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**Protest and the politics of open admissions: The impact of the
Black and Puerto Rican students' community (of City College)**

Dyer, Conrad M., Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1990

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**Protest and the Politics of Open Admissions:
The Impact
of the Black and Puerto Rican Students'
Community (of City College)**

by

CONRAD M. DYER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1990

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy .

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Abstract

Protest and the Politics of Open Admissions:
The Impact
of the Black and Puerto Rican Students'
Community (of City College)

by

Conrad M. Dyer

Adviser: Professor Frances Fox-Piven

In spring 1969, the City College of New York was paralyzed by a series of protests organized and led by Black and Puerto Rican students demanding the admission to the college of larger numbers of Black and Puerto Rican students.

Early that summer, the Board of Higher Education adapted an open admission policy which overnight effected a profound transformation of the University.

What motivated this abrupt change? The University has maintained consistently, that in adapting an open admissions policy it was simply moving up the deadline for implementing plans which had already been articulated in a series of plans. Thus, although it acknowledged that the student protests helped to set the stage for its action, in the University's view the policy was not a response to the protests. With little exception this view has been echoed by the relatively few observers who have looked at the decision. More particularly, these observers have credited the policy almost in its entirety to the political genius of then - Chancellor of the University Albert Bowker.

It is the contention of this study that this assessment has been decidedly one-sided. It is a view moreover, which sees power (i.e. the ability to effect change) as

lying exclusively in the hands of social elites; the poor and powerless (students, Blacks, etc.) are viewed as more or less malleable background material. In contrast, there is much in the literature on social movements to suggest that reforms (such as open admissions) are much less dependent upon the goodwill of elites, than upon the power exerted by the protesters themselves.

This study undertakes to develop this viewpoint in relationship to the impact of the protests at City College upon the decision to implement an open admissions policy at the City University, by testing the hypotheses regarding timing and scope of open admissions, and the political conditions which made the protests effective.

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Dedicated to my children
Azikiwe Alberto and Aziza Heather,
and to the memory of
Dr. Mattie Cook

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CHAPTER I

PROTEST AND REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Introduction

On April 22nd 1969, on the campus of the City College of the City University of New York, one of the largest and longest student occupations of an American University campus began. James Small, a member of the leadership committee recalls that:

No one was told of the date of the takeover until the night before. We were all called to a big meeting in the Bronx at the home of a Black professor. People were told to come to spend the night as a security measure. (Then) we came down in three groups. We came at 5 a.m. ... caught the guards with their pants down. It was raining bloody murder. We took seventeen buildings -- the largest takeover in the history of American campus takeovers...!

Soon the daily occupying force would grow to a number variously estimated to average two to three hundred persons, primarily of Blacks and Puerto Ricans. The leadership group was called the Black and Puerto Rican Student's Community and comprised ten individuals of varying ideological persuasions and prior organizational involvement in movements such as the Nation of Islam, the Black Panther Party, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and the Puerto Rican Nationalist Movement.

The insurgents had come to dramatize their unity and commitment to a document which by then had come to be referred to simply as "the five demands". But it was mainly around the fourth demand for dramatic increases in Black and Puerto Rican admission, that

opposition and hence controversy crystallized. The occupation ended two weeks later on May 5th, 1969, but for the next several weeks the City College campus became a virtual war zone as wrangles over the '5 demands' continued. Two months after the occupation ended, the Board of Higher Education of the City University of New York (hereafter: BHE) announced a decision taken at its July 9 meeting, renouncing virtually all prior existing barriers to entrance to the City University. On the face of it the BHE by its decision eclipsed what had heretofore been regarded as the far too radical demand by the students for a more inclusive admissions policy.

What was the nature and significance of this precipitous decision? The text of the BHE decision offered six explicit criteria or guidelines for the development of a new admissions policy to the university:²

1. It shall guarantee admission to some university program to all high school graduates of the city.
2. It shall provide for remedial and other supportive services for all students requiring them.
3. It shall maintain and enhance the standards of academic excellence of the colleges of the university.
4. It shall result in the ethnic integration of the colleges.
5. It shall provide for mobility for students between various programs and units of the university.
6. It shall assure that all students who have been admitted to specific community or senior colleges under the admissions criteria which we have used in the past shall be admitted.

The guidelines were of course, just guidelines, but of utmost significance nevertheless. For, at a stroke, the BHE brought to conclusion a tradition of exclusion and elitism that had at once brought great distinction to the university, and widened the gulf

which separated substantial and increasing numbers of Black and Puerto Rican communities from the economic benefits of free public higher education.

One gains a sense of the scope and significance of this shift in policy in the sheer numbers involved. For instance, when the open admissions policy took effect in September 1970, the freshman class entering CUNY was increased by 75% from the previous year to over 35,000. In 1964, by one earlier estimate, less than two percent of the black undergraduates in CUNY were matriculated in a degree program at the senior college level.⁴ Yet, by the fall of 1971 the percentage of Black and Puerto Rican student enrollment within the senior college stood at over twenty four percent of a total senior college population in excess of 91,000.⁵ And by 1980 fully thirty percent of CUNY's undergraduates and graduate students were Black. Taken together, minorities in 1980 comprised fifty percent of the senior college population, and seventy percent of the community college population.⁶ More recently it was reported that some 13,800 students have graduated through the SEEK and College Discovery programs over the twenty years of their existence.⁷ These programs were first introduced in 1964-1966 and subsequently became the major institutional channels through which some 97,000 Black and Puerto Rican students entered the university. And while the number of graduates may seem small compared to the total number of entering students, it is a quantum leap by comparison to the 330 Blacks that graduated from the City College between 1924-54, or the approximately 600 graduated between 1954 to 1969, the year of the BHE decision.⁸ Such then, in brief, was the scope and impact of this dramatic shift in admissions policy.

Yet numbers alone are insufficient to convey the full sense of what this change meant. The Free Academy, which would later emerge as the College of the City of New York, was first proposed in 1847, by Townsend Harris, and reflected the interests of a group of merchants led by him. The Free Academy was to provide business-related education to the children of the working class. This was no simple act of altruism however, for, as noted by Sherry Gorelick, Harris' proposal was designed to preempt and foil popular working class demands:

In 1829, the Working Men's Party of New York had advocated the ten-hour day, the periodic re-distribution of property, and the education of all young citizens under eighteen. The good merchants found educational reform more acceptable than restrictions on property...⁹.

Although fired initially by proletarian and egalitarian impulses, the Academy swiftly embraced a strong classics-oriented curriculum to the detriment of more commercially-oriented programs. The rigorous five-year program of classical studies -- including stringent requirements in such areas as Greek and Latin -- meant that only a very few of those for whom the Academy was intended, would actually benefit. Hence, quite early in its history a tradition of elitism was established.

Nevertheless, change was inevitable. The first major reform of public higher education in New York came about as a result of the so-called Progressive reform movement.¹⁰ Some important results were: the creation of a centralized system of public elementary and secondary education; and extensive reform of the City College curriculum to include such fields as engineering, teaching, and

business. Another result was that the City College would be fed primarily from the pool of graduates of New York City's high schools.

But even as the balance scale of history drifted once more toward a leveling of access opportunity, other profound influences were being exerted. A major one was the massive influx of immigrants into the city, which by 1900 counted foreigners and their off-springs as some 76% of its population. By the early 1900's the largely middle class clientele of the City College was being supplemented by an expanding pool of poor and working class students,— a disproportionate number of whom were of Russian-Jewish ancestry. This expansion meant that the competition, and hence the requirements for entry in the programs of the College would become more stringent. This was reinforced by the fact that the College leadership from early on seemed to view its working class origins as a stigma to be overcome. The way to compensate it seemed was to try to outdo the Ivy League schools. Hence the obsession with the classics; hence the need to establish stratospheric levels of achievement. This need to compensate probably intensified as City College changed from being mainly protestant middle class to being predominantly Jewish. For, as Gorelick observed, this change earned the epithet: "the Jewish University of America".¹¹ Propelled by this heritage (and the need to compensate for it) and the influx in particular of many gifted Jewish students barred from entering the Ivy Leagues, the City College went on to establish a singular reputation as an educational institution of the first order. The College numbered among its alumni luminaries such as Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Nobel Laureate Robert Hofstadler, and numerous other individuals who

excelled in public service, science, and the humanities. Moreover, the College soon led the nation in terms of graduates who went on to complete a doctorate degree. Alumni "had pride in the academic achievements of the institution and an almost fanatical attachment that promised every graduate of a city high school with an average of 82, entrance to a college where he could receive a quality education without the payment of tuition fees."¹²

It should come as no surprise then, given this tradition, that when the specter of radical reform reared its head at City College on the morning of April 22nd, 1969, that it provoked shocked and angry responses from many quarters, including alumni and faculty. These visceral reactions began to find expression when the negotiations at City College produced a proposal which many perceived as a "dual admission" system for Blacks and Puerto Ricans and synonymous with the destruction of the university. Hence Jonas Salk (class of '34), immortalized in science for his discovery of the polio vaccine, had this to say:

Let us create community colleges for all who desire to grow... Let City College continue to deserve its place among the great institutions of the nation...¹³.

Dr. Robert Hofstadler (class of '35), winner of the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1961, thought that "dual admission" would create two schools, which would somehow foment conflict and thus destroy the university, as would the accompanying desertion of the best faculty from the College.¹⁴ And Charles Orenstein (class of '24), who was then incoming president of the 25,000 strong CUNY Alumni Association, declared:

We are violently opposed to breaking down the standards of the school... open admissions would destroy the school rather than build it up.¹⁵

Similar views were expressed by David Kosh (class of '28) who, as president of the City College Fund had raised \$500,000 for the College during 1968. Not surprisingly, in the wake of the BHE's July '69 decision, alumni funding support of City College plunged precipitously, even as mass resignations from the City College Alumni's Association reached new heights.¹⁶

Nor were these Alumni views isolated. Arguably, they represented the preponderant opinion not only of the Alumni Association but also that of other influential groups in the City. (Faculty views will be discussed as part of Chapter II.) The New York Times editorial of May 26, 1969 titled "Bad Bargain at City College" synthesized the feelings expressed above. This "idealistic" plan, it said, betrayed "unrealistic faith, (a belief) in educational magic." Moreover, said the Times editorial, "apart from the ethics of such reverse discrimination, it would almost certainly turn City College into a de facto segregated, predominantly Negro and Puerto Rican institution."

It was not the case that those in opposition were prepared to denounce all proposed changes to the admission requirements. Most seemed to agree that some change was necessary, even perhaps inevitable. The question was, how much change? and how fast? The New York Times editorial referred to above, questioned, why a new "dual admissions" plan was being entertained when "successful" special admission programs [SEEK] already existed which integrated the minorities without jeopardizing the standards of the College. Even

among many who strongly supported change, a sense of caution seemed to pervade with respect to the scope and rate of change. Hence, the central message from some critical communities tended to support some version of gradual, orderly change. Nevertheless, in face of this apparently reasonable alternative, the Board of Higher Education chose on July 9, 1969 to take the university into a far more radical experiment and in the process jeopardized (in the eyes of many) the reputation, the support base, and possibly the very existence of what had been evolving as a great university.

Purpose of the Study

In some respects, time has done little to heal the rifts created by the open admissions policy. Among many of the Blacks and Puerto Ricans who attended in unprecedented numbers, the experiment has been an unqualified success. But among many faculty, a deep sense of rancor persists based on the conviction that the quality of students has declined, and correspondingly that faculty are unable to teach at the level of their professional training. Hence, the question of the success or failure of the open admissions experiment will continue to be debated.

One area in which debate is either nominal or non-existent relates to the explanations concerning the factors which motivated the BHE's decision in the first place. As we have indicated above, although pressures for change were everywhere present, and expected, the dramatic scope and timing of the decision was quite unanticipated. From a concept which projected "100% enrollment" by 1975, the BHE had overnight advanced this date by five years. Moreover, rather than a gradual approach, the university suddenly

faced a freshman class more than double the size of the previous year's, and more unequal in college skills than before.

Although authorship of the decision is formally attributed to the BHE, it is not clear how much of the credit belongs to the Board itself, Chancellor Bowker, Mayor Lindsay, or other sources; nor is it clear exactly what was the nature of the process that led to the decision. In fact it is the contention of this study that the bases for this controversial decision have not been adequately explored and explained. Moreover, it is argued that explanations of this, as other major social reforms, are only adequate in so far as they take into account the relationship between protest and reform. The open admissions reform came hard on the heels of a major protest by students and one purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between protest and reform. More particularly, the aim of the study is to examine the impact of the protest by Black and Puerto Rican students at the City College upon the decision to implement such a policy of open admissions. For, in so far as authorship of open admissions remains in question, the politics of protest forms a viable approach in assessing the contribution of the actors involved. Three major points will be argued, namely that:

1. the protest at City College was responsible for accelerating the timing of open admissions.
2. the protest influenced the scope and strategy of open admissions.
3. the protest was effective because of its confluence with a unique political and social situation of New York City, and the nation as a whole.

Significance of the Study

The study is inherently concerned with the effectiveness of protest in precipitating social reform. It also aims to contribute to the literature on the politics of open admissions.

In the nearly twenty years since its inception, open admissions has been the subject of a rapidly expanding literature. The bulk of this attention has focused upon assessing the educational impact of the experiment. To date only a few studies have focused specifically upon the politics of open admissions. Thus far only one book (Ballard: 1973), one dissertation (Gordon: 1975), and one major article (Karabel: 1983), has the politics of open admissions as their explicit concern. Add to this list an early Marxist analysis (Newt Davidson Collective: 1974) in magazine format. Beyond this the politics of the decision received important attention as introductory chapters in two important (educational assessment) studies of open admissions (Rosen et al: 1973; Lavin et al: 1981). The decision was also discussed in two important books on the politics of New York City (Morris: 1980; Shefter: 1985).

It is clear from the above that the literature on the politics of the open admissions decision is quite sparse. This condition may carry the suggestion that the subject is in need of no further discussion. Nothing could be further from the truth, for this scant literature recirculates certain ideas which have remained unchallenged and have essentially achieved the status of fact, to wit:

- the notion that open admissions was, more or less, the exclusive creature of then-chancellor Albert Bowker;

- that the protest by Black and Puerto Rican students at City College while it provided background, was not a critical factor in the decision to escalate the timetable or expand the scope of open admissions;
- that open admissions was inevitable and that the protests were more or less superfluous.

In challenging these and other notions, the study will contribute to a renewed discussion of the basis for the open admissions decision. Such a discussion has significance beyond illuminating the specific case. On a theoretical level the story of open admissions has profound implications regarding our views of the efficacy of protest, and the specific circumstances under which protests are effective. One significance of the study is that it provides an opportunity to test hypotheses concerning these two issues. This contributes to the theoretical discussion of protest, and is especially important because many activists continue to view protest as a viable tool for social change. Finally, the study will throw important light on a movement of which little is known, but which contributed mightily to the transformation of the City University: the Black and Puerto Rican Students' Community.

Review of the Literature: towards a theoretical framework

The two fundamental questions raised by the study concern the effectiveness of protest in achieving desired social change, and the conditions under which such protests are likely to produce desired change. And since it is the contention of the study that the City College protests were instrumental in the achievement of open admissions, the task of the research is at least two-fold:

1. to generate and test hypotheses regarding the impact of the protest upon the decision;
2. to generate and test hypotheses regarding the conditions which favored open admissions as the most viable policy option.

A review of the relevant literature on protest movements is therefore a necessary step toward developing an adequate analytical framework for the case at hand.

In an article published in the winter of 1985, the political sociologist Charles Tilly observed that:

Researchers who seek to account for real life events such as particular social movements and concrete revolutions find that the available theoretical apparatus gives them little grip on those events.¹⁷

Tilly's observation seems at once startling and yet predictable. Startling, because it seems reasonable that the virtual explosion of theoretical perspectives and approaches since the sixties - in response to new movements - would have supplied an adequate body of literature upon which the researcher could confidently draw. On the other hand, this very explosion of theory suggests either that the differences between the new phenomena and the old were such that new and innovative ways of comprehending them had to be devised, or simply that traditional theories were so flawed as to be, in any case, inadequate. Given this state of affairs it is useful and necessary, before setting the framework of this study, to give an overview of the overall state of theory. Such an overview serves to locate the approach to be adopted in this study.

Up until the decade of the seventies, the dominant theoretical approaches to explaining social movements focused primarily on

accounts of the origins of such phenomena. With the exception of Marxism, these approaches shared in common at least three assumptions: (1) that participation in social protest movements was a form of deviant behavior; (2) that such behavior was essentially irrational, and hence non-intentional; (3) that such phenomena as protest movements were outside of the sphere of 'normal' politics and processes, instead of being an extension of normal politics. It is these very assumptions which by the beginning of the seventies had begun to be seriously challenged by the new approaches.

The individual scholars who laid the foundation for the theoretical disputes in the contemporary analysis of social movements are too numerous, and their models too complex, to be reproduced here. Nor would such an undertaking be appropriate for the purpose at hand. Moreover, that task has been adequately done in any number of publications.¹⁸ Hence, for purposes of this discussion, and at the risk of oversimplification, we shall group pre-1970's theories of collective action into two broad though related categories, namely: (1) theories of structural breakdown (2) theories of psychological stress. Within this categorization, there is broad agreement that collective behavior – such as protest movements – arise on the heels of major societal dislocations caused by economic collapse, or too rapid economic expansion. There is, nevertheless, within this framework, substantive disagreement among theorists as to the relationship between such changes, and the origins of collective action.

Easily, the most influential (in terms of its impact on subsequent scholarship) formulation of the thesis which connects

social movements to rapid economic change was that of Durkhiem. Although he offered no comprehensive theory of collective action, Durkhiem's work provided the framework for much of the research on collective behavior in the decades up to and including the sixties. According to Durkhiem, society is defined by the common system of beliefs shared by the individuals which comprise it. It is these shared beliefs which serve to regulate individual impulse. This web of shared beliefs begins to disintegrate as rapid industrialization intensifies the division of labor and hence quickens the differentiation of society into seemingly ever more discrete sectors of interest. In Durkhiem's conception, there emerges, necessarily, a gap between the rate of differentiation, and the society's ability to regulate itself by way of its shared beliefs. He used the term anomie to describe this gap. Collective action, which Durkhiem viewed as deviant behavior, is clearly related to the phenomenon of anomie.

In the 1950's and early 60's, with the political movements for decolonization in full swing, and the subsequent period of widespread political instability in the new nations, Durkhiem's original formulation found new adherents. In Samuel Huntington's formulation, for instance, the concept of anomie finds expression in the political sphere: the political instability so endemic among emerging nations, he thought, was directly related to rapid political participation in the new states without a corresponding growth in the society's ability to institutionalize this political energy. In his own words, the violence and instability that characterized the new nations "was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow

development of political institutions."¹⁹ Durkhiem's concept of anomie thus became for Huntington, "the political gap" which was at the root of the collective action phenomena.

Some of the theorists who drew upon Durkhiem's basic notion of the breakdown of societal defenses evolved much more conservative formulations of this thesis than the one noted above. The dominant articulation of this view was embodied in the sixties in Neil Smelser's work, the Theory of Collective Behavior (1962). Smelser was oriented toward explaining the ferment of social movements which had begun to engulf the United States by the late fifties and early sixties. Such movements, he thought were evidence, not of inexorable forces that threatened to transform society, but rather a signal that the society was experiencing some form of "systemic strain" indicating the need for social measures to restore the system to balance. Drawing upon the Parsonian framework which specified the categories of 'values', 'norms', 'social organization', and 'situational facilities' as the four "action components" which guide social behavior, Smelser elaborated a system to describe the generation and the course of social movements. He conceived of "strain" as a faulty relationship between the action components. Collective behavior then was an "uninstitutionalized mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstruction of a component of action."²⁰ Thus the words of Michael Unseem,

... people affected by strain will suddenly endow an element in the environment with extraordinary power to threaten or to solve a frustrating situation [reconstitution at the situational level]; identify a person or group as responsible for an unwanted condition [social organization reconstitution]; create

new norms to control disapproved behavior [normative reconstitution]; or adopt fresh values that redefine the social order [value reconstitution].²¹

One of Smelser's key concepts is the notion of the 'generalized belief'. It is the 'generalized belief' that channels and motivates protest in an effort to reconstitute society in the action component or sphere in which it was affected. Since these generalized beliefs are themselves irrational -- even "magical" -- for Smelser the resulting social phenomenon (protest etc.) can only be viewed as irrational, deviant, and even dangerous. Although Smelser was able to use his model to explain a variety of social situations, he has also been severely criticized. Important aspects of the critique are expressed in the following observations:

Although the concept of generalized belief points to an important dimension of social movements -- their capacity to challenge the global orientation of their society -- his model was strongly ideological in nature: ultimately it is dysfunctions in the institutional processes that create collective behavior, and they are produced by forces external to the system. Collective action in its highest form, social movements, isn't seen as a creative force which produces its own solidarity, identity and ideology, but is produced by the social system. Conflict doesn't arise from within the system, but is merely a secondary effect of processes of adaptation which restore the system's equilibrium.²²

In contrast with Smelser and the functionalist school, classical Marxism has always contended that conflict is inherent in the social composition of society. The main actors in society are social classes. Collective action is presumed to be motivated by shared interests, a collective awareness of those interests, and an organizational structure which unified and promoted those interests.

Conflict arises in the system when changes in the relations of production begin to impact upon class interests as constituted. For instance, the introduction of particular technological innovations into the process of production may induce such conflicts. Moreover, in the Marxist view, conflict, and its expression as collective behavior is perceived as a logical and rational product of society. Marx's limitation, according to Shtobb, was his assumption that the "mass working class party," which he argued was the synthesis of the movement's activities, could by itself, provide the leadership required by the movement.²³ Because Marx equated "class struggle with political struggle", she feels that such a position considerably narrows the range of phenomena that can be construed as political struggle.

The theories thus far examined take the macro-level of society as their unit of analysis, and from the broad generalizations draw conclusions that are presumed to explain the motivations of the individual actors who participate in collective behavior.

In the early sixties a variety of theories emerged to confront this gap, which had as a central theme, the notion of relative deprivation. We shall examine this theory in some detail, because in its conscious formulations it found wide application in the attempt to interpret and explain the many manifestations of the Black movement. In its essence, relative deprivation theory argues that individuals experience stress or become frustrated when their expectations are not met. This essentially psychological state becomes transformed into aggressive behavior resulting in collective action. As noted above a variety of formulations of this thesis exist.

The theory of rising expectations became a popularly accepted explanation for the Black movements of the late 1950's and 1960's. Thus, then-president Robert Marshak in his 1970-72 Bienium Report could attribute to "the rising expectations" of SEEK students at City College the cause of the 1969 revolt, as well as the source of the subsequent university reform. Marshak's assessment was disarmingly simple, partly because it was couched in the terms of the truncated version of a rather more complex theory. In a single stroke he was able to explain not only the cause of the revolt, but its impact as well. But his choice of an explanatory model was also unfortunate, for he sought to apply a model which would shortly come under intense critical scrutiny.

The theory of rising expectations was of course not new, as evidenced by the J-curve theory of revolution propounded by J. Davies in 1962.²⁴ This theory was an attempt to reconcile two opposing views of the cause of revolution held by de Toqueville and Marx. The former held the source of revolutionary movements to be related to the rising expectations of the masses of people, triggered by rapid and apparent economic development. When expectations of economic prosperity fail to materialize, the resulting frustration was channeled into revolutionary activity. Marx on the contrary, viewed revolution as the inevitable result of the increasing immiserisation of the working classes. In proposing his synthesis, Davies observed that:

Revolutions are more likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continue ability to satisfy needs - which continue to rise - and, during the latter, a

mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality.²⁵

It is this "mental state of anxiety and frustration" that was seen here as the motivator of social movements. Variants of rising expectations theory (notably Gurr's classic relative deprivation model) were to become prominent in scholarly analysis of the Black movement, in particular, to explain the rise of the Black student movement, the Black Power movement and the urban riots. (Davies, 1969; Geswender, 1964; Mathews and Prothro, 1966). Moreover, "the same argument has been applied to the expansion of support for the women's movement in the late 1960's".²⁶ Since the Black protest movement is of special significance for this study, it is appropriate to look at the perspectives and contributions which these theories have brought to the analysis of that movement.

Matthews and Prothro (1966) applied the model to their analysis of the civil rights movement and in particular the rise of the Black student movement. They argued that the Black College youth who came of age in the 1960's had been nurtured in a climate of 'rising expectations' among the Black population.²⁷

Four special conditions facilitated this state of affairs:

1. the return of Black veterans from the second world war bringing with them "a new image of themselves, new hopes, new aspirations" and a conviction that they had earned the rights of first class citizenship;
2. decades of Black migration had created an urbanized population where "the informal restraints on aggressiveness towards whites were largely gone;"
3. the war itself and the postwar boom had benefitted Blacks economically;

4. "...the Brown decision, hailed as the second Emancipation Proclamation, raised Negro expectations to new heights." Finally, there was the growing mood of impatience and militancy in the Black communities around the feeling that the pace of reform was much too slow.

Given this climate of rising expectations, the authors asserted: "the time was ripe for rebellion... against white discrimination... segregation... legalism... gradual reform... against established Negro organizations and leaders."²⁸ The agency of this multi-targeted rebellion was the Black college population, who they argued, were triggered into action by the feeling of discontent fired initially by a sense of rising expectations.

In support of this theoretical position the authors drew upon data which showed that : disproportionate numbers of Black student protesters were of middle class origin; came from urban areas of some Black concentration; or came from areas where the 'Negro Problem' was less acute.²⁹ For instance, over 50% of participants came from families with annual income over \$6000, as compared to 6% from families with annual income under \$2000. Likewise, 33% of urban, versus 15% of rurally bred students were active. Scales developed by the authors indicated that Black students reported feeling more discontented with race relations than did Black adults. Further, "the students with the greatest sense of discontent tended to be more active in the protest than were the relatively contented."³⁰ Ironically these young activists were also reported to be very "optimistic about race relations and more tolerant of whites". Not only were they economically better off than other Blacks but significantly they "felt better off". According to the authors this

rampant optimism was soon transformed into "a sense of relative deprivation when they compared their chances with those of middle class whites..."³¹. The origins of the Black student movement is thus to be seen, they argue, as the result of the complex of "conflicting feelings" produced in these youth by the double message of hope, and societal intransigence.

This thesis did not go unchallenged, however. In his work on the origins of the Black Student Movement, for instance, Anthony Orum took issue with those observers who, like Mathews and Prothro, saw the rise of the Civil Rights movement as the direct result of "barriers to their economic and status-related achievement". For instance, contrary to findings by Mathews and Prothro, Orum reported that his data provided almost no support at all for the contention "that Negroes from middle class, or, in general, more privileged backgrounds are the more apt to be participants in the movement".³² What he found was that lower class students were almost as likely to be movement participants, as were students from the middle class.³³ In sum, Orum found that "... rising expectations, received no support in our data", nor did the interpretation "that the civil rights movement arose largely as a means of expressing the discontent of middle class Negroes, who felt relatively deprived...."³⁴

In the analysis of the urban riots the relative deprivation thesis also came under serious critical fire. For instance, Unseem (1975) in his review of movement literature found that the primary methodological shortcoming of the relative deprivation thesis was the tendency to arbitrarily link objective deprivation (income levels, housing, unemployment, etc.) to subjective deprivation and thence to

violent behavior.³⁵ For instance, citing Spilerman's 1970 study, Useem observed that:

Once region and size of the Black population were controlled, racial revolts were poorly predicted by such factors as... non-white unemployment rates, the ratio of white to non-white median income, and the percentage of dilapidated housing.³⁶

In short, there existed only a weak correlation between unrest and objective conditions in Black cities in the 1960's. He concluded, with McPhail (1971), that "the clear absence of subjective deprivation effects in many studies suggests that while deprivation may play a role in protest, it is not a necessary precondition".³⁷

In the same vein of criticism, A. Miller et al (1977) attempted to bridge the methodological gap between objective data and subjective discontent by collecting "perceptual data". They found that:

In the period preceding and during the riots, the Black community did not experience a sustained improvement in its economic situation followed by a sharp reversal. Instead of the J-curve scenario, the Black community specifically displayed dramatic ambiguity and instability in describing the trend of their finances, their financial satisfaction, and their expectations of future financial improvement.³⁸

These findings, the authors asserted, spelled rejection of the J-curve theory of relative deprivation. They argued instead that "these extreme fluctuations and ambiguities" of Black perceptions might have led to the urban riots of the 1960's.³⁹

Finally, although on the surface relative deprivation theory seem to have represented a departure from earlier theories of social movements such as "mass society" and "collective behavior" theory, at a more basic level they seemed also to share certain assumptions in common. Jenkins summarized the situation as follows:

... mass society theory, relative deprivation, collective behavior theory... shared the assumption that movement participation was relatively rare, discontents were transitory, movement and institutionalized actions were sharply distinct, and movement actors were arational if not outright irrational.⁴⁰

By the early seventies, new perspectives emerged which in effect began to overturn the assumptions described by Jenkins above. Where the old theories stressed the irrationality of movement actions, the new approaches emphasized their rationality and goal directedness. Where large scale movements had been viewed as aberrant phenomena, acting outside of the acceptable limits of society, they were now viewed instead as legitimate contenders for social power. Moreover, the new views played down the question of the origins of social movements, shifting the focus instead to exploring the factors that led to movement success (or failure). In thus shifting the terms of the debate, the focus is now on such questions as the resources, leadership, organization building, and the dynamics of the political process. The notion of "resource mobilization" has come to identify the viewpoints of a number of researchers who are broadly sympathetic to the sketch outlined above. The names associated with this tradition include Oberschall (1973); the Tillys (1975, 1986); Gamson (1975); McCarthy and Zald (1976); Doug McAdam (1982); Alden Morris (1984).

Two broad tendencies characterize the resource mobilization school of thought, one stressing political conflict, the other being what Craig Jenkins calls the "entrepreneurial model of movement formation". The work of Tilly, Tilly and Tilly (1975) typifies the political conflict approach. The Tillys' stress a model of society

in which there are polity members who influence decisions, and challengers who are on the outside and wish to change power relations. Instead of seeing the structural strain caused by social change as the occasion for psychological destabilization, the Tillys' view social change as significant because it may improve the resources of the challengers or decrease those of the members. Consequently, the challengers may be emboldened to demand changes due to an enlarged resource base. Thus social movements are, in the Tillys' view, the result of power struggles between polity members and challengers as the conditions of power (the resource base) are altered by the social changes which other analysts associate with structural strain. "The evidence," observe the Tillys', "accumulating from them (i.e. studies of collective violence) minimizes the importance of breakdown and maximizes the importance of struggles for power".⁴¹ Even so, however, because organization and integration are key resources in the model, and as organization and integration take time, social change is likely in the short run to be inversely correlated with protest.

The entrepreneurial model is exemplified by the work of McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977). Movements arise and become effective more or less in proportion to the availability of resources and the leadership necessary to mobilize those resources. In this formulation, therefore, the protest movement is leadership-driven, hence the notion of entrepreneurship. One of the primary contributions of this approach to the analysis of protest movements is the focus on the role of external elites, and the cooptation of institutional resources by movement leadership. Thus, Jenkins, summarizing the thrust of McCarthy and Zald note that they:

... have argued that the movements of the 1960's and 1970's mobilized 'conscience constituencies' of the wealthy and the affluent middle class (including college students) and coopted institutional resources from private foundations, social welfare institutions, the mass media, universities, governmental agencies, and even business corporations.⁴²

One of the more powerful results of McCarthy and Zald's work, and indeed of much of the resource mobilization approach, is that it prompted a reconceptualization of social movement phenomena. Whereas traditionally emphasis was put on such factors as indigenous leadership, volunteerism and mass membership, under the new scholarship, professionalization of the leadership and availability of powerful external allies seemed to revise traditional ways of analyzing protest. As we shall see other resource mobilization theorists, notably Morris, would challenge some of the assertions of this new scholarship.

The approaches subsumed under resource mobilization brought new insights to various aspects of the study of social protest. For instance, the Tillys (1975) observed that even violent protest did not represent a sharp and irrational departure from non-violent protest activity. "We have not found", they wrote, "a sharp division between violent and non-violent action". Indeed, "a substantial part of the violence we observed consists of the forcible reaction [original emphasis] of a second group -- often of specialized repressive forces in the employ of government -- to the non-violent collective behavior of the first".⁴³ Moreover, the new emphasis given to the shifting availability of resources further undermined the traditional concept that protest movements were the result of discontent induced by societal breakdown.

Nevertheless, resource mobilization was not destined to be a theoretical panacea. Alden Morris (1984, 1981) for instance, agrees with the central theoretical implication of resource mobilization that "social actors who have access to resources and who are well integrated within the institutions of a community are more likely to engage in protest than individuals who are marginal and uprooted".⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the availability of resources, Morris feels, does not guarantee that protest will arise, anymore than does the presence of grievances among the poor and disenfranchised. Morris also scores the emphasis given by resource mobilization theorists to the role of external elites, for instance the notion that protest by the poor means primarily the activation of "third parties (external elites) to participate in controversy in ways favorable to protest goals".⁴⁵ Since this theoretical viewpoint implied that the poor are [by definition] without organizational resources, it can be concluded conveniently, that "relatively powerless groups cannot use protest with a high probability of success".⁴⁶ Such a conclusion Morris feels is contradicted by his study of the origins of the Civil Rights Movement which showed that the overwhelming majority of local movements (which together comprised the southern civil rights movement) were indigenously organized and financed.⁴⁷ Morris' conclusions with respect to the role of indigenous leadership in Southern Civil Rights Movement are also mirrored in the work of Doug McAdam (1982).

Thus far, this review has attempted to illustrate the richness, diversity and shortcomings each succeeding generation of theory brought to the study of collective behavior. Such a review we have

indicated above, is a necessary step towards advancing the framework which will form the basic assumptions of this study. This study we have stated, argues that the protest at City College had a decisive impact on the open admissions decision, and is concerned with analyzing the basis of this impact. How then has this review of literature contributed towards shaping a framework for such an analysis? Three observations emerge. The first comes from Sidney Tarrow's assessment of that literature. "It is remarkable", he writes, "how few studies of movement success can be identified,

Overwhelmingly, students have focussed on explaining the preconditions of protest, its genesis and etiology, those who participate in it, its organizational strategy and its incidence over time. In few areas of social protest are there solid research findings on which to draw in beginning to compare the conditions in which protest succeeds with those in which it fails.⁴⁸

Tarrow's observation is confirmed for instance, with respect to the analysis of Black protest. Secondly it is not the case that students of protest failed entirely to recognize that protest did have impact upon social and political outcomes. "Groups which did not develop capacity to strive," the Tillys' concluded, "to demonstrate, to turn away the tax collector, lost power -- or never gained it. The cumulative effect of tax rebellions, food riots, or unruly demonstrations helped discredit governments, topple regimes, and bring new coalitions to power".⁴⁹ In other words, the research shows that protest can make a difference in the outcome. The fact is, however, that such outcomes are truly rare phenomena, especially when considered in light of the frequency and ubiquity of protest in general. Hence, although the Tillys' fully acknowledged the power of protest, they failed to provide an answer to the issue raised by

Tarrow. The third observation concerns the definition of resources. Although the literature acknowledges the importance of protest in general, it relies on an implicit definition of power which leads to absurd theoretical conclusions. Thus, for example, in terms of resource mobilization theory, it becomes almost impossible to conceive of movement success in the context of the northern urban uprisings of the 1960's, as distinct from the southern civil rights movement. For, unlike the south, in the north there was no expansive network of organized indigenous leadership, no entrepreneurial leaders, and scant resources were available to galvanize the 'poor and huddled masses'. And since, in the parlance of resource mobilization, resources are the keys to movement formation, the proposition that success is possible in the virtual absence of necessary resources is of course absurd.

What occurred in the northern context seemed to be more nearly like spontaneous explosions, than the timely and well orchestrated movements of the south. Moreover, this was precisely the context in which the protest at the City College by Black and Puerto Rican students arose, and in which the massive open admissions policy innovation was promulgated. A prime task of the theoretical framework is therefore to explain how success was possible (even conceivable), for a group that appeared to be without resources -- and hence without power. The theoretical framework to be utilized builds upon contributions from the work of Alden Morris, Doug McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow. The essential theoretical view point is based upon the work of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward.

One of the major contributions to the analysis of protest by the so-called resource mobilization school lay in its refutation of the

often near-mystical formulations of some theorists. Alden Morris expressed succinctly this general critique of the classical school of collective behavior, which saw social movements as

...emotional rather than reasoned, non-rational rather than rational; and spread crude, elementary forms of communication such as circular reaction, rumor imitation, social connotation and generalized beliefs....^{49a}

In contrast, Morris believes that social movements grow primarily through "pre-established formal and information communication networks". Moreover, in line with other resource mobilization theorists, Morris asserts a continuity between collective behavior phenomena and prior social arrangements. With this theoretical outlook Morris brought some rather unique insights to the analysis of the southern civil rights movement from 1953 to 1963. Central to his analysis was the notion of a "movement center" which he defined as a local "interrelated set of protest leaders, organizations and followers who collectively define the common ends of the group."^{49b} Conceptually speaking, the movement centers functioned as complete communication networks, linking leaders and followers to the issues as they developed, and to other communities as required. An example of such a center was the Montgomery Improvement Association which led the year-long bus boycott in that city. In Birmingham, the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights functioned as such a center.

Secondary to movement centers are what Morris called "movement halfway houses", defined as "an established group of organizations that is only partially integrated into the larger society because its participants are actively involved in efforts to bring about a desired change in society."^{49c} Conceptually, movement halfway houses were

the linkage between the ideas which guided movement leadership, and the deeper historical tradition which preserved those ideas. Thus for example, the Highlander Folk School founded in Tennessee in 1932, became host to many of the leaders who eventually headed the southern protest movement such as E.D. Nixon.^{49d} The special appeal of the Highlander school was that it advocated a kind of folk radicalism based on the premise "that oppressed people know the answer to their own problems". Highlander teachers specialized in getting people to talk about their problems and to develop their own solutions to them.

Another very important halfway house, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, sponsored the founding of the Congress of Racial Equality; provided training in the philosophy, history and methods of non-violence to the central leadership core of the southern movement; and numbered among its important alumni Bayard Rustin, A. Philip Randolph, James Farmer and others.^{49e}

Morris' work is an important stepping stone toward defining the theoretical approach of this study for two reasons: 1. his work showing the communication linkage between collective behavior and the ideas which define and direct that behavior is an appropriate empirical model for looking at the Black and Puerto Rican students movement at City College. Very little is known about the rise of this group beyond the usual cliché-like assumptions which are thought to account for the rise of such organizations. It is not intended to suggest here that elaborate movement centers and halfway houses were central to the City College Movement. However, it is assumed, in line with Morris, that some sort of communication network was essential in defining its growth and activity.

Morris's work is important to the study too because it is related to a problem mentioned above, namely, the definition of resources. In line with the work of the Tillys and other resource mobilization theorists, Morris shows empirically that the oppressed can and do exercise power. Thus he is severely critical of Michael Lipsky who argued that "'relatively powerless groups cannot use protest with a high probability of success (since) they lack organizational resources by definition'".^{49f} According to Lipsky therefore the goal of successful protest is to motivate influential third parties to enter the contest on the side of the oppressed. Morris contends that this view is entirely contradicted by the evidence of his research, which shows that "the overwhelming majority of local movements were indigenously organized and financed."

As useful as Morris' work is on the conceptual and empirical levels, it falls short as a model from which to make theoretical generalizations concerning the conditions which favor the success of protest. In part this is due to his failure to resolve the definitional problem cited above. In the end it appears Morris is far more interested in understanding the rise of the movement than the basis for its success.

The work of Dough McAdam, another resource mobilization theorist, also provides a useful touchstone in an analytical framework. For the present purpose its usefulness resides in the fact that although conceptually he brings different tools to the analysis, many of his implicit themes parallel those of Morris, and thus underscores the theoretical shortcomings of resource mobilization. Thus where Morris looks at communication networks, McAdam explores

what he calls the political processes which fuel the rise and generation of protest. Like Morris he emphasizes the central role of indigenous forces in the development of protest, and thus acknowledges that the oppressed can exercise power. And finally, like Morris, there is no explicit theoretical effort to comprehend the basis and conditions which account for the successes of the civil rights movement.

One quite interesting approach to this issue comes from the work of Sidney Tarrow. He observed that historically cycles of protest "are characterized by heightened conflict of many kinds across the social system: not only in industrial relations, but in the streets. Not only there but on the farm or in the school."^{49g} Those cycles seem to be closely followed by social reforms. Tarrow attempts to explore the theoretical possibilities of this apparent relationship. While it has obvious descriptive value, the attempt to define "cycles of protest" as a unit of analysis presents more problems than it can resolve. In any case Tarrow's approach builds in part upon insights drawn from the work of Piven and Cloward, which we feel offers the best way out of the theoretical dilemma discussed above.

There are three aspects to the Piven/Cloward model which make it appealing as a theoretical framework:

1. Like much of the work just reviewed the model acknowledges the significance of protest to social change; however, unlike the resource mobilization theorists cited, the model employs a definition of protest which implicitly attributes power to the oppressed;

2. Most importantly, the model sets forth theoretical propositions from which testable hypotheses can be generated regarding the conditions for protest success;
3. The model appears to match the essential conditions which prevailed in New York City during the period under discussion.

A review of the major features of the model to be deployed as the theoretical premise of the study is now in order.

The more recent literature on protest movements have tended to limit the definition of protest to phenomena with an identifiable organization and which articulate purposive goals. This conception is thoroughly in line with the emphasis of resource mobilization theorists upon resource availability, including the organizational facilities for deploying those resources. It seems clear, however, based on issues raised above, that such a definition is inadequate with respect to the poor and the 'resourceless'. In this connection, the formulation by Piven and Cloward seems more appropriate.

"The emergence of a protest movement", they assert, "entails a transformation both of consciousness and of behaviour".⁵⁰ There are three aspects to the change in consciousness. In the first instance the "system" loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the aggrieved persons. In other words, the system comes to be seen as "unjust and wrong". At the second level "... people who are ordinarily fatalistic ... begin to assert 'rights' that imply demands for change".⁵¹ Thirdly, the aggrieved people come to be imbued with "a new sense of efficacy". On the behavioral level the major change is the willingness of ordinarily 'law abiding persons' to begin to defy laws and traditions, both individually and collectively. One advantage of

this approach to defining social protest is that it removes the definitional bias imposed by traditional definitions. As the authors state, "prevailing definitions, by stressing articulated social change goals as the defining feature of social movements, have had the effect of denying political meaning to many forms of protest".⁵² Another advantage is that, in emphasizing the notion of collective defiance, the definition highlights what is perhaps the primary resource available to protest movements among the poor (especially the northern urban poor), namely, the threat of spontaneous mass disruptions. This notion of the threat of mass defiance as a resource of the oppressed is useful only within the limits defined by the model, as will be seen presently.

Observers of social movements and social change have long acknowledged that long term changes (demographic, technological etc.) in society do create opportunities for protest to emerge. Thus the Tillys' claim that protest is conditioned by long term shifts in balance of resources from polity members to challengers, parallels the Piven/Cloward assertion that the likelihood and effectiveness of lower class protest depends upon long term changes in society. The unique contribution of Piven and Cloward (and which renders it particularly useful to this study) was to show that such changes could also undermine governing coalitions in such a way as to make them unstable. When such a governing coalition becomes dependent upon the electoral support of an insurgent group, it becomes inherently vulnerable to the threat of mass disruption by that group. Under such conditions, the poor and oppressed are endowed with a fleeting though extraordinary power, as the dominant partners in the coalition are

likely to respond to such threats with reforms, in an attempt to restabilize their governance. The political opportunity which makes reform likely is thus seen to stem from a rare confluence of events and circumstances. Moreover, it is the element of spontaneity which empowers those protests to draw a favorable response from those in power. Spontaneous acts of mass defiance and disruption (riots, etc) while not necessarily leaderless, are by definition not formally organized, and hence cannot be simply called off, postponed or negotiated away. Perceptions also play a significant role. Thus during a cycle of protest the perception that riots may break out, can be as important (if not more so) as the actual event. Authorities may in fact respond merely to such perceptions with reforms designed to pre-empt an actual explosion. Thus Piven and Cloward have insisted that "... it was not formal organization but mass defiance that won what was won in the 1930's and 1960's ...".⁵³

The point should be made immediately that the relationship of protest to reform is not a mechanical one. The work of Piven and Cloward, for instance, implies that reform is not merely a response of intimidation to acts of mass defiance. What it suggests rather, is that reforms are the results of efforts by political elites to contain actual or foreseeable threats to the political stability of the electoral regime. It follows then that the actual reform may often not respond directly to the issues raised by the protest. This point is underscored by Tarrow: "... once a cycle of protest is underway, elites may respond with policy innovations that address, not the specific demands of the protesting groups, but the general climate of protest and demands for policy innovation in the system which may not

satisfy the specific demands of any protesting group".⁵⁴ This is an important observation, for as the study will indicate, the open admissions policy which was instituted, has little in common with the original demands of the City College protesters.

