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Meaning, skepticism, and truth in the immanent naturalism of W. V. Quine

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MEANING, SKEPTICISM, AND TRUTH IN THE IMMANENT NATURALISM OF W.V. QUINE

by

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ABSTRACT

MEANING, SKEPTICISM, AND TRUTH IN THE IMMANENT NATURALISM OF W.V. QUINE

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In this essay I offer an assessment of W.V. Quine's immanent natural position for the above three areas of philosophical interest. With the case of meaning, I argue that in light of a proposal by Jerrold J. Katz, there appear to be major internal considerations to indicate that Quine's skeptical views on meaning currently should be "softened." I will argue that this point, while pro tem, is consistent with a broad interpretation of Quine's naturalistic outlook. I further urge that such a broad interpretation is required to account for the progressive natural philosophy that Quine is committed to. The issue of epistemic skepticism is then addressed directly. Barry Stroud's influential

work on the importance of philosophical skepticism contains an explicit challenge to Quine's naturalism and Stroud argues that naturalized epistemology either fails as epistemology, or it fails to be epistemology. On this debate I argue that Quine can enlist grounds to hold that the immanent naturalized position currently enjoys an ascending viability against Stroud's skeptical challenge. Quine's position is then shown to be strengthened by an immanent construal of scientific truth that provides a straightforward way of rejecting Stroud's claim that naturalized epistemology fails. However, I conclude the essay with a critical treatment of whether Quine's move to immanence does full justice to the concept of scientific truth. While Quine asserts that the only conception of truth that he recognizes is an immanent one, I try to show that pending further argument to the contrary, the concept of truth cannot be immanently construed without sacrificing much of the progressive scientific outlook that Quine otherwise endorses. If I am right on this score, until such arguments are forthcoming, not only do Stroud's criticisms regain vigor, but issue is raised regarding Quine's emphasis on immanent standards of clarification and whether this requirement can ultimately improve our understanding of natural science.

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(I)

BACKGROUND TO QUINE'S NATURALISM

If we consider the influence that W.V. Quine has exerted upon the development of contemporary philosophy, we find what is arguably the most powerful force in Anglo-American philosophy since Wittgenstein. Colin McGinn has underscored this point saying that,

(1) Quine pursues his philosophical vision with an uncompromising consistency of purpose that makes his doctrines impossible to ignore. You either go with him or define your position in reaction to his. And that is one mark of a great philosopher. (JP:apr 83,246)

Perhaps the leading conception in the position that Quine has followed with such "uncompromising consistency of purpose," is his rejection of the philosophical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, along with the corollary rejection of there being a "fact of the matter" to meaning that is sufficient to resolve his doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation.[1] Regarding the analytic and the synthetic, Quine most notably announced his thesis in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" where he concludes that:

(2) ...for all its apriori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith. (TD,37)[2]

For Quine, any philosophically viable distinction between the

clarification of the notion of synonymy.[3] And it was with the introduction of his "thought experiment" in radical translation that Quine attempted to make the problem of synonymy that he pursued in "Two Dogma's" more graphic. It was in this context primarily, that Quine has tried to demonstrate his conception that there can be no "fact of the matter" to meaning beyond dispositions to verbal behavior. Quine writes:

(3) ...in order to make the problem of synonymy graphic, I developed a thought experiment in radical translation - that is, in translation of an initially unknown language on the strength of behavioral data. I argued that the translations would be indeterminate, in the case of sentences at any considerable remove from observation sentences... My position was that either manual could be useful, but as to which was *right* and *which wrong there was no fact of the matter.* (FOM,167)

In light of Quine's consistent stand on these linked positions, it is significant to note that over the years, critics and expositors alike have encountered a series of disavowals from Quine regarding what he takes to be the fundamental point in support of his stance. Notably, Quine has denied that his position depends finally upon the circularity that he demonstrates within the notions of necessity, synonymy, etc. (CUNY,8).[4] Quine also has disavowed the challenge that his position really is driven by nominalist scruples (RG,162; NYRB,32).[5] Further, let us consider another influential challenge that has been raised by Grice and Strawson in their well known article, "In Defense of Dogma" (DD). According to Grice and Strawson, Quine's skepticism primarily

Strawson in their well known article, "In Defense of Dogma" (DD). According to Grice and Strawson, Quine's skepticism primarily issues from a penetrating examination of cases, but they remind us, such a survey, of itself, does not suffice to warrant the uncompromising conclusion that Quine has continued to uphold from "Two Dogma's of Empiricism." (2) On Grice and Strawson's account then, the conclusion of Quine's argument must be seen as a non-sequitur. But further, they protest, not only does Quine's argument lack logical closure, it also lacks plausible closure. This second point is demonstrated by our manifest ability as language users to take an open list of analytic sentences (provisionally understood as true in virtue of their meanings) and continue it, and do likewise with a synthetic list. Accordingly, it appears prima facie evident that there is some kind of distinction that is operant in this sorting procedure. For Grice and Strawson, Quine's examination of cases, penetrating as it may be, has failed to generate either a plausible or a principled motivation to warrant his skeptical conclusion.

The force of Grice and Strawson's critique may be seen then as an attempt to show that Quine's arguments have not discharged an incumbent burden of proof, whereby, in the absence of either a plausible or a principled argument, it appears to be the Quinean skeptic that exhibits an unempirical dogmatism <u>against</u> analyticity and meaning clarification, supported only by some metaphysical article of <u>anti</u>-meaning faith.

In light of these disavowals, another avenue of criticism against Quine's analysis now might be considered. In the wake of this assault by Grice and Strawson, it may be thought that for Quine to remain steadfast in his position surely reflects the fact that Quine has set standards of clarification for analyticity and synonymy that are unreasonably high. Quine however, has responded by urging that his expectations regarding the appropriate standards for clarification are really quite modest. Quine writes:

(4) We find it argued that the standard of clarity that I demand for synonymy and analyticity is unreasonably high; yet I ask no more, after all, than a rough characterization in terms of dispositions to verbal behavior. (WO,207)

And as to the criticism that Quine's argument is a non-sequitur and as such has no principled footing, I believe this critical perspective has been shown to be mistaken. The point has been made by Professor Jerrold Katz who emphasized that in an appropriate sense, Quine's investigation should be considered exhaustive.[6] Professor Katz writes:

(5) ...Grice and Strawson fail to appreciate that the cases Quine examines are in an appropriate sense, exhaustive. Quine's overall argument considers <u>all</u> the places where it would be reasonable to expect clarification of the notion of meaning. (CSS,191)

It should be noted however, that while Katz considers Quine's pattern of argument to be adequate in form, he will contend nonetheless, that Quine's argument is defective in content. On

Katz's view, Quine has centered on the appropriate areas for clarification, namely: definition, logic, and linguistics. However, Katz also argues that Quine's investigation has failed to take account of more recent developments in one of those areas, namely in Chomskyan linguistics. Katz writes:

> (6) Philosophical faith in the power of Quine's arguments against meaning rests on a failure to appreciate this consequence of the Chomskyan revolution. Taxonomic theorists insisted that substitution criteria are the only legitimate means of clarifying linguistic notions because they held a physicalist conception of language which required all such notions to be built up from distributional regularities in a corpus of utterances. The Chomskyan revolution replaced this conception with a psychological conception from which no such requirement follows. Instead of viewing grammars as data cataloging devices, as the taxonomists had, Chomskyian linguistics viewed grammars as scientific theories of the ideal speaker's knowledge of the language. This view allows the clarification of a linguistic notion to be a matter of its connections with other notions in a predictively powerful theory of sentence structure. Hence, instead of requiring that a linguistic notion be built up from the empirical base, it can, as it were be dropped down from above. (CSS,192)

Katz's concludes then, that Quine has failed to appreciate the methodology indicated by Chomskyan linguistic theory because Quine had restricted himself to what was then the current state of linguistic theory, namely the taxonomic theory's of linguists such as Bloch and Traeger. However, the method that Chomsky has applied in linguistic theory and that Katz is proposing for semantic inquiry, is instructively similar to the method of endorsing the the inference that yields the best explanation of a set of phenomena. Russell, for example, used the method to escape the idealism implied by the Cartesian/subjective starting point. For

Russell, the hypothesis of an external world would be justified if it provided the best explanation of the variety and diversity of the subjective sense-data that constitutes our experience (PP,17-26). Katz wants to apply a similar approach to meaning.

(7) There is, then, the option of explaining meaning, synonymy, and analyticity on the model of Chomsky's explanation of syntactic notions like 'well-formed.' We can construct an abstract system of semantic representations that formally describes the meaning of sentences, characterize semantic notions like meaningfulness, synonymy, and analyticity in terms of such formal representations, and then justify both the representational system and the definitions indirectly on the basis of how well they predict and explain judgements of fluent speakers about such semantic properties and relations of sentences. (CSS,192)

A core implication of Katz's approach is that the history of philosophical semantics has attempted to clarify the notion of meaning reductively. However, the method that Katz is proposing (what he terms, "theoretical explanation"), is non-reductive. Theoretical explanation would clarify meaning independently of prior desiderata. (Frege, for example, introduces sense and meaning to clarify <u>reference</u>.) Katz urges that the approach he advocates is non-reductive in that it only commits one to:

(8) ...taking senses or meanings, <u>as they present themselves in our ordinary experience</u>, to be the proper objects of study in semantics. Other approaches are reductionistic. They seek to reduce the ordinary notions of sense and meaning away, replacing them with behavior-controlling stimuli, to images, methods of verification, stereotypes, truth conditions, extensions in possible worlds, use, illocutionary act potential, perlocutionary potential of various sorts, and even physical inscriptions. Indeed the history of philosophical semantics might well be written as a succession of

metaphysically inspired attempts to eliminate the ordinary notion of meaning or sense. (CSS,174)

Thus it appears that in (6) and (7), we can see that so far, Katz has met Quine's general requirement of providing a method of clarification that could be framed under conditions that would be consistent with presenting a "rough characterization in terms of dispositions to verbal behavior." Nonetheless, at a conference during 1984 (CUNY,1984), Quine has responded to Katz's proposal, and while Katz has urged that Quine has failed to appreciate the implications of this method, Quine makes it quite clear that the method has not escaped his notice, and "in general," Quine wrote, he is "sympathetic" with the proposal. Quine puts the point as follows:

(9) In general I am sympathetic to what Katz calls "theoretical explanation," if I understand him. I used it in introducing my notion of perceptual similarity in Roots of Reference. Physicists use it whenever they posit a new elementary particle; for there is never a definition in prior terms, but only an account of properties wanted for the purposes of the rest of the theory, ...It is not an attitude that had to await generative grammar. (CUNY,7)

Thus Quine seems to deny that Katz is right to think that he failed to appreciate recent developments in linguistics. Indeed, Quine volunteers that the method under consideration is one that has found a place in physics, and further, it is made known that Quine himself has taken advantage of the method for his own purposes in Roots of Reference. However, Quine stops short of a full endorsement and qualifies the approach in the following terms:

(10) But it is an approach that has to be assessed on the merits of its specific applications. If a notion thus introduced achieves a substantial simplification or illumination of some empirically well attested body of theory, and in a such a way as to bear promise of eventually finding its place in an explanatory physical or physiological mechanism, then we should have no reservations. A shining example is the gene, as posited at the turn of the century... On the other hand postulation by theoretical explanation is less promising in the case of the soul, or grace. In the case of meanings, or ideas, or even sameness of meaning, my misgivings can be allayed only by specific details of the proposed theory. (CUNY,7)

We may note then, that while Quine is "generally sympathetic" toward the method of theoretical explanation, in the case of meaning, his skepticism remains and "can be allayed only by specific details of the proposed theory." Thus while Quine gives a qualified endorsement of theoretical explanation as a means to assay a factual clarification of meaning, he still does not appear to relax his skepticism in any appreciable degree. In light of his "general sympathy" with this method, we now need to press further if we are to locate Quine's <u>principled</u> reservations that can support the staunch meaning skepticism that Quine has continued to express.

In "Ontological Relativity", we may find a strong indication that it is Quine's thesis of the <u>indeterminacy of translation</u> that remains to establish the point of principle that prevents Quine from relaxing his skepticism regarding a "factual" clarification of meaning. Here Quine writes:

(11) If we recognize with Peirce that the meaning of a sentence turns purely on what would count as evidence for its truth, and if we recognize with Duhem that theoretical sentences have their evidence not as simple sentences but only as larger blocks of theory, then the indeterminacy of translation of theoretical sentences is the natural conclusion... This conclusion once embraced seals the fate of any notion of propositional meaning. (OR,80-81)

In response to Quine's broad range of disavowals, we might now begin to question the thesis of indeterminacy directly to see if, or to what extent, indeterminacy could be the crucial mainstay in support of Quine's skeptical posture. The suggestion may gain further motivation by noting that Quine has recently emphasized the importance of this thesis by urging that translation presents an even deeper philosophical problem than that of analyticity. Quine writes:

(12) Analyticity is a lesser problem than translation. Given analyticity, we can get sameness of meaning within the language but still not between languages. (RK,198)

Quine's emphasis on translational indeterminacy appears to take on its fullest significance when we read that Quine establishes indeterminacy as a consequence of his behaviorism and then goes on to assert that in linguistics, "the behaviorist approach is mandatory." Quine writes that:

(13) Critics have said that my doctrine of indeterminacy of translation is a consequence of my behaviorism...the indeterminacy thesis is indeed a consequence of the behaviorist approach. I hold further that the behaviorist approach is mandatory. In psychology one may or may not be a behaviorist, but in linguistics one has no choice. Language consists in dispositions to verbal behavior. (BLM,1; ITA,5)

With this linking of Quine's behavioral approach, in conjunction with his "thought experiment" of tranlational indeterminacy, we might now believe that we have finally arrived at something like a two tiered "bottom line" in Quine's outlook. As Quine has said, "the standard of clarity that [he] demand[s] for synonymy and analyticity [is] no more, after all, than a rough characterization in terms of dispositions to verbal behavior" (4). And now we read that indeterminacy is a consequence of Quine's behaviorism and that in linguistics one has no choice, the behaviorist approach is mandatory, indeed, language consists in dispositions to verbal behavior (13). The two tiers appear then as a mandatory behavioral approach to language, along with the consequent translational indeterminacy that is revealed by the thought experiment in radical translation.

Perhaps we now might be inclined to conclude that Quine's final position on language may be explicated accordingly. Within Quine's general philosophical outlook, indeterminacy of translation demonstrates conclusively that there is no <u>behaviorally</u> sufficient way to clarify the semantic relations of synonymy, analyticity, etc. And, since behaviorism is mandatory in linguistics (13), it follows, that there can be <u>no</u> principled way of achieving a satisfactory clarification in any case.

Here then, we may hope, is the sought for support to buttress Quine's forceful conclusion that the supposed distinction between

the analytic and the synthetic is an unempirical dogma of empiricists and a metaphysical article of faith. (2) Nonetheless, in Quine's responses to Katz [(9)&(10)], this result also appears undercut. In those responses Quine allows that he is "in general sympathetic" with the method of theoretical explanation, with the qualification that his skeptical "misgivings could be allayed only by specific details of the proposed theory."

The above development of Quine's views reveal a deep difficulty for squaring Quine's view that indeterminacy is a consequence of his behaviorism and in linguistics behaviorism is mandatory (13), along with the view that (with respect to theoretical explanation), Quine's misgivings could be allayed only by details of the proposed theory. The difficulty is that this conjunction sounds like the hard and fast implications of indeterminacy that "once embraced, seal the fate of any notion of propositional meaning" (11), have begun to "soften." But if behaviorism is <u>mandatory</u>, how could this be allowed? I formulated the point as explicitly as I could, and put the issue to Quine in a letter. In this letter I wrote that:

(14) It has seemed to me that the indeterminacy thesis has widely been thought to have established a powerful inprinciple argument against countenancing semantic facts into a scientific ontology. However, in some of your comments at the CUNY conference (especially your "Reply to Katz"), it occurred to me that you might nonetheless be willing to consider, while perhaps not encourage, a possible avenue for locating semantic facts in a manner similar to what has occurred regarding clarification of the "gene." In your response to Professor Katz, you mention that you have thought well enough of the

> method that Professor Katz is calling "theoretical explanation" to have used it for your own purposes in Roots of Reference. As you noted, the method turns on there being "no definition in prior terms, but only an account of properties wanted for purposes of the rest of the theory." You then hasten to qualify what might seem like an endorsement b y adding that the method "is an approach that has to be assessed on the merits of its specific applications." What I found surprising in these remarks is that it sounds like you might be willing to allow that "depending on the merits of its applications", this method could provide an inprinciple means for circumventing the implications of indeterminacy, even if you continue to believe that such enterprising in semantics remains implausible. (Q,1)

Shortly after sending this question to Quine, I was gratified to receive a responsive reply. Quine's responded as follows:

> (15) You are right in your inference from my reply to Katz. I have no objection in principle to admitting meanings and ideas and synonymy relations in a behaviorally irreducible way, on a par with various notions of theoretical physics, and with my own relation of perceptual similarity. Such a step is to be assessed on its contribution to our overall understanding of the causal mechanisms involved. The present example, if really successful, would be part of a drastic revision of our scientific theory of mind and nature, and a revision therewith of my own philosophy of mind and language; for my naturalistic philosophy is continuous with science and shares its fallibility. But let me emphasize that it is part of my present scientific and philosophical outlook to view this eventuality as extremely unlikely. (Q,2)

We have seen a pattern of disavowals from Quine on a number of crucial points and the critical issue that now needs to be confronted is how, and to what extent is Quine's skepticism on meaning philosophically motivated. It was not circularity, nor nominalist scruples. Neither has it been too high standards of clarity. And now we see that, in principle, Quine allows that

indeterminacy may be gotten around in behaviorally irreducible ways. Indeed, it appears that Quine's position is more flexible than has been appreciated by Roger Gibson. Gibson has written that:

(16) The reading of Quine that I am advocating focuses on what I have elsewhere... dubbed the naturalistic-behavioristic thesis (NB thesis) of language. The thesis is naturalistic in that it makes the study of language accessible to empirical investigation, and it is behavioristic in that it relies upon behavior as the substance of observable data. (EE,1-2)

Gibson then takes the NB conjunction as a central axiom of Quine's systematic outlook and says:

(17) In calling the thesis an axiom, I do not mean that it is without empirical support. When I say that it is central, I mean it is one of those theses that Quine would hold <u>come what may</u>. (EE,179n)

However, in (15), Quine appears willing to allow that his conception of naturalism <u>could</u> survive the ouster of behaviorism, and thus, while Quine finds such an eventuality to be "extremely unlikely", he is not committed to the NB conjunction, "come what may." [7] It appears thus, that we are facing yet another repudiation of what Quine holds to be essential to his outlook. Indeed, professor Katz has taken the illusiveness of Quine's position to task, and ultimately concludes that Quine's view on meaning represents an "absolute skepticism." That is, Katz argues that Quine's skepticism is based only upon the mere logical possibility of systematic error. Katz writes:

(18) Given the momentous changes Quine's arguments have brought about, it is desirable that they be subject to careful and continuous scrutiny. ...Skepticism about translation, like skepticism about other things of which common sense assures us, incurs a burden of proof in challenging a common-sense view. If the skeptic provides reasons of sufficient strength to discharge the onus of proof, we are presented with an advance in knowledge whose surprising character marks it as a discovery of the most profound sort... But, if the skeptic's reasons lack the strength to discharge the onus of proof and can establish only the logical possibility that common sense is wrong, we are presented with nothing more than an "absolute skepticism." (RI,228)

What Katz presents us with here is reminiscent of the critique leveled against Quine by Grice and Strawson. Even though Katz grants that Quine's argument should not be viewed as a non-sequitur as Grice and Strawson charge, what Katz, Grice, and Strawson agree upon is that Quine's skepticism on meaning does not present a sufficient philosophical motivation to throw common sense into doubt. Thus whether Quine's treatment is a non-sequitur or whether it is not, the plausibility issue is further aggravated. Katz's criticism is thus all the more incisive in that he allows the general validity of Quine's procedure but in so doing finds that Quine has maintained his view based upon the mere logical possibility of systematic error. Adapting a notion introduced by G.E. Moore, Katz terms Quine's continued skeptical stance as an "absolute skepticism." The "absolute skepticism" comes in when we find that there is no in principle motivation left to support the skepticism even if we allow that Quine's procedure is formally adequate. Katz puts the point as follows:

(19) The aim of Quine's argument is thus to establish that, in principle, there is no way to construe questions about identity of intensional objects in terms of objective facts about verbal behavior. The reason is that translation is indeterminate...(RI,230)

Let us take note though that when Katz argues that in Quine's view there is "in principle,...no way to construe questions about identity of intensional objects in terms of objective facts about verbal behavior" (19), we face another implicit disavowal. In the response above (15), Quine claims that he has "no objection in principle to admitting meanings and ideas and synonymy relations in a behaviorally irreducible way,..." But the matter is further complicated when Quine claims that "the indeterminacy thesis is a consequence of the behaviorist approach" and in linguistics "the behaviorist approach is mandatory... one has no choice."(13) In light of these perplexing remarks I think it behooves us to rethink what Quine could possibly have in mind by his use of the term 'mandatory'. On the one hand Quine states that in linguistics, behaviorism is mandatory, but then he also says that he has no objection, in principle, to admitting meanings, ideas, and synonymy relations in a behaviorally irreducible way. What then does Quine want to convey by his statement that the behaviorist approach in linguistics is mandatory?

The preceding reflections on Quine's philosophical motivations are puzzling. After pursuing a number of important assessments of Quine's skeptical position, we saw that Quine has responded with a

general pattern of disavowals in answer to his critics and commentators alike. It seems apparent that matters cannot continue along these lines without subverting the force of what McGinn has referred to as the "uncompromising consistency of purpose that makes [Quine's] doctrines impossible to ignore" (1). Indeed, the problem of achieving a clear motivation for Quine's continued skepticism has been highlighted by Professor Jerrold Katz who has concluded that Quine's position on meaning represents an "absolute skepticism" (18). This motivational concern is further deepened when we notice that Quine staunchly proclaims that in linguistics, behaviorism is "mandatory ...[and] one has no choice" (13); and paradoxically, Quine then allows that he has "no objection in principle to admitting meanings and ideas and synonymy relations in a behaviorally irreducible way" (15).

If we hope to grasp the motivational force behind Quine's strong skeptical conclusions, it seems to me that we must make clear sense of what Quine intends by the above use of the term "mandatory."[8] What is required, is an account of how Quine might consistently maintain that in linguistics, behaviorism is mandatory ("we have no choice"); along with the admission that he has no inprinciple objection to admitting linguistic meanings and synonymy relations in behaviorally irreducible ways (we do have a choice?).

If there is a way out of these quandaries, and I think that there is, I believe we should remind ourselves of Quine's

endorsement of Roger Gibson's suggestion that, "the major obstacle to understanding [Quine's] position is failure to take [his] naturalism seriously." The endorsement of Gibson's suggestion occurs in a reply to Robert Nozick where Quine writes;

(20) Gibson has plausibly surmised that the major obstacle to understanding my position is failure to take my commitment to naturalism seriously. Truth for me is immanent. Factuality or matterhood of the fact, is likewise immanent. We do not adjudicate between our aggregate system of the world and a rival system by appeal to a transcendent standard of truth and factuality. (RN,367)

The key notion thus to clarify, is Quine's conception of naturalism. In a reply to Hilary Putnam, Quine has further emphasized his commitment to naturalism. In response to Putnam, Quine writes;

(21) ...I should like to clarify what Putnam and others have called my scientism. I admit to naturalism and even glory in it. (RP,430-31)

In the following chapters of this essay I plan to demonstrate that a clear appreciation of Quine's naturalism is indeed crucial for understanding his position. Thus the key notion that I will be taking under account in this essay is Quine's conception of naturalism, and more specifically, I will focus on what Quine has termed an "immanent naturalism" (20). I will try to show that indeed there is a consistent and principled way of construing Quine's skeptical outlook on language and meaning, though at the

same time, it will become apparent that Quine's longstanding position, which he has called "mandatory," must currently be "softened" for immanent methodological reasons. That is, for reasons that flow from within Quine's own naturalistic vision.

(II)

QUINE'S MOVE TO IMMANENCE

My task in this second chapter is twofold. First, I shall attempt to outline a working sketch of Quine's vision of an "immanent naturalism," and from this conception, I will then address last chapter's puzzle regarding Quine's intended sense in saying that behaviorism is mandatory in linguistics, while maintaining that he has no inprinciple objections to admitting meanings in certain behaviorally irreducible ways. Let us then turn to Quine's naturalistic perspective and try to spell out some of the principle motivations that underlie Quine's philosophical vision.

With the publication of "Two Dogma's of Empiricism" (1951), the philosophical community received notice of Quine's announced thesis. In that seminal article, Quine expressed his intention to define, clarify, and cleave more closely to the tenets of the naturalistic position. Twenty two years later, with the publication of Roots of Reference (1973), Quine explicitly voiced the view that naturalistically inclined philosophers of the past "failed to recognize the strength of their own position" and through confrontation with scientific "self doubts" along with a

fear of initial circularity, there arose a needless logical timidity regarding the naturalistic starting point.

Quine however, affirms a new naturalistic vision, advocating what he calls an "enlightened persistence in the old epistemological problem." In this persistence, the new natural epistemologist emerges as a "defender and protector,... out to defend science from within, against its self doubts." Quine writes;

(22) ...[the] old epistemologist...saw their problem as one of challenging or substantiating our knowledge of the external world. Appeal to physical sense organs in the statement of the problem would have seemed circular...

[However] This fear of circularity is a case of logical timidity,... The crucial logical point is that the epistemologist is confronting a challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science.

A far cry, this, from the old epistemology. Yet it is no gratuitous change of subject matter, but an enlightened persistence rather in the old epistemological problem. It is enlightened in recognizing that the skeptical challenge springs from science itself, and that in coping with it we are free to use scientific knowledge. The old epistemologist failed to recognize the strength of his position.

The epistemologist thus emerges as a defender or protector. He no longer dreams of a first philosophy, firmer than science, on which science can be based; he is out to defend science from within, against its self doubts. (RR,2-3)

Quine's vision of the naturalistic standpoint has thus far taken up the role of a defender of science from within science, along with a concurrent rejection of the dream of a first

philosophy, somehow prior to science. More explicitly, Quine writes that;

(23) ...my position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or ground work for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat -- a boat which, to revert to Neurath's figure..., we can build only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. (NNK,126-7)

Quine's use of Neurath's figure leads directly to Quine's conception of an immanent naturalism. Once we disavow the dream of a first philosophy, Quine believes that we are inevitably lead to embrace certain constraints. For Quine, we must view and attribute standards of reality and truth immanently.

