Kenneth Brown, an attorney, who defeated a white Democrat and the Republican incumbent in a State Assembly race in 1964.⁷⁹ Brown was succeeded in the Assembly by Guy

Brewer and Andrew Jenkins. The seat is currently held by Assemb. Cynthia Jenkins. After Brown's election, there was no significant insurgent black challenge to the white Democratic machine until the early 1980's. With the exception of Congressman Floyd Flake, and the possible exception of Assemblymember Helen Marshall, the black elected officials in Queens won office as loyal county politicians.^a These include one member of the city council, two Assembly members and one state senator, all from southeast Queens.

Not surprisingly, none of the black elected officials from Queens come from a black nationalist tradition, as does Al Vann or Roger Green in Brooklyn, and none come from the radical tradition of Adam Clayton Powell. While some may oppose the machine on occasion, they are not militants who fought the machine to gain a foothold and then made peace with the machine once they were in office. As a senior aide to Congressman Flake remarked, "...most of them are elected through the party and through the organization...they're not really their own people."⁸⁰

The Queens Democratic machine organization has, until recently, handpicked candidates for elected office. Maurice

^a Flake, while not supported by the Queens county organization, received support from Mayor Koch to defeat a black regular and a black reformer.

Small, aide to Congressman Flake, recalled his own experience in bucking the county's decision regarding an Assembly race:

...when I ran in '82, you know, I was a part of the Democratic organization, they told me not to run, I was too young, it wasn't my turn. I'm like, well what do you mean it's not my turn, I mean, I'm running for office, I have a right to. And because I did that, they kicked me out of the organization [and he lost the election].⁸¹

Despite the white county organization's influence over African-American elected officials and political clubs, it maintains a veneer of black inclusion. The Deputy County Leader is an African-American district leader, Dora Young. Young, however, is considered to have little influence in the organization. Queens activist attorney Leslie Black, when asked of the impact of Young's appointment to Deputy County Leader said:

What have we achieved as a result of it (?), that's always the bottom line. We could not even get placed on the agenda of the county meeting the discussion of who the county would support in the presidential primary, until it was raised by my [district leader] husband, the maverick...a telegram went out from my husband, not from the black political district leaders, saying let's discuss endorsing Jesse Jackson. No response from [county leader] Manton. Then there was a county meeting at which the Vice Chair [Dora Young] was there and was asked to bring it up, "Oh, no, no, we aren't sure that's what he [Manton] wants on the agenda." You know, what do we want on the agenda(?)...we want the county to look at our issues, they're not going to look at them if we don't point their heads and make them look at it.⁸²

Black political clubs are criticized by black

reformers for basically the same reasons white reformers criticized machines throughout this century. Many interviewees across the city criticized black political clubs for being exclusive, sexist, non-issue oriented, and often subservient to white machine leadership. But these criticisms were most forcefully directed at Queens political clubs and politicians.^a Leslie Black, the Queens activist, said:

The clubhouse politics that blacks have been involved in have been the politics of exclusion...If you have been anointed, and have been invited and been permitted to come into the fold of the club it's a big deal. The doors of the clubhouse generally are not flung wide open welcoming people in....The club exists for the purpose of promoting and supporting a politician or a group of politicians who come out of that particular club. It doesn't exist to promote good things in the community in which it exists.⁸³

In Manhattan, black club leaders learned the technicalities of election law and petition gathering, and used their experience in machine politics against the machine. Similar defections from the Queens machine have occurred only in the last six years.

The 1984 Congressional campaign of Simeon Golar, a wealthy African-American developer and former city official,

^a Criticisms of black political clubs because of their non-issue orientation, sexism, and obedience to party leaders, echo many of the standard criticisms made by White Reform Democrats of political machines in general.

against the machine-backed incumbent, Joseph Addabbo, was the first significant black challenge to a machine incumbent. Addabbo represented southeast Queens and the Far Rockaways since the early 1960's, when the area was primarily Italian. After Addabbo first took office the area became predominately black, although there still are significant white pockets in Ozone Park and the Rockaways. According to the 1980 census, the district was 47 percent black, 44 percent white, 8 percent Latino and 1 percent Asian.⁸⁴ By 1984, Addabbo was the ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee and chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Appropriations. He was able to hold on to his seat with political ties and iou's he had built up in the black community over the years, but most of all because of his machine support.⁸⁵

Black observed that a black candidate running against the machine must, "spend a heck-of-a-lot of money, or you've got to invest a whole lot of energy." Golar was unique for a black insurgent because he, "at least had money."⁸⁶ Although Golar received campaign support from Jesse Jackson, Illinois Congressman Gus Savage, and the black Deputy New York Assembly Leader Arthur Eve, the only Queens politician to support Golar was African-American Assemblymember Cynthia Jenkins. Golar lost miserably, but a key campaign worker, now an administrative law judge, summed up the campaign as a

success:

If you [work] in the main stream of [Queens] politics, generally the County organization was doing everything for you, so you didn't learn the nuts and the bolts....Golar's campaign gave black activists in Queens the experience of running their own campaign, from top to bottom.⁸⁷

A little more than a year after Golar's defeat, the city's corruption scandal had a major impact on black politics in Queens. It began with the suicide of Queens county leader Donald Manes. Manes was the undisputed leader of Queens politics. The New York Times reported in 1986: "While politicians in New York City's other boroughs have feuded in recent years, those from Queens presented a public picture of cooperation, according to various legislators and lobbyists. Many of those observers attribute that cohesiveness to Mr. Manes's control over the legislators..."⁸⁸ Manes was the chosen candidate of former county leader Matthew Troy for Queens Borough President in 1971. In 1974, he helped depose Troy and succeeded him as county leader.⁸⁹ Manes developed a close relationship with Mayor Koch and, as the corruption scandal revealed, Manes controlled important patronage in the city administration as well as in Queens.⁹⁰

Manes' death left a void in the Queens organization. Manes had been an imposing figure. Immediately after his death, the African-American Assemblywoman Cynthia Jenkins,

who had offered support for insurgent candidate Simeon Golar the year before, told the New York Times, "she had felt bullied by Manes and the senior legislators who were his allies. 'Donald wrote the book and everyone but me went along with it.'"⁹¹

The weakness in the machine caused by the criminal investigation and suicide of Manes was compounded by the death of Congressman Joseph Addabbo in April of 1986. A special election was held in June to decide who would hold Addabbo's seat for the months prior to the regular Democratic primary election in September. The election had five candidates. The machine put forward an African-American Assemblyman, Alton Waldon Jr.. The major opposition came from African-American insurgent candidate Rev. Floyd Flake, pastor of the Allen A.M.E. Church in Jamaica.

Flake had the twin attributes of being a forceful, charismatic speaker, and an excellent organizer with ties to City Hall. The New York Times reported that:

In his 10 years as pastor of the church, he has helped build an \$11 million 300-unit senior citizens complex in Jamaica; founded a 480-student school and multi-purpose center; a home-care agency that provides personal care services to 225 sick, elderly and handicapped people; a housing corporation that has rehabilitated 10 stores on Merrick Boulevard, and sponsored and managed the South Jamaica Multi-Service Center, which provides clinical services, teen pregnancy counseling, post-natal care and other community services.⁹²

Flake's church boasted 4,000 members, 2,700 of them registered Democrats. Flake's deeds had attracted the attention of his fellow ministers. Flake aide Maurice Small described the process by which Flake became a candidate: "...the clergy of Southeast Queens got together and said, listen, you know, if you want to run, we're willing to back you, and we'll back you financially, which they did."⁹³

Flake's campaign was described by those who participated in it as a "people's campaign," for every, "hundred or two hundred Flake buttons and banners and people, you'd see five or ten of Walden's people."⁹⁴ The election itself was a cliffhanger. Flake won a plurality of the votes tallied from the voting machines, but the county (based on a legal technicality) managed to block his name from appearing on absentee ballots. Flake's lawyers challenged the Board of Elections, but a court decision in Flake's favor came "too late" for his name to be placed on the absentee ballots.⁹⁵ As a result, Waldon won the election by 278 votes.

Waldon's victory was short-lived. Flake sought the support of Mayor Ed Koch, who endorsed him over Waldon. Koch's endorsement would have been unthinkable before Manes' death, but now Koch helped Flake campaign in areas where white voters had given strong backing to Waldon in the

previous special election. Flake's campaign mounted an intensive organizational effort, depending primarily on volunteers. In the two days before the election the campaign telephoned 14,000 households in an attempt to bring out the vote.⁹⁶ Flake won the primary election by more than 3,000 votes and went on, as is the rule in virtually all New York elections, to an easy victory in the general election.

Flake differs from New York's other African-American politicians. Except for civil rights, he is not an ideological liberal or radical, nor is he a machine politician. Flake is best described as a conservative black nationalist. He preaches a strong nationalist self-help philosophy, not unlike Booker T. Washington, that is popular among his black constituency. He is opposed to such liberal causes as abortion rights, a position that would undermine liberal white support for a Manhattan or Brooklyn black elected official, but does Flake little harm among his white Catholic constituency.

Flake's campaign was the first successful head-to-head campaign of a black insurgent against a Queens machine incumbent.^a Flake has not yet attempted to challenge the Queens organization in other races within his district, but

^a Brown's 1964 race for Assembly was against the Republican incumbent and the Democratic county candidate.

he has threatened to do so.⁹⁷ Flake is unpredictable. He has shown the shrewdness and tactical flexibility to win the simultaneous support of both Mayor Koch and Jesse Jackson, and he has popular support.^a By extending his influence within his district, he has the capacity to become either a major player in the Queens organization, or a major thorn in its side. In either case, Flake's emergence means that the Queens organization can no longer ignore the wishes of black elected officials, or at least this one.^b

Bronx

The black population in the Bronx increased from approximately 50,000 in 1940 to nearly 160,000 (11 percent of the total county population) in 1960, doubling again to 357,099 by 1970.⁹⁸ In 1980, the Bronx black population was estimated to be 372,099, or 28 percent of the total. That same year, the borough was 30 percent Latino (predominantly of Puerto Rican ancestry), and 40 percent white. African-

^a For Flake to win White support in Queens, Flake had to attract conservative White voters. "There is no liberal upper west side in Queens like there is in Manhattan," said Queens City Councilman Arthur Katzman, "and the Reform Democratic Movement has traditionally not been very strong." See David Hatchett, "Where Is Queens Headed Politically?" New York Voice (date). Flake's use of the then popular and conservative Koch was therefore a shrewd tactical move.

^b Flake's reputation has damaged by allegations that he misappropriated Federal funds allocated to a church affiliated corporation to build housing, and by a separate flap over an alleged extra-marital relationship with a church worker.

Americans have historically been concentrated in the southern part of the Bronx, in neighborhoods such as Morrisania, East Tremont, and Highbridge. A sizable number of blacks, particularly West Indians are concentrated in the north Bronx, in the Williamsbridge and Baychester communities.

The Bronx has three African-American assemblymembers, Larry Seabrooke, Gloria Davis, and Aurelia Greene; an African-American state senator, Joseph Galiber; an African-American City Councilmember, Rev. Wendell Foster, and a newly elected African-American district attorney, Robert Johnson. The first black elected official in the Bronx was Walter Galdwin, a native of British Guyana. A lawyer, he was elected in 1954. At the time of his election, his district in the South Bronx was 45 percent black, 15 percent Puerto Rican, and 40 percent Jewish.⁹⁹

The predominately white county organization supported Gladwin. As Edwin Lewinson explains:

The election of the first black officeholder in the Bronx reflected the political situation in the Borough, and the method by which he was chosen differed markedly from the way in which the first elected members of the race were selected in Manhattan and Brooklyn. In the former two boroughs Negroes had to defeat an entrenched organization in the primary or at least bring it to its knees in a general election to join elective office. On the other hand the Bronx political machine of Edwin J. Flynn recognized the changing population trends and granted Negroes and Puerto Ricans at least token representation without a struggle.¹⁰⁰

The generally cohesive attachment between black elected officials in the Bronx and the Bronx county organization persisted until the late 1980's. With the lone exception of Councilman Wendell Foster, all of the elected officials in the Bronx are supported by the machine. Cedric James, a former high ranking Bronx official familiar with the Bronx Democratic organization said, "I believe that even though they may not want to give that perception that all of the blacks in the county rely on the county [organization] for re-election...I think all of them except Foster are benefitting or somehow tied in to [the] county in a major way."¹⁰¹

Part of the dependence of Bronx black politicians on the county organization is due to the unusual tightness, even by New York standards, of the Bronx political machine. There have only been seven Bronx county leaders since 1914, most of whom have been exceptionally powerful. Those who left office did so because of either death or scandal, not intra-party contest. "Boss" Ed Flynn, who was county leader from 1922 until 1953, was also National Democratic Party chairman, and had easy access to the White House under Roosevelt. His successor, Charles Buckley, had similar access to the White House under Kennedy, and open access to New York's Mayor Wagner. Patrick Cunningham succeeded Buckley after his death in 1969, and was also the New York

State Democratic chairman. When Cunningham resigned, because of a scandal in 1978, he was replaced by his right-hand man, Stanley Friedman. The Bronx machine was thus able to pass the baton from Irish to Jewish leadership without opening up the kind of intra-white rivalry that unlocked opportunities for blacks in Brooklyn and Manhattan.¹⁰²

Under Friedman, African-American elected officials acquiesced to the county organization, "...under Friedman every significant position in government - borough president, district attorney, surrogate, and county leader - was still occupied by a white male."¹⁰³ In the past, African-American elected officials negotiated with the county on an individual basis rather than as a group. Cedric James, said:

I wish I could tell you that the coalition of blacks when they go up to Albany and they sit down with [county leader] George Friedman and want a project for their district, or they want a project for the county, that they're able to influence him because of knowing that he also wants their vote on different issues. That doesn't happen. George has a way of not dealing with you collectively, he'll deal with you individually. He picked that up from [former county leader] Friedman."¹⁰⁴

The county's divide-and-conquer approach inhibited the development of cohesive black elected leadership in the borough. There is no borough-wide black political organization in the Bronx. A sitting African-American judge

with a long history of involvement in Bronx politics said, "...there is no sense of organization in the Bronx...everybody walks in [to meetings] with an agenda and the agenda isn't necessarily the black agenda."¹⁰⁵

Part of the disorganization of black politics in the Bronx stems from the mercurial behavior of the one maverick African-American elected official, Rev. Wendell Foster. Foster has an organized church base and does not rely on the county for re-election. Nonetheless, Foster has not attempted to build an insurgent movement against the county organization, and on key issues he is as likely as not to side with the county organization.¹⁰⁶ Foster's influence is limited by his reputation for being cantankerous and unreliable. He is described as a "loner" and is said to have a poor working relationship with other African-American legislators and community activists in the borough.¹⁰⁷

There have been several occasions in which Latino or black politicians have challenged the county for borough-wide office. More often than not, however, the black and Latino politicians worked at cross purposes, creating hostility and mistrust on both sides. The Bronx machine is infamous for its ability to divide black and Puerto Rican leaders. The New York Times quoted several ranking state legislators and government aides who said the former Bronx

Democratic leader Stanley Friedman has been, "...skillful at taking advantage of the longstanding rivalries between the borough's black and Latino leaders."¹⁰⁸

In 1965, a Puerto Rican candidate, Herman Badillo, ran as an insurgent for Borough President of the Bronx. The county Democratic organization selected Ivan Warner, the black Assemblyman who replaced Gladwin, as its candidate to run against Badillo. Badillo won the hotly contested race by a scant 200 votes. In 1981, African-American State Senator Joseph Galiber, a regular, challenged Badillo's successor, a county regular named Stanley Simon, for Borough President. This time a Puerto Rican candidate entered the race, and the split between the black and the Puerto Rican vote provided Simon's margin of victory.¹⁰⁹ In 1985, a Puerto Rican Assemblyman, Jose Serrano, challenged Simon for the borough presidency. This time he did not have a black opponent, but he won less than half of the black vote, costing him the election.

Serrano's candidacy exemplified much of the antipathy and misunderstanding developed between the black and Puerto Rican communities. Judge Mitchell explains:

He didn't get any black support and he should have. I tried to convince the people in the 78th that we should support him. The 78th voted for him, but the politicians didn't support him and it was as much his fault (because of his attitude at that time) that he didn't get the support....[Serrano] made some statement

that he doesn't understand what the blacks in his community want. How difficult is that? I mean that's what the Jews have been saying all along and here comes a Puerto Rican...having the same problems. You know housing, lack of jobs, teenage pregnancy. I mean there's no [black and Puerto Rican] separation there and so that when he makes those kinds of comments, people got turned off so they wouldn't support him.¹¹⁰

Serrano's race gained momentum in the black community in the last couple of weeks before the election. Cedric James, who managed Simon's campaign in the black community said:

I was surprised that Joe [Serrano] lost that race. It was really a very close race though, as you know, I mean, it's still a question of whether or not we [the machine] stole the election...but if there was another week, Joe would have won."¹¹¹

Not only did the machine "steal" the election at the Board of Elections, Serrano said:

He [county leader Friedman] was able to twist the arms of every black and Puerto Rican elected official in the Bronx to keep me from being elected...I [met] people walking down the street, I would say hello to them and they would turn around the corner immediately."¹¹²

The same corruption scandal that led to the suicide of Queens Borough President Donald Manes created an opening for insurgency against the Bronx organization in 1986. County leader Stanley Friedman was convicted in November of 1986 on Federal charges of racketeering, conspiracy, and mail fraud. Even with Stanley Friedman's indictment, it was not immediately clear whether the machine would be appreciably

weakened. The machine continued to control enough patronage in the Bronx Borough President's office, the judiciary, the State Legislature and the Board of Elections, "to survive like a bear hibernating in winter."¹¹³ Despite his conviction, Stanley Friedman handpicked his successor, Assemblyman George Friedman (no relation), who was known for his unswerving loyalty to Stanley Friedman.¹¹⁴ As a testament to the power of the machine, George Friedman was elected in December of 1986 with only 3 of 28 district leaders and executive committee members opposing him, and one abstention.^a Black and Latino district leaders voted solidly for Friedman, even though together they had enough votes to vote in a black or Latino County Leader.¹¹⁵

George Friedman soon showed that he lacked the skill and power of his predecessor. In March of 1987, Bronx Borough President Stanley Simon resigned from office just days before his indictment for allegedly receiving bribes from the Bronx based Wedtech Corporation. When Simon resigned, Deputy Borough President Cecil Joseph became acting Borough President until a successor was named by the Bronx members of the City Council six weeks later.

^a Most of the district leaders were supporters of Stanley Friedman and had been elected with the help of the county organization. The New York Times reported that, "many [district leaders] ran unopposed after their challengers were excluded from the ballot for technical reasons."

Because of George Friedman's feebleness, a free-for-all developed in which three African-American and three Latino candidates vied for the City Council appointment.¹¹⁶ Among the black candidates, the frontrunner was acting Borough President Cecil Joseph. The other African-American candidates were Rev. Wendell Foster and businessman Dick Guidron. Cecil Joseph was a member of Simon's club, and a loyal machine Democrat. Joseph ran because he perceived that George Friedman was a weak leader, had Stanley Friedman been county leader, he would have backed off.¹¹⁷

Joseph eventually received the support of all the African-American elected officials in the Bronx. He raised \$30,000 in six weeks, and he began to receive grassroots support in the black community and elements of the white community. This was the closest the Bronx had come to an independent black political campaign. But then, according to Cedric James, "...all of a sudden...fundraising just stopped." James attributed the loss of fundraising to comments made by George Friedman and Mayor Koch that there should be a Latino Borough President in the Bronx.

During his maneuvering for re-election in September of 1986, the former county leader, Stanley Friedman, had pledged to support a Latino for Bronx Borough President after Simon.¹¹⁸ Mayor Koch, who was strongly supported by the Bronx machine, had received strong support for his re-

election from the Latino community, and indicated his preference for a Latino on the Board of Estimate.¹¹⁹ The implicit attack on his campaign from these officials made it difficult for Joseph to run a strong campaign. James remarked, "grassroots people, yes, they support you, but they didn't have the type of financing for us to run a formal campaign...[to] go out there on the radio...have brochures...[and] basic stuff you need."¹²⁰

The Mayor's support for a Latino was strongly resented by Joseph, who said that it was both "inflammatory" and "racist".¹²¹ What angered Joseph and many other black officials interviewed from the Bronx was that because there are no Latinos elected to the Board of Estimate, or to Congress, from other boroughs, the mayor and the governor supported Latino candidates over black candidates in the Bronx. African-American officials believed that they paid the price for Latino exclusion elsewhere in the city.

The leading Latino candidate for the Borough President position was Councilman Fernando Ferrer. In addition to Ferrer, two other Latino candidates, Assemblyman Jose Serrano, a reformer, and Assemblyman Hector Diaz, a regular Democrat, contended for the position. Ferrer was able to win the appointment because he gained the support from Friedman and white and Latino elements of the machine.¹²²

Nonetheless, machine regulars Joseph and Diaz had opposed his candidacy. Joseph won the support of the usually loyal African-American elected officials, and Diaz had the support of Raymon Velez, a former city councilman, Stanley Friedman confidant, and powerful head of the "patronage rich" Hunts Point Multi-Service Center. For the first time the Bronx machine was fracturing.

This breach opened wider during summer negotiations to select two State Supreme Court nominees and nominate a Surrogate Court Judge. George Friedman made the error of reneging on his promise to nominate a black person for the Surrogate position. Judge Mitchell related the events as follows:

Last summer...people were quite disillusioned with George Friedman, primarily because he had promised that a black person would get that surrogate job and then turned around and reneged on it. Not only did he renege on it, but he went outside of the organization to pick a candidate. He went up to Westchester...He [the county candidate] didn't even live in the Bronx and there were several people in the organization, though they be white, that we could have picked and he would have been patted on the back for having done that...but he went outside of the organization..and so that created a lot of animosity in his own ranks.¹²³

As a result of the disharmony within the machine, a African-American candidate, Civil Court Judge Hansel McGee, and a white candidate, Civil Court Judge Bertram Katz, challenged the machine in the surrogate race. Katz and McGee, along with insurgent Borough President candidate

State Senator Israel Ruiz, were ruled off the ballot by the Board of Elections in August of 1987 for having an insufficient number of valid petition signatures. The Bronx machine thus temporarily avoided a "civil war."¹²⁴ McGee's defeat showed that Friedman's supporters still had some power. The machine also fired several African-Americans blacks (holding patronage jobs) for attending meetings in support of Hansel McGee.¹²⁵

Vexation resulting from the judicial nomination process spilled over at the Bronx judicial convention in September of 1987. The convention was convened to nominate two State Supreme Court judges. African-American Assemblymembers Gloria Davis and Larry Seabrooke decided to support their own candidate for a judgeship. They selected William Martin, an African-American defense lawyer, who a month earlier had been ruled off the ballot while challenging county supported incumbent Mario Merola for District Attorney. Latino Assemblymembers Jose Serrano and Hector Diaz (the associate of Ramon Velez) supported a Latino Family Court judge, Frank Torres, for the other seat. The African-American and the Puerto Rican legislators formed a united front against the county organization. Judge Mitchell described what happened afterwards:

Eliot [Engel] and Oliver Koppell...are the reformers and they welcomed the coalition of the blacks and Hispanics at this juncture, and John Dearie joined them so at this point it was total revolt...when the

scenario began to play out the [staunch machine loyalist] Aurelia Greene's jumped over to the coalition so that...possibly two districts at best remained outside the camp. that was the first time that [a unified revolt] ever happened and you know it becomes obvious to everyone what can happen if people can just understand the nature of the beast. and they see it now. They see that its ripe to be overtaken.¹²⁶

Since the judicial convention of 1987 the power of the Bronx Democratic organization has steadily waned.^a Upon the death of District Attorney Mario Merola in the fall of 1987, the governor appointed a successor, Paul Gentile, to fill the office until the election the following year. County leader George Friedman declared that Gentile was "unelectable", no doubt angering the governor, and attempted find a candidate to run against Gentile. Friedman, however, was unable to find a candidate willing to run against Gentile (which would imply opposing the popular governor), at least as a county-supported candidate. In an embarrassing about face, Friedman decided to endorse Gentile.

Robert T. Johnson, an African-American judge, who had

^a The machine in the Bronx has never had great strength in the predominately Jewish areas of Riverdale and Co-op City. It has been kept in office by a coalition of Irish and Italian Democrats from former Congressman Mario Biaggi's northeast Bronx neighborhood and black and hispanic Democrats in the south Bronx. Riverdale is represented in the Assembly by an anti-machine Reform Democrat, G. Oliver Koppell. Co-op city, was represented, until recently, by Reform Democrat Assemblyman Eliot L. Engel.

been the county supported candidate for State Supreme Court the year before, was one of three judges who turned Friedman down. Johnson instead choose to run as an insurgent candidate, and he defeated Gentile in the primary, becoming the Bronx District Attorney. In the same election, reform Assemblyman Eliot Engel challenged machine incumbent Congressman Mario Biaggi, by now indicted for involvement in the Wedtech scandal, and won.

The election of Engel, and the sharing of power between a Latino Borough President and an African-American District Attorney, have upset the delicate balance of political relationships that characterized the Bronx machine. Ferrer is a fierce enemy of former machine stalwart Raymond Velez, while Johnson won office running against the white leadership of the machine. It is questionable whether Borough President Ferrer or county leader George Friedman will be able to restore the Bronx county organization to its past level of organizational hegemony. Certainly the machine will have to work harder to win the allegiance of black voters and its defecting black elected officials.

Participation in Black Political Clubs

That blacks are only roughly one-fourth of the city's population, and have a weak political status outside Manhattan help to explain why blacks have not achieved greater political success in New York. Declining interest in black political clubs offers a third reason. Rather than seeking career gains through politics, young professionals in New York tend to ignore politics in order to pursue careers in the private economy.

Martin Kilson maintains that the intense factionalism among New York's black politicians is attributable to what political scientist Joyce Gelb has described as "the demand/supply imbalance--too many professionally trained blacks chasing too few opportunities."¹²⁷ Gelb contends that the exclusion of blacks within New York's private economy leads to an excessive number of black professionals seeking careers through politics. In addition, because New York has a diffuse political structure, "[ambitious] aspirants will take their chances when support is offered by a dissident faction or pressure group."¹²⁸ Therefore black politicians are often pitted against each other.

Based on the rationale developed by Gelb, Kilson surmises that black politicians in New York have a "self-serving ethos," that is the opposite of the "other-serving ethos" among black politicians elsewhere. This "self-

serving ethos" generates factionalism, that in turn explains the relative lack of success (compared to Atlanta, Chicago, etc.) of black New York politicians in running for city-wide office, and their lack of influence on City policy.

An analysis of participation in black political clubs and elections today, eighteen years after Gelb's study, indicates that the situation is more nearly the reverse. Black political clubs are not over-populated by aspiring young black professionals. Queens activist Dick Hayes said:

Very few people in any black club are professionals looking for a contract, they're not vendors, they're not selling anything. I tend to think most of them are in it for the aesthetic desire to, you know, have black people get our due. They're aren't that many jobs that people get. You know that's all over played. They're aren't that many people who are qualified to get those jobs, even if they were available and you know, I mean, most of the lower jobs are civil service, most of the higher jobs, they aren't that many people who are, who have the, most of these people aren't lawyers or engineers or something like that. Most of these are good solid home owning people who, you know, they like to sit and put their little hands in politics and they like to see black folks and their neighbors get their due.¹²⁹

When asked what it would take to invigorate black politics in Brooklyn, a middle-aged black professional with over twenty years experience in local politics in Brooklyn commented:

I almost place the biggest burden of the solution

on a cadre of educated, professional, young blacks in this town that just aren't involved enough in the process, and there is nothing keeping them out of the process other than their own ignorance, or self-centeredness, or whatever, and I'm mildly resentful-- that's why I'm saying these things...because I've sacrificed a lot to stay involved as I have.¹³⁰

David Jones, an African-American attorney and director of the Community Service Society, argued in a recent interview that one of the particularities of New York, compared to Chicago and Atlanta, is that black professionals are loathe to forge links with the black community. In direct contrast to Kilson 'hyper-participation' argument, Jones contends that the lack of participation of black professionals in politics has hampered both black political progress and the development of a stronger black entrepreneurial class in New York. He states:

I can't help but feel that there's a generation of highly trained blacks who could've brought about real power-sharing in New York and gotten just what they wanted by doing that....What I've been preaching and trying to tell young black professionals is, this isn't morality or civil rights, this is whether you're ever really going to hold the keys to the boardroom. Failure to have a base of some sort with clout means you won't move, no matter how many cocktails you have with the managing director. You need a real core of support, even if it's not direct, even if it's just a sense that, Oh brother, we could work on the next municipal bond financing if we had a black mayor! And that's what we didn't realize...I still have trouble convincing people of this. Many young lawyers listen to me like I'm from Mars....Even the idea of contributing to a black political campaign is very recent; for the first time you see people who write out \$5,000 checks....The problem now is that there's really no established leadership committed to pursuing their professional careers and to reaching back into the community at the same time. I and some of my age group

have to be part of the effort to change the situation and to link black professionals back to the communities from which they came.¹³¹

In describing political clubs in Harlem, Cephus Sharpe, a District Leader in West Harlem, described the typical club member as "female--and their average age is about fifty, fifty-five." Sharpe thinks that "some young people are beginning to get involved in electoral politics. For example, in my club, we have several young people who have recently joined who are, like, in their late twenties...and that's a new phenomenon."¹³² The typical club member, according to Sharpe, is not involved in politics to pursue a career, or to secure business contracts. "The bulk of the club," says Sharpe, "are people who are inspectors and rely on the club...for means of additional money. I guess a person who's an inspector, in a year like this [a presidential election year], can earn about, oh, three hundred bucks."

According to activists interviewed from Harlem, club members in Harlem are usually older women who receive some needed spending money in exchange for their participation. Activists interviewed from Brooklyn, Bronx, and Queens describe black political clubs in those boroughs in a similar fashion. They do not fit the model of young professionals seeking careers and connections through

politics. Raymond Wolfinger's observation that the poverty status of many New York residents maintains a basis for continuation of patronage appears to be especially true of the African-American community in Harlem.¹³³

Most black clubs are in the machine tradition, they do not organize around issues in the community, hold forums on controversial issues, or train young people on the foundations and intricacies of politics. A former high-ranking African-American government official in the Bronx said:

I just wish we get more young people interested in politics. As I travel through the different clubs, it looked like it was a geriatric ward for the hospitals, not to knock it, but everybody was up in their age and people...were just there because they always go there every Tuesday night or every Monday night, you know, it wasn't where you had conversations about the county and what we should do in the county. It was like, well this is where we live and let's play cards tonight and what time we going to meet next week, that type of thing.¹³⁴

Numerous interviews confirm the general characterization of African-American political clubs described above. There is fear in many quarters that the clubs are "aging out", and that unless there is an injection of new blood, their influence will steadily decline.¹³⁵

Several activists said that if more young professionals, particularly lawyers, were involved in the

political clubs it would be much easier (and cheaper) for insurgents to get on the ballot. As a rule, insurgent black candidates have had difficulty resisting the petition challenges of county organizations. Paula Sage, a Harlem district leader, said:

I think a lot of people don't understand about volunteering and I see it the worst in the middle class community...You know, a lot of people say well people see politics as dirty, something they don't need, something maybe only poor people need or something that doesn't really, can't really help them. But, you know, I think it just shows our ignorance of how the system works. It shows an incredible ignorance of how the system works. You know, let's look at all the young white attorneys and business people who belong to clubs. If you look at the membership at some of these clubs, you know, not half, but certainly a part, a percentage of the active members are attorneys...and professional people and there's got to be a reason. And we can't find a black attorney to be active in our club. I mean I have called Bar Associations, I have called friends of mine at the Legal Defense Fund and we can't find anyone to be active. We have to pay someone white to do our petition challenges, you know, a couple of thousand dollars a year, or a term, because we can't find anyone black to do it....Do you know how hard it was for us to find a legal entity to file an injunction for us? We had to go to white groups first...and that's pathetic...You know, everybody wants to run off to a corporation, and that's only a pay check because they're fired like anybody else.¹³⁶

A prominent African-American attorney and Queens political activist, expressing frustration with the inability of black political clubs in Queens to master the petition process, said:

Only in the black political clubs is it a mystery how to make petitions comply with the election law, and some of the people who claim to have that rosetta stone of knowledge about petitions don't have it themselves. They send them over to the white law committee of the

county organization for them to stamp 'approved' on the petitions. Fundamental political ABC's, we don't have it on a regular basis in our community.¹³⁷

Raymond Wolfinger's contention that upper income residents are attracted to clubs for business contacts and the like does not generally apply to black clubs in New York. This can be explained by two factors. First, because of the hostility of the majority of black politicians to the Koch administration, a paltry amount of contracts that have been made available to black firms.^a The Mayor has simply dried up patronage coming into the black community. Because of this, there are not many contracts available black professionals who wish to use politics as a means of career advancement.

Secondly, black machine politicians get little patronage from county organizations in exchange for their support. When asked whether black machine politicians in Brooklyn receive significant patronage in exchange for their support Alice Booker said:

But really, basically, if you look at the blacks who were in political position at the time [of machine control in central Brooklyn,] he never really gave the black districts anything. Not in any way. He never

^a Crain's, a New York business weekly, stated, "Steadfastly opposed to programs establishing numerical goals or quotas, Mayor Koch has slammed the door on minority set-asides." Black-owned businesses are virtually shut out in competition for city contracts. See Alan Breznick, "Why minority firms do better elsewhere." Crain's, 2 February 1989.

provided for it. And now we see that, in effect, they were cutting a lot of deals that made a lot of the white politicians if not wealthy, at least powerful....They were committing contracts, economic development, building [a] sort of power in the white community. but blacks were getting a judgeship here or there, a district leader here or there with nothing--no jobs, really, to give away, except some things at the Board of Elections, and that sort of stuff....I mean, there was no real example of what one benefitted as a black, elected official leader--how one benefitted by being loyal to these [county organization] people. And the black community just suffered.¹³⁸

There is simply not enough patronage available to draw ambitious black professionals to politics. An aide to Harlem city councilman Hilton Clarke lamented that when seeking candidates for political office, "We do not get the best talent...[there are] not enough black people, younger people, people who I think would operate better in the government....the political process doesn't [attract] the more educated...politics to them is not a glamorous occupation."¹³⁹

Conclusion

Machines remained powerful in New York, outside Manhattan, not because of their patronage, although patronage has not been fully eliminated, but because of New York's cumbersome election laws and the ability of machines to control ballot access. They are not machines in the

traditional sense, but they are effective nonetheless. Running against the machine is expensive and labor intensive. They are able to take advantage of slack resources in the black community, and the lack of interest of black professionals in political club activity.

The lack of a strong white reform element outside of Manhattan also hindered black political progress. Black success in Harlem was helped by two factors. The first was the existence of a mass insurgency in Harlem in the 1930's and 1940's and the ability of Harlem regulars and insurgent leaders to unite. The second, and no less significant, was the existence of a white radical reform movement in Tammany Hall which offered to unite with black insurgents. The combination of a radical black mass movement and a radical white insurgency offered incentives for black machine politicians to break away from Tammany. A similar white insurgency never developed outside of Manhattan.

Brooklyn and the Bronx experienced powerful black protest movements in the 1960's and early 1970's but there was not a corresponding white reform movement. When Al Vann and other movement leaders challenged the Brooklyn political machine in the early 1970's they did not have white allies, and they faced a stiff uphill battle. Consequently there was not the same incentive for black machine politicians to

break loose as there had been in Manhattan. In the Bronx, the inability of black and Puerto Rican insurgents to unite again offered few incentives for machine politicians to break ranks. The formation of liberal insurgent coalitions is a recent phenomena in the Bronx and is only beginning in Brooklyn.

The formation of a liberal bi-racial coalition in Manhattan was initially beneficial for blacks, but it was unstable. The coalition broke down during the Sutton candidacy for Mayor in 1977. As noted earlier, the bi-racial coalition in Manhattan was essentially a black/Jewish coalition. Both groups had long been denied access to power in City Hall. By the early 1970's, both Jews and blacks felt that their turn had come to occupy City Hall. Abe Beame, elected in 1973, was the first Jewish mayor of New York. When Sutton ran for Mayor in 1977, he was opposed by two liberal Jewish candidates from Manhattan, Ed Koch and Bella Abzug, who were appealing to Jewish demands for ethnic representation.

The black/Jewish alliance broke down when their ethnic aspirations and material interests collided, there could be only one ethnicity represented in the Mayor's seat at a time. This finding supplements a recent argument by Ralpe Sonenshein that black/Jewish relations in New York are

weakened by conflicting material interests. However, Sonenshein maintains that Jews have been incorporated into New York's ruling regime for decades, which is certainly not the case.¹⁴⁰

Blacks formed liberal bi-racial coalitions in New York both for ideological reasons, such as the convergence of black and Jewish radicalism in Manhattan, and for practical reasons. Blacks needed an alliance with liberal white insurgents to win office against machine candidates. Once in office, however, black politicians frequently abandoned their liberal white allies for alliance with the machine, as Shirley Chisholm and the Unity Democratic Club in Brooklyn demonstrated. In the Coalition for Community Empowerment in Brooklyn, black politicians abandoned ideological and historical alliances with each other to make peace with the machine. Bonds created in periods of insurgency, whether with whites or blacks, frequently broke down after the accession to power.

New York has political machines, but it is inaccurate to describe it as a machine town. The city has five county organizations, although Manhattan's is too weak to describe as a machine. Each county organization is a faction in that it has its own political and material interest. Ethnic groups are also spread unevenly throughout the city, giving

rise to ethnic tensions within county organizations and ethnic coalitions across borough lines. The result is a confusing mix between factionalism and demagoguery V.O. Key described as characteristic of one-party systems, and competition between borough organizations that spurs borough party discipline transcending ethnic divisions.

These conflicting tendencies cause politicians to attempt to both broker deals with county organizations for political support and to use ethnicity or demagogic race-baiting to win ethnic votes. It is not unusual for city-wide candidates to present themselves as non-ethnic 'deal-making' candidates outside their ethnic community and as 'ethnic' candidates to their own ethnic group. Likewise local political leaders, such as local black district leaders or legislators, are torn between ethnic loyalty and supporting candidates endorsed by the county organization. All of this can be confusing for voters.

It is the conflict between New York's city-wide decentralized and factional political system versus county machine politics which produces confusion in the interpretation of black political efforts in the past. Kilson's view that Percy Sutton relied too heavily on white liberals, or that blacks simply did not know how to unite, entirely misses the structural dilemmas facing black

political candidates in New York.

Manhattan's black politicians gained their power and visibility from their leadership positions on the city's Board of Estimate, without ever having to build a base among blacks in the "outer" boroughs of Brooklyn, the Bronx, or Queens. In a sense, they became the principle leaders of black New York city-wide without ever having to work for it. Their power was based entirely on the support they received in Harlem, and on their ability to coalesce with white allies in Manhattan. If New York City did not have the Board of Estimate, there would have been a stronger incentive for black politicians in Manhattan to assist black insurgents in the outer boroughs, and for the creation of a city-wide black political organization decades ago. With the Board of Estimate, Harlem's black politicians sought power through building a multi-racial coalition in Manhattan, and blacks in the other boroughs were left on their own. White machine leaders in the outer boroughs sought to limit black political insurgency in their boroughs, and Manhattan's black political leaders did not interfere.

In this context, the inability of Percy Sutton to gain more than 60 percent of the black vote in 1977 is fully understandable. Sutton had done little work to build a

city-wide base before he ran, and black politicians before him did less. The "outer borough" county organizations exerted strong pressure on black politicians, who unlike Manhattan, were still within their grasp.

Strategic errors have also limited black politics in the city-wide arena. Percy Sutton's Mayoral campaign and David Dinkins's Borough Presidency campaign in 1977 worked at cross purposes. Arguments can be made that Sutton should not have run against other (white) liberals in the race, or that Dinkins should have stepped back to allow Sutton room to maneuver. In either case, the decision of a black Manhattan candidate to run for city-wide office was considerably confused by the concomitant danger of losing the only black seat on the Board of Estimate.

