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SYNTHETIC VISION: A STUDY OF ELIZABETHAN JUSTICE AND THE  
STRUCTURE OF RENAISSANCE GENRE

*City University of New York*

PH.D.

1980

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SYNTHETIC VISION: A STUDY OF ELIZABETHAN JUSTICE  
AND THE STRUCTURE OF RENAISSANCE GENRE

by

BERNARD YAECER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate  
Faculty in English in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
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1979

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## Abstract

### SYNTHETIC VISION: A STUDY OF ELIZABETHAN JUSTICE AND THE STRUCTURE OF RENAISSANCE GENRE

by

BERNARD YAEGER

Adviser: Professor Angus Fletcher

Georg Lukács in The Theory of the Novel attempted to determine the extent to which historico-philosophical viewpoint shapes literary genre. Lukács' aim was to discover what it is about the modern world that leads to a reformulation of epic into the novel. His position, ultimately, is that the novel is a fragmented form, and that its structural problems are "the mirror-image of a world gone out of joint". Lukács himself soon came to regard The Theory of the Novel as a failure. But surely it is a magnificent failure, a seminal work which establishes the historico-philosophic world view surrounding a work as a precondition for at least the nature of any given genre.

The interrelationship of world view and generic structure may be regarded from both ends: one may consider the structure of genre with a view toward understanding the

historico-philosophic milieu, or vice versa. My direction is essentially that of the latter, though the former procedure will also occasionally be followed. But specifically: It is my contention that we will only fully understand the literature of the last decades of Elizabeth's reign if we recognize the nature of the historico-philosophic world view which nurtured that literature and in part determined the structure of Renaissance genre.

But there is a third element: consider the influence of subject-matter on generic structure. Friendship as subject may predispose generic structure to alternating images of union and separation; universal harmony may give rise to images of ritual communal dancing, may shape metrical structure as a mirror of universal harmony; meaningless universe as subject may involve structure and imagery as paradox or structure of form transformed to--amorphous, formlessness as formal mirror of the subject. Here subject-matter rather than world view is the shaping principle.

No formal structure is totally free of the influence of both world view and subject-matter, and world view and subject-matter must be influenced likewise by genre. By the very act of creation through the novel, one is hard-pressed to posit a world view that is other than ironic. Genre likewise shapes subject-matter. That is, subject-matter is delimited by the nature of the form which contains it. If lyric is to remain lyric, it must project

its subject-matter not as conceptual abstraction but as concrete image; it must contain that image as stasis and avoid animation of the image, for such is the action of the mythopoeic lyric which becomes epic.

But at what point does the mythopoeic lyric become epical? And what taxonomy can adequately contain Song of Myself, the lyric epic? The fact is we don't have answers to these questions because generic categories are not so absolute as I have implied, nor is our critical vocabulary so precise as we ordinarily suppose. What is required is judiciousness, the recognition that any work may transcend generic theories without discrediting the general validity of those theories.

My contentions are essentially general theories whose validity is established by the abundance of evidence which led to their formulation: viz., the works of the last decades of the Elizabethan age reflect the world view of a given subject. The subject with which this study is concerned is justice. Most specifically, then, it is my contention that the historico-philosophic conception of justice at this time is mirrored in the imagery, agency, themes, and structures of the primary forms, epic, drama, lyric, centrally concerned with justice.

I should like to acknowledge the assistance of those whose efforts enabled me to develop and complete this work: John Hollander, who directed by interests toward genre theory; Angus Fletcher, who patiently and pleasantly supervised the work, and whose suggestions were most helpful; Samuel Mintz, who carefully read and criticized the work, who offered several fruitful avenues of research, and whose kind letters of praise always inspired me to resume the arduous though rewarding task. I should like also to acknowledge the immeasurable assistance I received years ago from the late Norman Silverstein of Queens College, whose influence was profound. And finally, I should like to try to acknowledge the assistance I have always received from my father, who unhappily did not see the completion of this work.

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The themes, topos, and symbols of the literature of Elizabethan England have long been regarded in relation to the Elizabethan milieu, and the primary genres have likewise received much attention both from developmental and structural points of view; but while both historicist and formalist positions have been expressed, each has toiled in separate fields. What criticism of Renaissance literature lacks are historicist-formalist joint endeavors, attempts to analyze formal structures of Elizabethan literature and their relationship to the Renaissance world view.

There have been many, of course, who have been concerned about the general relationship between genre, form, structure and Weltanschauung. Frank Kermode in The Sense of an Ending argues that "there must be a link between the forms of literature and other ways in which . . . 'we try to give some kind of order and design to the past, the present and the future'"<sup>1</sup>. He quotes Iris Murdoch ("since reality is incomplete, art must not be too afraid of incompleteness") to support his argument that literary form reflects world view.<sup>2</sup>

Kenneth Burke in The Philosophy of Literary Form argues that structures are no less symbolic of Weltanschauung than is the adoption of a dramatic rôle a symbolic act; Burke goes on to use a biological metaphor of poem as anatomical structure corresponding to world view in the poet as physiological function to demonstrate the relationship

of structure and world view.<sup>3</sup> In Language as Symbolic Action Burke recapitulates this view, referring to literature as a piece of symbolicity, i.e., poem as symbolic reflection of a writer's "social embarrassments, physical ills, and mental aberrations"--that is, a writer's world view.<sup>4</sup> He later remarks that the distinct structural principle that makes manifest a world view is repeated throughout the work,<sup>5</sup> becomes a principle of internal consistency,<sup>6</sup> suggesting a kind of fecundity, a richness of impulse compelling, imposing a world view on structure. Indeed, the structural principle of internal consistency, referred to by Burke as the "repetitive" principle, is a sine qua non of formal criticism, the recognition of which is essential to understanding a work and its milieu.

Ernst Cassirer likewise recognizes forms, structures, the "diversity of language" as reflections, indeed "discoveries" of world view, and as concrete universals symbolizing, interpreting, making manifest changing world views.<sup>7</sup> Cassirer's essential view, however, may be best determined by considering the following quotation from his Kants Leben und Lehre: "'A work of art is an individual and distinct thing, something self-contained and possessing its own purpose within itself; yet there is at the same time represented in it a new "whole", a new total image of reality and of the spiritual cosmos'"<sup>8</sup>. Here the work of art is regarded from first a formalist and then a

historicist point of view, the organic, centripetal nature of art not excluding art as symbolic of a Zeitgeist. Although Cassirer does not mention the important word "form" here, it is clear from other references that he is referring essentially to form, to structure, speaking on other occasions of forms as "roads by which the spirit proceeds towards its objectivization, i.e., its self-revelation"<sup>9</sup>--form, that is, as manifestation of world view.

More concretely, in a recent article in PMLA, R. G. Peterson points to the concentric structure of Divina Commedia as thoroughly consistent with the function and theological Weltanschauung of the work.<sup>10</sup> Most importantly, Peterson refers to Campion to show that Renaissance poets were very much aware of structure as reflecting world view.<sup>11</sup>

Northrop Frye, perhaps the most comprehensive of modern critics, virtually begins his discussion of genres by frankly admitting the current puerile state of genre theory. Delineating the primary categories of literature, drama, epic, lyric, is the necessary first step, according to Aristotle. "We discover that the critical theory of genres is stuck precisely where Aristotle left it".<sup>12</sup> But Frye is determined to go beyond a mere taxonomy of genres. He makes clear that a genre may be structured in part according to the predilections of a writer, and, even more, according to a philosophy, a world view.<sup>13</sup> Further, he notes that literary form, structure, is both temporal (mythos or narrative) and spatial (dianoia or thematic), and that form is both shaping and containing form.

Generic structure, moreover, can be seen as a concrete universal, making manifest as both example and precept the historico-philosophic world view which nurtured it.<sup>14</sup> "The study of genres", he goes on, "is based on analogies in form", the central principle of which is that a poem is an imitation of nature, but "its ultimate object is to consider . . . the order of nature as a whole as imitated by a corresponding order of words".<sup>15</sup> The essential point here is that literary form is structured not merely as nature but that every feature of formal structure symbolizes the structure of the historico-philosophic milieu which nurtured it: "the new poem, like the new baby, is born into an already existing order of words, and is typical of the structure of poetry to which it is attached. The new baby is his own society appearing once again as a unit of individuality, and the new poem has a similar relation to its poetic society".<sup>16</sup>

Frye then turns these notions into a vehicle for archetypal criticism: "the narrative aspect of literature is a recurrent act of symbolic communication: in other words a ritual. Narrative is studied by the archetypal critic as ritual or imitation of human action as a whole, and not simply as a mimesis praxeos or imitation of an action".<sup>17</sup> What is really being suggested (with the help of Mircea Eliade<sup>18</sup>) is that forms, structures of literature reflect the fundamental world view that gave it its birth, whether that world view be consciously perceived by the artist or not. Frye refers to "the union of ritual and dream [mythos

and dianoia] in a form of verbal communication" as "myth".<sup>19</sup> By extension, then, literary structuring is an act of mythopoeia, and myth is a symbolic reflection of Weltanschauung. Again, therefore, form as reflection of world view is the predominant perception. But mythopoeia moves beyond direct reflections of reality. Many of the works of the late sixteenth century in England, for example, became almost entirely structurally symbolic of ritual and dream, becoming thereby anagogical poetics which take on the mythic feature of Apocalypse and revelation. Form now passes beyond reflection of world view to reflecting the essence of a prophetic moment.<sup>20</sup> Literature now becomes Apocalyptic revelation, almost scripture, and recapitulates the eternal act of creation in illo tempore, returning cyclically to a golden age in the infinite past.<sup>21</sup>

This is a far too brief précis of Frye's perceptions upon genre and structure developed throughout his Anatomy, but it is sufficient, I think, to distinguish his pre-occupation with the concept of literary structure as reflecting a world view, a Weltanschauung. Other notable critics have been similarly concerned. In Shakespearean Criticism Samuel Taylor Coleridge distinguished two kinds of formal construct: mechanic and organic. "The form is mechanic", Coleridge stated, "when on any given material we impress a pre-determined form not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material . . . . The organic form, on the other hand, is innate; it shapes as it develops

itself from within, and the fullness of its development is one and the same with the perfection of its outward form. Such is the life, such the form".<sup>22</sup> The statement stands as a formalist manifesto, placing, as it does, maximum importance upon formal development; less obvious is the fact that the Coleridgean position is essentially Aristotelian. That is, Aristotle's essential position in The Poetics is one of organic mimesis, so much so in fact that form, meter, and structure must be consistent with, must reflect the nature, manner and intention of the subject matter if the work of art is to be properly constructed--and Aristotle's Poetics is the very source of formalist criticism.<sup>23</sup>

But the last sentence of Coleridge's standpoint must be recognized as not only formalist but also historicist, for the "life" which becomes the "form" is itself molded by social, political, economic and intellectual milieux, by forces which impose themselves, consciously or sub-consciously, upon life, upon forms. (Friedrich Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music recognized the Aristotelian concept of imitation of nature as expressing essentially this, that the artist is Apollonian (or individuated, subjective), Dionysiac (i.e., "in a state of Dionysiac intoxication and mystical self-abrogation"), or the perfect harmony of both (creating the perfection that is Greek tragedy) depending on the nature, the universe the artist imitates.<sup>24</sup>)

Such imposition is often unintended, indeed unobserved, almost tangential. Henry David Thoreau writes "Civil Disobedience" in response to a world that he regards as sufficiently unjust enough to be absurd, an evaginated morality controlling the functions of government. The topos of world upside down, of injustice, creates form as irony, an unbalanced scale of justice; the structure of "Civil Disobedience" is accordingly ironic and unbalanced:

Behold a marine, such a man as an American government can make, or such as it can make a man with its black arts--a mere shadow and reminiscence of humanity. . . .<sup>25</sup>

Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. . . . The only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less desponding spirits is in her prisons.<sup>26</sup>

I have paid no poll-tax for six years. I was put into a jail once on this account. . . . I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick . . . . I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through before they could get to be as free as I was. . . . I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax.<sup>27</sup>

These are but a few among innumerable examples which delineate the ironic and unbalanced structure of "Civil Disobedience" (the very title of which may be included): "Such is the life, such the form", for an ironic, unbalanced world view nurtured the life which produced the form.

Yet the ironic structure of "Civil Disobedience" is

neither demonstrably unintended nor tangential. The structure of imagery, on the other hand, may well be, for the major image throughout "Civil Disobedience" is the image of the government and its agents as machines. Here the perceptions of historicism can't be ignored; the recalcitrant formalist may assume that government imaged as machine is encomiastic--do we not admire the power and efficiency implicit in referring to an athlete as a machine? But clearly for Thoreau this is not the case, the machinery of government inevitably being exposed as inhuman if not inhumane by juxtaposition:

The people must have some complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which they have.<sup>28</sup>

All machines have their friction . . . . But when the friction comes to have its machine . . . let us not have such a machine any longer.<sup>29</sup>

[Of men marching to the beat of the unjust government's drummer] Now, what are they? Men at all? or small movable forts and magazines, at the service of some unscrupulous man in power? . . .

The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. . . . They put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones, and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well.<sup>30</sup>

What I find most interesting here--and clearly what is certainly tangential, almost unquestionably unintended--is the fact that Thoreau uses an image to excoriate the government which exposes much about Thoreau and his intel-

lectual milieu. That is, Thoreau is obviously preoccupied with the industrial revolution, and the fact that questions of technology are central to his milieu makes machine imagery available, if not imposing. That "the machine" as concept for Thoreau is used to degrade clearly establishes Thoreau's distrust of mechanistic societies and structures. In other words, he has great reservations about, indeed a considerable antipathy for, the long term effects of industrialization. All of which was not at all what Thoreau intended to demonstrate when he wrote "Civil Disobedience"--it imposed itself on the structure of imagery: such is the life, such the form. (One might note in passing that what we have considered about Thoreau relates just as well to Coleridge in his inhuman and human images "mechanic" and "organic", the latter clearly superior to the former.) Thus, with the formalist we may say that the form is the meaning of "Civil Disobedience", but with the historicist we need also agree that socio-historical factors in part shape, indeed generate those structures, those forms.<sup>31</sup>

This formalist-historicist nexus distinctly represents the approach taken by Georg Lukács in The Theory of the Novel wherein he attempted to determine the extent to which historico-philosophical viewpoint shapes literary genre. More precisely, Lukács' aim was to discover what it is about the modern world that leads to a reformulation of the primary genre epic into the form we know as the

novel. His position, ultimately, is that the novel is a fragmented, rather than a "closed" or "total" form, and that its structural problems are "the mirror-image of a world gone out of joint".<sup>32</sup> "This is why", Lukács continues,

the "prose" of life is here only a symptom, among many others, of the fact that reality no longer constitutes a favourable soil for art; that is why the central problem of the novel is the fact that art has to write off the closed and total forms which stem from a rounded totality of being--that art has nothing more to do with any world of forms that is immanently complete in itself. And this is not for artistic but for historico-philosophic reasons: "there is no longer any spontaneous totality of being".<sup>33</sup>

Lukács himself soon came to regard The Theory of the Novel as a failure, a judgment with which I must concur, if only because its conception of both the socio-historical realities which in part generate forms and the intrinsic structure of the novel are reductive. But surely The Theory of the Novel is a magnificent failure, a seminal work not unlike Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy in that each fails in its specific aim but achieves the far greater goal of establishing the validity of its general critical procedures.<sup>34</sup> That is, The Theory of the Novel and The Birth of Tragedy establish the historico-philosophic world view surrounding a work as a precondition for if not a specific genre then at least the nature of any given genre.<sup>35</sup>

It is important now to note that all art, not only literature, should be available to comparable appraisal. Indeed, the analysis of analogous art forms and structures may often be illuminating, or serve to authenticate if not to modify perceptions developed purely from considerations of literature. Jean Seznec points out, for example, that "iconography serves as a constant auxiliary to the study of the history of ideas",<sup>36</sup> and this is certainly accurate, for all art as formal construct may be a reflection of historico-philosophic world view.

Henri Focillon, somewhat more specifically, points to ornamental space, "the most characteristic expression of the high Middle Ages", as "an illustration of a philosophy that renounces development in favor of involution, that surrenders the concrete world for the frivolities of fantasy, the sequence for the interlace"<sup>37</sup> and to the interlace in Ireland as a "meditation on a chaotic universe that deep within itself clasps and conceals the debris or the seeds of humankind. The interlace twines round and round the old iconography, and devours it".<sup>38</sup> Surely here are examples of forms in art which reflect Weltanschauung. Focillon's position, frankly, is almost purely formalistic, indeed often regards art as autotelic, and he would seem to deny the historicist view while in the very process of proclaiming it. He says, for example, that the life of forms is not called into being by historical necessity, and with Coleridge agrees that "forms

obey their own rules--rules that are inherent in the forms themselves" (read Coleridgean "organicism" here) but he immediately follows with the qualification, "or better, in the regions of the mind where they are located or centered",<sup>39</sup> clearly indicating thereby that forms manifest or reflect world views as psychological landscapes: forms "mingle with life, whence they come; they translate into space certain movements of the mind";<sup>40</sup> "let us say, if you like, that art not only clothes sensibility with a form, but that art also awakens form in sensibility".<sup>41</sup> Focillon's seemingly shifting point of view is actually the result of a complex awareness, an awareness that forms are the results of their own internal laws, manifestations of social milieux, philosophies, psychological landscapes (which may or may not be consistent with the predominant world view) and indeed may themselves lead to the formation of a Zeitgeist, rather than vice versa. With regard to the latter point, for example, Focillon points to Van Dyck who, according to Focillon, may well have contributed to the creation of a social environment (while Focillon readily admits that in, say, architecture, social and natural milieux may, often do, shape the forms of art).<sup>42</sup> Again, while often pointing to ways in which the forms of art reflect the historico-philosophic world view, Focillon is also forthright (as we must be) about times when form need not reflect Weltanschauung:

The spiritual instant which is our life does not necessarily coincide with an historical urgency; it may indeed even contradict it. We have no right to confuse the state of the life of forms with the state of social life. The time that gives support to a work of art does not give definition either to its principle or to its specific form. It is quite capable of slipping back into the past or forward into the future. The artist inhabits a country in time that is by no means necessarily the history of his own time. . . . A sudden shift in the equilibrium of his ethnic values may bring him into violent opposition with his environment and hence with the moment. . . . He then seeks the world that he needs.<sup>43</sup>

Even less abstract, and more directly related to Renaissance form are certain views of George Kernodle about visual art in his From Art to Theatre. He points, for example, to the spatially advanced art of the Renaissance, enabling a Renaissance artist to present in one architectonic structure the unity of a work of art; this suggests the symmetrical essence that was Renaissance form, a reflection of the balanced, harmonious vision of the Renaissance.<sup>44</sup> By contradistinction, Kernodle remarks upon "the spaceless, featureless, atmosphere of the Baroque", which art certainly does suggest the chaos, incertitude of the Jacobean world view that follows the moment of Renaissance transcendence.<sup>45</sup> By considering perspective Kernodle again shows the usefulness of the analogy between visual and literary form: he finds the truth of Spengler's remark that "classical perspective is quite finite, while that of the Renaissance could be extended indefinitely";<sup>46</sup> by way of analogy, the structure of Renaissance art per-

spective reflects the Renaissance world view of man's boundless visionary capacity. Further, Kernodle refers to realistic theories of space and spatial constructs superseding theological theories, which concept "provides the foundation for the straight-line geometric perspective that underlay Renaissance art".<sup>47</sup> Again, world view is demonstrated as nurturing the structure of art. Finally, Kernodle refers to the theatre's mise en scène, the stage's nature, as symbolic in the Renaissance, but illusory, i.e., offering the illusion of reality, in the seventeenth century. Both conditions suggest the Weltanschauung of each period--the Renaissance metaphoric, mythic, visionary world view as opposed to the seventeenth century's ironic, realistic world view.<sup>48</sup>

Wylie Sypher is also concerned with the analogy of art and literary style and form, an analogy Sypher regards as viable whether we deal with architecture, painting, or sculpture and corresponding styles in literature, and whether we deal with chronological or geographical distinctions, so long as periods relate (e.g., formal analogies between English literary Renaissance and Italian visual art Renaissance, albeit spatially and temporally distinct).<sup>49</sup> For Sypher recognizes styles and forms as possible, indeed probable reflections, aspects of a larger history, i.e., style as "not so much a 'way of seeing the world' as it is a technique for representing what is already seen",<sup>50</sup> thus recognizing form as reflection of

world view (and therefore analogous forms from analogous world views--e.g., renaissances), though Sypher wisely cautions against assuming that all styles reveal world views.<sup>51</sup> In the main, however, Sypher is most sensitive to the recognition of form as symbolic of Weltanschauung:

Technique is not merely a technical feat: if it is a way of representing what is seen or experienced, then it involves the whole cultural and social world that influences the artist to try to represent reality as he does. If style is a mode of representation, yet the artist is bound to represent the kind of world in which he lives, to which he belongs. Therefore not all kinds of style are available at any given time, since a style is modified by the artist's own vision, and his vision, in turn, by the world he inhabits. . . . A style becomes an index to the structure of the contemporary consciousness and to the prevailing attitude toward experience in the contemporary world. . . . A style is a vocabulary. It may well be the most sensitive and explicit vocabulary of any society.

If style is a vocabulary, it is also syntax; and syntax expresses the way in which a society feels, responds, thinks, communicates, dreams, escapes. By tracing changes in literary syntax we are able to interpret the varying modes of consciousness in different eras of European culture. . . . Syntax is conditioned by the structure of the world in which we believe we live; and the whole organization of the artist's sensibility is a screen through which appears the world he represents. A prevailing style in the arts is the configuration<sub>2</sub> (the Gestalt) of our experience of reality. . . .

Sypher later refers more specifically to the periods with which my work is concerned: "the artist of the early renaissance is at home in the world, whereas the mannerist artist [who appears in England immediately after the Elizabethan age], uneasy, doubtful, alienated, arbitrarily distorts space, light, color, and contour,

and uses naturalistic details in a forced, unnatural way. Thus, Giotto would be more at home in the world than El Greco".<sup>53</sup> Again Sypher recognizes styles, forms, structures as reflections of world views, but although he here demonstrates his point by juxtaposing contrasting styles, contrasting periods and world views, Sypher generally concerns himself with Renaissance forms and structures.

A writer who generally concerns himself with the contrasting age following the Renaissance is Carl Friedrich in The Age of the Baroque. He too recognizes style--but in this case Baroque style--as a reflection of Weltanschauung. For Friedrich, the Baroque style, etymologically related to baroco--"intricate", "perverse", "eccentric"--which shows a predilection for avoiding a clear outline, suggests, reflects, the seventeenth century world view.<sup>54</sup> The Baroque style, according to Friedrich, reflects the age's skepticism, materialism, and sensuality on the one hand, while religious controversies, notably the Reformation and Counter Reformation dichotomy, lead to otherworldly concerns on the other hand.<sup>55</sup> Hence Baroque stylistic antitheses; hence the fussure that is represented most clearly by the metaphysical conceit, violently failing to yoke antinomies (often sacred and profane antinomies, significantly enough). Friedrich goes on to refer to Willi Hausenstein's definition of Baroque in his Vom Geist des Barock (1924) perhaps even more appositely than Friedrich realizes, for Hausenstein's

definition of Baroque as "the river with two mouths" contains the essence of the style, its tension--again well represented by the metaphysical conceit, again indicating that structure reflects Weltanschauung.<sup>56</sup> Friedrich is actually working with a fifty year period, from 1610-1660, but he realizes that the cultural, stylistic category of Baroque really applies to a period somewhat earlier, for Othello, Macbeth, King Lear, The Winter's Tale, and The Tempest all have "a distinctly baroque flavor".<sup>57</sup> The perception is significant for it is my contention that the end of the Elizabethan age is a far more apt point of delimitation for alterations of styles and forms reflecting world views. Admittedly, however, alterations in world view are occurring in other countries besides England which are consistent with English transformations: in Spain, for example, in poets such as Lope de Vega, Góngora, Cervantes, the theme of illusionism, of meaningless existence, of the world as absurd comedy or show, is consistent with more familiar Shakespearean ironic visions of life as a tale told by an idiot signifying nothing, or the stuff of dreams. At the core of such visions is the fissure, the fundamental antithesis of the Baroque, the insecurity and epistemological crisis that the metaphysical conceit, torn between body and soul, reflects, exemplary of the antinomy at the base of Baroque art and life, a non-synthesized, ironic vision.<sup>58</sup> Among sculptors (and

Italians) the most distinctly Baroque mind belonged to Lorenzo Bernini, whose St. Theresa of his Ecstasy of St. Theresa altar figure, enraptured as she is about to be pierced by the phallic dart of an angel, is the paradigmatic sensualist/spiritualist dichotomy. Friedrich refers to the eroticism and spirituality of the St. Theresa figure as representative of "the two-faced quality of baroque feeling, oscillating between the extremes of mystic devotion and sparkling sensuality . . . strikingly merged in this celebrated altarpiece".<sup>59</sup> Yet Bernini's St. Theresa, it seems to me, is precisely the opposite, not at all merging, synthesizing the antinomies of sensuality and spirituality, but distinguishing the remarkably dichotomous Weltanschauung of the period, or if yoking, then yoking by violence--i.e., not really developing symbiosis or isomorphism, but throwing together for the purposes of contrast, juxtaposition--like the metaphysical conceit. Finally, Friedrich turns to France and recognizes Cartesian dualism, the most significant of modern philosophical problems, as the essential reflection of the Baroque world view: mind/body, thought/matter, materialism/spirituality, sensuality/asceticism--all are unsynthesized dichotomies symbolizing the rift in the foundation of the Baroque world view.<sup>60</sup>

It is important to realize that I have thus far regarded the interrelationship of world view and generic

structure from both ends: i.e., one may consider the structure of genre with a view toward understanding the historico-philosophic milieu, or one may consider the milieu in order to comprehend the structure of genre. My direction is essentially that of the latter procedure, though the former, equally as valid if judiciously handled, will also occasionally be followed. But specifically: it is my contention that we will only fully understand the literature of the last decades of Elizabeth's reign and the first decades of James' if we recognize the nature of the historico-philosophic world view which nurtured that literature and which in part determined the structure of Renaissance genre. And, when a radical shift in the structure of genre manifests itself, we may be able to reverse the procedure--i.e., recognize such structural alteration as the mirror image of a world view which has been radically transformed.

The radical shift, for example, of the primary genre epic to the novel form as witnessed by Don Quixote is consistent with a radical shift from a position of balance between objective and subjective worlds to one of a paradoxical, antithetical relationship.<sup>61</sup> The structure of Don Quixote, therefore, reflects the dissonance of existence, the emerging ironic vision of a universe without a guiding deity: "the first great novel of world literature stands at the beginning of the time when the Christian God began to forsake the

world; when man became lonely and could find meaning and substance only in his own soul, whose home was nowhere; when the world, released from its paradoxical anchorage in a beyond that is truly present, was abandoned to its immanent meaninglessness". . . .<sup>62</sup> It is no accident that the ironic world view of Don Quixote is made manifest by the failure, the inefficacy throughout Don Quixote of metaphor, of romance, of myth.

Centrally important is the realization of what generic, formal distinctions imply. Kenneth Burke persuasively argues that "in the last analysis, a critic cannot get at the very core of a work except by specifying exactly what kind of work it is".<sup>63</sup> One example should suffice: several years ago I was introduced to an essay written by Northrop Frye, an exegesis of Paradise Regained ("The Typology of Paradise Regained", Modern Philology, LIII (1956), 227-238). The essay was notable for its acumen, but remarkable in that it demonstrated a realization that the structure of imagery of Paradise Regained was typological, and that only by analyzing the typological structure of imagery could one truly understand Paradise Regained. This was not said, but demonstrated as that typological structure of imagery was delineated.<sup>64</sup> And all of this is remarkable because this essay was produced years before Barbara Lewalski published her definitive study of the form of the brief epic. Once the form was understood, its essential

feature--typological structure--was known, and exegesis could take place. But Frye knew this beforehand. The glib answer is to say that Frye is remarkable, and let it go at that; the correct answer is to say that Frye, our best critic of genre, knew and understood the form of Paradise Regained without the historical investigation simply by encountering its essence, and went on from there to analyze the work based upon a hermeneutics not yet established by others. In any case, Frye no less than the rest of us needed to know the form before he could get to the core of Paradise Regained.

There is a third element in the equation. I have indicated that the structure of genre is in part predetermined by historico-philosophic viewpoint. What I have yet to consider is the influence of subject-matter on generic structure. Indeed, if Frye is correct, each primary genre is a manifestation of particular modes of development from the archetypal quest myth, subject-matters of the myth, so to speak, drama emerging from the ritual side of the myth, lyric from the epiphanic (i.e., imagistic) side, epic from its central encyclopedic structure.<sup>65</sup> But beyond this, any subject-matter may affect generic structure. Friendship as subject may predispose generic structure to alternating images of union and separation, as is in part the structure of Faerie Queene IV; universal harmony as subject may give rise to images of ritual communal dancing, poly-

phonic music, may indeed shape metrical and stanzaic structure as a mirror of universal harmony, as we see in Sir John Davies' "Orchestra"; fidelity-infidelity as subject may transform structure to that of a triad, with alternating imagery of gravitation and antigravitation; meaningless universe as subject may involve structure and imagery as paradox or irony or structure as reflected in the movement of The Revenger's Tragedy where "a frenetic, panic-stricken kind of rhythm" delineates "the pulse-beat of a world rushing headlong to its final and inevitable annihilation",<sup>66</sup> or chaotic world view as perceived in the discordance of song and formal structure in Antonio's Revenge:

Antonio. Wilt sing a dirge, boy?  
 Pand. No; no song; 'twill be vile out of tune.  
 Alberto. Indeed, he's hoarse; The poor boy's voice  
           is crack'd.  
 Pand. Why, coz, why should it not be hoarse  
           and crack'd,  
       When all the strings of nature's symphony  
       Are crack'd and jar? Why should his voice  
           keep tune,  
       When there's no music in the breast of man?<sup>67</sup>

Finally, meaningless universe as subject may involve structure of form transformed to--amorphous, i.e., formlessness as formal mirror of the subject. Here we are back again at Lukács and the novel, but this time I am suggesting subject-matter rather than world view as a shaping principle.

No formal structure, it seems to me, is totally

free of the influence, in varying degrees, of both world view and subject-matter, and in fact, to turn the procedure around, world view and subject-matter must be influenced likewise by genre. Wellek and Warren, in their Theory of Literature, point out that "the aesthetic convention in which a work participates shapes its character".<sup>68</sup> By the very act of creation through the novel form, for example, one is hard-pressed to posit a world view that is other than ironic, a world of epistemological crisis, or, indeed, an absurd universe. C. M. Bowra describes certain central occurrences of the Aeneid that can be seen as establishing both an annihilative and synthetic dialectic simultaneously.<sup>69</sup> These kinds of structures are likewise present in the Iliad, Gerusalemme Liberata, and in Faerie Queene V, suggesting that they are structural necessities, principles of prophetic epic construction. Genre likewise shapes subject-matter. Lukács refers to the primary genres "drama, lyric poetry and the epic" as "not the thesis, antithesis and synthesis of a dialectical process; each of them is a means, qualitatively quite heterogeneous from the others, of giving form to the world".<sup>70</sup> Kenneth Burke in The Philosophy of Literary Form and in Language as Symbolic Action suggests that the intrinsic nature of the lyric is imagistic (a reasonable enough observation if we may read imagistic as referring to all sense experience, including kinesthetic imagery),

that lyric moves not logically but imagistically, from one view of an image to another.<sup>71</sup> When the lyric ceases to be imagistic, becomes, say, concerned with character conflict, it is no longer lyric. The Elizabethan sonnet sequence is a case in point: most sonnets of a given sequence are indeed lyrics, but the sequence itself takes on the nature of drama; imagistic substructure seems slowly to fade and agency interaction holds center stage in, for example, Astrophel and Stella. This development can also shift lyric to epic: Jan de Vries suggests that the lyric with hero as static image is still lyric, but once a series of lyrics begin to posit a dynamic hero as central image, each, say, recounting a significant event in the hero's life, the series itself takes on the nature of epic--the movement is, as the title of his work implies, a shift from heroic song (lyric) to heroic legend (epic).<sup>72</sup> Now all of this is to establish rather circuitously that subject-matter is delimited by the nature of the form which contains it. If lyric is to remain lyric, for example, it must deal with its subject-matter as follows: it must project its subject-matter not as conceptual abstraction but as concrete image; it must contain that image as stasis and avoid animation of the image, for such is the action of the mythopoeic lyric which becomes epic.

But at what point does the mythopoeic lyric become epical? Or doesn't mythopoeia, with its intrinsic

involvement in mythos, preclude lyric, such that "mythopoeic lyric" is "epic" writ large? And what taxonomy can adequately contain Song of Myself, the lyric epic? The fact is we don't have answers to these questions because generic categories are not so absolute as I have implied, nor is our critical vocabulary so precise a calculus as we ordinarily suppose.<sup>73</sup> What is required of course is judiciousness, the recognition that any work may transcend generic theories without discrediting the general validity of those theories. It may be that the theories can be altered to include the anomaly; perhaps the anomaly requires its own category, becoming thereby institutionalized as it were, with a future possibility of distinguishing other, later forms as anomalous.

My contentions are essentially general theories which can no doubt be questioned with reference to specific works which do not fit the mold, but whose general validity is established by the abundance of evidence which led to their formulation: viz., imagery, agency, theme, and generic structure of the works of the last decades of the Elizabethan age and the first decade of the Jacobean age mirror the historico-philosophic world view of a given subject. The subject with which this synecdochic study will be concerned is justice. Most specifically, then, it is my contention that the historico-philosophic conception of justice at this time is mirrored in the imagery, agency, themes, structures, and even

conventions of the primary forms, epic, drama, lyric, centrally concerned with justice. My intention is to prove my thesis by first considering the perception of justice in the Elizabethan world and then by close analysis of the major juristic literature: Faerie Queene V (epic), The Merchant of Venice (drama), "Hymnes to Astraea" (lyric). As the historico-philosophic perception of justice is transformed, I shall consider such transformations before examining the texture of later work which recapitulates those transformations. Here I will be concerned mainly with Measure for Measure as a last gasp, so to speak, of a perception of justice about to be altered radically, a transformation in turn mirrored in Jacobean revenge tragedy and the metaphysical lyric.<sup>74</sup>

## Notes

- 1 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 93.
- 2 Kermode, p. 130.
- 3 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 19-20, 89-90.
- 4 Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 38.
- 5 Burke, Symbolic Action, pp. 54-55.
- 6 Burke, Symbolic Action, p. 485.
- 7 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans. Ralph Manheim, introd. Charles W. Hendel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), I, 53, 54.
- 8 Cassirer, Symbolic Forms, I, 19-20.
- 9 Cassirer, Symbolic Forms, I, 78.
- 10 R. G. Peterson, "Critical Calculations: Measure and Symmetry in Literature", PMLA, 91 (1976), 371. Champion's position (1602) was that a poem reiterates universal harmony by means of poetic meter. As the core of this belief is a realization that structure recapitulates world view; and this awareness was rife in the Elizabethan age, from Ascham's Of Imitation to Gascoigne's The Making of Verse, Whetstone's Of Comedy, Lodge's Defense of Poetry, Sidney's Defense of Poesy, and Puttenham's Arte of English Poetry. This is quite significant, for so widespread an awareness suggests that structural reflections of Weltanschauung in the works of writers I analyze in later chapters--works of Spenser, Shakespeare, Davies and others--may not be as subliminal as one ordinarily would suppose. (For all of the above citations, see J. E. Spingarn, A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), pp. 264-265, 269-270, 276-277, 277-278, and Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G. Gregory Smith (1904; rpt. London: Oxford University Press, 1967), I, 6, 7, 54-55, 59-60, 72; II, 51, 67.

- 11 Peterson, 371.
- 12 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 13. Later (pp. 246-247) Frye defines the primary genres as distinguished by the radical of presentation: acted (drama), narrated (epic), sung (lyric); and this leads Frye to formulate a fourth genre, "fiction": to be presented in written form. Here, however, it seems that Frye is simply wrong; he is confusing technology with literature as he tries to explain the novel, which is really an outgrowth of epic.
- 13 Frye, Anatomy, pp. 63-64. In Fables of Identity (Northrop Frye, Fables of Identity (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), pp. 11-13, 14-15, 66) Frye concentrates on describing ways in which imagistic structure, no less than generalized form reflects world view (often cultural categories: Baroque, Mannerist, Romantic, Gothic, and so forth).
- 14 Frye, Anatomy, p. 84.
- 15 Frye, Anatomy, pp. 95, 96.
- 16 Frye, Anatomy, p. 97.
- 17 Frye, Anatomy, pp. 104-105.
- 18 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return (New York: Pantheon, 1954), *passim*.
- 19 Frye, Anatomy, p. 106. For Cassirer in his Language and Myth, trans. Susanne K. Langer (New York: Dover Publications, 1953), pp. 83-99, metaphor is sufficient to develop myth; but this doesn't differ substantially from Frye's definition.
- 20 See Angus Fletcher, The Prophetic Moment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 212-213, *et passim*.
- 21 Frye, Anatomy, p. 120.
- 22 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Shakespearean Criticism, in English Romantic Writers, ed. David Perkins (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), p. 500.
- 23 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Gerald F. Else (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 21, 23, 26, 27, 64.

24 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), pp. 24-25.

25 Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience", in Contexts for Composition, ed. Stanley A. Clayes and David G. Spencer, 3rd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972), pp. 464-465 (*italics mine*).

26 Thoreau, p. 471 (*italics mine*).

27 Thoreau, p. 473 (*italics mine*).

28 Thoreau, p. 463.

29 Thoreau, p. 466.

30 Thoreau, pp. 464-465.

31 In the introductory chapter of Dialectical Criticism and Renaissance Literature (Michael McCandles, Dialectical Criticism and Renaissance Literature [Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975], pp. 1-13) Michael McCandles offers a useful examination of the historicist/formalist dichotomy. Each by exclusion of the other would be reductive, historicism overly involved with art as a mere excrescence of society, far too conscious of a work's spatial and temporal nurturing soil but not the work's textural space and time, formalism ignoring spatial and temporal nurturing soil and only concerned with textural space and time (which may be inaccurately observed because of the formerly mentioned ignorance).

