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**Power networks: Determinants of community participation
styles in Kreuzberg/Berlin and the Lower East Side/New York
City**

Bockmeyer, Janice Lee, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1994

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POWER NETWORKS:
DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION STYLES
IN KREUZBERG/BERLIN AND THE LOWER
EAST SIDE/NEW YORK CITY

by

JANICE L. BOCKMEYER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political
Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1994

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ABSTRACT

POWER NETWORKS: DETERMINANTS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION STYLES IN KREUZBERG/BERLIN AND THE LOWER EAST SIDE/NEW YORK CITY

by

Janice L. Bockmeyer

Adviser: Professor Marilyn Gittell

Lower-income urban community residents are those most affected by public and private-sector urban redevelopment plans, but their participation in policymaking is severely limited. This dissertation compares housing development participation strategies used by lower-income and immigrant residents in New York City's Lower East Side and Kreuzberg, Berlin since 1975 and hypothesizes that a complex network of factors emerging from local political cultures determines styles of participation. It finds that Kreuzberg participation was led by young Germans--while older Germans and immigrant workers were more reticent--was directed at the state and characterized by confrontational protest actions, primarily squatting. On the Lower East Side, in contrast, relatively heterogeneous community-based organizations targeted primarily private developers and landlords and competed for government funding to develop affordable housing. Kreuzberg strategies are explained by restrictive national immigration laws and a history of prohibitions against local associations, centralized labor interests, a paternalistic welfare state and

emergence of autonomous city bureaucracies. Specific generational and spatial factors also contributed to the network. Lower East Side styles were shaped by a tradition of community organizing reinforced by a decentralized Democratic party and the creation of community district boards, ethnic diversity and competition encouraged by American programmatic federalism and the limited involvement of the public-sector in housing. The dissertation concludes that in each site a unique network of influences shaped mobilization, pointing to the value of reconstructing power networks for specific sites, time periods and policy areas to understand resident participation.

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INTRODUCTION

This is an examination of how people, thought to have limited political resources, participate politically. It is, above all else, an attempt to rethink what we consider to be the modes of political participation. Growing up in Michigan, perhaps it was inevitable that I was introduced to the subject by my grandfather's solemn description of the Detroit Depression-years sit-down strikes. Laid-off from his factory job in Battle Creek, he temporarily moved his family to Detroit where factories were hiring. He found work--mandatory ten and twelve hour work days including Saturday with no talk of "overtime" pay, working conditions which were often dangerous, and where job security meant you had a job until a supervisor told you otherwise. My grandfather was a soft-spoken man, and when we prodded him with, "So how did people live like that? What did they do?" He replied, "They sat down."

The image of booming auto plants, thousands of production workers moving at top speed, molding tons of steel

and glass into automobiles--it was the very shape of power. And with the simple, common-place act of sitting down, refusing to work, the workers of Detroit and Flint, Cleveland, cities across the region, quieted the production lines and took the power into their individual hands, for a time. Jeremy Brecher writes that in 1937 alone 400,000 workers across the United States were involved in sit-downs, and most interestingly, usually did so without the authorization of their unions as "The workers all over began striking on their own" (Brecher 1972,193). There began my fascination with how individuals create power.

Today the question of how people seek to exercise power while experiencing substandard or severe living conditions remains only partly answered. At times low-income and working class citizens have been active voters; sometimes political responses have taken the shape of demonstrations, protests, boycotts, riots. Of equal importance are the times when there is no apparent reaction or desire to participate politically. Certainly the very roots of any democratic political system are the awake and active citizenry. It is essential for citizens, minimally, to voice their needs and policy preferences, to act as a watchdog over their elected representatives and to ensure that their civil liberties and rights are maintained. But it also happens in democratic societies that low-income and working class individuals appear to be slow in challenging leadership or in

creating solutions which would satisfy their own political needs.

My interest in the question of how citizens participate was renewed while living on Manhattan's Lower East Side in New York City in 1981. Rents in the community were escalating at an alarming rate, stories about landlords harassing elderly and low-income tenants out of rent-controlled flats in order to re-rent them at exorbitant prices abounded, and it was hard to sit in a local café without overhearing the plight of a tenant who, after losing an apartment, could find nothing affordable in the neighborhood. But it was difficult to determine how tenants were working to change or to protest these conditions.

While visiting West Berlin three years later, I was struck by the similarity of housing problems in that city's Kreuzberg neighborhood. But the response of community residents appeared to differ drastically. Beginning in 1979 squatters took over a number of buildings left empty or where numerous apartments were being held off the market. Landlords were warehousing apartments and sitting on their increasingly valuable properties while they waited for the city government to finalize local urban renewal plans. By 1984 nearly 5,000 students, workers, teachers, unemployed young people and others had moved into and rebuilt the warehoused apartments on their own, as a protest to city housing policies and private real-estate speculation.

Accompanying demonstrations and protest--sometimes violent--captured headlines almost daily for several years. Why in the face of similar severe housing conditions had one community erupted in political protest and citizen initiatives while another seemed complacent?

The focus of this dissertation is to inform our understanding of how citizens in different communities, even given similar problems, participate differently and why. The project focuses not on members of government as participants, or other institutional participants, or even voters, for their participation is thoroughly documented and perennially reviewed. Instead it studies low-income and working class urban community citizens, faced with all of the duties and tasks of daily life. And how in scant free time after work hours, family and domestic responsibilities, and possessing limited resources for participating politically, nonetheless, at proportionally greater expense, feel compelled to voice needs and demands and often to create solutions themselves which address their needs.

Methodology

By using comparative analysis--examining one German and one American community--the research seeks a broad understanding of what leads to political participation by low-income community residents. As Norton Long writes,

"There are excellent reasons why municipal officials should rejoice in the uniqueness of their cities. There are equally excellent reasons why scholars and administrators should seek to explore the dark continents of uniqueness and make comparisons however odious" (Long 1962, 218). The comparative approach allows for testing in which circumstances different political structures, policies and cultures create an environment for participation, and what factors determine the styles of participation residents will use. Manuel Castells in his study, The urban question, stressed the difficulties of studying the interconnection between the "urban structure" and "urban politics," between urban policy and the "conflict process in social groups" (Castells 1980, 378). Comparative analysis can resolve some of those difficulties because, as Dogan and Pelassy have noted, it "helps to rid us of inherited fossilized notions, obliges us to reconsider the validity of undiscussed interpretations, and enlarges our visual field" (1984, 9).

Certainly a wealth of cross-national studies have used comparative analysis to study the determinants of participation. But they either fail to define participation in a way including modes used by lower-income urban residents, or they examine a variety of participatory styles without isolating lower-income citizens as a population for study (see, for example: Dalton 1988; Barnes and Kaase et al. 1979; Verba, Nie and Kim 1971; Almond and Verba 1963). This

dissertation combines the study of participation by lower-income urban residents with what will be argued is a definition of participation inclusive of styles used by lower-income residents to ascertain the primary determinants of their participation. When the study of lower-income political participation is made methodologically possible as a result, it is hypothesized that the political culture of a specified place and time will be the leading determinant of the participatory modes used by lower-income urban community residents.

In other words, how many barriers lower income residents will encounter, how they attempt to overcome them, in general, how these individuals seek to create political power for themselves and their communities, will be shaped by their local political culture--a network of social factors, local historical developments, market influences, combined with the history of government policy decisions made at various levels. This definition uses Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's outline of political culture in their 1963 The civic culture, but extends it. Almond and Verba study "political orientations--attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system" (12). The partiality of the definition stems from two problems. First, it neglects time as an essential factor, which ignores the continuous process of exchange between political institutions and the attitudes

of individuals. Opinion, "habits of mind," passions, as Tocqueville has emphasized, are essential to shaping institutions; institutions, as Michel Foucault's "genealogies" have discovered, create "local memories" of reactions to institutional behavior. In other words, the arrows go both ways, and influences carried each way are continuous, so that time becomes the essential dynamic.

Almond and Verba acknowledged that their thinking was enriched by "anthropology and psychology as socialization, culture conflict, and acculturation" but their definition of political culture as operationalized did not reflect their broader understanding. Thus, the second problem, is methodological. They acknowledged the importance of anthropology, but employed neither its assets nor any historical data, eliminating the time factor entirely. Their surveys, furthermore, neglected class as a factor of political culture by narrowing the definition of political participation to the extent that styles used by lower-class individuals were not captured. Additionally, in their findings, the factor of class is ignored even when it reveals itself. Carole Pateman, in a critique of The civic culture, makes the important point that even when empirical democratic research revealed a strong correlation between SES and participation, it disregarded both the meaning and importance of these findings (Pateman 1980).

In order to test the central hypothesis, the research uses a cross-cultural approach studying comparative participation in two locations: The Lower East Side of New York City and Kreuzberg, West Berlin. This allows for testing in which circumstances different political cultures and policies create an environment for participation by low income citizens. In New York City, the definition for the Lower East Side is the Manhattan Community Board District 3, one of the localized districts created first in the 1961 New York City Charter to create advisory community forums on issues of planning and development. The Kreuzberg district is encompassed by the Kreuzberg Bezirksamt, one of the 20 Berlin administrative districts created in 1920, called Bezirke. The time period covered is roughly from 1975 to 1985, with the study reaching into the past and present to illuminate the issues.

To examine the styles of resident participation in housing and redevelopment issues and to account for differences observed, the project studies four dimensions: (1) Historical and demographic trends relevant to the development of ethnic, religious, class or cultural sub-communities; the socio-economic status (SES) of residents, diversity between them and the change in demographics between roughly 1975 and 1985; the presence of potential or actual separate housing and development interests. (2) Differing governmental structures shaping these policy

areas, including at what level and by whom decisions are made, and mechanisms for citizen input. (3) The historical circumstances of development in each community, including whether property ownership is private or public, extent of private development and public subsidy of private development; the history of relevant policies in housing and development affecting the community including redevelopment plans. (4) The relevant history of community activism and, within the years 1975 to 1985, the styles of community participation including strategies used by individuals, organizations, coalitions and intermediary structures, and the internal processes of collective efforts.

The Lower East Side and Kreuzberg were chosen as research sites for three reasons. First, they are demographically similar lower income urban communities with populations which were expected to have relatively low levels of political resources: low income residents, relatively high proportions of unemployed workers, large concentrations of immigrant workers, often with limited command in each country's language and many with tenuous legal status. Second, the communities are similar in housing stock and redevelopment activities. Both include hotly contested urban renewal districts which pitted redevelopment interests against the wishes of residents threatened with displacement and raised issues of citizen participation in redevelopment issues. More generally, the communities are

traditionally working class districts with severely aging and threatened housing stock vulnerable not only to decay, but to speculative real estate practices and government policies which often ignored the needs of residents.

The third reason for these site selections is for their very different political cultures. By choosing different national locations the research can observe the impact on participation of such factors as relative citizen efficacy, whether housing policies are made on the national or sub-national level, the role of public versus private ownership of housing, the power of bureaucracies, different authority patterns and governmental stance toward non-institutional oppositional interests.

Research data was collected from community publications including pamphlets and fliers, local archives, relevant government agencies, citizens' groups, political party offices, and city-wide newspapers. But the centerpiece of the research is extensive interviewing of community residents and relevant policy makers or administrative staff. Using reputational analysis, residents were identified as "participants" in housing and development issues. Each person interviewed was asked to identify other community participants, and names were checked against other interview references, newspaper, literature or document references. Once participants were identified, interviews were conducted using open-ended questions. A separate

instrument was used for government officials to elicit information about specific policies and how they viewed resident input.¹ For the purposes of this study, political participation was defined by community residents themselves describing their own participation in housing and development issues from lobbying for legislation, organizing protests and promoting a political ideology to more immediate activities like discussing building problems with other tenants or squatting in an apartment house to satisfy individual housing needs. The questions asked of all interviewees aimed at understanding how residents participated and why they felt others did not, why they chose particular methods of participation, what they felt their participation achieved and what kept them and other community residents from reaching what they considered to be any unmet local housing and development goals.

The material in the following pages will be organized as follows: The initial Chapter will present the argument for a redefinition of political participation which is inclusive of all economic classes. The way is then prepared for Chapters 2 and 3, presenting the historical and political-cultural base for community activism, on the Lower East Side. A social and demographic portrait of the Lower East Side for the period 1975 to 1985 is then presented in

¹For a description of interviewees, see Appendix One.

Chapter 4. The Kreuzberg case study of political culture is presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and a social and demographic portrait for 1975 to 1985 is found in Chapter 7. These chapters create a background to understanding resident participation for the more current local housing and development issues. The remaining chapters portray the housing crises that had developed by 1975 in both communities. Governmental decisionmaking processes, specific development policies and private development activities are described. Finally, the residents' reactions and participation strategies will be documented and compared. The final discussion compares and analyzes how the styles of participation differed and how the roots of these differences can be traced back to elements within the political culture of each place.

Chapter 1

THE STUDY OF PARTICIPATION BY LOWER-INCOME URBAN RESIDENTS

Until fairly recently, political power was defined as a concentrated institutional or governmental element of coercion binding over all members of a political society (Clastres 1987). For Machiavelli and Hobbes, for example, power is what determined who dispersed the resources of society, implying power concentrated in the hands of the monarch or ruler. Democracies call for more decentralized power structures, but, as Carole Pateman's research demonstrates, many theorists promote theories of democracy in which participation in political decision making by private citizens has only a minimal role (Pateman 1970). Arguments about how concentrated power should be in a democracy have created two general definitions for participation: 1) That citizens in a democracy participate by selecting policy-making representatives, and 2) That citizens participate by influencing both the selection of representatives and the policies they make. These two positions will now be examined and their inadequacies discussed.

Elitism and Democracy

In the first definition, citizens exercise power only through elected representatives. James Madison

institutionalized this definition in the United States, because, as he explained in his Federalist Number Ten, he feared most the "unfriendly passions" of the propertiless majority who, in "the form of popular government" is enabled to "sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens" (Madison in Heffner 1976, 44, 45). Thus, he set about engineering the many constitutional checks on this particular "faction." Among more contemporary political scientists Joseph Schumpeter's work best describes this school of thought. He wrote in 1943 that giving a broad participatory role to citizens is unrealistic and unnecessary to fulfilling the true definition of democracy, which only requires that competitors jostle for citizens' votes to gain power (Schumpeter 1943, 269). Pateman summarizes this argument by writing that Schumpeter's definition covers only the method of democratic processes, ignoring the important issue of how individuals in reality function in these processes, excepting the electorate, whose political abilities he likens to a "stampede" (Pateman 103, 3-5).

In fact, the primary consensus among political scientists favoring severely limited participation by citizens, from Madison to more recent works, is that limiting participation by individuals in a democracy encourages stability and is necessary to the governability of the political structure (Lipset 1963, Crozier et al. 1975). Due

particularly to the broad-based student, civil-rights and women's rights movements of the 1960's and 1970's, Samuel Huntington set off an alarm in 1975 that the American political system was becoming overloaded with demands. Michel Crozier worried, meanwhile, that greater citizen demands in Western Europe threatened social control (Huntington and Crozier in Crozier et al. 1975).

Farther into the 1970's, researchers like Jeffrey Berry documented that public interest groups were proliferating and challenging the private interest group lobbyists' stronghold on national politics. And while he found this development to include positive affects he also questioned if their influence would really represent the "common good" (Berry 1977). Loomis and Cigler concluded from their 1983 research that weakened political parties, technological advances in the distribution of political information, political polling, the rise of political consultants and other developments were increasing the political power of interest groups. And they concluded that, although the expanding scope of the political agenda makes politics "more representative than ever," it also leads to excessive government spending, deficits, and increasing response to specific demands of groups over "the more collective needs of a society" (Cigler and Loomis 1983; 20,28).

But these various positions are perhaps best understood in light of Seymour Martin Lipset's essays in his

1985 Consensus and Conflict. Here he voices the concern of many "consensus school theorists" (Lipset 1) that movement politics, civil disobedience and many varieties of "extremism" can be found both in Europe and in the United States--where it is "as American as cherry pie" (321). And he acknowledges that they have often had tremendous impact on policy. Nonetheless, the price of working outside the two-party system in the United States has been "backlash" reactions, violence, political assassinations. The solution to "paying this high price", for Lipset, is to work within the two-party system where the consensual values of a nation can be maintained. As he concludes:

Freedom, the underlying principle of a democratic society, requires a commitment to restraint, a willingness not to do anything to undermine the basic set of conventions which enable men of different values and interests to live together.(322)

In short, Lipset expresses directly what others have veiled with references to an imbalance of interests and inefficiency--that established conventions are expressed by political institutions which filter out previously unrepresented interests. Widespread participation, in which citizens are engaged beyond selecting representatives, is a threat to these long held "consensus" values. Lipset does not address whose interests these values represent, or who goes unrepresented. But by equating "freedom" with undisturbed political conventions, the school of thought

equated with Lipset is a Hobbesian yearning for stability, whatever the costs.

Taken together, these arguments for a limited representative democracy can be summarized into three: first, that participation beyond selecting representatives is inefficient, "overloading" the system; second, that given competing interests, some groups will participate more than others, some will win over others, resulting in policies overrepresenting some groups and neglecting the "common good;" which leads to the third, that representing broad citizen interests threatens established republican institutions. From another perspective, these statements can be seen as circular and contradictory to basic democratic processes and goals. Participation by some groups leaves representation unbalanced, but broader participation places too many demands on government and threatens an institutional status quo. This leaves us with the curious conclusion that the rule by interests historically garnering sufficient participatory resources should be conserved in their decisionmaking positions, and that that is somehow more in tune with democratic governance.

Since space in this study for these very complicated and important controversies is admittedly limited, it might be useful to look at M.I. Finley's excellent historical summary and analysis of the debate. In his essay "Democracy, Consensus and National Interest," Finley addresses how

democracies determine the "common good"--from the ancient slave-holding city-states to modern free-market republican societies--and cautions that groups have often claimed that some citizens should be limited from participation because they are apathetic and therefore uninformed, or vulnerable to "extreme" demands, or not representing the "common good." But, he contends, the various arguments have historically offered apathy as a benefit to an efficient government, making a virtue of "the loss of a sense of community" (Finley 1985, 106-7). Finley proposes addressing the causes of political isolation as the central democratic issue and concludes forcefully:

There is flawed logic in a doctrine which denies large sectors of the population effective participation in the decision-making process on the ground that their demands are likely to be "extremist" and then seizes on their lack of restraint as proof of the rightness of their exclusion...Historical inquiry, into both the recent and more distant past suggests to me that an attempt to resolve it by a retreat to apathy as a virtue is a desperate attempt to save the phenomena (108-9).

And taking Finley's cue, we may add that the specific influence these contradictory, confused and/or self-serving arguments are often seeking to limit is that of the lower classes, of individual citizens, of historically unrepresented peoples.

James Madison's justifications for creating limits on citizen participation ring strikingly familiar to the arguments more recently given for keeping them in place. Similarly, in West Germany the Basic Law creating the post-

World War II government ended the direct election of the president and the use of referenda to limit the power of citizens putting forward the argument that Weimar's failure had in part to do with a lack of judgment by citizens (Dalton 1989). At the same time, however, this assumes that the general electorate's judgment was somehow more flawed than that of the bureaucracy and lower level officials, many of whom remained in their posts during and after the Third Reich.

The real question is whose judgment can best decide the "common good", and for a democracy, the answer must be the citizens. On this point Finley is clearly correct. When the citizens' judgment is faulty, the choice is to ask why and seek remedies on that level, or to turn from principles of democratic rule in favor of more elitist structures.

Expansion of Participation

One reason for the continuous debate over how much participation a democracy requires is the reality of steadily expanding direct citizen influence in the governance of many democratic nations. This is demonstrated in the United States by both the expansion of civil rights and later use of these rights for expanding influence over policymaking. An end to property ownership requirements for voting, poll taxes, the grandfather clauses used to keep former slaves and indentured servants away from poll booths

and constitutional amendments extending voting rights to blacks and other racial minorities, women, and 18 to 21 year old citizens are all evidence of this expansion. But the broadening of participation has not been limited to voting rights. In many countries the 1960's and 1970's brought struggles for more direct access to the means of political power, such as in the former West Germany where the level of direct political action since the 1960s has been increasing (Prester 1987, Uehlinger 1988, Gabriel 1986). Student and leftist movements demanded changes in governmental policies, and more importantly, challenged how policies were made, who could influence them. The Feminist, Environmental, Student and Civil Rights Movements struggled for and won more direct access to policymaking. Most recently, in "democracy movements" throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, citizens brought down established governments demanding more direct control over governmental decision making.

Again the question of what role participation should play in a democracy remains central. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin wrote in 1967 that the answer depends on the definition of "representation." While the term has been taken to mean to be served in government policymaking by representatives chosen by voters, she argues that other definitions require that governments actually serve, or "represent" the interests of citizens. Eliciting this kind of "representative

government" may then require more direct participation by citizens (Pitkin 1967).

Hans-Martin Uehlinger's very interesting study on political participation in West Germany traced the definition of participation as witnessed by social science research questionnaires. Beginning with Robert Lane's 1959 survey, and Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture in 1963, he analyzed what parameters interviewees were given for their descriptions of their participation, up to the 1983 Jugend und Staat (Youth and State) survey in West Berlin. The earliest studies measured levels of participation by asking if respondents voted, if they contacted public officials and if they discussed politics. Later research broadened the definition of participation, adding questions on community, church and religious activities (Uehlinger 1988).

Definitions of political participation very clearly moved on from voting behavior to include more direct influence on policies. In their comprehensive study of participation in the United States, Verba and Nie recognized a range of activities by citizens beyond voting and defined political participation as, "those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (Verba and Nie 1972). Verba, Nie and Kim in 1978, reused this definition, backing away, however, from non-legal activities: "By political participation, we refer

to those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the action they take" (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, 46). And Kaase and Marsh's 1979 survey expanded it again to include: "all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system" (Kaase and Marsh in Barnes and Kaase 1979, 42). Finally, Uehlinger ends his review with the 1983 Jugend und Staat research which expanded the boundaries of participation still more to use an operational definition listing as possible elements of participation such activities as specifically forbidden demonstrations, wildcat strikes and confrontation with police (Uehlinger 33).

The redefinition of participation has been advanced by the most recent voting and participation studies in the United States and Europe. The most current research on American voting shows that turnout between 1968 and 1986 steadily declined and "is a systemic phenomenon, not associated with particular offices or levels of government nor...with particular regions" (Austin et al. 1991. 150). In fact, even in Presidential elections turnout has dropped nationally from 60.6% of eligible voters in the 1968 election to nearly 50% by the 1988 election; off-year voting has followed the same pattern dropping from, 47.4% for

gubernatorial elections in 1970 to a remarkable low of 38.2% in 1986 (149).

Similarly, Russell Dalton's study on citizen politics in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France finds that voting and election participation is generally on the decline or steadied, while the general level of political involvement is climbing (Dalton 1988 56). He concludes that overall participation is broadly increasing, but that modes of participation have changed in Europe as in the United States.

The new style of citizen politics thus seeks to place more control over political activity in the hands of the citizenry. These changes in the nature of participation make greater demands on the participants. At the same time, however, these activities can increase public pressure on political elites. Citizen participation is becoming more closely linked to citizen influence.(57)¹

What one gleans from this is--whether social scientists were responding to social changes bringing demands for greater participation, were observing, or were themselves advocating for heightened citizen input--there came a recognition that studying voting behavior alone was inadequate to the study of political participation, explaining the transition from our first definition of participation as voting, to the second, which includes influencing policy-makers and policies. This was clearly a recognition that a definition of participation reflects the image of who it is thought is, or should

¹see also Baker et al. 1981 for similar conclusions about the "transformed" political culture in Germany.

be, participating. But broadening the definition of participants and participation still cannot encompass the experiential dimension of participation.

Participation by Lower Income Citizens

The formal right to participate does not automatically create the ability to do so. For lower income citizens, the inaccessibility of most political resources limits their participation. Rousseau recognized the problems of economic inequalities for creating a participatory civil state when laws may keep "the poor man confined within the limits of his poverty, and...maintain the rich in their usurpation." He concluded that to build the civil state individuals must live in a social community where "all its citizens have something, and none have too much" (Rousseau in Barker 1960, n189). Most recently, Dahl and other democratic theorists are suggesting that economic inequalities must be recognized as central to the issue of who may participate in a democracy (Dahl 1985, Held 1987). Dahl clearly established that "resources of influence" are unequally dispersed based on social, political and economic structures in a given political society. He defined resource as "anything that can be used to sway the specific choices or the strategies of another individual" (Dahl 1961, 226). Since citizens' resources of, for instance, money, time, social

standing, charisma, control over jobs or information, vary, political power also varies between citizens. Particularly lower income citizens, possessing few "resources of influence," are found to participate in voting activities as well as other modes of participation at a low level (Verba and Nie 1972, Schattschneider 1975).

Additionally, as Schattschneider argued, since the "scope" of the American political agenda is narrow and reflects the bias of upper-class citizens, the agenda of policy issues addressed by government does not speak to those issues of central importance to lower income citizens. Defining democracy as "a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision making process," he argued for broadening the scope of that process so that conflicting interests reflecting the wider public may compete (Schattschneider 138).

Since Schattschneider's 1960 work, many researchers have turned their attention to how lower income citizens might participate in agenda-setting and influencing policies more directly. Studies on the ability of lower income citizens to participate on the local level suggest that given their scarce political tools of power they must organize to exert influence (Gittell 1980; Fainstein and Fainstein 1974; Piven and Cloward 1977; Lipsky 1968, 1970).

Collective action taken by organized citizens, according to Louise Tilly and Charles Tilly, "consists of all occasions on which sets of people commit pooled resources, including their own efforts, to common ends" (Tilly and Tilly 1981, 17). Research to date, however, has not found most collective action by low-income community residents to be effective in pressing their needs. As Fainstein and Fainstein's study of urban movements reported, it is difficult for them to convert the resource of numbers into power (Fainstein and Fainstein 1974, 191). And the gradual globalization of the economy has produced additional barriers to organizing by low income communities, such as factors leading to weakened unions, once a base for collective action on community issues, and a shift of many previously public services to the private sector (Fainstein et al. 1986).

Among the most restrictive barriers to effective political action are: 1) organizational maintenance. Studies consistently prove that people join organizations for individual material gain and membership in groups will increase as individual incentives to join also increase (Olson 1971). Although a small core may create an organization to promote political goals, as they seek to expand their numbers and, subsequently, their resources, they will become more involved with maintaining levels of material incentives to new members and keeping older members. Eventually leadership becomes preoccupied with organiza-

tional concerns and membership maintenance at the expense of pursuing its original political goals (Michels 1959). Particularly lower-income organizations must spend inordinate time on locating funding sources, preparing grant proposals, and continuing service-delivery to members (Gittell 1980); 2) redistributive goals. It is clear that the organizations least effective will be those most preoccupied with organizational maintenance concerns. Subsequently, those lower-income organizations which should be most effective are those not losing sight of their longer-term social justice or redistributive goals. Ironically, lower-income groups are least well equipped to fight these more fundamental and up-hill political battles. As Gittell concluded:

We encourage them to sustain advocacy as a primary strategy, although this requires the greatest investment of time and energy, and they are the least able to make this investment. In fact, we are asking them to be the source for reform of the very system that has denied them any means of access (Gittell 250).

External and governmental resistance to redistributive demands will likely be most substantial. The amount of external opposition can be the controlling variable in the survival of a community organization (Delgado 1986); 3) decisions by governmental agencies to mandate a group. When groups do articulate demands, the organization's effectiveness can be diffused by initial symbolic or insignificant material governmental responses. The appearance of flexibility by government isolates the group from outside

support and confuses followers. Even if concessions are not carried out, the token may satisfy some members, dividing membership loyalties. These were the conclusions of Piven and Cloward's study of poor people's movements. The greatest successes of the movements, they wrote, came from the initial protest activities and disruptions, boycotts, and demonstrations. Groups later became bureaucratized, losing their militancy, and most groups simply fell apart after a short time. Militancy and protests declined as groups received concessions from governmental actors, and concessions lessened as militancy disappeared. By the mid-1970's, the political gains of the American 1960's movements faded (Piven and Cloward 1977). On the community level, Gittell's research additionally confirms that limited cooperation from governmental agencies can create dependence and speed the move of community organization leadership from concerns with goals to those of organizational maintenance (Gittell 1980).

Recent studies on participation in the former West Germany indicate that interest in direct political action has increased significantly in the last two decades (Conradt 1978), with "new social movements" such as the women's movement, the Greens, the peace movement, claiming large memberships (Baker et al. 1981, Prester 1987). Baker et al. identified a shift in political culture between "old politics" of the 1950s and 1960s stressing economic,

security and national identity issues, and "new politics" of the 1970s and 1980s, representing the interests of younger Germans in "self-actualization," broad citizen participation, minority and women's rights and environmental issues (see also Gabriel 1986). They conclude that young West Germans "want to be directly involved in reaching decisions; they are not content merely to participate in the selection of individuals and groups who will make political decisions" (Baker et al. 290). "Citizen initiatives" (*Bürgerinitiativen*) demand direct access to decision making and now claim to have double the membership claimed by political parties (Baker et al.).

Direct action groups, however, face daunting barriers. Germany's history of feudal society, late industrial development and Prussian-influenced authority patterns contribute to a tradition of elite and bureaucratized decision making. Community groups face a special challenge in pressing their demands since governmental elite response is dominated by "old politics" priorities and remains technocratic in nature (Baker et al. 288). Peter Katzenstein describes West German decision making as taking place through decisionmaking processes where bureaucrats and political leaders work with party leaders and private-sector elites to formulate incremental policies without significant input from citizens (Katzenstein 1987). As direct participation has increased, the *Bürgerinitiativen* have come into

conflict with relatively closed governmental decision making. And while the debate continues on whether the "youth" dominated "new social movements" represent the "proletariat"--lower income citizens and foreign "guest-workers,"--the direct action groups have mounted substantial opposition to many government policies (Evers and Szankay, and Nelles, in Grottian and Nelles 1983). For Germany's "foreign" population, many of whom are second and third generation German "residents," the lack of civil rights and increasing violence against them have made them at times dependent on German-organized actions. Peter Cornelius Mayer-Tasch's comprehensive study of direct action in the former West Germany finds similar obstacles for German groups as in the United States: organizational problems and steady "institutionalization" (Mayer-Tasch 1985).

To summarize thus far, a review of the relevant literature on political participation by lower income citizens demonstrates that if participatory activities are limited to election-related work including voting, then lower-income citizens are disproportionately unrepresented. If the definition expands to include more direct action targeting policies, organizing is necessary to heighten the political effectiveness of their resource of numbers, but these organizations face additional barriers, not as threatening to middle or upper class organizations, again resulting in lower levels of representation in the political process.

These findings emphasize the inadequacy of the "broadened" definition of participation and brings the student of participation to a choice in approaches: one may try to make the second definition work by seeking to understand how formal, institutional barriers to participation by lower-income citizens may be broken down; or, one may choose to examine how citizens themselves hurdle or eliminate those barriers (this includes addressing income redistribution), or create new forms of participation in response to structurally and economically blocked pathways to power. This first option covers a spectrum of devices from working for reforms in existing governmental institutions (such as decreasing voter registration barriers in the United States, seeking to establish referenda mechanisms in Germany) to changing or replacing the institutions, but its emphasis is on formal political institutions and how citizens can be linked more directly with them. This study chooses to center on the second approach concerning the individual citizen and how, on a local level, participation by residents may be shaped by the various dynamics of a political culture.

Participation in the Immediate Realm

The question of how lower-income citizens participate is ultimately determined by methodology, by how participation is defined and studied. Both of the earlier

definitions described above look for participation within a predefined sphere which is formal public policy-making. Participation within the first definition is studied in electoral processes as citizens select policy makers. Using the second definition, citizen participation is studied in the decision-making process as citizens seek to influence the decisions of policy-makers or the process used for reaching decisions. In both, the participation of lower income citizens goes mostly unstudied since they do not, for the most part, have the political resources to exercise power there, in what will be called the "abstract realm." Especially, although not exclusively, for lower income citizens, power over nearly every aspect of their lives comes from nonapparent, external non-familial, or "abstract" sources. Choices in livelihood, residence, education, as examples, present themselves from invisible sources, and decisions are made between the best of the possibilities, assuming any range of choice exists.

Taking a hypothetical example, upon graduating from high school in the 1990s, the son of an American production-line worker learns of an open position at the same factory where his father is engaged. Unemployment in his community is high and many of his school-mates are having difficulty landing jobs. The job pays moderately well; he takes the position.

A complicated network of social, economic and cultural factors has created life-possibilities for this individual, most of which were either rooted in public policies, or could be moderated to varying degrees by them: the existence of a hierarchical education system which steered him from attending college; tax, tariff, regulatory policies which might have contributed to or moderated the effects of factories relocating outside his community creating high local unemployment; a history of zoning or housing policies which kept his neighborhood socially segregated and limited his exposure to a variety of life-possibilities; the absence of other politically active workers, or of the labor movement.

For the young man to see the connection between his circumstances and policy, and to become politically active seeking to influence any part of the process involves connecting the concrete to the abstract, what has often been called becoming "politicized." To engage in voting or electoral politics he must be able to see a connection between the historical policies of a political party and trends in his community, or, minimally, see some possibility of a connection between a candidate's promises and his individual circumstances.

Hannah Arendt has described a similar dichotomy between the private and public realms central to Greek thought. In the private realm of the household and the fam-

ily (oikia), the individual did not touch on matters of importance to communal life. Similarly, for one to engage in communal decision making in the public, or political, realm (polis), meant leaving the private realm completely (Arendt 1958 23-37). But as Arendt convincingly argues, this distinction between the two realms was entirely erased by the creation of modern society, "the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices" (38). The private realm became, through this process, "channeled into the public realm" (45), bringing with it a diminished capacity for both speech and action (49); most importantly, it brought the separateness of interests into what had been a place of communal concerns. Arendt describes this as a community without interest in the "common world."

The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them. The weirdness of this situation resembles a spiritualistic seance where a number of people gathered around a table might suddenly, through some magic trick, see the table vanish from their midst, so that two persons sitting opposite each other were no longer separated but also would be entirely unrelated to each other by anything tangible." (52-53)

Especially due to the articulation of separate property interests in the public realm, the policy making process became a mere extension of what had been private household interests (58-67). Before this modern development, Arendt

explains, one could only enter the public realm if holding substantial personal wealth so as to be "free" from the worries of household necessities, "free to transcend his own life and enter the world all have in common" (65). This blur between the private and public realms has severe implications especially for lower income citizens. Studying Arendt's philosophical history of the public and private realms, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin concludes in modern terms, that "when private power becomes sufficiently great, it may even outweigh and control the formally defined public realm, in effect making policy for the whole society in the private interest and under the control of a few" (Pitkin 1981 344). Pitkin makes an argument for recreating a sense of "public life" for those alienated from these processes. This would reduce the control of "the few," and teach the alienated "many" that commonly held conditions have created their hardships and that those conditions are changeable (348).

Feminist writers in the 1960s and 1970s made similar arguments that the public/private separation was an artificially erected wall between the realm of supposedly rational actions--from which women, as guardians of "affectivity, desire and the body" were excluded--and the private realm of particularism and need. But while some were led to conclude that this is gender-driven politics and lacks any substantial distinction, others, most notably Iris Marion Young, have concluded that while the public-rational/private-

particularistic argument is groundless, the distinction between public and private remains important. She argues for recognizing both realms as concerned with needs and different "human attributes" and that public life needs to be opened to previously excluded populations. Similar to Pitkin she concludes that "emancipatory politics requires generating a renewed sense of public life" (Young in Bengabib and Cornell 1987).

Returning to the distinctions between the realms of "necessity" and the "public," this study finds value in using parts of this distinction. Particularly for lower income citizens, the realm of necessity often constructs a complete barrier to entering the realm of communal decision making. Although, as Arendt had argued, the term "private" has been rendered meaningless from the ancient context, there still exists a realm of individual and immediate concerns, or necessities. Since the focus of this study is with how lower income individuals participate in housing and economic development issues, which may be of community-wide concern, it is important to understand how, what will be renamed the "immediate realm," affects their participation beyond necessities to affect, if not "public" concerns, those affecting the wider community.

In other words, applying Arendt's theory to the meaning of political participation, it is clear that the once precise distinction between private life and participa-

ting in political life has become blurred. For example, while the elected official may be basing his or her policy decisions on concerns with their private necessities, the private citizen may be affecting the "common good," or the wider community, by withholding rent, taking a particularly unscrupulous landlord to court, or even by informing others of building-wide problems and the possibilities for remedying them--to the extent that this ultimately improves living conditions for residents of an entire building, these acts would become more "public" and more "political" than the acts of the elected official working toward his or her private self-interests.

In practice, one may exercise power within what Arendt, and earlier Aristotle, called the "household," or "private" level. The real question is whether this power is of a political nature. This study answers yes, indirectly political. It is political because exerting power on this level may lead, pull, an individual into what Arendt considered the public realm. Certainly no person who is organizing public interest groups, managing election campaigns or rounding up signatures for a petition drive is entirely passive when their landlord cuts back on building-wide services or the children's school administrators are making poor curriculum decisions. Verba and Nie's research made the point clearly when survey results found that "activist" participants were more likely to participate at

all levels from routinized voting to forming political organizations (Verba and Nie 1972). Similarly, we can expect that the "activist" is also fully active on the "household" level.

But this does not diminish the need for a distinction between the two realms. That an activist in the public realm is more likely to be an activist in the private does not lead to the conclusion that an activist in the private realm has converted this type of power into power in the public realm. Rather, exercise of power in the immediate realm can be seen as a step toward the abstract realm.

John Dewey clarifies the distinction between the "private" and "public" by arguing that any transaction between two or more people without consequences affecting those outside that transaction is "private." As soon as the consequences extend to others not immediately involved in the matter, they may require regulation and legislation (Dewey 1946 12-15).

Taking an example, as long as a tenant/landlord dispute affects only the two parties, it is a "private" matter in which neither party is "participating" in a "political" sense. When that same landlord sells the building to a real estate speculator who intends to clear out tenants and renovate for higher rent apartments, then the scope of affected parties increases. If that same transaction takes place during a shortage of available low-income apartments,

in a low-income city neighborhood where significant numbers of similar "private" transactions have already been completed, then the consequences of each additional such transaction become potentially broader. Dewey's categories are useful then for their stress on consequences meriting "systematic care," rather than the intentions of transactions. Certainly one can accept Dewey's hypothesis that the consequences of transactions determine whether they are private or public (35). The tenant/landlord dispute in a community with a surplus of adequate housing is likely to end with less severe consequences than in the community where an evicted tenant might find no housing alternatives. But it often happens that all consequences cannot be foreseen. Dewey uses land as an example of an area of central importance to society, so that no transaction can be seen as entirely "private" which is why most land and real estate transactions are regulated by public formalities of contracts, ownership and transfer of records (51), keeping consequences "moderately predictable" (53).

Furthermore, "public" or political behavior is defined not only by the extent of consequences of transactions, but also by a conditioned response to earlier circumstances which led to broad consequences, or the potential of a transaction to have a substantial impact. In the case of rights to privacy, Dewey explains, "We agree to leave one another alone (within limits) more from recognition of evil

consequences which have resulted from the opposite course than from any profound belief in its positive social beneficence" (51). Similarly, a Manhattan community with a long history of housing crises and speculative practices is more likely to be aware of the potential consequences of individual real estate transactions and which strategies might protect the community from negative impacts.

Using Michel Foucault's metaphor, an individual recognizing the potential consequences of a given real estate transaction may be awakened to some forces of various "networks of power" (Foucault 1980). That step in itself is a positive one, and should one make this early step s/he is rewarded with the self-fulfillment inherent in controlling one's immediate environment, both in making those circumstances more comfortable, but also for the knowledge that one is not simply the subject of unpredictable and sometimes cruel circumstances.

For the individual, participation on the immediate level is important in itself as an opportunity for self-growth, but for the larger political society this is not enough. To argue that for previously unrepresented parts of a political society--such as women earlier restricted to the household realm, ethnic or other political minorities--activities on the immediate realm are by definition "political" and winning participation there is victory enough, is to argue that a democracy can survive with public participa-

tion reserved for an elite of higher income groups, men and ethnic and political majorities.

The importance of studying participation in the immediate realm, especially of how people are drawn by these activities into the abstract realm, is to understand how that level might be used to extend democratic participation to previously excluded populations. Immediate-level participation is not in itself a goal, but the means to the higher goal of creating democracy.

The question then, is how individuals become political participants. Whether an individual draws connections between their immediate experiences and the abstract realm of institutional decisionmaking--connections needed to draw them into a realm of political activity beyond their immediate experiences--would seem to be determined by a complex overlapping of cultural, economic, political and social dynamics. This points to the need for an admittedly more complex portrayal of political power and implications about how citizens "participate" politically and why.

The Roots of Participation

In trying to understand political power in eighteenth century France Michel Foucault posited that "mechanisms of power" explain more about individual exercise of political power than examining the delegation of power within a state system.

But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives. The eighteenth century invented, so to speak, a synaptic regime of power, a regime of its exercise within the social body, rather than from above it (Foucault 39).

In his studies of the French prison system, families, schools, mental institutions, and hospitals, Foucault sought to create a methodology for the study of how individuals participate in the exercise of political power or are subject to it by designing a "genealogy" for how power exhibits itself within the individual (83). This approach does not deny the existence or importance of power in the State, but takes the position that it is not the one "unique instrument of power." Power, in actuality, goes farther, passing through "...much finer channels, and is more ambiguous, since each individual has at his disposal a certain power, and for that very reason can also act as the vehicle for transmitting a wider power" (72). As Foucault explains:

Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. (98)

In short, Foucault is locating political power and the basis for the exercise of power within the individual, or within

individuals who may come together transmitting power collectively. His ultimate purpose, subsequently, in using "genealogies" of power or, "the union of erudite knowledge and local memories," is to recognize the power of individuals allowing "us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today" (83). Going back to our earlier example of the factory worker's son, this means that to understand whether and at what level the young man will become a political or public participant means studying not only the relevant state structures (such as voting registration requirements) but also the layers of policy decisions made historically, the economic structure and the concomitant cultural habits which reinforce or are reinforced by these.

Tocqueville, too, was interested in dissecting culture and society in order to understand the roots of political systems (Tocqueville 1955, xii). Like Foucault, he did not favor the study of political institutions within a current framework to understand political societies. For Tocqueville, the prejudices, the habits, and the passions of a society ultimately shape political institutions (Tocqueville 1956, 39). He aspired to understand how "social condition" (49) shapes "national characters." In his study of the French Revolution, for example, he did not study the events themselves or the political institutions of that time; rather, he sought out the "spirit" of the old regime, the

thoughts, habits and prejudices of the people living in that era (1955, viii-ix). Similar to Foucault's genealogies, Tocqueville sought to understand political societies by looking for the "background and nature" of political events rather than studying the events themselves (1955 vii). The way in which public business was handled, social relations existed between different classes, "sentiments," "ideas," and "mores"--those fibers of the "social structures," are the roots of political institutions (viii).

In terms of political participation, both theorists indicate that whether people seek to participate and how they participate is determined by social as well as political structures. This connection between a social power structure and political participation has not gone entirely undetected by political scientists, most notably, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. In a landmark 1963 article Bachrach and Baratz rejected the notion that political power is only "formal" or what had earlier been called "institutionalized power." They put forward the idea that power can be exercised by "the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force, singly or in combination," and furthermore, these elements may lead to policy decisions being made or, more importantly, to keeping grievances from developing into issues which would require decisions, what they call "non-decisions." They liken their

description of power exercise to Schattschneider's, agreeing that a "mobilization of bias" could shape decisionmaking, but add that it could as easily keep certain decisions from appearing on the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1963). From the 1960s and 1970s to the present, community power studies have looked into the many levels of power to analyze both how decisions are made and how decisions are kept off a local political agenda.

Calling the use of political resources in a decision making arena the "first dimension of power," the additional resource of the "mobilization of bias" the "second dimension of power," John Gaventa's 1980 community power study argued that most participation research ignores a "third dimension of power" (Gaventa 1980, 15). Gaventa echoes some of the elements in Foucault's and Tocqueville's works by calling for the study of political power which "influences, shapes or determines the conception of the necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of latent conflict" (15). To accomplish this he suggests the study of "the power processes behind the social construction of meanings and patterns" (15). His own study of quiescence among Appalachian Valley coal miners uses historiography to reveal the social structure reinforcing the control of British coal interests and the lack of rebellion against a history of policies destructive to the interests of community residents. Gaventa's approach is quite similar to

the 1962 sociological "participant-observation" study by Herbert J. Gans, which found that social group and class norms of lower and working-class Italian-Americans contributed to passivity toward a major urban renewal plan which bull-dozed their entire neighborhood (Gans 1962). The special contribution of Gaventa is that he takes the study of powerlessness beyond the level of the sub-group, as does Gans, and layers it with the history of relevant policy decisions, dominance by economic interests, and how these forces contributed to quiescence by unions, political representatives, church and social groups. He clearly demonstrates that social and political history influenced people's political behavior.

Gaventa's study of the "third dimension" of power, like Foucault's genealogies, concentrates on the multi-faceted network of power as it affects the individual or groups of individuals. Both writers, however, concentrate on how individuals become the subject of power, rather than how individuals create power. This is explained partly by the underrepresentation of low-income residents in decision making processes. But here he goes beyond Gans' work, which concentrates on explaining seeming passivity in a culture. The fuller picture looks at a complicated interplay of local cultural factors with economic development interests, policy decisions and structures, educational and other institutional influences. Gaventa's work opens the door for

examining how different factors may work upon individuals unevenly. While national political cultures may influence localized groups variously and community histories may affect residents differently depending on their length of residence, their own national origin, familial or other factors, the benefit of a community case study is to uncover the strongest lines of influence acting on the community as a collection of individuals.

Why Study "Community"

This study seeks to build on Gaventa's approach by asking how lower income citizens actually create possibilities for political participation. Not bound by the earlier definitional limits on what constitutes participation, this study focuses on urban low-income residents and the "immediate realm" experiences shaping their modes of participation. From Aristotle to Rousseau to Tocqueville the idea of participation as a developed skill which is not naturally abundant but created by constant exercise explains the study's interest in local, or community level participation.² Tocqueville wrote admiringly of the decentralized

²See, for example, J.J. Rousseau. The social contract. "By dint of being exercised, his faculties will develop, his ideas take on a wider scope, his sentiments become ennobled...that...he would unceasingly bless the day which freed him for ever from his ancient state, and turned him from a limited and stupid animal into an intelligent being and a Man" (185); Aristotle wrote that man becomes part of the political association to develop the 'innate capacity,' and only the "beast" or "God" would remain isolated. The Politics of Aristotle. p. 6; see also Barker, ff. 1, p. 6.

American political institutions of the early 19th century, that local decisionmaking structures drew citizens out of their individual concerns, into the practice of public decisionmaking.

It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of the state, because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the state can have upon his own lot. But if it be proposed to make a road cross the end of his estate, he will see at a glance that there is a connection between this small public affair and his greatest private affairs; and he will discover, without its being shown to him, the close tie which unites private to general interest (Tocqueville 1956, 196).

And this interest, he continues, becomes one of habit, moving the individual to a point of constant awareness of the larger political society.

Men attend to the interests of the public, first by necessity, afterwards by choice: what was intentional becomes an instinct; and by dint of working for the good of one's fellow-citizens, the habit and the taste for serving them is at length acquired (1956, 197).

But in fact, such community participation was threatened by national mechanisms for indirect representation. Hannah Arendt's On Revolution recalled Thomas Jefferson's hope that the American Revolution had blurred the distinction between the "ruler" and "the ruled," but that this line reappeared with the Revolution's end. By erecting a representative democracy, not Jefferson's favored option, the framers of the American Constitution quickly reinstalled a government isolating the people from the public realm. As a saddened

Jefferson wrote, this leaves the citizenry to fall into "lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty," or to retain "the reserve power of revolution" (Jefferson in Arendt 1963 237-238). Since political interests must participate to set the political agenda, express needs and create policies, and recognizing that lower income citizens have fewer resources for this effort, this research seeks to study what resources this population creates on the community level and how they use them.

Political thinkers and social scientists studying modes of participation have repeatedly called for the increased use of more direct community-level participation as one way of increasing citizen interest and involvement in public decisionmaking. Recalling Jefferson's proposal for a system of local "wards" in which citizens would have direct votes, the short-lived "sections" of the first Parisian Commune and Berlin Räte system of 1918-1919, Hannah Arendt proposed a similar system of community "councils" to facilitate direct democracy (Arendt 1963 253-281). Benjamin Barber concurs but suggests that "neighborhood assemblies" should not be larger than 25,000 citizens or, in a densely-settled urban area, could be limited to a city block or two (Barber 1984 267-270). Robert Dahl's most recent proposal for drawing citizens into decisionmaking includes a "minipopulus" of randomly selected local citizens--or at any level of government--to serve for a year or two of decisionmaking

(Dahl 1989 321-340). John Friedmann is calling for local decisionmaking to begin in households, communes and local communities (Friedmann 1987). Although differing on how large local governing districts should be, or how they should be structured, where these various proposals intersect is at the community level. The need, as Dewey wrote, is for the "generation of democratic communities;" and the mechanism for this achievement is the restoration of "local communal life" (Dewey 1946 216-217). Or as Lewis Mumford concluded in 1938, "This means, among other things, the introduction of small units, scaled to direct activity and participation, in every phase of organization..." (Mumford 1970 475).

In other words, this research has looked for participation styles on a "community" level, meaning the most localized governmental unit for all district-wide concerns in order that the potential for participation might be better understood. The study does not attempt to define "natural communities" in the sense of Tönnies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (community and society), where community meant cultural homogeneity and fixed relations (Tönnies 1963). Nor does it attempt to hold to Bender's more recent image of "community" as "a limited number of people in a somewhat restricted social space or network held together by shared understandings and a sense of obligation (Bender 1978 7). In fact, the position here agrees with Bender that the

governmental districts chosen for study may violate most meanings of "community:" they likely encompass many internal communities, residents might belong to several such communities. But the very strength of residents' identification with their district may be connected with their potential participation in district decisionmaking, contributing to the local political culture. As Logan and Molotch have similarly argued, community, taken in this sense, may or may not be created "through concrete, practical activities of individuals...who, regardless of where they live, work, or invest, see place as the vehicle for meeting significant needs" (Logan and Molotch 1987 10). We now turn to the first of the two communities that are the focus of this research.

Chapter 2

TRACING POLITICAL CULTURE: THE ROOTS OF LOWER EAST SIDE ACTIVISM


New York City's "Lower East Side" (LES) has often been characterized as an exceptionally politically activist urban community. In asking current residents why this is so, one is repeatedly led back to the neighborhood's history. Recounting her activism, one longtime LES activist said of moving there in 1944 that,

The Lower East Side was crawling with activists. It was in the soil; it was like mothers' milk, like the air you breathe. The Lower East Side has always had this history--it had Emma Goldman, it had a history of strikes and struggles. It was exciting.

To understand current community political behavior, particularly that of community organizations, political groups, activists and their interaction, it is helpful to document the earlier history of local political activism--meaning the involvement of community residents in vigorous direct action supporting or opposing a political issue.

The roots of the present community's activist nature were primarily shaped between 1880 and 1920 by: (1) immigration patterns which favored the influx of leftists and activists into the neighborhood and created concentration of ethnic groups facilitating collective action; (2) a milieu

Map 2.1 New York City, Manhattan Community Board 3



Source: Borough of Manhattan, Office of the President,
Topographical Bureau.

of activism, fed substantially by the presence of active socialists and anarchists and by the rise of community and activist publications; (3) economic factors including the rise of the "contracting" and later "factory" systems combined with surplus labor and the increasing demand for ready-made clothing. The resulting conditions attracted reformers into the LES and led to the rise of unionism and tenant activism among residents, and; 4) structural, political trends, primarily, the emergence of the Democratic Party as a champion of urban, working class and immigrant interests. Local clubs absorbed the labor vote as they co-opted radical themes setting a pattern of incorporating leftist challenges. In other words, many factors created a network of reactions by individual community residents, local political organizations and economic interests, which laid a foundation for the later and current political culture.

The Making of an Immigrants' Quarter

The Lower East Side is a district in lower Manhattan, today roughly defined by the Manhattan Community Board District 3 as created by the 1961 New York City Charter and which includes the former Manhattan Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth and Seventeenth Wards (see Map 2.1). The neighborhood began to take shape in the 1840s as waves of Irish immigrants poured into New York, and by 1855 the

Seventh, Tenth and Seventeenth Wards also saw an influx of Germans (Bridges 1987 42-3). But neither they nor any one group settled alone there sharing a common language, culture, history or even an intention to put down roots and call it home. Rather, this plot of Manhattan land stretching roughly from 14th Street south to today's Brooklyn Bridge and west to the Bowery, served as a stopping place for immigrants from many lands, pursuing many dreams.

German and Irish immigrants dominated until the mid-1800's, but the area really grew when newcomers from Italy, Poland, Russia, China and other countries flowed into the narrow streets of the "East Side" in the 1880's and later. Between 1890 and 1895 alone, the Lower East Side saw 58,000 men, women and children crowd into the community where "old-timers" were themselves fairly new arrivals (Hammock 1987, 271, 276).

Russian Jews poured into New York's harbors fleeing years of pogroms and persecution which became especially frequent and severe after the 1881 assassination of Russian Tsar Alexander. By 1891, 135,000 Jews left Russia for America, with thousands crowding into the old German Jewish neighborhoods in the Lower East Side's Tenth Ward. Historian Thomas Kessner reports that as early as 1880, the Lower East Side accounted for nearly all of Manhattan's Russian and Polish Jewish immigrants, and was widely known as the "Jewish quarter" (Kessner 1977, 18-19). As many as

480,000 Russians sought refuge in New York by 1920 (Kessner 20), and through the development of communal institutions designed to facilitate the transition to the new country, as well as active theater groups, an influential Yiddish press, political and literary organizations, the East Side became a center of American Jewish culture (Goodman 1979).

As the sociologists John Logan and Harvey Molotch explain, immigrants will be attracted to a community for its "use value"--"the overlapping and intersecting methods of solving daily problems" (Logan and Molotch 1987 110).

Immigrants seek personal contacts they might use to find work, schools, apartments or information which helps secure government or private assistance. It also means access to places of worship, religious education, ethnic shops, traditional entertainment. As an example, one Jewish activist on the Lower East Side explained of the community's stability:

The Jewish community remains stable...Jews can't move. I need my Yeshiva..my kosher bakery. Jews must live close to survive, close to the center of Jewish life.

The Italians also immigrated in the thousands, concentrating into the neighborhood quickly coined "Little Italy," roughly west of but somewhat overlapping with the Lower East Side. It too was rich with cultural institutions imported to the States and adapted to the new social climate. They hoped to find lucrative work so elusive in Italy and by 1900 Kessner reports that 145,000 Italians settled in New York City (Kessner 16).

The Jews and the Italians were two of the most populous immigrant groups on the East Side, but they were not alone. As the Americanized, Danish-born journalist, Jacob A. Riis, observed from his nightly stomp down the Bowery in the late 1800's, lower New York was as diverse as the world it reflected, and as divided:

One may find for the asking an Italian, a German, a French, African, Spanish, Bohemian, Russian, Scandinavian, Jewish, and Chinese colony. Even the Arab, who peddles "holy earth" from the Battery as a direct importation from Jerusalem, has his exclusive preserves at the lower end of Washington Street (Riis 15).

