“THE JAPANESE NEW YORKERS”:

“ADVENTURERS IN ADVENTURE LAND” IN

GLOBALIZED ENVIRONMENTS

by

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Author's Declaration

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Abstract

"The Japanese New Yorkers":
"Adventurers in Adventure Land" in Globalized Environments

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After the Immigration Act of 1965, the volume of almost all Asian immigrants drastically increased; however, the proportion of Japanese immigrants, which used to be the largest in the prewar years, dropped to being the smallest. In mainstream studies of American immigration, contemporary Japanese migrants to the United States seem to have disappeared. If the lens of "immigrants" is removed, however, a quite different picture emerges. The number of native Japanese living in the United States today is actually three times as large as that of the prewar Japanese-American community on the U.S. mainland. Removing the lens of "immigrants" also enables us to see some new forms of contemporary international migration.

This study explores Japanese-born persons living in the United States today called the *shin-issei* ("new first generation"), drawing upon several sets of data, theories, and previous studies, and concluding with an interview analysis of those living in New York--or "Japanese New Yorkers." A basic assumption of this study is that migration in our highly transnational environment no longer necessarily entails a change of nationality, or permanent settlement, or even a socio-cultural transition from one society to another.

The statuses of Japanese New Yorkers include: the *chuzaiin* ("corporate transferees"), entrepreneurs, international students, their families, and others. My

research reveals that: (1) the Japanese New Yorkers are mainly from middle- or upper-middle-class families; (2) the primary "push factor" behind their migration stems from the constricting aspects of the Japanese traditional social organization while the "pull factor" seems to be liberating images of New York that have been widespread in Japan; (3) their exodus seems to have been initiated largely by the example of Japanese celebrities who began utilizing New York as their vacation home in the late 1980s, during Japan's bubble economy; (4) contrary to the seeming indifference among Japanese to the "open-handed" U.S. Immigration Act of 1965, a large number of them actually struggle to obtain a green card; (5) nonetheless, they are not interested in naturalization; (6) these Japanese migrate as individuals not as families, and, unlike other Asians, do not engage in "chain migration"; (7) customarily, almost all return to Japan once in a while, typically every summer; (8) a majority including those married to Americans say that they will return to Japan permanently "someday" although very few have a clear plan for it.

I argue that Japanese New Yorkers are, so to speak, "adventurers" in highly transnational environments, placing themselves in ongoing self-adjusting processes in their journey. Most of them, unlike the *issei* ("the prewar Japanese emigrants"), willingly exit Japan as if resisting its traditional social organization. Like the *issei*, however, they almost inevitably encounter dilemmas in terms of legal status, culture, and social identity in the United States, and experience an unexpectedly rough transition into the society with which they try to identify.

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Note on Transliteration

In order to avoid confusion, both Japanese and non-Japanese names are shown with the given name first, followed by the surname, as is the American practice. Japanese terms that are integral to the text--such as *issei, nisei, shin-issei, chuzaiin,* and *akogare*--are italicized and, whenever necessary, translated in parentheses with quotation marks. This rule is not followed, however, when the terms are cited from other authors' work. Macrons for Japanese terms, which might disturb the ease of reading, are not used.

Introduction

At the end of the nineteenth century, Japanese migrants began landing on U.S. soil via Hawaii, a pattern quite similar to their Chinese predecessors'. Although these Asian groups each encountered social and legal exclusion within a few decades after their entries, their ethnic communities took firm roots. The Pacific War did not terminate Japanese-American community--although it interrupted them in a totally reprehensive way. In the immediate postwar era, both Chinese and Japanese communities grew at a similar pace relative to their prewar sizes. After the Immigration Act of 1965, however, huge differences developed between the two immigrant communities.

The Chinese-American population grew by 7 times between 1960 and 1990, compared to only 1.8 times for the Japanese-American population (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). The volume of almost all other Asian immigrants drastically increased as well, owing to the "open-handed" law of 1965, but the proportion of Japanese immigrants among them, which used to be the largest in the prewar years, oddly decreased to one of the smallest. As a result, in mainstream studies of American immigration, contemporary Japanese migrants to the United States seem to have disappeared.[1]

Some maintain that as Japan has become rich, its people do not need to emigrate. This present study disagrees with this kind of explanation stemming from an economic theory of migration. The shadow of economic migration theory obscures important

[1] In his review on *Japanese Immigrant Entrepreneurship in New York City* by Akiko Hosler (1998), Min (2001, p. 83) writes that, to his knowledge, it is "the first book that covers contemporary Japanese immigrants in the United States." Soon after Min's review, though, it is Karen Kelsky (2001) whose *Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dreams* gathers (continued…)

aspects of contemporary migration, such as socio-psychological motivations, business strategies by big corporations, and so forth. In the same vein, this study departs from discourses on migration that confine their attention to "immigrants." What makes today's Japanese migrants far less visible in academic discourses than in the real world--such as Lower Manhattan, New York--is a notion of migration that remains focused upon "immigrants" (or "illegal immigrants").

A basic assumption of this study is that migration in our highly transnational environment no longer necessarily entails a change of nationality, permanent settlement, or socio-cultural transition from one society to another. Migration does not imply immigration in the traditionally entrenched form. As Castles (2007) argues,

> Until recently, most migration... usually led either to permanent settlement, or to return to the country of origin after a period abroad. In the era of globalisation, there is a proliferation of patterns of recurring, circulatory and onward migration, leading to greater diversity of migratory experiences as well as more complex cultural interactions. (Castles 2007, p. 353)

Although Japan has become rich, that does not mean that "America" no longer attracts its people. Quite the contrary. While the volume of so-called "immigrants" from Japan is far less noticeable than other Asians, the total number of native Japanese living in the United States today is three times as large as that of the prewar Japanese-American community on the U.S. mainland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009). An official at the Japanese Consulate in Manhattan describes what is currently occurring in New York--one of the most attractive cities among Japanese expatriates today--by saying,

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huge scholarly attentions.

"There have been more and more Japanese places opening that are aimed specifically at Japanese people... The population there has reached a point where it is *self-sustaining*…" (Steinhauer 1994; emphasis added)

"America" still holds an allure for the Japanese, but in a different fashion from the past. Like many other groups, most of the Japanese who migrated to the United Sates in the prewar era--or the *issei* ("first generation")--were laborers (e.g., Takaki 1998). By contrast, the new forms of Japanese migrants--known as the *shin-issei* ("new first generation") (e.g., Azuma 2002; Minamikawa 2005a; Ishitoya 1991)--are seeking something else in the United States. In general, one of the major "pull factors" for migration has been job opportunities in the host society (e.g., Rystad 1992), which actually pulled the *issei*. However, new patterns of migration in our globalized environments, as argued above, make us question the generality of this economic theory of migration. In regard to the *shin-issei*, it is simply irrelevant.

Who are the *shin-issei*, then? What pushes or pulls them? What do they encounter or discover in their journey? Are they becoming Americans, or--to bring this more up-to-date--how far do they move into American society? What bars them, if anything, from integrating further? These are the major questions for this dissertation, whose answers a very few studies (e.g., Kelsky 2001; Hosler 1998; Ishitoya 1991) have sought so far. This dissertation, exploratory in nature, attempts to add some new findings, thoughts, and arguments to theirs. The references and methods employed in this study include: historical studies of Japanese migration to the United States, statistical profiles of the *shin-issei* in their pathways to a permanent resident status, an analysis of

the push/pull factors behind their embarkation, and in-depth interviews of the *shin-issei* living in New York--or what I call "the Japanese New Yorkers."

Almost all studies use the term "immigrants" to indicate foreign-born individuals--and their immediate offspring. For several reasons, I resist this terminology and will selectively use the terms "migrants," "emigrants," "immigrants," and "adventurers," depending upon the context. Arguably, first, the term "immigrants" connotes a host-country-centered view, which appears to be insensitive to the importance of migrants' varying backgrounds in their intercultural struggles. For the sending country, these are "emigrants," who are by no means divorceable from its history, especially in their deep-rooted socio-psychological character. The term "immigrants" tends to be thus blind to the other side of the same coin, "emigrants."

Second, in popular usage, the term "immigrants" often implies that migrants' socio-economic placement in the host society will be at a low stratum. "Climbing up the ladder," "intermarriage with white Americans," and even "model minorities" all apparently stem from this implication. Many migrants to the United States today, evidently, no longer conform to these traditional patterns and aspirations. According to Min (2006), for example, a "better opportunity for their children's college rather than a better economic opportunity for themselves is what has pushed many Koreans to choose *emigration* to the United States since the early 1990s" (p. 22; emphasis added). Their immigrant (or non-immigrant) status cannot be confined to the socio-economic, or even cultural, frame preset in the host society for them.

Third, most migrants from Japan today are, legally speaking, "non-immigrants." Calling them "immigrants" ironically (and carelessly) overlooks one of the hardest problems some of them share, i.e., obtaining a legal permanent resident status (or, more colloquially, a "green card"). A similar thing could be said for their prewar counterparts, the *issei*. Many of them had no clear point in time at which they became "immigrants." As late as World War II, they and their U.S.-born offspring were categorized as "enemy aliens" rather than "immigrants" (e.g., Shimada 2004). Calling the *issei* "immigrants" unjustly softens their unique struggles, and, again, many *shin-issei* are not "immigrants."

Bill Emmott (1992), editor of *The Economist*, chooses the term "adventurers" to describe the globalized character of the Japanese business migrants sent to the United States--called the *chuzaiin* ("corporate transferees"), a new category of postwar Japanese migrants. He suggests that they are

> Japan's new adventurers, modern equivalents of Marco Polo… [who] will shape the way in which Japan thinks of the strange world outside. More even than that, like Marco Polo, these adventurers will also shape the way in which the strange world outside thinks of Japan. (Emmott 1992, p. 66)

That is, a "strange world" meets another through these "new adventurers," who substantiate our globalized environments. In their journey, they are challenged by, and in turn challenge, what Robert E. Park (1928) called a "new invading culture."[2]

[2] Park's (1928, p. 887) suggestion, which regards "human migration" in changing social structures in general, is quite relevant to this discussion. He claimed, "When the traditional organization of society breaks down, as a result of contact and collision with a new invading culture, the effect is, so to speak, to emancipate the individual man," and the "individual is free for new adventures." His emphasis is placed on "culture" rather than "economy."

In this sense, migrants of any kind--be they *chuzaiin*, students, entrepreneurs, or their dependent families--can be seen as adventuring between the two or more worlds. Some may begin to act like those in the strange world; some may not. Some may eventually stay there; another may return to their own world permanently; and still another may keep shuttling between the two worlds. In addition to "migrants," "emigrants," and "immigrants," hence, I will use the term "adventurers," to convey these nuances.

This dissertation consists of two parts: (1) "historical background, the elements of continuity" and (2) "the *shin-issei*: 'tug-of-war' warriors, or wanderers?" The following chapter in the first part, titled "the Meiji Restoration and the opening of Japanese migration to the U.S.," presents an historical overview of the prewar period shaped upon some important socio-psychological, cultural, and political themes--which are continuously observed throughout the history of Japanese migration to the United States. These themes include the feeling of *akogare* ("longing, desire, or idealization") for the West, [3] nationalist concerns about Western influences potentially undermining Japanese identity, and what one might call the "tug of war" between the inward-looking and the outward-looking ideologies.

Although most studies of Japanese migrants to the United States tend to focus solely on labor migrants, the first wave--though relatively small in number--was comprised of "non-labor migrants." The Japanese "labor migrants," just like their

[3] In her *Women on the Verge*, Kelsky (2001, p. 26) translates the term *akogare* as "longing, desire, or idealization." It is the key concept in her study of the Japanese women, whose desires to become part of Western societies, according to Kelsky, stem from their strong (continued…)

Chinese predecessors, left their country in search of job opportunities; the "non-labor migrants," by contrast, explored new knowledge during an era when Japan was opening to modernization as a national imperative (Sawada 1996). In terms of their socio-economic backgrounds and purposes for visiting the United States, they were more comparable to today's *shin-issei* than to the labor migrants of their own era.

Intellectuals' agitation for modernization (practically "Westernization") of the Japanese social organization effectively induced the feeling of *akogare* for the West, which the "non-labor migrants" passionately shared. On the other hand, the intellectuals propagandized against traditional ("feudalistic") values and institutions in Japan (Beasley 1995). In reaction, not surprisingly, nationalist concerns developed and led to a tug of war over the direction and the character of Japanese society. For the advancement of the nation, most of the political leaders in Meiji did not disagree that Japan should follow the Western models, but to them, a nationalist sentiment must lead this Westernization. Although many were themselves among those who had studied in Western countries before they led Japan to a "modern" nation (see Conte 1977; Mori 1994; Nitobe 1891), they were vigilant against direct Western dominance over Japan, be it cultural or political. As the core spirit of the modernization project, thus, the Meiji government placed the feudal samurai code, an apparently self-contradicting arrangement called "samuraization" (Befu 1971). As such, the nature of Japan's modernization could not but be ambivalent, always tugged outward/forward and, on the other hand, pulled inward/backward. Thereafter, Japan has never been free from the tension of this ideological tug of war--as will be seen throughout this dissertation.

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feeling of *akogare* for the West. This present study will define the term in Chapter four.

Most of the labor emigrants initially planned to return to Japan in several years, and many actually did. Owing to the arrangement of so-called "picture brides" (a foremost pattern of *issei* wives coming from Japan through arranged marriage) (Moran 2001; Glenn 1986; Ichioka 1980), however, some of them formed families, and stayed in the United States as the *issei* ("first generation"). They developed what has come to be called the Japanese-American community, but their decisions to stay were not necessarily decisive. Many in fact returned to Japan years later.

About the time when their U.S.-born offspring, the *nisei* ("second generation"), were coming of legal age, their entire community on the U.S. mainland was relocated to internment camps as "enemy aliens"; the Pacific War erupted (Thomas 1969 [1946]). Conflicts grew in the camps and even developed into riots, though not primarily against the U.S. officials, but instead against the *nisei* leaders who assertively supported the U.S. policies against them (Iijima 1998; Hansen *et al*. 1985). The *nisei* leaders' attitude serving to the U.S. authority rather than to their own community will be discussed in connection to samuraization, the root of the Japanese collective psychology implanted in Meiji (see Day 2000).

Chapter two, titled "the postwar reopening of Japanese migration to the U.S.," discusses the roles played by the U.S.-led Allied Occupation to politically and culturally change postwar Japan (Velen *et al*. 1958; Dower 2000). On the political level, its goal was to implant a democratic ethos into this previously totalitarian state. Externally and internally, however, various factors hindered the effectiveness of this task. They included the outbreak of the Korean War and Japan's monopolistic power structure that easily rebuilt itself after the occupation left Japan. Critically, thus, whether the U.S.-led

Allied Occupation succeeded in the political and ideological changes of postwar Japan is questioned (Wolferen 1990; Chapman 1991; Takemae *et al*. 2002).

On the cultural level, in contrast, as G.I.'s brought their popular culture into Japan, the feeling of *akogare* for the West, which had been made taboo during the war, swiftly grew among the masses. In military bases, the Japanese got not just jobs--as sales service, clerical workers, and waitresses (Glenn 1986)--but also tangible ideas about, and even personal relationships with, Americans. Providing the potential impetus for adventure in America--the country of wealth and freedom--the occupation thus opened up a flow of Japanese migrants to the United States in the postwar era; inevitably, it also reopened the tug of war over the Western influences on the postwar Japanese social organization.

Many Japanese young women, later called "war brides," married U.S. servicemen in the occupation personnel (Schnepp *et al*. 1955; Herbison 1990; Storrs 2000), thus forming the first wave of Japanese migration to the United States in the postwar era. However, their marriages and migration were not celebrated by Japan or by the United States. Japanese viewed them as "traitors" leaving their defeated country behind to follow the soldiers of the former enemy. In the United States, on the other hand, war brides encountered not only prejudiced greetings as "enemy aliens" but also certain legal restrictions on interracial marriage still remaining intact in many states (Simpson 1998). Compared to other Asian countries, nevertheless, Japan sent by far the largest number of war brides to the United States--and their passionate intermarriage patterns and gender characteristics apparently appealing to American men are, as it were, inherited by female *shin-issei* today (Kelsky 2001; Lee *et al*. 1998).

Part II, titled "the s*hin-issei*: 'tug-of-war' warriors, or wanderers?," is based on several sets of data, theories, and previous studies that explore the *shin-issei*, concluding with my interview analysis of the *shin-issei* living in New York City. Its opening chapter, "the soaring economy and the rise of the new adventurers," first, defines the *shin-issei*. The emphasis is placed on the notion that their migrant statuses, and thus destinations, are not fixed but potentially switch in accordance with surrounding environments (i.e., personal relationships as well as macroeconomic conditions) in open-ended processes. The term "*shin-issei*" is defined, broadly, as native Japanese living in the United States either as U.S. citizens, or as legal permanent residents (LPRs), or as holders of any visas that permit them to stay longer than three months ("non-immigrant, long-term visitors" or LTVs), or illegal overstayers.

The chapter, then, compares and connects LPRs and LTVs among the *shin-issei* in their recent trends. Although almost invisible in the mainstream literature of immigration, the size of the Japanese LPR population today is about the same as that of the prewar Japanese community on the U.S. mainland, and that of the LTVs is twice as large as that (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009). Contrary to the economic theory of migration, moreover, it was Japan's "bubble economy" of the late 1980s that contributed to an increase of the LTVs by three times in that decade alone. Some of them adjusted their initial status to LPR, and over the next decade they contributed to the 150-percent increase in the number of LPRs. Although inclined to be overlooked, the status adjustment process is centrally important in contemporary migration to the United States.

The following section, "pathways to the green card," will examine statistical data about the preference for LPR status among the *shin-issei,* in comparison to their counterparts from major sending regions including Europe, Asia, and Latin Americas (based on "Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents," U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009b). The data reveal that there are usually only two ways for the *shin-issei* to obtain LPR status, namely, through the preference for "immediate relatives of U.S. citizens" (likely to be through marriage) and through "employment-based preferences" (work visas). Nearly two-thirds use the former route and one-third, the second route. The *shin-issei,* like their European counterparts, rarely take the route that results in "chain migration" (i.e., through "family-sponsored preferences"), which, by contrast, those from Latin Americas and other parts of Asia customarily utilize. This indicates that the nature of the Immigration Act of 1965 strongly favors those who migrate "as families" and thus "through chain migration," as opposed to those who move "as individuals" (*cf*., Law 2002). Contrary to their outward appearance of seeming indifference to the "open-handed" law of 1965, not a few of Japanese are actually struggling for LPR status.

Chapter four discusses "push/pull factors" affecting the trend of prospective *shin-issei* on the socio-psychological level, focusing on three major themes. They include (1) ideological discourses on "what it means to be Japanese," a genre called *Nihonjinron* (Lipset 1996, p. 222), closely intertwined with the relatively recent catchword *kokusaika* ("internationalization") (Lincicome 1993, p. 129), (2) current social issues in Japan with reference to the Japanese social organization, and (3) images of "New York" transmitted through the Japanese media, a content analysis of Japanese magazines in their effects on the trend of Japanese overseas adventurers. These factors are themselves primary sources

of the tug of war assumed to direct the flow of overseas adventurers. Of them, a main push factor shared among a majority of the *shin-issei* is the notion of Japan as a *mendokusai shakai* ("molding society") and a main pull factor, *akogare* for the West--which has been manifestly and continuously observed since the Meiji era.

Chapter five reviews previous studies on the *shin-issei* including (1) the *chuzaiin*, (2) the *ryugakusei* ("students studying abroad"), (3) entrepreneurs, and (4) "internationalists" or "wanderers." The *chuzaiin* constitute a new type of migrants that represents the global reach of postwar Japan's economy (Sanger 1993). Typically, they are men in their 30s or 40s and are accompanied by their wives (Goodman 1990). Unlike other types of *shin-issei*, *akogare* for the West is not their primary motive for leaving Japan; they are assigned by their corporations to manage overseas branches. Always under control of their headquarters in Japan, they are attached to Japanese cultural patterns during their journey, and their wives follow suit (Yasuike 2005). This does not mean, however, that they are never tempted to take risks of losing their good socio-economic standings in favor of a "more comfortable" (or maybe, less *mendokusai*) life in the foreign country (Befu *et al*. 2001, p. 8).

The status of students among the *shin-issei* is important because it can be switched, in principle, to any other status within LTVs and is a route through which to obtain LPR status. There are several different ways to engage in *ryugaku* ("study abroad"). By tradition, a small number of elites are fully sponsored by their employers, public or private, typically for a Master of Laws or MBA (Mori 1994, p. 6). In the 1970s, *ryugaku* became a boom led by increasingly large numbers of youths from middle-class families who moved to the United States as students, mostly on the undergraduate level.

The boom grew exponentially, and during the mid-1990s, Japanese students constituted the largest group among international students in the United States (IIE Open Doors 2009). In the early 2000s, however, this trend began declining for several important reasons. They included the repercussion of the burst of Japan's bubble economy, the *mendokusai* image of America grown after the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, and a gradual discovery by Japanese students of the difficulty in obtaining U.S. work visas. For now, one can argue, there is no ground for the *ryugaku* boom to ever return to American schools.

The number of *shin-issei* entrepreneurs in New York has increased in the last few decades. Typically, these are middle-aged, relatively highly educated, married men, who have stayed in the United States for a long time (Hosler 1998). Their previous statuses include *ryugakusei*, *chuzaiin*, or employees of other *shin-issei* businesses. Similarly to other Asian entrepreneurs in U.S. urban cities, they serve mostly their compatriots, such as other *shin-issei* and Japanese tourists. In many important aspects, however, they depart from their Asian counterparts. First, they do not engage in chain migration. Second, their naturalization rate is conspicuously low. Third, they do not seem interested in developing their own ethnic community in the United States. For them, running a business in America is a personal adventure for socio-psychological satisfaction rather than a collective instrument of ethnic adaptation.

Although, or perhaps because, the *shin-issei* are generally considered "internationalists," they are sometimes stigmatized in Japan as "Japan's shame." The most pejorative label is probably "yellow cabs," a sexual slur against female *shin-issei* who according to Ieda (1991, p. 1) "let anyone take a ride easily." Oftentimes, other

shin-issei are also viewed in negative light, with such labels as "rootless wanderers" or "adrift youths." It is suggested that the *shin-issei* whose embarkation is preoccupied solely with *akogare* and accompanied with no reasonable plan for their journey tend to follow unfavorable trajectories. It should be noted, however, that the negative labels attached to the *shin-issei* are not new in their spiteful outlook; since the Meiji era, several terminologies have been invented for those who leave Japan as, so-to-speak, "self-serving adventurers," as opposed to elites sent overseas as the nation's promised representatives.

Chapter six presents analysis of in-depth-interviews with *shin-issei* who currently live or previously lived in New York. I recruited most of them in New York and some in Tokyo, on the basis of snowball sampling, between the fall of 2007 and the summer of 2010. My sample consists of 36 people, of whom 32 are themselves *shin-issei* (or ex-*shin-issei*) and 4, informants (two *ryugaku* advisors in Tokyo, one father of two ex-*shin-issei*, and one U.S. citizen born to a war bride and married to a female *shin-issei*). At the time of the interview, the *shin-issei* were 40.3 years old on average, ranging from 22 to 69. Of them, 19 are female, 21 are married, 14 are parents, 14 are green-card holders, and 2 are U.S.-born citizens (each raised in Japan and having returned to the United States independently as adult).

These *shin-issei* vary in many respects, such as the specific reasons and methods for their embarkation, what they encounter and discover during their journey, and, above all, how far they have gone culturally and socially in their overseas adventure. On the other hand, they commonly share some inclinations in attitude and behavior as well as sources of their inclinations. First, most of them share a pair of pull/push factors, namely, *akogare* for the West and, on the other hand, the notion of Japan as a

mendokusai shakai. More specifically, each of my *shin-issei* interviewees recalls some fascinating images of America and New York portrayed in American TV programs and movies, which may serve as a root of the pull factor. The feeling of *akogare* grew in their young hearts for, to use their own words, "a totally different world" especially in "the children's attitudes." As for the push factor, on the other hand, an aphorism offered by one of my interviewees may summarize its essence. He says, "Japan is neat, orderly, but lacking individuality, closed-minded…," compared to America, which is "smelly, dirty, but sturdy and funny." He adds, "We are raised that way, molded from head to toe, solely as group members rather than as individuals." Upon these factors rooted in their minds deeply, each *shin-issei* later found specific reason and chance to embark for "a totally different world," America.

In their journey, the *shin-issei* also share some certain sojourner characteristics, and their escape from the *mendokusai shakai* seems far from conclusive. For example, almost all return to Japan once in a while--typically, every summer for a week or two--and stay at their parents' places. Through this custom called *satogaeri* ("occasional return to hometown")--traditionally practiced by wives in Japan--these international migrants today maintain social and/or economic ties to their mother country.

A more fundamental sojourner characteristic is seen in their apparent homesick outlook that leads many to say that they will finish their overseas adventure, "someday." Nearly two-thirds of my *shin-issei* interviewees, even those married to Americans, display this inclination. In actuality, however, none of those whose livelihood is in New York (i.e., those other than the *chuzaiin* and students) makes a clear plan to carry out this "someday."

Although the *shin-issei* migrate as individuals rather than in groups, they notice that the path they follow in their journey cannot be free from, besides visa and job, their relationships with other people, such as employers, spouses, friends, and offspring. Framed within such social elements on the personal level and economic and political conditions on the macro level, they place themselves in ongoing self-adjusting processes, taking opportunities and following chances, forward or backward. Although they certainly have their own wish for the future, they are, at the same time, well aware that a wish is not the same as will. One of them married to a European green-card holder may illustrate a nuance of the open-ended trajectories of their journey. She says,

> I don't know where we'll live in the future. We may live in Europe. But when my husband dies, that would barely make sense, and so we'll live in Japan... But if my daughters get the basis on which they'd better live in New York--like, marriage or job--then I'll live near them in New York... Since I had two daughters, New York has become the real world, no longer a Disneyland, you know. I'm a foreigner here.

PART I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, THE ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY

Ch. 1. The Meiji Restoration and the Opening of Japanese Migration to the U.S.

Both "labor migrants" and "non-labor migrants" who crossed the Pacific Ocean in the prewar years can be seen as products of the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912); however, their class backgrounds made an essential difference in the way they perceived and reacted to the restoration. Coming from the ex-samurai or the merchant class, the non-labor migrants actively reacted to the revolutionary era as a golden opportunity for lifting up their own social status (Nitobe 1891; Sawada 1996; Akiba 2006). Besides this ambition, the non-labor migrants' embarkation was energized by the shared feeling of *akogare* for the West. In principle, the spirit of *akogare* is internationalist and modernist. As an ideological and socio-psychological drive, it grew extensively in Japan--together with the other side of the same coin, namely, a sense of inferiority to the West. The inherent character of *akogare* that places Japan below the West, as such, placed political leaders in an awkward position; the leaders were caught between the advancement of the nation by following the West and the conservation of Japanese national pride and identity.

To cope with the ambivalent situation, the Japanese government required its emigrants, both labor and non-labor, to shoulder "Japanese pride"--or what Sawada (1996, p. 69) calls an "unstated mission" to avoid disgracing the nation's name. For the government, the emigration situation had to be directed thoroughly under its control.

Before the labor emigrants left Japan, for example, instructions were given to them by the governors of their respective prefectures, which stated, among other things: "Remember that you are the subjects of the Japanese empire, and never disgrace your homeland with shameful acts…" (Kimura 1988, p. 5) The non-labor migrants, considered "unofficial representative of Japan" (Sawada 1996, p. 69), were no less meticulously instructed and monitored during their overseas adventure. Emigration and issues of national identity were thus intertwined from the outset.

Non-Labor Migrants

For more than two centuries preceding the late nineteenth century, the emigration of Japanese commoners had been strictly prohibited by the government of feudal Japan. Emigration for non-labor purposes, such as business or study, started during a groundbreaking era in which the new government pursued a series of programs for modernization called the Meiji Restoration.

Having just opened its door to the world, the new Japanese government viewed the global situation as a simply structured hierarchy composed of the only two segments, namely, the conqueror ("the West") and the conquered ("the rest"). The choice its leaders made was unmistakable: to join the former. The major slogan that Meiji leaders raised for the new era, therefore, was *fukoku-kyohei* ("enrich the nation, strengthen the military"). In an outwardly similar fashion, intellectuals debated a radically progressive idea called *datsua-nyuo* ("exit Asia, enter Europe"). Industrialization at a furious tempo was taken for granted; catching up with the strongest in the world became an "obsession" (Wolferen 1990, p. 376). In the meantime, some prominent intellectuals attempted to

harness the huge momentum associated with these changes to move from "the absolutist and authoritarian traditions," largely dominant among the political leaders, to a literally reformist trajectory based on the essence of *bunmei kaika* ("civilization and enlightenment") and committed to individual liberties (see Beasley 1995, pp. 85-98).

Under such circumstances, the major factors that encouraged youth to leave Japan as non-labor migrants included: (1) internationalists' ongoing agitation for modernization of the nation, (2) the circulation of success stories about pioneer Japanese emigrants to Western countries, typically to America, and (3) the abolition of the feudal class system[4] that raised young men's hopes "to become successful entrepreneurs, renowned scholars, or even ministers in the government" (Yanagida 1957, p. 1).

Akogare *for the West, and the "Tug of War"*

According to Beasley (1995), it was Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835-1901), the founder of Keio University (1868-), who initiated the *datsua-ron* (the "argument of 'exit Asia'") with which to agitate for modernization of the nation. His highly provocative arguments were thoroughly in favor of modernization through Westernization and opposed to leaving any trace of the feudal past. In his *Bunmei-ron no Gairyaku* (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization), for example, Fukuzawa identified Japan in Social Darwinist language [5] as "one of the semi-civilized countries of the world… inferior to those of the

[4] There were four classes in the system, namely, samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants (more will be discussed later). Although some consider it a "caste" system since the mobility was restricted, many distinguish between the "caste system" and the "feudal class system," by its character of strata and rigidity of segregation (e.g., Grusky 1994, pp. 7-12).

[5] Darwin's theory was introduced into Japan in the late 1870s, alongside the ideas of Herbert Spencer that became known as Social Darwinism (Unoura 1999, p. 236). Both liberals and conservatives in Meiji Japan viewed the doctrine of "survival of the fittest" "as the absolutely (continued…)

West 'in literature, the arts, commerce, or industry…'" and claimed that "the first order of business… lies in sweeping away blind attachment to past customs," specifically, "the absolutist and authoritarian traditions of Confucianism" (1973 [1875]; cited in Beasley 1995, pp. 97-8).

Fukuzawa's books gathered huge attentions (Beasley 1995, pp. 89-90). Other publications followed with similar themes. In addition, a wide range of complete or partial translations of Western literacy works was published. Titles included: Smile's *Self-help*; Mills' *On Liberty*; Verne's *Round the World in Eighty Days*; Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*; Aesop's *Fables*; Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*; More's *Utopia*; Rousseau's *The Social Contract*…[6]

This drive to direct the societal atmosphere toward "Western tastes" soon brought complaints from those who believed that Japan's culture was being undermined (*ibid*., p. 85). The government, in favor of Japan's own culture, enacted a Press Law in 1875 to make private publications a subject of political censorship, claiming that a political unity required a dash of cultural conservatism. Standing on the same side, *Nihon*, a magazine whose mission was to reawaken the Japanese to uniquely Japanese characteristics and bolster the feeling of national pride, began publication in1899. Other similar magazines soon followed (Befu 1993, p. 309).

Nationalists in Japan did not simply dismiss the importance of Western knowledge. Most of the government top officials in Meiji, the champions of national

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true criterion by which to judge the validity of various political ideologies" (*ibid*., p. 242).

[6] Illiteracy rates in Meiji Japan varied by region, gender, and class. Available data based on conscription examinations (of men aged between 20 and 32) indicate that in 1899, downtown Tokyo recorded 9.9 percent in the "totally illiterate" category (unable to write one's own name) and 36.1 percent in the "some learning" group (Rubinger 2000, p. 178). Rural areas had roughly (continued…)

pride, had studied in some Western countries before assuming their positions (Nitobe 1891; Conte 1977; Mori 1994). Yet, they could not allow the trend of *akogare* for the West to take its own course. Its potentiality--ambivalent and precarious in its direction--needed to be watched closely. As exemplified by the Meiji leaders themselves, there was possibility of bringing in new knowledge for the nation's advancement, but on the other hand *akogare* could bring excessive foreign influence to Japan and weaken the Japanese identity.

It is important to note that "although some scholars claim as if Japan had maintained its nationalist tradition before Meiji, there had been no ground for this isolated country to have such tradition" (Sakaiya 1991, p. 104). Japanese nationalism was indeed a politically nurtured product of the Meiji Restoration following the models of the European imperialism. The literature about Japanese nationalism ascribes a pivotal role to schools in creating an "emperor-centered nationalism" whose spirit was deeply implanted through the Imperial Rescript on Education promulgated in the national system of compulsory education (Lincicome 1999, pp. 338; Smith 1983, p. 31).[7] After Japan won the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and, soon after, won the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Japanese nationalism rapidly took shape and generated a sentiment among the masses that affirmed "good, old, strong Japan" (Sakaiya 1991, p. 2). Every element of life, accordingly, came to be framed within what Kawakami (1964) calls "the aims of the state," below which stood a tower of *groups* in a monolithic manner, including company, school, community, and family (Nakane 1972; Lipset 1996).

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20 percent in the "totally illiterate" category and about 40 percent in "some learning."

[7] By 1880 there were 28,000 primary schools (the compulsory period of education was 3 years) with over two million pupils (about 40% of the school-age children) (Beasley 1995, p. 94).

Kawakami (1964) offers a critical argument concerning the relationship between the state and the individual as framed under nationalism. In Japan, according to him,

> State sovereignty is heaven-granted while individual rights are bestowed by the state. The state allows limited individual rights to the extent that they further the aims of the state. Thus, individual rights are always instruments of the state, not to be utilized for the aims of the individual… (Kawakami 1964; cited in Wolferen 1990, p. 209)

To the state, the energy of *akogare* for the West, if existent at all, has to be directed toward the "aims of the state" as against those "of the individual."

Conflicts between the aims of the state and those of the individual were inevitable especially in regard to emigration. Among the pioneer non-labor migrants, some indeed embarked on their overseas adventure as a challenge to Japan's "blind attachment" to the past (see above) "as individuals, not in groups" (Sawada 1996, p. 3). Yet others emigrated to study the Western world to reconfirm "Japan's past [as] a source of strength, not a cause for shame" (Okakura 1904; cited in Beasley 1995, pp. 99-100). The nature of non-labor migrants' adventure cannot be viewed in only one way; it may be found in how the migrant reacted to the conflicts.

Pioneer Japanese Emigrants

Success stories about pioneer emigrants, who contributed to the nation's advancement after their return to Japan, served to practically justify and further arouse potential emigrants' feeling of *akogare* for the West. John Manjiro (1827-1898), a well-known figure still much loved in Japan, is said to be the very first Japanese who crossed the Pacific Ocean long before Japan ended its strict policy of seclusion. His "Cinderella"

story, after his return from a ten-year journey to the United States, made him one of the most encouraging pioneers for non-labor migration to the United States in Meiji. A brief summary of his adventure, which has been published in numerous books and performed in plays, illustrates the reasons for his popularity. [8]

Manjiro was neither a labor migrant nor a non-labor migrant, but instead the son of a fisherman. He accidentally drifted far into the Pacific Ocean and left Japan in 1841. He was only 14 years old. Miraculously rescued by an American whaling ship a few months later, he was unexpectedly invited by the captain to visit America and study there. The captain, Whitfield, was impressed with the young boy's "intelligence and resourcefulness" (Nagakuni *et al*. 2003, p. 10). The boy courageously accepted the invitation.

In America, Manjiro moved into Captain Whitfield's home in the whaling town of Fairhaven, Massachusetts, where he went to school, and worked part-time, like an ordinary American boy. During his ten-year sojourn, Manjiro learned English and navigation, and became a sailor, a whaler, and a forty-niner who struck gold in the gold rush, when he sailed to California via Cape Horn and Chile.

When Manjiro finally returned to Japan in 1851, he was arrested and harshly interrogated for his illegal trip overseas, which, if judged to be spying for a foreign country, could merit execution. He had been aware of the risk in returning to Japan, but he wanted to see his family in his home village, regardless. What saved his life, however, was the judgment of the high-ranking official who examined Manjiro. Facing a critical situation in which Japan could be conquered by Western powers, the official discerned

[8] The summary is based on Nagakuni *et al*. (2003) as well as Nagakuni (1992).

the priceless value of the knowledge Manjiro had acquired in the United States, particularly of the language and of Western culture.[9] Instead of an execution, the poor fisherman's son was granted samurai status, and then worked for Japan's top diplomats as their most important interpreter and advisor. Later, Manjiro was even appointed as a professor of navigation at Tokyo Imperial University (today's Tokyo University).

Manjiro's image as a real life "Cinderella" provided hope for later generations of Japanese. The first book of Manjiro's story appeared as early as 1853 and combined with its performance in theaters, engendered adventurers following in his footsteps. Their stories, if successful, induced further followers.[10] Most of Manjiro's followers are students, writers, and merchants who leave Japan "to learn" something in the United States in order to be rewarded on their return to Japan--just as Manjiro was.

Inazo Nitobe (1891, p. 171), also a non-labor migrant in the late nineteenth century, [11] observed a positive side of the ambivalent reactions to *akogare* for the West, saying, "In its eagerness to assimilate Western institutions, Japan has tried to utilize the

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[9] Only two years later, the U.S. government sent Commodore Matthew C. Perry with a substantial naval force to Japan to negotiate a new relationship between the two countries (see Beasley 1995).

[10] According to Nitobe (1891, p. 157), there were several Japanese commoners, other than Manjiro, who also "drifted all the way across the Pacific Ocean," while Japan's door was still closed. Like Manjiro, they were shipwrecked sailors or fishermen. Their stories are, however, not necessarily as Cinderella-like as Manjiro's, and thus are not well-known. One of them lived and died a poor house-servant; another served as an interpreter in the British Legation after his return to Japan, but fell a victim to a xenophobic samurai's sword; still another came back to Japan as a naturalized American and became a merchant in Yokohama (*ibid*., pp. 157-58). Maybe there were some more who never came back to Japan or who came back but either were executed or concealed their journey for life.

[11] Inazo Nitobe (1862-1933)--whose portrait appears on the Japanese 5,000-yen bill today (approximately $50 in 2009)--himself began living in the United States in 1884 as a student at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland (see Ohta 1986). He converted to Christianity, and later (1891) married a white American. Coming from a samurai family, he achieved top bureaucrat status on his return to Japan in 1901, and accepted a full-time professorship at Tokyo Imperial University in 1913, becoming a founding director of the (continued…)

acquisitions of every young man who has 'rubbed himself against a foreigner.'" The Japanese thus have developed their own version of "Go West, Young Man!"--although its meaning splits between challenging and reconfirming the past.

Two pioneer Japanese students came to New York in 1866, according to Nitobe (*ibid*., p. 165). A year earlier, the Japanese government had eventually removed the ban on emigration for non-labor purposes (Nagakuni 1992). Their intention in coming to America was "to learn how to build 'big ships' and make 'big guns' to prevent European powers from taking possession of their country" (Nitobe 1891, p. 165). They were benevolently taken care of by American officials, instead of being deported, and their housing was arranged in New Jersey. The stream of Japanese non-labor migration into the United States--"to learn" something--would not dry up until the outbreak of the war fought directly between the two countries.

Risshin Shusse

The term *risshin shusse* ("advancement and achievement" or "success story") became like a slogan among urban youth especially after Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) (Sawada 1996, p. 76), which in effect affirmed Japan's aspiration to great power status. By 1871, the Meiji Restoration had completed the abolition of the feudal class system. Now, in principle, a person's ambition was no longer meaningless in shaping his own status. For most commoners, though, *risshin shusse* remained just a hope; the boundary between elites and commoners was rather becoming sharper anew when what Nakane (1972, p. 90) calls the "intra-group unity"

International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (later renamed UNESCO) in 1920.

among elites firmly developed into the new structure of the nation. Regardless, each exceptional success story blurred the distinction between hope and reality, and eventually led to a boom of *ryugaku* ("studying abroad") among young men coming mostly from ex-samurai or merchant class.

A "number of magazines, books, and pamphlets specifically devoted to *tobei*" ("crossing to America") were published, "aimed at young people who were convinced that their prospects for achievement lay on the opposite shore of the Pacific Ocean" (Sawada 1996, p. 92). Written mostly by student-laborers who had lived or were living in San Francisco, some guidebooks presented information about "schools, employment, and living conditions," projecting "a rosy picture of the city as a place where Japanese youth could work and study at the same time" (Ichioka 1988, p. 11)--a rosy picture that remains vivid in today's magazines.

Other than the Pacific Coast, the only region in the United States that saw an increase in the population of Japanese expatriates by 1920 was the Middle Atlantic States (Daniels 1988, p. 152). In the Northeast (the New England States and the Middle Atlantic States), where the Japanese non-labor migrants from middle- or upper-class families were concentrated, the number of Japanese nationals steadily swelled from 247 in 1890 to 3,613 in 1920, or by 15 times in 30 years (U.S. Census Bureau 2002).

Taking root about this time, the Japanese community in New York contributed remarkably to "the intercourse between the United States and Japan" (Nitobe 1891, pp. 165-73). Prominent figures among the permanent stayers included: Dr. Jokichi Takamine (1854-1922), a renowned chemist and industrialist who founded the Nippon Club in New York in 1905 and Dr. Hideyo Noguchi (1876-1928) who came to the United States as a

graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania in 1900 and then became a resident scientist at Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research from 1904 until his death in 1928 (see Hosler 1998, pp. 48-9). The first Japanese import food store, Katagiri Co., was established in Manhattan in 1903, and Japan's central bank, the Bank of Japan, opened its first overseas office in New York in 1905.

The Japanese community in New York was nevertheless inconspicuous, compared to its counterparts in the Pacific States; its size was no match for theirs. During the same period, the population of the Japanese nationals living in the Pacific States increased from 1,532 to 93,490 (or by more than 60 times) (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). Although comprised mostly of labor migrants, the Japanese community in urban area such as San Francisco attracted a large number of students as well. Their statuses tended to become vague over time, however, being switched from "non-labor migrants" to "student laborers" or even to "non-student laborers." Many of them worked as domestic servants, and the rest were employed as unskilled laborers in farming and fishing (Akiba 2006, pp. 149-50). Their size, not negligible at all, combined with their poor-looking standings, drew the Japanese government's close attention.

As early as 1888, a foreign minister sent some Japanese diplomatic representatives to the West Coast to investigate conditions among the local Japanese (Daniels 1988, p. 103). A report by the diplomatic representatives regrettably informed the government that the "shameless activities of... undesirable Japanese will no doubt impair Japan's national honor and dignity" (Daniels 1988, p. 103-4). The report focused on what Americans and the local Japanese themselves called "schoolboys," most of whom according to the report "had no real connection with higher education but came to

learn English and 'the ropes.'" The report overlooked, however, that these schoolboys were actually in the process of securing jobs, housing, and English skills in order to be admitted to American schools--although for many, it was too hard to complete.

Most politicians in Japan shared similar attitudes toward the schoolboys, or self-serving adventurers. One of them stated that schoolboys had developed "maid-servant's servility," calling them a "blot on Japan's national image," which he was afraid Americans would perceive as "representatives of Japan" (see Ichioka 1988, p. 24). The schoolboys were doing maids work, which was normally done in Japan by lower class women, not by a man who could represent his nation.

San Francisco was becoming the central focus of top Japanese bureaucrats as well as prominent intellectuals. What especially concerned Japanese leaders was not only the schoolboys but more substantially the increasing number of Japanese labor migrants who were touching the nerve of American nativists in the West States. They urgently warned that Japanese migrants would become the object of an exclusion policy, as had occurred with their Chinese counterparts (Nitobe 1891, pp. 185-86). If that happened, it would damage national pride, by ranking the Japanese "on the same low level as [the Chinese], the very people whom they themselves judged to be inferior" (Ichioka 1988, p. 250).

Labor Migrants

As soon as Japan embarked on its modernization project, the new government encountered various problems. One of them was the aforementioned ideological tug of war over the direction of the Japanese social organization under Western influence. Another was a drive for international labor emigration growing among the lower segment

of the population, mostly those in the farming class. A new tax on land, levied for the national projects aiming at the rapid industrialization and militarization, practically eroded the traditionally perpetuated socio-economic structure of farmers' villages (Norman 1975). Many in the northern prefectures moved north to the then almost-primordial island of Hokkaido where development projects were taking place; "In the southern prefectures such as Kumamoto, Hiroshima, and Yamaguchi, farmers were in an especially dire situation" (Takaki 1998, p. 43). The early Japanese international labor migration is considered "a phenomenon of southwestern Japan" (Azuma 2002, p. 33), and the emigrants themselves are often called *kimin* ("abandoned people") (Ichioka 1977, p. 17).

The labor migrants left, first, for Hawaii where sugar plantations suffered from labor shortages (see Kikumura-Yano 2002, p. 24), and, later, for the U.S. mainland when the United States annexed Hawaii (Jones 1992, p. 175). When they left Japan, they were called *dekasegi* ("sojourners for temporary jobs"), destined to come back after some amount of wages earned.[12] Among them, though, some changed their minds as they were establishing their own families in the United States, largely owing to the arrangement of "picture brides" (a foremost pattern of *issei* wives coming from Japan through arranged marriage). This does not mean, however, that their *dekasegi* temperament irreversibly disappeared. A large portion of the migrants actually did return to Japan years or even decades later, contributing to higher return rates than most other immigrant groups' of their era (Takaki 1998).

[12] Ichioka (1988, p. 4) suggests that the *dekasegi* pattern was also observed among European emigrants who started out as "birds of passage." Compared to European counterparts, however, the Japanese labor migrants' return rates were considerably higher--as will be discussed (continued…)

It is important to note that in terms of their motive to leave Japan, which was congenial to the general assumption of the economic theory of migration, the *issei* were rather unique among other Japanese expatriates who were (are) not job seekers overseas including the non-labor migrants of their own era as well as postwar Japanese adventures. In terms of what they inherited from the social organization created in Meiji, however, the *issei* did share some certain characters that penetrate now and then of Japanese people as a whole. These characters appeared in their journey in such specific forms as: (1) the picture-bride practice, a product of so-called samuraization, (2) their high return rates, and (3) the *nisei* ("second generation") and the trace of samuraization.

The Picture Brides and Samuraization

In most states where the Japanese labor migrants' population was concentrated, interracial marriages were prohibited by anti-miscegenation laws.[13] Although once repealed as unconstitutional, the law was soon reenacted in California in 1905, primarily in response to intensified concerns about amalgamation with a new group of Asian immigrants, the Japanese (Moran 2001, p. 31). Hence, without the arrangement of taking "picture brides" from Japan, the development of Japanese-American community would have been inconceivable. In 1900, before the picture-bride practice spread among the *issei*, there were almost five Japanese men for every Japanese woman in the United States (Moran 2001, p. 35). By 1910, the ratio had dropped to 3.5 to 1, and by 1920, 1.6 to 1.

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below.

[13] From colonial times until the mid 1900s, anti-miscegenation laws banning interracial sex and marriage were a common feature of state law (Moran 2001, pp. 4-6). In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that anti-miscegenation laws were unconstitutional.

Notably, anti-miscegenation laws remained critical in the phenomenon of Japanese war (continued…)

Reportedly, 45,000 Japanese women moved to the United States as picture brides (Akiba 2006, p. 151).

