

70-24,451

BARAZANI, Ronald William, 1939-
ATTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDE AS A FUNCTION OF
PERCEIVED CHOICE, NORMATIVENESS, AND STRENGTH
OF CONVICTION IN BEHAVIOR.

The City University of New York, Ph.D., 1970
Psychology, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

ATTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDE AS A FUNCTION OF PERCEIVED
CHOICE, NORMATIVENESS, AND STRENGTH OF
CONVICTION IN BEHAVIOR

by


RONALD (WILLIAM) BARAZANI

A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Psychology
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York.


1970

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

5-19-70
date


Chairman of Examining Committee

5-19-70
date


Executive Officer

Harold Proshansky, Ph.D.

William Ittelson, Ph.D.

Gertrude Schmeidler, Ph.D.

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to express my deep appreciation to many friends who, over the years, in formulating, carrying out, and writing up this research have not only been a source of invaluable suggestion and criticism but who have also provided very necessary emotional support. Notable among these are Linda Klau, Mimi Leibman, and Maxine Wolfe.

Maxine Wolfe portrays the student debater in the tape recordings.

Mimi Leibman is the voice of the moderator.

Linda Klau is the voice of the example in the pilot testing of the conviction of the tape recordings.

I also want to thank Dr. Harold Proshansky for many valuable suggestions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.	iii
LIST OF TABLES.	vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
Chapter	
I. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM.	1
Hypothesis 1	
Hypothesis 2	
Hypothesis 3	
Hypothesis 4	
Hypothesis 5	
Hypothesis 6	
Hypothesis 7	
Hypothesis 8	
II. METHOD.	24
Overview	
Subjects	
Experimental Design	
Procedure	
High Choice vs Low Choice	
Normativeness of Behavior	
Extremity of Arguments	
High Conviction vs Low Conviction	
Anti-Low Choice Condition	
Measurement Procedure	
III. RESULTS	43
Efficacy of Experimental Manipulations	
Perception of Choice	
Normativeness of the Issue	
Degree of Conviction Expressed in S.P.'s Behavior	

Chapter	Page
Test of Hypotheses	
Effect of Perceived Choice on Extremity of Attitude Attribution	
Effect of Normativeness on Extremity of Attitude Attribution	
Effect of Choice x Norm Interaction on Extremity of Attitude Attribution	
Effect of Degree of Conviction on Extremity of Attitude Attribution	
Effect of Choice x Conviction Interaction on Extremity of Attitude Attribution	
Effect of Experimental Variables on Certainty of Attitude Attribution	
Effect of Disobeying Instructions on Attitude Attribution and Certainty	
IV. DISCUSSION	76
Choice	
Normativeness	
Choice x Norm Interaction	
Conviction	
Choice x Conviction Interaction	
Certainty	
V. CONCLUSION	103
APPENDIX A	106
APPENDIX B	195
APPENDIX C	223
APPENDIX D	241
APPENDIX E	256
APPENDIX F	264
APPENDIX G	272
APPENDIX H	285
BIBLIOGRAPHY	290

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Definition of Symbols for Experimental Groups.	28
2. Responses to Question on How the Teams were Formed, as a Function of Experimental Condition (Question #6, Questionnaire II).	44
3. Number of "a" and "b" Responses to Question on How Teams were Formed as a Function of the Three Main Experimental Variables (Question #6, Questionnaire II).	45
4. Mean Responses to Choice Perception Question (Question #1, Questionnaire II).	46
5. Analysis of Variance for Responses to Choice Perception Questions (Question #1, Questionnaire II).	47
6. Number of "a" and "b" Responses to Question on How the Teams were Formed (Question #6, Questionnaire II).	50
7. t Test Comparisons for Responses to Choice Perception Question (Question #1, Questionnaire II)	51
8. Responses to Questions Pertaining to Perceived Normativeness of the Issue of Liberal Abortion Laws as a Function of the Position for which S Assumes a Hypothetical S.P. Argues	52
9. Mean Scale Score Responses to Norm Perception Question in Main Investigation (Question #2, Questionnaire II).	55
10. Analysis of Variance for Responses to Norm Perception Question in Main Investigation (Question #2, Questionnaire II).	56
11. t Test Comparisons for Responses to Norm Perception Question in Main Investigation (Question #2, Questionnaire II).	56

Table	Page
12. t Test Comparisons for the Perception of the Success with which S.P. Acted with High Conviction (Question #3, Appendix C).	57
13. t Test Comparisons for the Perception of the Success with which S.P. Acted with Low Conviction (Question #3, Appendix C).	58
14. t Test Comparisons Within Conditions for the Perception of the Success with which S.P. Acted with High and Low Conviction	60
15. Mean Attitude Attribution Scores	63
16. Analysis of Variance for Attitude Attribution Scores .	64
17. t Test Comparisons for Attitude Attribution Scores as a Function of Choice x Norm Interaction	65
18. t Test Comparisons for Attitude Attribution Scores as a Function of Choice x Conviction Interaction. . . .	70
19. Mean Certainty Scores.	71
20. Analysis of Variance for Certainty Scores.	72
21. Correlation Between Attitude Attribution Scores and Certainty Scores	73
22. t Test Comparisons for Attitude Attribution and Certainty Responses for ANH-HNH and ANH-LNH Groups .	74
23. Responses to Questions Pertaining to Perceived Normativeness of the Issue of "Liberal Abortion Laws" as a Function of the Position for which S.P. Argues where the Subjects and S.P. are Male.	114
24. Responses to Questions Pertaining to Perceived Normativeness of the Issue of "Liberal Abortion Laws" as a Function of the Position for which S.P. Argues where the Subjects and S.P. are Female. . . .	116
25. t Test Comparisons of Responses to Question Pertaining to Perception of Norms Regarding Liberal Abortion Laws, in Pilot Study.	118
26. Responses to Questions Pertaining to Perceived Choice of S.P.'s Behavior as a Function of Instructions Received.	201

Table	Page
27. Number of "b" and "c" Responses to Question on the Sex of the Club Members in Main Investigation. . . .	202
28. Responses to Question on the Status of the Club Members, in Main Investigation	203
29. Number of "b" and "c" Responses to Question on the Sex of the Audience, in Main Investigation	204
30. Number of "a" and "b + c" Responses to Question on the Status of the Audience, in Main Investigation. .	205
31. Number of "a" and "b" Responses to Question on Status of the Moderator, in Main Investigation.	206
32. t Test Comparisons of Responses to Adjectives as a Function of Position of Argument with Respect to Liberal Abortion Laws, Within High Conviction Condition.	233
33. t Test Comparisons of Responses to Adjectives as a Function of Position of Argument with Respect to Liberal Abortion Laws, Within Low Conviction Condition.	235
34. t Test Comparisons of Responses to Adjectives as a Function of Degree of Expressed Conviction, when S.P. Argues in Favor of Liberal Abortion Laws. . . .	237
35. t Test Comparisons of Responses to Adjectives as a Function of Degree of Expressed Conviction, when S.P. Argues Against Liberal Abortion Laws.	239
36. Mean Responses to Question of How Much Does S Like S.P.	270
37. Analysis of Variance for Responses to Question of How Much Does S Like S.P.	271

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Predicted Choice x Norm Interaction.	18
2. Choice x Norm Interaction.	67
3. Choice x Conviction Interaction.	69

CHAPTER I

FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

Interaction, communication, interpersonal perception always involve at least two parties; one sending cues and one receiving cues, at different points or simultaneously in the relationship. Our investigation focuses on the receiver. More specifically our research examines the influence of different sources of information on aspects of impression formation, in the framework proposed by Jones and Davis (1965) in their paper, "From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception." This framework will be described below.

The impression one person has of another is generally conceptualized as a cognitive structure consisting of a pattern of beliefs about the other person's attitudes, values, behavior tendencies, and feelings. A large number of studies indicate that first impressions of others are influenced by:

- (a) the physical appearance and overt behavior of the Stimulus Person (S.P.) (Secord and Muthard, 1955; Secord, Dukes, and Bevan, 1954; Shaw and Sulzer, 1964; Pepitone and Sherberg, 1957);
- (b) the personality, values, attitudes, set of the perceiver (P) (Gollin, 1954; Leventhal and Singer, 1964; Bruner and Perlmutter, 1957);
- (c) the context in which the S.P. behaves (Levy, 1960, 1961; Bruner, Shapiro, and Tagiuri, 1958; Steiner and Dodge, 1956; Jones

and DeCharms, 1957; Pepitone, 1950; Cohen, 1961; Suchman, 1956; Jones, Jones, and Gergen, 1963; Strickland, 1958; Exline, 1957).

We assume that an impression is formed using whatever information is available to the P about the S.P., through a process of inference. The present study is concerned with three sources of such information: the context in which the S.P.'s behavior is seen to occur, the content of this behavior, and the manner in which it is carried out by the S.P.

Consider a situation in which a student is told to present a speech supporting the Vietnam War. He does so. That aspect of the context in which we are interested is the degree of choice open to the S.P. in his behavior, as seen by the P. In this example we would assume that the S.P. is seen to have less choice in his behavior than if he raised his hand and volunteered to give a speech supporting (or opposing) the Vietnam War. It is this perceived choice which we hypothesize has implications for inferences that the P makes about the S.P.'s underlying attitude with respect to the given issue (attitude in this study refers to the S.P.'s beliefs and feelings regarding the issue, as reflected in responses to a 10-item Likert type scale). More specifically, we assume that behavior in a nonchoice context can be explained simply by reference to the constraints of the situation. But in a choice setting, where such constraints are lacking, we assume that the behavior will be more likely to be seen as reflecting the S.P.'s underlying attitude. We will describe the history of this notion later.

A second source of information is the content of the S.P.'s behavior. What does he say? In this regard we are concerned with

whether or not the S.P.'s behavior conforms to the norms of his membership group. In the example cited let us assume that it is normative at the given institution to oppose the war, and that the P feels the S.P. is aware of this norm. For reasons to be discussed we expect that behavior which opposes a norm (supporting the war in this example) will be more likely to be seen as reflecting the actor's underlying attitude than will behavior which conforms to the norm.

Finally, we are concerned with the way in which the S.P. carries out the given behavior. For example, the same speech may be presented with vim and vigor or very sluggishly. In this regard we predict that a speech presented with a high degree of vocal conviction will be more likely to be heard as reflecting the S.P.'s underlying attitude than will the same speech presented apathetically.

There has been considerable research on impression formation in which the experimental conditions in a given study, though not deliberately designed for this purpose, may be seen as reflecting variations in the degree of choice the S.P. is seen to have had in his behavior (Strickland, 1958; Strickland, Jones, and Smith, 1960; Jones, Jones, and Gergen, 1963; Pepitone, 1958; Jones and DeCharms, 1957, 1958; Steiner and Field, 1960). For example, Jones, Jones, and Gergen (1963) set up conditions in which the S.P. was in either a high or low dependent relation to another individual with whom he agreed. We might view the high dependent relation as one which would be seen by an observer to allow the S.P. less choice in his behavior than would the low dependent relation. In the latter case the S.P.

can feel freer to act without concern for consequences whereas in the former relation the S.P.'s behavior is more likely to be seen as restricted by the fact that he is dependent upon someone for some form of reward or sanction.

Consider, also, the study by Jones, Hester, Farina, and Davis (1959). Here the S.P. derogated the P and the latter was told that the S.P. was either maladjusted or well-adjusted. In this case we might regard the "maladjusted" S.P. as being seen to have less choice in his behavior than the "well-adjusted" S.P. The behavior of the former is more constrained by factors 'beyond his control' than is the behavior of the latter.

What are the implications of different degrees of perceived choice for attitude attribution? Degree of perceived choice was not specifically varied nor measured in the above studies, but if we assume that the experimental manipulations did result in variations in degree of perceived choice in the S.P.'s behavior, then several suggestive conclusions follow. Thus, when the S.P. is seen to have considerable choice in his behavior, and he behaves in a negative fashion, the P's impression of him is more negative, the P is more confident in his impression, and the S.P. is less acceptable than when he is seen to have had little or no choice in his behavior. When the S.P.'s behavior is positive there is greater trust and liking of the S.P. under conditions of high choice than under conditions of low choice. There is greater attention paid to background information and situational factors under conditions of low choice while most of the attention under high choice is given more directly to the S.P.'s behavior or remarks. And we might infer, from the

reactions just outlined, that this behavior is more likely to be attributed to some characteristic of the S.P. in a high choice setting than would be the case in a low choice setting. In the latter the context is held at least partly responsible for the S.P.'s behavior, whether this behavior is positive or negative.

Our notion that perceived choice will influence attitude attribution stems from Jones and Davis' (1965) paper, "From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception." Their theory of correspondent inferences may be seen as an outgrowth of aspects of the earliest work and theorizing on person perception. Asch, in 1946, noted that "we perceive behavior. When acts and actor enter into a cognitive unit formation the person takes on the qualities of his acts." This in effect, is Jones and Davis' concept of "correspondence." The question raised in Asch's statement would be when, under what conditions, do the act and actor enter into a "cognitive unit formation." Jones and Davis elaborate upon this in their theoretical structure, and our research considers three variables, choice, behavior, manner, variations in which might result in variations in the formation of a cognitive unit between act and actor.

Asch considers both content of the impression and process by which the impression is formed. He deals with variations in information given to an observer, discussing centrality and peripherality of different traits, their gestalt organization, the order in which they appear to an observer, the effects of the context on a given trait. But the above is considered only in terms of traits as written words, not in terms of real behavior. Thus, for example,

context refers to the trait words surrounding a given trait word.

Though Jones and Davis' notion of context is similar in that it is conceived of as having an impact on the perception of a given characteristic, on the meaning of a given behavior, their idea of context is more global, real life, and less immediately given; they refer to the setting in which a behavior takes place, to an observer's knowledge of background information. For example, is the S.P. mal-adjusted or well-adjusted? Did he have choice in what he did? Is his behavior generally deemed culturally desirable or undesirable? And then they proceed to consider the effects of these different contexts on the inferences the P will make to the S.P.'s underlying characteristics.

Further, Asch sees the impression forming process as one of a more immediate perceptual phenomenon, along Gestalt lines, than do Jones and Davis. The latter consider the process as more of a step-wise phenomenon - going from observation of behavior, to considerations of the effects of these behaviors relative to the effects of other possible behaviors, and then to attribution of characteristics to the S.P.

Heider also takes a gestalt approach to social perception (1958), considering the interrelationships of parts which go into making a resultant, coherent percept. Thus change in behavior and the origin of the behavior are seen as a perceptual unit, with the origin being considered the cause of the change. More specifically, our retina is stimulated. The proximal stimulus responsible for this is mediated through the behavior of the S.P. The mediation, in its context, provides the meaning we attribute to the distal stimulus (the S.P.).

A given mediation, or behavior, may reflect many underlying characteristics. For example, A hits B. A may be trying to bring B out of an hysterical fit, A may be in shock, A may be a soldier, A may be an actor, A may be an aggressive person, and so on. The interpretation the P will give to this behavior will be a function of a variety of contextual factors and the P's prior knowledge about the S.P. Experiencing the mediation cues and the embeddedness of the mediation, the P forms a percept which reflects the "distal stimulus." Jones and Davis would say that, on the basis of the above cues the P makes inferences to the "distal stimulus." The outcome is the same. P seeks underlying causes, origins of behavior. Heider feels we attribute causes which will provide a balanced picture of the world. The cause may be seen as laying in the actor or in the environment. He does not specify the process through which such attribution takes place. Jones and Davis explain the attribution by means of a step-wise inferential process.

Asch also says we tend toward organization as a whole. Heider feels we are motivated to produce consistency, stability in our perceptual world. "Such stability is provided by the attribution of perceptual data, in person perception, to the motives, sentiments, or beliefs of other persons." This is Heider's concept of phenomenal causality. We perceive the origin of a behavior as its cause, though the origin perceived will be a function of all the information available to the P. Jones and Davis also talk about attributing an intention to an act, and seeing this intention as its cause. From this intention (which can be seen as part of Heider's mediation) we attribute personality characteristics to the actor; these suffice

to explain the behavior. Thus Jones and Davis' concept of correspondence can also be seen as stemming from Heider's notion that "Acts are often assimilated to the origin so that the person comes to take on the qualities of his acts."

Jones and Davis' notion regarding context, causal attribution, inference, and the cognitive aspects of interpersonal behavior are seen, then, as an outgrowth of Heider's ideas. There is much similarity in their basic notions. But Jones and Davis attempt to set forth a system of "interrelated propositional statements" which more clearly lend themselves to empirical investigation, and which might serve to tie together the research which has grown out of Heider's conceptual structure. Jones and Davis more clearly specify the process through which the attribution to causes takes place. Our study focuses on their formulation of the perceptual process in terms of inference theory. This, basically, is the framework in which we will view our results.

Jones and Davis propose that the P's task is to explain the S.P.'s behavior, and that this is accomplished when an intention is attributed to the behavior. The impression forming process entails inferences from these intentions to dispositional traits. Intentions in turn are assumed to be inferred from the effect an act is seen to have relative to the effects other action alternatives which were available to the S.P. might have; availability being defined in terms of the degree to which the S.P. knows what other actions he might perform, knows their respective consequences, and is capable of carrying them out or of refusing to carry them out. The greater the degree of choice the S.P. is seen to have had in his behavior the

more the behavior is seen to reflect the S.P.'s intentions, and thereby personality dispositions are inferred.

Jones and Davis use the term "correspondence" to refer to the extent to which an act and the underlying attribute are similarly described by the inference. Thus, if the S.P. acts aggressively in a situation of high choice, the P will infer that he intended this behavior and its consequences. On this basis the P will attribute an aggressive disposition (or attitude) to him; that is, he is an aggressive person. Under these circumstances we would expect the P to see the S.P. as more extremely aggressive on some scale, and to be more certain in his judgment than would be the case in a low choice setting. Operationally, then, correspondence of inference is defined as the P's certainty that the S.P. is extreme on a trait which provides sufficient reason for the S.P.'s behavior.

Correspondence of inference, and therefore certainty and extremity of trait attribution, declines as the action to be accounted for appears to be constrained by the setting in which it occurs, i.e., as degree of perceived choice declines. Put in other terms (Thibaut and Riecken, 1955), the degree to which an act is seen to correspond to an underlying disposition is a function of the relative weight assigned, by the P, to internal and external causal factors. When an act appears to be constrained by the external setting the behavior may or may not reflect an underlying disposition of the S.P. The behavior can be "explained" simply by reference to the setting. However, when the S.P. is seen to be free to choose from a variety of behavioral alternatives his final behavior must be explained by reference to the S.P.'s personality dispositions, traits, or attitudes. In this

situation the inference is more correspondent than in a situation of low choice. We would therefore expect attribution of a more extreme attitude to the S.P. in a context of high choice than in a context of low choice.

There has been only one major piece of research which has directly set out to examine the role of choice on attribution of attitudes. This was carried out by Jones and Harris (1967). Briefly, they did three experiments in which the P's basic task was to estimate the "true" attitude of the S.P. after having read or listened to a speech by him expressing opinions on either "Castro's Cuba" or "Negro-White Segregation." One major variable manipulated was the degree of choice the S.P. was seen to have had in the position he took. Thus in one experiment the speech was in response to an exam question where the S.P. either did or did not have a choice in the position for which he argued. In another experiment the speech was part of a debate in which the S.P. either chose which side he would argue for or was assigned the side by the experimenter.

Another factor which was assumed to vary was the degree of prior probability of the given behavior for the S.P. It was assumed that expression of Anti-Castro sentiment had a high probability of occurrence for the S.P. because the S.P. was an American. It was also assumed that expression of pro-segregation sentiment had a high prior probability of occurrence for Southern students and a low prior probability of occurrence for students from the North.

The primary hypothesis tested by Jones and Harris was that the degree of choice perceived in the S.P.'s behavior would influence the extent to which the P would attribute a corresponding attitude to him,

but that this relationship would hold only when the S.P.'s behavior had a low prior probability of occurrence. Where the S.P.'s behavior is expected, however, the degree of choice would not influence the attribution process. This hypothesis received only partial confirmation. Thus, in some cases they found that degree of perceived choice influenced attitude attribution even when the behavior had a high prior probability of occurrence. In light of the paucity of research directly designed to test the basic tenets of Jones and Davis' theory, and considering the inconclusive findings of Jones and Harris' study, it seems useful to replicate aspects of this research.

We will first consider the factors of choice and prior probability separately. Our first hypothesis, following Jones and Davis' theory as discussed above, considers the factor of choice.

HYPOTHESIS 1: There will be more extreme attitude attribution to a Stimulus Person who argues in favor of or against a given issue when the Stimulus Person is seen to have had a high degree of choice in his behavior than there will be to a Stimulus Person who argues identically but is seen to have had a low degree of choice in his behavior.

In addition to the context of choice within which a behavior occurs we are concerned with the influence of the content of the behavior on attribution of attitude. Jones and Harris (1967) found that the nature of the behavior itself (that is, whether the opinion expressed by the S.P. was in favor of or against the issue) had an influence on the attribution process regardless of the choice context. Thus, within all conditions of their research there were differences in attitude attribution as a function of the S.P.'s behavior such that the attitude attributed to the S.P. was always in the direction ex-

pressed by the S.P.'s behavior.

Jones and Davis feel that a major distinction to be made in behavior is whether or not it is culturally desirable. They assume that correspondence increases as an inverse function of the cultural desirability of the act. A "culturally desirable" act is assumed to provide the P with very little new information about the actor's unique underlying dispositions. The basis for this assumption is that though a culturally desirable act might be explained as reflecting some personality disposition on the part of the actor, it can also be explained in terms of a constraining environment. Thus the act might simply be seen as reflecting conformity to norms, a desire to achieve the rewards that go along with conformity, or to avoid the cost of negative social sanctions that would accompany nonconformity. In this case the P need not concern himself with attributing intentions which reflect underlying traits in order to explain the S.P.'s behavior. But where the S.P.'s behavior is culturally undesirable the P cannot as readily use the external situation to explain the S.P.'s behavior. An explanation appealing to conformity and reward is simply not applicable. We infer that the P would be more likely to attempt to explain this behavior in terms of the S.P.'s personality traits and/or attitudes, and would therefore attribute a more extreme attitude to the S.P.

Jones and Harris refer to the "prior probability" of behavior rather than to its "cultural desirability." They feel that an act which is perceived to have a high prior probability of occurrence has lower informational value for an observer than does an act which has a low prior probability of occurrence. An act which has a high prior probability of occurrence adds little new information about the S.P.

The expectation for the behavior is presumably based on some prior knowledge about the S.P. or his reference groups and their norms. The behavior then would simply serve to affirm the P's previous knowledge or inferences but would not tell the P anything new about the S.P.

We can see that a culturally undesirable act would add little new information about the actor if this act had a high perceived prior probability of occurrence. For example, a robbery will have low informational value with respect to the actor if we know beforehand that he is a "thief." Similarly, seeing a teenager engage in some bizarre behavior on Times Square will add little new information about him if the observer knows he is being initiated into a fraternity. For the observer the behavior in these instances, on the part of the given S.P., had a high prior probability of occurrence.

Jones and Harris had assumed that there would be a high prior probability that a Southerner would express a strong pro-segregation opinion and that a Northerner would express a strong anti-segregation opinion. In this case we would expect greater attribution of attitude with respect to segregation by an observer who hears a Southerner express an anti-segregation opinion than if he hears a Southerner express a pro-segregation opinion; and the obverse if he hears a Northerner express these views. This hypothesis was not completely confirmed. It may be that the assumption of the stereotype of Southerners being seen as more pro-segregation than Northerners was not true for the subject population. There was no difference in the attitudes of Southern and Northern P's toward segregation. Furthermore, the P's perception of the norm for Northerners and

Southerners was never measured.

The subjects were students at a college in a border state, North Carolina, where both Northerners and Southerners undoubtedly meet, interact, and mutually influence each other's attitudes with respect to segregation. In the end the Southern students would tend to be less bigoted than expected and the Northern students somewhat more than expected. Thus the perceived probabilities of behavior which were assumed to exist by Jones and Harris would not have existed. Furthermore, the tremendous awareness of and concern about race relations today plus the "new" knowledge that very often racism is as prominent in the north as it is in the south might diminish differences in the perception of prior probabilities of behavior of Southerners and Northerners.

The term "normativeness" encompasses the concept of "cultural desirability" in that a normative (N) behavior is one which is deemed desirable by the group holding the norm. Members of the group therefore behave appropriately, but will begin to exert pressure upon any member who deviates from the norm. Thus, given knowledge of the S.P.'s reference groups, their salience for him at a given time, and what normative behaviors are relevant to the group, an observer will have expectations about what behavior is most likely to be exhibited by the S.P. This behavior is normative; and any deviation from this will be seen as resulting in pressure on the S.P. to conform.

It follows then that a nonnormative (NN) behavior (in referring to normative-nonnormative behavior we assume that the P perceives the norm as being known by and relevant to the S.P., perceives that the S.P. feels that his membership group is aware of his behavior, and

that his membership group is important to him) should be more informative with respect to the actor's personality, his underlying dispositions and attitudes, than a normative behavior. As we indicated earlier, a normative behavior might be explained by reference to sheer conformity and reveal very little about the underlying traits of the actor.

Any act has many effects for the actor, i.e., the S.P. Some of these effects are positive and some are negative. Jones and Davis assume first, that the perceiver will regard achievement of the normally desirable effect as the actor's most likely intention. For example, when a man buys a car he incurs a large debt. The average perceiver in this case would assume that the S.P. "desired the car so much that he was willing to go into debt for it," not that "he was willing to accept the burden of an automobile for the privilege of being a debtor." Thus the assumption made is that the actor acted in spite of, rather than because of, any negative effects in the choice area.

Jones and Davis go further and assert that "any effects in the choice area which are not assumed to be negative will take on greater importance the more negative the remaining effects. Inferences concerning the intention to achieve desirable effects will increase in correspondence to the extent that costs are incurred, pain is endured, or in general, negative outcomes are involved." To extend the above example, one would be more certain that an individual strongly desired a car if this individual went into very high debt, gave up other luxuries or necessities, and incurred the wrath of his wife than if he accepted the car as a gift or was able to pay cash for it easily

without any consequences.

Thus, given the assumption that one acts to incur positive effects, where one's behavior has many negative effects the positive effects take on greater meaning in the sense that the inferences made from these by the P about the S.P. in order to explain the behavior are more certain and more extreme. A nonnormative behavior, by definition, will be seen by the actor to incur sanctions from his membership group. The P must then account for the S.P.'s willingness to risk negative sanctions. In this situation the positive effect of expressing one's beliefs will take on greater importance than when the behavior is normative. Thus the P's explanation for the S.P.'s behavior is more likely to be that the S.P. really believed in his act, really believed what he said, when the behavior is nonnormative than when it is normative.

HYPOTHESIS 2: There will be more extreme attitude attribution to a Stimulus Person who is seen to be acting in a nonnormative way than there will be to a Stimulus Person who is seen to be acting in a normative way.

Results of the research cited earlier, as well as Hypothesis 1, lead us to conclude that a nonnormative behavior perceived to be performed in a context of high choice (HC-NN) will result in greater attribution of attitude than will a nonnormative behavior perceived to be performed in a context of low choice (LC-NN). We would expect a similar but smaller difference when the behavior is normative. Jones and Harris had hypothesized that choice would have no influence on attitude attribution when the behavior has a high probability of occurrence (as would our "normative" behavior). Their research con-

firmed this in some instances.

But the evidence cited earlier in which both positive and negative behavior had a stronger influence on the P's impression of the S.P. when the behavior was seen to be performed in a context of high choice than when it was seen to be performed in a context of low choice lends credence to the expectation that HC-N would result in greater attribution of attitude than would LC-N. The difference here, however, should be less than the difference that would occur when the behavior is nonnormative. Normative behavior is assumed to have less informational value for the P about the S.P. Whether the S.P. chooses or is assigned a normative position we cannot, theoretically, be certain about his feelings with respect to the issue. Here the P's judgment will be based mainly on the choice factor. But when the behavior is nonnormative the P has, in addition to the information provided by the choice context, the data that the behavior chosen was nonnormative. This certainly has greater informational value than the choice of normative behavior.

The above is summarized in the following interaction hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 3: The difference in extremity of attitude attribution as a function of variations in perceived choice will be greater when the behavior is nonnormative than when it is normative.

Assuming the behavior itself influences the P's attitude attribution, as was indeed shown by Jones and Harris, regardless of choice context, we would expect a difference in degree of attitude attribution between normative and nonnormative behavior under both high and low choice conditions. However, we would expect a greater

difference when the S.P.'s choice is seen to be high than when it is seen to be low. When the S.P. does not choose the position the P cannot be clear whether the S.P. agrees with his stated position. But where the S.P. chooses the position, the resultant behavior would be expected to have a greater influence on the P's inferences to the S.P.'s attitude.

HYPOTHESIS 4: The difference in extremity of attitude attribution as a function of variations in the normativeness of the behavior will be greater under conditions of high choice than under conditions of low choice.

The above two interaction predictions are summarized in Figure 1.




Fig. 1. Predicted Choice x Norm Interaction.

It is possible that there are conditions in which a highly normative act will result in high attitude attribution. There may also be low choice situations in which some other factor will result in a high degree of attitude attribution. One such factor is the manner in which the act is carried out.

