

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

**A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600**

EMOTION: SOMETHING MORE THAN FEELINGS

by

ALLYSON L. ROBICHAUD

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1997

UMI Number: 9807991

**Copyright 1997 by
Robichaud, Allyson Lee**

All rights reserved.

**UMI Microform 9807991
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.**

**This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

©1997

ALLYSON L. ROBICHAUD

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 30, 1997
Date

Charles Landmesser
Chair of Examining Committee

June 2, 1997
Date

Charles Landmesser
Executive Officer

Vyten Held
[Signature]
Julia Driver
[Signature]
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract**EMOTION: SOMETHING MORE THAN FEELINGS**

by

Allyson L. Robichaud**Adviser: Professor Virginia Held**

In this work I argue for a cognitive view of emotions. Emotions are judgments, however, judgments like no others; they are affective judgments. While it is a mistake to identify emotions with feelings, the phenomenological aspect of emotions cannot be ignored nor denied. One can experience physical upset yet no emotion and feelings do not differentiate emotions; it is judgments which constitute emotions.

Philosophy tends to exclude emotion as a means to explain and/or predict behavior, relying on beliefs and desires. I think this is to cheat ourselves out of a viable means of explanation. I argue that in order to offer a means of rational explanation for the presence of seemingly anomalous or inertial emotions, it is necessary to look for the source of emotions. It turns out that one's emotional history plays a central role in the genesis of one's emotions.

Given the ubiquity of emotion, it is bound to play some role in our lives, and I argue that it is not limited to one of distraction but rather that emotion is often directive. Emotions often serve an ideological role and the exclusion of emotion as a valuable

experience is ideological in nature. Emotions play crucial epistemic and axiological roles and to deny their importance is not only wrong, but dangerous.

Finally, I argue in favor of emotion playing a more useful and central role in morality than might be supposed. I think including emotions is a much needed anodyne for the traditional view valorizing dispassionate reasoning. Reasoning alone cannot always give us comprehensive knowledge of, or motivate us to act on, our moral duties and obligations. Indeed, I think to favor either above the other is a great error; both are necessary for a good life to be possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank Virginia Held for agreeing to step in and direct this project when it was already under way; she is to be commended for orchestrating its successful revision and completion.

I also thank Stefan Baumrin and Jim Landesman for their insightful comments, and Stefan particularly for his diligence in ferreting out typographical and grammatical errors, the absence of which I truly appreciate.

Thanks is due to Julia Driver and John Kleinig for cheerfully joining the examining committee at the end of the semester just when time is most scarce.

To my family, friends and cats, those who responded to my whinging with kind words and listened to my woes without flinching, great thanks is also due. They supported me however and whenever I needed. If not for them, this project would have been all the harder.

This work is dedicated to

**James Bottinelli
1946--1991**

as though the fullness of the soul did not sometimes overflow into
the emptiest phrases, since no one can ever express the exact measure
of his needs, his conceptions or his sorrows, and human speech is
like a cracked pot on which we beat out rhythms for bears to dance
to when we are striving to make music that will wring tears from the stars.
Flaubert, *Madame Bovary*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT p. iv

INTRODUCTION p. 1

CHAPTER ONE

In Favor of a Cognitivist View of Emotion p. 12

Robert Solomon: The Existentialist Perspective

..... p. 12

Emotions as Judgments p. 14

In Defense of Emotions as Judgments p. 23

The Pizza Problem p. 27

The World Through the Eyes of Another p. 29

William Lyons: An Evaluative Theory of Emotion

..... p. 32

Robert Gordon: Knowledge, Belief and Emotion

..... p. 41

Patricia Greenspan: Intuition and Emotion

..... p. 48

Feelings Do Count p. 50

Conclusion p. 54

CHAPTER TWO

**Emotion and Psychology: The Use of Emotion in
Explanation and, Explanations of the Origins of Emotion**
..... p. 56

Putting the Emotion Back into Belief/Desire

Psychology p. 56

The Neo-Freudian Representative View p. 68

Amélie Oksenberg Rorty: The Causal History p. 70

Annette Baier: The Representation of Historically

Deep Objects p. 75

Magda Arnold: Affective Memory p. 78

Ronald de Sousa: Salience and Paradigm Scenarios

..... p. 81

Jean Piaget: Intelligence and Affectivity p. 89

Conclusion p. 93

CHAPTER THREE

The Various Roles Played by Emotion p. 95

Emotion as Mere Distraction p. 95

Elliot & Phineas: Cases in Favor of Emotion p. 99

A Functional Account p. 102

Gumption p. 108

The Ideological Role Played by Emotion	p. 113
The Purpose of Ghettoizing Emotion	p. 118
In Defense of Feeling	p. 128
Conclusion	p. 132

CHAPTER FOUR

Emotion and Morality	p. 134
-----------------------------------	---------------

The Problem of Subjectivity	p. 135
Hume's Passions and Morality	p. 138
The Ethics of Care	p. 142
Psychopathology and Morality	p. 154
Bad or Faulty Reasoning	p. 157
Bernard Williams: Insights on Emotion and Morality	
.....	p. 160
Conclusion	p. 166

<u>CONCLUSION</u>	p. 168
--------------------------------	---------------

<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	p. 172
----------------------------------	---------------

INTRODUCTION

There exists a commonsense view of emotions which assumes that they are simply feelings, 'gut responses' that affect us greatly and more often than not throw us off kilter because they are interruptions in our usual 'steady-state.' It is thought that while we are undisturbed by any emotion, there is a sort of homeostasis. We are able to think clearly, act deliberately and so on. However, while experiencing some emotion or other, we are no longer acting deliberately or thinking clearly; all we think and do is corrupted by the feeling that has come over us. We speak of ourselves and others as being under the influence of an emotion; it dictates and rules our thoughts, actions, etc. Hence, emotions are seen as disruptive and irrational. An emotion is something which comes over us that we cannot control, and which in fact controls us. People say things like, "Don't pay any attention to her, she's so emotional." or, "You're letting your feelings get in the way." In the case of love for example, once the rose-colored glasses of love are over our eyes, we see the world differently and we claim not to be able to help it (nor do we usually want to in the case of love); the emotion 'colors' our view of the world.

Emotions, on this view, are thought of as being rather like hunger and itches. They are simply certain kinds of physiological feelings, internal states that arise whether we want them to or not and they are difficult to ignore. If we have poison ivy we feel itchy. If we haven't eaten for a while we feel hungry. If we are about to obtain something we want we feel happy. Given certain conditions, there is little we can do to control feeling itchy, hungry or happy; these feelings originate from within and their genesis is beyond our control (apart from avoiding poison ivy, fasting, and the having of certain desires).

When something happens to or around us, we may have some sort of emotional response to the situation, object or event. It is often the case that we have little or no

control over our surroundings, and, so we think, over the response or feelings they engender in us. We react to the circumstances seemingly without thought, but with emotion. Once an emotion is present, we might be able to do something about it, or because of it, as we can feed ourselves when hungry, but the genesis of the emotion and hence the feeling, is thought to be beyond our control.

The term 'feeling' as Alston points out, is a 'protean one.' It is used to cover a wide range of experiences: feeling things, like breezes and for a light switch; feeling twitches, tired, feverish, contented, embarrassed; feeling that things are improving, sorry for someone and like taking a walk.¹ I mean to reserve the term to refer to bodily sensations, e.g., feeling one's heart race or feeling suffused with energy; the phenomenological aspect which so often accompanies an emotion. For reasons which will become clear, I wish to avoid the appearance of aligning myself with the view that emotions are purely bodily sensations. Thus, I have tried to avoid using the term 'feeling' when referring to emotion. In some places doing so may seem a bit awkward, given that we commonly do use the term to refer to emotion, as in, "I didn't mean to hurt your feelings."

It would seem mistaken to count something as an emotion unless there were some sort of physiological response involved, yet as will be shown, it is a mistake to identify an emotion with a physiological response. While the phenomenon of physiological change may be necessary to any definition or discussion of emotion, it is not, in itself, sufficient, otherwise, we would include such things as itches and hunger as emotions, and we do not. Also, we could not account for the existence of emotions which seem to be long lived without some feeling constantly present—presumably love is one such emotion. This gives rise to the expectation that any account of emotion must include some sort of analysis of the

¹ William Alston, "Emotion and Feeling," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2, p. 483.

phenomenological aspect, since feeling something seems to be integral to most emotions. I will argue that bodily sensations and our awareness of them plays an important role in emotion.

While emotion and desire (and belief) are intentional states, and so have some commonalities, e.g., degrees of intensity, I think there are some significant differences. While emotion and desire are often present at the same time, impacting on one another, they are not the same thing. One way in which they are different has to do with the temporality of their objects. The object of one's desire is either in the future or in the past. Thus, desire can either be satisfied or frustrated; one wants what one does not have, or one wants not to have what one does have. To be in a state of desire, means that the object of one's desire has not been obtained. Once one obtains what one desires, the desire to possess that thing ceases to exist, something those who produce consumer goods are acutely aware of. This may generate a new desire, for example, the desire to continue to possess what one has acquired. This is also something known by producers of goods, hence the practice of altering a product slightly, then making the newer model appear to be more desirable than simply continuing to own the previous edition.

Conversely, the object of an emotion does not have this aspect of being in either the future or the past. The object of an emotion is necessarily in the present. In order to experience an emotion, the object of that emotion must be present. The object of an emotion is not something one can aim to obtain. If one is aiming to have or avoid having certain emotions, the emotions are then objects of desire, and as the objects of desire, have a temporal quality. One does not try to obtain the object of emotion for the sake of satisfying the emotion. However, if a desire resulting from an emotion exists, obtaining the object of that desire may extinguish the emotion. If, for example, I am angry that Sheila overstepped her authority, and then Sheila apologizes, I am no longer angry, *ceteris paribus*, with her. Notice, it is not that my anger has been satisfied and so disappears, it is

my desire that something change about the situation that has been satisfied, thus ameliorating my anger. In this case, Sheila's apology 'erases' the object of my emotion. Sheila was able to right the wrong by apologizing to me.

If I have a desire, there is something I want to have or to avoid. If I am able to obtain that which I want, or avoid that which I do not want, I will be satisfied, and if not, frustrated. However, the object of an emotion is not something which one comes to possess or avoid in the same way. I cannot possess Sheila's having wronged me or her apology to me, although I may desire she not wrong me or apologize to me. In the presence of my favorite cat I am happy, but that is not because I possess the cat, nor when I am in the presence of the vicious dog I fear, do I possess the dog. Rather, I possess conceptions about these states of affairs and these conceptions lead to my making affective judgments; it is these affective judgments which are the emotions.

The satisfaction I experience when I attain that which I desire may lead me to experience some emotion. Which emotion I will experience depends on the object of my desire. If, for example, I finally reach my desired goal, I may be happy, perhaps even proud of myself. However, if the object of my desire turns out to be different from what I thought it would be, I might experience sadness or even embarrassment. One may even desire that one have a certain emotion. I may desire, for example, that I achieve a state of happiness. My desire to have happiness is not the same as my experience of happiness. In fact, I can be happy I am experiencing happiness.

In the case of desire vis-à-vis its object, only two desires are possible. One can desire to possess the object, or desire to avoid the object. One could of course be indifferent to it, but then no desire is present. The case is different for emotion. The same situation, object or event can give rise to many different emotions. With desire, a situation, object or event is judged desirable or undesirable, whereas with emotion, many different affective judgments are possible. Different individuals may judge the same situation, object

or event differently, e.g., to be dangerous, ludicrous, etc. Thus, a wide range of emotions are possible given the same situation, object or event because of the possibility of a wide range of affective judgments occurring. Also, the same individual may come to judge the same object differently, for various reasons. Particular situations, objects, or events may well limit the sort of affective judgments possible, and so the emotions experienced as a result. For example, it would be hard to imagine (although not impossible) someone experiencing grief about achieving a life long goal.

Clearly the desire for a cookie isn't an emotion, although one's longing for one may be strong enough for an emotion to exist, e.g., sadness about one's not having any left in the cupboard. One may love a particular kind of cookie and as a result desire only that kind of cookie, to the exclusion of all others. Upon eating one, thus satisfying the desire, one may experience regret or guilt—one's New Year's resolution having been broken. It is not unusual for there to be a desire associated with an emotion, often the desire that some kind of action be taken. For example, love is accompanied by the desire to be with one's beloved and also the desire that they do well; when one is angry there often exists a desire for some sort of retribution; when lonely, there is the desire for some company—perhaps even a specific person one is lonely for. There are also emotions which do not seem to have a desire attached to them in this way, for example, grief or nostalgia. There isn't something one desires to do when grief stricken in the same way as when one is afraid. In the case of grief, one might claim that what one desires is the return of what has been lost. At the same time, one recognizes the futility of such a wish, knowing nothing one does can change the way things have come to be. The same is true for nostalgia—the past can never be re-lived. In fact, I think it is the irretrievability of what is lost that makes one's emotion grief or nostalgia. Given these differences, I think that emotion and desire, although related, are not identical.

It might be thought that perhaps emotions are much like perceptions since they often

arise as the result of some external situation, object or event, occurring around us. We seem to learn to refer to them in the same way we learn to refer to the objects of perception. What is the difference? One thing which is different is the way situations, objects or events affect us. Consider the case of a red ball. Our basic perception of the ball is informational--that it is a ball, that it is red, that it is on the table, et cetera. We recognize the object as a ball and can identify its color because we are working from a store of past experiences that allow us to pick out objects and name them. Anyone who has been around in the English speaking world for a while will have been in a position to learn about balls and redness. (I'm presuming here that learning by ostensive definition is how we are able to coordinate the name with the object.) Our minds process the information coming to us from our senses and all and every perceptually capable person who is part of the group who would use 'red ball' to describe such an object could pick out such an object. What, however, are we to say about the person who experiences happiness at the sight of a red ball? All of the usual perceptual paths are followed such that she recognizes that the object is a red ball etc., but further to this, is happy at the sight of it. The recognition of it as a red ball is part of the chain of events (or perhaps states) that doesn't seem to have a felt quality, the way happiness has a felt quality. What is she recognizing about the object that makes her happy? Perhaps it is the memory of a perfectly lovely afternoon in childhood, during which a red ball was tossed about, and she associates the memory with this particular red ball. According to Magda Arnold, our 'affective memory' plays a crucial role in the emotions we will have: "... affective memory is a reliving of the original acceptance or rejection in a new though similar situation ... our here-and-now appraisal is really a prejudgment (literally, a prejudice) dictated by affective memory."² Surely we would not

² Magda Arnold, "Perennial Problems in the Field of Emotion," in Loyola Symposium on Feelings and Emotions, edited by Magda Arnold (New York: Academic Press, 1970), p. 176.

can imagine someone experiencing anger in the presence of the same ball, or even indifference, i.e., no emotion at all. She is making some judgment about the presence of the ball such that she experiences happiness, while someone else, making a different judgment, will be angry. The presence of the ball might, for example, substantiate his claim that she stole it from his locker, and so he experiences anger that his accusation was not taken seriously.

Leaving aside the difficulties of verifying the verisimilitude of individual experiences, I want to say that when we are happy, what we experience is the same thing everyone experiences when happy. The triggers are, however individual and thus, subjective. I am extraordinarily happy at the sight of a red ball, you are angry and someone else is indifferent. Memories of previous experiences with red balls, something particular to the individual remembering, can 'add' to the perception of the ball such that there is more occurring than simply perceiving that there is a red ball; the experience is imbued with emotion. There may well be other things that 'add' to one's perceptions also, e.g., one is predisposed to be happy in the face of any 'nice' object because one just received praise for a job well done and the whole world and its contents seem placed to please and entertain. This example illustrates the phenomenological aspect of emotions and it is the sort of thing that often stands out sharply with such an experience. We have a perception of the ball, we recognize that it is a red ball; this, in and of itself, seems ordinary and mundane. What 'bumps' the perception up to more than just an observation and recognition of an object as that particular object, is the emotional aspect. Emotions stir us up more than the bare perceptions of objects. There is a phenomenological component to even mundane visual perceptions but the intensity is so low we fail to notice; it fails to stir us up in the same way. (One wonders if when humans were first able to notice themselves thinking and perceiving, the experience was less mundane than it is now.)

Suppose I have the perception that there is a bear coming towards me, the bare

perception of the bear, *qua* object, stirs me up no more than the photograph of a bear in a book would. A photograph of a bear might well precipitate a rush in me if it is, for example, precisely the sort of photograph of a bear I've been looking for to use as an illustration in my forthcoming novel, but the recognition or judgment *that* it is a bear, evokes no emotional response. The excitement I feel is because I judge that it is the perfect bear for illustrating my novel. This is different from the judgment that it is a bear. If the bear were in a cage in the zoo, there could be at least three judgments: that it is a bear; that bears can be dangerous; that this bear is not dangerous because caged. In the case of the bear charging me, my judgment that this thing is a bear is separable from my judgment that it is a thing which is dangerous. It is the latter affective judgment that makes the emotion one of fear. If the bear rushes past me and I believe it is gone, I no longer fear the bear. The situation may even remain dangerous--the bear is preparing to charge--but since I am distracted by someone calling out to me, I am unaware of her threatened charge, and so am not afraid. We need to notice that a bear is present and also, that the bear present is dangerous.

Philosophers, psychologists, and anthropologists question whether or not we ourselves play a crucial role in the origination of our emotions, or if they arise fully formed from structures embedded in our physiology and psyche. As we will see in Chapters Three and Four, there are disagreements over whether or not we have control over them, and if we have control, how much. Certainly some of our recognitions and responses occur so quickly that the notion of some intermediary cognitive process seems impossible. However, this doesn't rule it out since mental processes can occur so quickly as to be imperceptible, and anyhow we are often unaware of cognitive processes which are occurring in us. Trying to sort out what occurs due to some innate nature and what occurs as the result of learning is also problematic. Since learning begins so early (current wisdom suggesting some may even take place in utero), it is often difficult to show what if

anything is innate, what is learned, and what of that which is learned is dependent on innate cognitive structures so as to determine its form (as Chomsky suggests language is).

Eventually we come to know the concepts and their proper application to ourselves and others. When reading literature or viewing a dramatic performance, we have little trouble identifying (and often identifying with) the emotions of the characters. We are able to recognize emotions in others and in ourselves and it seems reasonable to suppose that what I feel when angry is the same thing that others feel when angry, although what if any action our emotional experience leads to, can of course vary. This has led to research into the universality of emotional experience and to the recognition of emotions in others by an observer, for example, through facial pattern recognition. There appears to be good evidence to show that there is universal expression for at least some emotions, i.e., "... happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, and sadness." ³ Since we are most often operating in our own familiar community, we also have the advantage of knowing what sorts of cultural quirks may be at play in the (culturally) typical expression of an emotion. For example, in Euroamerican culture, it is reasonable to assume that someone who is red-faced and stomping around yelling loudly is angry about something. In another culture this may of course indicate the existence of some other emotion, or none at all, and even in a Western culture, given the right circumstances, this behavior might not be an indication of someone having the emotional experience of anger, or any emotional experience at all; she may just be demonstrating to someone from another culture what an angry Westerner might behave like. This is not to suggest that a given emotion is identical with a particular behavior pattern, but merely to point out that in observing others, we become quite adept at hypothesizing correctly what emotion someone is experiencing by paying attention to their

³ Paul Ekman, "Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of Emotions," in Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p. 97.

observable (by us) behavior.

In this work I first lay out some views of what emotions are, ultimately siding with the view that emotions are affective judgments. For various reasons, to be presented in Chapter One, an emotion cannot be identified with tingles or shivers, although some kind of feeling is nearly always present when one is experiencing an emotion. Once it has been argued that emotions are affective judgments, I take up the important discussion of how it is that individuals come to make these judgments and hence to experience the emotions they do. Given the undeniably ubiquitous existence of emotions, I argue in Chapter Two that we ought to utilize emotions more in our explanation of the behavior of others; to settle for a belief-desire psychology is to cheat ourselves out of a valuable explanatory tool. Leaving emotion out gives the impression, which I vehemently deny, that emotions are expendable, explain little, and are unimportant. Emotions are the Cinderella of modern philosophy of mind—even though they do a lot of work, they often remain virtually unnoticed and so are left out of important discussions. In Chapter Two I also look at what I call the Neo-Freudian representative view of the origin of emotion. Using this view, I am able to show that there is good evidence to support the thesis that our history, emotional and otherwise, plays a crucial role in the genesis of our emotional repertoire.

After arguing that emotions ought not to be ignored, I think it is important to discuss the sort of role or roles they play in our lives. Toward that end, in Chapter Three, I begin with a view much like the commonsense view outlined above, i.e., the idea that emotions are feelings which distract us, and not for the better. I do so in order to offer some ideas on why such a view exists and to show how it is misguided. Indeed, I will argue that emotions play a central and indispensable role in our lives. Without them, we would lead an impoverished existence at best, or at worst, a nasty short life, owing to things like, for example, a lack of fearing that which can harm us. While it is the case that emotions can put us off track occasionally, to countenance their entire extinction is to toss

the proverbial baby out with the bath water.

Finally, and very importantly, in Chapter Four, I argue that emotion is necessary in order for morality to exist. I think the view that dispassionate critical reasoning alone can do the job is seriously flawed. At the very least, we must care about doing the right thing and I think we need something more than critical reasoning to see who or what we ought to value. This is not to insinuate that reasoning should be replaced by emotions or vice versa but rather, to argue that they are both necessary in order for us to live 'a good life.'

CHAPTER ONE

IN FAVOR OF A COGNITIVIST VIEW OF EMOTION

In this first chapter I intend to argue that emotions are cognitive in nature. I think this view of emotion affords the best explanation of the phenomena and sheds much light on human experience. Emotions always involve some conception of the world, and the ability to conceptualize requires cognition. At the same time however, I want to maintain that the physiological aspect of emotion plays an important role. On the face of it, this seems quite reasonable. Often one of the first things to come to mind when we think about what emotions are, is their felt quality. The phenomenological experience stands out sharply, usually drawing more attention than the cognitive aspect. I think the effort to cleave emotion from feeling stems from the desire to center emotion fully in cognition, thereby avoiding the problems which arise if feeling is deemed integral to emotion. In my view, and in the view of some others, this is a grave error. While I agree with Solomon's thesis that emotions are judgments, I disagree with his view that feeling plays no essential role in emotion.

ROBERT SOLOMON: THE EXISTENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE

Robert Solomon maintains that emotions are constitutional judgments, judgments which contribute to the creation of our world, the creation of what he calls our 'surreality.' I will make use of the term 'surreality' in this work, and when doing so, mean it in this sense. The way in which one conceptualizes the situations, objects or events is dependent upon one's view point and this in turn has many determinants. Such conceptualizations play a crucial role in which judgments we will make. Each of us makes such judgments;

they can and do differ widely. Such judgments constitute and structure a surreality, our own world. He contends that we create ourselves and the meaning of our lives through our choices and judgments. Because of his view Solomon earns the appellation, 'Existentialist.' It is in this sense that he follows Sartre; "Life is nothing until it is lived; but it is yours to make sense of and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose."¹ Emotions play a central role in the creation of our surreality. They help to shape what becomes for us, reality. The way we 'see' the world contributes to our experiencing particular emotions and the emotions, in turn, contribute to the way we 'see' the world. It will be argued, I think correctly, here and in later chapters, that one's surroundings, culture, etc., can greatly influence one's conceptions and perceptions and so one's surreality.

Following Solomon's line of thinking, if, for example, I am nostalgic about my golden youth, it makes no difference to me that, as a matter of fact, my youth was never golden. I hold the belief that it was so, and thus I pine for that lost time. Because I judge what I believe was a wonderful time in my life is a lamentable loss, the emotion I experience is nostalgia. There does not have to be, in fact, a golden youth which I have lost. Nor does my feeling of melancholy or my continual sighing make my experience one of nostalgia, though I may well suffer melancholia and sigh repeatedly. It is a certain sort of sadness, the kind of sadness which results from contemplating the permanent loss of a pleasant time long since passed. It is the judgment that this pleasant past is a rueful loss which constitutes my emotion. This judgment, in concert with and against a background of other judgments, helps to constitute my world.

An emotion is not an isolated judgment, but a
system of judgments which is in turn a sub-system
of the whole of our way(s) of viewing the world ...

¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, translated by Philip Mairet (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1948), p. 54.

Each emotion is, ... a particular focusing of judgmental structures through which the person constructs his or her view of the world and gives it significance.²

We each play an active and central role in the creation of our surreality, though it may be that we are sometimes unaware that we do or unaware of what motivates us to so create it. In the example above, it may be that I choose to see my youth as golden because doing so affords me one bright spot on a very bleak horizon which gives me hope. I believe it is possible for such states to exist because I believe my past to have been such a state. As a result, I am able to believe I may reasonably aspire to achieving such a state in the future. My faith in the possibility of bringing about such a state is what enables me to go on. It becomes something that drives me forward and motivates me to take certain actions.

EMOTIONS AS JUDGMENTS

For Solomon, "... emotions in general do appear to require this feature: to have an emotion is to hold a normative judgment about one's situation."³ To illustrate this he uses the example of being angry about John stealing his car and concludes, "My anger *is* my judgment that John has wronged me."⁴ It doesn't matter whether or not John has actually stolen the car. So long as he believes that John stole his car and that his doing so wrongs him, he will be angry. What this means is, if he is angry at John for stealing his car, he is angry 'that John stole my car,' not at his belief that John stole his car nor at the fact that John stole his car. His emotion, anger in this case, is such because of his judgment about

² Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions and Anthropology: The Logic of Emotional World Views," Inquiry vol. 21(Summer 1978), p. 187.

³ Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice," in Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Okesenberg Rorty (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p. 258.

⁴ Ibid., p. 258.

the object of his emotion. If it is false that John stole his car, that does not change the object of his anger (at least so long as he is unaware that it was not John or not his car). However, if his judgment had been different, the emotion would also have been different. If he were trying to commit insurance fraud, his judgment would not be that John had wronged him. He would no doubt judge the theft as a boon and might even be happy.

As many have noted, emotions are intentional, that is, they are about something.⁵ There must be something, a situation, object or event, that a given emotion is about, in order for an emotion to exist. This is so even if some or much consideration is needed to ascertain what the object is. If I am angry, there must be someone I am angry with or something I am angry about. This seems right; it is hard to imagine being angry without being angry about something. The intentionality of emotions can be seen more clearly in some emotions than others. Solomon contends that even moods, which are more generalized than emotions, are about something, on his account, the whole world.⁶ Others take a similar tack in trying to maintain the notion that such generalized states have objects. William Lyons for example, claims such cases are 'vague' or 'blurred' rather than "... exceptions to the general model of emotions."⁷ However, one might suggest they are inventing objects in order to save the model they have put forth. Claire Armon-Jones thinks one can maintain the view that emotions are intentional while not forcing moods or conditions such as generalized anxiety into that mold. Her contention is that one ought to look at affective phenomena as existing on a continuum with some phenomena more

⁵ For example see, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "Explaining Emotions," in Explaining Emotions, ed. Rorty, p. 103; Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge: The MIT Press, [1987] 1990), Chapter 5; Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 4.

⁶ Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 112.

⁷ William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 57.

closely related than others. Even so, all are within the same purview; all are affective states.⁸ Thus for her,

M states, (objectless affective states) as undifferentiated states, involve thought that is not focused on an object ... the metaphors of colouring and tonal quality capture the sense in which M states derive their identity primarily from mode or manner of thinking rather than from what is thought.⁹

I think her strategy offers a very useful approach to dealing with some of the disparities among the various phenomena, while allowing them to continue to be 'grouped' together.

It is nevertheless, the intentionality of emotion which rules out the possibility that my anger is a flushed face, and a clenched stomach, or the perception of my face flushing and stomach clenching.¹⁰ Feelings don't have objects and also, a fevered bout of peritonitis, for instance, could engender the same symptoms and physiological feelings. There needs to be something more than just feelings for an emotion to exist. Solomon notes, "An emotion cannot be identified apart from its object: 'I am angry' is incomplete— ... 'I am angry' requires that there *must* be more information available ... feelings have no such requirements."¹¹ It may be however, that one is unable to tell at the outset or perhaps ever, what it is that one's emotion is caused by. As we will see later in this chapter and in the next, it is sometimes the case that, for various psychological reasons, we are unable to recognize what is actually causing the emotion we are experiencing. When this is so

⁸ Claire Armon-Jones, Varieties of Affect (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 14.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

¹⁰ As William James would claim: William James, "What is an Emotion," in The Nature of Emotion: Selected Readings, edited by Magda B. Arnold (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 19.

¹¹ Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice," in Explaining Emotions, ed. Rorty, p. 253.

however, it is not that we simply have a feeling and are unable to say what we are, for example, angry about. If we are angry, there will be someone or something we can point to as the object of our anger, someone whom we judge to have wronged us. We may even believe that what we point to is also the cause. Even if we are mistaken, we will still be pointing at someone or something. It could also be the case that we don't realize we are angry, we mistake our anger for, say, depression. In some cases recognizing that we are angry and with whom may be threatening in some way and so we fail to recognize that what we are experiencing is anger. But, if we believe ourselves to be angry, we will find someone or something to name as the object of our anger. I take the fact that we can be mistaken as further evidence that the emotions are intentional states; there will always be an object, even if that means we must 'find' or create something or someone as the object.

It is this feature of emotions, their intentionality, that gives rise to some well known problems. First there is the problem raised by intentional objects which do not exist and secondly, the problem of trying to account for the referential opacity of intentional objects. Solomon argues that these problems largely disappear if one resists the temptation to separate having an emotion from what the emotion is about. That is, we ought not to think of emotions as being made up of two components: "(1) having the emotion, a feeling, an act or 'attitude,' and (2) the object of the emotion: a thing or person or incident or state of affairs or 'fact'."¹² In other words, he thinks it is a mistake to view the emotions in terms of a split between a subjective or mental component and an objective or external component. If for each of us our surreality is our own particular world, it is here that we find the objects of emotion. We none of us have access to an absolute Reality.

Emotions are subjective; their objects are not simply objects of the world, not 'facts,' not part of an anonymous and scientifically ascertainable Reality. The objects of the emotions are objects

¹² Ibid., p. 115.

of *our* world, the world as we experience it.¹³

The assumption that this dichotomy obtains is what gives rise to problems about the intentional objects of emotions. For example, if I am afraid of the bogey man in my closet, my fear exists and so, in some sense, must the bogey man in my closet. Very quickly the world may become filled with such not quite real existents—not quite real because such objects do not actually exist in the external world.

On Solomon's view, the bogey man is real insofar as it is part of my surreality. I think Solomon is right about this. From a detached standpoint there is no bogey man, but from the standpoint with which I am personally involved,¹⁴ my surreality, there is a bogey man and he frightens me.

Even where the object has no status in Reality,
it is based upon the world as we experience it,
interpreted and hypostatized, projected into the
world by our concerns and values.¹⁵

This is not to say the world plays no role, that matters of fact count for nothing. Even for the "... wandering knight ... who falls in love with a few golden locks. ... There must be at least a lock or a shoe, or at any rate a reputation or rumor."¹⁶ There is nearly always a situation, object or event 'out there' that an emotion is about. However, conceptualization on the part of the individual experiencing the emotion is what brings the intentional object to life. I think a knight must have a lot more than hair in mind in order for golden locks to be the object of his love. The way his world is constituted by him plays a crucial role in determining the sorts of objects which will 'populate' it. For instance,

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁶ Ibid.

although he is not the sole contributor to its constitution--social or cultural influences occur--such a knight is after all a man of his times, a time in which such romantic trappings have meaning. What I mean is, the object is in some sense, in the eye of the beholder. The same type of situation that will anger me greatly might simply amuse you. What Solomon is right in pointing out is the subjective nature of emotions. The emotions experienced by different individuals to the same situation, object, or event may differ, or the same individual may experience different emotions at different times in her life with the same situation, object or event--people may change. In fact, I think one of the ways people do manage to actuate real change in their lives occurs via gestalt shift; they come to think differently about a situation, object or event.

Given the subjective perspective involved in emotion, an account of the referential opacity of the intentional objects of emotions is also possible. "... the description of the 'objects' of belief or emotion must be geared to the mode of conceiving of them by the person who has them, not upon the 'facts.'"¹⁷ For example, if I am angry with John, I am experiencing anger because I have construed my world as a world in which John has wronged me in some way. It is this construal that is central to my coming to have the emotion I experience. Given this, it is not surprising that substitution of a proposition with the same reference can change the truth value of the original statement. I am angry 'that John stole my car'; this is the object of my emotion, not 'that Bill's brother stole my car,' even though, unbeknownst to me, John has a brother Bill. My conceptualization of John in this instance has nothing to do with the fact that he has a sibling.

I must have some kind of evidence for my judgment that I have been wronged, some object. I may or may not be mistaken about what I take to be evidence. It is possible that John did not steal my car but because I am so consumed with an underlying jealousy of

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 114.

him, I think the worst of him and welcome anything that besmirches his reputation. Thus, the person driving away in my car looks like John to me only because I have construed my world such that I wish to see him as capable of every sort of wrongdoing and so easily mistake the person stealing my car for him. It may be that the person who actually stole the car looks nothing like John but because I am so intensely interested in damning him, I manage to cast John in a bad light whenever an opportunity arises. In fact, as the example above shows, I even create scenarios in which John is the villain. I think it is a common enough experience to catch others (and sometimes ourselves) attributing acts or sensibilities to someone on the basis of prejudiced thinking. If I conceive of John as capable of committing X, it is no leap for me to think the person I see committing X is him, even when actual evidence is scant or nonexistent. This is why prejudice is such a dangerous frame of mind, those who are blameless will be cast in the role of villain for no good reason.

Solomon demonstrates that while beliefs and knowledge may play a role in emotion, emotion is not identical with belief or knowledge. There must be some belief, thought or perhaps only an intuition, upon which to make a judgment, but these are different from the judgment itself. There is a difference between the state of believing that the physician is correct, for example, in her diagnosis of my congestive heart failure, my knowledge about such a condition and its possible consequences, and my fear about the possible consequences. The belief need not lead to fear (or any emotion) in every case--some may face the diagnosis with equanimity, while believing the physician to be correct in her diagnosis. If the belief can exist without the emotion they cannot be identical.