Endnotes

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3. For a description of how patronage is channeled through the Surrogate Court, see Gerald Stern, "One Way to Stop Political Patronage," New York Times 25 January 1986, p. 27.
4. Wayne Barrett, William Bastone, and Jack Newfield, "How Koch Handed Over City Hall," Village Voice, 4 February 1986, 17.
5. Political scientist Martin Shefter maintains that Koch needed the county organizations to construct a "fiscally and politically viable" administration. White ethnic middle-class taxpayers were both fiscally and politically conservative. Martin Shefter, Political Crises/Fiscal Crisis, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987), xviii.
6. Michael Oreskes, "The Power of Patronage," New York Times, 27 March 1986, 1.
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16. Mayhew, David R.. Placing Parties in American Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 34.
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25. Kilson, 528.
26. Ibid.
27. Jesus Rangel, "Another Assemblyman Ruled Off Primary Ballot," New York Times, 9 August 1986, 27.
28. Frank Lynn, "Primary Petitions of 4 Bronx Democrats Nullified," New York Times, 4 August 1987, sec. L+.
29. Walter, 83.
30. Ibid., 118.
31. McDaniels, Clyde [pseud.]. Interview by author, 1 February 1989, Harlem, New York. Tape recording.
32. Walter, 81.

33. Ibid.

34. Wilson maintained that churches such as Powell's are politically important in the Black community "only" where there is no African-American political organization. Wilson contrasted Harlem to Chicago, where he described the machine as strong, centralized, with extensive patronage in the African-American community, and thereby better able to control elections. See James Q. Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation" MidWest Journal of Political Science 4 (November 1960).

35. Tammany could have done much more, as Wilson noted, to promote Black leadership in the 1930's and 1940's. Even so, there was a vibrant Black Democratic organization in Harlem in the 1940's. By 1944, J. Raymond Jones was the District Leader of the 13th Assembly District in Harlem. Jones and others were running candidates for other leadership positions and, said Jones, "had been moderately successful even before 1944." See Walton, 80.

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37. Ibid., 85.

38. Lewinson, 88.

39. Walter, 123.

40. Ibid., 129.

41. Ibid., 130.

42. Ibid., 195.

43. Lewinson, 102.

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Chapter 2 Draft

The Jackson Campaigns in New York

The 1984 Jackson campaign in New York City was both a continuation of the national Jackson campaign and a local campaign. Extensive national media coverage meant Jackson entered in his New York campaign with high name recognition and immense popularity in the black community. An October, 1983 poll by Ebony, the magazine with the largest African-American circulation in the United States, found that 67.1 percent of its readers approved of the idea of a black candidacy and 61.6 percent thought that Jackson should run.¹

The Jackson campaign generated remarkable excitement in the black community. A Baptist preacher and long-time veteran of the civil rights movement, Jackson evoked many of the movement's symbols and memories during his campaign. His speaking style, heavy use of religious symbolism, church rallies, defiance of the status quo, and populist rhetoric were all reminiscent of the of the 1960's. The Amsterdam News, a local black weekly, said Jesse Jackson, "has touched a nerve, a responsive chord in black America the likes of which we have not seen since the death of Martin Luther

King."²

As political scientist Lucius Barker noted, "I do not believe many persons--including some important black and white leaders, journalists, and professional analysts of all types--really appreciated the very deep attachment and support that Jackson's campaign enjoyed in the black community--an attachment and support that cut across socioeconomic lines and approached religious fervor."³ The same can be said of New York. A 1984 campaign organizer said:

There were people coming out of the woodwork that wanted to do things, there were collections, there were sermons, there were--every group there gathering money, there were fundraisers every night of the week, it was also very, very well-organized. I mean, we had Melva Tolliver doing press, you had some real good people working that campaign in terms of making sure it was moving across. And you had a lot of good street people there as well.⁴

Many activists interviewed in New York said that the campaign gave the black community a great sense of pride. As several political scientists have noted, Jackson took on characteristics of a Messiah. He came to symbolize many of the hopes and aspirations of African-American people. Jackson also took on the aura of a defiant black leader. His candidacy for the Democratic Presidential nomination came over the opposition of prominent black leaders such as Ben Hooks of the NAACP, John Jacobs of the Urban League, as

well as prominent New York black officials Congressman Charles Rangel and NAACP State Chairperson Hazel Dukes.

Jackson's support in the black community was so sweeping that, with a few notable exceptions, all the various political factions supported his candidacy. This support ranged from radical black nationalists and socialists who normally eschew electoral politics to black elected officials normally associated with the machine. In many cases, those involved in the campaign were not even on speaking terms.

Jackson's local campaign organization collected petitions to get him on the ballot, scheduled campaign appearances for Jackson throughout the City, organized fundraisers, secured endorsements from local officials and prominent persons, arranged for local media opportunities, and organized slates for Jackson supporters to run as delegates to the Democratic National Convention.^a

The campaign was in many ways a "bootstrap" operation. The New York campaign raised less than \$200,000. There were no direct mailings done in the state. The campaign had little white participation, and little support from labor

^a The 'local' New York campaign was state-wide, with the bulk of activity centered in New York City.

unions.⁵ There were four paid staff for the state: a campaign manager, an attorney, a field operations person, and a public relations person.⁶

Several experienced political activists from the Coalition for Community Empowerment (CCE) also played central roles in the campaign on a volunteer basis. A Brooklyn activist said, "All the major people were people out of Al Vann's [CCE] campaign structure. John Flateau, Audrey Bynoe, Paul Wooten, and Esmerelda Simmons are the people that were there."⁷ The chair of the campaign state-wide was Brooklyn Assemblyman Al Vann.

Despite its weaknesses, the campaign's well organized petitioning operation collected more than 70,000 signatures for Jackson to get on the ballot. In Brooklyn, the Jackson campaign collected more signatures for Jackson than the Brooklyn county organization collected for Walter Mondale.⁸

Political scientist and former Jackson advisor Ronald Walters described the 1984 Jackson campaign as having two types of objectives: "instrumental" pay-offs and "ultimate" goals. The former included pay-offs included more blacks running for elected office, increased black voter registration, and issue visibility. Jackson said in October

1983:

My running will stimulate thousands to run for [elected office]: it will make millions register. If you can get your share of legislators, mayors, sheriffs, school-board members, tax assessors and dog-catchers, you can live with whoever is in the white House.⁹

Ultimate pay-offs, provided a Democrat won the Presidency, included increased respect for black leadership, and domestic and international policy changes.¹⁰ Jackson's "ultimate" 1984 strategy, although not publicly stated as such, was essentially a bargaining strategy, intended to increase black leverage on the eventual Democratic nominee.¹¹

Because Walter Mondale lost to Ronald Reagan in 1984, this bargaining strategy was never tested.¹² However, whether Jackson's 1984 campaign led to "instrumental" pay-offs in terms of more local black candidates and increased black voter registration can be tested.

The Impact of the 1984 Campaign On Voter Registration

In March 1984, the New York Times wrote that:

By providing a rallying point and by tapping a wellspring of black pride, Mr. Jackson's candidacy has generated an emotional grassroots response that has already swollen the rolls of registered voters in some districts.¹³

Nevertheless, the direct impact of the 1984 Jackson

campaign on voter registration is difficult to measure. The 1984 campaign came in the middle of on-going voter registration efforts. The Coalition for Community Empowerment (CCE), led by Al Vann, began a voter registration effort in 1983, called the "Strive for '85" campaign, geared towards the election of a black Mayor in 1985. The drive involved churches, as well as the local black radio station - WLIB. These efforts were underway long before the Jackson campaign.

Brooklyn activist Alice Walker said:

In '83 we started with the "Strive for '85" campaign and we were really keyed to registering people to get rid of Koch. And there was this real high. People were on a high and we registered 84,000 people. There was that incredible energy. Churches were in on the voter registration drive, that sort of stuff. We really increased in the rolls across the city. [Abyssinian Baptist Pastor] Butts and everybody, all those people were involved in the voter registration drive. So on top of that, Jackson comes--he sort of almost comes in the middle of what was our long-range agenda. So he come in then. The people who were involved in the voter registration drive, it was natural for them to shift their thinking to start working for Jackson. Don't forget also, the force behind the Strive for '85 drive was because of Koch's attitude toward Tom Minter [a candidate for Schools Chancellor supported by black community leaders]. We moved from one momentum to the next to the next. So Jackson came in and benefited from that high, I think. The apparatus was already there for voter registration, and to then start expanding it.¹⁴

Actual registration figures (see Table I) indicate that the 1984 Jackson campaign did not lead towards a uniform increase in black voter registration. Of those

assembly districts with 50 percent or more black population, increases in Democratic registration varied from a high of 8955 in Assemb. Boyland's central Brooklyn district and 8641 in Assemb. Daniels's central Harlem district, to less than 1755 in Assemb. Rhoda Jacobs's Flatbush district.

In most cases, voter registration was closely tied to organizational efforts of local activists. Active voter registration was conducted in Brooklyn by CCE in the 40th, 55th, 56th, and 57th districts. These efforts began before the Jackson Campaign and were part of the Strive for '85 campaign strategy, that also included a potential Vann candidacy for Brooklyn Borough President. In the 42nd Assembly district, by contrast, the white Assembly member, Rhoda Jacobs, and the white councilperson, Susan Alter, had no incentive to increase black voter registration. There is no black political club in the area, and neither CCE nor union or foundation supported voter registration focused there. As a result, the 1984 Jackson Campaign did little to increase black voter registration in the 42nd Assembly district.

Voter registration gains in Southeast Queens depended on the efforts of local activists. Despite Jackson's personal campaign efforts in support of Simeon Golar's race against incumbent congressman Joseph Addabbo, voter

registration only increased by 1847 in the 33rd Assembly district. The 33rd was at that time represented by Al Waldon, who upon Addabbo's death contested Rev. Floyd Flake for the congressional seat. Waldon, an African-American machine-backed politician and supporter of Addabbo, did little to increase voter registration in his district. In the 32nd Assembly district, heavily black but represented by white incumbent Ed Abramson, a new political club developed in 1984. The 'Jesse L. Lewis Democratic Club' devoted itself to voter registration in Far Rockaway, but registration gains in that area were modest.¹⁵ Church-based voter registration drives in the 29th district, led by Floyd Flake, were more successful, and probably benefitted the most from Jackson's appearances in Queens.

The examples cited above show that the Jackson campaign led to increases in voter registration if and when there were local party activists actively engaged in voter registration beforehand, or where local activists followed up on Jackson's campaign appearances.

Table I**Registration Gain and Turnout in Black ADs**

Assembly Member	AD	Black %	82-84 Reg	82-84 %
Gain				
Vann	56	86	8675	54
Boyland	55	86	8955	49
Norman	43	80	3378	53
Jenkins	29	78	5230	54
Daniels	70	77	8641	51
Griffith	40	76	7257	53
Abramson	32	67	4011	48
Green	57	64	5110	55
Jacobs	42	58	1755	50
Seabrooke	82	54	3382	49
Clark	33	53	1847	47
Farrell	71	52	4626	54
Greene	76	50	5020	41

Source: Demographic data is taken from the 1980 U.S. Census Standard Tape File 4 (STF4). Election results are from the New York City Board of Elections and were provided by Professor John Mollenkopf.

The campaign did not lead to spontaneous outpourings of African-Americans to register, or to universal increases in voter registration, but it did provide a favorable climate for black activists to conduct voter registration.^a

The Impact of the 1984 Jackson Campaign on Voter Turnout

Unlike its impact on voter registration, the 1984 Jackson campaign caused a major increase in black voter turnout throughout the city. More than 293,000 black people voted in the 1984 Democratic presidential primary, and black voter turnout increased by more than 160,000 votes over 1980.^b Increased black voter turnout was reflected by the fact that blacks in 1980 constituted 23 percent of the total Democratic primary vote, while in 1984 blacks constituted 33 percent of total primary voters.^c Queens activist Maurice

^a On average, Democratic enrollment in majority black districts rose by more than 5,000 while Democratic enrollment in majority white district rose by about 1,000. See Sam Roberts, "New York Democrats Gain Black and Hispanic Voters," New York Times, 1 April 1984, p.26.

^b 1980 figures were taken from a March 30, 1984 New York Times article by Sam Roberts, "State Primary Puts Black and Hispanic Voters in the Spotlight," B1.

^c The percentage of Blacks in the 1984 New York City Democratic electorate is based on crosstabulations from the "CBS News/New York Times 1984 Primary Exit Poll." The margin

Small said that the '84 Jackson campaign, "got a lot more black people aware of the importance of voting, and voting for someone who was good."¹⁶ Black voter turnout city-wide reached 57 percent, 16 points ahead of whites and 28 points ahead of Latinos.

Turnout in majority black districts was uniformly high, seemingly regardless of local campaign efforts. Queens activist Leslie Black said, "I think there was a great excitement about Jesse at levels that had not had any political stimulus at all in 1984."¹⁷ The last column of Table I shows, for example, that voter turnout in the 42nd Assembly district in Brooklyn, that had the lowest increase in voter registration of any majority black district in the city, was slightly greater than turnout in the 55th Assembly district, that had the highest increase in voter registration in the city. The 42nd district was not an integral part of the 1984 Jackson campaign, and was not a focus of get-out-the-vote efforts, whereas the 55th district, in central Brooklyn, was the focus of many campaign activities.

of error is unknown. Separate estimates of the percentage of Black voters were developed by the author based on a model regressing Assembly district election results with racial breakdowns of the Assembly districts. The model estimated Black voters to be 31 percent of the total (only 2 percentage points difference from the CBS/NYT estimate), but with a standard error of 8 percent.

Black voter turnout may have been increased by the controversy and criticism of Jackson following the "Hymietown" incident. On February 19, 1984 the Washington Post reported that in conversations with some black reporters, Jackson had referred to Jews as "Hymies," and to New York City as "Hymietown" - a derogatory term referring to the common Jewish name 'Hyman.'¹⁸ The article said that Jackson denied making the remark, and that Jackson complained, "he was being hounded on the issue."¹⁹ After weeks of continual questioning by the press, however, Jackson finally admitted making the comment. On February 26, speaking before a synagogue in New Hampshire, Jackson said:

Even as I affirm to you that term was used in private conversation, I categorically deny that I am anti-Semitic. At first i was shocked by the press interest in private conversations apparently overheard by a reporter. (It was not used in a spirit of meanness. (But) however innocent and unintended, it was wrong. I affirm to you that the term was used in private conversation (in which) we sometimes let our guard down. An off-color remark has no bearing on religion or politics.²⁰

The furor over Jackson's statement was soon extended to include Minister Louis Farrakhan, a prominent Jackson supporter, and the leader of the Nation of Islam. In a March 11, 1984 radio broadcast, Farrakhan was reported to have referred to Milton Coleman, the black Washington Post reporter who reported Jackson's "Hymietown" remark, as a "no good, filthy traitor" and said that "one day we will punish

you with death."²¹ Even worse, during the same broadcast Farrakhan had referred to Hitler as a "great man."

Farrakhan said:

Here the Jews don't like Farrakhan, so they call him Hitler. Well that's a good name. Hitler was a very great man. He wasn't great for me, a black person, but he was a great German, and he rose Germany up from the ashes of her defeat by the united force of all of Europe and America after the First World War....Now, I'm not proud of Hitler's evils against Jewish people. But that's a matter of record.²²

Political scientist Lucius Barker noted that, "Farrakhan's comments--especially after Jackson's apology for his Hymie remark--provided the fodder needed to keep astir fears of anti-Semitism in Jackson's campaign and to cast aspersions on Jackson and his overall effort."²³

In New York's black community, the Hymietown incident and subsequent Farrakhan issue did not noticeably diminish Jackson's support. There was what could be described as a black backlash. As Barker noted:

Farrakhan's strong denunciation of Coleman apparently struck a sympathetic chord among many blacks, even among those who did not care much for Farrakhan or Jackson. Indeed, those conversant with the black community would have to agree with Dr. Alvin Poussiant, a black Harvard psychiatrist, who suggested that many blacks preferred to blame Milton Coleman as a traitor rather than blame Jesse Jackson for his naivete. Poussiant's view that feelings were running high in the black community, leading some to comment that "somebody should get that brother," referring to Coleman, also found support among blacks.²⁴

Jackson was perceived in the black community as a hero unfairly under attack. Farrakhan was perceived by many in the black community as someone who had dared to defend Jackson against his attackers. Farrakhan received invitations to address important black professional organizations and was able to pack large auditoriums to hear him speak. Even as Jackson criticized Farrakhan's remarks, he was hesitant to renounce Farrakhan or break all ties with him. Lucius Barker argues that Jackson's caution in renouncing Farrakhan stemmed from the fact that Farrakhan, "represents or reflects an important strain of political thought in the black community--separatism--which all of us might do well to analyze and ponder even if we disagree with it."²⁵

The fallout from the Hymietown incident probably solidified Jackson's black support, while it diminished any support Jackson may have hoped to receive from the Jewish community - the most likely source of white support for Jackson. ABC News exit polls showed that Jackson received only 3 percent of the Jewish vote in the state as compared with 7 percent of the white vote.²⁶ While Jackson did not win Jewish support, the low white turnout in the primary, 41 percent, suggests that there was not a white (Jewish) mobilization against Jackson as a result of the "Hymietown" controversy.

Did the 1984 Jackson Campaign Inspire Blacks to Run?

In 1985, after the 1984 Jackson campaign in New York, there was much anticipation surrounding the choice of a black candidate for mayor. Coming out of an earlier effort - led by Al Vann - by a number of black political activists and politicians to lobby the appointment of a black School Chancellor, a city-wide organization had been formed called the 'Coalition For a Just New York' (CJNY). CJNY served as the launching pad for a black mayoral candidacy. Said James Farmer:

In 1985, coming off of 1984, we had the Coalition For a Just New York and there was a clear spoken agenda about taking out the Mayor [Koch] in 1985. Here I guess if the Mayor hadn't jumped up and down on Jesse Jackson as much as he did I'm not sure you would have...had that same political consensus."²⁷

CJNY was essentially a coalition of CCE, community activists, and Harlem's black politicians. Noticeably absent were Queens and Bronx local black elected officials, all of whom (with the exception of Wendell Foster) were identified with their respective county machines, and therefore with the Mayor.²⁸ CJNY also did not include Latino politicians or white elected officials.²⁹

CJNY favored former Deputy Mayor Basil Paterson as a candidate. Paterson had served as a State Senator, New York Secretary of State, and Deputy Mayor during Koch's first

term. He was widely perceived as a political moderate, and a person who could appeal to white (particularly Jewish) voters. He also had the advantage of coming from a mixed - West Indian and native African-American - background. Intelligent and articulate, Paterson was considered the ideal candidate. Paterson could also raise money. He raised \$250,000 at a single fundraiser in the spring of 1985, at which the main speaker was Senator Ted Kennedy.³⁰

Unexpectedly, Paterson withdrew his name from Mayoral consideration, citing undisclosed personal reasons. Paterson's withdrawal set off a wave of maneuvering within CJNY as different factions attempted to find a replacement candidate. Brooklyn politician Al Vann announced his support for Herman Badillo. Badillo, like Paterson, had served briefly as former Deputy Mayor during Koch's first term. Badillo was a former congressman and a former Borough President of the Bronx. He was the first Puerto Rican to hold either position. Harlem's black politicians, however, disliked Badillo, particularly Percy Sutton, who blamed Badillo's 1977 mayoral candidacy as undermining his own campaign.³¹ In Badillo, Vann saw an opportunity to build a black-Latino alliance that would benefit the Mayoral candidate, and, no less importantly, shore up Vann's potential Latino support for Borough President in Brooklyn.³²

At this point Manhattan County Leader Herman Farrell, who had not participated in CJNY, joined the organization and immediately declared his candidacy for mayor. Brooklyn activist Bob Branch described what took place this way:

The Coalition For a Just New York made a major snafu by letting Denny Farrell come through and...people said to him [Vann] "don't allow this"...If you already started with the process...it should not be possible for people to actually come in and throw their hat in the ring...Well, they [Vann's people] would not do that, so Denny Farrell at the last minute, as we know, threw his hat in the ring and made a helluva good speech. I mean he really mesmerized a lot of people, myself included, because I got into the black theme too.³³

Farrell's speech was surprising, he had never been regarded as harboring strong black nationalist sentiments. A split developed when all of the Harlem politicians supported Farrell, as did CCE members Roger Green, Frank Boyland, and Clarence Norman. Vann continued to support Badillo. Tempers ran very high; all sides harbored resentment. The meeting during which CJNY nominated Farrell was the last meeting CJNY ever held.³⁴

CJNY participants and other political activists offered several explanations for what led to the demise of CJNY. Brooklyn activist Ella Salins said that the Harlem politicians wanted to ensure a successful candidacy of David Dinkins for Manhattan Borough President.

I mean, it's hard to explain, coming out of Harlem, which is the black capital of the world, how all those leaders [Congressman Rangel, Assemb. Daniels] say no

[to supporting Jesse Jackson]. These are the same people saying we need to have Denny Farrell as Mayor. (laughs) [It's] a little difficult, when you put it all together, to read anything into it except that this particular action at this particular time helps them....Their major goal for that year was electing David Dinkins and they didn't care what else happened...I'll put it like this: they did not want to sacrifice that Manhattan Borough Presidency for [personal] fiscal reasons, financial reasons, in order to empower black folks across the city...[Farrell] wasn't going to hurt David. And he was going to make sure that he didn't hurt David.³⁵

Salins' argument flowed from the Dinkins/Sutton experience of 1977, when Dinkins ran for Borough President and Percy Sutton ran for Mayor. The combined effect of two viable campaigns by black candidates hurt each candidacy, and the result was that neither candidate won. Farrell's candidacy, according to Salins, was simply a means of stopping a Badillo candidacy, and was never intended to be a viable campaign. Similarly, a staff member for Harlem city councilman Hilton Clark said:

I don't think it [the Farrell campaign] ever got off the ground. There wasn't any point in supporting something that did not have any impact...You could say, yes, I'm supporting it, but [it] really didn't mean anything.³⁶

This opinion was also shared by Queens activist Leslie Black, who believes that Harlem politicians' entire effort was to negate a strong black candidacy. Said Black:

Electing a black mayor - that was the opportunity not taken seriously. I think the greatest rip-off and con job was the so-called Coalition For a Just New York. There were a few fools, like me, who thought it was

sincere....In retrospect, it was about something altogether different, ensuring that there wouldn't be a black candidate...There was no guarantee, by the way, that a black would have been elected, but not seriously addressing the opportunity makes it that much more difficult to do it in 1989.³⁷

The Harlem politicians, according to Black, wanted to support a white candidate for Mayor. Their plans were thwarted, however, when Queens activist and NAACP Counsel Laura Blackburne declared her readiness to run for mayor. Before CJNY's formal endorsement meeting, an informal meeting was held in the Bronx. At this meeting Basil Paterson, Charles Rangel, [former State Senator] Carl McCall, and [former judge] Bill Booth agreed that none of them would run for Mayor. Said Black:

They were getting ready to move the agenda to start talking about 'Well which white candidate do we now support?' when [Laura Blackburne] said, "Wait a minute." And Carl McCall, to his great credit [said], "Well, there was someone else who had expressed interest and you haven't heard from her." Everybody got real quiet and they turned and looked at [Blackburne] and [she] said, "I am still interested in running for Mayor, I am available, I'm qualified, and I have the fire in the belly," and the room got so quiet you thought the air was sucked out of it. They didn't know what to say. Denny Farrell, when people recovered, got up and gave a ten minute lecture on the impossibility of having an effective candidacy by any black because of the numbers. Oh yes, oh yes. [Then there was] A hysterical discussion about the numbers. I don't forget this stuff.³⁸

Black's account of Farrell's statement at the Bronx meeting lends credibility to the notion that the Farrell candidacy was never intended to be a serious campaign. It

was a move to block Laura Blackburne, or Herman Badillo, from running a serious campaign against Koch.

Brooklyn activist Alice Booker suggested a second explanation of CJNY's demise. Booker said that a Badillo candidacy, engineered by Al Vann, would signal a shift of black political power away from Harlem to Brooklyn. As a result of their historical success in gaining leadership of the Manhattan county Democratic organization and election to borough president, Harlem politicians have long been regarded as the foremost spokespersons for black New Yorkers. Al Vann's chairmanship of the 1984 Jackson campaign, however, and his subsequent engineering of a Badillo nomination from CJNY, would appear to make him the preeminent black politician in New York. Harlem's politicians, according to Booker, resisted the potential loss in their political clout. Said Booker:

I kept seeing on the faces of Basil Paterson, Dave Dinkins and Denny Farrell...a panic, there was a real panic. And I think what they feared was that the power base was shifting to Brooklyn, and Harlem would be left out there with nothing. And they used the fact that they didn't like Badillo and they didn't like this and that...I think intellectually they understand, you can't win New York unless there's a [city-wide black] coalition. Intellectually, they understand it. But they prefer to govern by [default]--not having won it and earned it, but because somebody gives it to you. Theirs is a hereditary type of power base. And here was Brooklyn on the verge of taking that out from under them. They really don't want an expansive electorate. Harlem does not want an expansive electorate. Harlem wants it concentrated in the figurehead of one person so they can make deals through that one person...they'll go through David [Dinkins], everything

is going to go through David.³⁹

Booker's reference to a "hereditary" type of power base in Harlem refers to the different political styles of Harlem and Brooklyn black politicians (see Chapter One). Harlem politicians secured power not by challenging the county organization, but by uniting amongst themselves and negotiating deals with various white factions of the county organization. Similarly, Harlem politicians such as Sutton and Dinkins did not earn their city-wide leadership status among African-Americans because of their work in the "outer" boroughs, but because of the media coverage and prestige they gained from holding the Manhattan Borough President's seat. Al Vann, on the other hand, gained power through sheer muscle. Vann and other black independent politicians in Brooklyn had to fight an antagonistic white-led county organization for every vote. They relied on intense racial mobilization.

The stylistic differences were reflected in the choice of political strategy. The Harlem style was to shy away from racial confrontation. They preferred to secure an alliance with liberal whites (possibly by supporting a white Mayoral candidate) to ensure Dinkins' election to Manhattan Borough President. They could then work to amplify Dinkins' credibility as a Mayoral candidate. Ella Salins described

Harlem's motivation:

I think it was David [Dinkins] first, hatred [of Badillo] second, and the fact that he was Hispanic third. I think that's a big part of that. We're not privy to that here [in Brooklyn] because there are Latino areas and there are black areas. The Harlemites have this fear, in my opinion, of Spanish Harlem...I don't think they want to merge, that's the first thing, and they don't want to see it become a situation where they have to give credence to what happens over in Spanish Harlem - where they don't have much influence at all...They have done everything they can to keep that area as backwards as possible, not organized as possible.⁴⁰

The Brooklyn (CCE) strategy was to initiate a racial mobilization, this time broadening it (by supporting Badillo) to a Latino/black "Third World" mobilization, while secondarily hoping to attract white support.^a A black/Latin alliance and intense "Third World" mobilization, was the primary way Vann could hope to win as Brooklyn Borough President.

The different interests between Manhattan and Brooklyn politicians were described by Harlem district leader Cephus Sharpe this way:

There are different interests operating in Manhattan than in Brooklyn. Those interests have lined up on opposite sides. It could have been the issue of the mayor or it could have been any other issue along the way, but this split was an inevitable one because [there was] the Al Vann versus the Percy Sutton and Charlie Rangel and so forth. And then there's Al Vann

^a Vann probably counted on whites to be divided between the Golden and Genovese factions, creating an opening for him to strike a deal with Genovese.

versus Roger Green, you know, so the unity was very tenuous all along. And the Brooklyn group was looking for ways to manipulate the problems that the Manhattan politicians had and the Manhattan politicians were looking for ways to manipulate the problems that the people in Brooklyn had. And the basis for unity was the only thing that was really tenuous...So there wasn't any program which united them. What was motivating them all was protecting self-interest.⁴¹

In Sharpe's view, the CJNY never seriously contemplated a winnable minority candidacy once Paterson stepped out of the race. Maneuvering in CJNY centered on securing the best political advantage for conflicting Brooklyn and Manhattan borough politicians.

A third explanation, suggested by Jackson campaign activist Harold Jackson, is that CJNY was always too narrow to serve as a launching pad for a black Mayoral candidacy:

...let's look at where there was a black that was supporting Jackson but was not prepared to support a black [mayoral] candidate. The best example of that was in Queens where [Councilmember] Archie Spigner was the leader of the Jackson operation, and Flake, but these guys were clearly Koch supporters. I was not surprised that they weren't able to bring together what turned out to be a great victory in 1984 behind a black or another minority candidate, cause the pieces brought together for that campaign were not necessarily the pieces that were going to hang together for anything else.⁴²

While there was relatively widespread support of Jackson's national campaign, local alliances were more complex, and the same degree of unity was not present on the local level.

Too many black elected officials in the Bronx, Queens, and Brooklyn needed the support of their local machines, which supported Koch, to guarantee their own re-election. The potential racial mobilization caused by a strong black mayoral campaign could have even encouraged political insurgents to run against them.

In addition, tensions existed within CJNY between some black supporters of Jesse Jackson and elected officials committed Mondale. Said Harold Jackson, "Rangel had to explain why the hell he supported Mondale to the key black leaders who were supporting Jackson."⁴³ Harold Jackson also noted that the 1984 Jackson campaign lacked labor support and Latino support, and both of these weaknesses carried over into CJNY. "The Jackson campaign in fact was not a Rainbow in 1984 so the signs were there," said Jackson, "but the numbers were just so overwhelming in terms of what the campaign did produce that it sort of created a 'high'...if people had looked beyond the 'high' to the numbers, I think they would have seen some other stuff there."⁴⁴

These above theories are not mutually contradictory; together they explain the different factors that caused dissention and led to the demise of CJNY.

Voter turnout in the 1985 Democratic mayoral primary shows that the crumbling of CJNY had a demoralizing effect on those voters who supported Jackson in 1984. Table II, below, tracks voter transitions between the 1984 presidential and the 1985 mayoral primaries.

Table II

	<u>Voter Transition 1984-1985</u>			
	JJ84	VAC84	DNV84	New Reg
Farrell	27	1	1	3
VAC85	11	80	9	15
DNV85	62	20	90	82

Source: Demographic data is taken from the 1980 U.S. Census Standard Tape File 4 (STF4). Election results are from the New York City Board of Elections and were provided by Professor John Mollenkopf.

The variables listed across the top and side of the table represent the following:

JJ84 - voted for Jackson in 1984
 VAC - voted for another candidate in 1984
 DNV - did not vote in 1984
 New Reg - newly (since 1984 primary) registered voter
 Farrell - voted for Farrell in 1985
 VAC - voted for other candidates in 1985
 DNV - did not vote in 1985

Table II shows that only 27 percent of those who voted for Jackson in 1984 voted for Farrell in 1985, while 11 percent of those who voted for Jackson voted for Koch or Bellamy. Sixty-two percent of 1984 Jackson voters did not vote in the 1985 mayoral primary. Among Mondale and Hart voters, only 20 percent did not vote in the 1985 primary. Even allowing for statistical error, it can safely be said that the majority of Jackson voters stayed home in 1985. The data suggests that Jackson voters felt they had nothing to vote for in 1985. In addition, Farrell did not motivate voters who did not vote in 1984 to vote for him in 1985, and he a small percentage of those voters who registered between 1984 and 1985.^a

If Paterson viewed the 1984 primary as a factor in his decision to run, as he almost certainly did, the implications could not have been encouraging. Even though Jackson captured more than 90 percent of the black vote, he won less than 10 percent of the white vote. Lack of white support reduced not only votes but also the money that could be raised for his candidacy.

^a David Dinkins and Al Vann ran for Manhattan and Brooklyn borough president, respectively, in 1985. Low turnout among Jackson voters also suggest they were not motivated by either candidacy.

Jackson's Jewish support was diminished by his derogatory "Hymietown" remarks. The New York Times reported that, "By and large, representatives of the Jewish community were absent from Mr. Jackson's 'rainbow coalition,' in part because of his position on the Middle East and the remark about 'Hymies'."⁴⁵ Had Jesse Jackson endorsed and campaigned for Paterson, it certainly would have alienated Jewish voters, given the volatile atmosphere aroused by Farrakhan at the time. Had he not, it would have alienated black voters. Some black elected officials told the New York Times that they feared association with Jackson would hurt them in the Jewish community, but they refused to go on the record.⁴⁶

Jackson's weak showing among Latinos in 1984 also limited a serious black mayoral candidacy. Jackson won only about 30 percent of the Latino vote.^a Jackson was more than 90,000 votes shy of victory in New York. Even if Paterson won as many black votes as Jackson had, unlikely in itself, he would still have to broaden beyond Jackson's 1984 base of support. As Sam Roberts of the New York Times wrote, "The obstacles, both within the black community and in building bridges to white and Hispanic voters, may ultimately relegate last week's statistical gains to a historical footnote."⁴⁷ The fact that Jackson only raised

^a See CBS/NYT 1984 Presidential Primary Exit Poll.

\$200,000 in 1984 also could not have been encouraging to Paterson, who would need millions to run a credible mayoral campaign.

The potential had existed for Jackson's campaign to have great impact on the 1985 Mayoral race. That potential was largely squandered by Jackson's "Hymietown" remarks. Jackson's inability to campaign for a black candidate in 1985 largely mitigated the impact of the 1984 campaign. On the other side, Jackson's Rainbow Coalition was never institutionalized in New York. There were no 'troops,' army of volunteers, or organizational legacy left over from the Jackson campaign, Jackson's power rested on his charisma.

Had Jackson not made the "hymietown" remark, his subsequent campaigning on behalf of a black mayoral candidate in 1985 may not have been deemed offensive by Jewish voters. He would have been a powerful campaigner on behalf of a black candidate. Jackson might then have been able to pressure black machine officials to support a black candidate. Such direct pressure from so popular a figure would have been felt by black machine politicians and the political machines themselves. Black elected officials who opposed Jackson directly would have been in jeopardy of

losing their seats to insurgent Jackson supporters.* County organizations that attempted to force black elected officials to support Koch would have risked losing whatever support they had in the black community; in the Bronx and Brooklyn that might have meant the loss of county leadership to African-Americans or to white opponents. None of this happened, of course.

The conflicting interests of black politicians in the various boroughs also limited the potential impact of the 1984 Jackson campaign on the 1985 Mayoral race. Manhattan politician David Dinkins had a good chance of winning the borough presidency; his race would be the focus of attention in 1985 absent a strong black mayoral candidacy. A strong black mayoral candidacy probably would have hurt his fundraising and media coverage, just as Sutton hurt him in 1977.

Queens black politicians did not even involve themselves in CJNY. Their interests were in supporting the machine. The same could be said of the black elected officials in the Bronx, with the exception of Councilman Foster. Al Vann had an interest in either a strong black or a strong Puerto Rican Mayoral candidacy which could give him

* Black machine politicians had no problems supporting Jackson's campaign in 1984 so long as they could lead it in their own districts.

a large turnout in his potential run for Brooklyn Borough President. Unlike Dinkins, Vann would have been the underdog; he could not count on white support, and a strong minority turnout was crucial to his election chances. These conflicting agendas, which reflect the borough structure of New York City politics, prevented any type of city-wide unity among black elected officials. It would have taken a strong outside force to create such unity, but Jackson could not be that force.

Jackson's Impact in Manhattan

The 1984 Jackson campaign generally had a minor impact on local elections and political organization in Manhattan. Congressman Charles Rangel, who opposed Jackson in 1984, won re-election in November of 1984 unopposed. David Dinkins, had been the Manhattan coordinator for the Jackson campaign, ran for Borough President in 1985 and won handily, but Dinkins had run twice before for the same office, losing by a single percentage point in 1981. Dinkins did not invite Jackson to campaign for him in New York, nor did his campaign literature mention his role in the Jackson campaign. Byrum Branch, an aide to Harlem councilman Hilton Clark, said:

He [Dinkins] decided to appease the Jewish vote, he decided to tell Jackson, they made it an understanding that Jackson would stay out of his campaign...Jackson said he wasn't going to endorse Dave, but it was an

appeasement for the Jewish people...he wanted to distance himself from Jackson because he needed the Jewish vote to succeed.⁴⁸

Turnout in the 1985 Democratic primary election was only 28 percent in central Harlem (70th Assembly district), well below the 51 percent turnout for Jackson the year before (see Table III below), and a 19 percent drop from turnout in the 1982 gubernatorial primary.^a As Manhattan County leader Herman "Denny" Farrell commented to the New York Times, "Mr. Dinkins was elected through 'coalition politics'--alliances with whites and Hispanic Democrats--'not the black power direction'."⁴⁹ In all likelihood Dinkins would have won the race whether or not Jackson had run in 1984.

^a Table III lists turnout in majority Black Assembly districts for the following elections: 9/82 - the September 1982 Democratic gubernatorial primary; 4/84 - the April 1984 Democratic presidential primary; 9/85 - the September 1985 Democratic mayoral primary; 9/86 - the September 1986 Democratic U.S. senatorial primary; 4/88 - the April 1988 Democratic presidential primary.

Table III

Turnout in Democratic Primaries:
By Race/Ethnicity

	White	Black	Latino
9/82	49 (4)	47 (5)	42 (3)
4/84	42 (7)	57 (8)	33 (5)
5/85	21 (3)	18 (4)	27 (3)
4/88	50 (2)	61 (2)	24 (5)

Source: Election data is taken from the New York City Board of Elections. Demographic data is taken from the U.S. Census STF4 computer tape.

Vernon Mason, a political activist attorney who supported Jackson in 1984, ran for Manhattan District Attorney against long-time incumbent Robert Morgenthau. During his campaign Mason stressed his ties to Jackson, but he never developed a viable campaign organization and lost miserably. Both Mason and Jackson supporter Rev. Calvin Butts held open the possibility that they would challenge Congressman Charles Rangel and Assemb. Denny Farrell in future primaries, but the challenge never materialized.⁵⁰

David Paterson, the son of Basil Paterson, ran for the 29th State Senatorial District upon the death of Leon Bogue, the incumbent senator. Since Manhattan County Committee members residing in the senatorial district named Bogue's successor, Paterson's campaign consisted mainly of inside political maneuvering and phone calls. Paterson had supported Jackson and attracted at least a dozen young Jackson supporters to work on his campaign. The bulk of the inside work, however, was done by Paterson's parents, each of whom has deep political connections in the senatorial district.⁵¹ The county committee selected Paterson to fill the vacant seat.

Chuck Sutton and Peggy Shepard decided to run for

district leader as a result of their involvement in the Jackson campaign. Both had been active in the campaign, and decided to run for office after being inspired by Jackson. Sharpe noted that Sutton/Shepard's initial supporters included many people who were still enthused following Jackson's campaign in New York. After winning office, only the more traditional political elements remained active in the political club they formed, the West Harlem Independent Democrats.⁵² The club was one of two black political clubs established out of the momentum generated by the Jackson campaign.

The Manhattan politician that made the greatest use of the 1984 Jackson campaign was Hilton Clark. Clark, son of social scientist Kenneth Clark, had long been involved in Harlem politics, having started his own political club in Harlem in the 1960's. Clark is known as a maverick, and is a political opponent of Congressman Charles Rangel. According to Clark aide Byrum Branch, Rangel's decision to support Mondale, "gave a clear indication that he was out of touch with his community...he [Rangel] went to the [Democratic National] convention without the 16th [Congressional] delegates in his hand...and we had a clear understanding that the timing was absolutely right...that Jackson was a good catalyst to propel us along."⁵³ Clark won the seat vacated upon the death of Councilman Frederick

E. Samuel. Clark served one term before being defeated by community activist Virginia Fields.

Jackson Impact in Brooklyn

In Brooklyn, the Jackson campaign in Brooklyn brought together churches, community activists, independent black politicians, and politicians associated with the county organization. The New York Times described the Brooklyn campaign as, "an uneasy truce among usually warring black factions."⁵⁴ Led by Al Vann, the campaign had the potential to serve as a bridge over past differences and a launching pad for Vann's candidacy for borough president.