There has been some work on difference aspects of nonverbal communication - posture (Schefflin, 1964; Rosenberg and Langer, 1965), facial expression (Dittman, et al., 1965; Andrew, 1965; Ekman, 1964), and nonverbal properties of speech (Kramer, 1963; Davitz, 1964). It is clear that meaning is conveyed through much more than the words we use. However, it is not clear which of many concurrent cues dominates in a given setting; nor is it clear how or why different cues take on different meaning. Mehrabian and Ferris (1967) conclude from their research that the combined effects of a vocal and facial communication is a weighted sum of the independent effects.

Thus it is possible that despite the S.P.'s lack of choice, or the fact that his position agrees with the norm, the way he states his position, the gestures he uses, his facial expressions, his tone of voice will influence the inferences the P will make to the S.P.'s underlying attitudes.

Mehrabian (1968) distinguishes several aspects of a message: verbal, vocal, facial, postural, movement. He points out that all of these influence the meaning of the message. Vocal information is that which "is lost when speech is written down - intonation, tone, stress, length and frequency of pauses and so on." Vocal information includes such things as number of "ums," rate of speech, pitch, volume, and errors in speech. Mehrabian and Wiener (1967), studying the effect of

the interaction of tone and content in a communication on inferences about the communicator's attitudes, define tone as "those permissible variations of pitch and stress are linguistically unnecessary."

Using one-word messages and combining these with each of three different voice tones (positive, neutral, negative) they asked their subjects to judge the speaker's feeling. They concluded that, where no other information about the S.P. is available, tone contributes more than content to the affective meaning of the message. They further concluded that where vocal tone and word content are inconsistent tone contributes more than content to the interpretation of the total message.

Sullivan (1954), in discussing the psychiatric interview, feels that "sound accompaniments suggest what is to be made of the verbal propositions stated." Whether or not we can interpret them correctly, whether or not speaker and listener agree to their significance, these "non-verbal but nonetheless primarily vocal aspects of the exchange" play an important part in the perception of persons (Kramer, 1963).

Though there is no consensus regarding just which cues in speech are responsible for the communication of different feelings (Kramer, 1963; Davitz, 1964), there does appear to be a consensus that nonverbal aspects of a communication do play a significant role in conveying the "affective information" of a message. Thus conflicting emotional messages in the verbal and vocal channels result in a disruption of the affective communication (Soskin, 1953; Kauffman, 1954).

The point is, the way in which a verbal statement is made is expected to influence the meaning communicated by the statement and

therefore will influence what is attributed to the S.P. In the present research he is presented as a tape recorded voice taking a position either in favor of or against liberal abortion laws in the context of a collegiate debating society. One aspect of the S.P.'s verbal behavior which is relevant to this setting, and which is manipulable, is the degree of conviction reflected in the vocal quality of the message.

"High conviction" as revealed by voice quality is here defined as involvement in, concern about, commitment to a particular position on an issue. Said simply, high conviction means that the person feels very strongly about his stated position. "Low conviction," on the other hand, is defined as indifference, lack of involvement, lack of concern with the stated position. The indifferent individual really has no opinion in either direction on the issue.

We expect then that regardless of the content (normative or nonnormative) or context (high or low choice) a high conviction presentation will result in greater attribution of attitude to the speaker than will a low conviction presentation.

HYPOTHESIS 5: An argument presented with a high degree of conviction will result in more extreme attitude attribution to the speaker than will the same argument presented with a low degree of conviction.

Now consider the situation in which an individual is seen to have low choice in his behavior and yet does not act in accord with the seeming lack of choice. More specifically, what would happen if an individual was commanded to act in a given way but acted in the opposite way? We assume that this command comes from a source which

is seen to have the legitimate right to issue such orders. We refer to such behavior as anti-low choice behavior. That is, the context is one of low choice. This in itself would have certain implications for attitude attribution, as discussed earlier. Namely, we expect a low degree of attitude attribution when the actor is seen to have had a low degree of choice in his behavior.

However, this context is drastically changed by the actor's behavior of resisting his lack of choice and acting otherwise. And it is hypothesized here that this change will result in a high degree of attitude attribution. The P's task, in this circumstance, is to explain the S.P.'s resistance to the constraints placed on his behavior. And this cannot be done by any reference to the external situation, but must be referred to the S.P.'s feelings about the issue at hand.

Our predictions stem basically from some results obtained by Jones and Harris (1967). They had a "NonChoice-Ambivalent" condition in which the S.P.s were assigned a given side of an issue for which to argue but for which they presented an ambivalent argument. Their findings suggest that in such a situation the P feels that the S.P. is against the assigned position. To strengthen the effect of the main variable here, which is that of not following an instruction, we propose to have the S.P. behave contrary to his orders rather than ambivalently. If the S.P. is ordered to act in a nonnormative way but acts normatively the P should see the S.P. as having a more extreme attitude with respect to the issue than where the S.P. argues similarly but does not go against the constraint (low choice) or where there is no constraint against which the S.P. must react to make his position known (high choice).

HYPOTHESIS 6: Anti-low choice normative behavior will result in more extreme attitude attribution than will low choice normative behavior.

HYPOTHESIS 7: Anti-low choice normative behavior will result in more extreme attitude attribution than will high choice normative behavior.

Jones and Davis operationally define correspondence of inference as the P's certainty that the S.P. is extreme on a trait which is used to explain the S.P.'s behavior. Some of the research cited earlier (e.g.: Jones, Davis, and Gergen, 1961) has shown that more extreme impressions are given with greater confidence than are less extreme impressions. It seems, then, that there should be a close correlation between extremity of attitude attribution and the P's certainty in his judgments.

HYPOTHESIS 8: There will be more certain attitude attribution when there is more extreme attitude attribution.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Overview

To study the attribution of attitude as a function of perceived choice, normativeness of behavior, and conviction in behavior, small groups of female undergraduates were asked to listen to a speech for and against liberal abortion laws supposedly presented by another woman undergraduate participating in a college debate. The subjects were then asked to fill out a ten-item Likert type of attitude scale as they think the speaker would honestly fill it out. For each attitude statement the subject was also required to indicate how certain she was in her judgment of the speaker's position with respect to that statement. The first judgment provided a measure of attitude attribution and the second of the certainty with which such attributions were made.

The subject then completed a questionnaire covering a variety of aspects of her perception of the situation in which the debate occurred. She then filled out the attitude scale again, but this time her own attitude toward liberal abortion laws was measured. And finally we obtained demographic information about the subject.

Perceived choice was manipulated in the E's description to the P of how the debating teams were formed. Normativeness of behavior was varied in the content of the speaker's presentation. Conviction was varied by the tone in the speaker's voice.

After the subject filled out the last questionnaire she was asked to comment on the research, for example, her suspicions, etc., was told what the research was about and what we expected to find, and finally was asked not to discuss the research with any other students for a few weeks.

Subjects

One hundred and sixty-one Brooklyn College female undergraduates served as subjects for this research. They were each paid \$2.00 for their participation. Of these subjects four were not included in the analyses because they failed to complete their questionnaires. In addition, the data of other subjects were randomly eliminated to equalize the number of subjects in each experimental condition at 15, which was the lowest number of subjects in any one group. Subjects were at least sophomores, matriculated in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. We decided to use only one sex in order to avoid any confounding by sex-related factors. This seemed particularly relevant in light of the debate topic involved, namely, abortion. Pilot research (Appendix A) on the population from which our sample was drawn clearly indicated that attitudes toward liberal abortion laws was more normative and relevant among female than among male college students. For example, the female college students were more consistent in their responses to questions regarding liberal abortion laws, in their own attitudes on this issue, and in their perception of the attitudes and behaviors of others with respect to this issue. Females also made more extreme judgments, tended to see themselves as similar to their peers on this issue, and showed a consistency in responding

under different conditions much more so than did male college students.

Experimental Design

The design of the present investigation is a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial experiment with 15 subjects in each cell. The experimental conditions, perceived choice, normativeness of behavior, and degree of expressed conviction in behavior were independently varied at two levels each.

Experimental conditions were run in a randomly varied order. Subjects were assigned to the earliest condition for which they were available. That is, the order in which the conditions were run were preset. Subjects were then called and asked when they were available to participate. They were then assigned to the first hour for which they were available, and for which a subject was needed, regardless of which condition happened to have been scheduled for that time.

Perceived choice was varied by means of instructions given to the subject. These instructions were tested in an earlier pilot study (Appendix B) by having three groups of 20 subjects each read one set of the experimental instructions. None ever heard the actual argument. Anti-low choice subjects, in addition, read the beginning of the S.P.'s argument, the moderator's reply, and the S.P.'s retort. We thus eliminated the possible confounding of the effect of expressed conviction or of hearing the arguments. The subjects then responded on a 9-point scale, where "1" reflected high choice and "9" reflected low choice, to a question of how much choice they thought the S.P. had. Briefly, the subjects in high choice conditions were told that each

member of the debating team was selected according to the preference she expressed in arguing either for or against liberal abortion laws. The subjects in the low choice conditions were told that team members were randomly selected from the debating club and assigned to different teams by the moderator, without consideration for individual preferences.

Normativeness was varied simply by varying the argument the S.P. gave in the debate. Pilot research (Appendix A) indicated that it is normative among female Brooklyn College students to be in favor of liberal abortion laws and nonnormative to be against liberal abortion laws. Thus, the normative condition was that in which the subjects heard the S.P. argue in favor of liberal abortion laws; the nonnormative condition was that in which the subject heard the S.P. argue against liberal abortion laws.

Conviction refers to the extent to which one feels involved in and concerned about what he is doing, as contrasted with indifference. The S.P. was a tape recording of the supposed debater. Different recordings conveyed different degrees of conviction, as determined in pilot research (Appendix C). This was varied, then, by varying the recording to which the subject was exposed.

Table 1 describes the nine experimental groups. In the ANH condition the subject was exposed to the low choice manipulation but then heard the S.P. go against the instructions requiring that she argue against liberal abortion laws and instead heard her argue, with high conviction, in favor of liberal abortion laws.

TABLE 1

DEFINITION OF SYMBOLS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS

Experimental Condition	Definition
HNH.	High Choice - Normative - High Conviction
HNL.	High Choice - Normative - Low Conviction
HNNH.	High Choice - NonNormative - High Conviction
HNNL.	High Choice - NonNormative - Low Conviction
LNH.	Low Choice - Normative - High Conviction
LNL.	Low Choice - Normative - Low Conviction
LNNH.	Low Choice - NonNormative - High Conviction
LNNL.	Low Choice - NonNormative - Low Conviction
ANH.	Anti-Low Choice - Normative - High Conviction

Procedure

The Ss were seen in small groups, averaging five per group, depending upon their availability. They were recruited from introductory psychology, biology, and science classes with the following request, presented by the E:

I'm a graduate student at the City University. I'm here to ask for volunteers to participate in some research in which I'm involved. The research is concerned with how people come across to one another when they speak.

It will take about one-half hour to 45 minutes. You'll be paid \$2.00 for your participation. What you will be asked to do is simply to listen to a brief tape recording of someone speaking and then to fill out a questionnaire which asks you for your opinion on a few things about the speaker. I'll tell you more about it when we meet.

We'll meet in small groups, of about five each. We'll meet in the library here at Brooklyn College. I'm going to hand out some forms now. If you are interested in participating please fill in the times and days on which you'll be available. I'll call you within the next few days to make arrangements with you.

If you aren't called it is simply because our available hours do not coincide or we already have enough students participating.

The E called the S, reminded her who he was and that she had volunteered to participate. He asked if she was available at a given time. If so, an appointment was set up. If not, the E offered the next few available hours. If the S was free for none that week she was told that she would be called again the following week if she was still interested and if still needed. The E met the Ss in the lobby of the Brooklyn College library and escorted them to his office, which served as the experimental room. In the office was a long table with several chairs in front of it, all facing a wall. A tape recorder was kept in one corner of the room. Behind the S's chair was the E's desk, on top of which was a row of 45 tapes with a separate small pile of nine tapes which were used for the nine conditions of the investigation. On the long table, in front of each chair, were four questionnaires lying face down placed one on top of the other.

The S was asked to have a seat and make herself comfortable, and then to pay attention to what the E was going to tell her. She was then told:

I appreciate your helping with this research. As I told you in class, what we're interested in is how people come across to one another when they speak. So, again, what we want you to do is simply listen to a tape recording of a student presenting a position on an issue and then fill out some questionnaires asking you your opinion on a few things about the girl you'll hear.

Let me tell you a little about the tapes you'll hear, what they are, and where we got them, so that you'll have some idea of the context in which she is speaking. There's

a debating club here at Brooklyn College associated with the Speech Department. It's made up entirely of students; most of the club members are female. What they do is participate in matches with debating clubs from other schools. But at times they also have debates within their own club. These are pretty important to them because they do it in order to study and practice their own techniques in debating, to improve their diction, speech, arguments, and so on. These practice debates are completely student run; even the moderator is one of the students in the club. The practice debates are usually tape recorded so that the club can later listen to them and analyze them. And that's what these (pointing to the tapes on the desk) tapes are; they permitted us the use of some of their tapes for our research. What you'll hear then is one of the debaters in a recent practice debate held within this club.

Now just to give you an image of the setting in which the debate takes place let me tell you a little about the debating teams. They are composed of three members each; three arguing in favor of the issue and three arguing against the issue. The topic of the debate is usually decided upon by the moderator, who as I said is also one of the girls in the club. Then, for these practice debates, they have about an hour to write up their arguments before presenting it. The speaker you'll hear was participating in a debate on the issue of whether or not abortion laws should be liberal.

This part of the instructions was designed to establish both the theme and context for the debate in a way which made the presentation relevant to the norms for female Brooklyn College students. Thus it was stressed that most of the debating club members were female, all were students, and that the debate was a within-club practice session and thus did not involve any outside observers. The notion that it was a practice debate was included for a number of reasons. First, it made the idea of taping the presentation and the possibility of an ANH condition more reasonable. Second, as practice, it permitted the incorporation of an "indifferent" speech as given in the low conviction conditions. Finally, it could explain a mere one hour preparation more readily. The Ss might expect a

longer period of preparation allowed the team members if it was a real debate. The reality of the tapes were not questioned, nor was the boredom evident in the low conviction speaker, except to say that she was a bad speaker, or sounded like she had no choice. We will discuss this further later. Only one hour of preparation was permitted so that the S would be less likely to assume that the S.P.'s arguments stemmed from research she did in the area and could more readily attribute her arguments to her own ideas.

High Choice vs Low Choice

The choice manipulation was accomplished in the next part of the instructions to the S. The Ss in the high choice conditions were told:

Now the way the teams were formed for these practice debates was that after the moderator announced the topic to be debated, she asked each member of the club to mark down on a slip of paper the side of the issue on which she would prefer to argue, either in favor of or against liberal abortion laws in this case. The moderator then collected these slips and chose three girls who indicated a preference to argue in favor of the issue and three who indicated a preference to argue against the issue. These debaters made up the teams according to the side of the issue they asked for.

The Ss in the low choice conditions were told:

Now the way the teams were formed for these practice debates was that after the moderator announced the topic to be debated she randomly picked six members and assigned three girls to argue in favor of the issue, in this case that abortion laws should be liberal, and three to argue against the issue, that abortion laws should not be liberal. The girls who made up the teams, then, were not given a chance to select what side they wanted to argue on. They were simply assigned to different sides.

Then all the Ss were told:

After the speakers were given a chance to prepare their arguments they sat around a table in front of the rest of the firls in the club and began.

Now you'll just hear the moderator for this debate introduce the speaker and then you'll hear one of the speakers. It's about a give minute presentation. I really don't know which side of the argument you'll hear. I haven't heard all of these tapes myself yet. But I do know that it's on the topic of liberal abortion laws.

The tape recording was then turned on. The Ss in the high choice conditions heard the moderator say: "Susan, you had asked to argue (in favor of/against) liberal abortion laws. Would you please begin." Then the Ss heard the S.P. give a presentation either in favor of or against liberal abortion laws, depending upon the condition.

The Ss in the low choice conditions heard the moderator say: "Susan, you were assigned to argue (in favor of/ against) liberal abortion laws. Would you please begin." And, again, the S heard the S.P. give a presentation either in favor of or against liberal abortion laws, depending upon the condition. While the Ss were listening to the tapes, and filling out the questionnaires, they faced away from the E so that he could not be seen by them.

The instructions given to the Ss in the anti-low choice condition were identical to those given to the Ss in the low choice conditions. ANH Ss then heard the moderator introduce the S.P.: "Susan, you were assigned to argue against liberal abortion laws. Would you please begin." The S then heard the S.P. say: "I'm going to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws." The moderator interrupted

with the remark: "Susan, you were assigned to argue against liberal abortion laws." The S.P. replied: "I know, but I'm going to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws." Then the S.P., almost without pause, went into her presentation, which was identical to the one made by the S.P. in all of the normative - high conviction conditions.

The purpose of this dialogue was to assure the S that the S.P. correctly heard her instructions and was wilfully disobeying them. The moderator's interruption was not hostile, but simply served as a reminder. The S.P. continued quickly as though not to give the moderator a chance to interrupt her again.

Normativeness of Behavior

Normativeness was varied simply in terms of the attitudinal position argued by the S.P. on the tape. Pilot research (Appendix A) established the fact that it is normative among Brooklyn College female students to support the position of liberal abortion laws and nonnormative to believe that such laws should be strict. This conclusion is based on our findings which show that these students:

- (1) are mostly in favor of liberal abortion laws;
- (2) perceive most other female students at Brooklyn College as being in favor of liberal abortion laws;
- (3) feel it is more likely that a student would choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws than against liberal abortion laws, if given the choice;
- (4) feel it is more likely that a student who is really against liberal abortion laws will choose to argue in favor of such laws than the reverse, that is, that a student in favor of such laws would choose to argue against them;
- (5) feel that greater pressure, particularly in the form of the amount of argument evoked in her peers, would be brought against a student who argues against liberal abortion laws, than against a student who argues in favor of liberal abortion laws.

The first part of the instructions given to each S, as indicated earlier, was designed to stress the fact that the debate involved a social context made up of her own peers, that is, Brooklyn College women students. This reduced the likelihood that the S w see the S.P.'s behavior in the context of the norms of some other groups such as male students, faculty, etc.

The Ss in the normative conditions then heard the following.

I'm going to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws.

First of all, every individual should have the right to determine his or her own life. People speak about reverence for the life of an unborn child, about how important his life is, about how we should not interfere with it; but these people don't consider the reverence we should have for the life of the mother. We know that the mother is a living, independent, thinking, human being; but no one has yet completely proven that the fetus is human life. The mother's life and happiness should have first consideration.

Furthermore, our society feels that every individual has the right to protect himself against harm. So, if a birth threatens the physical or emotional health of the mother, or the stability and cohesiveness of a family, the mother should have the right to protect herself against this harm by having her pregnancy ended.

Another point I would like to present in favor of liberal abortion laws is that the laws of our society should reflect the real attitudes and values of our society as these are revealed in actual behavior. The sexual morals of our society are becoming more liberal, and our laws should follow suit. We are finally beginning to value the individual, and not to place the overall society above the worth of the individual. We find that sex is not valued only because it serves to maintain the species, but is enjoyed for itself; sexual behavior is not likely to be seen by most people today as promiscuous; and our laws should not be such as to cause a woman who has become pregnant to feel like a criminal nor to bear an unwanted child.

(For the remainder of this presentation see Appendix H).

The Ss in the nonnormative conditions heard the following.

I'm going to argue against liberal abortion laws.

First of all, we do not have the ability to choose between life and death in a fair way; we do not possess the wisdom or integrity or compassion or understanding to take on the responsibility of choosing between life and death. So there must be strict abortion laws.

Of course someone might argue that an unborn fetus is not really life. But we don't really know what life is; we have yet to come up with an adequate, commonly agreed upon definition of life. We should therefore assume that a fetus is alive until it is proven that it is not life rather than the other way around. At any rate, with the medical knowledge that we have today we should attempt to save lives, not to destroy them.

Furthermore, who knows where we will stop if we allow abortions. Choosing an abortion is choosing between life and death. Liberal abortion laws will set a precedent where people are allowed to make such a choice. With this precedent it will be easier in the future to change the point at which we take on this choice between life and death. For example, we might decide that all people who become senile should be put to death because they are a burden on society, as the fetus was a burden on the mother. Or we might say that all handicapped people should be eliminated because they are an unwanted burden. Who knows? We might at some distant time, finally say that all people we dislike, or who don't fit into society should be eliminated, since everyone has the freedom to act as he feels. We don't know; but, liberal abortion laws could be a dangerous beginning.

(For the remainder of this presentation see Appendix H).

Extremity of Arguments

It was hypothesized that the degree of choice the S sees the S.P. as having in her behavior, the normativeness of her arguments, and the degree of conviction with which she presents her arguments, would influence the extremity of the attitude attributed to her. However, it was possible that the differences in the actual content

of the normative and nonnormative arguments would have had a differential effect on the extremity of attitude attribution rather than the normativeness of the content, as a determinant of degree of correspondence.

Thus it was important that the arguments on each side of the issue be of equal strength or extremity before we began the main investigation. To achieve pro and con arguments of equal strength, 28 Brooklyn College undergraduates, randomly split into two groups of 14 each, were asked to read the statement presenting the position either in favor of or against liberal abortion laws. The statements that were read are basically identical to those which our experimental Ss heard except that they were presented impersonally. That is, there was no indication as to the author of the statement, why it was presented, or under what circumstances it was presented. To measure argument strength independently of the experimental variables, it was necessary to present them free of personal and social influences surrounding the arguments. Thus the Ss were also instructed to keep their own attitude from influencing their responses. Under these conditions the S did not know who prepared the arguments, and so did not know the norm associated with its presentation. Similarly she did not know the setting in which the arguments were presented and so was given no information regarding the author's choice.

One problem involved in measuring argument strength was what was meant by this dimension. "Strong" might mean valid, convincing, persuasive, emotional, and so on. The point is, if the S was simply asked to indicate how strong she thought the statement was we would not know the psychological basis on which she made her judgment.

Furthermore, it was more than likely that if we did this the S's own attitude would influence her perception of the "strength" of the arguments which she was to judge. It was unlikely that we could totally eliminate this influence, but it was possible to control and reduce it.

Our measure of the "strength" of the arguments was the extremity of the responses the S gave on the attitude attribution questionnaire which comprised our experimental dependent measure. The S was asked to respond to this scale not as she herself would, and not as the person who prepared the statement would, but simply as the statement itself would respond.

All the Ss received the same written instruction. These were:

A statement containing a series of arguments on abortion laws is presented on the following pages. Please read this through, without trying to study or memorize it. Just read it through once and try to get a feel for the opinion which is presented.

After you finish reading these few pages you will be asked to answer a few questions; but you will be asked to answer these questions not as you yourself would answer them but as you think the statement which you will have read would answer them.

You will be given more detailed instructions about this later. For now, please try to put your own feeling and opinion about the issue aside and read the statement once. Don't study it.

Turn the page and begin.

The S then read the statement (Appendix G) and was then given the attitude attribution questionnaire to fill out in accord with the above instructions.

High Conviction vs Low Conviction

Within the normative and the nonnormative conditions the degree of

expressed conviction in the presentation was manipulated by variations in the vocal quality of each speech. Thus, content was held constant while "style" of presentation, conceptualized as conviction, was varied. There were two conviction conditions within each norm condition. They were measured by asking each of four groups of female undergraduates at Hunter College of the City University of New York to listen to one of the four tape recordings and then to judge the degree of conviction conveyed by the voice. We felt that students at Hunter and Brooklyn Colleges were basically similar in their socio-economic backgrounds, ideals, attitudes, values - having been drawn from similar metropolitan, white middle-class environments, into schools with similar requirements, standards, and goals. In order to maximize the likelihood that the Ss would base their judgments on the tone and not on the content of the arguments, the instructions to them stressed the fact that the speaker had not prepared the arguments, that these were irrelevant for our current purposes, and that she had recorded many arguments for us with a variety of expressions. The instructions to the Ss were as follows.

I'm a graduate student at the City University. I'd appreciate your help with some research that I'm involved in.

Please listen very carefully now. It is very important that you fully understand the instructions that I'm going to give you. If you have any questions about what you are supposed to do, please raise your hand when I'm finished. Please ask me any questions you may have, rather than your neighbor.

Now. Basically, we're interested in how people can sound when they present a point of view - convicted of the position or indifferent about the issue, bored or excited, and so on. What concerns us is not the nature of the arguments one presents or the attitudes of the person speaking, or even your own attitude on the issues, but rather the tone and expression used in presenting the position. So, we had a girl record a whole variety of arguments on all sides of different current

issues; and she recorded each of these with different tones of voice and expression. I'm going to play just one of these tapes for you; then we would like you to judge the expression and tone by simply checking off a list of descriptive words - this was handed out to you already.

I want to stress that it is very important that you try to ignore the content of what she is saying and just pay attention to how she is saying it.

Let me give you an example. A person can say the same thing several times and sound different each time, just by varying the expression in her voice. Listen to this sentence; the sentence is, "Styles in clothing change so rapidly that a person has to get a new wardrobe every year." It was recorded twice, by the same girl, just to give you an example of what we would like you to do. Listen to both recordings now.

(E plays recording)

The content of both of these is identical, but the tone of voice and expression vary. And this is what we are interested in. The speaker may or may not believe what she is saying. We don't know. She didn't even prepare the arguments you will hear. This isn't important here. We also are not asking you whether you think they are interesting or dull or true or false or silly or important. All we want you to judge is the expression; independently of these other factors.

Now, obviously tone can vary in lots of different ways. And the aspect of the presentation that basically concerns us is the extent to which the tone of voice, the expression, convey a feeling of conviction about what is being said, a feeling of commitment, of concern about the issue; or a feeling of indifference, uninvolvedness, and lack of concern about the issue. Whichever is the case.

You were given a list of words which can be used to describe the tone and expression of her presentation, and all you'll have to do is to check off the extent to which you think each word accurately describes the performance. This will be explained more fully later.

Now, the tape you will hear is about five minutes long. It was not made by the same girl you just heard. The example I gave you is considerably shorter. In judging this tape, though, don't base your judgment on only one sentence. And don't try to judge it on the basis of little details in the speech. That is, try not to analyze each part, not to be a speech teacher or a theater critic. Just sit back, relax, listen to the entire recording, and give your immediate reaction to the whole thing, even if you might not be able to explain your reaction.

Let's see; this class is going to hear her presenting an argument (in favor of/against) liberal abortion laws.

Remember, your judgment of her conviction and expression is to be based only on how she sounds, not on what you may think of the arguments.

Are there any questions?

After hearing the tape recordings the Ss were asked (Appendix C) to assume that the speaker was supposed to present the argument in a manner which would convey a) a high degree of conviction; that is, as someone who is very concerned about the issue; as someone who feels strongly about the issue, and b) a low degree of conviction; that is, as someone who is not concerned about the issue; as someone who is indifferent about the issue, who is neither in favor of nor against it. Asked to make each of these assumptions (in reversed order for alternate Ss) the S is then asked to judge on a 9-point scale going from "extremely" (1) to "not at all" (9), how successful she thinks the S was. This question is worded in this way to remind the S to focus on the tone with which the argument is presented rather than on the content. Thus it is implied that the S.P. may be acting, that what she says may or may not reflect her real opinion, that we are not interested in her real opinion but only in how she sounds. The findings of this are summarized in the results section.

Anti-Low Choice Condition

This condition was not included in the factorial design. It differed from the LNH condition only in the fact that the S.P. was assigned to argue against liberal abortion laws (i.e., nonnormatively), and in the moderator's reminder to the S.P. of her assignment and the

S.P.'s immediate response that she knows this and is going to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws anyway.

Measurement Procedure

A ten-item Likert scale was constructed to obtain a measure of attribution of attitude towards liberal abortion laws. We were not concerned here with measuring the S's own attitude except as a check to control for differences between groups in this respect. Our interest is in the extremity of the attitude the S sees the S.P. as having and in the S's certainty of this judgment.

Fifty-four female college students were asked to respond to 70 items (Appendix E). One-half of these Ss were asked to respond as though they were "strongly in favor of liberal abortion laws." The other half were asked to respond as though they were "strongly against liberal abortion laws." The ten items which best discriminated between these two groups comprise our attitude attribution scale. The only restriction in selecting the items was that one-half be worded positively and one-half negatively. This method for constructing our scale was taken from Edwards (1967).

The Spearman-Brown split-half reliability coefficient (Ferguson, 1966) for the ten items is 0.98. This is significant at the .01 (two-tailed) level of probability.

After hearing the tape-recording the S was asked to complete this scale as she thought the S.P. would complete it. Following each of the ten attitude statements the S was asked to indicate how certain she was about her judgment (Appendix D). The S's attitude attribution score was the sum of her responses to the ten attitude statements. Her

certainty score was the sum of her responses to the ten certainty items. Thus for each of these the possible range of scores for a given S was ten to sixty.

After the S filled out the attitude attribution and certainty scales they filled out a questionnaire which served as a check on the experimental manipulations. In this questionnaire (Appendix F) were two questions designed to measure the S's perception of choice. The first question asked "How much choice do you feel the speaker had in picking the side of the issue on which she was to argue?" The S responded on a 6-point scale in which "1" reflected very low choice and "6" reflected very high choice. The other question (Q-#6) asked the S to indicate which one of four given possibilities best describes how the debating teams were formed. These four possibilities were:

- (a) the moderator randomly picks club members to argue on each side of the issue;
- (b) the club members tell the moderator which side of the issue they prefer to argue on, and are then selected accordingly;
- (c) the club members choose each other for the different teams;
- (d) first come, first serve; that is, as each member arrives at the meeting, she makes a selection among whatever teams have openings.