The custom of arranged marriage is believed to be a tradition handed over from pre-modern Japan, but it was actually "fostered by the government" in Meiji (DeVos 1961, p. 1205) through a set of political arrangements called "samuraization" of commoners (Befu 1971, p. 51). It was a, so-to-speak, invented "tradition." Although the new government abolished the feudal class system, it utilized the feudal samurai code as the foundation for its modern civil code. Though apparently self-contradicting, this arrangement functioned as the well-oiled machine for the nation's foremost slogan, *fukoku-kyohei* ("enrich the nation, strengthen the military"). Led by the renewed samurai authoritarianism, the commoners--most of whom were farmers--acted as the emperor's loyal, obedient, and self-sacrificing subjects. Once forged as a tradition, a given set of ideas can have irresistibly powerful authority for group members, for it claims itself to be an embodiment of the collectivity. Through samuraization, traditional rural modes of marriage among commoners were soon replaced with the samurai norm of parentally arranged marriage (Yanagida 1957). [14]

Sawada (1996, p. 153) maintains that the "tradition" of arranged marriage functioned in establishing the family as a component of the political structure of the state, whereby transferring "private social affairs" into the "public realm." Within the family, women assumed an essential role as *ryosai-kenbo* ("good wife and wise mother").

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brides who married American servicemen right after World War II (see Chapter 2).

[14] Hobsbawm *et al*. (1992) call this kind of rulers' efforts "invention of tradition," which attempts to establish continuity with a suitable past (p. 1). They observe, in particular, that a "'modernization' which maintained the old ordering of social subordination (possibly with some well-judged invention of tradition) was not theoretically inconceivable, but apart from Japan it is (continued…)

Likewise, through the roles assigned to every member of the family in a uniform fashion, outwardly at least, "the whole nation acted in unison." Samurai values and norms thus came to be seen as the touchstone for "the true Japanese." As such, many people self-consciously trace their founding to samurai class (DeVos 1961, p. 1207) although true samurai families accounted for only 6 or 7 percent of the population in the feudal era (Ikegami 1995, p. 162).[15]

The "tradition" of arranged marriage also effectively formed the *issei* families and thus the Japanese-American community. The *issei*, coming mostly from farming class, utilized the samurai tradition in finding their wives by exchanging letters and pictures through relatives in Japan. Most of the picture brides left Japan alone, believing that they were joining handsome, healthy, rich men in America.[16]

Births followed shortly after marriage and immigration (Glenn 1986, pp. 47-9). Large families were the norm, particularly among farmers. One study in the Seattle area found an average family size of 4.3 children. This does not mean that the *issei* acted unvaryingly in forming their families and developing their community in America. Many left, reversely pushed by a series of legal restrictions, and perhaps more importantly, pulled by an ever remaining fellow-feeling, if not a loyalty, toward Japan.

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difficult to think of an example of practical success" (*ibid*., p. 266).

[15] The size of the samurai population is still a disputed question among historical demographers; shogunate surveys always excluded the samurai population from the data (Ikegami 1995, p. 162). Some estimate it (including their families) at between 6 and 7 percent of the whole population. Most (more than 80 %) were farmers (and fishermen) and the rest (10 %), either artisans or merchants.

[16] Often, men who looked older and less handsome than those in their pictures greeted their brides (Lee 2003, p. 126). Not just their physical appearance in their pictures but also their occupations oftentimes misrepresented reality (Ichioka 1980, pp. 345-48). Sharecroppers passed themselves off as landowning farmers, small shopkeepers as big merchants, hotel bellboys as elevator engineers, and railroad section foremen as labor contractors.

The High Return Rates

The economic theory of migration suggests that the major factors that can shape the "return migration behavior of foreign-born persons in the United States" include the "per-capita GNP in the source country" (Yang 2002) and the "distance between the United States and the source country" (Borjas *et al*. 1996).[17] Other things being equal, that is: (1) the poorer the sending country is, the less likely its emigrants return; and (2) the geographically further the sending country from the host country is, the less likely its emigrants return.

From these, it may be easily (but erroneously) assumed that the Japanese labor migrants' return rates must have been *low*. First, they had left Japan because of economic hardship in their home villages and, on the other hand, because of economic opportunities in the receiving country. Daily wages of farm laborers in the end of the nineteenth century in Japan were indeed low, an average of "sixteen cents" (Yoshida 1909, p. 165), compared with "two dollars" in America (Buell 1922, p. 606). Geographically, Japan was far away from the U.S. mainland, and even from Hawaii. The first *dekasegi* group (*gannenmono*, or "first-year men")[18] required 33 days to get to

[17] Yang (2002) is based on "major post-1965 Asian immigrant groups including Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, Indians, Koreans, and Vietnamese" whose data come from the 1990 U.S. Census and an INS longitudinal data set (1977-97). The dependent variable is "naturalization."

Borjas *et al*. (1996) are based on 70 sending countries (including Japan) whose emigrants' data are available in the 1980 U.S. census as well as the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (1971-1986). The dependent variable is "outmigration."

[18] In the first year of Meiji (1868), an American trader, acting as a special agent for the Hawaiian plantations, recruited approximately 150 Japanese (141 men, 6 women, and 2 children) and shipped them as a group of *dekasegi* to Hawaii (Niiya 1993, p. 143). The emigrants were called "first-year men" because they left Japan in the first year of Emperor Meiji's reign (Saveliev 2002, p. 72). As the shipment had not been authorized by the new Japanese government, and as the migrants were treated like slaves in Hawaii, this *gannenmono* incident was seriously taken as disrespectful to the nation, and hence labor emigration was banned anew until 1885.

Hawaii in 1868, and of the 149 passengers one died during the long, stormy voyage (Niiya 1993, p. 143). The voyages of the picture brides, usually from Yokohama to Seattle or San Francisco--about 40 years after *gannenmono*--still took about a month, during which "the women experienced… physical illness" (Glenn 1986, p. 45). In short, the country was poor--at least for the *dekasegi*--and was remote from the host country. Despite these high costs and difficulties of returning to Japan, many Japanese labor migrants to the United States actually returned.

More than half (55%) of the Japanese who went to Hawaii between 1886 and 1924 returned to Japan, a rate even higher than return rates among their counterparts from Europe--though geographically closer to the United States--including Pole (40%), Greeks (46%), Italians (50%), and Englishmen (55%) (Takaki 1998, p. 11). For Japanese migrants to the United States, as many as 97 out of every 100 arrivals were offset by return departures during the fiscal years 1908-1914 (Thomas 1950, p. 461). Between 1915 and 1924, there were 86 returns per 100 arrivals, and after 1924 there was a consistent net migratory loss; departures per 100 arrivals numbered 146.[19]

Many researchers (e.g., Thomas 1950, p. 461) observe that the *issei* regarded themselves as sojourners "perhaps more than any other immigrant group in America." What kept their sojourner character unchanged, even with the high costs of returning to Japan, may be reduced to two factors; legal restrictions and a sentiment toward their

[19] To be noted, the return-migration to Japan included both "sojourners" and "repeaters"; some left permanently while others came back to the United States (Thomas 1950, p. 461). According to the War Relocation Authority (WRA), which handled the wartime internment camps, for example, no fewer than 40 percent of its internees had returned to Japan and remigrated to America at least once by the time of the internment, while about one in every ten had made three or more trips to Japan (*ibid*.).

mother country, Japan. At the onset, Japanese were ineligible for citizenship,[20] and this environment was further reinforced by a series of political restrictions--neither of which had much to do with most European immigrants' decision regarding whether to stay or to go. The Alien Land Law of 1913, for example, stripped the *issei* of any rights in regard to property for farming purposes (Buell 1923, p. 298).[21] Sensing the anti-Japanese movements in America, in 1921, the Japanese government voluntarily deprived the *issei* of the right to engage in the picture-bride practice, through what came to be called "the Lady's Agreement" (Inui 1925, p. 194). Finally, the Immigration Act of 1924 set quotas at 2 percent for each nationality (excluding some regions of countries) in terms of the number of its immigrants entering the United States in proportion to its contribution to the 1890 census (Jones 1992, p. 237). As noted, after 1924, Japanese departures per 100 arrivals numbered 146.

Socio-psychological factors are no less important to take into account for understanding the high return rates among Japanese. In a word, the migrants missed Japan. As Yoshida (1909, p. 166)--who was himself a sojourner and scholar in the United States at the time--observed, the *issei* "does not desire to exhibit the fruits of his toil before an American audience, but only before his fellow-countrymen." For the *issei*,

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[20] They were neither "white" (a primary prerequisite for the naturalization rights set in the Nationality Act of 1790) nor "aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent" (amended after the Civil War in 1870). Nonetheless, many *issei* filed petitions for U.S. citizenship. Of them, the most notable was the Ozawa case, which went up to the Supreme Court in 1922 (Ichioka 1977). Fervently supported by the Japanese migrant organization, it became a collective struggle for being the same as whites. The court, however, dismissed this claim. Prior to the Ozawa case, though, due to the ambiguous meaning of a "free white person," some lower federal courts had issued naturalization papers to a number of Japanese (more than 400 recorded in the census of 1910) (Buell 1923).

[21] The law was later amended twice (in 1920 and in 1923) in order to prohibit several means which the Japanese used to evade the law, such as lease and croppage contracts. For the "evasive devices" that the *issei* exploited, see Higgs (1978).

it was only his countrymen with whom he could have meaningful social interaction; they shared what Wierzbicka (1996, p. 527) calls "cultural grammar" ("a set of subconscious rules that shape a people's ways of thinking, feeling, speaking, and interacting") while the *issei* had no knowledge about white people's counterpart.

Then, who stayed? According to Thomas (1950, p. 462),

> Many of those who stayed… had established families, and their children held American citizenship. Even though sojourner-attitudes persisted, most of the immigrants who attained economic status and had American-born children became residents-in-fact if not settlers-by-intention... (Thomas 1950, p. 462)

Despite the legal restrictions, those who stayed managed to keep their jobs and formed families, whereby holding on to their own cultural grammar in America. Equally importantly, their U.S.-born offspring mediated between their niches and America, which otherwise would have been forever foreign to them. Thomas's (1950) observation above succinctly summarizes these factors, including the nuances of the migrants' decision making of whether to stay or to go, which yet seems situational and open-ended.

(As will be discussed later, the *shin-issei* today share the issue of "cultural grammar" coupled with the difficulty in dealing with a legal restriction--i.e., obtaining a green card--the major factors that, among others, shape the trajectory of their journey.)

The Nisei *and Samuraization and Its Discontents*

In a typical *issei* family, the *nisei* were born in the years 1918-1922 to a 35-year-old father and a 25-year-old mother (see Daniels 1988, p. 155). Most of the *nisei* thus came of legal age between 1939 and 1943, a critical time during which the relationship

between their parents' old country, Japan, and their own country, the United States, had completely deteriorated.

Since the Russo-Japanese War, there had been numerous rumors stemming from a concern about "the yellow peril."[22] They asserted that Japanese immigrants were in fact "military men in disguise who were awaiting orders from the emperor," or that "under the guise of fishermen, Japanese immigrants were spying for Japan in naval vessels disguised as fishing boats" (Ringer *et al*. 1989, p. 181). After the Pearl Harbor was attacked by Japan in 1941, the concern was intensely revived, and demands for evacuation of the entire Japanese immigrant community mounted inexorably on the West Coast (*ibid*., p. 188). President Roosevelt reacted to these pressures by issuing an executive order authorizing the Army to exclude all persons of Japanese ancestry--officially labeled "enemy aliens"--from designated military areas.[23] A month later, Congress passed this bill, the Executive Order 9066, in the name of "military necessity."

According to Kurashige (2001), there are three different stances in analyzing the wartime internment of the entire Japanese community on the U.S. mainland, the "apologist," the "triumphalist," and the "revisionist." The "apologist" accuses the internment policy of its racist nature, highlighting, for example, contradictions in the Allies' ideological crusade against the Axis, by comparing American racist actions with the racist Nazi attitude toward German Jews (Shaffer 1999, p. 598). The "triumphalist" stance stems from the model minority thesis, and focuses on how arduously and admirably the *nisei* proved their loyalty to the United States in many important ways,

[22] Chambers (1921, p. 28), for example, warned that dominating Asia by force, Japan now seeks the domination of the American side through her policy of "conquest by colonization."

[23] In 1942, the *nisei*'s status for draft was switched from 1-A (available for unrestricted (continued…)

including organizing the internment camps themselves and volunteering for service. The "revisionist," by contrast, questions "the stereotype of the Japanese American victim of oppression during World War II" (Daniels 1981, p. 129), a stereotype that has "concealed or obscured a more complex picture of Japanese American actions, motivations, and perspectives" (Kurashige 2001, p. 389).

Among these three stances above, it is the revisionist that most centrally focuses on the migrants themselves and their social, political backgrounds that shaped their reactions to the crisis. For example, no other stance points out that over the U.S. wartime policies of internment against them, members of the Japanese community bitterly disputed amongst themselves. More specifically, the *nisei* organization, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), supported the policy of evacuation "definitely arising from reasons of military necessity and national safety" (Hosokawa 1992, p. 290), while what Daniels (1981) calls the "left opposition" (p. 118) furiously labeled the JACL's attitude the "'patriotism equals submission' formula" (p. 125).

The JACL grew out of a coalition of clubs formed by relatively highly educated *nisei* (Spickard 1983, p. 153). In the beginning, the young JACL had little effect on the Japanese community and even less impact on larger society. By 1941, however, with ominous signs of war between Japan and the United States, the JACL had become the only Japanese-American organization in a position to deal with the crisis as most of the *issei* leaders had been arrested as "potentially dangerous Japanese."

Causes of the conflicts within the Japanese-American community under the JACL leadership, however, seem to have been smoldering at the onset. Their primary goal

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military service) to 4-C (the category ordinarily used for enemy aliens) (Shimada 2004, p. 81).

being Americanizing Japanese Americans more thoroughly, some leaders viewed the war, and the resulting wartime internment, rather "as their 'greatest opportunity' to demonstrate their patriotism" (Spickard 1983, p. 159). The causes varied in their specifics, but the socio-psychological roots can be traced to a single seed, namely, the Japanese collective psychology shaped in Meiji upon samuraization, whose impacts have proven to be long lasting. Indeed, at the San Francisco Peace Treaty held in 1951 between the Allied Powers and Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida retrospectively praised the JACL leaders. He stated, "Japanese Americans acted precisely in accordance with the code of samurai pledging the absolute loyalty and obedience to his master [the United States]" (cited in Day 2000, p. 93).[24]

In the hopes of saving the *nisei* from imprisonment, when the hearings on internment camps began, one of the JACL leaders offered a plan for a "suicide battalion" of Japanese-American volunteers (Hosokawa 1992, p. 267). According to his plan, the volunteer unit would be sent wherever there was an impossible mission to accomplish. To assuage any doubts about their loyalty, they would leave their parents as hostages with the U.S. government. The U.S. officials declined this plan as unfitting to the U.S. Army code and argued that if a *nisei* were loyal to the United States, he should be willing to accept internment as "his contribution to the safety and welfare of this country" (Spickard 1983, p. 164). As a concession, the Army officials then offered to let the JACL participate in discussions about how the internment operation would be carried out. The

[24] As was the case in Japan's modernization project carried out using the samurai code in Meiji, Japan's declaration of democracy in the postwar era seemed to appeal itself in the same samurai spirit. Ikegami (1995, p. 7) argues that the net effect of the "samurai's symbolic idioms," which had been "heavily exploited for political purposes by prewar military Japanese nationalists," "lingered in the collective memory of modern Japanese even after 1945."

JACL agreed. The organization of the internment camps was, therefore, based on self-government led by the JACL leaders under the U.S. War Relocation Authority (WRA).

To the Japanese community, the situation appeared ridiculous, disorderly, highhanded, but nonetheless, consequential. The Japanese ran about in confusion, anxiously exchanging pieces of information or rumors. Some optimistically argued that the internment policy was a bluff, or that if it were not, it would be impossible to implement (Shirai 1981, p. 49). When the evacuation and relocation were actually ordered, however, "there was talk that all of us were going to be herded into camps and machine-gunned to death" (Hane 1990, p. 570). The optimism based on the "bluff theory" disappeared. It became clear, at least, that they were being relocated.[25]

The JACL was to serve as a major advisory group in the internment camps, mediating between Japanese internees and the WRA (Day 2000, p. 67). On one hand, the JACL checked the living conditions of the camps. On the other hand, it watched for "disloyal" or "subversive" acts, and reported suspected acts to the WRA or FBI. Because of their stance and perceived attitudes of standing for the WRA rather than for their compatriots, however, internees soon began to call the JACL leaders *inu* ("informers" or "betrayers"; literally "dogs") (see Thomas *et al*. 1969 [1946], p. 21) secretly.

Six months later, a JACL meeting resolved the idea of volunteer for service by the *nisei*. The frustration and distrust of the JACL as *inu* came to the surface (Day 2000, p. 68). "How can we serve the country that treats us as 'enemy aliens'?" The indignation

[25] About 47,000 *issei* and 80,000 *nisei* were placed in ten internment camps including: Manzanar (CA), about 10,000 internees; Tule Lake (CA), 16,000 (later 19,000); Poston (AZ), 20,000; Gila River (AZ), 15,000; Minidoka (ID), 10,000; Heart Mountain (WY), 10,000; Granada (CO), 8,000; Topaz (UT), 10,000; Rohwer (AR), 10,000; and Jerome (AR), 10,000 (see Thomas *et al*. 1969 [1946], p. 27).

over the JACL and, of course, the internment policy itself, developed into riots in two camps (Iijima 1998, p. 402). In one of these, two people were killed. Throughout the night, the camp remained in a turbulent state (Hansen *et al*. 1985, pp. 63-4). Those whose names appeared on "blacklists" or "death lists"--along with their families and some WRA staffers--were spirited out of the camp by the administration and placed in protective custody.

The so-called "Loyalty Oath" questionnaire created another incidence of turbulence. Conducted by the U.S. War Department and the WRA, it was intended to test internees' loyalty to the United States, but instead only to induce a mixture of fear and anger. "The most serious problems were created by questions 27 and 28" (Daniel 1981, p. 113):

- Q. 27: Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?
- Q. 28: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, to any other foreign government, power, or organization?

To internees, this line of questioning seemed ambiguous and risky; if judged to be "loyal" to the United States, would the internee be trusted to leave the camp *and* to volunteer for service? All internees 17 years of age or older were required to be registered, but those who requested renunciation were exempted from the registration--and thus were freed from imagined risks, such as family separation, forced enlistment,

imprisonment, or even execution. As the registration went on, the number of applicants for renunciation and repatriation increased. [26]

Most of them felt doubly suspected by the country with which they had identified themselves; first, they had been relocated as enemy aliens and, then, were tested for their loyalty to the United States (Day 2000, p. 103). A Hawaiian-born *nisei* who served in the U.S. Army in World War I was "very bitter about the entire situation" and swore "to become a Jap 100 percent and never to do another day's work to help this country fight this war" (Thomas *et al*. 1969 [1946], p. 369). Violent incidents, especially those against suspected *inu*, continued to occur in the camps. All "disloyals"--those who answered both of the two questions above negatively--were gathered from all other camps to the Tule Lake camp, which tuned out to be a "society of terror" (Shirai 1981, p. 124). Internees were unable to walk around in the night; physical attacks could occur at any moment in the dark. In such a strained atmosphere, the administrators under the WRA continued pursuing registration and recruitment, and the JACL leaders fervently supported them.

Closely following the first bomb on Hiroshima, the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. Each blast killed nearly 100,000 people instantaneously--most of whom were children, women, and elderly--and many more

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[26] By October, 1942, some 2,800 evacuees (including minor children) had applied for repatriation or expatriation (Thomas *et al*. 1969 [1946], pp. 58-9). By October 1944, the number of the applicants had reached 19,000.

Most renunciants, as they had hoped, actually left for Japan. According to Christgau (1985), however, the subsequent lawsuit to restore their citizenship filed first in November, 1945, involved after all over 5,000 plaintiffs. Some of them found themselves stateless. Others sensed no foundation for, but rather discriminatory treatments of, their living in Japan. Their attorney, Wayne Collins, argued that the renunciations were invalid because they were the decisions made under the unconstitutionally ordered internment policy.

people would suffer from burns and genetically inherited radiation sicknesses. The Japanese government announced its unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers on August 15, 1945. That evening, the internees saw fireworks lighting up the sky beyond the barbed-wire fences (Shirai 1981, pp. 212-13). Americans celebrated the victory, outside, going on a spree.

Japanese migrants overseas who were "unable to psychologically accept that Japan could be defeated in the war" are known as the *kachigumi* ("victory group") (see Niiya 1993, p. 194). The clandestine networks of the *kachigumi* movement in Brazil are well known (e.g., Maeyama 1979). It was involved in nearly 30 incidents of terrorism including the assassination of 16 people of the *makegumi* ("defeat group"). The war and the defeat of *Shinkoku Nippon* ("the Divine Nation Japan") brought the sudden loss of their own social and symbolic structures (*ibid*., pp. 598-99).

On the U.S. mainland, where things were obvious, phenomena of this kind did not develop (Shimada 2004, pp. 193-202). Though smaller than the movement in Brazil, a similar movement under the same name, the *kachigumi*, did take place in Hawaii. In February 1946 alone, the *kachigumi* of Hawaii held 26 meetings in 17 places. The size of the audience rapidly increased at each meeting, from about 100 to more than 1,000. Its leaders and audience members shared "witness reports" such as:

- Japanese battleships have arrived at the Hawaiian harbors in order to occupy here;
- Hawaii has become a Japanese territory;
- Some people saw President Truman going to Japan in order to apologize to the Japanese emperor;
- The commission is coming from Japan to punish the Japanese disloyal to Japan, particularly the *nisei* who volunteered for service;

— According to a lecturer from the Christian church, the Bible prophesied that the Japanese emperor would eventually become the king of the world. (Cited in Shimada 2004, pp. 193-202)

The *kachigumi* of Hawaii continued promoting its own interpretation of the situation until 1948, and though no meetings were after the point, the movement did not officially dissolve until 1977. According to the *kachigumi*, the dissolution was the declaration of Japan's final victory, rather than a concession to the "propaganda." Its leaders had gradually changed the tone of their arguments as the odds seemed against them. Their initial insistence that Japan had won was altered to "Japan hasn't lost" and further to "Japan might have lost materially, but not spiritually." Their declaration of Japan's final victory was based on the revival of the Japanese economy as a great power.

Japan joined the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1964, and the 1970s opened the age of "Japan's global reach" (Emmott 1992). As if waiting for this triumphant "counterattack" by their old country, it took these 30 years for the *kachigumi* in Hawaii to soothe their wounded feeling about the "alleged" defeat of *Shinkoku Nippon*.

By contrast, people in Japan were exposed to the reality of the war's outcome immediately after it ended in 1945, as the nation was placed under U.S.-led Allied Occupation. Under the occupation, it was Japanese newspapers, no longer the government's *inu*, which earnestly reported to their readers that Japan's constitution was rewritten, war criminals were tried, and ultranationalist and militarist personnel were purged. Equally notable in regard to the occupation was the pervasion of American

culture among the masses. No longer needing to conceal their growing feeling of *akogare* for America, many Japanese viewed the occupation as liberation rather than humiliation. While the *kachigumi* in Hawaii and Brazil clung to a confused sense of identity after the defeat of *Shinkoku Nippon*, the majority of people in Japan were thrown into a new era, and sought hope in American idealism. In this atmosphere, the reopening of Japanese migration to the United States formed, beginning with a large number of "war brides."

Ch. 2. The Postwar Reopening of Japanese Migration to the U.S.

This chapter discusses "the postwar reopening of Japanese migration to the United States" in two sections: (1) "the occupation, Americanization and its discontents" and (2) the "war brides" married to the occupation personnel. The end of the Pacific War reopened Japanese migration to the United States. It was not automatic, but was impacted by the U.S.-led Allied Occupation in its cultural, socio-psychological, and ideological impetus.

After Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) headed by General Douglas MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) occupied Japan, until 1952. The U.S. government dispatched 430,000 troops to Japan, although it soon reduced its size several times, to 102,000 by 1948 (see Takemae 2002, p. 126). The troops included some *nisei,* estimated at about 4,000 Military Intelligence Service (MIS) personnel.[1]

Based on the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, the objectives of the SCAP-GHQ included "the creation of conditions which would prevent Japan from becoming a military menace and which would assure… the creation of democratic institutions in Japan" (Borton 1958). Two major factors, however, hampered the occupation's policies to change postwar Japan (e.g., Velen *et al*. 1958, pp. 3-4). Outside of Japan, the outbreak

[1] The *nisei* worked in the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS), the Repatriation Program, the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD), and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) (Nakamura 2008). By September 1945, ATIS had translated 18,000 captured enemy documents, printed 16,000 propaganda leaflets (e.g., urging Imperial troops to cease fighting), (continued…)

of the Korean War in 1950 drove the U.S. policy in the Far East to alter its goal from a total elimination of Japan's military power to a formation of a bulwark (Japan) to dam the expansion of the communist bloc in Asia. Inside Japan, taking advantage of the crisis, Japan's monopolistic power structure easily rebuilt itself as soon as the nation regained its sovereignty from GHQ. Despite the purge directive, many of the same hands grabbed the key positions in post-occupation Japanese institutions (e.g., Wolferen 1990), including those who had jokingly read "GHQ" as an abbreviation of "Go Home Quickly" (Dower 2000. p. 225).

Therefore, many argue that the occupation was largely, if not totally, a failure in terms of its proclaimed thrust to demilitarize and democratize postwar Japan (e.g., Chapman 1991). What it did leave in Japan, though, was a remarkable push in the underlying drive to Americanize the postwar population--called the "cultural policies" (Yoshimi 2003). The feeling of *akogare* for the West, which in Meiji had spread exclusively among the well-to-do segments of the population, was now democratized to the masses, replacing wartime antagonism against the Allied Powers. "America" turned out to be "a symbol of wealth and freedom onto which Japanese people themselves pinned their hopes" (Yoshimi 2003, p. 434). In short, the occupation worked in changing Japan on the socio-psychological level more than on the political level.

In the postwar era, the feeling of *akogare* for the West is expressed in terms of personal interests without necessarily being connected to the nation's advancement. Compared to their prewar counterparts, postwar Japanese overseas adventurers tend to feel less obliged to represent "Japanese pride" in their journey, although this does not

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and interrogated more than 10,000 Japanese prisoners of war (Takemae 2002, p. 21).

mean that societal anxieties about bringing disgrace to the nation have completely disappeared from Japan.

The very first wave of postwar emigrants, the "war brides," indeed brought much concern about disgrace to the nation. Although *akogare* for the West became widely shared, for the Japanese, these marriages crossed a line. GHQ did not celebrate them either. Despite its "cultural policies," it viewed such interracial unions as out of bounds and as politically onerous to the U.S. government. Aside from discharging its full duty--demilitarization and democratization of postwar Japan--GHQ was much occupied with restricting romantic relationships between its personnel and Japanese women. Ironically, the flourishing volume of the war-bride marriages it produced became more impressive than the political effects left on Japan.

The Occupation, Americanization and Its Discontents

Many point to surprisingly similar roles played, regarding Japan, by two American men; Commodore Matthew Perry (1794-1858) and General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964). "Perry opened the door of Japan's seclusion upon the new world of industrial gadgetry," and "MacArthur inserted the American concept of democracy into the institutions" (Hall 1968, p. 712). In other words, the former introduced the idea of "modernization" to the feudal nation and the latter, "democracy" to the totalitarian state. They are similar not only in the magnitude with which they shook Japan, but also their aftermath, in which there remain surprisingly few traces that they actually changed Japan (e.g., Nakane 1972; Wolferen 1990; Chapman 1991).

Within a generation or two after Perry had opened its door, Japan "was transformed from an agricultural, feudal society into the world's third most important industrial and military power" (Velen *et al*. 1958, pp. 3-4). However, this formation of "modern" Japan in Meiji was based on the "samurai" values (DeVos 1961; Befu 1971). The slogan of *fukoku-kyohei* ("enrich the nation, strengthen the military"), justly nurturing ultranationalism and militarism, had never lost its momentum upon samuraization of the entire population until 1945.

Japan's defeat in World War II dealt a "severe blow at home to the myth of Japanese superiority," leaving a "dangerous power vacuum," which General MacArthur attempted to fill (Velen *et al*. 1958, pp. 3-4). The occupation aimed "to remodel Japanese society through a series of far-reaching reforms" on a new base, a Western-type parliamentary democracy. Like Perry's modernization, which had been pursued upon samuraization, however, MacArthur's democracy was doomed to be methodically transformed in accordance to the framework of Japan's traditionally perpetuated paternalistic power structure. Some argue that democracy came "too easily" in such a milieu (from "above" and "outside") to establish deep roots (Dower 2000, p. 71) while others point to the administrative inconsistency of the occupation that had "lasting consequences for Japan's fledgling postwar democracy" (Takemae 2002, pp. 518-19).

The major tasks directed by SCAP-GHQ included a "new constitution," the "Tokyo War Crimes Trials," and the "purge directive." Each of these was filled with conflicts, and garnered arguments from all directions--from SCAP-GHQ itself, from Japanese leftists, from rightists, and from the Japanese masses. Such disputes were not fruitless; they can be seen as forming, in many important ways, the arena for the tug of

war fought in postwar Japan between Americanization of the Japanese social organization and its discontents--or, more broadly--the arena for the push/pull factors for political and cultural adventure in international environments by Japan's forthcoming generations.

The New Constitution

The new constitution written under the supervision of SCAP-GHQ replaced the Meiji constitution, which had formed the basis for Japan's polity between 1890 and 1945.[2] The new constitution has raised two major doctrines; "renunciation of war" (i.e., demilitarization) and "popular sovereignty" (democratization). Article 9 of this constitution known as the "peace clause" states: "War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations…" (see Dower 2000, p. 394) So "unique in history" (Quigley 1947b, p. 869), this doctrine continues to be a major issue of debate in postwar Japan. Some cynically argue that this clause is simply words interpreted in accordance with a given political stance rather than the other way around.

Facing the Cold War, it was MacArthur himself who first attenuated the meaning of the peace clause, declaring, "Every nation… has the inherent right of self-defense" (Kalischer 1958, p. 45). He then ordered the Japanese government to form self-defense

[2] During this period of only half a century, Japan was involved in at least five major wars under the three successive emperors, Mutsuhito, Yoshihito, and Hirohito. The wars included the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), World War I (1914-19), Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), and World War II (1941-45).

forces of near 80,000 personnel--the budget of which would be gradually expanded to the fourth largest in the world by the end of the 1990s.[3]

More people in Japan today want to keep the peace clause ("keep" 52% and "change" 30%; n=2,336) (NHK 2002). Among those who push for revision, some are concerned about the national defense itself, while others question Japan's sovereignty in the constitution, as it was written under the supervision of foreign powers (see Hook *et al*. 2001). Still another--perhaps the closest to MacArthur's stance--argue that Japan needs to change the clause in order to play its role more efficiently as a member of the international community.

Regarding the emperor's position, the Meiji constitution stated that "the Emperor is sacred and inviolable" and that "the Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal" (e.g., Kawai 1955, p. 663). The old constitution thus placed the emperor "above the clouds," below which was built the "family-state" (Beasley 1995, p. 80). As the head of the family-state, an emperor was to represent not just the line of emperors but also the line of all Japanese that were indivisible from the emperors' and accordingly "unbroken for ages eternal." Obedience to the emperor was equated to a quasi-religious obedience to the "collective representations"[4] of the chosen people *sui generis* themselves.

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[3] The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) were of a size and technological sophistication to compare with the defense of the United Kingdom, although Japan does not possess nuclear weapons or deploy aircraft carriers or nuclear-powered submarines (Hook *et al*. 2001, p. 14).

[4] In his *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim defined "collective representations" as "the product of an immense cooperation that extends not only through space but also through time; to make them, a multitude of different minds have associated, intermixed, and combined their ideas and feelings; long generations have accumulated their experience and knowledge" (1995, p. 15). Although in his definition, political aspects are absent--presumably (continued…)

In contrast, the new constitution proclaims that "the Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power" (see Quigley 1947b, p. 869). In other words, the new constitution relying upon the doctrine of "popular sovereignty" has lowered the emperor's position to "the side of the people" from "above the clouds."

Some Japanese welcome this for its democratic nature while others display anger for its disrespectful attitude toward the line of emperors and the entire family-state of the chosen people. Among the latter group, for example, one top politician claimed in the House of Peers, with the support of Premier Shigeru Yoshida, that "a *mere legal change*… would not affect the moral position of the dynasty" and that "the constitution *does not alter* the 'characteristics of the state'" (cited in Quigley 1947b, p. 868; emphasis added). In sharp contrast, still another raise the question of why the emperor system itself has to be retained when the constitution proclaims a democracy.

For several political, rather than juridical, reasons, MacArthur determinedly shut his ears to the voices calling for the overthrow of the emperor system, and instead, meticulously made the emperor "off limits" (Dower 2000, pp. 326-27). First, the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) maintained that to dethrone the emperor would cause violent reactions from a large number of Japanese who would happily die for him. OWI analysts played a definitive role in determining how to treat Japan's emperor system and the emperor himself in the postwar nation (Nakao 2007, p. 177).

Secondly, leftist voices, reactionary to the wartime hardship, were rapidly gaining popularity in Japan (Chapman 1991). Facing the Cold War, this trend needed to be

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because his discussion was about primitive societies--a political and ideological utilization of the (continued…)

stopped at any cost; otherwise Japan could become a communist nation itself, instead of the bulwark damming the expansion of the communist bloc in Asia. In final analysis, OWI planners in Washington were inclined to regard the emperor as a figure of "hollow" charisma, who could be used as easily for peace (and anti-communist strategies) as he had been for war (Dower 2000, p. 298). The emperor system, as such, survived, and Emperor Hirohito kept the throne without being judged in trials, trials in which many of his loyal servants were condemned to imprisonment or death.

The Tokyo War Crimes Trials

The war crimes trials were held in Tokyo between May, 1946, and November, 1948. Former top officials brought to trial included: premiers (most notably, Hideki Tojo), foreign ministers, war ministers, navy ministers, generals, ambassadors, economic and financial leaders, imperial advisors, and more (see Maga 2001, p. 2). Of them, seven officials were executed. A total of 5,700 individuals of various ranks were indicted for war crimes, and 920 were sentenced to death (Dower 2000, p. 447).

Many Japanese, realizing themselves as war victims, were enthusiastic about uncovering the country's war crimes. As soon as the trials began, the number of letters attacking those responsible for the war soared (*ibid*., p. 475). It is important to note that not only the rulers (such as military cliques, bureaucrats, police officers, and business leaders) but also the ruled (drafted soldiers) were unavoidably involved in war crimes.

The Japanese wartime atrocities included: cannibalism, the slaughter and starvation of prisoners of war (POWs), rape, enforced prostitution, murder of

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socio-psychological effect of this social fact is markedly visible in the Meiji constitution.

noncombatants, and biological warfare experiments (see Tanaka 1996).[5] War reflected the cultural level of the nation in every respect, a Japanese feminist argued, and the atrocities toward civilians revealed the "low position of women in Japanese male psychology" (cited in Dower 2000, pp. 506-07; *cf.*, DeVos 1961, pp. 1205-06). A political scientist attributed such behavior to a predictable "transfer of oppression" in Japan's inequitable, highly stratified society (*cf.*, Nakane 1972). Behind such tendencies looms the aforementioned samuraization of the commoners, which had been implemented to bolster the nation's ambition since Meiji. Many researchers (e.g., Norman 1975, p. 30) indeed observe that the "Japanese masses were not inherently militaristic, but made so by their leaders." The atrocities may be seen, then, as political products rather than circumstantial accidents.

As soon as the occupation left Japan and Japan's power structure had recovered its own shape, debates over war crimes by Japanese in critical attitudes, let alone discussions about the emperor in a negative tone, have become a sort of taboo. This tendency has been supported in various ways by some top politicians and bureaucrats, who openly support the aforementioned claim that "the constitution does not alter the 'characteristics of the state.'" The Ministry of Education, for example, screened any mention of Japanese wartime atrocities in history textbooks, eliminating or reducing mentions to vague and overly general terms (Maga 2001, p. 6). Many intellectuals

[5] Three types of war crime categories (A, B, and C Classes) were established (Tanaka 1996, p. 1). The A Class included "crimes against peace" committed by military leaders and politicians. The B Class encompassed more "conventional" war crimes--those committed by soldiers in the field against either enemy soldiers or civilians of enemy countries. The C Class covered "crimes against humanity," that is, against civilians of any nationality.

seriously consider this government-led trend to be a critical issue that has potential to push Japan back to the prewar era.

In 1965, Japanese historian Saburo Ienaga, one of such intellectuals, filed a lawsuit against the government, charging that the screening system violated academic freedom and freedom of expression as enshrined in Japan's new constitution (Kattoulas 1997). This drew huge attention not just in Japan but also worldwide, and developed into a series of legal actions that lasted until 1997, under various international pressures. The Supreme Court finally upheld Ienaga's claim on specific war crimes-related references; however, the issue of the constitutionality of textbook screening by the government--the key point of his lawsuits--was left untouched. While these legal battles raged on, Ienaga aged to nearly ninety years old, and died five years later. Some called him "a tired old man, obsessed with the details of specific atrocity tails" (Maga 2001, p. 6) while others (mainly American and Canadian politicians and intellectuals) nominated him for the Noble Peace Prize (Lewis 2002). Ienaga's lawsuits can be seen as one of the most widely publicized outcomes of the tug of war in postwar Japan that now involves far more direct international pressures than in the prewar era. Taking these influences into account, one may be inclined to view Ienaga as "a wise strategist" rather than "a tired old man."

Countering the momentum led primarily by Ienaga's charge, an organization developed in 1996 named the Atarashii rekishi kyokasho o tsukurukai (roughly translated as "The Association for the Making of New History Textbooks") (Ryang 2002). This group, like similar ones, attracts varying degrees of visibility in Japan's public arena, including education, politics, business, and the media. Its members accuse Ienaga and his supporters of a "masochistic historical view" (Lee 2001, pp. 28-29). Children are

learning "facts" that are uncertain in their veracity, such as the "Nanjing massacre" or the military use of "comfort women," whereby to unjustly disgrace the nation's past. In a few years, the organization's own textbook, *The New History Textbook*, was approved by the Ministry of Education for use in Japanese middle schools beginning in 2002 (*ibid*., p. 21).

The Purge Directive

By September 15, 1946, "the great purge in Japan"--i.e., the removal of ultra-nationalist elements from the Japanese institutions--had screened 7,769 individuals and judged 894 of them to be "undesirable personnel" (Quigley 1947a, p. 299). They included those in politics, finance, industry, journalism, and education. The Japanese press in large part supported the purge as a means of promoting democratization (*ibid*., p. 305). Some papers even preferred quick and drastic execution to the government's "lukewarm attitude." As was the case in the war crimes trials, many Japanese sent letters accusing "undesirable personnel." In total, the number of persons who were purged through this directive was around 200,000 (Kalischer 1958, p. 44).

"Modern" Japan--until the surrender in 1945--had been ruled by a combination of three power groups, namely, the militarists (army and navy men and chauvinistic civilian individuals and organizations), the monopoly capitalists (*zaibatsu*), and the bureaucrats, according to Maki (1947, pp. 391-93). None of these three groups of what Maki calls the "militarist-*zaibatsu*-bureaucrat oligarchy" could have ruled Japan as it was ruled without the support of the other two. Of these groups, nevertheless, the bureaucrats were not subjected to punitive action during the occupation. A relative unawareness of the significant political role of the bureaucrats, and the decision to use them as the machinery

through which the occupation operated, undoubtedly accounted for the absence of an anti-bureaucracy policy. Similarly to the wartime internment camps in its structure, the occupation was set to be self-government by the Japanese bureaucrats under the SCAP-GHQ (Takemae 2002, p. 113; Chapman 1991, p. 16). After the occupation, Maki (1947, p. 400) correctly predicted, "the bureaucrats… will once more be in a position to govern Japan as they think it should be governed." An American newspaper correspondent observed that there was a vast "conspiracy" among the bureaucrats "to block the SCAP directives" (Chapman 1991, p. 17).

According to Wolferen (1990), not only did a large number of officials escape the purge, but also almost immediately after SCAP-GHQ's departure, those who had been purged returned to top positions (p. 359, p. 77). On average, about one-fifth of cabinet ministers after 1955 were former bureaucrats (Beasley 1995, p. 232). Furthermore, between 1955 and 1980, ex-bureaucrats held office as Prime Minster for a total of twenty years, compared to only five years for those who had risen through the party's business. Again, although the occupation shook Japan, it is questioned as to how much it actually changed the Japanese power structure.

The "Vacuum" and Americanization

Matters that seem political, in general, can oftentimes have socio-psychological energies. The Japanese polity between 1868 (the opening of its modern history) and 1945 (its defeat in World War II), in particular, stood upon various socio-psychological elements that shaped its subjects' identity. The slogan of *fukoku-kyohei* was a political goal set on the macro level, but as it assigned every subject a role to play for it, it became a major source of identity on the micro level. Nationalism, an ideology, became

inseparable from its subjects' identity. Militarism, a major part of the goal, forcibly substantiated the connection between nationalism and identity. Facing defeat in war, however, the Japanese masses needed some certain alternative elements, or ideologies, upon which they could redefine themselves, or with which to fill in this "vacuum."

During the occupation, the Japanese people encountered the Western power and culture with some awe and astonishment on both the macro and micro levels. A majority of Japanese embraced the new supreme commander, General MacArthur, with an ardor previously reserved only for the emperor (Dower 2000, pp. 227-33). The Korean War, which erupted in the middle of the occupation, helped boost the image of "America" from benefactor to superhero. The America-centered worldview, which had just been hammered into the collective psychology with the unprecedented impact, was made deepened through the Korean crisis. Not only did this crisis dramatize the situation of Japan being under the protection of the United States, but it also provided the first giant step for the Japanese postwar economy to recover. Japan filled orders from American forces in Korea ranging from construction services to ordinance, automobiles, and textiles (Forsberg 2000, p. 84). These "special U.S. military procurements" from Japan totaled $3.4 billion in the period from 1952 to 1956 (Cumings 1984, p. 24). The governor of the Bank of Japan called U.S. spending "divine aid."[6]

"America" did not remain simply an external presence in postwar Japan (Yoshimi 2003). Japanese people for the first time saw with their own eyes such "Americans" as G.I.'s. Wearing sunglasses and chewing gum even while on duty, the U.S. servicemen--

[6] Under the Truman administration, U.S. military spending surpassed 10 percent of GNP (Forsberg 2000, pp. 84-5). Japanese receipts from U.S. military expenditures declined after the war, but they remained at a significant level, averaging slightly over $550 million per year from (continued…)

tall and well-built--seemed to the Japanese to act with no trace of restraint. With "offhanded friendliness," they gave sweets to hungry children, cigarettes to *kyodatsu* ("demoralized") men, and probably winks to curious young women (Dower 2000, p. 72).

Overpowering cultural influences--music, fashion, and style of interaction--spread out from the American military bases (Yoshimi 2003, pp. 438-41). Functioning as theaters or nightclubs, the U.S. military bases raised young Japanese musicians, leading to the establishment of jazz in Japanese music culture, and many Japanese popular singers began their careers by entertaining G.I.'s. In 1957, a legendary concert, called "The Western Carnival," was held in the heart of Tokyo, starring several Japanese rockabilly singers heavily influenced by American singers, such as Elvis Presley. It was against this background that the TV entertainment world in Japan was shaping its basic character. The "vacuum" was, hence, being filled rapidly with American culture.

The War Brides

In preparation for the occupation of Japan in the wake of World War II, one of the things the U.S. government was concerned about was the probable development of romantic contacts between U.S. servicemen in the occupation personnel and Japanese young women. If such events took place too frequently, at least two major problems would entail great expense to the U.S. government. First, the Japanese women, if married to the servicemen, would immigrate to the United States, and that would unmistakably recall the troubled history of existing Japanese-American community in the United States (Simpson 1998, p. 54). In addition, not only did the Immigration Act of

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1950 to 1960. The same pattern of spending reappeared during the Vietnam War.

1924 still bar Asians from immigration to the United States, but many states also maintained anti-miscegenation laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage.

To prevent such occurrences, the U.S. government elaborated many schemes. For example, an Army pamphlet destined to U.S. occupation troops warned how Japanese women could be dangerous to American men. It read:

> "[Japanese women] have been taught to hate you. They do as their men tell them, and many of them have been told to kill you. Sex is one of the oldest and most effective weapons in history. The Geisha girl knows how to wield it charmingly. She may entice you only to poison you. She may slit your throat. Stay away from the women of Japan--all of them." (Cited in Roehner 2008, pp. 33-34)

In Japan, more meticulously, GHQ under General MacArthur set a variety of rules and regulations (Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 3). They included, among others: (1) no Army vehicles for dates; (2) not to share Army food; (3) not to eat Japanese food, or have food cooked in a Japanese kitchen; (4) Japanese bathhouses, banks, and private homes off-limits; and (5) Japanese not allowed outside their Prefecture without approval.

Despite these efforts, more and more G.I.'s began to not only marry Japanese women but to demand assistance in getting their new wives' permanent visas to the United States (Herbison *et al*. 1990, pp. 4-5). The demand was not illegitimate, but it was not trouble-free either. In reaction, commanding officers often transferred G.I.'s who married Japanese women back to the United States or to Korea; a request for a marriage approval was often treated as a request for a transfer. Although sticking to this restrictive attitude, the U.S. government began setting up legal environments, with which to avoid bigger problems, such as the violation of human rights of U.S. soldiers to choose



Figure 2.1. Japanese Women Admitted to the U.S. as Wives of U.S. Citizens, Compared to Chinese and Korean Counterparts, 1947-1975

Source: US Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. "Asian Women Immigrants Admitted to the U.S. as Wives of American Citizens." Annual Reports,1947-1965.

their own wives. In the propaganda battles of the early Cold War, failing to handle such issues would be an embarrassment to the "free world" (Anbinder 2006, p. 179).

Some other neighboring countries also sent war brides to the United States. Yet, by far the largest influx was from Japan. Between 1947 and 1964, 45,857 women entered the United States from Japan, compared to 22,536 from China[7] and 6,423 from Korea, among other sending nations (US Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization; Wolgin *et al*. 2010, p. 47) (figure 2.1 above). The first law to treat war brides (Public Law 271 of 1945) in a special framework was enacted exclusively for Chinese women,

[7] Many Chinese "war brides" married Chinese-American soldiers, and some question if they were actually "war brides" or the product of the legal loophole in the quota system (see Simpson 1998, p. 77).

brides from an allied country. Two years later, the Soldier Brides Act of 1947 included women of the former enemy country, Japan. The volume of Japanese war brides entering the United States began appearing in the following years. The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 removed the racial barrier for naturalization. The number of Japanese war brides jumped up to 4,220, from 125 the previous year. This law burst open the door to couples in which the wives had been categorized as "aliens ineligible to citizenship"--though the law did not amend the racially skewed quota system set in the Immigration Act of 1924.

Of course, not all "Japanese women admitted to the U.S. as wives of U.S. citizens" were war brides. From the 1960s onward, as the new Japan was experiencing "unprecedented contact with the foreign" (Ivy 1995, p. 47), many Japanese women met their prospective husbands in other ways. This means that although the war brides initiated the reopening of the Japanese migration to the United States in the immediate postwar years, their character in political and economic terms should be seen as unique, belonging neither to the prewar patterns of labor migration (or "the *issei*") nor to the postwar transnational adventurers from Japan ("the *shin-issei*"). In socio-psychological terms, though, their phenomenon would hardly be understood without taking into account the feeling of *akogare* for the West, a major drive for Japanese migration to the United States consistently observed throughout history.