32 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1971), p. 17.

33 Lukács, pp. 17-18.

34 Nietzsche attempted to establish the condition of music as reflective of a world view of perfect integration at a distinct moment of Greek development, the moment that gave birth to such perfect music and hence such perfect art--Greek tragedy, which cries, according to Nietzsche, "'We believe that life is eternal'", Nietzsche, p. 102 (and music is regarded as the direct expression of that life). This perfect art "forces us to gaze into the horror of individual existence, yet without being turned to stone by the vision: a metaphysical solace momentarily lifts us above the whirl of shifting phenomena. . . . Now we see the struggle, the pain, the destruction of appearances, as necessary, because of the constant prolifer-

ation of forms pushing into life, because of the extravagant fecundity of the world will. . . . We become one with the immense lust for life and are made aware of the eternity and indestructibility of that lust. Pity and terror notwithstanding [Nietzsche's acceptance of catharsis], we realize our great good fortune in having life--not as individuals, but as part of the life force with whose procreative lust we have become one" (Nietzsche, pp. 102-103). This is the best unintended commentary on at once Paradise Lost and "To Autumn" that criticism has yet produced, which is sufficient, I think, to indicate that the structure a world view can develop needn't be a generic category so much as a species--in this case tragedy--of any given genre, epic, lyric, or drama. (In any event, this concept of regarding the condition of music as reflective of world view at any given time is a most important concept indeed, harmony or disharmony a key notion delineating universal order or chaos [cf. Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony, ed. Anna Granville Hatcher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963); S. K. Heninger, Jr., Touches of Sweet Harmony (San Marino: The Huntington Library, 1974); Bruce Pattison, Music and Poetry of the English Renaissance, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1970); and John Hollander, The Untuning of the Sky (1961; rpt. New York: Norton, 1970)]. In Nietzsche the state of music is the key to recognizing the Weltanschauung, for the perfect moment of harmonious music reaches a transcendent vision of a mythic moment (Nietzsche, pp. 102, 103, 105), whereas the later Attic dithyramb offered a degradation of the spirit of music, a reasoned onomatopoeia which transformed the mythic vision to an ironic vision, symbolizing a kind of dissonance (music "estranged" from itself, Nietzsche, p. 106) as a new controlling world view.

35 Indeed, the very form of The Theory of the Novel, which ends on the positive note of a vista of hope seen in Tolstoy, reflects its Weltanschauung, its affirmative, hopeful world view of primitive utopianism: "We have every right to smile at such primitive utopianism, but it expresses nonetheless an intellectual tendency which was part of the reality of that time", Lukács, p. 20. (The final step would be for us to analyze the world view shaping, generating the form of this work I am currently writing, but properly so only upon its conclusion.)

36 Jean Seznec, The Survival of the Pagan Gods, trans. Barbara F. Sessions (1953; rpt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 7.

37 Henri Focillon, The Life of Forms in Art, trans. Charles Beecher Hogan and George Kubler, 2nd ed. (New York: George Wittenborn, 1948), p. 26.

- 38 Focillon, p. 5.
- 39 Focillon, p. 10.
- 40 Focillon, p. 14.
- 41 Focillon, p. 47.
- 42 Focillon, p. 61.
- 43 Focillon, pp. 62-63.
- 44 George Kernodle, From Art to Theatre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 14.
- 45 Kernodle, p. 32.
- 46 Kernodle, p. 46.
- 47 Kernodle, p. 47.
- 48 Kernodle, p. 219.
- 49 Wylie Sypher, Four Stages of Renaissance Style (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), p. 5.
- 50 Sypher, p. 8.
- 51 Sypher, p. 7.
- 52 Sypher, pp. 13-16.
- 53 Sypher, p. 23.
- 54 Carl J. Friedrich, The Age of the Baroque, The Rise of Modern Europe (1952; rpt. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 38.
- 55 Friedrich, pp. 40-42, 51.
- 56 Friedrich, pp. 44, 45.
- 57 Friedrich, p. 49.
- 58 Friedrich, pp. 51, 53, 54.
- 59 Friedrich, p. 72.
- 60 Friedrich, pp. 116-117.
- 61 Lukács, pp. 98, 99.
- 62 Lukács, p. 103.

- 63 Burke, Symbolic Action, pp. 42-43.
- 64 Northrop Frye, "The Typology of Paradise Regained", Modern Philology, LIII (1956), passim.
- 65 Frye, Fables, pp. 16-17.
- 66 Gāmini Salgādo, ed. Three Jacobean Tragedies, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), p. 28.
- 67 John Marston, Antonio's Revenge, ed. G. K. Hunter, Regents Renaissance Drama Series (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), IV, 11, 88-94.
- 68 René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 226.
- 69 C. M. Bowra, From Virgil to Milton (1945; rpt. New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 72-74.
- 70 Lukács, p. 128.
- 71 Burke, Literary Form, pp. 30-33; Symbolic Action, p. 88.
- 72 Jan de Vries, Heroic Song and Heroic Legend, trans. B. Timmer (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), passim.
- 73 Wellek and Warren (pp. 234-245) point out that modern genre theory wisely invokes Proteus as opposed to Procrustes: "It doesn't limit the number of possible kinds and doesn't prescribe rules to authors. It supposes that traditional kinds may be mixed and produce a new kind (like tragi-comedy). It sees that genres can be built up on the basis of inclusiveness or 'richness' as well as that of 'purity' (genre by accretion as well as by reduction)".
- 74 I have attempted to keep juristic jargon to a minimum. When such use was essential, I tried to remain consistent with Elizabethan usage. For the Elizabethans there were five words of considerable significance: law, equity, mercy, clemency, justice. On the mundane level law denotes the actual law codes or the letter of the law; on the spiritual level it denotes rigorous application of the "eye for eye" principle, of the Mosaic law, of the Pentateuch, of the Old Testament in general. On the mundane level equity denotes a tempering or increasing of law's rigor depending upon the peculiarities of a case, peculiarities with which the letter of the law does not deal; for reasons which will be made clear, equity was generally administered by the ruler's prerogative courts. On the spiritual level equity, mercy

and clemency are basically interchangeable terms referring to the salvation of the new dispensation, the subsumption, fulfilling and surpassing of Old Testament law by New Testament mercy. (But equity in fact was seldom used as a spiritual juristic term, whereas mercy and clemency were seldom used with regard to mundane matters.) The last term of importance is justice, the definition of which can only be determined by context. Often justice is juxtaposed to mercy, in which context justice denotes law (sacred or secular); on other occasions, perhaps less often, justice and law are antinomical, justice in these cases standing for equity (secular) or mercy (sacred). But most often, I have used justice as a generic term under which law, equity, mercy and clemency are species.

The Elizabethan age and in particular Elizabethan justice reach the point of perfection, of dialectical synthesis revolving around Elizabeth as a symbol of union, fulfillment, and historical completion. All may be regarded under two rather broad, intersecting rubrics: justice and empire. A full consideration of the former must come to terms with the Reception of Roman law (i.e., the Justinian Corpus Juris Civilis) and the nature of Elizabethan equity.

According to F. W. Maitland there was a time (about mid sixteenth century) when England was on the verge of a full scale Reception, thanks to pressures exerted by the Renaissance and the Reformation.<sup>1</sup> Renaissance humanism lauded the jurisprudence of antiquity. The Micromachean Ethics, Politics, Cicero's De Officiis, Plato's Republic and Laws were of course central theoretic documents; but the Justinian Institutes provided a vehicle for thoroughgoing juristic reform. On the continent, 1519 marked a turning point for a juridic renovatio. Jurists such as Andrea Alciati, Ulrich Zäsi, and Guillaume Budé were transforming their respective legal systems by substituting Roman law for superannuated indigenous law. In some countries the Reception went hand in hand with the Reformation: when Luther posted his theses at Wittenberg in 1520 he also destroyed German law books, dramatizing the general view that German autochthonous law was barbaric and that a juristic reformation was

to accompany the religious one. This was the prevailing conception of most law on the continent, and it wasn't long before a wholesale Reception of Roman law took place in most Western and Central European nations. In Reformation countries there was an added incentive for legal reform: the current legal system was regarded by many theological reformers as an extension of the corrupt papacy; the Justinian codes, by contradistinction, offered a partial return to primitive Christianity.

Similar factors favored a Reception in England. Some of the most learned, influential Englishmen were desirous of a Reception of civil (Roman) law: Reginald Pole (the cousin of King Henry VIII), Thomas Smith, Thomas Starkey. Most importantly, King Henry VIII, attracted by Roman law because of the enormous power it offered a ruler of both church and state,<sup>2</sup> seemed to favor a Reception, and he cautiously moved to bring the civil law to England by establishing civil law chairs at Oxford and Cambridge, by suppressing the teaching of canon law, and by subtly undermining common law by transferring much from the jurisdiction of common law courts to prerogative, civil law courts--to such an extent, in fact, that there was an outcry in 1547 from students of the common law against the feared elimination of their profession. Of course, the procedural awkwardness of common law made necessary new legal forms to supplement the existing law in the mid sixteenth century, which invar-

ably led to a decline of activity in the common law courts.<sup>3</sup> Then too, there was an accommodation of those who were knowledgeable of the civil law and certain aspects of the civil law itself, largely because a modern state needed a knowledge of international law and, since many nations had turned to Roman law, the law which was required for global affairs was often civil law.<sup>4</sup>

But if certain conditions favored a Reception, others opposed such a step. For one thing, England had had a twelfth and thirteenth century Reception of sorts (i.e., modernizing alterations of the common law) developed through the work of Bracton and others,<sup>5</sup> and English common law, if, as Holdsworth makes clear,<sup>6</sup> cumbersome and excessively technical, was still far more competent to deal with modern, international juristic problems than the autochthonous laws of France, Germany, Italy, etc. This was due mainly to the interpolation of useful elements of Roman law into common law and to the nature of English common law. Continental law was abstract and static, a gallimaufry of codified, impermeable law. When its source was recognized as barbaric, it ceased to have authority, and its stasis led to inevitable stagnation. Indeed, it had no machinery for reform and thus could not meet the needs of a modern state--complete rejection of it and acceptance of Roman law was therefore the only means of legal reform. English common law, on the other hand, was based upon precedent--

an important point, for this made it a living, concrete law capable of recognizing cases for which no precedent had been set (and so capable of accepting new concepts and transformations) and also gave it a sense of traditional authority.<sup>7</sup> In addition, many Chancellors--e.g., More, Audley, Rich--were trained in common law and had infinite respect for it. Moreover, the operations of local government had been adapted to common law by justices of the peace; a thorough Reception therefore would have required local as well as central modifications.

But perhaps the most important factor militating against a Reception was the fact that common law was taught at the Inns of Court. Maitland shows how "taught law is tough law", i.e., law taught in school seems to develop a following, a group of adherents throughout the land, that protects it against encroachment or dissolution. (In contradistinction to England, indigenous law was not taught in France, Germany, Italy, Scotland--in all of which there were full scale Receptions of Roman law.) And that common law was taught at the Inns of Court was even more significant, for the Inns of Court were kinds of finishing schools for the most important Englishmen. Even those who had no inclination to practice law attended the Inns; those who intended to enter government service found the Inns of Court indispensable, for the operating nature of Tudor government organs was

as if they were courts. Invariably, then, many powerful government official became aficionados and defenders of the common law while attending The Inns. One such was William Cecil, Lord Burghley, who was at Gray's Inn around 1541.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, becoming a judge in sixteenth century England became a matter of technical ability;<sup>9</sup> one really had to know the law, and the Inns of Court became thereby the ultimate source of judges. By extension, here again, the common law was strengthened as it gained still further influential advocates.

In short, though Henry, no doubt pleased with the power of kingship embodied in Roman law, did set in motion a shift toward greater jurisdiction for his Roman law prerogative courts--namely Chancery and Star Chamber--as opposed to common law courts, he never did make a sincere effort to destroy the common law. This was in part due to the general perception of common law contingent upon its nature. That is, because common law was precedent law (not alterable except by new "living" cases), the collective wisdom of many generations, it was regarded as virtually divinely sanctioned. J. N. Figgis quotes an unknown source exemplifying this: "law is the breath of God; her voice the harmony of the world".<sup>10</sup> Henry VIII had, to be sure, incredible power as head of church and state, but, as Holdsworth points out, "Tudor Kings might on occasion pervert the law; but they respected it. For their most arbitrary acts

they always endeavoured to get a legal sanction".<sup>11</sup>  
 This despite the monarch's "absolute" (as opposed to "ordinary") right to act, which gave the king stupendous legal power. (Henry's wisdom in this regard can only be measured when we encounter James' folly.)

The question remains: was there a Reception of Roman law, and if so, to what extent? Holdsworth came to the tempered conclusion that Roman law was received by the English system in small doses only, that "there was something analogous to a Reception of Roman law in England".<sup>12</sup> To be more precise, English law in the sixteenth century was in a state of mild transition receiving features of Roman law mostly in the king's prerogative jurisdictions--Chancery, Star Chamber, the Admiralty court.

The most important of these were Star Chamber, controlled by the monarch's Privy Council and officially presided over by the king,<sup>13</sup> and Chancery (known as the court of the king's conscience), controlled by the Chancellor. These served as equity courts, the essential purpose of which was to administer justice when the normal course of law was not equipped to deal with the peculiarities of a case, was inappropriate, or was manifestly unjust under the circumstances.<sup>14</sup> These courts were regarded by common lawyers as not contrary to common law but rather adjuncts of it, equity regarded "as an essential part of the law, needed in order that the law

in its application to concrete facts might not contravene the law of God or of reason".<sup>15</sup> Sir Matthew Hale, writing but a short time after the time which most concerns us, held firm to the view that the prerogative courts fell under the aegis of the common law.<sup>16</sup> But that Hale had to mention the relationship, indeed that he had to be an outspoken advocate of the common law's supremacy over canon and civil law, bespeaks the friction that these equity courts encountered when their legal machinery came into contact with the common law.

The relationship between Star Chamber and the common law is instructive. Star Chamber considered cases which fell into essentially three categories: breaches of public order, assaults on the dignity of judges or others connected with the court, and violations of royal commands.<sup>17</sup> If we look carefully at this, we can see a pattern emerge: Star Chamber upheld hierarchy and universal order. To do this the court often employed extremely cruel punishments (e.g., nailing ears to pillories, cutting off ears, branding cheeks or foreheads, public whipping, etc.) and the most truculent tortures when extorting confessions or information. Nevertheless, Star Chamber was very highly regarded by common lawyers and by the general population under Elizabeth's reign; but under James it was regarded as a court used to maintain royal absolutism, a court of cruelty, a court of anti-constitutionality.<sup>18</sup>

The case of the court of Chancery was not unlike that of Star Chamber. The relationship between Chancery and the common law was a rather harmonious one during the sixteenth century (except for a time prior to mid century when Henry seemed to be trying to shift many cases from common law courts to his prerogative courts). This harmony was the result of several factors. For one thing, Chancery was under the direction of the Chancellor of the Realm; since the Chancellors were invariably trained in the common law at the Inns of Court, the common law had as much influence upon Chancery as the civil law of Chancery had upon the common law. Then too, Elizabeth used Chancery as well as Star Chamber with moderation, so that when Mary Queen of Scots was tried not according to the letter of the law but according to equity in what was in effect a special court of Chancery, a commission of English peers headed by the Chancellor, the "Keeper of the Queen's Conscience", there was no universal cry of injustice.<sup>19</sup>

But after the sixteenth century there were problems. Common lawyers felt that Chancery was increasingly encroaching on the domain of common law, and James did turn more often with each passing day to his prerogative courts. This created hostility between the monarchy and the common lawyers, for excessive use of these courts was regarded by common lawyers as infringements of their rights and professional obligations.<sup>20</sup> Ulti-

mately James made the mistake of favoring Chancery over the common law courts, and he was therefore accused of strident absolutism.<sup>21</sup>

But during the reign of Elizabeth the equity courts and the common law jurisdictions existed in halcyon harmony. The courts of equity were regarded as clemency courts, moderating the rigor of the law. Again, under Elizabeth equity was regarded as not a rejection of common law but an extension of it, an outgrowth from it, as in St. Germaine's Doctor and Student and as perceived by Edward Coke, and it stood as the juristic complement to the relationship of old law to new dispensation, Old Testament to New Testament, the fulfillment of the law by mercy. Never did Elizabeth use the equity courts arbitrarily or so extensively as to exacerbate common lawyers. She, as her father before her, always realized that no prudent English monarch could long avoid the limitations on their power provided by the rule of law.<sup>22</sup> This is nowhere better delineated than in Shakespeare's Henry IV, Part II. When the Lord Chief Justice speaks with the newly crowned King Henry V, they agree that when Henry was a riotous youth who defied the law, he was justly incarcerated by the Lord Chief Justice:

Ch. Just. Be now the father and propose a son,  
 Hear your own dignity so much profan'd,  
 See your most dreadful laws so loosely slighted,  
 Behold yourself so by a son disdained;  
 And then imagine me taking your part  
 And in your power soft silencing your son.

After this cold considerance, sentence me;  
 And, as you are a king, speak in your state  
 What I have done that misbecame my place,  
 My person, or my liege's sovereignty.  
 King. You are right, Justice, and you weigh this well,  
 Therefore still bear the balance and the sword,  
 And I do wish your honours may increase,  
 Till you do live to see a son of mine  
 Offend you and obey you, as I did.  
 So shall I live to speak my father's words:  
 "Happy am I, that have a man so bold,  
 That dares do justice on my proper son;  
 And not less happy, having such a son  
 That would deliver up his greatness so  
 Into the hands of justice".<sup>23</sup>

That the law is supreme is again evident in the rejection of Falstaff by Henry V. Just after Henry's accession Falstaff utters the following sanguine but telling remark: "I know the young king is sick for me. Let us take any man's horses; the laws of England are at my commandment". (V, iii, 141-143) The suggestion, of course, is that Falstaff will be able to defy the law with impunity thanks to his relationship with Henry. Clearly such a one must be rejected if justice is to prevail. Finally, the ironic Freudian slip of Hostess Quickly when she is among those taken away as the realm is cleansed--"O God, that right should thus overcome might!" (V, iv, 26-27, italics mine)--is something of a thematic epitome of the play, a beautifully conceived inversion that depicts the essential point that justice must be supreme in the realm.

This is not to say that Elizabeth was not a powerful monarch. Kermode notes that in the time of Frederick II

a juristic myth engulfed the concept of emperor, leading to the notion that the monarch was the fount of equity.<sup>24</sup> With the Reformation, the ruler, now ruler of the church, is the mediator between man and God, divine and natural law, and as such the repository of God's new dispensation mercy, a concept virtually indistinguishable from equity. Elizabeth easily becomes a figure of equity controlling the force of law, just one image of the vast power of the queen. It is Elizabeth as a figure of equity controlling, not abusing, the law through her equity courts that we see in the symbols of Isis and Osiris of Britomart's dream and Mercilla and the Lion in The Faerie Queene, Book V. With the extension of prerogative court jurisdiction, Elizabeth became a monarch of considerable juristic power, but she always used this power with moderation.<sup>25</sup> Not only did she avoid offending the common law, but she in fact made the study of common law attractive again after a mid century decline: after the middle of the sixteenth century there were several common law books published, and admissions increased at the common law Inns of Court toward the end of Elizabeth's reign--e.g., 247 students in 1594, 221 in 1595, 200 in 1598, 201 in 1600, 210 in 1602; on the other hand, admissions were often below 100 at mid century, and only 58 when Elizabeth died.<sup>26</sup> At the end of the Elizabethan age there was a struggle for supremacy between the common law courts and these rival courts. The earlier juristic

harmony was essentially the result of Elizabeth's personality as a controlling force, for Elizabeth never favored one court to the exclusion of the other. What there was then of a Reception was the inclusion of new legal machinery placed side by side with the old, with no attempt to have the new supersede the old. During the Elizabethan age, therefore, English law was a synthesis of quite diverse systems, a reconciliation of antinomies deftly maintained by Elizabeth.<sup>27</sup>

The image of Elizabeth as a symbol of union, of synthesis, goes beyond the concept of justice alone, for she represented a kind of sacred-secular nexus as well. The key event was Henry VIII's Reformation settlement early in the sixteenth century. As a purely political instrument, this gave Henry great power, and England was therefore early on one of the Western European countries with a potentially powerful monarchy. But the Reformation Parliament (1529-1536) formulated a "moderate" Reformation--i.e., the king as ruler of church and state, but the Protestant Church a supposed model of the primitive Catholic Church. Moreover, Henry avoided alliances with other Protestant rulers, and the Act of the Six Articles reaffirmed most Roman Church doctrines. Clearly the royal ideal was a gradual, moderate Reformation.<sup>28</sup> Of course certain power was necessarily derived from the Reformation, for it was perceived as not only reinstating the primitive church, but also as

reasserting the Holy Roman Empire. Thenceforth spiritual and temporal rule were under one head. Since the Reformation transferred the pope's power to the king, the monarch now became the vicar of God, and rule was regarded as "by divine right".

The notion of rule by divine right is based upon four fundamental propositions: a) the monarchy is divinely ordained; b) hereditary right is indefeasible;<sup>29</sup> c) the king is accountable to God alone and so the king's power is incapable of legal limitations; indeed, the king cannot limit the monarchy for his successor, for all law is the monarch's will, and a limited monarchy is a contradiction in terms; d) non-resistance, passive obedience is enjoined by God.<sup>30</sup> The Raison d'être of divine right was the rejection of papal suzerainty in 1366 which led to a recognition of England as imperial, the monarch as the emperor, and, with the Reformation, the monarch as spiritual leader. The Holy Roman Empire was able to have coequal rulers--one of church, one of state--because it was really a theocracy, the pope and the emperor merely vicars of God. Under Henry VIII, however, the monarch was the only vicar of God.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the monarch's juristic authority as vicar of God was potent, and scripture could be used to reinforce this power, e.g., "by me kings reign and princes decree justice" (Proverbs 8:15).

While the English monarchy was seen as existing

by divine sanction, there were certain limitations on the king's power. Bracton indicated that the king was under God and the law; indeed, that the law was supreme was the attitude of all in England.<sup>32</sup> The divine right of kings led to the juristic notion Jus Divinum, which is not only the same thing but also "law divine".<sup>33</sup> Recognition of the theory of divine right was necessary in England especially after the papal bull of excommunication of 1570, for the people of England were being told to become traitors on religious grounds; the doctrine of divine right required, as mentioned above, passive obedience, and this assuaged the spirit of rebellion; more importantly, divine right gave the people a ruler whose authority was from God, thereby mollifying the spirit of zealous rebellion that may have existed. The religious settlement in England, in brief, was a compromise,<sup>34</sup> a via media between the Scylla and Charybdis of zealous Protestantism and Roman Catholicism.

But after Henry VIII's moderation came the extremes of Edward VI's strong Protestantism and Mary Tudor's perfervid Catholicism; both offered policies, foreign and domestic, which were disliked. Mary's foreign policy, making England a satellite of Spain, was most repugnant to the largely Protestant English, and was greatly feared by the governing class to whom Henry had shrewdly distributed monastic lands after the Reformation, thereby giving them a pecuniary motive to maintain the reform.<sup>35</sup>

"All classes welcomed Elizabeth--the offspring of the marriage which was the immediate occasion for the settlement of the national church to which the large majority of moderate men desired to return".<sup>36</sup> And Elizabeth did not disappoint the moderates, for she approached the religious issue, as other issues, by taking the via media, calling the reformed church the primitive church and avoiding the extremes of Jesuits on the one hand and Calvinists on the other.<sup>37</sup>

It is important to realize that Elizabeth's moderation was the result of choice, not of imposition. Ernst Kantorowicz reminds us that the king was not only regarded as the vicar of God, but also as the lex animata, the incarnation of justice and a persona mixta: a divine essence is part of his being since the king is God and Christ by grace when anointed and consecrated king.<sup>38</sup> Thus Elizabeth could have displayed the kind of rule more akin to absolutism had she so desired. But she seemed to realize intuitively the value of moderation. In the Act of Supremacy, for example, wherein all of Mary's reactionary legislation was proscribed, Elizabeth changed the language of her father's "the only supreme head in earth of the church of England" to "the only supreme governor of this realm, as well in all spiritual and ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal" in order to seem less strident to Catholics while sacrificing nothing of actual power.<sup>39</sup> Also indicative

of Elizabeth's moderation in religious matters were a) her veto of an anti-Catholic measure for the safekeeping of the armour of recusants<sup>40</sup> and b) her proclamation of February 13, 1539, a denunciation of the Puritan extremist *Marprelate* tracts.<sup>41</sup> In all of these cases Elizabeth avoided overzealous Protestantism while remaining firm in her faith. In sum, then, Elizabeth dealt with religious controversy as she dealt with juridic controversy: by taking the via media of prudent rule, displaying herself as a mediator, a reconciler of antithetical positions.<sup>42</sup>

The conjoining, synthesizing of all things was the hallmark of the Elizabethan approach in regard to governmental concerns as well.<sup>43</sup> For one thing, the functioning of local government was entwined with central government operations, and medieval governmental forms were synthesized with more modern forms. Part of this fusion was developed by justices of the peace who enforced the common law at the local level and thus joined central and local government and law. But more important were the alterations in parish operations that took place under Elizabeth. The parish was the basic unit of medieval local ecclesiastical government. One of its main functions was the collection of relief for the poor (its ecclesiastical nature evident in the word "charity"). After the Reformation the parish also collected for secular and central government concerns: the repair of

highways, assistance for disabled soldiers and sailors, etc. This was administered by the parish church and enforced by the secular law courts. Again we see a knitting of sacred and secular, medieval and modern, local and central governments.<sup>44</sup>

But the most telling sign of Elizabeth's governmental moderation was the choice of William Cecil as Chancellor, a man of consummate moderation and thus the perfect lieutenant for Elizabeth. Taking the middle way in regard to the religious controversies of the day, Cecil signed the council letter of 1549 prohibiting Bonner, Bishop of London, from performing private masses at St. Paul's, while on the other hand Cecil was a member of a commission inquiring into Anabaptist heresies. With the accession of Mary Tudor, Cecil was faced with the polarities of obedience or exile; he found a moderate approach: obedience and withdrawal. Cecil also counselled religious moderation, persuading Elizabeth to make the moderate Matthew Parker her first Archbishop of Canterbury.<sup>45</sup> No finer indication of Cecil's religious moderation exists, however, than the Catholic perception of him as an extreme heretic and the zealous Protestant perception of him as merely a tepid supporter of the reformed church. As one of his biographers notes, Cecil was a man who "dissented from the papist and the puritan, disliking the superstition of the one and the singularity of the other after holding midway between them".<sup>46</sup>

Cecil's moderation of course went beyond the religious realm, for he was a highly regarded political and personal referee among his fellow councillors, the man always turned to when a judicious compromise was sought or when personal antagonisms, such as that between Somerset and Warwick, needed reconciling.<sup>47</sup>

But in order for us to appreciate fully the extent to which Elizabeth was seen as a reconciling agent, as a mediatrix, it is necessary that we understand the nature of the times in all its multifarious complexity. The Reformation is the result of innumerable factors, but certainly central is the desire to reestablish primitive Christianity at the point of earthly perfection and so to usher in the millennium. For many this time is the time of the Holy Roman Empire under its first Christian ruler, Constantine, a ruler of church and state, or, for the more Empire-minded, the time of Augustus. But since then the world has been tainted, disintegrated, a world, in short, of iron. England during the reign of Elizabeth seems to be the land where the golden age of Christianity is being restored. Its centuries of internal strife were finally halted with the marriage of Henry VII and Elizabeth conjoining the red and white of Lancaster and York, but it is not until Elizabeth appears, the namesake of her grandmother, that England feels that the one Tudor rose, uniting white and red, has arrived.<sup>48</sup> Lending further sanction to the Tudor

monarchy was the myth that Owen Tudor was a descendent of Cadwallader, the last of the old British kings. To this was added the legend that Arthur would return, suggesting that the first Tudor was Arthur redivivus.<sup>49</sup>

Moreover, the notion that the new golden age was dawning in England was fostered by many occurrences. For one thing, the struggle between England and Spain was surrounded by Apocalyptic prophecies. Melancthon and others, as well as various numerological tracts, suggested that 1588 was rife with chiliastic significance. England's victory, therefore, presented Elizabeth as a type of Messiah.<sup>50</sup> The novae at the end of the sixteenth century, especially the one in Cassiopeia in 1572, and the solar eclipse of the late years of the century helped to invest the Elizabethan regime with the stuff of chiliasm, and Elizabeth with features of the Empress of the last days.<sup>51</sup> Reinforcing this notion were prophecies surrounding Elizabeth, such as the one in the Tiburtina prophesying that one would come who would bring back the golden age, unite the Empire, destroy heresy (the identified antichrist was the pope) and convert the Jews. This was the empress of the last days. Another such prophecy was that made by Job Throckmorton in a parliamentary prayer of 1587 when he said of Elizabeth that "when she floeteth hence. . . we may then behold. . . Jesus sitting in His throne of judgment, to our endless and everlasting comfort".<sup>52</sup>

Even in the portraits of Elizabeth exists an Apocalyptic strain.<sup>53</sup>

The image of Elizabeth as empress of the last days, as a monarch of synthesis, of reconciliation, and as a monarch of extensive juristic involvement leads to a belief that the reign of Elizabeth is the renewed golden age. A representation of Elizabeth as the distinctly juristic monarch who reinstitutes the golden age is present in such works as George Peele's Arraignement of Paris. Paris, arraigned for giving the prize to Venus rather than to Juno or Pallas, is acquitted because under "equity and law"<sup>54</sup> he has been absolved. The legend has grafted on to it here an extension of the contest wherein Diana must now choose. But instead of choosing Venus, Juno or Pallas, she describes England in halcyon terms, calling it Elysium ruled by Eliza (for supposed etymological significance), or a second Troy, a place where the people are called Angeli. The first thing said about Elizabeth is that "she giveth laws of justice and of peace"; then Diana lauds Elizabeth as equal to Juno, Pallas and Venus in their major attributes, and so Elizabeth is given the golden apple of victory. In sum, the hyperbolic praise of Elizabeth and England here possess by weight of accretion an indication that England under Elizabeth stands at a point of renewal.

That there was to be such a renewal seemed clear

from Virgil's messianically interpreted Fourth Eclogue--  
Iam redit et Virgo. Frances Yates points out that the  
notion of Virgo as Astraea comes from Aratos, the Greek  
astronomical poet, who says in Phaenomena that the god-  
dess of justice Astraea was translated to the heavens as  
the constellation Virgo.<sup>55</sup> Virgil's Fourth Eclogue,  
bringing Virgo back to earth and establishing peace and  
the Augustan Empire, made the virgin an imperial virgin.  
Constantine was the first to interpret the eclogue from  
a Christian point of view. He felt that the virgin was  
Virgin Mary, and that the eclogue prophecied the reign  
of Christ.<sup>56</sup> Dante also read the eclogue as a visionary  
glimpse of the returned golden age, and he interpreted  
Virgo as a reference to the return of Astraea, goddess  
of justice. What is required to bring the world back  
to a moment of perfection, according to Dante (among  
others), is an imperial ruler in control of both church  
and state; a reign of peace and justice; the destruction  
of antichrist, the pope; an end to the sufferings of  
the reformed church, to be "compared to the ending of  
the persecution of the early church by the first Christian  
emperor Constantine".<sup>57</sup> Elizabeth is the ruler of church  
and state; she ushers in thirty years of peace and jus-  
tice; she casts out antichrist in the form of Mary Queen  
of Scots and in the form of the Spanish Armada; in Foxe's  
Acts and Monuments the end of the suffering of martyrs  
in the reign of Mary Tudor with the arrival of Elizabeth

is compared to the end of the suffering of the early church upon the arrival of Constantine, the first Christian emperor.<sup>58</sup> Here Elizabeth's mythical geneology was of value, for she was reputed to be a descendent of an English mother and a Roman father, from the line of Brutus who found London as Troynovant.<sup>59</sup> Elizabeth herself claimed imperial status, considering herself as just such a Ghibelline empress, an empress who maintains world wide peace and prepares for the coming of Christ, an empress in whom imperium and sacerdotium are united.<sup>60</sup> In short, the arrival of Elizabeth was viewed as the fulfillment of prophecies of the reinstatement of the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>61</sup>

The transfer of the imperial symbol to Elizabeth is a logical extension of Reformation politics: "The sacred One ruler of . . . Catholic Imperialist writers became in the hands of imperialist Protestant Elizabethan theologians the sacred One Virgin whose sword of Justice smote down the Whore of Babylon and ushered in a golden age of pure religion, peace and plenty".<sup>62</sup> In itself, this kind of position is invariably immixed with justice. Sherman Hawkins in his "Virtue and Kingship in Shakespeare's Henry IV" refers to justice as the primary virtue a king must have to enable him to carry out his royal office. This position was maintained by Justinian in the Institutes and by Bracton; moreover, justice and kingship were often yoked in scripture, e.g., 2 Samuel

8:15, 1 Kings 10:9, Jeremiah 23:5, and by such thinkers as Aquinas, Plato, Aristotle.<sup>63</sup> Most significantly, Elizabeth immediately recognized the relationship between sovereignty and justice: "then entered I further into the schoole of experience, bethinking what it fitted a king to do: and there I saw, he scant was wel furnished, if either he lacked justice, temperance, magnanimitie, or judgement".<sup>64</sup> Frances Yates points out that since Frederick II, the emperor was considered the essence, the fount of divine law, "the semi-divine intermediary through whom justice flows from God into the world".<sup>65</sup> Kantorowicz refers to the emperor as "the sole source of justice. . . . He interprets the law. . . . From him justice flows through the kingdom".<sup>66</sup>

Elizabeth was clearly regarded as an imperial monarch with distinctly juristic features. Norman Cohn points out that Rex Iustus, "right or just ruler", was one of the first titles given to a monarch regarded as potentially the emperor of the last days ushering in the new golden age.<sup>67</sup> One such ruler was Louis VII of France. Part of the prophecy surrounding him called for his letter to be changed from L to C--i.e., he will be the resurrected Constans who will be emperor of the last days.<sup>68</sup> This of course was also said of Elizabeth; for example, in several portraits Elizabeth is encompassed by the letter C. Other signs suggesting the emperor of the last days are the establishing of peace and justice and

the reconciling of antithetical conditions. Even fanatics such as Bockelson realized that the ability to reconcile was an important element in the self-appointment of one as emperor of the last days. To enhance his image as a reconciler, he devised an emblem symbolizing spiritual and temporal dominion in him alone: a globe pierced by two swords. The globe was surmounted by a cross which read, "one king of righteousness over all".<sup>69</sup>

Certainly, then, Elizabeth was viewed as empress of the last days, heavily involved with the concept of the reinstatement of the Holy Roman Empire, with extensive juristic features.<sup>70</sup> Now the ruler as Sol Iustitiae (as in the Magna Curia of Frederick II)<sup>71</sup> or lex animata (a Roman civil law concept going back to the Justinian Novels) becomes part of the Elizabethan myth, making the image of Elizabeth as Astraea, as the Roman virgin of justice returning to reestablish the golden age, a perfectly understandable one. Elizabeth as Astraea, of course, is one of the commonplace perceptions of the late sixteenth century in England. E. C. Wilson in his England's Eliza and Frances Yates point to numerous literary representations of Elizabeth as Astraea: e.g., in Histriomastix, Dekker's Old Fortunatus, The Misfortunes of Arthur, and of course Peele's Descensus Astraea.<sup>72</sup> Yet even Elizabeth symbolized in other ways tends toward the juristic. Wilson cites examples of Elizabeth as

Judith or Deborah or simply as a monarch whose outstanding features revolve around justice:

Was euer lande so gouerned  
 sith conquest heretofore,  
 As this hath bene in all respectes  
 this xj yeares and more?  
 What peace, what rest, what quietnesse,  
 what welth, what helth hath reynde,  
 What justice hath bene ministred,  
 to all that haue complainde.  
 Was euer Prince so mercifull  
 as this most noble Queene?<sup>73</sup>

But Elizabeth as Astraea is the basic juridic symbol. This goes a good length beyond merely emphasizing Elizabeth's juristic nature. For Elizabeth as Astraea is at the center of a mythical hub that encompasses the three primary mythic traditions, moral, physical and historical, suggesting a moment of perfection, completion, fulfillment, a moment above all of synthesis of Christian and Classical, ancient and modern concepts. Finally, Elizabeth as Astraea was used as part of an emperor cult symbolizing the fulfillment of the Virgilian prophecy reasserting the golden age and reestablishing Constantinian imperial Christianity: "the myth of the queen as Astraeon empress is inseparable from the use of apocalyptic figures with historical significations, and itself involves a strong sense that the whole history of the Empire from Aeneas to Constantine, from Charlemagne to Elizabeth, culminated in the present moment".<sup>74</sup>

What we have then in Elizabeth is a divine, imperial,

juristic virgin. But let us look at her position, her times, and her deeds structurally, as they form a pattern to the abstracting vision. Elizabethan law was a unique synthesis, a balance of Roman and indigenous English common law, and thus a blend of ancient and modern from one point of view, modern and medieval from another, Roman and English from yet another. Moreover, the common and civil jurists were not antagonistic but rivals who recognized the value of each other. Indeed, the juridic tour de force of the era may well have been Elizabeth's administration of equity through Roman law courts without antagonizing those trained in the common law who felt that equity was an outgrowth of common law and as such should be administered by the common law courts. The English monarchy for Henry VIII as for Elizabeth is likewise a synthetic construction, a union of church and state--primitive Roman Catholic Church reinstated and English Empire. Furthermore, Elizabeth maintained a religious equilibrium of sorts, what with the retention of certain Catholic rituals in the church, the rejection of papacy, and the control of a Calvinism which sought a church independent of the state. Elizabeth's balancing of theological extremes was duplicated in her handling of equity as a controlling factor of law, a source of enormous power which Elizabeth wielded with moderation.