In search of some point of commonality, one may observe that Lower East Siders' economic backgrounds, at least, were less diverse. Herbert Gutman studied and documented the class backgrounds of Lower East Side Jewish and Greenwich Village Italian immigrants in 1905, finding that only one-fourth of the Jews and one-seventh of the Italians had non-working class occupations, with unskilled workers accounting for thirty percent of the Jewish and fifty percent of the Italian men (Gutman 1957, 257).

Of the non-working class immigrants, many were professionals and students who were torn from their aspirations by political upheavals, violent persecution or economic depression. They abruptly found themselves in a new land without the mastery of its dominant language, work customs and connections needed to struggle back into their professions and studies. Suffering an immediate loss of

status, the need was for an instant wage for rent and other expenses, creating a population of displaced intellectuals forced into the local garment workshops. The writings of the Jewish intellectual and socialist, Morris Hillquit, documented this as he described the relief rooftop political meetings on Cherry Street gave many young immigrants on the Lower East Side.

It was an eager assemblage that foregathered there, mostly made up of young intellectuals...They were persons of high school or college education, who had been suddenly plucked from their studies and associations by persecutions and discriminations in their cruel native land and found themselves transplanted in new and strange soil...They felt unhappy and forlorn in their workshops, but at night on the roofs they again lived in a congenial atmosphere (Hillquit in Howe and Libo 1979, 163).

The political make-up of the Lower East Side was particularly affected by the "persecutions and discriminations" in Europe. All nature of political leftists were forced to flee Germany after passage of Bismarck's antisocialist "Exception Laws" in 1878, banning the Social Democrat party, all labor unions and radical political groups. Hillquit observed of American socialism that, "What there was of it was more like a foreign colony of Social Democracy in Germany than an indigenous American movement" (165).

Similarly, many of the Russians fleeing persecution had been politically active while in their homeland. This was also true for a number of Italians and other Europeans who fled repression of revolutionary actions in their countries and

immigrated to the United States (Foner 1975, 37; Rich 1977, 222).

The political scene was at times dominated by Germans fleeing Bismarck and Russian Jews fleeing pogroms and persecution. Italians, as Gutman's data indicates, were less well-educated, unskilled workers immigrating for economic reasons. Kessner, additionally, found that they were less likely to seek permanent residency in the United States, but after earning sufficient savings, returned home to Italy. From 1892 to 1896, for every 100 Italians immigrating, 43 were returning home. During the period from 1907 to 1911, this rose to 73 repatriates for every 100 immigrating Italians (Kessner 28). Moreover, of the better-educated Italian immigrants, almost one half were musicians, sculptors and artists who, rather than escaping dire circumstances, were attracted to New York's growing cultural opportunities (35).

The Russian and German Jews fleeing persecution, on the other hand, had no hope of returning, which necessitated taking an active role in Lower East Side politics. The future of their families depended on their ability to improve conditions and opportunities. As Kessner observes,

Clearly Jews migrated in family units. They may not have all come together, but the large number of women and children indicates that the decision to relocate was firm, and that it involved permanent resettlement. Plans and goals would therefore be expressed in long-range terms. Whatever their future would be, they knew that for them it would be shaped in the New World (32).

Additionally, immigrating Jews seeking work in the 1880s concentrated into the clothing industry, in which they had earlier experience in Europe. This provided "ground for a common consciousness" that eventually led to their dominance in union-building and other activism (69). In recounting the building of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, a 1935 ILGWU pamphlet cites three groups as primarily responsible: Jewish immigrants who were experienced tailors, liberal intellectuals forced from "the study of the Talmud...to the work-bench in the sweatshop," and who were later able to "stir public sympathy for the cause of the workers," and the revolutionaries:

These were not long-haired men and short-haired women with bombs in their pockets, but devoted radicals who had studied the labor movement of their own countries as well as the international labor movement. They had, many of them, experience in labor organization and radical agitation (ILGWU 1935, 27).

In short, despite the diversity of the Lower East Side's population, the politically active were predominately European leftists, students and intellectuals fleeing political repression, and Russian, German, Polish and other European Jews fleeing pogroms and religious persecution.

It must be stressed, however, that ethnicity is not a single factor accounting for LES activism. As Stephen Steinberg emphasizes, "ethnic patterns should not be taken at face value, but must be related to the larger social matrix in which they are embedded" (Steinberg 1981, ix). A

substantial number of Jewish immigrants were drawn into activism due to their concentration in the clothing industry, bad working and living conditions, and a shared sense of exploitation. In other words, the influx of thousands of immigrants to the Lower East Side created an opportunity for ethnic groups to erect and support their institutions in relative isolation from native influences. And within each group, an approach to survival and success in the new country included working together politically.

An Activist Milieu

The gathering of displaced leftists, students and intellectuals on the Lower East Side in the 1880s created a distinctive activist milieu. It was at the Cherry Street rooftop meetings mentioned by Hillquit, for instance, where he made contact with the "organizing socialist movement." Many of these contacts were members of a society called the Russian Progressive Union. He described it as containing "all shades of radical and liberal thought," sponsoring public lectures in Russian, English and German (in Howe and Libo 166). Such meetings were a regular part of East Side activism: frequent club and society meetings where radicals debated the merits of socialism or anarchism.

Socialism

Socialism had a strong appeal in these years.

Irving Howe and Kenneth Libo described socialism on the Lower East Side as an important cultural part of Jewish immigrant life.

Jewish socialism meant a remarkably wide range of interests and activities--working in unions, campaigning in the streets, cultural evenings, endless lectures, marching on May Day. To belong to a Jewish socialist group signified not just a political commitment; it made possible a new cultural ambience, a widening of horizons. Sometimes, one suspects, immigrants became involved with socialism less for political reasons than because they found in it an avenue to the outer world of thought and culture (Howe and Libo 174).

This "Jewish socialist milieu" was also a substantial political force. Its peak saw the election of the first Jewish socialist, the Lower East Side's Meyer London, to the United States Congress in 1914; and in 1917 Morris Hillquit ran a forceful, if unsuccessful, campaign for the New York City mayoralty (188). Hillquit--formerly Morris Hilkowitch--had worked and grown with the Lower East Side radicals. He began studying radical ideas, attending East Side lectures and gatherings, mostly joint socialist and anarchist affairs. He worked steadily through the years in union efforts and for a variety of socialist causes. Eventually he became a successful socialist attorney--representing the Cloakmakers' Union and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union--a leading Marxist theoretician and important in the Socialist Party (Goldman 635-6).

Hillquit's life says much about the intermixing of socialism with LES activism and unionism. He and the other leading community socialists were responsible for organizing the Jewish trade unions, supporting tenant unions and consumer boycotts.

Anarchism

These were also peak years for anarchism in the United States, and the heart of that movement was in the LES. One clear and passionate documentation of the anarchist scene comes from Emma Goldman's 1931 memoirs, Living my life. It is worth looking at Goldman's experiences in some detail, for they give the reader a view of LES activism from a resident of thirty years.

Originally from Königsberg, Goldman grew up in the Russian capital of St. Petersburg. At age seventeen, in 1886, she immigrated to the United States joining family already relocated in Rochester, New York and taking work in a factory (Goldman 1931, 12-13). Hearing of the Chicago Haymarket riot and the following 1887 execution of anarchists charged with inciting it, she began attending political meetings in a local German club. A speech there by the German anarchist, Johanna Greie, on the Haymarket affair convinced her to devote her life to anarchism. She read the New York City German anarchist paper Die Freiheit, edited in Lower Manhattan by Johann Most, and finally decided she

would go there and begin her work for the movement. In 1889, at age twenty, she moved to New York City. She immediately sought out an acquaintance, the anarchist, A. Solotaroff, on Manhattan's Lower East Side and settled into the community where she was to reside, although with some breaks, until 1919.

Goldman's venture into Lower East Side life was at once extraordinary and typical. Although she immediately made political contacts and was warmly welcomed, like nearly all foreign immigrants she had an immediate need for work. She first found employment at a corset factory, but within weeks the work had exhausted her and created violent headaches. After finding a room on Suffolk Street she made use of her own sewing machine and took in home piece-work from a nearby silk waist factory. She described the work as "exhausting" but was happy to be free of the factory and "its galling discipline" (37). Meanwhile, Goldman was making regular contact with the radical "East Side." Her experiences describe an engaged Lower East Side centered around local cafés and saloons, meeting halls and the Cooper Union auditorium, the radical press offices and in the factory.

Cafés and Meeting Halls

Goldman's first arrival on the scene was a visit to Sachs' café, on Suffolk street, long the "headquarters of

the East Side radicals, socialists and anarchists, as well as of the young Yiddish writers and poets" (5). It was in Sachs' where Emma's friend Solotaroff first introduced her to the well-known anarchist, Alexander Berkman, who was to become her life-long friend and comrade.

Another regular meeting place for immigrant radicals and intellectuals was Justus Schwab's saloon on First Street, "the most famous radical centre in New York." His back room, she wrote, was "a Mecca for French communards, Spanish and Italian refugees, Russian politicals, and German socialists and anarchists who had escaped the iron heel of Bismarck. Everyone gathered at Justus's" (119). It was at Schwab's that she finally met Johann Most, a Bavarian-born anarchist and former Reichstag (German Parliament) member who came to the United States in 1882.

Her first radical meeting was described as a "Jewish lecture" at 54 Orchard Street where she heard Solotaroff speak. But the next sizable meeting was the one through which she was truly introduced to the "East Side" radicals. It was a tribute to the Haymarket martyrs held in Cooper Square and "every East Side radical" was present, including Most and the Russian revolutionist, Sergey Shevitch, also editor of the socialist daily, Die Volkszeitung (42).

The Lower East Side meeting halls had a reputation for hosting a variety of radical events and organizing meetings, Forward Hall being one of the most famous. And even

when most halls were timid to rent space for radical meetings, especially for anarchists, the East Side's Cooper Union, on the western edge of the community, could still be relied on. The year 1897, is an example. By this time Goldman had established herself in the anarchist movement and was touring the nation giving lectures in cities from Detroit to San Francisco, meeting with Eugene V. Debs in Chicago, notable anarchists from coast to coast, and making headlines as a dangerous woman in every town. When she returned to New York City in December, no hall could be found to rent for her appearances (231). Finally, Cooper Union agreed, still adhering "to the principle established by its founder to give every political opinion a hearing" (234).

The Local Radical Press

In addition to supplying places for the gatherings of radicals, the Lower East Side was a center for the radical press. Beginning in 1870, many short-lived Yiddish newspapers sprung up representing the East Side radicals. The Arbeiter Zeitung, founded in 1890 by socialist democrats associated with United Hebrew Trades proved to be one of most notable longevity and influence. Its primary anarchist rival began later in the same year, Die freie Arbeiter Stimme. The rivalry was a fierce ideological one between socialists and anarchists including defections, conversions

on both sides. The Arbeiter Zeitung's editor, Philip Krantz, a new socialist convert, was brought in from his London spot as Chief editor of the anarchist Arbeiter Freind. Saul Yanofsky took over the Arbeiter Freind initially, but was also recruited to New York with the position of editor on Die freie Arbeiter Stimme. The rivalry was complicated when Samuel Gompers and his American Federation of Labor began to compete for the union Loyalties of Lower East Side workers. While socialists and anarchists had maintained a truce when it came to the workshop, the triad created by the AFL ruined the delicate peace and locals began to splinter, creating dual-unionism. The surprising split was an anarchist-AFL union on one side and the United Hebrew Trades representing socialists on the other. Although this split of leftist loyalties was not a first, certainly, in East Side politics, it was fundamentally deep. Abe Cahan, an avid socialist and long-time associate and contributor of the Arbeiter Zeitung, nonetheless forewas the long-term potential of the AFL and the threat of dual-unionism, and aplit with the United Hebrew Trades to establish a new Yiddish labor press, the Jewish daily forward in 1896 with Louis Miller, Morris Winchevsky, and other.¹

¹This discussion of the Jewish daily forward relies on Ronald Sanders' excellent history of Abe Cahan's Lower East Side experiences, The downtown Jews. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

The Forward began publication in April of 1897 and despite tremendous changes throughout the years, still publishes today. Its vivid coverage of the tenement conditions for LES workers, of the extreme poverty, exploitation by landlords and factory owners, contributed substantially to local organizing. Also important, it educated the workers on union and class theory in order to create a working-class consciousness. And its election coverage was a boost to campaigning socialists. Another socialist labor newspaper was the Jewish Volkszeitung, first published by the Jewish Workingmen's Union in June of 1886. It provided labor news and articles on Marxist ideology, including a reprint of Marx's pamphlet Wage-labor and capital. The paper lasted three and one-half years, having a circulation of 5,000 at its peak (Foner 1955 34-5).

The central place of LES anarchists to the national anarchist movement was largely due to two local newspapers and their editors. One was Johann Most, who edited the Freiheit. Most became a member of the First International in Zurich and had worked as a socialist agitator and editor of a Bavarian socialist newspaper. In 1874 he became a German Reichstag deputy, but was in and out of prison for his activities regularly. When the 1878 Anti-Socialist Law was passed he was released from his prison term and deported. Moving to London, he became aligned with a group of Russian anarchists and was expelled from the exiled

German Social Democratic Party in 1880. He established the anarchist Die Freiheit there but was imprisoned from printing a headline hailing the assassination of Tsar Alexander. Upon release in October, 1882 he immigrated to the United States, settling on the Lower East Side (Sanders 77-78). It was under his leadership, and through the pages of Freiheit, that the fledgling Social Revolutionary movement of the 1880s became united. This was especially noteworthy for splintering the Socialist Labor Party so vital to national unionism in the United States. Philip Foner credited the popularity of Social Revolutionary Clubs in major American cities in the 1880s to "large foreign populations and immigrants whose new and bitter experiences in the class struggle in the United States made them particularly receptive to anarchist ideas" (Foner 1955, 37). In contrast, Hillquit described their determination as coming from the experiences of repression in Europe.

The anarchist movement was then at its zenith. The brutal suppression of socialist propaganda in most countries of continental Europe had weakened the faith of many in the efficacy of peaceful methods and embittered them...(Hillquit in Howe and Libo 165).

Most succeeded in turning the clubs into a united, active force. Foner describes him as "A powerful orator, a caustic and brilliant writer, temperamental and egotistical" and "the acknowledged leader of the American anarchists." He was central to the founding of the International Working

People's Association, which had a membership of 7,000 at its peak in 1885 (Foner 38).

Another center of anarchism was the group producing the paper, Autonomie, on Fifth Street, in the club Zum Groben Michel. Its leader, Joseph Peukert had been a leader of the Austrian socialist movement. Johann Most and Peukert were at odds over both the theory for and practice of anarchism. Although their followers sometimes worked together, relations between the two camps were strained. The Autonomie group, linked with the German anarchist London weekly of the same name, stressed individual freedom and expression, while Most stressed the need for organized and violent action directed at leaders of capitalism. Goldman, Alexander Berkman and friends eventually split with Most over his heavy-handed approach to anarchism in favor of the Autonomie activists (Goldman 74).

Other radical papers sprouted up with defections from other publications, with need or inspiration. The eventual dissent of Louis Miller with Abe Cahan's grip on the Forward ended with his founding of the daily Wahrheit in 1905 (Sanders 354). After years of bitter feuds between the Wahrheit and Forward camps, the Wahrheit closed its doors in 1918 (436). In 1906 Emma Goldman founded Mother Earth, a literary, anarchist journal, a "place of expression for the young idealists in art and letters" (379). The many journals and newspapers published on the East Side--and only

a portion have been mentioned--represent, interestingly, a lively intellectual life, but also the fierce in-fighting of the radical scene. Splints within the socialist camp, and there were many, led as often as not to the founding of a new publication. The same was true of the anarchists. Meanwhile anarchists and socialists engaged in regular editorial-page battles. And the fighting was to affect deeply the success of related union activities, for the publication wars both reflected and created different approaches to improving workers' lives.

A Homeland Focus

One focus of direct action by immigrants which displays some unity in the Lower East Side's activist milieu was political conditions in Russia. Goldman reported on one such effort when, in 1890, the Lower East Side responded to news from "underground messages" to the East Side that political prisoners and exiles in Russia were severely maltreated. When news came of guards firing on prisoners who protested conditions, a new Lower East Side group sprang up in support, the Friends of Russian Freedom (69-70). This became a regular division of efforts by immigrant residents, between actions directed at local and American issues and those directed at events in the countries of birth.

In 1903, for example, bad news from Russia led Goldman to join "East Side radicals" in "intense activities" to

aid workers enduring hardships. Previous differences were set aside as "{t}rade-unionists, socialists, and anarchists" united to "help the victims of the Russian regime" (330). Again in early 1904, Goldman described similar efforts. The task of educating Americans on the "nature of Russian absolutism," she wrote, had become exclusively born by "the splendid efforts of the radical Yiddish press...confined entirely to the East Side" (359).

Another Russian visiting the United States to create support for the Russian cause was Catherine Breshkovskaya. After a tremendously successful Cooper Union appearance, she agreed to give a talk at 210 East Thirteenth. The crowd which gathered there is evidence of the various elements sometimes successfully combined on the Lower East Side. Liberals, including Bolton Hall, Ernest Crosby and Gilbert E. Roe; University Settlement members, with Phelps Stokes, Kellogg Durland and others; prominent women radicals; and Lillian Wald of the Nurses' Settlement (362). Accounts of many similar organizing efforts gives evidence of the varied elements of the Lower East Side: unionists, socialists, anarchists, radicals, liberals and intellectuals ready to combine, carefully, separating again over the next issue.

Summarizing to this point, in the same way that new immigrants joined others with their ethnic background, activists were attracted to a community with an active press, cafés and meeting places, halls and auditoriums for

gathering and organizing, and most importantly, like-minded comrades. That many immigrants had been activists in Russia, Germany and Italy, and could now pursue their missions in the new country with immigrants of similar backgrounds undoubtedly strengthened feelings of solidarity. And further, the "newcomers" sharing hardships and exploitation launched some into group actions who might otherwise not have protested dire conditions. Next to be discussed is the severity which Lower East Side immigrants encountered and how this, combined with other factors, led to unionism and community activism.

Chapter 3

POVERTY AND RESPONSE ON THE LOWER EAST SIDE

The potential for Lower East Side activism was undoubtedly stronger given the immigrant newcomers' particularly difficult circumstances. While they were certainly ready to endure hardships in the United States, at the same time they were leaving oppression and poverty explicitly to seek a better life. But the poverty of the Lower East Side from the 1880s into the early 1900s was dramatic. The Jewish Emigrant Relief Fund of New York wrote in a letter to Europe that Jewish refugees move into New York and "crowd the filthy tenements in a certain section on the East Side...The squalor, misery, and dirt of these tenements and their insufficient sanitary appointments must be seen to be understood" (in Kessner 20). Emma Goldman for some time earned her living as a midwife and nurse on the Lower East Side. In one, a two-room flat on Houston Street, she found a family with three children sleeping on the floor and a child on the way with no provisions. "Incredible poverty oozed from every corner" (Goldman 1931, 184).

The efforts of Settlement workers was one attempt by neighborhood and outside reformers to alleviate the misery

of Lower East Side residents. Goldman described Lillian D. Wald and others at the Nurses' Settlement on Henry Street as, "among the first American women I met who felt an interest in the economic condition of the masses. They were genuinely concerned with the people of the East Side" (160). But later she commented to her friend, "Teaching the poor to eat with a fork is all very well...but what good does it do if they have not the food" (160). Her final observation of the Settlement Houses on the Lower East Side was that "they were doing more harm than good. They were creating snobbery among the very people they were trying to help" (160).

This indictment was not shared by all. They provided what Lewis Mumford has called a "social nucleus" for community living--a community center for social and educational activities (Mumford 1938, 297). Foner, similarly, points out the important role played by the Henry Street Settlement and Lillian D. Wald in organizing women workers to apply for union charters (Foner 1964, 227). Most importantly, Henry Street was responsible for organizing primarily volunteer nurses to provide desperately needed health care to impoverished immigrant families (Howe and Libo 36). The Christodora Settlement House, located just off Tompkins Square Park, similarly aided the immigrant poor, and sent Lower East Side children to a fresh air camp in New Jersey (Rosler 1991, 210). All Settlements were responsible for substantial relief work, not available at

the time from governmental sources. The University Settlement was also responsible for making the wider public aware of the severe living conditions of community residents, sometimes resulting in reform legislation.

East Side Unionism

While reformers concerned themselves with helping the poor, the actions of community residents themselves went to the heart of their poverty: the factory system demanding inhuman output from workers under difficult and often dangerous conditions, and long hours for bad wages. In short, the economic conditions of the residents of the Lower East Side was a major contributor to the activist nature of the community.

Beginning at Chatham Square, the south-most point of the LES, the most congested factory district in New York began, spreading northward. Riding the Second Avenue Elevated, the "sweatshop district" appeared "one huge factory."

On either side of the tracks were rows of gaunt tenement houses. Through the open windows you could see pale women hunched over their work, stitching and basting, and men, half naked, pressing the garments. Morning, noon, and night, you beheld the same ceaseless toil. The men and women seemed to labor without end and without rest (ILGWU 1935, 3).

And in fact, by 1913 New York City was the largest maker of men's ready-made clothing, an industry ranking seventh in gross value among American manufacturers, and was second in

importance of New York City industries, valued at \$300 million. Additionally, over three-fourths of children's ready-made clothing was produced in New York (Best 1914, 10-11).

Most of the industry was concentrated on Manhattan's Lower East Side. On Broadway from Fourteenth to below Canal Street, on Center Street, upper Lafayette and in Astor Place, one found the highest grade shops; the lower-grade producers were scattered over the district, a number in streets along the East River, with the cheapest shops in the poorer sections of the LES. A study made for the University Settlement Society by Harry Best concluded that it was the concentration of shops in the district which mostly accounted for "the great congestion of population on the lower East Side of Manhattan Island, the district having a density equalled nowhere else in the world" (Best 12).

Whether the immigrants were drawn to the factories or visa-versa, the congestion and poverty of the LES made conditions for workers intolerable. In the beginning of clothing production, small "sweat shops" sprang up in residential six-floor buildings. An International Ladies Workers Union pamphlet described one LES shop of 1893.

Here is a dingy four room flat. The "shop" occupies one small room; in the other three live the owner, his wife, and seven children. Squeezing your way through the ill-lighted shop where the workers seem to be sitting on top of one another, you come to the kitchen. Here is a woman bending over a red-hot stove, or making bread on a corner of the table. On the table there are also several old tin cans, a baby's stocking, scraps of cloth, and a small pile of finished garments. On a rack

are still other garments. In the next room, an old women, her face covered with loathsome scabs, is walking the floor with a crying child in her arms (ILGWU 1935, 3).

The hours were as loathsome as the conditions. Men, women and children alike worked 15 to 16 hours a day, usually from 5:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., at least six days per week (ILGWU 4).

The driving force of these conditions was the "contracting system." Large warehouse owners advertised "ready-made" clothing, which earlier had been produced at home by women for their own families. Smaller "contractors" agreed to supply finished clothing articles to the warehouses. The surplus of contractors competing for contracts kept the prices of clothing cheap, increasing their popularity and increasing pressure to produce clothing ever faster and cheaper. With, as Best complained, some 10,000 immigrants flooding into the industry each year, this kept competition for jobs with the contractors stiff and delayed efforts to organize workers (Best 12). The resulting wages were miserly and working conditions abominable, with workers required to supply their own machines, and to pay for their thread and needles (ILGWU 22). Often workers were charged fees for the chairs they sat on, lockers for their coats, and for coming to work late (Howe in Howe and Libo 179).

The contracting system flourished between 1880 and 1900 when products were limited to cloaks, suits and skirts.

But after 1900, as dresses, shirtwaists and undergarments were added to production, the "factory system" began to replace smaller sweatshops. Specialists were needed for the more complicated articles, styles became more mixed, and direct catalog orders linked individual buyers with manufacturers. Hours, wages and working conditions did not improve, but the possibilities for organizing did. The blame for bad conditions could no longer be placed by contractors on warehouse-men paying low prices. Responsibility became fixed, workers became more concentrated and organizing became a real possibility, as the ILGWU describes.

First, it changed the attitude of the workers by bringing a greater number of men and women workers under one roof to work for one master. Bunched together and driven in a mass, the workers developed a mass resistance (ILGWU 23).

Organizing

It was in organizing workers that many political dynamics came together on the LES. In addition to the roles played by the rise of the factory system and the concentration of immigrants on the Lower East Side, the presence of the radical left became a major influence. In 1882, 1884 and 1885, Jewish Socialist immigrants--many of whom had been involved in or sympathetic to the Russian revolutionary movement before coming to the United States--founded workers' *vereins* (organizations). One of the first Jewish unions was the socialist Jewish Workingmen's Union founded

on April 19, 1885 and lasting over two years. Through the work of the JWU and its newspaper, the Jewish Volkszeitung, the socialists organized fourteen unions with 3,000 members, in and outside of the garment industry; supported a 1885 general strike of contracting shops, a 1886 strike of cigar and furniture makers; and organized a move for abolition of the contract-system (Foner 1955, 34-35).

It was Morris Hillquit's--at the time a shirtmaker--suggestion that an ethnic union be formed (Kessner 69), leading to one of the biggest success story of the Jewish socialists in unionism, the establishment of the United Hebrew Trades (UHT) in October 9, 1888. Hillquit became the first corresponding secretary and another LES socialist, Bernard Weinstein, a cloakmaker, recording secretary (Foner 35). Within six months it had eleven affiliated organizations and 1,200 members. By 1890 its membership had grown to 6,000. The founding principles of the UHT were Marxist, to "make clear to the workers that they can free themselves from the yoke of capitalism through organization and trade unions on the one hand and through political struggle on the other" (Foner 36).

LES unionism also combined varied political activists. Emma Goldman described her "labor baptism" on the LES just months after her arrival there when in 1890 a cloakmakers' strike was called and actions organized by a group of "young Jewish socialists and anarchists who had

organized the cloakmakers and other Yiddish unions." A meeting was called and "(E)verybody on the East Side who was able to say a few words in public was drawn into the struggle." One of these was the young Annie Netter, "one of the most intelligent and indefatigable women workers" in the various textile strikes and organizing struggles of the Knights of Labor (Goldman 54). She later joined the Pioneers of Liberty, "to which most of the active Jewish anarchists in New York belonged." It was also her family's home behind their grocery which became another meeting place, what Goldman called an "oasis for the radical element" (55).

Strikes and unionism were a part of LES politics from its earliest days. Harry Best reported that the first union in the garment industry was the cutters' union, organized in 1855 (Best 1914, 12). And strikes were found with regularity in the unions of the United Garment Workers in New York with notable strikes held in 1880, 1893 by the coat tailors, 1895, again in 1901 when the United Garment Workers called out 16,000 men, and in 1904 when 35,000 were out on strike (Best 13).

The next major union to be erected in the garment industry also saw its beginnings on the LES. This was the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), founded in 1900. As the ILGWU describes its beginnings, "On June 3, 1900, 11 men from seven unions in four cities...met at the

Labor Lyceum, 64 East Fourth Street, New York City, to draw the conclusions from the lesson they had learned in their years of struggle." What they had learned was that the craft unions were not as effective acting separately as an industry-wide union could be, operators, cutters, pressers and finishers (ILGWU 8). By 1904 it had spread to 27 cities, totaling 66 locals.

But the major landmark for ILGWU was the strike of 1909, the "Uprising of Twenty Thousand," and its source was Local 25, the Waistmakers" Union of the Lower East Side. Beginning as a small group, Local 25 met in an Eldridge Street hall:

...until we were \$600 in arrears for rent. We were thrown out of this hall and moved to 206 East Broadway. We had only 10 members left at that time. The new landlord was more insistent on being paid his rent...After some time, we decided to engage a walking delegate (business agent). Each one of us contributed \$1 a week for the purpose. After the walking delegate had worked for us three months our membership dropped to six. We then decided to disband. We covered our charter with a black cloth and sneaked out of the hall to avoid the landlord. But on the street, one of us moved that we reorganize our union and hold our meetings in the open air. The union was then and there reorganized (Local 25 secretary, as quoted in ILGWU 14)

But gradually, they built up their ranks, until in 1909 they had 100 members and \$4.00 in the treasury. When girls at the Leiserson and Triangle plants were dismissed for being suspected union members, the Local went on strike. Suffering almost daily police beatings on the picket lines, court summons and sentencing for "disturbing the peace," the idea

of a general strike was born (ILGWU 9). And if socialist leaders, like Meyer London and Jacob Panken, had been influential in organizing the unions, it was the young members of the locals, like the teenaged Clara Lemlich who fought for the right to be represented by unions. Lemlich had been picketing at the Leiserson plant daily, and fed up with union leaders, called for a general strike at the workers' meeting in Cooper Union.

"I am a working girl, one of those striking against intolerable conditions. I am tired of listening to speakers who talk in generalities. What we are here for is to decide whether or not to strike. I offer a resolution that a general strike be declared--now." (in Howe and Libo 180).

The strike was called and 20,000 workers, mostly girls, participated in what was later called the "uprising of the Twenty Thousand."

Again, many East Side elements combined to support the Jewish and Italian girls: Jewish socialists mobilized to support the strike's daily needs, Lillian Wald of the Henry Street Settlement with Mary Simhovitich, did publicity (Howe 180). After a hard fight improvements in working conditions were won, although no recognition of the union was given, and Local 25's membership grew to 10,000. Irving Howe, in recounting the losses and gains of the struggle, argues that its true significance went beyond a socialist or Jewish victory, "...for it was indeed an uprising of people who discovered on the picket lines their sense of dignity and self.

New emotions swept the East Side, new perceptions of what immigrants could do, even girls until yesterday mute" (Howe 182).

And indeed, the workers joining in both those and subsequent strikes were not only LES Jews. Kessner explains that Italians were new to unionizing when Jews were experienced union organizers (69). This combined with the early status of Italian immigrants as unskilled and non-union labor to keep their union memberships low. But in later years, Italian immigrants poured into the garment industry, showing similar "working-class militancy with a polished but forceful intellectual idealism" (ILGWU 28). Italians were especially numerous and active in the Boot and Shoe Workers (Foner 1965, 306-7). Of the United Garment Workers of America's 1913 strike in New York, Jews made up over half of the union members, and Italians, one third, with the remainder "Germans, Poles, Russians, Americans, and other" (Best 18). At the height of union organizing not only a broad mix of political activists were brought into the effort, but the range of ethnic immigrants represented on the LES as well.

The illustrations above can provide but a sample of union organizing and activism on the Lower East Side. Small workers' *vereins* grew into trade unions and unions grew nationally. The ILGWU, for example, grew to 110,000 members by 1920 (ILGWU 15). A growth of this size indicates reasons

for union activism which go outside community dynamics. Working conditions under the factory system had national impact and a national response was inevitable. But on the community level, on the Lower East Side, the concentration of the garment industry, the severity of working and living conditions, the ethnic concentration within locals and the multitude of bright, energetic, ideologically dedicated young leaders are all factors explaining why union activism had such a powerful presence.

Organizing at Home

The various organized neighborhood actions on the LES are far too many to discuss in full, but two examples of how local radicalism was also present in homemaker's activism deserve attention: the 1902 meat boycott and the rent strike of 1904. Once again, they demonstrate the combination of factors leading to direct actions, imitating the pattern found in the description of LES aid for the Russian workers and revolutionaries and unionism.

First, economic conditions set the stage. As an attorney for the Cloakmakers' Union and the ILGWU, Morris Hillquit reported on the living conditions of union members as compared to the recommendations of an investigation by the Departments of Labor and Agriculture. The Departments' 1907 investigation had concluded that for families earning from \$600 to \$700 per year, incomes could not meet basic

family needs. LES rents were too high; their incomes too low.

Rents seem to be highest on the Upper West Side, in Central Manhattan and on the lower East Side. Such a family had no bath, and only one family in ten has a toilet in their apartment...Twenty of the seventy-two families admit being in debt, the money being borrowed for food and rent. Not rarely do they visit the pawnshop...Such a family literally lives a hand-to-mouth existence. It requires no citation of elaborate statistics to bring convincing proof that \$600 to \$700 is wholly inadequate to maintain a proper standard of living, and no self-respecting family should be asked to live on such an income (Chapin quoted in Hillquit 1915, 11-13)

Hillquit next described the actual income of various garment workers and found that in four occupations--jacket underpressers, skirt underpressers, part pressers and finishers--even earning top wages, they could not reach a high of \$600 per year. Their average was found to be only from \$470 to \$582 (Hillquit 14). This means that workers on the LES were living "hand-to-mouth" and struggling every month to cover their basic expenses. When the prices of either increased, they became unreachable.

In 1902, butcher wholesalers raised the price for kosher meat and local butcher shops followed suit hiking prices from 12 to 18 cents per pound. Lower East Side housewives immediately reacted. They organized the Ladies Anti-Beef Trust Association and called for a community boycott until prices receded. To enforce the boycott they roped in the neighborhood institutions, calling on them to pressure their members to comply. Labor unions, synagogues and community societies all cooperated. After three weeks

their boycott was a success, with even kosher restaurants refusing to sell meat. Meat wholesalers finally restored their original price (Joselit in Lawson 1986, 41-42).

Rent increases, meanwhile, were not as easy to control. Similar to factory "contractors," middlemen, called "listers" began the practice of leasing buildings from landlords and renting to immigrant families at exorbitant rents (Lawson 9). Not able to meet these rents, families often took in boarders to help with the rent, adding misery to their already overcrowded conditions. Jacob Riis viewed countless LES apartments in the 1880s stricken with such overcrowding:

It has thousands upon thousands of lodgers who help to pay its extortionate rents. At night there is scarce a room in all the district that has not one or more of them, some above half a score, sleeping on cots, or on the floor. It is idle to speak of privacy in these "homes." (Riis 98).

And despite the crowded rooms, the dark and unsanitary conditions and disrepair, the "listers," or "cockroach landlords" nonetheless regularly demanded unreasonable rents. Riis provided pages of dramatic illustrations of suffering Lower East Side tenants, concluding that an attraction by renters to radical political solutions was inevitable:

This [garment machine] operator has four children at his home in Stanton Street, none old enough to work, and a sick wife. His rent is twelve dollars a month; his wages for a hard week's work less than eight dollars. Such as he, with their consuming desire for money thus smothered, recruit the ranks of the anarchists, won over by the promise of a general "divide;" and an enlightened public sentiment turns up its nose at the vicious for-

eigner for those perverted notions there is no room in this land of plenty (Riis 95).

And organizing by radicals was possible. But as with the 1902 meat boycott, the reaction to a rent emergency was a spontaneous one by local residents.

Jenna Joselit's study of pre-World War LES tenant activism describes an unplanned reaction to a housing crisis. The emergency came in the spring of 1904 when property owners raised rents 20 to 30 percent (Joselit 39). With families already barely able to feed themselves, the increases were unpayable. Moving was no option given the severe community overcrowding, but to make matters worse over seventeen thousand LES tenants had been recently displaced for the building of the Williamsburg Bridge, and the construction of local parks and schools. Tenants were immobile and, therefore, had no choice but to say 'no' to rent increases in a " 'spontaneous outburst' of rent withholding and protest" (Joselit 41). As in the 1902 meat boycott, housewives organized themselves. They picketed buildings where tenants had been evicted for nonpayment of rent; they formed building-wide organizations and went house-to-house to mobilize support. Eventually, the majority of landlords reinstated earlier rent levels and some gave tenants year-long leases, previously unknown in the neighborhood (42-3).

Here, as in the activism discussed earlier, the influence of socialism, unionism and radical journalism can

also be found. Joselit studies the language of the 1904 tenant action as shadowing the trade unionism active on the LES at the time:

Referring rather self-consciously to themselves as "strikers," to their non-cooperating neighbors as "scabs," to building-level tenant groups as "tenant unions," and to the withholding of their rent as a "rent strike," Lower East Side tenement dwellers drew on familiar political rhetoric--on the language of the labor union--in conducting their protest (Joselit 41).

She points out, additionally, that Abe Cahan, in covering the strike, refers to the community women's actions as "the offspring of that same struggle against Capital, which has grown up in our quarter owing to the work of socialists and trade unionists" (Cahan in Joselit 41).

That the socialists did not organize either the 1902 or 1904 actions is a matter of fact; both were organized by community women. But there may be some justification for Cahan's linking of the two. The women may have broadened their actions beyond separate individual responses because of their exposure to union radicalism, to successful trade strikes, and socialist ideology. Their needs drove them to take action; local radical politics shaped that action. The presence of the Jewish daily forward certainly did not hurt either effort. Its coverage praised LES women for their strength, drew parallels between the 1902 and 1904 events and encouraged women in 1904 to "take the rent question into their hands as they did the meat question" (JDF, 3-18-04, in Joselit 42).

Trained organizers did have a role in the 1904 action after it was well on the way. Joselit found that male leaders later moved in to "direct" the protest. Men from United Hebrew Trades, various locals, and the Workmen's Circle, joined together to form the New York Rent Protective Association. It was temporarily important for providing legal and financial assistance to tenants but dissipated when a dispute over how closely the group should be aligned with the Socialist party arose (Joselit 43). This pattern was later repeated in a yet broader 1908 tenant action. And again, as in the earlier actions, community women played an essential role in organizing the Lower East Side.

In sum, the existence of highly experienced radical organizers played a significant role, not in the initiation, but in the later organization of community actions. The pattern found in all the examples of LES activism discussed here was similar. First, economic conditions had to be severe enough that workers began, on their own, to feel action was necessary; secondly, a common understanding among residents that actions could be collective was needed--the large numbers of immigrants living in close quarters, clustered into ethnic communities created this environment; third, a theoretical "packaging" for ideas about the source of bad conditions and solutions for betterment expedited action--the existence of active socialists and anarchists helped this process; finally, local press instruments of

these political camps "advertised" action, giving them a final push.

Given the examples discussed in this essay-- unionism, organizing assistance for Russia, the meat boycott of 1902 and tenant organizing of 1904--it is clear that the existence of LES socialist and anarchist leaders and organizers alone could not have produced the level of organizing achieved. Class cohesion alone was not sufficient, especially since the community's immigrant workers came originally from a variety of economic backgrounds. All of the elements described were vital to collective action. Also, a number of elements unique to the place and time were important. That Bismarck had successfully ousted major radical leaders and that radicals had been persecuted in Europe were extraordinary events for LES politics. Present were not just socialists and anarchists, but international leaders of radicalism whose presence in any locale would have had a major impact. Similarly, not any community would have produced the same results; but the LES as a densely packed immigrant quarter provided a sense of inner cohesion that could not be replicated elsewhere.

The influence of the radical "milieu" described in these pages cannot be stressed enough. While the radical leadership, after its "importation" to the United States and the LES, was in itself vital, without the reputation which the LES had acquired an Emma Goldman would not have relo-

cated there; without the ongoing lectures, meetings and discussions, a Morris Hillquit would probably not have been drawn into collective actions and a leadership role.

Without the active community press informing its public, the radical scene would have been without its major source of gathering--both of people and ideas. Taken together this unique network of factors created an "activist" community.

From the Roots: A Culture for LES Housing Activism

By the year 1920, although the community continued to be characterized as "activist" up to the present, the style of its activism changed. Among the central reasons for the change are: the decline of socialism and anarchism, the changed nature of unionism, and the out-migration of much of the Jewish immigrant community and its second generation to other boroughs and neighborhoods and in-migration of new ethnic groups.

Socialism in the United States saw a decline in its numbers for many reasons. One of the most significant was the co-optation of its most popular ideas by Democrats in public office. As Tammany fought for the Lower East Side, for instance, one community reformer observed that it got away "...with it by a program of just enough radicalism in response to the tingling of its East Side nerves" (Moskowitz

in Howe and Libo 233). The community's United States Representative in the depression years was William Sirovich, a Democrat prepared to win votes with radical proposals, introducing bills for old-age pensions, child welfare and unemployment benefits (Boyer in Howe and Libo 235).

The Red Scare of late 1919 and 1920, however, was radicalism's harshest blow. Joseph Spencer's study of New York City tenant radicalism during this time found that red-baiting led to harassment of radicals "in the courts and on the picket line" and to expulsion of the five socialist New York Assembly members (Spencer 52). Anarchists were also targeted. A Federal Anti-Anarchist Law had already been passed in 1903 barring the immigration of anyone opposing all governments or affiliated with those who do. It was used periodically to deport anarchists, including foreign visitors seeking to lecture or attend meetings (Goldman 347-9). But deportation and harassment increased in 1919 and Goldman and Alexander Berkman were both deported in December of 1919. What Howe and Libo concluded about the "rocky times" for socialism in the 1920s is most likely true for both socialism and anarchism, that they were victim to prosperity, factionalism, communist rivalries, and the increasing domestication of the Jewish trade unions (Howe and Libo 188). Unionism did undergo a transformation and a decline of memberships. The ILGWU, for instance, after

reaching a membership high in 1920 of 110,000, dropped to half that number by 1932 (ILGWU 15).

Also, the make-up of the LES' population gradually changed. The ethnic Jewish neighborhood shrank and new immigrants have now claimed their turf. By 1980 over thirty percent of the LES was "foreign-born," coming not from Russia and Germany, but now from Latin America and Asia: 37% of LES residents are of Spanish Origin, 23% Asian. Russians today account for slightly more than 2% of the population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1980, 504, 506, 666, 667, 770-3).

Private Property, Labor and the Emergence of the Urban Democratic Vote

At this point, a fundamental difference between the history of activism in American and German working class communities needs to be highlighted for it will shed light on housing activism in later years. German workers were to be organized significantly by a single labor party, with much of Kreuzberg's community activism following the history of the trade union movement and its slow evolution into the Social Democratic Party (SPD). In contrast, no single "labor party" was to succeed nationally in the United States. Labor interests were absorbed into a broader centrist Democratic Party, which appealed to many interests. As Frances Piven has noted, sectional and investor interests have limited labor's hold on the Democrats while, even if

organized labor might have gained predominance, the uniquely decentralized and divided American political structures have left the Democratic Party "without an effective command center" (Piven 1992, 236-7).

In New York City the Democratic machine appealed to business, labor and other interests as required to build a governing regime. But as Martin Shefter has observed, labor demands have only been addressed when doing so did not threaten business interests (Shefter 1987, 16-21). Thus, labor was more co-opted than represented. On the Lower East Side these appeals to labor did much to weaken radical attempts to organize the labor vote. This was true of both local machine efforts and eventually the national New Deal policies.

According to the work of the Chicago School labor historian, Selig Perlman, political parties seemed an unlikely route to labor power because the state structure, constitution, and judiciary "treat as inviolate the autonomy of business and industry" (Perlman 1928, 169). As he explains:

If, under the constitution, government possesses considerable power to regulate industrial relations and improve labor conditions, political power is worth striving for. If, on the contrary, the power of the government is restricted by a rigid organic law, the matter is reversed. The latter is the situation in the United States. The American constitutions, both Federal and State, contain bills of rights which embody in fullness the eighteenth-century philosophy of economic individualism and governmental laissez-faire...In the exercise of the right, American judges have always

inclined to be very conservative in allowing the legislature to invade the province of economic freedom (Perlman 1922, 285).

In other words, although workers sought political gains on occasion, it was not possible to achieve politically a basic redistribution of property. A lack of progress on fundamental issues encouraged workers to place their demands directly with business.

The history of American labor illustrates Perlman's contention. Workers' most radical demands were co-opted by government responses, the height of which was the Homestead Law of 1862 granting 160 acres free to every settler to the West (39).¹ And while European and Russian workers had to fight as a class for suffrage rights (287) and freedom from a "caste system of society and political oppression" (121), American workers were "given" the vote as a "gift" from Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democrats (287). In New York State, in fact, an attempt by the New York Federalists to limit suffrage to holders of \$250 in property value or its equivalent was soundly rejected five-to-one in the 1821 New York State Convention debates. By the time of the 1846 Convention universal suffrage was so accepted that it was not even a topic (Meyer 1960, 238-239; 253). Workers were

¹The law, as Perlman points out, was a mostly empty promise since by the 1860s the United States was fast becoming industrialized and workers had little incentive to give up their money-earning industrial skills to farm unknown Western territories (Perlman 1922, 281).

received into the political arena as participants, in short, blunting any fundamental class-based opposition.

Perlman's point about the centrality of private property in the American governmental structure is also true of city charters. The well-known "Dillon's Rule" was articulated by jurist John Dillon in 1872, who, as Stephen Elkin explains, "built on the public-private distinction concerning the corporation and provided the rationale for the limited city implied by a restriction on proprietary functions and the protection of property rights" (Elkin 1987, 20). Dillon's widely-used judicial doctrine defined essentially the predominance of "private controllers of assets" and expressed his own views about "the need to protect private property and indicated his reservations about the kind of democracy developing in the cities" (21, 20). Simon Sterne, an attorney and member of the 1876 Tilden Commission on municipal government in New York, similarly declared that, "...a city is at one and the same time a decentralized portion of the general government of the state and a cooperative organization of property owners for the administration of private property" (Hammack 1987, 9).

The labor agenda pressing for redistributive goals alone, in short, could not have been pursued through the instrument of a labor party targeting electoral politics. Henry George's 1886 Labor Party campaign made a strong showing, as Hammack argues, not out of support for workers'

demands but largely because voters were alarmed at the widespread corruption of the Tammany men, reflecting a "belief of both rich and poor that the political machines had illegitimately usurped power over the city..." (Hammack 1987, 11). And Abram S. Hewitt as the Democratic candidate won the vote in the end, again by appealing to the working voters by promising an "easy market" for labor where workers and manufacturers could jointly accumulate wealth, and declaring that "there are no classes where all are equal at the ballot box" (in Hammock 1982, 115). Much of the Lower East Side, including the 10th ward, went for George, but he lost the election with 31% of the vote (Hammack 176). In 1897 Tammany made direct conciliatory appeals to labor and by 1900, all major political organizations included union planks in their platforms. Thus, labor removed itself from the electoral fray, but sat back waiting to reward the best offer with its vote (Hammock 180).

Perlman also explains the lack of electoral support for leftist political parties by American "opportunistic trade unionism" (1922, 279). Since unions' primary demand has been for collective bargaining, they necessarily have a stake in the existing order. Their gains through bargaining are an equivalent of private property and any threat to private ownership would be a direct threat to a perceived future return. As a result, unionists have acted like brakes on national socialist gains (302-3). As a result,

the loyalties of urban immigrant workers were dispersed with some supporting radical efforts that challenged the basic economic structure, and the majority paying alligence to unions and supportive machine politicians or both.

As the premier *laissez-faire* party, urban machine Democrats, like New York City's Tammany Hall, were anxious to please their business supporters by controlling the forces of labor activism while similtaneously woeing the labor vote. When George came close to winning the 1886 mayoralty, Tammany players in the the New York State legislature supported moves to create a labor dispute Board of Mediation and Conciliation and to prohibit employer coercion of union members while maintaining its extensive patronage system to working class voters (Shefter 1987, 16).

Conversely, when city and state Democrats could not control the working district votes, they moved aggressively against organized labor. The liberal use of police clubs during strikes on the Lower East Side led the socialist Jewish daily forward to note of the 1902 election that "...during election time these same politicians work with all their might convincing the Jew to cast his vote for the two parties {Tammany and Republican} who 'educate' the policy to break the heads of the workers during a strike" (Forward in Howe and Libo 224). And in fact, while machine Democrats grew in strength by appealing to the "Great Unwashed," they won the bulk of immigrant workers' votes

through insignificant but personalized and specific support (Shefter 1987; Elkin 1987; Judd 1988).

Nevertheless, on the Lower East Side the socialists who were central to the fight for labor repeatedly lost their own district to the machine Democrats. In 1906 Joseph Barondess, the cloakmaker leader, managed to carry about 20% of the vote under the Socialist banner. And 1908 was an even closer battle. Morris Hillquit, worker, socialist and labor leader, nearly tied up a victory but was defeated at the last minute when machine Democrats and Republicans worked out a deal joining to defeat him (Hillquit in Howe and Libo 229). It was not until 1914 with the election of Meyer London to the United States Congress that the Lower East Side put a socialist and labor advocate into office. Morris Hillquit ran a strong if unsuccessful campaign for the mayoralty in 1917 when radicalism was at a peak. After 1920 support declined (Howe and Libo 188).

Even as early as 1928, Bernstein documents a substantial shift of the urban vote to the Democrat Party. After 1920 more Americans lived in cities than rural areas and this demographic shift was reflected in electoral politics. New York City voted Democrat by 62.1%, and northeastern and midwestern major metropolitan areas showed sizable gains between the 1920 and 1928 elections (Bernstein 1960, 78-9). Al Smith was rounding up the working class and urban immigrant vote for the Democrats. Even though his bid

for the White House would be unsuccessful, the movement of a "working class"--or its roots--was toward the Democrats through the 1920s (Bernstein 80).

By the 1932 election a labor-Democrat link forged from a new voting block at the intersection of urban, immigrant, and working-class interests. The Democrats won the new electorate, including the labor vote, and was vaulted into office in the dark Depression years. As Irving Bernstein writes, this established a voting pattern remaining for almost a generation (Bernstein 1960, 508).

On a national level, historian George Mowry notes, that the socialists by 1912 were making extraordinary electoral advances, but even recording over one million votes, it was recruiting only one half of the approximately two million labor movement members (Mowry 1958, 292). Bernstein underscores the lack of significant radical electoral inroads. After 1929 the socialist effort went into serious decline and became centered in the Forward on the Lower East Side; the Communist Party "never became a mass movement and failed almost totally to convert American workers," and the later promise of the American Labor Party was short-lived (Bernstein 1970, 779-783).

When New York Senator Robert Wagner "mustered support" for the National Labor Relations Act, what John L. Lewis called "industrial democracy" gave union members security and formal bargaining power (Brecher 216). And at

the same time, as explained most succinctly by Gerstle, the Wagner Act was to replace labor unrest with social peace:

The unionized workplace would become a miniature democratic society, governed by a constitution (the NLRA) that granted workers basic industrial rights. By granting workers the right to join unions, to protest employer abuses, and to bargain collectively over "wages, hours, and working conditions," the NLRA was meant to dissuade workers--in certain situations it specifically prohibited them--from striking and engaging in other means of extralegal protest. As industrial citizenship replaced industrial serfdom, social peace would replace social conflict (Gerstle 1991, 183).

For Roosevelt and the Democrats, the Wagner Act maintained their support of organized labor shortly before the election. On an urban level, one of its immediate effects was to push workers into the Democratic fold. On the Lower East Side this was evidenced by the creation of the American Labor Party (ALP). Begun in the summer of 1936, social democrats observed that it had become common to be a social democrat and still support Roosevelt. They were not ready, however, to join the Democratic ranks and looked for a way to endorse Roosevelt from the outside. The ALP was an independent New York party, but functioned as a "conveyor belt of social-democratic support to Democratic Presidential candidates" (Sanders 1969, 445). After the 1930s, as long as the American Labor Party (ALP) pulled in votes for Democrats, many machine candidates ran on both the Democrat and ALP lines. When ALP became dominated by Communist supporters in the mid to late 1940s, however, Democrats "fused" with Republicans and Liberal Party members (anti-Communist

former ALP supporters) to defeat them. More importantly, the fusion supporters successfully won changes in New York State election laws significantly to the disadvantage of the ALP (Shefter 321). The party faded in the 1940s.

The impact of the Wagner Act was to de-radicalize labor on at least three fronts. First, it served as a formal bargaining mechanism between labor and management, amounting to, as Eleanor Holmes Norton describes, a "*de facto* pact of coexistence." This led to massive union organizing until by 1950, approximately one-third of labor was organized (Norton 1987, 207). Secondly, as the working force came increasingly under the control of unions, the most disruptive forms of strike tactics began to fade. As Bernstein concludes, the NLRA effectively eliminated the area of angriest contention, that over collective bargaining (Bernstein 1970, 788). Additionally, the Democratic Party successfully used the Wagner Act as part of the overall New Deal package to attract the industrial working class guaranteeing the dissolution of leftist electoral attempts.

And the necessary route would be through those demands which radicals had most successfully championed. The East Side's Democratic Congressman, William I. Sirovich, had already learned this lesson, and had gone into office vowing to push through what had been East Side socialist demands. Sirovich was first elected to office in 1926 and quickly introduced bills for unemployment pensions,

child welfare and old-age pensions. He later fought for the Wagner Labor Act and repeal of prohibition (Richard Boyer in Howe and Libo, 235).

Housing Activism Takes Hold

Both the influences from the roots of early LES activism and the changes in direct action strategies can be summarized by looking briefly at the early evolution of LES tenant activism. The radical communist and socialist led community-wide rent strike was left behind as a tactic, but was replaced, first, with lower-profile, communist-led protective tenant actions in the early 1930s, and second, by a housing reform movement headed by middle-class social workers and professionals in the later 1930s and 1940s.

Looking at the first, Mark Naison's study of tenant activism in the Great Depression concludes that activism turned from mass communal uprisings to the actions of professional advocacy organizations because of the diminished presence of communists in the major housing organizations, the greater concern of communism with anti-fascism in this time period, and the Communist Party's move from revolution to reform (Naison 1986, 96). The Lower East Side continued to have a mass communist membership long after the Party's numbers sank in other communities. This explains to a large extent the lingering use of some direct tenant actions in 1930 to 1933. Eviction resistance was one

Depression-years strategy, as organizers helped evicted families move their possessions back into their apartments, keeping police and landlords overloaded with repeated evictions and sometimes successfully negotiating to let tenants remain in their homes (101-2). Rent strikes for rent reductions were also successfully used by communist organizers. The LES played an active role in one communist-led city-wide strike and another major strike was staged in buildings along Avenue A in 1933 (107-8).

But there was a distinctive move toward professional housing and community organizations, led not by the Communist Party, but by progressive reformers. Naison reports that in 1933 and 1934 activists from settlement houses and other philanthropic organizations launched a housing reform movement with a base of support in Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia's new administration. Led by local settlement house workers, the Lower East Side Public Housing Conference was at the center of this movement. The social workers organized LES residents into a legislative group to lobby Washington and Albany on building low-income housing, they published a journal and gave LES tours to legislators (112-3). In 1934 a limited-dividend, federally assisted housing development, Knickerbocker Village, opened on the LES just north of the Brooklyn Bridge and created another push for local housing activism. Knickerbocker's owners had attracted a population of middle-class professionals and

families by promising state-of-the-art design: elevators, laundry rooms, radio hook-ups and children's playrooms. But when tenants found the project unfinished and inoperable on moving day and the landlord unresponsive, they organized themselves and withheld rents. With a strike committee including forty-four lawyers and seventeen journalists, they held meetings with the mayor, State Housing Board, and Knickerbocker managers; publicized their plight with four New York Times articles; and finally won a victory with finished apartments and almost \$25,000 in settlements (117). Knickerbocker tenant leaders joined the Lower East Side Public Housing Conference in forming the short-lived City-Wide Housing Conference and later was pivotal in bringing together eighteen other tenant associations to create the City-Wide Tenants League (later called the City-Wide Tenants Council) (118-119). Stressing tenants' legal rights and using the reform tactics of publicity and collective bargaining, the organization gradually established itself as the representative body for tenants with the press, the city bureaucracy, the courts and legislators (122).

The next step was to establish local branches, beginning with the LES where the East Side Tenants Union opened in late 1936 (120). Their new tactics were demonstrated on the LES when in 1937 several banks decided to close their LES tenements rather than comply with the new fire and health regulations of the Multiple Dwelling Law.