(24) Disavowing as I do a first philosophy outside science, I can attribute reality and truth only within the terms and standards of the scientific system of the world that I now accept; only immanently...(RL,316)

Quine thus characterizes naturalized epistemology as a defense of natural science from within science, along with a concurrent effort to "improve, clarify and understand" the scientific system of the world from the same internal vantage.

(25) The naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as a going concern. He tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified portions of it are wrong. He tries to improve, clarify, and understand the system from within. He is the busy sailor adrift on Neuthrath's boat. (FME,72)

In light of the "crucial logical point" that epistemology, both old and new, has been confronting a skeptical challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science (20), Quine presumes that failure to appreciate this point has lead to "a fear of an initial circularity" and resulted in a needless case of logical timidity. Quine thus spurns the needless timidity and affirms the viability of naturalized epistemology. For Quine, the natural epistemologist should feel free to use scientific knowledge in coping with the problem of naturalized epistemology, the question of substantiating,

(26) ...from within natural science, how it is that man works up his command of that science from the limited impingements that are available to his sensory surfaces. (RR,3)[9]

We should take note of the normative force of Quine's move to naturalism in the above passages. For Quine, it is the crucial logical point that frees the natural epistemologist to pursue their chosen vision, and in Quine's case, not only does he freely "admit to naturalism, [he] glories in it" (21).

The adoption of an immanent naturalism, in Quine's sense, may further be noted to have a normative duality. In a negative vein, the duality implies the rejection of a transcendent first philosophy, prior to science. However, in a positive vein, the Quinean naturalist is enjoined to "own and employ our scientific beliefs at the moment." This latter point was made explicit in

Word and Object when Quine wrote:

(27) Unlike Descartes, we own and use our beliefs at the moment...until by what is vaguely called scientific method we change them here and there for the better. Within our own totally evolving doctrine, we can judge truth as earnestly and as absolutely as can be; subject to correction, but this goes without saying. (WO,24)

In this passage and in passage (20) above, we see where Quine addresses his conception of scientific truth. Truth, like "factuality," will be considered under immanent standards, and Quine urges that an immanent construal must lead to a conception of truth that is captured essentially within Tarski's construction. In a reply to Harold Lee, Quine points this out as he says,

(28) Note that this immanent standard of truth is what Tarski's construction gives us. (RL,316)

Thus Quine has noted that;

(29) To say the statement "Brutus killed Caesar" is true, ...is simply to say that Brutus killed Caesar... (WO,24)

On Quine's view, the attribution of truth to a statement thus becomes equated with the statement itself. This Quine notes, has sometimes been referred to unjustly as the "disappearance" theory of truth. Quine put the point as follows:

(30) The attribution of truth to a statement is equated to the statement itself. This has been called the disappearance theory of truth, but unjustly; the quotation marks are not to be taken lightly. What can be justly said is that the adjective 'true' is dispensable when attributed to sentences that are explicitly before us. Where it is not thus dispensable is in saying that all or some sentences of such and such a specified form are or are not true, or that someone's statement unavailable for quotation was or was not true, or that the libel laws do not apply to the true statements, or that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God. In such contexts, when paraphrased to fit predicate logic, what stands as subject of the truth predicate is not a quotation but a variable. It is there that the truth predicate is not to be lightly dismissed. (QD,214)

On Quine's view then, the truth predicate is not to be lightly dismissed, when by the use of predicate logic, the subject of the truth predicate is not a quotation that names an object, but rather is a variable. The introduction of variables, for Quine, functions in our canonical vocabulary much as the pronoun functions in ordinary english grammar. Quine says that the function of the variable is essentially that of the pronoun, and its chief business is "linking, permuting and marking" various positions in a sentence. Thus, when the truth predicate is associated with a variable in predicate logic, we are presented with an ontological range, implicitly linked and permuted before us.

(31) ...variables in their various uses can range over objects of any sort. As for those various uses, they are not so various after all when we probe their inner nature. Variables are essentially pronouns....

Here, I say, is the birth of the variable: in the disambiguation of nested 'such that' clauses, which is to say nested relative clauses. This is not true historically, but it could have been. It is a myth of origins that reveals the

> basic role and ultimate utility of the variable. The variable is a device for marking and linking up various positions in a sentence so as to encapsulate, in an adjective phrase, what a sentence says about something. Its business is linking and permuting. (QD,237-38)[10]

There is in Quine's view, another important feature that is made explicit in Tarski's paradigm, and that is that the truth predicate serves as a reminder that "our eye is on the world."

(32) The truth predicate is a reminder that, despite a technical ascent to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world. This cancellatory force of the truth predicate is explicit in Tarski's paradigm:...

> Quotation marks make all the difference between talking about words and talking about snow. (PL,12)

Two principle points of Quine's commitment to Tarski's paradigm should be thus be taken note of in clarification of Quine's immanent naturalistic vision. The first is that when statements are explicitly before us, the truth predicate is indeed dispensable, but when the subject of the truth predicate is not a quotation, but a variable, the use of the truth predicate is not thus dispensable. The variable, it will be seen, embraces the role of the pronoun, and serves to mark, link, and permute relative positions within our statements. What this eventuates in is the implicit presentation of an ontological range, i.e., the range of the variables. Secondly, we see Quine's association with scientific realism projected in Tarski's construction, when Quine tells us that the cancellatory force of the truth predicate serves

as a reminder that "despite a technical ascent to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world" (32).

A further mainstay in Quine's naturalistic framework is the role played by observation and the hypothetico-deductive method. Once one gives up the dream of an a priori propaedeutic, or a supra-scientific tribunal, Quine finds the justification of science with no greater need than observation and the hypothetico-deductive method.

(33) ...naturalism: abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy. It sees natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in need of any justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method. (FME,72)[11]

Let me now sum up the main findings of this general sketch of Quine's emphasis on naturalism, immanently construed. Principally, Quine develops the sense of 'immanence' to contrast naturalism with an attempt to establish a first philosophy in the Cartesian sense (27). What Quine is reacting against is first philosophy understood as an a priori propaedeutic or a supra-scientific tribunal for the justification of natural science (23;33). For Quine, first philosophy may be abandoned without logical timidity by recognizing a "crucial logical point." The fear of an initial circularity may be spurned through a fuller appreciation that the problem of circularity is spawned from a skeptical challenge to natural science that arises within natural science itself (22). As

such, Quine affirms the viability of naturalized epistemology, and sees the natural philosopher as free to pursue their chosen philosophical vision. At this point the normative force of Quine's attitude is reminiscent of William James.[12] We may recall that in Quine's terms, he not only "admits to naturalism," but as he asserts, he "glories" in it.

With the abandonment of the quest for a first philosophy, the natural epistemologist is then "set adrift within the inherited world theory as a going concern" (25). Thus we learn that Quine's vision of the immanent natural philosopher is not only of one who "owns and uses his beliefs at the moment" (27), but of one who "emerges as a defender or protector" of those beliefs, while still working to "improve, clarify, and understand the system from within" (25).

The role of scientific truth, in this immanent enterprise, will be seen to follow Tarski's construction. Truth, while being disquotational, is "not to be lightly dismissed." The truth predicate is not to be so dismissed when in the notation of predicate logic, the subject of the statement is not a quotation, but a variable. The variable, whose prototype is the pronoun, functions to mark, link, and permute an ontological range implicit in the statements that are explicitly before us. A further aspect that devolves from Tarski's paradigm, is that its cancillatory force serves as a reminder that despite a technical ascent to talk

of sentences, "our eye is on the world."

Thus we see that from Quine's immanent perspective, the truth predicate, in reminding us that our eye is on the world, commits us to a robust realism, the realism that is incumbent in our inherited world theory. The point regarding truth and realism is essential to be clear upon if we are to appreciate Quine's commitment to naturalism. Quine cites two principle sources of his naturalism. One of them is a "holistic or system-centered attitude," brought about by despair of defining theoretical terms in terms of phenomena, even contextually, and the other is what Quine terms as an "unregenerate realism." Quine writes as follows:

(34) Naturalism has two sources, both negative. One of them is despair of being able to define theoretical terms generally in terms of phenomena, even by contextual definition. A holistic or system-centered attitude should suffice to induce this despair. The other negative source of naturalism is unregenerate realism, the robust state of mind of the natural scientist who has never felt any qualms beyond the negotiable uncertainties internal to science. (FME,72)

The point regarding truth and realism allows us to distinguish Quine's unregenerate realism from a more relativistic outlook towards truth and reality as may be found in the approach of a philosopher like Richard Rorty. In an interview, Quine has emphasized the difference between Rorty's approach and his own. Quine is quoted as saying that Rorty's approach;

(35) ...comes to pretty much the notion that philosophy is a matter of expressing oneself, ones attitude towards things... and that true and false in a really interesting sense doesn't apply. My attitude is that philosophy is and should be a continuation of science. That one is going after the truth. So all this negativistic debunking approach of Derrida and Rorty--I think of it as anti rational. (VLS,17)

Given this general sketch of Quine's immanent naturalism, I wish now to return to the quandary regarding Quine's use of the term 'mandatory' when expressing his view that "in linguistics, behaviorism is mandatory, [and] we have no choice" (13), while maintaining that he has no inprinciple objections to admitting meanings in certain behaviorally irreducible ways (15).

We can locate a fruitful point of comparison when we read above how Quine considers that "within our own total evolving doctrine we can judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be: subject to correction, but that goes without saying" (27). Let us note Quine's use of the term 'absolute' in this. It seems to me that Quine's juxtaposition of judging truth as absolutely as can be and at the same time subject to correction invites obscurity. To my "ear" the grammar of the term "absolute truth" implies that these supposed truths, if there are such, are just those truths that are <u>not</u> subject to correction. If we have to correct them, then we learn that they were not absolute truths after all.

The above point is raised as a matter of <u>usage</u>. Following Wittgenstein, I am assuming that my general sense of the grammar of

the term 'absolute truth' would be "something that everyone would admit." If I am right, then Quine might better have avoided the term altogether, and stuck to speaking of a naturalists ability to "judge truth as earnestly as can be, subject to correction", or to include a technical notation to clarify the usage. A suggestion in this respect might be simply to place an 'i' before the entrenched term to demarcate it as immanently construed; hence 'i-absolute' might go in place of the old philosophical sense of the transcendent notion of 'absolute.' Of course, Quine himself has been very sensitive to fluctuations in usage, and I am only indicating that Quine might use more care when using the philosophically entrenched notion of "absolute truth."[13] This may only be a quibble, but if we reflect upon the need for clarity in the context of Quine's persistent pattern of disavowals, then there may be good reason to press Quine for clarity on crucial points of usage. A related problem has been pointed out by Paul A. Roth, in an article titled "Missing Neurath's Boat." In an endnote, Roth writes that:

(36) Quine is not always clear when he is arguing for epistemology naturalized and when he is arguing from within that perspective. This leads to a confusion regarding what Quine assumes. (MNB,230-31)

The basic point that I wish to make is that when Quine is speaking from within his immanent naturalistic perspective, he is speaking within what he considers to be the current standards of the scientific community. Thus when Quine asserts that in

linguistics, "behaviorism is mandatory, [and] we have no choice," we must not be misled by Quine's usage. When Quine says "we have no choice," this must be understood immanently. That is, we have no i-choice under current scientific standards. These standards however, are subject to revision, and for Quine, that now "goes without saying." Quine's use of the term 'mandatory' should also be considered immanently. The immanent force of the term is most clearly understood to imply what we would normally associate with the notion of a mandate. In this case, we would be speaking of the mandates of current science. And for Quine, there are no higher tribunals of truth and factuality (20).

Earlier in this essay I argued that in (16) Roger Gibson had overestimated Quine's stake in behaviorism. Gibson had claimed that the conjunction of naturalism and behaviorism is a central axiom of Quine's system (the NB thesis). Gibson then went on to make the further claim that Quine is committed to the NB conjunction "come what may." In light of the above discussion and in consideration of Quine's remarks in (15), I think it is clear that Quine is better understood to hold that the NB conjunction is mandated by current science, rather than it being a position he would maintain "come what may."

(III)

IMMANENCE AND THE FACTUALITY OF MEANING

In Quine's view, it was naturalism that consistently led him to deny that the philosophical conception of meaning has or can be given any factual support beyond dispositions to verbal behavior. In this section, I will develop a position regarding how I believe Quine's immanent naturalistic vision has justified this conclusion.

It was noted above that the circularity demonstrated in "Two Dogma's of Empiricism" was called a "dead end" by Quine. The circularity was not supposed, of itself, to "prove" that intensional hopes for semantic clarification are rendered untenable. Quine claims that he has been thus "misunderstood" on the circularity issue. The arguments leveled in "Two Dogma's" were raised in empirical contexts and thus should not be considered as having the logical force of a proof. Nonetheless, Quine's circularity argument has been enormously influential. The passages from "Two Dogma's" that outline the argument require careful analysis and are not easily summarized. However, to bring the role of synonymy more critically before us, I will sketch one pattern of Quine's thoughts on the circularity issue. Initially, Quine presents the notion of analyticity by reference to the writings of

Leibniz. Here the notion of analyticity may be recognized under the conception of the 'truths of reason' in Leibniz's distinction between the 'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact.' Quine then considers Kant's conception, which he characterizes as evident from Kant's "use" rather than from his "definition" of analyticity. Quine writes;

(37) But Kant's intent, evident more from the use he makes of the notion of analyticity than from his definition of it, can be restated thus: a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact. (TD,21)

Quine then describes two classes of statements which harbor typical candidates for analytic statements. The first class is the logically true statements, typified by statements like; "No unmarried man is a married man." However, a second class of statements that are not logically true, yet may be turned into logically true statements by putting synonyms for synonyms, are typified by statements like: "No bachelor is unmarried." The problem, as Quine casts it, is then to show how the analytic statements of the second class may be reduced to those of the first class of logical truths. Very broadly, Quine proposes three areas in which this reduction might be thought to proceed. Those three areas are; I. Definition, II. Logic, and III. Linguistics.

In the area of definition we quickly recognize that, except in the case of explicitly introduced conventions or stipulations, what occurs in definition is an empirical recording of antecedent facts.

"Certainly", Quine writes, "the 'definition' which is the lexicographers report of an observed synonymy cannot be taken as the ground of the synonymy" (TD,24).

In logic, Quine turns to the work of Carnap. Carnap sought to introduce semantical rules and meaning postulates to effect the clarification of analyticity. In effect, he introduced meaning postulates into logical theory to yield truth in virtue of laws of logic and meaning postulates. Thus we would have our set of logical laws conjoined with a set of meaning postulates such that, (n, n+1, n+2,...) are the meaning postulates, and where n might be replaced thus: n=(if x is a sister > x is a sibling). The problem Quine notes with this approach is related to the problem of definition. That is, while the introduction of meaning postulates would get us a conception of analytic for some particular language ('analytic-for-L*'), Quine thus urges that we might untendentiously refer to Carnap's procedure as 'K', "so as not to seem to throw light on the interesting word 'analytic.'...By saying what statements are analytic for L*, we explain 'analytic-for-L*' but not 'analytic', not 'analytic-for'." (TD,33). What is wanting in Carnap's account is an explication of our prior understanding of the relation that picks out these postulates from any other class of statements.

In a third area of investigation, Quine considers the linguistic methods of Bloomfieldian linguists such as Bloch and

Traeger. In this linguistic domain, Quine examines the potential for meaning clarification by the use of "substitution criteria." The method requires the intersubstitution of co-referential terms, salva veritate. However, the method of substitution criteria, leads to problems of non-synonymous co-referentials as may be noted with terms like 'creature with a heart' and 'creature with a kidney.' Anticipating a reply, Quine suggests that for some, the problem might seem to be overcome by noting that the synonymy failure of co-referrentials is related to the fact that the terms co-refer contingently. Thus we might overcome the problem of contingency by introducing the notion of necessity. But here Quine notes that even if the language were rich enough to contain this notion, the move only presupposes that synonymy relations (understood via substitution criteria), can be made necessarily true. But this, Quine notes, is just to say that something is analytic. Let us bear in mind that the status of Quine's circle should not be considered to have the force of a logical proof, but rather be seen as an empirical examination of the most reasonable avenues of clarification that have commanded the field (See endnotes 4 and 6). As such, if Quine is to maintain his skeptical stance in the face of Katz's proposal, it must be shown that "theoretical explanation" falls out of the domain of "reasonable avenues of clarification." My position on this issue will be that the answer to this question depends upon ones conception of what would be a philosophically reasonable attitude to take. On Quine's view, all such issues are relativized to immanent standards. Thus,

to ask what is a reasonable approach to such efforts, is to ask what is i-reasonable. That is, what is reasonable according to the terms and standards of current science. However, I will argue that within Quine's immanent naturalistic vision, we will find terms and standards to indicate that such efforts are at least not unreasonable and clearly, not i-impossible. I will conclude thus, that even if Quine relies more heavily on the terms and standards of science that count against such efforts, there are counterpoising terms and standards that require the skeptical position that Quine calls 'mandatory,' to be "softened." To maintain a "hard" skepticism, Quine must show either that Katz's proposal is i-impossible or at least, i-unreasonable. I will contend that pending further evidential findings, Quine's position has shown neither.

Quine's treatment of the circularity issue is much richer and more fully detailed than this slice of it reveals. However, from this sketch we can the important role played the conception of synonymy. We saw earlier, that Quine considers the problem of translation to be an even deeper issue than analyticity (12). And in (3) Quine makes the connection between translation and synonymy. Quine writes that "in order to make the problem of synonymy graphic, [he] developed a thought experiment in radical translation." In the case of radical translation, Quine argued that translation manuals would be indeterminate. Here Quine claims that "there is no fact of the matter" with respect to which manual

is right or which is wrong. Quine enlarges upon the phrase 'fact of the matter' as follows:

(38) ...The intended notion of matter of fact is not transcendental or yet epistemological, not even a question of evidence, it is ontological, a question of reality, and to be taken naturalistically within our scientific theory of the world. Thus suppose, to make things vivid, that we are settling still for a physics of elementary particles and recognizing a dozen or so basic states and relations in which they may stand. Then when I say there is no fact of the matter, as regards, say, the two rival manuals of translation, what I mean is that both manuals are compatible with all the same distributions of states and relations over elementary particles. In a word, they are physically equivalent. (TPT,23)

And again, Quine writes;

(39) ...I speak as a physicalist in saying there is no fact of the matter. I mean that both manuals are compatible with the fulfillment of just the same elementary states by space-time regions. (FOM,167)[14]

Perhaps Quine's meaning skepticism comes out more plainly now. The circularity issue, Quine admits, is not a proof with logical force. What it showed was the supposed areas of clarification were "dead ends." But once the move is made to an immanent naturalism, Quine's assertion that there is "no fact of the matter" to adjudicate empirically adequate though divergent translation manuals, has to be understood as an ontological commitment to follow the immanent mandates of current science. And this is where Quine's physicalism enters into his naturalistic vision. And regarding a major purpose of physics, Quine has said that:

(40) ...a major purpose of physics has been to find a minimum catalogue of states--elementary states, let us call them--such that there is no change without a change in respect to them. This is true equally of physics today. (FOM,166)

Since Quine views a major purpose of physics to find such a minimum catalogue of states, correspondingly, he applies the purpose to linguistics.

(41) What now is the claim of physicalism? Simply that there is no difference in matters of fact without a difference in the fulfillment of the physical-state predicates by space-time regions. Again this is not reductionism in any strong sense. There is no presumption that anyone be in a position to come up with the appropriate state predicates for the pertinent regions in any particular case.

This formulation, 'fulfillment of physical-state predicates by space-time regions,' is decidedly unfinished. The space-time regions are sets of quadruples of numbers, determined according to some system of coordinates that I have not paused over. The physical-state predicates are the predicates of some specific lexicon, which I have only begun to imagine, and which physicists themselves are not ready to enumerate with conviction. Thus I have no choice but to leave my formulation of physicalism incomplete. (FOM,166)

Thus we see that Quine's use of the expression 'fact of the matter' refers us to 'reality,' but such reference is not reductionism "in any strong sense." For Quine, 'reality' is a matter that is formulated within the scope and purpose of current scientific ontology, however incomplete. This is certainly not to say that we can no longer speak of translations, and of their being better and worse ones. As Hilary Putnam has pointed out, if 'x' were the french utterance; 'Parlez-vous francias?' and 'y' the English expression; 'Do you speak French?', Quine would certainly

agree that 'x means y,' but he would deny that the formulation states a fact.[15]

Thus from Quine's naturalistic perspective, the "thought experiment" in radical translation forcefully demonstrates that current scientific ontology cannot provide a 'real' or 'factual' basis for adjudicating between rival translation manuals which are nonetheless empirically equivalent. The point of Quine's argument against meaning is thus deeply empirical. In a negative vein, the circularity issue was meant to show the futility of some often assumed avenues of clarification. And now, the thought experiment in radical translation provides positive weight to Quine's view that under current scientific standards, no other avenues may be expected to succeed. Quine's empiricism thus is not so much in opposition to quantifying over meanings for ontological preferences, but rather for lack of immanent scientific standards for identifying an ontology of meanings. Quine writes:

(42) In conclusion I want to relate physicalism to my perennial criticisms of mentalistic semantics. Readers have supposed that my complaint is ontological; it is not. If in general I could make satisfactory sense of declaring two expressions to be synonymous, I would be more than pleased to recognize an abstract object as their common meaning. The method is familiar: I would define the meaning of an expression as the set of its synonyms. Where the trouble lies, rather, is in the two-place predicate of synonymy itself; it is too desperately wanting in clarity and perspicuity.

Translation proceeds, presumably, by interlinguistic equivalence of synonymy of sentences. So, in order to make the problem of synonymy graphic, I developed a thought experiment in radical translation... (FOM,167)

To proceed from this point, we should make two others clear. Firstly, we need to clarify why it is that Quine is stressing physics as the promulgator of scientific ontology, and secondly, why it is that in an immanent naturalism we should <u>defer</u> to the ontological commitments of theoretical physics regarding scientific ontology in general. On the first point Quine writes:

(43) And why, of all the natural sciences, do I keep stressing physics? Simply because it is the business of theoretical physics, and of no other branch of science,

> "to say what...minimum catalogue of states would justify us in saying that there is no change without a change in positions or states ("Facts of the Matter"). (RP,430-31)

Thus Quine stresses physics as the promulgator of ontology and factuality simply because in an immanent naturalism, "it is the business of theoretical physics, and of no other branch of science", to establish the minimum ontological catalog.[16] On the second point regarding why one should defer to the commitments of current physics, the point is essentially the same. Once we have embraced an immanent naturalism in Quine's sense, we acquiesce in its current authority, there being no higher tribunal to turn to. As Quine will say, even if certain strange effects like telepathy were demonstrably established, and indeed established on a basis that was irreducible to the present catalog of microphysical states, it would still fall to the appropriate authorities (in this case the physicist) to pronounce on whether or not science must

countenance a new ontological annex. Quine writes that:

(44) ...if telepathic effects were established beyond peradventure and they were clearly inexplicable on the basis of the present catalogue of microphysical states, it would still not devolve upon the psychologist to supplement physics with an irreducibly psychological annex. It would devolve upon the physicist to go back to the drawing board and have another try at full coverage, which is his business. (RP,430-31)

Much in the spirit of C.S. Peirce, we see a pronounced ideal of a scientific community emerging from Quine's immanent perspective. And again, a normative dimension to Quine's naturalism is evident. In this case, the ideals of science are held out to guide the natural philosopher. However, in placing the normative force of his philosophy upon the ideals of science, Quine has been criticized for being unduly limited or even "parochial" in his perspective. At a Rutgers University conference in his honor, Quine was questioned on what he understood to be normative in his philosophy. Quine responded that it was "empiricism itself." Pressed to further clarify the remark Quine responded saying we should "beware the soothsayer." (Rutgers University, March 30, 1989). Later Quine was questioned on what appeared to be the "parochial" limitations of his position and Quine quipped; "parochial perhaps, but it is a rather large parish." [17]

These remarks, while humorously put, carry Peirce's sense of commitment to the scientific community as the best method of settling belief. Indeed, Peirce's enthusiasm reaches near

infatuation when he writes that the scientific method is to be exalted and "reverenced as his bride,...and he will be the worthy knight and champion of her." (FB,111-12). Quine's commitment to naturalism, while perhaps more soberly put, nonetheless carries normative force that should not be underestimated. Let us recall that Quine characterizes the natural philosopher as a "defender and protector" of the scientific perspective, out to "improve, clarify and understand the system from within." A position that Quine "not only admits to, but glories in." Lest these points appear merely anecdotal, we should recall Quine's endorsement of Gibson's suggestion that <u>the</u> major obstacle to understanding Quine's position is failure to take his commitment to naturalism seriously.

Thus, the strength of Quine's skepticism over meaning will be seen to issue from what Quine understands to be the immanent mandates of current science, and in particular, to the ontological commitments of physics. Hence, when Quine claims that there is no fact of the matter to meaning, he can be understood as saying that the phenomena of meaning cannot be "pinned down"[18] to a physical basis, relative to other sorts phenomena that we experience and can fix to a physical basis. In speaking of the "phenomena of meaning," I am simply referring to the common sense experience of meanings that Professor Katz has outlined in his article, "Common Sense in Semantics." In this article Katz writes:

(45) ... First, I want to claim that there <u>is</u> a particular way in which senses or meanings present themselves to us. Second,

knowledge of this way is a matter of common sense. Third, this way constitutes the phenomena that semantic theory is obligated to save.

> ...It is surely a matter of common sense that a sentence like "People sometimes procrastinate" is meaningful but a sentence like "Falsehoods sometimes procrastinate" is not, or that expressions like "bank", "ring", and "visiting relatives", are ambiguous, or that sentences like "Perhaps it will rain" and "Maybe there will be rain" are synonymous, or that expressions like "happy" and "sad" are antonymous. Moreover, it is also common sense that an expression or sentence of a natural language is meaningful when it has a sense, synonymous with another when they have the same sense, and antonymous with another when they have opposite senses. Such facts are as certain as the propositions on G.E. Moore's list in "A Defense of Common Sense." (CSS,175)

Let us consider the phenomena of optical illusions as an analogy to illustrate the point that meaning phenomena cannot be "pinned down" to physical facts. We have all experienced bent sticks in water that appear to falsify our understanding of the behavior of such physical objects. But we say that this experience is an illusion because <u>in fact</u> the stick is not bent by the water. Nonetheless, even though the phenomena can be predictively observed, our theory of optics will explain why the bent stick phenomena is false to the facts. The <u>fact of the matter</u> is that the stick is not so bent as it appears. Quine's skeptical challenge can thus be understood as saying that we cannot expect from semantic theory anything analogous to what optics has achieved in explaining visual illusions. For Quine, there is no physical basis in current science to pin down the divergent phenomena of meaning and translation, and the thought experiment in radical translation is offered to demonstrate that inevitability.