To summarize: this study is premised upon the assumption that:

1. The conditions and circumstances which prevailed in the City of New York during the period under discussion correspond in its essential features to the model discussed above, i.e.

- a. politics and society affected by long term changes,
- b. presence of unstable and dependent governing coalition;
- c. presence of an insurgent community, and ongoing threat (or perception thereof) of spontaneous disruption.

2. The impact of the protests at City College upon the open admissions reform can best be analyzed within the context of the assumptions posed by the model, i.e.

- d. that protest is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for reform;
- e. that successful protest is premised upon the presence of the features outlined (points a,b,c) above.

Three Hypotheses

Based upon this theoretical outlook three hypotheses are proposed around which the study is organized. Two of these concern whether or not the protests at City College had an impact upon the open admissions decision. These hypotheses are supported in general by the literature, which as we have seen, views protests as a significant determinant of policy outcomes. We seek, in this case,

to establish empirically if the faith of observers in the efficacy of protest is vindicated; in other words to show whether a cause and effect relationship existed between the protests at City College, and the decision to implement open admissions which followed closely. In relation to this, it is hypothesized that:

1. Without the protest at City College by Black and Puerto Rican students, open admissions would not have come about when it did. The protest accelerated the timing of open admissions.
2. The protest at City College changed the scope and strategy of open admissions.

The third hypothesis concerns whether the presence of the conditions described in the model is sufficient to make protest successful, (i.e. decisively influences the reform output). In this study this influence will be evaluated by looking at the response of the political leadership of the City (i.e. Mayor Lindsay), to the protest. It is hypothesized that:

3. Mayor Lindsay's support for open admissions was conditioned by the need to forestall the menace to his political regime represented by the protests at City College.

Procedure:

Types, methods and sources of data collection:

As indicated earlier, in addition to testing hypotheses about the effectiveness and conditions for the success of protest, an important aim is to provide a more complete picture of the Black and Puerto Rican students movement at City College. Several different types of data were collected:

(a) Interviews

Approximately thirty tape recorded interviews were conducted. Participants included former activists and supporters from the Black and Puerto Rican student movement, as well as former activists from the white Left at City College; faculty and administrators at various levels of involvement (SEEK directors, active supporters of the BPRSC, participants in the negotiations, conservative critics); former leaders and trustees of the university (including Chancellor Bowker and vice-Chancellor Edelstein). The interviews were open ended and ranged from forty-five minutes to several hours. Some interviews took several sessions to complete.

(b) Archival Material

The main sources of archival materials were the City College archive and the archives housed at the central office of the Board of Higher Education (East 80th St. NYC). The City College archive was an invaluable source for materials by and about the movement. While only a few original materials (flyers etc) survive, the back issues of various campus newspapers provided a wealth of information about contemporary issues and the flow of events on campus in that period. Such information, taken from The Campus, Observation Post, and Tech News, helped greatly to balance the personal recollections of individuals who were interviewed. In addition to the extensive clippings from outside media, the archives housed other original documents such as the minutes of faculty meetings, faculty and administration letters and memos. These were of particular value in gauging faculty and administration response to the crisis.

The archives of the BHE contained such indispensable sources of original information as the Minutes of the BHE; the various master plans for the university (and their yearly revisions); special reports such as A long range plan for the City University of New York 1961-1975. These were particularly useful in providing a historical backdrop to the evolution of public higher education policy in New York. The library at Queens College yielded an invaluable report by a special BHE appointed task force which investigated events involving the SEEK program on that Campus.

(c) Secondary materials

In addition to the books and other materials discussed earlier (bearing directly on the politics of open admissions), I made extensive use of books, journal and newspaper articles to develop various aspects of the work. This included the literature on social movements; aspects of the Black movement and the Black experience; aspects of federal anti poverty legislation and its repercussions on ethnic politics in New York.

(d) Other sources

In the course of the investigation valuable materials were contributed directly (copies of original tape recordings of activists and students at City College) or indirectly (a video-film in-progress) by individuals.

Analysis of the data

Hypothesis #1 (The timing of open admissions).

The question raised by the first hypothesis is whether, in the absence of the protests at City College, open admissions would have come about when it did. Put differently, the study will attempt to

establish through close analysis of relevant data whether other forces beyond the protest were responsible for the sudden shift in the timetable of open admissions. The study will also seek to identify evidence which seems to support a decisive role for the protests in that decision. The result of this analysis is detailed in Chapter IV of the study.

Hypothesis #2 (The scope of open admissions).

The study focuses here on explaining the discrepancies between the 1968 Master Plan (in which a version of open enrollment is envisioned for 1975), and the actual conditions of open admissions as implemented. The question raised is whether these discrepancies can be accounted for without reference to the protests. Chapter V comprises the results of this analysis.

Hypothesis # 3 (Why the protests succeeded)

The analysis of hypothesis #3 proceeds through four connected stages of argument, the first two of which focus on describing the forces and processes which helped to create the conditions called for in the model, a fundamental theme of which is political instability. In keeping with the theme that long term changes in society contributes to the undermining of governing coalition, the first stage looks at internal changes within the Black community, in particular at some aspects of its ideological transformation over time. This discussion takes up Chapter VI.

The second stage looks at the response of national political forces to these changes in the Black community. In particular it focuses on the War on Poverty, and its impact upon the coalition politics of New York City. The third stage argues that Lindsay's

rise to power came in direct relationship to the undermining of the governing coalition due to the changes discussed. These arguments are presented in Chapter VII.

The fourth and final stage of the argument attempts to establish whether Lindsay's response to open admissions was conditioned by his political vulnerability. It will be argued that the vulnerability of Lindsay's political base provides a credible account of his policy toward Blacks and the Black movement (of which the City College protest was a manifestation). The analysis will draw upon observers opinions (where available) and other data. The findings are presented in Chapter VIII.

Some Limitations of the Study

Social phenomena are by nature complex and interwoven. Any attempt therefore to separate them into discrete variables for the purpose of analysis is bound to be somewhat arbitrary, and thus imposes certain limits upon truth-finding. Decisions have to be made at various stages of the investigation that may affect the outcome of the analysis. Certain decisions were made in the process of this study to which attention must be drawn; other factors also imposed their particular limitations on the process and outcome of the study.

1. The decision was made to focus attention primarily upon the Black community and the Black movement, despite the fact that the Puerto Rican community played a critical role in the events. This decision is justified, it is felt, on the grounds that the primary movement for social change in the nation as a whole came out of the Black community. The Black movement was in fact the

prototype for the later development of activism among Puerto Rican youth.

2. It was also decided to limit interviews among the activists to those who comprised the core leadership of the BPRSC. The study thus suffers from a lack of viewpoints from a larger number of non-leadership students. Tracing the whereabouts of the core leadership was a difficult and time consuming job in itself. Extending the sample would have imposed an unacceptable investment of time.

Not only activists but many of the other participants in the events proved difficult to find - for various reasons. Some lived in other parts of the country, others were indisposed due to illness (President Copeland, Mayor Lindsay), yet others had died. Basically, interviews were limited to individuals who resided in the metropolitan area.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Interview with James Small, July 14, 1986.
2. Minutes of the Board of Higher Education, July 9, 1969.
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CHAPTER II

CITY COLLEGE: THE SEEDS OF STRIFE

Introduction - a historical footnote

The campus of the City College of New York has been, historically speaking, no stranger to strife. Twenty years before the South Campus seizure, coincidently in April, "violence that police said assumed near-riot proportions ushered in the first general strike of students of a municipal institution of higher learning" in New York City.¹ This event, separated in time and reflecting different political and demographic realities, nevertheless contained echoes of what was to be, twenty years later, a far more profound happening. Unlike the later event, the general strike which paralyzed the campus in '49 was not the work of a relatively obscure cabal, but rather it was an openly organized action sanctioned by "a referendum of the day students ... under the auspices of the Student Council".² At its peak, the strike reduced attendance in the 3000-member School of Technology by 30%, while the 4,200-member School of Liberal Arts was down by 75%.³

The issues of the '49 strike concerned charges of anti-semitism and racism against two prominent City College faculty members, along with the demand for their dismissal. Professor William E. Knickerbocker, Chairman of Romance Languages Department was charged with anti-semitism in his statements as well as in his promotional preferences. William C. Davis was an instructor in economics whose

duties included responsibility for administering Army Hall, a dormitory residence for veterans. Davis was charged with practicing segregation in his assignment of rooms to Negro and white students.

The strike lasted five days and generated a great deal of controversy, which also included public reactions to the presence of police on the campus. The New York Times for instance, considered the students' action as "...riotous and disorderly... misguided, unintelligent," and urged instead that they learn and practice the art and spirit of forgiving.⁴ In like manner, the strike was roundly condemned in a statement from a Committee of the Associate Alumni of the College, representing at the time, some 40,000 alumni. On the other hand, Mayor O'Dwyer received telegrams from the Teachers Union, among others, condemning the police actions against the student strikers at City College.

On campus there seemed to have been two main positions taken by the administration. The first was to proclaim business-as-usual: that is, classes were to continue as usual. The second, was to maintain vigilance against a communist takeover of the strike. This seemed to be necessitated by the fact that the Dean of Students was on record affirming that "the Student Council had conducted an orderly referendum". Thus it was difficult in this instance to scapegoat the communists as the prime agitators. Within five days, as noted, the strike ended due to lack of support and without a resolution of the demands. And business resumed as usual.

Campus Activism at CCNY (The White Left)

By the time the Black and Puerto Rican students Community seized its fleeting moment in higher education history in New York City in

April 1969, powerful societal forces were creating issues that were to be contested in every corner of the society. In no arena was this contest to be more fierce than on the campuses of the nation's colleges and universities. This was equally true of the City College, which even in the early sixties was considered to be very much a white institution -- despite the proximity of Harlem, the 'Negro Mecca'. The activism among the white students formed an important backdrop to the introduction and rise of Black and Puerto Rican student radicalism. Moreover, as will be seen, white activists claim some significant role in the later success of the newcomers.

By the end of 1966, opposition to the growing war in Vietnam was being expressed on the campuses in the form of anti-draft campaigns. The specific focus of such campaigns was to protest the release of students' class rankings to the Selective Service Bureau. Based on these lists of class rankings the Bureau would assign or remove students from the list of eligible draftees. Those whose class ranking qualified them for deferment were assigned the '2S' code. Opinion on the City College campus was by no means uniform on the College's role in the process. President Gallagher roundly condemned as "illegal" a sit-in demonstration called in November to protest the College's role in distributing the class rankings. On the other hand The Campus, a mainstream student newspaper, criticized the activists on the grounds that the distribution of class standings to the Selective Service Bureau was not the real issue at stake, rather it was the inherent elitism in the process that allowed those in college to qualify for deferment, while those not so privileged had to serve.⁵ The depth of feeling among the rank and file students came

to the fore in a referendum on the issue held in the week of November 17, 1966. With a record of 40% of students voting, the students voted against the release of class standing to the Selective Service by the college. The vote was 3,192 to 1,832; faculty on the other hand voted 275-214 to retain the status quo.⁶ A further breakdown of the faculty voting showed the Liberal Arts faculty supporting continued distribution while the Education faculty opposed. Sporadic demonstrations by factions of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) continued, especially in the wake of the announcement by President Gallagher that the Selective Service would be welcomed to use college facilities to give draft tests, and the announcement by the Board of Higher Education - following the City College referendum - that the university would continue to release class rankings to the Selective Service Bureau. The potency of this issue as a rallying point for student activism was soon lost, for by the summer of 1967 the Selective Service Bureau had abolished class ranking as a basis for deciding draft eligibility. Henceforth, college students would be required to complete 25% each year of a four year program in order to qualify for deferment.

The result was to intensify the antiwar activities of campus activists. But antiwar sentiments though powerful were only one among a variety of issues which preoccupied students. There was for instance, a growing concern among activists with the notion of 'campus democracy', a concern with students having a legitimate role in the decisions affecting campus life. There was also concern with the lifestyle and values of the growing youth counter-culture. Finally, there were those who were concerned with the broad issues of civil

rights. The most visible activist student organizations on the left at City College were the DuBois Club, later implicated in the preliminary activities which led to the 5 demands; the Students for a Democratic Society (which included two splinter groups, the Progressive Labor Party, and the SDS - Labor Committee); and City College Commune.

Of the groups mentioned, the City College Commune was the only indigenously evolved group and the one which associated itself most explicitly with counter-culture values, at least initially. The City College Commune was born in the fall of 1967 in the heat of the opposition which had sprung up over the administration's decision to construct temporary huts on the South Campus of City College. The genesis of the conflict stemmed from an announcement by the BHE of a planned increase in university enrollment of 5000 students. President Gallagher agreed that City College would take 1000 of the new students. In order to make room for the students, Gallagher planned to spend \$1.5 million to build temporary huts which would then be used to house the various academic departments, thus freeing up space for use as classrooms. Opposition to the construction came from students and many faculty alike on the grounds that "a crash construction program, accompanied by a crash enrollment program, would lower the college's academic standards".⁷ They further based objection to the plan on the lack of faculty and student input into the decision. These initial protestations in fall 1966 succeeded in postponing construction of the huts.

In the fall of 1967, the City College administration again attempted to begin implementation of its construction plans but again

ran into opposition from students, based in part on environmental concerns, and in part on the question of campus democracy. The conflict over the huts (also known as the "site six" controversy) illustrated some basic differences in the composition of the City College left. Ron McGuire, founder and leader of the Commune, recalls that:

SDS basically saw the site six issues as one of student power; we who formed the Commune saw it as an issue of aesthetics and of life style. We wanted to have green space on the campus.⁸

The fact is that in order to make room for the huts, a number of trees (including oaks and chestnuts--some estimated to be as much as 150 years old) had to be cut down. Opposition to the construction thus crystallized into a movement to protest the cutting of the trees. In the process a number of arrests were made including several members of the Commune.⁹ There was a strong faculty reaction to these arrests. Prof. Bernard Sohmer (mathematics) recalls that:

Most of us (i.e. faculty and administration) felt they'd done something they shouldn't ... the faculty formed a protest group and met en masse ... the first time in my thirty-five years in which they did so ... not as a General Faculty or Faculty Council or Senate ... but simply as a gathering of faculty without structure, in opposition to the administration ... they made some structural demands on the administration for greater involvement in decisions ¹⁰

The result was the creation of a "committee of 17" which was charged with making recommendations for a new governance structure which would accomodate the issues raised by the question of campus democracy.

The site six controversy generated a good deal of bitterness among segments of the Black students, who interpreted opposition to the huts as an act of racism. Indeed, in time, Commune members came to feel they had been exploited by conservative elements of the faculty who were fearful of changes on the campus. One professor of philosophy is reported to have formulated the issue thus: "there are some people who want to destroy City College and to replace it with Harlem Community College ...".¹¹ "He was very persuasive", McGuire remembers, "he managed to persuade us that in our stand for aesthetics we were also striking a blow for the preservation of the standards of the College".¹² In their ferocious stand for preserving the trees, the students' had indeed also struck a blow on behalf (especially) of those for whom the issues involved went far beyond mere aesthetics, to the question of who should have the power to make basic decisions affecting the campus: whether it concerned trees, or new construction, or, ultimately, who should attend City College, and under what circumstances.

The passing of the site six controversy into history by the late fall of '67 did not mean that the white student left would go begging for issues. As the spring of 1968 rolled along, it dragged in its wake the annual budget game that seemed each spring to make its scheduled appearance. Thus, when an assistant to President Gallagher announced in April that City College was anticipating a 10% reduction in the September 1969 freshman class due to proposed cuts in the 1968-69 budget, and moreover that the SEEK program would face such cuts as would allow neither an increase in student enrollment nor the anticipated expansion of the program to Baruch and Hunter College, the

stage was set for action. This time the activists comprised a coalition involving the DuBois Club, SDS, a group called The Christian Association, along with some faculty members. This coalition, which numbered about 70 persons, held a demonstration in late April and presented a list of four demands as follows:¹³

1. that President Gallagher accompany the students to Albany to demand an increase in SEEK funds from the Legislature;
2. that the SEEK enrollment at City College be quadrupled by September 1969;
3. that the College administration initiate a "positive discrimination" policy to reflect the racial composition of the city in the student body;
4. that President Gallagher establish a "commission of experts on Black and Puerto Rican Culture and History" in order to revise the curriculum which now distorted the contributions of these groups to American Society.

A few days after this demonstration, further protests were directed against one Professor Crane Johnson, allegedly for statements to the effect that students in the pre-Baccalaureate program (SEEK) were "trash" and were incapable of college work.¹⁴ In due course, on Monday May 6, 1968, some 200 students converged on Albany to lobby in support of SEEK. Funding (1968-69) for the program subsequently was increased by 50%, and the total number of students increased to 725.

In the fall of 1968, the student left accelerated its activities with respect to the war in Vietnam. One of the more dramatic moments culminated around the so-called 'sanctuary movement.' Again the leadership appears to have been taken by the City College Commune when they made contact sometime in October '68 with the Coordinated Draft Resisters. This group worked with anti-war groups who were willing to

give sanctuary to army deserters. Toward the end of October, Private Bill Brakefield arrived on the City College campus. The activists' had planned what they referred to as a 'Festival of Life' rally on Halloween night. The activity was held in the Findley Student Center ballroom, at which time the deserter was introduced to the activist community. Recalls Commune leader Ron McGuire,

... we announced he would stay until arrested. We eventually occupied the Student Center and set up a community. Our aim in having the deserter was to use it as a focal point to draw attention to the campaign against ROTC and military contracting - so it was critical that he not be arrested too soon ¹⁵

The sanctuary for Private Brakefield lasted eight days, and, at its peak, involved large numbers of activists and sympathizers. Some sense of its impact is given by the fact that when members of the New York City Tactical Police force invaded the sanctuary on November 13, 1968, along with Brakefield, they arrested some 170 supporters, including members of SDS and the Commune.¹⁶

As a result of the police raid on the sanctuary, fuel was added to the fires of campus discontent as both faculty and the student left reacted to the decision taken by President Gallagher to call the police. Undoubtedly faculty interest in the affair was, at least in part, fueled by its concern over power-sharing. "There had been a clear understanding", according to Professor Julius Elias (Chair of Philosophy) in an interview with a Campus reporter, "that he (Gallagher) was not to act unilaterally in such situations". One of the results of the 'site six' crisis he further noted, was that "it was very clearly established that the president would not call the police until he had exhausted all the available resources".¹⁷

According to the Campus article President Gallagher denied that such a compromise had ever been reached, and noted further that he would never surrender that kind of authority to any campus group.

For its part, the student left focused its anger in a protest march organized by SDS and the DuBois Club to demand of Gallagher that the police be henceforth barred from the campus. They also demanded the ouster of ROTC from the college. In the meantime, the City College Commune made good on its commitment to confront the issue of military contracting. Interviews had been scheduled for graduating engineers with four major military contractors including General Dynamic and Hughes Aeronautics Co. On Monday November 18, violence erupted at the interview site between protesters and engineers, as the former attempted to disrupt the interview process. As a result student leaders McGuire and Jeffrey Steinberg were suspended from the college. Significantly, the cancelled interviews were rescheduled, off-campus and under heavy security.

Concurrent with these developments the W.E.B. DuBois Society, on November 19, circulated its petition to "End Racism at CCNY". This petition, signed by some 1600 City College students and endorsed by the CCNY student government had been treated by some observers as being of pivotal significance in the development of the Black and Puerto Rican student movement for open admissions.¹⁸ This was not, in fact, quite the case, as will be indicated later in this account. This is not to suggest that the DuBois petition was unimportant. At the very least it served to sensitize the white activist community - until then largely consumed with the anti-war effort - to the social and political issues immediately surrounding

them. Thus the petition, although couched in the language of 'demands', was a critique of the BHE's Master Plan for the City University, which had been published earlier that summer (1968). More specifically, the DuBois critique charged that "in setting up a three-tiered system of senior colleges, community colleges and educational skills centers," the Plan "would perpetuate a tracking process within the City schools that was ... responsible for so few non-whites receiving academic diplomas...".¹⁹ Consequently, the DuBois Society in its petition made six demands upon President Gallagher and the Board of Higher Education, as necessary steps toward remedying the situation:²⁰

1. The racial composition of all future entering classes should reflect proportionally, the high school graduation classes in New York City.
2. The SEEK program should be increased by a factor of four by September 1969; and non-diploma students should be eligible for the program.
3. New senior colleges should be built to accomodate all who desired such an education.
4. Decent stipends should be paid to any who were unable to afford college.
5. Control of the college should be in the hands of a consortium comprising the community of faculty and students.
6. (a) Black, Puerto Rican and labor history should be incorporated in all college curriculum;
(b) Black and Puerto Rican history as well as Spanish should be required of all education majors.

As noted, the petition had wide campus sponsorship, not only in the activist community, but among such establishment oriented organizations as the student government. The timing of the DuBois petition was important too, for it coincided with currents of discontent that were also coming to a head in the Black and Puerto

Rican campus community. The educational and propaganda value of the DuBois document should therefore not be underestimated, particularly in relationship to how the issues of the South Campus seizure were understood by the larger campus community.

Enough has been said thus far to indicate the vibrancy and fluidity of the issues around which the political life of the City College white left orbited. The picture would be incomplete, without a sense of the opposition to their activities. This opposition came from two sources, primarily the organized 'right', and the administration, as personified in President Gallagher.

A feature article in The Campus of November 26, 1968, identified six major campus groups whose organizational impetus came from a felt need to counteract the activities of SDS and the City College Commune.²¹ The largest and most vociferous of those was the Young Republicans Club, led by Steve Schlesinger, and claiming to have 115 members. Although the group opposed the draft, it was not anti-war, and supported strongly the presence of ROTC on campus. Young Republicans took strong exception to SDS and Commune inspired disruption of interviews, and were in the vanguard of those who physically attempted to repulse the 'leftists.' They were also to play a role later, as the drama of the South Campus seizure unfolded.

Young Republicans were opposed to any kind of proposal for significant power-sharing by students in a governance structure. The students for an Open Campus, a more moderate group, viewed itself as a "non-partisan" alternative to SDS. It opposed in particular, what it perceived as the free use of violence and intimidation by SDS. The City College Coalition developed as an offshoot of Students for an

Open Campus. As a coalition of non-left groups, they hoped to exert effective influence on the administration and the student body in such a way as to undercut the influence of SDS. The Young Americans for Freedom, a group long dormant, had by late 1968 begun to reactivate in direct opposition to SDS. Its leader, one John Sotirakas, hoped the group would formulate "a philosophical analysis ... and establish the principle that the university is no place for force". The group described itself as "non-partisan", although it was strongly opposed to the Observation Post, a campus newspaper generally associated with the student left. Other groups included Objectivism (associated with the Ayn Rand Society), Young Conservatives, and Students for an Open University. All expressed opposition to the philosophy and tactics of SDS and Commune. The organized membership of these groups according to the Campus article numbered approximately 150. This indicates that besides the Young Republicans, membership in conservative campus organizations was marginal. Of more than passing significance too was the fact that, by and large, the ranks of student conservatives appear to have been drawn mainly from the engineering school.

The rise of extreme conservative feeling among students on the City College campus in the fall of 1968 may be gauged from the following observations. First, the Campus article cited above was titled, "The Campus Right: A New-Found Militancy", indicating there was a quite noticeable phenomenon in the making. Secondly, the student government elections of November 1968 was swept by a slate of explicitly conservative candidates.²² What made this victory particularly significant, was the fact that just a few months prior, an avowedly conservative incumbent candidate for student government

president had been overwhelming defeated.²³ This swing to the right, occurring on the eve of the turbulent spring months of 1969, is thus an important piece of the equation of tension and conflict on the white side of campus political life in that academic year.

Another side of that equation was expressed in the attitude of the college leadership in the person of President Gallagher toward the student left. This attitude appears to have been one of definite antagonism and perhaps even contempt for the philosophy, objectives and tactics of the left. That he distrusted the left leadership was made clear on repeated occasions. The basic attitude was expressed in his condemnation of the radical student leadership in the fall of '66 around the issue of the release of class rank to the Selective Service Bureau. The radicals, he thought, were bent on making a 'power grab', through the vehicle of the referendum on the issue. "I have made the appeal," he stated, "for preservation of responsible leadership ... I shall continue to make that appeal... I am pleased to report thus far the tiny minority has completely failed to capture the student leadership".²⁴ Gallagher's remarks drew charges of 'red baiting' from the Progressive Labor Club, which promptly called for a demonstration to protest the tactic.

In terms of left campus institutions, the Observation Post repeatedly incurred the President's ire. Observation Post was an activist paper which supported issues of student rights and power, anti-war protests, and similar activities. It regularly ran editorials critical of the administration's stance on these issues. According to Steve Simon, a former member of the editorial staff, "often rallies and demonstrations were timed according to the

publication deadlines of Observation Post, since it covered these events sympathetically".²⁵ Not surprisingly, the paper was not viewed with great favor by the administration, and, consequently, "they looked for any small reason to shut us down", recalls Simon. In fact the paper was suspended on a number of occasions - the only campus paper so treated. Simon felt that Gallagher was paranoid with regard to the left. He recalls on one occasion in the fall of 1968, going to see Gallagher for a scheduled interview,

... and before I knew it our paper was being castigated... he accused the white left of having sent people to Berkeley to intern [i.e. trained in tactics of] in disruption ... I went there for an interview about campus issues but all of a sudden he was leveling all these charges.²⁶

If Simon's depiction was self serving, it is not inconsistent with the events as they emerged, as the politics of confrontation continued on campus. Hence even The Campus, regarded as the 'objective' and 'responsible' campus paper, could, in late 1968, as the debates over a new governance structure grew, deride the president for his relentless attacks on the white left. In this connection, a Campus editorial on October 30, 1968 actually accused Gallagher of "Machiavellianism" in his handling of the governance struggle.

As regards the faculty, it seems safe to say that the bulk was either uninvolved or unconcerned with many of the issues discussed. This changed as the debate over governance developed, and the prospect of power sharing loomed.

Earlier on, an essential conservatism on issues of war and the draft seemed to characterize the liberal arts faculty. This much was indicated by the 1966 referendum vote on releasing class ranks to the

Selective Service Bureau. This conservatism appeared to have shifted considerably by the fall of '68, when the Faculty Council of the College of Liberal Art's voted 29:17 (2 abstaining), to remove ROTC accreditation at City College.²⁷ Clearly though, none of these issues raised by the left evoked as strong a reaction in the faculty as did the prospect of imminent and radical change symbolized by the newest insurgents on campus: the Black and Puerto Rican Students Community.

The New Arrivals and the Onyx Society

In its March 3rd, 1968 issue, The Campus featured a vignette titled: "Small White Island, Vast Black Sea". The article described an old Black derelict who had wandered unto the campus and found himself invited to sit in a classroom. He sat through a discussion of Sir Thomas Moore's Utopia, and,

... now and then the old man nodded, like one attending a sermon. The class ended. The man was completely ignored. It was as if he wasn't even there. He did not exist

The writer's aim in publishing this vignette was stated clearly – in italics – at the end: it was an attempt to explain why "a gulf existed between the College and Harlem". Nor was this sense of the College's reclusiveness (not to mention its exclusiveness) unfamiliar to Harlem intellectuals "such as John Killiens, James Baldwin, and John Williams [who] had frequently referred in their writings to the 'white citadel' on the hill... inaccessible to the Black population in whose midst it stood...."²⁸ Indeed, the state of affairs prompted Amsterdam News editor James Hicks to charge in a February 1965 editorial that City College was "almost as lily white during the day

as the campus of the University of Mississippi".^{28a} He also found President Gallagher to be quite culpable in the perpetuation of the situation.

From the heights of the St. Nicholas Terrace, atop which City College stands, it was perhaps not difficult to ignore the pulsating life of Harlem stretching away eastward. And, arguably, the high stone walls and iron gates of the old convent (which now constituted the South Campus) still functioned – and not only symbolically – to screen from consciousness the evidence of the vitality of Spanish and Black culture pressing in upon it from the south and west. Remarking on this phenomenon, Dr. Kenneth Clark of the Department of Psychology was moved to observe that "the College tends to face the setting sun – it doesn't look toward the park, it looks toward the river".^{28b} Not that physical barriers were necessary in the context of white American society – even in the mid-to-late 1960's – to ensure the 'invisible' status of these 'other' Americans just outside the gates. Hence it was not unnatural that Blacks and Puerto Ricans who found themselves in the mid-sixties wandering the still rustic campus should have felt – intensely – the sense of being outsiders, intruding upon forbidden territory. The intensity of this feeling as late as fall 1968 is conveyed for instance in the symbolism of the first name chosen by the first Puerto Rican student organization at CCNY:

The original name was "azerbache" which is a type of rock that in Puerto Rican custom is placed around the neck of newborns to ward off 'the evil eye'. For us it also had a double meaning ... 'the evil eye' was symbolic of being on the City College campus ²⁹

Although their numbers were very small, there were of course Blacks and Puerto Ricans among the City College day students prior to 1965. According to the City College records, between 1960-1965, there were 196 Black graduates of the College.³⁰ This averages out to roughly 33 Black graduates per year. In the same period, City College produced a total of 17,613 baccalaureate graduates, an average of nearly 3000 per year.^{30b} These figures do not reflect what percentage of the Blacks came out of the School of General Studies, which carried a very large percentage of non-white students. Professor Leslie Berger, founder and director of the City College Pre-Baccalaureate program (the pre-cursor of the SEEK program) estimates that no more than 3% of day students were Blacks, compared to some 30% in the evening school.³¹ Moreover, the first ethnic census of the City University of New York, done at the request of the State Education Department, reveals that in 1967 Blacks represented 4.2%, while Puerto Ricans were 4.9% of the matriculated students at City College.³² Those in non-matriculated status were 28% and 8.4% respectively. It is important to note that these matriculation figures included, by 1967, Black and Puerto Rican students who originally entered City College in 1965 and 1966 in non-matriculated status. Based on the foregoing, it is a reasonable conclusion that, statistically speaking, the pre-1965 Black and Puerto Rican presence in the City College day session was close to being insignificant.

Socially speaking it was not, at least not to new groups of Blacks and Puerto Ricans who began to arrive on campus in 1965. It is not known how pre-1965 students handled the isolation they surely felt. Since these students had entered City College under the old

system of rigorous academic competition, unlike the later arrivals, the sense of being stigmatized academically did not provide a basis for group solidarity (at least as expressed in organizational form). Moreover, in the late fifties and early sixties, Black middle class aspirations were still fed by the vision of integration. Hence it is likely that campus minorities simply involved themselves in existing social and political campus organizations. The Campus' reaction to the sudden burst of Black student interest in the newly founded (1966) Onyx Society is however, worth noting: "This is in sharp contrast," it said, "to the almost total absence of Negroes in clubs, house plans and fraternities".^{32a}

It was not until April 1966, almost a year after the arrival of the first 110 students who comprised the first affirmative action program at City College, that the Onyx Society emerged, thus presaging the emergence of a new ethnic sensibility among the Blacks on campus. "Although the society has been chartered for little more than two weeks," The Campus observed, "it has amassed over 200 members ... [to become] probably the largest club on campus".^{32b} Significantly, Onyx was founded as an inter-racial club, although the role of the white members was not clear to the founders. The organization's charter listed its purpose as to "convey a contemporary and novel expression of the viable but heretofore distorted image of the Negro College community".^{32c} Several committees existed to carry out the work of the organization. These included a Community Interaction Committee which was charged with visiting the predominantly Black high schools to inform prospective college students about the activities of the society; a social committee which planned parties and outings; a

cultural and historical committee sponsored lectures and discussions "on the American Negro heritage"; and an educational committee which had the task of orienting incoming students "on such subjects as registration and the armed forces".^{32d}

Initially at least, it seemed that Onyx functioned primarily as a social outlet. Thus Paul Simms (class of '69) and an Onyx founder, observed in an interview with The Campus that "Onyx was once only a social organization".³³ This observation, made in late 1967, suggested that already a shift was occurring in the society. Nevertheless, the theme of Onyx as a social organization remained a strong one in the memories of many of the activists who joined the organization and participated in its transformation from a social to political organization. Two activities dominated the Onyx Society's agenda, according to Serge Mullery who came to City as a transfer student in Spring 1967:

One was our yearly fashion show... featuring Black models and designers and so on... in that sense it was consciousness raising.... On Thursday nights we had something called 'coat-tails' ... this was in essence a disco type setting where for 3 or 4 hours we just danced and partied ³⁴

This purely 'social' aspect of Onyx was none-the-less of great importance in the sense of being "a support group for us ... there weren't too many of us on campus ... so the Onyx office was some place to go".³⁵ Some Puerto Ricans also found Onyx important as a social outlet. Iris Morales, who later co-founded the Puerto Rican Students For Action (PRISA) in fall 1968, became active in Onyx soon after she came to City in 1965 "because there were no Puerto Rican organizations on campus".³⁶

The fall of 1967 provided an important impetus toward the politicization of the Onyx Society as the controversy over the temporary huts heated up. "Site six was seen in very different terms by the Onyx Society and by us," recalls Commune leader Ron McGuire, "we did not understand then the situation we were in - especially given the fact that a lot of those professors were raising bail for us".³⁷ Onyx Society president Edwin Fabre (Class of '68) had attacked the white protesters, charging them with overt or covert racism in their preference for trees over building of facilities (the huts) to house the 469 SEEK students at City College.³⁸ Although it has been suggested that Onyx's reaction stemmed from their misapprehension of the role of the huts (they were never intended for classroom space),³⁹ the incident appears to have had a decisive impact on the group's self-perception - as well as its perception by the campus at large. For one thing the goals and aspirations of the Society were becoming clearer. "Our goals", Fabre noted, "are to provide for the cultural education and social well being of all Black people ... we're going to make the necessary changes on campus and off."⁴⁰ One primary target for change would be the college curriculum much of which it was felt, had "no real relevance for Black students". Another issue was the lack of "meaningful attempts to secure Black professors".

Clearly "the tone of the Onyx Society has undergone change since its birth at the College some eighteen months ago", observed The Campus.⁴¹ And not without reason! Just two weeks prior, the Society had shown an unsuspected militancy when it confronted the all white Student Council. Previously on October 19th, the Society had

hosted a conference on Black Power at which H. Rap Brown and other prominent activists were scheduled to appear. Subsequently the Student Council voted to suspend publicity funds to the Society for its alleged racism in not allowing whites to attend the conference.⁴² Additionally, Onyx was formally censored by the Council and denied room privileges for two weeks. Onyx countered by charging the Council with carrying out a vendetta against the Society, and descended - two hundred strong - upon the Council, where a reportedly raucous meeting ensued. Shaken, the Council at first voted to postpone a decision and then reinstated the Society's privileges. A CAMPUS editorial subsequently scored the Council for its lack of resolve in face of such obvious intimidation.

But if Onyx was experiencing a steady political transformation, this was related in part to an even swifter sociological shift in the composition of the group. Onyx's leadership, style and orientation had been for the most part set by traditional City College Blacks - those who had entered City College 'the hard way'. The first president, Stan Collymore, was matriculated for the class of 1968, vice-president Everard Rhoden for the class of '67. Hence, simultaneous with the passing out of the seniors who provided leadership, there was also the eclipsing of the so-called 'traditional' student at City College with the influx of 'non-traditional' SEEK students. The stage was set for conflict within Onyx, a conflict which many participants ascribe to a fundamental class-based cleavage in the groups' values and styles. As a former chairperson of Onyx's Educational Committee recalls it:

There were very real class differences between the traditional Blacks at City College and the new SEEK students.... These students who were in Onyx had gotten into City largely under regular tough competitive measures of 85+ average so they were rarities. When the kids from SEEK came in the ghetto as it were had invaded. And from one day to the next there were more of them, than all of us in Onyx. Onyx felt a great deal of pressure. The leadership, Tom Schick and others were very concerned. The SEEK students had an attitude also, because they came in saying 'these niggers are bourgeois! There was a great deal of classism here, a real fear by Onyx of being swamped.⁴³

These distinctions of class were reified according to one recollection, by the code of dress which typified each group:

Two modes of dress was popular in the City then that sort of reflected class differences and stratification. One was called 'Ivy League', today it would be the 'preppy' look. The other style was called 'Italian hustler', which was casual sweaters, silk and mohair pants, wingtip shoes made of alligator or lizard skin, roughly these styles reflected 'middle-class' versus 'street' values.⁴⁴

The significance of this piece of information is linked to the role played by geography in furthering the sense of alienation between the two groups. The office of the Onyx Society was located in the Findley Student Center on the South Campus, and as noted was the informal center of 'traditional' Black student life on campus. The SEEK administrative office around which much of the activities of the SEEK students gravitated, was located in the basement of the Administration Building on the North Campus. And, "... it was clear that those people who dressed 'ivy league', hung out on the South Campus and belonged to the Onyx Society, and on the North Campus we had all these people dressed in this 'Italian hustler' style, a clear stratification...".⁴⁵

Such perceptions are too widely held to be ignored, and provide an important sense of the issues involved in the group dynamics among primary factions of the Black students at City College. Whatever resentments there were, it seems clear, coexisted alongside a deepening commitment by those SEEK and non-SEEK students in Onyx toward making the College more relevant to "the community" and to Blacks in general. Of immediate concern was an increasing pervasive perception of intransigent institutional racism at the college. And if this coincided with the fact that by spring 1968 SEEK (special admission) students comprised the bulk of the Black and Puerto Rican students at City, it also comports with Ballard's observation that colleges now,

... increasingly brought unto their campuses Black youth who not only had experienced deprivation and white scorn, but were also sensitive to every conscious or unconscious manifestation of racism.⁴⁶

The Development of 'SEEK' Consciousness

It is not possible to fully appreciate the contribution of the SEEK students to the political evolution, and ultimately the eclipse of the Onyx Society, without a fuller understanding of the emergence of a 'SEEK' identity, with interests and issues separate from, though not antagonistic to, those of the 'regulars'. Some of these issues have been touched on in the previous segment and their role in the sense of alienation as expressed toward Onyx. There are however at least three factors which more profoundly stamped the sense of identity upon the new arrivals and led to the development of a 'SEEK' consciousness. These factors had to do with 1) matriculation status; 2) the expansion of the SEEK program to other campuses of the City

University; 3) the creation of the University Center and Dorm at the Alamac Hotel.

In September 1965 the first 'special admissions' program for Black and Puerto Rican students was instituted at City College. The authorship of the program is claimed by Dr. Allen Ballard, then an Assistant Dean of the College who recalls going to President Gallagher back in 1965

... because I was unhappy that I was teaching only white students - which is exactly what the situation was - I had come from a tradition which told us we had an obligation to see that if we made it , we had to help others who came behind... Gallagher appointed a Committee which included myself, Dean Shwartz, Dean Berger, Bernie Sohmer, and put it under the leadership of Dean Levy of the Evening Division....^{46a}

The program's first Director was Dean Leslie Berger, a specialist in clinical psychology. "The 'pre-bac' notion," he said, "came out of the idea to put pressure on students to perform - to show that they could qualify for the baccalaureate program. We did not give credit for any of the remedial work. The idea was to prepare them for the competition".⁴⁷ From its inception therefore, the program was designed to bring students up to the matriculation standard of the college, that is, in terms of skill levels. In other words, students in 'pre-bac' were by definition non-matriculants. Problems soon accrued around this fact, on a number of different levels, particularly following the formalization of 'pre-bac' and the 'SEEK' program in 1966.

According to Dr. Berger, City College had not been overly enthusiastic when Chancellor Bowker put up the money in the spring of '65 to test the 'pre-bac' idea. A faculty committee was organized

which he recalls did little to move the program toward implementation. "We got off the ground successfully in part," recalls Berger, "because we had very little faculty interference.... They went on vacation in May and we started the program in September".⁴⁸ Because the program was small (110 students) it was relatively easy to gain faculty support from some of the academic departments with which it had to interact. This was important not only for such basic reasons as classroom scheduling and teacher support, but also in gaining faculty support for one important goal of the program - which was to integrate immediately pre-bac students into mainstream courses. The Speech and Mathematics departments, Berger noted, were particularly supportive, and continued to be so. The real problem came when SEEK came into being the following year (1966); and it was that:

The College did not want to take the students....
The College administration and the faculty were
unwilling to expand at the rate at which we had
money for....⁴⁹

One consequence of this resistance was the decision to create the University Center, which centralized off-campus the SEEK preparatory programs. This resistance also manifested itself directly in terms of faculty attitudes in the classroom. Professor Fran Geteles came to City as a SEEK counselor in 1967:

In the early days in the SEEK program we were very careful not to put more than 2-3 students in any section of a class, so the teachers would not be angry and up in arms and feel you loaded them all down in my class, you had to be cautious, we had a Registrar who was a genius at balancing it out...".⁵⁰

Such attitudes were not lost on the students thus affected. Ballard, the first Black SEEK Director, describes a situation where

three black students originally admitted as 'special' students had successfully completed the remedial work and joined the regular student population. "Now thrust into the mainstream of the College's curriculum, they found themselves almost daily insulted, ignored and generally denigrated in their regular courses".⁵¹ He thought it was not surprising that these three played leading roles in the later seizure and occupation of the South Campus.

But the non-matriculant status of SEEK students had at least two other non-academic consequences which probably reinforced students' self perception as distinctly second-class citizens of the City College community. These were the prohibition barring non-matriculants from participating in varsity sports, and from formal involvement in the Student Council. The inability to play on the College's basketball team was especially irksome, because

... every Wednesday or Thursday night we were allowed to practice in the gym against the College's team - which was all white. We'd go out there every week on the court and whip 'em... but we couldn't play on the team....⁵²

The students eventually formed their own team - called the "Eights" and played independent basketball in their own intra mural league. "So impressive and effective were the Eights," said The Campus, "that they rolled to twenty four consecutive victories and three straight intra-mural championships".⁵³ In fact, the writer observed, the decision by the Board of Higher Education to abolish (in the 1968-1969 academic year) the non-matriculation status of SEEK students averted the possibility of a real embarrassment to the varsity team called the Beavers.

Finally, the inability to participate meaningfully in campus life by voting or running for office was a source of frustration, and resentment:

We realized that as SEEK students we were locked out... we felt this more acutely than non-SEEK students. We felt like we just didn't belong, especially given the fact that we were really based on the North Campus - which was white and very conservative.⁵⁴

At issue was not merely the right to exercise civic responsibility. Black and Puerto Rican student leaders it appears thought that their inability to enter formal campus politics separated them from a significant avenue toward affecting change. "This campaign," declared Henry Arce, presidential candidate in the first student government elections allowing SEEK participation, "is being used to show the political nature of the struggle (against campus racism) and the corporate nature of the university".⁵⁵ The intensity of students' feelings in this regard is suggested by the level of energy which they poured into the campaign which began late in the fall semester of 1968. "The entrance of the New World Coalition ticket," wrote the Observation Post, referring to the campaign slate headed by Arce, and comprising primarily SEEK students, "into the usually boring student elections has aroused a flurry of excitement on campus".⁵⁶

Prior to September 1968 when the Board's meeting on SEEK matriculation status took effect, student discontent in relationship to governance participation had resulted in the development of agitation for SEEK student government. This demand was directly related to the expansion of the SEEK program to other university campuses, and to the creation of the University Center.

In 1966, the State Legislature, by a special rider attached to the bill authorizing the University Construction Fund, created the SEEK Program [Search for Education Elevation and Knowledge]. The Program essentially extended the City College 'pre-bac' model to the rest of the senior colleges of the City University. One immediate implication of this was that all of the issues discussed above in relationship to the City College SEEK Community would be replicated in several locations at once. In part, this depended on how each institution chose to handle the program, that is, in terms of administrative philosophy. From the beginning at City, Berger contends, that philosophy was to integrate the program as much as possible into the mainstream of the academic arrangements.⁵⁷ This, as noted above, did not always work as satisfactorily as intended. At other campuses, notably Queens College, the philosophy was different, and seemingly, so was the level of serious regard for the program. Berger, who by this time had become university Dean in charge of the SEEK Program, noted that not only did Queens College entrust the directorship of the program to a "probation officer", but also located the program geographically outside of the college.⁵⁸ The significance of these arrangements can be seen from some of the 'findings' and 'recommendations' of the Special University Task Force which investigated the 'crisis' that developed at that campus during the week of December 16-23, 1968:

1. The Queens College SEEK Program is unique and singular, compared to the other SEEK Programs, in the following respects:
 - a. The headquarters and administrative offices of the program are off-campus and housed in converted living quarters.