Instead, the local Jackson campaign highlighted differences between the various factions and undermined Vann's candidacy for borough president. Several black politicians affiliated with the county organization supported Jackson, but felt that they were deliberately isolated during the campaign. Said Ella Salins, "There was definitely friction among...elected officials in Brooklyn, this only happened in Brooklyn, that were sort of dis-invited from being involved."⁵⁵ In a particularly abrasive confrontation, a Vann aide prevented several Brooklyn politicians from attending a meeting in Brooklyn with Jesse Jackson. Brooklyn activist Paul Wilson said:

Al Vann's Chief of Staff prevented Congressman Townes, who was appointed the [Brooklyn] Borough Coordinator, from entering a back room to talk to Jesse Jackson. [Assemb.] Mary Pinkett, [councilmember] Enoch Williams and all these other regular Democrats were with him and, you know, the Secret Service wouldn't let him [Congressman Townes] back there...It was detrimental to Vann cause Vann had the opportunity to give the perception that symbolically that he could bring all the sides together...That half an hour, hour, of controversy cost Vann the Borough Presidency.⁵⁶

A contradiction also developed between Vann and several prominent ministers, especially Rev. Bill Jones, over how to slate delegates to the Democratic National Convention. Vann wanted a single slate of candidates, who would then be voted in as delegates by voters at the polls at the same time as the Presidential primary. Given a long list of unknown delegates, voters generally vote for the first names that appear for Jackson. Vann wanted control over who would be named to the list, that he would be able to name the delegates. The churches strongly objected, and Bill Jones announced that he would form his own slate - which he did. While the Vann slate won at the polls, Jones and others got their revenge when they sat out Vann's candidacy for borough president the following year.⁵⁷ Vann also developed came into a conflict with Rev. Herbert Daughtry, a prominent Brooklyn civil rights activist, who also sat out Vann's campaign the following year.⁵⁸

County leader Howard Golden's wooing of CCE members and friction left over from the 1984 Jackson campaign affected, CJNY the following year. CCE members Assemb. Roger Green, Assemb. Frank Boyland, and Assemb. Clarence Norman voted with Harlem politicians against a Badillo nomination in serious affront to Vann.⁵⁹ Vann's prestige in and influence over CCE was obviously slipping.

Al Vann Runs for Brooklyn Borough President

Vann based his decision to run for Brooklyn Borough President largely on the gains in black voter registration accomplished before and during the 1984 Jackson campaign. Said Salins:

There weren't any new victories in '84. And the same thing, I think, holds true in '85. The difference, though, in the second part, is that...we brought in more signatures for Jackson in Brooklyn than the County brought in for Mondale. Way over. Way over. And we had the heart. This is important--as a result of the '84 voter registration for the Jackson campaign, the black districts [Vann and Boyland] had the highest registration of all the districts in the state, in Brooklyn...even higher than [former Assembly Speaker] Stanley Fink's district, which was always number one. So there wa a ripple in terms of people who know politics, and know what these numbers mean in terms of what is happening in Brooklyn. That's why so many folks thought it was right for Al [Vann] to run in '85.⁶⁰

Lack of support from Brooklyn's black politicians, both in and outside of CCE, undermined Vann's campaign.

Congressman Ed Townes endorsed Vann's opponent, Howard Golden. Townes told Vann that he read the figures and he knew Vann could not win. Bob Boswell, a long-time Townes associate said:

[Townes] told him it didn't make sense. What he should try to do was broaden his base, I mean, he had a chance, Al had a chance to build last time [in 1985]. He could have won, he would have beat [black machine councilmember] Mary Pinkett, and he could have taken [black machine councilmember] Enoch Williams out...But he thought he was ready to go himself and he went. So now the whole thing [CCE] is falling apart again, now it takes somebody whose going to bring that back together.⁶¹

Boswell stated that Vann:

Even lost in some black districts to Howard Golden, and of one the districts he lost (that came back to haunt him), was the 40th. He lost to Howard in a predominately black district because he excluded [black machine politician] Ed Griffith [from CCE], and it was a largely Caribbean community, which is another problem he had. He had not extended himself to the Caribbean community."⁶²

Ironically, Townes' ability to oppose Vann was increased by the success of the 1984 Jackson campaign. Black turnout for Jackson in the '84 primary convinced a white state senator from the 20th Senatorial district, Thomas Bartosiewicz, not to run against Townes. Townes associate Bob Boswell explained:

[The 1984 Jackson campaign] made it clear in certain areas that it would be difficult for a lot of white candidates to try to take out black candidates...for example, Bartosiewicz...had put the word out he was going to go against Townes, cause he felt that district has a lot of whites. [The district is] about 20

percent white, but he speaks Spanish and...he also was representing a large black and Puerto Rican district anyway....But I know when Bartosiewicz looked at those [1984 presidential primary] figures, it came out for Jackson. He backed off. In fact, he came and told us that he thought about it [opposing Townes], but when he saw those figures he said nah, no way in the world he could win that.⁶³

Other members of CCE, while not as bold as Townes, nevertheless also sat out Vann's race. Salins said:

The same three people [CCE members who voted for Denny Farrell in CJNY], the same three politicians did not help Al's campaign. I mean Roger [Green], Boylin, and Norman did not help Al, his campaign. And you know, you expect a big turnout from our districts--when I say "our", I'm talking about the Coalition--and it wasn't there...There was feuding going on as a result of that very bad blood [from the CJNY Mayoral nomination].⁶⁴

Vann felt, justifiably, that he had been abandoned by people he had helped put in office.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the defections were a consequence of Vann's having shunned an alliance with black machine politicians during the county leadership election in 1984 (see Chapter One), and having not integrated black machine politicians fully into the 1984 Jackson campaign. Vann's poor relationship with the church leaders also contributed to his defeat.

CCE also ran two candidates for City Council against black machine incumbents Mary Pinkett and Enoch Williams. Both races were close. Williams won (under questionable circumstances) by less than 300 votes. In both cases, the

inexperience of the two challengers contributed to their defeat.⁶⁶ Both candidates were inspired to run by the Jackson campaign. In New York, however, the complexity of election laws and expensive legal procedures make the transition from movement type mobilization to the nitty-gritty of local elections difficult. Even if a candidate makes it on the ballot, they are drained of resources.

Had Vann decided to concentrate on ousting Enoch Williams and Mary Pinkett instead of running for borough president, he possibly could have defeated both.⁶⁷ CCE also could have worked to build a political organization in the 42nd Assembly district and similar districts where there is a majority black population and a white machine-aligned elected representative. Had Vann focused on these lesser offices, the energy generated by the 1984 Jackson campaign could then have been directed towards weakening the county organization and expanding the base of CCE. It turned out that the energy generated by the Jackson campaign was dissipated by internal divisions within CCE and antipathy towards black machine politicians and the churches. These errors were compounded by Vann's decision to challenge Howard Golden without a solid base in the black community from which to launch the assault.

Jackson Impact in Queens

The Jackson campaign in Queens did not lead directly to any new candidates running for political office. Simeon Golar, a black businessman and former city official, ran against Congressman Joe Addabbo in the majority black 6th Congressional district. Golar began his campaign in February of 1984. The Jackson campaign then emerged in the middle of the Golar campaign. Golar received the support of Jesse Jackson, who campaigned on his behalf. Nonetheless, Golar lost decisively to Addabbo. Golar's loss was cited by one political scientist as an example of Jackson's short coattails in 1984.^a Golar, however, was a very poor test of the impact of the Jackson campaign in Queens. He had never developed any political base in Queens. Bob Boswell said:

Simeon could never realize what he wanted to be. You've got to remember Simeon ran for Congress, or tried to run for Congress in Brooklyn in 1978 against [Congressman Fred] Richmond, and Bernie Gibson knocked him out. Then he later decided he wanted to run [in Queens]. He always wanted to be a Congressman but he didn't know exactly from where. So he never really positioned himself. Even though he does live in Jamaica Estates [Queens]...after he lost instead of going back and working the district...he just went back to making money.⁶⁸

Golar was also known as a difficult person with whom to work. His experienced and capable campaign manager, Bill

^a See Reid, Adolf. The Jackson Phenomenon.

Lynch, left the campaign before it got off the ground.⁶⁹

Despite Golar's loss, the 1984 Jackson campaign had some positive effect for black political aspirants in Queens. The campaign led to the formation of the 'Jesse L. Jackson Democratic Club' in Far Rockaway. Through its voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts, the club was able to increase the number of black voters in Far Rockaway by 2,000. This increase later benefitted the campaigns of Floyd Flake and State Senator Andrew Jenkins, even though he had opposed Jackson's campaign in 1984.⁷⁰ The campaign also demonstrated the potential power of the black vote in Queens. Dick Hayes, a Queens attorney and activist, said:

I think that what grew out of the Jackson campaign was the fact that black people knew that we were going to have a black Congressman and that Jesse registered the black folks in numbers, even in this area. He gave people a sense of pride....In terms of money, in terms of percentage of votes, Jesse did better here (in Southeast Queens) than anywhere else in America.⁷¹

Leslie Black credited the Jackson campaign for, "jerking the clubhouse politicians into line to the extent any of them were in line in 1984...."⁷² However, the Jackson campaign did not cause African-American machine politicians to become more independent. Leslie Black described the problem in this way:

How do you get the scared club leaders to understand that their power can be greatly enhanced by increasing the membership in their club, by raising the political sophistication of the members of the communities in

which these clubs sit?⁷³

It was the suicide of county leader Donald Manes and the death of incumbent Congressman Joseph Addabbo, not Jesse Jackson, that gave African-American machine politicians such as Archie Spigner (a loyal county "lieutenant") the 'courage' to back insurgent Floyd Flake in the 6th Congressional district. Flake's ascendancy in the aftermath of the deaths of Manes and Addabbo threatened machine politicians in Southeast Queens. They could either continue to support the county organization and risk being challenged in the future by candidates backed by Flake, or they could get on Flake's bandwagon. Bob Boswell explained:

Initially Spigner was with Waldon, and then everybody saw that Flake had a better organizational process in place, and knew how to raise money, and also had Koch in his backing. They [the black machine Democrats] were backing Waldon. But there was such disarray when Manes died that there wasn't much organization out there, and they couldn't mobilize because they had brought this new young guy [Congressman Manton] in as a county leader. He's just not ready for that position and they had made it kind of clear that he was only going to be a figurehead for a while until they could decide who was going to be the new county leader. So I think, as I look at it now, Floyd Flake is the power broker in Queens. I think he'll try to take out people like Cynthia Jenkins. I think he'll go and try to get a black to win Eddie Abramson's seat over in Rochdale Village. If he can pull those two things off, I think he will be extremely strong, and he's well liked.⁷⁴

Floyd Flake's ascendance in Queens was not a direct outgrowth from the Jackson campaign. Flake had a strong community and church base and he benefited from disarray in

the Queens county organization. However, the Jackson campaign increased black consciousness in Queens, and helped create the momentum for Flake's later success. When asked if Flake would have run for Congress even if Jackson had not run in 1984, Flake aide Maurice Small said:

Yeah. It [the Jackson campaign] made it easier. I mean there's no question about it, the Jesse factor plays a role. I would be naive to say not, that it didn't. There's no question it did. It got a lot more black people aware of the importance of voting, and voting for someone who was good...The increased numbers as the result of Jesse's running in '84...[made] us even realize that, hey, we should have a black Congressman over here, as opposed to having the same one we had before, and that's even what brought Golar into the race during those years.⁷⁵

Queens activist Gary Morgan added that Jackson's campaign forced black machine politicians to become more independent, which benefited Flake two years later. Said Morgan:

Even when Manes was alive in '84, people had to go [with Jackson]. Black leaders had to break from Manes and go [with] Jesse Jackson. Jesse Jackson, I think, showed many people that [laughs] you've got to give the people what they want. Otherwise they're not going to follow you. So I think Jackson has made an impact in New York City, in Queens County particularly, as far as folks getting together. And I think that as a result of his campaign, you saw what happened with Floyd Flake, and you see what's happening now [the 1988 Jackson campaign]; it's just going to increase that much more. And [the campaign is] giving black folk (a) confidence that they can get involved in the political system and win, and (b) interest in the black political world. Because prior to Jesse Jackson, you had so many black folk who were just apathetic about voting...But I can tell you, after Jesse Jackson, there's so many people that I can think of off the top of my head, who had never voted before, but since '84 have voted every election. Because now they're involved and want to be

involved in the system. And previous to that hadn't happened. The increase of voter registration alone, on the rolls, causes the current political leadership, to have to take a back seat and listen to what these people are saying before they determine which direction they're going to go in themselves.⁷⁶

Many Queens activists argue that Jackson's 1984 campaign had a powerful effect in Queens because it had a powerful effect on black voters. It raised "black consciousness", helped increase voter registration, and forced machine politicians to be more independent of the machine. The Jackson campaign did not lead, however, directly to Flake's victory. Since Flake ran against several black opponents, all of whom supported Jackson in 1984, Jackson did not campaign for any of the candidates in the 1986 election. Perhaps out of fear of backing a loser, and thereby creating local enemies, Jackson choose to not enter the one race where his presence would have been decisive.^a Here Jackson's transition to a vote maximizing strategy was apparent. Jackson avoided local controversy and implicitly downplayed his earlier stated goal of promoting progressive local change--which ostensibly would include supporting a "people's candidate" against a machine-backed candidate.

Nonetheless, the 1984 Jackson campaign left a greater

^a Assemb. Al Waldon, Simeon Golar, and former Jackson aide Hulbert James ran against Flake in the 1986 primary.

legacy in Queens than anywhere else in the city. For the first time in twenty years, the black community in Queens united in a clear and independent voice against the Queens machine. Floyd Flake has emerged as a powerful figure, and was given respect from the machine "unheard of" for a freshman congressman.⁷⁷ The Queens county organization must now consider how to handle the new power relations in southeast Queens, there is no more politics-as-usual.

The Jackson Campaign in 1988

The 1988 Jackson campaign differed from the 1984 campaign, particularly in rhetoric of the candidate. Brooklyn activist Alice Booker said, "Now, I think, you've got a different kind of candidate. I think Jesse is running to show that he has political clout and a broader base...."⁷⁸ In 1988, Jackson avoided speaking out on many of the locally divisive racial issues: the murder of a black man in Queens by a gang of white youths, the shooting of four black youths by a white subway gunman, and the alleged rape of a black teenager [Tawana Brawley] by a white law enforcement official in upstate New York. Said Jackson, "Given the tension in New York around matters of race-- [Tawana] Brawley case, Howard Beach [Queens], subway shootings--it's a tinderbox on the question of race."⁷⁹ Jackson chastised the New York press for focusing too much

on issues of race. During a New York press conference he said, "...the media becomes so focused on the tinderbox confrontation that the homeless are locked off the agenda, unemployment is locked off the agenda...other people are locked off the agenda."⁸⁰

Mayor Koch's inflammatory anti-Jackson rhetoric overwhelmed Jackson's efforts to diffuse the issue of race. The Mayor said that Jews would be "crazy" to vote for Jesse Jackson, that Jackson's domestic programs would bankrupt the country "within three weeks," and that Jackson was not "fit" to be president.⁸¹ Jackson responded by portraying Koch as a divisive race-baiter and painting himself as a healer. Jackson said, "We all know it was unfortunate in a city where we were working on healing for a leader [Koch] to scream fire in a theater and therefore threaten to rupture delicate relationships...We deserve better leadership than that."⁸²

Jackson made a concerted effort to repair the damage done by his "Hymietown" statements in the 1984 campaign. He broke all ties with Minister Louis Farrakhan.⁸³ According to Newsday Jackson also took additional measures to win Jewish support:

These days, Jackson has moderated his rhetoric, and hired Austin, who is Jewish, to run his campaign. he specifically backs the Camp David Mideast Peace accords and talks of "secure" borders for Israel, and he avoids

mentioning the PLO although he continues to say the Palestinians have a right to choose their own representatives. He has visited a World War II concentration camp, sought the extradition of a Nazi war criminal from Syria and expressed concern about Soviet Jews to Mikhail Gorbachev.⁸⁴

Jackson was able to improve his rating among Jewish voters from 17 percent favorable versus a 62 percent unfavorable rating in January, to a 37 percent favorable versus a 43 percent unfavorable rating in March. He did manage to heal some wounds, but he still generated a negative reaction in the Jewish community.⁸⁵

Increased support from labor marked another major difference between the 1984 and the 1988 campaigns. James Farmer said, "...you had a candidate [Mondale] who was the candidate of the party, state party organization, and of organized labor in this state in 1984 which shut out a lot, a lot of access and resources to us in 1984, and we didn't have that same problem in 1988."⁸⁶ Jackson developed a strong labor message in the 1988 campaign. Jackson organizer Harold Jackson said:

I think one of the critical differences...between 1984 and 1988 [was that] Jesse did a classic job of building up a new constituency in organized labor. He had the church base, he had the black community, so to speak, and he bore physical witness. [Jackson appeared at] every possible demonstration of people on strike or any kind of workers struggle...it was a workers' message: greed, it was the corporation taking their jobs overseas...the people who empty the bedpans but couldn't afford to sleep in that bed because they don't have health insurance....⁸⁷

The New York Times reported that, "Mr. Jackson, who has regularly picketed alongside striking and laid-off workers, is credited by many trade unionists with pushing the entire [Democratic] party toward greater involvement with labor's cause."⁸⁸ Harold Meyerson, writing in the Democratic Left, said:

To say that Jackson "moderated" his message between 1984 and 1988 mis-states the actuality. Rather, Jackson became tribune of class and not of race (at least explicitly: he was always the implicit tribune of race as well). Not since the Roosevelt campaign of 1936 has this level of class advocacy and anti-corporate politics been heard in a major Democratic presidential campaign. Over the bleak landscape of neo-democracy, the Jackson campaign exploded with the shock of the old.⁸⁹

Jackson made important symbolic gestures to win labor support. Jackson's 1988 headquarters were located in Local 1199 (a powerful hospital worker's union), and the co-campaign chairman (with David Dinkins) was Stan Hill, director of District Council 37 of the municipal worker's union. Table IV shows a 14 percent increase in the proportion of black union member households among black voters in 1988. By contrast, white and Latino union household composition of the electorate showed a slight decline.

Table IV

Composition of Vote By Union
Household and Race/Ethnicity
 (%)

	<u>1984</u>		<u>1988</u>	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
White	43	57	36	64
Black	43	57	57	43
Latin	32	68	26	74

Source: CBS/NYT 1984 and 1988
 Exit Polls.

The 1988 New York campaign also made a concerted effort to win Latino support. Jackson was the only presidential candidate to appear in person before El Diario-La Prensa, the leading local Latino newspaper. In December of 1987 Jackson met with a dozen Latino elected officials in Assemb. Angelo Del Toro's residence in East Harlem. Assemb. Del Toro said, "He assured us that in our own district he'd help campaign for us. He really wanted a coalition." Herman Badillo told Newsday, "it makes sense for politicians facing potential primary challenges from blacks to support Jackson. 'It's a practical political problem that I understand, but it's not my problem.'"⁹⁰

As if to make good on Jackson's promise to support Latino elected officials, the Jackson campaign deliberately by-passed black elected officials in the Bronx and coordinated the campaign directly with Latino elected officials who supported Jackson. Said Harold Jackson:

The Bronx stuff, you know, that's crazy. It's the craziest and probably most difficult borough in the whole campaign. You've got a situation up there where black leadership for all practical purposes is really non-existent...[and they are] banging up on the Puerto Ricans all the time...In the interest of trying to think long-term, there was some conscious decision made in the Jackson campaign essentially to work through [Puerto Rican leadership] with the first call being [to] the Puerto Ricans...We may have paid a price for that. I think we paid some price clearly with some of them in the black community on that.⁹¹

The campaign's efforts in the Latino community paid off. Jackson won close to 56 percent of the city's Latino vote in 1988 as opposed to 36 percent in 1984.

The 1988 Jackson campaign also reached out to New York City's gay and lesbian community. Newsday wrote:

One of New York's most politically active groups, the gay and lesbian community, appears to be offering close to overwhelming support to the Rev. Jesse Jackson....Jackson has identified with the goals of the community, spoken out against discrimination in all forms and included its members as an integral part of his Rainbow Coalition, established in his 1984 Presidential bid.⁹²

Since no major poll canvasses gay and lesbian voters, it is hard to know what level of support they gave Jackson. However, an ABC News poll which asked questions about AIDS found that, "about half of white voters who regard the epidemic as a major concern are Jackson supporters."⁹³ Congressman Barney Frank, an openly gay Dukakis supporter from Massachusetts, believes that, "a significant percentage of Jackson's white support [across the country] has come from gay people."⁹⁴

The 1988 campaign was much better staffed and raised more money than in 1984. Whereas the 1984 campaign had only 5-6 full-time campaign staff, the 1988 campaign had 7-10 full-time campaign staff and 5 or more paid consultants.⁹⁵ The initial campaign staff included a paid borough

coordinator for four boroughs (excluding Staten Island), a campaign manager, an organizer in the central office, and an office manager.⁹⁶ Many more people were hired close to election day.

The New York Jackson state campaign raised \$1.4 million dollars, compared to \$200,000 in 1984. The campaign ended with a \$100,000 surplus.^a A review of Jackson campaign records shows that the 1988 campaign raised \$1,084,000 in New York City.^b The additional money enabled the campaign to buy media. The national Jackson headquarters spent close to \$1.4 million dollars for advertising in New York. The local campaign bought radio time, and mailed out 750,000 pieces of literature.⁹⁷

While the 1988 campaign was broader and better organized, it generated less grassroots participation and enthusiasm in the African-American community. Harlem district leader Cephus Sharpe said:

I think the last time for example you had a lot of students who were involved. You had a lot of grassroots community organizing types who were in the campaign. The grassroots types are the ones that I don't see this go around...Now what has happened is that you have a lot of people who are involved in traditional politics and traditional campaigns who have

^a The campaign estimated \$300,000 in expenses related to fundraisers, leaving a net gain of \$1.2 million.

^b Campaign contributions are taken from a computerized list of all Jackson campaign contributions for 1987/1988.

since come in, and I don't think they know how to integrate. They [the campaign] couldn't quite [figure out] how to bring the people who were with Jackson in '84 and mix them in with people who came on board this time...This time the ability to reach about was a lot more tremendous than our abilities in '84, but there hasn't been a mending of the two [campaigns] together...I don't see as much [enthusiasm]...it was a protest movement in '84. This time, it's a real campaign. It's moved beyond just being a protest...When things are a protest, they tend to have greater energy...And then, sometimes, when things move to a different level, the excitement is not always the same.⁹⁸

Brooklyn activist Ella Salins said the 1984 campaign was "community-based," whereas the 1988 campaign involved the "political people" who supported Jackson to further their own careers. Said Salins:

I would say that it was ten times as many people involved last time. And [last time] it was community-based. This time the political people are more involved because they see [it] as necessary for their political careers to be involved in Jesse Jackson's campaign. That's the same way that you have the Rangel's and the Harlemites who were supporting Mondale and saying that the time wasn't right for Jackson last time are now [for] Jackson. Because the time is right for them to join the Jackson bandwagon. And it doesn't matter if they're for Mondale or whoever--Dukakis--because the community votes Jackson and they see them as traitors...if they don't go with Jackson, so they at least have to put a Jackson face on to the public.⁹⁹

Harlem district leader Paula Sage blamed the the 1988 Jackson campaign leadership for the lack of grassroots participation in the 1988 campaign. Said Sage:

I'm sure what I'd have to say would be extremely unpopular. But I think because we have all the elected officials involved, you then get into the whole protocol situation and them wanting to monopolize

leadership, but really not having the time or desire or energy to provide leadership. You [have] the second tier people who are motivated and energetic and wanting to be out there for whatever reasons, maybe they have an agenda, but they are going to provide that energy and the outreach. And [then] you have a Rangel or somebody and they're not that interested, they're kind of jaded in terms of participation...In Manhattan [in 1984] every person who had a position, who was head of a committee or whatever, was part of the Manhattan Steering Committee, which met every Monday morning at 8 a.m. at 22 West for a breakfast meeting, every week. There is no Manhattan Steering Committee [in 1988] to my knowledge. I am never quite sure if there's a Saturday meeting or not. When we do have them, it involves [Assemb.] Geraldine Daniels, Rangel and [county leader] Denny Farrell sitting up front giving a little speech. It then involves every district leader being, you know, mentioned that they are there, and you wave or stand up and "are there any questions(?)" and then that's the meeting. That's the meeting...I mean nobody's going to those meetings. You know [in 1984] we used to give meetings at Church of the Intercession, they were called Volunteer Rallies, and they were every Saturday and there were 50, 60, 70 people...Bill [Lynch] had me instructing delegate candidates on how to do a piece of literature and get publicity, I did fact sheets on the Delegate Selection Rules, I was always generating something. There were flyers there were always rallies, there were prayer meetings at churches, it seemed like I was doing a flyer on a days notice every week or so.¹⁰⁰

Brooklyn activist Alice Booker, who played a leadership role in the 1984 Jackson campaign, insists that black political leaders planned not to have grassroots participation in the 1988 Jackson campaign to forestall the emergence of political upstarts who might challenge their authority. When asked why black political leaders would want to stifle "black awareness," Booker said:

Because they may be vulnerable themselves. Once you have a heightened black electorate--an aware black electorate, then you have the possibility of

insurgents, young candidates--you have all of that happening. And I don't think that the Charlie Rangels and the Denny Farrells and those people want to have insurgents--a heightened electorate that may turn around and say, you know, "Hey, you can't control a crazy person." If I know I'm going to bring 2,000 people, I'm going to say anything. You know. So they don't want that.¹⁰¹

Although black churches played a role in the 1988 campaign, they were not as central as in 1984, when many of Jackson's key supporters and advisors in New York were ministers. The 1988 campaign was kicked-off at a church rally in Brooklyn, "it was church based in that sense," said Jackson organizer Harold Jackson, "but [the campaign had] no sustained activity before that event or after that...In Queens there was a breakfast meeting [for Jesse Jackson] with Flake's infrastructure out there...[but] in terms of Ministers pushing out get-out-the-vote flyers, leaflets, I'm not sure. I don't know. I didn't feel it, it may of happened, I didn't see it concretely."¹⁰²

In sum, Jackson's 1988 campaign was broader and had more resources than the 1984 campaign. The campaign united the often fractious black and Latino political leadership and won powerful support from labor and elements of the white liberal community. Other than amongst black union members, however, it failed to generate the same high level of grassroots participation in the black community as did the 1984 campaign.

Jackson attempted to avoid racial polarization, but Mayor Koch largely undermined his efforts. Ironically, Koch may have generated more ardent African-American support for Jackson's campaign than might otherwise have been the case.^a The campaign's major accomplishment securing support from labor unions and Puerto Rican political leaders.

Jackson 1988 Impact on Voter Registration

In November 1988 the New York State Board of Elections reported that voter registration had declined by 380,000 in New York City since 1984. Brooklyn and Queens had the sharpest decline, registration dropped by 170,000 in Queens and 125,000 in Brooklyn. The Bronx declined 61,000 and Manhattan dropped 17,000 registered voters. The relatively low drop in Manhattan registration was attributed to a \$100,000 voter registration effort conducted by the Democratic Party and the Dukakis campaign. The campaign had more success in Manhattan than elsewhere in the city.¹⁰³

^a The Jackson campaign was severely criticized in the City Sun, a black oriented weekly periodical. In a front-page editorial entitled, "Jesse, Say It Ain't So," the paper remarked that "the ideological maverick of 1984 has become a political hostage in 1988, trying to win white approval at the expense of the broader Black imperatives that should have guided him all...along." Koch's attack on Jackson deflected criticism from elements in the black community who said that Jackson was too white-oriented in 1988. For further discussion, see Merle English, "Jackson Allies Criticize His City Campaign," Newsday, 18 April 1988, p.4).

Black voter registration declined significantly leading up to the 1988 Presidential primary. According to Harold Jackson, "the kinds of [union and foundation] money that was available in the 1983/1984 period was not available clearly in 1987/1988 for voter registration."¹⁰⁴ In 1984, Dinkins was planning to run for Manhattan Borough President, Al Vann was planning to run for Brooklyn Borough President, Congressman Townes was facing a challenge in Brooklyn, and Simon Golar was running for Congress in Queens. In 1988, however, there were no major campaigns pitting black and white opponents. Brooklyn activist Paul Wilson argues that except when they are running for higher office, most black politicians are not active in registering black voters. Williams said:

High voter registration and high turnout and voter education means they have to work harder and be accountable to more people. So low voter turnout is a tool to keep them in [office,] but the rhetoric is [to promote] voter registration. If you look at [the figures], voter registration has only been utilized as a tool to develop the machinery either [for a politician to] run for somebody else's [seat] or go for higher office, but [voter registration] never has been truly used as an avenue of political empowerment. Voter registration has been used to manipulate [the community] and give the perception that they want to do something, but [it] has always been [a] guise [for] someone's personal agenda and never the agenda of the community.¹⁰⁵

The 1988 Jackson campaign again demonstrated that without local organizational efforts, Jackson's candidacy did not increase black voter registration. The table below

shows the variation in Democratic voter registration by race between 1982 and 1988.

According to the estimates below, the greatest increases in African-American and Latino Democratic registration occurred between 1982-1984 and 1984-1985. Between 1982 and 1984, African-Americans gained more than 129,000 registrants, a whopping increase of 25 percent. In the same period, there was an 18,000 person increase in Latinos registered. white registration declined in 1982-1984 by 22,000.

The second large increase in African-American registration was between 1984 and 1985. African-American registration increased by 14 percent (78,700 registrants). In the same period, Latino registration increased by 21 percent (81,800) and white registration increased by 15 percent (178,600).

Table V

**Democratic Electorate: Estimated Registration by
Race/Ethnicity**

	White	Black	Latin
1/82	1,006,400	363,000	280,500
5/84	984,400	492,200	298,800
5/85	1,163,000	571,000	380,600
4/88	1,043,600	459,900	265,300

Source: Registration figures are taken from the New York City Board of Elections; demographic data is from the U.S. 1980 Census STF4 computer tape.

A significant decline in voter registration occurred between 1985 and 1988. white Democratic voter registration declined by 10 percent (119,500), African-American registration declined by 19 percent (111,000), and Latino registration declined by 30 percent (115,300). The far right column in Table VI, shown below, shows the decrease in voter registration between 1985 and 1988. Table VI indicates that those districts where had voter registration increased most between 1982-1984, particularly central Brooklyn (the 55th and 56th districts) and central Harlem (70th district), also had the greatest decreases in 1985-1988. Despite an even more visible Jackson campaign in 1988, black voter registration decreased significantly.

**Table VI Democratic Registration in Black Assemb.
Districts (%)**

<u>Registration Gain in Majority Black ADs '85 - '88</u>				
Assemblymember	AD	Black %	1982-84 Reg	1985-88 Reg
Boyland	55	86	8955	(9871)
Vann	56	86	8675	(9542)
Norman	43	80	3378	(4651)
Jenkins	29	78	5320	(4342)
Daniels	70	77	8641	(9890)
Griffith	40	76	7257	(7892)
Abramson	32	67	4011	(6052)
Green	57	64	5110	(7191)
Jacobs	42	58	1755	(4486)
Seabrooke	82	54	3382	(5589)
Clark	33	53	1847	(4098)
Farrell	71	52	4626	(6278)
Greene	76	50	5020	(7073)

Source: Registration figures are taken from the New York City Board of Elections. Racial breakdowns by AD taken from U.S. Census STF4 computer tape, and were aggregated to the AD level by Professor John Mollenkopf. Numbers in brackets represent decreases in voter registration.

Table VII Turnout for Democratic Primaries in Majority Black Assembly Districts (%)

<u>Voter Turnout in Democratic Primaries / Black ADs</u>						
Assemblymember	AD	9/82	4/84	9/85	9/86	4/88
Jenkins	29	44	54	27	49	65
Abramson	32	42	49	26	41	62
Clark	33	37	48	23	40	59
Griffith	40	48	54	23	33	58
Jacobs	42	44	50	30	40	59
Norman	43	61	54	28	35	61
Boyland	55	44	50	23	31	57
Vann	56	42	56	25	28	56
Green	57	46	56	28	39	62
Daniels	70	47	51	28	34	57
Farrell	71	49	55	35	40	57
Greene	76	39	42	24	27	47
Seabrooke	82	44	50	29	43	47

Source: Turnout percentages are calculated from election returns provided by the New York City Board of Elections.

Impact of Jackson '88 Campaign on Voter Turnout

Table VII shows that turnout was higher in 1988 than 1984 in every majority black Assembly district in the city except for the 82nd Assembly district in the north Bronx. Black turnout for the 1988 Presidential primary reached an all-time high of 61 percent. Jackson won the New York City, narrowly beating Dukakis by 4260 votes.

Jackson's superior fundraising efforts, media advertisements, and labor support helped increase African-American turnout. The New York Times reported:

Mr. Jackson's showing in the city was credited to the combination of passionate support among black voters, Hispanic voters, and many union members, along with an unrivaled get-out-the-vote operation....Mr. Jackson's campaign manager, Hulbert James, estimated that as many as 10,000 people were working at some point yesterday for Mr. Jackson distributing leaflets, working at telephone banks, watching polling places or selling buttons.¹⁰⁶

African-American turnout was aided by the racially inflammatory remarks of the Mayor. The New York Times reported that:

[Koch's] repeated attacks on the Rev. Jesse Jackson overwhelmed the New York Democratic Presidential primary...the excitement of the hard fought primary seemed dampened by days and weeks of bitterness that preceded the actual voting, to judge from interviews with numerous New Yorkers yesterday. And much of their displeasure focused on the mayor and his treatment of Jackson.¹⁰⁷

The racial polarization surrounding this campaign was also reflected in an 8 percent increase in white turnout compared to the 1984 presidential primary (see Table V). Black turnout in the 1988 primary was 4 percent higher than black turnout in 1984. The high turnout among both whites and African-Americans reflects the intensity of racial mobilization in this election. The heavy white turnout was largely an anti-Jackson mobilization. Jackson received less than 10 percent of the white vote. A New York times/CBS News exit poll showed that "nearly 70 percent of the unenthusiastic Dukakis supporters had an unfavorable view of Mr. Jackson and it thus appeared that it was the Chicago clergyman they were voting against." The poll suggested that, "many whites, particularly Jews, backed Mr. Dukakis mainly to defeat Mr. Jackson."¹⁰⁸ Koch chose to endorse Al Gore for President, the more forceful critic of Jackson, who despite a poor showing, managed to siphon off enough votes from Dukakis to hand Jackson victory in the city.

Table VIII

Democratic Primary Electorate by
Race/Ethnicity (%)

	White	Black	Latino
9/82	60 (4)	24 (5)	16 (3)
5/84	55 (7)	31 (8)	15 (5)
5/85	57 (3)	20 (4)	23 (3)
4/88	57 (2)	29 (2)	12 (5)

Source: Demographic breakdowns are based on election data provided by the New York City Board of Elections and demographic data from the U.S. 1980 Census STF4(a) computer tape.

Table IX

<u>Democratic Presidential Primary Vote 1984/1988</u>				
	JJ84	VAC84	DNV84	New Reg
JJ88	100	9	20	100
VAC88	0	89	13	0
DNV88	0	3	68	0

Source: Voter transitions are based on registration and election data provided by the New York City Board of Elections.

The labels across the top of the table represent the following:

- JJ84 - voted for Jackson in the 1984 primary
- VAC - voted for a candidate other than Jackson in 1984
- DNV84 - did not vote in the 1984 presidential primary
- New Reg - newly (post 1984) enrolled Democrats
- JJ88 - voted for Jackson in the 1988 primary
- VAC88 - voted for a candidate other than Jackson in 1988
- DNV88 - did not vote in the 1984 presidential primary

Table VIII shows that even though African-Americans voted in their highest numbers during the 1988 Presidential primary, their gains were offset by increased white voter turnout. Black voters constituted 29 percent of the primary electorate, roughly the same as in 1984.

Table IX estimates voter transitions between the 1984 and 1988 presidential primaries in New York.

Table IX shows that, of registered Democrats in New York in 1988, nearly 100 percent of those who voted for Jackson in 1984 voted for him again in 1988. Jackson also received votes from an estimated 9 percent of those voters who voted for Hart or Mondale in 1984, and he received votes from 20 percent of the vote from those voters who did not vote in 1984. Also, Jackson received nearly 100 percent of the votes cast by voters registered between 1984 and 1988. The data suggest that Jackson's increased votes in 1988 came from: a 9 percent crossover from voters who voted for Mondale or Hart in 1984; increased voter turnout among registered voters who did not vote in 1984; and new voters registered since 1984.^a

^a Overall voter registration went down between 1984 and 1988 in Black and White districts. Increases in voter registration were mainly in majority white Assembly districts, and were highly correlated with the size of Black populations in those districts.

Did the 1988 Jackson Campaign Inspire Blacks to Run?

The media perceived Jackson's victory in the 1988 New York City primary as an enormous defeat for Mayor Ed Koch and a big lift for a potential black mayoral candidate. The Daily News reported that, "Mayor Koch admitted last [primary] night that his relentless attacks on Jesse Jackson backfired, and an NBC exit poll showed a majority of city Democratic primary voters don't want Koch to run for a fourth term in 1989."¹⁰⁹ While Jackson won only 8 percent of the white vote, he won 63 percent of the Latino vote, a major increase from the 35 percent he received in 1984 (see Table VII). The New York Times noted that Jackson's campaign accomplished something virtually no politician had achieved in New York City, "the unified support of almost all black and Hispanic political leaders."¹¹⁰ The campaign demonstrated that it was possible to unite a winning coalition of African-Americans, Latinos, labor, gay rights leaders and liberal groups in a city-wide campaign.

In February of 1989 David Dinkins announced his candidacy for Mayor. Several factors contributed to Dinkins' decision. First, Dinkins had used his four years as Manhattan Borough President to increase his name recognition and support in the press. Second, the demise of Friedman

and Simon in the Bronx also led to the emergence of Borough President Ferrer. Unlike former Borough President Simon, Ferrer was seen as a potential Dinkins ally, in part because Ferrer needs the black vote. With the machine weakened, the black vote could hurt Ferrer should he be challenged for re-election by Assemb. Jose Serrano, who endorsed Jackson early.^a Serrano had sought to forestall a black challenger to Congressman Robert Garcia, who was indicted in the Wedtech scandal. Serrano was rumored to be interested in running against Garcia. Thus both Serrano and Ferrer had reason to support a black Mayoral candidacy in 1989.

The demise of Manes in Queens and Flake's victory over

Walden in 1986 also increased the potential for Dinkins to win political support in Queens. Manes had strongly supported Koch, while his successor refused any early endorsement in the 1989 Mayoral race. Floyd Flake's ascendance benefits Dinkins. Flake solidly entrenched himself as Congressman, with no need for Ed Koch's support. The Southeast Queens Clergy Coalition, the base of Flake's 1986 campaign, was one of the first clergy groups to endorse Dinkins.

In Brooklyn, CCE leadership passed from Al Vann to

^a Ferrer endorsed Jackson the week before the primary.

Congressman Major Owens. Owens did not have the same level of antagonism towards Dinkins (flowing from the 1985 CJNY fiasco) as did Vann. Owens is also closely tied to Dinkins' Chief of Staff and campaign manager, Bill Lynch, who was Owen's first campaign manager and chief of staff. More importantly, CCE has a strong interest in a credible black mayoral candidacy, despite past antagonisms with Dinkins, because it can potentially increase black turnout against white machine incumbents elected from majority black districts in Brooklyn.