Quine develops the conception of radical translation in Chapter Two of Word & Object. Radical translation is a thought experiment that places linguistic observers in a previously unexplored jungle in an effort to learn the native language. It is supposed that the linguist has settled upon what to treat as native signs of assent and dissent. Consider then a native utterance like 'gavagai' uttered in the presence of a rabbit. The linguist is "thereupon in a position to accumulate inductive evidence for translating 'Gavagai' as the sentence 'Rabbit'. The general law for which he is assembling instances is roughly that the natives will assent to 'Gavagai?' under just those stimulations under which we, if asked, would assent to 'Rabbit?'; and correspondingly for dissent." (WO,30). But in querying the natives thus, Quine claims that there will be an indeterminate number of translational hypothesis that can accommodate equally well any evidence from the speech dispositions of the native informants. Examples of such translational hypothesis are that "Gavagai" translates as (1) "rabbit", or (2) "undetached rabbit part", or (3) "rabbit stage", or (4) "rabbit fusion". Nonetheless, resulting translation manuals can remain empirically equivalent even while translational compatibility continues to diverge with respect to translational hypothesis. Hence in the case of meaning, Quine's view is that the circumstances of radical translation demonstrates that we cannot establish the standards of identity (synonymy) to make objective muster. Objectively, Quine will say that when speaking of reality, there is no factual difference without a difference in physical

states or positions (39). Thus if we cannot inprinciple exert objective controls over translation in the context of a set of fixed (though underdetermined) physical conditions, we are bound to say that there is no fact of the matter with respect to these vagaries of meaning. Thus, vis-a'-vis the thought experiment in radical translation, we can appreciate that even if we were able to replicate the same physical conditions for linguistic observers,[19] we cannot expect a commensurate replication of responses to what the observer would say the stimulatory episode means (MVD,90).

Wittgenstein's use of the 'Duck-Rabbit' also provides a suggestive visual analogy. The point here is that we may quantify over one stimulatory visual episode and nonetheless be subject to two predictively impoverished responses as to what that stimulatory episode represents. Hence, there is no fact of the matter regarding which of the interpretations is the correct one, though there is a fact of the matter about what the interpretations diverge from. In the context of questions of reality or factuality, we quantify over those things that can be "pinned down" to the minimum catalog of states and positions. In language generally, the domain of the factual must be pinned down to the verbal dispositions and verbal dispositions refer to microphysical states. However, Quine believes that once we appreciate the thought experiment in radical translation, any factual basis for the case of meanings must now appear simply as a "will-o'-the wisp."

(46) The verbal dispositions are all that is real about language, and they do not determine translation to the point of deciding between incompatible manuals. There is accordingly no residual fact of the matter to <u>be</u> determined. In the case of natural science, on the other hand, there is a fact of the matter, even if all possible observations are insufficient to reveal it uniquely. The facts of nature out run our theories as well as all possible observations; on the other [hand] the traditional semantics out runs the facts of language. (BLM,8/see also:ITA,10)

It is significant to note that the indeterminacy of translation is taken within the context of empirical "slack" or the under-determination of nature. This view acknowledges that all of our theories, in so far as we claim that they are true, go beyond their observational base of support. In Quine's view this problem is not only one of degree, but rather one that indeterminacy has shown as insuperable, even in principle.[20] But now wouldn't this point cut equally against truth in physics? In other words, if we accept the implications of under-determination generally, might we not simply "conclude that translational synonymy at its worst is no worse off than truth in physics."? Quine rejects the attempted parallel and writes of such thinking that "To be thus reassured is to misjudge a parallel" (WO,75).

Quine's point here is that radical translation has shown that there is no fact of the matter to meaning beyond a dispositional matrix of microphysical states.

(47) Radical translation proceeds in the light of observed

> behavior, and behavioral criteria will ordinarily decide in favor of one translation rather than another. When they do, there is emphatically a fact of the matter by microphysical standards;...On the other hand my doctrine of indeterminacy had to do with hypothetical manuals of translation both of which fitted all behavior. Since translators do not supplement their behavioral criteria with neurological criteria, much less with telepathy, what excuse could there be for supposing that one manual conformed to any distribution of elementary physical states better than the other manual? What excuse, in short, for supposing there to be a fact of the matter? (FOM,167)

Thus the point against meaning, is that the experiment with radical translation has revealed something like a second order indeterminacy. In the case of meanings, there is an indeterminacy that is "additional" to the underdetermination of nature. Quine writes:

(48) I have just been contrasting the underdetermination of natural science with the indeterminacy of translation by adopting a realistic view of nature, which indeed I hold. But I have elsewhere drawn the contrast without realism in the following way. Natural science, we again assume, is underdetermined by all possible observations. However, suppose then that we have settled for one of the many overall theories of nature that fit all possible observations. Translation remains indeterminate, even relative to the chosen theory of nature. Thus indeterminacy of translation is an indeterminacy additional to the underdetermination of nature. (BLM,8)

Quine further widens the parallel of underdetermination by noting that unlike translation, in physics, consensus on the parameters of truth remains "conveniently fixed most of the time." Quine writes:

(49) ...the parameters of truth in physics stay conveniently fixed most of the time. Not so the analytical hypothesis that constitute the parameters of translation. We are always ready to wonder about the meaning of a foreigner's remark without any reference to any one set of analytical hypothesis, indeed even in the absence of any: Yet two sets of analytical hypothesis compatible with all linguistic behavior can give contrary answers, unless the remark is one of the limited sorts that can be translated without recourse to analytical hypothesis. (WO,75-76)

In sum, Quine's skepticism on the factuality of meaning amounts to the view that there are no ontological means in current science to circumvent the implications of indeterminacy, and thus we cannot set truth and factuality in translation on a par with truth in physics, even though both are subject to the under-determination of nature generally. And to suppose that they could be set on such a par would be to "misjudge a parallel." The force of this view was not to assert the platitude that translations must always be more or less imprecise, but indeed, that there may be many correct translations in the offing.[21] Nonetheless, as we read above (15), Quine does allow that there are immanent methodological means for attempting a clarification of translation that could put translation on a par with physics, but only at the expense of forcing a "drastic revision of our scientific theory of mind and nature, and a revision therewith of [Quine's] own philosophy of mind and language; for [his] naturalistic philosophy is continuous with science and shares its fallibility" (15).

This then I believe, is Quine's inprinciple argument against the possibility of establishing a fact of the matter to meaning

that exceeds a particular dispositional matrix of microphysical states. It must first be recognized that the point of principle must not be evaluated as a proof (see 6n), but rather as an empirically based argument and demonstration via the thought experiment in radical translation. Along with the circularity that Quine demonstrates from "Two Dogma's", this treatment of meaning, once taken immanently, exhausts the standards of current science sufficient to show that meaning cannot be pinned down to the standards of truth and factuality that may be found in current physical theory. The point against meaning then is ontological, and for Quine, "it is the job of the physicist and of no one else to say what minimum catalogue of states would justify us in saying that there is no change without a change in positions or states" (43).

If Quine is right then, we cannot hope even for a resolution of indeterminacy via a reduction of meanings to brain states. Quine makes this point clear in a reply to Robert Nozick.

(50) I am pleased by Nozick's parable of the two brands of English. It brings out what I have found difficult to make clear to my students and critics; namely, why it is that even a full understanding of neurology would in no way resolve the indeterminacy of translation. (RN,365)

Nozick's parable is about a hypothetical situation in which two space ships take off and travel in opposite directions. Both ships contain infant children and teachers. The children on one ship will learn English and the children on the other will learn

"stage-english." (This is not the term "stage" as in a theatrical stage, but more like the term "undetached-rabbit part" in a language called "undetached-english.") The point of the parable is that ceteras paribus; "the only neurological differences between the child on one ship and a corresponding child on the other, will be due to trivial phonetic differences; otherwise they are neurologically identical" (ETL,346).

A few words should be added here regarding the most general considerations that Quine believes should guide the naturalistic enterprise. In The Web of Belief, Quine has identified six virtues of the naturalist: conservation, modesty, simplicity, generality, refutability, and precision. In the Rutgers conference, Quine further spoke of scientific method as the "technology of prediction." The principle of conservation, it might be noted, also has been characterized by Quine as a maxim of minimum mutilation, and this maxim plays an important role in Quine's views on recalcitrant experience and revisability. Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation will also loom large in support of his principled rejection of meanings. In "Two Dogma's" Quine wrote that:

(51) A recalcitrant experience can, I have urged, be accommodated by any of various alternative reevaluations in various alternative quarters of the total system; but, in the cases which we are now imagining, our natural tendency to disturb the total system as little as possible would lead us to focus our revisions upon those specific statements concerning brick houses or centaurs. These statements are felt, therefore, to have sharper empirical reference than

> highly theoretical statements of physics or logic or ontology. These latter statements may be thought of as relatively centrally located within the total network, meaning merely that little preferential connection with any particular sense data obtrudes itself. (TD,44)

In this context, we can see that when facing a recalcitrant experience, the maxim of minimum mutilation enjoins us to tamper as little as possible with the total system, and the metaphor of centrality reminds us to rule out statements at the periphery prior to consideration of central revisions.

> (52) Conservatism is rather effortless on the whole, having inertia in its favor. But it is sound strategy too, since at each step it sacrifices as little as possible of the evidential support, whatever that may have been, that our overall system of beliefs has hitherto been enjoying. (WB,67)

The soundness of the strategy is easily recognized in consideration of hypothesis formation in the face of a recalcitrant experience. If my car will not start one morning, I may countenance a wide range of hypotheses regarding the event. I may question if it has any fuel or if the battery is dead or if the carburetor is malfunctioning. I may also question if the car is in a cranky mood or if the principles of internal combustion have lost their meaning. These last two hypothesis, while tempting in such circumstances, are certainly ill advised. In taking these possibilities seriously, we tacitly challenge vast stretches of our current system of the natural world. Thus our maxim of minimum mutilation reminds us to "divide and conquer," or rule out those

hypotheses that are peripherally situated before consideration of more central revisions. Quine illustrates the maxim's applicability to allegedly occult phenomena like clairvoyance.

(53) Moving on to clairvoyance, we are faced with a challenge to our basic ways of thinking. Evidence of clairvoyance would have to be ironclad if it were to warrant a quest for the unimagined avenues through which clairvoyant information might pass.

The scientist must be left to apportion his finite time and effort prudently. It is a matter of cost accounting. Writing of miracles two hundred years and more ago, David Hume asked which is likelier: that the laws of nature that we have so well attested day in and day out should be violated now and then in miraculous ways, or that witnesses to the purported miracles have been deceiving themselves or us? (QD,7)

Thus we see that challenges to the more central aspects of our scientific system accrue an evidential burden that in this extreme case, must be "iron clad" to warrant serious scientific attention.

Up to this point, I have been emphasizing what might be considered as the "conservative" side of Quine's immanent naturalism and I have highlighted Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation as one of its overriding principles. However, I will show that Quine's immanent vision, in so far as it does justice to the richness of natural science, contains a wealth of "liberal" principles as well. I also wish to show that in this spirit, Katz's attempt to clarify a factual base for meaning presently forces a deep tension within the "body politic" of Quine's naturalism. Thus, in the fullness of its development, Quine's

immanent naturalism should currently lead us to reconsider the force of Quine's meaning skepticism from within his naturalistic standpoint. Indeed, I will argue that Quine's skepticism must be "softened" substantially.

This conclusion follows from taking the view that Quine's naturalism is like a bicameral institution. The conservative elements have been most evident in terms of the emphasis on the view that truth and factuality are immanent to the domain of science, and that we must defer to the judgements of the experts in a given domain. Thus, when it comes to setting ontology, while it may fall to the philosopher to clarify and edit the ontological commitments of physics, it is the physicists job to write the text and pronounce the last word. However, since we also need to keep science vital and flourishing, we will need liberal principles that promote change and scientific progress. However, Quine is well prepared to endorse this liberal side of science, and Quine writes of how a scientist will deliberately induce tensions against current scientific doctrine to "power the engines of science and make it forge ahead."

(54) ...the tension between law and anomaly is vital to the progress of science. The scientist goes out of his way to induce it. Sir Karl Popper well depicts him as inventing hypotheses and then making every effort to falsify them by cunningly devised experiments. It is the tension between the scientist's laws and his own attempted breaches of them that powers the engines of science and makes it forge ahead. (QD,8)

Certainly, this attitude is not unique to modern science. Ever since the time of Socrates, philosophy has served as something of a "gadfly," stinging the tendency towards complacency in conservative domains. Russell has characterized philosophy as the "science of the possible," and promoted the Socratic attitude so as to "enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation" (PP,161). For Quine, "philosophy is continuous with science and shares its fallibility" (15), and thus in the case of meaning and factuality, we might ask ourselves just what guiding principles are at stake, and whether liberal or conservative principles should gain current ascendancy.

Regarding what is at stake, we read above (15) that Quine views success with Katz's proposal, as requiring a "drastic revision of our scientific theory of mind and nature." We should be aware too that within Katz's proposal is the consideration that we construe meanings platonistically. That is, Katz proposes that we quantify over meanings as abstract objects. Quine, we have seen, has accepted a commitment to abstract objects, albeit the extensional kind. The issue then is ontological and on Quine's view, physics would be forced to consider whether or not to construct an <u>intensional</u> ontological annex for meanings.[22] And if ultimately accepted, the result would be a drastic revision of our theory of nature. However, by appeal to Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation, such drastic measures must not be taken

lightly, and challengers must discharge an evidential burden before gaining serious scientific attention.[23]

Regarding Katz's proposal, the point of issue seems to be one of evidential warrant along with a prudential attitude toward "apportioning [the scientists] finite effort and time." But now shall we say that the naturalists attitude towards theoretical explanation and the clarification of meaning in the way Katz envisions, should parallel Quine's attitude towards purported cases of telepathy or clairvoyance? Quine never urges drawing such a parallel, but let us note then that when Katz has written of "Common Sense in Semantics", we are reminded that the phenomena of semantic meaning is a familiar experience occurring to all language users on a regular basis. Attempting an easy association of meaning with occult phenomena would surely be mistaken.

Another important element that should be taken into account is methodology. While it may be conceded that Katz is challenging current scientific ontology, we should first note that if truth and factuality are immanent domains, then so too is methodology. For Quine, if we endorse Russell's view that philosophy is the science of the possible, we must configure the viewpoint immanently, and to introduce a new 'possibility' into science requires more than logical consistency. Further, the move to an immanent naturalism demands that we do not to construe 'possible' in remote and dubious ways. Thus the soothsayer and voodoo methodology have little place

in natural science. The use of the term 'possible' requires that we view the notion as i-possible. Again however, theoretical explanation is not thus susceptible, and Katz's proposal is clearly in line with accepted scientific methodology. Indeed, while Quine has withheld an endorsement, pending further details of the proposed theory, he nonetheless has forthrightly allowed that in general he is "sympathetic" with the proposal.

Secondly, we should emphasize once again that Quine has seen fit to employ Katz's methodological perspective for his own purposes in Roots of Reference, and further recall that Quine has volunteered an example of how the method has produced results in science generally. Quine notes a "shining example of its success" with the discovery of the gene. Since Quine views his philosophy as continuous with science, and since the method under issue has been a part of Quine's own philosophical development as well as part of scientific development generally, then Katz's proposal must be seen as continuous with science in Quine's sense. Indeed, what we have now appears to be an instance of Quine's endorsed view of the scientist [who] goes out of his way to induce a tension between law and anomaly" (54).

It thus seems clear that this proposal for the clarification of meaning, while being continuous with science in Quine's sense, not only evades most of the criticisms that Quine has leveled, but it has been acknowledged to be capable of circumventing the

implications of indeterminacy in behaviorally irreducible ways. What Katz's proposal then abuts against most forcefully, in Quine's naturalistic perspective, is the conservation principle; the maxim of minimum mutilation.

I have urged the view that Quine's naturalism can be understood as analogous to a bicameral scientific body politic. As such, there will be deep tensions when we reach such a set of competing demands and conditions as just outlined. Speaking again of science and the occult, Quine says some things that demonstrate his recognition and full appreciation of this kind of tension occurring. Quine writes:

(55) There was a notorious case two generations ago of a Boston medium, Margery. She was investigated by a committee of Harvard scientists who were being properly open-minded about spiritualism. Her table-tippings and her purported tidings from beyond the grave half persuaded them. They should have had a professional magician in tow as a consultant. Fraud did eventually transpire.

The scientist's position is peculiarly delicate when, as here, he must decide whether to accept the testimony of his own senses to a revolutionary phenomena, challenging entrenched scientific theory, or to dismiss the phenomena as a presumed effect of common place causes which he has merely not had the wit to think up. A too cavalier line in such dilemmas could block some momentous insight. Probabilities have to be estimated and weighed, not excluding such factors as the self interest of a psychic medium. (QD,8)

In rather striking terms, here we see the liberal dimension of Quine's naturalistic point of view. We now read that when faced with the possibility of a revolutionary phenomena that challenges

entrenched scientific theory, while caution and conservation are indicated, "taking a too cavalier attitude in such dilemmas could block some momentous insight." But moving away from occult matters and returning to the issue of meaning clarification, we should now recognize that the employment of theoretical explanation is an attempt to quantify over an every day phenomena, and not to be thus dismissed. And to be sure, while no one has yet established a persuasive theory of meaning, what we want to evaluate now is the internal force of Quine's skeptical stance, as generated from his immanent naturalism. Scientific conservation should not lead us into "taking a too cavalier attitude that could block some momentous insight."

What then can support Quine's skeptical stance in the face of the admitted potential of theoretical explanation? The considerations entertained above indicate that the question essentially amounts to reflections on a pervasive circularity infecting the primary avenues of such venturing, along with an appreciation of the thought experiment in radical translation. Beyond that stands Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation that cautions against a forcing a premature disruption of current science and encourages a prudent attitude for allocating the scientists finite time and energy. In this case, the issue is ontological anomaly, and Quine envisions success with theoretical explanation as forcing a drastic revision of our theory of nature. However, the naturalist is also urged to go out of his and her way

to induce a tension between law and anomaly and to avoid adopting a cavalier attitude that would obscure the possibility of some momentous insight. When faced with the potential of ontological anomaly, we must consider both methodological and evidential warrant. In the case of meanings and theoretical explanation, the issue is not methodological, it is evidential. As Quine has put it, theoretical explanation "is an approach that has to be assessed on the merits of its specific applications."

Theoretical explanation then seems to have gotten a foothold within the naturalistic perspective. In the case of meaning, it has opened up a new avenue of clarification against Quine's demonstration of circularity. Nonetheless, Quine has maintained his skepticism even while recognizing and using the method himself. Reflections on the thought experiment in radical translation seem to have discouraged Quine from pursuing such an avenue of clarification. Thus we must conclude that Quine does have a principled argument to support his continued skepticism even in the face of the challenge of theoretical explanation. However, Quine's current skepticism must be softened according to the internal demands of the liberal aspects of his own naturalistic vision.

Quine has accepted the principled possibility that theoretical explanation could circumvent the implications of indeterminacy, but only at the expense of forcing a major ontological anomaly upon current science. In Quine's view the method must pay its way in

evidential coin. Nevertheless, it appears that the progressive spirit of science and Quine's stated interest to urge the scientist to go out of his way to induce a tension between law and anomaly, along with an injunction to avoid adopting too cavalier an attitude where momentous possibilities are at stake, seems in a straightforward way to imply that the internal demands of summing Quine's naturalism would indicate that there is currently sufficient internal force to warrant and underwrite an evidential exploration of theoretical explanation, even if it is part of Quine's "present scientific and philosophical outlook to view [success in] this eventuality as extremely unlikely" (15).

The force of this conclusion follows from what I perceive to be an implicit swing in the body politic of Quine's naturalistic vision. Consequently, I am inclined to believe that Quine's perspective may have taken on a life of its own, believing as I do, that Quine himself would choose to side with the more conservative forces implicit in his naturalism.[24] However, Quine has appreciated the potential for a shift in the internal force of his vision when he replied that; "if a notion thus introduced achieves a substantial simplification or illumination of some empirically well attested body of theory, and in such a way as to bear promise of eventually finding its place in an explanatory physical or physiological mechanism, then we should have no reservations."

(IV)

IMMANENCE AND SKEPTICISM

In this section I wish to address the issue of skepticism and its connection with Quine's move to an immanent naturalism. We have seen how Quine has rejected the Cartesian attempt to found a first philosophy, a position that Quine calls an "a priori propaedeutic or ground work for science." Instead, Quine will attribute reality and truth only within the terms and standards of current science. That is, only immanently (23-24). "Unlike Descartes", Quine writes, "we own and use our beliefs at the moment" (27). It thus might seem that Quine has severed all ties with philosophy's Cartesian heritage and chosen to work more narrowly within his own naturalistic paradigm. However, Quine says otherwise. Quine sees the naturalization of epistemology not as "a gratuitous change of subject matter but an enlightened persistence rather in the old epistemological problem. It is enlightened in recognizing that the skeptical challenge springs from science itself, and in coping with it we are free to use scientific knowledge" (22).

My purpose in addressing the skeptical issue is twofold. Firstly, in The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry

Stroud has forcefully argued that Quine has failed to answer the challenge of Cartesian skepticism and thus Quine is not entitled to claim that his naturalized epistemology is an "enlightened persistence in the old epistemological problem." The thrust of Stroud's presentation is to show that Quine's move to an immanent naturalism fails either to be epistemology, or that it fails as epistemology.

Secondly, I will explore Quine's responses to Stroud. In doing so, I will strengthen my conclusion of the last section; namely, that in the fullness of Quine's naturalistic perspective, we currently find ample reason to soften his longstanding skepticism on meaning, and indeed we find a principled basis to encourage further evidential exploration along lines set forth in what has been termed "theoretical explanation." It will be demonstrated that Quine's skepticism on meaning currently must be seen as less forceful than his rejection of Stroud's epistemic skepticism. This is especially significant in that Quine's rejection of Stroud's position is softly couched. Quine writes that Stroud's position is "within rights" and his "only objection" is that the skeptical outlook is an "overreaction" to the fallibility of science. In this vein, I will argue that contrary to Quine's often adamant stance against meanings, the fullness of Quine's own naturalistic perspective requires that his current skepticism on meanings should be couched even more softly than his rejection of epistemic skepticism.

In Stroud's view, if naturalized epistemology is really to be an enlightened persistence in the old epistemological problem, then it must present an answer to traditional skeptical reasoning. However, Stroud doesn't find such an answer in Quine's naturalistic approach. Stroud makes the point as follows:

(56) If we then reasoned as Descartes reasons and arrived by reductio ad absurdum at the conclusion that we know nothing about the physical world, and we found ourselves dissatisfied with that conclusion, clearly we could not go blithely on to satisfy ourselves and explain how knowledge is possible by appealing to those very beliefs about the external world that we have just consigned to the realm of what is not known. By our own arguments, despite their scientific origin, we would find ourselves precluded from using as independently reliable any part of what we had previously accepted as knowledge of the world around us. (PS,229)

Here we see that Stroud has taken note of the fulcrum of Quine's position against skepticism, namely what Quine calls the "crucial logical point that the epistemologist is confronting a challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science" (22). However, in making the claim that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, Quine is quick to note that he is not accusing the skeptical reasoner of begging the question. Quine writes:

(57) I am not accusing the skeptic of begging the question. He is quite within his rights in assuming science in order to refute science; this if carried out, would be a straight forward argument by reductio ad absurdum. I am only making the point that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. (NNK,68)

The repudiation of science that Quine is here alluding to would cast the *reductio* in observational terms according to the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method. The point being that massive failure of observational predictions generated from current scientific theory would eventually force the repudiation of science as we now understand it. Quine writes:

(58) In *Word and Object*, concerned to stress sensory evidence, I wrote of systems withering when their predictions fail. The sustaining force is observation. (RS,316)

Nonetheless, Stroud's remark above indicates that he is well aware of what Quine calls 'the crucial logical point,' yet when faced with Cartesian reasoning Stroud remains unconvinced of it's liberating force. I have noted above that Quine views the enterprise of epistemology as an attempt to explain how it is that given such meager sensory input, we nonetheless have evolved an elaborate and useful science. Quine frames the question asking "How do we do this and why does the resulting science work so well? These are genuine questions and no feigning of doubt is necessary to appreciate them" (9n).

In Stroud's view it is this way of framing epistemology that gives Quine the needed connection to the philosophical tradition. But in so establishing Quine in the tradition, Stroud believes that Quine has failed to take account of the skeptical force that has fueled the tradition. Stroud writes:

(59) What I have meant to deny, with Kant, is that we can regard all our beliefs about the world as 'projections' or as 'theoretical' relative to some 'data' or bits of 'evidence' epistemically prior to them, while at the same time explaining how our knowledge of the world is possible. ...Quine's project of naturalized epistemology has the interest and the apparent connection with traditional epistemology that it has only because it contains and depends upon such a bi-partite conception of human knowledge of the world. That is what I have argued cannot succeed in explaining how knowledge is possible. But without that conception, 'naturalized epistemology' as Quine describes it would be nothing but the causal explanation of various physiological events. (PS,253)

Stroud thus associates Quine with the epistemological tradition in virtue of Quine's adherence to the "projection problem" or what Stroud refers to as the bi-partite conception of knowledge which regards our beliefs about the world as relative to and mediated by evidence or data. The skeptical challenge comes in by driving a wedge between belief and evidence, asserting that under such a bi-partite conception of scientific knowledge, the relationship between theory and evidence is always subject to the possibility of radical distortion. Speaking directly to the skeptical challenge Quine remarks that:

(60) The skeptic repudiates science because it is vulnerable to illusion on its own showing; and my only criticism of the skeptic is that he is overreacting. (RTS,475)

Quine's response then is not to deny the skeptical problem that Stroud is impressed with, but rather to assert that Stroud's estimation of its force is an "overreaction." This remark , I believe, indicates the broad scope of Quine's immanent point of

view. We see how Quine considers the legitimacy of the skeptical challenge by his admission that the skeptics are acting "within their rights," and by Quine's immanent standards, he must mean the same "rights" that are afforded to the "naturalistic philosopher [who] begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as a going concern..." (25). Thus even though Stroud's position derives from Cartesian reasoning, unlike Descartes, there is at this point no transcendental attempt to establish a first philosophy or an a priori propaedeutic that transcends science. Quine sees Stroud's skepticism as operating within natural science, but being impressed with the fallibility that science exhibits on its own showing, the skeptic no longer accepts our inherited world theory as a "going concern". The skeptic thus "overreacts" to this fallibility and sets out to repudiate science from within science. So far, Quine sees the skeptical challenge as acting immanently, that is, "within rights." But it also appears that for Quine, while the skeptical challenge arose as an overreaction to the fallibility of science, the ensuing "self doubts" have lead epistemology away from immanent considerations and into a transcendent "dream of a first philosophy that is firmer than science." However, by seeking such a first philosophy "the old epistemologist failed to recognize the strength of his [original] position." Quine's 'old epistemologist' thus appears to be a naturalist who, in reaction to the fallibility of science, sets out to repudiate it but often has ended up transcending it. While this psycho-historical sketch is fanciful, it nonetheless highlights an

important aspect of Quine's philosophy; namely, that an immanent repudiation of science is naturalistically "within rights," but that transcendent attempts to salve its fallibility quit the naturalistic paradigm.