These images of Elizabeth as mediator, as synthesis

of seemingly antagonistic juristic, theological and governmental (imperium-sacerdotium) elements, coalesce in the icon on the title page of the Bishop's Bible (the bible chained to the churches of Reformation England), with Justice and Mercy flanking and holding the crown over the head of Elizabeth. But the image of Elizabeth as mediator, as synthesizer, is yet more extensive, for her putative lineage is a synthesis of Roman and English blood, and she represents as the one Tudor rose the union of the red and white roses of Lancaster and York; moreover, the very act of regarding God's juristic surrogate as Astraea suggests a synthesis of Christianity and antique mythology. In addition to the image of Elizabeth as synthetic agent is the image of Elizabeth as restorer of the golden age of Christianity in her juristic, theological and governmental aspects, not only as reconciling agent but also as divinely inspired destructive force--e.g., the destruction of antichrist.

England, then, stands uniquely at a seeming pinnacle of earthly development at the end of Elizabeth's reign. All things seem completed or reestablished in their purity, and surely it would have been odd if many did not see Elizabeth synthesizing heaven and earth, Astraea returned as Empress of the Holy Roman Empire's last days, laying the groundwork, as it were, for the Last Judgement of the justiciar Christ. It is no wonder that, as Kermode points out, people saw every village

as Jerusalem, and the Heavenly City was seen in the sky.<sup>75</sup>

What we have here is a picture of Elizabeth, indeed of the Elizabethan world, as a multifarious dialectical process synthesizing antithetical elements or extirpating antagonistic ones. And this dialectical process would seem, from all we have seen, singularly juristic, leading, in many cases, to the image of Elizabeth as Astraea. This process exerts tremendous pressure on the imagery, agency and structure of Elizabethan literature of justice.

That the nature of the historico-philosophic world view of a particular subject should have structural and imagistic significance in those works dealing with that subject should be clear from my introductory chapter. This is true at all times under all circumstances; there is no better example than the balanced Weltanschauung which led Homer to construct the Iliad as a grand hysteron-proteron comparable to the structure of that Geometric Age. The entirely harmonious and ordered Weltanschauung of which jurisprudence was a part in the Elizabethan world view fostered ordered, harmonious metrics and structures. To order, harmonize one's literary structures is to reflect that milieu, is to present an ordered cosmos regarded as in a state of perfection. It is understandable therefore that Renaissance artists-- who from Leonardo to Cirthio found proportion in all

things--believed that all constructions of art had a law of unity, harmony, coherence.<sup>76</sup> Thus we see the motivation for a Puttenham, for example, to offer a lengthy discussion of the symmetrical, the proportional, the measured, the arithmetic (regarded as etymologically and so intrinsically related to "rhythmic") as the beautiful in art.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, Leo Spitzer refers to an irrefragible link between universal harmony and musical harmony, and regards the "concert of the stars"--an Elizabethan commonplace--as but a consequence of the topos of world harmony.<sup>78</sup>

But jurisprudence and measure have an intrinsic ability to propagate order or harmony. Note in the following quotation how law is inherently a controlling, measuring factor:

All creatures of God, as well in heaven as in earth, had laws given them after they were created, to be governed and ruled by: the sun, the moon and the stars, to keep their perpetual motions and course in their places and regiments; so the seas have their limits and bounds, how far they should rule and reign. And though one star differeth from another in glory, in greatness and in brightness, yet are they governed by one perpetual law: so the seas, although the waves thereof be so lofty and proud, yet are they shut up within doors and commanded to keep in, and not to go further than the place to them by law appointed. By law also the elements are commanded to stay within their own regiments, without trespassing one of another.<sup>79</sup>

Yet there is no more outstanding example of the subject of measure ordering the structure of literature than

in Stephen Hawes' Pastime of Pleasure. Hawes uses certain features of balance in verse as onomatopoeic reflections of the subject and the world view.

Mesure mesureth mesure in effecte;  
 Mesure mesureth every quantyte;  
 Mesure mesureth all waye the aspecte;  
 Mesure mesureth all in certayne;  
 Mesure mesureth in the stabilitie;  
 Mesure mesuryth in every doutful case;  
 And mesure is the lodesterre of all grace.

Affycte of mesure is long continuaunce,  
 Quantite without mesure is nought;  
 Aspect of mesure devoydeth repentaunce;  
 Certayne wold weye all thinges thought;  
 Stabilitie upon a perfite grounde is wrought;  
 Cace doubtfull may yet a whyle abyde;  
 Grace may in space a remedy provyde.

Countenaunce causeth the promocyon;  
 Nought avayleth service without attendaunce;  
 Repentaunce is after all abusyon;  
 Thought afore wolde have had perseveraunce;  
 Wrought how should be bydede the mischaunce;  
 Abyde nothing tyll thou do the dede;  
 Provyde in mynde how thou mayst have mede.

Promocion groweth after good governaunce;  
 Attendaunce doth attayne good favour;  
 Abusyon is causer of all variaunce;  
 Perceyveraunce causeth great honour;  
 Mischaunce alway is roote of dolour;  
 Dede done can not be called agayne;  
 Mede well rewarded both with joye and payne.<sup>80</sup>

When Hawes speaks of measure as a controlling feature for all things he "measures" his verse so thoroughly that it is initially rhyme royal as well as terminally, the terminal rhyme of one stanza becoming the initial rhyme of the next. Even creation is viewed as measured, God having "weyed all thynges in balauns" (Chapter XXII, stanza 9); justice by extension becomes an analogue of

order, creation, the opposite of chaos. Justitia is the one personification always shown with attributes which balance or symmetrically shape.<sup>81</sup> Literature of justice, accordingly, is structured in a highly symmetrical fashion or very unstructured, asymmetrical, if injustice is being described.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Frederic William Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901), *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> Maitland, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1924), IV, 252, 253.

<sup>4</sup> Holdsworth, IV, 233.

<sup>5</sup> William S. Holdsworth, Sources and Literature of English Law (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1925), p. 31.

<sup>6</sup> Holdsworth, IV, 258.

<sup>7</sup> Holdsworth, IV, 221-222, 224.

<sup>8</sup> B. W. Beckingsale, Burghley: Tudor Statesman (London: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. 20.

<sup>9</sup> Alan Harding, The Law Courts of Medieval England (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973), p. 113.

<sup>10</sup> John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), pp. 223-230.

<sup>11</sup> Holdsworth, IV, 201.

<sup>12</sup> Holdsworth, IV, 239.

<sup>13</sup> Edward P. Cheyney, A History of England (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1914), p. 87. Though Elizabeth never attended a session in Star Chamber, the royal arms, a vacant chair and a mace symbolized her presence.

<sup>14</sup> Cheyney, pp. 125-127.

<sup>15</sup> Holdsworth, IV, 281.

- 16 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 18, 28-29.
- 17 Cheyney, pp. 90, 92.
- 18 Holdsworth, V, 166.
- 19 Rene Craziani, "Elizabeth at Isis Church", PMLA, 79 (1964), 376-389.
- 20 Frank Kermode, Shakespeare, Spenser, Donne (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), pp. 53-54.
- 21 Holdsworth, V, 216-217.
- 22 G. R. Elton, Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 284.
- 23 William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II in The Complete Plays and Poems of William Shakespeare, eds. William Allan Neilson and Charles Jarvis Hill (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942). All quotations of Henry IV, Part II are from this edition.
- 24 Kermode, Shakespeare, pp. 51-52.
- 25 Holdsworth, Sources, p. 163.
- 26 Arthur J. Slavin, ed., Tudor Men and Institutions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 260.
- 27 Elizabeth, with her legendary Roman-Latin-Trojan ancestry and English being is, in the eyes of those concerned with law, the synthesis of English common law and the Reception of Roman law.
- 28 Holdsworth, IV, 10, 36, 39.
- 29 This is why Elizabeth as the namesake and granddaughter of Henry VII's wife Elizabeth is important: the marriage of Henry and Elizabeth yoked red and white, Lancaster and York, and so the question of primogeniture was no longer a problem, and usurpation became a moot point.
- 30 Figgis, pp. 5-6. If a monarch's rule is anti-God, of course one follows God's law, but passively submits to the king's penalty for failure to follow his rule.
- 31 Figgis, p. 39.

- 32 Figgis, p. 36n; Holdsworth, IV, 200.
- 33 Fredson Bowers, Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 170.
- 34 Holdsworth, VI, 122-128.
- 35 Holdsworth, IV, 40-41.
- 36 Holdsworth, IV, 41.
- 37 Elizabeth MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 20.
- 38 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 48-49, 96-97. That this was so even in medieval England is clear from the Norman Anonymous tractate.
- 39 J. B. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth: 1588-1603 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 14-16.
- 40 J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958), p. 99.
- 41 Neale, pp. 220-221.
- 42 Black recognized the essence of Elizabeth when he said that she was forever "counselling moderation and offering her services as a mediator" (p. 334; italics mine).
- 43 And, according to MacCaffrey (p. 100), governmental personalities. Only a mediating, reconciling individual such as Elizabeth could have managed for so long to control Robert Dudley and William Cecil, two incompatible albeit useful servants.
- 44 Holdsworth, IV, 151-152, 156, 157-158, 160-161.
- 45 Beckingsale, pp. 28, 54, 76-77.
- 46 Beckingsale, p. 217.
- 47 Burghley was also always aware of the law and legal positions, thereby helping to give the Elizabethan regime the sense of legal primacy that it had, and ultimately enhancing the conception of Elizabeth as a singularly juristic monarch. As Beckingsale points out, "Burghley's most usual response to problems was to seek a legalistic solution" (Beckingsale, p. 195).

- 48 George Kernodle, From Art to Theatre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 68, points out that to usher in Elizabeth's reign of reconciliation were two united rose trees, one red, one white, with a branch holding Elizabeth, and E. C. Wilson, England's Eliza (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), p. 63, mentions that pageants often presented Elizabeth as a monarch of unity, concord, for she was the grandchild of the Lancaster-York union.
- 49 Black, pp. 286-287.
- 50 Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), pp. v, 15, 175.
- 51 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 10.
- 52 Neale, p. 434.
- 53 Kermode, Shakespeare, p. 36. See Roy Strong, Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). In fact, there are a plethora of common references to Elizabeth and the return of the golden age--see, for example, Chapman's poem prefixed to a Relation of the Second Voyage to Guiana of Lawrence Kemys (1596) which speaks of Elizabeth as she who would create "a golden world in this our iron age". (Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965], p. 20.)
- 54 George Peele, The Arraignment of Paris, IV, iv, 161, in Elizabethan Plays, eds. Arthur Nethercot, et al. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971).
- 55 Frances A. Yates, "Queen Elizabeth as Astraea", JWCI, X (1947), 28.
- 56 Yates, "Queen Elizabeth as Astraea", 30, 32.
- 57 Yates, "Queen Elizabeth as Astraea", 41; Dante Alighieri, On World-Government or De Monarchia, trans. Hubert W. Schneider (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1949), pp. 7, 9, 13, 20, 52.
- 58 Yates, "Queen Elizabeth as Astraea", 38-41.
- 59 Jean Seznec, The Survival of the Pagan Gods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 19. The comparison between Elizabeth and Constantine was reinforced by this genealogy because Constantine was likewise said to be the child of an English mother and a Roman father. Concluding an edition of Foxe's Acts

and Monuments is a portrait of Elizabeth encircled by a "C", suggesting the reestablishment of Constantinian rule.

60 Kermode, Shakespeare, p. 49.

61 Frances A. Yates, Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 27-28, shows that after Charles V there was no strong central Holy Roman Emperor and the spiritual leadership was crushed by the Reformation and claims of corruption. The imperial idea therefore devolved upon individual monarchs to keep alive the hope of a unified, reconciled world empire.

62 Yates, "Queen Elizabeth as Astraea", 46.

63 Sherman H. Hawkins, "Virtue and Kingship in Shakespeare's Henry IV", ELR, 5 (Autumn, 1975), 316, 321.

64 Hawkins, 317.

65 Yates, Imperial Theme, p. 6.

66 Ernst Kantorowicz, Frederick II, pp. 234-235 in Yates, Imperial Theme, p. 6.

67 Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 20.

68 Cohn, pp. 57-58.

69 Cohn, pp. 296-297.

70 Indeed, in certain portraits, Iustitia is depicted in dresses similar to those of Elizabeth--e.g., see plate 20a of Yates' "Queen Elizabeth as Astraea".

71 Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies, p. 101.

72 Of course Astraea as a symbol of renovatio has been used in English literature without reference to Elizabeth. In Skelton's "Laud and Praise for Our Sovereign Lord the King" the return of Astraea symbolizes the returned golden age, contingent upon the union of York and Lancaster in the marriage of Henry VII. The important thing to realize is that Astraea's return and the renewed golden age are features which follow hard on a reconciliation. Elizabeth is a monarch of supreme reconciliation and her age is one of consummate synthesis, and so the symbol of Elizabeth as Astraea is easily understandable.

- 73 Wilson, pp. 16, 64. The quotation is from Fugitive Tracts, first series, no. 22.
- 74 Kermode, Shakespeare, p. 19.
- 75 Kermode, Shakespeare, p. 20.
- 76 Wylie Sypher, Four Stages of Renaissance Style (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 33, 61, 65, 76.
- 77 G. Gregory Smith, ed., Elizabethan Critical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1904), II, 67.
- 78 Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony, ed. Anna Granville Hatcher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 35, 117.
- 79 Lodowick Lloyd, A Brief Conference of Divers Laws, 1602, quoted in James Winney, ed., The Frame of Order (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957), p. 16.
- 80 Stephen Hawes, The Pastime of Pleasure (London: The Percy Society, 1845), pp. 102-103.
- 81 Adolf Katzenellenbogen, Allegories of the Virtues and Vices in Mediaeval Art (London: The Warburg Institute, 1939), pp. 55-56.

A hopeful, indeed visionary perception of justice at the beginning of the last decade of the sixteenth century is reflected in the imagery, agency and structure of Spenser's Faerie Queene V. Elizabeth as Astraea, as the embodiment of the complex juristic historico-philosophic world view detailed earlier, functions as the structural matrix of Faerie Queene V by ordering its narrative structure (balanced or antithetical), agency (identical or parodic), and action (two systems of dialectic).

The major image is one of balance, order, synthesis, reconciliation, as is the structure of the Elizabethan historico-philosophic juristic Weltanschauung. The same pattern can be discerned in the texture of agency. Agents of identity in Faerie Queene V seem to come together almost like mirror images or two vehicles rushing at one another from left to right, right to left, representing the two scales of a perfectly counterpoised balance. This kind of imagery and agency functions as formal reflection of juristic content, so that not only do we have images of balance, but also images of imbalance, not only controlled metrics but also cacophony, suggesting the condition of the universe at various points throughout Book V, so that the nature of justice in the universe can conceivably be charted simply by considering the imagery, language, agency and action.

Finally, the structure also of Faerie Queene V is

reflective of the juristic world view, dialectical synthesis or annihilation the central structures reflecting the syncretistic Elizabethan vision or the sword of justice preparing the way for the harmonious Elizabethan vision, leading to the culminating synthetic image of justice embracing peace.

## I

Perhaps the major image of Spenser's legend of justice, amounting as it does to the structural matrix of Book V, is the image of a balance. Spenser virtually announces the presence and source of this imagery in Canto I:

Now, when the world with sinne gan to abound,  
Astraea loathing lenger here to space  
Mongst wicked men, in whom no truth she found,  
Return'd to heaven, whence she deriv'd her race;  
Where she hath now an everlasting place,  
Mongst those twelve signes, which nightly we  
doe see  
The heavens bright-shining baudricke to enchace;  
And is the Virgin, sixt in her degree,  
And next her selfe her righteous ballance  
hanging bee.

(I, xi, 1-9)<sup>1</sup>

This is significant information inasmuch as it is important for the reader to know that the episodes of Book V are to take place after the golden age. But equally significant is what this stanza does not tell us but rather architectonically displays. That is,

Astraea has been translated to the zodiac, and she is alongside, reasonably enough, "her righteous ballance", Libra (Latin: scales). This is the first clearly defined image of a balance in Book V, and its heavenly placement suggests the possibility that its influence encompasses all beneath it--specifically, the earth. But in fact this is a balance within a balance, for Virgo and Libra are the sixth and seventh of the twelve zodiacal signs. If we look carefully at the image now, we may note that the zodiac itself presents a cosmic balance image--five signs to the left and five signs to the right of Astraea and her scales. The influence of balance now, it is suggested, encompasses the cosmos. This of course includes poetry, and in a masterful control of the very metrics and typography of a poem Spenser develops his verse to reflect this influence. Line 9, for example, of the above quoted stanza formally reflects its content and thus displays yet another balance:

And next her selfe her righteous ballance  
hanging bee.

(I, xi, 9)

Were we to look at the constellations and the line of verse, we would see the same thing--on our left (as we view the heavens and the line) is Virgo, and on our right is Libra. Moreover, Astraea and the balance are essentially syllabically balanced. That is (holding "righteous" in abeyance for a moment), the beginning syllables

are concerned with *Astraea*, the concluding syllables with the balance.<sup>2</sup>

Much of the above may seem the stuff of overinterpretation; and, in fact, in and of itself the above would constitute little else. The fact is, however, that Book V abounds with this kind of architectonic arrangement. When *Artegall* induces the Gyant to weigh two wrongs (or two falses) of equal share in the scales, the result is as it must be:

But right sate in the middest of the beame alone.  
(II, xlviiii, 9)

Right is in the middle of the balance, but it is also in the middle of the balance image which is created by the verse itself--i.e., "middest" is indeed "middest", five syllables to its left and five to its right. Turning back to the *Virgo-Libra* stanza now, we may note that "righteous" constitutes syllables six and seven of the last line of the stanza because it represents formally the very position of that to which it refers--i.e., *Astraea* (sign #6) and the balance (sign #7). In the middle of that line resides "righteous", as in the middle of the zodiac resides *Astraea* and the balance because "right" resides in the middle of a perfect balance, a perfect equilibrium. This notion has its roots, I suspect, in the *Themis* myth in which "right" and "justice" are etymologically fused. (This will be extensively

considered in part III of this chapter.)

In Aristotle's Ethics, Book V (a primary source of Spenser's Book V), moreover, we may note several linguistic and intrinsic conditions suggesting why the notion of a judge, justice, right (we will later find these to be identical, inextricably involved concepts) stands in the middle of a perfect balance:

The judge aims at being as it were the incarnation of justice. Then, what men seek in a judge is a middle term--in some societies the judges are actually called "mediators". People think that, if they get the mean, they will get the just. Thus, the just is in its way a mean, the judge being, as we have seen, a mediating factor between the disputing parties. What the judge does is to restore equality. . . . This is how the word "just" gets its name, dikaion, so called from dicha, "in half", dichaion being changed in pronunciation to dikaion. In the same way dikastes, "judge", is dichastes, "divider".<sup>3</sup>

Yet there is more involved here. Alastair Fowler, in Spenser and the Numbers of Time, points out that "the fifth digit had a varied range of meanings" but that "its principle Pythagorean epithet . . . was Justice".<sup>4</sup> Fowler then quotes Browne's Garden of Cyrus:

To enlarge this contemplation unto all the mysteries and secrets, accommodable unto this number, were inexcusable Pythagorisme, yet cannot omit the ancient conceit of five surnamed the number of justice. . . . The Ancients wisely instructing youth, even in their recreations unto virtue, that is, early to drive at the middle point and Central Seat of justice. . . . The Ancients have named it the Divisive Number, justly dividing the Entities of the world. (Numbers, p. 34)

To this Fowler adds (p. 34 n. 2) that the predominant meaning of the pentad as justice "was reinforced in the Middle Ages by the association of the Law with the Pentateuch". All of this is important in light of various findings above. Most obviously, of course, the use of Book V to distinguish the nature of justice is numerologically appropriate. Furthermore, the Virgo-Libra balance image previously referred to presented an image of, reasonably enough, Virgo and Libra with five zodiacal signs on either side; "middest" of Canto II, xlvi, 9, which represented "right", likewise had five syllables on either side; and "righteous" (formerly noted), representing Astraea (sign #6) and the balance (sign #7), also had five syllables on either side. The point is simply that these balance images are not only formal visual and onomatopoeic reflections of their juristic subjects, but also numerological reflections of their juristic subjects.<sup>5</sup>

Again, when Artegall tells the Gyant of the creation of the universe, he not only says that "the earth was in the middle center pight" (II, xxxv, 5), but he also formally places the earth in the visual vertical middle of the stanza, in line 5, and adds in the lines following that the earth is "Hemd in with waters . . . / And they with air" (ll. 7 and 8), so that the stanza both tells us and visually represents the image of a perfectly balanced universe (the earth, believed to

be the cynosure, in the middle held up by water, which is in turn held up by air, as line 5 is "held up" by line 7, which is in turn "held up" by line 8<sup>6</sup>).

In fact, we can see this perfectly balanced condition delineating right or justice (or associated notions) throughout Book V. In Canto III, for example, after having listened to his boastful parody quite enough, Artegall--truth, right, justice--manifests himself:

And unto all himselfe there open shewed  
(III, xx, 5)

The significance here is again in the verbal opsis. The manifestation of Artegall--truth, right, justice--occurs in line 5, with "himselfe" balanced by four syllables to its left and right. What we have in this stanza are perfect vertical and horizontal balances with "right", etc. "in the midst of the beame". What is actually occurring in the narrative of Canto III, at this precise instant and place, is that "right", truth, justice is at this moment stepping forward. The vertical and horizontal balances, therefore, precisely reflect the very spatial and temporal conditions of the instant. And the argument to Canto IV extends the image and prepares us for its narrative occurrence: "Artegall dealeth right betwixt/Two brethren that doe strive" (IV, Argument, ll. 1-2). "Right betwixt" is

ambiguous, meaning both "exactly in the middle of" and "rightness between"--both of which present a balance image with right and justice physically and/or intellectually in the middle. Artegall of course accomplishes both deeds, and this is in turn symbolized in Artegall's remarks to the twins Amidas and Bracidas:

[To Amidas] Your right is good (sayd he) and so I  
deeme,  
That what the sea unto you sent, your own  
should seeme.  
(IV, xvii, 8-9)

[To Bracidas] Your right is good (sayd he) and so I  
deeme,  
That what the sea unto you sent, your own  
should seeme.  
(IV, xviii, 8-9)

Artegall deals "right betwixt" the twins physically, intellectually, and verbally, establishing again and again the image of a perfect balance.

Actually, this pervasive balance image is very subtly developed at the outset of Book V:

So oft as I with state of present time,  
The image of the antique world compare,  
When as mans age was in his freshest prime,  
And the first blossome of faire vertue bare,  
Such oddes I finde twixt those, and these which  
are  
(Proem, I, 1-5)

Spenser is weighing the "antique world" and the "present time" in the balance, as it were; it is therefore not surprising that line 5 represents an unbalanced set of scales, the hemistich referring to the "antique world"



right sides of the line are mirror images of one another, thus displaying this line to be in content and visual image a perfect balance. But this judgement must be refined, for the line in question images the balance appropriate to present "stonie" times. Once we note that "wrong and wrong" are in the middle of the line whereas on the contrary "right" is in the middle of all perfect balances, the condition here is clear--this "wrong" balance image is a parody of "right" balance, one point being that injustice now holds sway over the world. Indeed, we may well note here that when we encounter Grandtorto in Canto XII he is a parodic judge who has sentenced Irena, and is as such the mediator, divider (see the above reference to Ethics) Great Wrong sitting in the middle of a grand parodic balance image. (The unbalanced image of the first stanza of the poem was merely established, I assume, in order to suggest the process from golden age to present time; once the scales shift however to parody, so far as regards the condition of the universe, the balance images usually shift radically from dualistic absolute to absolute, i.e., from or to an image of justice to or from an image of injustice.)

Balance images again appear at the beginning of Canto I:

Such first was Bacchus, that with furious  
 might  
 All th'East before untam'd did overroone,  
 And wrong repressed, and establisht right,  
 Which lawlesse men had formerly fordonne.  
 There Justice first her princely rule begonne.  
 Next Hercules his like ensample shewed,  
 Who all the West with equall conquest wonne,  
 And monstrous tyrants with his club subdewed;  
 The club of Justice dread, with kingly powre  
 endewed.

(I, ii, 1-9)

Spenser is herein comparing Artegall to two of his major types (Hercules is much the more important type in Book V). But more relevant to the purposes of the moment, lines 3 and 8 may be regarded as balance images, since each distinguishes in content and form the balancing functions of Bacchus and Hercules respectively. That is, each of these lines present syllabically and visually an antithetical balance--wrong and tyranny are seemingly turned to zero weight, while right and power are turned to maximum weight. (These are not arbitrary notions of abstract good and evil, for they most appropriately anticipate the nature of the ultimate struggle in Book V, the struggle between the tyrant Grandtorto (Great Wrong) and Artegall, the representative of right and power.) Yet both lines establish not properly balances, but more precisely radical imbalances. Contrariwise--and most importantly--these two imbalances unite to form a true perfect balance, for the entire stanza presents a visual vertical balance in that Justice is holding "princely rule" in line 5 (as in fact

Astraea is in the very first quotation of this study); likewise, justice is balanced by the whole world, Bacchus and the East on one side and Hercules and the West on the other.<sup>7</sup>

The above may at this point appear to develop a rather complicated web, if not an entanglement, of imagery, the significances of which must be equally complicated. This however is not the case, the images and significances being actually rather basic (though nonetheless important). The balance images of the stanza above, for example, are indicative of, indeed signify, the major mode of Spenser's Legend of Justice--the dialectical process. The balance image formed in Proem, IV, 4 ("Right now is wrong, and wrong that was is right") distinguishes the very condition, parody, which is necessary for one kind of dialectical process. The other balances heretofore noted are part of the overall balance image pattern, the total significances of which may now be considered.

The balance image pervades Book V most reasonably because it is a formal reflection of the book's central content--justice. Indeed, balance imagery is virtually intrinsic to any discussion of justice, the very idiom of which contains the image--e.g., the balanced biblical phrases "judge not that ye be not judged", "an eye for an eye", etc. (these go beyond, I think, usual biblical parallelism); or, the parodic balances, balances of in-

justice, which Thoreau creates in "Civil Disobedience" (whose paradoxical title represents the reign of injustice). Perhaps most important, let me once again remark that the language of Aristotle's Ethics, Book V, manifests balance imagery:

The equal, then, is a mean between the more and the less. But gain and loss are each of them more and less in opposite ways, more good and less evil being gain, and more evil and less good being loss. The equal, which we hold to be just, is now seen to be intermediate between them.

Thus the balance image functions to coalesce form and content, a very basic poetic impulse to achieve unity.

Yet as Angus Fletcher notes in Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode, here in The Faerie Queene there is a further impulse which is at the heart of allegorical creation:

Considered as a rhetorical device, allegory has the . . . capacity to provide narrative and dramatic equivalents of visual, geometric diagrams. . . . Agency becomes confused with imagery, and action becomes a diagram. The hypostatized agent is an emblem. Justice with the scales becomes an image; Cupid with his bow becomes an impresa--this suggests that allegorical agency is peculiarly fixated, and for this reason, conversely . . . we can perhaps ascribe to all allegorical images a kind of action, if only a symbolic one.<sup>8</sup>

In fact the balance images throughout Book V could be valuably charted as conducting the kind of diagrammatic symbolic action of which Professor Fletcher speaks that

would tell us instantly of the condition of Astraea, Artegall, right, etc.--i.e., justice or aspects of justice (or its antithesis)--at a given time and place. Moreover, the form-content interdependence may be regarded as occurring both on the grand scale and on the minute. That is, the image resides over the entire book as a grand general reflection of the book's concern; but the balance image also serves to reflect, to signify, the specific conditions at a given moment. Thus when we see a balance image with "wrong" in the middle we may note the nature of the world through the image, i.e., its fallen, demonic parodic condition. Again, when we see an image of radical imbalance, or what we may refer to as a radical antithetical balance, we may note that someone or something is being weighed in the balance and found wanting through the process of an annihilative dialectic.

Or, we may consider a balance image like the following:

There she him taught to weigh both right and  
 wrong  
 In equall ballance with due recompence,  
 And equitie to measure out along,  
 According to the line of conscience,  
 When so it needs with rigour to dispence  
 (I, vii, 1-5)

Lines 1 and 2 suggest a balance in small, concerned essentially with the laws of justice;<sup>9</sup> lines 3 and 4 deal with the other side of justice, equity, so that lines 1

and 2, and 3 and 4 constitute in sum two sides of a larger balance. (There is of course topical juristic significance here in "the line of conscience", a reference to Elizabeth's Chancery.) Line 5 establishes a plurisignative overall balance image. That is, line 5 is syntactically and lexically ambiguous. At the core of this ambiguity is "dispence", the primary meaning of which is "to ignore, do away with (in a special case) rigor (i.e., strict law)". The balance struck therefore between lines 1 and 2, and lines 3 and 4 constitutes a synthetic dialectic of law, rigor on the one hand and equity on the other, but significantly leaving equity as something of a subsumer of rigor. What we really have here is a growth process, so that the conflict of rigor and equity synthesized into equity's subsumption of rigor, and this is reflected in the formal growth process of the stanza's creation, line 5 representing the subsumption of lines 1 and 2 (law) by lines 3 and 4 (equity). Further, we must note that "dispence" is both a thoroughly legalistic and theological word, since it is a derivative of Latin dispensare, "to weigh, to weigh out" (thus continuing the balance imagery), and most importantly since it is the very word of Christianity--the new dispensation. Lines 1-5 therefore formally and metaphorically distinguish the theological foundation of justice, and at the same time reflect the subsumption, the fulfilling and surpassing of the old law by the new

dispensation (the new dispensation in short dispenses with, makes no longer necessary, the old), the growth process from Old Testament to New Testament, from rigor to mercy, from type to antitype. Conversely, the syntax of line 5--"When so it needs with rigour to dispence"--allows a very different reading: "When it is necessary to weigh with, by rigor" (here taking "dispence" in its Latinate sense), or "to deal forth rigor". Here the syntax allows a reading which tilts the balance to the side of rigor, law, power, when such is necessary. (We could of course regard lines 3 and 4 as a non-restrictive clause, thus leaving line 5 as a kind of balance between lines 1 and 2 and lines 3 and 4 since line 5 intellectually can be placed in this reading between the two groups.)

Thus line 5, meaning to be rigorous and/or to be merciful, is an epitome of Spenser's approach to the dichotomy of law and mercy, since Spenser wants and gets things both ways--i.e., he wants to recognize the new dispensation of mercy but he wants to do so not to the extent that freedom becomes license. What is required is a complex synthesis of rigor and mercy, allowing the viability of each. This line thus represents such a synthesis, since it may mean both (but mercy is syntactically, denotatively, connotatively, and theologically primary).

the balance images here, to return to the question

of image signification, are obviously plurisignative, but uppermost is the indication that the balance image may represent not only an annihilative dialectic, but also a synthetic dialectic, a synthetic dialectic which in turn represents the essential balances established by the juristic process developed in Book V, for justice comes to represent the balance, the synthesis, of old law and new dispensation, of law and equity, of rigor and mercy, of man's law and natural law, of microcosm and macrocosm, of earthly justice and the final judgment. Above all of this, finally, is the image of balance as cosmic providential anticipation of the ultimately harmonic conditions the universe is to achieve (reflecting imagistically all the way down to the very measuring process of poetics), so that when we hear that Astraea used to "divide her dred behests" (Proem, ix, 9),<sup>10</sup> we may note not only the perfect balance which is suggested by Aristotle's etymological analysis of "just" and "judge" as inextricably related and precisely in the center of a perfect balance and by the context (i.e., the universal peace which this stanza indicates existed during the golden age), but also we may note the symbolic anticipation of Mercilla-Elizabeth's reign, the type of Astraea's reestablishment; and further we may note the suggestion of a harmonious, synthesized universe inherent in the musicological sense of "divide" (i.e., "a harmonious joining of voices"<sup>11</sup>); or, conversely, we may note the

other sense of "divide"--i.e., "to separate absolutely"--and thus recognize the annihilative rather than the synthetic, the Apocalyptic rather than the messianic, aspect of the final judgment.

## II

Balance imagery serves in part to define, or distinguish conditions which in turn define, the nature of justice in Book V of The Faerie Queene. One of the most significant conditions distinguished in this fashion is parody.<sup>12</sup> Parody is, it seems to me, a function of a tendency in much allegory, the tendency to be dualistic. Professor Fletcher points out that dualism may be a "natural result of the cosmic function of allegory" (Allegory, p. 224), presumably because universal considerations inevitably go to the roots, so to speak--absolute good on one hand, absolute evil on the other. It would seem likewise inevitable that at its ultimate point much allegory is theologically dualistic:

This is not the dualism of double meanings, but dualism in its theological sense, where it implies the radical opposition of two independent, mutually irreducible, mutually antagonistic substances; in short, the opposition of Absolute Good and Absolute Evil.

(Allegory, p. 222)

Fletcher goes on to note that this "opposition of abso-

lutes . . . is expressed by an ordering of imagery and agents which is equally dualistic" (Allegory, p. 222), a condition which we have already seen at work through the balance images. (This is the condition, as we will soon see, of not only balance imagery but much imagery and agency of Book V.) The Faerie Queene is of course to a degree theologically dualistic in that, while Christ is not specifically set against Satan, the struggles of gentles and ladies may represent, from one point of view, that highest level of theological opposition:

The poet cannot often create direct images of deity, but he can mirror duality on the plane of the Gods, by showing us the deeds of knights and ladies. Here also dualism is the natural order of things. Redcrosse is warring to the death against Archimago, Una against Duessa, Calidore against the Blatant Beast.

(Allegory, p. 223)

We may suspect, then--and we will find this to be beyond question--that Book V manifests what is often a theological dualism. Yet dualism alone does not account for parody:

The crux of the critical problem in the study of allegory is the way we interpret this dualism. If we simply accept the war between absolutes as the ground plan of all allegories, we are being naive in one important respect. True, the war is always going on. But we should not assume the polar opposites are really separated by any distance. This above all is a case where the expression "extremes meet" is not a metaphor.

(Allegory, p. 224)

The point is that the imagery and agency of absolute good not only struggle with the imagery and agency of absolute evil but that, in fact, the imagery and agency on both sides tend very much to look and act exactly alike. Thus the image of a perfect balance seemed to obtain in the proem:

For that which all men then did vertue call,  
Is now cald vice; and that which vice was  
hight,  
Is now hight vertue, and so us'd of all:  
Right now is wrong, and wrong that was is  
right

(Proem, IV, 1-4)

Perfect the balance is in every way, as noted earlier; but after having observed the presence of "wrong" in the middle, we realized that what we had here was not a perfect balance, but its opposite--the perfect balance turned upside down, inside out, for this is the balance image of injustice, the parody of the balance of justice.

Most critics agree that parody serves at least the function of defining through inverse reflection the nature of its diametric opposite.<sup>13</sup> Thus we may learn of Una's nature by considering and then absolutely inverting the nature of Duessa; or we may learn of the nature of justice by remarking the nature and attitudes of injustice.

Parody, however, serves a much more important function:

Demonic parody is a fully developed Spenserian Technique. The narrative consequence of this technique is a continuous creation of ambiguous choices for the hero. Everywhere the hero must decide whether he is looking at the real thing, or at a double of the real thing. He is rarely given a choice between flatly different things. He can never take the forms of being for granted. He can only hope that, with his memory of principles holding firm and his love of the good remaining strong, he will continue in the process of discovery.  
 (Prophetic, pp. 35-36)

In other words, parody functions as a test, or a temptation, not of the base characters who may easily fall, but rather a test, a temptation of those who pursue good and fall partly due to the failure to realize that that to which they have yielded is not good, but its opposite.<sup>14</sup> Thus Satan tempts Christ in Paradise Regained:

know also thou, that I  
 On what I offer set as high esteem,  
 Nor what I part with mean to give for naught;  
 All these which in a moment thou behold'st,  
 The Kingdoms of the world to thee I give;  
 For giv'n to me, I give to whom I please,  
 No trifle; yet with this reserve, not else,  
 On this condition, if thou wilt fall down,  
 And worship me as thy superior Lord.  
 Easily done, and hold them all of me;  
 For what can less so great a gift deserve?  
 (Paradise Regained, IV,  
 159-169)

Now it would help to have certain utterances and tonal distinctions from Paradise Lost in one's mind here, but it isn't necessary, for it should be clear that through several phrases this statement echoes God's gift of

Paradise to Adam on one condition, that he ever obey and worship God, a mere trifle of a return for a gift so great. Moreover, the statement echoes the majestic voice of God. In other words, Satan's remarks contain the hint--but only a hint--that Satan is God. The temptation, then, employs demonic parody<sup>15</sup> of God in an attempt to pervert Christ away from God and to Satan. The peculiar force of this demonic parody, and thus its astonishing terror and malevolence, resides essentially in two conditions: a) as mentioned earlier, it tempts by working upon the very impulses which drive one to good, not evil; b) it tempts by merely adumbrating but not claiming that it is indeed he whom it parodies. To claim to be the Messiah, for example, may be ludicrous; but to refuse to claim such a condition and yet to hint that such is the case is, in fact, to give (in a most brilliant satanic fashion) that notion the ring of truth, and to parody yet again the hints and refusals, and circumlocutions of the biblical Jesus. We will find these parodies to be of major importance in Book V; and we will find that the mode employed by justice to deal with parody--annihilative dialectic--will further clarify the nature of justice.<sup>16</sup>

The first distinct parody to appear in Book V and which includes many of the conditions discussed above, occurs in Canto II:

There they beheld a mighty Gyant stand  
 Upon a rocke, and holding forth on hie  
 An huge great paire of ballance in his hand  
 (II, xxx, 1-3)

He sayd that he would all the earth uptake,  
 And all the sea, divided each from either:  
 So would he of the fire one ballaunce make,  
 And one of th'ayre, without or wind, or wether:  
 Then would he ballaunce heaven and hell togeth-  
 er,  
 And all that did within them all containe;  
 Of all whose weight, he would not misse a  
 fether.  
 And looke what surplus did of each remaine,  
 He would to his owne part restore the same  
 againe.