In this section discussed are: (1) the psychology of the "piercing wound" for losing women to men of the former enemy country, (2) "how did they meet in Japan?," and (3) "what happened to them in America?" These discussions are important not only in themselves but also as referential connections to the quite similar intermarriage patterns of female *shin-issei* today. Although these two groups of Japanese female

adventurers each grew up in different eras and different social environments, they share markedly common themes--most notably, *akogare* for America (Glenn 1986; Kelsky 2001), their own gender characteristics that appeal to American men (Strauss 1954; Lee *et al*. 1998), and a tendency of being targeted by pejorative labels in Japan (Dower 2000; Ieda 1991).

The Psychology of the "Piercing Wound"

Many Japanese frowned on the intimate relationships between Japanese women and U.S. servicemen that spread in Japan under the occupation. To them, the unreserved *akogare* for the West of these women was disgraceful; it so easily, but nonetheless deeply, impaired the Japanese sense of collective identity and accordingly, evoked the feeling of xenophobia for the Allied Powers that had previously been implanted by the Japanese government. During the war, a catchword the nation used was *kichiku-bei-ei* ("brutes, America, Britain"). Because of the images drawn from this, when Japan surrendered, rumors spread asserting that "men would be indiscriminately killed, women raped, and their cities looted by the murdering foreign devils" (Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 1). Although such brutal events did not happen in normal situations, the fearful image of the Allied Powers remained some time. The majority of the population welcomed the democratic reformation brought by SCAP-GHQ, but they were still appalled at young women falling in love with and marrying the men of *kichiku-bei-ei*.

Japanese government officials--the propagators of *kichiku-bei-ei*--presumed that the conqueror would demand sexual gratification. Taking charge of this matter, the national police commissioner enlisted a small number of women to serve as a buffer to protect the chastity of the "good" women of Japan (Dower 2000, pp. 124-35). As quickly

as August 27, 1945, 1,369 women in Tokyo had enlisted in the so-called Recreation and Amusement Association (R.A.A.). In many other cities, similar places were established. Called *panpan*, these women were used "as a buffer," which nonetheless the "good" population despised them as pariahs. The *panpan* could not become war brides; U.S. military policies strictly blocked them.[8] Yet, many Japanese did not distinguish between prospective war brides and *panpan* girls.

Parents prohibited their daughters from meeting Americans in any fashion, let alone dating or marrying. The social atmosphere regarding this matter was by and large rigid. A war bride recalled that she herself believed that only "bad girls" dated Americans (Storrs 2000, pp. 204-06). The announcement of her marriage to a G.I. failed to console her mother, who was concerned about the shame such a union would bring to her family. For Japanese women, marriage to a non-Japanese meant some degree of alienation and ultimately separation from parents and other kin (Glenn 1986, p. 59). Facts or explanations failed to appease the psychology of what Dower (2000, p. 135) calls the "piercing wound" resulting from losing women to men of another group.

Often observed as a centrally important element that can ignite intergroup conflicts, the "piercing wound" seems universal rather than specific to the Japanese.[9] At the root of this psychology, Brah (1993, p. 16) discusses the function of "women" in society. She argues that women serve as the "symbolic figuration of a nation." Brah goes on to suggest,

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[8] To marry a Japanese woman, a G.I. was required to obtain the permission of his commanding officer, to go through an interview with his chaplain who usually tried to dissuade him, and to produce proof of his single status and his ability to support his wife; while her record in turn was checked by the Japanese authorities to screen out known prostitutes and criminals (Strauss 1954, p. 99).

> the *defense of women and children becomes a rallying slogan of men going to war,* as women from opposing factions fall victim to rape and other sexual atrocities. When represented as guardians of the 'race' and nation women not only signify and demarcate juridical, political, cultural and psychic *boundaries of a national collectivity* but they inscribe these boundaries in and through a myriad of cultural practices, *their assumption of particular feminized subject positions*, their relationship to the upbringing of children, and involvement in religious and other ritualistic practices that construct and reproduce particular notions of tradition. (Brah 1993, p. 16; emphasis added)

Recall that the Japanese-American community developed owing to the practice of "picture brides." These women functioned by--to use Brah's terminology--not simply "upbringing children" but more symbolically signifying and demarcating "boundaries of a collectivity" through "their assumption of particular feminized subject positions" that the men were supposed to defend as their own "rallying slogan." It is the women, then, that transform a collection of people into a "society." It follows, conversely, that if the women leave for the men of another group, the "society" cannot remain undamaged, and this damage will be felt as a "wound" for the men left behind.[10] It may be this psychology that yields pejorative labels against such women in hopes of mitigating the pain.

How Did They Meet in Japan?

Despite all the efforts by both Japan and the United States to prevent the occurrence of intermarriage between U.S. servicemen and Japanese women, the rates

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[9] For some illustrations, see Moran (2001, pp. 36-37) and Kristof (1995).

[10] See also Veblen (1979 [1899], pp. 14-17) who, from the opposite angle, discussed "seizing the women from the enemy as trophies."

were quite high. The size of the U.S. servicemen population sent to Japan was initially 430,000, which was soon reduced to 102,000 by 1948. By 1957 (the period most directly affected by the occupation and the Korean War), the number of Japanese women admitted to the United States as U.S. citizens' wives was 21,472, and to expand the period to 1964 (the period affected by the Vietnam War), it was 45,857 (U.S. Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization). Considering the size of the U.S. servicemen, the numbers of U.S. citizens' wives seem very high. Some observe, moreover, that these wives were among a "relatively few" of the women who dated, visited, and lived with servicemen (Strauss 1954, p. 99). It was estimated that over 100,000 relationships broke up mostly due to GHQ schemes, such as "transfer" (Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 5), and to the couples themselves changing their minds (Strauss 1954, p. 99).

At marriage, the women were typically in their early 20's and their husbands, in their mid 20's (Strauss 1954; Schnepp *et al*. 1955). Most of the women had been adolescents or even younger at the end of World War II (Glenn 1986, pp. 59-62). The majority of their husbands were white. The women who married black servicemen encountered stronger disapproval. One of them, for example, said that her mother, after twenty years, still refused to acknowledge her grandchildren.

The men's occupations were mainly professional soldiering, semi-skilled or skilled labor, or white collar jobs, and their average education was comparatively low: high school or partial high school (Strauss 1954, pp. 100-102). Some of them married before announcing the fait accompli to parents in the United States. Strong religious belief and practices were rare among these couples. Most of the women were from small

towns or urban cities; but almost all met their husbands in cities where the men were quartered, and where the women worked.

At the end of war, with the loss of males in their families and the ruin of family enterprises, many young women went out to seek a livelihood (Glenn 1986, pp. 59-60). Some found jobs on military bases in sales service, as clerical workers, or as waitresses. There were parties, to which they were invited (Herbison *et al*. 1990, pp. 3-4). Those women working for Americans tended to be somewhat more independent than the average Japanese women. They had often been dislocated from traditional forms of constraint. Some of them even had lived overseas before the war and had the chance to experience different cultures. For them, at least, Americans were not *kichiku-bei-ei*.

Significant numbers of Amerasians (the "mixed-bloods between Americans and Asians") appeared in Japan about this time (Murphy-Shigematsu 2001, p. 209). It was not uncommon for couples to cohabit before marriage or to live as a married couple in Japan for an extended period before emigrating (Glenn 1986, p 63). If the men changed their minds or died, their marriage applications were revoked (Herbison et al. 1990, p. 5). Because of the Korean War, many women were left alone with mixed-blood children. Legally, these children could only choose Japanese citizenship if their fathers did not, or could not, acknowledge their paternity. Yet, their legal status was in direct contrast to prevalent "social attitudes, which regarded them as foreign." Owing to the appeal to the masses by white stars in numerous TV shows and movies, they suddenly gained popularity for their physical appearances and were scouted for modeling and acting (Murphy-Shigematsu 2001, p. 211). They were objectified as a target of *akogare* for the

West, and this rather ironically indicated the irremovable foreignness of their presence in Japan.

Japanese women tended to be attracted to U.S. soldiers, materially. Starvation was a serious problem during, and even after, the war. In those years of acute hunger and scarcity, the material comfort of the Americans was simply staggering to behold (Dower 2000, p. 136). A Japanese war bride recalls, for example, "Everything is carefree, lots to eat… I thought I was going to paradise" (Glenn 1986, p. 58). She confesses, however, that she was wrong. Although it is difficult to generalize about the socio-economic circumstances of war brides, their husbands tended to be from lower-class backgrounds (Saenz *et al*. 1994, p. 555). Another war bride says that despite her expectations about the wealth of Americans, her subsequent experience in the United States was rather one of a "downward mobility" and hardship (Storrs 2000, p. 214).

Culturally, American men were forward, and treated Japanese women with more respect, compared to Japanese men (Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 4). In addition to emotional and material security, marriage to an American offered the prospect of a "more egalitarian relationship" than was typical in Japanese marriages (Glenn 1986, p. 62). This may have been especially important to women who had tasted freedom before marriage. The Japanese women under the U.S.-led occupation got the chance, as it were, to examine anew Japanese men in comparison to more democratic American men. A woman who chose to marry a G.I. says that she thought she would find it difficult to tolerate a Japanese marriage (Glenn 1986, p. 240). Her selection proved right. She recalls:

> We're [women] in a bad position [in Japan]. Two years ago I went to Japan and I went to see my brother's family there. They're typical Japanese. He's so much a boss. I couldn't stand what he says to his wife: "Masako, get this, bring that," I said, "Why don't you get it yourself?" He gave me quite a look. (Glenn 1986, p. 240)

To the G.I.'s, Japanese women appeared to be nicer than American women in several important ways. Raised with Confucian traditions, most Asian women shared such traditional feminine traits as passivity, an uncomplaining nature, and a willingness to sacrifice themselves to the needs of men. Although war brides tended to be more liberated than the average Japanese women, they were still far more traditional than the average American women. They served their men with greater diligence than did American women, and hardly made great demands upon their husbands to supply them with money for clothes and other status-symbols (Strauss 1954, p. 102). When such changes in consumption habits occurred, husbands complained that their wives were becoming too Americanized.

In terms of sexuality, U.S. servicemen viewed Asian women as "exotic war booty," a view reinforced through cultural images in film and print (e.g., Storrs 2000, p. 200). Fantasizing about Asian women's sexuality, according to Marchetti (1993, p. 5), Hollywood films set taboos and then break them, treating Asian women as erotic "dolls" or "toys" to play with (Uchida 1998, p. 166).

Arguably, though, such images seem to be a product of the misunderstanding of non-Christian, matricentric sexuality, which is grotesquely deformed through the lens of Western phallicism. In Japanese culture, as many observe, there is no religious constraint on sexuality within intimate relationships (e.g., Posner 1992, p. 197). Also, the "husband expects his wife to be an overall care giver for him, including body care, as if he saw a

mother substitute in his wife" (Lebra 1994, p. 267). Japanese women are not dolls or toys with no subjective perception of their relationships with their men, but instead, can be better seen as the practitioners of a non-Christian, matricentric tradition.

What Happened to Them in America?

A headline in *The Saturday Evening Post* published at that time read: "They're Bringing Home Japanese Wives" (Smith *et al*. 1952). In three pages of color photographs, some couples hold their babies, some women learn how to cook American food, and, most importantly, everyone looks happy. The main thrust of the article, however, seems to be less about celebration of the couples than about the concern over assimilation of the Japanese wives and their mixed-blood children into American society. A caption to one of the photos warned: "Every day, from 30 to 120 American servicemen and civilians are marrying Japanese women in Japan." The text elaborated that "One thing [that the Japanese wives] have in common; an almost complete lack of knowledge about the United States as such." It goes on to suggests that

> Nothing much but time and bitter experience can overcome great hazards like language difficulty, racial question marks and the separation of truth about America from the dream of America as expounded by homesick soldiers and distorted movies… and their bright-eyed children soon will be knocking on school doors in most of the forty-eight states. The great question of how they will fit in and whether they generally will be welcomed or shunned remains to be answered. (Smith *et al*. 1952, p. 79, p. 27)

In contrast to the durability of *issei* and *nisei* marriages, war bride marriages tended to be "unstable and frequently disrupted by divorce" (Glenn 1986, p. 231). It was estimated that nearly 2,000 war brides were abandoned by their husbands in Los Angeles

County alone (Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 4). The breakups were doubly traumatic for the women because they were so isolated in the United States (Glenn 1986, p. 64).

War brides in general (including other Asian war brides) were not inclined to head for California, Hawaii, or New York, the three states with the largest Asian populations. Less than one-third of them settled there, compared to more than half of all other foreign-born Asian wives (55%), most of U.S.-born in-married wives of Asian origin (85%), and nearly a half of U.S.-born out-married Asian wives (42%) (Saenz *et al*. 1994, p. 555). Residents of rural and southern areas had never seen Japanese people, and the resulting encounter was often a painful one for the war brides (Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 6). For many, the Japanese were still the "enemy aliens."

It is suggested that the quality of spouses' relationships with their parents-in-law would predict spouses' marital success (Bryant *et al*. 2001). Failure to successfully enter the male's family is especially stressful when the husband is very devoted to his parents (Strauss 1954, p. 104). If wife and in-laws reject one another, and if the male is unwilling to give up his parents, then strain is at a maximum.

One empirical study conducted in Hawaii in the early 1950s found that Japanese war brides of Japanese-American husbands (i.e., the *nisei*) were *least* likely among other war brides to find themselves in "good" relations with their in-laws (Kimura 1957).[11]

[11] Kimura (1957) interviewed 324 war brides in Hawaii in the early 1950s, categorizing them into four groups by their race/ethnicity: "European wives of Japanese husbands" (EJ; 60 respondents); "European wives of non-Japanese husbands" (EN; 80); "Japanese wives of non-Japanese husbands" (JN; 60); and "Japanese wives of Japanese husbands" (JJ; 124). (The labels, EJ, EN, JN, and JJ, are not in Kimura (1957), but are used only in this paper.)

According to Kimura (*ibid*., p. 70), the European interviewees came from twelve different countries. "Non-Japanese husbands" included Chinese, Koreans, Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians, Filipinos, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, and a small number of other Caucasians. By these, Kimura indicated ethnic origins, and all husbands including "Japanese husbands" were U.S.

(continued…)

They were also least likely to find themselves in a "good" marriage (*ibid*., p. 72).[12] Of all wives who had troubles with in-laws, about three-quarters had these conflicts with their "mother-in-law." The rest were with "sister(s)-in-law."

In Hawaii, interestingly, the phrase "filial piety" was used more customarily than in Japan, and *issei* mothers expected a daughter-in-law to fulfill this obligation. For them, a daughter-in-law was to be subordinate to her mother-in-law as an apprentice in housewifely duties. For daughters-in-law coming from newer Japan, however, it was their mothers-in-law who should be learning more. Most of *issei* mothers were from small rural villages, where people spoke with strong dialects, while their daughters-in-law tended to be from urban cities in which 9 years of schooling was a basic norm.

What is more, many of their own parents in Japan had urged them to be independent of their Hawaiian in-laws, making "unfavorable remarks about the emigrants"[13] to Hawaii and complaining that the marriage was not a compliment to their family. Overall, the Japanese war brides might have found that they had married into a lower class, and to their in-laws, they tended to appear aloof.

When these types of problems arose, Japanese war brides generally kept them to themselves, feeling ashamed (Glenn 1986, p. 63). They did not inform their families in Japan that they were divorced or that they were working as domestics. They preferred to

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citizens.

Less than a half of JJ (48%) said they had "good" relations with in-laws, compared to EN (55%), EJ (60%), and JN (72%).

[12] As few as 39 percent of JJ said they were in "good" marriage, followed by EN (51%), EJ (70%), and (JN, 75%). Among those who had "fair" relations with in-laws, 35 percent of EJ and 67 percent of EN said they did not associate with their in-laws.

[13] This view treating Japanese emigrants and their offspring with no fellow-feeling is not unique to the parents who sent their daughters as brides to *issei* families in Hawaii, but largely shared in Japan, and even the *sansei* ("third generation") still today feel discouraged when they (continued…)

paint a rosy picture and suffer alone, rather than admit that they had made a mistake. One of these brides recalls her parents saying, "You made your own decision. If your husband leaves you, don't come back. Just slit your throat" (*ibid*., p. 58).

Owing to the technological advancement of transportation and communication services, a transnational character developed among some Japanese war brides. Compared to picture brides, far more war brides made return trips to Japan (Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 8). Videotapes were later sent by their Japanese relatives or friends. More recently, especially in urban areas or near military bases, Asian food markets rent tapes which the war brides viewed, dubbed, and circulated among their Japanese friends.

Yet, loneliness, homesickness, and an inability to speak English were principal complaints (Glenn 1986, p. 65). Unlike picture brides whose husbands shared a "cultural grammar" with them, war brides typically struggled with the language, food, and customs even in their own homes. Many of them put a great deal of effort into establishing relationships with other Japanese women. One of them reported that when she first arrived in the San Francisco Bay Area, she looked up people with Japanese names in the telephone book and introduced herself over the phone (*ibid*.). When this effort was fruitless, she went from house to house in a neighborhood where many Japanese lived.

Some wives developed "local war-bride clubs" (Strauss 1954, p. 102), and their husbands accepted this as a matter of course (Schnepp *et al.* 1955, p. 49). Unlike the practice in most American marriages, there seems to have not been very much introducing of wives to husbands' friends (Strauss 1954, p. 103). The war brides' Japanese upbringing conditioned them to expect a certain degree of distance between

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unexpectedly encounter this (see, e.g., Sanada 1995).

husbands and their wives (Glenn 1986, p. 239).[14] For many Japanese war brides, their children, rather than their husbands, tended to be the source of relief, as their "ally" (Storrs 2000, p. 197). Compared to their husbands, their children were culturally closer to them.

The war-bride marriage is unique in that although the classical assimilation theorists suggest that "marital assimilation" is "an inevitable by-product of structural assimilation" (Gordon 1964, p. 80), the war brides' assimilation was by and large started from, rather than concluded with, their marriages. When Japanese war brides tried to obtain U.S. citizenship, they faced a set of thorny barriers--"English" and "cultural literacy" (Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 7).

Most of them were fortunate enough to attend citizenship classes, which like English classes, gave them an edge in their preparation. Many were also aided by their grade school or junior-high school-aged children. In addition, it must not be overlooked that many of their American in-laws and friends helped them adapt. A war bride's daughter, for example, recalls:

> Donna [a neighbor] taught my mother about… how to shop, what measurements were in cooking… really took my mother under her wing. Yeah, I think that, being a small community and everything, that the people really came together to, sort of adopt her, 'cause she was… from a foreign country and going through the cultural changes, they really helped her adapt… (Cited in Herbison *et al*. 1990, p. 6)

[14] Doi (1973, p. 114) similarly observes this cultural trait, exemplifying that when one holds a party in America, the sexes are almost always paired off in equal numbers, but this is very rare in Japan. See also Shwalb *et al*. (1996, p. 181).

As newcomers, they followed the assimilation process, which forced them--to use terminology from *The Saturday Evening Post*--to "overcome great hazards" through "time and bitter experience" and to separate "truth about America from the dream of America" (Smith *et al*. 1952, p. 79). These "great hazards" included "unemployment" (Herbison *et al*. 1990), "loneliness, homesickness… inability to speak English" (Glenn 1986), and "in-laws" of different cultures (Strauss 1954; Kimura 1957). They had emigrated not in groups. No community of their own awaited them; nor did chain migration follow them.

What followed in the 1970s was Japan's "global reach" (Emmott 1992), during which Japan's income levels became higher than Great Britain's (Carlile 1996, p. 12). The number of overseas trips by Japanese rapidly increased. Especially notable was a *ryugaku* ("study abroad") boom to the United States by newer generations--quite reminiscent of that in Meiji in terms of *akogare* and perhaps, *risshin-shusse* (see Chapter 1). The boom, together with the upsurge of the *chuzaiin* ("corporate transferees"), contributed to the birth of a new type of international migrants from Japan later called the *shin-issei* ("new first generation").

Most of the *shin-issei* are, legally speaking, not "immigrants" initially, and thus their presence in the United States, although vital socially and economically, tends to be overlooked in mainstream studies of immigration. If one removes the lens of "immigrants," however, quite a different picture emerges. The volume of the *shin-issei* has actually grown to be larger than that of the prewar Japanese-American community on the U.S. mainland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009). Removing the lens of

“immigrants” also enables us to see some new forms of contemporary international migration.

PART II. THE *SHIN-ISSEI*: "TUG-OF-WAR" WARRIORS, OR WANDERERS?

Ch. 3. The Soaring Economy and the Rise of the New Adventurers

When Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) crossed the Atlantic Ocean to discover America, he did not have a passport or visa. Nor did John Manjiro (1827-1898)--although he stayed in the United States for ten years as a schoolboy and later as a whaler crossing the American border many times (see Chapter 1). Taking into account past patterns of overseas journey, one may wonder if today's adventurers are truly more liberated than earlier counterparts.

According to Torpey (2003), today's passport system emerged among the great powers involved in World War I (1914-1919). An earlier version had existed in most of the feudal states to bond their subjects to land securely, but the old organization collapsed in nineteenth-century Europe, as crossing borders--including the Atlantic--became more common. This led to the rise of European mass emigration, especially to the United States, the destination of nearly 65 percent of the European emigrants (McKeown 2007, p. 10).[1] Facing the crisis of World War I, however, anxieties about borders developed in many European countries, which reintroduced passport controls that had been "entombed in desuetude" (Torpey 2003, p. 84).

[1] The bulk of the remainder left for Argentina (which had the largest proportion of (continued…)

Following its European counterparts' protectionist reaction to the crisis, the United States developed a "visa system" as a form of self-defense against foreigners considered dangerous or inferior (Tichenor 2002, pp. 152-54). The new system was said to be a temporary wartime safeguard under the terms of the Passport Control Act of 1918. In retrospect, however, many view the establishment of the U.S. visa system as a legal device implemented at the outset to address restrictionist concerns rather than just for the war (e.g., *ibid*.; Torpey 2003). After the war, the visa system, still intact as a safeguard, effectively reduced the volume of non- and less-white immigrants (i.e., Asians and southern/eastern Europeans), and the Immigration Act of 1924, overruling certain terms of the Passport Control Act, mandated visa requirements on a permanent basis (Tichenor 2002, p. 155).

Although many believe that today's situation has become more open to potential migrants to the United States than in the nineteenth century, the truth seems to be the opposite. In the earlier period, many thousands of non-whites entered the United States with no visa, and those who stayed, although ineligible to citizenship, developed their own "hyphenated-American" communities (e.g., Chinese-American, Japanese-American, etc.). Even "schoolboys" (non-labor migrants in Meiji) got jobs "in various industries, including farming and fishing," or as "kitchen workers, stewards, mess boys, or cooks" (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, many migrants--later called "repeaters"--made multiple trips between the United States and their old countries.

Today, by contrast, although everybody is theoretically eligible for citizenship, in order to get a chance to *freely* (and permanently if one chooses) live in the United States,

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foreign born residents), Canada, Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay (McKeown 2007, p. 10).

one needs to follow one of these proceedings (altered in the Immigration Act of 1990): (1) to have a close relative with U.S. citizenship or green card, (2) to be an internationally recognized scholar or artist, (3) to be sponsored by an ethnically related business, [2] (4) to be a worker of an ethnically related religion, (5) to be a refugee, (6) to invest $1 million or more in a new U.S. business that shall hire at least 10 Americans, or (7) to win the diversity immigrant lottery, though limited only to aliens from countries underrepresented in the current immigration stock (e.g., Bray *et al*. 2010).

Although considered transnational, our present world is yet "divided by states," which still--or perhaps more strictly than before--control "territorial boundaries" (Waldinger *et al*. 2004, p. 1178). A Japanese aphorism about the U.S. green card says: "To get the Green Card, women marry, men cook [as sushi chef]" (Kelsky 2001, p. 22). Cynical, as it seems, this phrase suggests that contrary to their outward appearance of indifference towards the 1965 U.S. immigration law that opened the door for non- and less-white immigrants, many Japanese are actually struggling for obtaining a legal status to live freely in the United States.

This chapter consists of three sections: (1) defining the *shin-issei*, (2) a statistical sketch of the trend of the Japanese long-term visitors (LTVs) and legal-permanent residents (LPRs) in the last few decades, and (3) a statistical description of their pathways

[2] The applicants will first need certification from the Department of Labor to affirm that no U.S. worker is available, willing, and able to do the job (Bray *et al*. 2010, p. 13). According to Anna Law (2002, p. 6), the labor certification was a "negative requirement" prior to the 1965 Act; an alien was ineligible for immigration *only if* the Secretary of Labor determined that qualified United States workers were available for the job or the alien's employment would adversely affect American workers in the same line of employment. As the Secretary of Labor rarely took this type of action, in reality, it was not any kind of screen on immigration at all. After the passage of the 1965 Act, however, an alien could immigrate *only if* he/she obtained the Secretary of Labor's pre-clearance (an "affirmative requirement") that they would not adversely affect the job market (continued…)

to LPR status in comparison to their counterparts from major sending regions including Europe, Asia, and Americas.

The Shin-Issei *Defined*

The term *shin-issei* (literally "new first generation") was coined to contrast with the *issei* ("first generation"), those who developed the Japanese-American community in the prewar period. The term, however, is not defined methodically in most of the previous studies. One exception, Minamikawa (2005a, p. 139), emphasizes the "choice of permanent settlement" overseas by the migrants, whether "legal or illegal," excluding "long-term visitors" (or LTVs) such as the *chuzaiin* and students. Azuma (2002, p. 47), by contrast, offers a broader definition, calling the *shin-issei* "settlers" that include "business people and their family members," "youths to pursue education in the United States," and "individual entrepreneurs."

Precisely defining the term *shin-issei* is difficult because it is not an unchanging status but a character placed in ongoing self-adjusting processes in overseas journey. Most of the *shin-issei* are initially not "legal permanent residents" (LPRs), and some of them seek pathways to a green card, usually spending years in this process. The language of "choice" in becoming a *shin-issei* fails to take into account the importance of this self-adjusting process, through which they are *trying* to choose. Likewise, the notion of "permanent settlement," when taken literally, is also inaccurate. Even after one gets a green card whether he or she will actually stay permanently is another process to follow.

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for United States workers.

Massey *et al*. (2002, p. 474) observe the process of contemporary migrants upon the subtle nature of settlement. According to them, holding a green card today does not necessarily mean that the holder intends to stay in the United States forever. The permanent visa, they suggest, is a "simple convenience to enter and exit the country at will," while maintaining a primary home abroad. Some types of contemporary migrants in our highly transnational environment should be seen as sojourners "striving to live in two diverse cultural groups" (Park 1928, p. 881) rather than as predetermined permanent settlers.

In this study, I will use the term *shin-issei* as a character placed in ongoing processes rather than a fixed status, referring it thus broadly to any Japanese living in the United States either as U.S. citizens (whether naturalized or U.S.-born but grown up in Japan), legal permanent residents (LPRs), holders of any visas that enable them to stay longer than three months ("non-immigrant, long-term visitors" or LTVs), or as illegal overstayers. They include, more specifically, contemporary Japanese first-generation U.S. citizens, Japanese entrepreneurs running their businesses in the United States today, their Japanese employees, the *chuzaiin* ("corporate transferees") and their families, Japanese-born spouses of U.S. citizens or green-card holders, international students from Japan, Japanese workers of various institutions in the United States such as international NGO or NPOs, those living in the United States as professional sports athletes, artists, musicians, and more.

A Statistical Sketch of the New Adventurers

In 2008, more than 380,000 Japanese citizens lived in the United States (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009)--not including the so-called Japanese-American community or the war brides.[3] Of them, one-third (33.8%) were legal permanent residents (LPRs) and the rest (66.2%), long-term visitors (LTVs).[4] Notably, the size of Japanese LPRs today alone is about the same as that of the prewar Japanese community on the U.S. mainland. Compared to the negligibly small number of Japanese LTVs in the prewar years--the "non-labor migrants" (see Chapter 1)--their counterparts' population today is twice that of the LPRs.

Some LTVs switch their statuses to extend their journey one way or another, a status-adjusting tendency generally observed among many contemporary migrants. According to Massey *et al*. (2002), two-thirds (66%) of the immigrants (or LPRs) in their study initially entered the United States as non-immigrants (LTVs).[5] They spent years, seeking to adjust their former statuses as illegal border-crossers (21% of the immigrants in their sample), visa abusers (10%), non-resident visitors (15%), non-resident workers (4%), students or exchange visitors (5.5%), and refugees/asylees (10.5%) (*ibid*., pp. 477-

[3] The numbers are based on the self report by Japanese expatriates submitted to Japanese Consul, supplemented by survey data gathered from branches of Japanese corporations, Japanese clubs, and various schools Japanese nationals attend (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009). As some expatriates neglect to be registered when they move overseas, the actual numbers are assumed to be larger than those officially reported (Minamikawa 2005b). On the other hand, it can be also assumed that some neglect to remove their registration when they move back to Japan.

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2009, pp. 3-4) defines "permanent residents" as "Japanese national denizened by the resident country," including "Japanese national with dual nationality." "Long-term visitors" are Japanese staying for 3 months and over but not permanent resident.

[5] Their findings are based on the New Immigrant Survey Pilot Study (NISP), which surveyed a representative sample of legal immigrants (n=1,135) who acquired residence papers during July and August of 1996 (Massey *et al*. 2002, p. 473).



Figure 3.1. Japanese Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) and Long-term Visitors Living (LTVs) in the United States, 1971-2008

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009.

79). "Only one visa category (the smallest) conforms in any meaningful way to the mythic picture of inexperienced immigrants entering the country for the first time: diversity immigrants [i.e., green-card-lottery winners], 81% of whom had never been to the United States before" (*ibid*., p. 480).

In light of such findings by Massey *et al*. (2002), a close analysis reveals that as the volume of Japanese LTVs in the United States increases, that of LPRs follows, though at a slower pace (figure 3.1 above). Between 1971 and 2008, the LTVs increased by 8.6 times (from 28,997 to 250,294) and the LPRs, by 2.6 times (from 52,551to 134,034). Especially notable was the decade of Japan's "bubble economy" (between 1986 and1991), during which period alone the number of LTVs soared by 3 times. In the next decade, as if following this increase, that of LPRs grew by 1.5 times.

Two things should be noted. First, a majority of the LPRs are assumed to be initially LTVs, that is, some long-term visitors convert to legal-permanent residents, taking years usually. Second, the migration pattern of the *shin-issei* contrasts sharply with that of the prewar labor migrants (the *issei*) in regard to economic conditions. The *issei* had to move because of economic hardship; the contemporary Japanese migrants move, by contrast, owing to their nation's soaring economy. In fact, the slope of the increasing number of LTVs is the steepest during the bubble economy, and suddenly decreased when the bubble burst, at least for a time.

Things going on in the United States also affect the pattern. Among other instances, the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 seem to have discouraged some LPRs from keeping their permanent resident status--though this did not affect the LTVs as much. In 2002, the year following the attacks, the number of Japanese LPRs in the United States shrank by approximately 10 percent, the first decline since 1978--when a large-scale New York City blackout dismayed the whole world with its subsequent looting and vandalism (see Raab 1977). The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks bred not only fear of another attack--e.g., anthrax (see Barstow 2001) or even the possibility of war *in* the United States--but more imminently "a blow to the economy" (Kilgannon 2001). Compared to U.S. citizens, LPRs can more easily run away from a predicament developing in the United States. Some of those who were about to obtain a green card decided not to finish the process, saving its issuance fee, currently near $1,000, according to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The result was a 10-percent decrease in the number of LPRs.

By contrast, the volume of the LTVs increased by 7 percent in 2002. Two factors can explain this. First, those who were about to switch their status to LPR remained as

Table 3.1. Japanese "LPRs" and Breakdown of "LTVs," 2005-2008

	2005		2006		2007		2008	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
LPRs	115,844	32.94	123,398	33.32	126,961	33.88	136,034	35.21
LTVs								
Chuzaiin	125,770	35.76	130,272	35.17	130,033	34.70	128,353	33.22
Student	38,712	11.01	35,282	9.53	33,974	9.07	29,264	7.57
Professional	8,256	2.35	9,092	2.45	11,537	3.08	12,425	3.22
Journalist	1,770	0.50	1,871	0.51	1,546	0.41	1,570	0.41
Other	61,316	17.44	70,471	19.03	70,692	18.86	78,682	20.37
Total	235,824	67.06	246,988	66.68	247,782	66.12	250,294	64.79
Grand Total	351,668	100.00	370,386	100.00	373,743	100.00	386,328	100.00

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009; IIE Open Doors 2009.

Note 1: The figures include their families.
Note 2: "Professional" includes attorneys, accountants, physicians, artists, designers, chefs, sports instructors, religious workers, and so on; "Other" includes the government's diplomats, consular clerks, workers of international NGO or NPO, and so on.

LTVs--even if they left the United States, unless they report it to the Japanese Consul, they would be still counted as LTVs. Second, more than a third of the LTVs are *chuzaiin* ("corporate transferees"), and although students as a sub-category in the LTVs declined noticeably after 9/11, the business people did not. Just because the atmosphere in the United States became dark and chilly does not change the need for Japanese corporations to manage their U.S. branches; nor was 9/11 accepted as a good reason for *chuzaiin* to resist their companies' order to relocate. In short, the first group (i.e., LTVs who chose not to switch their status) stayed in the volume accumulation, while the second group (those appointed from Japan) joined it as scheduled. Combined with many other factors, they contributed to the 7-percent increase.

To provide a breakdown of the *shin-issei* in the United States, in 2008, the LPRs consisted of more than a third (35.2% of 386,328) and the LTVs, almost two-thirds (64.8%) (table 3.1 above). Of the whole shin-issei, the *chuzaiin* (including their families) accounted for near one-third (33.2%) or about the same numbers as LPRs; students

constituted less than one-tenth (7.6%); professionals, 3%; journalists, 0.4%; and other, 20.4%. Among LTVs, professional and other categories (for their breakdowns, see note 2 in table 3.1) have rapidly increased in recent years, seemingly pushing up the volume of LPRs by switching their status.

Between 2005 and 2008, professionals increased by 50 percent (from 8,256 to 12,425) and other, nearly by 30 percent (from 61,316 to 78,682) (see figure 3.2 below, as well). During the same period, the volume of the LPRs increased from 115,844 to 136,034 (up by nearly 20%). *Chuzaiin* remained by far the largest category among the LTVs and they may find it easy to convert to LPR status by switching their visa to one sponsored by companies with offices running in the United States. Pushed into *mendokusai* ("tiresome") situations, some actually rearrange their job contract with Japanese corporations in exchange for LPR status (see, e.g., Befu 2001, p. 8). Notably, the number of students decreased by 25 percent (from 38,712 to 29,264).

Student is an important subcategory that can be switched to any other statuses in the LTV category (see, e.g., Dreher *et al*. 2006). In 2008, 57.3 percent were undergraduate students, 21.5 percent were graduate students, and 13.6 percent pursued other degrees. OPT (Optional Practical Training)--a legal permission given to international students to work for a given period of time--accounted for 7.6 percent (IIE Open Doors 2009). Using OPT, in principle, students who want to stay in the United States could seek employment and thereby move toward LPR status. The reality, however, is often more difficult; jobs are open to non-LPRs in the condition that they cannot be taken by Americans (Bray *et al*. 2010, p. 13; Law 2002, p. 6). Ironically, most of them leave Japan to become more "international" (Ono *et al*.2004, p. 108), in the



Figure 3.2. Japanese "LPRs" and "LTVs," by Number (Left), by the Trend (Right, %, Relative to the Year 2005), 2005-2008

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009; IIE Open Doors 2009.

course of which they become confined to an ethnic jobs enclave. Some interviewees for this present study, whose jobs serve mainly Japanese customers, lament this situation, saying, "We don't even have a chance to speak English in New York, seriously." The LPR status (or the green card) is valuable for them since it would liberate them from the ethnic jobs enclave.

Pathways to the Green Card, a Statistical Analysis

How do the *shin-issei* get the "green card," if ever? Is there any difference between them and their counterparts from other regions in the process? To answer these questions, Japanese LPRs were compared with those from Europe, Asia, and Latin Americas. The data used for the comparison are from "Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents" (fiscal years, 2003-2009) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009b),

which archives the information grouped by region/country for each year between 2003 and 2009. The information is not based on sampling but enumeration, meaning that all persons obtaining the LPR status in these years are included in the data. Unfortunately, however, the data are not made available as individual microdata, but aggregated in tabulated categories. Although this limits the depth of analysis, it provides a rough idea of pathways to the LPR status on the basis of the migrants' characteristics, such as the region/country, the type of preference for the LPR status, gender, and age. For the analysis, the first two variables (i.e., region/country and the type of preference) were cross-tabulated with the latter two (gender and age).

Some minor modifications in the category of region/country were made. In terms of the values of the categories noted above, "Japan" was subtracted from "Asia" for comparison between these two groups. North (Caribbean and Central) and South Americas were combined into "Americas," and Canada was subtracted from "Americas."

Overall, the data set consists of 6,512,026 persons from the four regions who obtained the U.S. LPR status between 2003 and 2009 (table 3.2 below). Of these, 14 percent are from Europe; 38.8 percent from Asia; 46.4 percent from Americas; and 0.8 percent from Japan. A shift of the major sources of immigration from Europe to Asia and Americas is evident. In the 1950s, for example, 56 percent of LPRs were from Europe and in the 1900s, 92 percent (U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2009a).

In terms of gender, all regions in the comparison send more female LPRs than male counterparts: 53.8 percent from Europe; 55.6 percent from Asia; 55.7 percent from Americas; and 75.6 percent from Japan. Houstoun *et al*. (1984) observed that although immigration to the United States used to be dominated by "young economically

Table 3.2. A Comparison among LPRs from Europe, Asia, Americas, and Japan, by Gender, Preference to the LPR Status, Age Breakdown, 2003-2009 (N=6,512,026)

	Europe (N=914,314)		Asia (N=2,524,861)		Americas (N=3,020,894)		Japan (N=51,957)	
LPR	% to total	Female	% to total	Female	% to total	Female	% to total	Female
	14.04	53.76	38.77	55.60	46.39	55.74	0.80	75.62
Preference	% within	Female	% within	Female	% within	Female	% within	Female
Family-sponsored preferences	4.64	50.60	23.04	50.02	26.20	57.04	1.78	57.87
Employment-based preferences	18.44	46.20	24.11	49.45	7.11	48.67	31.44	53.24
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens	44.30	60.27	39.41	65.80	50.57	58.60	61.56	88.99
Diversity programs	11.98	48.55	2.36	42.07	0.44	50.32	4.74	56.94
Refugee and asylee adjustments	18.13	50.11	10.45	47.58	9.39	48.40	0.22	51.18
Other	2.51	50.92	0.64	46.19	6.29	46.82	0.26	55.14
Total	100.00	--	100.00	--	100.00	--	100.00	--
Age								
Under 18 years old	19.95	48.82	19.50	50.96	20.89	49.37	11.40	49.66
18 to 24 years	11.97	60.39	11.32	59.21	14.33	52.87	6.16	83.58
25 to 34 years	27.96	55.66	25.12	59.44	23.87	54.86	43.03	87.20
35 to 44 years	19.01	49.67	18.92	53.49	19.09	58.04	27.48	73.88
45 to 54 years	10.43	52.63	11.81	54.83	10.26	62.32	7.55	59.58
55 to 64 years	6.07	57.30	7.43	56.88	6.36	64.48	2.61	53.42
65 years and over	4.61	60.96	5.90	54.66	5.21	61.18	1.76	62.73
Total	100.00	--	100.00	--	100.00	--	100.00	--

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009b.

Note 1: The figures presented are based on the total mean average of the means in the fiscal years 2003-2009, not on the cumulative total, except the size "N."

Note 2: "Asia" excludes "Japan"; "Americas" includes North (Caribbean and Central included) and South Americas, but excludes Canada.

Note 3: For Japan, gender data for "Family-sponsored preferences" and "Refugees and alylees" in 2004 and 2007 are missing, and an equal sex ratio was assigned to each of the missing pairs.

motivated males," in the more recent pattern, female newcomers have annually outnumbered their male counterparts (*ibid.*, pp. 908-09).

The most popular preference across the four groups is "immediate relatives of U.S. citizens" (IR). If applicable, this is the easiest and fastest pathway to LPR status; the number of green-card issuances for this preference is not limited per year, and applicants do not have to wait in line, according to "Definition of Terms" by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Of the LPRs from Europe, 44.3 percent took this preference; from Asia, 39.4 percent; from Americas, 50.6 percent; and from Japan, 61.6 percent (see figure 3.3 below).

The second most popular choice among the Japanese LPRs is "employment-based preferences" (EB) taken by 31.4 percent, the highest among other groups (Asia, 24.1%; Europe, 18.4%; and Americas, 7.1%). It is notable that these two preferences combined (IR and EB) account for 93 percent of the Japanese LPRs.

The diversity program (DP) (better known as "the green-card lottery") is also open to the Japanese, but the chances of success are not high (4.7% of the Japanese LPRs). Through this program, 50,000 visas are annually issued on the basis of a random lottery process, for which more than 10 million people apply worldwide. The probability of winning this lottery is understandably quite low.

The diversity program was designed in the Immigration Act of 1990 for LPR applicants born in countries adversely affected by the changed immigration pattern wrought by the Act of 1965 (see Law 2002). Hence, the program currently excludes some Latin American and Asian countries that already send large numbers of LPRs. Relative to that of other preferences, Asians have a very small proportion through DP



Figure 3.3. Preference of LPRs from Europe, Asia, Americas, and Japan (%), 2003-2009

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009b.

FS: Family-sponsored preferences
EB: Employment-based preferences
IR: Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens
DP: Diversity programs
RA: Refugee and asylee adjustments

(2.4%) and non-U.S. Americans, almost none (0.4%). People from Most European countries are eligible for this preference, and as many as 12 percent of LPRs from Europe between 2003 and 2009 were winners of the lottery program.

One of the factors that has made Asia and the Americas by far the largest sending regions after the Act of 1965 is "family-sponsored preferences" (FS). Combined with IR, this is the primary means of chain migration. FS extends the frame of IR from immediate relatives of "U.S. citizens" (including the naturalized ones) to other relatives. In theory, one's sister among other family members will get a chance to become an American as

LPRs," and this further includes "siblings" of U.S. citizens.[1] If a person becomes a U.S. citizen (through FS), so may his sister's husband (IR), his sister's husband's siblings (FS), their children (IR), and their children's spouses (IR)…

The drastic changes of the American immigration patterns are said to have resulted from the Immigration Act of 1965. Amending the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, the law removed the quota system set in 1924. On behalf of the Kennedy-Johnson proposals, according to Reimers (1983, pp. 15-16), U.S. Administration officials insisted that "because of the desire to end discrimination in immigration law, it was necessary to abolish the national origins quotas and the Asia-Pacific Triangle." In practice, however, they thought that the recent pattern of immigration would be maintained; the prospective immigrants needed close family ties in the United States, and Africans and Asians had very few relatives in the United States. Attorney General Robert Kennedy told the House subcommittee on immigration:

> I would say for the Asia-Pacific Triangle it [the number of immigrants] would be approximately 5,000, Mr. Chairman, after which immigration from that source would virtually disappear; 5,000 immigrants would come in the first year, but we do not expect that there would be any great influx after that. (Cited in Reimers 1983, p. 16)

They were wrong. The Immigration Act of 1965 opened up the new waves of immigrants from the various regions, which had previously been mostly absent from the U.S. immigration stock, such as Asia, Latin Americas, and Africa.

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[1] Persons eligible to FS include: (1) unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; (2) spouses, children, and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens (LPRs); (3) married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; and (4) brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens (see U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services).

Maintaining firm family connections, 23 percent of LPRs from Asia and 26.2 percent from Americas took "family-sponsored preferences" (FS) between 2003 and 2009. By contrast, merely 4.6 percent of LPRs from Europe took FS. As for the Japanese, it was only 1.8 percent of all LPRs. Although both of these two groups have sizable communities with their own ethnic names in the United States, the ties to them are not as strong in the postwar years as before. Potential migrants from Ireland and Italy, for example, lament this situation, and it was this tendency that propelled the idea of the "lottery program," according to Law (2002).

This tells us that in analysis of contemporary American immigration, it is centrally important to take into account the nature of the Immigration Act of 1965, which favors those who migrate "as families" and thus "via chain migration," as opposed to those "as individuals" or "as adventurers" (i.e., most of Europeans and Japanese today). In the postwar era, Japanese migrants (including the war brides) are totally unconnected to the long-established Japanese-American community in the United States (Ishitoya 1991; Sanada 1995; Yamashita 2008).[2] What is left for the *shin-issei* as their pathway to the LPR status is, thus, either IR (61.6%) or EB (31.4%).

What is the most likely type of "immediate relatives of U.S. citizens" (IR) for them? The data do not provide a direct answer. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the types of IR include (1) spouses of citizens, (2) children (under 21 years of age and unmarried) of citizens, and (3) parents of citizens 21 years of age or

[2] During his stay in Berkeley in 1998-1999, for example, Yamashita (2008, p. 107) observed that there were two Japanese students associations at the University of California at Berkeley: Tomodachi ["Friends"], consisting of Japanese American students, and CJC (California Japan Club) consisting of international students from Japan. It is interesting to see that the Japanese Americans try to use Japanese (i.e., "Tomodachi") while the Japanese from Japan (continued…)



Figure 3.4. Preference of LPRs from Europe, Asia, Americas, and Japan, by Gender Ratio, 2003-2009

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009.

Note: The female proportions (%) are on the right.
FS: Family-sponsored preferences
EB: Employment-based preferences
IR: Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens
DP: Diversity programs
RA: Refugee and asylee adjustments

older. Based on these types of IR, the age proportion can provide a clue. If the youngest group size in a group is large, the most likely type of immediate relatives for this group is American "parents" rather than "spouses" or "children aged 21 and older." The gender ratio in this preference can also provide a hint; if the ratio in the preference is considerably more unbalanced than the overall ratio, it is unlikely to be "parents" or "children."

As shown above (figure 3.4), all the four groups have higher female proportions for this preference ("immediate relatives") than those in the group totals: Europe (60.3%

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choose the name that may sound more American ("CJC").

in the preference; 53.8% in the total), Asia (65.8%; 55.6%), Americas (58.6%; 55.7%), and Japan (89%; 75.6%). Across the four groups, this means, women are more likely than men to have American close relatives--most likely "spouses"--through whom they obtain the LPR status. The female proportion of the Japanese LPRs is especially extreme. Many Japanese LPRs (61.6%) took IR among other preferences, and of those who took it, 89 percent were female (compared to their overall female proportion, 75.6%).

Could they be "children (under 21 years of age and unmarried) of citizens" or "parents of citizens 21 years of age or older," if not "spouses of citizens"? Although "age" can serve as a hint, the original data sets are not based on the information from individual LPRs but are tabulated by their categories. Furthermore, the direct connection between "age" and the "preference" is not given. Each category, however, displays its own gender ratio. Below (figure 3.5) is a cross tabulation between "age" and "gender." In terms of the age breakdown, all three groups other than Japan show relatively consistent proportions throughout the category. Their female proportions by age are also rather stable, but some small ups and downs in these proportions should be noted. The youngest category "under 18 years old," first, displays the lowest female proportion with no exception (Europe, 48.8%; Asia, 51%; Americas, 49.4%; and Japan, 49.7%) (for "age," see the bars in figure above whose measurements are placed on the left axis; for "gender," see the lines whose measurements are on the right). It seems likely that those in the youngest category had American parents (including naturalized ones) or LPR parents. All the larger groups reunite with their children to start their new lives in the United States, though for Japan, to a noticeably lesser extent.



Figure 3.5. Age Breakdown of LPRs from Europe, Asia, Americas, and Japan, by Gender Ratio, 2003-2009

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009b.

Note: The female proportions (%) are on the right.