- b. There is more physical as well as social and academic separation between the SEEK Program and the regular college program... and the regular part of the college... than at other SEEK campus programs.
- c. Currents and tides of unrest and dissatisfaction have been more evident in the SEEK Program at Queens than elsewhere, over a longer period of time.⁵⁹

Observing that the SEEK Program had been designed to help Black and Puerto Rican students to "make it" as "Queens College students" and not as "permanent SEEK Students", the Task Force urged the College to "actively, urgently and energetically" take steps to reverse the directions that had been established. Prominent among its recommendations were that:

The SEEK Program should be moved into the mainstream of Queens College (and of the other colleges as well), toward the centers of concern and authority, with maximum prestige and status...⁶⁰

The Task Force further recommended as part of that thrust, that the future director of the program (starting September 1969) should be academically qualified and "able to command respect among his academic peers".

The Queens College episode illustrates that the feelings and perceptions that heretofore had been localized at the City College Campus, was now a university-wide phenomenon. And, sooner or later, it was probably inevitable that SEEK students from the different campuses would come together to compare grievances and to plan remedial strategies. As events transpired, it turned out to be sooner than later. The development of a university-wide SEEK student thrust for a 'voice' in the affairs that so closely affected their lives was

facilitated by the creation of the University Center and Dorm at the Alamac Hotel (71st and Broadway) in Manhattan. For in creating the Center, the University also created, as a by-product, a nerve-center of communication between the various campus.

The Center and Dorm had been the brainchild of Dr. Berger (assisted of course by the circumstance of the College's resistance to expansion). The theory of the Center drew upon the best that was available in the tradition of social therapy, and was logically sound - given the limitations and inherent biases of that tradition. Essentially that tradition took the view (exemplified in such works as The Mark of Oppression (1951), The Dark Ghetto, (1964) that a primary consequence of enduring the social environment of ghetto living was the development of serious distortions in individual personality. Such distortions while perhaps useful in such adaptations, were considered quite dysfunctional in terms of the requirements for 'making it' in the mainstream of American life. Since ghetto life pathologized its progeny, it was immediately apparent that the best way to assist aspirants into the mainstream was to remove them - physically - from that environment. Of course, once removed, the subjects would require psychological support in order to facilitate transition to the next stage.

These were the ideals operationalized in the University Center and Dorm. The Alamac Hotel became the gateway - for all students entering the SEEK Program - into the various units of the University. At any given moment one to three hundred students were receiving classroom instruction there, and, within one or two semesters, entered the mainstream on a campus. The Dorm was even more critical: at any

given moment two hundred students were housed there, and continued to live there after graduating the Center - commuting from there to the various campuses. A natural network of communication between the campuses was established thus facilitating a steady flow of ideas, grievances, strategies. It is not surprising to learn, that many of the organizations which found their way unto the campuses (and indeed into the neighborhoods), had their genesis at the Alamac (notably PRISA, and the 'Committee of Five'). In this sense the Alamac bears some resemblance to the type of communication networking described by Alden Morris and other resource mobilization theorists.

"When I came in spring of '68," recalls former Alamac resident, Louis Rivera (later a participant in the South Campus seizure), "the discussion on the table centered on developing a voice for SEEK students through the mechanism of SEEK student government".⁶¹ Rivera became vice president of student government at the Center that spring. Five similar organizations existed in the University. Later that spring, according to Rivera, all six SEEK student government presidents and vice presidents met and organized a group called the All City Wide SEEK Coalition. SEEK Students were becoming a self conscious, group, capable and willing to act in their own interests (which they often identified with the interests of the Black and Puerto Rican communities). They awaited a spark to launch them into action.

Evolution of the Committee of Ten

That spark came on April 4, 1968 with the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. One cannot overestimate the electrifying impact of that event upon Blacks in urban ghettos, on college

campuses, in high schools. The riots in dozens of burning cities across the nation, is perhaps all that one needs to recall to measure the depth and passion of the communities' response. At City College, Ballard observed:

The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968 brought into existence an even more militant leadership... and by the spring of 1969, the Onyx Society had become almost completely submerged by a radical coalition of special and regularly admitted students, who spearheaded the occupation of the campus for three weeks, and became the force that led to the open admission system....⁶²

As we have seen, this radicalization of Onyx had been occurring gradually and was not nearly as precipitous as Ballard for instance suggests, although he is clearly right in his characterization of the impact of King's assassination. How did this radicalization process reach its climax? Who were the principals involved? How in fact did this "submerging" of Onyx come about given the estrangement between Onyx and the SEEK students. The answers to these and similar questions become clear from an understanding of the evolution of the 'Committee of Ten'.

In trying to reconstruct the history of the Committee of Ten, this researcher encountered questions of facts, to which complete answers are not readily available. The nature of these questions will become clear in the exposition. Several groupings or organizations are generally associated with the South Campus seizure. These include the Black and Puerto Rican Students Community (BPRSC), the Onyx Society, the Puerto Rican Students for Action (PRISA), the 'SEEK students', and the Committee of Ten. The question as to the relationship between the entities is in need of clarification: It is

not uncommon for instance, for the media to use 'Committee of Ten' and 'BPRSC' interchangeably in covering events on and off campus; or, to see the Committee of Ten described as being made up of the organizations PRISA, Onyx and 'SEEK' Students.

Based on interviews with former Committee members and other participants in the Black and Puerto Rican activist student community at City College, at least partial clarity has been achieved. It seems clear for instance, that there was never a formal organization called the Black and Puerto Rican Student's Community. Rather, that was the communal label used informally by Black and Puerto Rican students, many of whom came out of a common experience of the Alamac, and, by virtue of the issues raised by their SEEK status, found themselves increasingly making common cause. It should be noted, for example, that the New World Coalition ticket headed by Arce had as one of its expressed purposes the "mobilizing primarily of Black and Puerto Rican students on campus".⁶³ A Committee of Ten member, Serge Mullery remembers:

The BPRSC became an organization without our having decided it would become so, that is, informally. We were cooperating in many things and had gotten used to referring to ourselves that way. So there was never a formal organization. The Committee of Ten was the organization.

The basis of the relationship between the PRISA, Onyx and the Committee of Ten, stems in part from the Alamac connection. The PRISA was organized in the fall of 1968 by a group of Puerto Ricans: Henry Arce (who claims for himself the distinction of being the very first student to live at the Dorm); Iris Morales (who in conjunction with Alamac residents Felipe Luciano and Pablo Guzman, would shortly found

the Young Lords Party); along with Pablo Cruz. All three later became active with the Committee of Ten, which in the minds of many Puerto Ricans was simply an extension of Onyx. And although the PRISA leadership openly pursued opportunities to collaborate with Onyx, this apparently created some internal disagreements. "Many students in PRISA did not care for coalition politics", Arce noted, "they felt they should wait until PRISA was stronger... there was a perception that the Blacks not only out-numbered Puerto Ricans but also were better organized, as in Onyx...".⁶⁵ It was PRISA which took the initiative "to attempt to influence some changes through campus politics", and sought Onyx's support in that effort. It was this collaboration effort, in Arce's mind, which solidified the political bond between the two groups and organizations.⁶⁶

Onyx too had a strong SEEK connection at the Alamac in the shape of informal organization. Former Committee of Ten member, Robert Feaster recalls that:

The early spark for the movement came from five people - myself, Pablo Torres, Leroy Hadj, Gilbert Gutierrez and Collier Smith (both now dead). This group predated the Committee of Ten... we got together in fall '67 to agitate for a SEEK student government (at City College) ... we were very confrontational about it... in retrospect this was probably unnecessary....⁶⁷

Both Feaster and Hadj later became members of the Ten. The Alamac probably added to the sense of estrangement between its City College residents (who constituted the bulk of students there), and the Onyx Society, by virtue of its unique identity. Moreover, it seems likely too that the SEEK leadership forged at the Alamac, were reluctant to lose standing in an organization to which they would be

newcomers. The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. supplied in part, the impetus to breach this gap, as well as did the arrival on campus in September of a number of students whose backgrounds were not Alamac or Onyx related. The 'Black Power' movement, and in particular, the notion of community control were at their zenith, as expressed in the controversy then raging over school decentralization; the growing economic 'miracle' of the Nation of Islam; and the thrust toward the development of an independent 'Black' politics. All of these phenomena were part of the backdrop that contributed – in ways impossible to measure precisely – to the specific decisions taken by specific individuals.

The mood of the times at City College is conjured up in one particular reminiscence of Robert Feaster that measured, for him, the impact of King's murder:

It was a very fascinating thing that happened... not many students wore 'Afros' up until the time he was assassinated (just before the spring break)... when we came back after the spring break there was an explosion of 'Afros' on the campus... you'd think there had been a conspiracy to do this... in truth that was when the movement was born... in that spring... and King's assassination was a spark....⁶⁸

More politically, the spark evidently intensified the feelings among students (SEEK and non-SEEK) that they had to do 'something'. Prior to April 4, the feeling was "we weren't sure what we wanted to do".⁶⁹ When September 1968 rolled around one obvious task seemed to have been to find a way to bring together Onyx-based students (which included many earlier 'pre-bac' students such as Francine Covington, Iris Morales and so on), and the newer SEEK students filtering from the Alamac. Conflict between the groups coexisted with a need to seek

ways of bridging the gap. The elements associated with the Alamac appear to have been more militant in mood and confrontational in tactics. "Our dialogue with Onyx intensified in the fall of '68", recalls Feaster, "we attended their meetings and demanded time on their agenda... we'd get up and read excerpts from Malcolm X, it was a classic confrontation...".⁷⁰ Onyx, in the minds of the dissident SEEK leadership, was linked to its older image as the host and sponsor of 'coat-tails' on Thursdays. Such an image was apparently viewed as inconsistent with the 'new' image as providing progressive leadership to City College's Black student community.

The dilemma was resolved by the formation of the Committee of Ten sometime, perhaps, in October, of 1968. The Committee of Ten was actually a new committee of the Onyx Society. This may seem contradictory, in the light of what we have presented thus far. However Onyx's organizational structure, as well as the concept of the Committee of Ten, explains why the dissident SEEK leadership became involved with the new committee.

The Onyx Society had a president and vice-president but functioned largely on the basis and initiative of its several committees, the most important of which were mentioned above. New committees were formed whenever an issue arose which did not fall within the purview of existing committees, and providing there were individuals interested in the new activities. The Committee of Ten, Louis Rivera recalls, came about when in the fall of '68,

a couple of fellows (who) had just got through seeing the "Battle of Algiers"... came into the school... and suggested the formation of cells similar to the "Battle of Algiers". The cells would be comprised of ten people... but the ten in one cell would be unknown to the ten in the other....⁷¹

The 'couple of fellows' probably included Rick Reed and Charles Powell, who began classes in the evening school that fall. Powell was also a member of the Black Panther Party. The 'Battle of Algiers' film had long been a part of the educational fare of the Panther Party. But it was Reed, who arrived on campus that fall, who provided the idea of using Onyx' committee structure to consolidate the energies into a solidary thrust.

Three names stood out in the process of conducting this study, namely, Charles Powell, Serge Mullery, and Rick Reed. If Powell and Mullery stood out for their prominent roles in the negotiations, Reed is recalled by participants as the visionary and strategist who inspired them. "City College was not just a 'protest'", Committee member Tom Soto would later state, "we knew we were going to win something concretely, Rick Reed had great insight and inspired the belief that we could change the admissions system...".⁷² Mullery, himself an admired campus rhetorician is even more categorical:

You can't talk about what happened in 1969 without talking about Rick Reed. We never held elections in the Committee of Ten... but we all knew Rick was the leader... I followed Rick's leadership... (he) came in with a wealth of information and experience and really gave us a sense of direction....⁷³

It was Reed and the other 'newcomer' (presumably Powell), Mullery stated, who contributed to the idea that there was "more to be done" at "a new level" of activism and, moreover, "that there ought to be a committee to address these issues". Mullery was impressed by the fact that Reed "did not attempt to form a rival organization, or to dictate to Onyx". (Reed was reputed to have been a SNCC worker years before. He was said to have had long and extensive contacts with the

full spectrum of Black radicals.) The "Battle of Algiers" evidently found appeal, perhaps due to the Panther Party, then riding a crest of popularity. The new committee was adapted along the lines of its 'ten-ten' program. Instead of 'cells', "we called ourselves families" Mullery noted.

The Committee of Ten helped to dissolve much of the conflict between SEEK dissidents and Onyx, as well as to temper the concerns of some Puerto Rican students regarding the perceived relative strength of Onyx. The Society was not hierarchical in nature, and the concept of the new committee probably supported a kind of illusion that members were not formally a part of Onyx. Nevertheless, the Committee of Ten was shortly to become the center of activity, so much so that Onyx was soon eclipsed by its growth. "I am not quite sure when Onyx disappeared," said Mullery, Chairperson of Onyx's Education Committee, "it just faded away... Tom Schick (its president) just couldn't get a meeting after a while...".⁷⁴ By February 1969, the Onyx leadership was already out of step with the pace and direction of the new committee: "Schick", noted the Observation Post, was "...uninvolved in the planning of the Committee of Ten's confrontation with the administration recently...".⁷⁵ That seemed to be a telling observation.

Towards an Agenda

Information regarding the actual working of the Committee, particularly at its initiation, is generally very fuzzy. The most comprehensive account was provided by Serge Mullery.⁷⁷ This account seems consistent with the actions later taken by the Committee, and with the contemporary practices of 'revolutionary' organizations such

as the Panthers. What the activists recognized, Mullery said, was the fact that while they had a lot of issues around which to organize, they lacked a comprehensive framework in which to couch these issues, and on which to plan action strategies. Thus,

The first decision of the Committee was to educate itself... we began to read... books I'd never heard of ... Wretched of the Earth, The Black Anglo Saxons, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual... we viewed the 'Battle of Algiers' a few times... we read Che Guevara... Stokely Carmichael... but ... Malcolm was the central figure in our thinking....⁷⁶

According to Mullery, they delved into Marxist analysis of society and were intrigued by the notions of commodity, and surplus labor, as adapted by Stokely Carmichael to explain the existence and perpetuation of America's racial ghettos. They were impressed said Mullery, by Harold Cruse's argument that the individual could only achieve proportional to the social, political and economic status of the group to which he or she belonged: "This made a lot of sense to us". From Che Guevara they adopted the maxim: 'don't charge a tank with rocks'; and resolved never to engage in confrontations with the police. "We were very impressed by the Strawberry Statement", recalled Mullery, "we thought that if the police was willing to bust the heads of rich white kids at Columbia, what would they do to us!" They adopted from Guevara another principle of guerilla warfare: never to get trapped in one place. Both of these principles seemed to have been at work throughout the escalating stages of their activities in the spring of 1969. "By late fall 1968", said Mullery, "We had a schedule of what was supposed to happen that spring". There was to be five stages: the petition stage; temporary occupation of

Administration Building; an activity called 'hit and run'; a 'lock-up' activity; and finally the takeover of South Campus. Briefly, the plans called for a swift occupation of the Administration Building, designed to send a message of their resolve - in the event (which was anticipated) that Gallagher's response to their initial petition was unsatisfactory. 'Hit and run' would escalate that tactic by selective acts of vandalism and class disruption; 'lock-up' would further escalate matters by a half day total shut down of the entire South Campus - this was to be accomplished in exactly the manner of the subsequent actual seizure. The activists said Mullery, planned to be gone by the time police arrived to reopen the classrooms. The final activity - the takeover - had been planned to occur just before the end of the semester. As events transpired, the 'lock-up' became the takeover. "We had not planned for a takeover" Mullery emphasized.

Meanwhile the DuBois Society in November had circulated its petition, signed by 1,600 students. This does not necessarily mean that their petition was the basis for the Committee's five demands, as implied by Ackerman (see above). There is evidence suggesting that the five demands were already a viable concept. The most compelling is offered by the words of one Lee Scofield, a SEEK student, who represented the views of the Committee of Ten to a class of City College students on May 15, 1969, while the negotiations were ongoing:

The first time you heard about the demands was probably in February... these demands were in fact worked over during last summer (1968). When Onyx came back on campus in September they had an evaluation unit and attempted to get the Black students on campus into the organization... but at that point they had (already) begun to formulate the five demands....⁷⁸

Moreover, a flyer circulated during the period by the BPRSC began with the words: "Since October, 1968 when the Five Demands were first presented to the administration...."⁷⁹ As chilled December winds blew, the Committee of Ten prepared for action, spurred on no doubt by the presence and fiery words of the heroes and heroines of the day: Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Kathleen Cleaver, Miriam Makeba, and activists from the Oceanhill-Brownsville school district, as well as a group of striking high school students from nearby Music and Art. Carmichael told the several hundreds gathered at Great Hall that Tuesday, December 2nd: "A black militant is an angry black man who is angry at white folk for keeping him out of the system".⁸⁰ The Committee of Ten was ready to engage in the politics of confrontation.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. The New York Times, April 12, 1949.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. The New York Times Editorial, April 13, 1949.
5. The Campus, Editorial, November 10, 1966.
6. The Campus, November 22, 1966.
7. The Campus, January 4, 1967.
8. Interview with Ron McGuire, Jan 26, 1989.
9. According to McGuire, the group did not become formally known as the Commune until the fall of 1968, following the visit by McGuire and other associates to Berkeley where in "summer 1968 we experienced an anarchistic community called the Berkeley Commune". Up to that time, the group was known as "the family" because "we rented apartments in the Bronx, close to each other and formed an extended family relation".
10. Interview with Prof. Bernard Sohmer, May 8, 1987.
11. Interview with Ron McGuire, January 26, 1984; this was Prof. Elias of the Philosophy Department who McGuire recalls as being among the more vocal faculty.
12. Ibid.
13. The Campus, April 25, 1968.
14. Early in September 1968 this professor tendered his resignation.
15. Interview with Ron McGuire.
16. The Campus, November 14, 1968.
17. Ibid.
18. See for example: David E. Lavin, et al, in Right versus Privilege, p.9; the DuBois petition probably achieved this status because of the article "The South Campus Seizure" written by Tom Ackerman for the CCNY Alumnus of October 1969. According to Ackerman the events that unfolded in April '69 had their genesis in the controversies of November 1968 that forced "the largest mass arrests of students and non-students in the school's history". After the petition appeared the DuBois

leader was invited to address a leadership group of Black and Puerto Rican students, who in turn "thanked him and left", and later adopted two demands from the DuBois petition into their own '5 demands'.

19. Tom Ackerman, CCNY Alumnus, vol. 65-66, October 1969, p.4.
20. This is paraphrased from the actual demands which were published in The Campus, November 14, 1968.
21. The article, titled "The Campus Right: A New-Found Militancy", was written by Livia Goldring.
22. See The Campus, November 26, 1968.
23. Ibid.
24. Remarks reported in The Campus, November 17, 1966.
25. Interview with Steve Simon, February 3, 1989.
26. Ibid.
27. The Campus, November 26, 1968.
28. Ballard, Education of Black Folk, p. 122.
- 28a. Quoted in a CAMPUS article concerning "The View from Harlem", March 3, 1965.
- 28b. Ibid.
29. Interview with Henry Arce, April 6, 1989. See also The Campus, November 7, 1968. The name was changed to PRISA - Puerto Rican Students For Action: See The Campus, November 20, 1968.
30. From records compiled by City College archivist, Barbara Dunlop.
- 30b. Compiled from figures provided in the The Minutes of the Board of Higher Education (1960 to 1965).
31. Interview with Prof. Leslie Berger, February 14, 1989
32. Published in the The Campus, December 20, 1967.
- 32a. The Campus, May 4, 1966.
- 32b. Ibid.
- 32c. Ibid.
- 32d. Ibid.

37. Interview with Ron McGuire, January 26, 1989.
38. The Campus, October 11, 1967.
39. Interview with Dr. Bernard Sohmer, May 8, 1987.
40. The Campus, November 16, 1967.
41. Ibid.
42. The Campus, October 27, 1967.
43. Interview with Serge Mullery, April 12, 1989.
44. Interview with Robert Feaster, July 13, 1988.
45. Ibid.
46. Ballard, The Education of Black Folk, p. 68.
- 46a. From a keynote address by Dr. Ballard at the CCNY SEEK Awards dinner, May 7, 1985.
47. Interview with Professor Leslie Berger, February 14, 1989.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Interview with Professor. Fran Geteles, February 27, 1989
51. Ballard, The Education of Black Folk, p. 72.
52. Interview with Robert Feaster, July 13, 1988.
53. The Campus, September, 13, 1968.
54. Interview with Robert Feaster, July 13, 1988.
55. Observation Post, February 7, 1969.
56. Ibid.
57. Interview with Prof. Leslie Berger, February 14, 1989
58. Ibid.
59. "Report and Recommendations of the Chancellor's Advisory Council on SEEK, p.8, Office of University Relations, February 3, 1969.
60. Ibid.
61. Interview with Louis Rivera, March 10, 1989.

62. Ballard, The Education of Black Folk, p. 67.
63. Observation Post, February 7, 1969.
64. Interview with Serge Mullery, April 12, 1989.
65. Interview with Henry Arce, April 6, 1989.
66. Ibid.
67. Interview with Robert Feaster, July 13, 1988.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid. [This sentiment was shared by several activists.]
70. Ibid.
71. Interview with Louis Rivera, March 10, 1989.
72. Interview with Tom Soto, August 11, 1988.
73. Interview with Serge Mullery, April 12, 1989.
74. Ibid.
75. Observation Post, February 14, 1969.
76. Interview with Serge Mullery, April 12, 1989.
77. Ibid.
78. Presentation by Lee Scofield on the Five Demands in Prof. Martha Weissman class at Fraternity House, City College, May 13, 1969.
79. BPRSC flyer (undated) titled "Message to the Grass Roots", The City College Archives.
80. The Campus, December 5, 1968.

CHAPTER III THE SOUTH CAMPUS SEIZURE

The Five Demands

The opening paragraph of text of the policy on open admissions which was adapted by the Board of Higher Education on July 9, 1969 reads as follows:

Perhaps no issue at the City University has ever received as much attention as the 'Five Demands' at City College. Negotiations at City College were followed by lengthy and intensive review and analysis by the City College Faculty Senate and the City College Administration. The Student Senate at the College developed a position after careful study, and polls were taken of the entire faculty to gain more insight into the issues. The Board itself has devoted five special meetings to these issues, in addition to discussions at regular Board Meetings and meetings of the Executive Committee.¹

Clearly, if nothing else, one impact of the five demands was to suspend 'business-as-usual' at every level of the university. What were the five demands? How did they come to have such overwhelming impact?

The five demands were as follows:

1. Establishment of a separate school of Black and Puerto Rican Studies.
2. A separate orientation for Black and Puerto Rican freshmen;
3. A voice for students in the setting of all guidelines for the SEEK program, including the hiring and firing of all personnel;
4. The racial composition of all entering classes should reflect the Black and Puerto Rican population of the New York City high schools;

5. Black and Puerto Rican history and the Spanish language should be a requirement for all education majors.²

The five demands defined both the ills, and a program to cure the ills of City College (and by extension - the United States) from the viewpoint of the Committee of Ten. At the core of those ills, in their view, was a systemic condition called racism, or more precisely, institutional racism. In part because their 'special status' simultaneously isolated them programmatically from so-called 'regular students' and unified them; in part because their few numbers contributed to the sense of being 'outsiders' on a predominantly white campus; in part because of the radicalizing influence of the Black Power movement, the student activists seemed pre-disposed to interpret their specific grievances in the context of institutional racism. Moreover, the ideologues of the movement seemed at some pains to make clear that what they had in mind in terms of racism was not simply bigotry. Thus Paul Simms, an Onyx member and supporter of the Committee of Ten - and the only Black student on the all white campus newspaper TECHNEWS - argued that in the context of American society, racism was a 'whites only' disease:

For to be a racist means one is involved in the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating (original emphasis) a racial group and maintaining control over that group....³

Simms was careful to specify the source of his definition (Black Power by Carmichael and Hamilton, p.3), a clear indication that he was firmly rooted in the ideological tradition of that perspective: thus, if few Blacks and Puerto Ricans graced the hallowed halls of City

College, it was not accidental; if the faces and stories of the Black and Puerto Rican peoples were absent from the syllabi and libraries, it was not from mere oversight or bad taste; if the special programs were designed to keep control in white hands and deny influence to their prime beneficiaries, all this was part of an institutional blueprint which had as its aim (whether conscious or unconscious) to perpetuate white dominance in the society.

While extensive evidence exists of the nature of the grievances experienced by the activists and defined by the five demands, the broader plans and rationale implicit in the demands are less clear. This is mainly because only sparse records exist of the activists' articulation (written or oral) of their vision at the time. Nevertheless, based on campus newspaper interviews and coverage of events, articles by sympathetic faculty, the recollections of activists, as well as secondary analyses of this and comparable phenomena, it is possible to offer a view of the vision implicit in the five demands.

Demand #1: A School of Black and Puerto Rican Studies

Although the original demand was for a separate School of Black and Puerto Rican Studies, by the time the New World Coalition (comprising members of Onyx, PRISA and an SDS minority) advanced its campaign slate in January of 1969, the first demand had changed. The activists now demanded instead a School of Third World Studies. Later that spring, in the March 25th publication of UTAMBUZI, the Onyx Society newsletter, the original five demands were expanded and the terminology amended from 'Black and Puerto Rican' to 'Third World'. This change indicated an evolutionary shift in the activists vision

form a narrowly ethnic, to a more international and multicultural vision. Why did this change occur?

It seems certain that the student elections of spring 1969, while usually a lack-luster event, also precipitated an important internal dialogue among the Black and Puerto Rican activists. One important piece of this dialogue concerned the issue of color and ethnicity in defining the goals and implicitly, the character of the movement. As noted above, there was resistance among PRISA activists to a coalition with Onyx in part because the latter was perceived as much better organized and hence potentially overpowering. Another aspect of their reluctance concerned the issues of color and ethnicity. The Onyx Society was in many respects, a creature of its time when "Black Student Unions, Afro-American Associations, Soul Student Unions ... came into being as a response to the demands and ideology of Black Power."⁵ Although the concept had a unifying influence among groups of Black students, it also contributed to the growth of a kind of chauvinism based on skin shading. This was a source of division between the Blacks and Puerto Ricans at City College. "The Basic issue was color", recalls former PRISA leader Henry Arce...

Puerto Ricans come in all colors - from very black to very light. At this time Blacks had just begun to embrace the concept of being Black, ... 'don't call me Negro, call me Black' regardless of whether you were light-skinned or dark - Black was in! Many of the Blacks were too zealous in their belief in Blackness to accept that that was not going to help us work together. Many Blacks would look at us (light-skinned Puerto Ricans) and think we were white, when in fact we were Puerto Ricans.⁶

The shift to the idea of a 'Third World' identity was thus an attempt to find a common ground on which to root the movement ideologically. It was also a recognition of the fact that it was necessary to accommodate to the reality of other non-white, but also non-Black groups who could be potential allies. Thus in the March '69 revision of the demands, the wording of the fourth demand:

That the racial composition of all entering classes reflect the Black and Puerto Rican population of the New York City high schools....

was changed to read instead:

... entering classes reflect the Black, Puerto Rican and Asian population....⁷

An aspect of the demand for a 'separate school' which received much attention concerned the virtual absence of courses in the City College curriculum with which Black and Puerto Rican students could identify. Hence, as late as the fall of 1968 The Campus could report that a 'History of Africa' course (which had lately been instituted as a result of Onyx lobbying efforts) was so popular that 90 people were closed out of the class. The Campus observed that despite the presence at City College of highly qualified specialists (for example, Jean Herskovits on West Africa or, Philip Silverman on East Africa), courses on Africa were few and scattered. The 'Peoples of Africa' course, it was noted, had been given only twice in five or six years.⁸ But the issue was not perceived simply as too few courses here or there. The critique of the curriculum implied by the demand went much deeper than that. It was in essence an attack upon what was seen as the cultural chauvinism represented by the curriculum as it stood. This point was elegantly articulated by author Toni Cade, then a writing teacher in the SEEK program:

A brief glance at the (City College) bulletin will reveal that the English Department is still dipping out of the old Anglo-Saxon bag, the snobbism and racism of which has its roots in the Jamestown Settlement and was nourished from generation to generation by Anglophiles like T.S. Elliot, for example, who were committed to the belief that the Anglo-Saxon tradition was superior to all and that its purity and sanctity needed to be protected by the most sturdy of America's cultural protectoral institutions - its universities. The infusion of one or two Black literature courses in their curricula does nothing at all to the deeply entrenched notion that Anglo-Saxon literature is THE LITERATURE....⁹

The primary function of the School of Third World Studies was therefore not merely to provide more courses, but to foster development of cultural constructs to counter the cultural hegemony represented by standard university curricula.¹⁰ It was for this reason that student activists and other proponents of such a "counter school" insisted that it had to be a separate (that is, autonomous) entity. For the new school to evolve a competitive ideology - so ran the logic - it would need an atmosphere independent of the institutional norms and controls of the university.

The new school was called upon to accomplish a number of broad goals. Among them, to provide "our freshmen with sufficient details of historical information to go into the various department" to challenge, and hence change the curriculum.¹¹ Thus, according to activist Louis Rivera, it had never been the intention to demand "our students to major in Black or Puerto Rican studies", but rather to precipitate the cultural transformation of the college. A second related broad goal of the new school was directed at creating change at the community level by linking the resources of the university to

the issues of the community. The key word was 'relevance'. Thus in her vision of the beginnings of such an institution at City College, Toni Cade conceived a center which:

....would tap the resources in our community and use as instructors those grandmothers, those on the corner hardheads, those students, those instructors, whoever happens to have the knowledge and expertise we desire, regardless of the number or absence of degrees, publications, titles, honors.¹²

The demand for a separate school, it is clear then, was fired by a vision which endowed the university with enormous transformational power. This power worked on the individual level to motivate through the inculcation of new cultural information; on the community level to transform through the coordination of resources.

Demand #2: A separate orientation for Black and Puerto Rican freshmen.

If the first demand was global in its implications, the second spoke to the specific experiences of SEEK freshmen at City College: "... the present freshman orientation structure", wrote activist Paul Simms, "does not deal with the adjustments that Black students have to make coming to City College."¹³ The Observation Post in its February 14th (1969) editorial in support of the demands argued that those adjustments were precipitated by the fact that "most Black students ... come ... from high schools that are the shame of the city's educational system". Examples of these included Hughes, Benjamin Franklyn, Brandeis, George Washington, Jefferson, and so on. Since this academic experience was so profoundly different for white and Black or Puerto Rican students, this fact dictated the logic of a special orientation class in which - according to the implied vision

of the editorial - Black and Puerto Rican students would "have learned to understand and articulate their experience". Only then would "white students ... be able to learn and benefit from the knowledge of that experience ...". "Black students", wrote Simms:

... are going to have to get used to naive little white students running up to them, asking to integrate with them until it's time to go home, or integrate to feel the Black experience, or integrating to find out what we really want. They want to know where you were during the riots, do you like Le Roi Jones, Bayard Rustin or George Schyler, and what about the Black Panthers....¹⁴

For the students then the demand addressed not merely the academic requirements normally covered in the brief general freshman orientation, but went to the core of their daily existence on campus. For them the primary purpose of a separate orientation was to process the feelings of isolation and the 'intruder' complex, as well as to draw upon the group for the skills and the energy to survive the ordeal of the initial exposure to the predominantly white college.

Demand #3: A voice for students in the setting of all guidelines for the SEEK, including the hiring and firing of all personnel.

This demand was a natural extension of the general clamor for a larger voice for students in campus affairs. Since SEEK students were non-matriculated, they were not a part of that scenario. Their groping for democratization had to be directed toward the SEEK structure. "This demand", Observation Post editorialized, "represents nothing less than the basic rights of all students everywhere...".

While the general thrust toward student power supplied some of the motivation for the demand, the notion of community control undoubtedly influenced student thinking as well. Certainly, the fact

that most of the SEEK personnel were white was a source of discontent for some activists. Professor Geteles who came to City College in January 1967 as a SEEK counselor recalls that Betty Rawls (who is regarded as a significant actor in the unfolding events),

... was the first Black SEEK counselor. In the beginning, Berger had hired only clinical psychologists because the thinking was that students had a lot of problems and that this was what they needed. This meant that most counselors were white....¹⁵

Rawls, she explained was working at the time on a doctoral degree in clinical psychology at Columbia University. The clinical orientation with its focus on individual adaptation drew the resentment of some students and faculty who drew the inference that they were viewed as essentially maladjusted. This basic interpretation did not change when the hiring of social workers permitted the entry of more Blacks as counselors. Thus at Queens College the fourth of nine proposals drawn up by the Black and Puerto Rican Student-Faculty Coalition stated that:

There must be academic counselors and not 'psychiatric' counselors (social workers).¹⁶

This demand was reiterated as Recommendation #15 in the Report and Recommendations of the Chancellor's Advisory Council on SEEK, stemming from the investigation of events involving the SEEK program at Queens College during December 1969.^{16a} This demand for a voice in hiring and setting guidelines thus spoke to the vision of a SEEK program which honored the experience of Black and Puerto Rican students as different perhaps from white middle class America, but fundamentally worthy (as against the prevailing mental health model which regarded children of the ghettos as fundamentally flawed).

Demand #4: The racial composition of als entering classes should reflect the Black and Puerto Rican population of the New York City high schools.

Of all the demands, this was perhaps the most instinctive, and ultimately, the most difficult. In discussing this demand, each of the former activists recall that it was an issue that came up very early in their career at City College, and struck with particular force. The recollections of Serge Mullery on this point is representative of the general feeling:

The first thing we wanted was to have some more Black students on campus. Why were so many of us in the evening school and so few of us in the day? How come there were so many of us in the high schools and so few of us in the College?¹⁷

The activists demand did not translate into a vision of open admissions, however. On the contrary, the vision that was articulated was a conservative one involving a very limited number of students, and relating exclusively to the City College. Without exception, the former activists, and many faculty who were interviewed, agreed that the vision of the fourth demand stemmed primarily from the input of Prof. Alfred Conrad of the Economics Department. Although a document prepared by Conrad on behalf of the students is not in evidence in the City College Archives (one suggested explanation is that it never became part of the formal documents of the negotiation), enough of the essential details survived to give a clear impression of the intent of the demand. According to these sources, based on figures he obtained from the Board of Education, Conrad developed a statistical model to depict the ratio of Black and Puerto Rican students in the city's high schools. The activists unequivocally assert that it was Conrad's contribution which boosted their sense of the moral correctness of

their 'non-negotiable' demand for proportional representation. (As will be seen later this was the most difficult aspect of the negotiations.) Prof. Fran Geletes describes as "brilliant" the proposal which was the out-growth of Conrad's research, and which she recalls as having been distributed widely among the faculty:

Conrad's proposal was to take the five worst high schools in the Bronx. A special College prep program would be set up in those schools in which City College students would be involved. Any high school student who survived the program would be guaranteed a place at City College....¹⁸

Conrad's proposal was never really taken seriously by anyone, recalls Geletes, except the students. And they did not envision open enrollment, "they were just asking to increase the enrollment - they were very sensitive to the issues of underpreparedness and were not asking for indiscriminate entrance".¹⁹ This point was also confirmed repeatedly in the course of interviews with the former activists.

Demand #5: Black and Puerto Rican history and the Spanish language should be a requirement for all education majors.

This was the least controversial of the demands, and as will be seen, was easily settled. The logic of the demand seemed irrefutable: the bulk of teachers in the New York City school system were trained by the Colleges of the City University; these schools increasingly were populated by a plurality of Black and Puerto Rican children; at a minimum, future teachers should understand the history, culture and language of that population. Thus once again, the thrust seemed oriented toward making the college directly relevant to a significant issue of concern to 'the community'.

'Hit and Run'

"During the week of December 16-23, a crisis in the SEEK program at Queen's College burst into public view. The situation continued to worsen during the year-end holiday, reaching a climax during the first week of 1969".²⁰ Thus began the report of the Chancellor's Advisory Council on SEEK. Concern over "gross manifestations of campus disruption, disorder, and violence" and its impact on "the temper of SEEK students on other campuses of the City University" led to the convening on Friday, January 10th 1969 of the Council, "to consider what could be done".²¹ The result of that meeting was the appointment of a Task Force which, over the next 12 days conducted an intense investigation resulting in the Report (cited above) which detailed an extensive set of Findings and Recommendations "for such steps as might meet and avoid the incipient dangers".

If one of those dangers included the possibility of similar eruptions on the other campuses of the university, the work of the Task Force was, to use a cliché, 'too little, too late'. For the Queens College eruption had set forth a model of confrontation. And while there is no direct evidence that the events at Queens influenced the City College activists, the strong probability is that it did. This is based on the fact, noted above, that a strong communications network (in part facilitated by the Alamac) existed among SEEK student leadership on a university-wide basis. Moreover, by this time the Committee of Ten had been in existence for several months, planning and debating action strategies. The Queens action might simply have spurred the Committee to act sooner and more resolutely than it otherwise would have done. This latter probability is anticipated by

resource mobilization theory, which sees planning (rather than spontaneous reaction) as the natural product of communication.

These speculations aside, on Thursday February 6th, the Committee held a rally at which "the Black and Puerto Rican students filled the Grand Ballroom [of Finley Student Center] to capacity with standing room only".²⁵ The meeting had been called to discuss the demands which were to be presented later that day to President Gallagher. The demands by this time were becoming fairly well publicized on campus since they essentially formed the platform of the New World Coalition, which sought to gain a voice for the Black and Puerto Rican student community through the channel of student politics. (As noted above, this was part of the appeal of the Committee of Ten.) It was this meeting too, according to the recollections of activist Louis Rivera, which established the Committee of Ten as a leadership organization vis-a-vis the larger mass of Black and Puerto Rican students who were heretofore unaware of its existence. At this meeting:

The Committee of Ten introduced itself as leaders of the Black and Puerto Rican community. Serge Mullery was the chief spokesperson and head of a cell. There were to be 10 cells each with 10 people. Newcomers would develop a new cell. Well I remember challenging them about who appointed them to be leaders, that caused an uproar.²³

The Committee survived the challenge in part because "they had already established a core" and , following the meeting, led the students in a march on the Administration Building to deliver the demands to President Gallagher's office. The students urged Gallagher (who was reportedly on vacation) to "utilize whatever means necessary

to meet the demands", and announced that they would reassemble the next Thursday at noon at the Administration Building to hear his reply. It was the first stage in the protracted strategy of 'hit and run' which the Committee had worked out in the fall.

If, as is generally accepted, the five demands first made their appearance on February 6th, then it seems appropriate to consider the following question: why did the activists find it necessary to stage a mass meeting as the context for delivering the demands? One obvious answer is that it was an accepted way of demonstrating the strength and popularity of the issues. This approach suggests, however, a curious lack of sophistication by the activists in terms of their appreciation of the importance of the rituals of 'normal' protocol in these matters. What is even more curious is that such an important event should occur with the activists unaware of the absence from the campus of their main target. The events of February 6th seem more in line with the proposition that the five demands had previously been presented through normal channels (perhaps in October, as suggested by the BPRSC flyer cited above). The February 6th show of force was then designed to indicate the seriousness of their intent, in the absence of a response to the demands. Gallagher for his part would claim that his first knowledge of the five demands was as of February 6th. This does not negate the probability that they'd been put through the College bureaucracy: the BPRSC expressed their frustration at being "sent running by President Gallagher through a bureaucratic maze in continual attempt to get a positive answer to our demands".²⁴

In due course, the next Thursday, February 13th the Committee of Ten and its supporters reconvened in front of the two-storey

Administration Building to hear President Gallagher's reply.

"Standing in a cold wind, and on a colder snow-covered lawn, Dr. Gallagher answered each of the demands".²⁵ But apparently not to the satisfaction of the gathered throng, which challenged him to give a definite "yes" response to any of the demands. Observation Post reporter, Jonathan Penzer recorded the following exchange:

Dr. Gallagher would not say 'yes' but said instead, 'you will find my answer affirmative throughout'. 'Did you say yes?' one girl shouted out. 'On not one of the five demands can anyone leave here today and say they've gotten a "no" answer.' An angry shout and several vociferous voices responded to his answer.²⁶

Clearly dissatisfied with Dr. Gallagher's "half-assed answer" the crowd of reportedly 300 Black and Puerto Rican students, by now augmented with many whites, swarmed into the Administration Building, expelled its occupants and proceeded to occupy the building. "Within a half hour," wrote the Observation Post witness, "the building was closed to whites and all administrative activities inside began to cease".²⁷ Gallagher, shaken by the turn of events refused to say whether he planned any action against the students. Inside, the students plastered the demands prominently on the walls and ceilings, and brandished a sign reading 'Free Huey; Che Guevara, Malcolm X University'. Outside groups of left affiliated students clashed with more conservative elements who spoke of raising 'an army of students' to expel the Blacks and Puerto Ricans. At four-thirty, three and a half hours into the takeover, the students slipped out of the building through a rear exit, purportedly to avoid the news media, as well as "to keep the College in doubt as to how many students were involved in the takeover".²⁸ It was a demonstration, noted Observation Post -

reporting the comments of a student - that "we can shut this College down if we want to. We'll be back if necessary".²⁹

The essence of Dr. Gallagher's "affirmative" response to the five demands was released in the form of a statement from the President's office that same afternoon:³⁰ In response to the demand for a separate school of Black and Puerto Rican Studies, the statement noted that Dr. Gallagher "invites students to join in planning programs of African, Afro-American and Hispanic studies...". He requested the Dean of Students "to re-examine the Freshman Orientation programs ...", keeping in view the "particular needs of Black and Puerto Rican students" With regards to the third demand Dr. Gallagher affirmed that the director of the SEEK program welcomed the participation of SEEK students in matters of policy and hiring personnel; "he affirms that the City University in September 1968, admitted Black and Puerto Rican students in full proportion to their ratio among all the high school graduates of New York City ...". Finally, he affirmed support for requiring Spanish, as well as Black and Puerto Rican history for Education majors.

If the temporary occupation of the Administration Building was any indication, Gallagher's response was perceived as a transparent, 'tongue in cheek' attempt to trick the students. Moreover, developments soon showed that the five demands were not about to be shunted aside as minor issues of the college. Clearly the Committee of Ten seemed determined to maintain the focus as the primary issues of the day. Hence the hit and run tactic moved to another level, and on Monday, February 17th the college was rocked by an apparently synchronized attack on eight buildings, including Steinman Hall, the

engineering building, where "vandals set fire to a stack of old newspapers ... causing fire alarms to go off, ... broke one of the large glass windows ...".³¹ In addition paint was spread over walls, clocks and bulletin boards on the second floor; display cases were broken throughout the building. "In the Financial Aid Office", in Shepherd Hall, "a heavyset Black person reportedly walked in, knocked all the books from a shelf, broke an electric typewriter with his hands and quietly walked out".³² Food was scattered and dishes broken in the North Campus Cafeteria; and "buckets of paint, stolen from the custodian's closet, were poured down the steps leading to Great Hall"; classrooms were emptied by smoke bombs and other devices.

Beyond the vague description that the attacks were carried out by "a group of Black and white young men and women", no positive identification was made by the administration regarding the individuals or groups responsible for the acts. For activist Serge Mullery, the operation marked a high point in the evolution from planning stage to operational stage of the Committee's ideas:

My family had Wagner Hall. We broke out the fire extinguishers and sprayed the hall ways ... we painted the walls and just disrupted classes. We planned this like clockwork. We had rehearsed it and walked through it, and we hit six buildings, painted walls, sprayed fire extinguishers, made noise. Our intention was to do no physical harm to anyone, and by the time they opened the doors we were gone.³³

Mullery felt that the ominous nature of the hit and run tactic was a factor in President Gallagher's initial reaction to the later South Campus takeover, which led to the prolonged and unanticipated occupation.

