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CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, PH.D., 1979

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KINSHIP AND CONTRACT:
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE KOMACHI OF KERMAN, IRAN

by

Daniel A. Bradburd

A dissertation submitted
to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York,

1979

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

January 28, 1979
date

Sally McChesden
Chairman of Examining Committee

January 30, 1979
date

Sydel Silverman
Executive Officer

Dr. Daniel G. Bates

Dr. Amal Rassam

Dr. Abraham Rosman
Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

Abstract

KINSHIP AND CONTRACT:

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE KOMACHI OF KERMAN, IRAN

by

Daniel A. Bradburd

Adviser: Professor Sally McLendon

The dissertation is an analysis of the social system of the Komachi--a tribe of nomadic pastoralists who live in Kerman Province in South Central Iran.

In it I examine the causes and consequences of the Komachi use of wage labor sheperding contracts. I argue that these contracts arise from encapsulation and penetration of the Komachi tribal economy by an external capitalist market system. I further argue that these contracts represent capitalist relations of production which contradict other important structural elements of the social system. I then attempt to demonstrate that these contradictions render the Komachi social system 'unstable'; the nature of this instability is demonstrated through the use of a diachronic model. In addition, I attempt to show that the instability of the system is reflected in other structures, notably the tribe's marriage system. Finally, I try to indicate the nature of the relations which hold between the various structural elements of the social system, and how those relations are translated into social action

in the arenas of spouse selection, marriage negotiation, and relations between employers and shepherds and among employers.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation is the result of two years of fieldwork in Iran and years of classes, discussions, and debates in which I learned to be an anthropologist. The debts to individuals and institutions that I have accumulated along the way are enormous. I would therefore like to mention here some of those who have made this work possible.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an analysis of the social system of the Komachi--a tribe of nomadic pastoralists who live in Kerman Province in South Central Iran.

The Komachi (and their neighbors in Kerman) appear to differ in three important ways from most Persian tribes for which there are ethnographic descriptions.

First, the Komachi are a very small tribe. Compared to the Basseri (16,000), the Shahsavan (40,000), the Qashqa'i (250,000-500,000), and the Bakhtiari (250,000-500,000), the Komachi with 550 people are minute (Barth 1961; Tapper 1972; Beck 1976; Oberling 1974; Garthwaite 1971; Black 1972).

Second, the Komachi do not have any formal political hierarchy: no khans, ilkhans, chiefs, katkhodas, headmen, or rish sefid, nor are they part of any larger tribal confederacy--as, for instance, the Basseri are part of the Khamseh confederation.

Third, there is consistent ethnohistorical evidence which suggests that the Komachi tribe, as a named entity, is no more than 75 to 80 years old, that it is larger now than it has ever been in the past, and that, in contrast, some other Kermani tribes have disappeared. Thus it appears that the Komachi tribe and similar neighboring tribes have rather short 'life cycles' and are unstable social entities.¹

¹I strongly suspect that the processes that I describe for the

The orders-of-magnitude difference in the size of the tribes is quite important for several reasons. First, it renders comparison of many aspects of Komachi tribal life to those of other tribes problematic. It is one thing to compare rates of FBD² marriage among the different Persian tribal groups, but quite something else to compare political processes among groups with a 1,000-fold difference in size. Indeed, a second reason that the great difference in size is important is the very fact that among the Komachi political processes take place at the level of household maneuvering against household rather than in some formally delineated field of politics.

Thus some foci of studies of other Persian tribes are just not relevant to the Komachi. Finally, the great difference in size leads, inevitably, to differences in the relationship of the data to the analysis. That is, the whole Komachi tribe, calculated in the most inclusive possible fashion, numbers no more than 550 people. Thus I was able, at one time or another, to be introduced to, meet, speak with, and visit virtually every member of the Komachi tribe. My observations are thus observations about the entire tribe seen as the sum, quite literally, of its individual parts; they are not extrapolations based on observations

Komachi operate in the larger tribes of Fars and Luristan as well. However, in those large tribes and tribal confederacies, the processes are likely to take place on different levels of social organization--perhaps lineages or even sub-tribes rather than households; they will be much more gradual--simply due to the social inertia of a system which contains half a million members; and they are more likely to appear as purely political rather than social processes. In a sense the Komachi are a microcosm of these larger systems.

²Throughout this dissertation I use the following notation: F=father, M=mother, B=brother, Z=sister, S=son, D=daughter, H=husband, and W=wife.

of some small percentage of the whole. Individuals and their relations to others thus loom large in the material that follows for, in the absence of larger institutions, those relations are the framework of the society; they are the concrete manifestations of the structure of Komachi society.

The theoretical framework which underlies my analysis of Komachi society is largely based on the works of Friedman and Godelier and, to a lesser extent, Althusser and Balibar,³ Derived from a combination of French Structuralism and Marxist theory, the theory (sometimes called Structural Marxism) is directed toward understanding the dynamic processes of social formations or the manner in which social formations reproduce themselves.

This is achieved by analyzing the relations that hold between the elements of a social formation. That is, the social formation is assumed to be a system, a set of structures which are linked to one another in a mutually determining, mutually limiting (i.e., dialectical) fashion. A structure is itself seen as being composed of constituent elements which are linked to one another in dialectical fashion. The relations between both the elements of structures and between structures are often contradictory--that is, they are at or beyond the limits of functional compatibility, where the output of one structure is no longer within the tolerable range of another structure to which it is linked. This may lead to changes both within the structures and within the

³See especially Althusser (1969), Althusser and Balibar (1970), Bloch (1975), Friedman (1971, 1972, 1975), and Godelier (1966, 1977) for a discussion of these theoretical considerations.

social formation as a whole. Thus, for example, Friedman's analysis of the structure of Kachin society (Friedman 1973) demonstrates the incompatibility of the inflationary marriage/brideprice system with the limits of production of slash-and-burn agriculture in Kachin society.

In general the theory assumes that all social formations contain both intersystemic contradictions (that is, contradictions between structures) and intrasystemic contradictions (that is, within structures). It is the playing out of these contradictions that leads to structural change in social formations.

Analytically, a social formation is composed of two superordinate structures: the infrastructure, which is composed of those structures which govern the production, consumption, and distribution of goods and services, and the superstructure, which is composed of those structures which represent (and often mystify) the social formation to its bearers.⁴

While the relationships that hold between these two structures are complex, generally the infrastructure is, in the last instance, determinant. This does not at all imply that the relationship is unidirectional; it implies simply that, in the last analysis, technical forces set the limits for other features of the social formation.⁵

⁴It is important to emphasize that these are functional categories, not cultural categories. To describe a social formation solely in terms of cultural categories--kinship system, political system, economic system, etc.--tends to give a severely distorted and overly linear view of social systems. For example, kinship can be both infrastructure (as a relation of production regulating access to pasture and water) and superstructure (as an idiom of group unity). Thus in the analysis that follows, when I speak of the Komachi kinship system or the Komachi marriage system, I mean their formal properties rather than in any way prejudging their functional properties with regard to the superstructure/infrastructure dichotomy.

⁵Thus, for example, Friedman suggests that technical forces determine "what cannot occur but not what must occur" (1972:163).

Further, it is quite clear that superstructural elements are often mystifications of reality--false consciousness--which distort and dissimulate the actual nature of the infrastructure and the contradictions within it.⁶ This often palliates the contradictions by making members of the society less aware of them, at least in part.

Finally, the theory assumes that all social formations are the products of particular unique sequences of historical conditions and that, as social formations change, pre-existent structures not only change in response to new internal or external conditions but also, in part, determine the structure of the new social formation,

With specific regard to the Komachi, my dissertation will thus be an attempt to examine the relations that hold within and between the following structures of the Komachi social formation.

1) The relations that hold between the structures which regulate access to the means of production. These structures, the social relations of production, are the dominant structures within the infrastructure; they "define the specificity of the mode of production and its developmental tendencies" (Friedman 1972:35). There are two contradictory sets of relations of production among the Komachi: communal property vs. private property and kinship vs. contract. The means of production in the Komachi economic system are herds of animals which are individually owned and pasture and water which are communally held. I will attempt to show what the functional consequences of this conjunction of

⁶See Marx (1967) and Godelier (1977) for discussions of mystification and false consciousness.

two quite different types of property are. One of these consequences is, I argue, the existence of wage labor shepherding contracts. These contractual 'relations of production' exist side-by-side with other relations of production (i.e., those controlling access to animals, pasture and water, and some labor) which are 'controlled' by the kinship system. These facts lead me to characterize the Komachi social formation as representing (or including within itself) two modes of production. In theoretical terms the instability of the social system flows from this.

2) The relations that hold between the various rules within the Komachi marriage system. Two rules dominate the Komachi marriage system. The first is a preference for close cousin marriage; the second prohibits multiple marriages between sibling sets. Since kinship ties are also relations of production, the structure which creates those ties plays a major role in determining the dynamic process of the Komachi social formation. (Note that this does not imply that marriage rules create or determine the relations of production. Rather they are the medium through which the relations of production are realized; as such, they do affect the way in which the relations of production are manifested in Komachi society while, at the same time, they are determined by the interplay of the relations of production themselves. The two systems are mutually limiting.)

3) The relationship that holds between the two dominant structures within the Komachi social formation: the relations of production and the marriage structure. It is the interplay of these two structures which is particularly manifest in social interaction surrounding the politicking for parriages and hiring shepherds. That is, the most

significant social interactions in Komachi society are generated by these structures; thus my attempts to account for 'what the Komachi do' focus on this set of structural relations.

4) The structural dynamics of the Komachi social formation, As these are, in large part, determined by the interplay of these structures, the dynamic nature of the Komachi social formation and its 'developmental cycle' are ultimately revealed in a diachronic analysis of the relationship between these structures.