Here (a) reflects the low choice condition while (b) reflects the high choice condition.

This questionnaire also taps the S's perception of the norms of female college students, the composition of the debating club, and the context of the debate. Then the S was asked to complete the same ten attitude items, in reverse order, so as to reflect her own opinion. Finally we collected demographic information about each S; age, sex, religion, marital status, major subject, term in college.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Efficacy of Experimental Manipulations

Perception of Choice

Responses to question #6 on Questionnaire II (Appendix F) indicate that the Ss saw the experimental conditions accurately. Thus 100% of the Ss in low choice conditions responses "a;" that is, that "the moderator randomly picks club members to argue on each side of the issue." Fifty-four out of 60 Ss in the high choice conditions responded "b," that "the club members tell the moderator which side of the issue they prefer to argue on, and are then selected accordingly." One S in the HNL group responded "d," while five responded "a." Two of these five were in the HNH group, two were in the HNNL group, and one was in the HNNH group. The difference in response to this question as a function of choice condition is significant at the .01 level of confidence (Tables 2 and 3).

Our manipulation of degree of perceived choice is deemed successful. The Ss did perceive the experimental situations accurately. We also note that there was no difference in response as a function of the position of the argument or degree of conviction in the presentation.

We find further evidence supporting the success of our manipula-

TABLE 2

RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON HOW THE TEAMS WERE FORMED, AS A FUNCTION OF
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION (QUESTION #6, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Experimental Condition	Response			
	a	b	c	d
High choice - normative - high conviction	2	13	0	0
High choice - normative - low conviction	0	14	0	1
High choice - nonnormative - high conviction	1	14	0	0
High choice - nonnormative - low conviction	2	13	0	0
Low choice - normative - high conviction	15	0	0	0
Low choice - normative - low conviction	15	0	0	0
Low choice - nonnormative - high conviction	15	0	0	0
Low choice - nonnormative - low conviction	15	0	0	0
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	15	0	0	0

Notes:

Response (a) = The moderator randomly picks club members to argue on each side of the issue.

Response (b) = The club members tell the moderator which side of the issue they prefer to argue on, and are then selected accordingly.

tion of perceived choice when we examine the responses to the question "How much choice do you feel the speaker had in picking the side of the issue on which she was to argue?" Here we find (Tables 4 and 5) that Ss hearing high choice instructions perceive the S.P. as having had a higher degree of choice in her behavior than do

TABLE 3

NUMBER OF "a" AND "b" RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON HOW TEAMS WERE FORMED AS A FUNCTION OF THE THREE MAIN EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES (QUESTION #6, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Response			Total	χ^2
	High Choice	Low Choice		
a	5	60	65	96.88*
b	54	0	54	
Total	59	60	119	
	Normative	NonNormative		
a	32	33	65	<1
b	27	27	54	
Total	59	60	119	
	High Conviction	Low Conviction		
a	33	32	65	<1
b	27	27	54	
Total	60	59	119	

Notes:

Response "a" = The moderator randomly picks club members to argue on each side of the issue.

Response "b" = The club members tell the moderator which side of the issue they prefer to argue on, and are then selected accordingly.

* $p < .01$ (with Yates Correction), ldf.

Ss hearing low choice instructions.

It is also apparent from Tables 4 and 5 that neither the position for which the S.P. argued nor any of the interactions had any effect on perceived choice. However, the degree of conviction with which the S.P. made her presentation did have a significant effect on the S's

TABLE 4
 MEAN RESPONSES TO CHOICE PERCEPTION QUESTION
 (QUESTION #1, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Experimental Condition	Mean Score
High choice - normative - high conviction	4.80
High choice - normative - low conviction	4.13
High choice - nonnormative - high conviction	5.00
High choice - nonnormative - low conviction	3.47
Low choice - normative - high conviction	2.13
Low choice - normative - low conviction	1.27
Low choice - nonnormative - high conviction	2.60
Low choice - nonnormative - low conviction	1.13
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	3.47

Notes:

1 = low choice
 6 = high choice
 Number of subjects per group = 15

perception of how much choice the S.P. had in her behavior. Thus the Ss who heard the high conviction tape recordings perceived the S.P. as having had a higher degree of choice in her behavior than did the Ss who heard the low conviction tapes, according to responses to Question #1.

Examining Q-1 more closely it appears that the Ss might have responded in terms of the amount of choice the S.P. felt she had, even though the S was aware that the context allowed the S.P. a high or low

TABLE 5

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR RESPONSES TO CHOICE PERCEPTION
QUESTION (QUESTION #1, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	p
Choice (A)	197.63	1	197.63	119.09	<.001
Normativeness (B)	0.03	1	0.03	<1	n.s.
Conviction (C)	38.53	1	38.53	23.22	<.005
A X B	1.20	1	1.20	<1	n.s.
A X C	0.03	1	0.03	<1	n.s.
B X C	4.03	1	4.03	2.43	n.s.
A X B X C	0.13	1	0.13	<1	n.s.
Error (within)	185.87	112	1.66		
Total	427.47	119			

degree of choice, whichever the case may be. That is, Question #6 indicates that the S knows what happened. Question #1 calls for more of a subjective interpretation on the S's part; it measures S's "attitude" about degree of choice and is thus influenced by many factors, one of these apparently having been degree of conviction. Thus 13 Ss (out of 60) in high choice conditions responded "3" or below on the scale, that is, that the S.P. had low choice in her behavior. Yet nine of these 13 responded "b" on Q-6, indicating that they knew the objective situation. These nine Ss were asked to explain their response. Generally they said that though they know she picked her own side she did not sound like she had much choice. Seven of these nine Ss heard a low conviction tape. One S said that a choice between two alternatives, in favor of or against, is not really much of a choice because it does not consider the gradations between these extremes.

Of the 13 Ss who saw high choice S.P.s as having low choice on Q-1, seven were in the HNNL group, two in the HNH group, three in the HNL group, and one in the HNNH group. Thus the condition in which the perception of the choice felt by the S.P., as seen by the S, was most dramatically counter to the description of the situation is that in which the S was told that the S.P. had a high degree of choice and then heard the S.P. present a nonnormative argument with very low conviction. Here the S is least able to accept the notion that the S.P. had much choice in her behavior. Our pilot research showed that the Ss feel it is unlikely that one would choose to argue against liberal abortion laws in the first place. The vocal quality of low conviction (in the HNNL condition) would then confirm this opinion in the S even though the S is told, and recalls, that the S.P. picked that side of the debate. Some of these Ss said that the S.P. apparently had no opinion, didn't care, and that this is the same as having no choice.

The Ss are aware of the "objective" choice involved, but some reinterpret this in light of the behavior they hear. At what point this reinterpretation takes place we do not know. It is likely that if the S were to answer Q-1 before hearing the argument we would have fewer low choice responses in the high choice conditions. This in fact is the case as will be seen in our discussion of the pilot testing of our experimental instructions.

Though 100% of the Ss in low choice conditions accurately responded "a" to Q-6, eight of these Ss (five in LNNH and three in LNH groups) responded "4" or above on Q-1, reflecting perhaps their perception that the S.P. at least felt as if she had high choice. Note that all low choice Ss who heard the low conviction argument responded

appropriately on both Q-1 and Q-6. Those who responded "4" or above on Q-1 said the S.P. sounded like she believed it - so she had choice - or at least it is the same as though she chose.

The above discussion does not include the anti-low choice group. In this condition the S was told that the S.P. was randomly assigned to argue against liberal abortion laws. But she argues in favor of liberal abortion laws, and with high conviction, despite the moderator's reminder of her assignment (ANH condition).

For this group one would expect the meaning of "choice" to be more subject to varied interpretation than for the other groups. However, we find that 100% of the Ss in this condition saw the situation accurately, as reflected in their responses to Q-6. All responded "a," that the S.P. was randomly assigned to a side by the moderator. There is no difference, on this question, between their responses and those of LNH Ss while there is a difference between the response of ANH Ss and that of HNH Ss (Table 6). On this basis we conclude that ANH Ss saw the S.P. as having had low choice in her behavior.

Responses to Q-1 tell us a slightly different story. There is no significant difference between ANH and HNH groups nor between ANH and LNH groups (Table 7). This finding reflects the fact that the mean response for the ANH Ss is midway in the scale (3.47) while the mean response for HNH and LNH groups is more extreme at opposite ends of the scale (4.80 and 2.13 respectively). The mean response for the ANH Ss does not however reflect a middle of the scale reaction on the part of most of these Ss but reflects extreme responses to both ends of the scale split evenly by the group. Thus six Ss responded "1" and six responded "6."

TABLE 6

NUMBER OF "a" AND "b" RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON HOW THE TEAMS
WERE FORMED (QUESTION #6, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Response	ANH	HNH	Total	χ^2
a	15	2	17	22.94*
b	0	13	13	
Total	15	15	30	

Notes:

Response "a" = The moderator randomly picks club members to argue on each side of the issue.

Response "b" = The club members tell the moderator which side of the issue they prefer to argue on, and are then selected accordingly.

* $p < .01$, 1df.

In discussing their reactions the S generally said she felt that the S.P. had a low degree of choice formally but that she created choice by her behavior. The split in responses seems to reflect these two interpretations. Thus, though both feelings may exist within a given S, only one can be expressed on the scale.

One final note on our manipulation of perceived choice. Pilot testing of the experimental instructions (Appendix B), in which the possible confounding effects of expressed conviction or of hearing the arguments were eliminated, showed that the Ss who read the high choice instructions saw the S.P. as having had much greater choice (Mean = 1.80) than did the Ss who read the low choice or anti-low choice instructions (Means = 8.65 and 8.45 respectively; $p < .001$ for both

TABLE 7

t TEST COMPARISONS FOR RESPONSES TO CHOICE PERCEPTION
QUESTION (QUESTION #1, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Experimental Condition	Mean Score	t
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	3.47	1.86*
High choice - normative - high conviction	4.80	
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	3.47	1.88*
Low choice - normative - high conviction	2.13	

Notes:

1 = very low choice
6 = very high choice

* n.s.

differences). There was no difference between the ANH and LNH groups.

Normativeness of the Issue

The issue that was used in this investigation is "liberal abortion laws." Pilot research (Appendix A) clearly established the fact that Brooklyn College female undergraduates feel it is normative among their peers to be (and argue) in favor of liberal abortion laws and nonnormative to be (and argue) against liberal abortion laws.

Thus it can be seen in Table 8, at the top, that the Ss who are asked to consider a hypothetical S.P. arguing against liberal abortion laws feel that it is more likely that the S.P. will get 'much argument' from her peers ($M = 2.52$) than do the Ss who consider an S.P. arguing in favor of liberal abortion laws ($M = 4.52$; $p < .005$). Conversely, the

TABLE 8

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO PERCEIVED NORMATIVENESS
OF THE ISSUE OF LIBERAL ABORTION LAWS AS A FUNCTION OF THE
POSITION FOR WHICH S ASSUMES A HYPOTHETICAL S.P.
ARGUES (SEE APPENDIX A)

Question	Position for which S is told S.P. argues	Mean	t	p ⁺
How likely is it that...				
S.P. will get much argument?	against ⁺⁺⁺ favor	2.52 ⁺⁺ 4.52	4.23	<.005
S.P. will get some argument?	against favor	1.91 3.13	1.96	n.s.
S.P. will get much agreement?	against favor	5.96 3.82	3.58	<.005
S.P. will get some agreement?	against favor	3.91 2.86	1.75	n.s.
others will try to change S.P.'s opinion?	against favor	2.65 3.78	2.10	<.05
others will insult S.P.?	against favor	5.39 6.47	1.56	n.s.
S.P. may lose some friends?	against favor	7.56 7.26	<1	n.s.
S.P. will be liked less than she was before?	against favor	7.60 8.00	<1	n.s.
S.P. will be liked more than she was before?	against favor	7.65 7.34	<1	n.s.
discussion will cease?	against favor	6.82 6.95	<1	n.s.
S.P. will choose to argue against liberal abortion laws?		6.52	8.20	<.005
S.P. will choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws?		2.86		

TABLE 8 - Continued

Question	Position for which S is told S.P. argues	Mean	t	p
How likely is it that...				
S.P. will choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws when she is against them?		6.00	3.72	<.005
S.P. will choose to argue against liberal abortion laws when she is for them?		7.34		
What is the attitude of most female college students?	against favor	2.47 [#] <u>2.60</u> 2.54	<1	n.s.
S's own attitude.	against favor	2.17 <u>2.82</u> 2.50	1.18	n.s.

Notes:

All Ss are female students.

+ two-tailed.

++ On a 9-point scale with "1" being "very likely" and "9" being "very unlikely."

+++ N = 23 per group.

On a 9-point scale with "1" being "highly in favor of" and "9" being "highly against."

latter group of Ss feel it is more likely that the S.P. will get 'much agreement' ($M = 3.82$) than does the former group of Ss ($M = 5.96$; $p < .005$).

We also find in Table 8 that Ss considering an S.P. arguing against liberal abortion laws feel that it is more likely that others

will try to change her opinion than do Ss considering an S.P. arguing in favor of liberal abortion laws ($M = 2.65$ and 3.78 respectively; $p < .05$). Furthermore, the S feels that the S.P. is more likely, if given a choice, to choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws ($M = 2.86$) than against liberal abortion laws ($M = 6.52$). Interestingly, the Ss also feel that it is less unlikely that an S.P. who is actually against liberal abortion laws will choose to argue in favor of such ($M = 6.00$) than it is that an S.P. who is in favor of liberal abortion laws would choose to argue against such. Finally, as seen at the bottom of Table 8, the Ss in general see most female college students as being in favor of liberal abortion laws ($M = 2.54$) and are themselves in favor of liberal abortion laws ($M = 2.50$). On the basis of this pilot research we concluded that the issue of liberal abortion laws is seen to have a normative and a nonnormative side for female Brooklyn College students.

In order to increase the salience of the norm, having established the fact that such exists for the given group, our experimental instructions, it will be recalled, stressed the setting in which the debate took place, namely, among college students most of whom are female. There were no differences in the perception of sex and status of the debating club members, the audience, or the moderator, as a function of any of the experimental variables. Most Ss saw the setting as it was described (see Appendix B for details and Tables).

In the final phase of the investigation we again asked our experimental Ss, after they had completed the dependent measures, how they think most Brooklyn College female students feel about liberal abortion laws (Q-2, Questionnaire II, Appendix F). We find no

significant differences among groups in responses to this question, with all groups indicating that they feel most students favor liberal abortion laws (Tables 9, 10, and 11).

TABLE 9

MEAN SCALE SCORE RESPONSES TO NORM PERCEPTION QUESTION IN
MAIN INVESTIGATION (QUESTION #2, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Experimental Condition	Mean Score
High choice - normative - high conviction	3.00
High choice - normative - low conviction	2.27
High choice - nonnormative - high conviction	2.93
High choice - nonnormative - low conviction	2.73
Low choice - normative - high conviction	2.53
Low choice - normative - low conviction	2.13
Low choice - nonnormative - high conviction	2.60
Low choice - nonnormative - low conviction	2.40
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	2.47

Notes:

1 = in favor of liberal abortion laws.

6 = against liberal abortion laws.

One final note on the content of the arguments. Data from earlier pilot research, as described in the Method, show that there was no difference in the extremity of the attitude attribution as a function of the content of the arguments per se ($M = 1.61$ and 1.50 for nonnormative and normative statements respectively; $t = 0.82$).

Scores for the nonnormative group are inverted in order to compare the extremity ratings. See Appendix G.

TABLE 10

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR RESPONSES TO NORM PERCEPTION QUESTION IN
MAIN INVESTIGATION (QUESTION #2, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	p
Choice (A)	3.01	1	3.01	2.92	n.s.
Normativeness (B)	1.01	1	1.01	<1	n.s.
Conviction (C)	4.41	1	4.41	4.28	n.s.
A X B	0.01	1	0.01	<1	n.s.
A X C	0.21	1	0.21	<1	n.s.
B X C	1.01	1	1.01	<1	n.s.
A X B X C	0.21	1	0.21	<1	n.s.
Error (within)	115.47	112	1.03		
Total	125.32	119			

TABLE 11

t TEST COMPARISONS FOR RESPONSES TO NORM PERCEPTION QUESTION IN
MAIN INVESTIGATION (QUESTION #2, QUESTIONNAIRE II)

Experimental Condition	Mean Score	t
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	2.47	< 1
High choice - normative - high conviction	2.13	
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	2.47	1.33*
Low choice - normative - high conviction	3.00	

* n.s. (two-tailed)

Degree of Conviction Expressed in S.P.'s Behavior

It will be recalled that we measured degree of conviction by asking the Ss to listen to the vocal quality of the speech, ignoring the content, and then to judge the degree of success with which the S.P. expressed a high or low degree of conviction. It can be seen in Table 12 that the degree of success with which the S.P. expressed conviction was approximately equal for the two high conviction tapes and for the two low conviction tapes. It can also be seen that the

TABLE 12

t TEST COMPARISONS FOR THE PERCEPTION OF THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH S.P. ACTED WITH HIGH CONVICTION (QUESTION #3, APPENDIX C)

Experimental Condition	Mean Score	t
favor - high	5.25 ⁺	<1
against - high	5.84	
favor - low	8.23	1.38
against - low	8.65	
favor - high	5.25	5.58*
favor - low	8.23	
against - high	5.84	6.69*
against - low	8.65	

Notes:

favor - high = in favor of liberal abortion laws, high conviction tape;

favor - low = in favor of liberal abortion laws, low conviction tape;

against - high = against liberal abortion laws, high conviction tape;

against - low = against liberal abortion laws, low conviction tape.

+ On a 9-point scale with "9" being "not at all successful" and "1" being "extremely successful."

* $p < .01$, two-tailed.

S.P. is seen as being significantly more successful in conveying a high degree of conviction in both high conviction tapes than in both low conviction tapes.

Similarly we find in Table 13 that the degree of success with which the S.P. sounded indifferent was equal for both high conviction tapes and for both low conviction tapes. We also see that the S.P. was

TABLE 13

t TEST COMPARISONS FOR THE PERCEPTION OF THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH S.P. ACTED WITH LOW CONVICTION (QUESTION #3, APPENDIX C)

Experimental Condition	Mean Score	t
favor - high	6.33 ⁺	<1
against - high	5.78	
favor - low	2.90	<1
against - low	2.45	
favor - high	6.33	5.94*
favor - low	2.90	
against - high	5.78	4.74*
against - low	2.45	

Notes:

favor - high = in favor of liberal abortion laws, high conviction tape;

favor - low = in favor of liberal abortion laws, low conviction tape;

against - high = against liberal abortion laws, high conviction tape;

against - low = against liberal abortion laws, low conviction tape.

+ On a 9-point scale with "9" being "not at all successful" and "1" being "extremely successful."

* $p < .01$, two-tailed.

seen as being significantly more successful in conveying indifference in both low conviction tapes than in both high conviction tapes.

In referring to degree of conviction we are speaking relatively. That is, the high conviction tapes were seen as "somewhat" successful in conveying high conviction rather than "highly" successful. The low conviction tapes, however, were seen as more "highly" successful in conveying indifference (Table 14).

We get further supportive evidence for the success of the conviction manipulation from the Ss' responses to a 22-word adjective scale (Appendix C). The words were chosen on the basis that, subjectively, they seemed to describe different aspects of conviction. Half of the words were intended to reflect lack of conviction and half presence of conviction. This measure is not to be taken as conclusive since many of the Ss reported difficulty in responding to these items, particularly to the items which were intended to reflect lack of conviction. Furthermore, the meaning of many of these words in the present context is open to debate and interpretation. Despite these shortcomings, however, we find (see Tables in Appendix C) that responses to most of the traits still support our main finding that there is no difference in degree of conviction conveyed between the two high conviction tapes involving normative and nonnormative views, nor between the two low conviction tapes, while there is significantly greater conviction conveyed by both high conviction tapes than by both low conviction tapes.

TABLE 14

t TEST COMPARISONS WITHIN CONDITIONS FOR THE PERCEPTION OF
THE SUCCESS WITH WHICH S.P. ACTED WITH HIGH AND
LOW CONVICTION (APPENDIX C)

Question	Mean Score	t
<u>favor-high</u>		
high	5.25 ⁺	1.28
low	6.33	
<u>against-high</u>		
high	5.84	< 1
low	5.78	
<u>favor-low</u>		
high	8.23	8.78*
low	2.90	
<u>against-low</u>		
high	8.65	12.88*
low	2.45	

Notes:

high = "Assume S.P. was supposed to act with high conviction,
how successful was she?"

low = "Assume S.P. was supposed to act with low conviction,
how successful was she?"

Conditions: favor-high = in favor of liberal abortion laws,
high conviction tape;

favor-low = in favor of liberal abortion laws,
low conviction tape;

against-high = against liberal abortion laws,
high conviction tape;

against-low = against liberal abortion laws,
low conviction tape.

+ On a 9-point scale with "9" being "not at all successful"
and "1" being "extremely successful."

* $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Test of Hypotheses

We have two main dependent variable measures in this study. One is attitude attribution and is based on the sum of a given S's responses to ten attitude items. Each item consists of a six-point scale. Thus with a range of ten to sixty, a score of ten would reflect an attitude most favorable toward liberal abortion laws while a score of 60 would reflect an attitude most opposed to liberal abortion laws.

Since our hypotheses are stated in terms of extremity of attitude attribution rather than in terms of position, we inverted the scores of all Ss who heard an argument in favor of liberal abortion laws. This gives the direction of the scales the same meaning, thereby making them directly comparable in terms of extremity. Now a score of 60 for Ss hearing the normative tape reflects a strong attitude in favor of liberal abortion laws while a score of 60 for Ss hearing the nonnormative tape reflects a strong attitude against liberal abortion laws. Thus we can directly compare the extremity of a response favoring the issue with that opposing the issue.

In undertaking our statistical analyses it was evident that the data did not seem to meet the requirements of normality, nor that of homogeneity of variance, both necessary for parametric statistics. These data were transformed so as to permit us the use of the F-test. The transformation consisted of taking the square root of the complement of the raw score ($60 - X$). With this transformation, plus the robustness of the F-test (Box, 1953; McNemar, 1963) we then felt this would be an appropriate statistic. Thus in looking at the results it is important to note that, given the transformation for extremity

ratings, a lower score reflects a more extreme response.

The second dependent variable measure was certainty of judgment. The S was asked to consider, for each attitude item, how certain she was of her judgment of the S.P.'s response to the item. The S's score is the sum of her responses to the ten certainty items, each consisting of a six-point scale. The possible range of scores, then, was ten to sixty, with ten reflecting low certainty and sixty reflecting high certainty. These data met the assumptions for parametric statistics. Our data were basically analyzed by use of F and t tests.

Effect of Perceived Choice on Extremity of Attitude Attribution

The mean responses (transformed scores) for Ss in all experimental conditions can be seen in Table 15. The mean response for Ss in high choice conditions is 3.16. We see in Table 16 that this difference is highly significant ($p < .001$). Ss in high choice conditions attribute a more extreme attitude to the S.P. than do Ss in low choice conditions, confirming our first hypothesis.

It is interesting to note that the original data, that is, before transformation, show a much high variance for the low choice groups (127.50) than for the high choice groups (11.64). This gives us an F (10.95) which is significant beyond the .005 level of probability. It appears then that not only does low choice result in a less extreme response, but also it results in a much greater variety of response than does high choice.

Effect of Normativeness on Extremity of Attitude Attribution

The mean response for the Ss who hear a normative argument is

TABLE 15
MEAN ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION SCORES

Experimental Condition	Mean Score
High choice - normative - high conviction	1.82
High choice - normative - low conviction	2.19
High choice - nonnormative - high conviction	2.38
High choice - nonnormative - low conviction	2.36
Low choice - normative - high conviction	2.43
Low choice - normative - low conviction	2.94
Low choice - nonnormative - high conviction	2.87
Low choice - nonnormative - low conviction	4.40

Note:

These are the means of the transformed scores. A lower score therefore reflects a more extreme response.

more extreme (2.35) than is that for Ss who hear a nonnormative argument (3.00). The resultant F is significant beyond the .005 level (Table 16). We see that Hypothesis 2, which predicted more extreme attitude attribution when the S.P. showed nonnormative behavior than when she behaved normatively, is not confirmed. Indeed, just the obverse is the case. Ss witnessing normative behavior attributed a more extreme attitude to the actor than did Ss witnessing nonnormative behavior.

Again we find a significant F for the nontransformed variances ($F = 2.34$; $p < .005$). The variance for the normative group is 45.04

TABLE 16

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION SCORES

Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	p
Choice (A)	28.41	1	28.41	24.73	<.001
Normativeness (B)	13.04	1	13.04	11.35	<.005
Conviction (C)	10.62	1	10.62	9.25	<.005
A X B	2.56	1	2.56	2.23	n.s.
A X C	5.33	1	5.33	4.64	<.05
B X C	0.76	1	0.76	< 1	n.s.
A X B X C	3.74	1	3.74	3.26	>.05<.10
Error (within)	128.67	112	1.15		
Total	193.13	119			

while that for the nonnormative group is 107.04. It appears that nonnormative behavior results in a greater variety of response than does normative behavior. This also contradicts our expectation. Our hypothesis regarding normativeness is predicated upon the notion that normative behavior provides the S with more ambiguous information regarding the S.P. than does nonnormative behavior. However, it is the nonnormative behavior which results in the larger variance, in conjunction with a less extreme judgment.

Effect of Choice x Norm Interaction on Extremity of Attitude Attribution

Table 16 reveals that the interaction of choice and norm had no significant effect on the extremity of attitude attribution. Hypothesis 3 predicted a greater difference in extremity of attitude attribution as a function of degree of perceived choice under non-normative than under normative conditions. This hypothesis is not supported. The difference is, however, in the predicted direction.

That is, the difference as a function of perceived choice is greater when the behavior is nonnormative (Mean difference = 1.26) than when the behavior is normative (Mean difference = 0.69). The former is significant at the .005 level (Table 17). If we take this to be meaningful it would appear that perceived choice has a greater

TABLE 17

t TEST COMPARISONS FOR ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION SCORES AS A
FUNCTION OF CHOICE x NORM INTERACTION

Experimental Condition	Mean Score	t
High choice - normative	2.00	1.77*
High choice - nonnormative	2.37	
Low choice - normative	2.69	2.66**
Low choice - nonnormative	3.64	
High choice - normative	2.00	2.51**
Low Choice - normative	2.69	
High choice - nonnormative	2.37	4.04***
Low choice - nonnormative	3.64	

Note:

A lower score reflects a more extreme response.

* $p < .05$, two-tailed

** $p < .01$, two-tailed

*** $p < .005$, two-tailed

influence on perception of the S.P. when the S.P. argues nonnormatively than when she argues normatively.

Hypothesis 4 predicted a greater difference in extremity of attitude attribution as a function of the normativeness of the be-

havior under conditions of high choice than under conditions of low choice. This hypothesis is also not supported. The difference that does exist here is in the opposite direction to that predicted. That is, the mean difference as a function of normativeness is greater under low choice (0.95, $p < .01$) than under high choice conditions (0.37, $p < .05$). It would appear that, to the extent that there is an interaction effect, it is such that normativeness has a greater influence on perception of the S.P. when the behavior is seen to have been assigned than when it is seen to have been chosen by the S.P. The interaction findings relevant to Hypotheses 3 and 4 are shown in Figure 2.

Effect of Degree of Conviction on Extremity of Attitude Attribution

The mean transformed response for Ss who heard a high conviction argument is 2.38 while that for Ss who heard a low conviction argument is 2.97, as can be seen in Table 16. This difference is significant at the .005 level of confidence. Hypothesis 5 is confirmed. Ss who hear a high conviction argument attribute a more extreme attitude to the speaker than do Ss who hear a low conviction argument.

Examining the variances of the nontransformed data we again find a difference such that low conviction results in a much greater variance (120.79) than does high conviction (3.10). This difference is significant at the .005 level of confidence. This finding is reasonable since high conviction is assumed to provide the observer with more definitive information about the actor than low conviction. Although indifference represents how a person may feel about an issue,




Fig. 2. Choice x Norm Interaction.

its noncommittal, unconcerned character makes it subject to a greater variety of interpretations of the S.P.'s attitudes.

Effect of Choice x Conviction Interaction on Extremity of Attitude Attribution

Table 16 shows a significant interaction effect between perceived choice and degree of expressed conviction ($p < .05$). Thus it can be seen in this table and in Figure 3 that the difference in extremity of attitude attribution as a function of the degree of conviction is greater when the S.P. is seen to have had a low degree of choice in her behavior than when she is seen to have had a high degree of choice in her behavior (Mean differences: low choice = 1.02; high choice = 0.17). It appears that the behavior itself has a greater influence on attitude attribution when little choice is involved than when a lot of choice is seen to be involved. As a matter of fact, under high choice conditions, degree of conviction had no effect on attitude attribution (Table 18) while the effect of conviction under low choice conditions was significant at the .01 level of statistical probability.

We also find that the difference in extremity of attribution as a function of perceived choice is greater when the argument is presented with low conviction than when it is presented with high conviction. It can be seen in Table 16 that under low conviction a difference of 1.39 occurs between the high and low choice conditions, whereas the corresponding difference under high conviction is 0.55. Thus it appears also that degree of perceived choice plays a greater role in attitude attribution when the behavior is carried out with low conviction than when it is carried out with high conviction.