Speaking thus within the naturalistic paradigm, let us look more directly at how Quine would address this naturalistically spawned skeptical challenge. In a review of Peter Strawson's book, Naturalism and Skepticism: Some Varieties, Quine cites Strawson's attempt at resolving the skeptics problem of justifying the existence of the external world. Strawson's response to the problem is to invoke a version of what he calls the naturalism of Hume and Wittgenstein. Quine writes:

(61) ...Strawson rallies to the naturalism, as he calls it, of Hume and Wittgenstein. Their position is that belief in external objects is ingrained in human nature and is never really suspended, the skeptics pretensions notwithstanding. It is not open to doubt or, therefore, to substantiation.

If this dismissal of the problem is felt to be lame, I would suggest that the feeling can be relieved by taking a more fully naturalistic stance. (NYRB,32)

Once again the theme of immanence is evident as Quine urges us to take "a more fully naturalistic stance" to "relieve" our skeptical self doubts. We might now ask what a more fully naturalistic position has to add to the "lame" naturalism of Hume and Wittgenstein to address the skeptical problem. In this case we should begin by reference to Quine's arguments against there being

a fact of the matter to meaning beyond dispositions to verbal behavior. Quine expands upon the point as follows:

(62) The sentences of science, no matter how theoretical, acquire what meaning they have through a network of sentence-to-sentence links whose starting point is sensory stimulation....The existence of external objects is itself just one among the tenets of our scientific theory, albeit a primordial one, and is sustained to the degree that the theory as a whole conforms to observational data. The very meaning of the existence thesis lies no deeper. (NYRB,32)

When Quine claims that "the very meaning of the existence thesis lies no deeper," we might remind ourselves that since Quine has concluded that there is no fact of the matter to meaning beyond a physical dipositional matrix, the reality of language is then treated as just such "a complex of dispositions to verbal behavior" (RR,15). Consequently, the flux of our language is warped across an association of utterances and sustained within the context of social reinforcement. For Quine, sensory events are the basis of language usage, and our association of publicly exchanged utterances achieves relative alignment according to innate similarity standards. These shared similarity standards (quality spaces) are not Kantian categories of the understanding, but survival remnants of heredity and evolution (RR,23). On this conception, public language reinforcement is essential, for the public domain provides the independent controls necessary to arrest the potential for sensory drift. Quine writes:

(63) This point was made by Wittgenstein. Unaided by language, we might treat a lot of sensory events as recurrences of one and the same sensation,... But if we have learned society's word for the sensation, the social intercourse will arrest the drift and keep us in line. We will be saved by the statistical fact that the speakers have not all drifted in the same direction. (FOM,155)

Quine's perspective, we should also recall, is system centered and holistic. Thus the point to take note of now is that the thesis of 'external objects' is not only one of the basic tenets of our current scientific viewpoint, but in Quine's eyes, it is a "primordial" tenet. Even so, the externality thesis appears to be more than a primordial tenet of scientific language, and more crucially, Quine seems to take it as a central tenet as well. This point gains plausibility once we appreciate that the externality thesis is presupposed within the leading question of epistemology as Quine sees it. Quine writes:

(64) Epistemology for me is science self applied;...Science tells us that our data regarding the external world are limited to irradiations of our bodily surfaces, and then science asks how it is that people manage from those data to project their story about the external world--true though the story is. (RSM,293-94)

In "Two Dogma's of Empiricism" we have read how Quine has urged that no statement in science is immune from revision under the pressure of experience. Quine outlines the holistic perspective of science as follows:

(65) Taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one.

> The idea of defining a symbol in use was, as remarked, an advance over the impossible term-by-term empiricism of Locke and Hume. The statement, rather than the term, came with Bentham to be recognized as the unit accountable to an empiricist critique. But what I am now urging is that even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our grid too finely. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science. (TD,42)

Thus, once we accept the holistic attitude toward the scientific system of the world, we must come to recognize that while any individual statement in science is subject to revision, the more central statements involve logical inter-connections of sentences that occupy vast portions of the entire scientific network. But how much of science should we include in any particular case? Must we really include the whole of science, en bloc? It should be remarked however that Quine's holistic position, as expressed in "Two Dogma's of Empiricism", has been moderated. In his essay "Five Milestones of Empiricism," Quine addressed the issue as follows:

(66) Should it be the whole of science or the whole of a science, a branch of science? This should be seen as a matter of degree, and of diminishing returns. All sciences interlock to some extent; they share a common logic and generally some common part of mathematics, even when nothing else. It is an uninteresting legalism, however, to think of our scientific system of the world as involved en bloc in every prediction. more modest chunks suffice, and so may be ascribed their independent empirical meaning, nearly enough, since some vagueness in meaning must be allowed for in any event. (FME,71)

Thus while Quine's holistic position has been moderated, the crucial force of the holistic position remains. Tampering with statements in the field must affect surrounding statements that are logically connected. Quine writes:

(67) ...total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. ...Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections--the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having reevaluated one statement we must reevaluate some others, which may be statements logically connected with the first or may be statements of the logical connections themselves. (TD,42)

The above line of thinking may be instructively compared to Wittgenstein's view that in a linguistic network, there will be certain propositions that will "stand fast." And these propositions that stand fast are analogous to door hinges that must stay put if the door is to function in its usual way (OC, 341-343). In a 1957 essay called "The Scope and Language of Science," Quine speaks of what it would mean to deny the existence of the external world in this holistic/Wittgensteinian spirit.

(68) We cannot significantly question the reality of the external world, or deny that there is evidence of external objects in the testimony of the senses; for to do so is simply to dissociate the terms 'reality' and 'evidence' from the very applications which originally did most to invest those terms with whatever intelligibility that they may have for us. (SS,229)

In a similar way, if I am right about Quine's views on centrality, the force of Quine's holistic approach is to impress upon the skeptic that not only are skeptical doubts scientific in origin, but because of the centrality of the 'externality thesis,' to propose doubting this tenet of current science would be to introduce radically disruptive prospects. However, by our maxim of minimum mutilation, such proposals would require a major breakdown in sensory evidence and a concurrent failure of predictions within the system before warranting serious attention.

For Stroud however, Quine's assimilation of the externality thesis, into the epistemological question, appears question begging. In a recent work by Christopher Hookway titled; Quine: Language, Experience and Reality, critical mention is made regarding Stroud's rejoinders to Quine. One aspect of Hookway's discussion regards how Quine seems not to appreciate the arguments that impress Stroud. Speaking of Quine's naturalized epistemology, Hookway writes:

(69) Many readers find this material unsettling. Even those generally sympathetic to naturalism can sense an almost wilful refusal to see the point of the kind of epistemology that belongs to the 'tradition.' (H,192)

Hookway then goes ahead to describe the basic differences between Quine's naturalized view and that of the epistemological tradition. Hookway writes:

(70) ...Barry Stroud has forcefully challenged Quine's right to describe his work as epistemology. He emphasizes two differences between Quine's naturalized epistemology and what he calls 'traditional epistemology'. Firstly, he suspects that it would be circular to use scientific knowledge in order to answer the questions that trouble the tradition, while Quine has no such scruples. And, secondly, Quine ignores the radical skeptical arguments based on the thought that we might be dreaming or the victims of a deceitful spirit or wicked scientist which provide the impetus for the traditional inquiries. (H,192)

Regarding the issue of circularity, two points need to be distinguished. The first is that there is a question regarding the circular use of scientific knowledge to address questions of the 'tradition.' Secondly, there is the question of circularity in Quine's assimilation of the 'externality' thesis into the epistemological question. I have argued in Chapter II that Quine's emphasis on 'the crucial logical point,' namely that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, should be seen as a normative move to embolden naturalistic philosophers to spurn logical 'timidity' and operate according to their own naturalistic lights. This crucial logical point allows Quine "free use of scientific knowledge even while coping with the challenge of skepticism."

In respect to the second circularity, Quine echo's Strawson's interpretation of Hume and Wittgenstein. The point was also made explicit in Peirce's dictum that we should not doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. To initiate inquiry, Quine encourages the natural philosopher to abandon feigning doubt and rather raise questions that are "genuine." Quine writes:

(71) Science tells us that our only source of information about the external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. Stimulated in these ways, we somehow evolve an elaborate and useful science. How do we do this and why does the resulting science work so well? These are genuine questions and no feigning of doubt is needed to appreciate them. (NNK,68)

Thus for Quine, when we assimilate the externality thesis into the epistemological question, we do not assume what needs to be proven, rather, we simply acknowledge a central tenet of the current scientific 'language-game'; a tenet we must recognize if we are to think of epistemology as an immanent domain of natural science.

It is Quine's view that skepticism has arisen from the assumption of a rudimentary physical science. As such, the force of the skeptical challenge only makes sense by adopting the externality thesis. The externality thesis then is used to generate Stroud's account of a bi-partite position that is always vulnerable to radical distortion. As such, the skeptic raises examples such as illusions or dream states to hypothesize systematic possibilities that are capable of continually distorting the relation of evidence and theory. The skeptical conclusion then is to affirm that we have no assurance that any such a bi-partite view of knowledge will yield a significant relationship between them.

Quine indeed holds such a bi-partite view of knowledge, but

his response to the projection problem is not so gloomy. The first point Quine makes is to raise the crucial logical point that shows that the skeptical challenge is parasitic upon positive science. Quine writes:

(72) Skepticism battens upon mirages, on seemingly bent sticks in water, on rainbows, after images, double images, dreams. But in what sense are these illusions? In the sense that they seem to be material objects which in fact they are not... The positing of bodies is already rudimentary physical science; and it is only after that stage that the skeptics invidious distinctions make sense. (NNK,67)

The second point to keep in mind is Quine's sharp distinction between first philosophy and the challenge of skepticism. The challenge of skepticism is viewed by Quine as "within rights," within the naturalist paradigm. However, as an a priori propaedeutic set forth to ground scientific practice, first philosophy quits the naturalistic paradigm and seeks transcendence. The distinction must be made sharp, because while skeptical considerations (naturalistic) may have caused the move to seek a first philosophy (non-naturalistic), we must recall that it is just this move that Quine wants the natural philosopher to resist. For Quine, such a move is built upon philosophical pretensions of doubt and an underestimation of the strength of the naturalistic position. As such, Quine views these aspects of the skeptical challenge as "within rights," but also as an "overreaction" to the fallibility that science exhibits on its own showing.

After examples of illusions and dreams, the final point in the Cartesian battery of distorting possibilities, is the possibility of an all powerful and malicious deceiver. It is significant to note that in the Meditations, Descartes attempts to motivate this possibility by considering:

(73) ...not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful has employed his whole energies in deceiving me,...

With the consideration of Descartes evil deceiver, we have clearly quit Quine's naturalistic paradigm. The key notion in the skeptical challenge is that of a possible distorting condition. As such, we see that Quine's move to immanence requires that we configure our conceptions of what is a possibility under immanent constraints. On Quine's view then, Stroud's skeptical challenge is within its rights only insofar as it martials immanent possibilities. Not only would Quine reject this transcendent 'possibility,' but it should also be noted that the force of such a supposition only makes sense relative to a metaphysical framework that can no longer be assumed. Hookway describes the Cartesian framework as follows:

(74) [Descartes] first concern was not with a science which would make sense of human experience, giving us predictive control over our surroundings. Rather, he wanted his science to tell him how things were for God--he sought an account of how reality really was, independent of human practices and human cognitive process. ...In that case, Quine could defend himself by saying that the naturalization of epistemology is an inevitable consequence of the secularization of our concept

of reality. We have abandoned the metaphysical framework which gave the Cartesian challenges their philosophical force. (H,197-8)

However, Hookway continues the discussion by mentioning what he calls a natural riposte for this reply.

(75) There is a natural riposte for this. When we read the first Meditation, we respond to the arguments: we feel the force of the possibility that all might be a dream; and students in their first weeks of philosophy are readily convinced of the need to reply to Descartes challenge. Perhaps this shows that we still do have the conception of reality which Descartes exploits; perhaps it shows that 'traditional epistemology' does not require that conception: either way it is a response that cannot be ignored. However, we can question the significance of this phenomenon. (H,198)

Hookway then mentions the earlier point raised by Peirce, that doubts thus generated are somehow disingenuous or "paper doubts," and only amount to philosophical pretense. However, there is a stronger point raised by Peirce that Hookway does not consider, and that is Peirce's claim that everyone tends naturally towards the hypothesis of science, and we only departs from it when we no longer know how to apply it. Here, we also see in Peirce the assimilation of the 'externality' thesis that Quine has adopted. Peirce writes:

(76) Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by

> reasoning how things really are,...Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are realities, or, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, therefore, is one which every mind admits. ...Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it. (FB,107-8)

Hookway then rests the issue of these two competing perspectives without recognizing a clear advantage for either. However, he then extends the discussion by mention of an attitude that has been typical of the positivist tradition. That attitude is represented as an inherent suspicion of philosophical speculation in relation to scientific thought. As such, Philosophical speculation is subject to a burden of proof that is additional to the burden of scientific thought. Hookway sees an advantage for Quine on this score:

(77) I suspect that Quine is guided by an attitude, which is typical of positivism, and which is neatly captured by Carnap:

> the experience in our investigations and discussions led us to the following practical attitude. We regard terms of the traditional philosophical language with suspicion...and accepted them only when they have passed a careful examination; in contrast, we regard terms of mathematics and physics as innocent...unless cogent reasons had shown them untenable.
>
> (Schilpp 1963, pp. 65-6)

> Science is innocent until proven guilty, while philosophy is guilty unless proved innocent. Unless forced by science to take skeptical worries seriously, the skeptic's arguments can be set aside as enjoyable but unconvincing anomalies. While this may explain and even justify Quine's response to skepticism, it will be insufficient to persuade Stroud that

the Cartesian challenge is of no philosophical importance. (H,198-9)

The point of this naturalistic move has been succinctly rendered by O.K. Bouwsma who wrote that:

(78) ...naturalism is nothing but adoption of the successful policy. ...For there is in metaphysics no criterion of proof. (N,21)

The same idea that Bouswma lights upon is evident earlier in Peirce and indeed in Bentham's efforts to introduce naturalism into moral thinking. As Peirce puts it, the hypothesis of science is one "which every mind admits" and;

(79) Experience of the method has not led us to doubt it, but, on the contrary, scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in settling opinion. ..

[On the other hand, with the a priori method,] the very essence of it is to think as one is inclined to think. All metaphysicians will be sure to do that however they may be inclined to judge each other perversely wrong. (FB,108-9)

Bertrand Russell is another philosopher who has actively pressed the methods of science into philosophy. For instance, Russell has argued for the rationality of a hypothetical acceptance of the current findings of science. Russell writes:

(80) For my part, I have no doubt that, although progressive changes are to be expected in physics, the present doctrines are likely to be nearer to the truth than any rival doctrines now before the world. Science is at no moment quite right,

> but it is seldom quite wrong, and has, as a rule, a better chance of being right than the theories of the unscientific. It is, therefore, rational to accept it hypothetically. (VW,17)

It should be noted that the above line of reasoning generates considerable substance in support of Quine's claim that naturalists have underestimated the strength of their own position. In a relative sense, it is evident that unlike scientific proofs, philosophical "proofs" have been the source greater contention rather than consent.

Thus on my reading of the Quinean position, there are three general platforms from which Quine could support his claim that the skeptical response, while operating "within rights," has nonetheless been an "overreaction" to the fallibility of science. First we have seen that there is the crucial logical point that skeptical doubts are in fact scientific in origin, and the question of possible ways to consider the radical distortion of our knowledge must be configured immanently. Secondly, Quine like other naturalistic philosophers, will point out that inquiry ought to be stimulated by genuine doubts rather than by the philosophical pretence of doubt that is characteristic of the Cartesian tradition. Hookway's "natural riposte" to this contention may be denied on the basis of Peirce's claim that contrary to the apparent naturalness of Cartesian reasoning, it is scientific reasoning that is actually more natural in our thinking, and scientific thinking is only abandoned when we do not see a way to employ it. What is

unscientific and transcendent in the Cartesian reasoning is the move to what Quine calls the dream of an a priori propaedutic or groundwork that somehow must precede science. That we sometimes do not see a way of employing scientific methods, along with the recognition of the inherent fallibility of science, may have lead philosophers into dreaming of this first philosophy somehow prior to science. For Quine, however, this move to transcend science is not only an overreaction to the fallibility of science, but it further underestimates the strength of the naturalistic position. This last point should be considered in the context of the third major platform that I would use to support Quine's dismissal of skepticism. That is, that philosophical proofs have been historically impoverished relative to scientific proofs. That philosophical proofs have clearly been the ground of much greater contention than have scientific proofs and that little consensus has ever emerged among them is amply illustrated by the perennial wrangling over the proofs for the existence of God, J.S. Mill's "proof" for utilitarianism, G.E. Moore's proof of the external world, and Descartes own "cogito." As Russell has observed:

(81) Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to

> confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. (PP,154-55)

In the face of such contention in philosophy, it is reasonable to require that philosophical proofs accrue a burden over and above their scientific counterparts.

To sum up thus far, I have tried to show that Quine's move to an immanent naturalism engages successfully with Stroud's skeptical challenge. Quine does not refute the skeptical challenge and he doesn't claim to. What Quine has shown however, is the ascending viability of naturalism against the challenge of skepticism, and given the threefold response above, I believe that Quine may defensibly contend that naturalized epistemology is indeed an "enlightened persistence in the old epistemological problem," and not "a gratuitous change of subject matter."

At this point I would like to refer back to the earlier chapters on meaning, and in particular, to the arguments advanced in chapter (III). In those chapters, I argued that Quine's meaning skepticism should be seen as a moderated or "softened" skepticism. I drew this conclusion based from the following main points. Firstly, Quine has accepted the principled possibility that theoretical explanation could circumvent the implications of radical translation. This would seem to imply that there are immanent means available to clarify synonymy. Earlier Quine has said that the problem of clarifying synonymy was a deeper matter

than issues of ontology, and he would be quite willing to construe meaning as an abstract object if such clarification was possible (42). More recently it appears that Quine has granted this possibility and volunteered that he is generally sympathetic with the method of theoretical explanation (9). The skeptical issue over meaning then falls to evidential warrant (10). However, Quine has also urged that it is part of the scientists job to go out of his and her way to induce a tension between scientific law and anomaly. In the case of theoretical explanation, the tension that is at issue is a restructuring of scientific commitments. As Quine has said of Katz's proposal, "The present example, if really successful, would be part of a drastic revision of our scientific theory of mind and nature,..." (15). Crucially then, Quine's meaning skepticism relies upon two primary struts. Namely, the conservative principle of minimum mutilation and a concomitant need for greater evidential warrant for the case of theoretical explanation.

However, the general thrust of my earlier argument was to show that there is thus an <u>immanent</u> possibility of meaning clarification which proceeds along behaviorally irreducible ways. I then pushed forward on these grounds by presenting some of the more liberal forces that are resident in Quine's naturalistic vision. Indeed, Quine appears to have accepted this immanent possibility, but finds the prospects for a successful outcome to be "extremely unlikely" (15). However, given Quine's injunction against adopting too

cavalier an attitude where momentous possibilities are at stake (55), it seems that currently there is sufficient immanent warrant to underwrite an evidential exploration of meaning vis-a'-vis theoretical explanation from within a Quinean framework. It now remains for us to evaluate the force of the major obstacle to encouraging such an enterprise, namely, the conservative force of Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation.

To gain further insight into how Quine estimates the force of this maxim in the face of competing interests, we should note an important parallel regarding Quine's rejection of Stroud's efforts to bolster the significance of epistemic skepticism. Quine sees Stroud's skeptical challenge to be methodologically continuous with science, and I have shown that from within a Quinean framework, Katz's proposal can be viewed no less charitably. Indeed, Quine's response to Katz above [(9); (10)], appears to grant the methodological point willingly. Thus, if Quine's only complaint against Stroud's skeptical position is that it is an "overreaction" to the fallibility of science, then it must be recognized that if the skeptics reductio were to prevail, the result would be a wholesale repudiation of the entire fabric of our current scientific system of the world. As such, the skeptical reductio, while remaining methodologically "within rights," nonetheless runs radically against Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation. On the other hand, while Katz's proposal with theoretical explanation assails current ontology and sets out to establish a fact of the

matter to meaning in behaviorally irreducible ways, and indeed Quine says that "if really successful it would be part of a drastic revision of our scientific theory of mind and nature" (15), it cannot be said to involve the wholesale repudiation of current science that the skeptical reductio implies. Thus, since both philosophical enterprises are methodologically continuous with science, in Quine's sense, we must conclude that with respect to Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation, the strictures emanating from Quine's immanent position are more stringent against the skeptic who attempts to repudiate science, then against a revisionary proposal that seeks to establish a fact of the matter to meaning in behaviorally irreducible ways. If Quine's only complaint against Stroud's skeptical position is that it is an "overreaction," then when Quine allows that he is in general sympathy with Katz's proposal (9), we should understand this remark with a corresponding generosity of spirit. However, aside from this principled comparison, there is reason to consider the possibility of an endorsement of Katz's proposal, for when Quine says that it is part of the scientists job to induce a tension between law and anomaly, we see in Katz's proposal efforts that are best described as attempts to explore immanent possibilities, rather than the skeptics reductio efforts that Quine believes arise from an "overreaction" to the fallibility of science. But this attempt to eke out novel possibilities should fall most naturally under Quine's conception of "inducing tension into law and anomaly in an effort to power the engines of science and make it forge

ahead" (54). And this, says Quine, is part of the scientists job.

Thus, even allowing the significance of the maxim of minimum mutilation, Quine's softly couched response to the more radically disruptive potential of Stroud's skepticism, implies that the corresponding response to Katz's proposal requires a softening of his staunch skepticism on meaning. What must be softened or "toned down," is Quine's view that "in linguistics behaviorism is mandatory, ...[that] one has no choice" (13).

I believe that this step towards softening Quine's skepticism on meaning follows from having shown that theoretical explanation has forced a deep tension into what Quine considered as "mandatory" (mandated) in current science. I have argued that theoretical explanation forces this tension by the creation of an <u>immanent</u> possibility for the a factual clarification of meaning against what Quine considers the mandates of current science. If my arguments are right, even though Quine has said that in linguistics behaviorism is mandatory and we have no choice, we must conclude nonetheless that within Quine's naturalistic outlook, <u>there is</u> an i-possibility of choice in the case of meaning, soft-skepticism notwithstanding.

(V)

IMMANENCE AND TRUTH

In this chapter I will consider Quine's naturalization of scientific truth. Like other naturalized concepts, truth must be construed immanently. In the previous chapters I have argued that Quine's immanent naturalized standpoint can be maintained against critics like Katz and Stroud. However, in the case of meaning, my investigations forced me to conclude that while Quine can maintain a principled skeptical position against meaning, his skepticism must nonetheless be "softened" to allow for the immanent possibility of a factual clarification along lines suggested by Katz. On the issue of epistemic skepticism, I have argued that Quine's immanent naturalism displays an ascending viability in the face of Stroud's influential skeptical challenge. However, in this chapter I will argue that Quine's attempt to render truth immanently results in an impoverishment of Quine's own conception of naturalism. I intend to show that in his effort to naturalize truth, Quine only satisfies the conservative needs of his naturalistic vision. I will thus raise issue as to whether Quine's conception of scientific truth can be immanently naturalized without sacrificing the progressive scientific outlook that he otherwise extols. If my criticisms are right, serious question is

raised regarding Quine's requirement that natural philosophy must construe its concepts immanently. And as such, Quine's move to an immanent natural position is placed at issue.

Let us begin by noting the general significance that Quine's vision accrues by taking truth immanently. A large bounty for Quine's immanent construal of truth is revealed against Stroud's skeptical challenge to Quine's naturalized epistemology. Strawson, for instance, has characterized Stroud's challenge as follows:

(82) ...according to Stroud, the skeptic...does not deny that we do, and need not deny that we must, employ the concepts in question in experiential conditions which we take to warrant or justify their application. His point is, and remains, that the fulfillment of those conditions is consistent with the falsity of all the propositions we then affirm; and hence that--failing further argument to the contrary--we cannot be said really to <u>know</u> that any such propositions are true. (SN,10)

On Strawson's account then, two main points of Quine's position are subject to Stroud's critique. First, Quine has associated himself with the philosophical tradition by accepting a naturalized version of the projection problem. For Quine, the problem is framed as a question of how it is that we work up the "torrential" output of science from our meager sensory input. But there is a second area of perceived vulnerability ushered in by way of Quine's thesis of revisability. Let us recall that for Quine;

(83) ...there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No

> particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.
>
> If this view is right,...it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. ...Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolomey, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle? (TD,42-43)

By taking scientific truth immanently, it can be shown that Quine's naturalism remains aloof from Strawson's articulation of Stroud's criticism; for in disavowing a first philosophy, Quine attributes reality and truth only within terms and standards of the scientific system of the world that he <u>now</u> accepts (24). And regarding the projection problem, Quine will say that under immanent constraints, science can rightfully ask how it is that we manage from our meager data to project and simultaneously affirm our story of the external world--"true though the story is" (64). In short, Quine's reply to Stroud, once again refers us to his affirmation of an immanent natural standpoint. The result is that from this perspective, the problem as Strawson has framed it, simply does not arise. Once we accept the immanent interpretation of truth as Quine does, it is only by an unrecognized "sin of transcendence"[25] that the naturalist would say; "failing further argument to the contrary--we cannot be said to <u>know</u> that any such

propositions are true." On Quine's view, such remarks reveal that the immanent character of truth has been transcended. Recall too, that Quine's immanent position requires that, "Unlike Descartes, we own and use our beliefs at the moment,...[and] we judge truth as earnestly and as absolutely as can be; subject to correction, but this goes without saying" (27). And thus, we "attribute reality and truth only within the terms and standards of the scientific system of the world that [we] now accept; only immanently..." (24).

Here we may sense the "parochial" character of Quine's immanent outlook. Nonetheless, we have seen that Quine is undismayed by such an issue, and rather, is concerned in a principled way to argue <u>from</u> his position. To a large degree, Quine is ready to argue in this way in an effort to avoid falling into what he believed to be the flaw of "the old epistemologist" who "failed to realize the strength of his [own] position" (22). From Quine's vantage;

(84) Naturalism looks only to natural science, however fallible, for an account of what there is and what there is does. Science ventures its tentative answers in man-made concepts, perforce, couched in man-made language, but we can ask no better. The very notion of object, or of one and many, is indeed parochially human as the parts of speech; to ask what reality is <u>really</u> like, however, apart from human categories, is self stultifying. It is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from parochial matters of miles and meters. Positivists were right in branding such metaphysics as meaningless.