Still, in order for fear to exist, if it does, there must be something about which I am afraid. However, according to Solomon, it would be a mistake to assume that there is always a causal relationship between the object and the emotion. As noted above, he thinks the relationship is not causal but conceptual. One has a conception of the world, one's

surreality, and it is within that conceptual framework that an emotion exists. While it may be the case that the intentional object of my emotion stands in a causal relationship to my emotion, it may not. It may happen that the actual cause of my coming to have an emotion is, for example, an overabundance of hormones in my system. My hormonal imbalance causes me to be easily aggravated, so I find an object upon which to place (misplace) my aggravation. I see that John has used the last box of chalk, leaving me none, and so I judge him as having wronged me. But the hormones are not the intentional object of my emotion; I am not angry at my hormones. I am angry at John. In fact, were I to realize that the real cause of my anger is my over-active adrenal cortex, I would most likely cease to be angry, or at least cease being mad at John. If I keep my adrenal condition in mind, noting that it is the cause of my hyper physiological state, I will take care to try not to displace it, although such transfers might still occur. Misattributions of the cause of one's emotion are common and I will deal with other instances later in this chapter.

Solomon correctly points out that I cannot remain angry if I know my hormonal imbalance is causing me to make faulty judgments, or to be hyper-vigilant in exposing even the most picayune foibles of others and then casting them as the objects of my emotions. I cannot know the actual cause of my anger is a hormonal imbalance and retain my anger at John.¹⁸ The intentional object of my emotion results from a conceptualization particular to me but it may be that it is not the cause. If I find out that the cause of my emotion is actually other than my judgment about the intentional object, I can no longer maintain the emotion. In fact, learning that the cause is other than I thought forces me to reconceptualize. As we will see in Chapter Two, things other than the actual state of affairs are often responsible for one's conceptions of the world and so one's emotions, e.g., events in one's past history. Another element of the gestalt shift I mentioned earlier, which

¹⁸ Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice," in Explaining Emotions, ed. Rorty, p. 260.

makes change possible, is knowledge of what is actually causing an emotion. The feeling of agitation or being out of sorts is not, in and of itself, an emotion--there is no intentional object.

Anyone experiencing an emotion is focused on something specific such that it is the intentional object of the emotion. The intentional object is particular to them, perhaps to them alone.

The object is always *subjective*, a part of the world as one sees it, whether or not it is in fact the case or not. The cause is always *objective*; it must be the case if it is to be the cause.¹⁹

Others may well be able to pick out what the intentional object is, just as others may easily be able to see where someone else's 'choice' of an intentional object is mistaken.

However, no one can come to see that she herself is mistaken about an intentional object or her judgment of it and maintain the emotion. Should she realize that she is mistaken about the intentional object of her emotion, she will no longer have that emotion (unless of course she displaces it onto a new intentional object).

This feature of Solomon's theory is helpful because it offers an explanation of how it is possible for people to have and maintain emotions that, to an observer, seem unreasonable. Someone who is angry for example, cannot herself know that the intentional object of her emotion is 'off base,' because knowing that it is would result in the elimination of the emotion. For her, the emotion plays a central role in the creation of her reality, her surreality. Where someone's anger seems to us inappropriate, for the person who is angry the anger serves a purpose and is the result of her particular standpoint. It is part of the system of judgments that helps to make up her world view.

I think a good example of this is the sort of conceptualizing one often notices

¹⁹ Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Live (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 123.

occurring in relationships or friendships. In an untroubled relationship, any missteps are generously excused, judged as inconsequential. However, in a troubled relationship, something as innocuous as the way in which someone holds his fork may become anathema to his lover because the *faux pas* seems, to the lover, clearly to exemplify the incredible breadth of his shortcomings. What is critical for an individual is the way in which she sees and interprets the events occurring around her. Sue is angry at the way Pete is holding his fork. She can't believe he is holding his fork that way, embarrassing her in front of their guests. She judges herself wronged by his action. This judgment is possible only because it fits in with Sue's world view, one in which any action Pete takes is seen as flawed and thus can become an object for an emotion. Given such a background, Sue will react angrily towards Pete much of the time and for doing things which to an observer hardly seem worthy of note, let alone anger. She believes what he does reflects badly on her.

Of course alternative scenarios are possible. She may be angry at herself for not having the courage to tell Pete she wants out of the relationship and the way he holds his fork is just a reminder to her that she has made a poor choice in Pete as a boyfriend. Notice however, which scenario obtains, depends on Sue's conceptualizing; what she wants and values can make a big difference in how she construes the events around her. In some cases one might 'deliberately' misconstrue an event in order to provide oneself with a way out. But, as has been argued, one can't engage in disingenuous emotional behavior. Sue can't consciously fool herself into believing it is Pete's fork that is driving her mad. We can't pretend to ourselves that we believe something without being aware that we are pretending, i.e., we don't actually believe that we believe it.

IN DEFENCE OF EMOTIONS AS JUDGMENTS

Emotions are judgments stemming from an individual's seeing of the world. It is

this feature that helps Solomon defend his view against charges like the one brought by Jenefer Robinson. Her claim is that, emotions cannot be identified with judgment since "... it is possible to make the judgment without feeling the corresponding emotion."²⁰ I can judge John to have wronged me by stealing my car, yet fail to experience any emotion, i.e., I may dispassionately judge myself to have been wronged. Robinson's claim is, if Solomon's thesis is that an emotion is a special kind of judgment, one which stands apart from dispassionate judgments, he doesn't make his case.

She notes²¹ that emotions and desires share the same formal properties, e.g., both, unlike judgments, can vary in intensity. Robinson argues that it is the connection of emotion with desire that separates the judgment of emotion from dispassionate judgments, thus filling in the gap she thinks Solomon leaves.

the judgmental element in our emotions should be thought of as a way of thinking about something which is governed by our desires and which is 'colored' by our desires in the sense that it shares some of the formal properties of desires.²²

Solomon would not deny that desires play a role in the judgments we make; they too contribute to the way we see the world. However, he would, as would I, disagree that it is (only) desire which makes the judgment one of emotion, as Robinson claims. Using her example, she maintains it is not the (dispassionate) judgment that a bear is dangerous which gives rise to the experience of fear but rather,

If I am afraid of the bear, this entails that I have an intense desire to stay alive and unharmed and to avoid threatening situations, and it is

²⁰ Jenefer Robinson, "Emotion, Judgment, and Desire," The Journal of Philosophy vol. 92, no. 2 (February, 1983), p. 733.

²¹ as does Patricia Greenspan in: "A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion," in Explaining Emotions, ed. Rorty.

²² Jenefer Robinson, "Emotion, Judgment, and Desire," The Journal of Philosophy, p. 731.

these desires and goals that determine the way I
think of the bear: I conceive of it as a threat to
these deeply held desires.²³

In order for me to conceive of the bear as a threat to my deeply held desire to stay alive and unharmed, wouldn't I have to think of (judge) the bear as dangerous, rather than the reverse? Robinson is right in stating that in a case of fear, one typically desires to somehow avoid the threatening situation but first one has to see the situation as threatening. I would argue such desires only come into play and become significant in conjunction with an emotion, if and when one has judged the situation as, in this case, dangerous and so potentially harmful. The desire to maintain one's health doesn't come forward until we judge ourselves to be in danger. My desire for health doesn't constitute my fear of the bear, it is my judgment that the bear is dangerous to me and so a threat to the health I desire to continue to enjoy. I would suppose the desire to remain healthy is one which is continuously held, though in the background, by nearly everyone. In different situations such a desire only becomes salient once we have judged a situation, object or event to be beneficial or harmful to our life or health. For example, I might become sad when the doctor informs me that I have congestive heart failure. I become sad because I judge this diagnosis as ultimately resulting in terrible losses for me. I might well, among other things, desire that I have my health returned to me but I don't think it is my desire for health that makes my emotion one of sadness. I could experience other emotions as a result of the same desire. I could desire my health and be mad. The diagnosis confirms that I was foolhardy in not exercising more. I could desire my health and be jealous. My neighbor is a heavy smoker and his heart seems to be just fine.

Desire by itself is not an emotion, although it
readily functions as a cause and a stimulus to
emotion ... one might analyze the various emotions
as judgmental structures enclosing a core desire

²³ Ibid., p. 739.

which is both their motivation and their 'conatus.'²⁴

Even in what appears to be a very simple situation, being surprised by a charging bear in the woods for example, one doesn't just make one simple judgment. "An emotion is the entire system of judgments, and the judgments that constitute the emotion are emotional by virtue of their place in that system."²⁵

Solomon credits Michael Stocker with the best counter-argument against the view that in an identical situation, say the bear in the woods again, one person can dispassionately make the judgment that the bear is dangerous, while her counterpart flees in fright. In the case of the individual making such a dispassionate judgment, "... such dispassion is better recognized as dissociation, a pathological condition ...".²⁶ (I will deal in greater detail with Stocker's views in Chapter Three.) I think it would take the explanation of the existence of some very odd or interesting circumstances for us to believe that someone who can dispassionately judge a menacing bear dangerous, is not dissociating. However, Solomon does not embrace the view that affectivity, i.e., feelings, can help rescue him from the charge that he cannot account for the difference between dispassionate judgments and the judgments of emotion. He wants only to add in more cognitions, widening the set, hoping to thereby explain away the seeming lack of passion. But, if one is dissociating, presumably it is one's feelings one is dissociated from. As will be argued at the end of this chapter, Solomon would do well to incorporate affectivity, in order to cover this and other problems which trouble his otherwise inviting view.

²⁴ Robert C. Solomon, "On Emotions as Judgments," American Philosophical Quarterly vol. 25, no. 2 (April, 1988), p. 189.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 187.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 189.

THE PIZZA PROBLEM

I think another virtue of a view like Solomon's is that it can also be used to explain a very common problem we encounter, what I shall refer to as the Pizza Problem.²⁷ A paradigmatic example of this problem occurred on an episode of the situation comedy, The Mary Tyler Moore Show. Mary's date arrives very late, with a pizza (hence the name of the problem). Mary assures him that she is not in the least upset or angry about his lateness. She appears calm and happy to see him. When he opens the lid of the pizza box, Mary sees that the pizza has anchovies on it. She becomes enraged and yells loudly at him for forgetting that she hates anchovies. This exemplifies the common problem. When something is difficult to face, or when facing a problem head on will result in a very messy interaction, people very often 'pick' as their intentional object, something 'safe.' This is a variation of the kick-the-cat theme. Mary herself, if questioned, would tell you that she is not angry 'that her date is late' but is angry 'that he ordered anchovies.' Many would swear that they are only angry 'that the cat jumped up' when in fact the cause of their anger lies elsewhere. They have constituted their surreality, for example in a manner that enables them to continue to avoid dealing with something.

Solomon maintains that this is, in part, what makes the emotions rational—they are purposive. Insofar as they serve some purpose they are deliberate, although the individual will not be consciously aware of what she is doing—as noted previously, she must be dissembling if she knows the anchovies are not the actual source of her anger. If the relationship has not been going well, Mary can 'fly off the handle' over the anchovies and extract an apology from her date, and then perhaps avoid having to address any larger issue concerning their relationship. In many cases, people suffer the Pizza Problem gladly rather than face up to more difficult discussions or decisions. This is not to say that this is always

²⁷ I owe thanks to Tim Johnson and Monica Wittek for discussions of this problem.

a good thing, merely that if one's goal is, for example, not to deal with larger problems in a relationship, this is a very effective means to sideline more painful discussions, decisions, etc. We may often be unaware of the purposes motivating such 'choices.' Following the earlier discussion of intentional objects, it is not the case that one is aware that she does not want to discuss the painful issues of the relationship and so with aforethought chooses as her intentional object 'that he ordered anchovies' since to do so would be, as we noted, to feign anger about the anchovies. Mary cannot know that her anger about the anchovies is a cover for her anger about the overall state of the relationship, and only remain angry about the anchovies—which is exactly what happens when her date suggests there is more behind her reaction than the anchovies on the pizza.

If we can pay attention (and there may be reasons why we cannot and do not pay attention), we will spot a Pizza Problem and not enter into a huge disquisition on, for example, why we left the window open a quarter of an inch instead of half an inch. It is unlikely that the quarter-inch difference in the gap is the actual cause prompting an angry accusation about our inability to care. But if it serves our purposes, we will become enmeshed in a vitriolic tirade about the gap. We too might be unable or unwilling to face the larger problems which annoyance over the gap is standing in for and so engage wholeheartedly in the argument.

We can't both recognize the existence of a Pizza Problem and genuinely continue to defend ourselves against the attack. If we think the attack to be legitimately about the gap, it must be because we see such an accusation, for example, as further evidence of just how small minded our accuser is; we do not know or cannot know that it is a Pizza Problem. Given our need to avoid admitting to ourselves or one another what the actual cause of the trouble is, we will not see that what we are dealing with is a Pizza Problem. We cannot notice that we have created an intentional object from something ready to hand in order to avoid closer scrutiny of something else, problems with our job for example.

THE WORLD THROUGH THE EYES OF ANOTHER

The ability to 'see' someone's world view allows us to gain knowledge about his emotional life and to understand why he responds as he does. We will be unsurprised by the emotions roused in certain situations, in fact, we should be able to accurately predict how he will respond in those situations. (I will have more to say about this in Chapter Two.) It is sometimes easier for an outsider to see how and why someone experiences a particular emotion in a given situation, than it is for the person experiencing the emotion. Knowing someone well includes knowing the sorts of judgments he will be likely to make, the sorts of beliefs he holds and the kind of knowledge base he is operating from; it is to know something about his surreality.

This sort of information about a world view is precisely what is needed when it comes to understanding the people around us as well as people from other cultures. We will be perplexed by the emotional life of others so long as we find it impossible to understand their world view. In "Emotions and Anthropology," Solomon draws our attention to the ethnographic study of the Utkuhikhalingmiut ('Utku') Inuit by Jean Briggs, in which she claims that anger is rarely experienced by the Utku, and when it is, it is most often children who experience it.²⁸ In order for us to understand how this is possible, Solomon argues, it is necessary for us to gain insight into their world view. It is because of their particular world view that they do not often experience anger. Theirs is a world view very different from ours.

In our society, the encouraged attitude, and consequently our behavior, is to fight, even for a lost cause, to take up or assign responsibility with moral enthusiasm. We are very judgmental and quick to blame. But the Utku find this idea 'strange', to say the least; in fact, they think

²⁸ Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions and Anthropology," *Inquiry*, p. 182.

it 'childish'. One accepts with equanimity.²⁹

As was noted previously, anger on Solomon's view includes the judgment 'I have been wronged.' Responsibility or blame is assigned and retribution is often sought. For the Utku, this kind of blame does not exist. Their lives are filled with constant hardship, so they do not expect things to be easy. Nor do they believe that someone or something is responsible for the hardships they experience such that they or it should be blamed. While they may be frustrated, they do not try to place blame, hence they are rarely angry. As a result, there is very little aggression or violence in their dealings with one another. For the Utku, it is a sign of maturity not to be angry. To be mature is to have achieved '*ihuma*.' "[I]*huma* is not merely 'control'; it is a certain 'rational' view of the world, one which is best summarized as 'equanimity under trying circumstances.'"³⁰ Normal adults who do express anger may be shunned by the community, as was Briggs herself at one point during her stay.³¹ This serves two ends: first, someone expressing anger is seen as unpredictable and perhaps dangerous, so their removal makes others feel safe. Secondly, since the community is the only source of one's physical and psychological support, isolation is, at best unpleasant, at worst deadly. Thus, one may quickly learn to have the 'correct' world view under such conditions, as did Briggs.

Notice, it is not that the Utku often feel anger but do not express it; they are not simply controlling their behavior, although this also occurs. They do not often experience anger. Something we would find very provoking would be met with sangfroid by the Utku. Once we understand their world view, the fact that they do not respond as we would to certain situations, i.e., with anger, makes sense to us. It is because of their approach to

²⁹ Ibid., p. 194.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 192.

³¹ Jean L. Briggs, Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 285.

the world, their conceptions of maturity, responsibility, blame, etc., that they do not often experience anger. Different world views make for different emotional experiences. Ronald de Sousa argues convincingly that different outlooks, within and between cultures, make the difference in what people enjoy laughing about.³² The society or culture in which one lives necessarily impacts on how one comes to conceptualize the world. From Briggs's study of the Utku we can see how there may well be cultural deviations not just in the overt expression of emotions—the behavior—but in whether or not a given emotion is experienced at all. The Japanese emotion of *amae* is another instance of the existence of an emotion particular to a given culture. *Amae* is an experience that is not well described by any phrase in Indo-European language,³³ let alone fully experienced by someone who was not brought up in that environment. According to Rom Harré, it is a sort of 'sweet dependence', experienced by 'playing baby.'³⁴

The culture one is raised in necessarily plays a role in one's surreality. Cultural variations in the interpretation or portrayal to oneself of situations, objects and events will exist and knowledge of the norms and mores of a given culture will help one to understand and perhaps predict how an individual from that culture will respond. Such knowledge can help to explain seemingly odd emotions or reactions given a particular situation, object or event or a seemingly odd lack of emotion. Even within a dominant culture, one can find marginalized milieux, street gangs, for example, where the rules of the game differ. More will be said about the interplay between culture and emotion in Chapter Three.

³² Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge: The MIT Press, [1987] 1990), Chapter 11.

³³ H. Morsbach and W. J. Tyler, "A Japanese Emotion: *Amae*," in The Social Construction of Emotions, edited by Rom Harré (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986), p. 289.

³⁴ Rom Harré, "An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint," in The Social Construction of Emotions, ed. Harré, p. 10.

WILLIAM LYONS: AN EVALUATIVE THEORY OF EMOTION

William Lyons thinks the reason we experience a given emotion is because each of us operates from a particular evaluative system. The system gives rise to an evaluation in response to a situation, object or event, and so an emotion is experienced. He contends that emotions always have an evaluative component. Lyons's view is similar to Solomon's analysis and his claim that our world view, our surreality, is the basis of our judgments and thus our emotions. If I am operating from such an evaluative system, it should be possible for me to find the cause of my emotion, my joy for example. There may well be something, perhaps something external to myself, that I have evaluated as good for me, and so I now have the experience of joy. But how does one come to make such an evaluation? One factor affecting the evaluative system that is in place, for example, is one's own personal and emotional history as will be demonstrated in Chapter Two. For now, we need only note that if one's personal emotional history plays a crucial role in how one comes to form evaluations, that history will thereby be central to all our emotions.

Lyons holds what he calls a 'causal-evaluative theory of emotion.' That is, in order for an emotion to occur it is necessary that a subject first evaluate a situation, object or event. Contrary to Solomon, Lyons thinks there are various components to an emotion. On his account, in order for any emotion to exist, some other component(s) must be present, along with an evaluation. Not all emotions exhibit every component, but Lyons stipulates that those which do are paradigmatic exemplars. He adopts the strategy of discussing paradigm cases, thereby allowing him to analyze all the components that could possibly be present in an emotion. This strategy also allows him to discuss how non-paradigmatic cases of emotion are instances of emotion nonetheless, though they differ from the paradigm case.

In the paradigm case, the components,
include the person's beliefs about his or her
present situation, ... which are the basis for an

evaluation ... This evaluation in turn causes the wants or desires which lead to behaviour, while the evaluations and wants together cause abnormal physiological changes and their subjective registering, feelings.³⁵

It is interesting to take note of the causal chain proposed by Lyons. Beliefs form the basis for an evaluation. The evaluation *causes* desires which in turn *lead* to behavior. The evaluation plus the desires *cause* the physiological changes or the feelings an emotion has. It is clear from this why his view is appropriately called a causal-evaluative theory of emotions.

I said above that the evaluation must be a certain kind of evaluation in order for it to cause an emotion, so we need to be clear about what the kinds of evaluations we are referring to. We make factual evaluations all the time, e.g., that the chocolate dessert in front of me is a large portion. How is it possible for such a factual evaluation to lead to an emotional state—a state of extreme joy, for example? It isn't the factual evaluation that gives rise to joy, although it plays a role, but rather my evaluation that such a lavish amount of a chocolate dessert is a very good thing. Given the same factual evaluation, I could have had a completely different emotional response. (I might be very dismayed because I want dessert but detest chocolate.)

Lyons is appealing to a distinction used very often in the psychological literature,³⁶ that evaluations are positive or negative; something is evaluated as pleasant/good for me or unpleasant/bad for me and it is these sorts of evaluations that give rise to emotions. Following Lyons's causal chain: I believe there is a very large chocolate dessert in front of me and that, on the whole, chocolate desserts taste very fine; I evaluate fine tasting desserts as good things and this leads to my wanting to eat it and to my doing just that. Such an

³⁵ William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 57.

³⁶ Andrew Ortony, Gerald L. Clore and Allan Collins, The Cognitive Structure of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 6.

evaluation would perhaps also lead to my uttering delighted expostulations about chocolate in general and this chocolate dessert in particular. The evaluation of the dessert as good for me, combined with my desire to consume it, causes joy to well up; the corners of my mouth keep turning up in a grin, I feel suffused with well-being and my fingers itch to grab up the fork and begin.

Here Lyons and Solomon part ways slightly. Solomon is not committed to the existence of a valenced hedonic appraisal as the cause of an emotion, although on his account, one may have such a response. Recall (see page 17), Solomon eschews the idea that emotions are comprised of components. He denies the existence of a subjective/objective split, which, as will be seen below, Lyons needs. For Solomon, we are all 'stuck' in subjectivity, our surreality.

Lyons contends that there are two possible sorts of evaluations. There is an objective evaluation and there is a subjective evaluation, which he calls subjective appraisal. One or the other must be present in order for any emotion to come about. For example, according to Lyons, fear involves an objective evaluation, whereas love is a prime exemplar of an emotion caused by a subjective appraisal. It is his contention that there is greater intersubjective agreement about what is dangerous than about what is loveable and so there is this difference.³⁷ In fact, Lyons claims it is by such evaluations that we can differentiate emotions. Which emotion one has is dependent on the kind of evaluation one makes. One looks to "... the evaluative aspect as the linchpin of the different parts which make up an emotional state, and the differentiator of the different emotions."³⁸ Each emotion exists as that emotion because a particular evaluation or appraisal is made.

He demonstrates, for example, how the difference between fear and excitement is a

³⁷ William Lyons, Emotion, p. 79.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 81.

matter of different evaluations. To experience fear, one must evaluate the situation as 'disagreeably dangerous' and for a situation to be exciting it must be evaluated as 'agreeably dangerous.'³⁹ Lyons is using agreeable/disagreeable as the evaluative knife by which we carve out the appraisal which forms the basis for an emotion. This seems mistaken, since I would argue that we are more likely to disagree about what we think is dangerous, than about what we think it means to claim an experience is disagreeable. While it is the case that there will be some agreement about which things are dangerous, I think, contrary to Lyons, there may be many cases where there will not.⁴⁰

It may be that fear is in fact the result of a subjective appraisal, not an objective evaluation. This correction could help to explain seemingly aberrant cases of fear and perhaps phobias. In these cases the things people feel threatened by are not obviously things to fear. That is, there is no objective agreement that what is feared by the phobic is dangerous. To fear certain things may seem ludicrous to those without the phobia, or at least the phobic's response may seem far too intense, given the object. In some cases merely showing a photographic representation of a phobic's feared object to her induces an emotional response. Following Lyons's view, it must be that the person somehow evaluates the thing as dangerous, threatening, etc., and thus she is afraid. In the case just described, this seems very odd since the phobic is not being confronted with an actual object, only a representation of it.

While Lyons admits that even in the case of fear "... the rating of the perceived situation as dangerous is done with a personal twist. The situation is seen in relation to me

³⁹ Ibid., p. 101.

⁴⁰ Just as I think, again contrary to Lyons, there is more agreement about what sorts of qualities in an individual can be construed as loveable. However, I would still maintain that there is more agreement on what the qualities of a pleasurable experience are than about who is loveable.

...",⁴¹ he upholds the notion that the fine distinction between some emotions results from an appraisal of agreeable/disagreeable. Hence his analysis of admiration and envy results in his claim that the difference between them is that, in the case of envy, "... the envious person evaluates his being inferior ... as displeasing."⁴² For example in the case of envy, one finds his inferiority to Ashkenazy in his ability to play piano (this is Lyons's example), disagreeable. Whereas in the case of admiration, while he recognizes a difference in ability, he does not find the recognition of his own inferiority disagreeable.

We might judge a situation, object or event as dangerous because we have no control over it and we might be harmed. This is disagreeable, and so we are afraid. However, I think which of the many situations we will evaluate as dangerous will depend upon our personal outlook more so than will our concept of what it is that makes an experience disagreeable. Using Lyons's example of a race car driver,⁴³ I would argue that race car drivers do not, for the most part, evaluate driving a car at 220 m.p.h. in the Indianapolis 500 as dangerous. The driver is in control of his vehicle, does not envisage imminent physical harm and so does not find the situation dangerous. Should he start to spin out, he might then evaluate the situation as dangerous, therefore disagreeable and so be afraid. It cannot be, I am arguing, that driving in a fast car race is evaluated by every one as engaging in a dangerous activity. While it may seem to be a very dangerous undertaking to some, to those who engage in it, especially the professionals, it is not evaluated as dangerous; although even they must admit the possibility of something dangerous occurring.

Perhaps this is what gives these sorts of activities the edge that those seeking them

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 60.

⁴² Ibid., p. 83.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 101.

enjoy. They court the possibility of danger and the excitement comes about because they enjoy being able to single-handedly supply the control necessary to keep danger at bay. It is mastery over a potentially dangerous situation they find agreeable, not the experience of danger. If a race car driver were truly seeking to engage in an activity she evaluated as dangerous, she could, for example, begin the race with no brakes. The reason this is an unlikely scenario is, race car drivers, like the rest of us, find danger (when they find it) disagreeable. If a driver were to begin a race with no brakes, I would suggest that it is not because she likes to be in dangerous situations but because she has the belief that her powers of control are such that she will be able to keep herself out of danger. In other words, she would not think the situation dangerous, (although she would probably agree that it is potentially dangerous) and hence would not find driving with no brakes a disagreeable situation (at least unless or until she loses control and envisages personal harm).

This does not mean that people do not find themselves in dangerous situations, but I would argue that once one evaluates a situation as dangerous, one finds it disagreeable. What makes it dangerous is that it is (or appears to be) a threat to life and/or limb. A person either tries to avoid danger, bring the situation under control and so render it harmless, or tough it out, the whole while experiencing the danger as disagreeable i.e., experiencing fear.⁴⁴

I am arguing that which sorts of situations, objects or events one evaluates as safe or dangerous is more up in the air than Lyons supposes; it is subjective. If X is evaluated as dangerous, it is because it is threatening, etc., and I think we would all agree that to undergo a threatening experience is disagreeable. I think it is noticing this which has

⁴⁴ A caveat is necessary: There are moments when we are faced with a dangerous situation, object or event but it all unfolds so rapidly that we don't seem to be afraid or notice that we are afraid until the danger has passed.

induced some philosophers to discuss the subjectivity of emotions as if the subjectivity is due to an agent's appraisal of a situation, object or event as agreeable or disagreeable. It is as though the discussion were akin to a discussion of why some people find the taste of coffee agreeable and others find it disagreeable. This in no way means that finding something agreeable or disagreeable plays no role in the decision to seek, maintain, avoid or discontinue something but it cannot be the primary constituent of an emotion. In fact the appraisal of something as agreeable or disagreeable can only occur once the situation, object or event is first judged to be, to stick with our example, dangerous.

I have maintained there is probably a lot more agreement among us about what it means to say an experience of something is agreeable or disagreeable (keeping in mind that it is what the 'something' *is like* that we will disagree about) since it has to do with, in the case under discussion, lack of comfort and security and control. Lyons argues that there is great intersubjective agreement about what is dangerous,⁴⁵ but I am arguing that there is greater intersubjective agreement about what it means for an experience to be disagreeable, and what one's phenomenological experience in relation to something or other must be like to label it disagreeable. There might be intersubjective agreement about what is meant by describing a situation, object or event as dangerous, e.g., like the possibility of injury or death. However, there is not intersubjective agreement on the evaluation of a particular situation, object or event as dangerous; this evaluation is subjective. People have differing opinions about which situations, objects or events they think are dangerous.

Noticing this can, I think, help to explain why some people engage in certain activities. While it is difficult for me to understand how anyone can see The Cyclone roller coaster at Coney Island as anything other than dangerous, I can understand what others mean when they tell me that for them it is an agreeable experience; they do not think it

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 78, 103.

dangerous. What makes their actions understandable to me is recognizing that they do not judge the roller coaster as dangerous. Were I not to do so, I too would get on and not find the ride disagreeable (so long as I did not revert to my original judgment about roller coasters and begin to think that I was about to be harmed). I know what it is like to feel exhilarated by a situation, object or event but such is never my experience in conjunction with roller coaster rides because I judge such rides as dangerous.

In fact it is very unlikely that I would ever consent to take such a ride since I, like most others, do not enjoy being afraid. I do not willingly seek out situations, objects or events that might bring about such a state—at least not for the sole purpose of experiencing fear. While it is true that people often, as we say, 'court danger,' I do not think this is because people seek out dangerous situations, situations fraught with fear, because they wish to be afraid. They may wish to prove that they can, for example, gaze courageously into the maw of death and return to tell the tale. In such a case, the person is afraid, knows going into the situation that she will experience fear, but conquers or at least controls her fear—which was the point of facing the situation, object or event. Some willingly or unwillingly bravely face what they know to be a dangerous situation, some naively view a dangerous situation as benign while others foolishly believe they won't be harmed and don't feel threatened and so are not afraid.

This may explain, in part, why young people (and some not so young people) often engage in what others think is dangerous behavior. They are not afraid because they do not perceive a threat. To them, the situation is not seen as dangerous so they are not afraid. Perhaps this is because they believe themselves invincible or are unable to imagine a future marred by grief or tragedy, especially grief or tragedy caused by their own action, or lack of action. This is why some adolescents drive too fast, why young men will often assume an aggressive stance in the face of armed assailants and explains, in part, why very young women decide to have babies. It is impossible for them to imagine themselves being

harm or their future compromised, much less their dying, being injured or killed.

If the main criterion for an experience being disagreeable amounts to its being an uncomfortable state, a state one would rather not be in, then there may well be variations in what different people find disagreeable. For example, in a case of the 'disagreeably dangerous,' what is disagreeable is one's lack of control over the situation, object or event, plus a threat of harm. If one were to judge a situation, object or event, as dangerous and could not avoid the situation, object or event, she would then undergo a disagreeable experience. But finding the experience disagreeable is parasitic on first judging the situation, object or event to be dangerous. If the situation, object or event were not first judged to be dangerous, it would not threaten lack of control and/or harm, and in fact it is possible that one would then be totally indifferent to it.

It is also possible for someone to have a disagreeable experience but as the result of something other than experiencing fear. If we judge a situation, object or event as, for example, lacking, then we are disappointed, not afraid. This could happen if, for example, one were a connoisseur of roller coasters and found the Coney Island ride a bore. What remains constant is that these situations are disagreeable and what makes them distinct from one another, and different for different individuals is the judgment of a situation, object or event as dangerous, lacking, a loss, unfair, unflattering, grotesque, etc. It is the judgment that gives rise to an emotion, not the appraisal of agreeable or disagreeable. If I judge a situation, object or event as dangerous, I am afraid; if a loss to me I am sad, etc. It is not the valenced appraisal of something as agreeable or disagreeable which accounts for the occurrence of an emotion but rather the judgment of something as creepy, disgraceful, a wonder to behold, a worthwhile accomplishment, etc. The valenced appraisal follows the initial judgment. If I judge a situation, object or event as creepy, the experience of being exposed to it is disagreeable. It is because I find it creepy that exposure to it is disagreeable to me. What I find creepy, the way a centipede scuttles out of sight in an instant, for

example, someone else might find intriguing.

In this regard I think Solomon's view offers a clearer analysis of this process. I have argued that Lyons is mistaken in thinking that an hedonic evaluation determines which emotion is experienced. There must be a judgment which precedes such an evaluation and in the arena of emotion, the judgment is always relative to the judge. Thus fear is no less subjective than love. One's judgment about a situation, object or event is always relative to oneself, thus necessarily subjective. It is the result of an individual's surreality which in turn becomes part of one's surreality, like my judgment that roller coasters are dangerous. It is my judgment which accounts for whether a situation, object or event is agreeable or disagreeable and furthermore, the difference in judgments that accounts for the difference in the emotion experienced.

ROBERT GORDON: KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND EMOTION

Robert Gordon has noticed an interesting feature of emotions. Some emotions appear to require that one have knowledge about something in order for them to occur while in other cases it appears that knowledge must be precluded in order for the emotion to occur. The former he refers to as factive emotions, the latter, epistemic. It turns out, on this analysis, that the majority of emotions are factive and only a few are epistemic, notably fear.

Gordon's claim is, in order for someone to, for example, fear that p, it must be that she is uncertain that p. If she knows that p, she cannot be afraid that p, although she may still be able to find something about the fact that p that remains frightening because unknown to her. For example, I might be afraid a burglar has broken into my trailer because I heard a noise. Upon checking, I am confronted by the burglar. I can no longer be afraid that a burglar has broken in because there is no doubt that one has. Still, I might be afraid that he may hurt me and if he does attack me, I might remain afraid that he might

permanently damage me, or kill me, etc.

In the case of factive emotions, anger for example, I must know that *p* in order to be angry that *p*. Strictly speaking, I cannot be angry *that p* if it is *not the case that p*. In order to demonstrate this, Gordon develops a Gettier-like example depicting a fellow, John, who is inadvertently given back a watch at the repair shop which is not his, although it is the same type of watch as his. His watch, now gracing the wrist of another, was not fixed properly and is running slow. The watch John was mistakenly given works perfectly but he sets it incorrectly. He looks at the watch and is angry that his watch is losing time.⁴⁶

Obviously John can't be angry that his watch is slow because, first and foremost, the watch on his wrist is not his. Since it is not actually his watch, what he knows about the watch on his wrist is not information about *his* watch. Secondly, if anger requires knowing that *p*, John fails to meet the requirement because he does not know that *his* watch, which is elsewhere, is in fact, losing time. Even though his watch is running slow, he doesn't know that it is because he does not know that it is elsewhere. Finally, the watch he is looking at is improperly set; it is not the case that the watch he is looking at is losing time. Noticing that he made an error when setting the watch in his possession won't help. Even if he were to notice his mistake, he could not be happy that *his* watch had been properly fixed. Happiness is also factive and so the initial problem arises--it is not his watch so he does not know that *his* watch is keeping time well.