Fig. 3. Choice x Conviction Interaction.

TABLE 18

t TEST COMPARISONS FOR ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION SCORES AS A
FUNCTION OF CHOICE x CONVICTION INTERACTION

Experimental Condition	Mean Score	t
High choice - high conviction	2.10	<1
High choice - low conviction	2.28	
Low choice - high conviction	2.65	2.86**
Low choice - low conviction	3.67	
High choice - high conviction	2.10	2.28*
Low choice - high conviction	2.65	
High choice - low conviction	2.28	4.16***
Low choice - low conviction	3.67	

Note:

A lower score reflects a more extreme response.

* $p < .05$, two-tailed

** $p < .01$, two-tailed

*** $p < .005$, two-tailed

Effect of Experimental Variables on Certainty of Attitude Attribution

It can be seen in Tables 19 and 20 that only degree of choice had a significant effect on Ss' certainty in their judgment of the S.P.'s attitude. The mean response for the Ss in the high choice conditions is 51.63 while that for Ss in the low choice conditions is 48.30, the difference between them being significant at the .005 level of confidence. None of the other factors had a significant influence on Ss' certainty.

On the basis of these data Hypothesis 8 is only partially con-

TABLE 19
MEAN CERTAINTY SCORES

Experimental Condition	Mean Score
High choice - normative - high conviction	54.40
High choice - normative - low conviction	50.33
High choice - nonnormative - high conviction	50.13
High choice - nonnormative - low conviction	51.67
Low choice - normative - high conviction	47.73
Low choice - normative - low conviction	48.53
Low choice - nonnormative - high conviction	49.87
Low choice - nonnormative - low conviction	47.07
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	53.93

Note:

A higher score reflects greater certainty.

firmed. Ss in high choice conditions attribute a more extreme attitude to the S.P. than do Ss in low choice conditions, and are also more certain of their judgments. But there are no significant differences in Ss' certainty of their judgments as a function of the normativeness of the argument nor as a function of the degree of conviction expressed.

We do however find an overall correlation of .54 ($p < .025$) between Ss' certainty judgments and their extremity judgments. Looking at the groups individually we find in Table 21 a signifi-

TABLE 20
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CERTAINTY SCORES

Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	p
Choice (A)	333.33	1	333.33	8.64	<.005
Normativeness (B)	9.63	1	9.63	<1	n.s.
Conviction (C)	38.53	1	38.53	<1	n.s.
A X B	24.30	1	24.30	<1	n.s.
A X C	0.53	1	0.53	<1	n.s.
B X C	7.50	1	7.50	<1	n.s.
A X B X C	158.70	1	158.70	4.11	<.05
Error (within)	4319.87	112	38.57		
Total	4891.87	119			

cant correlation for all groups except HNNL and LNH groups. The largest correlation (0.76) occurs in the LNL group, where the S.P. is assigned to argue normatively and does so with low conviction. The lowest correlation (0.05) occurs in the LNH group, where the S.P. is assigned to argue normatively and does so with high conviction. The other group with a nonsignificant correlation (0.31) is the HNNL group, in which the S.P. chooses to argue nonnormatively and then argues with low conviction.

Effect of Disobeying Instructions on Attitude Attribution and Certainty

Hypothesis 6 predicted that going against the restraint of assignment (ANH group) would result in more extreme and more certain attitude attribution than not going against such restraint (LNH group). This hypothesis is confirmed. Since the variances were homogeneous for the groups in question here the analyses were done on the original,

TABLE 21

CORRELATION BETWEEN ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION SCORES AND CERTAINTY SCORES

Experimental Condition	N	$\bar{X}$	$\bar{Y}$	r
High choice - normative - high conviction	15	1.82	54.40	.54**
High choice - normative - low conviction	15	2.19	50.33	.54**
High choice - nonnormative - high conviction	15	2.38	50.13	.59***
High choice - nonnormative - low conviction	15	2.36	51.67	.31*
Low choice - normative - high conviction	15	2.43	47.73	.06*
Low choice - normative - low conviction	15	2.94	48.53	.76****
Low choice - nonnormative - high conviction	15	2.87	49.87	.56**
Low choice - nonnormative - low conviction	15	4.40	47.07	.52**
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	15	1.69	53.93	.68****
Total	135	2.57	50.41	.54***

Notes:

$\bar{X}$ = attitude attribution score
 $\bar{Y}$ = certainty score

The attitude attribution scores are the transformed scores;
the certainty scores are the original scores.

* n.s.
** $p < .05$, two-tailed
*** $p < .025$, two-tailed
**** $p < .01$, two-tailed

nontransformed data. Thus a higher score reflects more extreme attitude attribution. As shown in Table 22 the mean attitude attribution response for the Ss in the ANH condition was 56.33. The mean

TABLE 22

t TEST COMPARISONS FOR ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION AND CERTAINTY RESPONSES
FOR ANH-HNH AND ANH-LNH GROUPS

Experimental Condition	Mean Score	t
<u>Attitude Attribution</u>		
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	56.33	< 1
High choice - normative - high conviction	55.80	
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	56.33	2.07*
Low choice - normative - high conviction	53.53	
<u>Certainty</u>		
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	53.93	< 1
High choice - normative - high conviction	54.40	
Anti-low choice - normative - high conviction	53.93	2.57**
Low choice - normative - high conviction	47.73	

* $p < .05$, two-tailed

** $p < .02$, two-tailed

response for Ss in the LN condition was 53.53, a difference which is significant at the .05 level of confidence. The mean certainty response for the former group was 53.93 and for the latter group 47.73. This difference is significant at the .02 level of confidence.

We find no differences in attitude attribution or certainty responses between ANH and HNH groups. The former group gives a mean attitude attribution response of 56.33 and a mean certainty response of 53.93. The latter group gives a mean attribution response of 55.80 and a mean certainty response of 54.40. None of the differences are significant.

Finally, we find a correlation between extremity of response and certainty of 0.68 ($p < .01$) for the ANH group, adding further support to Hypothesis 8. A more extreme response has a greater concomitant certainty.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

We will discuss the findings and implications of choice, normativeness, choice x norm interaction, conviction, choice x conviction interaction, and certainty in that order in this section.

Choice

The present study grew basically out of an essay by Jones and Davis (1965) - "From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception." This essay is described by the authors as an attempt "to develop a systematic conceptual framework for research on person perception." Their notions about the inference process in person perception, as discussed earlier in the Introduction, can be seen as an outgrowth of concepts developed by Heider (1944; 1946; 1958). The basic issue is one of "explaining" behavior, of defining conditions which influence the attribution of factors which are taken as causes for behavior. Jones and Davis feel that in attempting to explain a behavior an observer will seek to attribute an intention for the act. This attribution will be most influenced by the observer's consideration of the effects the act will have. The intention attributed to the act will suffice to explain it. But from this intention the observer may go further and attribute an underlying attitude or disposition to the actor.

But observing the effects of the act itself is not adequate for

attributing intentions. The observer's inference process will necessarily be influenced by the context in which the behavior is seen to occur. The "most central assumption" made by Jones and Davis "in considering the attribution of intentions is that actions are informative to the extent that they have emerged out of a context of choice and reflect a selection of one among plural alternatives." This assumption leads to further considerations about the nature of the effects of the act, the uniqueness of the effects relative to the effects of other possible acts, the "cultural desirability" of the effects, and how these aspects of the effects of a given act influence the act's "informativeness," that is, how much the act reveals about the actor.

A The expression "correspondence of inference" is used to describe this informativeness. When a behavior allows for a correspondent inference, the behavior is seen as directly reflecting some disposition. This notion is analogous to Heider's concept of Phenomenal Description, which implies a close coordination between the percept (the impression in our case) and the distal stimulus (the S.P.). Factors in what Heider refers to as the "mediation" (the S.P.'s behavior, the context, etc.) influence the degree of coordination (or correspondence). The most basic factor examined in this way is the choice the S.P. is seen to have in his behavior.

In the present investigation we had created conditions which can be grossly defined as high and low choice. Given the success of this manipulation, our results clearly confirm our first hypothesis and support the implications of Jones and Davis' formulation with respect to the role of perceived choice in the inference process. That

is to say, conditions of high choice resulted in more correspondent inferences than did conditions of low choice. This was seen in the fact that judgments made about the S.P.'s attitude toward the given issue were more extreme and were made with greater certainty when the S.P. was seen to be acting in a context of high choice than when she was seen to be acting in a context of low choice.

We also noted a much greater variance in extremity of responses under low choice conditions than under high choice conditions. Though not used by Jones and Davis to define correspondence this result can also be taken to mean that behavior in a high choice context conveys clearer, less ambiguous information about the actor than does behavior in a low choice context. In line with Heider's notions, the P perceives the S.P. in terms of the meaning of his behavior, rather than merely perceiving the overt behavior. And this meaning, again, is a function of the "embeddedness" of the behavior, or its context. The same behavior may reflect several distal contents. It is assumed (Heider, 1958) that the P seeks constancy in perception, seeks the invariances which underlie manifest behaviors. Jones and Davis assert that, in attempting to explain a behavior the observer will make inferences to the S.P.'s intentions. This will suffice to explain the behavior. But is the intention seen as invariant? We should ask how far beyond the intention will the observer go in the inference process. Jones and Davis feel that assigning an intention to the act, in order to explain it, is adaptive, allowing the P to "go about his interpersonal business unfettered by a concern with ultimate or infinitely regressive causes."

But Heider and others assume that we seek stable perceptual

environments. This would require going beyond the immediate intention to more basic causes. Jones and Davis feel that inference to an intention is prerequisite to inference to an underlying disposition. In our investigation the P was asked to give his inference to the S.P.'s underlying attitude. We might assume that this followed inferences to the S.P.'s intentions in the given setting. The inferences to intentions were, as theoretically discussed earlier in the Introduction, determined by considerations of the choice the P had in her behavior. Thus the intentions inferred under low choice conditions are seen to be lower in correspondence than the intentions inferred under high choice conditions, in that the former are not seen as describing the dispositions of the actor as readily as the latter.

Returning to the question of how far the inference process goes we might ask if the P actually goes through the intention to the underlying disposition. Thus we might ask the P why the S.P. acted as she did, rather than, or in addition to asking for S.P.'s attitude. This is questioning the nature of the process itself; is it stepwise, going from observation to intentions, and finally to inferences to "ultimate causes?" Or is the perception more immediate and given, as Asch might have felt, with the steps being added only in retrospect in response to an examiner's prodding?

It is difficult to judge whether Jones and Davis imply that the inference process is conscious or unconscious. It seems that both conscious and unconscious, immediate and stepwise aspects would be functioning. Thus in the high choice situation there might be an immediate impression of the S.P.'s underlying attitude on the issue

without realization of the basis for this impression, while in the low choice situation the process might be more stepwise and conscious. P might respond "I don't know how he feels - after all, he had no choice in what he was doing." At any rate it might illuminate the inference process if we were to ask the P why she judged the S.P. as she had. Perhaps we would see how available the process is to their awareness.

One wonders, further, the extent to which considerations of choice influence other aspects of the inference process. In our investigation we measured inferences to attitudes toward liberal abortion laws. What other attributes will the P assign to the S.P. as a function of perceived choice? Would the fact of greater choice in behavior result in a "clearer" picture of the actor, and thereby perhaps in a greater number of inferences to dispositions, and/or greater depth of inference, and/or a different type of inference? Following the inference approach further, perhaps high choice would result in more inferences to personality factors while low choice would result in more inferences to contextual factors.

In light of the fact that the central assumption in Jones and Davis' theory entails considerations of the choice context in which the S.P. is seen to act, it would be important to elaborate on the meaning, nature, and measurement of choice. Jones and Davis see the concept of choice in terms of different effects which would result from actions which are seen to be available to the S.P. It does not seem feasible to define and delimit the factors which go into creating a setting of high or low choice. Though Jones and Davis define choice,

and discuss the implications of this definition, questions still arise about the role of choice in the inference process. For example, given various effect-clusters for different available acts, how does the P perceive the source of the choice, and how will this influence the inference process? Thus, for example, might choice which is seen as delegated by an authority to the S.P. have different implications for the inferences the P will make about the S.P. than choice which the S.P. is seen to create for himself?

Our results clearly demonstrate the subjective nature, and thereby the malleability of choice perception. Thus we noted that high conviction behavior on the part of the S.P. resulted in the perception of a higher degree of choice than did low conviction behavior. As will be recalled, this was the case even though the P clearly knew that, objectively, the S.P. picked her position. This might be understood in terms of one's tendency toward cognitive consistency (Heider, 1946; Festinger, 1957; Newcomb, 1956; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955). As it seems consistent to choose to argue for that which one believes, it is also consistent to argue strongly for that which one chooses; or conversely to feel that if one argues strongly he probably chose the position.

Thus we also noted that seven of the Ps in the HNNL condition considered the S.P. to have had less choice in her behavior than their knowledge that the S.P. selected her position would predict. In the HNNL condition the P is told that the S.P. chose the position for which she argued. She then heard the S.P. present the nonnormative argument in a dull, apathetic way. Theoretically the knowledge of the choice context would result in the opinion that the S.P.'s behavior will

reflect her feeling, and thus will probably be strong. Added to this is the knowledge that the position chosen is nonnormative, which should further the expectation for a highly conviction presentation. It might be worthwhile to see what the P's expectations are at this point. At any rate, the P is then confronted with a virtual monotone. We do not know what went through her mind then, but the outcome for several was a lowered judgment of the choice available to the S.P. In this way the P restored, to some extent, the balance which was briefly upset in her cognitive sphere. Thus one of these P's said that a choice between only two alternatives is not really much of a choice. The theory must deal more specifically with the various dimensions of choice both conceptually and operationally.

The problem of "choice" is thus one of both operational and conceptual definition. Can one individual's subjective experience of choice be measured, and compared with the subjective experience of choice in others? Will both A and B, exposed to two alternatives, experience the same feeling of choice? If so, how do we know this? Will both A and B see a third person experiencing the same degree of choice in a given setting. Perhaps we can ask the P "how much choice do you think the S.P. felt" rather than "how much choice do you think the S.P. had?" The latter asks for the P's experience; the former for the P's judgment of the S.P.'s experience. It is also possible that perceived choice limitations which are based in perception of the S.P.'s ability have different implications for perception of the S.P. than do limitations seen to be due to external constraints. Perhaps these cannot be separated to begin with however. I suggest not. If one is seen to choose, he must be seen to be able to choose. Then again the

consideration of choice itself may become relevant only in a situation in which the S.P. is seen to have low choice. Otherwise ability, choice, may simply be taken for granted.

The notion of choice furthermore has wide implications for social psychology in general, for human interaction and relations, and for many practical issues. Thus in listening to a speech by a public figure, or from an ad agency, our impression of the speaker's opinion, and thereby the effect on our own opinion, may be influenced by the motives attributed to the speaker. These in turn will be a function of the choice alternatives seen to be available to the speaker. Our everyday interaction with individuals will also be influenced by our perception of the choice the individual is seen to have in his behavior, whether this perception or influence is conscious or unconscious, blatant or subtle.

One variation in the notion of choice we explored was that of anti-low choice. As will be recalled, Jones and Harris (1967) had a "Non-Choice Ambivalent" condition in which the S.P. presented an ambivalent argument for a position to which he was assigned. In our ANH condition the S.P. was assigned to argue nonnormatively but argued normatively, despite the moderator's interruption and reminder to the S.P. of her assignment, and presented the normative position with a high degree of conviction.

We expected that the act of going against a constraint, S.P.'s assignment in this case, would result in greater attitude attribution than would either the condition of following the instruction (low choice) or the condition of absence of constraint (high choice). The former expectation was confirmed. Ps in the ANH condition attribute

a more extreme attitude to the S.P., and did so with greater certainty, than did Ps in the LNH condition. The ANH condition results in greater correspondence of inference than does the LNH condition. But there was no difference in correspondence between the ANH and HNH conditions. This lack of difference may reflect several things. For one it may mean that there was no difference in the degree of choice perceived, and therefore no difference in attitude attribution; if indeed it is the choice perception which is the major determinant of correspondence. It may also mean that the quality or source of choice is irrelevant. We assume that the nature of the choice perceived in these two conditions is different. Perhaps the source of the choice, its quality rather than degree, whether bestowed upon the S.P. by the moderator or created by the S.P. herself, in the face of pressure, does not influence the correspondence of inferences drawn. Or it may reflect an experimental situation which did not adequately convey a conflict between the two forces - the S.P. and the moderator, and thus did not appear very different from choice in the HNH condition.

It would be useful, in measuring perception of choice, to ask the Ps to describe the quality and degree of choice they perceive, rather than asking for a simple scalar response. If the conflict in this condition could be made clear, it would be informative to see what other effects this choice condition would have on impression formation. Thus, as suggested earlier for high and low choice conditions, we might tap the extent and quality of inferences the P might make to other dispositions of the S.P.

Generally we have supported the hypothesis that perception of

choice in behavior will result in more extreme and certain inferences to the S.P.'s underlying attitude. But what of the influences of factors within choice conditions? Knowledge of choice per se is important. How does this relate to knowledge of what is chosen. This might merely affect the content of the inferences made. But we hypothesize that this will have implications for the correspondence of the inferences as well. Thus we come to a consideration of the normativeness of the behavior.

Normativeness

For reasons discussed in the Introduction, and above, we felt it important to examine not only the fact of choice variations but also the content of what is chosen or assigned; the behavior itself. That aspect of the behavior we are dealing with here is its normativeness.

Our pilot research had established the fact that it is normative among Brooklyn College female undergraduates, at the time of this study, in the Spring of 1969, to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws and nonnormative to argue against liberal abortion laws. Our hypothesis that nonnormative behavior would result in more extreme attitude attribution than would normative behavior was not confirmed. Indeed, the reverse of this occurred. There was more extreme attitude attribution when the S.P. argued for the normative position than when she argued for the nonnormative position. Further, and again contrary to what might have been expected if nonnormative behavior did result in more correspondent inferences than normative behavior, we found a much greater variance in extremity responses when the behavior was nonnormative than when it was normative.

Jones and Davis assume that an act is seen to be performed in order to achieve the "normally desirable effects" - these are the actor's intentions. They assume that, where the observer and the actor have things in common, as is the case in our investigation, the observer will use himself as a frame of reference with which to understand the actor's intentions. It is further assumed that the fewer universally desirable effects the act has, the more correspondent will be the inferences drawn. Thus, as noted in the Introduction, normative behavior is assumed to be seen as having several universally desirable effects - conformity to the group, avoidance of social sanctions, expression of own opinion. Any one of these may be used to "explain" the S.P.'s behavior, but only the last would apply when the behavior is nonnormative. From the intention thus inferred, the observer will infer underlying attributes about the actor. This latter inference should be more correspondent when the behavior is nonnormative.

But the reverse occurred. Normativeness is certainly an important factor. But the question remains why the normative behavior resulted in greater correspondence than the nonnormative behavior. If the theory is correct, then the normative behavior in this instance must have been seen as having fewer desirable effects than the nonnormative behavior. Again, as with choice considerations, it might be enlightening to ask the P why the S.P. acted as she did. What might some of the effects of the nonnormative behavior be, besides expression of one's own opinion? The S.P. might be seen as trying to show that she is an individualist; perhaps she is taking a nonnormative position for the sake of argument in the debating context; she might be seen as conforming to the norms of the larger society. The point is that

we must be very wary in predefining, and assuming the number of desirable effects different acts have, despite their normativeness. Perhaps it would be more instructive, for the theory, to test this issue by clearly defining the behavioral alternatives in terms of the types and number of effects - either by listing them for the subjects, or eliciting them from the subjects - rather than by defining behaviors conceptually as normative, nonnormative, culturally desirable or undesirable, with the implications that are assumed for these definitions.

Another possibility to be considered is that, in spite of our attempts to insure the use of the P's own peers as her frame of reference for judging the S.P.'s behavior, she might have, at least partly, used the larger society. In our pilot research (Appendix A) we found that the subjects saw themselves and their peers as significantly more in favor of liberal abortion laws than they saw their parents or the larger society. Perhaps then, the P identifies the whole college population as a deviant subgroup of the larger society, rather than considering the issue only in terms of the norms of her peers.

Jones and Davis saw commonality of objectives among people as tending to define desirable effects for the observer. The P will identify with the S.P., will put herself in the S.P.'s place. This is especially likely in a homogeneous group such as is our sample. It might then be felt that being in favor of liberal abortion laws, though normative for the student group in question, is less normative for the larger society. Pilot test responses to questions regarding societal norms were ~~unimodal~~ ^{unimodal}, bordering on the 'favor' side. Perhaps

perception of the adult standard is not clear, or not strong. But using both the student and societal norms as standards, arguing against liberal abortion laws would certainly be seen as disagreeing with the student norm; and might be seen as tending to agree more with the societal norm. We are implying now that the student sees the college standard as nonnormative with respect to the larger society. Using this frame of reference, then, arguing against liberal abortion laws would be seen as more normative than arguing in favor of liberal abortion laws. Theoretical considerations which applied to normativeness would continue to apply; but here favoring liberal abortion laws would be expected to result in more correspondent inferences.

This result also contradicts Jones and Harris' (1967) notion that a behavior with a low prior probability of occurrence would result in more correspondent inferences than would a behavior with a high prior probability of occurrence. Our pilot research clearly demonstrated that there was a higher likelihood that a student would argue in favor of liberal abortion laws rather than against these. But the favor position resulted in greater correspondence. The question remains, then, high or low probability for whom? And what is the source of this probability; coercion, free choice, basic attitudes, conformity to subgroup standards or to societal standards? These must be more clearly specified, with the implications for each spelled out.

The above considerations would also explain the finding of greater variance in the nonnormative than in the normative condition. A student would be clear about the salient norms of her own group. She would then tend to be clearer about the S.P.'s attitude when her be-

havior conformed to this norm. But in hearing an argument which is nonnormative for the subgroup and more normative for the larger societal group, the P may feel greater confusion in inferring the S.P.'s attitudes. The difference in variance might also be explained by assuming that the subjects used the society rather than their peers as the standard for defining norms against which to judge the S.P.'s behavior. In that event it would merely mean that the against argument is normative, and thus less clearly reflective of the S.P.'s underlying attitude.

The above discussion, while not eliminating the implications of normativeness for the inference process, as outlined by Jones and Davis, under the term "Cultural Desirability," does raise many questions which require further exploration. The meaning and source of prior probability should be specified; the groups to which the norm applies should be specified; and the reference points used by the subjects clearly demonstrated. We must answer the question - normative for whom, and how is this knowledge used by the subjects, if we are to make predictions.

We might also understand the finding of greater correspondence of inference under normative than under nonnormative conditions in terms of a balance theory of attitudes. Heider (1958) describes and explains behavior, attitudes, and interpersonal perception in terms of cognitive consistency. He feels that perception of persons and acts follows the laws of perceptual unit formation (for example: contiguity, similarity). For example, similarity and proximity between a person and his acts will favor the attribution of these acts to the person rather than to some other cause; and established causal person-act

units make for assimilation and contrast between the parts. Much social perception, then, is held to be determined at least partly by simple cognitive configurations (1946). One's attitude toward an event can alter his attitude toward the person who caused the event.

Let us consider Heider's p-o-x model. In this model let p refer to the perceiver, o to the S.P., and x to a third person, event, idea, or object. In terms of the present investigation x would refer to "liberal abortion laws." A balanced state will exist in p's cognitive realm if all three possible relations are positive, or if two are negative and one is positive. On the basis of our pilot research we will assume that p favors x. Given that p and o are from the same population of college students, and have many things in common, we will also assume that p feels at least some positive identification with o. The p is then exposed to some behavior on the part of o, related to x. When o favors x balance exists in p's cognitive structure. To maintain or reinforce the balance, the lack of which is assumed to produce forces toward restoration, p will assume that o favors x strongly; that is, will attribute the normative attitude to o strongly. To do otherwise would result in tension.

When o argues against x, however, imbalance exists. Balance may be restored in a variety of ways. The p may segregate o or x in his cognitive structure, making them unrelated to him or to each other; p may change his feelings about x; p may change his feelings about o; and p may deny the causal unit between o and her act, that is, may not attribute as extreme an attitude against x to o. Or all of the above may occur in varying degrees. We note (see Tables 36 and 37 in Appendix F) that the S.P. is liked more when arguing in favor of

liberal abortion laws than when arguing against liberal abortion laws, supporting the notion that balance is sought.

This reasoning implies that the perceiver must be considered in his irrational needs and perceptions, as well as the logical, rational being he is sometimes assumed to be in this theory. How might the P respond if the S.P. was not a member of his group, was not related to him, was already "segregated" in the P's mind; that is, has a different set of norms to follow to start with, with these having no personal relevance to the P?

Choice x Norm Interaction

We had hypothesized that perceived choice would have a greater influence on extremity of attitude attribution when the behavior is nonnormative than when it is normative; and that the normativeness of the behavior would have a greater influence on attitude attribution in a high choice context than in a low choice context. Neither hypothesis was confirmed.

It is interesting, nonetheless, to look at the direction of the differences which did occur. Results relevant to the first interaction hypothesis are in the predicted direction. That is, when the S.P. argues against liberal abortion laws (nonnormative) there is a greater difference in extremity of attribution as a function of perceived choice than when the S.P. argues in favor of liberal abortion laws (normative).

We might examine this in light of our earlier discussion, as follows. Let us again assume that the position favoring liberal abortion laws is much more normative for the S.P.'s subgroup than for the larger society, and that the P used the larger society, at

least partly, as a frame of reference in which to respond to the S.P.'s behavior. It would be important for the group to maintain and support its own norms against those of the outgroup. And in terms of Heider's p-o-x model a balanced state exists when o argues normatively; p will accept this as reflecting o's attitude. Considerations of choice then become less relevant. The P may have less need to base her inferences on commonality of effects, or desirability of effects in choice areas.

But when the behavior is nonnormative, contradicting the subgroup's norms, producing imbalance, and perhaps a sense of threat to the group, forces arise which push toward balance. One method of restoring balance is to distort the impression of the S.P.'s real position, or underlying attitude. This is accomplished more easily when the S.P. is seen to have had no choice in her behavior than when she is seen to have chosen the position. This then might result in a greater difference in extremity of attribution as a function of choice when the behavior is nonnormative than when it is normative.

It would appear then that the factor of choice will allow an observer to draw various kinds of inferences; what he will actually do though will be a function of his needs and the situation.

The results also point in the opposite direction to that predicted in our second interaction hypothesis. That is, normativeness is found to result in a greater difference in extremity of attitude attribution when the behavior is seen to occur in a low choice context than when it is seen to occur in a high choice context. The content of the behavior may be less relevant under high choice conditions; that is, the factor of choice may largely determine the correspondence

of inferences drawn without regard to the specific choices made. But when the position is assigned to the S.P. the content of the behavior may take on greater relevance in affecting correspondence of inferences. That is, the choice context provides very little information - so the P looks elsewhere - to the behavior; this is all she has to go on now.

What we find then, is that the normative behavior, under low choice, results in more extreme attribution than does the nonnormative behavior. Again, assume that the P desires to support the subgroup norm, and to maintain intra-cognitive balance; and that this would be accomplished by attributing a more extreme attitude to the S.P. under normative conditions than under nonnormative conditions. The P is freer to do this, to distort if necessary, under low choice conditions than under high choice conditions. Thus we would get a greater difference in extremity of attitude attribution under low than under high choice conditions. Again, low choice provides the opportunity for the P to use her cognitive processes more flexibly if she wants to. The behavior, concern for her group, other factors, may then provide the need to distort.

Another possibility is that this result can be seen as a function of the P's sharing of the S.P.'s frame of reference and norm. Thus if there is a strong ingroup identification the P is likely to be very pleased when hearing another group member argue for the position of the group. She might even exaggerate the S.P.'s normative opinion, thus increasing, by social comparison and consensual validation, the "validity" of the group's and of her own opinion. In this light it would be interesting to see the effects of normative and nonnormative

behavior when the observer and the S.P. come from populations with different norms with respect to the given issue.

One further possibility suggests itself. Measures of extremity of attitude attribution under low choice conditions may merely measure the P's impression of the norm. Thus the P might match her own attitude with that heard. Her resultant response will be some combination of this, reflecting her impression of the norm. For example, hearing an argument in favor of liberal abortion laws added to her initial view favoring these will result in a more extreme view of the norm; and this in turn might be reflected in inferences to a more extreme attitude on the part of the S.P. Hearing an argument against liberal abortion laws, combined with her own view favoring these would then result in less extreme inferences. It would be interesting, in this light, to compare P's whose initial views differ.

Perhaps extremity itself is not an adequate measure of correspondence. Extremity of attribution may reflect a variety of things - reflections of the norm, stereotypic impressions, as well as impressions of underlying attitudes. Depth of inferences, number of inferences, length of inferences, consistency of inferences might provide a more comprehensive indicator of correspondence.

Conviction

In light of research on nonverbal communication, as discussed in the Introduction, we had predicted that the manner in which the behavior is carried out would have a significant influence on the inference process as described by Jones and Davis. Specifically, we predicted that whether the behavior is normative or nonnormative,

whether it occurs in a context of high or low choice, the degree of conviction carried in the tone of voice of the speaker would influence the correspondence of inferences drawn in such a way that a high conviction presentation would result in more extreme attitude attribution than would a low conviction presentation. Our results confirmed this hypothesis. Though we found no difference in the certainty with which the attribution is made, we did also find a much smaller variance in attribution under high conviction conditions than under low conviction conditions. This latter finding would tend to support the notion that high conviction is more clearly informative with respect to the S.P.'s attitude than is low conviction.