5) The relationship between the dynamic structure of the Komachi social formation and the Komachi view of their own social order, This is fundamentally an examination of the relationship between the infrastructure and the superstructure which attempts to demonstrate how 'kinship' as an idiom of tribal unity is an ideological construct manipulated to palliate contradictions within the social formation. The extremely broad and inclusive definition of 'kin' that the Komachi use for reckoning tribal membership is, in this way, shown to be directly related to the underlying structure of the tribal system.

6) Finally, I attempt to present a brief outline of the particular historical circumstances which appear to have led to the development of the Komachi social formation as it is presently constituted.

The focus of this dissertation is a description of the structure of the Komachi social formation. However, a successful description of the structure of a society, at least from a structural-Marxist point of view, cannot simply set out the elements--functional, cultural, or otherwise--of a social formation but must also consider process--the relationships within and between those elements over time,

In the case of the Komachi, focusing on process reveals the fundamental short-term instability of the tribe as a social unit. Such structural instability makes it necessary for me to raise one final point here. In the course of the dissertation I speak of "the Komachi tribe" or of categories of individuals within the tribe, such as "economic classes." The simple descriptive terms used seem to render them concrete entities with real boundaries such that a person is then either Komachi or not Komachi and is or is not a shepherd. This, I stress, is an artifact of language, the result of the reification of categories. Society is flow and process, and if categories exist, then their membership changes constantly not only through the exigencies of the developmental cycle but through actual motion of actual individuals through their lives as well.

The dissertation proceeds in the following fashion.

Chapter 1 has two parts: one is a discussion of the physical and social environment in which the Komachi tribe is situated and their articulation with these environments; the other is a description of the basic structure of the Komachi economy. The discussion of the Komachi economy stresses the organization of production and consumption, the social relations of production which regulate access to pasture, water, animals, and products, and especially the structure of Komachi economic ties to the surrounding non-tribal world.

Chapter 2 is a more detailed examination of the organization of labor in Komachi society, particularly the use of hired shepherds to care for the flocks. It focuses on describing the bases of the use of hired labor, the relationships that hold between employers and employees,

the class-like distinction between these two groups, and the implications of these features of the economic system.

Chapter 3 is an outline of the Komachi marriage system. It places marriage in its larger social context and describes in general terms the process of getting married among the Komachi.

Chapter 4 is a detailed analysis of the Komachi marriage system. In it the structural relations that hold among the basic rules of the marriage system are examined and the patterns of actual marriages in Komachi society are examined to show how they reflect the underlying structure of the social formation. The implications of this relationship--particularly the association of marriage with the process of forming kin clusters--for the historical development of the Komachi system are also outlined.

Chapter 5 is an examination of the actual process of getting married. The arena of marriage is used as a focus for examining the nature of inter-household relations. The parallel between the process of getting married and hiring a shepherd (which is discussed in Chapter 2) is highlighted and the structural causes and effects of these relations are highlighted.

Chapter 6 is an examination of the articulation of kinship as the ideological force of Komachi identity with praxis. The manner in which kin ties--as markers of solidarity--are consolidated in reciprocal exchanges, the manner in which networks of kin ties are used, and the way in which the Komachi see their social order (and how that vision is used) are all discussed in some detail.

Chapter 7 is a description of Komachi camps. Camps, the largest

effective social units in the Komachi social system, are analyzed as microcosms of the larger Komachi system. The analysis focuses on the structure of the camp and the relations that hold between its members and their relationship to the underlying structure of the social system.

Chapter 8 is a summary of the synchronic relations that hold within and between the dominant structures of the Komachi social formation and an examination of those relations in the context of a diachronic model of Komachi society. Historical and ethnohistorical evidence is brought in to support the position that, viewed over time, the Komachi social formation is unstable.

CHAPTER 1
PHYSICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Section 1: The Area and the People

From April 1974 through November 1975 my wife and I lived with the people of the Komachi tribe in Kerman Province, in south central Iran. The Komachi are a very small tribe--there are fewer than 550 Komachi all told--and unlike the larger tribal groups in the east and west, they have played no role in national or regional politics.

Ancestors of the present tribesmen are said to have entered Komachi territory as early as seven generations ago. Some came from Baluchistan to the east, some from Fars to the west, and some from Khorrasan from the north. Over time they intermarried and became pichide, twisted together or intertwined. About 75 years ago they began to be considered one people. They were called Komachi, informants said, because when Farmanfarma, an important governor of the province, camped near their territory and demanded a gift from everyone in the area, the Komachi gave a loaf of simple shepherd's bread, a komaj. The governor, incensed, asked, "Who are these komaj-i [i.e., bready ones]?" and the name stuck.

The Komachi then see themselves as something of a composite group. And, even today, the unity of the tribe should not be overly stressed. There are, in fact, three major groups of Komachi and one minor group that bear enumeration. The first comprises 13 camps with 73 households. These camps all migrate in the same general region (see below) and form the main body of the tribe. This is the group

for which I have the most complete information, a household-by-household demographic and economic census. This group is the sample that I use for most of my analysis of data. The second group, three camps with 20 households, camp with the main body of the tribe in summer but are about 40 miles distant in winter. My data for this group lack some depth; though I have basic demographic and economic data, I do not have sufficiently detailed information based on observation to assure me of its accuracy.¹ The third group, two camps and 15 households, never lives with the main body of the tribe. They are, in fact, hiving off from the rest of the tribe (a process I describe in Chapter 8). My data for them are similar to those for the second group. As a result of some lacunae in the data for these groups, I have in general concentrated my analysis on the 73 households of the main group. I am quite certain, however, that in every case what holds for the main group holds for the second and third groups as well.

The fourth group of Komachi are six families who have recently settled to manufacture carpets. One household settled 13 years ago, another 3 years ago, a third 2 years ago, while three households settled during my fieldwork. All have settled in Shirinak, a village in the middle of the tribe's summer quarters. They continue to marry with migrating families and are very much part of the tribe's social affairs. I therefore include them in my marriage discussions but not in my economic material.

¹The Komachi consistently underreport their herd size. Thus, for example, one man once told me that he had 100 animals. When he saw that I seemed dubious, he asked "Do you want the ain-e haghghat?", the exact truth. When I said yes, he then gave me the correct figure, 400 animals. Had I not known about how many animals he had, I doubt I would ever have gotten the correct figure.

Nomadic pastoralists, the Komachi herd goats and sheep for a living. They move over 700 kilometers a year as they and their animals follow good pasture and clement weather. Their annual round takes them from high mountain valleys (about 100 kilometers due south of Kerman City) in which they spend their summer--their sarhad--to winter quarters in the garmsir near the shores of the Persian Gulf.

The sarhad and garmsir are isolated areas, backwaters, in an out-of-the-way province of Iran. Even so, being small and weak, the Komachi do not control their territory; they simply use it. They have access to it because it is marginal land, isolated and infertile, that no one else wants or needs.

Physical Environment: The Sarhad


The Komachi sarhad lies in a long narrow mountain valley that runs east-west from the foot of 14,500-foot Kuh Hazar to the base of Kuh Shah, another 14,000-foot peak. The valley is about 25 miles long and the valley floor is between 8,000 and 9,000 feet above sea level.

The Komachi are clustered around three villages (see Map 1): Giborj, Sarze, and Shirinak. The major properties in these villages are owned by landlords who live in Kerman City or the town of Qaryeit-al-Arab situated on the plains at the foot of the mountain band in which the valley is located.²

²Some of the Komachi own gardens and land as well. They are landlords, men whose land is worked by peasant sharecroppers, and do no agricultural labor themselves.

While it was not at all difficult to learn which Komachi owned land, it was very difficult to find out how much land some men owned and nearly impossible to find out what the land was worth (to buy or sell), what its annual yield was, and hence how important a part of their

Map I
Sarhad of the Komachi Tribe



Communications in the valley consist of one drivable dirt track which runs the length of the valley floor from east to west. At the extreme west end of the valley system, far out of Komachi territory, this track intersects the graveled road that runs from Kerman to the city of Baft. The Komachi rarely travel in this direction, however; their major access to the outside world is through the town of Qaryeit-al-Arab. There are two connections from the valley to Qaryeit-al-Arab, one in the vicinity of Shirinak and the other to the east of Giborj in the territory of a neighboring tribe. The Shirinak road passes over a 9,000-foot mountain pass before dropping steeply to the town on the plain below. This pass is frequently closed in winter, effectively shutting the valley off from the world outside. The road over the pass is a dirt track of reasonable quality and the distance is motorable in about one hour. In Qaryeit-al-Arab there are several shops which sell small quantities of tea, rice, cloth, vegetables, and almost anything else the Komachi household would require. There are also a gendarmerie, two banks, a clinic, and a government cooperative in which wheat is occasionally available at subsidized prices. Buses leave Qaryeit-al-

annual income came from land. Paradoxically, it was the smallest Komachi landholders, men who owned only small shares of gardens, who were willing to talk about their holdings. Thus, four brothers share $1/2$ deng (a deng is $1/6$ of the total holding; it is customarily divided into 16 habbe, each $1/96$ of the total holding) of the water in Giborj; another four brothers and several of their married children share $1-1/2$ deng; two other men each own $1/2$ deng apiece, and several others own other smaller shares. When the crop is divided between the landlord and the tenant, the former gets $2/3$ and the latter $1/3$ of the crop. Thus, a man with $1/2$ deng gets $1/18$ th of the total yield of the garden.

I do not believe that even the largest Komachi landholders got enough produce to do more than supplement their income. Land is important in providing a cushion--it cuts normal costs. I discuss its importance in tribal dynamics in Chapter 8.