While it seems right to claim that no one can be angry *that p* if it is *not the case that p*, what are we to say about the state John is in? Do we conclude that he is not angry? Such a conclusion seems, on the face of it, implausible. He believes the watch on his arm is losing time but this belief is false--he didn't set the watch correctly. He also believes,

⁴⁶ Robert M. Gordon, The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 41.

falsely, that the watch on his wrist is his watch. If John cannot be angry that his watch is losing time, what is he angry about, if he is angry? Gordon gives hints about how we can account for this, hints which point us back in the direction of Solomon.

where the context makes it clear that we are introducing the reader into the "notional world" of a person S, one may speak as if whatever S confidently believes to be true S knew to be true.⁴⁷

John confidently and sincerely believes his watch is losing time, so from his point of view it is as if he knows that it is and hence he is angry. Objectively he is wrong, it is not his watch nor is it losing time. Subjectively, his 'notional world,' which I take to be something like what Solomon means by his 'surreality,' is such that the state of 'his' watch angers him.

Undoubtedly we often experience emotions which are factive under the proper conditions. That is, we actually do know something is the case and so are, for example, happy. However, we often find ourselves (or others) experiencing an emotion because we (they) merely believe something to be the case. Since, objectively, it turns out to be a case of belief, we behave, in our notional world, as if we know something to be the case. This helps to explain the strength of conviction and/or response people often exhibit in this sort of circumstance. People who are unaware that they only strongly believe that p, will behave as if they know that p. If someone is convinced that p, they act as if p is true, as if they know that p. If it is not the case that p but they are unaware of this, they will still behave as if they know that p. For example, if I am told by the government that my daughter was killed in Bosnia, and I have no good reason to think the government is not telling the truth, I am sad and grieve for my daughter. If I am informed that there was a mistake made when the body was identified and it was not my daughter, I am immediately no longer sad. Still, before I am told about the misidentification, I am sad that p, because I

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

think that *p* is true; I act as though I know that *p*. It turns out that I did not know that *p*, since it is not the case that *p* but while I believed it, and wished with all my heart it was not true, I was sad.

I think Gordon misses the more crucial role facticity plays in emotion. Rather than focussing on how knowledge is necessary for certain emotions to exist, (a claim he must immediately back away from in order to explain how it is that John is angry in the watch case, undercutting his claim that most emotions are factive) we should focus on how facticity works to limit the existence of certain emotions. It seems to me that the role facticity plays is one of making it impossible either for certain emotions to come into being, or for one to continue to experience a certain emotion. Clearly in cases where someone finds out that what she thought to be the case is not the case, she no longer has the emotion. She can no longer believe that *p*; she knows that not *p*. For the emotions Gordon lists as factive,⁴⁸ if I know it is not the case that *p* I cannot experience those emotions. I cannot continue to be sad that my daughter is dead once I find out about the misidentification of the body. As soon as I find out that the body is not that of my daughter, my sadness over her death disappears. John's anger about the watch on his wrist losing time will disappear as soon as he finds out he has set it incorrectly. However, if I do not know that my daughter is alive and have been told by reliable sources that she is dead, I will behave as if I know she is dead, i.e., I believe that she is and I am sad. So long as John has no reason not to believe that the watch on his wrist is running slow (let alone no reason to believe the watch on his wrist is not his own) he will be angry that it is.

Knowledge of some fact or other very often plays a role in determining whether an emotion exists or not. Contrary to Solomon however, Gordon does not think the existence of an emotion is dependent on a judgment. Once one knows something to be the case there

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 32.

is no further judgment to be made, "[f]or 'knows' is not a judgmental predicate."⁴⁹ What one does have, in addition to what one knows, is a favorable or unfavorable attitude about a fact or an uncertainty. Such an attitude leads to the existence of either a positive or negative emotion. Gordon is wary about using the concept of pleasant/unpleasant to explicate the idea of a favorable or unfavorable attitude. He reasons that it is possible for someone to find anger pleasant even though it is typically thought of as a negative emotion. In order to avoid this sort of trouble yet remain able to explain why some emotions are positive and others are negative, he makes use of the notion of wish-satisfaction and wish-frustration.

Positive emotions involve a wish-satisfaction; negative emotions involve a wish-frustration. This guarantees that regardless of someone finding anger pleasant, it remains a negative emotion because in order for anger to occur, a wish has to be or to have been frustrated.⁵⁰ In order for someone to be angry that *p*, she must, among other things, wish it were not the case that *p*. It is, in part, because her wish that *p* is frustrated that she is angry. The same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for wish-satisfaction. For example, if I know that John stole my car and I wish that he had not taken it or wish that I still had it, I am angry that John stole my car.

While Gordon is correct in noting that there is no judgment to be made about a matter of fact, i.e., *p* either is or is not the case, I would argue that a judgment does need to be made about a matter of fact or about my uncertainty if an emotion is to exist; wish-satisfaction or frustration alone won't do all the work Gordon claims. Something must give rise to the satisfaction or frustration, whether I know that *p* or am uncertain that *p*. There must be a reason for the satisfaction or frustration of my wish. That is, I can know

⁴⁹ Robert M. Gordon, "Judgmental Emotions," *Analysis* vol. 34, no. 2 (December, 1973), p. 45.

⁵⁰ Robert M. Gordon, *The Structure of Emotions*, pp. 29-31.

that something is the case, for example, that there is a dead body in front of me, and wish it were not there, but it is the way I judge the fact that a dead body is present that determines which emotion I will experience. It is possible that completely different judgments all result in my wishing the body were not there. Which emotion I will experience depends on what sort of judgment I make, not on my wish. Notice, this is the same criticism which Lyons was subject to. Before we can make an appraisal that something is satisfying or frustrating, agreeable or disagreeable, there must be something that we so appraise; a judgment is necessary.

If I judge viewing dead bodies as grotesque, I will experience revulsion and/or perhaps regret at the fact that I walked into this particular room containing a dead body. If the dead body is that of a friend, I will judge its presence as indicative of a serious loss to me and experience grief. If the body keeps resisting my efforts to hide it, I might judge its presence as an indication that I am good at killing people, which makes me happy, but a miserable failure at getting rid of the evidence of my crime and so embarrassment or at least frustration tempers my happiness.

We get the same result if I am uncertain about whether or not the body in front of me is dead. I don't know for a fact that it is, and so I am afraid. It is my judgment of the situation that gives rise to my fear. For example, it might mean I hit him hard enough to kill him and so if I am caught I may be punished. On the whole, I judge jail to be a dangerous place to be sent and so fear I may ultimately wind up there. There must be a reason why the presence of a dead body is disagreeable or frustrates a wish of mine. Such a reason can only be my judgment either of what I know to be the case or of something I am uncertain about.

First I make a judgment, then what might remain is what Gordon refers to as attitude, or Lyons as a subjective appraisal. I see the dead body, recognize it as that of a dear friend, judge that I have now suffered a loss and am sad. I wish it were not the case

that my friend is dead, but my wish is as it is because I have lost someone I care for. It is the loss that makes the experience disagreeable. Had the circumstances been different, as in the scenarios above, the judgments leading to my having certain wishes or finding a situation agreeable or disagreeable would have been different. It is the judgment which makes the crucial difference in which emotion comes into being.

Does my knowing some fact or other inevitably lead to an emotional experience occurring? Imagine the reaction I might have upon walking into a room to find a potted plant upturned, dirt strewn across the floor. It was wind billowing the curtain which knocked the plant over, causing dirt to be hurled across the floor. It would be wrong for me to be angry with the cat for knocking over the plant; she didn't do it. Since it was the wind blown curtain that knocked it over, should I be angry with the wind? Perhaps I can only be angry about the fact that there is dirt on the floor, or at myself for leaving the window wide open, inviting such gusts. I don't think it makes sense for me to be angry at the wind.

The wind whipped the curtain, which knocked over the plant, but is it only the truth about what happened that ultimately affects the emotion I experience? If I am in a certain frame of mind to begin with, I might be disposed to laugh about the situation and cheerfully clean up, regardless of how the dirt got there. Alternatively, if I've had a very trying evening and am not feeling the least bit cheerful, I might experience anger since I see this as further proof of the endless variety of cruel jokes life can play on me. Perhaps I am in a particularly vile mood and feel inordinately irked by the cat, although she was blameless in the dirt debacle. Even though there is a fact of the matter there is no one 'correct' emotion one ought to experience in response to such a situation; there is no one correct way to respond emotionally to any situation. Indeed, one may fail to experience any emotion. This is so whether I know the fact of the matter or not.

Such is not the case with the situation itself. It either occurred in a certain way or it

did not. One can be correct or incorrect, as I was incorrect in thinking that Chinook knocked over the plant. Lighting the house on fire out of anger over the dirt on the floor would be going overboard, but what makes it wrong? If it is wrong, its being wrong must have to do with the action of burning down the house and the consequences of doing so relative to one's reasons for doing it. In this case, it would be unreasonable or wrong because presumably all I am angered over is dirt on the floor, a relatively benign state of affairs. A case can be made for a situation occurring in which one could successfully support the decision to set one's house alight, given the right circumstances, e.g., anger over the impending use of my house by the enemy to engage in strategic artillery staging.

This leads to some interesting questions about the emotions people experience as a result of their concocting situations that do not obtain; they need to shift the focus; their historical background is such that they fabricate situations in order to respond in an habitual fashion saving them from a more painful experience; perhaps it is simply impossible to believe that what seems to be occurring actually is. The level of self-deception can be staggering to an outside observer. Individuals wrap themselves in false beliefs and inferences in order to manage, psychologically and often times emotionally, the situation, object or event confronting them.

PATRICIA GREENSPAN: INTUITION AND EMOTION

The judgmentalist's claim is that our judgments, and so our emotions are based on beliefs or knowledge about a situation, object or event. Patricia Greenspan claims that while the judgmentalist view does offer a correct analysis of the emotions, it "... does not do justice to the diversity of emotional phenomena."⁵¹ Greenspan argues that to insist upon the existence of a full blown epistemic state, i.e., belief or knowledge as integral to

⁵¹ Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons: an Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 3.

the ability to make a judgment leaves out, or at least unexplained, cases that one would want to include.

In order to demonstrate her claim she uses the example of a person being suspicious about a salesman. There is something ineffable about the manner of the salesman which puts her on edge. She is suspicious of him because he makes her uncomfortable, though she can't formulate a definite idea of why he makes her uncomfortable. While she is not really afraid of him, she can be said to fear him insofar as she suspects that he can harm her somehow, perhaps only financially. There is nothing she can point to as that which she believes indicates that he will harm her, she just has the feeling that he might.

My 'intuitive' suspicion may be *warranted* however, even though I do not take it to be and even though the corresponding belief would not be, under the circumstances.⁵²

Greenspan thinks we might often find ourselves responding emotionally to a situation, object or event even though we fall short of having a belief which leads to a judgment of the situation, object or event. On her view, "[e]motion may be thought of as strengthening a weaker judgment motivationally, ...".⁵³ I think she is on to something here. There are times when we are bothered (or enthralled) by something about someone, although we can't quite put our finger on what it is about them that we are disturbed (enchanted) by. We can then account for situations, objects or events where someone is feeling comfort or discomfort without being able to say exactly how they have come to judge the situation, object or event as, for example, dangerous. Even without holding a belief or having knowledge, we are motivated to maintain the status quo, to try to change things or to try to be vigilant. With greater exposure, giving us the opportunity to gather more information, we can come to find out that we were warranted in thinking we needed to be careful

⁵² Ibid., p. 6.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 80.

(carefree) in their company. We then have distinct beliefs about the individual whereas previously we had only suspicions or premonitions. I think Greenspan's insight here is a useful (minor) revision to the judgmentalist position.

FEELINGS DO COUNT

Solomon claims that feelings, although perhaps always present, play no essential role in a state being an emotion. The feeling an emotion has contributes nothing.

it is so important to insist not only that an emotion is not identical to a feeling but that a feeling is not even a component of emotion ... the feelings are at most an accompaniment to the anger, like the excitable fans following an athletic team.⁵⁴

Solomon is anxious to take care of some problems which occur if one identifies emotions with feelings but I fear in so doing he loses something. If I am angry 'that John stole my car', I am worked up, *feel* angry, and no doubt am engaging in behavior that would clue an outsider into which emotion I am experiencing. There is an increase in my blood pressure, heart rate, etc., which I can feel happening.

Suddenly, John drives up and I see that the car looks like my car, but is not mine. Immediately I realize that John did not steal my car, and so I cannot be angry that he did. But there are feelings which linger. My heart rate is still increased and my perturbation does not disappear as soon as I find out that John did not steal my car. Thus, Solomon points out, the feelings cannot be identified with the anger since they remain after the anger is gone.⁵⁵ If feelings are an integral part of the anger, then anger must still exist since the feelings remain.

It takes more time for the body to respond to a newly apprehended state of affairs.

⁵⁴ Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 118.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 119.

My epistemic state changes as soon as I apprehend that the car John drives up in is not mine. I know immediately that he did not steal my car. However, my bodily state does not change so rapidly. The physiological return to calm doesn't occur instantaneously. There is some lag time during which feelings associated with the anger remain. We would want to say that I now no longer have any reason to be angry, or at least I cannot be angry that John stole my car. I am merely still keyed up after my recent brush with anger but am angry no longer.

I think there is no doubt that the existence of such lingering feelings often causes people to continue to be angry after the original source of anger no longer obtains. In other words, they find a way to continue their anger. It's not that they simply feel as if they are angry and are mistaking their feelings for anger, they actually are angry. In order for this to occur there is a shift to another situation, object or event, as the object of the anger, perhaps a 'deserving' one, although not always. Since an emotion needs an object in order to exist, a new vehicle to carry the anger must be sought if the original one no longer exists. The reason for a situation, object or event no longer being a candidate for anger can vary. For example, I might be mistaken about the object of my anger because such an object does not exist, as is the case with my thinking that John stole my car. If I am made aware of my mistake, it may seem as if the anger doesn't just disappear immediately; I still feel out of sorts. According to Solomon, however, all that remains is some sort of physiological upset, not anger. Without the judgment that I have been wronged, I cannot be angry no matter what my physiological state. I had judged myself wronged by John but the judgment turned out to be baseless since I can see that John did not steal my car. Thus, according to Solomon, whatever I am still feeling is not anger, but rather only some agitation left over from when I was angry about John stealing my car. I think this example shows very clearly that not everything which feels like the upset associated with an emotion is an instance of an emotion. There must be more present than physiological upset for an

emotion to exist, i.e., some cognitive element needs to be present, even if it is only a suspicion. However, I don't think this shows that feeling is not integral to emotion, merely that it is not enough.

When a situation like the one described above occurs, if I am not careful, I might fall into a situation similar to the Pizza Problem; my focus will shift. I argued that in the case of a Pizza Problem, the shift occurs to prevent one's focussing on a different problem. In this case, it is as if the remaining physiological feelings need a reason for being and so a new target is found. It is like the Pizza Problem particularly if the new focus for the anger is an object that doesn't 'deserve' to be one. Recall that with the Pizza Problem, the target of one's emotion was purposely a safe one--the cap left off the toothpaste rather than the sorry state of the marriage, for example--and in the case of lingering feelings being transferred, the new object may indeed be innocent in the same way. It's not necessarily the person who left the toothpaste cap off, the new situation, object or event to which the feelings have been transferred, that is the cause of one's anger. It can be especially vexing to be the object of such a transfer of anger. As the observer one can see that she is not the source of his anger but rather is being abused simply because the original source has disappeared or perhaps is too threatening to expose one's anger to.

Looking more carefully at Solomon's analogy of the feelings of anger to fans accompanying a football team, one may question whether or not the fans are an integral part of the whole enterprise. Without the fans to support the team, both financially and motivationally, the team would not exist, or at least not in the same way. The fans play a crucial role in getting the team up for a game, sustaining their drive throughout the game. Players of sports often comment on how they couldn't have performed as they did without the support of their fans. It is also true that the fans may well remain very excited even after the game is over. At first blush the fans might seem extraneous to a team and by analogy, the feelings to emotions. However, there is room to claim that the fans excite the

team, 'pump it up', give it an energy it would otherwise be lacking. The same is true for the feelings that go along with emotions. Without the feelings I think one would have a rather flat judgment, one with no verve. The problem that Robinson and others have raised, i.e., that it is impossible to differentiate the judgments of emotion from dispassionate judgments or such judgments as, the chair is five feet from the window, could be challenged further with the inclusion of feeling. I realize we may be left with some troublesome problems, such as explaining the existence of feelings which remain after the resolution of an emotion, or the existence of an emotion with little or no feeling. Yet to totally discard feelings and their role in emotion impoverishes any conception of emotion.

Lyons thinks feelings are an integral component of emotion, in fact he claims the presence of some kind of feeling is necessary in order for a state to be an emotional state.

X is to be deemed an emotional state if and only if it is a physiologically abnormal state caused by the subject of that state's evaluation of his or her situation. The causal order is important, emotion is a psychosomatic state, a bodily state caused by an attitude, in this case an evaluative attitude.⁵⁶

Evaluations and physiological 'upset' are central to all emotions according to Lyons. This is not to say that the particular feelings present dictate the presence of a particular emotion, nor is an emotion necessarily present just because one has certain feelings. Lyons recognizes the centrality of feelings to emotions while taking care to point out that one cannot use them to distinguish among emotions, nor imply that if present some emotion or other must be present. Imagine that I have all the same feelings present that would be present were I afraid but my physiological condition is the result of some drug I took. If there is no evaluation or judgment, there is no emotion, only some sort of physiological

⁵⁶ William Lyons, Emotion, p. 57.

upset.⁵⁷ Alternatively, a conception of emotions which does not include feelings is impoverished. I think in this regard Solomon's view could benefit from Lyons's insight. I am in agreement with Lyons here, feelings cannot be left out; they are constituents of emotion. While I think Solomon is right in claiming emotions are judgments, he is wrong to leave out feelings. Emotions are affective judgments. Without the feelings, one cannot separate the judgments of emotion from other kinds of judgment and clearly they are different in just this respect. In Chapters Three and Four I will deal more extensively with the ways in which affectivity contributes to the roles emotion plays in our lives.

CONCLUSION

We sometimes find ourselves thinking that an individual's emotional response is unreasonable (it is harder to do this for one's own emotions). We may say their response is unreasonable because they are wrong about the object of their emotion, perhaps what made them happy did not occur, for example. We may claim they are being unreasonable because they refuse to consider any evidence that might change their response or they don't seem to have the sort of evidence we think necessary to justify their experiencing a particular emotion. It may be that, given the object of their emotion, they've gone too far (as often happens with the Pizza Problem), the circumstances don't seem to us to warrant such a response. If, however, their emotional history or surreality is of a certain kind, perhaps they cannot respond other than as they do. Thus, from their perspective, the emotion seems entirely reasonable. Also, it is possible that although it seems to us there is no evidence for what they are seemingly reacting to, it may be that they have 'picked up' something that we have not and have formed a judgment, thus they are experiencing some

⁵⁷ See Stanley Schachter, "The Assumption of Identity and Peripheralist-Centralist Controversies in Motivation and Emotion," in Loyola Symposium on Feelings and Emotions, edited by M. B. Arnold (New York: Academic Press, 1970).

emotion or other. The conception one has of the world depends on one's perspective and perspectives are haunted by conceptions.

As we will see, particularly in the next chapter, one's perspective, is in large part the result of one's history. The kind of experiences we are subject to early in life, the culture we are raised in, the sorts of memories we have, veridical or not, all play a crucial role in our making the judgments we do and thus experiencing the emotions we do.

CHAPTER TWO

EMOTION AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE USE OF EMOTION IN EXPLANATION AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE ORIGINS OF EMOTION

PUTTING THE EMOTION BACK INTO BELIEF/DESIRE PSYCHOLOGY

We often find ourselves trying to explain or predict someone's actions. At other times it is our own actions we wish to explain, either to ourselves or to someone else. Such explanations and predictions occur regularly. We can predict mundane things such as, the person standing casually in front of the subway train doors, blocking the egress of riders, will not move when the doors open. Frequent riders of the subway are well acquainted with the stubborn immobility of those who stand in front of the doors. One can account for such behavior variously, e.g., they fear moving will cost them their position; they are getting off the train soon; it doesn't occur to them that they are in the way. In more serious cases, we can try to explain and/or predict such things as, the actions of people engaged in the practice of committing suicide with explosives, intending to undermine the Middle East Peace Accord. It is generally valuable to have some idea of how others might behave and to be able to explain why they act as they do. The ability to make predictions and provide explanations can help us to figure out what we need to do. We must, for example, be prepared to nudge past a door-blocker and upon noticing his scowl, refrain from calling attention to his uncooperative behavior. Perhaps successful prediction or explanation can even enable us to limit or ameliorate the effect of fanatical suicide bombers. We usually speak in terms of an individual's (including our own) beliefs and desires when offering such explanations and/or predictions

It is interesting to note that philosophical discussions of intentionality are often limited to analyses of belief and desire. I will argue that this leaves a crucial component out of the discussion, viz., emotion. If emotions are not identical to beliefs or desires, and I

think they are not, then they ought to be included, as an additional essential component, in our analysis of how we are able to arrive at such explanations and/or predictions. Indeed, in everyday life we often appeal to the existence of some emotion or other in order to explain why someone is behaving as she is, or as forming the basis for a prediction of how she will behave. If what is known as belief/desire psychology is merely a shorthand way of referring to an intentional psychology which would include emotion, as I think it is meant to, no complaints can be raised against such shorthand referencing. However, one can fault elaborations on the subject that do not extend to and cover emotion or whose description of the intentional is independent of the emotions.

Since emotions are intentional states, what applies, *qua* intentional, to beliefs and desires, ought to apply to emotions as well. Where we make use of beliefs and desires to explain or predict the actions of others, we should also make use, explicitly, of emotions. If, for example, we want to answer the question, "Why did Terry shoot the dart at his younger sister, Shelly?", it would not be out of place for us to do so thus: "Children are impulsive and he was angry with her for taunting him, then running away laughing". We could talk about Terry's beliefs that the dart would hurt her thus satisfying his desire for revenge. We might also discuss how he believes (rightly or wrongly) that retribution would be achieved by shooting the dart, hitting Shelly, causing her pain, and so he desires to fire the dart gun. Still, we might think this leaves the question of why he wanted such revenge and retribution unanswered. A reasonable answer to this question, one which explains his action simply is, he was angry with her. Terry judged Shelly to have wronged him by her taunts, laughter and retreat and thus he believed himself entitled to retribution and so desired it.

A clear and concise explanation for why Terry shot at Shelly with the dart gun can be given by describing his emotional state. We could also include some of the beliefs and desires to help to explain his coming to experience anger. To offer Terry's emotional state

as an explanation for why he did what he did to Shelly seems to be a good explanation for his action. In fact, if we were present and saw Terry beginning to show signs of anger towards Shelly, we would no doubt predict that if she did not watch herself, she would be likely to suffer some sort of retribution. If we saw him fooling around with the dart gun just as she began to taunt him, we might even predict that he would use the gun as the handiest means of meting out his retribution, especially if we saw her backing away laughing and preparing to run up the stairs quickly, retreating out of his reach. We might then desire further explanation about why he became angry rather than sad, for example, or why he shot at Shelly instead of crying and stomping his feet. However, a shorter story can told by describing his emotional state, which in turn can be used to explain and/or predict his actions.

Such lashing out is easily explained by utilizing emotions and seems especially appropriate in the case of children who are less likely to temper their impulses to act. I think this same analysis applies to the explanations of the actions of adults and in cases where the person is not acting impulsively. For example, we can utilize emotion to explain why elderly people often engage strangers in conversations in grocery stores. In many instances, such people experience loneliness and a sense of isolation and so are willing to converse, sometimes at length, with people they do not know. Given that engaging strangers in conversation is a little out of the ordinary, one might want to try to explain this phenomenon. What is the cause of their action? It is possible of course that their desire for contact could have an alternative source, say the desire to obtain help with something shelved out of reach. However, if we are going to consider the possibilities, one ought not to overlook emotion as a possible explanation.

A philosopher who has concerned himself greatly with our ability to explain and/or predict the actions of others is Daniel C. Dennett. He notes that,

We use folk psychology--interpretation of each

other as believers, wanters, intenders, and the like—to predict what people will do next. ... our power to interpret the actions of others depends on our power—seldom explicitly exercised—to predict them.¹

Our ability to interpret, explain or predict the actions of others is of great value to us. It allows us to interact successfully with each other or, for example, to remove ourselves from a potentially harmful, embarrassing, costly, etc., situation. We are able to make split-second decisions about what to do or how to act by 'reading off' the intentions of those around us. We are not always correct in our assessment of another's intentions. Occasionally our predictions based on them fail, sometimes to our great surprise and delight, at other times to our deep regret.

Dennett puts forth the view that what allows us to explain or predict successfully the actions of others is something he calls the intentional stance. In "Intentional Systems," he argues that when dealing with very complex systems, complex in terms of the design and/or physical instantiation, we can adopt the intentional stance in order to explain or predict the system's behavior.² We can explain or predict the behavior of a complex system if we "... treat it as if it had beliefs and desires and was rational"³

He argues that one is warranted in adopting the intentional stance when a physical or design stance would be impossible because of the complexity of the system. Such is the case for sophisticated chess-playing computers, human and non-human animals and possibly even aliens.⁴ I would want to add that at least in the case of humans and in a more

¹ Daniel C. Dennett, "Real Patterns," The Journal of Philosophy vol. 88, no. 1 (January, 1991), p. 29.

² Daniel C. Dennett, "Intentional Systems," The Journal of Philosophy vol. 68, no. 4 (February, 1971), p. 89.

³ Ibid., p. 92.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 92-93.

limited way animals (I'm not sure what to say about aliens), we would want to press emotions into service, along with beliefs and desires, to help provide such explanations and predictions. Dennett rarely mentions them.

In "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works," Dennett notes,

that while belief is a perfectly objective phenomena (that apparently makes me a realist), it can be discerned only from the point of view of one who adopts a certain *predictive strategy*, and its existence can be confirmed only by an assessment of the success of that strategy (that apparently makes me an interpretationist.)⁵

He claims that we are justified in adopting the intentional stance because it is a good strategy, allowing us to predict and/or explain successfully people's behavior. We are able to predict and/or explain behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, etc. However, we can make use of the idea that beliefs and desires, etc., lie behind behavior only if we have adopted the intentional stance. That is, one can only opine that belief X caused behavior Y when one has already adopted the intentional stance. Beliefs and desires only come alive when viewed through the lens of the intentional stance. The predictive success of the strategy justifies its adoption and in turn, the strategy gives life to beliefs and desires. Dennett is claiming that the ability to discern beliefs and desires is dependent on the role they play in allowing us to predict and/or explain successfully the behavior of others. Beliefs, desires, and I will add, emotions, become salient as a result of the roles they play in allowing us, from our point of view, to explain and/or predict the behaviors of others, or ourselves.

Jerry Fodor has tried to argue that Dennett might just as well go all the way and be a full blown realist, as he claims himself to be. He doesn't see why Dennett doesn't think beliefs, etc., exist apart from the role they play in the explanation and/or prediction of

⁵ Daniel C. Dennett, "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works," in The Nature of Mind, edited by D.M. Rosenthal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 340.

behavior. It seems to me that part of the problem here is that Fodor is grinding another edge of the axe. On his view, things like belief (and I assume joy, etc.) are ultimately represented somehow in mental structures.⁶ I don't think Dennett would be averse to listening to such a long story, (and neither would I) assuming Fodor or some other cognitive psychologist could tell it. Dennett doesn't disagree that this might ultimately be shown to be the case. Nevertheless, it will not annihilate or replace our folk psychological explanations which can only be made, he argues, via the intentional stance.⁷ It is not, I don't think, that Dennett doesn't think beliefs, etc. exist, but rather that we can't demonstrate their existence apart from their use in successful explanations and or predictions.

The other aspect that Fodor takes issue with is Dennett's assumption of rationality. Fodor thinks that general causal principles are what govern our predictions and/or explanations from beliefs to behaviors,⁸ not the assumption that the system whose behaviors we are trying to explain and/or predict is rational. He thinks it is

not postulates of rationality that license
intentional stance predictions: it is ... theories
about who is likely to have which propositional
attitude when, and what behavioral consequences
are likely to ensue.⁹

Still, how are we going to be able to predict what someone will do, that is, 'which behavioral consequences are likely to ensue' unless we have some idea of why someone

⁶ Jerry A. Fodor, "Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes," in Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by Jerry Fodor (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981), p. 120.

⁷ Daniel C. Dennett, "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works," in The Nature of Mind, ed. Rosenthal, p. 348.

⁸ Jerry A. Fodor, "Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes," in Representations, ed. Fodor, p. 111.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

might believe X rather than Y, and why someone might do P instead of Q when they believe X? It might be that we have some theories about this, but it seems to me that this does not rule out postulates of rationality playing some role. Without Dennett's postulate of optimality, i.e., that the design of the system being examined is optimal in terms of function, how am I to know, for example, what the best case scenario is? If I don't know that, how could I know that the instance confronting me is less than optimal?

In "Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes," Fodor claims not to be just quibbling with Dennett over the assumption of rationality.¹⁰ I think in fact he is quibbling, just a bit. The assumption of rationality is essential to the intentional stance. We must assume that the system we are interested in dealing with is rational. We need to include the assumption of rationality for ease in the explanation and/or prediction of the behavior of people (animals, chess-playing computers or aliens). Without it, we can't get our explanations and/or predictions off the ground because we have nothing with which to guide our explanations and/or predictions. Without a baseline assumption of rationality, we could never make any accurate predictions because we could not trust people, for example, not to always or even often "... do something utterly stupid, ...".¹¹

For Dennett, rationality is closely tied to a notion of optimal functioning. Thus, the notion can be applied with great generality. It covers very simple systems like clams which refuse to open in the presence of danger,¹² or it can be applied to more complex systems. In the case of computers, one can speak of optimal design relative to a goal¹³ while for

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 106.

¹¹ Daniel C. Dennett, "Intentional Systems," The Journal of Philosophy vol. 68, no. 4 (February, 1971), p. 95.

¹² Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: The Mit Press, 1987), p. 22.

¹³ Daniel C. Dennett, "Intentional Systems," The Journal of Philosophy vol. 68, no. 4 (February, 1971), p. 89.

humans it is the notion that if one supposes "... X has beliefs p,q,r, [etc.] ... one also supposes X believes what follows from p,q,r, [etc.] ...".¹⁴

Fodor also tries to challenge the assumption of rationality on the ground that sometimes we are able to make successful predictions about someone's behavior because we know they will not behave rationally. He notes that we can predict how someone who is nearly always a sucker for a knight fork will act in certain situations during a game of chess. While he admits it might be the case that "... such predictive successes can operate only 'against a background' of presumed rationality ...",¹⁵ he points out that this needs to be argued for. Fodor is here himself giving the basis for the argument Dennett has in mind, given his assumption of rationality,¹⁶ upon which I will elaborate.

First, it is important to note that Dennett cheerfully admits that the intentional stance is based on an assumption, one he claims is justified if it is "... the most fruitful one to adopt in dealing with a particular system."¹⁷ If assuming the system we are dealing with is rational leads to successful predictions and explanations, then so much the better for the assumption of rationality. It turns out that supposing people to believe the consequences of their beliefs increases our ability to predict and/or explain successfully their behavior. This is not to say that in each and every case people do so, nor that they are necessarily irrational in every case in which they do not. It is rather, that as a general rule, this assumption contributes to the success of our predictions and explanations.

Since Fodor agrees that we might need an assumption of rationality for successful

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁵ Jerry A. Fodor and Ernest Lepore, Holism: A Shopper's Guide (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1992), p. 151.

¹⁶ Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 80.

¹⁷ Daniel C. Dennett, "Intentional Systems," The Journal of Philosophy vol. 68, no. 4 (February, 1971), p. 89.

prediction then surely he would agree that such an assumption 'operates in the background' of our prediction that X will not, in certain situations behave optimally, e.g., he will be a sucker for a knight fork. We need to have in mind some standard for behavior, an idea of what playing well would mean in the case of chess, in order to pick out deformed cases. There could be no sense of irrational or non-rational behavior of a certain sort unless one had some idea of what would constitute rational behavior, either in general or in reference to a particular instance. To play an optimal game of chess, one ought to notice and take threats to one's Queen seriously. Not to do so is not to play optimally. But we need to know what parameters govern an optimal game of chess before we can pick out instances where the game is not played well due to a player making irrational moves. In fact, one could only deem a given more irrational with respect to some notion of optimal game playing. Similarly, we must have in mind some notion of what constitutes rational behavior in that context in order to pick out behavior that is not rational.

There are many times when we don't know someone is about to behave irrationally. When this happens we are nearly always taken by surprise. We are surprised because we expected something else; we expected he would behave rationally. It is only when we have special knowledge of someone that we can accurately predict that they will not behave rationally in a given situation. I would need to know, for instance, that Laurie is a sucker for a knight fork, in order to predict her suboptimal move. If I come to know that she is such a sucker, I come to know a pattern in her behavior that I can depend on to win games of chess against her.

According to Dennett, we are often able to see a pattern in the behavior of others and it is this pattern that gives us the ability to predict their actions.

I claim that the intentional stance provides a vantage point for discerning ... patterns. These patterns are objective--they are there to be detected--but from our point of view they are not *out there* entirely independent of us, since

they are patterns composed partly of our own
 "subjective" reactions to what is out
 there; ...¹⁸

These patterns are real discernable states of affairs that we can use to form a base for our predictions or explanations, just as the streak in a cloud chamber is discernable and allows us to explain or predict the trajectory of an electron. Of course these patterns, much like the streak in the cloud chamber, are subject to individual perspectival variation. That is, there really is a streak but what that streak is interpreted to mean, or whether it is interpreted at all, depends upon the observer. If I am standing at an angle different from you in viewing the cloud chamber, I'll see something slightly different from what you see. If my position vis-à-vis the cloud chamber is important for working out a trajectory say, and I don't correct myself, I am liable to misread the event. In fact, it is unlikely that I will even see such an event unless I am a trained physicist.¹⁹

Likewise in the case of adopting the intentional stance; given that we all have different perspectives on the world, because of differences in our histories, emotions, beliefs, etc., there are liable to be variations in our predictions and explanations of the behavior of others. Also, there will be variation in the explanations and predictions people give for our behavior and those that we ourselves provide for ourselves and others.

