

Slavery in the Classical Utopia : A Comparative Study

By

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Classics in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
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Abstract

Adviser: Professor Jennifer Roberts

The literary genre of utopia arose out of two main source elements in classical antiquity. These can be differentiated by their divergent approaches to slavery and enslavement, and reflect, respectively, the attitudes of slaves, or of masters towards concepts of ideal societies. Therefore, the terms are derived: servile perspective utopia, dominant perspective utopia, and “hybrid utopia,” a combination of the two. The servile perspective is characterized by an idealization of release from compulsion, a transformation of the natural order, and the undermining of socio-political order. Examples of it include the mythology of the Age of Kronos and the god Dionysos, the fragments and complete works of Old Comedy, the literature connected with Cynic philosophy, the New Comic works of Plautus, and the Augustan Elegiac poets. The dominant perspective represents the ideal society as internalizing the value of compulsion and mastery, accepting nature as it is in reality, and establishing and maintaining socio-political order. Examples of it include Plato’s *Republic*, *Laws*, and his myth of Atlantis, Aristotle’s *Politics*, Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*, and literature on the “real-life” utopianists the Pythagoreans and the Spartans. Hybrid utopias are ideal societies that internalize the value of compulsion as well as that of release, and promise a transformation of nature as a reward for the establishment and maintenance of

socio-political order. These include: Travelogues such as the accounts of Herodotus' Ethiopians, Iambulus' Islands of the Sun, where alteration of Nature takes place in the context of political virtue. Apuleius' Metamorphosis involves an inverse transformation of Nature, where servile values are eventually subsumed into dominant. Real-life hybrid utopias include the communities of Essenes, who absorb the Cynic and comic ideal of the primacy of Nature, but follow dominant values, and the accounts of ancient slave rebellions, which utilize both servile and dominant utopian techniques.

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Introduction: Slavery in the Classical Utopia

In classical antiquity, the reality of subservient toil was a prerequisite for the idea of utopia, and in turn, utopia came to be a tool for the justification of slavery. This seems an alien concept in modern times, where a rejection of the institution of slavery has become a mainstream political commonplace, and the abuse of labor seems antithetical to any daydream of an ideal world. Nevertheless, the classical ideal could not escape the slavery that was ingrained even in its early mythology, where the fall from grace and the introduction of sin after the golden age leads to the commencement of slave labor. Ultimately, the common roots of all utopian models lie in the idealized portrayal of the origins of humanity. Following this stage, two separate utopian types emerge; in both of which slavery is an archetypal, paradigmatic relationship, yet with completely opposed views on “what is best” for slaves. At the point at which classical authors started to combine these two approaches, the literary genre of utopianism as we are familiar with it in a modern sense began to coalesce.

I will designate these two perspectives as "dominant" and "servile," in accordance with the outlook on slavery that each represents. A utopia, whether it is an imagined or real enactment of idealism, consistently addresses the social interaction of subservience and dominance. Slavery is the most drastic example of such a power relation. Thus, a utopia's perspective on slavery is emblematic of its character and function, whether it originates from those who seek to apply controls or those who wish to evade and avoid them. The nature of the ideal world

in classical literature extends from the rampantly hedonistic paradise of freed slaves to the carefully constructed maps of virtue that rely on moral slavery. Slavery has a close connection with the philosophical construction of utopias. One link between slavery and utopia relies on the shared metaphor of extreme adversity. A utopia is always a boundary, since it figuratively, geographically or chronologically represents the outer limits of human behavior. The contrast of the utopia with an author's day-to-day life might be expressed as a function of utopian character that is virtuous and well formed beyond the normal means of society. In another case, the contrast is manifest in the remote location of a utopia that is not to be reached by normal modes of transportation. The future and the past are also common coordinates for utopia, utilizing the inherent boundaries of chronology. This all points to the difficulty inherent in creating an ideal: its achievement is often envisioned as impossible. Likewise, classical Greeks and Romans conceived of liberation from enslavement as a worthy yet nearly impossible goal. Slavery was the primary metaphor by which both hedonism and virtue were indicated in the ancient language of power, and as such, it was the essential condition by which everyone, master and subject, could comprehend both a personal "ideal" and its opposite.

Part of the utopians' extreme reliance on the image of slavery is explicable in terms of the inherent extremity and paradox of the condition itself. A slave was socially null, and morally coded as less than a corpse, but a slave could be freed, and unlike the dead, could redeem his or her wretched and disgraceful state. This could happen through two primary channels: legitimate manumission or escape,

both of which can exist on a real as well as a metaphorical level. A slave could become "better" by heroically surmounting difficulty, that is, by undergoing more trials and tests than a fairy-tale heroine. Likewise, the process of training the soul in virtue, a hegemonic utopia in miniature, incorporates slavery as one of its essential structural aspects, with emancipation as a kind of graduation, won by merit only. In other words, by full realization of the condition and acceptance of slavery's laws, one can be freed from slavery. In stark contrast (but just as unlikely), a slave could be freed by a great and unexpected stroke of luck, combined with a healthy opportunism on his or her part, by rejecting and escaping the condition in any way possible. This abdication of responsibility has a comic valence that reverses, or simply disregards empirical standards of goodness. Thus the two different perspectives on slavery, of the "good" slave vs. the "bad," become the foundations for the two different types of utopian vision. Extremes of self-restraint and self-indulgence form the boundaries of what the Greeks considered ideal.

Overall, the schema of my argument is organized in three sections. In part one I examine Greek and Roman comedy and mythological tales of the golden age, and the manner in which utopian literature reveals the servile perspective's association with unreality and wish fulfillment. Part two is concerned with the creation of the ideal *polis* of the classical era, whether it is literary or historical. This type of utopian construct is based on the dominant perspective, meaning that it reflects the incorporation of slavery into a realistic ideological utopia. Part three argues that classical authors created the genre of utopia in a literary sense by

combining motifs from the dominant and servile perspectives.

In Greek comic utopias, avoidance of reality translates into liberation for the subservient through the agencies of magic and divinity. The themes of leisure and luxury, characteristic of the worship of Kronos and Dionysos, are associated repeatedly with the *topos* of the absence of slavery. These two gods, who exemplify the reversal of norms and liberation from social bonds, have close connections with freedom from slavery both in old comedy and in religious ritual. Enslavement is an iconic, negative state functioning as the primary obstacle to escape or transmogrify in the comic world. Portrayals of distant, magical lands and the utopias of ancient comedy are primarily aligned with the "servile" perspective. In this type of comedic fiction, the inhabitants of the fictional world free themselves from society's demands as though these are mere encumbrances to the pleasures of life and not necessary moral obligations. Such literary fantasies incorporate elements of the Golden Age myth, replacing slaves with machines or magic, or even inverting the balance of power to make slaves the masters of a utopia. The description of the *χρύσεον γένος* in Hesiod's *Works and Days* is a paradigmatic example of this phenomenon. Likewise, in the fragments of Old Comedy, the labor by which people live becomes "magically" unnecessary. In Aristophanes' *Plutus*, the impoverished Chremylos brings back the god of wealth, a Golden Age character, who then runs amok, freeing the slaves and enriching the poor in the world of Athens in the end of the 5th and beginning of the 4th century BCE. Later in that century, practitioners of the Cynic way of life incorporated the subversive rhetoric of comedy and recast it into a code in which *ἐλευθερία* and

παρρησία became the guiding values, overcoming the stigma of inferior or slave status. Thus, although it is derived from the experiences of “real” people, literature concerning the Cynics is highly fictionalized, and represents the same desire of the underdog for liberty that pervades Old Comedy. Finally, in Roman Comedy, Plautus developed the character most appropriate to the utopian vision of the Saturnalia, the *servus callidus*, the slave with complete verbal *licentia*. The saturnalian spirit of inverted norms continues in the genre of Augustan elegiac poetry, the genre that saw the introduction of the metaphorical “slave of love” as a central voice. Elegy also exists in a utopian fantasy world based on the supremacy of *amor* and *otium*, a concept that consciously flouts the traditional Roman ideal of practicality and *officium*.

In contrast, I derive the idea of the "dominant perspective" from classical authors' frequent statements that the individual had to learn to "enslave" desires and emotions, rather than being enslaved by them. The outlook of didactic utopian philosophies relies on an aristocracy of virtue that demands the subjugation, persuasion, and the willing service of society. Thus, authors such as Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon and the Stoics always included slaves in their account as conquered enemies, as reminders of what the denizens of utopia did not want to become, and as the part of the self that must serve, so that the better part may rule. Many otherwise divergent philosophies all adhere to the idea of training the symbolic slave, making slavery a metaphor for an essential aspect of education. The idea of slavery as an educational tool also pervades the literature concerning the "real-world" utopians such as the Pythagoreans, the Spartans, and strangely,

the accounts of slave revolts and rebellions. In this way, slavery was an essential and cross-cultural ingredient for developing utopian virtue.

In the Hellenistic and Roman eras, and to some degree in the 4th Century BC, utopias that combined rigorous political virtue with hedonism appear much more frequently. One explanation for this is that the larger body of classical literature upon which authors drew produced a concept of utopia that used the philosophical constructions of the recent era along with the entertaining motifs of comedy and golden age myth. Within this range, the details of landscape, character and format were flexible, and spread across different genres of literature, even penetrating into history, philosophy, political writing, and real-world societies. An example of this is the "Islands of the Sun" of Iambulus, which reflect the servile perspective in the fantastically lush conditions in which the inhabitants maintain an egalitarian society, free of slavery. Yet there is also evidence of the dominant perspective, in that these inhabitants are compelled to display a unilateral virtue, as well as careful political organization. Authors such as Iambulus combined the dominant perspective's demand for virtue with the servile perspective's characteristic fantasy and wish fulfillment. This became a popular and iconographic method for creating utopias, which is ultimately integrated into our modern conception of the word.

Whether an ideal society's outlook was dominant or servile, or even if it had a ban on slavery, this "basest institution" made its presence felt, whether in the attainment, the maintenance, or even the destruction of a given utopia. Slaves penetrated all different sectors of the classical world, performing manifold tasks

as the occasion or master required, although their essential status of subjugation and disgrace remained the same. Likewise, what was considered ideal could change and fluctuate in different utopias, depending on what the author considered "the best." The concept of slavery is common to all of them.¹

¹ Since utopia evolved into a literary genre of the classical world only gradually, there are many motifs which exist independently of a complete utopian construct. The presence of even one of these can provide a work, which may ostensibly concern a completely different topic, with utopian associations. To a modern perspective, the presence of several together is enough to imbue a given literary scenario with an idealistic and idealizing aspect, so that one can refer to the given work, in short hand as it were, as a utopia. For examples of such motifs, see Appendix A.

Part One: Servile Perspective Utopia

Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων καὶ γενναίων ψυχῶν εἰς τὰς χορείας, οἷας εἶρηται δεῖν αὐτὰς εἶναι, διαπεπέρανται, τὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμωδήματα τετραμμένων, κατὰ λέξιν τε καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ κατὰ ὄρχησιν καὶ κατὰ τὰ τούτων πάντων μιμήματα εκωμωδημένα, ἀνάγκη μὲν θεάσασθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν· ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μέλλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι, ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ αὖ δυνατόν ἀμφοτέρα, εἴ τις αὖ μέλλει καὶ σμικρὸν ἀρετῆς μεθέξειν, ἀλλὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τούτων καὶ μανθάνειν αὐτὰ δεῖ, τοῦ μή ποτε δι' ἄγνοιαν δρᾶν ἢ λέγειν ὅσα γελοῖα, μηδὲν δεόν, δούλοις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσθοις προστάττειν μιμεῖσθαι, σπουδῆν δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι μηδέποτε μηδ' ἠντινοῦν, μηδέ ινα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερόν τῶν ἐλευθέρων, μήτε γυναῖκα μήτε ἄνδρα, καινὸν δὲ αἰεὶ τι περὶ αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι τῶν μιμημάτων. ὅσα μὲν οὖν περὶ γέλωτ' ἔστιν παίγνια, ἃ δὴ κωμωδίαν πάντες λέγομεν, οὕτως τῷ νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ κείσθω.

Those matters, on the one hand, pertaining to the choruses of beautiful bodies and noble minds, what sorts of things they should consist has been thoroughly gone over, but the comedic matters, concerning shameful bodies and thoughts and those things done for a laugh in written word, song, and dance, and all comedic imitations of these things, it is necessary to to observe and look into. For without humor it is impossible to understand serious things, or any opposites without their opposites, if someone intends to be learned, it is not at all possible for him to do both things. Further, if someone wants to partake of virtue even just a little, in fact, it is necessary to this very end, to learn humor, lest one should ever do or say anything funny on account of ignorance, that is not at all necessary. Such things we should enjoin on slaves and wage earning foreigners, so that neither should these matters ever be taken seriously, nor should any free man or woman publically learn them, but always there should be something new about the imitations to appear. On this topic, namely, as many things as concern laughable games, those things we all call Comedy, thus let it stand in law and argument. (Plato *Laws* 816d-e)

Chapter One: Myth, Comedy and the Golden Age

The above passage from Plato's *Laws* represents the philosophic perception of comedy as the embodiment of the servile perspective. In the ideal, yet practical "Cretan" city, not only are slaves and aliens allowed to participate in the making and acting of comedy, but in fact they are the only ones for whom this is proper.

The free citizens of Plato's utopia in the *Laws* are permitted to watch comedy

only in order to inform themselves by its negative examples; in other words, what buffoonery and slavish behavior to avoid. To Plato's Athenian speaker, comedy appears to be the art form most appropriate for slaves. Of course, the Athenian is creating a hypothetical polis, whereas in Plato's Athens and other cities, free citizens, such as Aristophanes, were authors and *choregoi* of comedies. Granted, that Plato has philosophical objections to drama in general, as it roused dangerous emotions and was mimetic rather than real. He makes the point that standards for tragedy in the ideal city of the laws would be impossibly stringent (Plato *Laws* 817a-e). At least he entertains the possibility that a tragedy could be noble, whereas the Athenian's disdainful attitude to comedy is rooted in a deep-seated perception of it as undignified, possibly shameful, and embodying the outlook of slaves. In short, it represents everything the ideal citizen should avoid in the dominant-perspective utopia. In contrast, in utopias fashioned from the servile perspective, the excesses of comedy represent the ideal.

A key difference between the servile and dominant perspective utopias is the attitude they take towards leisure, or *σχολή*. Throughout classical history, masters maintained their leisure by the use of slaves, while slaves, in their turn, may well have imagined a leisurely existence for themselves. Overall, the masters, not the slaves, have created utopian literature, although some important exceptions certainly exist. Therefore, one might expect authors of fictional ideal societies to have simply made use of slave labor to keep their hypothetical citizens from unpleasant and distracting tasks. Yet surprisingly, authors who depict "servile perspective" utopias reveal a great preoccupation with the replacement of slaves

with different devices, both magical and technological. An unreal quality characterizes this type of ideal society, both in terms of its miraculous setting and of the virtue that comes without effort. Hedonism is at a premium there, undermining the control of the passions, and creating a utopia based on pleasure and liberation from toil. This is not to say that the residents of hedonistic utopias are wicked, but they do not achieve their goodness by means of denying pleasure. These various factors suggest that a society that is ideal for these reasons represents a wish for release from hardship rather than the embracing of responsibility.

Hesiod's myth of the Golden Age is the first model of the "good life" made possible by σχολή, when freedom from toil is coupled with innate freedom from sin.² This period is associated with the time of the rule of the God Kronos, the father and eventually the defeated rival of Zeus, who had particular associations with liberation from slavery in both Greek and Roman religion. The Kronia (Greece) and the Saturnalia (Rome) attest to this, since both directly concerned the inversion of slave-master roles. The at least nominal equality of masters and slaves during these festivals shows that mythology and religious practice were linked, and that the egalitarian ideal of the Golden Age had a real-world dimension.³ On a literary level, motifs such as the automatic production of food,

² There are some Homeric examples, e.g., the Lotos Eaters and Phaiaceans of the *Odyssey*, but Hesiod's is the first fully realized account we possess on this *topos*.

³ See H. C. Baldry, "Who Invented the Golden Age?" *The Classical Quarterly, New Series* 2, no.1/2 (1952): 85. In this article Baldry demonstrates the traditional association of the Golden Age with Kronos, whereas he thinks the "χρυσέον γενός" to be Hesiod's own invention.

the unthinking virtue of the people, and the corresponding lack of slaves do not much alter over time, and remain fundamentally unchanged from Homer and Hesiod up to the period of Roman comedy. The fragments of the plays of the old comedians are full of this sort of imagery, so much so that egalitarianism must have been a stock comic theme, an aspect of the background of the age of Kronos myth. The subject of the golden age ideal, particularly adapted to comedy, lent itself to many different literary approaches, some aristocratic and conservative, others connected with radical ideas of religion and philosophy.

Myth makes use of utopian concepts, and many utopian tales are mythical. No real utopian genre existed at this time, but many different types of literature created idealized portrayals of a life of ease, as diverse as lyric poetry, philosophy, and didactic literature. For example, in different renditions of the “Golden Age” myth, Hesiod describes automatic food production (Hes. *Works and Days*, 109-119), and Empedocles tells of an age of abundance and vegetarianism and equality of humans and animals, all themes common in comedy.⁴ In Pindar’s *Olympian 2*, the poet talks of the Isles of the Blest, referring

⁴ Unusually, Empedocles describes this time as that of Venus, not Kronos, who was typically designated the king of the prehistoric idealized realm:

οὐδέ τις ἦν κείνοισιν Ἄρης θεὸς οὐδὲ Κυδοιμὸς
οὐδὲ Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς οὐδὲ Κρόνος οὐδὲ Ποσειδῶν,
ἀλλὰ Κύπρις βασίλεια.

τὴν οἱ γ’ εὐσεβέεσσιν ἀγάλμασιν ἰλάσκοντο
γραπτοῖς τε ζώοισι μύροισί τε δαιδαλεόδοις
σμίρνης τ’ ἀκρήτου θυσίαις λιβάνου τε θυώδους,
ξανθῶν τε σπονδᾶς μελίτων ρίπτοντες ἐς οὐδᾶς·
ταύρων δ’ ἀκρήτοισι φόνοις οὐ δεύετο βωμός,
ἀλλὰ μῦσος τοῦτ’ ἔσκεν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστον,
θυμὸν ἀπορραΐσαντας ἐνέδμεναι ἡέα γυῖα.

to them as “the castle of Kronos.”(Pind. *Olymp.* 2.75) ⁵ In general, these ideal societies stand in diametrical opposition to the real-life lot of the worker, coded in

Neither did they have Ares as a god, or Tumultor King Zeus, nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Kypris was Queen. Her they propitiated with holy statues, painted wooden panels, many well mixed perfumes, offerings of unmixed myrrh and sweet-smelling frankincense, pouring offerings of tawny honey on the ground. And the altar was not bedewed by the unadulterated blood of bulls but this was the greatest defilement among men, for them to eat their noble limbs, having deprived them of life.

(Empedocles fr.122 Diels, = Porphyrius, *de Abst.* 2.20).

ἴσασιν δὲ νύκτεσσιν αἰθεῖ,
 ἴσασιν δ' ἀμέραις ἄθλιον ἔχοντες, ἀπονέστερον
 ἐσθλοὶ δέκονται βίοτον, οὐ χθόνα τα-
 ράσσοντες ἐν χερὸς ἀκμᾶ
 οὐδὲ πόντιον ὕδωρ
 κεινὰν παρὰ δίαϊταν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ μὲν τιμίσις
 θεῶν οἴτινες ἔχαιρον εὐορκίαις
 ἄδακρυν νέμονται
 αἰῶνα, τοῖ δ' ἀπροσόρατον ὀκχέοντι πόνον.
 ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρίς
 ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν
 ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὄδον παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν· ἔνθα μακάρων
 νᾶσον ὠκεανίδες αὐραὶ περιπνέουσιν· ἄνθεμα δὲ χρυσοῦ φλέγει,
 τὰ μὲν χερσόθεν ἀπ' ἀγλαῶν δενδρέων, ὕδωρ δ' ἄλλα φέρβει,
 ὄρμοισι τῶν χέρας ἀναπλέκοντι καὶ στεφάνους
 βουλαῖς ἐν ὀρθαῖσι Ῥαδαμάνθυος,
 ὃν πατὴρ ἔχει μέγας ἐτοῖμον αὐτῷ πάρεδρον,
 πόσις ὁ πάντων Ῥέας
 ὑπέρτατον ἐχοίσας θρόνον. (Text from *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*: Pind.
Olymp. 2, 61-75)

Always holding the sun with equal nights and equal days the noble men welcome a less toilsome life, not harassing the earth or the sea water with force of hand, for the sake of a barren subsistence, but alongside the Gods, whoever rejoiced in honorable oaths, now possess a life without tears, but the rest bear frightful toil. Those who having remained on either side thrice, as many as dared to keep their souls altogether apart from unjust things, finish the road of Zeus to the Castle of Kronos, where the ocean breezes blow around the island of the Blessed. Flowers of gold burn, some from the earth from the shining trees, other flowers the water brings forth. These they weave together in garlands for their hands and crowns, in the upright councils of Rhadymanthos, whom the great father, the husband of Rhea has as a ready assistant for himself, she who has the highest throne of all. (Pind. *Olymp.* 2.60-75).

the Greek universe of values as potentially exploited and misused. Although Pindar and Hesiod were not egalitarian politically in the slightest, these utopias are the realization of hedonistic and egalitarian fantasy.

The theme of Hesiod's Golden Age incorporates an important aspect of the "servile" utopian character, in that it does not so much value asceticism, since the atmosphere is one of unthinking plenty. Subsequent hedonistic comedies take this idea a step further, as magic and technology play a major role in the attainment of leisure, rather explicitly replacing the real-life need for slaves. Similarly, although the inhabitants are described as virtuous, this morality seems as automatic as their methods of food production, not a result of long hard education and trials, but a simple gift from the gods. The setting simply lies outside the chronological range of sin, labor, and slavery, all potential obstacles to the utopian life; therefore the ideal world exists as if by default. There are no vices to be overcome by virtues, no *ponos* to make anyone miserable. Therefore, although such a land requires "goodness" as a basic preexisting quality, in fact it frankly celebrates sensual pleasure.

Hesiod's Golden Age

χρύσειον μὲν πρῶτιστα γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
 ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες.
 οἳ μὲν ἐπὶ Κρόνου ἦσαν, ὅτ' οὐρανῶ ἔμβασίλευεν·
 ὥστε θεοὶ δ' ἔζων ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
 νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνων καὶ οἰζύος· οὐδέ τι δειλὸν
 γῆρας ἐπήν, αἰεὶ δὲ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὁμοῖοι
 τέρποντ' ἐν θαλίῃσι κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν ἀπάντων·
 θνησκον δ' ὥσθ' ὑπνω δεδμημένοι· ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα
 τοῖσιν ἔην· καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα
 αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον· οἳ δ' ἐθελημοὶ
 ἦσυχοι ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο σὺν ἐσθλοῖσιν πολέεσσι.
 ἀφνειοὶ μῆλοισι, φίλοι μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν.
 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε,

τοὶ μὲν δαίμονες ἄγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσι
 ἔσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων,
 οἳ ῥα φυλάσσουσιν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα
 ἡέρα ἔσσάμενοι πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπ' αἴαν,
 πλουτοδόται· καὶ τοῦτο γέρας βασιλῆιον ἔσχον.

The deathless ones holding the Olympian houses first made a golden race of mortal men. They existed in Kronos' time, when he was ruling in Heaven. Just as Gods they lived, having a spirit free from care, far from toils and woe. Neither did they experience destructive old age, but always, with feet and hands untiring, they enjoyed their dances far apart from all evils. They died just as those overcome by sleep. They possessed all noble things, because the grain giving ground bore by itself much and unlimited fruit. And they lived freely and at peace with respect to their works with many noble things, and they were rich in flocks, beloved by the blessed gods. But when the earth covered over this race they ended up as holy spirits dwelling upon the earth, noble averters of danger, guards of mortal men, who watch over judgements and crooked deeds, wandering all the earth clothed in fog. They are givers of wealth, and they have this as a royal gift. (Hes. *Works and Days* 110-130).

Toil and sorrow (πόνων καὶ οἰζύος), two common aspects of enslavement, are mentioned as alien to the experience of the “Golden Race.” Yet Hesiod, conscious of the need to explain how they were able to maintain their constant feasting, says the earth automatically, without the touch of a tool, brought forth bounteously: “καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον (Hes. *Works and Days* 117-118). This is interesting in light of the context of the *Works and Days*, which as a didactic work on farming, involves frequent injunctions to *ponos*, and many mentions of slaves in terms of when to give them commands to work, and how to get them to work harder.⁶ In fact, one of its major themes is an invective against idleness, as Hesiod's comparison of the idle drones hated by gods and men reveals:

τῶ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἄνδρες ὅς κεν ἀεργὸς

⁶ See Hes. *Works and Days* 405-413, 458-464, 465-478, 502-503, 571-581, 597-608, 765-767.

ζῶη, κηφήνεςσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὀργήν,
οἳ τε μελισσάων κάματον τρύχουσιν ἀεργοὶ
ἔσθοντες· σοὶ δ' ἔργα φίλ' ἔστω μέτρια κοσμεῖν,
ὥς κέ τοι ὠραίου βιότου πλήθωσι καλιαί.
ἔξ ἔργων δ' ἄνδρες πολύμηλοί τ' ἀφνειοί τε,
καί τ' ἐργαζόμενος πολὺ φίλτερος ἀθανάτοισιν
ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.

Both Gods and men are justly angry at this man who lives idle, for he is similar in temperament to the drones without a sting, who, without working, waste and devour the labor of the honey-makers. But as for you, let it be your practice to order your affairs in moderation, so that your granaries may be full of stores at the proper season. From action men become rich in sheep wealthy and a working man is much dearer to the immortals. Work is no disgrace but laziness is (Hes. *Works and Days* 305-315).

In Hesiod's contemporary "iron age," the behavior that was noble and natural for the golden men, that is, lack of toil, has become a reason for the hatred of the gods rather than a sign of their special favor. Hesiod's fixation on the necessity for constant labor, as well as on the injustice of misusing resources, makes the χρύσειον γένος seem all the more anomalous and exceptional. In the Iron Age, work and resources are inextricably associated with power, on all levels of society from the slave to the king. In the golden age, on the other hand, slavery and other power relations are conspicuously missing, replaced by a magical plenty, the symbol of divine favor. Hesiod's speaker conveys the powerful connection between an automatic mode of production and perfect virtue and nobility. There is an aristocratic quality about the χρύσειον γένος. Yet they are not ruling over anybody; no inequality in their community is mentioned, nor, in fact anyone else but them. Undifferentiated from any "other," they peacefully coexisted. Interestingly, the golden men become protective spirits after their time was up, keeping watch on "judgments and cruel deeds" (Hes. *Works and Days* 124), certainly methods by which humans enslave each other. This sort of idealization

of a person or group which protects others against slavery is a motif among the Greek “servile perspective” utopias. The golden people switch from a life of unthinking bliss to one in which they constantly watch over human evils, as if the two are intrinsically connected. Thus they end up in positions of judgment after their deaths, in which, as ἀλεξικακοί, they protect humans of the later base-metal ages from the sort of inequality and wretchedness they never had to experience. Hesiod also mentions that they are bringers of wealth (Hes. *Works and Days* 126), a powerful tool to protect, or even liberate, oneself from slavery. As we will see from the Aristophanic and the other old-comic fragments, Πλοῦτος and “οἱ πλοῦτοι” are associated with role reversal, Kronos, and the primeval time without slaves. The χρυσεὸν γένος counterbalance the Hesiodic speaker’s deep sense of the unjust inequality of his time, and the precariousness of life, both elements intrinsic to the creation of slavery. They function as a dual symbol of freedom from the toil he extols in the *Works and Days*, as well as egalitarianism in justice, the absence of the abuse of power.

Chapter Two: Role Reversal and Inversion

Role reversal has been a preferred tool of comedy up to the present day. There is something perennially humorous in the discomfiture of a proud and wealthy character seeing life from the other side of the fence, as well as the first taste of power and luxury by a character unused to their exercise. This sort of plot is stock situation and character comedy, of which we have later examples in Shakespeare's cross-dressing comedies, the *Prince and the Pauper*, and modern movies such as "Trading Places," but goes back through Roman satire and comic drama to the comedians who preceded Aristophanes in creating Old Comedy, and to even more ancient fables and myths. Such reversals are associated with the creation of ideal societies that run counterpoint to the norms of existence.

Comic-utopian worlds are often marked by an inversion, or at least a leveling, of class structure based on traditional standards of wealth and power. The frequent use of themes of equality shows comedy's roots in myths of the Golden Age, and the "impossible wish" for equality's return. Role reversal between masters and slaves reflects through the lens of mythic utopian roots the deep seated dissatisfactions of the disenfranchised and slaves, which would be relieved by unlimited σχολή and ελευθερία. In reality, of course, most Greeks and Romans did not want slaves as equals, let alone superiors; nevertheless, they repeatedly imagined this possibility.⁷ There have been many different interpretations of this powerful subliminal need for the ideal society to be good

⁷ The overwhelming majority of surviving Classical texts come from authors who were aristocratic, wealthy, and free. There are a few exceptions, notably, Aesop, Horace, Terence, and Epictetus.

for everyone. I would argue that the “Age of Kronos,” and its attendant egalitarianism, bounty, and inherent virtue all possess positive associations in mythological terms. The Golden Age, the rule of Kronos, and the Isles of the Blest all function as literary shorthand to indicate a ‘good’ situation; the use that the author makes of the situation is subject to his particular objectives, as well as the details and context.

Comedy is profoundly folkloric, connected with religion in the service of Dionysos, the god who represents catharsis, the breaker-down of boundaries. If catharsis only affects to rid the audience of ‘dangerous’ ideas, then most of the power inversions of comedy ultimately serve to maintain the existing power structure. Nevertheless, the focus of the comedians using the theme of the Golden Age relies fundamentally on the perspective of the poor, who have the greatest interest in the cessation of labor. The poor must also have had the most interest in descriptions of a hedonistic, easy life, as well as in laughing at the politicians parodied in the course of the comedies.⁸ This is the background of 5th Century BCE Greek comedy, in which seemingly innocuous mythical scenes allegorize highly charged political issues. For the civically involved Athenian citizen of the 5th century BCE, servitude, labor and obedience to others would have been familiar functions, and watchwords from the recent past.

⁸ “They would obtain a sort of temporary refutation of their existence while watching the comedies, then go out and vote for the same men they had just been laughing at.” Marcella Farioli, *Mundus alter: Utopie e distopie nella commedia greca antica* (Milano Vita e Pensiero 2001), 239.

Fragments of the Old Comedians

It is interesting that rituals such as the Kronia, and the '*aischrologia*' of the Dionysia are a common topic in comedy, and had deep seated associations with the reversals of comedy, since behind both types of institutions lies a similar motive. The creation of modes of behavior opposite to social norms actually reinforces the regular power structures by introducing a sort of 'safety-valve' to the oppressed classes. One can even interpret the leveling function of a comic utopia as a tool of maintaining the status quo, inasmuch as the outlook of comedy reflects the practical viewpoint of those who required slavery for the continuation of their daily lives as citizens. These people, men and women, could not countenance a life without slaves, and indeed actively sought slaves to help them in their work.⁹ In many comedies and rituals, a story is told in which the 'oppressed' group forms a power structure like the one that they are trying to combat or subvert. This occurs, for example, in the *Fish* of Archippos, and in modern literature, Orwell's *Animal Farm*. There are many other examples of this sort of similarity between religion and comedy. For instance, the Saturnalia of Romans, or the Medieval Festival of Fools involve the temporary suspension of power relations, and the use of insults, behavior normally improper, and aggression.

Marcella Farioli in her book *Mundus alter: Utopie e distopie nella commedia*

⁹See Ehrenburg: "Free men never felt slave-labor to be a danger and scarcely a disadvantage." Victor Ehrenberg, *The people of Aristophanes: a sociology of old Attic comedy* (London ; New York: Methuen ; Barnes & Noble, 1974), 136. He also suggests that free and slave labor was on the same economic level (Ehrenberg, 137).

greca antica makes a case for the usage of "utopian world-reversal" as a double-edged tool of conservatism as well as social criticism.¹⁰ The starting point for this idea is the testimony of Athenaeus (*Deipn.* 6. 267e-270a), where, after an examination of slavery itself, the speaker states that there were certain comic poets in the ancient world who describe a life without slavery; he goes on to cite several cases, to which we owe the preservation of some of the only fragments of these poets.¹¹

Farioli approaches Athenaeus's idea of slavelessness from the angle that the lack of slaves is not really the common thread of these plays, but the conditions that make this possible; for instance, a hedonistic separation from reality, or a placement in remote time or space. Looking primarily at the fragments of the ancient comedians, often in relation to Aristophanes, she posits two separate utopian types in ancient comedy, which she names "the land of Cockaigne," of which the Age of Kronos is the basic standard and "the world upside down," or the comedy of inversion. Both of these deal continually with utopian and servile themes. I would add that Farioli's two models show a mutual exclusiveness and dependence when examined in light of slavery. The comedies of inversion generally include slaves, but seem to suggest that society's ills have merely

¹⁰Farioli, 4.

¹¹ According to this character, these fragments are in chronological order. If this is correct, the question arises of the imitation of the utopian ideas from one poet to the next, versus the equal usage of a preexisting concept by all of them. I would suggest that although a certain amount of appropriation and mimesis would be natural in any well-developed literary community, the concept of the absence of slaves in old Comedy has its roots more in religious and mythological tradition than in fashions of writing.

reemerged under new leadership. On the other hand, the “land of Cockaigne” utopias lack slaves, and are overall described in positive terms. This is not to say that the Old Comedians never satirize utopian motifs. Nevertheless, in order to diversify the traditional image of the Golden Age, they worked with a concept of an imaginary geographical model that could lend variety to the comic situation. This led to a separate category of anti-utopia, or a parody of the ideal world, indicating even in its mockery the interest of the writers in utopian subjects. In general, however, the idea of unlimited bounty was considered a good thing.

Farioli suggests that the interest of ancient writers in the "αὐτοματός βίος," such as we see in the *Beasts* of Krates (Fr. 16), lies more in the idea of automation itself rendering slavery obsolete, rather than in abolition of slavery.¹² She makes the case that the equality of the Age of Kronos lies in the natural abundance of land making slavery useless:

Thus, the acceptance of servitude in comedies is a secondary consequence to the acceptance of *ponos*. In the comedies cited by Athenaeus, the absence of slavery represents only a strange and unattainable state coming because of the warping of the laws, logic or physics. Such a concept brings about, consequently, the justification rather than negation of slavery.¹³

I would argue here that the absence of slaves, rather than being a mere side-effect of the absence of toil, is an extremely consistent canonical element of this mythological *topos* and is not necessarily secondary in importance to the comedic removal of all natural laws. Ἐλευθερία is a basic element in portrayals of the age of Kronos, past or future, and the happy afterlife. Additionally, in some cases,

¹² Farioli, 214-219.

¹³ Farioli, 216. Translation from Italian is my own.

slavelessness represents a reversion to extreme primitivism, more “natural” in the sense of closer to a state of φύσις.¹⁴ On the other hand, I agree with Farioli that the literary function of slavelessness is extremely varied, and can serve conservative as well as utopian ends.¹⁵

If we examine various ancient fragments, the element of egalitarianism appears standard, as do various other utopian motifs:¹⁶ Kratinos’ *Ploutoi*, for instance, reflects the same scene of effortless bounty for all, not just a few, who were present in the time of Hesiod’s χρυσέον γενός:

ἄρ’ ἀληθῶς τοῖς ξένοισιν ἔστιν, ὡς λέγους’, ἐκεῖ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐλθοῦσιν ἐν τῇ κοπίδι θοινᾶσθαι καλῶς; ἐν δὲ ταῖς λέσχαισι φύσκα προσπεπατταλευμένα κατακρέμανται, τοῖσι πρεσβύταισιν ἀποδάκνειν ὀδάξ;

Is it true, as they say, that it is possible for all the strangers coming here can dine well at “The Cleaver”? And as for the sausages hung up on pegs all over in the public places, can the envoys take a bite? (Kratin. *Plout.* fr. 166)¹⁷

Here it is possible for everybody to feast, both “strangers coming” (ξένοισιν) as well as “elders” (πρεσβύταισιν). Fruits ripen on their own, and although the

¹⁴ For instance, Pherecrates’ *Wild Men*. With a reservation, however, that this play lampoons utopian *topoi* which in other works are treated seriously.

¹⁵ For instance, by using the theme of Golden age of Kronos as subverted by Zeus, Kratinos can make his *Θραιτταί* a vehicle of political satire, specifically of the Periclean regime by the identification of Zeus with Pericles (see Farioli, 11).

¹⁶ For instance, the banquet of magically generated food. In Kratinos’ *Ploutoi*, dice playing with food and corn in the palaistra gives a special individual touch to Kratinos’ description of overwhelming bounty.

¹⁷ In the same play, see:

-οἷς δὴ βασιλεὺς -Κρόνος ἦν τὸ παλαιόν, ὅτε τοῖς ἄρτοις ἡστραγάλιζον, μᾶζαι δ’ ἐν ταῖσι παλαίστραις. -αἰγινᾶται κατεβέβληντο δρυπεπεῖς, βῶλοις τε κομῶσαι.

Kronos was their king long ago, when they played knucklebones with bread morsels, and tree-ripened leaf-wrapped Aiginetan barley-breads were cast down in the wrestling-grounds. (Kratin. *Plout.* fr. 160).

text is fragmentary, I infer that the meaning of fr.165 is that people *abstain* from meat eating, “not fighting over an ox’s jawbone.”¹⁸ This semi-vegetarian, hospitable zone represents a *standard* description of the regime of Kronos. Most importantly, goods come from the gods as “*automata*,” (Kratin. *Plout.* fr. 161)¹⁹ the same word Hesiod uses to describe the fruitfulness of the earth (*Works and Days*) and people are not “weighed down by trouble” (Kratin. *Plout.* fr. 7). Although Kratinos does not specifically refer to slaves here, the absence of any power relations is connected with the prevailing spirit of ease, bounty and equality, and is an integral element of the picture.

The opposite is the case when Kratinos does mention slaves, which re-emphasizes the fact that the ideal *polis* completely lacks them. The “slaves” of Kratinos’ *Seriphians* are identified as such because they work for wages, but they are really *nouveaux riches*, associated with an expansionist, slave-driven economic program.²⁰

... ἔς τε πόλιν δούλων, ἀνδρῶν νεοπλουτοπονήρων, ἀίσχρῶν,
-ανδροκλέων, -διονυσοκουρώνων

¹⁸ -περὶ σιαγόνος βοείας μαχόμενος.
fighting over the jawbone of an ox...(Kratin. *Plout.* fr. 165).

¹⁹ αὐτόματα τοῖσι θεὸς ἀνίει τὰγαθά.
God sent them blessings free of any toil (Kratin. *Plout.* fr. 161).

²⁰Farioli, 45. For the fragments of the old comedians I have used Rudolf Kassel and Colin Austin, *Poetae comici Graeci: (PCG)* (Berolini [Berlin], Novi Eboraci [New York]: de Gruyter, 1983), as well as Edmonds, J. M., August Meineke, Theodor Bergk, and Theodor Kock. *The Fragments of Attic Comedy* after Meineke, Bergk, and Kock. Augm., newly edited with their contexts, annotated, and completely translated into English verse. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957), as transcribed by the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*.

City of Slaves, of the wicked new rich, shameful, man-ruling, [drunk with wine].(Kratin. *Ser. Fr.* 208, cf. Eupolis 212).²¹

This comic diatribe probably indicates the Athens that was created by Pericles and slowly destroyed in the Peloponnesian War, in which foreign “*poneroi*” had a chance to become rich.²² David Rosenbloom suggests that Kratinos and Eupolis refer here to Hyperbolus the metic lamp-maker, as well as others of his ilk, who took money for crafts made in large slave workshops. “*Neoploutoponeroi*” is the term Kratinos uses to describe such unscrupulous moneymakers, whom he has cast as the perpetrators of his present-day ills. Therefore the play is a comedy not of evasion, but political satire, and the city of slaves can only be understood as rather a dystopian concept, looking nostalgically back to old times, aristocratic values and simple Spartan fare, summed up by the “the Age of Kronos.”²³ This metaphor for Athens, corrupted by the new rich and foreigners, is to be understood on an allegorical level.

In his *Chiron*, Kratinos again uses the situation of the transition of the regime of Kronos, father of Chiron, to that of Zeus.²⁴ The centaurs had once controlled

²¹ I disagree with Edmonds’ reading here. He takes “ἀίσχρῶν, ἄνδροκλέων, -διοϋσοκουρώνων” as proper names of citizens whom the playwright is lampooning.

²² David Rosenbloom, “Chrêstoi vs. Ponêroi: the Ostracism of Hyperbolos and the Struggle for Hegemony in Athens after the Death of Perikles, Part I,” *TAPA* 134, no. 1 (2004): 64.

²³ The affinity of Kratinos for aristocratic Sparta may be seen in the reference to the river of black broth, the typical Spartan mess-hall dish, in fr. 176. Also in Pherecrates’ *Persians*, the river of black broth (Pher. *Pers.* fr. 137.4) is typical of Spartan dishes, an example of the connection of Sparta with utopian concepts.

²⁴ Farioli, 54.

education, just as in the *Ploutus*, the Titans (or *Ploutoi*) used to control riches (see Kratin. *Plout.* fr. 162 a11). They were associated with the wealth of the earth coming from honest work, as opposed to Zeus giving dishonest riches.²⁵ According to Plutarch, in the *Chiron*, Zeus is identified with Pericles, and Kronos with Kimon, who gave large public banquets reminiscent of Golden Age (Plut. *Per.*10, 7). The association of Zeus with a tyrannical new regime is also present in the *Prometheus Bound* of Aeschylus, as well as the *Birds* and *Plutus* of Aristophanes. In this fashion the tale of Kronos' Golden Age acquires a conservative political application. Ironically, slaves are missing from this idealized picture, their absence once again a rote, typical element signaling the positive value of the nostalgic Age of Kronos, yet this time in the service of the aristocratic "good old days."

The comic playwright Krates, in his *Beasts*, also connects the lack of slaves with "good times." He differs from Kratinos in emphasis, since he seems more interested in fantastical imagery than good government, although he does echo an idea of Aristotle in the *Politics*. In two fragments of the *Beasts*, he makes the analogy of slaves to machines, when the protagonist commands his household objects, ordering them as if they were slaves (*Fr. At. Com.* fr. 14). In the first fragment, the gastronomic interest of automation is presented; in the second (*Fr. At. Com.* fr. 15), the idea of automation in other aspects of life is illustrated, such

²⁵ Farioli, 57.

as hot baths.²⁶ The miraculous and unexpected aspect of the scene is that there is no need for slaves; this deficiency is definitely shown in a positive light.

ἔπειτα δούλον οὐδὲ εἷς κεκτήσεται οὐδὲ δούλην.
 ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτῷ δῆτ' ἀνὴρ γέρων διακονήσει;
 τί δῆτα τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς πλεόν;
 πρόσσεισιν αὐθ' ἕκαστον τῶν σκευαρίων, ὅταν καλῆ τι. παρατίθου
 τράπεζα. λοπάς, παρασκεύαζε σαυτήν. μάττε θυλακίσκε. ἔγχει κύαθε.
 ποῦσθ' ἢ κύλιξ; διάνιζ' ἰοῦσα σαυτήν. ἀνάβαινε μᾶζα. τὴν χυτραν χρῆν
 ἐξερᾶν τὰ τεύτλα. ἰχθυ βᾶδιζ'. ἀλλ' οὐδέπω πὶ θάτερ' ὀπτος εἰμι.
 οὐκουν μεταστρέψας σεαυτὸν ἀλσι πάσεις ἀλείφων;

A) Then no one will have acquired either a male or female slave.

B) But then will even a codger have to wait on himself all by himself? How indeed will there be more for them?

A) Because each tool comes forward by itself whenever he calls it. "Place yourself, Table!" "Prepare yourself, Dish!" "Knead your bread, Trencher!" "Pour forth, Tankard!" "Where's the Cup? Come out and wash yourself!" "Rise, Bread!" "The Pot must throw up the beets." "Come on, Fish!" "But I am not cooked on the other side yet." "So, turn over, and oil up, and taste some salt." (Krates Fr. 14).

ἄλλ' ἀντίθες τοι· ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτὰ πάμπάλιν
 τὰ θερμὰ λουτρὰ πρῶτον ἄξω τοῖς ἐμοῖς
 ἐπὶ κιόνων ὥσπερ διὰ τοῦ παιωνίου
 ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης, ὥσθ' ἕκαστῳ ῥεύσεται
 εἰς τὴν πύελον. ἐρεῖ δέ, θύδωρ ἀνέχεται.
 ἔπειτ' ἀλάβαστος εὐθέως ἤξει μύρου
 αὐτόματος, ὁ σπόγγος τε καὶ τὰ σάνδαλα.

But you, give in, for first, in return, I will make hot baths for my people just as at the pillars of the healing shrine by the sea, so that each one's tub will be filled. He will say: "Water, come down!" and he will receive immediately a jar of oil, a sponge and sandals, all coming by themselves.²⁷

The roots of "automatic moving objects" are fairly common in fables and poetry as early as Homer; we have Hephaistos' mechanical assistants, and the Phaiaceans' self-sailing boats. This is the first instance, however, of outright

²⁶ The association of the aqueduct in Fr. 17 with aqueduct of Asclepius built in 420 BCE could date the play no earlier than that, but Farioli disagrees with this dating (Farioli, 64).

automata seen as a substitute for human toil.²⁸ Yet there is a sacrifice to be made for this leisure. In fr. 19, lines probably spoken by the human representative seem to indicate that no meats at all will be eaten if the given treaty between humans and beasts takes effect. Once again, this vegetarianism is characteristic of the golden age paradigm.

καὶ τῶν ῥαφάνων ἔψειν χρὴ
 ἰχθύς τ' ὀπτᾶν τοὺς τε ταρίχους, ἡμῶν δ' ἄπο χεῖρας ἔχεσθαι.
 οὐκ ἄρ' ἔτ' οὐδὲν κρέας, ὡς ὑμεῖς λέγετ', οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν ἐδόμεσθα,
 οὐδ' ἐξ ἀγορᾶς οὐδὲ τάκωνας ποιησόμεθ' οὐδ' ἀλλᾶντας;”

A) It is fine to eat cabbages and to fry fresh fish and dried, but you must keep your hands off us!

B) But is it true, as you say, that we may eat no meat? May we never bring home from the market pig-puddings and sausages? (Krat. *Beasts*, Fr. At. Com. Fr. 17)

The agreement between beasts and people states that the humans will have plenty of food and absence of toil in exchange for abstention from animal flesh. This brings up the question of whether the play is set in the Golden Age of the past, when men and beasts were friends, or if it is a contemporary, hypothetical fable. According to Farioli, vegetarianism is associated with the “*eschatoi*” of the world as well as with the uncommon virtue of utopian groups like the Pythagoreans. This can be seen therefore as a philosophic or religious satire, especially of Empedoclean, and Orphic themes.²⁹ The connection between men and beasts probably takes place in an immediate future tense, and the switch of power to beasts seems positive to men overall. If this is true, then the imagery of the age of Kronos is transferable to a different fictional time and place.

²⁸ See H. C. Baldry, "The Idler's Paradise in Attic Comedy," *Greece & Rome* 22, no. 65 (1953): 53. Baldry views this as a “traditional idea.”

²⁹ Farioli, 69.

The *Miners* (Μετᾶλλης) of Pherecrates also reflects such philosophical satire, and contains utopian elements in relation to food and sex.³⁰ The probable

³⁰ παρῆν δὲ χόνδρος γάλατι κατανεμιμένος
 Πλούτῳ δ' ἐκεῖν' ἦν πάντα συμπεφυρμένα,
 ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς πάντα τρόπον εἰργασμένα·
 ποταμοὶ μὲν ἀθάρης καὶ μέλανος ζωμοῦ πλέω
 διὰ τῶν στενωπῶν τονθολυγούντες ἔρρεον
 αὐταῖσι μυστίλαισι, καὶ ναστῶν τρύφη,^α
 ὥστ' εὐμαρῆ γε καὶ αυτομάτην τὴν ἔνθεσιν
 χωρεῖν λιπαρὰν κατὰ τοῦ λάρυγγος τοῖς νεκροῖς.
 φύσκαί δὲ καὶ ζέοντες ἀλλάντων τόμοι
 παρὰ τοῖς ποταμοῖς σίζοντ' ἐκέχυντ' ἄντ' ὄστράκων.
 καὶ μὴν παρῆν τεμάχη μὲν ἐξωπτημένα^β
 καταχυσματίοισι παντοδαποῖσιν εὐπρεπῆ,
 τεύτλοισί τ' ἐγγέλεια συγκεκαλυμμένα.
 σχελίδες δ' ὀλόκνημοι πλησίον τακερώταται
 ἐπὶ πινακίσκοις, καὶ δῖεφθ' ἀκροκώλια
 ἥδιστον ἀτμίζοντα, καὶ χόλικες βροός,^γ
 καὶ πλευρὰ δελφάκει ἐπεξανθισμένα
 χναυρότατα παρέκειτ' ἐπ' ἀμύλοις καθήμενα.
 παρῆν δὲ χόνδρος γάλατι κατανεμιμένος
 ἐν καταχύτλοις λεκάναισι καὶ πύου τόμοι.

Groats well washed with milk were there, and these things were kneaded all together for Plutus, and everything was made in every way for all the good people. Rivers of porridge and black broth flowed, gurgling through the straits with bread-spoons, and nourishments of cheesecakes, so well sweetened that they made an automatic and smooth entrance down the throats of the dead, and boiling sausages and slices of black pudding hissed, strewn alongside the rivers instead of shells. There at hand stood fried fish slices ready, dressed with all kinds of sauce, and eel cutlet covered in beet, and nearby them ribs of beef, and whole legs, melting in the mouth on trenchers, and well boiled pig trotters steaming sweetly, and ox intestines, and the daintiest pork ribs lay blooming sitting upon cakes of the finest meal. Nearby were groats snowy with milk in pans, and slices of baby meats.

— Οἴμ' ὡς ἀπολεῖς μ' ἐνταῦθα διατρίβουσ' ἔτι,^δ
 παρὸν κολυμβᾶν ὡς ἔχειτ' εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον. Τί δῆτα λέξεις τὰπίλοιπ'
 ἦνπερ πύθη;
 ὀπταὶ κίχλαι δ' ἐπὶ τοῖσδ' ἀνάβραστ' ἠρτυμέναι
 περὶ τὸ στόμ' ἐπέτοντ' ἀντιβολουσαι καταπιεῖν,
 ὑπὸ μυρρίναισι κἀνεμώναις κεχυμέναι.^ε
 τὰ δὲ μῆλ' ἐκρέματο τὰ καλὰ τῶν καλῶν ἰδεῖν
 ὑπερ κεφαλῆς, ἐξ οὐδενὸς πεφυκότα.
 κόραι δ' ἐν ἀμπεχόναις τριχάπτοις ἀρτίως

placement of the speakers in Tartarus suggests the original situation of an underworld utopia (Pher. *Miners*, Fr. 108. 21).³¹ Unlike the situation of the Eleusinian initiates of the *Frogs*, this is not an Elysium for a special few. The use of “τῶνδ’ ἕκαστος εἰ φάγοι τις ἢ πίοι...” suggests that all the dead in Hades are allowed to partake of the feast (Pher. *Miners* fr. 108. 31). This satire, primarily religious and philosophical, is concerned with painting the bizarre qualities of a utopian after-world. Similarly, in the *Tegenes* of Aristophanes we see a corresponding praise of death, wherein the underworld, run by Ploutos, is better than land of Zeus (Aristoph. *Tegenes* fr. 504, cf. Stobaeus 4. 53, 18).³²

These plays dealing with the theme of the Golden Age share a conception of a

ἤβυλλιῶσαι καὶ τὰ ῥόδα κεκαρμέναι
 πλήρεις κύλικας οἴνου μέλανος ἀνθοσμίου
 ἦντλουν διὰ χώνης τοῖσι βουλομένοις πιεῖν.
 καὶ τῶνδ’ ἕκαστος εἰ φάγοι τις ἢ πίοι,
 διπλάσι ἐγίγνετ’ εὐθύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν.
 Ὑπ’ ἀναδενδράδων ἀπαλὰς ἀσπαλάθους πατοῦντες
 ἐν λειμῶνι λωτοφόρῳ, κύπειρόν τε δροσώδη,
 κἀνθρύσκου μαλακῶν τ’ ἴων λείμακα καὶ τριφύλλου.

B) Alas, you will kill me, still wasting time here, when you have a chance to dive into Tartarus.

A) What then will you say when you hear the rest? Roasted and boiled thrushes nicely put in order, lay around our mouths, entreating us to drink, covered by myrtle leaves and anemones. Overhead, hung apples, the finest to look upon, grown from no tree.

Young girls blooming like roses in finely woven clothes poured through a funnel full cups of dark, fragrant wine for those wishing to drink. And when anyone ate or drank any of these things, instantly it was made up again, twice as much as before.

(Pher. *Miners*, Fr. 108.1-34).

³¹ The protagonist here is probably a woman, a teacher of the dead who preaches to the miners in the chorus (Farioli, 103).

³² Farioli, 27-30. Also see fr. 506, cf. Prodicus of Chios, concerning the negative attitude of Aristophanes towards philosophy and educational corruption.

world without slaves and toil, whether they place this ideal world in the afterlife, the past, or some future program. As we have seen, the author can send different messages by using the “life without *ponos*” motif, ranging from political conservatism to a mockery of radical religion, but a common thread is the absence of slavery, and overall, the life without toil is described in glowing terms. Egalitarianism may be impossible to achieve in the real world, but it is definitely a utopian quality. Equality and an absence of slaves are requisite mythological elements for any portrayal of the Age of Kronos, past, future, or otherworldly. The *topos* of the completely egalitarian society addresses contemporary real-world anxieties about hunger, labor and subservience. Although free Athenian citizens wrote these plays, they seem preoccupied with escape from servitude. This comic abolitionism is associated with the undermining of slave-owning authorities, who receive inherent mockery by contrast. At the same time, the traditionalism of the “Age of Kronos” possesses a ritualistic quality that undercuts the subversiveness of the theme of slavelessness.

The “world in reverse” comedies, on the other hand, often have to do with the exchange and transfer of slave status and political power between the dominant group (usually male citizens) and the exploited (servants, women, or animals). Just as in Orwell’s *Animal Farm*, the new society takes its basic structure from the one it has replaced. Elements of reality are therefore often retained, although warped, and thus slavery is sometimes kept on as a necessary factor.³³ This comic model, based on a reversal of power relations, including that of the master and

³³Farioli, 191.

slave, employs some of the motifs of the “Golden Age” plays, but to very different effect. This sort of structure tends to show the vicious cycle of power relations, and how one government is not necessarily superior to another. The interesting aspect of this is that these societies are satirized for their pretensions to utopia, which fall short. Good examples of this type of plot are the *Fish* of Archippus, and the *Wild-Men* of Pherecrates.³⁴

In the *Fish*, vegetarianism works as a tool of control, or punishment for humans, unlike its idealization in the *Beasts*, where it symbolizes the new concord between men and animals. The fact that people can no longer eat fish reveals their subservience to the new regime, rather than a peaceful coexistence. The state of the fish is a separate one, opposed militarily to men, but maintaining many of the same institutions. The fact that the fish practice executions, trials, and elections (Archipp. *Fish* Fr. 14-32), underlines the fact that their exercise of authority fundamentally resembles that of the Athenians.³⁵ This motif is very reminiscent

³⁴Farioli, 166.

³⁵ αἰρουμένους τε πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτας
ἀποδοκιμάζειν, πάλιν.
ἦν οὖν ποιῶμεν ταῦτα, κίνδυνος λαθεῖν
ἀπαξάπαντας γενομένους παλιναιρέτους.

And it is customary for those choosing directors of state affairs to reject them first and accept them after. If, therefore, we do things this way, we may escape notice as “those who are once-and for all chosen-before”(Fr. 14).

Ἄιγύπτιος μιαρώτατος τῶν ἰχθύων κάπηλος,
Ἑρμαιος, ὃς βία δέρων ρίνας γαλεούς τε πωλεῖ
καὶ τοὺς λάβρακας ἐντερεύων, ὡς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν.

That Egyptian, the most corrupt dealer in fish, Hermaios, who they say flays his sturgeon and pulls out the sea bass’ innards while still alive. (Fr. 20).

τοὺς μαιώτας καὶ σαπέρδας καὶ γλάνιδας

of Aristophanes' *Birds*, where the new power of the birds seems to develop along the same lines as the Athenian imperial state.

The *Wild-Men* of Pherecrates differs from other “worlds in reverse,” in that it creates a parody and inversion of a comic utopia, rather than a typical Athenian world. Plato mentions this play in *Protagoras*, taking *Wild Men* as meaning men devoid of civilized virtues. The protagonists, men who are leaving the city for a faraway “better world,” have a grim surprise in store when they encounter the “wild men” of the chorus:

οὐ γὰρ ἦν τότ' οὔτε Μάνης οὔτε Σηκίς οὐδενὶ
 δούλος, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς ἔδει μοχθεῖν ἅπαντ' ἐν οἰκίᾳ·
 εἶτα πρὸς τούτοισιν ἤλουν ὄρθρια τὰ σιτία,
 ὥστε τὴν κώμην ὑπηχεῖν θιγγανουσῶν τὰς μύλας.

No one had a slave, no Manes or Sekis, but all the women had to toil at all the household tasks. In addition, early in the morning they ground the grain so that the town rang from those working the mills (Pherecrates *Wild-Men*, fr. 10, cf. Phot. a 879).

ἐνθρύσκοισι καὶ βρακάνοις
 καὶ στραβήλοισι ζῆν· ὀπόταν δ'
 ἤδη πεινώσι σφόδρα,
 ὡσπερὶ τοὺς πουλύποδας
 νύκτωρ περιτρώ-
 γειν αὐτῶν τοὺς δακτύλους.

To live on wild olive shoots and weeds; but whenever they hunger for these with excessive pangs, just like the squid in the night to chew on their own toes (Pherecrates *Wild-Men*, Fr.13).

Here the absence of “Manes or Sekis” (common slave names), far from

ἀποδοῦναι δ' ὅσα ἔχομεν ἀλλήλων, ἡμᾶς μὲν τὰς Θράττας καὶ τὴν Ἀθερίνην αὐλητρίδα καὶ Σηπίαν τὴν Θύρσου καὶ τοὺς Τριγλίας καὶ Εὐκλείδην τὸν ἄρξαντα καὶ Ἀναγυρουντόθεν τοὺς Κορακίωνας καὶ Κωβιοῦ τοῦ Σαλαμινίου τόκον καὶ Βάτραχον τὸν πάρεδρον τὸν ἐξ Ὀρεοῦ. It is necessary for the Maiotian fish, the Nile perch, and the Sheat fish to exchange whatever each has of the others'; we Thracian ladies must return the flute girl Smelt, Sepia daughter of Thyrsus, the Mulletts, Euclides, who once ruled, and the Black Nile fishes of the Anagyryrus clan, the offspring of the Goby of Salamis, and Frog the assistant of Oreus...(Fr. 27).

representing a beautiful egalitarian ideal, represents a rough crude life which lacks luxury. Pherecrates also underscores the primitive diet of wild men, who exist primarily on “βρακάνοι” (wild herbs) and pine nuts; it is interesting to note that the vegetarian diet, associated with the happy Golden Age in other plays, is here indicative of poverty and primitivism. The negative picture of the life of the wild men could be a possible response to the idealizations of primitive man of late fifth century BCE, of which we have seen several examples in the comic fragments, as well as that of Herodotus’ discussion of early Athens, in which he states no slaves existed.³⁶ The play has many important antecedents to Aristophanes’ *Birds*, including the themes of flight from the home city, the protagonist’s hatred for humans, the decadent life of the polis, and the contrast of the rosy vision of a new life with the harsh reality of what is found. The implied conclusion of the author is that it is impossible to live out of the city; this does not mean that the polis is perfect, but rather shows ambivalence towards abandoning the city, albeit corrupt, for an unknown factor. Thus, the “utopia” that the protagonists hoped to find ends up bringing them contentment with what they had in the first place. The *Wild Men* satirizes the comic-utopian fixation on escapes, as well as the primitive ideal of the Age of Kronos itself. In its parodic form, it stays within the generic confines of comic-utopian subject matter.