Arab for Kerman about twice a day, carrying passengers, mail, and material to and from the city. Thus, during those months of the year when the pass is open, the Komachi are a little more than four hours away from Kerman.³

The fields and gardens in the valley are irrigated by water carried in jub, ditches, from the waters of a small stream which flows from east to west down the length of the valley through Giborj and Shirinak before it reaches Sarze. There the water leaves the valley system and flows down to Qaryeit-al-Arab where, having joined other small mountain streams, its waters are again tapped for irrigation. It then flows on again until its waters are captured for the last time in the fields of Baghin, an agricultural center about 30 kms south of Kerman city. In the Shirinak valley, the water from the stream is supplemented by the flow of some small qanats as well.⁴

The entire mountain valley region is farmed with a minimum of capital investment. Almost all agricultural work is done by hand or primitive animal-drawn implements, except for plowing, which is done by tractor. The qanats which supplement the waters of the stream are short and poorly maintained. People in the valley are uncertain when the

³It should be noted that, while Kerman is today, with modern transport, only a few hours from the Komachi sarhad, it was traditionally a three- or four-day march. Thus, while the Komachi now go back and forth quite frequently, it is unlikely that this was a common practice in the past.

⁴A qanat is a system of irrigation in which a horizontal shaft is tunneled out underground roughly parallel to the water table. It is used to carry water from the foot of a hill or mountain to the plain below and is, in effect, a man-made underground stream. See English (1966) for a more detailed description of qanats in Kerman.

qanats were built, or by whom they were built. They are certain, however, that within recent memory there were more qanats but that they no longer yield water due to improper maintenance.

In fact, lack of maintenance is perhaps the best way to characterize the conditions of the valley system that is the Komachi home. Crops of wheat and barley are often planted on steep, unterraced hillsides which are heavily irrigated one year and left to lie fallow the next. This causes severe soil erosion, a condition that is nearly irreversible in the area under present conditions. The slopes surrounding the villages have been completely denuded of any vegetation larger than small shrubs with a maximum height of about two feet. The predominant plant species in the area are darman (a kind of sage brush, artemesia), esfan (also called dashti, wild rue), and shirin behon (wild licorice). All are diagnostic for degraded land (Pabot, 1967). The area's demand for fuel for cooking or heat in winter is so great and access to alternatives so limited, the supply of real firewood having been exhausted, that the small shrubs which are the only remaining vegetation are now used as fuel. A common sight in both nomad camps and villages are huge piles of this brush firewood being brought down from the hillsides. Interestingly, in the villages men collect wood while it is the nomad women who go out and carry back loads so large and heavy that they are bent double under the load.

As the wood burns fiercely but quickly, the collection of firewood is, for the nomads, a daily task. Enormous quantities must be burned to maintain a reasonable fire and the constant collection of shrubs has led to the nearly complete destruction of natural vegetation

near villages or near where nomads habitually camp.

During the summer the climate in these valleys is extraordinarily pleasant. Daytime high temperatures average about 85°F while the nights are a cool 50-55°. The skies are almost always clear--weeks can go by without a cloud appearing in the sky--and from May through October it almost never rains.

By late October, daytime temperatures drop to a high of 65° and the nighttime low falls below freezing. Winters are quite cold. There is no long run of meteorological data for the area; however, Kerman city has an average January high of 12.8°C (55°F) and an average low of -1.2°C (29.8°F). As Kerman is roughly 5,700 feet about sea level while the sarhad valleys are over 8,800 feet, it is quite likely that they are considerably colder. Native informants who live in the valley over the winter all claim that it is "terribly cold." They also report that in most winters there is significant snowfall--to their waists in some areas of the valley--and that the higher surrounding mountains are often covered with snow so deep that communication with the outside world is impossible. Again, there are no accurate figures for average annual precipitation in the area; Kerman city averages 203 mm of rainfall per year (about 8 inches), the vast bulk of which falls between December and March. It seems reasonable to assume that precipitation is somewhat greater in the mountains. I estimate that the sarhad valleys receive about 15 inches of precipitation a year and the surrounding peaks perhaps somewhat more. The run-off from snow and ice melting on the high mountains is the source of irrigation water during the spring and summer.

Seasonal variation thus makes the sarhad a wonderful place to spend the summer but a most unpleasant place to winter.⁵ The harsh winter also makes the year-round maintenance of large herds unfeasible. The demands of sheltering, feeding, watering, and caring for more than a few animals over the winter are so great and the potential costs so high that no one ventures it. In summer, therefore, there is room for Komachi herds. In winter, however, the Komachi, like to many other pastoralists, escape the harsh climate by moving their herds to a warmer area.

Garmsir: Winter Quarters

Komachi winter quarters are centered about the town of Manujan in the southeastern corner of Kerman Province (see Map 2). Manujan is about 115 km due east of Bandar Abbas--the nearest major city--and, as the crow flies, is about 85 km from the Persian Gulf.


The garmsir is low, flat, and hot. Manujan, in the center of a large 'saucer' rimmed with distant hills, is about 400 feet above sea level; the hills that surround the valley do not exceed 1,000 feet.

Traditionally the garmsir was a region of date-palm agriculture. Settlements like Manujan, Rudan, and Jaghin were clustered about date gardens watered from wells, small streams, and qanats. The gardens were, quite literally, oases--bits of green in a vast surrounding background of dry and empty land.

⁵Thus, for example, in late Qajar times the governor of the province had a lodge in the town of Lalezar at the foot of Kuh-e Shah. He and his guests went there to avoid the oppressive summer heat of Kerman (Sykes, 1962).

Map 2

Komachi Garmsir Camps: Winter 1974-1975



The garmsir was, in many ways, a much harsher and less hospitable land than the sarhad. Far from areas under effective control of the Persian government, the area was a center of brigandage and banditry. (One of the few major rivers in the area is listed on old maps as the rud-e dozdan, the river of thieves.) The countryside was completely insecure. Each local area had its own small fortress from which the local strongman, part thief and part petty warlord, ruled. Malaria was endemic.

The garmsir has changed radically in the last 20 years. Bandar Abbas has become a major port; when chromite mines were developed in the area, several paved and graveled highways were put in, ending the physical isolation of the area; the area has also been completely pacified and malaria has been all but eradicated.

Finally, while date-palm oases still exist, the area is now a minor but growing center of cash crop agriculture: oranges, lemons, grapefruit, cucumbers, tomatoes, and melons are grown for markets in Tehran and other northern cities. The fields and gardens for these crops are irrigated by large diesel pumps rather than qanats or traditional wells.

Still, much of the land in the area is neither irrigated nor planted. Flat, dry, uninhabited, it is the winter pasture of the Komachi. Their animals browse and graze on the natural desert vegetation: camel thorn, acacia, lotus, tamarisk, and many smaller annual plants and grasses. Indeed, the grazing is far better in these winter quarters than it is in the sarhad. There are two reasons for this: first, until very recently the area was only sparsely populated, so

there is still much more open land, including rangeland, here than there is in the sarhad. Second, because the area has been relatively unpopulated for a considerable period of time, there has been less strain on the available plant resources than there had been further north. This situation, however, appears to be rapidly changing. All Komachi are agreed that over the past 20 to 30 years they have seen considerable destruction of natural vegetation, particularly the cutting of larger trees for charcoal and firewood.

The climate in the garmsir is the mirror image of that in the sarhad. While the sarhad is comfortable in summer and difficult in winter, the garmsir is comfortable in winter and brutal in summer. Through December, January, and February, the average low temperature for Bandar Abbas (the nearest weather station) was 11°C (58°F); the average high for this period was 76°F. The mean monthly temperature for January, the coldest month, is 66°F, and the absolute minimum recorded is 43°F. In short, days are generally balmy while nights are comfortable and cool. The weather is almost never severe enough to present any danger to the Komachi herds.

Indeed, the Komachi's main concern over winter weather is rainfall. The average annual rainfall in Bandar Abbas is 8,5 inches; over 5.5 inches of that rain normally falls from November to February. This rain is vitally important to the Komachi: the early rains in November and December sprout the annual grasses; then, if the year is normal, the relatively heavy rains of January (3,5 inches average) will ensure adequate pasture. If, however, the rains are late or early or if, as is possible, they do not come at all, then pasture is nearly

non-existent. Barring a disastrous dry year, however, the Komachi 'average' winter will see moderate temperatures and enough timely rain to ensure adequate winter pasture for female animals at the time of their peak milk production.

By March average rainfall drops to less than 1/2 inch, the temperature begins to rise and the vegetation rapidly dries. This, however, is a pale imitation of summer. The average total rainfall from May through September is .02 mm. The average low temperature for the same period is 84.7°F and the average daily high temperature is 99.8°F. The mean temperature for July, the hottest month, is 95°F and the maximum recorded temperature is 113°F.

Just as the extreme cold of the sarhad made year-round herding of animals there nearly impossible, the great summer heat and drought of the garmsir makes year-round herding impractical there as well.


Indeed, the Komachi do not wait for summer to abandon their winter quarters. By late March, as the temperature rises well into the eighties and rain slackens, the pasture begins to dry and the Komachi start their migration to summer quarters.

Migration


The Komachi migration route begins in Manujan with a two-stage move slightly north and west and then continues onward nearly due north until the high mountain valleys of Shirinak, Sarze, and Giborj are reached (see Maps 3 and 4).

The initial stages of the migration pass through valley systems similar to those of Jaghin and Manujan. The original settlements are based on river and qanat-fed date-palm gardens and the outlying

Map 3 Komachi Territory and Migration Route



Map 4
Altitude Profile of the Komachi Migration



settlements have fields of cash crops and grains irrigated by motorized wells. As the migration route progresses northward, the valleys give the impression of a long, low flight of steps and the altitude increases from less than 1,000 feet in Manujan to nearly 4,500 feet before the true highlands are reached. Although the river itself is often dry, the valleys are linked by the channel of the Rud-e Dozdan which passes through them. These valleys are the garmsir of the Lak, Lurak, Sulemani, and other tribes; their pastures have been grazed all winter and therefore the Komachi do not remain in any single area for a protracted period of time. At the Tang-e Mordan, when the migration is about one-third over, the Komachi move from the lowlands to the beginning of the central plateau. The tang is a long, narrow defile through the mountains which rises steeply to the plateau above. Near the top of the defile is the village of Zamarkand. Protected by the mountains from the more extreme weather on the plateau, Zamarkand is the north-most oasis of date and citrus agriculture that the Komachi pass on their migration route.