Dinkins and Farrakhan

In part because of his forceful denunciation of Farrakhan in 1985, Dinkins maintained good relations with Jewish voters in New York City. On October 7, 1985, Minister Louis Farrakhan organized a massive rally of over 25,000 African-Americans. The rally filled Madison Square Garden to capacity. David Dinkins, then the Democratic nominee for Manhattan Borough President, issued a statement on October 2, 1985 criticizing Farrakhan. Dinkins was the first African-American leader to openly criticize Farrakhan's visit. The statement read (in part):

Living in a free society, as we do, presents us with a clear obligation to face the wrongs in our community and to speak out against them. Recognizing this responsibility and in light of Minister Louis Farrakhan's visit to New York, I must say that I find his blatantly anti-semitic remarks offensive and I

condemn them....To a population that has long and disproportionately suffered from crime, unemployment and all the woes that accompany poverty, this message can be a strong elixir. But we must be vigilant in remembering that no good can come of prejudice. A call for power and pride couched in terms of racial and religious bigotry can never offer true hope.¹¹¹

Dinkins received instant criticism in the black community. On the next day, Rev. Calvin Butts, Executive Minister of the prestigious Abyssinian Baptist Church, Rev. Wyatt T. Walker, former aide to Martin L. King, and Brooklyn community leader Jitu Weusi, among others, held press conference on the steps of City Hall to defend Farrakhan's appearance at Madison Square Garden. Butts also appeared to criticize Dinkins for speaking out against Farrakhan and suggested that Dinkins had been pressured into denouncing Farrakhan. Butts said, "If David Dinkins had been left alone, he would not have denounced Mr. Farrakhan. He was not his own man in this instance, and his claim to [black] leadership is questionable."¹¹²

At the Garden rally, Farrakhan gave a long rambling speech and at one point issued a reply to Dinkins. He said:

These silly Toms run out and do their masters' bidding...The reason David Dinkins would do that is because they don't fear us. They fear white people. What I'm suggesting to black people is that the leaders have to begin to fear the people they say they represent...because when the leader sell out the people, he should pay a price for that...Don't you think so? Do you think the leader should sell you out...(pause) and then live?¹¹³

Farrakhan's implied threat against Dinkins caused an uproar in the press. The Mayor, through the Police Commissioner, ordered police protection for Dinkins.¹¹⁴ Dinkins accepted the protection. While Dinkins's stand against Farrakhan caused him some temporary discomfort in the black community, it enhanced his image as a conciliator and reinforced his support in the Jewish community. Dinkins' likely ability to win Jewish votes was a key consideration in his 1989 Mayoral candidacy. Without winning a substantial part of the Jewish vote, which constituted more than 30 percent of the during the 1985 primary electorate, he stands little chance of becoming Mayor.

Impact of Jackson Campaign on Dinkins Candidacy

Jackson's victory, and the emerging black-Latin-Labor alliance which his campaign brought about, symbolized, certainly encouraged Dinkins to run. Dinkins relied on the same labor coalition that supported Jackson.¹¹⁵ Given that black or Latin candidate has never won a city-wide election in New York City, Jackson's victory was widely perceived as a momentous gain for black New Yorkers.

Analysis of Jackson voters in 1984 and 1988 had some encouraging signs for Dinkins. Almost all voters who voted for Jackson in 1984 voted again in 1988, and they voted for Jackson. Jackson picked up 20 percent of the vote from registered voters who did not vote in 1984, while Dukakis and Gore together picked up only 13 percent of the these voters. In addition, almost all the voters registered since 84 voted in 1988, and nearly all voted for Jackson.

Dinkins, however, was wary of Jackson's potential negative impact, and stressed his independence from Jackson. When asked if Jackson would represent a political asset or liability, Dinkins said:

It's a function of how he comes in and how often...Clearly, some in the Jewish community would be less than pleased. But they will understand that David Dinkins is his own person and that its Dinkins who is running for mayor and not Jesse Jackson and that Jesse Jackson will not be part of the municipal government in New York."¹¹⁶

Table X

<u>Voting Results: by Race (%)</u>			
	White	Black	Latino
Koch 82	57 (7)	31 (9)	45 (6)
Cuomo 82	42 (7)	63 (9)	56 (6)
Mondale 84	65 (6)	6 (7)	48 (5)
Hart 84	33 (4)	0 (5)	16 (3)
Jackson 84	2 (4)	98 (6)	36 (4)
Koch 85	78 (6)	31 (8)	64 (5)
Farrell 85	1 (3)	40 (3)	13 (2)
Bellamy 85	17 (6)	20 (7)	16 (5)
Gore 88	17 (1)	0 (1)	5 (1)
Dukakis 88	76 (1)	0 (1)	39 (1)
Jackson 88	7 (1)	100 (1)	56 (1)

Source: Voting results broken down by race/ethnicity are based on data from the New York City Board of Elections and demographic data from U.S. 1980 Census Tape STF4(a) computer tape.

The Dinkins Mayoral candidacy aside, the 1988 Jackson campaign did not lead to insurgent black candidacies. District Leader candidate Chris Jackson in the 57th Assembly District in Brooklyn used Jackson's candidacy effectively, but he was supported by the Brooklyn county organization against another African-American, CCE-backed candidate Ron Ashford. Jackson used his last name and a photo he managed to take of himself standing next to Jesse Jackson, to give the impression that Jesse Jackson endorsed his candidacy. On election day, Jackson passed out fliers throughout the district saying "Support the Jackson Team." Ashford credited Jackson's deceptive flier with swinging a large number of votes. Ashford's loss, in what was formerly a reliable CCE district, showed that machine black politicians could be as adept as independent black politicians in exploiting Jesse Jackson's popularity.

Conclusion

The 1984 Jackson campaign in New York City had broad support in the black community, but it had little impact on the following municipal elections. Candidate appearances helped local voter registration efforts, but the campaign did not create any significant new local organizations to

register voters. Because of cumbersome voter registration procedures and the separation of local and national elections, it was difficult for a presidential campaign to have a direct impact on municipal politics. For the Jackson campaign to have an impact on following elections, the creation of a locally based mass organization was needed. The Coalition for Community Empowerment, a existing electorally oriented organization, was strategically poised to take advantage of the Jackson campaign in 1984. However, they made strategic errors in seeking to elect Al Vann Borough President rather than focusing on more winnable legislative races.

Structural obstacles limiting Jackson's local impact were compounded by mistakes made during the campaign. Jackson's "Hymietown" remarks and continued association with Minister Farrakhan inflamed sensitive black/Jewish relations. Because black politicians needed Jewish votes to win the Manhattan and Brooklyn borough president races in 1985, Jackson was non-invited to campaign. He was a non-player in the 1985 municipal elections and unable to play a unifier role amongst warring black political factions.

The 1988 Jackson campaign was more successful than the 1984 campaign, however its character was shaped primarily by the events of 1985 and 1986. The major advances between

1984 and 1988 came through Dinkins' victory in Manhattan, Flake's victory in Queens, and Robert Johnson's victory in the Bronx. Dinkins's victory was based on a multi-racial coalition whose outcome was not determined by the Jackson campaign. Flake's and Johnson's victories came primarily as the result of the breakdown in the ranks of the Queens and Bronx county organizations. At best, Jackson's 1984 campaign was one of several contributing factors to the three victories.

The city's corruption scandals made Koch vulnerable in 1989. Also, criminal convictions of important Bronx officials gave ambitious Latino politicians an incentive to seek alliances with black politicians; they needed black votes to win vacated seats. These factors, along with Jackson's fervent attempts to win labor and Latin support in 1988, made Jackson's campaign a testing ground for a black mayoral candidacy in 1989. In addition, Koch treated the Jackson campaign a direct affront. He did everything in his power to ensure high Jewish voter turnout against Jackson.

Jackson's efforts to broaden his 1988 campaign did not result in any weakening of its protest character in New York. In fact, his efforts to win labor, Latinos, gay and lesbians, and liberal whites, made his 1988 campaign a generalized protest against Mayor Koch's conservative

governing coalition. But, again, it was a challenge to Koch largely by Koch's own doing.

The 1989 Dinkins campaign was the result of a complex array of factors of which the 1988 Jackson campaign was only one. There is a good chance that Dinkins would have run for mayor even without a Jackson candidacy, particularly since he has been able to win labor and Jewish support in the past. After four years as a popular Manhattan Borough President, Dinkins was a leading politician in New York, regardless of Jackson's 1988 campaign. Given growing racial polarization, increasing dissatisfaction with the quality of life in the city, and Koch's declining popularity, there would have been pressure on Dinkins to run for mayor independent of the Jackson campaign. Jackson's 1988 victory crystallized trends already underway, but did not create them.

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Chapter 3

Black Politics in Oakland

Oakland's political structure is the polar opposite of New York City. It's elections are non-partisan, meaning that the candidate's party affiliation does not appear on the ballot. As in all of California, Oakland has no legally defined party organizations below county committees, has no equivalent of New York's district leaders, whose job it is to collect petitions for club endorsed candidates and to distribute patronage (however limited) to club members.¹ Political scientist Alan Ware wrote that in the East Bay (which includes Oakland), "the institutional framework was about as weak as it could be for a continuous and extensive electoral role for the parties."²

Since California restricts party control of the nomination process, ballot access is much easier in Oakland than it is in New York. A candidate simply pays a filing fee, obtains the signatures of a small number of registered voters, and supporters can vote for that candidate on election day. Brian Guthrie, an Oakland activist with extensive campaign and government experience said:

It's pretty easy [to get on the ballot.] There is a filing fee, but it's not prohibitive. Working people can afford it...it's in the range of \$100-\$150 bucks, and there are signature requirements, but modest ones. I want to say 50-100 signatures, something in that

range...Those [New York] kind of barriers don't exist here...when people don't run it's not because the structure makes it difficult for individuals to run.³

The ease of ballot access eliminates one of the primary functions of political clubs in New York, the collecting of petitions. Unlike New York, political clubs in Oakland are very weak. The virtual absence of political patronage also explains the weakness of clubs. While subtle forms of patronage do exist, they cannot compare with the patronage at the disposal of the mayor of New York, or even to the dozens of patronage jobs at the disposal of New York's borough presidents.⁴

Oakland's mayor has a weak role in city government. The office is a part-time position, that presides over the city council.⁴ The mayor does not manage the city on a day-to-day basis or prepare the city budget for city council ratification. That task falls to the city manager, who is appointed by the council.⁵

⁴ One of the subtle forms of "patronage" in Oakland flows from the part-time nature of the city council. Many city council members, and council aspirants, work for assemblymembers or county supervisors before, during, and after their council races. Councilmember Wilson Riles, Jr., for example, works on the staff of County Supervisor John George; Councilmember Aleta Cannon works on the staff of Assemblymember Eluhu Harris; Chappell Hayes, who ran for city council against incumbent Cannon, works for Assemblymember Tom Bates, and so on.

The mayor also has little control over the delivery of services. A host of specially elected bodies and other branches of government deliver services in Oakland. The schools are run by an elected seven member Board of Education. Transit, water, and parks services are run by separately elected boards for the respective departments.

Many local governmental functions are administered by the Alameda Board of Supervisors. Oakland is the largest of eight cities within the county. Three of the five Alameda County Supervisors represent part of Oakland along with the smaller cities of Berkeley, San Leandro and Alameda. The Board of Supervisors oversee the courts, jails, public defender and district attorney's office, and the county sheriff's department. They administer the entire welfare system and two hospitals and fund many of the community-based programs in the county. In New York, by contrast, most of these functions come under the control of the mayor.

Oakland has a weak city council as well as a weak mayor. Council members are elected to four year terms and are paid \$15,000 per year. Brian Guthrie described the powers of the council this way:

Oakland has a city-manager form of government, and as a result the council is a part-time position, it pays a modest sum that would be called 'walking around money,' its not real salary by any means. The power basically comes down to the title and what you [individual council members] do with it. It's not a strong-mayor

or strong-council form of government, the city manager runs the show. The council's power really comes down to the hiring and firing of that city manager.⁶

Another feature of Oakland politics is notoriously low voter turnout. Describing Oakland politics in 1972, political scientist Jeffrey Pressman said Oakland is characterized by "...a lack of interest in the electoral process and an absence of political parties and groups."⁷ While Pressman ignored the presence of a large and popular Black political group (the Black Panthers) he did capture a continuum in Oakland politics--low voter turnout. Voter turnout in local elections generally ranges between 15-30 percent.⁸

The low voter turnout, or apathy, associated with Oakland politics may be a reflection of the "balkanized" system of service delivery described earlier. Advocacy groups in Oakland are just as "balkanized." There is little history of unified political action across special interest groups. Oakland community activist Vinnie Rouse said:

[I] got involved in county politics around social services and health care. [I] realized that there's no [county] connection to the school district, and there's virtually no connection to the city government. And they're talking about the same kids and they're talking about the same families, and people are organized around the services for which they work, or the services which they use, and there are very few people who take an active role in more than one of these things. And even all the special districts are very, very segmented. There is a water district, there are two transit districts and so forth, each of which have

their own politics. So sometimes I think that if [services] were much more concentrated in city government I'm not sure if things would be better, but there could be more organization around common interests [and] more crystallization around coalitions to work on issues.⁹

Rouse's observations help explain why, when the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 led to budget cuts in education, health care, and other service areas, there was no unified opposition to the budget cuts from Oakland residents. In a study of the impact of Proposition 13 on recreational services in Oakland, urban planner Victor Rubin wrote that even advocacy groups fighting cuts in parks did not unite against budget cuts. Said Rubin:

There were dozens of interest groups that supported and lobbied on behalf of various specialized facilities such as flower gardens, riding stables, and lawn bowling greens. There was little citywide organizing for basic recreational services....[therefore] the political effectiveness of advocates for recreational and cultural services was erratic.¹⁰

Opposition has generally been single-issue oriented. Rubin noted that city councilmembers and the Mayor were adept at taking advantage of the divisions among community interest groups to deflect criticism of the budget cuts. One of the favorite tactics of Oakland's mayor, Lionel Wilson, was to turn to residents opposing cuts in a particular area and ask them, "What [program area] would you cut instead?"¹¹

Different coalitions have sprung up around education, health care, and other issues, but they are usually fighting different bureaucracies, and they do not coalesce into a political challenge. Because of the limited power of the mayor and other elected officials, they do not make easy targets for general voter dissatisfaction. Nor do the parties become arenas for what Schattsneider called the "generalizing of social conflict," or the bringing together disparate groups into political coalitions. Intense conflicts in the late 1960's, for example, between coalitions of Blacks, Hispanics, or Whites versus the city administration over issues such as education and anti-poverty spending were not linked to Democratic (or Republican) party activity.¹²

Oakland Demographics

Oakland was incorporated in the second half of the 19th century. It experienced rapid population growth after the San Francisco earthquake of 1906.¹³ Oakland developed as an industrial and shipping center around the time of World War II. Both Kaiser and Clorox corporations based themselves in Oakland. Oakland's population peaked in 1950 "as large numbers of wartime industrial jobs remained and post-war migration brought others to the metropolitan areas of California."¹⁴ The city had a large industrial base and

relatively inexpensive housing.

Unlike New York and other eastern and mid-western cities, Oakland did not have a large influx of European immigrants who came to work in its factories:

Oakland did not face an influx of immigrant Europeans. thus, the contention of white ethnic forces which heavily affected so much of the development of large Eastern cities, was absent. This accounts for the lack of significant white ethnic voting blocs in Oakland, of Poles or Irish or Italians now waiting to take "their turn" in city hall, as in Chicago or Boston. Instead, the vast majority of the early white population came from third and fourth generation Americans, who came West to make their fortune in gold.¹⁵

Many of the workers who came to work in Oakland's factories were Black. In 1950 15 percent of Oakland's population was non-White (mainly Black). By 1980, Oakland was 45 percent Black and only 38 percent White, the remainder divided between Latinos and Asians.¹⁶

Oakland's industrial base eroded in the 1950's and 1960's as new firms failed to move into the city and existing firms moved out. In addition, the central business district became largely stagnant, "replete with blocks cleared by the [urban] redevelopment agency but not rebuilt."¹⁷ By the early 1960's unemployment in Oakland was twice the national rate, and among minority youth it was nearly 50 percent.¹⁸ The city developed a large predominately Black low-income ghetto in East Oakland

commonly referred to as the "Flatland," because of its flat topography. Above the Flatland is a largely White, middle and upper-income area called the "Hills." Generally speaking, the higher up the hill one lives, the higher the income.

Oakland endured a period of economic decline from the 1950's to the late 1970's. Beginning in the late 1970's, the city began to reap the benefits of a large center city revitalization plan begun in the late 1960's, that included over \$300 million in federal grants, municipal loans, and private equity. The city benefited from the general upturn in the national economy and the spill over effect of booming growth in San Francisco (located across the bay). Five major office buildings opened in 1982 in Oakland, and 101 new construction projects were either planned or under construction.¹⁹

Much of Oakland's redevelopment was presided over by Oakland's first Black mayor, Lionel Wilson. The extent to which the impoverished black community has benefitted from the economic development during Mayor Wilson's tenure is the focus of major debate in Oakland.

Black Politics

Black politics in Oakland can be divided into three periods; the pre-1965 period, the 1965-1977 period, and the post-1977 period.

Before 1965 Oakland politics was dominated by conservative Republicans. Political scientists Browning, Marshall, and Tabb wrote:

Behind the formally nonpartisan politics of Oakland stood a powerful combination of corporate interests, Republican party leadership, and control over the local media. The financial and organizational strength of this coalition and its repeated ability to control local issues and win elections probably significantly delayed the formation of a successful challenging coalition in a city that had a majority of registered Democrats and a growing minority population.²⁰

The core of the coalition, since the 1930's, consisted of Henry J. Kaiser and Kaiser Industries, J.R. Knowland, his son Senator William Knowland, and the Oakland Tribune, owned by the Knowland family.²¹ The coalition later included the Oakland based Clorox Corporation.²²

The first Black person elected to office in Oakland was Byron Rumford. Rumford was elected to the state legislature as a Democrat by the increasingly Black population in the "flatland" section of East Oakland.²³ At the time of Rumford's election, Black churches exercised a virtually monopoly over black politics. There was not even a secular black political organization in Oakland until

after Rumford's election. Rumford, along with a black political activist named D.G. Gibson formed the East Bay Democratic Club.²⁴ The club had approximately 200 members and led Democratic political efforts in the Black community during the 1950's. Black participation in political organizations during the 1950's was low. Blacks, however, were loyal Democrats.²⁵

Blacks had little influence in city government in the early 1960's. Blacks were not included in the governing Republican coalition.²⁶ Although one Black, Joshua Rose, was appointed to the city council in 1964, his appointment was an effort to reduce black pressure against the city and he was not considered part of the dominant coalition.²⁷

Through their use of the media and use of the appointment process, Republicans maintained control of the city council throughout the 1960's, despite having a Democratic majority in the city electorate. Oakland councilmember Wilson Riles, Jr., said:

For a long time the Knowland's and the Tribune had a monopoly on the media. Councilmembers would resign in the middle of their term, the council would appoint a successor, then a new council member would run as an incumbent supported by the Tribune and the downtown business community.²⁸

Republicans were also aided by the at-large electoral system that made elections expensive, thereby favoring upper

middle-class Whites.²⁹ Having little influence on city government during the 1960's, black activists in Oakland tended to focus on gaining control of federal anti-poverty programs rather than winning elections.³⁰ Strong conflicts developed in the early 1960's between middle-class Black administrators of programs and Black community activists fighting for control.³¹

The second period of black political involvement in Oakland began roughly around 1966, with the formation of the Black Panther Party. In a city where Blacks were a sizable percentage of the population but lacked any meaningful political representation, the Panthers had "fertile ground" and faced little organized opposition in the Black community.³² The Panthers became such a force in Oakland during the 1960's and early 1970's that they lessened the importance of Democratic Party activity.³³ During the same period there was a strong anti-war movement in the neighboring city of Berkeley, led by White college students. The Panthers and the Berkeley anti-war movements became the respective national symbols of "black power" and student opposition to the Viet Nam war.

In 1972, with many of their leaders in jail, or in hiding, the Panthers announced their decision to get involved in electoral politics.³⁴ Scholar-activist Rod

Bush wrote:

The Panthers had already built a strong base of support among the black working class through their Survival programs, including free food, free shoes, legal defense, medical screening, and a busing program to visit relatives in jail.³⁵

Panther leader Elaine Brown explained that their involvement in electoral politics was "part of the revolutionary process--to build a base of operations to start talking about seizing power in Oakland, New York, Texas...."³⁶ The Panthers strongly supported the candidacy of Brooklyn congressperson Shirley Chisholm for the Democratic Party presidential nomination. Wilson Riles, Jr., recalled that, "[the Panthers] worked very hard for Shirley Chisholm's 1972 race for President, so Chisholm's campaign had an effect on Oakland because the Panthers got to test their system for voter registration."³⁷

The following year, in 1973, Panther leader Bobby Seale announced that he was running for mayor and that Elaine Brown was running for city council. The Panther announcement caught black Democratic activists off-guard. Most black Democratic party activists were supporting Otho Green for mayor. Green, a black businessman, had the support of most of the black leadership of Oakland.³⁸ Black supporters of Green met with the Panthers and attempted to persuade Seale to drop out of the race in

exchange for Green's endorsement of Elaine Brown's candidacy for city council. The Panthers, however, were not to be deterred.³⁹

Liberal White Democrats were supporting John Sutter, an environmentalist who in 1971 had become first liberal ever to win a council seat in Oakland. In 1971, the Democratic party in Oakland had organized an informal convention, open to all registered Democrats, as a way of uniting Blacks and Whites in support of a slate of Democratic candidates.⁴⁰ The convention was credited with helping to elect John Sutter to city council in 1971. Bobby Seale's entry into the mayoral race so frightened White Democrats (including several prominent liberals) that a second convention to nominate a slate of Democrats for the 1973 election was never convened.⁴¹

The Panthers initiated a voter registration drive in the low-income Black communities of East Oakland - the "Flatland." The Panthers registered more than 30,000 new voters before the elections.⁴² Wilson Riles, Jr., said:

Bobby Seale ran for mayor from totally outside of the political establishment, liberal or conservative...They [the Panthers] did the greatest voter registration ever done in the Flatland before or since. They registered people who had never been in politics, who had never thought of voting.⁴³

The results of the election stunned even the Black

Democratic activists.⁴⁴ Bobby Seale came in second place, trailing the incumbent Republican mayor, John Reading, by 31,000 votes. Surprisingly, Seale beat out Otho Green by 3859 votes and John Sutter by nearly 6000 votes.⁴⁵ Black turnout in the election, 63 percent, was spectacular by Oakland standards.

Seale's second place finish put him in a run-off with John Reading. In the run-off Seale garnered 43,749 votes to Reading's 77,634. "You had a real record turnout in the black community," said Wilson Riles, Jr., "I don't know if it has been rivaled since, but there was also a record turnout in the Hills, 90 percent or more in the Hill precincts."⁴⁶ Voters in the wealthy hills voted 10 to 1 against Seale.⁴⁷

Browning, Marshall, and Tabb wrote that Bobby Seale's candidacy postponed a successful challenge to the conservative Republican coalition:

Although in Oakland...organizations and leaders typically carried out demand-protest and electoral effort in mutually supportive ways, the unusual intensity of protest in Oakland, and in particular the extreme militancy of the Black Panther Party, did disrupt and postpone the kind of unity among blacks and supportive whites that would have been necessary for a successful challenge to the conservative dominant coalition...in 1973 this situation produced two black mayoral candidates, who split the black vote. Although their combined total was greater than 50 percent, the leading black candidate, Black Panther Bobby Seale, was unable to draw upon all of that total and lost in the runoff to the white candidate, the incumbent Mayor

Reading.⁴⁸

Most activists interviewed for this study believe, contrary to Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, that Bobby Seale's candidacy was an essential in mobilizing the black electorate for a successful challenge to the conservative Republican administration four years later. Alameda County Supervisor and senior black elected official John George said, "even for Bobby [Seale] to get where he got was a big step [for black politics in Oakland]." ⁴⁹ Oakland activist Jack Vorhees said:

When Bobby ran for mayor, he had tremendous organization, tremendous turnout, and he just scared the hell out of the city. It paved the way for [Oakland Mayor Lionel Wilson] Lionel to run and be elected.⁵⁰

It is highly unlikely that John Sutter or Otho Green could have produced the voter registration drives and mobilized the Black turnout that the Panthers generated in the 1973 mayoral race. It is myopic to say that the Panthers "split" the black vote in 1973. To a large extent the Panthers created the black vote in 1973. The significance of the Panther campaign was that it expanded the electorate. Wilson Riles, Jr., argues that the Panthers ensured that a black mayor would succeed John Reading:

It [Seale's candidacy] shook up people to the extent that the liberal white community and I think the Republican community realized that there would be a black mayor in Oakland. That they would have to deal

with the fact that blacks were a significant power force within the politics of the city. Liberal whites then looked for a black candidate.⁵¹

The Dellums "Machine"

The liberal/radical anti-war student movement developed in Berkeley at the same time that the Panthers emerged in nearby Oakland. The student activists made the transition to electoral politics earlier than did the Panthers. Bob Scheer, a radical anti-war activist and former editor of Ramparts magazine, ran for Congress in the 8th Congressional district (including Berkeley and sections of Oakland) in 1966, winning 46 percent of the vote.⁵² Scheer was supported by John George, a Black attorney for the NAACP and Panther defense lawyer, who ran for Congress in the 8th district two years after Scheer. John George received 45 percent of the vote, which was enough to convince Ron Dellums, a black anti-war activist, to run again in 1970. Dellums won the race and remains in Congress today. Former Berkeley activist Arlene Wilde explains the process that led to Dellums' election:

[Bob Scheer] ran for Congress on an anti-war campaign and we softened it up for Dellums. He [Scheer] won Berkeley, he won most of Oakland [north section], he lost in Contra Costa County. He got about 46 percent of the vote in the primary against a hawk pro-LBJ Democrat and had we won the primary, we would have been

right there...then actually John George ran the next time, and then after that Dellums ran...So the...coalition of forces-we had a thing called Community for New Politics-the city-wide coalition...[is] the same grouping of forces who are now sort of the left progressive wing of the electoral party, or electoral forces in the city [Oakland.]⁵³

Even though Dellums is Black, his roots and political base are in the anti-war movement centered in Berkeley. Dellums' district is 85 percent White. He is the only Black in Congress elected from a majority White district.⁵⁴ Dellums has a tremendous personal following that regularly returns him to office. His political organization is sometimes referred to as the "Dellums machine," but his "machine" bears no resemblance to the political machines of the East. Said Brian Guthrie:

Over the years the Ron Dellums operation has been known as the Dellums machine, and I think that it is kind that they do that, and it's good to have that reputation, but it's not a machine in the traditional sense at all. There's no patronage involved. California politics are kind of unique unto themselves. It's a misnomer to call it a machine. On the other hand, it is a volunteer-based organization that is driven by ideology in the best sense of the word, not a fanatic kind of a sense, but they believe...I mean I've seen poll data done by the Republican party on Ron Dellums and what that poll data says is that he has a majority in the district that'll march through a brick wall if he needs them. Incredible loyalty to him. And it's not honed into a real fine tuned political machine, but when the deal comes down, they're a lot of people out there that'll do a lot of work for the Dellums organization because [there is] a combination there of a strong personality [and someone] who has stood consistent on the issues.⁵⁵

Because Dellums represents a majority White district

that covers only part of Oakland, he has a limited impact on black politics in Oakland. His election in 1970 was less a reflection of black political development in Oakland than of the strength of the anti-war movement in Berkeley.

Lionel Wilson's Election

The third period in black politics in Oakland began with Lionel Wilson's candidacy for mayor in 1977. Brian Guthrie described Wilson's emergence this way:

I was involved in the first campaign for Mayor Lionel Wilson in 1977, which is really an important seminal year in the whole development of the black political structure in Oakland. Lionel Wilson was a Superior Court Judge. At that point there had been one black elected to the Oakland City Council in the history of Oakland and in fact that person was appointed, Josh Rose was his name, and was subsequently reelected...So there had never been a black elected in his or her own right to the City Council. So Lionel Wilson came along, he was a Superior Court judge, he managed to get all of the factions of the Democratic Party together, his slogan was "everybody's choice for Mayor", and it was an accurate slogan. It was a unique coming together of all the Democratic factions who agreed on a candidate. And that campaign was very successful not only in electing Wilson, but in electing other elected officials down the slate, city council members and school board members, everybody on the "Democratic slate" that year got elected, including people who were almost no chance going into that race.⁵⁶

Wilson Riles, Jr., said:

All those from moderate to radical supported Lionel Wilson in 1977. Jim Jones sent two bus-loads of people over from San Francisco. Tom Hayden brought people from all over the state. More money was raised than had ever been raised for a mayoral candidate. They probably wasted more money than some people spend in a

mayoral campaign. Wilson came in first in the primary, then faced a run-off. The Republicans gave equal amounts of money to Lionel and the Republican candidate.⁵⁷

The get-out-the-vote (gotv) effort for the campaign was run by the Panthers, who deployed more than fifty disciplined workers to the campaign.⁵⁸ At this time most of the male leadership of the party was in "exile." The Party's election efforts were run by Elaine Brown and Phyllis Jackson. Brian Guthrie said:

It [GOTV] was a very, very effective operation...The Panthers obviously had political baggage associated with them, and so their operation was very low key. They were working out of back rooms and satellite offices, but collectively the operation was incredible. This was literally an army of people in the streets that day, and elected Lionel Wilson by a relatively narrow margin. It is hard to imagine how much the world has changed in eleven years. It was a campaign that was great historical moment and you could feel it by being there at the time...you could sense that it was having an impact out there whether you were for Lionel Wilson or against him. They [the Panthers] deserve a great deal of the credit for that get-out-the-vote effort, they're the ones who went out in the street and got the bodies out and turned out the vote.⁵⁹

Although the Panthers organized a strong GOTV effort, Wilson was not an exciting candidate in the black community, nor did Wilson frighten the White community as Seale had four years earlier. Turnout in the primary was only 46 percent, and turnout in the runoff election was 52 percent. Wilson narrowly won, by 5517 votes, drawing 1000 less votes than Bobby Seale did four years earlier in losing to John

Reading.⁶⁰ In light of Wilson's narrow victory, notwithstanding White support for him, the importance of the Panthers is apparent. After Wilson's election, however, the Panthers self-destructed.^a

Since the Panthers, three types of political organizations have been active in Oakland.⁶¹ The first are the black ministers. The most active group of ministers has been the South East Oakland Clergy, led by Rev. J. Alfred Smith. Historically, ministers were the political leaders of East Oakland. Their influence has declined both because of the emergence of Black elected officials in Oakland and because of internal divisions within the clergy.⁶²

The second group is the Oakland Community Organization (OCO). OCO began in 1971 as a White-led Alinsky-type community organization based on East Oakland. Originally organizing against prostitution, for street cleaning, and other local issues, they received foundation and corporate funding. In the late 1970's they could boast more than 20 paid staff. OCO was able to recruit a mainly black and Latin low-income membership that now totals more than 2500 families in 165 communities.⁶³ For the last ten years,

^a Interviewees offered a host of reasons for the rapid demise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland including the involvement of Panther leadership in drug consumption and dealing, misappropriation of funds, and repression by the police.

their have fought the proliferation of drugs in East Oakland.⁶⁴ Black OCO director Nute Morris said that people in Oakland are just as involved in community organizing as they were when the Panthers were around. The difference is that, "most people tend to be issue-oriented and steer clear of electoral politics per se."⁶⁵ Part of the cause for the lack of greater community electoral participation in East Oakland is the conscious aversion to electoral politics maintained by OCO. Besides involvement in referendums, OCO has shunned electoral politics. The lack of electoral activism has caused some dissention in OCO, as some OCO leaders argue that OCO should "control" council seats in Oakland.⁶⁶ Thus OCO may soon move into electoral politics.

The third group consist of activists in the North Oakland/West Oakland axis. Activist Frank Ho described the activists in this area as, "more progressive White middle-class activists [who are] linked with black activists in the north Oakland area. [The alliance is] reflected in races such as [council candidate] Cassie Lopez, losing by [only] 80 votes against a more established candidate, [and by] the Oakland Progressive Political Alliance."⁶⁷ The Oakland Political Alliance (OPA) was an organization of 500 members, "primarily progressive activists" who banded together in the early 1980's in an attempt to overcome the divisions between

issue-oriented activists in the city.⁶⁸ OPA member Jack

Vorhees described OPA as:

[A] broader based political movement...which was formed in 1983 was an attempt to bring together a basis for coalition politics where people who are working actively in the problematic areas, that is people concerned with health care, health rights, people who are working in community areas as well as people who are out in a political light, like the Democratic Clubs and things like that. We formed up as a place where representatives of all these could come together in a common, to some sort of common focus to develop common focus that with a specific purpose of having political impacts. That is, we define issues and hope it was establish to work on two levels, issues levels, which would be city-wide and on district levels, so that district organizations would coincide with the councilmanic districts, and then the issues area which were city-wide. By covering that broad spectrum with representatives from various active organizations we felt that we had a common basis to come together around issues...The ultimate effect of those district organizations [was] to build precinct structures. The ultimate effect was [hopefully that] when we agreed on policy level to move in a political or issues direction or program direction that we would have the massive strength of all of those organizations to push toward a common goal. Unfortunately that hasn't happened, and in the last year it's been somewhat dormant.⁶⁹

OPA was never able to develop a central focus. The entire group was never mobilized, even for election campaigns. OPA did not hire paid staff, making it difficult to build the internal life of the organization. OPA members gradually sifted back into their separate issue areas, and the organization has suffered a slow death.⁷⁰

The three groups mentioned above: the North Oakland/West Oakland activists, OCO, and the Black

ministers, do not work together.⁷¹ At times they even work at cross purposes. Though each group has been critical of the Wilson administration, they do not speak with a unified voice.

A fourth group worth mentioning is the union "movement." Compared to New York City, union political activity is low in Oakland. One of the largest and most influential municipal unions, Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1616, is relatively new. SEIU Local 1616, for example, that represents county employees, is only 15 years old.⁷² Local 1616's first involvement in electoral politics was in 1982, during the Sandre Swanson campaign for the County Board of Supervisors.⁷³ The problems facing by SEIU Local 1616 reflect the problems faced by the unions in general. Part of Local 1616 was organized by the Panthers in the late 1970's. These workers are mainly black, live mostly in Oakland, and are predominantly non-professional. Most of Local 616's membership, however, is White, lives outside of Oakland, and a sizable portion is professional. The workers outside the city tend to be more conservative and less willing to support black candidates.⁷⁴

The Alameda County Central Labor Council also tends to be conservative, some say "racist," and does little to

encourage political activism on the part of Oakland's (mainly Black) union membership.⁷⁵ When Oakland's unions do get involved in local politics, as they did in opposition to city cutbacks in reaction to Proposition 13, they tend to focus narrowly on protecting the jobs of their members, without linking-up with broader community opposition to the cutbacks.⁷⁶ Because of political narrowness, internal political division, and to some extent their youth, union field representative Paula Forbes summed up what many activists repeated, "unions have not become the force in Oakland politics that they could be and should be."⁷⁷

Wilson As Mayor

Wilson's election to mayor swept two new city councilmembers into office.⁷⁸ The two remaining conservatives on the city council quickly realized that the nature of politics had changed in Oakland and rapidly moved to support the mayor.⁷⁹ As noted earlier, even the Republican party had contributed to Wilson's election campaign.

The key issue during Wilson's campaign had been job creation. As Mayor he immediately moved to develop the office of Economic Development and Employment.⁸⁰ A key

component of Wilson's plan was the re-development of downtown Oakland. Wilson believed that Oakland needed a new image in order to be attractive to the business community. To accomplish this goal, he established close working relationships with the downtown business community.

Councilmember Riles said:

At this same time Lionel was opening up and reaching out to that Republican White conservative community, to the downtown business community, [and] beginning to work with them very closely. So [they advocated] their concepts about how economic development was going to take place, which convinced him.⁸¹

Wilson believed that his twenty year history in the civil rights movement, and his former directorship of many of Oakland's anti-poverty programs, he would have the credibility to work with the downtown business community without sparking community protest. Community activist and urban planner Vinnie Rouse remarked:

I think that he [Wilson] feels that because he represents something other than the business community that he has the credibility to bring [business investment] about. [And] that a White business person in particular wouldn't be able to do that, wouldn't be able to somehow hold the community together.⁸²

Wilson was aided in his task by the election of Democrat Jimmy Carter to the White House in 1976. Carter released Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) funds and other funds that helped the City redevelop its downtown business center.⁸³ Wilson's election seemed to signify an

upward turn in Oakland's economic development.

The 1979 city council elections marked the beginning of a split between Wilson and White progressives that is often expressed, somewhat misleadingly, as the "Dellums versus Wilson" split. Wilson's "cozying up" to the Republican business community and his reappointment of Republicans to important boards and commissions had already begun to arouse dissatisfaction in Oakland's White progressive community.⁸⁴

One of the two new city councilmembers was Mary Moore, a white liberal independent-minded housewife. Moore joined on the council with John Sutter, a liberal incumbent, who had earlier run against Wilson for mayor. In 1979 Wilson Riles, Jr., and Marie Converse, a liberal white candidate, ran for city council. Wilson Riles, Jr., was considered a shoe-in because he carried the name of his father, the popular Black former State Superintendent of Schools. Converse was running against Marge Gibson, a former Republican who had recently switched party affiliation to Democrat (but who still campaigned on behalf of Republican candidates in other races), and was considered a conservative.⁸⁵

Wilson feared that if both Riles and Converse won,

they would - along with Sutter and Moore - form a liberal bloc that would hinder his ability to carry out his downtown business-oriented programs. Wilson decided to sit out the race, although Converse was supported by Dellums, County Supervisor John George (whose district mirrors Dellum's) and Riles, Jr.. The conflict was exacerbated when a liberal assemblyman declared that if Marie Converse was elected the liberals would take the council away from the mayor.⁸⁶ Gibson won the race, and became a steady supporter of the Mayor. She has been a target of White and Black progressive activists ever since.

Most political activists offer a mixed review of Wilson's record. His appointments won both criticism and applause among elected officials and activists. Two long-time Oakland community activists cited reform of the police department as the major achievement of having an Black mayor.⁸⁷ Wilson spoke out against instances of police brutality, but he retained the same police chief who had embittered many Blacks during the Panther era.⁸⁸ When the former city manager resigned, Wilson appointed a Black to fill his place, the first to hold the position. The appointment of Black officials, has also been accompanied by charges of corruption and nepotism.⁸⁹

Wilson continues to gain respect for his status as the

first black mayor of Oakland. He has appointed Blacks to top positions for the first time. Since Oakland's council elections were changed from an at-large to a district election system in 1981, Wilson has presided over a majority Black city council.^a In many ways, Wilson (who was 75 years old in 1988) is an elder statesman who symbolized the change from White domination and exclusion of Blacks from city government to black inclusion. A Black Republican active in city politics said:

Lionel was our first black mayor, that in itself in an accomplishment. I think that [since] he's been in ten years, that's saying something. I think that a lot of people would not be in the position they're in unless they had Lionel, including me, I was appointed to the court.⁹⁰

Wilson also receives credit for the "downtown renaissance" in Oakland. Cynthia Abernathy, repeated Wilson's defense of his administration, "If you don't bring people downtown and utilize that tax money and get jobs open, you can't help your community. Lionel understands that and has brought that about."⁹¹

Others are much more critical of Wilson's administration. One of the leaders of a Black women's group active in Oakland politics said, "most people feel [that] the same people who were running the city are still running

^a After the 1983 council elections, five (up from three) of the nine city council members were African American.

it...You know, it looks nice to see all these pretty buildings down here, but if you go into the [flatland] neighborhoods you can really see the deterioration."⁹² A Black community organizer with ten years experience organizing in East Oakland said:

Conditions have continued to deteriorate, particularly in the neighborhoods. There is a lot of unemployment, the quality of education is bad, housing -there's a lot of homeless. I think people have seen that a Black mayor is not necessarily a panacea.⁹³

Riles supporter James Vorhees said:

What we care about is anybody who comes into develop in this City who can't contribute to the overall welfare of the people - who are suffering in the City. So we want them to make contributions to funds to build low-income housing. We want them to support affirmative-action employment. We [want to] have them to have a "hire-us-on-first" policy and things like that."⁹⁴

Asked to assess the mayor's record, activist Vinnie Rouse said:

I think the city sells itself too cheap. I think it's redevelopment issues repeatedly are not analyzed for the impact they're going to have on the on the city [overall,] but for the impact they're going to have on direct investment, and an awful lot of public redevelopment money goes into bad projects for a lot of developers make promises that the council led by the mayor doesn't hold them to. In recent years it hasn't been that the development agreements have been bad, it's been that once made the agreement can be easily broken. Affordable housing in downtown, a cultural center paid for by the developer, all of these things, they're all in the development agreements negotiated by the mayor...Down the line the development agreements aren't enforced, and it's creating a lot of resentment. I mean, people are more, not so much actively angry at the mayor as they are this sort of impatient that he represents an era and now maybe there's another era

that needs to get taken over.⁹⁵

Despite criticism, particularly from the Riles-George-Dellums camp, Wilson has not been seriously challenged during elections. Wilson Riles, Jr., ran an unsuccessful campaign to unseat him in 1985, but Mayor Wilson has been able to raise large sums of money from his business supporters to mount high-visibility campaigns using extensive advertisements and direct mail.⁹⁶ While Wilson is considered a lackluster personality, his ability to raise money helps him to support council incumbents (such as Aleta Cannon and Marge Gibson) who consistently vote with him.⁹⁷

While Wilson has been relatively invulnerable in elections, so has his principle opposition. Dellums, Riles, and John George have large followings in their own districts and they have been unbeatable during reelection campaigns. Although Riles, George, and especially Dellums can rally volunteers to work the streets for them during re-elections, their appeal is personal. They cannot put "troops" at the disposal of other candidates to, seize a majority of the Oakland City Council. As a result, the Wilson-versus-Dellums split has been a stable and long-standing. Both sides have factions of White support, Wilson from the conservative Hill area and Dellums, et al, from the more

liberal Berkeley border area. Both sides compete for black support.^a

Mayor Wilson is heading toward probable retirement in 1989. The Dellums faction has thus begun making overtures to the Wilson camp, hoping to avoid a Black community split over choosing a successor. Riles has already stated his desire to run again for mayor. Understandably, a Dellums aide interviewed for this study minimized the split between Dellums and Wilson. When asked if there continues to be a Dellums versus Riles split, a top aide to Dellums said:

Without a doubt Lionel has shown more conservatism than Ron Dellums, but maybe he has to be more fiscally conservative because of the constituency that he serves and the resources that he has to go to [the business community] in order to get those things done. And we're real sensitive to that and realize that.⁹⁸

When asked if the split among black political factions in Oakland could be overcome, Wilson Riles, Jr. also tended to minimize the differences between himself and Lionel Wilson:

^a Political support does not strictly follow geographic lines in Oakland. Dellums has received significant financial support among wealthy White peace activists and Jewish supporters of Israel (Dellums has been a strong supporter of Israel) who live in the Hills. Mayor Wilson receives support in the heart of Dellums district, in which the city council representative is Marge Gibson, a Wilson supporter. See Dolly Lyndyn, interview by author, (date), Oakland, tape recording.