...The world is as natural science says it is, insofar as natural science is right; and our judgement as to whether it is right, tentative always, is answerable to the experimental testing of predictions. (STN,9)

Quine's view of scientific truth would surely be expressed in a similar spirit, where "to ask what [truth] is truly like, apart from human categories would [also] be self stultifying." For Quine, what is true is what science tells us and we can ask no better. But since science evolves over time, what are we to say of Quine's own notion of an eternal sentence such as "copper conducts electricity"? Could an eternal sentence be true at one time and become false at another? In the 1960 publication of Word & Object, Quine appears to say no.

(85) The primary distinction of eternal sentences is that they are the repository of truth itself, and so of all science. Insofar as a sentence can be said to be true, and not just true now or in this mouth, it is an eternal sentence. (WO,227)

However, in his 1970 publication of Philosophical Logic, Quine explicitly says that an eternal sentence may do "double duty" as true in one language-stage and false in another.

(86) ...an eternal sentence that was true could become false because of some semantic change occurring in the continuing evolution of our own language. (PL,14)

This position awkwardly threatens paradox. Can a true eternal sentence become false due to semantic evolution? Or perhaps, as the result of scientific evolution? If we were to retain a conception of propositional content, we could avoid the paradox by assigning truth to the propositional meaning rather than the

sentence. But once we have whisked the conception of propositional meaning away, as Quine has, this resolution is no longer available.[26] However, Quine has a ready response to this potential paradox, by relativizing an eternal sentence to a particular language at a particular time. Quine writes:

(87) When we call a sentence eternal, therefore, we are calling it eternal relative only to a particular language at a particular time. (PL,14)

Thus Quine temporarily fends off the paradox. However, within a single language such as English, the paradox still threatens, or so it would seem. But Quine has pressed for a further refinement by particularizing a single language with respect to time, and this refinement would defuse the paradox within a particular language. Quine writes:

(88) Here again we must view the discrepancy as a difference between two languages: English as of one date and English as of another. The string of sounds or characters in question is, and remains, an eternal sentence of earlier English, and a true one; it just happens to do double duty as a falsehood in another language, later English. (PL,14)

Essentially, Quine has now "time-locked" truth to language-stages, where inprinciple, the language-stage is further reduced and finally made accountable to a speaker-writer at the time of utterance. Quine writes:

(89) We are concerned simply with the language of the speaker or writer as of the time of speaking or writing. But in practice it can be convenient to talk simply of truth values of eternal sentences, tacitly understanding these as relativized to our present day English language habits. (PL,14)

While these refinements address the aforementioned paradox, I find the twists and turns disturbingly counter-intuitive, and I must question whether the means employed overburden the results. Indeed, the above convolutions appear as ad hoc implementations designed to maintain the move to immanence against a recalcitrant concept[27]. Quine's view in (85) was that an eternal sentence is "the repository of all science and not just true now or in this mouth." But later Quine says "We are concerned simply with the language of the speaker or writer as of the time of speaking or writing" (89). The impending conflict of these two statements is reconciled by use of the device of a language-stage which will demarcate separate languages if an eternal sentence does "double duty" in the next stage as false.[28] At this point I am reminded of Quine's own critique of Carnap in "Epistemology Naturalized." In that critique Quine wrote:

(90) [Carnap] was seeking what he called a rational reconstruction. Any construction of physicalistic discourse in terms of sense experience, logic, and set theory would have been seen as satisfactory if it made the physicalistic discourse come out right. ...
But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make believe? (EN,75)

Are Quine's refinements here excessive? In a pragmatic

spirit, we may allow that some degree of creative reconstruction may proceed within a theory, when tailoring a concept or set of concepts serves other needs of the theory. However, I plan to show that within Quine's own stated standards and interests, this immanent construal ultimately truncates the concept of scientific truth against the needs of the robust realism that Quine otherwise advocates. Finally, the larger critical issue will emerge regarding the ultimate value of Quine's requirement that only immanent standards of clarification are naturalistically significant. If these criticisms cannot be answered, I believe that serious doubt is cast upon Quine's conception of 'immanence' and ultimately, whether Quine's emphasis on this conception can improve our understanding of natural science.

In the earlier chapter on meaning, I have attempted to show that Quine's immanent view of naturalism is instructively analogous to a bicameral body-politic with conservative and a liberal forces. The liberal forces in Quine's naturalism would stress the more creative elements of the scientific enterprise, performing such services as attempting to induce a tension between law and anomaly, *and powering the engines of science to make it forge ahead* (54). In a reply to Harold Lee, Quine stresses these liberal forces by emphasizing that in his immanent naturalism, his realism too is consistent with what he calls "mans creative role in science." Quine writes:

(91) Perhaps [Lee] was mislead by my realism, not appreciating that it is consistent with recognizing mans creative role in science. The reconciliation lies in my naturalism. Disavowing as I do a first philosophy outside science, I can attribute reality and truth only within the terms and standards of the scientific system of the world that I now accept; only immanently. ...Note that this immanent standard of truth is what Tarski's construction gives us. (RL,316)

Here we have in a nut shell, Quine's commitment to naturalism associated with a realism that is anchored immanently. Further, we learn that the immanent standard of truth is given expression in Tarski's disquotational construction. These points are essential for us to be clear on if we are to sharply distinguish what Quine has referred to as his "unregenerate realism" (34), from a relativistic approach like that of Richard Rorty. Recall that Quine has said that for Rorty, "true and false in a really interesting sense doesn't apply. [And Quine's] attitude is that philosophy is and should be a continuation of science. [Where] one is going after the truth" (35).

As Quine's view of truth stands now however, we have the workings of a paradox that strains against the internal demands of his naturalism. It seems that Quine's immanent standard of truth, once restricted to Tarski's construction, fails to clarify the "liberal" sense of truth that is required to account for his interest to "fuel the engines of science and make it forge ahead." Quine's immanent employment of Tarski's construction may well capture the sense of truth that we now "own" in science, but it fails to capture the sense of it where, "one is going after the

truth" (35). This failure, we should note, cannot be idle, for Quine needs to account for this notion if he is to successfully distance himself from Rorty's perspective as he wishes to. When Quine says that unlike Rorty, the natural philosopher is "going after the truth," and then says that he "can attribute reality and truth only within the terms and standards of the scientific system of the world he now accepts," he fails to explain how it is that while his immanent use of Tarski's construction may successfully clarify what we mean by affirming the truth, it clarifies nothing regarding what I have been calling the liberal sense of "going after" or seeking the truth. The problem is not with Tarski's construction as such, but rather with Quine's restriction of truth to the terms and standards of current science. Surely, without the inclusion of a more expansive sense of truth, Rorty and others might well see Quine's protest as drawing a distinction without a meaningful difference. Indeed, it appears that Quine has used the locution of "seeking the truth" precisely to answer to this relativistic tension in his thinking. In a reply to Jules Vuillemin Quine speaks to his subscription to "a professed realism and a seeming relativism and instrumentalism." Quine writes:

(92) Vuillemin senses a tension between my professed realism and my seeming relativism and instrumentalism. The reconciliation is to be sought in my naturalism, which, ..., recognizes no higher truth than what we seek in science. For a little more in this vein see an early portion of my reply to Lee. (RV,662)

As with his response to Lee, Quine seeks to reconcile such

philosophical tensions by reference to his immanent naturalistic point of view. However, while Quine refers the reader to finding "a little more in this vein" with his response to Lee, Quine's language in his reply to Vuillemin (92), should be contrasted with his reply to Lee (91). There seems to me to be an important prima facie difference that needs to be addressed regarding the two replies. Initially, Quine has said to Lee that, "The reconciliation lies in my naturalism. ... I can attribute reality and truth only within the terms and standards of the scientific system of the world I now accept; only immanently. ...[in] what Tarski's construction gives us" (91). However, in responding to Vuillemin, Quine speaks of another reconciliation to his naturalism, "which recognizes no higher truth than what we seek in science" (92). The question to thus address is whether we can univocally reconcile Quine's conception of the 'truth that I now accept' along with a conception of the 'truth that we seek in science.'

A version of the point that truth needs to be attributed "beyond" the standards of current science is mentioned by Roger Trigg in his book, Reality at Risk. A Defense of Realism in Philosophy & the Sciences. Trigg argues that Quine reverses the relation between truth and theory. Contrary to Quine, Trigg argues that we take a theory seriously because we think it true, we don't take a theory as true because we take it seriously. Trigg claims that Quine's construal amounts to an affirmation of the latter

viewpoint. Trigg writes:

(93) Quine denies that he is lowering his sights and settling for a relativistic doctrine of truth. He says:

> The saving consideration is that we continue to take seriously our own particular aggregate science, our own particular world-theory...Unlike Descartes, we own and use our beliefs at the moment...until by what is vaguely called scientific method we change them here and there for the better. Within our own total evolving doctrine, we can judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be: subject to correction, but that goes without saying.

When he talks of 'judging absolutely', Quine is referring to the attitude with which we hold a belief rather than to its 'metaphysical' status...We earlier quoted Peirce saying that instead of trying to attain 'Truth' it would be better to try for a state of mind unassailable by doubt. Quine similarly wishes to link absolute truth to the conviction with which we assent to sentences. The fact that we continue to take our inclusive theory seriously is a bulwark against relativism for him. Yet this inverts what should be the correct order. There is no doubt a link between truth and taking a theory seriously, but it is not as Quine portrays it. We do not think something is true <u>because</u> we take it seriously. It is not even the case that taking a theory seriously constitutes truth. We rather take it seriously <u>because</u> we think it true. (RAR,78-79)

On the view I am adopting however, Quine's outlook does not need to be accused of "reversing" the link between taking a theory as true and taking the theory seriously. It seems to me that Trigg's sharp dichotomy does not do justice to Quine's system centered outlook. Surely, Quine would not accept the clearly ordered relationship that Trigg seems to assert (see Carnap discussion; pp. 119ff.). Nonetheless, what I am calling for is a clarification of two apparently different senses of attributing truth. Not only the sense of attributing the truth immanently,

which is captured by Tarski's construction (Trigg's view of taking a theory as true because it is taken seriously), but also the sense of attributing the truth "beyond" the standards of current science, a view which is not thus captured and one which I have argued is needed by Quine to maintain his "unregenerate realism" against relativist and instrumentalist interpretations of his view.

The question that I am now raising derives largely from puzzlement over how Quine can claim consistently that the only truth he recognizes is immanent to current science (expressible in Tarski's construction), and then claim that "the tension between law and anomaly is vital to the progress of science; and it is the tension between the scientist's laws and his own attempted breaches of them that powers the engines of science to make it forge ahead" (54). In other words, how can Quine wish the scientist to "power the engines of science to make it forge ahead" unless he also believed that what is true is not always and only what "we own and use at the moment" (27), but rather, something that is sometimes beyond what we own here and now. But in saying this, it is beginning to sound like our notion of seeking the truth is dangerously close to what Quine may disparage as a "sin of transcendence." Thus an apologist for Rorty might reply with the following dilemma: When Quine says that he is "going after the truth," either Quine is drawing a distinction that he has yet to give significance to, or by using language that reverts to a "sin of transcendence," he employs a conception that is unavailable to

him in any case. Further, should Quine wish to dismiss the dilemma by disavowing any further significance to the "truth seeking" locution, the resulting language will not be sufficiently rich to account for the progressive spirit of natural science that Quine otherwise upholds.

Let us attempt to give a little more substance to this "truth seeking" locution before proceeding further. When Quine distances himself from Rorty by speaking of "going after the truth," I am inclined to suppose that Quine is in affiliation with a time honored attitude toward the "truths of nature" found in the natural sciences. The attitude was perhaps most famously captured by Isaac Newton when he wrote:

(94) I do not know what I may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like a little boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me. (LS,110)

The attitude is similarly expressed by Albert Einstein in his essay, "The World As I See It." Here Einstein writes:

(95) I am satisfied with the mystery of the eternity of life and with the awareness and a glimpse of the marvelous structure of the existing world, together with the devoted striving to comprehend a portion, be it ever so tiny, of the Reason that manifests itself in nature. (WI,11)

An even stronger statement to the same effect was rendered by Max Plank. Plank considered the attitude as the "most sublime scientific pursuit in life." In his autobiography Plank had written:

(96) It is of paramount importance that the outside world is independent from man...something absolute; and the search for the laws which apply to this absolute appears to me as the most sublime scientific pursuit in life. (RST,71)

Given Quine's professed "unregenerate realism" (34), along with his remark in opposition to Rorty that in science one is "going after the truth" (35), It would seem that Quine does associate himself with the attitudes expressed by Newton, Einstein, and Plank. However, it also appears that in these quotations, the three natural scientists appear to adopt an attitude towards reality and scientific truth that is at odds with Quine's immanent conception of truth and reality. As Quine has written it, the natural philosopher "attribute[s] reality and truth only within the terms and standards of the scientific system of the world that [we] now accept; only immanently..." (91). However, in striking contrast we read that Newton's life as a natural philosopher is likened to a child at play on the seashore, while "the great ocean of truth lays all undiscovered before him." Plank and Einstein display a similar attitude.[29]

Perhaps Quine wants to express a similar outlook when he speaks of his "unregenerate realism" (34), and the natural

philosopher as "the busy sailor adrift on Neurath's boat," out to "improve, clarify, and understand the system from within" (25). However, with Quine's immanent construal, that attributes reality and truth "only within the terms and standards of current science" [my emphasis], we find a prima facie difficulty for making such an association. If reality and truth are immanent, then what is the force of Quine's remark that for Rorty, "true and false in a really interesting sense does not apply," and that "philosophy is and should be a continuation of science. That one is going after the truth" (35). If Quine did associate himself with the scientific tradition above, the point would be clear. However, the move to immanence appears to deprive Quine of this association. In the scientific tradition above, reality and truth appear as ideals, or for Plank an "absolute" that is beyond what is found in current science.

Let us note however, that there is at least one important difference regarding what Quine calls "the sin of transcendence," and making an attempt to "seek" for truths of nature that we do not "own." Quine has said that what was most faulty in the transcendent philosophy of Descartes, was the attempt to justify science vis-a'-vis an "a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science." As with transcendent thinking, truths of nature that we seek (Newton, Plank, and Einstein, e.g.), are not truths "that we own," but unlike the "sin of transcendence," there is no suggestion or assumption of an a priori propaedeutic, or grounding, for

science in the conception of these truths. Thus we may mute or soften our criticism. Going after the truths of nature that we do not "own," in this sense, may not commit us to a "sin of transcendence." However, in allowing this much, we have yet to approach anything resembling an immanent construal of this conception of truth that is beyond what we "own" in current science. Indeed, Quine's expressed view seems quite incompatible with this liberal conception of truth that I have associated with Newton, Einstein, and Plank. Quine's immanent position on truth seems only to satisfy the conservative forces in his naturalistic vision.

To summarize thus far, I have taken Quine's view that in natural science, we attribute reality and truth <u>only</u> within the terms and standards of current science; only immanently (21-22), to militate against a time honored conception of truth as expressed by great historical figures such as Newton and Einstein. Following their lead, I have urged that in natural science <u>we do</u> attribute reality and truth <u>beyond</u> immanent standards. And indeed, when Quine speaks of "going after the truth," or of there being "no higher truth than what we seek in science," he distances himself from a seeming relativism or instrumentalism by just such an assumption. The result appears that for Quine, the assumption of a reality or truth that is beyond immanent standards must be seen as either a "sin of transcendence" or it is an important conception that Quine has yet to articulate or define. However, since there

is no presumption that this conception requires an a priori propaedeutic, or grounding for science, there are grounds to weaken the charge that the conception results in what Quine would label as a "sin of transcendence." Nonetheless, the relativist's dilemma that I suggested has not been fully resolved. Quine still owes us an explication of what it means to "seek" or to be "going after the truth[s]" of nature that we do not "own." Tarski's construction seems quite incapable of providing a satisfactory basis for articulating this point.

The urgency of providing such an articulation is deepened when we recognize that if Quine allows some sense of truth that is not immanently articulated, not only does he lose a univocal sense of scientific truth, but he significantly weakens his response to Stroud's skeptical challenge as formulated by Strawson (82). The arguments presented in Chapter IV were meant to provide a ballast to show the ascending viability of Quine's naturalized position. However, Quine's position either requires a naturalized version of truth that immanence seems incapable of explicating, or we must accept some concessions on the centrality that immanence is supposed to play in "improving, clarifying, and understanding" the business of the natural scientist. If truth is not always immanent, then the clarifying role of Quine's move to immanence is put in question. Without a clear response to the issue of naturalizing truth in Quine's immanent way, Strawson's portrayal of Stroud's skeptical challenge returns with renewed vitality. With the move

to immanence itself under scrutiny, we will want to know with Strawson and Stroud; what further argument to the contrary can be offered to show that Strawson's formulation doesn't draw Quine's naturalism back into the skeptical whirlpool.

The above difficulties, I believe, issue essentially from Quine's firm affiliation with taking truth to follow Tarski's construction, along with what I have called Quine's "time-locking" of truth to language-stages. The association of these elements plague Quine's naturalized vision of science with deeply counter-intuitive results. In this vein, Hilary Putnam has raised a criticism of the disquotational view of truth that is congenial to my critical presentation. In an article titled, "Why Reason Can't be Naturalized," Putnam writes:

(97) Let us recognize that...we are committed to their being some kind of truth, some kind of correctness that is substantial and not merely disquotational--Why should we expend our mental energy in convincing ourselves that our thoughts aren't really about anything noumenal or phenomenal...[i.e.] beyond being the verdict of the moment... (WRN,246)

Here we see that Putnam characterizes the disquotational view of truth as tantamount to "the verdict of the moment," and in a related way, my criticism has been directed at the inadequacy of Quine's immanent account to achieve an explication of truth that is "beyond" the terms and standards of current science. While Quine claims that the only truth that he recognizes is immanent, he

nonetheless needs and uses a sense of "going after the truth" to distinguish his naturalism from relativistic or instrumentalist interpretations of his naturalism. Further, as the quotes from Newton and Einstein suggest, the assumption that truth is not wholly contained within the terms and standards of current science, provides important naturalistic fuel to "power the engines of science and make it forge ahead." It is significant to note here that Quine appears to be using the assumption that truth is not wholly contained within current science with his depiction of the natural scientist as a "busy sailor adrift on Neurath's boat." As Quine puts it, "The naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as a going concern. He tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified portions of it are wrong (25)." When Quine says that the naturalistic philosopher believes that some unidentified portions of his world theory are wrong, it seems clear that Quine's "busy sailor," as with the scientific tradition above (94-96), assumes that the truth about nature is not wholly contained within the terms and standards of the current world theory. Quine never says that he doesn't assume this. The problem however, is to incorporate this liberal conception of truth into Quine's expressed parameters for an immanent naturalism. Indeed, unless Quine continues to affirm that "philosophy is and should be a continuation of science, that one is going after the truth" (35), Quine's parochial posture could be a "story" congenial to a relativistic view like Rorty's. Quine has made such an

affirmation, and contrary to Rorty, he identifies one of the two sources of his naturalism with an "unregenerate realism." However, when it comes to an explicit articulation of the truths of nature, Quine tells us that the only truth he recognizes is immanent and given by Tarski's construction. But if that is the end of the matter, I am inclined to join with Hilary Putnam in asking; "why should we expend our mental energy in convincing ourselves that our thoughts aren't really about anything beyond the verdict of the moment (97)?" Quine's association with Tarski's construction, does appear to be subject his view to Putnam's characterization of "the verdict of the moment." To break the characterization, I believe that it would be necessary to reinterpret what I have called Quine's "time-lock" on the truth of eternal sentences, "the repository of our science."

In connection with Quine's immanent treatment of scientific truth, we yet may locate some further difficulties with what I suspect is a naturalistically recalcitrant concept. Let us consider another place of difficulty that emerges regarding Quine's metaphor of the natural philosopher adrift on Neurath's boat. As Quine has expressed it, the natural philosopher "begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as a going concern. He tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified portions of it are wrong (25)." The language Quine uses to describe the role of the "busy sailor," while suggestive, can be shown to involve difficulties that are particularly

pertinent to Quine's naturalized conception of truth and the role of the natural philosopher. The juxtaposition ensnares Quine's sailor in the very paradox that in Quiddities, Quine has described as a "paradox of reasonable belief." Quine outlines the paradox as follows:

(98) To believe something is to believe that it is true; therefore, a reasonable person believes each of his beliefs to be true; yet experience has taught him to expect that some of his beliefs, he knows not which, will turn out to be false. A reasonable person believes, in short, that each of his beliefs is true and that some of them are false. I, for one, had expected better of reasonable persons. (QD,21)

The parallel between Quine's language that describes the situation of the "busy sailor" and the language of this "paradox of reasonable belief" is striking. Thus we may similarly translate the parallel as follows: That of all the sailor's beliefs, if the sailor is reasonable, he believes that those beliefs are true. However, being a man of experience, the sailor reasonably believes also, that some of those beliefs, he knows not which, are false. But now, as with the paradox of reasonable belief, shall we continue the parallel and say; "in short, [the sailor believes] that each of his beliefs is true and that some of them are false"? One way of treating this paradoxical result is to do as Quine suggests with the paradox of the Barber who shaves all those and only those who don't shave themselves. Suppose now we asked if the Barber then shaves himself? The paradox follows that if he does, then he doesn't, and if he doesn't, then he does. Quine's response

to the barber paradox is to take stock of the assumptions that led to the paradox. Once we do, the paradox may be recognized as a clear instance of a reductio ad absurdum. For Quine, the paradox shows there is no such barber (WP,2). But shall we follow similar reasoning with the sailor and thus say that there is no such sailor? If so, then we scuttle Quine's image of the natural philosopher adrift on Neurath's boat and must look to Quine to present us with another metaphor.

Another response might be to join Quine in abandoning the use of intensional idioms and propositional attitude expressions, and recognize the importance of beginning with an "externalized" epistemological position with no awareness assumptions such as 'beliefs' (11n). But even so, these efforts will not yet rescue Quine's sailor, because the paradox will hold equally for a rephrasing of the language into physicalistic terms and patterns of behavioral assent. For the paradox to re-emerge, it would only require being renamed from the "paradox of reasonable belief" to "the paradox of reasonable assent." As a last resort, we might try to finesse the problem away by Quine's expedient of treating truth primarily in terms of moments of utterance as associated with language-stages. But no matter, for this counter-intuitive technical expedient does not address the issue of just what Quine intends us to understand by his metaphor of the sailor. In describing the role of the busy sailor adrift on Neurath's boat, Quine does use the 'belief' idiom, and as it stands, the metaphor

of the sailor adrift on Neurath's boat founders upon the paradox of reasonable belief. Since little logical sense can be thus made of the metaphor under these conditions, I think it is reasonable to ask how we can make useable sense of the metaphor, without the idiom. Thus, for an immanent interpretation of the concept of scientific truth, Quine's metaphor of Neurath's boat is either infected with logical paradox, or again, it is in serious need of extended clarification.

Another consideration might be raised here. Perhaps Quine has adopted a view of "seeking the truth" as a regulative ideal. C. S. Peirce and Karl Popper for instance, have argued for a construal of truth as such a regulative ideal. Quine, however, has been critical of Pierce's proposal and Popper approvingly cites Quine's misgivings against Peirce's convergence ideal (CR,231). However, Popper then goes on to elaborate a falsificationist view of truth that he calls a "Verisimilitude" theory. Popper writes:

(99) ...Our idea of approximation, or of verisimilitude, has the same objective character and the same ideal or regulative character as the idea of objective or absolute truth. It is not an epistemological or an epistemic idea--no more than truth or content. (In Tarski's terminology, it is obviously a 'semantic' idea, like truth, or like logical consequence, and, therefore, content.) (CR,234)

Taking the conception that the truth/falsity content of a theory is the class of all and only its true/false consequences, Popper expresses the crux of the "Verisimilitude" position as

follows:

(100) Assuming that the truth-content and falsity-content of two theories t1 and t2 are comparable, we can say that t2 is more closely similar to the truth, or corresponds better to the facts, than t1 if and only if either:
(a) the truth-content but not the falsity content of t2 exceeds that of t1,
(b) the falsity-content of t1 but not its truth-content exceeds that of t2. (CR,233)

Poppers efforts however, appear to have been flawed. Susan Haack has noted that D.W. Miller (BJPS;1974) and others, have shown:

(101) that a theory t2 has greater verisimilitude than another, t1, in accordance with Poppers (a) and (b) only if t2 is a true theory from which the truth-content of t1 follows. This means that Popper's definition of verisimilitude does not apply to comparisons between theories both of which are false; but that, of course, was the principle objective of the theory, which therefore fails of its epistemological purpose. (POL,117)[30]

Nonetheless, we can see that Quine's immanent perspective on truth is not vulnerable to the problems of the verisimilitude position. Firstly, Quine attributes truth to the standards of current science, "subject to correction, but that goes without saying." And secondly, holism shows that we cannot isolate the falsity-content of a false theory in any case. Thus, truth as a regulative ideal, in Peirce's sense or in Popper's, is not Quine's way. I don't think we could say that Quine's view is a correspondence theory either. For Quine, Tarski's construction has

been cited as what the immanent view of truth gives us, and its "cancellatory force reminds us that our eye is on the world." However, even though "our eye is on the world," there is no suggestion that a correspondence relation holds between our sentences and the world. Underdetermination and indeterminacy should quickly convinces us that there is no correspondence assumptions in Quine's immanent view of truth. However, the problem remains; how are we to construe an immanent-Tarskian view of truth in a manner that does justice to what Quine has called his "unregenerate realism"?

As a further possibility, we might see if the "seeking" sense of truth could serve Quine's purposes construed as an expression of ordinary language. An expression of ordinary language that, in J.L. Austin's sense, may rightly be considered as "the first word" but need not be considered the "last word," since ordinary language may be "supplemented and improved upon and superseded (PE,185)." An instance of a term from ordinary language that has been "superseded" and received such a "supplementation" for scientific purposes, might be seen with the concept of 'validity' as it occurs in ordinary and scientific language. In ordinary language this term is attributable to such diverse things as sentences, points of view, and aesthetically significant ideas. In logic however, the sense of the term is improved upon by restricting its application to arguments.[31] But how close <u>is</u> Quine's outlook to the ordinary language movement? Generally, I have found Quine's position on

ordinary language philosophy to be complex and illuminating. As such, I should now like to digress somewhat to address a few crucial aspects of Quine's position in relation to ordinary language philosophy. It will be shown that while Quine has important affinities with this movement, the problems I find regarding his conception of truth gains no relief through such affinities.