The age category "35- 44" from Europe displays a low female proportion, as well (49.7%, compared to that in their total, 53.8%). This is consistent with their preference EB, in which male LPRs outnumber their female counterparts (the female proportion, 46.2%). Their ages support the aforementioned findings of Massey *et al*. (2002), indicating that they spent years to switch their non-resident work visas to the LPR status. Conversely, their age category "18-24" is noteworthy for its high female proportion (60.4%). Many of these female LPRs seem to be "spouses" of citizens.

Similarly, the female proportions of Asian LPRs in the age categories "18-24" and "25-34" are higher than the overall female proportion (59.2% and 59.4%, respectively, compared to 55.6% in the total). It is unlikely that they are "parents of citizens 21 years of age or older," and most of them were obviously not "children (under 21 years of age)." Most of their preference type, therefore, was likely to be "spouses."

Like their European counterparts, Asian LPRs' age category "35-44" has a lower female proportion (49.5%) than that in their total (55.6%). This may also reflect years spent adjusting their non-resident work visas to the LPR status.

As for Americas, "35- 44" and over shows the female proportions increasing steadily until "55-64" (from 58% to 64.5%, compared to 55.7% in the total), although the volume itself is decreasing. It can be assumed that they all have the possibility of being "spouses," "parents," and "children," almost evenly.

Notice, although the age categories "18-24" and "25-34" from Japan are eye-catching in terms of their extremely high female proportions (83.6% and 87.2%, respectively), all other age groups display lower female proportions than that in the total (75.6%): "-18" (49.7%), "45-54" (59.6%), "55-64" (53.4%), and "65-" (62.7%). As discussed above, the youngest group seems to consist of "children" of citizens or LPRs. Similarly to the European and Asian male counterparts, many men in the older groups from Japan are likely to be the ones who spent a long time switching their non-resident work visas to the LPR status. EB ("employment-based preferences") can thus be seen as only one door to LPR status open to Japanese men. Nearly one third of Japanese LPRs (31.4%) took EB between 2003 and 2009, and of them, 53.2 percent were female, far lower than the overall female proportion (75.6%). The most popular preference among the Japanese LPRs was IR ("immediate relatives of U.S. citizens"), which was taken by 61.6 percent of them, of whom, 89 percent were female.

Across the four groups, as examined, the most popular preference is "immediate relatives of U.S. citizens" (IR), and many who took IR for their LPR status (except those from Americas) seem to be "spouses of citizens." Does this indicate that the

intermarriage rates between U.S. citizens and newcomers--who are more likely to be female than male--are rapidly increasing, thereby inducing the predominance of female LPRs in the new pattern of American immigration?

As noted, "U.S. citizens" include naturalized ones. Houstoun *et al*. (1984, p. 919) explain the predominance of female LPRs partly in terms of what they call "secondary migrations" based on "marriages between earlier-arriving males and later-arriving females from their regions of origin." This means that their marriages are not necessarily intermarriages, but can rather be seen as a major booster of chain migration. Lee (1999) supports this secondary-migrations thesis, observing that women are seldom the first in the family to migrate (p. 113). In other words, they follow their husbands, with or without children, after things in the United States, such as visas, income, housing, and social networks, are set.

Engaging in no chain migration, however, contemporary Japanese migrants do not seem to conform to the secondary-migrations thesis in their marriage pattern. Lee *et al*. (1998), for example, examined the trends in intermarriages in the United States, focusing primarily on Asians.[3] Instead, their findings are indicative of the pattern-breaking tendency observed among foreign-born Japanese migrants to the United States, especially among female *shin-issei*. First, overall intermarriage levels have considerably declined for all Asian ethnic groups between 1980 and 1990,[4] except for the Japanese whose

[3] Their study (Lee *et al*. 1998) is based on the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 U.S. Population Census. The primary unit of analysis is the married couple, defined as the head of household and his/her spouse. The Asian ethnic groups in their analysis included: Chinese, Filipino, Asian Indian, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese. They compare their findings with those reported by Lee and Yamanaka (1990) based on the 1980 Census.

[4] Lee *et al*. (1998, p. 329) observe that "demographic and other social developments during the 1980s may be partly responsible for the overall decrease in the level of racial and (continued…)

intermarriage levels remained not only relatively stable but also the highest (25.6%), followed by Filipinos (18.9%), Chinese (12.1%), and Asian Indians (12.1%) (*ibid*., pp. 327-29). Second, the native-born outmarry at substantially higher levels than the foreign-born, except for Japanese females--of whom the foreign-born are more likely to outmarry. The 1980 census shows that foreign-born Japanese females were more likely than their native-born counterparts to outmarry (62.1% and 24.8%, respectively); in the1990 census, although the margin became narrower in the decade, the tendency remained unchanged (foreign-born, 54.3%; native-born, 34.2%) (*ibid*., p. 335). This tendency negates not only the secondary-migrations thesis but also the assimilation theory, both of which are based upon traditionally shaped immigration patterns rather than recently observed adventurers, whose theories are now awaited.

In summary, the trends of the *shin-issei* in their legal status in the United States in the last several decades indicate that they are, first of all, status adjusters. Most of them seem to start their journey in the United States as LTVs, or non-immigrants. Some of them then try to obtain LPR status, but their pathways to a green card are quite narrow. More than a half of the *shin-issei* LPRs, mostly females, get a green card through marriage to U.S. citizens, and the rest, including males, via work visas. Moving as individuals, not as families, chain migration is not a formula they use. Nonetheless, following such narrow pathways, the number of Japanese LPRs in the United States increased by 2.5 times between 1971 and 2008 (from 52,551 to 134,034) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009). This increase is assumed to have stemmed from a growing volume of Japanese

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ethnic outmarriages among Asian Americans."

LTVs, from 28,997 to 250,294, or an increase of nearly 10 times. What push/pull these overseas adventurers are discussed in the following chapter.

Ch. 4. The Push/Pull Factors

For the discussions about "push/pull factors" presented in this chapter, three themes will be focused. They include: (1) *Nihonjinron* ("essays on what it means to be Japanese") (Lipset 1996, p. 222) coupled with *kokusaika* ("internationalization") (Lincicome 1993, p. 129), (2) some current and major social issues in Japan, and (3) the images of New York portrayed in Japanese magazine articles. These are themselves the major sources of the tug of war over the direction of the Japanese social organization, which is in turn assumed to shape the trend of Japanese overseas adventurers (with some exceptions among the *chuzaiin*).

Nihonjinron *and* Kokusaika

The ideological tug of war was not a new development in the Meiji era. Throughout Japan's history, external influences have induced internal frictions to a greater or lesser extent, which in general depended on the power balance between Japan and the source of the influence in a given era.[1] In Meiji, when the modernization project following a Western model was imperative, for example, traditionalism overall tended to give way to progressivism (Befu 1993, p. 309)--although the meaning of "modernization" itself was far from uncomplicated. In the period leading to World War II, by contrast, the popular feeling of *akogare* for the West utterly lost its location, and even English

[1] As early as in the mid-sixth century, according to Sakaiya (1991, pp. 134-39), Japan faced huge conflicts over the influence of a foreign religion, Buddhism, accompanied by new knowledge in areas such as medicine, architecture, irrigation, agriculture, metal casting, and so forth. In the middle of the sixteenth century, Christianity stirred up similar turbulences, which (continued…)

(including loan words) disappeared, labeled as the enemy's language. Then again, just one month after Japan's surrender, a guide book for conversation in English was published and sold 3.5 million copies in three months (Dower 2000, p. 188).

The nature of the tug of war in postwar Japan differs from past periods in some important ways. The most notable difference lies in Japan's direct postwar exposure to international pressures brought in by means of a principle of democracy proclaimed in the new constitution (see Chapter 2). Handling internal affairs now entails a concern about how the tug of war will appear to the international community. The aforementioned Ienaga lawsuit, which was closely watched by non-Japanese scholars and politicians overseas, is a case in point. Conversely, it is not surprising that many in Japan irritably challenge the "forced" constitution that justifies foreign interventions into the structure of Japan, as exemplified in a controversial discourse, *The Japan That Can Say No*, by Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita (1989).[2] From this perspective, a *Nihonjinron* boom arose in the postwar years, preceded in its theoretical version by an American scholar, Ruth Benedict. One literature survey estimates that over 2,000 works dealing with Japanese uniqueness--i.e., *Nihonjinron*--were published in the first four decades in postwar Japan (Lipset 1996, p. 212).

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led to the policy of seclusion in less than a century.

[2] To be noted, the two authors are viewed quite differently. Sullivan (1992, p. 56), for example, observes that Akio Morita, co-founder of Sony, is harsh but fair in his remarks on America, while those made by Shintaro Ishihara, a politician (currently Governor of Tokyo), are isolationist, racist, and xenophobic.

A Classical Nihonjinron *from America*

Nihonjinron has two different versions. One is a genre of in-group discussions about Japanese uniqueness that promote and defend the traditional form of Japanese identity. The other consists of scholarly studies of Japaneseness, providing theorized views of the character of Japanese people and society.

The most widely cited classical *Nihonjinron* of the latter version is, probably, Ruth Benedict's (1989 [1946]) *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. It is a cultural anthropological study of Japaneseness, assigned under the U.S. Wartime Information Bureau, for preparation of the U.S.-led occupation of Japan (Nakao 2007). In Japan, its translation was published in 1948 and its pocketsize edition, in 1967. This was a period, during which admiration and envy of the West was dominant, and Japaneseness itself was often viewed in self-derogatory ways (Befu 1993, p. 309). In all, Benedict's *Nihonjinron* book sold more than 2 million copies in Japan (Ryang 2002). The century-old Japanese inferiority complex, intertwined with *akogare* for the West, bubbled up to the surface of the Japanese consciousness in the immediate postwar era. This may have made the Japanese people fervently and anxiously check the text written by an American scholar, about themselves.

To summarize some of the themes in Benedict's *Nihonjinron*, she first views the character of the Japanese people and society as not simply "alien" to the West in its quality but also distinctively "self-contradictory" in its pattern. She observes a "fantastic series of 'but also's,'" stating that:

> The Japanese are, to the highest degree, both aggressive and un-aggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and

> resentful of being pushed around, loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways. (Benedict 1989 [1946], p. 2)

The title of her book, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Benedict symbolizes this self-contradictory aspect of Japaneseness, namely, "a popular cult of aestheticism… upon the cultivation of chrysanthemums" and "the cult of the sword" (*ibid*., p. 2).

Benedict places her foremost attention on the Japanese "spirit," which informs habits of attitude and behavior. In the path to the Pacific War, the government insisted that Japan would win "a victory of spirit over matter" (pp. 22-23). "The spirit, she [Japan] said, was all and was everlasting; material things were necessary, of course, but they were subordinate and fell by the way." Physical death, then, was not the end of a life since its spirit could live forever. The order of the Kamikaze Corps (suicide bombers) could be understood with this idea.

The lexicon of the Japanese morality includes *on* ("indebtedness"), *chu* ("loyalty"), and *ko* ("filial piety"), among others. *On* develops in the hierarchical relationships to one's superior, such as parents, teachers, and, above all others, the Emperor. It has to be repaid through limitless devotion (including physical death), a moral custom called *chu* or *ko*. Every kamikaze pilot of a suicide plane was, it was said, repaying his Imperial *on*; all the troops who died defending some island of the Pacific were said to be discharging their limitless *on* to the Emperor (p. 101). Their spirit would live forever upon their *chu*.

Japanese moral behaviors, such as *chu* and *ko*, are sanctioned by the notion of "shame." Japan is a "shame culture," according to Benedict (*ibid*., pp. 223-25), which relies on "external sanctions for good behavior," not, as a "guilt culture" (e.g., the United

States) does, on an "internalized conviction of sin." In other words, Japanese morality does not stand by itself upon a personal judgment alone, but has to be supported by socially entrenched reference. "Shame," the Japanese say, "is the root of virtue."

The problem is, however, that Japan's "virtue" is not universal; that is, it cannot be exported as is to the outside world, argues Benedict (*ibid*., pp. 225-27). Japanese are "most vulnerable," she observes, in "foreign lands where their own formal signposts of good behavior do not hold." In the United States, as a result, some Japanese speak of anger and some, of a frightened feeling--an apparent symptom of normlessness or what sociologists call "anomie."[3]

Benedict, on the other hand, depicts a possible assimilation path that Japanese expatriates may follow in the United States. She suggests, "Once Japanese have accepted, to however small degree, the less codified rules that govern behavior in the United States,"

> they find it difficult to imagine their being able to manage again the restrictions of their old life in Japan. Sometimes they refer to it as a lost paradise, sometimes as a "harness," sometimes as a "prison," sometimes as a "little pot" that holds a dwarfed tree. [Once] planted out in open soil, the dwarfed pine could never be put back again. They feel that they themselves are no longer possible ornaments in that Japanese garden. (Benedict 1989 [1946], p. 227)

Put another way, what the Japanese society calls "virtue" can turn out to be a push (expelling) factor for its expatriates who seek "open soil," which in turn becomes a pull

[3] Durkheim (1951) discussed the term "anomie" in various ways in various dimensions (micro and macro, economic and social), but his definition most relevant here is: the lack of "restriction [of desires] upon individuals imposed by superior authority, i.e., by collective (continued…)

(alluring) factor for them. The result is a cultural transition from suffering anomie (e.g., "speak of the anger") to enjoying freedom ("no longer possible ornaments"). What is missing here, though, is an account of conflicting aspects of the assimilation process involving, among other aspects, the psychology of "minorities" (Tajfel 1978), "cultural grammar" (Wierzbicka 1996), and adaptation to the new world at the sacrifice of bonds to the old world.[4]

Benedict's analysis of the assimilation path is based on an autobiography written by a Japanese woman who attended an American college in the prewar era (p. 225). This seems baffling. Non-labor migrants (such as students, writers, and traders) themselves constituted the minority among Japanese emigrants at that time, and female students were almost nonexistent. The student Benedict uses for her analysis on the Japanese norm actually stood far from average. Although Benedict here effectively helps bring up a cultural problem deep-rooted in Japan since Meiji (i.e., "virtue" vs. "prison"), her *Nihonjinron*, like many others' (as examined below), does not seem flawless. Immediately after her book's publication in Japan, a more critical flaw in her thesis was pointed out by Japanese intellectuals.

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authority" (p. 251).

[4] For an argument for the reverse course, see *Escape from Freedom* by Erich Fromm (1969). Fromm critically discusses "the powerlessness and insecurity of the isolated individual… who has become free from all bonds that once gave meaning and security to life" (p. 282). For Fromm, "freedom" (or "open soil") is synonymous with "anomie."

The Japanese Reactions to the American Nihonjinron

Following the publication of a Japanese translation of *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* in 1948, according to Ryang (2004),[5] *Minzokugaku Kenkyu*, Japan's most widely circulated academic journal of ethnology, paid tribute to the book in a cluster of articles entitled "What is offered in Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*?" Five scholars, starkly divided into supporters and critics of the book, presented their views. The supporters read the book as "a guide or manual for Japan's self-criticism and revision of its prewar and wartime militarism," calling it a "book of lessons." They observed that Japanese readers were generally "impressed with the book in multiple ways," although, on the other hand, "amused over Benedict's minor misunderstandings."

The critics, by contrast, unanimously pointed out Benedict's failure to distinguish between "the state-imposed norms" and "the people's grass-roots lifestyle"--or to take into account the "samuraization of the commoners" (see Chapter 1). They suggested, for example, that the term *on*, which plays a central part in Benedict's understanding of hierarchical human relations in Japan, was in fact not part of daily language among the commoners. Her failure in this vein, it seems, misled her to the "fantastic series of 'but also's,'" lumping the samurai-like characters (including the "shame culture" and the "kamikaze pilots") with the peasants' way of life (neither "militaristic" nor "brave"). As such, Benedict left layers of the inner conflicts--concealed in the hierarchical social structure of Japanese culture--untouched.

Ryang (2004) critically observes that, in retrospect, Benedict's *Nihonjinron* "helped give birth" to the "inward-looking" version of the *Nihonjinron* literature in the

postwar years. Like Benedict's, this version of *Nihonjinron* identifies the Japanese with samurai in their moral character. Similarly to Benedict's work, it reifies "Japan" in a conceptually entrenched frame offering no distinction between the nation, the people, and the government, as if they were the products of a single seed. What essentially distinguishes it from Benedict's, though, is its "inward-looking" notion of Japanese "virtue," which Benedict rather critically estranged as a source of Japanese emotional vulnerability in foreign lands, or more broadly--and importantly--in the international environment that now includes Japan itself.

Nihonjinron *as Ideology*

Harumi Befu (1993), who critically points to an almost intrinsic connection between *Nihonjinron* and Japanese nationalism, offers a brief summary of commonly shared tendencies in *Nihonjinron* literature. "In short," he observes,

> a claim is made for equivalency and mutual implications among land, people (i.e., race), culture, and language, such that those and only those who practice the culture also speak the language and have inherited Japanese "blood" from their forebears, who have always lived on the Japanese archipelago, and that no other person speaks the language natively and practices the culture. (Befu 1993, p. 302)

Called "genetic determinism" based on "blood," such tendencies seem to imply that there can be no cultural change in Japan either by itself or under foreign influences.

Apparently in line with this version of *Nihonjinron*, according to Chapman (1991, p. 246), a well-known Japanese linguist stated that Japanese as a "pure" language had

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[5] Ryang's paper, archived only in the HTML format, does not provide its page numbers.

endured no other influences than that of Chinese long ago. Puzzled, Chapman argues that any foreigner who grapples with learning the Japanese language is surprised to discover the large number of "loan words," including, ironically, *yuniku* ("unique"), the most often used word to describe the Japanese culture (*ibid*., p. 246) (see also Seaton 2001). Echoing Benedict's estrangement of Japanese "virtue," Chapman warns that such *Nihonjinron* causes much amusement when exported abroad, although much of it goes uncontested in Japan and is accepted by millions of Japanese readers (*ibid*., p. 244).

The number one bestseller of *Nihonjinron* in recent time is *Kokka no Hinkaku* ("the dignity of a nation") written by mathematician and essayist Masahiko Fujiwara. Published in 2005, it broke records for sales, shooting past the 2 million mark in 190 days (Schreiber 2007). The term *hinkaku* became the top buzzword of 2006 in Japan and a social phenomenon of the time. Although non-scholarly, this nationalist version of *Nihonjinron* (and other similar ones) can be seen in its popularity as a substantial reflection of the Japanese sentiment of the time about the Japanese social organization.

Densely sharing the tendencies noted above, Fujiwara (2005) begins his *Kokka no Hinkaku* by pointing to the "limitation of rationality" of our modern time as initiated by the West (p. 11). He attacks the power balance that places the present world exclusively under "Western logic." Fujiwara's arguments can be abridged as follows:

- The West has led the world to the breakdown of family and education, the common phenomena of the advanced countries today (*ibid*., p. 16).
- We need *jocho* ("emotion") rather than *ronri* ("logic"); the most important things such as morality cannot be explained by logic (p. 44).
- Liberty, equality, and democracy--the fictions made up in the West--should be questioned; they are full of contradictions (pp. 65-93). One freedom collides head-on against another, and so does an equality.

— Instead, we Japanese should rediscover the spirit of *bushido* ("the samurai code"), a set of moral laws based on affection, fidelity, perseverance, justice, bravery, sympathy, honor, and shame (p. 116). Historically, foreigners who visited Japan, such as missionaries, were surprised by the high morality of the Japanese; if countries in the last several thousand years could be measured in terms of morality, Japan would be the top on a different level (pp. 187-88).
— There are, hence, no people other than the Japanese that can save the world (p. 191).

Fujiwara's claims here are not new, but instead he restates, quite eloquently, the sentiments widely shared in Japan, since Meiji. His stance placed on the dove side, as against the hawk's, may have led his readers, who already shared the sentiments, to easily express their agreement with his ideas. Being a mathematician, in addition, he has some experience in U.S. education institutions as an instructor, and this made his voice, like Benedict's, appear to have an international quality.

In terms of the timing of the book's publication, furthermore, the social atmosphere was very gloomy and *anomic*. Due to a prolonged economic recession--and major corporations' defensive reactions to it--the job environment was unusually chilly, and the social environment followed suit. The "lost decade"--and the *lost norm*--had to be made up with something that could aid the Japanese identity.

Right after World War II, it was "American democracy" that attempted to fill what Velen *et al*. (1958, p. 3) called Japan's "power vacuum" (see Chapter 2). Now it is *hinkaku* that attempts to fill today's "vacuum." Fujiwara collides head-on against the previous prescription for the "vacuum," i.e., the Western ideology of democracy, and offers instead the Japanese ideology of *bushido* ("the samurai code"). For Fujiwara, the loss of the Japanese self-confidence (or the loss of *hinkaku*) itself is the "vacuum," which

cannot be filled with anything other than self-confidence. "History has shown," MacArthur claimed, "that no nation or race relinquishes freedom once having experienced it" (Shibusawa, 2006, p. 54). He was wrong; the social phenomenon of *hinkaku* evidences that the American freedom barely worked in Japan. On the other hand, though, it seems unlikely that *bushido* will work positively in the international environment (Benedict 1989 [1946]; Chapman 1991). Regardless, Fujiwara's book is being followed by other works seemingly imbued with what Ryang (2004) calls the "inward-looking" tendencies.

Nihonjinron *as Theory*

Not only did Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* help give birth to the nationalist version of the *Nihonjinron* literature, but it paved the way for more academically oriented studies of Japaneseness in the postwar years. The notion of Japan in the international environment in the literature shifted from--in Benedict's (1989 [1946], p. 1) term--"the most alien enemy" to what one might call "the most alien partner." The focus on Japanese culture has also been shifting--more openly than before in Japan, too--from its collectivity based upon "harmony" to one molded upon "inner conflicts." The term "samuraization" coined by Befu (1971), for example, can be seen as one of the simplest albeit the most penetrating theories of the latter aspect of the Japanese culture.

The concept of *wa* ("harmony"), the key to the Japanese culture,[6] was introduced in Japan's polity as early as the beginning of the seventh century by Prince Shotoku, in

[6] The word *wa* also means "Japan" or "Japanese" itself, as seen in *wa-shoku* ("Japanese food"), *wa-fuku* ("Japanese dress"), *wa-shitsu* ("Japanese room"), among others. All these were made up *vis-à-vis* foreign styles, such as Chinese and Western. An interesting one coined during (continued…)

his Seventeen Article Constitution (see Kramer *et al*. 1997, p. 81). In the first article, it stated:

> Wa o motte tattoshi to shi, sakaraukoto naki to seyo ("Value harmony, eliminate disobedience").[7]

Wa, originating from Confucian and Buddhist ideals, remains the most important value in Japan. It is applied to the various institutions including family, school, the workplace, and, above all others, the nation.

The Japanese *wa*, however, is being questioned for its intrinsic features as problematic in today's environment. First, as Kramer *et al*. (*ibid*., p. 81) observe, although solidarity of the inside is strong through *wa*, it creates and excludes outsiders upon an intensively nurtured *uchi-soto* ("inside-outside") consciousness. In such consciousness, Maruyama (1999) observes, "the world" is placed outside of Japan (p. 36). *Wa*, as such, draws a line *around* Japan, and, according to Nakane (1972, p. 20), "anyone outside 'our' people ceases to be considered human." The Japanese *wa* did not contradict militarism, but rather utilized it.

Second, *wa* is a groupism hierarchically maintained upon emotional involvement or submission of its members. By definition this groupism has to be total, and so does one's involvement in it. The principles of Japanese social group structure, according to

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the Meiji Restoration was *wakon-yosai* ("Japanese spirit, western knowledge") (e.g., Nakane 1972, p. 119), a symbiotic message for the "tug of war" fought between traditionalism and progressivism.

[7] Some translate this as: "Harmony is to be valued, and the avoidance of wanton opposition to be honored." This translation misleadingly softens the high-handed tone of the latter part; the word "sakaraukoto" (disobedience) is missing, and instead the word "honored," which is not stated, is added.

Nakane (1972, p. 7), can be seen in the household structure, which still persists in various group identities. On the national level, first, Japan is considered a "family-state" that places the emperor as the father and the people as his children (Unoura 1999, p. 245; Beasley 1995, p. 80). The attachment to this "family," at least until the end of the war, was supposed to be total, and eternal.

Workplace is considered a family, as well. *Wa* in the workplace, as in the nation, does not recognize a boundary between public and private life of its members. As Nakane (1972) observes:

> The kinship which is normally regarded as the primary and basic human attachment seems to be compensated in Japan by a personalized relation to a corporate group based on work (p. 7)… [The emotional involvement] is facilitated by continual human contact of the kind that can often intrude on those human relations which belong to the completely private and personal sphere (p. 10). Individual autonomy is minimized. When this happens, the point where group or public life ends and where private life begins no longer can be distinguished… Obedience in Japan takes the form of total submission (p. 103). (Nakane 1972, p. 7, p. 10, p. 103)

Praising and rewarding unwavering loyalty and non-stop work prompted one pharmaceutical company to advertise a new beverage in a television commercial with the song "Can You Fight 24 Hours for Your Corporation?" (Budd 2006, p. 2) Many point out, however, that the phenomenon of "Japanese workaholics" stems from the centripetal force of *wa* rather than the people's own disposition; polls show that employees want to work less and play more (Chapman 1991, p. 180; Budd 2006, p. 17). Despite the alleged workaholism, the Japanese "labor productivity still is only two-thirds that of American

workers" (Sullivan 1992, p. 188), which may mean that Japanese workers' overtime work is a "ritual act of submission" under "power-oriented managers" (*ibid*., p. 93).

A third problem of the concept of the Japanese *wa* is "the negation of the ego" whereby to mold the Japanese personality into a homogenous character. For the Japanese, according to psychologist Hiroshi Minami (1989, p. 7), "the certainty of the ego" can be accorded only to "the faithful submission to the social system"--that is, paradoxically, to the orderliness of the system, *wa*, through the negation of the subjective ego. Smith's (1983) comparison between popular stories for children in Japan and those in the United States may succinctly illustrate the difference between the children of these two groups in terms of their ego formation. He observes:

> Unlike the heroes of Horatio Alger's [a nineteenth century-American writer] stories, who seem to be born honest and true and strong, those of the typical Japanese success story become all these things through suffering, perseverance, and obedience. The injunction that guides [Japanese children] is *messhi hoko* ("destroy ego and serve others")... For the Japanese, individuality lies at the opposite pole from social involvement. (Smith 1983, pp. 100-02)

Under such an injunction, the idea of individualism, from the Meiji period to the present, has "never flourished among the Japanese" (Minami 1971, p. 18).

The school system is an important institution that assumes the primary role of the system of *wa*, as its latent function. According to Allison (1996, pp. 88-89), children learn less about reading and writing than they do about how to become a "Japanese" student.[8] She attributes this tendency of Japanese schools to "the state's control over the

[8] Allison's (1996) study is based on a fieldwork in a Tokyo neighborhood among middle-
(continued…)

systematization of education," which starts as early as in nursery schools. Upon the understanding and support of parents and teachers, the rules and patterns of "group living" are thus first introduced to young children.

The most important purpose of Japanese education as a whole, Sakaiya (1991, p. 303) observes, is to acquire the knowledge and skills everybody else has "in the same way." He calls this tendency "the standardization of the people," one of the three major pillars in the state structure redesigned in 1941--the other two being "the standardization of mass products" and "the centralization of the nation around Tokyo" (*ibid*., pp. 299-304). Homogenization of the population had been important since Meiji, but it was intensified in the path leading to World War II. In the postwar era, despite the political efforts made by GHQ, the situation does not seem to be altered much. The Ministry of Education prepares even more detailed, book-length guidelines for the curricular essentials of all elementary, lower secondary, and upper secondary schools (Vogel 1979, p. 167). In addition to the government guidelines, so-called "school rules" regulate children's hairstyle, clothes, posture, usage of words, and more (Sakaiya (1991, p. 304).

Allison (1996) describes an episode that exemplifies "the standardization of the people" in school. According to her work, a nursery-school teacher told one mother that her daughter was incompetent in every task, skill, and behavior expected of children her age (p. 120). This teacher pointed to, as an example, the child's failure to draw triangles the "correct" way. Most mothers Allison met did not argue against a similar "bleak report" given to their children. They repeated, instead, "*shikata ga nai*" ("it can't be helped"). Some who maintained a slightly different view, however, said that

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class Japanese mothers in 1987-1988.

> My worry is that we are just producing kids who fit into the mold. In school it is stressed that there is one right way to do things. We have to keep teaching our children to follow authority and be subordinate to their superiors. (Allison 1996, pp. 120-21)

Among the homogenized individuals, according to Minami (1989, p. 9), the fear for being estranged from groups (including one's own as well as reference groups) develops an "insecure ego," and a "weak subjective ego." Stemming from the insecure ego, this can cause "the tendency of excessive self-consciousness against others, caring too much about the reputation or face" (*ibid*., p. 3). A Japanese war bride's mother's concern over "the shame such a union would bring to her family" may exemplify this theory (see Chapter 2). Japanese also tend to be anxious about how their reference groups, such as the West, view them--as evidenced in the Meiji leaders' concern about the emigrants' behaviors overseas (see Chapter 1). Any remark made about Japan or Japanese by the West--in newspapers, books, movies, TV programs, and the like--be it positive or negative, evokes panicky reactions from the Japanese (see, e.g., Zipangu 1998).

Equally importantly, as a Japanese ego tends to stand upon the group consciousness rather than one's own individuality, other members' problems exposed to the outside is irritably taken as the group's (or Japan's) shame. An article in *The New York Times* (Onishi 2004), for example, reports:

> The young Japanese civilians [volunteers for a nonprofit organization to help Iraqi street children] taken hostage in Iraq returned home this week, not to the warmth of a yellow-ribbon embrace but to a disapproving nation's cold stare… "You got what you deserve!" read one hand-written sign at the airport where they landed. "You are Japan's shame,"

> another wrote on the Web site… [A] psychiatrist, who examined the three former hostages twice since their return, said the stress they were enduring now was "much heavier" than what they experienced during their captivity in Iraq. (Onishi 2004)

The mob can be seen as a product of the insecure ego collectively molded. It should be noted, though, that to the extent the mob immaturely scapegoats the helpless, many Japanese today heartbreakingly lament their attitude and behavior.

Facing the international environment, Maruyama (1999, p. 40) argues, the Japanese have discovered that they exist "in the world," which used to be outside of them. He adds, "Now we need to locate ourselves 'in the world'; without that, our past will rather burden us." Maruyama's argument can be seen also as a *Nihonjinron*. Unlike Fujiwara, though, Maruyama places his *Nihonjinron* outwardly in the notion of *kokusaika* ("internationalization"). For Maruyama, what marks the center line of this tug of war is no longer "modernization" with which to confront the outside world, but is instead *kokusaika* to enter it as its part. The problem is, though, as was the case in "modernization" based on "samuraization" in Meiji, one cannot be certain about the meaning of *kokusaika*. It varies, depending on who handles it.

Kokusaika *as* Nihonjinron

The term *kokusaika* ("internationalization") became a catchword in the 1960s when--to use Maruyama's (1999) argument--the Japanese were gradually discovering that Japan existed "in the world." From that point on in the media, phrases including the word *kokusaika* have become commonplace. This trend was not fully spontaneous nor

was accepted uniformly in Japan; it was prompted from the outside, and many, including top politicians and bureaucrats, initially resisted it.

It was the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) that made the Japanese government accept the idea of *kokusaika* in 1964, by offering its membership in exchange for a promise of "the liberalization of trade and capital" (Oliver 2007, p. 49). Keeping this promise, however, was not easy, as it could adversely affect Japan's paternalistic power structure as well as national-economic interests. Although the OECD's offer signified the global reach of postwar Japan's economy, it was often likened to Commodore Perry's black ships (*ibid*., p. 52); both initiated enormous pressures from inside and outside regarding opening Japan's door to the world outside.

One of the things the Japanese government did as a new member of the OECD was remove restrictions on "foreign exchange-consuming outbound travel" by Japanese (Carlile 1996, p. 11). Prior to that,

> [most] passports issued were valid for one trip only. Any international travel had to be approved by a Ministry of Finance committee. There was a $500 limit on the amount of foreign exchange that could be taken out of Japan, and travel for the purpose of tourism was not considered a valid reason for authorization. (Carlile 1996, p. 11)

After this, the number of Japanese overseas travelers "grew by over 44 percent in both 1971 and 1972 and a whopping 64 percent in 1973" (*ibid*., p. 14). The notion of *kokusaika* was becoming a status symbol for a higher portion of the Japanese population. The feeling of *akogare* for the West permeated a far wider portion of the population.

More essentially, the government soon initiated committees and study groups "to promote *kokusaika*." In practice, it "was difficult to tell what *kokusaika* meant when

[such committee members as] bureaucrats, scholars, and television commentators used the term" (Smith 1998, p. 32). In 1980, for example, a government report entitled "Bunka no Jidai" ("The Era of Culture") was prepared, but its content was rather nationalist, lauding Japanese culture for its emphasis on harmonious human relations, on members of society knowing their station in life, and on Japanese tradition in general (Befu (1993, p. 304).

The *kokusaika* slogan was adopted by the subsequent prime minister, who utilized it to call for an education reform in 1984, launching a group of intellectuals called the National Council on Education Reform (NCER) (Lincicome 1993). The council in its report depicted an image of the "cosmopolitan Japanese" standing upon the ability to communicate in one or more foreign languages, a thorough knowledge of foreign countries and cultures, a capacity to appreciate cultural differences, and an "international consciousness" (*ibid*., p. 127). In its specific advice to educators, however, the report turned its recommendations inwardly. To promote *kokusaika* in education,

> Japanese history teachers are informed that their goals should be "to secure [pupils'] overall understanding of the evolution of our nation's history from a global perspective and, by deepening their awareness of the special characteristics of our nation's culture and traditions, to increase their ability to think in historical terms and cultivate both their identity as Japanese people (*kokumin*) and their temperament as Japanese living in international society... (Lincicome 1993, p. 147).

In this *kokusaika* project, one of the objectives the NCER proposed was a more active acceptance of foreign students wishing to study in Japan. Its purpose was twofold, according to Ivy (1995, p. 3), i.e., the "thorough domestication of the foreign" and the "dissemination of Japanese culture throughout the world." The slogan, then, as a whole

could be better interpreted as a governmental endorsement of the nationalist *Nihonjinron* ideology, reinforcing the *uchi-soto* consciousness, which otherwise might have been weakened through the discovery that Japan exists *in* the world. In the *uchi-soto* consciousness, Japan has to exist *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world.

Social Issues and the Social Organization

The Japanese societal atmosphere at present is deeply tinted by the sharp contrast between the bubble economy in the 1980s and, on the other hand, its burst and the repercussions. Most of today's social issues tend to be seen as stemming from this economic dead end. The way they developed, however, may be found in the mold of the Japanese social organization handed over since Meiji, or what *Nihonjinron* describes as *wa*. The social issues discussed here include: (1) "parasite singles," (2) "freeter" and "NEET," (3) "*karoshi*" ('death by overwork')," and (4) "Japan's high suicide rates."

"Parasite Singles"

The phenomenon that sociologist Masahiro Yamada (2000) calls "parasite singles" grabbed Japanese public attention in the late 1990s. The term refers to people of 20 to 34 years old "who continue living with their parents even after they become adults, enjoying a carefree and well-to-do life as singles" (*ibid*., p. 49). From the 1995 national census, the number of the parasite singles was estimated at about 10 million--nearly 10 percent of the total Japanese population, or one-third of this generation. Not having to pay rent, utilities, or food costs, they enjoy spending their entire incomes on brand-name sporting goods, or mastering a leisure pursuit (*ibid*., p. 52). Since their parents take care

of their basic needs, the singles choose work based on what they want to do (p. 50). Their carefree personal lifestyle supported by their parents, however, is considered a serious social issue. Most directly, it spurs Japan's low birthrate crisis and the shrinking labor force, which will certainly make pension taxes and health care costs untenable. This trend also erodes such traits as "individual vitality and motivation," adds Yamada (*ibid*., p. 50), who views it as a "symbol of the impasse" (p. 49).

Against this view "most common in the Japanese press," however, some argue that it "misses something more substantive: an unconscious protest against the rigidity of both traditional family roles and Japan's punishing professional system" (Orenstein 2001). Young people in Japan, according to the critics, saw "their elders work their guts out for the company and then watched as, when the bubble burst in the early 90s, the company scrimped on their commitment to them, dumping many 'permanent' employees" (Pulvers 2010). These critics view the parasite-single phenomenon as a "symptom of their pessimism," which is not of their own making. Now, the youths say, "I want to live for myself and enjoy my life" rather than to be *ryosai kenbo* ("good wife and wise mother") or to "work for work's sake" (Orenstein 2001).

For working women, marriage and child-bearing will result in quitting their job, and when this happens, according to Orenstein (2001), "it's virtually impossible to re-enter the work force." One woman claims,

> Unless [politicians] create a society where women feel comfortable having children and working, Japan will be destroyed in a matter of 50 or 100 years. And child subsidies aren't going to do it. Only equality is. (Orenstein 2001)

Japan's population is aging more rapidly than any other on the planet--by 2015 one in four Japanese will be elderly (Orenstein 2001). By 2001, Japan's birthrate had sunk to 1.34 per woman, well below replacement levels, compared to 2.08 in the United States. If this trend continues, Japan's working population, which was 87 million in 1995, will have shrunk to 52 million by 2050 (*Asahi Shimbun* 2010).

Freeters and NEETs

Similar to the phenomenon of "parasite singles," other new terms and categories are emerging, such as NEET (Not in Education, Employment nor Training)[9] and freeter.[10] These capture the precarious condition of today's young people in contrast to the traditional dichotomy between the employed and the unemployed (Inui 2005, p. 244). The Japanese government defines "freeter" as "people of 15 to 34 years old who are not in education or keeping house and either work as temporary, part-time or dispatched workers from a temporary labor agency, or are jobless and want to work as temporary, part-time or dispatched workers" (*ibid*., pp. 246-47). The number of the freeters was estimated at about 2,090,000 in 2003. Only 14.9 percent of these chose to be freeter in the first place; the remaining 72.2 percent actually wanted a regular job.

"NEET" is defined as "people from 15 to 34 years old who are out of the labor force, single, not in education, and not keeping house" (*ibid.*, pp. 246-47). The number of NEETs was estimated at about 520,000 in 2003, an 8.3 percent increase from the

[9] The term NEET originated in the United Kingdom, where it describes recent school graduates aged 16–18 (Genda 2006).

[10] In Japan, "freeter" was a term introduced by an advertisement magazine in the late 1980s, combining "free lance" and "albeiter" (a slang that means part-time or periodical side job) (Inui 2005, p. 244). The term became popular as freeters increased even more in the 1990s.

previous year. They tend to come from less privileged backgrounds and to have a lower educational level (Ishiguro 2008). Genda (2006) categorizes the NEETs into two groups: "non-seeker NEETs" and "discouraged NEETs" (p. 5). Most of non-seeker NEETs experienced work at least once before exiting the labor force. Discouraged NEETs, who account for more than 80 percent of the NEETs, often suffer from physical and/or socio-psychological problems to varying extents. They may have withdrawn from society, lost contact with others, and become isolated at home for long periods. They are also called *hikikomori* ("shut-ins"), social victims of *ijime* ("bullying") who "develop their anti-social solution and establish it as a painful rent in the social fabric," hence illuminating "how scapegoating structures social existence in Japan" (Taylor 2006, p. 7).[11]

Some scholars attribute these phenomena of "freeter" and "NEET" (as well as "parasite singles") not only to Japan's stagnant economic condition but also to the resulting treatment of workers (or pre-workers) by corporations. They observe that it was the parents' generation who provided the core labor force for Japan's economic global reach, but now, the following generation has inherited a so-called "employment ice age" (Ohta *et al*. 2008, p. 57). Public opinions about this issue led by the media, however, tend to emphasize young people's work orientation itself rather than the macroeconomic condition and political and business leaders' reactions to it. In 2003, in line with this tendency, the Japanese government launched a new policy for youth, the Wakamono Jiritu Chosen Plan ("a plan for youth to pursue independence"), focused mainly improving young people's attitudes toward work (Inui 2005, p. 245).

[11] In 1985, *ijime* (bullying and teasing taking place in schools) surfaced as a much serious problem (Wolferen 1990, p. 91). Although conformism is highly appreciated in Japanese society, press commentators concluded that *ijime* as a means of promoting it could not be tolerated.

Karoshi

Much attention has also been given to the issue of *karoshi (*"death by overwork") in Japan. The term *karoshi* was first coined in Japan in the late 1970s (Iwasaki *et al*. 2006, p. 538), referring to "fatal incidence and associated work disability due to cardiovascular attacks such as strokes, myocardial infarction or acute cardiac failure which could occur on the basis of aggravating hypertensive or arteriosclerotic diseases, triggered by heavy workload" (see Budd 2006, p. 1). *Karoshi* includes death as well as permanent disability resulting from overwork, but excludes any damage caused by accidents, even if resulting from fatigue due to overwork (Iwasaki *et al*. 2006, p. 539).

Japan's heavy workload has many aspects: long working hours (more than 60 hours per week); excessive overtime (more than 50 hours per month); and working during holidays (more than half of their fixed holidays) (Budd 2006, p. 1). Work hour regulations in the Labour Standards Law mandate an 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek system since 1987, and an additional limitation was set on the amount of "overtime work" in 1998 (Iwasaki *et al*. 2006, p. 537). In 2001, nevertheless, 28.1 percent of employees in Japan worked for 50 or more hours per week, compared to their counterparts in the Netherlands (1.4%), Sweden (1.9%), Finland (4.5%), and Germany (5.3%).

After medical cases stimulated increased media attention, the government initiated a series of studies on *karoshi* in the late 1990s. One of its reports recognized 300 cases of brain or heart disease between 2002 and 2005 resulting from overwork, which eventually led to the enactment of a law requiring provision of health guidance for

overworked workers (Iwasaki *et al*. 2006, p. 537). Some lawyers and scholars estimate that the annual number of victims of *karoshi* is at least 8,000 (Budd 2006, p. 2).

Many researchers locate the cause of *karoshi* in the traditional Japanese value of self-sacrifice by members of a given group for their group interests. Budd (*ibid*., p. 4) observes that Japanese workers are fully committed to the advancement of the goals of their corporations often at the sacrifice of their private lives. Whether such value is followed voluntarily by workers, though, is not an easy judgment. The value involves membership, and the rejection of it can be taken as the rejection of the membership itself.

According to Budd (2006), a survey was conducted by a Japanese insurance company in order to assess whether attitudes among Japanese workers were changing.[12] When asked "Do you know any workers suffering from extreme work-related stress?" nearly half (46%) said "yes." When asked "What can be done to reduce work-related stress?" more than half of the respondents mentioned "their efforts" ("endure," 17%; "self-improvement," 44%) rather than "corporate reform" (39%). When asked "If your boss took more vacation, would you also take more vacation?" 71 percent said "yes." In short, many employees suffer from work-related stress, but most believe that it is workers themselves who should overcome the problem, rather than their companies.

Japan's High Suicide Rates

Among the G-7--the group of seven major economic powers--Japan has the highest suicide rate (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare [MHLW] of Japan 2010, p.

[12] The survey was administered to 200 Japanese fathers of high school students enrolled during the 2001-2002 school year in a given high school located in Nagoya, Japan (Budd 2006, p. 6). The school is private with a total enrollment of approximately 1,200 students. The response (continued…)

1).[13] Although historically already high, the rate jumped in 1998 from 15.2 suicides per 100,000 during the previous year to 20.4. This was during the time when the effects of the burst of the bubble economy were encroaching upon a large segment of the population. From that point on, more than 30,000 suicides are annually reported. In 2006, Japan's suicide rate, as calculated by OECD (2010), was 19.1 per 100,000, compared to that of Canada (10.2), France (14.2), Germany (9.1), Italy (4.8), the United Kingdom (6.1), and the United States (10.1). [14] According to MHLW (2010, p. 1), Japan is only country in the world whose highest cause of death for people aged 15-34 is suicide.

Men are more likely than women to commit suicide, but the gap between them increased further in the 2000s in Japan; since then, approximately two-thirds of suicides are committed by men (National Police Agency of Japan [NPAJ] 2010). The most extreme gender imbalance among suicides is seen in the age category of 50-59 in 2009, in which, 80 percent were male. In terms of occupation, about 50 percent of the suicides were committed by "jobless," followed by "salaried" (25%), "self-employed" (13%), "housewives or husbands" (8%), and "students or pupils" (2.5%). Presumably, the "jobless" included NEETs and freeters, as well as the ex-"salaried" and ex-"self-employed" who had lost their jobs in the prolonged recession.

According to NPAJ (2010), 47 percent of the suicides were assumed to be committed because of a "health problem," followed by "economic problem" (25%),

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rate was 50%.

[13] The 7 advanced countries or "Group of Seven" include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.

[14] As the definition of "suicide" varies, the rate calculated is not uniform across the institutions, such as the OECD and the World Health Organization (WHO).

"family issue" (12%), "workplace" (7%), and "love affair" (3%). The major factors that increase the risk of suicide include "depression," "joblessness," and "divorce or widowhood" (MHLW 2010, p. 8). By far the largest portion of those reporting a health problem is "depression." Joblessness makes a huge difference: jobless men aged 35-54 are 5 times more likely than working men of the same age to commit suicide (*ibid*., pp. 2-3). When jobless men become divorced or widowed, the suicide risk jumps to 20 times as high as that of working men living with their wives.

Public health experts blame "Japan's romanticized image of suicide as an honorable escape, going back to ritual self-disembowelment by medieval samurai, for the high suicide rate" (Fackler 2009). They argue that Japanese suicide today should not be interpreted as a samurai ritual or as altruistic to *wa*. Rather, it may be a harsh self-punishment by more than 30,000 people per year for not being included in *wa* as functional, rewarded members, or a manifestation of their *anomic* feeling to *wa*.

It should be noted that those who commit suicide are a tiny minority of the population and do not represent the Japanese or their character as a whole: they account for only 0.00027 percent of the population. Taking into account Japan's highly advanced economic standing (its GDP higher than any European countries'), however, Japan's suicide rate may indicate something. It does not seem purely personal but--to apply Durkheim's terms (1951, p. 145)--"must necessarily depend upon social causes and be in itself a collective phenomenon."

"New York" in Japanese Magazines, a Content Analysis

Media coverage brings lights not just to the surface of a given topic but more latently various aspects of organization and culture of the society that receives it. The same topic, therefore, can appear quite differently in different societies. In this section, I examine "New York" as portrayed in Japanese magazines. Whether the coverage is accurate is not important here; the focus is how that city is treated in it.

I collected magazine articles in May 2009 at a private library in Tokyo, Ohya Soichi Bunko, which is well known for its nearly exhaustive collection of Japanese magazines.[15] Using such keywords as "New York," "ニューヨーク," and "紐育," slightly more than 10,000 articles published after 1981 were obtained through a computer search at the library.[16] Not all were chiefly about the city; they included irrelevant topics such as "New York Stock Prices Collapse" (*W Diamond*, Nov. 7, 1987).[17] However, my objective was in part to obtain a rough indication of the changing numbers of articles about New York over time rather than the precise number of the articles. The primary purpose was to analyze the content of this corpus of articles, or how Japanese readers related themselves with New York in the last several decades.

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[15] The library collection includes almost all types, as long as they are sold at ordinary bookstores, such as consumer magazines, newsmagazines, sex magazines, opinion magazines, intellectual magazines, quality magazines, men's interest magazines, women's interest magazines, business magazines, fashion magazines, gossip magazines, and so forth.

It owns--besides approximately 70,000 books--690,000 issues of 10,000 magazines. Among those that are currently published, it holds 1,000 magazines. Annually, the number of issues increases by more than 10,000. The number of articles included in its computer-search index, which sets the time to be "after 1981" by default, is about 4,700,000. This also increases each year by 250,000. For more information, visit <http://www.oya-bunko.or.jp/>.