(II, xxxi, 1-9)

For why, he sayd they all unequall were,  
 And had encroached upon others share,  
 Like as the sea (which plaine he shewed there)  
 Had worne the earth, so did the fire the aire,  
 So all the rest did others parts empaire.  
 And so were realmes and nations run awry.  
 All which he undertooke for to repaire,  
 In sort as they were formed aunciently;  
 And all things would reduce unto equality.

(II, xxxii, 1-9)

The Gyant presents himself as justice incarnate, equipped with the appropriate instrument (a balance) and further indicates that his jurisdiction extends to cosmic proportions (stanza xxxi). In fact, the concerns of stanza xxxi--earth, sea, fire, air, heaven, hell--distinguish the Gyant as in some way related to the creation, since these are the elements of creation. Moreover, the Gyant's desire to arithmetically rebalance earth and sea, fire and air, etc. indicates that what the Gyant intends is the inverse of the creation process, mildly suggesting that the Gyant is he who will "restore"

(xxx1, 9) the universe to its original condition. Finally, the "divided each from either" of line 2 echoes the words of Genesis regarding the process of creation. Now, all of this adds up to imply, to adumbrate that the Gyant is the most important justice of them all--Christ, the logos of creation. But the Gyant is of course a demonic parody of Christ; not the image of the final judgment judge, but rather the image of Christ's anti-thesis--Satan, the advocate.<sup>17</sup> When the Gyant offers to arithmetically balance earth and sea, fire and air, he is advocating not the restoration of perfection, but its opposite--the restoration of chaos, the reverse of creation, and thus the imposition of disorder on order. Again, when the Gyant offers to balance heaven and hell together he is offering the destruction of the chain of being, of hierarchy; true justice, on the other hand, is dependent on hierarchy as a staple of order. Finally, as the Gyant mildly suggests that he is the logos of creation, he does so in a dissonant rather than harmonic fashion, which uncovers his deception. That is, stanza xxx1, which recounts the Gyant's demonic suggestion of his Sonship, is dissonant, and thus indicates that the Gyant is not the true harmonious-voiced logos, but his parody. Indeed, the very measuring, balancing imagery of the stanza--another parodic element, since Christ measured, balanced the universe--is shown to be parodic by its dissonant, ill-measured verse. One suspects that

the Gyant will measure out the universe in this ill-measured fashion, bring the reverse of harmony, and order everything disorderly.<sup>18</sup>

But Artegall recognizes the Gyant's parodic nature, referring to the Gyant as "thou that presum'st to weigh the world anew" and then continuing the balance imagery into stanza xxxv (thus juxtaposing the presumptuous, parodic world measurer with the true world measurer):

For at the first they all created were  
 In goodly measure, by their Makers might,  
 And weighed out in ballaunces so nere,  
 That not a dram was missing of their right,  
 The earth was in the middle centre pight,  
 In which it doth immovable abide,  
 Hemd in with waters like a wall in sight;  
 And they with aire, that not a drop can slide:  
 Al which the heavens containe, and in their  
 courses guide.

(II, xxxv, 1-9)

Such heavenly justice doth among them raine,  
 That every one doe know their certaine bound  
 (II, xxxvi, 1-2)

I have previously noted certain architectonic aspects of stanza xxxv. Added to this is the balance imagery of lines 2 and 3, leaving stanza xxxv a complex of balances. The point is not, however, to display one's technical metrical range, but rather to distinguish the nature of true justice. This stanza stands in contra-distinction to the destroying, disordering, and leveling ("reduce unto equality") remarks of the Gyant by distinguishing the heavenly justice of creation, order, and hierarchy, for this image of the perfectly balanced

cosmos stands as a monument to order and hierarchy. (This is not alone the result of the stanza's verbal texture; the stanza's visual vertical balance also intimates that the nature of universal balance, true justice, is hierarchical.) When we hear that "such heavenly justice does among them raine,/That every one doe know their certaine bound", we may note that the justice of the cosmos stands as an image of the macrocosm-microcosm analogy. Consider the following macrocosm-microcosm analogy concerned with hierarchy and order:

Almighty God hath created and appointed all things, in heaven, earth, and waters, in a most excellent and perfect order. In heaven he hath appointed distinct orders and states of archangels and angels. In earth he hath assigned kings, princes, and other governors under them, all in good and necessary order. . . . The sun, moon, stars . . . do keep their order. . . . And man himself also, hath all his parts . . . in a profitable, necessary, and pleasant order. Every degree of people in their vocation, calling, and office hath appointed to them their duty and order. Some are in high degree, some in low, some kings and princes, some inferiors and subjects. . . . Where there is no right order, there reigneth all abuse, carnal liberty, enormity, sin, and Babylonical confusion.<sup>19</sup>

For Spenser, universal order is based on just such notions of hierarchy, and this in turn influences the nature of justice.

But the Gyant wants to change all this:

Therefore I will throw downe these mountaines  
 hic,  
 And make them leuell with the lowly plaine:  
 These towring rocks, which reach unto the skie,  
 I will thrust downe into the deepest maine,  
 And as they were, them equalize againe.  
 Tyrants that make men subject to their law,  
 I will suppressse, that they no more may raine;  
 And Lordings curbe, that commons over-aw;  
 And all the wealth of rich men to the poore  
 will draw.

(II, xxxviii, 1-9)

Here again we see the Gyant as parodic restorer, the supposed undoer of the effects of the Fall;<sup>20</sup> but with the reference to "Tyrants", the Gyant's truly rebellious (and not revolutionary) nature pours through--he is, from one point of view, the very image of satanic rebellion. Fletcher rightly characterizes "rebellion as the demonic parody of revolution" (Prophetic, p. 226), and later cites a 1571 Homily Against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion:

He that nameth rebellion, nameth not a singular and one only sin, as in theft, robbery, murder and such like; but he nameth the whole puddle and sink of all sins against God and man, against his prince, his country, his kinfolks, his friends and against all men universally; all sins, I say, against God and all men heaped together, nameth he that nameth rebellion.

(cited in Prophetic,  
 p. 238)

Part of this abhorrence of rebellion is as a result I think of regarding the king as of two bodies, the natural and the body politic (or body corporate) and so all subjects and institutions of England.<sup>21</sup> Moreover,

to rebel against the ruler is to attack God vicariously, especially so when the ruler is head of church as well as head of state. This entire process eventually results in a nexus of God-King-Justice.<sup>22</sup> Now the Gyant's program is a call, in short, for rebellion, calling as it does for disorder, ruination of hierarchy, etc.,<sup>23</sup> and the vulgar rout welcomes it in the hope of gaining "uncontrolled freedom" (II, xxxiii, 5)--which is really license, a parody of true freedom. Thus the crowd's anger when deprived of their hope (by the destruction of the Gyant) manifests itself as dissonance, symbolizing the inharmonious, disorderly, unjust nature of rebellion:

That when the people, which had there about  
 Long wayted, saw his sudden desolation,  
 They gan to gather in tumultuous rout,  
 And mutining, to stirre up civill faction,  
 For certaine losse of so great expectation.  
 For well they hoped to have got great good,  
 And wondrous riches by his innovation.  
 Therefore resolving to revenge his blood,  
 They rose in armes, and all in battell order  
 stood.

(II, li, 1-9)

The rebellious Gyant and his crew (a kind of travesty of the king's two bodies) are politically antithetical to justice. Moreover, the Gyant is a parody of justice's true political nature, for justice in a fallen world stands for revolution against tyranny, which is in turn an image of the Apocalypse<sup>24</sup> (of which more later).

From the juristic point of view, the Gyant is a

simpleton. Justice does not mean an arithmetical equality, but rather a geometric equality (like the complex of balances distinguished in stanza xxxv) based upon merit as reflected in hierarchy:

Here then is a minimum of four terms in which justice finds expression--two persons and two shares. And the equality of the second pair will be reflected in the equality of the first. The ratio will be the same in the one case as in the other, because, if the persons are not equal, their shares will not be equal.

We see the same result when we look at the practice followed in awarding shares according to merit. It is admitted on all hands that in distributing shares justice must take some account of merit.

(Ethics, p. 146)

"Justice, then", as Aristotle and Spenser would have it, "is the expression of a proportion" (Ethics, p. 146).

In order to destroy this antithesis of true justice, Spenser turns to an extensive consideration of the Gyant using his balance, almost as if the Gyant were weighing himself in the balance (which is indeed metaphorically the case). Artegall has the Gyant weigh truth in one scale against false in the other, but the Gyant finds such a levelling impossible, "for by no meanes the false will with the truth be wayd" (II, xlv, 9).

This is not only so in the abstract. The determination of true as opposed to false--a function of judgment, be it noted--is central to the false versus true Florimell contest (note the juristic, judgmental

language of III, xiii, 6-9), a contest which is presented in terms of balance and judgment. Thus, when the confused Marinell looks at the Florimells, he sees

The semblant of this false by his faire  
beauties Queene.

(III, xix, 9)

Spenser here again creates what appears to be a perfect balance, what with both Florimells standing side by side in seemingly perfect counterpoise, and also "balanced" to syllabic perfection (the first three feet concerning the false; the last three, the true). The fact of course is that the false is the parody of the true, and in reality its antithesis; but one point Spenser is trying to make is that it is so hard to be certain about which is which, Marinell and the host of knights and ladies judge not by the mind analyzing a complex situation but merely by surface appearances, and they are thus stupified. Artegall, on the other hand, realizes that the determination of truth is complex, and requires careful analysis:

Then did he set her by that snowy one,  
Like the true saint beside the image set,  
Of both their beauties to make paragone,  
And triall, whether should the honor get.  
Streight way so soone as both together met,  
Th'enchanted Damzell vanisht into nought  
(III, xxiv, 1-6)

False and true are "concretely" being weighed in the balance, and it appears as though they balance perfectly

(line 2 again presents visual and syllabic balance). "Triall" (line 4) clearly indicates that this is a contest which images justice, for one function of justice is to determine true from false. "Paragone" (line 3) is the perfect word. Spenser and others used it to mean "a perfect match, perfect comparison", or "a perfect rivalry". "Paragone" also was used to mean to be placed side by side or parallel. All of these meanings are present here, but the "perfect rivalry" meaning (from, I suspect, "equal to struggle, i.e., agon") is primary. (The other meanings are here mainly to show how confusing the issue can be; indeed, to show how successful a parody can be, for this is precisely the case, and the narrative employs a word whose ambiguity attests to this.)

Now: at the instant the two Florimells meet, the False disappears, turns to zero, nullity, "for" (as we learn in the abstract in the Gyant section) "by no meanes the false will with the truth be wayd". Movement, then, in the balance imagery of the Florimell episode is from apparent perfect balance to radical antithetical balance.

Again in the Gyant episode the scales are used to weigh right and wrong, and again "all the wrongs could not a little right downe way" (II, xlvi, 9), indicating another radical antithetical balance.

Which when he saw, he greatly grew in rage,  
 And almost would his balances have broken:  
 But Artegall him fairely gan asswage,  
 And said; "Be not upon thy balance wroken:  
 For they doe nought but right or wrong betoken;  
 But in the mind the doome of right must bee;  
 And so likewise of words, the which be spoken,  
 The eare must be the ballance, to decree  
 And judge, whether with truth or falshood they  
 agree.

(II, xlvii, 1-9)

The Gyant's anger is represented in the dissonance here; and juxtaposed to this are the properly measured lines 6, 8, and 9 which distinguish yet another true balance (the mind amidst, the ears as the balancing scales). Being weighed in this balance are the words of the Gyant, and so we may regard the reference to spoken words (line 7) as the rhetoric of the Gyant. Thus the Gyant has been weighed in the balance by true justice and has been found wanting, and his destruction is consonant with his cacophonous rant:

So downe the cliffe the wretched Gyant tumbled;  
 . . . . .  
 His timbered bones all broken rudely rumbled,  
 So was the high aspyring with huge ruine humbled.  
 (II, 1, 6, 8 and 9)

The cacophony of course onomatopoeically resonates the falling, rumbling destruction of the Gyant but also suggests the true ill-measured nature of the parodic logos Gyant and his "grand plan". (There are echoes here too of the fall of the Tower of Babel imaged in the fall of the babbling Gyant.) And, finally, it is Artegall

who remains and the Gyant who turns to nought, to zero, thus presenting the conclusion of the struggle between justice and its parody and antithesis as a radical antithetical balance.<sup>25</sup>

### III

Now much of the above can be understood as aspects of one of the two dialectical modes working throughout Book V. "Dialectic" is fast becoming a critical cliché, so it is important that I clarify my terminology. "Dialectic" is not here a synonym for "tension", but rather a system of fundamental logic by which truth is determined. This is of course perfectly consistent with the theological dualism, parodic agency, and balance (or imbalance) imagery of Book V; yet the dialectical process of Book V does not merely distinguish constant dualistic struggle, but more importantly reaches a resolution. That resolution is distinguished in the phrase "annihilative dialectic", a process whereby the interaction of truth and falsity, right and wrong, justice and injustice yields truth, right, justice as maximum weight, falsity, wrong, injustice as nullity, zero weight. The image of a balance between false and true Florimell is the very image of this conflict and resolution, and this annihilative dialectic is in turn in a limited sense the image of the Apocalypse (as we shall see when we examine

the Grandtorto episode). And, consistent with this, the annihilative dialectic ultimately can be seen not only as a radical antithetical balance, but as a kind of restoration of true balance, as exemplified in the earlier radical antithetical balances of Bacchus and Hercules, which while annihilating injustice at the same time established true justice. This mode, finally, reflects Spenser's conception of the juristic process as not only a process of systematic annihilation of evil, but as at the same time the establishment of a higher level of good, representing the ultimate re-establishment of perfection.

To comprehend fully the nature of the above process, it would be worthwhile to turn to the first reference in Canto XII to Grandtorto, the essence of injustice and the demonic parody of God:<sup>26</sup>

And wittesse be Gerioneo found,  
 Who for like cause faire Belge did oppresse,  
 And right and wrong most cruelly confound:  
 And so be now Grantorto, who no lesse  
 Then all the rest burst out to all outrageous-  
 nesse.

(XII, 11, 5-9)

It is not surprising that Canto XII should virtually begin by distinguishing the characteristic inherent in Grandtorto's name. This serves as something of a mnemonic device, since the final battle between right and wrong was long before this carefully charted. That is, throughout Book V Artegall is systematically related

to, indeed identified with (to the point of isomorphism), abstract "right", almost to the exclusion of other related notions of general good. But to say that this was done in order to establish, to chart, the ultimate struggle of Book V, would be to state the case backwards, for Spenser does not here conform to Grandtorto's name, rather, Grandtorto's name (which is in part a reflection of the common law expression "Tort", i.e., personal injury) conforms (by antithesis) to Spenser's view of the nature of justice.

To be specific, justice for Spenser (perhaps for most thinkers of his time<sup>27</sup>) is virtually inextricable from "right". In the Mercilla episode Spenser gives Themis, the Greek goddess of law, justice, the epithet "righteous" (IX, xxxi, 6), and points out that she is the mother of "Just Dice" (and, of which more later, "myld Eirene"). There is, moreover, an etymological link between ius--"law", but also, and primarily, "right"--and justice.<sup>28</sup> Indeed Hooker, in a related context, remarks as much when he refers to "Themis, which we call Jus or Right".<sup>29</sup> In The Faerie Queene, V, the nexus of right and justice begins in the proem:

Justice sate high ador'd with solemne feasts,  
 And to all people did divide her dred beheasts,  
 Most sacred vertue she of all the rest,  
 Resembling God in his imperiall might;  
 Whose soveraine powre is herein most exprest,  
 That both to good and bad he dealeth right,  
 And all his workes with Justice hath bedight.

That powre he also doth to Princes lend,  
 And makes them like himselfe in glorious sight,  
 To sit in his owne seate, his cause to end,  
 And rule his people right, as he doth recommend.

Dread Soverayne Goddess, that doest highest sit  
 In seate of judgement, in th'Almighties stead,  
 And with magnificke might and wondrous wit  
 Doest to thy people righteous doome aread  
 (Proem, ix, 8-xi, 4)

Furthermore, in Canto I we learn that Gloriana "Chose Artegall to right her [Irena, Peace, Ireland] to restore;/For that to her he seem'd best skild in righteous lore./For Artégall in justice was upbrought/Even from the cradle of his infancie,/And all the depth of rightfull doome was taught" (I, iv, 8-v, 3). And Artégall's training is summarized as follows: "Thus she him trayned and thus she him taught,/In all the skill of deeming wrong and right" (I, viii, 1-2). But it is not only Artégall who is yoked with right. Arthur, who is identified with Artégall (through his encounter with Artégall allayed by Samient, through name, through kindred relationship vis-a-vis the Court of Mercilla, through similar deeds, e.g., Geryoneo and Grandtorto episodes, through Hercules imagery, through mythistory, etc.), and who stands in similar relationship to justice, is likewise identified with right:

It often fals, in course of common life,  
 That right long time is overborne of wrong,  
 Through avarice, or powre, or guile, or strife,  
 That weakens her, and makes her party strong:  
 But Justice, though her dome she doe prolong,  
 Yet at the last she will her owne cause right.

As by sad Belge seemes whose wrongs though long  
 She suffred, yet at length she did requight,  
 And sent redresse thereof by this brave Briton  
 Knight.

(XI, 1, 1-9)

Indeed, even abstract justice is identified inextricably  
 with "right":

Nought is on earth more sacred or divine,  
 That Gods and men doe equally adore,  
 Then this same vertue, that doth right define:  
 For th'hevens themselves, whence mortal men  
 implore  
Right in their wrongs, are rul'd by righteous  
 lore  
 Of highest Jove, who doth true justice deale  
 (VII, 1, 1-6)

Accordingly, when we encounter evil we find it to  
 be identified with the inverse of this nexus. Munera,  
 to cite but one example, perhaps a parody of Astraea,<sup>30</sup>  
 is said to have had feet and hands "which sought  
unrighteousnesse, and justice sold" (II, xxvi, 8). And  
 the very essential antithesis of this goodly nexus is  
 Grandtorto, Great Wrong, who fought "to justifie his  
wrong" (XII, xiv, 9).

Yet this union of right and justice is really part  
 of a greater symbiosis of right-justice-peace. Of  
 course, in Book V "the work of Justice is peace"  
 (Dunseath, Spenser's Allegory, p. 228), but it is so  
 not for arbitrary reasons. In Canto IX, stanza xxxi,  
 for example, "Just Dice" and "myld Eirene" are dis-  
 tinguished as sisters. Professor D. Bigongiari, in his

introduction to Aquinas, remarks that, as Luchaire had shown, "the Middle Age view was that the King was entrusted with the maintenance of . . . peace through justice."<sup>31</sup> In addition, Fowler notes that

. . . the theme of Britomart's promised union with Artegall is related to a traditional festival motif, the Reconciliation of Peace and Righteousness. This motif did not spring from a pacifist belief that Peace was the necessary concomitant of Righteousness. Indeed, their joint occurrence, though desirable, was rare enough to be worth celebrating; to have about it, even, a millennial quality.  
(Numbers, pp. 129-130)

Perhaps a union of peace and righteousness was not a pacifist notion, but the desire to achieve peace through justice was certainly widespread, and was desirous enough and achieved rarely enough, as Fowler suggests, to take on let us call it "messianic" quality. But the messianic resonance was not entirely dependent on topicality, for a messianic reference to a union of peace and right or peace and justice had its biblical authority in, for example, Psalms 85:10 ("righteousness and peace will kiss each other") or in, as Dunseath (p. 63) notes, Isaiah-- "the work of Justice shall be peace", a passage interpreted by Calvin and the Fathers as prophetic of the justiciar Christ. An example of this messianic hope is literalistically translated in the frontispiece to Saxton's Atlas, 1579 (reproduced in Numbers, plates 12 and 13a). In this example of the traditional motif,

peace and justice (or peace and righteousness<sup>32</sup>) embrace above the head of Elizabeth. Fowler remarks that "there were almost always Astraea redux or millenarian [messianic] implications in the motif". (Something very like this exists in the abstract in Mercilla's palace where "Ne ever was the name of warre there spoken,/But joyous peace and quietnesse alway,/Dealing just judgments"--IX, xxiv, 6-8.) The popular tradition also conceived a union of peace and justice, the very title "justice of the peace" being but one example.<sup>33</sup> But perhaps most important for Spenser is the reference to peace in Revelation--"Out came another horse, oright red; its rider was permitted to take peace from the earth, so that men should slay one another"<sup>34</sup>--for this is in fact what Grandtorto has done. This is thoroughly consistent, then, with the union of justice and right and the union of these with the ultimate goal, peace, for where peace is established there cannot be, virtually by definition, Great Wrong.

These polarities are developed at the outset of Book V. The champion of true justice, Artegall, was chosen by Gloriana "to succour a distressed Dame [i.e., Irena],/Whom a strong tyrant did unjustly thrall,/And from the heritage, which she did clame,/Did with strong hand withhold: Grandtorto was his name" (I, iii, 6-9). Yet Grandtorto's full nature is not revealed until we reach the penultimate Canto of book V. Sir Sergis,

meeting Artegall, reminds him of his promise to meet Irena and "for triall of her right/With her unrighteous enemy to fight" (XI, xxxix, 4-5), thus making clear the juristic nature of the conflict. When we learn in the very next stanza that in fact Irena was tried by Grandtorto and condemned to die if no one arrives to clear her of the crimes Grandtorto has accused her of, the parodic justiciar aspect of Grandtorto's nature is evident.<sup>35</sup> But because the object is peace, and because the legend of justice is inherently theologically dualistic, Irena's judge is invariably associated with Satan, the advocate, as Artegall--he who will accomplish Irena's "redemption" (XII, xi, 9)--has a certain degree of association with the final judge, Christ. In this sense, then, Grandtorto is a demonic parody of Christ.

Grandtorto's truly satanic nature is perhaps best illustrated in the Burbon-Flourdelis episode. Burbon, having been saved by Artegall and Talus, explains his momentary loss of Flourdelis:

But sure to me her faith she first did plight,  
 To be my love, and take me for her Lord,  
 Till that a Tyrant, which Grandtorto hight,  
 With golden giftes and many a guilerull word  
 Entyced her, to him for to accord.  
 O who may not with gifts and words be tempted?  
 Sith which she hath me ever since abhord,  
 And to my foe hath guilefully consented:  
 Ay me, that ever guyle in wemen was invented.  
 (XI, 1, 1-9)

Flourdelis's abandonment of faith and of her Lord Burbon, the temptation, indeed the general tenor of these lines suggest that one of the levels of allegory here refers to the Fall in the Garden. This suggestion is amplified when we hear that Burbon abandoned his shield--which significantly was given to Burbon by Redcrosse, which had "His deare Redeemers badge upon the bosse", and which enabled Burbon to "appall" Grandtorto on numerous occasions (XI, liii)--"Hoping thereby to have [his] love obtayned" (XI, liv, 6), an obvious abandonment of faith. The abandonment of the shield, moreover, suggests a kind of nudity, and when Flourdelis is finally rescued, she likewise is semi-nude:

Her halfe dismayd they found in doubtfull plight,  
 As neither glad nor sorie for their sight;  
 Yet wondrous faire she was, and richly clad  
 In roiall robes, and many Jewels dight,  
 But that those villean through their usage bad  
 Them fouly rent, and shamefully defaced had.  
 (XI, lx, 4-9)

The semi-nudity, pun in "dismayd", and the fall from royalty suggested in the clothing imagery, mildly continue the Fall motif. Artegall rebukes Flourdelis for "breach of faith" and for "change of love for . . . worlds delight" (XI, lxi, 4-5), concluding his reprimand as follows:

Dearer is love then life, and fame then gold;  
 But dearer then them both, your faith once  
 plighted hold.  
 (XI, lxiii, 8-9)

All of this suggests yet again that Burbon and Flourdelis represent from one point of view Adam and Eve, and so by extension Grandtorto's truly satanic nature is delineated. Moreover, the more certain historical allegory here is thoroughly consistent with this, for historically Burbon represents Henry of Navarre who was roundly condemned in England for abandoning his faith by converting to Catholicism in order, presumably, to hold Paris (Flourdelis).<sup>36</sup> Now certainly no mystical poetic transformation would be necessary for the Elizabethan to regard Henry's apostasy as a move from the true faith to antichrist; again, therefore, the presentation of Grandtorto as a satanic parodic force is evident.

All of the above is relevant to Artegall's conquest of Grandtorto. But before proceeding to that, it will be useful to consider an occurrence immediately preceding. That is, in order for Artegall to free Irena he must first arrive on the shore of the "salvage Isle". The task is arduous because Grandtorto's forces are defending the shores:

But when as nigh unto the shore they drew,  
 That foot of man might sound the bottome plaine,  
Talus into the sea did forth issew,  
 Though darts from shore and stones they at  
     him threw;  
 And wading through the waves with stedfast sway,  
 Maugre the might of all those troupes in vew,  
 Did win the shore . . .

(XII, v, 2-8)

This seems reasonable enough; but we realize something rather curious if we note that Talus is derived from the Greek Talos, the brazen man who maintained the laws and guarded the shores of Crete (Icons, p. 42). For here in Book V of The Faerie Queene Talus does not defend the shores, but in fact invades them, does not maintain the laws for the tyrant Grandtorto, but in fact assails those laws. What we have here is something of the reverse of the parodic agency earlier referred to. That is, not only does vice parody virtue, but virtue to a degree parodies vice. We can understand this by recognizing the world of Book V as essentially a fallen world with pockets, mere vestiges, of the golden age or its Christian equivalent, e.g., Mercilla's palace, the temple of Isis. In such a world Grandtorto is a ruler, and the laws are antithetical to true justice. In order to reestablish the perfect universe which had been turned upside down, it is necessary to turn the universe upside down once again. The forces of evil thus seem in a parodic world to be good; the forces of good, evil. Not only must Talus invade rather than defend; Artegall must revolutionize, i.e., destroy the ruler Grandtorto. This accounts in large measure for the pervasive use of guile by justice throughout Book V--to defeat guile in a parodic universe, one must attack it with guile; to defeat evil, one must parody that evil.

So Artegall encounters Grandtorto (he who justifies

wrongs), the representative of the iron age (panoplied in "yron plate", a steel "rustie brown" cap, carrying an "yron studded" polax), and annihilates him. This is of course the annihilative dialectical system--right annihilating wrong, justice annihilating injustice, Christ annihilating Satan--which I have earlier considered. It can be stated as follows: a) Given--golden age, virtue, paradise, peace, etc; b) Thesis--iron age, vice, this fallen world, Grandtorto, etc; c) Antithesis. But the defeat of Grandtorto is not an isolated incident in Book V; it corresponds to, was anticipated by, Arthur's annihilation of Geryoneo and Britomart's annihilation of Radigund.

Geryoneo is a carefully developed demonic parody of the Messiah. We early learn of his triune nature, his vaguely messianic self-presentation to Belgae as a kind of Saviour, and his establishment of a perverted church deifying his likewise triune father (with something of a travesty of the Holy Spirit beneath the "Father" idol, thus establishing again a parodic three-personed deity): X--ix, xii, xiii, xxvii, xxviii, xxix. The historical element is thoroughly consistent with this. Geryon (a giant, hence vaguely related to titanic rebellion), Geryoneo's father, is the essence of the antichrist who controlled Spain:

He that whylome in Spaine so sore was dred,  
 For his huge powre and great oppression,  
 Which brought that land to his subjection,  
 Through his three bodies powre, in one combynd  
 (X, ix, 3-6)

Geryoneo is the scion of antichrist's rule in Spain--  
 the Inquisition:

But he had brought it now in servile bond,  
 And made it beare the yoke of inquisition  
 So now he hath new lawes and orders new  
 Imposed on it, with many a hard condition,  
 And forced it, the honour that is dew  
 To God, to doe unto his Idole most untrew.  
 (X, xxvii, 1-2; 6-9)

Yet when we recall that Artegall was said to have set out not on a quest, but, appropriately enough for the champion of true justice, on an "inquest" (I, xiii, 1), we may note how subtly Spenser has arranged Geryoneo's parodic nature to extend to a parody of justice in ways additional to the spill-over justice parody inherent in the parody of Christ, the Final Judge. And, further complexifying the parody of justice here, the idol and monster at its feet combine to form a parody of the Isis-Osiris nexus, a parody of the Mercilla-Lion nexus, and hence a parody of the new dispensation--i.e., justice reconciled with peace.

When Arthur encounters Geryoneo in Canto XI, the tyrant's wrongness is thoroughly developed (XI, 1--quoted earlier), which along with the constant reference to his "tortious powre", establishes Geryoneo as a

parody of justice and an anticipation of Grandtorto. Geryoneo tempts the Briton Prince by hinting that he is the Saviour and the essence of justice and righteousness--

And with bold vaunts, and ydle threatning bad  
Deliver him [i.e., Geryoneo] his owne, ere  
 yet too late,  
 To which they had no right, nor any wrongfull  
 state. . . .  
 He [i.e., Geryoneo] boldly aunswered him, he  
 there did stand  
 That would his doings justifie with his owne  
 hand.

(XI, iii, 7-9; iv, 8-9)

--but Arthur is not seduced by the parody, and quickly dispatches Geryoneo. Following this, Arthur is told that the idol and sphinx-like monster beneath it (which mutilated several of Belgae's children) still exist. These, as already mentioned, combine to form a demonic parody of the union of justice and peace, and must therefore be annihilated by the representative of true justice, the true saviour of Spain. Looking at the episode in its entirety, I think we can see a movement from Belgae's rule, to Geryoneo's rule, to annihilation of Geryoneo--and thus the parts of the annihilative dialectical system are again evident.

Such, also, is the case in the Radigund episode. Radigund is a complex parody and travesty of Britomart-Isis-Equity. For example, she is in several ways associated with the moon; Isis, according to Plutarch,

is goddess of the moon. Radigund (whose actions prove her to be grossly carnal) is chaste--through no fault of her own, for she had been rejected--and Britomart is Chastity. Radigund stands above the conquered Terpin in parody of the true union of mercy and power, equity and law:

Soone as she saw him on the ground to grovell,  
 She lightly to him leapt, and in his necke  
 Her proud foote setting, at his head did leuell,  
 Weening at once her wrath on him to wreake,  
 And his contempt, that did her judg'ment breake.  
 (IV, xl, 1-5)

Consistent with this, Radigund constantly uses juristic language, again suggesting some relationship to justice.

The above is background, so to speak, to the Artegall/Radigund encounter. (Here, perhaps more than anywhere else in Book V, Artegall demonstrates the characteristic of an idée fixe which Fletcher says is prevalent in allegorical agency, in that his actions seem compulsive, forcing him to move almost hypnotized and magnetized toward a union with Radigund because she in many ways seems to have the characteristics to which Artegall is drawn by his very nature.) Artegall, standing above Radigund and about to destroy her, sees in the unadorned fair visage, the blood and sweat filled face, yet another image of Britomart, with whom he had earlier in The Faerie Queene struggled:

At sight thereof his cruell minded hart  
 Empierced was with pittifull regard,  
 That his sharpe sword he threw from him apart,  
 Cursing his hand that had that visage mard  
 (V, xiii, 1-4)

Artegall, standing over Radigund, is--for the first time since it was said in Canto IV (1, 9) that "powre is the right hand of Justice"--faced with a decision, a judgment. Much has conformed to suggest that beneath Artgall's feet lay the embodiment of she with whom he is to merge; enough, in fact, to make Artgall forget what he had previously learned, i.e., that similar looking conditions may in reality be absolutely antithetical if examined carefully. Artgall drops his sword, having fallen to the literal travesty of essentially metaphysical conditions. Now in the overwhelming majority of Justice icons of Spenser's time Justice is accoutered with a sword in her right hand and a balance in her left. Artgall's relinquishing of his sword, then, is in essence the relinquishing of his power, since "powre is the right hand of Justice". And this, I suspect, is the major reason why Talus can't aid Artgall, for Talus is essentially Artgall's power, his sword by metonymic extension.

And, with justice fallen, the world turns upside down. So Radigund ritualistically signals the establishment of disorder, the reverse of hierarchy, by first "dubbing" Artgall--"The with her sword on him she flat-

ling strooke,/In signe of true subjection to her powre" (V, xviii, 1-2)--in parody of the Order of Maidenhead to which she is antipathetic, and then by undressing Artegall, giving him the clothing and function of a woman (V, xx), thus establishing herself as the dominant force. Radigund's parodic nature is herein continued, for, although in fact she has turned the world upside down, her relationship to Artegall maintains the parody of the true relationship toward which Artegall by nature moves--the Isis-Osiris, Mercy-Power, Equity-Law relationship (with the feminine principle dominant).

Britomart, of course, is the true representative of Isis, Mercy, Equity, and it is she who is to join with Artegall, the representative of Osiris, Power, Law. Britomart, therefore, is she who must annihilate her parody, and she promptly does. Again, the outline of the process presents the aspects of the annihilative dialectic previously considered.

Now I refer to this dialectic as "annihilative" because there is no synthesis (at this stage of the process) of thesis and antithesis. Yet the system is not only destructive, but also recreative since the antithesis, by destroying the thesis, reestablishes in a typological sense the golden age. In the Geryoneo episode, for example, Arthur's annihilation of the false idol and the monster beneath, the parodic union of justice and peace, leads immediately to singing and

dancing, traditional symbols of harmony (XI, xxxiv, 1-9; xxxv, 1-4). Destruction of evil thus leads immediately to the reestablishment of a harmonious universe; moreover, the language, tone, and events of XI, xxxiv, 1-9, and xxxv, 1-4--dancing, singing, shouting "that unto heaven it rong", leading Arthur through the streets "crowned with girlonds of immortal baies", Arthur "whose everlasting praise/They all were bound to all posterities to raise", the reestablishment of Belgae, etc.--all combine to suggest that Arthur's victory is in some sense messianic. Consistent with this, Professor Fletcher remarks that

A providential note hovers over this allegory, when we recall that Geryon is the final Herculean victim. Geryon and Geryoneo are creatures of death, of the setting sun, of the west. If Arthur is a prince of the sun, like Artegall, Geryoneo is another demonic parody of the sun king. We have noticed the recurrent resurrection theme in the Belge episode; the sun revives the drooping flower, "that earst was dead, restor'd to life againe". Liberation then means freedom in the sense of redemption from death; it also means political restoration of ancient rights.

(Prophetic, p. 212)

Again, in the Radigund episode, once Radigund is dispatched the world is turned right side up, this time by a ritualistic reversal of the ritual which symbolized the inception of disorder:

Thenceforth she streight into a dowre him  
 brought,  
 And caused him those uncomely weedes undight;  
 And in their steede for other rayment sought,  
 Whereof there was great store, and armors bright,  
 Which had bene reft from many a noble Knight;  
 Whom that proud Amazon subdued had,  
 Whilst Fortune favoured her successe in fight,  
 In which when as she him anew had clad,  
 She was reviv'd and joyd much in his semblance  
 glad.

(VII, xli, 1-9)

So there a while they afterwards remained,  
 Him to refresh, and her late wounds to heale:  
 During which space she there as Princess rained,  
 And changing all that forme of common weale,  
 The liberty of women did repeal,  
 Which they had long usurpt; and them restoring  
 To mens subjection, did true Justice deale

(VII, xlii, 1-7)

Finally, Artegall's annihilation of Grandtorto is the victory of right over wrong and achieves justice's goal of reestablishing peace, thereby achieving symbolically the messianic embrace of justice and peace. This process can thus be seen as corresponding to the basic Christian cycle of birth, death, rebirth, or Paradise, Fall, Paradise regained, and was in fact brilliantly epitomized by Spenser in the first stanza of Canto I--

Though vertue then were held in highest price,  
 In those old times, of which I doe intreat,  
 Yet then likewise the wicked seede of vice  
 Began to spring which shortly grew full great,  
 And with their boughes the gentle plants did  
 beat.

But evermore some of the vertuous race  
 Rose up, inspired with heroicke heat,  
 That cropt the branches of the sient base,  
 And with strong hand their fruitfull rancknes  
 did deface.

(I, 1, 1-9)

--but importantly, only in type, and only momentarily. The annihilative dialectical system in Book V, after all, is one of endless action and reaction. Arthur and Artegall leave Britomart and Belgae after but a moment's pause, pursuing yet another quest. And, if the destruction of Grandtorto is the type of the Final Victory, then it is only the type, for Artegall's victory is short-lived, the Blatant Beast--who must surely be related to the blasphemous beast of Revelation, the new risen satanic surrogate after "the accuser" had been thrown down--along with Envy and Detraction quickly appearing to re-menace the regained vestige of paradise. The historical allegory of the Grandtorto episode of course provides a certain degree of pressure for this, what with Lord Grey's tepid reception after being called home only partially successful; and, frankly, one wonders whether the historical pressure here isn't a bit too much for the poem to bear. Yet this conclusion is consistent with the other books of The Faerie Queene, and is consistent with the Spenserian vision:

Artegal's . . . resurrection of Irena is vaguely messianic. That it does not bear final apocalyptic sway over history is precisely the irony Spenser wants to achieve with his Envy and Detraction. But in principle the rescue is a final one, born of true justice and good will.

(Prophetic, pp. 212-213)<sup>37</sup>

But let us return to the embrace of peace and justice, the type of the reestablishment of the golden age. Here, I think, there is something of a synthesis of opposites (inherent in "reconciliation", as the embrace was commonly called), in that what is in part a war-making capacity embraces peace. This of course is an iterative image in Book V, occurring in Britomart's dream in the temple of Isis, in the momentary union of Britomart and Artegall, and in Mercilla's palace. The image is on all occasions the same: an entity we may variously call equity or mercy merges with law or power.<sup>38</sup> And this synthesis occurs at the instant of reestablishment of some good (cf. the movement and resolution in Britomart's dream). There is therefore a synthetic dialectic which occurs at the apex of the dialectical process, and in itself symbolizes the momentary establishment of a harmonious universe during the age of Elizabeth. For this synthesis is the final image of balance, balance of moon and sun, of peace and justice, and thus an infinite and eternal balance achieved in an instant. In other words, the cosmic image, the perfect balance--an image of universal and eternal justice--which serves as a structural matrix for Book V, is also the image symbolizing the reestablishment of the reign of justice at the zenith of the Elizabethan juristic golden age (peace and justice embrace, in the frontispiece of Saxton's Atlas, exactly in the middle of the

canopy (i.e., between the columns), indeed, in the middle of the beam, above Elizabeth). The perfect balance, then, is ultimately symbolic of what Fletcher has referred to as "a moment of total consciousness" (Allegory, p. 321), or "the prophetic moment" (Prophetic), a moment in which, if only for an instant, "one passes from allegory into myth" (Allegory, p. 322).