Meanwhile, the annual political ritual associated with the budget process was beginning to intrude upon the campuses. Gallagher for one had seized the opportunity when confronted with the five demands to inject the notion that the SEEK program itself was jeopardized by the anticipated shortfall. The Governor's budget for 1969-70 as proposed, he argued, would cut the SEEK program in half, and reduce the freshman class by 20%.³⁴ The seriousness of this prospect received a further boost when later in February, Gallagher actually threatened not to open the college that September if the State persisted with the budget cuts. This was not a new ploy for him, according to the Campus. Two years before President Gallagher had successfully employed this gimmick when faced with a similar situation³⁵. The atmosphere of crisis was further augmented by the decision by the University Administrative Council to delay acceptance letters to new students. These letters, which were normally sent out by April 15, would be delayed until July 1. These developments fired a general mobilization of students and faculty throughout the university to oppose the proposed cuts. The Student Advisory Council, a predominantly white group, took on the task of mobilizing people for a proposed massive visitation to the seat of power at Albany. They were joined in this effort by the newly organized Black and Puerto Rican Student Coalition which represented the various 'Third World' organizations throughout CUNY. A major rift soon developed between the two groups centered around the target of mobilization. The Black and Puerto Rican Student Coalition argued the need to mobilize their communities in support of the budget struggle, while the Student Advisory Council emphasized mobilizing the student population.

In keeping with their position, the Black and Puerto Rican Student Coalition held a mass rally in Harlem on Saturday March 15, just three days before the scheduled Albany demonstrations. "Who will survive America?" was the question raised by the chanting of the estimated one thousand participants: "very few Negroes... no pigs at all! ... NGAWAH ... Black Power".³⁶ The most prominent speaker at the rally was Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr., who attacked the governor and the mayor for attempting to "perpetrate educational genocide" upon the Black and Puerto Rican communities by way of the proposed budget cuts. Other speakers included Jeanette Washington, of the Citywide Welfare Coordinating Council, Julio Rosado, Jerome Smith, vice chairman of Harlem CORE, Dr. Thomas Matthews, chairman of NEGRO (National Economic Growth and Reconstruction); Gilberto Geneva-Valentin, Commissioner of Puerto Rican Affairs for the City Commission on Human Rights. The SDS Labor Committee composed primarily of white activists which had also planned a rally at the same site (125 St. at 7th Avenue) to protest the proposed State Office Building, attempted to join forces with the larger group. They were rebuffed by Black and Puerto Rican organizers who challenged them to:

Go into your white neighborhood and try to hold
non-violent seminars for the Northeast regional
KKK, because we don't want you coming uptown. We
cannot ally ourselves with people we know not to
trust.³⁸

This attitude held by Black and other minority radicals was to dictate their relationships with white radicals on many campuses across the nation. This was to be no less true as the days of crisis approached for the City College.

On March 18, 1969 eleven thousand CUNY and high school students converged upon Albany in two hundred and fifty buses. A sampling of posters read as follows:³⁹

"CUT THE CRAP, NOT EDUCATION"

"DON'T STUNT OUR COLLEGE GROWTH'"

"SUPPORT THE BOY'S SCOUTS - LET 'EM HAVE AN
EDUCATION"

"ROCKY'S A TRUANT, HE CUTS CLASSES"

"KISS ME, I'M FOR CUNY"

According to the Campus observer, the jubilant mood of many of the students soured when it became apparent that their demonstration was to be a showcase of "who's who" among politicians and bureaucrats. Thus a seemingly endless roll call of public officials and college presidents were met by an equally endless stream of heckling and catcalls by the students⁴⁰. Eventually four students leaders met with Governor Rockefeller and extracted "a promise ... of priority consideration for the SEEK program". Marc Beallor, a City College student leader perhaps expressed the cynicism of many students: "Unfortunately the thing is being led by state legislators and college presidents who are opportunistically using this thing to bolster their positions".⁴¹

Over the next several weeks the battle of the budget raged - at times dramatically, such as when in early April President Gallagher tendered his resignation upon the occasion of the signing of a budget by Governor Rockefeller which guaranteed a 20% cut (3,500) in freshman admission to CUNY for fall 1969.⁴² To add to the drama, 23 out of 27 heads of academic departments at City College also resigned their

chairmanships, "unless a budget adequate to the functioning and development of the City University is provided".⁴³ By mid-April the focus shifted from Albany to City Hall, where proposed cuts promised to leave the University some twenty million dollars short of what Bowker considered adequate, merely for the institution to "stand still". The result was a proposed mobilization of some 35,000 students and workers - under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Committee for City University, representing over thirty major civic and educational organizations - for a massive demonstration at City Hall. On Friday April 18, the day of the demonstration, 161 persons showed up, along with 2,500 police. Perhaps it was because of the heavy rains that day; perhaps the mood of Albany - the sense of being mere pawns in a larger political game - still haunted the students; perhaps more than a few students suspected - in line with an earlier Campus editorial (3-12-69) - that "a compromise will likely be reached wherein the university exchanges some of its autonomy for cash ... [since] the State will not pay for an institution over which they have little control".⁴⁴ Thus on the eve of what was to be the most serious crisis in the history of the university, the public debate over its future stood at an impasse.

Meanwhile, back at City College, the Committee of Ten had begun gearing up to resume its strategy of escalating the confrontation. A prolonged boycott of classes was therefore announced, which would take place starting Monday April 21st. Dr. Gallagher, no doubt fearing the disruptive impact of such an event, hastily drafted a "Memorandum to the Members of the Black and Puerto Rican Community" which was distributed on the morning of April 16th. The Memorandum read in part as follows:

Since the year is fast drawing to a close, I want to restate and clarify my position in language which can be better understood. For this purpose, I would like to invite members of the community to meet with me at 3:00 p.m. today, Wednesday, April 16, 1969 in the Aronow Auditorium at Finley Center ⁴⁵

Accordingly, close to 300 students assembled at the appointed place and time. "I came here to tell it like it is," Gallagher stated as the meeting began, "I am committed to the whole thrust of these demands."⁴⁶ To bolster this contention the President proceeded to cite "my own personal life long commitment to justice and equality." He also distributed copies of his letter of resignation to the Board of Higher Education, by which act "I put my whole career on the line".

Moving to the five demands: with regards to the demand for a separate school of Black and Puerto Rican Studies, Dr. Gallagher declared that "If CCNY is open in September, there will be a Black and Puerto Rican studies program here".⁴⁷ Dr. Wilfred Cartey had been imported from Columbia University back in February to develop such a program. The President said he expected to see Dr. Cartey's report shortly. On the question of a separate orientation for Black and Puerto Rican freshmen, he saw no reason why such a program could not be implemented that fall "if upperclass men ... are willing to run it". He declared, in reference to the demand for a voice in the administration of the SEEK program, that the newly appointed director, Dean Young "is ready to work with any SEEK students". On the fourth demand - for proportional representation in freshman admission - the President "pointed to the budget cut in Albany". He was happy to report, on the final demand, that the School of Education had recently voted to make Spanish a requirement for all entering students wishing

to major in education. Moreover, he reported, the School of Education was working on a plan for the implementation of the requirement of Black and Puerto Rican History for education majors.

Predictably, the students' response to the presentation was a mixture of sarcasm and disbelief. For instance, one questioner wanted to know why the President had not chosen to address them on the issues "two weeks ago" before what Gallagher himself perceived to be 'a communications gap' developed. Joined now by SDS and other left oriented student groups, the plans went forward for a general boycott in protest said one protester, of "the barrage of administrative bullshit" on the five demands.

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on Monday April 21, 1969 several hundred students assembled on a lawn next to the Cohen Library (renamed 'Liberation Hill'). Shortly after, the protestors started off--joined by some 400 students from Music and Arts high school -- in a procession that took them through several classroom buildings "chanting slogans and singing ... On Strike; Shut it Down". Some of the demonstrators opened classroom doors and urged the occupants to join in. The highlight of the protest came when the students finally arrived in front of the Administration Building. A mock trial was held,

... in which 'the man' [presumably Dr. Gallagher] was accused of a host of crimes including denying Black and Puerto Rican students a separate school of studies and separate freshman orientation program ... Convicted, the dummy was set aflame amid shouts of 'Burn him! kill the pig!' As the dummy burned, the crowd sang, 'Time to pick up the gun; the revolution has come'48

The Campus observers estimate the Monday boycott to be 30% effective⁴⁹. Estimates of the number of protesters vary: TechNews, as well as Observation Post put the number at "1500 or more"; while The Campus guessed a conservative 1000. Significantly, The Campus also added that 60% of the demonstrators were white students! This indicates that, beyond those directly involved in leftist politics at City College, a fairly large core of white students were sympathetic – at least to the spirit of – the five demands. And no doubt they cheered in good spirit, when Rick Reed announced: "School is out ... and this is no one day thing, we made our point for today ... see you tomorrow"⁵⁰. They, like nearly everyone else on campus that day, could have had no idea how different tomorrow was going to be.

The University of Harlem

When, early the next morning, members of the Committee assembled at the gates of the main entrance (on Convent Avenue) of the South Campus to initiate the next level of action, little did they know how their plans would shortly change. They had come to implement another stage of the plans which had been worked out in the latter part of the fall. This was the so-called 'lock up', which according to Mullery would precede the culminating event of the semester, that is, a prolonged occupation of the South Campus. According to the plan:

... we were going to chain and lock ourselves in and when they attacked we would not be there. The aim was to disrupt classes for at least half a day. It was also meant to gauge reaction to the lock up in order ... to ... plan for the take over. We had not planned for a takeover!⁵¹

Mullery's emphasis on the spontaneity of the decision to prolong the 'lockup' is shared by those participants who were interviewed. Without exception, participants pointed to the fact that they had arrived quite unprepared for an extended stay. For instance, no provisions had been made for basic things such as food, change of clothing, blankets, sleeping bags and so on. "We did not anticipate being there more than a day" said one participant.⁵²

Although the recollections of the various participants vary somewhat, there is general agreement that at least thirty-five individuals arrived at the South Campus at some time between 5:00 and 7:00 a.m. It was raining heavily. The students carried new padlocks, heavy chains and tools to remove the existing locks. Since there were several entrances to be secured, they broke into groups. At the main entrance, a pivotal confrontation took place between the students and the Burns security guards. Again, accounts of this confrontation vary. According to one version, the guards were caught "with their pants down", implying that the students' action quickly became a feat accompli.⁵³ Another version saw the Burns guards advancing resolutely upon the students, who on their part exhorted them in the name of 'the people', since "our demands were gonna affect their children". According to this version the guards' resolve was broken when one member broke rank and refused to attack the students reportedly saying 'I'm not going to hurt these folks because they're fighting for me'.⁵⁴ The essence of reality in these accounts seem to be that there was genuine sympathy by the Burns guards for the students point of view, "... otherwise we would have failed", said Mullery.

According to Technews⁵⁵ reporter Paul Simms, by eight a.m. all gates to the South Campus were locked, and the Black and Puerto Rican students behind the barricades were urging the white students who sought entry to go and discuss the issues raised by the protestors. At 8:30 the police arrived and removed the locks from the main gate. Meanwhile, a group of up to one hundred white students confronted the insurgents and demanded entrance. The insurgents held their ground, screaming 'Go home' in response to the whites' demand to 'Let us in.' Later at about 11:00 a.m. a smaller group of 50 whites demonstrated in front of the Administration Building to protest their lockout from the South Campus.

By perhaps 11:00 a.m. it was fully apparent to a stunned campus that business, as it was usually conducted especially on the South Campus of the City College, had been suspended. "It was a bewildering event" said Prof. Bernard Bellush recalling the moment when news of the 'lockup' first reached him:

... coming to school and finding the gates closed was a total surprise to us. Nobody had any idea that this was feasible or even possible - in the minds of students ⁵⁶

Professor Bernie Sohmer recalls a similar reaction. "In no context" said he, "was it familiar".

The decision by the insurgents to prolong the occupation came some time during that morning:

Buell Gallagher sent a delegation to talk with us. I think he had been impressed by the 'hit and run' - which had committed some vandalism. Later that morning by eleven or so it became clear they were not going to attempt to take back the campus, so we had a meeting and decided - the take-over was on.⁵⁷

There is no documented account of what took place on the South Campus between the time that decision was taken, and when the occupation ended two weeks later. The following portrait of life on the campus of the 'University of Harlem' is based on the rather sketchy recollections of participants, and often equally sketchy newspaper references. Over the next several hours the core of students who had carried out the morning action, was joined by several hundred people. Newspaper and eyewitness estimates suggest that for the two weeks of the occupation, close to two hundred students occupied the premises on a twenty four hour basis. This number fluctuated considerably during the daylight hours when often, as the New York Times observed "some residents and sympathetic high school students responded by visiting the South Campus ..." and participated in "impromptu classes and tutorial lessons held by the dissidents".⁵⁸ The Campus reported that during the course of the occupation several heavily attended rallies were held; speakers included Betty Shabazz, Kathleen Cleaver, James Foreman and Adam Powell Jr.⁵⁹ This symbolic opening up of the City College campus had profound connotations. It was the first time, noted student-activist Barbara Christian, that many of the residents who lived directly across from Finley Hall, had ever set foot on the campus.⁶⁰

The immediate impact of the decision to prolong the occupation did not, according to activist Charles Powell (later one of the main student negotiators), hit home until "about 10:000 p.m." that evening when:

... the real impact of the responsibility came home to us. Over the next two days a contract of responsibilities had to be worked out concerning issues such as security, food, health, and so on⁶¹.

One of the first decisions was to rename the campus - The University of Harlem. Responsibilities were delegated according to the cell structure of the Committee of Ten. Security was seen as a paramount concern, particularly in the early days of the occupation when it was felt that an attack by the NYC Tactical Police was imminent. Moreover, since so many people were coming on campus daily, "we had to be concerned with that. Anybody who wanted to come were allowed to - except whites".⁶² The concern over security seemed to be vindicated when an undercover policeman was discovered to have infiltrated the occupation. The infiltrator - patrolman Ronald Broadway - in what Charles Powell recalls as a "frightening experience", was roughed up while being interrogated by the security cell. Prof. Bernie Sohmer too recalls the entire faculty Senate which was meeting on the North Campus, "came streaming out when the news came that the students had apprehended an undercover policeman".⁶³ Shortly after this incident shots were reportedly fired at the insurgents by the police⁶⁴.

The problem of food was solved by a steady flow of supplies from the surrounding community. Participants gave much of the credit for organizing the food supply to the mother of activist Henry Arce, who in his turn "could not believe we were getting that much support from our parents and community people"⁶⁵.

The students developed a daily agenda which included, whenever possible, tutorials "to keep students in touch with their lessons". They set up a "walk in clinic" where pre-med students (including activist Barbara Justice) took blood pressures and referred individuals to Harlem Hospital. Perhaps the most important activity was the nightly "community meeting". As one participant recalls "one reason there was no major crisis in the group was because we vented so much on a daily basis".⁶⁶ Besides discussing the issues raised by the ongoing negotiations, the community meetings aired complaints "about food, security, not being able to swim or play basket ball" (The latter two restrictions, explained one activist, were some of the security measures to prevent the breakdown of discipline). As the days extended into weeks, Powell recalls, the meetings often became tense and chaotic: "There were shouting matches, but nothing physical". Some conflict also began to develop between the Blacks and the Puerto Rican students around issues such as "whose flag was flying higher". The Puerto Rican students also reportedly felt that their demands were not fully accommodated in the Five Demands. They cited the issue of bilingual education as an example. But somehow the group's solidarity held until the evening of May 5th, exactly fourteen days later, when they made a jubilant exit and marched through Harlem singing:

Deep, Deep, Down, Down
 Deep down in your hearts.
 Love your brothers and sisters
 Deep down in your hearts ...⁶⁷.

Meanwhile a group of approximately fifty white radicals associated mainly with the City College Commune, had seized and occupied Klapper Hall on the North Campus in sympathy with the actions

of the Committee. Mel Friedman, one of the occupiers recalls that several assaults had been made on the group by conservative white students. There was particular concern about impending attacks by right wing Cuban activists. Some students began to fashion homemade weapons in preparation. Because:

... we were isolated. At that point ... we asked to join them on South Campus but they refused. They told us to do our own thing. They basically wanted nothing to do with us⁶⁸.

The first negotiations, and other reactions

Immediate reactions to the takeover varied as we have indicated, from shock and surprise on the one hand, to outrage on the other. Yet when the outraged Student Senate leadership called for a rally in Great Hall at which 1,000 (predominantly white) students showed up, the meeting quickly turned into a support rally for the South Campus occupiers - to the consternation of the Senate leadership, who had called the meeting with precisely the opposite in mind.⁶⁹

The next day the Faculty Senate met and voted 22:1 to oppose the use of force on campus to remove the insurgents, or to use injunctions "as long as negotiations are going forward".⁷⁰ President Gallagher meanwhile declared that the college would remain closed while negotiations with representatives of the Black and Puerto Rican students were ongoing. This decision did not sit well with other segments of the college, however, in particular the faculty and students of the Engineering School (based on the North Campus). Subsequently over 700 engineering students ignored Gallagher's decision and went to classes. This prompted Gallagher to declare, on Friday evening, that "if regular classes are held on the campus

Monday, the negotiations will be seriously delayed", and furthermore could create "the possibility of igniting the kind of conflict we all wish to avoid".⁷¹ That same evening a spokesman for the Dean of Engineering assured the President that the Engineering School would comply with the order to close the college. By this time too, some 40-50 Black and Puerto Rican faculty (including adjunct and tenured) announced the formation of a group called Black and Puerto Rican Faculty of City College. They issued a statement supporting the five demands, and argued that the college should remain closed during the negotiations. Two days into the occupation, negotiations began. The process and composition of the faculty participants to the negotiations, affords a glimpse into the nature of faculty politics at the time.

Besides the administration, three people were chosen to represent the faculty: Arthur Bierman and Joseph Copeland (who Ackerman described as "a moderate" and "a traditionalist" respectively), and sociologist Jay Schulman. The latter had played a leading role back in February in organizing a group called Faculty for Action. This group, which eventually grew to include about twenty-five members, had come out quite early in support of the five demands.⁷² The Faculty for Action argued for greater student/faculty control of the university, and included among its adherents both tenured and untenured faculty, although it appears the latter were in greater abundance. Prominent in its leadership were Alfred Conrad, Chair of the Economics Department, Jay Schulman of the Sociology Department who was an antiwar activist and mentor to some of the white student activist; Betty Rawls, the outspoken SEEK counselor,

and mentor to a number of the Black and Puerto Rican activists. Avowedly conservative faculty such as Howard Adelson have no difficulty – even with the vision of hindsight – in concluding twenty years later that "the left faculty" (in which he explicitly included Schulman) was motivated by the sole intent of destroying the City University.⁷³ One faculty of more moderate opinion, was only slightly less harsh in his assessment of the role of this group.⁷⁴

The foregoing should serve to indicate that relations between faculty at City College were quite conflicted during the events of this period. And although we have singled out the Faculty for Action as a major dissident group, this is not to suggest that the divisions among the faculty were so simple. Certainly a great divide existed between tenured and non-tenured faculty (which included adjuncts and outnumbered the tenured faculty), over the question of voting rights of non-tenured faculty. A leadership crisis of sorts was developing within the faculty ranks, even as the crisis of City College unfolded. In the view of Dr. Schulman, this was of critical importance to the process that lead to the selection of the first negotiation team:

The establishment faculty – people like Henry Lustig, Bernie Bellush, Julius Elias, Sam Mandell – the leadership of the faculty ... called a meeting to which 1000 faculty members showed up – 300 regulars and 700 adjuncts. Importantly, this was a time of transition for the faculty because the old faculty mechanism had been eliminated – a new mechanism, the Faculty Senate, had just been voted on but not yet in office: This was very important to what happened. Bernie Bellush was in the chair ... and he essentially called for a ratification of their right i.e. the old faculty group, to deal with the issues posed by the student takeover. The motion was defeated. Every person, that is regular or adjunct faculty

had a vote - for there was no constitution - so to speak, so that the Faculty for Action group controlled the faculty machinery. We could have taken all three seats if we chose to, for it was an election, we chose to take only one.⁷⁵

This researcher was unable to confirm or disprove Schulman's account. However, a few days later at a faculty meeting held on April 30, 1969, matters once again came to a head when Prof. Stanley Feingold (Political Science) "proposed that an ultimatum be delivered to the Black and Puerto Rican students occupying South Campus".⁷⁶ The motion was endorsed by the tenured faculty, but rejected by the non-tenured. Prof. Sam Hendel who chaired the meeting then ruled that the vote of "the senior faculty" would be final, despite the fact that they were out voted by the non-tenured people. The latter then staged a walkout (by 100 of their numbers), held a separate meeting in Shepherd Hall, and formed the Caucus of Concerned Faculty and Instructional Staff. The senior faculty followed their coup at the next meeting four days later on Sunday May 4th: for voting purposes, yellow cards were issued to non-tenured, and green cards to tenured faculty. From that point, the influence of the left faculty was effectively curbed.

On the student side, the negotiators were Rick Reed, Charles Powell and Serge Mullery. In terms of the chronology of events around the negotiations and the official closing of the College, the account by Tom Ackerman in the weeks following the crisis is quite serviceable. According to Ackerman, by Tuesday April 29th, eight days into the occupation of the South Campus, three of the five demands had been ironed out. The two issues that proved most difficult were those relating to admissions, and the separate school of Third World

Studies. Nevertheless optimism was expressed about reaching agreement on these, and, consequently, the reopening of the college. Two days later, however, President Gallagher was served with two separate court orders "requiring him to show cause on Monday May 5th why the College should not be reopened".⁷⁷ Similar orders were served on Chancellor Bowker, having been filed by "a group of fifteen liberal arts students and the Jewish Defense League." Meanwhile City Comptroller Mario Procaccino (Class of '35), in another court action, exhorted the court to issue an order to force the college to reopen by Friday, May 2nd. The negotiations were thus proceeding under increasing pressures of time. By Sunday May 4th, under pressure from alumni, students and the threat of court action, the BHE decided that the college should be reopened for business the next day, and that a new negotiating instrument would be developed. At 7:30 p.m. the next day the students were served with a court order directing them to vacate the campus. Two hours later they left.

The issue which bogged down the negotiations was the fourth demand, for a proportional admissions system. The formula proposed by the students called for a 43% non-white freshman class. The formula worked like this: 60% of the new students entering in fall 1970 would be selected from students having an economic and academic profile similar to the SEEK criteria. One-third of these would be white students, while the rest would be primarily Black and Puerto Rican. Another 3% of Black and Puerto Rican students would also be admitted under regular competitive requirements (thus the 43% formula). President Gallagher's proposal limited the SEEK-like admission total to 40%, saying (significantly) that it would be impossible to provide

proper services to so large a number of underprepared students. Two of the faculty negotiators (Copeland and Bierman) on the other hand rejected both formulas on the grounds that they represented ethnic quotas. They resorted instead to a proposal which was essentially identical to one previously put forth by the students "as a stop gap for the 1969 -70 term: that 300 extra non-white student be immediately admitted in a pilot program whose success would be assessed at the end of one year".⁷⁸ These inconclusive discussions came to an end, as noted, on May 5th, but a new phase was about to begin.

A violent interlude, and the second negotiation

The court sponsored re-opening of the College did not mean that things were back to normal. The first full day of school was almost normal, reported the Observation Post, except for "a rally at Cohen Library at 11:00 a.m. (which) drew about 350 students to support the five demands ... but the campus was quiet and the demonstrations peaceful"⁷⁹. The next morning around 10:00 o'clock "a group of 20 Blacks and Puerto Ricans, armed with clubs, came into Steinman Plaza and ordered the students to leave".⁸⁰ A pitched battle ensued as the engineers grabbed "sticks and golf clubs". Similar episodes were enacted across the campus - at times involving white radicals, who along with the Black and Puerto Rican radicals were now agitating for the resumption of the severed negotiations (and the reclosing of the college). Gallagher, perhaps with a foreboding of worse things to come, ordered the college closed once more. Protest was swift in coming, as the engineering students converged on the Administration Building. The demonstration soon shifted to the South Campus, which they were told was being kept open by students, in defiance of

Gallagher's orders. As they passed onto the South Campus "a swelling mass of police" was coming unto Convent Avenue to cheers of "we want cops! we want cops!" from crowds of students. At the St. Nicholas Terrace gate the crowd of engineers "200 strong ... trapped four Black girls against the locked gate ...". When some twenty Black and Puerto Rican students swarmed over the gate to confront the crowd, the biggest battle of the day was on: seven engineers were treated for minor injuries at Knickerbocker Hospital. By 12:30 South Campus was quiet again as many students - frightened of the violence - left the campus, and the police began their extended occupation. Classes, Gallagher had announced, would resume on Thursday at 9:00 a.m.

Class attendance as school resumed ranged from "below normal" to "quite light", and "many school facilities seemed deserted", according to the Observation Post. As some sixty SDS picketers demanded that the college be closed "the first of eleven fires that day was set in ... Finley ... and ... while guards moved to quell the fire a group entered Lewisohn Lounge, upsetting furniture, smashing cabinets and slicing the new air conditioning ducts".⁸¹ All through the morning and into early afternoon skirmishing continued between large groups of students around the reclosing of the campus. When "rocks, clods of earth and ... bottles" began to fly, the police charged in with clubs swinging. Eight students - all Black - were ultimately arrested and by 2:00 p.m. the police were once again closing the gates to the South Campus. A few minutes later smoke was observed "pouring out of the shattered windows of Aronow Auditorium". The auditorium was gutted by fire as hundreds of students watched. The temporarily closed campus was reopened. Later the Faculty Senate voted 36-20 to request

Gallagher and the BHE to close the campus for safety reasons. The latter refused, citing their unwillingness to knuckle under to coercion. The next day, Friday May 9th, President Gallagher informed the BHE that he wished to be relieved of his duties by 9:00 a.m. Monday.

What role did the Committee of Ten play in the events just described? This question is a difficult one to answer, in part because it appears that group cohesion was beginning to fall apart, and that distinct tendencies within the group were beginning to exert themselves. The eyewitness reports by campus observers, for instance, pointed on several occasions to obvious collusion between Black and white radicals in the "violence and promises by the Black and Puerto Rican Students Community to keep the college closed".⁸² This violence was on the other hand, roundly condemned by Lee Scofield, a BPRSC representative.⁸³ The violence he said, was probably done out of personal frustration and did not reflect the position of the Black and Puerto Rican student leadership. In fact, said he, those involved had been reprimanded, in consequence of which a serious internal conflict had developed. The nature of the conflict was not specified. Ackerman, however, was probably correct in his assessment of the movement at this point.⁸⁴ It was split he said, between two Black Power schools of thought: the cultural nationalists - symbolized by Carmichael - and the militant nationalists - symbolized by Cleaver and the Black Panthers. Militant community control advocacy formed the essence of this position. According to Ackerman, it was the cultural nationalist wing, led by Charles Powell and Serge Mullery, which placed great emphasis on the negotiation process, as it was seen

as important in creating a future pool of Black intelligentsia. The community control faction reportedly saw City College as merely one issue in a larger struggle which ultimately involved the control of Harlem as a community. Tom Soto, according to Ackerman, led this group in pushing for community organizing. Finally the cultural nationalists held sway when Rick Reed "previously a mediating influence on the Committee, apparently decided to cast his lot with those concentrating on the negotiations rather than on community organizing". Interviewees were unable to contribute any clarity to this somewhat murky picture.

Meanwhile, other pressures had been building for resumption of negotiations. A May 5th press release by the Black and Puerto Rican Faculty Caucus castigated the BHE's action in calling off the first negotiations.⁸⁵ Noting that the Black and Puerto Rican students community and President Gallagher had for two weeks engaged in fruitful negotiations - in which the BHE had been asked to participate but refused - the press release called the BHE's action a "slap in the face" of the City College community, and resolved to "refuse to hold classes, to grade papers, and to administer final exams" until negotiations resumed. A few days after this Gallagher resigned and, at an emergency session, Dr. Copeland - a biologist - was appointed Acting President by the BHE.

On Monday May 12th the College reopened once again. Acting President Copeland addressed the 72 members present, of the 87 member Faculty Senate. According to the minutes recorded that day "because of the presence of an extraordinary number of students, faculty and guests in the corridor requesting entry" a motion was passed to allow

for the seating of "accredited press, students and public."⁸⁶ The Board of Higher Education, Copeland told the body (as recorded in the Minutes) "had chosen him for two attitudes:

1. City College will not be closed. Absolutely minimum force will be used to assure calm, civilized obedience to law. Those who commit crimes will be arrested, tried and sentenced ... We will use our best efforts ... to settle tensions
2. With deep awareness and keen sympathy for the people ... City College will assume its proper share of the solution of the problems ⁸⁷

Following Dr. Copeland's departure a number of speakers addressed the Senate. An unnamed representative of the Black and Puerto Rican Students' Community "strongly urged the Faculty to close the College and remove the Police". He cited an agreement signed during the first negotiations, and maintained "that the College had broken its word." The Rev. Dr. Henry D. Rucker of the Ad Hoc Committee of Interested Residents of Harlem, "after an impassioned appeal for unity in the pursuit of justice, quality education and elimination of poverty for 38 million minority people ...", demanded the removal of the police, the closing of the College and the resumption of negotiations ... to open the doors" These sentiments were echoed by the Rev. Nelson Dukes who "strongly indicated that the leaders of the community are in accord with the students". Later in the meeting, after "long and sometimes passionate" debate, a resolution introduced by Dean Robert Young (SEEK Director) was adopted by the Senate (as amended by Prof. Guerriero). The resolution called for the removal of the police, and the closing of the college to allow the resumption of negotiations, "at the point

at which they had been cut off". The resolution also called for a convocation of faculty and interested students, to occur simultaneously with the negotiations (Thursday May 15, Friday 16th), to allow "a full exploration of the five demands".

Two days later (May 14th) the Black and Puerto Rican Faculty Caucus issued another press release deploring the BHE's action in calling off the negotiations, and supporting the May 12th Faculty Senate resolution.⁸⁸ The press release also denounced Copeland for betraying "the goodwill" of Black and Puerto Rican students, faculty and the Harlem community. President Copeland had rejected the Senate resolution on the grounds "that if he were to remove the police from the campus ... he would be dismissed by the BHE ⁸⁹ Copeland reversed this position a few days later, after receiving assurances from the Black and Puerto Rican Students Community "that the campus would remain peaceful while negotiations proceeded".

On Thursday May 15th, a marathon (12 hours) session took place at City College involving Chancellor Bowker, State Senator Basil Patterson, Assemblyman Robert Garcia "and about a dozen Black and Puerto Rican leaders". The purpose of the meeting, said the New York Times the next day, was "to negotiate the terms of the negotiation". To facilitate the meeting, the Times observed, white radicals called a moratorium on the disruptive tactics which still kept the college from functioning normally. In consequence of the agreement reached that day, negotiations resumed on Monday, May 19th and continued through Thursday May 22nd. Convocations were held on Tuesday and Wednesday. On Friday May 23, the Faculty Senate received the fourteen page document produced by the negotiations.

Under terms stipulated by the Board, the new negotiating team were limited to five people: two from faculty, two from the students, and one representing the administration. The Faculty Senate submitted four names - chosen at the very first meeting of the new institution (May 5) from which the Board would chose two. The names included Prof. Bernard Bellush (History), Prof. Joseph Copeland (Biology), Prof. Stanley Feingold (Pol. Sci.), and Dean Robert Young (SEEK Director)⁹⁰. Bellush and Young were ultimately selected; for the students Charles Powell and Rick Reed continued as negotiators. Mullery says he was "kicked out of City College" at this point.

The negotiated settlement: texture, content, aftermath

This researcher has attempted to go beyond the documented facts, in order to capture some sense of the texture of both sets of negotiations. In the shadow of memories dimmed by time, this has proved to be extremely difficult. Nevertheless, some rather vivid recollections survive. Perhaps most common to the participants is the memory of the long and arduous hours consumed by the process. "They were long, exhausting, drawn out", recalls Dean Robert Young, "to the extreme that some faculty negotiators were replaced or withdrew due to emotional and intellectual exhaustions."⁹¹ Sessions typically began at 9:00 a.m., and went on with minimum breaks to 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. It was not uncommon for sessions to go to 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. the next day, only to begin on schedule again.

Some recollections focussed on the level of sophistication exhibited by the students: "You must understand", said Young, "these students were organized, they were deliberate, and sometimes - politically speaking - intimidating, they knew when to raise

questions, when to insist on going into caucus, or to place the administration in a position that could best be described as 'ill at ease".⁹² Prof. Bellush, concurring with this judgement, observed that "faculty are not trained to face up to an organized grouping of students who feel they are right, who in the process of the negotiations are making clear they are not acting in the role of subservient students, faculty were terribly shaken - psychologically, educationally - whichever way you put it".⁹³

The students were allowed to bring in various people to the negotiation table. Among those called in were Prof. Alfred Conrad, Betty Rawls, Frank McDonald (both from the Black and Puerto Rican Faculty Caucus), as well as other people from the community. Dean Young states that in the first negotiations President Gallagher surreptitiously provided much of the support to bolster the students' arguments against himself because, said he, Gallagher really wanted them to win. One statement by Prof. Schulman relates both to the texture and the content of the (first) negotiations, and is worth quoting at length:

A lot went on in the so-called negotiations. There were some wonderful, creative models that were built for the establishment of a first class Black and Hispanic college that would serve ... poor whites as well. All kinds of experts were brought in, particularly by Conrad. He had access to all sorts of people at the National Economic Council - he brought them in - the way it worked was: the negotiation would get started at about 9:30, peak around 4:00, 5:00, maybe 6:00 and grab some supper - then the friendly negotiators would convene again with the students at maybe 8:00 o'clock to discuss ... how do you make open admissions work? What are the mechanisms that would be necessary to have a qualitative college and yet bring in lots of people who are underprepared? We weren't talking

about the university as a whole - but about City College ... there were all sorts of things being discussed - how do you change the attitudes of the Education faculty? What kinds of courses should we require on race and racism? How do you develop a training program for the Education faculty? So we weren't negotiating - we were institution building ... Biernan and Copeland were negotiating, everybody else - including Gallagher - were institution-building.

Schulman's characterization of course applies to the first negotiation. From the text of the second negotiation, it is clear that 'institution-building' was also at the core of the second set of discussions. As with the first negotiations, the question of admission and a separate Third World college were at the center of the discussion. (The BHE had on May 8 ruled that Spanish, as well as Black and Puerto Rican history would be required of Education majors). The negotiated agreement (submitted to the Faculty Senate on May 23) on admissions policy read in part as follows:

1. Starting in September, 1969 the admissions policy of the City College shall be dual in structure
2. Approximately fifty per cent of the incoming class will be chosen by traditional criterion of high school performance ... the other fifty per cent will be chosen under the new special admissions program⁹⁵.

Students would be eligible for special admission if they met any of four criteria, (a) if they were from those high schools in the Bronx and Manhattan (contiguous to City College) which traditionally had produced "less than the average proportion of college-bound graduates"; (b) if they resided in "poverty areas of the city" as defined by city, state or federal criteria; (c) those who met the criteria already established for SEEK students; (d) those who met the

criteria for the '100 - Scholars' program (to be discussed elsewhere) established by Chancellor Bowker.

The '50/50' program would take effect fully in September 1970. In the meantime, the agreement stipulated that 300 additional freshmen would be admitted immediately (Fall '69) in addition to the normal number of SEEK admits. This supplementary number of 300 would be repeated for Spring 1970, along with a stipulated 40% of total freshmen as special admits. The agreement also included a detailed "Proposal for Supportive Services", which included such areas as recruitment (of students and staff), evaluation and diagnostic testing, counseling, staff training and the like.

The document resonated with unbridled optimism as it described the impact the new admissions policy was anticipated to have on secondary education:

Students, being aware of the opportunity to have some control over their educational futures, will more readily invest in the academic possibility of college. Grades will improve, incentive to achieve stronger, and probability of reward greater. Teachers and high school administrators will be affected by a new competitive spirit among students.... Ultimately the City College will quietly but forcefully create a new vitality and spirit of challenge that has been absent in these high schools⁹⁶.

The agreement proposed "that there shall be a School of Urban and Third World Studies at the College as of September 1969." The School would be headed by a dean who, along with a policy making council made up of "the faculty, matriculated students, and members of the community" would control it. The curriculum presumably would be based on the model submitted by Prof. Wilfred Cartey earlier (May 15). The model had called for the establishment of a "School of

Regional and Community Affairs". It had called for the School to be divided into six areas of concentration: African Studies, Afro-American Studies, Community Studies, Caribbean Studies, Puerto Rican Studies, and Studies of other New World areas (such as Brazil).

The agreement soon ignited a furious public debate in which a number of mayoral hopefuls figured prominently. Herman Badillo, Mario Procaccino and John Marchi all attacked the "quota system" which they said, was inherent in the plans; the incumbent Mayor Lindsay, reserved comment but voiced opposition to the notion of a quota system⁹⁷. The New York Times in an editorial "Bad Bargain at City College", denounced the agreement as betraying a belief in "unrealistic faith in educational magic". Said the Times:

Apart from the ethics of such reverse discrimination, it would almost certainly turn City College into a de facto segregated, pre-dominantly Negro and Puerto Rican institution⁹⁸.

Badillo agreed, saying the policy "would lead to two separate and unequal colleges of uncertain quality". He called instead for strengthening the SEEK program.⁹⁹ From the Board of Higher Education came voices of dissent, as members David Ashe and Dr. Azzari publicly condemned the "quota" implication of the plan, and attacked the concept of the School of Urban and Third World Studies.¹⁰⁰ Lindsay officially joined the chorus of opposition when he urged the Faculty Senate to reject the plan on the basis that it was a quota system.

For its part the Faculty Senate was divided. Opposition ran along several lines including the quota issue, the implied threat of a decline of standards, issues of reverse discrimination, the logistics

of handling what would essentially be two separate freshman classes. Some now indicted the negotiation process itself which was "conducted like a kidnap gang's negotiation, with the so-called representatives of the faculty and of the administration fearful that the college would be invaded from Harlem and destroyed."¹⁰¹ Those in support cited issues of social responsibility and long overdue justice.

On May 29, the Faculty Senate by a vote of 37:36 rejected the negotiated agreement. (One day prior to this in a poll taken by President Copeland, the tenured faculty by a margin of 7:1 also rejected agreement.) A few days later the faculty produced its own "Text of the negotiated agreement on Admissions Policy as revised by the City College Faculty Senate."¹⁰² Actually this was a "replacement", as opposed to a 'revised' plan, since the distinctive features of the original negotiated agreement were now null and void. In place of the proportional admissions formula, the plan proposed that "For the Fall of 1969, up to 300 additional freshmen will be recruited on the selected high school or poverty area basis, beyond the number to whom acceptances have already been mailed." The plan provided that "up to 100" be recruited for Spring 1970, but only in the event that the 300 number for the previous Fall was not met. A similar provision applied to the 1970-1971 year, noting the necessity "to evaluate the impact of the current special admissions programs." Meanwhile, the document urged the BHE to accelerate its timetable for open admissions.

At the June 10th meeting of the Faculty Senate two motions were introduced (original by Prof. Albert Ehrlich; substitute by Prof. Claire Sellitz and Herbert Nickin) calling for "the establishment of a

preparatory school." As recorded in the Minutes for that day: "After a very brief discussion Prof. Hendel moved that it is the sense of this Senate that the Board should consider these documents and that this Senate intends to consider them in the Fall. This motion carried". This final action by the Faculty Senate was rendered superfluous by the decision one month later by the Board of Higher Education to impose its own admissions plan.

For the first time in living memory, observed The Campus, graduation exercises were held off the campus of the City College (Madison Square Gardens).¹⁰³ With the ending of the semester, the Committee of Ten, by now referred to everywhere as the Black and Puerto Rican Students Community, also ceased to exist as a player in the drama of City College and the City University. Nevertheless in the brief months of its existence, it had been a catalyst of great importance on that campus. But what was its impact upon the wider concentration of forces which ultimately yielded the decision of July 9, 1969. This question is the main focus of the next several chapters.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Minutes of the Board of Higher Education, July 9, 1969.
2. "Message to the Grassroots," BPRSC flyers (undated), City College Archives.
3. Tech News, February 6, 1969.
4. Observation Post, April 18, 1969.
5. George Napper, Blacker Than Thou: The Struggle For Campus Unity, (Grand Rapids, Mich: William B. Erdman's Pub. Co., 1973), p. 32.
6. Interview with Henry Arce, April 6, 1989.
7. Observation Post, April 18, 1969.
8. The Campus, October, 1, 1968.
9. Toni Cade, "Realizing the Dream of a Black University", Observation Post, February 14, 1969.
10. Ibid.
11. Interview with Louis Rivera, March 10, 1989.
12. Toni Cade, "Realizing the Dream of a Black University", Observation Post, February 14, 1969.
13. Tech News, February 6, 1969.
14. Ibid.
15. Interview with Prof. Fran Geteles, February 27, 1989.
16. 'Attachment A' of the Report on the SEEK Program at Queens College, by the Chancellor's Advisory Council on SEEK, Office of University Relations, 2-3-69.
- 16a. Ibid, p. 16.
17. Interview with Serge Mullery, April 12, 1989.
18. Interview with Prof. Fran Geteles, February 27, 1989.
19. Ibid.
20. Report and Recommendation of the Chancellor's Advisory Council on SEEK, p. 1, Office of University Relations, 2-3-69.

21. Ibid.
22. Tech News, February 6, 1969.
23. Interview with Louis Rivera, March 10, 1989.
24. "Message to the Grassroots," BPRSC flyers (undated), City College Archives.
25. Observation Post, February 6, 1969.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Reproduced in Observation post, February 14, 1969
31. Tech News, February 19, 1969
32. Ibid.
33. Interview with Serge Mullery, April 12, 1989
34. Statement by President's Office, printed in Observation Post, February 14, 1969
35. The Campus, February 26, 1969
36. Tech News, March 19, 1969; also interview with Louis Rivera, March 10, 1989
37. Tech News, March 19, 1969
38. Ibid.
39. The Campus, March 19, 1969
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. The Campus, April 2, 1969
43. Observation Post, April 18, 1969
44. The Campus, March 12, 1969
45. As reported in Tech News, April 18, 1969

46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. This quotation, and description of the rally is based on information in Tech News, April 18, 1969
49. The Campus, April 22, 1969
50. Quoted in The Campus, April 22, 1969
51. Interview with Serge Mullery April 12, 1989
52. Interview with Robert Feaster, July 13, 1988
53. Quoted in Chap I, p.1
54. Interview with Tom Soto, August 11, 1988
55. Reported in Tech News, April 23, 1969
56. Interview with Prof. Bernard Bellush, January 23, 1989
57. Interview with Serge Mullery, April 12, 1969
58. The New York Times, April, 25, 1969
59. The Campus, May 6, 1969
60. From Legacy of Struggle - Video Work in progress, The City College, 1989
61. interview with Charles Powell, August 13, 1987
62. Ibid.
63. Interview with Prof. Bernie Sohmer, May 8, 1987
64. Interview with James Small, July 14, 1986
65. Interview with Henry Ance, April 6, 1989
66. Interview with James Small, July 14, 1986
67. Observation Post, May 12, 1969
68. Interview with Mel Friedman, February 11, 1989
69. The Campus, April 25, 1969
70. The New York Times, April 25, 1969
71. The New York Times, April 26, 1969

72. Tech News, March 5, 1969
73. Interview with Dr. Howard Adelson, February 15, 1989
74. Dr. Bernie Sohmer hints at a conspiratorial role by certain members of this group, and the student unrest at City.
75. Interview with Dr. Jay Schulman, April 30, 1987
76. The information in this paragraph is based on a report in Observation Post, May 12, 1969
77. Tom Ackerman, "The South Campus Seizure" in C.C.N.Y. Alumnus Vol. 65-66, October 1969, p. 18
78. Ibid. p. 19
79. Observation Post, May 12, 1989
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. From a presentation on the Five Demands at City College on May 13, 1969 (Taped by Prof. Martha Weissman)
84. Ackerman, "South Campus Seizure", p. 29-30
85. Press Release, May 5, 1969: Black and Puerto Rican Faculty Caucus, City College Archives
86. Minutes of Meeting of Faculty Senate, May 12, 1969 City College Archives
87. Ibid.
88. Press Release May 14, 1969, Black and Puerto Rican Faculty Caucus, City College Archives
89. As presented in Press Release cited above
90. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Faculty Senate, May 5, 1969, City College Archives
91. Interview with Dean Robert Young, February 10, 1989
92. Ibid.
93. Interview with Prof. Bernard Bellush, January 23, 1989
94. Interview with Prof. Jay Schulman, April 30, 1987

95. "Text of Agreement on Point Four", Printed in Observation Post, May 27, 1969
96. Ibid.
97. The New York Times, May 26, 1969
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. The New York Times, May 27, 1969
101. Prof. Hubert Beck (Education), Quoted in The New York Times, May 27, 1969
102. Minutes of the Faculty Senate, June 1969, City College Archives
103. The Campus, May 22, 1969

CHAPTER IV

THE CITY COLLEGE PROTEST AND THE TIMING OF OPEN ADMISSIONS

Introduction

The concern of this study is to analyze the impact of the protest by Black and Puerto Rican students upon (a) the timing of open admissions, (b) the scale of open admissions, (c) the basis of that impact. In this chapter we consider the question of timing. Such an exercise can be a hazardous undertaking, since social phenomena do not occur in discrete packets of 'variables' that can be neatly separated out and weighed one against the other. Moreover, anyone vaguely familiar with the complex and fluctuating context of the sixties should appreciate the difficulties presented by the effort to isolate variables for such analysis. This caveat is not meant to suggest the futility of such analysis, but simply as a warning of the hazards of the undertaking. In keeping with this, a brief explanation is in order, concerning how the issues under study are to be presented in this document.