In the first section of Word & Object, Quine had already made the claim that "science is self-conscious common sense." (WO,3) And in "The Scope and Language of Science" (1954), Quine reaffirms the important link between scientific language and its connection to ordinary language in its common sense origins. In this article, Quine expresses the connection by claiming that the language of science is "a splinter of ordinary language, [and] not a substitute." Quine writes:

(102) Terms which are primitive or irreducible from the point of view of scientific notation may still be intelligible to us only through explanation in ordinary language rife with indicator words, tense, and ambiguity. Scientific language is in any event a splinter of ordinary language, not a substitute. (SLS,236)

We thus may recognize that in Quine's naturalistic outlook, our scientific language cannot transcend its common sense origins, rife as these origins are with ambiguity. To attempt to do so is to undermine the circumstances that did most to invest intelligibility into our terms. But Quine notes, we may now begin

to feel certain logical misgivings. We may recall that on Quine's naturalistic position:

(103) All I am or ever hope to be is due to irritations of my surface, together with such latent tendencies to response as may have been present in my original germ plasm. And all the lore of the ages is due to irritation of the surfaces of a succession of persons, together, again with the internal initial conditions of the several individuals. (SLS,228-229)

Quine then notes that the seeds of certain logical misgivings may appear from such a perspective. Quine writes that:

(104) ... this reflection arouses certain logical misgivings: for is not our very talk of light rays, molecules, and men then only sound and fury, induced by irritation of our surfaces and signifying nothing? (SLS,229)

Reminiscent of the later Wittgenstein, Quine responds to these logical misgivings by grounding his behavioral conception of 'intelligibility' with reference to the "original applications" of our terms. Quine then argues that the reasoning behind such misgivings are rooted in a particular philosophical fallacy. A fallacy which Quine believes philosophers have become increasingly aware. Quine writes:

(105) To reason thus is, however, to fall into fallacy: a peculiar philosophical fallacy, and one whereof philosophers are increasingly aware. We cannot significantly question the reality of the external world, or deny that there is evidence

> of external objects in the testimony of our senses; for to do so is simply to dissociate the terms 'reality' and 'evidence' from the very applications which originally did most to invest those terms with whatever intelligibility they may have for us.
>
> We imbibe an archaic natural philosophy with our mothers milk. In the fullness of time,..., we become clearer on things. But the process is one of growth and gradual change: we do not break with the past, nor do we attain standards of evidence and reality different in kind from the vague standards of children and laymen. Science is not a substitute for common sense, but an extension of it. (SLS,229)

For Quine then, science does not break from common sense, but rather evolves as a continuation of it. And even with his concomitant acknowledgement that science is not a substitute for common sense, Quine can and does believe, that for its purposes, scientific language is an improvement upon common sense. For Quine, the growth and development of our scientific discourse has not been achieved by breaking with the past. Using the concept of 'evidence' Quine believes that the scientist, like the layman, begins with the same primitive sense of evidence. Quine writes:

(106) Not that the layman has an explicit standard of evidence--nor the scientist either. The scientist begins with the primitive sense of evidence which he possessed as a layman, and uses it carefully and systematically. He still does not reduce it to rule, though he elaborates and uses sundry statistical methods in an effort prevent it from getting out of hand in complex cases...

Our latest question was, in brief, how science gets ahead of common sense; and the answer, in a word, is 'system.' (SLS,235)

Largely a matter of degree, scientific discourse thus gains

most significantly beyond the "original applications" of ordinary language, by introducing "system" into our language. Quine's conception of 'transcendence' and what he calls the "sin of transcendence," might thus plausibly be associated with this "peculiar philosophical fallacy." A fallacy, we might say, of disassociated intelligibility. To blithely abandon the "intelligibility" of our original applications, in the spirit of a supposed perfectionism, is for Quine, a "pompous confusion." Quine writes:

(107) Science is not a substitute for common sense, but an extension of it. The quest for knowledge is properly an effort simply to broaden and deepen the knowledge which the man in the street already enjoys, in moderation, in relation to the commonplace things around him. To disavow the very core of common sense, to require evidence for that which the physicist and the man in the street accept as platitudinous, is no laudable perfectionism; it is a pompous confusion, a failure to observe the nice distinction between the baby and the bath water.

Let us therefore accept physical reality, whether in the manner of unspoiled men in the street or with one another degree of scientific sophistication. In so doing we constitute ourselves recipients and carriers of the evolving lore of the ages. (SLS,229-30)

We may suppose then, that on Quine's view, the "baby" of our original applications, confers whatever <u>original</u> intelligibility our terms have been given, rife as those circumstances are with ambiguity. Science thus seeks to clean-up "the bath water" of these original circumstances to facilitate prediction and to "improve, clarify, and understand" our evolving system from within.

(108) The utility of science, from a practical point of view, lies in fulfilled expectation: true prediction. (NNK,68)

For Quine then, the language of science should be understood as an outgrowth of ordinary language and common sense. Given this viewpoint, we may be inclined to associate Quine's position on intelligibility with paradigm-cases. In a reply to J.J.C. Smart, Quine has sought to clarify his commitment to the paradigm-case argument. Quine writes:

(109) [Smart] finds me ambivalent on the paradigm-case argument. In fact my attitude toward the paradigm-case is univalent but intermediate. What I meant in the misunderstood pages (WO, pp. 3f.) was that the paradigm case is not a permanent stopping place, but a point of departure. The expressions 'real', 'exist', 'there is', first come to make sense to us through their commonest uses. So do pronouns, the prototypes of all bound variables. The paradigmatic objects of reference of all these cases are, I suggest, visible tangible bodies. If certain speakers have learned these expressions only from such applications, and then someone proceeds forthwith to deny the reality or existence of bodies, those speakers will find the denial puzzling or absurd. Someone can, on the other hand, intelligibly shift his attributions of existence a little at a time...

In the beginning we needed the paradigmatic bodies, in order to begin to get the knack of the pronouns themselves and of kindred terms and devices. Paradigm cases confer intelligibility, but continuity of change suffices to [preserve?] intelligibility. Paradigm cases launch our ship, but afterward, in Neurath's figure, we can stay afloat while we rebuild it plank by plank. (WOB,292)

Quine thus accepts the paradigm case argument but notes that on his intermediate view, the intelligibility of our terms, while grounded in their original applications, is not limited to them. "Paradigm cases confer intelligibility, but continuity of change

suffices to preserve intelligibility." In his article, "Facts of the Matter", Quine provides some detail regarding his views on how the primitive cases evolve and yet retain continuity with the early paradigms.

(110) Direct conditioning or simple induction does not suffice for the acquisition of language generally. The learning process has to be more elaborate when we move on to grammatical constructions, to past and future tenses, to conditionals and conjecturals and metaphors, and to theoretical and abstract terms. It is evident that these further linguistic structures are based, however precariously, on the observational vocabulary that was learned by direct confrontation and simple conditioning. The superstructure is cantilevered outward from the foundation by imitation and analogy, by trial and error. (FOM,158)

Thus Quine's use of the phrase "continuity of change [which] suffices to preserve intelligibility", should thus be understood in the context of analogy and imitation. For Quine, it is by such means that the intelligibility of our original applications may then be "cantilevered outward."

Quine's conception of an evolving intelligibility may be further clarified by noting its crucial relevance in the Quine-Carnap dispute. The well known exchange between Quine and Carnap took place over Carnap's proposed distinction between internal and external existence questions. In his article "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology", Carnap used the internal-external distinction to clarify his philosophical outlook with respect to the question of the existence of abstract entities. On Carnap's

view, a sharp distinction must be drawn regarding the following two forms of existence questions:

(111) ...we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions.

...consider as an example the simplest kind of entities dealt with in everyday language: the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events. Once we have accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., "Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?",..., "Are unicorns and centaurs real or merely imaginary?" ...The concept of reality occurring in these internal questions is an empirical, scientific, non-metaphysical concept. ...real, according to the rules of the framework.

From these questions we must distinguish the external questions of the reality of the thing world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this question is raised neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers. ...To be real in a scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of practical decision concerning the structure of our language. (ESO,206-207)

In short, Carnap considers scientific existence questions as questions that are internal to the scientific system or framework. External questions, on the other hand, attempt to regard the reality or existence of the framework itself. However, in Carnap's view, such questions are not raised by scientists, nor by the man in the street, but only by philosophers. But such questions transcend the bounds of Carnaps's view of empirical meaningfulness.

Nonetheless, these philosophical questions should not be dismissed as empty of all significance. On Carnap's view, such questions are more properly considered in the context of pragmatic concerns over which framework would be most practical to adopt. Hence, on Carnap's view, the controversy over the existence of abstract objects, is most properly thought of as a practical question of whether to adopt a linguistic framework that specifies such entities. In drawing such a distinction, Carnap allows room for a multiplicity of linguistic forms, and indeed his willingness to countenance divergent linguistic frameworks is strikingly ecumenical. Carnap writes:

(112) Let us learn from the lessons of history. Let us grant to those who work in any special field of investigation the freedom to use any form of expression which seems useful to them; the field will sooner or later lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful function. Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms. (ESO,221)

In contrast to Carnap's ecumenical leanings, we have seen how Quine has settled on a "sectarian" or "parochial" characterization of his outlook (21n). We have also just seen that on Quine's view, scientific language is a "splinter" or an extension of ordinary language and not a substitute for it. Thus we see Quine's concern to maintain an intelligible connection with the common sense origins of the evolving system of science, and by so doing, Quine believes intelligibility is preserved and we continue to be "recipients and carriers of the evolving lore of the ages". Thus,

unlike Carnap, Quine is more inclined to appreciate the connection between the language of current science and the significance of our terms in their original applications, or as paradigms-cases. And while we may gradually modify and "cantilever out" from the original applications of our home language, Quine reminds us that such modifications are only intelligible as extensions, and should not be thought of as substitutes. As such, even though paradigm cases may confer whatever original intelligibility our original applications have, the original paradigms themselves may be scrutinized in turn, as our system evolves. In "Ontological Relativity", Quine addresses the issue as follows:

(113) The relativistic thesis to which we have come is this, to repeat: it makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or reinterpret that theory in another. ...talk of subordinate theories and their ontologies <u>is</u> meaningful, but only relative to the background theory with its own primitively adopted and ultimately inscrutable ontology.

...we cannot require theories to be fully interpreted, except in a relative sense, if anything is to count as a theory. In specifying a theory we must indeed fully specify, in our own words, what sentences are to comprise the theory, and what things are to be taken as the value of their variables, and what things are to be taken as satisfying the predicate letters; insofar we do fully interpret the theory, <u>relative</u> to our own words and relative to our overall home theory which lies behind them. But this fixes the objects of the described theory only relative to those of the home theory; and these can, at will, be questioned in turn. (OR,50-51)

The picture that thus emerges is plainly reflective of Quine's holistic outlook, and Quine has used Neurath's figure to suggest how the perspective may continually evolve. Thus recalling that

Quine has identified "a holistic or system-centered attitude" (34), as one of the two sources of his naturalism, shall we say that Quine believes that Carnap's use of the internal-external distinction commits a sin of transcendence? I think it should be clear by now that Quine's emphasis on the notion of immanence has broad philosophical implications and should not be thought of as explicable in precise terms. There appears to be normative force to Quine's use of the notion of immanence, and its sense is well captured in its ordinary meaning as "dwelling within." Note Quine's earlier cited remark that one aspect of his naturalism that is normative is "empiricism itself," leading us to "beware the soothsayer" (See page 41). These vague pronouncements might be thought of as injunctions and expressions of Quine's staunch refusal to leave the indwelling tenets of his immanent naturalistic vision. A vision that is launched by common sense and reaches its fullness with the terms and standards of current science. However, to get clear on Quine's view of Carnap's position, let us turn to one of Quine's direct comments from his 1954 essay, "Carnap and Logical Truth." Quine writes:

(114) Carnap's present position is that one has specified a language quite rigorously only when he has fixed, by dint of so-called meaning postulates, what sentences are to count as analytic. The proponent is supposed to distinguish between those of his declarations which count as meaning postulates, and thus engender analyticity, and those which do not. This he does, presumably, by attaching the label 'meaning postulate'.

Suppose a scientist introduces a new term, for a certain substance or force. He introduces it by an act either of legislative definition or of legislative postulation. ...Now

> I urge that scientists, proceeding thus, are not thereby slurring over any meaningful distinction. Legislative acts occur again and again; on the other hand a dichotomy of the resulting truths themselves into analytic and synthetic, truths by meaning postulate and truths by force of nature, has been given no tolerably clear meaning even as a methodological ideal. (CLT,131-32)

We see then that in more precise terms, Quine considers Carnap's internal-external distinction to rely finally upon the cleavage between the analytic and the synthetic. Quine continues the essay by arguing that it is only by Carnap's assumption of the analytic-synthetic distinction, that he is able to draw the distinction between factual issues (internal questions), and issues of practical linguistic decision (external questions).

(115) One conspicuous consequence of Carnap's belief in this dichotomy may be seen in his attitude toward philosophical issues as to what there is. It is only by assuming the cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths that he is able to declare the problem of universals to be a matter not of theory but of linguistic decision. Now I am as impressed as anyone with the vastness of what language contributes to science and to one's whole view of the world; and in particular I grant that one's hypothesis as to what there is, e.g., as to there being universals, is at bottom just as arbitrary or pragmatic a matter as one's adoption of a new brand of set theory or even a new system of bookkeeping. Carnap in turn recognizes that such decisions however conventional, "will nevertheless usually be influenced by theoretical knowledge." But what impresses me more than it does Carnap is how well this whole attitude is suited also to the theoretical hypothesis of natural science itself, and how little basis there is for a distinction. (CLT,132)

Quine is thus critical of Carnap for granting the influence of theoretical knowledge with respect to our conventional and practical decisions on the one hand, but on the other hand,

refraining from drawing similar conclusions with respect to the theoretical hypothesis of natural science itself. That Carnap leaves this second domain untouched, and thus claims to present a general distinction on kinds of existence questions shows, in Quine's eyes, that Carnap has failed to appreciate Quine's critique of the underlying reliance upon the analytic-synthetic distinction.

Certainly, the issue is one that Carnap was well aware of, and indeed, it was an issue that Quine and Carnap had discussed at considerable length. In a 1951 paper titled "Carnap's Views on Ontology", Quine makes significant mention of these discussions and says that he had hopes of dissuading Carnap regarding the underlying assumptions of his view. Quine writes:

(116) ...if there is *no proper distinction* between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence. Ontological statements then end up on a par with questions of natural science. ...

Carnap maintains that ontological questions, and likewise questions of logical or mathematical principle, are questions not of fact but of choosing a convenient conceptual scheme or framework for science; and with this I agree only if the same be conceded for every scientific hypothesis. (CVO,211)

Given these remarks, I do not think we can make much of what might appear to be a point of parallel between Carnap's internal-external distinction and Quine's immanent-transcendent distinction. It may be true that Carnap's highly liberal attitude towards the adoption of linguistic frameworks seems rather insensitive to

Quine's holistic picture, where a more gradual "continuity of change by imitation and analogy" is required to preserve clear intelligibility for alternative decisions. But the liberality issue is really just a matter of degree, and it is not the liberality issue per se that bothers Quine, for he too encourages liberality, though of a more limited sort. For Quine, the limitations to be applied to the proliferation of linguistic forms are vaguely bounded, but nonetheless, may be broadly characterized as matters to be adjudicated under an immanent conception of the needs of current science.

As Quine has written above, he is as "impressed as anyone with the vastness of what language contributes to science and to one's whole view of the world" (115). The problem for Quine is that what allows for Carnap's more extensive liberality to begin with, is his acceptance of the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. But further, if Carnap believes that one may "stand aloof and recognize all the alternative ontologies as true in their several ways," that we shall see, would be for Quine, to confuse truth with evidential support. That this is a confusion follows from Quine's view that truth is immanent to our current world theory, and we can speak of no higher. What Carnap thus seems to be charged with is not transcendent considerations, but immanent confusions. The mark of the transcendent appears more surely now as the attempt to establish a supra-scientific tribunal, somehow prior to science. The following discussion regarding Quine's own

conception of proxy functions[32] bears these interpretations out. Quine writes:

(117) ...all ascription of reality must come rather from within one's theory of the world; it is incoherent otherwise.

> My methodological talk of proxy functions and inscrutability of reference must be seen as naturalistic too; it likewise is no part of a first philosophy prior to science. The setting is still the physical world, seen in terms of the global science to which, with minor variations, we all subscribe. ... Epistemology, for me, or what comes nearest to it, is the study of how we animals can have contrived that very science, given just that sketchy neural input. It is this study that reveals that displacements of our ontology through proxy functions would have measured up to that neural input no less faithfully. To recognize this is not to repudiate the ontology in terms of which the recognition took place.
>
> We <u>can</u> repudiate it. We are free to switch, without doing violence to the evidence. If we switch, then this epistemological remark itself undergoes appropriate reinterpretation too; nerve endings and other things give way to appropriate proxies, again without straining any evidence. But it is a confusion to suppose that we can stand aloof and recognize all the alternative ontologies as true in their several ways, all the envisaged worlds as real. It is a confusion of truth with evidential support. Truth is immanent, and there is no higher. We must speak within a theory, albeit any of various. (TT,21-22)

The ontological relativity that Quine commits himself to is thus resolved in practice by what Quine has called, "acquiescing in our mother tongue" (OR,49), and the lesson to be learned from this relativity is that in the naturalism that Quine is presenting, ontology is the service of truth, or rather, true sentences. Quine writes that:

(118) It is occasion sentences that report the observations on which science rests. The scientific output is likewise sentential: true sentences, we hope, truths about nature. The objects, or values of variables, serve merely as indices along the way, and we may permute or supplant them as long as the sentence-to-sentence structure is preserved. The scientific system, ontology and all, is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory stimulation to sensory stimulation. (TT,20)

In "Facts of the Matter" Quine writes in a similar vein:

(119) All theoretical entities are here strictly on sufferance; and all entities are theoretical. What were observational were not terms but observation sentences. Sentences, in their truth or falsity, are what run deep; ontology is by the way. (FOM,165)

If it is "sentences in their truth and falsity that run deep, and ontology is by the way," we are thus abruptly returned to the importance of getting a satisfactory clarification of Quine's conception of scientific truth. The above excursion however, has shown that Quine's conception of truth, cannot be assimilated to the paradigm case-position as outlined above. Unlike the case of 'evidence,' the intelligibility of truth should no longer be countenanced among paradigms of ordinary language, or by reference to their "original applications." For unlike the concept of evidence, with truth, Quine has accepted an explicit standard of clarification, vis-a'-vis Tarski's construction. Thus, for the concept of truth, however suggestive a paradigm-case approach may have appeared, I do not think it remains as a viable option for Quine to adopt. To consider it so would be to view the liberal

expression of 'seeking the truth' within a common sense paradigm, with all the attendant ambiguity. However, in Quine's naturalism, truth has now been clarified in more austere scientific vocabulary, comparable in part to the concept of 'validity.' Tarski's construction has removed the rife ambiguities of the original applications of truth, and notably in terms of eliminating the semantic paradoxes. Further, Quine's association with Tarski's construction provides clear grounds upon which Quine can satisfy the influential work of Paul Bernaceraf who argued that the conditions for the truth of 'P' cannot be such as to make it impossible for the conditions to be satisfied. Bernaceraf's position was written as a challenge to platonism in mathematics, but the general conception he advances is as follows:

(120) It must be possible to establish an appropriate sort of connection between the truth conditions of p ...and the grounds on which p is said to be known, at least for propositions that one must come to know --that are not innate. (MT, 672)[33]

Thus unlike the concept of evidence, it now would be a scientific mistake to refer to common sense applications to justify the conception of truth as that which is sometimes beyond what "we own and use" in current science. However, if I am right that since Quine needs and uses this liberal sense of truth to maintain his realism against relativistic and instrumental interpretations of his views, the liberal expression of truth needs to find a role in Quine's outlook as an explicit bona fide scientific conception.

Once we have settled for an explicit standard, such as Tarski's construction, we must adhere to that explicit standard to achieve our ends, or reconsider the serviceability of the standard altogether. Responsible scientific inquiry must require nothing less.

Let us return then to the paradox of truth anew. Explicitly, we might present the points to reconcile as follows: How can Quine reconcile the view that scientific truth embraces; (A) the view that truth is only attributed according to the terms and standards that we now accept, only immanently, along with the view that; (B) truth is sometimes considered to be beyond what we "own" in current science, and it is in science that we "seek" these truths. Let us for the moment see if perhaps the seeming paradox is not a paradox after all. Perhaps my reasoning in arriving at the paradox is part of what I have called Quine's fallacy of disassociated intelligibility. What I have in mind is that (A) and (B) above, have to be construed immanently, which is to say, we might simply remark that to seek truths that are "beyond what we own" in current science is not to say that we are considering such truths as being <u>transcendent</u>. That is, Quine might want to say that if we are to speak <u>intelligibly</u>, we can only consider such truths that may be "beyond what we currently own" as somehow <u>continuous</u> with the terms and standards that we now accept for truth. Thus, if we avoid the fallacy of disassociated intelligibility, and we reject all <u>a priori</u> propaedeutic requirements, we may be free to reconcile (A)

and (B) as follows. The truths that we seek in science (B), are intelligible only under the terms and standards that we now accept in science, only immanently (A). This way of reconciliation appears to take Tarski's construction as something of a "filter" which is continuously reapplied to our evolving scientific system of the world. In Aristotle's terms, it enables us to say of what is, that it is, yet still allows us to continually adjust Tarski's material adequacy requirement to the vagaries of scientific experience. In this way, current science may reject Berkeley's philosophical idealism, but in so doing the idealism has not been rendered as unintelligible. And it doesn't seem to matter whether we are referring to historical developments or to talk of possible futures. In an immanent naturalism, possibilities are intelligible via extensions of the terms and standards of current science. But let us ask if this is really a satisfactory reconciliation for Quine. I will urge that it is not. The difficulty I have with this purported reconciliation is twofold. Firstly, it still doesn't seem to say anything interesting about the sense of truth seeking as opposed to truth affirmation. All that the purported reconciliation has achieved is a sanctioning of the intelligibility of alternative possibilities. The use of the truth locution appears superfluous. Further, it appears open for us to say that what we have achieved, is simply the scientific affirmation of what Putnam has called, the "verdict of the moment" (97). Secondly, the purported reconciliation threatens Quine with a relativism that Quine rejects. In Quine's reply to Vuillemin (92), he is

responding to a supposed tension in his "seeming relativism and instrumentalism." It is interesting to note that in his reply, Quine twice mentions that reconciliation on the issue of relativism is achieved by recognizing that there is "no higher truth than what we seek in science" [my emphasis], (RV,619 and 622). That Quine doesn't use the terms ascribe or attribute in this reply, may indicate Quine's felt need to speak against relativism and instrumentalism in ways that are not satisfied by Tarski's construction. I have spoken of how Newton and Einstein appear to attribute truth beyond what we "own" at the moment. But more precisely, let us note that when Newton speaks of the great "ocean of truth" that lay undiscovered before him (94), there does not appear to be an ascription or attribution of any given truths there at all. For the moment then, let us consider more carefully what Quine would allow as an attribution or ascription of truth. I think we might plausibly consider a phrase like "attribution or ascription of truth," to be subsumed under assent conditions in the context of Quine's conception of what we would "quantify over." If this interpretation is right, then certainly, Newton's phrase has little to do with such measures. Indeed, if to seek the truth is the same as to ascribe or attribute truth, and these in turn are to be understood in the context of "quantifying over" an ontology, then Quine's reply to Vuillemin has little reconciliatory force. On this view of attribution or ascription, truth is relative to the terms and standards of current science, and thus truth is again returned under Putnam's characterization as the "verdict of the

moment." Nothing interesting has been indicated to clarify Quine's use of the phrase "seeking the truth", rather than simply affirming it. Thus the purported reconciliation only tells us that, whatever intelligible possibilities we seek in science, they are simply possibilities and cannot be considered as truths until affirmed in current science. It must be noted however, that the acceptance of such truths are, on Quine's view, achieved according to the highest standards of truth and factuality that there are. There are no transcendent standards. This is an important point, and I think it should be Quine's response. Nonetheless, we are again returned to the issue over truth and possibility. If intelligible possibilities will do, why speak of reconciling relativism into naturalism by mention of the truths that we seek in science?

Let us see how the relativistic concern can still become apparent within Quine's position. The relativist concern seems to go something like this. On Quine's immanent interpretation of truth, we haven't escaped the charge that something is true because science says so, not because it is so. Thus Quine's view of truth appears to have embraced a philosophical relativism, even though moderated by the immanent methods, terms, and standards of current science. For Quine to say that the issue of relativism is thus reconciled in his naturalism is not an answer to the question of relativism, but rather an assimilation of the issue within his naturalistic outlook. However, I do not see how this assimilation is an answer to the philosophical relativistic concern. It is

surely open to the relativist to see Quine's naturalism simply as a special case of relativism rather than vice versa. At this point, Quine may seek refuge in his "parochialism." However, since we have attempted to take Quine's conception of immanence seriously and appraise his position from within, Quine now needs to do more than argue from his naturalism, his philosophical obligation here is to argue for it. Clearly, Quine has been explicit in claiming that the immanent position he adopts just is an effort not to "underestimate the strength of the naturalistic position" (22). However, even while arguing from the naturalistic view point, Quine still owes the philosophical community a response to the question of whether truth is relative to the pronouncements of science at a given time. I believe that in the above quote (22), Quine's language can be seen as an effort to resist the issue of relativism when he says; "The scientific output is likewise sentential: true sentences, we hope, truths about nature" (118). But why would Quine say "true sentences, we hope" when we have seen Quine use the expedient of creating a new language stage, where the sentence that is up for falsification remains true in the earlier stage and simply does double duty as a false sentence in the later language stage? I believe that a more consistent response here would be for Quine to speak of the output of science as true sentences, and true relative to the terms and standards of the time, for there are no higher standards.

While I have argued that Quine's immanent outlook holds truth

relative to a time, it would be wrong to characterize Quine's view as a simple relativism. Nonetheless, the relativistic strain seems equally out of keeping with Quine's professed "unregenerate realism." But shall we conclude that Quine's moderated view is a relativism nonetheless? To appraise this issue, let us ask ourselves what Quine would say about abandoned scientific perspectives. Were they previously true, but not now? Shall we say that a sentence like; "The sun is a planet of the earth," was true before the time of Copernicus, but it has now become a falsehood? Was it really true at the time of Ptolemy, because the current science of the time said so? In Word & Object, Quine appears to have addressed this problem. Quine writes that:

(121) To say that the statement 'Brutus killed Caesar' is true, or that 'The atomic weight of sodium is 23' is true, is in effect simply to say that Brutus killed Caesar, or that the atomic weight of sodium is 23. That the statements are about posited entities, are significant only in relation to a surrounding body of theory, and are justifiable only by supplementing observation with scientific method, no longer matters; for the truth attributions are made from the point of view of the same surrounding body of theory, and are in the same boat.