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, Volume II: Books IV-VII, ed. J. C. Smith (London: Clarendon Press, 1909). All quotations of Spenser are from this edition; unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from Book V of The Faerie Queene.

<sup>2</sup> Note at this point (we shall consider this more thoroughly hereafter) that aspects of the balance images just considered, and many of those we are soon to consider, are formed or partially formed by verbal opsis.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, trans. and rev. J. A. K. Thompson (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971), p. 149.

<sup>4</sup> Alastair Fowler, Spenser and the Numbers of Time (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> This kind of number symbolism continues to influence various balance images (partly because the purely coincidental condition of the Spenserian stanza (line 5 in the middle) allows Spenser almost infinite number symbolism opportunities) to which I am soon to address myself; I will rarely, however, remark its presence because it is in some sense tangential, and because, no matter how correct, references to it would confuse rather than clarify.

<sup>6</sup> These architectonics are intricately involved in balance imagery proper, for balancing, measuring, in scales was regarded as part of the Creation process. Thus Milton refers to the newly created earth as "self-balanc't" (Paradise Lost, VII, 242), and notes God's "golden Scales . . . /wherein all things created first he weigh'd, /The pendulus round Earth with balanc't Air/ In counter-poise" (Paradise Lost, IV, 997-1001). [John Milton, Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1957).]

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Browne's last quoted line above.

<sup>8</sup> Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971), p. 69.

9 "Due recompense" may suggest distributive, geometric justice as opposed to merely arithmetical justice.

10 My italics here and throughout this study (with the exception of italicized names in quotations from The Faerie Queene) unless otherwise indicated.

11 Cf. Milton's "My muse with Angels did divide to sing", "Passion", line 4, a reference to the harmoniously significant linking of his muse's voice to "the Angelic Choir" in the Nativity Ode, line 27.

Note further in this regard that the earlier considered zodiacal balance image suggests universal harmony in a kind of dance and/or music of the spheres (especially so since the zodiac was often arranged as, and was considered as, representing a perfect circle). See Dunseath's analysis of the frontispiece of Sphaera Civitatis in T. K. Dunseath, Spenser's Allegory of Justice (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 209.

12 It should be noted that the balance image merely keynotes the presence and importance of parody on certain occasions. Many times, of course, parodic agents or images occur without reference to a balance image. Moreover, parody, as we shall see, is a result of the very nature of allegory. I am therefore not claiming that the parodic agency and imagery of Book V is necessarily the result of balance imagery; I do think, however, that the prevalence of the parodic mode in Book V is in part due to the balance matrix.

13 E. g., Rosemund Tuve, Allegorical Imagery (1966), in Edmund Spenser, ed. Paul J. Alpers (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1969), p. 305; or Angus Fletcher, The Prophetic Moment (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 98.

14 In this regard, note that while Artegall is certainly a complex and ambiguous character, he falls to Radigund partly due to faulty awareness. This, moreover, is consistent with Aptekar's analysis of the Britomart-Artegall union as involved with the Hercules-Pallas relationship. Jane Aptekar, Icons of Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 191ff.

15 I shall be using the phrase "demonic parody" only when the parodic condition involved can be regarded as in some sense a theological parody, and not in the sense as used in Allegory.

16 Although it will be tedious and unnecessary to consider all of the parodic agents (and images) of Book V, it is important to recognize the prevalence of such agency (and imagery). Among several I shall not discuss, note the following: 1) Pollente and his "groom" (Guizor, evidently) parody Artegall and Talus, Justice and the instrument of Justice, in that they divide labor similarly, Pollente dealing with the rich, the groom with the poor, functioning "according to the custome of their law" (II, vi, 6-9; xi, 4-7). (The main function of parody here is reflective, i.e., Pollente and groom represent respectively that which Artegall and Talus, as power and lex talionis, may become if untouched by equity. Thus during their battle, as many critics have noticed, Artegall and Pollente are syntactically and physically fused; but more significant, it seems to me, is the remark in stanza xiii (Canto II), "There being both together in the floud,/They each at other tyranously flew", the point being that Artegall less equity is in serious danger of becoming a tyrant. But this is a complex issue, especially in the early cantos, and one with which I shall not extensively deal. For further consideration, see Dunseath, Spenser's Allegory of Justice, passim, and Icons, passim.) 2) Clarinda is something of a parodic mediatrix in that she pretends to mediate between Radigund and Artegall, while in fact maintaining an imbalance between the two. 3) Malengin is a demonic parody of Christ, a false shepherd and fisher of men (depicted with the appropriate implements, a staff topped with iron hooks, and a net--IX, xi, 1-9), whose truly satanic nature is clear "when as he would to a snake again/Have turn'd himselfe" (IX, xix, 1-2), for the syntax allows not only "would have turned into a snake", but significantly, "would have turned into himself, i.e., a snake". 4) Duessa is a parodic Mercilla-Elizabeth on the theological and historical levels (since church and state are fused), and she is a parodic Astraea since Mercilla-Elizabeth is Mercilla-Elizabeth-Astraea and, most importantly, because her trial consists of five witnesses for her defense, and five named plaintiffs, thus establishing Duessa (whose doubleness fits in here nicely) amidst in parody of Astraea and her balance, Libra, in parody therefore of a perfect balance, in the middle of the zodiac (i.e., five zodiacal signs to the left, five to the right of double Duessa). (The use of groups of five here suggests a Justice parody, as Fowler first observed--Numbers, p. 47.)

17 Which polarity is of course central in the legend of justice.

18 It would be wise at this point to consider Spenser's use of verbal opsis or, broadly speaking, onomatopoeia. Frye remarks that The Faerie Queene perhaps exhibits "the most remarkably sustained mastery of verbal opsis in English" (Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 259), and follows this statement by citing numerous examples of verbal opsis from The Faerie Queene which typify the various techniques Spenser employs to create images through the verset's sound and/or typography which either enhance or undercut meaning. An often used technique is dissonance--quite important a technique, since harmony is an important aspect of justice (of which more later). It will be objected, however, that Spenser occasionally--and, indeed, more often in Book V than in any previous book of The Faerie Queene--adds an extra light syllable to develop feminine endings, and that feminine rhymes commonly display an extra light syllable the onomatopoeic significance of which is dubious. And, frankly, there are stanzas in Book V in which what I have referred to as dissonance seems not to have any onomatopoeic significance--e.g., III: vi, viii, ix; IV: xii. But on the other hand, the extensive use of verbal opsis or onomatopoeia in Book V (some of which we have seen, more of which we will see), and the often used technique of dissonance through extra syllables, leads me to believe that at least occasionally Spenser is employing verse as I have suggested. There will be further examples of this, of course; for the moment note but the following:

And if that any ill she heard of any,  
 She would it eeke, and make much worse by telling,  
 And take great joy to puolish it to many,  
 That every matter worse was for her melling.  
 Her name was hight Detraction, and her dwelling  
 Was neare to Envie, even her neighbour next;  
 A wicked hag, and Envy selfe excelling  
 In mischief: for her selfe she onely vext;  
 But this same both her selfe, and others eke  
 perplext.

(XII, xxxv, 1-9)

There is no more dissonant stanza in Book V, and the onomatopoeic significance is not, I think, questionable, when we realize that this stanza describes the person and language of the very essence of dissonance--i.e., Detraction. Further, it should be noted that the cacophony here is entirely the result of an extra light syllable establishing feminine endings and feminine rhymes.

19 From "An Exhortation Concerning Good Order and Obedience to Rulers and Magistrates", 1547, written by King Edward VI's Council of Regency, reprinted in M. H. Abrams, ed., The Norton Anthology of English Literature, Revised, Volume I (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 421-422.

20 And here the Gyant's standing "upon a rocke" may suggest the Gyant as parody of Christ in the sermon on the mount.

21 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 438-439, et passim.

22 This union is so extensive as to be beyond anyone's ability to chart thoroughly. Indeed, Kantorowicz's King's Two Bodies, which on page after page distinguishes this and other correspondences, presents but a modicum of what the entire system would look like thoroughly charted. All we need note here, however, is that this nexus of God-King-Justice is omnipresent in Spenser; for our current purposes, it is omnipresent in Book V, felt everywhere and so really beyond charting. Consider as exemplary but the following:

For th'hevens themselves, whence mortal men  
 implore  
 Right in their wrongs, are rul'd by righteous  
 lore  
 Of highest Jove, who doth true justice deale  
 To his inferiour Gods, and evermore  
 Therewith containes his heavenly Commonweale:  
 The skill whereof to Princes hearts he doth  
 reveale.

(VII, i, 4-9)

23 All is inextricably fused into an infinite system of good versus evil; but rebellion may be regarded as the epitome of evil. Thus a brief review of the Elizabethan system of correspondence, hierarchy, order, etc., in Edmund Spenser, Books I and II of The Faerie Queene, eds. R. Kjellogg and O. Steele (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1965), p. 49, culminates in the following:

Elizabeth was seen by many Englishmen, including Spenser and Shakespeare, as a sovereign whose position in the social hierarchy was a metaphor of God's rule over the universe. In principle every man had his proper place

in society; every man had his superiors and his inferiors and he had responsibilities to both. In such a political theory the great crime was revolution, amounting to the revolt of Satan against God.

I would merely suggest the emendation "revolution" to "rebellion".

24 For further consideration see Fletcher's chapter (Prophetic) on rebellion and revolution, especially pp. 224-225.

25 Balance imagery is further complexified here if we note that the Gyant is in a sense destroyed by Art-egall's balance, since Talus's name could mean, among other things, a pair of scales (Prophetic, p. 139n).

26 These two characteristics coalesce in one figure partly because there are times when to be one is to be the other as well. A book of justice, after all, is concerned with trial and judgment, and can't avoid messianic-Apocalyptic resonance in a Christian context.

27 Perhaps partially, but not necessarily, through the influence of Aquinas (see Thomas Aquinas, "Of Right", Summa Theologica, selections in The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. D. Bigongiari (New York: Hafner Press, 1953)).

28 The aphoristic summum ius, summa iniuria, which goes at least as far back as Cicero, is used in regard to "law", not "right".

29 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in Tudor Poetry and Prose, ed. J. William Hebel, et. al. (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1953), p. 1042.

30 This of course would be most appropriate to the subject immediately being considered. (My "perhaps" is a result of little evidence which ought therefore be recounted here. First, Munera's perverted relationship with gold, the parody of Astraea's link with the golden age; more importantly, Munera's attempt to bribe Talus suggests a travesty of the Astraea-Artegal (or Astraea-Talus) relationship; finally, Munera's feet are silver (silver tyre--"purified"--ironically enough), as Astraea's are on occasion, e.g., in Ben Jonson's The Golden Age Restored (line 210), Ben Jonson: Selected Masques, ed. Stephen Orgel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 148.)

31 Luchaire (Histoire des Institutes Monarchiques de la France sous les premiers Capetiens), cited in Aquinas:

God instituted kingship so that rulers might render justice to men and establish peace, which is their first and most essential duty.

32 Fowler refers to the union 1) as that of peace and righteousness beneath the detail 13(a), and 2) as that of justice and peace on p. 129 (n)--which only goes to prove my point about the isomorphism of these concepts.

33 Dunseath covers this subject well (pp. 62-65), citing Lombarde's Elrinarcha and Aylett's Peace with her Foure Garders among other examples of the popular association of justice (or right) and peace.

34 The Oxford Annotated Bible, eds. H. May and Bruce Metzger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 1496.

35 Grandtorto's "law" may be further regarded as a travesty of law in that Grandtorto has found Irena guilty until proven innocent.

36 Fletcher (Prophetic, p. 209) notes that Henry is reputed to have said that Paris was surely worth a Mass.

37 Fletcher's language here seems to correspond, unintentionally perhaps, to the cyclical, dialectical motion of The Faerie Queene, but his conclusion is I think the correct one.

38 It might be objected that, since the equity-law, mercy-power nexus extends to New and Old Testaments, new and old dispensations, Christ and God of Wrath, etc., the merger is more a subsumption than a synthesis, especially since the images of Isis-Osiris, Mercilla-Lion are visually and conceptually presented as indicating Isis above Osiris, Mercilla above the Lion. This is a complex issue, and one which I cannot presently carefully examine; I can say, however, as earlier suggested, that a thorough analysis will indicate that Spenser in Book V regards mercy and power as virtually equal aspects of justice despite appearances to the contrary: i.e., his language in favor of mercy is balanced by the action of Book V--Mercilla's sword is rusty and the Lion is chained, out Duessa, as her nature demands, is condemned

to death nevertheless, and Malfont's punishment can hardly be regarded as merciful. As noted in Chapter II, equity serves to balance the inherent injustice of law when law cannot justly deal with the circumstances of a specific case. Equity might therefore be merciful or brutal beyond the scope of law in order to be just. Moreover, Equity in Aristotle's Ethics is imaged, as in Spenser's Book V, as in some sense "above" law, but both law and equity fuse to form absolute justice, and here again equity serves to balance law:

Equity, though a higher thing than one form of justice, is itself just and is not generically different from justice. Thus, so far as both are good, they coincide, though equity is to be preferred. What puzzles people is the fact that equity, though just, is not the justice of the law courts but a method of restoring the balance of justice when it has been tilted by the law. The need for such a rectification arises from the circumstances that law can do no more than generalize, and there are cases which cannot be settled by a general statement. . . . So, while it is true that equity is just and in some circumstances better than justice, it is not better than absolute justice.

(Ethics, pp. 166-167)

I have said that Weltanschauung in part generates and therefore can be seen in generic structure. This, according to Rosalie Colie, is certainly true of Shakespeare's forms.<sup>1</sup> Since the Elizabethan world view is molded by juridic reconciliation, indeed Christian juristic golden age returned awaiting the immanence of the Final Judge, Shakespearean drama of justice certainly would not take tragic form. But neither would it take ordinary comic form, for comedy generally does not present the kind of rigid antithesis followed by dialectical synthesis that is in fact the movement of the world view involved. What we should expect, then, is tragedy resolved. Northrop Frye points out that tragedy involves ritual sacrifice, but that tragedy is implicit or uncompleted comedy having comedy as its sequel--"Divine men do not die: they die and rise again".<sup>2</sup> Comedy accordingly contains potential tragedy, but seldom does the tragic element approach culmination. When it does, when tragedy is on the verge of occurrence and then the comic vision follows the tragic verge, we have tragi-comedy.

Allan Gilbert perceives the tragicomic structure as a reduplication of the structure of world events: when providence seems to be overruling fortune in the universe, so does reason, good, belief, etc. conquer their antitheses in literature, yielding the tragicomic form in drama,<sup>3</sup> and Joan Hartwig somewhat similarly considers tragicomedy dependent upon a fusion of tragedy

and comedy.<sup>4</sup> Giambattista Guarini (whose influence on Gilbert and Hartwig is evident), one of the earliest theorists and one of the earliest practitioners of the tragicomic form, also refers to tragicomedy as a mixture of both comedy and tragedy: "he who makes a tragicomedy does not intend to compose separately either a tragedy or a comedy, but from the two a third thing that will be perfect of its kind".<sup>5</sup> Guarini's language here is distinctly dialectical, indicating that the structure of tragicomedy develops in the manner that its name suggests--viz., consistent with a pattern of dialectical synthesis.

The dialectic of tragicomedy often involves a predominant concern with evil, almost an abstract metaphysical evil, but one which is not omnipotent: man's actions do not produce irremediable effects; there is an agency more powerful which offsets human evil and/or folly. Evil, in other words, only appears to be in control of the universe; benevolent powers arrive to thwart the machinations of evil just when evil seems indomitable. In a less specific description, the tragicomic movement is "from threatening complications to a happy ending and a general assumption of post-dated innocence".<sup>6</sup> This corresponds to an interesting suggestion in Empson's Some Versions of Pastoral that tragicomedy presents a nexus of heroic and pastoral modes<sup>7</sup> and Eugene Waith's view that tragicomedy--a proliferation of oppositions--

almost always involves pastoral romance.<sup>8</sup> From this point of view, the heroic mode would shift into the pastoral as the work of art moves from reality to myth or to romance. If this can be abstracted, the development is in any case one from experience to innocence.

Not unusually, the tragicomic form often was used as the structural matrix for dramatic presentations of the Christian myth. Marvin Herrick details the evolution of the early sixteenth century humanist dramatists who followed the Christian Terence but went beyond antique notions of generic decorum, notions according to which history was viewed as the proper subject for tragedy, fiction for comedy; exalted characters, angels, God, a hieratic style for tragedy, humble, middle class characters and demotic style for comedy. Instead, these humanist dramatists mixed humble and sublime characters and styles, and grounded dramas, containing both tragic and comic events, on the history of scripture. They developed, in other words, tragicomedies, mixing elements of both forms.<sup>9</sup> (That the tragicomic form was regarded as appropriate for religious subjects is not extraordinary, since the structure of the Christian myth is essentially tragicomic.<sup>10</sup>)

Of course, not all English playwrights were very conscious of generic distinctions, but many were. Allardyce Nicoll, among others, makes clear that many Renaissance dramatists--notably Shakespeare--were more and

more aware of genre, genre structure, and the significances involved, as the seventeenth century approached.<sup>11</sup> It is very possible that Shakespeare recognized the intrinsically dialectical nature of his juristic subject when he wrote The Merchant of Venice, which prompted him to develop the play as a tragicomedy. Frye indicates that comedy often approaches a potentially tragic crisis near its conclusion, a point of ritual death, before all is saved. In The Merchant of Venice we come very close to that tragic crisis, which prompted Frye to note that it is a play which "seems almost an experiment in coming as close as possible to upsetting the comic balance".<sup>12</sup> Frye was of course not the first to question the form of The Merchant of Venice. Early in the eighteenth century Nicholas Rowe gave evidence of his discomfort with the play's form:

Tho' we have seen that Play Receiv'd and Acted as a Comedy, and the Part of the Jew perform'd by an Excellent Comedian, yet I cannot but think it was design'd Tragically by the Author.<sup>13</sup>

Rowe's statement, and those of Heinrich Heine<sup>14</sup> and, more recently, A. C. Moody<sup>15</sup> expressing an inability to determine whether the play should be regarded as a comedy or a tragedy, give unintended articulation to the dialectical, tragicomic form of the play.

As the play's form recapitulates the dialectical historico-philosophic milieu, so do its constituent

elements, which present an incredibly complex network of interrelated thematic, imagistic, linguistic, geographic, personal, and structural dichotomies. Among the most significant of these is the polarity of age versus youth. The motif, a common feature of new comedy,<sup>16</sup> involves the attempt of a young man to win a young lady. The senex, the old "blocking" character who stands in the way of the young lovers, in The Merchant of Venice is, of course, Shylock, who stands in the way not only of Jessica and Lorenzo, but more importantly of Portia and Bassanio (whose marriage cannot be consummated until Shylock is defeated<sup>17</sup>).

Shylock stands as the senex in conflict with Portia because the youth versus age antithesis is more significant than its surface suggests. It is the symbol of the struggle of winter and spring, the harsh world of heroic struggle and the green world, a land of old age and death, and Shakespeare's locus amoenus. For Shakespeare the green world is always juxtaposed to a form of rough realism,<sup>18</sup> the victory of the former symbolizing the triumph of life over the waste land and the rebirth of the year, and, more abstractly, the return of the golden age.<sup>19</sup> Part of the revival and purifying is accomplished through a reproduction of the scapegoat ritual, which not only expels demons from the society, but expels the old year as well, regeneration suggesting a return to the instant of creation, a cosmogonic act, regeneration

through repetition of the archetypal gesture, which recapitulates the primordial, ordered cosmos. There is a ritualistic representation in all this of the moment of passage from chaos to cosmos.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, the significance of the Shylock/Portia polarity can be seen as paramount when we recognize it as symbolic of Venice and Belmont (the latter, it should be remembered, is the green world, hence spring, hence youth, etc.), Old Testament and New Testament, old law and new dispensation, indeed Jew and Christian, law and mercy dichotomies. Clearly it permeates all of the major themes of the play, including the passage from the age of iron to the renewed golden age, the moment of rebirth in the Christian myth, which is, ultimately, what The Merchant of Venice is all about.<sup>21</sup>

The Jew/Christian dichotomy is perhaps the next logical link in this dialectical concatenation. The Merchant of Venice is veritably drenched with pejorative references to Shylock's Jewishness, while at the same time there is a constant punning on "gentle" and "gentile", which ultimately mean one another.<sup>22</sup> These iterative references to Jew and Christian are not developed to indicate theological interrelationship and similarity; quite to the contrary, they are developed to increase the antithesis, the tension, especially when the repeated "Jew" is compacted against "if you shed one drop of Christian blood". Such statements as "to

leave a rich Jew's service, to become/The follower of so poor a gentleman", "Now (by my hood) a gentle, and no Jew", "We all expect a gentle answer Jew" and countless other dichotomous phrases serve to bifurcate rather than integrate.

Yet the Jew/Christian antithesis is arranged in a far more complex and absolute fashion than has been hitherto realized. Both Shylock and the Christians allude to their respective primary texts--Shylock to the Old Testament (to Laban, to Daniel), Portia, the duke, the other Christians to the New (it is no mistake, for example, that mercy is like "gentle rain"). As J. E. Siemon, in "The Canker Within", has shown, this inevitably leads to an Old Testament law/new dispensation mercy dichotomy, Shylock adamantly standing for law, for rigid justice, the Christians counseling leniency and mercy.<sup>23</sup> This juristic bifurcation will be considered more thoroughly hereafter; for now let us note that the basic antithesis we are here considering, Jew versus Christian, is not only racial but also unforgettably theological. That is, Christians are merciful: the Christians are like Christ in sentiment and direction; Shylock must therefore be satanic: the "Jew" is by the syncretistic correspondent and analogical methods of the English Renaissance, inextricably related to the devil, to the point of isomorphism. This begins with the farcical Gobbo referring to Shylock as "a kind of

devil" and "the very devil incarnation". Salanio continues the association by mockingly noting that the devil comes "in the likeness of a Jew" when Shylock arrives.<sup>24</sup> Damnation is the logical extension of this, Jessica being told she's probably damned if she is "the Jew's daughter", she protesting to having been saved by her husband who "hath made [her] a Christian". More seriously, in the trial scene Shylock is called "this devil" and a "cruel devil" by Bassanio.

At this point The Merchant of Venice takes on the features of the medieval Processus Belial. In The Dyer's Hand W. H. Auden compares the trial scene with the medieval Processus Belial in which the Virgin Mary defends man against the devil who claims a legal right to man's soul.<sup>25</sup> Nevill Coghill and Barbara Lewalski also refer to the play's indebtedness to the allegorical Processus Belial, and Lewalski makes the obvious connection between Portia and the Virgin Mary.<sup>26</sup> Here it is most important to remember that a cult of the Virgin surrounded Elizabeth (more accurately, Elizabeth was regarded as a surrogate Virgin)--by extension, then, Portia equals Elizabeth, and Elizabeth is the hub of the juristic Weltanschauung upon which the jurisprudence of The Merchant of Venice is contingent. Portia, then, equals surrogate Holy Virgin; her opponent, satanic (Satan=Advocate) Shylock. Shylock, by circuitous extension, is devil upon devil damned. And so, again logically, he whom

Shylock is trying to destroy--Antonio--is a type of Christ.<sup>27</sup>

The allegory here is of course loose rather than rigid and can be regarded from differing points of view, but certainly one of the more obvious allegorical readings points to Antonio as a type of Christ agreeing to pay in blood the debt that is ultimately Bassanio's. As such, Antonio-Christ sacrifices himself for Bassanio-Mankind to Shylock-Satan. Indeed, even Antonio's attitude and language bear witness to this allegory:

Antonio.

I do oppose  
My patience to his fury, and am arm'd  
To suffer with a quietness of spirit,  
The very tyranny and rage of his.  
(IV, 1, 10-13)

He seeks my life, his reason well I know;  
I oft deliver'd from his forfeitures  
Many that have at times made moan to me,  
Therefore he hates me.  
(III, iii, 21-24)

Mircea Eliade refers to a period immediately preceding a harmonious, visionary moment, which includes humiliation of the ruler, overturning of the social order, and so forth.<sup>28</sup> Generally involved in this is a mythical ritual sacrifice symbolic of a sacrifice made by a god ab origine in illo tempore, which returns the present moment to that time, abolishing quotidian, profane, concrete time, and as such an essentially antihistorical element.<sup>29</sup> The sacrificed deity, moreover, is often a pharmakos in a sparagmos myth, the god's torn body re-

plenishing the food supply in the new year, and obviously corresponding to the passover celebration, no more clearly indicated as part of the Christian myth than when Jesus, at the Last Supper--a passover feast--broke the bread and said, "Take, eat; this is my body".<sup>30</sup>

Now the Eucharist is the communion celebration commemorating the Last Supper, and its demonic parody is truly eating, consuming the torn body of the sacrificed deity. Hence the abundance of food, eating and blood imagery revolving around Shylock-Satan. Shylock predaceously thinks, "if I can catch him once upon the hip,/I will feed fat the ancient grudge I bear him" (I, iii, 41-42), establishing the sequential irony invoked by his greeting the intended prey, "Your worship was the last man in our mouths" (I, iii, 55). The bond, of course, nominates the forfeiture to be a pound of Antonio's flesh, and feeding of that flesh is never far from Shylock's consciousness. When bid to share Antonio's table, Shylock hesitates because of Jewish dietary laws and distaste, but acquiesces, saying he'll "go in hate, to feed upon/ The prodigal Christian" (II, v, 14-15). Asked what use could be made of Antonio's flesh, Shylock replies, "To bait fish withal,--if it will feed nothing else, it will feed my revenge" (III, i, 47-48). The imagery is clearly not Eucharistic, but its antithesis--cannibalistic, and thence descending to animalistic:



has "the love of wealth". The polarities of giving and getting are emphasized in the casket choice. The motto on the gold casket reads, "who chooses me shall gain", and on the silver, "who chooses me shall get"--but on the lead, "who chooses me must give". Many have noted this pattern: Max Plowman sees the play as postulating the conflict of the life value versus the money value; G. Wilson Knight noted Shylock's emphasis on gold and the Christians' emphasis on internal gold; M. C. Bradbrook regards the gold of Venice as a medium of exchange and the gold of Belmont as an expression of love.<sup>33</sup>

The bond is likewise antithetical, representing an opportunity for Shylock to vent his hatred by killing his enemy, but also representing Antonio's opportunity to show his love for and to aid a friend. The bond, then, as Sigurd Burckhardt has indicated, is perhaps the play's controlling metaphor, ranging from a bond of death to a ring of love.<sup>34</sup> I have previously indicated that Antonio can be regarded as a type of Christ. His bond of course adds to that symbolism, and this in turn yokes the sacrifice motif and the money imagery, for the language of the Christian myth is distinctly pecuniary. Barbara Lewalski refers to an interesting gloss in the Geneva Bible exhorting people to lend free of interest: "for as much as Christ bindeth him selfe to repaie the whole with a most liberall interest".<sup>35</sup> There is certainly no need to recount extensively the plethora

of financial terms--e.g., redemption, saving mankind, payment for sins--which makes money the dominant metaphor of the sacrifice of Jesus. The language of the play, moreover, is weighted to enhance this position: all should be "bound to him" because "he was much bound for [them]". Now this is a bond of love which extends to Caritas and Agape, whereas for Shylock a bond is invariably a literal financial agreement: "Fast bind, fast find,--/A proverb never stale in thrifty mind" (II, v, 53-54). Furthermore, a bond to Shylock is that which constricts; for the Christians, all bonds are types of that first bond which freed man.

Ultimately, binding imagery, money imagery, giving and getting, all are part of the overriding antithesis of law (exacting and avaricious) and mercy (charitable and generous). In the trial scene of Act IV clash the major elements of The Merchant of Venice embodied in Shylock and Portia, the one symbolizing Judaism, the Old Testament, legal rigidity as a juristic principle, Venice, money lust, hate, winter, a world of ironic realism where money is the supreme reality, hence a materialistic world view, indeed Satan, the other symbolizing Christianity, the New Testament, mercy as a juristic principle, Belmont, the spirit of giving, love, the world of romance and myth where money is only a metaphor of the supreme reality, i.e., Christian redemption, hence a spiritual world view, indeed the Holy Virgin and/or

Christ.

Now an understanding of the significance of this encounter requires that one realize the intrinsically symbolic nature of it, and not haggle over pointless legal quiddities.<sup>36</sup> Much debate has been conducted on the spurious legal quibble by which Shylock's bond is practically nullified--R. F. Fuller and Rudolf von Ihering were the first to point out that the granting of a pound of flesh implied the granting of whatever was requisite to obtain it. C. H. Phelps pointed out the manifestly unfair, unethical, and immoral features of the trial from Shylock's legal point of view--e.g., the duke's bias, the supposedly impartial imposter amicus curiae whose partiality extends to her being the wife of the principle debtor, the entirely ludicrous proviso that a creditor could take no less than that to which he is entitled, and so forth. C. M. Brune shows the absurdity of a deed of gift which is extorted. J. O. Boyd and T. Niemeyer indicate the odious injustice inherent in Shylock's forced conversion.<sup>37</sup> Such discussion engenders a belief (noble, but off the mark) like that of Hermann Sinsheimer that The Merchant of Venice was intentionally developed as a remarkably subtle satire of justice and courts of law.

What is important is that we realize that the trial scene of the play represents the struggle of law and mercy as fundamental juristic concepts, the principle summum

ius, summa injuria of great significance, as Ulrici first realized.<sup>38</sup> If there is a more purely historical allegory involved, it concerns the conflict between common law and the equity of Chancery and Star Chamber, here presenting the equity courts as victorious, Elizabeth, through Portia, again asserting her juridic authority by superseding the common law.<sup>39</sup> J. Wilson McCutchan regards Portia as not unlike the Equity figure of the morality plays; this character offered a greater measure of moral justice than strict law.<sup>40</sup> Kermode also views Portia as a type of equity and as a symbol of Virgo, Elizabeth, and/or the Holy Virgin.<sup>41</sup> This corresponds to the Coghill, Lewalski, Auden perception that The Merchant of Venice is indebted to the medieval Processus Belial (previously mentioned) wherein the devil is thwarted of his legal claim for man's soul by the intercession of the Holy Virgin who obtains mercy. Along similar lines, M. C. Bradbrook regards the play's theme as the conflict of justice and human law versus mercy and divine law.<sup>42</sup> This takes on both more religious and allegorical features, conjoining, in C. L. Barber's perception, such dichotomies as Judaism versus Christianity, Old Testament legalism versus New Testament mercy.<sup>43</sup> Nevill Coghill conceives the allegorical theme as symbolizing a debate in the Parliament of Heaven between two of God's daughters, Justice and Mercy, before the throne of God, over the fate of postlapsarian man.

The tricking of Shylock, from this point of view, is like the tricking of the devil in medieval tradition, who is kept from his prey by the atonement of Christ, thus reconciling the demands of justice and mercy.<sup>44</sup>

The allegory can be extended here to viewing Portia, entering like a dea ex machina, as a type of Christ who won the right by payment on the cross to enter Hell (Venice) and despoil the devil (Shylock) of his prey (Antonio, man).

The result of the law/mercy antithesis leaves mercy reigning supreme through the agency of the law (after law was almost tragically victorious), thus reconciling the two in the new dispensation. Ultimately, then, Frye's point about comedy is perceptive: "the action of comedy, like the action of the Christian Bible, moves from law to liberty. In the law there is an element of ritual bondage which is abolished".<sup>45</sup> Clearly, one of the symbolic features of Shylock's forced conversion is the defeat of the old law by the new dispensation.

That mercy reigns supreme over procrustean law is in fact demonstrated time and time again in The Merchant of Venice. Even the comic Gobbo plot, which is proleptic of the main plot in Venice, makes this clear: while supposed legality demands that Gobbo remain with Shylock, Gobbo decides to follow his evil genius' advice and flee to Bassanio. Gobbo's farcical struggle mirrors the pull of Shylock and Portia for Antonio--Old Testament law is

superseded by New Testament mercy, allowing Antonio's freedom and Gobbo's escape. More seriously, the trial scene demonstrates the superiority of mercy over law in the great mercy speech of Portia (wherein we are told that "mercy seasons justice"), in the iterative references to the mercy man has received through the agency of Christ's sacrifice, by the mercy Shylock is shown by the duke and by Antonio when in fact they can condemn him. Finally, mercy is shown to be dominant in that the play rejects the demands of revenge and accepts the wishes of mercy by stultifying Shylock's blood lust. Asked why he wants Antonio's flesh, Shylock replies, "it will feed my revenge"; he continues, "if you wrong us shall we not revenge? . . . If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his humility? revenge! If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example?--why revenge!" (III, i, 47-48, 60-64) Now if this were written in the Jacobean age I make no doubt Antonio would die, and The Merchant of Venice would be yet another Jacobean revenge tragedy (which will be demonstrated in a later chapter). But The Merchant of Venice was written at the height of the Elizabethan visionary moment, when an Elizabeth could be counted on as the symbol of the reconciliation of opposites in a holistic, syncretistic understandable and just universe, and so mercy, as the image of divine forgiveness, dominates the older concept of rigid law.

The structural image of this visionary, transcend-

end juristic Weltanschauung is synthesis, union (its opposite, polarities which cannot conjoin). Accordingly, all the irony and dialectical conflicts reconcile, synthesize, as mercy is victorious: for mercy is an outgrowth of the old law, Christ having paid the price and thus ushered in the new dispensation; the New Testament is a subsumption and fulfilling of the Old, Roman Law equity an outgrowth of English common law, and Christianity a fulfillment of Judaism as Christ fulfills and supersedes the prophets. All is of course symbolic of a return of the Christian golden age, Paradise regained, the reconciling of the old law and the new, where bonds of debt (I owe--i.e., against--you) turn to bonds of union and mutual give and take, etc., and so Act V, the vision of this multiform synthesis, takes place on mythical Belmont with the harmonious music of the spheres symbolizing the perfectly ordered cosmos under which Jessica and Lorenzo embrace and all of biblical and juristic history is resolved.

One of the dichotomies not yet discussed at length is comprised of the antitheses Venice and Belmont, which are rhythmically alternated throughout the play. Venice is the waste land of winter, the sea-level real money world of shipwrecks, usury, golden ducats, squealing fifes and money bonds; Belmont is the renewed soil of spring, the locus amoenus, the mountain above the sea (hence above its welter) where cupidity is folly and



encompassing harmony, that of the earthly music of which he speaks, and the harmony of the divine music of the spheres, which conjoin to suggest an earth-heaven nexus symbolized by musical harmony. Indeed, the very language of this passage is created to express harmony and interpenetration. That is, the extensive synesthesia--e.g., sweet moonlight, soft stillness, harmony which is both sweet and tactile ("touches of sweet harmony" involving aural, tactile, and gustatory senses)--and animism (sleeping moonlight, creeping sounds of music, not to mention the beings investing the spheres) serve to interfuse all life and sense perception not as separate entities but as aspects of a convolved and inextricable unity of existence--a universe.

This harmony clearly is a metaphor for different kinds of harmonies, unions. Leo Spitzer refers to musical harmony as a metaphor of universal order on the one hand, and order in an individual being as well. Musical harmony, then, extends from microcosm to macrocosm.<sup>49</sup> That the universe is harmonious, heaven and earth conjoined, should be clear from all that has been mentioned previously; that the individuals on Belmont are also individually harmonious entities should also be clear, for the exclusion of Shylock is in this regard eloquent. Shylock is shown to be offended by music in his rejection of the masque; moreover, it was felt that there was a relationship between musical harmony and Christian

love,<sup>50</sup> and since the Pythagorean concept of a relationship of cosmic order and musical harmony was also current, St. Augustine conflated these, leading to the union of Christian love, cosmic order, universal harmony--all of which the "Jew" distinctly lacks. Furthermore, the language of musical harmony fuses the concepts of love, order, harmony: "concordia" is shown by Spitzer to encompass heart (hence love), peace, order, harmony of strings, world harmony.<sup>51</sup> Shylock's expulsion is necessary because only those who are individually harmonious may be part of the ordered, synthesized vision.

Finally, harmony extends beyond individual harmony to a harmony of the human family. Frye points out that the final scene of comic reconciliation brings together all accepted members of the society on the stage, representing a new social integration which excludes those who would prevent it. Frye concludes: "the essential comic resolution, therefore, is an individual release which is also a social reconciliation".<sup>52</sup> The chief image of this social integration in Shakespeare is marriage. Here on Belmont, accordingly, are no less than three marriages, the metamorphosis of the bond that kills to the bond that perpetuates life. Spitzer shows that marriage was regarded by Shakespeare as a symbol of human harmony.

Yet there is an image of social integration, of union, even more important than the standard one of

marriage. There is, to begin, the Nietzschean conception of individuation versus communalism, Apollonian individuation the root of evil, the rebirth of Dionysus leading to a dithyrambic transport suggesting the re-integration and reconciliation of a formerly fragmented society in a transcendent, timeless instant.<sup>53</sup> But in this very Christian tragicomedy we have not Dionysus, But a type of Christ in Antonio. Now let us recall the cannibalism imagery in regard to Antonio as a type of Christ, previously delineated. Shylock is thwarted of his satanic attempt to cannibalize Antonio, but the imagery doesn't end there. In Act V Lorenzo shows Jessica the heavens and distinguishes "patens of bright gold". Patens are small dishes used in the celebration of Holy Communion, and so the cannibal imagery is transformed into Eucharist imagery in the visionary moment, suggesting the communion which integrates the society in Christian harmony.<sup>54</sup> Finally, Lorenzo again uses food imagery after being told of the deed of gift from Shylock:

Fair ladies, you drop manna in the way  
Of starved people.