The analysis identifies two primary levels of activity:

- (1) A more or less highly visible level of action and reaction between actors at the City College and the leadership of the City University. The impact of the student protest upon the timing and scope of the open admissions reform is analysed at this level, and is presented in this and the next chapter.

- (2) At a less visible level there was the interaction between the university leadership, and the political environment of the city and state. The peculiar political and racial environment ushered in under John Lindsay's stewardship of New York City, is viewed as the critical variable which gave potency to the protests. The impact of the Lindsay years is presented in Chapter VIII, and builds upon information and perspectives which comprise Chapters VI and VII.

As an experiment in public higher education, the open admissions policy of the City University of New York was unmatched and unprecedented, for its apparent precipitous timing, and its vast scale. Commenting on the phenomenal nature of the change, one group of researchers were moved to observe how:

...striking was the abruptness of the change: no major university system had ever moved, almost overnight, from a rigorously selective admissions standard to a policy of guaranteed admission for all high school graduates".¹

And, although it is quite true that voices were already long at work pushing CUNY towards a form of open enrollment (1975 was the target date), researchers have failed to explain adequately not only the decision to accelerate the target date, but also why the decision was made at the time it was.

The chapter begins with a detailed review of aspects of the political and institutional background which laid some of the foundation for open admissions, and goes on to discuss leading explanations of the decision. It then presents information to support the contention that the best explanation of the timing of open admissions is that it was a direct response to the protests at City College.

Aspects of the Political and Institutional Background of Open Admissions

The reform that changed the racial complexion of the City University of New York in 1970 was in part born out of a developing crisis of institutional survival that confronted the municipal college system in the aftermath of the Second World War. In brief, the source of the challenge was the state government of New York. This segment recounts aspects of this challenge and the response and consequences of that response by the city forces.

Starting with the first Strayer (or Rapp-Coudert Report) of 1944, the state legislature of New York took an increasing interest in the affairs of the municipal college system of New York City. At that time, the system consisted of a loose federation of a few colleges: City College, Hunter (1869), Brooklyn (1930), Queens (1937). The system was governed by the Board of Higher Education organized in 1926. This Report (1944) emphasized "the need for the development of an integrated system of higher education".¹ Underlying this recommendation was the feeling coming from the war "that America's economic and military power has become more dependent than ever before on technology, and local officials were already talking of the municipal colleges as a breeding-ground for a new labor force of highly-skilled scientists, technicians, managers and workers".² The municipal college presidents were enthusiastic in their response to this Report. In line with the first Strayer Report, New York State in 1946 established a temporary commission on the need for a State University, and two years later the State University of New York was a reality. The stage was being set for a long battle for institutional survival by the municipal college system.

The second Strayer Report of 1951 ignited this struggle when it called for, among other things, the incorporation of the municipal colleges into the newly created state university system.³ The ostensible reason for this recommendation was to ensure "a sounder and more equitable basis for financial support" to the municipal system. Earlier on, another study had been proposed to look at "the minimum capital plant requirements of New York City public higher education through the nineteen fifties and sixties".⁴ This study, known as the Cottrell Master Plan (1950), had recommended establishment of community colleges in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Richmond.⁵ It also recommended the expansion of the senior colleges to provide increased day session enrollment from 27,258 students in 1949, to 40,000 in 1960.⁶ Several community colleges were brought on line in due course: New York City Community College (1953), Staten Island Community College (1957), and Queensborough College (1958). At the senior college level expansion was slow. Whereas the Cottrell Master Plan had called for expansion to 40,000 students by 1960 the Colleges had fallen far short of this figure. In fact actual enrollment in 1961 was only 32,180 for the senior colleges, and 2293 for the community colleges.

In 1957, the Russians launched Sputnik, causing a profound reaction throughout the political and educational communities of the United States. In New York State, under the leadership of newly elected (1958) Governor Rockefeller, the response was the appointment of another commission to study ways of "meeting the increasing demand for Higher Education in New York State". The commission's report was headed by then president of the Ford Foundation, Henry T. Heald. The

commission's report, known as The Heald Report,⁷ was published in 1960. Its recommendation included a massive expansion of the community college program, to accommodate by 1965 some forty to fifty thousand students, with the state paying 50% (instead of 33%) of its cost.⁸ The report reiterated the earlier notion to absorb the municipal system into a single statewide university system. This suggestion came in the form of a recommendation to have state representation on the Board of Higher Education, and a second recommendation to establish a uniform tuition charge of \$300 for all publicly supported undergraduate education, including New York City.⁹

The Heald Commission had raised the issue of higher education as a matter of national strategic importance, requiring a unified and centrally directed response. The recommendations were, in effect, a critique of the municipal college system, and its role in facing the scientific and ideological challenge represented by the Russian achievement.

The BHE in the meanwhile had anticipated the thrust of the Heald Commission, and had authorized its own "Committee To Look To The Future" in May of 1959, but its report would not be available until two years hence. Nevertheless, the BHE had to respond to the challenge to its autonomy represented by the Heald Report. In its response the BHE proposed a centralization plan of its own: the consolidation of the municipal colleges into a centrally coordinated City University of New York. Moreover, went the argument, the newly organized university would be in a better position to serve the needs of business and industry. The BHE made it clear that it would fight to maintain its autonomy, and its policy of free tuition.

With this resolution, the BHE, supported by Mayor Wagner and a broad coalition of ethnic, labor union, business and civic groups, executed an intense lobbying and public relations campaign as a result of which the State Legislature in the spring of 1961 passed legislation creating the City University of New York. This action gave the BHE and CUNY a new lease on its autonomous institutional life. What was required now was a new strategy; a re-thinking of the rationale for meeting the inevitable challenges of the future. The basis of this re-thinking was provided in the long awaited report of the Committee to Look to the Future, under the directorship of Thomas Holy. The report, "A Long-Range Plan for the City University of New York 1961-75" was made public in 1962, and became, in effect, the blueprint upon which the City University could later draw in defending its positions.

The central message of the report was the need for a massive expansion of the university to accommodate the anticipated enrollment crunch coming as a result of "greatly increased births following World War II". "We now face", said the report, invoking the words of the Heald Commission, "an unprecedented rise in college and university enrollments - a rise so dramatic that it will substantially alter the shape of our higher educational system".¹⁰

The report summarized its own mandate as follows:

The students who will answer roll call in the City University's classrooms and laboratories between now and 1975 are already born. The essential problem is one of determining how many of those new citizens will be qualified for educational programs beyond high school and how many of those who are qualified will seek to fulfill their educational goals at the City University.¹¹

The report observed that in projecting numbers of eligible students its calculations would take into account the presence of huge numbers of new migrants from the south and the Caribbean, and a corresponding exodus from the city of some one million whites between 1950-60.¹² The projection arrived at by the report is worth considering at for two reasons. First, it shows the failure of the Committee to anticipate the explosion of actual numbers that would ultimately occur in the university. Secondly, it shows the Committee's failure to anticipate an active campaign by non-white students to change the eligibility standards. And yet it was this very issue around which the future of the university would ultimately turn. What was most ironic about the Holy Report then was its ability to marshal facts and figures pointing to a coming crisis, yet at the same time it was unable or unwilling to confront the issue of eligibility. From 1952-61 the report found that the required high school average for admission to a senior college went from 80 to 85.¹³ In the same period applications to the senior colleges rose by 44.9% from 15,651 to 22,678. The actual numbers admitted however, went from 8,002 in 1952 to 8,106 in 1961, a mere 1.3% change!¹⁴ Amazingly, the Committee was able to recommend in its report that "the senior colleges continue to be highly selective in their admission requirements".¹⁵ In fact, the report noted, in 1961 only 20% of academic high school graduates met the entrance requirements. This meant in effect, that some 30,000 potential college students were shut out in that year alone!

By 1962, then, there were clearly established pressures for expansion and change being felt within the City University, not the least of which was the possibility of absorption by the State.

Nevertheless, the path toward expansion and change was not to be as clear-cut as circumstance seemed to dictate. For one thing, expanding the university on the scale proposed would be costly, and, furthermore, the university was committed to its free tuition policy. For another, the leadership of the university was committed to maintaining a tradition of academic elitism, which meant in practice, maintaining a high level of student selectivity. "For the City", wrote Shiela Gordon of the battle against Albany, "the central issue of expansion of public higher education was dwarfed, while all energies focussed on saving the cherished tuition free status ... defending tradition, obscuring pressing needs for expansion".¹⁶ Paradoxically, there was, in the aftermath of the victory against Albany, little change in attitude on these issues. CUNY would continue to be vulnerable on both issues of expansion and free tuition. It seemed clear that the required scale of expansion would be impossible without state aid, which, it was equally clear, would not be forthcoming as long as free tuition remained the central priority of the university.

By 1962 a territorial truce of sorts existed between CUNY and the forces at Albany. Under the terms of the truce "the New York City boundary was recognized as the dividing line between CUNY and the State University of New York".¹⁷ For, not unnaturally, SUNY, driven by its own expansionist urge, had seen the potential of the city for swelling its student body. Such an agreement did not mean, however, that the issue of institutional autonomy was now moot. The thrust for absorption from Albany would and did continue. Indeed, in creating CUNY in 1961, the state legislature had removed a major obstacle to its future advances, namely, the 125-year-old statutory mandate for free

tuition.¹⁸ Furthermore, the BHE had been empowered to enact tuition charges whenever it was deemed appropriate. Additional pressure came when in 1962 the SUNY trustees imposed a tuition of \$400 on students within the state system. This measure, coupled with the creation of the Scholar Incentive Awards program, further undermined any justification for CUNY's free tuition policy. That the CUNY leadership found these measures alarming was evidenced by its strenuous efforts to reinstate the free tuition mandate in the CUNY charter, as well as to roll back tuition at SUNY.¹⁹

By 1964, the year when the College Discovery Program was initiated, CUNY's position was becoming more untenable. It appears that upstate Republicans attempted to exploit the ethnic and class divisions within the City's coalition around the tuition issue. For example, earlier, in 1963, the Republican Assembly speaker, Joseph P. Carlino had attacked CUNY's free tuition policy as a policy designed to serve a white middle-class elite, at the expense - was the implication - of poor non-whites. And, in an interesting coincidence, a Black member of the SUNY board of trustees would later echo speaker Carlino. In his open letter to State Senator John Marchi, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Affairs of the City of New York, Lester B. Granger attacked free tuition as a device which tended to support discrimination against Blacks.²⁰ Even within the BHE itself dissatisfaction had begun to surface around the admission of more Blacks and Puerto Ricans.²¹ Governor Rockefeller, to make matters even worse for CUNY, had by then put into circulation, word of his intention to build branches of the State University within the city for those thousands of students who, for lack of space, could not be served by CUNY.²²

Meanwhile, the BHE had attempted to institute those aspects of the Holy report that were less costly. The most important of these, was the organization of the graduate school. For this purpose Dr. Albert Bowker, renowned scholar, and Dean of the Graduate School at Stanford University, was brought in. He would shortly succeed Dr. Everett to become the second chancellor of the university.

In early 1965 a serious internal crisis erupted within the ranks of the CUNY forces. The crisis was precipitated by Dr. Bowker, who, noting that although he had been called in originally to organize the graduate school, recalls:

I became convinced very quickly that the real job was to expand the university to meet the needs of New York City.²³

Bowker also recognized that expanding the university on the scale required to meet those needs even minimally, would be impossible without state aid - given the fiscal short-fall with which the city was faced. For, it appeared unlikely that the city would be able to fund the university for even the 25% increase in operating expenses anticipated for the upcoming fiscal year.²⁴

The university could choose to maintain the status quo - which in practice would be to deny admission to thousands of eligible students, or it could choose to submit to institutional absorption by the state university system. Bowker sought a way out of the dilemma by proposing a plan "which I called the 'dummy plan' in which students would get practically all their tuition paid for - a few people would pay a little".²⁵ The full scope of Chancellor Bowker's plan called for the state to take over the full operating costs of the senior colleges. In return, the university would agree to a "nominal

imposition of tuition", the proceeds of which would go to the State Dormitory Authority as collateral for capital construction bond issues. The proposal struck at the very heart of the free tuition policy - which had all along been the rallying point of the city forces. Perhaps this was the reason - along with the fact that there was "continuous tension between him and the Board chairman" - that Bowker decided to make the plan public, before clearing it with the Board.

The Board reacted by calling a special meeting to reaffirm its support for free tuition. It also censored Chancellor Bowker because, as recalled by then Coordinator of Planning for CUNY, Julius Edelstein, it was felt "the Chancellor owed 'fealty' to the Board of Higher Education".²⁶ In the wake of these developments Bowker, President Meng of Hunter College and President Gideonese of Brooklyn College all resigned, thus bringing to a head the crisis of leadership that had been brewing within the university. In November 1965 the state legislature intervened, as the Assembly's Joint Legislative Committee on higher Education prepared to hold hearings. These hearings, conducted under the leadership of Senator Ohrenstein, were concluded in March 1966. The recommendations from these proceedings were, (a) that the free tuition policy be continued; (b) that Governor Rockefeller abandon plans to build SUNY units in the city; (c) that state support rise to 65% of undergraduate operating costs; (d) that, contributing equally, the city and state together pay \$400 per CUNY student into a special fund to be pledged to the State Dormitory Authority as backing for capital construction bonds.²⁷ The university thus retreated from what seemed like the brink of disaster

with a new lease on its institutional life. A new umbrella organization - the Ad Hoc Committee for CUNY - comprising labor, business and civic group emerged to campaign for legislature adoption of the recommendations.

Within CUNY some important changes occurred. Among these was the request by the Board that Bowker withdraw his resignation. Perhaps equally important was the resignation of Dr. Rosenberg as chairman of the BHE thus bringing to a close a style of leadership that had characterized the Board to that date. "The first priority of the BHE leadership", recalls Dr. Edelstein, "was obeisance, a pejorative respect for the political leader - that was their first consideration. If the political leader said, 'no we can't give you more money', why, that was it. Well, Bowker did not feel that way".²⁸ The elevation of Porter Chandler as the new Board Chairman was another important change, primarily because of the working relationship between the Board Chairman and the Chancellor. Bowker described Chandler as "probably the most sophisticated man on the Board", who understood that the function of boards was to set policy rather than to act "as an operational entity".²⁹ Bowker thought he had the full backing and support of the new chairman, whom he recalled "in effect considered himself my lawyer in how to get the Board to back me".³⁰

Yet another important change was the fact there were a number of vacancies to be filled on the Board following the events described above. Bowker thought that Lindsay had made a number of "excellent appointments", which were motivated by competence rather than by political considerations. He described the new composition of the

Board nevertheless, as "fairly liberal". And so, after this internal revolution on the Board, "I came back not with much change in formal authority, but the Board was mine, they took my leadership".³¹

Finally, and in many ways perhaps the most significant, as part of the 1966 legislation authorizing the construction fund for expanding the university, the SEEK program was established. This was a special program for bringing Black and Puerto Rican students into the senior college system, by-passing the established entrance requirements. That same year the Board enunciated a plan for "100% enrollment" by 1975. This was re-emphasized in the 1968 Master Plan for the University. And on July 9, 1969 the decision was taken to accelerate this timetable by five years.

Explaining the timing of Open Admissions: The Literature

From the foregoing account at least two compelling observations can be discerned: a) that a powerful 'push' factor existed for expansion of the University; b) that a significant change in vision and style had occurred at the highest levels of university leadership. Perhaps these compelling facts help to explain why the leading explanations of the decision have in large measure tended to emphasize them and, correspondingly, to weaken the role of the City College protest. In fact there is no explicit attempt in the literature to address the timing of the open admissions decision in the manner in which it is posed in this study.

One can discern two models of explanations of open admissions: one, stressing ineluctible social and historical forces (the push factors) which inevitably 'threw' open doors of the City University. In line with this view one group of researchers (Lavin, Alba,

Silverstein) argued in part that open admissions was inevitable since it was only part of the traditional mandate of the university to be "in the vanguard of the development of public higher education for the urban poor".³² The authors felt that the publicity which accompanied open admissions at CUNY was quite inappropriate, since "open access to higher education is hardly new in the United States". They traced the roots of the policy back to "developments that began earlier in the century. In the United States... the twentieth century has been marked by dramatic increases in levels of education and in access to higher education".^{32a} They note, moreover, that as early as 1862 the Morrill Act established land grant colleges which offered admission to all high school graduates. In like vein, an earlier group of researchers (Rosen, Brunner, Fowler, 1973), noted that "in reconstructing the coming of open admissions to CUNY, it is impossible to avoid noting a trace of an historical imperative".³³ Implied in this argument is the notion that the special programs such as College Discovery (1964) and the SEEK Program (1966) were stages in the inexorable march to open admissions. And, in the final stage "a number of social forces, political opportunities and forceful personalities combined to provide a viable climate for open admissions at CUNY".³⁴

This theme of historical inevitability co-exists, however, with another and dominant model of explanation which sees open admissions as virtually the brainchild of Chancellor Albert Bowker. Thus Rosen and his colleagues had this to say:

It seems true that the major motivation for implementing open admissions in 1970 came from the corps of men who occupy East 80th Street.

Without men like Bowker, Tim Healey ... and others, the demonstrations at City College and the rising racial tension in the City would have had no effect on CUNY as an institution.³⁴

They projected Bowker as the prescient mastermind who foresaw as early as 1963 that the university had a critical role to play in providing opportunities for upward mobility for the city's burgeoning Black and Puerto Rican minorities. This was in line with the notion of the traditional and historical mission of the university. Moreover he was, as a "master politician, one of the few men in New York City politics who consistently won the battles he assumed". They continue in this vein, to project him from victory to victory, and ultimately to the engineering of open admissions - his ultimate victory. Thus, in this view, the students' demonstration merely raised the curtain on a stage that had been skillfully orchestrated by Bowker, giving the issues the public airing that he had been waiting for.

Lavin and his colleagues have similarly lavished credit upon the Chancellor, noting that although "the impetus came from several sources ... rising expectations and growing militancy...", it was Bowker who "saw the long run interests of the CUNY as requiring a major expansion...".³⁵ He is credited with pulling off a major balancing act between contending forces which resulted ultimately in open admissions five years sooner than planned.

One of the more pervasive versions of Bowker's machiavellian creativity suggests that he was able to exploit the 'opportunity' presented by the students to advance his agenda of open admissions.³⁶ What makes this notion intriguing is that although researchers manage to conclude that the City College protestors had

impact, it was only because Bowker saw their movement as an opportunity to advance his own interests:

For having previously failed to convince the relevant City and State authorities that the drastic expansion of the University was an absolute necessity, Bowker now had in the militant protests of Black and Puerto Rican students an invaluable weapon: either provide the University with the resources that it had long coveted or risk inciting a campus riot that threatened to engulf the entire city ³⁷.

There is a troubling and pernicious suggestion in this formulation, that the protests of the lower classes exist only in so far as they are useful to elites, and then only on the level of propaganda, to fuel the advancement of other interests. Clearly, it would be foolish to attempt to belittle the role played by Chancellor Bowker in the process which led to open admissions. On the other hand it is a sort of intellectual sleight of hand to suggest that Bowker could more clearly see what others (for instance, legislators) could not, and therefore could exploit their collective credibilities to the effect that a potentially explosive situation existed in the city which had to be addressed. The impression is thus given that Bowker adjusted the social movement to his agenda. Yet the alternate position can be just as persuasive, namely, that open admissions was an attempt to adjust to the social dilemma present in the city - the cutting edge of which, for the university, lay in the protests at City College.

In the final segments of this chapter, three lines of argument are presented to support the view that the timing of open admissions was in direct response to the protests by Black and Puerto Rican students at City College. The first line of reasoning looks at

expectations regarding the early BHE rhetoric about open admissions, and discusses indicators which suggest that but for the City College protests, open admissions would, in all probability continue to exist as rhetoric. The second looks at the pattern of response by the university leadership to the activism of the SEEK population, especially following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Third we present an overview of the perceptions of activists, faculty and staff who participated at some level in the events leading up to the decision. These perceptions overwhelmingly support the view that the protests precipitated that decision.

Rhetoric and Expectation

On February 28, 1966 the members of the Board of Higher Education met and "affirmed its determination" to pursue the recommendation of the Administrative Council (consisting in large measure of the CUNY presidents):

... to offer the benefits of post-high school education to all residents of New York City who are able and eager to avail themselves of these benefits ³⁸

The Board projected that by 1975 CUNY would be able to implement a system of '100% enrollment'. It was the first official sanction of the concept of a more inclusive university. And two years later, in its 1968 Master Plan for the University, the Board reaffirmed its commitment to the concept of 100% enrollment by 1975. (The specific contents of these plans will be discussed in the next chapter, here, timing is the primary concern.) The significance of these statements by the BHE is that the university has been able to claim, as a matter of record, that open admissions had already been on the agenda and was

thus not a response to pressure, protests or otherwise. This explanation of the July 9th decision has continued to be the 'official' viewpoint of the university. Thus, thirteen years after the event, Chancellor Murphy would express the essential view of the University:

...an open admissions policy came soon after the campus violence at City College, blurring the fact ..." that the University's chancellor had already recommended that the University phase in a policy of open admissions over a six year period from 1969-1975. The decision to accelerate implementation was seen by many as a capitulation....³⁹

How serious though, was the university's commitment to its rhetoric of open enrollment by 1975?

It can safely be assumed, judging from its actual impact, that the fiscal crisis which shook the city in the mid-1970's would have effectively blocked any large scale expansion of the university. That is the wisdom of hindsight. Yet in 1969 questions were being raised regarding the fiscal possibility of supporting the far more modest 'dual admissions' plan at City College. Comparing the demand for 'dual admissions' and the plan for 'open admissions', one observer had this to say:

The President (Gallagher) has acceded to their demands 'in principle', and points out that the Master Plan for the City University also accepts 'in principle' open admissions by 1975. In view of the even greater crisis in the elementary and high schools, the one million on welfare and the threats of strikes by various city employees to enforce their escalating salary demands, the expectation that New York City can finance even half of the cost for the Master Plan for higher education seems remote.⁴⁰

The writer expressed astonishment that in the light of such facts the "militant Blacks and Puerto Ricans at City College could demand what they call 'equality now'". What the foregoing suggests is that the thoughtful observer, acquainted with the fiscal difficulties faced by the city could only regard these statements of the Board as part of the rhetoric of appeasement demanded by the times. In fact the Board appeared to hedge on its own early rhetoric, by its calculation that only 66% of those eligible under its 100% enrollment plan would accept the offered place.⁴¹ This suggests some hedging in the actual expectations of the BHE. Prior to the events at City College, said Rev. Ross Johnson, who participated in the decision, the Board was content to issue statements of intent.⁴² He was not convinced of the serious intent of the rhetoric. Nor was he alone in this retrospective assessment. Former Chancellor Bowker betrayed a similar belief as he recalled the rhetoric of the 1968 Master Plan and the events which foreshadowed the July 9 decision. "Fortunately" he said (chuckling) "we were able to say later that open enrollment was what we had in mind all the time".⁴³ Bowker also expressed his conviction that had the City College protests not precipitated it, the admissions policy envisioned by the 1968 Master Plan would have been doomed by the city's fiscal crisis.

A Pattern of Response

There is no doubt that the university leadership felt itself to be under intense pressures to open up the system, and, that a great deal of its concern in this regard was in response to the extra-ordinary stirring of Black people across the nation. This concern was heightened after the assassination of Martin

Luther King Jr. And, that summer, as violence and passions flared, the Board was moved to announce what was in effect a declaration of a state of emergency. Citing:

... the existence in our city of a condition of social emergency involving deep social inequities and injustices and of massive individual and group frustrations with resultant intergroup tensions and resentments

The Board concluded that:

... the need of New York City high school graduates from economically, socially and educationally deprived neighborhoods and homes to be provided with equalized opportunity for post-high school education is increasingly urgent, and it itself represents a social danger requiring our immediate consideration, deliberation and action ⁴⁴

Among the steps proposed by the Board was the recommendation that full matriculation status be given to all SEEK students - a direct response to expressed grievance. In fact the response of the board and the university leadership during the Queens and City College crises seemed consistent with the notion that the SEEK population itself represented a potential "social danger" which had to be carefully handled. As witnessed by the Report of the Advisory Council Task force, as a result of the impact of reports of "gross manifestation of campus disruption, disorder, and violence ... an imminent and growing threat developed to ... the temper of SEEK students on other campuses ...".⁴⁵ On the directions of Chancellor Bowker the Advisory Council convened an "emergency meeting ... to review the situation". Similarly, when the South Campus takeover occurred at City College, the university leadership gave Gallagher full approval in his approach to the situation, which was to close the

college and negotiate. Asked about his recollection of the Board's reaction to the occupation, Rev. Johnson said:

Well they were shocked. They were scared to death. They wanted to know what damage was done to the property [I] raised the question about what damage was done to the students ... and then the question came up about greater security.⁴⁶

In a related vein Prof. Schulman recalled that:

The process of the negotiation was governed by one and only one fact: whether, if the police were called there'd be a major civil disturbance in Harlem ... period! The BHE called all of the negotiators and Gallagher before them on three occasions during this period of negotiations, each time the members asked only one question: would there be a major disturbance and violence if the police were called ...?⁴⁷

Concurring with this theme Bowker himself recalled that "it was a frightening time to have City College in the hands of Black students - to me and to lots of people. I thought violence was a real possibility".⁴⁸ Within days of the end of the occupation, Aronow Auditorium was in flames, and the campus became unserviceable as a college for several weeks. On June 18, 1969, a "Draft of a Proposed Board Statement" was issued to Board members.⁴⁹ This document already reflected a determination that open admissions could not "wait to 1975" but should be implemented starting 1970.

We have grounded the case thus far on evidence showing two discernible patterns: (a) that although the Board was on record as having established open admissions as an agenda, reasonable doubts existed as to its implementation; (b) there was a consistent concern among university leadership about the potential "social danger" represented by the SEEK population. Given these patterns, as well as the testimony of key players who linked the July 9 initiative to the

action at City College, to argue (as former Board member Herbert Berman does⁴⁹) that "City College had no impact whatever on the Board's decision to escalate the timetable", is to argue for a truly remarkable coincidence.

Individual Perceptions

With one notable exception (cited about), there was general agreement among the approximately thirty individuals interviewed, that the protest at City College precipitated the escalation of the open admissions policy of the City University. The rationalizations given for these perceptions varied, but the overwhelming consensus supports the view that City College was the precipitating factor (within a complex interplay of forces).

Among the activists themselves there are two discernible views of this impact. Some individuals, notably Tom Soto and Henry Arce, appeared to accept open admissions as the immediate and logical outcome of their struggle at City College (in conjunction with the larger struggle then being waged by the Blacks). Others, such as Mullery, Small and Feaster viewed open admissions as a deliberately timed attempt to sabotage the process that had been initiated by the 'five demands'. This process they argue would have institutionalized a far more conservative, but potentially more successful program for educating the City's Black and Puerto Rican youth. The main point here, however, is that both groups view open admissions as a direct result of the student agitation at City College.

Some examples of the perceptions of university leadership have been cited above. Julius Edelstein, self-described as Bowker's political 'point man', thought that "the City College events had a

tremendous role, a great impact on the City officials. Lindsay was in a frenzy both politically and otherwise. When Bowker came up with the plan (to implement open admissions immediately) he agreed, the disruption was of course, a major factor."⁵¹ Edelstein also noted that Lindsay himself was opposed to sending police to City College to retrieve the occupied South Campus. As noted above, former Board member Berman's denial that City College had any impact on the decision is an exception. And just for that it is noteworthy. But as will be shown in the next chapter, Berman's denial was inconsistent with other statements made about the Board's conduct.

Among the staff and faculty interviewees opinions were remarkably consistent that the City College events precipitated escalation of the open admissions timetable. "Clearly", stated Prof. Leslie Berger (first SEEK director at CUNY, later University Dean for Special Programs, based at CUNY's central office), "the City College protest was the catalyst, but the response was not to their demand ... rather it was to dilute the demands".⁵⁰ Berger thought that open admissions was largely about buying social peace. "I think tired, scared men will make bad decisions", he said, adding, "the administrators should have opposed it".

Dr. Allan Ballard (second SEEK director at CUNY, later University Dean for Academic Development) concurred with Berger's assessment: "Without the student protest, there would have been no open admissions."⁵³ Ballard noted that the overall context of change in the society had to be considered, as well as the fact that the university had already moved toward a more open university with the introduction of SEEK and the College Discovery program. He added,

however, that "it was the students who forced the issue of open admissions". In his early (1976) analysis of the decision Ballard had noted the Board's acknowledgement of the Black and Puerto Rican students movements at City College as "the prime impetus for change in the approach to the matter of enrollment policy". He criticized the Board then on the grounds that it "diverted the thrust of the Black and Puerto Rican demands and gained a white middle-class constituency for the program".⁵⁵

Among the more conservative faculty, the opinion that the Board capitulated to pressures instigated by the events at City College, held sway. Prof. Howard Adelson (self described as 'the symbol of the opposition to the left faculty') was convinced that the BHE took the decision only because it had been persuaded by the left faculty, that the students would raze the campus unless it moved to implement some dramatic step, such as open admissions.⁵⁵ Prof. L. G. Heller (Dept. of Classical Languages and Hebrew at CCNY) in his book (1973) agreed that the Board's decision was a response to "violence and intimidation".⁵⁶ And, reflecting on the same experience a few years later (1980), Theodore Gross (Dept. of Humanities) spoke of the:

... summer riots (which) sometimes jolted the academic community and created fear in the minds of those who sent their children to the campus on St. Nicholas Heights. At other times assassinations like Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, and local uprisings, led by Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, sent terror through the college campus. These disturbances soon flared more frequently and burned closer to the campus.⁵⁷

Indeed Gross evoked the image of a college and a society embroiled at every angle. "By 1969" he wrote, "flames were in our

buildings," and "decent human beings wrangled with one another", as Blacks and Jews, liberals and conservatives, young and old confronted each other. Gross left no doubt about his perception that it was this climate of fear and of "the fury of those who once had been excluded from the City College of New York" that was ultimately responsible for the "dramatic change in our admission policy". In this view open admissions was nothing short of capitulation to intimidation.

Enough has been said so far to illustrate that overwhelmingly, participants (students, faculty, administrators etc.) tend to view the timing of open admissions as a primary response to the protests which occurred at the City College during spring 1969. Moreover, although there is evidence that other factors were pushing the university toward more changes, the protests at the City College were the precipitating factor. Thus, in line with hypothesis #1, the evidence suggests the strong likelihood that open admissions would not have happened in 1975 (and possibly never at all), as originally planned. We consider next the question of the scope of open admissions as it was influenced by these protests.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

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2. Newt Davidson, Collective, Crisis at CUNY, p. 54.
3. A Long Range Plan, p. 37.
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5. Ibid, p. 38.
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7. Ibid, p. 39.
8. Ibid, p. 40.
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10. A Long Range Plan, p. 53.
11. Ibid, p. 82.
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23. Interview with Chancellor Albert Bowker, February 19, 1987.

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26. Interview with Dr. Julius Edelstein, March 13, 1987.
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28. Interview with Dr. Julius Edelstein, March 13, 1987.
29. Interview with Chancellor Albert Bowker, February 19, 1987.
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46. Interview with Rev. Ross Johnson, July 8, 1988.
47. Interview with Prof. Jay Schulman, April 30, 1987.
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CHAPTER V

PROTEST AND THE SCOPE OF OPEN ADMISSIONS

Introduction

This chapter concludes the first of the two levels of analysis outlined at the beginning of Chapter IV.

It is acknowledged by those familiar with the facts, that open admissions as it materialized at CUNY in 1970 was vastly different in scope and content compared to what was anticipated by the Master Plans for 1975. The accomplishment of open admissions has been hailed by researchers as a genius of political compromise, for which full credit is bestowed upon Chancellor Bowker. Yet the dramatic shift from the scope projected by the Master Plans has not been viewed by researchers as requiring explanation, despite the patently obvious fact that the university's resources and credibility would be strained far beyond its limit under the weight of the newcomers. The standard response to this question has been to echo Bowker, who justified the shift as a way of putting to an end the yearly struggle over admissions. This response may serve for purposes of justifying what appears as a quite irrational action, but it breaks down as an explanation. For there was no real political struggle over admissions until the Black and Puerto Rican students made it so. There is therefore, an 'explanation vacuum' here concerning the motivation to dramatically expand the scope of open admissions.

This chapter attempts to fill this vacuum by arguing that the dramatic expansion of open admissions is made more comprehensible if it is seen as a direct response to the protests at City College. The argument proceeds along two lines, one drawing on the observation that prior to the events at CCNY, nothing in the university's plans, projections or pronouncements even hints at such a shift in admissions policy. Particularly with regards to the recruitment of minorities, the university seemed committed to a deliberative and gradualist philosophy, designed at the same time to insulate the university from the academic deficits of its newest clientele. Moreover, qualitative changes also occurred in the plans in the aftermath of City College. The second line of reasoning is premised upon the observation that open admissions, as implemented in 1970, was not designed with academic success (only, or primarily) in mind.

EXPANDING THE UNIVERSITY

a. The new Admissions Policy and its Impact

Following its July 9th decision, the Board appointed a Commission on Admissions consisting of 38 persons, and which reflected a diversity of forces and opinions in the university. Traditionally, admission to the university was determined on the merit of high school averages (minimum of 82 for most senior colleges, 75 for community colleges), and on standardized test scores. Now the Commission faced a serious dilemma since in order to integrate the university (one of the six criteria of the July 9 decision), large numbers of Black and Puerto Ricans would have to be admitted. These were students, observed Ballard, frequently with averages "well below the 75 average". After long and contentious discussions the Commission,

unable to agree on a single plan of admissions, submitted three separate plans to the Board.^{1a} Briefly the plans were as follows: Plan 1 proposed that the major part of the new freshman class be admitted based on the students' rank in his or her own school. The remainder would be selected according to SEEK-like criteria; Plan 2 called for admitting 60% on the basis of class rank, 15% according to SEEK criteria, and 25% on other criteria; Plan 3 like Plan 1, called for a major part of the freshman class to be determined by class rank, the remainder would be admitted through the SEEK program in such numbers as to ensure ethnic balance.

Perhaps reflecting the sentiments of a Minority Report¹⁶ which characterized the Commissions plans as "muddled", the Board after public hearings adopted its own admissions criteria:

1. students with 80 average and over were guaranteed admission to a senior college;
2. students ranking in the top 50% of their class were equated with 80 average and also admitted to senior colleges;
3. SEEK and College Discovery students would continue to be admitted on an economic basis;
4. all other graduates were guaranteed admission to a community college.

Assessing the impact of open admissions upon the composition of the CUNY student body Lavin and his colleagues wrote:

Open admissions produced a dramatic rise in the number of students entering CUNY. In the first year (1970) the freshman class numbered almost 35,000, a 75% increase over the previous year. The college attendance rate among New York City high school

graduates rose from 55% to 75%, putting New York well in front of the national college-entry rate of 60%. Almost all of this increase was attributable to open admissions.¹

The author noted moreover that previously, two thirds of these freshmen would have been ineligible to enter either the community colleges or the "non-elite" senior colleges. At the elite colleges (City College, Hunter, Queens, Brooklyn) "by 1975 almost 40% were open admissions student". Similarly open admissions affected the number of minority students attending the university where, in 1969, the SEEK program accounted for 75% of all minorities in the senior colleges. By 1975, according to the authors, (excluding those recruited through special programs) the number of Blacks and Hispanics attending CUNY's senior colleges increased five-fold over 1969. By 1975 too, CUNY's total student body had bulged to a quarter million strong; full-time staff and faculty numbered close to twenty thousand, and was further augmented by nine thousand adjunct faculty. All of this was in consequence of the open admissions policy.

b. Changes in the Vision of the Master Plan(s)

On a qualitative level, none of this mammoth expansion had been anticipated - even vaguely. At no time during the formative years of open admissions, Irwin Polishook wrote in April 1976 - even as the university teetered toward collapse - did the leadership "publicly declare that open admissions represented a new departure for the largest urban collegiate system in the country".² Instead, said he, the leadership spoke in terms of "the reaffirmation of a traditional success", oblivious to the fact that "by introducing open admissions ... the City University had enlarged the scope of its mission in the

direction of resolving intransigent social problems"³ Here was one way in which the open admissions era of CUNY differed from the one anticipated by the Master Plan, the addition of what Polishook called a 'service' mission to the traditional academic vision of the university. And, indeed, the academic program envisioned by the Master Plan was itself a far cry from what eventually materialized.

As noted above, the pronouncement upon which the BHE would later draw, to justify the claim that it had simply advanced its 1975 target date, and to rationalize the July 9th decision, was the 1966 interim revision of the 1964 Master Plan for the City University. Although the 1968 Master Plan is often cited by researchers as the definitive statement, in fact - the plans and projections worked out in 1966 did not in fact substantially change in the report two years later. The 1966 plan envisioned the use of "four main components of the City University" to implement a goal of offering "100% enrollment" to high school graduates. The four components were as follows:⁴

1. The baccalaureate program at the senior colleges;
2. The career and transfer program at the community colleges;
3. The College Discovery Program;
4. The Educational Skills Centers.

We note that it was the Board's prediction that in offering 100% enrollment to high school graduates only 66% would accept.⁵

Therefore all of its projections for 1975 were based on this formula. Notice too that the SEEK program was not mentioned, since it had been institutionalized in the senior colleges.

By 1975, the Master Plan (1966) envisioned that 25% of high school graduates would enter the senior colleges as regular admits.

The Plan estimated that by 1975 some 23,000 graduates would be eligible to enter a senior college. Based on the 66% formula, however, only 15,700 of this number were expected to accept.

At the community college level the Plan expected to increase intake from "10% of graduates in 1965 to 20% in 1975 and 25% in 1980". Accordingly, "by 1975 we estimate that we should be offering (emphasis in original text) enrollment in the community colleges to 40% of the high school graduate group, with a view toward actually admitting (emphasis in original text) between 20% to 25% ...".⁶ Of an estimated pool of 37,000, it was expected that 20,300 would be attending a community college in 1975. It was further estimated that of 9,000 students who would be eligible under the College Discovery program (geared toward Blacks and Puerto Ricans), 6,000 would accept to attend the program. It is important again to note the actual wording of the statement: "It is our goal by 1975 to offer (emphasis in original text) these programs (College Discovery) to 10% of the high school graduate group, with the estimate that 6% or 7% would accept" (original emphasis).

The Educational Skills Centers was the final pillar of the 1966 Plan. Under its auspices a number of specific programs were included:⁷

- (a) Career Discovery Program. This was supposed to provide students with less than 8th grade reading level with skills training in printing, business technology, machine technology, design technology, and so on. The courses would aim at providing occupational direction.

- (b) Occupational Skills Program. This program aimed to prepare a slightly higher caliber of student with skills in hospital technician, repairmen, draftsmen, photographers, clerks, etcetera.
- (c) Work and Study Program. This concept would involve students in apprenticeship programs in fields such as aircraft, automobile, printing, and so on. The on-the-job training would be supplemented with formal classroom training.
- (d) College Adapter Program. This program aimed at providing those of the 25,000 students who graduated each year with a vocational or general diploma with an opportunity to upgrade themselves for entry to a community college. In addition to those students who received vocational or general diplomas, the Educational Skills Centers also aimed at the 24,000 who dropped out before high school graduation.

Protest, and change in the Admissions Philosophy

a. The retreat from gradualism

It is worthwhile to note the following regarding the above-mentioned plans: (1) Absolutely no hint was given that a major restructuring of admissions criteria was in store for university degree granting programs. (2) It included no provisions to increase minority enrollment at the senior college level. (3) The major thrust for involving minorities was through the community colleges and the Educational Skills Centers. The vocational thrust was reemphasized in the 1967 Interim Revision of the 1964 Master Plan, when the Board proposed, in addition to a community college in Harlem, the creation of institutions such as Health Career Centers. The Board's rationale was that:

The establishment of such centers could be of temporary value in remedying the injustices that have been visited upon certain segments of our population for the last century ⁸

Such Centers, the Board further stated, would encourage development of the view that "teaching the children of the disadvantaged (is) not ... a burden to be avoided but ... a challenge to be met ...".⁹ What comes through clearly is that the Board as late as 1967 and even 1968, appeared to be convinced of the need to be deliberate as it looked to the future of the university. Thus speaking with reference to the College Discovery program it emphasized its experimental nature: "Its underlying purpose is to find and develop sound criteria for discovery and measurement of college potential among the socio-economically deprived ...".¹⁰ The operative assumption was that students coming from inadequate academic backgrounds had to be made college-ready. This was not only for their own good but also for the good of the institution. This was the whole premise of the pre-bac program (SEEK), and as noted above, these students were often institutionally insulated from the regular college population. In line with this, it is not surprising that Rosen and his colleagues concluded that:

The inherent philosophy of the Centers was one of insulating the institution from such students. If City University had expanded the Centers as proposed ... it would have established an overt track intended to prevent a large body of high school students from enrollment in ... a degree program ¹¹

These researchers concluded that the Educational Skills Centers were "the backbone" of the 1968 Master Plan (which was essentially a

reiteration of 1966), because it allowed the university to engage in the "rhetoric" of "open admissions" while effectively denying enrollment to almost 20,000 students. The major difference between the 1966 and 1968 versions regarding minority enrollment concerned projections for the SEEK program. This program was clearly seen as the major recruitment channel for bringing minority students into the senior colleges. From a base of approximately 3,000 in 1968, the program was projected to add a net increase of about 1000 students each year, from an average a yearly high school graduate population of some 40,000.¹² Total enrollment in these programs was expected to reach 9,800 by 1975.¹³ This is in sharp contrast with the nearly 16,000 students who in the 1969 plan, were expected to accept a place in the Senior college in 1975 alone! Thus gradualism and deliberation again appeared to characterize the Board's approach to minority enrollment up to 1968.

On August 1, 1968 the Board met in special session and declared "the existence in our city of a condition of social emergency ...". (Full quote cited above.) As part of their response to this "social emergency" two new mechanisms for recruiting minority students were recommended. The first, called the "hundred scholars" program, called for the top 100 graduates of all high schools to be admitted to a CUNY unit irrespective of grades. The second called for the university to adopt five disadvantaged high schools. A third recommendation was that SEEK students should be given full matriculation status effective September 1968.

Responding to the August 1, 1968 decision regarding a new recruitment strategy, the university Senate on September 25, 1968

"directed its chairman to appoint a Special Joint Committee to consider the Board's resolution". On February 12, 1968 its Report on Special Admission Policy was released.¹⁴ The Committee expressed guarded support for the hundred scholars program. Their concern stemmed from the observation that: "of the 60 public academic high schools in the City, 17 had students in the first hundred ranks, in the 1967 graduating class, with averages below 82". (These were therefore averages below the minimum acceptable for regular admission.) Moreover, 13 of the 17 could be designated "ghetto high schools" (i.e. over 36% Black and/or Puerto Rican). Using the 1967 graduating class as a base, the Committee estimated that of the 800 eligible students, 75% had averages varying from below 80 to below 75. In fact, noted the Committee, 60.5% of students who entered CUNY in September 1968 under this program, had averages between 74 and 79.9.

Said the Committee:

We recognize that the newly eligible students will enter the university with severe educational deficiencies. They cannot be thrown in to sink or swim as regular matriculants, but must have as much transitional support and remedial teaching and tutoring as possible. It is essential that programs like SEEK and College Discovery be expanded, and that they should be able to provide even more intensive assistance where it is required.