Why does high conviction result in greater correspondence than low conviction? Recall that a correspondent inference means that the behavior is seen as directly reflecting an underlying disposition. Jones and Davis feel that inferences to dispositions are preceded by inferences to intentions; the latter being determined by factors which influence the observer's perception of the choices available to the actor, and the implications for resultant effects that different choice areas have. The question presents itself, then, as to whether variations in expressed conviction have their influence on correspondence by affecting the perception of choice, or whether such variations influence correspondence more directly in their own right. As noted earlier, conviction did influence choice perception. High conviction S.P.s were seen as having had greater choice in their behavior than low conviction S.P.s. The reverse might also be true; that choice perception influences the perception of vocal conviction, but we have no data on this.

We must next consider, then, how conviction might influence choice perception. High choice implies the availability of more alternatives than does low choice. Several Ps reported that the S.P. "sounds like" she had no choice, under low conviction conditions. Perhaps these Ps are merely reflecting the tendency toward consistency which we discussed earlier. It is more consistent to feel that, having chosen a position one will sound more convinced about it, or that sounding highly convinced she either chose the position, or would have if given the choice. Concepts of balance might then explain the difference in correspondence by means of alterations in choice perception.

But it seems that, though the above might contribute to our understanding of the findings, the vocal conviction can be seen as having its influence more directly. On a nonrational level it is more consistent to feel that a person arguing vehemently about a position believes in it more strongly than does one who argues apathetically about it. To explain the result more directly in terms of Jones and Davis would require the inference that high vocal conviction is seen as having fewer universally desirable effects, and as being less culturally desirable; these being the two main determinants of correspondence. Such considerations require further exploration.

Choice x Conviction Interaction

We also noted a significant effect on extremity of attribution, due to the interaction of conviction and choice. There was a greater difference in extremity of attribution as a function of degree of expressed conviction under low choice conditions than under high choice

conditions. The difference in extremity as a function of conviction under high choice conditions was nonsignificant. Both high and low conviction presentation resulted in a high degree of attribution under high choice. That is, conviction seems to have no implications for correspondence when the behavior is seen to have been chosen. The potency of the choice factor, as proposed by Jones and Davis, thus receives further support. A low conviction presentation in a high choice context results in more extreme attitude attribution than does a high conviction presentation in a low choice context. When the choice factor is lacking, that is, in a low choice context, degree of expressed conviction takes on a significant role; that is, determines the correspondence of the inference. Under low choice, where we presume the P is at a loss for clear information with which to judge the speaker, she will turn to what is available. In this particular analysis it is the tone of voice used by the speaker (as it was, almost, the normativeness of the position in our earlier discussion). Thus we find a significant difference in extremity of judgments as a function of the degree of conviction expressed when the behavior takes place in a low choice context.

We further found that when the behavior is presented with low conviction there is a greater difference in extremity of attribution as a function of perceived choice than when the behavior is presented with high conviction. Again it appears that the P will use the best available information in making judgments about the S.P.; "best available" meaning that which results in greatest correspondence, which is most informative about the underlying dispositions of the S.P.

Low choice, and low conviction, and as seen earlier, possibly

normative behavior do not have clear implications for describing the S.P.; so the P seeks other information. Thus, under low conviction conditions the P looks at the S.P.'s choice more than is the case under high conviction conditions.

The inference process, its determinants and consequences, as outlined by Jones and Davis is obviously a complicated affair. Perhaps there is a hierarchy such that different types of information take precedence over others in determining correspondence - for example, nonverbal cues, choice, content of behavior. Perhaps the hierarchy varies in different situations. Varieties of information are presented to the P, but she differentially selects different aspects to focus upon in different contexts, when judging the S.P. What determines these differences? And how might such different sources of information influence more elaborate aspects of impressions formed?

Certainty

In light of Jones and Davis' concept of correspondence as being operationally defined by both the certainty and extremity of attitude attribution, with the implication that these necessarily go together in the inference process, we had predicted a correlation between extremity and certainty judgments. This prediction is borne out by our results.

In looking at the three main variables individually, however, we find a significant effect on certainty due only to the choice factor. Neither variations in normativeness nor in degree of expressed conviction had a differential effect on the certainty with which attitude judgments were made. The question is raised then, are normativeness and conviction in behavior weak factors in determining the corresponde

ence of subsequent inferences, or is certainty an inadequate measure of correspondence? We had noted in all conditions that the factor of choice seemed to have the strongest influence on correspondence, influencing both extremity and certainty responses. This indeed supports Jones and Davis' notion that the perceived choice is most relevant for providing information on which to draw inferences regarding the actor's underlying dispositions.

Yet we do find differences in extremity as a function of both normativeness and conviction in the behavior. Do these differences reflect differences in correspondence, even though we find no difference in certainty? Perhaps the notion of correspondence needs further clarification, both conceptually and operationally. It will be recalled that an inference is said to be correspondent when it similarly describes an act and an underlying attribute. In this case the act is presumed to be a clear, direct reflection of an underlying disposition. The extent, then, to which conditions result in correspondent inferences is presumably reflected in the extremity of underlying dispositions attributed to the actor and the certainty with which such attribution is made.

But we would not say that an inference is either correspondent or not. There will be gradations of correspondence between these extremes. Perhaps different combinations of extremity and certainty responses reflect such gradations. Thus a factor which affects both extremity and certainty of attribution might be considered as resulting in greater correspondence than one which affects only extremity, or only certainty of attribution. The latter would in turn be considered as resulting in greater correspondence than a factor which affects

neither extremity nor certainty. Thus there are various combinations possible - each with different implications for the meaning of correspondence. For example, might not there be conditions in which one would feel certain that the S.P. has a moderate attitude on an issue? It seems that this inference would be correspondent, though it entails high certainty and low extremity.

Besides a significant overall correlation between extremity and certainty we also noted that seven of the nine experimental conditions individually showed significant correlations. The conditions which resulted in nonsignificant correlations were those of HNNL and LNH. In the HNNL condition it will be recalled that the P sees the S.P. choosing to argue nonnormatively and then hears her present her position with an indifferent tone of voice. This presents a very inconsistent picture to the P. The context of high choice and the non-normative behavior are presumed to be highly correspondent sources of information; to convey much clear information about the speaker's underlying dispositions; to result in extreme and certain inferences. One does not lightly choose to go against the norm. But she does. And what happens? She sounds bored. This might at least surprise the observer; we do not know, though, what went through her mind. Recall, also, that this is the condition in which seven of the Ps felt that, though the S.P. picked her position it seemed as though she had low choice. This is obviously a confusing situation. Thus perhaps we find the low correlation.

It is possible that subjects choose to focus on different aspects of the situation in making their judgments - the context, the behavior, the content - resulting in differences in extremity and

certainty judgments. If subjects based their judgments mainly on considerations of choice then, particularly in this condition, it might be instructive to know which aspect of choice was focused on - the P's knowledge of the availability of alternatives or her subjective impression about the meaning these had for the S.P. in terms of feeling a sense of choice. We might also wonder if the bases for extremity and certainty judgments are the same. This consideration would obviously have important implications for the prediction of correlations.

Let us note that the LNH condition, which also shows a nonsignificant extremity - certainty correlation, presents a somewhat inconsistent picture to the P. Here the S.P. is assigned to argue normatively. These two factors are presumably low in correspondence value. But then she argues with high conviction. This is again confusing, perhaps resulting in the low correlation.

The LNL condition resulted in the highest correlation. And here we have a very consistent picture. The S.P. is assigned to argue normatively and does so in a bored way. All factors are low in correspondence value. Thus perhaps the consistencies in the situations are related to the correlations of factors which define correspondence. Or perhaps the correlations can be better understood if we clearly knew the bases for the P's extremity and certainty judgments. Such bases may vary in different conditions, affecting the certainty with which the same judgment is made. For example, maybe the P's extremity judgment is based on her confusion, imbalance, annoyance - thus confusing her confidence - when the cues she is exposed to are conflicting. Whereas her extremity judgments in a situation such as HNNH might be based more on what the S.P. is saying, on her arguments, and

thus might be more rational and more correlated with certainty.

Whatever the case may be it is clear that the concept of certainty, its relation to extremity, its role in correspondence of inference, are unclear and require further elucidation.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Social psychology is concerned with understanding the behavior of individuals as they influence and are influenced by each other. Prerequisite for this understanding is a grasp of how each perceives or construes the other. Thus before we can predict what A will say to B we must know what A thinks about B. This research has added some knowledge to our understanding of what factors go into A's thinking about B.

People talk about "meaningful communication" today. "Generation gap" can be conceived of as a "communication gap." This gap means that A and B are not getting their feeling, intentions across to one another. A says one thing and B hears something else. How can we close this gap; what might A do to be clearer in his intent; what might B do to get the message that A intends; what in the situation might be causing the muddle?

The observer, in striving to know, cognize, construe the other person makes inferences from the myriad of cues presented to him. He must decide which cues are truly reflective of the actor and which of something else. The inferences he will draw will be a function of his own peculiar history with these cues, his own needs and goals in the situation, as well as the cues presented.

The present study has been concerned with investigating the influence of a small portion of the information received by one

individual about another on his perception of this other. In exploring some of the factors outlined by Jones and Davis in their theory of correspondent inferences, as these apply to impression formation, we conclude that for our subject population and for the conditions of this investigation, perception of a high degree of choice in behavior results in more correspondent inferences to underlying attitudes than does perception of a low degree of choice, as correspondence is measured by both extremity and certainty of inference; high vocal conviction results in more extreme inferences than low vocal conviction. We also conclude that normativeness of the behavior has a major effect on attitude attribution, albeit in reverse of that predicted. That is, normative behavior results in more extreme attitude attribution than nonnormative behavior.

The inference process is seen as a process through which causes are attributed to behaviors. The task comes down to defining preconditions for the attribution of various causes - personality dispositions, contextual factors, etc. Jones and Davis' proposal is generally supported. But many questions are raised about specific aspects of their propositions. Thus the notion of correspondence is seen to require further elaboration, conceptually and operationally. We suggest that extremity and certainty are not sufficient measures of correspondence.

Much of our results are found to be explicable in terms of cognitive balance processes, particularly as outlined by Heider. We also note that our assumption of the frame of reference used by our subjects might be questionable and might account for our reversed findings with respect to normativeness. In this respect we also

question the role of normativeness in the inference process. Thus the P's identification with the same norms as those used by the S.P. might also account for greater attribution of attitude when the behavior is normative than when it is nonnormative. Behaviors should be defined in more specific terms of effects and effect-clusters rather than in terms of grosser concepts, at least at this point in the development of this theory. Finally, more elaborate measures of attribution and of person perception should be employed to further illuminate the inference process outlined.

With an understanding of the influence of factors such as those explored here we might come to at least understand the basis for the communication gap. How can we believe a person means what he says if we think he can be arrested for waying otherwise; if we think he will lose votes for acting otherwise; if we feel he has some vested interest other than communication of his intentions or dispositions in how he acts?

APPENDIX A

Discussion of pilot research relevant to
the use of the issue "liberal abortion
laws" and of female subjects.

Pilot Questionnaire I

Questionnaire II - City University Survey

Questionnaire III - Form 1

Form 2

Form 3

Form 4

USE OF THE ISSUE " LIBERAL ABORTION
LAWS" AND OF FEMALE SUBJECTS

Three pilot questionnaires were devised. The main purpose of these was to obtain an issue:

- (1) which is seen as having a normative and a nonnormative side among a given population;
- (2) for which the subject population's attitude is fairly consistent, thus controlling for this factor in the final investigation;
- (3) for which reasonable, realistic arguments on both sides of the issue can be constructed.

Questionnaire I asked male and female college freshmen to rate the position of the majority of male and female college students on a variety of issues, ranging from bad breath to capital punishment to marriage, to indicate their own position on these issues, and to explain their position. Consideration of the three factors listed above led us to further test the issue of "general legalized abortion."

Questionnaire II asked college students, again, to rate how they think most male college students feel with respect to the issue of general legalized abortion, and to explain the feeling of those who are in favor of and of those who are against the issue.

Some seemingly inconsistent findings led to Questionnaire III, the four forms of which are a refinement of Questionnaire II. The following discussion is based on the results obtained with these questionnaires.

Questionnaire III differed from Questionnaire II as follows:

(1) Questionnaire II dealt with the issue of "general legalized abortion" while Questionnaire III dealt with the issue of "liberal abortion laws." We felt that the latter would yield greater consistency in perceived attitude of others since it is not as extreme a statement as the former, and is more open to flexible debate than is the former. Furthermore the wording "liberal abortion laws" was used rather than "more liberal abortion laws," so that this issue might be used even if New York State's laws were to become more liberal in the near future.

(2) In Questionnaire III the direct measure of the perceived opinion of others (Question #11) followed indirect measures whereas this preceded (Q-1 and 2) the indirect measures on Questionnaire II. Also, Ss' own attitude was rated last on Questionnaire III (Q-12) whereas it was rated near the beginning on Questionnaire II (Q-3). Though Ss' own attitude is important, perception of others' attitude is more relevant for our purposes here. Thus, to the extent that responses to questions on own and others' attitudes would influence each other it was deemed preferable to have own attitude influenced than to have perception of the attitude of others influenced. Thus the latter measures preceded the former.

(3) In Questionnaire III consideration of the perception of reactions to S.P.s arguing in favor of and against the issue of liberal abortion laws were dealt with on completely separate questionnaires, with independent groups of subjects, rather than in one questionnaire as in Questionnaire II.

(4) Whereas with Questionnaire II male and female subjects considered only male S.P.s, on one questionnaire, Questionnaire III had

female subjects consider female S.P.s and male subjects consider male S.P.s. In effect then, there was a 2 x 2 design; sex x position (in favor of/against) with Questionnaire III.

We feel that the subject should be a member of the group whose norm we are dealing with. Thus if we use female subjects, S.P. will be female. Otherwise we cannot be as certain which norms are at work. This is the reasoning behind #4 above.

(5) Questionnaire III asked the S to explain his responses to certain questions (#7, 9, 10) which produced seemingly ambiguous or inconsistent responses on Questionnaire II. These responses clarified the seeming inconsistency.

(6) Secondary data obtained included information on the S's perception of the S.P.'s motives for his behavior. This is really a minor test of the experimental hypotheses rather than a test of the perceived normativeness of the issue, and though the findings point in an optimistic direction they are not directly relevant to this discussion.

We also obtained information on the Ss' perception of societal and parental positions on the issue, and on his perception of the current state of abortion laws.

Subjects for Questionnaires II and III were above freshman level, mostly juniors and seniors. We felt that upper classmen would be more likely to have thought about the issue than lower classmen and to have formed an opinion.

The following evidence led us to conclude that the issue "liberal abortion laws" is seen by college students to have a normative and a

nonnormative side to it among college students. This finding is clearer and more consistent among females than among males, though apparently true for both. It is normative to favor liberal abortion laws and nonnormative to oppose liberal abortion laws.

Nonnormative behavior should result in greater group pressure to change the behavior than should normative behavior. Questions 2a through 2j ask the subject how he thinks other college students might react when the S.P. argues (a) in favor of, or (b) against liberal abortion laws.

Both males (Table 23) and females (Table 24) feel that it is equally unlikely that the S.P. might lose some friends (Q-2a) or will be liked more or less than he was before, regardless of the position for which he argues. Such reaction to an argument would be fairly strong, and it would be unreasonable for the subjects to expect these reactions to occur unless the norm was seen as extremely strong and the issue as very vital to the college population.

In support of the hypothesis that it is normative to be in favor of liberal abortion laws, we find that Ss feel it is more likely that the S.P. will get much or some argument from his peers when arguing against the issue than when arguing in favor of the issue, and that it is more likely that the S.P. will get much or some agreement when arguing against it; that it is more likely that others will try to change the S.P.'s opinion when the S.P. argues against the issue than when the S.P. argues in favor of the issue; that the S.P. will be more likely to choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws than against liberal abortion laws; that Ss feel most college students are in favor of liberal abortion laws (males: 2.70; females: 2.88, on

a 9-point scale).

The data also suggest that females have a clearer attitude on the issue, and a clearer, or more definitive perception of the norm among female college students with respect to this issue than do males among male college students. Thus we find that though both male and female subjects feel it is more likely that the S.P. arguing against liberal abortion laws will get much, or some, argument, than S.P. arguing in favor of this issue, the differences are more extreme among female than among male subjects ($t = 4.23$ for female Ss and 3.96 for male Ss; $t = 1.96$ for female Ss and 1.58 for male Ss; for 'much' and 'some' questions respectively). However we do find that there is a greater difference among males ($t = 3.16$) than among females ($t = 1.75$) in their feeling that it is more likely that the S.P. arguing in favor of liberal abortion laws will get some agreement than will the S.P. arguing against this issue.

While males feel it is equally unlikely that S.P. will receive insults whether arguing in favor of or against the issue, females feel it is less unlikely ($t = 1.56$; $p > .05 < .10$) that S.P. will be insulted when arguing against the issue than when arguing in favor of the issue. Males feel it is less unlikely ($t = 1.52$; $p > .05 < .10$) that discussion will cease if S.P. argues in favor of the issue than if S.P. argues against the issue. Females feel that this is equally unlikely to happen regardless of how S.P. argues.

We also find that both males and females feel that, given a choice the S.P. would be more likely to choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws than against this issue, but this difference is much more extreme for females than for males ($t = 8.20$ and 3.88 respectively).

We further find that females feel it is less unlikely that a student who is against liberal abortion laws will choose to argue in favor of such than it is that a student who is in favor of liberal abortion laws will choose to argue against such ($t = 3.72$). Males feel that it is equally unlikely that S.P. will choose to argue against his beliefs, regardless of that belief or of the choice. Thus, at least for females, we again have some support for the normativeness of being in favor of liberal abortion laws. It is easier to argue with the norm than against it, regardless of one's own attitude.

There appears to be greater internal consistency among responses for females than for males, perhaps reflecting a greater lack of opinion on the topic among males than among females.

Question # 11 asks S to directly rate the attitude of the majority of students. Question #12 asks for S's own attitude. Among males, though none feel that most students are against liberal abortion laws, there is a difference ($t = 1.57$; $p > .05 < .10$) such that Ss who had a questionnaire dealing with an S.P. who argues in favor of this issue see most male college students as more in favor of the issue than do Ss whose questionnaire dealt with an S.P. who argues against this issue. We find a similar difference among female Ss. But this is due to three subjects who went to the extreme end of the scale (9) in rating the attitude of most college students. Eliminating these three subjects (out of 26 Ss) we find no difference among female subjects as a function of their experimental treatment. The data cited above exclude these Ss on the ground that they did not perceive the norm as most do, and that we are interested in reactions only where the norm is perceived as

such, whether or not it actually exists. Further, from open-ended questions, it seems that at least two of these subjects might have misread the scale.

Similarly, though the average rating of own attitude is 2.55 (in favor of), there is a difference ($p < .05$) among male subjects with those receiving "against" questionnaires being more in favor of the issue than those receiving "in favor of" questionnaires. This seems to reflect a contrast effect. Where S considers someone arguing against liberal abortion laws his attitude moves more toward favoring the issue; where he considers someone arguing in favor of liberal abortion laws his attitude moves away from this position (though it is still in favor; just not as strongly). This may reflect a weak attitude to begin with. There is no such difference among females in reporting of their own attitude, with all favoring liberal laws.

We also find that males who consider an S.P. arguing against the issue see themselves as more in favor of the issue than they see most other students, while those considering an S.P. arguing in favor of the issue see themselves as less in favor of liberal abortion laws than they see most others. Attitudes of females are not significantly different from their perception of the attitude of most other female students, regardless of condition.

All groups perceive society and their parents as less in favor of liberal abortion laws than they see themselves or most students, though society is not seen as opposing liberal abortion laws.

We conclude that favoring liberal abortion laws is reacted to as normative among female college students; opposing liberal abortion laws is reacted to as nonnormative among female students, by females.

TABLE 23

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO PERCEIVED NORMATIVENESS OF THE
 ISSUE OF "LIBERAL ABORTION LAWS" AS A FUNCTION OF THE POSITION FOR
 WHICH S.P. ARGUES WHERE THE SUBJECTS AND S.P. ARE MALE

Question	Position for which S is told S.P. argues	Mean	t	p
How likely is it that...				
S.P. may lose some friends?	against ⁺ favor	7.90 ⁺⁺ 7.75	<1	n.s.
S.P. will get much argument?	against favor	3.10 4.95	3.96	<.005
S.P. will get much agreement?	against favor	5.65 3.65	3.51	<.005
S.P. will get some argument?	against favor	2.05 2.85	1.58	>.05<.10
S.P. will get some agreement?	against favor	4.45 2.40	3.16	<.005
S.P. will be liked less than he was before?	against favor	7.50 7.35	<1	n.s.
S.P. will be liked more than he was before?	against favor	7.35 7.45	<1	n.s.
others will try to change S.P.'s opinions?	against favor	2.90 4.00	2.29	<.025
others will insult S.P.?	against favor	6.35 6.45	<1	n.s.
discussion will cease?	against favor	6.70 5.65	1.52	>.05<.10
S.P. will choose to argue against liberal abortion laws?		6.20	3.88	<.005
S.P. will choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws?		3.65		

TABLE 23 - Continued

Question	Position for which S is told S.P. argues	Mean	t	p
How likely is it that...				
S.P. will choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws when he is against them?		6.65	<1	n.s.
S.P. will choose to argue against liberal abortion laws when he is for them?		6.75		
S.P. will refuse to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws when he is against them?		5.95	<1	n.s.
S.P. will refuse to argue against liberal abortion laws when he is for them?		5.90		

What is the attitude of most male college students?	against favor	2.90 [#] <u>2.50</u> 2.70	1.57	7.05<.10
S's own attitude.	against favor	1.95 <u>3.15</u> 2.55	1.75	<.05
Perception of societal attitude.	against favor	4.75 <u>4.80</u> 4.78	<1	n.s.
Perception of parents' attitude.	against favor	4.40 <u>5.05</u> 4.73	1.01	n.s.

+ N = 20 per group

++ On a 9-point scale with "1" being "very likely" and "9" being "very unlikely."

On a 9-point scale with "1" being "highly in favor of" and "9" being "highly against."

TABLE 24

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO PERCEIVED NORMATIVENESS OF THE
 ISSUE OF "LIBERAL ABORTION LAWS" AS A FUNCTION OF THE POSITION FOR
 WHICH S.P. ARGUES WHERE THE SUBJECTS AND S.P. ARE FEMALE

Question	Position for which S is told S.P. argues	Mean	t	p
How likely is it that...				
S.P. may lose some friends?	against ⁺ favor	7.56 7.26	1	n.s.
S.P. will get much argument?	against favor	2.52 4.52	4.23	.005
S.P. will get much agreement?	against favor	5.96 3.82	3.58	.005
S.P. will get some argument?	against favor	1.91 3.13	1.96	.05
S.P. will get some agreement?	against/ favor	3.91 2.86	1.75	.05
S.P. will be liked less than she was before?	against favor	7.60 8.00	1	n.s.
S.P. will be liked more than she was before?	against favor	7.65	1	n.s.
others will try to change S.P.'s opinion?	against favor	2.65 3.78	2.10	.025
others will insult S.P.?	against favor	5.39 6.47	1.56	.05 .10
discussion will cease?	against favor	6.82 6.95	1	n.s.
S.P. will choose to argue against liberal abortion laws?		6.52	8.20	.005
S.P. will choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws?		2.86		

TABLE 24 - Continued

Question	Position for which S is told S.P. argues	Mean	t	p
How likely is it that...				
S.P. will choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws when she is against them?		6.00	3.72	<.005
S.P. will choose to argue against liberal abortion laws when she is for them?		7.34		
S.P. will refuse to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws when she is against them?		5.13	<1	n.s.
S.P. will refuse to argue against liberal abortion laws when she is for them?		4.82		

What is the attitude of most female college students?	against favor	2.47 [#] <u>2.60</u> 2.54	<1	n.s.
S's own attitude.	against favor	2.17 <u>2.82</u> 2.50	1.18	.10 < .15
Perception of societal attitude.	against favor	4.43 <u>4.65</u> 4.54	<1	n.s.
Perception of parents' attitude.	against favor	4.26 <u>4.30</u> 4.28	<1	n.s.

+ N = 23 per group

++ On a 9-point scale with "1" being "very likely" and "9" being "very unlikely."

On a 9-point scale with "1" being "highly in favor of" and "9" being "highly against."

TABLE 25

t TEST COMPARISONS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTION PERTAINING TO PERCEPTION OF NORMS REGARDING LIBERAL ABORTION LAWS, IN PILOT STUDY

Question	Mean	t	p ⁺
Perception of student attitude	2.85 ⁺⁺	<1	n.s.
Own attitude	2.67		
Perception of student attitude	2.85	6.52	<.001
Perception of societal attitude	4.67		
Perception of student attitude	2.85	4.01	<.001
Perception of parents' attitude	4.32		
Own attitude	2.67	6.16	<.001
Perception of societal attitude	4.67		
Own attitude	2.67	5.34	<.001
Perception of parents' attitude	4.32		

Notes:

N = 49 per group

+ two-tailed

++ On a 9-point scale with "1" being "very highly in favor of" and "9" being "very highly against."

Questionnaire I

This is an attitude questionnaire. We want to see how college students feel with respect to a variety of issues, and how they think others feel with respect to these issues. Please do not dwell over any of the questions, but give a fairly rapid response. It is also important that you give an answer to every question.

Do not place your name on any of these sheets. This will remain completely anonymous.

Please read the following instructions carefully; raise your hand if there is anything about which you are not clear.

Circle the number which you think best describes the attitude, opinion, or feeling of at least 75% of the members of the following groups of people, toward the issue involved. For example, consider the following:

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: The Military Draft

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

If you think that 75% or more male college students (this being the group of people involved in this question) are very highly against the military draft (this being the issue involved in this question), then you would circle number 4 on the right side of the scale above; if you think that at least 75% of male college students are slightly or a little in favor of the military draft, you would circle number 1 on the left side of the scale above; if you feel that 75% or more male college students are indifferent toward the military draft, have no feeling about it in either direction, then you would circle zero in the center; and so on.

Do each page before going on to the next; do not go back after you have completed a page; answer every question.

If you have any questions, now or later, raise your hand.

Proceed.

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Cheating on Exams

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Birth Control

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Capital Punishment

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Bad Breath

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Marriage

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Smoking

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Extra-marital Sex for Men
and Women

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Seeing Someone Cheat on an Exam
and Reporting it to the Instructor

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: General Legalized Abortion

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Women Not Shaving Their Legs

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Gambling

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Biting Finger-nails

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Diamond Engagement Rings

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Male College Students

ISSUE: Plagiarism

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Cheating on Exams

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Birth Control

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Capital Punishment

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Bad Breath

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Marriage

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Smoking

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Extra-marital Sex for Men
and Women

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Seeing Someone Cheat on an Exam
and Reporting it to the Instructor

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: General Legalized Abortion

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Women Not Shaving Their Legs

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Gambling

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Biting Finger-nails

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Diamond Engagement Rings

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

GROUP: Female College Students

ISSUE: Plagiarism

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the number which best describes your own attitude, opinion, or feeling toward the following issues.

Cheating on Exams

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Birth Control

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Capital Punishment

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Bad Breath

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Marriage

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Smoking

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Extra-marital Sex for Men and Women

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Seeing Someone Cheat on an Exam and
Reporting it to the Instructor

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

General Legalized Abortion

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Women Not Shaving Their Legs

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Gambling

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Biting Finger-nails

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Diamond Engagement Rings

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

Plagiarism

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no feeling for or against		against		very highly against

INSTRUCTIONS: Go back to the beginning. Do not erase or change any of the answers which you have already given. Look at each issue for each group. Now you are asked to do one of three things, in accordance with the following instructions.

- a) If you feel that you have absolutely no idea or impression about how 75% or more of the group (for example, Male College Students) feel with respect to the given issue (for example, The Military Draft), please place an X next to the word ISSUE, for that given issue.

OR

- b) If you do not feel that at least 75% of the group feels the same way about the issue (for example, you may feel that 50% are for and 50% are against the issue; or you may feel that 50% are for, 25% are against, and 25% are indifferent with respect to the issue), place a zero, 0, next to the word ISSUE, for that given issue.

OR

- c) If neither of the above applies, and you feel as you have indicated, do nothing and go on to the next issue.

Consider the following example:

GROUP: Male College Students

X (or) 0 ISSUE: The Military Draft

4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4

Suppose you had circle #3 on the left. But you felt that you had no idea about how male college students feel with respect to the military draft. Then you would now place an X next to the word ISSUE above. OR, if you feel that 50% are for the draft and 50% are against the draft, and so on, you would place a zero next to the word ISSUE; OR, if you feel as you have indicated, namely that at least 75% of male college students are pretty much in favor of the military draft, then you would do nothing now and go on to the next issue.

Please answer as quickly as you can.

You may tear out this page for reference if you like.

Indicate the following about yourself:

AGE _____

SEX _____

TERM IN COLLEGE (check one): Lower Freshman _____

Upper Freshman _____

Lower Sophomore _____

Upper Sophomore _____

Lower Junior _____

Upper Junior _____

Lower Senior _____

Upper Senior _____

MAJOR _____

MARITAL STATUS _____

Questionnaire II

CITY UNIVERSITY SURVEY

This is a questionnaire on attitudes toward the general legalization of abortion. By "general legalization of abortion" we mean that a woman will be allowed to have an abortion, legally, if she wants it; there need be no special conditions attached to it.