[16] "NY" was not included in the keywords for the search because the result would include "SONY," "CUNY," and the like."

[17] To avoid flooding the bibliography section with the magazine articles, their information (without their publishing companies' names) is placed in the text of this section only.

The library's computer system listed the articles with their magazine names, dates, and titles. I noted all those assumed to be directly relevant, read hard copies of eye-catching ones among them, photocopied the most interesting ones, and translated them into English. *Akogare*, or at least curious feelings, stood out as a major theme in the magazine articles that mainly covered New York. The articles can be categorized into four genres: (1) New York as an "adventure land"; (2) Japanese celebrities in New York as "pioneers"; (3) successful *shin-issei* in New York as "model adventurers"; and (4) trouble (or alienation) in New York as "anti- *akogare*."

Defining Akogare

To begin with, I define the tem *akogare*, a centrally important keyword not just for this section but for this dissertation as a whole. The term is used in many studies, but the author who most meticulously addresses its definition and thus is most often cited is probably Karen Kelsky (2001). Her study, *Women on the Verge*, was about Japanese women with much *akogare* for the West--although, curiously, Kelsky nowhere in her book uses the term *shin-issei*. According to her,

> To have akogare is to long for something that is *unattainable*. Akogare exemplifies the relations of teacher-student, dominant-subordinate that have characterized Western-Japanese interactions in the modern era: the West is the desired, always unattainable, Other. If denial of akogare is where most internationalist narratives end, it follows that akogare, acknowledged or not, is where they begin. (Kelsky 2001, p. 26; emphasis added)

This argument is appealing, but I disagree with one claim. The object of *akogare* is not unattainable but is actually quite attainable. I hence define *akogare* as a feeling of

being lured--just as Kelsky maintains--which grows from the perception of a superior character of the person/status/thing/institution/place being desired, alongside some feelings of inferiority towards the object of desire. Such feelings drive the subject to approach, and further to identify with, the object; the subject wants to be a part of the object desired.

The object of *akogare* can vary and can include people (e.g., celebrities), occupations (firefighter), consumer goods (iPads), institutions (prestigious schools), and places (New York). Many, if not all, objects are therefore attainable.

It is important to add that some people conceal *akogare* even when they are hooked on it, either because *akogare* implies a subjectively felt inferiority complex or humble feelings of the subject relative to the object, or because its attainability is so low that other people would laugh. As Kelsky rightly suggests, "akogare, *acknowledged or not*, is where they [narratives] begin" (2001, p. 26; emphasis added).

The Adventure Land

Many of the magazine articles obtained through the computer search straightforwardly played to readers' feeling of *akogare* for New York as an adventure land. This tendency, quite reminiscent of that in Meiji (see Chapter 1), was noticeable especially in magazines for young people. Unlike their counterparts in Meiji, though, many of today's readers are women. As Carlile (1996, p. 14) observes, "Whereas earlier the Japanese tourist market tended to be dominated by honeymooners and wealthier, older couples, a number of new types of new categories were in evidence--notably, female office workers." Not only tourism, but, more pertinent to this present study,

ryugaku (“studying abroad”) also grew as an industry targeting young people--including women as a majority.

The Japanese media fanned the trend on the socio-psychological level. Here are a few of the headlines from articles depicting New York as an “adventure land”:

> “Falling in Love with NY” (*an-an*, July 13,1984);
> “Manhattan Housing Situation” (*X-Men*, Nov. 1987);
> “The Days When I Was a *Chuzaiin* in NY” (*W Diamond*, Dec. 5, 1987);
> “Introduction to a Dual Life between NY and Japan” (*Suntory Quarterly*, June 1988);
> “Having a Checkbook, a Must in NY Life” (*Cosmopolitan Japan*, Mar. 1988);
> “NY, Not for Sightseeing But for Studying” (*W Myojo*, Apr. 6, 1989);
> “I Got My New Self in NY” (*Ef*, July 1989);
> “Career-up in NY: Japanese Women Wanted in U.S. Companies” (*Weeks*, Dec. 1989);
> “Your Dream to Work in NY Will Come True” (*Cosmopolitan Japan*, July 1997);
> “Remaking Myself in NY” (*Crea*, Apr. 1996);
> “Escaping Manhattan, Commuting from NJ” (*Nikkei Trendy*, June 1998);
> “The Pathway I Followed to Adventure in NY” (*an-an*, Oct. 9, 2002).

Articles discussed how to live or stay for a while, rather than travel, in New York; this became a trend in the “adventure-land” type of magazine articles owing to the bubble economy in the late 1980s. Some even mentioned such concrete matters as housing or a checkbook. Others focused on more abstract aspects. A theme oftentimes repeated in those articles is the “new self,” which it is suggested an adventurer will discover in New York. The youth showing interest in a “new self” may actually long for their own individual “ego,” which tends to be negated in Japan’s older social organization, *wa*.

The adventure-land genre also discusses challenges, such as seeing more of life or changing one's life. The below is an example, entitled "Be a Film Director Only in Two Months!":

> The biggest point to make for the "New York Film Academy" at Union Square, New York, is that you can direct some genuine 16-mm films of your own during the two-month lecture period. Some students make 4 of them. Here is how. You make a group with about 10 other students and take turn to help each other make films as either a crew member or the director. They are variety of people including Mexicans, Spanish, and so forth. You will learn how to communicate with them, too. (*Cosmopolitan Japan*, June 1997)

To the ordinary Japanese reader, living in the United States may still sound somewhat daring and costly, but it is no longer unthinkable or utterly reckless. The same magazine article (*Cosmopolitan Japan*, June 1997) publicizes other schools in New York that welcome adventurers, including the "New York School of Dog Grooming," which can be finished in five weeks; "Steps on Broadway," which offers a scholarship audition each month for those who want to become professional; and the "International Center of Photography," whose lectures are held with professional level equipment.

The Pioneers

A majority of the magazine articles on New York fall into the celebrity type. They highlight the private lives of Japanese celebrities who regularly spend some time in New York. Their appearances in the media are assumed to have drawn masses of Japanese to New York, or more broadly to the United States. Of course, not every *shin-*



Figure 4.1. Japanese Magazine Articles on "New York," 1981-2008

Source: Ohya Soichi Bunko; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009.

Note: The number of the *shin-issei* in the U.S. is placed on the right, and the number of Japanese magazine articles on "New York" is on the left.

issei is interested in them; many indeed refuse to be connected to them in their motives to live in the United States.

The very first pioneer celebrities were a couple of Japanese singers who grabbed the heart of the Japanese audience not only with their songs but with their private lives, namely, their romantic relationship with each other. In a few years, though, they suddenly broke up. One of them, Hiromi Go, soon married the daughter of a famous Japanese actor, and then moved to New York. The other, Seiko Matsuda, also married, and she also moved to New York. The anxious, jealous attention of the Japanese masses has thereafter been nailed to their private stories.

Hiromi Go moved to New York in 1987 with his wife, Yurie, and stayed for two years. Seiko Matsuda moved to New York in 1988. The volume of magazine coverage of New York related to their private stories jumped in these years (figure 4.1 above). Their headlines include:

"Hiromi-Yurie, NY life" (*W Josei*, June 28, 1988);
"Re-importing Hiromi Go from NY" (*Josei Jishin*, July 12, 1988);
"Seiko Matsuda's NY diary" (*Sunday Mainichi*, Nov. 27, 1988);
"Seiko cheating in NY" (*Josei Seven*, Feb. 21, 1989);
"The dentist office in NY that reconnects Go and Seiko" (*W Asahi*, Nov. 14, 2008).

Moving to and fro between the United States and Japan, these two Japanese singers remarkably changed the image of living in the United States. They have, as it were, warmed up the place for potential adventurers to move to, a place which otherwise would have looked foreign to ordinary Japanese--though popular all the time. By overlapping their images with New York City, at the same time, the quality of their popularity seemed to be upgraded to a different dimension. Many other Japanese celebrities soon followed their paths to New York life in the 1990s and further induced more adventurers embarking on their own new self.

In 1995, it was Hideo Nomo, a Japanese baseball pitcher, who drew almost the entire Japanese societal attention to the United States, or to the MLB (Major League Baseball). That year, he became the first native Japanese to play in the American major leagues in three decades. He was then selected to start the All-Star Game, and in the end of the season became the National League rookie of the year. Here are some headlines

from the Japanese magazine articles covering his first year in the MLB, changing their tone with time from that of the nervous concern to triumphant elation:

> "Nomo's challenge for the MLB--gamble" (*Shincho*, Jan. 12, 1995);
> "The die is cast--Nomo goes to the MLB (*Bunshun*, Jan. 1995);
> "Akogare MLB!" (*Flash*, Jan. 24, 1995);
> "Nomo, a baseball friction between Japan and the U.S.?" (*Asahi*, Jan. 26, 1995);
> "Oh, this is MLB! Can't get excited more!" (*W Bunshun*, June 29, 1995);
> "Nomo in All-Star Game!" (*Friday*, July 21, 1995).

Nomo's very first game against the New York Mets was reported in *The New York Times* with much curiosity and expectation displayed in its headline: "On Baseball; Nomo Breaths Life into America's Game" (Smith 1995). Not only was Nomo's pitching style--called "the Tornado"--new to the MLB, but the large Japanese audience that followed him to the stadium was also unprecedented. The article read:

> "It's funny, but we've never had many Asian fans," said Joe McIlvaine, the Mets' general manager. "We had a lot tonight. And it's great for baseball." And Nomo is turning heads not only on both coasts but across the Pacific, as the presence of more than 100 Japanese reporters at last night's game shows. (Smith 1995)

Besides the fact that this Japanese pitcher was now a major leaguer, the way the U.S. media covered him became an essentially important part of the "Nomo fever" in Japan. The Japanese media reported not just on how Nomo performed in his games but even more fervently the way he was depicted by the U.S. media, and this very effectively tickled the psychology of the Japanese audience. Nomo's challenge for the major

leagues, initially considered a gamble, turned out to be a dream-come-true success that was spotlessly endorsed by the West.

When asked "who's next?" (*Sunday Mainichi*, Aug. 6, 1995), many Japanese players began raising their hands, officially or unofficially. As they face various restraints based on their contracts and agreements, they cannot simply move from one team to another only on their own wishes. Still, following Nomo's example, one player after another, cleared such hurdles and joined the phenomenon of the Japanese major leaguers. The waves of their exodus explain in part the ups and downs of the volume of the magazine articles on New York shown in figure 4.1 above. Such waves include Hideki Irabu (NY Yankees in 1997), Tsuyoshi Shinjo (NY Mets in 2001), Ichiro Suzuki (Seattle Mariners in 2001), Hideki Matsui (NY Yankees in 2003), Kaz Matsui (NY Mets in 2004), and Daisuke Matsuzaka (Boston Red Sox in 2007), to name a few.

It is important to note that their motives to move to the MLB are not based on money. Quite the contrary; in most cases, these players took a "significant financial risk in joining the MLB ranks" (Kuehnert 2003). Ichiro Suzuki, for example, who earned Japan's highest pro baseball salary of about $5.5 million (in 2000), signed with the Seattle Mariners for $14 million for three years (or $4.67 million a year). At the time, his move to Seattle was actually a near million-dollar step down in terms of annual salary.

"The Japanese players know a lot about Major League Baseball," according to *The Japan Times* (Kuehnert 2003),

> and that's what they want. Ichiro told me [sports writer Marty Kuehnert] before the 2001 All-Star Game in Seattle what he liked most about baseball on that side of the ocean was, "We are treated as adults here, not as children (as we are in Japan)." (Kuehnert 2003)

Apparently related to Ichiro's comment here, Robert Whiting (1990) in his *You Gotta Have Wa* points out the notion of *wa* and suggests:

> If you asked a Japanese manager what he considers the most important ingredient of a winning team, he would likely answer *wa*. If you asked him how to knock a team's *wa* awry, he would probably say, "Hire an American." (Whiting 1990, p. 78)

Since baseball was introduced in Japan in Meiji, according to Whiting *et al*. (1991, p. 5), its most important doctrines for the players include loyalty to the team, obedience to the manager, self-sacrifice, and hard training. American players are appalled by Japanese players who do not complain at all about "practicing twice as hard, being ordered sacrifice bunt three times as often, and getting wages as low as a quarter of American players" (*ibid*., p. 7). Before he left for the MLB, according to Kuehnert (2003), "Nomo bucked an oppressive manager and system and basically said, 'I quit, so give me my unconditional release.'" Nomo may have also been the one who sought his own new self, which had been oppressed in *wa*. Many other players have been following his example not only in playing baseball but, arguably, in finding a new self.

The Model Adventurers

Not every pioneer is a celebrity or superstar, for sure. Success stories of ordinary Japanese, taking advantage of the allegedly freer environment of New York, are also covered in magazine articles on New York. They can be considered model adventurers for prospective *shin-issei* to follow. Below is a typical article found in a magazine that is very fashionable and popular among young people in Japan. The 12-page article intrigues with its lead:

> New York is the city around which talents in various genres gather from all over the world. From Japan, too, of course. We introduce 28 of them this time. From Japan, *via* New York, and to the world! (*Harper's BAZAAR Japan*, May 2001)

Displaying the picture of each one of the 28 *shin-issei*, it briefly introduces their jobs and describes the personal histories that led them to their New York life. Their jobs, unmistakably evoking *akogare*, include:

> illustrator, photographer, music producer, film analysis, fashion model, dancer, graphic designer, merchandiser, fashion designer, fashion stylist, hair stylist, make-up artist, chef, math teacher, accountant, art therapist, internet consulting, massage therapist, and jewelry designer…

To introduce a couple of the personal histories:

— Hiroshi Tanabe, 34, graduated from Tama Art School in 1990. He came to NY two years later. His clients for his illustration include "*New York Times Magazine*," *NOVA*," "*Harper's BAZAAR*," etc. "NY is good. You can live at your own pace."
— Miho Aoki is a fashion designer who has lived in NY for 10 years. She came to NY when she was a high school student, and then attended Fashion Institute of Technology. In 1996, she and her partner established their own designer's office. "I consider business first rather than my own favorite fashion, so we survive…"

Stirring up *akogare* this much, though, the article never explains how these Japanese managed to get a visa that permits them to take such jobs. This article is not unique on this matter; magazine articles of the model-adventure genre usually pay no attention to the visa issue--and this may cause seemingly unfavorable trajectories by young adventurers sometimes called "rootless wanderers" or "adrift youths."

Also included in the model-adventure genre of magazine articles on New York is Japanese culture, which according to these articles garners flattering attention from New Yorkers. The essence of these articles is similar to that of the nationalist version of *Nihonjinron* discussed previously. The below are a few examples.

"MANGA, New Yorkers jump at" (*Denim*, Dec. 1993);
"Sushi boom too extreme yields the robot sushi chef in NY" (*W Diamond*, Jan. 21, 1994);
"'God Wind' (Kamikaze) performed in NY" (*W Bunshun*, May 25, 1995);
"Long hit? Pokemon in NY" (*Nikkei Trendy*, Feb. 2000);
"The Kabuki tornado struck NY" (*Josei Seven*, Nov. 11, 2003);
"Japanese food boom in NY" (*Brutus*, Dec. 15, 2003);
"Is 'kawaii' [cute] English yet?" (*Mono Magazine*, August 2, 2008).

As the boundary between the nationalist version of *Nihonjinron* and *kokusaika* blurs, the nature of *akogare* becomes complicated. It can be directed toward a simple internationalism itself or an internationalism based, more rhetorically, on nationalism. As was the case among the pioneer non-labor migrants in Meiji, some people today emigrate as a challenge to a blind attachment to Japan's past, while others do so as a reconfirmation of Japan's superior culture endorsed in the West (see Chapter 1).

Anti-Akogare

In the computer search of the Ohya Soich Bunko library, the combination of the keywords, テロ ("terrorism") and ニューヨーク ("New York"), gathered 128 magazine articles between September 2001 and January 2002. For the same period, by contrast, the combination of the keywords, "*akogare*" (あこがれ, アコガレ, or 憧れ) and "New York," gathered only 40 articles. Although the Japanese public heavily sympathized with New

York for being attacked by terrorists, the 9/11 events seem to have quickly reduced the feeling of *akogare*. The following headlines exemplify this sudden shift.

> "The day NY became Beirut" (*W Asahi*, Sept. 28, 2001);
> "The longest day in NY. WWIII?" (*W Yomiuri*, Sept. 30, 2001);
> "The bloody clash between the civilizations" (*For Site*, Oct. 3, 2001);
> "NY, dying. Terrorism, anthrax: people, job, money leaving" (*W Gendai*, Nov. 24, 2001);
> "Sigh! Japanese tourists, the richest guests, in NY declined by 90%" (*W Diamond*, Feb. 2, 2002).

By 2002, however, some articles returned to reporting New York in a more supportive fashion, such as "The firefighters, heroes in NY" (*Ef*, Jan. 2002), "NY, yet a powerful city after the terrorism" (*Spa!*, Jan. 9, 2002), and "Japanese tourists coming back to NY" (*Nikkei Business*, Mar. 18, 2002).

The 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 were by no means the first events that resulted in some anti-*akogare* articles in Japanese magazines. Violence, drugs, robberies, and AIDS have repeatedly been used in the anti-*akogare* type of coverage. Especially, when such negatives involve Japanese visitors, these articles effectively evoke the readers' anxiety, as shown below:

> "Japanese female NYU student shot" (*Sunday Mainichi*, Mat 28, 1989);
> "500 Japanese female students in NY got AIDS" (*Bisho*, Aug. 29, 1992);
> "The most dangerous job in NY--'yellow cab'" (*M Kadokawa*, March 1994);
> "Why was the Japanese school in NY targeted by arsonists?" (*W Asahi*, Apr. 7, 2006).

The "yellow cab" referred to in the third headline above is not a New York taxi, but is a pejorative label used for Japanese women who "let anyone take a ride easily"

(Ieda 1991, p. 1)--which will be discussed in the next chapter. This "yellow cab" and the Japanese female students' AIDS can be seen as directly pertinent to the notion of Japan's shame. The tone of these is condemnatory, or cynical, about the unfavorable aspects of New York and, no less importantly, about Japanese adventurers' carelessness.

Some articles of the "anti-*akogare*" type make fun of the negative aspects of New York. One entitled "No Divorce, No Grown-up" (*Hoseki*. Aug. 5, 1988), for example, wrote: "New Yorkers take it for granted that if you haven't experienced a divorce, you are not yet grown up." Another describes a group of camera thieves in New York with a comical touch. Entitled "Our 'NY manic story': NY is not just for girls!" (*Playboy*, Dec. 13, 1988. Dec), it writes, "When I went to NY…"

> I took a walk in Central Park. I thought the daytime would be okay. But all of the sudden, two guys came up, saying "Hey man." One of them had a knife in his hand and the other, scissors. They cut off the belt of my camera hanging from my neck. Then, they asked, 'How much?' Practically, they were asking me to buy the camera, which had been mine seconds ago. I said, '$100.' They said, "OK, man." I gave them 100 dollars and got my camera back. My camera was actually 800 dollars, for which I paid only 100. Good, right?

Typically, these types of articles are found in men's magazines whose readers seem to have little chance or motive for overseas adventure. Although its title "NY is not just for girls!" is fringed with some envious tone, its content makes fun of those who earnestly share the feeling of *akogare* for New York. This superior attitude, conversely, might provide a glimpse of some ashamed feeling for "girls" (or "yellow cabs") following American men in seemingly unprincipled manner, or, more broadly, of an irritated feeling toward Japanese youths placing their identity below the West.

Ch. 5. Previous Studies

Some of the *shin-issei* leave Japan by their own "desire/choice" while others do so based on "obligation/need." The former *(*"desire/choice") typically share the feeling of *akogare* for the West in their motivations to leave. Of them, some try to find pathways to a legal permanent resident (LPR) status. As noted earlier, however, their initial desire/choice alone is insufficient to determine their final destination (see Chapter 3). Rather, many are driven by circumstances to quit their adventure in their dreamed "adventure land," which, in reality, tends to remain foreign to them in many important aspects (e.g., cultural grammar and visa).

The majority of the adventurers in the latter category ("obligation/need") are *chuzaiin*, i.e., business people, predominantly male, assigned to their companies' branches overseas (Isa 2000). Their assignment is temporary, usually for four to five years. Conversely to the desire/choice adventurers, the temporariness of their assignment does not mean that they never get lost overseas. If they find the host country "pulling" and experience Japan "pushing," some venture to switch the basis of their status from "obligation/need" to "desire/choice." Typically, they either seek a job at another company in the host country (Hechanova *et al*. 2003, p. 214) or begin their own businesses there (Hosler 1998, p. 63).

This chapter presents a literature review on the *shin-issei*, i.e., any native Japanese living in the United States as U.S. citizens (grown in Japan), LPRs, LTVs, or illegal overstayers. It consists of four sections: (1) the *chuzaiin*, (2) the *ryugakusei* ("students studying abroad"), (3) entrepreneurs, and (4) "internationalists," or "wanderers." In all,

more than 380,000 of these individuals are experiencing their adventures in the United States today, making decisions one after another, taking opportunities, and following chances. Of them, the ones who most firmly remain tied to Japanese society and culture during their journey are the *chuzaiin*, who (including their families) account for a third of the whole *shin-issei* population.

The Chuzaiin

The *chuzaiin* are often said to be--and some of them even call themselves--a new type of *dekasegi* ("sojourners for temporary jobs") working in a place distant from their home. However, they essentially differ from *dekasegi*. The *dekasegi* (coming mostly from farming class) were pushed by the economic hardship from their home villages in Meiji, while the *chuzaiin* (middle or upper class) are representatives of postwar Japan's "economic miracle" (e.g., Forsberg 2000). Recall that daily wages of farm laborers in Meiji Japan were an average of only "sixteen cents," compared to "two dollars" in America in the same era (see in Chapter 1). In sharp contrast, the *chuzaiin* sent to the United States in the late 1980s earned more than twice the average incomes of European counterparts (Hosler 1998, p. 52).

As a symbol of their global reach, major Japanese corporations (e.g., Sony, Fuji, and TDK) began placing their giant neon signs in Times Square, New York, in the 1970s, "perhaps the best location in the United States" (Kusumoto 1991). Jobs generated for Americans by these companies were appreciated, but this development on the other hand led the U.S. media to warily refer to Japan's economic "invasion" (e.g., Sullivan 1992). "Planeloads of Japanese carrying suit cases of money spread fear and greed around the

Pacific rim," snapping up "icons of the capitalist world such as Columbia Pictures, the Rockefeller Center and CBS Records" (McCormack 1998, p. 31). The "invasion" fed a resentment which exploded in acts known as "Japan bashing" such as the "smashing of a Japanese VCR in Congress in 1987," and led some to declare that it was time to play "hard ball" with Japan (*ibid*.). [1]

Viewed as hostile agents of an "invasion," the *chuzaiin* were placed in an uncomfortable situation. In no time, though, their products made "deep inroads into American culture," including Sony Playstation, Nintendo, Pokemon, and hello Kitty (McGray 2002, p. 46). With a very different cultural background from Americans', yet, the *chuzaiin* and their families tended to act clumsily in such ambivalent situations. Although some Japanese themselves say that most "young people [in New York] have no culture shock… [because they] study English, they are exposed to music, they get MTV and everything in Japan" (Steinhauer 1994), studies of contemporary Japanese migrants indicate starkly different realities (e.g., Ishitoya 1991; Okada 1993).

This section explores and discusses such realities the *chuzaiin* commonly face during their overseas adventure. Publicly, they are perfectly willing to go, following their employer's instructions (Emmott 1992, p. 66). Privately, most are somewhat worried about leaving Japan. Their concerns include: (1) their own business performance as managers, (2) their wives' probable difficulties in the new environment, and (3) their

[1] The term "Japan bashing" was coined by Robert Angel, an American lobbyist for the Japan Economic Institute in Washington, to invoke the idea of "Japan as victim" (see O'Connor 2001, p. 9).

Besides lobbyists like Angel, there is a circle of non-Japanese writers known as the Chrysanthemum Club (Smith 1998, p. 22). It is supported by Japanese institutions (*ibid*., p. 34). There is a Mitsubishi chair of law at Harvard and a Toyota chair of anthropology at the University of Michigan, among numerous other endowments like them.

children's education remote from Japan. Anxious about these matters, their assignment, though temporary, is not easy for most of them. Their pressing question is not how to integrate into the host society, but rather how to maintain ties with Japan during their assignment in the United States. As Sullivan (1992, p. 237) observes, the *chuzaiin* tend to "live in enclaves, send their children to their own schools, and party among themselves."

Even so, as "modern equivalents of Marco Polo," the presence of the *chuzaiin* today connects the two "strange worlds," at least economically (Emmott 1992, p. 66). An official trip to Tokyo made by New York Mayor Dinkins in 1993 illustrates the importance of the roles they play in our globalized era. The primary purpose of his trip was, Mr. Dinkins said, "to reinforce to our friends in Japan their vital presence in our city, and let them know how they are helping us fulfill our economic vision" (Sanger 1993). About 150 Japanese businesses kept their American headquarters in New York at the time. The Mayor glad-handed politicians and senior business executives, "gamely pretending that he liked sushi and bowing slightly as he passed out business cards with his name properly printed in the Japanese phonetic alphabet." As actors on our globalized stages, this new model of international migrants shapes, and is in turn shaped by, the character of their host societies, in ways quite different from the classically theorized patterns.

Their Performance in the United States

In 1990, the Japan External Trade Organization counted a total of 9,560 Japanese-affiliated companies with operations only in the United States and Canada (Emmott 1992, p. 5). Though momentarily fluctuating from 98,000 in 1989 (the positive effect of the

bubble economy) to 38,000 in 1991 (its burst), the number of *chuzaiin* in the United States has been more or less than 50,000 in the last two decades (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009). Including their families, it was approximately 128,000 in 2007 (*ibid*.), about the same as that of the entire prewar Japanese community on the U.S. mainland (see Thomas *et al*. 1969 [1946], p. 27). Unlike the prewar migrants, though, the size of the *chuzaiin* population has been maintained by steady circulation. That is, as one family leaves, another fills that position. This means that the number of Japanese who have lived in the United States as *chuzaiin* or their families is increasing every four or five years by more than 100,000, and so is the number of Japanese children born in the United States (Okada 1993). So far, however, "there is almost no literature on these [*chuzaiin*] families" (Abe 2005, p. 2).

During the 1970s, many early *chuzaiin* in New York lived in Queens (Okada 1993, p. 5). By the 1980s, as their companies had taken root in the United States, they (or their successors) began moving to suburban areas seeking a better living environment. Their companies basically pay their rent as a necessary expense. Currently, their residential areas include Manhattan, Westchester, Bergen County (New Jersey), and Fairfield County (Connecticut). The New York Japanese School was founded in Queens specifically for their children in 1976, and it moved to Greenwich in Connecticut in 1992, renamed as the Greenwich Japanese School.

New York City's living prices, though expensive to most Americans, were cheap to the *chuzaiin*. On overall average, the cost of living was 28 percent lower than in Japan (Sullivan 1992, p. 64). Food cost 30 percent less, cars 19 percent less, and housing 46 percent less. This relative cost of living difference remains more or less the same today.

Tokyo has been placed the world's most expensive city since the 1980s, and New York, about 10th (e.g., Brooke 2003). What additionally made the *chuzaiin* become like "Gulliver" in terms of expenditure in the United States was their high incomes, about twice those of their European counterparts' in the late 1980s on average.

Japan's economic growth is not without its downside, however. Among other things, Japanese families have been called "fatherless" because of fathers' overtime work (Ishii-Kuntz 1999, p. 37-38), which includes socializing with bosses and clients after working hours (Abe 2005, p. 1). It is not unusual for fathers to return home at 11 P.M. (Isa 2000, p. 31). On weekends, some are often roped in to play *settai* ("business entertainment") golf with their business clients (Okada 1993, p. 175).

Another job arrangement that makes a family even more fatherless is called *tanshin-funin* ("leaving one's family behind when assigned to a new workplace") (see Goodman 1990, p. 20). The father leaves his family behind for *tanshin-funin*, and his wife accepts it as a social norm, or as *shikata ga nai* ("it can't be helped"). The aforementioned traditional distance between husbands and wives (see Chapter 2), especially after they become parents (Yasuike 2005), seems to normalize such an arrangement. In the case of *tanshin-funin* within Japan, the father returns to his home once a week at best, depending on the distance between his workplace and his home and his level of busy-ness. If located overseas, it might be once or twice a year.

"But *tanshin-funin* are extremely rare" in developed countries such as "the USA, Britain and Europe," according to Emmott (1992, p. 68). Goodman (1990, p. 22) suggests that a number of factors determine whether the *chuzaiin* choose *tanshin-funin* or bring their families with them. First, if they are posted to a developing country, most of

them prefer not to take their children. Second, girls are more likely than boys to be taken overseas. Third, even if they go with their families, they tend to switch to *tanshin-funin* when their children pass a certain age, for two major reasons: the preparation for the entrance exam for high school or college in Japan and the development of their children's social and cultural identity as Japanese. Their children, if any, are likely to be younger than middle school students during their assignment; over 80 percent of the *chuzaiin* are in the age-band 36 to 45, and nearly 80 percent of their wives are 31 to 40 (*ibid*.).

According to Abe (2004, p. 44), *chuzaiin* families tend to remain "fatherless" to a lesser extent in the United States than in Japan. More than two thirds of *chuzaiin* participants in her study (17 out of 24 fathers) said they tried to spend more time with their families in the United States.[2] Abe points to several factors that enable them to do so. First, commuting time is much shorter in the United States than in Japan, where it is not unusual to commute two hours each way because housing prices in the central cities are unaffordable. Second, following American parental norms, *chuzaiin* parents take turns transporting their children to and from school, which is quite unusual in Japan. Third, they can leave their workplace much earlier in the evening in the United States than in Japan. These factors, however, do not alter every father's orientations toward his job and family relations; about one third of *chuzaiin* participants in Abe's (*ibid*.) study said they still maintained such traditional self-images and orientations as "company men," "being work-oriented," and "prioritizing work over family."

[2] Abe's (2005) research is a qualitative study involving in-depth interviews with 24 Japanese fathers who grew up in Japan and lived in the United States for business. Many of her participants were recruited through the Georgia Japanese Language School.

Being fatherless in a foreign country is more painful to family members than in Japan. One of the *chuzaiin* says, "I don't like to play golf in Los Angeles, but we received many visitors from Japan…" (Sullivan 1992, pp. 65-66) During all of this time, his wife, who could not drive a car, was on her own. "For the first two years," he says, "she watched television all day and couldn't understand a word." According to Okada (1993, pp. 174-75), there is a home-stay exchange program annually held for three days and two nights between middle school students from a Japanese school in New York and a nearby American school. It is not unusual that for a lunch-time party, all American family members come to the Japanese host family, but the father of the Japanese family is missing for a job obligation such as *settai* golf with his business clients.

According to Sullivan (1992), Japanese managers are more concerned about "status and power" than Americans are (p. 76). Being often roped in to play *settai* golf as a part of their job may reflect this tendency. More directly related to workplace, Sullivan observes, many Japanese firms in America are rather clumsily managed (*ibid*., p. 6). For example, before they knew better,

> Japanese executives wanted senior Americans to punch a time clock in their Japanese-owned Wall Street securities firm. In an Ohio factory the Japanese forbade Americans to chew gum. Japanese owners of a New England ball bearing plant removed chairs from the factory floor so workers could not sit down. At several Japanese factories employees are only allowed to go to the bathroom on their breaks. (Sullivan 1992, p. 6)

Analogizing the deep-seated chasm between the two cultures, an ex-*chuzaiin* says, "Japan is like a group of people on a train. Everyone goes in the same direction. The train cannot stop for one person. In the United States you travel by automobile, and when

you want to stop, you stop--very individualistic" (*ibid*., p. 66). This seems appealing in terms of control by the group. In terms of protection by the group, however, it should be pointed out that after the bubble economy burst in the early 1990s, Japanese companies have given up the system of "lifetime employment,"[3] and leave many in a prolonged "employment ice age" (see Chapter 4). In terms of family life, more basically to the society's character, the "train" has hardly been scheduled for wives and children throughout the industrialized era, customarily leaving Japanese families fatherless. Likening Japan to "a group of people on a train" may be a penetrating aphorism to portray those people *on* that; to the extent that it disregards what is happening *behind* that, though, it is misleading.

Their Wives in the New Environment

English is the only foreign language that is required to be learned in Japanese schools; however, the level of fluency in English among Japanese is roughly equivalent to that in French among Britons or Americans, that is, "pitiful" (Emmott 1992, p. 65).[4] This problem with the English language is shared among *shin-issei* as well, including *chuzaiin* wives. Some attribute the problem of poor English skills to a lack of motivation. More specifically, the increasing number of Japanese LTVs led to the growth of "Japan Towns" around the world during the 1980s, and individuals tied to

[3] Kambayashi *et al*. (2009, p. 1) define the practice of "lifetime employment" as "implicit long-term employment contract that ends at mandatory retirement for the regular workforce."

[4] The Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL)--"designed to measure the English language proficiency of people whose native language is not English"--shows that Japan's average score has each time been one of the worst among Asian countries (e.g., 484 for Paper-Based Test in 2002-03, compared to South Korea's 530, China's 559, and India's 566) (TOEFL 2002-03).

Japan Towns focus on maintaining their Japanese identity rather than assimilating into their host society (Goodman 1990, p. 38). Observing this, people in the host society describe Japanese expatriates as "insular and non-communicative" (Arnault 2002, p. 295).

Two things, at least, should be noted. First, many *chuzaiin* wives are actually distressed that they cannot speak well with Americans, or sometimes cannot take messages over the phone (*ibid*., p. 299). They encounter the need for English skills on many occasions. For example, the apartment manager may call them to talk about repairing "something," or their children's schoolteacher may call.

Second, being insular in Japan Town is not simply a product of personal disposition; it is shaped to a great extent through institutional arrangements. According to Arnault's (*ibid*., pp. 298-99) study--based on semi-structured interviews with 25 *chuzaiin* wives in the United States--*chuzaiin* wives are organized by their husbands' companies into support groups. The wife of a company boss heads each of these groups. When *chuzaiin* wives face situations where they need help, they seek it mostly from within their respective support group. Yasuike (2005, p. 79) observes, similarly, that the social circles of *chuzaiin* wives are exclusively formed around associations with their husbands' corporations, keeping a distance from the outside world, i.e., the host society.[5] Japanese transnational corporations are concerned about maintaining positive images in in their host countries, and accordingly they remind *chuzaiin* wives that their actions will reflect upon the reputations of their husbands' companies (*ibid*., p. 186).

[5] Yasuike's (2005) data-collection process involved in-depth interviews with 21 *chuzaiin* wives and 10 *shin-issei* couples and ethnographic observation, conducted between 1998 and 2002 in Southern California (p. 58).

Such support groups or social circles create village-like environments (Yasuike (2005, p. 188) where the wives do not have to speak English. Instead, they need to be careful about the "cultural rules governing reciprocity" in "help seeking and social support" (Arnault 2002, p. 295). Their attention in everyday life thereby tends to be preoccupied with the inside rather than the outside. Two opposing dynamics are central in Japanese social interactions: intimacy (*amae*) (*cf.* Doi 1973) and hierarchy (*enryo*). Even within their support groups, wives do not freely communicate with each other for help or for fun, but instead are supposed to strictly follow the cultural rules. Women who fail to conform to the expected behavior incur bad reputations and become the targets of gossip (Yasuike 2005, p. 187). An ex-*chuzaiin* wife, who *misbehaved* without realizing that, recalled, "They secretly spoke ill of me. When I heard it from my friends, I was really shocked" (Isa 2000, p. 31).

Some consider such rules *mendokusai* ("constraining" or "tiresome") while others value them as *bitoku* ("virtue") with which to maintain the Japaneseness of their social life. Muttering *shikata ga nai* to themselves, after all, the former cannot but follow the rules of *bitoku*; participation in support groups or social circles is mandatory (Yasuike 2005, p. 191). According to Berry (2005, p. 700), "acculturation can be 'reactive'… rejecting the cultural influence from the dominant group and changing back towards a more 'traditional' way of life, rather than inevitably towards greater similarity with the dominant culture." In light of this observation, the institutional arrangements of social circles creating a social haven appear to defend a traditional way of life against the influence from the host culture.

Living abroad for some years, however, can expose migrants to new cultural horizons (Isa 2000, pp. 34-36). In particular, it may shift some *chuzaiin* wives' attitudes toward the cultural rules from *bitoku* to *mendokusai*. As *chuzaiin* wives tend to have more free time during their U.S. sojourn than in Japan, some learn about American voluntarism by participating in activities at various institutions including their children's school (*ibid.*). Such activities enable them to make new friends and to learn about American cultural traits through more candid and less *mendokusai* interactions. They may find women acting differently in the United States. Their acculturation, then, may be pulled towards greater similarity with the host culture. When they find themselves interacting with people of the host society more freely than before, however, it may be time for them to watch their own reputations within their support groups (Yasuike 2005, pp. 201-02), as well as their husbands'.

One of the most important roles *chuzaiin* wives are expected to play throughout the U.S. sojourn period is preparing for the return to Japan. Concerns commonly shared among them include: children's education in Japan, their entrance exams, bullying, friends' and relatives' lack of understanding of their intercultural experiences, and reentry shock (Isa 2000, p. 28). Upon reentry, some *chuzaiin* wives rediscover the difference between Japanese and American societies; most noticeably to them, the former is based on hierarchical structures and the latter, on more egalitarian relationships. When they carelessly talk to others about the *mendokusai* aspects of Japanese society in order to win their sympathy, there may be negative reactions; doing so tends to be considered *gaikoku-boke* ("demented from living overseas") (Goodman 1990, p. 64). The ill-treatment of returnees includes ostracism and rejection or, alternatively, cruel taunting about their

overseas experiences (*ibid*., p. 56). Their young children, who are likely to be less clear than their parents about hierarchical or egalitarian issues, tend to face more perplexing situations both in the United States and in Japan.

Their Children's Education

Away from Japan, a major concern for *chuzaiin* families during their overseas journey is their children's education. There are several types of educational institutions that Japanese children overseas attend. They include: full-time Japanese schools (*Nihonjingakko*), public or private local schools (*genchiko*), international schools (*kokusai-gakko*), supplementary Japanese schools (*hoshuko*), and cramming schools (*juku*) (Goodman 1990, p. 24; Okada 1993, p. 5). Although *Nihonjingakko* are normally set up as private schools, they receive considerable support--at least 50 percent of their budget--from the Ministry of Education of Japan (Goodman 1990, p. 31). In 2010, 88 *Nihonjingakko* ran overseas (Ministry of Education of Japan 2010). Most were located in developing countries while only 4 were in the United States.

In developed countries, such as the United States, most *chuzaiin* families choose local schools so their children can learn Western languages and cultures (Okada1993, p. 5). Only 2 percent of Japanese children in North America attend *Nihonjingakko* (Ministry of Education of Japan 2010). In developing countries, by contrast, many more children attend *Nihonjingakko*: 60 percent in Asia; 46 percent in the Middle East; 38 percent in Central and South America; and 16 percent in Africa. Children in developing countries who do not go to *Nihonjingakko* attend international schools dating from the colonial period, with lessons taught in English or French (Goodman 1990, pp. 34-35). In developing countries, children have very little contact with local communities. Like their

mothers, they socialize mostly within small, closed *chuzaiin* communities (Yasuike 2005, p. 176).

The unsociable attitudes of Japanese toward developing countries or non-white people stem not just from *chuzaiin* associations overseas but from the country as a whole. Most visibly, Japan's political leaders have repeatedly made offensive remarks about the non-Japanese minorities of other countries with no apparent political aim in doing so. When officially rebuked, they apologize each time. In 1986, for example, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said that blacks and other minorities had lower intelligence levels than other Americans (see, e.g., Sanger 1992). In 1988, Michio Watanabe, soon to become Foreign Minister, said that blacks used credit cards irresponsibly, spending themselves into bankruptcy. In 1990, during a sweep of a Tokyo red-light district, Justice Minister Seiroku Kajiyama compared foreign prostitutes to American blacks who, he said, destroyed good neighborhoods. In an interview, an American sociologist doing research in Japan critically commented, "There is a very high acceptance of discrimination in Japan… They [the old politicians] don't realize this is out of bounds" elsewhere (AP 1990).

Japanese children overseas get into trouble every time Japanese leaders make these types of gaffes (Okada 1993, p. 63). Even worse is when some Japanese children overseas do or say things that are considered out of bounds in the host society. A teacher recounted with some shock, for example, how occasionally a Japanese child of 7 or 8 would refuse to touch something an African child had touched, and how the other children would follow suit (Goodman 1990, p. 24).

Although the number of *Nihonjingakko* is small in the United States, there are a lot of *hoshuko* ("supplementary Japanese schools")--more than 80 in 2009 (Ministry of Education of Japan 2010). *Hoshuko* meet only on Saturdays, but cover the same curriculum as Japanese public schools. It means that the children learn a 5-day program in one Saturday. Most Japanese children who attend local schools also attend *hoshuko* in order to be prepared to return to Japan (Okada 1993, p. 5). Additionally, many Japanese children go to cramming schools (*juku*) after school. *Juku* primarily focus on taking entrance exams for high school or for college in Japan. Japanese children living in the United States are thus very busy. Many of them scarcely have time for a play date.

About 90 percent of Japanese children in New York go to public schools (Okada1993, p. 16). How do they perform? Contrary to the stereotype that children are adaptive, most of them face problems in their schools. They are thrown into a world in which other people speak a language that is foreign to them--English. Along with their mothers, many learn English in private lessons before they leave Japan, but this is insufficient preparation. Schools in New York are required by law to have ESL (English as a Second Language) programs, and a majority of students assigned to ESL programs in American schools in popular *chuzaiin* areas are Japanese (*ibid*., pp. 40-41). In this environment, their progress in acquiring English skills tends to be slow. They shoulder what Okada (*ibid*., p. 16) calls a "quadruple handicap," i.e., "can't hear, can't talk, can't read, and can't write." In an art class, for example,

> as other children drew a woman, a Japanese boy drew a cute girl, but the theme for the picture was "the mother." In a music class, Japanese children do not follow the lyrics of a song other children sing. They just pretend singing it together. When they forget to bring the lunch money, they simply do not eat anything. Having no idea about what is

> required to do in class, they sit quietly. They say to themselves, "Everyone believes I'm just stupid." (Okada1993, p. 16)

Many teachers do not understand the situation and, instead, consider these children to have some type of physical handicap. Not a few parents are asked to have their children's hearing checked.

English language skill is probably the most noticeable aspect of the acculturation process in the United States. Other than this skill, though, there are several other important influences on acculturation to be taken into account. According to Minoura (1992, p. 322), these include: age at entry, length of stay, interaction with American peers, the mother's proficiency in English and the degree of the father's exposure to American ways, and the child's extroverted behavioral tendency.[6] Based upon the combination of such factors, Minoura (*ibid*., p. 316) suggests, the incorporation of American cultural patterns by Japanese children occurs through three levels: (1) recognizing the existence of differences in cultural patterns (the cognitive); (2) mastering behavioral norms and practicing them (the behavioral); and (3) internalizing culture-specific meaning systems--to the extent that an emotional reaction is evoked when their mundane exercise is interrupted (the affective). On the third level (the affective), the children are completely at ease interacting with their American peers while prior to the first level (the cognitive), they hold on to their own cultural grammar without understanding that it may not be universal.

[6] Through her longitudinal study (1976-1979), Minoura (1992) observed and interviewed 72 Japanese mother-child pairs of *chuzaiin* families living in Los Angeles.

Minoura found that children who came to the United States before age nine, and those who resided there for more than four years, tended to internalize the American meaning system most (1992, pp. 324-26). Young children who have scarcely developed their own system firmly enough to feel psychological strain more easily internalize the cultural meaning system of the host society as they interact. Conversely, those who enter a foreign society after age of nine (e.g., most of the *shin-issei* in general) remain forever foreigners, to a greater or lesser extent, in their cultural meaning systems.

Gender seems to matter, too. Many Japanese children belonging to American schools develop maladjustment symptoms, and most of them are boys (Okada 1993, pp. 50-52). According to a Japanese psychiatrist in New York, about 60 to 70 percent of Japanese children who attend American schools show such symptoms as psychosomatic diseases, loss of hair, biting fingernails, and withdrawal. Since boys are far more likely than girls to quit American schools because of maladjustment, they outnumber girls in *Nihonjingakko* (*ibid*., p. 160). In 1993, out of 366 students in the New York Japanese School, 270 (73.8%) were boys.

Successful cultural adjustment in the United States, however, is not necessarily greeted warmly upon return to Japan. Some Japanese are afraid that foreign ways can contaminate Japanese culture. In the early 1960s, *kikokushijo* ("Japanese returnee children") became a national issue (Fry 2007, pp. 131-33). Not only were their behaviors and attitudes frowned upon, but their apparently low academic performance (especially in Japanese) appeared to be troublesome. The situation changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, when the nation became obsessed with the catchword *kokusaika* ("internationalization"). The *kikokushijo* then turned out to be "valuable assets for

Japan" (*ibid*.). Guided by the Ministry of Education, the number of schools that offered special entry criteria for returning children increased. This does not mean, however, that "the *kikokushijo* problem" has disappeared.

Although the schools that offer special programs for *kikokushijo* see themselves as educating the leaders of the next generation (Goodman 1990, p. 185), they do not neglect to *sai-nihonka* ("re-Japanize") them and *gaikoku o hagashi* ("peel off their foreignness") (p. 4). In order to function as "valuable assets for Japan," *kikokushijo* need to be Japanese, not *henna-Nihonjin* (strange Japanese) (p. 59). Observing this, some critics argue that through this process, the children lose much of the "positiveness" they have learned overseas. Will they still be considered "valuable assets for Japan"? Some of them will be, if they finish prestigious Japanese universities (Vogel 1979, p. 45). Otherwise, they may downplay their overseas experiences in order to avoid being left out in the cold (Mori 1994, p. 167). Some may choose to leave Japan again by themselves, most likely as college students to begin with.

The **Ryugakusei**

When finishing American colleges, Japanese international students have two *possible* choices for employment. A majority of them seek jobs in Japan and some, in the United States. Of those who get positions in Japan today, though, many will be sent to their companies' overseas branches as *chuzaiin*. Some view this recent trend of what one might call "circular migration" as a product of the transnationalization of the world economy that yields the greater need for employees like them.

It is important to note, however, that the link between the "need" to hire ex-international students and the "practice" of doing so in Japan has hardly been as simple as it seems. In modern tradition, there are some important hurdles for returned students to clear if they seek jobs in Japan. One is a principal question shared among Japanese firms as to how ex-international students (like *kikokushijo*) can be framed within the Japanese culture (see Mori 1994). Partly related to this, Japanese companies expect returned students to have finished Japanese colleges prior to their departure (Vogel 1979).

There was a period of time during which these hurdles were temporarily lowered for two major events: the bubble economy and the *kokusaika* slogan. The former led to a labor shortage, and the latter yielded pressures for hiring Japanese students returning from overseas. This situation was short-lived, however, and served to rather mislead large numbers of prospective international students, especially those on the undergraduate level; the bubble burst and the *kokusaika* slogan lost its force against the hurdles reset for returned students. The media, which portrayed *kokusaika* as being a borderless condition between Japan and the West, were (and still are) also misleading; although some Japanese students try to stay in the United States after completing a degree, obtaining a work visa has never been as easy as implied. During the bubble economy, the number of Japanese students leaving for the United States grew remarkably, and hit a peak in the 1990s; however, it is now decreasing straightforwardly.