From the conservative 'emergency' admissions policy change initiated by the Board, to the response of the University's highest academic leadership body, it can be seen that as late as spring 1968, concerns over minority recruitment emphasized caution, planning, a gradualist approach to the issue, and the insulation of the university (via special programs) from the effects of such special recruitment.

The politics of the budget moreover, suggested a downward revision would occur in special minority recruitment. Yet within a few turbulent months all this changed abruptly, as a radically altered plan of admissions took effect; and one which was all the more profound, for it eliminated the Skills Centers as a central pillar of the new university. What brought about this virtual collapse of deliberation and gradualism which all along had characterized the approach to the expansion of CUNY to benefit Blacks and Puerto Ricans? On the basis of argument and information presented in the previous chapter, it is suggested here that these changes in the admissions program came in response to the protests at City College. For there is nothing in the records which suggests - barring the events at City College - that a major shift in the admissions philosophy was forthcoming. And with reference to those who argue that Bowker simply used the events at City College to advance his long stated goal of open admissions, it should suffice to point out that at no time did Bowker ever suggest the radical shift in admissions policy which the Board resolved upon in November 1969.

b. Ethnic Integration and Appeasement

We have tried to show in this chapter that open admissions constituted an abrupt departure from previously articulated philosophy and practice, especially in relationship to the admission of minorities to the University; further, that this shift was linked to the events at City College. In this segment it will be argued that open admissions was a political response to the events at City College. In other words, if Bowker used the protests at City College as a convenient vehicle, it was not to put forth an educational agenda

but to implement a program of political appeasement. The argument on surface is in part speculative, hence risky; nevertheless, many questions and anomalies abound regarding the open admissions policy from which, when taken together, suggests a certain desperation on the parts of those who made the fateful decision. Moreover the argument demonstrates that the changes induced by protest may then also produce consequences which actually run counter to the original aims of the protest.

The weight of opinion among the interviewees involved in this research (some of whom were involved in implementing the policy), tends toward the conclusion that the open admissions policy as implemented by the City University in 1970 was not designed for academic success. Ballard, then University Dean for Academic Development in his book (cited earlier) recalled that even as the open admissions policy passed from politics to implementation, "on everybody's mind was the immensity of the problem before us...", and how concerned the planners were less a major miscalculation occurred. Within a year of implementation, he wrote:

...indications were forthcoming that the major threat to open admissions did not lie in the academic structure of the program, but in the stringent New York State and City budget cutbacks that threatened to make impossible the concentrated attention on underprepared students necessary to give them a fair chance for academic success.¹⁵

Almost twenty years later he had this to say:

What you ended up with was all these students coming in and everybody's common sense telling them that this was impossible to do ... yet you end up with it ... and its demise a few years later due to financial strains ... people strains ¹⁶

Ballard would have preferred to see "a well articulated, gradually phased in, well funded operation aimed at a saveable number of Black and Puerto Rican students in the high schools".¹⁷ As he observed, this was precisely what the activists at City College had advocated.

Prof. Leslie Berger too, a CUNY administrator closely involved with implementing of the policy, concurring with Ballard's assessment, noted the severe shortage of support services. "It was almost criminal", he said, "to let them come in and to let them fail because of the lack of service. We knew what we needed, it was no mystery".¹⁸

Irwin Polishook came to similar conclusions too when he wrote (in 1976) that there had been a "general underfunding of open admissions since its inception". He observed that CUNY officials had somehow managed to underestimate certain statistics vital to the budget process. Hence, they expected an "increase in freshman students from 16,599 in 1969 to between 32,250 and 34,567" in September 1970. The actual number was 35,395. In like manner, where CUNY officials had anticipated that 35% of the new freshman class would need remediation, the actual percentage was closer to 50%. He noted that the freshman enrollment jumped by 22,000 in 1970, and another 22,000 by 1971:

Yet City and State agencies consistently provided less money than required by constantly underestimating the number of students who might enroll, and the special educational support these students would require. (Thus) for 1970 the state budgeted on the basis of 30,000 first-time students, a short-fall of more than 5,000.¹⁹

In actual dollar amounts the short-fall to CUNY was \$11.9 millions for 1970, and \$35 millions for 1971. This, said Polishook was according to the "CUNY administration's own calculations". The results of this underfunding, Polishook thought, was to be seen in the alarmingly high attrition rate of 56% for open admissions students (calculated on the basis of 7 semesters starting with September 1970), as compared to 36% for regularly admitted students. CUNY officials, Polishook charged, had attempted to camouflage the real attrition picture by combining the rate for the two groups to get 48%. The most significant statistical finding regarding the open admissions population, Polishook observed, were those which "indicated as a projection that perhaps as many as 70% would not graduate from a unit of the City University".²⁰

These observations corroborate closely those of Lavin and his colleagues who found in their exhaustive study (1981), that at the senior college level the graduation rate for Blacks and Puerto Ricans was 22% and 19% respectively, for open admissions students.²¹ Among open admission Jewish students the figure was 38%. Significantly, the authors noted that "among all ethnic groups, regular students were more likely to earn a degree than open-admissions students from the same ethnic group. These differences were substantial..."²². And even though they concluded that open admissions brought large numbers of Blacks and Puerto Ricans to graduation who might otherwise not have entered the University, arguably these were the same students who would have made it through the system had it been just a bit more selective. The inescapable conclusion is that for vast numbers, especially of minority students, the City University under its open

admissions program became a huge revolving door, or – to use a more politically loaded notion – a sort of holding pen.

But aside from the implication that it was not designed for academic success, there is also the very strong perception from sources important to the university that open admissions put at risk the credibility and reputation of the University as an academic institution. Lavin and his colleagues summarized the picture as follows:

Without doubt this has been the most controversial aspect of the program. Some critics charged that as a result of the deluge of students with weak high school records, academic standards had become so watered down as to be almost meaningless. Hostile articles appeared ... claiming that CUNY was awarding degrees to thousands of nearly illiterate students.³³

The authors observed in response, that sufficient data was not available to make a judgment about an actual decline of standards. The point is, however, that the perception did exist, and as the Minority Report of the Commission on Admissions had warned, the perception of the academic decline of the University could be just as powerful as the reality. Not surprisingly, as the juggernaut of open admissions rolled along, the university leadership felt increasingly compelled to address "the perception of open admission's negative impact upon standards". One important attempt to do so came in December 1975 when the Board passed a resolution which stipulated that in the future students wishing to enter the University had to demonstrate a minimum of eighth grade reading and math competence²⁴. Had this standard been applied to the 1971 freshman class, observed Lavin (et al), it would have eliminated 12,000 of the

38,000 students admitted that fall. Ultimately, a new admissions formula was adopted. This plan kept the required high school average for admission to a senior college at 80. In addition, students in the top 35% (instead of 50%) of their graduating class could attend a senior college. All other students would attend the community colleges. Those judged academically inadequate would be referred to a "transitional program" for remediation. This change in policy greatly reduced the number of students eligible to enter the senior colleges, and correspondingly increased allocation to community colleges.

Considering the information just reviewed, the 'mystery' of open admission looms even larger. For it is inconceivable that the University leadership were unaware of the dimensions of what they proposed to do. The Commission on Admissions was itself torn and ambivalent to a fault. In the end the Chancellor and the Board produced their own 'compromise' and overwhelmed everyone else. Bowker would later argue that he did so because a quota system was politically unacceptable. Yet the quota implications of open admissions cannot be escaped, for the criteria for open admissions as directed by the Board called explicitly for the ethnic integration of the University. In fact it appears that the ethnic integration of the institution was (at least in the early stages), far more important to the leadership than the creation of circumstances conducive to academic success. At least this much is suggested by all we have discussed above. Moreover, since "ethnic integration" of the University was never part of the discussion in the Master Plans, why did it seem suddenly to blossom and become such a prominent aspect of the open admissions agenda? There is a reasonable link to be made, we

believe, between the Board's action, the protests at City College, and the thrust for integration – given the context of national concern over increasing Black militancy, especially among urban youths.

In the turbulence of the late sixties, the perception grew that Blacks were rapidly moving away from "integration" as a solution to racial exclusion, towards militant separatism. These perceptions were fed in part by the Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Mar. 1969). Contrary to the conclusions drawn earlier (1966), by the Kerner Commission, the Report asserted that notions such as "'inclusion' and 'integration' have become largely irrelevant to Black youth".²⁵ Moreover, it suggested, there was emerging "a generation of Black activists" which had a wide communal base of support around issues such as "community control, cultural autonomy", and militant protest.²⁶ The Report traced this shift toward greater militancy to the convergence of:

... two streams feeding into contemporary Black student protest. One is from the middle classes of the Southern Black community; the second, and increasingly more dominant stream, is from the urban ghettos of the North. In recent years, both sources have ... found a congenial response among high school youth. It is these youth, with roots in the urban Black communities ... who are now beginning to attend the universities and colleges of America in greater numbers.²⁷

The Report further documented numerous instances in cities across the nation of violent demonstrations often led or instigated by high school youths. This youthful militance, the Report noted, also provoked an "official militancy" as "Black youth has become a special target for governmental and police action".

The paranoia that seemed to grip university administrators at such institutions as Harvard and Cornell (and City College), was undoubtedly connected to this perception of the volatile, unpredictable and perhaps dangerous breed of militant Black student. This attitude, according to one account, even pervaded the leadership of Howard University - a predominantly Black university. On March 1, 1968, in the first action of its kind in the country, militant students at Howard seized a number of buildings and issued demands. According to the witness the "administration and faculty leadership had become literally petrified in the face of Black student power".²⁸ The witness, William Corson, a former counter-intelligence expert who had served in Vietnam and Korea, had chosen Howard University as the field-site for a study of the Black college student, out of concern that they represented a revolutionary potential. His observations and conclusions are important, for while they may not represent the conscious thinking of university leaders in this period, it is not unlikely (given what is now known about such governmental efforts as Cointel-Pro), that it mirrored the thinking of important governmental policy making agencies. (Corson writes for instance, that his interest in Howard University was aroused by the suggestion of "a friend in the Justice Department ... that Howard University was at least serving as a revolutionary incubator" [p.19]. He felt that the March '68 seizure confirmed this belief.) Moreover, his model of revolutionary cause and response bears a striking resemblance to the revolt at City College, and its aftermath.

For Corson, there were three sides to the revolutionary order, namely, "the revolutionaries, the masses, and radicalized members of

the middle-class". And, the Howard University seizure he thought, was without doubt the work of trained revolutionaries:

The Howard takeover was characterized by strict organization and discipline, which are usually absent in student/administration confrontations, and which are certainly not an automatic by product of social protest ... The entire operation was almost a textbook model of an exercise in social reform. The seizure was swift and efficient, there was no damage to any university property throughout the five or six days of occupation; the switchboard was manned and operated; internal discipline was maintained by the students themselves; food was brought in on a regular schedule. The students left the door open for dialogue and discussion with the University.²⁹

Revolutionaries by themselves, however, cannot make a revolution; they must involve two other elements. Thus Corson argued that the radicalization process was most important, for it was in this way that the middle class and the masses became involved. He cited a number of scenarios at Howard which he thought contributed to the creation of a "revolutionary space" by adding to the propaganda strength of the revolutionaries. The failure of the Howard University leaders to respond appropriately he thought, led to a violent and destructive outburst fourteen months later as "students acted out of an overwhelming sense of frustration with a university administration that had deceived them, obstructed change, and refused to act on constructive suggestions"³⁰ The way to prevent the closing of the triangle of revolution he thought, was to deny to the revolutionaries any objective grounds upon which to base propaganda. If this meant Black Studies programs, or more Black faculty - that was the way to go "if we are to slow down or stop the process of Black radicalization on college campuses"

Although the foregoing represents the thinking of one man (albeit one constrained by training and habit to thinking along such lines), it would seem remarkable indeed had such perceptions not been shared by a wider community. Indeed, it is to be recalled that the Board's declaration (cited earlier) of a condition of social emergency came at the height of national concern about rising Black militancy (especially among youth), and the decline of belief in integration as a viable approach to the problems of the Black community. That declaration moreover is consistent with the response of the university leadership to the handling of the protests at the City College (for example, not calling in the police etc.); it's also consistent with the final decision to place integration ahead of the educational integrity of the institution. Small wonder that Bowker felt constrained to act 'to remove politics out of the admission issue', at the expense (apparently) of the academic integrity of the University. For former Board member Rev. Ross Johnson, it was the purest act of appeasement. Moreover, by going to open admissions (which was in effect a radical revision of admissions criteria) Bowker and the BHE removed as well perhaps the most powerful motivating issue around which Black and Puerto Rican students and youths could organize. And the absorption of young minorities into the campuses in the meantime would also serve a valuable emergency social control function.

To summarize the argument of this chapter:

- 1a. The University had, up to the City College protests, enunciated and practiced a careful, gradualist approach to the admission of "special" students (i.e., Blacks and Puerto Ricans, primarily, who did not meet the regular criteria). If anything, the Master

Plans affirmed that such special admissions would be increased through the expansion of special programs. Moreover, students with primarily vocational high school background would be insulated from the degree granting programs. The fact that these fundamental aspects changed so abruptly can only be attributed to the action at City College.

- 1b. Nowhere in the Master Plans is there the suggestion that admissions criteria would be so radically revised, or that integration was to be a part of its agenda. The manner of its doing suggests an ulterior motive (i.e., other than academic success), since the program was underfunded, overwhelmed and put at risk the academic reputation of the University. The motive it is suggested was to appease an explosive urban youth (especially) (and in NYC Black and Puerto Rican) population.
- 2) Contrary to the normal research vision, it is suggested that Bokwer did not use the revolt of City College to deliver open admissions. Rather, open admissions under the banner of integration was the response to a movement of lower-class students.

The protest at City College did not by itself bring about the reform in the admissions policy of the City University. The basis for its success must be analyzed on at other levels. Open admissions (read as the ethnic integration of CUNY), appears to have been motivated by the peculiar conditions of the local political environment of New York City. The presence of these conditions we hypothesized earlier, gave potency to the protests thus resulting in a radically changed admissions policy. This argument is developed over the next three chapters.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

- 1a. Report and Recommendation to the Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, "University Commission and Admissions, CUNY", October 7, 1969
1. David E. Lavin, et al Right Versus Privilege, pg. 86
2. Irwin Polishook, "Open admissions assessed - The example of the City University of New York, 1970-1975", in Midstream, April, 1976, pg. 17
3. Ibid.
4. 1964 Master Plan for the City University of New York: 2nd Interim Revision-1966, BHE, June 1966, pg. 55
5. Ibid, pg. 58
6. Ibid, pg. 56
7. Ibid, pg. 30-32
8. 1964 Master Plan: 3rd Interim Revision - 1967, pg. 15
9. Ibid
10. Ibid 8.11
11. David Rosen, et al, Open Admissions, p. 63
12. Master Plan of the Board of Higher Education or the City University of New York: 1968; BHE, July 1, 1968, pg. 26
13. Ibid
14. Report on Special Admissions Policy, The University Senate of CUNY, adopted 2-12-69, City College Archives
15. Ballard, The Education of Black Folk, pg. 141
16. Interview with Dr. Allen Ballard, November 12, 1986
17. Ibid
18. Interview with Dr. Leslie Berger, February 14, 1989
19. Polishook, "Open Admissions Assessed", Midstream April, 1976 pg. 22
20. Ibid, pg. 23

21. David Lavin, et al, Right Versus Privilege, pg. 92
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid pg. 95
24. Ibid pg. 296-297
25. Jerome H. Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), pg. 170-171
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, pg. 110
28. William R. Corson, Promise or Peril: The Black Student in America, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. 1970), pg. 21
29. Ibid, pg. 20
30. Ibid, pg. 47

CHAPTER VI

CHANGE IN THE BLACK MOVEMENT: FROM INTEGRATION TO SEPARATION

Introduction

This chapter begins the second level of analysis outlined in Chapter IV. It is concerned ultimately with the development of the political and racial environment which, under John Lindsay were a critical aspect of the politics of reform. The analysis builds through several stages (Chapter VI, VII) and concludes (chapter VIII) with a look at the dynamics and impact of the Lindsay regime upon the university reform.

As earlier indicated, the protests at City College did not by themselves bring about the reform in the admissions policy of the university. The protests achieved their impact because other factors were involved which helped to create the political conditions to make reform a possibility. The key to understanding this complex process, we have hypothesized, in general is to be found in the instability of governing coalitions. Where this coalition is dependent upon an insurgent group, it is also vulnerable to challenges from that group, such as the threat (or perception thereof) of disruptive actions (strikes, sitins, riots etc). These conditions appeared to approximate those which brought the Lindsay regime to City Hall in New York, and formed the setting under which the City College protests occurred, and out of which came the reform of university admissions policy. However, these conditions did not bloom overnight, but

instead developed over time. Hence, in line with the framework of analysis outlined earlier, we look at some of the long-term changes which contributed to the rise of a politically unstable environment in New York City. This chapter focusses on the impact of changes in the Black community, and in particular, upon the evolution of dominant ideological trends in that group. This perspective is important for the mood of the Black community (and response to it) was often based (at least in media) upon perceptions which were informed by the rhetoric of the times. Moreover, the protests at City College were at once the product and expression of deep and long term changes in the Black community.

As indicated earlier, one of the primary guidelines of the BHE for devising new admissions criteria for the university was that such criteria should result in "the ethnic integration of the university". By this criteria open admissions has been a resounding success. That this should be so seems only to underline the importance of this clearly political goal; for this goal was apparently of greater value to the decision makers at that time than was the preservation and maintenance of the perception of the university as an institution of excellence. This focus, we have shown, was also consistent with the Board's earlier perception of a social crisis in the city. In part this was a reaction to the events which followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. The Board's political agenda (integration) also seemed consistent with reports of the increasing rejection, in particular by young urban Blacks, of the goals and ideals of integration (and non violence) in favor of greater militance and separatism. This phenomenon did not arise or come to full bloom

overnight, but evolved in counterpoint to the rise of the middle-class led Black protest movement, a development which was accompanied by a contempt for, and rejection by the Black middle-class, of the values and folk ways of the mass of poor urbanized Blacks. On the other hand there was a strong commitment to assimilate to white values and cultural standards, and hence to integration as a socio-political goal. This resulted effectively in the virtual political abandonment of the northern urbanized Black poor, a growing legacy of lower class suspicion and distrust of the Black bourgeoisie, and the creation of a leadership vacuum in which sundry forms of alternate visions could be asserted, based mainly on the appeal of nationalist feelings. One critical source of challenge to the integrationist agenda came from new aspirants to leadership among SNCC youth even as the civil rights movement appeared to have reached its limits as a movement for change. These developments provide an important perspective for understanding the later contribution of the Black community to the climate of political instability in New York City.

The Triumph of Integration

(a) Legacy of the Washington era

The rise of the Black middle-class led protest movement, and the subsequent evolution of that movement is a complex phenomenon. Certainly it is not possible to appreciate that development without considering the impact of Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey. They were the source of two sets of tensions that would have important impacts upon the movement, namely: (a) tension between the Black middle class leadership, and (especially) the masses of urban impoverished grass roots Blacks: (b) leadership tension within

inter-racial resistance movement organizations. The first helped to shape the character of the Northern urban response to Black middle-class led change organizations. The second helped to change the later character of the integrationist movement, and triggered federal intervention to offset its impact.

If, despite a lack of response to their problems, continued loyalty to the Republican Party was a fact of Black political life – even in face of rising anti-Black terrorism in the South and increasingly in the North – one explanation for it was Booker T. Washington. Moreover, it was the rise to prominence of Washington which also served to spur the development of a more radical form of resistance by elements of the Black middle class against the white supremacy orientation of the 'New' South. Washington's philosophy of accommodation promulgated at the opening of the 1895 Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition, was welcomed by those forces bent upon taking the Blacks completely out of the political equation of the South. Washington's de-emphasizing of Black activism for political or civil rights (which was doubtless a response to increased racial antagonism) thus provided sanction for the continuing movement to disenfranchise Black southerners. The social philosophy was in effect an endorsement of the Jim Crow segregation practices enshrined in *Dred Scott*, and *Plessy vs Ferguson*. "In all things that are purely social", Washington had pronounced, "we can be as separate as the fingers, yet as one hand in all things essential to mutual progress". The program of practical education in such areas as agriculture and service professions and, the development of a Black business class also found sympathetic ears in the persons of some northern

philanthropists. In short order Washington was thrust from relative obscurity and projected as a national 'race' leader, and became, without doubt, the most powerful person of his race in the country.

If Washington had indeed sold out the Black south, as his critics would, in effect charge, this was primarily the opinion of a small but vocal group of middle class intellectuals. Washington was lionized in the Black press, much of which he was said to control through 'hush money' and subsidies. Moreover, as Louis Harlan observed, "The editors were themselves small businessmen who generally agreed with Washington's economic orientation and the conventional wisdom of a commercial age".¹ Washington clearly had the sympathy and admiration of the ordinary people, not just in the South but also in the northern cities. As Theodore Roosevelt's chosen advisor on questions concerning the 'Negro problem', his influence on urban Black politics was considerable, as he exercised the power to elevate and to demote men based on his access to federal patronage. Washington's political influence rested on keeping the Black electorate within the Republican fold. And no doubt the rate of defection to the Democrats, though steady, was considerably slowed because of this influence.

The first assault upon the accommodationist position advocated by Washington came from Harvard educated William Monroe Trotter in the pages of his Boston Guardian. Trotter would later be joined by W. E. B. Dubois and others, who strongly and consistently condemned Washington's silence on lynchings and the disenfranchisement of Blacks. In July 1905 a group of 29 like-minded men and women solidified their opposition to the Washington program by organizing the Niagara Movement and promising "persistent manly agitation", as

"the way to liberty". The Niagara Movement was in its turn attacked as radical, and the motivation of its leadership was questioned in the Black press. It was implied to the Black public that the Niagara Movement was motivated by men jealous of the accomplishments of Booker T. But it was the inability of the Niagara Movement to respond to atrocities through concrete action, that was, in the eyes of the Black press, the real measure of the correctness of Niagara's position. On this account the Movement frequently came in for vilification, especially by the AGE, a New York based paper said to be owned by the Washington machine. But Washington's appeal to leading white opinion also ensured unfavorable press for groups advocating a 'radical' approach to the race problem. The conflict escalated when in 1909 the organization that was to become the NAACP came into being through the auspices of a group of liberal whites. Within a year the Niagara Movement had merged with the new organization which now came under strenuous attack from the Washington organization. Yet Washington's star was already waning, with his failure to influence either Roosevelt or Taft on the race question. With Wilson's inauguration in 1912, and subsequent endorsement of steps to extend Jim Crow to the Federal bureaucracy, the end of the Washington mystique was in sight. "The increasing of southern influences in the government caused some Booker T. Washington supporters to join NAACP groups."² The passing of the 'Wizard' at the end of 1915 ironically seemed also symbolic of the passing of the age of accommodation.

The Washington saga is important because it points to a problem that has historically plagued the efforts of the Black intelligentsia to build an effective resistance movement: namely, the inability to

bridge the gap to the lower classes of working and unemployed who comprised the mass of the Black population. Washington's large base of Black support which included the church, business and civic groups and even large elements of the nascent middle class, cannot be explained away completely by his access to white money. And while his persistent attempts to sabotage and undermine his critics are well known, these efforts do not fully explain the inability of organizations such as the Niagara Movement to gain a foothold in the Black community. Given his stress on the development of the "talented tenth", it seems clear that DuBois' emphasis was on organizing the Black intelligentsia to carry out a 'historical role'. This was clearly an elitist vision of roles and responsibilities in the struggle for rights and dignity. The failure of Niagara and the success of 'Bookertism' thus pointed to the inability of the Black intellectuals to bridge the gap between progressive ideas on the one hand, and on the other, active programs with mass appeal. Furthermore, the fact that the Niagara leadership was absorbed into a white organized and led institution did not increase their mass appeal. Quite the contrary, the alliance of Black middle class intellectuals with white liberal supporters turned out to be both a curse and a blessing to the former. The blessing was that Black organizations such as the Niagara Movement could gain access to greater resources through such alliances. The curse was that such alliances would ultimately increase the credibility gap between this middle class leadership and its urban grass roots. In fact, DuBois himself came under editorial assault not long after the formation of the NAACP, accused by the editor of a Negro newspaper, the Bee, said

to be a Washington devotee, "of being under the control of a large committee of white people". DuBois, it was alleged, "could talk only when this committee told him to talk, write only when this committee instructed him to write, and come and go only when this committee told him to come and go".³ But the inter-racial alliance also produced its own internal tensions, which initially threatened to burst the new organization assunder. The conflicts between DuBois and the NAACP's first board chairman Oswald Garrison Villard, and later Joel Spigern, the second board chairman, and the internal crises it produced for instance, is well documented by Charles Kellogg. Although the NAACP would eventually witness an orderly shift of leadership from white to Black, this was not to be the case for some other inter-racial movement organizations - a fact which carried profound consequences for the subsequent development of the resistance movement.

b) The Challenge of Garveyism

The Booker T. Washington phenomenon, we have argued above, was also symbolic of the gap between the leadership of the nascent Black middle class, and the masses of disenfranchised and impoverished Blacks. And while Washington was much closer to the pulse of these folk, his greatest appeal was to the stable upward-striving lower middle class. Moreover, as Cruse has observed, Garveyism was nothing more than Booker 'T'ism' clothed in racial nationalism. Garvey and his organization galvanized masses of the Black poor in a way never before or since witnessed. This is well documented and need not preoccupy us here. Rather, the reaction of the middle-class leadership to the Garvey phenomenon is of concern to the analysis.

The public denunciation of Garvey by men such as DuBois and Randolph is well known. It is also documented that Garvey's 1922 arrest and prosecution was urged, and approved by prominent elements of the Black New York intelligentsia. The question is: what was the basis of this violent rejection of a man and a doctrine to whom millions were just as violently devoted? And how did this rejection affect the subsequent development of the resistance movement?

There is no settled opinion as to the basis of Garvey's rejection by influential members of the Black intelligentsia. Certainly Garvey's indictment of the Black leadership as reactionary and opportunistic must have been an important factor. Garvey was suspicious of their leadership because much of it was comprised of light skinned negroes. He said of his first visit to the offices of the NAACP, that for a moment he thought he was in a white institution. Besides the strictly physical basis, it seems in retrospect quite consistent that Garvey and DuBois should have entered into a fierce polemic, since Garvey had in fact picked up the mantle of economic self-determination that Washington left behind. The difference was that Garvey had imbued the economic self-help philosophy of Washington with a Black nationalist thrust. It was a thrust to which vast numbers of Blacks were ready to and did, in fact, respond.

DuBois and the NAACP were not alone in their reaction to Garvey. He was also loudly denounced as a charlatan and opportunist by Black radicals of the day, both within the Communist Party, and by Socialists like A. Phillip Randolph. According to Cruse the anti-Garvey crusade was grounded in (a) the threat he represented to

pro-integrationist forces like the NAACP, (b) the threat to the doctrinaire Marxist line being touted by American communists at the time (c) the West Indian vs. Afro-American ethnic feuding. DuBois was to declare Garvey the "most dangerous man" in the country, because of the latter's strident nationalist advocacy at a time when 'reasonable' people were looking to an inter-racial approach to the 'Negro problem'.

The Communist doctrine viewed Garveyism essentially as an aberration which could only hamper the work of building working class solidarity. And, as Cruse writes, "an anti-West Indian bias was implicit in some of the relentless editorial assaults in Randolph's Messenger against the Garvey movement, as part of the 'Garvey must go' campaign carried on by the American leadership".⁴ These heated debates were all along whirling far above the heads of the very people on whose behalf the middle class intelligentsia professed to work, i.e. the mass of the Blacks. Rare was the attempt to come to grips with the implications of Garveyism, observed Cruse. Black Communists went in locked step with the Party line coming out of Moscow. Even the intellectuals of the Harlem Renaissance, seemed more the creatures of white patrons than independent thinkers. Garveyism had shown that nationalism was a profoundly important ingredient in any approach to organizing the masses of Blacks. Nevertheless, Garvey and Garveyism was soundly and loudly repudiated by the Black intelligentsia - thus widening the breach between this class and the masses of Black (especially urban) poor. Claude McKay had been moved to lament that "the Negro intelligentsia cannot hope to get very far if the Negro masses are despised and neglected"⁵ The nature and significance of this breach bears further examination.

Rudwick and Meier have suggested that the phenomenal response of the lower classes to the Garvey movement was based on "the promise of self-esteem, rather than nationalism", and cites as evidence "the fact that many followers of the nationalist Garvey, ended up in the ostentatiously inter-racial cult of Father Divine."⁶ Such an explanation falls short of embracing the full implications of the movement however. For one thing there does not seem to be a necessary contradiction between nationalism and the need to reinforce one's self-esteem. Furthermore, Father Divine's star rose in the depression of the 1930's, suggesting an economic impulse, rather than the need for self-esteem as an explanation of his following. Finally, the rise of the Nation of Islam which incorporated much of the Garveyite ideology, and its adversarial stance toward the Black bourgeoisie, cannot be explained if the nationalist content of Garveyism is omitted, which significantly, was the vehicle for imbuing self-esteem.

A more satisfactory explanation of the Garveyite phenomena is provided by Lawrence Levine.⁷ The march of white supremacy in the South through progressive disenfranchisement, the apparent bankruptcy of the Washington philosophy, the reign of terror that greeted returning veterans in the summer of 1919 produced "a heightened tendency to look inward, to reach within the community for protection, understanding and sustenance".⁸ The result of these tensions was the development of a "revitalization movement," which, in the words of the anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace, upon whose work Levine draws, is "a deliberate, organized conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture".⁹ Characteristic of such movements is the tendency "to stress the revival of central

cultural beliefs and values and the elimination of alien influences".¹⁰ Garvey's message, stressing African identity, resurrecting a version of African history, attempting to build a Black-centered economy was essentially a message of revitalization based upon race consciousness. Nevertheless, as Levine insisted, "Garvey did not create race consciousness", that concept was already one of the organizing principles of the reality of American life. Garvey articulated a vision that was consonant with the strivings of a sizeable stratum of people. But perhaps of far greater moment was the fact that Garveyism did not attempt to build institutions that were radically different from those to which its membership belonged. Hence the church, which as the center of the Negro social life became a primary recruiting ground for Garveyism, and, importantly, provided the model for meetings and conventions. Garveyism fused form: the liturgy of worship, with content: race consciousness as organizing principle for economic and political self-determination. By affirming the lower class individual in this manner, Garveyism clearly enhanced the self-esteem of its members. Hence the attack upon Garveyism by the Black intelligentsia would have far more profound consequences than it might at first appear. For in attacking the movement, the intelligentsia was, in effect, also laying waste to the source upon which hundreds of thousands drew for a positive, forward-looking sense of self. This could only result in deepening the developing alienation of the Black middle-class (and the intellectuals in particular), from Black lower-class majority. Moreover, the facile emulation of the white culture by the 'Black Bourgeoise' of which Frazier would later write, and the deepening inter-racial character of

the middle-class led movement organizations served to increase the level of suspicion and distrust. But the political implications of this breach was not to become evident until the later 1950's and 60's when the myriad urban grassroots organization spawned by resurgent Garveyite ideology, raised up to challenge the established middle-class leadership on the direction and tactics of the movement.

With the demise of Garveyism, nationalism was no longer a contending force. The middle-class would continue to consolidate its leadership of the resistance movement through the building of national organizations, typically, the NAACP and National Urban League. The history of these organizations is well documented and need not be replicated here, except in so far as certain features of that history would shape later perceptions of such organizations within the movement. Two such features within the NAACP were (a) commitment to an inter-racial approach to the 'Negro' problem; and (b) commitment to a gradualist philosophy of social change. The organization engaged in heavy propaganda work for example in its anti-lynching campaigns. It has even been credited with reducing white public tolerance for violence as a means of maintaining inequality and segregation.¹¹ Nevertheless, it is primarily its legal attacks upon the system of segregation and political exclusion by which the NAACP is popularly identified. By its very nature the legal approach to the dismantling of the Jim Crow system had to emphasize inter-racialism and gradualism. This was especially true in the political arena where the organization acted as a pressure group to influence legislation. With its historic victory in *Brown vs. the Board of Education* in 1954 the organization reached the zenith of its career as an entity for

change. After 1954 other forces began to call the gradualist and inter-racial stance into question. Ironically one of the primary movers in this later drama was to be the Congress of Racial Equality which had been founded on an inter-racial and implicitly gradualist outlook in 1942.

A New Challenge: The Nation of Islam

Thus far we have tried to trace the development of a schism between the Black middle-class (and its leadership) and the northern urban lower class Blacks. "White middle class society", wrote Essien-Udom, "for a long time to come may not be open to the millions of Black Americans, but, in fact, neither is Negro middle-class society open to them."¹² In all likelihood, he observed, "most will remain members of the lower class, despised by the White and Negro middle-class society alike".¹³ Perhaps the principal impact of this schism was the failure to integrate the urban ghetto dweller into an organized movement structure similar to that which emerged in the South (SCLC). Because the thrust of the middle-class led organizations was toward the South, there was no significant organized attack upon the problems confronting the ghettoized Blacks, for example, police brutality, racial attacks, housing, de facto school segregation and so on. The ghettos were in essence a leadership vacuum within which numerous groups and personalities contended for the hearts and minds of the poor. These groups ranged from religious sects, to Garveyite separatists. Eric Lincoln noted that "in New York City alone, a score or more organizations operate in the name of Black Solidarity".¹⁴ One of the more influential of such groups was the Nation of Islam.

Founded along with a number of religious/nationalist groups (1930) in the aftermath of Garveyism, the Nation reached the peak of its prosperity between 1955 - 1964. The movement was avowedly religious, and eschewed any political participation, including protest demonstrations. Nevertheless, it attracted numerous converts, and perhaps countless sympathizers within the ghettos. The Nation gave to its followers, Essien-Udom argued, the very thing that was denied them by both Black and white middle-class society alike, and that was a positive identity. The Nation's teachings on identity, which projected Blacks as the 'original man', and whites as evil mutations, was threatening to the Black middle-class leadership whose strategy, wrote Lincoln, "has characteristically been to avoid embarrassing the white man, even at the cost of some delay in attaining a desired end".¹⁵ Consequently, among the Black intelligentsia the Nation and its leadership was "systematically ignored" at first. Ignorance of the movement was for a time, according to Lincoln, a badge of honor among otherwise well-informed Black intellectuals. "It represented a refusal to acknowledge the existence of any phenomenon that might be interpreted - by the white community, at least - as casting doubt on the social and intellectual acceptability of Black people".¹⁶ By their strident attacks upon the established Black leadership and the 'white man' in general, the Nation strongly encouraged popular distrust and suspicion of this leadership in the ghetto. At the same time, the view was promoted that the 'white man', who had achieved dominance by trickery, murder and fraud, was susceptible only to overpowering force. This force of retribution was to be wielded by Allah in the final conflict. Muslims in the meanwhile were limited to

self defensive action in situations of imminent danger. The doctrine reached its most articulate expression and popular influence in the person of Minister Malcolm X, who was for a period its foremost spokesman.

It is extremely difficult, beyond the general observation of its influence made by those who have studied the Muslim movement, to access its impact upon the ghetto populations in general. Membership at its peak was still a small percentage of the Black population but, we are told, sympathizers were numerous. This was especially true in Harlem, where crowds gathered readily to hear Minister Malcolm X speak. The Nation's image within the ghetto was that of a unified organization, a veritable paragon of Black solidarity comprised of men who were purportedly unafraid of white power, and who seemed in any case prepared to fight fire with fire. The appeal of this image especially to male converts to Islam is clear from the testimonials gathered by Essien-Udom. The fissure within the Nation and the subsequent separation of Minister Malcolm X from the organization sent a clear message about that image of solidarity. Although Minister Malcolm X would continue to be respected as a popular and charismatic spokesman, there was a genuine sense of popular disappointment and loss following the 1964 separation. There was also some confusion generated as the Minister seemed to shift away from positions with which he had become publicly identified, and seemed to move increasingly on shifting ideological grounds. The image of a Black solidarity organization had been shattered. Many were sure this was the work of the white powers. Those who waivered in this belief were convinced of it upon the assassination of the Minister a year later.

Moreover, with the separation, the Nation lost its tinge as a political organization, becoming more clearly identified as a conservative though separatist religious organization.

The Nation of Islam failed to fulfill its potential as a political mass movement addressing the problems of the urban Black poor. This failure ensured the continuity of the existence of a leadership vacuum which the Southern leadership would not be able to fill as events soon proved. Thus the Nation, along with many lesser organizations merely tilled the soil of discontent in the ghettos. The lack of coherent leadership, seem as plausible a partial explanation of the spontaneous nature of later urban explosions, as theories of rising expectations. At the same time on the ideological level these separatist and nationalist currents helped to lay the ground-work for wide acceptance of the Black Power philosophy.

From Non-Violence to Black Power: The Legacy of SNCC

Within a few years of the momentous Brown vs the Board of Education decision, the Southern civil rights movement had reached an impasse. The lessons of the Montgomery bus boycott (as well as other situations), made it clear that realizing the basic goals of desegregation and political enfranchisement was going to be a hard fought and protracted struggle. Neither the civil authorities which sought to preserve the old order, nor the civil rights leadership which confronted it, were prepared for the cathartic impact of the Black youth movement that was about to be released upon them. In the words of two seasoned observers:

The Civil Rights Movement would never be the same again. The Southern College student sit-ins set in motion waves of events that shook the power structure of the Black

community. They made direct action temporarily pre-eminent as a civil rights technique, ended NAACP hegemony in the civil rights movement, speeded up incalculably the whole process of social change in race relations, all but destroyed the barriers standing against the recognition of the Negro's constitutional rights, and ultimately turned the Black protest organizations toward a deep concern with the economic and social problems of the masses.¹⁷

That the rapid pace of desegregation of transportation and public facilities and the re-establishment of voting rights for millions of Black Southerners, would have been inconceivable without the participation of thousands of college students and other youth, is attested to in the literature on the movement. Nevertheless, the outpouring of this energy did not occur without controversy or without unsettling consequences - especially for the civil rights movement itself. The Black youth movement in the South succeeded in radicalizing the tactics of the civil rights movement - and in so doing, exposed the limits of its possible achievements; perhaps most importantly, it forced to a head in 1966 the ideological crisis which had long simmered within the resistance, thus splitting the movement. At the same time, in the Northern ghettos Black youth were emerging as an especially troubling presence.

Although sit-in demonstrations are reported to have occurred as early as 1957, it was the action of four young college students at Greensboro, North Carolina on February 1, 1960 which set the movement into motion. Their action caused a brushfire effect, as similar demonstrations developed spontaneously across the South, and as far away as Boston, where some 400 people from Harvard and adjoining

institutions picketed a Woolworth's store. The civil rights leadership responded swiftly in an attempt to exploit the new potential. The new movement, we are told by Meier & Rudwick, was virtually to breathe new life into the languishing Congress of Racial Equality. Meanwhile, by April of that year, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference had, through the foresight of its executive secretary Ms. Ella Baker, arranged to sponsor a leadership conference around the newly mobilized students. The conference was held on the campus of Shaw University at Raleigh, N.C. and drew students from 15 states. Out of this conference grew what was to become the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). SNCC was never more than a fraction of the vast resource of youthful idealism that was to be mobilized in the ensuing years. Nevertheless the organization came to symbolize a restlessness and volatility that, in the opinion of its chroniclers, made it the cutting edge of the civil rights movement.

Although the civil rights leadership clearly welcomed the energy and idealism of the new movement, it was from the beginning wary of a separate and independent student organization. Partly this was no doubt due to concern around coordinating activities with yet another organization; partly this wariness was tied to the suspicion that the established leadership would be unable to control the activities of the organization. SNCC as it turned out received relatively little material support from SCLC or NAACP. On the other hand the suspicion that the student organization would prove to be a 'wild card' seemed to be substantiated by subsequent events.

SNCC's leap into the civil rights limelight came on the heels of the aborted Freedom Ride initiated by CORE. Under the leadership of

Diane Nash, a core of SNCC members decided to continue the rides. One chronicler of the period wrote that "as the student activists gained control over the freedom ride campaign, Kennedy's aides attempted to de-escalate their first civil rights crisis. President Kennedy and leading Justice Department officials supported the goals of the freedom rides, but feared the potential for large scale racial violence which would require federal intervention".¹⁸ The President's priorities were clear: to maintain the loyalty of the Democratic Party in the South he had to avoid situations that would require such intervention. Moreover, he avoided giving the impression that his administration was overly vested in the unfolding events there. As Zinn observed, "quite soon in his tenure he expressed the view that a civil rights bill was unnecessary, preferring to use Executive Orders as more efficient".¹⁹ Furthermore, precisely at the moment when he had the grand opportunity for a positive impact upon the situation, by appointing fair or liberal judges - Kennedy instead capitulated to political expedience by appointing a series of racist and segregationist judges to the federal bench. With regard to the agitation of the direct action campaign Kennedy's strategy was to attempt to rechannel it, working through private philanthropic sources. The attempt was therefore made "to persuade civil rights groups, including SNCC to become more involved in voter registration work ...",²⁰ which heretofore had been ongoing, but with far less than dramatic success. Accordingly, a sum of some \$800,000 was provided by Field and other foundations for distribution among the civil rights groups. This development led to one of the first of several crises within SNCC, as well as to their increasing isolation from the mainstream groups.

The Kennedy initiative caused a split in SNCC's rank between those who saw 'direct action' as the key strategy versus those who welcomed the opportunity to do voter registration work. A reconciliation was effected by Ella Baker who proposed that the organization could work on both fronts - while taking advantage of a new source of finance. Far from de-escalating their momentum, the shift to voter registration plunged SNCC and its membership into new situations through which they continued to seek to confront the system and thus to precipitate federal intervention. Alternately, in the view of a major SNCC organizer, they sought to "register voters so as to expose the dirt of the United States and thus alienate Black people from the whole system".²¹

The shift to voter registration brought SNCC face to face with what they came increasingly to view as the hypocrisy of the federal government and the Kennedy administration in particular. In places like Mississippi SNCC workers confronted not only the virtually feudal subjugation of Blacks but also witnessed and suffered themselves brutal and frequent acts of violence by the white population. Their naive faith that the federal government, especially the Justice Department, would intervene in face of such blatant violations was fast dissipating. "There is little disputing the facts", Howard Zinn wrote, "in literally thousands of instances Southern policemen and local officials have trampled on the constitution with no interference ... They have done this openly, in many cases under the eyes of federal officials and have remained untouched by the law".²² He went on to observe that where the federal government did undertake to bring suits geared toward ending voting discrimination,

"those suits have been too few, too weak, too late, and ineffective ²³ As the time of the 1963 march on Washington approached, important elements of SNCC's leadership (Lewis, Foreman and others) seriously considered demonstrations against the Justice Department as part of the planned activities. They were dissuaded from this by other civil rights leaders. Nevertheless, controversy arose around the content and tenor of the speech that was to be delivered by SNCC chairman John Lewis. The speech which included a scathing indictment of the federal government for its repeated failures, precipitated a last minute crisis as important elements of the religious and liberal establishment reacted to it. Lewis was finally persuaded to tone down the speech, but the episode helped to increase SNCC's drift toward a more radical stance. Many of SNCC's activists did not attend the March "since they resented the moderation of its demands and the restructuring of its rules, such as allowing only prescribed picket signs".²⁴ Foreman, in a more cynical assessment viewed the march as having been aborted from its original purpose "a march for jobs and freedom". In his view it became a "victory celebration for the Kennedy administration".