We are interested in how college students feel about this issue and how they think others feel about it.

This questionnaire is anonymous. Do not put your name on any of these sheets.

1. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think at least 75% of male college students feel about general legalized abortion. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their attitude.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

2. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think at least 75% of female college students feel about general legalized abortion. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their attitude.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

3. Indicate, on the following scale, how you feel about general legalized abortion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

4. If you feel that a majority, but not quite 75%, of male college students feel as you have indicated in Question #1, check here: _____.
5. If you feel that a majority, but not quite 75%, of female college students feel as you have indicated in Question #2, check here: _____.
6. What makes you believe that most male college students feel as you have indicated in Question #1?
7. Why do you think most male college students feel as you have indicated in Question #1? That is, how might you explain their feeling?

8. Discuss your own feeling about general legalized abortion.
Why do you feel as you do? How strongly do you feel as you do?

9. There will be some male college students who do not feel as you think the majority feels. Discuss their feeling (those who feel differently from the majority). Why do you think they feel as they do? How might you describe and explain their feeling?

10. Consider the following situation: You are sitting around with a group of fellow college students. The issue of the general legalization of abortion comes up. One of the people present argues that he is against the general legalization of abortion. Describe how you think you might react; and how others around you might react. That is, would you, or anyone else there say or do anything; and if so, what, and why?

11. Consider the following situation: You are sitting around with a group of fellow college students. The issue of the general legalization of abortion comes up. One of the people present argues that he is in favor of the general legalization of abortion. Describe how you think you might react; and how others around you might react. That is, would you, or anyone else there say or do anything; and if so, what, and why?

12. Consider the following situation: Bob is a college student. He is with a group of his peers, other male college students, whom he knows in school. They are discussing the issue of the general legalization of abortion. Bob takes the position that abortion should not be generally legalized.

There are a variety of things which might happen. On the following scales indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that the thing indicated might happen.

Bob will lose many friends.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get much argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get at least some argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get much agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get at least some agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Discussion will cease.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will be liked less than he was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will be liked more than he was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will try to change Bob's opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will insult Bob
(call him names; say he has a stupid opinion; etc).

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

If you think something else is likely to happen, please mark it down here:

13. Consider the following situation: Bob is a college student. He is with a group of his peers, other male college students, whom he knows in school. They are discussing the issue of the general legalization of abortion. Bob takes the position that abortion should be generally legalized.

There are a variety of things which might happen. On the following scales indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that the thing indicated might happen.

Bob will lose many friends

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get much argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get at least some argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get much agreement

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get at least some agreement

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Discussion will cease

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will be liked less than he was before

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will be liked more than he was before

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will try to change Bob's opinion

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will insult Bob
(call him names; say he has a stupid opinion; etc)

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

If you think something else is likely to happen, please mark it down here:

14. Again: Bob is arguing against the legalization of abortion, in the presence of a group of his peers. To what extent do you think he might be:

trying to conform to what he thinks is expected of him

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to impress his group

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to avoid argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to create argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to convince others that they are wrong

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

expressing his true feelings and opinions

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

taking this position because he feels this is the appropriate way to behave

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

15. Bob is arguing in favor of the legalization of abortion, in the presence of a group of his peers. To what extent do you think he might be:

trying to conform to what he thinks is expected of him

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to impress his group

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to avoid argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to create argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to convince others that they are wrong

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

expressing his true feelings and opinions

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

taking this position because he feels this is the appropriate way to behave

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

16. Consider the following situation: A male college student is asked to participate in a debate; he will be debating with other college students, also males. The topic of the debate is the general legalization of abortion. Assume that he is free to choose to argue on either side of the issue.

- a. On the following scale indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that he will choose to argue against the general legalization of abortion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

- b. On the following scale indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that he will choose to argue in favor of the general legalization of abortion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

17. If the above person was actually in favor of general legalized abortion, how likely do you think it is that he would choose to argue against this issue in a debate? Indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the following scale.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

18. If the above person was actually against general legalized abortion, how likely do you think it is that he would choose to argue in favor of this issue in a debate? Indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the following scale.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

19. Consider the following situation: A group of male college students have agreed to participate in a debate. The issue to be debated is that of the general legalization of abortion. Each person taking part in the debate is assigned, by the moderator, a different side of the issue on which to argue.

- a. If a person was against the legalization of abortion, and he was assigned to argue in favor of this issue, how likely do you think it is that he would refuse to argue as he was assigned?

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

- b. If a person was in favor of the legalization of abortion, and he was assigned to argue against this issue, how likely do you think it is that he would refuse to argue as he was assigned?

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

20. Why do you think a person in a situation described in Question #19 would refuse to argue the position he is assigned? What do you think of this person? What kind of person do you think he might be?

21. Indicate, on the following scales, how you think the large majority of male college students feel about the issues indicated. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their attitude.

Capital Punishment

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

Birth Control

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

Marriage

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

Pre-Marital Sex for Men and Women

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

Extra-Marital Sex for Men and Women

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

Obscenity Laws

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

22. Do you thin abortion is legal in New York State? (check one)

Yes _____
 No _____
 Don't Know _____

If you think it is legal, under what conditions, if any, do you think it is legal?

Fill in the following information about yourself:

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

TERM IN COLLEGE: _____

MAJOR: _____

Questionnaire III - Form 1

CITY UNIVERSITY SURVEY

This is a questionnaire on feelings about abortion laws.
Please answer the following questions.

This questionnaire is anonymous. Do not put your name on
any of these sheets.

1. Consider the following situation: You are with a group of fellow college students. The issue of abortion laws comes up. One of the people present argues that she is in favor of liberal abortion laws. Describe how you think you might react; and how you think others around you might react. That is, would you, or anyone else there say or do anything; and if so, what, and why?

2. Consider the following situation: Carol is a college student. She is with a group of her peers, other female college students, whom she knows in school. They are discussing the issue of abortion laws. Carol takes the position that abortion laws should be liberal.

There are a variety of things which might happen. On the following scales indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that the thing indicated might happen.

Carol may lose some friends.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will get much argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will get some argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will get much agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will get some agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will be liked less than she was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will be liked more than she was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will try to change Carol's opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will insult Carol
(call her names; say she has a stupid opinion; etc).

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Discussion will cease.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

If you think something else is likely to happen, please mark it down here:

3. Consider the following situation: A female college student is asked to participate in a debate; she will be debating with other college students, also females. The topic of the debate is abortion laws. Assume that she is free to choose to argue on either side of the issue, for or against liberal abortion laws.

On the following scale indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that she will choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

4. If the above person was actually in favor of liberal abortion laws, how likely do you think it is that she would choose to argue against this issue in a debate with her peers? Indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the following scale.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

5. Consider the following situation: A group of female college students have agreed to participate in a debate. The issue to be debated is abortion laws. Each person taking part in the debate is assigned, by the moderator, a different side of the issue on which to argue.

If a person was in favor of liberal abortion laws, and she was assigned to argue against this issue, how likely do you think it is that she would refuse to argue as she was assigned?

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

6. Why do you think a person in the foregoing situation would refuse to argue the position she is assigned? What do you think of this person? What kind of person do you think she might be?

7. Go back to question #3. Do not change your answer. Briefly explain why you answered as you did. That is, why do you think the person involved would be likely or unlikely (as you indicated on the scale) to choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws in that situation?

8. Carol, a college student, is arguing in favor of liberal abortion laws, in the presence of a group of her peers. To what extent do you think she might be:

trying to conform to what she thinks is expected of her

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to impress the group

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to avoid argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to create argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to convince others that they are wrong

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

expressing her true feelings and opinions

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

taking this position because she feels this is the appropriate way to behave

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

9. The first part of Question #8 (on page) asked: "How likely do you think it is that Carol might be trying to conform to what she thinks is expected of her?"

Indicate who you think this refers to; that is, expected of her by whom?

10. The last part of Question #8 (on page 6) refers to "appropriate way to behave." What do you think is meant here by "appropriate behavior."

11. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think the large majority of female college students feel about liberal abortion laws. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

12. Indicate, on the following scale, how you feel about liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

13. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think the majority of the adult population of New York State feels about liberal abortion laws. Circle the appropriate number.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

14. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think your parents feel about liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

15. Why do you think most female college students feel as you have indicated in Question #11? That is, how might you explain their feeling?
16. Discuss your own feeling about abortion laws. Why do you feel as you do? How strongly do you feel as you do?

17. There will be some female college students who do not feel as you think the majority feels. Discuss their feeling (those who feel differently from the majority). Why do you think they feel as they do? How might you describe and explain their feeling?
18. What do you consider to be liberal abortion laws?

19. What do you think the abortion laws currently are in New York State?

Fill in the following information about yourself.

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

TERM IN COLLEGE: _____

MAJOR: _____

Have you recently filled out any questionnaires on abortion?

Yes _____

No _____

If you have, briefly describe its nature, and where you filled it out.

Questionnaire III - Form 2

CITY UNIVERSITY SURVEY

This is a questionnaire on feelings about abortion laws. Please answer the following questions.

This questionnaire is anonymous. Do not put your name on any of these sheets.

1. Consider the following situation: You are with a group of fellow college students. The issue of abortion laws comes up. One of the people present argues that she is against liberal abortion laws. Describe how you think you might react; and how you think others around you might react. That is, would you, or anyone else there say or do anything; and if so, what, and why?

2. Consider the following situation: Carol is a college student. She is with a group of her peers, other female college students, whom she knows in school. They are discussing the issue of abortion laws. Carol takes the position that abortion laws should not be liberal.

There are a variety of things which might happen. On the following scales indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that the thing indicated might happen.

Carol may lose some friends.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will get much argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will get some argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will get much agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will get some agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will be liked less than she was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Carol will be liked more than she was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will try to change Carol's opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will insult Carol
(call her names; say she has a stupid opinion; etc).

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Discussion will cease.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

If you think something else is likely to happen, please mark it down here:

3. Consider the following situation: A female college student is asked to participate in a debate; she will be debating with other college students, also females. The topic of the debate is abortion laws. Assume that she is free to choose to argue on either side of the issue, for or against liberal abortion laws. On the following scale indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that she will choose to argue against liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

4. If the above person was actually against liberal abortion laws, how likely do you think it is that she would choose to argue in favor of this issue in a debate with her peers? Indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the following scale.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

5. Consider the following situation: A group of female college students have agreed to participate in a debate. The issue to be debated is abortion laws. Each person taking part in the debate is assigned, by the moderator, a different side of the issue on which to argue.

If a person was against liberal abortion laws, and she was assigned to argue in favor of this issue, how likely do you think it is that she would refuse to argue as she was assigned?

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

6. Why do you think a person in the foregoing situation would refuse to argue the position she is assigned? What do you think of this person? What kind of person do you think she might be?
7. Go back to Question #3. Do not change your answer. Briefly explain why you answered as you did. That is, why do you think the person involved would be likely or unlikely (as you indicated on the scale) to choose to argue against liberal abortion laws in that situation?

8. Carol, a college student, is arguing against liberal abortion laws, in the presence of a group of her peers. To what extent do you think she might be:

trying to conform to what she thinks is expected of her

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to impress the group

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to avoid argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to create argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to convince others that they are wrong

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

expressing her true feelings and opinions

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

taking this position because she feels this is the appropriate way to behave

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

9. The first part of Question #8 (on page) asked: "How likely do you think it is that Carol might be trying to conform to what she thinks is expected of her?"

Indicate who you think this refers to; that is, expected of her by whom?

10. The last part of Question #8 (on page) refers to "appropriate way to behave." What do you think is meant here by "appropriate behavior."

11. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think the large majority of female college students feel about liberal abortion laws. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

12. Indicate, on the following scale, how you feel about liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

13. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think the majority of the adult population of New York State feels about liberal abortion laws. Circle the appropriate number.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

14. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think your parents feel about liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

15. Why do you think most female college students feel as you have indicated in Question #11? That is, how might you explain their feeling?
16. Discuss your own feeling about abortion laws. Why do you feel as you do? How strongly do you feel as you do?

17. There will be some female college students who do not feel as you think the majority feels. Discuss their feeling (those who feel differently from the majority). Why do you think they feel as they do? How might you describe and explain their feeling?

18. What do you consider to be liberal abortion laws?

19. What do you think the abortion laws currently are in New York State?

Fill in the following information about yourself.

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

TERM IN COLLEGE: _____

MAJOR: _____

Have you recently filled out any questionnaires on abortion?

Yes _____

No _____

If you have, briefly describe its nature, and where you filled it out.

Questionnaire III - Form 3

CITY UNIVERSITY SURVEY

This is a questionnaire on feelings about abortion laws.
Please answer the following questions.

This questionnaire is anonymous. Do not put your name on
any of these sheets

1. Consider the following situation: You are with a group of fellow college students. The issue of abortion laws comes up. One of the ~~people~~ present argues that he is in favor of liberal abortion laws. Describe how you think you might react; and how you think others around you might react. That is, would you, or anyone else there say or do anything; and if so, what, and why?

2. Consider the following situation: Bob is a college student. He is with a group of his peers, other male college students, whom he knows in school. They are discussing the issue of abortion laws. Bob takes the position that abortion laws should be liberal.

There are a variety of things which might happen. On the following scales indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that the thing indicated might happen.

Bob may lose some friends.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get much argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get some argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get much agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get some agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will be liked less than he was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will be liked more than he was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will try to change Bob's opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will insult Bob
(call him names; say he has a stupid opinion; etc).

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Discussion will cease.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

If you think something else is likely to happen, please mark it down here:

3. Consider the following situation: A male college student is asked to participate in a debate; he will be debating with other college students, also males. The topic of the debate is abortion laws. Assume that he is free to choose to argue on either side of the issue, for or against liberal abortion laws.

On the following scale indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that he will choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

4. If the above person was actually in favor of liberal abortion laws, how likely do you think it is that he would choose to argue against this issue in a debate with his peers? Indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the following scale.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

5. Consider the following situation: A group of male college students have agreed to participate in a debate. The issue to be debated is abortion laws. Each person taking part in the debate is assigned, by the moderator, a different side of the issue on which to argue.

If a person was in favor of liberal abortion laws, and he was assigned to argue against this issue, how likely do you think it is that he would refuse to argue as he was assigned?

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

7. Go back to question #3. Do not change your answer. Briefly explain why you answered as you did. That is, why do you think the person involved would be likely or unlikely (as you indicated on the scale) to choose to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws in that situation?

8. Bob, a college student, is arguing in favor of liberal abortion laws, in the presence of a group of his peers. To what extent do you think he might be:

trying to conform to what he thinks is expected of him

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to impress the group

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to avoid argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to create argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to convince others that they are wrong

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

expressing his true feelings and opinions

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

taking this position because he feels this is the appropriate way
to behave

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

9. The first part of Question #8 (on page 178) asked: "How likely do you think it is that Bob might be trying to conform to what he thinks is expected of him?"

Indicate who you think this refers to; that is, expected of him by whom?

10. The last part of Question #8 refers to "appropriate way to behave." What do you think is meant here by "appropriate behavior?"

11. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think the large majority of male college students feel about liberal abortion laws. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

12. Indicate, on the following scale, how you feel about liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

13. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think the majority of the adult population of New York State feels about liberal abortion laws. Circle the appropriate number.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

14. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think your parents feel about liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

15. Why do you think most male college students feel as you have indicated in Question #11? That is, how might you explain their feeling?
16. Discuss your own feeling about abortion laws. Why do you feel as you do? How strongly do you feel as you do?

17. There will be some male college students who do not feel as you think the majority feels. Discuss their feeling (those who feel differently from the majority). Why do you think they feel as they do? How might you describe and explain their feeling?
18. What do you consider to be liberal abortion laws?
19. What do you think the abortion laws currently are in New York State?

Fill in the following information about yourself.

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

TERM IN COLLEGE: _____

MAJOR: _____

Have you recently filled out any questionnaire on abortion?

Yes _____

No _____

If you have, briefly describe its nature, and where you filled it out.

Questionnaire III - Form 4

CITY UNIVERSITY SURVEY

This is a questionnaire on feelings about abortion laws.
Please answer the following questions.

This questionnaire is anonymous. Do not put your name on
any of these sheets.

1. Consider the following situation: You are with a group of fellow college students. The issue of abortion laws comes up. One of the people present argues that he is against liberal abortion laws. Describe how you think you might react; and how you think others around you might react. That is, would you, or anyone else there say or do anything; and if so, what, and why?

2. Consider the following situation: Bob is a college student. He is with a group of his peers, other male college students, whom he knows in school. They are discussing the issue of abortion laws. Bob takes the position that abortion laws should not be liberal.

There are a variety of things which might happen. On the following scales indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that the thing indicated might happen.

Bob may lose some friends.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get much argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get some argument.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get much agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will get some agreement.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will be liked less than he was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Bob will be liked more than he was before.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will try to change Bob's opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Others will insult Bob
(call him names; say he has a stupid opinion; etc).

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

Discussion will cease.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

If you think something else is likely to happen, please mark it down here:

3. Consider the following situation: A male college student is asked to participate in a debate; he will be debating with other college students, also males. The topic of the debate is abortion laws. Assume that he is free to choose to argue on either side of the issue, for or against liberal abortion laws.

On the following scale indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how likely you think it is that he will choose to argue against liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

4. If the above person was actually against liberal abortion laws, how likely do you think it is that he would choose to argue in favor of this issue in a debate with his peers? Indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number on the following scale.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

5. Consider the following situation: A group of male college students have agreed to participate in a debate. The issue to be debated is abortion laws. Each person taking part in the debate is assigned by the moderator to a different side of the issue on which to argue.

If a person was against liberal abortion laws, and he was assigned to argue in favor of this issue, how likely do you think it is that he would refuse to argue as he was assigned?

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

6. Why do you think a person in the foregoing situation would refuse to argue the position he is assigned? What do you think of this person. What kind of person do you think he might be?
7. Go back to question #3. Do not change your answer. Briefly explain why you answered as you did. That is, why do you think the person involved would be likely or unlikely (as you indicated on the scale) to choose to argue against liberal abortion laws in that situation?

8. Bob, a college student, is arguing against liberal abortion laws, in the presence of a group of his peers. To what extent do you think he might be:

trying to conform to what he thinks is expected of him

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

9 trying to impress the group

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to avoid argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to create argument

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

trying to convince others that they are wrong

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

expressing his true feelings and opinions

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

taking this position because he feels this is the appropriate way
to behave

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

-
9. The first part of Question #8 asked: "How likely do you think it is that Bob might be trying to conform to what he thinks is expected of him?"

Indicate who you think this refers to; that is, expected of him by whom?

10. The last part of Question #8 refers to "appropriate way to behave." What do you think is meant here by "appropriate behavior?"

11. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think the large majority of male college students feel about liberal abortion laws. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their opinion.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

12. Indicate, on the following scale, how you feel about liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

13. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think the majority of the adult population of New York State feels about liberal abortion laws. Circle the appropriate number.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

14. Indicate, on the following scale, how you think your parents feel about liberal abortion laws.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very highly in favor of		in favor of		no opinion for or against		against		very highly against

15. Why do you think most male college students feel as you have indicated in Question #11? That is, how might you explain their feeling?
16. Discuss your own feeling about abortion laws. Why do you feel as you do? How strongly do you feel as you do?

17. There will be some male college students who do not feel as you think the majority feels. Discuss their feeling (those who feel differently from the majority). Why do you think they feel as they do? How might you describe and explain their feeling?
18. What do you consider to be liberal abortion laws?
19. What do you think the abortion laws currently are in New York State?

Fill in the following information about yourself.

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

TERM IN COLLEGE: _____

MAJOR: _____

Have you recently filled out any questionnaire on abortion?

Yes _____

No _____

If you have, briefly describe its nature, and where you filled it out.

APPENDIX B

Discussion of pilot research relevant to perception
of choice and recall of relevant
information in instructions.

High Choice manipulation

Low Choice manipulation

Anti-Low Choice manipulation

Questionnaire tapping perception of the situation described.

PERCEPTION OF CHOICE AND RECALL OF RELEVANT INFORMATION IN INSTRUCTIONS

Three sheets were prepared as potential "instructions" to be given to subjects. These corresponded to high choice, low choice, and anti-low choice conditions. The Ss for this pilot test were 60 female upperclass Brooklyn College students, randomly broken down into three groups of 20 each. Each group was asked to read through one instruction sheet once and then to fill out a questionnaire. The questionnaires for the high choice and low choice conditions were the same. The questionnaire for the anti-low choice conditions has some additional questions which were relevant only to that condition.

The main purpose of this pilot was to see if:

- (a) the instructions would result in differences in perception of the amount of choice the S.P. had in her behavior;
- (b) in order to assure the student reference group was salient so that the assumed norms would be relevant, that the sex and student status of the debaters, moderator, and audience were accurately perceived and recalled by the Ss.

Secondarily, information relevant to the experimental hypotheses was obtained.

Results

We find a significant difference in perception of choice between high and low choice conditions and between high choice and anti-low choice conditions such that high choice Ss see S.P. as having much greater choice ($M = 1.80$) than low or anti-low choice Ss ($M = 8.65$ and 8.45 respectively). There is no difference in perceived choice

between low and anti-low choice conditions.

We also find, in response to a free recall question (Q-1) and a multiple choice question (Q-10) that Ss accurately recall the method of selection of the S.P.s. 100% of the high choice Ss describe the selection as one reflecting the S.P.'s preferences; 70% of the low choice Ss and of the anti-low choice Ss describe S.P.'s selection as being through random assignment. The other 30% make no reference to the method of selection in the free recall question. However, 100% of the low and anti-low choice Ss accurately recall the method in the multiple choice question. We conclude that the instruction give us the desired manipulation of perceived choice.

In order to assure the salience of the reference group, for the purpose of manipulating perceived normativeness of the behavior, it is important that the Ss be aware that the debating club, the moderator, and the audience are female college students, rather than males or representatives of the "Establishment."

In response to Q-12, 100% of the high choice and anti-low choice Ss and 95% of the low choice Ss recall that the debating club is comprised of females; 100% of high, low, and anti-low choice Ss see the club as comprised of students. 100% of the high and anti-low choice Ss see the moderator as a female student, as do 90% of low choice Ss.

75% of high choice Ss see the audience as female, 5% as male, and 20% as male and female. 65% of low choice and 75% of anti-low choice Ss see the audience as female; 35% of low choice and 25% of anti-low choice Ss see the audience as male and female. The patterns

between the groups are not significantly different ($\chi^2=3.07$; 4df). However, within groups we find no significant difference under low choice (and almost no significant difference under anti-low choice) between seeing the audience as female and seeing it as male and female. It is apparent then that our instructions to the Ss must be altered in such a way as to make the makeup of the audience before which the debate is taking place clearer to the S.

The results are similar when the Ss are asked if the audience is student, faculty, or both, or other. 60% of high, low, and anti-low choice Ss see the audience as student comprised; 25% of high choice, 40% of low and anti-low choice Ss see the audience as comprised of both students and faculty; 15% of high choice Ss see the audience as "other."

The following findings do not directly relate to the experimental manipulation of choice, but are interesting in terms of our hypotheses.

Under the high choice conditions Ss feel it is significantly more likely ($M = 2.25$) that the S.P. will be arguing for a position in which she really believes than under low choice ($M = 5.30$) or anti-low choice ($M = 5.00$) conditions ($p < .005$). The difference between low and anti-low choice conditions is nonsignificant.

Similarly, under high choice the Ss feel it is significantly more unlikely that the S.P. is arguing for a position in which she does not believe ($M = 7.00$) than under low choice ($M = 4.75$) or anti-low choice ($M = 4.90$) conditions ($p < .005$). Again the difference between low and anti-low choice conditions is nonsignificant. Another interesting finding in this respect is that there are extremely small

variances (1) under low and anti-low choice conditions. The mean responses under these conditions is around the midpoint of the scale. Thus, it appears that Ss might be saying that where the S.P. has no choice it is possible that she is arguing for a position in which she does not believe; they cannot tell. Though there is greater variance under high choice conditions, these still are not large, and the responses are more extreme at both ends of the scale.

This has implications for our study in the sense that we see that under low choice conditions the S does not know whether or not the S.P. believes in what she is saying; she may or may not; this will depend on other things. Such other things, we are saying, are normativeness of behavior and conviction in presentation. It seems, though, that the influence of these other factors might be much stronger under low choice than under high choice conditions, since it appears that under high choice the S has already made some judgment about the S.P.'s attitude, whereas his judgment has been held off under low choice. There is also greater room for movement (on the scales) in impressions under low choice than under high choice conditions.

We find an inconsistency in the anti-low choice group. Though the Ss respond to Q-5 and 6 in such a way as to indicate that they feel the S.P. may or may not be arguing for a position in which she does or does not believe, when asked to explain why the S.P. went against the instructions the Ss feel this is because she has strong feelings about the issue ($M = 2.55$), more so than because the S.P. is stubborn ($M = 4.80$), is trying to make a show ($M = 5.45$), or did not hear her orders ($M = 8.20$).

In response to Q-7 we find that Ss under all conditions feel it

is a little less than possible that the S.P. will be arguing on an issue in which she has no opinion (high choice: $M = 5.60$; low choice: $M = 6.45$; anti-low choice: $M = 6.00$). This is all right for our purposes, since then we might more readily attribute differences we find in our dependent measures to our experimental manipulation, than would be the case if the Ss felt the S.P.s had a strong commitment to the issue.

In response to Q-21 and Q-22 we find that Ss feel it is "possible" that the moderator, and the other debaters will behave in any of the ways indicated (i.e., say or do nothing more, insist that the S.P. argue on the side assigned, disqualify S.P., just remind S.P. of her assigned position).

Most Ss see the debating teams as composed of three members each. Some responded "six members."

90% of the high choice Ss and 95% of low choice and anti-low choice Ss see the S.P. as having ten minutes in which to prepare her arguments.

TABLE 26

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO PERCEIVED CHOICE OF S.P.'S
BEHAVIOR AS A FUNCTION OF INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED

Questions	Condition	Mean	t	p
4 - Perceived choice	High choice	1.80 ⁺	22.33	.001
	Low choice	8.65		
	High choice	1.80	18.30	.001
	Anti-low choice	8.45		
	Low choice	8.65	1	n.s.
	Anti-low choice	8.45		
5 - S.P. argues for own belief	High choice	2.25 ⁺⁺	6.65	.005
	Low choice	5.30		
	High choice	2.25	6.51	.005
	Anti-low choice	5.00		
	Low choice	5.30	1.67	.05 .10
	Anti-low choice	5.00		
6 - S.P. argues against own belief	High choice	7.00	7.26	.005
	Low choice	4.75		
	High choice	7.00	3.91	.005
	Anti-low choice	4.90		
	Low choice	4.75	1	n.s.
	Anti-low choice	4.90		
7 - No opinion on issue	High choice	5.60	1.57	.05 .10
	Low choice	6.45		
	High choice	5.60	1.14	n.s.
	Anti-low choice	6.00		
	Low choice	6.45	1	n.s.
	Anti-low choice	6.00		

Notes:

N = 20 per group

+ On a 9-point scale, with "1" being "very high choice" and "9" being "very low choice."

++ On a 9-point scale, with "1" being very likely" and "9" being "very unlikely."

TABLE 27

NUMBER OF "b" and "c" RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON THE SEX OF THE
CLUB MEMBERS IN MAIN INVESTIGATION

Response			Total	χ^2
	High Choice	Low Choice		
b	29	28	57	<1
c	31	32	63	
Total	60	60	120	
	Normative	NonNormative		
b	31	26	57	<1
c	29	34	63	
Total	60	60	120	
	High Conviction	Low Conviction		
b	27	30	57	<1
c	33	30	63	
Total	60	60	120	

Notes:

Response "b" = females

Response "c" = both males and females

None responded "a," males

TABLE 28

RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON THE STATUS OF THE CLUB MEMBERS, IN
MAIN INVESTIGATION

Response			Total
	High Choice	Low Choice	
a	56	57	113
b	0	0	0
c	4	2	6
d	0	1	1
	Normative	NonNormative	
a	56	57	113
b	0	0	0
c	4	2	6
d	0	1	1
	High Conviction	Low Conviction	
a	57	56	113
b	0	0	0
c	3	3	6
d	0	1	1

Notes:

a = students
b = faculty
c = both students and faculty
d = other

TABLE 29

NUMBER OF "b" AND "c" RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON THE SEX OF
THE AUDIENCE, IN MAIN INVESTIGATION

Response			Total	χ^2
	High Choice	Low Choice		
b	21	16	37	<1
c	39	44	83	
Total	60	60	120	
	Normative	NonNormative		
b	20	17	37	<1
c	40	43	83	
Total	60	60	120	
	High Conviction	Low Conviction		
b	20	17	37	<1
c	40	43	83	
Total	60	60	120	

Notes:

b = females
c = both males and females
None responded "a" - males

TABLE 30

NUMBER OF "a" and "b" + "c" RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON THE STATUS
OF THE AUDIENCE, IN MAIN INVESTIGATION

Response			Total	χ^2
	High Choice	Low Choice		
a	36	40	76	<1
b+c	24	20	44	
Total	60	60	120	
	Normative	NonNormative		
a	41	35	76	<1
b+c	19	25	44	
Total	60	60	120	
	High Conviction	Low Conviction		
a	39	37	76	<1
b+c	21	23	44	
Total	60	60	120	

Notes:

a = students

b = faculty

c = both students and faculty

None responded "d," other

Only one subject, in HNH condition, responded "b"

TABLE 31

NUMBER OF "a" AND "b" RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON STATUS OF THE
MODERATOR, IN MAIN INVESTIGATION

Response			Total	χ^2
	High Choice	Low Choice		
a	49	52	101	<1
b	11	8	19	
Total	60	60	120	
	Normative	NonNormative		
a	51	50	101	<1
b	9	10	19	
Total	60	60	120	
	High Conviction	Low Conviction		
a	50	51	101	<1
b	10	9	19	
Total	60	60	120	

Notes:

a = student

b = faculty

Please read the following SLOWLY.