This section reviews studies about Japanese international students in the United Sates. The students can be categorized into several groups on the basis of how they leave Japan and the level of degree they pursue, including: (1) a small number of young elites whose *ryugaku* is sponsored by their employers, such as government ministries and

private firms; (2) so-called career-up *ryugaku* to improve reemployment prospects either in Japan or, more preferably for many, in the United States; and (3) undergraduates, who account for the largest portion of Japanese students in the United States since the 1970s.[7]

Sponsored Young Elites

Japanese youths began studying in the Western countries in Meiji, dreaming of *risshin shusse* on their return to Japan (see Chapter 1). Many returned students, just as they dreamed, were placed in high positions in various institutions newly established for the nation's modernization projects that relied on their knowledge acquired in the West. Based on "297 students who had attended school in the United States between 1865 and 1885," a study reported that "162 (55%) occupied positions of responsibility and influence in government, academic and business life" (see Conte 1977, p. 180).

It would be erroneous, however, if this were taken as indicative that Japan librated the door to *risshin shusse* for simply anyone who came back from the West. Many returned students rather found the nation's attitude toward them strictly conditional and exclusive. An examination of the list of returned students over the last hundred years shows that those who took the major roles in the development of modern Japan are, overall, those who were sent abroad at the government's expense or under the auspices of business institutions (Nakane 1972, p. 114). That is, those who got high positions had actually been chosen to do so before they left Japan.

This tendency was intensified as the nation established its own educational institutions by the mid-Meiji era. In terms of the way returned students were treated, a

[7] Other than the above, there are non-academic types such as language and vocational (continued…)

sharp boundary was drawn between those who finished prestigious Japanese universities and those who did not, or more fundamentally, between those tied to *uchi* ("the inside") and those just coming (back) from *soto* ("the outside"). Elites could grow, it seems, only from the "intra-group unity" of elites themselves (see Chapter 1).

As for contemporary students from Japan, the situation regarding the way returned students are treated does not seem to have changed much. Most of those who secure important positions on their return are preselected and fully sponsored by their employers, be they public (i.e., government agencies) or private (big corporations) (see Mori 1994, p. 6). To be chosen, a minimum prerequisite is to have graduated from prestigious Japanese universities.

In public institutions, according to Hartcher (1998, p. 12), those sent for *ryugaku* are called "career stream officials" (or high-ranked bureaucrats), and the majority of them (on average about 90%) are graduates of Tokyo University, the most prestigious educational institution in Japan since Meiji. Not only is their old school prestigious, but typically their families come from the upper portion of Japanese society (see Goodman 1990, p. 84). They are the ones who meet a series of narrow criteria that finally authorize them as career stream officials to join the machine that controls the nation. The following episode may illustrate these functionaries' power practically even more substantial than their respective ministers'. One politician, who would become the prime minister a few years later, submitted himself to his mandarins at the Finance Ministry when he was first appointed minister. He said:

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ryugaku (as shown in Chapter 4), but they are not included in the discussions here.

> You are the true elite of the elite. Studying at the topmost university in this country, your brains are the highest quality in Japan. I will, therefore, leave the business of thinking to you, and I will, with your permission, take responsibility for the results. (Cited in Hartcher 1998, p. 12)

Incidentally, as prime minister, he was more successful in extracting public funds from the Finance Ministry for his programs than any other postwar politicians.

Japanese bureaucrats' retirement age is as early as fifty-five (Wolferen 1990, p. 44). Well before they retire as officials, they choose their post-bureaucrat careers, most typically as politicians, business directors, or college professors. They reserve, as it were, the "tickets" for these paths during their government career, by serving top politicians in their own ministries, by monitoring and instructing big corporations, and/or by developing personal networks in academic institutions. As noted earlier, some cabinet ministers in the postwar years were former bureaucrats, and not a few even held office as Prime Minster (see Chapter 2). Recently (in 2009), however, as Japan's voters cast out the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), for only the second time in postwar history, and as the new government restricts *amakudari* ("descent from heaven" or "parachuting of the ex-bureaucrats to the private sector"), their central focus tends to turn towards teaching at universities (*Sankei Shimbun* 2010). Although very few are Ph.D.'s, universities appreciate their applications in the name of "intra-group unity."

Japan's economic global reach yielded a boom of what one might call "MBAs made in the USA." Of those in the *ryugaku* boom for MBA (Master of Business Administration), the most promised ones--besides "career stream officials"--were (and still are) young business elites sent by their companies. As an investment, their employers "fully sponsor the 2-year programme by paying tuition, subsidizing rent, and

paying full if not part of their regular salary" (Ono *et al*. 2004, p. 109). They constitute the executive track that leads to upper management. Typically, they are male, having graduated from prestigious Japanese colleges, with several years of work experience, between 26 and 30 years old, married and accompanied by their wives, and scheduled to return to their companies (Sugano 1990, p. 5; cited in Ono *et al*. 2004, p. 111). Their MBAs are, in effect, another job assignment for these young elites.

It should be pointed out that for analysis of LTVs (i.e., non-immigrants or non-LPRs), the status of these elites is ambiguous and possibly misleading. They are business people when they leave Japan for high degrees, but are counted as "students," not as *chuzaiin*, when in the United States. In the future, many of them come back to the United States as *chuzaiin*, and technically it is correct that they are ex-international students. However, it would be misleading were their *chuzaiin* assignment to be treated--as it is in youth magazines and *ryugaku* agencies--as forming a circular migration of successful ex-international students whose American degrees led them to the executive track of big corporations. They are preselected for this track beforehand, and their circular migration starts at their Japanese companies, not at the American schools where they are sponsored by their companies.

Career-up Ryugaku

Many of those who pursue advanced degrees, such as MBAs, are not preselected today. Although a majority had been company-sponsored until the early 1980s, the bubble economy, which made Japanese firms accept the reemployment of the skilled coming from outside, helped change this tradition. The burst of the bubble, although adversely affecting employment prospects for undergraduate *ryugakusei*, rather supported

the change for a downsizing effect on firms' budget for sponsoring *ryugaku* for advanced degrees. One Japanese economy magazine estimated that self-funded students comprised 70 percent of all Japanese MBAs in 2000 (see Ono *et al*. 2004).

It is important to note that not every self-funded student upon completion of a so-called "career-up *ryugaku*" aims at Japanese corporations. For many, *ryugaku* has become a method for escaping, rather than clinging to, the traditional Japanese business culture. They often prefer companies in the United States or non-Japanese firms in Japan (called *gaishikei*).

The term "career-up *ryugaku*" emerged in the late 1980s (Mori 1994, p. 125). Like sponsored business elites, those who engage in career-up *ryugaku* have usually already finished Japanese college degrees and have job experiences. Unlike the elites, however, their *ryugaku* is self-funded, and its payoff is not guaranteed. The former leave for high degrees because they are on the executive track, while the latter do so because they are dissatisfied with positions that are too far off this track.

Several macroeconomic factors, some of which were specific to the time, not only encouraged *ryugaku* in general but also yielded this new type, career-up *ryugaku*. During the bubble economy, the labor market became highly favorable for sellers (i.e., workers), and this made the high-handed business environment more lenient towards, or even enthusiastic about, the reemployment of the skilled (Mori 1994). This environment, as it were, provided a safety net for *ryugaku*. Second, the importance of advanced degrees such as MBAs was acutely realized by executives in the globalized business world (Vogel 1979, p. 45). Third, the Plaza Accord in 1985--an U.S. diplomatic strategy led by President Reagan to reduce the trade imbalance--drastically devalued the U.S. dollar

against the Japanese yen (e.g., Schaeffer 1997). The idea behind this accord was that as the yen rose, so too would the cost of Japan's exports. Within a year and a half, the yen was twice as strong against the U.S. dollar. Although this lessened Japanese export companies' profits, for Japanese adventurers leaving for the United States, this meant that the value of their funds in yen doubled in U.S. dollars. The winds became unprecedentedly favorable for *ryugaku*, and women, who had traditionally been placed outside of the business world, reacted to this opportunity more fervently than men.

Including all levels of *ryugaku*, the proportion of female students leaving Japan increased from 40 percent to 70 percent during the 1990s (Yamashita 2008, p. 105). Among adult students, the female ratio became 80 percent--although many chose what is called *yugaku* (short-time or refresh-type *ryugaku* for non-academic purposes such as a few months of language or vocational schools) (see Kashima 1989, p. 190). As for *ryugaku* for advanced degrees, women constituted one-quarter of Japanese students attending American business schools in the 1980s (Matsui 1995, p. 358). According to one survey conducted in 1989, among those engaging in self-funded *ryugaku* for MBAs, female students, who are almost all self-funded, even slightly outnumbered their male counterparts, who comprised a quarter of all male MBA students (Ono *et al*. 2004, pp. 109-10). [8]

Career-up *ryugaku* became a controversial topic in the media as a defiant behavior by educated women against prevailing social norms of womanhood in workplace and more broadly in life. Traditionally, jobs assigned to female workers did not involve the

[8] The survey was conducted by the Japan–US Educational Commission (JUSEC), targeting Japanese MBA students attending the top 10 schools including Columbia, Harvard, MIT, Stanford, UC Berkeley, UCLA, Chicago, Michigan, Wharton, and Virginia (n=169; 58% (continued…)

possibility of relocation or promotion. For Japanese employers, it would be unreasonable to treat men and women equally; men will grow to become experts forever loyal to their companies, while women are expected to quit jobs upon marriage or childbirth.[9]

In the Japanese business culture, the primary jobs assigned to women include serving tea to male workers, making photocopies for male workers, and typing business letters for male workers. Within a couple of years, most women dispiritedly discover that they will be doing the same thing indefinitely (Yamashita 2008, p. 106). Upon this discovery, they stop dreaming of the possibility of promotion. Witnessing the changing labor environment in the globalized economy, some of them have begun dreaming, instead, of a different world, such as companies in the United States or *gaishikei* ("non-Japanese firms in Japan") where greater gender equalities can be expected. *Ryugaku* for them can be a breakthrough whereby to find a "new self" in terms of career, and of life plan.

In reality though, upon completion of their MBAs, most of them find jobs, if at all, either in Japanese companies that accept the reemployment of the skilled, or at best, in *gaishikei* (Ono *et al*. 2004, p. 114). This may reflect the difficulty in finding U.S. firms to sponsor work visas for them. On their return to Japan--a last resort--they could additionally shoulder other sources of discrimination than gender, e.g., their age (too old as job applicants in Japan) (Ishitoya 1991, p. 223), cultural orientations (too

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response rate) (Ono *et al*. 2004, pp. 109-10).

[9] In 1986, an Equal Employment Opportunity Law was enacted as one of the products of *kokusaika*, that is, of the pressures mounting from inside and outside. Several years later, the law kept being negotiated. According to *The New York Times* (Sanger 1994), Japanese corporate executives said that "while they would listen to the Government's plea, they were not inclined to change their attitude--or to comply with the country's eight-year-old Equal Employment Opportunity Law, which is widely disregarded."

Americanized), and even education level (too high for women) (Ono *et al*. 2004, p. 111). Harsher realities are encountered by *ryugakusei* who have not finished Japanese college degrees previously, one of the hurdles traditionally set in the Japanese business culture for job applicants to clear.

Undergraduates

The 1970s in Japan is said to be the opening of an "age of mass overseas tourism" (Ivy 1995, p. 47). The number of Japanese international tourists grew by more than 5 times in that decade alone (from 638,489 in 1971 to 3,269,325 in 1980) (Ministry of Justice of Japan 2004). To the Japanese, "America" was no longer a country that could only be seen in movies or TV programs. Unmistakably, Japan was entering a new era, both materially (escorted by "economic miracle") and mentally (by *kokusaika* as well as *akogare* shared among the masses).

The new era yielded a *ryugaku* boom, in which undergraduate students for the first time outnumbered graduate students (Ono *et al*. 2004, p. 106). They come from middle- or upper-middle classes rather than exclusively from elite families. The boom can be seen as a reflection of the drastic growth of middle-class families in Japan in terms of their size relative to the entire population, of their incomes, and of their *kokusaika* consciousness.

Newspapers in Japan carried a lot of articles examining the *ryugaku* boom. The overall tone, however, was not supportive. One article summarized the characteristics of the *ryugakusei* as follows:

> (1) they are not elite students but are rather the Japanese entrance examination "dropouts"; (2) the agency did all of the application and administrative paper handling for those *ryugakusei*; (3) they had no clear plan or objectives regarding their sojourn; and (4) most participants come from upper-middle class families. (Cited in Mori 1994, p. 78)

For Japanese institutions, college entrance exams are crucially important; they test not just students' academic knowledge but more latently their perseverance as well as submissiveness to authority.[10] Some *ryugakusei* were (and still are) among those who failed or evaded the exam. Societal attitudes toward *ryugaku* as "dropouts" as opposed to as "elite students" quickly turned negative.

These kinds of newspaper feature stories were followed by further news stories, which had chilling effects on the *ryugaku* boom. First, two murder cases occurred one almost immediately after the other, involving assaults by Japanese students; one of them took place in Paris in 1978 and the other, in New York in 1979 (Mori 1994, p. 75). The Japanese media reported on the two cases, analyzing them as resulting from "the psychological condition of Japanese staying overseas as often unstable due to culture shock and failure to adapt to their new foreign environments."

In 1983, major corporations listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange clearly stated that they did not want to hire Japanese undergraduate *ryugakusei* (*ibid*., p. 127). This destroyed the dream of an honorable return that was shared by many *ryugakusei*. In the eyes of business managers, ex-international students who left Japan while young are

[10] Note that the reasonableness of the entrance exam, in both its manifest and latent functions--and, therefore, of the label "dropouts"--has never ceased to be questioned in Japan (e.g., Sakaiya 1991, p. 304; Wolferen 1990, p. 86).



Figure 5.1. The Number of Japanese Students in the United States, 1971-2008
Source: IIE Open Doors 2009.

"dropouts" not only regarding the entrance exam but also regarding adequate enculturation as Japanese.

More structurally, while those in Japanese colleges are already in the job market early in their senior year, *ryugakusei* absent from Japan do not have this luxury (Befu *et al*. 2001, p. 8). By Japanese tradition, all new students of the same age start school on the same day ceremoniously greeted by their principals, and all new workers start their careers on the same day, greeted by their presidents. On that day (early April), unfortunately, *ryugakusei* are still in their spring semester. Moreover, Japanese firms set an age limit for initial employment (Ishitoya 1991, p. 223).

After these newspaper articles were published, the volume of *ryugakusei* noticeably decreased in the early 1980s (figure 5.1 above). Soon, however, the situation reversed as a result of several factors previously mentioned, (1) the bubble economy, (2) the *kokusaika* slogan, and (3) the devaluation of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen

for the Plaza Accord of 1985. Additionally, and maybe more importantly, the media tone suddenly shifted and redefined "*ryugakusei* as heroes of internationalization" (Mori 1994, p. viii).

In the mid-1980s, a recruiting company began publishing a magazine specifically edited for Japanese *ryugakusei* in the United States (Mori 1994, p. 113). The magazine carried advertisements from 73 corporations and several articles describing recruitment practices in Japan. By the summer, more than 40 *ryugakusei* had received employment agreements from corporations they found through this magazine.

In a few years, employment of *ryugakusei* by Japanese corporations became almost commonplace (*ibid*., p. 136). In the latter half of the 1980s alone, during which *ryugakusei* as a whole turned out to be "heroes of internationalization," the number of Japanese students in the United States increased by nearly 3 times (IIE Open Doors 2009) (figure 5.1 above). The boom grew further. Between 1994 (45,276) and its peak of 1997 (47,073), Japan sent the largest volume of international students to the United States (approximately 10 percent of all international students), followed by China, Korea, India, and Taiwan (IIE Open Doors 2009).

This surge did not last long, however. Following the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, the number of *ryugakusei* in the United States began to decrease. By 2008, Japan had fallen to the sixth largest provider of students after other Asian countries, plus Canada, and its volume became about one-fifth of China's (IIE Open Doors 2009).

The decrease may have been triggered by fear around the terror attacks, but the continuous downturn calls for a more structural explanation. Several factors can be considered to have shaped this trend, namely: (1) the end of the bubble economy that

recalled the high hurdles for employment opportunities especially for undergraduate *ryugakusei*; (2) the prolonged recession in Japan that began suppressing family budgets for their *ryugaku;* (3) a gradual discovery by prospect *ryugakusei* of the difficulty in obtaining U.S. work visas; and (4) the U.S. reactions to the 9/11 terror attacks that with time have changed the image of America, in ways discouraging to *akogare.* The bubble burst in the beginning of the 1990s, but it was not until the end of that decade that Japan's unemployment rate rose seriously and led to the "employment ice age" (see Chapter 4). The terrorist attacks took place in 2001, but years later the U.S. security level (including the complexities and fees of obtaining and maintaining U.S. visas) still remains chillingly high. Facing these events, it is no surprise that the dream of an honorable return to Japan or of life in American after *ryugaku* slowly but surely lost its momentum.

A seemingly typical reaction to the high hurdles for job opportunities in Japan comes from a female interviewee in Matsui's (1995) study.[11] Having obtained a degree in English language education in the United States, she says,

> If I went back, I wouldn't have a good job. There are too many returnees with American degrees. I'm too old for private firms or public schools. I don't expect much. I've done what I wanted. I'll pay for it. Probably I'll open a small *juku* (cram school) to teach English for children. (Matsui 1995, p. 374)

Although it entails a high cost, *ryugaku*, especially on the undergraduate level, provides little reward. Until the 2000s, undergraduate *ryugakusei* comprised nearly two-thirds of Japanese students in the United States, while graduate students accounted for 17

[11] Matsui's (1995) study is based on interviews with 10 female students from Japan or China enrolled in various American universities between 1991 and 1993.

to 19 percent (Ono *et al*. 2004). In 2008, however, as the overall size shrank, the ratio shifted: undergraduates, 57.3 percent; graduates, 21.5 percent (IIE Open Doors 2009). The trend seems to be going back to the era prior to the 1970s, in which students from the elite class were dominant. Drastically losing a major segment of the student body, the *ryugaku* boom from Japan to the United States should now be seen as over.

Entrepreneurs

Scholars of immigration often emphasize the importance of "ethnic niches" in the immigration environment; distinct ethnic occupational or industrial specializations develop through such ethnically-based networks (Foner 2000, p. 91). Korean immigrants' specialties, such as grocery stores, for example, would have been unthinkable without their "dense web of trade associations, churches, and friendship and kinship ties in the Korean community [that] has provided help with business information, loans, and staffing problems" (*ibid*., p. 96). Similar patterns are observed among many other ethnic groups that run their own specialties in the United States today including Indians and Chinese (Portes *et al*. 1986). Their entrepreneurship can be thus seen as a collective instrument of ethnic adaptation. Their counterparts from Japan, however, appear to be quite different in many respects, such as the mode of entry into the United States, the motive for starting a business, the lack of commitment to ethnic organizations, and the lack of interest in naturalization. Hosler (1998, p. 57), considered to be the pioneer researcher on *shin-issei* business owners (see Min 2001), calls them "a new breed of entrepreneurs."

Parallel to other studies conducted on pathways to the legal permanent resident (LPR) status in general (Massey *et al*. 2002; Dreher *et al*. 2006), Hosler (1998, pp. 63-65) reports that a majority of the *shin-issei* entrepreneurs (72%) entered the United States initially as non-immigrants (LTVs): 31 percent as tourist; 22 percent as students; and 18 percent as *chuzaiin*.[12] Typically, they are male (82%), 48 years old, with 15 years of education, married (80%, of which 17% are intermarriages),[13] have stayed in the United States for 20 years, and have been in business for 13 years (*ibid*., p. 59). The most frequently mentioned work experience was "Japanese small business in the United States" (57%), followed by "Japanese corporations" (47%), "American corporations" (21%), and "owning a business in Japan" (15%) (p. 82).

In the 1970s, the growing Japanese economy began sending sizable numbers of Japanese to the United States including *chuzaiin*, students, and tourists. This environment soon yielded Japanese small businesses catering to these individuals. Today their targets comprise a mixture of Japanese and American customers, serving them through businesses including restaurants, souvenir shops, travel agencies, commercial real estate firms, retail and personal service outlets, hair salon**s**, and computer programming firms (Hosler 1998, pp. 52-55; Ishitoya 1991, p. 216).[14]

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[12] Hosler (1998, pp. 13-20) conducted research on "Japanese immigrant entrepreneurs in New York metropolitan area" in 1993, using (1) a mail survey sent to approximately 500 individuals and (2) face-to-face intensive interviews with nine Japanese business runners. Her sample consisted of permanent residents and first-generation U.S. citizens.

[13] Their intermarriage rate (17%) is consistent with other studies' findings. Based on the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 Census, for example, Lee *et al*. (1998, p. 335) report that 17.3 percent of foreign-born Japanese men outmarried. Their intermarriage rate was the highest among other Asian counterparts, such as Indians (12.4%), Filipinos (11.9%), Vietnamese (7.2%), and Chinese (6.7%). For native-born men, though, their rate (28.2%) was lower than the Asian average (37.7%).

[14] Hosler (1998, p. 12) excludes self-employed professionals (physicians, lawyers and (continued…)

The owners of these businesses share many characteristics, which are consistent with this present study's analysis of the *shin-issei* in their pathways to the LPR status (see Chapter 3). In terms of gender and age, for example, only two preferences gathered almost all Japanese (93%) for their LPR status, namely, "immediate relatives of U.S. citizens" (IR) (61.6%) and "employment-based preferences" (EB) (31.4%). Most of those who took IR (89%) were female. For EB, by contrast, the gender ratio was most evenly balanced among other preferences (female 53.2%). This job-oriented preference, EB, was practically the only door to the LPR status open to Japanese men. The *shin-issei* entrepreneurs are among those men who took it. As they spent a long time to switch their status, these *shin-issei* are not young (48 years old on average).

In terms of kinship ties, according to Hosler (1998, pp. 63-66), very few of the *shin-issei* entrepreneurs have relatives in the United States, and even fewer plan to invite kin to the United States for the purpose of immigration. This is not unusual, as only 1.8 percent of the Japanese LPRs took the "family-sponsored preferences" (FS), a major booster for "chain migration" most visibly utilized by Latinos and other Asians. The amendments of immigration law in 1965 are said to have induced the phenomenon of chain migration through kinship ties among ethnic groups, but, as made clear previously, it did not happen among the *shin-issei*.

Additionally, unlike other Asians, the *shin-issei* entrepreneurs are not much interested in U.S. citizenship, a status that can propel chain migration. Their naturalization rate in Hosler's (1998, p. 70) sample is as low as 8.7 percent. According to Yang's (2002, p. 385) study conducted on naturalization among Asians in general, the

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accountants) from her analysis. Ishitoya's (1991) study is based on his fieldwork in Los Angeles (continued…)

naturalization rate of Japanese was 27 percent, which is still quite low, when compared to other Asians, such as Filipinos (68%), Chinese (58%), Vietnamese (58%), Koreans (56%), and Indians (49%).[15]

Regarding the variance in naturalization rates, Yang (1994) suggests that naturalization is an outcome determined not only by immigrants' adaptation and demographic characteristics but also by social contexts in immigrants' countries of origin and destination through the intervening roles of "the perceived costs, benefits, and meaning of naturalization." The costs of naturalization Yang points to include shouldering "citizen obligations in the host country," loosing "political, civic, and social rights" in the country of origin, a "long, complicated application process" with some application "fee," and so on (*ibid*., pp. 452-53). The benefits, on the other hand, include the "right to vote," "easier and faster immigration of their relatives to the United States," and others. Taking these factors into account, for the *shin-issei* as a whole, naturalization *per se* may be unappealing. More specifically, for the *shin-issei* entrepreneurs, who may want to expand their business into Japan or keep another in Japan, there may be more to lose with naturalization than to gain. Seen in this light, their low naturalization rate of 8.7 percent is not puzzling at all.

Consistent with their indifferent attitudes toward chain migration and naturalization, the *shin-issei* entrepreneurs do not share much interest in developing their own ethnic community in the United States; only 3 percent in Hosler's study participate

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in 1989.

[15] These are based on the 5-% PUMS data from the 1990 U.S. Census (Yang 2002, p. 382). The sample consists of 105,362 foreign-born Asians who were 18 years old or over in 1990 and who immigrated to the United States between 1965 and 1984, of which 3,845 cases were Japanese origins.

in ethnic organizations (1998, p. 201). If an ethnic community is defined on the basis of what sociologists call "we-ness"--e.g., William G. Sumner's (2002 [1907]) "we-group" as against "others-group"[16]--one can argue that the Japanese ethnic community barely exists. Although most of the Japanese businesses target Japanese customers, they interact with each other through commercial goods and services rather than through social ties framed upon their ethnically defined "we-ness."

Ishitoya's (1991, p. 217) observation may illustrate the lack of a sense of community among Japanese migrants in the United States. According to him, as the number of Japanese businesses running in Los Angeles increased after the 1970s, some emotional friction has emerged among Japanese Americans (the *nisei* and their offspring, the *sansei* or "third generation") and the *shin-issei* in some complicated ways. The *chuzaiin*, socio-economically ranking themselves as higher than all others, tend to look down upon others. Workers in Japanese businesses, in turn, commonly view the *chuzaiin* to be the most arrogant customers, but, on the other hand, they alienate Japanese Americans as outsiders. Although some of the *sansei* have begun learning the Japanese language in order to seek jobs in Japanese companies running in Los Angeles, Japanese managers seldom see them as potential employees for their businesses. Some say, "It seems that they are now different ethnic groups with different modes of thinking, and different associations" (Yamashita 2008, p. 107).

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[16] Sumner (2002 [1907], p. 12) drew a sharp boundary between "we-group" and "others-group," assuming that the insiders in a "we-group" are in "a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other." Their relation to all outsides, of "others-groups," by contrast, is one of "war and plunder..."

Tajfel (1978, pp. 9-10) critically views Sumner's ethnocentric boundary as too simplistic, or "less universal than Sumner assumed it to be." Tajfel points out that there are "comparisons rooted in the membership of groups" and that "these comparisons are then made with other social (continued…)

Facing the alienating atmosphere brought from Japan, one of the Japanese-American women Sanada (1995) interviewed says,

> We Japanese Americans always pay close attentions to what's going on in Japan, and even those who have no relatives or friends in Japan still feel strong ties to Japan. Do the Japanese people coming from Japan feel the same way toward us? Not likely. (Sanada 1995)

"They look down upon us as if we were the losers," says another. She adds, "They've become rich, but what happened to their beautiful culture now?"

Although only 8.7 percent of the *shin-issei* entrepreneurs in Hosler's study are naturalized citizens (see above), when asked about their commitment to permanent relocation, one-third say that they want to stay in the United States, and the rest, either want to go back to Japan or are undecided (Hosler 1998, p. 73). Is "one-third" big or small? As Massey *et al*. (2002, p. 475) argue, the questions of permanence, settlement, and intention to stay have themselves become anachronistic in this highly transnational environment. Contemporary migrants, indeed, keep crossing the border back and forth regardless of whether they are LTVs, LPRs, or first-generation citizens. Not only are they what Min (2006, p. 24) calls "status adjusters" in social and economic terms, but they are at the same time "repeaters" (Thomas 1950, p. 461). The "one-third" may be better seen as a mere result of the question that is awkwardly framed in terms of permanence, failing to take into account many surrounding elements that are continuously changing, such as the macroeconomic condition and personal relations with other people.

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groups or their individual members." Hence, "no group is an island."

Hosler (1998, p. 200) suggests that "other things than money" motivate the *shin-issei* entrepreneurship. The 1990 Census figures show that although self-employed workers earned more income than salaried workers, and that this tendency was especially clear among Asian immigrants (*ibid*., p. 34), the Japanese foreign-born population in the metropolitan area appeared to be the opposite (p. 79). Of them, salaried workers made $55,140 on average, compared to $31,485 for the self-employed. As noted above, most of the self-employed *shin-issei* were previously salaried workers (for Japanese or American firms), meaning that their incomes were likely to be higher. For the *shin-issei* entrepreneurs, again, "other things" are more important than "money" in their motives to start businesses. The most frequently stated "other things," according to Hosler (*ibid*., p. 85), included "Wanted the challenge of something new" (54%) and "Wanted to be my own boss" (34%). For them, then--parallel to the aforementioned Japanese baseball players moving to the MLB (see Chapter 4)--running a business in the United States is a personal adventure for socio-psychological satisfaction rather than purely economic ambition--let alone a collective instrument of ethnic adaptation.

"Internationalists," or "Wanderers"?

Some consider the *shin-issei* to be "internationalists" (Kelsky 2001; Mori 1984) while others view them critically, using such terms as "yellow cabs" (Ieda 1991; Kelsky 2001), "adrift youths" (Minamikawa 2005b), and *nenashi-gusa* ("rootless wanderers") (Ishitoya 1991). Neither of these opposing views seems incorrect; the *shin-issei* vary. Although they almost commonly (with some exceptions among the *chuzaiin*) share push/pull factors--namely, the *mendokusai shakai* (the "molding society") and, on the

other hand, *akogare* for the West--their diverse methods of embarkation make a difference. It is suggested, more specifically, that motives preoccupied with these push/pull factors with little ideas about reasonably set goals can lead to insecure trajectories. This section presents discourses from previous studies concerning whether the *shin-issei* are "internationalists" or instead are "wanderers."

The study of intermarriage involving Asians began in the United States in the early 1950s (Zai *et al*. 1999, p. 880), triggered by large waves of interracial unions entering directly from overseas, i.e., war brides (e.g., Strauss 1954; Schnepp *et al*. 1955) (see Chapter 2). Their marriage patterns hardly fit previous theories, which were to explain exclusively the experience of European immigrants and their descendants. Unlike the traditional patterns, not only did war brides start, rather than finish, their assimilation process upon their marriage, but their socio-economic standings also had little, if any, to do with their romantic encounter.

Their intermarriage patterns, thus unique in the American immigration history, are still quite similarly observed among Japanese female adventurers today at higher rates than existing theories capture. As noted earlier, more than half of Japanese-born women marry non-Japanese men in the United States (mostly whites), a rate that is by far the highest among other foreign-born Asian women, and is even higher than their native-born counterparts' (Lee *et al*. 1998, p. 335). Like the war brides, many of them step into the assimilation process more deeply upon their marriage. Though to a lesser extent than in the war brides' era, their romances still tend to be frowned upon in Japan. Thus, despite their diverse personal experiences, some stigmatic labels bunch up their adventure.

The most disgraceful label is, probably, "yellow cabs" referred to as Japanese women who "let anyone take a ride easily" (Ieda 1991, p. 1) (see Chapter 4). Low-brow men's weekly magazines quickly elevated the "yellow cab phenomenon" to scandal of the year (Kelsky 2001, p. 134). According to Ieda (1991), those whom she calls "yellow cabs" come to Los Angeles or New York as tourists, businesswomen, or students of various schools, such as those for high degrees, English, or dance (p. 3).[17] Most of them are between 20 and 40 years old. Those who work (legally or illegally) include stylists, writers, businesswomen, dancers, instructors, teachers, designers, and part-time helpers (p. 12). Among the students, some are supported by their parents (p. 116) while others illegally work at Japanese restaurants or so-called "piano bars" that exclusively target Japanese *chuzaiin* (p. 62).

As a *shin-issei* business, piano bars are important; they reveal some aspects of the presence of Japanese in the U.S. urban cities today, involving their owners (*shin-issei* entrepreneurs), employees (female *shin-issei*, a majority of whom are students), and their customers (*chuzaiin*). They are high-class hostess clubs in which young women serve as companions for their patrons, offering "a chance for ritualistic flirtation but no sex," a common practice in Japan known as the "geisha tradition" (O'Brien 2002). Since the mid-1970s, driven by the influx of Japanese executives to America, these exclusive *kurabu* ("clubs") have been transported to mid-Manhattan (Dunn 1995).[18] For the

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[17] Ieda (1991, p. 3) conducted a survey questionnaire, sampling near 90 Japanese women living in Los Angeles or New York. Of them, she interviewed 28.

Some groups of people challenged the credibility of Shoko Ieda's (1991) study entitled *Iero Kyabu* ("yellow cab"), arguing that although Ieda claims that "Americans call Japanese women 'yellow cabs,'" "no American knows the term 'yellow cabs'" (Toyoda 1994, p. 62).

[18] According to O'Brien (2002), Manhattan harbors some 15 Japanese hostess clubs. At the clubs, patrons pay cover charges of up to $150 per person and buy bottles of liquor at about

(continued…)

patrons and their guests (business clients), these "sanctuaries" provide "the illusion of back home" (O'Brien 2002). For the companions, by contrast, although most of them initially come to America "to flee the oppression of Japanese society," in the jobs they hold here they, according to one of them, end up with "playing the same old role" (Dunn 1995).

The women in Ieda's (1991) study commonly highlight positives of America (or the pull factor) and, on the other hand, negatives of Japan (the push factor). "Everything in Japan is *mendokusai* ["tiresome"]--human relations, superior-inferior relations, fetters of *on* ["indebtedness"] and *giri* ["social obligation"]," says one of her interviewees (p. 100). "I want to be honest about my feelings." For them, American men--"more physically beautiful, sexier, and more egalitarian" (pp. 117-18)--can be their "prince" who would rescue them from the socio-cultural fetters of the *mendokusai shakai*.

Taking advantage of their preoccupied feeling of *akogare*, however, some men in New York cheat Japanese women out their money, according to Ieda (*ibid*., p. 140). They talk to these women in broken Japanese. It does not matter to them if a woman is a tourist or a resident of New York. They know she is eager to make American boyfriends.

"Every night, we go to discos," says a woman who has found her own American boyfriends (p. 145). Involved in an unexpectedly tricky situation, however, she says,

> I pay. They ask me to buy coke, marijuana, etc. We then go back to my place and have sex until the morning… until we fall asleep. When you let them into your place, they steal money, cards, and things like that. (Ieda 1991, p. 145)

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three times the retail price. A bottle of Johnnie Walker Black for $120 is a popular choice.

Though troublesome, some of them do not want to leave these "boyfriends." "I can't say 'No' [to American boyfriends]," says a student (*ibid*., p. 118). "I know they use me... So I ask my parents to send me more money."

Those who work at piano bars get the money to spend on their boyfriends from their patrons, whom they call the "lonely Japanese *chuzaiin*" (p. 92). Pushed by the *mendokusai shakai* and, on the other hand, pulled by more egalitarian and sexier American men, they hang on to these relationships they develop during their adventure, although such relationships tend to be costly as long as they last.

Kelsky observes quite similar tendencies among Japanese women in their overseas journey. The women discussed in her *Women on the Verge* (2001) were predominantly highly educated, urban, mostly single career women between the ages of 20 and 45, with extensive study abroad or work abroad experience and English-language expertise (p. 5). One of her interviewees explains her own feeling of *akogare* for the West in terms of American TV programs, movies, and picture books (pp. 146-49). "You want to be one of those people," says the woman. "And of course all these picture books, and Disney stories, [e.g., 'Sleeping Beauty' and 'Cinderella'] all had princes who had white faces." "They want a man," Kelsky observes, "like a movie star or the prince in a fairy tale."

Not surprisingly, when their personal narratives are reduced to the general term of *akogare* for the West, most of those whose boyfriends or husbands are white feel uncomfortable. According to Kelsky (2001, p. 146), at her presentation on "yellow cabs" at the University of Hawaii, Japanese female students in the audience demanded in so many words, "how can you [Kelsky] claim that race has anything to do with my

relationship?" They contended, "I love X because he is X, not because he is white!" In the same vein, the majority of women Kelsky interviewed shun the foreign husband as a means of acquiring a U.S. green card (*ibid*., p. 212). They hate to be referred to as "Green Card Cinderellas."

Kelsky considers her subjects "internationalist women" although, on the other hand, she suggests that the "difference between yellow cabs and internationalist women… appears to lie more in method than in motivation" (p. 152). That is to say, the proper means, or a reserved basis for a proper socio-economic standing in journey, can justify the end, motivation. This seems generally applicable to all *shin-issei*; other than just "yellow cabs," among the *shin-issei* whose method appears to be rather defenseless, many are seen as "adrift youths" and "rootless wanderers."

Minamikawa (2005a, p. 140) is one of those pointing to the insecure trajectories that some of the *shin-issei* follow as a result of their apparently vulnerable method of embarkation. He views this method as that of "consumers" who purchase international migration as commercialized service. Having no tie to dependable social networks overseas, their migration is guided by commercialized industries, such as travel agencies, *ryugaku* agencies, and Japanese local newspapers. Some *shin-issei* businesses serving Japanese customers (e.g., restaurants, piano bars, and supermarkets) employ them as handy part-timers, usually without sponsoring work visas for them (Minamikawa 2005b, pp. 115-16).[19] Some of these youth, a majority of whom are students in the United States, are even unaware that such jobs are illegal. For them, *ryugaku* is a convenient instrument

[19] Minamikawa's (2005b) study is based on interviews with Japanese youths living in Los Angeles. Research methods are not given. Most of his interviewees were students of colleges or language schools or illegal overstayers, and his objective was to see why they left Japan, what (continued…)

for staying in the United States for several years or more, and they misunderstand that as long as they maintain a student visa, they are entitled to take jobs, just as some of them did in Japan as freeters (see Chapter 4). Hardly having a clear goal or tangible plan for their overseas journey, instead they pursue self-satisfaction in an environment that is "free from their parents" (pp. 120-25). Calling them "adventurers" or *yu-min* ("idlers"), Minamikawa argues, overlooks some important points (p. 129). Although coming from Japan, an economically advanced country, they are not transnational elites; rather, they constitute a class that is not very poor yet is adrift in today's labor market quite insecure for them both in Japan and in the United States.

According to Ishitoya (1991, p. 55), the *shin-issei* comprise those who failed college entrance exams, those who grew *akogare* for America through the media, and those who quit their jobs to engage in career-up *ryugaku*.[20] In terms of education, occupation, and social identity, they are the "ones who abandon, and in turn are abandoned by, Japan" (*ibid*., p. 76). For them, their overseas adventure is a "consolation match for a rebirth." Their rebirth, however, does not seem easy; most of them hardly have better information or strategies than before (p. 77). They face various problems in their journey as foreigners, such as English language skills, visas, and many more, none of which would have been a problem if they lived in their own country, Japan (pp. 11-12). In regard to why they came, a young man says he wanted to be a radio director, another says his dream was to become a chiropractor, and a young woman says she came to study how to produce promotional videos for pop music. They left Japan, believing

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they do in Los Angeles, and what they think they will do in the future.

[20] Ishitoya's (1991) study is based on his fieldwork in Los Angeles in 1989, visiting several places assumed to gather *shin-issei,* such as Nichibei Bumka Kaikan ("Japanese American (continued…)

that their efforts would be rewarded in America. Having spent a few years, however, they either still attend language schools or community-colleges, or are no longer enrolled in any school and illegally work as part-timers in Japanese-related businesses. They dream of something almost unrealistic, and are seen to be "rootless wanderers" in Japan, especially by their own parents (p. 10).

Facing the unexpectedly high difficulty in obtaining a green card, and thus in getting a job freely and legally, some *shin-issei*--just as discussed in the previous studies above--follow trails laden with uncertain elements rather than events to lead them to an eye-catching rebirth. For some of them, *akogare* once embraced as a dream can turn out to be a bitter mistake. For another, *akogare* continues its-glittering appeal to the extent the *mendokusai shakai* views them with the same old molding labels. For still another, though, the meanings of the factors that initially pushed/pulled their overseas adventure soften with time. That is, they (including many of those I interviewed for this study) place the two societies, Japan and America, on the same horizon in their perception, or to say, in the same world as its components, standing exclusively for neither one of them. In this sense, I argue, such *shin-issei* can be seen as internationalists. In terms of where they place themselves, however, they may be yet better seen as wanderers, inclined to settle permanently in neither of these societies.

Cultural and Community Center") in Little Tokyo, piano bars, and Japanese restaurants .

Ch. 6. "The Japanese New Yorkers"

This chapter is devoted to an interview analysis of those related to, or themselves, the *shin-issei* living in New York--whom I call the "Japanese New Yorkers." Embarking on an overseas adventure as individuals rather than as groups, the *shin-issei* are quite diverse in many aspects, such as why and how they leave Japan, what they encounter and discover during their journey, and, above all, how far they get into their receiving society.

On the other hand, the *shin-issei* commonly keep their character as sojourners--largely owing to goods and services that make today's world transnational, such as relatively inexpensive air tickets and basically free communicative tools on the Internet. Almost all, for example, engage in so-called *satogaeri* ("occasional return to hometown"), a custom traditionally practiced among wives in Japan. Among the *shin-issei*, the term is used to indicate a return trip to Japan that is made once in a while (typically once a year). Possibly carrying personal and business purposes together, this transnational custom--together with the Internet connection--helps maintain or even develop social and/or economic ties to Japan.

More fundamentally, nearly two-thirds of my *shin-issei* interviewees including green-card holders and even those parenting with their American spouses say that they will permanently go back to Japan, "someday," although other than the *chuzaiin* and students, none has an actual plan to do so. It seems that their "someday" is in actuality being shaped continuously, rather than determinedly, upon various factors that are themselves ever changing--such as the macroeconomic conditions and personal relations

with other people. The *shin-issei*, again, is a character placed in ongoing self-adjusting processes as opposed to a fixed status. Some may stay, while some go.

Method, Sample and Data

I conducted a data collection based on depth-interviews with Japanese people who currently, or used to, live in New York. In order to collect information about *ryugakusei* (both prospective and returned), I additionally interviewed a couple of *ryugaku* advisors in Tokyo as informants. Most interviewees were recruited in New York, some in Tokyo, between the fall of 2007 and the summer of 2010, on the basis of snowball sampling.

The interview questions were semi-structured, but priority was given to flexibility over structure, so as to let the interviewee talk as freely as possible. The primary purpose was to explore the *shin-issei* in terms of what push/pull them, what they do in New York, what they encounter and discover during their journey, how they interact with non-Japanese as well as other Japanese (as friends, spouses, and, when applicable, parents), difficulty they may share, and their future perspectives.[1]

I recruited my interviewees mostly in three ways: (1) making contact (by calling or emailing) with Japanese companies whose advertisements appeared in Japanese newspapers published in New York, (2) making contact with personal friends who may have some information about those who are related to, or are themselves, the *shin-issei*, and (3) directly talking to seemingly potential interviewees at public places in New York-

[1] See the interview schedule attached to appendix.

-such as in parks, on the subway, and in Japanese supermarkets. The selection criteria included adults over age18 who are related to, or are themselves, the *shin-issei*.[2]

In public spaces in New York, reactions of the Japanese to my recruitment were split into two categories: one was curious and supportive and the other--the majority--warily or frigidly dodging. People today in general are quite sensitive about potential risks of being involved in unknown matters or having personally identifiable information leaked out--although there was no such risk in this study's data collection. Also, in particular, the *shin-issei* tend to shun an encounter with other Japanese through a direct approach from a stranger.

By emailing or calling, I got some supportive reactions from several Japanese firms and institutions whose contact information was available in Japanese newspapers in New York (e.g., travel agencies, realtors, and newspaper editors and writers). Not surprisingly, though, most people are reluctant to spend their personal time on an unknown matter. I was unable to get an appointment with a *chuzaiin* in New York. Those business people I could secure interviews with included so-called *genchisaiyo* ("the employed locally"), *gaishikei* (employees in "non-Japanese companies"), and freelancers ("part-timers").[3] They gave me their lunch time at salad bars or coffee shops.

It is no exaggeration to say that today almost all Japanese have some connections to the *shin-issei* or ex-*shin-issei* in one way or another within their social networks, as

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[2] I strictly followed the rules set by IRB (Institutional Review Board for human participants) (see http://web.gc.cuny.edu/orup/humansubjects.html#About).

[3] The *genchisaiyo* is different from the *chuzaiin*, referred to as those who live overseas already and get their jobs in Japanese firms' overseas branches or in small businesses run by other *shin-issei*.

In Japan, the term *gaishikei* means "non-Japanese companies in Japan," but in New York, it is also used to indicate "employees in non-Japanese companies in the United States."

friends, relatives, friends' friends, or relatives' friends. The number of Japanese who have stayed in the United States as *chuzaiin* (including their families) is increasing by more than 100,000 every four or five years, in steady circulations (see Chapter 5). Also, during the 1990s, the number of *ryugakusei* in the United States was continuously higher than 40,000. By making contact with my Japanese friends in Japan, I got some email responses that led me to some interviews in New York as well as in Tokyo. This does not mean, however, that they are open-handed to an interview request by a stranger.

After each interview, I asked the interviewee about the availability of other potential interviewees in his or her social networks. Most of the interviewees reacted to my request positively. From some *shin-issei* mothers, for example, I learned the term "*mama-tomo*" ("mother-friends"), circles of friends among *shin-issei* mothers, through which they said I might get some more interviewees. I only found out after the fact that snowball sampling is not easy.

Except for one, all interviews were conducted in Japanese. The length of the interviews averaged about one and a half hours. The older the interviewee was, the longer the interview tended to be. Most interviews took place at coffee shops or salad bars, and a few, at the interviewees' homes or offices. I brought a small digital audio device to tape-record the interviews with the interviewees' permission. Nearly two-thirds of the interviewees gave me the permission to tape-record the conversation.

When translating these interviews into English, I transcribed the interviews from the tapes and/or my interview notes. I used free translation (focusing on the meanings the words convey) as opposed to literal translation (the words themselves), the latter of which could lose the meaning of what was really said, especially with the significant cultural

differences between the two languages. Everyday conversations, including proverbs and idioms, are filled with unique elements that are taken for granted in a given culture, and I do not think literal translation would bring as much of their meaning to readers outside of the culture.

I carefully reread the transcripts in order to find shared issues and concerns among the interviewees. In accordance with them, I coded the transcripts. Among shared findings are the push/pull factors, encounters and discoveries during their journey, visa, ties in New York, ties to Japan, cultural differences, identity, and their future perspectives. These issues seem to be interacting with each other and thereby to direct the character of a given *shin-issei*'s self-adjusting processes in his or her journey, forward or backward.

I am aware that there are some limitations in my interview analysis. As noted above, the interviewees included in my analysis are only those who were supportive to this study's snowball sampling. This could cause biases. For example, the tone of the narratives of those who volunteered might be brighter than that of those who refused to be interviewed--although a few of those who called themselves overstayers did consent to interviewing.

In addition, some selection biases during the process of analysis might be unavoidable. I did not include the entire narrative, as given, in analysis, which might heighten the risk of privacy breaches for my interviewees. Instead, I selected some parts of the narratives on the basis of theme, in accordance with what I had learned in my dissertation preparation--i.e., the historical backgrounds, the statistical information, the ideological and theoretical *Nihonjinron*, the current social issues, the magazine articles on

"New York," and information from the previous studies. Although based on these various pieces of information, my selection of the narratives cannot be completely free from my own subjective viewpoints or ideological inclinations.

Each one of the interviewees gave me truly rich narratives not just about him or herself as the respondent, but, as informants, about other people, institutions, and events related to overseas adventure by the *shin-issei*. I learned a great deal from them, and heartily thank them. When they said, "Goodbye," they added, "*Ganbatte*" ("go for it"), which really encouraged me.

Description of the Sample

The number of my interviewees is 36 (20 females and 16 males). Of them, 4 were non-*shin-issei*: two *ryugaku* advisors (male, 35 years old; male, 40), one father (54) of two ex-*shin-issei* offspring (daughter, 26; son, 21), and a Jewish-Japanese American (40) born to a war bride in New York and married to, interestingly, a *shin-issei* (40). I interviewed them in order to get information from various perspectives. Unfortunately, I could get no interview appointments with the two ex-*shin-issei* and the *shin-issei* wife; they did not feel like participating. The demographic description of the *shin-issei* interviewees below excludes these 4 non-*shin-issei* and, of course, the two ex-*shin-issei* and the *shin-issei* wife, with whom I was unable to speak.