Have we now so far lowered our sights as to settle for a relativistic doctrine of truth--rating the statements of each theory as true for that theory, and brooking no higher criticism? Not so. The saving consideration is that we continue to take seriously our own particular aggregate science, our own particular world-theory or loose total fabric of quasi-theories, whatever it may be. Unlike Descartes, we own and use our beliefs of the moment, even in the midst of philosophizing, until by what is vaguely called scientific method we change them here and there for the better. Within our own total evolving doctrine, we can judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be; subject to correction, but that goes without saying. (WO,24-25)

The saving consideration for Quine is the adoption of an immanent outlook where "we continue to take seriously our own particular aggregate science,..." But is the adoption of the immanent outlook really sufficient to dispel the apparent relativism? Let us consider the explicit details of how Quine would reconcile the relativistic paradox. On pages 92-95 above, we saw that when faced with the paradoxical result that a true eternal sentence could become false, Quine responded by "time-locking" the truth of the eternal sentence to the particular event. Then Quine has the language divide at that point into two languages, earlier and later English. This counter-intuitive strategy, I claimed, appears motivated solely for the sake of relieving the paradox of a true eternal sentence becoming false. Quine wrote of the move that, "we must view the discrepancy as a difference between two languages: English as of one date and English as of another. The string of sounds or characters in questions is, and remains, an eternal sentence of earlier English, and a true one; it just happens to do double duty as a falsehood in another language, later English" (88). Here then it appears is the crucial juncture at which Quine attempts to repel relativism. However, it is not clear to me that this move provides a plausible response to relativism, even from within the Quinean corpus. Aside from what seems to be an ad hoc and deeply counter intuitive suggestion, this way of salving the paradox strikes me as dangerously close to a major criticism that Quine has leveled against Carnap in "Two Dogma's of Empiricism." Namely, Quine has

chastised Carnap for leaving off his pragmatism at the supposed boundary of the analytic and the synthetic. But in time-locking the truth of an eternal sentence, we might ask if Quine himself has succumbed to making an attempt to save some transcendent sense for an eternal sentence, making it "a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may"? (TD,41). Let us ask ourselves, what is to motivate this sharp boundary between early and later English after we read that for Quine, once a holistic approach is adopted, "on the face of it there is no saying which of the component sentences of a false theory are to blame." As Quine writes the point;

(122) A reasonably inclusive body of scientific theory, taken as a whole, ...will imply a lot of observation conditionals, as I call them, each of which says that if certain observable conditions are met then a certain observable event will occur. But, as Duhem has emphasized, these observation conditionals are implied only by the theory as a whole. If any of them proves false, then the theory is false, but on the face of it there is no saying which of the component sentences of the theory is to blame. ...

The scientist does indeed test a single sentence of his theory by observation conditionals, but only through having chosen to treat that sentence as vulnerable and the rest, for the time being as firm. (FME,70-71)

On the face of it then, Quine's holism is not congenial to singling out any given sentence of a false theory. But what else has Quine done here except to single out an eternal sentence of a false theory, restrict it to an earlier language-stage, keep it as true in the earlier language-stage, and allowed it to do "double-duty" as false in a later language-stage? Is this not to single

out the truth of an eternal sentence, and "treat it as a limiting kind of statement which is confirmed ipso facto come what may."? If so, I cannot see what useful role this construal of an eternal sentence can play in the immanent naturalism that Quine has offered. Indeed, the move appears to be either a concession to the old philosophical desire for necessary truth (a kind of truth that is true eternally, and remains true, "come what may"), or it appears to be a counter intuitive ad hoc measure, specifically designed to resist relativism.

On the other hand, we might sense that since Quine's ad hoc treatment of truths that are subject to falsification violates Quine's holism, perhaps we should consider this expedient to have less philosophical significance than I have attached to it. As such, Quine may consider it to be a technical adjustment, and we should not overestimate his commitment to it. However, the ad hoc treatment Quine employs seems more artificial than the relativistic paradox appears to warrant. I think it would be a better balance for Quine to accept the relativism of truth, and emphasize how the relativistic label is moderated in the context of the terms and standards of science. In this spirit, we might hark back to Quine's use of judging truth as "absolute", and recommend a similar treatment with the eternal sentence. We recall that at that point Quine had said that the natural philosopher "can judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be; subject to correction, but this goes without saying" (27). My suggestion there, as here, is the

same; Quine might have avoided the term altogether, or perhaps placed a technical inscription upon it such as 'i-eternal' to demarcate it as immanently construed and avoid any transcendent connotations associated with the term. This treatment, however, has the expense of leaving the issue philosophically committed to interpreting Quine's naturalism as a relativism, albeit a moderated version. While the moderating influence would be seen as a function of current scientific judgement, a relativist like Rorty could certainly consider Quine's perspective as a special case of the relativistic doctrine. On the relativist interpretation, it is open to claim that what Quine is thus providing, is a particular "story" of truth according to its more regimented and disciplined applications in the sciences. We have seen however, that Quine has taken some drastic measures to avoid this interpretation by keeping the truth of an eternal sentence within an earlier language-stage. However, I believe it would have been better for Quine to accept and defend his naturalism, within the context of a moderated relativism, rather than to attempt a reconciliation that involves such ad hoc and artificial applications along with the apparent incongruity that this move has within Quine's own holistic outlook.

There are then three areas of difficulty that I see for Quine's immanent naturalism as it confronts the attempt to naturalize scientific truth. The first difficulty is that in the fullness of Quine's naturalism, there are both conservative and liberal forces at work. However, when it comes to truth, Quine

holds that he can only attribute truth immanently, according to the terms and standards of current science as explicated in Tarski's construction. Indeed, this would give us the sense of truth that we now affirm in science, but it cannot capture anything like the sense of truth that we seek in the sciences. The difficulty is that under this construal of truth, Quine only makes use of the conservative side of his naturalism. However, not only do we have ample historical notice that scientists sometimes do consider truth to be beyond immanent standards, but further than this, Quine needs and uses such liberal assumptions to distance himself from certain anti-realist and relativistic views, and to foil criticisms suggested by Lee and Vuillemin.

A second issue emerges regarding Quine's use of Neurath's figure of science as a boat adrift at sea. The boat, like science, cannot be dry-docked and overhauled, but only can be revised or rebuilt plank by plank. The problem as I foresee it might be called the sailor's paradox. It focuses on how the natural philosopher ("the busy sailor adrift on Neurath's boat"), is to view truth. Quine's depiction of Neurath's figure appears dangerously vulnerable to falling under the paradox of rational belief, a paradox from which one can derive a statement that : "each of [ones] beliefs are true and that some of them are false" (98). It appears that the source of the paradox again, is the earlier mentioned assumption that some of the truths of nature are beyond what we "own" in current science.

A third problem arises over some convoluted moves that Quine makes in an attempt to save the sense of the truth of an eternal sentence. I raise it here in connection with a possible way that Quine might resolve the sailor's paradox. Quine does not offer the following as a way of resolving the sailor paradox, but I wish to hold these as general criticisms regarding Quine's views on truth. Taking the sailor's paradox as a case in point, Quine could time-lock truth to moments of utterance at language-stages and the sailor paradox may thus be resolvable in the following way. First, we break-up the questionable assent into prior moments of utterance and at the discrepancy over the assent becoming false, we allow that "the string of sounds and characters in question is and remains a true one; it just happens to do double duty as a falsehood in another language, later English" (88). Let me repeat that not only would such a move strike me as objectionably ad hoc, I find the motive to such measures to be seriously out of keeping with Quine's overall philosophical vision, running strongly against the holistic picture of language that Quine otherwise endorses. To make the point graphic, let us ask what would motivate such a move except a felt need to save the sense of eternal sentence as true come what may? Perhaps the motive is simply to avoid the paradoxes mentioned. But this results in an internal conflict with Quine's holism. Otherwise, the result is that what we have saved could be described simply as "a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may." However, this description cannot be consistent with Quine's larger motivations,

for it is only a return to the circle of analyticity that Quine has so vigorously sought to purge from the naturalistic vision.

The above issues raise two critical challenges to Quine's naturalistic vision. The first issue is that Quine's immanent realism, while continuous with earlier forms, is not clearly the unregenerate realism Quine claims as a source of his naturalism. The views I have associated with Newton, Einstein, and Plank are what Bohr called "the customary viewpoint of natural philosophy" (29n). However, in these views, immanence appears transcended. Secondly, I believe that Quine's position on scientific truth has forced an underlying relativism on his naturalistic view of truth. While this relativism is moderated by the highest terms and standards of current science, there appears no escaping the philosophical implications. Since Quine believes that his "philosophy is continuous with science," I want to urge that Quine owes the philosophical community more than the general claim that relativism is dispelled by repairing to the immanent standards of current science. Indeed, we see that Quine's explicit reconciliation of the paradox of a true eternal sentence becoming false, is to employ an ad hoc expedient that appears only designed to assimilate an immanently recalcitrant concept. Perhaps the strength of the naturalistic position would be better served if Quine would reconcile himself to an underlying philosophical relativism, however moderated, instead of attempting to dispel the relativism within his naturalism.

(VI)

THESIS SUMMARY

In a review of W.V. Quine's recent book, Pursuit of Truth, Michael Williams writes: "Though not drastically revisionary, the book shows a general drift toward a softening of some of Quine's more radical theses." However, Williams continues to say, "On the issue of meaning, Quine makes no retreats: determinate meanings are a myth" (JP 89 1992, pp.48-49). In this essay I first argue that there are major considerations to indicate that a "softening" of Quine's views currently should be applied to his stance on meaning. I will show that this point, while pro tem, is consistent with a broad interpretation of Quine's naturalism. I further urge that such an interpretation is necessary to maintain the vitality of a progressive natural philosophy.

Initially, I describe how Quine's rejection of any fact of the matter to meaning (beyond dispositions to verbal behavior), follows from standards outlined under his "immanent" interpretation of naturalism. However, there are competing forces at work in Quine's immanent vision. The competing elements may be generally characterized under conservative and liberal headings. Specifically, a conservative principle of "minimum mutilation"

plays a crucial role for maintaining Quine's skeptical outlook in the case of meaning. Nonetheless, in response to a proposal by Jerrold J. Katz, I have urged that the liberal elements of Quine's naturalism presently should override the skeptical position that Quine calls "mandatory."

Professor Katz has presented arguments to encourage a clarification of meaning by use of a method he has termed, "theoretical explanation." In a 1984 conference at the CUNY Graduate Center, Quine volunteered that the methodology of theoretical explanation is one that he has used for his own purposes in Roots of Reference, and that the method has found successful employment in the sciences. Further, it appeared that Quine was allowing that in principle, theoretical explanation could evade the implications of his indeterminacy thesis. After the conference, I raised the point to Quine in a letter. Indeed, Quine agreed that Katz's proposal, if successful, could establish a "fact of the matter" to meaning in "behaviorally irreducible ways." Quine was quick to add however, that the result would involve a drastic revision of current science, and that success with the method he thought "extremely unlikely."

However, not only does theoretical explanation thus evade the implications of indeterminacy, but in positive terms, it has now been shown to be methodologically endorsable within a Quinean framework. The burden of its continued viability thus is not

methodological, rather, it is evidential. I further argue that pending such evidential results, the liberal and progressive forces of Quine's naturalism now must "soften" the longstanding skeptical position that Quine has called "mandatory." The upshot is that I find appropriate grounds to conclude that further inquiry into the factual basis of meaning has become philosophically viable within a Quinean framework, and in a corollary way, it appears that within Quine's robust naturalism, the same liberal elements should presently lend encouragement to such evidential inquiry, "soft-skepticism" notwithstanding.

The point is then reinforced by consideration of Quine's rejection of Stroud's views on the importance of epistemic skepticism. Quine's rejection of Stroud's position is not resounding. Quine considers the skeptical position to be naturalistically "within rights" and it appears that his "only objection is that [Stroud's skepticism] is an overreaction" to the fallibility of science. In this vein we should note that if Stroud's skeptical outlook were to prevail, the result would force a radical disruption upon the fabric of current science. Let us further note that the "mutilating" potential of Stroud's skeptical position radically outweighs the disruptive potential of success with theoretical explanation in the case of meaning. Consequently, the skeptical posture runs more drastically athwart Quine's "maxim of minimum mutilation" than Katz's proposal for renewed exploration in the domain of meaning. Thus, I am again led to conclude that if

Quine's only objection to Stroud, is that his skeptical arguments are "an overreaction," then presently, the progressive elements of Quine's own natural vision should afford a basis for renewed inquiry into the factual possibilities for meaning.

The issue of epistemic skepticism is also addressed directly. The need to address Stroud's skeptical challenge directly is evident in that Stroud has argued that Quine's naturalized epistemology either fails as epistemology, or it fails to be epistemology. Quine has responded to Stroud that naturalized epistemology is "not a gratuitous change of subject matter, but an enlightened persistence rather in the old epistemological problem." My conclusion on this debate is that due to Quine's "crucial logical point," namely that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, Quine can enlist grounds to hold that the naturalized position currently enjoys an ascending viability relative to the old epistemological viewpoint. Further I show that Quine's immanent construal of scientific truth provides a straight-forward way of rejecting Stroud's claim that naturalized epistemology fails. However, this step to naturalizing truth leads me to raise several critical issues regarding Quine's insistence on making truth immanent to the terms and standards of current science. I Thus complete the essay by questioning Quine's general requirement that only immanent standards of clarification are naturalistically significant.

Through an exploration of Quine's view of scientific truth, I urge that pending further argument to the contrary, scientific truth cannot be immanently naturalized without sacrificing much of the progressive scientific outlook that Quine is committed to. If I am right on this score, until such arguments are forthcoming, not only do Stroud's criticisms regain vigor, but serious doubt is cast upon whether Quine's emphasis on immanent standards of clarification fruitfully improves our understanding of natural science.

Problems arise in the context of what some have seen as a relativist-instrumental (R-I) tension in Quine's philosophy. Quine rejects the R-I association and believes that the apparent tensions are reconciled within his immanent natural outlook. However, my investigations have revealed that on the issue of truth, such attempts at reconciliation create difficulties that require further argument and clarification. Initially we should note that a relativistic paradox obtrudes regarding whether a true eternal sentence may become false during a shift such as the Ptolemaic-Copernican transition. Quine, however, has a ready expedient to handle such a difficulty. The expedient permits the culpable sentence to be enlisted for "double-duty" as false in the prior language-stage and true in the later. Nonetheless, I raise issue with the expedient, urging that the expedient is artificially ad hoc, and that its employment appears contrary to Quine's holistic perspective generally.

A second issue is noted by locating two distinct conceptions of 'truth' in Quine's arguments. One of them is a truth "affirming" conception and the other is a truth "seeking" conception. The truth "seeking" conception is then shown to have played a significant part in the philosophical literature of natural science, occurring importantly in the writings of such major figures as Newton, Einstein, and Plank. Further, Quine needs and indeed uses this conception to distance himself from the R-I interpretations of his naturalism. However, it is then pointed out that the use of this conception appears to undermine a univocal treatment of truth according to the Tarski construction that Quine employs within his immanent framework.

Attempts at reconciliation are then considered. Viewing truth as a regulative ideal in the manner of C.S. Peirce is explicitly ruled out by Quine under issues of indeterminacy. Pressing for further alternatives, one might suggest a link-up with ordinary language to capture the sense of "seeking" the truth. It is shown that Quine has some important points of contact with ordinary language philosophy, but since Quine has associated his view of truth with Tarski's construction, such a reconciliation now must be considered as a scientific mistake. Finally, we might try and locate an immanent sense of "seeking" the truth by taking Tarski's construction to serve as something like a filter, or a net, being cast continually over experience. Again however, such a move fails to help, for the metaphor of "casting" appears only to

conflate the conception of immanent possibility with that of truth.

Quine often refers to the metaphor of Neurath's figure to encourage the gist of his own naturalistic perspective. However, with the concept of truth I find that the metaphor only leads to deepened paradox. The language Quine uses to describe the natural philosopher as "the busy sailor adrift on Neurath's boat," is shown to bear a striking parallel to Quine's consideration of the paradox of rational belief, where the paradox eventuates in a statement that; for a reasonable person, all ones beliefs are true and some of them are false. I thus argue that if we interpret truth by using Neurath's figure, clarity on this issue is not gained but we find rather that Neurath's metaphor is prey to the language of paradox. The force of this point is demonstrated by reflecting upon Quine's treatment of the barber paradox. In that case, Quine saw the paradox simply as a reductio, demonstrating that there is no such barber. However, drawing a parallel conclusion for Quine's "busy sailor" cannot be a response that Quine would welcome. Thus, on the issue of truth, clarification by way of Neurath's figure is shown to be seriously compromised. Indeed, rather than achieving greater clarity through its use, we now need to explain how the metaphor may be articulated so as to avoid the language of paradox.

I conclude thus, that the best balance to strike within Quine's naturalism is to accept a moderated relativism regarding truth. I argue that there are powerful considerations within

Quine's own outlook to consider his view on truth as a relativism despite his disavowals. While Quine has said that there is no "cosmic exile" (16n), and thus the R-I tensions are reconciled within his naturalism, and while the reconciliation of relativism is achieved according to our highest scientific standards, Quine has also said that "philosophy is continuous with science." For Quine, the role of the natural philosopher may be distinguished from the natural scientist by regarding such things as "breadth of categories,...[and] the task of making explicit what had been tacit, and precise what had been vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing kinks, lopping off vestigial growths, clearing ontological slums" (16n). In the face of these considerations, I conclude that to reject the apparent relativism by repairing to the immanent standards of current science, surely fails to do justice to the breadth of our philosophical categories. I thus conclude that pending further argument to the contrary, the broadest philosophical category that fits Quine's immanent view of truth is a moderated relativism. The conclusion however, is not innocuous, and the urgency of providing further argumentation to redress this point is shown by noting the expense of accepting the relativist label. By accepting the category of relativism, however moderated, we seem to revitalize Stroud's skeptical challenge and concurrently raise serious issue over whether Quine's insistence upon immanent standards of clarification ultimately improves our understanding of natural science.

ENDNOTES

1. While Quine has written that the cleavage between analytic and synthetic and the dogma of reductionism are "at root identical," (TD,41) Quine has recently emphasized that it was the dogma of reductionism that was "the primary villain" of his critique. (Conference at Rutgers University, 3-30-89)

2. In anticipation of a possible objection, we may read where Quine might be thought to have moderated this position in Roots of Reference. Here Quine writes:

> ...it would seem that we all learned 'bachelor' uniformly, by learning that our elders are disposed to assent to it in just the circumstances where they will assent to 'unmarried man". ...In learning our language each of us learns to count certain sentences outright, as true;... The analytic sentences are the ones whose truth is learned in that way by all of us; and these extreme cases do not differ notably from their neighbors, nor can we always say which ones they are." (RR,80)

However, setting terminology aside, it remains clear that Quine continues to refuse to invest what may be termed an analytic sentence, with any epistemological significance that is independent of his general naturalistic outlook. An outlook that is empirical, behavioral, and homogeneous with regard to the epistemic status of the sentence structure we acquire. Thus we note that for Quine, the analytic sentences "do not differ notably from their neighbors nor can we always say which ones they are."

3. Tracing the background for analyticity to Kant's cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths, as well as its forshadowings in Hume and Leibniz, Quine writes:

> "...Kant's intent, evident more from the use he makes of the notion of analyticity than from his definition of it, can be restated thus: a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact." (TD,21)

4. "...I have been misunderstood on the matter of circularity. The circular interdefinability of analyticity, synonymy, consistency, etc. was of itself no 'sign of a troubled family of

concepts,' in my view it was merely a dead end encountered in the course of seeking an explication of analyticity." (CUNY,8)

5. " 'For Quine,' Goodman writes, 'nominalism could countenance...only physical objects.' No, my physicalism was additional. Nominalism as I understood the term could also countenance--unlike me--an irreducibly mental realm of sensory events. What I have called nominalism, and do not indeed see my way to maintaining, is what he calls particularism." (RG,162)

"However enticing to the tough mind, nominalistic repudiation of all abstract objects is simply incompatible with all levels of science as we know it. Intensional objects can indeed be banished, and good riddance; but the extensional abstract objects, numbers notably, remained to be reckoned with (and not in one sense alone.)" (NYRB,32)

6.Recently Quine has commented upon this point as follows:

"My argument for the indeterminacy of translation, or for that matter my argument against analyticity in 'Two Dogmas', is not a proof by cases. It is not a proof at all. What went by cases was the exploration of a few avenues of definition that I or others might have felt were hopeful, but ended in dead ends. ...

The question of assuming intensional notions in our theory comes down to the question of whether they would play a useful role in a theory that meets the test of prediction. That is where the doubts come. I would not hope for proof. I have engaged in proofs in logical contexts, but not in empirical ones, which this is." (RK,198)

Perhaps Quine is concerned to stress the <u>empirical</u> exhaustiveness of the "few avenues that [were felt to be] hopeful." However, it is not clear from the above remark whether Quine means that there were only "a few avenues" that appeared reasonable to consider <u>at all</u>, or whether he is saying that his investigation focused on "a few avenues," <u>among others</u>, that might also have been considered. The force of Quine's conclusion from "Two Dogmas" (2), would most emphatically require the former alternative.

7. The term that Quine uses to describe his naturalistic account of behaviorism (in linguistics), is that behaviorism is "mandatory" (13). I hope to show that Quine's use of the term "mandatory" is best understood as something rather like a "mandate of current science," in opposition to something that "Quine would hold come what may."

8. In exploring Quine's association of behaviorism with linguistics, Gibson has cited the following four instances where Quine has emphasized the connection (EE,2). Quine's use of the term "mandatory" may thus be elaborated upon in this context.

> (1) "Language is a social art. In acquiring it we have to depend entirely on intersubjectively available cues as to what to say and when" (WO,ix).
>
> (2) "Language is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of other people's overt behavior under publicly recognizable circumstances" (OR,26).
>
> (3) "A language is mastered through social emulation and social feedback, and these controls ignore any idiosyncrasy in an individuals imagery or associations that is not discovered in his behavior" (PPLT,4).
>
> (4) "Language is socially inculcated and controlled; the inculcation and control turn strictly on the keying of sentences to shared stimulation. Internal factors may vary ad libitum without prejudice to communication as long as the keying of language to external stimuli is undisturbed" (EN,81).

I expect that statements such as these have led Gibson to claim that Quine would hold to the conjunction of behaviorism and naturalism "come what may" (Note 7). However, by using the term "mandatory" to express this connection, Quine may be better understood as indicating that the NB conjunction is "mandated" by current science rather than it being a position he would hold "come what may." In chapter II, I will further try to show that Quine's use of the term "mandatory" may be understood compatibly with the view that he has "no objection in principle, to admitting meanings in behaviorally irreducible ways."

9. We may note that at the Wolfson College Lecturers (1975), Quine explicitly extends this conception of the epistemological question to include reference to; "why the resulting science works so well." In his essay on "The Nature of Natural Knowledge" Quine writes;

> Science tells us that our only source of information about the external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. Stimulated in these ways, we somehow evolve an elaborate and useful science. How do we do this and why does the resulting science work so well? These are genuine questions and no feigning of doubt is needed to appreciate them. (NNK,68)

10. A few words should be said here to distinguish what Quine calls "a not unusual misunderstanding..." It has been shown in Quine's remarks above (28), that the introduction of variables into predicate logic has a linking and permuting function, thus extending our ontology to the range of the variables. As Quine says below, "The ontology is the range of the variables." However, Quine warns against assimilating the "ontology of a theory" to what the theory is "ontically committed to." In a reply to Hintakka, Quine writes;

> My remaining remark aims at clearing up a not unusual misunderstanding of my use of the term 'ontic commitment.' The trouble comes of viewing it as my key ontological term, and therefore identifying the ontology of a theory with the class of all things to which the theory is ontically committed. This is not my intention. The ontology is the range of the variables. Each of various reinterpretations of the range (while keeping the interpretations of the predicates fixed) might be compatible with the theory. But the theory is ontically committed to an object only if that object is common to all those ranges. And the theory is ontically committed to 'objects of such and such kind',say dogs, just in case each of those ranges contains some dog or other. (RH,315)

11. We should be careful to note here that Quine's use of the term 'observation,' should be understood along lines that Gibson has described as Quine's externalized empiricism. The sharp divide that was thought to exist between 'theory' and 'observation,' is ultimately characterized by Quine under the dogma of reductionism. Instead of talking of pure observational terms, Quine will rather speak of observation sentences. Instead of talking about theoretical terms, Quine will rather speak of standing sentences. Yet even with this distinction, it will be seen that the difference between these kinds of sentences will "grade off." Thus, the significance that was invested in the role of observational terms is in Quine's view ultimately turned over to scientific experience at large. The unit of empirical significance has become the whole of science.

Along with this shift to the empirical language of science at large, we see Quine externalizing the subjective Cartesian starting point. Russell characterized this starting point as follows:

> By inventing the method of doubt, and by showing that subjective things are the most certain, Descartes performed a great service to philosophy, and one which makes him still useful to all students of the subject. (PP,18)

Quine, however, rejects this subjective starting point which in Russell's epistemology resulted in the doctrine of the primacy of "sense data." Quine's recognition of what he has called "the crucial logical point," enables him to start with neural input without timidity of an initial circularity. Quine comments that:

> The burden that Russell placed on sense data, I place upon neural input--adopting thus a black-box model with no awareness assumptions. I am able to take this stance because of my naturalism, my repudiation of any first philosophy methodologically prior to science. My affinity here is not to Russell but to Neurath. (Rstn,298)

12. I am referring to James's essay on "The Will to Believe," which he later preferred to have titled; "The Right to Believe." The thesis of that essay is as follows:

> The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision, -- just like deciding yes or no, -- and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth. (WB,11)

13. We may note an instance of Quine's sensitivity to fluctuations in word usage from his section on "Usage and Abusage" in Quiddities. Here Quine considers the term 'hectic' and notes that;

> Even the best of us, very nearly, are unaware that the meaning of hectic was 'chronic'. I say 'was' because the shift has been so massive. Not to be party to the shift, I happily eschew the word. I still have 'chronic' for its old sense and 'frantic' for the new. (QD,230)

In a similar spirit, I am suggesting that Quine should be more scrupulous in using the notion of 'absolute truth' then he is with the example above. Perhaps Quine envisions a shift from the "old" sense of this notion to a naturalized immanent version, but I would venture to say that the shift to an immanent version of 'absolute truth' is hardly as "massive" as the 'hectic' case Quine identifies above.