To protect the threatened tenants they picketed the banks, met with the mayor and housing commissioner resulting in city-sponsored hearings on the threatened evictions (121). By 1940 the City-Wide Tenants Council claimed over twenty affiliates, lobbied vigorously for public-housing and housing reforms and provided substantial political resources for low-income tenants, maintaining ties with housing reform organizations, the Communist, Socialist and American Labor Parties (124-5).

The strength of both Knickerbocker and City-Wide diminished during World War II and after, but the seeds of LES housing activism remained in the form of the East Side Tenants Union, with the energetic leadership of Ester Rand (Schwartz 1986, 153). That organization, together with community tenants, labor activists, political party members and reformers worked to shape the direction of housing and local development on the Lower East Side. Later chapters will document how on the LES, compared with Kreuzberg, residents struggled to control and shape these issues. The activist milieu has continually attracted political activists and reformers and this influence will appear again as the 1975-1985 period is examined. The tradition of direct action, the heritage of community women in local political struggles, and of political cohesion growing from ethnic sub-communities are all elements nurtured in the LES' past, but have not faded since then.

Most importantly, as will be seen in later comparison with Berlin community activism, Lower East Siders were compelled to target private sector interests when seeking to gain control over local housing and development issues. Local employers, private landlords, banks, shop-owners were as or more likely to be the subject of protest than city officials. The role of LES activists historically, has been to force private property interests to consider community well-being, or to use the legal system or relevant city agencies to intervene and regulate according to community demands. Unlike Berlin communities, then, Lower East Side activism was more likely to be aimed at localized, not national, issues; it was most often directed at private property interests, not governmental actors. Although some influences on community participation change with each era, these patterns will be found throughout the history of Lower East Side activism into the present.

What LES "newcomers" have also inherited, are a deteriorating housing stock, overcrowding, a severe housing shortage. The community has continued to be one of Manhattan's low income immigrant neighborhoods, with surprisingly many of the same economic hardships borne by the earlier immigrants. The mix of economic hardship, housing crises and political activism will be seen to produce continued LES activism, but the strategies used by residents will be determined by changing economic conditions, ethnic make-up

and governmental regime change. In the same way that activism turned gradually from radical confrontational direct action to an increased use of community advocacy organizations, the exact style of later residents' activism will be determined by a new network of determinants, some inherited from the Lower East Side's past, some created anew. The next chapter will examine demographic data for the years 1975 to 1985, update the portrait of the Lower East Side, and from it derive the potential dynamics of political action.

Chapter 4

A DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT OF THE LOWER EAST SIDE, 1975-1985

To bring this discussion to the period under examination, 1975 to 1985, the descriptions of the Lower East Side as a politically activist community and an immigrant community with ethnic diversity need not be revised. But the network of influences shaping Lower East Side political culture in this more recent time period can be added to by documenting two more recent developments: first, the numbers and proportions of new immigrants and some of their lands of origin have changed; second, a new population of more prosperous native-born Americans have chosen to reside side-by-side with a substantial proportion of lower-income residents making it clear that the profile of community participation in local land-use and housing decisions is a complex one of varied needs and conflicting demands. An updated demographic profile of the Lower East Side is necessary in order to shed light on three important political dynamics: first, the potential political interests growing out of social and ethnic groupings; second, the housing and development demands to be expected from each interest; finally, the data will explain what styles and

extent of participation were used by residents in neighborhood redevelopment.

The "New" Immigrant Community

The Lower East Side remains a diverse immigrant community today as in earlier years. As can be seen in Table 1, in the 1980 Census the district's population was just over 32% foreign-born, compared with 24% of the total New York City population. And following a city-wide increase, the number of foreign-born persons on the Lower East Side was up 13.1% between the 1970 and 1980 Census (Table 4.1).

The Lower East Side has become a predominantly Latino and Chinese community, with an additional mix of first and second generation European and other Asian immigrants, and native-born African-Americans and whites. Using 1980 census data for those tracts within the Community Board #3 boundaries, calculations show that the Lower East Side was approximately 37% Spanish-speaking origin--28% reporting themselves in census questionnaires as being Puerto Rican--and about 23% are Asian (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.1 Foreign-born Population of New York City
and Community Board District 3

	New York City			Manhattan Community District 3		
	1970	1980	change (%)	1970	1980	change (%)
All persons	7,894,798	7,071,639	-823,159 (-10.4)	183,676	155,267	-28,409 (-15.5)
Number of foreign-born persons	1,437,058	1,670,199	+233,141 (+16.2)	44,075	49,833	+ 5,758 (+13.1)
Percent of foreign-born persons	(18.2)	(23.6)		(24.0)	(32.1)	

Source: United States Bureau of the Census. Table P-2. "Social Characteristics of the Population: 1970." pp. 201, 203, 298-300; Table P-9. "Social Characteristics of Persons: 1980." pp.666, 667, 770-773.

Table 4.2 Ethnicity of Community Board District 3,
1980

<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Spanish Origin(a)	56,939	36.7
Asian(a)	35,557	22.9
Black(a)(c)	16,462	10.6
Italian(b)	6,287	4.0
Polish(b)	4,887	3.1
Russian(b)	3,472	2.2
Ukrainian(b)	2,592	1.7
English(b)	2,285	1.5
Irish(b)	2,245	1.4
German(b)	1,476	1.0
Hungarian(b)	870	0.6
Total CB3 Pop.	155,267	-

Sources: (a) Calculated from 30 selected tracts in 1980 Census of Population and Housing. "Table P-7 Race and Spanish Origin: 1980. pp504-506. (b) Calculated from 30 selected tracts in 1980 Census of Population and Housing. "Table P-8 Ancestry of Persons: 1980." pp610-612. (c) Identifies race only, not national origin and may overlap with Spanish origin. Table 7 reports 1,846 blacks of Spanish origin for the 30 CB3 census tracts.

What is of greatest importance, however, is the concentration of immigrant and various ethnic groups into smaller areas within CB3. A breakdown of race by census tract reveals a concentration of ethnicity by neighborhood, with the riverside tracts being Puerto Rican/Hispanic neighborhoods named "Loisaida." The "Two Bridges" area south of Loisaida is "Chinatown," a neighborhood which extends farther west and south also into the Community Board #2 district. East Village, west of Loisaida, is predominantly a

white neighborhood with a broad mixture of ethnic groups who have been the immigrating "new arrivals" of past eras; Polish, Italian, Russian, Ukrainian, English, Irish, German and Hungarian peoples can be found here. South of "East Village," in the "Old Lower East Side," which is roughly south of Delancey Street, traces of the "Jewish Lower East Side" can still be found. Although the Jewish population there is no longer close to the 1924 numbers of approximately 600,000, it is still about 25% Jewish, and many of the synagogues erected in the 1880's are still in use.

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate the extent of ethnic concentration for the major ethnic groups on the Lower East Side. In Table 4.3, the extent of foreign-born concentration indicates that as immigrants settle on the Lower East Side, as in the 1800s and early 1900s, they seek out the communities of their fellow immigrants, families and friends who immigrated before them. By doing so they are also better able to find assistance as they search for housing, employment and contacts with government offices. Within these neighborhoods, community groups can also be found specifically targeting assistance to immigrants. Table 4.4 broadens the definition of the neighborhoods slightly by including second, and possibly third, generation immigrants or those identifying themselves as from single-ancestry groups. This statistical representation confirms the brief

Table 4.3 Number of CBD3 Census Tracts with Foreign-born Residents by Level of Concentration, 1970 and 1980

	1970 (a) #(%)	1980 (b) #(%)
0 - 10.0%	4 (13.3)	6 (20.0)
10.1 - 20.0%	10 (33.3)	5 (16.7)
20.1 - 30.0%	8 (26.7)	7 (23.3)
30.1 - 40.0%	5 (16.7)	5 (16.7)
40.1 - 50.0%	2 (6.7)	3 (10.0)
50.1% - over	1 (3.3)	4 (13.3)
TOTAL	30 (100.0)	30 (100.0)

Sources: (a) Calculated from 30 selected tracts in 1970 Census of Population and Housing. "Table P-2 Social Characteristics of the Population: 1970." pp.298-300.

(b) Calculated from 30 selected tracts in 1980 Census of Population and Housing. "Table P-9 Social Characteristics of Persons: 1980." pp.770-773.

description given above, showing the various pockets of ethnicity.

The Ukrainian community, although relatively small (with less than 2% of the LES population; see Table 4.2), is shown as most concentrated with more than 90% of Ukrainians living in 7 census tracts. On a walking tour, one can quickly identify these tracts as centered around 2nd Avenue

Table 4.4 Percentage Concentration of Ethnic Groups by Cumulative 1980
Census Tracts in New York City Manhattan Community Board #3

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Spanish Or. ¹	10.1	19.0	27.6	33.8	39.9	45.5	50.9	59.9	60.8	65.3	69.7	73.4	76.8	79.8	82.5	85.2	87.5	89.5	91.4	93.2	94.8	96.1	97.4	98.3	99.1	99.4	99.7	99.8	99.9	100.0
Asian ¹	19.0	36.9	51.4	65.4	74.6	79.7	82.2	84.2	86.2	88.1	90.0	91.8	93.0	94.1	95.1	96.1	96.8	97.5	98.0	98.5	99.0	99.4	99.6	99.7	99.8	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
Black ^{1,3}	11.0	19.6	27.8	35.1	41.5	47.8	53.9	59.9	65.5	68.8	72.0	75.1	78.1	80.7	83.2	85.7	88.0	89.8	91.3	92.6	93.7	94.8	95.9	96.9	98.0	98.8	99.2	99.5	99.8	100.0
Italian ²	22.8	31.3	38.9	46.0	52.8	59.5	63.7	67.8	71.2	74.5	76.9	79.1	81.3	83.4	85.2	86.9	88.5	90.0	91.5	92.9	93.9	95.0	96.0	96.8	97.5	98.2	98.8	99.4	99.9	100.0
Polish ²	20.0	33.9	44.3	54.6	64.7	71.0	76.6	80.3	83.3	86.2	88.3	89.9	91.2	92.4	93.4	94.3	95.2	96.1	96.8	97.4	97.8	98.1	98.5	98.8	99.1	99.4	99.6	99.8	100.0	----
Russian ²	15.3	26.7	35.6	44.5	52.1	59.3	65.2	71.0	74.8	77.9	81.0	83.8	86.2	87.6	89.1	90.5	91.8	93.2	94.4	95.5	96.5	97.4	98.1	98.7	99.1	99.4	99.6	99.8	100.0	----
Ukrainian ²	37.1	58.0	70.3	77.2	84.1	87.9	90.4	92.0	93.2	94.4	95.4	96.3	97.1	97.8	98.3	98.7	99.1	99.4	99.6	99.8	100.0	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
English ²	12.2	22.6	31.5	39.4	45.8	51.2	56.3	61.1	65.8	70.4	73.2	75.7	78.1	80.3	82.2	84.1	85.8	87.3	88.7	90.1	91.4	92.7	93.9	95.0	96.2	97.3	98.2	99.0	99.6	100.0
Irish ²	12.4	23.5	32.6	40.9	49.0	56.1	61.6	65.8	70.0	73.7	77.3	80.5	83.6	86.4	89.1	91.8	93.7	94.9	95.9	96.6	97.2	97.8	98.4	98.8	99.3	99.6	99.8	100.0	----	----
German ²	15.4	30.5	41.0	49.0	55.4	60.6	65.4	70.0	73.4	76.8	79.7	81.8	83.7	85.6	87.2	88.8	90.4	91.9	93.4	94.6	95.9	96.9	97.7	98.4	98.9	99.5	100.0	----	----	----
Hungarian ²	15.7	31.0	39.2	46.7	53.9	60.3	65.9	71.1	76.1	80.1	84.1	87.9	91.1	93.7	96.1	97.1	98.0	98.7	99.4	100.0	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Source: United States Bureau of the Census. 1980. 1980
Census population and housing. Wash.D.C.: U.S.
Bureau of the Census. pp.504-506, 610-612

Note: Empty cells beyond 100% indicate that no members of this ethnic group are reported in additional census tracts; repeated 100% concentrations indicate that additional members of the ethnic group are reported, but not appearing due to rounding.

from East 4th Street to 14th (see Map 2.1). There one finds the Ukrainian National Home, the largest cultural center, a Ukrainian museum, several popular Ukrainian restaurants and shops and, most importantly, St. George's Ukrainian Catholic Church at Seventh Street, the Ukrainian religious and community center. Although statistically small, the Ukrainian community has been an active force on Community Board 3, partly due to their increase in numbers in the 1940s and 1950s, when thousands of Ukrainians fled the Soviet Union because of political and religious oppression. The Rev. Patrick Paschak of St. George's Church has described his community as originally one of professional people who, after immigrating, had to take menial work. As the sons and daughters grew up and pursued educational opportunities, they chose, at first, to leave the neighborhood for the suburbs of New Jersey, Long Island and Queens, while maintaining ties with the church and community. In the 1980s many tried to return to East Village, although with difficulty due to a tight housing market. In a 1987 New York Times interview, one such community member, now a 38-year-old physician, explained that she moved her family back to East Village from Forest Hills, Queens because, "There is so much in this community for the children--Ukrainian schools and theater, folk music and dancing. It's important to me that my children are bilingual. The culture adds depth and flavor to their lives," and goes on to say that she is not

alone in these feelings, "But a lot of us would now like to continue the tradition by moving back." This indicates strong ties to a larger sub-community outside of the LES with which residents identify. In this case, even after relocating outside the Lower East Side, this sub-community has political power beyond their residential numbers within the Community Board because of the addition outside financial resources made available to local Ukrainian organizations, as well as strong cultural cohesion used as added support on issues where local Ukrainians clash with other LES ethnic groups. This perhaps explains, additionally, St. George's Rev. Paschak's estimate of the East Village Ukrainian community at roughly 25,000 (Foderaro Jan. 4, 1987), despite Census data reporting a population of under 2,600 (Table 4.2). As Reverend Paschak said in a 1985 interview about gentrification pressures, "The old feeling that this is our turf and no one is going to take it away from us has returned...The area is now cleaner and safer and there seems to be a renewed enthusiasm from Ukrainians living in the area and from those who fled during the turbulent 60's to revive the community" (Demkowych 1985). This provides an example of how a sub-community might reinforce the power of members of that sub-community within geographical boundaries, or "turf."

In contrast, the Asian-American community is the second most populous and concentrated, with 90% of the popu-

lation found in 10 census tracts, in what is coined "Chinatown," south of Delancey and continuing below Canal Street, from the Bowery to the East River. Within these lines one finds important Asian-American cultural and social service centers and potent community organizations including: Asian Americans for Equality (AAFE), a civil rights and tenant advocacy organization; It's Time, a Community Action Agency which has in recent years become a vocal housing advocacy group; Chinatown Planning Council, a service organization, which also plays a significant role in Chinatown housing and economic development advocacy; and other smaller social services and localized tenant organizations. But what is most important to note, looking again at Table 4.3, is that of the seven census tracts listed in 1980 as having over 40.1% concentration of foreign-born residents (combining the two categories of highest concentration), six of those tracts are predominately foreign-born Asian-Americans, with two of those tracts including the two Lower East Side tracts of highest population concentration. This confirms recent claims by community leaders that housing in Chinatown has reached a saturation level as new Asian immigrants pour into the Lower East Side, causing a push northward into surrounding census tracts which had been predominately Latino. Two census tracts just north of Chinatown (#18 and #30.01) are now Asian and Latino with the first, calculated as having 61.2% foreign-born residents, a mixture of Latino

(36.2%) and Asian-Americans (47.0%); and the second, with a foreign-born population of 42.5% being predominately Latino (70.4%) with a smaller population of Asian-Americans (10.5). This shifting of ethnic groups over time creates conflict particularly important to the housing issue as will be seen in the following chapters. In contrast to the Ukrainian sub-community reinforcing turf, the Asian-American sub-community is self-contained, and as the population of the sub-community grows an effort to expand the physical turf can also be expected to increase.

Other areas of ethnic concentration are not accompanied by similar sub-community identity or evidence of turf of the strength of the Ukrainian or Asian Lower East Siders. Hungarians and Poles are concentrated in the East Village census tracts, as are most of the remaining white, non-Spanish-origin residents of the Lower East Side. African-American Lower East Siders are concentrated primarily in census tracts along the East River and north of Delancey in Loisaida and in the relatively isolated New York City public housing high rises there and south of Chinatown; but black Latinos, overlapping with Spanish-origin population data, will be found primarily in Loisaida. No separate African-American community organizations could be identified on the Lower East Side, although African-American community activists are found in other community organizations, coalition groups, and are active on the Community Board.

The Latino community is the largest ethnic group on the Lower East Side. It is concentrated in a large area north of Delancey and east of Avenue A, as well as south of Houston from the Bowery to the East River but north of Grand Street. In addition, large numbers of Latinos can be identified in census tracts containing public housing along the East River. The concentration of Latinos and their large proportion explain the presence of many powerful Latino cultural organizations, advocacy and housing organizations including: Pueblo Nuevo, a housing and development organization and the most powerful of the Latino groups; Charas, the oldest LES Latino cultural organization; the Coalition of Housing and Development, Inc., a housing and advocacy organization.

Religious Diversity of Residents

Another way to describe the community's diversity and interests is through identification of local religious institutions. A walking tour of the neighborhood will show any visitor or resident some of the changes the religious institutions have undergone. Of the old "East Side" synagogues which were once active centers of the Jewish community many are now gone, and others, although still used, face dwindling resources as most of the more affluent members have moved to other communities.

As the Jewish religious community has dwindled, the Catholic community has become more active. A survey of the New York Bell yellow pages identified 19 of the 48 churches listed between the boundaries of the Community Board 3 as Roman Catholic (40%). The Catholic churches, much like the Jewish institutions, have played a central role in the building of their communities by providing the Lower East Side with educational institutions, social services, legal assistance and community meeting places (Sanders, 1977). These institutions, once important to the influx of Irish and then Italian Catholic immigrants in the 1800s, today service the Catholic segments of the Latino community.

Of the Protestant and Orthodox churches on the Lower East Side their names reflect the ethnic make-up of the community as it is now, and they provide evidence of the earlier ethnic neighborhoods which have since become less dominant: Reformed Dutch, Greek Orthodox, American Orthodox Greek, Ukrainian Orthodox. The Orthodox churches service many of those Eastern European immigrants, now second and third generation arrivals, who settled in the community and have not moved on or who return to the neighborhood to worship. The majority of the churches are now Chinese-American and Latino churches: Chinese Baptist and Presbyterian can be found; Latino Orthodox and Protestant churches with Latino congregations will also be found. And there is a variety of other smaller congregations:

Adventist, Assembly, Buddhist, Church of Christ, Episcopal, Methodist. The largest number of Hispanic churches, however, are the Catholic community churches which offer a variety of services needed by new immigrants unfamiliar with a new country, in need of housing information, jobs, education, and information on how to deal with an unfamiliar government. At one time this type of "service provider" was the local Democratic clubs. One of these clubs still provides such services, but much of their clientele has either left the community (largely Irish and Italian residents), or has found these services with various community and church organizations.

In this sense, the role of the Protestant churches as a service provider and center of community activities has not duplicated the efforts of the many new Pentecostal Latino churches, or, more significantly, by the two primary Lower East Side religious service centers: the Lower East Side Catholic Area Conference (LESCAC) and the United Jewish Council (UJC).¹ These two organizations now play a major

¹The dominant role of Catholic and Jewish organizations in community service groups has a long New York City history not confined to the LES. Greenstone and Peterson (1976) similarly found that the two major New York City sectarian activists in welfare politics were Catholic Charities and the Federation of Jewish Agencies, who supported the distribution of public funds to local sectarian service organizations; in contrast, the Protestant Federation of Agencies is not only notably smaller--Greenstone and Peterson attribute this to the make-up of New York City's poor as historically Catholic and Jewish--but has favored government support of local secular groups such as Mobilization for Youth (MFY) on the Lower East Side in the 1960s (p. 41).

role in local political decision-making, representing their constituencies on many housing and local economic development issues, acting as organizers and developers. The Catholic Area Conference, for example, has a Housing Development Institute which works through the Archdiocese as a local development arm; it works closely with a local umbrella group of "homesteaders," or residents who rebuild vacant building in self-help projects, its director sits on the Housing Committee of Community Board 3 as well as on the boards of several local housing and advocacy organizations. In interviews with LESCAC, the organization explained its role as working with local groups on "principally advocacy" work and generally as advocacy in "support of preservation and development of low income and homeless housing." It feels a special need to represent low income and minority residents who are "overwhelmingly Catholic."

Interviews with leaders within the United Jewish Council on the Lower East Side, indicated a difference in constituencies between LESCAC and UJC. The United Jewish Council sees itself as representing a "dwindling" Jewish community, as Jewish residents moved in the late 1960s and early 1970s to Riverdale, Westchester, New Jersey and other communities. Those remaining usually have been lower-income residents and senior citizens. Eventually the organization became a mandated anti-poverty organization which is funded

to service the entire community through home care, lunch programs, and social services. It claims its constituency to be approximately 50-60% Jewish and 30-40% non-Jewish; it additionally acts as an umbrella for 50-60 Jewish organizations and synagogues, has members on the Community Board, and has various ties to local Democratic elected representatives. It generally sees its mission in local politics as to create and preserve a middle-class community south of Delancey and to promote local economic development projects to anchor small businesses and middle income housing.

We can begin to see from the above descriptions that not only is there tremendous ethnic and religious diversity on the Lower East Side, but that these differences translate into a variety of needs and political interests.

Socio-Economic Status of Residents

By all measures, the Lower East Side is a predominately lower income neighborhood. Community Board #3 reported in its "Statement of Community Needs" for Fiscal Year 1983, for example, that it had a "substantial low-income population with a minority in the moderate income level." It also reported that the District's median household income in 1970 was \$6,487, compared to New York City's median household income of \$9,682 (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1983, 32). From the 1980 census, the Community Board found that the median family income for CB3 was only

\$10,727 compared with the New York City median income of \$16,818 (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1989, 48). Not only did the Lower East Side remain a lower-income district, between the 1970s and mid-1980s, it saw an increase in most indicators of poverty. For instance, while the Community Board reported that 22.1% of its population needed some form of governmental income supports in 1980, by 1986 that figure rose to 27.4% (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1989, 39).

While to some extent the Lower East Side poverty rate increases can be viewed as a reflection of city-wide increases, Table 4.5 below demonstrates that the increase in poverty rates for Community Board #3 accelerated beyond that of the city-wide rates.

Within the community, however, there is a greater economic diversity than might be expected from these figures. First, the poverty rates vary substantially between ethnic groups: the poverty rate in 1980 for Latino residents according to the Community District Statistics (NY Dept. of

Table 4.5 Poverty Rates for CBD3 and New York City,
1970 and 1980

	<u>1970</u>		<u>1980</u>	
	NYC	CB3	NYC	CB3
Total Pop. (a,b)	7,894,862	183,944	7,071,639	155,216
Persons w/ income below poverty (c,d)	1,164,673	46,533	1,391,981	50,372
% Persons in Poverty	(14.7)	(25.3)	(19.7)	(32.4)

Sources: Derived from, (a) U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Table P-1. General Characteristics of the Population: 1970." pp. 1, 3, 98-100; (b) U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Table P-1. General Characteristics of the Population: 1980." pp. 4, 5, 108-111; (c) U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Table P-4. Income Characteristics of the Population: 1970." pp. 601, 603, 698-700; (d) U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Table P-11. Income and Poverty Status in 1979: 1980." pp. 1090, 1091, 1194-1197.

City Planning 1984) was the highest of all groups at 47.4%; for African-Americans the poverty rate was second highest at 35.6%; for whites, it was reported at 28.1%; for Asian-Americans, although still high, rates were the lowest at 23.9% (see Table 4.6).

This diversity in economic status between ethnic groups can be further studied by examining labor force participation and education levels. Table 4.6 below demonstrates substantial differences between groups, although no single group fares better in all indicators than the others; what is found, rather, is a portrait of the individual economic characteristics of various groups of immigrant populations mixed with native, mostly low-income residents. Whites, on the average, were far more likely to be both high school and college graduates than any other group, and more likely to be employed than any group except Asian-Americans. With the city-wide unemployment rate in 1980 at 7.7% (NYC Dept. of City Planning 1985), the unemployment rate for whites at 8.1% was higher than the city-wide average.

Asian-Americans, in contrast, had the lowest unemployment rate on the Lower East Side, at 3.6%; in addition, one can see a higher female labor force participation rate and extremely low unemployment rate. Nearly 64% of Asian-American women 16 years of age and older were in the labor force, compared to the roughly 46% average for women on the Lower East Side, and a female unemployment rate of

Table 4.6 1980 Social and Economic Characteristics by Race and Spanish Origin for Community Board District 3

	Total	White	Black	Asian & Pacific Islander	Spanish Origin ¹
Total Persons (% of CB3 total)	154,779 (100.0)	69,704 (45.0)	16,400 (10.6)	35,614 (23.0)	56,540 (36.5)
HIGH SCHOOL AND COLLEGE GRADUATES					
Persons 25 years and older	97,277	49,217	9,626	22,380	27,692
High school graduates (% graduates)	43,431 (44.6)	27,265 (55.4)	5,144 (53.4)	6,981 (31.2)	7,613 (27.5)
College graduates (% graduates)	14,612 (15.0)	11,076 (22.5)	978 (10.2)	2,135 (9.5)	968 (3.5)
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES					
Persons 16 years and over in the labor force	67,450	32,523	6,458	18,509	17,714
Unemployed (% unemployed)	5,855 (8.7)	2,634 (8.1)	935 (14.5)	665 (3.6)	2,409 (13.6)
Females 16 years and over	61,019	29,864	6,054	12,830	20,739
--In the labor force (%)	28,165 (46.2)	13,605 (45.6)	2,778 (45.9)	8,193 (63.9)	6,539 (31.5)
--Unemployed (%)	2,035 (7.2)	949 (7.0)	324 (11.7)	167 (2.0)	879 (13.4)
POVERTY RATE					
% Persons w/ income below poverty level	(32.8)	(28.1)	(35.6)	(23.9)	(47.4)

Source: New York City Department of City Planning. Community district statistics (New York: New York City Department of City Planning, June 1984), 10, 16, 28, 34, 45.

¹ Persons of Spanish origin may be of any race.

only 2%, compared to 7.2% for women on the Lower East Side generally. These rates can be attributed to some extent to employment by family members in family owned or managed businesses located in the community, such as in the estimated 800 Chinatown restaurants and shops (Lum 1985), as well to the many small factories, textile workshops and service-sector employers in Chinatown. But these indicators alone do not account for the economic status of the Asian-American Lower East Side community. A 1982 study of the Chinatown garment industry reported 450 Chinese-owned factories employing around 20,000 unionized Chinese workers, 95% of whom were women (Christina Lo in Lum 1985), and it has been estimated that about half of Chinatown's garment workers also live in the community (Lum 1985). It often takes the wages of several family members to cover household expenses, and thus, it may be economic hardship, not prosperity which accounts for the higher Asian-American, and especially female Asian-American employment rates. In addition, Chinatown has undergone an industrial to service sector transition, with Lum reporting the conversion of at least three factories to offices in 1985 alone. Many of the service-sector jobs are low-paying and demand longer than average working hours. Additionally, the education-levels of the Asian-American community are the second lowest on the Lower East Side (see Table 4.6), again indicating that employment for Asian-American residents is most likely in

the low wage service sector or in unskilled factory or workshop employment.

Although having the second highest rates of high school and college graduation, nevertheless, only 53.4% of African-American Lower East Side residents are high school graduates. Unemployment for African-Americans is the highest of all groups at 14.5%, but for African-American women the rate is significantly better at 11.7%.

Residents of Spanish-origin suffer more than any other group from poverty, with 47.4% living on an income below the poverty level. Unemployment is only slightly lower than that of African-Americans at 13.6%, but Latino women have the lowest employment participation rate of any group and, of those in the labor force, suffer from an unemployment rate of 13.4%. Rates of high school and college graduation are also the lowest of any group, with only 27.5% of all Latinos on the Lower East Side graduating from high school and only 3.5% graduating from college.

Much of the low graduation rates and high unemployment among Lower East Side Latinos can be explained by a lack of bilingual education programs in the public schools and the difficulty of non-English speaking immigrants to find work. An examination of student records at one Lower East Side bilingual community-based college, Solidaridad Humana, revealed that students were mostly older adults and recent immigrants from nearly every Latin American country.

Like earlier "East Side" immigrants, although many had skills and professions in their native countries, their lack of English skills kept them out of the New York job market (Gittell with Moore 1983). In addition, unlike Chinatown, Loissaida lacks the local businesses and factories which might provide extensive local employment. With limited work and language skills, having to seek employment outside the local community explains much of the particularly high unemployment rate.

In stark contrast to the majority of low-income Lower East Side residents, there was also an influx of higher income populations during the years studied. Local newspapers and various other city-wide and community publications voiced widespread concern about prosperous incoming population and the "gentrification" of several New York City neighborhoods, including the Lower East Side. Documenting this change in Community Board 3 is, however, a complicated task. City-wide data, collected for the 1980s in Michael A. Stegman's 1987 Housing and Vacancy Report, indicates that "In a sharp reversal of the recent past, income gains widely exceeded the rise in the cost of living with the result that the inflation-adjusted median income for all households climbed 19 percent from 1983 to 1986" (Stegman 1987, 19). With this in mind, various indicators must be examined to determine whether household incomes overall have increased or more prosperous incoming popula-

tions were altering the household statistics. City-wide trends must also be taken into account to determine whether changes in income distribution on the Lower East Side indicated community changes or simply reflected overall city-wide trends.

Looking at developments in income distribution on the city and borough-wide levels, Stegman's research indicates that at least three variables were likely impacting on local income distribution. The first is the make-up of incoming populations. The largest incoming populations since 1978 by race were Asian-Americans and non-Puerto Rican Latinos, with the number of whites decreasing by 11.5%, and the populations of African-Americans and Puerto Ricans remaining unchanged (Stegman 3). This affected income distribution since Asian-Americans shared with whites the highest median renter household incomes. The incomes of non-Puerto Rican Latinos were the second lowest city-wide, although higher than those of Puerto Ricans (Stegman 95). Stegman reported

In-migration is an important part of the changing income pattern in New York because some portion of the gain recorded by census enumerators from 1983-86 probably results from the higher incomes of families and individuals who are newcomers to New York City...Households moving into the city from other parts of the tri-state area have the highest median incomes of all in-migrants (\$32,000), followed closely by families who move to New York from other parts of the country (\$30,000). Recent movers from Asia or Europe are next highest (\$22,000 and \$20,000, respectively), and recent movers to New York City from Latin American and Puerto Rico have the lowest incomes (Stegman 104-105).

In addition, movers from outside New York City are more likely to be single without children and to live in a cooperative or condominium unit (Stegman 105).

The change in types of households in New York City was a second possible factor affecting local income distribution from the 1970s to the 1980s. Stegman found that the largest increase in the type of household for New York City from 1978 to 1987 was 14.2% increase in the households of single adults, with the second largest increase in adult households without children. Manhattan, the borough with the highest proportion of single-person households among renters (as compared to owner-occupied units), experienced a further dramatic 24.8% increase of single adult-households, from 42.8% to 53.4% (Stegman 7).

Third, in Manhattan between 1984 and 1987 there was a decrease in the number of renters by 31,000 but an increase of 17,400 of owner occupants. Stegman cited the high level of co-op/condo conversions and new construction of co-ops and condos as accounting for an increased homeownership rate in Manhattan from 14 to 17% between 1984 and 1987. Stegman also explained that homeowners are more likely to be white and Asians, and these homeowners are the city's most affluent (Stegman 27).

In addition to these factors of the changing demographics of in-coming population, the change in household type and the increase in the proportion of owner-

occupant cooperative or condominium units (Stegman 105), Stegmen's research found that the gap between income groups increased. In 1977 the average income of the city's highest ten percent was 15 times higher than that of the bottom ten percent; in the period between 1980 to 1983 this grew to 17 percent, and after 1983 it rose to 20 times greater (Stegman 107).

Bringing this to the local level, Stegmen reported that in 1986, 28.2% of Lower East Side households were single adults (Stegman 153); 90.5 percent of LES households were renters, with 9.5% owner-occupied (166); and owners as compared to Lower East Side renters were more likely to have higher incomes. While the mean income for all Lower East Side households in 1986 stood at \$17,958, that of owners was \$34,910 compared with a renter income of \$16,616 (156).

This local income profile can be summarized by saying that of all Manhattan sub-borough areas studied by Stegman in this time period, the Lower East Side had the greatest mix of the very low-income with higher income residents. It had the greatest proportion of residents in the lowest income category behind East and Central Harlem, but when examining the highest income categories, nearly a quarter of Lower East Side residents were also found there (Stegman 157).

Table 4.7 below reports the incomes by households of Lower East Side residents and New York City for 1980. While

over 30% of the Lower East Side had household incomes below \$5,000, 9.4% of residents earned \$25,000 and over, including 1% earning \$50,000 and over. The increase from 9.4% to 24% of residents in this higher-income bracket in Stegman's 1986 data indicates a significant increase in this income level beyond the rate of inflation.

Table 4.7 1980 Household Income in New York City and CBD3 by Income Level

Income	CB3		NYC	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Less than \$5,000	19,121	(30.3)	545,980	(19.6)
5,000-9,999	15,771	(25.0)	500,004	(17.9)
10,000-14,999	11,547	(18.3)	438,850	(15.7)
15,000-24,999	10,727	(17.0)	649,777	(23.3)
25,000-49,999	5,271	(8.4)	537,395	(19.2)
50,000-over	616	(1.0)	120,608	(4.3)
TOTAL				
HOUSEHOLDS	63,053	(100.00)	2,792,614	(100.00)

Source: Derived from, U.S. Bureau of the Census. Income and Poverty Status in 1979: 1980. Table P-11. pp. 1090, 1091, 1194-1197.

The changing population from the 1970's to the 1980's on the Lower East Side has often been linked with a temporary surge in what had been called the "East Village Art Scene." Artists and galleries, trying to escape the tight Soho and 57th Street store-front rents, and the steep prices for Manhattan studio and loft spaces began moving to the Lower East Side around the fall of 1981. Art critics

Rosalyn Deutsche and Cara Gendel Ryan identified a growth from 2 to 25 art galleries on the Lower East Side by 1983 and over 40 by 1984 (Deutsche and Ryan 1984). Local sources and media accounts often referred to this scene as accompanied by waves of young movers like, "young white secretaries, phone company workers, punkers, artists, nurses, and chefs, spilling in from places like North Carolina, Ohio, England, and Japan," (Gottlieb 1982).

Frank DeGiovanni's study on Lower East Side displacement pressures concluded that demographic changes indicating gentrification were clear, but only in selected parts of Community Board 3. Using 1970 and 1980 Census tract data on income and educational attainment, he identified increases in both beyond the city-wide increases, particularly in East Village north of Houston Street from Third Avenue to Avenue D.

Conducting a selective household survey in June, 1984, however, he found stronger evidence of an in-coming higher-income population moving to the community after June, 1979. These recent movers were found to be primarily "white, young college graduates living alone or with an unrelated person(s) and earning a moderate level of income. Their income level appears low relative to their education" (DeGiovanni 1987, 17). This last observation, concerning the moderate income of in-movers, indicates that although they are more prosperous and well-educated than long-time

residents, their youth shows that they had not reached an earning peak and/or their chosen occupations were in the moderate income range. DeGiovanni's data did not point to significant changes in the demographics of other parts of CB3, which is confirmed by earlier research (DeGiovanni 1987; Marcuse 1986).

The Potential for Power

This community portrait indicates that a network of dynamics can be expected to shape the level and style of participation in housing and development issues by residents. First, the dynamic of intervening, what will be called "sub-communities," can be expected to fortify the community-level power of what might otherwise be small forces in local decisionmaking. Sub-communities are those group identities which are not restricted to geographical boundaries such as religious, national or ethnic affiliations. On the Lower East Side the Catholic and Jewish communities, for example, can be expected to garner substantial support from their institutions outside the immediate community in terms of financial support, the intervention of influential institutional elites and a sizable member base. Ethnic sub-communities such as the Ukrainian community can similarly be expected to rally members from outside the

neighborhood to demonstrate support at Community Board meetings, to provide financial and organizing assistance when issues of import arise.

Secondly, data on the various LES groups indicates that the potential to participate and/or styles of participation will vary by ethnicity. The Latino community is deeply affected by their severe unemployment and poverty rates and low levels of educational attainment. Whites will exhibit the highest levels of participation in election or other formal modes of participation due to their greater economic resources. African-American Lower East Siders can be expected to participate at moderately high levels in formal participation if only SES, particularly education levels, is taken into account. The lack of a visible cohesive sub-community which might be used as a political resource may affect other styles of community participation. Asian-Americans have a clearly important network of community support, and high SES indicators, but the language obstacle limits some modes of formal participation while cultural cohesion will encourage other styles.

Third, the concentration of ethnic groups into specific geographical areas, or "turfs," within CB3 is another dynamic that plays a role in shaping participation. Especially where sub-communities exist within turf lines, a connection between the economic vitality of sub-communities with the various "turfs" identified in this chapter can be

tion by residents. The insular nature of Chinatown's economy is one example of how turf lines can be drawn in such a way to increase political resources. The following chapters will examine how other turfs have sought to create economic bases through economic and housing development which subsequently may have bolstered their levels of political participation.

What is yet to be discussed is how these dynamics come together to create, shape or diminish participation across the Lower East Side, and the additional dynamic of Community Board Three's housing stock, housing market and the intervention of private real estate interests and local, state and federal governmental agencies into housing policy. This will further explain what policy interests Lower East Side residents have and how these interests vary between turfs and sub-communities.

Chapter 5
DISPLACED HISTORY AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF
KREUZBERG

The only thing in Kreuzberg remaining the same is the houses.

--(Interview with current Kreuzberg resident; author's translation).

The reader is wise to remember that our purpose is not a general, comparative study of the political cultures of Kreuzberg and the Lower East Side, but an investigation into the comparative determinants of community political participation at distinct points in time. Important influences may come from within a community's development or history, and may as substantially come from larger national, state or regional political cultures. Compared to the Lower East Side, Kreuzberg's style of active citizen housing policy intervention is more deeply rooted in its unique position in history and unusual physical definition as a place. From its creation as a backyard for a monarch's administrative center to the present, Kreuzberg's political culture reflects that of Prussia's as much as its more recent neighborhood history.

When the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, Kreuzberg was cut off from its roots and suddenly its political cul-

ture was given a new and drastic set of influences; when the Wall came down in 1989, some of the community's traditional influences were restored and new ones added. What is one to make of the 28 year glitch in Kreuzberg's political history and, more importantly for our purpose here, to where should one look for the sources of Kreuzberg's activism between the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s? The answer posed here is to examine both the history of Kreuzberg's development within the context of German history and political culture and to excavate specific community influences.

This chapter will investigate the roots of lower and working-class activism in Kreuzberg by organizing the many important political, cultural influences into the following categories: 1) the Prussian monarchy and the impact of its authoritarian decisionmaking in the history of Kreuzberg as part of the Prussian *Hauptstadt* (capital city); 2) economic factors including the fast and state-managed industrialization process, the severe living and working conditions for workers, and the development of a residential and workshop mixture called the *Kreuzberger Mischung* (Kreuzberg mixture); 3) structural, political trends including the impact of Bismarck's social reforms of the 1880s and the patriarchal administration of the welfare state, and the emergence of the Prussian bureaucracy as a means of social control; 4) activism and corporatism, including the rise of the labor movement, Kreuzberg's role as a workers' settlement with

reformism tendencies, the rise of labor self-help organizations and clubs, and the development of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as labor's seat in government. The pattern of the incorporation of moderate labor interests into governance, managed by a patriarchal and rigid bureaucracy, but the barring of other lower-class and radical interests will be examined as sources for the later lack of access for community participation. These factors will explain, at least in part, the charges of "paternalism" made by tenants against housing bureaucrats and the use of direct action by tenant activists in the late 1970s, and the loyalty by older German workers to government policies--even when they were seemingly failed--rather than support for what were viewed as radical housing initiatives.

The Prussian Monarchy and Administrative Authoritarianism

Kreuzberg historian Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm observed that standards for development in Kreuzberg's history came either "*von oben oder von außen*," from above or outside (Hoffmann-Axthelm 1984, 9). In the 17th and 18th centuries, power came singly from above, from the Prussian state. The style of decisionmaking, as Hoffmann-Axthelm explains, was direct and made without regard to the appropriateness of planning to the project:

Typically Prussian is, in particular, the barbaric directness with which the Prussian head of state let the methods of proportion be trampled. One sees that most manifestly in development policy, the same which later

provoked the "Kreuzberg mixture," with its construction habits and characteristics...(Hoffman-Axthelm 1984, 9; a.tr.).

What drove both the physical and cultural building of Kreuzberg was its unique devise as a monarch's planned suburb, site of industrial production and planned workers' quarters. While the Lower East Side was quickly erected in the mid-1800s by private developers to accommodate the immigrant masses and textile workshops, Kreuzberg, with the exception of the S036 district, was the result of centralized state planning and management in all aspects: city building, industrial and residential growth, and cultural development. In fact, the theme of top-down planning is consistent throughout Kreuzberg's development.

The Master Builders

What is Kreuzberg today is an area covering three earlier districts: Southern Friedrichstadt, Luisenstadt, later to include the south-east Postal District 36 (S036), and the northern tip of a southern district, Tempelhof, called the "Tempelhofer Vorstadt" (Kaak 1988, 58). Meant to extend the central district of the Prussian *Hauptstadt*, Friedrichstadt and Luisenstadt were each created by a state-commissioned chief planner. Friedrichstadt was first laid-out in 1688 by Head Engineer Johann Arnold Nering for the Great Elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm. The "straight forward military organization of the building

process" set up rows and blocks of uniform soldiers' and workers' houses bordered in part by a protective wall to prevent soldiers from deserting, in the manner of "planning absolutism" (Heise 1984; 222, 220; a.tr.).

The district was completed by the royal city planner Philipp Gerlach from 1732 to 1738, commissioned by the "soldier-king" Friedrich Wilhelm I. The Gerlach Plan also created a *Massenquartier* (mass quarters) without differentiation in layout or architectural style. The impression of endless repetition, according to Volker Heise, was the direct impact of the Prussian military organization on the building process (221). Where to build, how to build and who should live in the finished products were state-directed decisions and since the Prussian state was, above all, a military state, the planning process took on military attributes.

Hans Reichhardt's characterization of early city expansion emphasized the extent to which Berlin's development was slowed by its history of feudalism and royal planning. The 1794 Universal Prussian Land Rights, for instance, reinforced feudal land rights. From 1807 to March, 1850 an awkward and slow process began in which "the feudal bond to property ownership metamorphosed into the modern bourgeois form of private property as a freely sold ware" (Reichhardt 1984, 91; a.tr.).

Gradually private property owners became a force in city development. Reichhardt documents the tensions between royal planning processes and the emerging industrialists in the mid-1800s. In 1835 when the crown prince drew up a plan for part of south eastern Berlin, up to Köpenicker Field, the chief of administration, Karl Friedrich Schinkel, advised him against implementing it. Speculators had already purchased parcels lining the Spree and many sites were occupied by factories. Schinkel warned the prince that to build a road following the Spree as the Prince wished would cost the state dearly since it involved buying-out continuous parcels and particularly expensive industrial sites.

Additionally, Schinkel cautioned that laws did not exist to demand that the owners sell to the state. Implicit was the need for cooperation with the developing capitalist interests. Schinkel's report, Reichhardt emphasizes, was early evidence of the transition phase between the "feudal-absolutist ideal-planning to the capitalistic city-building from the mid-1800s onward" (Reichhardt 1984, 93; a.tr.). Indeed, when the prince became King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, that he hoped to partially mediate this process is evidenced by his 1843 decree that planning new streets or altering existing ones in Berlin and Potsdam could only be done with his direct approval (93).

What Reichhardt calls the "upheaval of the feudal social order" arrived with a March, 1850 law bringing hereditary lease and rent relationships to an end. But the law only applied to the city environs. With Köpenicker Field and other new districts outside of the city wall, including what was to become Kreuzberg, feudal landowners battled the proposed changes until 1856 when private property rights were also extended there (91). This blunted the pace of industrialization and slowed its emergence drastically compared to other European countries.

Luisenstadt

The building of the Luisenstadt section of Kreuzberg took place in the midst of these developments. It was in 1840 that Friedrich Wilhelm IV commissioned his Director of Gardens, Peter Joseph Lenné, to plan an extension of Berlin and to beautify the central district (Kraus and Wunderlich 1987, 2.1). His "romantic plan" for Luisenstadt created a mixed-use district to attract industry and to "parallel the interests of individual landlords" (Lenné in Bascón-Borgelt et al. 1984, 83; a.tr.).

The Minister of the Interior drew up Lenné's plans for Berlin's *Zoologischer Garten*, Luisenstadt with its artificial canal, and the Köpenicker Field, which had been agricultural land (Reichhardt 1984, 94). This area was part of the royal "Plan of ornament and layout for the residence

Berlin" built between 1840 and 1852. But more than an example of centralized decisionmaking, the plan became evidence of the growing power of a rising class of capitalists. For while elected representatives had no significant power over Berlin's development, the King was losing ground to the industrialists and, in particular, the private railroad companies. As Reichhardt concludes, for all of the efforts of the Prussian state to "equalize the excesses of expanding industrialism" the growth of the railroad's domain in the city destroyed the idea of "harmonized total planning," so that in Luisenstadt the plan could only be implemented where it did not conflict with the rail-owned property and developments (Reichhardt, 95, a.tr.).

S036 and Private Development

The last part of Kreuzberg to be developed was the Köpenicker Field immediately east of Luisenstadt. James Hobrecht was commissioned for this task and in 1862 presented his plan for the extension of Berlin to Friedrich Wilhelm IV's successor and brother Kaiser Wilhelm I. Unlike Lenné's "romantic plan," the Hobrecht Plan provided for concentric city expansion, large and very deep city blocks to reduce the cost of access roads, and few parks or squares. Hobrecht was not to service the desires of the court as much as the needs of the newly industrial Berlin.

In contrast to South Friedrichstadt and Luisenstadt, accommodation, in what was to be S036, was to private capi-

tal, industry, speculators and the housing needs of workers pouring into Berlin from Silesia (today in the region of southwest Poland) and other eastern territories. Real estate companies and private speculators carried out the development, and as seen earlier, private railroad owners were a factor. The railroad baron, Bethel Henry Strousberg, built "his" Görlitzer train station in the heart of S036 even before development began. Another private investor, Andreas de Cuvry, owned an essential property--that at Schlesisches Tor, today the last platform of a busy cross-town subway line--and had Cuvrystrasse built in 1830. As land values took off, the estate of Cuvry sold individual parcels at tremendous returns (Kraus and Wunderlich 1987, 2.2).

As workers poured into S036, badly-designed and quickly-constructed tenements were built to accommodate the human flow; small factories sprouted up, mostly workshops. Here the full force of industrialization and rise of capitalism were seen. The monarchy lost its dominance over the aesthetics of the city design as the state bureaucracy collected new force through its role in administering plans. As Hobrecht wrote of his 1862 Plan: "...the development plan, being part of the building regulations cannot take into account considerations of beauty and artistic quality" (Hobrecht in Kraus and Wunderlich, 2.2). In fact, in addition to neglecting "artistic quality," Hobrecht also

neglected to include parcels for future market places, churches or schools (Freyer 1989, 13). In short, the dominance of the monarch was losing ground to the hegemony of private capital and its influence on administrative decisionmaking. SO36's development was more comparable to that of the Lower East Side's, and foretold much of the impact Kreuzberg's industrialization would have on the lives of workers and their possibilities for creating some control over their lives. But quite unlike on the Lower East Side, Berlin workers would use the well-worn pathways of the past and set both their desires and fury at the feet of the state, not the private property owners; to a large extent, the owner of the land was still the state.

The Role of Residents in Decisionmaking

The possibilities for workers or lower-income citizens to participate in public decisionmaking during the 1800s was limited by several factors. First, decisionmaking in general was dominated by the Prussian monarch. But in some Prussian cities, local self-governance was granted early.¹ The Chief Minister of Prussia, Baron von Stein,

¹Max Weber's important work, The city (NY: Free Press, 1958) describes the history of city self-rule from the Middle Ages as power was granted to patrician families who ran local councils. The guilds were later to supplant their power, giving the "burgher class" primary rule. This extent of autonomy, however, was never found throughout Germany, and the most powerful guild confederation had permanency only in some Lower Germany and Baltic regions. (138-9; 157-8). In general, the vast political autonomy of the medieval urban communities was historically exceptional, with only some German cities maintaining independent city governments alongside the developing "modern patrimonial

hoped to reform city structures through the City Charter Law of 1808. He was able through this means to give cities generous discretionary power over local concerns, but the Prussian state maintained a general right of supervision--including police and judicial functions (Gunlicks 1986, 8). It retained powers to review citizen complaint decisions, approve new city ordinances and confirm *Magistrat* members upon their local selection. Despite reforms in 1831, the Stein City Charter Law was influential throughout the 19th-century in creating relatively autonomous city governments (Gunlicks, 8). Stein's primary goal, however, was to "awaken the sleeping energy of the passive subjects" (Ernst Maste in Gunlicks, 7). He hoped to do this by setting up locally elected legislative councils and an executive *Magistrat* selected by council members. He thereby hoped to replace an inefficient and costly state administration with unpaid citizen-administrators (7).

The influence of the Stein reforms, although still felt today in some German states (*Länder*) (Gunlicks, 7), was not to take root as deeply in the Prussian monarch's residence, the city-state Berlin.² One reason is that "bureaucratic states" (181-2). Berlin was not one of these.

²Berlin is one of three German city-states (with Hamburg and Bremen) of Germany's original twenty-five created in 1871--a number reduced to 18 during the Weimar and consolidated to ten within West Germany after 1945 (Gunlicks 1986, 20). States primarily function to administer national laws, with cities having local administrative powers. While other city-states (notably Bremen) have kept separate state and city governments, Berlin, as the Prussian

frage was severely restricted. Citizen rights were only granted to men owning a house or having a yearly income of over 200 *Talern*, a rarity in the general population. As of the 1805 census, only 12,862 of Berlin's 155,706 residents would have qualified for voting rights (Reichhardt 1984, 91). Additionally, the Prussian monarch placed the Council and *Magistrat* directly under a mayor (*Oberbürgermeister*) nominated by him. In 1850, a three-class voting structure was created to expand citizen governance throughout Prussia, but the additional requirement of having to own a house restricted the reform's impact and the size of the voting population stagnated roughly where it had been (Reichhardt 1984, 91).

Finally, and most significantly, the power of the state bureaucracy in Berlin was so prevailing that the local council had no significant impact on major local development or housing policies. Here the king placed a branch of the police directly under the Minister of the Interior (*Innenminister*) with a special office for trade and con-

capital, did not. Since the 1949 Basic Law, although states kept some autonomous legislative competence (i.e., education), their greatest importance is still administrative. They can influence national legislation through representation in the national Senate (*Bundesrat*). Berlin, however, after the 1971 East-West Agreement was not recognized as a state of West Germany so was absent that role. In this regard, until 1989 West Berlin operated with a single governing Senat, or executive body, exercising both state and city functions.

struction. What today might be most readily associated with business licensing and inspections, the *Gewerbe-und Baupolizei* (business and construction police) was in a position to award the gas and water utilities (and in 1826 and 1851 assigned them to a private English company), was responsible generally for drawing up development plans, and was responsible for the layout and paving of streets until 1875, and for the determination of property and building lines. In fact, since the early 1800s, police powers were so broadly defined that they had a role in regulating industry and trade, churches, schools, health and poor laws. It was not until the end of the 19th-century that the nature of police responsibilities became closer to the modern notions of providing protection and safety (Reichhardt, 91; Gunlicks 1986, 8). These vast powers left development decisionmaking largely to state bureaucrats, with the monarch intervening where he desired and was able; and private interests were beginning to move into a role as an active force. City residents, particularly lower-income residents, were closed-out of formal processes.

Development of a New Economy: The Emergence of State-Managed Industrialization

Luisenstadt and the Kreuzberger Mixture

Centrally conceived and planned, Kreuzberg developed as an entirely unique combination of workers' and middle-

class residential district, business, industry, small workshops and a working class cultural center. Dieter Hoffman-Axthelm writes that Kreuzberg, compared with overall European industrialization, was a "singular occurrence." In no other industrial quarter could this unusual class mixture and industrial, residential, and business combination be found. The name *Kreuzberger Mischung*, or "Kreuzberg mixture," in fact, has come to stand for this unique blend, mostly found in Luisenstadt and SO36, less so in Friedrichstadt (Hoffmann-Axthelm 1984, 9-10).

Luisenstadt's early history as royal gardens was quickly overtaken with the late 1880s. As Friedrichstadt to the west and Neucölln to the south became overcrowded, an immigration wave flowed into Luisenstadt and SO36 bringing fine crafts workers including leather and silk craftsmen, gold workers, handkerchief finishers, stocking weavers. Köpenicker Straße became the manufacturing thoroughfare. Leather factories lined the old Jakobstraße, while after 1820 easterly streets became lined with vital cotton producers, and the occasional silk manufacturers. In 1836 metal producers also moved into Köpenicker Field, made possible by Luisenstadt's man-made canal. Heavy industry, however, was mostly found outside Kreuzberg. In 1836 the record of businesses showed textile trades as most prevalent, with cabinet-makers listed second. This

dominance of crafts over industry was not to change substantially in the late 1880s (Hoffman-Axthelm 1984, 11-12).

Berlin became an urban industrial center between 1855 and 1865 and, much like on the Lower East Side, a number of factors coincided to reshape Kreuzberg. One major factor was the drastic overpopulation of the countryside. As people left rural areas in search of employment, Luisenstadt's population increased from 16,742 in 1827 to 86,867 by 1861, climbing to 119,443 by 1864. In the fifteen years from 1849 to 1864, the population quadrupled. This meant a yearly increase in the 1860s of 10,000 new residents looking for work and needing housing (Hoffmann-Axthelm 1984, 13-14).

But of the many newcomers few would find work in Kreuzberg. Local employment, throughout the 1800s and up to the present, was for skilled workers. There were large employers--a sewing machine factory and a velvet factory, employing around 1,000 workers each--but the average sized firm for the district was closer to five employees. A typical place of employment for Kreuzberg was more likely a *Stockwerkfabrik*, a loft building with floors leased to various small workshops (Hoffman-Axtheld 1984, 16). Most local residents, subsequently, were skilled workers, shop owners, small business owners--the '*klein bürgerlich*,' or petty bourgeois resident.

The nature of the Kreuzberg tenement itself demonstrates this. The 1853 building code--affecting the later built SO36 more than the earlier planned Southern Friedrichstadt and Luisenstadt--allowed particularly dense construction. Hobrecht's deep city blocks were occupied by buildings extending into the block interior through wings on each side meeting a perpendicular building after a brief courtyard, forming a hollow square. These were sometimes repeated three deep, so that the entire block became densely packed by the continuous *Hinterhäuser*, or backyard extensions of each building. Needless to say, the price of rent depended entirely on how far into the block one lived, how much light and air one could afford. The tenants within a building, then, represented the entire class structure mix of the district. Hoffman-Axthelm described the results of a police search (for a building code violation) as a rather typical profile of community building residents: three journeymen joiners, three master joiners, two journeymen masons, one construction foreman, one board cutter, one day-laborer (Hoffman-Axthelm 1984, 14). On nearby streets one could easily find office workers, buyers, real-estate owning craftsmen, bureaucrats.