The march had also increased the level of distrust between SNCC and the traditional leadership, which some felt had 'sold out' to the liberal establishment and were increasingly willing to back away from confrontation. This feeling continued to grow in elements within SNCC in the ensuing months, in particular with respect to Dr. King and the SCLC. Three incidents helped to confirm this conviction. The first involved the challenge mounted by the SNCC sponsored Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) to the seating of the regularly

elected delegation of Mississippi Democrats at the 1964 Democratic party convention in Atlantic City. The MFDP had grown out of a mock election in the fall of 1963 which had been designed to highlight the fact of the legal dis-enfranchisement of thousands of Blacks, and to debunk the official myth that Blacks were uninterested in voting. The challenge received unexpected support from members of the Credentials Committee at the convention as well as from other sources and caused consternation among the leadership of the Democratic Party, as a crisis loomed over the question of which delegation would be seated. The impasse was forcefully resolved by President Johnson, however, who among other actions "moved also to alienate MFDP support on the Credentials Committee. Good jobs were offered to some members of the Committee and dismissals from federal employment were held out to others".²⁵ A compromise was worked out by Vice-Presidential hopeful Hubert Humphrey, which had the approval of Dr. King and Bayard Rustin. This compromise proposed seating of all the Mississippi regulars "who would accept the loyalty oath." In addition, it allowed the seating of two MFDP delegates with "full voting rights". This compromise was rejected by the MFDP delegates despite intense pressure to do otherwise. According to Brisbane, "when Dr. King appeared to address the delegation, the atmosphere became charged. To many delegates he was fast becoming a Judas".²⁶

The second development centered around the upcoming election itself. Johnson had prevailed upon the civil rights organization, in the interest presumably of getting a civil rights act through congress, to refrain from demonstrations. According to Theodore White this was to stem the mounting tide of white "backlash", and its

potential for inter-racial violence, which had been engendered by the Wallace presidential campaign. Senator Goldwater is reported to have agreed with Johnson to refrain from any form of race baiting tactics during the campaign - for the same reason. While these perceptions might well have been encouraged it is also worthwhile observing that Johnson's strategy also helped to preserve the white south for the Democratic Party - since it virtually removed the race issue from the agenda. At any rate SNCC (and CORE) refused to abide by this arrangement, again seeing it as an accommodationist policy on the part of the mainstream leadership.

The third, and perhaps the most important incident occurred with respect to the activities around the Selma-Montgomery march on March 7, 1965. This attempt to dramatize the voter registration campaign ended in a bloody route at the hands of police and Alabama State troopers, within minutes after it had begun. The site was the Pettus Bridge. When King, a few days later led an 'illegal' march on the same route - they were again confronted by superior force. King, to the astonishment of many, refused the challenge, and ordered his followers to turn back. Later King would admit that he had worked out a 'tacit' agreement with federal and local authorities, and that his actions had been in line with that agreement. For many SNCC workers this was a deep disappointment.

Within months of the Selma-Montgomery marches President Johnson was putting his signature on the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The entire civil rights movement was in disarray. "There is no more civil rights movement, lamented one SCLC veteran, "President Johnson signed it out of existence when he signed the Voting Rights Bill."²⁷ And

even as the leadership sought to redefine new objectives for the movement, five days after the signing of the Voting Rights Act on August 6th, the community of Watts exploded, with fearsome energy. The Watts explosion did in fact sound the death knell of the civil rights movement and raised the curtain on another struggle, for human and economic rights in the ghettos of the North.

Meanwhile, within SNCC the seeds of crisis were maturing. From the beginning, serious differences existed among the staff around the philosophy of non-violence, and integration. When "Freedom Summer" was launched in 1964, it had been with serious misgivings, since it meant introducing into the movement a large number of white activists. It was felt by many SNCC stalwarts that unleashing scores of white activists upon rural Mississippi was not the best way to build the pride, and combat the fears and sense of inferiority of many Black Mississippians. As anticipated, most of these activists left at the end of the Freedom Summer campaign. But a good number stayed on as full-time SNCC workers, participating fully in its activities.

During the fall of 1961 a new student organization had come into being comprised of Black students of Central State University at Wilberforce, Ohio. Critical of the non-violent approach they resolved to form a political party - the Revolutionary Action Movement, (RAM) whose purpose was to work among the northern urban ghetto communities, in the same way SNCC was working in the South. Like SNCC many RAM members left school to become full-time workers. Chapters of the organization were established under the title of the Afro-American Student Movement (ASM) in Nashville, in Detroit, and in Los Angeles. In May of 1964 the ASM convened a conference on Black Nationalism at

which a number of the themes that would come to dominate the rhetoric of Black Power emerged. These included the idea of Black control of Black communities; the rejection of the "bourgeois reformist" approach of the civil rights movement and support instead for the "human rights" position advocated by Minister Malcolm X; insistence on the need for a cultural revolution which emphasized "re-Africanization". RAM was among the groups that responded to Freedom Summer, thus infusing SNCC with an ideology that was congruent with and articulated the feelings of some SNCC veterans.

Meanwhile as SNCC was slowly becoming more isolated from the mainstream civil rights movement based on its experiences, it was aided in this drift by other developments. Not the least among them was its long standing association with white left wing activists, and its ongoing refusal to buckle under to anti-communist rhetoric, amidst the repeated threat of Congressional investigation. More importantly, the developing Vietnam conflict helped to push the organization increasingly to oppose the Johnson administration, and to widen the breach with the moderate civil rights leadership. As SNCC chronicler Claybourne Carson reports, anti-war sentiments had long been dormant in most SNCC workers. However, since anti-war activity was most identified with the left, the sentiment was that " ... we can't do anything to help the Vietnam situation, and we can hurt ourselves by trying".²⁸ While individual SNCC leaders, such as Bob Moses, had taken uncompromising anti-war positions, the organization as a whole only slowly and agonizingly worked its way up to the decision to issue a public statement. The murder of SNCC worker and navy veteran Sammy Younge, Jr. on January 3rd, 1966 provided the final push which brought

SNCC firmly into the anti-war camp. Predictably this development caused the Johnson administration to take steps to further isolate SNCC from the mainstream movement. By the summer of that year, the separation would become irrevocable as Black power ideologues seized the leadership of the organization.

The challenge to non-violence and integrationism as a guiding philosophy was raised by a core of the RAM associated membership of SNCC, which had established itself strongly in Atlanta. Avowedly separatist in orientation, this group advanced the notion that the logical basis for organizing the Black communities was to appeal to racial consciousness. Such a position quite naturally rendered the integrationist line absurd; it also raised the issue of the presence of white workers within SNCC. These internal contradictions came to a head at a bitter SNCC staff meeting in March 1966, where the expulsion of white staff members was demanded in a position paper presented by the Atlanta group. Although SNCC leadership refused to accede to the extreme positions advanced at the March meeting, the impact was nevertheless profound - for the separatists had voiced many of the feelings long dormant within SNCC. Just how deep this impact was became evident barely two months later when John Lewis, Chairman of SNCC since 1963, and avowedly integrationist, was replaced by Stokely Carmichael.

The latter, while he had long maintained a media profile as one of the more separatist-oriented SNCC veterans, also had maintained extensive ties in the white left. He had in fact defended the presence of whites in the movement at the March meeting. Nevertheless, Carmichael's victory was perceived in the media as a

Black Nationalist takeover of SNCC. When the new leadership announced on May 23rd its decision to withdraw from the White House Conference on Civil Rights, it drew still further attacks for its "extremist" orientation.

The 'final straw' came on the night of June 16, 1966 at Greenwood, Mississippi. SNCC, CORE and SCLC had come together to complete the walk across Mississippi begun by James Meredith. SNCC's proposal to use the march to assist voter registration drives and to "use civil disobedience in communities where they encountered resistance" had reportedly caused the NAACP to withdraw its support. "The nightly rallies in Mississippi communities became contests in which the three leaders (King, Carmichael, McKissick) competed for the support of Black residents", with the latter two stressing "the need for greater militancy".²⁹ Moreover, SNCC workers sought every opportunity to challenge King's non-violent rhetoric, and found the most responsive chords in the themes of powerlessness and racial identity. The term "Black Power" which had been in SNCC's vocabulary for some time, found a special resonance on the night of June 16, when Carmichael addressed the assembled crowd. When CORE later declared its support for the Black Power concept it signalled a parting of the ways of what had been here-to-fore a movement for civil rights unified by the doctrine of non-violence and the goal of integration. Perhaps no phrase in the political lexicon of the period generated more emotional response than these two words. Black Power was alternately condemned and criticized by moderate groups such as NAACP, established media (Time, Newsweek, Saturday Evening Post), and praised by segments of the Black clergy, and the Black press (Ebony). It sparked a lively

debate as some Black intellectuals, politicians and activists sought to grapple with issues and define a political program consistent with the concept.

Ironically, having "launched a new era of Black political discussion", SNCC also achieved its own demise as an organization. Within a few short years, it had been succumbed to the ideological crisis it had helped to catalyze, as separatists within the organization pushed for the expulsion of remaining whites and took increasingly militant position on issues. Funding sources began to dry up, in consequence, leaving programs in disarray.

Non-violent integrationism achieved its greatest victories in the south in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and of course increasing desegregation of public facilities. But by 1966 the ideology and program of integrationism, as well as its leadership, was being profoundly challenged on a broad basis that would grow to include intellectuals, clergy and a few politicians. Perhaps the most critical challenge still came from the ranks of Black youth. As the observers of the urban insurrections were to discover, youth were frequently the volatile element that led to massive confrontation and violence. This image of volatility was enhanced by the prestige and growing popularity of groups like the Black Panther Party. The rhetoric of revolution was swiftly replacing the rhetoric of non-violence. Black Power had raised not only political but economic questions. The economic program offered by the government was summed up in the War on Poverty. It was to prove far more important as a political than economic program however, in so far as it helped shore up the sagging reputation of integration, by

appealing to the rhetoric of participation. Moreover, the War on Poverty programs contributed greatly toward the rise of a political regime in New York City, which was vulnerable to developments within the Black community. We look next at the origins of the War on Poverty and its impact on the politics of race in New York City.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

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25. Robert H. Brisbane, Black Activism: Racial Revolution in the United States 1954-70, (Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson Press, 1974), p. 90.
26. Ibid, p. 91.
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28. SNCC worker Donna Richard, quoted in Carson, p. 187.
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CHAPTER VII

RACIAL CONFLICT AND COALITIONAL POLITICS IN NEW YORK

Introduction

The anti-poverty programs initiated by the Great Society legislation of President Johnson had varied but pronounced impact on the Black struggle for change. The programs on one hand set the stage for the illusion of real Black power (while draining the ranks of the civil rights movement of experienced personnel). The promise of 'maximum feasible participation' generated a level of rhetoric and activity which, coinciding with the rhetoric of community control, reinforced the image of a far more radicalized and strident movement. As a result, the programs engendered enormous controversy especially at local levels of government. In New York City this controversy contributed to the emergence of a fragile electoral coalition between Blacks, Puerto Ricans and liberal Jews, and led to the election of a liberal mayor. This inherently unstable political circumstance was part of the context for the later reform of the university.

The War on Poverty

The enabling legislation for the war on poverty, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, was among the major pieces of legislation initiated by the Johnson administration. There is some controversy concerning the origins of this Act. A review of this controversy is germane to a better understanding of the impact of the war on poverty on the 'modernization' of Black urban politics.

According to Lawrence Friedman, the war on poverty did not arise out of a social movement making demands upon government. "There were no outside stimuli", he argued, "no war, no depression, no obvious revolutionary stirring, except in the case of the Black minority."² With respect to the Black 'stirring', he viewed as ludicrous the notion that the war on poverty was a program to "buy off Blacks", noting that the Watts rebellion did not come until after the bill had passed. The bill could not be explained either as an attempt to placate discontented groups, or as the result of the lobbying of powerful interests. Rather, he argued, the war on poverty was the product of an intellectual climate on the one hand, and the expanded powers of an overconfident Presidency.³ This argument was in large measure an echo of the earlier assessment by Moynihan. "The war on poverty", he had argued "was not declared at the behest of the poor: it was declared in their interest by persons confident of their judgement in such matters."⁴ These "persons" were themselves the product of an intellectual revolution which had witnessed tremendous advances in econometrics; the exponential growth of knowledge; the professionalization of the middle-class and the rise of foundations.⁵ It was in particular the rise of foundations "with immense and permanent resources, which ... identified themselves ... with liberal social change" and which according to Moynihan, spurred the people and events, out of which grew the war on poverty.⁶ Following this scenario the Ford Foundation through its so-called Grey Areas Project, became linked with professional change seekers who were convinced that with proper planning and the application of scientific methods, social and institutional changes could be engineered. Thus,

scientific faith mingled with missionary zeal and, backed by liberal foundations, combined with an imperial presidency to create the Great Society.

One of the problems with this explanation of the war on poverty is that it projects the policy as a phenomenon outside of national political developments. The willingness of a major foundation to underwrite an experiment in liberal social change (the Grey Area's Project) is not linked to any larger political currents. Furthermore, it assumes that the Black movement was inert and exercised little influence except in the South (Moynihan).

This view is powerfully challenged through the work of a number of observers, who saw in the Great Society programs the unfolding of a political strategy by the National Democratic Party to consolidate the American city as a political base.⁷ The New Deal, in this view represented the first, successful attempt to build an urban core of electoral support for the Party. Such programs as the WPA went a long way to consolidate that support, particularly among the Black electorate. Nevertheless, as noted elsewhere, the Black vote was a vote for Roosevelt, and not for the Democratic Party. Truman's Fair Deal was an attempt to reconsolidate some Democratic losses due to Republican and conservative attacks on the New Deal programs. The now famous Executive Order desegregating the armed forces (under the threat of Randolph's March on Washington Movement), had secured the support of the Black voter – mainly northern urban – which was recognized as critical. But one of the primary pieces of Fair Deal legislation, the 1949 Housing Act, was to prove itself counterproductive in the long run, with regard to Democratic aims

vis-a-vis the urban Black electorate. The Housing Act of 1949 was the basis of the Democratic vision of an urban renewal program through which the Party would attempt to consolidate the urban core. The legislation allowed local authorities to acquire properties for redevelopment through the power of eminent domain. This meant inducing private developers to invest in central city areas which were for the most part occupied by Blacks. The process of acquiring properties proved slow, and the rate of private involvement even slower. This was to undergo a radical change under the Eisenhower administration. Under Eisenhower, new legislation reduced the original emphasis on developing low income housing, and provided incentives for local government and private developers to focus on rebuilding downtown areas. This meant condemning whole sections of central city areas to destruction, and their resurrection into office towers and luxury housing.

This onslaught of 'progress' had a great and disproportionate direct impact upon the Black population, leading to public charges that urban renewal was in many instances, in reality a program for "Negro removal". The fact was that, in proportion what was destroyed, Urban Renewal produced very little housing. Interestingly enough the response from the Black community was surprisingly mild, with a few exceptions (such as attempts to organize rent strikes). This could be interpreted as a measure of the alienation and powerlessness of Blacks in the ghettos. CORE's successes in organizing around ghetto discontent vis-a-vis urban renewal were not remarkable, although this also apparently reflected the schism between its middle-class leadership and the grassroots.

The Politics of Community Action

If urban renewal proved to be a source of alienation and discontent for most urban Black, it also provided in part the circumstance which paved the way to the Great Society. Urban Renewal could destroy and rebuild the central cities for its own purposes, but it had no plans for accommodating the emerging generation of ghetto youth. In the 1930's the novelist Richard Wright took up the issue in the book Native Son. The protagonist of the novel is a Chicago-bred youth named Bigger Thomas. But as Wright explained "if I had known only one Bigger I would not have written Native Son".⁸ In fact Bigger Thomas represented for Wright a composite of individuals he had witnessed, whose distinguishing feature was his bold recklessness in confronting and violating the Jim Crow barriers. Bigger Thomas, he wrote "was an American, because he was a native son; but he was also a Negro nationalist in a vague sense because he was not allowed to live as an American".⁹ Bigger had no loyalties, for his nationalism, bordering on intense hatred of whites, did not lead him to identify with his own race in any spiritual sense. In fact, "the civilization which gave birth to Bigger contained no spiritual sustenance, had created no culture which could hold and claim his allegiance and faith, had sensitized him and left him stranded, a free agent to roam the streets of our cities, a hot and whirling vortex of undisciplined and unchanneled impulses".¹⁰

Wright recalled working with the Chicago South Side Boy's Club, which was an institution ostensibly devoted to reclaiming "the thousands of Negro Bigger Thomases". Ultimately he was lead by this experience and his analysis, to conclude that his real job had been

"to distract Bigger with ping-pong, checkers, swimming, marbles, and baseball in order that he might not roam the streets and harm the valuable white property which adjoined the Black Belt".⁴

Wright had been especially disturbed by what he considered to be the natural fascistic propensity of the Bigger Thomases of America - in particular the white Biggers. For Wright insisted that Bigger Thomas was only a symbol of a real character that is produced within a context of oppression. The protagonist of Native Son was the working out of that symbol within the American context of racial oppression.

The failure of leadership to build viable organizations in the North was ultimately a failure with respect especially to lower class urban youth. And although Wright's worst fears were not realized, his vision of Black Bigger Thomases roaming the city streets - filled with "undisciplined and unchanneled impulses" - seemed close enough to reality. For urban ghetto youth of the late forties and fifties, membership in gangs defined a significant part of existence. The proliferation of these gangs were simultaneously, evidence of the disintegration of urban family life. The images of daily life for many youth in Harlem during this period are starkly evoked in Claude Brown's autobiographical epic Manchild in the Promise Land. Several of these images stand out. First is the climate of extreme hostility among the youth which resulted in incessant intergang violence. The second image expresses the predatory relationship between these youth and the white world, primarily local merchants. Third, is the extent to which the lives and ideas of these youths were untouched by any of the contemporary movements of that era. Hence, for instance no

hint of nationalism or of group solidarity is evident in their conversation. (This third image is consistent with observations made by F. Franklin Frazier in his 1940 study of Negro Youth at the Crossways.) Here then it seems was a force that responded primarily to its own needs, oblivious to and unheeding of the Black world, seeing the white world less as enemies, than as preys. In the Harlem of Claude Brown, predatory stealing was a way of life for many of these youth - as natural and as necessary as gangfighting. And, the inevitable consequence of this mode of existence in Brown's vision was the development of a virtual state of war between the police and the youth of the ghettos.

By the mid to late fifties, the problem of urban juvenile gangs was among the top social issues of the day. This was of course not a new issue for large cities such as New York. The difference was that the gangs were now Black (and Puerto Rican) and seemed somehow to represent a special kind of havoc. As Moynihan would later observe "... the implications of the un-nerving rate of youth crime among urban Negroes was beginning to be grasped".¹¹ The concern then, as now, was hardly with respect to the debilitating impact of such activity upon the Black communities. Rather, such activity was detrimental to economic growth in the cities, that is, to urban renewal.

In this context, the so-called Grey Areas Project initiated by the Ford Foundation appears to have been motivated more by the desire to create an attractive social climate for business, than simply by altruistic interest in liberal social change, as Moynihan implied. Moreover, it does not seem reasonable to explain Kennedy's adoption,

(through the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD) of the program and outlook of the Grey Areas project without reference to the politics of the burgeoning civil rights movement in the South. The fact is that although the northern Black vote had been steadily growing in numbers as well as in strategic importance for presidential elections, its loyalty to the Democratic Party could not be taken for granted. "Negro voting in the North", wrote Herbert Krosney, "had rarely improved the economic plight of the Negro. It rarely meant changes in the life of the slums. Yet Kennedy knew, as a politician that Negro voters held a 'balance of power' position, and that Negro voters could mean control of the Northern cities and states across the width of the nation. Thus, the interests of Northern Negroes were close to his heart, his morality, and his instinct for power."¹² Furthermore, it was known that Blacks, who had turned out 79% of their vote for the party in 1952, gave it only 61% in 1956.¹³ This, was an indication of Black disaffection with the Democratic Party's (and its presidential candidate Adlai Stephenson's) feeble stance on civil rights. It was clear that Blacks would support the party that supported their interests. Kennedy, with his more progressive profile, managed to attract 8% back to the party for his extremely narrow 1960 presidential victory.

Kennedy had campaigned on a fairly strong civil rights platform. Hence it seemed clear that his re-election prospects in large measure would be determined by his ability not to further alienate the Southern Democrats, while at the same time appearing to support the Blacks. This double strategy is evident for instance in the controversial appointment of a number of Southerners to Federal

judgeships, on the one hand, and the President's apparent preference for private appeals to influence persons and groups friendly to civil rights. The involvement of the Taconic Field Foundation in voter education was a case in point. The initiation of this project, it will be recalled, had caused a major rift to develop within the Southern movement – particularly between SNCC and mainstream groups. The more radical elements of SNCC perceived the shift to voter education as a ploy to reorient the movement away from direct action, to more innocuous activity, thus relieving the President of one source of pressure. The point is that Kennedy's southern strategy was ambiguous enough to raise questions about the level of his commitment to civil rights. The point was not lost upon those, like Minister Malcolm X, who sought to hammer home to their ghetto audiences the seemingly endless scheme of duplicity in which the (white) power structure was willing to engage to keep the Blacks oppressed: It was the shame and treachery of the Black middle-class leadership that they willingly or through ignorance lent themselves, via commitment to a nonviolent strategy, to a scheme that ensured the continued subjugation of the mass of their people, or so ran the militant grass roots critique of the southern movement. Clearly, Kennedy needed a northern strategy.

According to Moynihan, the focus on delinquent youth by the Ford Foundation and Mobilization for Youth struck a responsive chord with the Kennedy administration which had already begun fishing for a domestic program which would fire the popular imagination in the same way as had the Peace Corps concept.¹⁴ "In one master concept", the Peace Corps, "had brought together the most divergent of impulses and

attractions - missionary zeal ... youthful idealism, no-nonsense pragmatism, the thirst for adventure"¹⁵ The President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime was established by Executive Order on May 11, 1961. But it was only toward the end of his second year in office, that a Presidential study group was established to look at the possibilities for a National Service Corps. "What emerged from the group's planning effort" wrote Moynihan. "was a program for community action."¹⁶ This was formally proposed by the President to the Congress on February 14, 1963.

Far from being purely the result of an intellectual climate then, the war on poverty appear to have resulted from the conflict between urban economic interests and the decaying ghetto on one hand, and the political opportunism involved in striking a balance between the southern and northern interests of the Democratic Party. Thus, contrary to claims by Moynihan et al, the civil rights movement in the South was a significant factor in reaching that balance. Because of the southern movement, the Party was vulnerable to Black electoral strength in the northern cities.

"Maximum Feasible Participation"

A second point of controversy around the war on poverty concerned the origin and impact of the "maximum feasible participation" clause of the economic opportunity Act of 1964. More than anything else, this issue was the catalyst for the Black surge toward urban power in many areas via community action programs, with varying results. In New York City, the circumstances were especially fortuitous, for the legislation occurred at a time when entrenched political forces were under challenge from political reformers, as well as from the leadership of the discontented.

At least two theories exist regarding the origins of the "maximum feasible participation" clause. Some observers argue that it was written into the legislation in an effort to ensure that poverty funds would be channeled directly to the poor, and not through the private social welfare bureaucracy which traditionally dominated the business of rehabilitating the poor. Alternately, Moynihan for instance, suggests that it was designed to ensure that Blacks in the South were not prevented by the local white power structures from receiving their fair share of the funds.¹⁷ These viewpoints are not incompatible with each other. Nevertheless, they do not satisfactorily explain the shift in the original conception of community action as primarily "service coordination" among the poor to participation of the poor. This latter conception of community action evolved later. Moynihan reports for example, that Sargent Shriver, the designated head of OEO, had originally been a supporter of "community action" along the lines envisioned by the Ford Foundation; community action would be implemented after careful planning and study to maximize benefits. Shriver, he said however, had a change of heart "when he learned that the time it would take to produce a comprehensive community action program would preclude any Democratic results for the war on poverty in time ... to influence the 1964 election"¹⁸ Thereafter, the community action component of the proposed Economic Opportunity package slipped from first to fifth place in order of priority¹⁹. Community action of course stayed as part of the program but greater emphasis was given to other areas - jobs for draft rejectees, old people, dependent mothers, education loan programs - which were "more immediately promising, saleable, and

democratic." What Johnson wanted apparently was "action, not planning ... nationwide scope, not target areas ... in particular to see that Negroes got something fast, without in the process alarming whites".²⁰

Peterson and Greenstone have argued, cogently, that the shift in the conception of community action from an economic to a political focus came about not because of pressures exerted by the poor, but because of bureaucratic power struggles at the Federal level. They expressed agreement with the Piven/Cloward thesis that the participatory thrust was designed "to absorb disruptive discontent welling up in racial ghettos", while garnering votes for the national Democratic Party. Nevertheless the authors felt that Piven and Cloward had "too vaguely" demonstrated the strategy of the Democratic Party leadership as a self-conscious effort. Contrary to the thesis that the participatory thrust was plotted from above by Democratic Party political strategists, the authors argue instead that citizen participation "was seized upon by a new government organization - the Office of Economic Opportunity - which needed an operating mission in a politically charged, racial atmosphere".²¹

"Shriver never seriously tried to establish a coordinating function for OEO,"²² note the authors. To the contrary, he shifted from this emphasis by actually administering programs such as Job Corps and Vista within the OEO agency. Great opposition and suspicion had already been aroused among certain bureaucrats who saw the new entity engendered by Economic Opportunity Act as a potential threat to their authority and spheres of activity. The new agency was perceived as a coordinating and centralizing super agency which "would dictate

social policy to Department heads". This view of the new agency was widely shared in the Congress, where Shriver was perceived as the 'Czar' of a new super agency. Because the emphasis had shifted from coordination to providing direct service, Shriver's agency was vulnerable to charges that it was just another administrative entity "providing yet another set of services to the needy". To avoid attack as merely duplicating services and to strengthen its own viability as a distinct department, OEO "needed a sufficiently distinctive purpose or mission so that it could both make some special claim on government funds, and develop its own supportive clientele".²³ The OEO sought, then, to recruit this clientele through the community action program, by drawing on the authority of the 1964 Act which provided for "maximum feasible participation" by the poor. The OEO directed that the policy boards of any group expecting to receive funds under the EOA should have at least a third of their membership comprised of minorities and representatives of the poor. A disproportionate share of OEO resources was directed to big cities with large Black populations, an indication that the agency had defined its support clientele largely in terms of Black participation (a result which seems to confirm the Piven/Cloward thesis cited earlier). Nevertheless, it was never the intention of the OEO planners to foster the confrontational stance which the programs unleashed within these communities. And in fact, Johnson is reported by Peterson and Greenstone to have been "visibly upset" as community action came to be "identified with protest and demonstration".

Toward a new Governing Coalition in New York City

The "maximum feasible participation" clause of the Economic Opportunity Act created concern in many quarters, and in particular

among the nations mayors who, according to Peterson and Greenstone resented the implied interference with a potential source of patronage funds. The possibility of the Community Action Programs becoming a competing power source or a magnet for organizing discontent, had already surfaced in the events surrounding Mobilization for Youth, and Mayor Wagner of New York City. Mobilization for Youth (MFY) was a juvenile delinquency program that had been set up as a result of the efforts of the Ford Foundation's Grey Areas Project, in concert with the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. It received funds from the federal government as well as from the City and private sources. During 1963 and 1964, MFY supported low income groups which engaged in organized action against the school system, police, and certain city departments. In addition, MFY engaged in voter registration drives, school boycotts and rent strikes. The interests thus affected reacted predictably: "Local school principals lodged a public complaint against MFY, and the police department indicated its displeasure over an MFY resolution favoring a civilian review board. Local Italian politicians on the Lower Eastside opposed MFY's efforts to enroll Puerto Ricans as voters, while real estate interests attacked the use of MFY funds to promote rent strikes."²⁴ In addition, charges were made that MFY was heavily infiltrated by Communists. It seems clear that Wagner's experience with MFY had raised the specter of the new poverty program funds being used by activists to mobilize the poor along political lines.²⁵ Hence, he attempted to frustrate the intention of the "maximum feasible participation" clause by effectively excluding representation by the poor in any meaningful way on his proposed Council Against Poverty.

Wagner's action precipitated Congressional hearings under the auspices of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. This, according to Moynihan, gave sudden and unprecedented exposure to the "participation" clause, and thus awakened the poor across the land to their potential for impacting upon their local communities. Nor were the hearings a disinterested action by the Harlem Congressman. One of the longstanding complaints of Harlem politicians had been the paucity of patronage available through the party structure for distribution to Blacks. Especially as local governments moved to a professional and merit basis, there was less and less opportunity for patronage through such channels. The potential of the Community Action Programs as a direct source of patronage hence was large. By denying adequate representation of the poor Wagner would have succeeded in maintaining control by City Hall of the poverty funds, thus denying a significant source of influence to the Harlem Congressman. Powell was able through the hearings to politicize Harlem and other such communities around the participation issue. But the hearings also contributed to another process: the emergence of an electoral coalition that was from its inception fragile, and became more so with the passage of time.

The coalition that brought John Lindsay to power as the Republican Mayor of New York in 1965 was built in part on the ashes of an older arrangement. This 'arrangement' which comprised "the city's regular Democratic Party organizations, the public works empire of Robert Moses, and the Municipal government's welfare bureaucracies",²⁶ had been under attack by young liberal reformers, starting in the 1950's. Until 1961 Wagner had been associated with the Tamany political machine under the leadership of Carmine DeSapio.

Although a machine 'boss', DeSapio had maintained a liberal facade by publicly backing liberal legislation. He ultimately came under attack when Adlai Stevenson's presidential candidacy foundered after his failure to win New York. This result was blamed on the failure of the Democratic Party machine to fully back the candidate. The reform movement received a great boost from this event since, according to Martin Shefter, "Jewish professionals, the predominant group in the reform movement", had been fierce Stevenson loyalists, and felt betrayed by the machine.²⁷ The reform movement grew rapidly with the backing and support of New Deal liberals such as Governor Lehman and Eleanor Roosevelt. By 1961 Wagner felt compelled to distance himself from DeSapio and the political stigma of the machine.

Although he had won the 1961 mayoral election on a reform platform - based on his promise to reorganize the city's housing programs following scandals which involved the urban renewal program - Wagner was unable to shed completely the public perception of his culpability in those goings on. Moreover, he came under increasing attack for, among other things, his apparent inability to control Robert Moses. "This inability contributed to the image of ineffectuality that his opponents asserted characterized his entire stewardship of the city."²⁸ These failings gave increasing legitimacy to the reform movement, so that although Wagner was not to be a candidate for the 1965 mayoral elections, his heir-apparent - Paul Screvane - was unable to shake the stigma of the association. The specific issues upon which the Wagner-Screvane coalition foundered, however, were primarily issues affecting the minority population of the city: police conduct, school desegregation, and

representation on the new poverty councils. These were the issues which formed the springboard of the Lindsay campaign. Wagner's strategy in the past had been to distance himself by various bureaucratic and political ploys by not taking any active position on such issues. (With respect to the anti-poverty programs, however, he had taken measures, as noted above, to effectively exclude the blacks from poverty councils.) Despite his best efforts (and non-efforts) to placate contending parties on these critical issues, "the battles over school desegregation and the civilian review board raged without the Mayor's participation".²⁹ And when in the summer of 1964, following the police-murder of a 15 year old boy, Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant erupted, it also at least symbolically marked the shattering of the 'ancient regime' which ran New York City.

The 1965 election was hence polarized around issues perceived to be racial, mainly school busing and the civilian review board. The Democratic candidates, Paul Screvane and Abe Beame, both sought in different ways to side-step and diffuse these issues. Buckley, the Conservative candidate, opposed civilian involvement in reviewing police conduct. The candidate of the reform Democrats, William Fitts Ryan, took a position similar to Republican candidate Lindsay: both supported measures of civilian review of police conduct; both supported the notion of intermediate schools as a compromise on the school integration issue; and both supported decentralization of the poverty program. In the end Lindsay won a narrow victory at the general elections based on a fragile coalition of liberals, reformers, Blacks and Puerto Ricans. The stage was set for unprecedented changes in the political influence of Blacks and Puerto Ricans in the City of New York.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society, p. 34.
2. Lawrence M. Friedman, "The Social Political Context of the War on Poverty", in A Decade of Federal Anti-poverty Programs, Ed., Robert H. Haveman, (New York: Academic Press, 1977), p. 26.
3. Ibid, p. 26.
4. Patrick Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty, (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 25.
5. Ibid, p. 25-36.
6. Ibid, p. 34.
7. This discussion is based information and perspectives developed in the following works: The Contested City (Chap. 1-3), by John H. Mollenkopf, (Princeton Univ. Press, 1983); Power and Crisis in the City (Chap. 4-7), by Roger Friedland, (New York: Schocken Books, 1982); "The Great Society as Political Strategy", by Frances Fox Piven, in The Politics of Turmoil: Poverty, Race and the Urban Crisis, by Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).
8. Richard Wright, Native Son, Introduction: "How 'Bigger' was Born", (New York: Harper and Row, 1940), p. ix.
9. Ibid, p. xxiv
10. Ibid, p. xix
11. P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, p. 63
12. Herbert Krosney, Beyond Welfare - Poverty in Supercity, (New York: Hold Rhinehart and Winston, 1966) p. 3
13. Piven, Politics of Turmoil, p. 275.
14. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, p. 65-72
15. Ibid, p. 72
16. Ibid, p. 72
17. Ibid, p. 87
18. Ibid, p. 82
19. Ibid, p. 84

20. Ibid, p. 84
21. Paul Peterson and David Greenstone, "Racial Change and Citizen Participation", in A Decade of Anti-poverty Programs, p. 254
22. Ibid, p. 244
23. Ibid, p. 247
24. Stephen M. David, "Welfare: The Community Action Program Controversy", in Race and Politics in New York City, edited by Jewell Bellush and Stephen David, (New York: Praeger Pub. Co., 1971) p. 38
25. Ibid.
26. Martin Shefter, Political Crisis, Fiscal Crisis, The Collapse and Revival of New York City, (New York: Basic Books 1985), p. 42
27. Ibid, p. 45
28. Ibid, p. 49
29. Ibid, p. 70

CHAPTER VIII

JOHN LINDSAY AND THE REFORM OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY

Introduction

So far we have examined two sets of phenomena that in combination worked to transform the political leadership of New York City. This transformation created the circumstance of the politically unstable environment which, we have hypothesized, were particularly conducive to reform initiatives from below. In this final chapter we seek to consider whether this hypothesis is confirmed by the record of the Lindsay administration.

When John V. Lindsay was elected mayor in 1965 he faced a City fraught with numerous problems. Not the least of these was the fact that his success at the polls was predicated in large measure on the support of a community which was itself in the throes of a volatile transformation. This situation presented opportunities and problems for the new regime. The primary opportunity was that Lindsay would have a chance to consolidate a Black and Puerto Rican electoral base. The problem was that these increasingly militant communities threatened to alienate his white liberal and moderate support base. This tension formed the essence of the political context within which the City College protest developed, and within which the university reform emerged.

'Black Power' in the City

On July 20, 1967, barely four days after the city of Newark had been ravaged by several days of insurgent and counter-insurgent violence, 1000 delegates from across the nation (and from across the seas, including Nigeria, Bermuda) convened at Newark for the four-day National Conference on Black Power. Journalist and conference organizer Chuck Stone wrote exultingly that:

If the National Conference on Black Power did nothing else, it buried once and for all the traditional civil rights movement, raised questions about the ultimate values of integration, shoved the myth of the so-called "Big Five" of Negro Leadership into the dungeon of obscurity and offered a new weapon of mass black leadership ready to take charge of the black man's destiny.¹

Stone's assessment appears in retrospect bloated and perhaps wishful, yet it captures in essence the headiness of the times as seen from the perspective of those in the resistance who waved the banner of Black Power and appeared then to hold the ideological high ground. And indeed there seemed to be ample ground for the confidence and even haughtiness which echoed in the rhetoric of the period. As city after city burned across the nation, the prophets of non-violence found their voices drowned out in the din, while cries of 'burn baby burn' fanned the summer flames. More alarming was the fact that the 'riots' did not yield to the simple explanations of being instigated by 'outsiders' and 'malcontents' since increasingly large percentages of ghetto residents and even middle class blacks were in sympathy with the insurgents. Joyce Geib in her study observed that "like the Black Power movement, riots are considered by most (Black) politicians to be at least partially useful ..." since the riots "... have achieved what

they [Black politicians] have never been able to achieve [that is] make whites aware of how bad things are in the ghetto, and that white society has something to lose if it fails to change".² Gelb also noted that Black politicians viewed riots as an important factor that "forced policy makers to listen to Negro demands". With the seemingly relentless energy with which the ghettos confronted the 'system', some political observers began to question the 'riot' designation and to describe the events instead as 'rebellions' and 'insurgencies'. The distinction was an important one, for as political scientist Charles Hamilton noted, the "observable acts" of "looting, burning and sniping" which are the focus of public attention, are in fact the least important of all. These events are not riots, Hamilton declared because, "in the minds of many of the people breaking the windows and burning the property, ... authority is not duly constituted. They are, in fact, revolts".³ In this view, by their action Blacks were declaring the illegitimacy of a system that forced them to live under intolerable conditions. The burning city was thus a relevant and legitimate response to an oppressive and illegitimate situation. It was moreover, the ultimate symbol of communal defiance.

In this volatile context, the key to success of the protests at City College is provided by the efforts of John Lindsay to remain a viable candidate. Lindsay held great promise for Blacks in particular as he squeezed to victory with 35% of the Black vote. To understand this relationship it is necessary to review the history of Blacks in the politics of New York City.

Black Political Experience in NYC: The Lindsay Appeal

If in the south the civil rights organizations had emerged as primary brokers for achieving access to the political and economic system, in the Northern urban centers the burgeoning Black population had over the years achieved grudging concessions, such as representation at various levels of local politics. Yet the record of achievement was sufficiently dismal so that by the mid-sixties these representatives were conscious enough of their growing obsolescence to be particularly sensitive to the accusations of "selling out", increasingly leveled against them by militants. The prospect of participation by the poor in community action programs thus held great promise in a political world where here-to-fore only a few individuals had influence.

Black resistance to racial oppression historically has assumed various forms, among them migration to the urban centers of the North. Hence as early as 1860 New York City had a sizeable although not politically significant Black population. After 1910 dramatic increases in migration began to occur. For instance the Black population of New York City increased by 66%, from 91, 709 in 1910 to 152,467 in 1920, and, a decade later reached 327,706.⁴ Meier and Rudwick have argued that this migration was not prompted entirely by racial dissatisfaction, that it was in large measure an economic effect produced by a convergence of several factors. These included: "The ravages of the boll weevil" on the cotton industry, and the impact of the floods of 1915 upon thousands of rural Blacks in Mississippi and Alabama.⁵ In addition, Blacks were attracted by the pull of northern industry after 1915 to support the Allied war

effort. Furthermore, this migration was encouraged by the activities of labor agents operating in the South, as well as by glowing accounts of urban life depicted in the Black newspapers.⁶

The steady shift of new population to the North had its inevitable repercussions. The new migrants were greeted with tremendous animosity and suspicion by the white ethnics whom they encountered. This attitude was fed by the competition for jobs, housing and other services. This competition sometimes erupted into fierce communal rioting. The summer of 1919, 'Red Summer,' was so named for the ferocity of the racial clashes as thousands of veterans of the war returned home and the competition for jobs and housing intensified. Even as the Black population grew, forms of "Jim Crow" restrictions began to spring up in places where such restrictions did not exist before. Furthermore, residential restrictions as well as mob violence was gradually beginning to define the pattern of racial ghettos that would eventually characterize these northeastern cities. It was just such a pattern of racially motivated mob violence, for instance, that helped push the Black population of New York City from enclaves in the Village and Mid-town areas to its Harlem stronghold. The resulting ravages and tensions for the newly urbanized Blacks in New York City was early-on depicted by sympathetic whites such as Mary White Ovington.

What was the response of the Blacks to their new circumstance? On the one hand, as Oscar Handlin would later observe, "the Negroes [and Puerto Ricans]" did not develop "the integrated pattern of voluntary organization that gave their predecessors an understanding of the problems of metropolitan life, and aid in dealing with

them".⁷ These included institutions such as "hospitals, orphanages, homes for the aged and other philanthropic institutions "⁸ On the other hand, urbanization produced some important developments, among them, an increasing interest in politics as a way to affect changes in Black status, both locally and nationally.

As the Black masses crowded together in the cities of the north, they inevitable became caught in the web of politics, where, as with other aspects of urban life, race was a conditioning factor. Hence in most cities a pattern of racial patronage emerged, with local Black political leaders relegated by the white dominated party structure to the task of garnering the Black vote in support of the party's candidate. For instance, in 1887 the Republican county leader in New York City, Lemuel Eli Quigy refused to appoint a Black as assistant District Attorney, despite his exceptionally high qualifications, on the grounds that "the time had not come" for such appointments.⁹

But if, as Gilbert Osofsky would later observe, "the Negro did not become a major political force in New York City in the first 30 years of the new century"¹⁰, it was not entirely a matter of race. Part of the reason for this was the almost fanatical devotion of the Blacks to the Republican Party, in consequence of which little or no effort was made by the Democrats to court them. This began to change, slowly at first, for any sympathy with the Democratic Party was viewed as a form of racial treason among the Blacks. Thus when a group of dissident Negro Republicans broke with that party and supported the Tammany candidate for mayor in 1897, they found themselves "socially ostracized" within the Black community.¹¹

Although the pattern of Black loyalty to the Republican Party was maintained on the national level, locally Blacks increasingly supported the Democrats, giving 27% of their votes to the successful Democratic candidate for mayor in 1917, and, four years later 70%.¹² The reason for the shift locally was not hard to find. Tammany offered patronage in the form of jobs and services. Much of the credit for this shift in the Negro vote has been given to Charles Murphy, Tammany's leader from 1902-1924. Murphy, wrote the New York Age, "increased the places opened to the race in the city service, and it was with his approval that they grew of greater importance"¹³ As the Black population grew in New York City, the potential for Black political power also grew, for by 1930 they held the majority vote in two assembly districts. Nevertheless, the promise was not to be the reality, since from the very beginning the Black striving to gain a foothold on the rung of power encountered problems that would persist for a long time to come.

Two of these problem areas, as Joyce Gelb would later observe, were "(a) intra group rivalry and disunity (b) unresponsiveness of white party leaders to the needs and demands of the Black community".¹⁴ Both of these patterns were evident from the very beginning, and each fed upon the other. Eli Quigley's refusal to appoint a Black assistant D.A. has been cited above. His actions prompted the departure of a dissident group of Black Republicans into the Democratic ranks. Within the latter party they functioned as a segregated club, the United Colored Democracy. This and similar segregated organizations were used to funnel what limited patronage there was to the Blacks. While Murphy led Tammany, for instance, the

United Colored Democracy under its leader Ferdinand Morton was able to flourish, because "all Black patronage was channelled through Morton". After Murphy died in 1924 the UCD was no longer seen as important by the Tammany leadership: in fact, it was perceived as a liability. As Levinson explained it:

A conflict arose between Morton and the white leaders of the Harlem districts. When the Negro vote was small and scattered, the United Colored Democracy has served as a rallying point for Negro Democrats. But when Negroes constituted a substantial portion of the voters of several assembly districts, the existence of a separate organization cutting across district lines undercut the power and influence of the district leaders.¹⁵

The result was that Murphy's successor in the Tammany gave the distribution of patronage to the regular district clubs. There-after the UCD declined rapidly.

If the case of the United Colored Democracy demonstrated the susceptibility of the Blacks to white political control, it also showed how open to intra-group rivalry was the Black community. This intra-group divisiveness, Gelb noted, was often caused by Blacks concerned with guarding turf against other insurgent Blacks. Hence, "often, first Negro county committeemen and then district leaders joined together with whites to defeat Negroes for political office, largely for fear of losing the benefits they had obtained from whites". As late as the 1950's Tammany was able to keep Harlem politics divided by its support via patronage of Assemblyman Hulan Jack against congressman Adam Powell.¹⁶ But the extreme manifestation of intra-group rivalry came in the shape of the relationship between Powell and J. Raymond Jones, a Harlem politician

who in 1964 became the first Black county leader of the Democratic Party in New York State. These men, Gelb observed, possessed political skills and styles that could have complemented each other, yet divided or alone, they were unable "to dominate other Harlem politicians or to 'deliver' the Negro vote with certainty".¹⁷ Powell and Jones came together as the United Democratic Leadership Team in an attempt to break Tammany's hold on Harlem during 1958-59. But the partnership soon collapsed into bitter public feuding. "The relationship between Powell and Jones, and their relationship to other politicians," Gelb noted, "is symptomatic of the factional strife embodied in Harlem politics. The Harlem Democratic political picture is dotted with primary contests every year, often pitting former associates against each other".¹⁸ The behavior of Black politicians in Harlem and elsewhere in New York City she suggests, has been promoted by their valuing of self-interest over public interest. Hence, among Harlem Republicans, leadership challenges have been motivated largely by the promise of personal gain in the form of jobs and status. The "zeal and potential strength" of challenging club organization "have dissipated as soon as these individual aims have been achieved".¹⁹ This preference for individual over community rewards, Gelb conclude, greatly diluted the potential political power of the Black community. "Moreover", she observed, "while there has been change in the condition of the Negro, the Black politician has contributed little in bringing it about".²⁰

This observation was not lost on the black community either, for it no doubt contributed to the political apathy that came to characterize the electorate of that community. Despite the quarter of

a million votes regularly cast by Harlem voters, and despite the fact that "Negro leaders" have sat on the inner councils of New York's Tammany, the historian Robert Brisbane has noted disdainfully that "the net gains made by the Negroes in the 20 years of voting in New York City added up to nothing more than a few scraps of patronage distributed through obedient Negro leaders by the incumbent political machine".²¹ Given this history, it is not surprising that Black support for Lindsay's candidacy was somewhat tentative. For although he supported those issues important to the Black community, nevertheless, he was an unknown quantity. The thirty-five percent support which he received, also indicated that Blacks were willing to experiment, politically speaking if this held out the possibility of positive change. Judging by the overwhelming support given four years later, it was clear that the experiment had been viewed as a success.