In fact, this explains how it is possible for different people to offer different explanations and/or predictions about the same person, which sometimes happens. Sometimes interpretations differ so widely that agreement is impossible or at least very unlikely. At other times discussions about why each person thinks as they do might lead to consensus. For example, one person may be able to offer into evidence for her

¹⁸ Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 39.

¹⁹ For an excellent discussion of the important role background beliefs, knowledge and theories play in one's perceptions see: Norwood R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

interpretation some previous experience which gives her the inside edge in successfully explaining the behavior. Once something like this is brought forward, the other person is apt to admit that their explanation won't do quite as well.

Slight variations often don't bother us at all, large variations are in need of explanation. For example, imagine the case of Phyllis who is obsessed with Danny, a rock star. Phyllis explains that Danny called her today and predicts that he will do so again soon, because he loves her. Even though he only ever asks about the child Phyllis has tricked him into believing is his son, she always explains and predicts his behavior on the basis of her belief that he loves her. She believes that he loves his 'son' but rarely explains or bases her predictions of Danny's actions in terms of this. Phyllis suffers a mad obsessive love for Danny, and this taints her view of him (and much else). She nearly always manages somehow to couch her explanations or predictions of his behavior towards her in terms of his love for her. There is little doubt that she strongly believes he loves her, although this is something he continuously and vehemently denies both to her and to others. Phyllis even manages to reformulate his professed growing hatred for her into a profession of love. It seems that it is possible for a perspective to become a pathology.

The intentional stance allows us to pick out patterns that lead to successful explanations and/or predictions and given the above example, it also explains how people can go wrong. They pick up a pattern, but misidentify it. In Phyllis's case, this is the result of an underlying problem, viz., her obsession. Notice how we can identify Phyllis's problem and make sense of her behavior. Indeed we can often predict what she will do, even though we think she is, as we would say, out of whack. It is because of our knowledge that Phyllis is obsessed with Danny that we can explain her actions. Without this knowledge, her actions would remain inexplicable, totally unpredictable and, to say the least, odd.

Her obsessive love for Danny, informed by her belief that he loves her, dictates her

goal of trying to possess him. It is in this context that we can explain or predict Phyllis's actions. It is also due to our knowledge of her obsession that we may suffer from a lack of confidence in our ability to predict her behavior. Because she is obsessed, she will sometimes behave irrationally. It is because we have some idea of how and when she will act irrationally that we are sometimes able to make a successful prediction. At other times we are at a loss because this same tendency to behave irrationally limits our ability to make a successful prediction. I think that when we can successfully predict the actions of someone like Phyllis, who is prone to behave irrationally, it is because we can figure out what would count, for her, as optimal behavior--she is informed by her obsession; she wants to have that with which she is obsessed. If we can pick out what would count as optimal for even the most irrational person, we can predict and/or explain what she will do. Using another example, imagine Bill is experiencing auditory hallucinations of God telling him to rid his children of the devil. If we come to know that he believes this, I have no doubt most of us would predict that if left alone with his children, he will harm them.

Dennett's works nearly always focuses only on beliefs and desires but his analysis is meant to cover emotions, since his view is meant to deal with intentional states in general. On occasion he (and others) mention an emotion when providing a laundry list of intentional states.²⁰ Our ability to make fast decisions is enhanced greatly by our being able to read and interpret other people's emotions. It's rather like a short hand route into discovering some of their beliefs and desires without having to take the time to stop and do a careful inventory of which beliefs and desires they might have.

In my example above with Terry and the dart gun, if Shelly had had to stop and wonder what Terry was believing and/or desiring, Terry would have had time to reload and shoot at her again. All Shelly had to do was to notice that Terry was angry and that he had

²⁰ Daniel C. Dennett, "Intentional Systems," The Journal of Philosophy vol. 68, no. 4 (February, 1971), p. 87.

the gun in his hand and so take the prudent course of running up the stairs all the faster. Given time, she could have formed an opinion about his intentional state in terms of his beliefs and desires, but that would quite likely have cost her her escape from harm. She was able to make the decision to run quickly because she only needed to notice that he was becoming angry at her. Her fast assessment of his anger allowed her to predict that he might seek retribution and so she ought to take herself out of harms way, which she quickly sought to do.

We are interested in trying to explain the behavior of people, yet sometimes the current situation, object or event seems not to offer the means to come up with such an explanation easily. Sometimes, given the current state of affairs no explanation is forthcoming without a lot of story telling. With such peregrinations, the explanation may end up seeming rather fantastical. Thus it seems reasonable to suppose that, in some cases, something other than the present state of affairs is responsible for an individual's behavior. Perhaps we can easily discern that a certain emotion exists, and that it explains an action, but fail to see how the source of the emotion could possibly be the present situation, object or event. In the next section I will discuss some views which deal with just this problem.

THE NEO-FREUDIAN REPRESENTATIVE VIEW

Different philosophers and psychologists have put forth what I am going to call a Neo-Freudian representative view. What this view offers is an explanation of the genesis of emotions when a given state of affairs seems to lack an appropriate object of the emotion. One of the basic tenets of a Neo-Freudian view is that the object of an emotion may be something other than the current situation, object or event. While on the face of it, it will appear as though the current situation, object or event is causing the emotion, this is not always the case. As in the case of the contents of a Freudian unconscious playing a role in our state of being, our past history, real or imagined, may determine what sort of

emotion we will experience.

In order to explain an individual's (or one's own) emotional state when it seems to be, for example, too strong or perhaps inappropriate, given the current situation, object or event, accessing an individual's particular past history can be invaluable. Without such information, people's emotional states and their actions might end up seeming inexplicable, irrational and even bizarre.

It is often the case that our past experience with a given situation, object or event determines how the situation, object or event will strike us now, or how we will portray it to ourselves. The current situation, object or event can operate in tandem with an individual's particular past history, causing her to experience a particular emotion. In some cases, the individual will not even be aware that it is a past situation, object or event that is the cause of her present emotional state. It is also possible that the present situation, object or event may merely be a stand-in, a representative of some past situation, object or event. If, for example, I was set upon by dogs in the past and I now fear the very friendly and toothless poodle next door, it is because Fifi, *qua* dog, appears dangerous to me. She appears dangerous to me because of my particular history. Fifi causes me to experience fear even if I believe that she will not (and moreover cannot) harm me.

In other instances, the situation, object or event engenders a heightened response because it resonates with a past experience. Imagine that while almost everyone enjoys seeing a rainbow, I, because of my history, am extraordinarily pleased at the sight of one. Any experience of seeing rainbows that I have resonates with the emotion I have had at past sightings. Throughout my life, almost every time I saw a rainbow I was in the company of loved ones, making these experiences especially joyous for me. I may not now even be aware that it is these past experiences that lead to my inordinate joy at the sight of a rainbow. It might not have come to my attention that my rainbow sightings in the past mostly occurred in the presence of loved ones. Nonetheless, it is these past experiences

that contribute to the intensity of my present experience of joy.

Using works of Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Annette Baier, Magda Arnold, and Ronald de Sousa, I am going to try to flesh out what I mean by a 'Neo-Freudian representative view' of the emotions. Their views elaborate the notion that past events in one's personal history contribute to one's present emotional experiences and, as with de Sousa especially, also play a central role in the acquisition of one's emotional repertoire. These authors argue that not only do such experiences greatly affect the sort of emotions one will experience, one's emotional repertoire, they also affect aspects like the intensity or longevity of an emotional experience as well. Also, if there is any possibility of finding an explanation for an individual having a particular emotion different from, "It's irrational for her to have such an emotion," we will need to look to the individual's past history.

AMÉLIE OKSENBERG RORTY: THE CAUSAL HISTORY

In "Explaining Emotions," Amélie Rorty takes the approach that if one can explain cases at the fringe, e.g., the phenomena of the conservation or inertia of emotions in spite of a change in beliefs, some general insights into the nature of emotion can be gained. Her hope is that the effort to explicate cases which are out of the ordinary will shed light on the more ordinary ones. Rorty claims that in order to offer reasonable explanations of such anomalous cases, it is often necessary to look at an individual's past history. If it is shown that one's history plays a role in the anomalous cases, there is good reason to believe it also plays a role in more ordinary cases.

In the case of, for example, emotional inertia, by looking at an individual's history, one is able to proffer an account which can make sense of the existence of such an emotion, by uncovering the actual cause of a particular emotion. Without such an account, the continued existence of an inertial emotion will be puzzling. Sometimes it is the difficulty in seeing how the current situation, object or event could possibly be the cause that leads us to

look in a different direction. In fact, one may not even be able to offer a reasonable account for the existence of a particular emotion, given the present state of affairs. Rorty notes that what often happens in anomalous cases, is that the present state of affairs plays only a minor causal role. Even in cases where it may at first appear that the current situation, object or event is the only cause of an emotion, limiting the search for the cause to the present state of affairs solely will not always afford the fullest account.

According to Rorty, there are three strands in one's causal history: the formative events in one's psychological past; a socially and culturally determined range of emotion along with behavioral and linguistic expressions; and the set of genetically fixed threshold sensitivities and patterns of response.²¹ She focuses her attention on the first of these in order to show how we might explain why someone has what appears to be an anomalous or unreasonable emotional response to a situation. Her view is that we need to look at a person's past history and see if we can come to a reasonable explanation for why someone is acting or reacting as she is.

The significant cause of an emotion is the set of events—the entire causal history—that explains the efficacy of the immediate or precipitating cause. Often the significant cause is not in the immediate past; it may be an event, or a series of events, long forgotten, that formed a set of dispositions which are triggered by the immediate cause.²²

In the search to locate the cause of an emotion, it may not be sufficient to only look at the immediate possibilities. What Rorty terms the 'significant cause' of an emotion may lie buried, perhaps so long buried in one's past history that it is inaccessible. If, for example, I don't remember being set upon by dogs in my youth, I may mistakenly believe Fifi is the

²¹ Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "Explaining Emotions," in Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p. 105.

²² Ibid., p. 106.

significant cause of the fear I experience when in her presence (although given her toothless docility some suspicion that this is not the whole story should arise). Each successive contact I have with dogs, over time, can reinforce my fear of them because my past provokes my fear every time I am in contact with a dog. Rather than coming to fear dogs less, as one might think should happen when numerous occasions of contact with dogs result in no harm to me, as in cases of anxiety reactions, the situation becomes self-reinforcing. I continue to experience fear in what is to me a fear-provoking situation, rather than having the fear extinguished. In fact I may be so spooked, given my history, that I even feel slightly nervous around battery operated toy dogs. Examining my personal history in order to try to explain my overweening fear of dogs seems to be the only avenue available that might allow for an explanation of the genesis of my fear. There must be something which can account for my experience of fear in the presence of dogs I know are not dangerous.

If we do not wish to conclude simply that I am bonkers, an irrational mess, we must look for a way to explain my odd fear of even toothless docile dogs. Rorty thinks we must invoke the principle of charity, giving us support in our effort to cast round for an explanation of my emotion which doesn't quickly conclude me to be irrational.²³ It appears as though I both believe Fifi not to be dangerous—I know she is toothless and arthritic—and to believe she is dangerous, hence I fear her. On this account I have an inconsistent set of beliefs; I don't believe the consequence of my belief that Fifi is toothless and docile, i.e., she is not dangerous. Rorty claims that we need to look at my past history to find an explanation for my state, in order to avoid finding me irrational from the outset.

Personal experiences of situations, objects and events over time may give rise to magnetizing dispositions and these then play a central and causal role in our coming to have

²³ Ibid., p. 104.

and maintaining particular emotions. She uses the term "magnetizing" because, "... some dispositions have a magnetizing momentum of their own: the more they are acted upon, the more likely it is, the easier it becomes, to fall into that way of responding".²⁴ Our emotional life is often controlled by these dispositions. When such dispositions reign, it is not the case that what appears to be the intentional object of an emotion is the sole cause of that emotion. There may be one or many objects from one's past causing an emotional response. For example, it is not only Fifi causing my fear but rather the disposition to fear any and all dogs, which has been magnetized over time by the succession of dogs I have encountered. My fear of dogs is continuously reinforced each time I encounter a dog. Also, I will tend to see situations, objects and events in such a way that allows me to respond to them in a familiar (perhaps for me safer) fashion. In other words, I gestalt the situation, object or event into a pattern I can deal with. This is how, at least with my first apprehension of her, Fifi causes me to be afraid.

In order to help explicate her view, Rorty uses an example of a newswriter Jonah, who resents his female editor. Although Jonah comes to believe, in accord with her behavior, that his editor Esther is not a tyrant, he still experiences resentment whenever she gives him an assignment.²⁵ Given that Jonah is an intelligent individual, how can we explain his experience of resentment when he himself admits he doesn't believe that Esther is a tyrant? Rorty argues that by looking to see what sorts of events contributed to the psychological construction of Jonah, his causal history, we should be able to find the significant cause of his response to Esther. This allows us to find a reason for his resentment other than its occurring as the result of inconsistent beliefs.

Since Jonah claims he doesn't believe Esther is dictatorial, the sole cause of Jonah's

²⁴ Ibid., p. 124, n. 9.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 106.

continuing resentment cannot be Esther's action of assigning work to him. In fact, given his psychological history and magnetizing disposition, any woman giving Jonah work, whether dictatorial or not, will cause him to experience resentment. His reaction to any woman senior to him in a power hierarchy will be the same, i.e., he will feel resentment toward her.

In order to explain such a generalized reaction, Rorty looks at Jonah's past, and the following story emerges. During one of his father's frequent absences, due to his army career, his mother's hospital stay for the birth of Jonah's brother necessitated that Jonah stay with his grandfather. During this stay, his grandfather unknowingly passed on to Jonah his negative attitude toward Jonah's mother, who was a brusque, although loving parent.²⁶ Having done this,

We now have an account of why a reasonable person might, in a perfectly reasonable way, have developed an intentional set that, as it happens, generates wildly askew interpretations and reactions.²⁷

Because of these events, which occurred at a crucial time in Jonah's psychological development, he tends to view women who hold positions of authority, with a jaundiced eye. As a young child his mother inevitably had authority over him. This, along with the events discussed above, cause Jonah to hold his particular and perhaps peculiar view of women in positions senior to him. Such women are for him, representatives of his mother. Thus, whether or not such women are dictatorial, he resents them. It is important to point out that Jonah does not experience such resentment against all women, he harbors no resentment against the women on the secretarial staff.²⁸ Nor is it the case that he resents

²⁶ Ibid., p. 110.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 111.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 106.

everyone who is in a position of authority, or a position superior to him, since he does not resent Abe Zlotny, the editor-in-chief.²⁹ It is only women who have authority over him, as his mother once did, that Jonah resents.

Looking at Jonah's past history allows us to reasonably explain Jonah's feeling of resentment toward Esther, given his avowal that he does not believe her to be a tyrant. Women in positions of authority remind him of his mother, albeit for the most part unconsciously. It is because of his history, which accounts for his particular psychological construction, that he views women in positions of authority as overbearing and tyrannical, whether they ever evince these characteristics toward him (or anyone) or not. Perhaps it would be possible to come up with an alternative account of Jonah's anomalous emotion, but I doubt one could do so without appeal to his past history, which is Rorty's point. In looking at an individual's history, one needs to decide, charitably, whether the events in question could plausibly be the ones which led to the individual's coming to have that emotion.

ANNETTE BAIER: THE REPRESENTATION OF HISTORICALLY DEEP OBJECTS

Annette Baier also wants to claim that sometimes what our current emotions are about is some part of our particular and perhaps peculiar past history. Something from our past is causing the present experience of some emotion or other. Baier points out that Descartes noticed an important fact about emotions when he noted that,

at least some of them have 'deep' objects, that behind the immediate object stand the ghosts of all the other objects which that specific sort of emotion has had in this person's history, and maybe also the shadows

²⁹ Ibid.

of those that it will have.³⁰

We see expressed here the notion that often when one is experiencing some emotion, it is not simply the current state of affairs that gives rise to the emotion. A significant role is played by one's past emotional history and experiences. What we would take to be the object of an emotion, Fifi the toothless poodle for example in the case of my fear, is in fact not the only object of my fear.

Using Baier's terminology, Fifi is the 'apparent' or 'immediate' object of my fear but there also exists the 'deep' object, in this case the dogs that set upon me when I was young. Imagine that I am out for a jog and I spy Fifi asleep on her cushion in her screened-in porch. Immediately upon noticing her toothless form, I find myself experiencing fear. Fifi is clearly the object which initiates my fear, but is she its only cause? Having been set upon by dogs in the past, I now fear any and all dogs. It is these dogs from my earlier frightful experience that remain as a deep object. They are "... the paradigm original particular objects for the formal objects of a given emotion type."³¹ This deep object is the source of my fear of dogs, even harmless dogs like Fifi. The vicious dogs set upon me in my youth are the paradigm for the formal object, in this case the formal object of fear. In general, the formal object of fear is something like 'the dangerous.'

As with Rorty, one's personal history is of the utmost importance on Baier's account of the genesis of emotions. In some instances a current situation, object or event is but a representation of a past situation, object or event. The current situation, object or event is merely a catalyst or trigger for the occurrent experience of an emotion. It plays a

³⁰ Annette Baier, "What Emotions are About," in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 4, Action, Theory and Philosophy, edited by James E. Tomberlin (California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1990), p. 4.

³¹ Ibid., p. 5.

role in initiating the emotional response, but only insofar as it allows the present situation, object or event to be likened to a past situation, object or event. The current situation, object or event is not causing the emotion, in any deep sense. The object causing the emotion is an historical artifact of experience which remains and has remained viable through representatives. Occurrent situations, objects or events represent this historical or deep object to the percipient.

we need to tell a historical and associational story showing how the current immediate object can 'represent' ... Representation will come into the emotion not primarily through the beliefs or evaluations directly implied in a current emotion ... but in the way this emotional episode repeats and represents a series of past emotions of the same type, terminating in the original, so 'deep,' or 'paradigm' object.³²

I don't believe Fifi poses a danger to me or to anyone. No one who has seen her hobble arthritically off her cushion and into the front yard to gum her old tennis shoe could judge her as dangerous. To my knowledge she has never even chased anybody, in spite of being invited to do so. Hence, it cannot be that I judge her to be dangerous, yet whenever I see her, I am afraid. If I am not evaluating her as a danger to me, why is it that I experience fear whenever I see her? The fear may die down once I reassure myself that it is just good old toothless Fifi barking, but the fear is always there initially. A reasonable explanation is that Fifi is a representative for me, of the dogs which scared me greatly in the past. Given the proliferation of dogs as pets and workers, I have had occasion to run into many of them. Each time I do so, I experience fear, whether or not the dog I see is actually dangerous—I even shiver when passing the guard dog which is always securely fenced in. All of the dogs I encounter are representatives, in fact,

[t]hese representatives are successors and memorials to what they represent, and they

³² Ibid., p. 6.

represent all their predecessor representatives as well as the ultimate one represented.³³

There is a long chain going back through time, ultimately resting at the original deep or paradigm object. One can see then, if each instance of a situation, object or event after the initial experience of it is a representative of it, certain emotional responses will become ingrained. It will be almost impossible not to react to certain situations, objects and events.

Once again we can see the idea that emotions may have historically deep objects helps to explain anomalous cases. Take for example the situation of an individual who fears some seemingly innocuous object. If Harold fears coffee mugs say, how are we to explain this? Coffee mugs are not usually taken to be dangerous items. Perhaps some sort of traumatic event involving a mug happened to Harold; he pulled a mug of boiling coffee off a table and burned himself when he was a toddler. Over time he has had experience involving mugs and each time he was fearfully cautious in the presence of one. Each mug he saw was a representative of that first mug, the one which hurt him terribly. If each time he sees a mug and the mug causes him to be afraid, it is not that the mug appears dangerous to him, it is rather that the mug is a representative of the deep object. New life is breathed into his mug-fear each time he encounters one. Each new experience he has with a mug resonates with all of those which have gone before, most importantly, the paradigm mug, the first link in the chain.

MAGDA ARNOLD: AFFECTIVE MEMORY

Magda Arnold also holds the view that one's past history plays a central causal role in one's current experiences and emotions. She focuses her attention on what she terms our 'affective memory' which fits in nicely with the notion that there are deep or paradigm objects causing our emotions.

³³ Ibid., p. 7.

In "Perennial Problems in the Field of Emotion," she puts forth the thesis that we have stored in our memories not just sensory based informative 'pictures' of past situations, objects and events, but also the feelings experienced during our initial exposure to them.³⁴ That is, we don't simply remember the sights, smells and sounds but also the feelings we had in association with some situation, object or event.

When faced with a new but comparable situation, object or event, the way we will react to it is the result of cumulative affective memories. The reason we experience a particular emotional response to a situation, object or event is because our affective memories color our current experiences or perceptions. Even though we are often unaware it is these memories that are the source of our emotion, the way in which we respond is directly related to what has occurred to us in the past.

Since affective memory is a reliving of the original acceptance or rejection in a new though similar situation, the resulting feeling carries no date line so that we are completely unaware that our here-and-now appraisal is really a prejudgment (literally, a prejudice) dictated by affective memory.³⁵

Throughout our lifetime we experience and respond to (or not) different situations, objects and events. Very often a current emotional response has roots leading back to some earlier situation, object or event. Arnold points out that any individual's emotional repertoire is dependent upon one's personal experience and history and thus is unique to that individual. If this is the case, it is unsurprising that there are differences in people's responses and reactions to the same situations, objects and events. While there will be similarities, since we often experience situations, objects and events differently, the

³⁴ Magda B. Arnold, "Perennial Problems in the Field of Emotion," in Loyola Symposium on Feelings and Emotions, edited by Magda B. Arnold (New York: Academic Press, 1970), p. 173.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 176.

formation of our patterns of affective memory will often differ. Thus, things may strike different people differently. Rather like Rorty's notion of magnetizing dispositions, what we focus on and react to emotionally depends very much on what has gone on before in our lives. "Indeed, affective memory is ubiquitous yet intensely personal because it is the living record of the emotional life history of each person."³⁶

On Arnold's account, emotions are aroused through appraisal. When we appraise something as good there is a felt tendency toward it and if bad, away from it. It is the appraisal which gives rise to the emotion.³⁷ If, for example, I perceive an empty chair next to Shelly, my seeing that the chair is empty does not, in and of itself, give rise to an emotion. But, if I have wanted to speak with Shelly all morning, then I will no doubt appraise the open space next to her as a boon and be delighted. Thus Arnold's view, in this respect, mirrors the judgmentalist view which was just discussed in Chapter One.

What is crucial to the sort of appraisal one will make, is one's affective memory. If, for example, I have been dissatisfied in the past with my interchanges with Shelly, while I may be glad that there is a seat available, I will be less than delighted to spend time chatting with her. If Shelly is actually a lovely person but I somehow got the impression she was awkward to deal with initially, I will not be glad to have to deal with her again. My first impression tainted my future interactions with her.

Those around me might think I overreact when dealing with Shelly since they find her easy to work with. However, if she becomes aware of my opinion of her, she may well display a reluctance to deal with me. Her reluctance will then give credence to my idea that she is awkward to deal with. It is also possible that, like Rorty's Jonah, the reason I initially found Shelly awkward was the result of some affective memory of a

³⁶ Ibid., p. 177.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 175.

similar situation in my past. Even though Shelly is in fact not awkward to deal with, given my affective memory, I appraised my initial interaction with her in terms of that memory, and so always find my interactions with her awkward.

Arnold's view, like that of Rorty and Baier, helps to explain anomalous or seemingly odd emotional responses (along with more ordinary cases). It can help explain, for example, the phenomena of post traumatic stress. People suffering from the disorder often find themselves susceptible to emotional pitfalls because a current situation, object or event bears some resemblance to previous occasions of intense fear or anxiety.³⁸ For example, exposing someone to an odor that had been experienced initially during a traumatic experience can cause the person to experience fear, in spite of the fact that the present situation is safe. If the initial experience has been repressed in any way, the experience of fear could be quite baffling for the individual. It may even be that such an initial trauma can result in anxiety about a seemingly innocuous situation, object or event. If, for example, there is an odor present that kindles the memory of a frightening experience, coupled with a benign situation, object or event, the person might come to develop an anxiety disorder in connection with that situation, object or event as its trigger. This analysis offers an explanation of how some people can fear what most would consider nothing to be afraid of.

RONALD DE SOUSA: SALIENCE AND PARADIGM SCENARIOS

Ronald de Sousa hypothesizes that we acquire our emotional repertoire through exposure to paradigm scenarios. This process is much like the process of language acquisition. We learn to label emotions in a way similar to the way we learn to label other things, i.e., by ostensive definition. In the case of emotion, we are exposed to little

³⁸ Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), pp. 203-204.

dramas³⁹ through which we learn the language of emotion, and more. By way of these scenarios which revolve around different situations, objects or events, we become acquainted with the kinds of responses they may engender by watching those around us. Thus we come to see which emotions 'match' which situation, object or event.

Paradigm scenarios,

involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic *objects* of the specific emotion-type ... and second, a set of characteristic or 'normal' *responses* to the situation, where normality is first a biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one.⁴⁰

Through paradigm scenarios we come to know what sorts of situations, objects or events ought to give rise to which emotions and what kinds of responses are appropriate, or 'normal.' Just as one comes to call a certain kind of four legged object a dog, one learns to call the response to the loss of certain kinds of objects, sadness.

De Sousa claims that the starting point of the acquisition of our emotional responses is physiologically innate behavior. He disagrees with the view that there are a certain number of primitive emotions (the numbers vary for different theorists) which, depending upon their configuration, give rise to all emotions. Rather, "... the primitives out of which emotions emerge are not emotions."⁴¹ Certain behaviors that infants engage in, for example, smiling, are considered innate because they occur early enough to preclude the possibility of the infant having learned them. Often caretakers will treat an infant in a certain way because of such behaviors, say by smiling back at her, and these early "... feedback loops give way to complex interactions that it is plausible to think of as

³⁹ Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge: The MIT Press, [1987] 1990), p. 45.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 182.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 183.

scenarios."⁴² Initially an infant's behavior is the result of innate responses to the environment, or innate spontaneous behaviors, like smiling.

When other people in the environment respond (or not), such interactions (or lack of them) play a crucial role in marking off paradigm scenarios for the infant. Presumably smiling is eventually associated with contentment and/or happiness. Situations, objects or events in which or with which the infant is contented and/or happy, or in/with which the infant sees others are contented and/or happy become, for the particular infant, paradigm scenarios for contentment and/or happiness.

This view on the process of acquiring an emotional repertoire, and the labelling of one's internal experience, allows us to explain how we come to have what we think of as 'normal' emotional responses to a given situation, object or event. However, it can also help explain the existence of anomalous emotional responses or how those whom we might think of as emotionally impaired came to have odd responses. For example, studies have been conducted to look for impairment in the emotional development of children with depressed mothers. Such studies have found that some such children do have problems. Other factors can also play a role: the mother's marital status; the existence of a psychologically impaired partner; a depressed mother's ability to alter her moods in the presence of her children, i.e., some women manage to hide their depression so their children aren't exposed to the depression. In any case, children who grow up in homes where some or all of these situations obtain, may develop problems. They may, for example, not develop a good concept of self, adequate impulse control or social competence.⁴³

Infants whose interactions with others are less than optimal are not exposed to the

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ S.H. Goodman, et. al., "Social and Emotional Competence in Children of Depressed Mothers," Child Development vol. 64, no. 2 (April, 1993), pp. 517-519.

'right' sorts of paradigm scenarios and so do not develop a 'normal' emotional repertoire. There are (at least) two sorts of problems that may occur. 1. Children who grow up with a paucity of adult attention or supervision may come to lack emotional depth. 2. Children who are being cared for by someone who doesn't have a 'normal' emotional repertoire, also fail to develop a 'normal' repertoire.

These examples of less than optimal circumstances of child-rearing seem to me to offer a possible explanation for the existence of children who appear to lack empathy and thus can commit heinous acts with little hesitation. There has been a spate of cases recently in which pre-adolescent children have beaten, tortured and even killed other young children. An example of this is the case of the two ten year old boys in England who abducted, tortured and killed James Bulger, a two year old toddler.⁴⁴

Also, we can perhaps explain the existence of children who are, for example, hyper-vigilant or inordinately sensitive. If, for example, a parent is afraid of the water as the result of some accident in his past, such a fear is often 'passed on' to a child. If the parent doesn't monitor his behavior around the child while at the beach say, the child will be aware of the father's fear and some event occurring at the beach could easily become a paradigm scenario for the child vis-à-vis the water. The child might then come to experience fear when too close to the ocean.

De Sousa, like Rorty, thinks that we ought to be able to assume that individuals are, for the most part, rational. What's needed then is an account of how their coming to have a particular emotion is rational. Recall that Rorty argues in favor of tracing one's personal history in search of magnetizing dispositions. If an individual's emotional response makes sense in light of their psychological history, then their having that emotion is rational. De Sousa has a similar strategy.

⁴⁴ William E. Schmidt, "Liverpool tries to reconcile murder and a boy next door," New York Times (February 24, 1993), A 1, p. 5.

Since emotions are learned in terms of paradigm scenarios, they cannot, at least within a given social context, be criticized for inappropriateness if they occur in response to a relevantly similar situation.⁴⁵

For example, imagine that while edging ever closer to the ocean, with no one near enough to shove me in, I experience fear. If, because of my father's great fear of the ocean, all of my 'little dramas' at the oceanside were fraught with fear and dread, it is appropriate, for me, to experience fear. On the other hand, if no such thing ever occurred and all my ocean adventures were lovely, my now experiencing fear in the same circumstance would be irrational. "True irrationality of emotion involves the perception of a situation in terms of a scenario that it does not objectively resemble."⁴⁶

According to de Sousa, paradigm scenarios play a crucial role in our coming to experience a particular emotion in our interactions with situations, objects or events. The reason a situation, object or event evokes the emotional response it does depends on the sort of experiences one has had up to the present.

All our emotions are about the past, among other things. This follows from the role of paradigm scenarios in defining their formal objects and therefore their identity.⁴⁷

It can sometimes happen that we are not even aware of what is engendering the emotion. We may think it has only to do with the situation at hand, in fact the situation at hand is resonating with some previous experience, it echoes a paradigm scenario. It is mainly the previous experience that gives rise to the emotion, not the present situation. De Sousa, like the authors discussed above, claims that this sort of view helps to explain the

⁴⁵ Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge: The MIT Press, [1987] 1990), p. 185.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 188.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 187.

seemingly anomalous responses people can have to a situation, object or event.

If this view is correct, I judge as I do against a background of beliefs, desires, attitudes, etc., that are particularly and perhaps peculiarly mine. (Which doesn't mean others can't share some or even most of them.) If I wish to explain why I have a particular emotion, I can make use of my history (or someone else's if they happen to be the subject of study) to explain the genesis and if necessary, the continuation of my emotion. This is often difficult to do for oneself, since what causes the emotion may well be unconscious.

For example, suppose I want to explain a woman's seemingly anomalous love for a man who abuses her. I can, for example, summon up some cultural beliefs to which she would have been exposed, beliefs such as: women are inferior in comparison with men; women who live alone are incomplete, unhappy and economically deprived, unlike women with mates; women are no better off leaving abusive men since they will not be protected.

Given that beliefs about one's inferiority (as a female) will permeate one's entire existence, the formative events that make up a woman's emotional history will have been tainted to some extent by this cultural disvaluation. It is then easy to see how the woman in this example can claim to love her abuser, it is in her (perceived) best interest to sustain the position she has obtained through her love. As an outsider, we would want perhaps to complain that it cannot possibly be love she is experiencing since surely no one could find such abuse appealing, (leaving aside the problem of masochism) nor do I think the woman herself finds the abuse itself appealing. It is merely something that she tolerates and it plays no role in her love of this man.

If to be in love requires that one feel a certain way about one's situation in relation to another (among other things), she meets these criteria, or at least we have to believe that she does (or thinks she does) since all we have to go on are her reports professing her love for her mate and perhaps the fact that she remains with him despite the conditions.

De Sousa is convinced that in order to account for our ability to develop an

emotional repertoire from what were initially, rudimentary innate responses or behaviors, we need to look at our evolutionary history. Biologically we have the capacity to respond emotionally and it is through the process of evolution that we have come to possess this characteristic. De Sousa entertains the idea that the development of the ability to experience emotion is advantageous from an evolutionary perspective because it gives us a capacity which can pick up where reason leaves off. "... the function of emotion is to fill gaps left by (mere wanting plus) 'pure reason' in the determination of action and belief."⁴⁸ The important issue of the role emotions play will be more fully addressed in Chapters Three and Four.

It would be a mistake to think the emotions are necessarily good characteristics simply because they have been naturally selected in the process of evolution. It is always possible for evolution to give rise to some characteristic that, in the long run, turns out not to be advantageous to the survival of an individual or even an entire species. One might be tempted to think that the ability to respond emotionally is a good thing since humans have managed to continue to survive. This seems to be de Sousa's contention; "... it is unlikely that an *important* and *pervasive* characteristic can be thoroughly maladaptive, if it is widely distributed in a *thriving* population."⁴⁹ However, given that the story is far from over, it is not clear that this is so in the case of emotions.

This is, for example, Arthur Koestler's point, in "The Urge to Self-Destruction." Here Koestler puts forth the thesis that it is our capacity to experience emotion that has led to some of humanity's gravest problems—possible global nuclear war, for example (something which clearly would not be conducive to survival of the human, or perhaps

⁴⁸ Ronald de Sousa, "The Rationality of Emotions," in Explaining Emotions, ed. Rorty, p. 136.

⁴⁹ Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge: The MIT Press, [1987] 1990), p. 80.

any, species). He is convinced that without intervention of some sort, our emotions might very well lead to the annihilation of the human species.