Most of the buildings were owned by craftsmen who ran a small workshop business in the back courtyards and employed perhaps two or more workers. In a typical situation, he rented the airy and most elegant front flat, over-

looking the street, to the well-to-do state bureaucrat or business owner and his family and servants. Other apartments with good light may have rented to skilled workers and their families. And the darkest, least healthy quarters, particularly the cellar flats, were rented to the unskilled laborer, a widow, a disabled worker. The unskilled workers were quite likely not employed in Kreuzberg, but were most probably traveling to jobs in the neighboring more industrial districts where work for unskilled labor was more plentiful. What Kreuzberg provided was a bounty of cheap flats, and the early development of sound transportation made it possible for workers to travel beyond their communities.

This addresses the potential for community participation, compared to the Lower East Side in three ways. First, unlike the East Side, masses of unskilled workers were not concentrated in unhealthy and dangerous workplaces in Kreuzberg; if they worked in Kreuzberg, they were most likely working in twos or threes at small courtyard or loft building workshops. Secondly, since some of the industrial workers labored outside of Kreuzberg, they did not even share a common workplace experience with other laborers living in their community. Thirdly, feelings of solidarity were less likely to emerge as a result of the vast class mixture of Kreuzberg residents. Those most exploited by living or working conditions were living not with other

workers, but with the local shop owners and bureaucrats with whom they shared little other than having the same landlord. Together, these factors created far less potential, unlike on the Lower East Side, for finding a common consciousness or organizing within the community.

S036 and the Potential of Commonality

Since the S036 district held the greatest concentration of unskilled workers and the severest living conditions, it is here that we can expect the greatest potential for community organizing. As mentioned earlier, in S036 private speculators and property owners exercised far greater control over development. That fact combined with Hobrecht's unusually deep city blocks led to the worst living conditions in Berlin. The latest of the Kreuzberg districts to be built, its second construction boom (following the Hobrecht Plan from the 1860s) began in 1883. The streets of "Schlesische Quarter" were built: Falckenstein, Cuvry and Taborstraße. And with a last construction period between 1896 and 1900, S036 was densely built with no remaining undeveloped parcels (Freyer 1989, 14).

Late construction concentrated on block interiors. A typical block by 1900 was fully ringed by bulky tenements and crossed in its middle interior by another row of tenements attached to the street level buildings by side wings, creating a grid of apartment buildings in the interior of

the block. The courtyards inside were extremely short, packed with work sheds and outdoor toilets. The overall quality of such living quarters was grim. On one parcel the glove-maker Emil Paul Haberkern built seventy-five apartment buildings in the short span between 1872 and 1875. They were crammed into two city blocks by adding connecting side-wings wherever possible--one especially long side wing held 230 apartments--creating devastating overcrowding (Thörnig 1989, 10-11).

Virtually no light made its way into the *Hinterhäuser*, or backyard apartment buildings. As in Luisenstadt, only more middle-class families could afford apartments in the street or corner buildings. Unskilled workers were packed into the dimly-lit interior flats. Tuberculosis (TB) and other communicable diseases were rampant. And in part because many of these buildings are still in use, SO36 is still the urban neighborhood with the highest TB rate in Europe (Freyer 1989, 9).

Response: The Welfare State

A German workers' movement began to emerge by the 1870s, if not fully in the Kreuzberg districts. Bismarck reacted to its potential and the harsh conditions of urbanization and industrialization through legislation, hoping to satisfy workers' grumbling before a powerful democratic force could coalesce. He erected a protective tariff

policy to address the agrarian depression; forced through the (Anti-) Socialist Laws and accompanied that repressive measure in the 1880s with clearly co-optive social measures. (Koch 1978, 273; Dalton 1989, 339). Bismarck hoped that government benefits for workers would sever 'the roots of Social Democracy' (Bismarck in Raff 1990, 158). And in selling social reform measures to the *Reichstag*, he took the stance of a champion of labor demands:

'The state must take this matter in hand. Not as charity but as a right to sustentation when the will to work no longer suffices. Why should those who were disabled by war or those civil servants disabled by old age have a pension while the soldiers of labour have none?' (Bismarck in Raff 1990, 159).

He was successful in getting a 1883 health insurance law creating public corporations to cover benefits for patient care; a 1884 accident insurance law to pay for treatment and provide a pension during recovery; and a 1889 law to provide disability and retirement benefits. As historian Diether Raff concludes, despite the resistance of Social Democrats and liberals to these clearly co-optive steps, the chancellor was successful in laying "the foundations of state intercession in social problems, an intercession which to this day remains an essential feature of German society" (Raff 1990, 159).

This creation of Germany as a social welfare state was followed by continuous expansion and adaptation without changing its basic premise. The work of Claus Offe

demonstrates that the major political parties did not disagree later over the basic system, but only over the details of when or how much benefits should increase--what he concludes from its origins was "depoliticized rigidity." This met its basic goals, as Offe explains it:

The German welfare state was originally uniquely designed to generate compliance, to be effective, and hence to provide stability within the parameters of this type of industrial social structure (Offe 1991, 124).

In Kreuzberg as well as in Germany generally, industrialization came very late, compared to the United States and elsewhere in Europe, and was characterized by its direct state intervention. This wider German state-industrial melding led, according to Ralf Dahrendorf, to a combination of economic patterns with an authoritarian political order. German industrialization was characterized by state ownership of property with paternalistic protections for workers administered by a "severe and benevolent paternal authority" that is primarily centralized (1967, 42). This foundation for economic development set by the state was laid as "the permanent goal of those running the state to uphold a more rigid notion of order, by force if needed, against the 'threats' of capitalistic anarchy" (40-41). Workers had no reason to press their demands with business, because the state had set a pattern of taking the responsibility for industrial development's effects. In short, the speed and lateness of industrialization plus the "dynastic state"

structures of Prussia, according to Dahrendorf, are the two factors at the core of Germany's unique state development (45). The "industrial feudal society" combined with Prussia's "authoritarian welfare state," to create an effect which carried into recent years (58).

This style limits participation while paternalistically ruling in the interests of the workers:

Those in power are not exposed to any decisive control by representative institutions, but instead prevent the many from political participation. At the same time, the authoritarian regime is not one of arbitrary power. Its leaders do not rule by terror, but by that mixture of severity and benevolence that characterizes the patriarchal family (59).

The welfare state measures and the leadership style of the national regime had clear limiting effects on community activism. This influence combined with Kreuzberg's unique class mixture and its workshop economy to erect vast barriers to organizing. Not only did lower-income residents lack formal mechanisms for participation, but they were also largely missing the opportunity for a common consciousness to arise from the workplace, from living conditions, from a common struggle for basic social benefits.

Nonetheless, activism did evolve in Kreuzberg, its form deeply affected by the structural and cultural influences discussed here. Chapter Six will next address the nature of early Kreuzberg community participation and how this addresses the shape of activism found in the 1975 to 1985 period.

Chapter 6

ACTIVISM AND CORPORATISM IN KREUZBERG'S POLITICAL CULTURE

Although Berlin residents were denied formal mechanisms of participation, they were active in seeking to create political power. One early attempt, following on the heels of the 1948 French Revolution and the 1847 "hunger year" in Germany, was the March 1848 Revolution in Berlin when workers and others demanded basic political rights. When the king's troops opened fire on the crowds, some two hundred barricades were quickly erected, persisting through a sixteen hour battle with the troops. Eventually, the king did grant some rights (of the press, of assembly, to raise a militia), but the only lasting impact of the 1848 Revolution for Berlin residents was the municipal code of 1850 and its nearly meaningless three-class franchise.

Workers were finding a sense of solidarity, however. German workers and craftsmen organized a national German Workers' Association in London in 1840. Following the 1848 March Revolution, a Universal German Workers' Convention was held in Berlin creating on September 3, 1848 the German Workers' Association (*Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeiterverbrüderung*) (Grebing 1987, Raff 1988). These signs of com-

mitment to expanding workers' rights, however, were found largely on a national level. Workers' local political associations were rare. And with reason. In reaction to the 1848 Revolution, the monarch took concrete action to keep radicalism from taking root. In 1850 the Prussian monarch created the Organization Law (*Vereinsgesetz*) which forbid the organization of political groups (Grebing 1987, 192). And while it was lifted in the early 1860s in some provinces--in 1861 in Sachsen, for instance--it remained in effect in Prussia until 1869 (Grebing 1987, 53). The effect of the laws was to leave organizational activities to a committed leadership core willing to take on tremendous risk and able to work diligently at creating structures for the union movement.

To see the effectiveness of the Association Laws on local protest or workers' political actions, one needs only to observe the wave of strike activities from the time the laws were lifted. From 1869 to 1873, with a peak at 1872, Prussia witnessed a massive strike wave by textile workers, shoemakers, cigarette makers, metalworkers and others. 1869 alone witnessed 152 strikes in Germany including the first major mass strike of 6,000 to 7,000 coal miners in Niedersachsen. In 1872 the number of strikes in one year had risen to 352. Workers demanded higher wages, better working conditions, the ten-hour day and the right to organize workplace unions (Grebing 53-4). By 1872 the state bureaucracy

began to crack down on strike activities once again, until strikes were forbidden altogether in early 1874 (Grebing 56).

This level of activity is especially important in addressing how the skilled workers of Kreuzberg participated politically. Historian Helga Grebing documents that the overwhelming proportion of politically active workers were craftsmen and skilled workers, not unskilled:

The untaught were not ready for strikes and organizing because of their constantly susceptible position in business cycles; and the trades, with their higher earnings and a heightened social prestige, remained long within the domain of the liberals (Grebing 1987, 57; a.tr.).

In 1870, forty percent of organized labor (two to three percent of workers were organized by this time) belonged to the liberal Hirsch-Dunckerschen Union, forty percent were organized by socialist or socialist-democratic unions, and the remaining by religious-socialist organizations (Grebing 57). Of the latter, the Protestants had begun reaching out to impoverished workers as early as 1833 when they established the Hamburg 'Tough House,' an education asylum sheltering orphans. Similarly, in 1848 the 'home missions' trained nurses who spread out across Germany caring for the sick. The Catholic Church, however, was particularly active in combining a similar mission with union organizing. The first Catholic journeymen's unions (*Gesellenvereine*) was founded in 1846 blending education with specific incentives

for joining such as sickness and old age benefits (Raff 1988, 103).

It bears reviewing here that, although Kreuzberg workers had a high level of political resources as relatively well-off skilled workers, a number of factors mediated their activism: the repressive political environment of the Prussian capital city, the national intermittent laws against political organizations, and the "Kreuzberger Mixture" which stunted class consciousness by creating a diverse residential class mix and small workplaces. Nonetheless, workers did eventually organize politically, beginning in the 1860s. Again, however, the structural constraints on political activism led the political organization of workers to take place on a national, not local level. A description of the development of a workers' party will further illustrate the lack of early community activism.

SPD and Continuity of the Bureaucracy

The history of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) partially accounts for the limited role of community workers' political participation. In fact, the history of SPD is a history of centralizing labor power. Beginning in 1863 Ferdinand Lassalle helped to organize a radical faction of the *Arbeiterbildungsverein* (a workers' self-help education association) with the intent to win universal suffrage

in Germany. He constructed an authoritarian structure to drive the struggle, with himself at the helm, but died one year later. Equally authoritarian, his predecessor Jean Baptiste von Schweitzer maintained the centralized organization and tripled its membership to over 16,000. A faction split with Schweitzer over the lack of democratic governance, establishing the Social Democratic Workers' Party (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*), SAP, pressing for state-aided producers' cooperatives and other Marxist International demands. But the parties merged in 1875 at Gotha in part as added protection from stepped-up police harassment of both groups. The result was the Socialist Workers Party (SAPD) and the early base for social democracy (Hunt 1970, 2-7).

This brief review of social democracy's beginnings addresses two factors relevant to our discussion of working class community participation. First, it emphasizes the extent to which the authoritarian Prussian regime shaped early workers' associations; through the fear of labor organizations, the state was driven to suppress organizing, effectively centralizing it. Specifically, the Association Laws of the 1850s and early 1860s made illegal the creation of local branches within political organizations. This pushed labor groups to base decisionmaking centrally. In the case of the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein* (ADA), Lassalle could dominate decisionmaking at the top and have

deputies manage local units (Hunt 4). Although this was a structural way to hide local branches, it later became an excuse not to give local units autonomy. SAP, in contrast, circumvented the Association Laws by creating independent local units, only loosely bound (6). In fact, the ADA had been banned by the Prussian state just before the merger of ADA and SAP in 1875, giving SAP an open door to insist on its style of decentralization. Its new center was in Hamburg where the Association Law was more flexible. But just as decentralized decisionmaking became a reality, Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Law in 1878 banned the social democrats entirely. Against this background of a repressive Prussian state, with its centralized and bureaucratic control and accompanying economic and aristocratic elite, the development of a hierarchical labor opposition in response is not surprising. But this answer was ultimately not the most effective mechanism for empowering labor. As Dahrendorf has argued, "The expectation that by its own nationalism it could help labor to social acceptance and its organizations to political recognition had to be vain" (Dahrendorf 1967, 182).

Secondly, these early state maneuvers gave social-democratic leaders an opportunity to recover their preferred centralized structure. Evidence indicates that the Anti-Socialist Laws merely ended the debate on governance. Annual meetings were held in Switzerland and leadership in

Germany was assumed by the party's Reichstag deputies (the law did not bar social-democratic candidates from running for office). Local social-democratic "clubs" met clandestinely as sports, smoking clubs, education groups, but they nonetheless had no real power in decisionmaking.

By the time Anti-Socialist Laws were allowed to lapse in 1890, and the newly named Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) was officially recognized, SPD's structure was established and was not to change significantly up until 1933. The central congress, although composed of local delegates, elected executive and judicial branches. Two chairpersons, two secretaries and a treasurer acted as the executive submitting annual reports and running the organization between congresses. Local units chose Reichstag deputies but deputies were expected to vote as a unit according to congress-mandated resolutions. Through this hierarchy, SPD concentrated its efforts to build a mass party for winning elections. By 1903 SPD's efforts were rewarded when it captured twenty-four percent of the total vote (over three million votes) sending 81 deputies to the Reichstag.

In short, workers were generally closed-out of the political arena until the creation of Social Democracy. But the SPD quickly became a hierarchical mass party allowing little chance for participation beyond election-time votes. This turn of affairs was cemented by the party's 1905

reforms. Local units were replaced by election district organizations; *Land* or regional units were established as a middle tier through which local communications had to pass; local units were to pass on twenty percent of all dues to the central organ. Annual financial and organizational reports were required of all branches at every level and secretaries were hired to keep records. As important, secretaries were nominated at the local level, but were appointed and paid by central offices. As a result, they tended to reflect the perspective of the central office and gained clout in local decisionmaking. For these reasons, historian Richard Hunt marks 1905 as the "inception of the party bureaucracy" (Hunt 1970, 13).

Given this history, however, internal SPD interests cannot be viewed as monolithic. The most intense early internal pressure (before the devastating later split over Germany's entrance into World War I) erupted around the issues of mass strikes and effective strategies in increasing labor's power. Berlin became a focal point for these debates, and in no other labor center was the fighting as bitter (Glaeßer, Lehnert, Sühl 1989, VII). Mass strikes had already gained appeal among Berlin's industrial workers. At the peak of the strike movement was a mass strike by 12,000 construction workers in the summer of 1885. Even the Anti-Socialist Law could not stop mass strikes. Again, on May 19, 1900 a mass strike of street-car workers demonstrated

the anxiousness of workers to exercise their new and growing strength (Grebing 1987, 77).

It could not be said that the Kreuzberg districts were the center for this activism. Rather, it was neighboring Prenzlauerberg, with its cafés and meeting halls, that the radical scene called home. Kreuzberg, with its liberal skilled workers played primarily two roles in the rise of the labor movement: a publishing center and a place for workers' education. The general strike pamphlet came usually from the Freier Arbeiter-Verlag in Naunyn Straße 73 and Vorwärts, the SPD press, was also located in Kreuzberg within the publishing district in southern Friedrichstadt.

The *Arbeiterkulturbewegung* (workers' culture movement) quickly took root with the more liberal skilled workers of Kreuzberg. Heavily promoted by SPD leader August Bebel, the movement was to upgrade workers' culture: "The socialist society is forming not in order to live proletarian, rather in order to abolish the proletarian way of life for the many" (Bebel in Glaeßner et al. 1989 IV). Education clubs were not only a way earlier to skirt the Anti-Association and Anti-Socialist Laws, but were to be a base on which to build labor consciousness and to overcome what were viewed as underclass traditions and forms of industrial capitalism culture (Glaeßner et al. 1989, XII). That they developed primarily after 1890 emphasizes the desire of moderate SPD leadership to push for educational

workers' organizations to counter more radical demands for direct participation and massive strikes.

Kreuzberg *Kneipen* (local pubs) and workers' clubs became gathering opportunities for skilled workers to socialize, learn and discuss politics. Precisely because the "Kreuzberg mixture" had fostered isolation, these new opportunities created possibilities for the development of a new workers' consciousness. The racing cyclists' club "Luisenstadt 1910," "Sportclub Adler," the wrestlers' club "Adler Ost" are examples of an organizing theme used to organize workers and to gather families into community groups (Haben 1984, 253). Even SPD's leftist factions in the early years of the *Kulturbewegung* supported raising workers' consciousness. The learning center in Lindenstraße 3 in 1910 is indicative: Rosa Luxemburg instructed students in "political economy and political history," Franz Mehring in "German history since the middle ages," while others taught the "History of socialism," and "Workers' rights" (Pforte 1984, 295).

But increasingly, the deep divisions between SPD's internal factions--especially over war credits and ending the war--affected socialist unity. "*Realpolitiker*" like Friedrich Ebert, Philipp Scheidemann, Gustav Noske, remained the core while the more revolutionary "fundamental opposition," like Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and Karl Liebknecht, split off as the Spartacus, later founding their own

party, the Communist Party (KPD) on January 1, 1919. The "independents" like Georg Ledebour and Hugo Haase, who had founded the Independent Socialists (USPD) in the spring of 1917, also continued to battle the center, a division that came to street fighting in Berlin by January, 1918 (Kaak 1988, 77; Peukert 1992, 26; Miller 1988, 309). In order to maintain party discipline and strength, SPD's centrist leadership faction became resisted opposition, particularly from its left. Even at the time of the 1918/19 Revolution, SPD shunned incorporation of radical demands. Detlev Peukert points out the reliance of the revolutionary *Räte* (soldiers' and workers' councils) on local leaders as diverse as from the two workers' parties, and even liberal and Centre politicians in some regions.¹ A new order might have been created out of this ideologically mixed governance had the "pragmatic" SPD not stood uncompromisingly aside from these other interests (Peukert 1989, 27-8). Hegemony, not compromise or co-optation of other left interests, was at the roots of SPD's rise to power in the Weimar Republic. This continued to reinforce the pattern of conflictual politics on the local and national levels.

This was not true, however, of two other forces: the bureaucracy and the military. Peukert explains that in

¹The Centre Party was founded in 1868 and gained popularity as a defensive political device for Catholic Germans in the face of Bismarck's anti-Catholic policies from 1871-8 (see Paterson and Southern 1992, 22).

order to come to power, SPD had to put both elements in positions of strength. The bureaucracy, in fact, had never left power. Even during the Revolution of 1918/1919, the Reich government in Berlin maintained continuity in state administration, with leading administrators remaining in the bureaucracy (28-29). Even Max Weber, himself a member of the Heidelberg Workers and Soldiers' Council during the 1918 Revolution, became furious that the Revolutionary leaders chose to keep the professional bureaucracy in power but expected to effect fundamental change in governance:

Thus the present structure of the revolutionary state signifies nothing new in principle. It places power over the administration into the hands of absolute dilettantes, who, by virtue of their control of machine guns, would like to use expert officials only as executive heads and hands (Weber 1946, 92).

When SPD prevailed and constructed the Weimar Republic, Friedrich Ebert, a dominant influence, continued the governance pattern of the revolution and pressed for a continuance of the existing bureaucratic mechanisms and employees. Fearing the weak post-World War I bargaining power faced by the Bolsheviks and the domestic disorder, Ebert was, according to Peukert, obsessed with order. In November, 1918 Ebert shaped a compromise with the old military leadership (Peukert 1989, 29-30). And fundamental changes within the bureaucracy were never undertaken. In fact, this acceptance of the primacy of traditional administration was part of social democratic goals:

Finally, the preoccupation with order and administrative continuity was also a product of the statist tradition within German Social Democracy. Apart from a few theorists such as Rosa Luxemburg, German socialists had envisaged socialism not as a process of spontaneous self-organization by the masses but as an expansion of public administration designed to promote the general welfare (Peukert 1989, 30).

But while SPD set the groundwork for expansion of the welfare state, they also left in place the internal opposition presented by the old bureaucracy rooted in nationalism and based on service to the Kaiser. In contrast to the American bureaucratic roots, created as part of a Republican government, the German bureaucracy was created by the Prussian monarchy, born of patriarchal priorities, and served changing regimes thereafter, more or less intact with a continuity in power and traditions. While German society after the 1890s was becoming increasingly industrial and urban, in other words, the day-to-day mechanisms of the state remained inflexible and firmly rooted in a Prussian culture of the past.

The Local Political Milieu

Given the late planning and construction of much of Kreuzberg and the history of structural constraints on community activism, it is not surprising that a significant political blossoming did not occur until the early 1900s, and became truly activist only with the arrival of the 1920s (Haben 1984, 241). On April 27, 1920, under the new Weimar Republik, the new *Stadtgemeinde Berlin*, or city community

districts called *Bezirke*, were created. Kreuzberg became one district, combining the former southern Friedrichstadt, Luisenstadt including the eastern-most S036 area, and the southern skilled workers' community of Tempelhofer Vorstadt. This was to be the most populous and densely populated administrative district of Berlin. In addition, after the end of World War I and the Revolution of 1918/19, all remaining soldiers (a remnant of the Prussian military barracks) were moved out of Kreuzberg to areas beyond the city limits (Kaak 1988, 83-84).

The *Kneipen* again became a focal point for political activists, but political sympathies in Kreuzberg were very mixed. In the first vote for Kreuzberg district representatives, and the first vote after the Weimar elimination of suffrage restrictions, of 39 seats, 14 went to SPD, 20 to the more radical USPD (the "independent" splinter of the previously united SPD), and 5 to the Communist Party of Germany, KPD. After 1922, when the SPD and USPD once again united, SPD was the strongest political force in Kreuzberg until 1929. But once again, even though SPD was in the majority, it never successfully politicized its voters in the way that Prenzlauerberg or "red Wedding," an industrial workers' district to the north, were able to do (Kaak 1988, 85). The KPD was able to rally loyal clubs throughout Kreuzberg, although never a majority within the district. Between 1925 and 1933 over 100 *Straßenzeller*, or street

cells, were active and meeting regularly in *Kneipen* (Haben 1984, 252). But at the same time the nationalists and national socialists were also sharing some success. In fact, both the extreme left and right took solid hold in Kreuzberg.

"First food, then rent"

The Berlin rent strike of 1932 is a clear illustration of how community-level demands speedily shaped themselves into a central organization--even though internal political loyalties were divided--which was then coopted by the policies of a national party in government. The immediate causes of the strike were unemployment, poverty, housing shortages and deteriorating conditions. In general, the Berlin economy did not go far towards recovery after World War I. Kreuzberg, for example, became a community of the unemployed--between 1924 and 1928 ever increasing numbers of Kreuzberg residents were receiving public assistance. But with the New York stock market crash in 1929, and the ensuing international repercussions, unemployment skyrocketed. The level of unemployment increased until it reached a peak in 1932. This massive unemployment (see Table 6.1) in Kreuzberg and in Berlin led tenants to openly question their levels of rents and living conditions. On July 27, 1932, a meeting of 180 tenant representatives from fourteen tenement buildings decided to go on rent strike

beginning on August first. Their demands: a thirty percent rent reduction and forgiveness of all back-rent due from the tenants of the real estate corporation Mädlerschen Grundstückverwertungs AG.

Table 6.1 Kreuzberg Unemployment, 1928-1932

<u>Date</u>	<u>Unemployment and Welfare Recipients</u>
January 1, 1928	15,087
January 1, 1929	41,645
January 1, 1930	57,859
January 1, 1932	81,917
December 31, 1933	62,611

Source: Calculated from Renate Freyer. "Die Entstehung des Stadtteils." in ...außer man tut es! hrsg. Renate Freyer und Raimund Thörnig (Berlin: Grenzlos, 1989), 15.

Meanwhile, a similar strike hit Prenzlauer Berg, Kreuzberg's eastern neighbor. The site was a former prison building, the "Wanzenburg," where the former cells became home to entire families. One hundred ten families voted to go on strike demanding a fifty percent rent reduction. After negotiations--which included the Social Democratic Party (SPD)--the rent was cut by forty to forty-two percent and overdue bills were forgiven.

As strikes sprang up around the city the SPD assisted in negotiations, although they did not fully endorse the growing move to strike. In fact, even while

they hoped for negotiated settlements on the hottest strike sites to generally calm the general city-wide strike fever, their hopes were snuffed as it quickly gathered energy. With settlements in individual buildings receiving extensive press coverage, and the hope for positive results rising, in September of 1932, 35,000 tenants city-wide were striking. The movement organized itself by house-delegates voting at central meetings. One September meeting drew 1,000 tenant delegates. By the beginning of 1933, tenants were sending 3,300 representatives to the central deliberation (Rada 1992).

Kreuzberg, particularly the Luisenstadt section, was devastated by unemployment after World War I. Its workshops were ideally suited for munitions manufacturing and during the war it had become a virtual gun-forging center. Peacetime left thousands out of work and hard-pressed to make rent payments (Hoffmann-Axthelm 1984, 18). Kreuzberg was engulfed by the strike wave as thousands participated (Freyer 1990). In one of the most notable, in Köpenicker Straße number 34/35, around thirty working-class residents--predominantly community women--went on strike and sat as delegates in a community meeting of Kreuzberg strikers.

In fact, as was seen in the Lower East Side rent strikes and meat boycotts, the overwhelming basis of the entire Berlin movement was women tenants, women from unemployed households suffering from deplorable housing con-

ditions, and simply unable to meet the rent. Of the sixty-three Köpenicker 34/35 tenants, living in the "totally dilapidated" building, fifty-eight were on strike, six of whom were employed (Rote Fahne, Oct. 1, 1932, in Rada). Most were four to five months behind in their rent. Their demands were similar to most in the movement: a fifty percent rent reduction, a cancellation of back rent, and building renovations including provisions for indoor toilets. In this case, the building was owned by the city of Berlin, which offered to settle with a ten percent rent reduction. They refused the settlement and continued the strike (Rada).

As the strike spread to all areas, it affected small private landlords, real estate corporations, city-owned buildings and the holdings of the city's public-private housing corporations. The strikes were born of necessity, unlike the more idealistic strikes of the 1920s that demanded specific changes in housing policy and the building of public housing. In contrast, the strikes of 1932/1933 were sparked by the inability of unemployed workers to meet the demands of high rents driven by a housing shortage. This fact is dramatized by the often-heard motto: "You can kill a person with an apartment just as you can with an axe to the head" (Rada, a.tr).

Most importantly here, the strike wave was so spontaneous that leaders were scurrying to harness tenants' anger into a political force. Both SPD and the KPD tried to

lead various negotiations, but neither took credit for the movement or could rally its force under one political ideology. Strikers were as likely to be KPD as SPD or NSDAP (National Socialist) and, interestingly, it often happened that striking houses could be identified by the variety of party flags hung from the windows, KPD side-by-side with Nazi party flags. Table 6.2 demonstrates the wide split of party loyalties in Kreuzberg.

Table 6.2

Kreuzberg and Berlin Voting Results, 1928-1933

Reichstags vote

		SPD	KPD	DNVP	DDP	DVP	Zentrum	NSDAP
1928	Kreuzberg	35.5	25.1	27.4	6.4	5.2	3.3	1.7
	Berlin	32.9	24.6	17.7	7.6	6.4	3.3	1.6
1930	Kreuzberg	28.7	29.2	13.1	4.3	2.5	3.6	14.0
	Berlin	27.2	27.3	13.0	5.7	3.7	3.6	17.6
Juli	Kreuzberg	28.3	30.1	7.4	1.2	0.5	4.0	26.6
1932	Berlin	27.3	27.3	8.3	1.6	0.8	4.9	28.7
Nov.	Kreuzberg	24.2	34.5	10.2	1.1	0.7	4.2	22.7
1932	Berlin	23.3	31.0	11.4	1.4	1.1	4.4	26.0
1933	Kreuzberg	22.9	27.0	10.0	1.2	0.6	4.8	32.8
	Berlin	21.7	24.5	11.0	1.8	0.9	5.0	34.6

Bezirksverordnetenversammlung (Kreuzberg district Assembly vote)

1929	31.0	26.0	17.6	4.7	4.8	4.0	4.0
1933	23.6	22.0	11.1	1.3	0.4	4.7	36.1

Source: Renate Freyer. 1989. ...ausser man tut es! (Berlin: Grenzlos), 17.

The major tenant organizations did, however, have some influence. Unlike American tenants, German tenants were organized into national tenant organizations. One of the most powerful, Der Bund Deutscher Mietervereine (The Association of German Tenant Unions), was first founded in 1900 in Leipzig to counter the ever more powerful real estate owners' associations (Riese 1988, 69). It became a major force in the Berlin 1932/33 rent strikes when it began negotiating with the National Socialists for fundamental housing policy programs. While the local Berlin tenants' organization, the Berliner Mieterschaft, had avoided entering into the larger political debates surrounding the strikes helping instead to negotiate with landlords, Der Bund Deutscher Mietervereine worked with the NSDAP to implement public housing policies of rent controls and increased housing production. What was to be the pinnacle of the rent strike, a city-wide meeting of strikers' delegates on February, 1933, never took place. On January 30, 1933, Adolph Hitler came to power and the Bund Deutscher Mietervereine became the official body representing tenants (Rada 1992). This effectively quelled leftist housing demands and abruptly ended the work of another national tenants' organization, Der Reichsbund Deutscher Mieter, which had worked with both SPD and KPD, as well as with unions on national issues (Riese 1988, 287).

Conclusions

In sum, many factors that political scientists and historians have found to be indicators of working class or lower-income resident collective action were not present in Kreuzberg's history; quite to the contrary, indicators of social control were overwhelming. First, the Prussian state restricted voting rights so extensively, that until the Weimar Republic, workers, defined by their income level and non-property holding status (even, in practicability, under the expanded three-class suffrage), could not vote for representatives.

Secondly, the Anti-Socialist Law of 1878 forbade the most likely organizing of workers: that of union organization or other labor action groups. The early Association Laws, worse than restricting collective action, shaped it by mandating centrally-run organizations, giving the labor party incentives to solidify its already hierarchical decisionmaking structure. Although some collective action was possible, given these structural restrictions, a style of participation inclusive of community organizations or community-level collective actions was least likely to emerge.

Third, social factors were also influential. George Rudé found in his study of industrial British workers in the 1800s, that a "cohesive culture" among individuals is vital to collective action. While British workers were engaged in organizing and other actions in the 1830s and 1840s, in the 1850s he found that a "self-improvement" climate dampened this inertia. The benefits of various free trade laws had brought some economic stability to the lower-classes; the Tories and Cobbettites had co-opted popular workers' demands; and, most importantly, an atmosphere of "self-improvement"--through media campaigns, encouragement to unemployed workers to move to Canada and Australia, and the general "propagation of middle-class values," like self-improvement and personal salvation--created a cultural stability which did not favor collective protest (Rudé 1980, 158-164).

Similarly, in Kreuzberg the labor movement was forced underground into self-improvement groups as camouflage for illegal organizing, but the disguise became reality over time as local SPD branches lost their place in significant decisionmaking. The shift of SPD into government as a major political party confirmed the sense that workers were well provided for. The tradition of the state as a paternal care-giver was already a comfortable one, having been established by SPD's royal predecessors. Regardless of the governing regime, the continuity was the

machinery of the social welfare bureaucracy. Established by a monarch, maintained by the 1918/19 revolutionaries, the Weimar Social Democrats and the fascist National Socialists and post-World War II regimes, it is a continuous stabilizing influence among lower-income residents.

Nonetheless, these factors should not be taken as indicators of complacent low-income participants; they more correctly address what styles of participation will be most likely used and most effective. There is, simply put, no tradition of community organizing within Berlin's history; for while there has been organizing and protest actions in communities, the focus quickly shifts to city-wide policies or, more often, issues of national or international scope. Since the parliamentary agenda is narrowly set by SPD, *Außer-Parlamentarische Opposition* (APO, opposition outside of parliament) was to become a more prevalent means of changing government policies. Direct action generally, circumventing both legislative and administrative structures was a reaction to closed decisionmaking. But, importantly, in reaction to closed and centralized policymaking, protest actions from the 1960s through the 1980s were to concentrate on issues of national and international scope as priorities of an APO presence. Community organizing will be found, but as Margit Mayer's research confirms, even local protest actions quickly become focused on issues outside of the community:

Given the relatively centralized German federal system, and the integrated party structure, but especially given the highly statist and corporate system of interest regulation, most German citizens' initiatives, while locally based, frequently become nationally focused. Whenever opposition to a local issue emerges...the protest immediately confronts the whole state and the whole party apparatus (Mayer 1989, 352).

The Kreuzberg protest movement of the 1975 to 1985 period to be addressed in the next chapters was shaped by the structural and cultural past of the Prussian hierarchy, the centralization and bureaucratization of labor interests and structural discouragement of community-level participation. When a community movement erupted in the mid-1970s, it was to be a protest of city-wide policies and closed bureaucratic decisionmaking and less a grassroots effort by lower-income community residents. Above all, the protests were to be targeted at the state--as decisionmaker *and* as property-owner, the administrator of real-estate--in contrast to the Lower East Side, where actions were to be aimed vastly at private developers and landlords.

Chapter 7

A DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT OF KREUZBERG: 1975-1985

A good understanding of Kreuzberg's demography for the 1975-1985 period is necessary for explaining the styles of political participation used during those years. In a sense, Kreuzberg was created anew by the in-migration of two sizable populations: young adults from other West German states and foreign-born workers. The groups had no earlier attachments to Kreuzberg and little meaningful knowledge of its past. Indeed, Kreuzberg's history rested under the community's surface like an undiscovered ancient burial ground. For the nearly one third of residents who immigrated from Turkey and other, mostly South European countries, in 1975 their own only recently unpacked suitcases cradled the pictures and reminiscences of another past. Young Germans moving into Kreuzberg were not initially interested in the history of their new home: their purpose in moving was to create a fresh way of living; to break with the past, not rediscover it. Much about Kreuzberg's political past and participatory structures, or lack of them, would shape participation during the 1975-1985 period, but often residents would be unaware of these influences. As on the Lower East

Side, the political dynamics of Kreuzberg changed significantly with the influx of new residents and immigrants with a different political heritage. The diversity itself became a factor in determining local participatory modes as did the desire of young Germans to reject the political institutions established by earlier generations.

The Berlin Wall: A Rupture in History

When the Soviet east-sector occupation forces built the Berlin Wall in August, 1961, thousands of West Berliners packed and moved to "West Germany." Many feared that the allied forces would not succeed in securing the "island" of West Berlin from forced incorporation into the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or "East Germany." Especially because East Berlin had been chosen as the capital city for the GDR, the armed take-over of the western sectors seemed, to many West Berlin residents, imminent. West Berlin's post-World War II population peaked in 1958 at 2,225,900 and declined steadily to 1,860,084 in 1985 and further until the removal of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But while the Berlin population experienced a decline of more than twelve percent in the years of the Wall, the population loss was felt unevenly by the city's *Bezirke*, or districts. Three *Bezirke*--Wedding, Charlottenburg and Kreuzberg--each lost more than 22,000 residents between 1974 to 1980 alone (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 1981, 38). In Kreuzberg,

the population shrunk from about 211,000 in 1950 to just 159,000 by 1970 (23).¹ Between 1970 and 1985, Kreuzberg lost over 35,000, almost 21.7% of its residents (see Table 7.1).

When the Wall was erected, Kreuzberg lost its position at the city's heart and suddenly became the periphery to a new "West Berlin." This event physically cut Kreuzberg off from its past. Neighborhood shops next to the Wall went out of business when neighbors from the eastern streets could no longer visit, the much-used Treptower Park to the

¹This total differs from that recorded by the Berliner Statistisches Jahrbuch. Most of the data presented in this chapter is drawn from special reports of the Berlin Statistics Office (*Statistisches Landesamt Berlin*), from a monthly statistics journal, Berliner Statistik, and from the Berlin Statistical yearbook, Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (also a publication of the Statistisches Landesamt Berlin). These reports are largely based on data collected from Berlin's governmental, especially service-delivery, agencies. The last major attempt at a general census in 1987 was widely challenged as an invasion of privacy and the accuracy of its data questioned by the claims of organized groups to have given deliberately false data to census takers. This project avoided relying solely on that census. Various totals used here may differ depending on the agency providing data. Some figures are based, for example, on year-end totals, some on yearly averages. An interview by the author with a statistician at the Berlin Statistics Office confirmed that Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch, as a separate division, routinely provides different totals than those of Berliner Statistik and other publications--a research impediment that has been noted by others compiling community demographics (Weiher 1987, 4). This author has made every effort to use one source or consistent sources within tables and to double check data whenever a second source was available.


Table 7.1 Population for Kreuzberg and Berlin (West), 1970-1985

<u>Year</u>	<u>Kreuzberg</u>	<u>Berlin (West)</u>
1970	162,626	2,122,815
1975	143,700	1,984,800
1980	130,100	1,896,200
1985	127,393	1,860,084

¹ Figures indicate year-end totals


Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1971), p. 32; Ibid. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1981), p. 38; Ibid. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1986), p. 42.

Map 7.1 Berlin (West), Kreuzberg and Statistical Districts



Source: Statistisches Landesamt

Map 7.2 Kreuzberg Statistical Districts (12-17) and Postal
Districts (36, 61)



east became inaccessible, and two normally lively streets became dead-end roads (Thörnig 1989, 22).²

The new West Berlin government promoted the rebuilding of this curious urban space by announcing its first urban renewal program in 1963 for the Kreuzberg district closest to the Wall, "S036"--or postal district south-east 36 (see Maps 7.1 and 7.2). Building permits were denied, local construction frozen as the city held Kreuzberg in a "renewal anticipation district" (*Sanierungserwartungsgebiet*). As community historian Raimund Thöring explains, "Those who were able--above all young families--moved away; left behind were the old, the socially disadvantaged groups, primarily in the old buildings in bad repair" (1986, 22-3). Kreuzberg became depopulated as residents moved out and buildings sank into disrepair. Meanwhile, students moved into the now cheaper apartments as did new immigrants, mostly Turkish workers invited by the Federal Republic of Germany to fill a national labor shortage.

In other words, Berlin's uncertain status, security threats and general discomforts from its physically isolated, walled-in status, led to an exodus from the city; but Kreuzberg, within sight of the Wall and its armed patrol, was considered unappealing even by many of those remaining in the city.

²Köpenicker Straße and Schlesische Straße.

"Guest workers" and the New Immigrants

As dramatic as the Kreuzberg out-migration seems, these statistics underplay the true extent of the demographic upheaval. For while long-time district residents were leaving Kreuzberg, and in some cases Berlin, foreign-born "guest workers" ("*Gastarbeiter*") were moving in. This was the result of negotiated contracts between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and southern European neighbors to solve the post-World War II labor shortage.

As early as 1955, Italy and the FRG had negotiated an arrangement by which Italian seasonal farm laborers were brought to Baden-Württemberg at the expense of the local farmers' association for a six-month period (Meier-Braun 1983, 107). By December, 1955 the Italian and West German governments formalized the experiment on a larger scale, with workers brought in at the FRG's expense. Similar agreements followed with Spain and Greece in 1960, 1961 with Turkey, 1964 with Portugal, with Morocco and Tunisia in 1965 and finally, Yugoslavia in 1968 (Meier-Braun 108). That the workers were frequently called "guest workers" emphasizes the expectation by Germans that the arrangement was temporary; guests, after all, do eventually go "home."

Meanwhile, in a cost-benefit analysis conducted in 1977 by Rudolf Blitz, it was found that foreign workers had sustained the FRG's economic growth, rescuing it from a labor shortage and doing manual labor German workers would

often not accept (Blitz 1977). David Conradt estimated that, particularly in large cities, foreign workers accounted for from 15 to 20 percent of the work force and likely 30 to 40 percent of all manual workers (Conradt 1989, 65). Additionally, Blitz points out, during this early period the FRG benefited from a population of workers in their most productive years without having paid the cost of workers' education or other social costs as these were borne by the country of origin. Calculating these savings combined with taxes and social insurance contributions paid to the FRG by their "guests," Blitz found that the indirect benefits were approximately 10 billion per year for the late 1960s and early 1970s (Blitz 1977).

When a serious recession hit West Germany in the mid-1970s, however, the labor shortage ended. The recruitment of foreign labor was withdrawn (excepting European Community, EC, workers) officially in November, 1973 (Braun-Meier 108). With families joining workers, however, and with a high birth-rate among foreign workers in Germany, the population of immigrant residents grew from 110,000 in 1957 to 2.5 million in 1973 and 4.7 million by 1988. Of the over 4.7 million, 1.7 million remained in the workforce (Conradt 1989).

The official policies of the FRG toward immigrant non-German residents since the mid-1970s into the 1980s is worth detailing for it reveals much about the possibilities

that can be expected for immigrants' political participation in urban renewal policymaking. After the 1973 ban on further entry for non-EC workers, it became clear that most immigrants were not returning to their countries of origin. Additional steps were made to encourage their departure. For example, the state of Baden-Württemberg offered unemployed workers 6,000 DM to return home (Meier-Braun 109). In 1983, the FRG governing party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), initiated a policy of paying 10,000 DM and a pension refund to workers and their families if they agreed to return home. The CDU administration claimed that at least 500,000 foreigners took this offer (Dalton 1989, 89).

Meanwhile, the West German, state and local governments made it difficult for non-Germans to integrate into German society, despite the overwhelming evidence that they, particularly the largest population, the Turks did not plan to leave. Even ethnic Turks and other immigrants who were born in Germany, including by the late 1970s third-generation immigrants, were not automatically granted citizenship since citizen rights are rooted in German ancestry, not place of birth. The FRG constitution, The Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), states in Article 116.1 that:

A German, in the sense of this Basic Law is...one who possesses German citizenship or has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich, as it stood on December 31, 1937, as a refugee or exile of German ethnic origin

or as a spouse or descendant of such a person (a.tr.)
(Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik, S.80).

In other words, an ethnic non-German was not granted citizenship even if s/he is born in Germany, while an ethnic German born abroad is entitled to claim citizenship.³ Aliens could apply for permanent residency after five to eight years and citizenship after ten years, under the 1965 *Ausländergesetz* (Foreigner Law), but citizenship was, in fact, seldom awarded.⁴ The citizenship law, first drafted in 1913, is so restrictive that even children born to two non-German parents both born in Germany have to go through a lengthy, expensive and complicated process to apply for citizenship. Recently, a CDU member of Parliament, Erwin Marschewski commented in frustration:

We have to make it easier to become German. We have too many cases of people who were born in Germany or who have lived most of their lives here, who speak the language and are fully integrated, but who cannot become citizens...On the other hand, a baby born in Brazil is entitled to German citizenship if he is descended from some German who emigrated in 1850, even if the family has lost all contact with Germany (Marschewski in Kinzer 1993, A8).

³This was revised with the War Consequences Consolidation Act, effective January 1, 1993, so that descendants born after this date will not be considered German nationals (see Manfred Kuechler. The Germans and the 'others': Racism, xenophobia, or self-defense? Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C. 2-5 September 1993).

⁴The new *Ausländergesetz* effective January 1, 1991 lengthened this period to fifteen years and closes the date for application at December 31, 1995. Children can apply after living in Germany for eight years and attending school for six (Bundesminister des Innern 1991).

John Ardagh reported in 1987 that of northern European countries, West Germany had the lowest yearly percentage of foreign residents who were granted citizenship. In Sweden 5.2% of foreign residents became citizens annually, in Great Britain, 2%, France 1.2%, while in the FRG, only .3% were awarded citizenship (Ardagh 1987, 250-1).

In Berlin the rate of citizenship for Turks, specifically, could be somewhat higher than Ardagh's national figures, but still well below two percent. As an example, 2,071 Turks had been naturalized as of 1988, almost all of these since 1972--due to the minimum required residency of at least ten years before one can apply for citizenship and the fact that the earliest entry for Turkish workers was in 1961 (see Table 7.2). Assuming a fairly immobile population (given their low income level and a lack of employment opportunities), this would mean that not more than 1.6% of the approximately 111,663 Turks in Berlin in 1987 are likely to be German citizens.⁵

⁵Calculated from Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 3/90, 51; Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 7/89. Although this calculation provides a good estimate for naturalization of Berlin Turks, comparable data for most other groups is not available. Citizenship data is recorded by place of naturalization and ethnic group. Data was not available for the legal status of residents by ethnic group. Turks are in all probability residents in the place of naturalization due to the requirements of first establishing permanent residency. All Turks, for example, granted citizenship in 1988 in Berlin were permanent residents there (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 7/89, 10). This is not true for those claiming citizenship based on German ancestry, under Basic Law Article 116, who may maintain residency elsewhere; for example, in 1988, 38% of Israelis granted citizenship resided outside of Germany, 23% of Brasilians, and 20% of

Table 7.2 Naturalized Persons in Berlin (West) by Country of Origin, 1945-1988

Country	1945-1971 (N/%)	1972-1988	1945-1988
Israel	4,431 (19.1)	2,181 (7.7)	6,612 (12.9)
Poland	650 (2.8)	5,042 (17.9)	5,692 (11.1)
Yugoslavia	390 (1.7)	1,842 (6.5)	2,232 (4.4)
Turkey	81 (0.3)	1,990 (7.1)	2,071 (4.0)
South Africa	258 (1.1)	1,153 (4.1)	1,411 (2.8)
Austria	909 (3.9)	497 (1.8)	1,406 (2.7)
Czechoslovakia	488 (2.1)	854 (3.0)	1,342 (2.6)
Great Britain	491 (2.1)	581 (2.1)	1,072 (2.1)
Hungary	543 (2.3)	367 (1.3)	910 (1.8)
Italy	331 (1.4)	555 (2.0)	886 (1.7)
Romania	333 (1.4)	556 (2.0)	889 (1.7)
Argentina	307 (1.3)	577 (2.0)	884 (1.7)
Greece	122 (0.5)	642 (2.3)	764 (1.5)
Other, state-less, undeclared	13,854 (59.7)	11,317 (40.2)	25,171 (49.0)
TOTAL	23,188 (100%)	28,154 (100%)	51,342 (100%)

Sources: Calculated from Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, Einbürgerungen in Berlin (West), 1988 (Berlin: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, Juli 1989) 4; Ibid. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1972), 35.

Table 7.2 shows that while Turks have been the single largest non-German resident group in Berlin since 1966, only 7.1% of all naturalizations between 1972-1988 have been of Turks. A larger proportion of naturalizations is found among Israelis and Poles, groups with quite low representation in the Berlin population during these years, but where ethnic-German ancestry and requests for asylum are factors. Of the four-class asylum priority classification, ethnic Germans are given first priority, and are considered "resettlers," not immigrants. Asylum-seekers coming from the former communist "Soviet-bloc" countries were also given priority. This means that Berlin, as the east-west port-of-entry, saw high numbers of immigrants in these categories, especially among Poles. Yugoslavians, meanwhile, have remained the second largest non-German resident group in Berlin since 1968, although in numbers significantly smaller than Turks (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 1983, 10-11; see Table 7.3). The relatively high proportion of naturalizations for both Poles and Yugoslavians compared with Turks may be linked partly to the greater burden the citizenship process puts on Turkish workers. One requirement of citizenship is a high level of proficiency in German--a difficult barrier for Turkish speakers, especially when the education level for Turks is particularly low among

South Africans (11).

Table 7.3 Foreign Population in Kreuzberg and West Berlin
for Select Nationalities¹

	1975				1980				1985			
	<u>Kreuzberg</u>		<u>West Berlin</u>		<u>Kreuzberg</u>		<u>West Berlin</u>		<u>Kreuzberg</u>		<u>West Berlin</u>	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Foreigners Total	37,909	26.4	185,559	9.3	38,216	29.4	233,011	12.3	38,974	30.6	248,656	13.4
Turks	25,513	17.7	85,452	4.3	25,870	19.9	114,306	6.0	25,707	20.2	111,618	6.0
Yugoslavians	5,277	3.7	30,027	1.5	4,226	3.2	31,564	1.7	3,284	2.6	30,316	1.6
Greeks	2,056	1.4	9,053	.4	1,154	.9	7,125	.4	1,128	.9	7,190	.4
Italians	618	.4	6,185	.3	681	.5	6,969	.4	771	.6	7,556	.4
Other Europeans	1,818	1.3	25,581	1.3	2,176	1.7	29,442	1.5	3,422	2.7	40,883	2.2
Other Non-Europeans	2,627	1.8	29,261	1.5	4,109	3.2	43,605	2.3	4,662	3.6	51,093	2.7
Population Total	143,700	100.0	1,984,837	100.0	130,100	100.0	1,896,200	100.0	127,393	100.0	1,860,084	100.0

Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. Berline Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1976), 30, 35; Ibid. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1981), 38-40; Ibid. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1986), 39, 50.

¹Figures indicate year-end totals.

immigrant groups. The great expense of the citizenship process is also a larger barrier for Turks as one of the poorest immigrant groups. Some Turks also hesitate to give up their Turkish citizenship from fear of losing unrestricted access to their families and other connections in Turkey. Most recently, a debate in Germany has focused on the issue of offering Turks dual-citizenship. But is presently a faint possibility. Finally, ethnic discrimination is another possible factor. As will be discussed below, the possibilities for this were substantially greater before changes in the Foreigner Laws in 1978 and 1991.

Whatever the reasons, the result is that nearly one-third of Kreuzberg's population is widely disenfranchised. How this concentration of immigrants developed in Kreuzberg is relevant to understanding Turks' civil rights. When foreign-born workers first came to West Germany, they were brought to urban centers and Germany's industrial region for employment opportunities. But to avoid the creation of large settlements of any non-German population, federal regulations barred non-European community immigrants from settling in districts that already had a foreign-born population of over twelve percent. This practice kept families from reuniting and was challenged in state administrative courts. By 1979 the restrictions were found to violate the European Convention of Human Rights that protected the right to freedom of movement (O'Brien 1990, 30). These restric-

tions, however, had an impact, so that no single major city became an immigrant center. Berlin shared its high level of ethnic diversity with Frankfurt, Köln, Munich and Stuttgart (Posse 1984, 230). Berlin's foreign-born population increased from just one percent of the total Berlin population in 1960 to approximately 12% in 1980 (11.7%). After the cap was removed, and as families reunited and grew, that percentage increased to 12.4% in 1981 and 13.4% by 1985 (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 1983, 10).

But non-German ethnic populations, particularly Turks, have concentrated within Berlin and within *Bezirke* in patterns similar to those found on the Lower East Side. Kreuzberg was especially appealing because it offered an abundance of vacant apartments in a city with an otherwise severe housing shortage. Approximately twenty percent of all Berlin buildings were destroyed during World War II (Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin 1987, 22). The rebuilding of apartments happened at a dramatic pace, so that by 1978 post-1949 built flats made up 45% of all apartments in Berlin (Berlin Building Review 1978, 18). But newly constructed apartments could be built efficiently and quickly in the less congested outer districts. Kreuzberg, as a densely built-up inner city district, was one of the last to experience any rebuilding effort. By the time it was declared an "anticipated renewal district," its housing stock was among the oldest in Berlin. Approximately one-

half of the residential buildings in the Kreuzberg renewal district had no central heating, no bathrooms, and toilets were shared facilities on the landings (Kraus and Wunderlich 1987, 5.5). This was a district where an immigrant workers new to Berlin could easily find an inexpensive apartment.

Although this was true of much of Kreuzberg, particularly in this phase in renewal districts from 1965 to 1975, immigrants concentrated where older buildings were emptied and neglected. As family members who had remained behind gradually joined workers, Kreuzberg increasingly became a community of large, mostly Turkish families. Once settled in Kreuzberg, they were especially immobile: not only were inexpensive flats a rarity in Berlin, but yet more problematic, the newly constructed and renovated apartments were designed for the traditional German household and were one or two bedroom flats. Perhaps one finds a hint of frustration in the community description written by Kreuzberg's urban planning and "careful urban renewal" team, S.T.E.R.N. (*Gesellschaft der behutsamen Stadterneuerung Berlin mbH*) in 1987.

The largest group of inhabitants, 50% in all, are the large immigrant families--mainly Turkish. They were brought in as interim tenants during the demolition phase, have settled here and can no longer be moved around (Kraus and Wunderlich 1987, 4.1)

In fact, as large, predominately low-income Muslim families, with the need for the recently established Turkish mosques, stores that catered to their special needs and community

centers, Kreuzberg's Turks would become the community's most stable population.

In 1975, Kreuzberg included 26.4% so-called "foreign" residents, meaning all residents of non-German ancestry (government statistics do not take into account country of origin). By 1985, this figure rose to 30.6%, with Turks forming the largest ethnic group at 20.2%; the next largest ethnic group was Yugoslavians, a population declining in Kreuzberg from 3.7% in 1975 to 2.6% by 1985. No other single ethnic group is found in such sizable numbers during this period or since (see Table 7.3). Not only has the population of Turks increased steadily since they first arrived in the 1960s, but the concentration of ethnic Turks into communities was also increasing through these years. As Table 7.4 demonstrates, the Turkish population concentrated most heavily in the Mariannenplatz area (statistical district 14, see Map 7.1). At the time of the 1987 census, this statistical district was approximately 45% Turkish, and the neighboring Wiener Straße district (district 15), 35%. This is in part because of low rents in both districts that hugged the Berlin Wall and were targeted for heavy renewal in the 1980s (Senator for Building and Housing 1980, 12). The largest numerical population of Kreuzberg Turks resided in the Urban district (district 16), where they were over 23% of the population. Again, part of the district was slated for renewal and possible clearance.

Table 7.4 Concentration of Foreign Residents in Kreuzberg, 1970 and 1987

	1970		1987	
	Population	Non-German (%)	Population	Non-German (%)
Kreuzberg	160,514	13,022 (8.1)	138,594	37,259 (26.9)
Statistical Districts:				
12-Mehringplatz	7,997	1,395 (17.4)	13,692	2,236 (16.3)
13-Moritzplatz	19,204	1,713 (8.9)	17,890	3,661 (20.5)
14-Mariannenplatz	26,080	2,869 (11.0)	21,727	9,701 (44.6)
15-Wiener Straße	32,726	2,899 (8.9)	25,580	8,921 (34.9)
16-Urban	54,777	2,837 (5.2)	44,433	10,341 (23.3)
17-Victoriapark	19,730	1,309 (6.6)	15,272	2,399 (15.7)

Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. Ergebnisse der Volks- und Berufszählung in Berlin (West) am 27. Mai 1970 (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1974), Sonderheft 218, p. 29; Ibid. Berliner Statistik: Volks- und Berufszählung in Berlin (West) am 25. Mai 1987 (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1989), Sonderheft 406, p. 16, 48.