In the inversion comedies predicated on the familiar Athenian world turned upside-down, power roles are commonly exchanged, upsetting the order of societal institutions normally taken for granted. This attack on authority and

³⁶ Farioli, 181; 184. Herodotus refers to a time when Athenian women had no slaves, but performed all of household tasks by themselves (Her. *Hist.* 3.137).

accepted norms is a basis for humor, and indicates the arbitrariness of who or what happens to be in power. As such, comedies of reversal have a close relationship to the egalitarian "land of Cockaigne" theme, which in their ritualistic, traditional slave-lessness; suggest that equality is not arbitrary, but primal, natural, and fundamental. Thus the two comic models complement each other, the one showing the constant struggle for power that uses the rhetoric of utopia to achieve its aims, the other that has no need to struggle, and simply exists in an iconographic state of utopian bounty.

Aristophanes

Out of Aristophanes' surviving plays, only two, the *Birds* and the *Plutus* treat the type of "return to the age of Kronos" theme that was popular among the other old comedians. Further, even in these two plays, there is a great increase in the complexity of utopian motifs and approaches to the issue of slavery. The *Birds* and *Plutus* both expand beyond the boundaries of Farioli's categories of "the land of Cockaigne" and the "world in reverse." In the *Birds* the presence of slaves undercuts the validity of several idealizing themes, resulting in a comic-utopian conundrum. In the *Plutus*, which at first glance possesses a traditional "Age of Kronos" plot, elements of "the world in reverse" appear as well. Rich become poor, slaves freed, and vice versa, and the very value of the golden age ideal becomes obscured in the perverse sophism of the debate between Wealth and Poverty.

Aristophanes' interest is not in creating comedies as vehicles for typical

themes. It is characteristic of his tendency to alternately elaborate upon and undermine generic *topoi* that he goes beyond the traditional “age of Kronos” imagery and incorporates utopian rhetoric from other fields such as politics, philosophy, and the “fringe” mythology of the Orphics. In using utopian themes as vessels for political and philosophical satire, he shares the same material and technique with his contemporary comedians. Yet Aristophanes puts many different facets of utopianism into play besides the simple “golden age of bounty” or “role reversal” approaches that Farioli suggests. In this context, he sometimes treats slavery as an anti-utopian state, and sometimes creates slaves as tools by which utopia can be attained. I would argue, however, that the characters in Aristophanes’ plays who take advantage of slaves are coded as hypocritical and weak. Nevertheless, this is a dramatic device focused more on the negative qualities of the free than the positive ones of slaves, for while Aristophanes imbues many of his slaves with an impish realism and pathos, and is interested in the quirks of fate which lead to a life of slavery versus freedom, he falls short of questioning the institution itself. He works with a slavish character that was considered “typical” as a negative standard of behavior, showing that he has internalized the prevailing stereotype of slaves as the most ignoble of people.³⁷

³⁷ At the end of the period following the extreme deprivations of the Peloponnesian War, there is a shift of interest in comedy from the public to the private, which probably results from a corresponding growth of interest in personal, rather than political activities in Athens. The comedies of Aristophanes, spanning the period of the Peloponnesian War, (431-404 BCE) certainly reflect this shift in priorities. The slave characters in Aristophanes also reflect this change. In early plays slaves often have a flexible characterization, used to lampoon political figures, whereas later they seem to reflect a more individual interest in one’s lot in life, a perspective exemplified best by Menander in his

Perhaps because of the complete absorption of this common standard, it becomes good comic material to invert it. Aristophanes gets laughs by showing free masters displaying ‘slavish’ qualities, such as cowardice, gluttony, or a propensity to mock people behind their backs, the assumption being that they, unlike their slaves, should not be acting like this. This theme, for example, is particularly prominent in Aristophanes’ *Frogs*. On the other hand, slaves make many digs at their masters from their position of ironic detachment and rationality. Yet the main dramatic interest does not lie with the slave, since the role reversals between masters and slaves do not as much suggest that a slave has noble characteristics, but that the master has slavish ones. Such qualities should disqualify anyone for citizenship in ‘serious’ utopias, but it is clear that this is not necessarily the case.

In the *Birds*, there is a focus on the power of utopias and the rhetoric of idealism to hoodwink the unsuspecting birds, as well as on the actual effects of the utopia once enacted. The treatment of slavery and other power relations is very ambiguous. For instance, the chorus attests that slaves are “welcome” as citizens in the new state (*Birds* 760-763), a statement that shows the attractiveness of the idea of slavelessness in the comic utopia. Nevertheless, this should not be taken literally, but can be interpreted as a complete inversion of the familiar habits of the *polis*. Whereas the Athenians have parricides and make a distinction between citizens, foreigners and slaves, at Cloudcuckooland there will be none of

creation of Middle-New Comedy. Throughout his works, however, Aristophanes demonstrates an interest in political idealism and utopianism. It is a debatable question from one play to another whether he actively observed the position of slaves in relation to such power structures, or simply used them as stock characters.

the former, and no distinction between the latter. Thus Aristophanes puts a profoundly shocking crime and a socially acceptable institution on the same level. In this way, the presence of slaves is both called into question, and blankly accepted.

The *Birds* also focuses on the insidious sense of entitlement to dominate and enslave that goes along with overwhelming success, a theme that profoundly subverts the value of the achievements of the birds utopia. The Athenian protagonist of the *Birds*, Pisthetairos, all but forgets his original, selfish goal to found a new litigation-free community when he adopts the new scheme to erect an all-powerful state and seize control from the gods. The birds not only succeed in gaining this sovereignty, but also become a kind of model state that mortals try to join or imitate. This achievement functions as a parodic utopian ideal, as well as a caricature of Athens and her restless imperialism. The solidarity of the birds is contrasted with litigiousness of Athens; on the other hand, as in Athens, visions of peace and plenty can intersect with imperialist desires. The date of this play, right before the failure of the Sicilian expedition, has led many scholars to conclude that it is a political allegory, but many reject the political theme, creating a lively debate around the 'politics' of the *Birds*. In my opinion, this controversy springs from the fact that political satire of Athens *is* embedded in the play, but is never allowed to overwhelm the other comic-utopian elements.

David Konstan, in *Greek Comedy and Ideology*, creates useful guidelines for unpacking the different utopian strands of the *Birds*. He posits four types of relations between a utopia and a given place in terms of its *nomoi*, an approach

that may be somewhat artificial, but avoids suffocating the complexity of the play.³⁸ Although his study is intended as a basis for interpreting the political nature of the *Birds*, it is appropriate in a utopian context also, and lends some flexibility to understanding this contradictory comedy.

Konstan's first category is *anomia*, a state that characterizes a place with no *nomoi* at all, an absolute lawlessness, and an absence of rules. In their pre-civilized state, birds lack purses, corruption, and slavery; they are *atimoi*, also *astathmetoi* (lacking fixed abode), and *atekmartoi* (without boundaries). This reveals the opposition between nature and culture, and their mysterious spatial indeterminacy. In light of this interpretation, we see that the emerging city of Cloudcuckooland has elements of pre-civilized existence that are incorporated into civic life. The freedom from want and injustice, the reconstitution of the city without its inner stresses, and the positive aspects of progress without the negative all show the utopian benefits of a simple absence of *nomos* belonging to an earlier time. To win over the birds, Pisthetairos must implant a sense of lack in them, by telling them the myth of their original power before Kronos and the Titans.³⁹ This

³⁸Konstan, David. *Greek Comedy and Ideology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 33-34.

³⁹ ΠΙ. Μὰ Δί' ἀλλὰ λέγειν ζητῶ τι πάλαι, μέγα καὶ λαρινὸν ἔπος τι, ὅ τι τὴν τούτων θραύσει ψυχὴν. Οὕτως ὑμῶν ὑπεραλγῶ, οἵτινες ὄντες πρότερον βασιλῆς—
 ΧΟ.. Ἡμεῖς βασιλῆς; τίνας;
 ΠΙ. Ὑμεῖς πάντων ὀπόσ' ἔστιν, ἐμοῦ πρῶτον, τουδί, καὶ τοῦ Διὸς αὐτοῦ, ἀρχαιότεροι πρότεροί τε Κρόνου καὶ Τιτάνων ἐγένεσθε, καὶ Γῆς.
 ΧΟ. Καὶ Γῆς;
 ΠΙ. Νῆ τὸν Ἀπόλλω.
 ΧΟ. Τουτὶ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἐπεπύσμη.
 ΠΙ. Ἀμαθῆς γὰρ ἔφυς κού πολυπράγμων, οὐδ' Αἴσωπον πεπάτηκας,

image of state of nature imbued with a pre-Olympian vision of power and domination is descriptive of the new regime of the birds. Thus slavery is absent as a *nomos*, since the birds have no power relations amongst themselves, but there is a suggestion implicit from the tale of their past that they will not be averse to enslaving others, since they once ruled the world.

Antinomia is Konstan's term for a state in which the *nomoi* are reversals or inversions of those of another existing society or structure. This is the same idea that Farioli described as "the world in reverse." According to the principle of

ὅς ἔφασκε λέγων κορυδὸν πάντων πρῶτην ὄρνιθα γενέσθαι,
 προτέραν τῆς γῆς, κάπειτα νόσω τὸν πατέρ' αὐτῆς ἀποθνήσκειν·
 γῆν δ' οὐκ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ προκείσθαι πεμπταῖον· τὴν δ' ἀπορούσαν
 ὑπ' ἀμηχανίας τὸν πατέρ' αὐτῆς ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ κατορύξει.

EY. Ὁ πατήρ ἄρα τῆς κορυδοῦ νυνὶ κείται τεθνεώς Κεφαλῆσιν.

ΠΙ. Οὐκ οὖν δῆτ' εἰ πρότεροι μὲν γῆς, πρότεροι δὲ θεῶν ἐγένοντο,
 ὡς πρεσβυτάτων ὄντων αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς ἐστ' ἡ βασιλεία;

EY. Νῆ τὸν Ἀπόλλω. Πάνυ τοίνυν χρὴ ῥύγχος βόσκειν σε τὸ λοιπόν·
 οὐκ ἀποδώσει ταχέως ὁ Ζεὺς τὸ σκῆπτρον τῷ δρυκολάπτῃ.

Pisth.) But, by Zeus, I wish to speak something about times of old, and it is a big fat tale, which will shatter their spirit. How I grieve for you, who once before were kings

Chorus) We, Kings? Of what?

Pisth.) You were kings of everything there is, of me, first, and of this man here, and of Zeus himself, and you were even more ancient than Kronos, the Titans, and the Earth.

Chorus) Even than Earth?

Pisth.) Yes, By Apollo.

Chorus) This, by Zeus, I didn't know.

Pisth.) That's because you are ignorant and not energetic, nor have you gone over your Aesop, who told the tale that the Crested Lark was the first bird of all, before the Earth, and then her father died from disease, but the earth still didn't exist, but he was laid out until the fifth day. But she, being at a loss, for lack of anything else to do, buried her father in her head.

Eu.) Then the lark's father now lies dead in Kephale!

Pisth.) Therefore indeed if they preceded both the Earth and the Gods, is kingship not rightly theirs, since they are older.

Eu.) By Apollo, it is very important for you to maintain your beak from now on. For Zeus will not soon return the scepter to a woodpecker (Aristoph. *Birds* 465-82).

antinomia, all the things that are ruled out as shameful according to the *nomoi* of Athens are the very things that are considered virtuous among the birds (*Birds* 755-6). For instance, the fact that slaves, foreigners and *atimoi* are all welcome (*Birds* 766), creates a suspension of status distinctions. Therefore, a disenfranchised slave could become a citizen in Clouducuckooland, reinforcing an egalitarian conception of society, yet there is no positive logic behind the inclusion of slaves.

Eunomia denotes a state in which laws and conventions are imagined as just or excellent. This viewpoint integrates the positive values from one's own culture. For instance, when a father-beater shows up (*Birds* 757), Pisthetairos tells him that the young birds maintain the custom of caring for a parent after they leave the nest, indicating a shift from the spirit of contrariness to one of traditional order. The ready obedience to custom and deference to station and degree also indicate *eunomia*. In a sense, the birds are old-fashioned believers in their ancestral constitution, good legislation, and a spirit of respect for their legacy from former times. This all adds up to solidarity among them, with their aggression focused outwards. Given the birds' respect for authority and order, the fact that slaves can join this new regime as undifferentiated equals seems contradictory, but this problem is reconcilable by the idea of selectivity of *nomos*, a technique in which the author takes the positive traditions from a society and excludes the negative. The dystopian associations of slavery in the fragments of the other Old Comedians support the idea that it would also be considered a negative institution here.

Megalonomia, Konstan's final paradigm of the *Birds*, describes the utopia's tendency to exceed all limits. This is a quantitative rather than qualitative state, not better, but just grander than its model; a utopian type that lends itself easily to satire. The principle of *megalonomia* strikes at the core of the main thematic schism of the *Birds*. Once Pisthetairos begins ruling the birds, they are affected with new desires for rule over the universe (*Birds* 548-9, 637-38). In this sense, the birds, diverging from their beginnings as a non-slave state, are well on their way to becoming the greatest slavers of all. This sudden, passionate will to dominate arises when the birds are reminded of their ancestral powers, yet at the same time, it represents the infectious ambitions of an Athenian imperialist. In other words, the plot of the *Birds* makes of these thematic strands excessive or megalonomic, both the typical "age of Kronos" *topos*, as well as the critique of contemporary conditions embodied in the pleonexia of Pisthetairos.

These various different utopian themes undercut and neutralize each other, creating interplay of consciously utopian approaches. For instance, the new regime, originally conceived as the selfish, private scheme of Pisthetairos (the "trustworthy friend") supposedly inaugurates a return to the Golden Age for everyone. In a long choral ode (Aristoph. *Birds* 685-740), the new bird-rulers promise they will confer an earthly paradise on men in exchange for their sovereignty, supporting commerce, navigation and mineral wealth. Ironically, these are all modern inventions traditionally associated in general with decline of innocence and natural virtue and in particular with slavery. Pisthetairos has used the persuasive powers of the myth of the Age of Kronos to set himself up as a tyrant.

This is clear when we see him at the end, roasting birds who were “political criminals.” He has created a new state on a premise of utopian egalitarianism, and in support of his servile perspective, unscrupulously employs these principles because of their great popular appeal, attested by their repeated usage in other comedies. Pisthetairos creates a dystopia from a variety of utopian ingredients. Thus, the rule of the birds represents a return to the golden age yet also a fallen state; the birds form a city in order to reclaim their heritage, and mark their territory to define what they will conquer. The politics of the city of birds are clearly inconsistent, as is the utopian reading, sending a contradictory message about the nature of slavery and equality. So many approaches to idealism, including Orphic themes, the ideal philosopher’s city, the technological imperialism of the Athenians, as well as traditional values, together create a utopia that avoids being pinned down by a simple construct, unlike the more generic golden age themes Krates or Kratinos use. This is characteristic of Aristophanes’ avoidance and mockery of his peers’ straightforward approaches to slavery and utopia.

Unlike the *Birds*, the *Plutus*, appropriately, accepts wealth and riches as the main criterion for the attainment of an ideal society, and at the same time, addresses the role of money in creating the difference between masters and slaves.⁴⁰ Further, Aristophanes shows that the slave is on the same emotional

⁴⁰ The *Plutus* is a play that has been overlooked as indicative of Aristophanes’ waning powers, citing its lack of truly dramatic conflict, and of plot consistency (see Sommerstein, 190; 210 ; David, 1 n.1). The play certainly does lack conflict, as none of the main actions that take place in the play encounters any serious resistance. There has also been much critical defense for this play. Several

continuum as other men. The theme of a return to wealth is traditional and iconographic; Aristophanes simply describes it from an unusual viewpoint, one that epitomizes the servile perspective. Nevertheless, the *Plutus* is rare in that it actually addresses the issue of enslavement and discusses its effects, whereas often slaves in Aristophanes' works do not necessarily signify anything about the state of slavery itself, but rather their presence makes a statement about the social content of their milieu. Connecting poverty and hunger, Aristophanes has taken the "abundant food" theme so popular in early comedy and given it a dimension

scholars, all of whom use some unconventional methods, or arrive at new conclusions, have attempted to create new grounds of interpretation for the *Plutus*, which relate in different ways to concepts of slavery and the ideal life (see David Konstan, Ephraim David, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, James McGlew, Douglas S. Olson). For instance, David sees the later plays of Aristophanes, in particular the *Ecclesiazusae* and *Plutus* as often maligned and neglected, but primarily as historical sources. David wants to rehabilitate these plays by showing that they do in fact have a significant social message. Both plays are based on the theme of salvation from poverty, and their descriptions of poverty are so vivid as to give the impression that poverty was an immediate concern of many Athenians. See Ephraim David, *Aristophanes and Athenian society of the early fourth century B.C* (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 2. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, in his article, "The Political Outlook of Aristophanes," believes Aristophanes was a man of vigorous conservative "Cimonian" views, meaning anti-war, and aristocratic; also, that he did in fact make political statements of his views. On the other hand, Sommerstein in "Aristophanes and the Demon Poverty" makes a case for the idea that Aristophanes underwent a great change in attitude towards the rich versus the poor near the end of his life, suggesting that Aristophanes had been impoverished following the loss of his estate in Aegina, and lost respect for the 'kaloi kagathoi' after the behavior of the 30 Tyrants in 404 (Sommerstein: 265). Finally, after the restitution of democracy, he saw the grinding impoverishment of the peasant classes he had held dear in the past, and changed his tune to support the poor instead of the wealthy. Sommerstein, who is negative about the play's good qualities on the whole, believes that the multiplicity of different interpretations of the *Plutus* reflect a certain desire on the part of scholars for the inconsistencies of Aristophanes to have real significance. See G. E. M. de Ste Croix, "The Political Outlook of Aristophanes," in *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London: 1972), 374; and A. H. Sommerstein, "Aristophanes and the Demon Poverty," *The Classical Quarterly, New Series* 34, no. 2 (1984).

as a tool of political coercion and temptation. Aristophanes' interest in food, hunger and poverty are linked with a focus on slavery, as the enslavement of Karion probably reflects the reality of debt slavery in Greece. This intersection of ideas must be understood in the context of Aristophanes' contemporary Athenians, in whose approach to money and material goods wealth was bound up with the idea of *autarkeia*, and the receipt of wages was tantamount to slavery. Thus, the eradication of poverty would mean the end of debt slavery as well.⁴¹

The attacks on the wealthy throughout the play are indicative of the hostility felt for the rich in Athens at the time, especially for the nouveaux riches. For instance, Isokrates indicates that the attitude towards rich had grown more negative at the end of the Peloponnesian War (Isok. *Antid.* 159-60).⁴² Thus the characters of the

⁴¹David, 16.

⁴²See Alexander Fuks on the significance of the great and widening divide between rich and poor in the 4th Century BCE, in his article, "Isocrates and the social economic situation in Greece" *AncSoc* 3 (1972) 17-44. The locus of Fuk's discussion centers around the following passage from the *Antidosis*:

Ἐνθυμούμαι δὲ μεταξύ λέγων ὅσον τὰ τῆς πόλεως
 μεταπέπτωκεν, καὶ τὰς διανοίας ὡς οὐδὲν ὁμοίας περὶ τῶν
 πραγμάτων οἱ νῦν τοῖς πρότερον πολιτευομένοις ἔχουσιν.
 Ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ παῖς ἦν, οὕτως ἐνομίζετο τὸ πλουτεῖν
 ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ σεμνὸν ὥστ' ὀλίγου δεῖν πάντες προσε-
 ποιῶντο πλείω κεκτήσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν ἣς ἔχοντες ἐτύχχα-
 νον, βουλόμενοι μετασχεῖν τῆς δόξης ταύτης· νῦν
 δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ πλουτεῖν ὡσπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἀδικημάτων
 ἀπολογίαν δεῖ παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ σκοπεῖν, εἰ μέλλει τις
 σωθῆσεσθαι. Πολὺ γὰρ δεινότερον καθέστηκεν τὸ δοκεῖν
 εὐπορεῖν ἢ τὸ φανερώς ἀδικεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἢ συγγνώμης
 ἔτυχον ἢ μικροῖς ἐζημιώθησαν, οἱ δ' ἄρδην ἀπόλλυνται, καὶ
 πλείους ἂν εὐροίμεν τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐκπεπτωκότας ἢ
 τοὺς δίκην ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων δεδωκότας.

I am struck, while talking, by how great a change has befallen the city, and how there is nothing like the same state of mind concerning affairs now as there was among the former citizens. For when I was a child, to get wealthy was so safe and respectable that almost everyone pretended to have acquired more property than

Plutus stand in relation to wealth according to their independence of financial concerns, and the potential for the loss of self-sufficiency is as ominous as loss of freedom; in fact, the two represent a continuum of loss culminating in enslavement.

A fundamental problem at the heart of this play ultimately does not receive a logical resolution. Aristophanes introduces ideological conflicts, such as that of wealth attained justly as opposed to unjustly, of the benefits of poverty over riches, and the role reversals of slaves and masters, and in effect, declares the victors while giving the losers a better case in the central agon of the play. The upshot is that the side of *Plutus* wins the battle unthinkingly and automatically, but victory is undermined by the logical arguments of the opposing faction. In this way, Aristophanes offers arguments that subvert the traditional “golden age” comic topos, and by overriding these, forces his characters to remain within the inverted system of the comic state. As in the *Birds*, the action does not at any point entirely undermine or support the typical, ritual theme of the Age of Kronos ideal. The treatment of slavery in the play is a good example of this phenomenon, since slavery is questioned as an aspect of unjust poverty, yet ultimately is kept on in the new society. In the fragments of the old comedians, on the other hand, the

he really happened to have, wishing to share in this good reputation. Now, if anyone would even be safe, he must prepare and investigate a thorough defense-speech against being rich, as if it belonged to the category of the greatest of crimes. Much more risky it is to appear to be doing well, than to clearly do wrong. For those who do the latter receive amnesty, or are punished in small ways, while those who do the former are destroyed completely. We might find more men who have lost their property than who have payed the penalty for their crimes. (Isokr. *Antid.*15.159-160).

retention of slavery in the ideal society generally signifies a dystopian, or inverted state. There are certain elements of this satirical approach in the *Plutus*, but there is also a sense that the traditional “return of the Age of Kronos” theme wins out in the end. Thus Aristophanes uses the “layering” technique familiar from the *Birds*, gathering his implicit utopian critique around the issues of slavery and poverty.

Karion, the slave of the protagonist Chremylos, receives a divided treatment in the *Plutus*. Although he elicits sympathy because of his combined plight of poverty and slavery, he exhibits many of the negative values associated with slavery, such as gluttony and thievery. In a recent article, “Cario and the New World of Aristophanes' *Plutus*,” Douglas Olson points out certain negatively coded aspects of Karion’s behavior, such as his “light handedness,” (*Plutus* 27, 318-21) and gluttony (*Plutus* 188-92). In general, Olson sees Karion’s behavior as “typically slavish,” finding it implicit of the criticism of Wealth’s new regime, that he treats Chremylos and Karion to a similar reward.⁴³ The very fact that such a one as Karion can benefit from *Plutus*’ rulership may be a strike against it. Yet the major role he plays is unusual for a slave character of old comedy, and in fact he his plot-driving activities foreshadow those of a Plautine slave. The question remains whether this represents a master-slave role reversal.

Karion delivers the opening speech of the play, highlighting the resignation to fate that is necessary on the slave’s part, rather than any revolutionary zeal, yet he does show resentment at being forced to serve. Far from being a submissive slave,

⁴³Douglas S. Olson, “Cario and the New World of Aristophanes' *Plutus*,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 119 (1989): 193.

throughout the rest of the play Karion argues with several different characters, and has a drawn out agon with the chorus. Nevertheless, when Aristophanes allows Karion to bewail his plight of slavery convincingly, he shows himself as a man affected by the same forces of wealth and poverty as everyone. This speech reflects a contemporary political problem: that the growing dependence of the Athenians on money lies behind their increasingly precarious state, as more and more people are enslaved for debt. Thus, Karion introduces a starting point for a utopian train of thought: lack of wealth is behind the enslavement of many. Some, however, deserve their poverty more than others.

In spite of the play's traditional theme of the return of the golden age, there is not a strain of utopianism suggesting there will not be any slaves. Instead, who these slaves will be is re-determined, since all the characters and events of the play are coded in terms of how well they handle the "new wealth." When Plutus is healed by Asclepius, the feast and fine furnishings which appear within Chremylus' house are described as a type of Golden Age bounty (*Plutus* 804-5). After this symbolic action by the reinstated god of Wealth, it is said that injustice no longer has anything to do with the acquisition of riches.⁴⁴ This new rule is made clear in the contrast between those who engage in useful labor as opposed to those who exploit the apparatus of the state (*Plutus* 900-906). For instance, a sycophant can't profit from peace and plenty because he can't envisage a life as

⁴⁴ Hunger and food function as punishment and incentives in Aristophanes. For instance, Praxagora knows that the best way to get support for her program is promises of abundant food (*Eccl.* 676-90), and after Wealth regains sight in the *Plutus*, the undeserving are punished with hunger.

an “ἄεργος” (*Plutus* 921). Olson sees it as significant that Karion is driven out of his master’s house, blinded by the sacrificial smoke (*Plutus* 802-821), although there is a great banquet inside. According to Olson, this is the event that triggers a radical change in Karion, from a good-for nothing, lazy thief, to a loyal, submissive slave.⁴⁵ Blindness is an appropriate punishment for the saucy slave, as it echoes the blindness of Plutus himself. At the end of the play, Hermes joins the household of Chremylus, and Karion gives him a task proper to a slave: washing off the offals for the Master’s dinner (*Plutus* 1170). There is a clear switch of roles here, with the slave newly empowered, versus the humbled god. Thus slaves and work paradoxically persist, in spite of the alterations of power structures. It seems that the new order of society has merely rearranged, not abolished power relations based on wealth.⁴⁶

The healing of Plutus is the signal for this new age of prosperity, and his recovery of the power of sight indicates his overall power in the world and shifts the plot from theme of the proper distribution of wealth to that of the Golden Age itself.⁴⁷ Essentially, this dramatic strategy is conservative and apolitical,

⁴⁵ Olson: 197.

⁴⁶Paul Cartledge, *Aristophanes and his theatre of the absurd*, Classical world series. (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1995), 54.

⁴⁷David Konstan, *Greek comedy and ideology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Konstan, as he does in his examination of the *Aves*, creates an external literary construct by which to understand the *Plutus*, suggesting that although it is similar to a general pattern of Aristophanes’ utopian plots, there is a thematic tension between two different conceptions of want and sufficiency (Konstan [1995], 75). First, Aristophanes represents wealth and poverty as a result of unequal distribution, in which the rich are equivalent to the dishonest, and the poor to the honest. Second, he suggests a notion of universal scarcity, which

displacing the real social problems of unequal distribution with a vision of communal solidarity and nostalgia. As in Kratinos' Seriphians, the reign of Zeus is considered a time of hardship for men, as opposed to the Eden-like regime of Plutus. A defense of Zeus is put into the mouth of Penia, who explains the positive aspects of poverty in terms very similar to Hesiod's "good eris" (*Works and Days*) as self-discipline, creativity, strength, ambition, etc. (*Plutus* 510-561). Ironically, this is similar to what Chremylus has already said about those whom Plutus himself will reward (*Plutus* 160-161). The fact that the two agonists' views reach the same conclusion based on opposite principles points out an ambiguity in the text, and possibly a fundamental discomfort in the play with the idea of Golden Age bliss.

James McGlew promotes the theory that the apparently ambiguous argument of Penia and Chremylus in fact represents Aristophanes' celebration of the integrity of comic fantasy.⁴⁸ He argues that Aristophanes creates the character of Penia as a sort of evil specter who represents the harsh and negative aspects of reality, and although her arguments may be cogent, the laws of comic utopia must overthrow her. McGlew believes the audience would have fully expected this, and only been surprised by the manner of Penia's defeat. He makes a good case for

causes all to be more or less poor. The solution to the first problem is a programmatic redistribution, to the second, a general improvement in resources that represents a reinstatement of the Golden Age. Overall, Konstan doesn't treat such contradictions relating to poverty and wealth as flaws in the *Plutus*, rather as "literary over-determination of motives." (Ibid., 96) This theory would indicate a sort of purposeful confusion of the message in the play, with simultaneous contradictory conclusions.

⁴⁸ James McGlew, "After Irony: Aristophanes' Wealth and Its Modern Interpreters" *The American Journal of Philology* 118, no. 1 (1997): 36.

the representation of Penia as a sort of comic bugbear, a character who functions as a necessary antagonist to the prevailing spirit of Kronian fantasy and good humor. Yet it is too extreme to dismiss the elements of utopian satire from the *Plutus* as simply the foil to a typical theme, when so many contradictory motifs abound in the text.

The debate of Chremylus and Penia is the central argument of the play, yet they argue at cross-purposes. Chremylus has supported the distribution of wealth based on virtue, whereas Penia makes general case for the advantages of poverty, and basically denies the fact of unequal distribution, instead positing universal scarcity as the cause of human ills. Ultimately, Penia's case rests on an appreciation of a moral position in contrast to decadence, whereas *Plutus'* power is based on the worship of decadence. Chremylus is defeated by Penia in argument, but rejects her nevertheless, implying a victory of materialism over logic. In other plays of Aristophanes, such as in the argument of the right and wrong "logics" in the *Clouds* (277), it seems clear that the loser in an agon is not necessarily wrong, or bad, but just cannot argue as effectively as the winner.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, there is an implied censure of materialism here, as we see in the

⁴⁹According to David, it is difficult to find any non-comedic sources for the utopian ideas in Aristophanes (David, 22). It is not likely that these ideas are taken from Plato's *Republic*. Plato's communism, so very anti-materialistic, is different indeed from the glut of material riches imagined by Aristophanes. Yet these were ideas "in the air" at Athens. In the *Plutus*, salvation plays a broad role, since all mankind is to be saved from poverty; even the priest of Zeus Soter at the end of the play abandons Zeus to join new regime. These concepts of "salvation" could stem from radical democracy or from "Laconizers," both of which involve the idea of the redistribution of property. To David, the communal theme, a parody of Sparta, loses its basic austerity when adapted to Athenian hedonism in the *Ecclesiazusae*, becoming a *reductio ad absurdum* of sexual communism (David, 25).

mockery of the transformation of the political function of government to a gastronomic one. This tension is evident in the mixed message of the *Plutus*. On the one hand, Penia wins the debate with Chremylus in terms of ‘virtuous logic,’ representing a middle of the road ideal between surfeit and want. Chremylus certainly acts with courage in his convictions by kicking Penia out, as if he is also kicking out the quibbles of her logical argument in favor of embracing plenty. This rejection of logic and a moral basis for behavior represents the traditional comedic exposition of the servile perspective. The strength of Penia’s arguments reveals Aristophanes’ tendency to subvert the usual endorsement of automatic golden age plenty. On the other hand, in the genre of comedy it is necessary to have a big utopian banquet at the end of the play.

Mary Douglas, and Conclusions on Aristophanes and Old Comedy

Mary Douglas, in her study on the subversive, anti-authoritarian effects of humor, promotes the theory that almost all humor requires a tacitly understood social context to achieve its effects properly. A joke overturns this understood background of culture and convention, in the process liberating not only the individual from authority, but society itself from its irrevocable patterns.⁵⁰ As she says, “the joke rarely lies in the utterance alone, and can only be understood with reference to the total social situation.”⁵¹ Douglas also spells out the opposition of

⁵⁰ Mary Douglas, "Jokes," in *Implicit meanings: essays in anthropology* (London ; Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1975), 90-114.

⁵¹ Douglas’ view is shared by Umberto Eco, who says, “the tacit suppression of the violated norm is essential to the comic” (Umberto Eco, "The Comic and the Rule," *Travels in Hyper Reality: Essays, San Diego* [1986]: 272).

jokes to rituals. She suggests that organized religious rites affirm the existence and the symbiotic relationship of social structure and the authority that supports. Jokes, on the other hand, undermine rules and regulations. As Douglas says, jokes can “connect widely different fields, but the connection destroys hierarchy and order. They do not affirm the dominant values, but denigrate and devalue...The message of a standard rite is that the social patterns of life are inescapable. The message of a joke is that they are escapable, for a joke implies that anything is possible.”⁵²

The application of Douglas’ theory to the topic of Old Comedy immediately generates a problem. Old Comedy is full of jokes and humor, extremely subversive humor at that, yet at the same time constitutes religious ritual itself. The elements of role reversal of slaves and masters, and the inversion of expectations in comic utopias certainly achieve the effect that Douglas discusses, reversing the value of accepted *nomoi* in Greek culture, and certainly exceeding the range of mundane possibilities. Yet at the same time, the religious function of this humor requires incorporation into a dramatic context, such as the Dionysia (Greater and Lesser), or into rituals such as the Kronia. Old Comedy unites the two elements that Douglas believes function at opposite ends of the spectrum. In a sense, the “festivals of inversion” like the Kronia or Dionysia, or the traditional legends of the Age of Kronos, whether ensconced in the nostalgic past or

⁵² Douglas, 311-14, 323. A problem with Douglas’ theory is that she ignores the possibility that humor can be used in the service of the dominant culture and can back the interests of authority just as much as that of society’s oppressed. A case in point is a racist joke, for instance.

unattainable future, create a “safe” space in which ritual can buffer the otherwise dangerous or even revolutionary results of laughing at authority. Thus, in the world of Old Comedy, the utopian fantasy of liberation from slavery can be indulged, without consequences. By introducing utopian elements that fall outside of the traditional comedic subject matter, Aristophanes often comes dangerously close to violating the safety of the ritual space, and thus his humor can cut close to the bone of real political criticism.

The “age of Kronos” theme present in the *Birds* and *Plutus* represents a deeply rooted utopian tradition we have seen in the fragments of the old comedians, and remains a driving force in the creation of Aristophanes’ plot. Yet he incorporates utopian conceptions from outside of the purely comic tradition, and sets all these motifs at odds with each other. Without relying on a particular utopian formula, he combines as many of them together as he can. This creates an uncomfortably thin impression of nostalgic Golden Age satisfaction, with underlying arguments peering through that undermine the very basis of the self-indulgent, physically gratifying ideal-seeking that embodies the servile perspective. Additionally, the individualism of his utopia-seeking protagonists reflects a departure from the traditional “Age of Kronos” ideal, which included a whole *genos* or *polis*, rather than one self-interested citizen. In this way, Aristophanes anticipates the domestic, private orientation of Middle Comedy, but even more importantly, the extreme solipsism of the Cynics.

Chapter Three: Cynicism : Slavery, Freedom and Comedy

The context of comedic drama and religious ritual, as well as the unattainability of the canonical utopia offer a certain protection from the rhetoric of liberation that permeates the material of Old Comedy. The Cynic movement, on the other hand, which gives rise to the model of the solitary, indigent philosopher who critiques his or her society by means of aphoristic jokes, falls outside of the confines of religious tradition. Further, this character even dismisses ritual as meaningless, cultural tripe, *nomos* as opposed to *phusis*. Yet the Cynic corpus shares with Old Comedy a propensity to create the same sort of “safe” space for subversive humor within the role of the Cynic himself, who places himself outside the boundaries of acceptable civilized conventions, rituals, and *nomoi*, and therefore is able to speak about them as an outsider.⁵³ At the

⁵³ Foremost of the Cynic “Virtues” or objectives are ἐλευθερία, or freedom, and *amathia*, or ignorance. In its original definition, ἐλευθερία meant the manumission of a slave by his master. Eventually this gets extended to the sovereignty of states, or the fact that they are not subject to others in terms of tribute or political subjection, a meaning of this word often seen in Thucydides, for instance. The Cynic ἐλευθερία, in turn, comes to have the sense of “license,” or the willingness to say or do what may be considered gross or inappropriate, or even politically dangerous. Those, on the other hand, who fear the judgement of society in their conversation, are really nothing but slaves. The slavery of appetites was an important theme as well; for instance, Philo Alexandrinus laughs at men who are manumitted and think themselves free, but then are compelled by their impulses to consume wine, food, sex, etc., instead of obeying masters. The Cynic *askesis* (hardening, self-examination) was a process of educating the body in *karteria*, so as to eventually achieve self-sufficiency, or *autarkeia* –the idea being to want as little as possible. For this objective more than any others the Cynics were decried for hypocrisy, since although they said they did not need anyone or anything, they were recognized as parasites of working people. Some of the central ideas of Diogenes’ Cynicism: 1: Nature provides a norm observable in animals. 2: Society is at odds with Nature, therefore its values are false and counterproductive. 3: Humans can realize their nature only through corporeal

same time, the iconoclastic and critical Cynic humor attacked authority all the more severely in that it did not exist in the buffer zone of ritual. The Cynics created a new type of buffer zone for themselves: the role of the extreme eccentric jester, the prototype of the fool.

The Cynics may seem out of place in a chapter focused on comedy, as they were philosophers, not comedians, and were real people, not fictional characters. Diogenes Laertius' anecdotal style is usually an impediment to understanding philosophy, but in the case of his *Life of Diogenes of Sinope's* it works well, since aphorism and anecdote are main vessels of "the Dog's" thought. Unlike any other ancient philosophers, the Cynics depended on the tools of comedy. With ἐλευθερία and παρρησία as their central goals, they represent the servile perspective which uses humor as its primary vehicle of transmission. Literature on the Cynics reflects their predilection for snappy one-liners and clever remarks that would not be out of place in a comic *stichomachia*. Likewise, the Cynics also base their comedy on literary parodies, just as the Old Comedians would refer to each other's works, and comment on literature from other genres. Krates' parody of Solon's famous hymn to the Muses, substituting "constant fodder for his belly" for "prosperity and good reputation among all men" is a good example of the sort of cross-genre combinations the Cynics would create for satirical purposes.

(Krates, Fr. 1 Diehl). The short, pithy aphorism is another Cynic favorite, which

askesis 4: Goal of *askesis* is *autarkeia*, bringing happiness. 5: Cynic freedom is negative on the whole, but also active, in tradition of "defacing" tradition, and *parhessia*. See the introduction to *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy*, ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie Odile Goulet-Caze: University of California Press Berkeley CA (1996), 9.

resembles the brevity and attack of comic dialogue. Diogenes' aphorisms in particular can be characterized by a dark humor reliance on the element of surprise necessary for a good punch line. Yet these jokes are delivered from a stance of moral superiority that is superficially at odds with the physical ridiculousness and obscenity of the Cynics, and represents a divergence from the tradition of Old Comedy. This combination of serious and frivolous attitudes led eventually to the Cynic-centered genre of the *spoudaiogeloion*.⁵⁴

Over time, the image of the Cynic sage became a typical, even “novelized” character, with attributes so iconographic that he could instantly be recognized. The wallet, staff and raggedy cloak were only the external features of the Cynic sage; his rough-hewn manners and scathing commentary on hypocrisy were even more fundamental to his characterization. It is because this typology was so easy to recognize, like the *topos* of the “Age of Kronos” itself, that there are so many portrayals of Diogenes and other Cynics in extra-philosophical genres, since many different writers appropriated them for their particular literary aims. The Cynics are the most comic of all philosophers, since they undermine authority, including that of philosophy itself, while still maintaining its stamp. In one passage from his *Life* by Diogenes Laertius, “the Dog” reveals a comedic grasp on his contemporary philosophical jargon and terminology by his readiness to pun

⁵⁴ The “serio-comic” style, as exemplified by the writings of Menippus of Gadara, also known as the “Menippean Satire” became a highly popular literary form in the Roman Empire, and was highly influential on other satirical forms. Seneca writes Menippean satire in the *Apocolocyntosis*, and Lucian in the *Necumantia* and *Icaromenippus*. A useful article on Menippus is Joel C. Relihan’s “Menippus in Antiquity and the Renaissance” in *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (1996), 265-293.

and play on it, for instance, calling Plato's "*diatribe* (a serious argument) a *katatribe* (waste of time), and σχολή (leisure) χολή (bile). Yet he is not completely opposed to philosophers inasmuch as their practical function makes them useful, like the pilots of ships, for example, but dislikes them for their resemblance to hucksters who play on people's foolishness to attain wealth:

Δεινός τ' ἦν κατασοβαρεύσασθαι τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολὴν ἔλεγε χολήν, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβὴν κατατριβήν, τοὺς δὲ Διονυσιακοὺς ἀγῶνας μεγάλα θαύματα μωροῖς ἔλεγε καὶ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ὄχλου διακόνους. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ὡς ὅταν μὲν ἴδη κυβερνήτας ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φιλοσόφους, συνετώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων νομίζειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ὅταν δὲ πάλιν ὄνειροκρίτας καὶ μάντις καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας τούτοις ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ δόξῃ καὶ πλούτῳ πεφυσμημένους, οὐδὲν ματαιότερον νομίζειν ἀνθρώπου. συνεχῆς τε ἔλεγεν εἰς τὸν βίον παρεσκευάσθαι δεῖν λόγον ἢ βρόχον.

He was quite formidable at heaping verbal abuses on others. He called the school of Euclides "bile" (*schole/chole*) and he called Plato's discussions "wastes of time" (*diatribe/katatribe*). He said the Dionysiac games were amazing marvels for idiots, and he said that demagogues were the servants of the crowd. He said that when on the one hand he saw ships' captains, doctors, and philosophers in this life, he thought man was the most clever of all living things, but when, again, he saw the dream interpreters and prophets, and those paying attention to their opinions, and those engorged with wealth, he thought nothing more useless than a human. He said that for life, it was necessary to prepare oneself either a reason, or a bridle. (Diog. Laert. *Life of Diog.* 6.24.4-25.1)

Even non-Cynic authors utilized the Cynic philosopher as a character in their writings, and focused on their typical freedom loving and subversiveness. Thus Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1.8-13) depicts Aristippus as saying he doesn't want to be one of the ruled (a slave) or one of rulers, for he prefers the middle path of "ἐλευθερία." In the interest of this goal, he advocates idleness, irresponsibility, indifference to others and statelessness.⁵⁵ He is, of course, happy about being

⁵⁵ See John L. Moles, in "Cynic Cosmopolitanism" in *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (1996). Moles discusses the issue of whether Cynic cosmopolitanism could have positive aspects as well, asking "Do the Cynics think

exiled from Cyrene (*Gnomologium Vaticanum* 28). In this fashion, Xenophon, a politically and civically committed thinker, has created in Aristippus a character with many Cynic aspects, functioning as a foil to Socrates' views on social responsibility. Ironically, although the historical Aristippus does seem to have shared certain characteristics with the Cynics, his hedonistic views invited a rebuttal from Krates, who wished to counter his argument that momentary pleasure was the highest good, by a redefinition of pleasure as the absence of pain.⁵⁶ This emphasizes the fact that Xenophon created Aristippus' character in the *Memorabilia* as a vehicle for Cynic views.

On the other hand, Antisthenes is often associated with the Cynic ideology and Diogenes in the tales told of him, but also is frequently invested with a Socratic identity that opposes many Cynic characteristics. The controversy over whether

the *polis* is “against nature, and is cosmopolitanism negative in rejecting the polis?” (Moles, 107) Moles finds that the Aristippus is a much more “negative” character than Diogenes, and contrasts the former's statelessness and identification with the ξενός with the later's “cosmopolitanism.” He finds some positive aspects in the role of Cynic sage as *didaskalos*, and mediator between men and gods (Moles, 117), as well as the fact that his cosmopolitan nature giving him greater freedom, and a potential kinship to everyone (Moles, 118). Moles takes his material from Diogenes Laertius (*Vit. phil.* 6.63, 6.72, 6.38).

⁵⁶See Gabriele Giannantoni, *Socraticorum reliquiae*, 4 vols. ([Naples, Italy]: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1983), vol. 2 V H 44. There is a fundamental paradox inherent in early Cynic belief, for the Cynics waged war against Pleasure, at the same time saying they led a life more pleasurable than any other (Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 6.71). This can be interpreted as the redefinition of pleasure as satisfaction with bare essentials, and the absence of pain, rather than an ambitious seeking for the finest wares. Likewise, whereas traditional Greek virtues are on the whole positive, concerned with what contribution one can make to the community, Cynic ‘virtues’ are negative, designed to remove one as much as possible from any public role, to facilitate a focus on complete individuality. See A.A. Long, “The Socratic Tradition,” in *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (1996), 44.

Antisthenes was really more of an important forerunner to Cynicism rather than the first Cynic is should be secondary in importance in our discussion to the fact that he seems to be a model for the Cynics, and as such, a novelized character of Cynic fables.⁵⁷ His belief that virtue is empirical and does not require a lot of discourses and learning does correspond with the credo commonly associated with Cynicism:

τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων. αὐτάρκη τ' εἶναι τὸν σοφόν·

He also looked upon virtue as consisting of deeds, not needing many arguments, or much instruction; and he taught that the wise man was sufficient for himself; (Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 6.11.5).⁵⁸

⁵⁷ The later Stoics tradition wished to connect Antisthenes with the Cynics, as he then functioned as a conduit between the Stoics and Socrates by way of Zeno. Probably on account of this many aspects of his legend are at variance with the Cynic philosophy we find in works on Krates or Diogenes, since the Stoics would have wished to make him a more Socratic figure, and excise the taint of Cynic *anaidea* from such a founding figure. In fact, Seltman published important numismatic evidence that he was not Diogenes' teacher in 1936, who pointed out defaced coins from Sinope from 350-340 BCE, and others from same period inscribed with the name Hicesias, Diogenes' father. This is the main evidence that Diogenes was not a student of Antisthenes, who would have been dead before he got to Athens, although this doesn't rule out the possibility that he could have come to Athens earlier, then returned to Sinope. See Charles T. Seltman, "Diogenes of Sinope, Son of the Banker Hicesias," in *Transactions of the International Numismatic Congress, organized and held in London by the Royal Numismatic Society, June 30-July 3, 1936, on the occasion of its centenary*, ed. Royal Numismatic Society (Great Britain) et al. (London,: B. Quaritch Ltd., 1938). Marie Odile Goulet-Caze makes some interesting points in support of Antisthenes' identification as the first "Dog," relying heavily on the fact that Aristotle mentions Antisthenes several times, and in the same work that he mentions "the Dog" (Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.10.1411a24; 3.4 1704a10), but never Diogenes (see Marie Odile Goulet-Caze, "Who was the First Dog" in Appendix B, *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* [1996], 415).

⁵⁸ Bracht Branham states that although the Cynics shun discourses as a road to happiness, nevertheless in oral culture "great words' as well as great deeds are seen as form of action. Cynicism is the most orally oriented philosophical tradition (see Robert Bracht Branham, "Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism" in *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* [1996], 83).

He shares a questionable ancestry with many Cynics as well, for Antisthenes was no Athenian citizen, but the son of a citizen and a Thracian woman; thus he is depicted as having held his “lectures” in the gymnasium reserved for “*nothoi*,” or illegitimates, known as the *Cynosarges*, or “agile dog.” This last name is certainly at least partly responsible for Antisthenes’ synthesis into the Cynic group. His birth, which deprived him of Athenian citizen rights, also endows him with the potential for Cynic cosmopolitanism, and a predilection for overlooking matters of rank and status. According to Diogenes Laertius, when chided with the fact that both his parents were not free-born, Antisthenes responded, “ὄνειδιζόμενός ποτε ὡς οὐκ εἶη ἐκ δύο ἐλευθέρων, “οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ δύο,” ἔφη, “παλαιστικῶν, ἀλλὰ παλαιστικός εἰμι.” “Nor do I come from two wrestlers, yet I am one” (Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 6.4). This statement implies that he possessed the ideas of world-citizenship and personal freedom that are so important to the Cynics. Thus, his tradition is ‘Cynicized’ in that the style of his descriptions has a Cynic flavor, possessing all the right elements of clever pithy aphorisms, questionable status, and a dearth of aristocratic sentiment.

Like the old Comedians, many Cynics convey their philosophy in utopian language, though to the Cynics this medium was more flexible. For instance, Krates parodies such utopian framework in his poem on the glories of *Pera*, here conceived as a magical Isle of the Blessed, but really a pun on the word for the knapsack or wallet which every Cynic carried around with him to carry his food:

Πῆρη τις πόλις ἐστὶ μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι τύφῳ,
καλὴ καὶ πείρα, περίρρυπος, οὐδὲν ἔχουσα,
εἰς ἣν οὔτε τις εἰσπλεῖ ἀνὴρ μωρὸς παράσιτος,
οὔτε λίχνος πόρνης ἐπαγυλλόμενος πυγῆσιν·

ἀλλὰ θύμον καὶ σκόρδα φέρει καὶ σῦκα καὶ ἄρτους,
 ἐξ ὧν οὐ πολεμοῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τούτων,
 οὐχ ὅπλα κέκτηνται περὶ κέρματος, οὐ περὶ δόξης.
 Pera is a city in the middle of the wine-dark blindness,
 Fair and fat, girt all around, and possessing nothing.
 Here no parasitical idiot man sails,
 Neither does any lewd pimp seduce with buttocks
 But it bears onions, leeks and figs, and hunks of bread,
 Over which things they do not fight against each other,
 Nor do they take up arms over riches, nor over honor.⁵⁹

The importance of Pera is that it is so simple that no one strives to possess it; it has too few attractions for the corrupt, lending no hope to ambitious desires. By naming his island “Wallet,” Krates makes the radical implication that the utopia lies within every person untrammelled by possessions, which he cannot bring around with him, and ambitions, which condemn him to live in one place. The fact that Pera was an island, on the other hand, represents the extreme individuality of the Cynic ideal. A Cynic was his or her own walking utopian island, and everybody else was drowning in the sea of taphos. This resonates with many Aristophanic plots of Old Comedy, in which the protagonist creates his or her own private solution to the public problems of the times. The description of Pera is actually a parody of the Homeric description of Crete,⁶⁰ and it has other resonances with more contemporary literature. The tenor of utopian life here is very similar to the description of the “City of Pigs” in Plato’s Republic, but very

⁵⁹ Diels, fr. 4, Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 6.85.

⁶⁰ Κρήτη τις γὰρ ἔστι μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ,
 καλὴ καὶ πείρα, περίρρυτος· ἐν δ’ ἀνθρώποι
 πολλοὶ ἀπειρέσιοι, καὶ ἐννήκοντα πόλεις
 Crete is a land that sits in the middle of the wine-dark sea,
 Fair and fat, and girt all around. Within it are many men,
 Too many to count, and ninety cities (Homer, *Odyssea*, 19.172-174).

different from its full-blown ideal of *politeia*, which includes warriors and luxuries. Krates diverges more radically from Plato, however, in the personal nature of this utopia, signified by the title “Wallet,” the emblem of Cynic individualism. Even in the small community of the “City of Pigs”, the members had a responsibility towards each other, and thus some sort of political consciousness as a group, as opposed to Cynic living for himself out of his solitary knapsack.

In stories about Plato and Diogenes, the former is opposed to the latter as the archetypical anti-Cynic: “a plutocrat and metaphysician.”⁶¹ On the other hand, Diogenes takes a pragmatic approach to the truth that he shares with the rhetoricians and sophists of the 4th century BCE.⁶² R. Bracht Branham in

⁶¹ See Branham (1996), 88. Branham draws attention to the contrast between the literary dimension of Cynicism and its “street credit.” He addresses the strangeness of both writers and illiterates throughout subsequent history finding good use for cynicism, whereas no other philosophy of antiquity had such a disparate influence. Branham points out that “great words” were considered a form of action, and that Cynicism remained the most orally oriented of the Greek philosophical traditions. The Cynic slogan “defacing the currency” had to do with the breakdown of genres considered appropriate to philosophy, such as dialogues, symposia, treatises, or epistles, which when presented in new literary forms, such as mythological material in burlesques or parodies. They altered forms like the aphorism, to which they gave such a characteristic stamp, that this genre was ever after associated with them. One example of a Cynic invented form is the diatribe, the creation of Bion of Borysthenes, for information on whom see J.F Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes* (Uppsala 1976). Another is Cercidas’ creation of a new meter, the *meliambus*, to write political poem from Cynic perspective. All this supports Branham’s case that they revolutionized the “map of literature.” In terms of the figure of Diogenes himself, Branham relies on Bahktin’s perception of the original Cynic as a “hero of improvisation not tradition.” Branham suggests that in a sense he created himself as a literary character, “a highly novelized figure,” and says that Diogenes made himself and his life an “object of experimentation,” and refers to his “comic self dramatization” (Branham [1996], 87).

⁶² Branham (1996), 90.

“Defacing the Currency: Diogenes’ Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism” argues that this sort of practical, improvised thinking is not just implicit in Diogenes’ philosophy, but that he is completely aware and self-conscious about this quality.⁶³ Cynicism’s underlying idea is that the success of a philosophy is its embodiment in action. Similarly, Long suggests that stories of Krates’ life, like those of Diogenes, should be read as a contribution to philosophy; in both cases, life and thought are inextricably linked.⁶⁴ Branham sees the Cynics as actively undermining the gods of tradition, which would include the gods and rituals of comedy itself.⁶⁵ Cynicism engages life directly, and the physical activities of the Cynic are as important as his *logoi*, whereas comedy is circumscribed by its fictional basis and its function as religious worship, and philosophy is confined to intellectual exercise with no implicit impact on the world. Thus the central Cynic value, ἐλευθερία, and its subset, παρρησία, both existed only inasmuch as they received practical application and performance.⁶⁶ Freedom of speech is similarly essential to comedy, and religious rituals involving power reversals between

⁶³ Branham (1996), 91.

⁶⁴ A.A. Long, “The Socratic Tradition” in *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (1996), 42.

⁶⁵ It is interesting to compare Branham’s view to that of M. Odile Goulet-Caze, who holds the view that the Cynics were agnostics, not atheists, and withheld judgement on religious matters in general. See Marie Odile Goulet-Caze, “Religion and the Early Cynics” in *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (1996), 47-80.

⁶⁶ It was not ἀυτάρκεια, since Cynics as beggars and social satirists were dependant on the city state, and therefore were not autonomous (see Branham [1996], 96-97).

masters and slaves like the Kronia. *Licentia*, in fact is one of the specially sanctioned privileges of the slave on holiday in the Roman Saturnalia. The Cynics, on the other hand, were expected to implement the behavior of slaves on holiday on a regular and daily basis. On this topic, Branham suggests that a joke is an assertion of freedom. This is a basis for the idea that a commitment to freedom gave rise to Cynic practice of practicality, improvisation, and humor.⁶⁷ Overall, Branham sees Cynic rhetoric as a performance based on the practice of freedom, and that Cynicism was the only philosophical movement in antiquity to make freedom a central value, and freedom of speech in particular.⁶⁸

Orlando Patterson calls the defining quality of slavery itself social death. The removal of family connections, duties to the state, courage in war, even the loyalty of friendship would all be characteristic of a typical slave who had been removed from his or her native culture. The Cynics, ironically, view all of these disassociations as steps towards ἐλευθερία, their highest goal.⁶⁹ It is part of their

⁶⁷ For this theory, Branham depends heavily on Mary Douglas' argument in *Jokes*.

⁶⁸ See Branham (1996), 104, and Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: from Diogenes to the 6th century A.D.* (London: Methuen, 1937). Branham critiques Dudley, who acknowledges that Diogenes' "shamelessness" was philosophically motivated, but doesn't see that humor was essential to παρρησία, his main method of teaching (Dudley, 145).

⁶⁹ The Cynics think of this process of unlearning as one of liberation; one is truly free once one cares no more for any person or institution, once one serves no "master." Ironically, such a breaking of societal bonds would have been a prerequisite for a traditional state of slavery. It was essential, prior to enslavement, for a person to be removed from his previous ties of identity; these connections could be artificially replaced with the paternalistic bonds of slavery, in which the slave metaphorically gets a new "father," who does not have quite the same parental feeling for him, however! The Cynics, however, seemed to

motto, “παρὰχάρᾳ τὸ νόμισμα” (defacing the currency) to thus alter the traditional criteria for what constitutes freedom and slavery, and going beyond the fictional realm of comedy, to incorporate these changes into life itself. For instance, most of the well-known Cynics, in fact, were really exiles from their native lands. The Cynics cultivated this “statelessness” as a sort of freedom from the trammels of existence, along with a sense of apathy towards the conflicts of life and shamelessness about sin, all these contributing to true freedom.⁷⁰ They are in line with previous philosophical doctrines in considering pleasures as traps for the soul’s enslavement, but are unusual in actively seeking hardship as the process of the soul’s education, with no other object in mind than to develop the individual’s endurance of suffering and his contentment with very little. Yet there

seek out that condition of ‘social death,’ without, of course, the substitution of the new artificial paternal power of the master. In a figurative sense, Plato thinks of the process of moral education as the enslavement of the passions, that is, forcing them to obey the rational mind. This seems similar in a way to the Cynic ideal, which recommends the “liberation” of the soul from passions and desires, but Cynics do not in turn demand that the rational mind should become “master of the soul,” but that the soul should exist untroubled by any of these forces, content with little but its individuality.

⁷⁰ Many of the Cynics were somehow disconnected from their family background, but in a variety of different ways; for instance, note the difference in background of Diogenes and Krates. Diogenes certainly suffered exile and possibly actual slavery, as did Menippus of Gadara, Bion of Borysthenes, and Monimus of Syracuse, whereas Krates was the son of a wealthy landowner, who was physically handicapped, a humpback, and gave all of his wealth away. Some simply chose a life of wandering and public philosophizing, such as Dio Chrysostom or Antiochus of Cilicia, and suffered exile, like the same Dio and Demetrius of Corinth. The main point is that they disconnect from their family ties and traditional background, willingly embracing the state of exile. See Marie Odile Goulet-Caze, “A Comprehensive Catalogue of Known Cynic Philosophers,” in *Appendix A, The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (1996), 389-413.

is no ascetic system behind the Κύνικος βίος, rather, it appear to oppose any sort of philosophical systematization whatsoever. Cynics attacked all community institutions, even individual ones such as friendship, “decrying everything that made life pleasant, civilized, and livable at that time.”⁷¹ In this way, they did much to destroy respect for existing religions by ignoring divisions of race and country, and instituting an order of wandering preachers who took the license to say what they pleased.⁷² Because of their fixation on individual bodily self-

⁷¹ Farrand Sayre, *The Greek Cynics* (Baltimore 1948), 7.

⁷² See See Farrand Sayre. *Diogenes of Sinope; a Study of Greek Cynicism*. Baltimore: J. H. Furst, 1938, Sayre, (1948), and Luis E. Navia, *Classical Cynicism: a critical study*, Contributions in philosophy, no. 58. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996). There is a good deal of inconsistency within the full range of Cynic sources, some of which advocate ‘positive’ virtues, even recommending things like work and education. These views are possibly spurious, having become attached to the Cynic corpus through a process of accretion, but even such contradictions underline the individualistic nature of Cynicism, which is not a school of thought, but a way of life; different Cynics adopted whichever views seemed appropriate to them. Part of the difficulty with an examination of Cynic sources is that very few writings by the earliest Cynics exist, since the production of literature did not go well with the lifestyle. As a result, apocryphal sayings and stories of Cynics abound, in particular concerning Diogenes himself. According to Sayre, there appear to be two main strands of tradition, an originally Cynic source, coming primarily from the writings of Krates, which rests on the thesis that pleasure is the main thing to be sought in life, and another, deriving from Socrates and Antisthenes, which places virtue before all else. This view is promoted by Sayre in his dissertation, *Diogenes of Sinope*, as well as his later work on the Cynics (Sayre [1938], 7; [1948], passim). Luis Navia, however, citing Diogenes Laertius, makes a case for the connections of Antisthenes with Cynicism as well as his later function as a “Cynic Sage,” whatever his real influences may have been (Navia, 18). This premise can be illustrated by the fact that in early writings Cynicism was called “τὴν σύντομον ὁδὸν ἐπ’ εὐδαιμονίαν,” or a “short road to happiness” (Krates *Epistulae*, 13), but later was described as a “short cut to virtue” (Plutarch *Amatorius* 759, & Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 6.104). It could be useful to take a brief look at the sources and interpretations of these opposing views on Cynic thought. Stories which concern Diogenes often abound with contradictions. For instance, Diogenes Laertius has Diogenes support education in one story, calling it “wealth to the poor” (Diog.

sufficiency, they are unconcerned with creating a dominant power structure or a code of behavior that works as a vehicle for their utopian ideas. Rather they disentangle themselves as much as possible from anything that does not pertain to their most basic needs. They embody the servile perspective because their goal is the individual's complete separation from civilized preconceptions, and with this as the realization of an alternative utopian lifestyle, they envisage societal responsibilities as a type of "slavery." Thus, Maximus of Tyre (Diss. 36, 5) says that Diogenes was uninvolved with politics and everything, having freed himself from the trammels of ambition.⁷³ Yet the Cynic aversion to labor, based on a wish to avoid restraints, had an elitist, superior quality to it. The Cynic often compared himself to kings, but never to members of the working class. As far as they were concerned, the Cynic was free, and even a king, and everyone else was a slave who owed his master a living.⁷⁴ To bring out this contrast, Cynic literature

Laert. *Vit. phil.* 6. 68), while elsewhere he denounces education as useless and unnecessary (Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 6.73). Similarly, Plutarch tells a tale that Diogenes, seeing a boy with bad table manners, hit his tutor for not teaching him properly (Plutarch *An virtus doceri possit*, 2). This act would be inconsistent with Cynic concept of *anaidea*, or shamelessness, as well as the demand for *amathia* or ignorance. For Diogenes, the conventions and norms antithetical to nature are those of popular morality, including education. Nevertheless, his tradition abounds with remarks about the importance of training, and the fact that proper training can overcome any obstacle. His main concern in these apothegms is similar to that of the philosophers Plato and Xenophon: whether what is being taught is natural or unnatural, useful or useless?