Past Zamarkand, the Komachi continue to climb over a high mountain pass until the valley of Esfandagheh has been reached. Esfandagheh is a cluster of villages in the center of a large, irregularly shaped valley. The plain is over a mile high and is surrounded by mountains whose maximum is nearly 10,000 feet. Esfandagheh is roughly the geographic mid-point of the migration route. The Komachi say, "When we reach Esfandagheh we are no longer in the garmsir but have reached the sarhad." From Esfandagheh on, cold and the possibility of snow become factors the Komachi must reckon with.

The Esfandagheh valley is an important point in the Komachi migration route. The valley is large and there is sufficient open space and grass for the Komachi to remain in the area for several days. The villages there have stores at which the Komachi can buy and sell small amounts of material. There is also a government clinic which is heavily patronized by the nomads during their stay there. Finally, many Komachi have trading relationships with members of other tribes in the area.

The valley and its surrounding mountain ranges are both the sarhad and garmsir for several tribes. The largest and most important of these are the Lori and some Lur who claim to be kin to the Mammasani Lur of Fars Province. These tribes do not migrate over long distances as the Komachi do but spend their winters on the relatively sheltered southern slopes of the mountains and their summers on the higher slopes of the mountains to the north. Their short migration means they never enter the garmsir proper where certain products valuable to the nomads are produced: dates and some date products for food and, more importantly, black goat hair from which tents are made. Both the Komachi and the tribes in Esfandagheh herd goats, but they are Kashmir goats with a fine downy undercoat called kork (which is used for rugs and embroidery). They do not own the small black-haired downless goats native to the garmsir whose hair is used for tent construction, and therefore they must buy hair for their tents.

The Komachi buy goat hair for themselves in the garmsir and pack additional hair to trade with the tribes in Esfandagheh. In return for the hair and dates, the Komachi get cash and dairy products (which they

market with their own). The relationship is useful to the Lori; they get material they need with little effort, while the Komachi generally make a small profit on the transactions. The days in Esfandegheh are generally hectic, with much visiting between members of the various tribes and use of the facilities that the villages themselves have to offer.

From Esfandegheh the Komachi begin their climb into the high mountains. After a few days' march, they halt on the plain of Dar-e Pan. This is a spot with good pasture, plenty of water, and good browsing for the camels, which have become noticeably thinner and worn-looking from their long uphill climb. From Dar-e Pan, the Komachi must climb over a nearly 10,000-foot high mountain pass to reach their sarhad on the other side. The rest in Dar-e Pan is looked on as a breather for the final push ahead: a series of four or five long, hard marches. Should weather or grass conditions ahead be wanting, the Komachi may extend their stay in this area. By this time, however, the Komachi are usually anxious to reach their sarhad, so much delay is unusual. If they stay too long they will be pressured by the Lori, for Dar-e Pan is their spring pasture.

Social Landscape

Just as there are differences in the physical environment of the garmsir and sarhad, there are also great differences in their social environments.

The Komachi are a Persian-speaking tribe. The dialect that they speak is similar to the dialect of Kerman City and is nearly identical to the local dialect of peasants in the sarhad region,

Physically, the Komachi resemble their sarhad neighbors as well: aquiline and often rather fine features, straight dark hair, light though heavily tanned skin are the general rule. Dress is also similar: men wear dark shalvar, pants that are rather like cotton pajama bottoms, long-sleeved shirts that often hang to mid-thigh, vests, and western-style sports jackets. Some men wear hats, generally a fedora, although some wear dark felt hats that resemble a fuzzy, broad, flat-brimmed bowler. Women wear long, brightly colored dresses over bright, geometrically patterned shalvar, and a flowing light-colored shawl-like head covering. They are never veiled.

In contrast, the natives of the garmsir look, speak, and dress differently. The garmsir dialect of Persian is vastly different from Komachi speech. Among themselves, they speak a 'language' which they described to me as "not Persian." (Certainly it was unintelligible to me; the Komachi also claimed that they could not fully understand it.⁶) Indeed, even the 'language' the garmsir natives do consider Persian--the dialect they used in conversation with the Komachi or me--is vastly different from Komachi, Kermani, or standard Persian. Among other things, their dialect has an extraordinarily lilting sing-song character which is quite unlike standard Persian. In addition, men's voices are often pitched very high, in a near falsetto. The effect is striking and, among themselves, the Komachi frequently imitate these speech patterns as a stock comic routine.

⁶I am rather certain that this garmsiri 'language' is in fact an extreme dialect of standard Persian rather than a different language. Nearly no descriptive linguistics has been done in this area, however, and all I record is my impression.

The garmsir population is much darker-skinned than the Komachi; they have quite curly, often woolly, hair and much broader features. They are thus physically quite different from the fine-featured, straight-haired Komachi.

Local dress in the garmsir is also different. Men frequently wear a lang, a long rectangular cotton cloth worn either as a loincloth or wrapped towel fashion, rather than shalvar. Men also frequently work shirtless, which the Komachi never do. In addition, men often wear rough turbans of cloth wrapped about their heads. This led my Komachi host to comment once, "Those garmsiri--they bind their heads and their assholes and that is all," a joke which was considered so funny that it was repeated for weeks afterward. Garmsiri women also dress differently, wearing looser and more flowing garments. They also often appear in public wearing a mask that, at least to my eyes, resembled a bird's beak.

Finally, while the peasants in the sarhad have wedding, circumcision, and religious celebrations which are similar to those of the Komachi, these celebrations among the garmsir residents are, the Komachi say, very different.

The Komachi are thus rather like their sarhad neighbors but quite different from the people in the garmsir. These differences mark in effect an ethnic boundary. This is implicit in Komachi linguistic use. Sarhad peasants are referred to as dehati, villagers, or zeim, agricultural workers, to mark them off from the Komachi or other ashayer, tribesmen; the distinction marked is roughly occupation or nomad/settled. By contrast, locals in the garmsir are called garmsiri. This, I believe, makes a completely different taxonomic distinction: the division here is one not of occupation but of culture,

The Komachi and their Environment

The Komachi think of the sarhad as their homeland, claiming to have lived there since "az aval-e ruz-e qadim," the beginning of ancient days--roughly seven generations.⁷ Almost everything that they produce or buy passes through the Kerman bazaar or is affected by the prices set there. In the bazaar they have taraf, agents, who extend credit to the Komachi in advance for wool or dairy products; they carry over debts and also act as patrons. Other patrons are khans, men who own or owned the villages of Sarzeh, Shirinak, and Giborj, and thus controlled Komachi access to water, stubble, and fodder for animals. These khans were the dominant political and economic force in the sarhad area; they still help regulate disputes, intercede with the government, and give advice to the Komachi on how to make their way in the outside world. Ties between the Komachi and the khans go back for generations; they are ratified by habit. Both bazaaris and khans are men the Komachi can, and do, turn to.

Relations with local peasants are even more intimate. The late katkhoda, headman, of the village of Shirinak married a Komachi woman; four of his five children are now Komachi. The one son who did not become a nomad inherited his father's position as katkhoda and the close ties between village and tribe continue. The late katkhoda's close friend--a very old man--is still katkhoda of a small neighboring village; he is close friend and counsellor to several Komachi. He attends

⁷The Komachi tend to confound history with myth--both Islamic and older Persian traditions. Knowledge of these elements is picked up from odd sources, e.g., radio broadcasts during the 2,500th anniversary celebration, and they are rather jumbled. The Komachi simply tack their own history onto these events.

their weddings and circumcisions, gives advice to them, and sells them agricultural produce at a slightly better price than they might get in the bazaar.

Other local peasants also attend Komachi weddings and circumcisions; some have become Komachi by taking jobs as shepherds and then marrying tribal women. (The reverse does not occur.) During the fall the tribesmen sponsor rozeh, religious meetings at which the martyrdom of Imam Hossein is recounted and a meal is served; local people are expected to attend and participate.

Finally, a few of the wealthiest Komachi are small landowners in the sarhad area and have landlord/tenant relations with some of the local peasant families.

The situation in the garmsir is radically different. The Komachi are relative strangers there. They have been in Manujan for only 30 years;⁸ they market almost no materials there, have no contacts in the Bandar Abbas area, and are not at all as emotionally bound to the area as they are to the sarhad.

The khans in the garmsir are men the Komachi characterize as goroshne, hungry--anxious to make and take money from everyone including the Komachi. Relations with them are at best ambivalent: the Komachi need resources that these men control (water from motorized pumps,

⁸The Komachi came to Manujan as it was being pacified by a particularly forceful local strongman who was--apparently--intent on restoring order in the area. They say they came at his invitation and under his protection. They left their old garmsir because it was too crowded!

stubble, fodder in bad years), but they fear these men as well.⁹ While the relations with local khans are ambivalent, relations with local garmsir peasants are nearly non-existent. Whereas the Komachi know everyone in the sarhad valleys more or less intimately, in the garmsir there are only a few locals who are rafiq, friends. These men are usually not simply sharecropping peasants. Many of them are operators of the motorized pumps or small shareholders in wells. They are men who are useful to the Komachi and who have therefore been sought out. It is at these men's houses that the Komachi will stay if they visit the garmsir out of season and here that they store material that they may not wish to transport. These men--and there are perhaps no more than ten of them--are the only garmsir people invited to Komachi weddings and circumcisions.

Bandar Abbas is even more alien territory. The Komachi do not like it; they say that it is smelly, dirty, and confusing. All their transactions in the bazaar there are strictly cash and, generally, they purchase only imported items that are unavailable in Kerman. The Komachi alien status in Bandar Abbas is exemplified by the fact that when a group of men and women went there to take a sick woman to the doctor, the whole group was forced to spend several nights sleeping in a bus terminal for want of a better place to stay. In Kerman this would have been unimaginable--there, there are always homes where one can be a guest.

⁹Thus, for example, several times the Komachi were certain that local garmsir khans, or their men, had stolen tribal animals. This was never a concern in the sarhad.