Turks were settling, in short, into those blocks most deteriorated and least likely to survive renewal plans. This is confirmed by a block-by-block survey conducted by the Senator für Bau- und Wohnungswesen (Commissioner for Construction and Housing) in the renewal district surrounding an empty lot where the Gölitzer train station had been (overlapping districts 14 and 15). They found that in 1976 the blocks were occupied by 35.3% foreign immigrants, with a concentration within six blocks of over 40% (Der Senator für Bau- und Wohnungswesen 1979, Figure 5)⁶. Posse found, similarly, that the highest concentration of immigrants throughout Berlin was in the urban renewal areas within Kreuzberg, Wedding, Tiergarten, Schöneberg and Charlottenburg (Posse 1984, 242-3). Clearly this points to the economic vulnerability of foreign immigrants and their need for inexpensive housing. It addresses, additionally, the potential for an ethnic sub-community to create community support institutions.

In fact, the Turkish community did begin to function as a sub-community. This is evident from the founding of mosques and the establishment of two important Muslim institutions (see Table 7.5). The Islamic Federation Berlin reported only 25,000 members in 1970, but by 1980 this had

⁶Calculated from Map 5 using only those blocks within the "awaiting renewal" area (*Sanierungserwartungsgebiet*).

Table 7.5 Religious Institution Members in Berlin (West),
1970-1980*

	1970	1980
West Berlin Population	2,122,815	1,896,200
Institution Members	1,873,767	1,576,239
Evangelic	1,549,291	1,175,360
Roman-Catholic	256,972	269,579
Islamic Federation Berlin	25,000	47,000
Croatian-Catholic Mission	-----	15,000
Muslim Mission	-----	13,000
Serbian-Orthodox	-----	8,000
Greek-Orthodox	-----	7,000
Apostles of Jesus Christ	5,965	6,603
Jewish	5,447	6,530
Jehovas Witness	5,500	5,000
Others	25,592	23,167

*as reported by religious communities

Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1971), pp. 32, 110-111; Ibid. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1981), pp. 39-40, 136-137.

nearly doubled to 47,000. The newly created Muslim Mission reported 13,000 members by 1980. The general census of May, 1987 calculated that Islamic religious institutions had 127,491 members in Berlin, most of Turkish ancestry (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 1990, 66). Of Turkish residents in Berlin, 94.2%, according to the census, were Muslim (70).

Additionally, from the mid- to late 1970s, numerous political and cultural Turkish and Turkish-German groups were founded. The Turkische Bund, with a storefront meeting place and sports clubs provided a gathering place (but has since closed). The important Turkische Gemeinde is a meeting center funded by the Berlin Senat (City Commission). And various storefront meeting places were created to focus on specific areas of need, mostly funded by the Senat: a Turkish parents' center, a Turkish girls' meeting place, a Turkish women's center. The Türkenzentrum e.V. was founded in 1977 in the Wedding area to address the needs and problems specific to the Turks in West Berlin. Although not centered in Kreuzberg, it became a center of activist Turks city-wide debating the issues of assimilation and cultural values, and also has provided regular courses in German, mathematics, physics, culture studies, literature, and Turkish (Arbeitsgruppe Stattdbuch 3 Berlin 1984, 87-88). Like most counseling and storefront organizations in Berlin, it, too, was funded by the Berlin Senat. But, as is true

for not-for-profit, tax-exempt American organizations, this means that their work cannot cross the line from cultural to political. The Tükenzentrum could not get funding for some years because of their possible ties to the communist party. They received Senat funding for the first time in 1991 (Interview. Berlin, 25 July 1991).

With the development of connections, however, deep divisions also appeared. Three of these are of greatest importance to the style of political participation among Turkish and immigrant Kreuzberg residents: 1) divisions between leftists and political rightists, fighting over governance issues in Turkey; 2) The difficult tensions between Kurds and Turks (statistical data does not distinguish between the two ethnic identities, so that references to Turks here includes the immigrant Kurds). Both groups settled in Kreuzberg and brought the animosities that they felt while in Turkey; 3) The gulf between those involved in politics centered in Turkey and those favoring active involvement in local or national issues in the FRG--in short, the difficult challenge to immigrants in most every place and time of whether one pursues "homeland" concerns or those of the newly adopted land.

The Workers-Youth Organization of Turkey (Arbeiter-Jugend Verein der Türkei), founded in 1974 and the Association of Workers from Turkey (Verein der Arbeiter aus der Türkei) are two examples of leftist groups seeking to

organize workers. Another, Informationsbüro Türkei e.V., has worked as a Berlin-based opposition to fascism in Turkey and Kurdistan. And, in 1984, the Kurdistan-Komitee Berlin (West) e.V. was founded to work toward the right of Kurds for self-determination (Kunstamt Kreuzberg 1990, 114). Meanwhile, many of Berlin's 282 reported immigrant political associations, as of 1987, were associated with Islamic concerns. Thirty were reported as 'associated with Islam,' and 23 were considered 'in the direction of Islam' (Interview, 12 July 1991). Most were likely founded in the late 1970s to early 1980s.

Although the numerous organizations indicate the presence of a strong sub-community, in several interviews with Turkish activists and with Germans working with Turkish organizations and activists, these deep divisions were mentioned as major barriers to the political participation of Turkish and Kurdish immigrants in any issue area. One interviewee declared that the left/right conflict is so divisional in Kreuzberg that whether a rightist or leftist Turk owns an apartment building, store, café or restaurant will determine who will gather there, and who may rent, shop or visit there (Interview, 25 July 1991). Several Turkish activists observed that the protest against changes in the Foreigner Law in 1990 was the first time they had seen a united Turkish action.

In sum, the 1970s and 1980s were for Kreuzberg Turks similar to the experiences of new immigrants of many periods on the Lower East Side. This was a period of resettling, of building a support-system, establishing institutions for workers' aid, for worship, religious or cultural education. In political participation many issues are similar--whether to let go of the ties to politics back home, how far to go in integrating culturally and in language. Similar to the Lower East Side's immigrants, Turks in Kreuzberg have established strong religious institutions, have set up schools for religious instruction and have struggled hard with questions of what role their children should have in the habits and ways of their new German land.

One critical difference is that Lower East Side immigrants saw the active political intervention of the Democratic machine politicians forming a relationship with workers' organizations. Turks do not have the benefit that voting power brings to a new immigrant and so have no clout with German parties. With under two percent of Turkish Berliners having suffrage rights, this factor presents a marked difference in the road to societal and, most importantly, political integration. With their attention turned more to concerns over renewing visas, their role in the housing battles at issue in these remaining chapters is quite predictable--and certainly less than the rent strikes of the Jewish immigrants in those early years.

The one remaining issue that will later help explain immigrants' role in the urban renewal issues of the 1970s and 1980s is a significant limit on non-voting participatory rights of immigrants contained in the *Ausländergesetz*, or Foreigner Law. Since very few Turks have citizenship, the real concern for most is maneuvering through the visa process. Under the law, foreigners can first apply after five years for a permanent resident permit (*Unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*). Until the 1991 Foreigner Law, immigration administrators had almost complete discretion in granting or denying resident permits. Peter O'Brien reports that immigrants were sometimes denied visa extensions and even deported for minor misdemeanors and, in some cases, for accepting unemployment compensation (O'Brien 1990, 30). These discretionary powers were limited in a 1978 law (the *Verfestigungsregel*) setting out more precise requirements for granting unlimited resident permits and the yet more secure "residence entitlement" (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*). The more recent 1991 Foreigner Law further narrows discretion.

Access to political participation by immigrants is blocked by constitutional provisions limiting both voting rights (Article 20.2) and the right to form political parties (Article 21.1) to citizens. The major barrier to participation, however, comes from the 1965 Foreigner Law that lists as a prerequisite for receiving visas and residency permits or entitlements the provision that "the

foreigner does not injure the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany" (in O'Brien 30). Further, Article 6 of the same law permits limiting or suspending political activities by foreigners "when such activity disturbs the public order and safety or interferes with the political will of the Federal Republic of Germany." Although the provision is not used frequently today, it was often employed in the 1950s and 1960s to deport political organizers (O'Brien 31).

These laws taken together, however, has created a general awareness among immigrants that any level of political activism may threaten one's success in attaining the desired legal documents. When any of these changes in legal status are denied by immigration officials, foreigners are not informed of the grounds for denial. A Kafkaesque aura hangs over proceedings as applicants try to meet bureaucrats' demands and vague wishes without knowing precisely what are the rules of the game.

Even though discretion is now more limited, in interviews with ethnic Turks, even after passage of the new Foreigner Law, it was widely perceived that most political activism would threaten visa, residency or citizenship applications. One very telling interview was with a university student whose mother had immigrated to Berlin twenty-six years ago, and who had herself lived on Berlin for seven years. She observed that first-generation Turkish

immigrants seemed to go through a "depolitization process." They were cut off from political ties at home and did not feel they could establish new political interests in Germany. When they also have a dream of someday returning to Turkey, it further prevents them from establishing such ties (Berlin, 24 July 1991). Another immigrant, a political exile from Turkey, echoed those comments:

The main problem faced by Turks in Germany is having no right to vote. People here became less and less politically involved because they lost their political identity. Parties here in Germany did not care about Turks without a vote (Berlin, 25 July 1991).

In short, those who do participate are most likely to be second or third-generation immigrants, and even they are likely to be very sensitive to the possible dangers that political activism could pose for their legal status. Political parties, meanwhile, have little incentive to service these non-citizens. These factors point to a resident population, roughly one-third of Kreuzberg, whose participation is so restricted that any actual creation of political power from within the community is impressive. As was discussed in Chapter One, were one relying on the narrowest definitions of political participation--restricted to the vote--one-third of Kreuzberg's residents would be of little concern in this study. Mechanisms for participation have been created, however, even if severely limited. With few possibilities for formal political participation, it remains

to be seen in the next chapters how--if at all--non-German immigrants participated in housing decisionmaking.

Kreuzberg and the Leftist German Youth Scene

We now turn to the other significant in-migrating group, young German adults. Age becomes an important demographic variable in studying participation in Kreuzberg for two reasons: 1) The age structure changed significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, witnessing a large in-migration of young German adults and, 2) Their reasons for moving to Kreuzberg define their potential for housing participation. As mentioned earlier, Kreuzberg's German population declined steadily after the announcement that it was a "renewal anticipation district." German residents were displaced in a period from 1965-1975, a period in local city planning history known as "renewal by demolition." Blocks were gradually emptied and then purchased by the public housing authorities using eminent domain (the *Städtebauwohnungsgesetz*). It was during this period that many long-time German residents were "re-accommodated" by the Senator for Construction and Housing to newly built apartments. The large, old tenements, especially the *Hinterhäuser*, the buildings in the block interior, were the special enemy of city planners, and among the first to be bulldozed. Entire blocks of structurally sound apartments were demolished and

replaced by newer and more expensive flats (Kraus and Wunderlich 1987, 2.3-2.4).

During these years, it also happened that many West German youth migrated to West Berlin in order to avoid serving a mandatory West German military service. Since Berlin was technically governed by the Allied occupying powers, West Germany was not permitted a military presence in West Berlin and could not draft Berlin residents. Although additional permission to move to Berlin from defense administrators was also necessary, in practice, interviewees said that they often did not find this to be enforced. Some of this demographic shift can be spotted in Berlin and Kreuzberg census data on age (see Table 7.6) demonstrating that a remarkable almost 42% of Kreuzberg residents were aged from 20 to 39 by 1987.

Kreuzberg, specifically, attracted young adults in reaction to the perceived housing crisis created by the "renewal by demolition" policy and the warehousing of vacant apartments. The politics of Berlin renewal policies created an activist opposition of young adults who organized themselves and established a network dispatching themselves to reside in the various affected areas, in districts throughout the city. Since Kreuzberg included such extensive renewal activity, the protest participation centered in, but was not limited to, Kreuzberg. In other words, on the Lower East Side, residents explained how they

Table 7.6 Age Structure for Kreuzberg and Berlin (West), 1987

<u>Age</u>	<u>Kreuzberg N(%)</u>	<u>Berlin N(%)</u>
under 10	15,596 (11.3)	170,631 (8.5)
10 to 19	15,410 (11.1)	193,342 (9.6)
20 to 39	57,720 (41.6)	628,433 (31.2)
40 to 54	24,876 (17.9)	456,630 (22.7)
55 to 69	12,016 (8.7)	271,504 (13.5)
70 and over	12,976 (9.4)	292,169 (14.5)
TOTAL	138,594 (100.0)	2,012,709 (100.0)

Source: Calculated from Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. 1989. Volks-, Berufs-, Gebäude-, Wohnungs- und Arbeitsstättenzählung in Berlin (West) am 25. Mai 1987. Sonderheft 406, (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag), 22, 23, 32, 33.

were drawn into local housing politics; in Kreuzberg, housing politics shaped who became residents. S.T.E.R.N. (the "careful renewal" planners responsible for Kreuzberg) reported that by 1980, about 25% of residents in their targeted areas were young Germans (Kraus and Wunderlich 1987, 4.1).

It is interesting to remember Michel Foucault describing power as inserting "...itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives" (Foucault 1980, 39). The 1960s and early 1970s in West Germany could be described as a period when youth became aware of the everyday influences of the residuals of fascism and, more prevalent, paternalistic decisionmaking. In spontaneous social rebellion, youth began to reject the life-styles of their elders as dangerous habits of thought. As Sigrid Weigel has observed, the youth revolt of 1968 was a revolt of sons against fathers who represented fascism and "old power structures in the new West German Society" (1992 46). In a study of young activists' autobiographies, she writes:

Their narratives vacillate between efforts to posit themselves as morally superior competitors in a power struggle and attempts to interpret themselves as victims of their fathers (47).

And in a different way, young women of the 1960s were faced with their rejection of their parents' cultural values and past, and with the realization that "women are not situated

outside of history, in a state of innocence" (48). Young women rebelled against their fathers and mothers, accepting their own responsibility in the political life of their society. And although the social and political movements in the United States certainly were felt in Lower East Side politics as well, repeatedly in interviews with Kreuzberg activists, "1968" was given as the source for their political involvement and reason for moving to Kreuzberg. West Germans who were too young to be part of the 1968 movement looked to Berlin as a place where they could still find a culture for activism. As one interviewee, born in a town of 10,000 residents, described:

The country was boring...At that time the student movement was dead, but I hoped to find the after-effects of it. I regret that I was too young to participate in 1968 and thought that a revolution was more likely in Berlin (Berlin, 31 July 1988).

A young woman from a mid-sized German city moved to Berlin partly to study at the university, and repeated that the draw of the city was what she called the "myth of Berlin."

The student movement was over, but there were some new things: energy, resistance to old ideas, communal living, free love, no private property, sexual liberation. I was able to say what I wanted and fight for it (Berlin, 12 August 1988).

Another activist echoed this, saying that Berlin had magnetism and an aura of electricity for activists (Berlin, 10 July 1992). The heritage of the 1968 student-founded extraparlimentary opposition (*Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, APO) was often cited as a reference point for Berlin

squatters. The APO was founded in 1967/8 to democratize university decisionmaking. With it came an explosion of ideological, leftist activities. The influence of APO combined with the influence of Berlin culture "bringing constant exchange with other cities like Copenhagen, Amsterdam and other German cities" drew this later wave of West Berlin student activists (Berlin, 16 June 1988). It was a time of "individual developments" and communal living, and Berlin's history of political activism was attractive. When Kreuzberg housing activists and squatters were questioned about why they moved to Berlin and/or Kreuzberg, their answers were, as often as not, history lessons in Berlin leftist activism, with one interviewee referring back to the workers' culture in the 1862-1879 period (Berlin, 10 July 1988).

In all of these discussions, questions of lifestyle were never separated from the political activism, as the following comments illustrate:

I was 19 and tired of my small town in West Germany and was thinking that the usual family life was not the only way to live. I was really looking for a new way to live--a sort of utopia. Or, looking for a way to build it (Berlin, 24 June 1988).

We will return again to the role of these attitudes in shaping political participation, but for our purposes here, it is of central importance to underscore why the lifestyle goals of the in-migrating Germans determined that they would decide to move into emptied urban renewal buildings. Set-

ting aside their direct political demands, young Germans needed precisely those large and open apartments built in the 1800s and early 1900s to establish "living communities," *Wohngemeinschaften*, or "WG's." The newly constructed apartments, as mentioned earlier were primarily one and two-bedroom flats. Students and other single residents could generally rent studio apartments. But this was a challenge to the possibility of WG's. To build this dream of a different way of living, a challenge to the lifestyle of their parents, large flats were needed where walls could be removed and community spaces designed. Empty buildings were ideal and that the hated urban renewal plans created the warehousing situation made their 'occupation' all the more appealing.

Lifestyle and housing politics were inseparable. I asked one squatter whether those moving into Kreuzberg squats were aware of the role city policies played in creating the empty buildings they occupied:

Central tenant movement people knew this history; maybe other people didn't--there were a lot of young people moving to the city for the "scene" and they probably didn't know all the reasons--the punk movement was taking place at the same time. Not everyone knew the history of the politics, but when the campaign started, others joined in. This coincided with the "punk idea" at the time against a life of just working and going to school. They wanted to do something revolutionary (Berlin, 19 August 1988).

And the 'revolution' was to create a new way of living together that their parents had not found. One squatter

answered my questions about his political involvement with a critique of the idea of "political." "'Political' can be a way of living with other people," he responded. "It is non-reliance on oneself, or on a nuclear family" (Berlin, 15 July 1988). When he listed the goals of his WG, the structural needs became clear: cooperative community living, unrestricted open areas in the building, cheap rent, and to develop ideas about people living together (Berlin, 15 July 1988).⁷

To build on these ideas meant having control over entire buildings, something that young people, students and those fighting the life of "working for rent" would not normally be able to achieve. The old buildings of the renewal districts were not only abandoned and "free," but they provided another advantage mentioned in earlier chapters as a barrier to workers' political unity in the 1800s. The "Kreuzberg Mixture"--with a front residential building connected by sidewings to inexpensive workers' housing and a

⁷It should be noted that this squat was located in an urban renewal district in Schöneberg, the *Bezirk* neighboring Kreuzberg. Squatters seldom distinguished between districts and considered the squatting scene, for the most part, as one political action. The majority of squatters interviewed had, in fact, lived in more than one squat, often in different districts. They seldom distinguished between their Kreuzberg squats and others. When asked whether the political goals differed between districts, responses were unanimously negative. The only distinguishing feature mentioned by two respondents was that some Kreuzberg squatters displayed arrogance since the scene began and was centered there.

backyard building for factory space--provided the possibility for large communes with community centers, common eating and work facilities. One squatter described his first Kreuzberg home and the building's neighborhood center. It was a "living room" for the building, but also had a shower, washing machine and a café. This means, he explained, that "Your private life just sometimes takes place in public. This is not usual for Germany, but is more characteristic for Kreuzberg." He later helped to establish another squat and described it as the ultimate satisfaction of his political goals, "a combination of living and working together with political action" (Berlin, 31 July 1988).

The Berlin Senat, in short, sought to bulldoze precisely those buildings, especially the back houses, that young Germans needed for communal living. The warehoused buildings were like a vacuum into which the Berlin youth scene was pulled. In 1970 only 22.2% of Kreuzberg residents (15 and over) were single--slightly higher than in West Berlin. By 1980, over 40% of residents were single, well over the 30.1% of Berlin as a whole (Table 7.7). By 1987, 41.6% of Kreuzberg residents were aged 20 to 30, a figure over 10% higher than it stood for Berlin (Table 7.6).

That these in-migrating young adults can be attributed in large part to young adult Germans and not only the Turkish workers moving into Kreuzberg is found in docu-

Table 7.7 Marital Status for Kreuzberg and Berlin (West),
1970 and 1987

<u>Marital Status</u>	1970		1980	
	<u>Kreuzberg</u>	<u>Berlin (West)</u>	<u>Kreuzberg</u>	<u>Berlin (West)</u>
single	29,893 (22.2)	368,546 (20.4)	46,843 (40.4)	529,470 (30.1)
married	69,704 (51.7)	1,017,657 (56.4)	46,774 (40.3)	844,980 (48.0)
widowed	22,331 (16.6)	291,548 (16.2)	10,792 (9.3)	222,130 (12.6)
divorced	12,823 (9.5)	125,464 (7.0)	11,679 (10.1)	165,238 (9.4)
TOTAL, 15 years and over	134,751 (100.0)	1,803,215 (100.0)	116,088 (100.0)	1,761,818 (100.1)

¹ errors due to rounding

Sources: Calculated from Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. Ergebnisse der Volks- und Berufszählung in Berlin (West) am 27. Mai 1970, Sonderheft 218 (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1974), pp. 30-31, 33, 50-51, 53; Ibid. Volks-, Berufs-, Gebäude-, Wohnungs- und Arbeitsstättenzählung in Berlin (West) am 25. Mai 1987, Sonderheft 406 (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1989), pp. 22, 23, 32, 44, 45.

ments kept by police authorities on squatters.⁸ Of the 4,954 squatters, over 90% were German (an issue we will examine in Chapter Nine), 77.6% were single and 59.6% were between 18 and 25 years old (Der Senator für Inneres 1983, 6). Assuming a much larger "scene" including young people living, but not squatting, in Kreuzberg, it is clear that there was a significant sub-community of young German adults.

Although many of the Germans were clearly activists, it still remains to be seen what interaction, if any, will be found between them and the immigrant residents. Furthermore, even though both groups had similar housing needs, for large and inexpensive apartments, there was still a potent conflict. Since most Turkish immigrants are Muslim, married and have large families, they would likely resist living nearby or within houses of primarily young, single, mixed-sex communes. Similarly, the cultural and family needs of immigrant families would not likely be pressed by German activists who might see these needs as "reactionary." The imbalance of political power between the groups has, therefore, important implications.

⁸Police routinely held surprise searches of squatted buildings, whether or not they intended to make arrests. At that time, all residents were lined up and asked to produce identification and answer questions. Demographic data was then compiled and updated with new searches.

The Socio-Economic Status of Residents

Some final words need to be addressed to the SES of Kreuzberg residents. For while many of the activist Germans came from middle-class backgrounds and were university educated, as students and unemployed young people, they had limited financial resources. Side-by-side with these activists was a substantial group of young people from lower-income families, attracted to the neighborhood and the squatter scene, but without the education background to attend the university or to begin a profession. Many on the periphery of the activism were substance abusers, runaways, teen-aged parents and others with special needs for housing, social services and financial support. Combined with these were the old-time German residents and senior citizens who could not afford new housing in other districts and remained behind as the Senat carried out renewal plans.

Table 7.8 shows the increase of welfare recipients (*Sozialhilfe*) between 1970 and 1980 by over 6,000--at a time when the community population dropped by over 32,000. This puts Kreuzberg, at 13.6%, at the highest level of residents in poverty in Berlin, a fact confirmed by district officials. Unemployment has also been higher in Kreuzberg than in other districts (Interview, Berlin, 1 July 1991).

It is notable that the Statistisches Landesamt Berlin fails to keep any unemployment data other than by occupation (a fact frequently noted by disgruntled research-

Table 7.8 Recipients of Income Maintenance* in Berlin (West) and Kreuzberg 1970 and 1980

	1970		1980	
	West Berlin	Kreuzberg	West Berlin	Kreuzberg
Population	2,122,815	162,626	1,896,200	130,100
Recipients of Income Maintenance	104,973	11,064	150,180	17,734
% of Recipients in Population	(4.9)	(6.8)	(7.9)	(13.6)

*Sozialhilfe

Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1971), pp. 32, 313; Ibid., Berliner Statistik: Statistische Berichte. (Berlin: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, 31 Januar 1972), KI 1-j/70, p 2; Ibid. Berlin Statistisches Jahrbuch (Berlin: Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1981), pp. 38-9, 351; Ibid. Berliner Statistik: Statistische Berichte (Berlin: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, Januar 1983), KI 1-j/83, p. 13.

ers). There is, similarly, no data on unemployment or income level by ethnicity. But interviews with knowledgeable government officials indicate that the rate of unemployment is higher for immigrants than for Germans. Immigrants, as noted earlier, requesting visas, changes in residency status or citizenship fear that an application for government assistance will jeopardize their requests. Proof of self-support is required as part of the immigration process. And, even though immigrants assumed that welfare applications were shared with immigration officials, this was not formalized and required of *Bezirksamt* (local city hall) welfare officials until 1 July 1991.

Usually even in severe situations, immigrants rely on family and friends rather than apply for government assistance. This implies that the poverty rate is, in fact, far higher than indicated by the figures in Table 7.8. Telling is a report to the Kreuzberg *Bezirksamt* citing the Wiener Straße district income level for 1979 as the lowest in the city (13,850 DM yearly compared with the Berlin average of 18,947 DM). Overall, Kreuzberg reported an average income at 86.4% of the Berlin average (Weiher 1987, 26).

High school graduation rates would be a further indication of the extent to which Kreuzberg residents suffered a lower SES than other Berlin districts. As Weiher has noted, however, enrollment data is compiled in such a

way that attrition cannot be calculated (Weiher 64). Interviews with *Bezirksamt* officials and an area social worker, however, indicated that the education level of Turkish residents is especially low (Berlin, 1 July 1991; Berlin, 9 July 1992; 12 July 1991). Also, Weiher notes that enrollment in Kreuzberg in *Hauptschule*, the general secondary education that is not college preparatory, is significantly higher than in Berlin, while enrollment in the college preparatory *Gymnasien*, is substantially lower (Weiher 64).

These indicators of a low-income population are especially high in the renewal districts, and even higher in the older, unrenovated buildings, according to block surveys conducted by the Topos planning firm. They reported, for example, a 1980 income average in Berlin for 4-person households at 3,150 DM monthly, while for Turks in unrenovated urban renewal area buildings it stood at 2,310 DM and 2,300 DM for Germans. In buildings in the same area but with modern facilities, Germans earned 2,860 and Turks 2,780 DM, still well below the Berlin average (Gude 1986, 20). And, again, even when Turks qualified for rent support, none reported applying for any, even when 7-12% of Germans in the same buildings received it (26).

Although there are prosperous immigrant families in Kreuzberg and, certainly, middle and working-class Germans, especially in S036 and particularly in urban renewal areas, most Kreuzberg residents are low-income and many are either

receiving some form of government assistance or are qualified to.

The Island of Kreuzberg

Kreuzberg, in sum, is quite unlike any other Berlin district in several ways that will help explain residents' style of political participation. First, Kreuzberg has become a diverse, immigrant community predominately of Turkish families. Because of their often tenuous legal status, however, and the direct limits placed on the political participation of "foreigners," the possibilities for expressing housing needs and pressing demands are narrow. Even government rent assistance is shunned, likely out of these concerns. The presence of an active cultural and religious community, however, indicated that political power could arise in some form from the strength of the sub-community and its extent of geographical concentration. Whether divisions within the sub-community allow this still needs to be addressed.

Secondly, a wave of young German adults moved into Kreuzberg in the 1975 to 1985 period for political reasons that had to do with both Berlin housing policies and their needs for suitable large, inexpensive spaces. This group, with substantial motivation and political resources can be expected to dominate housing activism. Their leftist agenda, however, is at odds with the primary interests of

many Muslim Turks. This points to some likely reluctance by Turks to support the youth scene's causes, but also indicates that leftists might champion some civil rights and perhaps social service concerns of Turks, perceiving them as an 'oppressed' population. Most importantly, these dynamics highlight the likelihood that selected Turkish interests would be served, where concern exists on the left, without their active inclusion in decisionmaking.

Third, the remaining low-income residents will likely follow established patterns of participation by Germans especially of older generations. Their direct activism is unlikely, and support for formal political institutions more established. On housing issues, one can expect a clash of interests between young German squatters, activists, leftists and older, more politically conservative Germans who are unaccustomed to participatory styles exhibiting direct action. The conflict here, in fact, has most to do with the question of what participatory styles are legitimate in the FRG, and less with any particular policy area. In other words, we can expect that older Germans will be more comfortable with an established patriarchal, centralized hierarchy of decisionmaking, while young Germans will challenge this very structure. In comparison with the Lower East Side, however, it remains to be seen whether young Germans will bring their protests to community issues on the community level, or whether their concerns will

engage authorities at the top of the decisionmaking structure.

Chapter 8

COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT: FROM ABOVE

We now turn to the structure of development decisionmaking and the central community development and housing issues in Kreuzberg, and will examine the Lower East Side in Chapter Nine. Earlier chapters have discussed some roots of resident participation; this chapter will discuss housing and development decisionmaking structures and institutions and how they function as elements in the political culture of a community to affect styles of community response.

The process of post-World War II redevelopment decisionmaking in Berlin was quite consistent with administrative practices described in earlier chapters. Although earlier the monarch sat at the apex of imperial planning, as mentioned in Chapter Five, the state-commissioned chief planner and the Minister of the Interior had broad powers over city development and building. The role of industrialists and other private-sector interests grew steadily after land rights changed in 1807, but planning for new economic development remained in the hands of a head town planner or building commissioner. It is important to remember that even after a Berlin Council was created with propor-

tional representation, the state planning and building bureaucracy remained almost completely autonomous.

There was a pattern of private-sector driven development with the local state providing a centralized planning function that was evident, for example, in the 1910 General Urban Development Exhibition held in Berlin. The main event was a competition for a Berlin master plan to control the city's breakneck growth since 1870 by achieving "controlled development planning" (Kraus and Wunderlich 1987, 1.2). In every era, in fact, the German public sector, compared with the United States, has played a more interventionist role in the urban development, housing and other policy arenas to such an extent that some have labeled the structures "municipal socialism" (Gunlicks 1986, 208). Nonetheless, in both places the private market has steered government intervention to encourage investment, mediate between conflicting interests and develop appropriate infrastructure. Affordable and decent housing for lower income residents was seldom seen as necessary to these development goals.

The Effort from Under: The Cooperative Housing Movement

One exception to this history of relevance here is the housing reform era of the Weimar Republic. With its Article 155, Weimar's Constitution set as its goal, "the provision of a healthy place to live for every German citizen" (in Homann und Scarpa 1983, 58). World War I had

stopped housing construction from 1914 to 1918 creating an emergency need for well-built, affordable housing. The private sector was not well-suited for building at the bottom of the market, so workers' organizations formed housing construction cooperatives (*Bauhütte*) in 1919 to, practically speaking, compete with the housing market. The driving force of the idea was planner and architect, and later Building Commissioner of Berlin, Martin Wagner. He dreamed of rationalizing production in the building industry in order to produce affordable housing, and first envisioned a cooperative effort between the construction industry and the state.

After the Revolution of November, 1918 and the establishment of the Weimar Republic, the vision seemed suddenly possible. The first government-managed project was Lindenhof in the Schöneberg district of Berlin. But even given the new mission of the state, the Berlin construction and housing bureaucracy was predictably hostile and constant administrative delays frustrated Wagner's idea of continuous production, careful and regular resupply of construction materials, and very like production-line building techniques (actualized later without the social-cultural elements, interestingly, by the profiteering American Levitt and Sons). Meanwhile, the local *Bezirke*, administrative districts created in 1920, were unable to manage the apartments using their traditional administrative procedures and it

became clear that the state/construction industry effort was in trouble (Novy 1986; Homann and Scarpa 1983).

Martin Wagner continuously searched for a building mechanism that would hold down costs to provide housing at prices affordable to workers and to keep management within the communities. It is here that we find development of key institutions in later Kreuzberg redevelopment. Wagner was able to make use of the Weimar-era Workers' Bank (*Arbeiterbank*) for financing. In addition, the effort was anchored by the SPD government through the 1922 tax reform requiring private landlords to pay an assessment on their properties to finance public housing (Novy 1986, 123). Next, companies were founded to implement plans and construct the housing. In Berlin this was *Gehag* (*Gemeinnützige Heimstätten Aktiengesellschaft*, the Civic Home Investment Society) in Hamburg, *Neue Heimat* (New Home) (Homann and Scarpa 59). And finally, Wagner turned to the unions and the smaller, localized housing cooperatives--many in existence since the late 1800s--to hold shares. These smaller cooperatives had some limited success in creating affordable apartments themselves, but much of their chief reform goals stressed cooperative living. Many feared that building on a larger scale would threaten their prized social reform goals (Novy 1984, 1986). This was a central reason why Wagner chose not to seek entirely public administration of the cooperative building projects.

Also buying shares was the German Housing Concerns Investment Society of State Administrators, Clerical Employees and Workers, called '*Dewog*,' (*Deutsche Wohnungsfürsorge-Aktiengesellschaft für Beamte, Angestellte und Arbeiter*), begun in 1924 with the explicit purpose of developing housing "for the lower income groups" (in Homann and Scarpa, 59). And finally, 1924 also was the beginning of the Housing Provision Company (*Wohnungsfürsorgegesellschaft*). Using the multi-tier effort--based in the union movement and the workers' bank and investment company, supported with state financing, and keeping its community focus with localized cooperatives--the effort formed a remarkable housing network. It preserved the political, affordable housing goal, the social reform elements and the possibility of rationalized production (Novy 1986). Bruno Taut came aboard as Chief Architect, and achieved through design the built form of diversity and tolerance. *Gehag* took over the leadership and construction (with Wagner as chair) and continued building cooperative settlements throughout Berlin.

Under this arrangement over 1,000 apartments were constructed in Berlin's Britz community in 1925, and Berlin became famous for its social housing policy (Homann and Scarpa 1983). Nonetheless, costs were not contained to the extent that was hoped for and most of the settlement was occupied by skilled workers and white-collar workers. Settlements were also constructed for the politically radi-

cal, later so-called "red-reform," cooperatives Ideal, Paradies, Freie Scholle, Lichtenberger Gartenheim, and others. In 1926, Martin Wagner became Civic Councillor for Building--essentially commissioner of city planning--carrying his mission into the Weimar government (Homann and Scarpa 58).

Klaus Novy put the highpoint for the cooperative effort in the years 1931-1932 when the city was challenged by economic crisis. The cooperatives survived as communities with countless programs to support one another--which speaks, he suggests, to the quality of this living form. When the National Socialists came to power, however, the settlements started to experience regular harassment. The organizations of the *Wohnreform* movement were taken over, ending an era of decentralized and participatory community planning and building (Novy 1986).

A Return to Centralized Development

What ensued was a dismantling and reorganization of the institutions from this exceptional era in Berlin housing history, and a return to the centralized and traditional planning mechanisms. In 1937, elected leaders within the building societies and cooperatives were violently removed and replaced by Nazi bureaucrats. Small building cooperatives were combined into one large organization under state control with compulsory membership. Union companies were

confiscated by the German Work Front, a Nazi organization. Construction and buyers cooperatives were likewise confiscated. The German Work Front, under Robert Ley, gradually absorbed housing construction functions until it gained official status in 1940 as the "*Sozialer Wohnungsbau*" program, or social housing construction. In 1938 the union companies were consolidated nationally and renamed New Home (*Neue Heimat*), except in Berlin where *Gehag* took on this role (Novy 1986, 124). Meanwhile, the Housing Provision Society was split into two entities: a new building society, GSW, the Public Settlement and Apartment Construction Society Berlin (*Gemeinnützige Siedlungs- und Wohnungsbaugesellschaft Berlin*) was created of eight district societies, making it Berlin's largest Housing Authority; and some of its authority was transferred to a new public investment bank, Housing Construction Credit Institution (*Wohnungsbau-Kreditanstalt*) (GSW 1984).

When Albert Speer became the General Building Inspector in 1938, he was given nearly complete autonomy over Berlin development. Housing dwindled in importance and Hitler's obsession with the monumental and spectacular took a built form. In 1929, about thirty-three percent of Berlin's construction budget went for public buildings. By 1936, it climbed to 67.5% and continued upward yearly until reaching almost one hundred percent during World War II (Warner 1983, 76). Once again, Berlin's building style and

level of housing stock was dictated by its status as Germany's capital and the force of a single ruler. The accumulation of Speer's building decisions together with the massive bombing of the war brought a housing emergency to Berlin lasting years after World War II had ended in May, 1945.

The Senator for Construction and Housing

After the war, Berlin's government was restructured as an occupied territory which kept, roughly, the twenty administrative districts (*Bezirke*) and was governed by the Four Powers--United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. In September, 1950, the (West) Berlin Constitution was signed creating a new city-state government of the three western sectors under the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, with ultimate authority left to the occupying powers. It provided for a popularly-elected legislature that selects a governing mayor. The central decisionmakers are the members of a Senat, similar to many American city commissions, who are selected by the mayor to run the executive departments, limited to sixteen at most. The House of Representatives (*Abgeordnetenhaus*) must confirm the selection of Senators, but is otherwise a secondary power--at best--to the body of senators who have nearly autonomous power over their respective departments.

The districts--twelve of which were in the three western sectors administered by the occupation forces after 1948--also have limited decisionmaking power (over, for example, supervising local school districts), but they operate primarily as local administrative branches of the central Senat departments. These branches are each headed by a *Bezirksstadtrat*, similar to a district senator, who is voted into the local *Bezirksamt* (local Senat) by the district representatives (*Bezirksverordnetenversammlung*).

In short, this structure creates a "party state" where relatively cohesive parties formulate policy, discouraging interest group or resident lobbying of individual decisionmakers (Gunlicks 1986, 199). The majority party of the district legislature votes its party members into the *Bezirksamt*; the majority party in the city House of Representatives chooses a mayor who puts party--or coalition--supporters into the Senat. The role of citizens is largely limited to choosing between party platforms by selecting candidates on a list "loosely tied" to parties, in a form of proportional representation (Gunlicks 1986, 175; Spencer 1984).

Once voters have spoken, however, they have very limited access to internal departmental decisionmaking. All housing, construction and planning decisionmaking in the new Berlin Senat was originally under the *Senator für Bau- und Wohnungswesen*, or the Senator for Building and Housing.

This department was responsible for city planning, housing and other public construction projects, with the exception of transportation needs which are directed by the *Senator für Verkehr und Technik*, Transportation Senator. Housing and development policymaking has been mostly dominated by the Social Democrat (SPD) majority since creation of the Berlin Senat. SPD held the Senat as a ruling majority until 1975 and then in a coalition government with the Christian Democrats (CDU) until 1981.

In 1981, two changes affected urban development decisionmaking. First, CDU came to power in Berlin as a majority for the first time; secondly, federal mandates required the addition of local structures for environmental protection. Driven largely by the growing Greens Movement, a 1976 Federal Protection of Nature Act required all states (Berlin is both a city and a state) to respond to a national initiative in environmental protection with state legislation to preserve and promote natural resources (Senator for Building and Housing 1978, 48). The Berlin House of Representatives passed the Natural Heritage Act in December, 1978. The Act called for a land use plan to be drafted as the basis for environmental protection and to promote natural resources and recreational parks.

In May, 1981, CDU Mayor Richard von Weizsäcker came into office with the first completely CDU Senat. CDU chose to use the occasion to meet the requirements of the Natural

Heritage Act by dividing the Senator for Construction and Housing into two departments, moving the planning and development responsibilities into a new department, the Senator for Urban Development and Environmental Protection (*Senator für Stadtentwicklung und Umweltschutz*). The new Senator took on responsibilities for creating a land-use atlas, sponsoring a grant program for resident-created green spaces, and vegetation protection (Senator for Building and Housing 1980, 1982, 1986). Nonetheless, the Senator for Construction and Housing preserved its autonomy over major city construction projects.¹

The Development Coalition

The devastation left by World War II created a demand for centralized and active public planning and building. The urban housing shortage was around seventy percent by 1948, and little private capital was available for rebuilding housing, roads and commercial centers. As a result, in 1949 the public sector accounted for 69 percent of all new housing starts using the Social Housing subsidy program with shared federal-state financing and local administrative authority (Mayo and Barnbrock 1985, 117-119).

¹It is also interesting to note that the 1990s have witnessed a return of the position of *Bau Direktor*, or Construction Director, under the Senator for Construction and Housing. The first Director named to the position, Hans Stimmann, has exercised tremendous autonomy over building standards and design.

This heavily public-sector development was supported by Marshall Plan financing from 1950. The building interests that combined during this construction spree were to remain the solid Berlin development coalition for future decades: the SPD building bureaucracy, the Housing Construction Credit Institution (*Wohnungsbau-Kreditanstalt*)--created under the Nazi regime out of the Weimar-era consumers bank--private banks, the construction industry, the Weimar-era civic building companies (GSW, Neue Heimat-Berlin, DeGeWo, Gehag, Gewobag) and pro-American businesses especially successful in winning city contracts (later called "Berlin pork fat") (Bodenschatz et al. 1983, 23).

And at the helm of this development coalition was, until 1981, SPD and the SPD Construction and Housing Senator. The debate surrounding the direction of post-World War II Berlin development is a debate, in other words, over how SPD chose the policies of activist state intervention in urban renewal, clearance and "bureaucratic-functionalism" that drove the fast-paced public building boom of the 1960s and 1970s. The pace, planning priorities and building designs that put clearance and new construction above lower cost rebuilding to accommodate working-class residents was a break with the SPD, Weimar-era ideology (Glotz, Pfeiffer und Siedler 1984, 27). As Ulrich Pfeiffer explains, in the 1950s the one priority was building as quickly as possible. The planners, planning bureaucracy and civic housing and

construction societies--what Peter Glotz calls the "power-political coalition" (*machtpolitische Koalition*)--became intoxicated by their construction record. It was at the threshold of the 1960s that a style of technocratic uniformity developed in which the political basis of the entire direction was simply no longer discussed (Glotz, Pfeiffer und Siedler 1984, 28-30).

This public-sector intervention was uniquely large in Berlin for several reasons: the extent of the war-time destruction, the division of the city which all but eliminated outside private investment, and the political need to have an anchor for West Germany's claim to the city by keeping it economically viable. In 1953, for example, the FRG provided 79.7% of financing for housing construction, compared with an average of 35.2% for locations in West Germany (Bodenschatz et al. 1983, 24). The 1956 Second Housing Construction Act sought to encourage private investment by increasing tax benefits for private development, and to back away from direct subsidies and construction. But despite a gradual, slight decline in public sector construction, the public sector, nonetheless, continued its active role in directing development in stark contrast with the United States. In sum, rather than the Weimar Era policies, discussed above, setting the framework for SPD policies in later years, they were exceptional. The Post-World War II SPD policies shadowed the traditions of cen-

tralized Berlin planning conducted within insulated planning bureaucracies formulating policies compatible with private investment needs.

Development by Demolition

The West German government again took command of the pace of housing investment when the Berlin Wall went up in 1961 with the Berlin-Help Law (*Berlin-Hilfe-Gesetzes*) of 1962. It further extended tax credits for private housing construction. From 1965 on, private-sector investment in housing rose, with heavy subsidies and credits continuing. Private-sector housing construction in Berlin was only 7.7% in 1964, jumping to 12.4% in 1965 and by 1968 it was up to 28.1% (Bodenschatz et al. 28). Nevertheless, little housing was entirely without subsidy, so that the Senator for Construction and Housing could claim as late as 1980 that government constructed and assisted subsidized housing "have often represented more than 90% and never less than 75% of the total housing construction in the city" (Senator for Construction and Housing 1980, 12).

With construction at an annual rate of almost 20,000 apartments from 1955 to 1975, the Senator for Construction and Housing chose the city's less densely built-up outer districts for large housing projects before attention was turned to the district along the wall (Senator for Construction and Housing 1983). Even then, little was heard of

rebuilding residences for the German and immigrant workers remaining there. The first urban development program was passed in 1963 and called for patching the Berlin highway network which had been rendered partly inoperable by the Berlin Wall's construction. The highway *Stadtring*, or circular roadway surrounding Berlin, was left in broken arcs by the city's division. This early plan sought to reconnect them with a north-to-south roadway along the wall, through Kreuzberg. Much of the area was declared a renewal district (*Sanierungsgebiet*), unannounced to local residents. This first renewal district along Wassertorstraße was slowly denied reinvestment, bank improvement loans, and city building permits as it awaited clearance. For the most part, residents were completely uninformed that their homes were scheduled for destruction, or that a highway was to replace their community (Laurisch 1981, 16). The plan was first published two years later in 1965 (Senator for Construction and Housing 1980, 56).

A Technocratic Approach

The city of Berlin lay atop the drafting tables for development editing many times following World War II. What bears repeating is that planning was centralized. For community residents this means that plans for Berlin as a whole are designed within the Senator for Construction and Housing offices and local communities each have a function within


that larger context. Plans were not drawn to accommodate community needs, but rather city-wide development priorities.

Following the war in the early 1950s, the Senat plan to reconstruct the Berlin highway network envisioned a major expressway and overpass through Kreuzberg's east-west main thoroughfare, Oranienstraße and another north-south highway over the scenic man-made canal (*Landwehrkanal*), through south Kreuzberg (see Maps 8.1a and b). In interviews, one landlord recalled that period around 1952-3 when his family received a city offer to buy their house. His grandfather had purchased the house in 1936 and his father refused to sell. When the Berlin Wall went up, the highway plans were scrapped. But they reappeared in the late 1960s in a new form. By this time the house had passed into his ownership. The Senat announced a new plan to construct the north-south roadway, but this time as a tunnel under the canal and his property (see Maps 8.2a and b). They discontinued negotiations with him, and he waited.

They probably thought that the houses would collapse on their own without buying them when the tunnel would go through. Anyway, the city couldn't afford to buy out local business owners. They had money enough to buy out the front-house owners, but not the industrial businesses in the interior courtyards (Berlin: 16 August, 1988; a.tr.)


He stopped worrying about Senat plans until he applied for a bank loan for housing improvements in 1969 and was turned down. He discovered that his property was listed in the

Maps 8.1a and b. Highway Network in Berlin



Map 8.1a

Motorway network (former plan)



Map 8.1b


Motorway network in Berlin (West)

- Basic network
- 10 BAB Ring Berlin (West)
- 11 BAB Berlin-Hamburg
- 13 BAB Berlin-Southeast
- 15 BAB Berlin-Hanover / Nuremberg
- Branches
- a BAB Branch Reinickendorf
- b BAB Branch Wedding
- c BAB Branch Neukölln
- d BAB Branch Zehlendorf
- e BAB Branch Steglitz


in operation
under construction

Source: Senator for Construction and Housing, Berlin building review 1978 (Berlin: Senator for Construction and Housing, 1978).

Maps 8.2a and b. Renewal Plans for Kreuzberg-Kottbusser Tor Area
 So ist es
 O şöyle dir Map 8.2a As it is.



So soll es einmal werden
 O ilerde bir gün şöyle olacaktır Map 8.2b As it will be.



Source: Der Senator für Bau- und Wohnungswesen, Städterneuerung rund um die Kohlfurter Straße (SKS/PVI) im Sanierungsgebiet Kreuzberg-Kottbusser Tor (Berlin: Senator für Bau- und Wohnungswesen, Juni 1974).

city's real estate listings as within an anticipated renewal district. This meant that no bank would extend credit for home repairs and the city would not approve building permits. He, and other landlords in the area, waited (Berlin: 16 August, 1988).

"Dear Fellow Citizen..."

One morning in August, 1974, a near-by building owner found a letter in his mailbox from the district construction administrator (*Bezirksstadtrat für Bauwesen*), saying, in part:

Dear Fellow Citizen!
 You live in a renewal district that will be cleared in the end of 1977. You may move to a newly constructed apartment in the following streets...The rent for these modernized or new apartments will be higher than for your present apartment. For many of you this means a heightened burden. In such cases you can expect support from Living-Assistance {*Wohngeld*, a rent-subsidy program}. If you wish, your Renewal Supporter will also help you arrange apartments in other districts at lower rents...With Friendly Greetings (letter 23 August, 1974, Bezirksamt Kreuzberg, Construction Department, City Planning Office; a.tr.).

So it was that many Kreuzberg residents were informed of the First Urban Renewal Act (*Städtebauförderungsgesetz*). Under the 27 July 1971 Act, specific procedures for administering renewal plans were developed for 'slum clearance and modernization' (Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin 1987, 89).

The guidelines for implementing the law were already established by the Berlin Senat in 1961, and the organiza-

tional framework for renewal was approved by the Berlin House of Representatives. The 1971 Urban Renewal Act, however, created comprehensive regulations for community redevelopment and, in 1972, contracted the housing construction society, GSW, to administer the Kreuzberg effort as a district renewal manager (*Sanierungsträger*) (Gemeinnützige Siedlungs- und Wohnungsbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH 1984). Renewal managers were called on to organize the entire local clearance effort, from purchasing properties to evicting and relocating tenants, to administering construction and rental of any new or modernized units (Bodenschatz et al. 1983, 34).

The first phase under the Act was for the Senator for Construction and Housing to select districts awaiting renewal (*Sanierungserwartungsgebiete*). Throughout this phase, the Urban Renewal Act was not yet valid, but for the next five to ten years selected renewal managers received preliminary contracts (*Vorverträge*) with the city and began to acquire parcels of land. Meanwhile, in a general pattern found throughout renewal areas, speculators stepped in to bargain with landlords for their increasingly valuable properties. Prices increased steadily in anticipation of renewal and landlords stopped maintaining buildings as they positioned themselves to sell at the highest possible price (Eichstädt-Bohlig 1981, 213). This process pushed property values in Kreuzberg on the average from around 35 marks per

square meter in 1962 to roughly 120 marks by 1972 (Bodenschatz et al. 1983, 35).

Kreuzberg building owners had already encountered barriers to maintaining their properties throughout the sixties, but with the 1971 Act, many began to seek out buyers or discuss turning their properties over to the city. As tenants moved out, landlords did not try to replace them and gradually the tenements emptied. GSW and other building societies, meanwhile, were directed by the Senat to begin purchasing properties in the renewal districts, to be held until renewal plans were developed. Similarly, in the neighboring district to the west, Schöneberg, the Bülowstraße was slowly emptied to make way for highway construction and Neue Heimat-Berlin purchased buildings for the Senat.

Meanwhile, as one building society official explained, the Senator for Construction and Housing began to formulate plans for Kreuzberg's redevelopment, envisioning clearance of the old buildings, construction of new, modern apartments with greater height but less bulk, separated by spacious gardens and parks (see Maps 8.2a and b). Air, sun, light--these were the new goals of city planners (Berlin: 2 September, 1988).

In a second phase, most of the districts already chosen became "examination districts" (*Untersuchungsgebiete*) to ensure that they fulfilled the requirements of

having substandard housing conditions. Berlin planner, Franziska Eichstädt-Bohlig notes that since the first renewal phase creates abandonment, a positive finding for the second phase is assured. In fact, communities rarely got beyond this phase intact. Finally in the last phase, an area was formally established as a renewal district within full power of the law, and the "renewal manager" received a formal contract (Eichstädt-Bohlig 1981, 214).

Beginning with the first urban development plan in 1965 up to 1975, this became the "decade of demolition" in Kreuzberg as it did in urban centers throughout Germany. Driven by the Social Democratic "state interventionist modernization strategy," the renewal plans accommodated the array of building interests through the SPD party apparatuses and dominated planning bureaucracies, and as Margit Mayer found, essentially blocked the possible participation of other interests through local parliaments. As Mayer explains:

The participation and decision-making procedures thus systematically excluded all interests which were adversely affected by the consequences of the modernization strategy. Hence, these interests mobilized outside of and against the institutions of the established system (Mayer 1987, 349).

With SPD remaining the Berlin majority party until 1981, and the national governing party until 1982 (including years of coalition governance), party growth policies were effectively maintained.

Kreuzberg was divided into the renewal areas of Luisenstadt and Renewal District Kreuzberg-South (SKS, *Sanierungsgebiet Kreuzberg Süd*), which was subdivided into eleven separate renewal plans. Every plan was an ambitious strategy of block-by-block clearance and construction of new apartments, schools, child-care and senior centers. Of all Berlin renewal districts by 1971, the city emptied 9,040 apartments and cleared 436 pieces of land containing 7,180 apartments. But the construction of new apartments could not keep pace. By that same year, only 3,409 new apartments had been completed, although construction proceeded slowly. When a strong recession hit in 1973-74 it became clear that the Senat could not afford to clear all the land originally envisioned and could not replace the older buildings with new ones (Bodenschatz et al. 1983, 39). Of the ambitious goal to complete 26,800 new apartments by 1975, as of 1974 only 5,800 were finished (Dieser 1983, 118). City building ambitions were stymied by fiscal realities. Over 9,000 apartments intended for clearance or modernization instead stood vacant, the ambitious highway plans were drastically scaled back and thousands of renewal district residents crowded into fewer apartments awaiting some relief from a now worsened housing shortage. By 1978, only one-half of the intended clearance, resident resettlement and demolition was completed and only 40% of new apartments were finished (Senator for Construction and Housing 1978, 12).

"Urban Repair"

1974 marked the beginning of a new strategy by city and private growth interests to accommodate both the continued pressure for construction and a newly constricted local economy. Two factors thus combined to scale down the ambitious clearing and building of new apartments stressed in the earlier decade. First, and clearly central, was the 1973-74 global recession and inflation that drained Berlin resources which were heavily reliant on national coffers to stimulate local investment. Not coincidentally, a second influence was the new emphasis, internationally, of urban architects and planners on urban "restoration." Berlin became a focus in this new discussion largely because of the much anticipated International Building Exhibition (IBA) planned to celebrate Berlin's 750 anniversary in 1987. As early as 1974 debates had begun about the plan of Berlin and ending the 'decade of destruction.' According to one of IBA's coordinators, Josef P. Kleihues, by 1976 or 1977 there was already a public discussion of the concept, "urban repair" (Kleihues in Kleihues and Klotz 1986, 9).

This change in development policy first came in 1974 with the Second Urban Redevelopment Program emphasizing repair and modernization. The Senator for Construction and Housing, wrote in 1978 that buildings "worthy of preservation must be saved. If a city is to be a living city it needs evidence of its past, not merely in the form of iso-

lated buildings but of whole districts" (Senator Harry Ristock in Senator for Construction and Housing 1978, 7). This change in policy first came in 1974 with the Second Urban Redevelopment Program (12).

Two changes in urban development policy led to new possibilities for the participation of affected residents. First, a revised section 2a of the Federal Building Act provided for limited citizen access to development plans before they became binding. Earlier, the only requirement was for public hearings after plans were published. The new section 2a varied this somewhat by allowing the inspection of plans, providing information on their impact and taking comments from citizens before finalizing plans. Perhaps more meaningful was the potential for access provided by a 1977 Berlin Urban Renewal and Town Development Act, section V. This measure required the appointment of a renewal district representative (*Vertreter*) chosen from affected tenants, landlords, businesses and workers to advocate the districts' interests in the style of community lobbyists (Senator for Construction and Housing 1978, 16).

To most, the years of massive demolition and displacement seemed over. By the end of the 1970s, the SPD Senat was fully behind the idea of "careful renewal" and modernization. And a new concept appeared by 1979, *Instandsetzungsprogramm*, meaning to gradually, and less costly, repair buildings while tenants remained in them, or

were given temporary flats nearby. National and Berlin development programs emerged around 1977 to support these new priorities. The federal 1977 program for modernization projects was called the Future Investment Program, or ZIP (*Zukunftsinvestitionsprogramm*) (Dieser 1983, 122). ZIP monies, approximately DM 204 million were allocated to modernize 4,000 flats in affected districts (Kreuzberg was one of five) by 1980. The senator for Construction and Housing received the support with open arms, noting in the yearly Building review that, "The fact that the programme will guarantee between 1,500 and 2,000 jobs in the building sector is a welcome and very important side-effect for Berlin" (1978, 10). Again, plans were engineered with more than housing needs in mind, always keeping the development coalition's needs in focus. The program was administered in conjunction with a Berlin compensation plan from its inception, and as it drew to a close, was partially replaced by a 1980 Berlin State Modernization Program (*Landesmodernisierungsprogramm*) (Dieser 1983, 122).