⁷³Sayre (1938), 9.

⁷⁴See A.A. Long, "The Socratic Tradition" in *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy* (1996). Long discusses the idea that the Cynic alone of men has command over himself, therefore is true king (Long, 35). The king vs. slave distinction is supported by many passages in Diogenes Laertius also, where the bulk of the population is described as slaves, and Diogenes himself as "king" or

shows an interest in matters of slave identity, for instance, investing Diogenes with slave status to give him an opportunity to show his indifference to it. This also gives “the Dog” a chance to play upon meanings of obedience, mastery and expertise; he implies that enslavement is inconsequential if one possesses true mastery.

ἔλεγε τῷ ἐνιάδῃ τῷ πριαμένῳ αὐτόν, δεῖν πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ, εἰ καὶ δούλος εἴη· καὶ γὰρ ἰατρὸς ἢ κυβερνήτης εἰ δούλος εἴη, πεισθῆναι ἂν αὐτῷ.

He said to anyone coming to buy him, that it was right to obey him even though he was a slave. For if a slave were a doctor or a pilot, it would be right to obey him (Diog. Laert. Vit. Phil. 6.30).

καὶ τοῦ κήρυκος ἐρωτῶντος τί οἶδε ποιεῖν, ἔφη, “ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν.” ὅτε καὶ δείξας τινὰ Κορίνθιον εὐπάρυφον, τὸν προειρημένον Ξενιάδην, ἔφη, “τούτῳ με πῶλει· οὗτος δεσπότης χρῆζει.

And when the herald asked him what he knew how to do, he answered, “rule people.” And when he saw the Corinthian merchant approaching, the aforementioned Xenaiades, he said, “Sell me to that man. He needs a master” (Diog. Laert. Vit. Phil. 6.74).⁷⁵

These anecdotes both emphasise Diogenes’ admiration of practical expertise as opposed to societal status or wealth. Yet Diogenes does not seem to dismiss power roles completely, since in fact by taking on the role of “master” himself, he appears to endorse them. This, however, is the illusion created by Diogenes use of his dramatic context. Just as in Old Comedy, he uses the situation he is given as a

“master.” For instance: Diogenes says to a boastful victorious athlete, “I defeat men, you only slaves” (Diogenes Laertius *Vit. phil.* 6.33). Upon his sale, Diogenes, seeing Xenaiades, says “sell me to this man, he needs a master” (*Vit. phil.* 6.74), and “fear is the mark of the slave, whereas wild beasts make men afraid of them” (*Vit. phil.* 6.75).

⁷⁵ The contexts of these two quotations from Diogenes Laertius’ *Vit. phil.* both involve the alleged enslavement of Diogenes of Sinope, which is not supported by any other historical evidence.

platform to invert the normal meanings of words. Diogenes' most important views, that is, his admiration of practical skill in general, and his own self-admiration in particular, are transmitted here through the metaphor of the power relation of slave and master. Diogenes achieves a similar effect in his discussions of animal behavior as educational paradigms. The use of animals by Cynics as educational models for humans is interesting given the similar usage by Xenophon, an author with a similar focus on ideal leadership. Whereas Xenophon makes the comparison to the disadvantage of animals, however, comparing the science of ruling men to that of herding cattle, for instance, the Cynics often choose to admire wild animals, seeing in them an idea of how to live an undomesticated life.⁷⁶ Just as Xenophon can see the process of education metaphorically as learning how to train animals, or being trained like an animal oneself, Cynic philosophy seeks to impart the natural self-sufficiency of animals, or their *autarkeia*, as a life goal. The ultimate Cynic role model, the dog, is a domesticated animal who can also run wild, a dual status that illuminates the dependence of the Cynic beggar on the support of the *polis* and its infrastructure. The question of domesticity and servitude is particularly interesting in the case of

⁷⁶ There are several interesting examples of this in the compendium of articles *The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy*. In "The Socratic Tradition," Long points out the Cynic use of animal behavior to show the superiority of the natural to the conventional (Long, 39). Whereas rational human nature demands training to develop self-sufficiency, animals have this as matter of course. Marie Odile Goulet Cazé shows that animals are most like the gods to Cynics in "Religion and the Early Cynics" (Goulet Cazé, 61). Finally James Romm, in "Cynicism Before the Cynics?" (Romm, 133), discusses a utopian society as a possible forerunner of Cynic philosophy in the case of the Kunocephaloi of Ctesias, showing the admiration of the neighboring peoples for these animals with a utopian society (Ctesias *Indica*, 20.22-23).

the lion metaphor, which Diogenes uses to undermine the fact of his slavery, and to point out that slavery may come from *nomos*, but the strength of the lion is from *phusis*:

τοὺς γνωρίμους λυτρώσασθαι αὐτὸν θελήσαι, τὸν δ' εὐήθεις αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοὺς λέοντας δούλους εἶναι τῶν τρεφόντων, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τρέφοντας τῶν λεόντων. δούλου γὰρ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ θηρία φοβερὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἶναι. θαυμαστὴ δὲ τις ἦν περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα πειθῶ, ὥστε πάνθ' ὄντιν' ῥαδίως αἰρεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. He said that lions were not the slaves of their feeders, but the feeders of the lions, for the fear of a slave, and the fear of beasts were both common to men. His power of persuading a man was wondrous, so that it was possible for him to control anyone easily with words. (Diog. Laert. *Vit. Phil.* 6.75.1-6).

The reliance of the Cynic ideal upon *phusis* as opposed to *nomos* also undermined definitions of slavery in the Platonic and Aristotelian utopian visions, in which people cannot exist outside of their social context, and where, in fact, their whole existence is designed to further the good of the state. The Cynic, on the other hand, lives only for himself, and it is a violation of his code to seek the greater good. According to Aristotle, one who lived outside of society was a sort of monster; a truncated limb of humanity masquerading as a whole person, yet to the Cynic, his individual independence was his credo. Thus the issue of education for slaves or free men, so crucial to the socially responsible ideal societies of Plato and Aristotle, is totally irrelevant to the Cynics, as the Cynic education is really a process of de-schooling a person of conventional beliefs.⁷⁷

⁷⁷The Cynics were unique among classical “schools” in their method of “de-education” (a phenomenon perhaps not unlike the modern “un-schooling”), transforming the values generally used to define slaves (such as statelessness, or solipsism) into their educational goals. *Amathia*, an important Cynic virtue, would certainly qualify a person for slavery in the ideal world of Plato or Xenophon. Stobaeus attributes to Diogenes the statement that the noblest despise wealth, learning, pleasure, and life, esteeming above them poverty, ignorance, hardship and death. Diogenes Laertius (Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 6. 103) says the Cynics

dispense with normal subjects of instruction. Plutarch addresses the question of why the Cynics reject learning but profess wisdom, saying that it is achieved immediately, with no preparation, by magic revelation (Plut. *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus*, *Mor.* 75). They reject the stratification of labor which characterizes most utopian visions in the 5th-4th centuries, therefore any sort of learning which would require structure or organization as opposed to phusis (see Sayre [1938], 20-21).

Chapter Four: Roman Comedy's Utopian Slaves

Plautus

The mythological models for Roman comedy were fundamentally the same as those of the Greeks, since both were based on the worship of Kronos and Dionysos. The Roman Saturnalia, although a more popular and prominent holiday than the Greek Kronia, was in its ritual aspects quite similar. Yet as far the institution of slavery was concerned, the historical setting differed greatly. The reasons for this were extremely complex, but in brief, can be ascribed to two main causes: first, the population of slaves was so much more widespread and numerous, and slaves had replaced many other free laborers. Second, the Roman law of slavery varied from the Greek, allowing the freed slave much greater opportunities for advancement, in theory at least. The increased ubiquity and mobility of the slave in real life was matched by the corresponding importance of the slave as a literary character and metaphorical agent. Several plays of Plautus are interesting examples of his treatment of different servile characters, from the *servus callidus* to the "good slave." The characteristics of Plautus' comic slaves help to determine the values projected as necessary to achieve a utopian state of existence. These values are consistently linked with those of the slave protagonists, although they can vary drastically.

The slaves who populate the works of Plautus are often motivated by goals involving a complete transfer of power to themselves. This tendency to reverse roles and gratify pleasure is utopian in a similar sense to Old Comedy, although it is more nihilistic in terms of traditional morality. At the same time, some Plautine

plays celebrate the ideal “loyal” slave, and confirm the traditional values of mastery and natural slavery inherent in an authoritarian society. These two sets of values can both be interpreted as utopian constructs, in different senses. The strange juxtaposition of these two utopian “directions” is a testament to Plautus’ dramatic inventiveness in manipulating the motif of slavery. As a playwright, he used the models of Middle Comedy, but really developed a Roman idiom in which slaves played a major role as movers of the plot. His extensive and sometimes contradictory use of slaves in idealizing modes suggests that ideas of slavery and subjection are essential prerequisites for creating comic utopia.

In the festive Saturnalian atmosphere of the Plautine world, the unusually wide range of choices for the slave runs the gamut from vice to virtue. One approach to the *servus callidus* of Plautus is to read him as a “slumming” fantasy of the free. The free spectators, through their stage-induced empathy with the slave character can imagine themselves revolting against their superiors, and acting with a lack of dignity inappropriate to a citizen. Because little is expected of him, the slave can represent freedom from moral restrictions and the demands of a public image. Since the world thinks the worst of the slave, he or she has license to indulge those impulses forbidden to his superiors, and it is proportionally shocking when he acts in a virtuous fashion. In contrast to this type of clever slave who delights in tricks, a significant proportion of Plautine slaves do in fact behave extremely well, in fact better than their masters do, creating a different aspect of the utopian reversal. Protracted virtue on the part of a slave, however, invariably leads either to an offer, or to the attainment of freedom, helping us disassociate such good

qualities from slaves themselves. On the other hand, the “good” slave’s counterpart, the wicked plotter, seems to derive utopian enjoyment from vice itself, ascribing the same value to *malitia*, consisting of trickery, lies, and plots, as others ascribe to virtue. This quality not only seems to replace the ideal of virtue, but also the concept of utopian bounty itself. The slave is released from his duties, not through the magical appearance of food, or cessation of labor, but by his own skills, wits and plans, which he enjoys just as much as free dinners and vacations. Thus, the concept of an ideal world continues in these comedies, with an extremely different emphasis of values, however ironic Plautus may have meant this to be.

Plautus also invests the clever slave as his literary vehicle a step removed; his servant in creating a conduit between his world and the audience. Normally marginal to the social life of other characters, the slave was able to move back and forth between the real and fictional, addressing the audience to comment on the action.⁷⁸ As privy to other characters’ secrets, he was well suited to narrate, and also sometimes to create, events of the plot, becoming assimilated to the playwright’s role. In this way, the hard work and punishments, the traditional

⁷⁸sed quasi poeta, tabulas cum cepit sibi,
 quaerit quod nusquamst gentium, reperit tamen,
 facit illud veri simile, quod mendacium est,
 nunc ego poeta fiam: viginti minas,
 quae nusquam nunc sunt gentium, inveniam tamen.
 But just like a poet, when he picks his tablets up
 Seeks what is nowhere among men, but finds it nevertheless,
 And creates that which is like to truth, but is really a lie,
 Now I will become a poet: twenty minas, which exist nowhere among men,
 nevertheless I will find (Plautus, *Pseud.* 402-6).

provinces of slaves, become a metaphor for the literary endeavors of the author. For example, the wily slave Pseudolus compares the variegated scars that come from the beating of the slave to the act of writing florid verses.⁷⁹

Descriptions of toils and tortures, while coloring the language of the play, also create the impression of utopian abundance, an excess of pain turning into the audience's pleasure at hearing it so well described. The clever slave does not shrink from plotting at fear of punishment, but seems to consider it a badge of honor. At the same time, slaves are never punished on stage, since this would be contrary to the spirit of the Saturnalia. This is never explicitly stated, but it forms part of the utopian backdrop of Plautus' work.

The prevailing holiday spirit at the time of the Saturnalia translates in Plautine comedy as the systematic subjection and humiliation of the master by the slave. Anyone who attempts to obstruct such a reversal is coded as a "villain," their crime their prevention of the Saturnalian festivity. The Saturnalia itself, like the Greek Kronia, has powerful utopian connotations in the sense of its connection with the idea of Saturn and the Golden Age, the concept of bounty and license for those who do not usually possess it, a complete abandonment of normal social

⁷⁹Quis me audacior+
 sit, si istuc facinus audeam?+ immo sic, Simo:
 si sumus compecti seu consilium umquam iniimus [de istac re]
 aut si de ea re umquam inter nos convenimus,
 [quasi in libro cūm scribuntur calamo litterae]
 stilis me totum usque ulmeis conscribito.
 Who would be more daring than I, if I dared to do this deed of yours? Come then, Simo, if we ever have been colluding conspirators in a plan, or have ever plotted anything about this matter amongst ourselves, just as when the letters are inscribed in a book with a reed, mark me up completely with elm-rods. (Plautus *Pseud.* 544-6).

strictures. To attain this level of *libertas*, the clever slave of Plautus is willing to run the risk of any sort of punishment, simply to gain the satisfaction of punishing the master by putting him in the same role of dependency and compulsion that the slave usually endures.

Two critics dealing in particular with the problem of Plautus' problem slaves are David Konstan, in his work on Roman Comedy,⁸⁰ and Kathleen McCarthy in her book *Slaves, Masters, and the Art of Authority in Plautine Comedy*. Their difference of approach lies partly in the area of literary theory. Konstan perceives utopian elements in the Plautine corpus in terms of their depiction of "fantasy virtue." Slaves can display utopian-level "quality" just as well as masters, and in some cases they are the characters who set and embody the central issue. McCarthy, on the other hand, ties up the vagaries of Plautus' work as different embodiments of two main approaches, the naturalistic, and the farcical, both of which are also utopian in quite different ways.

McCarthy interprets Plautine theater as a mixture of these two primary modes, and even considers these two modes to be "aware" of each other to such an extent that some of the plays are in fact "mixtures;" for instance, a farcical play can parody the naturalistic mode. In terms of slavery, the naturalistic mode tends to corroborate accepted attitudes towards slavery and authority. It is "an idealizing naturalism...which represents the familiar world of the spectators, but with all the rough edges smoothed away."⁸¹ This sort of idealism is "truer" than real life in a

⁸⁰ David Konstan, *Roman Comedy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

⁸¹ Kathleen McCarthy, *Slaves, Masters, and the Art of Authority in Plautine*

sense, and brings about results which have an important permanent impact on characters' lives. The method of creating this comic world is to make the dramatic illusion as powerful as possible. The moral perspective of the naturalistic mode is based on the contemporary social code, as the idealized values are the same as those in the canon of ancient Roman virtue, such as innate nobility, or piety. In these plays, Authority is a construct based on these virtues, and is truly deserved and rewarded. Since these plays present themselves as versions of reality “more real than real,” McCarthy interprets their function as one of ideological indoctrination, the implication being that things are fundamentally the way they are supposed to be.⁸²

The farcical mode, on the other hand, creates a “frequent rupture of the dramatic illusion...draws attention to the theatrical artifice itself, undermining any attempt to focus on a transcendent meaning of the play.”⁸³ A *servus callidus* in a farcical play becomes the hero, whose primary purpose is only to undermine a master's authority, and thus trickery achieves pride of place in field of the play's values. In this reversed hierarchy, in which the fantasy of the slave as a hero predominates, virtues exactly opposite to those required for success in the “naturalistic” dramas are exalted. The clever slave enjoys a sort of cornucopia of

Comedy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 11.

⁸² “Therefore it would not be too much to say that these plays perform the function of hegemonic discourse; they make the world around us seem to be the one that is destined by divine (or superhuman, at least) will.” *Ibid.*, 14.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

bad behavior, in utopian abundance, and safely out of reach of the real world.⁸⁴

McCarthy avoids the inherent contradictions of this dualistic schema by positing a "free dialogic interaction between the two comic modes, without an overarching organizing structure."⁸⁵ To explicate this a bit; both types of play have a common interest in rebellion, but in the naturalistic type, rebellion works in the service of the good, making society more humane, and showing the way to improve life in general. The actual values of the existing world appear utopian in themselves, and the slaves who support them win their freedom based on merit. In the farcical mode, on the other hand, rebellion does not need justification, as it is its own, and the placement of *malitia* as the foremost of the virtues supports the necessity for the slave to remain firmly in hand as a slave.

McCarthy's theoretical approach makes it much easier to fit any of the plays into her framework, since all contradictions can be explained away by the suggestion that the plays of Plautus are all quoting each other. In addition, pointing to the obviousness of the motifs that recur repeatedly in the Plautine corpus, she asserts that an individual play cannot be understood by itself, but that

⁸⁴"This is a truly subversive approach, as it questions the natural domination of the master, but limited by the fact that the slave never breaks out of his status. The greatest contrast with the naturalistic mode is that resolutions of problems change nothing fundamental to the characters' situations; the tricks are revealed, but the clever slave remains a slave, looking forward to another round of trickery and damning the consequences. This mode reminds the audience of the play's status as an artifact, and the dramatic illusion is often broken by addresses to the audience. Additionally, inverted authority is fundamentally linked to the world of poetry " ...as the lies of the slave are compared by Plautus to his own inventiveness (Ibid., 14). Also See Niall W. Slater, *Plautus in performance: the theatre of the mind* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).

⁸⁵ McCarthy, 7.

the reader must read "horizontally" across all of it.⁸⁶ The advantage, and simultaneously, the pitfall of her method, is that it does not require us to seek any authorial motive or purpose in the individual works; instead, we are seeking in Plautus what he did not consciously intend. By calling it subliminal, she evades the need to establish the "dialogic interaction of modes" as a self-conscious approach on the author's part, a much easier job than proving its intentionality. The appreciation of the audience would be subliminal too. Of course, an ancient Roman audience would certainly have had an extensive acquaintance with the typical themes and characters of Plautus' comedy, but would they, hearing a play for the first time, judge it necessarily in the context of all the others they had ever heard? In spite of my problems with her reading, I think the contrast McCarthy brings out between nihilist Saturnalian topsy-turvy-dom vs. positive values and a traditional happy conclusion that confirms the status-quo is extremely fruitful in examining the often-contradictory position of slaves in Plautus. Yet I cannot help thinking of Plautus the self-conscious playwright, exploiting all his elements of dramatic ammunition, and calculating for laughs, consciously making contradictory themes and motifs wherever they seemed appropriate.

Konstan's approach deals with some similar issues, but he differs in that he views the plays more as individual universes, in which he sees various separate issues of "utopianism" played out. He takes two plays of Plautus, the *Rudens* and *Captivi*, as specifically utopian in theme in their questions of morality concerning slaves and slavery, but from two almost opposite standpoints. On the one hand, he

⁸⁶ Ibid., 15-16.

sees the *Rudens* as resolving problems of freedom, slavery, and possession into a civilized utopian construct of equal property rights that is diametrically opposed to the complete absence of rights and laws in the realm of wild nature.⁸⁷ The fundamental morality of slavery, however, is not in question here. In contrast, the *Captivi* has implications that undermine the justifications for slavery in moral inferiority, creating a potential utopian vision, yet it reverts right at the end to a "normal" acceptance of the status quo.

In the *Rudens*, the activities of the slave characters are invisibly weighed against the cardinal virtue of the play, respect for property. In the words of Arcturus, who delivers the prologue, all nature is under the sway of Jupiter, the ultimate arbiter of disputes, who always knows when someone cheats in a claim. Thus, Konstan reads the shipwreck that tosses up both the slave girls and the treasure chest as a case study in the Jupiter-given right of legal *possessio* holding precedence over the catch-as-catch-can laws of nature, specifically of the sea.⁸⁸ The characters of the play are coded quite dramatically by the *elenchos* of their approach to *possessio*; this gets ironic in the case of slaves, who are possessions themselves.

Plautus gives to two slaves the scene that is the play's crux of dialogue and

⁸⁷Konstan (1983), 79.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 79. Konstan quotes Herman Melville on the distinction between a "fast-fish" vs. a "loose-fish," an opposition which according to the author of *Moby Dick* is not only a highly ancient, but applicable to spheres outside of piscatorial lawsuits. Melville makes his comparison abstract as well as concrete, since the rights of human freedom, as well as those of serfs and slaves can be judged by the same law: "Rights of Man and Liberties are fast-fish also" (Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*, 422).

action. Here, Gripus' approach to the stray piece of property codes his approach to his own slavery as well. After finding a chest in the sea, he invokes Neptune as his patron, in the language of a manumitted freedman.⁸⁹ Gripus fantasizes, on

⁸⁹ Neptúno has agó gratiás meo **patróno**,
 qui sálsis locís incolít pisculéntis,
 quom me éx suis locís pulchre ornátum expedívit
 †templís reducém, plurimá praeda onústum,
 salúte horiaé, quae in marí fluctuóso
 piscátu novó me uberí compotívit;
 miróque modo atque increíblei hic piscátus mihi lepide évenit,
 neque píscium ullam unciam hodié pondo cepí, nisi hoc quod fero hic ín rete.
 nam ut dé nocte múlta impigréque exurréxi,
 lucrúm praeposívi sopóri et quiéti:
 tempéstate saéva experíri expetívi,
**paupértatem erí qui et meám servitútem
 tolerárem**, opera haud fui párcus mea.
 nímis homo nihilist quis piger est nímisque id genus odi égo male.
 vigiláre decet hominém qui volt sua témperi conficere ófficia.
 non énim illum expectare óportet, dum erus se ád suom suscitet ófficium.
 nám qui dormiúnt libenter, síne lucro et cum málo quiescunt.
 nám ego nunc mihi, qui ímpiger fui,
 répperi ut piger, sí velim, siem:
 hóc ego in mari [quidquid inést] répperi.
 quidquíd inest, grave quidem inést; aurum hic ego inésse reor;
 nec míhi consciust ullús homo.
 nunc haéc tibi occasio, Grípe optigit, ut **líber s**
 nemo> éx populo praetér te.
 nunc síc faciam, sic cónsilium est: ad erúm veniam docte atque astute.
pauállatim pollícitabor pro cápite argentum, ut sím liber.
 iam ubi **líber** ero, igitúr demum instrúam agrum atque aedis, **máncipia**,
 navíbus magnis mercáturam faciam, ápod reges rex pérhibebor.
 post ánimi causa míhi navem faciam átque imitabor Strátonicum,
 oppída circumvectábor.
 ubi nóbilitas mea erít clara,
 oppídum magnum commúnibo, ei ego úrbi Gripo indám nomen,
 moniméntum meae+ famae+ ét factis+, ibi quí regnum magnum ínstituam.
 magnas res hic agito in mentem instruere. nunc hunc vidulum condam.
 sed hic réx cum aceto+ pránsurust et sále, sine bono pulménto.

I give thanks to Neptune my patron who inhabits these salty fishy places since he sent me off from his territories gorgeously laden, loaded with much booty, with the boat safe, which allowed me a strange and rich type of fishing in the stormy

gazing on his treasure, that he will purchase his freedom and eventually become so rich that he will become a king, fortify a great city, and finally be an emperor, a fantasy that goes far beyond the normal lot in life of a regular citizen. Therefore, since he is currently a slave, he would be making a complete reversal of his condition, not into any sort of egalitarian ideal, but into an equally unfair situation in which he would simply be on the top instead of the bottom of the social scale. Gripus' dream is in fact of a tyranny based on an opportunistic theft. When Trachalio, the *calator* (soldier's slave) of Pleisidippus shows up (*Rud.* 938), and wants to find the chest's rightful owner, this argument concerns different aspects of law of possession. Amusingly, both the slaves echo the legalese of property litigation, as well as old *sententiae*. For instance, it may be that "mare quidem

sea. This fishing trip has turned out prettily for me in an amazing and wondrous fashion, nor did I capture another ounce of fish today except this, which I am carrying here in my net.

For as I quickly jumped out of bed in the middle of the night, I put profit before sleep and quiet : In a savage storm I sought to try to lighten my the poverty of my master and my servitude, and I didn't spare myself at all. The man who is lazy is a complete nothing and I really hate that type terribly. A man who wants to complete his duties on time ought to stay awake. He should not wait until his master stirs him up to his business. For those who sleep at will rest without profit and with trouble. I was not lazy, and I now have discovered how I might be lazy if I wish: I found this in the sea. Whatever is in it is indeed heavy. I think gold is in here. And nobody knows about it but I. Now, Gripus, opportunity has arranged that nobody of the people may be free as you. Now this is what I'll do, this is the plan. I will come to my master cleverly and cunningly. I will promise him, gradually, money for my head, so that it might be free. Then, when I am free, I will at last set up a field, and houses, and slaves, I will become a merchants with great ships, and I'll be know as a king among kings. Afterwards, for amusement, I will make myself a ship, and imitate Stratonicus, I'll sail around the towns. And when my nobility is well known, I will encircle a large city with walls and I will give it my name (Gripus), a monument to my glory and deeds, where I set up a great kingdom. I am busy, drawing up great things here. Now I will hide this trunk, but here the king will dine on vinegar and salt, without a good relish. (*Rud.* 906-938).

commune certost omnibus" (*Rud.* 976), but artifacts that come from the sea can be subject to rules of private property. Konstan thinks that Plautus is bringing up a contrast between nature and culture here, since by treating the chest as nature's booty (*praeda*), Gripus is bringing the "law of the wilderness into the city."⁹⁰ In his attempt to keep his treasure, Gripus expresses contempt for *leges urbanas* (*Rud.* 1025), but is willing to submit to the arbitration of his own master, Daemones, who to his slave's surprise, refuses to let the law of wild, represented by the ocean, penetrate the civil codes of conduct (*Rud.* 1024). He believes that the law of possession, even as it applies to something found in the wild, is the basis of good faith (*Rud.* 1043). This certainly echoes the theme established by the prologue Arcturus, in which Zeus, the paternal symbol of civic responsibility, is universal, and essential to all human affairs, rather than Nature.

Because Daemones respects the laws of *possessio*, he is rewarded by finding his daughter again. The girl's attainment of freedom comes about not through any action of her own, but is simply affected by her legal identity and status. Having been stolen from her parents and made a slave, she is finally recovered by rightful procedure, and the funny part is that Daemones is so respectful of ownership rights, that he even compensates Labrax, the slave-dealer who bought Palaestra from the pirates. This is a great contrast with Gripus, who views the chest from the fisherman's perspective, as product of nature. Nevertheless, in this fantasy of total fair play, even he, as the finder of the treasure, gets a share. In the final reconciliation in the fifth act, Gripus and Labrax are both rehabilitated; the former

⁹⁰ Konstan (1983), 85.

is freed, and the latter is compensated with half the money from the chest when he frees Ampelisca, and both are invited to dinner.⁹¹ Instead of attaining his fantasy of excessive wealth and power, rather like the tale of the poor fisherman and the genie, Gripus must settle for an egalitarian share of the pot. According to Konstan the crux of the *Rudens* is the theme that a utopia can also be an ancient *polis*, and that the law of the city is not determined by its physical boundaries, but by an individual's conscience, anywhere he or she may happen to be in Nature. Konstan points out that this is a contrast with the *Captivi*, in which the "structure of city-state relations is neither idealized nor conjured away," whereas in the *Rudens*, the beautiful, pastoral setting is important because the point of the play is to "extend boundaries, incorporating heaven and nature into the urban contract."⁹²

The *Captivi* is set against the background of petty warfare, and deals with its main byproduct, the enslavement of prisoners of war. The play shows a dichotomy between the values of warfare, such as courage, and loyalty to one's own side, versus the values of slavery, obedience, and loyalty to the master one happens to serve. This contrast is further complicated by the play on the father/son relationship, which was very close to the slave/master in certain ways. In general, the Roman ideological norms permit of the "good" family relationship versus the "bad" slave/master relationship. The slave Tyndarus, nevertheless,

⁹¹ Konstan expands his theme to human property in his suggestion that the girl herself was analogous to her washed-up chest. He argues that this reflects a utopian construct: "In the reconstituted world of the drama, there are no predators, and good faith reigns supreme among the class of free citizens, each holding just title to his possessions" (Ibid., 93).

⁹² Ibid., 93.

forces his master (and unknown father) Hegio to acknowledge the moral rightness of his disobedience, which has taken the form of his role reversal. Tyndarus, a slave himself, parrots the rhetoric of aristocratic values in his defiance of Hegio's rage. He says it is better for him to die himself than allow Philocrates to suffer the indignity of his own condition in life, a humiliation he has experienced first hand. Tyndarus bests Hegio at a debate by catching him in a double standard. By forcing him to examine his deed from the perspective of his loyalty to Philopolemus, he makes Hegio admit that if a slave had done such a thing for him, he would have freed him. Hegio, though intellectually beaten, fails to rise above the typical attitude of the angry slave-owner. Although Tyndarus' act may have been just, it has opposed Hegio's own interests, at least, for the dramatic moment. In a sense, having taken on the role of the master, Tyndarus has acted in an "un-slavish" fashion and has coded himself as a morally "free" person. However, Plautus provides an escape route from this uncomfortable knowledge in the two plot devices; that of the "villain slave," and the *anagnorisis* of paternity. One could perhaps even see it as simply as a contrast between "good" and "bad" models of slavery in the persons of the slaves Tyndarus and Stalagmus. While for the former, there is assimilation to parent-kinship roles, the latter's relationship with his enslavement is one of force and enmity, which reinforces the ideological basis of slavery in general. The fact that Tyndarus is actually Hegio's son makes his virtue explicable in terms of his birth. In Aristotle's sense of slavery, he rises above it because of his innate qualities-and of course, he just happens to have been well raised and gently treated. Thus, the slave assimilates to family in

Roman culture. Nevertheless, the *Captivi* does show discomfort with the idea of the inherent possibilities of paradox in slavery. It takes into account the chanciness, and vagaries of fate and war; the whole situation is precipitated by the fact that Hegio's other son is also in danger of becoming a slave, in spite of his aristocratic birth.

According to Konstan, a tension grows in the text of the *Captivi* that might lead to an acknowledgment of a sort of "universal humanism" with utopian aims. There is a contrast and battle between two main "ethical systems or world-views, the communal ethos of the city-state, and a universal humanism."⁹³ He sees this as not quite realized, however, because of the resolution of the slavery problems at the end of the play. The idealizing potential of the *Captivi* lies in the fact that Hegio is forced to acknowledge that his own slave acted on an ethical imperative (freeing a good man) which outweighed his sin (deceiving him). This is pointing towards a conception of "higher" good that is distinctly utopian in quality. If a slave is capable of this sort of behavior, the entire moral basis of slavery, which is founded on the "inferiority" of the slave, is undermined. McCarthy takes issue with this "almost-utopian" interpretation of the play, stating that Konstan seems to ignore what seems to her the central issue in defusing the tension created by the noble slave character: the concept of natural vs. conditional slavery. She makes a salient point that since Tyndarus' free birth is revealed in the prologue, the audience did not have to be that uncomfortable with his characterization as a noble slave at any point. The idea, familiar to Greek philosophy since Aristotle

⁹³ Ibid., 64.

and Plato, that a truly noble character would be unable to act in any way but a free one would certainly have been reassuring to the Roman slaveholding audience, as would the suggestion that a slave could be so loyal to his master as Tyndarus.

In spite of Plautus' escape routes, he shows a degree of discomfort with slavery in this play.⁹⁴ The play may reinforce the model of slavery on the level of literary subtext, yet it is portrayed throughout as a condition from which all the slave characters look for an out. The *Captivi* is also an interesting example of Plautus playing with his different models of his slave characters. Tyndarus can be understood as the ultimate "good" slave, who knows the mind of his master, and likes what he likes in order to properly serve him; so much that he finally becomes assimilated to the character of the master himself, as does Messenio in the *Menaechmi*. In contrast, he can be the villain of the piece, opportunistic and wicked, like Stalagmus, or even a flunky, dispensable slave like the Lorarius. All are alike in showing a persistent motivation to attain freedom. Thus, the ideal of liberty has a utopian, Saturnalian allure, whether it is attained through un-slavish virtue, or through a clever, wicked freedom of speech.

***Servitium Amoris* in Plautus' Comedy**

The cast of characters in Plautine comedy usually includes a callow, hapless youth who is overcome by passion for a girl who is for some reason completely unsuitable for marriage, either because of her slave status, or because of some other machinations on the part of the more clever and wicked characters, such as a *lena* or pimp. This rather helpless youth is typically assisted by his *servus callidus*

⁹⁴ Ibid., 10-11.

to free the object of his affections or overcome the obstacles to love in some other fashion. The *Casina*, *Pseudolus*, *Menaechmi*, *Bacchides*, *Persa*, *Mostellaria* and others all present variations on this theme. Power reversal between master and slave in the context of the lover's inability to resolve his situation on his own causes the assimilation of the lover into a slavish role. For example, Plautus' Bacchis announces "mulier tibi me emancupo" and the wily slave Pseudolus "sub Veneris regno vapulo." (Plautus *Bacchides* 92; *Pseudolus* 14).

In this fashion, Plautine comedy has created the precedent for the elegiac atmosphere of wallowing in subservience to a specific, albeit rather caricatured, mistress.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ It is a controversial issue whether the concept of the lover as slave to a slave was entirely new to the Roman Elegists. R.O.A.M. Lyne suggests that sometimes the comparison between lover/slave was made colloquially, taking his evidence primarily from Roman comedy, but argues the case that the true *servitium amoris* motif is original to Propertius and the Elegists. Many aspects and motifs of elegy in fact stem from Hellenistic and even Greek antecedents, and elegy itself has its roots in 7th century BCE poets such as Mimnermus. Callimachus was a major proponent of the meter, composing the Epigrams entirely in elegiacs. But did he or his contemporaries use the topic of the lover as slave in an elegiac context? Lyne puts forward the argument that usage of the slavery of love concept was only "colloquial and not literary" before Propertius, therefore it is a fundamentally elegiac motif (Lyne [1979]: 121-123). Since Lyne is trying to make the case for *servitium amoris* being original to Propertius, he downplays the significance of any previous references, defining it as specifically denoting slavery to people rather than to passions. Problematically, however, there is previous evidence of love interpreted as slavery, and in fact for slavery being used to describe any unequal relationship. It is not a new idea that slavery is associated with the degraded state of the lover, and that love is warlike, and takes prisoners. For instance, the theme that passions bring about loss of freedom is familiar from the complete role reversal of Heracles with his female slaves in the *Trachiniae*; the dying demigod, in the grips of the hydra's poison, induced ultimately by his own predilection and lack of control for making girls his slave-concubines, compares himself to a "weak little girl." A few generations later, Plato explicitly formulates this idea in philosophical terms. In general, all physical passions, like lust, take a position subservient to the intelligence in the hierarchy of the soul, but since

It has been suggested that Latin Elegy of the Augustan era derives many of its character-types from New Comedy, such as the obstructive *vir* and *lena*, as well as the girl who is beautiful and difficult to obtain, and her foolish lover.⁹⁶ New Comedy is also deeply preoccupied with the character of the slave, often the central mover of the action and the setter of the tone. He is frequently the protagonist, and assimilates ideas of mastery and authorial control, showing superiority to the actual master, who is often a foolish callow youth or an obnoxious old man. Also, the Plautine corpus frequently deals with themes and ideas of slavery, as we have discussed previously, with “good” slaves turning out to actually be free, and “*servi callidi*” exercising *licentia* (freedom of speech) to a utopian degree. Finally, in elegy, because of the motif of the *servitium amoris* the

passion for another can be a means of causing the lover to see beyond himself and his interests, Plato invests love with a positive potential. Nevertheless, he only thinks of the process of love in this hopeful light because feelings of longing ultimately connect the lover to the overarching ideals of the forms, which ultimately lead away from affection for a specific person. For slavery to love, not a lover, see Plato *Phaedr.* 238 e. Love slavery is also a popular idea in Hellenistic evidence; for instance, Apollo is a slave to Admetus (*Call. Hymn* 2.47-54; cf. Rhianus *fr.* 10 Powell). The piquancy of the topic is based on the extreme role reversal of the protagonist from god to slave, but the agent of the change is generally described as non-human; for instance as “passion” personified, or Venus herself. There are also Hellenistic comparisons like the catastrophe of being taken in war with that of falling in love; for instance, in Misumenus *fr.* 2, the soldier Thrasonides says, “a paltry little girl has enslaved me, a feat never achieved by my foes in war.” This is an obviously ironic reversal, as the girl is the speaker’s prisoner of war. Lyne would argue that all these examples have to do with the lover’s submission to Eros, the personification of love itself, rather than to a specific individual, the Elegiac beloved, who is only a sort of tool or vessel of the works of love.

⁹⁶ J. C. Yardley, “Comic Influences in Propertius” in *Phoenix*, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Summer, 1972), pp. 134-139. Also see K. Sara Myers, “The Poet and the Procuress: The Lena in Latin Love Elegy,” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 86 (1996): 1-21.

“slave” takes center stage in the role of narrator-lover-poet, and becomes the controller of everything that occurs in the poetic arena, just as in comedy.⁹⁷

The Paradise of *Otium* and the *Servitium Amoris* in Roman Elegy

The elegiac love poetry of the Augustan era is also marked by the inversion of societal norms, very reminiscent of the Plautine *servus callidus* type of play. The lover-poets of elegy, Catullus, Propertius, Tibullus, and Ovid, invariably reject the actual real-life demands on the free, elite Roman male to work, soldier, or run for political office; in other words, to perform *officia*. In substitution for these realistic and serious occupations, the *amator* of elegy devotes himself to what constitutes a hedonistic utopia, where the highest value is placed on the success of his suit with his *domina*. This depends, in his opinion at least, on the quality of his poetical persuasiveness. Thus in a self-consciously artificial sphere in which love and poetry stand as the cardinal ideal, the elegiac lover-poet creates the pose of the “*servitium amoris*,” a motif which combines aspects of two generic roles quite familiar from Plautus: the ingenuous, heartbroken lover, and the tricky, witty slave.

The elegiac “love slave” professes his feelings of helplessness and subservience to his mistress rather than sweeping her off her feet. Like the *ianitores* to whom the *exclusus amator* often complains and begs for entrance to

⁹⁷Similarly, in elegy, the slave character fulfils a dual social and literary function as a “Go-between.” For instance, in Ovid’s *Amores* 1.11 and 1.12, Nape the hairdresser, bearer of Ovid’s tablet messages to Corinna, becomes a symbol for the messages themselves. Just as she is a “dresser of complex tresses,” just as Ovid is writer of complex poetry, so the tablets are “double,” as slaves are sometimes duplicitous messengers.

the girl, he wears harsh “chains,” and has been conquered like a prisoner of war. The *domina* abuses him at her will with figurative whippings and hot irons, and he has no recourse; in fact, he seems rather paralyzed. Most importantly, like a slave, he has lost his freedom of speech; for fear of offending the mistress, he feels constrained to speak only what will be pleasing to her. Propertius’ *amator* refers to the “symptom of his servile state” (Prop. *Carm.* 1.1.26-27), a lack of freedom of speech or *licentia*: “fortiter et ferrum saevos patiemur et ignes / sit modo libertas quae velit ira loqui.” This is the same metaphor that is called medical cure for furor by Celsus (Celsus 2.11; 3.18. 21), who states that madmen are to be denied freedom of speech. Similarly, in Tibullus 1.5.5, the speaker is content to lose his freedom of speech: “Ure ferum et torque, libeat ne dicere quicquam” (Tib. *Carm.* 1.5.5). This contrasts with Propertius (Prop. *Carm.* 1.1.27), where the speaker is willing to undergo servile torture to restore his freedom of speech and demands *libertas loquendi* (Prop. *Carm.* 1.1.27). In Propertius 1.9, Ponticus, who has also fallen into love (Prop. *Carm.* 1.9.1-4), likewise loses his freedom of choice in writing poetry; he can no longer select subject matter displeasing to his mistress.⁹⁸ In Propertius 1.10 (*Carm.* 1.10.21.ff), the addressee Gallus is warned not to “speak proudly”, and to excise freedom

⁹⁸...quid tibi nunc misero prodest grave dicere Carmen / aut Amphioniae moenia flere lyrae? / plus in amore valet Mimnermi versus Homero/ carmina mansuetus lenia quaerit Amor./i quaeso et tristis istos sepone libellos, /et cane quod quaevis nosse puella velit!

...What good is it to you now, wretched one, to speak your grave Song, or to bewail the walls of Amphion’s Lyre? A verse of Mimnermus has more weight in love than Homer. Soft love seeks sweet songs. /Go, I beseech you, and get rid of those books of yours,/ and sing what a girl wants to know. (Prop. *Carm.* 1.9.9-12).

from his *pectore*. Other elegiac metaphors for a slavish state of love include physical tortures such as fire, chains and brands. For instance, the Propertian speaker (Prop. *Carm.* 1.18.8) bears *nota*, or brands from Cynthia. This image appeals to Tibullus, who develops idea of servile punishments meted out to lover, and invites punishments, in the “Nemesis” poem for example:

Hic mihi seruitium uideo dominamque paratam: / iam mihi, libertas illa
paterna, uale./seruitium sed triste datur, teneorque catenis,/ et numquam
misero uincla remittit Amor,/ et seu quid merui seu nil peccauimus, urit./uror,
io, remoue, saeua puella, faces.

Here I see slavery and a mistress prepared for myself: Now farewell, my ancestral freedom. Yet is it a sad slavery that is given; I am held by chains and never does love release the bonds from the wretched one; but whether I deserve it, or whether I haven't sinned, he burns me. I am burned, O, savage girl, take away the torch (Tib. *Carm.* 2.4.1-6).

These are all typical examples of the the basic stance of the elegiac *seruitium amoris*. As a metaphor for the painful helplessness of unrequited love, in may be a concept original to the Roman elegists, starting with Propertius.⁹⁹ Yet how sincere is it? Rather, how insincere?

A theme running consistently through the elegists is the praise for a life of idleness and emotional entanglements with no practical value. This of course was antithetical to the traditional Roman code of *virtus*, in which one farmed, soldiered, ran for political office, and married to make good connections. The elegists make a *recusatio* of the traditional life, and argue for a pursuit of *otium*, rather than *negotium*, and the neglect of Jupiter and Mars for Venus. They call the

⁹⁹When Propertius makes references to Cynthia as his “domina (Prop. *Carm.* 1.1.21, 3.17, 4.2, 4.7.6), Lyne, (see note 96) interprets this that he truly means slave mistress, as opposed to the speaker of Catullus *Carm.* 68.68, where Lyne thinks he means the mistress of the household. On three occasions Propertius refers to love as *seruitium*: 1.4.4, 1.5.19, 1.12.18.

life of the lover superior, yet strangely akin, to that of the soldier. (Prop. *Carm.* 1.6.; 1. 14, Tib. *Carm.* 1.1; 1.10).

One explanation for the specific rejection of Roman *virtus* may be found in a look at the historical context of the early Empire under Augustus. The political atmosphere that immediately precedes the flowering of Roman elegy was one in which citizens were regularly deprived of liberties, such as the liberty to choose unconventional lifestyle, to participate actively in government, or to exercise freedom of speech. The slavery of love was a safe metaphor for what many may have seen as a new regime of political slavery. Similarly, Cicero, in his letters to Matius (*Att.* 4.6.1-2, *Q. fr.* 3.5.4, *Fam.* 11.28.3) deplores the condition of the Roman Republic under the first triumvirate as falling into slavery, in terms very similar to those elegy uses to describe the degradation of slavery to a mistress. In the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* he also characterizes the lover as the slave of the beloved (*Cic. Par. Stoic.* 36). In general, certain types of behavior were labeled as servile, and it was unheard of for good Romans to consciously choose slavery, as Propertius and the other elegists seem to do so brazenly, both in their choice of lifestyle and in their vocal submission. The unfamiliar imagery of such a humiliation as a Roman citizen choosing the way of life of enslavement to a woman would have supplied shock value to Propertius' poetry, as surely was the poet's aim. According to R.O.A.M. Lyne in his article, "The *Servitium Amoris*"¹⁰⁰ the idea of the lover as slave goes along part and parcel with the rest of the elegiac

¹⁰⁰ R.O.A.M. Lyne, "Servitium amoris": *CQ* N.S. 29, 1 (1979): 117-130. Also see:
F.O. Copley, "Servitium Amoris in the Roman Elegists," *TAPA* 78 (1947): 285.

lifestyle, so that to be a proper member of this romantic poetic landscape, so far removed from practical concerns, had to invert his practical status as well. “The strategy of Elegiac alternative philosophy was openly to avow its dishonorable state”...and servile love functioned as a “delightfully awful programme for the unconventional to rally to.”¹⁰¹

Is it possible that at this time Romans were consciously choosing a fantasy of irresponsible slavishness, acting out against their sense of increasing powerlessness in lives both public and private? At the same time, the Romans were the masters of many slaves, and well understood the irony that they in fact had many more opportunities than the elegiac mistress. Sharon James in fact holds that the pose of *servitium amoris* is geared towards an elision of the relation between a prostitute and her client, by dint of the *amator* ignoring the girl’s status, and outspokenly rejecting his own (*recusatio*).¹⁰² The new roles for the *amator*

¹⁰¹ Lyne (1979): 128.

¹⁰² James takes a theoretical position that the constant poetic evasions of the money question amount to an actual portrait of the “type” of the elegiac puella, and that we can construct through the intentional misunderstandings of the poet, a picture of the realities and necessities the girl’s life would entail. See Sharon L. James, “The Economics of Roman Elegy: Voluntary Poverty, the “Recusatio,” and the Greedy Girl” in *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 122, No. 2, [486]. (Summer, 2001), 223-253. Whether or not it is possible to glean any information on social history from the elegists is not my focus here, but Lyne does make a case for the historicity of an elegiac utopian society. Cicero (*Pro Sest.* 136 ff.) identified an “idle society of pleasure” which he attacked. As Lyne puts it: “...but with the elegists the implicit is made explicit, and a veritable ‘alternative society’ now presents itself.” Lyne calls their way of life the “life of love.” See R.O.A.M. Lyne, “Servitium amoris”: *CQ* N.S. 29, 1 (1979): 117. Also see James’ book, Sharon L. James and ebrary Inc., *Learned Girls and Male Persuasion Gender and Reading in Roman Love Elegy*, Joan Palevsky Imprint in Classical Literature. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

Nec vagus ignotis repetens compendia terris/ Presserat externa navita merce
 ratem./
 Illo non validus subiit iuga tempore taurus,/ Non domito frenos ore momordit
 equus,/
 Non domus ulla fores habuit, non fixus in agris,/ Qui regeret certis finibus
 arva, lapis.
 Ipsae mella dabant quercus, ultroque ferebant / Obvia securis ubera lactis
 oves.
 Non acies, non ira fuit, non bella, nec ensem/Inmiti saevus duxerat arte faber./
 Nunc Iove sub domino caedes et vulnera semper,/ Nunc mare, nunc leti mille
 repente viae.

How well they lived in Saturn's reign, before the earth was laid open to long
 journeys! Not yet had the pine looked with scorn at the caerulean waves, and
 offered a blown out breast to the winds, nor had any wanderer seeking prizes
 from unknown lands pressed down his raft with foreign merchandise.
 At that time the strong bull had not yet gone under the yoke, the horse did not
 bite the reins with mastered mouth, not a house had doors or fixed boundary
 stones in the fields that rule over the flocks with certain markers. The oaks
 gave honey of themselves, and sheep stood by chance in the way with sure
 milk. No battle line, no anger was there, no wars, nor did the savage smith
 create the sword with his harsh art. Now, under lord Jove, always there are
 slaughters and wounds, now the sea, now a thousand roads open up suddenly
 to death (Tib. *Carm.* 1.3. 35-50).

The Tibullan *amator* also combines Dionysiac Golden Age imagery with the
 metaphor of slavery in 1.7. In this poem, Dionysos inverts normal modes of
 behavior, such as the natural divide between men and women, humans and
 animals, etc. He has links with fantasy and impossibility, important aspects of the
 servile perspective utopia. The Tibullan speaker describes the concept of wine as
 a tool of liberation in the contexts of farming and of imprisonment:

Bacchus et agricolae magno confecta labore/pectora laetitiae disoluenda
 dedit/Bacchus et afflictis requiem mortalibus affert / crura licet dura compede
 pulsa sonent.
 Bacchus grants the laborer's breast, crushed with great toil, to be released in
 joy, Bacchus brings rest to afflicted mortals, although ankles battered by a
 harsh chain may sound. (Tib. *Carm.* 1.7.38-42).

These Golden Age images, as represented by the rustic regime of Kronos, and

the liberating alcoholic stupor of Dionysos, are connected with successful *amor*, in the general context of pleasure-seeking *otium*. Thus, the *servus amoris* of elegy conveys a servile perspective, in that he wishes to be free from all responsibilities and serious concerns. His self-induced pose of servitude to his mistress, however, adds a new dimension to the traditional picture of the liberated slave in his comic utopia. The paradox of the elegiac lover's condition is that his servitude can be willing or unwilling; as we have seen, Propertius' amator interprets poetry as a means of exorcising his enslavement, whereas Tibullus is content to be tortured in enforced silence, if his mistress will be kind. Both stances are interpretations of different slave states; as we have seen in Plautus' plays, a "good" slave accepts his condition willingly, but is not necessarily always superior to the "bad" *servus callidus* when it is time to express *licentia*. Both are positions which are traditionally associated with enslavement, and which are proper, depending on the situation. This makes sense in view of the elegiac *amator's* desire to abdicate all responsibility and to receive no blame for doing so. If he is forced, helpless, to choose a life of love and an idyllic paradise of *otium* over the traditional responsibilities of the Roman citizen, who can blame him? Yet the elegiac poets also seem to enjoy making their utopian ideal go horribly wrong, and thus creating the opportunity for the punishment of the love-slave, albeit an ironic and comedic punishment. In this way, Augustan love-elegy introduces a new variation on the comedic servile perspective utopia in making a "slave of love" the author, speaker, and protagonist of the ideal world.

Conclusion: Servile Perspective Utopia

What is the fundamental connection of slavery with comic utopia? On one level, the presence of slaves creates a potential for contrast, since the complete inversion of their state clearly shows a shift in the balance of power. This breaking down of roles and boundaries is the province of Dionysos, and in a sense fundamentally produces the tension of drama. Even more essential is the religious conception of the time of Kronos/Saturn as an era of freedom for slaves. It follows from this concept that all power relations result from our civilized values, which, in the servile perspective fantasy, could once again be replaced by the unthinking, egalitarian happiness of comedy. Thus, the utopian spirit of this drama often involves the abolition or reversal of slavery. Slavery can also be a powerful tool of satiric criticism in a comic utopia. High-thinking protagonists come off as pragmatic power mongers when confronted with the simple question of who will do the hard work. The original impulse behind a utopian plan can be warped into a more familiar expression of imperialism, a term that is often equated with the idea of slavery in ancient Greece and Rome. Finally, the slave in comedy exists also on a figurative level, representing universal fears of powerlessness, but also a fantasy of freedom from responsibility. Just as in life, the slave character is a neutral figure, separate from the burning issues that dog the protagonists, and thus becomes an ideal vehicle for the narrative distance and irony required to take things less seriously.

These servile perspective utopias are not constructed with a view to the greatest possible good, and benefit to the “best” of the society. In fact, the

Classical servile perspective utopias stem from a religious tradition that describes an age of innocence and attempts to channel subversive humor in ritual. The wish-fulfilment of the “age of Kronos” neutralizes the dangerous aspects of the servile perspective, which seeks a selfish liberty and freedom of speech without consideration for slave status and the demands of labor. These servile perspective utopias, when combined with motifs of the dominant perspective, eventually give rise to the elements of magic, egalitarianism and parody that we associate with “canonical” utopian or dystopian works, such as Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels*. Nevertheless, the servile perspective utopias do have a relationship to the dominant perspective. The virtues lost with the age of innocence act as models for the creators of philosophical ideals, and in turn, the negative qualities implied by from the Fall consist of the problems Utopians must resolve: Authority, war, vice, inequality of property, and lack of leisure, to name a few. We consider some of these inherently evil, while others are contrivances of necessity, such as Hesiod’s good ἔργα, which force people to labor. Such ἀνάγκη lies at the root of the creation of *ponos* and slavery. The sense of impossibility attendant on myths of the Golden Age brings about the first political utopias that develop from the ideals of the past.¹⁰³

¹⁰³George Kateb says that utopian idealism is a part of human morality, “part of system of values which place harmony in the center,”stemming from myth of golden age. But utopia cannot be a return to primitivism. For instance, Socrates must, at the cost of primitive innocence, leave the “non-luxurious state in order to found the city of justice” (Kateb, *Utopia and its Enemies* [1963], 8-9).

Part Two: Dominant Perspective Utopia

Societies based on the dominant perspective reflect the ideology of masters rather than that of servants, and view the servile perspective values of liberation through hedonistic pleasure as “slavish.” A realistic setting for an ideal world forces its occupants to deal with problems such as warfare or poverty that servile perspective utopias can ignore or overcome by magical devices, avoiding the dampening effects of reality. In particular, warfare as a factor in a utopia’s success inevitably leads to the practice of slavery as a commuted death sentence for prisoners. Overall, classical philosophical attitudes towards war are ambiguous, since wars initiated with the aim of conquest or the attainment of wealth are coded as immoral, and are evidence of overweening *pleonexia*. Yet the need to defend oneself, and sometimes even attack another, was all too frequent in the ancient world, and any ideal society that made claims to authenticity or practicality had to consider it. Toil and poverty are also realistic obstacles in these utopias, associated with the value the dominant perspective places upon asceticism and painfully acquired virtue, the counterpart to the servile perspective’s fantastical, amoral abundance. The consignment of a “banausic” class to purely technical careers is the solution to the utopian labor problem, which is justified by manipulating slave-based ideology.

Ponos and *polemos* are the common ground of slavery and idealism. This holds true in examples from real life as well as literature. The brotherhood of the Pythagoreans, like the Athenian of Plato’s *Laws*, use the metaphor of slavery for the painful acquisition of ἐγκρατεῖα. The training of the Spartans focuses on

military success, as does that of Xenophon's ideal leaders and Plato's warrior class. Finally, accounts of slave rebellions in the Greek and Roman worlds show great preoccupation with the ideas of warfare, technology, and natural slavery as Aristotle formulated them.

In general, a problem with the historical and biographical tradition of the classical world is the extent to which "utopianization" corrupts the telling of actual events and renders them highly suspect. Further, stories of "real" dominant perspective utopias have a fictional aspect, as they tend to borrow utopian motifs from purely literary accounts. Thus, there are important parallels between solely literary and real utopias in terms of *topoi*. For instance, isolationism is an element of Pythagorean and Spartan life, as well as an aspect of Platonic utopias. This tendency to separate themselves from the rest of the world invests these societies with a sense of mystery and difficulty. Additionally, real-life cultures commonly idealize a period of their past if only to make a contrast with their contemporary evils; consider the ancient Romans' preoccupation with their early history, or the American idealization of pioneer days. Many fictional utopias reside in the past, and antiquity and permanence are prime utopian values. Real or fictional, utopian communities often separate themselves from their root society, attempting to create an identity that stems from a philosophy or reasoned process rather than standard cultural evolution. They are practical applications of literary and philosophical utopian ideas. Elements of elitism and authoritarianism that can create a basis for slavery are common in such groups in the classical world. However, just as in a successful fairy-tale, the integration of members into real-

life utopias seems a figurative transformation from a slave to a free state of existence.

Chapter five, the first concerning dominant perspective utopias, will address the limitation of technological growth by the practice of asceticism, which in turn promotes the incorporation of slavery into the societal structure. Since such a world prohibits slavery as a luxury, it is strictly prescribed and punitive and as such functions as a barometer of virtue. Central to this topic are the philosophical texts dealing with the development of slavery in terms of technology and immorality, such as the "City of Pigs" in book two of Plato's *Republic*, as well as the account of the fall of Atlantis in the *Critias* and *Timaeus*. Closely associated with this idea are Aristotle's interpretation of the slave as a tool in the *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, and his negative view of technology in general.

Chapter six concerns the concept of slavery of character in the context of education, and the possibility of slave-specific education in utopian models. This entails a continuation of the discussion of Aristotle's *Politics*, a work in which the slave functions as a negative educational example, yet ironically, slavery itself is a didactic paradigm in terms of the absolute and willing submission of the student to the master. To an extent, Plato, Xenophon, and the Pythagoreans share this idea. In a discussion of utopian education, the question arises whether there is any evidence for education for slaves specifically, since there is much more overwhelming evidence for education as a metaphorical model of a route into liberation. Concerning this topic, I explore the possibility of slave-specific education in Plato's *Laws*, and discuss the great ambiguity of Plato's attitude

towards conquest and slavery. The contrast between peaceful and warlike utopias is extremely revealing when one focuses on the issue of education. The role of warfare in *paedia* is a crucial point in interpreting Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Oikonomikos*, as well as literature on Sparta, the real life military "utopia," in which slavery and education were of paramount importance.

The discussion of the "real-life" dominant perspective utopias requires a chapter of its own, although many of the same issues are involved. Chapter seven deals with the contrast between two warlike and unwarlike systems, namely, the Spartans and Pythagoreans, reveals that these two groups, both often categorized as utopian, and having very similar modes of historical transmission, have very different approaches to slavery. The Pythagoreans diminished the role of slavery in their society, and relegated it as much as possible to a purely metaphorical construct. Since they opposed violence and war, they retained slavery primarily in its educational and archetypal sense, as a lengthy *ponos* through which eventual success conferred freedom.¹⁰⁴ As they pursued an internalized morality, they also attempted to internalize slavery. The Spartans, on the other hand, make large-scale enslavement and subjugation their public emblem of utopian success. The Helot system that enabled Sparta to specialize their elite became both the means and the end to the traditional interpretation of Sparta as utopian, as it supplied the citizens with a permanent system of warfare as well as a permanent enemy in their

¹⁰⁴ Although the Pythagoreans do not eschew slavery completely, we do see this among their spiritual heirs, the Essenes and the Therapeutae, as described by Philo of Alexandria in *Every Good Man Is Free* 12.79 and *On the Contemplative Life* 3.71.

slaves. Besides its central bellicosity, the utopian aspects of Sparta focus on permanence and traditionalism. Many of the tales concerning Sparta rely on a nostalgic worship of their “Lycurgan” constitution.

Chapter Five: Ἀρετή καὶ Σχολή : Slavery and Technology in the Classical Utopia

The fact is that civilization requires slaves. The Greeks were quite right there. Unless there are slaves to do the ugly, horrible, uninteresting work, culture and contemplation become almost impossible. Human slavery is wrong, insecure and demoralizing. On mechanical slavery, the slavery of the machine, the future of the world depends...There will be great storages of force for every city, and for every house if required, and this force man will convert into light, heat, and motion, according to his needs. Is this Utopian? A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realization of Utopias.¹⁰⁵

Σχολή (leisure) was a prerequisite for attaining virtue in many classical societies, as well as a release from the daily grind of toil. The common demand for leisure is a major link between the servile and dominant perspective utopias, since they both need it, either for virtue or pleasure. According to its use of σχολή, one can describe a utopia in terms of the dominant and servile perspectives discussed in the introduction. In the former case, asceticism limits the need for luxury and extra work, reduces the call for slaves, and naturally leads to more free time. A high value is placed on the control of the passions, and those who fail to repress them are identified as slaves. Such slavery can be metaphorical or actual, but in both cases creates an educational tool by means of a negative example. In the heavily stratified political utopias, slavery functions as the symbol of moral weakness, as well as the tool of leisure by which the free can achieve “complete” virtue. The idea of willing slavery can also have a positive function,

¹⁰⁵ Oscar Wilde, "The Soul of Man under Socialism," in *De Profundis and Other Writings* (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), 33-34.

when the passions acquiesce to the leadership of intelligence. The acceptance of moral grounds for leadership by extension becomes the justification for slavery. In turn, the attachment of a stigma to certain professions that are proper to slaves only creates a method for the avoidance of change. The most salient examples of this phenomenon are the “constructed political societies,” such as we see in the work of Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon, models that presume the same technological level under which the author’s contemporaries actually lived at the time, yet which entail a decided rejection of luxury, the fruit of industry. This goes along with a conservative ideology, which sees technology as the root of destructive change, yet unavoidable at a basic level, as well as a *fait accompli*.