The age of the 32 *shin-issei* interviewees (36 minus the 4 non-*shin-issei* above) was on mean average 40.3 (median, 43), ranging from 22 to 69. The sample consists of more female *shin-issei* than male *shin-issei* (19 females and 13 males). Their average length of stay in the United States was 13.5 years, with a range from 2 to 43 years. Their

family backgrounds indicated that they were from middle- or upper-middle class; their families' primary breadwinners (all of whom were fathers) included white-collar workers (some ex-*chuzaiin*), business owners, educators (e.g., professors), medical doctors, accountants, and government bureaucrats. The interviewees themselves had high education levels; only 4 out of 32 (1 male and 3 females) had no college experience, while on the other hand, 5 had master's degrees (3 males and 2 females).

One-third (11 out of 32) were single, 7 were married to non-Japanese (6 females and 1 male), and 14 were married to Japanese (7 females and 7 males). The spouses of their intermarriages included a European immigrant to a male *shin-issei* (69 years old), an African-Korean American to a female (32), a Korean green-card holder to a female (44), white Americans to females (45, 45, and 55), a European naturalized citizen to a female (43), and a European green-card holder to a female (50). More than a half of those married (14 out of 21) were parents, with an average of 1.7 children. The age of their children ranged from 3 to 18 years old.

Of the *shin-issei* interviewees, 2 were U.S. citizens. They were U.S.-born but grew up in Japan. One of them (female, 26 years old) had an ex-*chuzaiin* father and the other's (male, 35) father was a priest sent from Japan to serve Japanese Christians living in the United States. The woman came back to the United States as an adult for her own business purposes, and the man returned as a graduate student.

More than 40 percent of the interviewees (or 14 out of 32) were LPRs (or green-card holders), having mostly followed either of the two major pathways: marriage and job. Through marriage, 6 received their green card; all are female. Of them, 3 married white-American husbands (not the first generation of European immigrants), 2 married

non-white, non-Japanese husbands (an African-Korean American and a Korean green-card holder), and 1, a Japanese green-card holder. All of them had jobs--including 1 entrepreneur, 1 *genchisaiyo* ("the employed locally"), 3 *gaishikei* ("employees in non-Japanese companies"), and 2 freelancers.

Through work visas, 5 interviewees had LPR statuses (2 females and 3 males). They include 1 self-employed (male, 69 years old), 1 entrepreneur (male, 59), 2 *gaishikei* (females, 43 and 52), and 1 *genchisaiyo* (male, 54). Their current jobs include photographer, restaurant owner (recently taking a break), bank clerk, copywriter, TV director, and accountant. One got a green card through a journalist visa (female, 50).

Only one person in my sample (male, 45) got a green card through the green-card lottery. He won it while in New York, right after he had relinquished his work visa. He currently runs a small film making company in New York. Also, only one in my sample (male, 52) got a green card through the "family-sponsored preference" (FS); his mother remarried an U.S. citizen in Japan. He came to the United States by himself after he finished college in Japan, and he is now a Japanese newspaper editor.

Other than these green-card holders, 5 interviewees had visas that permitted them to work in the United States (3 females and 2 males). They included 3 *genchisaiyo* (females, 30 and 48 years old; male, 26), 1 ex-*chuzaiin* (male, 53, currently in Tokyo), and 1 religious worker (female, 37). All of the 3 *genchisaiyo* were formerly international students in the United States, of whom two got work visas and one, OPT (Optional Practical Training). One of them was a realtor and the two were travel agents at two different companies; all of them serve Japanese customers. The male travel agent was about to switch his OPT to a work visa upon his company's sponsorship.

Nearly one-fifth of the *shin-issei* interviewees (6 out of 32) were students (3 females and 3 males), whose ages ranged between 22 and 27 years old. One of them attended a language school and the rest, undergraduate programs. Only one was married--to a *chuzaiin* whom she met in New York. None of these *shin-issei* was sure if they would stay in the United States; some wished to but knew that there would be many issues including jobs, visas, and their parents waiting for them to return to Japan.

The sample includes 3 ex-*chuzaiin* wives. All were interviewed in Tokyo. Two of them became mothers in the United States, and one already had a daughter prior to her departure. In the year of the interviews, they were 40, 43, and 46 years old.

Scoring their Japanese skill at 100 (mastery), their self-evaluations of their English skills were on average 50 to 60, and the highest, 90. More than a third of may sample left this question unanswered, often with a wry smile. To be reminded, Japanese are modest and shy and their self-evaluations tend to be lower than their actual skills.

Narratives

Although the specifics varied, the trajectories of the *shin-issei* are inevitably shaped by some certain common themes. They include: (1) the push/pull factors, (2) discoveries and encounters, (3) visa, (4) ties in New York, (5) ties to Japan, (6) cultural differences, (7) identity, and (8) the future perspective of their journey.

The narratives are presented, as noted above, in a series of focused episodes on the basis of theme rather than by person-by-person adventure stories. The purpose of this arrangement is twofold. The focus of analysis is on how the *shin-issei* deal with the shared themes rather than on each person's life course *per se*. No less importantly,

placing whole stories would heighten the risk of privacy breaches. A downside of this arrangement, however, is its tendency to make the narratives appear somewhat fragmented. It should be noted that the end of a narrative within a given theme is not the end of that person's story; the same person's narratives will reappear in another theme(s). All interviewees' names appearing here are pseudonyms. Also, some personal details are altered for privacy purposes.

The Push/Pull Factors

The *shin-issei* share images of the United Sates and of New York, which are shaped primarily through the media, such as magazines, TV programs, and movies (see Chapter 4). During the first several decade of postwar Japan, there was a series of American TV programs broadcast that provided the very basics about "big, rich America," thereby effectively inducing the feeling of *akogare* from future adventurers.

Specifically, the most popular TV programs included "I Love Lucy," "Father Knows Best," and "Bewitched." With astonishment, Japanese people witnessed for the first time such characters as the lady always loud, the democratic father, and an equal relationship between a married couple. All such Americans went against Japanese norms molded by Confucian doctrines, whereby ladies must be quiet, fathers are authoritarian, and wives unconditionally obey their husbands. TV watchers in Japan were, so to speak, enchanted by "America," which appeared to be limitlessly liberating. Below are some brief narratives that connect *akogare* and overseas adventure.

Yayoi (female, *gaishikei*, 52 years old) is one of those interviewees who recalls the impact of the early American TV programs on her feeling of *akogare*. She was a little girl heavily impressed by happy American families and their "big house, big garden,

big furniture, big refrigerator, big TV set…" Later in her college years in Japan, she majored, not coincidentally, in American literature. Upon graduation, Yayoi got a job at a Japanese advertising company. Then came a substantial pull factor from New York; an American advertising company wanted to hire someone who could mediate between the two countries. Her boss immediately recommended her for this position because of her English language skills as well as her *akogare* attitude toward, and her ample knowledge about, "big, rich America."

Similarly to Yayoi, Mr. Masaki (the father of two *shin-issei* offspring, 54) shares this feeling of enchantment with those old American TV programs. He says, "They [the TV programs] showed us a totally different world, and I was impressed by many things, especially the children's attitudes." As a child, he wondered why he could not interact with other people that freely in Japan. When Mr. Masaki met his would-be wife, he became jealous of the fact that she had attended a high school in California; her uncle's family lived there as a *chuzaiin* family at the time. Mr. Masaki himself has never experienced overseas adventure, and he thinks, in retrospect, that he handed over his *akogare* to his children, who later each embarked on their own *ryugaku*. Mr. Masaki happily talks about his son's experiences in his journey that "smelled like the good old American TV programs."

> My son attended a high school in Arizona through a student exchange program. The host family had two wild brothers. The first one was the same age as him and belonged to the same school. He was bossy and forced my son to join the football team. When he came back to Japan, we found that he had a lot of muscles.

Mr. Masaki also supported his daughter's *ryugaku* in Canada for high school and then college. When she came back to Japan upon completion of her BA, she was accompanied by a white Canadian--her boyfriend. He stayed at Mr. Masaki's home for about a month. The young man said to Mr. Masaki--by way of the daughter's translation--that he would come back to Japan to marry her after he got a job in Canada. Mr. Masaki confesses that he has conflicted feelings about this situation.

Besides TV programs and movies, younger generations in Japan soon got their own medium to more exclusively address their curiosity--teen magazines. Machiko (female, freelancer, 26), for example, says she got the images of America and New York through magazines for young ladies. For her, America is a country of "freedom," "fashion," "multinational," and "gun" She says,

> Also, Americans are different from Japanese in their attitudes towards "jobs," "private life," "marriage," "family," and so on. I think the image I got was right. Americans are more individualistic than Japanese, and I think it's nicer to be oneself than to be a part of a group, or than being under control of social pressures all the time. I'm trying to become like American, in this sense.

Push/pull factors today cannot be simply equated to factors that expel people from their home country or alluring them to a receiving country. Japan can create pull factors for prospective adventurers overseas, as well. "I'm one of those who came here at a very good time," says Yasuko (female, journalist, 50). Although a major push factor for her adventure stemmed from a sexist tendency in Japanese business culture, a pull factor for it also came from Japan--its good economy that was setting overseas environments socially and economically favorable to Japanese adventurers living there.

Yasuko took a job as a writer at a publishing company in Japan after she finished college. Soon, however, she noticed that there was a firm "glass ceiling" for female workers in Japan. After a fruitless consultation with her boss, she decided to take a break--in New York. To her surprise, when she was about to leave her company, her boss who learned that her destination was New York nicely offered her a sponsorship for her journalist visa, with very good pay; magazine articles on New York were highly demanded in Japan. The manager said she could get jobs from other companies, too, as long as she would prioritize his. "That was a miracle," Yasuko recalls.

In New York, she found, the images of Japan were no longer "exotic" but "cool" owing to *manga*, video games, and many aspects of popular culture. Americans became interested in "Japanese culture, food, and girls" in ways different from the past. In Japan, there was a demand for information about New York. According to Yasuko,

> As a magazine writer living in New York, I got a lot of jobs offered from Japan. At the same time, people I met in New York for my jobs including my interviewees--some of them being celebrities--were really nice to me. They invited me to a variety of parties one after another. I was twenty seven and single. This place looked to me like an adventure land, that is, like Disneyland. Me? An adventurer, not a princess though, of course.

Using her job status, she got a green card years later, years during which she experienced a number of exciting events. One of these was her marriage to a European green-card holder. She is now the mother of two daughters.

Together with *akogare* as a major pull factor, the *shin-issei* also share some push factors. Similarly to the sexist tendency in Japanese business culture, the entrance exam system for Japanese higher education is one of the most widely shared push factors. Of

the *shin-issei* I interviewed, 14 out of 32 did not take (or did not pass) the college entrance exam in Japan, and instead began their American lives as undergraduate students. Excluding the 5 undergraduate students currently taking courses, 6 out of 9 (14 minus 5) of the interviewees finished BAs. Their present statuses include 1 freelancer (female, 34), 1 *gaishikei* (female, 44), 3 *genchisaiyo* (female, 30 and 48; male, 26), and 1 entrepreneur (male, 45). To avoid being misleading, however, only 2 of them got their jobs based on their BAs alone. The other 4 did so, owing to the green card they obtained either through marriage or the lottery.

"When I decided to study abroad, I was still a high school student," says Yumiko (female, freelancer, 34). "I said to my parents that Japan's entrance exam system was so oppressive that it was killing me." Because they themselves were critical of the system, her parents supported her decision. All of her friends happily told her that the *mendokusai shakai* could not mold her. Following a *ryugaku* agent's instruction and arrangement, Yumiko came first to Kansas where she would see very few Japanese and could thus advance her English skills quickly. After taking some liberal arts and ELS courses in Kansas, she was then admitted to an art school in San Francisco. Yumiko met her husband, a Japanese chef, at a Japanese restaurant where she worked as a waitress while in school. After she got her BA, the couple moved to New York as her husband tired of San Francisco, which he felt was a small Japanese world. Yumiko says she became an adult--and a mother--in the United States.

"We don't encourage anybody to go ahead," says a *ryugaku* advisor in Tokyo, Mr. Hara (40). According to him, when *ryugaku* boomed in the 1990s, mothers were more active than fathers in sending their children to study abroad. Mr. Hara says,

> I don't think that's because mothers are more conscious about *kokusaika* or more rebellious to the *mendokusai shakai* than fathers. As you know, most celebrities' children study abroad today--some are even our clients. I think they are following this, in part. It was like a celebrity endorsement.

According to Mr. Hara, compared to those who are personally motivated, those who are pushed by their parents tend to be less successful in *ryugaku*. "Although people believe that young people have a high capacity for adaptation to unknown worlds, I disagree with this," he says. "They try to come back to Japan, making up excuse one after another." Some say they feel "sick." Some become involved with drugs in order to be sent back.

In Japan--though rare among Mr. Hara's clients--some students refuse to go to school, a social phenomenon known as *tokokyohi* or *futoko* ("school refusal"), which might lead to *hikikomori* ("shut-ins") typical among NEETs (see Chapter 4). The most likely cause is *ijime* ("bullying"). Mr. Hara took care of one girl, a high-school student who was persistently bullied by other girls in school. Her school, like most others, did not solve the problem. Then her parents considered *ryugaku* as the last resort. He says,

> I talked to her face-to-face, here. She was smart, had her own ideas, but that individualistic attitude seemed to be the reason for being bullied in Japanese school. I arranged everything for her to go to an American boarding school. A few months later, she emailed me, saying, "Thank you very much, I'm now revived in America!" That made me cry with joy, and her parents, too. She had been dismissed in Japan as an "ugly duckling," but she was actually a "beautiful swan." She's got a lot of friends, and she loves her school in the United States. I'm very happy with this.

Aside from the entrance exam, there are various other push factors, some of which tend to be seen as taboo and are thus not discussed openly among the *shin-issei*. Min-su (male, freelance, 45) is one of the few who do not conceal these factors. According to him, what pushed him for *ryugaku* in New York was a deep-rooted discriminatory environment in Japan against Korean Japanese. His parents supported his decision, concerned about the future of their only child. Min-su says, "They didn't want me to face similar situations in Japan." He continues,

> My father, a small business owner, is a Z*ainichi* ["Korean Japanese"]. When I was still young, I used to hear him and his friends talking about their experiences of discrimination. Through that, I learned that it could happen to me, too. That was hard, psychologically, deeply. Like most other Koreans in Japan, I had a Japanese name, which I don't use in New York, though. I understand very basics in Korean, but don't speak Korean very well.

Min-su's parents believed that in New York, there should be no difference between Japanese and Koreans. They are all Asians, and, indeed, Koreans are doing well in New York. "I think they wanted to me to set up my starting point in this so-called free country," in which ethnicity should not matter. Min-su goes on to say,

> According to my father, incomes of Z*ainichi* tended to be polarized. That is, they were either somewhat above or way below average, although, of course, most were below and a very few, above. He said Koreans could get decent jobs neither in private companies, like white-collar worker, nor in public sector, like bureaucrats or teachers. So there were four choices for them to pick: (1) take a menial job if available; (2) be involved in underground economies, such as gambling industry, sex industry, and so on; (3) try to be a superstar in sports or entertainment industries; and (4) study hard, help each other, and run your own business. He said, "Because no company hired me, and because I was not

> that talented, handsome, or physically tough, I had no choice other than running my own company." He became successful thanks to discrimination, although, of course, not everyone who chooses to run a business is successful.

Min-su dropped out of college in New York in his first year; there was no adequate help available to this 18 year-old boy. He did not go back to Japan, however; he could not tell his father of his failure. He says, "I think I felt obliged to achieve something to bring back to my parents in Japan, something that could substitute for a college degree. I was just a kid." Min-su has been in New York for 27 years, during which time he married a *shin-issei* wife but does not yet have children. Like Yumiko above, he became an adult in the United States. Currently, he is trying to establish legal status. His dream is to visit Japan with his wife.

The Discoveries and Encounters

Through years of experiences from living in New York, many *shin-issei* change their ideas about the "cool" city and the "rich" country, often in sobering or disenchanted ways. Most of them discover that some images they had previously gotten through the media were biased, incorrect, or obsolete. They find, for example, that America is no longer a country exclusively full of rich white people. Mr. Murakami (*genchisaiyo*, 52) recalls that when he came to Los Angeles in the 1980s, he was surprised to see a variety of people of color, such as Asians and Hispanics. "It was more astonishing," he adds, "to see that *they* were today's Americans"--a growing segment of the U.S. population.

According to Jimmy (a Jewish-Japanese American born to a war bride and married to a *shin-issei*, 40), as he grew up, the neighborhood in Queens where he lived

changed drastically in terms of race, ethnicity, and class. He used to go to Flushing, Queens, to attend a newly opened karate school. At the time, Jimmy was six. Flushing was much cleaner back then than today, according to him. He says,

> I walk around there and enjoy every once in a while today, but if I lived there, I wouldn't be happy... Now there are a lot of different people. I guess it's a different neighborhood, you know. Diversity? Yes, diversity is good as long as it doesn't drive down the property value.

The idea of "diversity" was alien to most of the *shin-issei* until recently, although they were very familiar with the term "the melting pot," i.e., the idea of integration as opposed to segregation. Like Jimmy, some *shin-issei* are critical of "diversity." Yurie (female, student, 22) is one of those with this opinion. According to her, when her school had an event to promote "diversity," she was asked to wear a Japanese kimono. "I felt like being pushed back," Yurie says. "I mean, I came here to become more international, but they ask me to keep being a traditional Japanese woman." She may have felt that she was being placed outside of the *akogare* subject with which she was trying to identify. For her, like many others, *akogare* is not directed toward "diversity."

Other than the idea of diversity, what can perplex the *shin-issei* is an experience of what they identify and perceive as "discrimination." Akiko (female, *gaishikei*, 44) gives some nuance of their perplexed feeling, saying, "The Japanese media always tell us that Japanese are the most loved and respected people all over the world. I found that not necessarily true in America as soon as I came here." Discrimination is by no means unique to the United States, but most of the *shin-issei* have not been victims of discrimination in Japan on the basis of their ancestral characters--with the exception of

Korean-Japanese, Ainu, Okinawans, and burakumin.[4] Even when they are tourists, Japanese seldom experience discrimination. As migrants, however, some face it directly, and if they do at the beginning of their journey, their shocked feeling tends to be unspeakable. It can be considered what might be called a "reverse push factor."

"When I was a student in California, I was discriminated against a lot, totally unexpectedly," says Mr. Miyata (entrepreneur, 45). He lived in a poor area at that time. For reason unknown to him, some children spit on him, or even threw stones at him. He took this as a product of the antagonistic idea against his mother country--"Japan bashing." Although he did not represent his country, Mr. Miyata became conscious about his Japaneseness for the first time in his life, in America.

Below are some more experiences of what the interviewees themselves call "discrimination." It is not clear, though, if it was specifically directed against their particular race or ethnicity or if they just encountered nasty people, or if their understanding of the situation was accurate. Either way, it is clear that they were hurt.

— When I was lying in the park, a black boy threw a plastic bottle at me. When I was walking in the street, a guy from a passing car yelled at me, "Soy sauce!"
— At my school cafeteria, when I asked a person about something, she said, "I don't want to speak with a 'kindergarten kid' who can't speak English." Maybe my English was too bad. Maybe they didn't say that. I don't know, but I felt shocked.
— Do you remember the subway tokens? You had to buy them at the subway booth although today you use vending machines instead to buy the metro-card. Some workers at the booth pretended not to hear me screaming "excuse me." Sometimes they prompted the person behind me, shouting "next," although I hadn't finished buying anything.

[4] See, e.g., "Multiethnic Japan and the Monoethnic Myth" (Murphy-Shigematsu 1993).

— My daughter and I, and my mother in-law, went to the beach in Long Island. My husband couldn't join. So my mother in-law drove the car. When we were about to get onto the beach from the boardwalk, a white guy yelled at us, saying that we needed to have a pass, $10 each. But he didn't look like an official worker for the beach. My mother in-law insisted it was free. Anyway, we left there and then got onto the beach from another path, and then, as she said, it was free. Later my husband said that the guy was probably trying to con us into paying the baseless pass and that Asians tended to be cheated easily. He's proud of us; we didn't pay.

Some *shin-issei* routinely feel disturbed in New York by careless mistakes that yield a lot of hustle. "I wonder if this place is actually a part of the First World," says Mari (female, *genchisaiyo*, 48), angrily. She unexpectedly discovers a variety of reverse push factors during her overseas adventure. As early as the first week of her journey in New York as a student, she encountered her first reverse push factor. In order to follow the procedure for her first semester, Mari went to the admissions office of the school, as indicated in the admission letter sent to her in Japan. A staff member of the admissions office said to her, however, that she needed to go to another office without confirming these details. She had to take the subway to do so, but she followed the instructions. Mari found the office successfully, but was told that she needed to return to the admissions office. She says, "This kind of things never happens in Japan." Not surprisingly, her feeling of *akogare* was instantly dispirited on that day--although she later successfully finished a BA and got a job with a work visa via OPT, now waiting for her green card to be issued in several years.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001 became a huge reverse push factor; in the following year, the number of LPRs decreased by 10 percent, despite the steady increase throughout the preceding two decades (see Chapter 4). Not only did this event

deteriorate the New York economy, but it also reduced the volume of jobs related to Japan. According to Mr. Murakami (*genchisaiyo*, 52), "Businesses in downtown [Manhattan] were almost virtually eliminated by that. Also, those in the Empire State building are gone; after the terrorism, not just the workers but also customers were required to show their ID to just get into the building." Related to this, Mr. Yoshida (*gaishikei*, 54) working for a construction company as an accountant says, "After that, fewer people became interested in renovating their kitchen, bathroom, things like that, unless they are trying to sell their property."

Jobs related to Japan declined drastically, as well. "Until the 9/11 terrorism," Mr. Miyata (entrepreneur, 45) editing films for Japanese companies says, "the main part of my jobs relied on Japan, but after that, I lost most jobs coming from Japan." Similarly, Emi (female, *gaishikei*, 55), who worked for a luxury gift store in Manhattan mostly targeting Japanese tourists, says:

> The number of Japanese customers coming to the store fell in the latter 1990s, but after the 9/11 terrorism, the company decided to close it, permanently. Ever since, the situation hasn't been wonderful to me.

What got damaged was not just the economy but the images of "cool" New York as well as "rich" America. Mr. Yoshida (*gaishikei*, 54) observes, for example, "The American government looked pretty much confused." He goes on to say,

> Bush pretended to be another Roosevelt, repeating, "Pearl Harbor, Pearl Harbor, terrorism, terrorism," but people seemed to get tired of it. See the Iraq War, the oil price, the terrorist threat level, etc., etc. America was no longer cool.

After the terrorism, the *ryugaku* boom to the United States noticeably decreased. Regarding this, Eriko (female, freelance, 45) says, "I'm not surprised at all by that because the situation surrounding us, all of us flying between the two countries all the time, is now really bad." As one of those much frustrated with the situation going on after the 9/11 terrorism, she says,

> The flights we took back then were nice and easy. At the airport, we were excited. But now, one flight is usually combined by two air companies, so the flight is always crowded. To save the budget, the service, especially the food, is becoming worse and worse. Moreover, at the airport, it used be the case that my husband saw us [Eriko and her children for *satogaeri*] off until at the door of the airplane we took! Now we are treated as if we were criminals or refugees.

Visa (Self-Adjusting Processes)

Many contemporary migrants switch their statuses during their journey. Traditionally, their final goal in terms of the legal status is to become U.S. citizens. In today's transnational environment, however, this may not necessarily be a goal. Among the *shin-issei*, indeed, few choose to become U.S. citizens despite their high intermarriage rates (see Chapter 3), and in my sample, there were no naturalized citizens or even prospective ones.

For the *shin-issei*, an immediate goal is to stay in the host country on their own terms, and in order to accomplish this, to maintain a visa. When necessary and possible, they will switch this visa to another type. The most convenient visa is certainly a green card. As Mr. Murakami (*genchisaiyo*, 52), who effortlessly got a green card through his mother's remarriage to a U.S. citizen, says,

> If you have a green card, things are easier in America. For green-card holders, companies don't have to spend their money for a sponsorship for a visa. So they choose those who already have it. I myself changed my jobs several times in the United States, owing to my green card.

Hisako (female, *gaishikei*, 43) is another of my interviewees who got a green card, but like most others, this process entailed years of self-adjusting steps involving relationships with other people, such as her employers and friends. The status of a migrant seems to be the product not of an individual making a decision in isolation, but instead of a series of encounters and interactions with events and other people dynamically surrounding him or her.

Hisako came to the United States as a graduate student in 1996. This jouney was a kind of career-up *ryugaku*, but was not an escape from the Japanese business culture; she got her company's (TV production) permission to take a break and to later return to the company. While in America, however, a friend of hers in Japan gave her information about a good job in New York; an American TV production company in New York wanted to hire a director related to Japan. Hisako honestly consulted with her boss in Japan about this opportunity. He happened to be quite familiar with the company and rather happily allowed her to take the job. He said he would support her job as much as he could because that would be to his company's benefit, as well. "My New York life thus began at that time"--at which Japan was a primary source of profit for many American companies. Her new company sponsored her work visa, according to Hisako, but kept her wages at a low level because the manager knew that she could not quit until she received the green card. As this manager rightly predicted, she is now thinking about

quitting her job--not because she has gotten a green card, but because she has become a mother.

Through her job in New York, Hisako met a European naturalized citizen. He was an interviewee for her TV program as a young, successful European living in New York, a prototype that Japanese audience wanted to see most. Her marriage followed her daughter's birth. Motherhood, Hisako says, changed her life course once again. To produce such TV programs, staff members need to not just walk around New York but sometimes travel between Japan and America. Hisako found it impossible to take care of her daughter in the ways she thought she should. Although her husband offered his help for babysitting, she began to think about leaving her TV job. To get a job that fit with her mothering, Hisako took a TESOL (Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages) certificate, an international certificate to teach English. "Currently, I'm taking a break from the TV job," she says. Despite her husband's citizenship, when asked about naturalization, her answer was, "A green card is good enough for me; you never know about the future." She implies that her entire family might eventually live in Japan.

Prior to their overseas adventure, many *shin-issei* have some business career in Japan; 13 of my sample of 32 *shin-issei* fit this category. Of them, some began their journey as students engaging in career-up *ryugaku*. Another immediately ran their businesses related to their previous career, relying on social and business networks as well as the macroeconomic condition of the time. Still others embarked on their adventure as salaried workers, and of them, some later started their own businesses. Mr. Kato (entrepreneur, 59) followed this third path to an entrepreneurship in New York, via a work visa. In Japan, he was a white-collar worker at a big corporation. He quit, moved

to Los Angeles as a sushi chef, and later opened his own restaurant in New York. Mr. Kato says, "I decided to do *datsu-sara* ("exit career") and *datsu*-Nippon ("exit Japan"), maybe because I wanted to find my own life, not the one molded in the *mendokusai shakai*, although I was married at that time and knew it was risky."

The Japanese business culture is complicated and filled with various hidden rules, according to Mr. Kato. In it, *oyabun* (employers) shape their *kobun*'s (employees) behaviors strictly and entirely for the sake of the group.[5] Selflessly, in turn, *kobun* follow their *oyabun*, but their selflessness is a *tatemae* ("one's public position"); in *honne* ("one's real intention or motive"), they do so for "carrot and stick."[6] Loyalty and obedience cannot last long by themselves if there is no hope for "carrot." Mr. Kato says he gradually found that *oyabun* use their *kobun* as tools for their own benefit, and when necessary, they adeptly sacrifice their *kobun*. For example, for a bad decision *oyabun* made, *kobun* are asked (or forced) to take responsibility, sometimes as far as stepping down from their positions.

"I became unable to put up with this when I noticed what was actually going on," says Mr. Kato. About that time, one of his colleagues who was sent to Los Angeles as a *chuzaiin* called him in Japan and said, "A Japanese restaurant in Los Angeles is looking for a sushi chef to hire." Many *chuzaiin* in Los Angeles demanded "good Japanese sushi." Mr. Kato says,

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[5] According to Smith (1983), *oyabun* refers to the superior and *kobun*, the inferior. Nakane (1972) suggests that *oyabun* is a person with the status of *oya* (parent) and *kobun*, with the status of *ko* (child). The essential elements in the relationship are that *kobun* serves *oyabun*, and *oyabun* in turn protect *kobun*.

[6] *Honne* is one's real motive or intention, while *tatemae* refers to outwardly shaped motives or intentions (Hoffer *et al*. 1986, pp. 94-95). This set of terms may reveal that how "harmony" is balanced upon hidden conficts.

> He knew I had worked for my father's small sushi restaurant while in school. Also, he knew I was dissatisfied with my company boss. I thought it was my first and last chance to do *dastu-sara*, and talked about it to my wife. She said she would follow me. That meant, "Go ahead!"

A few years later in Los Angeles, Mr. Kato got the information about a small restaurant in Manhattan for rent. After a careful study of the situation in New York, he decided to take it. Mr. Kato recalls,

> The neighborhood of that restaurant was beautiful, like a movie, and it was like a dream to open my own business over there. Among others, there were lots of *chuzaiin* demanding good sushi. I found no negative factors. So we moved to New York.

This was about 20 years ago, according to Mr. Kato. Later, he had a daughter and he is now proud of her success in high school. In terms of his own business, however, he confesses that he is not currently doing well; the environment became bad in the mid-1990s and then even worse after the terrorist attacks in 2001.

Ties in New York

None of the *shin-issei* in analysis associated with descendents of the so-called Japanese Americans, such as the *nisei* and *sansei*, although many have stayed on the West Coast prior to moving to New York. Consistent with this, Jimmy (a Jewish-Japanese American born to a war bride and married to a *shin-issei*, 40) recalls that his mother, a Japanese war bride, was rather isolated in her neighborhood in Queens, New

York, although some Japanese families (probably *chuzaiin*) lived there. According to him,

> There were some Japanese kids living in my neighborhood in Queens. I guess it was the mid 70s. There were 7, 8 kids in my school. They were 100 percent Japanese. I don't know what their parents were doing; I was seven, eight years old.

Half of my *shin-issei* interviewees (16 out of 32) say their friends are exclusively Japanese, typically other *shin-issei* sharing similar legal statuses. Their age on average is 36.1 years old, 8.4 years younger than those who have some non-Japanese (such as American) friends; their average length of stay in the United States is approximately 10.5 years, 6 years shorter than those who have non-Japanese friends.[7] Most of them attribute this tendency to their own lack of communication skills, particularly in English, cultural differences in values and norms, and their social and business environments surrounded exclusively by Japanese.

Tomoko (female, *genchisaiyo*, 30) says, "We don't even have a chance to speak English in New York, seriously." According to her, she goes to Japanese supermarkets, buys lunch at Japanese restaurants, buys books at Japanese bookstores, and so on. All the employees of her company are Japanese and so are all of her customers. In addition, all of her three roommates are Japanese and exclusively watch Japanese TV programs. "I mean, I don't speak English here," says Tomoko.

Machiko (female, freelancer, 26) says that although she is a U.S.-born citizen, she does not have a single non-Japanese friend. According to her,

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[7] As a few of them skew the distribution, and as some of them do not accurately (continued…)

> I was born in New York. My father was a *chuzaiin*. I actually grew up in Japan. So although I'm a U.S. citizen, I don't speak English well. If my Japanese is scored 100, my English score will be like 30. My friends in New York, all Japanese, are surprised when I say I'm an American. My name is Japanese, and I look Japanese. I myself feel strange and funny. Do I feel I'm "American"? I don't think so, at all. It's just a legal thing, but not cultural or spiritual. I mean, it's not about my identity.

Having finished beauty school in Japan, Machiko decided to "come back" to New York because she thought there would be more business opportunity for her. Working as a hairstylist in New York, she says, all of her clients are Japanese women.

Although these *shin-issei* say they do not have non-Japanese friends, when they talk about how they interact with other people in New York, it seems that they may in fact have some. Tetsuya (male, student, 27) may clarify this confusion that seems to result from the high hurdle of the "cultural grammar" (see Chapter 1). He says he has no "American friends." Prior to his departure from Japan, he thought he would, but found, "Their culture is different" not only in interactions between friends but also in the definition of a "friend" itself.

> One thing puzzling to me in New York is that people easily call each other "friend." Other students in my school call me "friend." That surprises me, not annoying though. Maybe, there is a difference between the two cultures in the definition of "friend." In Japan, friends are together all the time, at least, in the heart.

Called *mama-tomo*, circles of friends among *shin-issei* mothers attract many newcomers, but, on the other hand, tends to limit the frame of friends to only the

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remember the first year in the United Sates, the figures are given as just a rough idea.

Japanese. Regardless of their husbands' race or ethnicity, the *shin-issei* mothers among my interviewees join one or more circles. Minako (ex-*chuzaiin*-wife, 40) joined *mama-tomo* as soon as she came to New York. According to her,

> There were a lot of Japanese neighbors, far more than I had expected in Japan. What I did was to make a smile and say "konnichiwa" ("hello") to those who had little kids of similar age to my daughter. So, my daughter's friends, and mine, prior to her nursery school, were all Japanese. When I called my parents and talked about how she played with her friends in New York, they got confused because, you know, all the kids' names were Japanese.

Yumiko (female, freelancer, 34), one of the mothers who leads a circle, describes what *mama-tomo* is like. On the surface, it is an informal circle for children to play together. In a foreign country, *shin-issei* mothers are thirsty for making friends for their children. As a latent function, though, *mama-tomo* provides a chance for mothers themselves to also play together. Customarily, no husbands join the circle. As noted earlier, some certain degree of distance between married couples is a norm in Japan--and in New York--especially after they have a child (see Chapter 2).

The number of mothers in Yumiko's own circle who regularly (once or twice a week) come to the playground in Queens is about 15. This is not a small group; they bring their children with them. When they meet, they exchange information with each other about what is going on in Japan, such as popular TV programs, popular actors and singers, and who got married to whom. Yumiko says, happily, "I think some of us know these kinds of things even better than people in Japan." More pragmatic types of information are certainly exchanged, too, such as information about schooling, shopping, and housing.

Those who have a mixture of Japanese and non-Japanese friends (16 out of 32) tended to be older and have longer lengths of stay in the United States. Their age on average is 40.2--8.4 years older than those having friends exclusively Japanese; their average length of stay in the United States is approximately 16.5 years--6 years longer than those having exclusively Japanese friends.[8] Also, perhaps not surprisingly, all of those married to non-Japanese have non-Japanese friends.

Having ties in New York today may not simply mean having a relationship with an American. Nor may this involve only those two cultures. Many ties in New York are indeed shaped on three or more cultures. Akiko's (female, *gaishikei*, 44) marriage, for example, involves three cultures, Japanese, Korean, and American. Her husband came to New York from Korea as a graduate student in art, and then took a job as an art director in a company where she would later be hired as a copywriter. When the couple met, he already had a green card. According to Akiko, her husband is quite rare among Asian men; he is naturally egalitarian, as opposed to Confucian. His parents, who live in Korea but occasionally come to New York, however, are more traditional than their son. She says,

> They are unhappy with their son's marriage to a Japanese woman, me; I don't follow their expectations, especially in gender roles. For example, when they came to know that my husband does the dishes, according to my husband, they were almost traumatized. I think they consider me the worst in-law in the world.

Akiko's son is now 11. According to her, he speaks English very well and Japanese, to a lesser extent, but no Korean at all. Her husband is fine with that but his parents are not.

[8] As noted above, these figures are given just for a rough comparison.

In some cases--as with the war brides--developing ties in a new world results in a loss of those to the old world. Yuko (female, *gaishikei*, 45) met her husband, a white American, at Narita airport in Japan. He had just arrived from New York and she had just come back from Singapore as a flight attendant. They took the same bus to Shinjuku, Tokyo, and sat next to each other. Yuko thought he was a poor student traveling through Japan by himself. She gave him her number so he could call if he encountered trouble. A couple of weeks later, he called her to give her his number in Tokyo, and said, "I'm okay." He was not a poor student but a financial advisor just transferred to Tokyo. It was 1990.

They were married in 1994 in Japan. Yuko's family members, such as her parents and sisters, said nothing about her marriage nor visited her new home; they were unhappy with the situation. After her daughter's birth, though, their attitudes turned positive; they loved the girl very much, as *kawaii* ("cute"). "But later as we decided to live in New York for his job," Yuko sorrowfully recalls, "one of my sisters got upset and doesn't see us anymore." According to her parents, her sister got upset because

> I not only married a *gaijin* ("foreigner" or "alien") but also live in the country of *gaijin*. I think I've lost most of my Japanese friends, as well, not because they got upset, but because it seems we've lost the channel through which we could maintain our relationships. I hadn't expected this at all, but I think I need to accept this reality that I may seem to be becoming *gaijin* ("alien") to them. Very sad though.

Ties to Japan

All of my interviewees--except overstayers--say that they have returned to Japan at least once during their stay in the United States. Among the female *shin-issei*, only 2

out of 19 say that they have not visited Japan within the last few years. One of them, Emi (female, *genchisaiyo*, 55), says she lost both of her parents and feels like she has become a stranger to Japan. It used to be the case that she met her parents in Japan every summer, during which time she would go to the dentist, have a physical exam, renew her driver's license, and take care of similar necessities.

The other, Tomoko (female, *genchisaiyo*, 30), has not returned to Japan in the last three years. "For my visa situation," according to her,

> I don't think I should leave America now. They [her company's seniors] say, if you work with E-1 for longer than two years, you can travel outside America freely, but, they also say, it's not 100 percent sure. So, I don't want to gamble.

Among the male *shun-issei*, most engage in *satogaeri*. Kiyoshi (male, *genchisaiyo*, 26), one of the few who does not, says that his friends in Japan ask him to stay in New York during his vacation so they can come instead as tourists. Often, the *shin-issei* are used as tour guides by their friends, and, of course, they are happy with this arrangement. Not surprisingly, though, their parents are frustrated because this reduces chances for their *shin-issei* offspring to come back to Japan. When they become unable to stand it, some parents visit New York to see them, instead.

Mr. Kato (entrepreneur, 59) is also one of the few who has not returned to Japan for a long time. Similarly to Emi above, he lost his parents and does not feel like seeing today's Japan, which according to him became totally different from the "Japan" he knew of--a phenomenon called "Urashima Taro" shared among the *shin-issei*. The last time--long ago--when he went back to Japan, it was for his mother's funeral.

The majority do engage in *satogaeri* ("occasional return to hometown") at least once a year. Typically, the *shin-issei* return to Japan during the summer, staying in their parents' homes, for 2 to 3 weeks. Even Mr. Kato's wife and daughter (a high school student) return to Japan for a month every summer, leaving him in New York.

Like Mr. Kato's wife, other wives seldom hesitate to leave their husbands in New York when the husbands are unable to travel with the family. Again, some degree of distance between mothers and fathers is a Japanese norm. Mr. Murakami (*genchisaiyo*, 52), another husband left in New York alone during the summer, says, "In the last 10 years, I didn't go back to Japan; my job situation doesn't allow me to take a long vacation, like a week." His wife returns to Japan once a year, according to him, with their two children (a daughter and a son, both high school students), each time staying "for about a month." Mr. Murakami accepts this as a norm.

The *shin-issei* women married to non-Japanese husbands also follow this norm and their husbands tend to accept it--perhaps as *shikata ga nai*. Yuko (female, *gaishikei*, 45) is married to a white American and says she goes back to Japan every summer with their two daughters. Her husband sometimes joins them and sometimes does not, depending on his job situation. She stays in her parents' place with the girls "for 6, 8 weeks," regardless of her husband's presence. She is a school administrator in New York whose summer vacation is long, and her husband, a financial advisor, has a very short summer vacation.

Although some American husbands may feel lonely when left without their family for weeks, some seem to choose to stay in order to avoid being involved in a social organization that may appear to be unbearably *mendokusai* to them. Eriko (female,

freelancer, 45) married to a white American says, "My husband joined us going back to Japan only once."

> He didn't like it. In Japan, he says, he found the reason why the Japanese suicide rate was the highest among the developed countries in the world. I think, to him, it was too cramped for comfort, like *mendokusai*. He never joins afterward. So I bring my children, two sons, not him.

Smith's (1983) sketch of a Russian envoy dispatched to Japan may clarify this cramped tendency of Japanese cultural rules. At a loss, the envoy wrote in his journal:

> In Europe, people are worrying at this moment about whether to be or not to be, but we argued for whole days about whether to sit or not to sit, to stand or not to stand, and how we should sit and what we should sit on… (Cited in Smith 1983, p. 85)

According to Mr. Asada (ex-*chuzaiin*, 53), most Japanese companies share a set of *chuzaiin* rules for *satogaeri*. The *chuzaiin* in developed countries (like the United States) are entitled to receive round-trip tickets for their entire families' *satogaeri* every two years and to stay in Japan for two weeks. For the *chuzaiin* in developing countries, the frequency of *satogaeri* is set at twice a year (4 times that of those in developed countries) because they are supposed to take their physical exams in Japan. Also, as families tend not to join their husbands' *chuzaiin* assignment in developing countries (see Chapter 5), the companies allow them more frequent opportunities for this family reunion in Japan.

Regarding the rule for *satogaeri*, Minako (ex-*chuzaiin* wife, 40) says that the *chuzaiin satogaeri* in "every two years" is a free version of *satogaeri*. In reality, most of

the *chuzaiin* wives return to Japan every summer and their husbands follow their families' *satogaeri* when they can take a long summer vacation, as well. "But as my husband's schedule for vacation hardly overlapped with our daughter's," she says, "we usually moved separately. I mean, I moved with her, of course, and he moved by himself, if ever."

Megumi (ex-*chuzaiin* wife, 46) says, similarly, "When we lived in America, we came back to Japan every summer and stayed for about 10 days." Their *satogaeri*, however, was not a relaxed trip but was instead filled with events that her husband busily dealt with. She says,

> We were expected to visit both of our parents' places. Our children all looked forward to it, but my husband was extremely busy in Japan. He was expected, or actually obliged, to visit his company in Tokyo, see his friends and relatives in Nagasaki, and my parents in Iwate, and so forth, within 10 days.

Like Megumi's husband, some *shin-issei* including non-*chuzaiin* combine personal and business purposes in their *satogaeri*. Hisako (female, *gaishikei*, 43) whose job is to mediate between her American company in New York and its client companies in Japan, for example, shuttles between New York and Tokyo very often. Sometimes, with her company's permission, she brings her young daughter, but not often her husband.

Those *shin-issei* who customarily engage in *satogaeri* maintain Japanese mannerism and are quite knowledgeable about what is currently going on in Japan. In the eyes of their friends and relatives in Japan, however, this may not necessarily be the case. Many, especially those who have stayed in the United States for a long time, tend to be

teased in Japan not only as "*henna-Nihonjin*" ("strange Japanese") (see Chapter 5) but also "Urashima Taro," a fairytale character who finds nothing familiar in his home village upon his return from a long journey.

Of those who stayed in the United States longer than 10 years, 15 out of 19 interviewees say that they are Urashima Taro. That is, they do not catch up with what is going on in Japan, especially in terms of popular TV programs, popular singers and actors, and other popular culture. Although almost all engage in *satogaeri*, this indicates that the occasional return alone does not suffice to catch up with the dynamic social change in their home country.

Interestingly, some confess that they are Urashima Taro not just in terms of their connection to Japan but to the United States as well. For example, Minako (ex-*chuzaiin* wife, 40) says,

> We were subscribed to a major Japanese newspaper in New York. We also watched Japanese TV programs almost everyday. Still, when I went back to Japan, I felt I was left out in catching up with new names and faces of Japanese celebrities or politicians. In terms of the U.S. or world news, I didn't read American papers at all; I can't read them. I didn't watch American TV news programs, either; I can't hear their English. Maybe I barely knew what was going on in the world or in Japan during my stay in New York. In that sense, I was even like a caveman, you know, not just Urashima Taro.

Of my 32 interviewees, 19 say they are Urashima Taro. The average length of stay in the United States among the Urashima was 17.3 years, compared to 7.9 years of the non-Urashima (i.e., those who catch up with the social change in Japan). The age of the Urashima was on average 45 years old, compared to 33.3 of the non-Urashima. Slightly more than a half of the female *shin-issei* (53%) are Urashima, compared to more

than two-thirds of the male *shin-issei* (69%). All of those married to non-Japanese fall in the Urashima category, except one person whose job was closely related to Japan (as a hairstylist for Japanese women). Whether they have non-Japanese friends makes no difference and neither does whether they think they will permanently return to Japan. Below are some further comments about Urashima-Taro symptoms.

— I don't know anything about celebrities or politicians in Japan (Mr. Yoshida, *gaishikei*, 54). My wife [Japanese] knows a lot, even better than average in Japan, I guess. She watches a lot of Japanese TV programs, like soap operas, which she calls *torendo dorama* ("trend dramas"). Sometimes, that annoys me. You know, this is New York, but my environment is becoming Japanese more and more.

— I'm not Urashima Taro, I'm completely a foreigner in Japan, knowing nothing about, say, Japanese celebrities and their gossips (Hashida, freelancer, 69).

— I'm Urashima Taro (Mr. Takada, freelancer, 32). But as most patrons of my restaurant and my colleagues talk about things going on in Japan, bringing Japanese magazines, CDs, DVDs, things like that, I think I know some. Almost always, someone among them has just come back from Japan, and so the information is fresh.

— My wife knows a lot about what's going on in Japan (Jimmy, a Jewish-Japanese American, 40). She watches a lot of Japanese TV programs, such as Japanese soap operas. She now watches some Korean programs, which she says is very popular among Japanese women today. She never stops watching it. Our daughter also watches Japanese cartoons. I'm okay with that, of course.

Cultural Differences

Pushed by the *mendokusai shakai* and pulled by the images of New York, most of the *shin-issei* tend to view Japan in a critical (if not necessarily negative) fashion and America in a friendly (if not positive) manner. Over time, however, some of them get chances through their own experience to reevaluate the two cultures in different ways

from the past. In their comparisons between the two cultures, the *shin-issei* seem to stand for neither culture any longer, but rather for themselves. This does not mean that the *shin-issei* as internationalists are no longer confronted by cultural differences. The most often referred to concepts regarding cultural differences that they do face include: individualism, groupism, independence, interdependence, critical thinking, harmony (or *wa*), open-mindedness, close-mindedness, and gender roles.

Mr. Hashida (freelancer, 69) who has lived in New York for 43 years remains an admirer of American culture. He was a high school art teacher in Japan. In the early 1960s, when works of modern art began coming from America into Japan, Mr. Hashida felt shocked by the unrestraint energy in these pieces. He viewed the energies as stemming from the power of individual artists rather than, as was the case in Japan, that of organizations, which molded artists. This finding pushed and pulled Mr. Hashida towards his embarkation on an adventure in New York as an art student in 1964. Comparing the Japanese and American cultures, he says,

> America is smelly, dirty, but sturdy and funny, while Japan is neat, orderly, but lacking individuality, close-minded and blind to the outside. We are raised that way, molded from head to toe, solely as group members rather than as individuals. The difference can be seen among students of the two countries. When they enter the dorm, for example, American students set the room in ways comfortable to them, hanging pictures on the wall, etc., etc. Their room may be smelly, dirty, but at least a home for them. But Japanese students seldom do it, and use the room as is. Their room may look neat, orderly, but lacking individuality. The room controls them rather than the other way around. They try to fit in a given frame, which Americans try to reshape it for them or simply disregard it.

Akiko (female, *gaishikei*, 44), parenting an 11 year-old son, finds cultural differences in social interactions. She has two different groups of friends in New York. One comprises those in *mama-tomo* and the other, parents from her son's American school who are mostly non-Japanese. Akiko finds that they interact differently. According to her, although in both Japanese and American societies, *amae* ("dependence" or "the desire to be passively loved") [9] is important in intimate relationships, when it can go against the matter of individuality, Americans tend to reserve it, while Japanese will feel sad whenever it is lessened in interactions. American mothers try hard not to accept their children's *amae* as they grow, for example, while Japanese mothers do not even feel obliged to act in this way. She adds, "I'm a Japanese mother, of course, and will accept my son's *amae* for life; it is my culture, rather than personality."