It is during this period that the Construction Senator was still reporting a goal of modernizing 200,000 apartments city-wide with some form of public aid by the year 2,000. What is interesting about this widely publicized goal is that while many assumed it to include renewal district pre-war buildings, this was never the Senator's intention. The 1978 Building review specified that:

These figures do not include the approximately 100,000 flats without bathroom and inside toilet since rehabilitation is neither reasonable nor economically justifiable in these cases. Redevelopment is usually the less expensive alternative" (Senator for Construction and Housing 1978, 12).

Plans for those inexpensive Kreuzberg flats, in other words, that were serving lower-income residents willing to share a hallway toilet to keep rents low, were largely unchanged.

In describing the actual use of ZIP funds, the Senator reported:

The funds are to benefit almost exclusively the particularly disadvantaged boroughs of Tiergarten, Wedding, Kreuzberg, Schöneberg and Neukölln. If both the proprietor and the tenants decide to take advantage of the scheme, almost all modernization measures (which should, if possible, be supplemented by the total removal of the core of the rear buildings) are eligible for promotion (Senator for Construction and Housing 1978, 10).

As Kreuzberg residents were gradually introduced to the decisionmaking process through their official representatives and as organizations began to form, this last evidence of continued demolition policy was viewed as expectedly deceitful. The early mention of "careful renewal" policies had been received by Kreuzberg residents with suspicion, particularly in Kreuzberg SO36 where demolition had been most substantial. By Autumn 1979, 7,200 apartments, or 45 percent of the residences, had been destroyed. Only 3,200 had replaced those, at significantly higher rents. Yet another 2,200 apartments were scheduled for demolition (IBA 1987, 27).

Residents, the remaining and in-migrating, had already started to react, but the history of housing and

development decisionmaking "from above," the pro-development intention of renewal policies, and the special vulnerability of Kreuzberg's renewal district residents combined to exclude residents from formal participation. 1977, however, was a turning point. With almost 10,000 apartments standing vacant city-wide, during a housing crisis, and the city ready to embark on another phase of demolition, residents began to organize. But while the city had created some participatory mechanisms, agencies had never anticipated actual resident participation, nor had they the means or desire to incorporate tenant responses. In Chapter Ten, several factors will be discussed as creating the emergence of a movement resisting government development policies. The refusal of the Berlin Senat to accept residents' attempts at fully joining the decisionmaking process will be seen as pivotal to the creation of styles of participation outside formal processes.

Chapter 9

COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT: FROM OUTSIDE

Both the funding level of governmentally provided housing and the structure of housing and development policymaking, as witnessed by the Lower East Side, present a strong contrast to Kreuzberg. First, less housing per capita is constructed or subsidized by the public sector. Rather, the provision of housing is driven by forces outside of the local public sector, overwhelmingly by private development and the real estate market. Where public housing programs do exist, in the 1970s and after they primarily subsidize rents or private-sector development of moderate and lower-income housing production, or they manage, maintain and rehabilitate publicly-owned housing produced before 1975.

Secondly, while German "cooperative federalism" produces a local administrative instrument for implementing housing policies regardless of where they originate, American housing policies are fragmented across governmental levels and agencies. Given the lack of coordinated housing decisionmaking structures, interests that could mobilize to influence the housing policymaking structures themselves, were most successful in achieving the housing policies they

sought. Thus, upper and middle-class housing reformers, developers, construction interests and unions were able to win housing programs favoring middle-class, publicly-assisted (subsidized) apartments rather than the lower-income public housing that serve the majority of Lower East Side residents. Both of these characteristics have influenced the styles of participation created by Lower East Side residents in seeking to shape community development and need careful examination.

Housing and Urban Development in the Private Realm

Viewing housing, land-use and construction planning as intimately linked, the history of American city governments in these areas is that of a limited public-sector role. As mentioned in Chapter Three, John Dillon's 1872 legal formulation for the city as a mediator between private interests outlined a limited role for city governments in controlling land-use and city growth. Although the New York City Democratic machine of the late 1800s was happy to build the earliest roads, schools and other public use facilities in order to supply patronage for supporters, building lacked both continuity and long-range central planning. Development was guided primarily by New York City's "indifferent" 1811 grid plan that allowed, as architecture historian Manfredo Tafuri writes, "enormous possibilities for exploitation" (Tafuri 1980, 484). Private

builders, meanwhile, pursued nearly uncontrolled development and land speculation. It was this unfettered development that has led many to call the American city the "*laissez-faire* city" where the grid layout, "functioned as a neutral support for capital's free exploitation of the city soil" and machine bosses controlled public construction (Manieri-Elia 1980,1).

Machines and the Laissez-faire City

As a study in extremes, Berlin is the portrait of imperial regimes providing continuous city-wide planning, while New York City's picture is colored by the history of machine-dominated administrations resisting central planning as interference by 'do-gooder' reformers. They saw centralization as a clear limit on the personalized and ward-centered deal-making necessary to recruit political, especially immigrant, support (Pecorella 1994, 47-48). The early William Tweed machine built its power primarily on an active development policy that created thousands of jobs for unskilled, immigrant workers. Kick-backs were collected for granting municipal construction contracts that allowed Tweed and party members to reap a healthy profit, leaving bounty enough for selectively distributed poor relief to individual supporters (Shefter 1985, 17).

And while the competition between machine and reform politicians extends back to antebellum New York (Bridges

1987), Shefter identified a "dialectic" between reform and machine rule, determined in part by development interests. Boss Tweed, for example, lost critical support from business interests when budget-draining corruption was discovered. A pattern emerged in which Democratic machine or "regular" politicians vied with reform or "fusion" (disgruntled Democrats, Republicans, reformers and business leaders) administrations to find a winning coalition of sufficient voters and investors, business and development interests (Shefter 1985, 15-29).¹ The regular Democrats returned to power consistently because of their hold on the city resources most important to the variety of development interests. As Shefter summarizes:

Especially important among these were construction firms seeking municipal contracts and real estate owners and developers, the value of whose holdings was heavily influenced by the public facilities the city constructed, the tax abatements and zoning variances it granted, and the building plans it approved. Unions in the building trades and mortgage bankers had similar interests; they, along with contractors, developers, and realtors, were the largest contributors to the city's regular Democratic organizations (Shefter 1985, 27).

With Tammany at its peak between 1880 and 1930, construction interests had to court the machine in order to build, and were properly rewarded for their support (Wade 1990, 274-5). The use of building projects, including bridges, roadways, schools and other public buildings as solder for holding together sufficient political support was not, however, the

¹See also Pecorella 1994, 33-34.

same as a meaningful development policy accommodating the housing needs of the city's many lower income residents.

Lower East Side residents, in other words, could not "participate" in the housing policymaking of Democratic regulars because there was no discernible policy process. Where a decision was made to build, there was a particular interest to satisfy. Over years, layers of decisions built up without an element of coordination. As mentioned in earlier chapters, tenants saw correctly that the important "decisionmakers" were neighborhood landlords. Building owners were assaulted with rent strikes and protest until local party interests intervened in response to unrest. In short, machine politicians satisfied building owners' demands for public order while Lower East Siders were "bought-off" by token individual assistance.

During the 1908 Lower East Side rent strike, for example, municipal court judges issued thousands of dispossess notices to quell "lawlessness" when many strikers used red flags at their windows in support of the Socialists (Joselit 1986, 46). This show of force was not limited to the Lower East Side.² Tammany, in short, had more incentive

²During the Brownsville rent strike of 1932, police patrolled streets around the clock and set up an on-site police station outside striking buildings. As historian Mark Naison records, the strike was finally broken after "more than forty evictions, an injunction against picketing, and numerous arrests and injuries. The police needed full-scale mobilization to suppress such strikes" (Naison 1986, 106).

to satisfy property owner's concerns than to take an interest in the housing needs of working-class community residents.

Reformers and City Planning

An attempt at governmentally controlled growth and land-use came with the brief American City Beautiful movement, which promoted the use of centralized planning. But the movement's impact in New York City was limited to targeted projects like Vaux and Olmsted's early Central Park and Brooklyn Park at Prospect Hill, leaving the surrounding areas to real-estate speculation (Manieri-Elia 1980, 106). The reformer and planner John Nolen, in a 1909 national conference on city planning, compared American planning with European, particularly German, and declared, "What is needed in American city planning?...Everything. For with few exceptions, our cities are lacking in almost all those essentials of convenience, comfort, orderliness, and appropriate beauty" (Nolan in Manieri-Elia 1980, 105). But few governmental or legal mechanisms were in place to accomplish very extensive city planning. The New York City Board of Public Improvement had already reviewed early proposals for redirecting the city's growth away from the grid method around the turn of the century and rejected the idea (Manieri-Eli 72).

Housing Standards by Committee

A pattern emerged in the early twentieth-century for New York City housing and development decisionmaking that would remain in its basic form to the present. Where city government failed to legislate, committees of private citizens formed to either push local administrations to action or, more often, to influence state-level elected officials whose legislation is binding on the local level. These private interests were committees of planners, of urban "experts," of citizen-reformers, or of business interests. Initiatives have not come from a central city ruler or head planner, as in Berlin, but usually from these various reformer interests acting in combination.

Beginning in the middle nineteenth-century, commercial interests and civic reform committees prodded and moved city governments to standardize housing regulations and building codes. For example, historian Jon Teaforde documents the impressive influence of the National Board of Fire Underwriters, founded in 1866, to press municipalities into setting building standards and outlawing flammable construction materials. By the 1890s, it had the power to nearly dictate fire protection standards to city governments (Teaforde 1984, 201). The Board drafted a model building law in 1896 and by the turn of the century many municipalities had incorporated this standard into building codes. Other construction interests whose business earnings were affected

by municipal codes also actively sought to push for regulations--including real estate developers, builders, architects and construction suppliers. Teaford concludes that the "rules governing the construction of American cities in the late nineteenth century were largely the product of joint action by the parties to be regulated" (Teaford 1984, 202).

Low-income housing was likewise championed by external interests, rather than by city officials. One early initiative to house the unemployed homeless, the Municipal Lodging House, was initiated by urban reformers. But when the idea of limited public housing was approved by the New York State legislature, authorizing New York City to build four lodging houses, and a committee of private charities implored the land-use and franchise-granting New York City Board of Estimate to appropriate 15,000 dollars for the purpose, the Board rejected the proposal as an unnecessary new municipal function. It was not until the reformers took up positions inside government (as political independents or in a "fusion" alignment with reform Democrats and Republicans) that the housing was funded (Teaford 272).

This is in direct contrast with German cities--including Berlin--which maintained free housing for the unemployed homeless, in order, Teaford writes, to extend "the paternalistic supervision of the municipality to the

transient poor" (Teaford 271). The essential difference is the centralized decisionmaking power in Germany, where policy could be used as an instrument of control, compared with the limited functions of American municipalities that would control unrest through their police powers more readily than by expanding municipal functions.

Passage of New York's first building codes in 1901 and 1916 is similarly instructive. New York City created a Tenement House Committee in 1894 to study revision of the Tenement Law of 1867. The "New York Committee of Fifteen," led by planner and settlement house philanthropist Lawrence Veiller and including Robert W. de Forest, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and George Foster Peabody, publicized scandalous housing conditions in lower Manhattan that even basic building standards might correct (Mowry 1962, 66). Veiller led the Tenement House Committee of the Charity Organization Society to launch the provocative 1900 Tenement House Exhibition. The installation documented squalid tenement house conditions, rallying reformers and frightening the delicate upper-class viewers and business leaders concerned about New York City's future direction (Dal Co 1980, 206).

Lower East Siders and other voters, meanwhile, were only an indirect consideration in the legislative effort. Struggling with local Tammany leaders all the way, Veiller eventually secured New York State Governor Theodore Roosevelt's support for the establishment of a New York

State Tenement House Commission. Its primary recommendations were adopted in the Tenement House Law of 1901 (Dal Co 1980, 205-6; Mowry 1962,66). Passage of the act was secured, in part, when academics and housing experts could convince their partners in Albany that tenement house reforms would pay off with Lower East Side working-class votes. The Chairman of the Charity Organization Society's Tenement Reform Committee, Frederick W. Holls, wrote to the State Republican Chairman in 1899 that the Republican Party "can do nothing more calculated to gain support further than to champion the cause of healthy and attractive homes for the poor against the greed of builders and tenement house owners" (Holls in Hammack 1982, 142-3). Indeed, the majority of East Side residents supported the move. This allowed reformers to push for the housing measures, by convincing party politicians that such laws would recruit popular political support (Hammack 1982, 142-3).

An Early Development Triad

Stephen Elkin finds this to be a general pattern, as reformers bargained with machine politicians--who controlled votes--and businessmen, so that reformers could accomplish little independent of the triad (Elkin 1987). Architecture historian Francesco Dal Co identifies this first with the 1901 law and extending well beyond. Veiller, who subsequently became director of the Tenement House Department,

he writes, never intended the law to affect the production of sound housing, but simply to "restrict" the particularly negative aspects of tenement construction such as a lack of air, light and sanitation.

The supporters of the 1901 law rallied together for the Zoning Ordinance of 1916. Reformer Benjamin Marsh of the 1908 Committee on Congestion of Population held an exhibition on urban congestion from which came the creation of the 1913 Heights of Buildings Commission and the 1914 Commission on Building Districts and Restrictions. These efforts were crowned by the City Zoning Ordinance of 1916 establishing land-use zones for residential, commercial and unrestricted purposes. Dal Co quotes one of the code's drafters as saying that it was forged mainly for "the necessity of conserving real estate values" (Ford in Dal Co 1980, 207). The effort to create legal guidelines for housing and development was, according to Dal Co, a combination of reform and business concerns over urban chaos:

This convergence of interests came about through the gradual weakening and replacement of the old patterns and alignments of laissez-faire, the philanthropic origins of a good part of urban reformism, and the changed sociopolitical conditions that were beginning to make the chaotic development of the city disadvantageous for the large corporate enterprises in their attempt to "rationalize" speculation and the increment of property values (Dal Co 1980, 207-8).

The zoning laws were not intended, in sum, to coordinate public investment, but simply to regulate individual building projects (Tafari 1980, 432). When the new zoning laws

would have threatened the well entrenched manufacturing interests on the Lower East Side, for instance, by limiting the mixture of manufacturing and residential uses, a loophole was added to create a zoning exclusion for the Lower East Side (Schwartz 1993, 21-22).

The combination of support, in sum, included initial advocacy by middle and upper-class reformers, by development and housing business interests looking for standards in construction and regularity in regulation, and by politicians in office--often at the state level--happy to accommodate business interests, middle and upper-class reform supporters and those working-class voters who thought reforms would improve their living conditions. But the role of the public sector in actual housing production was not on the public agenda. In fact, of the total housing created from 1921 to 1930, none was built by the public-sector and only 900 units were publicly-aided; this compared to 761,400 units privately built (Roistacher and Tobier 1984, 448).

And the lack of public sector housing production was not an openly debated issue. As with more current growth policies, as Elkin explains, the questions of areas for public investment do not regularly become electoral issues. Arousing public debates might slow economic investment, a concern of developers, reformers and machine politicians in and out of office:

That such matters are not regularly raised is best understood as a result of the structural arrangements

that arise out of the natural alliance between development interests and officials. It is easy to see that if the use of land assembly, zoning changes, access improvement, and the like to induce investment were regularly raised at election time, investment in the city would be substantially slowed (Elkin 1987, 45).

Housing and other land-use issues were, and mostly continue to be, "best kept from the public's gaze," in the view of those most involved with guarding the structures of decisionmaking (Elkin 1987, 45).

The Quiltwork of Programmatic Federalism

What Gunlicks has called American "functional federalism," has also shaped participation in housing policymaking (1986, 199). The division of responsibility and initiative in housing and urban development has taken on a fragmented form, with different governmental levels sometimes producing housing, other times subsidizing housing production in the private sector. The federal level has done both and has sometimes directed housing funds to the state or city level in the form of specific programs, often working directly with community groups. Thus, federal intervention has provided little coordination to an already negligible public role on the local level. Housing policy, in other words, is administered through different structures depending on a specific program. This "programmatic federalism" further confuses the possibility of resident participation, since it is often unclear on the community level which

levels or agencies are responsible for overall housing decisionmaking, or whether there is, indeed, a "housing policymaking process."

The Impact of American Federalism on Public Housing

The construction of the Lower East Side's first public housing is instructive of the political mixture of federal, state and local actors to produce a housing project without a guiding housing policy. It also begins the story for middle-class public housing programs on the lower-income East Side. The early groundwork for the project was laid in 1926 with passage of a New York State Housing Law under Governor Al Smith. A State Board of Housing was created with powers of eminent domain and tax exemptions for redevelopment companies building moderately priced housing. This was structured around the idea of limited-dividends, or multiple dwellings built by private investors at limited profits. Although initially the concept went nowhere, Al Smith, as ex-governor, later led a Housing Association of the City of New York to champion the plan in Albany with full support from construction and banking interests.

With radical reformers seeking something akin to public housing corporations, rather than the proposed limited-dividend companies, they found themselves blocked at the state level by Smith and his supporters. The leading housing reformer Mary Simkhovitch, economist Edith Elmer

Wood and settlement house workers throughout the city formed the Public Housing Conference and headed to Washington for help (Schwartz 1993, 32-33).

The first federal housing production program, the 1932 Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), was already drafted to offer loans to private developers for low-income housing. An anti-Depression measure, the project mostly provided jobs and aid to the New York City construction industry. The Public Housing Conference pressed New York Senator Robert F. Wagner, Sr. to assist the creation of public housing or "municipal housing boards," but came away with more narrow limited-dividend company funding. The aid was delivered to the appropriate New York State agency, the State Emergency Public Works Commission, co-chaired by Robert Moses, the former New York State Parks Commissioner. Moses imagined using the funds for public works and roadways, rejecting most project applications, including that of the Public Housing Conference. The only project approved was the Lower East Side's Knickerbocker Village (Schwartz 33-34). One of only two projects awarded nationally, the project received 98% of the funding, allowing developers to construct a three block site of 1,573 apartments. It did little to produce low-income housing, however, since Knickerbocker's owners quickly raised rents pushing out most of its low-income tenants (Judd and Swanstrom 1994, 129).

Public Housing and the Federal Role

A governmental mechanism for the purpose of public housing production was created only in the 1930s. This was the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), the first local housing authority in the country, established in 1934 (New York City Department of City Planning 1977, 7). Local housing authorities were created by states widely during the 1930s to circumvent federal court decisions limiting both local and federal agencies from using eminent domain for any purpose but "clear public use," not thought to include municipal housing. Since city officials could seldom afford to buy out landowners at owners' inflated demands, cities lobbied states to create state-chartered housing authorities with the powers of eminent domain (Todd and Swanstrom 1994 129-130; Schartz 1993, 3).

New York State passed its "Municipal Housing Authorities Law" in 1934 providing for "the establishment, organization, operation and dissolution of municipal housing authorities." This cleared the way for New York City to create a local housing authority by a Board of Aldermen Resolution on February 6, 1934 (New York Board of Aldermen 1934, 228-9). The agency was directed by a five-member board chosen by the mayor, but beyond this link to city government it was an independent non-mayoral agency. Its powers were extensive: to "investigate slum and housing conditions throughout the city," to receive city, state and

federal loans and subsidies or to sell its own bonds with approval of the city. Sites could be acquired by negotiation, condemnation or by asking the city to condemn property on the New York City Housing Authority's behalf (New York City Housing Authority 1939).

The city purchased its first property in November, 1934, a row of tenements at Avenue A and Third Street on the Lower East Side. It cleared the site, constructed 122 moderate income housing units and took its first tenants in 1935 in the so-called "First Houses" (Weisman 1974, 51; Schwartz 1993, 59). In 1937, with passage of the national Wagner-Steagall Public Housing Act, the Housing Authority became the local housing agency for administering an ambitious federal effort to offer relief from the Great Depression's effects. The initiative was intended to both stimulate construction and provide low-income housing. But resistance from private sector builders, who saw the Act as a public-sector competitor, was so intense that a requirement was added to the bill limiting local authorities to constructing only the number of units equal to those "slum dwellings" they tore down (Judd and Swanstrom 1994, 131).

And it was successfully limited in its national impact. Judd and Swanstrom report that nationally only 169,451 units of low income federal housing were completed--most of these before World War II (1994, 132). In New York City although construction did pick up, only 12,797 units of

federal public housing or, as calculated by Roistacher and Tobier, eight percent of all units completed between 1936 and 1941 were built under the new federal housing program (Roistacher and Tobier 1984, 450; Department of City Planning 1986, 3).


The Lower East Side is a national exception, and largely because of the development ambitions of Robert Moses, with his special city title of Construction Coordinator. Moses saw the Lower East Side as vital to his downtown development strategy, initiating wide-ranging construction plans. When possible, he used private investors to build middle-class housing. But frustrated by the stubborn refusal of bankers to risk funds on his vision of river-front housing on the Lower East Side, Moses settled on the last resort building mechanism, federal low-income public housing allocations. With these funds in 1940 he built the all-white Vladeck Houses, 1,533 units along the East River (Schwartz 1993; 59, 165). In 1943 low-income housing was constructed along the East River from the Brooklyn Bridge to 14th Street including the Governor Alfred E. Smith, Baruch and Lillian D. Wald Houses (298). Combining local, state and federal public housing initiatives, the Lower East Side is the site of more publicly constructed new housing than any other New York City Community Board at a total of 27,642 units built between 1930 and 1985. Only

East Harlem has more federal public housing units (14,806 units compared with the Lower East Side's 12,925).

The number of apartments owned and operated by the NYCHA boomed in the post-World War II years from 1948 to 1955, producing 61,578 new units with a peak of 13,558 units in 1950, the total reflecting as well new state and city housing programs (Department of City Planning 1986; Smothers 1973). For instance, at the time when Vladeck Houses were constructed with federal public housing monies, New York City funded the neighboring 240 units of housing called Vladeck City (Schwartz 1993, 59). In short, the federal public housing funds contributed toward a one-time building boom of affordable housing in New York and on the Lower East Side. And this was in large measure a result of a need for construction investment as the real estate market recovered from the Depression.

After this period of peak federal public housing investment, construction tapered off, producing several thousand city-wide until the mid-1970s. Thereafter, the federal level withdrew from public housing support through the 1973 Nixon administration housing moratorium and the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act signed by President Ford. Since 1975, very limited public housing has been built, with a yearly high in 1980 of 841 units (Department of City Planning 1986, 3; see Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1 Public and Publicly Aided Housing Units in New Construction by Program and Year of Completion in Manhattan Community District 303, 1953-1985



Source: Figure derived from NYC Dept. of City Planning. Housing Database Public and Publicly Aided Housing in NYC. 1985 Update Volume. Table C-1, "Summary of Housing Units in New Construction by Program and Year of Completion Located in Manhattan by Community District." NYC: NYCDP. August, 1986. p.109.

The 1974 Act represented a fundamental shift away from public housing, setting the earlier period apart as unique in American housing history. The 1974 legislation created a complex system of programs, but generally led to an emphasis on direct tenant rent subsidies through the Section 8 program, with aid going to a broad spectrum of income levels from very low through moderate (Hays 1985, 146-7; Weisman 1974; Smothers 1973). The Act also made available federal grants for new construction, but this in the form of a Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) distributed through state governments. This meant that substantial housing monies were diverted by state legislatures to suburban areas. Under categorical programs almost seventy percent of federal housing funds went to central cities; under the Housing and Community Development Act CDBGs, this figure dropped to just over 42%. Federal funds also shifted generally from the Northeast to the South and West, leaving New York underfunded (Hays 1985; 213, 216).

With an end to an active federal public housing role, the NYCHA became primarily a managing agency for existing projects. Project residents have protested racist rental policies, eviction and other decisions, but complaints have not usually connected NYCHA practices with national, state or city policies. In fact, to organize diverse and potentially explosive protests, the NYCHA took the initiative in organizing tenants themselves. On the

Lower East Side in 1958 it sponsored tenant organizations and floor meetings run by the Henry Street Settlement House (Schartz 1993, 291). And in 1970 it created a city-wide council of tenants with advisory powers (Weisman 1970). On a community-level broad issues of housing development, or the lack of low-income housing were not raised against NYCHA. It is, after all, both insulated from the more accessible city council and has a city-wide, not community focus. Further, seeing NYCHA as an independent agency, residents of public housing are less likely to share general housing concerns with other community residents suffering from the diverse problems of abandonment or escalating rents at the hands of private building owners or speculators.

The State Role

As noted earlier, New York State has often taken a leading role in regulating housing standards, especially when local Democrats were loath to see active governmental regulation, and "up-state" (areas outside of New York City) Republicans or reform Democrats had a city base of support for doing so. In an era when the reformer-led "home rule movement" brought greater autonomy for most cities nationally, New York City remained severely limited by New York State. Historically, much of this controlling force is explained by the largely Republican upstate concern over

local Tweed scandals and later Tammany control.³ This was codified with a court challenge of New York State's 1929 municipal dwelling law creating New York City housing codes. Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo upheld the codes, in the case of Adler v. Deegan (1929), even though they applied only to New York City. Such intervention was justified by "substantial state concern" intermingling state concerns with those of a locality (in Benjamin 1990, 237). And with the population New York City consistently forming over forty percent of the state population and over 28% (with a peak at 49.4% in 1950) of the state-wide voting population, the interests of elected state officials with New York City affairs has been considerable (Benjamin 228).

This explains, in part the remarkable attention given to the Lower East Side, with a population at nearly 155,000, greater than most up-state cities, and a traditional stronghold for Democratic regulars as well as a center of concern for urban reformers. And, given the interest of reformers with upgrading lower income districts rather than accommodating the needs of lower-income residents, it is notable that although New York State added 719 units to the public housing stock administered by the NYCHA, most of the State-funded public housing has been for middle-class

³Hammack offers a particularly good account in Power and society, see especially pages 130-131; see also Mowry's excellent chapter on "The cities and the states" in The era of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 59-84.

families.

Islands of Middle-Class Housing

The largest state initiative in the community has been the 1943 New York State Redevelopment Law, designed to build publicly-sponsored middle-class housing. The legislation created Redevelopment Companies after World War II with the powers of eminent domain and to grant partial tax exemptions. In New York City, three Manhattan districts received the overwhelming portion of the funding. The largest of these projects was the 8,736 units built in Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village, skirting the Lower East Side's northern edge, in Manhattan Community Board Six. On the Lower East Side it produced a substantial 4,447 units of middle-class apartments between 1949 and 1965, representing the most significant state housing investment in the community (Department of City Planning 1986; 5, 95-121).

The Redevelopment Companies Law was a broad state-level housing initiative, but can again be viewed as one resource combined with many others to build specific housing projects. To see how this operated on the Lower East Side, a look at the Amalgamated Cooperatives is instructive. Similar, in some regards, to Berlin's union housing cooperative, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers union attempted to provide affordable housing for their members and promote the idea of cooperative living. On the Lower East Side in the

1930s, a combination of interests drew together to realize these goals. Housing reformers, including Lillian Wald, were firm supporters, as were the East Side Chamber of Commerce, local business leaders, bankers and realtors. Local boosters promoted the housing as an asset to the community's economic well-being, while settlement house workers thought the cooperatives to be a healthful replacement for tenement house living. As in Berlin, the challenge was to finance the plan in such a manner that would hold down costs and keep the flats affordable to workers (Schwartz 1993, 30-31).

The State Redevelopment Law allowed the city to use eminent domain for land clearance and union leaders financed the project by selling shares to interested parties, such as the *Jewish daily forward*, and managed to secure a 3.5% interest loan from Mutual of New York Insurance (Schwartz 126). They cleared a small low-income tenement area and successfully built the first project, the Amalgamated Dwellings. Impressed by their ability to build during the devastating Depression years, construction czar Robert Moses, came to see Amalgamated as a private partner for constructing publicly-assisted working-class and middle-income housing. He encouraged them to build another project in the north Bronx and was central to removing both legal and financial impediments (134).

The Great Depression forced Moses to bargain hard with investors and bankers to secure financing for housing

initiatives. City revenues plunged almost fifty million dollars and unemployment, increased demands for city services, and a steep rise in debt service charges were unprecedented (Pecorella 1994, 49). The 1933 Bankers Agreement, in fact, had forced the Democratic machine to enact severe retrenchment measures, freeze property taxes and end new taxes on life insurance firms, savings banks and stocks. In exchange, financiers kept credit lines open and purchased seventy million dollars of city securities (Pecorella 50).

The agreement produced, in the words of one observer at the time, a shifting of power "from the political organization and its leaders to the financial interests of the community, especially the bankers (William Beyer in Pecorella 50). The lesson was clear: given the unpredictability of the unfettered market, support of financial interests would be the most essential element in any governing regime. This explains much of Robert Moses' power in driving city construction. Mayor O'Dwyer relied so heavily on Moses' ability to pull together federal, state and private funds and build, that by 1946 he had granted Moses almost unlimited power as the New York City Construction Coordinator and 'czar of public and redevelopment housing' (Schwartz 1993, 123).

The Lower East Side was essential to long-term private development because of its proximity to the downtown financial district. This made the district, Moses thought,

too valuable for additional low-income public housing (Schwartz 114-5). Amalgamated was useful to Moses because its pool of pension funds and other assets enabled it to finance construction. In 1949 he urged them to build on the Lower East Side once again when he sought to expand middle-class housing in the area. It was Moses who arranged a loan for the project from Mutual of New York. The city again provided eminent domain assistance and three twelve-story buildings, the Sidney Hillman Houses, were added along Grand Street as what historian Joel Schwartz has coined "middle-class islands" which were not even affordable for all of Amalgamated's members (176). When construction stalled over the displacement of 218 families, Moses had the New York City Housing Authority accept forty of them into public housing as a conciliatory gesture (Schwartz 135).

When the next expansion of Amalgamated Housing was proposed, the new federal 1949 Housing Act was in place to ease development. Under the Act's Title I, the federal level extended eminent domain powers and shared the cost of site preparation, covering two-thirds, and provided assistance to local governments for writing down the cost of the land to the purchasing developer (Judd and Swanstrom 1994, 137). To finance the housing, this time Amalgamated was joined by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union to develop the Corlears Hook district adjoining Amalgamated's other cooperatives and the NYCHA Vladeck Houses.

Again Robert Moses, now as the City Construction Coordinator and Chair of the Mayor's Slum Clearance Committee assisted by acquiring tax breaks and write-downs for the project, smoothed the way for Board of Estimate approval, and arranged for the removal of 878 mostly Puerto Rican low-income families from around twelve acres of residential dwellings. The ILGWU split the mortgage with the Bowery Savings Bank in exchange for half of the apartments going to its members. Only the American Labor Party, the Manhattan Tenants Council and some of the Puerto Rican residents protested or complained (Schwartz 1993, 176-77).

The unions, the Lower East Side radicals of earlier years, showed all of the signs of aging organizations concerned foremost with service delivery to their membership. Especially as the gains of earlier years improved the living standards of their constituent garment workers, less effort was devoted to the concerns of still unorganized, and less affluent, Puerto Rican and black neighbors. The role of the Lower East Side, mostly Jewish, garment industry unionists in community politics changed dramatically after the Amalgamated buildings went up. Their middle-class Jewish residents would acquire a reputation of acting as a consolidated interest working against later community efforts to address the needs of lower-income residents; and with this came the nickname, "the Grand Street Gang."

The stock of middle-income housing on the Lower East Side once again increased with passage of the 1956 New York State Limited Profits Housing Companies Law, known as the Mitchell-Lama Act. Named for State Senator MacNeill Mitchell and Assemblyman Alfred Lama, the Mitchell-Lama Act sought to stimulate housing development by creating a low-interest loan fund for the building of moderate and middle-income cooperatives. An income limit on coop purchasers was established and the resell price was restricted to the original purchase price plus amortization (City limits, November 1981, 6).

Once again, as Schwartz points out, Mitchell-Lama adoption stemmed from support by bankers, unions and reformers, who began to push for cooperative housing in 1954 as a measure to preserve middle-class neighborhoods. Mayor Wagner especially hoped to establish home-ownership programs over rental as a barricade against Robert Moses' Committee on Slum Clearance and massive building of low-income public housing (Schwartz 1993, 267-8). City-wide, Mitchell-Lama constructed some 420 housing developments with 164,000 units including the sprawling 15,372 unit Coop City in the Bronx (City limits 1979, 8). The Lower East Side was a heavy recipient of Mitchell-Lama coops. 123 units were built in the community under the state program in 1974 and over 4,689 units were constructed by the city Mitchell-Lama program between 1964 and 1978. Of all public and publicly-assisted

new housing constructed by 1985, moderate and middle-income housing on the Lower East Side--including Limited-Dividend Companies, New York State Redevelopment Law and Mitchell-Lama units--accounted for 11,169 units, or at least forty percent (see Figure 9.1).

This period of public housing construction was not to last. The federal funding dried up, and the force of Robert Moses as a powerful unelected development official was unique in New York City construction history. Moses' construction ambitions permanently affected the housing stock on the Lower East Side eliminating many lower-income units and replacing them with fewer moderate and middle income units. His tactic of clearing low-income tenements and 'dumping' the displaced into MYCHA projects was halted when Mayor Wagner completely reorganized the New York City Housing Authority in 1958, effectively limiting Moses' influence over public housing. And when insider deals between the Committee on Slum Clearance and Tammany realtors became public, CSC was dissolved and replaced by a Housing and Redevelopment Board in 1960, ending the era of Moses rule (Caro 1975, 805; Schwartz 1986, 164). Housing policy decisionmaking remained a patchwork process involving various public and private actors. In fact, on the Lower East Side it is almost impossible to find low and moderate income housing not constructed by what urbanists more recently have called "public-private enterprises" after completion of the

A "Housing Policymaking Process?"

Between the fragmentation of housing programs across the local, state and federal level and the dominance of the private-sector in housing production, it is difficult to isolate a discernible housing policymaking process for New York City. With Moses and the title of construction czar gone, the structure of housing decisionmaking and its inadequacy was even more apparent. In addition to the NYCHA and the new Housing and Redevelopment Board, other agencies also administered housing and construction programs. In 1962 New York State transferred the post-war rent control administration to the New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration and created the Receivership Bureau. Meanwhile, the New York City Department of Relocation, the Department of Buildings and the Department of Real Estate remained separate agencies. Of these administrative agencies, no single office had general policy-setting responsibilities, no commissioner of housing or development provided coordination. Rather, as one housing administrator testified in 1967, the city had repeatedly established temporary committees and boards unable to offer long-term coordination:

In little over a decade we have had a Construction Coordinator, a Slum Clearance Committee, an Urban Renewal Board, a Housing and Redevelopment Board, a Mayor's Housing Policy Board, a Housing Executive Committee and a Coordinator of Housing and Development...And they

haven't worked...The city government knows it. The neighborhoods of our city know it (Nathan 1967, 5).

The City Planning Commission, created by the 1936 City Charter, had not provided the answer. It was established, not to guide city planning and construction, but with the narrow purpose of advising the central land-use and franchise-granting decisionmaking body, the Board of Estimate, on pending decisions (Schwartz 1993, 67).

The powers of the now defunct Board of Estimate evolved since its creation just after the turn of the century, but its primary duties were land-use and franchise-granting decisionmaking. Its weighted voting system, additionally, favored mayoral power while underrepresenting the majority of city residents.⁴ The structure granted the mayor three votes, the comptroller and president of the city council each two, and each of the five borough presidents received one. Board members were not initiators of policy or development coordinators.

City housing policy initiatives have come largely from the mayor. New York City has a "strong mayor" form of government, stemming in part from the state's concerns about a weak mayor's vulnerability in a city with New York City's history of machine politics. The city's legislative body,

⁴The Board of Estimate was declared unconstitutional in 1989 by the U.S. Supreme Court because its equal weighting of boroughs with very different population sizes violated the 'one person, one vote' standard of equal representation.

the City Council, as a result, was granted limited capacity to affect long-range development. Its thirty-five members⁵ were notoriously lackluster, as Savitch concludes: "...it has never shorn its reputation as an assemblage of political ghosts who are anxious to avoid controversy and be elected" (Savitch 1988, 57).

In short, borough presidents have been tightly linked with their county Democratic party organization, seeking to pull in lucrative and job-producing projects when possible. Their interest in the borough offices and on the Board of Estimate was not likely to stray to long-range planning issues; City Council members, as district representatives were similarly more concerned with funding for services to their constituents than city-wide needs; the City Planning Commission and Department, monitoring individual projects and zoning proposals, also had no mandate to initiate long-term housing and community development policies. Only the mayor, with a city-wide constituency and agenda-setting power, could initiate and direct coordinated housing policies. This has led Mollenkopf to write that, "To strengthen the planning process, the Mayor should lead the city's varied and competing interests to forge a new

⁵The 1989 Charter Revision increased the City Council's size to fifty-one and altered some of its responsibilities. Although it remains to be seen how the Council will utilize its new powers, its land-use role appears strengthened.

consensus of the process and vision of planning." In the absence of such leadership, he concludes, no "careful, far-sighted planning" is possible (Mollenkopf 1989, 165).

When Mayor Lindsay took office, he took the initiative and reorganized housing decisionmaking structures by creating the first of his "superagencies" to stream line city administration. In November, 1966, he combined the many separate housing offices to "provide the city with the modern governmental structure which it surely needs to meet housing needs" (Lindsay in Long Island press 27 July 1967). The new Housing and Development Administration (HDA) claimed to both consolidate the "crazy-quilt of housing agencies," but also to decentralize community outreach by creating Area Administration to "bring city government close to the people and make the city more responsive to the people's needs" (Nathan 1967, 9).

Far from accomplishing these goals, the HDA was repeatedly attacked as a "large, clumsy bureaucracy." Accused by City Council for squandering \$61 million in bad loans to low-income tenement owners (through the Municipal Loan Program), the HDA was slightly reorganized (Asbury 1972). After investigation by the New York State Commission for New York City, the "Scott Commission," in 1973, drastic restructuring was recommended (Fried 1973). The major charges were that HDA was too massive to efficiently coordinate housing programs. But HDA, nonetheless, remained

only one of at least twenty-two city, state and federal government agencies affecting housing policy in New York City (Alpern 1973, 205).

In 1977, HDA was eliminated and reorganized into the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) and the Department of Buildings was re-established as a separate agency. Still operating as the central housing agency, HPD's commissioner is to plan, initiate, and coordinate city housing, urban renewal and neighborhood conservation programs. In addition, it is to maintain rehabilitate, and manage city-owned housing properties (New York City Department of Records and Information Services 1994).

These changes came amidst the larger process of decentralizing New York City's government with the 1975 City Charter revisions. They established a system of fifty-nine community district offices, called Community Planning Boards, and gave local boards an advisory role in a land-use decisionmaking process, the Uniform Land-Use Review Procedure (ULURP) (Pecorella 1994, 127-8). In use by 1977, the new procedures required that a community potentially affected by a change in zoning or local land-use be allowed local public hearings which could produce recommendations to the City Planning Commission. After further public hearings, the final decision was left with the Board of Estimate.

At first glance, the revisions of the mid-1970s appear to have radically altered the levels of both coordination for housing decisionmaking and community input. The promise of the charter revisions, however, were not realized. The City Planning Commission, for example, came to see their role as limited to reviewing ULURP proposals. Asked by the author about his role in city planning, a Planning Commissioner explained simply that his role was mostly limited to reviewing proposed zoning changes and voting on them (New York City, 6 February 1989). A top-level official in the City Planning Department responded that city planning "is impossible in New York City because of its size and problems." The Department's role in planning is limited to researching and preparing the Commissioners for ULURP votes (New York City, 20 March 1989).

The decentralization of decisionmaking, meanwhile, seems also to have been illusory. As one experienced community housing activist outlined:

As I see it, the mayor makes policy which then "trickles down" to communities. These policies are "reactive" in that they respond to demands by various groups and operate without any larger plan. In general, they do not address the needs of people, especially the poor, who have little political clout (New York City, 31 March 1989).

Community housing activists echoed this description repeatedly, one saying that housing policy is shaped by "'the great political beast'--the mayor and his top advisors. It makes decisions based on political interests.

The resulting policies are short-sighted and lack any planning or vision" (New York City, 26 June 1989).

Interviewees consistently identified the Mayor as the primary housing decisionmaker, and private-sector real estate and development interests--what one called "the small power elite"--the strongest influence on mayoral decisions. "The city doesn't have a housing policy," concluded another, "It has a political agenda." Many of these comments reflect the structural and electoral differences between New York and Berlin governments. Berlin respondents rarely failed to identify the Berlin Senat and an insulated Senator for Housing and Construction as primary decisionmakers in housing policy. But likely since it is not directly chosen by voters, the Senat was not mentioned in interviews as reacting to easily identifiable political support. The awareness of development scandals was general, not specific knowledge, and rarely had one mentioned community organizations as possible influences on policy.

In contrast, the mayor was described as only responding to various demands with an eye on election time:

On housing, the mayor makes decisions based on his re-election concerns and on pressure by various players, primarily real estate developers. He does respond also to community groups, but there is no overall housing plan. Actions are just responses to demands (New York City, 21 February 1989).

The marketplace, in other words, and the importance the mayor places on development and investment was ultimately

seen as driving housing decisionmaking. The following summary by a community planning expert nicely summarizes the decisionmaking structure.

The major influence on decisionmaking is the marketplace. It produces demand for development; the income of residents then determines the power they may have over development with lower income citizens having no power at all. City leaders agree with development it sees creating economic growth which it sees as good for the city...Formal steps are formal and empty with participation by community groups declining as they see how meaningless the process is (New York City, 16 March 1989).

Policy initiatives continued to come from the mayor primarily, and coming to office in 1977 on the heels of a major fiscal crisis, Mayor Ed Koch launched no significant low-income housing policy until his tenth year in office, 1987 (Fainstein and Young 1992, 219). Again, the private market remained the primary determinate of housing policy.

The hesitancy of New York City government to play a role in dictating an active housing agenda stems in part from the 1975 fiscal crisis which further institutionalized the preeminence of banking interests, investors and private developers (Bellush 1990, 308-9). As the nation and New York state slid into recession combined with high inflation, the cost of borrowing became an unwieldy burden. With New York City borrowing to full capacity--five billion dollars in 1974 alone--the city's major banks started to shun municipal securities. When, in 1975, New York City's outstanding short-term debt reached the level of an average

year's tax revenue, underwriters for city debt disappeared (Netzer 1990, 46).

This crisis elevated the power of private development and financial interests in three ways. First, with New York City in fiscal ruin, a combination of interests came to the rescue, but won a stronger hand in formal city decision-making in return. Investors and major bankers improved their decisionmaking strength when New York State intervened in the crisis and created the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB). The EFCB members included the governor, the mayor, the state and city comptrollers and three private-sector appointees of the governor. These were, in 1975, private banking leaders, marking their formal entry into city decisionmaking in their capacity as private financial interests. The Board had the power to approve all city budgets until they balanced for three years, approve revenue estimates, borrowing, and to oversee the reform of budget practices (Bellush 1990, 314).

Secondly, the financial interests gained broader power simply because the city had been made painfully aware of its vulnerability. Business demands reached City Hall faster and mayors thereafter became acutely sensitive to two of what Martin Shefter had called the "political imperatives" of city governance: to maintain a healthy economy and a good credit-rating for municipal bonds (Shefter 1985).

Thirdly, New York City mayors--and this was particularly true of the first post-fiscal crisis mayor Ed Koch--were anxious to promote growth and development at almost any price, as a safeguard against future fiscal down-turns. Toward this end, a series of subsidy programs were designed to open New York City's economy for "doing business" and, following the Moses legacy, city-owned lands were examined as possible incentives to once again spur middle-income housing development.

In addition to those factors already discussed is the fact that local governments must raise the majority of their own revenues. One primary strategy has been to attract investments that raise the value of taxable property. As Susan and Norman Fainstein have argued, this does not mean that cities act generally in the interest of investors and businesses since they are "mutually competitive," but they act to keep local firms competitive nationally and to eliminate economic "blight," in other words, resource-use not valued by capital (Fainstein and Fainstein 1986, 251, 252).

Especially after federal cutbacks to urban centers, cities became even more dependent on private investment. Savitch reports that federal contributions to New York City's budget during Mayor Lindsay's term went from 11.8% in 1967 to 20.5% in 1973 and remained a steady one-fifth of New York City's revenues until the Reagan and Bush "new federal-

ism" years. Then contributions dropped from 19.5% to a low of 9.3% in 1990 (Savitch 1993; 252, 261, 264). This cut-back affected housing programs severely. The federal housing budget dropped from \$30 billion in 1981 to less than 8% billion in 1988. This meant a near elimination of federal housing programs in New York City, which in 1981 had amounted to \$2.2 billion (New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development 1989, 3).

Abandonment, In-Rem, and Selling the Public to the Private

Against this backdrop, tax foreclosed properties were seen by some city officials as a possible revenue-raising source. Just following the long fiscal crisis in 1976, the city owned 4,611 apartment buildings throughout the city. With foreclosure, or *in rem*, proceedings taking up to three years, by the time the city took possession buildings were often abandoned or severely neglected. On January 1, 1977, the city enacted Local Law 45 to allow foreclosure after just one year. By the end of that year, the city was in possession of at least 11,000 buildings city-wide, with more than half of them vacant (Roistacher and Tobier 1984, 467; Interview, 12 January 1989, New York City). In 1984, New York City's *in rem* housing stock totalled 52,446 units, and stood at 55,980 in 1987 (Stegman 1988, 206).⁶

⁶This does not indicate an increase in a pool of housing units since buildings enter and leave city ownership quite rapidly. Stegman notes that only 41% of *in rem* units in 1984 were also *in rem* in 1987 (1988, 207).

Tax-foreclosed buildings that fell into city ownership became an important issue for Lower East Side residents. The city enacted Local Law 45 to not only discourage tax delinquency, but to preserve low and moderate-income housing by "vesting" (acquiring "property through legal action for non-payment of property taxes") before buildings fall into disrepair beyond recovery (Stegman 188, 207). This was not to say that the city would convert buildings into public housing. In fact, the fate of vested units again demonstrates the centrality of the private-sector in housing disposition issues.

The recession had hit the Lower East Side especially hard. An estimated 7,000 units of housing were lost to landlord disinvestment between 1970 and 1982, with 1,340 units lost between 1980 to 1982 alone. Especially farthest east between Delancey and 14th Street, 22% of the housing stock was lost (Lower East Side Joint Planning Council 1984, 21). So while Kreuzberg in Berlin during this period began to lose housing stock due to city redevelopment plans, the Lower East Side lost dwellings to the fluctuations in the private real estate market. This meant that the Lower East Side had an especially large pool of housing to be vested by

HPD. Community organizers estimated an *in rem* pool of approximately 600 buildings in the middle and late 1980s.⁷

The issue of disposition, then, became a key issue for low-income housing advocates. City officials within HPD were responsible for *in rem* management. Since a sizable portion of the buildings were in a deteriorated state, HPD officials shunned the potentially expensive rehabilitation or reconstruction they would need to convert them to city-owned apartments. Stegman's research emphasizes this by documenting that 55% of all housing vested since 1970 were still in the city inventory by 1987. In Lower Manhattan, the figure is somewhat lower, but still nearly half of *in rem* units were in uninhabitable buildings (Stegman 1988, 209).

HPD has used a range of policies for *in rem* disposition. The soundest housing stock was routinely auctioned to private owners until widespread protest in the late 1970s. Some units come under HPD management through its Division of Alternative Management Programs (DAMP). DAMP has experimented with selling livable buildings to tenants, community groups, private owners, and keeping them in public hands while extending management to other city agencies, not-for-

⁷ Pinpointing an exact figure is challenging for housing advocates since not all visibly vacant buildings are *in rem*, not all *in rem* buildings are vacant, and city agencies were disposing of particularly valuable properties as quickly as possible.

profit community groups and private, for-profit real estate management companies under the Private Ownership Management Program (POMP) launched in August, 1979 (Baldwin 1979,2).

Affordable housing advocates were becoming aware of the combined interest of then Mayor Koch, his HPD commissioner and private developers to use publicly-owned properties to strengthen the city budget and stimulate private investment. As then City Council member (now Manhattan Borough President) Ruth Messinger would later summarize the issue:

Pittsburgh is a steel town. Houston is an oil town. New York is a land town. Land is the commodity that we buy and sell; develop, over-develop and abandon; use and abuse...In its role as a developer, the city does not consult with or listen to the affected community. It disposes of land to the highest bidder for the most it can get. It does not set requirements for use, even when the consequence is to plough up a garden, create shadow--as at Columbus Circle--or provide a generous subsidy to a developer whose profit is already secure (Ruth Messinger 1988, 16).

Community-level concerns with the role of small-time speculators and major developers eying the Lower East Side reached a peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The *in rem* disposition issue would combine with growing alarm about city plans for a still-unresolved Title I urban renewal area, Seward Park, to arouse community residents. Their participation in the issue of low-income community housing would be shaped by the absence of a clear "housing policymaking process," the fragmentation of housing agencies between the federal, state and local levels, by "program-

matic federalism" and the lack of long-range housing planning and, particularly, by the predominance of the private market in setting the development agenda.

Chapter 10

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES ON THE LOWER EAST SIDE

Thus far, we have described some important lines in very different networks of participatory determinants for the Lower East Side and Kreuzberg. On the Lower East Side, we have seen a history of community organizing reinforced by the influence of a decentralized Democratic party, a dominant private-sector housing market with limited governmental intervention and a fragmented, programmatic style of decisionmaking when public-sector housing development is found.

These primary lines, together with others, have worked upon community residents unevenly. The demographic data presented earlier also lead to the expectation that participation by individuals will be shaped by their SES, age and, in the case of immigrants, may be affected by the political cultures of their countries of origin. Individuals are also affected by personal, familial experiences that bring them to different conclusions about the benefits or responsibility of participating and what participatory strategies will product some effect.

The emphasis for this research is not to construct all lines for all individuals, but to pull together many

primary determinants of overall community participation in order to expose networks in comparison between political cultures. This chapter and the following will address how the many lines of each network have shaped community participation as a whole. The descriptions below, in other words, present examples of the dominant modes of participation, rather than a detailed account of all participation. And by highlighting primary modes in comparison, some finer channels of the personal, individualist determinants are also revealed, linking in some places the immediate and abstract realm experiences. Again, every individual's set of participatory determinants is unique, but examining communities in comparison allows observations to be made about what determinants are strongest in each place.

Participation and Public Housing

Lower East Side participation was shaped extensively by the structure and requirements of specific housing programs. The extent to which a program can isolate one groups' interests and from those of other community residents is best illustrated by the participatory style of the community's thousands of public housing tenants. As mentioned earlier, New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) residents were organized by NYCHA in the early 1970s to coordinate input and diffuse protest (see Chapter Nine).

Public housing tenants are further set apart from other lower-income Lower East Side residents by the fact of already having affordable housing and their concern with insulated housing project issues, particularly that of effective anti-crime and anti-drug patrols. Since the NYCHA administration is insulated from HPD, and city politics in general, they perceive that immediate concerns would not benefit from pressuring city hall or working with Community Board 3 or community-based housing groups.

In addition, of all Lower East Side residents, public housing residents are more likely to have the lowest SES levels. This creates tough barriers to activism in terms of time and other necessary organizational resources, and leaves the NYCHA-mandated groups the most, or only, accessible instrument for expressing needs. Several community organizers confirmed these observations and added that activists outside of public housing stay out of 'the projects' since resident leaders see them as a threat to established groups and resent the interference of younger, often Hispanic, activists into groups led by older and experienced, more often black, residents. The most dominant mode of activism for the Lower East Side, as a result, has shunned targeting the public housing administration and in the face of a diffuse housing policy making process, has concentrated on private-sector landlords and development.

Community-based organizing has been the dominant style of Lower East Side participation. It has, however, been molded by particular governmental housing programs, their funding levels, and their elimination and replacement. Following the housing organization with perhaps the longest history will demonstrate the extent to which "programmatic federalism" has shaped community participation.

Following the Funding: The Adopt-A-Building Story

A flurry of community-based organizing in the 1970s produced at least 20 community-based organizations (CBOs) related to housing and community development on the Lower East Side. Of these, one of the largest and most ambitious was Interfaith Adopt-A-Building, Inc. (AAB). It began in 1970 as a Lower East Side branch of the East Harlem mobilizing effort by Reverend Norman Eddy. Eddy's initiative, The 100 Worst Buildings Committee, publicized the destructive effects of community disinvestment and listed many Lower East Side tenements among the "100 worst." A VISTA volunteer, Ibis Muraro, began working the Lower East Side and was joined in 1971 by a community native, Roberto Nazario.

Nazario's concern for the Lower East Side began when he joined Chino Garcia, Angelo Gonzales and other former Assassins gang members who had been trying to organize the Hispanic Lower East Side north of Delancey since 1965 with

success and failure often hinging on the availability of government funding. Seeking a positive alternative to gang violence, they became the "Spartican Army" to rescue the Lower East Side, later called the Real Great Society (RGS). According to some members, the early goals of the RGS were nothing short of ending poverty on the Lower East Side through community created initiatives. They recalled that although Mobilization for Youth (MFY) was formed as a Lower East Side anti-poverty action, the RGS considered MFY the "big establishment anti-poverty group" and RGS would present the "independent alternative" (interview, Baltimore, 26 July 1989).

In a local church basement, made available by a supportive priest, they plotted the rebuilding of their neighborhood, beginning with cultural events and social activities. Their successful break with violent gang life and discussions of community renewal attracted the attention of a pair of white Philadelphia reformers, Fred and Michael Good who encouraged them and became a source of contacts, advice. Garcia also established ties with a research psychologist well-known for his work with gangs, Dr. Charlie Slack. Through these and other supporters, the RGS leaders found themselves on highly-publicized speaking tours of universities, law enforcement groups and foundations across

the states, billed as "the New York model" for reform of delinquent urban youth (Poston 1971, xi).¹

In 1967, the group received non-profit, tax-exempt status, landed a Vincent Astor Foundation grant and started a leather goods store, social club and child-care exchange service for single mothers. A second Astor grant of \$25,000 enabled the founding of an education program, the University of the Streets, later that year. Despite their earlier pledge to remain "independent" the grant brought expansion and a changing focus. The University's staff was multi-ethnic, including Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, South Americans, blacks and whites, and had a broader education emphasis offering G.E.D., art, martial arts and filmmaking courses, and whatever participants wanted to teach. Anyone could teach, anyone could learn and instruction was unstructured, as was group administration. But even with a peak involvement of 1,600 participants teaching and learning, and acclaimed success, a key staff member complained that they "had to put in so much energy just keeping the operation alive, paying the rent...meeting the payroll, that about all we had time for was fundraising" (Poston 1971, 81).

¹This account is based on interviews with RGS participants and those who worked with them. It also cautiously draws on Richard W. Poston's 1971, The gang and the establishment (New York: Harper and Row), relying on interviews where text and members' recollections conflict.