Place yourself in the following situation: You are asked, as part of a study, to listen to part of a tape-recorded debate, and then to answer some questions about the debater whom you heard on the tape. Before hearing the tape, however, you are given the following information by the researcher.

There is a debating club here at Brooklyn College; this club is made up entirely of female college students. It is coordinated with the Speech Department. The club often participates in matches with debating clubs from other schools. At times they also have debates within their own club; they do this in order to study and practice their own techniques in debating; to improve their diction, speech, arguments, and so on. The debates are completely student run, with a student moderator, though advice is sometimes sought from the faculty. The practice debates are usually tape-recorded so that the club might later analyze them. The club permitted us the use of some of their tapes for our study; what you will hear will be the first debater in a recent debate held within this club.

First I want to tell you a little about the debating teams. They are composed of three members each; three arguing in favor of the issue and three arguing against the issue. The debaters do not know beforehand what the topic of the debate will be. They are told this by the moderator, who is one of the club members, at the time of the debate. The debate you will hear will be on the issue of whether or not abortion laws should be liberal.

The debating teams were formed as follows. The members of the club met. The moderator then announced the topic to be debated. She then asked each member of the club to mark down on a slip of paper

the side of the issue on which she would like to argue, either in favor of or against liberal abortion laws in this case. The moderator collected these slips and then chose three who preferred to argue in favor of the issue and three who indicated a preference to argue against the issue. These debaters made up the teams in accord with the side of the issue they asked for.

The first speakers were given ten minutes in which to prepare their opening remarks. They sat around a table in front of the rest of the club, also female students. The moderator then introduced the first speaker.

Please turn this paper over now.

Please read the following SLOWLY.

Place yourself in the following situation: You are asked, as part of a study, to listen to part of a tape-recorded debate, and then to answer some questions about the debater whom you heard on the tape. Before hearing the tape, however, you are given the following information by the researcher.

There is a debating club here at Brooklyn College; this club is made up entirely of female college students. It is coordinated with the Speech Department. The club often participates in matches with debating clubs from other schools. At times they also have debates within their own club; they do this in order to study and practice their own techniques in debating; to improve their diction, speech, arguments, and so on. The debates are completely student run, with a student moderator, though advice is sometimes sought from the faculty. The practice debates are usually tape-recorded so that the club might later analyze them. The club ~~permitted~~ us the use of some of their tapes for our study; what you will hear will be the first debater in a recent debate held within this club.

First I want to tell you a little about the debating teams. They are composed of three members each; three arguing in favor of the issue and three arguing against the issue. The debaters do not know beforehand what the topic of the debate will be. They are told this by the moderator, who is one of the club members, at the time of the debate. The debate you will hear will be on the issue of whether or not abortion laws should be liberal.

The debating teams were formed as follows. The members of the club met. The moderator then randomly chose six members, and assigned

three to argue in favor of the issue (that is, that abortion laws should be liberal in this case) and three to argue against the issue (that is, that abortion laws should not be liberal in this case).

The first speakers were given ten minutes in which to prepare their opening remarks. They sat around a table in front of the rest of the club, also female students. The moderator then introduced the first speaker.

Please turn this paper over now.

Please read the following SLOWLY.

Place yourself in the following situation: You are asked as part of a study, to listen to part of a tape-recorded debate, and then to answer some questions about the debater whom you heard on the tape. Before hearing the tape, however, you are given the following information by the researcher.

There is a debating club here at Brooklyn College; this club is made up entirely of female college students. It is coordinated with the Speech Department. The club often participates in matches with debating clubs from other schools. At times they also have debates within their own club; they do this in order to study and practice their own techniques in debating; to improve their diction, speech, arguments, and so on. The debates are completely student run, with a student moderator, though advice is sometimes sought from the faculty. The practice debates are usually tape-recorded so that the club might later analyze them. The club permitted us the use of some of their tapes for our study; what you will hear will be the first debater in a recent debate held within this club.

First I want to tell you a little about the debating teams. They are composed of three members each; three arguing in favor of the issue and three arguing against the issue. The debaters do not know beforehand what the topic of the debate will be. They are told this by the moderator, who is one of the club members, at the time of the debate. The debate you will hear will be on the issue of whether or not abortion laws should be liberal.

The debating teams were formed as follows. The members of the club met. The moderator then randomly chose six members, and assigned

three to argue in favor of the issue (that is, that abortion laws should be liberal in this case) and three to argue against the issue (that is, that abortion laws should not be liberal in this case).

The first speakers were given ten minutes in which to prepare their opening remarks. They sat around a table in front of the rest of the club, also female students. The moderator then introduced the first speaker. She had been assigned to argue against liberal abortion laws.

She began to speak, and it became apparent that she was presenting an argument in favor of liberal abortion laws. The moderator then reminded her that she was assigned to argue against this issue. The debater said, "I know; I would like to continue to argue as I have begun." She continued to argue in favor of the issue.

- - - - -

Please turn this paper over now.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please read each question slowly and carefully. Answer each question before going on to the next question. Please be sure to give an answer to every question even if you have to guess.

1. Write down all that you recall about the situation just described to you.

2. How were the debating teams formed? That is, how was it decided who would argue on each side of the issue?

3. What is the nature of the debating club?
 - a. Who are its members?
 - b. With whom do they debate?
 - c. Who is the moderator?

DO NOT RETURN TO ANY OF THE FOREGOING QUESTIONS.
DO NOT CHANGE ANY OF YOUR FOREGOING ANSWERS.

4. Indicate, by circling the appropriate number on the following scale, how much choice you feel the debater had in picking the side of the issue on which she would argue.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very very high choice		high high choice		some choice		not much choice		no choice

5. How likely do you feel it is that the debater will be arguing on the side of the issue in which she really believes? Circle the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your feeling.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

6. How likely do you feel it is that the debater will be arguing on the side of the issue in which she really does not believe? Circle the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your feeling.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

7. How likely do you feel it is that the debater will be arguing on an issue in which she has no opinion? Circle the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your feeling.

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

8. How many individual are on each debating team? Check one:

_____ a. 3
 _____ b. 4
 _____ c. 5
 _____ d. 6

9. What was the topic of the debate?
10. Which of the following come closest to describing how the debating teams were formed? Check one.
- ☐ a. The moderator randomly picks club members to argue on each side of the issue.
 - ☐ b. The club members tell the moderator which side of the issue they prefer to argue on, and are then selected accordingly.
 - ☐ c. The club members choose each other for the different teams.
 - ☐ d. First come, first serve; that is, as each member arrives at the meeting, he makes a selection among whatever teams have openings.
11. How much time do the debaters have in which to prepare their opening remarks? Check one.
- ☐ a. one week
 - ☐ b. one day
 - ☐ c. thirty minutes
 - ☐ d. ten minutes
12. Who comprises the debating club in the situation described?
- | | |
|---|---|
| Check one: | Check one: |
| ☐ a. males | ☐ a. students |
| ☐ b. females | ☐ b. faculty |
| ☐ c. males & females | ☐ c. students & faculty |
| | ☐ d. other (specify) _____ |

13. Who comprises the audience in the situation described?

Check one:

- ☐ a. males
☐ b. females
☐ c. males & females

Check one:

- ☐ a. students
☐ b. faculty
☐ c. students & faculty
☐ d. other (specify) _____

14. Who is the moderator?

Check one:

- ☐ a. male
☐ b. female

Check one:

- ☐ a. faculty
☐ b. student

(NOTE: The following questions were given only to Ss who received the Anti-Low Choice instructions).

Please DO NOT change any of your former answers.

15. The topic of the debate in the given situation was "liberal abortion laws." On which side of this issue, in favor of or against liberal abortion laws, was the debater in the present situation assigned to argue? 0

Check one: ☐ a. in favor of liberal abortion laws.
☐ b. against liberal abortion laws.
☐ c. don't know.

16. On which side of the issue was the debater arguing?

Check one: ☐ a. in favor of liberal abortion laws.
☐ b. against liberal abortion laws.
☐ c. don't know.

17. The debater was assigned to argue against liberal abortion laws; however, she argued in favor of liberal abortion laws. Why do you think the debater acted as she did?
18. In such a situation how do you think a moderator for the debate would respond?
19. In such a situation how do you think the other debaters would respond to this debater's behavior?

20. Indicate on the following scales, by circling the appropriate number in each scale, how likely you think it is that the reason indicated below was the reason that the debater above argued on the side of the issue opposite to the side she was assigned.
How likely do you think it is that she did this because she:

did not correctly hear the instructions

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

is a stubborn person

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		~~unlikely~~		very unlikely

has strong feelings about the issue

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

is trying to make a show

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

21. Indicate on the following scales, by circling the appropriate number in each scale, how likely you think it is that the moderator, in the above situation, would:

not say or do anything further

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

insist that the debater argue on the side she was assigned

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

disqualify the debater and not let her continue

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

remind the debater, again, of the side she was assigned, and then
allow her to continue as she chooses

4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely

221. Indicate on the following scales, by circling the appropriate number in each scale, how likely you think it is that the other debaters, in the above situation, would:

not say or do anything									
4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4	
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely	

insist that the debater argue on the side she was assigned									
4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4	
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely	

remind the debater of the side she was assigned, and then allow her to continue as she chooses									
4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4	
very likely		likely		possible		unlikely		very unlikely	

Please fill in the following information about yourself.

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

TERM IN COLLEGE: _____

MAJOR: _____

NUMBER OF CHILDREN YOU HAVE: _____

Have you recently filled out any questionnaires on abortion?

Yes _____

No _____

If you have, briefly describe its nature, and where you filled it out.

APPENDIX C

Conviction perception questionnaire.

Tables

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Describe how this performan came across to you. Use as much or as little space as you need.

2. On the next few pages is a list of descriptive words. Following each word is a 6-point scale. What we would like you to do is to tell us the extent to which each word accurately describes the manner in which the actress presented the argument. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about this performance.

For example:

ANXIOUS

1	2	3	4	5	6
not at all					extremely

If you feel that the actress presented the argument in a very highly anxious manner you would circle "5" or "6" depending upon which best describes your opinion of the performance. If you feel that the actress presented the argument in a manner which was not at all anxious you would circle "1." If you feel that the actress presented the argument in a manner which was slightly or somewhat anxious you would circle "2" or "3" depending upon which best describes your opinion. And so on.

If any of these instructions are unclear, please raise your hand.

Respond to the following descriptive words in the manner described above.

Be sure that you circle one number for each and every word.

INDIFFERENT

1 2 3 4 5 6

UNCERTAIN

1 2 3 4 5 6

CONFIDENT

1 2 3 4 5 6

UNEXCITED

1 2 3 4 5 6

SINCERE

1 2 3 4 5 6

EXCITED

1 2 3 4 5 6

CASUAL

1 2 3 4 5 6

UNCONCERNED

1 2 3 4 5 6

EMOTIONAL

1 2 3 4 5 6

SELF - ASSURED

1 2 3 4 5 6

DETACHED

1 2 3 4 5 6

INVOLVED

1 2 3 4 5 6

UNCONVINCED

1 2 3 4 5 6

PASSIONATE

1 2 3 4 5 6

SPIRITLESS

1 2 3 4 5 6

INSINCERE

1 2 3 4 5 6

CONCERNED

1 2 3 4 5 6

CONVINCED

1 2 3 4 5 6

DECISIVE

1 2 3 4 5 6

UNEMOTIONAL

1 2 3 4 5 6

UNINTERESTED

1 2 3 4 5 6

CERTAIN

1 2 3 4 5 6

3. The argument you heard was from a script which had been prepared beforehand.
- a. Assume that the speaker was supposed to present this argument in a manner which would indicate a low degree of conviction; that is, as someone who is not concerned about the issue; as someone who is indifferent about the issue, who is neither in favor of nor against the issue. How successful do you think she was?

Indicate your answer by circling the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your opinion.



- b. Assume that the speaker was supposed to present this argument in a manner which would indicate a high degree of conviction; that is, as someone who is very concerned about the issue; as someone who feels very strongly about the issue. How successful do you think she was?

Indicate your answer by circling the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your opinion.



4. What do you think the speaker's real attitude toward liberal abortion laws is? Circle the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your opinion of her real attitude.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very highly in favor of				very highly against	

5. How certain are you of the judgment you made in question #4? Circle the number on the following scale which best describes your feeling of certainty.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very highly in favor of				very highly against	

6. What is your own attitude toward liberal abortion laws? Circle the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your feeling.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very highly in favor of				very highly against	

7. What do you think the attitude of most female college students is toward liberal abortion laws? Circle the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very highly in favor of				very highly against	

Personal Information

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

TERM IN COLLEGE: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

MAJOR: _____

COLLEGE: _____

TABLE 32

t TEST COMPARISONS OF RESPONSES TO ADJECTIVE AS A FUNCTION
OF POSITION OF ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO LIBERAL
ABORTION LAWS, WITHIN HIGH CONVICTION CONDITION

Adjective	Position	Mean Score	t	p*
Passionate	favor against	6.71 ⁺ 8.00	2.59	< .01
Certain	favor against	3.71 4.00	<1	n.s.
Confident	favor against	4.00 3.94	<1	n.s.
Excited	favor against	6.92 7.91	1.99	n.s.
Sincere	favor against	4.13 4.31	<1	n.s.
Involved	favor against	4.71 5.47	1.38	n.s.
Convinced	favor against	3.79 1.66	<1	n.s.
Concerned	favor against	3.96 4.31	<1	n.s.
Emotional	favor against	6.63 7.72	2.69	< .01
Self-assured	favor against	3.83 3.75	<1	n.s.
Decisive	favor against	4.25 4.34	<1	n.s.
Indifferent	favor against	7.92 7.38	1.19	n.s.
Uncertain	favor against	7.67 7.91	<1	n.s.
Unexcited	favor against	4.79 3.22	2.68	< .01

TABLE 32 - Continued

Adjective	Position	Mean Score	t	p
Insincere	favor against	7.67 7.91	<1	n.s.
Detached	favor against	6.67 5.63	1.77	n.s.
Unconvinced	favor against	7.71 7.06	1.16	n.s.
Spiritless	favor against	6.42 5.78	1.26	n.s.
Casual	favor against	4.54 4.88	<1	n.s.
Unconcerned	favor against	7.25 7.16	<1	n.s.
Unemotional	favor against	5.42 4.50	1.61	n.s.
Uninterested	favor against	7.42 7.53	<1	n.s.

Notes:

$$N_f = 24$$

$$N_a = 32$$

+ On a 9-point scale with "9" being "not at all" and "1" being "extremely."

* two-tailed

TABLE 33

t TEST COMPARISONS OF RESPONSES TO ADJECTIVES AS A FUNCTION
OF POSITION OF ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO LIBERAL
ABORTION LAWS, WITHIN LOW CONVICTION CONDITIONS

Adjective	Position	Mean Score	t	p*
Passionate	favor against	8.80 ⁺ 8.85	< 1	n.s.
Certain	favor against	5.73 6.20	< 1	n.s.
Confident	favor against	5.97 6.65	1.07	n.s.
Excited	favor against	8.77 8.90	1.00	n.s.
Sincere	favor against	6.77 7.20	< 1	n.s.
Involved	favor against	7.73 8.55	2.31	< .05
Convinced	favor against	6.60 6.80	< 1	n.s.
Concerned	favor against	7.37 7.70	< 1	n.s.
Emotional	favor against	8.60 8.80	1.18	n.s.
Self-assured	favor against	5.43 6.05	< 1	n.s.
Decisive	favor against	6.03 7.20	2.03	< .05
Indifferent	favor against	4.33 2.15	3.38	< .01
Uncertain	favor against	7.33 6.55	1.34	n.s.
Unexcited	favor against	1.83 1.65	< 1	n.s.

TABLE 33 - Continued

Adjective	Position	Mean Score	t	p
Insincere	favor	5.90	2.50	<.05
	against	4.10		
Detached	favor	3.73	2.46	<.05
	against	2.30		
Unconvinced	favor	5.73	1.02	n.s.
	against	4.90		
Spiritless	favor	2.20	<1	n.s.
	against	1.75		
Casual	favor	2.63	2.19	<.05
	against	1.85		
Unconcerned	favor	4.40	2.59	<.01
	against	2.70		
Unemotional	favor	2.37	2.06	<.05
	against	1.55		
Uninterested	favor	3.53	1.39	n.s.
	against	2.60		

Notes:

$$N_f = 30$$

$$N_a = 20$$

+ On a 9-point scale with "9" being "not at all" and "1" being "extremely."

* two-tailed

TABLE 34

t TEST COMPARISONS OF RESPONSES TO ADJECTIVES AS A FUNCTION
OF DEGREE OF EXPRESSED CONVICTION, WHEN S.P. ARGUES
IN FAVOR OF LIBERAL ABORTION LAWS

Adjective	Conviction	Mean Score	t	p [*]
Passionate	high low	6.71 ⁺ 8.80	4.76	<.01
Certain	high low	3.71 5.73	4.59	<.01
Confident	high low	4.00 5.97	3.97	<.01
Excited	high low	6.92 8.77	4.13	<.01
Sincere	high low	4.13 6.77	5.57	<.01
Involved	high low	4.71 7.73	6.68	<.01
Convinced	high low	3.79 6.60	5.43	<.01
Concerned	high low	3.96 7.37	7.30	<.01
Emotional	high low	6.63 8.60	5.81	<.01
Self-assured	high low	3.83 5.43	3.41	<.01
Decisive	high low	4.25 6.03	3.38	<.01
Indifferent	high low	7.92 4.33	6.08	<.01
Uncertain	high low	7.67 7.33	<1	n.s.
Unexcited	high low	4.79 1.83	5.36	<.01

TABLE 34 - Continued

Adjective	Conviction	Mean Score	t	p
Insincere	high	7.67	3.25	<.01
	low	5.90		
Detached	high	6.67	5.03	<.01
	low	3.73		
Unconvinced	high	7.71	3.04	<.01
	low	5.73		
Spiritless	high	6.42	8.31	<.01
	low	2.20		
Casual	high	4.54	3.57	<.01
	low	2.63		
Unconcerned	high	7.25	4.84	<.01
	low	4.40		
Unemotional	high	5.42	5.74	<.01
	low	2.37		
Uninterested	high	7.42	6.53	<.01
	low	3.53		

Notes:

$$N_h = 24$$

$$N_l = 30$$

+ On a 9-point scale with "9" being "not at all" and "1" being "extremely."

* two-tailed

TABLE 35

t TEST COMPARISONS OF RESPONSES TO ADJECTIVES AS A FUNCTION
OF DEGREE OF EXPRESSED CONVICTION, WHEN S.P. ARGUES
AGAINST LIBERAL ABORTION LAWS

Adjective	Conviction	Mean Score	t	p*
Passionate	high low	8.00 ⁺ 8.85	3.04	<.01
Certain	high low	4.00 6.20	3.50	<.01
Confident	high low	3.94 6.65	4.38	<.01
Excited	high low	7.91 8.90	3.94	<.01
Sincere	high low	4.31 7.20	4.80	<.01
Involved	high low	5.47 8.55	6.54	<.01
Convinced	high low	4.25 6.80	4.28	<.01
Concerned	high low	4.31 7.70	6.78	<.01
Emotional	high low	7.72 8.80	3.86	<.01
Self-assured	high low	3.75 6.05	3.40	<.01
Decisive	high low	4.34 7.20	4.91	<.01
Indifferent	high low	7.38 2.15	9.93	<.01
Uncertain	high low	7.91 6.55	2.42	<.05
Unexcited	high low	3.22 1.65	3.69	<.01

TABLE 35 - Continued

Adjective	Conviction	Mean Score	t	p
Insincere	high low	7.91 4.10	5.99	<.01
Detached	high low	5.63 2.30	5.66	<.01
Unconvinced	high low	7.06 4.90	2.92	<.01
Spiritless	high low	5.78 1.75	7.98	<.01
Casual	high low	4.88 1.85	6.46	<.01
Unconcerned	high low	7.16 2.70	7.60	<.01
Unemotional	high low	4.50 1.55	6.61	<.01
Uninterested	high low	7.53 2.60	8.69	<.01

Notes:

$$N_h = 32$$

$$N_l = 20$$

+ On a 9-point scale with "9" being "not at all" and "1" being "extremely."

* two-tailed

APPENDIX D

Attitude attribution scale.

Certainty scale.

Own attitude scale

ATTITUDE ATTRIBUTION AND CERTAINTY QUESTIONNAIRE

On each of the following pages is a statement. What we would now like you to do is to respond to each statement by indicating degree of agreement or disagreement.

However, in responding to these statements we do not you to indicate how much you agree or disagree with them. We want you to indicate how you think the debater you just heard would honestly respond to them. Thus we would like you to indicate how much you think the speaker would agree or disagree with each statement if she was filling this out.

To respond to each statement, choose the number below (+1, +2, +3 or -1, -2, -3) which most closely corresponds to how you think she would respond to the statement. Write this number in the space provided.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE	-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH	-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH	-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Following each statement there will be another scale. On this scale we would like you to indicate how confident and certain you are in the judgment you made. Please do this by circling the number which most closely reflects how certain you are in your judgment about the speaker's response to the statement.

FOR EXAMPLE:

All women over fifty years of age should
be allowed to have abortions.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

(instructions are continued on next page)

Now if you think the speaker you just heard would agree very much with this statement you would write "+3" in the space provided. If you think she would disagree very much with this statement you would write "-3" in the space provided. And so on.

Then, if you are not too sure about this judgment you would circle "2" or "3" on the scale. If you are very sure about your judgment you would circle "5" or "6" depending upon which you felt best described your feeling.

Please be sure to respond to EVERY STATEMENT in this questionnaire. Leave no blanks.

If you have any question, raise your hand. Turn the page and begin.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Abortion is an expression of
individual selfishness.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Decency forbids abortion.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

A pregnant woman should be permitted to
have an abortion if she is unwed.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

An unborn fetus is not life.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

The practice of abortion evades man's
duty to propagate the race.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Abortion should be permitted if the stability
of the family is threatened by the birth.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
low high

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Abortion is morally wrong in spite
of its possible benefits.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

All women should have the right to decide whether
or not they want to have an abortion.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
low high

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Abortion is murder.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

+1	AGREE A LITTLE	-1	DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2	AGREE PRETTY MUCH	-2	DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3	AGREE VERY MUCH	-3	DISAGREE VERY MUCH

A woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she cannot afford another child.

The speaker would _____ with this statement.

My certainty in this judgment is:

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low					very high

OWN ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

On each of the following pages is a statement. We would now like you to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.

Choose the number below (+1, +2, +3 or -1, -2, -3) which most closely reflects how you feel about the statement. Write this number in the left hand margin next to the statement.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

FOR EXAMPLE:

_____ All women over fifty years of age should be allowed
to have abortions.

If you agree very much with this statement you would write "+3" in the space provided. If you disagree very much with this statement you would write "-3" in the space provided. And so on.

Please be sure to respond to EVERY STATEMENT in this questionnaire. Leave no blanks.

If you have any question, raise your hand. Turn the page and begin.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
 +2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
 +3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
 -2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
 -3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

_____ A woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she cannot afford another child.

_____ Abortion is murder.

_____ Abortion is morally wrong in spite of its possible benefits.

_____ All women should have the right to decide whether or not they want to have an abortion.

_____ Abortion should be permitted if the stability of the family is threatened by the birth.

_____ The practice of abortion evades man's duty to propagate the race.

_____ An unborn fetus is not life.

_____ A pregnant woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she is unwed.

_____ Decency forbids abortion.

_____ Abortion is an expression of individual selfishness.

APPENDIX E

Attitude - scale construction questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE

Below is a series of statements. What we would like you to do is to respond to each statement by indicating how strongly you agree or disagree with each.

In responding to these statement we would like you to act as though you are a person who is strongly opposed to liberal abortion laws. This is very important.

To respond to each statement, choose the number below (+1, +2, +3 or -1, -2, -3) which most closely corresponds to how you feel, acting as though you are strongly opposed to liberal abortion laws. Write this number next to the statement in the left hand margin.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE	-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH	-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH	-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Consider the following example:

_____ All women over fifty years of age should be allowed to have abortions.

Now, in responding to this statement as though you are strongly opposed to liberal abortion laws, if you disagree very much with this statement you would write "-3" in the left hand margin next to the statement.

Please respond to each statement in this manner. Be sure you respond to every statement in this questionnaire. And keep in mind that you are acting as though you are strongly opposed to liberal abortion laws.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Below is a series of statements. What we would like you to do is to respond to each statement by indicating how strongly you agree or disagree with each.

In responding to these statement we would like you to act as though you are a person who is strongly in favor of liberal abortion laws. This is very important.

To respond to each statement, choose the number below (+1, +2, +3 or -1, -2, -3) which most closely corresponds to how you feel, acting as though you are strongly in favor of liberal abortion laws. Write this number next to the statement in the left hand margin.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE

+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH

+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE

-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH

-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Consider the following example:

_____ All women over fifty years of age should be allowed to have abortions.

Now, in responding to this statement as though you are strongly in favor of liberal abortion laws, if you agree very much with this statement you would write "+3" in the left hand margin next to the statement.

Please respond to each statement in this manner. Be sure you respond to every statement in this questionnaire. And keep in mind that you are acting as though you are strongly in favor of liberal abortion laws.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
 +2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
 +3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
 -2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
 -3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

- _____ 1. Abortion should be permitted if the stability of the family is threatened by the birth.
- _____ 2. Abortion should be permitted if the emotional health of the mother is threatened.
- _____ 3. Everyone has the right to be born.
- _____ 4. We do not really know what "life" is.
- _____ 5. Each individual has the right to protect herself in any way she sees fit.
- _____ 6. Morality should not be put into law.
- _____ 7. A pregnant woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she is unwed.
- _____ 8. The right to exist is more important than another's right to live happily.
- _____ 9. A child who might become a great person might be killed in an abortion.
- _____ 10. An unborn fetus is not life.
- _____ 11. Liberal abortion laws will save many lives.
- _____ 12. Liberal abortion laws will result in a breakdown of the concept of family.
- _____ 13. Abortion is murder.
- _____ 14. If a woman indulges in sex she should bear the responsibility for the consequences.
- _____ 15. Our laws should reflect our society.
- _____ 16. Everyone has the right to safe medical treatment.
- _____ 17. All women have the right to decide whether or not they want to give birth.
- _____ 18. The government has the responsibility to check our moral behavior.
- _____ 19. Each individual has the right to determine her own life.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE	-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH	-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH	-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

- _____ 20. There are many alternatives to abortion.
- _____ 21. Liberal abortion laws will result in providing the woman with many needed medical and social services.
- _____ 22. A liberal society should have liberal abortion laws.
- _____ 23. Liberal abortion laws will not relieve our social ills.
- _____ 24. A woman who does not want her child should bear it and give it up to adoption.
- _____ 25. Strict abortion laws discriminate between the rich and the poor.
- _____ 26. An unborn fetus is life.
- _____ 27. Society is hypocritical.
- _____ 28. All women should have the right to decide whether or not they want to have an abortion.
- _____ 29. A woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she becomes pregnant as a result of incest.
- _____ 30. Abortion should never be permitted.
- _____ 31. Morality is an individual decision.
- _____ 32. Liberal abortion laws will result in a breakdown of the concept of marriage.
- _____ 33. The government has the responsibility to legislate morality.
- _____ 34. We only pay lip service to the concept of equal opportunity.
- _____ 35. Man is not capable of wisely choosing between life and death.
- _____ 36. A woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she becomes pregnant as a result of rape.
- _____ 37. Liberal abortion laws will save the lives of many women who would otherwise seek an illegal abortion.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
 +2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
 +3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
 -2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
 -3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

- _____ 38. Liberal abortion laws will lead to people having the right to decide who should and who should not live.
- _____ 39. Liberal abortion laws will result in an increase in sexual promiscuity.
- _____ 40. A woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she wants one.
- _____ 41. The mother's life and happiness is more important than that of a developing egg.
- _____ 42. We should concentrate our efforts on ending the causes of unwanted children, not on legislating abortion laws.
- _____ 43. Even though a child is unwanted, he has the right to be born and pursue happiness.
- _____ 44. Only God has the right to decide between life and death.
- _____ 45. An unwanted child is better off unborn.
- _____ 46. A woman will never forgive herself for having an ~~ab~~ r
 abortion.
- _____ 47. A woman denied an abortion will not take proper care of herself during her pregnancy.
- _____ 48. A child born of an unwanted pregnancy is likely to inherit undesirable qualities from the mother.
- _____ 49. An abortion may make it physically impossible for a woman to conceive later on.
- _____ 50. Not all women are meant to be mothers.
- _____ 51. A woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she cannot afford another child.
- _____ 52. A pregnant woman is not capable of making a rational decision.
- _____ 53. People who are in favor of abortion are sexually promiscuous.
- _____ 54. A mother will learn to love a child which was previously unwanted.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
 +2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
 +3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
 -2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
 -3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

- _____ 55. Every human being has a contribution to make to society.
- _____ 56. A mother will not take care of an unwanted child.
- _____ 57. A good woman would never seek an abortion.
- _____ 58. People who are in favor of abortion are really interested in undermining the basic moral character of our country.
- _____ 59. The type of woman who would need an abortion is likely to pass on undesirable traits to her children.
- _____ 60. The children of sexually promiscuous women will grow up to be like their mothers.
- _____ 61. A child of an unwanted pregnancy will be a drain on society.
- _____ 62. Since illegal abortions are often performed by incompetents, they may be unsuccessful and lead to the birth of deformed children.
- _____ 63. The sexual morals of our country are very liberal.
- _____ 64. Only a fool can oppose liberal abortion laws.
- _____ 65. Decency forbids abortion.
- _____ 66. Liberal abortion laws will solve many of our social problems.
- _____ 67. Abortion is morally wrong in spite of its possible benefits.
- _____ 68. The practice of abortion evades man's duty to propagate the race.
- _____ 69. Abortion is an expression of individual selfishness.
- _____ 70. I believe in children of choice, not of chance.