(V, I, 294-295)

The reference to manna indicates the fulfillment of the Old Testament by the New, as well as the fulfillment of the Promised Land in the chiliastic vision. Ultimately, then, the imagery by which the satanic element hoped to destroy the symbol of Christ became the vehicle that

unifies, harmonizes the society of the synthesized, reconciled returned golden age.

Of course there is one distinctly unpleasant, indeed to many of us odious, requirement which must be met before the millennium arrives: viz., the conversion of the Jews. Conversion would seem to be truculent at best, but it must be recognized as essential to the Apocalyptic vision as symbolic of the reconciliation of opposites. This is intrinsic to a world view of juristic dialectical synthesis which calls not for the destruction of Old Testament law, but for its subsumption in New Testament mercy, a conversion such as the one undergone by Jessica. Moreover, the arrival of the returned Constans suggests the Apocalyptic moment when all of society becomes one. Bertrand Evans has noted that Portia seems to be a providential, numinous figure in control of the universe,<sup>55</sup> something of this returned Constans. Furthermore, the essential nature of tragic-comedy posits in Classical and Christian terms Fortuna in control of all, then miraculously superseded by Divine Providence, which provides justice and defeats the caprice of Fortuna.<sup>56</sup> Portia's arrival as a dea ex machina to set a tragic world aright suggests the movement from tragedy to comedy, and recapitulates the Christian myth. Then too, Portia has many attributes similar to those of the ruler of the last days: the ruler of the last days traditionally establishes justice,

subdues evil, unites all polarities (even cosmic, elemental ones), comes as an act of mercy to save man when the last judgment is at hand, and, in general, brings an age of peace, order, harmony.<sup>57</sup> Portia clearly symbolizes from one point of view Elizabeth who reinstitutes this juristic golden age. One of the important functions of the returned Constans was the destruction of heresy while reuniting the empire. Bringing this kind of reunification calls for the conversion of those who are not part of the Christian body.<sup>58</sup> In the Tiburtina as well as in canonical Christian scripture, the conversion of the Jews is prophecied as an element in the renewal of the golden age.

Now this is all well and good for Jessica, but for Shylock exclusion is necessary, conversion is only nominal. Frye speaks of a dream pattern of irrational desire which conflicts with reality; to achieve a goal, a scapegoat must be found and expelled or slaughtered, thereby freeing society from its bonds of impurity.<sup>59</sup> (Freeing society from its bonds to be sure, because the scapegoat is not a foreign element so much as a vessel of all that the society of necessity tolerates but morally abhors--e.g., usury. C. L. Barber refers to the little realized fact that Shylock represents the more submerged but necessary features of Christian economic society.<sup>60</sup> His expulsion, therefore, is a scapegoat ritual, Shylock infused with the unpalatable aspects of the society.)

This is followed in literature by marriage as symbol of the reintegrated society. Shylock is the scapegoat in The Merchant of Venice, and his expulsion from the community is logically necessary. Moreover, Shylock's nature is so interfused with the demonic that his inclusion would be repugnant to most observers. This invariably happens as literature moves toward the romantic: incrementally, the hero becomes more and more messianic, the antagonist, satanic; the surface gives way to allegorical exegesis wherein the hero comes from the upper world (Belmont) into the lower (sea-level Venice) to defeat the demonic chthonic force.<sup>61</sup> Adolf Katzenellenbogen details the various measuring emblems that icons of Jutitia are found to hold: the set square, plumb-level, measuring rod--all tools assisting in the determination of "right" with greater accuracy; but Justitia always held a sword in the other hand with which to punish wrong.<sup>62</sup> In other words, measure, balance, reconciliation, dialectical synthesis is the usual mode of justice, but dialectical annihilation was also sometimes necessary.<sup>63</sup>

But most of the other polarities do seem actually to synthesize in the resurrected Christian golden age. The people of Venice now commune on Belmont, and news comes of the end of tempests and the successfully completed journey of merchant vessels. Even money is acceptable here, Lorenzo receiving word of his inherit-

ance at Shylock's expense, and Portia, as we know, is infinitely wealthy. By giving, they ultimately receive, as Christ gave his life so that man could receive eternal life--"The quality of mercy . . ./. . . blesseth him that gives, and him that takes". (IV, 1, 180-183)

But materialism is largely surpassed, for this is a highly symbolic world where material wealth suggests spiritual wealth, and human love suggests divine love. I have previously mentioned that Bassanio had "love's wealth" and Shylock had "the love of wealth". We must note that the antitheses "love's wealth" and "love of wealth" are also linguistic antitheses, money imagery being metaphoric in the former and literal in the latter. In fact, the extensive money imagery throughout The Merchant of Venice is almost always literal for Shylock and the world of Venice, and metaphoric for the Christians and the world of Belmont especially in the dialogue of Bassanio and Portia (consider Portia's zeugmatic "since you are dear bought, I will love you dear" [III, 11, 312] ). For example, Antonio refers to his appreciation of Salerio whose "worth" Antonio holds "very dear" (I, 1, 62). (There are constant permutations of "worth" used by the Christians in reference to friendship and love.) Moreover, the Christians often mention gold, but again generally as metaphors for spiritual or internal values. The language surrounding Bassanio's quest for Portia's love is distinctly involved with

winning the golden fleece:

Bassanio. . . . her sunny locks  
 Hang on her temples like a golden fleece,  
 Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchos' strand,  
 And many Jasons come in quest of her.  
 (I, 1, 169-172)

And Gratiano refers to his and Bassanio's love success in similar terms: "We are the Jasons, we have won the fleece" (III, ii, 240). Finally, there is Lorenzo's reference to gold in the heavens; here gold is a metaphor for the returned golden age. By contradistinction, when real gold is referred to, it is regarded as repugnant pelf, called by Bassanio "gaudy gold,/Hard food for Midas". Most importantly, money imagery is the metaphor for salvation, redemption, as Christ pays man's debt, which language is often used about or by Antonio and Portia, e.g., Portia's remarks after saving Antonio:

He is well paid that is well satisfied,  
 And I delivering you, am satisfied,  
 And therein do account myself well paid  
 (IV, 1, 411-413)

But far different is the language of Shylock. The first remark we hear from him is "three thousand ducats, well", (I, iii, 1) and it is representative enough, for its literalness is the essence of Shylock's language--in regard to all things, not only finances. When Shylock speaks of the hazards at sea, he mentions "land-rats, and water-rats, water-thieves, and land-thieves, (I

mean pirates)" (I, iii, 20-22); this is a characteristic clarification: he tells Jessica to "stop my house's ears, I mean my casements" (II, v, 34). If we search for the essential principle of Shylock's language we will find that it is inexorably literal, almost ruthlessly realistic. Figures of speech, clichés, hyperboles are systematically, perversely literalized: a pound of flesh, in other words, is not hyperbolic of paying dearly--for Shylock it is literally the payment. This is likewise the case with the food cannibalistic imagery, wherein feeding fat Shylock's revenge indeed requires ripping the flesh from his adversary. Again, when Shylock says he "will have the heart of him if he forfeit" (III, i, 117), we may be certain it is literally meant. Now Shylock's language is not only literal, but in fact the reverse of metaphoric language in that even metaphors must be literalized:

Thou call'dst me dog before thou hadst a cause,  
 But since I am a dog, beware my fangs  
 (III, iii, 6-7)

So Shylock becomes the dog he was metaphorically degraded as, a dog whose fangs will tear the flesh of Antonio. If we relate this style--and, indeed, the specific gestures of cannibalism and animalism--to Swift's literalized metaphor--"the English are devouring the Irish"--or to Lear's animal imagery into which people are transformed, we may see in "A Modest Proposal" and in King

Lear just what kind of tragic, ironic universe this presupposes. The contrast of the Christians and Shylock is distinct when Gratiano pleads with the knife whetting Shylock: "can no prayers pierce thee"? (IV, i, 126) The irony of "pierce" is consummate, for Gratiano expresses a characteristic literal metaphor symbolizing a spiritual alteration, but Shylock contemplates a literal incision. The linguistic contrast, then, is stark and unabating. For the Christians language is invariably metaphoric, for Shylock unyieldingly literal. Where the Christians turn the literal into the metaphoric, Shylock crushes metaphors into the material, into literalizations.<sup>64</sup>

This linguistic dichotomy is indicative of more significant distinctions. Rosalie Colie indicates that topoi (e.g., the topos of world harmony, of hierarchy) and even linguistic structures reflect Shakespeare's milieu, the nature of the culture from which his language springs.<sup>65</sup> And Wellek and Warren remark that each period has a style which includes characteristic figures of speech--or no figure of speech--which style reflects that period's Weltanschauung.<sup>66</sup> Ernst Cassirer points out that metaphoric thinking is the form of mental conception which operates in both myth and language; he remarks that "it has frequently been noted that the intellectual link between language and myth is metaphor".<sup>67</sup> The importance of this cannot be underestimated,

for by extension Shylock's literal language and the Christians' metaphoric language reflect ironic realism and romance or myth, respectively. Thus an investigation of the language of The Merchant of Venice reveals that the world view of Shylock is realistic, and that the world view of the Christians is romantic, mythic, that the worlds of ironic, tragic realism and romance, the worlds of Venice and Belmont, clash in Act IV, and the world of ironic, tragic realism is destroyed.<sup>68</sup>

What remains is Belmont, the visionary, transcendent, mythic universe of the returned golden age, where, for the most part, antitheses reconcile, synthesize into a holistic, unified cosmos. Here all the world is a metaphor (material reality turning back into the metaphor it originally was of a universe of spiritual eternity), a symbol, of the divine harmony of existence. And those whose style is dominated by metaphor reflect their historico-philosophic milieu, a vision of mythic transcendence, a concept of the golden age restored, as those whose language is literal reflect a world view quite contrary indeed. Metaphor, moreover, is a manifestation of correspondence, which in turn is a manifestation of an interrelated, harmonious, ordered universe, as S. K. Heninger makes clear; he further indicates that metaphor is an indication of recognition that this world is God's metaphor for the real (i.e., ideal). "Cosmos . . . is a palpable projection of archetypal ideas in

the mind of the creating godhead. As the Psalmist sings, 'The heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handiwork'. For Calvin, nature is a mirror in which God is reflected".<sup>69</sup> Heninger goes on to cite this startling passage from Du Bartas:

God, of himselfe incapable of sense,  
 In's Works reveales him t'our intelligence:  
 There-in our fingers feele, our nostrils smell,  
 Our Palats taste his vertues that excell:  
 He shewes him to our eyes, talkes to our eares,  
 In th'ord'red motions of the spangled  
 Sphaeres.<sup>70</sup>

This concise passage is notable in several ways. First, it should be realized that all sense perceptions, including kinesthesia, are involved in the reference to this world as metaphor of God. The last reference combines sight, sound, and motion to express the topos of music of the spheres, the divine, "th'ord'red" harmonious music of the universe. Now Lorenzo expresses this very condition--indeed, the same synesthetic concerns--when he speaks on Belmont of the perfect, ordered, harmonious golden age restored universe, for to him as to Du Bartas the cosmos is a metaphor of the divine perfection, and the world is at a point of mythic renewal when the divine shows itself through the world. Heninger concludes: "that which is beyond sense perception is rendered knowable by this translation of attributes into a sense-perceptible form, into the objects of nature. Such is the raison d'être of metaphor".<sup>71</sup> Platonism and the Bible,

then, conform to present metaphor as expressive of the mythic beyond, yoking thereby heaven and earth.

For Shylock, then, money, gold, is real, substantial, as is the Old Testament; for Portia money is basically a metaphor for love's wealth and that in turn basically a metaphor for Redemption and divine love, the Old Testament a metaphor for the New, and gold a metaphor for the returned golden age. And with this transformation to originality, tragedy returns to its original form before the Fall--comedy.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Rosalie Colie, Shakespeare's Living Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Northrop Frye, "The Argument of Comedy", in Love's Labor's Lost, ed. John Arthos (New York: The New American Library, 1965), p. 167.

<sup>3</sup> Allan Gilbert, "Fortune in the Tragedies of Giraldi Cintio", PJ, XX (1941), 234-235.

<sup>4</sup> Joan Hartwig, Shakespeare's Tragic Vision (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Allan Gilbert, Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden (New York: The American Book Co., 1940), p. 507.

<sup>6</sup> Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 162.

<sup>7</sup> William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (New York: New Directions, 1950), pp. 30-31.

<sup>8</sup> Eugene Waith, The Pattern of Tragicomedy in Beaumont and Fletcher (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 15, 42.

<sup>9</sup> Marvin T. Herrick, Tragicomedy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 25-26.

<sup>10</sup> An early English Renaissance example of this kind of religious tragicomedy is Nicholas Grimald's Christus Redivivus (1543) wherein are mingled lowly and exalted characters, demotic and hieratic styles, early tragic elements but a joyous conclusion.

<sup>11</sup> Allardyce Nicoll, "'Tragical-Comical-Historical-Pastoral': Elizabethan Dramatic Nomenclature", Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XLIII (1960), 70-87.

<sup>12</sup> Frye, Anatomy, p. 165.

<sup>13</sup> Nicholas Rowe, "Some Account of the Life Etc. of Mr. William Shakespeare", in Shakespeare: The Merchant of Venice, A Casebook, ed. John Wilders (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 25.

- 14 Heinrich Heine, "Shakespeare's Mädchen und Frauen", trans. C. G. Leland, in Casebook, p. 29.
- 15 A. D. Moody, "An Ironic Comedy", in Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Merchant of Venice, ed. Sylvan Barnet (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 108.
- 16 Frye details the outlines of the motif in his "Argument", p. 163.
- 17 Leo Salingar, Shakespeare and the Traditions of Comedy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 302-303.
- 18 Here Empson's point about the movement from heroic to pastoral becomes more intelligible.
- 19 Frye, "Argument", pp. 168-172.
- 20 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return (New York: Pantheon, 1954), p. 54; Sir James Frazer, The Golden Bough (New York: Macmillan, 1950, abridged), pp. 633-679.
- 21 Frye (Anatomy, p. 171) points out that the basic structure of a rebirth cycle is really trinomial, but the reader is not shown the first stage. The tale begins in the second stage--in, that is, the fallen world which has been wrested from purity by Satan. The social standards, laws, etc. are those of the fallen world; the world is only set right again when these are overturned.
- 22 Frank Kermode, "Some Themes in The Merchant of Venice", in Twentieth Century Interpretations, pp. 97-98.
- 23 J. E. Siemon, "The Canker Within: Some Observations on the Role of the Villain in Three Shakespearean Comedies", SQ, XIII (1972), 435.
- 24 This satanic association encompasses all of the Jewish persuasion. So Tubal's arrival is met with Solanio's jeering "here comes another of the tribe,-- a third cannot be match'd, unless the devil himself turn Jew". (William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, ed. John Russell Brown [London: Methuen, 1964], III, i, 70-71; all quotations of The Merchant of Venice are from this edition.)
- 25 W. H. Auden, The Dyer's Hand, in Shakespeare's Comedies: An Anthology of Modern Criticism, ed. Laurence Lerner (Baltimore: Penguin books, 1967), pp. 147-148.

<sup>26</sup> Nevill Coghill, "The Governing Idea", SQ, I (London, 1948), 9-17; Barbara Lewalski, "Biblical Allusion, and Allegory in The Merchant of Venice", SQ, XIII (1962), 338.

<sup>27</sup> G. Wilson Knight, The Wheel of Fire (London: Methuen, 1961), p. 256, points to Shakespeare's predisposition of symbolic personification whereby hero as mankind, villain as devil, loved one as divine principle (he cites Beatrice) constantly appear: in The Merchant of Venice the hero is Antonio, Shylock is the devil, and Portia is the divine principle.

<sup>28</sup> Eliade, p. 57. This is something akin to Frye's ironic Zeitgeist immediately preceding a mythic metamorphosis.

<sup>29</sup> Eliade, pp. 35, 85.

<sup>30</sup> Matthew 26:26, in The Oxford Annotated Bible, eds. Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 1207.

<sup>31</sup> John Russell Brown, Shakespeare and His Comedies (London: Methuen, 1957), pp. 62-67; Merchant, LVI-LVII.

<sup>32</sup> Sylvan Barnet (Twentieth Century Interpretations, pp. 3-5) expresses similar views.

<sup>33</sup> Max Plowman, "Money and The Merchant", in Casebook, pp. 78-79; G. Wilson Knight, "Tempest and Music", in Casebook, p. 84; M. C. Bradbrook, Shakespeare and Elizabethan Poetry (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), p. 16.

<sup>34</sup> Sigurd Burckhardt, Shakespearean Meanings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 210-211.

<sup>35</sup> Lewalski, 335.

<sup>36</sup> O. Hood Phillips, Shakespeare and the Lawyers (London: Methuen, 1972), pp. 91-118 and William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice: A New Variorum Edition, ed. Horace Howard Furness (New York: Dover Publications, 1964), *passim*.

<sup>37</sup> Along these same lines, the Albany Law Journal of 1879 reported on a mock trial written by Esek Cowen which found the trial so lacking in reasonable points of law that Portia is said to embody the classical idea of justice--a woman with her eyes completely blinded.

38 Hermann Ulrici, Shakespeare's Dramatic Art and His Relation to Calderon and Goethe in Casebook, pp. 31-32. This is also true in regard to the ring transfer (and thus links the two main plots). The implication is that to demand strict law is--in all cases--immoral and and unjust.

39 This is essentially the position of Mark Edwin Andrews, according to O. Hood Phillips (p. 114), as present in Mark Edwin Andrews, Law Versus Equity in "The Merchant of Venice" (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1965).

40 J. Wilson McCutchan, "Justice and Equity in the English Morality Play", JHI, XIX (1958), 409-410; Robert Haggood, "Portia and The Merchant of Venice: The Gentle Bond", MLQ, 28 (1967), 20, also regards Portia as performing the function of equity, tempering justice with mercy.

41 Frank Kermode, Shakespeare, Spenser, Donne (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 19.

42 Bradbrook, p. 14.

43 C. L. Barber, Shakespeare's Festive Comedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 185.

44 Nevill Coghill, "The Theme of The Merchant of Venice" in Twentieth Century Interpretations, pp. 109-111.

45 Frye, Anatomy, p. 181.

46 Frye, Anatomy, p. 184, refers to the tendency of Shakespearean romance to move from a lower world of confusion to a higher world of order.

47 John Sisk, "Bondage and Release in The Merchant of Venice", SQ, 20 (1969), 220-221, points out that those which are polarities in the ironic world of Venice are reconciled in the transcendent world of Belmont; Graham Midgley, "The Merchant of Venice: A Reconsideration", in Casebook, pp. 193-194, feels that some polarities could not be synthesized, that the lack of Shylock, for example, indicates that things for which he stands must be rejected, forgotten.

48 Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony, ed. Anna Granville Hatcher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 19-20.

49 Spitzer, p. 13.

- 50 Spitzer, pp. 19-20.
- 51 Spitzer, p. 84.
- 52 Frye, "Argument", pp. 164-165.
- 53 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), passim.
- 54 Frye, Anatomy p. 148.
- 55 Bertrand Evans, Shakespeare's Comedies (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 67.
- 56 Gilbert, "Fortune", 230.
- 57 Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 104.
- 58 Kermode, Shakespeare, p. 20.
- 59 Frye, Anatomy, p. 112.
- 60 Barber, pp. 167-168.
- 61 Frye, Anatomy, p. 187.
- 62 Adolf Katzenellenbogen, Allegories of the Virtues and Vices in Mediaeval Art (London: The Warburg Institute, 1939), pp. 55-56.
- 63 J. E. Siemon, "The Merchant of Venice: Act V as Ritual Reiteration", Studies in Philology, 67 (1969), 207, says that "the beauty of this vision . . . [i.e., Act V] distracts our attention from means [the forced conversion of Shylock] to end"; now there is no disputing the truculence of this act, nor is there any defense for the despicable behavior of the Christians. Ultimately, Shylock is "Jew" supremely by iteration if nothing else, and his conversion is nothing less than his destruction. Certain features are intrinsic to a species, and in Shylock's case no Christian miracle could ever really reconcile "gentle" and this "Jew". This is clearly borne out by Shylock's grudging acquiescence and disappearance after Act IV. What we have here is not dialectical synthesis but an annihilative dialectic: "gentle" touched "Shylock" and so he disintegrated.
- 64 Burckhardt, p. 209, passim, noted the literal language of Shylock and what he regarded as the eloquence of Antonio, but he chose to interpret this distinction from the standpoint of a modern value judgement which

admires the simple, direct, concrete. This, in turn, says something about the modern world, though that is a subject inappropriate for analysis at this point. Mark Van Doren, Shakespeare (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1953), p. 84, also noted the harsh, concrete language of Shylock, and John Palmer, "Shylock", in Casebook, pp. 116, 122, was perhaps the first to realize Shylock's idiosyncratic literalizing explanations of unintended metaphors, though Palmer did not explain any function of this technique.

65 Colie, p. 5.

66 René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 197. A Weltanschauung is made manifest, of course, in many other ways. George Kernodle, From Art to Theatre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 219, points out, for example, that the Elizabethan stage was symbolic, whereas in the seventeenth century the stage had a setting showing, say, a city--serving, in other words, as an illusion for the mise en scene. This is significant, for a symbolic stage represents a metaphoric Zeitgeist, whereas an illusion is an illusion of reality, indicating the ironic realistic, the literal language Zeitgeist of the seventeenth century, after the visionary renewed golden age crumples.

67 Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, trans. Susanne K. Langer (New York: Dover Publications, 1953), pp. 34, 38.

68 D. A. Traversi, An Approach to Shakespeare (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), I, p. 201.

69 S. K. Heninger, Touches of Sweet Harmony (San Marino: The Huntington Library, 1974), pp. 325, 357-358.

70 Du Bartas quotation from Guillaume Saluste du Bartas, Devine Weekes and Workes, trans. Joshua Sylvester (London: 1605), p. 6. (Quoted in Heninger, pp. 325-326.)

71 Heninger, p. 326.

We encounter what seems to be virtually an elaboration of the transcendent vision of The Merchant of Venice, Act V, when we turn to the Sir John Davies corpus; for in Davies, in contradistinction to the works previously considered, there is no dialectical process culminating in synthesis--all is synthesis to begin with.

Davies seems almost a poet given birth by the harmonious Zeitgeist, and his vision of a synthesized and ordered universe is nowhere more evident than in "Orchestra". Here, as E. M. Tillyard notes in Poetry and its Background<sup>1</sup> and in The Elizabethan World Picture,<sup>2</sup> is the epitome of one of the central expressions of the ordered, symmetrical world view of the Elizabethan age, the cosmic dance of universal order and the resolution of chaos.<sup>3</sup> This of course is not peculiar to the late Renaissance in England: dance as metaphor of cosmic order goes back at least as far as Davies' primary source, Lucian's Peri Orkheseos, and is present in such Renaissance writers as Du Bartas, Antoine de Baif, Montaigne, Béranger de La Tour (in Choreide, Autrement, Lovenge du Bal, 1556), and Elyot (The Governour)<sup>4</sup>; finally, dance as the essential embodiment of a golden age vision and cosmic order can be found in such Jonsonian masques as The Golden Age Restored and The Masque of Beauty. But in "Orchestra" Davies presents dance as a metaphor of a very definite visionary moment, a moment of the returned golden age, not unlike the komos, the

processional, ritual dance of comedy which symbolizes a new social integration.

Indeed, the very sequence of Antinous' argument reflects the symmetrical, structured tectonics of the work; Antinous begins by showing how Love shaped the amorphous cosmos by harmonizing the elements and imposing a universal dance; Love then imposed the order of dance on men to harmonize the world (in fact, all of nature is shown by Love to be dancing harmoniously); then Antinous points to the internal dance of harmony within Penelope. Finally, a speculum showing the Elizabethan society and cosmos as perfectly ordered in a dance is shown to Penelope.<sup>5</sup> The form, in short, reflects the matter--ordered, symmetrical, balanced.

The essential order, control, harmony of the Davies vision is exemplified by the form of other Davies works, for example by "A Hymne in Prayse of Musicke". As John Hollander pointed out,<sup>6</sup> "A Hymne in Prayse of Musicke" presents a remarkably ordered structure which reveals something like a reverse gradatio or reverse scheme climax. Formal structure also orders the presentation of the subject: in the last five stanzas, the first two lines deal with "praise", the second two with "pleasure", and the last two with "profit". In addition, the content of the poem as well as its form demonstrates Davies' predominant concern for heavenly music and the unified cosmos.

Let us return to "Orchestra", for it is necessary to realize that more than a dance is therein involved. If we consider the cosmic dance and the music of the spheres it becomes clear that they are inextricably involved, for both have to do with time, measure, harmony, cosmic motion, and so forth. One must remember that it was commonly felt that music created, shaped the cosmos, and that the motion of the heavens was regarded as a cosmic dance reflecting universal harmony. This merged into a conception of creation as a joint venture of music and dance (e.g., moving of atoms, relations of elements). Throughout "Orchestra" an elaborate nexus of dance and music is developed (e.g., "Love taught men, and men thus learned of Love/Sweet Musicks sound with feete to counterfaite", 76, 1-2<sup>7</sup>), and dancing is eventually referred to as "the child of Musick and of Love" (96, 2).

This is not unusual in the Elizabethan Renaissance. Gretchen Finney refers to the image of an instrument to symbolize the harmonious universe--and, indeed, man and his harmonious works and institutions--throughout the Renaissance.<sup>8</sup> She further notes that there were three levels of music corresponding to levels of existence: music of the universe, of man's soul, and of instruments; she concludes with the realization that in the Elizabethan Renaissance "motion, dance, and music were inseparable".<sup>9</sup> John C. Meagher points out that in such a representative poet as Ben Jonson dance

became a metaphor for song, poetry, masque, and so was intimately related to music.<sup>10</sup> Davies' cosmic dance should thus actually be considered a cosmic music-dance; and seen from this point of view, "Orchestra" distinguishes four analogous levels of music-dance: the music-dance of the poem's metrical and stanzaic structure, Elizabeth's court, the general physical world, and the spheres. Each of the first three is a mirror image of the last (the vision of Elizabeth's court a mirror image literally, i.e., seen in a magical mirror); and the experience of simultaneously contemplating these plateaus of music-dance leaves one feeling as though poetry, fiction, reality, and ideality melt together to express a Platonic conception of forms,<sup>11</sup> a kaleidoscopic image thoroughly consistent with the Elizabethan synthetic vision of worldly and cosmological, antique and modern harmony, culminating with the vision of the moon encircled by the stars, i.e., the vision of concord in the English court the cynosure of which is Elizabeth "in this our Golden Age" (126, 7), thus positing the English body politic as a symbol of cosmic order.

Another feature which indicates the visionary moment that "Orchestra" (in fact all of the Davies corpus) presents is its temporality. Mircea Eliade points out that the repetition of paradigmatic gestures suspends time and "projects man into the mythical epoch in which archetypes were first revealed", that repetitions of cosmog-

onic acts--such as dancing in "Orchestra"--always abolish concrete, profane time, and transport man "into the mythical epoch in which its [i.e., the archetypal divine act] revelation took place".<sup>12</sup> Now the dancing of Davies' "Orchestra" and the dancing of the Elizabethan court, and the poetic dancing of Davies' symmetry all are such attempts to reaffirm the renewed golden age of harmony and an ordered cosmos. Indeed, the profane time of "Orchestra" is abolished, and the present is projected into the mythical moment of the renewed golden age--which is of course the Elizabethan age--the transference to which is couched in the language of a vision of the regained paradise:

in another world divided far,  
 In the great, fortunate, triangled Ile,  
 Thrise twelve degrees remov'd from the North  
 star,  
 Shee [Nature] will this glorious workmanship  
 compile  
 Which shee hath been conceiving all thys while  
 Since the worlds birth, and will bring forth  
 at last,  
 When sixe and twenty hundreth yeeres are past.  
 ("Orchestra", 121<sup>13</sup>)

The hub of the Davies vision is of course the incomparable Elizabeth, who is praised by Davies as the catalyst of the synthetic, harmonious universe:

How shall we fraime a harmony  
 Worthie your eares, whose princely hands  
 Keep harmony in sundry lands  
 ("To the Queen", 6-8)

And as an agent of reconciliation, Elizabeth is glorified as semi-divine:

For you which downe from heaven are sent  
Such peace upon the earth to bring,  
Have hard the quire of Angells sing,  
And all the sphaeres consent,  
Like a sweete Instrument.  
("To the Queen", 13-17)

"Orchestra" and "To the Queen" are central to perceiving Davies' vision; out the main work here that concerns the relationship of generic structure and world view is Davies' juristic poetry,<sup>14</sup> "Hymnes of Astraea" (if we may so regard these hymns, revolving around Elizabeth as Astraea and dealing with justice intermittently). One important factor of Davies' "Hymnes" which generally goes unnoticed is the very central image itself: Elizabeth as Astraea. The choice is of course reasonable for a jurist, as Davies was. Since these are occasional panegyrics for the Queen's pleasure (entered in the Stationers' Register on the anniversary of the Queen's accession, and proudly presented to her for that occasion<sup>15</sup>), and since the lyric essence, according to suggestions in Burke,<sup>16</sup> is imagistic, a logical central juristic image is Elizabeth as Astraea. Yet there is more here. For Davies the Elizabethan age presents the regained paradise immediately and completely:

## HYMNE I.

## OF ASTRAEA.

E arly before the day doth spring,  
 L et us awake my Muse, and sing;  
 I t is no time to slumber,  
 S o many Joyes this time doth bring,  
 A s time will faile to number.

B ut whereto shall we bend our Laves?  
 E ven up to Heaven, againe to raise  
 T he Mayde, which thence descended  
 H ath brought again the golden dayes,  
 A nd all the world amended.

R udenesse it selfe she doth refine,  
 E ven like an Alchymist divine,  
 G rosse times of Iron turning  
 I nto the purest forme of gold:  
 N ot to corrupt, till heaven waxe old,  
 A nd be refin'd with burning.

Astraea is of course the goddess whose return to earth symbolizes the returned golden age, just as her earlier translation to the heavens indicated the loss of the golden age.<sup>17</sup> And it is Elizabeth alone who renews the age:

G race, plentie, pepce and honor  
 I n one faire houre with her were borne,  
 N ow since they still her Crowne adorne,  
 A nd still attend upon her.  
 ("Hymne X", 13-16)

I f we this Starre once cease to see,  
 N o doubt our State will Ship-wrackt be,  
 A nd torne and sunke for ever.  
 ("Hymne XXII", 14-16)

So Elizabeth-Astraea as the symbol of the returned golden age is entirely understandable.

Astraea is not a metaphor for Elizabeth in Davies;

rather, Elizabeth-Astraea is a fusion, an incarnation, the metaphor of divine Astraea made real, if you will, in Elizabeth. As such the union of Elizabeth-Astraea demonstrates a central element of a visionary moment: syncretism, reconciliation, synthesis. The first hymn indicates this fusion as the renewed golden age is referred to in terms of the Christian Apocalypse (a renewed golden age not to cease "till heaven waxe old,/ And be refin'd with burning").<sup>18</sup> In other words, the golden age and the Christian Apocalypse go together for Davies, antique mythology and chiliasm fuse. This pagan-Christian fusion is in fact a staple of Renaissance synthesis. Seznec cites numerous examples of shrines, fresco cycles, palaces, churches (e.g., the Old Sacristy of San Lorenzo) where astrology, the zodiac, mythic (pagan) gods and Christianity are immixed. Adolf Katzenellenbogen finds representations on Romanesque church facades of the twelve Apostles representing aspects of each month (hence aspects of a seasonal myth) and also aspects of the zodiac.<sup>19</sup> Elizabeth-Astraea represents a yoking, the essence of a golden age synthetic dialectic, which can be achieved only in the heart of a visionary moment.<sup>20</sup> And this nexus is not only temporal, but also spatial, a reuniting of heaven and earth, rejoining the parts separated by the Fall. This too is essential Renaissance syncretism. In Ronsard's Hymne des astres we can see man's self-respect growing,

Ronsard regarding man's body, but not his soul, as influenced by the heavens. Marsilio Ficino and Nicholas of Cusa had similar views of man's relation to the heavens: "It might be said that Mars has more resemblance to man than man to Mars, for man is more than Mars and the other planets".<sup>21</sup> By the time we get to the Davies vision, Elizabeth and Astraea are one, earth and heaven are rejoined, the golden age is restored in Elizabeth's England:

T ell all the Starres of heaven,  
H eaven never had a Starre so bright,  
A s now to earth is given.  
("Hymne VI", 8-10)

R esolve me, Muse, how this thing is,  
E ver a bodie like to this  
G ave heav'n to earthly creature?  
I am but fond this doubt to make,  
N o doubt the Angels bodie take,  
A bove our common nature.  
("Hymne XIX", 11-16)

Consistent with this, Davies' view of Elizabeth's justice is that it reconciles, that it symbolizes a synthesis of Justitia and Clementia, more precisely, law fulfilled and superseded by mercy, Elizabeth's Roman law mercy not disdained (as one might suspect of a lawyer of common law) but highly praised as her new dispensation "sword and scepter":

## HYMNE XXIII.

## OF HER JUSTICE.

E xil'd Astraea is come againe,  
 L o here she doth all things maintaine  
 I n number, waight, and measure:  
 S he rules us with delightfull paine,  
 A nd we obey with pleasure.

B y Love shee rules more then by Law,  
 E ven her great mercy breedeth awe:  
 T his is her Sword and Scepter,  
 H erewith she hearts did ever draw,  
 A nd this Guard ever kept her.

R eward doth sit in her right hand:  
 E ach Vertue thence takes her Garland  
 G ather'd in Honors garden:  
 I n her left hand (wherein should be  
 N ough but the Sword) sits Clemencie,  
 A nd conquers Vice with pardon.

If the use of Elizabeth-Astraea as a central image symbolizes the renewed golden age, other features of "Hymnes of Astraea" indicate the visionary moment. One such element is time--more properly, the atemporal texture of "Hymnes of Astraea". It is not that, as in "Orchestra", the quotidian present is eschewed in favor of a transference to a future age of wonder; rather, the temporal setting of "Hymnes of Astraea" is timeless, there is no concrete, profane time to abolish, for we are immediately and throughout in the center of a transcendent, mythical moment of the renewed golden age when the ravages of Time are suspended, feckless:

## HYMNE III.

## TO THE SPRING.

E arth now is greene, and heaven is blew,  
 L ively Spring which makes all new,  
 I olly Spring doth enter,  
 S weete young Sun-beames do subdue  
 A ngry, aged Winter.

B lasts are mild, and Seas are calme,  
 E very meadow flowes with Balme,  
 T he earth weares all her riches,  
 H armonious birdes sing such a Psalme  
 A s eare and hart bewitches.

R eserve (sweete Spring) this Nymph of ours  
 E ternall garlands of thy flowers,  
 G reene garlands never wasting;  
 I n her shall last our states faire spring,  
 N ow and for ever flourishing,  
 A s long as heaven is lasting.

## HYMNE X.

## TO THE MONETH OF SEPTEMBER.

E ach Moneth hath praise in some degree;  
 L et May to others seeme to be  
 I n Sense the sweetest Season;  
 S eptember thou art best to me,  
 A nd best dost please my reason.

B ut neither for thy Corne nor Wine  
 E xtoll I those mild dayes of thine,  
 T hough corne and wine might praise thee;  
 H eaven gives thee honor more divine,  
 A nd higher fortunes raise thee.

R enownd art thou (sweet moneth) for this,  
 E mong thy dayes her birth day is,  
G race, plentie, peace and honor  
 I n one faire houre with her were borne,  
 N ow since they still her Crowne adorne,  
 A nd still attend upon her.

These poems present the essential temporal condition  
 of "Hymnes"--spring and autumn continual, the usual  
 Eudenic moment.<sup>22</sup> The temporal attitude here is clearly

antihistorical, and if it looks forward to a time at all, it looks forward to a time when Time shall be no more ("Not to corrupt, till heaven waxe old,/And be refin'd with burning", I, 15-16). As Eliade notes, the Judeo-Christian vision is one of limited cyclical time, not eternal cyclical time (i.e., golden ages periodically reappearing); limited cyclical time has a renewed golden age only once.<sup>23</sup> This is important, for it points to the significance of a belief in a renewed golden age in a Judeo-Christian vision as opposed to the relative insignificance--because common--in eternal cyclical visions.<sup>24</sup>

Now we mustn't lose sight of the fact that it is only Elizabeth who makes this transcendent moment possible. When Davies refers to "the new fresh houres and Graces" ("Hymne IX", 8) being pleased to be where Elizabeth-Astraea is, we recall that the Graces--Castitas, Pulchritudo, Amor--were regarded as symbolic of the returned golden age. Seznek refers to the Guariento Venus and the Venus of a Modena manuscript, the Liber physiognomiae. While Venus alters enormously from a staid, solemn, evidently middle aged deity of the Guariento representation to a nude, nubile, sensual creature of the Modena miniatures, one thing does not change: to the left of both is the scale of justice. Seznek also refers to a medal of Niccolò Fiorentino which represents Venus-Virgo and the three Graces.<sup>25</sup> Venus initially

becomes involved with Virgo because the Graces are really the Horae, controlling Time, and Virgo is a traditional symbol of temporal renewal; by extension Venus becomes conflated with Virgo-Astraea and so develops a scale of justice, and a mythistory of fruitfulness yet chastity. But it is essential to realize that only around and by means of Elizabeth is temporal control exercised--without her the universe collapses back into profane, concrete time, a movement akin to a temporal fall, as the original Fall propelled man into time and decay.