It's theoretically possibly to do it if Lionel is clear enough about not wanting to run again. That would be historically significant in terms of black political activism in this area. If we can bring those two forces together I think we can really have some power. It's not policy, it's personality around here. I think that basically Lionel's goals are the same, there are definitely differences in style and tactics."⁹⁹

County Supervisor John George, however, while advocating reconciliation between the two factions, disagreed with Riles's characterization of differences between the two factions as mainly differences of "personality." George said, "a black [Lionel Wilson] carried out a Republican program, that's why you saw Riles running [in 1985.] It's not just [that] Riles looks better."¹⁰⁰

John George also made a critical insight into the changing nature of Black politics in Oakland. He said that the proliferation of drugs and crime in the black community has obliterated the former distinction between the two political factions and has created an entirely new - more class than racially oriented - dynamic to black politics. George said that, "there's a whole new dynamic, when you go around now and say you want to be a black politician [people say] 'I don't care if you are black, I want a White or anybody who can kick these [drug dealers] peoples asses.' That's a whole different agenda."¹⁰¹ Riles alluded to the same attitude in the Black community when he lamented,

"[the] black community wants more police and they don't care about civil rights being violated."¹⁰²

Similarly, the former leader of OCO's anti-crime committee and past president of OCO, Frank Gilbert, strongly criticized Mayor Wilson, Ron Dellums, and Wilson Riles, Jr., for collectively ignoring the drug epidemic in East Oakland.¹⁰³ Black community activist and OCO director Nute Morris said:

He [Riles] hasn't dealt with the drug issue. No one locally has really tried to tackle the drug issue and come out with something creative...if kids are into [selling] drugs for money, or to support their families, then the city ought to do something to match that, as best the city can. Maybe we can't come up with the same type of money, but something better than minimum wage: jobs for every youth who wants it, and maybe pushing a different value system, along with good opportunities and good jobs. It seems that [such a program] would be key, but none of our elected officials are pushing anything like that...they feel that they are not going to be challenged, and if they are challenged they have enough resources to get re-elected.¹⁰⁴

Molly Krane, a newly elected Black official said:

People in the flatlands are angry because they drive by shootings, or the drugs and the crime is right there in front of their houses. They are angry about that. They want something done about it. They have [an] educational system which is...more inferior than people's in the hills. They're probably angry about that. I just think people want more pro-active government and people in the flats would like more activist government, which is why this kind of big activist movement came in and brought Lionel. And he was the perfect person for that time and I don't know exactly what will come next, but it will be

different....I don't see it in anybody that said they're going to do it [run for mayor.] It's got to be higher energy, its got to be really high energy.¹⁰⁵

Many Oakland activists and elected official said that Oakland was ripe for a political movement centered in Oakland poor neighborhoods and focused on the related problems of drugs, education, and crime. No one believed that Oakland's politicians were focusing enough on these problems.

Conclusion

With weak political parties, decentralized government, and balkanized delivery of services, Oakland is on the opposite end of the political spectrum from New York City. A mayor with more charisma or ideological fervor than Lionel Wilson might be able to spark greater interest in Oakland mayoral elections or Oakland government in general. Without a charismatic leader, the weak, part-time mayor's office does not have the power or command over city services and budget to make the mayor a center of controversy, or make mayoral races significant enough to focus public attention. The weak mayoral system and diffusion of governmental services also diffuses community organizations and opposition groups in different directions. Low

participation in electoral politics at the local level is a result. The level of political activity in Oakland does not appear to be less than that of New York, it may even be higher, but it is diffused and often non-electoral. Protest activity also tends to take a non-electoral "movement" form.

Because of the weakness of the political parties, the Panthers were easily able to enter the electoral arena in 1972. The fear that the Panthers aroused among White Democrats and middle-class black Democrats paved the way for Lionel Wilson's candidacy in 1977. The specter of Bobby Seale running the city of Oakland created a popular demand among Oakland's middle-class Democrats for a moderate black candidate.

Wilson began his term with an emphasis on job creation, a popular message in the black community. Job creation, however, soon came to mean alliance with traditional downtown development and business interests. Wilson became conservative on local policy issues, but remained a liberal on national and international issues. Despite his local conservatism, Wilson benefits from his symbolic status as the city's first black mayor. There have also been no strong protest movements in Oakland since the Panthers and weak challenges to him electorally. More

important, the absence of strong party or union organizations has led to little organized opposition to Wilson since his move to the political right. However, growing dissatisfaction with related problems of drug-dealing, violence, education, and housing may inspire others to follow the Panther's example of community organizing.

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Chapter 4

The Jackson Campaigns in Oakland

The 1984 Jackson campaign generated great excitement in Oakland's black community. Oakland activist Arlene Wilde said:

[The Jackson campaign] in '84 was the first time in my life I've seen people - thousands and thousands of people - wanting to work on such a thing, wanting to be that [precinct] captain and be proud of it....You've talking about people who were never political before, never, and [there were] tremendous numbers of blacks - community people, you know, young, old. And they were just dying to be plugged on to this campaign.¹

Despite ample excitement, the 1984 Oakland campaign was poorly organized. Oakland activist Jack Vorhees, who worked as a volunteer on the Jackson campaign in 1984, described it as "an ad hoc kind of campaign...it was really based on enthusiasm, we turned out [because we were] fired up by his message and having a real person challenge the establishment."²

There was no paid staff for the Jackson campaign in Oakland in 1984.³ The head of the campaign was City Councilmember Wilson Riles, Jr.. Mayor Wilson opposed Jackson in favor of Mondale. Several splits occurred during the campaign. One developed between black ministers in San Francisco, led by the powerful Rev. Milton Galamison, and

Riles. The split centered on who represented the Jackson campaign: religious leaders or politicians. The ministers viewed Jackson as "their candidate."⁴

Another split developed between Riles and black ministers in East Oakland. Oakland activist Dolly Lyndyn said, "there was some ugly stuff with money and Riles got pushed out [of East Oakland.]" East Oakland ministers wanted the Jackson campaign headquarters to be located in East Oakland, Riles wanted the headquarters located in a more central location in downtown Oakland. The split also had racial overtones. East Oakland is in the heart of the black community, and part of the reason for locating the office outside of East Oakland was to attract white activists to the campaign. These differences were temporarily muted by dividing the campaign organization according to congressional district. East Oakland was then able to have its own office for the 9th Congressional District. Riles set up another office in the adjacent 8th Congressional District. Nevertheless, the minister who allowed his church to be used as the office for the Jackson campaign's voter registration effort in East Oakland closed the office. White Jackson supporters from North Oakland showed up at the church only to discover that the doors were locked and the office closed.⁵

Riles and the ministers had additional disputes over control

of money that was raised by the campaign, and even arguments over seating arrangements at Jackson events. The ministers eventually severed themselves off from the overall campaign and formed their own campaign faction.⁶

Another split developed among Jackson supporters in the 8th Congressional District. The 8th district covers both Oakland and Berkeley, and the split concerned whether the campaign office should be located in Oakland or Berkeley. Many Oakland activists believed that locating the office in Oakland would help them to organize volunteers and channel momentum for Wilson Riles's mayoral candidacy the following year. Berkeley activists argued that there would be more resources available, including free office space, if the campaign office was located in Berkeley. Wilson Riles, who was at this point the leader of the Jackson campaign in the 8th district, decided to locate the campaign office in Berkeley.⁷

Because of these splits, fundraising was not coordinated. None of the activists interviewed had any idea how much money was raised in Oakland for the 1984 Jackson campaign. When asked how much money was raised by the Oakland Jackson campaign in 1984, Rainbow organizer Vorhees said, "No, I don't, and I don't know where that figure will come from."⁸ Compared to New York, the campaign

organization for Jackson in 1984 was almost non-existent.

Impact of the 1984 Jackson Campaign on Voter Registration

According to several activists, the 1984 Jackson campaign helped to increase black voter registration.

Dellums' aide Ken Coppel said:

We did have a massive voter registration drive. It was fueled, in addition to Jesse running, by having monies available - as an additional incentive for people to get out and do voter registration. In the primary when Jesse ran we increased voter registration in the 8th Congressional District by about 11,000 people. In the general we increased it by 19,000 - an additional amount of people.⁹

The Democratic Party didn't release money for voter registration until, "the day after the close of voter registration" for the Democratic primary."¹⁰ Much of the money that was used for voter registration prior to the Democratic primary came from Dellums's political organization. After the close of voter registration for the primary, the Democratic party channeled money into Oakland. The money was used to register voters for the general election. Workers were paid one dollar per name to register voters in targeted areas. Ken Coppel explained:

Those new registrants came from targeted areas. People were not paid to register mainly in the...white areas or questionable areas, but you would pay monies for registering in black areas and the Flatland areas.¹¹

Voter registration was done with on flatbed trucks, using loud-speakers, and in caravans. Many of the people working on voter registration had never before been involved in politics.¹²

The large numbers of people who registered to vote was encouraged for Oakland activists who for years had attempted to increase voter participation through the Oakland Progressive alliance (OPA). Former OPA member Jack Vorhees said:

A number of people who came out to register to vote had previously not been involved in the process. The number of people who could immediately relate their dissatisfactions ...to the way [Jackson] articulated the issues [made it] appear to me that we [Oakland progressive activists] finally had, at least for the first time in years of attempts, the possibility of [building] an organization with mass appeal... which could become a mass movement with more possibility for political success.¹³

Analysis of voter registration figures shows a sharp increase among blacks beginning in the winter of 1983 and lasting through the 1984 general election (see Figure 1). The vertical axis on Figure 1 represents the percentage of the voting-age population which is registered, the horizontal axis represents the date. Between October 1983 and April 1984, registration in predominantly black census tracts went up seven points, from around 23 percent of the voting age population to nearly 30 percent. The graph also shows that white registration went up just as much as did black voter registration, from 24 percent of voting age

population to 32 percent. This may be the result of general anti-Reagan voter registration efforts funded by unions, foundations, and others. There was no net gain in the percentage of blacks registered.




Figure 1

Source: Registration data was provided by the Alameda County Registrar's Office. Demographic data is taken from the 1980 U.S. Census STF4(a) computer tape.

Table I

Democratic Registration By Race (%)

	White	Black	Asian	Latino
1982	27 (8)	56 (8)	7 (14)	10 (7)
1983	28 (8)	56 (9)	6 (15)	10 (7)
1984	30 (8)	53 (7)	7 (13)	10 (6)
1986	29 (7)	55 (7)	7 (13)	9 (6)
1988	29 (7)	55 (7)	7 (12)	9 (6)

Source: Registration data was provided by the Alameda County Registrar's Office. Demographic data is taken from the U.S. 1980 Census STF4(a) computer tape. Numbers in brackets are standard errors.

White registration increased to a higher rate than black registration. Without the voter registration efforts associated with the Jackson campaign, however, it is unlikely that black voter registration would have increased as much as it did. The Jackson campaign apparently helped to prevent a large disparity between black and white voter registration from emerging (see Table XI). Despite increases in black voter registration, blacks declined as a proportion of registered Democrats in Oakland.

It must be recalled, however, that it took money and assistance from the Dellums political organization as well as the labor-intensive volunteer effort of groups like OPA to actually increase black voter registration. As in New York, the Jackson campaign encouraged black registrants to sign up when the cards were put in front of them, but it did not provide the people to seek such signatures. The most crucial determinant in voter registration was local follow-up and organization.

Impact of 1984 Jackson Campaign on Black Voter Turnout

Black voter turnout for the 1984 primary was very low. The disarray of Jackson's 1984 campaign provided no strong organizational pull on the vote. In Oakland, unlike New York, black turnout was low in areas lacking organization.

Jackson's charisma alone was not enough to pull out the black vote.

Figure 2 shows that black voter turn-out for the 1984 Democratic primary was only 35 percent. Only 4 of 30 predominately tracts turned out at a higher than 48 percent rate, while 18 tracts turned-out in the 18-48 percent range, and was less than 18 percent in 8 tracts. In fact, 8 of the 12 tracts in Oakland that had a turnout rate of less than 18 percent in the 1984 Democratic primary were greater than 60 percent black.

The Tribune, apparently based on selective sampling, estimated black turnout in Oakland to be less than 55 percent in low-income neighborhoods such as Brookfield Village in East Oakland, and close to 64 percent in Berkeley. However, the mean turnout of predominantly black census tracts indicates that black turnout was well below 55 percent. Regression estimates put black turnout at 30 percent and white turnout at 57 percent.

Source: Registration data was provided by the Alameda County Registrar's Office. Demographic data is taken from the 1980 U.S. Census STF4(a) computer tape.




Figure 2

This coincides with the mean turnout figures in highly black and highly white census tracts.

The 1984 California primary had the lowest state-wide turnout in 40 years, with only 48 percent of voters going to the polls.¹⁴ Jackson won 80 percent of the black vote across California.¹⁵ He won a similar percentage of the black vote in Oakland (see Table XII). The Tribune reported, however, that the low black turnout "clouded Jackson's impact on the election. Jackson's candidacy has rested on the assertion that he could spur record participation among poor voters who have historically lagged far behind in turnout. But the low turnouts Tuesday carried over into predominantly black Eastbay [Oakland] precincts."¹⁶ By carrying 78 percent of the black vote, 30 percent of the white vote, 71 percent of the Latin and 64 percent of the Asian vote, Jackson was able to win Oakland (see Table XI), but a higher black turnout would have made it a more convincing victory.

Clay Carson, a specialist in black history and politics at Stanford University, suggested that the low turnout in Oakland, compared to New York and Chicago, resulted from diffuseness of the Jackson campaign in California, the relative lack of a tradition of political activism in California's black communities, and because

black voters in New York City and Chicago used the Jackson campaign to send signals to local politicians such as Mayor Koch and Chicago Councilmember Ed Vrdolyak. By contrast, according to Carson, most blacks in California live in cities with black mayors. "There was less a sense of sending a message here," said Carson.¹⁷

The historical activism of the Black Panthers in Oakland appears contrary to Carson's assertion that California's blacks lack an activist tradition. Also, the diffusion that Carson says characterized the Jackson campaign in California was also apparent in New York, if to a lesser degree. There was high black turnout even in areas of New York City where the Jackson campaign was barely existent.(see Chapter II). The major difference between Oakland and New York appears to be Carson's third point: the relative lack of racial polarization in Oakland politics at the present time. Mayor Wilson, like Congressman Charles Rangel in New York, opposed Jackson's candidacy in 1984. Because of Wilson's support for Mondale, he was regularly booed off the platform at his own campaign appearances in Oakland.¹⁸ Neither of them, however, attacked Jackson personally, as did New York's Mayor Koch. Wilson also could not be associated with the historical exclusion of blacks from higher political office and appointments, as was Mayor Koch. Lacking resources and without provincial racial

conflicts linking the campaign with local protests, the Jackson campaign was unable to stimulate large black voter turnout in Oakland.

Did the 1984 Jackson Campaign Inspire Blacks to Run ?

In June of 1983, after several well-attended meetings with "interested, eager, liberal and progressive activists," Wilson Riles, Jr., decided to run for mayor and began to build a campaign organization.¹⁹ His campaign started before the Jackson campaign and cannot be said to have been inspired by Jackson. Nonetheless Riles played a leading role in the Jackson campaign, and because the Mayor opposed Jackson, many perceived Riles as the most likely beneficiary of Jackson's success in Oakland.^a The week after the presidential primary, Riles said, "I think there will be a significant effect from the Jackson campaign on the mayoral race...We got 7,000 more people registered, most are young Blacks. I think they'd be more receptive to a message that challenges the corporate elite's control of the city."²⁰

Riles set up an advisory committee early in his campaign. The initial committee was fairly broad, including

^a Wilson Riles, Jr. enjoyed high name recognition as the son of long-time California State Schools Superintendent Wilson Riles, Sr..

representatives of community organizations, the Dellums office, small businesses, the women's movement, as well as progressive activists and community organizations.²¹ From the beginning there were two opposing views on campaign strategy. One favored a hard-hitting campaign on the issues, a "peoples" campaign that would focus on grassroots organizing. The second advocated a more traditional campaign focusing on fundraising, high media visibility, and a middle-class base.²² Riles refused to take a position on the strategy and direction of his campaign. As a result of Riles' indecision, the more moderate and politically mainstream members of his advisory committee began to leave early in the campaign. They argued that Riles was beginning his campaign organization too early, and that his initial emphasis should be on fundraising and acquiring endorsements.²³ They strongly contested the idea of creating a city-wide organization to build a grassroots campaign.

Most of the young professional blacks on the committee, moderate and left-leaning, also quit the campaign by the summer of 1984. They left because Riles refused to make a commitment to a hard-hitting grassroots campaign effort and wanted Riles to take more leadership on issues important to low-income black communities in East and West Oakland.²⁴ One black elected official said, "Wilson

Riles's campaign...was not one that I felt comfortable with because...I didn't see [people] understanding basic issues that affect and concern black people in the city."²⁵

Oakland activist Anne Weills wrote:

The fact that Riles could never choose [a] strategy makes it difficult to project a real alternative to Lionel Wilson. Nor can Riles really inspire deep grassroots support without the clear image and substance of being an aggressive advocate for their interests. Part of the problem is that Riles was basically raised in a white liberal environment. Riles was born in Arizona, where his father was a school administrator and teacher. Wilson Riles, Sr., a former [California] State Superintendent of Schools, then moved his family to L.A. and eventually to Sacramento. Riles, Jr., ended up a student body president at his Sacramento high school and then went to Stanford. In both contexts, blacks were very much in the minority. As a result, Riles, Jr., is a well educated middle-class man who is more comfortable with black and white yuppies than he is with poor and working class people in Oakland. Unlike Jesse Jackson, who grew up poor in the racist rural south, Riles doesn't communicate in a way that inspires working class or poor people to follow or identify with him.²⁶

Because of Riles's indecision, his campaign was reduced to a hard core of loyal supporters. Riles often missed major opportunities to distinguish himself on the issues. For example, in early summer of 1984 hundreds of "irate" trade unionists packed the Oakland City Council to demand that the police stop acting as strike-breakers at two strike sites in Oakland. It was a great opportunity for Riles to curry favor with labor, a potentially significant force in the following year's election. Riles, however, missed the meeting! Mayor Wilson responded to the strikers

and won some needed support from labor. The Alameda County Central Labor Council later decided to split their endorsement between Riles and Wilson.²⁷

Riles did not link his campaign with Jackson's Riles could not evoke the same kinds of emotional response from the black community as could Jackson, but few politicians can. Molly Krane, an elected official in Oakland, said:

Jesse's gains were that we got people registered to vote and they figured out how to get to the ballot box and they cast a vote for Jesse Jackson. But then he doesn't become president so there's a lot of frustration around that then somebody has to come behind at the local level that can say there's a reason to do this [vote] at the local level. And it's going to require charisma...because your not going to be able to deliver that much stuff with shrinking dollars. Your going to have to be creative and figure out how to bring people in and do the kind of peer stuff that people might be able to do around drugs. But be bold and daring and go out and actually talk to people and make them feel good about you and hope that they believe you. I don't think that people in East Oakland believe anything that any politicians say - with the exception of Jesse Jackson.²⁸

Jackson attracted much more enthusiasm in Oakland communities than did Riles' campaign. As the Jackson campaign developed, it became harder and harder to get volunteers to work through the Riles campaign.²⁹ With better organization, the Jackson campaign could have boosted the Riles campaign. When the Riles campaign to afford a campaign office, Riles' supporters hoped that he would use the Jackson campaign office to give him visibility during

the Jackson campaign. After the Jackson campaign Riles could inherit the office.

Riles, however, without consulting his own campaign coordinator or advisors, decided to locate the Jackson headquarters outside of Oakland in Berkeley. This decision physically divided the two campaigns, to his own detriment. Riles's time became so divided between the two campaigns that he became less visible in his own campaign, demoralizing his supporters.³⁰ Neither the Jackson nor the Riles campaign was able to build a precinct structure in Oakland, and Riles accumulated little organization or momentum from the Jackson campaign.

Going from bad to worse, Riles made judgments that caused many Oakland liberals to question his principles. Riles attended several "Religious Freedom" rallies of Reverend Moon's Unification Church. At one such rally he declared that Oakland is "a Christian city."³¹ Riles continued to attend the "Religious Freedom" rallies even when warned that it would cost him liberal support.

By the end of the Jackson campaign, Riles' campaign was in trouble. He managed to raise only \$4360 in cash and \$12,100 in in-kind contributions between July and December of 1984. Wilson raised \$100,000 in that same period, mostly

from corporate contributions, and increased his campaign chest to \$211,000.³² Six weeks before the April 1985 election, ten of Riles's closest supporters came together and hired professional campaign consultants, for "an incredible amount of money," to rescue the Riles campaign.³³

Congressman Ron Dellums took the position that Riles should wait until 1989 to run against Wilson. Dellums was worried that if he supported Riles against Wilson, Wilson would find a more moderate black candidate to run against him in 1986.³⁴ Dellums made clear that he would support Riles only if Riles developed a well-financed, and high-powered campaign. When Riles failed to develop such a campaign, Dellums backed away from him.

Dellums aide Ken Coppel said that Riles had been a consistent Dellums supporter, and that Dellums wanted to see Riles rise in Oakland politics. Riles, however, had not been able to keep his workers and financial backers enthusiastically behind his campaign. Dellums wanted to avoid a split in the black community:

His [Riles] campaign was one that was going up against [a] split in the black community on the support for Lionel Wilson. And I think that was borne out by the vote in the black community for Lionel Wilson. So that was one thing that was taken into consideration. And at this point in time the last thing that we need is to continue to split the black community. I mean we have enough splits without creating additional splits. So

that was one thing that had to be considered - how do we least split up the black community.³⁵

Jesse Jackson's refusal to endorse his candidacy was the final blow to Riles. When asked why Jackson did not endorse him in 1985, Riles alluded to the fact that Mayor Wilson organized fundraisers for Jackson after the 1984 campaign to help retire Jackson's campaign debt. Riles stated:

In 84 Jesse Jackson did not endorse me. I don't know what he will do this time [in 1989]. I don't know if I should even ask him [for an endorsement]. After the 1984 elections Lionel [Wilson] raised money for him, and I think that's one of the reasons he didn't endorse me.³⁶

Lionel Wilson reacted to Riles' threatened candidacy by quickly neutralizing Jackson's influence. From the standpoint of gaining broader support for his 1988 campaign Jackson's decision to stay out of the Oakland mayoral race was shrewd. Riles's campaign pushed Mayor Wilson to raise money for Jackson, and Jackson had to do nothing in return.

Jackson's personal involvement in the Oakland mayoral race could have made a difference for Riles' campaign. Given Riles' poor campaign organization, indecisiveness, and failure to win the support of Ron Dellums, salvaging Riles's campaign would have required a strong commitment from

Jackson. Jackson's strategy, however, was focused on building consensus in the black community -and maximizing votes - not on evoking local change.

Riles attributed his failure to Mayor Wilson's popular status as the first black mayor of Oakland. Riles believes that black voters in Oakland have not gone beyond racial identification as the primary issue in elections. Riles was therefore hesitant to forcefully attack a fellow black leader during the mayoral campaign. Riles' hesitancy to attack Wilson made him appear to be a weak, indecisive, and dull candidate. Riles states:

There are a lot of things he [Wilson] couldn't have got away with if he was a white mayor. A lot of people in the black community haven't gotten quite down to figuring out what are the issues or points that they want to focus on to move. For them voting was to put a black into office and they thought all the rest of the stuff would follow from that. When I ran for mayor, in 1985, the turnout was atrocious, particularly in the Flatlands, we're talking about something like 23 percent turnout or less. I think that was because people saw Lionel as a hero, he was the first black mayor of Oakland. And they were a little bothered by the fact that another black would challenge the first black mayor of Oakland. They thought I ought to wait till he got out of office to do anything, and I was kind of tentative about it myself. I didn't go out and attack as much as a lot of people wanted me to...that you've got to paint this guy as a devil and enliven people enough to go out and do something. I didn't do that. I said what he was doing wrong and went step by step down the list of things he was doing wrong. But that wasn't motivating anybody.³⁷

Analysis of the 1985 election data confirms Riles' view that he was unable to motivate black voters against

Wilson. Table XIII tracks voter transitions from the 1984 presidential primary to the 1985 mayoral election.

Table II

<u>Jackson/Riles Voter Transition</u>				
	JJ84	VAC84	DNV84	NReg
Riles	15	13	5	5
VAC	26	11	5	6
DNV	59	62	91	89
Source: Registration and voting preferences are derived from data provided by the Alameda County Registrar's office.				

The variables used in Table XI (below) are as follows:

JJ84 - the 1984 Jackson presidential primary vote

VAC84 - Mondale, Hart, Glenn, McGovern, Larouche vote
in 1984

DNV84 - registered voters who did not vote in 1984

NReg - voters registered since the 1984 presidential
primary

Riles - the 1985 Riles vote in the mayoral primary

VAC - vote for candidates other than Riles (mostly
Mayor Wilson) in mayoral primary

DNV - registered Democrats who did not vote in the
mayoral primary

Table XI shows that close to 60 percent of the voters who voted for Jackson in the 1984 presidential primary did not vote in the 1985 Democratic mayoral primary. The same can be said of the turnout of voters who voted for other candidates in the 1984 primary. Turnout was exceptionally low across the city, especially considering that the 1984 primary turnout was already comparatively low.

The 1985 mayoral primary race clearly did not attract Democratic voters in Oakland, including Jackson supporters. There was no carry-over from Jackson to Riles. In fact, Mayor Wilson appears to have beaten Riles most decisively among Jackson supporters, a majority of whom were black.^a A breakdown of the 1985 mayoral primary by race and ethnicity (see Table XII) estimates that Wilson won 55 percent of the black vote and 69 percent of the white vote. While estimates of overall white turnout in the election varies widely, between 40 and 60 percent depending on the method of analysis used, black turnout appears to have been no higher than 25 percent. In short, Riles failed to mobilize support in the black community.

^a An ethnic breakdown of Jackson voters shows an estimated 51 percent were black, 20 percent were white, 20 percent were Asian, and 9 percent were Hispanic. These percentages are based on the turnout and candidate preference percentages calculated by the author.

1987 Council Elections

In the 1987 Oakland city council elections four progressive candidates ran for office. None of these campaigns grew out of the Jackson campaign. Ignacio de la Fuente, Wilson Riles, Jr., Cassie Lopez, and Chappell Hayes ran, but only Riles won. Ignacio de la Fuente is the Latino leader of the Molder's union. His decision to run had little to do with the Jackson campaign.³⁸ Lopez, a black junior high school teacher, ran for the same council seat she contested four years earlier.³⁹ Chappell Hayes had a long history of involvement in radical black politics, and said that his decision to run for office was made independently of the Jackson campaign.⁴⁰ Riles had little opposition and was easily re-elected.

Table III

<u>Voter Preferences By Race (%)</u>				
	White	Black	Latino	Asian
Jackson `84	30 (21)	78 (13)	71 (11)	64 (21)
*Wilson `85	69 (8)	55 (8)	31 (7)	46 (13)
*Riles `85	24 (8)	41 (8)	52 (7)	39 (13)
Jackson `88	38 (9)	97 (9)	84 (7)	72 (14)

Source: Voter preferences are derived from election results provided by the Alameda County Registrar's Office. Demographic breakdowns are derived from U.S. 1980 Census STF4(a) computer tapes. Numbers in brackets are standard errors.

Lopez lost to an incumbent white conservative councilperson, Marge Gibson, by a scant 127 votes.⁴¹

Lopez' candidacy was:

It was the closest thing we had in a long time to really affirming grassroots politics, and a part of that is Cassie as a candidate. She is an incredibly class conscious woman, comes from Detroit, I don't know if that has [anything] to do with it. Her support in the black community is overwhelming. She is so unlike a candidate, she's real and she's honest and she's hardworking and she talks real straight...The fact that she came as close as she did in such a diverse district was tremendous and phenomenal....⁴²

The Lopez campaign was a low-budget operation that relied on support from unions, progressive groups, and community volunteers. She was endorsed by Congressman Dellums, but Lopez got only luke-warm support from middle-class black organizations, many of which were put off by her gruff manner. Lopez also intimidated many middle-class whites. Oakland activist Nute Morris, who worked on Lopez's campaign, said, "had there been another black female other than Cassie, Marge [Gibson] wouldn't be there...white people in the Hills felt threatened by Cassie's appearance."⁴³

Cassie Lopez and Chappell Hayes represent a newly emerging type of progressive black politics in Oakland, one with a more working-class issue orientation. Like Cassie Lopez, Chappell Hayes's campaign had a sharp class edge to it. Chappell Hayes was not a typical candidate. He was heavily involved in the militant black nationalist movement

in the 1960's and had served time in prison. Despite being a doctoral candidate in wood science and technology at the University of California at Berkeley and the program director for an award winning program that teaches entrepreneurial skills to young people, Hayes lives in one of the poorest areas in Oakland.⁴⁴ In announcing his candidacy, Hayes said:

Unfortunately our representative has allowed conditions of economic deprivation to prevail, resulting in extremely high incidence of murder, drug trafficking, prostitution, joblessness, and homelessness...Our current leadership offers us only concern about our image, and our ability to attract large retail businesses to this environment. If we put our priorities where they belong we wouldn't have to worry about our image because our city would be improving instead of getting worse.⁴⁵

Hayes lost to Wilson-backed incumbent Aleta Cannon. After the campaign Hayes was offered a job by Berkeley/Oakland Assemblyman Tom Bates, a white progressive official who resides in Berkeley. Mayor Wilson, Oakland Assemblyman Elihu Harris, and Aleta Cannon used white-progressive support for Hayes as an issue in the campaign. Oakland activist Charles Hanson said:

What happens is that because of this style of organizing, organizing around race, progressive gets left out of the picture and it gets [racially] polarized. So now, I'm telling you in this environment, 'progressive' equals 'white.' So, you're either 'black' or 'progressive.' So people like Riles and John George and [Chappell Hayes] get put with the white people...They try to subtract our leadership from us. It's like well, you know, they're off into the white trip. Even though their knowledge and understanding is a lot deeper than that.⁴⁶

Mayor Wilson's ability to portray either Hayes and Lopez as water-carriers for the liberal/progressive white faction of Oakland politics has limits. The issues they raise: drugs, poor education, and lack of affordable housing, strike a chord with Oakland's low-income black residents. Wilson or Riles could be portrayed as a middle-class black intellectual having little in common with the most black Oakland residents, it is difficult to portray Hayes or Lopez in such a manner.

When asked why he was running against a black incumbent, Cappell Hayes said, "...it's not about just our [racial] identification, but it's about our progress as a people."⁴⁷ The new progressive politics represented by Hayes and Cannon exemplify an emerging change in emphasis in black politics - from a focus on civil rights to a focus on class, ie., low-income black economic and social progress - where the opposition is not necessarily defined by race. This reflects growing inequality among blacks themselves.

The Rainbow Coalition

In 1984 those supporting the Jackson campaign in Oakland were loosely referred to as the Rainbow Coalition. The formal establishment of a Rainbow Coalition in Oakland

did not occur until 1986. In 1986 the remnants of the Jackson campaign in the 8th Congressional District established a local chapter of Jackson's Rainbow Coalition.⁴⁸ The local chapter became a sub-division of the State Rainbow Coalition and the national Rainbow Coalition.

The Oakland Rainbow was established strictly as an electoral organization. Local activists hoped that Jesse Jackson's name and his powerful articulation of issues would enable the local Rainbow to be more successful in attracting grassroots support than OPA and other activist organizations had been.⁴⁹ The 8th Congressional District Rainbow had 350 paid members by 1988, approximately half of whom are white, 30 percent are black, 15 percent are Asian and 5 percent are Hispanic.⁵⁰

The Rainbow Coalition in the 8th Congressional District was formed as a non-profit organization to avoid tax regulations governing political organizations.⁵¹ One consequence is that the Rainbow is not allowed to support political candidates. Individual members of the Rainbow can support candidates, and work on their campaigns, but the Rainbow Coalition cannot. The Rainbow Coalition, therefore, does not have a clear linkage to Jackson's campaign efforts, and the Rainbow Coalition has not been a factor in local

election contests. Oakland activist Jack Vorhees complained that the non-profit status of the Rainbow hurt organizing efforts:

[Non-profit status] really hurt, it really hurt our abilities to organize politically....Part of the reason [the Rainbow was formed as a non-profit organization]...really relates to the [Jackson] campaign. The campaign was set up so that there was one central treasury and all funds had to come into the national office so that they could be accounted for and then they would be disbursed. Well, Jackson had trouble with the Federal Campaign Practices Commission in 1984 and I guess they wanted to avoid any of that this time by having restricted control over funds, fundraising and disbursement. But the ability of the Painbow Coalition to capitalize on a campaign and to grow was severely hampered by this structure.⁵²

The establishment of the local Rainbow Coalition as a non-profit organization was another reflection of Jackson's emphasis on mainstream national politics over local protest politics. The National Rainbow Coalition's decision to incorporate its chapters as a non-profit organization clearly limits its ability to serve as a vehicle for local political organizing and involvement. The Rainbow is even divorced from Jackson's political campaigns. In Oakland as well as New York, the Rainbow lacks direction and serves primarily to hold together Jackson supporters between presidential elections.

The Rainbow in the 8th Congressional District has been innovative in finding ways to be active in Oakland politics while not violating its non-profit status. The

Rainbow Coalition was a prime sponsor of 'Measure L,' a ballot referendum to change Oakland's municipal election schedule to coincide with state and national elections.

Rainbow leader Charles Hanson said:

We had been suffering from 20 percent turnouts for years and now we're consolidated with the federal and state primaries and that's going to double our voter turnout. That's going to go very well for the disenfranchised here in the communities and I give the Rainbow a lot of credit for getting behind me and being one of the first endorser - actually a sponsor for the measure.⁵³

In short, while Oakland activists hope that the Rainbow's attachment to Jackson would help them recruit members, the inability of the Rainbow to endorse candidates has made it difficult for the organization to engage in local political battles. The Rainbow Coalition is not a disciplined league of volunteers ready to change the face of Oakland politics as the Panthers did in the 1970's.

The 1988 Jackson Campaign

"The 1988 campaign was much better organized and we had many more people," said Oakland activist Jack Vorhees.⁵⁴ The 1988 Jackson campaign had one local staff member, an office manager. The office manager was paid out of funds raised in the Oakland area.⁵⁵ Jackson campaign records show that the Jackson campaign raised \$148,000 in

Oakland in 1987/88.^a The Jackson campaign in Oakland received little assistance from the national and state office, except for literature.⁵⁶

The 1988 Jackson campaign received strong union support in Oakland. The 'Labor-for-Jackson' contingents did most of their own fundraising, leafletting, and they put out their own literature.⁵⁷ The Jackson campaign was not as centralized in Oakland as it was in New York. Many groups, such as labor, worked quite independently of the official Jackson campaign. According to Vorhees:

One of the things we would have liked to have [done] in the Jackson campaign is strengthen the coordination of the constituency elements, because most of them operate independently, raising their own funds, putting out their own advance, putting out their own budget and so forth.⁵⁸

Black churches were not as involved in the Jackson campaign in 1988 as they had been in 1984, in part because of their internal divisions. A split within the churches developed when a group of ministers in Oakland began to develop working relationships with Rev. Moon and the Unification Church.⁵⁹

Jackson's 1988 campaign unified the oft-warring political factions in Oakland politics. Unlike 1984,

^a Campaign fundraising figures are taken from a computerized list of Jackson campaign donations for 1987/88.

Jackson received the support of Mayor Lionel Wilson. Jackson had greater prestige in 1988, and was not opposed by someone with Mondale's history of party leadership and a strong civil rights record. Jackson also received the endorsement of Tom Bates, the progressive white Assemblyman from Northwest Oakland/Berkeley. Bates supported Jackson because he had swept the delegates in his own 8th Congressional District in 1984 and Bates was worried about being out of step. Brian Guthrie, a long-time associate of Assemblymember Bates said:

People thought that Jackson would do well [in 1984] but how well he did was really an eye opener. I know that was the case of Tom Bates, he was a Hart delegate in 1984. He ran on the ballot and was defeated. This was a person who is very popular and has very high name ID, was defeated by Jackson delegates who were low level political hanger on types because their name had Jesse Jackson next to it whereas Tom Bates, popular local official had Gary Hart next to it. The message wasn't lost on Tom Bates who was Jesse Jackson's state-wide co-chair in 1988.⁶⁰

Despite Jackson's broader support, many Oakland Jackson supporters argued that Jackson didn't attract the same degree of mass enthusiasm in 1988. The Jackson campaign did not focus on Oakland poor neighborhoods; there was more of a Northern Californian regional strategy. Said Arlene Wilde:

I think they [state campaign leaders] had a Northern California strategy, where they put a lot of energy into [white upper income] Marin [county.] Marin went for Jesse, that's amazing, right? The main headquarters was in San Francisco...and I know there was a Berkeley office...and there was a downtown

Oakland office...but, just not a whole lot of organizers, [not] a lot of energy...I don't think they put a whole lot into Oakland and you didn't have people locally like these ministers or the networks that are already there taking it up. There wasn't, for whatever reasons, the same excitement in the black community in Oakland this time.⁶¹

Perhaps because of the Jackson campaign's Northern California strategy, the Jackson campaign did not do as well in the 8th Congressional District (a Jackson stronghold in 1984) as it had in 1988. Brian Guthrie observed:

I was surprised in the 8th Congressional District...Dukakis ended up with four delegates while Jackson got five. That's got to be viewed as a bit of a set-back for the Jackson operation locally. I think that their get-out-the-vote effort in the election on June 7th took a lot for granted.⁶²

Voter Registration in 1988

Democratic voter registration in Oakland increased by only 3506 between the 1984 and 1988 Democratic presidential primaries, moving from 133,352 to 136,858.^a Figure 1 shows that there was no surge in black voter registration, moving up only one percentage point from the 1984 primary election. Jackson's campaign did not motivate churches or progressive activists in Oakland to do intensive voter registration, as many had in 1984. In addition, no black

^a Voter registration and election figures are from the Registrar of Voters for Alameda County.

insurgents planned to run for office on the heels of the 1988 Jackson campaign.