Personal Information

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

MAJOR: _____

TERM: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

On the following scale please circle the number which most closely reflects your own attitude toward liberal abortion laws.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very highly against	highly against	against	in favor	highly in favor of	very highly in favor of

APPENDIX F

Experimental Questionnaire II

QUESTIONNAIRE II

How much choice do you feel the speaker had in picking the side of the issue on which she was to argue? Circle the number on the following scale which most closely reflects your feeling.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very low choice				very high choice	

Indicate, on the following scale, how you think most female students at Brooklyn College feel about liberal abortion laws. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very highly in favor of				very highly against	

Who are the members of the debating club?

Check one: ☐ a. Males

☐ b. Females

☐ c. Both

Check one: ☐ a. Students

☐ b. Faculty

☐ c. Both

☐ d. Other (specify)

Who makes up the audience? That is, in front of whom is the debate taking place?

Check one: ☐ a. Males

☐ b. Females

☐ c. Both

Check one: ☐ a. Students

☐ b. Faculty

☐ c. Both

☐ d. Other (specify)

Who is the moderator for the debate?

Check one: ☐ a. Male

☐ b. Female

Check one: ☐ a. Student

☐ b. Faculty

Which of the following comes closest to describing how the debating teams were formed? Check one.

☐ a. The moderator randomly picks club members to argue on each side of the issue.

☐ b. The club members tell the moderator which side of the issue they prefer to argue on, and are then selected accordingly.

☐ c. The club members choose each other for the different teams.

☐ d. First come, first serve. That is, as each member arrives at the meeting, she makes a selection among whatever teams have openings.

Indicate, on the following scale, how you think most of the members of this debating club feel about liberal abortion laws. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling about their opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very highly in favor of					very highly against

How much time did the speaker have in which to prepare her statement?

- Check one: ☐ a. fifteen minutes
☐ b. one-half hour
☐ c. one hour
☐ d. one day
☐ e. one week

On which side of the issue, in favor of or against liberal abortion laws, was the speaker you heard assigned to argue? Check one:

- ☐ a. In favor of liberal abortion laws.
☐ b. Against liberal abortion laws.
☐ c. Don't know.

On which side of the issue did the speaker argue? Check one:

- ☐ a. In favor of liberal abortion laws.
☐ b. Against liberal abortion laws.
☐ c. Don't know.

How would you describe and explain the speaker's behavior?

Indicate, on the following scale, how much you like or dislike the speaker you heard. Circle the number which most closely reflects your feeling.

-3	-2	-1	+1	+2	+3
dislike	dislike	dislike	like	like	like
very	pretty	a	a	pretty	very
much	much	little	little	much	much

What is your impression of the speaker? Write as much or as little as you feel is necessary to tell us what you think of her.

List all the points that you recall the speaker made in her presentation.

Personal Information

AGE: _____

SEX: _____

MARITAL STATUS: _____

TERM IN COLLEGE: _____

MAJOR: _____

NUMBER OF CHILDREN YOU HAVE: _____

RELIGION: _____

Have you recently (within the past year) filled out any
questionnaires on abortion and abortion laws?

Yes _____

No _____

If you have, please briefly describe its nature, and the circumstances
(where and when) under which you filled it out.

TABLE 36

MEAN RESPONSES TO QUESTION OF HOW MUCH DOES S LIKE S.P.

Experimental Condition	Mean Score
High choice - normative - high conviction	2.40
High choice - normative - low conviction	3.53
High choice - nonnormative - high conviction	3.27
High choice - nonnormative - low conviction	4.47
Low choice - normative - high conviction	2.67
Low choice - normative - low conviction	4.00
Low choice - nonnormative - high conviction	2.80
Low choice - nonnormative - low conviction	4.80

Notes:

1 = like

6 = dislike

TABLE 37

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR RESPONSES TO QUESTION OF
HOW MUCH DOES S LIKE S.P.

Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	p
Choice (A)	0.67	1	0.67	<1	n.s.
Normativeness (B)	14.01	1	14.01	12.85	<.025
Conviction (C)	60.21	1	60.21	55.22	<.025
A X B	1.41	1	1.41	1.29	n.s.
A X C	1.87	1	1.87	1.72	n.s.
B X C	1.01	1	1.01	<1	n.s.
A X B X C	0.67	1	0.67	<1	n.s.
Error (within)	122.13	112	1.01		
Total	201.99	119			

APPENDIX G

Pilot research on extremity of arguments

A statement containing a series of arguments on abortion laws is presented on the following pages. Please read this through, without trying to study or memorize it. Just read it through once and try to get a feel for the opinion which is presented.

After you finish reading these few pages you will be asked to answer a few questions; but you will be asked to answer these questions not as you yourself would answer them but as you think the statement which you will have read would answer them.

You will be given more detailed instructions about this later. For now, please try to put your own feeling and opinion about the issue aside and read the statement once. Don't study it.

Turn the page and begin.

This is a brief statement of several arguments to support a position against liberal abortion laws.

First of all man does not have the ability to choose between life and death in a fair way; he does not possess the wisdom or integrity or compassion or understanding to take on the responsibility of choosing between life and death. So there must be strict abortion laws.

Of course it might be argued that an unborn fetus is not really life. But it is not even really known what life is; there has yet to be produced an adequate, commonly agreed upon definition of life. Medically, a person is dead when there is no pulse, when his heart stops beating, and when he has no brain waves. But there have been cases where these were true and the person was revived by medical techniques or surgery. So, does this mean this person was dead and then revived from death, or that he was never dead, or was only temporarily dead? With the medical knowledge and ability that exists today the focus should be on saving lives, not destroying lives. At any rate, it is not absolutely known what life really is; and it should therefore be assumed that a fetus is alive until it is proven that it is not life rather than the other way around.

Furthermore, who knows where it will stop if abortions are allowed. Choosing an abortion is choosing between life and death. Liberal abortion laws will set a precedent where man is allowed to make such a choice. With this precedent it will then be easier in the future to change the point at which the choice between life and death is taken on. For example, it might be decided that all people

who become senile should be put to death because they are a burden on society, as the fetus was a burden on the mother. Or it might be said that all handicapped people should be eliminated because they are an unwanted burden. Who knows? It might, at some distant time, finally be decided that all people whom one dislikes, or who do not fit into society should be eliminated, since everyone has the free choice to act as he feels. Thus liberal abortion laws could be a dangerous beginning. It isn't known what dangers lie ahead.

Another point which should be presented against liberal abortion laws is that in destroying a fetus one might be depriving the world of a great leader, a great artist, a great thinker or scientist, someone who might contribute tremendous good to mankind. And society certainly cannot afford to lose such potential.

Another argument against liberal abortion laws is that a person's right to live happily cannot come ahead of another's right to exist. And there should be strict laws to make sure that this never happens. If people cannot accept the moral responsibility to life themselves, then the government must legislate this responsibility; must put it into law. Thus restrictive abortion laws are needed.

Of course, if there is a very strong likelihood that the mother's life is in danger, and that aborting the fetus will save her, then abortion might be acceptable. But in this situation one life is being saved, whereas not permitted an abortion might have resulted in the loss of two lives.

It should also be pointed out that liberal abortion laws will not solve the problems in our society which lead women to seek abortions. With liberal abortion laws these problems would just be

forgotten. Rather than alleviating the symptom, which is the desire for abortion, there should be more work done directly on the social ills which cause unwanted or illegitimate pregnancies.

Liberal abortion laws might even increase these social ills. Thus there might be an increase in sexual promiscuity, which will then lead to even more women seeking abortions. Granted that with today's knowledge of contraception and the easy availability of devices a woman can fairly easily be sexually promiscuous if she wants to be; but this is no reason to add to the factors which might increase sexual promiscuity. This is not to say that liberal abortion laws will necessarily result in an increase in sexual promiscuity; but if there is a possibility that they will, there should not be any. Instead of legalizing abortion, and thereby alleviating the consequences of sexual promiscuity, there should be more work on the causes of sexual promiscuity; promiscuous behavior should be made unacceptable, undesirable. Also, the value and joy of motherhood should be stressed and taught so that a woman who previously might not have wanted her child will now look forward to it.

Another problem, the problem of poverty will not be solved by authorizing widespread abortion. This may relieve society's guilt for the problem, but it will certainly not solve it. Rather than telling the poor person to have an abortion if she cannot afford another child, she should be told to have the child and that society will help with the support, will try to teach her how to care for the child, will not let them go hungry, will not reject them. And if all of this fails, the woman is still free to give the child up for adoption. Though she may not want the child there are many

people who cannot have children and would love to have them.

Finally, people often need rules to govern their lives. People are constantly faced with all kinds of decisions to be made. Liberal abortion laws will simply add the burden of another large choice that people would have to make; that between life and death. Restrictive abortion laws also protect a woman from being coerced into an abortion. Liberal abortion laws will destroy the ideals of marriage, children, family. Even if these laws are sometimes violated, their existence still serves to maintain the ideals of family.

And finally, there is a lot of killing going on in the world as it is; this should not be added to.

This is a brief statement of several arguments to support a position in favor of liberal abortion laws.

First of all, every individual should have the right to determine his or her own life. People speak about reverence for the life of an unborn child, about how important his life is, about how one should not interfere with it; but these people do not seem to consider the reverence which should be had for the life and well-being of the mother. It is known that the mother is a living, independent, thinking, human being, but it has not yet been completely proven that the fetus is human life. The mother's life and happiness should have first consideration.

For another thing, society feels that every individual has the right to protect himself against harm. So if a birth threatens the physical or emotional health of the mother, or the stability and cohesiveness of a family, the mother has the right to protect herself against this harm by having her pregnancy ended.

Another point which should be presented in favor of liberal abortion laws is that the laws of society should reflect the real attitudes and values of society as these are revealed in actual behavior. But laws are usually way behind in this respect. The sexual morals of society are becoming more liberal, and laws should follow suit. The individual is finally beginning to be valued for his own worth; overall society is no longer being placed above the worth of the individual. Thus sex is not valued only because it serves to maintain the species, but is seen as enjoyment in and of itself; sexual behavior is not likely to be seen by most people today as promiscuous; and laws should not be such as to cause a woman who has become pregnant to feel like a criminal, nor to bear an unwanted

child.

Even if sexual behavior is seen as promiscuous, there is nothing to prove that strict abortion laws inhibit such promiscuity. Perhaps if there was greater freedom in attitudes, as reflected by the laws, then promiscuous behavior would in fact decline. But whether or not this is the case, the question of what is and what is not promiscuous is not the government's concern. Just because there are liberal abortion laws does not mean that the women involved in this way are going to flock to get abortions; nor does it mean that so-called illegal sexual behavior, adultery, incest, rape, pre-marital sex will increase. With the present widespread use of contraceptives, it is unlikely that strict abortion laws will inhibit sexual behavior.

Furthermore, this is a moral issue; abortion is seen by many as a moral issue; and even if this is a moral issue, each person is entitled to her own morality; morality is built into the individual, not forced upon her. Morality cannot be legislated; what some people think is moral should not be made into law in an attempt to get everyone to adopt these morals; each individual must make her own decision; whether or not she will feel guilt and whether or not she is willing to carry her own guilt is her own decision, but she cannot be burdened with the guilt or responsibility of all society. This choice, again, must be open to the individual.

Another reason abortion laws should be liberal is that a woman should not be forced to have an unwanted child. Most laws allow abortion if the life of the mother is in danger; but we must extend the concept of health to include emotional, social, and even economic health. With an unwanted child, not only will the mother suffer, but so will the child and the entire family. But with liberal

abortion laws a woman will feel freer to go to a competent doctor. In this situation she will get a lot more medical, social, and emotional support and counseling than she would otherwise, and maybe then she will come to want the child. But if, after these services, she still does not want the child, she should have this freedom of choice. The law should permit the abortion if she wants it. With strict laws, there is very little chance that she would even get a little help.

Furthermore, a society which forces a woman to bear an unwanted child and then offers no help is hypocritical. With strict abortion laws a woman is forced to go through with her pregnancy and to give birth, and then she and her child are forgotten about. If the child is physically or mentally imperfect he is looked upon as a freak, and possibly pitied, but he is given very little help or understanding; if the family is poor they receive little financial assistance; if the child is illegitimate he is looked down upon by the society which forced his mother to bear him.

Another point to be raised is that with liberal abortion laws it is more likely that the lives of many women who otherwise would have gone to an incompetent doctor, and paid some huge amount of money, would be saved. With liberal abortion laws a woman could more readily seek a known doctor, who is licensed to practice, will pay a much more reasonable fee, and will not suffer the severe psychological and physical damage that might otherwise occur.

It is also true that restrictive abortion laws are very discriminating. It is much easier for a rich woman to obtain an abortion, and to obtain it under more sanitary and safer conditions,

than it is for a poorer woman. However, it is probably the poorer woman, whose knowledge and use of contraceptives might be more limited and who cannot afford more children, who needs the abortion more.

Finally, society must increase equality of opportunity for people. The social, sanitary, medical services that should go with all abortions should be available to all women without fear of reprisal.

INSTRUCTIONS

On the following page is a series of statements. What we would now like you to do is to respond to each statement by indicating degree of agreement or disagreement with each.

However, in responding to these statements we do not want you to indicate how much you agree or disagree with them; we want you to indicate how much you think the statement you just read would agree or disagree with them. That is, we would like you to respond to each of the statements on the following page as you think the statement which you just read would respond to them.

To respond to each statement, choose the number below (+1, +2, +3 or -1, -2, -3) which most closely corresponds to how you think the statement would respond. Write this number next to the statement in the left hand margin.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE	-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH	-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH	-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Consider the following example:

_____ All women over fifty years of age should be allowed to have abortions.

Now, if you think the statement which you had read would agree very much with this sentence, you would write "+3" in the left hand margin next to this sentence.

Please respond to each statement on the following page in this manner. Be sure you respond to every statement in this questionnaire. And keep in mind that you are responding as you think the arguments which you had read would respond.

If these instructions are not crystal clear to you, if you have any question about them, please raise your hand.

+1 AGREE A LITTLE
+2 AGREE PRETTY MUCH
+3 AGREE VERY MUCH

-1 DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2 DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
-3 DISAGREE VERY MUCH

- _____ 1. Abortion is an expression of individual selfishness.
- _____ 2. Decency forbids abortion.
- _____ 3. A pregnant woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she is unwed.
- _____ 4. An unborn fetus is not life.
- _____ 5. The practice of abortion evades man's duty to propagate the race.
- _____ 6. Abortion should be permitted if the stability of the family is threatened by the birth.
- _____ 7. All women should have the right to decide whether or not they want to have an abortion.
- _____ 8. Abortion is morally wrong in spite of its possible benefits.
- _____ 9. Abortion is murder.
- _____ 10. A woman should be permitted to have an abortion if she cannot afford another child.

Personal Information

Age: _____

Term: _____

Sex: _____

Marital Status: _____

Major: _____

On the following scale please circle the number which most closely reflects your own attitude toward liberal abortion laws.

1	2	3	4	5	6
very highly against	highly against	against	in favor of	highly in favor of	very highly in favor of

APPENDIX H

Full text of the normative argument
presented by the S.P.

Full text of the nonnormative argument
presented by the S.P.

FULL TEXT OF THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY THE S.P.

I'm going to argue in favor of liberal abortion laws.

First of all, every individual should have the right to determine his or her own life. People speak about reverence for the life of an unborn child, about how important his life is, about how we should not interfere with it; but these people don't consider the reverence we should have for the life of the mother. We know that the mother is a living, independent, thinking, human being; but no one has yet completely proven that the fetus is human life. The mother's life and happiness should have first consideration.

Furthermore, our society feels that every individual has the right to protect himself against harm. So, if a birth threatens the physical or emotional health of the mother, or the stability and cohesiveness of a family, the mother should have the right to protect herself against this harm by having her pregnancy ended.

Another point I would like to present in favor of liberal abortion laws is that the laws of our society should reflect the real attitudes and values of our society as these are revealed in actual behavior. The sexual morals of our society are becoming more liberal, and our laws should follow suit. We are finally beginning to value the individual, and not to place the overall society above the worth of the individual. We find that sex is not valued only because it serves to maintain the species, but is enjoyed for itself; sexual behavior is not likely to be seen by most people today as promiscuous; and our laws should not be such as to cause a woman who has become pregnant to feel like a criminal nor to bear an unwanted child.

Even if sexual behavior is seen as promiscuous, there is nothing to prove that strict abortion laws inhibit such promiscuity. Perhaps if we were a bit freer in our attitudes, as reflected by our laws, then promiscuous behavior would decline. But whether or not this is the case, the question of what is and what is not promiscuous is not the government's concern. Just because there are liberal abortion laws does not mean that the women involved in this way are going to flock to get abortions; nor does it mean that illegal sexual behavior will increase. With the present widespread use of contraceptives, it is unlikely that strict abortion laws will inhibit sexual behavior.

Furthermore, abortion is seen by many people today as a moral issue; but each person is entitled to her own morality; morality is built into the individual, not forced upon her. Morality cannot be legislated; what some people think is moral should not be made into law in an attempt to get everyone to adopt these morals; each individual must make her own decision; whether or not she will feel guilt and whether or not she is willing to carry

her own guilt is her own decision; but she cannot be burdened with the guilt or responsibility of all society. This choice, again, must be open to the individual.

Another reason abortion laws should be liberal is that a woman should not be forced to have an unwanted child. Most laws allow abortion if the life of the mother is in danger; but we must extend the concept of health to include emotional, social, and even economic health. With an unwanted child not only will the mother suffer but so will the child and the entire family. With liberal abortion laws, however, a woman will feel freer to go to a competent doctor. Here she'll get more medical, social, and emotional support than she would otherwise; maybe then she will come to want the child. But if, after these services she still does not want the child, she should have this choice. The law should permit the abortion if she wants it. With strict laws there is very little chance that she would get even a little help.

I also want to point out that a society which forces a woman to bear an unwanted child and then offers no help is hypocritical. With strict abortion laws we force a woman to go through with her pregnancy and to give birth; and then we forget about her and the child. If the child is physically or mentally imperfect he is looked upon as a freak, and possibly pitied, but he is given very little help or understanding; if the family is poor they receive little financial assistance; if the child is illegitimate he is looked down upon by the society which forced his mother to have him.

Another point I'd like to raise is that with liberal abortion laws we would be likely to save the lives of many women who otherwise would have gone to an incompetent doctor, and paid some huge sum of money. With liberal abortion laws a woman could more readily seek a known doctor, one who is licensed to practice, will pay a much more reasonable fee, and will not suffer the severe psychological and physical damage that might otherwise occur.

It is also true that restrictive abortion laws are very discriminating. It is much easier for a rich woman to get an abortion, and to obtain it under more sanitary and safer conditions than it is for a poorer woman. But it is probably the poorer woman whose knowledge and use of contraceptives is more limited and who cannot afford more children who needs the abortion more.

Finally, our society must increase equality of opportunity for all people. The medical, sanitary, social services that should go with all abortions should be available to all women without fear of reprisal.

FULL TEXT OF THE NONNORMATIVE ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY THE S.P.

I'm going to argue against liberal abortion laws.

First of all, we do not have the ability to choose between life and death in a fair way; we do not possess the wisdom or integrity or compassion or understanding to take on the responsibility of choosing between life and death. So there must be strict abortion laws.

Of course someone might argue that an unborn fetus is not really life. But we don't really know what life is; we have yet to come up with an adequate, commonly agreed upon definition of life. We should therefore assume that a fetus is alive until it is proven that it is not life rather than the other way around. At any rate, with the medical knowledge that we have today we should attempt to save lives, not to destroy them.

Furthermore, who knows where we will stop if we allow abortions. Choosing an abortion is choosing between life and death. Liberal abortion laws will set a precedent where people are allowed to make such a choice. With this precedent it will be easier in the future to change the point at which we take on this choice between life and death. For example, we might decide that all people who become senile should be put to death because they are a burden on society, as the fetus was a burden on the mother. Or we might say that all handicapped people should be eliminated because they are an unwanted burden. Who knows? We might, at some distant time, finally say that all people we dislike, or who don't fit into society should be eliminated, since everyone has the freedom to act as he feels. We don't know; but, liberal abortion laws could be a dangerous beginning.

Another point I would like to present against liberal abortion laws is that in destroying a fetus we might be depriving the world of a great leader, a great artist, thinker, or scientist; someone who might contribute tremendous good to mankind. And we certainly cannot afford to destroy such potential.

Furthermore, one person's right to live happily cannot come ahead of another's right to exist, and there should be strict laws to make sure that this never happens. If people cannot accept the moral responsibility of life themselves, then the government must legislate this responsibility; must put it into law. Therefore we need restrictive abortion laws.

Of course, if there is a very strong likelihood that the mother's life is in danger, and that aborting the fetus will save her, then abortion might be acceptable. But in this situation we are saving one life, whereas not permitting an abortion might have resulted in the loss of two.

I also want to point out the fact that liberal abortion laws will not solve the problems in our society which lead women to seek abortions. If we had liberal abortion laws we would just forget about these problems. Rather than alleviating the symptom, which is the desire for abortion, we should work more directly on the social ills which have caused an unwanted or illegitimate pregnancy.

Liberal abortion laws might even increase these social ills. Thus there might be an increase in sexual promiscuity, which will then lead to even more women seeking abortions. Granted that with today's knowledge and widespread use of contraceptives a woman can fairly easily be sexually promiscuous if she wants to be; but this is no reason to add to the factors which might increase sexual promiscuity. I'm not saying that liberal abortion laws will necessarily result in an increase in promiscuous behavior; but if there is a possibility that they will we should not have them. Instead of legalizing abortion, and thereby alleviating the consequences of sexual promiscuity, we should work more on the causes of promiscuity; we should make such behavior unacceptable; undesirable. We should teach the value and joy of motherhood for example, so that a woman who previously might not have wanted her child will now look forward to it.

Another problem, the problem of poverty, will not be solved by authorizing widespread abortion. This may relieve society's guilt for the problem, but it will certainly not solve it. Rather than telling the poor person to have an abortion if she cannot afford another child, we should tell her to have the child and that we, the society, will help with the support and will not let them go hungry, nor will we reject them. And if all this fails the woman is still free to give the child up for adoption. Though she may not want the child there are many people who cannot have children and would love to have them.

Finally, people often need rules to govern their lives. We are constantly faced with all kinds of decisions that we have to make. Liberal abortion laws will just add the burden of another large choice that people have to make; that is, between life and death. Restrictive abortion laws also protect a woman from being forced into an abortion. Liberal abortion laws will destroy the ideals of marriage, children, and family. Even if these laws are sometimes violated, their existence still serves to maintain our ideal of family.

And finally, we have a lot of killing going on in the world as it is; let's not add to it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andrew, R. F. Origins of facial expressions. Scientific American, 1965, 213, 88.
- Asch, S. E. Forming impressions of personality. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1946, 41, 258-290.
- Box, G. E. P. Non-normality and tests on variances. Biometrika, 1953, 40, 318-335.
- Bruner, J. S. & Perlmutter, H. V. Compatriot and foreigner: a study of impression formation in three countries. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 55, 253-260.
- Bruner, J. S., Shapiro, D. & Tagiuri, R. The meaning of traits in isolation and in combination. In Tagiuri (R.) & Petrullo (L.) (Eds.), Person perception and interpersonal behavior, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958, Ch. 18.
- Cohen, A. R. Cognitive tuning as a factor affecting impression formation. Journal of Personality, 1961, 29, 235-245.
- Davitz, J. R. A review of research concerned with facial and vocal expressions of emotion. In Davitz (J. R.) (Ed.), The communication of emotional meaning, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, Ch. 2.
- Dittman, A. T., Parloff, M. B., & Boomer, D. S. Facial and bodily expression: a study of receptivity of emotional cues. Psychiatry, 1965, 28, 239-244.
- Ekman, P. Body position, facial expression, and verbal behavior during interviews. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 68, 295-301.
- Exline, R. V. Group climate as a factor in the relevance and accuracy of social perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 55, 382-388.
- Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance, New York: Harper & Row, 1957.
- Gollin, E. S. Forming impressions of personality. Journal of Personality, 1954, 23, 65-76.
- Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958.

- Heider, F. Attitudes and cognitive organization. Journal of Psychology, 1946, 21, 107-112.
- Heider, F. Social perception and phenomenal causality. Psychological Review, 1944, 51, 358-374.
- Jones, E. E. & Davis, K. E. From acts to dispositions: the attribution process in person perception. In Berkowitz (L.) (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1965, Vol. 2.
- Jones, E. E. & DeCharms, R. Changes in social perception as a function of the personal relevance of behavior. Sociometry, 1957, 20, 75-85.
- Jones, E. E. & DeCharms, R. The organizing function of interaction roles in person perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1958, 57, 155-164.
- Jones, E. E. & Harris, V. A. The attribution of attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1967, 3, 1-24.
- Jones, E. E., Hester, S. L., Farina, A., & Davis, K. E. Reaction to unfavorable personal evaluations as a function of the evaluator's perceived adjustment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 59, 363-370.
- Jones, E. E., Jones, R. G., & Gergen, K. J. Some conditions affecting the evaluation of a conformist. Journal of Personality, 1963, 31, 270-288.
- Kramer, E. Judgment of personal characteristics and emotions from nonverbal properties of speech. Psychological Bulletin, 1963, 60, 408-420.
- Leventhal, H. & Singer, D. L. Cognitive complexity, impression formation, and impression change. Journal of Personality, 1964, 32, 210-226.
- Levy, L. H. Context effects in social perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 295-297.
- Levy, L. H. Adaptation, anchoring and dissipation in social perception. Journal of Personality, 1961, 29, 94-104.
- Mehrabian, A. Communication without words. Psychology Today, 1968, 2, 52-55.
- Mehrabian, A. & Ferris, S. R. Inference of attitudes from nonverbal communication in two channels. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 1967, 31, 248-252.

- Mehrabian, A. & Wiener, M. Decoding of inconsistent communications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 109-114.
- McNemar, Q. Psychological statistics. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963.
- Newcomb, T. M. The prediction of interpersonal attraction. American Psychologist, 1956, 11, 575-586.
- Osgood, C. E. & Tannenbaum, P. H. The principle of congruity in the prediction of attitude change. Psychological Review, 1955, 62, 42-55.
- Pepitone, A. Motivational effects in social perception. Human Relations, 1950, 3, 57-76.
- Pepitone, A. Attributions of causality, social attitudes, and cognitive matching processes. In Tagiuri (R.) & Petrullo (L.) (Eds.), Person perception and interpersonal behavior. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958, Ch. 17.
- Pepitone, A. & Sherberg, J. Cognitive factors in interpersonal attraction. Journal of Personality, 1957, 25, 757-766.
- Rosenberg, B. G. & Langer, J. A study of postural-gestural communication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2, 593-597.
- Schefflin, A. E. The significance of posture in communication systems. Psychiatry, 1964, 27, 316-331.
- Secord, P. F., Dukes, W. F., & Bevan, W. Personalities in faces: I: An experiment in social perceiving. Genetic Psychological Monographs, 1954, 49, 231-279.
- Secord, P. F. & Muthard, J. E. Personalities in faces: IV: A descriptive analysis of the perception of women's faces and the identification of some physiognomic determinants. Journal of Psychology, 1955, 39, 269-278.
- Shaw, M. E. & Sulzer, J. L. An empirical test of Heider's levels in attribution of responsibility. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 39-46.
- Steiner, I. D. & Dodge, J. S. Interpersonal perception and role structure as determinants of group and individual efficiency. Human Relations, 1956, 9, 467-480.
- Steiner, I. D. & Field, W. L. Role assignment and interpersonal influence. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 73-81.

- Strickland, L. H. Surveillance and trust. Journal of Personality, 1958, 26, 200-215.
- Strickland, L. H., Jones, E. E., & Smith, W. P. Effects of group support on the evaluation of an antagonist. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 73-81.
- Suchman, J. R. Social sensitivity in the small task-oriented group. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1956, 52, 75-83.
- Thibaut, J. W. & Riecken, H. W. Some determinants and consequences of the perception of social causality. Journal of Personality, 1955, 24, 113-133.