The Komachi use of their habitat is typical of nomadic pastoralists. They move over long distances with a considerable change in altitude in an attempt to remain in a temperate climate that is comfortable for their animals and provides good pasture. As the extreme weather conditions in the sarhad (in winter) and the garmsir (in summer) make year-round maintenance of herds in those areas difficult, there is generally pasture available for a group like the Komachi who use it only in the 'good' season. However, although the Komachi are much more at home in their sarhad--the region in which they trade, have patrons, and have close ties to the local settled population--there is more pasture available for their animals in the garmsir. While there may be abundant pasture in the sarhad for local residents and their animals, there is not enough for the nomads. This fact is brought home in several ways. First is the generally bleak prospect of all areas not under cultivation. Second is the fact that the Komachi buy fodder and stubble in the sarhad to supplement the grazing for many of their animals and to fatten any animals that they wish to sell.¹¹ Third, and most suggestive, is the fact that, although the Komachi remain in their sarhad until late October, their animals begin the long slow trek

¹¹The Komachi buy enough fodder, usually alfalfa, for it to be a worthwhile cash crop in the area. It is my impression that, given the nature of alfalfa and other leguminous crops, in the long run it may be more profitable for the villagers to plant them than it is for them to plant the normal staples of wheat and barley. Legumes are perennial plants and will yield in the same fields for over five years; unlike wheat and barley, they do not require fertilization and there is no need to fallow the fields. Finally, unlike wheat and barley, the leguminous crops fix nitrogen in the soil and prevent erosion, thus improving the soil instead of depleting it. The problem is marketing sufficient fodder to buy enough wheat to meet the villagers' needs.

to the garmsir in mid-August. The Komachi explain the early departure of the flocks as being due to a shortage of pasture. The animals which remain are generally those which are fodder-fed and fattened either for sale or for slaughter by the Komachi themselves.

The Komachi thus find themselves in the position of having as their sarhad, which is their home territory, an area which is poorer for them than their garmsir is. Their relative isolation in the garmsir is, I think, due largely to its insecurity until the recent past, the rather late arrival of the Komachi in that particular area, and the "culture barrier" between the Komachi and their garmsir neighbors.

The Yearly Round of Komachi Life

The Komachi live a life punctuated by the needs of their animals and the related need to move. Movement and animal care are cyclic and Komachi life appears as a series of annual rounds. There are many places to pick up the cycle: spring migration (as I did when I joined the Komachi in the field), the fall marriage and circumcision celebrations (the major social season), or the annual rehiring of shepherds around the summer solstice. Indeed, like any true round there is no beginning or end to the Komachi annual cycle. Still, their animals are the base of Komachi life and it is their needs that, in general, determine the annual cycle, and so I will start my description in November when the kids and lambs are born.

By the time the Komachi arrive in garmsir, kids and lambs are being born. The newborns are brought into camp by the shepherds and handed over to women who are told which female animal is the mother of each kid or lamb. The kid or lamb is not reunited with its mother until

late at night. Because the young are separated from their mothers shortly after birth, much of the labor of November and December centers on feeding them: handing each ewe or nannie her own young, making sure that she doesn't reject it and that the kid sucks until satisfied.

By February the young animals are old enough to require less intensive care and the focus of Komachi activity shifts to the production of dairy products. Where all the milk used to go to the young, now their feedings are reduced, since their mothers are milked first.

Most of the milk is turned first to yogurt, from which butter, ghee, kashk, and tarf are produced. (Kashk and tarf are both dried milk solids, tarf being the reduced form of the whey produced in making kashk. Both are quite sour; tarf is used as a seasoning and is rarely drunk reconstituted.) From morning to night, women are busy, milking animals, churning butter, and preparing the other dairy products. At this time, the rains are very important; if they have come on time and if they have been heavy enough, then there will be good grass and the females will produce much milk. If the rains have failed the grass will be poor and dry, and milk production will be reduced.

The quality of pasture sets the stage for the next major phase of the Komachi year, their spring migration. The better the grass, the longer the Komachi may stay in winter quarters; the worse the grass, the more likely they are to move early.

Some time between middle March and the first week of April, the Komachi begin their journey north to summer pasture. The road is long and hard, over 350 kms and uphill all the way. The work is exhausting. To the care of the animals and the preparation of dairy products are

added the extra tasks of packing and unpacking camels, pitching and breaking camp, and walking, walking, walking.

It is with more than a little relief that, roughly a month after their journey begins, the Komachi reach their summer quarters. Here activity slackens: migration is done, the young animals are large enough to be herded with the older stock, milk production and the preparation of dairy products begin to slacken. In late June and early July, the animals are sheared and then there is a true break in productive activity.

Women no longer working on dairy products begin to weave tents, pack bags and gelims, while men begin to sell male animals.

By mid- to late August, the pasture in the summer quarters is exhausted and the blocks start the return toward winter quarters. Most of the people, however, stay north. Now is the season for marriage negotiations, for religious celebrations, for weddings and circumcisions. It is the period when the members of the tribe are bi kar, without work. It is a time of intense, and sometimes tense, social interaction, of excitement and, at the same time, relaxation.

Then, in early October, the social whirl ends and work begins again. Preparations are made for the migration to winter quarters; supplies must be purchased, accounts with merchants in the bazaar settled, and business in summer quarters completed. Finally, in late October, the Komachi hire large trucks and in a day or two are driven quickly to winter quarters. There the flocks are waiting for them. Female animals have begun giving birth; there are kids and lambs to care for and another year is about to begin.

Section 2: An Outline of the Komachi Economic System

There are several features of the Komachi economic system that are particularly relevant as background for the analysis of Komachi society which follows. Therefore the discussion will be focused about these points: 1) the fact that the basic unit in the Komachi economy is the nuclear family household, and 2) the fact that the Komachi tribal economy has been encapsulated within and penetrated by an external market system. These facts form the context in which many of the more traditional aspects of economic analysis will be considered,

Households

The household is the basic unit of the Komachi economy; it is the unit of production and consumption. It is an almost completely autonomous economic corporation and its cooperative ventures are frequently generated through narrowly-defined self-interest.

The foundation of any household's economic situation is its herd of animals: the primary subject of labor (and means of production) in a pastoral economy. The animals in a household's flock are nominally owned by individual members of the family. In practice, however, animals are managed as a joint asset held in common and they are controlled by the head of the household, generally the oldest male. He also controls the distribution of their produce. There are no Komachi households which do not have any animals, although there is considerable variation in flock size (see Table 1, pp. 65-66).

Access to Animals

The basis of a household's flock is the herd of animals that a

young man inherits from his father when he marries. There is no strict formula for determining the number of animals that he will receive. A father tries to give his son enough animals to establish a comfortable and independent household. The actual number of animals is largely determined by the size of a man's herd at the time his son married, the number of children that remain in the parental household, and, to some extent, the man's feeling toward his son.¹² (See Table 1, pp. 65-66; for a listing of reported inheritance.)

Should a man live to see all his children marry, then unless his wife dies he will generally continue to maintain an independent household until his death; then there will be a second division of his estate among all his heirs (including his wife if she is alive). Under either of these circumstances the preponderance of a man's estate passes to his sons rather than his daughters. This is so even though the Komachi recognize--formally--a daughter's right under Islamic law to one-half the share her brother receives.

Daughters are most likely to inherit a significant portion of their father's estate only when he dies before they, or all their brothers, are married; under these circumstances there is a greater likelihood that the Koranic injunctions will be followed. It is also in these circumstances that the most rigorous calculation of sons' portions of the estate takes place as well. Concomitantly, this is also when there is the greatest likelihood of disputes over inheritance,

¹²This pattern contrasts somewhat with the pattern of inheritance reported for the Basseri (Barth 1961) but is similar--save for the lack of ultimogeniture--to the pattern that Irons (1975) reports for the Yomut.

For example, there was only one instance in which a man reported that he received no inheritance: his father died while he was young and he said, "I left my brother my share along with the debts." By contrast, there are 30 cases in which a daughter did not inherit any animals. Further, in the majority of cases in which a daughter did inherit, she did so only after her father's death and the dissolution of his household. The average reported inheritance for men is 73 animals; the average reported inheritance for women is 8.4 animals; and the average inheritance of those women who did in fact inherit is 16.7 animals.

Other than inheritance there are almost no regular means of access to significant numbers of breeding stock. As I document below, shepherds receive one female animal per year as a portion of their annual wage--a number that makes the rapid building of a sizeable herd nearly impossible. Small gifts of animals are given to grooms at weddings and to boys when they are circumcised (these gifts are called pahnoz (pah andoz in standard Persian), but the numbers of animals involved are small and generally do not materially affect herd size one way or another. Finally, the Komachi do not commonly buy, sell, or lend breeding stock among themselves. The only female animals that they do sell are those older animals which seem to have reached the end of their productive and reproductive careers. Thus inheritance is the only regular means by which households gain access to the primary means of production: animals.¹³ In a very real sense, then, access to the means

¹³Inheritance is associated with herd size: chi square equals 9.42, p less than .01 for 54 households that have been established for more than five years. But it does not seem likely to closely determine a household's economic trajectory (see Table 24, p.).

of production is a function of kinship and kinship ties.

The fact that kinship is the medium of access to the means of production--at least with regard to herds, pasture, and water--means that kinship and economics are not two separate "systems" but different facets of the same structure. Kinship ties are relations of production.¹⁴

Production

The Komachi produce the following pastoral products: kork (the down-like underhair of the Kashmir goat), wool, a range of dairy products (including yoghurt, clarified butter, kashk, tarf, and cheese), and meat (which is sold on the hoof to butchers from Kerman City).

The locus of production for these products is the household. It is the unit which manages the primary resources of the society, herds, and labor. Thus, although certain aspects of pastoral production may be cooperative, ultimately each household produces its own portion of kork, dairy products, or meat; a household's survival as an independent economic unit depends on its ability to provision itself through the exchange of these items.