Many of the progressive Oakland activists who were involved in voter registration in 1984 put their hopes for increasing voter participation in local elections on 'Measure L,' rather than building upon the Jackson campaign. Measure L passed in June 1988, making Oakland municipal elections simultaneous with State and national elections.⁶³ Oakland's municipal elections have traditionally been held in April, with the run-off election held in May. Under the new system, the City will have a primary in June and a run-off election in November, at the same time as the congressional and state legislative elections.⁶⁴ Supporters of Measure L reason that changing the election dates will automatically help get out the vote.

Other Oakland progressive activists argued against changing local election dates to a June/November cycle, reasoning that such a change would strengthen local Democrat "power brokers" and make it harder for progressive candidates to get elected. Brian Guthrie summed up the two arguments:

The argument for a June and November cycle is that more people will vote. I don't think that fully addresses two questions. Number one, why aren't people voting. What are the factors that lead people to think that city government doesn't matter. That has to be addressed in deeper ways than just changing the date to

a June election which is slightly higher but is still going to have a lot of apathy. And when you put it on a crowded ballot - by the time people get down to the end of the ballot in Oakland - is there really going to be any more focus in a June election than there was in April election? I really don't think so. The other question you have to look at is by changing to a November situation you politicize it...you make it easier to slate up with the Democratic slate. When the Democrats put out their slates in a June or November election, then they will sell space on them (and that's what they do) to candidates who are running for city council. [City elections will become] more political. Instead of going to the people you go to the Democratic power brokers [to] get on the slate and that's how you get elected. There's been a debate on whether this helps "progressive" candidates.⁶⁵

As Guthrie states, Measure L will probably will increase the power of Democratic "power brokers" and in the short run it may hurt progressive politicians who have displayed little ability to organize strong street-campaigns in Oakland. In the long run, however, it may force Oakland's divided and narrowly focused single-issue groups to band together in support of progressive candidates. In order to get elected against the "power brokers," progressive Oakland politicians will have to rely less on personal appeal and more on organization. Measure L, if passed, would also dramatically increase the local impact of a national protest candidacy such as Jackson's 1984 campaign.

Turnout in 1988

Turnout in the 1988 Democratic presidential primary was well above 1984 turnout (see Figure 2). Black turnout was nearly 50 percent, up 15 percentage points from 1984. White turnout also went up by 15 percentage points, from just over 55 percent in 1984 to nearly 70 percent in 1988. The actual number of voters in the Democratic primary increased from 58,077 to 70,144 in 1988. Because blacks constitute a greater percentage of registered Democrats than do whites, the increase in black voter turnout meant that the Democratic electorate in the 1988 primary was predominantly black.

The Jackson vote went up by 16,568, from 32,672 in 1984 to 49,240 in 1988. In 1988 the campaign had the support of the Mayor, more moderate white and black voters, as well as the unions. The 1984 campaign was more protest-oriented, had more involvement from churches, and had less traditional political support.

Impact of Jackson '88 Campaign on Local Politics

The unity between the Wilson and Dellums factions of Oakland politics that characterized the 1988 Jackson

campaign is likely to have little spill-over into local elections. The most important election facing Oakland in the next several years will be the election to replace Lionel Wilson, who is likely to retire by 1990. When asked if the unity achieved around the 1988 Jackson campaign could last, Brian Guthrie said:

I think its temporary. Around here what you find is that these factions are fairly well defined and then they break down around certain issues. People come together around certain issues and certainly Jesse's candidacy has been one of those issues. But tomorrow when the issue is downtown development versus neighborhoods or other issues, rent control being one, that have divided the body politic locally. They will stay divided. I don't anticipate that there will be a candidate, and in fact one of the big questions floating around in Oakland politics now is who will succeed Lionel Wilson. Lionel has with very little effort become about 75 years old, and is obviously in a place in his life and career where he has to think about stepping aside. But part of the problem is that there is not a consensus on who would succeed him, and there's two or three or more factions competing for the right to be the anointed successor to Lionel. But there no clear leader emerged out of that pact at this point.⁶⁶

Many political activists interviewed expect at least two black candidates and one white candidate to contest for mayor. Riles is attempting to win Wilson's endorsement, but given their history of confrontation, that is unlikely. More probable is a continuation of the split in the black community. Riles predicted that, "The candidates will be myself, Leo Bazile, and Dick Spees, all of us are Council members. They're a few other people being talked about but I don't think that this is serious."⁶⁷ Leo Bazile is a

moderate black councilmember representing the far eastern section of Oakland. Dick Spees is a moderate white councilmember who represents the 4th district - encompassing much of the Oakland Hills area, as well as portions of the Flatlands in the southern part of the district.

No one expects that the most recent Jackson campaign will have any effect on the outcome of the election. The Rainbow Coalition is also unlikely to be a force in the coming election. Wilson Riles maintains that the Rainbow Coalition in Oakland has "struggled and stumbled" through the last four years.⁶⁸ County Supervisor John George said that Jackson is a non-factor in Oakland and other black-led cities:

I think blacks would be moving even without him [Jackson] around. He's not going to help us any more, who he would help is Asians, they are involved more [as a result of the Jackson campaign.] I can't see him helping blacks much.⁶⁹

Veteran Oakland community activist Nute Morris offered a candid assessment of Jackson's impact on local politics in Oakland:

Jackson's 1984 and 1988 campaigns had no impact whatsoever on local politics. It had an impact on participation, more people came out to vote on [presidential primary] elections, but other than that on any of the local races it hasn't had an impact whatsoever. The turnout hasn't been increased in any portion, a more progressive council hasn't been elected....You know he talks about the Rainbow and his effort's going to have an impact from dog catcher all the way up, well you know, it hasn't had that type of

impact...Once again it's a lot of talk and little action when it comes to having a major impact locally. I supported Jackson's effort in '84, [but] I was luke warm in '88. I think he...could probably have much more of a say nationally if he could start getting a lot of people elected locally, and in State Houses on up the road. Then his Rainbow Coalition, if it is controlling cities and then states and that sort of thing, [has] got the basis of a strong organization. Right now, you got Jackson is the key and [the Rainbow] spreads out across the nation, and that's about it. Its not really rooted as I see it.⁷⁰

In what seems to be a pattern, Jackson's campaign had greater acceptance and wider support in 1988, but it generated less grassroots enthusiasm and local voter registration. The 1988 campaign had stronger union support and the support of Oakland's mayor. This translated into higher voter turnout and a greater share of the vote for Jackson. But community activists such as Nute Miley are disappointed that Jackson, and the Rainbow Coalition, have not devoted more attention to local politics, that is, getting local people elected on the local level and building up a stronger base of support.

Conclusion

The burning local issues in Oakland are drugs, crime, education, and housing. While local officials such as John George and Wilson Riles, Jr., condemn the federal government for exacerbating many of the problems, they blame Mayor

Wilson for implementing "Reaganite" policies at the local level.

An article by Michael Preston on black mayors posed the problem facing black politics in Oakland:

[the rise of black mayors can become a] two edged sword; they may become a "temporary source of black pride on the one hand, but it may, on the other hand, also become a signal that the system does not work for blacks. The question thus becomes: will the emergence of black mayorships be a political advantage to blacks or will it lead increased political cynicism? The question has its roots in the fact that while black mayors are emerging, there is no corresponding change in the structural characteristics of city politics which by nature are painfully restrictive and often unresponsive."

Preston noted that the primary problem of urban black politics is weak political organization. He warned that the election of a black mayor, unless it is accompanied by a strengthening of local black political organization, is largely symbolic. Without strong political organization, black mayors will not be able to challenge entrenched financial and bureaucratic interests, assuming they want to, and they will not be able to win substantial policy benefits for their black constituents.

Preston's worries are confirmed in Oakland. Lionel Wilson did not sustain the coalition that elected him into office. After election he aligned with Oakland's traditionally "political activist" business corporations.

He relied on their funds for his "high-tech" reelection campaigns rather than building local political organizations. The idea of marriage to the downtown business sector as a strategy for economic development for low-income blacks was a failure. Wilson failed to deliver substantive policy gains for most poor and black Oakland residents, while presiding over redevelopment of downtown Oakland. Wilson suffered minor political consequences for his move to the right. After his election, black community organization atrophied, and Wilson did nothing to re-build it. The absence of strong party or union political organizations, combined with narrow issue orientation of Oakland's activist groups, left an organizational vacuum in the city.

Jackson's 1984 campaign gave a political focus to opponents of Wilson. The leaders of the campaign, however, were poorly organized. Rather than attempting to make the campaign a local referendum on approval of Mayor Wilson, as the 1988 Jackson campaign in New York was a referendum on Mayor Koch, Riles attempted to separate the Jackson campaign from local politics, including his own mayoral campaign against Wilson. Adding insult to injury, Wilson outmaneuvered Riles by offering to help retire Jackson's campaign debt from his ample corporate donated war chest.

By uniting with Wilson, Jackson helped to solidify his position as a mainstream political candidate in 1988, but his campaign generated less enthusiasm than in 1984. Jackson won only four of nine delegates from the 8th Congressional district, Ron Dellums', arguably the most liberal district in the country and one that he swept in 1984. Activists who enthusiastically supported Jackson in 1984 worked less hard and were more cynical in 1988. Even though Jackson won more votes in 1988, the black community's strong support for Jackson was not translated into local political organization or momentum for change.

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Chapter 5

Black Politics in Atlanta

Atlanta has no strong political parties. Like Oakland and unlike New York, Atlanta lacks district-level political organizations. Atlanta politics has a non-partisan reform character without much official patronage in city government. Municipal elections in the city were conducted on an at-large basis until 1973.¹ In the absence of a strong political party, personal organizations, racial organizations, and interest groups, particularly business organizations, play an important role in Atlanta politics.² Atlanta is locus classicus of the politically influential establishment.³

Atlanta has a part-time city council consisting of 18 members, 12 from single-member districts and 6 at-large. Council members are elected to four-year terms.⁴ Atlanta shares some governmental powers with the Fulton County Board of Commissioners. The Board of Commissioners runs the Public Health Department, including Grady hospital, which is the largest indigent care hospital in the state. The Board also runs the library system, and along with the city runs the zoo, the stadium, and the Omni Convention Center. In parts of Fulton County outside of Atlanta, the Board

controls zoning and provides basic water and sanitation services.⁵ The Board of Commissioners, like the city council, is a part-time body. The Commission consists of 7 members, 4 of whom are elected from districts, and 3 that are elected at-large. One of the members is elected as chair. Atlanta has an elected 9 member Board of Education. The members serve part-time except on the Board of Education. In general, the Mayor appoints members to serve on various city commissions and the council confirms them.

Municipal government in Atlanta is not as weak and fragmented as it is in Oakland, but Atlanta's Mayor does not have as much patronage and municipal control as does the Mayor of New York. The Mayor's office in Atlanta is neither weak nor strong. Because other elected bodies in Atlanta are part-time and have limited staff resources, however, the mayor has considerable formal authority and there is no city manager. Mayoral politics is the focus of politics in Atlanta.

The labor unions are weak in Atlanta, and play a minor role in electoral politics. Derrick Bowles, an economist active in Atlanta politics, said:

It's never the case that you can say that this is the candidate of AFSCME [the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees is one of the largest unions in Atlanta.]...[But] for the most part the only unions you ever see any activity coming out of is AFSCME and the police union, and they're always taking white, or conservative, positions. So there's no real organized union opposition [even though] you've got

some large auto plants here. Even those workers are not very vocal in terms of their involvement in electoral politics.⁶

In contrast to labor unions, business plays a large role in Atlanta politics. Business groups have been the preeminent political force in Atlanta's white community, not counterbalanced by labor unions, party organization, ethnic organizations, or, until recently, neighborhood preservation groups. Political scientist Clarence Stone wrote that Atlanta's businesses operate in a political vacuum.

According to Stone:

Atlanta itself has been a nonpartisan city, and the labor union movement has been weak. Thus nonbusiness interests have lacked ready organizational opportunities....In this organizational vacuum, large business enterprises enjoy an extraordinary concentration of politically useful resources. They are able to not only meet obvious needs such as those for campaign funds, including highly valued "early money," they also possess staff and organizational capacities that can be helpful to candidates and can be used on behalf of specific issues. In Atlanta, downtown business has, for example, consistently played a major part in most referendum campaigns. Thus, even in the electoral arena -- the heartland of popular control -- Atlanta's business elite has had a large role.⁷

Stone explained that Atlanta businesses use their private resources to establish an informal, but powerful, system of private patronage. Stone wrote that, "Behind the facade of 'good government,' Atlanta is run by an elaborate system of business patronage."

Black Politics in Atlanta

Black electoral activity dates back to Reconstruction, when blacks loyally supported the pro-emancipation Republican Party. In 1880, a prominent black minister, the Reverend Henry M. Turner, ran for governor of Georgia and won 350 votes.⁸ Black participation in electoral politics was short-lived. The state adoption of a cumulative poll tax in 1877 prevented most blacks, as well as many whites, from voting. The adoption of the 'white primary' in 1909 completely disenfranchised black voters. White primaries prevented blacks from running in Democratic primaries, and therefore blacks could never become Democratic party candidates. The white primary limited black political participation to infrequent special elections and general elections - generally of secondary importance to the white Democratic primaries.⁹

Even during the period of the white primary, black voters used their limited franchise to advance their collective interests. In 1930, blacks played a crucial role in blocking the recall of Mayor James Key, who had advocated fair treatment for all citizens regardless of race.¹⁰

In the 1930's Atlanta was the focus of substantial black migration, and a considerable black professional

stratum developed.¹¹ As Malcolm Suber, a student of Atlanta politics, wrote:

Atlanta not only had the traditional institutions of black life in America - churches, fraternities, sororities, lodges, mutual aid societies, etc., but it also had five black colleges - Spelman, Clark, Morehouse, Morris Brown and Atlanta University....¹²

In a doctoral dissertation on Atlanta's first black Mayor, Georgia Persons noted that between the early 1930's and the elimination of white primaries in 1946, Atlanta's blacks conducted citizenship schools and they established political organizations in anticipation of the demise of the white primary. When the white primary was finally eliminated, there were 100,000 blacks living in Atlanta, more than 30 percent of the total, and blacks were prepared to play a wider role in Atlanta politics (see Table XVI).

Post-White Primary

The Georgia white primary was nullified in 1946 by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Chapman v. King.¹³ Black leadership immediately initiated a voter registration drive which added nearly 25,000 blacks to the registration rolls in Atlanta.¹⁴ Black Democratic and Republican leaders then came together to form the Atlanta Negro Voters League (ANVL). ANVL soon began to play an important role in

Atlanta politics. The ANVL became the dominant black political organization until the early 1960's. ANVL suggested which candidates blacks should support, and published a "ticket" which listed the names of candidates blacks were to support at the polls.¹⁵

With almost unanimous black support, Atlanta's Mayor Hartsfield narrowly won re-election in 1948. Without it Hartsfield would have lost the election.¹⁶ This election was the beginning of an alliance between black voters and middle-class whites from the relatively prosperous northern section of Atlanta, most of whom strongly supported Hartsfield. During this period Atlanta became known as "the city too busy to hate."

The alliance between blacks and middle-class whites, however, was unequal. Segregation was still a fact of life in Atlanta. As Georgia Persons wrote, "...this biracial coalition was totally a function of Negro support for white candidates. whites refused to vote for Negro candidates unless they did not know the candidate was a Negro."¹⁷

Table I

<u>Population of the City of Atlanta</u>				
Year & Population	Total	White Population	% Population	Black
1940 34.6	302,288	197,686	65.4	104,533
1950 34.6	331,314	209,898	65.4	121,416
1960 38.2	487,455	300,635	61.8	186,820
1970 51.6	496,973	240,503	48.4	255,051
1980 58.3	413,364	120,702	29.2	240,991

Source: Figures obtained from U.S. Bureau of Census from sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth census of the united States, General Population Characteristics, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., quoted in Malcolm Suber, "The Internal Black Politics of Atlanta, Georgia, 1944-1969: An Analytic Study of Leadership Roles and Organizational Thrusts," (Political Science Dept., Atlanta University), p.22. Figures for 1980 are taken from 1980 U.S. Census Tape STF4A for the state of Georgia.

The Civil Rights Era

In the late 1950's and early 1960's new forces began to emerge in Atlanta politics. The Civil Rights Movement was developing throughout the South. Georgia Persons wrote:

In Atlanta, previous issues of race had to do with obtaining a separate but unequal share: the hiring of black policemen and black firemen for the black community, more Negro schools, better wages for negro teachers, etc. Now integration was the issues. blacks were demanding the integration of Grady Hospital, the desegregation of schools, the integration of parks, pools and other recreational facilities, integration of lunch counters, and amazingly, the right to try on clothes before purchase at Rich's department store.¹⁸

The Civil Rights Movement coincided with the overtly racist candidate in mayoral elections, Lester Maddox. Maddox, whose political base was among low-income whites, threatened the dominant coalition of middle-class whites and blacks. He accused Mayor Hartsfield of being dominated by the NAACP.¹⁹ While race had never been far below the surface in Atlanta, Atlanta's reputation for racial cooperation came under severe strain. At this time, the city's major daily newspaper, the Atlanta Constitution, began to play an active advocacy role in Atlanta's mayoral elections.²⁰ The Constitution tried to find a middle-ground between Lester Maddox's demand for segregation and Blacks demanding full integration. Although opposed to Maddox, the paper called the demand for full integration "irresponsible."²¹

This period also witnessed a major effort on the part of Atlanta's business community to lure Northern industry to the Atlanta region. During 1961 mayoral election, when a successor to Hartfield was to be chosen, the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce launched a million dollar "Forward Atlanta" national media campaign aimed at luring northern businesses to Atlanta.²² Six years after the Brown v. Board of Education decision, Atlanta was also on the verge of integrating its public schools.

The specter of racial violence posed a threat to the Atlanta business community's plans to attract Northern businesses. Black college students, much to the chagrin of ANVL leaders, had begun to occupy segregated city parks. For the first time, ANVL's traditional hold on Black leadership in Atlanta was being challenged. At the same time, Lester Maddox was preparing to run for mayor with a substantial white low-income base of support.

In a tense racial climate, the business community introduced its own candidate, Ivan Allen. For Allen to win, however, he needed the unified support of middle-class whites from the Northside and the Black community. Supported by the Constitution, a concerted effort was made to project Allen as the candidate who represented "all the people" and the candidate who could answer Atlanta's "call

to greatness."²³ The ANVL supported Allen, but the young Black insurgents involved in the sit-in activities balked. They supported Mugsy Smith, a liberal white candidate.

Allen led the primary election with 38,820 votes, Maddox came in second with 20,914 votes, and Smith trailed the field with 15,801 votes. There was a run-off between Allen and Maddox. Smith and the young Black insurgents endorsed Allen against Maddox and he won the election.

Allen remained mayor of Atlanta for two terms (Atlanta has a two term mayoral limit). By the 1969 elections, Black voters made up more than 40 percent of the voting population, an 11 percent increase since Allen was first elected.²⁴ The time had come to consider a Black candidate for mayor. The white business community decided to support Rodney Cook, a moderate Republican businessman. Black leaders refused to support Cook, who they regarded as too racist. The liberal Vice-Mayor of Atlanta, Sam Massell, then announced his candidacy, hoping to win Black support. Finally, Dr. Horace Tate, the President of the all-Black Georgia Teachers Association, declared his candidacy for mayor.

Not one of fifteen Black elected officials in Atlanta in 1969 endorsed Tate. Tate was endorsed by civil rights

leaders Rev. David Abernathy, Rev. Hosea Williams, Arthur Langford, Jr., Julian Bond, and Mrs. Coretta Scott King. Rev. Jesse Jackson also campaigned for Tate.²⁵ The civil rights leaders had gained national prominence by 1969, and in the words of Georgia Persons, "exercised considerable influence, but not dominance, on local politics as well."²⁶

Massell won the election with 31,096 votes, close to 19,000 of which were cast by Black voters. Cook finished second with 26,891 total votes and only 2,000 Black votes, and Tate finished third with 22,869 votes, less than 1,000 of which were cast by whites.²⁷ It is obvious that Tate could have won the election with a unified Black vote. The inability of traditional clientage politicians and civil rights activists to unite caused his defeat. However, the 1969 election marked the last hurrah of the traditional black and middle-class white voting alliance, as black voters were clearly moving in a more independent direction. The election was also a blow to the white business establishment, who saw their candidate lose.

Maynard Jackson Runs for Mayor

Maynard Jackson was considered a "movement man" and a political insurgent in the late 1960's. Jackson's

grandfather, however, had been a prominent Atlanta leader in the 1930's and his father was a Baptist minister. Jackson thus had the unique ability to appeal both to the civil rights crowd and to more traditional blacks. Jackson's introduction to electoral politics came in his 1968 upstart campaign against incumbent U.S. Senator Herman Russell. Jackson lost the race but he carried the majority of Atlanta's precincts.²⁸ Jackson easily won a campaign to become Vice-Mayor of Atlanta in 1969. Jackson had refused to endorse any candidate for mayor and hence did not become embroiled in the Tate versus Massell controversy.

By the 1973 mayoral elections, Atlanta had become a majority black city and 49 percent of its voting population was black.²⁹ Atlanta also had more than 160 community organizations that could be of value to a black candidate. These organizations were mostly black, social in character, and many had been in existence for decades. The informal community organizations, "had a lot to do with the power of the black community to sustain itself during periods of white power."³⁰

A city charter change, signed into law by Governor Jimmy Carter, added to the level of political activity in 1973. Twelve of Atlanta's city council members were to be elected from single-member districts for the first time,

with six remaining at-large. In addition, six district members of the school board were to be elected, with three at-large.

Blacks and whites were both politically divided in 1973. Mayor Sam Massell changed from being an ultra-liberal to running an overtly racist campaign in 1973, but he could still claim a measure of black support. The white business community supported former Congressman Charles Weltner, who ran a weak campaign. The civil rights community was internally divided and had waned in influence since the late 1960's. A moderate black leader, Leroy Johnson, who had vigorously opposed Tate's campaign in 1969, was the first black candidate to declare for mayor in 1973 and Maynard Jackson declared soon after.³¹ In the midst of this confusion, Jackson ran a strong, professionally organized grassroots oriented campaign.³²

Jackson was able to win over 80 percent of the vote in the heavily black 10th, 11th, and 12th council districts located in the southern part of Atlanta. He won less than 8 percent of the vote in the northern white districts, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd (see Table XVII). On the strength of the black vote, Jackson made it into a run-off with incumbent mayor Massell. Interestingly, Jackson won approximately 20 percent of the vote from the northern white districts in the

run-off. According to former city councilmember Jack Smith,

Maynard united the black, not completely, but by and large united the black community and got the white progressive vote of which the city has no more than any other northern city but much more than most southern cities. We have a respectable white progressive vote here.³³

Jackson, as Smith indicated, was elected with strong black support and significant white liberal support. Jackson's solidity in Atlanta's black community may have been reinforced by the offense it took at the killing of several blacks by white police officers. Atlanta police officers killed nineteen persons in situations perceived by the black community as example of police brutality in 1973 alone.³⁴

Table II

<u>Mayoral Elections 1973/1977</u>				
Council Turnout	Black District Run-off	Voters	Jackson '73	Jackson '73 Run-off
(%)	(%)		(%)	(%)
7	1.4		4.9	22.6
59				
6	2.0		7.2	21.9
58				
8	2.2		3.9	18.7
64				
12	21.4		24.9	30.0
54				
11	51.6		60.0	61.3
56				
1	56.0		67.5	82.3
72				
5	65.9		****	81.0
56				
2	69.9		61.1	72.0
55				
4	88.6		74.9	83.3
59				
10	97.2		82.5	95.1
70				
9	97.6		84.1	93.7
66				
3	97.7		80.0	92.7
65				

Source: Figures provided by Maynard Jackson '89 Campaign.

Jackson as Mayor

Maynard Jackson's election came at the tail end of the civil rights and black power movements, and was one of the successes of that movement.³⁵ It was a source of pride for Atlanta's black community. Derrick Bowles said:

There was a great deal of psychological benefit to be gained from just having a black person in office. And Maynard at the same time was an individual who had a better feel for the pulse of the black community, [and he] had a better sense of commitment to the black community, and even though he was not from the class strata that would be typical of blacks in Atlanta [he was from an upper class black background], he certainly had more of an identification with...the needs of ordinary working class folks.³⁶

Jackson is credited with reducing the level of police brutality. Ed Samuels, a leader of the Atlanta NAACP, said, "not only did [Jackson] inspire people...he gave people some very practical things. He stopped all this [police] brutality in this town...he stopped it cold."³⁷ One of Jackson's first acts as mayor was to attempt to replace the white police chief, John Inman. Inman had gained a reputation as an incompetent administrator, and he maintained a sour relationship with Atlanta's black community.³⁸

Inman resisted Jackson's dismissal through a number of legal maneuvers. The issue soon became a focus of racial polarization in the city. Jackson was eventually able to

appoint a black Safety Commissioner, Reginald Eaves, who presided over the police department.

Jackson also forcefully confronted the white business community. Political scientist and former Jackson official Adolph Reed, Jr., described Jackson's style:

Jackson was inclined to insist that his suitors come to City Hall to meet in his office and to ask for his support, rather than simply to inform him of their needs and assume his compliance. This posture was a shocking contrast to the longstanding norms of public/private interaction in Atlanta, and the added racial dimension to the shock led to charges that Jackson was "arrogant."³⁹

Gerald Dobbs, an official in the Young administration and former official in the Jackson administration, defended Jackson's confrontational approach to the white business community:

The night-and-day comparison is that Maynard was the first [black mayor] and a lot of the battles he won on municipal government are accepted as kind of rote today: you know, the kicking down the door of the business community, demanding that the city coffers be opened to everybody for contracts and drives and the like...This guy [Maynard Jackson] was forced to paint everything in race because that's how everything had been painted heretofore.⁴⁰

Although Jackson had a combative relationship with the white business community, Reed ascribes it to the unwillingness of white businessmen to treat black elected officials and businesses as partners, and not to any anti-business policy on Jackson's part. Reed describes Jackson

as always having been in support of downtown business revitalization and development projects.⁴¹

Adolph Reed, Jr., said that Maynard Jackson not only accommodated white business leaders, he rallied black Atlantans behind development projects that bore the black community little benefit. In the controversy over construction of a new airport, Reed said that, "Mayor Jackson succeeded in defining the issues at stake in the airport controversy in a way that identified his black electoral constituency's interests with one pole of a debate over options within a development-policy agenda that actually had little bearing on that constituency."⁴²

Smith's contention, however, is that in the face of organized white business opposition Jackson had little choice but to rally his black electoral base. Smith believes that Jackson needed the total support of the black community even to win a small share of construction contracts and franchises for black-owned firms. Smith said:

It has always been said, Maynard has the political control, but the white people had the economic control. They [say] that there was [a] kind of tension between the two. As long as that tension continued to exist, the blacks in the power structure continued to preach unity to the grassroots, they crushed opposition in the [black] power structure because they were trying to countervail against this enormous white economic control.⁴³

The primary beneficiaries of Jackson's aggressive advocacy for minority business contracts were middle-class black contractors and professionals. Jackson insisted, for example, that 30-35 percent of the airport construction contracts go to minority-owned firms. Although Jackson subsequently softened his demand for minority involvement in the project, the project "didn't only make some black millionaires, it put some black folks in the middle-class who would not have been there otherwise."⁴⁴

Few of Jackson's initiatives benefited low-income Atlantans. Atlanta city councilman Jabari Samama offered a critical assessment of the limited impact of the Jackson administration:

Maynard was important because he established strong black leadership which opened up the door to city government for blacks in both employment and also contracts. The other thing that was significant about Maynard's election is that he altered power relationships in this city forever...But although it [his administration] was very effective in doing all these things, still it benefitted primarily the educated -those who were skilled, successful businesses already. It really didn't touch that strata of invisible [poor] people....⁴⁵

Maynard Jackson took several actions which belied his image as an advocate of Atlanta's predominantly poor black community. When the white business community loudly protested against the aggressive tactics of Jackson's Commissioner of Administrative Services, Emma Darnelle, who

was responsible for implementing Jackson's stated desire to bring minorities into major positions in political and economic life in Atlanta, Jackson fired her.⁴⁶ Darnelle was the only prominent black female in the administration, and was very popular in the black community.⁴⁷ Soon thereafter, Darnelle sued Jackson for race and sex discrimination, and she opposed him unsuccessfully in the 1977 mayoral election.

In the middle of the Darnelle controversy, in late 1976, Jackson fired 1,000 predominantly black sanitation workers. The workers were members of AFSCME, and were on strike demanding a \$500 annual increase for workers making less than \$7,000 per year, which included most of their membership.^a The strike was poorly organized and the union failed win the support of the black community. Georgia Persons wrote that, "The mayor in this instance was enhanced by the local political culture, or mobilization of bias, which embodied a strong anti-union sentiment."⁴⁸

Larry Lawrence, long-time administrator for the Fulton County Commission, stated that there is a residue of distrust among Atlanta's poor population against Maynard Jackson:

^a The city council had approved a \$361 increase for all but the top level political appointees.

What did [Jackson] do for them [poor blacks]? Not a lot. They were poor in 1973, they were poor eight years later at the end of his term and they're still poor. So they don't have the great love that a lot of us might think that they have. They have some serious problems about not only poverty, but if you remind them of the murder of innocent children that happened during Maynard's term...there were problems that people in this [poor] community didn't think [government officials] were doing enough to protect their children. Maynard threatened to fire and eventually did fire a couple of thousand garbage workers...those were low income people. He was a union buster and to exacerbate it even worse there was not the great love among those people that there is among the sort of [black] elite. And keep in mind the demographics of the city. There are not a lot of high-income, well-to-do black folks anywhere in this country, let alone in Atlanta. I think something like 10 percent of the black population has an income of forty thousand dollars and above.⁴⁹

Unlike Lawrence, however, many Atlanta activists and officials stated that Maynard Jackson's role as the city's first black mayor, made him enormously respected by all segments of the city's black population. Jackson also became popular among many low and middle-income white Atlantans for his opposition to disruptive highway development projects.⁵⁰

Andrew Young as Mayor

In 1981, Andrew (Andy) Young ran to succeed Maynard Jackson as mayor and to become Atlanta's second black mayor. Young had represented Georgia's 5th Congressional district, that includes most of Atlanta. Born in Louisiana, Young

pursued a career as a minister and worker for the United Council of Churches until he joined the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC) under the leadership of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.. Young played a leading role in SCLC, although he usually operated behind the scenes.⁵¹

Young entered politics in 1970, when he ran for Congress. He won the Democratic primary but lost to Republican Fletcher Thompson in the general election. The 5th Congressional district was only 39.5 percent black in 1970 and black voters were only 31.4 percent of the electorate.⁵² Young also ran a weak campaign in the black community, only 50.9 percent of blacks turned out for the election, and less than 60 percent of them cast a ballot for a Congressional candidate.⁵³

The boundaries of the 5th district were re-drawn in 1972 by order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The district had been found to be malapportioned, gerrymandering the black vote.⁵⁴ As a result, the black percentage of registered voters was increased to 38 percent of the total. Young ran in the 1972 Democratic primary against a liberal white opponent, Wyche Fowler, and a black opponent, Henry Dodson. Although Young won 90 percent of the black vote and 32 percent of the white vote in the primary, black turnout was only 32.2 percent.⁵⁵ In

contrast to 1970, Young launched an all-out effort to register and turnout black voters for the 1972 general election.⁵⁶ Young won the election against Republican Rodney Cook, winning 98 percent of the black vote and 26 percent of the white vote.⁵⁷ black turnout reached 56.7 percent, several percentage points higher than Black turnout in the 1970 general election. Young became the first Black elected to Congress from the deep South since Reconstruction, and he did so with substantial white support.

Young quit his post as U.S. Representative in December of 1976 when Jimmy Carter, the newly elected President and former governor of Georgia, nominated him to become United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Young held that position until 1979, when he was forced to resign after secretly attending a meeting with representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Young returned to Atlanta and entered the race to succeed Maynard Jackson as mayor.

Young was supported by black churches, civil rights leaders, and the black business community, who raised \$100,000 to boost his financially strapped campaign.⁵⁸ Young was not the first choice of many black Atlantans, who would have preferred a native-born candidate for mayor, but

he was the compromise candidate most acceptable to all factions of the community.⁵⁹ Reginald Eaves, Jackson's former black public safety chief, also declared his candidacy for mayor. In the primary, Young came in first, Sidney Marcus second, and Eaves third. Young then entered a run-off against Marcus, and was endorsed by Eaves.

Young faced organized white business opposition, who initiated a campaign in Atlanta's northside to prevent white voters from giving money to the Young campaign.⁶⁰ Despite the relatively low level of overt racial appeals by Young and his principle opponent, liberal white State Representative Sidney Marcus, the election was highly polarized by race. In the 1981 primary and again in the run-off election, more than 90 percent of white and black voters voted for candidates of their own race.⁶¹ Both groups turned out for the election at a rate of nearly 63 percent of registered voters.⁶² Fortunately for Young, by 1981 the majority of registered voters in Atlanta were black.

Young entered City Hall under different circumstances than had Maynard Jackson eight years earlier. Jackson already had fought many of the initial battles to increase minority shares of city contracts and to elevate blacks to high positions in municipal government. With the Reagan

Administration in Washington, Young was faced with a new set of problems. He faced the prospect of reduced community development, revenue sharing, and block grant money.⁶³

Atlanta also faced a trend of capital dis-investment when Young took office in 1981, as developers shifted to the mostly white North Fulton County area (above the Atlanta border), as opposed to downtown Atlanta. Young set as a first priority restoring close working relationships between city hall and the white business community. Ed Samuels said:

I believe that Mayor Young came into office because there was a perception that Maynard made things so bad for the boys downtown that they couldn't communicate well with city hall. And I think he tried to build a relationship with the power structure. I think he really tried and opened himself up for suggestions and ideas, and as a measure of good faith, sought to implement some of those policies that would be more favorable to the business class in the city...I think he really felt the need to build bridges in the city. I don't think he wanted Atlanta to be perceived as a "black" city... I really don't think he wanted the whites to feel that they had to flee. I mean they had already left and deserted the school system. They'd pretty much deserted the city. So the only thing left were the businesses, the economic hub of things.⁶⁴

Young's spirit of cooperation was well received in the white business community.⁶⁵ He skillfully used foreign relationships he developed during his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to lure foreign capital into Atlanta. By 1988, Atlanta ranked second only to Los Angeles in the number of Japanese companies located in the city. Largely due to Young's efforts, Atlanta also has the

only two black owned Honda car dealerships in the country.⁶⁶ New construction soared during Young's administration. In 1988, Young called urban development, "all blessing and no curse."⁶⁷ Over \$1 billion in building permits for new construction were approved in Atlanta in 1986 and 1987 alone.⁶⁸ Former councilman Jack Smith commented,

During Maynard [Jackson's administration], the heavy capital was going outside the city. During Andy [Young's administration], the heavy capital continues outside the city and a lot of heavy capital came into the city. A lot. There tremendous building."⁶⁹

Black-owned businesses also benefitted from Young's administration. When Jackson left office, 21 percent of city contracts went to minority owned businesses, by 1988 43 percent of city contracts went to minority-owned businesses.⁷⁰ As a sign of their prosperity, affluent blacks have increasingly been moving out of Atlanta into suburban communities.⁷¹

Young's "free-market" business orientation to urban development has generated substantial criticism from the black community and community-oriented white activists. In 1988, a quarter of Atlanta's population earned less than \$5000 per year and one-third lived in poverty.⁷² Development in Atlanta's mostly black Southside has been minimal. Job opportunities have increased mostly in the

white-collar sector, for which most blacks are unqualified. Large numbers black residents have been displaced by downtown development projects, and the quantity of sub-standard housing has increased to at least 25 percent of the total housing stock since the 1970's, despite a decrease the number of housing units overall.⁷³

Virtually every black activist or official interviewed for this study criticized the Young Administration for ignoring the needs of Atlanta's low-income residents.

Gerald Dobbs, an official in the Young administration, said:

Maynard, because of his bruising fights with the business community, probably had very few protractors and a zillion detractors in business. Andy has a lot of protractors in the business community for a variety of reasons. One is [that] it just happens that on occasion our agenda has been the same as theirs. Secondly, like it or not, he [Young] has a trickle down perspective on urban economies. If you have development then you have jobs for black people. And that sometimes works, sometimes doesn't. It works here a little bit, but I think this is the exception to the rule...Because we have such a strong minority business commitment, the presumption is that black people hire black people, which trickles down. But that ain't enough...⁷⁴

Fulton County Commission chairman Michael Lomax told the New York Times that he sees increasing separation between affluent white and black Atlantans, and the black urban poor. Lomax complained that "One group ends up living in a twilight zone of privilege and affluence and the other in a kind of inferno of destructiveness and blight."⁷⁵

Lomax indicated that poor black Atlantans live in a harsher environment after Young's tenure than before. When Young ran for re-election in 1985, former city councilmember and now congressman John Lewis said of Young, "One thing I do hear in the black community - people just think he's not producing for them."⁷⁶ SCLC chairman Joseph Lowery said in 1985 that, "They [the black community] want to see the poor be the beneficiaries of this partnership [with the private sector.]"⁷⁷

In a widely publicized speech given in the spring of 1988, Atlanta councilmember Jabari Samama characterized Young's trickle-down philosophy to economic development as, "voodoo politics, you know, magic to open up the floodgates of the city and let them [business] all come in and in some kind of way it's going to trickle down...."⁷⁸ That summer, Atlanta city councilmember and former civil rights leaders Hosea Williams said that Young had opted to placate the white business community at the expense of the black underclass.⁷⁹ NAACP leader Ed Samuels said, "...his [Young's] administration has been run... primarily for the benefit of the power structure. And if there's any benefits to accrue as a result of that, then fine. People get the scraps from the table..⁸⁰ Edna Dickson, the black head of a major anti-poverty organization and former high-ranking city official, said that Young when Young visited public

housing projects in the summer of 1988, he was viciously berated by the tenants. "Almost nobody has a good word to say about Andy," said Dickson, "nobody."⁸¹

A poll conducted by the Atlanta Constitution in May 1988 found that significant numbers of the city's poor blacks strongly disapproved of Young's performance. Among people with less than a high school education, 29 percent said the city had moved forward while 37 percent said it had gotten worse. Conversely, 48 percent of college graduates said the city had moved forward and only 13 percent said it had gotten worse.⁸²

Political scientist Clarence Stone writes that the business oriented character of Atlanta's city government is no accident.⁸³ Stone contends that entrepreneurial opportunity, wide business prerogative, and assurance of minority participation is the glue that holds Atlanta's bi-racial governing coalition together. According to Stone:

These regime arrangements satisfy each partner: white business executives gain needed black allies; and black political leaders are able to cultivate a useful and visible black constituency. Furthermore, black contractors and other business executives are a principal source of campaign funds. Overall the system is reinforcing.⁸⁴

Stone further argues that while city contracts may require minority participation, these requirements do not

specify which minority businesses. White business leaders still determine which black sub-contractors to bring on board. White business leaders thus have considerable leverage in building alliances and rewarding those black businesses who are most amenable to their interests.⁸⁵ In addition, because Atlanta has a weak one-party system and no strong labor unions, business faces little opposition in asserting its interests.⁸⁶

Jack Smith maintains that the Young administration, with its "love" relationship with the white business power structure has rolled back the initial gains that came with the election of the first black mayor. Smith said that Young, "has been like Reagan...He has been on the move relentlessly overcoming the things that we had achieved from the start of the people's movement...one of them is that big highway that's going out here through this neighborhood."⁸⁷ Community and welfare rights activist Pat Hampton said that, "It wouldn't be any worse off with the white man [as mayor], not by any means."⁸⁸

New Leadership

Despite frequently voiced criticisms, Mayor Young faced only token opposition in the 1981 mayoral race. Young received an overwhelming 80 percent of the vote.⁸⁹ Atlanta

activists and officials offered six explanations for why there has not been stronger political opposition to the Young Administration. Edna Dickson said that Young benefits from a Southern black tradition of supporting black leaders. "We still have a tradition of trying to support and protect the black leader, I mean the black mayor," said Dickson, "let's face it, Maynard Jackson used that and Andrew Young uses that. I heard Maynard say many times during his first term, 'Well [Edna] you know, no matter what we do the first black mayor is always re-elected.' I think it's because of the fact that here is the deep South and this is our tradition. No matter what happens it's a family matter."⁹⁰ Similarly, Jack Smith contended that black businessmen are loathe to support a black candidate against a black incumbent. They are afraid that a split among blacks will further strengthen the white business community, and cost them contracts.⁹¹

Similarly, Atlanta councilmember Jabari Samama argues that black Atlantans are so accustomed to focusing on racial issues that they are theoretically unequipped to grapple with the class issues that are dividing the black community. Samama stated:

It's important that we begin looking at class issues, because a purely racial analysis has been insufficient in the past. We put black people in all these places, Superintendent of Atlanta Public Schools, Chief of Police, and look what happened [instances of brutality perpetrated by black cops]...it's not merely a question

of exchanging white faces for black faces. We're talking now about some real class issues. We're talking really now about some programs that are fair and that benefit all of us. We're not merely talking about a race question.⁹²

Community activist Kwame Jones noted that the City Council does not challenge the Mayor on major policy issues because they are captive to the same interests. Jones maintains that because "many people on the council are real estate people," little opposition is likely to emerge from the city council on important issues such as rent control (Atlanta has no rent control program).⁹³

Political activist/economist Derrick Bowles maintains that lack of opposition stems from the absence of working class organizations such as unions and tenant organizations. In addition, potential leaders of Atlanta's low-income blacks have frequently come under legal indictment. Bowles said:

The real key issue is the absence of organizations among working class blacks and the question is whether it's going to come, and how soon...it's going to come, but how soon is it going to come. And I think that is what is going to make the difference in terms of the future of Atlanta politics. in the absence of that we'll continue to go from one black mayor to another black mayor and still see a city developed in the central part to the north part, with the masses of blacks left behind....the city has not yet elevated a candidate who can sort of tap the masses of blacks in organizing [for power]....the closest thing to it was [former Public Safety Commissioner] Reginald Eaves [under criminal indictment]..There are always attempts to discredit a real genuine candidate that they think might represent the interest of ordinary black folk.