On his view, evolution has made a mistake insofar as the same human characteristics that were or are conducive to the survival of our species, can also lead to disaster. For example, it was necessary, and to some extent still is, for humans to band together into cooperative groups to ensure survival. In such collectives, providing food, child care and defense in cooperation with others increases the chance for any one individual's survival. Living in cooperative groups provides safety in numbers, an excellent survival tactic. Early on in our history, such behavior was crucial for survival. Koestler contends however, that in perpetuating such behavior, evolution 'overshot the mark.' What allowed us to survive the vagaries of a primitive existence remains and we are still stuck with

this overwhelming capacity and need for identification with a social group and/or system of beliefs which is indifferent to reason, indifferent to self-interest and even to the claims of self-preservation. ... this *self-transcending tendency* ... the phenomena of individual and collective suggestibility which dominate life ...⁵⁰

This ability to form such a strong attachment to one's own culture/kind, leaders or ideology resides more on our affective side, than our rational side. Koestler argues that the split between reason and emotion, a split which is the result of the way in which the human brain evolved, has left us in this precarious position. This is not to say he believes we are inevitably doomed. However, given the slow pace of evolution, we cannot afford to maintain the status quo and wait for a solution to come from that quarter. We must try to 'supplant biological evolution' to try to rid ourselves of the deleterious side of such characteristics, something I think is possible.

⁵⁰ Arthur Koestler, compiled by Arthur Koestler, "The Urge to Self-Destruction," The Heel of Achilles: Essays 1968-1973 (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 11.

JEAN PIAGET: INTELLIGENCE AND AFFECTIVITY

Piaget's view that intelligence is acquired developmentally is well known. Thus it should be no surprise that he wishes to claim the emotions are also acquired through a developmental process. He gives us some insights into this process, i.e., of the development of affectivity, and shows how it is intimately linked with the development of intellect.

It is impossible to find behavior arising from affectivity alone without any cognitive elements. It is equally impossible to find behavior composed only of cognitive elements.⁵¹

Affective schema are laid down at the same time that cognitive structures are formed, each playing an indispensable role in the development of the other. "In truth, there is as much construction in the affective domain as there is in the cognitive." (IA 52) Let me briefly describe these six stages as Piaget discusses them in Intelligence and Affectivity: Their Relationship During Child Development.

The first stage consists in what Piaget terms 'hereditary organizations.' Included here are instinctual drives and inborn affective reactions. (IA 20) After an analysis of what are commonly believed to be innate drives or instincts, Piaget makes clear that even if such things are inborn, they never result in purely innate behavior.

Every instinct, ... is manifested in complex behaviors where the most diverse and alien elements intermingle; *and these integrated wholes undergo transformations.* (IA 20)

In other words, no matter the inherited instinct or drive, external conditions influence the behavior that ultimately results and then this too undergoes further change. Such changes

⁵¹ Jean Piaget, Intelligence and Affectivity: Their Relationship During Child Development, Annual Reviews Monograph, translated and edited by T.A. Brown and C.E. Kaegi (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews Inc., 1981), p. 2. This book is cited in the text by IA followed by the page number.

can be the result of changing conditions, like maturation of the individual.

In the second stage there occurs an attachment of feelings to perceptions, i.e., the experience of pleasure or pain. Also, the ability to differentiate between needs and interests develops. (IA 21) The child begins to associate feelings with certain situations, objects or events. In fact, a hierarchy of pleasures develops.

from pleasures of the simplest localized physical variety up to the most complex forms of functional pleasure connected with elaborated activities like grasping or swinging an object, etc. (IA 22)

Thus the child comes to discern a difference between the contentment of things like the cessation of hunger for example, and the enjoyment of interacting with a toy. We have here "... a constant dialectic interaction between affectivity and intelligence." (IA 25) The intellectual ability to recognize differences meshes with the affective response to these different situations, objects and events.

The third stage is marked by the acquisition of feelings for others, given the development of the ability to distinguish oneself from others. Other people, *qua* people, come to be appreciated as such and so interpersonal feelings begin to develop. (IA 36) Also, objects begin to become valuable, not in and of themselves only but in relation to their being used as a means to some goal. (IA 26) The child begins to place a value on things because of the role they play as a means to achieving some goal. For example, a blanket makes for a nice surface on which to sit but more than that, it can be used to pull a toy closer. Insofar as some things will play a more central role in goal achievement, they will be valued more. Thus we begin to see the development of the ability to order values in a hierarchy.

The ability to manipulate symbols begins in the fourth stage, a crucial step in the child's affective development. "Representation and language allow feelings to acquire a stability and duration they have not had before." (IA 44) This is a critical development

because "... after representation becomes possible, feelings last in the sense that they can be recreated." (IA 46) Up to this point the child has been stuck in the here and now, so to speak. With the ability to represent the world to herself, memory can play a central role in her ability to interact with the world, and those around her. She now has a permanent base upon which to draw for information, both in the sense of knowledge about situations, objects and events, but also information about affective responses.

In the fourth stage values begin to be conserved and in the fifth stage some of these values become "... moral feelings or normative affects, ...". (IA 59) It is in this stage that the child moves from thinking about morality in terms of simple minded obedience to the ability to make moral evaluations on her own. (IA 65)

In the sixth and final stage, with the capacity for hypothetico-deductive reasoning, the child integrates more and more with adult society and takes on adult behavior. It is in this final stage of intellectual and affective development that it is "... possible for a person to think about what and how he thinks." (IA 69) This gives rise to the idealism so often seen in adolescents. Such idealism allows one to envision the future and elaborate ideas. (IA 70) Once this stage is reached, further maturation occurs as a result of the broadening of experience, exposure to new ideas, etc. The basic affective and intellectual schemata are in place.

Throughout his discussion of the stages of development, Piaget insists that intelligence and affectivity, reason and emotion, are inseparable.

there is a constant and dialectic interaction between affectivity and intelligence. Both are developed and transformed in interconnected ways as a function of the progressive organization of behavior, but one is not caused by the other. (IA 25)

For example, in his exposition of stage two, Piaget explains how both intellect and affect play a crucial, though different role in the child's ability to separate herself from other

objects.

obstacles to the satisfaction of needs
simultaneously lead to intellectual
differentiation, in this case the perception of
distance, and to affective differentiation, in
this case, unsatisfied desire. (IA 25)

Affectivity and intelligence play different roles; "... the energetics of behavior arise from affectivity whereas the structures arise from cognitive functions." (IA 7) What we will focus on (find of interest or value) is a matter of affectivity; how we manipulate, mentally, whatever it is we focus on, is a matter of cognition or intelligence. Our interest in a situation, object or event is due to affectivity. No one would begin anything or bother with intellectual operations on something were there not some interest drawing them to start the process. That upon which we will perform intellectual operations is drawn to our attention through affectivity, by our being or becoming interested. Even if we were to engage in something which seems to be solely an intellectual operation, like solving an algebra problem, it is not only the intellect which is involved. We must also have some sort of interest in or need to solve the problem and we will experience certain emotions while working on it and once we have finished it. (IA 3)

While it is the case that affectivity develops along with intelligence, Piaget's view of why we come to have the emotions that we have differs from the Freudian and Arnoldian view. On Arnold's account, we have stored in memory the emotions we had in response to past situations, objects or events.⁵² When faced with such a situation, object or event in the present, we react as we do as a result of stored affective memories. For Freud, the way in which we experience a present situation, object or event is often the result of repressed

⁵² Magda B. Arnold, "Perennial Problems in the Field of Emotion," in Loyola Symposium on Feelings and Emotions, ed. Arnold, p. 173.

affectivity.⁵³ Piaget maintains that we operate from schemes that have developed in early childhood, and the inception of these schemes is dependent on both intelligence and affectivity. "Schemes of this sort have their beginnings in the child's reactions to his parents, and the schematization of the individual's affective and cognitive reactions make up his character." (IA 51) The emotions we experience in the present are not memories of emotions experienced in the past, either in the sense of called to the fore as with Arnold nor operating without our awareness, as with Freud. Rather, they are the result of our being able to recreate reactions based on past experiences, in much the same way we can figure out how to do a complex proof, for example.

The Freudian hypothesis assumes that feeling is conserved as such and that this accounts for the obvious continuity of affective life from childhood to adulthood ... [but] Feeling, properly speaking, appears, disappears, and oscillates in intensity not because it sinks into or emerges from the unconscious but because it is created, then dissipates, then is recreated. (IA 50)

At the very least, one has to have an interest in one's world—one needs to be engaged. Such an interest, according to Piaget, is affective in nature, that is, it has a phenomenological aspect and serves to motivate us toward that which we are interested in. From such interest, we engage in the world and in turn, further emotional response is possible. Emotions constantly aid us in creating and recreating our surreality.

CONCLUSION

From what we have seen in this chapter, one's past history can have a profound effect on the sort of emotional life one will come to have. Some of us will mature emotionally, and have a full repertoire of what would be considered 'normal' emotions and

⁵³ Jonathan Lear, Love and its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis (New York: Noonday Press, 1990), pp. 107-109.

the 'right' ones given the circumstances. Others are not so lucky and so will not develop emotionally. I have argued that we ought to utilize emotion, along with belief and desire, to provide explanations of the actions of others. In order to explain the genesis of emotions, we need to look at the past histories of individuals. I will argue in Chapter Three and Chapter Four that the emotions play a very important part in our lives. Thus, to have a marred emotional history and so a less than full emotional life, is to be left epistemically and axiologically impoverished.

CHAPTER THREE

THE VARIOUS ROLES PLAYED BY EMOTION

EMOTION AS MERE DISTRACTION

Since emotions feature prominently in human experience, it is reasonable to wonder what role they play. One can find different responses to such questioning. A common view of the role emotions play is expressed by the philosopher Jerome Shaffer. He claims that emotions only disrupt our lives, thus, we would be as well or better off without them.

to live and act in a rationally and morally
justifiable way it is sufficient to have
justifiable beliefs and desires ... emotions play
no necessary role in making a life rational and moral.¹

His thesis represents the view that emotions are not needed to initiate or motivate thoughts or actions in response to a situation, object or event. Shaffer thinks beliefs and desires are sufficient. Using his example, if I come around a curve and see a log across the road, my heart races etc., I am afraid, I slam on the brakes. Shaffer's view of this situation is,

I stop the car because of my beliefs and desires,
and I could have done that without undergoing
the resulting physiological/sensational effects
which constitute emotion, in this particular case,
fear.²

The fear need not be there for me to stop the car. I could as easily have stopped the car, avoiding harm, had I present certain beliefs and desires only. Indeed, for some who are not easily made afraid, this must be what happens. They have no trouble applying the

¹ Jerome A. Shaffer, "An Assessment of Emotion," Philosophical Quarterly vol. 20, no. 2 (April, 1983), p. 171.

² Ibid., p. 163.

brakes; fear is not needed to assure completion of the avoidance action. One may be tempted here to think of the desire as an emotion, since desires also seem always to have an affective edge. However, as I have argued previously, it is a mistake to cast desire as a species of emotion. In the Introduction and Chapter One, I argued that emotions and desires, though they have qualities in common, are not the same. The desire to stop the car to avoid hitting the log is not the same experience as fearing one will be harmed if one hits the log—as this example shows, I can have one without the other. While the fear will probably be accompanied by the desire to avoid the log, the judgment that one is in danger is different from the judgment that it is desirable to avoid this danger. One must have some reason to believe harm might occur in order to come to desire that one not be harmed. In Chapter One I argued in favor of the view that fear is the affective judgment that something is dangerous. Because my judgment is that X is dangerous, I experience fear. If the judgment had been different, I would have experienced a different emotion. So too, it is because I am afraid that I have the desire not to be harmed, specifically, not to be harmed by this thing which I deem dangerous to me. If my emotion were different, the desire would also be different. My fear of X is not the same thing as my desire not to be harmed by X, although my fear is what gives rise to my desire, and that which causes the further desire to avoid X.

Let's look at another case to see if Shaffer's analysis holds up. Imagine I find out my sister is in dire need of a kidney transplant, my heart races in fear for her and I say, "I will be a living related donor." One could say I offer my kidney because I hold certain beliefs and desires. Yet a further question begs to be answered: what is the source of my desire to donate one of my kidneys? Shaffer is right in so far as my racing heart doesn't seem to help (or hinder) my ultimate reaction—a desire to donate a kidney. Still, I don't think his analysis quite holds up. I take it he would have to say something like: my belief that she is dying and my desire that this not be so will be enough for me to act, to offer my

kidney. However, what is causing my desire that she not die? I suppose one could try to build a case that I hold some other desire, e.g., that no sister of mine die too soon, but why would I desire that? I think we would be left with an endless repetition of the question, "But why do you desire that?" Rather than an endless list of affectless desires, I should think that what is motivating me to do something that holds a potential danger to myself, is my love for my sister and the fear that she may die without my help. In this case my emotions cause my desire to help my sister. As was argued in Chapter Two, beliefs and desires are not enough. They alone cannot account for my choice to give my sister a kidney. To leave out affect is not to tell the whole story. Indeed, there must be some emotion lurking in the background of Shaffer's own example. Why, if I am not afraid of something, do I put on the brakes? I desire not to have an accident perhaps. But why? Is it only that I desire there be no insurance costs from damaging my car? I desire no pain? I desire to be in control at all times? I would at least have to care about these things, or about avoiding them, to have such desires in the first place.

Shaffer notes some would claim that when a strong desire exists, emotion is involved. However, he wishes to defend the claim that even such strong desires can be without affect. To do so he claims that one can distinguish "... such occurrent states as yearning, pining ... which have an admittedly physiological/sensational component.", from a strong desire, although he doesn't say how. What he does say is, "[i]t (the desire) may just spur one on to great efforts."³ This is very unsatisfactory. At the very least one would suppose that such a strong desire, if it is able to 'spur one on,' must have some sort of affective component. I don't think he can detach feeling from desire although perhaps one can argue that some desires exist without there also being an emotion, e.g., my desire that I exercise before I eat. However, Shaffer must try to show there can be affectless desires

³ Ibid., p. 168.

because he equates emotion with a physiological/sensational response to a desire and belief, and so if such feelings are present along with desire, an emotion is present. In order to eliminate emotion, as he would like to do, he must find a way to have affectless desires, something I don't think he can have. I would argue that if someone has a desire, even a weak desire, affect is present, even if all it amounts to is a mild form of compulsion or repulsion.

Shaffer examines other plausible roles emotions might play, apart from motivation, to see whether or not they can be shown to be useful and so perhaps necessary to us. Are they useful because they bring a lot of pleasure to our lives? Are they epistemically useful? Do they aid in communication? In each case, Shaffer concludes that we are as well to stick with beliefs and desires, because he thinks it is they which make the difference, not the emotion. He concedes that from an evolutionary perspective, emotions must have had survival value but he argues that we would now be better off,

if we let our purposeful behavior be controlled by our beliefs and desires alone, and not be affected by the physiological and sensational sequelae which comprise emotion.⁴

He notes that emotions do still affect us, do still play some role but he assumes their effect is negative, for he concludes that we would now be better off without them. They have outlived their usefulness. While he notes that it is difficult to generalize about whether the emotions yield "... a positive or negative hedonic balance, ...",⁵ here he seems willing to suppose that in general, their effect is negative, else why suppose them to be superfluous?

Shaffer's thesis is supported by taking too narrow a view of what constitutes an emotion; according to him, they are simply physiological/sensational states. He argues that the intensity wrought by an emotional response only throws us off; it doesn't add anything

⁴ Ibid., p. 166.

⁵ Ibid.

but rather distracts us, perhaps making us less effective than we would otherwise be. This point of view is not uncommon and those who subscribe to it think the emotions mostly throw us off track by distracting us, compromising our ability to think clearly and rationally.

There are those who disagree with Shaffer's thesis, (I count myself among them) and believe emotions do play a necessary role in rationality and morality. However, many would agree that emotions do seem often enough to distract us. They can be disruptive, and seem to be irrational and outside of our control. If emotions only get in the way, it would make sense to claim we could do without such distraction, or at least with less of it. In this chapter I will argue that to see the role of emotion as limited merely or mostly to a distraction, is badly mistaken. While Shaffer is right to note the centrality of beliefs and desires in human action, he is wrong to conclude that they would be sufficient on their own.

ELLIOT & PHINEAS: CASES IN FAVOR OF EMOTION

The cases of Elliot and Phineas discussed by Antonio Damasio,⁶ offer compelling evidence against the view expressed by Shaffer. Elliot was found to have a benign brain tumor located above the nasal cavities, compressing both frontal lobes upwards. (DE 35) As a result of this tumor, Elliot was transformed.

he was still physically capable and most of his mental capacities were intact. But his ability to reach decisions was impaired, as was his ability to make an effective plan for the hours ahead of him, let alone to plan for the months and years of his future. (DE 37)

The case of Elliot shows that if the brain is damaged in particular locations, judgmental

⁶ Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994), Chapter 1 & 3. This book is cited in the text by 'DE' followed by the page number.

abilities can be impaired in an interesting way.

Elliot had been a capable business man before his health and behavior changed as a result of the brain tumor. Afterward, he made bad investments, and his inability to prioritize and so complete duties made work impossible. If left to himself, he would easily be sidetracked by some competing interest, and although he remained capable of intelligent analysis and commentary, he could not, on his own, remain directed long enough to complete a task.

Along with these problems, it was noted that Elliot no longer displayed much emotion. He was neither sad nor joyful and could calmly describe his tragedy without affect. After much testing, Damasio concluded

that the cold-bloodedness of Elliot's reasoning prevented him from assigning different values to different options, and made his decision-making landscape hopelessly flat. (DE 51)

Elliot was in possession of justified beliefs, he continued to have desires, yet these did him no good when it came to making real-life decisions. When his ability to solve ethical problems was tested, he was able to draw reasonable conclusions, discuss consequences and point out the courses of action available. However, if asked to pick among the different options, he was stymied. In his life, when faced with a decision requiring that he value and so choose one course of action over another, he could not. "Some part of the value system remains and can be utilized in abstract terms, but it is unconnected to real-life situations" (DE 11)

Elliot's case shows, contrary to Shaffer's view, that emotion plays a role in helping people to manage their lives; it aids one in making concrete real-life rational and moral decisions. Beliefs and desires alone are not enough for us to function well. Accompanying his loss of emotion, Elliot lost his ability to make rational decisions based on appropriate value judgments. Even though all the standard tests of intellectual capacities

carried out on him indicated that his intellect was completely intact, if left alone to complete a simple task, like sorting documents, Elliot could not complete the task. He could not choose between all the possible ways one could order the documents. Also, he was likely to become sidetracked reading through some of the documents, forgetting the task at hand. (DE 36) In spite of these obvious real-life problems, it was very difficult for Damasio and his colleagues to pinpoint the source of Elliot's deficiency because he did well on all the standard psychological intelligence tests.

The case of Phineas P. Gage, whose brain was similarly injured, is also discussed by Damasio. His is a famous case, well known to students of psychology. A tamping iron accidentally passed through his head while he was blasting rock for the Rutland & Burlington Railroad in Vermont in 1848. (DE Ch. 1) His case remains of interest since it is one of the earliest on record of someone whose severe brain injury resulted in a significant change in personality, while other abilities remained unscathed. What was remarkable about his case was that, at first, Phineas seemed normal, despite his severe brain injury. None of his motor or verbal skills were affected, which was what had been seen, until Phineas, in those who managed to survive their brain injuries. His brain was damaged in just the right way, i.e., in much the same way Elliot's was damaged by the tumor and its removal.

Phineas so engaged the interest of the doctor who cared for him that when he heard of Phineas's death, some five years after the event, he petitioned his sister to exhume the body and retrieve the skull. This was done and the tamping iron which had been buried with him was also retrieved and both remain at the Warren Medical Museum of the Harvard Medical School. (DE 22) Hanna Damasio and her colleagues, using photographs of Phineas's skull and computer imaging, were able, in 1992, to demonstrate the extent of the frontal damage to his brain. In so doing, they brought Phineas into the present, adding his

case to the relatively few other recorded cases.⁷

Like Elliot, Phineas was a very different man after his accident; he couldn't hold down a job and couldn't make important decisions for himself. Unlike Elliot, Phineas's personality changed for the worse. He no longer respected social conventions, engaged in profanity, obstinately pursued his desires and invented tales. He had turned from a conservative hard-working man into a recalcitrant wanderer. Accompanying an inability to maintain employment, for reasons which appear to mirror those of Elliot, Phineas seems to have undergone a shift of values. It was as if he no longer valued the social convention against the use of profanity nor the moral force in favor of truth-telling. With the shift came a shift in desires also. He didn't lack desires or beliefs yet he failed to function as well as he had before his injury. Somehow, along with the loss of ability to value things one previously valued, comes the elision of emotion, or vice versa. What these cases demonstrate is that when the ability to experience emotion is somehow compromised, one is unable to function as well as one had or perhaps to function well at all. Thus, these cases support the view that emotions do in fact play an integral role in our lives.

A FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT

One can conclude, from an evolutionary perspective, that emotions play a role in promoting the survival of human beings. The contribution to survival of particular emotions, viz., fear and anger, can easily be seen. Typically fear is a warning mechanism, promoting survival by prompting avoidance behavior; anger often keeps us focused on our enemy.

In the event of danger, split second decisions need to be made for one to avoid, escape or deal with the danger. If there were nothing in place to ensure that the warning is

⁷ For other cases see, DE pp. 54-62.

taken seriously and so requires a fast response, we might take time deliberating about possible courses of action, and end up harmed or dead. Earlier we saw Shaffer try to argue that desire alone would be enough. However, the question remains, why should I desire to avoid or escape something I think is dangerous unless I somehow value doing so (or do not value the consequences of not doing so)? How does the desire alone 'carry' the value? When we are afraid of the danger, as well as desire to escape or avoid it, our response is almost guaranteed. There will be instances when the split second decision made is not advantageous to the person in danger. Mistakes will occur but their existence does not negate the overall advantage of having such a system in place.

Without the ability to experience fear, we would be less able to protect ourselves against various dangers and so would not survive for very long. Because it is better to err on the side of safety, we might sometimes find ourselves experiencing fear when no true danger exists. For example, we often experience a startle response and perhaps a tinge of fear when an unexpected noise occurs. In the case of an unexpected noise in the night when we believe we are securely locked in our home, we may find ourselves momentarily frightened. Humans are constructed to react to such things because if the situation had been truly dangerous, the ability to respond quickly would contribute to our continued survival.

Since failing to recognize danger can result in harm or death, it pays, in the long run, to be overly sensitive. It is better to be mistaken and react unnecessarily, never missing a possible instance of danger, than risk overlooking something dangerous and failing to react. Nico Frijda makes a useful analogy, likening emotions to an alarm system. Sometimes an alarm system is triggered by something other than a burglar but such sensitivity is necessary to make sure the alarm always warns against actual intruders. The same is true for fear. In order to be certain it will always operate when necessary, it sometimes kicks in needlessly.

If emotion manifests the operation of [a] useful relevance-detection system, this need not imply that every manifestation of that system is useful. ... emotion, as a phenomenon and a provision, is useful; not every individual emotion necessarily is.⁸

A caveat is called for here. Excessive fear can of course be anything but conducive to survival. If one is burdened by, for example, terrible anxiety, so much so that one fears leaving the house, such fear is not useful. In fact, it is detrimental. The same can be said for the debilitating effects phobias can have on the lives of individuals. Such aberrations do not, however, undermine the overall usefulness of this (or other) emotions.

While the role fear plays may seem obvious, it's not so simple to give such explanations for other emotions. It is useful to turn to the functional accounts of emotion(s) some psychologists have given, to see how such views shed light on the role of other emotions. If one takes the view, as I think one ought, that emotions are, on the whole, more than just inherited predispositions to respond to the environment, then looking at functional accounts is helpful.

According to James Averill, there must be a reason, presumably a good reason, why we possess emotions. He warns that to assume emotions, in toto, serve only one function or that any particular emotion serves only one function, can lead to error and so false conclusions. He does not think there is one overriding function all emotions share.

He claims the function(s) of emotion(s) is always context specific. To try to determine the function of any emotion, one must first define the contextual parameters before attempting an analysis.

any given emotion can have a multiplicity of functions depending on the aspect of the emotion under consideration, the nature of the consequences being considered ... and

⁸ Nico H. Frijda, "Emotions are Functional Most of the Time," in The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, edited by Paul Ekman, and Richard J. Davidson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 117.

whether the point of reference is the individual, species, or society.⁹

If one wonders, for example, whether the existence of a particular emotion is functional or dysfunctional, the answer depends on the context. Taking the point of reference to be the individual, and not the society, may lead one to conclude the emotion is functional, or vice versa. For example, an individual's needs may be served by his ability to cower those around him with his anger. However, such widespread anger would render society dysfunctional. Alternatively, society benefits by individuals becoming angry, about social injustice. However, an individual's anger over such injustice could lead to actions which result in her being killed.

While Averill's admonition that care must be taken in providing functional explanations is right, his claim that there can be no one function all emotions share is not. I think the idea of Frijda and others that emotions, in general, are 'relevance detectors' is correct. This is the view that an experience is highlighted by emotion and as a result is paid more attention.

emotions can be understood to represent a process of relevance signaling: ... They can be considered the mechanism whereby the organism signals to its cognitive and action systems that events are favorable or harmful to its ends.¹⁰

An emotional response to a situation, object or event sets that situation, object or event off from other ones, causing us to pay attention to it.

Still, Frijda's account seems to be missing a step, i.e., what makes it possible for us to evaluate some things as favorable and others as harmful? I think here one might appeal to social or cultural norms or perhaps in some cases, idiosyncratic responses. In

⁹ James R. Averill, "Emotions are Many Splendored Things," in The Nature of Emotion, ed. Ekman and Davidson, p. 102.

¹⁰ Nico H. Frijda, "Emotions are Functional Most of the Time," in The Nature of Emotion, ed. by Ekman and Davidson, p. 113.

any case, some kind of judgment is necessary and judgments are acts of cognition. While it is reasonable to suppose emotions are an inherited condition of human evolution, I think it is a mistake to suggest that the function of emotion is to operate in lieu of cognitive processes. It is suggested that when time is limited and danger nigh, the emotions can be relied on to provide a fast response; a noncognitive manoeuvre out of danger. But the fact that time is limited does not rule out the possibility of a cognitive event occurring. How does one choose one means of avoidance over another, or the strategy of avoidance at all? If an act of choice is occurring, the response is not only the result of some noncognitive instinct or reflex reaction. If an action is purely instinctive, there is no choice; an inevitable action or reaction results from something 'hardwired' into the brain. I'm thinking here of the sort of automatic responses non-human animals have to certain situations, like baby birds crouching down when a hawk-shaped figure appears above their nest, or the sort of reflex responses humans have, like the automatic blinking which occurs when an object nears the eye too quickly.

With any sort of slightly more complicated behavior, learning plays a crucial role. Even behavior which may be instinctual in origin is subject to change, further conditioning or even inhibition. The behavior can be completely extinguished or the urge to so behave remain but be resisted. "Intelligence permits learning by experience. Experience then permits modification of crude instinctual patterns to fit the maze equivalents of everyday life."¹¹ The decision to flee, fight or not move comes from a comprehension of one's situation. Whatever instinctual pattern exists is augmented or modified by learning. Humans are no doubt born with the potential to fight or flee in response to certain situations but which is actualized, whether one fights or flees (or plays possum), and which situations are determined to call for one of them to be chosen, depends on learning.

¹¹ Willard Gaylin, The Rage Within: Anger in Modern Life (New York: Penguin Books, [1984] 1989), p. 22.

One can inculcate, through habituation or conditioning, a desired response. What has become 'second nature' then appears to occur automatically. Earlier on however, cognitive capacities were utilized both in choosing effective strategies and in the learning process. Once a response is learned, cognitions continue to play a crucial role. One had to come to know, for example, that leaning to the left was the best response. Furthermore, one must be able to judge that the instance present either is or is not a situation which requires leaning to the left, although one may of course make a mistake and lean the wrong way.

With simple physical responses, the learning often occurs through trial and error. The body comes to 'know' what to do—although the action is orchestrated by the mind. I have noticed that because of my extensive childhood exposure to snow and ice, I walk with confidence in such winter conditions and am likely to recover and remain upright following a slip. When the slip occurs, I experience the trill of fear, and seemingly without consciously willing my action, correct the slip (the same is true of winter driving). The response, learned over time, has now become automatic and so appears to occur without cognition. Still, that I'm slipping and am dangerously close to falling over if I don't correct the slip, must be something I am able to judge, albeit judge very quickly. The evaluation must be cognitive, not simply emotional, although fear, or at least anxiety may also occur. This analysis jibes with the views considered in Chapter One about the role of judgment and evaluation in emotion.

I think when fear leads people to act in ways which later seem foolish or damaging, it is as likely this results from a lack of experience as it is because fear overwhelmed or paralyzed them. An interesting example of this is the response of people who have had the misfortune to be accosted by criminals. Those who have never practiced self defense, nor thought much about how to react are often surprised by their response. Those who consider themselves less than courageous have found themselves standing up to and

sometimes successfully warding off attackers. They do this even when they have heard experts warn against such actions. People, especially women, are encouraged to develop skills to deal with such dangers. Spending time thinking about and even practicing giving up one's purse or wallet to a mugger is advised. It makes it more likely that one will then be prepared to do so if the real situation occurs. A mistake in reasoning during a robbery may have dire consequences.

Gender bias also plays a role in conditioning reactions. Men are more likely to resist or fight than they are to flee, given the social conditioning of males. This is further evidence in favor of the idea that what seem to be natural instinctive responses are often learned, or at least augmented greatly by learning.

GUMPTION

Another facet of the 'relevance-detection' role of emotions is that they often motivate us to act or not, in a given circumstance.

Emotions can roughly be regarded as motivators meant to deal with the emotional event ... they motivate behavior meant to maintain or modify a particular kind of relationship with the environment.¹²

How is it that, for example, some people can achieve all that they set out to, while others languish in inactivity? Achievers are well motivated. They have the will power and persistence to continue their quest for whatever goal they are trying to reach. They are determined to get where they want to be. Others, although also filled with desire, seem to lack these qualities and so have great difficulty in getting themselves to move forward. How can these differences in character or behavior be accounted for? It can't be done only in terms of desire because both kinds of individuals desire that they reach their goal. Also,

¹² Nico H. Frijda, "Emotions are Functional Most of the Time," in The Nature of Emotion, ed. by Ekman and Davidson, p. 114.

both groups have beliefs concerning how to go about achieving their desires, in some cases identical beliefs about what is required. Although some may be mistaken in their beliefs, that is a different problem. Having mistaken beliefs is not what holds them up or not the only thing that holds them up.

Some people can be thought of as having gumption. They have the get-up-and-go required to get things done and the staying power over the long haul to continue in the struggle. The O.E.D. defines gumption as, common sense; initiative; and enterprising spirit. I think gumption helps to motivate the desire to reach a goal, just as, for example, love motivates the desire to care for the one loved. If those who have gumption falter, it is a temporary set-back which they eventually overcome to reach their goal. Others, once started on the journey become permanently waylaid, still others never get going in the first place. To those who are waylaid, the reasons for not managing completion sometimes seem to explain the lack. However, to those on the outside evaluating the attempt, such reasons may seem very weak and forced. People often claim that such things as competing distractions, e.g., family commitments, result in a goal not being reached. To an observer however, it may appear as if opportunities exist for that person to achieve what she desires: her commitment to her family is being used as a means to avoid the effort required to achieve the goal. For some reason, the gumption required for attaining the goal simply wasn't there. Had it been, the obstacles would have been overcome eventually. This is not to say the person was simply too lazy, she may have spent countless hours heavily involved completing other tasks. Belief and desire alone won't always lead to the achievement of a goal. I can intensely desire that something be the case, have justified beliefs on how to bring about such a state, yet never manage to bring it about. Something must motivate me. If the gumption to stay on course and finish the task is missing, no matter how much the end seems to be desired (at least on a conscious level), it will not be realized. One must have some desire to reach a goal, regardless of how weak that desire

may be. However, without some kind of initiative, without some motivating force, it is hard to imagine any project being pursued.

What could account for this? What is it that motivates us from within, supplying us with the ability to will ourselves to act in accord with our beliefs and, more importantly, our desires? Strength of desire isn't always enough. As I have noted, two people can strongly desire the same thing, yet only one manages to achieve what is desired. Also, often enough we are faced with competing or conflicting desires. How are we able to adjudicate? Sometimes the relative strengths of the desires makes the difference. If one desire is much stronger than another, it is this desire which carries. In other instances, its strength is something to be reckoned with in order that one may act in accordance with another competing desire. In such a case an act of will is necessary to overcome such a strong desire. Here doing what one desires requires not doing something else which one desires even more strongly. For example, individuals often report that the desire to smoke cigarettes coexists and competes with the desire to be a non-smoker. The second desire has a host of other desires which go along with it, e.g., the desire for good health and the desire not to be victimized by cravings. Even though the preponderance of desires lie with the desire not to smoke, the desire to smoke is the one which determines the actions--such is the well known and often tragic consequence of addiction. In spite of, or in the face of, such an overwhelming desire to smoke, some are able to manage to hold out, extending the period of not fulfilling the desire to smoke to a lifetime. This takes gumption and I think, often enough, some other emotion or emotions. Many people are unable to shoulder the burden of denying such a strong desire until an episode of ill health or the scare of impending ill health causes them to greatly fear perpetual infirmity--a living death--or death itself. Such a fear helps motivate the desire to not smoke into action, aiding one to do battle against the strong desire to smoke. Success in the battle against the desire to smoke gives rise to pride, happiness, etc., which likewise help to motivate one to continue to resist.

Along the way, one needs to beware of and combat emotional experiences which tend to motivate one toward smoking, such as, experiencing a loss or some aggravating frustration. Such experiences often give rise to the notion that smoking a cigarette would quell anxiety or aid in calming one in the face of some crisis. People often resume the habit when some crisis does occur. Experiencing negative emotions may cause individuals to give in to the desire when it surfaces during an emotionally stressful time. In this case it is as if the presence of negative emotions are able to undermine one's motivation, weakening one's will and draining one's gumption.