The average ewe produces 1.5 g of kashk, .75 kg of clarified butter, and 1 kg of wool per year; a nanny goat produces perhaps slightly more milk but only .5 kg of kork. Prices for these items during 1974-75 were:¹⁵

¹⁴Kinship ties are also manipulated as ideology as well. I discuss the importance of this multi-faceted aspect of kinship in Chapter 8.

¹⁵One toman (abbreviated T) equals 10 rials and is worth about 15¢ (6.75 to the dollar). It buys roughly 1 kg of wheat, 1.2 kg of barley, or .2-.25 kg of rice. In general, prices rose about 30 percent while we were in Iran. Pastoral products rose as much as or more than

wool	17-25 T/kg
kork	14 T/kg
kashk	10 T/kg
clarified butter	30-35 T/kg

Thus in any one year the potential income of any household is roughly \$8 per female breeding animal in wool and dairy products, plus the value of male kids and lambs, older females sold for meat, and older stud males sold for meat. Prices for these animals during 1974-75 were:

kid	150-175 T/head
lamb	200-250 T/head
male goat	250+ T/head
ram	250+ T/head
old ewe or nanny	100-130 T/head

The actual disposition of a herd's produce varies from household to household and from year to year. For example, a relatively poor family with a total herd of 28 sheep and goats sold the following amounts of produce in 1975:

3 lambs at 240T each	720 T
6 kids at 175 T each	1,050
21 kg of kork at 13 T/kg	280
6.5 kg of butter at 34 T/kg	<u>220</u>
Total	2,270 T (\$336)

By contrast, a wealthier family with just over 800 animals sold the following:

200 kids and lambs at 175 T	35,500 T
40 mature rams, goats, ewes, and nannies	4,320
75 <u>man</u> butter at 100 T	7,500
200 <u>man</u> kashk at 30 T	6,000
40 <u>man</u> kork at 40 T	1,600
145 <u>man</u> wool at 75 T	<u>10,857</u>
Total	65,295 T (\$9,763) ¹⁶

other materials and, although there was some seasonal variation, the general trend was upward.

¹⁶One man equals 3 kg. This total does not include yield from

In 1975, which was a good year, these households had the following costs directly related to herd maintenance:

Household I

labor (shepherds)	0 T
barley for goats, 140 <u>man</u> at 2 T	280
dry stubble	20
alfalfa	50
garmsir pasture, water	<u>100 (est.)</u>
Total	450 T

Household II

labor (shepherds)	4,800 T (cash)
barley, 1300 <u>man</u> at 2.4 T	3,120
alfalfa	1,300
stubble	200
meadow grazing	300
garmsir water	<u>500</u>
Total	9,720 T

Total direct costs of herd maintenance are thus roughly 20 percent of the gross yield in a good year. Years are not always good, however, and in bad years it is not uncommon for costs of herd maintenance to exceed the value of what is produced. I was unable to record exact figures for a bad year; however, since the fall before I came very few lambs and kids had been born, I do have figures for lambs/kids born in a bad year versus a good year and these figures do, I think, give an accurate picture of the magnitude of difference. In 1975, a good year, 4,006 kids and lambs were born while 1974, which followed an exceptionally

gardens in both the sarhad and garmsir or from speculating in animals or other products. The value of these products and labor is impossible to estimate on a yearly basis. The Komachi tend to be close-mouthed about agricultural yield while the yield from speculation, momale, is terribly variable.

dry year, saw a crop of only 1,200 kids and lambs. Note that this difference in the number of young animals born not only reduces the number of animals available for sale, but also means that that many fewer ewes and nannies will produce milk as well. In addition, since 1973 was a bad year because of drought, not only was Komachi production drastically cut, but production costs rose as well. In the dry year, the Komachi were forced to buy much more fodder, at much higher prices, than they would have bought in a good year. As a result, coupling high costs and low production, bad years can be truly disastrous.

The great potential for variation in annual production means that the minimum herd needed for a household's survival is a herd which will get them through a bad year. (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of minimum herd sizes.) Households which cannot make ends meet on what their herds produce generally must supplement their income by having male members work as hired shepherds.

There are in fact two important thresholds of herd size in the Komachi economy: one is the minimum herd needed to support an independent household--roughly 60 animals. The second threshold is at somewhere over 200 animals, when a household's herd becomes large enough that barring all but the most extreme disasters the household will be able to produce consistently more than it needs to survive; it reaches a threshold beyond which the further accumulation of wealth becomes progressively easy while the loss of wealth is progressively less likely. (See Chapter 7 for a discussion of inheritance of position.) The 200 to 250 animals per household barrier sets off the truly wealthy employer families--the economic elite--from the remainder of the tribe.

There are then three primary economic categories of Komachi: those households whose herds do not produce enough to support the household and whose members must therefore work for wages (usually as shepherds, chupan), those households whose herds produce enough to live on but do not produce a great surplus, whose herds will be considerably depleted by inheritance and whose fortunes seem, perhaps, more likely to fall than rise (independent households), and those households which are quite wealthy, and likely to get wealthier. These latter households are able to pass on sufficient inheritances such that their sons will also be wealthy and they are the major employers of shepherd labor.¹⁷ Household wealth thus plays an important role in determining the organization of production within a household.

Organization of production

Household economies are directed toward the production of three kinds of commodities: wool, dairy products, and meat. As the sine qua non for the production of any or all of these commodities is the maintenance of the household's animals, the basic task of the Komachi is the care of their animals: seeing that they are fed and watered, that they are not destroyed by predators or harsh weather, and that females are successfully bred.¹⁸ To achieve some of these ends Komachi

¹⁷I discuss the nature of these categories in some detail in the following chapter.


¹⁸Although I speak of animals in this section, my primary reference is to sheep and goats, the main productive livestock. Camels are the only other animals which have economic significance. They are kept as pack animals. Occasionally, the Komachi use camel hair in making ropes and lines and they sometimes sell camels to other tribes or to traveling camel-meat traders. (The Komachi do not eat camel themselves.) The price of a camel ranges from 700 to 1,500 tomans. During 1974-75 the main group of Komachi owned 538 camels.

households pool their flocks into larger camp herds (see Chapter 7). The animals are then redivided on the basis of age, sex, breed, and other criteria into several smaller herds whose composition varies with the annual round. In general, sheep are kept separately from goats, male animals from females, and kids and lambs are kept separately from (a) each other and (b) larger animals. During the breeding season in early summer, male and female animals and run together in common herds; during the late fall and early winter, those female animals that have lambed are separated from those which have not. Those which did not lamb in the fall are placed back with the male stock in the hopes that they will lamb in the spring. The flow of animals from flock to flock is illustrated in Figure 1 (p. 47).

The day-to-day care of animals in these flocks is almost invariably entrusted to hired shepherds. They see that the animals are fed and watered, they protect them, they help female animals give birth. The only animals for which shepherds are not responsible are the flocks of newborn kids and lambs which are kept in or near camp and are herded by children.

Although the animals belonging to the households of a camp are joined together into common flocks for efficient herding, other productive labor is not cooperative in this fashion. For example, although all ewes that have lambed are herded together, each household separates its ewes from that flock and milks them itself. Similarly, for feeding, kids and lambs are brought to their mothers who are separated from the common flock on a household-by-household basis. And, when animals are sheared, the men from each household often shear only their own animals,

Figure 1 The Flow of Animals through the Herds



and always shear all their own animals before they help anyone else. Thus, while herding labor is cooperative, and generally in the hands of hired shepherds, the bulk of the remaining labor is done on a household-by-household basis and what cooperation there is is specifically recognized as the members of one household giving assistance to the members of another.

Within the household there is a strict division of productive labor. Men do all the actual herding of all adult animals (all shepherds are men and, in all cases in which households do not use hired shepherds, men do all the herding), all the shearing of animals, and all the preparation of wool and kark for market. Women, on the other hand, do all preparation of dairy products from milking to preparing the finished products.

There is, of course, the additional division of labor between large herd owners who employ labor and poor men who work. The result of this division of labor is that wealthy men do nearly none of the actual physical labor required to maintain a herd or produce commodities from it. Except for shearing, which they do, wealthy men are largely a 'managerial class.' If questioned on the subject, they assert that they are "working" by traveling from camp to camp, getting information on prices, pasture conditions in other areas, and the like. While these men are indeed gathering and exchanging needed information, it is my opinion that visiting and talking is far more a social than an economic practice. Poorer men do a great deal of physical labor; they do all the work their employers do not do and they do all their own work as well. Among women, wealth makes little difference in the amount of actual

labor they do: wealthy or poor, Komachi women work. Wealthy women, however, do only their own work, while poorer women often give considerable assistance to their wealthier neighbors (see Chapters 2 and 7). Finally, regardless of whose labor is involved in production, men have at least nominal control over the distribution of commodities. They are responsible for marketing wool, meat, and dairy products, for purchasing the major supplies needed to support both the herd and the household; they are, as such, the household's representative to the external economy.

Consumption and Household Economy

The household is the unit of consumption as well as the unit of production. It is the locus of social reproduction. It is within the household that the struggle to balance means and needs takes place.

The bulk of Komachi production is 'production for consumption.' In many traditional economies this production for consumption is a direct process; people produce what they need: food, clothing, shelter, etc. Among the Komachi, and indeed among all Southwest Asian pastoralists, this is not the case. The Komachi produce pastoral products, meat, wool, and dairy produce, but they live on bread and rice. In addition they drink enormous quantities of tea, eat large amounts of sugar, feed their animals barley and fodder which they do not grow, wear clothes that are neither homespun nor homemade (and have not been for a considerable period of time, if ever), and live in tents made of black goat hair which does not come from their own animals. In short, the Komachi produce one kind of commodity but generally consume other kinds.