Utopian paradigms stemming from the dominant perspective quite consciously reject the Golden Age fantasy of automatic abundance; this difference is clear when the author abandons the magical luxury scenario for a more realistic one, depicting humans at an early, even primeval stage of development. Characters such as the Platonic Socrates idealized an ascetic, anti-technological mode of existence. In Socrates’ portrayal of the early rustic humans’ life in book two of the *Republic*, what resources people do have they share in an egalitarian mode, and they have plenty of free time. They do not aim at a lifestyle much greater than subsistence level. Because the members of this society simply do not know anything about slavery, or war, or even the work necessary to move beyond their basic state, it is not a state of paradise, but of innocence. The important thing is that it is an achievable state, unlike Hesiod’s χρύσειον γένος version. Socrates constructs a possible human life that is potentially attainable again.

Ironically, although this ideal does not require slaves, its values eventually lead to utopian slavery. The unconscious simplicity of the primitive world without slaves gives rise to the great value placed on asceticism in the dominant perspective utopias that develop from this idealized yet realistic view. The slave worker is unnecessary in the simple, rough primeval society, but when the constructed political utopia emerges from its basic roots the relationship of the slave to the tool, and to the development of technology, is clearly drawn.

As a point of departure, the chapter of Plato's *Republic* in which Socrates sketches the model state begins with the "rustic" or rudimentary society, colorfully named "the City of Pigs" (Plato *Rep.* 2. 367e- 372a). He describes a group that supplies the needs sufficient to survival. Its members are vegetarian; the group is small with only enough individuals, each specialized in a certain function, to ensure the physical well being of all. Each sees to each other's wants without the necessity of any political, or power relations. At Glaucon's protest, however, that he would have the citizens of his state "live on dry bread and butter," Socrates adds luxury into the ideal city-state, putting meat eating, shepherds, flute-girls, poets, and doctors into the mix. Then he calmly states that with all these new people and habits to support, "we'll want to cut off a chunk of our neighbor's territory, too." (Plato *Rep.* 2.373e-374.a). Here is the origin of the warrior caste of the *Republic*. The suggestion that luxury eventually requires conquest, although it does not amount to a categorical justification of slavery, creates the situation from which the vicious cycle of slavery naturally arises. In fact, the description of the new demand for a "service industry" directly precedes

that of the need for warfare. The City of Pigs lacks the basis for the large labor requirements to support a higher standard of living. It is interesting that Socrates admits the need for luxury, warfare, and power relations before he organizes a fully evolved complex. The idyll of simplicity, a kind of rural socialism, must be abandoned in favor of progress once the addictive fruits of progress have been tried. Yet as the *Republic* progresses, the dialectic construction of the new state and the education of the guardian class involves the analysis and rejection of almost every single one of the luxuries and services Socrates has just listed here. Most people would not willingly reject any “advancements” made in civilized life, yet in this *polis* they must do that very thing, and do it consciously. In this way, the rustic simplicity of the “City of Pigs” informs the morality of the full-blown state, tempered by a conservative bent towards luxury. The higher up one is in this society, the more sparsely, like “a soldier on campaign,” one must live. The question remains of whether there is a difference in the prescribed approach to luxury for the lower classes of the *Republic* as well.

Luxury in Plato’s works connotes higher technology, and he connects the issue with a sense of being out of control, unbridled desire for conquest and enslavement. The dialogue that illustrates this connection most clearly is the *Critias*, the unfinished sequel to the *Timaeus*. The advanced inventions of the Atlanteans create an exponential increase in their desire for more, a *pleonexia* of inventions, wealth and power. Their luxurious and elaborate devices, buildings and systems catalyze their imperialist temperament, and eventually a vicious cycle of the two creates an inevitable downward spiral. By contrast, an anti-

technological utopia, ancient Athens of ten thousand years ago, highlights this slippery slope of technology. One can construe these two mythological lands as case studies in the servile and dominant utopian perspectives, which undermine the former, and support the latter.

Additionally, in both the *Critias* and the *Timaeus*, the identity of the eponymous character adds a thematic dimension to the text. The *Timaeus* focuses on the connection of the ancient Athenians with their spiritual heirs, the Egyptians, as well as the connection of the story with the habits and politics of Athens itself. In addition, Timaeus the Pythagorean sage, who since he is known only from this dialogue may possibly be an invention of Plato, invokes the ideal world on a divine level, as his subject matter, the creation of the universe and the gods infers. This fits in with the never-ending quality of Pythagorean views of reincarnation; like human souls reborn, the reappearance of the utopian qualities in ancient Athens, Egypt, and even the more recent Athens of Solon is connected with divine permanence. Yet Critias, possibly the infamous Critias of the Thirty Tyrants, or else his grandfather, makes the introduction to his discourse on the heavenly spheres. The fact that the Atlanteans, power-mad enemy of the ancient Athenians, are described fully in the *Critias* itself is very suggestive. It is not to the point to address the controversy over who exactly is the Critias of the dialogue, since I think that Plato makes this purposely ambiguous. It is fairly likely that the story is not placed in the mouth of the reputed “enslaver” of the Athenian democracy and a pro-Spartan, oligarchic extremist, but in that of his grandfather of the same name. Nevertheless, the fact that Plato uses several

generations of the Critean *genos* to make his statement about a culture falling away from an ideal state foreshadows the actions of the oligarch Critias, and the eventual collapse of the Athenian democracy.¹⁰⁶ Atlantis and Critias himself both represent the generational forces of change, driven by desire for empire, technology and slavery.

In the *Timaeus* the literary context relates to concepts of utopian permanence. The description of the habits of the early Athenians is insulated from the time of the dialogue by several distancing devices, all of which concern Athenian public affairs. Thus, the story always relates to the present situation of the Athenians, but reinforces the links with the past by a sense of repetition, or reincarnation. The *Timaeus* begins with an establishment of philosophical context, as Socrates mentions that on the previous day, they had created an ideal “*politeia*” in conversation (Plato *Tim.* 20 a-22 b). The desire of Socrates to see his ideal *polis* in action, not just sketched in dialogue, inspires Critias to tell the tale of Atlantis, portrayed as a “real” place. Nevertheless, the several levels separating the tale from the dialogue function as buffers between a philosophically constructed city and a “real” city that is actually fictional. Each retelling of the story has its own philosophical significance; for instance, Critias’ description of hearing the tale from his grandfather, and the emphasis he places on the transmission from an

¹⁰⁶Rosenmeyer addresses the controversy on the identity of the title character of the *Critias*, one which has continued since John Burnet’s *Early Greek Philosophy*. Burnet was the first to argue in 1914 that the Critias of the dialogue could not be the oligarch, as he defines himself as an old man. See John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed. (London: A. & C. Black, 1930). Part 1, 338, note 3. Also see Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, “The Family of Critias” *The American Journal of Philology* 70, no. 4 (1949): 404.

elder to a receptive child, underscores once again the Platonic emphasis on education. Although Critias professes not to remember everything Socrates discussed concerning the abstract *polis* of dialectic, he remembers the tale his grandfather told him perfectly, as he heard it in childhood, at the *Apaturia*. At this political rite of passage, the registration of youth in the city, the elder Critias having hearing many poems of Solon, tells how he heard the story of Atlantis from the famous poet and lawgiver as well. The ascription of the tale to Solon has the effect of associating the story with the practical labors that Solon undertook to balance the affairs of state in his day, and in general, the reorganization of states, not to mention the freeing of debt slaves. The next link in the utopian descent of Athens is that Solon undertook these reforms after he heard the story from the priest of Neith, the Egyptian Athena. This priest and his fellow citizens of the district of Sais greatly honored the Athenians, and maintained a constitution and habits exactly like the ones of Socrates' ideal *polis*. The Egyptian priest (via Solon and the two Critiases) briefly summarizes their habits and constitution, based, he says, on those of Athens of ten thousand years before. The final step to the tale of Atlantis lies in the archives of the temple of Neith, from which the Egyptian priest takes his story. By maintaining a connection with Socrates' contemporary *polis*, the *Timaeus* fulfils Socrates' wish to see an ideal city "in action." Nevertheless, since the ideal must be permanent to fit the parameters of utopia, Critias passes through many different layers of storytelling, to find Socrates philosophical model as a *muthos*, a childhood tale that "accidentally" illustrates their contemporary findings of dialectic.

In contrast, where the *Timaeus* focuses on utopian permanence, the *Critias* examines the corrupting effects of change. Particularly, technological change can generate unjust enslavement and abuse of power. Critias sketches in detail the relative merits of the people of Atlantis, and their contemporaries and rivals, the Athenians of a thousand years ago. The landscape of Athens is more bountiful than in Plato's time, but relatively familiar. Whereas Atlantis is extremely rich and exotic, possessing all sorts of fruits and riches (Plato *Crit.* 115b-c), the Athenians are fixed in their customs and laws, maintaining the most virtuous possible mores. As Critias says, Athens was fertile in those days, covered with earth, and so was able to support an army without having the warriors spend any time farming or in any other labor, and they do not take more than they absolutely need from the farming classes (Plato *Crit.* 110d-111e). He stresses the unity and unchanging institutions of the old Athens: the number of warriors does not alter; the spring of water is always the same temperature. (Plato *Crit.* 112c-d). There is no indication of expansionism, luxury or technology going wildly out of control; in fact, they seem to maintain sameness as a virtue. In contrast, the ancient Atlanteans' technological achievements are described in detail. Their culture employed bridges, much decoration with gold and silver (which the ancient Athenians did not use at all), elaborate irrigation systems, and a huge canal. Of this last it is said:

τὸ δὲ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τό τε μήκος αὐτῆς ἄπιστον μὲν λεχθέν, ὡς χειροποίητον ἔργον, πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διαπονημασι τοσοῦτον εἶναι, ῥητέον δὲ ὅ γε ἠκούσαμεν...

In respect to its size and weight and length it seems unbelievable that a man-made work should be so great in comparison with other works of toil... (Plato *Crit.* 118 c-d).

The description of Atlantis conveys a sense of wealth and technology advancing together apace. At first, the Atlanteans are not “drunken with wantonness” because of their wealth, as they see that the luxuries of the physical world are perishable, unlike their divine ancestry. Eventually, however, they succumb to the temptations of riches and begin to act basely, and the final lines of the almost certainly unfinished *Critias* describe their behavior perjoratively.¹⁰⁷ (Plato *Crit.*120-121b-c). When the Atlanteans plan to conquer the Greek mainland and the Athenians, they are surely setting themselves up for the utter destruction of their continent mentioned in the *Timaeus*. Although they possess the means to enslave and conquer others, they do not have the moral organization that justifies mastery. The inception of their worsening behavior is described in terms of the perceptions of two imaginary, hypothetical audiences-“someone” with the ability to see clearly, who realizes that the Atlanteans are gradually becoming “shameful,” and on the other hand, “those unable to see the truly blessed life.” This latter group, which embodies the servile perspective, sees the Atlanteans as “altogether blessed.” Those of a slavish temperament admire the enslavers, who themselves are subject to disastrous passions:

¹⁰⁷ Welliver’s theory is that Plato actually left the *Critias* unfinished intentionally in order to villainize Critias by associating him with the sudden disastrous intervention of Zeus in the fate of Atlantis. This seems unlikely, as it is very uncharacteristic for Plato to allow the context to outweigh the content of one of his dialogues. As Gill points out in his article “The Genre of the Atlantis Story,” this would be more convincing if Welliver was arguing that Plato presents the oligarch Critias here, rather than his grandfather. See Warman Welliver, *Character, Plot and Thought in Plato's Timaeus-Critias* (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 32; passim; Christopher Gill, “The Genre of the Atlantis Story,” *Classical Philology* 72, no. 4 (1977): 292.

καὶ πολλάκις ἀνακεραυνυμένη, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον ἦθος ἐπεκράτει, τότε ἤδη τὰ παρόντα φέρειν ἀδυνατοῦντες ἠσχημόνουν, καὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ μὲν ὄραν αἰσχροὶ κατεφαίνοντο, τὰ κάλλιστα ἀπὸ τῶν τιμιωτάτων ἀπολλύντες, τοῖς δὲ ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἀληθινὸν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν βίον ὄραν τότε δὴ μάλιστα πάγκαλοι μακάριοί τε ἐδοξάζοντο εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἀδίκου καὶ δυνάμεως ἐμπιμπλάμενοι. θεὸς δὲ ὁ θεῶν Ζεὺς ἐν νόμοις βασιλεύων, ἅτε δυνάμενος καθορᾶν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐννοήσας γένος ἐπεικὲς ἀθλίως διατιθέμενον, δίκην αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι βουληθεῖς, ἵνα γένοιοντο ἐμμελέστεροι σωφρονησθέντες...

Through so often being mixed, the human character came to predominate, and at that point, because they were unable to withstand their property, they became dishonored, and began to appear shameful to one who was able to see it, having destroyed their greatest beauties from their most honorable parts. To those, however, unable to see the truth about the blessed life, then indeed they seemed altogether beautiful and blessed, being in truth completely filled up with violent desire for injustice and power. Then King Zeus, God of Gods in Law, as he could see what sort of things they were doing, judged them a noble race gone wrong. He wished them to pay the penalty, in order that they might be more harmonious, once they were taught a lesson (Plato *Crit.* 120e-121b-c).

The idea of the different perception of what constitutes true blessedness reveals Plato's consciousness of the servile and dominant perspective utopias. To those (significantly, in the plural) who idealize luxury and see freedom in terms of power, the Atlantians' *pleonexia* appears as a utopian state. This is the majority view, that of "οἱ πολλοί" who in the Athens of Plato's own time also consider the ideal world to be one of instant gratification. On the other hand, the singular individual who sees "correctly" recognizes this as the opposite of the dominant perspective utopian ideal. With this contrast of the singular and plural, the aristocrat Plato subtly creates a diametrical opposition of the two utopian perspectives.

Another implied connection with themes of enslavement lies in the maritime interest of the two dialogues. In history and literature, nautical technology has a profound connection with slavery. In the classical world, this was especially true

of Athens. Without ships, the potential slave population becomes strictly limited to enemies accessible by land; probably closer neighbors against whom it may be more difficult to create an ideological pretext for enslavement. Pirates had been notorious slavers for centuries by Plato's time, and the greatest epic battle of Greek literature, the *Iliad*, culminates in the naval enslavement of the Trojan women. In general, sailing is associated with luxury, foreign people, and goods, and the slave falls into all three categories. Thus, although none of the speakers of the *Critias* or *Timaeus* specifically expresses the possibility of unjust enslavement, Plato's Athenian readers would certainly have fully understood the consequences of sea-conquest.

Pierre Vidal-Nacquet¹⁰⁸ suggests that Plato specifically attacks naval technology in the *Critias* and *Timaeus*. Quite rightly, he states the importance of looking at the two cities together; pointing out that the conflict between proto-Athens and Atlantis is paradigmatic. Proto-Athens is the model for the reverent (εὐσεβής) city of the *Republic*; whereas Atlantis is "warlike" (πολεμικός). Vidal-Nacquet is amused that some scholars try to locate Atlantis geographically, seeing it as he does as a metaphorical counterpart.¹⁰⁹ He sees the point of the fable as a cautionary tale and etiology of sailing.¹¹⁰ Atlantis, in its aggressive, malignant aspect creates a pattern for sailing culture associated with warlike qualities. Proto-

¹⁰⁸ Pierre Vidal-Nacquet, "Athènes et l'Atlantide: Structure et signification d'un mythe Platonicien," *Revue des études grecques* 77, no. July-Dec. (1964): 426.

¹⁰⁹ Barbara Pischel, *Die Atlantische Lehre* (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), J. V. Luce, *Lost Atlantis: New Light on an Old Legend*; James W. Mavor, Jr. *Voyage to Atlantis*; Otto Muck, *The Secret of Atlantis*, (New York, 1978).

¹¹⁰ Vidal-Nacquet (1964): 438.

Athens, on the other hand, does no sailing at all; it is associated with the element of earth in the form of its plentiful topsoil, a very different landscape from Plato's day (Plato *Crit.* 111 b-d). Even in the great cataclysm, the Athenian warriors are swallowed up by the Earth, and the Atlanteans, in contrast, by water. Thus, Vidal-Naquet defines Atlantis as the "other" city, contrasting with Athens in heightened relief. The tidal wave washes all the earth of Athens away and it becomes the long bare-bones promontory to the sea that we know today, a site condemned by its lack of topsoil to permanent seafaring. As seafaring was the downfall of the Atlanteans, causing them to swell with hubristic wealth, and unjust imperialism, Vidal-Naquet's hypothesis seems attractive enough, and is consistent with Plato's rejection of technology in this tale, and his cautionary statement to the Athens of his own day. Nevertheless, Vidal-Naquet looks at the story too much in a vacuum, and neglects the role of the characters Critias and Timaeus; in particular, the fact that Critias is at least associated with the pro-Spartan oligarch falls outside of Vidal-Naquet's purely anti-navigational thesis. The *Timaeus* and *Critias* represent two different aspects of utopian thought in the classical world, the permanency of the dominant perspective values, as opposed to the inevitable degradation of technology, politics and wealth.

One might deduce from all this that Plato would reject slavery along with naval technology, imperialism and luxury. In his time, he must have witnessed the great advancements of engineering and art, as well as the political structure that gave Athens its glory and power, and elevated the common people into a force to reckon with. He saw this very success leading his city into acts of greed, pride and

folly. Yet he is not making a complete denial of technology, rather a criticism of technology that goes beyond a certain stage. Advancement in science and technology tends to bring about change in society, and Plato has sense of change as decay, not a normal process of growth. The Athenians of the *Critias* are superior to the Atlanteans for many reasons, but most of all because they maintain stable habits, making a virtue of consistency. Likewise, Socrates calls the “City of Pigs” the true and healthy state, although he slyly lets it go, knowing that the introduction of vice in his community will give him a pretext to define justice in a complex city-state. His true ideal, however, is pre-technological. Plato’s stratification of society stems from the difficulties of subsistence in the ancient world. With technology undeveloped, equality must fail if a utopia progresses beyond complete rusticity. Yet Plato’s mores retain simplicity, the virtue of the primitive, egalitarian community, in his hierarchical Republic. Only the upper classes, the fully ascetic, are worthy to rule and practice communism, and slavery is a way to identify and keep in check those who cannot master their desires. In fact, it makes sense that Plato accepts slavery, as the concepts of “mastery” and “slavery” are key to his structure of the soul as well as the state.¹¹¹ Just as the

¹¹¹ As Gregory Vlastos demonstrates in his article “Slavery in Plato’s Thought,” the language of slavery is key to this idea, as he uses different variants of “*Douleia*” to describe the relationship of the parts of the soul, putting slavery in a positive light. It is right and proper for the passions to be ‘enslaved to the intellect, (Plato *Rep.* 4. 444e), just as in the *Laws* proper obedience to the right authorities is “*douleia*” as well (*Laws* 6.777d, 6. 793 e). Thus, the relationship of the farmer and artisan class is correct in its subservience to the Guardians, who master parts of the soul that they cannot (*Rep.* 10.590 cd). Therefore, it is quite natural that Plato would not question slavery as an institution, since his worldview presupposes inherent and absolute inferiority and superiority predicated on the presence of logos.

farmers and artisans are subservient to the warriors and Guardians, the emotions and passions must serve courage and intelligence in the soul. Just as the ancient Athenians overcome the imperialist Atlanteans, whoever is self-contained and satisfied is “freer” than one who desires more.

Xenophon conceives mastery of the self and of others as a *techne* in its own right. When he describes the training of slaves in the *Oikonomikos*, he arrives at the same *topos* of asceticism as Plato does, although in a contradictory fashion. First, he suggests that the methods used for training dogs are also useful for inculcating compliance in slaves; since most slaves obey their appetites, all one needs to do is fill their bellies to inspire their loyalty (Xen. *Oik.* 13.6-10). He acknowledges, however, that there are certain innate characteristics, even in slaves, that fit them for success as the owner’s surrogate as housekeeper or foreman; for example, a good memory, or a talent for inspiring others to work well. Socrates can exclaim with shock that a slave may be so well trained as to be able to properly allocate tasks to others. If one takes this to its logical extreme, such a slave could even teach kings (Xen. *Oik.* 13. 4-5). Thus, Xenophon’s dialecticians describe mastery itself as an art, or *techne*, which is transmittable even to the “*douloi*” (slaves).

Aristotle goes to great trouble to refute this idea in the *Politics*, a work that deals profoundly with slavery and technology in the ideal state. By positing the three different types of rule: political (over a wife), kingly (over a child), and despotic (over a slave), he undermines the case for a slave who learns the “art” of

mastery being fit to rule. In addition, according to his description of virtue, mere knowledge of the “*techne*” of ruling other slaves does not make the slave fit to be a master. For that, one must possess “complete virtue.”¹¹²

According to Aristotle, the perfect organism is complex, and always contains a “ruled and ruling part.”¹¹³ He agrees with Plato in describing the ruling part as the intelligence and the ruled the passions, but differs in the “completeness” he demands for his virtuous citizen. Not only must this citizen be ascetic, but courageous as well, and wise to boot, possessing *phronesis*, or the ability to distinguish between noble and base; whereas Plato depicts each part ruling the other separately. In addition, he is supposed to study the arts, such as music, but never too much of one subject. If any aspect of virtue, such as the warrior spirit, is lacking in the citizen, he is a “natural slave,” capable of belonging to another (Arist. *Pol.* 1254 b 20). Finally, the natural *eleutheros* should have a genetic advantage, but Aristotle is willing to sacrifice this in cases where there are obvious strengths of mind or character. It does not matter how good his raw material is, though, if the citizen does not receive a proper upbringing. This leads

¹¹² Aristotle discusses the idea of “complete virtue,” and the idealism of the city at *Politics* 1.1253a1. His argument roughly runs: All people need a city in order to fulfill their highest function. Those without a city are either base or superhuman. The city reaches a full level of self-sufficiency, and “exists for the sake of living well” (i. e., what is best for self-sufficiency, or what is most complete). Therefore city exists “by nature” and man is a political animal.

¹¹³ ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἐν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διηρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις.”
 ... for as many things as come from many and become one thing in common, either from the same sorts of sources, or different, appear in all cases to have a ruling and ruled part, and this phenomenon, coming from all of nature, is present in living creatures...(Arist. *Pol.* 1254a. 29-30).

to the Greek term for leisure, σχολη, from which we derive our term, ‘school.’

The concept of “τέχνη” in ancient Greece is bound up with a certain amount of prejudice against laborers, whom Aristotle calls “βαναύσοι,” (“menial,” literally “furnace working”) although they may be skilled. (Arist. *Pol.* 1277 b1) A person who spent most of the time engaged in some technical work, including a specialist such as a poet or doctor, did not have sufficient σχολή, in Aristotle’s mind, to develop all the facets of full virtue. (Arist. *Pol.* 1338 b, 9-1339 b) This included slaves, but Aristotle no doubt considered many prominent free craftsmen of the day worthy of slavery as well; in fact he thought the problem with natural slaves is that there were too many of them walking around free.¹¹⁴ In the

¹¹⁴This “condition” of natural slavery was derived, in addition to bad luck in the genetic lottery, to poor social conditions as well, thus education is an indispensable tool for becoming “ελευθερος”: a state which Aristotle considers diametrically opposed to that of the slave:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεισθαι τῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθερίων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθερίων φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βαναύσον. Βαναύσον δ’ ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. Διὸ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας· ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιούσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινὴν. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν τινὸς ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἔνοχον ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκεν πράττει τις ἢ μαθάνει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι’ ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων δι’ ἄλλους πολλάκις θητικὸν καὶ δουρικὸν δόξειεν ἂν πράττειν.

It is not unclear that it is required to teach the necessary elements of practical affairs. But on the other hand, not in respect to all things, for it is clear that free and servile activities are different, and that someone must partake of only as many such useful activities as do not render the participant banausic. It is necessary to define as banausic any practise, that art, or science, as may render useless the body, the soul, or the understanding of free people for the useful occupations and practices of virtue. On this account, we call such skills banausic as make the body

Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle also discusses different relations between human beings, and in the case of the slave, posits the same rules as he gives in the case of the artisan and his tools; they have no friendship and no justice. The idea that a slave is “a tool with a soul” whereas other tools are “slaves without souls” lies at the heart of his view of complete devotion to any τέχνη as banausic.¹¹⁵

worse, and the wage earning trades. For they make the understanding too busy, as well as base. It is not servile to participate in some liberal branches of knowledge up to a point, but excessive labor to the point of harshness is generally characterized by the aforementioned problems. It makes much difference why someone acts or learns. For although to do something may not be servile for one's own sake, for one's friends, or on account of virtue, someone doing the same thing for others might appear like a hired laborer or slave (Arist. *Pol.* 1337b, 1-21).

¹¹⁵ ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δούλον· ὠφελείται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βούν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δούλον ἢ δούλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δούλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δούλος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δούλος, οὐκ ἐστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλείον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὔσιν. For in a tyranny there is no, or small friendship. In those circumstances where there is nothing in common for the ruler and the ruled, there is no friendship. Neither is there justice. It is the same sort of relation as that of the tool to the workman, the body to the soul, and the slave to the master. For all of these, on the one hand, are benefited by being used, but there can be no friendship, or justice, for inanimate objects. Just so, there is none for a horse or an ox, or for a slave inasmuch as he is a slave, for there is nothing in common between them. The slave is a tool with a soul, and the tool is a slave without a soul. Inasmuch, then, as he is a slave, there is no possibility of friendship with him, but inasmuch as he is a man. It seems that there is some just element that belongs to every person in in regards to everyone else who is able to share in common law and custom. Indeed, there is friendship, inasmuch as someone is a man. Among tyrants, in fact, friendships and justice make up a small element, but among the democrats, a large one. For there are many things in common among equals (Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 1161b 6-8).

Aristotle does not want to admit that friendship with slaves is possible, but he is forced begrudgingly to allow the possibility, only “inasmuch as they are human beings rather than tools.” This is explicable in terms of Aristotle’s contempt for utilitarian impulses that do not consider human relationships. People who are educated in a technological field only to achieve material gain never leave the confines of a tool-based mentality. To Aristotle’s mind, they are best off remaining “speaking tools.” Thus, training in technology goes against Aristotle’s definition of what a free person should attempt, and he removes the *eleutheroi* from specialization in any craft. Aristotle cannot deny the essential role of technology, but he undermines the humanity of laborers as much as possible by equating them spiritually with the tools they use. As Aristotle wants his ideal character to attain a mean between all extreme qualities, the increase of luxury through technological advancement is an idea he would oppose. Leisure is a luxury that slaves can supply without the need for extra technology, thus Aristotle needs to keep slaves in his ideal state of the *Politics*, since they supply leisure to his more privileged classes. Yet Aristotle does seem to be able to envisage a world where slaves are not necessary for this purpose when he makes the point, familiar from Old Comedy, that if tools would work by themselves, we would need no slaves:

εἰ γὰρ ἠδύνατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀποτελεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, καὶ ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἢ τοὺς τοῦ Ἥφαιστου τρίποδας, οὓς φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θεῖον δύεσθαι ἄγωνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον αὐταὶ καὶ τὰ πλήκτρα ἐκιθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δούλων.

For if each tool was able to accomplish its work, either on command, or anticipating it beforehand, just as they say the tools of Daidalos did, or the tripods of Hephaistos, which the poet says “entered all on their own the

divine assembly,” if thus shuttles wove of themselves, or plectrums strummed the kithara, then there would be no need of assistants for builders, or of slaves for masters (Arist. *Pol.* 1253 b34-39).

This leads one to question what Aristotle foresees in the case of such a technological leap; would the “natural slaves” then begin to be able to receive virtue-breeding leisure as well? Could they simply be eliminated? According to David Brion Davis, this passage refers only to the functional role of slaves who would still be ethical inferiors.¹¹⁶ Indeed, Aristotle does not believe a slave capable of profound knowledge; in fact, he thinks the skill of slaves lies in the realm of technique and imitation, never the true discernment of the noble from the base.¹¹⁷ If virtue is the end of Aristotle’s ideal, then everything else is a tool to achieve it. Therefore, even with the sort of technology he describes in this passage, which is reminiscent of the freedom from labor supplied in the servile perspective utopias, he would want to retain an ethical hierarchy. The virtuous should compel the non-virtuous, their labor-saving “animate tools,” to supply them with free time in which to be as good as they can possibly be:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπάρχειν· τέλος γάρ, ὡς περ εἴρηται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου σχολὴ δ’ ἀσχολίας.

But since the the same aim seems to exist for people, as individuals and in common, and the best man and the best polity seem to have the same

¹¹⁶David Brion Davis, *Slavery and Human Progress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 25.

¹¹⁷Aristotle thinks slaves share reason sufficiently to perceive it, but not to have it (Arist. *Pol.* 1.5.1254b20). Thus they cannot really reason themselves or they would not be slaves. They may have “reasoning” and be clever or skilled, but they lack prudence or nobility. Slaves by nature have a certain “condition” which comes about not only at “generation,” but also by training.

necessary definition, it is clear that there is need for the virtues of free time. For as it is often said, peace is the goal of war, and leisure the goal of business (Arist. *Pol.* 1344a, 11-16).

Here Aristotle underscores the importance of leisure on an individual level as well as that of the community. Like Plato, he sees the group benefit as intrinsically related to that of one person. Concerning war and peace, the tension and effort involved in concluding these pursuits with success are conceived in terms of didactic leisure. To the dominant perspective, *scholē* is explicated as a utopian tool, rather than a goal in of itself, as it exists in the servile perspective utopia.

χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσι πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ. δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν ὅπως ἐξῆ σχολάζειν· διὸ σώφρονα τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικὴν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις, οἳ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως δούλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν.

But those of the virtues regarding leisure and its application are useful, both those that relate to the activities of leisure, as well as to those of business. For it is necessary for there to be sufficient quantities of necessary things in order for one to be able to pass leisure time. On this account, it is fitting for a city to be moderate and brave and tough. For according to the proverb, leisure is not for slaves, but those unable to encounter dangers bravely are the slaves of those coming against them (Arist. *Pol.* 1344a, 16-22).

Here he pinpoints the mutually exclusive relationship of slavery and leisure. It takes educational *scholē* to construct a character that can rise to deal with a crisis if necessary, whether military or in business. Without this character, a person is “enslavable” because he is lacking in courage and can be subdued. Additionally, these virtues teach proper use of leisure time, as the passage goes on to say:

ἀνδρείας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσכולίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν, σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρόνοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ’ εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον.

Therefore, for business one needs courage and endurance, for leisure time, philosophy, in both periods, temperance and justice, and even more so for those keeping the peace and passing free time. For the practice of war necessitates that men should be just and moderate, yet the enjoyment of good fortune and the conduct of leisure with peacetime instead makes them prideful (Arist. *Pol.* 1344a, 22-28).

This signifies the contrast between the inertia of character that often comes as a default in peace, as opposed to the character-building properties of war. It is crucial for those in either state to use leisure for educational, virtuous pursuits, but particularly those at peace are at risk of becoming luxurious and therefore slavish men.

πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης μετέχειν τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἰ τινές εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις·

Therefore the ones need much justice and much temperance who seem to do the best, and enjoy all blessings, just like, as the poets say, the ones who are in the Isles of the Blest (Arist. *Pol.* 1344a, 28-31).

This is Aristotle's most emphatically worded statement of the utopian nature of his imaginary state. The crux of the matter is that the ideal society, that is, the people living in the happiest possible state of blessedness, will have to make the best use of this time, if they are not to degenerate from their blessed state. Therefore in order for to remain and persevere in their superlative status, they must cultivate the arts of leisure, otherwise known as the "liberal" arts. If they are not to develop softness or "insolence," (*hubris*) the vices of peace, they need to practice the arts of war to generate the counteractive virtues of war, wisdom and temperance. Aristotle does not specify if justice is also an art of war. To the same degree, freedom and the proper use of leisure amount to practicing no activity out of economic necessity, and consequently with a technical specialization, but only

as a didactic tool of character.

μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ σπουδαίαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέχειν, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθοῦς, εἰρήνην δ' ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώδεις. διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν.

Rather, those need philosophy, temperance, and justice most of all, who are passing their free time with an unstinting amount of such goods. On account of this, therefore, it is clear why a city that is seriously intending to be fortunate must take part in these virtues. For it is characteristic of a base person to be unable to use good things, still more so to be unable to make use of leisure. Likewise it is base for those to appear good when busy, occupied in war, but who when living in peace and at leisure, act like chattel. On account of this, it is not fitting for the city to seek after virtue in the manner of the Lacedaimomnians (Arist. *Pol.* 1344a, 31-40).

This passage is particularly interesting for its condemnation of the Spartan specialization in war. The warriors who possess the virtue of courage, may be victorious, but do not know how to conduct themselves properly or appreciate what they have. Aristotle infers then that for those who acquire leisure through slaves, and who are the most blessed in a material sense, there is a corresponding demand for education on how to the proper use of such leisure. The aristocratic ideal of *scholē* depends on the dual sense of slavery. Slavery is the tool by which the ruling class comes to run the “Isles of the Blest,” and at the same time supplies a negative example of the sort of pleasures to avoid once one has arrived there. The idea of certain pleasures as “slavish” hearkens back to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle describes them as the desires that do not differ substantially from those of animals, such as food and sex. (Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 1111b, 1117a). As animals are also animate tools, like slaves, these desires are

correspondingly denigrated. Since people are ἔλευθεροί only inasmuch as they display qualities that are peculiarly human, the opportunity for intemperance supplied by peace is a crucial factor in the makeup of the slavish character.

Aristotle and Plato seem to have based their views on slavery and technology in an ideal world on two main factors. First, slave labor was relatively familiar and stable, unlike new technology. Second, the dominant perspective utopia entails the integration of the concept of slavery of character. Historically, the classical association of slavery with all types of manual labor made disaffected slaves and unmotivated masters. Utopian philosophers addressed these problems, but retained the ideology of slavery in their ideal societies. They deal with what they think to be the main consequences of slavery. Slaves may lack an incentive to improve their work, since they do not benefit substantially from it.¹¹⁸ We can

¹¹⁸F. W. Walbank ascribes to the traditional liberal theory as to why widespread slavery was responsible for the lack of technological development in the ancient world, and its eventual economic collapse. The ancients never took steps toward industrialization although they made progress in other areas of endeavor. For instance the Periclean democracy possessed an advanced level of political construct, yet was dependent for its livelihood on tribute from subject cities. Although the Athenians on the whole lived frugally, saving the bulk of their money for communal municipal enterprises, the “evil seeds” of slavery were set. Slavery “spread from the home to the plantation and the mine,” and was never effectively challenged by philosophy or by technology. According to Walbank, the ancients saw technological advance as a problem, not a solution. This view has been disputed extensively, especially by Edelstein, who feels that progress was a living concept in the classical era, and that the drive of human invention was extremely active, particularly in the 5th century BCE. He points out writers such as Xenophanes as optimistic concerning the improvement of humanity by its own devices. David Brion Davis, moreover, makes a case for slavery as actually a “progressive” institution, an improvement on killing prisoners of war, and not as economically wasteful as one might think. Nevertheless, in the 4th century, the philosophical association of moral idealism, rejection of unbridled technology, and support for slavery seem to support the thesis of Walbank. See F. W. Walbank, *The Awful Revolution: The Decline of the Roman Empire in the West*,

see an interest in this issue in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*, when Ischomachus advises interesting the slaves in the success of the communal enterprise by making them feel a part of it. Additionally, the free may suffer from the dullness that arises from lack of adversity and reliance on others' labor. To counter this they should devote themselves to the craft of leadership, liberal arts, and learn to be content with little. They should have contempt for mechanical tasks, the province of slaves; therefore, they will not try to develop any new technology. These attitudes are manifest in the selections from works of Plato and Aristotle examined above, and reflect an aristocratic, anti-technological bias.

There is a great paradox and circularity inherent in the classical contempt for technology, for thanks to certain inventions, such as the wheeled cart, the sailing boat, smelting, the use of oxen, and devices of war, their civilizations were able to come into being. Nevertheless, this trajectory did not continue. It would be interesting to investigate whether the time of these inventions' first implementation was also a period of bias against technology, but this is out of my scope here. Nevertheless, once a certain range of inventions were in use, slaves or the economically underprivileged were required to operate the tools of production, linking technology with political exploitation and menial drudgery. Although class warfare was at the root of most of the political troubles of classical times, Greek slaves fell beneath the radar of class, and represented a silent economic force. The classical period of technology was largely "silent" as well. In

New ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1969), 40-45. See also Ludwig Edelstein, *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), and David Brion Davis, *Slavery and human progress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

this way, the historical underpinnings of social structure placed limits on the technological boundaries of utopias. If technology takes care of the problems of production, an idea celebrated and explored in the servile perspective utopias, there is no rationale for the liberal character of the classical statesman. Since advanced technology would undermine the power structure of the of the dominant perspective utopias, they base their modes of production and moral systems on slavery instead.

Ironically, classical rulership and liberal education are both τέχνα in their own right. The concept of τέχνη bridges the divide between physical technology, which is associated with the work of menials and slaves, and the abstract craft of leadership, linked with ideas of education and morality. Liberal education was a tool by which one achieved true freedom, whereas training in a material craft tied the learner securely to a subservient status. Education in virtue was intrinsically associated with concepts of self-mastery and enslavement of the passions and impulses, to which slaves were seen as utterly subject.

Chapter Six: Πόνος και Παιδεία: Slave vs. Free Education

As David Brion Davis writes in *Slavery and Human Progress*, “Virtually every vision of individual salvation or collective utopia is conceived as emancipation from a state of figurative, yet final slavery.”¹¹⁹ The manner in which one attained this “liberation” was generally education in the manners and mores of the system to which one ascribed. The education of free children was a popular subject for writers of Utopia, since the inculcation of proper ritual habits was essential for the continuation of their society. According to the philosophers of the 4th century BCE, there was nothing more crucial to the development of good citizenry than the proper education. There is not as much information, however, on the education of the slaves who participated in utopias. Classical authors often gloss over this topic, as if it requires no special attention, even in the ideal community. On the other hand, they utilized stereotypes of slavery as a negative standard for behavior. By inference, then, it may be possible to construct a model as to what a proper “slave” education would consist of in the different ideal societies. The defining characteristics of the ideal system would shape the definition of slavery in that system as well. The question is, whether an educator would consciously educate a person *into* slavery. Classical education in general actively inculcates moral betterment and reduces “slavishness” to eventually integrate a student into the cultural whole. Freedom is the professed goal of this process. Yet in spite of this focus on *eleutheric* education, I will propose the hypothesis that character training for slaves does exist in the works of the philosophers Plato and

¹¹⁹ Davis, 19.

Xenophon. The fundamental quality of the slave “track” in ancient education is the inculcation of increasing dependency and moral inferiority, to bind someone more firmly to subservient status.¹²⁰

The Paedia of Xenophon

ὅστις γάρ τοι ἀρχικοὺς ἀνθρώπων δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος καὶ δεσποτικοὺς ἀνθρώπων δύναται διδάσκειν, ὅστις δὲ δεσποτικοὺς δύναται ποιεῖν, καὶ βασιλικούς.

For whoever has the power to make men like rulers of other men, clearly can also educate them to be like masters of others, and whoever can make them like masters, can also make them like kings (Socrates to Ischomachus, on the training of the slave bailiff, Xen. *Oik.* 13.5).

Xenophon examines the subject of ideal education in both the *Cyropaedia* and *Oikonomikos*. In the latter, the professed literary goal is the creation of the ideal household, and in the former, ideal political and military leadership. Unlike Aristotle, Xenophon portrays the exercise of power as fundamentally consistent even in these different areas of life, so that the same principles apply in managing an empire as in organizing a household. The first question to consider is what exactly constitutes the ideal in each case. Xenophon makes this judgment in the interest of external characteristics, such as “how to get the best-running farm,” or

¹²⁰ These ideas are implicit but never directly addressed in Aristotle’s *Politics*. He does not discuss the training of slaves in great detail, but it is possible to understand aspects of his ideas on slave training by inference, as he describes what *not* to do in the education of a “gentleman,” or, what will cause a child to become slavish in temperament. Any kind of specialization can cause the unevenness of character, which can lead in turn to “natural slavishness.” This is not really an active injunction on how to train a slave, however. Yet the sense we get from the *Politics* is that the “natural slaves” (who encompass all but a small portion of the population) do have a certain “virtue” of their own in fulfilling a necessary role in society. It is possible they can be trained to do this more effectively—but how? Aristotle’s silence on the subject indicates once again his aristocratic fixation in terms of education—to him, it belongs only to gentlemen—all others do not truly partake of education.

“how to get men to obey the most effectively.” He treats slavishness as a matter of individual character, as opposed to a class determination. For instance, if a slave shows innate nobility his training can be similar in kind to that of free person. Appeals to can manipulate free people who act basely, as well as slaves. In general, Xenophon’s didactic speakers, such as Ischomachus in the *Oikonomikos*, or Cambyses in the *Cyropaedia*, recommend inculcating a sense of belonging in anyone from whom obedience is desirable; this amounts to a belief that the success of the venture served is beneficial to the servant as well.¹²¹

Although on one level this view is quite Machiavellian and manipulative, it also has egalitarian aspects. For example, in the excerpt above, Socrates suggests to Ischomachus that he can train his steward to be a “gentleman.” This passage,

¹²¹ Many scholars have proposed that the view of education presented in the *Cyropaedia* is based on an idealization of the Spartan educational system, the *agoge*. There are many points of correspondance, but the connection between the positive treatment of the commoners of Persia as opposed to the Helots of Sparta seems rather remote. In many ways the picture is similar, in terms of organization, fighting style, training to abstemiousness and privation, trickery against the enemy, etc. Yet Sparta did not usually encourage Helots to seek promotion, on the contrary, doing what they could to keep them down. On the other hand, the case of the *nothoi*, or *mothakes* of Sparta is quite different, however, as the Spartans had a very minimal concept of illegitimacy. Because of extreme liberality in their practice of marriage, boys who were the sons of Helot mothers could attain a higher status by going through the *agoge* along with their *gnesioi* Spartan brothers. This seems similar to the practice Xenophon recommends, which places merit above accidents of birth. In the end, the system of Persian education portrayed in the *Cyropaedia* must be considered fundamentally as a romantic fictional product, incorporating aspects of Spartan education, but deviating at many points. See Croiset, 1873, 147, 150; Delebecque, 1957, 385; (Contra: Proietti, 1987, Ch.5, Strauss, 1939, 529) Winston Weathers, "Xenophon's Political Idealism," *The Classical Journal* 49, no. 7 (1954).; C. Tuplin, "Xenophon, Sparta and the *Cyropaedia* in Anton Powell and Stephen Hodkinson, *The Shadow of Sparta* (London ; New York: Routledge for The Classical Press of Wales, 1994). On Spartan illegitimacy and training of *nothoi*, see Daniel Ogden, *Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic World*, Part II, "Sparta, Chapter 1, Common Bastardy."

loosely translated, runs: “Whoever can make ‘rulers’ out of men makes them ‘masterly,’ (δεσποτικοί) and whoever can teach them to be masterly can teach them to be “king-like” (βασιλικοί). This is stated in the context of training a good slave bailiff, the character who serves as intermediary between the master of an οἶκος and his δούλοι. Xenophon’s Socrates is setting up a contradiction here. If a slave is βασιλικός, how can he continue to be a servant and subordinate? This passage and other evidence show that he thinks this transformation to be quite possible. Yet on the other hand, Ischomachus does not have a very high opinion of the moral qualities of most people, and slaves in particular, looking on them as similar to dogs in their responses to appetites and pain, and their capacity to be exploited by these impulses:

...καὶ τὰ κυνίδια δὲ πολὺ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆ γνώμη καὶ τῆ γλώττῃ ὑποδεέστερα ὄντα ὁμῶς καὶ περιτρέχειν καὶ κυβιστᾶν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ μανθάνει τῶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ τρόπῳ. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ πείθεται, λαμβάνει τῶν δέεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀμελῆ, κολάζεται.* ἀνθρώπους δ’ ἔστι πιθανωτέρους ποιεῖν καὶ λόγῳ, ἐπιδεικνύοντα ὡς συμφέρει αὐτοῖς πείθεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ δούλοις καὶ ἡ δοκοῦσα θηριώδης παιδεία εἶναι πάνυ ἔστιν ἐπαγωγὸς πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι διδάσκειν· τῆ γὰρ γαστρὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις προσχαριζόμενος ἂν πολλὰ ἀνύτοις παρ’ αὐτῶν. αἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι τῶν φύσεων καὶ τῷ ἐπαίνῳ παροξύνονται. πεινώσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου οὐχ ἥττον εἶναι τῶν φύσεων ἢ ἄλλαι τῶν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν.

...puppies are much lesser than humans in terms of intelligence and language, yet, likewise, each learns to run around and flip over in a similar way. For when it obeys, it gets something it needs, but when it is careless, it is punished. Yet it is possible for someone showing them how it is beneficial for them to obey to persuade men more easily, with words only. For slaves, however, the education seemingly good for wild animals can be a very great assistant for teaching obedience, for by gratifying the desires of their bellies you will obtain much from them. On the other hand, those with honor-loving natures are made keener by praise. For some thirst after praise just as other types of natures after food and drink (Xen. *Oik.* 13.8-10).

This blueprint for extracting obedience from slaves is quite a simple equation, utilizing the fear of punishment and the desire for rewards, primarily edible ones.

This fits the generally accepted view of the slave as subject to desires and impulses, and a proponent of the servile perspective utopia. Yet it is important to remember the context of this remark, that a slave is himself the one learning these techniques. As Ischomachus has just finished saying, those who are to learn to exercise authority and rights themselves must not be subject to many desires for food, sex, and rest, whereas those destined to remain subservient and menial should have these appetites in profusion. Interestingly, a slave who loves money, a potential route for liberation, is a good candidate for bailiff, since a reminder that diligence brings profit can be an effective incentive to make him work. Ultimately, the common link between these approaches is that the “trainee,” whether bailiff or underling, slave or free, should see him or herself as profiting more from the group success than individual advancement, and the ruler, or master, should be viewed as the external embodiment of this group success.

The equation of farming with ruling persists throughout the *Oikonomikos*, as well as the *Cyropaedia*. The metaphorical comparison between the ruler and the practitioner of animal husbandry suggests that in both cases a certain distance is necessary. The “sheep” must trust and obey the shepherd, who on the other hand must always maintain an emotional distance from his charges, never becoming too familiar, or attached.¹²² In the *Cyropaedia*, the structure of the household compares to that of the army on several occasions. For example, Cambyses tells

¹²² Cyrus always behaves in a noble fashion in the novel never allowing his emotions to be swayed by his subjects, or shows passion or favoritism to anyone. For instance, He refuses even to look at Panthea, the captured Assyrian woman, when he hears a glowing report of her beauty, fearing that his passions will be swayed (Xen. *Cyr.* 5.1.8).

the young Cyrus that a company of soldiers, just like workers in a house, both need food and supplies to live up to their full potential (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.12), going on to say, “how burdensome to support an idle man, even more an idle household, even more an idle army.”

ὡς χαλεπὸν μὲν καὶ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον ἄργον τρέφεσθαι,
πολύ δ' ἔτι χαλεπώτερον, ὧ παῖ, οἶκον ὅλον, πάντων δὲ
χαλεπώτατον στρατιάν ἄργον τρέφειν.

How difficult it is to nourish even one lazy man, how much more difficult, my child, to nourish a whole lazy household, but the most difficult of all is to nourish an idle, do-nothing army (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.17).

A good general will weed idle hands out of the army, just as idle slaves should be disposed of quickly. Much later, in a dinner speech to his upper class (*homotimoi*) officers, Cyrus urges them not to select their soldiers because of familiarity or favoritism, but to look beyond those from their homelands and judge instead based on merit alone. “Just as a house cannot be run by vicious servants, so the army cannot be run by vicious soldiers.”

οὔτε γὰρ ἄρμα δήπου ταχὺ γένοιτ' ἂν βραδέων ἵππων ἐνότων οὔτε
δίκαιον ἀδίκων συνεζευγμένων, οὐδὲ οἶκος δύναιτ' ἂν εὖ οἰκῆσθαι
πονηροῖς οἰκέταις χρώμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνδεόμενος οἰκετῶν.
Neither would a chariot go quickly at all, with slow horses pulling it, nor
would it be right if it was pulled by an unworthy team, just as a house would
not be well run that made use of base servants, but better would it be if it used
no servants at all (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.26).

This conflation of the idea of the household with military power structures ultimately extends to the political realm as well, as when Cyrus, victorious over his enemies at the end of the story, sets up his empire on the same basis that he would set up a household economy. Just as in a kitchen, things work better when everyone has his special task, than when one overwhelmed cook must do everything (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.6). The political metaphor extends to animal husbandry

as well; just as the duty of a good shepherd is to make his flock as happy as possible, so Cyrus sees the need to “share the wealth” with his subjects rather than hoard it, and to reward them as often as possible. (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.14)

Xenophon’s attitude towards slavery seems oddly paradoxical, for he has a real sense of the inherent merit of individual slaves, and their potential to be educated not only into more effective tools, but into better people as well. Yet at the same time, he does not see the possibility that they could graduate out of servitude by obtaining moral virtue, or physical gain, but rather the necessity to incorporate them even more firmly into the structure of the *oikos*, or in the case of the “soldier commoners” who populate the *Cyropaedia*, the army. Thus, there is an essential similarity between all ranks of people, for everyone has an equal potential to be loyal to the sovereign. The youthful Cyrus, upon considering “how to get people to obey” under the tutelage of Cambyses, looks back at his own education in obedience (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.18). From this he has learned: “punishments and dishonor for the bad, praise and honor for the good.” Cambyses agrees this is alright up to a point, but the trick is how to get any man to obey willingly, rather than by compulsion. The only way to do this is to show oneself wiser in terms of the interests of the subject than the subject is himself, acting always as the benefactor. (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.21)¹²³ Cyrus’ and Cambyses’ conversation in book

¹²³ One appears to much better effect as a benefactor than as a receiver of help; this is Cyrus’ strategy in dealing with someone like his uncle Cyaxares: he ostentatiously helps him and showers him with gifts (Xen. *Cyr.* 4.5.51, 5.5.1-5, 5.5.25-35). This is reminiscent of Aristotle’s description of the “magnanimous man” in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, who does not allow anyone else to help him, or if he does so, then returns the favor many times over. Thus, he maintains others in a state of debt to himself (Arist. *Nich. Eth.* 1124b10-15).

one introduces what amounts to an inverted philosophy of education; the appearance of honor and luxuries for the bad, and hard work, obedience, and increasing responsibility for the good-virtue its own reward. Of course, one might imagine that punishments for the bad and unrepentant might eventually ensue. Nevertheless, from the dominant perspective of the virtuous ruler, our exemplar Cyrus uses the servile perspective against itself, and the text implies that this servility exists on more than the societal level of actual slaves alone.

Cyrus' manipulation of higher caste power dynamics can greatly resemble his control of slaves, and part of his education is in acquiring slaves who are unaware of their own servitude. An interesting example of this is the scene where Cyrus 'court-marshals' the rebellious Armenian king. (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1-45) Upon being asked why he failed to deliver tribute to Cyaxares, king of the Medes, the Armenian answers that he wanted to furnish ἐλευθερίᾱ for himself and his children (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.10). Because the Medes had conquered him, he had considered himself to be in a state of slavery, although he had continued to hold his kingdom. Cyrus agrees that although it is glorious to protect oneself from slavery, once one has actually become a conquered slave; if anyone tries to "rob the master of himself," he is guilty of theft (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.11). Here he draws the explicit comparison of the rebellious king with a runaway slave, disingenuously asking the king what he does in these cases. The Armenian's response is an interesting look at the traditional merciless treatment of the runaway slave, describing several vicious punishments in some detail. Yet despite this rhetorical

strategy, Cyrus chooses not to punish the offending monarch, as this would not be truly advantageous to him. Instead, he wants to secure his allegiance and friendship, but not at the cost of seeming soft. Accordingly, he allows the king's son Tigranes who, according to James Tatum, uses a pseudo-Socratic dialectic, to persuade him to return the Armenian his family, and even his kingdom.¹²⁴ Thus, Cyrus makes the Armenian a prisoner of goodwill, and of the fear of what he could have lost. As Tigranes puts it, “ὡς ὁ φόβος τοῦ ἔργῳ κακοῦσθαι μᾶλλον κολάζει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.23). The fear of harm is usually worse than the reality, thus it is more effective to threaten punishment than to actually perform it.

The helpful son Tigranes echoes the words of Cambyses in book one when he suggests that people submit without the need for compulsion if they think others are “better than they are” (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.20). Cyrus has certainly shown himself superior to the Armenian king in terms of military guile, and when he also outflanks him in argument, his victory is complete. Both of these points are easily applicable to enforcing slave obedience as well. The leniency of Cyrus is effective in obtaining the loyalty of the Armenian king, who supports Cyrus when he had just previously rebelled. Cyrus makes a great show of returning the wife and children of the king “without ransom,” so that they may know that they come to

¹²⁴Tatum interprets the scene in the light of Cyrus' Sophistic skills; he suggests that Cyrus forces Tigranes to abandon several arguments that do not contribute to his greatest control of the situation. Finally, Cyrus allows himself to be “convinced” by an argument that it is most advantageous for him to keep the Armenian royals in power (see James Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction: On the Education of Cyrus* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989], 65).

you as “ἐλεύθεροι” (Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.37). In fact, Cyrus has firmly imbedded the king in a new servitude. In this fashion, the text builds the case that addiction to privilege and luxury works better than punishment in making people better servants. If Cyrus wants to induce slavishness in people, he treats them more softly, whereas to bring commoners out of lowly status entails educating them in hardship. The appearance of a return to power has deceived the Armenian king into accepting a more subtle slavery.

In the case of Croesus, king of Lydia, Cyrus is dealing with a much cleverer adversary, who is conscious of the manipulative effects of servility on a “master.” Here Xenophon shows the servile and dominant perspectives in conflict over control of power. The latter wins out, but with greater difficulty, and interestingly, this scene places together the two different views of “the blessed life.” Although Croesus is a good military man, he does not share Cyrus’ strategy that privation builds character, and on the contrary, views the ideal life as one of complete self-gratification. In fact, Croesus thinks his wife lives “happiest of all lives” because she shares his wealth but not his responsibilities.¹²⁵ This lifestyle of all play and no work is the embodiment of the servile perspective. Now, Croesus says, he will

¹²⁵ καὶ ὁ Κύρος εἶπε· Τίς δὴ ὁ ἔχων ταύτην τὴν μακαρίαν βιοτήν; Ἡ ἐμὴ γυνή, εἶπεν, ὦ Κύρε· ἐκείνη γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν μαλακῶν καὶ εὐφροσυνῶν πασῶν ἐμοὶ τὸ ἴσον μετεῖχε, φροντίδων δὲ ὅπως ταῦτα ἔσται καὶ πολέμου καὶ μάχης οὐ μετὴν αὐτῆ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς ἐμε κατασκευάζειν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἦν ἐφίλουν μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ἄλλα μοι δοκῶ χαριστήρια ὀφειλήσειν.

Then Cyrus said, “Who then indeed possesses the most blessed life?” “My wife, Cyrus,” said he (Croesus.) “For she has an equal share with me of all good things, luxuries and blessings, but she does not have a share in these worries: how the affairs of war and battle will be carried out. Thus you seem to have set me up just as I set her up whom I loved most of all people, so that I think I will owe offerings to Apollo”(Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.28).

himself enjoy the same sort of blessedness in accepting his dependant status to Cyrus. In this way he implies that a state of servility, i.e, that of a woman dependant on Cyrus, to be his ideal, on the surface of it at least. Where the apparent return of freedom easily deceived the Armenian, Croesus makes no bones about his clear perception of the real state of affairs, calling Cyrus his “master” (δεσπότης – Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.9). Cyrus does not exactly trust this extreme servility, and actually fears Croesus because of it, bringing him everywhere with him,¹²⁶ apprehensive that this man so devoted to the servile perspective will act in a completely self-interested way, and will free himself at any given opportunity, not bound by any ties of loyalty or morality.¹²⁷ Thus, Cyrus makes sure to maintain Croesus in the luxury to which he is accustomed, not punishing him, but neutralizing his opposition by the steady supply of the μακαρίη βιοτή, in other words, total gratification of the servile perspective.

Xenophon bases the structure of the state in the *Cyropaedia* on an education in the principles of self-denial, privation, and the subordination of individual wants to the group interest. He illustrates this concept in the second book, when Cyrus

¹²⁶ ἀκούσας δ' ὁ Κῦρος τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ ἐθάύμασε μὲν τὴν εὐθυμίαν, ἦγε δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ὅποι καὶ αὐτὸς πορεύοιτο, εἴτε ἄρα καὶ χρήσιμὸν τι νομίζων αὐτὸν εἶναι εἴτε καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον οὕτως ἡγούμενος.

Hearing his words Cyrus was amazed at his good mood, but for the future, always wherever he happened to go, he led him along, either thinking him to be useful in some way, or thinking it to be safer thus. (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.29).

¹²⁷Tatum discusses the resonances of this with the passage of Herodotus' Histories, in which Croesus is similarly unperturbed by his defeat and captivity at Cyrus' hands, but because of the stoical Herodotean wisdom learned through hard experience and the wisdom of Solon. There, he is also taken everywhere with Cyrus, but as a very worthy counselor, not a dangerous and self-interested slave (Her. *Hist.* 1.86 ff; Tatum, 148).

offers the Persian commoners a chance to raise their social status by taking up the same arms as the nobles. In a telling speech, he exhorts the Persian commoners to seize the opportunity to raise their status:

ἄνδρες Πέρσαι, ὑμεῖς καὶ ἔφυτε ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐτράφητε, καὶ τὰ σώματά τε οὐδὲν ἡμῶν χείρονα ἔχετε, ψυχὰς τε οὐδὲν κακίονας ὑμῖν προσήκει ἡμῶν ἔχειν. τοιοῦτοι δ' ὄντες ἐν μὲν τῇ πατρίδι οὐ μετείχετε τῶν ἴσων ἡμῖν, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀπελαθέντες ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀνάγκην ὑμῖν.

“O Persian Men, you were born and you were nurtured in the same country as we were, and you possess bodies that are not worse than ours in any way, and thus it is right for you to possess souls that are not worse in any way than our own. For being of such a kind, you have not partaken of equal rights in the fatherland with us, not because you were overlooked by us, but because of the necessity for you to make your livelihood” (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1. 14).

It is the demands of “making a living” (ἐπιτηδεῖα) that obstruct the education that truly differentiates the rulers from the ruled. In this sense, Cyrus is egalitarian, in that he sees potential in the lower classes to improve with such an education. The inspiration for these adults to undergo “liberal” training so late in life is the flattery that they are “no worse” than the *homotimoi* physically. Cyrus implies that they will benefit from a higher place in the successful enterprise, and tries to inspire them with a desire for the victory of the whole effort, not simply their own benefit. By giving them a better education, and superior “souls,” he is imbuing them with a limited version of his own dominant perspective as ruler. Easily convinced by Cyrus’ rhetoric, the commoners decide in council that if they refuse Cyrus’ offer, they deserve to live in want for all time:

ἀκούσαντες δὲ οἱ Πέρσαι ἐνόμισαν, εἰ παρακαλούμενοι ὥστε τὰ ὅμοια ποιοῦντες τῶν αὐτῶν τυγχάνειν μὴ ἐθελήσουσι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, δικαίως ἂν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος ἀμηχανοῦντες βιοτεύειν. οὕτω δὲ ἀπογράφονται πάντες ἀνέλαβόν τε τὰ ὅπλα πάντες.