Inspired by the potential of the organization and after several projects were rejected for federal grants, several organization leaders went to Washington, D.C. in 1967 seeking to expedite an Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) grant application. After some lucky chance meetings with key officials and creating a noisy fuss outside OEO offices, a grant for over \$253,000 was approved in early 1968, primarily based on the success of the University of the Streets. The RGS also used the resources to expand into East Harlem. This fact, together with the continued popularity of gang leaders on speaking tours, further strained operational concerns at home. RGS leaders had never focused on administrative concerns but left them to the largely non-Puerto Rican staff. When bookkeeping and finances came to a state of distress, staff and leadership battled to fix the blame. The entire organization began to disintegrate in 1969. "The Real Great Society," said one staffer, "was ruined by the federal funding" (in Posten 161). In a vicious split over the role of non-Puerto Rican University staff (with some RGS leaders unsuccessfully demanding the resignation of white and black staffers), funding and mismanagement, the University of the Streets splintered-off as an autonomous project. RGS was audited and its federal funding was not renewed. In 1970, the RGS changed its name and focus to become Charas and, with Chino Garcia as Direc-

tor, returned to its role in community awareness-building as a Lower East Side Puerto Rican cultural center.

Nazario, meanwhile, returning from the military in 1969 to find RGS in shambles, sought to rekindle the ideas of the RGS's early basement dreams. He felt that housing must be a central focus and saw the newly-established Interfaith Adopt-a-Building as an appropriate vehicle. The organization drew widely on community leadership; the staff was almost entirely Hispanic and Garcia later joined AAB's board. Funding came from multi-denominational congregations in the community to battle the beginnings of landlord disinvestment. Group volunteers worked to restore basic services to abandoned buildings and organize tenants for eventual self-management. By 1975 they had a significant presence, operating out of a storefront, maintaining a small staff. Regarding much of their work as community consciousness-raising, they renamed their target area--from 14th Street south to Houston and from Avenue A to the East River--Loisaida, Spanish for the Lower East Side.

Beginning in 1974, the city-wide Interfaith AAB focused on community-based organizing, shifting emphasis toward the Lower East Side and encouraging neighborhood branches to take complete control. Churches were encouraged to sponsor, or "adopt," occupied but abandoned buildings to extend the housing options of low income residents. Congregation involvement brought some financial support as

well. The small staff of five and a bookkeeper took turns going onto unemployment rolls every six months while church funding covered the remaining staff. The phrase, "No one had government funding then," was heard in an interview with a sigh that usually comes when recollecting good times.

Many of the AAB initiatives and joint projects with other community residents were extremely imaginative. The 11th Street Movement was one such cooperative effort. Two buildings, 517 and 519 East 11th Street had become victims of landlord abandonment and arson by 1972. In spring of that year, thirteen fires broke out in 519, gutting the building. Five or six residents worked to save the buildings. One woman dramatized their living conditions by freezing the rats she trapped in her apartment and offering them for display at housing court whenever residents were asked to pay rent. AAB assisted residents with their legal battles.

In mid-1973, a new resident, Michael Freedberg, joined the group. A white, South African, Yale graduate with a background in architecture, he had experience in self-help housing rehabilitation, or "rehab housing" and had worked briefly for New York City's HDA (later the Department of Housing Preservation and Development), but left convinced that community residents should be empowered to do their own planning. His former roommate, Philip St. Georges, together with HDA Assistant Commissioner Robert Schur, shared the

idea of self-help housing development and the three decided to call it "sweat equity housing," or housing development in which residents purchased housing through their own labor (interview, Chicago, 4 August. 1989). St. Georges had followed the work of RGS and the East Harlem youth gang, the Renigades, which led him to suggest Freedberg contact 11th Street residents and AAB's Roberto Nazario. He did and shortly after joined tenants rebuilding 519.

Chino Garcia was also a prime supporter of the 11th Street project. Although Charas was not a formal sponsor, the informal network of Garcia and RGS veterans was pivotal for building wider community support. Since the late 1960s the new city-created Community Board of several local residents had started meeting but by 1973 its influence had not equalled that of RGS and its informal network of young, mostly Hispanic community leaders. Nazario and Garcia were key, for example, in finding residents for 517 willing to do "sweat equity-rehab," and in safeguarding the project against local drug gangs.

This last threat highlights one need for community-based organizers that cannot be met by outside advocates. Drug gangs were mentioned repeatedly in interviews as a major barrier to local housing development from the late 1960s into the 1990s. Garcia was described as a community "godfather" who could secure necessary cooperation from former gang members, who was respected by current gang members

to the extent that projects were mostly unharassed. Even so, AAB was forced in the mid-1970s to agree not to organize specific buildings or blocks on gang turf in exchange for AAB sanctity on other blocks. AAB as late as 1989 was still reporting similar challenges by gangs. But AAB through the 1970s was so closely connected with respected neighborhood residents that it was especially well-positioned to build a sound organization and support other groups.

The community support network included, in addition to AAB, the 11th Street Movement and Charas, the arts groups El Theatre, Seven Loaves and the Puerto Rican Poets Cafe, and Green Guerrillas, a group providing technical assistance to volunteers starting urban green spaces. It was this mix of housing activism, community development and cultural identity movement that made the constellation of activists unique. Participants recounted a vision of rebuilding a community from within as a road to empowerment in the face of landlord abandonment and city government inaction. When asked if residents contacted city officials about policy decisions, many mentioned admiration for long-time City Council member Miriam Friedlander, but could rarely point to specific contact with her offices. The Anti-poverty group Mobilization for Youth and the OEO-created Community Action Agency were noted for having some "good people" on staff, but were described variously as "establishment" or "basi-

cally corrupt," reflecting an inherent distrust of government-mandated organizations.

Nonetheless, the groups mentioned above as community-based ignored both their fears of government-funding and the disastrous history of RGS and began by the mid-1970s to pursue city and federal grants. Freedman took the job of chasing down funding for 11th Street. Recalling the neighborhood wisdom of the times, "whenever you wanted money you had to do a sit-in," the Movement held a sit-in at HDA and successfully pulled in one of the city's last municipal loans. They invited the Renigades downtown for a "demolition derby" to gut 519. Next, with the \$177,000 low-interest loan, they hired eleven or twelve crew members, paying \$3.00/hour for 32 hour weeks and covered 8 hours/week with sweat equity time to begin rehab. After nine months, with the loan monies exhausted, they switched to full-time sweat equity to continue their work.

From 1975 to 1976, the project attracted national attention as the first sweat equity rehab. Internationally-renown architect Buckminster Fuller consulted with 11th Street about constructing domes for urban dwellings. Architect Travis Price of the Energy Taskforce assisted residents in adding solar energy for hot water with a \$43,000 federal Community Services Administration grant, the first such federally-aided project in the nation (Reif,

6 July 1975).² And an extraordinary 2,000-watt, 14-foot diameter wind generator was installed on the roof to generate electricity with the help of 35 11th Street residents (Claiborne 4 December 1976). Technical Assistance to 519 was also provided by the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB). UHAB was founded in 1974 by squatters in the Manhattan West Side Urban Renewal Area. Comprised of urban planners, architects and community organizers, UHAB provides residents in the process of rehabbing their building, with a low-fee architect to assist with designs and information on needed structural repair and also helps them apply for city grants, loans and to meet sweat equity requirements (Van-Buren 1977, 183).

Construction was completed in 1976 and 519 residents moved in. It was touted as a model for low-cost renovating in lower-income urban communities by the national Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and locally by HDA. In 519 itself, although residents applauded themselves for a heroic effort, some people moved on, a couple landed in jail for robbery, and others left when the construction jobs ended. The work of maintaining the 11th Street Movement began to take on a different emphasis.

²Community Services Administration, within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, partially succeeded the Office of Economic Opportunities, eliminated by President Nixon in 1973.

Several developments reshaped the style of activism found on 11th Street by 1977. The first is captured by one respondent's observation that "519 11th Street put AAB on the map" (interview, New York, 11 July 1989). President Carter had a special interest in housing development, and with 519's national attention and widespread support, AAB's association with 519 11th Street boosted its viability in the view of federal agencies, much in the way that the University of the Streets had been a selling point for RGS leaders. The 11th Street Movement viewed itself as largely autonomous from AAB, and residents wondered aloud why AAB became so involved in their activities. But based largely on 519's success, AAB was able to win a multi-million dollar Comprehensive Education and Training Act (CETA) grant.³

Together with corporate and foundation contributions and a \$85,000 HDA contract to seal up 10 unsafe area buildings, AAB's budget went from around \$40,000 to over \$4 million "nearly overnight" (Interview, Baltimore, 26 July 1989; City limits May 1977). The aid intended to meld community-based housing rehab with job training for low-income urban residents. The idea itself was exciting for many committed organizers. In theory, community residents became pros-

³CETA was a federal 1973 job training block grant that passed national monies on to county and city governments to give jobs to the unemployed. With a policy shift under President Reagan, funding for CETA ended after 1983.

pective homeowners and received important construction skills. But the funding "proved to be a nightmare" (Interview, New York, 11 July 1989).

Suddenly new staff was required. The organization quickly hired new office personnel, a bookkeeper, construction workers. In one year's time, AAB expanded from five community activists to around 200 employees. Most of the newcomers were motivated by the attraction of a job, rather than the concept of community empowerment, and problems began to develop. Many of the CETA workers had limited reading and writing skills and were required to first complete G.E.D. courses. Participants uniformly expressed the exhaustion and frustrations of that time. "AAB went from an empowerment organization..of community values and a purpose to a technical organization," concluded one founding activist (Baltimore, 26 July 1989). Ex-staffers recited a litany of disasters. Many of the CETA workers had been gang members, but had not made the transformation of RGS activists. Problems with criminal behavior, drinking and illiteracy required supervision that AAB staffers were unprepared to supply.

A territorial dispute also arose over the 11th Street Movement. Freedberg himself was mired in organizational administration. "I spend as much time organizing the bureaucracy as I spend organizing our community," he complained to reporters in late 1977 (McBride 1977). He still

considered 11th Street only a block organization represented by a Mutual Housing Association and its board. But when AAB's millions came to the street to finance five buildings 11th Street found it was not structured to manage the new demands. AAB's vision to organize the entire Loisaida area differed fundamentally from 11th Street's goals and gradually the 11th Street Movement relinquished certain responsibilities to others. A new city-wide, not-for-profit community development group, the Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers, headed by ex-assistant housing commissioner Robert Schur, took up the task of contracting the CETA training jobs. Individual rehab loans went directly to targeted building residents, while AAB controlled hiring, supervision and firing. "It was a recipe for problems" one activist observed, "never answering the question of who would control the project" (Chicago 4 August 1989). AAB eventually took over 11th Street supervision, and Freedman left, shifting his focus to alternative technologies.

Another development pushed AAB to the edge. A new Colombian drug organization appeared on the Lower East Side with which the Puerto Rican AAB supporters had no past relationship. The 'peace pact' of earlier years had no meaning and violent confrontations resulted. With the new funding bringing AAB to organize tenants or work with them on various projects in as many as 60 buildings, the new gang threatened organizers and fire-bombed some buildings they

could not control. AAB leaders recalled that any confrontation "would've been war with the drug dealers" (26 July 1989). In a serious blow to the organization, two core leaders, Roberto and Ruth Nazario, left suffering from mental exhaustion.

In the months preceding this departure, a number of dedicated, white planning and housing activists had found their way to AAB through various paths, some as graduate school interns, others as CETA workers or volunteers. Most expressed some sentiment that they were attracted to the Lower East Side as "a neighborhood of action" (New York, 11 July 1989); some had been anti-Vietnam War activists and were searching for new political involvement. Several, who had been involved in organizing their own buildings through "homesteading," or self-help rehab, found their way to AAB and 11th Street through community housing connections. But while their goals in working for AAB were primarily to organize residents to advocate for the creation and preservation of affordable housing--among the founding goals of AAB--some of the newer, Hispanic leaders joining AAB at the peak of government funding focused on community housing development, believing they were serving a vital Loisaida need.

From 1978, the tension between those favoring advocacy coupled with organizing and those heading toward housing development grew. Even those favoring more tenant

organizing expressed frustration with their successes in that area. Many tenants feared neighborhood drug dealers and shied away from building organizations. Low-income tenants also feared their landlords and, given the shortage of affordable housing in Loisaída, felt they could not risk eviction. Even when these were not barriers, tenants lacked the necessary time and energy to attend meetings, keep court appointments and work with organizers. An organizer recalled:

When people are just surviving, that drains their time and energy. We had the idea of self-management, and believed in it philosophically. But what we asked of people was to go to their factory job in New Jersey riding the bus two hours each way, work ten hours, feed the kids, and fight their landlord...We were asking a lot (Interview, New York, 28 July 1989).

Impatience with organizing results and watching developments in HPD housing programs heightened internal organizational tensions and the direction of AAB. An AAB study in 1979 reported that Loisaída had 201 city-owned vacant lots--representing 74% of all vacant buildings, almost one-quarter of Loisaída's housing stock (AAB 1979, 29). The approaches to insuring that these properties would become affordable housing for community residents were many and AAB had finally chosen housing development over exclusive tenant organizing. Other Lower East Side organizations, meanwhile, chose the other route, and it is to these we next turn.

Advocacy, Rent Strikes and Housing Court

An important participatory strategy used by many organizers was to keep lower-income tenants in their apartments by informing them of their legal rights to a safe and habitable dwelling. Adopt-A-Building had concentrated efforts there in its early years by creating a Tenant Assistance Unit to counsel residents on tenants' rights and using organizers to build block associations (AAB 1979, 39). Other Lower East Side organizations had focused exclusively on tenant organizing as the only effective strategy in securing affordable housing since housing is overwhelming privately-owned. From the 1908 Lower East Side rent strike, this strategy took a well-worn path in the community.

Like AAB, many community organizations offered tenant counseling as part of their repertoire to affect housing policy, but three concentrated efforts there: Mobilization for Youth (MFY), the Good Old Lower East Side (GOLES), and the Metropolitan Council on Housing (Met Council). Met Council is a city-wide tenants organization founded in 1958 through the efforts of Jane Benedict, Miriam Moody, Staughton Lynd and other veteran American Labor Party (ALP) organizers (Schwartz 1986, 168). It first began on the Lower East Side as the 1st Avenue Tenant and Consumer Council, in part through the efforts of Esther Rand and Frances Goldin. Goldin with others launched an anti-renewal organization in 1959, Cooper Square Committee, which suc-

cessfully battled off Robert Moses' slum clearance designs for western East Village. It is still organizing tenants within the Cooper Square area, between 2nd and 3rd Avenues, from Delancey to 9th Street, and claims over 700 tenants as members, many as part of a Mutual Housing Association.

Esther Rand remained the central Met Council activist on the Lower East Side, and its driving force when the city-wide organization opened Met Council community branches in 1976, including that on the Lower East Side, the Eastside Tenants Council (Lawson 1986, 232). Although Met Council's focus was consistently on city-wide and state housing and planning policies, the Lower East Side branch was organizing tenants in large numbers by the late 1970s, and assisting with rents strikes.

Much of what made rent strikes possible was the recodification of the New York State Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law in 1962 allowing tenants to withhold rent when landlords violated maintenance requirements of the lease, which was legally viewed as a "contract" (Schwartz 1986, 174). On the Lower East Side, the 1962 law was put to use by New York University's chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1963 when they organized 94 Eldridge Street residents to withhold rent in lieu of repairs (Schwartz 1986, 175-6). Mobilization for Youth, Inc. (MFY), founded in 1961 as an anti-poverty project to

battle youth delinquency,⁴ expanded on the CORE experiment in 1963. MFY Legal Services was established and a Tenement Housing Program, initiated by political scientist Frances Fox Piven, began tracking housing violations by the most egregious area landlords as a strategy to mount a widespread rent strike (Schwartz 1986, 175). At its peak in 1964, the resulting Stanton Street Tenants Association worked with 170 tenants to organize 82 buildings (Schwartz 1986, 180). In the largest single rent strike action since the 1908 strike, MFY ignited the Lower East Side Rent Strike in January, 1964. Organizers from the East Side Tenants Council, NYU CORE, the University Settlement and MFY agreed to spread out from Fifth Street down to Delancey and the Seward Park Extension trying to spur a community-wide strike. At its height, CORE claimed six buildings striking on Eldridge Street and MFY had organized an additional fifty (Piven and Cloward, 152; Schwartz 1986, 178).

But the individual building strikes became a heavy management task for small and largely volunteer organization staffs. Piven and Cloward assessed the overall strike effort as developing little political force:

...the bureaucratic rites by which repairs were to be exacted, and tenants educated, exhausted organizers and bewildered tenants. To cope with agency procedures required precisely those resources of money and expertise which are scarcest among the poor. Meanwhile land-

⁴see Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the poor (New York: Vintage, 1993, 1972), 290.

lords exploited bureaucratic intricacies and corruptibility to evade or overcome the challenge (Piven and Cloward 1972, 154).

What seemed on its face to be pure advocacy, directly challenging substandard housing conditions and their causes, in practice required very technical knowledge of tenants' rights, possible legal strategies when tenants were dragged into court by landlords, and endless organizing energy as tenants backed down in the face of eviction threats or required court appearances. Above all, the greater resources of landlords to initiate court actions, hire attorneys and spend time in court overwhelmed the limited time, knowledge and confidence of lower-income tenants. Inevitably, courts ordered tenants to turn over rent monies from their escrow accounts. Piven and Cloward concluded from the MFY rent strikes that targeting the landlords never worked as a strategy to affect public housing policies. Political leaders simply responded with calls to enforce regulations and building inspections already required by housing laws. The legal rent strike tactic of collecting rents into escrow accounts and awaiting a court decision never served to disrupt the basic low-income housing dynamics of small-time investors and speculators edging into the lower segment of the real estate market where they could afford to invest, but not to properly run or maintain apartments. Changing those circumstances required disruptive illegal strikes, where tenants pocketed their rents in order

to stir political leaders into action (Piven and Cloward 1972, 155-160).

In fact, city officials did react predictably to rent strikes in the early 1960s. In 1965, Article 7-A was added to the law allowing tenants to petition a court to appoint an administrator for the building to collect rent and use them to repair building code violations that threatened occupants' safety and health. By 1974, this was amended to allow tenants themselves to play that role (Lawson 1986, 228; Schwartz 1986, 183). This burdensome responsibility, however, could not be handled by tenants without legal assistance, thus requiring low-income residents to rely on outside organizers, and resulted to a large extent in advocacy groups getting bogged down in legal paperwork. The first 7-A administrator was appointed to a Lower East Side building organized by Action for Progress, a University Settlement creation to provide legal and organizing resources for lower-income residents. But the new option gained greater success among middle-class Jewish Grand Street area residents than low-income tenants (Schwartz 1986, 184). Even with the 1974 amendment, few tenants would petition to take over their own building's management. City-wide by June, 1977, only 162 Article 7-A proceedings were initiated by tenants. Meanwhile, affordable housing advocates feared that city policymakers would use 7-A to avoid housing construction and subsidy. A Civil

Court judge remarked to a journalist at the time that 7-A was clearly allowing city officials to push the responsibility for housing onto low-income tenants (Gillerman 1978, 9).

Nonetheless, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Met Council and MFY Legal Services continued to assist tenants with rent strikes. Strikes were further incorporated into the city's 'housing policy' when 1972 New York State Civil Court Act 110 authorized the creation of New York City borough Housing Courts, stating that:

A part of the court shall be devoted to actions and proceedings involving the enforcement of state and local laws for the establishment and maintenance of housing standards, including but not limited to the multiple dwelling law and the housing maintenance code, building code and health code of the City of New York (in Kirschenbaum 1994, 16).

Rent striking and Housing Court became the devices through which the city claimed to enforce building codes and punish violating landlords. With low-income tenants having little time or expertise to initiate court proceedings, however, court actions were more often initiated by landlords seeking withheld rents. By 1986, one study found that 92% of all housing court actions were landlord-initiated rent collection cases. Whether or not landlords were found in violation of building codes, in 83% of court mandated tenant-landlord settlements, tenants were ordered to release escrow accounts to landlords. In less than 40% of the cases were

landlords ordered to made repairs (Liebman and Kirschenbaum 1994, 21).

In part because rent strikes became an ineffective means for organizing community residents and required vast organizational resources, some Lower East Side groups continued using them only when tenants requested assistance. The exception to this was the Good Old Lower East Side (GOLES), founded in 1978 by Floyd Feldman. GOLES, driven by Feldman until his death in 1986, was an aggressive and scrappy team of four to five organizers and an attorney working toward establishing a constellation of tenants' building organizations through the vehicle of rent strikes. No individual cases were accepted, saving GOLES from the fate of MFY Legal Services and Met Council who became mired in individual tenant inquiries and service requests. Feldman, a long-time Lower East Side resident, saw GOLES as a front-line organization to defend Lower East Side tenants from predator landlords seeking to make a quick profit from their displacement. From 1978 to 1989 GOLES was described by an organizer as a "rent strike machine," assisting on 20-25 strikes per year, or over 200 strikes.

The explanation for GOLES' use of this strategy is found in the changing real estate market on the Lower East Side during these years. In 1978, as Mayor Koch began his first administration, the city's economy was beginning to recover and investors were again sizing up Manhattan real

estate. The Lower East Side, with its abandoned lots and tenements and its location, convenient to Wall Street, was ripe for speculation. In mid-1979 a boom in rental building sales began. One analysis of a five-by-six block section within GOLES' "service area" (from Houston to 14th Street and 4th Avenue to Avenue D) found that 17 different real estate interests had engaged in multiple sales from 1979 to 1982, and during those years on Avenue A from 8th to 14th Streets, property changed hands over fifty times, at profits of 200 to 300 percent (Gottlieb 1982). This gentrification was confirmed by DeGiovanni's findings that precisely in that area, there was a substantial increase in white, college educated residents from June, 1979 to June, 1984 (DeGiovanni 1987, 17; see Chapter Five). Particularly because community real estate had been in decline, prices were low and attractive to new investors. With new investment rent escalated between 128 and 172 percent between 1970 and 1980, compared with a city-wide increase 125 percent (Smith et al. 1994, 156). As landlords sought to empty buildings for more profitable sales, GOLES received calls from tenants facing harassment or eviction proceedings. Their strategy was, in short, a defensive one, seeking to preserve and stabilize the community.

Joel Schwartz has observed correctly of rent strikes that:

There is no evidence that the rent pageants of 1904 provided a kind of collective memory that shaped behavior

on the Lower East Side in 1919, or that these earlier outbreaks influenced the tenant rebellion of 1932...In short, each tenant generation believed itself unique in confronting problems in the housing environment, generally elaborating approaches in ignorance of what had been tried before (Schwartz 1986, 196).

There were, among the interviews discussed in this chapter as well, only general references by activists that the Lower East Side had always been a "place of action." Their clearer points of reference were in the shallow past, but this influence is no less important. Few who organized rent strikes in the 1970s and 1980s were unaware of Esther Rand's tireless work in the early years of Met Council and the Eastside Tenants Council; no one, in interviews, who had battled with developers to preserve low-cost housing was unaware of Frances Goldin's tireless efforts beginning with Cooper Square Committee's success against Robert Moses. Similarly, Cooper Square activists who battled for the Lower East Side in the mid-1940s were familiar with the work of radicals like Emma Goldman who had left only some two decades before. Community residents, in sum, may have been short on the details of successful organizing strategies, but they were, and are, aware of who in the community carries this knowledge when crises erupt.

The continuity that is of equal importance, and is what Schwartz misses, is in politico-structural and market influences. Tenants return repeatedly to rent strikes and building-wide tenants' associations because the American

legal framework permits and, in fact, elicits this response to the dominant role of the private-sector in housing ownership, development and housing conditions. Rather than taking responsibility for housing residents, or for monitoring private-sector interests who do, the secondary public policy allows tenants whose landlords violate city codes to bring the offenders to court. It is this default housing policy that is common between Lower East Side's tenement dwellers of 1908 and today. The difference in degree of rent striking comes not from ignorance of rent striking history, but from changes in various parts of a network of determinants.

One of the most important changes is in the New York oddity, Housing Court, which has routinized and deradicalized rent strikes. Another is the real estate market itself. With landlord neglect preceding or accompanying a period of abandonment, rent strikes will be more appealing to residents. Landlord harassment during gentrification also presented possibilities for mobilizing tenants but were used primarily as a defensive strategy. Since 1989, Lower East Side organizers have seen a calmer real estate market and fewer cases of landlord harassment. But "creeping gentrification" is still threatening tenants with steady foreclosures, but properties going back on the market rather than being vested by the city. GOLES, now the only Lower East Side group still noticeably organizing rent strikes, has

seen a drop of cases from the earlier average of twenty per year to ten strikes out of twenty court cases per year (interview, New York, 10 July 1994.

Development and Management

Housing development has become a primary participatory strategy as the result of proliferating government programs that leave housing development to community organizations. The availability of federal monies that could be filtered directly into the city budget, the city's fiscal crisis or health, the real estate market conditions on the Lower East Side and the proliferation of community housing organizations are all factors that combined to shape this style of community participation since the late 1970s.

From 1975 the combination of severe abandonment and the city's own fiscal crisis led housing officials to rely on community organizations to develop low-cost housing in city *in rem* sites that it could not afford to rebuild itself and could not resell in a real estate market recession. The primary funding mechanism initially was federal CETA and Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) money, the latter made available after passage of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. Block grant funding was at a peak from 1978 to 1981, sharply cut by the Reagan administration thereafter (Hays 1985, 210). Another element of the 1974

Act to change housing participation was Article 201 establishing Section 8. Section 8 was to subsidize new housing construction by the private sector, substantial housing rehabilitation and, added in 1978, a moderate rehabilitation program. These programs were intended to replace direct housing subsidies to the poor with section 8 funding to private for-profit and not-for-profit developers, while changing the focus from low-income housing to include units considered "moderate income" defined by a local community's median income effectively cutting support for low-cost housing (Hays 1985, 147, 162).

Coinciding with the new federal programs, city officials fighting to recover from the 1975 fiscal crisis had taken steady measures to move CDBG funds into the regular city budget. Initially, separate yearly CDBG hearings were held to determine, with public input, how funds would be distributed. In 1979, city officials received an allowance from HUD to use greater portions for its overwhelming *in rem* management costs, and by 1980 were permitted to coordinate the CDBG decisionmaking process with the city's regular budget cycle, eliminating special hearings and, therefore, community input. The share of CDBG funds devoted to *in rem* programs gradually rose to between sixty to seventy percent (Rogowsky and Strom 1989, 28-31). In short, with federal aid it became more cost-effective to fund community groups to rehap and manage *in rem* buildings than for the city to

renovate them for use as public housing. As Katz and Mayer observed of this city strategy:

...tenant self-help was reformulated and appropriated from the street level by state agencies in an attempt to restore tax and rental revenue flows from a slum housing market left in chaos by 10 years of landlord abandonment and bank disinvestment (Katz and Mayer 1985, 21).

The Lower East Side, as one district with extensive *in rem* buildings and a wealth of community organizations, became a textbook illustration of this government "appropriation" of local activism.

Again, following Adopt-A-Building's strategies through this period is instructive. From approximately 1978 to 1984 AAB became entirely consumed with housing development, with the help and financial support of HPD. AAB's calculations of 1978 government funding for Loisaida show a quiltwork of the programs mentioned above. \$1.75 million was available in CETA monies, \$25 million in Section 8 new construction funds and \$10.5 for gut rehabilitation, and \$1.3 million for the city's Community Management Program (CMP) that funded community organizations to manage *in rem* buildings (AAB 1979, 119). The 1979 AAB report lamented the thrust of this funding, sending the group full force into managing city-owned buildings. There was an urgent concern that AAB was prodded by its funding programs to concentrate on developing city-owned properties while 83% of residents in Loisaida still resided in privately-owned buildings (AAB 1979, 85). The AAB study concluded:

We now believe that we have overlooked potential strategies for preventing abandonment because of our focus on existing programs and funding sources available for the city-owned residential stock. This emphasis has perhaps contributed inadvertently to building abandonment (AAB 1979, 121).

Ignoring their own findings, AAB leadership decided to move ahead with Section 8 applications.

In 1980, several AAB advocate-professionals on staff raised evidence of possible misuse of funds, and pushed hard on the need for reemphasizing advocacy over development. When administrators responded with hints that the majority of those raising the issue were white, ethnicity became a diversion from the issue of the organization's shifting focus. Three important staff members and two interns resigned including an experienced tenants organizer, a specialist in planning and a long-time administrator and tenants advocate. When the executive director fled amidst rumors of drug connections, the organization seemed in shambles. With funding cuts and high staff turnover, AAB focused on its remaining grant projects and by 1984 was entirely occupied with developing and managing city-owned buildings.

The appearance of management funding affected nearly every Lower East Side housing organization, as groups claimed separate districts as their "service" or "catchment areas" and applied for funding to develop vacant and occupied city-owned buildings within their districts. HPD's

Division of Alternative Management Programs, headed in 1978 by UHAB's former director, Philip St. Georges, offered two especially enticing programs for *in rem* administration. One was the Tenant Interim Lease Program (TIL) under which tenants rehab, manage and maintain their *in rem* building with the help of CDBG funds. A second, the Community Management Program (CMP) funds community housing organizations to upgrade and manage city-owned buildings with a goal of eventually selling the building to tenants as a low-income cooperative at \$250 per apartment. Community groups also have the option to retain management of the building as a "low-income rental" (New York City Department of City Planning 1993).

Even before these programs were operational MFY's Community Development Unit had attempted a "low-income co-op" in 1973. It took organizers six years of haggling with city officials to secure financing, of helping tenants manage the rebuilding and trying to keep the operation solvent before the eight co-ops were completed by 1979. The difficulties absorbed organizers' energies and required MFY to play the mediator when disputes arose between tenants--for example, over non-payment of rents. MFY persisted initially because, "There was simply no alternative to self-management on the Lower East Side" (Falk 1983, 18). But MFY decided in 1979 to disband its Community Development Unit and reorder its priorities. A later follow-up review of

four 10th Street co-ops found that two were stable tenant co-ops, one had failed and one was struggling with serious difficulties (Falk 1983).

Managing tenant owned co-ops had administratively overwhelmed community organizations who had earlier been devoted to advocacy. A 1982 HPD report on city in-rem programs, in fact, stated that:

...the evolution of the Community Management Program (CMP) into a treatment program leading to the sale of city-owned buildings as tenant cooperatives or non-profit rentals has been made possible largely by the professionalization of the fourteen community groups presently under contract" (New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development 1982, 11).

"Professionalization" meant primarily that organizations abandoned community organizing activities and turned their attentions to the few buildings they were contracted to manage. At CMP's prodding, groups also discouraged tenants from self-management and took on management themselves, even though some groups complained that they would become "bureaucratic stand-ins for landlords" (Lawson 1986, 237). Even with expert administration, however, the *in rem* programs were found by a 1985 Community Service Society analysis to present only a partial and inadequate replacement for "a coordinated housing strategy." Most low-income residents, it concluded, simply cannot afford the level of rents needed to cover the maintenance, management and debt service payments of *in rem* co-ops (Shiffman and Foxworthy 1985, 42-3). And HPD offers little to offset the hardships

endured by tenants as they struggle to make ends meet. To such complaints, HPD assistant commissioner Joan Wallstein replied, "It's a self-help program. That's what tenants asked for. That's what they've got" (In Chang 1984, 8).

Even as inadequate programs, however, community organizations relied on CMP and TIL, having lost vast CETA funding since late 1979. In the post-1975 fiscal crisis period city funds were scarce leaving community organizations with fewer sources. Community advocates throughout the city were urging community-based organizations to restrengthen organizing efforts and resist government and private funding sources in their "love affair with the concept of 'self-sufficiency'" (City limits 1980, 3). In 1982, Robert Schur urged community organizations to return to advocacy, writing:

To survive and to achieve what they were created to do, neighborhood housing groups must become confrontational. To do so effectively, these groups must, first *organize* their communities. A decade ago, every local housing group was first, last and always, engaged in organizing. There wasn't much else one could do then. These weren't any Community Development Block Grants, nor any Neighborhood Preservation or Community Consultant contracts; no CETA workers...or Section 8s to scramble for (Schur 1982, A15-16).

Lower East Side organizations, however, did not heed this warning. AAB, at its peak managed twenty buildings but it continued to undergo "organizational disarray" until it lost its city CMP contract in 1987 (Turetsky 1993, 25). Examination of AAB records by this author in 1989 showed that under

the administration of AAB's former bookkeeper, the group had new city contracts to manage six buildings, to assist 46 buildings with a New York State funded weatherization program (awarded through HPD), and additional contracts to rent, rehab and administer repairs in city-owned buildings. Including those to whom AAB claimed to be giving technical assistance, they were working with 56 buildings (Interfaith Adopt-A-Building, Inc. 1989).

This process of moving from advocacy to development was repeated by nearly every Lower East Side organization examined. By 1989, DAMP reported that it was sponsoring 15 TIL and seven CMP contracts within Community Board 3 for its current *in rem* workload, and 26 TIL and seven CMP buildings within sold *in rem* buildings (NYC HPD 1989). The majority of these are now managed by Pueblo Nuevo, a Hispanic community-based organization south of Houston. Pueblo Nuevo was founded in 1970. It was initially a city-mandated organization, the Grand Street Project Area Committee, which was required as part of the Seward Park Urban Renewal Area. Its early goals were "to preserve, develop and advocate for low-income housing" (Interview, New York, 26 July 1989). Like AAB, their small staff of six began with tenant organizing, rent strikes and self-management. In 1974 the city housing commissioner, Roger Starr, defunded them and was remembered to have said that "funding Project Area Committees' is like giving arms to the PLO" (26 July 1989).

They gradually put together a small budget with a state Neighborhood Preservation Corporation grant, one Section 8 project and a city contract as a Community Consultant--an HPD grant program for community-based organizations to provide technical assistance locally in ways "that complement and support HPD programs and initiatives (NYC HPD 1990, 13).

They remained close to their activist roots for some years working with the Lower East Side Joint Planning Council (JPC). JPC began shortly after the Seward Park Urban Renewal Area tenements were bulldozed in 1967 to protest the displacement of 1,850 neighborhood families and 350 small businesses. Since JPC had no staff, and was involved in a labor-intensive lawsuit against the city, demonstrating, organizing to affect the urban renewal site's future use, a "traditional understanding" developed that Pueblo Nuevo staff would act as the office foot soldiers in JPC's advocacy efforts (26 July 1989). Viewing itself as representing the low-income residents at the edge of Seward Park, Pueblo Nuevo came to see JPC goals as intertwined with their own. This was particularly true after a former Hunter College urban planning intern, Lisa Kaplan, moved gradually through the ranks into the position of Executive Director. She stayed there for six years, and later served on the Board. Kaplan was a devoted low-income housing advocate who had been a homesteader on the Lower East Side, became one of JPC's leaders, served on the Community Board Housing Com-

mittee and on the boards of at least four other housing and development organizations.

Coinciding with Kaplan's departure to a city-wide community development foundation, Pueblo Nuevo secured substantial development contracts. Pulling in DAMP and Section 8 contracts, by 1989 Pueblo Nuevo had surpassed AAB's funding peak with a \$2 million Community Management contract to sponsor 233 *in rem*, mostly TIL, apartments, \$156,000 from the New York City Office of Business Development (a funding source for six years) to administer Clinton Street development and capital improvements, an HPD Community Consultant contract and others. Although the current executive director continues to work closely with JPC, its own activities are consumed by the "day-to-day management" of over 400 city-owned and subsidized apartments (Interview, New York, 17 March 1989).

For fiscal year 1989, HPD was funding seven Lower East Side community organizations through Community Consultant contracts.⁵ Of those groups, It's Time is another illustrating how groups are pulled into housing development. It's Time was originally a federally-designated Community Action Agency for the southern Lower East Side covering the Henry Street area and reaching out to part of Chinatown.

⁵ Asian Americans for Equality, Cooper Square Committee, GOLES, It's Time, Coalition of Housing Developers, Pueblo Nuevo and the United Jewish Council.

Its early goals were "to foster community and the development of the individual," but these changed as staff members recognized that these were not attainable without adequate housing for neighborhood residents (Interview, New York, 30 June 1989). They turned to counseling tenants on their legal rights, mediating tenant-landlord negotiations and extending technical assistance to tenant-managed buildings. But toward the late 1980s, after watching one assisted building become abandoned, *in rem*, and empty for ten years, the group was pulled into housing development. Through a competitive process, It's Time was awarded a New York State grant to rehab the building, developing ten units of affordable housing.

In total, Lower East Side residents together with community-based housing organizations have rehabbed over 1,311 apartments, built over 420 new units and are managing at least 546 units of city-owned housing. Although these efforts have clearly rerouted community groups from an advocacy path, it is nonetheless a remarkable success story in the face of heavy barriers against any type of lower-income residents' participation: the constant shift in governmental programs, the administrative energy required to qualify and requalify for grants, the battle against drug dealers and real estate speculators, and government disinterest. Left with an overwhelming need for affordable housing, local residents have moved into the housing policy

vacuum and housed over 1,731 lower-income community families since 1975.⁶

Fighting Displacement: The Joint Planning Council

Since the mid-1970s thousands of Lower East Side residents have affected housing conditions by rent striking, taking their landlords to court and contacting community groups for information on tenants' rights and working to rehab their landlord-abandoned apartments. Hundreds have staffed community groups, counseled tenants, organized buildings, worked to pull housing development funding into the community. What remains for discussion is the advocacy work of a small core of full-time housing activists who have waged a difficult and sophisticated battle against governmental policies threatening the Lower East Side's remaining low-cost housing stock. Many of these activists who are, or have been, heads of housing organizations have advocated as part of the umbrella group, the Lower East Side Joint Planning Council (JPC).

As mentioned earlier, JPC was founded in 1967 to monitor the Seward Park Urban Renewal Area planning after

⁶These numbers are estimates based on interviews with eleven Lower East Side community-based organizations, two local branches of city-wide groups, and a review of HPD documents and media accounts. The figures reflect units completed between 1975 and 1989. Self-help buildings not working with UHAB, RAIN, LESCAC or other community-based housing groups, or illegally squatted buildings, are likely not reflected in the totals.

families and businesses had been displaced. As a key founding member, Frances Goldin's success in battling Moses' urban renewal plans for the Cooper Square area and her years of housing activism left her uniquely skilled for the struggle over this second renewal site. Pueblo Nuevo activists were also central, including trained planner Lisa Kaplan. Although the membership--from 24 groups in the early 1970s to 31 currently--has changed as have their representatives to JPC, the central decisionmakers are a small, fairly consistent core, or Steering Committee.

Confirming the vast research on political activists, JPC Steering Committee members do not reflect, in general, the demographics of Community Board 3. They have included some of the white activists moving into the Lower East Side in the mid-1970s; they are more likely to have graduate degrees in planning and social work. Long-time member Robert Caballero, the current Executive Director of Pueblo Nuevo, is also a Democratic Party district leader on the Lower East Side. Another member came into the community after working for the New York City Office of Business Development and had five years experience as an Executive Director of the Lower East Side Catholic Area Conference (LESCAC) Office of Neighborhood Preservation. In short, the Steering Committee over more than two decades has remained an activist core of highly skilled professionals and experienced organizers dedicated to creating and preserving low-

cost housing on the Lower East Side. Free from the service delivery demands of community organizations and funding restriction (it survives on contributions from constituent organizations), the JPC is on the fast-track of housing advocacy.

Its first major battle came when the first new Seward Park Extension housing was built, 360 units of public housing. When the JPC learned that 171 leases had gone to middle-class Jewish residents who were members of the local synagogue, they worked with MFY Legal Services (a JPC member) to challenge the arrangement. Orthodox Jewish residents had asked NYCHA for, and received, preference in renting based on the argument that they needed to live close to their house of worship in order to avoid harassment while walking to services. Since former site occupants were 33.5% white, 44% Hispanic, 12.5% Asian-American and 10% black, the rental policy received cries of racism. MFY prepared a court challenge on the behalf of former site residents and in the decision, *Otero, et al. v. New York City Housing Authority*, the federal court ruled that the NYCHA must follow its own regulations to allow the return of former site residents to urban renewal area housing and cannot give site preference to tenants based on the proximity of their house of worship. The leasees appealed in 1973 and won when the higher court decided that NYCHA had reason to seek a racial balance in renting that would prevent "concentrated racial

pockets." It was also found justified to grant synagogue members requesting transfers from other public housing priority if it was for reasons of safety rather than religion.

With the case remanded for further lengthy investigation, JPC and the United Jewish Council (UJC), representing Seward Park area Jewish interests, agreed to a mediated settlement under which apartments were rented to 60% Hispanic and other minorities and 40% white, with 161 former site tenants receiving priority. A second site of moderate income apartments developed by the Grand Street Guild, agreed to make 160 additional apartments available to those displaced former site tenants who would not be housed in the new NYCHA units (Esperon and Cortijo 1975). Despite the ethnic references, the battle between UJC and JPC over the Seward Park Extension can be most accurately viewed as a class struggle over land use (Gendrot and Turner 1983). The political debate opened old wounds over the use of public housing for middle-class rather than lower-income residences. As the JPC summarized:

At the beginning, the Seward Park Extension Urban Renewal plan reflected the desires and the prejudices of the white, middle-income community. It also expressed the policies of the City administration. The middle-income community justifiably felt that it could rely on the City to represent its interests. Later, when some public housing was included in Seward Park, representatives of the Jewish community were able to persuade the Administration to violate its own regulations governing renting procedures (Esperon and Cortijo 1975, 11).

The deep resentment harbored over earlier displacement of low-income Hispanics and blacks for the Corlears Hook and Seward Park sites, 95% of which came to be occupied by middle-class Jews, resurfaced over the Seward Park Extension. To distance themselves from UJC, a group of Jewish "Cooperators for Fair Housing" issued a fact sheet at the time supporting low-income housing and pointing out correctly that much of the struggle against the UJC plan was also led by Jews.

The fight for middle-class housing was led, not by an autonomous ethnic group, but by a specific sub-community of middle-class Orthodox Jews hoping to preserve their territory, weakened by years of steady out-migration. The Jewish Lower East Side had at one time been home to perhaps 75% of New York area Jews, a figure that dwindled to 23% by 1916 and a scant .25%, or roughly 10,000 by 1994 (Bernstein 1994, B-1). Witnessing this eventuality, the United Jewish Council was created around 1969 as a defensive organization to battle perceived threats, namely the school decentralization effort. When the local public school superintendent, Luis Fuentes, sought greater representation for community Hispanics on the school board, local Jews protested that he wanted to "drive out the Jewish teachers" (Interview, New York, 8 August 1989). This issue combined with the Seward Park Extension proposal to draw clear battle lines. One early UJC member explained that although they contacted Man-

hattan Borough President Percy Sutton, as a black elected official he would support the community's minority representatives. UJC subsequently devised a strategy to build contacts among the area's elected officials and to run supporters for office. It was also hoped that this would address the distribution of anti-poverty funds that UJC thought were unfairly controlled by the Manpower Anti-Poverty Coalition, a group they felt was controlled by Hispanic interests.

The struggle between UJC and JPC was partially resolved by electoral politics and control of the Community Board 3. As mentioned in Chapter Nine, 1975 Charter revisions gave Community Boards an advisory role in local land use decisions. They also have come to play an important role in recommending community-based organizations for government and private funding. Although 'letters of support' from Community Boards and local elected officials are technically not required, few grants are actually won without them. And since one-half of Board members are appointed each by the borough president and local city councillor, working to elect supporters to those positions bolsters groups' funding possibilities. By 1977 UJC, with its substantial political sophistication, helped elect Sheldon Silver to represent the 63rd New York State Assembly District and a new Borough President Andrew Stein.

Through Stein, they won a majority of seats on the Community Board and dominated the Community Board 3 Housing Committee that made recommendations on groups to be funded for housing projects. But, ironically, UJC's influence was diminished when they successfully won from \$11-16 million in funding. As witnessed in other community groups, this diverted their energies toward service delivery. As one UJC leader observed, they no longer had time to wrangle with JPC, "We had contracts, we had no time for this. There were 600 people to monitor, therapy, food stamp assistance and filling contracts" (Interview, New York, 14 August 1989). Concurrently, the election of Miriam Friedlander, a strong low-cost housing advocate, to the City Council brought some balance to the Community Board. But still, some complained that the Board contained so few blacks, Hispanics and Asian-Americans that they considered bringing a lawsuit to challenge the appointees (Baldwin 1982). This balance shifted when David Dinkins became Borough President in 1985, appointing Joint Planning Council members to the Community Board in large numbers. Together with Friedlander's appointees the majority was so strong that JPC's opponents claimed that JPC and the Community Board were one and the same.⁷

⁷The balance changed yet again recently when Friedlander was ousted by a conservative and a strong JPC opponent. JPC currently has no Community Board 3 majority.

Competition and Turf

In a final transformation in participatory styles that takes this discussion from the mid-1980s to the present, it can be said that participation is dominated by community organizations competing for development and management funding, a competition mediated by groups' level of support from JPC or sub-communities. The recent competition stems from market shifts that suddenly increased the value of Lower East Side properties since the late 1970s. In 1979 Community Board 3 received an agreement from the city to call a moratorium on auctions of city-owned properties in the district. But as the price of funding community groups to rehab and manage *in rem* buildings grew and city officials saw the demand for them on the private market heighten, in 1982 HPD announced that it would sell 119 buildings (City limits 1982).

The Joint Planning Council began work immediately on an alternative plan for the disposition of all Community Board 3 city-owned property. The original plan called for all units to be developed for low-income housing, protective inclusionary zoning measures, and establishment of a "local enforcement unit" through JPC that would ensure buildings were developed according to the plan.

The proposal met with opposition from city officials and Community Board members. Jewish Grand Street area residents proposed that a city proposal to sell approximately

300 of 600 sites at market rate prices would create enough revenue to subsidize 100-200 sites of low-income housing and 50-75 for Jewish community centers and public use. JPC rejected the proposal bringing charges that they were unrealistic in demanding all low-income housing. Working with the city-wide not-for-profit Community Service Society and Pratt Institute community development consultants, JPC devised a new plan. After over forty buildings deemed unsound were demolished, JPC put forward a compromise plan designating 50% of remaining city-owned buildings to go for low and moderate-income housing. On September 30, 1987, the city agreed to and signed a plan for 200 units of market-rate to "cross-subsidize" 200 units of low and moderate income housing and a local enforcement unit (LESJPC 1989).

Despite this hard won victory, however, the greater control of JPC over city buildings created new tensions. While negotiations dragged on, new Lower East Side residents, primarily white, young adults began squatting in vacant buildings. At least fifteen buildings by 1987 were squatted and loosely networked into Eviction Watch, a group organized to assist squatters facing evictions. While squatters had no political clout or ties on Community Board 3, several forcible evictions created public disturbances and their visibility in the media made evictions unsavory. Most squatters charged that JPC had become conservative in their stance toward the city, leaving hundreds of units

standing vacant when low-cost housing was increasingly scarce. A special target for the squatters' wrath was the RAIN buildings. Since their support came from LESCAC, a powerful member of the JPC, but no work seemed to be done on their buildings, squatters argued that JPC had no real desire to move on development as long as they received city support.

Other squatters, realizing their vulnerability, sought the cooperation of the Community Board. One described frequent, fruitless meetings with Housing Committee members. Each time his building submitted documentation of racial make-up and description of their rehab progress, but was told to return the next month. After four appearances, a letter of recommendation was granted, rescinded and reissued. These squatters' assessment matched that of others interviewed, that:

Community organizations are getting city money and just being appeased. The city supports what they are doing but they're mostly not serving the Lower East Side community. Since the cross-subsidy negotiations the city has pushed very little housing in the community...The less opposition there is to the city, the happier it is.

It is unlikely that squatters will exercise any real influence over housing in the future, as the few abandoned buildings are gradually developed. But as a group outside the circle of JPC and Community Board housing activists their criticisms foretold the infighting that would develop between JPC members.

As part of the cross-subsidy agreement, JPC members agreed not to develop any *in rem* projects in another members' "catchment" or "service areas." But as properties became scarce, particularly in the overdeveloped Chinatown, groups sought new areas for development. When the Enterprise Foundation, which links government development funding to private support, and HPD approved support for an Asian Americans for Equality (AAFE) proposal to develop 48 units of moderate-income housing in 1989, the Community Board Housing Committee, dominated by JPC members, defeated the plan because the units were outside AAFE's service area, and AAFE failed to consult JPC on the plan. In four separate interviews, housing activists pointed to that vote as an indication that territorial concerns had come to override community interests. One community group supported AAFE's proposal, but a few years later echoed the same complaints when AAFE proposed a project in their catchment area.

The turf struggle of Jews in the Grand Street area to keep community housing middle-class has also continued over the Seward Park Extension. In 1980, a compromise plan to resolve the urban renewal district was proposed by Mayor Koch. It proposed the construction of a senior citizen residence, a commercial mall suggested by Grand Street developers and the UJC, and the low-income housing favored by JPC. Then Borough President Andrew Stein intervened for UJC, commenting that "it was 'ludicrous' to suggest that

economic development and lower-income housing can coexist" (Purnick 1980, B5). When the plan reached the Board of Estimate Stein advanced an amendment to remove the low-income housing, and the Seward Park package was passed in that form.

Koch tried again to develop the area, writing a Request for Proposal in 1988 in cooperation with developer Sam Lefrak that could not be met by any other. The plan again made no provision for the remaining displaced former site tenants and, with the legal assistance of MFY, JPC defended the proposal. The Seward Park Extension is still unresolved.

In the final analysis, the idea of a coalition effort like JPC is a potent one. They can potentially free activists from the demands of fund-raising and service delivery to advocate for affordable housing. And JPC had made tremendous gains through the use of legal actions to control development and unite support for the cross-subsidy plan. But a community coalition is nonetheless bound to the ULURP process, to HPD decisions and the fear of losing community funding. It is also, in the unique case of the Lower East Side, limited by the intensity of internal competition produced largely by funding mechanisms. Programmatic federalism has produced a coalition aware of grant sources and the funding rules-of-the-game. A return to pure advocacy remains unlikely unless community coalitions unite with

others on a city-wide level to prevent funding reprisals, or return to strategies of disruption that have brought the community earlier successes.

In sum, the structure of housing and development decisionmaking and lack of a clear policy or policymaking process have shaped participation styles. But they are also molded by a larger network of factors: the history of community competition between middle and lower-income housing interests; by the desire of the Orthodox Jewish community to stem its out-migration mediated by the history and influence of the trade unions in housing and city politics; by changing market conditions first creating housing abandonment, then gentrification; the intervention of Democratic representatives to aid local supporters; and the continuing attractiveness of the Lower East Side to activists of many backgrounds who have become residents and brought with them special expertise in both housing and organizing.

Chapter 11

PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES IN KREUZBERG

Kreuberg's housing activism was less directed at specific community housing needs than targeting city-level development decisions, the closed decisionmaking processes and--at its core--a paternalistic and rigid political and social structure. Activism was centered in Kreuzberg because it was the site of the Berlin Senat's most ambitious redevelopment. For reasons outlined earlier, this activism did not include the almost one-third of Kreuzberg's foreign-born residents and their descendants who were severely restricted from housing activism. Of ethnic Germans, the "activists" were primarily those born after World War II who began to resist precisely those lines of the power network that worked to restrain older cohorts. Older ethnic-German residents were less likely to challenge policy decisions once made, and were not comfortable with direct action in opposition to policies. The description below, for these reasons, will begin with an account of one early community-corporatist organizational effort to create citizen participation, but then will concentrate on resistance to the Senat's urban renewal plans by activist, German youth.

Community-Corporatism: "Strategies for Kreuzberg"

The historical lack of community-level citizens' organizations additionally reinforced by the presence of a district administration largely absent participatory access, shaped in Kreuzberg an early style of community reaction to redevelopment plans that will be called community-corporatism. Kreuzberg Evangelic vicar Klaus Duntze--who had been laying the groundwork for a community renewal initiative since 1974--observed that, unlike in middle class Berlin communities, Kreuzberg residents felt powerless in the face of redevelopment planning. Their practical experience of city administrators was that "'They do what they want anyway'" (*Die da oben machen, was sie wollen*) (Duntze 1984, 300). In 1977 he pulled together a group of local landlords, tenants, social workers, business owners, professionals from the German Institute for Urban Studies (DIFU) and others, including immigrant residents, who met to formulate recommendations to city construction and planning administrators. Since on the district level redevelopment plans were administered by the local district office representative for construction (*Baustadtrat*), CDU member Kliem, recommendations were primarily intended to influence his decisions (Thörnig 1990, 26).

Vicar Duntze and SPD legislative representative Gerd Wartenberg organized the group into a planning project covering the area around the Görlitzer Station called

"Strategies for Kreuzberg" which quickly became the community representative body required by the 1977 Berlin Urban Renewal and Town Development Act, section I, requiring the input of community representatives. The project was governed by a Commission with 34 voting members, of whom twenty-two were residents of the Kreuzberg renewal districts and representatives of neighborhood groups and twelve were administrators from the Berlin Senat and the Kreuzberg district offices (Gutenmorgen 1985, 23). Although the group was often touted as an organization of residents from the affected renewal districts, it was from the outset a corporatist combination, or in other words, a joint effort between local community elites and development and other administrators. The Commission proposed a competition for renewal proposals that would redirect planning priorities toward "careful renewal." All residents were invited to submit proposals and on March 3, 1977 the Commission began meeting to promote "qualitatively new" development plans consistent with "citizen participation for the fulfillment of services in a communal space (Strategien Kreuzberg 1979, 5; a.tr). The Project was launched in cooperation with relevant government agencies and was introduced to S036 residents by Duntze, Wartenberg, Construction Senator Ristock and Kreuzberg district Mayor Pietschker.

With the promise of access to planning decisionmaking, the Strategies Commission was also initially the col-

lecting place for community demands. When the city proposed razing a beloved and vacant local firehouse the "Citizens Initiative Fire Station" brought its campaign to save the building to the Commission. The result was the Commission's first recommendation: that the building should be spared removal and rebuilt as a community center. When the district office (*Bezirksamt*) rejected the proposal, a varied group of residents moved into the firehouse hoping that their occupation would hamper clearance. Group members pressed Kliem directly for compliance with residents' demands without success. With the issue already before a local judge for a final decision, at dawn one morning in July, 1977, Kliem had the firehouse residents evicted and began demolition. The presiding Judge Grundei observed that in his twenty year career, never had an administrator acted before the court's decision (Neske 1990, 37). This intimidating show of bureaucratic initiative sparked questions among community residents about the ability of government-mandated representatives to resist administrative decisionmaking.

In reaction, the Fire Station Initiative launched its own Roundtable S036, later renamed Citizens Initiative S036 (*Bürgerinitiative S036*). The Strategies Commission, in short, very quickly became recognized as a compliant and powerless government-mandated organization incapable of opposing Senat redevelopment plans. Since development

decisionmaking is rooted in the Senat, a body selected by the ruling city-level party (or coalition parties), decisionmakers have no community-level constituency and, therefore, no political requirement to service localized demands. Recognizing this fact, and witnessing the impotency of the courts in development decisionmaking, other German activists with what Duntze (1984, 301) later called the "68er-Touch"--referring to 1968 student movement activists and/or their sympathizers--quickly reoriented demand-making from the Strategies Commission and the community level to direct action targeting the Construction Senator and the Berlin Senat.