14. Quine qualifies his physicalism as "not reductionism in any strong sense." He draws this distinction by arguing that in his view, there is "no presumption that anyone [is] in a position to come up with the appropriate state predicates for the pertinent

regions in any particular case." (FOM,166)

15. Putnam writes:

> Quine denies that **'X means Do you speak French?'** states a 'fact', even when **X** is the familiar French utterance, **Parlez-vous francais?** ; but he would certainly answer the question 'What does **Parlez-vous francais?** mean?' with 'It means **Do you speak French?'** and not with **'It means Coachman, stop, the road is jerky; lookout! you will lose the turkey.'** (MFR,31)

16. It should be noted that while physics serves as the primary producer of scientific ontology, the natural epistemologist can and does play a significant role in the process of defining it. As noted above, Quine's view is that epistemology serves current science not only as "a protector and defender" (20), but it also serves to "improve, clarify, and understand the [scientific] system from within." (23) In this spirit, we see that it is part of the philosophers job to clarify the ontic commitments of current science. Thus, Quine's long standing view that classes must be countenanced into an adequate scientific ontology, can be seen as a philosophical comment on the explicit and tacit commitments of current physical science.

As early as 1959 Quine had clarified the natural philosophers role within the scientific community. In Word and Object Quine describes the relationship:

> The question of what there is a shared concern of philosophy and most other non-fiction genres...A representative assortment of land masses, seas, plants, and stars have been individually described in the geography and astronomy books, and an occasional biped or other middle-sized object in the biographies and art books. Description has been stepped up by mass production in zoology, botany, and mineralogy, where things are grouped by similarities and described collectively. Physics, by more ruthless abstraction from differences in detail, carries mass description farther still. And even pure mathematics belongs to the descriptive answer to the question what there is; for the things about which the question asks do not exclude the numbers, classes, functions, etc., if such there be, whereof mathematics treats.
>
> What distinguishes between the ontological philosopher's concern and all this is only breadth of categories. Given physical objects in general, the natural scientist is the man to decide about wombats and unicorns. Given classes or whatever other broad realm of objects the mathematician needs, it is for the mathematician to say whether in particular there

> are any even prime numbers or any cubic numbers that are sums of pairs of cubic numbers. On the other hand it is scrutiny of this uncritical acceptance of the realm of physical objects itself, or of classes, etc., that devolves upon ontology. Here is the task of making explicit what had been tacit, and precise what had been vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing kinks, lopping off vestigial growths, clearing ontological slums.
>
> The philosopher's task differs from the others', then, in detail; but in no such drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the philosopher a vantage point out side the conceptual scheme that he takes in charge. There is no such cosmic exile. (WO,275)

17. See Section (V) for a recent elaboration on Quine's use of the term "parochial".

18. I use the term "pinned down" to indicate something of Quine's qualifications with respect to "reductionism." See endnote 12 for a statement of Quine's qualifications. I use this vague notion of "pinned down" instead of associating meaning with supervenience, simply to set the extensive and complex literature on that topic aside for the purposes of this essay. In support of the vaguer phrase however, we may recall that Quine's thought experiment in radical translation was supposed to show that even with underdetermination and ontological relativity infecting all of physical theory, indeterminacy of translation was a relativity over and above such underdetermination. Indeed, this may be why Quine says that in psychology one may or may not be a behaviorist, but in linguistics, one has no choice (13). Thus even with the problem of underdetermination as we may find it in psychology, for Quine the underdetermination is multiplied in the case of linguistics, and it was the thought experiment in radical translation that was to demonstrate the point. Hence for Quine, the concept of supervenience would probably involve a connection between meanings and the physical world that is altogether too tight.

19. Quine has referred to the possibility of a pure case of radical translation as a "near miracle." However in RK, Quine denies that radical translation is "fanciful." Citing the work of Kenneth Pike Quine writes:

> Radical translation is not fanciful. Kenneth Pike and his students have surely done what comes close to it, anyway. Pike's demonstrations are startlingly rapid cases of getting a wedge into radical translation. (RK,199)

20. Quine makes this point explicit in Word & Object with a discussion of Peirce's notion of truth as the idealized consensus of the scientific community, unceasingly approached as the limit of inquiry. On Quine's view, even if certain technical problems in Peirce's conception were set aside, it would seem likelier that rather than a unique ideal result, "countless alternative theories would be tied for first place." Quine writes:

> Peirce was tempted to define truth outright in terms of scientific method, as the ideal theory which is approached as a limit when the (supposed) canons of scientific method are used unceasingly on continuing experience. But there is a lot wrong with Peirce's notion, besides its assumption of a final organon of scientific method and its appeal to an infinite process. There is a faulty use of numerical analogy in speaking of the limit of theories, since the notion of limit depends on that of "nearer than," which is defined for numbers and not for theories. And even if we by-pass such troubles by identifying truth somewhat fancifully with the ideal result of applying scientific method outright to the whole future totality of surface irritations, still there is trouble in the imputation of uniqueness ("the ideal result"). For, as urged two pages back, we have no reason to suppose that man's surface irritations even unto eternity admit of any one systematization that is scientifically better or simpler than all possible others. It seems likelier, if only on account of symmetries or dualities, that countless alternative theories would be tied for first place. Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords even in principle no unique definition of truth. Any so-called pragmatic definition of truth is doomed to failure equally. (WO,23)

21. Empirically equivalent translations are affirmed to be equally correct, even if logically incompatible. This position has led Quine to consider, and reconsider, his views on how to speak of empirically equivalent systems of the world. Should Quine say that in a parallel way, empirically equivalent systems of the world are equally true? Quine writes:

> Gibson points out a startling contradiction between consecutive essays in Theories & Things. There was an appreciable lapse of time in my writing of the two essays, and the more so in that the first one developed from earlier lectures. I was aware of my change in attitude, but not of so abrupt a conflict. In the first passage I had held that one of two systems of the world must be deemed false even if we know them to be empirically equivalent. I shall call this the sectarian position. My reason for it was naturalism: my disavowal of any higher tribunal than science itself. In the later and conflicting passage, as Gibson relates, I opted for truth of both systems of the world, finding it offensive to my

empiricist sensibilities to declare otherwise. This I shall call the ecumenical position. It raises two questions that can be satisfactorily dealt with, we shall see, and a third that seemingly cannot.

One apparent difficulty with it is that two empirically equivalent systems of the world may be logically incompatible, and hence incapable of being simultaneously viewed as true. This difficulty was met in Theories & Things (pp. 29f) by the following expedient, due to Davidson. When a sentence is affirmed in one of two empirically equivalent theories and denied in the other, the incompatibility is resoluble simply by reconstruing some theoretical term in that sentence as a pair of distinct homonyms. If the two theories have unlike ontologies, we can reconcile them by distinguishing two styles of variables.

A second apparent difficulty with the ecumenical position is the naturalistic restraint cited just now in support of the sectarian view. But this again can be accommodated. Once the two empirically equivalent systems of the world have been rendered logically compatible, they can be treated as a single big tandem theory consisting perhaps of two largely independent lobes and a shared logic. Its lobes describe the world in two equally correct ways, and we can simultaneously reckon as factual whatever is asserted in either. What can be known of the world is the common denominator of all the world systems, logically reconciled, that conform to all possible observation.

But there is a third difficulty, raised by Follesdal in a recent conversation. To exhibit it I must distinguish cases. In the tandem theory just now contemplated, a sentence in the added lobe may or may not be couched wholly in the vocabulary of our original lobe. Those that are so couched are either already affirmed also in the original lobe or can be freely added, for they treat of the same matters without contradiction. They might even be welcome additions, as settling the truth values of some old but hitherto unadjudicated sentences.

The picture changes when we come to sentences of the added lobe that do contain alien terms, perhaps created by Davidson's expedient of forging homonyms or perhaps present in the rival theory to begin with. Can we systematically so reinterpret this deviant lexicon as to render it in our own language without distorting empirical content? If so, we are back in the benign first case and can cheerfully annex the whole lobe to our original theory. All is ecumenical still.

But the remaining case, and the sticky one, is where the alien terms of the annexed lobe are irreducible. The

sentences containing them constitute a gratuitous annex to the original theory, since the whole combination is still empirically equivalent to the original. It is as if some scientifically undigested terms of metaphysics or religion, say, 'essence' or 'grace' or 'Nirvana', were admitted into science along with all their pertinent doctrine, and tolerated on the ground merely that they contravened no observation. It would be an abandonment of the scientist's quest for economy and of the empiricist's standard of meaningfulness.

The sectarian position then is my newly recovered stance on these precarious slopes. It is called for in that last case, where no way is evident of annexing the rival system of the world without adding new terms. Our own system is true by our lights, and the other does not even make sense in our terms.

And what if, even so, we have somehow managed to persuade ourselves that the two are empirically equivalent? then surely we must recognize the two as equally warranted. Having got the swing of the alien jargon without benefit of translation, we might even oscillate between the two for the sake of an enriched perspective on nature. But whichever system we are working in is the one for us to count at the time as true, there being no wider frame of reference. (RG,156-57)

Quine's decision to rest with the sectarian position is here taken from a reply to Roger Gibson that was published in 1986. The comments that Quine made at the Rutgers University Conference on March 30, 1989 continue the sectarian line. At Rutgers the issue was raised in terms of the "parochial" character of Quine's outlook, but his commitment remains sectarian and committed to the "parish" of the scientific community. For Quine there is no higher tribunal for truth and factuality and no wider frame of reference. Nonetheless, the sectarian view that Quine has settled with had its ancestry at least as early as the publication of Ontological Relativity, which was first given in March of 1968 as the John Dewey Lecturers at Columbia University. In his essay, "Ontological Relativity", Quine had already outlined the basis for a sectarian perspective that follows from his immanent naturalistic outlook. Quine writes:

I have urged in defense of the behavioral philosophy of language, Dewey's, that the inscrutability of reference is not the inscrutability of fact; there is no fact of the matter. But if there is really no fact of the matter, then the inscrutability of reference can be brought even closer to home than the neighbor's case; we can apply it to ourselves...

We seem to be maneuvering ourselves into the absurd position that there is no difference on any terms,

interlinguistic or intralinguistic, objective or subjective, between referring to rabbits and referring to rabbit parts or stages; or between referring to formulas and referring to their Godel numbers... Reference would seem now to become nonsense not just in radical translation but at home.

Toward resolving this quandary, begin by picturing us at home in our language, with all its predicates and auxiliary devices. This vocabulary includes "rabbit," "rabbit part," rabbit stage," "formula," "number," "ox," "cattle"; also the two place predicates of identity and difference, and other logical particles. In these terms we can say in so many words that this is a formula and that a number, this a rabbit and that a rabbit part, this and that the same rabbit, and this and that different parts. In just those words. This network of terms and predicates and auxiliary devices is, in relativity jargon, our frame of reference, or coordinate system. Relative to it we can and do talk meaningfully and distinctively of rabbits and parts, numbers and formulas... reference is nonsense except relative to a coordinate system.

...If questions of the sort we are considering make sense only relative to a further background language, then evidently questions of reference for the background language make sense in turn only relative to a further background language.

...In practice of course we end the regress of coordinate systems by something like pointing. And in practice we end the regress of background languages, in discussions of reference, by acquiescing in our mother tongue and taking its words at face value. (OR,48-9)

22. Since Quine does admit some abstract objects (the extensional variety, notably numbers), a brief digression on Quine's view of objects, physical and abstract, is in order here. In Theories and Things, Quine addresses the issue as follows.

For lack of a definable stopping place, the natural course at this point is to admit as an object the material content of any portion of space-time, however irregular and discontinuous. This is the generalization of the primitive and ill-defined category of bodies to what I call physical objects. (TT,10)

Quine thus moves to quantify over 4-D events of "material content" to count as physical objects. The move plays an important role in how we are to speak of the identity of objects. Quine's move results in a shift away from speaking of the identity of an object as the 'same thing' to speaking of the 'parameters of individuation over time.'

> Our liberal notion of physical object brings out an important point about identity. Some philosophers propound puzzles as to what to say about personal identity in cases of split personality or in fantasies about metempsychosis or brain transplants. These are not questions about the nature of identity. They are questions about how we might best construe the term 'person'. Again there is the stock example of the ship of Theseus, rebuilt bit by bit until no original bit remained. Whether we choose to reckon it still as the same ship is not a question of 'same' but of 'ship'; a question of how we choose to individuate that term over time. (TT,12)

Given this sketch of physical objects Quine goes on to address the need in natural science for abstract extensional objects. In broad outline, Quine argues that mathematics can be captured in set theory, and since mathematics is required for the generality of our quantitative laws, sets or classes must be reified right along with our physical objects. Nonetheless, Quine looks upon mathematics generally as serving an instrumental role in natural science, and correspondingly, it is by auxiliary reference that its objects are established. Quine writes:

> Physical objects in this generous sense constitute a fairly lavish universe, but more is wanted--notably numbers. Measurement is useful in cookery and commerce, and in the fullness of time it rises to a nobler purpose: the formulation of quantitative laws. These are the mainstay of scientific theory, and they call upon the full resources of the real numbers. Diagonals call for irrationals, circumferences call for transcendentals. Nor can we rest with constants; we must quantify over numbers. Admitting numbers as values of variables means reifying them and recognizing numerals as names of them; and this is required for the sake of generality in our quantitative laws.
>
> ...whenever we count things we measure a class. If a statistical *generality about populations quantifies over* numbers of people, it has to quantify also over the classes whose numbers those are.
>
> Sometimes in natural science we are concerned explicitly with classes, or seem to be--notably in taxonomy. ...To say that there are over a quarter-million species [of beetles] is equivalent to saying that there is a class of over a quarter-million <u>beetles</u> none of which are conspecific. This still conveys impressive information, and it still requires reification of a big class, but a class only of beetles and not of classes.
>
> This way of dodging a class of classes is not always

available. It worked here because species are mutually exclusive.

> Note the purely auxiliary role of classes in all three examples. In counting things we are more interested in the things counted than in their class. ...it is because of an interest still strictly in beetles, not in classes, that one says there are so many species. The statement tells us that beetles are highly discriminate in their mating. It conveys this sort of information, but more precisely, and it makes auxiliary reference to classes as a means of doing so. Limited to physical objects though our interests be, an appeal to classes can thus be instrumental in pursuing those interests. I look upon mathematics in general in the same way, in its relation to natural science. But to view classes, numbers, and the rest in an instrumental way is not to deny having reified them; it is only to explain why. (TT,13-17).

23. In a 1993 article, "Quine, Underdetermination, and Skepticism", Lars Bergstrom speaks about Quine and conservatism. Bergstrom writes:

> Conservatism may be a good rule of thumb in theory choice. But notice that the usual motivation for it does not seem to apply in the case of empirically equivalent theories. ...
>
> ...we should distinguish between the aims and methods of science, or between the conditions that a theory should satisfy and the conditions under which a person is justified in believing that a theory is true. Conservatism seems relevant only for the second item in these pairs. By contrast, the underdetermination thesis has to do with the first item. (QUS,334)

My thesis on the Quine-Katz controversy, which favors a current "softening" of Quine's skeptical stance on meanings, plainly exploits Bergstrom's first point regarding the aims of science. Here I insist that the progressive elements of science have to be taken into serious account. However, I do not believe that Quine would accept a sharp dichotomy on the distinction that conservatism is only relevant to methodological choices. Indeed, it seems that Quine's realism is an effort to conserve the realism that Bohr wanted to bring into question when he referred to "the essential inadequacy of the customary viewpoint of natural philosophy" (28n). The issue of realism and truth, however, will be more fully addressed in section (V) of this essay.

24. In Quine's latest book, Pursuit of Truth, we find in a section on meaning, a reiteration of Quine's position, expressly given above in (13). Quine expresses his position in the same language, calling his behavioral position on meaning "mandatory." Quine then offers the "thought experiment" in radical translation to secure the point. However, this, I have argued, should be modified in light of Quine's remarks in (15), where he allows that Katz's proposal could show that meanings could be clarified in "behaviorally irreducible ways." This possibility, I have also argued, is not merely possible, but indeed, i-possible.

Further, in a review of the book in the Journal of Philosophy, Michael Williams writes that:

> Though not drastically revisionary, the book shows a general drift toward a softening of some of Quine's more radical theses. The familiar Quinean themes are all in evidence, but frequently played in more muted tones. ...
> On the issue of meaning, Quine makes no retreats; determinate meanings are a myth. (JP:pp 48-49, 1992)

25. Quine uses an expression like "the sin of transcendence" in his 1992 article "Structure and Nature." There Quine writes:

> My global structuralism should not, therefore, be seen as a structuralist ontology. To see it thus would be to rise above naturalism and revert to the sin of transcendental metaphysics. (STN,9)

26. Lars Bergstrom has noted some remarks by Donald Davidson that raise issue over Quine's association of immanence and truth, and the attendant potential of relativistic difficulties. Bergstrom puts it as follows; "What [Davidson] wants to object to is the idea that the truth value of a theory may change from one person to another, or from one time to another" (QUS,352). Davidson has expressed this point regarding the case of deciding between empirically equivalent theories, but it seems that the difficulty would be general, applying to the case of theory revision as well. Davidson expresses the point in the following terms:

> According to Quine's other view [i.e. the sectarian view], a speaker or thinker at a time operates with one theory and, for him at that time, the theory he is using is true and the other theory false. If he shifts to the alternative theory, then it becomes true and the previously accepted theory false. The position may illustrate what Quine means when he says that truth is "immanent." This conception of immanence or relativity of truth should not be confused with the pedestrian sense in which the truth of sentences is relative to the language in which they occur. Quine's two theories can belong

> to, and be stated in, the same language; indeed, they must be if we are to understand the claim that the theories conflict. ...It is not easy to see how the same sentence (without indexical elements), with interpretation unchanged, can be true for one person and not for another, or for a given person at one time and not at another. The difficulty seems due to the attempt to import epistemological considerations into the concept of truth. (SCT,306)

27. Perhaps Quine's pragmatic tendencies lead him to take these steps that appear so ad hoc. In another context, Russell has found Quine's logical systems to be skillful but unsatisfying because of their ad hoc characteristics. Russell writes:

> When The Principles of Mathematics was finished, I settled down to a resolute attempt to find a solution of the paradoxes....
>
> While I was looking for a solution, it seemed to me that there were three requisites if the solution was to be wholly satisfying. The first of these, which was absolutely imperative, was that the contradictions should disappear. The second, which was highly desirable, though not logically compulsive, was that the solution should leave intact as much of mathematics as possible. The third, which is difficult to state precisely, was that the solution should, on reflection, appeal to what may be called 'logical common sense'--i.e. that it should seem, in the end, just what one ought to have expected all along. Of these three conditions, the first is of course universally acknowledged. The second, however, is rejected by a large school which holds that great portions of analysis are not valid as they stand. The third condition is not regarded as essential by those who are content with logical dexterity. Professor Quine, for example, has produced systems which I admire greatly on account of their skill, but which I cannot feel to be satisfactory because they seem to be created ad hoc and not to be such as even the cleverest logician would have thought of if he had not known of the contradictions. On this subject, however, an immense literature has grown up, and I will say no more about its finer points. (PMPA,74)

28. Presumably, even if science were to go back to an earlier theoretical standpoint, this would also create further languages in the forward sense Quine mentions. The given sentence(s) then would be performing "n-tuple-duty," as true or false in various languages.

29. It should be noted however, that this attitude has not been free from contention even in scientific circles. In her book, Reality And Scientific Truth, Ilse Rosenthal-Schneider mentions that Neils Bohr was one important physicist that; "spoke of 'the essential inadequacy of the customary viewpoint of natural philosophy,' and of a radical 'revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality.'" (RST,67).

30. In her book, Philosophy of Logics, Haack summarizes Miller's argument as follows:

> Very briefly, Miller's strategy is first to show, if t1 and t2 are comparable by truth-content, how they are also comparable by falsity-content; and then to show that for t2 to be nearer the truth than t1, t2 must be a true theory from which the truth-content of t1 follows, since otherwise t2 will exceed t1 in falsity--as well as truth-content, so that their verisimilitudes will not be comparable. (POL,117)

31. The context from which these remarks are extracted are from Austin's article, "A Plea for excuses." The content of the passage is as follows:

> Certainly ordinary language has no claim to be the last word, if there is such a thing. It embodies, indeed, something better than the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely, as was said, the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men. But then, that acumen has been concentrated primarily upon the practical business of life. If a distinction works well for practical purposes in ordinary life (no mean feat, for even ordinary life is full of hard cases), then there is sure to be something in it, it will not mark nothing: yet this is likely enough to be not the best way of arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual than the ordinary. And again, the experience has been derived only from the sources available to ordinary men throughout most of civilized history: it has not been fed from the resources of the microscope and its successors. And it must be added too, that superstition and error and fantasy of all kinds do become incorporated in ordinary language and even sometimes stand up to the survival test... Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember it is the first word. (PE,185)

32. Quine uses the conception of a 'proxy function' to further his doctrine of ontological relativity. Quine writes:

> All that is needed..., is a rule whereby a unique object of the supposedly new sort is assigned to each of the old objects. I call such a rule a proxy function. Then, instead of predicating a general term 'P' of an old object x, saying that x is a P, we reinterpret x as a new object and say that it is the f of a P, where 'f' expresses the proxy function. Instead of saying that x is a dog, we say that x is the lifelong filament of space-time taken up by a dog. Or, really, we just adhere to the old term 'P', 'dog', and reinterpret it as 'f of a P', 'place-time of a dog'. ...
>
> The apparent change is twofold and sweeping. The original objects have been supplanted and the general terms reinterpreted. There has been a revision of ontology on the one hand and of ideology, so to say, on the other; they go together. (TT,19)

33. Note that since Katz is proposing that we introduce meanings platonistically, on this point a Quinean might consider Katz's proposal to be in arrears. Instead of assent conditions, Katz invokes an intuitionism to answer to Bernaceraf's criterion. As such, we are presented with a proposal that invokes a faculty whose mechanisms we are completely ignorant of. The intuitionism that Katz invokes is not in the perceptual tradition (as with Husserl views and Godel's mathematical intuitionism), but Katz draws his intuitionism rather from the rationalist tradition, building on the Kantian conception of "pure intuitions". In his book, Language & Other Abstract Objects, Katz outlines a response to the issue (LOA,192-220)). However, the proposal as described earlier could still be applied within a Quinean framework without the assumption of linguistic intuition. While this would certainly not be suitable to Katz's overall philosophical picture, nonetheless, if successful on perceptually based conditions, it would still force Quine to assent to an analytic-synthetic distinction with the full force of his own naturalized vision.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BJPS British Journal for The Philosophy of Science 25, 1974.

BLM Quine, W. "Behavioral Limits of Meaning." Paper presented at The City University of New York Graduate Center; conference on the philosophy of W.V. Quine. New York, 1984.

CLT Quine, W. "Carnap and Logical Truth." In Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, pp. 107-32. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

CVO Quine, W. "On Carnap's Views on Ontology." In Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, pp. 203-211. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

CR Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968.

CSS Katz, J. J. "Common Sense in Semantics." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2 (April 1982): pp. 174-218.

CUNY Quine, W. "Responses." The City University of New York Graduate Center. Conference on the philosophy of W.V. Quine (Xeroxed). New York, 1984.

DD Grice, H.P. and P. Strawson. "In Defense of Dogma." In Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Edited by J. Rosenberg and C. Travis, pp. 81-94. Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey, 1971

EES Quine, W. "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World." Erkenntnis 9, (1975): pp. 313-28

EN Quine, W. "Epistemology Naturalized." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, pp. 69-90. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.

ESO Carnap, R. "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." In Meaning and Necessity, 2nd ed., pp. 205-221. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

ETL Nozick, R. "Experience, Theory, and Language." In The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by L. Hahn and P. Schilpp. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Press, 1986.

FB Peirce, C. "The Fixation of Belief." In Charles S. Peirce. Selected Writings, edited by P. Wiener, pp. 99-112. New York: Dover, 1958.

FME Quine, W. "Five Milestones of Empiricism." In Theories and Things, pp. 67-72. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

FOM Quine, W. "Facts of the Matter." In Essays on the Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by Shahan, R. and Swoyer, C. pp. 155-169. Norman Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, The Harvester Press, 1979.

H Hookway, C. Quine: Language, Experience and Reality. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988.

ITA Quine, W. "Indeterminacy of Translation Again." The Journal of Philosophy, 1 (January 1987): pp. 5-10.

JP Journal of Philosophy, New York: Columbia University Press.

LOA Katz, J.J. Language and Other Abstract Objects. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowan and Littlefield, 1981.

LPV Quine, W. From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. rev., paperback. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

LS Mathematics. Life Science Library, Time Incorporated, New York, 1963

MFR Putnam, H. The Many Faces of Realism. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989.

MNB Roth, Paul A. "Critical Discussion: On Missing Neurath's Boat: Some Reflections on Recent Quine Literature." Synthese 61, (1984) pp. 205-231.

MVD Quine, W. "Mind and Verbal Dispositions." In Mind and Language, edited by Gutenplan, S. pp. 83-95. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

N Bouwsma, O. "Naturalism." Journal of Philosophy, (Vol.45, 1948) pp. 12-22.

NNK Quine, W. "The Nature of Natural Knowledge." In Mind and Language, edited by S. Guttenplan, pp. 67-81. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

NK Quine, W. "Natural Kinds." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, pp. 114-138. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.

NYRB Quine, W. "Four Hot Questions in Philosophy." Review of Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. In the New York Review of Books, (Vol. 32:32, F14, 1985): pp. 32-33.

OC Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty. Edited by Anscombe, G. and von

Wright, G. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972.

OR Quine, W. "Ontological Relativity." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, pp. 26-68. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.

PE Austin, J.L. "A Plea for Excuses." In J.L. Austin. Philosophical Papers, 2nd ed., pp. 175-204. Edited by Urmson, J. and Warnock, G. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

PL Quine, W. Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

POL Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

PP Russell, B. The Problems of Philosophy. New York: Galaxy Books, 1959.

PT Quine, W. Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.

PMPA Russell, B. "Principia Mathematica: Philosophical Aspects." In Bertrand Russell: My Philosophical Development, pp. 74-85. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959.

PS Stroud, B. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Q1 Clark, C. Correspondence to W.V. Quine: (March 8, 1988).

Q2 Quine, W. Correspondence to C. Clark. (March 11, 1988).

QD Quine, W. Quiddities. An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.

QUS Bergstrom, L. "Quine, Underdetermination, and Skepticism." Journal of Philosophy, 7 (July 1993) pp. 331-358.

RG Quine, W. "Reply to Nelson Goodman." In The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by Hahn, L. and Schilpp, P., pp. 162-163. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986.

RI Katz, J,J. "The Refutation of Indeterminacy." Journal of Philosophy, 5 (May 1988).

RK Quine, W. "Reply to Katz." In Perspectives on Quine, edited by R. Barrett and R. Gibson, pp. 198-199. Cambridge, England: Basil-Blackwell, 1990.

RL Quine, W. "Reply to Harold N. Lee." In The Philosophy of W.V.

Quine, edited by L. Hahn and P. Schilpp, pp. 315-18. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986.

RN Quine, W. "Reply to Robert Nozick." In The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by L. Hahn and P. Schilpp, pp. 364-67. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986.

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