Inevitably, then, Komachi consumption is based on their ability to exchange what they produce for what they need. Traditionally this

exchange might have taken place in dyadic relations with local settled people; there is, however, no evidence that this is so, while there is some evidence that for a considerable period of time the bulk of Komachi exchanges have been with merchants from the Kerman bazaar,

The quantity and quality of material consumed within Komachi households varies considerably and is almost directly related to household wealth. Bread is the staple of the Komachi diet and all adults eat roughly 500 g of bread per day. In addition to their daily bread, the Komachi drink numerous cups of very sweet tea. In so doing they eat about 100 g of sugar, and it seems likely that, at least for poorer Komachi, the 400 calories that they receive in this way is an important part of their diet. The basic cost of this diet is roughly 35¢ per day. In poorer families the only additional regular feature of their diet is kashk, dried milk solids, which is reconstituted to form a thin watery fluid. This is then mixed with small amounts of clarified butter and crushed dry herbs to create a milk-like soup. Bread is normally torn into small pieces and placed into the kashk mixture. The resulting rather sodden mass of wet bread is then grasped in a piece of dry bread and eaten. Kashk, bread, and tea is the normal meal for poorer Komachi. The Komachi produce their own kashk so it costs them nothing (though it is 10 T/kg in the bazaar) and the cost of the dried herbs is negligible.

Wealthier Komachi eat much better. My next-door neighbor, a wealthy man, ate rice at least once a day and often ate it twice a day. The rice was frequently mixed with raisins and large amounts of clarified butter. Lentils or pulse are sometimes added to rice as are various

seeds like cumin and caraway. Rice is eaten in addition to, not as a substitute for, kashk and bread which are also consumed in large quantities. Rice is relatively expensive--about 3-5 T/kg compared with 1-1.5 T/kg for wheat; poorer families eat rice only on special occasions. Rice is a sufficiently special food that it is a vital element of any festive meal, excepting only the meal served at a rozeh.

No Komachi, even the wealthiest, eats meat every day. Sheep and goats are not killed capriciously; they are killed only for a celebration such as a wedding or circumcision, for a rozeh, or for a sacrifice. Sacrifices are made on important religious holidays, in response to life crises, and for other quasi-religious motives. Some households kill more animals than others, but no household reported killing more than 12 animals in a year. The meat from sacrificial animals, nazri, is always shared with neighbors in camp, close kin who happen to be nearby, and guests (See Chapter 6). For weddings and circumcisions several animals will be killed; during 1974-75 the number ranged from four to nine and varied with the number of guests.

The only other sheep and goats slaughtered are those which are so sick that there is no hope for their recovery. Then, depending on the nature of the illness, the animal may or may not be eaten,¹⁹ Sick animals are at best an irregular source of meat and one that the Komachi would prefer to avoid. Wealthier Komachi have larger herds, lose more animals to disease (absolutely if not relatively), and thus eat more meat. Still, I doubt that even the wealthiest Komachi eats meat more

¹⁹The Komachi scrupulously avoid the meat of animal that has not been properly slaughtered.

than one or two days a week except during the early fall, when everyone eats meat at least once, if not twice, a day nearly every day for a week or two.

When and if they can get them, the Komachi eat fruits and vegetables. During the early fall harvest, for example, they eat large amounts of onions and potatoes. In mid-summer they get green legumes (lentils and chick-peas) and in late fall in the garmsir watermelons. Wealthier Komachi also eat dried legumes, dried fruits, dates, date jam, dried tomatoes all year round and, in season, quantities of walnuts, fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, oranges, lemons, and eggplant. They purchase many of these items from local cultivators or gather them from their own gardens. Poorer Komachi eat these items in much smaller quantity and much less frequently and generally they eat much poorer quality goods. This is particularly marked with regard to rice, tea, and sugar.

All Komachi have fresh yoghurt from February through June and most have fresh and dried cheese in summer and fall. In sum, although I do not have quantified data on this point, it is my strong impression that there are very marked differences in consumption between wealthy and poorer Komachi and that the result of this difference is marked: wealthy Komachi are noticeably heavier than their poorer neighbors.

Differences in patterns of consumption are marked in other areas as well. Wealthy Komachi live in large tents that are filled with luxuries. A wealthy family may have several good carpets; men, women, and children will all have four or five sets of clothes; they have many blankets and cotton quilts. Wealthy households have luxury items like pressure cookers, pressure lanterns, and sewing machines; they are

also likely to have several teapots, dishes enough to serve all the members of the family and guests, and numerous teacups and saucers. They are also certain to have any item that might be considered a convenience, like storm lanterns, flashlights, shovels, axes, and the like.

Poorer families usually do not have pressure cookers or lanterns, and their 'necessities' are fewer and cheaper: perhaps a single cheap carpet and some matting rather than several good carpets, a single battered kettle, a chipped teapot, no lanterns, no flashlights, no shovels or axes, and often only two or three dishes and a single teacup and saucer. Poorer families have fewer changes of clothing, wear them longer, and look more ragged. The difference goes right down to the brand of cigarettes that men smoke: wealthy men buy and smoke either imported 'American' cigarettes like Winston and Lark, or expensive Iranian cigarettes; poorer men invariably smoke smaller, cheaper Persian cigarettes. Truly wealthy families also purchase real luxuries like motorcycles, tape recorders, radios, Seiko watches, and fancy western-style clothes for city wear. Poorer families cannot hope to get items like these.²⁰

Finally, a major difference between rich and poor families is that the former, by hiring shepherds to care for their flocks, not only add salaried employees, but also add adult consumers who must be supplied with daily food, tea, sugar, and clothing while the poorer households that provide shepherds are in effect able to slough off adult

²⁰Differences in standard of living are common knowledge. One night, I heard children asking each other riddles about who had what among the tents in camp. Their knowledge of people's possessions, including mine, was both detailed and accurate.

consumers at the same time that they gain their salaries. This is, I believe, extremely important to poorer households while, at the same time, it clearly indicates the differences in consumption rates between wealthy and poor households.

Komachi and the Market

Most of the items the Komachi consume are commodities that they cannot produce; they are therefore obliged to enter into extensive exchange relations with the external, settled world. Most of these relations are with merchants and butchers in Kerman City. Through these exchanges, the Komachi are inextricably bound into a market economy. In the discussion that follows, I will examine the Komachi relationship to the external market system and I will focus my attention on two particular areas: first I will examine the details of Komachi relations with merchants and middlemen, and then I will examine the history and formal structure of Komachi relations with the external market.

Relations with Merchants and Middlemen

Most Komachi deal regularly with certain merchants in the Kerman bazaar or with middlemen. These men are called taraf, agents or brokers, and the Komachi relationships with them are long-standing ones. In general, the Komachi conduct all their major transactions with these men; there is something of a patron/client relationships here as well as a commercial one.

Taraf buy Komachi products when they are available and sell the Komachi what they need when they need it. Although the values of the transactions are always calculated in cash terms, very little money actually changes hands. Instead, taraf extend credit to the nomads

against the value of their goods on delivery. If there is any surplus the nomads draw against it until it is exhausted. In actual fact, very few nomads ever run up a large positive balance with their taraf. Rather, as one Komachi put it, "taraf are men one has debts to,"

The debts, which the merchants are quite willing to carry, stem from two primary causes. The first is the variability of production that I outlined above. In a bad year only the wealthiest Komachi will be able to cover completely the year's cost from what they produce. In a good year most Komachi will produce enough to pay for their needs and wipe out their debts from bad years. The second apparent cause of debt is the structure of the relationship between nomads and their taraf. The taraf buys cheap and sells dear; he buys pastoral produce from the Komachi in the spring when the market is flooded with many tribes' produce. The taraf buys grain from farmers under the same conditions. The Komachi, however, buy on a different cycle--they sell cheap and buy dear. As Barth has pointed out for Fars (1961:99), the advantage to the merchant must be substantial for merchants do not charge interest for these debts.²¹

The arrangements with taraf are, in a sense, mutually advantageous. The Komachi are assured easy access to the commodities that they need--good year or bad--and the merchants are assured an almost guaranteed supply of the pastoral produce they need. The difference is that the Komachi pay for the privilege of this convenience while the taraf makes a profit from it. Nonetheless the ability to roll debt over with

²¹Merchants do, however, offer the Komachi lower prices for cash vs. a fair market price for 30 or 60 days' delay in payment. In effect, the Komachi extend the merchant free credit.

the taraf appears to be an extremely important feature of the Komachi economy. It probably helps keep many households afloat which would otherwise be hard pressed to survive.²²

Some Implications of the Komachi Relationship to the Market

There are several important effects which arise from Komachi transactions in the market. Wealth is drawn from the Komachi economy, putting pressure on each household's economy. The Komachi must, for example, produce not only enough material to satisfy their own wants, but also enough material to satisfy their taraf's margin of profit.

It seems reasonable to conclude that Komachi wage labor shepherding contracts and the economic stratification of the social system are the results of their involvement in a capitalist market economy. The effects of the market dictate larger household herds on the average, poorer households thus do not fare as well. There is also an impetus for wealthy households to maximize their holdings to protect themselves against the vagaries of a market they do not control.

The combination of these two factors appears to set the stage for both the use of hired shepherds and for some of the internal differentiation in wealth within the tribe. It is the pressure of the market which impoverishes marginally productive households. The cost of doing business in the market--buying dear and selling cheap--makes it

²²Debt and shepherding contracts seem important in keeping poorer Komachi in the tribe. Note that credit mechanisms also insure merchants both guaranteed markets for what they sell and guaranteed sources of pastoral products for the urban market. Credit also depresses normal market forces since the creditor nomads cannot shop around for the best price of what they buy or sell.

more difficult for them to make ends meet; thus, they are forced to dip into breeding stock--capital--which leads to their further impoverishment.²³ In essence, the conditions of exchange in the market depress Komachi domestic consumption.

It should be noted that the market affects domestic consumption largely through the setting of exchange rates for the conversion of different kinds of produce. This directly affects certain aspects of Komachi production as well. First, the market controls--to some extent--the amount of material that the Komachi produce (see above), generally causing them to produce more than they otherwise might; and second, the market exerts some control over the types of commodities that the Komachi do produce.