Inasmuch as some emotions can motivate and sustain the desired cessation of smoking, others can motivate one to gravitate back toward smoking. To be able to consistently and successfully counter the strong desire takes an act of will—one needs to willfully and continuously turn her back on the desire to smoke. I have been suggesting that gumption, as an emotion, aids the will. One must have ready to hand and mind coping devices to distract or override the desire; one needs to be very enterprising. One must: try to cultivate behaviors meant to replace smoking behaviors, especially those which contribute to one's sense of well-being, making one happy; take pride in being clever enough to recognize the cues egging one on, tickling the desire to smoke; have at the ready a litany of reasons for not smoking to iterate, in order to enhance the continual effort to convince oneself of the futility of smoking. Without such coping strategies well in place, one is liable to fail, liable to talk oneself into releasing the grip, giving in to the desire to smoke. Convincing oneself that the only true means to enjoyment and happiness is through smoking will weaken one's resolve. One needs gumption to keep denying what is so strongly desired.

I think this analysis also holds when looking at desires other than those which result from addiction. The desire for good health in general, for example, leads one to desire to exercise, or at least wish one would desire to exercise. While desiring good

health, so in some sense the means to achieve it, one also desires to not exert oneself overmuch and to eat tasty, often high fat, foods. How is one able to deny oneself the desire for pizza and a front row seat on a soft couch with easy access to the remote control? Again, one is in the position of needing something to motivate, helping to decide between competing desires—the easier route versus the harder route. Something must motivate; one needs initiative to push oneself up off the couch and into doing an exercise routine. Gumption can motivate us to get up off the couch; it serves our will to achieve what we desire. Emotions often lend a hand in the effort. The fear of ill health and not fitting into our clothes helps to motivate us into action. Pride in our ability to sustain an exercise program and maintain fitness motivate us to continue to fight the competing desire to take it easy and not bother.

Another way in which the emotions are utilized in their capacity of motivator, is one which many individuals and institutions have taken advantage of. If we can cause or utilize particular emotions in individuals, they can then help to bring about something which we desire. For example, fear can provide a means of motivating an individual to obey. If I can bring it about that John fears my power to punish him say, I can motivate him to obey my commands—I threaten him. As many have noted, the same ends can often be achieved because John loves, respects or perhaps pities me. I can even prey on John's jealousy of my relationship with Phil to motivate him to behave as I desire.

Aristotle points out that if we can cause someone to feel as we do about our cause, we can win them over to our way of thinking.

When people are feeling friendly and placable,
they think one sort of thing; when they are
feeling angry or hostile, they think either
something totally different or the same thing
with a different intensity: when they feel
friendly to the man who comes before them for
judgment, they regard him as having done little
wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take

the opposite view.¹³

We can capitalize on the emotions an individual is currently experiencing, as when we wait until someone of whom we wish to ask a favor is in a good mood. Or, we can bring about a particular emotional state in order to achieve some end, as when we describe transgressions in lurid detail in order to get a friend to hate the enemy, thus siding with us in the battle.

Emotions can help to get us where we want to go, or they can stand in our way. If we wish to achieve some goal, we would do well to think of which states of mind would best help us to get there and then try to cultivate them, either by ourselves or with the aid of others. In some cases, professional help may well be necessary to try to help us find the source(s) of our problems, and hopefully help us achieve a gestalt shift, looking at the world in a new way. As much as possible, and I think it is more available to us than we recognize, we can ourselves set the stage for success—or failure. Paying attention to what we take to be the source of our happiness or its lack and taking steps to encourage or prevent its growth or cultivation would take us a long way to achieving what we set out to do. Gumption can aid us in getting this done.

THE IDEOLOGICAL ROLE PLAYED BY EMOTION

Catherine Lutz argues that a tendency to view emotions as essences to be discovered compromises our ability to explain fully the role emotions play in our lives and interactions. Her interest in refocusing the discussion of emotions results from her fieldwork as an anthropologist and a desire to accurately represent and report on the practices of other cultures. On her view, we can better understand the practices, etc., of other cultures if we drop the assumption that emotions are psychobiological states to be

¹³ Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. XI, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), Book II. 1, 1377b30.

uncovered by measuring physiology. According to Lutz they are ideological practices:

the concepts of emotion can more profitably be viewed as serving complex communicative, moral and cultural purposes rather than simply as labels for internal states whose nature or essence is presumed to be universal.¹⁴

The assumption that emotions are merely internal states tends to make descriptions of physiological states the focus for discussion. One may then fail to notice or describe the sort of ideological and normative role they play because the concern is with describing emotions in terms of the physiological state someone is in. Emotions are more than just a quickening pulse and reddening face. However, these sorts of physiological changes are often studied and remarked upon since they are publicly observable, recordable and reportable. These, as indications of some internal state, then become the focus.

Naomi Scheman, in agreement with Lutz, argues that we would do well to consider emotions

as situationally salient, socially meaningful patterns of thought, feelings, and behavior, rather than as states that one might discover within particular individuals at a particular time.¹⁵

As patterns they are identifiable to observers and the individual experiencing the emotion, but a significant part of the pattern is the context in which the emotion takes place.

Scheman proposes the analogy that emotions are like constellations, as opposed to galaxies.¹⁶ Following her analogy, just as, if we are not standing on the earth we can't see

¹⁴ Catherine Lutz, Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 5.

¹⁵ Naomi Scheman, "Feeling Our Way Toward Moral Objectivity," edited by Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark, Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics (Cambridge: The MIT Press), p. 224.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 222.

Orion, if we believe patients have autonomy, for example, we will regret withholding information about their medical condition. We must first have the context of respect for individual autonomy in order to regret compromising it. Respect for individual autonomy is not something all cultures share and this can sometimes be problematic. Some cultures, Japanese for example, believe family members ought to receive information about the ill person's condition and decide treatment for them—especially in the face of bad news. If a Western physician is treating a non-Western patient with this belief, should she only tell family members, not the patient, and regret her action, or insist on informing the patient? In this case, the physician is operating from a different position. The pattern, or constellation she sees is one in which autonomy overrides nearly all other considerations. Because this is so, she will feel differently about the situation than will her Japanese patient and the patient's family.

Lutz suggests that a cultural purpose is served by the belief that relative to thought, emotions are 'bad.' She offers a list containing paired concepts associated with emotion and thought, e.g., chaos and control, female and male, to exemplify this.¹⁷ She thinks these "... notions are ideological practices whose meanings are found in the diverse uses to which they are put."¹⁸ However, there is an interesting tension: emotions are bad relative to thought; good relative to a complete lack of emotion. Because emotions are conceptualized as causing chaos, creating problems for the person experiencing them and sometimes threatening others nearby, they are not valued. (This sounds much like Shaffer's position.) Alternatively, emotions are considered good relative to a coldly rational approach. Too much emotional detachment is not valued.

A classic example of this is Mr. Scrooge, someone who values money most of all

¹⁷ Catherine Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions*, p. 57.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 58.

and treats others in a cold-hearted way in order to make more of it. He is reviled and hated for his inability to be moved by the suffering or needs of others. Lee Iacocca is an example of a modern day Scrooge. He has been criticized for his unfeeling appeal to what he decided would be the most profitable approach in dealing with the problems experienced with the gas tank of the Pinto automobile. His calculations showed (as it happened he was incorrect) that it would be cheaper to pay out money in lost law suits to the victims or the families of victims killed or injured when the gas tank exploded in flames in a rear-end collision, than to pay to fix the design problem.¹⁹

Conceptualizations of emotions also serve a moral purpose. (I will have more to say about this in Chapter Four.) If emotions are thought to be beyond our control, to descend upon us whether we will or no, then actions resulting from them cannot be fully intentional. This has had a very profound effect on how we view people's responsibility for their actions. We cannot be held responsible for that which is beyond our control.

The dominance of the view of emotion as unintended and uncontrollable event is also clear in such phenomena as the readiness to acquit or countenance leniency for those accused of 'crimes of passion.'²⁰

If an individual is overcome by a 'fit of passion,' she cannot stop the ensuing action, or so it is thought.

Such a conceptualization serves to justify, in an ad hoc fashion, certain behaviors. If, for example, an angry man hits a woman or child, it is said to be because he lost control; he couldn't help himself. If some other person angers this same man, a police officer for example, he manages very well to control himself. Thus, the idea that he can never control

¹⁹ Richard De George, Business Ethics, Fourth Edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 221.

²⁰ Catherine Lutz, Unnatural Emotions, p. 63.

his anger is clearly not true.²¹ In this case the man's anger is used to excuse and mask his real problem: inconstant impulse control. Thus, the prevalent idea that one is unable to control oneself when under the effects of certain emotions is pressed into service with regard to individual responsibility. It lets certain individuals off the hook.

Crimes of passion are not judged as harshly as premeditated crimes. This is because of the widely accepted belief that we cannot control our emotions or the behavior that results from them, especially if they reach a certain intensity. In this instance the emotions play an exculpatory role. Once our passions are inflamed, we cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the actions they give rise to. It is interesting to note that this view is held especially with respect to anger and other so-called negative emotions. I don't think it works as well for other emotions. Imagine someone pleading that he is not blameworthy because his extreme joy caused him to wreck the car.

Individuals may use the conception of emotion as beyond one's control to let themselves off the hook. If they hold the belief that they cannot control their emotions or responses, they thereby give themselves permission to behave in certain ways at certain times. Some people, for example, believe that admitting to a character flaw is enough to excuse them and any bad behavior which results from it. If David confesses to being, for example, gruff, he may believe he has somehow altered himself through his admission to having the flaw. He may also believe that such an admission is the most he can do, and furthermore, that he should be lauded for his willingness to admit to it. He then continues to be easily irked and irritated, allowing himself to treat others badly (especially those he can easily get away with mistreating) because (poor thing) he is gruff. In a sense he sees himself as a victim, someone who cannot control himself, cannot make the changes needed to rid himself of this flaw, or even to temper the actions stemming from it.

²¹ Willard Gaylin, The Rage Within: Anger in Modern Life (New York: Penguin Books, [1984] 1989), p. 105.

THE PURPOSE OF GHETTOIZING EMOTION

The claim that reason and that which falls under the purview of reason, e.g., the sciences, are dispassionate and in a realm altogether different from emotion, allows for a hierarchizing of faculties and thus people as well. If it is claimed that reason is preferable relative to emotion and the maximal attainment of reason is only ever realized by a certain sector of the population, then all others are necessarily less than these.

Feminists have called attention to the fact that this split goes much deeper than a simple commentary on epistemic differences; "... epistemological assumptions have political implications."²² How knowledge is defined and claims about who is and is not in a position to gain knowledge, in the senses of unable to and has no 'right' to, politicizes any epistemological position. A general claim feminists have made is that the very foundation of any epistemic enterprise, i.e., definitions of and assumptions about reason and rationality may be suspect because generated by (elite white) men and so perhaps tainted by their claims about who is in a position to have them. The question has been raised: is it possible that the ability to reason is gender based or is it only that such ability appears to be gender specific because of prejudice in the original assumptions concerning who has the ability?

Authors like Jean Grimshaw and Genevieve Lloyd²³ have argued that misogyny, although undoubtedly a repetitive feature of philosophy, doesn't guarantee that reason or rationality are gender based. If such is the case, it would be much harder to make out. There needs to be a distinction made between the chauvinist tendencies of male writers and

²² M. E. Hawkesworth, "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth," *Signs* vol. 14, no. 3 (1989), p.534.

²³ Jean Grimshaw, *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking*, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

the question of whether or not reason (or emotion) is gender based or gender specific, that is, male (female).

The exclusion of women until recent times, from systems of education, certainly accounts for part of the difference in the ways in which men and women think, and what they know. However, lack of education in lower class (white) men did not push academics, for the most part, to perceive them as thinking differently, in the way in which women and minorities were and are perceived of as inevitably inferior in their epistemic capabilities. That is, uneducated (white) men could be brought to reason in a way most women could not, regardless of effort on their part. I think this is simply a reflection of the prejudicial belief that most women are inherently subordinate to men intellectually, a claim which the recent academic achievements of large numbers of women clearly challenges. The exclusion of women from education is one feature in the larger picture which draws women as inferior. The belief that women are more susceptible to the vagaries of emotional upheaval is another. In fact, the latter was used to promote the former. It was thought the inherently weak, emotional nature of women made them unsuitable for academia or the professions.

If it is the case, as historical materialism claims, that social being determines consciousness, it is unsurprising that men and women appear to be cognitively separable and different. As Lloyd puts it, "What has happened has been not a simple exclusion of women, but a constitution of femininity through that exclusion"²⁴ The Beauvoirian Other is a social construct that annihilates equality.²⁵ It is not that women, blacks or any oppressed groups are inherently inferior, inherently Other, but rather exclusion constructs them and so constructs their inferiority. To claim that any such group is epistemically

²⁴ Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason, p. 106.

²⁵ Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated and edited by H. M. Parshley (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 142.

disadvantaged is to have a political agenda that advantages some over others; historically it is the claimants of such inequality who have been advantaged. A hierarchizing agenda is far reaching in its existential import.

The notion that there can be a feminist epistemology arises because there appear to be ways of knowing that differ from those revered by the dominant framework, but they have arisen under the constraints of it. If women, as a group, know what and as they do as a result of their position in the hierarchy, what and how they know could and probably would change as a result of a revolution of frameworks. It is the case that social evolution is currently happening in many places, with a noticeable shift in the position of the oppressed. Unfortunately the shift over time hasn't been as sudden and as all encompassing as the kind of revolution which Thomas Kuhn describes as happening in the sciences. With the Civil Rights and Women's Movements we have adopted a somewhat different paradigm from the one in force thirty years ago, but the 'old guard' is still promulgating and enforcing the old paradigm. Unlike the case Kuhn constructs,²⁶ the new paradigm will not entirely and completely supersede the old one when the adherents to the old paradigm/framework die, because adherence to it doesn't die with them. In the case of social systems or frameworks, there is a legacy, unlike in the sciences. Adherence to a cultural or social paradigm/framework does not become an historical fact all of a piece as happens with scientific paradigms. There are many left over beliefs that continue to be transmitted socially or culturally. Social frameworks form the foundation for the creation of human consciousness, unlike the function of scientific paradigms.

Thus, social revolution can't happen in the same way it does in the sciences, there is no crucial experiment with which to obliterate cleanly the old ways of thinking and behaving such that they are simply and unequivocally shelved by the new generation. The

²⁶ Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979), pp. 111-135.

problem is compounded by the fact that those who are marginalized may remain so, in part, because the dominant framework doesn't see them as important contributors. The marginalized are believed to be, by nature, epistemologically compromised. Thus, their contentions, complaints or contributions may not be taken seriously because they are not thought to be capable of knowing much, if at all. It would seem that while reason and rationality are not inherently gender (or race) based, the job of combating this view against existing prejudice might well be like the labor of Sisyphus, except that perhaps with each new generation, the rock won't roll quite so far back down the hill.

Alison Jaggar suggests that 'the myth of the dispassionate investigation' in science is closely tied to the disavowal of the worth of emotion. Emotion and value, thought and fact are seen as closely tied pairs, and the former pair are not seen as playing a valuable role; they distract one through upset or prejudice from the serious business of finding the truth. Jaggar claims that we buy into the myth believing if we work hard at it, we can keep emotion from corrupting scientific enterprise. She argues that it is not possible to keep emotion out, and that emotion does not inevitably corrupt the process. The idea that no values find their way into the world of fact is untenable. At the very least, social values necessarily find a place given that, for example, some problems are seen as more 'interesting' and in need of solving.²⁷

As with all myths, this one serves a purpose. The myth of the dispassionate investigator

functions, obviously, to bolster the epistemic authority of the currently dominant groups, composed largely of white men, and to discredit

²⁷ Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," *Inquiry* vol. 32 (June, 1989), p. 162.

See Also: Alison Jaggar, "Sex Inequality and Bias In Sex Differences Research," in Science, Morality and Feminist Theory, Supplementary Volume 13, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, edited by Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen (Calgary, Alberta: The University of Calgary Press, 1987).

the observations and claims of the currently subordinate groups including, of course, the observations and claims of many people of color and women.²⁸

If it is believed that one must be completely dispassionate in order to engage successfully in such pursuits, and that only a certain segment of the population can actually achieve such a dispassionate stance, entire groups of people can be barred from contributing to the enterprise of science (or any serious search for truth). Michael Stocker agrees that emotion is central to our ability to do any kind of intellectual work well.

there are and must be desires, goals, interests, emotions, and the like within and proper to the intellect, within and proper to intellectual activity, for there to be intellect and intellectual activity.²⁹

Genevieve Lloyd's work, Man of Reason, highlights the male-female distinction in the texts and thus ideas of some renowned philosophies. Part of what she is able to emphasize in so doing is the history of the split between reason and emotion, where reason is aligned with the category of male and emotion, female. She demonstrates how throughout history, subordination and subjugation of women leaves them disadvantaged intellectually, reinforcing the idea that women are, by nature, intellectually inferior. Since very few women managed to be engaged in the philosophical arena, and then only despite being female, their contribution in no wise helped to change the discourse. Recently there have been such contributions by women, often in the form of much needed critiques of various philosophical assumptions. As we will see in Chapter Four, much of the ethics of care, as a criticism of only employing dispassionate intellectualism in ethics, has been provided by women entering into ethical discourse.

²⁸ Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge," Inquiry, p. 164.

²⁹ Michael Stocker, "Intellectual Desire, Emotion, and Action," in Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), p. 333.

Men and their pursuits were/are valued, women and their pursuits less so. "... [T]he male-female distinction itself has operated not as a straightforwardly descriptive principle of classification, but as an expression of values."³⁰ The activities that men and women typically (often what is typical is the result of social conditioning) engage in are ranked. The jobs men do are more highly valued than those women do. The so-called 'pink collar' jobs women hold, for example, are not as well respected, nor as well paid as the jobs men do.³¹

There can be serious consequences from such valuations. In fact, I think it can be argued that ideas about which jobs women are suited to do is, in part, responsible for the recent decline in test scores of American children. Teaching, most especially in the lower grades, is associated with women because it is thought that they are best able to do jobs which require the care of others. Traditionally, teaching as well as nursing, were seen as acceptable professions for women, hence women with talent, education, and the desire or need to work, found their way into them. The best and the brightest found employment in these fields. In the last few decades, intellectually adept and well educated women are choosing other professions, ones which are more lucrative, intellectually stimulating and better respected. The rate of pay for the job of teaching children has not changed appreciably, so the desire to teach is unappealing in that aspect, among others. Those who now teach are, although of course not uniformly so, significantly unlike the ranks of a few decades ago and the education system is the worse for it.

It is no accident, according to Lutz, that in Euroamerican culture, the concept of emotion is aligned with what is subjective, irrational, uncontrollable, weak, etc. Such

³⁰ Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason, p. 103.

³¹ Johnnetta B. Cole, "Commonalities and Differences," in All American Women: Lines That Divide, Ties That Bind, edited by Johnnetta B. Cole (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 7.

conceptualizing plays a role of separating feelings from thoughts and so groups of people. Cognitive capabilities are highly valued and since the marginalized and the underclass in society are seen as governed largely by emotion, they are weakened in the eyes of the dominant class or gender.

There exists a cultural belief or bias that if one is displaying and experiencing the 'proper' emotion(s), one is correctly ensconced within one's gender role. To do so is to be properly masculine or feminine.³² If, for example, a woman displays anger openly and freely, she is often suspect because she is not behaving in a feminine fashion. Either she may be seen as a threat and somehow silenced or deemed psychologically ill and so lose credibility. Similarly, if a man shows too much sensitivity, apart from when it is culturally sanctioned (usually it is in private), he may be branded as 'womanly,' a serious insult since it is a label of inferiority, given society's hierarchical arrangement.

Many people believe and so claim that women are far more emotional than men.³³ However, I think what often occurs is that the emotions women are encouraged and expected to display are more remarked upon. "... the overarching belief that females are more emotional than males enhances the salience of females' emotion relative to males' emotion."³⁴ If a woman is seen crying, it is taken as a sign of her weakness, strengthening the cultural stereotype (unless she is doing so in the role of nurturer). There is a popular saying, "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned!" and indeed tales of treachery abound. However, if one considers the inordinate number of orders of protection women seek each year against the men they have 'scorned,' the reverse is true. A 'scorned' man is far more

³² Lucy Gilbert and Paula Webster, Bound by Love: The Sweet Trap of Daughterhood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1982), p. 3.

³³ Susan Brownmiller, Femininity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 208.

³⁴ Richard A. Fabes and Carol Lynn Martin, "Gender and Age Stereotypes of Emotionality," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin vol. 17, no. 5 (October 1991), p. 539.

likely than a woman to unleash an often deadly fury.³⁵

It is predominantly men who openly display anger, anger which sometimes culminates in violence. Although anger is an clearly an emotion, they are not charged, as are women, with being overly emotional.³⁶ This is because men are expected by the culture to openly express their anger, but I think more importantly, because such expression is seen as a sign of their strength. Because men's anger is taken as a show of strength and strength in men is, on the whole, seen as a good thing. Men are not considered too emotional, based on displays of anger, because one can't have too much of a good thing. Being called 'emotional' is disparaging and good things are not usually disparaged.

While many expect men not to be able to control their anger—outbursts are excused because a good man can only endure so much—the same does not hold for sadness and tears. Men are often expected to endure the pain of loss stoically. If they are unable to contain their grief, it is more acceptable for them to lash out than to become sodden with tears. I once attended a funeral at which the deceased's inconsolable brother paralyzed those present with his incessant sobbing. Everyone was uncomfortable, turning away from and avoiding him. When he dove onto the casket and began hammering on it, people immediately rushed to his side to try to console him. Rage brought help, copious tears only embarrassed avoidance.

What is thought to be natural in a woman—her inherent weakness—in a man is seen as a justified response to a given situation. "While women's emotion is seen as

³⁵ McCoy, Marshall, "Domestic Violence: Clues to Victimization," Annals of Emergency Medicine vol. 27, no. 6 (June 1996), p. 764.

³⁶ Leslie R. Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotion," in Handbook of Emotions, edited by Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993), p. 448.

characterological, men's is seen ... as situational and, hence, sensible."³⁷ Thus, a man's anger is seen as required by the situation. He uses his emotion wisely to deal with the situation at hand. Conversely, a woman's response brings her no such respect; it is merely the result of her supposed inherent weak disposition.

Men's emotionality is aligned with what is thought to be paradigmatically masculine, hence it is seen as normal and useful as an aid to help him achieve his goals.

A man's anger will usually be seen as more important (that is, as requiring attention) simply by virtue of the fact that he is culturally defined as a more important person.³⁸

Anger in men is often thought to be righteous and well-founded, simply because of the status accorded males.

I think Lutz is right in her assertion that one of the ideological roles emotion plays is to help bifurcate gender roles, elevating males above females. To experience only the emotions and emotional intensity expected of one's gender is to fall squarely within the culture's expectations.³⁹ Emotions allow one to express one's gender identity; a woman may evince an emotion expected of females and so demonstrate her femininity. The same thing applies to males; a man's display of machismo sets things straight regarding his (heterosexual) masculinity.

Traditionally women have been conceived of as governed mostly by emotions and so weak and unable to control themselves. This has served to justify the view that women need to be governed and controlled by someone else. Thus, it has been the social practice,

³⁷ Catherine Lutz, Unnatural Emotions, p. 73.

³⁸ Catherine Lutz, "Emotion, Thought, and Estrangement: Emotion as a Cultural Category," Journal of the Society for Cultural Anthropology vol. 1 (1986), p. 299.

³⁹ Leslie R. Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotion," in Handbook of Emotions, edited by Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993), p. 452.

until recent times, for women always to fall under the control of some male, someone assumed to be ruled mostly by dispassionate reason. While her emotionality is seen as beneficial insofar as she is the keeper of the home and the hearth, it is to her detriment in the social world where, for the most part, it is alleged that one needs to be ruled by the head and not the heart. The view that the head should always rule has been challenged most recently by the proponents of an ethics of care.

Lucille Ball's character on the I Love Lucy show comes to mind as a good example how women's actions are often viewed as being capricious and thus, not serious or important. Lucy is always led into such wild situations because she doesn't think clearly and lets her emotions and desires drive her into what is thought of by the audience (and the other characters in the show) as hilariously forgivable schemes; forgivable because she is pushed to such schemes by her uncontrollable passion for something or other and so isn't truly responsible for her actions; hilarious because her ridiculous actions never result in harm—her husband Rickie always rescues her. In the end he saves the day, and any victims of her shenanigans, with his cool-headed solution. He is always able to resolve any troubles caused by yet another of her hair-brained plots.

The reason this show had and continues to have such appeal to audiences is that the antics of women are seen as funny, cute, and in the end, harmless. They provide a good laugh at no one's expense (except women of course). Some may find Lucy's exaggerated portrayal of the antics of women amusing because the show's action resonates with cultural ideology about the behavior of women. They 'get it' because they pick up on the 'truths' about the gender role she is exhibiting with her hyperbolic caricature of women's behavior. Others may find it amusing because it represents such a quaint and unenlightened view of the behavior of women. Still others may not find it terribly amusing because it broadly represents attitudes about women and their place in society that we've begun to leave behind, like some of the caricatures of blacks in old movies—they hadn't even made it on to

television when "I Love Lucy" was at its hey day.

IN DEFENSE OF FEELING

According to Stocker, among others, emotions play a central and indispensable role because they are essential constituents of life. Stocker's claim is that emotions are essential as epistemic indices, ultimately playing a crucial role in morality. It is precisely the intensity, the affective component of an emotional response, that is so necessary since it is that which draws our attention to what otherwise might not become known.

these various emotional structures, e.g., of anger or fear and pity, help reveal, and also help constitute, such thick moral notions as honor and slights. They thus show a good part of a very large and complex evaluative, psychic, and social world.⁴⁰

Who and what we value can become known to us, if we pay attention to our emotional responses to situations, objects or events. I might well think myself indifferent to a certain state of affairs, until that is, the state of affairs is realized and I notice that in fact I am, for example, very angry about it. Stocker uses his reaction towards hearing about the start of a recent war as an example of how we can come to know where our values actually lie. He believed himself to not care very much, to see the whole affair as "... yet another merely very unfortunate inter-national affair, but nothing really serious, nothing really terrible." When he heard the war had started, he found himself "... very upset, and saddened, almost to distraction ...".⁴¹ His emotional response to the situation precipitated his coming to know that in fact, he held a stronger position than he would otherwise have thought.

⁴⁰ Michael Stocker, "How Emotions Reveal Value," (Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, photocopy, 1993), p. 29.

⁴¹ Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 56.

As with Aristotle, for Stocker, emotions are dependent upon social arrangements and engagements. Whether or not, for example, it is possible for a slight committed by one to cause anger in another depends upon the relationship between the two people involved and their place in society at large. "[T]o understand and evaluate anger and other emotions, we depend on such categories as the personal, the impersonal, the institutional, and the general."⁴² Given a certain kind of life, not to loathe violence is unthinkable.

Alternatively, for another kind of life, violence is revered as a perfectly viable solution to one's ills. The way in which we are related to one another plus our place in society, plays a central role in the values we hold (and perhaps share) and thus, the sorts of emotions we tend to have. While it may be the case that we are unaware of what or whom we value, we are most often acutely aware of the emotional state we are in. Paying attention to our emotional states may allow us to gain knowledge of the values we hold. "[M]y getting angry at someone who makes a slighting reference to my nationality, or religion can show me, even contrary to what I thought, that I do care about that."⁴³

In fact, Stocker wants to claim that the sort of emotion one will experience depends upon one's relation to a situation, object, or event. If, for example, two individuals are suffering the same fate, the emotion I experience, or fail to experience, as the result of knowing about their fate, can differ. My emotional response is dependent upon my relation to those individuals.

differences in emotional distance engender
different emotions - annoyance if I or someone
close to me is delayed, and perhaps no feeling
at all or amused contempt if a stranger is delayed.⁴⁴

As Aristotle points out when discussing pity, "... we have to remember the general

⁴² Michael Stocker, "How Emotions Reveal Value," p. 24.

⁴³ Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions, p. 57.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 317.

principle that what we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others."⁴⁵ On this view, it is not the case that the intensity of the emotion differs with the distance between oneself and another, but rather that the kind of emotion one will experience depends on one's relationship to another individual. Also, the emotion experienced is dependent upon whether it is oneself that is involved in the situation or some other person. Following Aristotle, if I am being threatened by an undeserved lawsuit, I am afraid of what will happen. If it is my friend in that same position, because she is my friend, I will feel pity for her. Someone even more distant from me might arouse no emotion or perhaps disgust at the general 'lottery' mentality about lawsuits.

I think it can be argued that distance can also yield differing intensities in emotions. I may well feel a more intense sympathy for my friend's loss of her mother than for the same loss incurred by someone I hear about but don't know. I am sympathetic about the losses for both individuals, but the sympathy for the stranger is just not quite as intense. Indeed we are able to feel sympathy for the plight of others whom we do not know but hear about in the news, those starving *en masse* in distant lands for example, where we are not even able to distinguish any particular individual for whom we feel sorry. The same is of course true for joyous events. I would be very happy and pleased if a friend were to achieve excellence in athletics, for example, but I am still happy about the success Florence Griffith Joyner enjoys.

As I have noted, some philosophers think it is mistaken to include feelings as part of what comprises emotions. However, Stocker believes they cannot be left out.

Indeed, psychic feelings are necessary, though by no means sufficient, for a good life. Without them, one's life, including one's life of action, is certain to be marred by such maladies of the spirit as meaninglessness, emptiness,

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, *The Works of Aristotle*, Book XI, edited by W.D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), Book II. 8, 1386a25.

dissociation, ennui, accidie, spiritual weakness
and tiredness.⁴⁶

If emotions serve an epistemic function, to be bereft of them or to have them in a 'deformed' manner is to leave one in the position of not being able to get at certain sorts of knowledge, about oneself and about others. This is not to say that dispassionate reasoning about certain situations, objects or events is never called for. In some cases, distance is necessary in order to gain the knowledge one needs to effectively and efficiently handle a situation. But the preference for this sort of reasoning is misguided. If, as Stocker argues, emotions are constitutive of and integral to one's life, to prefer affectless cognitions to those imbued with affect is mistaken. While he generally agrees with those who follow a strict cognitivist account of emotions, i.e., that they are judgments or evaluations, (as Solomon, Lyons et al. would maintain) he insists that affectivity is central and indeed indispensable to a complete account of the emotions.

feelings are not mere feelings; there is
little that is mere about them; and this helps
explain how what is mistakenly thought of as mere
feelings can be of vital evaluative and moral
importance.⁴⁷

Affect is required for evaluative knowledge; feelings are of paramount importance. Someone who is alexithymic (unable to recognize or name their emotional state), cyclothymic (undergoing marked fluctuations between lively and depressed emotional states), schizophrenic or just consistently and coldly rational, will not be as well off epistemically. This has implications for our way of being, the kinds of actions we will engage in, the sort of person we will be and the ways in which we will treat other people.

⁴⁶ Michael Stocker, "Psychic Feelings: Their Importance and Irreducibility," Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 61, no. 1 (March, 1983), p. 6.

⁴⁷ Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions, p. 54.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have tried to support the view that emotions play a central and indispensable role in our lives. Shaffer's view that we would be better off without emotion, maintaining beliefs and desires only, is used as a representative of the notion that emotions get in the way and do more harm than good; they only distract us. However, were we to rid ourselves of emotions, as Shaffer thinks advisable, we would eliminate not only the upsets we feel when angry or in love, but the ability to function well. The cases of Phineas and Elliot show that one can have beliefs and desires, not lack intelligence, yet bereft of emotion, be unable to manage one's life. Shaffer's thesis depends on an impoverished view of emotions, i.e., that they are primarily physiological/sensational states and as such are distracting. He contends that it is these feelings, hence emotions, which get in the way of our ability to perform well. However, I have argued that because emotions are affective judgments, they play critical axiological and epistemic roles; they can inform us about ourselves and others. Emotions make it possible for us to value some situations, objects or events over others; they help create our surreality.

Also, if emotion is lacking, we may well not be motivated to act on our desires, we haven't the gumption to go after what we want. In many cases desire alone does not provide the drive needed in order to ensure that we will achieve our goals. I have argued that even when many people desire the same thing, only those who have gumption--initiative, determination--will reach the goal. Unless one can somehow will oneself to act and so gain what is desired, goals remain unachieved. Emotions often assist us in achieving our goals, for example, the joy involved in the process or the pride in accomplishing steps along the way keeps us going. Even fearing the consequences of not acting can help to motivate us toward that which we desire. In some cases emotions may stand in our way, causing our motivation to seep away. If we suffer a grievous loss, for example, causing us to no longer see the world as we once did, our motivation wanes. For

some, the occurrence of such an event only leads to a temporary stay in one's ability to move forward, for others, things are forever changed.

As a category of experience, emotions play an ideological role. I have tried to illustrate how they have been utilized to separate and hierarchize genders and classes. Once again, it is the view that emotions are little more than bothersome niggles which has relegated them, along with those whom the culture has deemed rife with them, to the margins. Such a framework casts emotions aside in favor of 'pure' reasoning. I have tried to demonstrate that there is no such thing as pure reasoning. Reasoning cannot be completely free from affect, even if only in the form of an interest in what one is reasoning about or analyzing.

In the following chapter I will expand on the role of emotion in morality, something I've touched upon only briefly here. If, as argued above, emotions are central to our ability to evaluate, allowing us to value certain forms of action over others, for example, then it must be that emotions play a crucial role in morality.

CHAPTER FOUR

EMOTION AND MORALITY

One's view of emotions is bound to play some part in what one thinks their role in ethics is or could be. If, like Shaffer, one takes them to be distractions, physiological responses one could act perfectly well without, they will not be seen to play a positive role. In such a case, references to emotions will have to do with how they keep us from doing the right thing, not how they aid us in doing so. If the subjectivity of emotions is stressed, likening them to subjective preferences or matters of personal taste, then it may be thought impossible for emotions to contribute much to something as serious as the moral arena. There has long been a rationalist tradition in ethics, especially following Kant, of disallowing emotion any appropriate role in determining which actions are right and which wrong. In fact, there has been an active denigration of emotions in favor of a dispassionate intellectual approach to the making of moral judgments.

I want to argue that the exclusion of emotion from morality is untenable and that emotions do in fact play a very important role in our ability to make and carry out moral judgments. In this chapter, it will be argued that emotions often provide access to particular views of the actions and positions of individuals, and that as a result of obtaining such knowledge, we are in a better position to make moral assessments of individuals or their actions. Thus, as was noted in the previous chapter, emotions aid us epistemically with respect to others and their relationship to us such that we are often better able to censure them, laud them or perhaps judge ourselves morally responsible for coming to their aid. Emotions are also often useful for motivating moral behavior. We can, for example, as a result of our emotional reaction to a situation, object or event, become aware of someone acting in a morally degenerate manner and so are moved to take steps to curb their

actions. Also, there are those, like Hume, who will claim that emotions are the source of moral judgments in the first place. It is our sentiments which give rise to morality, not our reason, although it too is necessary.

THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVITY

Our values and preferences are, in part, what makes each of us unique. When emotions are seen as individual, perhaps unique reactions to the world, reflecting such values and preferences, they thereby land on the value side of the fact/value divide. With any given situation, object or event, there will be certain immutable facts which obtain. Such facts will exist, regardless of who is involved with the situation, object or event, or how they are affected by it. However, there is no one way that every individual is expected to be affected by a given situation, object or event. We may expect that most will be affected in a certain way, but there can be exceptions, exceptions which are reasonably explained with reference to a particular person's individuality. Perhaps because an individual has a certain outlook on life say, the result of her particular history, she is affected in one way. Someone with a different outlook is affected in another.

This is not something extraordinary or odd, since we expect individuals to have different ways of interpreting situations, objects or events as a result of their having different values and preferences. If emotions are part of one's individuality in this sense, then they are more akin to values than to facts. Looked at in this manner, the only truth conditions attached to emotions or preferences are those concerning whether or not the emotion or preference exists. One either is or is not presently happy; one either does or does not prefer the taste of salmon sandwiches to peanut butter and jelly. An individual will not necessarily become angry when faced with a certain situation, nor will they necessarily find the taste of salmon sandwiches delicious, peanut butter and jelly disgusting. Different individuals will make different judgments about the same situation,

object or event and so will experience different emotions. Also, there are differences in what different individuals will judge preferable from among presented options.

While we may not be too concerned with whether an individual prefers a certain kind of sandwich above all others, we will be concerned about whether or not that individual values certain kinds of behavior. It matters whether or not someone values being honest, and perhaps, in certain circumstances, what kind of emotional response they have given particular situations, objects or events. For example, we ought to be concerned by someone who experiences great joy at the prospect of others experiencing extreme pain.

One may think judgments like, 'Salmon sandwiches are delicious,' 'Car alarms make me angry,' 'Cheating on tests is wrong,' are all similar because they are simply the unique perspectives of different individuals. Holding such a view makes it seem impossible for truth to have any place in morality, so moral relativism looms. In this scenario, individuals will prefer different, perhaps conflicting ways of life, and there is no one way which is, *prima facie*, the best or right way to conduct oneself. In fact, if such a view of morality obtains, it cannot even be said that one's own way is better, only that it is what one chooses. There is no looking beyond one's own judgments. A worry ensues if it is thought that what we choose as best only depends on our subjective and often unique preferences and emotions. The fear is that such subjectivity will hamper both moral realism and the possibility of universalizing certain moral judgments.

I think it is viewing the inclusion of emotion in this way which leads to the idea that moral relativism ensues. Each of us will decide what we think ought to be done, relative to our own individual preferences, values and emotions and so moral judgments will differ for different individuals. Since the notion of moral truths (or the existence of truth in general) is a hotly disputed issue, the specter of emotion may frighten those who, even though agnostic about moral realism, at least dearly hope there may be some moral truths.

I think raising the specter of relativism as an objection to the inclusion of emotion in

morality is unjustified. If it arises from the suggestion that emotion is just personal feeling, a physiological reaction to situations, objects and events, then emotion is being viewed as a non-cognitive, perhaps uncontrollable and certainly unreasoned reaction. On this basis, it might be thought that emotions are like matters of taste—unreasoned personal preferences. However, in Chapter One I argued that emotions are more than physiological responses to situations, objects or events; emotions are something more than feelings. On my view, emotions are affective judgments and these judgments are based on and constitute our surreality. They are not simply mindless reactions. As with all judgments, mistakes may occur. Nevertheless, such affective judgments aid us in seeing the world as we do and so can aid us in seeing a moral or immoral world as well. Moral outrage over an action surely involves seeing the world a certain way, a way which involves emotion and also, reason.

I think a willingness to concede emotion a role in morality, should not be seen as the claim that emotion must be the sole or central contributor, replacing or trumping reason. There are good arguments in favor of recognizing that they are both necessary to morality. What is needed, as has been pointed out previously in this work, is a balance between reason and emotion. I am arguing that both reason and emotion are valuable for the contributions they make to our ability to form judgments, including moral judgments.

Reason allows us to categorize, to group, for example, what is similar and delineate what is dissimilar. Once we decide on the categories, reason allows us to differentiate among the options available. One can imagine this as like the activity of putting objects into an endless row of boxes. If we know which box should contain what, we can pick out, from among the possible choices, that which fits. However, the question may be raised, what allows us to decide on the categories we will use? How would it be possible for us to choose from among the boxes if there is no particular ordering? Why should we value placing something in one box rather than another, or, more importantly, value the contents of one box over those of another? There would be no way to do this without the

hierarchizing ability brought to the enterprise by values. In Chapter Three I argued that emotions are both a source of values and a means by which we can come to know what we value. Hence, when seen as contributing to this capacity, emotion will surely play a constructive role in morality.

HUME'S PASSIONS AND MORALITY

When Annette Baier had her students in an introductory ethics course find out what the "... great moral theorists would have said in answer to Kohlberg's test question about whether Heinz should steal the drug ...",¹ it turned out that David Hume, unlike all the others, answered "... as did most of Gilligan's mature women."² That is, rather than working from a "universalist/impersonalist tradition"³ typified by a Kantian morality, Hume's view of morality is one in which the passions count, both our own and the passions of others. His is a morality based on connection and passion, not impartiality and reason. I do not intend (or pretend) to present more than an outline of the thesis Hume puts forth in the Treatise, to help me support my arguments in favor of the view that emotions play a useful role in morality.

Hume is well known, among other things, for arguing that emotion, or rather passion, plays a central role in morality. His famous claim, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any office than to serve and obey

¹ Annette Baier, "The Need for More than Justice," in Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics, edited by Annette Baier (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 54.

² Ibid.

³ Margaret Urban Walker, "Moral Understandings: Alternative 'Epistemology' for a Feminist Ethics," Hypatia vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer, 1989), p. 19.

them."⁴ comes from his overall view that it is the passions which animate us, which give rise to volition, motivation and action. This is something he claims reason cannot do. The passions are also the source of our preferences, our values and our moral judgments. However, reason and passion are not opposed to one another; they have different scopes. Indeed they often work in tandem; it is reason which makes sympathy, a cornerstone in morality, possible.

No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From *these* we infer the passion: And consequently *these* give rise to our sympathy.
T. 567)⁵

We need to utilize reason in order to be able to know of another's passion and so come to feel with and so for them. Using reason, we can infer by the outward signs of another person that she is, e.g., happy, and further, what is causing her happiness. We infer that she is happy and sympathy ultimately leads to our experiencing happiness. Sympathy allows us to 'catch' another's emotions but reason is also needed for the process to occur. For Hume, "... the perceptions of the mind may be divided into *impressions* and *ideas*, ..." (T 275) the passions are impressions, the ideas "... the faint images of these [impressions] in thinking and reasoning; ...". (T 1) Without impressions, including the passions, reason would have nothing to work with.

For Hume, sympathy is not a passion but rather a principle or mechanism of communication.⁶

No quality of human nature is more remarkable,

⁴ David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 415. This edition of the Treatise is cited in the text by "T" followed by the page number.

⁵ See also, T 319.

⁶ I owe thanks to Walter Brand for discussions concerning the role of sympathy in Hume.

both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from or even contrary to our own. (T 316)

Sympathy is not something we feel but rather something by which we can come to experience the passions another is experiencing.⁷ Thus, by means of the passions, as a result of their being communicated to us through sympathy, we become 'vividly' aware of the plight (or fortune) of others. This in turn causes us to 'feel' for them. It is not that we are able to put ourselves in another's place. As Hume recognizes, this is impossible. The best we can do is to draw inferences about a situation and the reactions of someone to it, and through the mechanism of sympathy, come to have passions similar to those being experienced by them. Thus a sense of their grief or joy is communicated to us and infects our sensibilities such that we too come to feel grief or joy. Sympathy as an aid to morality, is the ability to see the position someone else is in, which ultimately results in our experiencing an emotion. Presumably then, sympathy can cause us to think about that person in a certain way, i.e., with some passion or other and so determine our actions toward them.

Thus it appears, *that* sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature, ... *that* it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues ... [and] we may presume, that it also gives rise to many of the other virtues; ... (T 577)

Annette Baier points out that Hume's view of the source of morality is what sets him apart from Kant and the Kantian tradition of rule based morality derived solely from the realm of reason. She claims what led Hume to such an approach was his

⁷ Páll S. Árdal, Passion and Value in Hume's *Treatise* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), p. 48; Philip Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between Sympathy and Morality with Special Reference to Hume's *Treatise* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 21.

failing to find any such universal rules of morality, as well as failing to see how, even if we found them, they should be able, alone, to *motivate* us to act as they tell us to act, ...⁸

Hume is deeply committed to the idea that we need passion in order to be motivated to act. Along with this is his insistence that we need to be able to get along in our community. The best way to manage that is to develop 'fellow-feeling' for those near (and dear) to us. Unlike Kant and his followers, Hume thinks the rules of justice, something central to morality, are neither derived from reason nor universal. For Hume, justice is an artificial virtue, something that pleases us because it is useful to social living.

Hume sees [artificial virtues] as authored by self-interest, instrumental reason, custom and tradition, and rationally 'frivolous' factors such as historical chance and human fancy and what it selects as salient.⁹

Morality for Hume is a matter of having the right character, and the passions contribute to one's character, to one's being virtuous or vicious. According to Hume, the right sort of character to have would be that which causes pleasure in the mind of an onlooker. "An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness ..." (T 471)

Now it cannot be the case that a person is always virtuous or completely vicious, and so, according to Baier,

Since moral evaluation is applied to character, and since a person can have character for a single virtue or vice, then we may recognize and approve of some virtue in a person while still reserving judgment about the whole mix of traits that the

⁸ Annette Baier, "The Need for More than Justice," in Moral Prejudices, ed. A. Baier, p. 56.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

person exemplifies.¹⁰

In any case, it is a person's character, their intentions and actions which make them virtuous or vicious. The kind of character one has is mostly the result of one's passions since it is the passions which motivate action. Noting the actions of others allows us to judge their intentions, which we have no access to otherwise. That which motivates someone to act as she does, we assume to be indicative of the kind of person she is, the sort of character she has.

'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper
(T 477)

If sympathy causes 'fellow-feeling' for or toward another individual, the way in which one will act toward them is affected by this. I think it not unreasonable to suggest that Hume's notion of sympathy is in this respect like the concept of care central to the ethics of care, which is why Hume was found to fall where he did on Kohlberg's scale. Caring is the mechanism by which one can move from having an idea about, e.g., the plight of another, to experiencing an emotion which may then give rise to a desire and/or the motivation to act. There must be a means by which the ideas or knowledge we have of the lives of others move us. One must somehow be moved, for example, by seeing the plight of the homeless man begging on the street to feel compelled to come to his aid (or feel guilty for not doing so).

THE ETHICS OF CARE

A new focus in ethics, the ethics of care, has come into prominence only within the

¹⁰ Annette Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 190.

last dozen or so years.¹¹ While much of the working out and critique of the ethics of care has been done by feminists, it ought not to be thought that its ambit is limited to them. In fact, as we just saw, there is a way in which Hume's ideas can be seen to fit in with such a view, as well as can, I think, some of Aristotle's views on ethics. In this approach to ethics, the emotional aspect of caring is seen as central to one's ability to make sound moral judgments; caring both constitutes and reveals moral obligations. Those who promote an ethics of care warn that if we depend exclusively on rationality, while at the same time enforcing the exclusion of emotion, we will be impoverished with regard to moral knowledge and hence moral judgment. Real people in actual situations may require more than rational generalizable moral judgments.

Caring, empathy, feeling for others, being sensitive to each other's feelings—all may be better guides to what morality requires in actual contexts than may abstract rules of reason or rational calculation.¹²

I will argue that an ethics of care lends support to my view that emotion plays a useful role in morality.

Margaret O. Little argues that the inability to see the necessity of emotion (and desire) in morality is the result, in part, of a trope in our intellectual history. As we just saw, Hume tries to derail this notion by claiming that each plays a different but necessary role, and that reason shouldn't be thought of as more valuable to us than passion. However, doctrines developed during the Enlightenment pit reason against emotion,

¹¹ Alison M. Jaggar, "Caring as a Feminist Practice in Moral Reason," in Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, edited by Virginia Held (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 179.

¹² Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 52.

valorizing reason over emotion¹³ and these often hold sway even now (cf. Lutz and Scheman in Chapter Three).

there is a tendency to view emotion and desire with deep suspicion ... something that infects, renders impure, and constantly threatens to disrupt—particularly in the epistemic arena.¹⁴

This has led to what Little terms a 'bureaucratic model of morality,' i.e., reason makes a moral judgment which is then passed down the line to emotion, which issues, or not, the appropriate response. On this scenario, reason is responsible for the existence of a moral judgment and emotion and desire only come along later, if at all, to help one to do, as one has already determined by reason, one ought. One can come to see one's duty solely as a result of a rational process. The only possible role emotion might play is that of motivator.

Little argues that this way of depicting the process of making moral judgments is incomplete. On her view, emotion and desire play a necessary epistemic role in our ability to make moral judgments in the first place; they are essential for gaining moral knowledge. Emotions (and desires) are not simply what motivates action following such judgments. In order for us even to begin to engage in moral deliberation about a given situation, we must be able to pick out certain features as salient. This ability is dependent on affect: "What one is attentive to reflects one's interests, desires, in brief, what one *cares* about."¹⁵ Others have argued that caring allows us to note and take into account the particularity, unique individuality and needs of others, hence their position vis à vis us. Rather than viewing each person as equally interchangeable with any and every other person, particularity and individuality must be taken into account.

¹³ Margaret Olivia Little, "Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology," *Hypatia*, vol. 10 (Summer, 1995), p. 119.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

If the others I need to understand really are actual others in a particular case at hand, and not repeatable instances or replaceable occupants of a general status, they will require of me an understanding of their/our story and its concrete detail.¹⁶

Along with others,¹⁷ Little is arguing that emotions often operate as axiological and epistemic indices, pointing out to ourselves and others, the people or things we value, or care for. Those involved in the ethics of care argue that caring for or about someone or something ensures the attentiveness necessary to good moral judgment.¹⁸ If I care about or am interested in someone's welfare, I will be primed, for example, to note transgressions against them. Part of this kind of attentiveness is the result of my paying attention to their particular characteristics, needs, emotions, etc. Such emotions toward others keep us poised to act or react on their behalf. "The moral relevance of attentiveness belies the adequacy of the abstract, exchange-oriented individual as the moral subject."¹⁹

Questions have been raised about whether or not certain sorts of relationships give rise to special obligations. Ought I to favor the people I favor? In other words, does or should caring about or for another impact on the moral judgments I make? A popular example often discussed is the situation in which there are two drowning children, one's own child and a stranger's child. Is there any extra obligation on the part of a parent to save her own child first? What if it is possible to only rescue one child, or if the stranger's

¹⁶ Margaret Urban Walker, "Moral Understandings: Alternative 'Epistemology' for a Feminist Ethics," *Hypatia*, p. 18.

¹⁷ Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, *Valuing Emotions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Virginia Held, *Feminist Morality*; Joan Tronto, "Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality from Caring," in *Justice and Care*, ed. V. Held.

¹⁸ Margaret Olivia Little, "Seeing and Caring," *Hypatia*, p. 123.

¹⁹ Joan Tronto, "Women and Caring," in *Justice and Care*, ed. V. Held, p. 112.

child is closer? Based on the fact that, presumably, one cares for and about one's own child more than that of a stranger, ought one to make the moral judgment to save one's own child first? If we argue that emotions should be banned from such judgments and the actions which follow, then my caring for my child should not enter into it. An ethics of care would propose that such interest or caring which results in and from emotions is prior to and aids in one's ability to make a moral judgment in the first place. Without caring about others in general, why would I judge rescuing a stranger's child or anyone, at some risk to myself, to be morally required of me?

A Kantian might respond by noting that rescuing one's own child before any others could be seen as a duty, one which we could agree ought to be universalized. We do seem to believe that people have special duties with respect to their children, even if such duties are not universally fulfilled. The duty to rescue one's own child or children preferentially may even number among these special child-related duties. However, what reasons could a Kantian appeal to in order to justify the existence of such a duty? Perhaps one might suggest universalizing indifference toward one's child in such circumstances would be inconsistent with the duty created by bringing a child into the world. However, this move is incomplete unless one is willing to agree that adoptive parents or guardians do not then have the same moral duties toward their children as biological parents. One might argue that such a duty originates from a concomitant duty to do everything possible to, e.g., maintain one's genetic line; guarantee aid to oneself in one's elder years; provide one's child with enough life to gain wisdom. While one may well desire that these things come to pass (although clearly the child's survival does not guarantee that they will), such desires don't seem to generate the force of a moral duty. Wouldn't it be necessary for there to be something more than the expected fulfillment of a parent's desires? I think more is needed than just the calculation of desires to generate such a (or perhaps any) moral rule.

We might agree, universally, that special

relationships such as being a parent entail certain duties toward our children, but this moral precept cannot then bring us any closer to how to engage in the practice of caring in a moral way.²⁰

In the case above, I think it can be argued that emotion plays a part, despite the deontologists²¹ desire to ban it. We need more than the abstract notion of duties, emotion must be involved. In a situation such as this, one is faced with a tragic choice. In cases where it is impossible to avoid loss of life, a determination of which life to save must be made. At the very least, an ethics of justice would dictate that an equality exists with respect to these children as discrete individuals. Viewing the children only in these terms leads one to conclude that it is irrelevant, morally, that the person standing on the river bank happens to be one child's parent. However, I think this seems right from only one perspective, that of the child whose parent is not there. If I am in need of rescue, as desperately as the person next to me, it seems unfair that a mere contingency should tip the outcome in favor of that other person. The contingent fact that the person on the river bank happens to be the other person's parent ought not to determine who gets rescued. Surely such a contingent fact cannot be morally relevant? But, what if it is my parent who is on the river bank, don't I, because of our special relationship, have expectations of my parent that the stranger next to me cannot share? As the parent on the river bank, I am motivated by my love for my child to rescue her, but am I not also obligated to do so because of our relationship? Is there more here than simply a feeling of obligation, stemming from my love for my child, am I not also morally obligated, on the basis of my relationship, to rescue my own child first, or perhaps only? I would argue that in a relationship of trust, such as that of a parent and child, one has the moral obligation to try to help one's child

²⁰ Ibid., p. 104.

²¹ I do not mean to suggest by this that every deontologist wishes to exclude all emotion.

first. I think this sort of obligation applies in other relationships also. For example, I will have a greater obligation to rescue my best friend's child, or a friend of my child's whom I know very well, before a stranger's child. In these cases, my being in some way connected with these children through a preexisting relationship such that they trust me to care and look out for them, morally obligates me to rescue them first.

If caring can give rise to and/or lead one to see one's moral obligations and motivate one's actions as a result of its emphasis on actual others and our connections to them, then we ought to find a way to instill such caring into all members of society.

In emphasizing moral interdependency over moral autonomy, the ethics of care provides the kind of theoretical focus that could make education and the social determinants of moral knowledge salient.²²

I would argue that those who unswervingly do the right thing in the right way, are successful because they both think about things in the right way and have the right emotions. Those who are, for example, moved only by fear of reprisal, are willing to transgress when they believe they can get away with it. They are not motivated to do the right thing for its own sake, nor do they care about how their actions affect others; they merely behave prudentially with respect to their own well being. I have been arguing that the emotions related to caring about and for others can play a useful role in our coming to see where our moral obligations lie, as well as motivate us to fulfill those obligations. Nevertheless, even those operating only from fear still care on some level; they care enough for and about themselves to behave when others are watching.

Aristotle also felt very strongly that to ensure people behave virtuously, i.e., do the right thing, they need to be properly educated. More specifically, they need to be brought up in such a way that they will develop the right sort of character. Acquiring such a

²² Cheshire Calhoun, "Justice, Care, Gender Bias," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 85, no. 9 (September, 1988), p. 458.

character makes it possible for adults to be virtuous. "The character, then, must somehow be there already with a kinship to virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base."²³

I think Aristotle is right about this. People are not born knowing how to behave virtuously, knowing right from wrong. It is something which is taught. However, it is not enough just to teach right from wrong, i.e., to impart knowledge. One must also be taught how to feel (and perhaps what to desire). In order to be sure people will do the right thing, the training must start early in life, including being trained to experience the appropriate emotions in certain situations, and most importantly, for and about people. If, for example, a child is not encouraged to care enough for others (including animals) not to hurt them, it is likely that she will see nothing wrong with interactions others would consider morally offensive because of the harm they cause others. Unless these sorts of lessons are learned early, and learned well, one is not likely to 'hate what is base.' If one does not, one will not judge herself to be choosing the wrong course.

Aristotle's ethics of virtue gives a central role to emotion, without which virtue cannot be attained. In order to be a virtuous person, one must have the right passions for the right reason and at the proper intensity. To have too much, too little, or the wrong sort of emotion leads one into trouble, if not vice.

For those who are not angry at the things they should be angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons; ...²⁴

Some have made a case for the existence of moral emotions, viz., empathy and sympathy, suggesting it is they which allow us the 'inside edge,' enabling us to judge another, for example, to be miserable and thus in need of aid. I think caring, as an

²³ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by D. W. Ross, Introduction to Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1947), Bk. X. 9, 1179b30.

²⁴ Ibid., Bk. IV. 3, 1126a5.

umbrella term, can cover these. However, it is not only just being able to care that keeps us morally involved. As I suggested earlier, following Hume's notion of sympathy as a mechanism of communication, if we care, other emotions come into being as a result. Such things as anger, outrage even grief can help one to be in the right position to make a good moral judgment. While it is true that anger can get in the way, as can other emotions, it can also aid us. It has been noted that in some cases, until we are able to recognize that it is anger we are feeling, we are unable to see ourselves as being treated unfairly.²⁵ Anger is the affective judgment that we have been wronged, including morally wronged and so is necessary to seeing an action as one requiring moral sanctions for or against it. When one is indignant, either on one's own behalf or on behalf of another, it is because one affectively judges some action, or lack thereof to be morally deficient. In some cases indignation also seems called for in order to help motivate some action in response. Simple intellectual awareness of some transgression may not be enough.

Those who would bar emotions may agree that caring, or even hating, can 'perk up' one's attentiveness to every nuance of the actions of others, thereby putting us in the right position to make moral judgments. Yet they would claim this only shows that, at best, it is sometimes preferable to have certain emotions (and desires) so we won't fail to notice whom to praise or blame. But, they claim, emotions being helpful sometimes does not show them to be necessary to morality. However, I think the views discussed above help to make the case that our inherited tradition of valuing dispassionate intellectualizing can leave us impoverished epistemically and so unable to pick out what may be morally salient. Such views give us good reasons to dispel the opposition's claim that moral judgments can be made on purely intellectual grounds.

²⁵ Naomi Scheman, "Feeling Our Way Toward Moral Objectivity," in Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics, edited by Larry May, Marilyn Freidman and Andy Clark (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 227.

This is in line with the argument that one must have certain emotions and desires in order to be able to pick out moral properties. Using the example of cruelty, if one can distinguish between an action causing pain and an action being cruel, what allows one to make the judgment that an action is cruel, i.e., morally degenerate? To see the situation as cruel is to make an evaluation and to see the situation as in need of a response. To judge an action as cruel involves not only seeing that someone or thing is in pain, but also to think some action ought to be taken to stop it. This doesn't follow merely from noting that the action is causing pain. If one needs to be motivated to respond, "... then in order to 'see' the moral landscape clearly, in order to discern it fully and properly, one must have certain desires and emotions."²⁶

But couldn't one judge an action as due moral censure without experiencing emotion in relation to the agent or victim (barring an appeal to a general love for all humanity)? It seems reasonable to suppose that I could care very little for someone yet not fail to notice they were ill treated, believing they ought to be avenged. In an effort to meet this criticism Little argues that if we care, we will be better listeners, taking in all of the important details of an individual's particular narrative. "... [F]rom the valorized position of dispassionate detachment we are often actually less likely to pick up on what is morally salient."²⁷ and so may, following our example, not recognize a cruel act.

If we stand only on the intellectual plane, we may well miss something important. A lack of caring or 'fellow-feeling' may cause us to not listen carefully to an individual *qua* unique individual. When that occurs, we may not be in a good position to judge or act correctly. By not paying attention to others in the right way, we can fail to make the right, or any, moral judgment. "One of the few antidotes we have against these tendencies is

²⁶ Margaret Olivia Little, "Seeing and Caring," *Hypatia*, p. 127.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

listening from a stance of caring for the person herself."²⁸ Unless one cares about and can empathize with others, it might be more difficult to distinguish between an action merely causing pain and an action cruelly causing pain. If I couldn't care less about the person being tortured or if I have no regard for the rights of others, it is unlikely that I will see the action as cruel and so think I should try to get it stopped. I have argued that to suppose one can employ only rational thought in ethics leaves us in an impoverished position vis à vis moral knowledge and thus moral judgment, yet I have not advocated that we give up such thinking entirely. Thus, I am faced with a problem of compatibility. How can an ethics based on justice, i.e., a rationalist approach to ethics, (either deontological or teleological) one which eschews emotion and an ethics based on care which embraces it, work together?

In "Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason," Alison Jaggar notes that justice is meant to be blind to difference, it demands the universalizability of its dictates: they apply equally to everyone, regardless of individual differences, preferences, etc. The same cannot be said for an ethics of care. The unique, perhaps idiosyncratic differences between individuals can make different features morally salient; one cares unequally for many reasons. As a result of this difference, an interesting problem arises. Is it the case that justice and care are parts of the same value system, or do they represent opposing ideals such that when and if one mode is adopted, the other is backgrounded and vice versa?²⁹ While there are advocates of both positions, "[m]ost proponents of the ethics of care now dispute the possibility of an easy synthesis of care with justice"³⁰

Keeping this in mind, Jaggar raises some problems in the care tradition, which need

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Alison M. Jaggar, "Caring as a Feminist Practice in Moral Reason," in Justice and Care, ed. V. Held, p. 184.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 187.

to be addressed. One such problem is,

how we distinguish 'pseudo-needs' from 'real needs' by suggesting that 'genuine attentiveness,' ... is self-authenticating. From here, it is easy to slide into paternalism, authoritarianism, and dogmatism.³¹

If we think our caring about someone will automatically make us experts on what that individual really needs, we may be mistaken. The role we see ourselves playing can mask self-serving purposes, disguising them as care. For example, I might think that because I care about my students, I want them to do well. Thus, without warning, I call on them in class to answer questions, believing such an action to increase the likelihood of their being well prepared for class. I believe this is good for them, they need 'help' to ensure they complete the assigned reading. The fact that such a tactic might result in a student's public humiliation does not occur to me because I believe myself to be doing it for the good of my students. I want what's best for them because I care about them. My position of authority over my students and the professional autonomy granted me in conducting class, allow me to express my 'caring,' in my own way. The means I choose to help my students reach the goals I have set for them reflect my standards and ideology. In the same vein, another possible problem results from confusing one's own needs for those of another as in the situation where parents use their children to try to meet needs of their own.³²

Another problem Jaggar raises is that the focus on the particularity of individuals, the mark of an ethics of care, may cause us not to be able to see or account for the 'bigger picture' and so may lead to "... band-aid or social work approaches to moral problems rather than efforts to solve them institutionally or prevent their occurrence through social

³¹ Ibid., p. 189.

³² Joan Tronto, "Women and Caring," in Justice and Care, ed. V. Held, p. 106.

change."³³ Jagggar argues that attempting to export the ethics of care to deal with larger social issues, like homelessness, "... is incompatible with the characteristically interactive and personal relation that defines care thinking."³⁴ Although it makes for a slightly uneasy partnership, justice ought to have a place, thus allowing us to deal with such larger social inequities or problems of distribution. Care alone may not show general social practices to be morally deficient or offer equitable solutions.

This sort of problem is familiar. Focusing on the particular means one has to ignore the aggregate and vice versa. Moral theorists have often found this tension troublesome. The point of universalizing rules is to ignore the particularities of individuals and their unique circumstances, with the result that various conflicts can arise. For an individual, one's particular situation may, for example, make the universal rule seem untenable or make it impossible to choose among rules in the event of a clash among them. Utilitarianism, although it too has problems at the outer limits, is meant to best serve the aggregate, at times to the detriment of particular individuals. Some rights theories attempt to address these worries by making the particular individual salient but are also forced, at the outer limits, to consider the consequences for the aggregate--perhaps no right is ever absolute. The problems cited above for an ethic of care reflect a similar difficulty insofar as focus on individuality and particularity may, as Jagggar points out, avert one's gaze from larger social problems. What is clear is that our moral outlook has to have both a narrow and a wide focus and such a demand taxes any one point of view.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND MORALITY

Something else which is appealing about the view that emotions play a role in

³³ Alison M. Jagggar, "Caring as a Feminist Practice in Moral Reason," in Justice and Care, ed. V. Held, p. 196.

³⁴ Ibid.

morality is that such a view enables us to explain, and perhaps pose a solution to, certain moral transgressions. There are some individuals who cannot be held responsible for their actions because their psychological impairment compromises their ability to know that what they are doing is wrong. They may be deluded as to the nature of the situation at hand. Some may even be experiencing hallucinations and so be reacting to an inner 'reality,' which results from their mental illness. We think such individuals are unable to recognize that what they are doing is morally wrong—or morally right for that matter—because they are both epistemically and emotionally compromised.

However, there are other individuals, those we can label 'psychopaths,' about whom we believe "... whatever the nature of their disorder, know right from wrong and have the requisite self-control"³⁵ but commit crimes anyway. In such a case, the individual knows that doing X is considered morally wrong, could stop himself from doing X, but because of his pathology does so anyway. Such individuals don't care that they have transgressed and feel no guilt about their actions or the consequences of their actions. Psychopaths raise an interesting problem. They know that others consider what they are doing wrong, yet that doesn't deter them. I think one can argue that because these individuals are emotionally compromised, they fail to be moved by the knowledge that an act is considered wrong and so continue in the action. Part of what is missing is that they simply don't care—either about the fact that others consider the action wrong or about the people for whom their action has bad consequences.

Although the label of psychopath has been applied rather indiscriminately to various individuals, the psychiatrist Michael Craft suggests, among other things, that to diagnose psychopathy this feature must be present: "... a lack of feeling quality to other humans, described by some as affectionlessness and others as lovelessness. In extreme cases he

³⁵ John Deigh, "Empathy and Universalizability," in *Mind and Morals*, ed. May, Freidman and Clark, p. 201.

may be without feeling sense."³⁶ This is different from the case where what someone is doing is considered wrong, say molesting children, but manages to re-cast the world in his own mind such that he believes the children desire and consent to such interactions.

Psychopathic individuals, who because they can't feel the right way or perhaps any way about others or their own actions, commit wrongs, sometimes terrible wrongs. Even after they have committed such a wrong, they do not experience guilt or regret. There are individuals who are remarkable for their distinct lack of concern for those whom they have harmed. On the other hand, someone who is not a psychopath and transgresses, may feel guilty about her transgression and so be less likely to commit many such. I think it can be argued that it is because she cares about something, perhaps just following the moral code is enough, that she is able to feel guilty if she transgresses and that such caring will limit the episodes of transgression.

Thus, the impaired moral judgment of a psychopath can be explained by a paucity of emotions. If she is unable to feel obligated, disgraced, outraged, etc., her judgments and so her actions, will be askew.

Persons may have a high I.Q. and be able to articulate verbally the culture's moral rules, but if they cannot feel the emotional force of inner obligation, they can disregard all moral rules or arguments without a qualm.³⁷

It is possible that such a person is able, for example, to know intellectually that stealing is considered morally wrong and to recognize the consequences if everyone were to shoplift, yet not care nor worry about following through and not stealing the necklace. Without the ability to experience emotion, psychopaths are missing a crucial source of motivation.

³⁶ quoted from: Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer, The Lust to Kill: A Feminist Investigation of Sexual Murder (New York: New York University Press, 1987), p. 88.

³⁷ Sidney Callahan, "The Role of Emotion in Ethical Decisionmaking," Hastings Center Report (June/July, 1988), p. 10.

While the desire not to be caught and incarcerated could certainly motivate their behavior, I wouldn't think such habitual or learned prudentially determined behavior necessarily counts as moral behavior.

BAD OR FAULTY REASONING

Those who try to strengthen the case against the emotions playing a role in morality often focus on showing how emotions may taint our judgments. If a person lets her emotions take over, they can blind her. However, this is not reason enough to rule out entirely the possibility that emotions can or ought to play a role in the making of moral judgments. Indeed, I find the notion that we are very often blinded by emotion unconvincing, regardless of its popularity. I have argued that people are or certainly can be, more in control of their emotions than is sometimes supposed. If emotions are affective judgments, not physiological reactions, control is possible. For example, my despising David for his actions toward others won't necessarily cause me to fail to make the judgment that he was subsequently cruelly treated by the muggers who beat him. If I focus only on my hatred perhaps I might do so. But what does this amount too? Perhaps I fail to see the mugger's actions as cruel because I believe David deserves the pain he suffers—I experience *Schadenfreude*. Perhaps I believe the pain will somehow benefit him and so doesn't constitute a cruelty. What could make me believe this? Such a random event in David's life cannot be direct 'payback' for his bad deeds (unless one is thinking of it in terms of 'cosmic justice,' which raises other problems). The muggers don't know David is a nasty person and so cannot be acting against him in order to inflict a deserved punishment. It is also doubtful that such an event would benefit him by somehow teaching him a lesson. In fact, it is probable that for someone like him, such an event will increase the likelihood of his mistreating others, to 'get his own back.'

In such a case, if we 'conveniently' fail to take into account all the aspects of the

situation, including what we know about David's character, we won't think about what happened in the right way and will thereby experience an inappropriate emotion. Notice, it is how we think about the situation, the judgment we make, which is flawed. If we know something about someone which causes us to dislike them, we might not think about the situation in the right way. If knowing about someone is the source of our liking or respecting them, we probably won't fail to see the situation correctly. However, we might overcompensate in another circumstance. Interestingly, if we care about people in general, and see a stranger mugged and beaten, we are likely to see the action as cruel.