Hearing these things the Persian commoners thought that, thus being called, if they should happen to be unwilling to work on the same things as them (the

aristocrats), then justly they should toil in vain for the rest of their lifetime. Thus, all of them agreed, and all took up arms (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.19).

Once again the appearance of status at issue here, for by promising the peasants a share in the status of the *homotimoi*, Cyrus makes them serve the function he desires, that of soldiering. Yet unlike the case of the Armenian king, they themselves are altered in the process. It is the fact that this livelihood (βιοτεύειν) is chosen rather than enforced, that gives the peasants the “μηχανή” of productivity that leads to a different stage of society. Through acceptance of the role of military servitude to Cyrus, they become educated in the craft of self-discipline which Cyrus himself learned. To make these peasants fit in with his conception of the Persian aristocratic ideals, Cyrus subjects them to the same trials and training that the “*homotimoi*” had received, and ironically, in spite of the difficult lives the peasants had led, this is training in just another brand of difficulty. Yet unlike the anonymous work of farming, this difficulty takes place under the public eye, which makes the peasants feel a sense of competition for praise on a level with that of their “superiors.” Xenophon demonstrates this in an extended scene in which Chrysantas, one of Cyrus’ peers and boyhood friends, makes a proposal that if the Persians and Medes are victorious, they should share out the rewards of booty, according to merit in war, not equally (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.17 ff). Cyrus agrees heartily, saying he will put the measure to a public vote. Chrysantas does not think the commoners will adopt the proposal, as they will be likely to lose out to the *homotimoi*. Cyrus, however, believes even the disadvantaged will see the way in which this benefits the success of the entire venture (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.20-21). When they discuss the matter the next day,

Pheraulas, a commoner, speaks in favor of it, and indicates his feeling of absorption into the group as a whole, and of a competitive footing in a contest of merit (Xen. *Cyr.* 2. 3.7). The *homotimoi*, as he says, have at risk a life of status, whereas the commoners have at risk only a “life of toil unhonored,” a most burdensome possession (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.3.11). As the commoners already have trained in privation and hard labor, the work of a soldier seems easy in comparison (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.3.13).

In contrast, at the end of the *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus treats very differently those whom he wishes to keep as slaves, as Xenophon explicitly says, allowing them (and only them) to eat and drink when they are on a hunt, and always readily satisfying their appetites, and neither does he let them carry their own weapons:

...οὓς δ' αὖ κατεσκεύαζεν εἰς τὸ δουλεύειν, τούτους οὔτε μελετᾶν τῶν ἐλευθερίων πόνων οὐδένα παρῶρμα οὔθ' ὄπλα κεκτηῆσθαι ἐπέτρεπεν· ἐπεμελεῖτο δὲ ὅπως μήτε ἄσιτοι μήτε ἄποτοί ποτε ἔσοιντο ἐλευθερίων ἕνεκα μελετημάτων. καὶ γὰρ ὅποτε ἐλαύνοιεν τὰ θηρία τοῖς ἰππεύσιν εἰς τὰ πεδία, φέρεσθαι σίτον εἰς θήραν τούτοις ἐπέτρεπε, τῶν δὲ ἐλευθέρων οὐδενί· καὶ ὅποτε πορεία εἴη, ἤγεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ ὕδατα ὥσπερ τὰ ὑποζύγια. καὶ ὅποτε δὲ ὥρα εἴη ἀρίστου, ἀνέμενεν αὐτοὺς ἔστ' ἐμφάγοιέν τι, ὡς μὴ βουλιμιῶεν· ὥστε καὶ οὔτοι αὐτὸν ὥσπερ οἱ ἄριστοι πατέρα ἐκάλουν, ὅτι ἐπεμέλετο αὐτῶν ὅπως ἀναμφιλόγως αἰεὶ ἀνδράποδα διατελοῖεν.

Those whom he was preparing to be slaves he did not encourage to have any concern for the labors of the free, neither did he neither did he supply them with their weapons. Yet he had a care that they should not be without food or without drink because of the activities of the free. For one, whenever he drove the wild beasts into the plain on horseback, he supplied them with food for the hunt, but for no free person. Also, whenever there was a chance, he led them to water just like oxen-teams. And whenever the weather was fine, he distributed to them whatever there was to eat, lest they be hungry, so that they, just like the aristocrats, used to call him “father,” because he took good care of them so that they would happily end their lives as slaves (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.1.43-44).

Xenophon slyly inserts a comparison between the “*aristoi*” and the *andrapodes*, for all of them, in a continuum from slave to noble, think of Cyrus as

their benefactor, a replacement paternal figure. He is able to convey a sense of the ideal in both dominant and servile terms. Similarly, Cyrus takes away the horses and weapons of any soldiers he sees misbehaving, making them follow only with a sling, which he considers the weapon of slaves (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.4.15). Cyrus fosters a quality of dependency in those he wants to keep down, and gives them a “lowly” weapon. In contrast, he teaches self-control and the ability to bear privation, as well as giving the weapons of the Persian *homotimoi* to the commoners whom he wishes to raise up in the ranks. Cyrus has made new criteria for education, previously based on accident of birth, redefining slavery and freedom. In the world of the *Cyropaedia*, it is a soldier’s attitude and behavior towards Cyrus that determines his place in the ranks.

This principle of valuing loyalty to himself alone above any other considerations is what causes Cyrus to select eunuchs as bodyguards. The eunuch is traditionally associated with a degraded, slave status, both by dint of the violent, dishonorable punishment that has been inflicted, as well as the fact that since he cannot reproduce, he cannot constitute a dynastic force to be reckoned with. Like other slaves, they have been rendered socially dead by the removal of their ability to generate family ties. Yet this is exactly the reason why they make such useful servants. Because they have nothing to distract from their loyalty to a master, they can replace the family with the master as their primary object of concern. Again the imagery of animal husbandry emerges, as gelded animals are described as easier to handle, and not less loyal than the rest (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.58). Earlier in the novel, Cyrus’ treatment of the eunuch prince Gadatas foreshadows

this decision. Because the castrated prince has no possibility of having children, Cyrus tells him that he and the Persians will act towards him just as children would towards a father. (Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.19) This image of familial substitution is really at the root of Xenophon's conception of "good" slavery, where the best slave has his master's interest as much at heart as any child or brother, and possibly more so. Part of the usefulness of slaves in general is their liminal status in terms of familial and cultural identity, which gives them the ability to perform tasks that would be shameful or demeaning to free persons. Thus, Cyrus neutralizes the degrading appearance of an act equivalent to enslavement, while benefiting from the effects of this act himself.

James Tatum has an interesting view on the comments of the Athenian of Plato's *Laws* discussing Cyrus, suggesting that Plato is offering a dialectical critique of the *Cyropaedia*.¹²⁸ Plato, he argues, believes that any education which does not aim towards inculcating τό αγαθόν, the good, in a student, and which furthermore does not do this in a philosophical manner is "menial and unfree."¹²⁹ Since the educational strategy of the *Cyropaedia* is simply geared towards getting

¹²⁸ Tatum, 228-230.

¹²⁹ τὴν τροφήν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιστ' ἂν μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἢ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύϊν, ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης, βάνασόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἄξιαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι.

Which sort of upbringing, as it seems to me, this argument would now like to define as the only education, but that which has property as a goal, or some kind of force, or some other branch of learning lacking thought and justice, it would define as menial and servile and not worthy to be called "education" (Plato *Laws* 644a-b).

people to obey the most effectively, and overcoming their natural resistance to cooperating with a ruler, Plato sees the education of Cyrus as a no real education at all, but rather a sort of political trade school. In a sense, Plato is saying that Xenophon assumes the servile perspective in Cyrus' subjects, and thus his leader is no better than a ποιμῆν, a herdsman.¹³⁰

Xenophon's descriptions of education, slavery and obedience are cynical in the modern sense. His ideal ruler, householder, or general looks at human beings as a flock or herd, and strategizes how to get them to obey the most effectively. This is essentially the utopian vision of the *Oikonomikos* as well as the *Cyropaedia*. In these texts, obedience imposed from without is a form of slavery, whereas if it is self-enforced, it becomes an act of an ἐλεύθερος, who has the potential to possess the same type of power as the king himself. The trick of the clever ruler is to convince the subjects that their loyal obedience is their own most devout wish. It is not productive to appeal to the honor or challenge the hardiness of those who are easier to move by their "slavish" desire for public advancement, or physical gratification. These are the people designated for a slave existence, and it does not

¹³⁰ ΑΘ. Ὁ δὲ πατήρ γε αὐτοῖς αὖ ποιμνία μὲν καὶ πρόβατα καὶ ἀγέλας ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν πολλὰς ἐκτάτο, αὐτοὺς δὲ οἷς ταῦτα παραδώσειν ἔμελλεν ἡγνόει τὴν πατρώαν οὐ παιδευομένους τέχνην, οἷσαν Περσικὴν—ποιμένων ὄντων Περσῶν, τραχείας χώρας ἐγγόνων—σκληρὰν καὶ ἱκανὴν ποιμένας ἀπεργάζεσθαι μάλα ἰσχυροὺς καὶ δυναμένους θυραυλεῖν καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν καὶ εἰ στρατεύεσθαι δέοι στρατεύεσθαι. Their father did indeed gain possession of many flocks and herds, and many other prizes, of men and of other kinds, yet he was ignorant that he was about to leave these things to those who were uneducated in his ancestral art: that is, being Persian. For since the Persians were shepherds, offshoots of a rough homeland, it would be necessary for these shepherds to be able to accomplish suitable harsh tasks, to be very strong, to be able to stay outdoors, to go without sleeping, and to fight anything that might need to be fought (Plato *Laws* 694e-695b).

matter, essentially, what their public status actually is, since they are easily compelled to obedience by appeals to these vicious tendencies. Thus, Xenophon's education for slaves involves the repeated manipulation of self-interest, luxury, and public image. His approach to creating free men, ironically, involves no less obedience and servitude, but it teaches obedience as an aspect of learning the craft of ruling. Paradoxically, the most effective servants learn obedience for its own sake, and by undergoing this process willingly, are subsequently able to teach it to others, transcending slave status by participation in the dominant values of the πολιτική τεχνή.

Education in Plato's *Laws*

Plato's language of power relationships in the soul repeatedly uses the imagery of slavery, as we have seen, yet in the *Republic*, his most elaborate utopian vision, he does not really specify what societal role slaves will perform. Traditionally, slaves served at whatever occupation their masters required of them, ranging from specialized clerical and political tasks, to the most menial labor. Plato believes in specialization of occupation, and one might infer that he would recommend training in whatever field of expertise a slave happens to chance into.¹³¹ Plato

¹³¹ Although the opinion of Vlastos has been decisive for most on the controversy of whether or not there are slaves in the *Republic*, some have raised objections worthy of notice. Gregory Vlastos, "Does Slavery exist in Plato's Republic? Slavery in Plato's Thought," in *Platonic studies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). Brian Calvert, for instance, thinks the question worth re-opening Brian Calvert, "Slavery in Plato's Republic," *The Classical Quarterly, New Series* 37, no. 2 (1987). He and Levinson both refer to the existence of "wage-earners" in the Republic (434c) who lack *logos*, but do have sufficient strength to do the "rough and dirty work," in contrast with the Guardians who do not work for money (Plato *Rep.* 463b; Calvert: 369; Levinson, 171). According to this argument, the slave in the ideal city would have no work to do. Calvert also makes the objection that no one is qualified to own the slaves, since the Guardians

does not discuss the actual character training of the slave, except in the *Laws*. Here he sees slave training as problematic, for how is one to train the character of a person who is not destined to engage in the work of the free, when education is directed towards the attainment of a “figurative” emancipation? In his other works, Plato’s characters repeatedly use slavery in a metaphorical sense, a leap facilitated by comparisons of the soul and the city-state, and we only see the actual slaves briefly. In the *Laws* we see the most we ever see of slaves in Plato’s works, where he includes them in his educational blueprints, but the primary role of slavery remains the “negative model” of education; in other words, the results of bad education.

Plato’s “Athenian” of the *Laws* has a certain difficulty getting away from the

cannot hold private property, and the third class of menial workers are not worthy on moral grounds to be slaveowners. This addresses Vlastos’ suggestion that the slaves would belong to the third class (Vlastos, 141 n. 6). Extrapolating, Calvert argues that the introduction of slaves into the ideal polis would entail the creation of a fourth class, which would then have no counterpart in the soul. Plato does greatly emphasize the completeness of his tripartite vision in *Rep.* 435bff, and 441c, and Calvert’s conclusion is that that if Plato did mean to include slaves in the ideal politeia, he should not have! (Calvert: 371) Ultimately I would agree with Vlastos that Plato references the existence of slaves in the ideal city when Socrates states that the presence of *dikaiousune* will create the best possible situation for guardians, women, slaves, etc. (Plato *Rep.* 433d). Also, Plato’s comments on the enslavement of barbarians point to the probable identity of these hypothetical slaves, (Plato *Rep.* 369b8-471c2) a point which Vlastos argues effectively (Vlastos, 293). I would suggest two points on the issue, first, that the identification of the slaves with barbarians effectively alienates them from the *mores* of the ideal city, and removes them from the soul-city correspondence. Barbarian slaves represent the “socially dead” other, whose existence is not fully acknowledged. Second, on Calvert’s objection that the Guardians cannot hold private property, I do not see that this would necessarily be an obstacle to slave holding, since it was perfectly possible for slaves to constitute communal property instead, as they did in Sparta. Why could the Guardians not allocate “public” slaves to work in any sector of the community?

moral dimensions of education and describing more practical methods. He does suggest “he who is to be good at anything should play at that thing as practice, and should be provided with miniature tools at a young age:

Λέγω δῆ, καί φημι τὸν ὅτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐκ παίδων εὐθύς μελετᾶν δεῖν, παίζοντά τε καὶ σπουδάζοντα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἑκάστοις προσήκουσιν.

Indeed, I declare that whichever man is intending to be good at something must work at this occupation right from childhood, in play and in earnest, using each of the fitting tools of his pursuit (Plato *Laws* 2. 643 b-c).

This is a very interesting statement for our purposes, for it comes close to giving a general recommendation for the education of all children, and possibly slaves could be included in this. The Athenian recognizes the importance of play in sparking a child’s interest in a given profession, and σχολή is important for fully developing play. But does this signify that slaves as young children were to be provided with “play-time” in which they could pretend they already worked at their destined craft? This seems unlikely, although not impossible. The fact that many slaves were foreigners who were trained elsewhere and for a different purpose as children would preclude the scientific application of such play in their training, but for the homebred slaves, more fully integrated into Greek society, it could be a possibility.

What begins with play develops with practice, and so the Athenian’s precept that educated or uneducated in one sense refers only to completeness of training in one or another field:

νῦν γὰρ ὀνειδίζοντες ἐπαινοῦντές θ’ ἑκάστων τὰς τροφάς, λέγομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν πεπαιδευμένον ἡμῶν ὄντα τινά, τὸν δὲ ἀπαίδευτον ἐνίοτε εἷς τε καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡγουμένων, ὡς ἔοικ’, εἶναι παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιούσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ

ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης.

For now, when blaming or praising each man's nurture, we talk of how one person is educated, but another uneducated, although he may be especially well trained in hawking goods, or running ships or some other such skill. Yet we, as is fitting, are not thinking that this is education in the sense of the present argument, but rather the education that aims towards virtue from childhood on, making a man desire and yearn to become a complete citizen, who knows how to rule and be ruled with justice (Plato *Laws* 2. 643d-e).

This is a strange passage, for the Athenian here entertains two separate views on education. The first one takes quantity, or thoroughness of education as its main factor, which can pertain to expertise in craft and different practical endeavors, possibly even menial ones. The second view of education undercuts the first, by giving a moral criterion as its prime directive, and questioning the worth of anything that does not apply to moral training. The process of learning can refer to any sort of task, including 'banausic' types of labor. Yet the only goal "worthy to be called education" is learning the love of goodness. Would slaves also be thoroughly schooled in the love of goodness? Plato's Athenian does not make different recommendations for slaves and free as he does in later examples. Yet he shows a certain recognition here of the manner in which everyone learns, both slave and free.

Some practical examples appear in the following section concerning songs and dances used in educating the young. In an interesting comparison to the world of animals that Plato uses so often in images of slavery, the Athenian says young animals (also children) have no control over their bodily movements.¹³² In the

¹³² φησὶν δὲ τὸ νέον ἅπαν ὡς ἔπος εἶπεν τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι, κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἀεὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φθέγγεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἀλλόμενα καὶ σκιρτῶντα, οἷον ὀρχούμενα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαίζοντα, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα πάσας φωνάς. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῶα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν

case of humans, however, a divine factor in music and dance can direct the otherwise unchannelled energy of the child. Χαρά, or delight, is thus associated etymologically with χοροί, or dances. Because of this power to harness the pleasure principle, instruction in music and dance can educate the otherwise unmanageable student.¹³³ It is essential, however, that they be “good” songs and dances. Thus, the Athenian prescribes a system of such carefully censored rhythms for the public, including slaves. The inclusion of slaves is supported by the subsequent statement that the entire community, as well as the slaves should recite a certain “spell” (Plato *Laws* 2. 665c), a song which somehow works as developer for the proper attitude, teaching orderly behavior.

The point here is that if one can teach children that a myth such as the one of ‘*Spartoi*’ or sown men’ is true, one can persuade them of anything (Plato *Laws* 2.

τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιῶν, οἷς δὴ ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα καὶ ἄρμονία· ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς εἶπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, ἣ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾧδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα.

...that it is altogether impossible, so to speak, for any baby creature to keep maintain quiet either physically or vocally, but always it strives to move and to make noise, sometimes leaping or jumping, sometimes dancing or playing with pleasure, sometimes making noises of all kinds. Although other living things cannot perceive order and disorder in regards to those movements to which we give the names rhythm and harmony, but to us, the gods whom we say were given as our “fellow-dancers,” have given rhythmic and harmonic perception together with enjoyment in it, and indeed, they make us move and lead our choruses, gathering us together with each other by means of songs and dances, and choruses have received their natural name from their inherent charm (χαρᾶ) (Plato, *Laws* 2. 653d-4a).

¹³³ An interesting comparison here is the tale of Pythagoras in which the sage orders a *aulos* player to change his tune from frenzied Phrygian modes to a somber tune in order to calm a young man about to commit arson (Iambl. *VP* 25.112).

664a). Up to this point, the slaves and free seem to receive equal treatment in terms of musical training, but Plato recommends a divergence of method in his next statement on the subject of appropriateness: dances and songs must be appropriate to each other- also there is a type of rhythm appropriate only for slaves:

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνάι γε ἕξαμάρτοιέν ποτε τοσοῦτον ὥστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ χρώμα γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέρων αὖ καὶ σχήματα συνθεῖσαι ῥυθμούς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσαρμόττειν, οὐδ' αὖ ῥυθμούς καὶ σχήμα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς...

For they (the Muses) would not ever make such a mistake as to make a song of men in a womanly mode, or to harmonize slavish rhythms to songs and gestures of the free, neither, in contrast, would they make rhythms and dances into a free song, and then fit a contrasting style to these rhythms...Plato *Laws* 2. 669c-d).

What the rhythm appropriate to slaves may be exactly is unclear, but this points to a certain limitation in the ‘musico-moral’ training of slaves. The Athenian extends the musical metaphor a bit later in the book (Plato *Laws* 2. 701a), drawing an analogy between musical law and the law of the state. This actually describes the breakdown of respect for law in the democracy of Athens, where there is excessive liberty, just as when musicians care more for pleasing the audience than they do for the quality of art, the art suffers. (Plato *Laws* 2. 699 e)

Perhaps Plato is uncomfortable with describing education for slaves, because he does not want there to be too many slaves, or too many masters, for that matter. His account of the problems of Persia, or extreme autocracy, as opposed to those of Athens, where extreme liberty destroys respect for laws, supports this idea. He looks at these extreme examples through the lens of education. First, he points out the evil life commonly led by sons of autocrats (Plato *Laws* 2.695e),

possibly with his own failure with Dionysos II of Syracuse in mind. He returns to the importance of temperance in education (Plato *Laws* 2.696a), a virtue little applied in the training of coddled royal youth. The case of Persia gives him a safe historical example, far from Sicily and the present, but a very similar case where the troubles stem from excessive servitude and autocracy (Plato *Laws* 2.698a), or in other words, a multitude of slaves and only one master. He traces this more elaborately in the third book, where we see that the success of Cyrus was due to his middle course between subjection and liberty. As he conquered various peoples, he gradually placed them on terms of liberty with themselves (Plato *Laws* 3.694a), whereas his heir Cambyses, raised by eunuchs and women, and fully corrupted, loses his throne at hands of the “famous eunuch.” (Plato *Laws* 3.695b)

The *Laws* restates the principles of the *Republic* in a compromised and more practical form. One effect of this is that the text deals more extensively with the effects of war, and the practices of existing cultures. Witness the statement of Clinias to the Athenian that “the normal attitude of one city to another is one of constant undeclared warfare” (Plato *Laws* 1.626a-b). The state Clinias describes ought to direct all training towards the maintenance of warlike skills, a situation evocative of Sparta. The Athenian asks Clinias if the same is true on small scale, or in other words, if one man is always “at war” with another. Dialectic forces Clinias to the ridiculous hypothesis that every man is at war with the rest, as well as with himself. (Plato *Laws* 1.626d) When the good elements succeed over the bad in this invisible, figurative conflict, then the city and the man are both masters

of themselves. When the city or man loses, he is enslaved to himself or possibly to others. The Athenian has taken as truth a statement in which he does not really believe: the concept of potential enmity as the necessary default condition between cities. In doing so, he transmutes the language of warfare and enslavement used by conventional politics into an internalized moral code, and explains the process of ideal education as a type of training in battle. This could have a certain appeal to those who condemn philosophy as impractical and consider a warlike temperament necessary. Yet Plato's hypothetical, ideally educated citizen would not believe in the concept of constant undeclared warfare, as it goes against the humanitarian interests of virtue. It sets the stage, however, for a discussion of education, regarding which he then gives a series of more specific instructions.

The Athenian's statement that "...if children indulge in passions as they are brought up, but are trained to endure pain, they will be "half-slave-half-free" (Plato *Laws* 1.635 d) is a common characterization of soldiers, who are conditioned to endure suffering from external sources, but notoriously run amuck in their off-duty behavior, as well as their conduct towards defeated enemies. By treating others with a lack of respect as they do to slaves, they are themselves behaving slavishly. It is interesting to compare this point with the training of the Spartan youth, who of course may not indulge their "passions" in the course of their rigorous endurance training, yet were notoriously susceptible to the luxuries of the world outside of Sparta. This thought seems to be completed a little further on, with the idea that it is only possible to attain "mature" courage by fighting

with the shamelessness within (Plato *Laws* 1.647d), therefore Plato recommends the drinking of wine to “transcend” its powers (Plato *Laws* 1.648d), for it makes people confront weakness and try to master it. Similarly, he proposes the confrontation and testing of erotic feelings lest one fall victim to an unknown “slave of sex”:

ἢ πρὸς τὰ φροδίσια ἡττημένης τινὸς ψυχῆς βάσανον λαμβάνειν,
ἐπιτρέποντα αὐτοῦ θυγατέρας τε καὶ υἱεῖς καὶ γυναῖκας, οὕτως, ἐν
τοῖς φιλτάτοις κινδυνεύσαντες, ἦθος ψυχῆς θεάσασθαι...

Or is it not more risky a test, thus to turn someone, whose soul, overcome with regard to sex, has become slavish, onto one’s daughters, sons and wives, thus causing a danger among one’s loved ones, just to observe the character of his soul? (Plato, *Laws* 1.650a)

This is the very reason that Socrates abandons the “City of Pigs” in the *Republic*, for although that society lacks vice it has not conquered it. The task of education is to help us make slaves of our passions, lest we become slaves of them. Yet, Plato’s final remarks on the subject of wine recommend its strict prohibition when not used in an educational fashion. He would deny the taste of wine to male and female slaves in “civic life,” as well as to any citizens engaged in any important undertaking (Plato *Laws* 1.674a-c). Beyond the purpose of education, it is not useful to indulge in passions. Slaves, do not have the same need to overcome passions, and therefore should not partake of them.

Plato’s Athenian frequently plays up the difference between the effects of military success on those trained in control of passions vs. those untrained:

παιδεία μὲν οὖν φέρει καὶ νίκην, νίκη δ’ ἐνίοτε ἀπαιδευσίαν.

One one hand, education can bring victory, but sometimes, victory brings loss of education (Plato, *Laws* 1.641c).

In general, victory in war requires a certain amount of discipline and training, but the tendency for the victors to abuse their power counteracts this very quality.

A good historical example is the behavior of the Athenians following the Persian wars. Having “rescued” all the rest of the Greeks from slavery through their great innate superiority, they then proceeded to abuse the fruits of their victory and ‘enslave’ the Greeks again, an act which led eventually to the Peloponnesian Wars.

Historical reality informs Plato’s attempts to bridge the practical and the idealistic, and he investigates existing *poleis* in the effort to construct a realistic yet ideal city-state of his own. Like Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*, the *Laws* deals with many of the constant concerns of leadership, organization, and training. Plato and Xenophon share the conception of education as a path to freedom. Xenophon looks at this freedom as akin to mastery and education as training in the extraction of obedience from others. His *paedia* of the dominant perspective consists of training a potential ruler to confront and overcome the servile perspective in others, by inculcating them with their own values, or else manipulating their servile impulses. Since Xenophon creates a utopian state based on a perfect chain of command and obedience, he can envisage utopian features in structures so diverse as a farm, a military company, or an empire. The techniques of education in mastery are the same in all. Plato, on the other hand, cannot be satisfied with bare obedience as the critical factor in designing the “best possible state.” The fact that Plato’s *Laws* makes a clear critique of the *Cyropaedia* reveals his consciousness that both works are ultimately concerned with shared factors. Both authors show that proper training and education are essential for taking one’s rightful place in society. Xenophon’s Cyrus is quite willing to make this training a

softening, vitiating process for those whom he wishes to remain subservient and enslaved. Plato will not go so far, since he does not approve of inculcating vices. Thus, while *eleutheroi* receive training to handle their wine in moderation, slaves and menials do not require this, as there will be less danger to others on account of their drunken irresponsibility. It seems Plato would forbid any sensual indulgence to slaves at all. His discussion of banausic training shows his clear concept of how any child should learn a craft, by simply playing with the tools of the trade. He denies that this is really education, but these are the *techniques* of education, applicable to slaves as well as free. Plato cannot escape his scientific idealism, and would really like everyone to be educated in the “good.” He shows inklings of Xenophon’s ideas of sensual manipulation, however, in his discussion of the dances appropriate to slaves, as well as the passage on comedy, which demands that actors and creators of comedies be slaves. Educators need these negative paradigms in the context of teaching the noble what is ignoble; therefore, Plato has need of slaves who are acting slavish. In both Xenophon’s and Plato’s texts, the training of slaves clearly involves the involvement of the slave in the modes of the servile perspective, so that the dominant perspective can continue to control it.

Chapter Seven: So-called “Real Life” Utopias

The paradox of utopias is that they are primarily fictional, yet their theories can apply to real life. Likewise, real world societies can view themselves and their pasts as utopian. Utopian accounts may serve present goals more than historical reality, and in the case of the Pythagoreans and Spartans, these goals are literary and political. In both cases, we are dealing with real-life communities who coded themselves as ideal, and who transmitted their precepts in a quasi-religious, gospelized fashion.¹³⁴ In general, the accounts of real-life utopias adhere to the dominant perspective; this arises from the absence of the fantastical or technological substitutes for slavery that appear in comedic fantasies. On the other

¹³⁴ Permanence in utopian sensibility was akin to the Platonic need for a utopia to be unchanging. This conservative attitude was responsible for the passing down of traditions to later generations, both to participants and to authorial observers, and is reflected in the narrative of Iamblichus, the primary Pythagorean biographer, as well as in Xenophon and Plutarch’s calculated mythologizing of the Spartan past. Ideal societies often reintroduced and preserved their ancient practices in a fashion reminiscent of the Egyptians in Plato’s *Timaeus*. It is not surprising that Philo of Alexandria, a philosopher who combined aspects of Judaism and Hellenism, a Hellenistic scholar of the first century BCE, who may have had direct experience with these groups in Egypt (Philo *On the Contemplative Life* 3.1). Although Philo does not directly state that the Essenes are the spiritual descendants of Pythagoras, he associates them quite strongly by the context of his argument, remarking in *Every Good Man is Free* that he approves of the Pythagorean philosophy, and describing his Essenes and Therapeutae in very similar terms as Iamblichus does the Pythagoreans. Like the Pythagoreans, they maintain a concept of learning *enkrateia*; unlike them, they put a ban on the use of slaves. Philo’s descriptions of the Essenes and Therapeutae are of great interest as offering an illustration of the continuation of the ascetic-utopian lifestyle inaugurated by the Pythagoreans.

Clearly classical philosophers attached a certain cachet to the concept of legitimate continuity and descent. Thus, the belief in the traditional roots of an ascetic code was clearly an important attraction for later generations. For instance, the ancient constitution of Lyscurgan Sparta, which valued military virtue above all else, initiated a mystique-laden utopian tradition, from Xenophon to Rousseau, which outlasted the power of the city-state itself by thousands of years.

hand, attitudes towards slaves and enslavement vary widely in the various real-life utopian communities, and the defining factor in this is their approach to war, a major distinction that immediately presents itself in a comparison of the Spartan state with the Pythagorean-type communities. The Spartans used the Helots as a constant reminder that war brings enslavement for losers, and aristocracy for victors, whereas the Pythagorean view of reincarnation imposed the threat of living a slave's life later if one abused that of the master now. In consequence, they held slaves but did not make them.

Additionally, classical accounts of slave revolts and rebellions, although they do not constitute full-blown utopias, make use of the many motifs commonly present in militaristic idealized cultures, such as Sparta and Rome, or even the leader-hero cult of Alexander the Great. It is ironic that these motifs stem primarily from the dominant perspective on slavery in utopia, as if suggesting that the rebellious slaves on some level have made themselves worthy of emancipation. I will argue that the use of “utopianizing” techniques in the case of the servile uprisings reflects that the slaves are making constructive use of the dominant ideology they are trying to cast off. In considering the accounts of their attempts, it is clear that the sympathetic literary reception of the slave rebels' deeds corresponds to their degree of military virtue.

Πολεμός και Εγκρατεία: Sparta, Pythagoreans and their Slaves

When it came to their slaves, the Pythagoreans were dedicated to the use, and the Spartans to the abuse, of power. The ethical mainstay of the Pythagoreans is

the injunction not to shed blood, an interesting approach in terms of the conception of slavery as “social death.” Since they do not believe in harming or killing other creatures, how can they endure, let alone enable, a commuted death sentence? In addition, if one understands slavery as luxury, this is also completely opposed to their outlook on life. Yet they treat slavery with a certain degree of resignation, as perhaps a necessary penance for past crimes.¹³⁵ The only way the Pythagoreans could reconcile slavery to their code was in terms of their process of education, through the course of which one must suffer a lengthy period of obedience before one can ‘rule’ oneself. The tale of the emancipation of Pythagoras’ slave Zalmoxis and his development into a sage in his own right reflects the “liberation” metaphor of the Pythagorean initiate, who transcends servitude by means of adherence to the Πυθαγορείος βίος. Additionally, character training to master the passions places the utmost importance on the

¹³⁵ The story of the Locrian Maidens, although it does not deal directly with Pythagoreans, is an interesting parable on a situation they might have considered deserving of slavery. In this case the innocent descendants of the original malefactors are punished with slavery and death. The Locrians fighting in the Trojan War had violated both the people and religious symbols of Troy generations before, but as a divine recompense for their atrocities, they had to send a number of maidens over to Troy. These, while being hunted by Trojans, had to make it from the ship to the temple in the dead of night. If they arrived at the temple alive, they then had to serve as unclean temple slaves for the rest of their days (Iambl. *VP* 8.41). This tale seems like an apology for slavery; in spite of its horror, it shows a situation in which slavery is deserved in some sense for their ancestors’ lack of *σοφροσύνη*. Probably because of the Pythagorean belief in reincarnation, the plight of the Locriae would be interpreted as restitution for the sins of incontinence many generations past. It is appropriate, then, that in his dealings with slaves and social inferiors Pythagoras is described as bringing his asceticism and continence to the fore. His treatment of slaves is put in context with his control of his diet and speech, as we see in Diogenes Laertius, who states that “he was never known to punish a slave or freeman in anger” (Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 8.19-20).

humane treatment of slaves and the powerless. Both these approaches, the transcendent liberation of the slave, and the use of the slave as an educational tool for the benefit of the “free” student, are metaphorical representations of the type familiar in the Platonic tradition, and signify the moral continuum of slavery to freedom. Thus, the possession of slaves gives the Pythagorean sage a testing ground for good behavior, with the philosophical focus on the masters, not the slaves.

The Pythagoreans considered the pursuit of physical pleasure to be the most pernicious influence on character, and proselytized this doctrine to the population at large.¹³⁶ What they would preach to the community they would practice themselves, sometimes to an excessive degree. A remarkable story about the Pythagorean training in ἐγκρατεῖα tells that they would prepare an elaborate feast, gather all together, and look at it for a considerable period of time; then, once their desires were roused, have it sent away without eating any.¹³⁷ Such

¹³⁶συνήθειαν εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὴν ἡδονήν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν εὐλαβείας δεομένων· οὐθὲν γὰρ οὕτω σφάλλιν ἡμᾶς οὐδ' ἐμβάλλιν εἰς ἀμαρτίαν ὡς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος.

Take care to guard against pleasure if you guard at all against anything essential. For nothing makes us fail and fall into error as this feeling (Iambl. *VP* 31.204). This statement is similar to a speech of Archytas reported by Cicero (Cic. *Cato Maior* 12, 39-41).

¹³⁷Concerning food, see Iambl. *VP* 24.10828.150; 31.187. Iamblichus describes a drastic contrast with the servile perspective of Old Comedy, in which, as we have seen, the ideal life is often envisaged as an endless banquet. Perhaps because of this, the lifestyle of the Pythagoreans offered contrast and fodder to some Comic writers. Some preserved fragments make jokes about the leanness of the Pythagorean diet, their poverty, and dirty appearance, as well as their belief in life after death, and the polish of their words. (*Tarentini* of Alexis, quoted in Athenaeus *Deipn.* 4.161 b, and Kratinus' *Tarentini*, ap. Diog. Laert. *Vit. Phil.* 8.37). It is interesting that the utopian perspective of comedy, primarily based on

asceticism does not pertain only to eating, but also to sexuality and the mastery of strong emotions such as anger. In general, the Pythagorean practice was strongly self-prohibitive, with an initiate gaining ground proportionally to his ability to forgo various pleasures. Yet these prohibitions are not confined to the inner circle of devotees, but are adjusted to be appropriate to whichever group is being addressed.¹³⁸ In his third speech (Iambl. *VP* 10.51), Pythagoras talks to the boys of Croton about the importance of not insulting others, or losing their temper if they are insulted. Anger can be a destructive pleasure, and its prohibition has an important application in dealings with slaves, a popular arena for self-indulgent anger.¹³⁹

happy, unthinking hedonism, ranges freely through different ‘ideal’ lifestyles, if only to mock them, suggesting an underlying notion of some commonality between the different senses of idealism.

¹³⁸The question of the isolation of the Pythagoreans, and their role in the community is important in terms of their utopian identity; were they more self-involved, and cut off from the masses, or did they have a real concern for these people and a sense of responsibility for them? If their focus is inwards, esoteric and elitist, it might suggest they would have little concern with the plight and sufferings of such unfortunate outsiders as slaves. Pythagoras’ first speeches at Croton show the more public side of his character. Francois Lenormant describes the Pythagoreans as having a popular mission, rather than as being a sort of monastic order. He says their teaching encompassed material and moral affairs, including, “Metaphysics, physic, science, religion, liturgy, morals, laws, and politics...” (Francois Lenormant, *La Grande-Grece*, vol. II [Paris: 1882], 224) On Pyth. Concern for the public at large, see Iambl. *VP* 35.264. On the *Akousmatics* vs. the *Mathematics* see Iambl. *VP* 29.92; Porph. *VP* 18-19. On the necessity for the elders of Croton to govern equally and morally, so as to pass on torch to next generation (see Iambl. *VP* 30.129).

¹³⁹Certain stories about Pythagoreans indicate that they did indeed have slaves, although these tales are set up to convey the mercy and goodness of the Pythagorean master. For example, the tale of Zalmoxis, who belonged to Pythagoras, shows that the Thracian slave benefited so much from his indenture that he became a sage himself, a state incidentally coinciding with his liberation

Whereas Pythagoreanism was based on the supreme importance of individual morality, Sparta operated from the opposite end of the spectrum, giving sanction to as little private life as possible, and that strictly controlled by the state. In Spartan terms, the subjection of the body to the mind had to be secondary to the ultimate sacrifice of the individual to the public goals of success in war, the driving force behind Spartan utopianism. The institution of Helotry, originally made possible by conquest and enabling constant warfare, relates integrally to Sparta's military idealism. Few societies are based on one overriding motive in the same way as Sparta, where throughout the many echelons and gradations of society, state interests were focused on the success of the military machine, and

from slavery. This story is interesting compared to the statement of Iamblichus about education: "in their way of living, men differ from animals, Greeks from barbarians, free from slaves, and philosophers from uneducated men"(Iambl. *VP* 9.44). This shows the importance of education as supplement to natural qualities, and the possibility of transformation from a state of enlightenment to one of ignorance, and back again. Pythagoras seems to have decided in the affirmative the answer to that conundrum of Plato's *Meno*, "whether virtue can be taught." Another tale, of Archytas of Tarentum, shows the extreme continence of the master when faced with his own anger at his slaves (Iambl. *VP* 31.197). This is really a cautionary fable about punishing anyone when in the grip of passion, a successful application of the anger management principles we have already seen taught to the boys in Pythagoras' first address to the Crotoniates (Iambl. *VP* 10.51). Nevertheless, it indicates that Archytas possessed agricultural slaves, and that he would have punished them, if he had not been angry. It clearly shows an acceptance of authority and obedience, even of human property, for those who have learned "to command themselves." On the other hand, the mechanics of this sort of property are unclear. How did the slaves function in a situation where property is communal, or is this even the case? Is Archytas even living in a utopian Pythagorean community, or on his own estate, but adopting the principles of the lifestyle? If he is in the demesnes of the "Society," the fact that he uses agricultural slaves at all smacks of a Spartiate obtainment of leisure, but with the object of meditation and purity rather than military might. From what we have seen of Pythagoras' activities at Croton, it was possible that Archytas could have simply stayed in his own home, living an internally moral life, but externally similar to that of his contemporaries-a modified compromise.

ideology forbade that this machine be run by the Spartans' slaves.¹⁴⁰ A wide scale program of bullying and repression was in effect to ensure that the status quo remained in place. Yet Helots who were successful fighters for Sparta had the chance to rise in rank and gain more rights.

Peter Hunt's revisionist history on the actual activities of the Helots of Sparta gives us some idea of how this absorption of the dominant ideals occurred. Hunt investigates the ideology of the citizens of this period, finding that it was predicated on an extremely high valuation of military prowess, through which combatants could determine their proper status as slaves or masters. This, at any

¹⁴⁰ Helots were of a different status than chattel slaves; they had families and homes, and they could possibly rise in society, but in Spartan ideology, they were "arch-slaves." Helots were of a different status than chattel slaves; they had families and homes, and they could possibly rise in society, but in Spartan ideology, they were "arch-slaves." Vidal-Naquet, who has written extensively on the political difference between "serf" type slaves as opposed to chattel, finds that in utopian fiction as well as historical tales, the former are often conceived as working with women and other marginal groups who invert the existing power structure, whereas the latter are never depicted in this role (see Vidal-Naquet, "Slavery and the Rule of Women in Myth, History, and Utopia": in *The Black Hunter*, 218). Yet many Greek writers refer to the Helots as "δοῦλοι." The Messenian Helots had lost their freedom because of defeat in war, and military inferiority was the most common basis for slavery. Likewise, the servitude of the Laconian Helots, whose true origins are so very murky, was justified in legend on the basis of conquest or cowardice. Maybe the Greeks in general were more conscious of the dishonor shared by Helots and slaves than of their differences in status. Certainly the Spartans went to great pains to demonstrate this dishonor, at least publicly. The stories of the ephors' yearly declarations of war on Messenia, or of Spartans forcing Helots to get drunk as object lessons for youngsters, indicate the Spartans worked on maintaining a very public antipathy against the Helots, to keep them demoralized and alienated. The story in Thucydides (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 4.80.3-4) of the "freeing" of the 2000 Helots indicates that there was no official incorporation of Helots into the citizen body on the basis of merit. In this tale, the Helot soldiers had fought for their Spartan masters, proving their loyalty and courage, but these were conceived as warlike qualities and thus potentially dangerous; therefore, the 2000 were executed en masse.

rate, is the rationale for enslaving people in war. On the other hand, in order to maintain military might, it was necessary in many cases to actually arm the despised slaves and convince them to fight. Through the avenue of courage, skill or luck, the lowly slave might have shown himself worthy of some better sort of life.

Hunt argues against the idea that a dominant ideology convinces the oppressed to remain in their state of subjugation:

Ideology works by presenting a vision of the world that justifies certain actions, behaviors, or social relations. Such a model of the world often unifies opinion within a class, and thus greatly enhances its power. A certain view of the world may also have a persuasive power among those whose interests are either unclear or ambivalent. This, too, is significant, since ruling classes often offer perquisites to some of their inferiors. An ideology may convince such inferiors whose interests are mixed: the usually rebellious Helots fought loyally for the Spartans at Plataea. They may have expected rewards, perhaps even freedom; their interests were mixed.¹⁴¹

When a dominant ideology is accepted, it is often because it can be used against the class in whose interest it was created. Since such an ideology often idealizes social relations, it can be used to criticize the way in which these relations are actually practiced: the classical Greek notion that citizens deserve their status by virtue of military service to the state tended to bolster the distinction between citizens and non-citizens. This ideology could threaten its creators when they allowed slaves to fight or depended on mercenaries.¹⁴²

Hunt theorizes that to an extent, this shift in attitude had to do with the changing conventions of battle, since a secondary function of hoplite warfare was self-representation as a citizen.¹⁴³ By fighting for the polis, wearing the same outfit as one's fellow citizens, one acted clearly and openly for the advantage of

¹⁴¹Hunt, 22.

¹⁴²Hunt, 23.

¹⁴³Hunt, 11.

the city. According to Hunt, the desire to keep slaves out of war relates to this wish of those in power to prevent this from happening, and to keep slave-citizen categories pure.¹⁴⁴

Extrapolating from Hunt, we can hypothesize that the exclusive social structures of the classical political utopias may also be based on this view of warfare as a touchstone of “natural” freedom; even when war loses prestige, the virtues associated with it persist in idealized society. The Greeks used the metaphor of slavery to describe a large variety of unequal relations. The Athenians are often depicted as attempting to “enslave” members of the Delian League in Thucydides’ work, just as Plato conceives the divisions of the soul in terms of slavery. It is possible to see the connection of slavery with war as a justification of the notion that the reason for victory is virtue; the old saw “God on our side” reflects this continuing attitude to the idea that the winners in war are right and good. Orlando Patterson has argued that ideal of freedom in ancient Greece was inseparable from the ideology of chattel slavery, implying that the negative associations that go along with slavery exist to define the true citizen identity by contrast.¹⁴⁵ Ideally, the citizen should be “good” in this way, and the slave “bad”; in fact, all of the political utopian writing we have encountered demands such virtue from its citizens.

In spite of the systematic employment of the Helots in the military, the act of war polarized a person’s character in the mind of the Spartans and other Greeks as

¹⁴⁴Hunt, 22.

¹⁴⁵Patterson (1991) 177.

well, marking it clearly as slave or free. In order to maintain the role of mighty oligarchy, the Spartans had to arm their Helots on multiple occasions, and as Sparta's structure grew straitened under the duress of the Peloponnesian wars, the boundaries between the serfs and their overlords broke down on a military and social level.¹⁴⁶ The decline of the hoplite ἄγων led to conditions conducive to the use of slaves in war, yet the idealization of the hoplite ethos remained.¹⁴⁷ Thus, if a slave participated in battle as a hoplite, he became militarily "coded" as a citizen. Yet the ideology of the Spartans, and the Greeks in general was such that slaves in war should not have existed. Their official doctrine suggests that the *homoioi* should have banned Helots from war, but doctrine and their practice were clearly at odds, since much evidence exists that Helots climbed the social ladder because of outstanding distinction in war.¹⁴⁸ It is tempting to appeal here to the

¹⁴⁶ Hunt, 8. Early hoplites conceived warfare as an ἄγων, with set rules, clearly understood by both contestants. If one ignored these conventions of honor, it might be possible to obtain at least a temporary advantage, although eventually, this too would cease to exist. For the idea that the Athenians and Spartans created the idealized concept of the hoplite *agon* following the victories of the Persian Wars, see Peter Krentz, "Fighting by the Rules: The Invention of the Hoplite *Agôn* " *Hesperia* 71, no. 1 (2002), as well the collection of compiled essays: Jean Pierre Vernant, ed., *Problèmes De La Guerre En Grèce Ancienne* (La Haye: Mouton & Co., 1969).

¹⁴⁷ The Helots enabled the Spartans to be a professional army, since by taking over all the menial tasks, in particular the agricultural work, they provided the "Equals" with leisure to devote their entire existence to military life. Yet the so-called *homoioi* were very few in number, certainly not enough to provide enough soldiers for a state in constant war, and still maintain their reputation as the most powerful army in Greece. Because of this deficit, the Spartans gave their Helots weapons, and commanded, or convinced them to fight in their wars.

¹⁴⁸ The existence of the νεοδαμόδεις " ('newly-of-the-demos') attests to this, as does that of the Helots who had been given higher status, perhaps equivalent to that of the περιόικοι. There were usually more of these underlings in the field

modern doctrine that a share in society contributes to the superiority of a citizen army. Sometimes poverty or the desire for freedom can also spur soldiers on. So why did the Spartans make such an enormous effort to maintain an official attitude so different from their actual practice?

In terms of status the stratification of Spartan society was fairly complex compared to that of Athens, since Sparta had many subdivisions and shades of political equality and inequality, all geared in some way towards waging war. If one contrasts the Spartan Helot mobility with the Athenian slave system a factor of caste complexity emerges. In general, military hierarchy is conducive to incorporating slaves and other underprivileged groups. Although there were many different gradations of wealth in Athens, and the very rich may certainly have thought of themselves quite differently from the poor, the only political divisions of the Athenians were citizens, metics and slaves. Even the *thetes*, the lowest income class, had full citizen rights, and the second lowest, the *zeugitai*, fought as hoplites.¹⁴⁹

When an army is composed of homogeneous citizen hoplites, the use of slaves in warfare threatens their order, whereas in a highly stratified army, as in society,

than the total number of Spartan citizens. They were used when an expedition had to be gathered quickly, since they seem to have been professional soldiers, who did not farm (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.23-24, Hunt, 171). The use of νεοδαμώδεις was not confined to the decline of Sparta, but they were used with regularity during least 50 years of her heyday. Helots could only be freed by a state edict. The Spartan *perioikoi*, on the other hand, often freed their slaves, calling them Aphetai, Adespotoi, Eructeres, or Desposionautae, referring to the different functions they would fulfil after manumission (Myron, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker* 106F1).

¹⁴⁹ See the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* p. 526 under *hoplites*.

there is place for the lower classes to function. (Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.15; Arist. *Pol.* 1253b33) Sparta was a precursor of the modern military in this regard; then as now, many ranks made it possible for soldiers to practice both command and obedience constantly, with the competition for promotion as a driving force. Additionally, the breakdown into ranks allows the incorporation into the military machine of the lowest stratum of soldiers without giving them too much power. If there were only privates and generals in the army, the privates would have much more influence as a unified group. Promoting some of the Helots to higher rank within the Spartan system simultaneously reduced the threat they posed, and gave them more incentive to fight. This did not prevent the Spartans from viewing them as slaves, with all the implications of dishonor that slavery entails. In this sense, their ideological portrait at the hands of Sparta was crucial to Spartan identity as well. They were only able to create an idealized, utopian image of themselves by contrast with the vilified portrait of their slaves. In this fashion, the Spartans used a combination of cooption and intimidation to keep the Helots in check, as they geared the entire fabric of their social life towards group success in war. These very principles of military idealism and competition for honors, recast in a rebellious mode, later helped the Helots to liberate themselves and to rewrite their history. When they seized power, they made use of the model of dominant ideology and warfare already in place.

If one contrasts the Spartans' blatantly forceful exploitation of the Helots with the Pythagoreans' moral goal of improving the souls of all people, including slaves, through service it is difficult to think of the two groups in the same terms.

Yet ironically, the Helots' potential ability to achieve higher status through military education stems from a similar ideological standpoint. The militaristic Lakedaimonian and peacenik Pythagorean share many similar practices and a thread of shared idealism binds them together. Both societies develop order, discipline, and regimentation to a high degree. The silences, the inclusion of women as important members of the community, as well as the elitism pertaining to the inner circle are all remarkably similar elements. Gymnastics and music play an important part in the educational systems of both, and common food and possessions are basic institutions. The mixed constitution of Sparta corresponds to the cosmology of the Pythagoreans, in terms of the theory of equilibrium and balanced forces of the universe. Both require a stringent education of initiates before they achieving a level of influence, and both rely on subservient labor for the leisure to practice their utopian lifestyle.¹⁵⁰ In both cases, education is the path

¹⁵⁰The similarities between Pythagoreanism and Lycurgan Sparta have prompted some to suggest that Pythagoras, an Ionian of Samos, took Sparta, a Dorian city, as his model. Francois Ollier suggested a possibility that the systems of both came from a common source. His claim that there is an ancient "fount of Greek wisdom, of which the Dorian sources are better preserved than any others" does seem to agree with the pattern of the idealization of the Dorian past in the case of Pythagoreans, Sparta, Crete, and Delphi. See: François Ollier, *Le Mirage Spartiate; Étude Sur L'idéalisation De Sparte Dans L'antiquité Grecque De L'origine Jusqu'aux Cyniques, Et Étude Sur L'idéalisation De Sparte Dans L'antiquité Grecque Du Début De L'école Cynique Jusqu'à La Fin De La Cité*, ed. Lyon Université de, Annales. 3. Sér. Lettres, Fasc. 13. (New York: Arno Press, 1973), 202. We also have information from Aristoxenus (Diog. Laert. *Vit. phil.* 8.8; 8.21) that Pythagoras took his precepts from the Priestess at Delphi, the same source ascribed in some legendary "history" to Lykourgos. Likewise, Justin Martyr says that Pythagoras studied the institutions of Crete and Sparta (Justin *Epit. Trog. Pomp.* 20.4). Justin is following Plato's *Timaeus* in making this statement. Delphi, Crete, and Sparta were repositories of old "wisdom," and aristocratic notions. It was not possible, according to Ollier, for the Pythagoreans to be anything but aristocrats (Ollier, 196). The rationale for this idea is based not

to the ascetic life and a justification for slavery.¹⁵¹

only on the fact that members of the society were chosen from higher levels of society, but also because given their love of order, nothing was more hateful to them than innovations, violence and instability of the “mob.” Ollier overlooks here the fact that Pythagoreans did not consider wealth or birth alone to be determining factors for virtue. Nevertheless, he is correct in saying that the notion of aristocracy, even though it is usually draws on superiority of birth or of riches, is often justified by claims of moral and intellectual superiority. To the Pythagoreans, their order constituted a real “aristocracy,” just as the Spartans admitted only the members of the *homoioi* to complete citizen rights.

¹⁵¹ The Spartan educational system, the *agoge*, emphasized the public and the external in their educational process. One of the main missions of Spartan education was to make everyone the “same, or equal” (ὁμοίος) so that the process was the same for all; all, meaning a select few. The traditional historical accounts of Xenophon and Plutarch describe their educational system as extremely harsh, highly stratified into different age groups, and as confined to the small percentage of the boys whose parents could afford it. The long passage through the *agoge* made the painful distinction between inferior and superior warriors, as well as rich and poor. There is a movement among modern critics to suggest that many sources, including Plutarch, distort the harshness of life for boys in the *agoge*. Kennell, for one, doubts that many of these practices were historically accurate. In contrast to the traditional ultra-stable and conservative depiction of Spartan institutions, Kennell takes an “archeological” approach to examining the Spartan *agoge*, meaning he looks back in time in an order reversed from the usual historical method (Kennel, 115-116). Although his subject matter is limited, his approach has a wider application in terms of our interpretation of other evidence on Sparta. By examining what was associated with the Spartan *agoge* at different periods, Kennell is trying to avoid the accretion of misconceptions that have piled up over the years. His point is that one cannot think of rituals and institutions as static; rather it is necessary to see what they mean at different points in time for a culture. In his opinion, the *agoge* was always a living entity, not a fossilized one. Thus, he attempts to overcome the tendency to ascribe what later sources tell us to its early stages. For example, it is not certain the name “*agoge*” was not even a product of the classical era. Since we do not have any attestation of this word, which Kennell calls an “artificial expression of Spartanism” earlier than the 3rd century BCE he thinks the education system was such an organic part of Spartan life the participants didn’t even feel the need to name it. Ducat also agrees with Kennell and Vidal-Naquet that the Spartans imposed such harshness on children primarily during rites of passage, as well as normally antisocial practices such as stealing (Ducat, 45). For instance, the fact that young Helots often accompanied young Spartans in their service may show that life was less harsh for them than has commonly been thought. Nevertheless, it is clear that there was great pressure for the boys of the *homoioi* to distinguish themselves publicly from the other

One institution common to both the Spartan and the Pythagorean systems was the use of silence as an initiatory or educational tool. As we have seen, the concepts of asceticism and ἐγκρατεῖα separate slaves and free in an framework of utopian ideology. Silence has important application to the development of the strong, self-contained, and thus “free” character. This is an interesting contrast with the *libertas loquendi*, or παρρησία that is a determining value of the servile perspective utopias. In Sparta, silence, like dress and manners, was a basic feature of upbringing, and a tool for discipline, since it required the suppression of the self. As Plutarch says in the *Moralia*: “οἱ γὰρ εὐγενοῦς καὶ βασιλικῆς τῶ ὄντι παιδείας τυχόντες πρῶτον σιγᾶν εἶτα λαλεῖν μαθάνουσιν,” or “those who have had an education fit for a noble or a king learn first to be silent, then to speak. (Plut. *Mor.* 506c7). As Ephraim David puts it, “The Spartan system of communication put great emphasis on learning when, where, why and how not to talk, and the proper amount of talk as opposed to silence.”¹⁵²

The rituals of Artemis Orthia entailed that the Spartan youth bear a painful

sectors of society, ranging from Helots to the *upomeiones*. See Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).; Nigel M. Kennell, *The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education & Culture in Ancient Sparta*, Studies in the History of Greece and Rome. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).; Jean Ducat, "Perspectives on Spartan Education in the Classical Period," in *Sparta: New Perspectives* ed. Stephen Hodkinson and Anton Powell (London [England] Oakville, CT: Duckworth with the Classical Press of Wales ;Distributor in the U.S.A. David Brown Book Co., 1999), 45.

¹⁵² In his article, “Sparta’s Kosmos of Silence” David examines the use of silence in Sparta from an anthropological and structural point of view. See Ephraim David, "Sparta’s Kosmos of Silence," in *Sparta: New Perspectives*, ed. Stephen Hodkinson and Anton Powell (London [England] Oakville, CT: Duckworth with the Classical Press of Wales ; Distributor in the U.S.A. David Brown Book Co., 1999), 119.

beating in silence. David contrasts this rite of passage with another rite of corporal punishment, the annual flagellation of the Helots, and calls this a parody of the Orthia beatings, in which the Helots' cries of pain would have reinforced the self-image of the Spartans.¹⁵³ Similarly, Kennell suggests that the Orthia ritual, usually seen as the ultimate expression of the warrior virtue of endurance, could instead signify a religious focus on the opposites of a normal state, revealing the temporary reversion of the ephebes to slave status.¹⁵⁴ The beating with whips, usually used to punish slaves, emphasizes this. The removal of their old identity, a temporary social death, precedes the rite of renewal and rebirth, but in order to attain this, punishment must be borne in silence, which thus functioned as a method for regaining self-control, and free status. Another example of the Spartans' use of silence as a determinant of status was their practice of getting Helots drunk in the public messes. Producing the shameful chattiness of inebriation in the Helots would have reinforced the image of silence as self-control. As David remarks, "Volitional silence, accompanied by a facade of docility, is known as a strategy of passive resistance among the oppressed."¹⁵⁵ Depriving the Helots of silence deprived them of their resistance.

The Pythagorean use of silence as an educational technique makes an interesting contrast with the Spartan usage. The most dramatic difference lies in the length of time demanded for silence, and the private, interior character of this

¹⁵³Ibid.,123.

¹⁵⁴Kennell,129.

¹⁵⁵David,124.

trial, as opposed to the brief, public Spartan ordeal. Although Pythagoreanism certainly had a public character in teaching the population at large, its charismatic mystery lay in the difficult entrance to its inner circle.¹⁵⁶ Before entering on the first stages of initiation, novices received an interview that weeded out sufferers from excessive “talkativeness” (λαλία). Subsequently, they must be completely silent for five years before acceptance into the *Mathematikoi*.¹⁵⁷ Unlike the silent

¹⁵⁶ According to Iamblichus anyone who requested admission to the society was sent away and ignored for three years after their first request, then if he were finally accepted had to keep a period of 5-year silence (Iambl. *VP* 71-72). Character training and family background were also factors in admission, and members were active in governing the duties of the group by seniority. Although there was no tuition, the function of common property entailed giving all of one’s possessions to the society; apparently, one of the duties of the more powerful members was to divide the goods of new members. Members of the Pythagorean Society called πολιτικοί οἰκονόμοι took and distributed the possessions of new members who had not yet finished the five-year σιγή (Iambl. *VP* 21.97; 17.72).

¹⁵⁷ πολιτεία δὲ ἡ βελτίστη καὶ ὁμοδημία καὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων καὶ θρησκεία θεῶν καὶ ὀσιότης πρὸς κατοικομένους, νομοθεσία τε καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔχεμυθία καὶ φειδῶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀγχίνοια καὶ θειότης καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ, ὡς ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, ταῦτα πάντα τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν ἀξίεραστα καὶ περισπούδαστα δι’ αὐτὸν ἐφάνη.

The best government and community, the common goods of friends, rituals of the gods and reverence for those who have gone before, the establishment of law, education, silence, and mercy for other creatures, self mastery and temperance, sharpness of mind and godliness, all other goods, in a word, because of him were manifest to lovers of learning as attractive and serious pursuits (Iambl. *VP* 6.32).

ἔτι δὲ ἔχεμυθία τε καὶ παντελῆς σιωπῆ, πρὸς τὸ γλώσσης κρατεῖν συνασκούσα... Then ritual quiet and complete silence, practise for mastering the tongue...(Iambl. *VP* 31.188-concerning the development of *enkrateia*).

τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀποχὴ ἐμψύχων ἀπάντων καὶ προσέτι βρωμάτων τινῶν ἤσκειτο γενναίως, τοῦτο δὲ ἐπεγρίαὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ εἰλικρίνειαί τῶν ἐμποδιζόντων ἐπετηδεύοντο, τοῦτο δὲ ἔχεμυθία τε καὶ παντελῆς σιωπῆ, πρὸς τὸ γλώσσης κρατεῖν συνασκούσα ἐπὶ ἔτη πολλά, τὴν ἀνδρείαν αὐτῶν ἐγύμναζεν...

In a noble way, they practiced abstinence from all living things, and some other foods as well, restraining speech and complete silence, working many years at

endurance of intense, but relatively brief physical pain of the Artemis Orthia ritual, the Pythagoreans used continuous silence as a gage of a student's seriousness and his ability to control his minor, reflexive reactions. In his first description of Pythagorean *echemythia*, Iamblichus refers to “τὸ γλώσσης κρατεῖν” (mastery of the tongue) as the most difficult type of *enkrateia*, and thus the best long-term regulator acquiring the habits, or ethics.

μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς προσιούσι προσέταττε σιωπὴν πενταετῆ,
ἀποπειρώμενος πῶς ἐγκρατείας ἔχουσιν, ὡς χαλεπώτερον τῶν
ἄλλων ἐγκρατευμάτων τοῦτο, τὸ γλώσσης κρατεῖν...

gaining mastery of the tongue, and this trained their courage...(Iambl. VP 32.225-226).

...ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν νενομοθετημένην αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ Πυθαγόρου ἐχεμυθίαν
θείων μυστηρίων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀτελέστους ἀπορρήτων
τρόπων ἤπτοντο καὶ διὰ συμβόλων ἐπέσκεπον τὰς πρὸς
ἀλλήλους διαλέξεις ἢ συγγραφάς
...according to the established law of the Pythagoreans, they kept a vow of silence
about the divine mysteries, and in the presence of the uninitiated they
communicated through symbols their conversations and letters to each other
(Iambl. VP 23.104-105).

Is autem, qui tacebat, quae dicebantur ab aliis, audiebat, neque percontari, si parum intellexerat, neque commentari, quae audierat, fas erat; sed non minus quisquam tacuit quam biennium: hi prorsus appellabantur intra tempus tacendi audiendique akoustikoi. 5 Ast ubi res didicerant rerum omnium difficillimas, tacere audireque, atque esse iam coeperant silentio eruditi, cui erat nomen echemythia, tum verba facere et quaerere quaeque audissent scribere et, quae ipsi opinarentur, expromere potestas erat; 6 hi dicebantur in eo tempore mathematicoi, ab his scilicet artibus, quas iam discere atque meditari inceptaverant...
He moreover, who was silent, heard the things said by others, nor was it proper for him to ask questions if he had not understood completely, nor to comment on what he had heard, but each was silent no less than two years. These, further, during their period of silence and listening, were called *akoustikoi*. But, when they had learned the most difficult things, namely, being silent and listening, and when they had become skilled in the silence, which was called *echemythia*, then they had the authority to make and to investigate words, and to write the things that they had heard, and to express their opinions. These were called at that point *Mathematikoi*, from those disciplines that they had begun to learn and consider...(Aulus Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 9).

After this, he ordered them to observe a five-year silence, in the attempt for them to gain self-control, as if thinking that control of speech was the most difficult of all types of self-control...(Iambl. *VP* 17. 72).

Training in silence seems peaceful, and has monastic associations for us, yet it can have a warlike aspect. The tale of Timycha of Lacedaimon reflects a very macabre application of *echemythia* that would not seem out of place in a militaristic context. Timycha, wife of the Pythagorean disciple Myllias of Kroton when captured and threatened with torture by Dionysos of Syracuse in the final month of her pregnancy, bites off her own tongue rather than reveal the secret rationale for the order's prohibition on beans. As Iamblichus writes, she demonstrates that:

...εἰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν βασάνων τὸ θῆλυ αὐτῆς νικηθὲν συναναγκασθεῖη τῶν ἔχεμυθουμένων τι ἀνακαλύψαι, τὸ μὴν ὑπηρετήσων ἐκποδῶν ὑπ' αὐτῆς περικέκοπται.

...even if what was female in her be defeated by torture and compelled to betray one of the things to be kept silent, she had got rid of the part that enabled her to do so (Iambl. *VP* 31.194).

The fact that just before, ten Pythagorean disciples chose to die rather than suffer capture underscores the fact that the Pythagoreans do not intend to undergo the breaking of personal code that could precede enslavement. That Timycha defeats her own possible lack of control in such a violent manner seems much out of step with the usual peaceful emphasis of Pythagorean activities. The point of this story, although it deals on the face of it with the dietary prohibitions of the order, is that even a woman or slave, weaker, and thus easily subservient, can achieve self-control, and thus avoid the condition of slavery, although perhaps at the cost of death. Pythagoreanism offers the weak escape from enslavement, at the price of complete absorption of the Pythagorean code.

Both the Pythagorean and Spartan systems share an approach to silence that is completely opposed to the servile perspective's worship of παρρησία. Both groups consider talkativeness an aspect of slavish rather than liberated character. The use of the comedic word λαλία underscores the association of excessive talk with inferiority of character, while silence, on the other hand, is included among the array of utopian virtues. Silence occurs in a period of probationary training in both cases, after which it is no longer required in the same way, although the high valuation of silence is a component of the famous taciturn character of the Spartans as well as the cryptic, short sayings of Pythagoras. After learning the habit of silence, *Mathematikoi* and *Homoioi* have the right to speak up when it suits them. It then falls to them to compel their initiates, as well as their real slaves, to silence. The difference between the two groups lies in a question of priorities: war vs. philosophy. The Spartan use silence as a public, official demonstration of warrior status, while the Pythagorean *echemythia* is a process of long-term character training focused on the development of internal morality.

Resistance: Helots, Messenia, and Rebellion

The development of Messenia reveals the Spartans' degree of success at inculcating their Helots with the idea of social death. The fact that so many preferred to become Messenians, abandoning the possibility of becoming *neodamodeis*, suggests their wish to reinvent themselves completely, apart from a tradition of slavery. The relationship of "Messenianism" to Helotry is very revealing of the Spartan attitudes towards Helots, the Helots' views of

themselves, and Greek attitudes to slavery in general. The emergence of Messenia should have broken the Spartan veneer of idealism, just as the emancipation of the black slaves of the south should have destroyed the idealization of plantation culture. This did not occur because the classical Greeks were not able to bring themselves to attach blame to the practice of slavery, but only to the vices of “slavishness.”

In their history of conflict, the warrior aristocrats of Sparta did as much as they could to dishonor the Messenians, while casting themselves in a contrasting light. In their traditional justification of the events behind the Messenian war, the Spartans used the Delphic oracle. Looking at the series of Delphic responses during the Messenian War, there appears to be an obvious bias in favor of the Spartans.¹⁵⁸ For instance, the Messenians were described as impious, and as

¹⁵⁸All Delphic responses from Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle, Its Responses and Operations* (University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1978).

13. 13. First Messenian War. Spartans on whether to accept the appeal of the murdered Kresphontes' sons for help. Reply that they should accept the appeal and help the wronged. c. 740.)

14. First Messenian War. Messenians seeking a means of victory during the siege of Mt. Ithome. Instructed to sacrifice to the underworld gods a maiden chosen by lot from the Aipytds from a family that offers her willingly. c. 725 BC.

15. First Messenian War. Spartans on defeat in battle in the course of the war. Reply that Messenians acquired their land by trickery and it will be taken from them by trickery. c. 725 BC.

16. First Messenian War. King Aristodemos of Messenia on the conduct of the war during the Spartan siege of the Mt. Ithome. Reply warning to beware of the trickery that will bring Spartans victory. c. 725 BC.

17. First Messenian War. Messenians on how to achieve victory in war with Sparta. Reply stating that victory comes to those who first place 100 tripods around altar of Zeus Ithomatas. c. 720.

18. Second Messenian War. Spartans on how to defeat Messenia most quickly. Instructed to get a leader or counselor from Athens and/or perform certain sacrifices. c. 685 BC.

“having taken their land by trickery,” revealing that the oracle had adopted the Lakonian, not the Messenian version of the myth of the Heracleidae. Spartans help the children of the murdered Kresphontes, whereas the Messenians are tricked into performing a human sacrifice, an act that, according to the precepts of Greek myth, would have infected them with miasma. In this way, the oracle itself sanctioned their conquest.

Who in fact were the Messenians, as opposed to the Helots? The Spartans seem to have viewed the two designations as functionally the same. Yet the tradition that generated the tales of the origins of Helotry is separate from that dealing with the conquests of Messenia. The difference between the evidence for the Helots as opposed to the Messenians is not merely one of chronology, but also of identity politics. “Helots” were deracinated, alienated from a sense of their native rituals, whereas the Messenians thought of themselves as a Greek *polis*. Literary descriptions often reflect this difference. There is a large collection of tales dealing with the Spartan conquest of Messenia, as well as a large body of history dealing with Messenian independence; on the other hand, the information on the origins of the Helots is both sparse and contradictory. This may reflect two factors, first, that Helotry is so ancient that its origins stem from myth and are very difficult to determine. Helotry predates the Messenian Wars, and is not

19. Second Messenian War. Messenian request for salvation. No response given because the request was deemed unjust.c.685 BC

20. Second Messenian War. Aristomenes of Messenia on the occasion of the loss of his shield in battle. Request not stated, instructed to go to adyton (the inner or secret shrine of ancient places of worship) of Trophonios in Lebadeia. c. 680 BC.

21. Second Messenian War. Messenian envoys Aristomenes and Theoklos on salvation after defeat in battle. Reply that when a goat drinks near Neda, Apollo will no longer preserve Messene, for destruction will be near. c. 680 BC.

always described as outright conquest, but is justified separately. Secondly, Messenia was “re-founded” after a long struggle, and the new citizens, distancing themselves from their embarrassing stint as Helots, established a different version of the story from the Spartan one. Strabo tells us several of the Spartans’ pretexts for the subjugation of Messenia, including the killing of Kresphontes, assaults on Spartan maidens in ritual settings at the temple of Artemis, and the assassination of the Spartan king Telekos (Strabo, *Geogr.* 8.4.9). The Messenians, on the other hand, according to Pausanias, describe the Messenian folk-hero Aristomenes as unjustly attacked by Sparta, citing the quarrel between the Messenian Olympic victor Polychares and Spartan Euaiphnos (Paus. *Perieg. Graec. descr.* 4.4.5-5.7). Certainly, the predominance of Messenian Olympic victors of this period lends credence to their case that the Spartans were just plain jealous!¹⁵⁹ Cartledge, however, thinks overpopulation must have triggered the first Messenian War, in spite of stories about the assassination of king Teleklos, and other literary evidence.¹⁶⁰ These versions, although conflicting, are at least consistent with the

¹⁵⁹If one looks at Eusebius’ list of Olympic victors, there is a great predominance of victors from Messene in the Stadion race from 770-736. After this, the Messenian victories cease abruptly. 3rd [768 BCE] - Androclus of Messenia, stadion race [At this time] Romulus and Remus were born. 4th [764 BCE] - Polychares of Messenia, stadion race 5th [760 BCE] - Aeschines of Elis, stadion race 6th [756 BCE] - Oebotas of Dyme, stadion race 7th [752 BCE] - Diocles of Messenia, stadion race 8th [748 BCE] - Anticles of Messenia, stadion race 9th [744 BCE] - Xenocles of Messenia, stadion race 10th [740 BCE] - Dotades of Messenia, stadion race 11th [736 BCE] - Leochares of Messenia, stadion race (Eusebius *Chron.* 1.90).

¹⁶⁰ Cartledge points out many contradictions in the oral history; for instance, that Messenia had supposedly been allotted to the Heraclid Kresphontes, but the successor dynasty to the Dark Age, the Aipytids attested in the Delphic response, was Dorian also. Therefore, Messenia was heterogenous, and already Dorianized (see Cartledge [1979], 116).

internal politics of Sparta and Messenia at different historical points, when each attempted to justify their role in the conflict. The Laconian Helots, on the other hand, have no such political legends of their own, and only the interest of later scholars tells us anything about their original subjection.¹⁶¹ Cartledge, however, succinctly sums up the argument that:

The transformation of the inhabitants of the lower Eurotas furrow into Helots occurred not only long before the full development of chattel slavery, but early enough for them, unlike their Messenian fellows to have forgotten their nationality by the 5th century.”¹⁶² This point will continue to be controversial, as there is so little agreement among ancient sources on the origins of Helots.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹When Francois Ollier wrote his exhaustive treatise, *Le Mirage Spartiate: Etude sur l'idealisation de Sparte dans l'antiquite grecque de l'origine jusqu'aux cyniques* in 1933, he was the first to look at Sparta as a “utopianized” state. He subscribed to the theory that when the Eurotas valley was invaded by Dorians in the 12th Cent. BCE, the resident Achaeans were reduced to a state of serfdom as *periokoi* and Helots. Ollier wrote this in the 1930's, and since then the controversy on this issue has raged. See Yavetz, postscript. Recently, a collection on the Messenians and Helots by Nini Luraghi, *Helots and their masters in Laconia and Messenia*, has countered this view quite successfully. See Nino Luraghi, “The Imaginary Conquest of the Helots”; David Rosenbloom, “Chrêstoi vs. Ponêroi: The Ostracism of Hyperbolos and the Struggle for Hegemony in Athens after the Death of Perikles, Part I,” *TAPA* 134, no. 1 (2004): 109-135.

¹⁶²Cartledge (1979), 77.

¹⁶³A.J. Toynbee observed that there are four mutually irreconcilable accounts of the origin of Helotry, which suggests there is no authentic record (see Arnold Joseph Toynbee, *Some problems of Greek history* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 195). The fact that Herodotus and Thucydides ignore the origins of non-Messenian Helots suggests that they take the idea of agricultural serfdom for granted. Thucydides suggests that most of the Helots were descended from Messenians (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 1.102). On the other hand, the conquest of a country was more interesting to them as an historical topic. More interest in the basis of this institution comes later in the Hellenistic period. Antiochus of Syracuse, who places its origins in the first Messenian War, merges the time frames for Messenian and Laconian Helotry, stating that the Laconians who wouldn't fight were reduced to slavery, and those born while the army was on campaign were called “Partheniae,” deprived of political rights, and eventually

Thucydides, although he gives us little information on slaves in general, uses very distinct language in discussing Messenians as opposed to Helots.¹⁶⁴

Thucydides was a slave owner, and his vocabulary reveals his contempt for the lowly status of the *conquered* Messenian Helots, whom he thinks of as slaves,

sent to colonize Taras (Antiochus *Fragmente der Grieschischen Historiker* 555F13). This tradition indicates a strong association of military ideology with a rationale for enslavement, as well as putting together the story of the *ktisis* of Tarentum. Vidal-Naquet suggests that all of the versions of the foundation of Tarentum have to do with different underprivileged, i.e., non citizen groups. Thus sometimes it was known as a sort of “city of slaves,” historically speaking (see Vidal-Naquet, “Slavery and the Rule of Women in Myth, Ideology, and Utopia” in *The Black Hunter*, 21). There also is a tradition in Ephorus that originally the *perioikoi* had *isotimia* under Spartan rule, and there was no Helotry. When they were pressed for tribute, those who resisted (the residents of Helos) were made into serfs. The rest had to be content with a simple loss of equal rights (Ephorus *Fragmente der Grieschischen Historiker* 70F117). This tale seems inspired by philosophical analysis, possibly Plato’s account in the *Republic* of the development of timocracy bringing about serfdom of the demos. Similar is the version of Hellanikos (Hellanikos *Fragmente der Grieschischen Historiker* 4F188), who says the Helots are those who were not by birth the slaves (*douloi*) of the Spartans, but those occupying the city of Helos who were the first to be defeated on their arrival (Plato *Rep.* 8.547b). The etymology of “helos” could make sense, since presumably the greatest concentration of Laconian Helots would have been in the Helos plain, the most fertile part of Laconia. At the same time, ‘Helot’ may well come from a root word “to capture,” which would point to their origin in conquest. Similarly, the theory Theopompos uses to explain the origin of Helots and *penestae* is based on conquest (Theopompos *Fragmente der Grieschischen Historiker* 115F122). His most important point is that serfdom is associated with conquest, and precedes chattel slavery, for the Chians were the first to use chattel slaves, and all previous slaves were Greeks themselves, acquired by conquest by other Greeks and bound to the land.

¹⁶⁴ Thucydides does recognize the importance of slaves for Sparta: “αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς Εἰλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθειστήκει.”

“For most of the Lacedaimonians’ ways have always been established especially with regard to protection against the Helots” (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 4.80.2).

with no right to name themselves.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, he has a different perspective on the *successfully* rebellious Messenians. He dates the identity of the Messenians to the Great Revolt, and the group that escaped to Naupactus. (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 1.101.2; 1.103.1)¹⁶⁶ He makes a point of saying that the rebels were considered to be Messenian, and later refers to them as allies of Athens (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 7.57.8).¹⁶⁷

Thomas Figueira, in his article “The Evolution of the Messenian Identity,” suggests that Thucydides uses two separate styles of reference to talk about the

¹⁶⁵ He uses the expression: " Μεσσήνια τῆ Μεσσηνια ποτε ουσῆ γῆ" or, “the land that once was Messenia” (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 4.3.2).

¹⁶⁶ πλείστοι δὲ τῶν Εἰλώτων ἐγένοντο οἱ τῶν παλαιῶν Μεσσηνίων τότε δουλωθέντων ἀπόγονοι· ἢ καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ ἐκλήθησαν οἱ πάντες. Most of the Helots were descendants from the Messenians of old, who were once enslaved. For this reason they all were called Messenians (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 1.101.2).

Οἱ δ' ἐν Ἰθώμῃ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ὥς οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ξυνέβησαν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ' ᾧ ἐξίασιν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπόσπονδοι καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιβήσονται αὐτῆς· (2.) ἦν δέ τις ἀλίσκεται, τοῦ λαβόντος εἶναι δούλον. ἦν δέ τι καὶ χρηστήριον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις Πυθικὸν πρὸ τοῦ, τὸν ἰκέτην τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἰθωμήτα ἀφιέναι. ἐξῆλθον δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες, καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι κατ' ἔχθος ἤδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπακτον κατώκισαν, ἦν ἔτυχον ἠρηκότες νεωστὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων.

Those in Ithome, in the tenth year, since they could no longer hold out, came out to the Lacedaimonians, on the condition that they should leave the Peloponnese under treaty and never come back. Anyone was captured there would be the slave of his captor. But the Spartans had a Delphic oracle enjoining them: “To release the Ithometan suppliant of Zeus.” So they left with the women and children, and the Athenians welcomed them because of their hatred for the Lacedaimonians, and settled them at Naupactus, which they happened to have recently taken from the Ozolian Locrians (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 1.103.1-3).

¹⁶⁷ To corroborate Thucydides’ information, we have an inscription from Naupactus referring to Messenians as separate from the Naupaktioi (Meiggs-Lewis *GHI* 13).

Helots.¹⁶⁸ They are Helots when the given information relates to their role in Spartan affairs, and Messenians when it relates to Athens. There is one scene, however, where the two separate styles intermingle, when the Spartans request the rebels' withdrawal from Pylos. They are described as “Μεσσηνιοῦς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἴλιотας τε καὶ ὅσοι εὐτομοληκεσαν ἔκ τῆς Λακονικῆς” (Thuc. *Pelop. Wars* 5.35.6-7). As Figueira says, in this passage, Thucydides has merged "the discrepant identifications of the persons in question."¹⁶⁹ In contrast, Diodorus Siculus reports that only Messenians withdrew from Ithome under truce, and the Athenians established them at Naupactus, while the Spartans punished the Helots responsible for the revolt. (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 11.84.7-8) Thucydides never refers to the Messenians at Naupactus as φυγάδες although they were in flight from their homeland as ideological dissidents and collaborators with Athenian policy. He also never calls the Helots the “*demos*” of Laconia, although he often describes the general tactic of Athens in the Peloponnesian War to rouse the *demos* of a polis against oligarchy.

Figueira's main thesis, that the term “Messenian” was ideologically determined, and really had nothing to do with any historical provenance of peoples, implies that the Helots learned something from the Spartans about the idealizing of their background. The creators of the stories about the Messenian

¹⁶⁸ Thomas Figueira, "The Evolution of the Messenian Identity," in *Sparta: New Perspectives*, ed. Stephen Hodkinson and Anton Powell (London [England] Oakville, CT: Duckworth with the Classical Press of Wales ; Distributor in the U.S.A. David Brown Book Co., 1999).

¹⁶⁹ Figueira, 217.

folk-heroes Aristodemus and his successor Aristomenes seem to have internalized the extreme value placed on warrior culture and fighting to the death, even though their heroes were not victorious.¹⁷⁰ For instance, the Messenian leader Aristomenes twice loses his shield, a mishap would have caused the demotion of a member of the Spartan *homoioi* to the *upomeiones*. He recovers the shield, however, and uses it as a special dedicatory offering, thus turning the loaded motif of failure into an iconographic success. In terms of the folkloric narrative, the shield functions as a magical object, but the focus upon its loss and recovery represents the Messenian's infection with the Spartan obsession with keeping their shields at all costs.¹⁷¹

After the Theban conquest of Lacedaimon, there were two possible two ways of explaining the separation of Messenia from Sparta, either as "liberation" or as a return from exile and a refounding of the state of Messenia.¹⁷² The latter is much more prominent; the word *kathodos*, or return, occurs several times in Pausanias'

¹⁷⁰ See Paus. *Perieg. Graec. Descr.* 4.9-24. These stories took on their canonical form after the liberation of Messenia in 369 BCE. This version probably originated with the 4th century BCE historian Callisthenes, but Pausanias likely got the bulk of his material from the 3rd century BCE Cretan poet Rhianus.

¹⁷¹ The shield is lost at the hands of the Dioscuri (Paus. *Graec. Descr.* 4.16.4-6), and again when Aristomenes is thrown into the Caeadas (4.18.4-19). He is said to dedicate it both in the sanctuary of Athena Chalkioikos in Laconia to terrorize the Spartans (4.15.5) and then again in the sanctuary of Trophonius at Lebadea (4.16.7). For Aristomenes in general see Daniel Ogden, *Greek Bastardy: In the Classical and Hellenistic Periods*, Oxford Classical Monographs. (Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1996).

¹⁷² See Figueira, 205.

description of the protracted Messenian conflicts.¹⁷³ According to Pausanias' description, both the Helots and the Athenians took up the Messenian cause as that of a *polis* whose territory was occupied by an aggressor, not as a slave revolt. Accordingly, the second κτισίς of the city was expressed as a return to an ancestral home, rather than as a class struggle.

In the *Hellenica*, Xenophon reflects the same mentality when he classifies the successfully rebellious Messenians separately from the Helots, although the two groups come very close in the text. Interestingly, although Helots are conceptually linked with the “rebellious allies” of the Peloponnesian League who had defected from Sparta, the use of the term “Helot” ceases after 7.2.2, and from that point on there are only descriptions of Messenians.¹⁷⁴ All but two mentions of Messenia occur in book 7, in context of the liberation of the *polis*. (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3; 6.5.33)

¹⁷³Paus. *Perieg. Graec. Descr.* 4. 3.3; 4.20.4;4.26.3;4.27.4;4.27.8; 4.29. 4.

¹⁷⁴ ... καὶ ἀποστάντων μὲν πολλῶν περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἰλώτων, ἔτι δὲ τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατεύοντων δ' αὐτοῖς ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ...
...since many of the Perioikoi, all the Helots, and most of their allies excepting a few were in revolt from them, and the rest of Greece, so to speak, was also campaigning against them... (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.2.)

ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐγγύτατά τε ἐτύχανον ὄντες καὶ ὠξυλάβησαν, ἐξῆλθον ὀπόσους δὲ ἔφθασαν πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀρκάδων συμβοηθήσαντες, ἀπεκλείσθησαν ἔνδον καὶ ληφθέντες διενεμήθησαν· καὶ ἓν μὲν μέρος ἔλαβον Ἀργεῖοι, ἓν δὲ Θεβαῖοι, ἓν δὲ Ἀρκάδες, ἓν δὲ Μεσσήνιοι. οἱ δὲ σύμπαντες ληφθέντες Σπαρτιατῶν τε καὶ περιοίκων πλείους τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐγένοντο.

Therefore as many came out as happened to be nearby, and seized the chance, but those whom many of the Arcadians anticipated by coming to help were closed off within, seized, and split up as booty. The Argives took one part of them, the Thebans one, and the Messenians one. Altogether, the captured Spartans numbered more than one hundred.

(Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.27).

Once Messenia was securely re-founded, Xenophon refers to it in similar terms as any other Greek city. He does try to keep his categories straight; Helots are one thing, Messenians another, and somehow he completely avoids the shift between the two, generating a paradox in his discussion of Messenia, and slaves in general.

No contemporary witness ever identifies someone as either a Laconian or a Messenian Helot. It is questionable whether the Spartans saw a great difference between the two different kinds of Helots, who perhaps grew homogenized through type of work they did for Sparta. Messenians and Laconians alike did personal service, attended the *sussitia*, and labored on non-allotted land.¹⁷⁵ Because of the caste-like structure of Spartan society, homogenization did not lead to general integration, and there was an inverse relationship of the degree of Messenianism to “psychological compliance with Spartan government.”¹⁷⁶ The νεοδαμόδεις acquiesced to the dominant identity of their culture, and became good soldiers because they were always watching the Spartans at war, ready to take their places. On the other hand, the slave-ranked Helots, whether Messenian or Laconian, had much less investment in the Spartan identity, and so were ready to create a new one. Yet in their process of disaffection, they developed an individual ethnicity that, ironically, relied on Spartan virtues superimposed upon

¹⁷⁵ Cartledge draws distinction between Laconian and Messenian Helots, saying the Spartans probably exercised more restrictions against the latter, since, as they farmed more land, and were separated by a massive mountain barrier, they would have had more opportunity for consolidation (Cartledge, *Laconia and Sparta* [London, Boston: Henley; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979], 177).

¹⁷⁶ Figueira, 224.

their own folk heroes.¹⁷⁷ The Messenians had taken on the methods and the values of the Laconian culture, foreshadowing the absorption of dominant ideology that occurs in the accounts of later slave rebellions.

¹⁷⁷ “Folk memories of Messenian resistance and motifs of wish-fulfilment” (Figueira. 232).

Conclusion: Dominant Perspective Utopias

The utopias that embody the dominant perspective in classical literature attempt, at many levels, to explicate the moral necessity of slavery. The authors of these texts establish codes of behavior in which slavery is always included as an essential economic and ethical factor. Dominant utopia differentiates itself from the mainstream mainly by an ascetic focus, which is also the justification for its position of moral superiority. By emphasizing the “weak” status of the servile perspective’s values, it undermines the servile perspective’s priorities: hedonism, idleness, and *παρρησία*, as well as the typical vehicle of these qualities, comedy. In terms of technology, the slave in the utopia functions paradoxically as a stabilizing factor, which prevents undue technological advance, but is associated nevertheless with luxury, corruption, and unjust imperialism. As an educational metaphor, the slave state stands for the subservient yet willing transformation of the student. At the same time, the manipulation of servile perspective values figures in slave-specific education and helps differentiate between the “liberal” and “banausic” modes. Real-life utopian accounts share many aspects of fictional utopia, representing slaves as taking on the values of the dominant perspective, and as such, transcending their state of enslavement. This appears sincere in the philosophical context of the Pythagoreans, since process through slavery has a focus on individual betterment, and potentially, equality and liberation through training. In a military utopia like that of the Spartans, however, transcendence of slave status is always limited to minor advances in status. In their case, war works as a justification for continuous slavery and as a temptation to the rebellious to

abandon resistance, and be co-opted. Descriptions of rebel Messianians utilize utopian motifs previously employed by Sparta, such as military idealism, revealing an absorption of the dominant perspective's justification for power, and a repudiation of any connection with Helotry. Overall, writers of dominant perspective utopias are highly conscious of servile-utopian values, and devise various means to counteract their subversive effect on authority, education, and the slave system. In this fashion, they ensure the retention of subservience and authority in their ideal world.

Part Three: Hybrid Utopias

Neither the servile nor the dominant perspective alone can satisfy the utopian needs of an entire society. Ultimately, the classical Greeks need a literary *topos* that combines the approaches of the two basic utopian models. The servile perspective's comedic mayhem and magical problem solving is out of step with the requirements of real life, since its imaginary victory over the slave state works is based on unrealistic conditions, such as the replacement of *ponos* by Kronian or Dionysian magic or the comic slave philosopher's pursuit of liberation through humor. On the other hand, without the veneer of magic and physical gratification, the dominant perspective alone seems impossibly ascetic and coercive. As interesting as training in dominant utopian techniques may be to soldiers, politicians and philosophers, it is not as widely attractive on the same level as the fantasy of effortless liberation. The placement of dominant utopian rhetoric in a servile context thus enabled it to clothe its message more attractively. Statements of idealism at best dry and at most politically dangerous take on a fictive allure and a refuge from censorship, while avoiding overseriousness in the comedic mythology of the servile perspective.

In a fictional mode, a combination of the two perspectives emerges as early as Herodotus, who combines the magical slave-replacement with conscious virtue, and associates transformations of human nature with the idealization of culture and virtue. He is able to accomplish this only by figuratively stepping outside the boundaries of the known world, and looking back. Many authors in the subsequent syncretistic period of Hellenism followed the precedent he established

in their continued interest in the magical travelogue.¹⁷⁸ Diodorus Siculus the compiler shows an intense degree of interest in egalitarian utopian motifs in his transmission of the texts of writers like Iambulus, author of “the Island of the

¹⁷⁸ Of these far-flung paragons, who generated many motifs that became easily and quickly identifiable as utopian, Pindar’s Hyperboreans are an early instance (Pindar, *Pythian* 10.26-48). Hecataeus of Abdera, a contemporary of Alexander the Great, takes up the same topic, showing his interest in the mystical aspects familiar from Chaldean astrology and Pythagoreanism in his *Peri Hyperboreon* (Hecataeus *Hist. Abderita*, Fr. 5 Diels & Kranz ; cf. Diod. Sic. 47, 1ff. also see Diels & Kranz *Schol. Apoll.* 2.675). Antiphanes of Berge was more comedic, and so frankly fictional that he gave his name to the *topos* of the consciously fantastic journey: “Bergean,” purposefully fictional, but not avowedly (For instance, Strabo 1.3.1 says Eratosthenes calls Euhemerus a Bergean). Pliny the Elder’s Taprobane, located outside of the οἰκουμένη, takes a more political and egalitarian color (Pliny Maior *Natural Histories* 6.81-91): “...nobody kept a slave, everybody got up at sunrise and nobody took a siesta in the middle of the day; their buildings were only of moderate height; the price of grain was never inflated; there were no lawcourts and no litigation ... [and] the king was elected by the people on the grounds of age and gentleness of disposition and as having no children, and if he afterwards had a child, he was deposed, to prevent the monarchy from becoming hereditary.” The idea of Taprobane as a utopia was to become popular among Roman writers, comes first from Artemidorus of Ephesus (fl. 104-101 B.C.) as cited by Pliny (*Nat. Hist.* 7.2.30). At the end of the Roman era, Antonius Diogenes’ *Wonders Beyond Thule* shows the eventual crystallization of the generic elements of utopian travelogue (Photius *Bibl. Cod.* 166, 140-149 in vol. 2). Also see Stephens, Susan A., and John J. Winkler. *Ancient Greek Novels: The Fragments: Introduction, Text, Translation, and Commentary*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995, as well as L. Di Gregorio “Sugli Apista Huper Thoulein di Antonio Diogene” *Aevum* 42 (1968) 199-211. As Romm says of this work, it is in the tradition of the Hellenistic Romantic novel, but it takes interest in fabulist wonders (*apista*), not the romantic relationship between lovers. Antigenes is using an explorer’s log to try to “mediate between the poles of geography and fiction”(Romm [1992], 205). Adopting the form of the explorer’s log helps the author situate a tale in the middle ground between truth and fiction, a category Strabo wanted to eliminate, for as he says, “the distant is difficult to test”(Strabo *Geogr.* 11.6.4). On the other hand, Lucian in the *True Histories* discusses his rationale for creating *pseudea* and cites the precedents of Ctesias, Iambulus, and Homer as exemplifying the pleasantness of fictions, not truth (*True Histories* 1.3). Geographic elements can even describe literary constructs, for instance, Quintilian (Inst. Orat.10.1.46) refers to the mixing quality of Ocean as a metaphor for mixing the genres of serious writing with humor.

Sun.” The novelistic tradition and the development of the Milesian tale that culminate in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius take the idea of the utopian religious epiphany as the end of the comedic journey of slavery. Philosophy found its way into the fully-fledged utopia through the Cynic combination of humor and philosophic ideology. The effect of Cynicism was to break down the generic barriers of tradition, paving the way for a new literary *topos*, and their motto of “defacing the currency” opened up new possibilities for envisaging the natural order.¹⁷⁹ Lucian uses themes such as the “miraculous utopian journey” and the “philosopher as slave” as preexisting literary categories to select from at will.

The full-fledged “hybrid” utopia also has its real-life examples, and just as in the servile and dominant modes, the utopian conceptions of historians influence what we know of these. Philo of Alexandria’s Essenes and Therapeutae are completely without slaves, and not only that, object to all masters as evil and unnatural.¹⁸⁰ These groups are the spiritual descendants of the Pythagoreans, differing from them primarily in their belief in Heaven and Hell after death rather than reincarnation. The Essenes, and possibly the very early Christians are distinctive in furthering the idea of egalitarianism in this life by their use of paradise as a utopian reward in the next, for the idea of heaven more often served

¹⁷⁹ The seeds of these crossovers had certainly begun at a previous point; for instance, even Plato contributed to the process at an earlier stage, representing Socrates as the archetypal character of the sublime cloaked in the ridiculous, the embodiment of *parrhesia* in the service of order. Diogenes of Sinope leans much more heavily on the comedic side with its servile and egalitarian aims, but has a similar characterization. See Branham and Goulet-Caze, 23.

¹⁸⁰ See below, 197-205, Philo *EGMF* 12.79; *OCL* 3.71.

to cement the dominant power structure's hold on the oppressed. Heaven is interesting as a "Hybrid" utopia in its own right, servile in its promise of physical rewards, and dominant in its exclusivity and promise of manumission.¹⁸¹

The Essenes made their ideal society in a pacifist mode, but there are also "hybrid" cases of idealization of military virtue. Stories of slave revolts and rebellions may not seem likely to contain many idealized elements, but in fact they utilize many, most prominently, that of the "mystical ruler," in whom semi-divine powers are combined with virtues. Other utopian motifs are examples of specialization of labor, and the transmutation of slave status by means of military honor. Drimakos, Aristonicus, Eunus, Salvius, Athenion and finally, the most influential slave rebel of them all, Spartacus are all examples of this phenomenon.¹⁸² The accounts of the slave uprisings describe grotesque, comedic

¹⁸¹ Heaven is interesting as a "hybrid" utopia in its own right, servile in its promise of physical rewards, and dominant in its exclusivity and promise of manumission. Early Christian documents such as the *Apocalypse of St Peter* describe the physical beauty of the residents of heaven (6-10) as well as the fertility of landscape (15-18), and the "equality of glory" of all the residents of heaven (Akhmim Fr. 6-19, "The Apocalypse of Peter," in *The Apocryphal New Testament*, ed. Translation and Notes M.R. James (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924)). A specific promise of manumission is inferred in the scriptures that discuss that infants that have been exposed. These babies, who would be sold into slavery in this world, are delivered in heaven to a care-taking angel, by whom they are educated and so grow up, and they will be, it says, "as the faithful of a hundred years old are here" (Clem. Alex. *Eclog.* 41.1), "even if they are the offspring of adultery" (Methodius *Conviv.* 2.6).

¹⁸² All these accounts of slave uprisings are gathered from previous sources by compilers. Theopompos' tale of Drimakos is preserved via Athenaeus, the tale of Aristonicus can be pieced together from Strabo and other stories, and Diodorus Siculus writes of the Sicilian slave wars in his Stoic-influenced versions of Posidonius. Spartacus, of course, generated biographers and admirers from Plutarch to the Spartacists.

reversals of masters and slaves, as well as moments of moving virtue on the rebels' part and their attempts to create dominant utopian constructs.

The hybrid utopias that exclude slaves from their midst or liberate them superficially appear to treat egalitarianism as an ethical ideal. Yet on more studied consideration, they are revealed as extremely controlled and selective. The practice of the residents of utopia to either kill or eject the unworthy, rather than enslaving them does not significantly attack the dominant notion of virtue as a basis for freedom. In addition, the fact that a transformation of the natural state must precede the utopian group's collective *eleutheria* functions as a distancing device, placing the social reforms safely in a fictional context. Eventually, however, the ideal of "exclusive egalitarianism" proves to be adaptable to real-world utopia as well.

Does slavelessness, then, reflect the overturned values of the servile perspective, or is it a logically constructed position of the dominant stance? My hypothesis is that in the classical "hybrid" utopia, egalitarianism depends in the first place upon a comedic, fictionalizing context. Nevertheless, by exclusivity, that is, extending actual equality only to the members of a very private club of the virtuous, a *telos* that was previously servile comes to the aid of the dominant perspective.

Chapter Eight: Utopian Strangers

Herodotus' Ethiopians

In his *Histories*, Herodotus methodically demonstrates the hubris of ethnocentricity.¹⁸³ By the combined usage of servile and dominant tropes, he applies this view in his treatment of the “Long-Lived Ethiopians.” The Ethiopians practice the moral rectitude of the dominant perspective utopia, clearly apparent in the strong and honest attitude of their king. On the other hand, reliance on magic and nature as opposed to traditional slave-based technology evokes servile perspective tropes. The Ethiopians, gifted in their natural resources as well as in their strength and virtue, are unconquerable in both the servile and the dominant modes. In contrast, the Persian ruler Cambyses is an apparent “enslaver” who is really a “natural slave” afflicted with all the ills of the civilized world.

In a literary sense, the Ethiopians' remote location and diametrically opposed customs make a contrast with real-world society, and generate self-criticism in the civilized reader. For this reason, the Ethiopian king's rejection of the “gifts” of Cambyses, which are all slave-industry products, represents his inherent criticism of slavery itself. Magical items that rely on nature alone, and do not come from slave industries balance the Persian gifts. Most interesting, however, is the

¹⁸³ This, according to Romm, can be defined as the willingness of ancient peoples to enslave foreigners, and to denigrate strange civilizations while automatically holding their own superior. See James S. Romm, *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 47.

Ethiopian king's immediate perception of Cambyses' deceitfulness, which is associated with slavish behavior as well as unjust enslavement.

ὁ δὲ Αἰθίοψ μαθὼν ὅτι κατόπται ἤκοιεν, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιάδε. “οὔτε ὁ Περσέων βασιλεὺς δῶρα ὑμέας ἔπεμψε φέροντας προτιμῶν πολλοῦ ἐμοὶ ξείνος γενέσθαι, οὔτε ὑμεῖς λέγετε ἀληθέα ἤκετε γὰρ κατόπται τῆς ἐμῆς ἀρχῆς, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἀνὴρ δίκαιος. εἰ γὰρ ἦν δίκαιος, οὔτ' ἂν ἐπεθύμησε χώρης ἄλλης ἢ τῆς ἑωυτοῦ, οὔτ' ἂν ἐς **δουλοσύνην** ἀνθρώπους ἤγε ὑπ' ὧν μηδὲν ἠδίκηται. νῦν δὲ αὐτῷ τόξον τόδε δίδόντες τάδε ἔπεα λέγετε.” “βασιλεὺς ὁ Αἰθιοπῶν συμβουλεύει τῷ Περσέων βασιλεί, ἐπεὰν οὔτω εὐπετέως ἔλκωσι τὰ τόξα Πέρσαι ἔόντα μεγάθει τοσαῦτα, τότε ἐπ' Αἰθιοπᾶς τοὺς μακροβίους πλήθει ὑπερβαλλόμενον στρατεύεσθαι· μέχρι δὲ τούτου θεοῖσι εἰδέναι χάριν, οἳ οὐκ ἐπὶ νόον τρέπουσι Αἰθιοπῶν παισὶ γῆν ἄλλην προσκτᾶσθαι τῇ ἑωυτῶν.

But the Ethiopian King, learning that they had come to spy, said these sorts of things to them: “The King of the Persians did not send you bearing gifts in honor to become my guest friend, neither do you speak truth, for you have arrived to spy on my rule. Neither is he a just man. For if he was just, he would not set his heart on a country rather than his own, nor would he lead men by whom he has not been dishonored into a state of slavery.” Then, giving the envoy a bow he said these words: “The king of the Ethiopians counsels the Persian king that if the Persians can thus draw such great bows as this easily, then upon the long-lived Ethiopians let him make campaign, attacking in numbers. Until then, know that it is the favor of the gods that they do not turn the mind of the children of the Ethiopians onto acquiring a land other than their own”(Herodotus *Hist.* 3.21.2).

The king of the Ethiopians possesses many of the characteristics of the “ideal ruler,” a *topos* of the utopian construct. The emphasis placed on his individual strength, as represented by the bow, counters the contemptible “πληθει” of the Persians. He is a symbol of strength as much as the bow that he proffers as a challenge to Cambyses, standing between his people and any possibility of enslavement. The bow represents the king's readiness to use force, and in fact, the focus of his response to Cambyses is on the level of force when he suggests that Cambyses will be fit to conquer such aristocrats by nature as the Ethiopians when he has the requisite strength to use the weapon. Indeed, after the Ethiopian

episode, the Persian king goes mad with frustration since he is unable to draw the bow (Her. *Hist.* 3.31.1).

The Ethiopian king also speaks out firmly against the enslavement of those who have done no wrong, and coveting of alien countries. His is an idealized people beleaguered by the rest of an inferior world, with natural honesty and power diametrically opposed to the vices of the “civilized” Persians, in whose mode of existence enslavement takes its place along with other kinds of trickery and con artistry. Although the Ethiopians do not seem to possess any slaves themselves, the king implies there could be a fitting condition under which one might justly attempt to conquer and to bring *doulosune* on another country, that is, if it were a rightful possession of the attacker, or if it committed a crime against him. Cambyses’ attempt to drag the Ethiopians out of their utopian tranquility into technological and agricultural dependence by means of “an army of superior numbers,” is seen for what it really is. The king, although naturally virtuous, is not an innocent, and clearly does understand the concept of slavery. Underlining this is the fact that the Ethiopians do have prisoners, bound, symbolically, with gold fetters.¹⁸⁴ The use of gold in fetters is telling in light of future attitudes

¹⁸⁴ “...δεύτερα δὲ τὸν χρυσὸν εἰρώτα τὸν στρεπτὸν τὸν περιαιχένιον καὶ τὰ ψέλια· ἐξηγεομένων δὲ τῶν ἰχθυοφάγων τὸν κόσμον αὐτοῦ, γελάσας ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ νομίσας εἶναι σφέα πέδας εἶπε ὡς παρ’ ἐωυτοῖσι εἰσὶ ῥωμαλεώτεροι τούτων πέδαί.

...second, he asked about the necklace and arm-bracelets. When the Ichthyphagoi were answering that this was his decoration, the king, laughing, and thinking that they were fetters, said that they themselves had much stronger ones (Her. *Hist.* 3.22.2).

“...ἀπὸ τῆς κρήνης δὲ ἀπαλλασσομένων, ἀγαγεῖν σφεας ἔς δεσμωτήριον ἀνδρῶν, ἔνθα τοὺς πάντας ἐν πέδησι χρυσεῖσι- δεδέσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι Αἰθίοψι πάντων ὁ χαλκὸς σπανιώτατον καὶ τιμιώτατον.

concerning jewelry and the slavery of greed and self-indulgence, from Spartan injunctions against luxury to St. Thomas More's symbolic use of golden fetters in his *Utopia*.¹⁸⁵ It is possible Herodotus is making a similar point here, although he may also be emphasizing the great natural wealth of the Ethiopians, or simply making a reversal of values. Clearly, the metallic wealth of the Ethiopians does not influence their character, as they are not greedy, although they have much gold. Their lack of copper, the metal of the warlike Bronze Age, might imply that they are not powerful in a military sense, but this is not the case, as the king's gift of the unstringable bow suggests. The Ethiopians do not wage the wars of conquest that are to a great degree the basis of slavery, nevertheless they are "too good" (in Aristotle's sense) to be slaves themselves. In this way, the virtues of the Ethiopians reflect the values of the dominant ethos.

On the other hand, a transformation of nature rooted in the servile perspective is clear in the descriptions of Ethiopian miracles, in which the transformative power of nature supersedes the cultural gifts of the οἰκουμένη. The bread of the

...after they went away from the fountain, he led them to a mens' prison, wherein it was for all to be bound in golden chains. For among the Ethiopians, copper is the rarest and most prized thing of all...(Her. *Hist.* 3.23.4).

¹⁸⁵ They eat and drink out of vessels of earth, or glass, which make an agreeable appearance though formed of brittle materials: while they make their chamber-pots and close-stools of gold and silver; and that not only in their public halls, but in their private houses: of the same metals they likewise make chains and fetters for their slaves; to some of which, as a badge of infamy, they hang an ear-ring of gold, and make others wear a chain or coronet of the same metal; and thus they take care, by all possible means, to render gold and silver of no esteem. And from hence it is that while other nations part with their gold and silver as unwillingly as if one tore out their bowels, those of Utopia would look on their giving in all they possess of those (metals, when there was any use for them) but as the parting with a trifle, or as we would esteem the loss of a penny. (Thomas More, *Utopia*, 2.5).

Persians, for instance, made possible by slave-based agriculture, corresponds to the automatically boiled meats of the “table of the sun.”¹⁸⁶ The cultivation of wheat demands intensive labor, a situation conducive to slavery, and relates to the shortness of the normal life span. The Ethiopian king scoffs at this diet, since, unlike the Persians, the “μακροβιοι” Ethiopians live to 120 quite commonly on meat and milk alone.¹⁸⁷ Bread, as it comes from the dirt, foreshadows the eventual return to the dirt at death; an Ethiopian, on the other hand, is careful to avoid the dirt even after a much-delayed demise, by means of enclosure in a special transparent, crystal coffin that has a preservative effect (Her. *Hist.* 3.24.1-

¹⁸⁶ See Herodotus’ hard-nosed description of deception of the demos with this utopian motif:

Ἡ δὲ τράπεζα τοῦ Ἡλίου τοιήδε τις λέγεται εἶναι. Λειμών ἐστι ἐν τῷ προαστείῳ ἐπίπλεος κρεῶν ἐφθῶν πάντων τῶν τετραπόδων, ἐς τὸν τὰς μὲν νύκτας ἐπιτηδεύοντας τιθέναι τὰ κρέα τοὺς ἐντέλει ἐκάστοτε ἔοντας τῶν ἀστῶν, τὰς δὲ ἡμέρας δαίνυσθαι προσιόντα τὸν βουλόμενον· φάναί δὲ τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ταῦτα τὴν γῆν αὐτὴν ἀναδιδόναί ἐκάστοτε. Ἡ μὲν δὴ τράπεζα τοῦ Ἡλίου καλεομένη λέγεται εἶναι τοιήδε.

Now the Table of the Sun is said to be something of this kind: there is a meadow outside the city, filled with the boiled flesh of all four-footed things; here during the night the men of authority among the townsmen are careful to set out the meat, and all day whoever wishes comes and feasts on it. These meats, say the people of the country, are constantly produced by the earth of itself. Such is the story of the Sun's Table. This story may be an indication of offerings made to the dead, or of a region of great fertility. In Homer the gods are fabled to feast with the Ethiopians (Her. *Hist.* 3.18 ff.).

¹⁸⁷ ἀντειρομένων δὲ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν ἰχθυοφάγων τῆς ζῆσης καὶ διαίτης πέρι, ἔτα μὲν ἐς εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπικνέεσθαι, ὑπερβάλλειν δὲ τινὰς καὶ ταῦτα, σίτησιν δὲ εἶναι κρέα τε ἐφθὰ καὶ πόμα γάλα.

When the Ichthyphagoi asked the King questions concerning lifestyle and the length of life, he answered that many of them arrived at a hundred and twenty years, but some even exceeded that, and that they ate boiled meats and milk as a drink...Her. *Hist.* 3.23.1).

4).

Similarly, the artificial beautification of purple robes and perfumes is easily outdone by the magical, skin-softening, life-extending fountain.¹⁸⁸ The one area in which Persians can claim superiority is in the invention of wine. I believe there is a two-fold reason for this. As Romm suggests, the contrast between the good and bad use of wine is implicit in the text, for whereas Cambyses has a destructive relationship with alcohol (Her. *Hist.* 3.341-35.1), the Ethiopian king treats it as a life-extending drink (Her. *Hist.* 3.22.e-23a). This passage evokes the use of wine for training in moderation in Plato's *Laws*. On the other hand, in terms of the loosening and liberating powers of Dionysos wine can be a tool of the servile perspective as well. It represents the point at which nature and technology intersect, and reality is transformed.

θῶμα δὲ ποιευμένων τῶν κατασκόπων περὶ τῶν ἐτέων, ἐπὶ κρήνην σφι ἠγήσασθαι, ἀπ' ἧς λουόμενοι λιπαρώτεροι ἐγίνοντο, κατὰ περ εἰ ἐλαίου εἶη· ὄξειν δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ὡς εἰ ἴων.⁹ ἀσθενὲς δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ τῆς κρήνης ταύτης οὕτω δὴ τι ἔλεγον εἶναι οἱ κατάσκοποι ὥστε μηδὲν οἶόν τ' εἶναι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιπλέειν, μήτε ξύλον μήτε τῶν ὅσα ξύλου ἐστὶ ἐλαφρότερα, ἀλλὰ πάντα σφέα χωρῆειν ἐς βυσσόν. τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο εἰ σφι ἐστὶ ἀληθέως οἶόν τι λέγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἶεν, τούτῳ τὰ πάντα χρεώμενοι, μακρόβιοι.
 But when the spies were expressing their wonder concerning their years, he led them to their fountain, from which one would become as if anointed, being washed. But if what is true, it was this, the fact that they were constantly using the fountain, that made them long-lived (Her. *Hist.* 3.23.2).

In contrast:

Ταῦτα δὲ εἶπας καὶ ἀνείς τὸ τόξον παρέδωκε τοῖσι ἤκουσι. λαβὼν δὲ τὸ εἶμα τὸ πορφύρεον εἰρώτα ὅ τι εἶη καὶ ὅπως πεποιημένον· εἰπόντων δὲ τῶν ἰχθυοφάγων τὴν ἀληθείην περὶ τῆς πορφύρης καὶ τῆς βαφῆς, δολερούς μὲν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔφη εἶναι, δολερά δὲ αὐτῶν τὰ εἶματα.
 Having said this, taking up the bow he gave it to the ones who had arrived. Then taking the garment of purple he asked them how it was made. When they answered the truth concerning the purple and the dye, he said that these men were deceitful, and their garments deceitful also (Her. *Hist.* 3.22.1).

In his demonstration of these contrasting “modes of production,” Herodotus makes Cambyses’ attempt to enslave the Ethiopians redolent with irony. The Persian king is himself an exemplar of slavish behavior, a purveyor of technological inventions coded as servile because of their association with deception and toil. While the Ethiopians’ magical methods are called “natural” and “honest,” Cambyses attempts to deceive through “lying” (δολερό) gifts. The negative depiction of Cambyses draws clearly the rationale behind the Ethiopians’ rejection of technology, namely, their virtue combined with the physical abundance of their land. By giving the noble Ethiopians long lives, methods for avoiding post-mortem decay, an abundance of food and the miraculous, primal buffet of the “Table of the Sun,” Herodotus effectively removes the necessity for slave labor, and endows them with golden age characteristics. On the other hand, by giving the Ethiopian king military strength, and an understanding of *doulosyne*, he invests him with the conscious rejection of an unjust path familiar from the dominant perspective. In this way, the real-life slave-based Persian economy contrasts with the image of a state that fulfils the utopian aims of Comedy and Philosophy. The ethical application of superior force balances with the fanciful mythological coloration of a world where essential things come without effort. To Herodotus’ Ethiopians, virtue and effortlessness are associated, where they were previously quite distinct.

One might argue that the portrayal of Hesiod’s Golden Age resembles the Ethiopians in the virtue of the χρύσειον γένος. Yet the Golden race is undifferentiated and innocent, whereas the Ethiopians contrast sharply with the

slavish vices and economy of the Persians by dint of their rejection of wicked things. This is because the temporal coexistence of a utopia with an actual society contributes to its power of contrast. There are many literary instances of mythical populations geographically removed from the ‘normal,’ who enjoy uncommon virtue, along with a rudimentary yet abundant livelihood.¹⁸⁹ These stories tend to invert the actual human tendency to distrust, despise, attack or enslave those who

¹⁸⁹ David Winston writes on the genres of “travel fantasy” and the “extraordinary voyage” the former being frankly fictive, and the latter, an accumulation of artificially-scientific evidence.(see David Winston, "Iambulus' Islands of the Sun and Hellenistic Literary Utopias *Science Fiction Studies*, 3, Part 3, (1976). This last comes from the tradition of eyewitness accounts after Alexander, mostly lost. Franz Susemihl lists over forty of these works, which used a proliferation of geographical data (see Franz Susemihl, *Geschichte Der Griechischen Literatur in Der Alexandrinerzeit* [Leipzig: 1891], 649-701 of Volume 1, under *Geographie und Periegesis*). For instance, just a few of his examples include such works as the *Voyage* of Nearchus of Crete (Susemihl, 651), the *Παραπλοῦς τῆς Ἰνδικῆς* of Androsthenes of Thasos (Ibid., 653), Gorgos' treatise on gold and silver mining, Philon's *Athiopika* for admiral Ptolemy (Ibid., 654). Patrokles, a ward of Seleucus I, wrote studies on the Hyrcanian and Caspian seas, as well as treatises on the northern Indians (Ibid., 657). Agatharchides of Cnidos the Peripatetic authored the extant *Περὶ τῆς Εὐρύθρης Θαλάσσης* (Ibid., 665-676). Artemidorus of Ephesus (fl. 104-100 BCE) reflects the increasingly Roman preoccupation with the Atlantic Oceans, Spain, etc. (Ibid., 693) Following such works, Iambulus uses his best scientific terminology to win his reader's confidence and make it more “real.” Pöhlmann states that the fantasy element is necessary in this genre of literature, thinking of Iambulus as a sort of socio-economic Jules Verne, he calls his work a political romance, and the culmination of a tradition of Greek poetic utopia (Pöhlmann, 320). He also suggests that Diodorus emphasizes fantastical elements at the expense of the social and economic, whereas Iambulus' original would have concentrated much more on the social structure. Even so, he sees the political system of the islands of Sun as a fully communist regime, an authoritarian collectivism, emphasized by the lifelong term of the ἡγεμονῶν of each group. Nevertheless, this potentially oppressive element is softened by the abundance of the land and the ensuing σχολή this provides for all the residents of the islands. This theory fits the syncretism of Iambulus' ideas, which correspond to streams of Platonism, Cynicism, and Stoicism. See Robert von Pöhlmann, *Geschichte Der Sozialen Frage Und Des Sozialismus in Der Antiken Welt*, 3d. ed. (Munich: 1925), 305-24.

are ‘alien’ and less technologically advanced than themselves.¹⁹⁰ Herodotus states clearly the Persian principle of ethnocentrism, in which they honor those closest to themselves geographically, and vice-versa (Her. *Hist.* 1.134), a view which describes the Greek attitude towards barbarians as well. By inverting this pattern, and showing the most geographically remote places to be best, he creates a phenomenon that Romm describes as the “theory of reverse ethnocentricity.”¹⁹¹ Herodotus’ treatment of the Ethiopians dramatically undercuts the expectation that barbarians make good slaves, and that their enslavement is morally justifiable. According to Romm, this also functions as a distancing device, enabling the outermost tribes enabled by extreme primitivism to “mock, preach to, or simply ignore” the peoples of the interior.¹⁹²

The moral superiority and “un-enslaveability” of the idealized alien, along with the retention of justified slavery, all are aspects of the dominant perspective. On the other hand, the distance and unassailability of the alien stems from the servile

¹⁹⁰ See Romm (1992) 55; Hartog (1988) 33, and Suzanne Said, "Usages des femmes et autres nomoi chez les sauvages d'Herodote," *PSNA* 8 (1978) 949-1005. Said posits a gradual movement towards bestiality as one moves outward in space, until eventually people take on characteristics of beasts (Said: 961).

¹⁹¹ Romm (1992) 46. He cites examples of the theory of inverse ethnocentricity going back to Homer, such as the milk drinking Abii and Mysians, (*Iliad* 13.1-6), who, in stark contrast with Greeks and Trojans on the battlefields, live in a world defined by the contentment of the inhabitants (see Romm [1992], 53). A comic example that puts an extra twist on the tradition of ethnologic satire is Theopompos’ Meropis, a vast continent filled with idealized “Pietists” or Eusebeians, and located a great distance even beyond the Hyperborean land. Of course, when they sail to see the Hyperboreans, they are filled with disgust at their miserable lot and refuse to go on any further (see Romm [1992], 67; Aelian *Varia Hist.* 3.18).

¹⁹² Romm (1992) 47-48.

perspective's *parrhesia*, which offers a platform on which to critique society without repercussions. As Romm says, early examples of ethnologic satire often “go furthest in exploring comic and grotesque aspects of distant humanity without leaning as heavily on object lessons...”¹⁹³ This “ethnologic satire,” as he calls it, shows master races humbled by aliens, also a *topos* of comedy.¹⁹⁴

Iambulus' Island of the Sun

The compiler Diodorus Siculus preserved political fables set in magical landscapes. Although he wrote during the early Augustan period of the Roman Empire, he reproduces stories of much older authors whose works were lost, one example of which is his summary of the travelogue of Iambulus, a writer of the early Alexandrian period about whom we know little else. As reproduced by Diodorus, Iambulus' account of the “Islands of the Sun” allegorizes many aspects of political and moral philosophy. At the same time, it is located far to the south on the boundaries of the known world, and possesses many technical and natural advantages. In the Islands of the Sun, elements of the servile and dominant

¹⁹³ Romm (1992) 50.

¹⁹⁴ Romm offers an overview of various treatments of the Hyperboreans, starting with Pindar's Pythian ode (Pyth.10.34-44; Romm [1992], 60). This utopian group has deep mystical and mythological associations with such a powerhouse of the dominant ethos as the Delphic oracle. (See the story of Apollo and the founding of Delphic oracle by the Hyperboreans (Paus. *Perieg. Graec. Descr.* 10.5.9) Yet they are certainly in an “altered state” of nature, without sickness, old age, toils or battles, and enjoying constant music, festivals, feasts, all of trappings of servile perspective utopia ([Ephorus] Strabo. 7.3.9; Romm [1992], 45). Romm points out that Herodotus considers them exceptional in that they have *eukrasia*-perfect climate *and* abundant resources in their pocket of climactic tranquility (see Romm [1992] 65; Her. *Hist.* 1.142; 3.106).

perspective utopia combine to create a new form simultaneously entertaining in its strangeness, and didactic in its paradigms.

Iambulus uses many servile utopian “*topoi*” that reflect changes in nature as opposed to culture. For example, the perfectly round shape, and geographic remoteness of the islands, is comparable to the fabulous land of the Hyperboreans. The fact that the islands possess a “eukrasian” climate as well as an abundance of resources is a reminder of Herodotus’ Ethiopians. In addition to resources superseding a normal natural supply, the residents have a slightly abnormal physiology; besides being unusually tall, strong and good-looking, they possess forked tongues with each part of which they can carry on a separate conversation at once. Finally, the easy death they achieve with the magic plant is a motif going back to the *χρύσειον γενός* of Hesiod. The altered shape of the peoples’ tongues, as well as their exceeding good looks and their long disease-free lives reflect the transformation of the natural order familiar from comic utopias, a servile utopian trope.

Nevertheless, with all their natural gifts, they still practice technology and politics; for instance, in direct contrast with Herodotus’ Ethiopians, the islanders understand the baking of bread, the use of dyes, and writing.¹⁹⁵ They are highly

¹⁹⁵On bread: φύεσθαι γὰρ παρ’ αὐτοῖς κάλαμον πολύν, φέροντα καρπὸν δαψιλῆ, παρεμφερῆ τοῖς λευκοῖς ὀρόβοις. τοῦτον οὖν συναγαγόντες βρέχουσιν ἐν ὕδατι θερμῷ, μέχρι ἂν τὸ μέγεθος σχῶσιν ὡς ὠοῦ περιστερᾶς· ἔπειτα συνθλάσαντες καὶ τρίψαντες ἐμπείρως ταῖς χερσὶ διαπλάττουσιν ἄρτους...

A certain reed grows among them plentifully, bearing an abundant fruit like the white vetch. Gathering this together, they put it in warm water, until it has become the size of a pigeon’s egg, then crushing and kneading it by hand skillfully they mold it into loaves (Diod. *Sic. Bibl.* 2.57.2).

organized in their political structure as well. Their communism recalls Plato, as they practice the Platonic “community of wives and children.” Also reminiscent of Platonic models are the system of kingship, the oligarchy of elders, and the great importance placed on education. Their careful, stable political organization, communism of wives and children, specialization of labor, and their practice of ascetic simplicity even in the middle of the bounteous fertility of the island all represent the dominant philosophical aspects of the island.¹⁹⁶ Iambulus, however, seems to owe a greater debt to the Cynic school of thought in the Island of the Sun’s emphasis on simplicity, the absence of law courts, the equality of their citizens, and a lack of slavery.¹⁹⁷ In their code of values, labor is not innately

On dyes: ἔσθητας δὲ αὐτοὺς κατασκευάζειν ἕκ τινων καλάμων ἐχόντων ἐν τῷ μέσῳ χνούν λαμπρὸν καὶ μαλακόν, ὃν συνάγοντας καὶ τοῖς θαλαττίοις ὀστρέοις συγκεκομμένοις μίσγοντας θαυμαστὰ κατασκευάζειν ἱμάτια πορφυρᾶ.