The Context of University Reform

Hypothesis three proposes that Lindsay's support for open admissions was conditioned upon his politically vulnerable status. In the course of the study this researcher was unable to find direct evidence to support this contention. Nevertheless the circumstantial evidence, such as the pattern of Lindsay's relationship with the Black community, as well as the perceptions of significant actors, provides a reasonable base of support for the hypothesis.

a. Lindsay and the Black community: Conciliation and Containment.

It was noted above that John Lindsay won the 1965 mayoral election on a narrow and inherently unstable political base. As a Liberal-Fusion political leader he owed his victory substantially to electoral support by the city's Black and Puerto Rican minorities as

well as liberal Jews. Since the traditional Democratic base had been aligned with Beame, Lindsay would need to expand his power base. Clearly his natural constituency were the Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Lindsay's appeal to the Blacks in particular had been conditioned by his championing of 'maximum feasible participation' by the poor in the new poverty programs, as well as by his stance on issues such as the Police Civilian Review Board. The community which Lindsay now sought to build his power base upon was not a merely pliant and acquiescent community, but rather one which looked to his leadership with militant expectancy, anticipating the fruits of the political victory he had won with Black and Puerto Rican support. Almost from the beginning, however, Lindsay waivered.

When the Southern civil rights movement began to shift northward, not surprisingly, one of the central targets was the issue of de facto segregation. In New York City the attack was led by the NAACP and CORE in the demand for integrated schools. These pressures resulted in a proposal by the New York City Board of Education to build a new intermediate school (IS 201) which would, by 'integrating' Black and Puerto Rican children, ostensibly satisfy the demand from the activist community. Since in the beginning the parents and community leaders wanted the school built on a location which facilitated attendance by white children, the Board's "decision to build a windowless school in a rundown, semi-industrial area adjoining the New York Central Railroad created great anger in the community".²³ In consequence of what was seen as the Board's duplicity, community leaders and activists decided that, since an essentially de facto segregated institution was being forced upon

them, the community should, at least, have control of its administration and functioning. Thus was born the movement for community control of schools, which was to become inextricably linked to theories of Black Power. This was an ironic result, since as Marilyn Gittel observed: "most of the coalition of poverty workers, parents, and minorities that demanded control over the school looked upon community control as a consolation prize"²⁴ Yet if the cry for community control seemed to supply the ideological glue for issues as disparate as welfare rights, school decentralization and police civilian review, it also had the impact of galvanizing opposition not only to Black demands but more importantly, to the man who seemed to give succor and encouragement to such demands. If nothing else, the demands for community control and Lindsay's apparent support awakened a white ethnic (and openly racist) backlash that soon constrained the Mayor to temper his support.

When on May 2, 1966 Lindsay fulfilled a campaign promise by creating through his executive power a civilian dominated Police Review Board, he touched off a bitter controversy which set the racial tone for other issues as well. The decision was immediately challenged by the Policeman's Benevolent Association on the grounds that Lindsay's action was illegal under the city charter, and that in fact such a body could be legally created only by public referendum to amend the charter. The PBA thus set the stage for what was to become a bitterly contested struggle at the polls. In the end the police review partisans were handed an overwhelming defeat (1,313,161 vs. 765,468). Moreover, the vote essentially composed itself along racial lines: "the Black and Puerto Rican areas of the city together with a

few scattered others, were lost in a sea of city-wide opposition".²⁵ Since civilian review was perceived in the context of civil rights, the referendum vote was at once a rejection of any measure of community oversight of police conduct, and, a repudiation of Black militancy and protest generally. This repudiation was based on white perceptions that "civil rights leaders had been pushing too fast ..." and which saw Blacks "as generally violent".²⁶ Perhaps most importantly, the referendum demonstrated the nature of the political opposition which the City's white-run bureaucracies could muster in the face of racial challenges.

This scenario was bound to replay itself when Lindsay in 1967 took on the issue of school decentralization. His announced intention of redesigning the entire authority structure of the school system, coming as it did in the wake of his publicized support for greater community input in selecting principals and district superintendents, could only arouse the suspicion and antagonism of the interests embedded in this vast educational bureaucracy. Principally these included the 40,000 strong United Federation of Teachers, and the 3000 member Council of Supervisory Associations.²⁷ The restructuring plan, made public in the fall of 1967, provided for 30-60 school districts "each with elected school boards having assigned powers over budget, personnel and curriculum".²⁸ Further, it provided that the system of certification be revamped in such a way as "would admit more minority-group members into teaching and supervisory positions".²⁹ Moreover, local school board members would be elected by "parents of children in the schools". The plan naturally triggered a firestorm response as the UFT and its allies began to mobilize to defeat it in

Albany. As Gittel observed, "their approach was blunt: they raised fears about abolition of the merit system and about Black racism ..."³⁰ While they did not succeed in defeating the bill in the legislature, the UFT was successful in using their potential for political reprisals to postpone legislative action on the plan for another year. By this time, it should be noted, Lindsay, while nominally in support of the plan had already begun to distance himself from it. Not only did he not agitate to secure passage of his own bill, but his very "strategy seemed to be designed to limit his leadership in the undertaking".³¹ This retreat became more pronounced as the conflict intensified around the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration district, which culminated in the teacher's strike in fall 1968, and the ultimate legislative defeat of the school decentralization plan in 1969.

If these two political defeats had been insufficient to convince Lindsay of the necessity to rebuild the bridges to alienated white ethnic support, his defeat in the Republican primaries of 1969 certainly would have. From the outset it appears he was not unmindful of the need to temper his support for minority constituents. The apparent strategy had been to consolidate Black and Puerto Rican support through the anti-poverty programs. This was to be balanced by a demonstrated ability to keep New York from exploding. Lindsay's apparent political foolhardiness in supporting the issues discussed above, must then be understood in the context of this two-pronged containment of minority (especially Black) political ambition on one hand, and communal rage on the other. The attempt at political containment is to be observed in the initial efforts to keep tight

mayoral control over anti-poverty programs. The containment of communal rage was evident in changed police tactics in handling potentially explosive situations, and in the special interest directed toward pre-empting youth-inspired incidents.

When Lindsay took office as Mayor of New York City, it is fair to say that the notion of black entitlement was well established in regard to the War on Poverty funds. This entitlement extended to the right of participation in determining how this money would be spent. Unlike his predecessor, Lindsay had little political choice but to cede to the 'maximum feasible participation' imperative. Nevertheless, he would attempt to control this participation by limiting its role in policy making. Under the newly reorganized superagency, the Human Resources Administration, the Community Development Agency, was charged with coordinating the representatives of the poor in the various anti-poverty programs. This was accomplished through the policy board of the CDA, which made decisions on proposals coming from the various local community corporations. The staff of the CDA was controlled by the HRA, "the original hope" being "that the central staff - largely white - would be able to ... control ... the council"³² This hope was soon engulfed by the rising tide of militant belief in entitlement. Thus, the "field staff - predominantly Black and Puerto Rican and predominantly militant - quickly split with the central HRA staff and organized picket lines and sit-ins at headquarters".³³ In short order, many of the top officials of HRA/CDA withdrew, leaving leadership of the poverty programs effectively in the hands of Blacks and Puerto Ricans. It is a measure of Lindsay's dependence on this political base that he

refrained from applying the Green Amendment, which would have allowed him to reestablish mayoral leadership and control over the programs. In any case, whether by design or default, these programs often functioned to regulate discontents which might otherwise have posed more serious political problems for the Mayor.

The movement for community control, converging as it did with the demand for Black Power and the mood of entitlement, combined to create a perception of the anti-poverty programs as bastions of grass roots militance in the Black communities. This perception, which is supported by the public struggle over leadership, obscures an ironic result, namely, that the programs were also the agents of a deeper process of social management. This result has been hinted at in a global way by some observers. Typically, Charles Morris in his post facto indictment, wrote that "Johnson was only one of many politicians to justify new programs ... by the need to forestall riots ...".³⁴ By Morris' account, the programs served primarily to inspire further social instability, reinforcing the view of anti-poverty programs as the repositors of grass-roots militance. Research on the impact of the community action program at the neighborhood level, strongly suggests, however, that the programs also functioned as agencies for institutionalizing discontent. In their work on the East Tremont Action Agency in the Bronx, Pollinger and Pollinger (1972) found community input through the local policy boards was nominal because the board was usually in a general state of chaos. Meetings were poorly attended and generally unproductive.³⁵ "Real control of the Tremont Community Corporation fell ... to the Executive Director," who as a "shrewd politician ... maintained tight control over all

operations of the corporation".³⁶ Moreover, this Executive Director was reputed to work consciously to isolate the Board of Directors, the Corporation staff and Delegate Agencies.³⁷ The Corporation was thus insulated from the community at large, with little effort to encourage participation. The authors concluded that by its failure to empower the community the Corporation functioned as an agency of social control.

An even more compelling case for such an impact is revealed by Peter Eisinger in his study of six community action corporations in Brooklyn.³⁸ The prime function of the policy boards, he observed, "is not to govern - i.e. to make policy - but rather to legitimize the operations and decisions of the Executive Director and the Corporation staff". Executive Directors frequently acted as political entrepreneurs, developing a sub-leadership cadre whose task was to coordinate community mobilization activities. One profound consequence of this was to centralize "power in the ghetto by absorbing the leaders of small organizations". Thus:

In some ghetto areas the leaders of the most militant of the little associations either refused to join or were prevented from joining the CAG coalitions. For this reason, the expression of black power ideas and the attempt to experiment with radical solutions has in many cases been confined to the little associations which form the residue of the fragmentary structure now largely centralized by the CAG. As a result, the effect of the black power militants had been minimal in many ghetto areas. They compete for attention now not primarily with other small groups, as before the establishment of the CAG, but with the CAG's and their million dollar budgets.³⁹

Although Lindsay failed in his efforts to maintain white control over the programs, nevertheless his goal of maintaining social peace was perhaps better served by the new leaders. Hence, while the corporations sponsored demonstrations, these were for the most part focused toward concrete goals. For instance, only about 7 1/2% of political efforts made by the Brooklyn Corporations were directed toward more general goals, such as supporting the Poor People's March on Washington. This emphasis on the concrete suggests the extent to which protest had been institutionalized as a kind of bargaining process through the community corporations. Moreover, such institutionalized protest provided Lindsay with the safety valves to prevent a buildup of grievances which could lead to spontaneous disruptions (where upon rested much of his political reputation).

Two other aspects of Lindsay's containment strategy - youth control and police tactics - contributed to New York's avoidance of more serious civil disorder. Money was channeled through the community corporations for summer youth programs. In addition, Lindsay created the Summer Action Task Force which was designed for monitoring and responding to potentially explosive situations. Hand in glove with this came a significant change in police tactics and in handling mass conflict situations. The new approach aimed at minimizing confrontation by an overwhelming police presence - a kind of psychological warfare. "The King riots were the most serious ghetto incidents during the entire administration and demonstrated the Lindsay containment tactics at their best".⁴⁰ And although police counted more than 600 incidents, the large scale confrontations such as occurred at Watts, Newark and Detroit, were avoided in New York.

b. Impact of the Mayoral Elections of 1969

Given the foregoing background, it is reasonable to say that the takeover of the south campus of the City College could not have come at a more inopportune moment for John Lindsay, engaged as he was now in a fight for his political life. The mayoral elections added a critical dimension, since the candidates in different ways sought to exploit the City College takeover to their own political benefit. For Lindsay, City College was at once a problem because of the widespread perception - despite his best efforts - amongst Jews (who along with Blacks and Puerto Ricans were part of his original political core group) that Lindsay had identified his interests primarily with those of Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Lindsay's refusal (cited in Chap. III) to clear the campus forcibly, could only have added to that perception. Moreover, Jews were particularly wary, notes Karabel, about what a new admissions policy would mean, since "it was the Jewish community that had by far the most to lose from any radical change in CUNY's admissions process".^{41a} Caught in what seemed to be a political 'no-man's-land', Lindsay at first strove to maintain a non committal stance. Thus, while his political competitors (Badillo, Procaccino etc.) blasted the evils of the quota system which they said was implicit in the 'dual admissions' formula arrived at in the City College negotiations, Lindsay at first said he would not comment on the plan until the BHE had studied it.^{41b} Immediately following the first public outcry - including an editorial attack by the Times - Lindsay urged the Faculty Senate and the BHE to reject the plan, based on its quota implications. Perhaps to improve his belated and feeble stance, Lindsay also threatened to use his budgetary powers to impede

its implementation should the BHE accept the plan.^{41c} Then, two days later, according to the report of the New York Times, Lindsay replied when confronted with the prospect of renewed violence at City College if the plan was rejected: "The BHE has the responsibility to do what's right".

Was this an attempt to shift public blame away from himself and his candidacy in the event of a major incident? This seem to be a plausible if naive interpretation; naive because it seems unlikely in the context of the times that political blame could be so easily sidestepped. It is conceivable that the Mayor was giving a public signal to the Board to do whatever was necessary to avoid precipitating such an incident. For as the former chair of the Faculty Senate Dr. Bernard Bellush said:

... if you are Mayor of the City of New York, and the City is - figuratively speaking - burning, what do you then do to ease some of the problems confronting you? As mayor of the City one of the ways is to say to the BHE - in whatever way it is said - 'look ladies and gentlemen let's open the doors, this is one of the ways that may save the city.^{41d}

Such a view was consistent with the perceptions of many who saw in the Board's subsequent action a capitulation to the threat of communal violence.

Yet a third view is possible, which is that Lindsay's remarks to the New York Times was a signal that he would support a major university reform which would at the same time indemnify him politically. (In other words, that the BHE had his approval to move forward on a compromise which would offend no one politically, while ensuring increased loyalty from minorities.) Open admissions (read integrating the university), was just such a compromise, for as Bowker

later remarked: "it was hard to find anyone who was 'gung ho' for it, but no one was against it...."^{41e}

For the BHE it appears, Lindsay's approval carried the weight almost of command. According to Herbert Berman, a Lindsay appointee to the BHE:

For political reasons there was extremely heavy pressure both at the City level and the State level to put the program in. There were threats by members of the legislature to reduce the funding available to the university if we didn't go into this.^{41f}

Berman explained that although the threats first emanated "particularly from the Black and Puerto Rican members", there was a general consensus in the democratically controlled Assembly that they wanted the University to play a major role in addressing the existing "social and educational crisis in the City". The legislators Berman said, were concerned because of the:

...severe disciplinary problems in the high schools, if you took the same students and put them in the university -- you might have the educational problems but you wouldn't have the disciplinary ones -- at least you had a shot at trying to educate the students.^{41g}

He also noted that "substantial pressure" came from the Lindsay administration along similar lines which, when added to the pressures from Albany, helped push the Board toward the final decision:

It was the general feeling of the Board that if it did not go along with this, it would seriously and adversely affect the funding of our ongoing programs.^{41h}

CUNY Chancellor Albert Bowker summed it up bluntly: "Lindsay ... needed the support of the minority community". Open admissions

it seems was the political salve needed by the Lindsay candidacy. That he needed such a salve seemed to be indicated by the closeness of the mayoral race.

As the elections approached speculation grew regarding the outcome of the result. The New York Times reported on October 6, for instance that Lindsay needed at least 60% of the Jewish vote to win - almost twice the percentage for his 1965 victory. Two weeks later an analysis by the New York Center for Urban Affairs announced that the upcoming election was the most unpredictable mayoral elections in forty years.⁴¹ The statement was based on its analysis of twelve mayoral elections since 1929.

From the look of things it seemed that if Lindsay expected to win, his primary anchor would have to be the Black and Puerto Rican communities. This was the view of the New York Times analysis mentioned above, which projected that Lindsay needed at least 70% of those votes. Nor was the acquisition of these votes to be taken for granted, as the Congress of Racial Equality indicated by its threat to mobilize the people to drive the candidates out of Harlem because of their alleged lack of attention to the concerns of the Black communities.⁴² The issue of opening the university thus posed an unprecedented opportunity for Lindsay to further ingratiate himself with the minority communities, while limiting his vulnerability to white voters. The election results indicated that although Lindsay received only 42% of the vote (the lowest since LaGuardia's 39.4% in 1933), he received an overwhelming percent of the Black and Puerto Rican vote (83%). Predictably he lost a good portion of the Jewish vote, in particular those characterized by the Times as "middle income, home-owning Jews" who voted for Proccacino.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. Chuck Stone, "The National Conference on Black Power", in The Black Power Revolt, ed. by Floyd Barbour, (Boston: Sargent, 1968).
2. Joyce Gelb, "Blacks, Blocs and Ballots: The Relevance of Party Politics to the Negro", Ph.D. dissertation, N.Y.U. 1969, p. 107.
3. Charles V. Hamilton, "Riots, Revolts and Relevant Response", in The Black Power Revolt, ed. Floyd Barbour, p. 205.
4. Nathan Daniel Glazer & Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City 2nd Ed., (Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 128.
5. Meier & Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 216.
6. Ibid.
7. Oscar Handlin, The Newcomers: Negroes & Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 105.
8. Ibid.
9. Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto, (New York: Harper and Row, Pub., 1965), p. 160.
10. Ibid, p. 159.
11. Ibid, p. 161.
12. Edwin Lewinson, Black Politics in New York City, (New York: Twayne Pub. Cp. Inc., 1974), p. 59.
13. Ibid, p. 61.
14. Joyce Gelb, "Blacks, Blocs and Ballots", p. 18.
15. Lewinson, Black Politics in New York City, p. 62.
16. Gelb, "Blacks, Blocs and Ballots", p. 28.
17. Lewinson, Black Politics in New York City, p. 89-90.
18. Gelb, "Blacks, Blocs and Ballots", p. 83.
19. Ibid, p. 94.
20. Ibid, p. 136.

21. Robert Brisbane, The Black Vanguard: Origins of the Negro Social Revolution, (Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson Press, 1970), p. 234.
22. Kenneth Marshall, "Goals of the Black Community" in Governing the City: Challenges and Options for New York, ed: Robert Conner, Demetrio Corale; (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 19.
23. Marilyn Gittell, "Education: The Decentralization Community Controversy", in Race and Politics in New York City and Stephen David, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 146.
24. Edward T. Ragona, et al. "Police: The Civilian Review Board Controversy", in Race and Politics in New York City, p. 70.
25. Ibid, p. 86.
26. Gittell, in Race and Politics in New York City, p. 140-41.
27. Ibid, p. 149.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid, p. 150.
30. Ibid, p. 151-152.
31. Charles Morris, The Cost of Good Intentions, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1980), p. 64, 65.
32. Ibid, p. 65.
33. Ibid, p. 59.
34. Ibid, p. 65.
35. Kenneth J. Pollinger, Annette C. Pollinger, Community Action and the Poor: Influences vs Social Control in a New York City Community, (New York, Praeger, 1972), p. 92.
36. Ibid, p. 92.
37. Ibid, p. 94.
38. Peter Eisinger, "The Anti-Poverty Community Action Group as a Political Force in the Ghetto", Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1967.
39. Ibid, p. 138.
40. Morris, The Cost of Good Intentions, p. 65.

- 41. The New York Times, October 19, 1969.
- 41a. Jerome Korabel, "The Politics of Structural Change".
- 41b. The New York Times, May 26, 1969.
- 41c. The New York Times, May 28, 1969.
- 41d. Interview with Dr. Bellush, January 23, 1989.
- 41e. Interview with Chancellor Albert Bowker, February 19, 1987.
- 41f. Interview with Herbert Berman, March 30, 1989.
- 41g. Ibid.
- 41h. Ibid.
- 42. The New York Times, October 18, 1969.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

A Review of the Argument

The reform of the admissions policy of the City University in July 1969 changed abruptly, and forever, the character and some established traditions of that institution. This study grew out of a dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the explanations given for the change in policy. Two features of that explanation were: (1) the claim in the official (BHE) version that open admission was a voluntary acceleration of already established plans for expansion (in 1975); (2) the view by analysts of the decision that open admissions was essentially the creation of then-chancellor Albert Bowker. In contrast to these views, the study has attempted to explore the relationship between this reform and the protest by Black and Puerto Ricans students at City College which preceded it. The study was guided by hypotheses derived from the literature on protests movements. Specifically, these hypotheses suggested that: (1) protests could and often did make a difference in disputes over social policy; (2) that a successful outcome (i.e. reform) depended not on the whim of elites, but upon the political vulnerability of the political leadership to lower class insurgency. These hypotheses were formulated and tested with data derived from our study of the impact of the Black and Puerto Rican students' community upon the open admissions policy.

The Findings

(a) Hypothesis 1

This hypothesis suggested that the sudden acceleration of the timetable of open admissions was a response to the protests at City College, and not simply a voluntary decision by the University. This hypothesis was confirmed by our analysis of the data. Specifically: (a) nothing was found in the data which suggested that such an acceleration of timing was anticipated; (b) some indications were found that the planned implementation date (1975) might not have materialized due for example to the fiscal crisis; (c) it was the perception of many of those interviewed that the abruptness of the decision was a direct response to the students' activism; (d) the decision was consistent with the BHE's pattern of handling situations involving Black and Puerto Rican students; (e) the Black and Puerto Rican communities represented the primary source of pressure for change in University policy.

(b) Hypothesis 2

This hypothesis suggested that the protests dramatically influenced the scope and strategy of open admissions. The hypothesis seems to be confirmed - if somewhat tentatively - by the data. Specifically (a) the implemented plan was very different from that projected for 1975, in that many students who entered the university as fully matriculated students under the new plan would not have qualified under the 1968 provisions; (b) the level of funding, given the extraordinary needs of a large segment of the new matriculants, suggested a less than

serious commitment to the plan; (c) these facts, in combination with the new insistence that open admissions must result in the ethnic integration of the colleges, suggested a political and not an educational motive for the policy; (d) finally, these changes appear to be consistent with the BHE's own pronouncements concerning the urban crisis, as well as with nationally expressed concerns over rising Black militance and rejection of integration as a goal.

(c) Hypothesis 3

It was hypothesized that Mayor Lindsay's support of open admissions was conditioned by the fact of his political vulnerability. This hypothesis was confirmed by indirect evidence. Lindsay's rise to Mayor came in consequence of certain long term changes which undermined the old political coalition that ran New York under Wagner. Lindsay's political future was thus tied to his relationship with the Black and Puerto Rican electorate from which much of his strength derived. By the time of the South Campus seizure, Lindsay's original coalition of liberal Jews and Reform Democrats had already begun to unravel in consequence of issues such as school decentralization and the police Civilian Review Board. As a result of this polarization the perception grew that Lindsay was the mayor of the Blacks and Puerto Ricans primarily.

In a social climate where the probability of communal riots was very real, the seizure at City College brought political conflict to a new level. For Lindsay the situation presented a problem and an opportunity. On the one hand he had to avoid giving the impression of

cuddling the insurgents so as not to further undermine his white support. On the other, here was an opportunity to further solidify his electoral strength in the Black and Puerto Rican communities. The 1968 Master Plan would have excluded large numbers of Black and Puerto Rican students. Therefore it was politically unfeasible to implement it. Of course, these students could have been admitted by expanding the SEEK program, but this would have drawn politically unwelcomed criticism at that time. Open admissions as implemented was a kind of educational pork barrel, for it had something for each community: Blacks, Jews, ethnic whites. Moreover, since the chancellor and the Board of Higher Education took full credit for the decision, the Mayor was thereby politically immunized against charges of destroying the university.

Implications for Theory

As shown earlier in the review of protest literature, analysts of protest movements have generally conceded a significant role to protest activities in determining the outcome of contested issues. The findings from this study certainly tend to support this conclusion. The findings also give support to the Piven-Cloward model for assessing the conditions for the success of protest. Since this model ascribes the power to lower class groups under certain condition, to extract concessions from the governing coalition, the findings of the study thus fly in the face of those of Jerome Karabel, for instance, who casts Bowker in the analogous role of a "state manager." In this role Bowker sought to maximize the organizational interests of the University which, says he, Bowker had long identified as open enrollment. The student protests merely provided the timely

opportunity to do so. Karabel expressed the theoretical relationship as follows:

The struggles of subordinate groups to change the educational system are most likely to succeed when the demand that they put forward coincide with the organizational interests of educational administrations.¹

One observation should suffice to render this generalization suspect: if the plan which was implemented in 1970 had been the same one projected for 1975 the argument might have held. However, as we have seen fundamental qualitative changes occurred, which do not reasonably yield to Karabel's model as an explanation of open admissions. Thus the Piven-Cloward model looms even more compellingly as an explanation for that phenomenon.

Implications for further research

The study has, at a minimum, cast some doubt on the role ascribed to chancellor Albert Bowker in the precipitous decision to implement open admissions in 1970. The record is clear that Bowker intended to press for the expansion of the university. Yet it is also clear that the expansion achieved was not the one intended. And as we have suggested above its motivation seemed more consistent with political than educational goals. "I suppose", said Bowker in retrospect, that "in terms of what's educationally desirable, it would have been better to go slower. As a responsible leader and educator I would rather have gone slower."² Was Bowker then a political tool or ally of the mayor? Were there promises made by the Mayor or others as regards the actual resources which would be made available to fund the new and different policy of open admissions? For if Bowker managed to convince the BHE (as then trustee Berman insists) that open

admission would not jeopardize the reputation of the University, perhaps it was on the basis of the promise of resources to match actual needs. Questions such as these suggest that important aspects of the chancellor's role in the decision need to be examined further.

FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSION

- 1 Jerome Karabel, "The politics of Structural change", p. 48.
2. Interview with Chancellor Albert Bowker, February 1987.

APPENDIX I

TABLE I

PROJECTED UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT FOR CUNY: 1965, 70, 75

	<u>WHITE</u>			<u>BLACK</u>		
	<u>NYC COLLEGE AGE (17-20)</u>	<u>ATTENDING CUNY</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>NYC COLLEGE AGE</u>	<u>ATTENDING CUNY</u>	<u>%</u>
1950	366,175	50,678	13.8	43,187	2,667	6.2
1960	322,628	66,846	20.7	56,341	3,519	6.2
1965	378,416	75,500	20.0	64,539	5,000	7.5
1970	375,583	84,500	22.5	89,673	9,000	10.0
1975	414,465	103,500	25.0	106,235	13,500	12.5

Source: A Long Range Plan for the City University, p. 92

Note 1: Actually in 1970 there were 113,275 in the senior colleges alone (Roser et al p. 91); total CUNY registration was approximately 196,000 (BHE Minutes).

Note 2: The vocational skills program by 1970 was eliminated. it was projected to absorb 25,000 dropouts.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

1. Black and Puerto Rican Students' Community

Henry Arce
Robert Feaster
Serge Mullery
Charles Powell
Louis Rivera
James Small
Tom Soto
Maria Vasquez

2. The City College Commune

Mel Friedman
Ronald McGuire
Steve Simon

3. Faculty and Administrators of the City College

Dr. Howard Adelson, History Dept.
Dr. Allan Ballard, Dean of Faculty for CUNY
Dr. Bernard Bellush, History Dept.
Ira Bloom, President's office
Dr. Leslie Berger, former SEEK director
Dr. Allan Feline
Dr. Fran Geteles, SEEK counselor
Israel Levine, Asst. to President Gallagher
Frank McDonald, former SEEK faculty
Dr. Jay Schulman, Sociology Dept.
Dr. Bernie Sohmer, Math Dept.
Dr. Martha Weissman, Speech Dept.
Dr. Robert Young, former SEEK director

4. CUNY Administrators and Trustees

Herbert Berman, Esq., CUNY Trustee
Dr. Albert Bowker, Chancellor
Dr. Julius Edelstein, Vice Chancellor
Rev. Ross Johnson, CUNY Trustee
Benjamin McLauren, CUNY Trustee

ADMISSIONS (1969)

General Admissions Procedures

All applications for freshman admissions must be sent to the University Application Processing Center, Box 148, Vanderveer Station, Brooklyn, New York 11210. The Center will compute the high school average and combine it with the results of the Scholastic Aptitude Test of the College Entrance Examination Board in order to arrive at a composite of those two elements. If the composite score is sufficiently high the application will be sent to the City College from the Center. Otherwise the Center will redirect the application to one of the other colleges that constitute The City University of New York. Students planning to enter in February 1970 should apply by October 15, 19679; those entering in September 1970, should apply by January 15, 1970.

Residence and Citizenship Requirements

Applicants for admission as undergraduates must be citizens of the United States or applicants for citizenship, and must meet the following residence requirements:

1. Residents of New York City. Residents of the City who meet the scholastic requirements are entitled to free tuition. This residence must be bona fide, that is, they and their parents must be permanently domiciled in New York City, their parents must as a rule be voting residents, and this residence must not have been established principally for the purpose of benefiting by the free tuition. Therefore, unless an applicant is over twenty-one and fully self-supporting, his residence for purposes of admission is normally determined by his parents' place of residence rather than his own.
2. Residents of New York State Outside of New York City. Residents of New York State outside of New York City may enroll as fee-paying students. Such applicants must file with the Registrar a certificate showing that they are residents of a particular county. The blank certificate may be obtained from the Registrar's office. The certificate is valid for one year, and must be renewed in July immediately preceding the September registration.
3. Residents of Other States. Residents of the United States outside of New York State may enroll only as graduate students or as non-matriculated students in the Evening Division.

High School Courses Required for Admission

1. Units: Applicants must offer evidence of preparation in at least sixteen units of secondary school work. A unit means the satisfactory completion of one year's work with recitation at least four or five periods a week in a subject requiring preparation, or equivalent school work in a subject not requiring preparation. These sixteen units must be distributed as follows:

English	4 units
America History	1 unit
Foreign Language	3 units
Mathematics	3 units
Science	1 unit
Electives	4 units

- a) The foreign language requirement may be met in French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Latin, Portuguese, Russian or Spanish.
- b) The mathematics requirement includes elementary and intermediate algebra, plane geometry, and trigonometry. Prospective candidates for the B.S. degree are advised to complete advanced algebra in addition.

Source: From the 1969-70 bulletin of the undergraduate division of the College of Liberal Arts and Science of The City College.

- c) The science requirement may be met by a year course in General Science, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Physiography or Earth Science. Prospective candidates for the B.S. should have completed elementary physics.
- d) The electives may include courses in such areas as Foreign Language Mathematics, Social Studies, and Science. In other subjects accepted by the high school for an academic diploma, up to three units may be offered. For subjects requiring little or no home preparation, only one half unit will be allowed for a year's work.

2. Admission with conditions: Candidates who present only fifteen or fifteen and a half units of preparatory work, or who present the full number of units but who lack not more than two units of the list of required subjects, may at the discretion of the Committee on Admissions be admitted conditionally to the freshman class. Such students must completely satisfy the entrance requirements within a year from their admission, unless an extension of time is granted by the Committee on Course and Standing.

3. Certification of preparation: Applicants should submit transcripts to their school record as evidence that they have their high school diplomas and have completed the required units of preparation. Certifications are accepted from a) public high schools of New York City, b) high schools of New York State recognized by the Board of Regents, and c) high schools of the United States accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, or similar regional accrediting agencies.

Graduates of foreign institutions must present original transcripts with certified English translations; credentials must give details of the courses of study. Such students will normally enroll first in the School of General Studies as non-matriculants. After they remove their entrance deficiencies, achieve a sufficiently high grade of scholarship, and present evidence that they have applied for citizenship in the United States, they will be admitted to the degree program.

Grades Required for Admission

1. All applicants must take the Scholastic Aptitude Test of the College Entrance Examination Board. Those entering in September should take these examinations the preceding November, although the preceding December 21 will be accepted. Those entering in February must take the examination no later than the preceding May or July. Application to take the examinations should be made through the College Entrance Examination Board, Box 592, Princeton, N.J., at least one month before the examination date.

2. The computation of the high school average is based on class grades, with 65% as the passing mark. As a rule, only academic subjects requiring home preparation are included in the average. In some high schools certain courses are modified for the benefit of students who cannot meet the demands of the regular course. Such modified courses do not count in the computation of the average, nor can they be included among the units presented for admission unless the work is validated by the successful completion of a Regents examination in the subject.

3. The administrative authorities of The College determine on the basis of available funds and space how many new students may be admitted each term in the Day Session. Applicants are ranked in order of merit in the composite score, which is based on the high school average and the entrance examinations. Applicants are selected in order of rank until the Day Session quota is filled. The standard thus determined applies in both the Day and Evening Sessions. Students whose composite scores does not qualify them for admission to the Day Session but who present a sufficiently satisfactory composite score, may enroll in the Evening Division as non-matriculants. (For a description of curriculum and fees see the Bulletin of the School of General Studies.)

4. As of September 1, 1967 a non-matriculated student may qualify as a matriculated student if he:

- a) removes all entrance conditions; and
- b) completes 14 credits at The City College with an average grade of B; or
- c) completes 30 credits at The City College with a grade average point of 2.5 (calculating each credit of A as 4, C as 2, D as 1, F as 0); or
- d) completes 45 credits at The City College with a grade point average of 2.25; or
- e) completes 60 credits at The City College with an average of C.

Notes: I. Candidates for the B.S. and B.A. degrees must offer 3 credits of Science or Mathematics (excluding Mathematics 53) at 30 credits, 6 credits of Science and/or Mathematics (excluding Mathematics 53) at 45 credits, and 12 credits of Science and/or Mathematics (excluding Mathematics 53) at 60 credits.

II. Candidates for Engineering or Architecture degrees must offer at least two Physical Science and/or Mathematics courses (at the calculus level). The student's average in mathematics, science and engineering courses taken at The City college must be C or better.

III. A transfer student can matriculate on city College grades just as the non-transfer student can, provided that, in addition, his overall average (CCNY plus transfer) is C or better; or, a transfer student can matriculate if he has 80 credits or more, of which at least 25 were taken at CCNY with a C average, provided that his overall college average is C. Appropriate, Mathematics and Science courses must be included in his credits, as above.

Physically Handicapped Students

All admissions are subject to the provisions that the candidate meets the health standards of the college. Severely handicapped students will have their applications reviewed by the Health Guidance Board to determine whether they could profit from college training.

Veterans

Students with more than six months of service in the armed forces may be eligible for credit. Such students should present their discharge papers (DD Form 214) for evaluation at the Office of the Registrar.

Admission with Advanced Standing

1. Transfers: Students at recognized colleges or universities may transfer to The City College under the following conditions:

- a) They must be graduates of accredited high schools.
- b) They must meet the entrance unit requirements.
- c) They must have completed at least one year (30 credits) of college work with at least a B minus average.

Both the college transcript and the high school record should be sent directly to the Registrar's office of The City College. This should be done prior to November 1 for the Spring term and prior to March 15 for the Fall term.

Alternatively, if they meet the requirements for freshman admission and have the required entrance units, they may be admitted provided that the average rating in the college work is at least C.

The number of credits allowed for work at other colleges is determined after consultation and evaluation. The student should present an official transcript of his record, listing courses and grades, together with a certificate of honorable dismissal, and also credentials for his high school or preparatory work. The high school record should be certified on forms provided for the purpose by this college; college records should be certified on the forms in use at the institution from which the student is transferring.

Courses completed with a grade D will not ordinarily be credited for advanced standing (certain exceptions may be made for students from the other city colleges), but the student may be excused from repeating such courses.

Students dropped from other institutions for poor scholarship or for other reasons are not eligible for admission to The City College.

ADMISSIONS (1975)

In November 1969, the Board of Higher Education adopted a policy of OPEN ADMISSIONS for all of the undergraduate units under its jurisdiction. This means that the City University of New York will offer admission to one of its college programs to all applicants who are bona fide residents of New York City, receive a high school diploma and are in good health.

All prospective applicants for admission are urged to obtain copies of The Application for Admission (4 pages, 8-1/2" x 14") and The City University of New York - 1976 College and Curriculum Codes (4 pages, 8-1/2" x 14"). These are obtainable through high school college advisors, at the Office of Admission Services, 875 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10001, from the University Processing Center, Box 148 Vanderveer Station, Brooklyn, New York 11210, and at the admissions offices of the various units of the City University of New York.

A very important point mentioned in these documents is that an applicant should list on his "Application For Admission" form, in order of preference, six choices of college and curriculum. These will be honored on the basis of the applicant's relative standing as compared with that of all other applicants and the places available in the colleges. Thus, an applicant who has given City College, Liberal Arts and Science, Day Session, as his first choice, may not finally be assigned to the City College, Liberal Arts and Sciences, Day Session.

Applicants for freshman admission who are bona fide New York City residents and were graduated from a high school before June 1970, or applicants who are residents of New York State, outside of New York City, are not covered by the broadest provisions of the Open Admissions Policy. However, every effort will be made to accommodate them, within the limits of space and financial ability.

Occasionally, we have applicants for admission who are not bona fide residents of New York City, but who attended high schools outside of New York State. Only the graduates of schools accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, or by similar accrediting organizations, will be considered for admission.

Applicants for admission who are graduates of foreign secondary schools applying for admission to undergraduate programs who hold (or expect to obtain) temporary (non-immigrant) visas, must obtain the Application For Admission For Foreign Undergraduate Students form from The City University of New York, Office of Admission Services, Foreign Student Section, 875 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10001. The Information For Foreign Undergraduate Students leaflet which is supplied with the application form gives the applicant complete information regarding filing deadlines, financial requirements, academic requirements, examination requirements, health requirements, credentials and translations required. All transactions must be handled through that office.

All Applications for freshman admissions must be sent to the University application Processing Center, Box 148 Vanderveer Station, Brooklyn, New York 11210. The Center will compute the high school average and consider both this, and the student's rank in his high school class. A check for \$10, payable to The City University of New York, must accompany each application.

If an applicant is eligible his application will be sent to us from the Center. Otherwise, the application will be redirected to one of the other colleges that constitute the City University of New York. Students planning to enter in February 1976 should apply by October 15, 1975, those planning to enter in September 1976 should apply by January 15 1976.

All applicants must meet three basic requirements: a high school diploma, residence and health.

High School Diploma

A diploma from an accredited high school is required for admission to the City University of New York. A high school certificate is not an acceptable substitute for the diploma.

A New York State Equivalence Diploma or General Education Development Examination may be substituted. USAFI diplomas must be converted to New York State Equivalency Diplomas.

Residence

Applicants for admission as undergraduates must meet the following residence requirements:

1. Residents of New York City. Residents of the city who meet the scholastic requirements are entitled to free tuition.

RESIDENCY GUIDELINES. A person shall be accorded status as a resident of the City of New York for tuition rate purposes if he or she has been determined to be a resident of the City of New York in accordance with these guidelines:

Resident: A resident of the City of New York is an adult person (18 years of age) who has continuously maintained his or her principal place of abode in the City of New York for a period of six consecutive months immediately preceding the first day of classes for the semester with respect to which the determination is made, and (intends) states his/her intention to live permanently and maintain his or her principal place of abode in New York City.

The residence of a minor (person under the age of 18) is that of his/her parents unless the person is an emancipated minor (one whose parents have intentionally and voluntarily renounced all the legal duties and surrendered all the legal rights of their position).

APPEALS: Students currently classified as non-residents who wish to apply for residence status must apply to the appropriate unit of the Office of the Registrar for an "Application in Support of New York City Residence."

2. Residents of New York State Outside of New York City. this class of student may enroll, provided that tuition fees are paid at the non-resident rate. For the academic year 1974-75, the required fee was \$600 per semester for full-time students. The summer session rates were \$45 per credit, and \$30 for each additional contact hour.

NOTE:

To the best our knowledge, only Erie, Nassau and Suffolk Counties, according to different formulae, partially reimburse the student for tuition fees paid. However, to become eligible for a refund, the student must file a Certificate of Residence with the Registrar showing that he is, in fact, a resident of Erie or Nassau or Suffolk County. The blank certificate may be obtained from the Registrar's Office. The Certificate, completed by the county fiscal officer and filed with the Office of the Registrar, is valid for one year, and must be renewed in July immediately preceding the September registration.

3. Residents Outside New York State. Residents of the United States, outside New York State, who meet the scholastic requirements for admission, may enroll as tuition-paying students on a space availability basis. Tuition charges for out-of-state students were \$600 per semester for full-time students during academic year 1974-75. Tuition charges for the Summer Session were \$45 per credit plus \$30 for each additional contact hour.

4. Foreign Students. Qualified students, who are residents of a foreign country, may enroll on a space-availability basis. Such full-time students pay instructional fees at the same rates as out-of-state residents. Effective with the Fall Term 1973, the tuition rate was \$600 per semester. Tuition charges for the Summer Session were \$45 per credit and \$30 for each additional contact hour.

Health

All students must submit, as an integral part of their application for admission, a medical examination report, on the form provided by the College. Out Physician will determine whether a student's health permits of school attendance.

Physically Handicapped Students: A campus coordinator for disabled students provides counseling for physically handicapped students and serves as liaison between the College and outside agencies.

High School Courses Recommended for Admission

It is strongly recommended that applications complete successfully at least sixteen units of secondary school work. A unit means the satisfactory completion of one year's work with recitation at least four or five periods a week in a subject requiring preparation, or equivalent school work in a subject not requiring preparation. The sixteen units should be distributed as follows:

English.....	4 units
American History.....	1 unit
Foreign Language.....	3 units (of a single language)
Mathematics.....	3 units
Science.....	1 unit
Electives.....	4 units

- a) The foreign languages recommended are French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Latin, Portuguese, Russian or Spanish.
- b) The Mathematics recommended includes elementary and intermediate algebra, plane geometry, and trigonometry. Prospective candidates for the B.S. degree are advised to complete advance algebra in addition.
- c) The sciences acceptable are year courses in General Science, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Physiography or Earth Science. Prospective candidates for the B.S. should have completed elementary physics.
- d) The electives may include courses in such areas as Foreign Language, Mathematics, Social Studies and Sciences.

Placement

Most students whose high school preparation has endowed them with adequate skills in reading, writing, study methods and mathematics will be able immediately to begin regular college credit-bearing work. Others will be required initially to enroll in preparatory courses, preliminary to their enrollment in college level work. Such students will find that these courses may extend the time necessary to earn a degree.

Deficiencies in the areas of reading, writing and mathematics will be determined by analyzing the results of the placement examinations which will be given each year. Prior to an applicant's admission.

Students are encouraged to take the Scholastic Aptitude Test given by the College Examination Board for guidance and counseling purposes, although the test scores are not required for admission to any program except the Bio-Medical Program.

Advanced Placement

High School students who have enrolled in an advanced placement program at their high schools, and who have taken the advanced placement examinations administered by the College Entrance Examination Board, may be excused from certain courses and in some cases may be granted up to thirty-two credits toward graduation.

The college usually grants placement with credit to students who have received examination ratings of 4 or 5; those with rating of 3 usually receive placement without credit. However, all examination papers must be evaluated by the department in question in order to be considered for placement and/or credit.

Students who take advanced placement examinations and who expect to enter The City College should indicate their plans to the College Entrance Examination Board.

Exemptions

Students may be excused from courses on the basis of exemption of examinations administered by the college. For further information, see the section below under the heading "Special courses of Study."

Special Admissions Program For High School Juniors

A limited number of high school students of exceptional academic ability may be admitted to the College upon completion of the junior year. These students will enter as matriculated undergraduates in the College's special honors program. Each student will be given an opportunity to proceed at his own pace in studying for the Bachelor's degree.

Students will be accepted for the program on the basis of demonstrated academic achievement and potential during the first five terms of secondary school work. It is expected that most successful applicants will come from the highest ten percent of their respective high school classes, based on grade average. However, each applicant will be judged individually, and no fixed number or categories of high school units of academic work has been set as the minimum requirement for admission.

Acceptance in the program will be based on the student's individual record and an interview by a member or designee of the admissions committee. Applications will be accepted from any resident of New York State attending an accredited public or private secondary school.

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