The Strategies Commission continued to operate as an intermediary organization sponsoring community projects compatible with the Senat's priorities. Particularly for immigrants this resulted in funding for community social services (Laurisch 1981, 26). The project *Wohnen+Leben* (a play on the words living, as in a residence, and living, as in life) was funded, for example, to provide bilingual tenant counseling and other community services to both German and immigrant residents. Of eleven projects selected by the Commission, *Wohnen+Leben* was one of only three finally funded by the Senat whose goals were largely realized. Also funded were a Lausitzer Straße community center and the Association S036 e.V. (*Verein S036*). Association S036 with a Senat financed staff of social workers and

professionals continues to counsel tenants and plan community projects. It successfully secured financing for a neighborhood playground and a daycare center and has cast support to residents' protests over traffic patterns and a proposed highway overpass. But as a mandated organization Association S036 was never in a position to oppose Senat policies. A group staffer concluded:

With money from the Senat it was a problem to remain in opposition. Mistakes were made but this is always the problem for citizen's initiatives providing services. Social work in the FRG is financed by the government (Berlin 9 July 1992).

And the Senat saw no political gain in funding oppositional organizations. Of the eleven projects forwarded by the Strategies for Kreuzberg competition, the only two that fundamentally challenged renewal plans by proposing building renovations through tenants' initiatives were vetoed by Construction Senator Ristock.

Squat!

Effectively barred from the renewal planning process, meanwhile, the Citizen Initiative S036 (*Bürgerinitiative S036*, or BI S036) opened a storefront in Sorauer Straße 28 and, with the goal of preventing clearance in S036, started a newspaper, the Southeast express (*Südost Express*) to publicize their views. In May, 1977 Construction Senator Ristock announced that 70 million DM through the ZIP program (*Zukunfts-Investitions-Programm*) would target Kreuzberg renewal districts. But when the Strategies

Commission learned that the funding would modernize only street-front houses and that back and side wings in the interior blocks would be cleared, Commission members protested: not only did they oppose razing structurally sound buildings, but were angered that even as official community representatives they had not been consulted (Thörnig 1990a, 35). When yet another Senat-mandated organization was created in 1978 to advise policymakers on ZIP proposals--made up of one-half residents and one-half district and city construction administrators--it recommended that the Senat not raze the famous and structurally sound two "Haberkern" blocks on the former Cuvry estate (see Chapter Five). Again, the Construction Senator rejected the decision (Thörnig 1990a, 43).

The political repercussions for Kliem were that in the early 1979 elections, the SPD faction was able to use the issue to force Kliem out. For the community, this period called by Duntze (1984, 300) the "dill pickle time"--called all promises of resident participation into question. The provision in the Urban Renewal Act became transparent concessions to earlier student movement protests and demands for democratization of decisionmaking processes. But even the sizable inclusion of administrators on the community commissions had not produced access. On the city-level the Construction Senator alone shaped policy as administered by the district Construction Senator.

Squatting Phase I: Resource Mobilization

Of far greater significance was the finality of this decision for BI S036 activists. It was clear that negotiating with construction administrators was fruitless and that no meaningful access to decisionmaking could be created. BI S036 had worked particularly hard to save the Haberkern blocks. In working with the Strategies Commission and the ZIP Committee it was hoped they could influence the redirection of an additional 10 million DM that the Senat had announced could go to Kreuzberg, with a special interest in the Haberkern blocks (Thörnig 1990c, 46). BI S036 wrote letters to elected officials, spoke with administrators and used the Southeast express to publicize the need to maintain sound housing. They had also exhausted direct negotiations with BeWoGe (*Berliner Wohn- und Geschäftshaus GmbH*, an authority owned entirely by the *Land Berlin*), the public housing authority administering the blocks on a Senat contract. The BeWoGe was managing approximately 300 emptied apartments in 42 buildings in the Kreuzberg renewal districts (Thörnig 1990b, 47). In desperation, on February 3, 1979, BI S036 occupied two of the Haberkern apartments amidst a carefully and very cleverly devised publicity blitz aimed at the press, radio and TV broadcasters. This first phase in Berlin squatting was a mechanism to create access to renewal decisionmaking and concentrated on publicizing

destructive renewal policies, not on possession of the specific apartments. The city was plastered with non-threatening, even comic images of "regular" Berliners holding paintbrushes and a grandmother hanging a sign on the squatted building that read: "Because empty apartments will not be rented: Self-help squatting" (or *Instand(be)setzung*, a play on the words renovation and occupation). The positive, rather than confrontational message won results and favorable coverage even in the conservative Springer publications (Thörnig 1990b, 47). BeWoGe offered the squatters leases after just a few days of occupation.

BeWoGe continued to negotiate with BI S036, the ZIP Committee and Association S036 about the small "Strategies for Kreuzberg" district. An agreement was reached over the year's discussion that some building wings had become uninhabitable and would be razed, that others could be rented immediately and a back wing at Appelner Straße 21 would be renovated by Berlin's first "self-help" project, a group of activists willing to renovate the units themselves through Senate financing with the goal of winning a long-term lease from BeWoGe (Thörnig 1990b, 47). From that point onward, no publicly-owned, BeWoGe-managed buildings in the Strategies area were squatted (until 1989 when squatting was again used to protest slow renovation on two streets) (Thörnig 47).

The success of BI S036 came through circumstances unique to the Strategies area: BeWoGe was open to negotia-

tions; area residents were more carefully organized than any other and far better connected to administrators and elected officials. BI S036's publicity campaign had brought widespread public support. But these conditions would not be found within Kreuzberg's other renewal areas. First, the demographic shifts mentioned earlier (see Chapter Seven) led to the tremendous in-migration by young Germans and immigrant, mostly Turkish, workers without ties to local, active Evangelic churches, elected officials or district office officials. And among long-time residents who might have fostered such connections the new neighbors found instead ambivalence or rejection. Duntze writes, for example, of a local, often heard joke that some German residents were happy to have someone moving in under them on the social ladder (Duntze 1984, 301). There was no pretense that the Turkish newcomers would be included in redevelopment negotiations, making those renewal districts where they concentrated most vulnerable to continued clearance.

Secondly, of the young Germans many were university students moving in search of low-cost apartments. But a significant portion were unemployed youths who had not finished high school or vocational training. Duntze (1990, 301) recalls that "the new residents stepping into the community were stepping out of the society" (a.tr.). They were viewed with distrust and, more often, with disdain as a serious threat to established social norms. When this group

later squatted empty buildings the support offered to BI S036 organizers would not be found.

In addition, individual public housing authorities reacted differently to squatting. Kreuzberg's primary renewal manager, GSW, and other authorities would negotiate selectively while Neue Heimat, the union-owned authority managing the neighboring Schöneberg renewal site, would resist negotiating entirely. The next round of squatting was to be far more confrontational.

Squatting Phase II: Resistance and New Forms of Living

The younger Germans moving to Kreuzberg in the late 1970s were deeply affected by both the city-wide housing shortage and the remarkable lack of success found in local negotiations with city administrators. That the first step forward toward "careful renewal" came from squatting was a lesson, absorbed immediately by the city's politically engaged. In Kreuzberg throughout 1980, a second phase of squatting began with ties to the 1979 BI S036 action, but developing its own goals. The Haberkern squatting was a protest action directly targeting city renewal policies. Protesters were mainly community activists who hoped to affect community-level redevelopment, and who had little interest in the apartments for individual use. This would change in the fall of 1979 when BI S036 began discussing the seventy empty Cuvrystraße apartments owned by the public housing management company, Combau. Since Combau owned 209

area flats, it was assumed that all would eventually become vacant and readied for clearance. Many Cuvrystraße residents joined BI S036 in a subcommittee to secretly plan possible intervention.

Bernd Laurisch, a participant, recalled that a squatting action was devised partly to affect renewal policies, but that a second goal emerged: to rebuild the flats to accommodate local residents suffering from the ever worsening community housing shortage. Toward these goals, they sought families with children to become squatters since they most desperately needed housing. The naïveté of this goal became clear when no family could be found willing to take on the risk, stress and harsh physical demands of renovating and living mostly without utilities. The goal was especially unrealistic since the vast majority of area families were Turks who had no contact to the activists. Although young, single students could most easily find apartments, the irony of the predicament found no resolution and they became the squatters' core (Laurisch 1981, 63).

The importance of this shift from squatting as direct confrontation to challenge redevelopment decisionmaking processes and subsequent plans, to the additional use of squatting as an ends in itself, cannot be overstated. First, the squatters were drawn less from Kreuzberg's circle of housing activists and more from the sector of students and other young Germans who primarily came from West Germany

in search of life-style alternatives. Frustrated in their attempts to create residential communities (*Wohngemeinschaften*, or WGs) by the predominance of one and two-bedroom apartments, they were anxious to design larger spaces through self-renovation projects (Laurisch 65). As Laurisch recalled:

As the occupation first developed the old motive came to the foreground. It was about the possibilities opened up by the squatted buildings: for living differently, for new forms of living together (Laurisch 1981, 33; a.tr.).

At the bottom line, squatters during this phase were not discussing the option of occupying the buildings in order to rescue them for those most in need but least able to squat. More specifically, although residents of the targeted buildings on Cuvrystraße owned by Combau and an independent speculator were over 59% immigrants (Laurisch 55), activists attempted no contact with them and did not promote their needs in the publicity accompanying the occupations. It was hoped, however, that by squatting vacant apartments in the ethnically-mixed buildings, the buildings themselves would be saved and the resident Turkish families could also stay.

Regardless, this was seldom the result. More often, when building owners offered alternative flats to immigrants, they moved. When young squatters arrived, rather than their presence encouraging Turks to remain, fearing trouble, the occupations expedited their departures. At minimum, immigrants made it clear in most cases that they

were not cooperating with squatters. On November 1, 1980, three apartments in separate "renewal Block 133" buildings (between Cuvry-, Wrangel-, Falckenstein- and Görlitzer Straße) were squatted. When the squatters tried to break into one back building entrance to search for a livable flat, the Turkish building superintendent called the police. This spurred a lengthy discussion among group members. "The contact to the Turks was weaker than that to the German residents," wrote Laurisch. Language was one barrier, but some squatters felt that the Turks did not want to mix with the squatters (Laurisch 1981, 56-57). Remaining Turks, meanwhile, kept their distance fearing the close presence of illegal squatters who signaled possible police activity and unwanted negative press attention.

The Block 133 squatters became an important reference point for those who saw squatting as an important challenge to planning policies. The entire Cuvrystraße 20/23 factory complex owned by a private real estate group was squatted to both save the buildings and create a community of cooperative living and working. Already organized as the *Kerngehäuse, e.V.* (again, playing with the literal meaning of a 'core association' and the internal reference to the 'center of houses'), the association hoped to save the factory complex and to purchase it themselves (Laurisch 1981, 117). Eventually the cooperative did buy the buildings with assistance from the Senat and used it as a multi-

purpose cooperative space including: a taxi-cooperative, a cabinet maker, a theatre group, music group, health group, kindergarten and a radical activist organization, the Office for Unusual Measures (*Büro für Ungewöhnliche Massnahmen*). The residences include both individual apartments and living cooperatives and all have the option to participate in a cooperatively run kitchen. Still in operation, *Kerngehäuse*, became a model for activist, cooperative living.

Other groups were also beginning to squat in vacant Kreuzberg buildings. On November 21 Görlitzer Straße 36 was occupied--as with the earlier actions--in cooperation with BI S036 (Thörnig 1990d, 56). By the end of 1980, 22 buildings squatted in Berlin (Der Senator für Inneres 1983, 9) and were working together through a squatters' senate (*Besetzerrat*) founded in March of that year (Thörnig 1990d, 57).

Tenant Associations and "The Kreuzberg Model"

This phase created a deep division between BI S036 and Kreuzberg activists from Association S036 and forced Berlin's older city-wide tenant organizations to take a stand on squatting. Within Kreuzberg, Association S036 withdrew most of its support from BI S036 and its squatting activism. The Association itself became directly involved in only one occupation, that of Forster Straße 16/17, squatted by a tenants' block association. The primary goal,

similar to that of the first squatting action, was the emergency preservation of housing, in this case occupied almost entirely by Turkish families. It was clear that those families had no political resources for protecting their own interests, so the Association supported the occupation and negotiated with the *Bezirksamt* in their behalf. As part of this action, Berlin's only Turkish self-help housing group was later created (Thörnig 1990d, 57).

Of the two largest national tenants' organizations, each had strong Berlin offices represented by branches in Kreuzberg: the Berliner Tenants Society (*Mietergemeinschaft*) and the Berliner Tenants Association (*Mieterverein*). Neither organization has played a post-World War II role in organizing tenants. Both see a need to educate tenants about their rights, to work directly with government officials toward maintaining or strengthening those rights and to provide tenants with legal counseling on the local level. By, in a sense, "selling" legal insurance--the guarantee of legal counsel in a dispute with a landlord in exchange for a sizable yearly fee (over 80 DM by the late 1980s)--both groups became active service providers but played little role in addressing redevelopment issues beyond lobbying for strengthened rights for tenants' threatened by displacement or compensation when affected by intrusive reconstruction work.

The housing crisis and resulting squatting actions created heated internal debates within the tenants organiza-

tions. Berliner Tenants Association, during one of their regular monthly city-wide meetings in 1980, was approached by a group of Kreuzberg squatters asking for support. They debated the result of illegal actions and chose a moderate stance: Squatting was a response to a housing emergency; while it would not be encouraged, the Tenants Association would support any squatters in their efforts to negotiate for leases. Their choice to encourage legal tactics stemmed partly from their representation of tenants' rights' generally. Arguing for squatting challenged their perceived protection of those tenants who were paying rent. Similarly, the use of rent strikes had been rejected in earlier internal debates because German local courts refused to review individual contractual relationships (i.e., tenant-landlord) as class actions or group settlements, and the Tenants Association decided not to encourage illegal tactics. It chose instead to concentrate on city-level lobbying. As a former boardmember explained, "We are a city-wide tenant advocate, a lobby group--and too big to do local, more radical activities like organizing or rent strikes" (Berlin: 19 February 1990). Their advocacy has led them to primarily work with political parties, churches and local "citizens' initiatives" (*Bürgerinitiativen*). The ideal political strategy, in their view, was cooperation between localized citizens' initiatives--like BI S036 organizing in Kreuzberg--and the city-wide tenants' organizations lobbying

the Senat and political parties, with their national headquarters targeting federal decisionmakers.

This participation model had widespread support from young activists drawing on the years of Berlin's APO (*Außer-Parlamentarische Opposition*, Parliament's external opposition) and student movements, roughly 1965 to 1969 (Mayer-Tasch 1985, 13). Taking off from these early protest years, citizens' initiatives throughout the 1970s focused on regional and community approaches to solving problems of importance to citizens mobilized for direct action. And since Berlin's Freie Universität was at the center of those movements, interest in community-initiated actions was still valued by Berlin "68er" activists working within the housing organizations. Covering the period of 1978 to 1980, the cooperative effort of Association S036, BI S036, the Evangelic congregations, both major Berlin tenant organizations and Kreuzberg activists who identified with the earlier 1968 movement, shaped an organizational structure that some have called the "Kreuzberg Model" (Eichstädt 1990, 145) consistent with the citizen initiative ideal described above. This period of community participation came unraveled at the end of 1980 when its limited promise in the face of still inaccessible decisionmaking structures was challenged by new squatters. Younger university students and others who were attracted to Berlin for its activist history were not content to repeat a strategy that seemed to have no confrontational impact.

When the police were deployed by the Minister for the Interior to prevent the squatting of a building on Fränkelufer Straße in the Kottbusser Tor Kreuzberg renewal area on December 12, 1980, supporters poured into the streets in a show of force that demonstrated the broadened support among Berlin's younger activists for resistance to state force and insulated state decisionmaking. The eviction became a riot that lasted through the night and became a rallying cry for previously unmobilized supporters. As Eichstädt writes, this began the debate over whether the community's organizations would unify behind the emerging squatters' protest movement or become irreparably splintered (Eichstädt, 145).

Squatting Phase III: Challenging Social Norms

In the third phase of squatting beginning with the riot of December 12, 1980, goals broadened from those of the first phase targetting a specific Kreuzberg renewal policy, and beyond the second of challenging community redevelopment and hoping to rebuild needed community housing. The third stage was launched by the riot and was followed by thousands of young activists spontaneously occupying vacant apartments throughout Berlin as a broad-based "squatters' movement" confronting German political structures and the social values supporting them. The political system, in other words, lost legitimacy for thousands of young Germans who watched policymakers erect means of access for Berlin resi-

dents affected by renewal plans, and then witnessed as all citizens' recommendations were ignored. Both the consciousness and behavior of young observers--and some participants--were transformed and consistent with Piven and Cloward's characterization of movements, the transformation led men and women to demand change, demonstrating a heightened sense of efficacy (Piven and Cloward 1977, 3-5).

In contrast with American social movements, however, the squatters' transformation was less concerned with redistributive issues (which were important to the earlier two phases of Berlin squatting) focusing on a central conflict, and more concentrated on "transforming society towards a more emancipatory future," as Mayer and Roth have described European "New Social Movements" (Mayer and Roth 1994, 3). The elements of what some call New Social Movements (NSMs) found in the Berlin squatters included an emphasis on individual autonomy and rejection of bureaucratized or "programmed" power (Mayer and Roth 7). NSMs seek to reshape society through, for example, feminist, ecology, youth groups, or "anti-bureaucratic" actions targeting housing or psychiatry administration (Eder 1993, 101). In contrast to movements seeking political emancipation or labor's battle for economic justice, NSMs target "subjective individual happiness and 'the good life'" (Eder 109). Through what Eder calls a "collective protest of the petit bourgeois," NSMs are "fighting for a radical demo-

cratization of social relationships as such (not only social relationships in production!)" (Eder 1993, 155-156).

In Kreuzberg, the early two stages of building occupations were tied to resource redistribution more similar to the actions of the Lower East Side's community-based organizations. This third and most extensive phase of squatting, in contrast, was a movement seeking changes in social relationships and was less concerned with housing policy debates. And most important to this discussion, the new emphasis was on challenging norms throughout society, not within any specific community. In fact, the localized issue of housing for Kreuzberg residents was unimportant for squatters from 1981 onward.

Since deciding to squat was not tied to location, young people had to first decide to give up their apartment, to commit an illegal act, and to work and live communally. Upon reaching this difficult decision, activists searched for empty buildings throughout Berlin, or for established squats who had room for one more. One medical student who had been living in Kreuzberg at the time of the December 1980 riot decided to squat and recalled that the search first led him to a Wedding squat, north of Kreuzberg. Finding it full, he consulted the new radical daily paper, Tageszeitung, beginning daily publications on April 1, 1979. "Taz," as the Berlin section came to be called, had just started with the outburst of the squatting movement and was

almost exclusively devoted to squatting news, becoming an important source of communications for Berlin squatters. Running a column in its advertising section, "meeting Active Apartment-hunters," in 1981 it quickly became a daily listing for finding a place in a squat, or for collecting a group to search for an empty building.

In February, 1981 the medical student found an address in Taz for Schöneberg, just blocks from Kreuzberg, and joined a core group of eight university students and an assistant professor from the Freie Universität. The group grew to twenty, an average-sized squat, ranging in ages from 18 to thirty. All were "full-time" squatters, indicating that no one kept their old apartment leases which was felt to threaten a group's legitimacy. They simply moved in scattered belongings, located the electricity source, sealed the windows against the winter cold and immediately began construction work.

It was only after addressing these initial necessities that squatters investigated the reasons why their building had become vacant:

You would squat first, then you had to go and find out why you were squatting. Tenants organizations knew the history of various houses and knew why they were empty (Berlin: 31 July 1988).

In other words, tenant organization branches understood the urban renewal plans and histories for specific communities but focused on tenants' rights advocacy on the city level rather than community renewal policies. Squatters were

mobile and prepared to occupy any warehoused building, but were not concerned with community housing needs or coordinating a protest movement to demand that specific, localized needs be addressed. Their most fundamental demands were that sound buildings not be cleared and that all squatted houses be legalized and financed by the Senat for immediate repairs and building maintenance. This phase of squatting was not community participation in the sense used through this dissertation, but was a social movement with a center in Kreuzberg. It was, in fact, a symptom of centralized development decisionmaking structures with roots in Berlin Development policies beginning in the 17th century. Much in the way that the German labor movement was driven to organize centrally in answer to a rigid political, aristocratic and economic elite since the 19th century, young activists were driven to mobilize as a city-wide movement, associated with other German and international squatters. And their challenges targeted the organization of society and politics rather than focusing on narrow policies.

And to achieve these demands, thousands squatted vacant buildings throughout the city in a remarkable wave of protest action. By June, 1981 the police reported that 108 building had been squatted, a number that increased to 139 by January, 1982. Of these 74 buildings or 53% were in Kreuzberg, 27 in neighboring Schöneberg and 38 sprinkled

throughout seven other Berlin districts (Der Senator für Inneres, January 1982; November 1982; July 1983). As police attempted to repress the protest movement, policing measures and the decisionmaking autonomy of the Senator for the Interior, or the police head, was itself questioned, led by Berlin's fledgling Alternative List

The Alternative List Berlin

The squatting movement was not an isolated protest action, but was part of a wider call for social changed and political restructuring springing from developments in the late 1970s, including growing environmental and feminist movements. On October 5, 1978 the "Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection" (AL) was founded as a new Berlin political party (Bühnemann et al. 1984, 10). They ran their first list of candidates in the March, 1979 elections, winning 3.7% of the vote. In addition, extended active sponsorship of leftist projects; for example, the "Netzwerk" project to sponsor self-help groups in Berlin, a protest to keep the British army from clearing a small forest in southern Berlin. And in September, 1980, AL delegates voted to support the estimated twenty squatted Kreuzberg buildings deciding, "...that, should it come to the point to police evictions, everything on legs will be mobilized and appropriate steps for struggle will be taken (Bühnemann et al. 1984, 22; a.tr.).

With the added support of this emerging political force, therefore, the decision by the Interior Senator to evict one of those squats was viewed as overtly confrontational. During the December 12th riot, hundreds were wounded, barricades were erected around the nearby central square and many arrests were made (Bodenschatz et al. 1983, 312). This confrontation spurred another demonstration three days later on Kurfürstendamm, the busy downtown shopping street, protesting the arrests of demonstrators on December 12th. Primary concerns evolved, in other words, from squatting to insulated decisionmaking in housing and policing. Since AL presented an alternative view of governance, their support of these demonstrations kept activists focused on bureaucratic governance rather than community issues.

The AL energetically supported "citizens initiatives" consistent with their commitment to 'bottom-up' governance. But hoping to prevent the evolution of a hierarchical party, they encouraged citizens initiatives to remain fully independent projects (Bühnemann u.a. 1984, 92). Nonetheless, one "citizens-initiative-thinker," Wolfgang Beer, observed that the party inevitably drained communities of their activists as they became AL activists ("zitty" in Bühnemann 1984, 147). It is an overstatement certainly to blame the AL for shrinking interest in community activism from the late 1970s into the 1980s. Rather, the growing

support for the AL reflected the national development of movement politics whose priorities were simply captured by the Greens nationally, and the AL in Berlin. The irony of an interest in social movements developing among those most politically engaged in "local conflict" has not gone unnoticed (Roth 1987), and yet this attraction to new social movements has been explained as fundamental opposition to the materialist foundation of society and an "institutional system" supporting it (Bahro 1986, 11).

The point at which diverse citizens' initiatives became aware of common structural causes linking their various interests and consolidated into an extra-parliamentary opposition, Dieter Rucht places at 1977 (Rucht 1980). In sum, citizens' initiatives targeting the specific needs of community residents for better housing were missing the larger issues of the consequences of housing produced for a profit, or the role of speculators in creating housing shortages. The AL had a special role to play in publicizing housing scandals within the Senat and among speculators that served to heighten awareness of causes of Berlin's housing shortage. One case in point was the public revelation that one of the Senat's construction contractors had used over 115 million DM of public housing funds for high-risk Middle Eastern investments and then disappeared (Bühnemann 1984, 23). The extent of the scandal forced the resignation of the SPD-FDP (Free Democrats) coalition Senat led by Stobbe

which was then replaced by a SPD-FDP coalition led by Vogel in January 1981. Further, the information added to the public awareness that many renewal district buildings were purchased from their original owners by speculators in anticipation of lucrative buy-outs from the designated district renewal managers.

The next major Berlin demonstration, of 15,000 participants, targeted speculation and warehousing and called for the public to squat empty buildings. AL members joined the demonstration, and others throughout the next months. But one that they organized on July 12, 1981 best illustrates the AL concerns: it was announced as "demonstrators visit speculators" and resulted in 5,000 protesters marching to the homes of identified real estate speculators in Berlin's posh Grunewald community (Bühnemann 1984, 28). Beyond casting support to squatters and publicizing the broader housing issues, AL was not able to shape housing policy from the outside and remained a remote influence on the direction of the larger squatting movement.

The Dynamics of Violence

Another influence shaping the nature of the squatting movement was the autonomy of law enforcement and justice officials. As the number of squatted buildings grew throughout 1981, the police head, or Senator for the Interior (*Innenminister*), gained a prominent role in the renewal

process. Since every senator has autonomous decisionmaking power within their department, policies toward squatters were not neatly coordinated. This presented the odd portrait of a multi-faced head reacting with various expressions to the same scene. This results as well from German coalition politics. In order to reach a majority and form a government in 1979, for example, SPD and FDP governed jointly. In the 1981 elections, amidst the turmoil of demonstrations and squatters' protests, CDU came to power (joined in a coalition with FDP in 1983), bringing in a CDU Senator for the Interior, Heinrich Lummer.¹

SPD had already devised a policy toward evicting squatted houses. The so-called "Berlin Line" stated that buildings would not be evicted unless crimes more serious than trespassing had been committed within them, or where other uses for the building were already planned (Dreyer 1984). Even where the latter case applied, the SPD Senat agreed in late 1980 to provide "substitute" vacant houses for squatters. In an example of conflict between the Senators for Construction and the Interior, the riot of December 12, 1980 erupted specifically because police forces claimed to prevent squatters from violating the agreement with the Senator for Construction to not squat "substitute" houses. it was later made clear that the house they had

¹AL won its first seats in the Berlin parliament as well, capturing 9 of 132.

attempted to squat was never a "substitute" (Koopmans 1994, 176). Further, as Koopmans observes, even the Senator for the Interior has no direct control over the public prosecutor. So, for example, those arrested during the December 12 riot were meted severe sentences, between 12 and 30 months (Koopmans 1994, 176).

Evidence of conflicting policies within the CDU government was also abundant. While the CDU Construction Senator Rastemborski agreed to hold the "Berlin Line" and to offer a moratorium on evictions of buildings squatted before October 1, 1981, later extended to December 2, 1981 (Die Neue 6 October 1981). Regardless, Senator Lummer interpreted his job as guaranteeing the private property rights of building owners. Thus the number of evictions, police searches and arrests under Lummer grew (Mulhak 1983, 238). On September 22, 1981 police were ordered to evict eight Schöneberg buildings. With the aid of--common to eviction procedures through the movement years to the present--police tanks, water canons and a troop of 1,800 officers dressed in full riot gear, the police nonetheless encountered some resistance. Resorting to tear gas, the scene exploded into chaos, and an 18-year-old squatter was run over by a police bus and killed (Besetzer ließen rich...). Headlines screamed "Herr Lummer, you have a person on your conscience" (Gaserow 1981).

The new AL representatives called for a vote of 'no-confidence' in response, but the CDU Senat unified around

Senator Lummer claiming full support. The impact of this incident was to ignite further resistance and demonstrations. Protests of over 5,000 continued on an almost weekly basis throughout 1981 and 1982. The Süddeutsche Zeitung (29 April 1982) counted 357 demonstrations in Berlin between July 1981 and April 1982. A review of press accounts for the peak squatting movement years until 1984 shows seventeen demonstrations, directly related to housing issues and squatting, of over 5,000 participants. Squatters attentions were increasingly focused on the issues of police violence and arrests.

These shifting concerns are reflected in the squatters demands in their senate: that those arrested should be released, that evictions should end and that the Senat should negotiate with the Squatters Senate, not individual squats. Discussions focused on two issues: whether squats should negotiate for formal leases and whether police violence should be answered with violence. Both issues eventually split the movement. For those favoring legalization of houses, their goals in squatting were to affect lifestyle changes. This goal, for many, required rebuilding apartments and stabilizing communes through legal leases. For those against negotiating, the act of squatting was a direct protest of the destruction of inexpensive housing--a tactic only useful so long as the act remained illegal.

The Squatters Senate held off negotiating, even when offered a settlement for legalization through the Berlin

Senat in April, 1981. But as evictions intensified late that year, individual houses began to strengthen their bargaining positions by seeking prominent "sponsors" or "godparents." The squatters' district senate in Kreuzberg in October, 1981 called on all supporters and "deserting police" to squat with them to secure the buildings. While the Schöneberg squatters announced their intention to negotiate in November. Finally, on February 28, 1982 the Kreuzberg squatters senate decided that members who wished could negotiate for leases. Brutal police evictions continued of 'non-negotiating' houses, and of those deemed to have 'criminal elements.' When it became clear that CDU policies continued to push for evictions, individual squats broke off negotiations. A demonstration, 10,000 strong was held to demand legalization in November, 1982 opening the way for further negotiations. By March, 1984, 66 buildings had negotiated contracts allowing residents to remain in their self-rehabbed "living communities" (Dreyer 1994).

Marks of the Squatting Movement

For those squatters victim to violent evictions, arrests and imprisonment, this final phase of the Berlin squatting movement reinforced feelings of rage for many--especially the younger, less well-educated Germans who already felt distance from the intellectual core of the movement. The feelings of anger gave unity to those some have called *Autonomen*, or autonomous of any political

affiliation (Koopmans 1989). Yearly violent confrontations on May 1st still see *Autonomy* youth locked in street fighting with riot police. But the numbers of the disaffected left are significantly less than the squatting activists of the 1979-1984 period.

For those legalized squats, residents refer most often to the lifestyle alternatives they were successful in creating. And local housing officials are quick to credit the squatters with having changed policies from those of clearance to "careful renewal" and self-help housing rehab.

Overall, the 1975 to 1984 years are exceptional ones for Kreuzberg. The time before and since saw far less of the radicalism and activism than in this period. The August, 1961 building of the Berlin Wall, setting off a chain of redevelopment and demographic changes, was a major contributing factor in creating an activist environment. And since the removal of the Wall, the activists have mostly moved on. As one remaining activist described Kreuzberg:

Today the neighborhood has changed, the *Szene* is gone. The people who could have moved to Prenzlauerberg {Kreuzberg's eastern neighbor}. Now we have the leftovers, people who have too many problems to move on...Some of us who have stayed have joked, our job is that of an undertaker: we try to assess the past and present it to the public (Berlin: 10 July 1992).

Although the most of the housing "participators" were not of the community before their involvement in the squatting movement, they did influence it, and were influenced by it.

Chapter 12

CONCLUSIONS

The role for theory today seems to me to be just this: not to formulate the global systematic theory which holds everything in place, but to analyse the specificity of mechanisms of power, to locate the connections and extensions, to build little by little a strategic knowledge (*savoir*) (Foucault 1980, 145).

The search set out in the previous chapters has been to understand the determinants of participatory styles used in two urban, lower-income communities to battle housing development practices not thought by residents to reflect the best interests of the communities. The strategies used by each were very different. One goal of this project has been to analyze why and to reveal something of the determinants of strategies that could inform our knowledge about community participation and the continuing work of activists.

The dissertation hypothesized that the primary determinant of community participatory styles is the unique local political culture of a particular place and time. Defining local political culture as the intersection of a network of factors--social, local historical developments, market influences, state structures and policy decisions

made at various levels--the research sought to excavate what Michel Foucault called "networks of power," multidimensional relationships extending through history, throughout, between and within all levels of a political structure (Foucault 1980, 98).

This definition began with Almond and Verba's 1963 usage of political culture as, "political orientations," but employed Foucault's notion of "networks" to encompass the complicated nature of such orientations, recognizing time as an essential factor.¹ Secondly, "networks" capture distinct local cultures. A national political culture might be identified, particularly as an influence in elite decision-making, but elements of it may find their way into community cultures to differing degrees and may be absorbed with different meanings.²

Similarly, as Robert Putnam has found, horizontal networks of civic engagement unique to a place may increase the likelihood of collective action by building a necessary store of "social capital." Different paths lead to the creation of strategies for civic engagement, providing the conclusion that in tracing the styles of engagement, history

¹See also Aaron Wildavsky's discussion acknowledging the continuous modification of culture in "Choosing preferences by constructing institutions," American political science review 81 (1987): 3-21.

²For an excellent discussion of the term's evolution see Ruth Lane, "Political culture," Comparative political studies 25 (October 1992): 362-387.

matters in smoothing some paths and closing off others (Putnam 1993, 181). This history includes not only that of developments in civic attitudes but also in structures, as "attitudes and practices" become mutually reinforcing (Putnam 1993, 180). As was explained in the Introduction, attitudes, including those leading residents to choose specific participatory modes, both shape and are shaped by institutions, in a dialogue of influences.

The dialogue in this research has been viewed as between forces of development and a community, but not meaning the community as a whole. The community, as examined here, has meant a collection of individuals shaped into administrative districts. The research findings point to a range of influences shaping the participatory acts of individuals first, and then collections of individuals built into communities. The dissertation finds that the influences on contemporary participation styles are very different for each site examined, and that different lines of influence have affected contemporary participants unevenly even within sites.³ We now turn to a summary of

³It should be noted that Foucault suggested genealogies of exercising power and developing strategies of struggle to counter the first within "carefully defined institutions" (see Foucault, *The subject and power*. In *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1983), 222). Within housing development decisionmaking, however, communities are more accurately seen as the point of application and site of struggle. Particularly since development is a combination of public and private-sector decisions, no single institution encompasses its generation of priorities, regulations and hierarchy.

the primary participatory styles used in each community and the chief determinants of those styles.

Participatory Styles

The modes of participation for Kreuzberg and the Lower East Side differed in three regards: in the actual strategies devised, the extent to which they were community-based, and in the target for those strategies.

Lower East Side Styles

As discussed in Chapter 10, Lower East Side participatory strategies were characterized by active and competitive community-based organizing that concentrated on limiting private-sector development while working cooperatively with local, state and federal agencies. Residents created and participated in 28 community housing organizations most of which were represented by a community housing umbrella organization. Most of the groups began as advocacy organizations concentrating on tenant organizing and over the decade of 1975 to 1985 gradually moved toward housing development and management. In fact, how to balance advocacy and development has been the chief organizational debate within the vast majority of groups. As Table 12.1 demonstrates, based on the estimates of Lower East Side group leaders, the community has constructed 420 new units and renovated 1,311 units of low-income housing. They are

Table 12.1 Measures of Lower East Side and Kreuzberg Resident Housing Actions, 1975-1989

Styles	Lower East Side	Kreuzberg
Squatted buildings (at Peak)	15	74
Community or city housing protests of 5,000 or over, attended by community squats or CBOs	1	17
New housing units constructed by community	420	-
Rehabbed housing units by community	1,311	700
City-owned housing units managed by community	546	-
Rent strikes	over 200	-
Community organizations active in housing	28	6

also the acting managers of over 546 units of renovated city-owned apartments. While this pace of community housing development is impressive, its price has been dear. Groups have become overwhelmed by the requirements of chasing-down and administering grants from different levels of government and from private foundations to support development projects.

Not only has this shift toward housing development damped housing advocacy, but it has fostered competition between organizations and the "service-areas" they represent. With most of the organizations representing primarily one ethnic group, reflecting smaller neighborhoods within Community Board Three, the competition appeared pinned to ethnic competition but ethnicity did not act alone. While interviewees often mentioned the ethnic group with whom they were competing for housing program dollars, usually specific organizations rather than single ethnic groups were identified as violating the informal rules of competition. The inter-ethnic group alliances tended to shift over time with no consistent pattern of ethnic-based support. The clearer pattern is tied to the number of tax-foreclosed, *in rem* buildings found within groups' "service areas." As a case in point, for one densely-populated Chinatown catchment area fewer *in rem* apartments were located there, frustrating organizations pressured by the densest population and unique market pressures of a busy

commercial district. As a Chinese-American organization sought to develop affordable housing within the service areas of predominately Hispanic groups, cooperative bonds were strained.⁴ But among those groups angered by this violation of service areas was another organization serving a largely Chinese-American neighborhood.

An umbrella organization, the Joint Planning Council (JPC), negotiated with the city over the ratio of *in rem* buildings sold at market value to those developed for affordable housing by community groups. This "cross-subsidy" alternative community housing plan, although steeped in controversy, was one of the community's most direct intervention in city housing policy. But as conflicts form between member groups, the JPC has become a community broker for necessary letters in support of grant applications and has not been a neutral player. In the peak of in-fighting, some JPC members broke an unspoken pact by contacting a funding agency and arguing against another JPC member's application.

Community organizations have also fought private-sector landlords and developers through the strategies of rent striking and law suits. The legal rent strike tactic of collecting rents into escrow accounts when landlords harass tenants or otherwise try to force low-income resi-

⁴As of this writing, one group had withdrawn from the Joint Planning Council amidst charges on both sides that groups have not worked cooperatively on housing development.

dents from their home was widely used by community organizers. Made legal by the recodification of the New York State Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law in 1962, the 1965 creation of Article 7-A (as amended in 1974) allowing tenants to take over management of their buildings when code violations threaten tenants' safety, and of a special Housing Court in 1972, Lower East Side organizers have used the rent strike to protect individual tenants and as a defensive tactic against speculators. They have assisted tenants in over 200 building-wide rent strikes and worked on court actions challenging private landlords, developers and city officials working with private developers who have threatened local residents with displacement through development plans.

As Chapter Ten indicated, however, the legal mechanisms erected to support court actions as organizing tools have done most to soften the effect of legal actions, leading some organizations to discontinue using them except when tenants request assistance. The creation of a Housing Court has routinized rent strikes into a first stage for getting disgruntled tenants into Court where, as the data indicated, landlords are far better equipped to argue that escrow accounts be released for repairs before they are made. Most importantly, more than 90% of Housing Court cases are landlord-initiated rent collection cases. 7-A provisions, meanwhile, have remained too complicated for use

by untrained tenants resulting in few 7-A proceeding, initiated primarily by better-educated middle-income Lower East Side tenants. When housing groups have assisted low-income tenants with 7-A, the cumbersome procedures have taxed their resources, again diverting staff from organizing and advocacy. In the way that community organizers of the 1970s and 1980s were enticed from advocacy and organizing by government programs that turned their attention to housing self-help rehab and construction and management, the new tenant-protection structures have deradicalized once effective organizing strategies. Given the dominance of the private-sector in housing development, these Housing Court, legalized rent striking and 7-A procedures have become New York City's default housing policy--further reinforcing property rights while failing to develop a policy for housing lower-income city residents.

In the case of the Seward Park urban renewal extension site, the city attempted to pave the way for a private developer to create moderate and middle-income housing on publicly-owned land. The style of community participation used was again legal action that focused on another turf battle between ethnic groups but one that was primarily a class-based competition (Gendrot and Turner 1983). The federal 1949 Housing Act originally permitted the city to purchase the land for clearance and renewal with the provision that displaced residents have first choice in newly con-

structed housing. In 1967, 1,850 lower-income families and 350 businesses were removed. But when housing was completed on the site, Democratic elected representatives intervened to guarantee leases to mostly middle-class Jewish residents. They had been lobbied hard by the United Jewish Council, formed to strengthen the political support of the now mostly middle-class descendants of Jewish Lower East Siders. UJC was concerned with anchoring their sub-community and viewed low-income housing as a threat to future commercial and residential up-grading. The JPC, representing the low-income former site residents, fought the leasing practices of the city in federal court. Although an out-of-court settlement resulted in a compromise between the two organizations, the turf battle raged on in 1980 when a commercial mall and senior housing were proposed for the site. Again a compromise was struck adding some lower-income housing, but JPC was finally defeated when the Borough President and UJC supporter intervened to remove the low-income housing from the plan. Once again, in 1988, JPC used a law suit to defeat a plan by Mayor Koch giving development rights on the site to a large developer for building middle-income housing. Part of the Seward Park extension is still contested and unresolved. The turf battle over the site has pitted community organizations against one another each seeking to protect a constituency. Class-interests have layered with ethnicity and with traditional ties of the Jewish trade

unionists to the local Democratic party clubhouse to forge a multi-layered net of contention.

In part because of the extensive competition and infighting on The Lower East Side, little in the way of community-wide protest actions were found. JPC was able to organize one sizable demonstration 'for affordable housing' during the time period examined, and several small protests around the Seward Park issue. In general, organizations were preoccupied with the needs of their service areas and were necessarily focused on short-term organizational needs rather than the longer-run housing needs of the community. Community housing activists were both aware of these realities and were frustrated by them. In interviews, when group members were asked what are the most important housing issues on the Lower East Side, JPC members were nearly unanimous in declaring that the creation of affordable housing was of central importance. Most viewed their role in bringing funds into the community as the participation strategy most likely to meet that goal. When asked whether they tried to influence housing policymaking toward the same goal, the most frequent replies were that there is no housing policymaking process that might be targeted.

UJC members were more likely to view commercial development and job creation as concerns inseparable with housing issues, but they too noted that bringing funds into the community was the immediate priority. The one group to

use more confrontational tactics, those squatting illegally, was more likely to focus on city housing decisions or on the underlying market factors creating a shortage of affordable housing. But squatting was limited to at most fifteen buildings and their actions received almost no support from established housing groups leaving them as simply additional competitors for vacant buildings in an already crowded field. Protest activities, in short, were limited by a lack of unity, strained group resources and the absence of a clear target for those protests. While Lower East Side participants did develop housing using government grants from various levels, the self-help housing participation did not challenge policies or their priorities, with the notable exception of the JPC cross-subsidy plan. The other dominant participatory style, legal action, primarily targeted private-sector landlords and developers.

Kreuzberg Styles

Kreuzberg participation, in contrast to the Lower East Side, was characterized by confrontational protest strategies that were not community-based, but more city-wide in scope with a center in Kreuzberg, and targeted the local state far more than the private sector. Two groups were not active participants: these were the approximately one-third of community residents who are immigrant workers, and older working-class Germans. Among ethnic-Germans, one early community organizing effort, led by a Evangelic church leader,

attempted to create community representation in the redevelopment process. In what was described in Chapter 11 as "community-corporatism," this early "Strategies for Kreuzberg" became a panel of community residents, interested city academics and district officials. Even though the panel included government officials, their recommendations on renewal projects and on the status of a firehouse scheduled for clearance were ignored by the district Construction Representative. Although the Strategies Commission did generate and support some important community projects--in particular, the Senate-mandated Association S036--they were quickly identified by younger Germans as ineffective.

The reaction to failed attempts at influencing the Berlin Construction and Housing Senator's renewal plans was direct confrontation. Squatting was the desperate reaction to a closed decisionmaking process. This dissertation identified three unique phases in squatting activism exhibiting different relationships with the community of Kreuzberg. In a first phase, the Citizen Initiative S036 group of Kreuzberg residents worked with the Strategies Commission, started a newspaper to publicize destructive renewal plans and contacted elected officials and tried to negotiate directly with the appropriate renewal manager. But when the Berlin Construction Senator did not respond they squatted one of 42 buildings scheduled for demolition within the

Strategies for Kreuzberg renewal district. More than a squatting effort, this was a publicity measure for broadening opposition to the renewal plan. It was well coordinated with a media strategy which was designed to rally support from "average" Germans. When the renewal manager granted leases and the buildings were spared clearance, the squatters ended the occupation. The goals of the tactic were to publicize the city's most egregious renewal policies. But, like the Lower East Side's Joint Planning Council with its alternative plan for community housing, the BI S036 hoped to rescue desperately needed affordable housing for Kreuzberg residents. At this phase in an era of squatting, in other words, the action of squatting was essentially a maneuver by a community-based organization to affect community housing.

In the second phase of squatting, a subcommittee of BI S036 expanded the notion of squatting goals and moved away from community-based demands. Participants in this phase intended to keep the apartments they would save through squatting. Although they sought out low-income families to occupy the houses, when none were found, they used single students as an activist core. The circle of participants began to expand beyond Kreuzberg residents, therefore, and squatting as an ends in itself was added to group goals. As reported in Chapter 11, in stepping away from community-based goals, one effect of this development was the exclusion of immigrant workers' dwelling needs from

group demands. It also represented a split from the goals of Berlin's city-wide tenant associations. They, in contrast, occupied one building in order to rescue it for the Turkish building residents threatened with displacement. Apart from this act, the city-wide tenant organizations were not engaged in community-based organizing.

The third phase of squatting beginning with the massive riot on December 12, 1980, was characterized by almost complete separation from community-based concerns. Squatters moved where they could find vacant apartments so that some Kreuzberg residents became squatters in other districts and those occupying Kreuzberg buildings were often without earlier ties to Kreuzberg. In short, the actions were part of a broad-based squatters' movement confronting both German state structures and the social values they represented. Their goals, in short, grew to include creating building forms through renovation that could accommodate new, communal lifestyles. This aim represented a distancing from community-based needs and from special concerns about preserving lower-income housing to the new priorities of a far broader national, even international "new social movement."

An arsenal of political strategies accompanying the movement included the establishment of a new leftist daily newspaper, the regular use of protests--and riots in response to police evictions and violence--the organization

of a squatters' senate and building ties to prominent academics, artists, church and party members and others who lent credibility to movement goals. At a peak, 74 buildings were squatted in Kreuzberg, 53% of the city total. Protests by thousands were held weekly with at least 357 held in the peak squatting year from mid-1981 to mid-1982. Partly in reaction to civil unrest, Berlin voters had turned out the governing SPD Senat. After the conservative Christian Democratic Union came to power the "Berlin Line" divided squatters and began negotiating with those actively renovating buildings. The new CDU Senator of the Interior, meanwhile, had complete autonomy in evicting squatters using violent means especially with squatters unwilling to negotiate for legal contracts. By spring, 1984, only eleven buildings were squatted and 66 had been given leases. The Senat extended assistance for rebuilding costs and technical assistance, and a radical squatting movement was transformed into a "self-help" tenants' initiative.

Networks of Power

Although Kreuzberg and the Lower East Side have responded very differently to community development plans, they shared a common movement away from advocacy toward self-help housing development that appeared similarly linked to state structures and market forces. As summarized by Katz and Mayer of both Berlin and New York City citizen-

initiated housing projects, the local state "institutionalizes selected community and tenant-based self-help efforts...to reshape citizen expectations away from the state" (1985, 42). Looking at the Kreuzberg and Lower East Side cases, however, the data presented in this dissertation indicate that on while the Lower East Side participation could be viewed as activist demands steadily incorporated by state structural mechanisms set into force by localized interest articulation, Kreuzberg demands were blocked until a point of direct and violent confrontation, after which the most moderate demands were incorporated in a sorting process. Localized self-help housing is, in short, very new to Germany's national political culture. Other elements in both site's unique development combined with national influences to shape the participation styles found in each during the 1975 to 1985 period.

A Network of Power on the Lower East Side

One important difference between the Lower East Side and Kreuzberg was the extent to which community residents targeted private developers and landlords. This is heavily tied to the limited intervention of the public-sector in housing development in the United States generally, to the unique housing market conditions of New York City and specifically, on the Lower East Side to the history of public housing built strategically to attract private-sector

developers. Adopt-A-Building noted in the late 1970s, that even in their service area with seemingly vast city-owned buildings, in fact, city-owned property amounted to less than twenty percent of total residential property. This circumstance is shaped partly by a history of restrictions on cities extending back to "Dillon's Rule" in 1872 prohibiting cities from owning land, and continued in limited local governmental intervention in land use forming a steady pattern since. As explained in Chapter Nine, reformers, machine politicians and development interests in New York City came to act as a triad in order to affect some limited reforms in housing construction where political constituencies would benefit from them. But otherwise, no consistent or fluid housing development policy would emerge.

On the Lower East Side, when public housing funds were directed into the community, it was to appease specific local groups--primarily the well organized union members counted on as a voting block by Democratic politicians from local clubhouses. Low-income public housing was constructed through the push by Robert Moses, primarily to house those who were displaced by his ambitious construction of middle-class housing built cooperatively with the Amalgamated Union. Federal, state and city public housing funding dropped off sharply after the 1960s, and was replaced by diverse and scattered subsidy and rehab programs from all levels of government, in what has been called programmatic

federalism. Not overarching housing policy was found on any level, and certainly no intergovernmental cooperation could be claimed. City-owned *in rem* buildings became the natural focus of community activists, even though the proportion of publicly-owned housing to private was relatively slight, since the predominance of private-sector property rights had conditioned an expectation that trying to increase public intervention in the low-income housing sector was unlikely to bring a response. Tenants rightly came to view their landlords as "decisionmakers," and their style of participation was shaped accordingly, pelting building owners with rent strikes, and later court actions.

Particularly Democratic politicians, organized on the community level through the history of American party formation, were anxious to hold their constituency and reached out where tenant protests threatened unrest. As documented in earlier chapters, governmental structures were routinely reorganized to respond to local interests, so that Housing Court and 7-A incorporated tenant interests, self-help housing programs channeled federal CDBG and CETA monies into community housing rehab programs.

That Lower East Siders were organized to the extent that they were was shaped by the history of activism. In contrast with Kreuzberg, there was a strong continuity between the participatory modes used over time. As an immigrant community since the mid-1800s, community organiza-

tions have often begun as cultural support groups to help new arrivals get established, but quickly took on an advocacy role as the crowded factory district gave rise to a workers' movement. Many immigrants were pulled into workers' organizations on the Lower East Side, and others moved to the district for its activism. These roots were consistently mentioned by interviewees as one reason contemporary activists moved into the Lower East Side. The history of Lower East Side activism was found to be one factor reinforcing more current levels of activism.

But unlike the pre-1960s decades, the later use of government grants to fund housing programs affected the radicalism of community-based organizations. Especially as funding began to disappear during the 1980s, groups have scrambled for limited foundation, federal, state and local grants and have found that they are competitors in the business of housing development.

A Network of Power in Kreuzberg

In Kreuzberg, differently lines in a network of influences affected groups very differently. Participation by immigrant workers, arriving only after 1961, was restricted by language barriers, the lack of citizen rights and visa restrictions against participation. Residents may not form political parties, vote in elections, or be found to threaten "the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany." Article 6 of the 1965 Foreigner Law permits

suspending political activities by foreigners "when such activity disturbs the public order and safety or interferes with the political will of the Federal Republic of Germany." Although the provision is now infrequently used, it was often employed in the 1950s and 1960s, and Turkish residents identified this in interviews as a reason for limited participation by immigrants. While those with German citizenship may participate freely, under 2% of Berlin ethnic-Turks, the largest immigrant group in Kreuzberg, have citizenship.

Of Kreuzberg's long-time, German working-class residents, they responded to community redevelopment plans with reticence, most moving from their homes when offered flats in other communities. This response was explained here as a Kreuzberg variation to what Baker and colleagues have called "old politics" (1981). They identified a distinctive set of values found in Germany's pre-World War II generations based in "materialist" concerns with social order, economic and military security. The accumulated depoliticizing experiences reinforcing this behavior were found here to be multifaceted. The influence of the Prussian state on Berlin's city charter, prohibitions against local associations strikes, union and socialist organizing repressed community-level activism. Similarly, the organization of labor interests became centralized and bureaucratic. This conditioned a pattern of reticence, particularly with working-class communities like Kreuzberg. Kreuzberg provided the additional

element of local building designs that encouraged mixed-class residences and small workshops rather than larger factories--workers and lower-income tenants were dispersed with less chance for a common consciousness to develop.

These influences affected both the contemporary German workers and the leftist German youth, but took on different meanings for each group. While the older Kreuzberg workers were more reluctant to express disapproval about Senat development policies and were relocated with some ease, younger Germans erupted in protest over exactly those patterns of paternalistic and closed decisionmaking processes. The "new social movements" of the post-World War II generations are a reaction to the structure of decision-making more than the decisions themselves. The design of Kreuzberg's renewal district tenements was ideal for creating communities of alternative lifestyles so that renewal sites were natural sites of contention between state administrators and the "new politics" of younger Germans.

In closing, the influences on contemporary participation styles are very different for each site studied. Some factors extend from points in communities' histories or from past housing development decisionmaking. Furthermore, different lines of influence have affected contemporary participants unevenly. Taken together, the local political culture, or point of joining for a network of factors has been found to shape community participatory styles. Some

lines have presented themselves as stronger than others. But no single factor in either site was found, when taken alone to explain the differences between the two locations. An especially useful aspect of the community as a site of network reconstruction is for understanding the interplay of state structures and market forces with local histories of activism. Looking at the example of housing development policies presented here, it also is clear that different policy areas will alter both the state structures, intervening market forces and local participatory strategies. A next important area for research might be a comparison of networks by policy area within a single community.

Reconstructing community networks makes possible a community awareness of strategies conditioned by influences that have lost meaning in the present. The Kreuzberg squatters are a good example of participants becoming aware of a network of power and struggling against its most egregious elements. Most immigrant residents, meanwhile, are still responding to visa restrictions that may have lost some influence with more recent reforms. Similarly, the Lower East Side turf battles reinforce the destructive nature of programmatic federalism and private sector dominance of community development. A consolidated battle to put community housing on the public agenda would go farther to address affordable housing needs. For both communities, creating multi-cultural coalitions that are linked with other coali-

tions on a city-level would build a stronger counter-force to for-profit housing interests.

APPENDIX

Much of the analysis presented in this dissertation is the result of 71 interviews, conducted on the Lower East Side, New York City and in Kreuzberg, Berlin from 1988 to 1992.¹ Three preliminary interviews were conducted with Berlin activists to explore the appropriateness of the Kreuzberg site. These were conducted in New York City and were not counted in the totals below. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and specific interview dates are also not listed to further guard the interviewees. These precautions are particularly necessary for the Kreuzberg participants where academic and journalistic data has been used to prosecute activists who have used illegal tactics.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the participants were identified by community residents as active in local housing issues, were mentioned in media accounts or documents on local activism or were identified by other interviewees.

The author acted as a participant-observer, living on the Lower East Side from 1981 to 1985, and as a resident attended local Community Board meetings, was a member of a tenant organization, and as such was counseled in methods of

¹Two of the American interviews were held in Chicago and Baltimore, where two important Lower East Side participants were located.

tenant organizing, organized a rent strike, pursued two legal actions in housing court, attended community meetings and one demonstration. Living in Berlin for part of 1988 and from 1989 to 1992, the author attended demonstrations, forum discussions on city-wide and Kreuzberg development, was the member of a tenant organization and worked with one Kreuzberg community group. The list below indicates that interviews were conducted with a range of community residents, housing officials and with knowledgeable observers including journalists, academics, and real estate developers.

Berlin

- 1) Squatters: 13 interviews with 7 interviewees
- 2) Community historian: 1 interview with 1
- 3) Immigrant activists: 3 interviews with 3
- 4) Community organization activists: 2 interviews
with 2
- 5) Community building owners/Mietervertreter/
renewal district resident:
3 interviews with 3
- 6) Journalist: 1 interview with 1
- 7) District officials/housing officials:
5 interviews with 4
- TOTAL: 28 interviews with 21 interviewees

Lower East Side

1) Community organization activists:

27 interviews with 21 interviewees

2) City-wide organization activist:

3 interviews with 2

3) Squatters: 2 interviews with 2

4) Community economic development activist:

1 interview with 1

5) Real estate developer:

1 interview with 1

6) City planning officials/Housing officials:

4 interviews with 4

7) Journalists, unionists, academics:

6 interviews with 6

8) Elected representative

1 interview with 1

TOTAL: 43 interviews with 38 interviewees

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