They make their garments from a reed having in the middle a soft and bright down, which, gathering together they mix with crushed sea shells to make wondrous purple garments (Diod. Sic. Bibl. 2.59.4).

On writing and education: ὑπάρχειν δὲ παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ παιδείας πάσης ἐπιμέλειαν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀστρολογίας· γράμμασί τε αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι... Every branch of learning is an object of concern to them, especially astrology. Also they use a system of letters...(Diod. Sic. Bibl. 2.57.3-4).

¹⁹⁶ πάντες δ’ οἱ κατοικοῦντες ἐν αὐταῖς, καίπερ δαψιλῆς ἔχοντες πάντων χορηγίας αὐτοφυεῖς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀνέδην χρώνται ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν λιτότητα διώκουσι καὶ τὴν ἀρκούσαν τροφήν προσφέρονται·

But all living in the islands, although they have plentiful supplies of everything growing automatically, nevertheless they do not use these supplies in an unrestrained way, but live according to simplicity, and take only a sufficient amount of food (Diod. Sic. Bibl.2.59.1).

¹⁹⁷ There have been diverse theories of philosophical correspondence on the Island of the Sun. Both Rohde and Farrington take the Elder Stoic approach of complete compatibility with nature, and point out the connection of Egalitarian

menial, and workers are the political equals of the other residents (Diod. Sic. *Bibl* 2.58.2).

It is questionable whether the absence of slaves from the Islands of the Sun stems from the dominant or servile perspective, as the basis of citizenship there is extreme moral virtue and courage. Ultimately, although it is grounded in Cynic egalitarianism, the fact that there are no slaves may stem from the fact that the citizens are quite prepared to eliminate their “unworthy” members. The description of this process combines dominant and servile techniques, as the intensive ἐλεγχός of the character fitness of infants is performed in a ridiculous, fantastical fashion on the back of an enormous bird:

ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν συστημάτων τρέφειν ὄρνεον εὐμέγεθες
 ἰδιάζον τῇ φύσει, καὶ διὰ τούτου πειράζεται τὰ νήπια τῶν βρεφῶν
 ποίας τινὰς ἔχει τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεις· ἀναλαμβάνουσι γὰρ αὐτὰ
 ἐπὶ τὰ ζῶα, καὶ τούτων πετομένων τὰ μὲν τὴν διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος φορὰν
 ὑπομένοντα τρέφουσι, τὰ δὲ περιναύτια γινόμενα καὶ θάμβους
 πληρούμενα ρίπτουσι, ὡς οὔτε πολυχρόνια καθεστῶτα οὔτε τοῖς
 ἄλλοις τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς λήμασιν ἀξιόλογα.

They are accustomed to have each of their assembly nourish a bird gigantic by nature, and through this creature a test of the infant children is made, showing what sort of character of soul each possesses. For after putting them up on the animals, they raise the ones who endured the flight through the air, but they cast out the ones the ones who became sick and full of fear, on the supposition

communism with Chaldean astrology and with the imagery of the sun, a symbol of justice in Orphic sources. Richter, on the other hand, contests the connection of Iambulus' utopia with Stoic thought denying that the concept of living in accordance with nature is strictly Stoic. Tarn points out the patchwork of philosophical ideas typical of Hellenistic age. Africa points out the role of utopia in forming a contrast with the rest of the world. See T.W. Africa, "Aristonicus, Blossius and the City of the Sun," *International Revue of Social History*, no. 6 (1961).; Benjamin Farrington, *Head and Hand in Ancient Greece* (1947), 55-87; Erwin Rohde, *Der Griechische Roman and Seine Vorläufer*, 3. ed. (Leipzig: 1914); Waldemar Richter, *Iambulus Beilage Zum Osterprogramm Des Gymnasiums* (Schaffhausen: 1888); W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: University Press, 1948 reprint, Chicago Ares Publishers 1981).

that they will not be long-lived, nor worth much because of weaknesses of the soul (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 2.58.5).

The test of character is not limited to courage and a head for heights in babies, but members of all age groups must adhere to stringent cultural and natural standards. The narrator of Iambulus' tale is finally expelled after seven years' sojourn on the islands, as hopeless of any improvement of character in comparison with the citizens, who no matter what their occupation must be worthy in order to live in social equality (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 2.60.2). Their external happiness, with its magical and technological elements, is contingent on the morality of their souls as much as their social organization. Thus, a combination of magic, technology, and philosophic doctrine makes possible a fictional elimination of slavery. Nevertheless, the exclusivity of the islands precludes any possibility of a true opposition to slavery. By eliminating potential "slaves by nature" from the utopia, the islanders make certain of the absence of real ones.

David Winston, in his article on Iambulus designates what I am calling servile and dominant perspective utopia as "cockaigne utopianism" vs. utopianism proper.¹⁹⁸ Although my argument differs from his in that I posit that two source types combine to create new genre that is specifically utopian, Winston's definition of "Cockaigne utopianism" closely corresponds with my conception of the servile perspective utopia. As he says, Cockaigne is marked by a refashioning of nature, rather than the social order, and the creative expression of hidden desires, which in Iambulus' work meet the expression of "the reflective mind and

¹⁹⁸Winston (1976).

philosophical ideals.” Cockaigne utopia rebels against “the given.” I would add to this that dominant perspective utopia tends to begin with “the given.”

Although Winston observes that philosophical ideals are present in the Island of the Sun, he suggests a philosopher would discount it as serious discourse because of its imaginary component. Interestingly, Winston suggests that Iambulus tackles the “real” problems of dominant philosophy with the help of Cockaigne utopia. He perceives the narrative as formed from opposing designs, simultaneously approaching and escape “the real,” yet does not observe the merging of these contrasting forces into a new literary type.

The Goddess Isis and the Slave Philosopher’s Journey

One interpretation of anti-slave sentiment in literature is that the free felt a need to attribute to slaves those bad qualities that they were in a position to observe in their masters. Indeed, they were in a unique position for such observation. Slaves, like philosophers, were often outsiders to the important events of political and social life. With an affinity of roles is born the comic slave-philosopher, for the liminal status of the slave provides a convenient standpoint from which to criticize society, and the trials of slavery a testing ground for the truth of a philosopher’s claims. In this vein, we have already seen the behavior of Diogenes of Sinope, who saw no reason to concern himself with the ambitions of public life, and reconciled himself to his slave state by denying the natural existence of status distinctions. The 6th century BCE slave fabulist Aesop

establishes a paradigm for the character Diogenes later came to inhabit.¹⁹⁹

Although Aesop's *Fabulae* and *Vita* are not utopian, they do embody the servile perspective in the principle of *parrhesia* and power reversal. The *Life of Aesop*, in particular, reflects a great interest in a philosophy of life similar to that of the Cynic, that is, in undermining the emptiness of logistical constructs in the face of real-world difficulties. Aesop himself is a slave to Xanthos (ironically, a common name for slaves), a man who is obsessed by rigorous philosophical logic. By taking advantage of his master's excessive commitment to logical order, Aesop is able to manipulate him and avoid his beatings and other dire consequences. Like the tale of his life, the fables attributed to Aesop often represent the outlook of a slave, and a practical grasp of the master's vulnerabilities. According to Fitzgerald, Hopkins and Bradley,²⁰⁰ the *Fables* embody a tradition of oral literature, that may well have been passed down by slaves. They are simple and easy to remember, a necessity for tale-tellers confronted by difficulties of translation or lack of writing supply. They also often reflect a slave's viewpoint, while masking and distancing the issue of slavery itself. The fact that most of the

¹⁹⁹The story of Aesop's life goes back at least to the 5th Century BCE, with first mentions by Herodotus, Heraclides Ponticus, and Aristophanes. (Herodotus *Hist.* 2.134.15-135.1; Heraclides Pont. *Fragmenta* 73.4; Aristoph. *Wasps* 1445-7. In Plato's *Phaedo*, Socrates passes his last days in jail versifying Aesop's fables. (Plato *Phaedo* 60c1-d1; 61b6) The animal fable tradition is even more ancient, going back to ancient Mesopotamia (see Daly [1961], 21; 23).

²⁰⁰Fitzgerald, William. *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination* Roman Literature and Its Contexts. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 93; Hopkins, Keith. "Novel Evidence for Roman Slavery." *Past & Present* 138 (1993): 3-27; Bradley, K. R. *Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control* Collection Latomus ; V. 185. Bruxelles: Latomus (1987) 150-3.

characters are animals is highly significant as several animals, including the donkey, the mule, the dog or the ox, consistently represent issues and problems of interest to slaves in other Classical literature.

Besides the *Fables* of Aesop, the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius is the only classical work told from the perspective of a “slave” in the person of the transformed donkey protagonist, Lucius.²⁰¹ It is important to understand the context of the *Metamorphoses*, which makes use of motifs of cultural alienation popular in the Greek novelistic tradition, which itself resembles on many counts the genre of the fabulous voyage or travelogue.²⁰² Lucius, the hero, satirizes the character-type of the romantic heroine, such as Psyche.²⁰³ Another literary factor is the motif of the *servitium amoris* familiar from love elegy, which also makes its presence felt in the interest in magic in the text. In essence, the text is centrally concerned with worship of the feminine, shifting from Lucius’ corrupt (yet very entertaining) enslavement to physical desires, passing through many punishments

²⁰¹ See Fitzgerald’s argument that it is truly a slave narrative (Fitzgerald, 99). The use of servile animal imagery and the character of the slave philosopher continued in the classical world over time, and eventually branched into a more general application. The Stoic Epictetus also compares people to beasts, yet he counsels the acceptance of the slave state. This is interesting considering that Epictetus was a slave himself, and as such can lay claim to identification as slave philosopher. One should treat one’s body like a poor broken-down donkey, and: "If it is commandeered and a soldier lays hold of it, do not grumble, for you may lose your donkey" (Epict. *Disp.* 4.1.76-9).

²⁰² Romm (1992) 205; Branham 23; cf. ci-dessus, note 185.

²⁰³ Fitzgerald points out the donkey’s resemblance to Psyche on several points; for instance, they both suffer on account of curiosity and the anger of the Goddess, and they both experience “alienation” from their bodies (as Psyche is so beautiful she cannot benefit from it), as well as downward and upward mobility into slavery and a final utopian state of liberation (Fitzgerald, 97).

until finally arriving at to a proper obedience to the divine. Although his original transformation, as well as many of the narratives imbedded in the story, is governed by the literary tropes of the servile perspective, his eventual retransformation, conceived as manumission into a utopian state, is clearly a construct of the dominant ethos. In the “syncretistic” religions of the Hellenistic and Roman eras, such as the worship of Isis, or Christianity, the formerly subversive concept of liberation is sublimated into propaganda for slave obedience.²⁰⁴ The ass Lucius can only escape his involuntary servitude by embracing the service of the Goddess Isis, seen as liberation *into* a different type of slavery, and expressed in the language of manumission:

Plane memineris et penita mente conditum semper tenebis mihi reliqua vitae tuae curricula adusque terminos ultimi spiritus vadata. Nec iniurium, cuius beneficio redieris ad homines, ei totum debere, quod vives.

"Only remember, and keep the remembrance fast in your heart's deep core, that all the remaining days of your life will be devoted to me, and nothing can release you from this service but death. Neither is it anything but just that you should devote your life to the one who redeems you back into humanity." (Apul. *Met.* 11.6).

Isis offers shelter from the personified goddess Fortune, whom the priest calls “blind,” and who doles out *servitium* in the context of many other sufferings. This

²⁰⁴*Vita G* in Perry's *Aesopica* was probably written in the 1st century CE in Egypt, and reflects a similar interest in the goddess Isis, as well as some hostility to the quintessentially Greek God Apollo. (*Vita G* 142) Aesop regains power of speech from priestess of Isis, just like Lucius in the *Metamorphoses*, (*Life of Aesop* 4;7 ; cf. Planudes 43; 47;53;56;72). Similarly, the Aesopic fable of the “Ass and the Potter” (Perry, *Aesopica: Fabulae* 179) resembles the story of Lucius in the continuing downward spiral as the ass is sold from bad master to worse. On the association of Isis with the Muses and the power of speech, see John Dillery, “Aesop, Isis, and the Heliconian Muses” *Classical Philology*, Vol. 94, No. 3. (Jul., 1999), 268-280.

makes an interesting comparison of the god of wealth in Aristophanes' *Plutus*, who is also blind, and is seen as responsible for the enslavement of Karion (Apul. *Met.* 11.15; cf. Aristoph. *Plutus* 13-20). Worship of the goddess Isis, on the other hand, also entails *servitium*, but the sort of educational slavery employed by Plato and the Pythagoreans, which involves willing obedience to the tenets of the dominant ethos, with the aim of eventual utopian redemption. In return for his constant service, Lucius will be "*beatus*" while he lives and after death will dwell in the Elysian Fields.²⁰⁵ Thus, servitude to the goddess represents membership in a utopian state, one that demands obedience to the dominant perspective in this life, and offers the servile perspective rewards of the afterlife. As the priest sums up the paradox: "Nam cum coeperis deae servire, tunc magis senties fructum tuae libertatis" (Apul. *Met.* 11.15).²⁰⁶

The theme of the slave journey coexists with that of the Goddess throughout the Golden Ass, particularly in the person of the slave girl Photis, as well as the

²⁰⁵ Vives autem beatus, vives in mea tutela gloriosus, et cum spatium saeculi tui permensus ad inferos demearis, ibi quoque in ipso subterraneo semirutundo me, quam vides, Acherontis tenebris interlucentem Stygiisque penetralibus regnantem, campos Elysios incolens ipse, tibi propitiam frequens adorabis. Quodsi sedulis obsequiis et religiosis ministeriis et tenacibus castimoniis numen nostrum promerueris, scies ultra statuta fato tuo spatia vitam quoque tibi prorogare mihi tantum licere.

You, moreover, will live blessed, you will live honored in my guardianship. When having measured out the length of your life, you descend to the shades below, there also, in that underground domain, you will often worship me, whom you now see, favorable to you, shining among the shadows of hell, and ruling in the Stygian chambers. You yourself will live in the Elysian fields. And if through your dutiful obedience and your scrupulous offices, and your continual purity, you deserve my divine reward, you will know that only I can extend your life beyond the limits established by your fate (Apul. *Met.* 11. 6).

²⁰⁶ "As soon as you become the goddess' slave, you will experience more fully the fruit of your freedom."

story of Psyche. Although a slave, Photis exhibits aspects of feminine divinity that recur consistently in the text. Apuleius subverts her slave identity, for instance, describing hair as a crucial attribute of feminine beauty, without which even Venus would be unattractive to her husband, then portraying Photis' hair in glowing terms. (Apul. *Met.* 2.9). Inversely, when she lets down her hair for Lucius at their first liaison, she is described as appearing like Venus (Apul. *Met.* 2.17). On this same occasion, she is garlanded with roses, the flower of Venus (as well as the antidote for Lucius' impending condition). This opposition of a slave to a mistress parallels and foreshadows the jealousy of Venus in the tale of Cupid and Psyche, where the goddess appears "entwined with roses" as well.²⁰⁷

In the context of love, themes of war and slavery often emerge; for instance, the lovemaking of Lucius and Photis is conceived as a battle. This is a theme familiar from Elegy, and the text reflects the interest of Elegy in magic and the *servitium amoris*.²⁰⁸ When Lucius tries to convince her to use her mistress' magic ointment to turn him into a bird, he tells her she will "bind him as her eternal slave" if she does this for him, ironically, he uses a very technical term of slavery: *manicipium*, meaning "permanent transfer of ownership."²⁰⁹ The character of

²⁰⁷ Sed initio noctis e convivio nuptiali vino madens et fragrans balsama Venus reheat totumque revincta corpus rosis micantibus.

At the start of the evening, Venus returned from a wedding, dewy with wine, fragrant with balsam, and with her whole body strung with roses. (Apul. *Met.* 6.11).

²⁰⁸ See Ovid *Amores* 1.3; 1.1, Prop. *Carm.* 2.7, Tib. *Carm.* 1.3.

²⁰⁹ "Patere, oro te," inquam "dum dictat occasio, magno et singulari me adfectionis tuae fructu perfrui et impertire nobis unctulum indidem per istas tuas

Photis acts as a dramatic locus for the two themes of slavery and the power of the goddess; since she shares in both aspects, she is a perfect conduit through which Lucius is sucked into the contagion of both. It is Lucius' twin slaveries of lust, and curiosity about magic, which lead to his transformation into the Ass. His period of subjection to these stands opposed to the subsequent period of educational slavery, and his eventual epiphany.

Similarly, the character Psyche is described as becoming the "slave-girl of Venus," a metaphor which is quite elaborate and comical. When she applies to Ceres and Juno for assistance in her distress, invoking the sympathy of the latter for pregnant women in trouble, Juno refuses because of the laws against harboring runaway slaves (Apul. *Met.* 6.3; 6.4). Mercury must make a pronouncement in the divine "marketplace," giving a complete description of Psyche as a runaway slave-girl.²¹⁰ Venus, like a stereotypical high-born *matrona*, has a whole crew of

pupillas, mea mellitula, tuumque mancipium inremunerabili beneficio sic tibi perpetuo pignera ac iam perface ut meae Veneri Cupido pinnatus adsistam tibi." I beg you, I said, to allow while the occasion calls, so that I may benefit from a great and singular enjoyment of your affection, to share with me this precious unguent, from the same place, by your breasts, my honeypot, and now accomplish your permanent ownership of me as an irredeemable benefit, as a pledge of love to you forever, so that, as a winged Cupid I may sit by you my Venus (Apul. *Met.* 3.22).

²¹⁰ Nec Mercurius omisit obsequium. Nam per omnium ora populorum passim discurrens sic mandatae praedicationis munus exsequatur: "Sic quis a fuga retrahere vel occultam demonstrare poterit fugitivam regis filiam, Veneris ancillam, nomine Psychen, conveniat retro metas Murtias Mercurium praedicatorem, accepturus indicivae nomine ab ipsa Venere septem savia suavia et unum blandientis adpulsu linguae longe mellitum" (Apul. *Met.* 6.8). Mercury didn't fail to obey. Running before all people everywhere thus he fulfilled the duty with his assigned command: "If anybody can restrain from flight or point out the hidden runaway princess, the slave girl of Venus, by name Psyche, let him meet this announcer, Mercury, behind the Murtian turning posts.

other slave girls, of whom Psyche is just one. When mistress “Habit” (*Consuetudo*) catches her, she castigates her just like a returned runaway in trouble, in language which must have been very familiar in the slave culture of Rome (Apul. *Met.* 6.8-9). Finally, Psyche is handed over to two other slave girls, “*Sollicitudo*” and “*Tristities*.”²¹¹ Venus, who calls her unborn child “the son of a cheap slave-girl,” then verbally torments her (Apul. *Met.* 6.9). Like Lucius, Psyche must completely accept this subjugation, and take on the tasks assigned by Venus, however impossible, before she can attain her utopian reward of manumission into the company of the gods, and legitimate marriage with Cupid.

In the *Metamorphoses*, the servile imagery of the whims of fortune and pursuit of sensual indulgence runs counter to the dominant utopian security inherent in the submissive worship of the Goddess. In its self-centered aims, magic appears as a fatal attempt to wrest divine power from its proper channels. Apuleius celebrates the vividness of the sensuality in the text, even as he finally subsumes its energy into a dominant construct. I would argue that this dualist design is intentional. A hint from his *Apologia* gives a theoretical statement of what the *Metamorphoses* accomplishes in narrative: an expansion of the two-fold image of

As a reward for his evidence, he will receive from Venus herself seven sweet kisses and one deeply honeyed by the caress of her blandishing tongue.

²¹¹ “Vbi sunt” inquit “Sollicitudo atque Tristities ancillae meae?” Quibus intro vocatis torquendam tradidit eam. At illae sequentes erile praeceptum Psychen misellam flagellis afflictam et ceteris tormentis excruciatam iterum. “Where,” she said, “are Care and Sorrowing, my slave girls?” To whom, once called, she handed her over for torture. But they, following their mistress' order, had wretched Psyche beaten with whips, and then again racked with different torments. (Apul. *Met.* 6.9).

the feminine:

Mitto enim dicere alta illa et diuina Platonica, rarissimo cuique piorum ignara, ceterum omnibus profanis incognita: geminam esse Venerem deam, proprio quamque amore et diuersis amatoribus pollentis; earum alteram uulgariam, quae sit percita populari amore, non modo humanis animis, uerum etiam pecuinis et ferinis ad libidinem imperitare uel immodica trucique percussorum animalium serua corpora complexu uincientem; alteram uero caelitem Venerem, praedita[m] quae sit optimati amore, solis hominibus et eorum paucis curare, nullis ad turpitudinem stimulis uel illecebris sectatores suos percellentem...

For I omit to speak of those exalted and divine Platonic mysteries, which unknown except to the rarest man among the pious, are completely unknown to the profane: that Venus is a twin goddess, each with its own love and both having sway over different sorts of lovers. One of them is common, which is stimulated by ordinary love, not only to command human souls to lust but even domestic and wild animals, conquering boundless and savage force the servile bodies of stricken animals by its embrace. But the other is a celestial love, endowed with the best love, and prepared to care for men alone, and just a few of them, spurring on its followers by no goads or blandishments to shamefulness...(Apul. *Apolog.* 1.12).

Apuleius' Platonic image of the two Venuses represents the continuum between servile and dominant perspective utopia. Because of the "Milesian" character of the narrative, the text makes constant shifts of genre ranging from comedic and grotesque to romantic and tragic. In a similar fashion, the character of Lucius combines motifs of the servile and dominant perspective utopias. In the former category, his obsession with magic and lust for the slave-girl Photis symbolizes his vulnerability to the physical pleasures of Aphrodite *Vulgaris*. His sudden transformation inverts typical comedic role-reversal of the slave into the master. Further, his role of "the Ass" represents the iconic slave viewpoint as familiar from the beast fables of the Aesopic tradition. Finally, the journey of the transformed Lucius parodies the tropes of the Hellenistic travelogue, as the enslaved donkey-hero, rather than a romantic heroine, is gradually mired in

progressively deeper ignominy and squalor. The tropes of the dominant perspective, on the other hand, are embodied in the realization of the proper attitude towards the Divine Feminine, that is, one of willing and conscious servitude. Open acceptance of one's slavery to the *right* Goddess, that is, Aphrodite *Caelestis*, can transmute the indignities of the slave state into a trial of initiation not unlike that of the Pythagoreans. Like them, Lucius the donkey must remain silent. Also like them, he finds redemption in his final acceptance of the dominant moral code that Isis represents. Lucius' retransformation and subsequent existence as a devotee of Isis' cult are described in utopian terms, just as Psyche, eventually rehabilitated, lives in a paradise of legitimate marriage and everlasting bliss in Olympus.

The representation of the cult of Isis in the *Metamorphoses* has an interesting resemblance to early Christian representations of heaven, and to descriptions of religious conversions and epiphanies. Although Christianity downplays the role of the "divine feminine," it resembles the Isiac cult in the focus on chastity and asceticism as "free" virtues, and their opposites as "slavish" vices. Christianity, like the cult of Isis, uses slavery "both to describe what Christ has delivered us from and of our proper relation to Christ."²¹² Additionally, the cachet of having a great and noble master, whether it be Christ, Isis, or the Emperor of Rome, reflects a reality of social mobility in the ancient world, where a slave's chances for freedom and advancement were greater with a master of high status than a poor, lowly one. It is no great step to envisage servitude to a great master as

²¹² Fitzgerald, 113; cf. *Romans: N.T.* 6.6, 8.2.

conceived in the utopian terms of the dominant perspective.

According to G.E.M de Ste. Croix, this attitude represents the culmination of the standard Classical *topos* of “moral slavery,” which, he argues, developed over a long period from Homer on.²¹³ To summarize this line, slavery, like other misfortunes, is the result of Τύχη, not Φύσις. Good and wise men are never really slaves, and bad ones, in bondage to lusts, are never free. It was easy, according to de Ste. Croix, for those who held this view to conclude that when a bad man was a slave his condition was justified.²¹⁴ The position of Christianity, as well as that of the cult of Isis, did not significantly differ on this topic from the pagan tradition, and continued the metaphor of the “bad” slave as subject to vice, and the “good” slave as a student of virtue.²¹⁵ As far as the figure of Isis goes

²¹³ See G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), 418.

²¹⁴ De Ste. Croix (1981), 419.

²¹⁵ For instance, St. Paul describes the distinction between slave and master as no more in need of change than that between man and woman, and equality exists in the sight of god with no relation to temporal affairs (*Pauline Epistles: Colossians* 3.1; *Galatians* 3.28). His exhortation to the Christian slave to regard himself as Christ’s freedman may have been more comforting than the pagan view that he was already “really” free, yet this is basically the same view. (*Pauline Epistles: Ephesians* 6.5) There is a continuing emphasis on slave obedience in later Christian writers, for example, the Post-Apostolic *Epistle of Barnabas* 19.7 and the *Didache* 4.11 state explicitly for the slave to obey his master as “a counterpart of God.” Augustine found slavery an evil in principle, but he calls it punishment for original sin, and so represents slavery as divinely ordained (*De Civ. Dei* 19.15-16, cf. 21.; De Ste. Croix [1981], 420-421). For texts of the *De Civ. Dei* and Paul’s *Epistles*, see in Mark J. Edwards, *Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians*, Ancient Christian commentary on Scripture. New Testament ; 8 (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1999) ; Polycarp, Papias, and James A. Kleist, *The Didache, The epistle of Barnabas, The epistles and The martyrdom of St.*

Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* reflects de Ste. Croix's formula quite clearly. The difference in the text, however, is that although the hero ends up in a utopian epiphany governed by dominant perspective values, the strong undercurrent hedonism and role reversal reflects the presence of the servile perspective as well, making the *Metamorphoses* a truly 'hybrid' utopia.

Chapter Nine: Real-life-models: Holy Communists and Slave Rebels

The Essenes

Philo of Alexandria's Essenes and Therapeutae²¹⁶ are representatives of a Pythagorean model of life transmuted into the slightly more recent context of Judaic Alexandria. The permanency of the idea of the *πυθαγορείος βίος* is in itself an interesting aspect of dominant perspective utopia, showing that a model for others to follow persisted after the death of Pythagoras and his earliest adherents long after the original was gone. In general, his description of the Essenes fulfils all the tenets of dominant perspective utopia, but with one fundamental difference: Philo states that their communities are completely devoid of slaves.²¹⁷ Here we have an example of real “utopian society” with a pragmatic, not merely philosophical, abrogation of slavery. Interestingly, their rationale for this stems from a servile perspective approach closely connected with Cynic views on the preeminence of nature over culture, whereas the arguments of Philo, and some of his descriptions of them, are steeped in the dominant ethos.

The description of the ‘abolitionist’ Essenes comes in after Philo has already gone on a long rhetorical diatribe on the correlation of virtue and freedom. Philo refers to them in the course of his interpretation of moral slavery and freedom which is based on a recycled and standardized Cynic-Stoic model (i.e., in a spiritual, rather than external sense). Philo, unlike the Essenes themselves, does

²¹⁶ In *Every Good Man Is Free* and *On the Contemplative Life*, hereupon referred to as *EGMF* and *OCL*.

²¹⁷ Philo *EGMF* 12.79; cf. Josephus *Antiquit. Iud.* 18. 18-22; cf. *De Bello Iudaico* 2.154-159.

not demand the eradication of slavery, but attempts to reconcile the slave to his state by placing slavery on a moral basis. This interpretation is clearly the “typical” dominant perspective trope from the tradition of Aristotle, Xenophon, and Plato, that the wicked are slaves to their passions.²¹⁸ Ideally, a person’s internal state should reflect his or her external condition, a phenomenon common in utopias and rare in real life. As Philo interprets it, the Essenes’ level of spiritual freedom is so great that it manifests itself in the physical world; thus, the absence of slavery in their midst simply reflects their virtue. Just as in Iambulus’ “Island of the Sun,” the standards of entry into the Essene group are stringent.

Philo uses many different rhetorical arguments concerning slavery piecemeal, with the result that he sometimes contradicts himself, reflecting contrasting dominant and servile values. For instance, although he does not oppose slavery, he views it as “against nature.” He takes the line that the truly good man cannot be prey to external circumstances like slavery, and draws many comforting examples from this precept, such as the metaphor that the condition of the virtuous man is like that of an athlete in the *pankration*, completely hardened to blows (Philo *EGMF* 26.5). Taking another approach, he discusses slaves who serve as stewards and guardians of households (Philo *EGMF* 35), and who possess natural authority because of their position and practice. Yet, pointing out the artificiality of the slave state, he emphasizes the criminal violence of enslavement; since if someone is seized in war and sold, he is not really a slave, but free in accordance with “laws of nature.”

²¹⁸ De Ste Croix (1981), 418.

εἰ δέ τις ὑπ' ἀνδραποδοκαπήλων ἐπευωνιζομένους
 ἰδὼν τις οἶεται δούλους εὐθὺς εἶναι, πολὺ διαμαρτάνει τῆς ἀληθείας· οὐ
 γὰρ ἢ πρᾶσις ἢ κύριον ἀποφαίνει τὸν πριάμενον ἢ τὸν πραθέντα
 δούλον, ἐπεὶ καὶ πατέρες υἰῶν τιμὰς κατέθεσαν καὶ υἱοὶ πολλάκις
 πατέρων
 ἢ κατὰ ληστείας ἀπαχθέντων ἢ κατὰ πόλεμον αἰχμαλώτων
 γενομένων,¹¹
 οὓς οἱ τῆς φύσεως νόμοι τῶν κάτωθεν ὄντες βεβαιότεροι γράφουσιν
 ἐλευθέρους.

If anyone sees people who have been traded by the slave dealers and thinks them to be slaves, he wanders very much from the truth, for a sale does not clearly show the buyer to be a master, nor the bought to be a slave, since when they were carried away by piracy, or become property of the spear in war, fathers have often paid ransoms for their sons, and sons for their fathers, whom the laws of nature, surer ones, indeed, than the lower laws write down as free (Philo *EGMF* 36-37).

Philo returns to the idea of the potential power of a slave, this time in the motif of *servitio amoris*, saying that sometimes a slave has become master, if the master falls in love with him (Philo *EGMF* 38). Finally, he ties up his examples with a riddling parable:

εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸν λέοντα ὠνησάμενον δεσπότην φατέον εἶναι λεόντων, ὅς, εἰ μόνον ἐπανατείναιτο τὰς ὄψεις, οἷους ἐπρίατο κυρίου ὁ δύστηνος, ὡς χαλεπούς καὶ ὠμοθύμους, αὐτίκα παθὼν εἴσεται. τί οὖν; οὐκ οἴομεθα τὸν σοφὸν ἀδουλωτότερον εἶναι λεόντων, ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ ἀτρώτῳ ψυχῇ τὴν ἀλκὴν ἔχοντα μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ σώματι φύσει δούλῳ καὶ εὐτονίᾳ κραταιοτάτῃ ἰσχύος ἀφηνιάζοι.

Unless someone would say, in fact, that a person who has bought a lion is the master of the lion, who, wretched, will immediately suffer in knowing what sort of harsh and ravenous masters he has bought for himself, if the beast only menaces him with his eyes. Wherefore then? Do we not believe a wise man to be less like a slave than lions are, since he has a greater defense in a free and unbendable soul, more than one who resists his master with a body by nature slavish, although endowed with great strength? (Philo *EGMF* 40).

Philo attempts to make obedience palatable by dissociating it from slavery. It is not necessarily equivalent to servitude to submit to necessity, as long as one need do nothing shameful. This contrasts with Philo's Cynic-Stoic examples that rely on the "laws of nature," and the importance of the internal state of mind that can

endure harsh reality. For example, Philo does not see the inherent contradiction in his quotations of the tragic poets in which the virtuous choose to die rather than be enslaved (therefore, the virtuous cannot be slaves (Philo *EGMF* 152.4;116.2; 134.2), with his statement that slavery does not even truly exist, and his advocacy of obedience in many quarters.²¹⁹

Philo first mentions the Essenes when giving some examples of actual virtuous men who are free. Thus, he describes them with a view to supporting his Neo-Platonic rhetorical exercise. It is difficult to determine the degree to which Philo creates a historical, as opposed to rhetorical portrait of the Essenes, although it is quite detailed, as if he has even observed them directly. My sense is that he does not fully consider the implications of the complete ban on slavery in the Essene community, but takes them as piecemeal examples of yet another association of virtue and freedom. His preceding arguments in the tract stem from various sources with often opposed philosophies, and likewise, he invests the Essenes with Cynic as well as Platonic utopian motifs.

Philo first concentrates on Essenes' rejection of luxury in which their spiritual freedom is inherent, as well as their lack of slaves. He numbers them at 4000

²¹⁹ As he says, "the wicked are tended by others rather than serving them." (Philo *EGMF* 5.31). To separate the situation of the wicked from that of the good, he makes a point similar to that of Xenophon, that like sheep and goats, most men need a governor to keep them out of trouble (Philo *EGMF* 5.30). He quotes a story from the Bible of the intemperate brother whom his father made a servant to the temperate one (*Genesis* 28:1). He lists several examples of this idea, for instance, in the military, one must serve one's commander voluntarily (Philo *EGMF* 6.32), or the constraints of poverty can compel one to toil (Philo *EGMF* 6.34). Similarly, children are forced to submit to their parents, although most parents will not willingly give them menial tasks (Philo *EGMF* 6.36).

(Philo *EGMF* 12.75), and describes them as living in villages, avoiding the lawlessness of cities (Philo *EGMF* 12.76). This does not necessarily imply that they live apart from other villagers in their own utopian communities, but this seems to be the case when he later points out their communal resources. Such group property is used in the pursuit of common survival, not the accrual of individual gain.

ὧν οἱ μὲν γεωπονοῦντες, οἱ δὲ τέχνας μετιόντες ὅσαι συνεργάτιδες
εἰρήνης, ἑαυτοὺς τε καὶ τοὺς πλησιάζοντας ὠφελοῦσιν, οὐκ ἄργυρον
καὶ χρυσὸν θησαυροφυλακούντες οὐδ' ἀποτομὰς γῆς μεγάλας
κτώμενοι
δι' ἐπιθυμίαν προσόδων, ἀλλ' ὅσα πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου
χρείας ἐκπορίζοντες. μόνοι γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων σχεδὸν ἀνθρώπων
ἀχρήματοι καὶ ἀκτήμονες γεγονότες ἐπιτηδεύσει τὸ πλεόν ἢ ἐνδεία
εὐτυχίας πλουσιώτατοι νομίζονται, τὴν ὀλιγοδείαν καὶ εὐκολίαν, ὅπερ
ἔστί, κρίνοντες περιουσίαν.

Some of whom toiling at farming, some learning as many of the arts as are helpers of peace, help both themselves and all those who come near them, since they do not heap up treasures of silver and gold, nor do they get their hands on enormous amounts of land because of greed for wealth, but they practice everything that is necessary for livelihood. For only they, out of almost all other men, being without wealth and without acquisitions, more because of their habits than lack of luck, are nevertheless thought to be the richest with regard to needing little and good spirits, since they judge whatever there is to be plenty (Philo *EGMF* 12.76-77).

It is interesting to note the contrast of the Essenes' spiritual state with their actual poverty of resources. Yet their physical activities are completely consistent with their moral outlook. "They possess no weapons, commit no acts of war, and do not even engage in "wicked" peaceful occupations, such as trade or navigation" (Philo *EGMF* 12.78). Interestingly, these rejected occupations are the mainstays of the slave system, so although the Essenes may not actively be rooting out slavery, they stay away from situations that lead to it. Perhaps Philo is aware of this, and builds on the argument, as his next statement directly relates to

this topic:

...δουλός τε παρ'αυτοῖς οὐδὲ εἷς ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ἀνθυπουργοῦντες ἀλλήλοις· καταγινώσκουσί τε τῶν δεσποτῶν, οὐ μόνον ὡς ἀδίκων, ἰσότητα λυμαينوμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἀσεβῶν, θεσμὸν φύσεως ἀναιρούντων, ἢ πάντας ὁμοίως γεννήσασα καὶ θρεψαμένη μητρὸς δίκην ἀδελφούς γνησίους, οὐ λεγομένους ἀλλ' ὄντας ὄντως, ἀπειργάσατο· There is not even one slave among them, but all as free men they work to help one another. They scorn masters, not only as unjust, and as corrupters of equality, but as unholy, and as destroying the law of Nature who made them, gave birth to all of them in the same way, and brought them up by the law of a mother as legitimate brothers, not like those who are only called so (Philo *EGMF* 12.79).

Here we have a description of their practical management of the workload that usually shouldered by slaves, a sort of philanthropic communist labor force functioning for the greater good of the community. Additionally, in declaring the fraternity of all humans, they are basing a rejection of slavery on a principle that goes beyond Philo's statement that "a virtuous man is immune to the blows of fortune." In terms of property, as well as workload, they share everything, taking away the basis for covetousness, luxury, and extreme poverty, all of which can lead to slavery.

...πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν οὐδενὸς οἰκία τίς ἔστιν ἰδία, ἢν οὐχὶ πάντων εἶναι κοινήν συμβέβηκε· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ κατὰ θιάσους συνοικεῖν. ἀναπέπταται καὶ τοῖς ἐτέρωθεν ἀφικνουμένοις τῶν ὁμοζήλων. εἴτ' ἔστι ταμεῖον ἐν πάντων καὶ δαπάναι κοιναί, καὶ κοινὰ μὲν ἐσθῆτες, κοινὰ δὲ τροφαὶ συσσίτια πεποιημένων· τὸ γὰρ ὁμωρόφιον ἢ ὁμοδίαιτον ἢ ὁμοτράπεζον οὐκ ἂν τις εὖροι παρ' ἐτέροις μᾶλλον ἔργω βεβαιούμενον· καὶ μήποτ' εἰκότως· ὅσα γὰρ ἂν μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐργασάμενοι λάβωσιν ἐπὶ μισθῷ, ταῦτ' οὐκ ἴδια φυλάττουσιν, ἀλλ' εἰς μέσον προτιθέντες κοινήν.

First, then, there is no private house belonging to anyone, which does not belong to everyone in common. For they live together in groups, and the house lies open for all arriving from anywhere who are of the same doctrines, there is one storehouse belonging to all, and common supplies. Their garments

are communal property, as is their food, since they have instituted group meals. One would not find among others a group with common house, mode of life and table, as firmly established in practice, and likely one never will. For as many things as they do by their daily chores that are worth money, these they guard not as private property, but they put forward as available for group use (Philo *EGMF* 13.85-87).

With all this philanthropy and repudiation of the luxurious life, it is no surprise that Philo paints them as “devoting all attention to moral rather than natural or logical philosophy.”²²⁰ Indeed, morality takes on a religious quality in their synagogue, similar in many respects to the descriptions of the rituals of Pythagoreans. The elders teach the younger, giving explanations of not very intelligible allegorical texts and teaching what they know to the rest of the people.

²²¹ This is quite reminiscent of the *akousmata*, or cryptic sayings of the Pythagoreans, as well as the Pythagorean precept of the primacy of elders.

Philo wraps up his description of the community by accentuating the way their spiritual impermeability manifests itself in reality: “Although savage tyrants have ravaged the land, and corruptions have made people wicked, no accusation has ever been brought against the Essenes, and no one could ever really harm

²²⁰ ...φιλοσοφίας τε τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἰς κτήσιν ἀρετῆς λογοθήραις...
 ...abandoning the rational aspects of philosophy to the “argument-hunters” as not necessary for acquiring virtue... (Philo *EGMF* 12.80).

²²¹ εἶθ' εἰς μὲν τις τὰς βίβλους ἀναγινώσκει λαβῶν, ἕτερος δὲ τῶν ἐμπειροτάτων ὅσα μὴ γνῶριμα παρελθῶν ἀναδιδάσκει.
 One person is in charge of teaching the books, but each of the more experienced going through as many things as are not commonly known, teaches them. (Philo *EGMF* 13.81-83).

them.”²²² Somehow, the perfect morality of the group gives them immunity to military attacks as well as corrupting influence. Philo’s meaning is unclear,

²²² σημεῖον δέ· πολλῶν κατὰ καιροὺς ἐπαναστάντων τῇ χώρᾳ δυναστῶν καὶ φύσεσι καὶ προαιρέσεσι χρησαμένων διαφερούσαις—οἱ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἀτίθασον ἀγριότητα θηρίων ἐκνικῆσαι σπουδάσαντες, οὐδὲν παραλιπόντες τῶν εἰς ὠμότητα, τοὺς ὑπηκόους ἀγεληδὸν ἱερεύοντες ἢ καὶ ζώντας ἐπι μαγείρων τρόπον κατὰ μέρη καὶ μέλη κρεουργοῦντες ἄχρι τοῦ τὰς αὐτὰς ὑπομεῖναι. συμφορὰς ὑπὸ τῆς τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἐφορώσης δίκης οὐκ ἐπαύσαντο· οἶδὲ τὸ παρακεκινημένον καὶ λελυττηκὸς εἰς ἑτέρας εἶδος κακίας μεθαρμοσάμενοι, πικρίαν ἄλεκτον ἐπι τηδεύσαντες, ἡσυχῇ διαλαλοῦντες, ἡρεμαιοτέρας φωνῆς ὑποκρίσει βαρύμηνι ἦθος ἐπιδεικνύμενοι, κυνῶν ἰοβόλων τρόπον προσσαίνοντες, ἀνιάτων γενόμενοι κακῶν αἴτιοι, κατὰ πόλεις μνημεῖα τῆς[”] ἐαυτῶν ἀσεβείας καὶ μισανθρωπίας ἀπέλιπον τὰς τῶν πεπονθῶτων ἀλήστους συμφορὰς, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὔτε τῶν σφόδρα ὠμοθύμων οὔτε τῶν πάνυ δολερῶν καὶ ὑπούλων ἴσχυσε τὸν λεχθέντα τῶν Ἑσσαίων ἢ ὀσίων ὄμιλον αἰτιάσασθαι, πάντες δὲ ἀσθενέστεροι τῆς τῶν ἀνδρῶν καλοκάγαθίας γενόμενοι καθάπερ αὐτονόμοις καὶ ἐλευθέροις οὔσιν ἐκ φύσεως προσηνέχθησαν, ἄδοντες αὐτῶν τὰ συσιτία καὶ τὴν παντὸς λόγου κρείττονα κοινωνίαν, ἢ βίου τελείου καὶ σφόδρα εὐδαίμονός ἐστι σαφέστατον δεῖγμα.

This is the proof of it: At times, although many powerful men have risen up over the land, who, differing in their various natures and judgements, are zealous to surpass the wild animals in respect to untameable harshness, do not avoid any sort of bloodlust, but sacrifice their subjects in herds even while alive, or cut them up into parts and limbs in the manner of a butcher. They did not stop doing these things until they themselves, as is human nature, suffered this same misfortune because of divine justice. There are others who have altered their evils into a different form, ragingly mad and violent, practicing a bitter and unspeakable sin, although speaking peacefully, with the heavy hypocrisy of a sweet voice, yet revealing their character when, having thrown themselves down in the manner of fawning dogs, they become the causes of unholy deeds. In the cities they leave memorials of their own lack of reverence and hatred of humanity, consisting of those who have suffered unforgettable misfortunes—but no one of these savage ones, or of the extremely cunning and unsound has been able to attach guilt to the aforementioned band of the Essenes, or Holy, but all of them have been weaker than the virtue of these men, inasmuch as they live according to their own free laws of nature, enjoying their common banquets, and the community is stronger than all words, which is a most clear example of the complete and happy life (Philo *EGMF* 13.88-91).

perhaps he is suggesting that the Essenes would never submit to perform immoral acts at anyone's coercion, and therefore cannot be true slaves.

Philo describes a similar group in his tract *On the Contemplative Life*. The Θεραπεῦται are so similar to the Essenes, that it has often been suggested that they are in fact the same group with a Hellenized name.²²³ His detailed description of their banquet, an ecstatic symposium, functions primarily to contrast with examples of banquets that embody servile utopian fantasy by providing an absolute excess of decorations, food, and service (Philo *OCL* 3.48-50). At these wild parties, the young boy slaves who serve at the table are depicted as erotically dressed, like the food, in order to rekindle the satiated appetites of the guests. All is excremental luxury, and a travesty of the true function of the banquet, the sustenance of the body and soul. The diners and servants at the "bad" banquet are the ultimate representatives of the bondage of self-indulgence, and could not make a greater contrast with the boys and women

²²³ See de Ste. Croix (1981), 422 and Philo *OCL* 2.2. This has to do with the translation of the Hebrew word Essene into Greek (Essene=Therapeutae). There are some important differences, however, not least that at the beginning of the tract Philo himself contrasts them, saying that whereas the Essenes achieve great virtue and freedom in their practical way of life, the Therapeutae master the spiritual, or 'contemplative' realm (Philo *OCL* 1.1-3). In fact, the activities of the two groups do seem extremely similar, with the exception that the Essenes appear to be permanently settled, and involved with agriculture. Characteristics of the Therapeutae's spirituality are manifest in their decisions to give up all their property to their relatives or friends and to leave them and everything familiar behind, traveling to a desert place (Philo *OCL* 1.19). They, like the Essenes, avoid the corrupting influence of the cities, but live near them nevertheless, in order to have opportunity to minister their therapeutic techniques, one might suppose. According to Philo, the greatest number of them lives right outside of Alexandria, beside the Mareotic lake. (Philo *OCL* 3.32) Did Philo have a direct, eyewitness experience of this group, or did he simply make them up?

of the Therapeutic feast, whose simple dress, free will, and voluntary virtue are a major focus:

διακονοῦνται δὲ οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνδραπόδων, ἠγούμενοι συνόλως τὴν
θεραπόντων κτήσιν εἶναι παρὰ φύσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρους ἅπαντας
γεγέννηκεν, αἱ δὲ τινῶν ἀδικίαι καὶ πλεονεξίαι ζηλωσάντων τὴν
ἀρχέκακον ἀνισότητά καταζεύξασαι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις κράτος
τοῖς δυνατωτέροις ἀνήψαν... ἐν δὲ τῷ ἱερῷ τούτῳ συμποσίῳ δούλος
μὲν ὡς ἔφην οὐδεὶς, ἐλεύθεροι δὲ ὑπηρετοῦσι, τὰς διακονικὰς χρεῖας
ἐπιτελοῦντες οὐ πρὸς βίαν οὐδὲ προστάξεις ἀναμένοντες, ἀλλ'
ἐθελουσίῳ γνώμῃ φθάνοντες μετὰ σπουδῆς καὶ προθυμίας τὰς
ἐπιτελεῦσαι.

They are not waited on by slaves, but they think that the acquisition of servants is completely against nature, who for her part has generated all free, but the injustices and greed of those seeking to attain the greatest evil, inequality, have imposed their power onto the weaker in the interest of the stronger...but as I have said, there is not even one slave in their holy banquet, but the free all serve, not forced to complete the necessary tasks not forced, nor obeying any commands, but showing a willing spirit with zeal and forward heart they carry out the work (Philo *OCL* 3.71-72).

To the Pythagoreans, the concept of voluntary servitude is extremely important in terms of the process of education. They see education as a sort of willing slavery, entailing the complete submission of the student's will to that of the teacher. The Essenes and Therapeutae also believe in obedience and hierarchy based on age and experience, but attempt to elide the metaphor of slavery by allocating all normally servile labor to the free youths.

οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες ἐλεύθεροι τάττονται πρὸς ταῖς ὑπουργίαις
ταύταις, ἀλλ' οἱ νέοι τῶν ἐν τῷ συστήματι μετὰ πάσης ἐπιμελείας
ἀριστίνδην ἐπικριθέντες, ὃν χρὴ τρόπον ἀστείου καὶ εὐγενεῖς πρὸς
ἄκραν ἀρετὴν ἐπειγομένους· οἱ καθάπερ υἱοὶ γνήσιοι φιλοτίμως
ἄσμενοι πατράσι καὶ μητράσιν ὑπουργοῦσι, κοινούς αὐτῶν γονεῖς
νομίζοντες οἰκειότερους τῶν ἀφ' αἵματος, εἴ γε καλοκάγαθίας οὐδὲν
οἰκειότερόν ἐστι τοῖς εὐφρονοῦσιν· ἄζωστοι δὲ καὶ καθειμένοι τοὺς
χιτωνίσκους εἰσίσαισι ὑπηρετήσοντες, ἕνεκα τοῦ μηδὲν εἶδωλον ἐπιφέρει
δουλοπρεποῦς σχήματος. εἰς τοῦτο τὸ συμπόσιον

Neither are they just any free men who are appointed for these services, but those of their young men who have been judged as the best after all care in their company, eager to act in the way it is necessary for the good and well-

born to act, and who wish to reach the high point of virtue. They, just like legitimate sons, acting loving to their fathers and mothers in service, think that their common parents are more properly theirs than those of blood relation, since to those who think rightly, there is nothing more proper than beauty and good. Ungirt and with tunics loose they come in for service, so as to bring nothing at all that resembles a slavish appearance into the banquet (Philo *OCL* 3.73).

In even greater contrast with the slavish eroticism of the ‘corrupt’ feast, the youths serving at the banquet take on kinship roles to the older people whom they serve. This idea of the “family of the virtuous” has many utopian sources, recalling Plato’s communal children, the *σοσσίτις* of the Spartans, as well as the *Μαθηματικοί* of Pythagoras.

The key to understanding the Pythagorean view on slavery lies in their practice of asceticism, and their belief in reincarnation. The concept of spiritual slavery is an aspect of ascetic training, for all these sects consider someone who does not know how to command himself ‘slavish.’ As we have seen, the role of the student or acolyte is similar in many ways to that of a slave. The difference is that the willing disciple consciously abases his appetites and curtails his impulses in order that he may ultimately rule, whereas the unwilling slave, with an external master, does not necessarily associate his own will with the force compelling him to obedience. The similarity between the two positions, nevertheless, creates if not a justification, then a sense of resignation towards slavery. The Essenes, on the other hand, not only avoid, but also condemn slavery actively, stating that it is against nature. G.E.M de Ste. Croix and Zvi Yavetz agree that the Essenes are the first historical people, since the unnamed men in Aristotle’s *Politics*, who

maintain that slavery is πάρα, not κατά φύσιν.²²⁴

The injunction to shed no blood, in line with the Pythagorean practices of moral behavior, is paradoxically an argument both favoring and subverting slavery. The argument of reincarnation that lies behind this rule implies a kinship and connection of all creatures, similar to the family feeling amongst the Pythagoreans and Therapeutae. One should not harm any other living creature, since then one is truly harming oneself. The same is true for slaves, and anything or anyone less powerful than oneself. On the other hand, if a person has done harm in this, or some past life, he or she can expect to suffer wrong at the hands of another, possibly as a slave. This is an aspect of the Pythagoreans' acceptance of educational slavery. On the other hand, the Essenes avoid any sort of exploitation, including soldiering, meat eating, or slavery. I would argue that this relates to the fact that they do not believe in reincarnation, but a Christian-like "heaven."²²⁵

²²⁴ See: De Ste. Croix, 422; Yavetz, 3. The following passage from *De Bello Iudaico* contains Josephus' explicit statement of this Essene doctrine: Καὶ γὰρ ἔρρωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἢδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ μόνιμον αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους αἰεὶ διαμένειν, καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος ὥσπερ εἴρκταις τοῖς σώμασιν ἵυγγί τινι φυσικῇ κατασπωμένας, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀνεθῶσι τῶν κατὰ σάρκα δεσμῶν, οἷα δὴ μακρᾶς δουλείας ἀπηλλαγμένας τότε χαίρειν καὶ μετεώρους φέρεσθαι. καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀγαθαῖς ὁμοδοξοῦντες παισὶν Ἑλλήνων ἀποφαίνονται τὴν ὑπὲρ ὠκεανὸν δίαιταν ἀποκεῖσθαι καὶ χῶρον οὔτε ὄμβροισι οὔτε νιφετοῖς οὔτε καύμασι βαρυνόμενον, ἀλλ' ὄν ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ πραῦς αἰεὶ ζέφυρος ἐπιπνέων ἀναψύχει· ταῖς δὲ φαύλαις ζοφώδη καὶ χειμέριον ἀφορίζονται μυχὸν γέμοντα τιμωριῶν ἀδιαλείπτων. δοκοῦσι δέ μοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν Ἕλληνας τοῖς τε ἀνδρείοις αὐτῶν, οὓς ἥρωας καὶ ἡμιθέους καλοῦσιν, τὰς μακάρων νήσους ἀνατεθεικέναι, ταῖς δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ψυχαῖς καθ' ἄδου τὸν ἀσεβῶν χῶρον, ἔνθα καὶ κολαζομένους τινὰς μυθολογοῦσιν, Σισύφους καὶ Ταντάλους Ἰξιονᾶς τε καὶ Τιτυοῦς, πρῶτον μὲν αἰδίους ὑφιστάμενοι τὰς ψυχὰς, ἔπειτα εἰς προτροπὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀποτροπὴν. τοὺς τε γὰρ ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι

Whereas reincarnation offers its followers the chance to expiate any wrongs committed in another life, the prospect of resurrection after death, and only one chance at it, places a much higher premium on correct behavior in this life. Essenes, of course, would have lived in a greatly different cultural context than the Pythagoreans, but they are extremely similar in many ways. The psychological motivation of different conceptions of the afterlife, then, becomes a far more revealing comparison. One could object that many Christians who believe in resurrection not only condone, but promote slavery. This is explicable in light of the traditional and even primitive character of the Essene code. The Essenes did not have the loopholes of later Christian dogma that allow for the

κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀμείνους ἐλπίδι τιμῆς καὶ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν, τῶν τε κακῶν ἐμποδίζεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς δεῖι προσδοκῶντων, εἰ καὶ λάθοιεν ἐν τῷ ζῆν, μετὰ τὴν διάλυσιν ἀθάνατον τιμωρίαν ὑφέξειν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν Ἐσσηνοὶ περὶ ψυχῆς θεολογοῦσιν ἄφυκτον δέλεαρ τοῖς ἀπαξ γευσασμένοις τῆς σοφίας αὐτῶν καθιέντες.

For this opinion is common among them: that bodies are subject to decay, and the material they consist of is impermanent, but that their immortal souls always remain, and coming out of the lightest air they are woven together, as if seduced by some natural spell into the bodies that are prisons, but when they are released from the chains of the flesh, then it is fit for them to rejoice as if released from great slavery, and to go upwards. In these following good doctrines, they appear to resemble the sons of the Greeks, in positing a life beyond the Ocean, and a place not weighed down by rains, snows, or heat, but on which a sweet soft west-wind always is blowing. But for inferior souls they apportion a cave, dark and full of storms, resounding with incessant punishments. In this, it seems to me, they think the same thing as the Greeks, in establishing for their brave men whom they call heroes or demi-gods abodes in the Islands of the Blessed, but for the souls of the base and unholy a place in Hades, wherein they say that some are being punished, such as the Sisyphuses, Tantaluses, Ixions, and Tityuses, but by first lifting up the reverent souls, they make a reward for virtue and a punishment for evil. For the good feel the need to become better during their lifetime because of the hope of honor after death, and the impulses of the wicked must be restrained when they see ahead that even if they should escape notice in life, after death they will suffer an immortal revenge. These things, therefore, the Essenes theologize concerning the soul, an irresistible delight to those who have once tasted their wisdom (Josephus *De Bello Iudaeo* 2.154-159).

pardon of sins, and thus the ability to live with the more convenient and useful of them on a long-term basis. In fact, their company, in its slaveless yet exclusive state, very much resembles their own portrayal of heaven in the afterlife.

Ancient Slave Revolts: Utopian Elements and Interpretations

To understand the utopian aspects of the slave rebellions, it is necessary to take a step back and look at the accounts beyond any question of categories. A common modern approach to ancient events is to sever the connection between religion, politics and philosophy, thus tidying up the morass of possible interpretations. Many scholars discard group religious consciousness or mass mentality of war as apolitical, un-philosophical, and therefore non-utopian. Yet mystical elements can relate closely to philosophical ideals. The idealistic concept of the “benevolent ruler,” as embodied, for instance, in Xenophon’s Cyrus, based its success on religion as much as politics, especially after the career of Alexander. In fact, the imperial gains of Alexander had already made a connection between Greek secular government and the Persian divine kingship. Hellenistic God-Kings and slave rebel leaders may seem far apart, and the consensus of most ancient dramatists, poets and philosophers on the ideal qualities of the “city of slaves” was that it in fact had none. If they thought of it at all, the majority believed a *polis* composed of slave citizens was a contradiction in terms, and would constitute a negative, even dystopian paradigm. Thus in fiction the πόλις δοῦλων is little known, although it is sometimes used as one of the

extreme inversions of comedy, and as a term of detraction.²²⁶ On the other hand, in historical writing, we have several accounts of slaves attempting to set up their own states following successful rebellions, using the some of the same political maneuvers familiar to us from "free" governments, and even, arguably, from philosophical utopian models. Such elements, which appear consistently in the tales of slave rebellions and slave rebel leaders, include military motifs, magic, and the quasi-religious *topos* of the "Good Ruler." Additionally, the historians' praise of the ability of the rebel slaves to organize on a military level reflects a culturally prevalent idealization of warfare reminiscent of the utopian paradigms set forth by Xenophon. Rebel slaves transmute their status by risking their lives for their freedom, and empower themselves to organize their own culture. In the course of this effort, some succeed and some fail at a psychological departure from the figurative slavery so popular a metaphor in ancient philosophical thought. The conclusions of their stories, then, consist either of an ignominious and degrading death, or of a heroic death.

The tale of the slave leader Drimakos, Strabo's version of the Pergamene revolt, the "Diodoran" tales of the Sicilian slave wars, and Plutarch and Appian on Spartacus all show a common interest in divination, magic, and cult mysticism as they focus on particular leaders. In the case of the Syrian "slave-king" Eunus, his magical powers act as the catalyst of the entire rebellion, whereas Drimakos gains heroic-cult status after his death. Religion was certainly a powerful influence even on acquiescent slaves, bringing them consolation, and a fantasy of a different

²²⁶ *Krat. Ser. Fr.* 208, cf. *Eupolis* 212.

world. Cults such as the Eleusinian Mysteries may have offered a solace similar to that which slaves of the American South found in Christianity; in fact, both of these religions are based on a utopian vision of the afterlife. The only refuges for abused slaves lay in the sanctuaries of certain gods, not in the judicial system.²²⁷ The consolidation of many religious views into one could transform slaves with disparate backgrounds into united force, a type of syncretism that became much more common after the Alexandrian conquest. Properly handled, such a new religious consciousness could transform the identity vacuum of slaves.

According to the sources, servile vices often prevent the successful revolution of slaves. They suffer several specific pitfalls. Superstition and desire for booty outweigh their ideals of good government and personal virtue. Ideological freedom seems impossible when physical escape from slavery is almost insurmountably difficult. Disagreement and dissent among individual rebels prevents their collective success. In the ancient historical accounts, slave revolts incur these typical problems, and come to grief because of a lack of unifying utopian virtue. Historians have emphasized the lurid aspects of slave rebellions, playing up the authorial tactic of getting a visceral, terrified response from the reader that is finally relieved when things are "set to normal." Yet certain of the slaves' attested *good* actions deviate from this pattern, appearing as they do

²²⁷ E.g., the shrine of the Palici in Sicily, (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.3; 11, 7, 89) the Chian cult of Drimakos, (Athen. *Deipn.* 6.265c-266e) and the sanctuary of Aesculapius on Tiburtina (Suet. *Claudius* 25) although this last is of a strictly medical character). On the founding of the Palike by the "rebel" Ducetius, see Emanuele Ciaceri, *Culti E Miti Nella Storia Dell' Antica Sicilia*. Catania: F. Battiato (1911), 106-7.

amidst the list of horrors perpetrated by the rebels. In fact, they display actions and virtues that were common components of fictional utopias.