Same with [City Council President] Marvin Arrington
[under criminal indictment].⁹⁴

Welfare rights/prison activist Pam Hicks contends that the repressive nature of Atlanta's welfare bureaucracy has stifled greater political activism in Atlanta's low-income black communities. Hicks claims that black elected officials have allowed government bureaucrats to intimidate and abuse poor blacks. Hicks described how the welfare bureaucracy stops poor people from organizing:

As a result of the social system being so repressive people are afraid of to say anything...So consequently you don't have poor people [organizing] now. Now take for instance a situation like this. We have a young lady who works [as a community organizer] with us, she has three children, she gets a stipend of a little bit over \$300-a-month, her rent is \$225, she has to have some money to live on because that does not take care of carfare, gas and electric and...telephone. It doesn't take care of the rest of those things. She dare not open her mouth in too big a way because if she does they will check her right down the line and find that she is making \$10 extra a week. When they find that she is making \$10 extra a week they will charge her with welfare fraud and put her in jail. That's what happens. So you get a community that dares not to open up its mouth because they will put their investigators on [an activist] and really bring you down. I think the politicians should protect us from that.⁹⁵

Finally, NAACP activist Ed Samuels argues that community organization in Atlanta dissipated after the election of a black mayor, a majority black city council, and black school board members. Samuels stated:

What that [elected blacks] does is resolve us from responsibility from acting ourselves. The mayor's up

there, so and so's on the school board, the fact that he's one in five or one in seven don't mean nothing, he's there, you know. [In the past] we didn't have anybody in county commission meetings [but] you did have a little committee of people going to just watch over things... and once we elected somebody they stopped going, 'Well, John is up there now.' And I think this is part of a problem that may be nationwide with us....⁹⁶

Despite weak political opposition to the Young Administration, there are definite signs that black politics in Atlanta is changing. A few newly elected black officials focus more on accountability of government to low-income constituents, particularly the black poor. In recent years, Atlanta has elected two city councilmembers, Jabari Samama and Bill Campbell, who consider themselves part of a "new wave" of black politicians dedicated to representing Atlanta's poor.⁹⁷ Mable Thomas, a newly elected State Representative, is also part of the "new wave" of black politicians in Atlanta. Thomas's political base is in the low-income black neighborhoods of central Atlanta (near the Atlanta University complex), and she is a strong critic of the middle-class bias of Atlanta's traditional black politicians.⁹⁸

The most visible example of emerging cleavages within Atlanta black politics may have been the upset victory of John Lewis over Julian Bond in the 1986 congressional race for representation of the 5th district. Lewis won despite

the support Bond received from Mayor Young and most of Atlanta's elected officials. The black elected officials who supported Lewis were City Councilmember Bill Campbell, Fulton County Commissioner (former Public Safety Director) Reginald Eaves, and Mable Thomas, all of whom are viewed as quasi-insurgents and have poor relationships with the Young administration.⁹⁹

1989 Mayoral Race

Two candidates announced candidates for mayor in the 1989 race, former mayor Maynard Jackson, and Fulton County Commission chairman Michael Lomax, both are black. Both candidates made overtures to the white business community, but it was clear early on that Lomax had an edge in white business support. Both candidates attempted to distance themselves from Young's abandonment of poor black Atlantans, but Maynard Jackson was able identify Lomax with business control of the city.

As a clear signal that Jackson did not intend to repeat the mistakes of Julian Bond, Jackson hired C.T. Martin as his campaign manager, the campaign strategist for John Lewis's 1986 congressional campaign. At his campaign announcement, Jackson aimed his appeal clearly at low-income voters. He declared, "Help is on the way," for a city

struggling with homelessness, drugs, and poverty. He told listeners, "I've listened intently, and people want some help."¹⁰⁰ In his campaign appearances, Jackson stressed many of the issues that have been the strongest criticisms of the Young administration, "development of the mostly black Southside; affordable housing and eradication of homelessness; a war on crime, drugs and poverty...."¹⁰¹

Many Atlanta activists thought that the Jackson versus Lomax race would be a historic turning point for black politics in Atlanta. Two strong black candidates faced each other in contest for the highest elected office in the city. For the first time race would not be a dominant issue in the campaign. The candidates would be forced to focus on their individual merits and proposals. Derrick Bolwes said:

I think its good that we're getting to the point where we can pose black candidates against black candidates, because they will then have to begin to address issues designed to enthuse their constituency, as opposed to centering on issues solely around race, expecting a vote by default. So I think its going to be a good fallout over a campaign like Jackson and Lomax.¹⁰²

The reality of Atlanta politics is that the white business community is well-organized and able to play a large role in financing political candidates, and poor black Atlantans are poorly organized. black Atlantans, however, still represent more than 60 percent of registered voters; only a small minority are middle-class. Atlanta's poor

Blacks are a force in Atlanta politics, if only by their numbers. Because Jackson was acutely aware of this reality, and pitched his campaign to low-income blacks, he was able to force Lomax out of the race.

Conclusion

Atlanta has weak party organizations, weak unions, and few white ethnics. Atlanta politics, like all Southern politics, has historically been dominated by the race issue. The main cleavages in Atlanta politics have traditionally boiled down to white versus black. Blacks were excluded from participating in most important elections until white primaries were eliminated in 1946. Even after 1946, and until blacks had a solid voting majority in the 1970's, mayoral (and congressional) contests in Atlanta generally pitted the racially "liberal" white candidate (usually supported by white business) against a racial conservative, who could usually count on low-income white support. Blacks had little choice under these circumstances but to support the more liberal white candidate. White business leaders and blacks thus formed an electoral coalition in the 1950's and 1960's which governed the city. The coalition was not a relationship among equals. Blacks were junior partners in the alliance. The main benefits blacks received were symbolic, such as the hiring of black police officers.

However, black middle-class leaders did receive recognition as black leaders from the white establishment. They were the "legitimate" leaders of the black community.

Black Atlantans had enough votes to elect Tate as the city's first black mayor in 1969, but the refusal of black elected officials to support him divided the black vote. Black clientage politics was still a potent force, even in Martin Luther King's hometown a year after his assassination. However, Tate's candidacy mortally wounded the traditional alliance, and set the stage for Maynard Jackson's victory in 1973.

After the election of a black mayor, the black/white business political coalition was re-established, this time with middle-class blacks on a more equal basis. The losers in the new governing coalition are low-income blacks and white neighborhood preservation groups. The growing disparity between Atlanta's 'black haves' and 'black have-nots,' as well as the conflict between Atlanta's pro-business policies and neighborhood preservation groups, is beginning to find political expression in Atlanta elections.

Although poor blacks do not have the money or organizational capacity to match Atlanta's white (and black) business community, they are a large fraction of the

electorate. It was low-income blacks and white neighborhood groups whose lack of support cost Julian Bond a congressional seat in 1986.

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Chapter 6

The Jackson Campaigns in Atlanta

Jackson's initial proposal that a black candidate run for president in 1984 won a cold response from the most important Southern civil rights and political leaders. Coretta Scott King, Andrew Young, Joseph Lowery, and Julian Bond opposed Jackson's idea of running for president because they were said to have thought his behavior following the death of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. was opportunist and self-promoting.¹

1984 Jackson Campaign in Atlanta

But Jackson won the early support of black church leaders in Atlanta. Jack Barnett, a leader of Atlanta PUSH and early Jackson supporter, recalled:

The local ministers were fully behind him [Jackson]. Reverend Cameron Alexander, who was the president of the State Convention [a 500,000 member state-wide African American organization called the General Missionary Baptist Convention of Georgia] ...raised \$38-39,000 at the convention during their annual session as encouragement and to facilitate some things for Reverend Jackson.²

Except for former mayor Maynard Jackson and a few ministers, however, no other established black leaders supported Jesse Jackson's candidacy for President.³ Mayor

Andrew Young was officially neutral during the campaign, although he repeatedly stated his opposition to a "symbolic" black presidential campaign.⁴ Other leaders, such as Georgia State Senator Julian Bond, openly supported Mondale.

Jackson's 1984 Campaign in Atlanta

Georgia State Representative Tyrone Brooks led Jackson's campaign in was led by . Brooks opened a small campaign office in Atlanta, but the campaign had no paid staff.⁵ None of the 1984 Jackson supporters interviewed knew for certain how much money was raised in Atlanta in 1984, but estimates were well below \$200,000 for the entire state of Georgia.⁶ Jackson had the support of some influential black businessmen, guided by long-time political and business leader Jesse Hill, who played a large role in fundraising efforts.⁷

Despite his low budget, Jackson managed to run a high visibility campaign in Atlanta. He spoke before the Georgia State Legislature (located in Atlanta), dined at housing projects in the black community, held a combination prayer meeting and campaign rally at the Atlanta Civic Center, and appeared at numerous churches.⁸ Opposition from Atlanta's black establishment added to the protest flavor of Jackson's

1984 campaign. Kwame Jones said that Jackson's campaign, "was a protest kind of thing...it was telling them [the black and white power establishment] to go to hell, basically."⁹

As in other cities, the Jackson campaign created a feeling of hope, even "zeal," among many black Atlantans.¹⁰ Gerald Dobbs, an official in Young's administration, said,

It [the 1984 Jackson campaign] did the same thing here it did other places, it brought black politics to a crescendo...he raised substantive questions and he provided some answers. In addition to raising some questions it catalyzed a lot people who had never been involved in politics and things like that...but some of the stuff is hard to quantify."¹¹

The division between Atlanta's elected and civil rights leadership and Jesse Jackson created some confusion among Atlanta's black voters. Derrick Bowles said,

Division among black leaders created a great deal of confusion in 1984, although people were inspired by Jackson and could identify with him."¹²

PUSH leader Jack Barnett said that the less than unanimous support Jackson received in Atlanta's black community, "is owed in some part to the fact that the common naysayers, if you will, thought this wasn't the time for a black person to offer themselves for President, meaning the Andy Young's, and the Coretta King's, and so forth. There's a certain amount of people that somehow think that ...top

leadership in government is reserved for white people...they just felt that Reverend Jackson was rocking the boat, so they were able to influence the [masses of] people."¹³

One black official, city councilmember and former SCLC leader Hosea Williams, claimed that Jackson never consulted with Atlanta's black leadership regarding his campaign. Williams said Jackson, "has never asked black leaders for their advice. And we don't need someone else telling us what to think. If we allow a black dictatorship, we might as well accept a white dictatorship."¹⁴

In short, the Jackson 1984 campaign in Atlanta won a warm response from black ministers and a large segment of the black community. But most of Atlanta's elected black leadership and civil rights leaders snubbed Jackson.

Jackson 1984 Impact on Voter Registration

The unique impact of Jackson campaign on voter registration in Atlanta is difficult to measure because Atlanta was already the focus of on-going voter registration efforts by the Atlanta Voter Education Project and other groups.¹⁵ Figure 3 demonstrates a steady increase in black voter registration from April 1983 through October 1984,

just before the 1984 general election.^a Between April 1983 and March 1984, around the time of the Democratic primary, black voter registration increased by more than 14,000, from 94,017 to 108,052. White voter registration increased by only 1,442 in that same period. There was clearly a substantial degree of organized voter registration in the black community. Given the weak organization of the Atlanta Jackson campaign in 1984, it is highly unlikely that it was directly responsible for registering many of the 14,000 new registrants.

When asked whether the Jackson campaign led to new voter registration, Gerald Dobbs said,

I think that some portions of the black belt that he [Jackson] can take credit for, but in urban areas, there are some processes that are institutionalized that I think it would be hard for him to take credit for...and I mean five or ten rallies where he calls down a hundred college students is not too many votes."¹⁶

When asked if the Jackson campaign registered new voters, Atlanta activist and former city councilmember Jack Smith said, "In my opinion, no. The voter registration is hard work and a lot of people talk about it but almost nobody does it."¹⁷ Nonetheless, Jackson's appearances at churches, rallies, and housing projects undoubtedly helped

^a Voter registration figures, broken down by race, are taken from the Fulton County Office of Voter Registration.

create a favorable climate for on-going voter registration efforts.¹⁸




Figure 1

Source: Turnout percentages were calculated based on election figures provided by the Fulton County Elections Department. Voter registration figures, broken down by race, were provided by the Fulton County Office of Voter Registration. Turnout percentages for whites and blacks were calculated by means of simple regression. Standard error margins were (with a single exception) less than 10 percent.

Jackson 1984 Impact on Voter Turnout

Black voter turnout was well over 60 percent in the 1973 mayoral election, when Atlanta elected Maynard Jackson its first black mayor. Black voter turnout in the 1984 presidential primary did not approach these levels. Table XVIII shows that only 40 percent of black registered voters turned out in the 1984 primary.

Part of the low voter turnout might be explained by the weak organization of the Jackson campaign, but Atlanta activists suggested other reasons as well. Kwame Jones suggested that black Atlantans simply are not as enthused about a black person running for political office as are African Americans in other cities. Jones said:

If there's a city in this country where there's an attitude that you just can't elect black politicians just because they're black, I think it's Atlanta. People have sufficient experience that [they know] it's got to be something more than that."¹⁹

Others suggested that black voters are disappointed after having elected black mayors with high expectations of material improvements. They believe that participating in electoral politics has brought them little material benefit.

Julian Bond, a Mondale backer, told the New York Times

that Mondale mailings had been keyed to upper-income black homes in Atlanta and that Mondale workers took pains to not mobilize Jackson voters.²⁰ Analysis of black voter turnout and voting preferences, however, reveals little class differentiation among black voters in the primary election.

To analyze black voting patterns, majority black census tracts (greater than 70 percent black) were grouped by 1980 per capita income. The low range consisted of tracts with a per capita income of less than \$2500 (35 tracts), the middle-income range was \$2100-\$4500 per capita (16 tracts), and the high range was above \$4500 per capita (1 tract). Precincts were combined to approximate census tract boundaries. Precinct-level election results were then aggregated by census tract. Democratic primary results (1984) could thus be tabulated by income, controlling for race.

Among black low-income tracts, 13 of 35 had greater than 40 percent turnout, 18 had between 30-40 percent turnout, and 4 had less than 30 percent turnout. In the black mid-income range, 7 of 15 tracts had greater than 40 percent turnout, 8 had 30-40 percent turnout, and none had less than 30 percent turnout. There is only one majority black/high income tract - not enough to constitute a trend.

Thus it appears that low-income registered voters were only slightly less likely to turnout for the election than were middle-income voters.

The Mondale campaign's careful efforts to mobilize upper-income black voters and avoid mobilizing low-income black voters was unsuccessful on both counts. It also does not appear to have been necessary. Only 5 of 54 black tracts gave Mondale less than 25 percent of the vote, and 23 of 54 gave Mondale greater than 35 percent of the vote. Mondale got a significant part of the black vote in black low-income areas as well as in middle-income black areas. Mondale won more than 25 percent of the vote in 19 of 38 low-income black tracts, and greater than 35 percent in 15 of those tracts. Mondale won more than 25 percent of the vote in 7 of 16 middle-income black tracts, and more than 35 percent of the vote in 8 of those tracts. When it is considered that middle-income black neighborhoods are more likely to be integrated with whites than are low-income black neighborhoods (public housing is 90 percent black in Atlanta), the slight edge in the Mondale vote among black middle-income tracts is insignificant.

Table I**Voter Turnout (%)**

	Black	SE	White	SE
Dem Primary 1982	31	(2)	*	
Dem Primary 1984	40	(2)	*	
Mayoral Election 1985	32	(2)	25	(1)
Dem Primary 1986	32	(3)	*	
Bond/Lewis Run-off	30	(3)	17	(2)
Dem Primary 1988	39	(2)	*	

Source: Turnout percentages were calculated based on election figures provided by the Fulton County Elections Department. Voter registration figures, broken down by race, were provided by the Fulton County Office of Voter Registration.

Did the 1984 Jackson Campaign Inspire Blacks to Run

The most important race to follow on the heels of the 1984 Jackson campaign was Andrew Young's 1985 re-election. Young had suffered acute embarrassment at the 1984 Democratic National Convention as a result of his opposition to the Jackson Campaign's call for a plank favoring the elimination of run-off primaries.^a When Young rose, in a nationally televised broadcast, to speak against the Jackson plank, he was loudly booed by Jackson delegates. Young broke out in tears in front of the national audience. Coretta Scott King was also booed when she later defended Young at a Jackson delegates meeting during the convention.

Despite his embarrassment on national television, Young faced little fallout at home because of his opposition to the Jackson Campaign. Criticism of Young was vociferous in 1985, but it was focused on local issues (see Chapter 5).

PUSH leader Jack Barnett said that Young's increasing

^a Many Southern states have provisions for Democratic primary run-off elections, as does New York City. If no candidate wins more than 50 percent of the vote, a run-off election is held between the two candidates with the largest number of votes in the primary. Supporters of Jackson argued that run-off primaries hurt the chances of black candidates in districts, where blacks constitute less than a majority of the Democratic electorate. Blacks are given little chance of beating a white in these one-on-one contests. Young argued that run-offs have the opposite effect in districts where blacks are a majority of the electorate, and should be supported. The Southern Democratic parties were strongly in favor of retaining run-off primaries.

unpopularity was, "more related to local issues...I think some of it is that politicians over promise and there's been some problem with the police department, killings and so forth. Those things affected his rating more than his opposition to Reverend Jackson."²¹

Young faced criticism in the black community because of his support for a highly regressive city sales tax critics said forced the poor to subsidize wealthy businesses in Atlanta.²² Young also sponsored an increase in property taxes that antagonized wealthy homeowners on Atlanta's Northside.²³

Edwin Beeker, long-time voter registration worker in Atlanta, said that the only reason Young did not face strong opposition in 1985 was out of "etiquette."²⁴ Edna Dickson added that, "opposing Jesse didn't hurt Young as much as it would have in New York or Los Angeles because we still have very much a tradition of trying to support and protect the black leader."²⁵

Jackson's 1984 Georgia campaign manager, Tyrone Brooks, briefly considered running against Mayor Young. Brooks said that Atlantans were "rebellious" against Young and that voters wanted, "someone who will stay home and do the job as mayor."²⁶ Young did not take Brooks threat to

run seriously. Young also discounted any threat of Jesse Jackson coming to Atlanta to campaign against him. Young defined Jesse Jackson's mission as increasing black political participation, not challenging existing black leadership. Young said that Jackson would not campaign against him because, "He'd be in trouble all over the country, because he would discredit the very idea of the Rainbow Coalition, which was to advance black political participation...If he sets foot in here against me it only says that this was a Jesse Jackson power trip all along."²⁷ Underscoring Young's point, Jesse Jackson issued a statement saying that he had no plans to campaign for Brooks.²⁸

Facing only token opposition, Young won the election with 83 percent of the vote. The Atlanta Constitution estimated turnout for the election at only 32 percent.²⁹ Regression analysis suggests that black turnout was about 32 percent, while white turnout was close to 25 percent (see Table XVIII). Young won approximately 91 percent of the black vote and 58 percent of the white vote.^a Apparently, Young faced no negative repercussions in the black community because of his opposition to Jackson in 1984. No Jackson inspired candidates ran against him.

^a A breakdown of Young's vote by race was accomplished by means of bivariate regression.

The only candidate to run for office in Atlanta directly as a result of the 1984 Jackson campaign was the then 26 year-old Mable Thomas. Mable Thomas's first political experience was organizing students and community residents who live near the Atlanta University complex for Jackson in 1984. Thomas ran as a Jackson delegate and her determined organizational efforts won her more votes than any other Jackson delegate in the city.³⁰ Afterwards Thomas immediately ran for the Georgia State Assembly against an old-time black assemblymember, Grace Davis. Davis represented a past era in Atlanta politics. She, "actually [had gone] to Congress for federal hearings and testified that we didn't need a black [congressional] district when re-districting was taking place. So Grace needed to go and Mable was the one to get her out."³¹ Thomas won with strong community support.

Thomas's victory was primarily the result of her own efforts, since the 1984 Jackson campaign left no organizational legacy. Kwame Jones commented that, "there was no [Jackson] structure...there was no attempt to build a structure...and the Rainbow was more a concept than a reality here."³² Jones describes Mable Thomas as an example of a new breed of black politician in Atlanta: she is not part of the black elite and her primary efforts are clearly aimed at Atlanta's low-income African Americans, who

constitute a majority of her constituents. Jones said, "Mable Thomas represents a particular trend in politics. She's one of the forerunners in terms of what's happening locally...it's interesting, too, that Atlanta may be one of the first places that a new black politics begins to emerge."³³ Mable Thomas later played an important role in supporting John Lewis against Julian Bond in the 1986 congressional race. With the lone exception of Thomas, the 1984 Jackson campaign did not lead to any new political candidacies in Atlanta.

Bond versus Lewis

The 1984 Jackson campaign was not an issue in the 1986 congressional race in Atlanta's 5th Congressional district. Neither of the two major candidates, Julian Bond and John Lewis, supported Jackson in 1984. Both Lewis and Bond had long histories of involvement in the civil rights movement. Lewis had been the chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) during the height of student protests in the South. Bond had been SNCC's communications secretary. Lewis went on to succeed Vernon Jordan as the director of the Voter Education Project, while Bond began a twenty year tenure as a Georgia State Senator. Lewis ran for congress from the 5th Congressional district in 1976,

were he lost badly to Wyche Fowler. Afterwards, Lewis won a seat on the Atlanta City Council.

Bond had the support of Andrew Young. Bond even had the endorsement of New York's Mayor Ed Koch. Bond accepted the Koch endorsement despite an urgent anti-Koch telegram from leaders of New York's black clergy to influential black Atlanta clergymen Rev. Cameron Alexander and Rev. Cornelius Henderson. The New York preachers said in the telegram that Koch was no friend of black people and they urged Atlanta clergy to dissuade Bond from accepting Koch's support. Bond's support among the black Atlanta clergy was underscored by the fact that neither Alexander nor Henderson publicized the telegram sent by the New York ministers.³⁴

Mayor Young lent a key aide, Gene Duffy, to manage Bond's campaign. Bond also had an early lead in fundraising and political polls showed him to be far ahead of Lewis among black voters, who constitute a majority in the district.³⁵

According to Lewis supporter Barry Smothers, Bond's early lead led him to make a series of mistakes. For starters, Bond's campaign wrote-off the white vote.³⁶ Smothers criticized the Bond campaign for not doing a single mailing to the white residents of the 5th district, even

though whites constitute 42 percent its voters.³⁷ Bond also made the mistake of debating Lewis three times. Bond was ahead of Lewis in the polls, so it was not clear why he wanted to debate Lewis. Several Atlanta activists suggested that Bond, who is a highly sought-after national speaker, wanted to show off his oratorical skills next to Lewis, who does not enjoy a favorable reputation as a public speaker. In any case, the debates backfired on Bond. Atlanta city councilmember Hosea Williams contends that the debates were disastrous for Bond:

Julian Bond got killed because of his ties to the black elite. I begged him not to debate John Lewis. He had something like 48 percent of the vote, and John had just 34. Julian should have gone on vacation. But his ego tells him to debate. So he gets on TV, all articulate, with his thin nose and lips, and all these white characteristics. And here comes ol' John, stumbling and dark-skinned and thick-lipped and wide-nosed and inarticulate. And the race was over. Because half the blacks in this city are just like him.³⁸

Many activists described the polarization between Atlanta's black elite and black working class masses as not only a class difference and but also a difference between light-skinned blacks and dark-skinned blacks.^{*} PUSH activist Jack Barnett contended that many of Atlanta's black political leadership supported Bond not because they thought

* The identification of skin-color with class differentiation among blacks dates back to slavery. For an interesting treatment of the subject see, E. Franklin Frazier, On Race Relations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), Chapter 15.

him to be more qualified than Lewis, but because of intra-black class and racial prejudice. Barnett said:

[After the election, a white radio host] depicted him [Lewis] as being an idiot and stuttering. [As a result] a lot of black people were up in arms that they would dare talk about a congressman that way. But in fact, many people in the black leadership had depicted him in the same manner and many people wanted Julian not so much [because] he was better qualified than John...but [because] he would be more acceptable to them. He could talk good and smooth and he's quick on his feet and he's light-skinned, with good [straight] hair and so forth. But I don't think that someone need be disqualified because they have a stammer and they stutter a little bit [and] they came from a plantation school.³⁹

Bond supporters also contended that there was race-baiting in the campaign, but that it was Lewis, not Bond, who catered to racial prejudices. "John was able to race-bait [to whites,]" said Gerald Dobbs, "and they would literally say, 'If you want Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young again, vote for Julian Bond. If you want someone who is going to listen to you (which is a euphemism for "I'm not going to be pro-black"), vote for me.'"⁴⁰

Persistent rumors of alleged drug use set back to the Bond campaign. Gerald Dobbs, who played a leading role on the Bond campaign, said:

[There] was this kind of whispering campaign about his alleged drug abuse...and [Bond] took a principled [civil libertarian] position that no one could get him off of. It's easy to say that he took a principled position because he was an alleged drug user. But the fact of the matter is this guy's known for his life to take a principled position, and he said, "I ain't takin

it [the drug test], and if I gotta lose this race, I'm gonna lose the race." And that comes real inside baseball because I was in the room when we were asking him literally to piss in the can for a short-term gain...he said, "I ain't doing it."⁴¹

During a televised debate, Lewis challenged Bond to take a drug test. Lewis said, "Can you tell us, Julian, why you will not take the test so that the people will know you are not on drugs?...Let us go down the hall to the bathroom and take the test right now."⁴² Two of the Atlanta activists interviewed, Pam Hicks and Edna Dickson, who do extensive work in Atlanta's low-income black communities, said that the drug issue turned them (and many others) away from Bond into Lewis's camp. Both of them commented that drug addiction and related violence is too severe in Atlanta's low-income communities for there to be any suspicion of drug use on the part of an elected official.

Julian Bond won the election with 47 percent of the vote (27,000 votes). Lewis came in second with 35 percent of the vote (21,000).⁴³ Because of Georgia's run-off primary law, Bond and Lewis had a run-off election. The run-off promised to be a close race.

An incident then occurred that proved to be costly for Bond. When Bond approached newly elected State Representative Mable Thomas to work in her district for him,

Thomas requested \$1,000 to pay her supporters. Bond then went to the newspapers and implied that Thomas wanted a payoff in exchange for her political support.^a Bond's allegations gained further credence when a former Congressional candidate turned Bond supporter, Jan Douglass, said that she had paid Thomas \$5,000 and that all Thomas had done was distribute the money to her supporters in local housing projects.⁴⁴ Mable Thomas was outraged. Jones said that:

Well Mable did what was characteristic of Mable, she just kept on going...she rode with John. And it was that [working class] element that Mable helped bring that probably helped John win. So again that class orientation that these [Bond] people maintained impacted.⁴⁵

John Lewis narrowly won the run-off election, winning 81 percent of the white vote and 40 percent of the black vote.^b He got 35,142 votes to Bond's 32,447, a 2,695 vote difference.⁴⁶ Lewis had been able to tap into Northside white dissatisfaction with the Young Administration's support for Georgia 400, a massive highway construction project that would de-value homes and displace Northside

^a In a city with a tradition of relatively strong party organization of low-income voters, such as New York, the provision of "walking around money" is a common and accepted practice. In Atlanta, with weak party organization and a tradition of business domination of politics, patronage is private (see Chapter 5). The provision of "walking around money" is viewed by many in Atlanta as corrupt.

^b Vote percentages by race were estimated by bivariate regression.

residents.^a Lewis also won a substantial portion of the black vote. Atlanta activist Derrick Bowles said that "Lewis' strongest support was in the housing projects. The housing projects were overwhelmingly for Lewis...there was sort of a black backlash against the black political establishment."⁴⁷

Several activists called Lewis's victory a fluke, something that was not supposed to happen and would not have happened without Bond's campaign errors. Jack Smith, while calling the election a fluke, said it represented polarization within the black community:

It was a fluke but it was the beginning of something else, which is this self-indulgence of self-criticism within the black community [which is based on] the confidence of a profound [black] political majority.⁴⁸

The significance of Lewis's victory was not lost on the white business community. Dillard Munford, a conservative white businessman, offered a candid assessment of Lewis's victory:

You see, the Congressional race between John Lewis and Julian Bond showed that there's been a breakdown within the black community between the well-off, light-skinned blacks and the dark-skinned masses. The light-skinned blacks have always just used the dark-skinned blacks for their votes. This time around, though, the dark-skinned blacks elected their own candidate, John

^a Ironically, in a bid for developer money in the closing weeks of the campaign, Lewis (unknown to most northside residents) reversed his position on Georgia 400. See Smothers, interview by author.

Lewis.⁴⁹

The 1984 Jackson campaign appears to have had little impact on the election. Both candidates sought Jackson's endorsement, but Jackson had declined to support either.⁵⁰ Table XIX estimates the proportion of Jackson 1984 voters who voted for Bond, Lewis, or did not vote in the 1986 run-off. As can be seen, about half (54 percent) of the 1984 Jackson voters stayed home, although they were more likely than non-Jackson supporters to vote. Those Jackson voters who voted in the run-off displayed a clear 4-to-1 preference for Bond. Bond was hurt by the low-turnout of 1984 Jackson voters. Kwame Jones argues that:

Julian Bond lost the 5th Congressional district because he didn't support Jackson. If Julian had supported Jesse during 1984, he would have won, no problem. Because it's that same working class element [that voted for Jackson] who had no reason to vote [for Bond]. I think it's a logical position to say, 'Why go and vote when I've seen what this system does?' I think people are very intelligent and they're not just lazy and don't want to go and exercise their rights - cause a lot of people died for that...John Lewis was able to get a certain portion of that element, because they were able to say this is the son of a sharecropper while Julian is the son of a college president.⁵¹

An increase in turnout from 1984 Jackson supporters would have helped Bond, and probably pushed him over the top, however, fewer debates, a different response to the drug issue, more energetic street campaigning, or more outreach to northside white voters might have pushed him

over the top.

The Jackson campaign did not have a major impact on the 1986 election between Bond and Lewis. It could have had an impact if Jackson endorsed one of the candidates, or had Bond supported Jackson and then used Jackson's popularity to distance himself from Atlanta's black political establishment. Despite the closeness of the race and its characterization as a "fluke," Bond's loss represented a major turning point in Atlanta black politics. The middle-class black political establishment was challenged and defeated in a major political contest. This time, the challenger was black, and the opposition consisted of low-income blacks and neighborhood-oriented whites opposed to the white business sponsored development. Bond's opposition to Jackson in 1984 was not a decisive cause of Bond's defeat. Bond's opposition to Jackson was an additional factor that only broadened the already growing gap between Atlanta's black establishment and it's increasingly alienated black population.

Table II

<u>Voter Transition: 1984 Democratic Primary/1986 Run-off</u>				
	JJ84	VAC84	DNV84	New
Reg				
Bond	36	0	14	23
Lewis	9	17	12	15
DNV	54	83	72	60

The labels on the variables above signify the following:

JJ84 - Voted for Jackson in 1984
 VAC84 - Voted for candidate other than Jackson in 1984
 DNV84 - Did not vote in 1984 primary
 New Reg - Registered to vote since 1984 primary
 Bond - Voted for Bond in 1986 run-off
 Lewis - Voted for Lewis in 1986 run-off
 DNV - Did not vote in 1986 run-off

The 1988 Jackson Campaign

As in New York and Oakland, the 1988 Jackson campaign in Atlanta differed in many respects from the 1984 campaign. The 1988 campaign was better organized, having a paid office manager in 1988, and a full-time field coordinator responsible for metropolitan Atlanta.⁵² In addition, Jackson's Southern regional headquarters was located in Atlanta, headed up by Ron Daniels, a Jackson aide sent from the national headquarters. The 1988 campaign also raised more money. Jack Barnett estimated that the 1988 Jackson campaign raised more than \$200,000 in Georgia and \$81,247 in Atlanta.^a

In contrast to 1984, most black elected officials endorsed Jackson in 1988. The notable exception was State Representative Tyrone Brooks, who was Jackson's 1984 State Campaign Manager. Brooks said that he supported Jackson in 1984 because he supported the "symbol" of a black candidate running for president. Walker publicly urged Jackson not to run in 1988, "let's let the [Democratic] party heal itself," said Walker, "Let's play the role of insider for a while."⁵³ Although Walker made no public comments regarding Jackson's failure to support his putative campaign

^a Jackson contribution figures are taken from a computerized list of Jackson contributions for 1987/88.

against Andy Young in 1986, it is unlikely that he forgot it when Jackson declared his candidacy in 1988.

Andrew Young was again neutral in 1988, but made no public comments discouraging Jackson's efforts, as he had in 1984. Jack Barnett said, "Over the past three or four weeks, Mayor Young and Jesse have healed the wounds, if you will, and Mayor Young has acknowledged Jesse as a moral leader of the movement, if you will, for black people. So, I think Andy has remained very neutral in the 1988 campaign."⁵⁴ The unity of black elected officials in support of Jackson helped to generate a more enthusiastic response to Jackson throughout Atlanta's black communities.⁵⁵

The 1988 Jackson campaign consciously reached out to liberal whites in Georgia.⁵⁶ The state campaign co-chair was Mike Mears, the white mayor of Decatur, Georgia, an Atlanta suburb. The son of a Mississippi truck driver and a garment worker, Mears had grown up poor. He was an early supporter of the civil rights movement, and eventually became a lawyer in Decatur. Mears ran for city council in Decatur and was elected in a majority black district. Mears was attracted to Jackson's populist working class message.⁵⁷

Did the 1988 Campaign Increase Black Voter Registration?

Black voter registration declined by 2,276 in Atlanta between 1984 and 1988. Barry Smothers, who has worked on several important election campaigns in Atlanta since the 1960's, maintains that:

Voter registration is not on the minds of incumbents. There has been no major voter registration effort in Atlanta for a long time. The Jackson campaign had some grassroots organizations doing voter registration in 1984, the Democratic Party pumped in some money, and so did labor - to help Mondale. This time the Democratic Party said no money until after the primary. They saw that voter registration had helped Jesse in '84."⁵⁸

Without insurgent politicians challenging incumbents in the black community, and without outside funding for local groups to do voter registration in Atlanta, voter registration decreased. The decrease occurred despite the fact that Jackson had a warmer reception in Atlanta in 1988 than he did in 1984. Voter registration simply does not happen spontaneously or through Jackson's charisma, but takes organization and workers to follow-up. Having only two paid staff, a minimal budget, and no local contests motivating systematic organizational efforts, the Jackson campaign had a minimal impact on voter registration in 1988.

Did the Jackson Campaign Increase Black Turnout?

As Table XVIII shows, black turnout in 1988 was

roughly the same as in 1984. Blacks voted at an estimated 39 percent rate in 1988 and a 40 percent rate in 1984. Despite improvements in campaign organization, the Jackson campaign did not have much money to pump into get-out-the-vote efforts. In contrast to 1984, however, Jackson won an estimated 98 percent of the black vote in Atlanta, and 15 percent of the white vote. While Jackson captured 38 percent of the total Democratic vote in 1984 in Atlanta, he won 69 percent in 1988.

Did the 1988 Jackson Campaign Inspire Others to Run?

The 1988 Jackson campaign did not inspire any new political campaigns in Atlanta. The major race following the 1988 Jackson campaign is the October 1989 mayoral contests between Maynard Jackson and Michael Lomax. Michael Lomax endorsed Jackson in 1988, but he did so on the eve of the primary and did not play a visible role in the campaign.⁵⁹ In 1984, Lomax had endorsed Gary Hart and was a Hart delegate to the 1984 Democratic Convention. Maynard Jackson endorsed Jesse Jackson in 1984 but withheld his endorsement in 1988.⁶⁰

An early poll conducted by the Atlanta Constitution showed Lomax far behind Maynard Jackson in black support

(Jackson had a 3 to 1 edge), while Lomax led among whites 2 to 1.⁶¹ Because black voters are more than 60 percent of the electorate, the greatest danger Maynard Jackson faced, before Lomax dropped out, was a combination of low black turnout and high white turnout.

Lomax, a college English professor from California, did not have the same kind of appeal in Atlanta's low-income neighborhoods John Lewis had.⁶² Maynard Jackson did not face the threat of Lomax taking 40 percent of the black vote. Low black turnout, however, could have had the same effect. Maynard Jackson had the task of convincing Atlanta's low-income communities that he would deliver for them - in contrast to the Young Administration.⁶³ It is little wonder that Maynard Jackson targeted his campaign announcement to low-income black communities and declared, "Help Is On the Way."⁶⁴

Ironically, Andrew Young may benefit most from the 1988 Jackson campaign. Andrew Young has declared an interest in running for governor of Georgia. Should he run for governor, Young would benefit from a strong racial mobilization among blacks in Georgia, particularly in the rural areas.⁶⁵ Jackson won the Democratic primary in the state of Georgia, and there is little doubt that Jackson would be an effective campaigner on Young's behalf.

Moreover, Jackson supporters declared their intention to build a state-wide "Georgian New South Coalition" after the campaign.^a Young aide Gerald Dobbs, however, insists that Jackson's ability to affect local races is overstated. Dobbs does not think that Jackson was decisive in Wyche Fowler's 1986 Senatorial victory in Georgia, that he would be a decisive factor in a Young election, or that Jackson's Georgia victory convinced Young to run for governor. Said Dobbs:

Young was [already] set to go for governor....Every local race has its own ingredients, its own cultural bias, its own constituency...and I think that has to be examined accordingly...[To say that Jackson is responsible for local electoral victories, such as Fowler's] I think, does an injustice to Jesse and to the people who produced that local election.⁶⁶

Even if Young wins strong black support, he will still need a sizable portion of the white vote to win. Most of Atlanta's liberal white voters are in Atlanta, or in smaller urban centers.⁶⁷ Some of Young's positions, such as using local police to train the Guatemala police force, have further antagonized white liberals in Atlanta who are already displeased with Young's support for the Georgia 400 highway.^{68 b}

^a The organization has not yet been established.