Seemingly related to *amae*, Emi (female, *gaishikei*, 55) observes that Japan is like a society of "family" while America is like a society of "strangers." She says, "If you're not considered a family member, you are out in Japan. But in America, everybody is out in some sense."

Social group behaviors and the way that parties are held, according to many of my interviewees, makes a clear distinction between America and Japan. Tomoko (female, *genchisaiyo*, 30) says, for example, "In America, you as an individual need to be active in a party, while in Japan, you as a group member are supposed to follow what's going on in a party." She says she cannot enjoy a party held in the American way. In fact,

[9] For more socio-psychological discussions about *amae*, see Doi (1973).

> at a party in America, I try to see if there's another Japanese person, a pet, a dog or cat, or a little kid, ideally a baby, so I can kill time with them while the party is going on.

Eriko (female, freelancer, 45) says she had her own wedding party in New York in the American style. She invited her parents and some friends from Japan. If this event had been held in Japan, there would have been a host to lead the party from beginning to end and the guests would pay attention to, and join in, events such as speeches, karaoke, and games throughout the party.

> But we held our party in American style. We let people enjoy chatting, eating, drinking, as they pleased. There was no center to pay attention. A friend of mine from Japan then came up to me and anxiously said, "No host is leading your party. Everybody is doing different things. Has the party started yet?"

For the *shin-issei* who became adults in the United States, conversely, Japanese parties look rather strange. Kiyoshi (male, *genchisaiyo*, 26) is one of those who had never attended a Japanese party until he came to New York. It was his company's end-of-year party. According to him,

> It looked to me just like a party I had seen in a Japanese TV program. It was a big party of more than 100 people. There were two hosts, who, acting like comedians, led the party from the beginning to the end, and the guests kept paying their attentions to what was going on in the party from the beginning to the end. It was funny but weird to me, you know. Imagine serious Japanese business people acting like comedians, going wild, and getting drunk like lunatics. To be honest, I didn't like that.

The notion of "sexism" cannot be missed in the discussion about cultural differences; although sexism, like racism, is everywhere, it varies across societies in its

severity. The *shin-issei* tend to rediscover the depth of the sexist tendency of Japanese society in direct comparison to other cultures. For example, Hisako (female, *gaishikei*, 43) argues, "Although American women I know of here complain of their status, I would say, 'Come see the situation in Japan!'"

Midori (female, student, 26), married to a *chuzaiin* she met in New York, talks about the gender roles in the everyday life of her marriage. According to her, other students in her school say that their husbands share some housework, such as doing the dishes. Midori says,

> Mostly we have Japanese food. My husband likes it. I cook, but he doesn't. I do the dishes, but he watches TV. Do you know any Japanese husbands who do home cooking regularly?"

The double-faced tendency of *honne* ("one's real intention or motive") and *tatemae* ("one's public position") was previously discussed. It is a tendency to change one's attitude depending on the situation. When the situation involves formal pressures from above, *honne* hides itself behind *tatemae*. Ayako (ex-*chuzaiin* wife, 43) observes this, most markedly, among the *chuzaiin* changing their attitude as they cross the border between Japan and America. Indeed, according to her, they call the International Date Line the "attitude line"; when they cross it, they change their attitude toward Japanese business norms in positive ways, in *tatemae*. When they cross it back into the United States, they relax a little more than in Japan and exchange *honne* among themselves. Their wives, too, share this double-faced tendency, says Ayako as one of them. For example, all of them in public (*tatemae*) appreciate "*chuzaiin* circles," but some of them secretly (*honne*) call it a *mendokusai* village society.

Interestingly, some of those who came to New York long ago observe the difference not just between Japan and America but also between New York's past and present. Eriko (female, freelancer, 45), for example, is critical about the change that has taken place in New York in the last few decades. To her, New York is becoming boring and less energetic in terms of culture.

> Initially I came to New York, having much interest in arts. But now everything seems to be swallowed up in the business world, measured and evaluated through the monetary value. The focus is on economics rather than arts. I think there still remained the cultural energy in New York when I came here long ago.

Mr. Yoshida (*gaishikei*, 54) is another *shin-issei* who laments the change in New York. He says, American novels he had read gave him a lot about New York, by authors such as Peter Hamill and Irwin Shaw. New York afterward changed in many ways, mostly "in bad ways." He recalls,

> When I came here in the late 1970s, although the city was more dangerous, it was okay, because people were more unique, creative, critical, and autonomous… I don't like the recent trend of "consumption culture" dominated by big money, like, MTV, Apple, Microsoft, etc., etc. I use them myself, though. People became more babyish. "I want this, I want that," you know. There is no antithesis.

The city's characters Mr. Yoshida points to--such as "unique, creative, critical, and autonomous"--also distinguish between Japan and America, according to many other *shin-issei*. Yuko (female, *gaishikei*, 45) similarly laments the disappearance of "critical thinking," "originality," and "antithesis" from America. Her view, however, distinguishes between America and Japan clearly. She says that America has been losing

these characteristics while Japan has not yet gotten them. For example, in her view, there are no singers in Japan with much originality, like Bob Dylan. There is no Jimi Hendrix in Japan, either.

> When my husband [a white American] and I saw him [Jimi Hendrix] in his DVD playing "The Star-Spangled Banner" in the Woodstock concert, apparently to protest against the Vietnam War, he excitedly and proudly said, "That's American!" By contrast, when we say, "That's Japanese," it's not likely to be about critical thinking, but quite the opposite [i.e., loyalty and obedience to authority].

Identity

The *shin-issei* encounter various situations in their journey that cause them to think anew about identity. As Erik Erikson (1963, p. 282) suggests "we begin to conceptualize matters of identity at the time… when they become a problem," or, as Jenkins (1996, p. 9) views, when our "social maps" may no longer fit our "social landscapes" for our perception of what we ourselves are. For the *shin-issei* living in the two different cultures, matters of identity cannot be simple. For some of them, furthermore, the "we" include their offspring, possibly with races or ethnicities different from their own. Matters of identity for the *shin-issei* are problematic.

Hisako (female, *gaishikei*, 43) says her daughter (3 years old) has two last names--her husband's and hers--although people consider hers a middle name. She hopes her daughter is developing a mixture of identities. In terms of language, however, there does not seem to be a mixture. Her daughter speaks English and some Japanese, but almost none of her husband's language. She attends a private nursery school in her

neighborhood, Queens, for American children, where she speaks English. The daughter learns Japanese from her mother, Hisako. Coming from a small country in Europe, her husband is happy with this situation because he believes the most useful language in the world today is English. He speaks to their daughter exclusively in English, according to Hisako.

It seems that, like Hisako's daughter above, children of intermarriage tend to speak their mothers' language better than their fathers'; they usually spend more time with their mothers than with their fathers. Yasuko's (female, journalist, 50) daughters (10 and 12 years old) do not follow this tendency, however. Similarly to Hisako, Yasuko encourages her daughters to develop and maintain a mixture of identities. They each have two first names, one Japanese name and one American name, and one last name, their father's, which is German. Unlike Hisako's husband, however, her husband does not forgo his language, German, from their childrearing. Yasuko and her husband seem to pull their daughters each other and in reality, toward their own cultures. According to Yasuko,

> My husband, for example, speaks to them in German exclusively. He buys our daughters a lot of movies and books in German. So if their English is100, their German, 90, and Japanese… 30. Instead, I join their school events to volunteer, say, to demonstrate how to make *origami* ("paper folding"). I want to show them not only *origami* itself but their mother, me, trying to maintain Japanese culture.

Some *shin-issei* parents place their emphasis on the importance of an "original self" rather than "collectivity" or a self based on one's ethnicity, when considering their children's identity. Eriko (female, freelancer, 45), for example, says she wants her sons

(5 and 12 years old) to train themselves to express themselves as *themselves* rather than as Japanese, American, or Japanese American. Eriko laments this difficulty, however. She says,

> People see others through labels attached to them by their society. For example, Japanese people call our sons *haafu* ("half") meaning half-Japanese and half-American. The term doesn't connote a negative meaning, compared to *ainoko* ("a child of the mixed"), yet I don't like it. They are not *haafu*, but each of them, a whole person.

Each of her sons speaks Japanese well. She says, "If their English is 100, their Japanese is about 50, not very bad, compared to my husband," a white American who speaks only English. The boys' school has more than 10 Japanese children, from the pre-K to the fifth grade, in total. They do not seem to speak Japanese in school but exchange information about Japanese *manga*, popular among non-Japanese children, too. In that situation, they seem to identify with being Japanese, says Eriko, laughing.

Not many children of *shin-issei* have English-speaking parents. If their parents, especially mothers, have difficulty with English, the children tend to lag behind in their early school days (see Chapter 5). If this struggle persists into the third grade, according to Eriko, and if they attend *hoshuko* ("supplementary Japanese school"), their teacher will suggest that spending so much time learning Japanese is not a good choice. Eriko says Bloomberg's education policy eliminating social promotion pushes the schoolteachers in this direction. Local education policies, then, can affect identity.

Minako (ex-*chuzaiin* wife, 40) says that in the beginning, her concern was about English skills not just of her own but also of her daughter (currently 10 years old). She thought she would send her daughter to a public school in New York. Very soon,

however, she found herself left out in terms of English, and her concern shifted. Minako says,

> I began worrying about if she could maintain good Japanese, that is, Japanese-like Japanese, not Americanized Japanese. About that time, she was losing her Japanese friends because they belonged to different schools, mostly Japanese private schools, and got different friends for play dates. She herself was developing her own circles of non-Japanese friends. It might be rather me who was getting into dilemma, being left out in between Japanese and American cultures… So I decided to join PTA activities of her school as actively as possible.

In the self-adjusting processes of their overseas adventure, most of the *shin-issei* discover the change in their identity, often unexpectedly. Sometimes, this change comes from outside, that is, from other people's view on them. Sometimes, it can emerge from within. When the perception of identity from outside and that from inside create a gap, it may lead to struggle or isolation.

Akiko (female, *gaishikei*, 43) says that from the Japanese view, she may look more American than Japanese, but from the American view, she may be nothing other than Japanese. She likens herself to a "mermaid," half fish and half human, married to a non-Japanese and non-American man, and raising a boy born in America.

Mr. Yoshida (*genchisaiyo*, 54), by contrast, is one of my interviewees who discovered themselves viewing New York as their "home." According to him, long ago when he came back to New York from a visit to Japan, and saw the view of Manhattan from the airplane in the sky, he felt as though he was going "home." He says he discovered himself seeing New York that way.

> In Japan, though, I rather had felt like a *yosomono* ("an outsider" or "stranger"). Am I becoming an American? I don't know. It's difficult to answer… Do I think I'm an Asian? Well, the old categories, such as Asian, American, or Japanese, sometimes don't fit people today. Many are themselves. In that sense, I'm "myself" rather than "Japanese" or "quasi-American."

Yumiko (female, freelancer, 34), who reached adulthood in the United States, also rejects the frame of American or Japanese. "Am I becoming an American?" Her answer is negative but not simply so. She says,

> I don't think so. I'm not a duck, as in "The Ugly Duckling," nor am I a swan. I'm okay with that. Indeed when we look around, we see a lot of people just like me in New York. They are not ducks, nor are they swans.

Like Akiko (likened to a "mermaid"), her identity is, in a word, "marginal" (see Park 1928). Yumiko's idea about herself and a lot of people in New York as neither a duck nor a swan, however, may demand a new view that tries to capture the marginality as its own character, or as a new type emerging in the new environment. Park (*ibid*., p. 881) argued, "It is, therefore, in the mind of the marginal man that the process of civilization is visibly going on, and it is in the mind of the marginal man that the process of civilization may best be studied." The *shin-issei*, then, is not just a process in their journey but more broadly, a phenomenon going on in an environment that is increasingly becoming transnationalized.

The Future Perspectives

As noted above, nearly two-thirds of the *shin-issei* I interviewed say they will terminate their journey in the future--although of them, none of those having jobs in New York has a clear plan about "when" and "how." One of the factors that pull them back to Japan may be the "cultural grammar." Megumi (ex-*chuzaiin* wife, 46) says, for example, that during her journey, "I think I was always thirsty for personal interactions with other people who share my generation, my language, and my culture." When she worked for a Japanese restaurant as a part-time waitress, she met her husband, a *chuzaiin*. Megumi says, "He taught me a lot about New York, and about Japan, and that was the only one meaningful relationship I encountered in New York." After their marriage, she lived in New York for six years as a *chuzaiin* wife and they had two children (a girl and a boy). She now lives in Japan. She loved New York, but she loves Japan more, Japan where other people share, in their deep psychology, the same cultural grammar.

Another factor that makes the *shin-issei* turn back to Japan seems to be their own deep-seated sentiment toward their family-nation, Japan--quite similar to that shared by the prewar labor migrants who returned to Japan even after decades of their journeys in America (see Chapter 1). Their sentiment can be equated to a feeling for one's own "mother"--whom one may miss after having played until the evening outside--rather than to a notion of patriotism or nationalism. Yayoi (female, *gaishikei*, 52) says, "Japan is special to me… And, of course, it'll be Japan where I'll die." Many of the *shin-issei* share this feeling although on the other hand, they tend to remain critical of the Japanese social organization.

When asked about the future perspective, very few had an unequivocal answer. For the majority, the future is not a decision they can make by themselves; the future depends on relationships with other people, especially their friends and families, including those in Japan. No *shin-issei* mother failed to mention her offspring when asked about her future perspective, for example. Some talked about their aging parents in Japan whom they thought they would need to take care of. Their self-adjusting processes seemed ongoing and dependent upon various factors that surrounded them. In their answers, some claimed their direction to be forward, while some hinted that to be backward. The tug of war on the micro level continues. Here are some of their own words:

> After I become old enough, I think I'll go back to Japan with my husband (Yayoi, female, *gaishikei*, 52). Until then I'll keep learning a lot. And, of course, it'll be Japan where I'll die. I don't know if I'll die earlier than my husband or the other way around, but we'll be in Japan rather than in America.
>
> Before I become too old, I think I'll live in Japan (Akiko, female, *gaishikei*, 44). For my son, both Japan and America will become his own countries. My husband may want to stay in New York for his job. I want to write books in Japan about Japanese culture in comparison to American culture.
>
> My family members including my son, daughter, and wife will all live in Japan (Mr. Murakami, *genchisaiyo*, 52). Our son lives in Japan already [for high school], and our daughter is following him, with my wife. I'll have to stay here by myself, until my job situation changes. I don't know when.
>
> In the future, I don't know where I'll live (Eriko, female, freelancer, 45). But when my [American] husband dies, I think I'll go back to Japan permanently. My dream is to go back to college as a student someday. My sons will live in Japan, too.

I will probably live in Japan (Mari, female, *genchisaiyo*, 48). My parents are aging. I need to take care of them. When? I don't have a specific plan. I don't know what I will do in Japan.

I think I'll live in Japan (Mr. Takada, freelancer, 32). I still want to work as an artist. Although I don't paint today, I will, if I get the chance. Recently a friend of mine, Japanese, mentioned an advertising job, which I think is related to art, somewhat. If I get that job, I won't have to beg money from my parents anymore. Rather, I could support them. Then, maybe, I would go back to Japan.

To be honest, I've become tired of things in this city, which are bit foreign to me (Koji, male, student, 22).

I don't know where we'll live (Yasuko, female, journalist, 50). We may live in Europe. But when my husband dies, that would barely make sense, and so we'll live in Japan... But if my daughters get the basis, on which they'd better live in New York--like, marriage or job--then I'll live near them in New York... Since I had two daughters, New York has become the real world, no longer a Disneyland, you know. I'm a foreigner here.

Most of my son's [5 years old] friends are children of *chuzaiin* (Mr. Shimada, religion, 35). Sooner or later, they go back to Japan permanently. In fact, some of them, Ken, Jun, Ai, and Mina, have left New York, and so he asks me when we will leave.

I think I'll stay in America (Hisako, female, *gaishikei*, 43). My dream is to maintain a good relationship with my husband until either one of us dies. I don't have a clear idea about our daughter's future; she's still young [3 years old]. But I think it'll determine a lot of my future as well.

I want to run a school for little children, like, toddlers, in New York (Yuko, female, *gaishikei*, 45). They can be anything, like, Japanese, American, Vietnamese... If my children want to help me do it, I'll be happy. If not, it'll be okay, too, though. But at least, I want to be connected to my children anyhow. So, as I said, if they want to live in Japan, I'll help them. I don't know what my husband will do. It won't be easy.

I'll do my job in America and, at the same time, raise children, which I hope to have (Tomoko, female, *genchisaiyo*, 30). My job would be like a hairdresser or something like that, and my husband would be a Japanese businessman working for an American company. We'd go back to Japan every summer. Something like that.

I think I'll live in Los Angeles (Kiyoshi, male, *genchisaiyo*, 26). I don't know yet if I'll eventually become an American, though. My father is retired now and thinking about opening a small restaurant in Tokyo, which his relatives will help with. I'm wondering if I could open its sister restaurant in Los Angeles.

I'll be living in New York. I've lived in New York longer than I did in Japan (Min-su, male, freelancer, 45). In that sense, I grew up in New York. Socially and economically, I think I'm a New Yorker, not legally yet though. After I get a green card, I want to visit Japan, with my [Japanese] wife. That's my dream, right now.

I don't know where I'll live in the future (Emi, female, *gaishikei*, 55). It could be Japan, but I don't think there would be room for me over there. I think it'll depend on my relationships with other people. I may have another chance for marriage. Then my husband would join the decision of where to live. Likewise, my job situations may determine where I would live. So I myself don't know right now. But if there's another big terrorism [for which her company closed permanently] attack in America, I think I'd better leave, regardless.

My dream is to keep singing (Midori, female, student, 26). As I said, I used to sing in Japan. I may be doing the same or maybe more in New York. I'm sure my husband will support me. So I'm wondering what'll happen to me in Japan if I go back there after I become something in that business in New York.

I don't know where I'll live (Mr. Miyata, entrepreneur, 45). Currently, 70 percent of my jobs are related to Japan somehow. So I shuttle between Tokyo and New York several times a year. It used to be the case that if you do a job related to filmmaking or film editing, you have to live either in New York or in Hollywood. But today, you can live anywhere. I'm happy with this, and, I think, so is my wife. Also, my son is becoming

more Japanese-like than before, maybe because of my wife's influence. Anyway Tokyo will remain as one of our bases, and so will New York.

I'm planning to go to Australia next year (Mr. Hashida, freelancer, 69). One of my Japanese students lives there with his family--his wife and children. I taught photography at some different colleges, while I was doing my master's degree at Columbia University. In the beginning, in the early 1970s, most of my students were white and very few were Asians. But later, the number of Japanese students increased a little. He was one of them. He now teaches photography to Japanese students over there. I promised him to teach his wife how to make a pinhole camera. Also, I'm thinking how it'll be wonderful to take pictures in Australia with my pinhole camera.

Conclusion

This study explored contemporary Japanese migrants to the United States called the *shin-issei*, concluding with an in-depth interview analysis of those living in New York, the Japanese New Yorkers. One of the major assumptions of this study was that migration in our highly transnational environment no longer necessarily entails a change of nationality, or permanent settlement, or even socio-cultural transition from one society to another. Closely related to this, the inappropriateness of the term "immigrants" was critically discussed from several angles. To briefly summarize, first, the term connotes a host-country-centered view and tends to be blind to the other side of the same coin, "emigrants," or the sending country's culture that is deep-rooted in migrants' socio-psychological character. Second, the term confines itself to the old image of migrants seen through the lens of the economic theory of migration. Third, most of the *shin-issei* begin their adventure as, legally saying, "non-immigrants," and calling them "immigrants" ironically overlooks the most difficult problem some of them face, i.e., to obtain the "immigrant" status (or a green card). Besides "immigrants," hence, this study has selectively used the terms "migrants," "emigrants," "immigrants," and "adventurers," whenever it conveys a more suitable nuance.

The study consisted of two major parts: "historical background, the elements of continuity" and "the *shin-issei*: 'tug of war' warriors, or wanderers?" The first part presented the origins of the continuity between now and then of the Japanese overseas migrants to the United States in several important elements. They included: (1) the feeling of *akogare* for the West, (2) nationalist concerns about Western influences

potentially eroding Japan's national identity and social organization, and (3) the resulting conflicts, or tug of war, between traditionalism and progressivism. The feeling of *akogare* grew upon the government's modernization project called the Meiji Restoration, coupled with intellectuals' agitation known as *datsua-nyuo* ("exit Asia, enter Europe") that argued in favor of the Western thoughts of individual liberties and, on the other hand, against Japan's feudal past. The political leaders' reaction to *akogare* could not be unequivocal, caught between the nation's advancement from following the Western models and Japanese national pride and identity. The slogan *fukoku-kyohei* ("enrich the nation, strengthen the military") was substantiated through Western knowledge, but interestingly, its spirit was molded upon the feudal samurai code--a political arrangement called samuraization. Emigration for non-labor purposes, such as *ryugaku*, was not restricted, as it could be beneficial to the modernization project, but as such, its energy was supposed to be directed toward the aims of the state rather than those of the individual. Regarding the direction of this energy, the ideological tug of war has never lost its tension in Japan, thereafter.

Sharing *akogare* for the West, and dreaming of *risshin shusse*, many ambitious youth from ex-samurai and merchant classes embarked on their overseas journey in Meiji, the very first wave of Japanese migration to the United States. In terms of their adventure style, these non-labor migrants had many parallels to today's *shin-issei*. Utilizing knowledge acquired overseas, some of them fulfilled their dreams by contributing to the development or reformation of Japan's institutions in various arenas, such as politics, business, press, and education. Not a few, on the other hand, were

viewed in a negative light for their insecure overseas trajectories, greeted with pejorative labels, such as "a blot on Japan's national image."

Although ousted in practice by Japan's modernization project, and thereby called *kimin* ("abandoned people"), the labor migrants nonetheless maintained the national character and a deep sentiment for it throughout their journey. Even decades after their emigration, many returned to Japan, leaving behind high wage jobs and taking long voyages across the Pacific Ocean. Those who stayed in America utilized the practice of arranged marriage in finding wives from Japan. It was discussed that although arranged marriage is believed to be an ancestrally practiced folk custom, the practice was actually disseminated in Meiji as a part of samuraization, a policy that molded all that is thought to be "Japanese." The shadow of samuraization lasts long. Even a generation after their emigration, the Japanese, i.e., the *nisei*, acted in samurai-like manner in reaction to the U.S. wartime policies against them, offering a "suicide battalion" and service by the entire *nisei*.

The U.S.-led Allied Occupation, which took place in immediate postwar Japan, reopened the flow of Japanese migration to the United States. Its proclaimed goal was to democratize and demilitarize the polity of this previously totalitarian state. To this end, it changed Japan's constitution, tried war criminals, and purged militarist and/or ultranationalist elements, all of which continue to be controversial. Through these tasks, the occupation formed the arena for the tug of war over the postwar Japanese social organization, or for the push/pull factors for political and cultural adventure in international environments by Japan's forthcoming generations. Its immediate impacts on the masses, though, were more cultural and socio-psychological than political. For

American culture they faced, *akogare* was swiftly revived and grew more substantially than ever. Under such circumstances, a large number of young women left Japan as U.S. servicemen's wives, the first big wave of Japanese migration to the United Sates in the postwar era.

The second part of this study was devoted to analysis of the *shin-issei* through several methods. For the definition of the term *shin-issei*, the emphasis was placed on their character set in "ongoing self-adjusting processes." Such processes encompass several statuses that include "immigrants" (or LPRs), "non-immigrants" (LTVs), U.S. citizens (naturalized or U.S.-born raised in Japan), and illegal overstayers.

The trend of the *shin-issei* in the last several decades was statistically analyzed. Today, more than 380,000 Japanese live in the United States, 3 times that of the Japanese Americans on the prewar U.S. mainland. Of them, one-third were LPRs and the rest, LTVs. Since the 1970s, LTVs increased by 8.6 times and LPRs, by 2.6 times. The most rapid increase among the LTVs was observed in the latter 1980s, Japan's "bubble economy," during which period alone the number of them rose by 3 times. As discussed, their statuses are not fixed, but potentially move from LTV to LPR. In the 1990s, as if following the increasing number of the LTVs, that of the LPRs grew by 1.5 times. This crossing of the boundary from LTV to LPR is essentially important in contemporary migration.

The preferences for switching status from LTV to LPR among the *shin-issei* were analyzed in comparison to their counterparts from other major sending regions such as Europe, Americas, and Asia (excluding Japan), using data based on those who obtained LPR status between 2003 and 2009. The findings were as follows. First, all these

regions sent more females than males, but Japan was extreme in this tendency; its female proportion was 75.6 percent. Second, Japanese took almost exclusively one of two preferences for their LPR status: "immediate relatives of U.S. citizens" (IR) (61.6%) and "employment-based preferences" (EB) (31.4%). Third, while Asia and Americas customarily utilized "family-sponsored preferences" (FS)--a primary means to "chain migration"--Japan and Europe barely used this path. This trend made the difference among these groups in the growth of "immigrants" they sent to the United States after the Immigration Act of 1965. It was argued that in analysis of contemporary American immigration, it is important to take into account the nature of the Act of 1965 set in favor of those who migrate "as families" and thus "in chain migration." In all, today's migration situation in the United States hardly seems to be more liberated than that in the nineteenth century, especially for those migrate as individuals.

Major factors assumed to push/pull potential overseas adventurers were discussed in three sections: "*Nihonjinron* and *kokusaika*," "the social issues," and "'New York' in Japanese magazines." *Nihonjinron* has two different versions, the ideological and the theoretical. The former is to promote and defend the traditional form of Japanese identity, while the latter is comprised of scholarly studies of Japaneseness. As a classical work in the latter version, Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* was examined. Published in the immediate postwar era, this piece evoked excited reactions from Japanese readers, in both positive and negative ways. The supporters appreciated her *Nihonjinron* as a "book of lessons." The critics pointed out her failure to distinguish between "the people's grass-roots lifestyle" (symbolized by Benedict as "the chrysanthemum") and "the state-imposed norms" (as "the sword"). Benedict, according

to them, overlooked the inner conflicts concealed under the Japanese "virtue," a culture that had actually been politically forged in Meiji, based on the samurai code.

In reaction to the increasing international pressures and influences in the postwar era, the ideological version of *Nihonjinron* grew, and it was soon followed by a slogan of *kokusaika*. Although polar opposites in their ideological standpoints, both *Nihonjinron* and *kokusaika* are utilized by the Japanese government as if they were the same thing, whereby to pull the meaning of *kokusaika* in a nationalist direction. The critics of this version of *Nihonjinron* attack what is considered to be the foremost Japanese virtue of *wa* ("harmony") as a dysfunctional ideology in the international environment in various ways. According to these critics, first, it creates and excludes outsiders upon an intensively nurtured *uchi-soto* ("inside-outside") consciousness. Second, it is a groupism that entails a total submission of its members to its hierarchical structure. Third, it negates the individual "ego," and hence molds the Japanese personality into a homogenous character.

Current social issues in Japan include the "parasite singles," "freeter and NEET," "*karoshi*," and "Japan's high suicide rate." These phenomena are assumed to be stemming from the social atmosphere tinted by the sharp contrast between the bubble economy in the 1980s, its burst, and its prolonged aftermath. Some argue, though, that these issues are also shaped upon the Japanese social organization, such as the notion of *wa*. For them, for example, the "parasite singles," though blamed in the media of contributing to Japan's low birth rate, are in fact a "symptom of their pessimism," resulting from "Japan's punishing professional system." The freeters and NEETs, more critically frowned upon in the media, are certainly more deeply dipped in this

"pessimism." Similarly, the phenomenon of *karoshi* is seen as a painful signal of the self-sacrificing spirit of the Japanese social organization. Japan's suicide rate, despite its impressive GDP, remains very high. It was argued that it should not be seen as *altruistic* to *wa* in its spirit; rather, suicide may be a manifestation of *anomic* feeling to *wa*.

"New York" appearing in the Japanese media was analyzed as forming "pull factors" for overseas adventurers. Japanese magazine articles were categorized into several groups. First, in the "adventure-land" type of the magazine articles, how to "live" or "stay for a while," rather than "sightseeing," in New York seemed to be a dominant focus. The repeated theme was a "new self" that would be found through an adventure in New York. Second, a majority of the magazine articles on New York, the "pioneer type," focused on Japanese celebrities who began utilizing New York, or more broadly America, as a vacation home. These celebrities changed the image of New York from a city that was "cool yet foreign" to a city that could be "one's new address." Third, the "model-adventure" type of articles highlighted the *shin-issei* doing very well in New York in terms of business, study, romance, and more lifestyle. By contrast, finally, the "anti-*akogare*" type focused on negatives of New York, such as violence, drugs, robberies, AIDS, and "yellow cabs."

Very few studies previously explored the *shin-issei*. One chapter was devoted to a summary of their findings, thoughts, and arguments. The statuses of the *shin-issei* in those studies included: (1) the *chuzaiin*, (2) the *ryugakusei*, (3) entrepreneurs, and (4) "internationalists" or "wanderers." The *chuzaiin* system developing in the early 1970s for Japan's global reach, together with the *ryugaku* boom among middle-class youths, rapidly set the ground for the growth of the new type of Japanese international migrants

later called the *shin-issei*. Among them, some began running their businesses to serve the special needs of other *shin-issei* as well as massively increasing numbers of Japanese tourists in U.S. urban cities, such as Los Angeles and New York. Running supermarkets, restaurants, souvenir shops, travel agencies, and piano bars (or hostess clubs), the presence of these entrepreneurs is important in the *shin-issei* phenomenon. They come up from the large latent stock of the *shin-issei*, by adjusting their statuses from one (e.g., students) to another (employees of Japanese-related businesses) during their journey. Some of those who are employed by them in turn start their own businesses. An official at the Japanese Consulate in Manhattan described the Japanese situation in New York as "self-sustaining." Although they interact with other *shin-issei* through their businesses, they are not developing their own "ethnic community." For them, running a business overseas--or, more broadly, living in New York--is a personal adventure for socio-psychological satisfaction rather than an instrument for a collective advancement.

The *ryugaku* boom rapidly grew in the 1970s as youth from middle-class families joined the academic adventure, which had previously been monopolized by the elite class. The *ryugaku* boom kept growing and hit a peak in the 1990s; however, it began to decline in the early 2000s. The most drastic decrease was seen among undergraduate students. Several factors assumed to be contributing to this decline include the burst of the bubble economy and its repercussions, the unexpectedly high difficulty in obtaining U.S. work visas, and the U.S. reactions to the 9/11 terrorism that gradually dispirited the feeling of *akogare*. Rewarded neither in Japan nor in the United States, Japanese youth cannot be expected to form another boom of *ryugaku* to the United States.

Although the *shin-issei* are often considered "internationalists," some negative labels are attached to them in Japan. As the most stigmatic one, "yellow cabs" was discussed. According to the previous studies, those labeled "yellow cabs" share *akogare* for a romance with American men, and therefore embark on their adventure. It seems, then, from the fact that Japanese women's intermarriage rates are very high, that their adventure bears fruit. The previous studies of female *shin-issei*, nonetheless, tend to focus on scandalous aspects of their *akogare*, as if soothing, or rather evoking, what Dower (2000) calls the psychology of the piercing wound (see Chapter 2). Compared to the studies of the war brides, indeed, one can find relatively fewer narratives analyzed in a sympathetic or humane lens. Although these previous studies are, needless to say, valuable as the pioneers, more studies, and theories, are awaited.

Other than the "yellow cabs," there are some negative labels put on the *shin-issei*, such as "adrift youths," "rootless wanderers," and the like. These *shin-issei* tend to be young and come to the United States mostly as students. One of the previous studies considers them to be "consumers" whose international migration is based on commercialized services, such as travel agencies, *ryugaku* agencies, and Japanese local newspapers, rather than dependable social networks overseas. Some of them take jobs in *shin-issei* businesses as part-timers, without being sponsored for their work visas. Their journey is hence precarious, with no clear goal or idea. Another study views the *shin-issei* as placing themselves in a "consolation match for a rebirth," one based on information or strategies no better than before. Their future is insecure in a foreign country, but many of them seem unaware of and unconcerned about this.

What previous studies overlook, however, is the presence of many *shin-issei* who started as nothing other than "rootless wanderers" or "adrift youths" and who *did* make a rebirth in the United States, including many of my *shin-issei* interviewees. One can argue that the term "adventure" connotes "derailment," without which there would be no "rebirth" or no "new self" for many individuals. More obvious examples, other than my interviewees, could be seen among well-known *shin-issei*--such as Rocky Aoki, Yoko Ono, Junki Yoshida, and Shin Koyamada--who apparently had no secure future until they reached it in their adventure derailing from Japanese society.

The final chapter, "the Japanese New Yorkers," presented the interview analysis of the *shin-issei* in New York. The foci were placed on the issues and concerns shared among the *shin-issei* interviewees, including the push/pull factors, their discoveries and encounters during their journey, visa, ties in New York, ties to Japan, cultural differences, identity, and their future perspectives.

The early American TV programs effectively left the huge impact on the feeling of *akogare* shared among the *shin-issei*. The magazine articles portraying images of America and New York later reinforced these feelings. Japan itself also yielded some "pull" (in addition to "push") factors for prospective *shin-issei*; owing to its economic growth as well as its people's heightened interest in New York, jobs were created overseas for those in the advertising industry, filmmaking corporations, journalism, and travel agencies.

The major push factors included the *mendokusai* traditions in the Japanese business culture (e.g., a sexist tendency and the *oyabun-kobun* relationship) and Japan's college entrance exam. Nearly half of my *shin-issei* interviewees began their journey

overseas as first-time college students; they had not taken or passed an entrance exam in Japan. Because of this, some of them reached adulthood in America and many of them lived in the United Stated longer than in Japan. Besides the pain of the entrance exam, some youth leave Japan for *ryugaku* in order to escape bullying in their schools in Japan, which can lead to school refusal and possibly NEET, according to a *ryugaku* advisor in Tokyo.

After living in New York for years, many *shin-issei* change their ideas about the "cool" city or the "rich" country, often in disenchanted ways. They discover, for example, that America is no longer a country of rich white people. Although "diversity" is being promoted in America today, many of them are indifferent to it; their *akogare* was not directed towards it. Some discover, shockingly, that Japanese people could be discriminated against, and in light of this, they also discover their own Japaneseness more substantially in America than they did in Japan.

The 9/11 attack was one of the major events that changed the environment of New York in several ways. First, jobs in New York were lost, and the flows of jobs coming from Japan stopped. No less importantly, the U.S. government's reaction to the terrorism served to deteriorate the images of America. One of the *shin-issei* interviewees pointed out, "See the Iraq War, the oil price, the terrorist threat level, etc., etc." Another mentioned that because of the heightened security level, "Now we are treated as if we were criminals or refugees" at the airport.

My *shin-issei* interviewees unanimously emphasized the importance of obtaining a green card in order to live freely in the United States. A green card liberates one from the restriction not just of the time length during which one can stay, but more importantly

of choice of jobs one can apply for. One of my interviewees suggested, "For green-card holders, companies don't have to spend their money for a sponsorship for a visa. So they choose those who already have it." Usually, though, this entails years of self-adjusting processes, shaped upon a series of encounters and interactions with events and people surrounding them.

Regarding ties in New York, when asked if they had non-Japanese (such as American) friends, half of my *shin-issei* interviewees said they did not. These *shin-issei* tended to be younger and to have lived in America for less time than those who had non-Japanese friends. Besides the English language skills, this tendency stemmed from their own social and business environments where they are surrounded exclusively by Japanese, such as their ethnic jobs enclave, *mama-tomo* circles, and *chuzaiin* wives' circles.

One of the interviewees pointed out, interestingly, that there is a difference between the two cultures in the definition of "friend." Although non-Japanese people in New York use the word "friend" to indicate an acquaintance, in Japan, according to him, "friends are together all the time, at least, in the heart."

Ties in New York today can involve more than just two cultures, if one married a non-Japanese, non-American spouse--as shown in the *shin-issei* family comprised of the Japanese wife, her Korean husband, and their U.S.-born son being raised in American culture. Also, a development of ties in a new world can result in a loss of those to an old world; some Japanese still consider non-Japanese countries to be *gaijin no kuni* ("aliens' countries"). Recall, *wa* draws a line *around* Japan, and "anyone outside 'our' people

ceases to be considered human" (see Chapter 4). They do not want their close relatives or friends to be placed "outside 'our' people."

Most of the *shin-issei* customarily engage in *satogaeri* ("occasional return to hometown") whereby to maintain their ties to Japan. Typically, they return to Japan almost every summer, staying at their parents' homes for a few weeks. In this custom, the Japanese norm of keeping a certain distance between fathers and mothers is observed. The *shin-issei* mothers do not hesitate to leave their husbands behind, whenever they think it is *shkata ga nai*, and their husbands (including Americans) accept it.

Through their *satogaeri*, some gradually discover themselves becoming "Urashima Taro," a fairytale character who finds nothing familiar in his home village upon his return from a long journey. The longer their journey in the United States, the more deeply they tend to become an Urashima Taro. This indicates that the occasional return alone is not an enough of a chance for them to catch up with the social change continuously taking place. Females are less likely than males to become an Urashima Taro, although they are more likely than males to marry non-Japanese spouses. Their intermarriages today do not seem to automatically lead them to a deeper process of assimilation.

Some, including the media, claim that today there is no cultural difference between Japan and America; however, most of the *shin-issei* disagree with this. Often mentioned concepts related to the cultural differences between the two countries include: individualism, groupism, independence, interdependence, critical thinking, harmony (or *wa*), open-mindedness, close-mindedness, and gender roles. Party behavior was described as an example that illustrates most of these concepts. At American parties,

according to the *shin-issei*, people are expected to actively interact with each other as individuals, while in Japanese parties, participants are supposed to follow what is going on as group members. For the *shin-issei* who became adults in the United States, Japanese parties appear rather bizarre.

The *shin-issei* inevitably rethink their own identity as their own "social maps" come to no longer fit their "social landscapes" for their perception of what they are. Especially those who intermarry in New York tend to face complicated situations, involving their U.S.-born offspring as well as friends and relatives of various cultural backgrounds. Most children of intermarriage have names (first or middle) that represent both of their parents' backgrounds. The first language these children speak can be an issue between the parents, as well as their grandparents.

Yumiko's (female, freelancer, 34) idea about herself, and a lot of other people in New York, as neither a duck nor a swan (as in the "Ugly Duckling"), demands a new view that captures the "marginality" as its own character, or as a new character emerging in this new environment. It was argued that the *shin-issei* phenomenon is a process not just in those individuals' journey but, more broadly, of "civilization" (Park 1928, p. 881) going on in an environment being increasingly transnationalized.

Nearly two-thirds of the *shin-issei* in my analysis including those parenting with American spouses said they would terminate their overseas adventure "someday." However, none of those who had jobs rooted in New York had a specific idea about actualizing this plan. Several factors seemingly related to this tendency were discussed. One of them is their deep-rooted sentiment toward Japan, possibly likened to the feeling toward a "mother," whom a child would miss in the evening no matter how fun an

adventure was. Another is the "cultural grammar" whose vacuum some of them unexpectedly discover during their journey in the city foreign to them.

Many seemed to be undetermined how long their journey would last. Their decision during the adventure, or self-adjusting processes, depend upon their own relationships with other people in the United States (e.g., friends, spouse, and offspring) and those in Japan (friends and parents), together with macroeconomic conditions. "No group is an island," says Tajfel (1978, pp. 9-10). He adds, "In the same sense… "no man is an island." America, or New York, cannot be "an island" in this sense. Nor can the individual who embarks on his or her adventure.

To list the major findings in this study,

- The Japanese New Yorkers are mainly from middle- or upper-middle-class families.
- The primary "push factor" behind their migration stems from the constricting aspects of the Japanese traditional social organization while the "pull factor" seems to be liberating images of New York that have been widespread in Japan.
- Their exodus seems to have been initiated largely by the example of Japanese celebrities who began utilizing New York as their vacation home in the late 1980s, during the bubble economy.
- Contrary to the seeming indifference among Japanese to the "open-handed" Immigration Act of 1965, a large number of them actually struggle to obtain a green card.
- Nonetheless, they are not interested in naturalization.
- These Japanese migrate as individuals not as families, and, unlike other Asians, do not engage in "chain migration."
- Customarily, almost all return to Japan once in a while, typically every summer.
- A majority including those married to Americans say that they will return to Japan permanently "someday" although quite a few have a clear plan for it.

In conclusion, “the Japanese New Yorkers”--and, more broadly, the *shin-issei* as a whole--are “adventurers” in today’s highly transnational environments, placing themselves in ongoing self-adjusting processes in their journey. Most of them, unlike the *issei*, willingly exit Japan; however, like the *issei*, they almost inevitably encounter dilemmas in terms of legal status, culture, and social identity, dilemmas that are unexpectedly rough in a society with which they try to identify.

Appendixes

Oral Consent Script

Project: “Japanese New Yorkers”: “Adventurers in Adventure Land” in Globalized Environments

Principal Investigator: Hirosuke Hyodo (A translation provided below)

ぼくは CUNY の博士号課程にいて社会学の分野で博士号論文を執筆している日本人の学生で、兵藤博資ともうします。ぼくの論文のテーマは「NY に住む日本人」です。NY に暮らす日本人の時代と共の変遷、国際結婚、子育てのありかた、日系人と非日系人の違い、等々を土台として書きあげたいと思っています。もしインタビューさせていただければ、それらにまつわる様々なエピソード、見聞きなさったことや御自身で経験なさったこと、などを伺えればと思っています。

合計で２０か３０人にお話を伺おうと思っています。NY に住む今の日本人をもっとよく知ってもらうためにぼくの研究は役立つと信じます。殆どの参加者にとってのリスクは世間話の延長のようなものですので、ほとんどありません。しかしながら、もしあなたが非合法にアメリカに滞在しているとすれば、そしてなにかの原因でそれが漏れた場合、あなたの滞在の身分に不都合が生じるかも知れないことは念のため伝えておきます。と同時に、いかなる状態であっても、ぼくは参加者のプライバシーを守るための最善の努力を払うことをお約束いたします。

一、二時間ほどのインタビューになると思いますが、もちろんお答えになりたくない質問には答えていただかなくて結構です。あるいは、途中でおやめになりたければ、いつでも中止いたします。インタビューの記録はインターネットに接続していないエクスターナルハードドライブや鍵の付いた引き出しなどに厳重に保管され、ぼく並びにぼくのアドバイサー以外には漏れることはありません。そして念のために、論文が全部終了、つまり、論文が最終的に認可されたら、全ての記録を消去またはシュレッドいたします。

英文で要約したものを博士号委員会の三人の CUNY の教授たちが最終的に読むことになります。もし出版されるようなことになりましても、本名、会社名、あるいは学校名はふせますので、プライバシーは厳守いたします。もし出来上がった論文のコピーがお入用でしたら、メイルアドレスをください。お送りいたします。もしメイルを明かすことを避けたいと思われるなら、<https://wfs.gc.cuny.edu/HHyodo/www/dissertation.htm> を時々覗いて見てください。論文ができあがり次第、ダウンロードできるようにリンクをつけます。

後々にご質問がありましたら、ぼくの連絡先は (hhyodo@gc.cuny.edu)、ぼくのアドバイサー Professor Paul Attewell は (pattewell@gc.cuny.edu)、そして Kay Powell, IRB Administrator, The Graduate Center/City University of New York, (kpowell@gc.cuny.edu).

ご協力ありがとうございます。できればインタービューをテープレコードしたいのですが、よろしいでしょうか？

Translation

My name is Hirosuke Hyodo, and I am a student in the sociology Ph.D. Program at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY), and Principal Investigator of this project, entitled "Japanese New Yorkers" (tentative). This is a research study of "how Japanese people in New York are becoming American or maintain their original identity." This study will be the basis for my dissertation project. I would like to get a permission to interview you about your experiences in New York in terms of making friends, marriage, parenthood, and your changing or remaining ideas about your "identity" in comparison with the Japanese people living in Japan.

This interview will take from one to two hours. With your permission, I would like to audio-tape this interview so I can record the details accurately. The tapes, which will be electronically stored on my external hard drive not connected to the internet, will only be heard by my advisors and me--and no one else will have access. All information gathered on paper will be also kept strictly confidential; it will be stored in a locked file cabinet, to which only I will have access. When my dissertation project is done, that is, when my dissertation is finally approved, I will completely erase the data electrically stored on my external hard drive and shred all the paper used for the interviews. At any time you can refuse to answer questions or leave this interview entirely.

There will be approximately 30 of participants taking part in this study. For most participants, the risks from participating in this study should be no more than encountered in everyday life. The benefit of your participation is that the Japanese people living in New York today will be understood more. However, I should let you know that a breach of confidentiality, if you are here illegally, could result in something unfavorable to your status in the U.S., although I do promise, as I stated above in detail, I will do all that I can do to protect your confidentiality.

I may publish results of the study, but names of people, or any identifying characteristics, will not be used in any of the publications. If you would like a copy of the study, please provide me with your email address and I will attach a copy to my email to you in the future. Or in case you do not want to give me your email address but want to have a copy, visit <https://wfs.gc.cuny.edu/HHyodo/www/dissertation.htm> in the future. As soon as I finish my dissertation, I will add a link to the URL address, so you can download my dissertation. It will take more than a year though.

If you have any questions about this research, you can contact me at or hhyodo@gc.cuny.edu, or my advisor Professor Paul Attewell at pattewell@gc.cuny.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you can contact Kay Powell, IRB Administrator, The Graduate Center/City University of New York, kpowell@gc.cuny.edu.

Thank you for your participation in the study. Do you agree to have this interview audio-taped please?

Investigator: Hirosuke Hyodo

The Interview Guide

The Japanese New Yorkers

Name (Pseudonym) ID#

Date Place

A Birth Place

Year of Birth (Age) Sex

Religion (if any/how long?)

Father's job Mother's job

Status in US If green card, how?

Language: If your Japanese is scored 100, how is your English scored?

Where to live and how long?

Education (in Japan, in New York)

Occupation (in Japan, in New York)

Income (in Japan, in New York)

When and why did you decide to come to the US? Dream you had?

What did your parents and friends say to your decision?

B Marital status How long # of children

Souse's age Race/ethnicity / birth place

Main language

Status in US If green card, how?

Education

Occupation

Income

How did you meet? What aspects of your spouse attracted you?

How long have you been with him/her?

How are you satisfied with the relationship?

C Children's birth places Sexes Ages

Languages (speaking, reading, writing)

School: where

Type (public, private, religious)

Friends' race, ethnicity

Parental goal of childrearing

Self / collectivity (the importance of self vs. group)

Self-interest / harmony (*wa*)

Freedom / discipline

Japaneseness (any activities or training?)

Does your spouse agree with your parental goal of childrearing?

D How often do you go back to Japan, and how long do you stay there?

Where do you stay, parents' place, friends', or?

How many relatives/friends in Japan?

How much do you know of Japan now? (fashion, celebrities, politicians, etc.)

Do you watch Japanese TV programs in New York? What are they, if any?

E The image of US

The reality of US

Your favorite American TV programs, movies, nobles?

What is the difference between Japan and US, and that between Japanese and American?

Communication (talking patterns) / friendship / party behavior

What does it mean to become American?

Do you consider yourself an immigrant? If not, then what?

Do you consider yourself an Asian? If not, then what?

Do you think you are becoming American?

Any differences between you and Japanese in Japan?

F Prejudice/discrimination

Isolation/loneliness

G In international sports games, when American and Japanese teams compete each other, which do you (your spouse) support?

What do you think of the Japanese major league baseball players?

Manga / cartoons, Pokemon, Yugio, Naruto, Spirited Away, etc.?

H In the future, where do you think you will live? Dream?

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