The story of Drimakos, from the 3rd century BCE, is the earliest example of the phenomenon of religious leader-worship as a unifying force for slaves (Ath. *Deipn.* 6.265 e-266). This Chian slave was a runaway turned brigand who gained cult status after his death as a patron of both runaway slaves and slave-owners. His military success was so great that he was able to make advantageous bargains with the Chians, and set himself up as a judge of moral abuses against slaves. He does not seem to have opposed slavery in general, and his tight discipline, which caused his followers to fear him more than they did their previous owners, resembles a “Xenophontic” pattern of leadership. In an ironic narrative twist, this Drimakos transcends slave status with a heroic death. Theopompos (preserved in Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophistae*) writes that he took advantage of the punishment the Chians wanted to give him and thus was able to confer liberation and financial security on his chosen *eromenos*, effectively making him his heir to his own escape of slavery (Ath. *Deipn.* 6.90.10-15). Transmission of his legal status should have been beyond a slave’s reach, but his heroic self-sacrifice puts him beyond the boundaries of slavish behavior into the category of cult hero. Yet Drimakos is identified fully as a slave, and institutes a kind of final court of appeals for injustice specifically against slaves, reminiscent of the shrine of the Palici. Athenaeus even makes a religious justification for this in his statement that the Chian slaves will never cease to run away, since this is “in accordance with a divine dispensation” (Ath. *Deipn.* 6.88.14). The fact that slave owners also pay

homage to his cult to keep their slaves from running away reflects a dualism that is a typical aspect of the power of a god; he is concerned with the problems of both masters and slaves.

This story reads like an etiological morality fable with an unusual emphasis on slavery, and the aspects of servile perspective role reversal in the tale are absorbed into the dominant ideology. Drimakos is a utopian leader in that he embodies the spirit of liberation from slavery, not through the socially acceptable channel of manumission, but by means of opportunism, guile and force, all techniques of war. His subversive death, by which he elevated himself to a cult figure, is worthy of an archetypal trickster like Hermes, Sisyphus, or Coyote, by the very fact that it makes use of the price on his head as a runaway. Yet the servile perspective enjoyment we feel at the slaves turning the tables on the masters is balanced by the worthiness of the hero of the tale. Drimakos is an exemplar of ascetic military virtues, who after living a harsh lifestyle, sacrifices his own life for a beloved companion. It is interesting that our account of him, although preserved by Athenaeus, originally comes to us from Theopompos, an exile from Chios for pro-Spartan sympathies in the 4th century BCE. This might explain the emphasis on the warlike virtues of Drimakos, which resemble those approved by Xenophon for his ideal leaders. Xenophon was in no way egalitarian or in favor of runaways, and as it turns out, Drimakos is not either: slaves who do not have sufficient grounds for complaint he returns to their masters, and his harsh discipline makes him a fearful, intimidating figure to his followers. If we think of the state of slavery as the natural corollary to defeat in war, Drimakos transcends that state by

attaining warlike virtues, and changing his relation with the citizens of Chios from the fearful attrition of the runaway slave to a state of predatory combat. The virtues that “liberate” Drimakos are closely akin to those idealized by Sparta.

In the case of the second century BCE Pergamene rebellion of Aristonicus and his "Citizens of the Sun," idealized details again emerge through the vehicle of a slave's religious leadership. Aristonicus called his primarily slave followers “*Heliopolitae*” (Strabo *Geogr.* 14.1.38c646), a fact which Pöhlmann and W.W. Tarn use to support their opinion that Aristonicus' social program was influenced by Hellenistic utopian literature, in particular Iambulus.²²⁸

There already exists a fair degree of controversy over the possible utopian elements of the revolt, which Tarn argues were born from the principle of *Homonoia* promulgated by Alexander the Great as a means to integrate the culturally disparate elements of his empire.²²⁹ The revolt was at least partially

²²⁸ Pöhlmann, 404-06; Tarn, 411-14.

²²⁹ Although Pöhlmann suggested that “Stoic cosmopolitanism” lies behind the political structure of the Island of the Sun (Pöhlmann, 405), Tarn denies that this utopia is Stoic in nature, since he says the Stoics did not believe in abolition of slavery, and slavery is absent from Iambulus' paradise (Tarn, 411-414). Tarn is a thorough proponent of the theory of *Homonoia*, a cult concept that he argues to predate Alexander. Earlier Greeks called it the job of the king to promote harmony and goodwill among the Greeks, but not among the barbarians, whom they considered slaves by nature. Alexander included Persians in his more global concept of *Homonoia*. According to Tarn, Iambulus adopted this idea in his description of the Island of the Sun, where people “prized *Homonoia* above all things” (Tarn, 412). I have some difficulty with this distinction between “Stoic cosmopolitanism” and *Homonoia*, since in fact they seem to be very similar concepts. The main difference seems to be that Cynic/Stoic cosmopolitanism has to do with the removal of all boundaries of status and questions of nationality, saying they are irrelevant. Therefore the corollary of this approach is that such boundaries can continue to exist, ignored by the true stoic philosopher. *Homonoia*, on the other hand, denotes concord between different groups, an

nationalistic, rather than servile, since Aristonicus was actually aspiring to the throne of Pergamum, and Attalus may have left the kingdom to Rome as a way of circumventing the claims of Aristonicus, who although he had a low-status slave mother, was a son of the king.²³⁰ Although Africa admits that the Pergamene rebellion was “definitely servile,” he tries to undermine the elements of class warfare in his interpretation, comparing it to the Italian revolt of 91, as opposed to the Spartacan war.²³¹ As he puts it:

On a Mediterranean level, Aristonicus was an Attalid resisting Rome; while within Pergamum, he waged class warfare...he exploited the poor against the

alliance in which the validity of social and cultural differences is maintained under the aegis of a superior power, yet different groups are in concord, and equal with each other. Whether either of these concepts was at work in the revolt of Aristonicus is controversial and questionable. Africa, who considers the slave king's focus on the sun to be religious rather than philosophical, counters Tarn's view with a good degree of success, and deconstructs the utopian and “marxist” themes in the revolt of Aristonicus, as well his connection with Blossius, the tutor of the Gracchi. Africa also points out the paucity of the sources in order to counteract the claims of scholars that Aristonicus was trying to realize the romantic utopia of Iambulus: ex. Tarn, 131, Toynbee, 179-180, Bidez « La cite du monde st la cite du Soleil chez les stoiciens »: Academie royale de Belgique Bulletin de la classe des Lettres [ser 8][1932], 18, 290-291) ; Hansen, 144 ; Africa: 114.

²³⁰ Aristonicus' mother was a concubine and harp player of Eumenes II. The status of concubines in the Attalid dynasty partook of the traditions of both Greek and Persian attitudes towards slave women and bastardy. Daniel Ogden makes a good case for the revolt as an “amphimetric” dispute between Attalus III and Aristonicus, who then took on the name Eumenes III. See Daniel Ogden, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death: The Hellenistic Dynasties* (London: Duckworth with the Classical Press of Wales, 1999), 207-10. The Greeks in general (excepting the Spartans) had a more stringent attitude towards illegitimacy, and concubines were usually slaves. The Persians considered practically everyone a slave in comparison with the king, and therefore the status of his favorites was possibly not as important as the fact that they were favored.

²³¹ Africa: 117.

rich, the rural serfs against the cities, and the inland Asians against the coastal Greeks.²³²

Even if we grant that Aristonicus was fighting as an Attalid dynast against the power of Rome, not as a slave trying to free himself, Africa comes to an invalid conclusion in rejecting any utopian interpretation of the term “*Heliopolitai*.” It may be true, as he says, “Iambulus’ “Island of the Sun” would have little weight as a “literary parable...with various proportions of utopian allegory to geographic romance when compared with the religious appeal of real cities of the sun, such as Egyptian On, and Syrian Baalbek.”²³³ The cult of the sun flourished in Asia Minor, whereas the works of Iambulus were probably not widely known by the slave population of Pergamum. Certainly, Aristonicus, as a resident at the court, might have had access to the great library of Pergamum, with its many works of philosophy, including perhaps those of Iambulus himself. However, here Africa ignores the point that religion could have a component of class sensibility, not to mention utopian imagery. As he himself says, the sun was a popular deity because it was so universal, going beyond normal boundaries of religious nationalism.²³⁴ The sun shone on rich and poor alike and on slaves as well. At Delphi, Apollo was the protector of the liberated slave, and in Thrace, a much used source of slaves the cult of Helios was popular. The imagery of the sun would be a suitable deity to bring together the disparate, dislocated elements of the slave army, giving

²³² Ibid.: 118.

²³³ Ibid.: 120.

²³⁴ Ibid.: 123.

them an identity through which to shed the stigma of slave status. Peter Green, in his article “The First Sicilian Slave War” writes on the unifying and revolutionary aspects of the mystery cults of Atargatis, Hadad, and Zeus Helios, comparing them to Greek *koine*, in that they:

...linked the slaves of many nations in a common bond...obliterated social distinctions: bond and free worshipped together. These cults provided the truly revolutionary spark which was later transmuted into political action. All their emphasis was on *soteria*: on material blessings in this world, and even better rewards in the next.²³⁵

The fact that the religions of unification promise *material* blessings is a clear reflection of a servile perspective utopian model. Further, there is an attested connection of this cult of the oppressed to the original cult of servile utopia, that of Kronos and Saturn. Most probably, the “Helios” of the Heliopolitae represents Baal-Hammon, the Phoenician deity who in his original incarnation had embodied the ideal of kingship and mastery, then after conquest by Rome assimilated by the Carthaginians first to Saturn, and later simply to the Sun. Baal was the most flexible of deities, rivaling the cult of the earth mother in his ability to shift according to the specific needs of any community. In his post-Roman Conquest form, he was a symbol of utopian reversal to the downtrodden in general, and to slaves above all.²³⁶

²³⁵ Peter Green, “The First Sicilian Slave War” *Past and Present*, No. 20 (Nov., 1961): 22.

²³⁶ In the greater part of the Roman proconsular province, Baal Hammon was very soon assimilated to Saturn, who replaced him and enjoyed considerable prestige among the peoples of Africa, particularly the smaller tribes...The recent settlers assimilated him not to Saturn, as elsewhere, but simply to the Sun. This is supported by his depiction as the sun on several examples of coinage from 10-5 BCE. Although Baal was a nature god, there are as many different versions of

There is a great deal of controversy over the nature of Aristonicus' uprising, which has been interpreted as nationalistic as well as servile. The fact that Aristonicus himself was a member of the royal family of Pergamum, yet launched his rebellion at a historical moment favorable to many other slave insurrections makes this issue particularly confusing. It may be impossible to establish any proof of any slave-based ideology or a demonstrable connection between Aristonicus and any other slave risings, just as we cannot see exactly what he would have tried to do as king.²³⁷ What seems more important is the fact that even if Aristonicus was attempting to take over the Attalid dynasty, he offered a common ideology of freedom to his slave followers intended to help them overcome the psychological obstacle of their status. The attempt to unite their consciousness by calling them "*Heliopolitae*" fits in with the religious-identity pattern of other slave revolts. To achieve survival and freedom Aristonicus exploited a rhetoric and imagery that was religious as well as philosophical, concepts not that far apart at that time. He embodied the Hellenistic ideal monarch as well as the fairy-tale tradition of the hidden hero, here specifically the king's son of doubtful birth raised in obscurity. The impact of the story on subjugated

Baal as there are Phoenician colonies, it seems. He probably originally was a version of Zeus, as his name means "Lord," and had an association with the fertility of the earth, luxuriance and ecstatic union, as well as with the idea of mastery, since his name can mean either "master" or "owner." See: Alain Cadotte, "Neptune Africain" *Phoenix* Vol. 56, No. 3/4. (Autumn-Winter, 2002): 330; <http://phoenicia.org/pagan.html#anchor90487>.

²³⁷ Africa merely hypothesizes when he extrapolates that Aristonicus probably aimed at a redistribution of wealth, not a social democracy with universal suffrage (Africa:122).

peoples in antiquity could potentially have been very powerful, just as fables like that of Moses, or Robin Hood can unite popular consciousness against oppression.²³⁸

In the accounts of the Sicilian Slave Wars, Diodorus Siculus describes slaves as quite capable of developing a sense of a shared cause, and a group identity. In terms of the narrative itself, often their behavior falls into both utopian

²³⁸ Several supporting characters in the history of Aristonicus figure in terms of their relationship to slavery and egalitarian ideals. For instance, the character of Blossius, the tutor of the Gracchi, is a mystery in the puzzle. Perhaps he had contempt for slave insurrections, since he bypassed the uprising of Eunus in Sicily to go to Pergamum, and maybe he thought of Aristonicus as a legitimate ruler. Unfortunately, the amount of controversy about the nature of Tiberius Gracchus' land reform is even greater than on Aristonicus. For the Gracchi as well, there are issues of social inferiority as the motivating factor of the problem, as well as fierce arguments for and against the utopian motives of the leaders (See D. R. Dudley, "Blossius of Cumae," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 31 [1941]: 98). However, the scholarly consensus agrees that the Gracchan program of social expansion was purely Roman, not provincial, and that the Gracchans would have exploited Pergamum fully (see contra: Jerome Carcopino, *Autour des Grecques* [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1967], 17; 34). If, however, Blossius was sympathetic to the Gracchan plan of land reform, or even the instigator of the idea, as Cicero, Valerius Maximus and Plutarch suggests (Cic. *Lael.* 37, *de Amic.* 11.37; Val. Max. *Fact. Dict. Mem.* 4.7.1; Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 8.17), why would he seek shelter from those who were rebelling against a scheme he had supported? In any case, the actual motives of Gracchus and Blossius may not have been as significant as the perceptions of the rest of the world, in the eyes of which Gracchus seemed a sort of proto-marxist utopian. Another example, the death of Licinius Crassus at the hands of Aristonicus' band, also makes the insurrection seem more slave-oriented, considering Crassus' extreme contempt for his captors, which polarizes him as an "anti-slave" (Strabo *Geogr.* 14.1.38.). Additionally, it is interesting that the same M. Peperna who had reduced "King Antiochus" (Eunus) but had refused a triumph over "chattel," then hurried to stop Aristonicus (Florus *Epit. Tit. Liv.* 2.6.19). It may have been mere coincidence that a Roman general active at the time pursued two consecutive missions to reduce dissidents, but it is tempting to conjecture that having stopped one group of rebellious slaves, Peperna achieved a reputation of experience with that particular type of problem. Whether or not this was in fact the case, Peperna gained a literary identity as a stopper of slave rebellions, a sort of ancient Roman Sheriff of Nottingham.

frameworks, when the slaves appear in the context of a grotesquely comedic role reversal, or when the author loads the values ascribed to the rebels with dominant-utopian constructs. Religious inspiration and military idealism in particular appear to galvanize resistance to the slaves' common enemies. Yet historically speaking, it seems unlikely and anachronistic to think of the rebellions in terms of "class consciousness," or "slave ideology." Keith Bradley in his book *Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World* undermines the argument for a "slave ideology," as it is easy for him to dismiss utopian aspects of the rebellions for of lack of evidence of unified politics or philosophy.²³⁹ He makes the case that the slave rebellions, meaning the first and second Sicilian rebellions and the Spartacus rebellion, did not start as large, ideologically based movements, but as small, self-interested bands, which grew because of effective leadership and favorable conditions.²⁴⁰ Once they had grown very big, these slave rebellions were

²³⁹ K. R. Bradley, *Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World, 140 B.C.-70 B.C* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

²⁴⁰ Bradley's book has a rather unconventional beginning in that it starts with an overview of the maroon communities of the late 18th century: "because slavery has not limited itself historically to any place or time"(see Bradley [1989], xiii). He compares other modes of slave resistance, trying to show that the slave rebellions were simply "aberrant extensions" of normal resistance. The accounts of these are of course more vivid than those of the ancient rebellions, and additionally there exist some oral traditions from the slaves themselves. The main object of Bradley's comparison, though, is to make a distinction between earlier revolts which were "restorationist" or "traditional," whereas later ones of the era of the French Revolution era were "revolutionary" in aspect such as the revolt of St. Domingue, or the Tailors' Revolt in Brazil (Bradley [1989], 12-13). The fact that both types existed in times that are more recent supports his theory that the ancient revolts were more of a traditionalist nature. The tales of the maroons have many parallels with ancient revolts, including the religious aspects, such as, for example, the eponymous obeah woman of Nanny Town, or the assumption of a dynastic kingship residual from the previous culture as in the case of the Surinam

extremely unmanageable because of their disproportionate size and their lack of unifying philosophy. In fact, Bradley suggests that ideology was often imposed on the rebellions after their size had grown, to help deal with a messy situation.

Overall, Bradley dismisses class consciousness among slaves, emphasizing the divisiveness of the general slave population, as well as taking little stock in any sense of common troubles which might have bridged the gap between slaves and free.²⁴¹ He suggests that even within the slave population there was not

rebels. Additionally, he examines the impact of their new society on the culture of the slaves, for example, the self-styled “popes” of the 17th century Brazilian resistance leaders. Finally, like the ancient slave rebels, these maroon communities were constantly at war, and lived the parasitical existence of the foraging warrior behind enemy lines, and it was the task of the slave leader to rationalize and organize this existence. For instance, the story of Drimakos shows that an ancient “maroon” community depended on the free estates for a living. Although there are fundamental differences between modern and ancient slave systems, which limit the comparison, Bradley still feels that the modern analogy points up the contrast of “restoration vs. revolution.”

²⁴¹The question of the divide between slaves and free poor is also at issue here, since there were supposedly free participants in the rebellions. Could the consciousness of shared difficulties have superseded their sense of superiority to slaves? In the Old Comedy of the 4th century BCE there appears to be increasing evidence of common problems shared by slaves and free, in particular, poverty. In Aristophanes’ *Plutus*, Karion benefits just as much as Chremylus from the unblinding of the god of wealth. Likewise, in the plays of Plautus there is a great affinity between the slaves and the “parasite” characters, in their typical goals and love of trickery. On a dramatic and ideological level, at least, the traditional utopian idea of bounty pertains to the slaves as well as the poor. Then there is the issue of freedmen. Would former slaves be more or less likely to sympathize with a slave rebellion? Maybe those who had escaped on their own power would be less likely to associate with a group cause of slaves, and those who had been achieved legal manumission, perhaps, would be thoroughly co-opted into the system of slavery and liberation. Possibly, a poor freeman and an oppressed slave actually had more in common with each other than with a wealthy freedman. In reality, of course, the case may have been quite different. The free poor of the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE may have felt a sense of competition with slaves, and superiority over them, rather than any solidarity. One might compare this with the “To Kill a Mockingbird” phenomenon of the poor whites of the American South,

necessarily any sense of common problems or a shared identity.²⁴² Although he considers the Roman slave population to have been “the most disadvantaged of society” Bradley thinks there is “no sign of class-consciousness or class solidarity ever developing in the Roman slave body as a whole, in spite of the “common bond” of their status.²⁴³ Yet Bradley neglects the degree of religious syncretism in the Hellenistic and Roman world and overlooks the elements of the joint cause

whose extreme ideas of freedom and race drove a wedge between groups that had common economic problems. It is significant that Diodorus Siculus contrasts the more careful behavior of the rebellious slaves as opposed to the destructive looting of the poor free in the Second Sicilian War (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 35.48). This would indicate there was no sense of commonality between them. Yet there are also many instances cited of slaves and poor working together, as well as former slaves betraying the rebels’ cause. An interesting example of the latter is the case of Titinius Gadaeus, an ex-slave and brigand who at the beginning of the 2nd Sicilian Slave War moved between the slave and free populations, but felt no solidarity with the slaves, and in fact betrayed them (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.3).

²⁴² Bradley suggests the cause of this was an intense degree of specialization in slavery in the “villa” model of agriculture, which prevailed after the 2nd Century, much more than in the earlier pastoral peasant model. The contemporary Plautine evidence of the manifold and varied roles of slaves supports this point. This sort of specialization, according to Bradley, had the effect of keeping slaves ideologically separate, and invested in their particular roles (see Bradley [1989], 28).

²⁴³ Vidal-Nacquet makes a good case for the class designation of the slaves of Athens at least, showing that they shared enough of a common social stigma as well as lack of legal rights to be a “class” in their own right, albeit a class defined by “otherness” in comparison to the rest of the population. Vidal-Nacquet suggests, in fact, that the citizens of Athens needed to think of the slaves as a class to help themselves feel free in contrast (Vidal-Nacquet [1986], 163). It seems strange that if the free thought of the slaves as a class that the slaves did not think of themselves as a class at all. Vidal-Nacquet’s structuralist dualism is very much in agreement with Bradley’s perception of slavery and liberty as two extremes that excluded and defined each other, although the lucky few could bridge the gap. See Bradley (1989), 31; Vidal-Nacquet “Were Greek Slaves a Class?” in Pierre Vidal-Nacquet, *The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

of freedom and the religious unity of the slave rebellions.²⁴⁴

Although political class-consciousness may have been negligible in the First Sicilian Slave War, its religious aspects were manifold. It began at Enna, a city devoted to the cult of Demeter, and located, in fact, on the supposed place where Persephone had been dragged down to the underworld, a rocky terrain with excellent natural defenses that enabled the slaves to hold out for a rather long time and maintain control of the shrine of the goddess. This was particularly significant in light of the devotion of the slave leader Eunus to the Syrian Atargatis, an incarnation of the Mother-Goddess whose rites were particularly violent.²⁴⁵ Most

²⁴⁴ On the other hand, Bradley is quite correct in pointing out that no historian can completely escape his or her cultural context, as well as the danger of applying such interpretations to ancient history oneself (Bradley [1989], xxi). This critical attitude to the sources is very useful when considering the problems of the Classical era in terms of the modern vocabulary of class-consciousness and class ideology. Yavetz in his overview of theories of Classical slavery from antiquity to the present is especially acute in his account of the Stalinist historians who interpreted ancient slavery as class struggle (Yavetz, 134-8), and de Ste Croix creates a category-defying picture of the different manifestations of slavery, as well as the different types of “unfree labor.” The problem of projecting one’s modern outlook onto ancient psychology does not imply that it is useless to make any conclusions. Literary evidence suggests that whereas class struggle is a modern archetype, slavery is an ancient one. According to de Ste Croix, the parallel relationship at stake in both eras is one of property control, rather than political control (a free person being his/her own property). Thus, fully conscious of potential accusations of anachronism, he entitled his work *The Class Struggle in the Ancient World*. The difficulty is that whereas we have much more first hand evidence from those engaged in the losing side of modern struggle over property, there is much less evidence from the losers of antiquity: the slaves.

²⁴⁵ See Lucian, Harold W. Attridge, and Robert A. Oden, *The Syrian goddess = (De dea Syria); attributed to Lucian* (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1975), 50-51. Additionally, the 1st century BCE hymn to Isis is good evidence of the assimilation of all Great Mother Goddess cults, showing that Demeter and Atargatis could easily have been interpreted as the same deity (See Isidorus I, Vera Frederika Vanderlip, *The Four Greek Hymns of Isidorus and the Cult of Isis* (Toronto: A. M. Hakkert, 1972).

intriguing, however, is the description of Eunos by Diodorus as an ἄνθρωπος μαγός.²⁴⁶ In this time period, “*magi*” of were viewed with a mixture of suspicion, religious devotion, and fear. Some were thought to be charlatans and swindlers who used the title of *magus* to inspire awe in weak-minded individuals and fleece them. Diodorus sees this quality in Eunos in his description of his fire-breathing antics, as well as the statement that he *claimed* to have divine visions (Photius *Bibl.* p. 384.8; Const. Porph. *Exc.* 3, 24b). Diodorus does not describe him as a strong soldier or trickster like Drimakos, or even like Athenion from the Second Sicilian War. In the realm of inspiring religious awe, however, he seems to have been very charismatic, an effective *magus*, whether he was a swindler, or a true devotee.

On the other hand, there were also *magi* who were considered real “wise men” of the type we see in any Christian nativity scene, who gave guidance on moral issues, as well as, according to Plutarch, speaking of “a time on earth of peace, happiness and equality.” (Plut. *Isis and Osiris* 46-47).²⁴⁷ Although it is focused on

²⁴⁶ Ἦν δέ τις οἰκέτης Σύρος Ἀντιγένους Ἐνναίου τὸ γένος, ἐκ τῆς Ἀπαμείας, ἄνθρωπος μάγος καὶ τερατουργὸς τὸν τρόπον. Αὐτὸς προσεποιεῖτο θεῶν ἐπιτάγμασι καθ’ ὕπνον προλέγειν τὰ μέλλοντα, καὶ πολλοὺς διὰ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐφυΐαν ἐξηπάτα.

There was a Syrian house slave of Antigonos Ennaios from Apameia by birth, a *magos* and a wonder worker in his way. He pretended to predict the future, by the command of the gods, in dreams, and he deceived many by his cleverness in this respect (Photius *Theol. Scr. Eccl. et Lexicogr., Bibliotheca.* z Codex 244 Bekker page 384b line 16.; Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 34-34.2.5).

²⁴⁷ According to Iamblichus, Pythagoras also drew his precepts from the Chaldean Magi, as well as the Orphics, suggesting a common utopian thread between them (Iamblich. *VP* 28.151.11; also see 28.145.4-15; 28.151.2).

moral, rather than material conditions, this teaching is reminiscent of the Golden Age material familiar from Hesiod, Old Comedy and Plautus, in which the slaves' "Saturnalian" fantasy of the reversal of the harsh conditions of real life is realized. Eunus' actions when king are to a certain extent consistent with the social harmony Plutarch attributes to the teachings of the *magi*. Even before his rebellion, he would talk about the good policies he would make when he was king, and after he became king of the slaves, he applied some restraints to the bloodthirsty revenge of his followers (Photius *Bibl.*, p. 384, 8). Bradley calls it "valuable evidence of rational, and even sensible and enlightened character in slaves' actions" that they did not destroy the farms, equipment, and free agricultural population of Sicily.²⁴⁸ Diodorus definitely makes Eunus out to have some good points as a ruler; for instance, he makes a good choice of councillor, appointing a Greek, Achaeus, who is not afraid to speak out plainly to him about the danger of retaliation for the slave rebellion (Photius *Bibl.* p. 386, 16; cf. Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 34-35. 2.1; Const. Porph. *Exc.* 4, 42). When he orders executions of the citizens of Enna, he spares those who were good to him when he was a slave; for instance, after the "trial" of Damophilus and his murder by the slaves, they let his daughter go, since she previously had always been kind to the abused slaves (Const. Porph. *Exc.* 2. 39 ; cf. Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 34-35.1.7). Finally, the seemingly instant loyalty of the slave leader of southern Sicily, Cleon, who joins Eunus, "just as a general his king," when he could have fought him instead, speaks for a certain kingly popularity in Eunus, and indeed, for a sense of a common cause

²⁴⁸ Bradley (1989), 110.

(Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 34-35.2.17; 43).

An examination of the motives of Diodorus in passing on this very mixed portrait of Eunus and his rebels reveals his mixed agenda of dramatic irony, a Stoic approach to the question of status and morality, and an interest in utopian societal constructs. Diodorus is of course primarily a transmitter of the tales of others, rather than an original author, yet his choice of what to include reflects his own preferences, and in these accounts he shows that the historical events, however squalid and dismal, could sometimes serve as material for utopian literature. It is important to remember that he was the preserver of the tale of Iambulus' Island of the Sun, as well as the account of the Indians who avoid injuring or enslaving any agricultural workers in war, and who possess a caste society in which there is no superiority of one group to another (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 2.57-60). In that particular story, the concept of equality between castes leads naturally towards the idea of freedom for all, and Diodorus here shows the Indians banishing slavery completely from the picture.

Νομίμων δ' ὄντων παρὰ τοῖς Ἰνδοῖς ἐνίων ἐξηλλαγμένων
θαυμασιώτατον ἂν τις ἠγήσαιτο τὸ καταδειχθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων
παρ' αὐτοῖς φιλοσόφων· νενομοθέτηται γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς δούλων μὲν
μηδένα εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, ἐλευθέρους δ' ὑπάρχοντας τὴν ἰσότητα
τιμᾶν ἐν πᾶσι. τοὺς γὰρ μαθόντας μὴθ' ὑπερέχειν μὴθ' ὑποπίπτειν
ἄλλοις κράτιστον ἔξειν βίον πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς περιστάσεις· εὐηθες
γὰρ εἶναι νόμους μὲν ἐπ' ἴσης τιθέναι πᾶσι, τὰς δ' οὐσίας ἀνωμάλους
κατασκευάζειν.

Concerning the special customs that prevail among the Indians, one would think one established by their ancient philosophers to be the most remarkable; for it is laid down by law that no one among them at all shall be a slave, but that being free, they are to honor equality amongst all. For they think that those who have learned not to dominate over or to fall under the power of others will have a life that is the strongest with regard to all circumstances. For it is foolish to establish laws for all based on equality, but to make inequalities of existence (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 2.39.5).

Diodorus and his source, Posidonius, were both Stoics, and Stoic philosophy does not reflect a rejection of slavery, but rather an indifference to all questions of status. In Eunus' story, the atrocities committed by slave-owners or rebels draw equal criticism, but there is silence on the issue of slavery itself. It is possible to read this as a Stoic morality tale. The terrible pride and luxury of those like Damophilus gets them killed by slaves with terrible living conditions, and in turn, Eunus' corruption by the luxuries of his kingship finally makes his demise more ignominious, when he is dragged from a cave with his baker, cook, masseur and fool. No character in the story is exempt from the theme of hubris; for instance, in the description of Eunus' mime-show, the slave king reproaches the owners for their "arrogance and inordinate pride that was now leading them to destruction." The passage concerning the slaves "eating the sacred fish" is corrupt, but it may be an instance of ominous foreshadowing; a sin following Eunus' meteoric rise signals his equally swift end (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 34-35.9.1-6 cf. Const. Porph. *Exc.* 4, p. 387).²⁴⁹

According to Bradley, the Stoic belief in the spiritual brotherhood of humanity did not stand in the way of slavery as an institution. In fact, ideally, it would make it possible for slaves and free to coexist peacefully, since it argues that issues of status are of no true significance. As a Stoic, Diodorus can disapprove of the

²⁴⁹Certain fish were sacred to Artemis in Sicily at the Fons Arethusa, and were a common element in the worship of Syrian Atargatis. Thus if Eunus' followers ate them, it could be construed as a sin against his own patron deity. Certain fish were sacred to Artemis in Sicily at the Fons Arethusa, and were a common element in the worship of Syrian Atargatis (see S. H. Hooke, "Fish Symbolism" *Folklore*, Vol. 72, No. 3. [Sept., 1961]: 536).

actions of the rebel slaves and the slave-owners equally, since their status in theory has no bearing on the morality of their actions. Yet the case of Diodorus' Indians seems to run counter to this idea, since they maintain a caste-system, and thus a division of labor into political and apolitical classes. Yet economically, they are of the same status, and they avoid slavery as contrary to the principle of equality that guides them. The Indians, however, have an anomalous and utopian quality, and it seems likely that Diodorus includes as them as an interesting curiosity, a group that places its ideals and reality on the same level. He considers their actions to be "θαυμασιώτατον" (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 2.39.5), a word which can be variously interpreted as "to be admired" or "to be wondered at."

To an extent, Diodorus portrays the utopian aspects of the figure of Eunus in a parodic, even comic vein; for instance, Eunus' prophecy of his future good kingship reads through the vehicles of situation comedy and dramatic irony. Diodorus enjoys the fact that the Sicilian landowners who patronize Eunus as an amusing oddity at dinner will in fact be at the mercy of the future "king." He also laughs up his sleeve at the credulity of the slaves who are so awed by his magical antics, and at Eunus himself, so undignified and ridiculous a figure, calling himself "Antiochus." In this respect, an "historical" account shares aspects of reversal more familiar from comedy. Additionally, the utopian elements of the rebels' actions gain an ironic dimension from the primarily lurid and grotesque environment of the slave rebellion.

Behavior also exhibited by Diodorus' idealized Indians, such as the slaves' sparing the lives and property of farmers makes a pathetic contrast here, since the

slaves will never get to enjoy the benefit of their utopian policies. In comparison with a bountiful, magical landscape such as the Island of the Sun, which admits no slaves and has enough food for all, the culmination of the first Sicilian Slave War in the starvation and cannibalism of slaves by slaves creates an opposite extreme, which, while keeping the utopian ideal in mind, flips the scene firmly back to reality.

In the Second Sicilian Slave War, while the theme of religious leadership continues, its combination with military organization emerges as a dominant factor. The leaders in this rebellion, Salvius and Athenion were both expert astrologers. It is important to remember that in the Hellenistic period, divination enjoyed the reputation of a completely rational science, so although some Romans certainly viewed it with suspicion, it must have had great influence with many foreign born slaves.²⁵⁰ In fact, Cato the Elder's recommendation that the ideal *vilicus* should avoid astrologers suggests that this was probably a common phenomenon.²⁵¹

Salvius was also an "ecstatic flute player for womens' festivals" (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.4.4.8) and displayed a marked talent, not only for divination and for music, but also the breaking down of the slave population into groups to maximize their potential. His policy of "avoiding cities because they were centers

²⁵⁰ Bradley (1989), 115; cf. n.18; Pliny *Nat. Hist.* 30.14-17; Tacitus *Ann.* 2.32.

²⁵¹ Cato, *De Agri Cultura* 5.4: "Haruspicem, augurem, hariolum, Chaldaeum nequem consuluisse velit." The *vilicus* should have no desire to consult astrologers, a sentiment Columella repeats (*Res Rusticae* i. 8. 6).

of corruption,”²⁵² which recalls Pythagorean asceticism and Philo’s description of the Essenes, may have been an attempt to create a unified basis of ideology among the slaves, and not have them distracted by other influences in the cities.²⁵³ Salvius also took the external appurtenances of kingship to a new level by synthesizing the trappings of Hellenistic kingship with those of Roman authority. For instance, like Aristonicus and Eunus before him, he wore a diadem and called himself “Tryphon,” a common title of Seleucid kings. He also created *lictors* among his followers to carry *fasces* when he sat in judgement (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 7.4). Historically, this probably reflects the fact that as time went on, Roman authority and military discipline may have appeared as more effective models than the hollow and rotten Macedonian dynasties, leftovers of Alexander. Salvius showed talent for innovative symbolism in religious activity when he offered a Roman toga at the shrine of the Palici in thanks for victory in battle (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.7.1). This act seems particularly important in light of the function of this shrine, where slaves who were abused by their masters could come and take sanctuary. If the priest considered a complaint just, a master had no right to recover the slave without a promise to cease the abusive behavior. Otherwise, the slave would remain at the shrine, serving the god (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 11.89.6-8). Just before Salvius’ revolt, a large number of slaves had gathered at the shrine, all

²⁵² οὗτος βασιλεύσας τὰς μὲν πόλεις ἀργίας αἰτίας καὶ τρυφῆς νομίζων ἐξέκλινεν.

He, having become king, stayed away from cities, thinking them causes of laziness and luxury (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.4.4.10).

²⁵³ The idea of cities as sources of corruption is a familiar motif from Philo’s account of the Essenes, as well as Old Comedy.

protesting governor Licinius' withdrawal of the offer of freedom to slaves who had been citizens of Rome's allied states.²⁵⁴ We can interpret Salvius' offer of the Roman toga, the garment of freedom and citizenship, as a creative rite of mass manumission. The slaves had no ritual in place to legitimize the freedom they had taken for themselves, so Salvius invented one for them.

Salvius' organizational skills and forbearance, as in the tale of Drimakos, are again reminiscent of the virtues Xenophon attributes to a good ruler or overseer. Even more than Eunus, he was remarkable for his humane behavior towards the citizens whom he conquered, a quality that helped him acquire weapons as well as reputation (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.4.8). In keeping with the theme of specialization according to skill, he divided the population of the slaves into three parts and selected intelligent men to give him advice (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.4.4.12). By imprisoning his fellow general Athenion, he seems to have fallen prey for a time to a fear of competition that he eventually surmounted (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.8.2).

Athenion, the second leader of the slave war had been a "οἰκονόμος" (*vilicus*) and like Salvius, "τῆς ἀστρομαντικῆς πολλὴν ἔχων ἐμπειρίαν" (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.5.1).

²⁵⁴Certain slaves were promised manumission by the decree of 104 BCE. This had come in response to Bithynian Nicomedes' excuse that he could not supply troops to Rome since the bulk of his eligible citizens had been kidnapped and enslaved. When the hopeful slaves went to Licinius to apply for freedom, he revoked the decree, probably currying favor with Sicilian landowners who were fearful of losing their workforce. The slaves then gathered at the shrine of the Palici, and accepted Salvius' offer of freedom which they had previously refused (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.7.1).

He was accustomed to living a rough life in the open and commanding other slaves, as well as influencing people with his prophecies. As a “slave king,” Athenion instituted a policy contradictory to that of previous rebel leaders by rejecting certain of his followers as soldiers, and keeping them at the task of making food. This way, he ensured that his food supply would be as constant as possible, and kept unsuitable people out of military affairs, a clear instance of the Spartan and Platonic type of work specialization (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.5.1-3).

Although Athenion incited a revolt at the same time as Salvius, the uprisings were completely separate, but just as Cleon and Eunus had in the first slave war, the two soon banded together, confounding the hopes of the wealthy citizens of Sicily. Nevertheless, Diodorus says that Salvius detained Athenion for a time, suspecting him of planning a *coup*, probably because of Athenion’s astrological prediction that he would rule over all Sicily (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.7.3).²⁵⁵ Although Salvius gave in to a selfish fear of competition in this case, it appears that the slave rebels often felt a sense of the utility of working together. Bradley’s view that this shows there was no solidarity between the rebels is a misjudgment; simply because leaders are suspicious and jealous of their power does not mean that there is no commonality to the rhetoric of their cause.²⁵⁶ In any case, after a certain point Athenion was released, and began his military activities once again. Bradley suggests that since we hear no more of Salvius after a certain point, that

²⁵⁵ This was probably on account of Athenion’s astrological prediction that he would rule over all Sicily (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 7.3).

²⁵⁶ Bradley (1989), 77.

he had died, and Athenion took over.²⁵⁷ He may well be correct in this, since Diodorus says that when Athenion recommended an open engagement with Roman troops, and commanded a cavalry, he showed his battle tactics to be much less cautious than those of Salvius. The slaves suffered such a resounding defeat he himself only escaped by feigning death (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.8.4).

At this point, the Stoic storytelling of Diodorus creates a heroic climax for the slaves. As he says, when the surviving slaves had taken refuge they were so demoralized they considered returning to masters, but then decide to resist till the end (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.8.5). The slaves fought the final stage of war under the command of a certain Satyrus, since Athenion died in the last battle with Rutilius (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.10. 2-5). When the last group was captured, and they were brought to Rome, condemned to fight as gladiators in the arena, they preferred group suicide to that dishonor, and so killed each other, and finally, Satyros dispatched himself, in front of altars (Diod. Sic. *Bibl.* 36.11.5). Their ultimate fate, like Salvius' offering to the Palici, involves a symbolic cult transformation from slave to free status. By killing themselves in front of the altars of the gods, rather than the arena, in an extremely public fashion, they avoided the return to the slave status of the gladiator, attaining contact with the gods in the form of human self-sacrifices. Surmounting the fear of death was the final step in their transformation from rebel slaves to heroic figures of a tale.

The accounts of the two Sicilian Slave Wars emphasize the divine, even

²⁵⁷Athenion was placed under detention by Salvius, but is not imprisoned when the Romans sent a force under Lucullus in 103 BCE (see Bradley [1989], 78).

godlike aspects of the king in the Hellenistic world. Anyone who aspired to kingship aspired also to divine status. As a determining utopian factor, however, the ideal of Hellenistic kingship was replaceable. As the Roman power structure became more familiar to its new subjects, the rituals and symbols of Roman government, as well as its political and military methods began to have much more weight as models for rebel slaves' organization. This pattern, which begins to appear with Salvius and Athenion, becomes much clearer in the rebellion of Spartacus, in which the adoption of the role of Hellenistic monarch is replaced by that of a Roman military commander. Considering the religious awe with which the Romans viewed military affairs, and their sense of manifest destiny, it is conceivable that the ideological cult of the benevolent monarch, which unified the slaves under Aristonicus, Eunus and Salvius, could be replaced by a militaristic idealism under Spartacus.

As Plutarch describes Spartacus, he was:

... οὐ μόνον φρονημα μέγα καὶ ῥώμην ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνέσει καὶ
 πραότητι τῆς τύχης ἀμείνων καὶ τοῦ γένους ἑλληνικώτερος.
 ...not only did he possess great courage and strength, but he was also superior
 in understanding and kindness, and was more like a Greek than was typical for
 his race (Plut. *Cras.* 8.2).

This adulation of his character is followed by the tale of the snake which wrapped itself around Spartacus' head while he was asleep, interpreted by his wife, "a prophetess and initiated into the ecstatic cult of Dionysios, as a sign of power and luck (Plut. *Cras.* 8.3). The sign functions as a confirmation of his natural fitness as leader, and suggests his mystical stature, since the snake lying across the lap was an aspect of the Thracian god Sabazius, and "snake stories" in

mythology have a heroic cult significance. Sons of mothers impregnated by divine snakes are destined to battle snakes in their turn, attaining the folkloric status of heroes.²⁵⁸ The feminine dimension of the story is also important. His wife's status as a prophetess reflects his alliance with the sort of cult dimension familiar from the other tales of slave rebels, yet since he does not actually prophesy himself, he is freed from the intimations of chicanery which Diodorus points out in the tales of Eunus and Athenion. Religion and superstition are consigned to the women, and he is solely concerned with military leadership. Unlike the stories of previous slave rebels, his religious contribution is limited to this one prophetic dream; instead, Plutarch and Appian emphasize Spartacus' military and political actions, many of which are open to an idealistic interpretation by the standards of ancient Greek political utopia. For instance, his equal division of spoils among his followers is consistent with the egalitarian ideals of the Stoics and Cynics, as well as the practices of Iambulus' Island of the Sun (Appian, *Rom. Civ. Wars*, 1.14.116). Although it may well have been that the historical Spartacus had simply adopted these policies out of sheer practicality, as they attracted many more followers to his group and reduced squabbling over matters of status, nevertheless, the utopian interpretations of Spartacus' biographers have had a great literary resonance over time, influencing groups as recent as the early 20th century "Spartacists." There is no reason that his actions could not have given rise to utopian analogies by his contemporaries as well. For instance, the notion of

²⁵⁸ Strabo *Geog.* 10.3.15, Diod. *Sic. Bibl.* 4.4.1 Clement *Protrepticus*, 1, 2, 16: "God in the bosom' is a countersign of the mysteries of Sabazius to the adepts, "This is a snake, passed through the bosom of the initiates."

equal benefits for all (although of course “all” would have been a much smaller group) is reminiscent of the Spartan *Homoioi*. Also seemingly “lifted” from Lyncurgan Sparta were Spartacus’ avoidance of gold and silver coinage and the substitution of iron and brass as the metals of choice within the group.²⁵⁹ As in Sparta, this would have increased the isolation of the community from outside influences, and emphasized the military character of the group as opposed to booty and luxuries. Although it is impossible to say if Spartacus consciously adopted these policies in imitation of ancient Sparta, nevertheless, the similarities would have been clear enough to Appian and his predecessors who set down the events, especially since by this time the myth of Lyncurgan Sparta was fully crystalized, and Romans in particular much admired it. Such paradigms of militaristic ideal societies, including the Romans’ idealization of their own past military virtues, could easily have influenced the legend of Spartacus. Possibly, this reputation could have been helpful in his lifetime. The character of Spartacus himself is certainly an idealized example of military virtue; this “heroic” stature could have had practical application while he still lived and led the slave rebels. Unlike his predecessor Eunus, however, Spartacus does not appear susceptible to any delusions of grandeur, or any goal apart from liberty and return. Perhaps his own disinclination to permanent political leadership prevented his developing any long-term strategies, such as religion, or kingship, that could take on further utopian dimensions. Ironically, this led to the idealization of his legend as a slave

²⁵⁹ Spartacus at Thurii banned gold and silver completely from his community (Pliny Maior *Nat. Hist.* 33.14. 49; Appian, *Rom. Civ. Wars*, 1.16-17).

rebel. He belongs to the literary type of the classical hero, the good soldier trying to get home, rather than the Eastern god-king. Although Plutarch and Appian may detract the qualities of his followers, they do not accuse Spartacus himself of any vice or double-dealing, but for such pro-Roman authors, seem strangely sympathetic towards him. Although he was overwhelmed, betrayed, and finally martyred, he certainly made the literary transition, familiar from the tale of Drimakos, from slave to hero. The most conservative writer can appreciate this change, and imbue it with a sense of idealism.

The historical reality of utopian elements in slave uprisings may never be determined; we simply have sufficient evidence to know that these rebellions did occur. This should not be surprising in view of the consistent desire of human beings over the ages to free themselves from oppression and attain the right to self-government. Some of the rebel slaves' attempts at self-government were just as destructive and reactionary as the confinements of their slavery. Some of their actions inspired others with utopian thought and goals of long-term social improvement. We only know the slaves rebels through the biographers and historians who have their own agendas of the dominant perspective to fill. Considering the power of slavery as a metaphor within utopian visions, it makes sense that the stories of rebellion against slavery make use of utopian ideas. The interpreters of the slave rebellions were members of a culture that used Slavery and Liberty to define each other as mutually exclusive opposites, and their literary obsession with crossover between these extremes reveals their simultaneous fear and fascination at the prospect of such a radical change. In view of this attitude, it

may be possible to extrapolate one historical perspective of the slaves. Just as many slaves internalized the standards of their masters in military, cultural, and religious affairs, they also internalized their utopian conception of liberty. Since there is plenty of precedent for slaves co-opting the tools of their masters to free themselves, it is not so surprising that they would also adopt utopian imagery, the literary tool of politics.

Conclusion: The Roots of More's *Utopia*

This book has dealt with a question of genre, tracing the development of utopia before utopia got its name. I have argued that before its official naming, it had already become a familiar literary trope, not simply drawn from a conglomeration of various ancient models, but a synthesis of two specific sources, the dominant and servile, representing the division of society into free and unfree. The dominant perspective is recognizable by its practical and ideological interest in the control of the “real-world,” and in the establishment and maintenance of an ordered regime. On the other hand, the servile perspective is characterized by the use of subversive humor and free speech, the transformation and reevaluation of concepts of virtue, the escapist fantasy of a life of ease, and the taking of control through the destruction of the existing order. In both models, issues of class, property and power critically inform utopian concepts, and the relationship of slavery to utopia is archetypal, representing the basic societal strictures that one side wants to impose and the other to escape. The desires for license and free speech, for more than just sufficient physical satisfaction, rest, relaxation, and unruffled calm are clearly those of slaves. This does not mean that slaves are the only ones who have these desires, yet they are the coded in Classical literature as experiencing the most and the greatest lacks, wants, and needs. In a similar fashion, issues of race in the 20th century United States deal with blacks as archetypally disenfranchised, although they are certainly not the only people who suffered toil or exploitation during this period. Because of the slave's symbolic relation to desire, desire itself is defined as “servile.” Conversely, the virtues of

the dominant perspective consist of directly opposed qualities, conceived as “free,” such as eleutheric or liberal education, and the overcoming of physical desires. Writers of dominant utopias, often subliminally, and sometimes consciously, envisage the achievement of their goals as a victory over the values of the servile type. The self-imposition of a Pythagorean initiate’s five-year period of silence replaces the *parrhesia* of an outspoken slave-philosopher. Σχολή becomes School, a necessary didactic context, rather than the comedic vision of leisure as wallowing in orgies, bacchanalia, or complete indolence. Asceticism is the philosopher and soldier’s answer to feasts and images of everlasting, overwhelming fertility, and paradoxically, becomes their moral justification for slavery.

The two utopian sources blend their manifold counterpoints and oppositions into the fully developed, paradigmatic hybrid utopia. In this genre, although the dominant values typically prevail, concessions are made to the servile perspective in terms of φύσις, sweetening the imposition of authority by transforming the natural order. Although utopian cultural strictures may be repressive and rigid, if the normally harsh laws of nature alter and improve upon the physical characteristics of utopian people and places, a safety net appears against the worst effects of poverty, subjugation, and the concomitant political discontent. The utopian imagery of the slave’s liberation, from Kronian mythology and Old Comedy, to the idealization of *parrhesia* by Cynic philosophers and *servi callidi*, and to the promised afterlife of Isis and Christianity, is a compelling incentive to anyone who has experienced the hardships of toil, want, and repression. Under the

right circumstances, consciousness of this imagery can be useful to a master's well-ordered aims. The metaphor of the religious epiphany as manumission and the promise of the paradisiacal afterlife is a direct manipulation of the servile perspective, with the aim of inculcating obedience to dominant values. On the other hand, all power structures, utopian or otherwise, are subject to attack and satire at the hands of comedy, and in fact provide most of the material for the jokes. This tendency makes the figure of the comedic slave-philosopher very effective, as he can combine tropes from the servile and dominant perspectives, *parrhesia* with *enkrateia*. He can be insightful or even inspirational, but is a liminal figure, and often acts so strangely it is difficult to use him as a model for polite behavior. Likewise, the vantage point of the geographically remote and idealized society is a useful vehicle for an author's radical or even dangerous views of what is improvable, or simply ridiculous, in this world. Thus, Classical authors had a powerful motivation to combine motifs from the servile and dominant perspectives in interactive relationships.

The merger of cultural improvements with natural miracles eventually became a generic norm. Whereas the two primary sources, comedy and philosophy, had originally represented antithetical standpoints, and completely divergent literary functions, by the time of the ascension of Christianity and into late antiquity utopian literary constructions consistently drew upon both sources. The frequent combination of both types eventually grew into the recognizable tropes of a genre. The most iconographic and recognizable of these *topoi* include:

- 1) The location of the best possible society only in unknown and miraculous

reaches of the globe.

Herodotus and Iambulus are the first examples of hybrid constructs of the geographic travelogue, which permeate the Greek novel, and culminate in late antiquity with Antonius Diogenes' *Wonders Beyond Thule*. Servile perspective traditions that feed into this trope are extremely ancient, drawing on Homeric and Hesiodic myth. Old Comedy also reflects the beginnings of the association between goodness and distance, although "the best" in the far-off lands of Comedy often do not turn out to be so. The Cynic tradition also inverts the value placed on citizenship in a responsible *polis* of the known world, creating the image of the "citizen of the world" and idealizing the character of the foreigner and slave as an outside commentator on society. On the other hand, the dominant perspective tradition generally takes the opposite view of the distant barbarian, as the willingness of philosophers to include foreign, but not Greek slaves in utopias reveals. Plato's description of Atlantis shows his interest in distant locations, but only as a negative contrast with ancient Athens. Alexander the Great is exceptional as an integrating figure, since his expeditions sparked a great interest in distant locales, while reinforcing the dominant construct of the utopian ruler.

(2)*The earthly transfiguration of the slave state by the adoption of dominant values.*

As a hybrid construct, this theme emerges primarily in narratives with a dramatic storyline as opposed to theoretical expositions. Historically, the accounts of slave rebels such as Drimakos, Eunus, or Spartacus portray the transformation of slaves into free people not by the fact of their rebellion, but by their adoption of

dominant utopian values such as military organization or idealized leadership. On a literary level, these tales utilize comedic tropes of role reversal, and historically, reflect religious undercurrents such as the worship of the sun that derive from the servile perspective. Yet religion functions to construct the mass ideology, and serves as an instrument of control. Philosophically speaking, the governing moral concepts of the tales stem from dominant sources, including such thinkers as the Pythagoreans, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the Stoics, who take an “educational” view of slavery and freedom, and maintain this internal dichotomy as an essential structure of their thought. The case of the Spartans and the Messenians is very enlightening on this topic, since the Messenians’ history of struggle with Sparta was at some point rewritten, with a view to co-opting the militaristic values of their old masters for themselves, and erasing their identification as slave rebels.

In narratives that combine elements of romance with philosophy, the figure of the philosopher with an ugly appearance or servile status, but a soul that is archetypally “free” exemplifies the union of the comic and slavish with dominant virtue. Literary characters such as Plato’s Socrates or Apuleius’s Lucius embody this construct, as they are both “free,” but suffer a physical condition associated with slavery. In the case of Socrates, the servile element is purely external and serves only to emphasize the fundamentally free condition of the philosopher’s soul. With Lucius, however, the transition from superficial freedom, grounded in servile values, to slavery and suffering, then back to a deeper freedom reflects the moral journey and metamorphosis of his soul. Additionally, in philosophical

expositions such as Philo's account of the Essenes and Therapeutae, the contrast between the good banquet and the vicious banquet reflects the difference between slave and free values.

The image of the slave philosopher stems from the comedic roots of the servile perspective tradition, commencing with Aesop, whose predilection for clever speech and discomfiting his master reflects the servile tropes of *parrhesia* and role reversal. Diogenes of Sinope might appear as a hybrid figure in that he is a slave, yet he utilizes a dominant philosophical construct in considering slavery to be a moral condition. Nevertheless, he challenges the ideological basis of dominant moral values such as those of Platonic philosophy, undermining its constructs with the natural realities experienced by animals. Thus, his servile perspective is clear in the Cynic inversion of the typical Classical moral hierarchy, and an approach that gives animals supremacy replaces one that assumes human cultural concerns are of the utmost importance. Additionally, the reverse of the moral transformation of the slave into free exists in the world of the Latin Elegists, and the Plautine figure of the *servus callidus*. In the former case, the poetic protagonist adopts and idealizes servile values such as unproductive *otium*, rustic plenty, and promiscuity as escapes from civic and military responsibilities, and intentionally becomes a slave to a lover. The *servus callidus*, on the other hand, overcomes his master and the accepted social hierarchy by reorganizing the moral universe with trickery and *parrhesia* as the guiding forces. Both cases involve something quite different from the hybrid-utopian transformation, since in Elegy the free man becomes a slave, and the Plautine

trickster does not adopt dominant values.

(3) The religious epiphany, conceived as a servile-utopian reward in an otherworldly afterlife for obedience to the tenets of dominant virtue.

In a sense, this last motif is an outgrowth of the first two hybrid utopian tropes, which both associate freedom with virtue. The distinctiveness of this final motif rests in the fact that the ultimate utopian reward of freedom awaits in the afterlife rather than in this life. Thus, the portrayal of the afterlife itself is of great importance; it is conceived, as we have seen, in similar terms as other far-flung utopias that describe the gratification of physical desires, as well as an egalitarian distribution of honor, yet exclude the unworthy. The achievement of this *post-mortem* goal, on the other hand, entails the philosophical process of educational slavery and the repudiation of servile values, and the prospect of the reward can serve to reconcile slaves to their state in life. The promise made to Apuleius's Lucius by the goddess Isis clearly follows this pattern, as she delineates the sublimation of physical drives, a willing into a state of enlightenment and bliss after death. Likewise, early Christian descriptions of heaven represent its residents as physically beautiful, surrounded by lush bounty, and all possessing equal honors. Yet St. Paul's parallel of the servitude of the Christian to Jesus, with that of the slave to his master, clearly counsels not only resignation to slavery, but its joyful acceptance. Servile roots of the motif are as old as the worship of Kronos and the portrayals of the bounteous afterlife in Old Comedy, whereas its dominant aspects, apparent in the contingency of the reward upon adherence to a moral code, are first exemplified in Orphic myth, and Pythagorean and Platonic ideas of

transmigration of the soul.

The image of the afterlife as a hybrid utopia characterizes and supports the culture of Christianity, even when much Classical literature falls into oblivion or disfavor in the Middle Ages. In fact, Christian portrayals of a paradisiacal afterlife become the dominant utopian image, replacing the late antique interest in the travelogue until its resurgence in the time of Marco Polo. The idea of heaven also informs the Medieval sense of resignation to the existing power structure. It is from this tradition that Thomas More eventually launches his *Utopia*, at the point when Renaissance reverence towards the dominant ideology of the Classical past encounters a rekindling of interest, sparked by the actual contact with the old boundaries of the οἰκουμένη, in the utopian travelogues of the servile perspective.²⁶⁰ The narrator who describes the isle of Utopia itself, Raphael Hythlodæus, has a significant name in ancient Greek, as Ἰθλόος actually means “nonsense” or “babble.”²⁶¹ The geographic Neverland where Utopia lies, the

²⁶⁰ The resurgence of *practical* interest in works such as Iambulus’ “Islands of the Sun,” or Strabo’s *Geography* reflects the extent to which some travelers misunderstood their accuracy. Nevertheless, More is not under any such delusions. See Gian Battista Ramusio, “Navigatione di Iambolo mercantate antichissimo,” in *Delle Navigationi et Viaggi* (Venezia 1550), 188-90; also John Harris, *Navigantium atque itinerantium Bibliotheca* (London 1764), 383-85; E. Jacquet, “De la relation et de l’alphabet indien d’Iamboule,” *Nouveau Journal Asiatique* 19, 2d ser., tome 8 (1831), 20-30; E. Stechow, “Kannte das Altertum die Insel Madagascar?” *Petermann’s Geographische Mitteilungen* (1944), 84-85; Christian Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde* (Leipzig 1858), 253-71.

²⁶¹ The question of the significance of the second syllable of his name “-daeus” is a matter of minor controversy. My own view is that More simply used it as a final suffix familiar from Homeric names. The alternative: “δαίος—in the sense of “cunning,” or δαίω, or δαίζω, to divide, or apportion, and thus “analyze” or perhaps most likely, but with the wrong etymological root, δάω, to learn or teach. See Elizabeth McCutcheon, “Raphael Hythlodæus, and the Angel Raphael”

significance of Hythlodæus' name, and his denial of the value of the philosopher as advisor to the politician, all represent the comedic backdrop of More's work. Nevertheless, the ideological slant of his fictional state is ultimately repressive. For instance, one aspect of More's vision is the inclusion of slaves who have actually chosen to be slaves in Utopia as opposed to free in neighboring tribes (More, *Utopia*, 2.6.1). His assertion that they were better off as Utopian slaves than free in their own lands represents a clear instance of the "educational" slavery that was a popular *topos* of the dominant perspective in antiquity. Additionally, the virtues of the island's political system are those of asceticism, centralization and the intense control of labor and technology.

Together, these comedic and philosophical strands characterize and define the modern concept of the ideal society. The presence of slaves in More's ideal society should not then be surprising, as slavery and freedom are essential concerns of both utopian types. Although More's *Utopia* became canonical, his technique of combining the servile and dominant literary approaches was not without precedents. In fact, his ideal society reflects the paradigm, developed in Classical antiquity, of the "Hybrid" utopia.

Appendix A

1) A ruler or king who holds a divine dispensation over his followers or surroundings. His special idealized power often manifests itself when he liberates his people, or protects them from enslavement. Herodotus' Ethiopian King, Xenophon's Cyrus, Spartacus, leader of the great slave rebellion of the 70's CE, and the Cynics' "free man" are all such characters. Yet whereas the first two actually inhabit a utopian climate, the latter coexist with other idealistic motifs in a "real" world.

2) Practices associated with unconventional modes of living, such as communism of possessions, including women and children, with equality of the sexes, division of labor into specialized groups, and asceticism. These phenomena sometimes appear in isolation and sometimes together, most notably in Plato's *Republic*. When these appear in "real world" scenarios that are difficult to describe as idealized, they nevertheless retain utopian associations. For instance, in the accounts of the slave revolts of the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE, many such themes occur in a non-utopian literary context.

3) Extreme abundance of growth and fertility of the land, miraculous natural phenomena or creatures, or miraculous technological tools are all characteristic of a utopian landscape. An example of this is the marvelous fertility of the Islands of the Sun, with its magical birds, and the unusual physiology of the inhabitants. Others are the enchanted mechanical tools in the old comedy fragments, or the "Table of the Sun" of Herodotus' Ethiopians, which magically produces boiled meats.

4) A state of Saturnalian inversion, in which *licentia* is the goal and everything normal is a target and a challenge to the protagonists. This literary theme appears most dramatically in the Plautine corpus, where the inversion approach to comedy makes slaves into masters, although it certainly does appear in Greek literature as well, particularly in association with Dionysiac abandonment. This *topos* is similar in certain respects to the "*servitium amoris*" of Roman love elegy, which itself occurs in the context of an inverted Roman social value system.

5) A series of long, painful and difficult trials, ordeals or journeys, from which metaphorical "slavery" the hapless protagonist eventually learns virtue and liberates him or herself into a state of utopian bliss. This motif is exemplified by Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*. There is also a sense of this in Philo's descriptions of the trials that the Essenes underwent in order to become full-fledged members of that community. Additionally, in Diodorus Siculus' accounts of the slave rebellions, he implies that some of the rebels also "graduate" into this higher, liberated state after suffering horrible indignities as slaves. This is a good example of a folkloric, narrative device employed in so-called historical writing.

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