As I have indicated, the idea that we are very often completely taken over by our emotions and so fail to judge or act appropriately is to overstate the case. It isn't just the emotions that are blameworthy for our not getting it right. Beliefs and desires also play a role. In the example of David's mugging, I think it is hard to imagine most people actually failing to see the beating as cruel. Even those who dislike David intensely, who would like him subject to some sort of repercussions for his nastiness, are likely to feel badly about what happened to him. I think we believe that, in general, it is bad for people to be beaten, and always when the beating is undeserved.

How could hatred alone cause someone to fail to see the beating as cruel? There would also have to be a failure in one's thinking about the situation, or a failure to think at all. Since people don't usually stop thinking or making judgments when they experience an emotion, if there is a problem, it must be that the individual is not thinking properly. Someone who hates David, judges that he is therefore unworthy of being liked, and so sees the beating as deserved, so not cruel. In such a case, she would have to have something like the following in mind:

Those I hate on the grounds of their nastiness deserve any beating they get, even beatings which have nothing to do with their being nasty.

I think this shows a failure in reasoning not an instance of being blinded by an emotion.

It's not simply a matter of the emotions either causing her not to notice her incorrect reasoning, or directly causing her to reason incorrectly. Rather, her hatred is a cloak for her failure to reason properly, or perhaps a cloak for some desire. Undoubtedly our reasoning may be misdirected by our emotion, it is not unusual for our reasoning to be thrown off by the affective judgments we make—for good or for ill. What I am denying is the inevitability of this, such that emotion is then thought never to play a positive role in our ability to make moral judgments.

A case such as this shows, I think, that this person's reasoning, in itself, is poor. It is not a case of her emotions overwhelming her ability to reason well. I think that in this case, any amount of reflection whatsoever would lead to the conclusion that the beating was cruel. To not reach this conclusion points out a problem with the person's ability to reason properly. Hatred alone will not do it; it is a more complicated matter. I think those who are reasoning poorly, or who fail to take the time to think about things, may rely more on their emotions and so are more noticeably misdirected in their thinking. They are likely to claim that one can't help what one feels, thereby terminating all further analysis of the situation at hand. In such a situation they blame their emotions in order to justify the view they want to hold, even in the face of evidence which is contrary to such a view. It is not just her emotion causing her to quit analyzing the situation at hand, or even that her emotion is the main cause of her failure to go further; something else is also going on. At the outer edge of poor reasoners are those who suffer some sort of disorder and for them, it might well be easy to fail to see something like David's mugging as cruel. They have a very skewed view of things in general. In this case, we readily agree it is their thoughts as well as their emotions that are warping their view of the world. I think the idea that ordinary cases are very like these defective cases ought to be considered.

BERNARD WILLIAMS: INSIGHTS ON EMOTION AND MORALITY

Bernard Williams, in "Morality and the Emotions," blames a philosophical trope for the fact that not enough has been done on the connection between the emotions and moral philosophy. He thinks it is the result of attention being focused on the linguistic terms used in moral philosophy and the easy refutation of emotivism within that philosophical approach.³⁸ He revisits the theory of emotivism in order to cull from it some valuable insights and is thereby able to argue in favor of a connection between emotion and morality. His focus is on moral utterances, and so he claims,

a man who sincerely makes some moral utterance expresses his judgement of the situation, his beliefs about its merits, his moral outlook, his opinion, his feelings on the matter—possibly his intentions.³⁹

Williams takes people to be expressing not only what they believe about something but also how they feel about it, i.e., an emotion lies behind or is part of the moral judgment. While it is possible to make an insincere moral judgment, if one does so, he is not expressing his actual beliefs or feelings about the matter. Using William's example, someone can insincerely express the moral judgment that homosexuals ought to be flogged, to please an illiberal host.⁴⁰ The person expressing this judgment doesn't hold the beliefs and feelings about homosexuals that would be necessary in order for him sincerely to express such a moral judgment.

Williams thinks it is impossible to hold the strong claim that certain emotions are necessary to make a moral judgment, since an insincere moral judgment is a moral judgment nonetheless. However, the fact that certain emotions cannot be shown to be

³⁸ Bernard O. Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 208.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 217.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 218.

necessary does not mean they never play any role. It seems reasonable to suppose that an individual must have the right sort of underlying emotional structure to be able sincerely to make certain moral utterances.

in general, the display of feeling and the moral utterance will be taken together, and the strength of feeling displayed about the matter is generally taken as *one* criterion of the man's having a strong or serious moral view about it.⁴¹

What allows someone's utterance to be understood by another as expressing a moral judgment (whether sincerely or not) is the assumption on the part of the listener that the speaker has certain beliefs, desires and emotions.

The person trying to please his illiberal host is merely mouthing a moral judgment. He is not himself making this moral judgment about homosexuals and if he is expressing anything, he is deceitfully expressing someone else's moral judgment under the guise that it is his own. What makes him credible to the illiberal host is that he is mouthing what others, including the host, when speaking about this issue, do sincerely believe, desire and feel. He is, in a sense, doing an imitation of such a person who holds such beliefs and emotions. What makes it seem as if he himself is actually expressing a moral judgment when he makes such an utterance is that he is just acting as if he is the same as those who sincerely have these beliefs, desires and emotions concerning homosexuals.

I would argue that he is not actually expressing the moral judgment he utters. When he insincerely says homosexuals ought to be flogged, he only appears to be expressing a moral judgment. He gets away with it because there is a sincere version. The insincere version is parasitic upon the sincere version, which is where the beliefs, desires and emotions actually lie. This shows that emotions are part of holding and so expressing a moral judgment, not that one can express a moral judgment without them. If one doesn't

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 219.

have the right feelings about something, as in this case, he is merely stating what others can express. He doesn't actually share their convictions.

At the end of his paper Williams points out that if one wants to argue that emotions play a role in morality, one must inevitably face up to Kant. He and the tradition he engendered, are most responsible for our thinking emotion has no place in morality. Williams takes issue with what he sees as Kant's objections to "... the idea that any emotionally governed action by a man can contribute to our assessment of him as a moral agent ...".⁴² He suggests that, in part, it is Kant's crude view of the emotions that leads him to want them entirely expunged from morality. Kant mentions three features of emotion which he thinks rules out their playing any useful role, viz., they are passively experienced, too capricious, and although innate, unevenly distributed.⁴³

Kant's first two formulations of the categorical imperative have played a significant role in the way we think about morality. They form the foundation for the notion that there are such things as moral requirements which hold universally and that one ought always to treat others with respect. Kant believed these formulations and the resulting duties could be arrived at and followed by use of the intellect alone. Because he wants to eliminate the possibility of emotions or inclinations leading us to do the wrong thing, he bans them from the entire process. If one allows one's emotions or inclinations to be involved in making moral judgments, one is likely to be inconstant. He sees no role for emotion in aiding one to see why the formulations ought to hold nor in motivating one to follow their dictates.⁴⁴

I think the case he makes against emotion, arguing that only the categorical imperative be used to guide one's action, is similar to what we've seen already. It is the

⁴² Ibid., p. 226.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1948), p. 67; 78-79.

view that emotions ought not to play any role because sometimes they allow us to be led astray. As we have seen however, although we may be led astray, it is also the case that not having any emotion can lead us astray, making it important to include them. Williams thinks Kant is in error because trying "... to make each of us into a Supreme Legislator [is] a fantasy which represents, not the moral ideal, but the deification of man."⁴⁵ Kant is even unwilling to assign moral worth to the beneficent gestures of someone who has a 'sympathetic temper,' and enjoys spreading joy for its own sake.⁴⁶

I think it can even be argued that emotion factors into our ability to have any sort of regard for the categorical imperative in the first place. Kant claims that reason alone will cause us to see that the way we choose to act ought to be subject to universalizability and that when acting we ought never to treat another as a means only.⁴⁷ What allows us to be convinced that we should only choose actions which could be universalized, rather than be inconsistent? Why should we care whether or not what we choose to do could become a universal moral law governing the behavior of all? Kant reasons that we will, through the intellect alone, be able to determine what our duties are and then be able to follow through once we have rationally determined what they are. He worries that if we are not acting from duty, we will not have an overriding reason to carry out an action and might be pulled in some other direction by our emotions or desires. While he is correct in supposing that some people are pulled in the wrong direction by their emotions and their desires, he, like many others, doesn't credit emotion for turning us in the right direction, causing and/or helping us to think about this at all. Also, as has been pointed out previously, emotion may well be what motivates us to carry out the action dictated by a moral judgment. It is not

⁴⁵ Bernard O. Williams, Problems of the Self, p. 226.

⁴⁶ Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 66.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 93.

clear how reason alone could do so.

One might consider oneself, for example, momentarily exempt from the dictates of a moral rule in order to achieve what one desires, say the rule against telling lies. Kant's argument is that we cannot ever will to universalize the maxim that we tell a lie, since it would be inconsistent with the practice of truth telling it presupposes. However, a question can be raised: what justifies the practice of truth telling in the first place? On what grounds would I will that the practice of truth telling be universalized? I think that in order to justify the practice, there has to be an appeal to consequences. The implications of not adopting a general policy of truth telling are onerous, ones we would not desire, ones which would inevitably lead to much unhappiness. Thus, at this level, in order for Kant to answer the question, "Why ought I to agree that a certain practice be universalized?", it must be: I care how things turn out. If things would turn out badly from universalizing such a practice, either for myself, particular others, or society as a whole, I would not agree to it. If adopting a practice results, in general, in good consequences, I could agree that it ought to be adopted.

We must somehow care about, be interested in, or motivated to see the importance of doing the right thing for the right reasons. I know that if I were to tell a lie, the entire practice of truth telling would not collapse. While I must agree, rationally, that I cannot both will that everyone tell the truth and everyone not tell the truth, I must also care about the importance of the practice of truth telling.

Kant is correct in his assessment that barring emotions, inclinations and desires will eliminate some of the problems associated with inconstancy, although as I have noted, he goes too far with his total ban. Still, how is this likely to convince the average individual that one ought to fall in line with Kant's view? I think if individuals recognize not only inconsistencies, but furthermore can be brought to see the larger context such that their inconsistency can be made to have meaning for them in relation to others, they may be

motivated to apply the categorical imperative and follow through with its dictates. If individuals care about how they and others behave or ought to behave, they could be so motivated. Otherwise, I don't see on what grounds anyone could be convinced that inherently consistent moral rules are more important than the consequences for them, no matter what these rules may be. There must be some way to make people see what is important, they need to care about getting it right. In other words, both rationality and emotion play a useful role.

It is perhaps even easier to see how caring is involved in the second formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant claims our duty to treat all others as ends in themselves rests on the fact that we are all rational, and as rational individuals, we all have goals, etc. Without caring for anyone, or whether anyone achieves their goals, or caring enough to respect that one has the right to try to achieve one's goals, I'm not sure how we could be persuaded to never treat others as a means only.⁴⁸ I should think that a failure to care for and about others and their autonomy is sometimes what leads to transgressions against them. To care for and about others on an emotional level such that one is able to be compassionate or have sympathy seems to me far more likely to result in one coming to see why others ought never to be treated as a means only.

Many have noted that the second formulation which enjoins us to treat others as we would ourselves rationally will that we be treated, is much like the Golden Rule. We have to be able to put ourselves, even if marginally, in the position of the other person and then see how we would rationally will to be treated. This means we have to care, in that projection, what happens to us *qua* the other person. In other words, we must be able, at the very least, to empathize with the plight or good fortune of another to see how we ought to treat them. Even if we can't get to the point where we care about the other person, we

⁴⁸ Kant notes in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that this is a problem, but it is one for which he does not provide a solution.

can, in caring about what happens to ourselves, figure out what to do. Without any feeling whatsoever, caring or empathizing, it's hard to see how Kant's moral agent is going to be able to get things right.

For similar reasons, teleological theories fare no better. On the teleological view, one must look to the consequences of actions or the motives to act in certain ways to see what would happen to oneself and to others. If the actions would lead to unwarranted pain and suffering say, such actions ought to be avoided by everyone. Undoubtedly there will be instances, as noted previously, where the tension between the individual and the aggregate is felt and this too will enter into one's decision. Nonetheless, I think what is of importance here is that one must somehow care both for and about oneself and others, even, in some cases, for future others. I have to care in the first place in order to be able to decide what I ought to do, which consequences are acceptable. In fact, as I have argued, it is sometimes because people just don't care that there are problems trying to get them to do the right thing. Problems occur when people don't care about how things would be if everyone were to act as they do. They fail to care about those who would be hurt now, and the future generations who will be harmed by current recklessness. I think that minimally, one must care about those others to be swayed by the notion that one has some sort of obligation toward them. One must care about them in the sense of recognizing how our present actions jeopardize their future well-being. However, we must also, in some sense, care for them, else how can we be moved to guarantee their future well-being?

CONCLUSION

I have been arguing that emotion must be included in any system of morality because reason alone can't do all the work. It alone cannot direct our attention to all that is morally salient, or obligatory, nor will it alone provide the motivation for behaving in an ethically correct way. Our reasoning powers have to have something to work with and

utilizing only the facts about, for example consequences, doesn't seem to me to be enough; we also need to care. The recognition that the adoption of a given maxim would amount to our being inconsistent may not provide the impetus to not transgress. Something more than information must be communicated to the person viewing the situation, etc., in order for a moral judgment to be made.

Like Hume, I think there must be some means by which we can come to see the situation of another in such a way that allows us to recognize what needs to be done for them. Sympathy or caring, as actual emotions or as the means by which we come to have other emotions, seem promising. Admittedly, this approach has its problems. For example, we might identify too strongly with someone and so be unable to help them as effectively as someone who is less involved. At the same time, to be unable to fathom their plight on an emotional level may well leave us unable even to notice that they need help. Those who are 'emotionally deformed' are unable to care about others, and so are able to, for example, use others as means to their own ends. If I lack the ability to pick up on the sentiments of others, or recognize the impact my actions may have on them, my ability to act in the right way will be compromised. Knowing what justice requires is no guarantee that one will fulfill one's duty. One needs to be able to see a situation as requiring moral attention and I have argued that a dispassionate rational view of things may not always afford such insight.

CONCLUSION

Emotions are ubiquitous phenomena of human experience. I have argued emotions are affective judgments; the objects of our emotions constitute our surreality as well as result from it. If there were no emotion, our lives would be greatly impoverished, if not shortened. Although they may sometimes distract us, without emotion not only might we fail to notice when we are, for instance, morally obligated to come to someone's aid, we might fail to react to a dangerous situation and so be grievously harmed. Emotions play significant epistemic, axiological and motivational roles in our lives; were they nothing more than feelings they could not do this.

Attention is often paid only to the notorious reputation emotions have for landing us in some muddle or other, so much so in fact that at times people bemoan their very existence. As I have shown, this is the result of too narrow and negative a view of the effect they have on us. Such narrowness is the result of assuming as true what I have referred to as a commonsense view of emotion. This is the view that emotions are simply distinct sorts of feelings we experience and that when they hold sway, we cannot do other than as they dictate; reason flies out the window and emotion controls and rules.

It should now be clear that such a view of emotion is false and needs to be replaced with a cognitive view; emotions are affective judgments, not physiological responses. While it is the case that most of our emotional experiences are imbued with certain feelings, emotion is not the feeling. Without a judgment there is no emotion, whether or not feelings are present. It is an affective judgment which determines that and which emotion is present, not a feeling. Nonetheless, I have claimed that feelings are vitally important; they cause us to sit up and take notice. Feelings 'bump up' an experience so that it stands out in a way it might otherwise not; feelings make these judgments 'louder.' This feature makes

emotions different from other judgments, e.g., factual judgments and is also that by which emotions get themselves noticed more than other judgments; it makes them uniquely salient.

We are able to tell whether we are angry or excited or afraid even though, physiologically, the feelings we experience are much the same. It is the affective judgment which differentiates one state from another. If I am afraid, there is something which I judge to be dangerous. It is possible that because I am focusing on some other part of the experience I fail to notice that I am, for example, afraid—I am so totally involved in the rescue of a person drowning that I am not aware of my fear until after the situation is resolved. My mind was, as it were, elsewhere. I wasn't focusing on my fear, even though, in retrospect, I can say that I was afraid throughout the rescue—perhaps I was afraid that she would pull me under, drowning us both. It is also possible, given the same situation, that I was not afraid but exhilarated and happy. Her foolishness afforded me the opportunity to showcase my skills as a lifeguard.

The notion of the emotions as physiological responses opposed to thought or ideas has played out in the traditional split between reason and emotion. Reason is typically preferred over emotion since it is seen as utilizing a dispassionate intellect and emotion is thought to cause disequilibrium. The physiological upset leads to an inability to 'think straight.' To be emotionally involved renders one distracted. As I have argued, this is not always the case and focusing only on this is the result of too narrow a view of emotion. As affective judgments, emotions can serve as guides to what is valuable, what is worth pursuing and so on. They can indicate what and whom we care about, or ought to care about.

Rather than simply distracting our attention, emotion can focus it, making certain features of a situation, object or event stand out for us. Both reason and emotion are needed to operate successfully. While their scopes may differ, they work in tandem. They

may give rise to different sorts of judgments but the one does not work well in total isolation of the other. Those who suffer some sort of emotional deficit are not better off for lack of an emotional life. They may fail to take notice of things which could be important to them. As was pointed out, the victims of particular kinds of brain damage suffer axiological deficits and so are severely debilitated when their ability to experience emotion is hampered. Often those who remain coldly dispassionate experience the same deficiency.

Another complaint made against emotions is that they are too subjective. While it is the case that different people may well experience a different emotion in identical circumstances, this does not mean there is no account to be given for people's unique responses. Also, within a given community, there are liable to be many things which strike us similarly. Indeed, having knowledge of either the typical expressions of emotion, or even differences in emotions of a culture someone is from, may lead to a better understanding of their behavior.

In order to provide an explanation of the source of particular emotions, one may need to look at an individual's emotional history. The events experienced in one's life affect the content of a person's judgments. We judge as we do against a background of beliefs, desires, attitudes, etc., that are particularly and perhaps peculiarly ours. In order to explain the existence of an emotion, particularly when it seems aberrant given the situation, object or event, it is useful to look to an individual's history. This will result in our being able to explain the genesis and when necessary, the seemingly anomalous continuation, of an emotion. It is also clear that in order to more easily explain the behavior of others, it is essential to include emotions. To rely solely on an individual's beliefs and desires may make it more difficult to explain or predict their actions than it need be. Using emotion as a tool in explanation and prediction will allow one successfully to explain an individual's actions or predict future behavior. Although I think they have been somewhat overlooked, they are as useful in this respect as are beliefs and desires.

One's emotions and emotional repertoire can have a great effect on how one is viewed. While being able to maintain a 'cool head' is prized, so is the ability or willingness to experience compassion at the plight of another. I think we underestimate the extent to which there is the possibility of control over oneself with regard to the emotions experienced, not just in the expression of those which already exist. I also think more could and should be done in terms of inculcating and eradicating or toning down some emotions. Those which contribute most to human flourishing should get a boost, those which do not, ought to be discouraged.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abu-Lughod, Lila. Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles California: University of California Press, Ltd., 1986.
- Allers, Rudolph. "The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions." The Thomist 4 (October): 589-648, 1942.
- Alston, William. "Emotion and Feeling," Encyclopedia of Philosophy II, edited by Paul Edwards, New York and London: Macmillan, 1967.
- Árdal, Páll S. Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966.
- Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle. Translated into English Under the Editorship of W. D. Ross, Vol. XI Rhetorica, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross. In Introduction to Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1947.
- Armon-Jones, Claire. Varieties of Affect. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- Arnold, Magda B., ed. The Nature of Emotion: Selected Readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
- Arnold, Magda B., ed. Loyola Symposium on Feelings and Emotions. New York: Academic Press, 1970.
- Arnold, Magda B. "Perennial Problems in the Field of Emotion." In Loyola Symposium: Feelings and Emotions, edited by Magda B. Arnold. New York: Academic Press, 1970.
- Ashton-Jones, Evelyn and Olson, Gary A., ed. The Gender Reader. Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1991.
- Austin, J.L. "Pretending." In Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Averill, James R. "Emotions Are Many Splendored Things." In The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, edited by Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Baier, Annette. Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

- Baier, Annette. "The Need for More Than Justice." In Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics, edited by Annette Baier. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Baier, Annette. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Baier, Annette. "What Emotions are About." In Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 4, Action Theory and Philosophy, edited by James Tomberlin. California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1990.
- Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron. "Envy and Jealousy." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1990): 487-516.
- Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron. "The Nature of Emotions." Philosophical Studies 52 (1987): 393-409.
- Bradshaw, Carla K. "A Japanese View of Dependency: What Can Amae Psychology Contribute to Feminist Theory and Therapy?" Women and Therapy 9, 1-2 (1990): 67-86.
- Briggs, Jean L. Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Broad, C. D. "Emotion and Sentiment." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism XIII (1954): 202-214.
- Brody, Leslie R. and Hall, Judith A. "Gender and Emotion." In Handbook of Emotions, edited by Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland. New York: The Guilford Press, 1993.
- Brownmiller, Susan. Femininity. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.
- Calhoun, Cheshire. "Justice, Care, Gender Bias." The Journal of Philosophy 85, 9, (September 1988): 451-463.
- Callahan, Sidney. "The Role of Emotion in Ethical Decision Making." Hastings Center Report (June/July 1988): 9-14.
- Cameron, Deborah and Fraser, Elizabeth. The Lust to Kill: A Feminist Investigation of Sexual Murder. New York: New York University Press, 1987.
- Candland, Douglas K. ed. Emotion: Bodily Change. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1962.
- Carnap, Rudolph. "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology." In Meaning and Necessity, edited by Rudolph Carnap. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956.
- Chodorow, Nancy. The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Cohon, Rachel. "Hume and Humeanism in Ethics." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69, 2 (1988): 99-116.

Cole, Johnnetta B. "Commonalities and Differences." In All American Women: Lines That Divide, Ties That Bind, edited by Johnnetta B. Cole. New York: The Free Press, 1986.

Cole, Johnnetta B., ed. All American Women: Lines That Divide, Ties That Bind. New York: The Free Press, 1986.

Collins, Arthur. "Unconscious Belief." The Journal of Philosophy LXVI, 20 (October 1969): 667-680.

Darwin, Charles. The Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896.

Damasio, Antonio R. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994.

Davis, Teresa L. "Gender Differences in Masking Negative Emotions: Ability or Motivation?" Developmental Psychology 31, 4 (1995): 660-667.

de Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. Translated and edited by H. M. Parshley, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953.

De George, Richard T. Business Ethics. Fourth Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995.

Deigh, John. "Empathy and Universalizability." In Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics, edited by Larry May, Marilyn Freidman and Andy Clark. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996.

Dennett, Daniel C. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987.

Dennett, Daniel C. "Intentional Systems." The Journal of Philosophy 68, 4 (February 1971): 87-106.

Dennett, Daniel C. "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works." In The Nature of Mind, edited by D. M. Rosenthal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Dennett, Daniel C. "Real Patterns." The Journal of Philosophy 88, 1 (January 1991): 27-51.

de Sousa, Ronald. "The Good and the True." Mind 88 (October 1974): 534-551.

de Sousa, Ronald. The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge: The MIT Press, [1987] 1990.

de Sousa, Ronald. "The Rationality of Emotions." In Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.

Eckman, Paul. "Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of Emotions." In Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Los Angeles: University of California Press, Ltd., 1980.

- Ekman, Paul and Davidson, Richard J., eds. The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Elster, Jon. "Rationality, Emotions, and Social Norms." Synthese 98, 2 (January 1994): 21-49.
- Fabes, Richard A. and Martin, Carol Lynn. "Gender and Age Stereotypes of Emotionality." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17, 5 (October 1991): 532-540.
- Firestone, Shulamith. The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution. New York: Morrow, 1970.
- Fodor, Jerry A. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981.
- Fodor, Jerry A. and Lepore, Ernest. Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1992.
- Fricker, Miranda. "Reason and Emotion." Radical Philosophy 57 (Spring 1991): 14-19.
- Frijda, Nico H. "Emotions Are Functional Most of the Time." In The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, edited by Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Gaylin, Willard. Feelings: Our Vital Signs. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.
- Gaylin, Willard. The Rage Within: Anger in Modern Life. New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1989 (1984).
- Gibbard, Allan. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Gilbert, Lucy and Webster, Paula. Bound by Love: The Sweet Trap of Daughterhood. Boston: Beacon Press, 1982.
- Gilligan, Carol. In A Different Voice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Goleman, Daniel. Emotional Intelligence. New York: Bantam Books, 1995.
- Goodman, S. H., et. al. "Social and Emotional Competence in Children of Depressed Mothers." Child Development 64, 2 (April 1993): 516-531.
- Gordon, Robert M. "Judgmental Emotions." Analysis 34, 2 (December 1973): 40-48.
- Gordon, Robert M. "The Aboutness of Emotions." American Philosophical Quarterly 11, 1 (January 1974): 27-36.
- Gordon, Robert M. The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

- Gordon, Robert M. "Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator." Ethics 105 (July 1995): 727-742.
- Green, O. H. "The Expression of Emotion." Mind (July 1970): 551-568.
- Greenspan, Patricia. 1980. "A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion." In Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.
- Greenspan, Patricia. Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification. New York: Routledge. 1988.
- Greenwood, John D. "The Social Constitution of Emotion." New Ideas in Psychology 10, 1 (1992): 1-18
- Grimshaw, Jean. Philosophy and Feminist Thinking. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
- Hanen, Marsha and Nielsen, Kai, eds. Science, Morality and Feminist Theory. Supplementary Volume 13, Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Calgary, Alberta: The University of Calgary Press, 1987.
- Hanson, Norwood R. Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
- Harré, Rom. "An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint." In The Social Construction of Emotions, edited by Rom Harré, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986.
- Harré, Rom, ed. The Social Construction of Emotions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986.
- Harrison, Bernard. "Moral Judgment, Action and Emotion." Philosophy 59, 229 (July 1984): 295-321.
- Hawkesworth, M. E. "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth." Signs 14, 3 (1989): 536.
- Held, Virginia. Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- Held, Virginia, ed. Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.
- Helm, Bennett W. "The Significance of Emotions." American Philosophical Quarterly 31, 4 (October 1994): 319-331.
- Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Hundert, Edward M. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Neuroscience: Three Approaches to the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. V

- Irani, K. D. and Myers, G. E. eds. Emotions: Philosophical Studies Volume 2, Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Haven Publishing Corporation, 1983.
- Jaggar, Alison M. 1995 "Caring as a Feminist Practice in Moral Reason." In Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, edited by Virginia Held, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.
- Jaggar, Alison M. "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology." Inquiry 32 (June 1989): 151-176.
- Jaggar, Alison M. 1987. "Sex Inequality and Bias in Sex Differences Research." In Science, Morality and Feminist Theory, edited by Marsh Hanen Marsha and Kai Nielsen. Supplementary Volume 13, Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Calgary, Alberta: The University of Calgary Press, 1987.
- Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by H. J. Paton. New York: Harper & Row, 1948.
- Kenny, Anthony. Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963.
- Koestler, Arthur. The Ghost in the Machine. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967.
- Koestler, Arthur. The Heel of Achilles: Essays 1968-1973. New York: Random House, 1974.
- Kosman, L. A. "Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics." In Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Second Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
- Kraut, Richard. "Two Conceptions of Happiness." The Philosophical Review 88, 2 (April 1979): 167-197
- Lear, Jonathan. Love and its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis. New York: Noonday Press, 1990.
- Little, Margaret Olivia. "Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology." Hypatia 10 (Summer 1995): 117-37.
- Lloyd, Genevieve. The Man of Reason. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
- Lutz, Catherine. "Emotion, Thought, and Estrangement: Emotion as a Cultural Category." Journal of the Society for Cultural Anthropology 1 (1986): 287-309.
- Lutz, Catherine. Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.
- Lyons, William. Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

- Lyons, William. "Emotions and Feelings." Ratio XIX, 1 (June 1977): 1-12.
- Lyons, William. "Emotions and Motives." Canadian Journal of Philosophy VI, 3 (September 1976): 501-516.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. Against the Self-Images of the Ages. London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 1971.
- McCoy, Marshall. "Domestic Violence: Clues to Victimization." Annals of Emergency Medicine 27,6 (June 1996): 264-765.
- McCullagh, C. Behan. "The Rationality of Emotions and of Emotional Behaviour." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68, 1 (March 1990): 44-58.
- McDowell, John. "Virtue and Reason." The Monist 62, 3 (1979): 331-350.
- McGill, V. J. Emotion and Reason. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1954.
- May, Larry; Freidman, Marilyn and Clark, Andy, eds. Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966.
- Mercer, Philip. Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between Sympathy and Morality with Special Reference to Hume's Treatise. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Midgley, Mary. "The Flight from Blame." Philosophy 62, 241 (July 1987): 271-291.
- Morsbach, H. and Tyler, W. J. 1986. "A Japanese Emotion: *Amae*." In The Social Construction of Emotions, edited by Rom Harré, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986.
- Ortony, Andrew; Clore, Gerald L. and Collins, Allan. The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Panksepp, Jaak. "Toward a General Psychobiological Theory of Emotions." The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (1982): 407-467.
- Parsons, Howard L. "Reason and Affect: Some of Their Relations and Functions." The Journal of Philosophy LV, 6 (March 1958): 221-230.
- Parsons, Howard L. "Reason, Affect, and Value." Educational Theory IX, 2 (April 1959): 65-75.
- Peters, Richard S. 1970. "The Education of the Emotions." In Loyola Symposium: Feelings and Emotions, edited by Magda B. Arnold. New York: Academic Press, 1970.
- Peters, R. S. and Mace, C. E. "VII - Emotions and the Category of Passivity." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series, 62, 1961-1962: 117-142.

Piaget, Jean. Intelligence and Affectivity: Their Relationship During Child Development. Annual Reviews Monograph, translated and edited by T. A. Brown and C. E. Kaegi. (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews Inc., 1981).

Radke-Yarrow, et al. "Affective Interactions of Depressed and Nondepressed Mothers and Their Children." Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 21, 6 (December 1993): 683-695.

Radke-Yarrow, M., et al. "Young Children of Affectively Ill Parents: A Longitudinal Study of Psychosocial Development." Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 31, 1 (January 1992): 68-77.

Robinson, Jenefer. "Emotion, Judgment, and Desire." The Journal of Philosophy 80, 11 (November 1983): 731-741.

Robinson, Jenefer. "Startle." The Journal of Philosophy 92, 2 (February 1995): 53-74.

Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg. "Explaining Emotions." In Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.

Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg. ed. Explaining Emotions. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.

Roseman, Ira J., et al., "Cultural Differences and Cross-Cultural Similarities in Appraisals and Emotional Responses." Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 26, (January 1995): 23-48.

Rosenthal, David M. ed. The Nature of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Rossmann, Neil. Consciousness: Separation and Integration. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991.

Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Emotions: A Sketch of a Theory. Translated by B. Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism and Human Emotions. New York: Citadel Press, [1957] 1990.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism and Humanism. Translated by Philip Mairet, London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1948.

Schachter, Stanley. "The Assumption of Identity and Peripheralist-Centralist Controversies in Motivation and Emotion." In Loyola Symposium: Feelings and Emotions, edited by Magda B. Arnold. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Scheff, Tomas J. and Retzinger, Suzanne M. Emotions and Violence, Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991.

- Scheman, Naomi. "Feeling Our Way Toward Moral Objectivity." In Mind and Morals: Essays on Cognitive Science and Ethics, edited by Larry May, Marilyn Freidman and Andy Clark. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996.
- Shaffer, Jerome A. "An Assessment of Emotion." Philosophical Quarterly 20, 2 (April 1983): 161-173.
- Solomon, Robert C. "Emotions and Anthropology: The Logic of Emotional World Views." Inquiry 21 (Summer 1978): 181-99.
- Solomon, Robert C. "Emotions and Choice." In Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.
- Solomon, Robert C. "Emotions' Mysterious Objects." In Emotions: Philosophical Studies, edited by K. D. Irani, and G. E. Myers. Volume 2, Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Haven Publishing Corporation, 1983.
- Solomon, Robert C. "On Emotions as Judgments." American Philosophical Quarterly 25, 2 (April 1988): 183-191.
- Solomon, Robert C. Love: Emotion, Myth and Metaphor. Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1981.
- Solomon, Robert C. The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.
- Solomon, Robert C. The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion. Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976.
- Solomon, Robert C. "The Rationality Of Emotions." The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 8 (Summer 1977): 105-114.
- Solomon, Robert and Calhoun, Cheshire. What is an Emotion: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Stocker, Michael. Plural and Conflicting Values. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- Stocker, Michael. "Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology." The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 738-752.
- Stocker, Michael. "Emotional Thoughts." American Philosophical Quarterly 25, 1 (January 1987): 59-69.
- Stocker, Michael. "How Emotions Reveal Value." Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse. Photocopy.
- Stocker, Michael. "Intellectual Desire, Emotion, and Action." In Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.
- Stocker, Michael. "Psychic Feelings: Their Importance and Irreducibility." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61, 1 (March 1983): 5-26.

- Stocker, Michael and Hegeman, Elizabeth. Valuing Emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Stoppard, Janet M. and Gruchy, Carla D. Gunn. "Gender, Context, and Expression of Positive Emotion." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19, 2 (April 1993): 143-150.
- Taylor, Gabriele. "Justifying the Emotions." Mind 84, 33 (July 1975): 390-402
- Tomberlin, James E., ed. Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 4, Action Theory and Philosophy. California, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1990.
- Tronto, Joan C. "Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality from Caring?" In Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, edited by Virginia Held, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.
- Walker, Margaret Urban. "Moral Understandings: Alternative 'Epistemology' for a Feminist Ethics." Hypatia 4, 2 (Summer 1989): 15-28.
- Warner, Richard. "Enjoyment." The Philosophical Review 4, (October 1980): 507-526.
- Weber, Alden O. and Rapaport, David. "Teleology and the Emotions." Philosophy of Science 8, 1 (January 1941): 69-82.
- Williams, Bernard O. Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- Wollheim, Richard and Hopkins, James. Philosophical Essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982.
- Wollheim, Richard. Sigmund Freud. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971 .