I said that the structure of "Hymnes of Astraea" was ultimately significant as reflection of world view, in this case as reflection of the Elizabethan visionary moment. Surely the very thematic order to some extent reflects the ordered cosmos. The "Hymnes" show a carefully developed pattern throughout the 26 "Hymnes": the first two establish Astraea as the controlling symbol, and relate the symbol of Astraea implicitly to Elizabeth. Hymns III-XII are concerned with Elizabeth-Astraea as related to the outer world, though "Hymne XII" is a transitional poem which discusses a portrait of Elizabeth as prelude to discussing her unseen beauties--mental (hymns XIII-XIX), emotional (XX), general, e.g., wisdom, justice (XXI-XXV), ending with a closure hymn "To Envy", something of an envoi.<sup>26</sup>

Yet the structure of "Hymnes" as reflective of the transcendent, visionary *Weltanschauung* is a far more com-

plex proposition than merely one of thematic pattern and order. For Davies' "Hymnes of Astraea" are acrostics, a fact far too often ignored or belittled. C. S. Lewis refers to the acrostics of "Hymnes" as "a silly tour de force that vanishes from consciousness in proportion as it is successful".<sup>27</sup> One wonders whether that elusive "it" has acrostics of any given poem as referent, making the statement rather contradictory. But the point is clear, albeit off the mark. Lewis, certainly one of the finest critics of this period, simply does not realize the significance.

A careful reading of "Hymne I" is instructive: Elizabeth is never mentioned, yet by the end of the poem she is miraculously yoked with supernal Astraea. The poem, in a very real sense, performs a miracle: Elizabeth is never mentioned, but is there throughout, and her name marks the boundaries, is the circumference, within which the poem is structured.<sup>28</sup> S. K. Heninger puts it succinctly: a poem reflecting cosmic harmony, unity, "should be a network of active correspondences, so that much of its meaning is conveyed in the arrangement of its parts, in its structure. Metaphor in such a poetics becomes the major mode of discourse, and structure [of acrostic structure] is itself a metaphor, revealing the divine plan in action".<sup>29</sup> The structure of "Hymnes" is thus a metaphor revealing Elizabeth as the structural matrix of the ordered, unified, holistic Elizabethan vision.<sup>30</sup>

The acrostic "Hymnes" are thus poems of verbal opsis, interestingly similar to the visual arts. An analogue worthy of note is Ghirlandaio's "Last Supper", wherein Christ and his disciples are pictured at the table of the Last Supper. A Latin inscription is on the wall: "I dispose of you just as my Father disposed the kingdom for me so that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom". R. G. Peterson describes well the effects of the work: "Christ is in the center and surrounded by the disciples; and the words of the Latin are so arranged that 'regnum' (i.e., the 'kingdom' disposed for Christ) is in the middle of the sentence and above the figure of Christ, and 'Ego' and 'meo' (both referring to Christ) are at the beginning and end of the sentence and above the two ends of the table, enclosing, as it were, the disciples within Christ's kingdom".<sup>31</sup> This is of course a perfect analogue of Davies' image of Elizabeth, and suggests his view of her and his concept of the ordered cosmos. Elizabeth is cynosure, ever-present element, and containing force of the harmonious universe as developed in "Hymnes of Astraea".

Now the thaumaturgic quality of Davies' "Hymnes" goes beyond acrostic structure. Leo Spitzer shows that cosmic and musical harmony are inherently involved with numbers and symmetrical mathematics. In the Republic, for example, the harmony of the spheres immixes with music, motion, and number to indicate that all of these

are involved in universal order.<sup>32</sup> Spitzer also refers to the Augustinian conflation of cosmic order, music, time, motion, harmony, number and love.<sup>33</sup> And R. G. Peterson refers to a statement in the Timaeus conjoining "order, harmony, proportion, the numerical ratios", and he goes on to indicate that a poet creates ordered, harmonious works by number, magic, harmony, geometric structure, as the Deity created the cosmos.<sup>34</sup> Such Renaissance poetic theorists as Puttenham perceived a yoking of arithmetic, geometry, music, harmony and poetical proportion, and made pointed reference to an etymological link between rithmus and arithmus--folk etymology, to be sure, but it is more important to note that such a belief was held than whether it is accurate.<sup>35</sup>

Bruce Pattison and Christopher Butler independently also refer to this nexus when they describe the Pythagorean notion of a relationship of the music of the spheres and numerology since the number of spheres known which were thought to revolve around the earth equalled the musical intervals into which the octave was divided (e.g., 2:1 time for the octave or diapason, 3:2 for the fifth or diapente).<sup>36</sup> And S. K. Heninger brilliantly and blithely deemphasizes that which I'm emphasizing--a music-number union: "the items of nature are organized according to mathematical proportion or (the same thing [!]) musical harmony".<sup>37</sup> There is, in other words, a very possible relationship between cosmic and musical harmony, and the

magic of numerological symbolism. Of course the magic of acrostic structure and the magic of numerology are not incompatible. Joseph Summers points to the logical connection of these in a writer like Herbert (in whose work verbal opsis appears more often than numerological symbolism, as in "Trinitie Sunday").<sup>38</sup>

A magical or unifying element, number symbolism by its very nature suggests a secret, arcane unity. Dante's symbolism, Petrarch's, Spenser's, even the numerological substructure of St. John's Revelation are cases in point. In Davies' "Hymnes" the number symbolism revolves around the number 26, for 26 is the numerological symbol of Virgo-Astraea, according to the Ptolemaic description of the constellation Virgo as containing 26 stars. Thus Accession Day tilts had 26 knights participating on two different occasions (1584 and 1590), and in 1633 "an arch was set up whose face 'represented a heaven, into the which appeared his Majesty's ascendant Virgo. She was beautified with six-and-twenty stars, after that order that they are in their constellation'".<sup>39</sup> The encomiastic lyrics, therefore, of Elizabeth-Virgo-Astraea are 26 in number. And in "Orchestra" Love, in stanza 121, looks forward 2600 years to Elizabeth's time. It is of course not exactly 2600 years after the setting of "Orchestra"; the number is used for its symbolic value: the golden age of a returned Virgo-Astraea will be ushered in with the accession of Elizabeth. The number 26, in other words,

serves Davies as a magical suggestion of the visionary epoch of which he sings.

Jerome Mazzaro makes an interesting point about the mystical quality surrounding the lyric. He speaks of the father of lyric poetry, Simonides, who was said to have spent half of a song, ostensibly about the Olympic games, in praise of the Gemini, thus suggesting that lyric poetry is a vehicle of jointure of this world (Castor) and the divine (Pollux). This is so from lyric's association with music, music being seen as a mirror of heavenly harmony. Lyric poetry was therefore regarded as capable of magic, incantatory, shadowing forth the harmonious universe, or its image, Mazzaro referring to "the lyric poem as a kind of incantation" and the lyric poet's function as "that of a magician".<sup>40</sup> This of course is pertinent to Davies' "Hymnes", as regards both acrostic structure and numerology.

Yet the transformation the lyric undergoes in these "Hymnes" is more than magical, is in fact generic. Perhaps the most outstanding feature of lyric poetry throughout its history is its subjectivity and its at times narcissistic first person point of view (or, as Frye put it, "the individual communing with himself"<sup>41</sup>). According to Aristotle and Plato the three primary genres may be distinguished by mode of imitation, and the lyric's mode is the poet's own persona; E. S. Dallas characterized genre similarly, referring to lyric as first person singular,

future, and epic as third person, past; and Roman Jakobson described lyric as first person singular, present, and epic as third person, past (the objective "I").<sup>42</sup> And Jerome Mazzaro recapitulates a point earlier made by J. E. Spingarn about the excessive subjectivity of the Renaissance lyric because of the enormous influence of the Petrarchan paradigm.<sup>43</sup>

Now all of the above about lyric subjectivity is remarkably inapplicable to Davies' "Hymnes", for "Hymnes of Astraea" are poems nearly anonymous. Part of the reason for this is that "Hymnes" were meant to be sung, and the song lyric, as Catherine Ing shows, was essentially impersonal. This impersonal, objective lyric predates the subjective Elizabethan lyric.<sup>44</sup> Surely "Hymnes" do have some elements in common with the Petrarchan love sonnet of the age--e.g., the use of antithesis and oxymoron. Leonard Forster, in his Icy Fire, points to "Of her Justice" ("Hymne XXIII") wherein such an oxymoron as "delightfull paine" and ruling by Love (see the antithesis of line 6) are used.<sup>45</sup> But "Hymnes" essentially present the love poetry of praise of famous men, or women, which C. Day Lewis describes as the "free yielding up of oneself", clearly an anti-self-consciousness point of view,<sup>46</sup> the precise opposite of the tension filled "I" and "all" bifurcation in, say, Herbert, where such a dichotomy reflects a dichotomous Weltanschauung.<sup>47</sup> In Davies, by contradistinction, reality and the ideal are one, "I"

and "all" melt into one another, for its unified nature symbolizes its holistic, synthetic vision.

Now Friedrich Nietzsche distinguished Apollo as the essence of individuation (subjectivity) and Dionysos as the essence of communalism (objectivity). Davies' poetic is a fusion of these, Davies as Apollo the lyric singer, but also Davies the anonymous poet in the "Hymnes", losing himself in the rapture of admiring Elizabeth and the returned golden age: "So stirred [i.e., by a vision of harmony, joy] the individual forgets himself completely".<sup>48</sup> This is not inconsistent with Puttenham's view of the sub-genre hymn: "These hymnes to the gods was the first forme of Poesie and the highest and the stateliest, and they were song by the Poets as priestes".<sup>49</sup> This makes a hymn hieratic in an absolute sense; since the lyric is generally viewed as demotic in contradistinction to the epic hieratic, since a hymn is in praise of a god or gods (all of whom Puttenham regards as euhemeristic), and since the poet singer is inspired, priestly, forgets himself, there is the suggestion that Davies' "Hymnes" are fundamentally mythopoeic.

Davies, we must remember, presents a poetic in the heart of the synthetic Renaissance vision. Nietzsche speaks of the Greek hope for a return of Dionysos to eliminate individuation and to reestablish harmonious oneness<sup>50</sup>; this is akin to the Christian hope for a second coming of Christ. In art, it is the figure of

harmony, the god returning who reestablishes the golden age and eliminates individuation--as Elizabeth-Astraea in Davies' "Hymnes". Now surely only Elizabeth can represent the entire synthesized, Christian golden age returned vision; but when one being so predominates as the essence of all that is good in a perfect age, there is pressure to apotheosize that individual, especially so when she is semi-divine to begin with by virtue of her socio-political position. This is the kind of pressure that yields a poeticized Elizabeth as not only Astraea but also Cynthia, Diana, even a surrogate Holy Virgin. And it yields in Davies not only Elizabeth as Astraea, but Elizabeth-Astraea worshiped, as the lyric becomes a hymn. And, in fact, these "Hymnes" are the essential mythopoeic kernel, a lyrical-hymnal foundation of epic which can only arise at a moment of vision, of prophecy, of transcendence, when a poet feels the universe reaching culmination and the world is new made, earth brought up to heaven and joined eternally. These hymns correspond to certain features of Frye's definition of high mimetic art--of which the epic is part--by having "the emphasis on cynosure or centripetal gaze, and the tendency to idealize the human representatives of the divine and the spiritual world, which are characteristic of the high mimetic. Divinity hedges the king and the Courtly Love mistress is a goddess".<sup>51</sup> In other words, the very formal, structural metamorphosis the Davies lyric undergoes re-



epic content (cantilenae) and a cycle of hagiographical legends revolving around one figure<sup>54</sup>--again there is the suggestion of a combined lyric-hymn origin of epic. Later, when considering the anonymity of the Niebelungenleid poet, de Vries theorizes that the poet may have regarded himself merely one in a long line of reciters who but occasionally and slightly alter the legend, thus not worthy of personal identification.<sup>55</sup> It seems to me, however, that there may be another impulse for anonymity: the hero is the cynosure to such a degree that other characters appear largely as background accentuating the foregrounded hero; the poet's personality, masked or not, would be an intrusion. In any case, it is important again to note that "Hymnes of Astraea" are poems almost completely free of authorial personal pronouns, which suggests that Davies' lyric-hymns may be the root stuff of epic. De Vries offers further evidence of a relationship between lyrical hymn and epic. In Greece there was a distinction between aidoi, epic makers, and rhapsodoi, epic reciters: the former made and recited epics at court accompanied by a lyre; the latter were "weavers" of tales into an epic, rhabdos meaning shuttle. But the rhapsode's traditional staff suggests a relationship to the Boeotian singers of hymns who bore laurel twigs in their hands. De Vries concludes: "there is therefore a connexion between the lyric poetry of the hymns and the epic poem".<sup>56</sup>

De Vries finds evidence of this everywhere, and while

it is unnecessary to relate his complete findings, some are of considerable significance. He notes, for example, the recurrence of themes from heroic legend adorning temples, and therefore seeks to discover the religious element in epic--perhaps the hero was not only heroic, but semi-divine. De Vries then finds that many epics are rooted in cults, that epic heroes are not only brave but bearers of an ideal essence, that it is this essence more than the hero's personality that is worshiped.<sup>57</sup>

Now all of this is clearly pertinent to the Davies lyric-hymns and Davies' later reference to an Astraean shrine, for the paradigmatic epic develops as follows: hymns repeatedly praise a hero who is already partially, or is in the process of being, deified; the hero's deeds are glorified, perhaps adorn a temple; more detailed accounts of the hero's deeds develop; the growth of the hero from infancy to adulthood is described; these elements are further elaborated and shaped into coherent units, which units eventually become parts of a whole, after to be molded, pruned, and given a sense of unity by the true epic poet.<sup>58</sup> This work is hardly altered by later reciters, for it is the epic proper.

Frye also notes how smoothly the Apollonian paeon and the Christian hymn flow into the epic,<sup>59</sup> and Nietzsche, questioning why Greek statues and cameos placed Archilocus, the lyric poet and the spirit of subjectivity, next to Homer, the epic poet and the spirit of objectivity, finds

that the lyric poet is both subjective in the Apollonian (individuated) phase and objective in the Dionysiac (communal) phase--in the latter phase, the poet merges with the oneness of all life and is essentially that poet whose work leads to the great epics<sup>60</sup>: such a one is Davies, poet of the epical "Hymnes of Astraea".

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> E. M. W. Tillyard, Poetry and its Background (London: Chatto and Windus, 1948), pp. 30-48.

<sup>2</sup> E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), pp. 101-106.

<sup>3</sup> As pointed out by James L. Sanderson, Sir John Davies (Boston: Twayne, 1975), p. 60. Robert Kreuger in Sir John Davies, The Poems of Sir John Davies, ed. Robert Kreuger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 360, and others, "orchestra" derives from the Greek orkheisthai, to dance, and to Davies designated the place where the chorus of the Greek theatre sang and danced.

<sup>4</sup> Sanderson, pp. 70-74.

<sup>5</sup> See both Sanderson, pp. 62, 64-65 and Tillyard, Poetry, pp. 31-32 for useful summaries of the narrative line of "Orchestra".

<sup>6</sup> John Hollander, The Untuning of the Sky (1961; rpt. New York: Norton, 1970), pp. 118-122.

<sup>7</sup> Sir John Davies, The Poems of Sir John Davies, ed. Robert Kreuger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 110. All quotations of Davies are from this edition.

<sup>8</sup> Gretchen L. Finney, Musical Backgrounds for English Literature: 1580-1650 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962), pp. 1, 9.

<sup>9</sup> Finney, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> John C. Meagher, "The Dance and the Masques of Ben Jonson", JWCI, XXV (1962), 258-259.

<sup>11</sup> Surely there are Platonic elements in "Orchestra", especially so as we approach the concluding stanzas and the vision of a renewed golden age; but as Sanderson points out (p. 74), Davies' Platonism is more probably the result of incorporating aspects of the intellectual inventory of the times than of any specific influence. (Useful introductions to the influence of the Platonistic thinkers are provided by Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953), passim,

and by Douglas Bush, The Renaissance and English Humanism (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1939), pp. 72-73.)

12 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return (New York: Pantheon, 1954), pp. 35, 85.

13 The reference to the Fortunate Isles distinctly indicates a vision of the regained paradise, as so regarded since Hesiod. For an elaboration of its mythistory, see Davies, p. 375, n. 121.

14 There is, to be sure, a sense in which "Orchestra" too is juristic. Golding's Metamorphoses refers to "eloquence and justice (which are meant/By true accord of harmonie and musicall consent)", ll. 513-514 (quoted in Davies, p. 371), thus showing why harmony and poetic consent ("eloquence") are intrinsically juristic concepts. Now Hollander points out that Davies substitutes cosmic dance for musical harmony as image of cosmic order in "Orchestra", and so by extension the music-dance of "Orchestra" is a juristic notion at its core. Ian Sowton, "Hidden Persuaders as a Means of Literary Grace", University of Toronto Quarterly, XXXII (1962), 66, 69, is searching for a way to express a perception of this when he overreads the word "judicially" in the title "Orchestra or a poem of dancing judicially proving the true observation of time and measure" to mean that "Orchestra" itself is forensic in structure; but surely the poem is a defense of dancing as right, just, reflective of the ordered universe, and so forth, and Queen Elizabeth is the sole judge of dancing's acceptance, if only by implication.

15 Davies, p. 111.

16 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 30-33; Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 88.

17 Jean Seznec, The Survival of the Pagan Gods, trans. Barbara F. Sessions (1953; rpt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 37-38 refers to the tendency to translate euhemeristic deities to the heavens as entities of the various spheres; the return of those deities symbolizes the reestablished golden age when gods walked the earth.

18 Frank Kermode, Shakespeare, Spenser, Donne (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 19, somewhat cryptically notes this pagan-Christian fusion when he refers to the myth of Elizabeth as Astraeon empress being inseparable

from Apocalyptic notions.

<sup>19</sup> Adolf Katzenellenbogen, Allegories of the Virtues and Vices in Mediaeval Art (London: The Warburg Institute, 1939), pp. 76-77.

<sup>20</sup> Seznec, pp. 76-77, 80-81, 82-83, 145-147.

<sup>21</sup> Seznec, pp. 58-59.

<sup>22</sup> Both spring and autumn are used, for spring is the usual timeless present, autumn the fruitful present. Autumn also appears because of Elizabeth's September birthday, and because Virgo--the constellation long conflated with Astraea--is an autumnal zodiacal sign.

<sup>23</sup> Eliade, pp. 110-112.

<sup>24</sup> So significant, in fact, that its failure leads to profound depression, of which the last stanza of "Hymne XXII" is prophetic:

R ight princely Vertue, fit to raigne,  
E nthroniz'd in her Spirit remaine,  
G uiding our fortunes ever;  
I f we this Starre once cease to see,  
N o doubt our State will Ship-wrackt be,  
A nd torne and sunke for ever.

("Hymne XXII", 11-16)

<sup>25</sup> Seznec, pp. 197, 204, 205, 115.

<sup>26</sup> Sanderson, pp. 89-90, describes a similar pattern.

<sup>27</sup> C. S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (Excluding Drama) (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 526.

<sup>28</sup> The structure of words in "Hymnes" corresponds to the structure of dance in "Orchestra" wherein Davies uses dance to represent sound, motion, order, as he ranges throughout all levels of being to demonstrate dance as image of universal harmony. Thus all nature seems unified by a mystical notion of dance.

<sup>29</sup> S. K. Heninger, Jr., Touches of Sweet Harmony (San Marino: The Huntington Library, 1974), p. 340.

<sup>30</sup> A useful analogy is Herbert's carmen figuratum poems, which were regarded as religiously (i.e., mystically) manifesting spiritual truth.

- 31 R. G. Peterson, "Critical Calculations: Measure and Symmetry in Literature", PMLA, 91 (1976), 372-373.
- 32 Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony, ed. Anna Granville Hatcher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 13-14.
- 33 Spitzer, pp. 19-20, 28-29, 101, 126.
- 34 Peterson, 368, 369.
- 35 Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. G. Gregory Smith (1904; rpt. London: Oxford University Press, 1967), II, 67, 73.
- 36 Bruce Pattison, Music and Poetry of the English Renaissance (London: Methuen and Co., 1970), p. 1; Christopher Butler, "Numerological thought", in Silent Poetry, ed. Alastair Fowler (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970), pp. 1-3.
- 37 Heninger, p. 76.
- 38 Joseph H. Summers, "The Poem as Hieroglyph", in Seventeenth-Century English Poetry, ed. William R. Keast (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 238.
- 39 The Entertainment of the High and Mighty Monarch, Prince Charles, etc., in The Poems of William Drummond of Hawthornden, ed. W. C. Ward (London: Oxford University Press, 1894), p. 86, in Alastair Fowler, Spenser and the Numbers of Time (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 198-200.
- 40 Jerome Mazzaro, Transformations in the Renaissance English Lyric (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 10-13, 16.
- 41 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 250.
- 42 René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 227-228.
- 43 Mazzaro, p. 3.
- 44 Catherine Ing, Elizabethan Lyrics (London: Chatto and Windus, 1951), pp. 15-17.
- 45 Leonard Forster, The Icy Fire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 139.

46 C. Day Lewis, The Lyric Impulse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 22.

47 See Stanley E. Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 173, for a useful discussion of persona in Herbert as reflection of Zeitgeist.

48 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), pp. 22-23.

49 Elizabethan Critical Essays, 31.

50 Nietzsche, p. 67.

51 Frye, p. 153.

52 Elizabethan Critical Essays, 28-29.

53 Jan de Vries, Heroic Song and Heroic Legend, trans. B. J. Timmer (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 9.

54 De Vries, pp. 22-42.

55 De Vries, pp. 165-166.

56 De Vries, p. 172.

57 De Vries, p. 230.

58 At times, biography is extraordinarily distorted. In Nora K. Chadwick and Victor Zhirmunsky, Oral Epics of Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 302-304, for example, various national epics are referred to which alter the traditional subject to reflect "the psychology and the social ideas of the peoples who have created them" (p. 304). Eliade refers to the myth developed around Dieudonné de Gozon, third Grand Master of the Knights of St. John at Rhodes, who was famous for slaying a dragon. The dragon slaying was an exploit imposed several hundred years after de Gozon's life because he belonged in a category, an archetype, which demanded certain acts--e.g., dragon slaying. Eliade calls this "the metamorphosis of a historical figure into a mythical hero" (p. 42), who is formed after the image of ancient mythic heroes. The person's historicity is not doubted; but the mythicization goes beyond any real historical event: the euhemeristic model is shaped in whatever way necessary to fit the archetypal form.

59 Frye, pp. 204-295.

60 Nietzsche, pp. 36-39.

The visionary juristic epoch of which I speak is distinctly Elizabethan; but the vision did not fade for the first year or two following the death of Elizabeth. For reasons that will be considered in detail later, the juridic Weltanschauung was essentially still one of dialectical synthesis, reconciliation, harmony: England, in short, felt itself merely to have shifted from the female centered perfection of Elizabeth's rule to its male counterpart under James.<sup>1</sup> Now drama, referred to by E. S. Dallas as the genre of the second person, present tense,<sup>2</sup> may be regarded as the form most completely reflective of the present moment; accordingly, the harmonious Elizabethan vision is also developed in the juristic Measure for Measure (written almost simultaneous with the death of Elizabeth and James' accession) through the process of a dialectical synthesis which manifests itself in verbal opsis, imagery, tone, theme, structure, agency, and genre.

But synthesis is the culmination of the dialectical process; before culmination we have a struggle of antinomies. In Measure for Measure this struggle virtually begins and ends with the conflict of law and mercy, a law so rigid that it monstrously intends to put Claudio to death for fornication, and a mercy so forgiving that it has led to repeated violations of law with impunity and a resultant breakdown in hierarchical order ("Liberty plucks Justice by the nose,/The baby beats the nurse, and quite athwart/Goes all decorum"<sup>3</sup>). Wylie Sypher, in

one of the most perceptive readings of Measure for Measure, sees the play in almost precisely these terms in fact, regarding the play as demonstrating an equation between death and mercy.<sup>4</sup> And J. W. Lever also recognizes the antithetical thematic elements of Measure for Measure, but takes his awareness beyond the polarity of law and mercy: "lust was set over against abstinence, brothel against convent, mercy against justice, nature against spirit".<sup>5</sup> Lever is of course correct, for there are several thematic polarities developed throughout Measure for Measure: if justice is divided into the extremes of rigid law and promiscuous mercy, sexuality seems equally divided, asceticism (convents, priests, nuns) on the one side, license (brothels, pimps, bawds) on the other. The juristic world and the sexual world clash head on at the outset, Angelo punishing Claudio and debating with the novitiate Isabella, and Elbow and Escalus dealing with Pompey. In fact, the antinomies of law/mercy and asceticism/license are not parallel but intersecting, and nothing could be more evident when Pompey switches professions--pimp becomes hangman--and Angelo is metamorphosed from a pillar of the rigid law and a man seemingly above sexual ardor to a lecher who will circumvent all law, all that is sacred ("Having waste ground enough,/Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary/And pitch our evils there?" [II, 11, 170-172]), to satisfy his lust. Indeed, the complications of these dichotomies become extraordinarily

involved when we realize that the sin of Claudio and Juliet is duplicated by Angelo (Claudio's harsh judge) and Mariana, with the antithetical feature that Claudio loved Juliet despite the loss of a dowry, whereas Angelo stopped loving Mariana because of the loss of a dowry.<sup>6</sup>

The above has brought us from thematic development to the construction of agency, and agency is likewise developed antithetically: e.g., Angelo is something of an embodiment of legal rigidity, Escalus of promiscuous mercy--both, it must be noted, are manifestations of extreme positions<sup>7</sup>; Mistress Overdone is, well, Mistress Overdone, while Isabella is Maiden Underdone or Neverdone. From another point of view, Isabella, pleading for mercy for Claudio, is the antithesis of the unyielding Angelo, both of whom participate in the play's "rigidly schematic measure for measure",<sup>8</sup> both of whom represent extremes which must be mollified. Interestingly, both retain their antithetical postures almost throughout: as Angelo's depravity increases, so, in a sense, does Isabella's in her despicable reviling of her brother. Each ultimately reaches the point of greatest extremity, where they are paradoxical: Isabella becomes "the merciless pleader for mercy . . . neatly poised in balance with the lustful puritan".<sup>9</sup> The italicized terms here suggest that both Angelo and Isabella are developed to reflect antithesis within their own beings: Angelo is the epitome of virtue one moment, a ruthless monster the next,<sup>10</sup> and Isabella's

behavior toward Claudio exposes her as a rhetorician of mercy but a virago of mercilessness.<sup>11</sup>

Northrop Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism points out that characterization in comedy is contingent upon plot, and plot upon structure<sup>12</sup>; characterization therefore is a function of structure, and if characterization is developed antinomically, so too must the structure be developed. Now the structural and formal antitheses of Measure for Measure are less easily discerned, but nonetheless important. Anthony Caputi points out that a great number of scenes are informal disputations wherein two characters or groups of characters articulate opposing positions, which in Caputi's view revolve around the fundamental antinomy civilization/natural man. (The primary occurrences Caputi refers to are the debates between Isabella and Angelo, but conversations between the provost and Angelo, Angelo and Escalus, Escalus and Pompey, Pompey and Elbow, Claudio and Isabella also exemplify the point.) In each scene the positions are not reconciled, but rather calcify in intransigence: the interlocutors separate, generally, no less opposed than when they began conversing, indeed often displaying an intensification of disagreement.<sup>13</sup>

And if most individual scenes are constructed antithetically, we may suspect that these brief encounters reflect the structure of the entire work. This has been noticed often, but not always with complete understanding. Wylie Sypher, for example, ultimately views Measure for

Measure as radically antithetical and imbalanced, and refers to its "structural instability":

[The world of Measure for Measure is] a world of sullied motives and radiant good will, of romance and bestiality, of cleanliness and lechery, of responsibility and defection, of love and lust--and all counterpoised for the instant. . . .

This brief counterpoise is really the structure of the play.<sup>14</sup>

Harold Skulsky views Measure for Measure as an ambiguous play,<sup>15</sup> as does L. C. Knights,<sup>16</sup> but both regard the play as somehow structurally defective because of its antithetical tectonics. This is also the position of E. M. W. Tillyard, who, clearly uncomfortable with the character "inconsistency" of Measure for Measure and allegorical readings of the play, says that "the tone in the first half of the play is frankly, acutely human and quite hostile to the tone of allegory or symbol", while admitting that the tone is radically different and amenable to allegory in the second half; he concludes, "the play is not of a piece but changes its nature half-way through".<sup>17</sup> This is certainly an accurate reading, though it does not make the play a problem; the fact is that the antithetical tenor recapitulates the play's dialectical structure (ironies leading to synthesis) and is but one manifestation of the formal antithesis here, a radical shift from realism to allegory. All of which indicates that here again in Shakespeare we have the dramatic form uniquely suited

to a dialectical process, tragicomedy.

J. W. Lever, on the other hand, does recognize anti-thesis as a structural principle intrinsic to Measure for Measure:

Measure for Measure is made up of contrasts and antinomies juxtaposed and resolved, and the process is incorporated in its dramatic form.<sup>18</sup>

Lever goes on to note that Giambattista Guarini's Compendio della poesia tragicomica (English translation, 1602) presented ideas of tragicomic form that were well known in England, and he suggests that Shakespeare may have been experimenting with this form while structuring Measure for Measure:

Not only are the tensions and discords wrought up to an extreme pitch, threatening the dissolution of all human values, but a corresponding and extraordinary emphasis is laid upon the role of true authority, whose intervention alone supplies the equipoise needed to counter the forces of negation. The form here is a close blend of tragic and comic elements, so carefully patterned as to suggest a conscious experiment in the new medium of tragicomedy.<sup>19</sup>

Precisely so, except that the tragicomic form is no mere experiment but the form constructed by the juristic historico-philosophic world view of reconciliation and harmony, a world view which shapes genre along the lines of a dialectical synthesis. Murray Krieger also thought of Measure for Measure as reflecting a generic experiment of sorts, a hybrid made up of Elizabethan romantic comedy

on one hand, and Jonsonian "dark" comedy on the other: "the inconsistency of the play . . . does not . . . spring from a confusion of moral principles so much as it springs from a confusion of two technical patterns".<sup>20</sup> Again, the position here is I think correct, but Shakespeare is not simply experimenting: the form rather reflects the fluctuating, uncertain world view shifting from the Elizabethan golden age to the unsure Jacobean period.

Clearly, then, what Caputi uncovers as a central structural feature of individual colloquies goes some distance beyond mere stichomythia, is in fact a manifestation of a pervasive dialectical structuring which permeates even the very verbal texture of Measure for Measure. There are, for example, antithetical passages throughout the play:

Some rise by sin, and some by virtue fall.  
Some run from brakes of ice and answer none,  
And some condemned for a fault alone.  
(II, 1, 38-40)

There is a vice that most I do abhor,  
And most desire should meet the blow of justice;  
For which I would not plead, but that I must;  
For which I must not plead, but that I am  
At war 'twixt will and will not.  
(II, 11, 29-33)

O, it is excellent  
To have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous  
To use it like a giant.  
(II, 11, 108-110)

Thieves for their robbery have authority,  
When judges steal themselves.  
(II, 11, 176-177)

O cunning enemy, that, to catch a saint,  
 With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous  
 Is that temptation that doth goad us on  
 To sin in loving virtue.

(II, 11, 180-183)

Heaven hath my empty words,  
 Whilst my invention, hearing not my tongue,  
 Anchors on Isabel: Heaven in my mouth,  
 As if I did but only chew his name,  
 And in my heart the strong and swelling evil  
 Of my conception.

(II, iv, 2-7)

To sue to live, I find I seek to die,  
 And seeking death, find life.

(III, i, 42-43)

There is a devilish mercy in the judge,  
 If you'll implore it, that will free your life,  
 But fetter you till death.

(III, i, 64-66)

When vice makes mercy, mercy's so extended  
 That for the fault's love is th'offender friended.

(IV, ii, 110-111)

Duke. Here is Lord Angelo shall give you justice;  
 Reveal yourself to him.

Isab. O worthy Duke,  
 You bid me seek redemption of the devil.

(V, i, 28-30)

Shame to him whose cruel striking  
 Kills for faults of his own liking!  
 Twice treble shame on Angelo,  
 To weed my vice, and let his grow!  
 O, what may man within him hide,  
 Though angel on the outward side!  
 How may likeness made in crimes,  
 Making practice on the times  
 [

To draw with idle spiders' strings<sup>]</sup>  
 Most ponderous and substantial things!  
 Craft against vice I must apply.  
 With Angelo tonight shall lie  
 His old betrothed, but despised:  
 So disguise shall by th'disguised  
 Pay with falsehood false exacting,  
 And perform an old contracting.

(III, ii, 260-275)



above. There is, to begin, the very basic pattern of freedom and restraint. In the antithetical, unsynthesized universe of Measure for Measure (before the world is set right) freedom and restraint are oddly juxtaposed and immixed:

Lucio. Why, how now, Claudio? Whence comes this  
restraint?

Claudio. From too much liberty, my Lucio, Liberty  
(I, ii, 116-117)

Here sexual freedom is presented as antithetical to the law, and a similar suggestion exists later when we hear of Liberty plucking Justice By the nose(I, iii, 29). In Act III spatial and temporal physical freedom (including both the physical freedom of Claudio and the sexual license of Angelo) is the opposite of spiritual freedom, is oddly consistent with spiritual restraint, a kind of elastic constriction of the soul:

Isabel. There is a devilish mercy in the judge,  
If you'll implore it, that will free your life,  
But fetter you till death.

Claudio. Perpetual durance?

Isabel. Ay, just, perpetual durance; a restraint,  
Though all the world's vastidity you had,  
To a determin'd scope.

(III, i, 64-69)

The freedom-restraint imagistic polarity is similar and somewhat parallel to the dichotomy prurient sex/ascetic religion imagistically developed in the play:

Having waste ground enough,  
 Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary  
 And pitch our evils there?  
 (II, ii, 170-172)

Dost thou desire her foully for those things  
 That make her good?  
 (II, ii, 174-175)

O cunning enemy, that, to catch a saint,  
 With saints dost bait thy hook!  
 (II, ii, 180-181)

Heaven hath my empty words,  
 Whilst my invention, hearing not my tongue,  
 Anchors on Isabel: Heaven in my mouth,  
 As if I did but only chew his name,  
 And in my heart the strong and swelling evil  
 Of my conception.  
 (II, iv, 2-7)

Clearly this is a world where notions which are inherently antinomical cohere and others which are ordinarily correlated are contradistinguished. The world of Measure for Measure we must remember is completely antithetical, chaotic, hierarchically inverted until it is set right, and so we should not be surprised to find that in fact appearance and reality are at opposite ends of the continuum. There is, for example, the appearance and the reality of Angelo. The initial presentation of Angelo is that he is something of a saint, developed through his name, through the high opinion others have of him, through his ascetic, puritanical attitudes and remarks. Once his sexual appetite is whetted, however, the angel becomes its antithesis--a devil:

Let's write good angel on the devil's horn--  
 'Tis not the devil's crest.  
 (II, 1v, 16-17)

This outward-sainted deputy,  
 Whose settl'd visage and deliberate word  
 Nips youth i'th'head and follies doth enew  
 As falcon doth the fowl, is yet a devil:  
 His filth within being cast, he would appear  
 A pond as deep as hell.  
 (III, 1, 88-93)

Duke. Here is Lord Angelo shall give you justice;  
 Reveal yourself to him.

Isab. O worthy Duke,  
 You bid me seek redemption of the devil.  
 (V, 1, 28-30)

'Tis not impossible  
 But one, the wicked'st caitiff on the ground,  
 May seem as shy, as grave, as just, as absolute,  
 As Angelo; even so may Angelo,  
 In all his dressings, caracts titles, forms,  
 Be an arch-villain.  
 (V, 1, 55-60)

There is also the appearance and reality of coins of value, counterfeiting representing an important imagistic development.<sup>22</sup> When Angelo pleads that "there be some more test made of my metal,/Before so noble and so great a figure/Be stamp'd upon it" (I, 1, 48-50) we can hardly fail to realize that Angelo's name contains the pun on the coin "angel", and that although he is presented as fine gold, he proves himself to be of very base metal indeed. Angelo seems to regard sexual license and the fruits thereof as no better than counterfeiting or theft:

Ha? Fie, these filtny vices! It were as good  
 To pardon him that hath from nature stolen  
 A man already made, as to remit  
 Their saucy sweetness that do coin heaven's  
 image  
 In stamps that are forbid. 'Tis all as easy  
 Falsely to take away a life true made,  
 As to put mettle in restrained means  
 To make a false one.

(II, iv, 42-49)

Yet it is Angelo whom we find to be the counterfeit, the concealer of truth.

Actually, the imagery of appearance and reality mirrors the agency of Measure for Measure, as not only Angelo, but in fact many characters dissemble--there is the deception of Claudio and Juliet, the multiple dissembling of Angelo, the disguised duke, the lying Lucio, the deception of the bed trick (in which the duke, Isabella, and Mariana all participate), and the false beheading of Claudio (in which both the duke and the provost take part). The dissembling by the honorable characters is of course necessary. This, we must remember, is a completely inverted, chaotic cosmos wherein only deception can fight deception, something of homeopathic medicine to reestablish the health of the universe:

Craft against vice I must apply.  
 With Angelo tonight shall lie  
 His old betrothed, but despised:  
 So disguise shall by th'disguised  
 Pay with falsehood false exacting,  
 And perform an old contracting.

(III, ii, 270-275)

Another antithetical pattern of imagery is that of weighing, measuring, and/or the image of an imbalanced scale. When the provost responds to Abhorson's disapproval of Pompey as an assistant, he does so in the image of a balance: "Go to, sir, you weigh equally: a feather will turn the scale" (IV, ii, 28-29). The implication is that there is little difference between excessive license and excessive judgment. There are of course more significant references to weighing, scales, or measuring. When Angelo mocks Isabella's faint hope to broadcast his sinfulness, he does so in the imagery of weighing, scales, measuring:

My vouch against you, and my place i'th'state  
Will so your accusation outweigh,  
That you shall stifle in your own report  
(II, iv, 155-157)

Say what you can: my false o'erweighs your true.  
(II, iv, 169)

Now the ramifications of this are significant, for the image of an imbalanced scale in a work which is fundamentally concerned with the nature of justice suggests the juristic cosmos in a state of chaos, as in fact is the case for much of Measure for Measure.