^b Regarding Young's plan to train Guatemalan police officers, Kwame Jones said, "Young wouldn't talk about professionalizing Bull Conner's policemen in Alabama as a way of bringing about democracy. So why should he talk about professionalizing the Guatemalan police at the expense of the American

If Young fails to attract strong white liberal support, he may need Jesse Jackson's support to mount a credible campaign for governor. As noted in Chapter 3, however, Jackson has the greatest impact in elections which pit black against white candidates and in which blacks are a majority. Applying this formula to Georgia, where blacks are a minority of the state's electorate, Young would logically have to carefully weigh the pro's (black mobilization) against the cons (white counter-mobilization) before seeking Jackson's support. This consideration may have led Young to maintain his neutrality in the 1989 Democratic primary and to delay announcing his intention to run for governor until after the Jackson campaign.

Conclusion

Black Atlantans were becoming increasingly divided by class when Jackson began his campaign in early 1984. Mayor Young's opposition to Jackson in 1984 further divided black

people...Amnesty [international] came out against [Young] because of the 50,000 disappearances in Guatemala that involve the security forces and [because of] death squad activity. Andy was going to use the same process that the Reagan Administration was using - private funders to finance a program to help legitimize a bunch of bandits, a bunch of butchers that are killing their own native people in Guatemala...It just didn't follow...On a federal level 15 of 23 members of the Congressional Black Caucus wrote Andy a letter telling him this was bad politics and it is my understanding that more wanted to sign it but they wanted to get something to him real quick.

leadership in the city. Nonetheless, 70 percent of black Atlanta voters cast their ballots for Jackson in 1984. This could be seen as an outright rejection of Mayor Young's leadership. Interviews suggest many blacks have become cynical towards local politicians. However, there are no black organizations capable of turning that cynicism into local political protest. The 1984 Jackson campaign had a protest character, but the protest was short-lived. And, weak political organization led to low (40 percent) turnout.

Mayor Young faced few local negative political consequences because of his opposition to Jackson. Local criticism of Young has focused almost entirely on local issues, not his opposition to Jackson. Again, black organized opposition to Young was weak and disorganized. Weak organization reflects the absence of political party and union organization in Atlanta, as well as the decline of voter registration and political organization in the black community since the election of black mayors.

Despite Jackson's populist appeal, his 1984 campaign did not change the face of politics in Atlanta. Jackson was not prepared to criticize Young as he had criticized Koch. Such criticism might have won him support from elements of the black community opposed to Young, or perhaps from white

neighborhood preservation groups, but it would it would have divided the black community. The weak state of black political organization in Atlanta, aside from resources available to the Mayor, left Jackson little choice but to avoid challenges to Young.

The major local political contest after the 1984 Jackson campaign was the race between Julian Bond and John Lewis for U.S. Congress. The race was the first major black-on-black contest in Atlanta. It marked the end of an era in which blacks fought primarily for racial representation and began a new era in which various classes and segments of African Americans fought to advance their particular interests. To some degree Bond and Lewis symbolize emerging intra-black conflicts in Atlanta. Bond represented the affluent middle-class black Atlanta establishment, and Lewis became the symbol of the black working-class outsider. The 1984 Jackson campaign, and Jackson himself in 1986, played no role in this contest.

A second important aspect of Bond/Lewis battle was the role of white neighborhood groups in the campaign. Lewis won based on his majority white support. When black politicians are divided, the white minority can have the pivotal swing vote. Progressive white neighborhood preservation groups and insurgent black politicians may form

the core of a new politics in Atlanta.

Most of Atlanta's elected officials supported Jesse Jackson in 1988, although Young maintained formal neutrality. However, the campaign lost its protest character. Jackson increased his share of votes but the local impact was less even than in 1984.

Strong working-class oriented black political organizations have not yet developed in Atlanta. Given the large numbers of poor and black Atlantans, however, aspiring black political entrepreneurs may well attempt to build such an organizational base. Although Jackson could have a role in stimulating black working class organization through a local Rainbow Coalition, or the local New South Coalition, he has not done so. As stated previously, Jackson has avoided stimulating black-on-black electoral conflict, and in Atlanta there is no other kind.

Endnotes

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39. Barnett, interview by author.
40. Dobbs, interview by author.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Ball, 65.

43. Thomas E. Ball, Julian Bond vs. John Lewis," (Atlanta: HBCC Publishing, 1988), 85.
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Conclusion

American Political Structure and Jackson Campaigns

Political Structure

The difficulty of winning ballot access in New York made it more difficult for blacks to win political offices independent of political machines in Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Queens. New York's five county party structure, and voter's borough identity, also made it difficult for black politicians to organize city-wide.

New York's political structure delayed the emergence of black political power, however there were also missed opportunities. Black leaders were unable to capture control of the Brooklyn county organization because of internal division, not external constraints. Similarly, political divisions between blacks and Latinos in the Bronx were often self-imposed.

While New York has a strong party system, Oakland and Atlanta have non-partisan elections. The latter cities have weak political parties and easy ballot access. Unions are also weak, exerting minimal influence in Atlanta politics, and little systematic political activity in Oakland. The

absence of party (and union) organization makes it easier for wealthy special interests (business) to impact on elections. The balkanization of Oakland's government into a dizzying maze of boards and commissions, each with their own elections, also facilitates control by special interests, and tends to divide community activists into narrow issue oriented groups.

In the absence of party organizations that unite activists around a common program, campaigns focus mostly on personalities. Also, because issue oriented activists are not organized into political clubs -- indeed there are no ward systems in Oakland and Atlanta -- politicians seldom need such activists to win elections.

The absence of community or union based political organizations facilitated the rightward drift of black mayors in Atlanta and Oakland. Despite the anti-democratic aspects of political machines in New York, their presence forced political insurgents and local unions to develop political organizations to challenge them. Union organizations and insurgent political clubs can possibly serve as a counter to business campaign contributions and influence in New York.

Ease of ballot access and the absence of party

organization generally, though not always, benefits wealthy special interests. On rare occasions when community activists unite around a common program and direction, they can enter the electoral process with relative ease. The overriding issue that united black and white (liberal) activists in the early 1970's in Atlanta and Oakland was resistance to racial discrimination. The Civil Rights/Black Power movement in Atlanta (through Maynard Jackson) and the Black Panther movement in Oakland (through Bobby Seale) were able to move directly from "movement" to electoral politics. This ease of transition was not possible in New York. Only a few "movement" types were able to win political office in New York: Al Vann and Roger Green in central Brooklyn, and this was with great difficulty. As a result, the mass political movements of the 1960's and 1970's were able to exert a greater electoral impact in Atlanta and Oakland than in New York. The continued existence of machine politics in New York mitigated the impact of the Black Power Movement and had the effect of delaying popular city-wide black electoral mobilization.

Because blacks in New York never had city-wide representation in local government, Jackson's 1984 campaign was linked to the demand for local black representation. The campaign was the first strong city-wide black electoral mobilization. Because Jackson's campaign did not hold the

same promise of local political reward in Atlanta and Oakland, it did not generate the same type of political interest, and black voter turnout was lower in those cities.

Separation of National and Local Elections

Alexander Hamilton theorized that separating senate and congressional elections would make it more difficult for popular movements to change national government.¹ The effect here is similar. Popular national campaigns can only impact on local elections if they build strong local organizations and accumulate enough resources to re-mobilize their base in subsequent elections. Even though Jackson's campaigns generated high black voter turnout twice in New York and once in Oakland, their potential to impact local elections was limited by the separation of local and national elections. If local and national elections were held jointly, as Oakland's Measure L proposes, the local impact of the 1984 Jackson campaign might have been stronger. Jackson would have had considerable potential power as a protest leader, independent of his ability to win enough votes to be a presidential contender. It could have directly threatened Young's and Wilson's re-elections.

The separation of local and national elections made

local organization the key determinant of the local impact of Jackson's campaigns. Likewise, cumbersome local voter registration procedures made it impossible for Jackson's national campaign to register voters in large numbers. It was the strength of locally organized voter registration efforts that accounted for voter registration increases.

Jackson could have campaigned for local insurgent candidates and helped register new voters in the years following his presidential campaigns. It would have been difficult, however, to pursue a second national campaign to win national office and simultaneously campaign to change the face of local government, particularly local black government. Conducting a "win" oriented national presidential campaign and building self-sustaining local organizations capable of transforming local governments was an overwhelming task from a strictly organizational and financial standpoint. From a political standpoint, it was virtually impossible. Winning a presidential campaign requires large sums of money, years of preparation in the "early" states, and the wooing of elected officials and diverse interest groups. Changing local government requires the creation of local organizations that agitate on controversial issues, and challenge local incumbents; these are suicidal tactics for presidential contenders.

Jackson had a choice: to support local efforts to oppose black mayors such as Young and Wilson, or to back away from internal black political struggles in favor of a strategy of uniting black Americans to exercise bloc-bargaining leverage against the national Democratic Party, and perhaps winning a spot on the 1988 presidential ticket. He chose the latter. Because he did not support local insurgents in 1988, Jackson won the support of Mayor Wilson and, unlike 1984, he faced no opposition from Mayor Young.

Many 1984 Jackson activists in Atlanta and Oakland, however, were not motivated to support Jackson in 1988. There is a sizable core of people in those cities who supported Jackson in 1984 because they were are disenchanted with local black leadership, and were searching for more radical/liberal alternatives. Jackson's 1984 campaign managers ran for mayor in Oakland and Atlanta. The 1984 Jackson campaign looked as though it might lead to local action against black leadership in Atlanta and Oakland; by 1988, it was clear that the Jackson campaign posed no such threat.

It is not clear whether Jackson, however, was personally comfortable with this shift in strategy. At the 1988 Democratic Convention, he reportedly told his supporters in a private meeting to "take out" of office

black elected officials who opposed his progressive movement, and to generate "street heat" against such officials.² Moreover, there is a more fundamental dilemma in Jackson's shift to a mainstream, "win" candidacy. If Jackson's goal is not substantive reform, but the symbolic representation of a black on a successful national Democratic ticket, then Jackson may not be the best candidate. Other black officials such as Congressman Bill Gray of Philadelphia or Governor Doug Wilder of Virginia have demonstrated greater appeal among white Democrats and do not carry Jackson's baggage among Jewish voters.

Coalition Politics

As mentioned earlier, bi-racial political coalitions were essential for the election of black mayors in Oakland and Atlanta, and were pivotal for the election of a black mayor in New York. Even though the proportion of black voters in the total electorate is different in each of the cities, in no city did blacks have the votes to elect a black candidate without white support. Successful black mayors not only built bi-racial coalitions to win office, once in office they increased their political ties to more conservative white business elites. Conversely, they fought white liberals opposed to business oriented development policies. Many of these liberals gave Wilson and Young

critical support before the mayors controlled city hall.

Jackson's spotlight on the black poor focused attention on the pro-business policies of the Young and Wilson administrations. It created opportunities for local criticism among poor blacks and disenchanted white liberals. A large-scale grassroots mobilization would have created a political force beyond their control. It could have increased the chances for black and liberal white opponents to mount challenges to their re-election. Therefore neither Young nor Wilson used their resources to mobilize the black vote for Jackson, even though Wilson endorsed Jackson in 1988. The potential for large-scale grassroots black mobilization posed by the Jackson campaign was not in their interest.

Summary

Many thought that the main benefit of Jackson's presidential campaigns would be mobilization of non-voting low-income blacks. However, Jackson's campaigns in New York, Atlanta, and Oakland did little to increase black voting. Several political, demographic, and practical problems prevented Jackson's campaign from having a greater local impact.

Given a winner-take-all electoral system and the minority status of blacks, Jackson's "win" oriented 1988 electoral strategy negated mobilizing the black poor. The need to simultaneously appeal to an economically conservative white middle-class, socially conservative Southerners, labor, and women's groups, to name a few, as well as impoverished minorities, makes it difficult for vote-maximizing candidates to utilize specific race or class oriented appeals with any degree of success. Jackson was forced to choose between broadened appeal and more votes versus deeper racial mobilization. Although his economic populism won some additional white votes, and he won a larger share of black votes in 1988, Jackson was unable to develop black political organization or increase black voter participation much beyond its 1984 level.

Jackson presumably would like to broaden his appeal and mobilize poor minorities. He maintains the Rainbow Coalition, staffed by radicals and insurgents, to pursue a movement strategy. Nonetheless, as he moves more into the mainstream the Rainbow Coalition gets less attention and its actions are increasingly circumscribed.

A second obstacle to Jackson's campaign having greater local impact was opposition from local black mayors. Intensive (and unified) voter registration and grassroots

black political mobilization in Atlanta and Oakland occurred only during insurgency against white domination, such as the first-time election of black mayors. Established black mayors do not "over-organize" low-income blacks.³ As a result, the interests of low-income blacks are weakly represented, even in cities with black mayors. Jackson received no help from Atlanta and Oakland black mayors in 1984, and little help in 1988.

Thirdly, the separation of national and local elections made it more difficult for Jackson's campaign (or any national campaign) to have a local impact. Even in 1984, when Jackson concentrated on local grassroots mobilization, money raised for the campaign went to Jackson's national headquarters, making it difficult to accumulate local resources for voter registration and mobilization in future municipal campaigns.

Lastly, because low-income blacks are habitually mobilized to get blacks into office, and then discarded, there are ample grounds for their cynicism about politicians. Jackson's switch to a more populist non-racially oriented "win" strategy after 1984 may have increased this cynicism in the 1988 election in Oakland and Atlanta.

New York was an exception. The lack of black political representation, and Mayor Koch's fitful reaction to Jackson, made Jackson's campaign a local black protest campaign. Jackson's attempts to water-down his rhetoric in 1988 made his campaign no less explosive. The need for black unity to win power in government outweighed friction among local black leaders and led to unified support for Jackson's campaign in 1984 and 1988. Also, the weakening of political machines in 1986 increased the possibility for a successful black mayoral candidacy in 1989. The promise of power long denied made Jackson's 1988 campaign more important locally.

Theoretical Implications

Pluralism

Contemporary debate around pluralism has essentially focused on whether urban systems are open avenues for racial minority advancement, or whether minorities are blocked by local power elites. Neither pluralist nor elite models, however, adequately describe power relations in Atlanta, Oakland, or New York City.

Robert Smith, in "Black Power and the Transformation

from Protest to Politics," cited the election of black mayors, along with the acceptance of black interest groups (such as the Congressional Black Caucus), as factors which demonstrate the, "entrance of black interest organizations into the competitive, pluralist interest-group system...."⁴ The weakness of the pluralist model with respect to black politics, however, is the assumption that a gradual process of black assimilation is underway, and that black (group) demands can be met within an incremental bargaining framework. The increasing homelessness, crime, and sustained unemployment in the black communities of Atlanta and Oakland indicate that black group interests are not being incorporated into the governing coalition, despite the election of black mayors. In recognition of this problem, Smith said, "The question, then, is can the black lobby - representing the gradual incorporation of blacks at the middle level of power - fundamentally alter the terrible conditions of the black underclass."⁵

Smith captured both the merits and the shortcomings of pluralist theory. Blacks won power in city halls and share in decision-making on major urban issues. On the other hand, the dependence of local governments on private (invariably white) businesses limits their power. Fearing business flight, black mayors seeking alliances with established white elites are constrained in their attempts

to address the needs of low-income black populations. Moreover, it is unclear how far individual black elected officials are willing to advocate urban policies beneficial to low-income blacks. After initially hostile reactions, white business leaders in Atlanta and Oakland learned to incorporate black mayors into their development agendas, and in exchange offered them political support. With substantial corporate campaign dollars, black mayors in Oakland and Atlanta lost much of the need for mobilizing masses of low-income blacks.

This finding supplements studies by Karnig, Mdlenka, and others who suggest that the election of black mayors has had little impact on relevant urban policy or black economic advancement.⁶ While these studies document the limited impact of black mayors on urban policy, not enough attention has been directed to discovering why this is so. The findings of this study suggest that black mayors face both external constraints and that they have political incentives not to advocate radical shifts in urban policies. As Karnig and Welch noted, black elected mayors are not necessarily liberal, group minded, or endowed with an expansive vision of black social, economic, and political progress.⁷

Nonetheless, despite conservative tendencies of black mayors, and the exclusionary tendencies of middle class

black beneficiaries of government benefits, there is a limit to how far a separate black "bourgeois" politics can go. Black elected officials must still rely on black voters, the masses of whom are low-income, and politics is still the main point of entry to power for black entrepreneurs. Black mayors must exercise caution because, as Kilson wrote in 1983, there is, "fear and apprehension of elite blacks among lower-strata blacks...."⁸

"Black" politics exists as a unique entity in American politics precisely because all classes of blacks are still trying to overcome the effects of centuries of exclusion from economic and political development. Blacks are also affected by contemporary racism, and need their collective resources to confront a hostile environment. This was the contradictory position of black mayors -- needing conservative white business support for economic success, and needing low-income black support for political success -- that produced their uncertain and inconsistent response to the Jackson campaigns.

In Atlanta and Oakland, cities with more than a decade of black political power, black political identification remains politically relevant, but it has become an insufficient basis to rally the black community. Black politics is increasingly defined by class interests, and

thus is becoming less racially oriented. Pluralism helps to explain the limited success of the black middle class in cities like Atlanta and Oakland, and the diversification of black class interests. But pluralism cannot account for the lack of broader inclusion of low-income blacks, nor the continuing necessity for "black" politics.

The difficulty in interpreting the two Jackson campaigns lies in understanding the historical promise of contemporary black politics, which is related to the pluralist assimilation theory. Charles Hamilton alluded to this as a "process-product equation," many blacks anticipated material benefits and social inclusion as a result of their political participation. Yet blacks have not received needed material benefits, and racism is alive and well.⁹ Put another way, there was a revolution in black electoral participation, with black mayors presiding over cities where blacks could not sit in public parks a generation before. However, there has not been a corresponding change in economic conditions for most blacks. This has created cynicism towards electoral politics, particularly in cities where blacks control city government.

Jackson's 1984 campaign revived part of this promise, causing Ronald Walters to refer to it as "a protest movement in an electoral form."¹⁰ Jackson's phrase "Keep Hope

Alive," was not only a general call for despairing people to lift their spirits. It was used in the political context to mean that blacks should not give up their expectation that participation in politics will ultimately deliver benefits to them. It was a plea to black Americans to believe in pluralist mythology.

Structural Racism Theory

Ronald Walters argues that the structure of American politics is institutionally weighted against blacks. Because of America's peculiar form of racism, blacks have been a permanent minority in American society. Walters maintains that blacks were always dependent on either the Democrats or Republicans, both of whom took blacks for granted. Blacks have therefore reaped few benefits from electoral participation on the national level, and this has created apathy and lack of political participation among blacks.¹¹ Walters contends that blacks should shed their reliance on the Democratic Party and become politically independent, brokering with the Democratic and the Republican parties. Walters reasons that radical, direct advocacy of black interests will spark greater black electoral participation.

Walters argues that the 1984 Jackson campaign demonstrated that blacks are ready for an alternative strategy for indirect representation through white Democratic leaders. Besides black presidential campaigns, direct representation might include the formation of a Third Party or a Black Political Party. Walters believes that independent black political organization would increase black political participation and that blacks could be a swing vote between the Democratic and Republican parties.

Jackson's 1988 campaign buttresses Walters' contention that the need for presidential candidates to appeal to the white majority leads to minimizing black interests. The same logic applied to Jackson when he decided to focus on winning a spot on the national Democratic ticket. Nor are black political interests minimized only in presidential politics. As noted earlier, the desire to retain support from local white economic elites limited the ability of established black mayors to address the needs of low-income blacks, weakening their political attachment to poor blacks as well.

From a strictly national perspective, Walters' argument has merit, but it ignores the substantial power black mayors have accumulated on the local level. It also misses the lessons of the 1984 Jackson campaign, ie., few

blacks in power would be willing to sacrifice local power for an elusive national black political strategy. It would be electorally foolhardy for a black mayor to encourage blacks to leave the Democratic Party, as Walters does, when they are in need of white Democratic support to win reelection. In addition, more black politicians are seeking office from majority white districts. These new "trans-ethnic" politicians are likely to resist independent black organization.

Contrary to Walters' assertion, for black elected officials, the choice whether to build independent black political organizations geared towards winning substantive rewards from the political system or to pursue the symbolic rewards of electing blacks to high office through the Democratic Party is not merely a question of shifting their emphasis. If they choose to build independent black organizations, these officials risk alienating important white constituencies, whose support black mayors and "trans-ethnic" politicians need.¹²

Walters' separatist bent favoring either a third party or separate black organizations is probably not realistic for most cities. However, his argument directly counters the coalition theorists who contend that blacks are well served by electoral coalitions with liberal Democratic

whites. Walters aptly notes the failure of blacks to receive many benefits from participation in bi-racial Democratic coalitions.

Coalition Theory

Browning, Marshall, and Tabb stressed the importance of bi-racial coalition formation for black political advancement in municipal elections.¹³ They contend that blacks are most likely to form electoral coalitions with liberal whites, therefore the existence of a liberal white bloc of votes is an important element of black political advancement.

Bi-racial coalitions, and specifically liberal white Democratic support, were indeed critical for initial city-wide black electoral victories in Atlanta, Oakland, and New York. However, once it became evident that blacks had a secure hold on municipal elections, conservative white elites began to seek alliances with black elected officials. Lionel Wilson and Andrew Young no longer relied solely on liberal whites to raise money and win elections. The emphasis Browning, Marshall, and Tabb place on liberal white support for black political progress was therefore most relevant in explaining the initial election of black mayors.

The tendency of black mayors to shed liberal white allies is not a new occurrence in electoral politics. In Chapter 1, we noted that the Unity Democratic Club in Brooklyn abandoned their liberal white allies after winning a state legislative office. Electoral coalitions frequently change after their leaders ascend to power.

Browning, Marshall and Tabb also contend that blacks have made substantive gains in employment and policy preferences as a result of the election of black mayors, particularly when they form liberal coalitions able to dominate local government. Their study is limited, however, by the fact that they examine ten relatively small cities in Northern California, and their data was collected before conservative Reagan administration policies took effect. More recent studies suggest that the election of black mayors has not had a substantive impact on black employment.¹⁴

Browning, Marshall, and Tabb consistently contrast black electoral effort and office-holding against "demand-protest" activity.¹⁵ They maintain that electoral mobilization has been much more effective than demand-protest in changing city government. Their focus is narrow in that they do not consider how these two forms of political participation might compliment each other under

different circumstances. Prior to the election of black mayors, demand-protest activity was generally focused on conservative white governments that had weak support in the black community, and few incentives to accede to black demands.

Black mayors, by contrast, have a black voting base, and a greater incentive to respond to black-led protest activity. The decline of demand-protest activity following the election of black mayors -- particularly considering the absence of party or union organization in Oakland and Atlanta -- facilitated Lionel Wilson's and Andrew Young's move towards conservative urban policies. Because Browning, Marshall, and Tabb do not fully address the failure of coalition politics to bring substantive benefits to blacks, they see no need for black protest activity following the formation of dominant black-led bi-racial coalitions.¹⁶

An exception to the generally optimistic assessment of the achievements of bi-racial coalition building is Clarence Stone's study of Atlanta.¹⁷ Stone showed that only a privileged minority of blacks benefitted materially from the election of a black mayor. White businesses have become adept at sub-contracting to blacks, reserving whites' power to determine which blacks will reap economic rewards from Atlanta's public/private projects. Ironically, the result

has been the creation of a black business bloc that is dependent on white business benefactors. This black business bloc has become a conservative influence on black mayors that operates from within the black community. Because Stone was cognizant of the shortcomings of a black mayoral regime, he was able to show the underlying tensions in the black community caused by the failure of the bi-racial coalition to deliver indivisible benefits to low-income blacks.

Summary

The rallying cry for Jackson's 1984 campaign was its promise to increase local black electoral participation. It did not have that effect in Atlanta or Oakland, and its effect in New York coincided with radical changes in local politics. A more promising departure point for increasing black political participation will require re-focusing on black mobilization on the local level. Among others, two questions are central to efforts at increasing black political participation: a) What can be done to translate black electoral success on the local level into tangible benefits for low income black communities and b) how can liberal bi-racial coalitions that elect black mayors be maintained in the face of conservative business opposition

and incentives?

Part of the answer may lie in Stone's "resource mobilization" model. Stone's argument is the antithesis of Paul Peterson's notion of "city limits," eg., that city governments are hostages of external economic forces.¹⁸ Stone believes local resources exist to support progressive urban policies. The problem in Stone's view is that liberal/progressive coalitions have not been prepared to run large cities. For liberal/progressive coalitions to succeed they not only need votes, they need to cultivate economic and technical resources to implement progressive policies.

Stone identifies small businesses and neighborhood groups as potential sources of support, however the list can be expanded. Pension fund holders, mortgage bankers and attorneys, real estate holders with long-term fixed investments, local employers, and others with long-term financial interest in cities could possibly be persuaded to support more progressive urban policies, and taxes, that emphasize educational quality, affordable housing, job training, drug counseling, etc.. It can be argued that social investments increase the long-term marketability of cities, transferring costs from law enforcement and crises management to urban development.

The white middle class and the private sector can always raise the specter of massive flight from the cities at the first sign of tax increases or radical policy shifts. However, black mayors in Oakland and Atlanta have not challenged local businesses or taxpayers with a compelling vision of the long-term benefits to them that derive from progressive, socially-oriented urban policy. Nor have they used their existing resources, such as pension funds and bond issues, as leverage against reticent businesses. Before a national black political strategy can be effective, blacks (and liberal/progressive whites) must develop and use the resources at their disposal more effectively. More effective use of local power is vitally needed as a first step in realigning current black politics with its original goal -- not merely electing blacks but improving the quality of life for the black majority. When the political process, on the local level, can be shown to increase benefits to low-income blacks, the result will be increased local black political participation. A national black presidential campaign will then promise more than symbolic representation.

Endnotes

1. See Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 60 in The Federalist Papers, (New York: Bantam Books, 1982): 305.
2. Ester Salins, conversation, 16 July 1989, Brooklyn, N.Y., field notes.
3. In a study of Mayor Coleman Young of Detroit, Wilbur Rich noted that Mayor Coleman Young tries not "overorganize or overpromise" low income black constituents. See Wilbur C. Rich, Coleman Young and Detroit Politics, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989): 274.
4. Smith, *ibid.*
5. Smith, 443.
6. See Kenneth R. Mldenka, "Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics," American Political Science Review, 83 (March 1989): 172-175, 185. Constraints cited by Karnig and Welch include: possible conservatism or incompetence on the part of the black elected official, opposition from white officials, the limited role of local governments, a limited tax base, lack of enough time in office to make substantial policy changes. See Albert K. Karnig and Susan Welch, Black Representation and Urban Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 151-152.
7. Karnig and Welch, Black Representation and Urban Policy.
8. See Martin Kilson, "The Black Bourgeoisie Revisited," Dissent, (1983): 93.
9. Charles Hamilton, forward to Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul Peryear (eds.), The New Black Politics (New York: Longman Inc., 1982).
10. See Ronald W. Walters, Black Presidential Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 183.
11. Walters, 171.
12. To say that protest mobilization will engender conflict does not imply that it is ineffective. James Button's study of six Florida communities suggests that "protest and violence" helped win concessions from white elites that conventional strategies could not. However, Button does not consider the protest movement taking place in an electoral form, as does Walters, nor do Button's six cases include a city where blacks already hold substantial power. Direct black-on-black electoral competition, as well as protest and violence, create the possibility of splitting black voters and

weakening whatever political positions blacks now occupy. Protest and conventional strategies may not work hand-in-hand when the targets of the protests are black officials, and when the protest assumes an electoral form.

13. See Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, Protest Is Not Enough, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For an insightful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of bi-racial coalitions, see Raphael J. Sonenshein, "Biracial Coalitions in Big Cities: Why They Succeed, Why They Fail," in Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, eds., Biracial Politics in American Cities, (New York: Longman, 1990).

14. Mdlenska, *ibid*.

15. Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, eds., Racial Politics in American Cities, (New York: Longman, 1990): 23.

16. In an update of Protest Is Not Enough Browning, Marshall, and Tabb are more critical of minority political leadership, "As important as representation is...it does not guarantee minority interests or minority power. The mere presence of minority people in office does not ensure that they will seek to fulfill a particular interests or that they will be able to influence their governments." The authors have not extended their analysis, however, to an analysis the role of demand-protest in the context elite oriented minority governments.

17. See Clarence Stone, Regime Politics, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989).

18. For a strenuous argument on the structural limitations of local government, see Paul E. Peterson, City Limits, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

Appendix

Data Collection

1. Interviews

Fieldwork conducted in New York, Atlanta, and Oakland consisted of 65 semistructured interviews. The interviews, lasting approximately one hour each, were conducted primarily in the spring and summer of 1988. The focus was on the two Jackson campaigns and their relationship to black mobilization and local politics. Because virtually all of the interviewees are still involved in politics, their names have been changed (with a few exceptions) to allow greater candor. The interviewees included several city councilmembers, former city councilmembers, Democratic party district leaders (in New York), mayoral and congressional campaign managers, former and current city officials, several judges, civil rights activists, Jackson campaign officials and activists, union officials and community activists. Interviewees were an elite group, selected on the basis of their knowledge and leadership in local politics and/or the Jackson campaign.

2. Database

2.1 New York

The analysis of racial voting patterns required the

creation of computer databases which included numerous precinct-level election results from each city, as well as estimates of the racial composition of precincts for each city. The New York database was first developed on the Assembly District level by Professor John Mollenkopf. The precinct level-data base for New York was developed by Professor Mollenkopf and the author. Because the only tract and block level census data available was 1980 census data, it is somewhat dated. Also, in New York City, election precincts and census tracts are not coterminous. Therefore census data was allocated to precincts according to the percentage (in city blocks) a precinct comprised of the total census tract. Because population is not dispersed evenly over city blocks within census tracts, there is a degree of error in estimating racial composition by precinct.

2.2 Oakland

The Oakland database is constructed similar to the New York database. Voter registration and precinct-level election data was entered into the computer for municipal, state, and national elections from 1982 to 1988. Candidate preferences were not directly available for the 1984 presidential primary. Voters did not vote directly for candidates but selected delegates representing various candidates to national party conventions. Vote totals for

Oakland's 85 delegate candidates were entered into the computer and totaled for each candidate.

After election and voter registration data was entered into the computer, a map of Oakland's 294 precincts was overlaid on top of Oakland's 104 census tracts. With few exceptions, precincts fit neatly into tract boundaries. Split precincts were assigned to the tract visually encompassing most of the precinct. Precincts were aggregated by tract to produce xxx units of analysis. Tract level census data was then used in conjunction with tract level election and registration data.

2.3 Atlanta

The Atlanta database was constructed in an identical manner to Oakland. Atlanta had 104 tracts and 195 precincts. Atlanta, like Oakland, had a good fit between precincts and census tracts.

2.4 Exit polls

Wherever possible this study made use of exit polls conducted by local or national news organizations. Unfortunately, in many cases the sample sizes for sub-groups of the population were too small to be very reliable. The 1984 CBS/NYT Presidential Primary Exit Poll sampled only 62 Latinos from New York City, and sampled 64 Latinos from the

City in 1988. Therefore there are instances where this study reports racial voting estimates from exit poll results and estimates from regression analysis.

3. Methods

3.1 Ecological regression.

Because exit polls are not always available in primary elections, and voters are seldom asked who they voted for in past local elections, ecological regression was employed to estimate racial voting patterns and voter transitions in the three cities. Ecological regression infers individual level behavior from group level data.¹

Voter transitions refer to shifts in voter behavior from election to election. There are several potential problems or sources of error inherent in the use of ecological regression. The first problem is the possibility of mis-specification, or as it is sometimes called, the "ecological fallacy." When inferring individual level behavior from group data, the researcher may attribute behavior to the wrong class of individuals. Some groups share several attributes. Senior citizens may tend to be poorer than younger citizens, and they may also tend to be less educated. If the researcher wants to infer information about the behavior of poverty stricken individuals using data from groups of low-income census tracts, he/she must

exercise caution to distinguish between the effects of low-income versus the effects of low education or age. What may appear to be a function of low-income status may in fact be the function of age. The only safeguard against misspecification is a sound theoretical construct that controls for alternative explanations of individual behavior, and in the use of a large number of cases that reduces random effects, such as the distortion effect of clusters of senior citizens in the above example.

This study utilized ecological regression in two ways: to estimate racial voting and registration patterns, and to analyze voter transitions across elections. Estimating racial voting patterns posed the least danger of misspecification because residential patterns are strongly segregated in all three cities. Table III, Table V, Table VIII, Table XII, and Table IVX (of Chapter 6) estimate racial registration and voting patterns using regression.

Analyzing voter transitions was more difficult for several reasons. First, it was impossible to estimate mobility between precincts, or groups of precincts. The impact of voter mobility is probably greatest in New York, which has a lower proportion of homeowners than Atlanta or Oakland. Thus, voters who appear as new voters in regression tables may actually be old voters who moved, and

voters who appear as non-voters in one precinct may actually be new voters in another. Because New York has such a large number of election districts ($n > 5400$), however, the effect of voter mobility in precinct level analysis is minimized. Second, in analyzing voter transitions it is technically impossible to know how many individuals who voted for candidate X in one election voted for candidate Y in a subsequent election. The researcher can only identify relationships between the proportions of voters that voted for candidates X and Y, or between voters who did not vote for X and Y, etc., and he/she can suggest that correlations between precincts indicates patterns of individual behavior. The standard error of the estimate is reported with each regression to give an idea of the reliability of voter transition (as well as racial voting) patterns. Tables

3.2 Hi-Lo method.

Some tables simply compared the average turnout and voter preference from precincts that were highly (greater than 65 percent) black and those that were highly white. The obvious difficulty with this technique is that it does not account for individuals who live in more integrated neighborhoods. Table I, Table VI, Table VII, and all of the figures utilize this method.

4. Table Notes

4.1 - Table I - Demographic data from the 1980 U.S. Census Standard Tape File (STF4) was available at the census tract level. Census tracts were aggregated to the Assembly District (AD) level by Professor John Mollenkopf. Split tracts were allocated according to the number of census blocks in each AD. While splitting census tracts creates unknown error, there is no known bias. For more information on this method, see John H. Mollenkopf, The Wagner Atlas: New York City Politics 1989, (New York: The Robert F. Wagner, Sr. Institute of Urban Public Policy, 1989), 6.

4.2 - Table II - Voter transitions were estimated using ecological regression. In this case, aggregate (Assembly district) level regression coefficients representing the proportion of registered Democrats who voted for Jackson, Farrell, other candidates, or did not vote, were used as surrogates for individual level behavior. Because there were only 60 cases (Assembly districts) the regression estimates give only a rough indication of voter preferences.

4.3 - Table III - Table III compares turnout by race/ethnicity for the following elections: 9/82 - the September 1982 Democratic gubernatorial primary; 4/84 - the April 1984 Democratic presidential primary; 9/85 - the September 1985 Democratic mayoral primary; 9/86 - the

September 1986 Democratic U.S. senatorial primary; 4/88 - the April 1988 Democratic presidential primary.

Percent of race registered is the percent of persons 18 years or older who are registered Democrats. The registration figures, broken down by AD, are taken from the New York City Board of Elections. The population statistics are taken from the census, and were compiled into AD units by Professor John Mollenkopf.

Racial breakdown of registration by AD was established by means of multi-variate regression. Standard error of the coefficients were in the 5 percent range. Two cautionary notes are in order: first, the use of AD data restricts the number of units to 60, the use of such a small number of districts increases the margin of error; second, the use of AD data can cause mis-specification. Blacks and Puerto Ricans, for example, are often mixed in the same ADs. In analyzing data, it may sometimes be impossible to distinguish between the behavior of the two groups.

Declines in voter registration result from bi-annual purges conducted by the Board of Elections. Purges occur when a voter moves, or does not vote in a four year period.

(give explanation of racial breaks using ecological regression) (error margin explanation) (82 and 84 data uses 60 cases on AD level; other elections use 5400 cases and therefore have a smaller error margin).

4.4 - Table IV - Because of the small Latino sample size ($n < 80$) there is no reliable estimate of Latino union household composition of the election in 1988 versus 1984.

4.5 - Table V - Estimated registration by race/ethnicity.

4.6 - Table VI - Democratic registration in majority black ADs.

4.7 - Table VII - White, Black, and Latin turnout was estimated using 1980 U.S. census data from the Census of Population and Housing, 1980 (New York): Summary Tape File 4, U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, and from Assembly district registration figures from the N.Y.C. Board of Elections.

By compiling STF4(a) census tract data into Assembly districts, estimates were obtained of the voting-age population for each Assembly district. Voting-age population was then multiplied by race and ethnic estimates

for each Assembly district, also taken from STF4(a) census tract data. The estimates of White, Black, and Latin voting-age population thus obtained for each of the 60 Assembly districts in New York City were broken down into percentages and used as independent variables regressed against the percentage of voting-age population registered Democratic in each Assembly district. The resulting correlation coefficients represent turnout percentages for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. These turnout figures can be multiplied with the mean percentage of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos in the voting-age population to produce a breakdown of the Democratic electorate in a particular election (see Table VI), or the "level" importance of Blacks, Whites, and Latinos in the election. For discussion of the "level" importance of a regression variable, see Achen, Christopher H., Interpreting and Using Regression (Beverly Hill: Sage Publications, 1982) p. 71-73.

Asians and other persons represent close to 5 percent of the total population and 1 percent of registered Democrats, but were excluded to simplify the analysis. Combined turnout estimates for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos, however, when multiplied by estimated breakdowns of the Democratic electorate produce vote totals which are very close to actual vote totals. Estimated vote totals, using the method described above, was less than 1 percent from

actual vote totals in 1982 and 1984. In 1985, the difference was 4 percent, and in 1988 there was a 5 percent difference. Increasing error is expected because voting-age population has probably increased in New York since 1980.

4.8 - Table IX - Overwhelming support for Jackson in some Assembly districts produced correlation coefficients that exceeded the zero-to-one logical limit. This was expected since, as J. Morgan Kousser states, "My experience shows that one is likely to obtain such [illogical] estimates whenever a group overwhelmingly supports or opposes a candidate or referendum proposal...If impressionistic evidence corroborates the estimates, and if the figures are close to logical limits (say within 10 percent), then the inadmissible estimates may well be the products of random errors in 'sampling.'...Whether in these cases one leaves the inadmissible estimates...[or] sets the estimates at their limits and recompute the other estimates accordingly seems chiefly a matter of taste." See Kousser, J. Morgan, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics". Journal of Interdisciplinary History, IV:2 (Autumn 1973), 237-262. Since continued high support for Jackson among those who voted for him in 1984 is corroborated by exit poll data, and illogical coefficient estimates fell within an acceptable range (near 10 percent), the estimate in question was set to 100 percent. The NBC exit poll (n=1360) found

that Jackson won 97 percent of the black vote in New York City. For analysis of the NBC poll, see "Koch Claims No Regrets About Campaign Conduct." Newsday, 20 April 1988, p.7.

4.9 - Table X - For 1988 races the unit of analysis was 5200 election districts; for previous elections the unit of analysis was 60 ADs. Because of the increased units of analysis in 1988, standard errors were lower.

4.10 - Table XII - Standard error margins on the 1985 election were very high (above 10 percent). To test the accuracy of the Wilson and Riles voters preferences, regression estimates were compared to the mean percentage of votes for Wilson and Riles in highly white and highly black (greater than 65 percent) tracts. The results closely paralleled regression estimates.

4.11 - Table XVIII - Turnout percentages were calculated based on election figures provided by the Fulton County Elections Department. Voter registration figures, broken down by race, were provided by the Fulton County Office of Voter registration. Turnout percentages for whites and blacks were calculated by means of simple regression. Standard error margins were (with a single exception) less than 10 percent.

5. Figures

5.1 - Figure 1 - Voter registration tends to rise prior to general elections, as both parties spend money to register new voters. In Figure I, or1182, or1184, and or1186 represent voter registration (as a percentage of voting age population) rates during November 1982, 1984, and 1986 general elections. The dates or584, and or688 represent voter registration rates in April of 1984 and June of 1988, around the time of the presidential primaries. Note that black voter registration during the 1984 primary was even higher than during the 1982 general election, in which the black mayor of Los Angeles ran for governor. Black voter registration in April/June of 1988, by contrast, fell by several percentage points after Bradley's second run for governor in 1986.

Endnotes

1. For a study of ecological regression see Laura Irwin Langbein and Allan J. Lichtman, Ecological Inference (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978).

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