The above, be it noted, are images of radical imbalance; in fact, the themes, characterizations, structures and imagistic patterns I've referred to are varied features of a highly complex, unsynthesized dialectic--unsynthesized until, that is, the reestablishment of universal order and justice by the returned Vincentio.

Kenneth Burke speaks of key images in Shakespeare developed by and in the plot as essential paradigms of a play's theme,<sup>23</sup> and Frye refers to emblematic objects which represent recognition in literature<sup>24</sup>; George Kernodle, always sensitive to visual aesthetics, points to the hypothesized visual image in drama as a focal point.<sup>25</sup> Thus the volte-face toward order and justice is perhaps most understandably and best displayed in a work so manifestly involved with juristic philosophy by the image of the scale of justice, an image which virtually visualizes the play in epitome<sup>26</sup>:

Duke [first to Angelo, then to Escalus]

Give we our hand,  
And let the subject see, to make them know  
That outward courtesies would fain proclaim  
Favours that keep within. Come, Escalus,  
You must walk by us on our other hand;  
And good supporters are you.

(V, 1, 14-19)

The duke has just returned to Vienna. He is from one point of view the representative of true justice, so that his placing Escalus (scales) on one hand and Angelo (something of a sword of justice throughout) on the other performs the symbolic action of distinguishing a balance with justice amidst its common iconographic instruments. This image thus ritualistically manifests the condition which now exists, i.e., the reestablishment of true justice in Vienna. Furthermore, the image is that of a perfect balance, symbolizing Vincentio's function as a vehicle of reconcilia-

tion, drawing, as it were, a moderate amount of law and a corresponding amount of mercy into the center of the balance, into his being, to balance the scales. One look now at the title demonstrates another image of a perfect balance in verbal opsis (clearly suggested by the word "measure", i.e., "weight").<sup>27</sup> But "measure for measure" is ambiguous, both an analogue for Old Testament law-- "an eye for an eye"--and New Testament mercy--"judge not that ye be not judged". What in fact we find it to mean at the end of the play is a synthesis of both, with mercy presented as fulfilling and superseding the law, the Old Testament equipoised, fulfilled but not overmastered by the New.<sup>28</sup> And formally, the first half of the play is imbalanced, tragic realism dominating, while the second half is equally imbalanced, comedy holding sway if only because the audience feels the returned duke is in complete control of events. Put together at the conclusion, the tragicomic form presents an image of two radically imbalanced scales fused to present equilibrium.<sup>29</sup> In brief, what now happens with the imagery, themes, agency, and structures of Measure for Measure is that they begin to reconcile, synthesize as the juristic Weltanschauung is reverted, set right by the returned Vincentio. In linguistic structure, for example, an antithetical, radically imbalanced poetic becomes its opposite--chiastic:

What's mine is yours, and what is yours is mine.  
(V, i, 534)

And, likewise, the uncovering of Vincentio by Lucio brings all deceptions to light--the bed trick, the false beheading of Claudio, the presence of the duke, the lies of Lucio, and the odious behavior of Angelo.

Measure for Measure does not employ an annihilative dialectic but a synthetic dialectic, and its culmination is a reconciliation of extremes at a midpoint. Thus rigid law and promiscuous mercy, asceticism and license are extremes which must be moderated, must move from the edges toward the center of the continuum, so that law is reasonable yet sufficiently respected to be obeyed, while mercy tempers law but not to the point where contempt for the law occurs. Asceticism and sexual license must likewise be modified. As extremes both are deadly, the one through distaste refusing to propagate, the other through savor propagating the pox. Human sexuality with the blessing of religion and the sanction of justice is the point of convergence--the physical and spiritual communion of marriage, a condition wherein both civilization and nature may prosper. Even the radically transformed Angelo is ultimately neither the saint he at first appeared nor the devil into which he seemed abruptly to turn, but, in fact, a synthesis of these--frail man; and the formerly merciless and fastidiously chaste Isabella grows to reveal herself as a merciful and nubile woman.

The duke, like the embodiment of an Aristotelian mean, orchestrates the full range of the centripetal reconcil-

iation, and here we should turn our attention to the Vincentio-James relationship. Perhaps the first point to note is that the duke was Shakespeare's invention, for the duke does not exist in George Whetstone's The Historie of Promos and Cassandra, the primary source of Measure for Measure.<sup>30</sup>

Shakespeare was a member of the King's Men, and one of the first plays produced for the new king was Measure for Measure.<sup>31</sup> Josephine Waters Bennett<sup>32</sup> and George Geckle<sup>33</sup> note various idiosyncratic similarities and concentrate attention upon the often remarkably similar phrasing of passages in James' Basilikon Doron, widely known at all levels of society, and Measure for Measure, specifically references to the just ruler. Ernest Schanzer also concentrates upon the relationship of James and Duke Vincentio, and compares the philosophy and morality of Basilikon Doron with that of Measure for Measure.<sup>34</sup> Even the presentation of Vincentio as priest and duke relate him to the secular and sacred ruler James. (In Renaissance England, where the ruler was both head of church and state, reformed Christians find a priest-ruler perfectly understandable.) In addition, James, like Vincentio, was involved in a celebrated legal case for which he was lionized as a ruler of consummate justice and mercy when he justly sentenced Lords Cobham, Grey, and Sir Markham to be hanged, and then mercifully commuted their sentences.<sup>35</sup> Lever, moreover, points out that Vienna was

once the capitol of the Holy Roman Empire, and that Shakespeare's glorification of Vincentio-James is similar to Cinthio's treatment of Maximian, Holy Roman Emperor, in Epitia<sup>36</sup>; and it begins to appear as though Vincentio-James stands as the same kind of synthetic figure as Astraea-Elizabeth.

This was indeed the popular perception of James in the early years of his reign; surely, it was felt, James' reign was a continuation of the renewed golden age. Vincentio's return, like the return of Astraea, brings order and justice where chaos ruled. Again we have a vision of a golden age ruler of the last days who, like Frederick or John of Salisbury,<sup>37</sup> was seen as a reconciling factor, binding elements of the universe together, whose coming is a work of divine providence, a ruler of peace, order, mercy, harmony. There are of course well known suggestions of this, especially Angelo's reference to divine providence:

O my dread lord,  
I should be guiltier than my guiltiness  
To think I can be undiscernible,  
When I perceive your Grace, like power divine,  
Hath looked upon my passes.  
(V, i, 364-368)

And countless critics have made note of this and other suggestive incidents--e.g., the clandestine duke always in control of events,<sup>38</sup> or the unusual manner in which the duke grows throughout the play from an ambiguous,

missing figure early, to a symbolic, semi-divine figure controlling almost the entire action of the play later on.<sup>39</sup> Leavis put it succinctly: "the sense of him as a kind of Providence directing the action from above, has been strongly established. The nature of the action as a controlled experiment with the Duke in charge of the controls, has asserted itself sufficiently".<sup>40</sup> This is enough to suggest the Battenhouse, Coghill, Knight readings of the play as an allegory of the divine atonement.<sup>41</sup> The duke does indeed seem an incarnate lord, disappearing, thought perhaps to be dead, then returning like a deus ex machina to establish justice by divine fiat; and the people of Vienna are in fact helpless without such divine intervention. Here, as in The Merchant of Venice, the suggestion of a dying and resurrected deity in the tragicomic form recapitulates the Christian myth. Nevill Coghill regards the fundamental shape of Shakespearean comedy as based on the simple formula of Vincent de Beauvais and Dante, i.e., a tale of trouble that turns to joy.<sup>42</sup> But Frye notes that in fact comedy reduplicates the Christian myth structurally, ending on the happy note of rebirth and social integration (i.e., marriage).<sup>43</sup> And in Anatomy he refers to cyclical, Christian mythic development, of which Measure for Measure is exemplary: innocent world turned upside down by insane law, brought back to the golden age by the returned savior<sup>44</sup>; moreover, the movement from law to liberty also follows the pattern

of the movement from the Old Testament to the New Testament.<sup>45</sup> There is, in fact, a Nietzschean, almost dithyrambic texture to Measure for Measure if we realize that the movement of the play is from license to imposed rigid law which creates disorder, and the reassertion of license. As such, the duke stands as a kind of comic lord of misrule and compares with Nietzsche's returned Dionysos, thus a Christ-like deity.<sup>46</sup>

All of this suggests, and I believe accurately so, that Measure for Measure establishes an Apocalyptic moment. According to Mircea Eliade, certain essential features of such a moment are "Enthronement of a 'carnival' king [Angelo], 'humiliation' of the real sovereign [cf. Lucio's remarks], overturning of the entire social order (according to Berossus, the slaves became the masters, and so on [cf. references to babies beating nurses])--every feature suggests universal confusion, the abolition of order and hierarchy, 'orgy', chaos". This is done "to prepare the way for a new and regenerated human species".<sup>47</sup> And the world is new made by the king-priest: "in the last analysis . . . the sovereign repeats the Creation of the cosmos [cf. new social integration and marriage, paving the way, as it were, for the new and regenerated human species]".<sup>48</sup> Now the presence of a semi-divine ruler and divine providence as overseer suggest that myth and reality merge in Measure for Measure, or rather that myth and reality are one. Frye speaks of mythic struc-

ture as literary structure: "the dialectic in myth that projects a paradise or heaven above our world and a hell or place of shades below it reappears in literature as the idealized world of pastoral and romance and the absurd, suffering or frustrated world of irony and satire".<sup>49</sup>

This of course is precisely the difference between Measure for Measure with or without Vincentio. Vincentio's presence at the end is indicative of the golden age perfect moment of reconciliation, "the mingling of the sun [i.e., divine] and the hero [i.e., man], the realizing of a world in which the inner desire and the outward circumstance coincide".<sup>50</sup> What we have at the conclusion of Measure for Measure, then, is a multifaceted synthesis of opposites which symbolizes the harmonious universe, and doing so by accepting this historical moment as actual as well as symbolic, this Vincentio as partially allegorical but clearly a fully humanized character as well, more God's vicar on earth, as James, than an allegorical representation of Christ. And the multiple reconciliations, syntheses of law and mercy, civilization and man's nature, of marriage as a vehicle for satisfying both sacred and sexual needs, a union of body and soul (where before were images of the soul loathing the body, the body ignoring the soul) also point to an acceptance of this life while regarding it as at the same time a perfect moment symbolizing the returned golden age.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> R. W. Chambers, Man's Unconquerable Mind (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 227-228.

<sup>3</sup> William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, ed. J. W. Lever (London: Methuen, 1965), I, iii, 29-31; all quotations of Measure for Measure are from this edition.

<sup>4</sup> Wylie Sypher, "Shakespeare as Casuist: Measure for Measure", The Sewanee Review, LVIII (1950), 263-264.

<sup>5</sup> J. W. Lever in William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, ed. J. W. Lever (London: Methuen, 1965), p. xlv; this antithetical thematic matrix differs markedly, it should be noted, from the thematic developments in the primary sources of Measure for Measure, George Whetstone's Promos and Cassandra and Giraldi Cinthio's Epitia.

<sup>6</sup> Lever, p. lv.

<sup>7</sup> Some critics of Measure for Measure (e.g., John W. Dickenson, "Renaissance Equity and Measure for Measure", SQ, XIII [1962], 297), overwhelmed by Escalus' semi-allegorical name, regard Escalus as not an extreme character, but rather a balanced, moderate figure, symbolic of, the essence of, equity; this, however, is a sentimental view, for Escalus' good intentions fall far short of what equity could accomplish. Consider, for example, his acumen--myopic, at best--when confronted with the conflicting stories presented when Isabella publicly accuses Angelo of his criminal behavior. Left to the perceptions of Escalus, Isabella, Mariana, Vincentio and Friar Peter would be imprisoned for calumny, while Angelo would be exculpated.

Lever (pp. lxvi, lxxviii-lxxix), on the other hand, correctly regards Escalus as excessively merciful in the early stages of the play.

<sup>8</sup> David Lloyd Stevenson, The Achievement of Shakespeare's Measure for Measure (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 23.

- <sup>9</sup> Stevenson, p. 29 (*italics mine*).
- <sup>10</sup> Critics long ago recognized the essentially anti-theoretical structure of the work in its presentation of Angelo. Gervinus, Shakespeare Commentaries, trans F. E. Bunnett (The Early English Text Society, 1875), p. 500, for example, noted Angelo's radical transfer from one so high to one so low, one so dignified to one so degraded, etc.
- <sup>11</sup> Stevenson, p. 45.
- <sup>12</sup> Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 171-172.
- <sup>13</sup> Anthony Caputi, "Scenic Design in Measure for Measure", in Twentieth Century Interpretations of Measure for Measure, ed. George L. Geckle (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 88-89.
- <sup>14</sup> Sypher, "Casuist", 273.
- <sup>15</sup> Harold Skulsky, "Pain, Law, and Conscience in Measure for Measure", JHI, XXV (1964), 148, 160, 168.
- <sup>16</sup> L. C. Knights, "The Ambiguity of Measure for Measure", Scrutiny, X (1942), 222, 223.
- <sup>17</sup> E. M. W. Tillyard, Shakespeare's Problem Plays (London: Chatto and Windus Ltd., 1950), p. 123.
- <sup>18</sup> Lever, p. lix.
- <sup>19</sup> Lever, pp. lx-lxii.
- <sup>20</sup> Murray Krieger, "Measure for Measure and Elizabethan Comedy", PMLA, LXVI (1951), 781, 783.
- <sup>21</sup> Certainly the euphuistic style of John Lyly cannot be ignored in this discussion, for it profoundly influenced the structure of Elizabethan prose fiction and dramatic poetry. Yet there is an important distinction to be made between simply digesting and reduplicating a style mechanically on the one hand, and employing a style which organically reflects the structural significances of a work on the other, as it does in Measure for Measure.
- <sup>22</sup> Sypher, "Casuist", *passim*, details this pattern in its entirety.
- <sup>23</sup> Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 30-33.

24 Northrop Frye, Fables of Identity (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), p. 25.

25 George Kernodle, From Art to Theatre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 147.

26 The tendency in Shakespeare is to image justice as a scale, a balance. In Henry IV, Part II, for example, the Chief Justice speaks of his juristic responsibilities in terms of a balance, proclaiming that he'll not be "thrust . . . from a level consideration" (William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II in The Complete Plays and Poems of William Shakespeare, eds. William Allan Neilson and Charles Jarvis Hill [Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942], II, 1, 123-124.

27 Lever, p. xci, similarly sees the title "with its two connotations of weight set against weight and of a mutual tempering of extremes" as reflecting the play's ultimate structural reconciliation.

28 W. W. Lawrence, Shakespeare's Problem Comedies (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), pp. 114-115, recognizes a certain balancing in the play which gave point to the title, but only acknowledges the Old Testament sense of the phrase, whereas Donald J. McGinn, "The Precise Angelo", in Joseph Quincy Adams Memorial Studies, eds. J. G. McManaway, G. E. Dawson, and E. E. Willoughby (Washington: The Folger Library, 1948), p. 137, recognizes the New Testament source of Measure for Measure and its accompanying suggestion of mercy; finally, Donald A. Stauffer, Shakespeare's World of Images (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949), p. 150, regards the play's title as referring to the Aristotelian mean--"the hope for man is that measured or temperate action may meet with a like response".

29 F. H. Ristine, English Tragicomedy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1910), p. xiii, long ago realized that tragicomedy is a radically shifting form, an antithetical balance, disaster being averted when the "dei ex machina descend in the nick of time: wrongs are righted, wounds healed, reconciliation sets in, penitent villany is forgiven, and the happy ending made complete".

30 F. R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit (New York: NYU Press, 1952), pp. 169-170, was the first to make much of this point.

31 George L. Geckle in Twentieth Century Interpretations, p. 1.

- 32 Josephine Waters Bennett, Measure for Measure as Royal Entertainment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 73-104.
- 33 Geckle, p. 2.
- 34 Earnest Schanzer, The Problem Plays of Shakespeare (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 120-125.
- 35 The tale is told more elaborately by Wilbur Dunkel, "Law and Equity in Measure for Measure", SQ, XIII (1962), 275.
- 36 Lever, p. xxxix, xl, xlii-xliii. Duke Vincentio may also be compared to the Roman Emperor Alexander Severus who was regarded as a paragon of rulers and who is reputed to have gone disguised throughout the land to determine what the people really wanted, if his appointed officials were being just, etc. Shakespeare's knowledge of Severus may have come from Sir Thomas Elyot's The Image of Governauce (1541), but more likely from Whetstone's A Mirrour For Magistrates of Cities (1584), certain phrases from which--e.g., "visible Lightes in obscure Corners", "brainsick iades"--seem to have influenced Shakespeare.
- 37 See Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 104; Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 96-97, notes the imperceptible yet irrefragible link between the ruler, abstract Justice, and Christianity. In the case of John of Salisbury, for example, justice ruled through him, and his power over law was transferred from his liturgical authority.
- 38 Robert M. Smith, "Interpretations of Measure for Measure", SQ, I (1950), 210, regards the duke as a type of providence and bringer of the dominant word--pardon.
- 39 D. A. Traversi, An Approach to Shakespeare (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), II, p. 60. William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (New York: New Directions, 1950), pp. 85-86, points to heroic characters who slowly turn into Christ during the course of a work--e.g., Piers Plowman. This, in a sense, could be said of Duke Vincentio.
- 40 Leavis, p. 170.
- 41 G. Wilson Knight, The Wheel of Fire (1930; rpt. and rev. London: Methuen, 1969), pp. 73-96; R. W. Battenhouse, "Measure for Measure and Christian Doctrine of the Atonement", MLA, LXXI (1946), 1029-1059;

N. Coghill, "Comic Form in Measure for Measure", Shakespeare Survey, 8 (1955), 14-27. From this view the duke is symbolic of the incarnate lord (though still retaining his humanity, in Coghill's opinion [21]), Lucio Satan, and Isabella man's soul destined to be the Bride of Christ. Knight's reading is perhaps the most extreme of this kind, for he regards the duke as a type of Christ, and the play as an analogy of Jesus' parables. A similar reading is that of M. C. Bradbrook, "Authority, Truth and Justice in Measure for Measure", The Review of English Studies, XVIII (1941), 385-386, who sees the play as an essential moral allegory of a contention between Justice and Mercy, Angelo standing for False Authority and Law, usurping the place of the duke who is both Humility and Heavenly Justice, while Isabella is Truth and Mercy. Clearly, however, such allegorical readings of Measure for Measure disregard too much, are too selective with the references used; the fact of the matter is that while there is certainly a sense of an allegory of the divine atonement, such by no means dominates the play.

42 Nevill Coghill, "The Basis of Shakespearian Comedy", in Shakespeare Criticism: 1935-1960, ed. Anne Ridler (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 204.

43 Northrop Frye, "The Argument of Comedy", in Love's Labor's Lost, ed. John Arthos (New York: The New American Library, 1965), p. 167.

44 Frye, Anatomy, p. 171.

45 Frye, Anatomy, p. 181.

46 Sypher, "Casuist", 270. The comparison of the Nietzschean vision in Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy From the Spirit of Music, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1956) with Measure for Measure is even more remarkable when we consider that the fusion of Apollonian and Dionysiac elements, which Nietzsche viewed as the supreme moment of Greek art, combined justice and individuation (Apollonian) with sexual freedom and communalism (Dionysiac); moreover, breaking the spell of individuation in Dionysiac communalism corresponds to marriage in transcendent comedy (Nietzsche, pp. 62, 65, 67).

47 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return (New York: Pantheon, 1954), p. 57.

48 Eliade, p. 136.

49 Frye, Fables, p. 34.

50 Frye, Fables, p. 18. Elizabeth Marie Pope, "The Renaissance Background of Measure for Measure", in Twentieth Century Interpretations, p. 71, points out that mercy at the end of Measure for Measure is totally disproportionate with the juristic practice of the time; but clearly the intention was not to represent the current state of jurisprudence, but rather to display the golden age, visionary Weltanschauung of which "excessive" mercy is an indication.

In Measure for Measure we see again that one step beyond irony which is myth, as Frye notes throughout the Anatomy of Criticism. But I should like to suggest that the process can be reversed: remove the reconciling agent, have the deity abscond, and man, feckless at best, more generally depraved, is thrown back on himself, divine providence seems not to be working in the universe, earth separates from heaven, history from prophecy; and literature, shaped by a new historico-philosophic world view, literally falls apart. Chaos, injustice, an absurd universe replace the harmonious vision; centrifugal force, unreconciled irony, intentional dissonance dominate imagery and structure of the metaphysical lyric; personal revenge replaces the justice of God's surrogate, and irony, never overcome except by solipsistic neoplatonism, shapes literature. From a Nietzschean point of view, when the spell of Dionysiac transport is broken, the world is viewed with loathing: "The truth once seen, man is aware everywhere of the ghastly absurdity of existence".<sup>1</sup>

For some, Measure for Measure is premonitory of this radical shift. The body-soul union I spoke of in regard to the syncretistic conclusion of Measure for Measure is precisely those elements which are most conspicuously sundered in the traditional metaphysical lyric--i.e., the sensual/sacred conceit which is in truth never synthesized--and the very essential rift later given voice by the Cartesian mind/body dichotomy. For Wylie Sypher

Measure for Measure is part of a brief, ephemeral twilight between the Elizabethan and Jacobean ages; indeed it is seen as a distinctly mannerist work peopled with ineffectual humanity, an ominously pre-Jacobean work<sup>2</sup> which mixes antitheses which never really synthesize: "The dramatic world of Measure for Measure . . . is the bleak territory of the Jacobean stage where brutality and lyric are in equipoise so venturesome that it can hardly be maintained".<sup>3</sup> And Northrop Frye, while acknowledging that a "new social integration" takes place in Measure for Measure as in all transcendent comedy, also perceives a mild sense of forced unreality, which suggests the uncertain view of James' rule in its early days.<sup>4</sup> Frye gives point to this view when he acutely notes that "every make character is at one time or another threatened with death"<sup>5</sup> in Measure for Measure and that the green world is conspicuously absent from the more ironic comedies--specifically, All's Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure.<sup>6</sup> E. K. Chambers holds a similar view of Measure for Measure, regarding it as presenting a nascent pessimism, anticipating King Lear,<sup>7</sup> and Mary Lascelles also regards Measure for Measure as moving forbodingly toward Shakespearean tragedy and a solipsistic world view.<sup>8</sup> James Trombetta likewise senses a threatening note in Measure for Measure anticipating Jacobean horror: "Although it ends in marriage, the play still generates too much anxiety for laughter to dispel",<sup>9</sup> a view very much like Nevill Cog-

hill's: "Measure for Measure ends in what (I think) we must take for rejoicing, hastily patched up as it may seem; but only after long anxieties; Barnadine and Lucio make their chastened escape from the executioner. It is a play without cheerfulness".<sup>10</sup> And, finally, there are the truly pessimistic views of Measure for Measure, such as that of Una Ellis-Fermor who regards the play as demonstrating the spiritual exhaustion of the Jacobean age, the death dread and life horror, the incertitude, the fundamental Jacobean negation,<sup>11</sup> and the most extreme of such views poignantly expressed in the following comment whose focal point was Measure for Measure by J. Dover Wilson in The Essential Shakespeare (1932): "The hatred of sentimentalism and romance, the savage determination to tear aside all veils, to expose reality in its crudity and hideousness, the self-laceration, weariness, discord, cynicism and disgust of our modern literature of negation all belonged to Shakespeare about 1603".<sup>12</sup>

While I do not share the abovementioned views of Measure for Measure, the mere iteration does, I think, suggest that Measure for Measure points the way to an absurd universe. Lukács indicates that the movement from comedy to tragedy results when the correspondence between an ordered world view and an ordered, harmonious vision breaks down.<sup>13</sup> Measure for Measure does point the way to this when deus absconditus, but it is a "saved" world view when Vincentio returns. Yet in the world of English

politics no one could save England after Elizabeth.

The failure of James, specifically as God's juridic surrogate, transmuted gold back instantly to iron. Certainly, "the beginning of James I's reign was seen by contemporaries as one of the most hopeful moments of English history".<sup>14</sup> Part of this was undoubtedly due to the remarkably prosperous Elizabethan Empire and the general socio-political comforts James inherited upon accession; but equally important was the fact that James had indeed been a successful ruler of Scotland, and he seemed to exemplify the essence of the just ruler developed in Basilikon Doron--a suggestion nurtured by James himself. But the times quickly called for proof of James' juristic expertise. Administratively, for example, James' failure began almost immediately. J. H. Gleason notes that by 1608 the administrative ineptitude of the newest justices of the peace was becoming obvious.<sup>15</sup>

When it came time for James to maintain the delicate balance of the king's Roman prerogative courts of equity and the autonomous, autochthonous courts of common law,<sup>16</sup> he failed miserably, precisely because he chose in favor of one as opposed to the other instead of, as he should have, choosing neither. Worse still, he chose in favor of Chancery, his court of equity, and very shortly thereafter all of the king's equity courts came to be regarded contemptuously.<sup>17</sup> Edward Jenks recalls one incident among many where James overrode the courts of Common Law with

Chancery.<sup>18</sup> And William Hudson writes that after 1605 Star Chamber was beginning to be regarded as a court of royal absolutism, of cruelty, of disregard of the constitution, whereas under the Tudors it was revered. James was trying to bolster his sovereignty, certainly; but his actions can hardly be judged tyrannical from a modern point of view. To the Englishman of the early seventeenth century, however, his imperiousness appeared to signal the erosion of the indigenous jurisprudence of which the English were so extraordinarily proud.

It wasn't long before the common lawyers lined up behind Edward Coke against Stuart absolutism, and later as Parliamentarians, and civil lawyers lined up as Royalists. Early in the century Dr. John Cowell, Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge, made the civil law position clear when in his law dictionary of 1607 he defined the King of England as an absolute monarch.<sup>19</sup> It worked both ways: when the civilians required it, James supported their jurisdiction in matters of dispute with the common lawyers. But James was understandably predisposed to defend Roman law, having lived in Scotland whose laws were based upon Roman law.<sup>20</sup> This mutually beneficial arrangement continued as Archbishop Bancroft, civilian spokesman, declared the monarch's right to hear any case whatever, thereby suggesting that the king was above the law. This incensed common lawyers, who venerated the law and regarded the king as subject to it.<sup>21</sup>

Sine iustitia, confusio: like a chain of dominoes, when the juristic synthesis separates, the universe collapses, so involved are all facets of the universe that all feel the strain.<sup>22</sup> Even William Elton, a critic who regards the Elizabethan and Jacobean ages as of a piece, both presenting an ironic universe behind the vesture of synthesis (as I certainly do not), admits to the "multiple vision of the Elizabethan age . . . its illogical syncretism . . . its mingling of disparate and divided worlds".<sup>23</sup> But King Lear is another matter entirely, and with regard to that work surely Elton is irrefutable. The chain of being is broken, man and the cosmos are split, justice has become injustice, order disorder. And generic structure inexorably reflects the prevailing historico-philosophic world view, as a ruthless structural and sequential irony continually undercuts whatever evanescent vestige of hope may momentarily appear. Clearly we have here the very opposite of the synthetic, harmonious vision of the Elizabethan golden age. If in Measure for Measure man seems almost a puppet living in a just, visionary universe miraculously reconciled by the benevolence of divine providence, as Kenneth Muir indicates,<sup>24</sup> then in King Lear the synthesizing agent seems not to be working through James, and the universe seems without direction, out of control.<sup>25</sup> Man as a result is inevitably thrown back on himself and his own ability--more usually inability--to administer justice. The

results in less abstract terms are a heightened subjectivity and personal revenge as a substitute for cosmic justice.

The concept of Renaissance subjectivity recalls the common view stemming from Jacob Burckhardt,<sup>26</sup> whose perception was that there was an awakened subjectivity in Renaissance Italy. Man stopped thinking only as a member of a race and began thinking of the world and himself as individual. This newly found subjectivity was the shaping principle, as Burckhardt saw it, of Italian Renaissance life and literature.<sup>27</sup> And the areas wherein this best can be discerned are, respectively, personal revenge and satire, stemming from politico-ecclesiastical corruption. Burckhardt points to the duel as a prime example of that which is won or lost by individual merit and not providentially ordained. This is the result of man's new found individuality, his new freedom: tyranny, a lack of guidance by divine providence, contempt for a cancerous state and a deus absconditus world view, throw man back upon himself; if political and cosmic justice are ineffectual, man must take it upon himself to administer a rough-hewn justice of personal revenge. The attitudes and values of Machiavelli as opposed to those of Dante present the parallel development in the Italian Renaissance. For Dante, the universe was symmetrical and all human institutions were correspondent; for Machiavelli the universe was neither symmetrical nor rationally ordered. Chance

and Fortuna had replaced providence, and justice was achieved by those who were decisive and crafty.<sup>28</sup>

These are the same perceptions that go to make up the Jacobean world view. When Coke says "Revenge belongeth unto the magistrate",<sup>29</sup> we may well ask what happened to vindicta mihi, since that concept ascribes vengeance to the Lord, and we may likewise wonder if men have arrogated vengeance to themselves since by virtue of having to make the statement Coke seems to admit that personal revenge is the rule rather than the exception. Jacobean revenge, in fact, is an answer to both queries, an indication that man no longer feels he can depend on providence and no longer has respect for the political institutions to administer justice.

Whereas in Measure for Measure we had chiastic lines concluding the play implying the balanced juristic Weltanschauung wherein mercy subsumed law, in the metaphysical lyric we have anacoluthic lines and in such a Jacobean revenge tragedy as Marston's Antonio's Revenge we have radically imbalanced lines of personal revenge: "Murder for Murder, blood for blood doth yell",<sup>30</sup> and where we formerly had balanced, synthetic titles--e.g., Measure for Measure--we now have ironic, antithetical titles--e.g., The White/Devil (with the same inherent suggestion of an absurd universe that led Thoreau to create "Civil/Disobedience"). Indeed, in 1613 there were so many duels that Star Chamber had to take note of, and respond harshly

against "those insolent persons [who] take upon them to frame a law . . . to themselves, as if they had power to cast off the yoke of obedience to peace and justice".<sup>31</sup> Jacobean revenge tragedy is the perfect representative of this particular world view, but we may see this same world view in Jacobean comedy, which like Attic comedy is a kind of bastard comedy which merely demonstrates the quotidian, e.g., in Jonson's Volpone (1607), the concluding trial of which, instead of reconciling and positing mercy as the fulfillment of the law, asserts "social revenge on Volpone" as the moral norm.<sup>32</sup>

But the distinctive literary manifestations which indicate man's new born subjectivity, individuality, according to Burckhardt, are satire and formal parody, for only with the growth of individuality can man be satirized for his peculiarities. Burckhardt's position here is surely debatable (and I have no doubt that Burckhardt was fully aware of this)<sup>33</sup>; but perhaps we can make some headway if we recognize that satire and formal parody are functions of irony, and this makes a good deal more sense; for satire and formal parody are most clearly manifestations of an ironic, unsynthesized world view, and one great age of epigrammatic satire and formal parody of Petrarch is the early seventeenth century. And this ironic world view is manifested in the metaphysical conceit, the very stuff of the seventeenth century lyric, a device which attempts to unite disparate worlds but cannot, in a lyric

whose subjectivity attempts to approach the divine but likewise cannot and so it is thrown back on itself, whereas in Davies subjectivity melts behind the vision of Elizabeth, the reconciling object of reverence.

The world view now is ironic and realistic, romance and a synthetic dialectic are of another time; and the attempt to go beyond itself through a metaphysic it is no longer sure of is doomed to failure. M. C. Bradbrook points out that in the early seventeenth century satiric comedy replaced courtly allegory, and literary theory held with Bacon that man needed poetry to show him the vision, for what was in the world seemed to deny transcendence.<sup>34</sup> When, at the conclusion of Henry VIII, Shakespeare looks back on the Elizabethan golden age, it is referred to in prophetic terms, but the vision oddly begins to sound like a wistful memory of a past never to be recaptured. "The Golden Age was by then in the past. Terras Astraea reliquit".<sup>35</sup>

## Notes

- 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy From the Spirit of Music, trans. Francis Golffing (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1956), p. 51.
- 2 Wylie Sypher, Four Stages of Renaissance Style (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 139-140.
- 3 Wylie Sypher, "Shakespeare as Casuist: Measure for Measure", The Sewanee Review, LVIII (1950), 262.
- 4 Northrop Frye, "The Argument of Comedy", in Love's Labor's Lost, ed. John Arthos (New York: The New American Library, 1965), p. 164.
- 5 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 178.
- 6 Frye, Anatomy, p. 183.
- 7 E. K. Chambers, Shakespeare: A Survey (New York: Hill and Wang, 1958), pp. 208-217.
- 8 Mary Lascelles, Shakespeare's Measure for Measure (London: The Athlone Press, 1953), p. 138.
- 9 James Trombetta, "Versions of Dying in Measure for Measure", ELR, 6 (Winter, 1976), 60.
- 10 Nevill Coghill, "The Basis of Shakespearian Comedy", in Shakespeare Criticism: 1935-1960, ed. Anne Ridler (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 225.
- 11 Una Ellis-Fermor, The Jacobean Drama (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 259-260.
- 12 J. Dover Wilson, The Essential Shakespeare (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 117.
- 13 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1971), pp. 40-41.
- 14 J. W. Lever in William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, ed. J. W. Lever (London: Methuen, 1965), p. lvii.

<sup>15</sup> J. H. Gleason, The Justices of the Peace in England (London: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 117-118.

<sup>16</sup> "At the end of the Tudor period it was becoming clear that a struggle for supremacy was imminent between the common law courts and these new and rival jurisdictions. In fact, we can see that the Tudors had left the legal institutions of the English state in much the same position of unstable equilibrium as they had left its political and ecclesiastical institutions. The new had been placed side by side with the old, and no attempt had been made to define their respective spheres. A continuance of the harmonious working of these diverse institutions depended on the personality of the Tudor sovereigns. . . ." (William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law [London: Methuen, 1924], IV, p. 284.)

<sup>17</sup> Holdsworth, V, p. 217.

<sup>18</sup> Edward Jenks, A Short History of English Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1922), pp. 165-166.

<sup>19</sup> Brian P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England: 1603-1641 (London: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 5, 8, 14, 82.

<sup>20</sup> Levack, p. 82.

<sup>21</sup> Levack, pp. 86-87, points to the Corpus Juris Civilis as the primary document used to advance James' concept of monarchical superiority to the law. And Charles McIlwain suggests that the struggle between civil and common law may have been intentionally exacerbated by James:

For there is some evidence, not often noticed, that in James's first years a conscious and determined effort was being made, not altogether without the sympathy of the King, to weaken the immemorial custom of the courts of common law by a "reception" more or less complete--more rather than less the lawyers feared--of the principles and procedure of Roman law, already employed in the courts of Scotland and in various jurisdictions in England, particularly the ecclesiastical.

(C. McIlwain, Political Works of James I, quoted in Levack, p. 123.)

22 J. W. Allen notes that throughout the sixteenth century English thought was unique for almost unanimously not feeling that there was ever cause for rebellion. "Only very late in Elizabeth's reign is the question seriously taken". (J. W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century [London: Methuen, 1960], p. 131.) And not long after James' juristic mistake, the question becomes central; in short order the very nature of hierarchy, the existence of the chain of being, the functioning of divine providence, the dependence upon cosmic justice come into question.

23 William R. Elton, King Lear and the Gods (San Marino: The Huntington Library, 1966), p. 188.

24 Kenneth Muir, "Measure for Measure", in Shakespeare's Sources: I. Comedies and Tragedies (London: Methuen, 1965), pp. 101-109, rpt. in Twentieth Century Interpretations of Measure for Measure, ed. George L. Geckle (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 13-20; J. W. Lever (xcvii) also criticized the characterization and poetic spontaneity of Measure for Measure, for he regards the play as warped by structural dominance, and the characters as plastic and incapable of real action because the duke dominates the flow of the action.

25 Such is the view of M. H. Mahood, Poetry and Humanism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), pp. 14-15, who sees a false humanism manifesting itself in "Jacobean pessimism in literature and Mannerist frigidity in art" (p. 20), although it is Mahood's position that the disintegration of a holistic vision began earlier than I believe it to have begun.

26 Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (London: The Phaidon Press, 1944), Part II, pp. 81-103.

27 Interestingly, Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. Mario Domandi (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 126-129, notes that one of the leaders of this movement was Petrarch who fought a lifelong battle against the communalistic, anti-individual principles of Averroism.

28 Joseph Anthony Mazzeo, Renaissance and Revolution (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), pp. 72-73.

29 Coke, Third Institute, p. 197, cited in Holdsworth, V, p. 199; Elizabeth Marie Pope, "The Renaissance Background of Measure for Measure", in Twentieth Century Interpretations, p. 55, indicates that such exhortations were heard throughout the early years of the seventeenth century.

30 John Marston, Antonio's Revenge, ed. G. K. Hunter, Regents Renaissance Drama Series (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), V, 111, 113.

31 Lord Percy of the North v. Gervase Markham, 1616, cited in Holdsworth, V, p. 200.

32 " . . . and the play ends with a great bustle of sentences to penal servitude and the galleys. One feels perhaps that the audience's sense of the moral norm does not need so much hard labor". (Frye, "Argument", p. 165.)

33 If we use the yardsticks of satire and formal parody to distinguish the great ages of English and American subjectivity we would discover that for England it was the age of Pope and Swift, not the age of Wordsworth and Shelley, and that for America it is the twentieth century, rather than the age of Whitman, Emerson, and Thoreau. Clearly we must be speaking of different kinds of subjectivity when Lukács finds it essential to the amorphous novel and Burckhardt finds it intrinsic to the Commedia, the one a falling back on man by the process of elimination, the other a virtual apotheosis of man.

34 H. C. Bradbrook, The Growth and Structure of Elizabethan Comedy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), pp. 44-45, 105-106. This is of course somewhat Platonic, but it makes clear that the great age when history was viewed as symbolic is passed, for poetry must now do the work. The only transcendence left is a virtual rejection of reality in neoplatonic transcendence (The Tempest) or poetry which claims to reconcile man and the cosmos but gainsays itself through an ironic tone.

35 H. C. Bradbrook, Shakespeare and Elizabethan Poetry (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), p. 21.

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