In the absence of data for long periods of time, it is difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate the effect of the market on what the Komachi produce; there is, however, clear evidence that changes in market demand for kork to wool and meat have substantially changed the focus of Komachi production; this, in turn, has led to changes in the types of animals herded and also changes in the demographic profiles of the herds. For example, for wool or kork production, adult male animals are an important adjunct of the flock. They are larger than females and do not suffer potential damage to their coats from pregnancy and milk production. As a result, when they were engaged primarily in wool/kork production, the Komachi kept large herds of adult males. For meat production,

²³See Bates (1973) for a discussion of the effects of an increase in pasture costs (analogous to variation in commodity prices) among Yörük pastoralists in Turkey.

the prime animals (with regard to price) are large kids and lambs. Most herdowners therefore sell their male animals well before they are a year old. Herds are therefore now mostly composed of breeding females with some stud males. The exception to this rule are several particularly wealthy herd owners who keep fairly large numbers of adult male animals. They do so because the actual price of a full-grown male animal is higher than the price of the smaller kid or lamb (even with the price per pound differential). The presence of adult male animals seems to give these wealthy herd owners a buffer against bad years. They have animals to sell to meet their costs even if there is not an appreciable lamb/kid crop. Smaller herd owners cannot build up these reserve herds because they need all the cash they can get each year to cover their operating costs and, generally, debts. The Komachi also report that they have made some attempt to herd sheep instead of goats in response to rising wool prices and falling kork prices.

The History of Komachi Relations with the Market

There is, in fact, no specific record of Komachi relations with the market in the past and very little on general tribal/market relations in Kerman. However, some recent work by Robert Dillon (1976) in which he analyzes the development of weaving trades in Kerman Province is strongly suggestive with regard to the length and nature of involvement with the market that Kermani tribes must have had.

Dillon shows that as early as the mid-17th century, the Kerman region was exporting kork. Kork is the down-like undercoat of the kashmir breed of goat; it was used in the manufacture of felt hats, replacing

beaver fur (Dillon 1976).²⁷ In the 1670s the British East India Company established factors in the area to arrange for the large-scale purchase and transport of kork. By the 1730s, over 70 tons of kork per year were being exported from Kerman by the East India Company alone. This represents the production of an estimated minimum of 150,000 animals. The Dutch and French were also exporting kork from Kerman at that time in unknown quantities. Thus by the late 17th and early 18th centuries large amounts of pastoral produce were being drawn from the area. While the kork trade fell off later in the 18th century, probably due to the precarious Persian political situation, it picked up again in the 19th century when Persians began manufacturing fancy shawls for export. These shawls were made of kork from Kerman.

Dealing with the non-tribal sector of Kerman, Dillon argues that one of the results of capitalist pressure on the area is the contractual domination of the hinterland by urban elites. With regard to kork, and later wool, contractual domination means that large flocks of animals are owned by the members of the urban elite who control the weaving industries. They hire shepherds on fixed contracts to care for their herds (English 1966:91-92).

Dillon suggests that this contractual domination arises "as a response to the inherent limitations (with respect to capitalist expansion) of the family economic system" (Dillon 1976:245). His argument on this point proceeds in the following fashion: he assumes, along with Chayanov, Sahlins, and others, that since domestic production aims to satisfy the needs of a household, no more will be produced than is

²⁷Kashmir goats are not common everywhere in Iran. The pastoralists in the Zagros region, the area of large tribal confederacies, herd mainly sheep while the black Baluch goats have hair but not kork.

necessary to meet the household's felt needs. Thus when demand for an item like kerk increases, with a proportional increase in its exchange value, production will drop as the needs of the households producing for domestic consumption are more easily met. This latter eventuality is clearly not in the interests of the contractor who wants more kerk, not less.

To assure that he has the access to the amounts of kerk that he wishes, the contractor takes direct control over the means of production. Then he can "directly expand the production of his flocks, limited now only by the inherent limits of animal husbandry and the market for his wool, rather than by the rather limited traditional consumption requirements of peasant families" (Dillon 1976: 245-246).

The contractor thus takes direct control of the means of production (i.e., he owns the herds, land, etc.) to insure his access to a needed product, for this access cannot be guaranteed when production is in the hands of people who produce only to satisfy their needs. That the herder is no longer involved in a domestic mode of production but is selling his labor in the marketplace is in some ways incidental.

Dillon's work deals exclusively with settled populations who live near the metropolitan center of Kerman city. It was relatively easy for members of the urban elite to assume full control over the means of production in this area. Farther into the hinterlands, in tribal territory, such complete control was impossible. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demands of the kerk market would have had profound effects on tribal production.

I imagine that the process went something like this: Let us

assume that the demand for kork exceeded the productive capacity of settled areas near Kerman city, areas which could be placed under the direct control of contractors. The only additional source of kork available then was from the tribes. At the same time, the tribes were vulnerable to the demands of the market because they had to exchange their pastoral produce for the commodities that they consumed. Variation in the exchange rate could force them to increase their production of kork.

In essence, then, Kermani tribes, through their need to convert pastoral produce into consumable commodities, would have been drawn into the market when the demand for kork reached a level that could not be met from non-nomadic sources. The market they were drawn into was one dominated by (mercantile) capitalist relations of production marked, in some cases, by the direct presence of the British East India Company. Thus it seems reasonable to assume that the domestic economies of Kermani tribes have been part of an external capitalist market system for over 300 years.

Summary

There are several aspects of Komachi economic organization outlined above that I would particularly like to emphasize at this point:

1. the importance of the household as the unit of Komachi economy and society
2. the dominance of kinship ties as relations of production controlling access to the basic means of production (animals, pasture, and water)
3. the existence of alternate relations of production based on kinship and contract, controlling access to productive labor

4. the encapsulation of the Komachi domestic economy within a larger, dominant capitalist economy
5. the considerable pressure put on the Komachi domestic economy by the external capitalist economy as it (a) draws wealth from the Komachi economic system and (b) controls exchange rates and hence rates of consumption and production
6. the likelihood that this capitalist market is not a recent phenomenon but has existed for as long as 300 years

The importance of these points will, I believe, become apparent in the analysis of the structure of Komachi society which follows.

CHAPTER 2

ECONOMIC DIVISIONS IN KOMACHI SOCIETY

The rather marked differences of wealth in animals of Komachi households are paralleled by differences in the households' relations to the means of production and product which, in essence, divide Komachi society into three classes. There are employer households, wealthy households who hire shepherds to herd their flocks; there are employed households, whose men work as shepherds for the large herdowning households; and there are independent households which neither work for others nor hire much shepherding labor.¹ This division based on use of labor varies somewhat from the Komachi view of their own social order. The Komachi divide their society into chupun, families in which people are actually working as employees, and arbab, or all those families in which no one is employed as a shepherd. As I argue later, this lumping together of independent and employer households under the single term arbab has an important role in masking conflict in Komachi society.

In the main body of the Komachi tribe, there are 20 employer households, 22 employed households, and 31 independent households. The 22 employed households supplied, in 1974-75, 43 full-time workers, shepherds, and camelherds.²

¹They may hire fractions of a shepherd but are never major employers. Often they do a great deal of their own labor.

²Although there is some difference in the actual work involved, in terms of social position, shepherds and camelherds are undifferentiated.

The employer households own nearly 60 percent of the tribe's animals (see Table 1) and are, on the average, four times as wealthy as their employees' households. This difference in wealth, both in average household herd size and in average number of animals per consumer, establishes a fundamental difference in the relations of production: employer households support themselves on what their herds produce while employed households support themselves, in part, on the salaries their working members earn. Employer households own the means of production; employed households own their own labor. Households in the middle range own only marginally more animals per household than do employed households, but they have far fewer consumers per household and thus, on the average, have over 1.5 times the number of animals per consumer as employed households.

There are, at the very outset, several aspects of the employer/employed dichotomy which bear mention. First, as shown in Table 1, there are considerable differences of wealth between those households which supply labor and those which hire it. Second, there are equally significant differences in other important aspects of Komachi life as well. For example, wealthy men have more close kinsmen in the tribe than poorer men do. Thus, counting first cousins as a measure of the number of close kin a person has, Table 2 shows that employer men have far more first cousins in the tribe than employed men do. While it is true that wealthy employer households are larger than employed households (7.88 average vs. 6.35 average), I do not believe that that difference is great enough to account for the extraordinary difference in size of cousin sets. Looked at over time, the average size of

TABLE 1
WEALTH IN ANIMALS, NUMBER OF CONSUMERS,
AND NUMBER OF ANIMALS/CONSUMER BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE

Household #	Herd Size	# of Consumers*	Animals/Consumer
<u>Households supplying labor</u>			
2	60	7	8.6
3	90	6	15
9	150	8	18.8
15	30	6	5
16	200	6	33
17	20	3.5	5.7
22	60	6	10
23	130	6.5	20
26	60	5	12
27	60	4	15
31	40	4.5	8.9
33	65	3.5	18.6
34	70	7	10
37	30	2	15
38	60	6	10
41	60	8.5	7.1
55	20	6	3.3
57	70	5	14
61	120	5	24
62	90	7	12.8
64	50	7.5	6.7
68	25	2.5	10
22 households	1,560	122.5	12.73 average
		5.57 average	
<u>Households hiring at least one shepherd</u>			
1	150	3.5	42.9
12	200	3.5	57.1
14	180	6	30
18	375	9	41.7
20	840	8	105
29	390	7	55.7
30	135	2	67.5
36	705	9.5	74.2
40	400	5.5	72.8
42	300	8	37.5
43	180	4	45
46	240	8	30
51	240	8	30
52	200	3.5	57.1
53	250	5	50

TABLE 1--continued

Household #	Herd Size	# of Consumers	Animals/Consumer
<u>Households hiring at least one shepherd (continued)</u>			
54	180	7	25.7
56	180	5	36
60	125	3.5	35.7
65	140	4.5	31.1
19	160	2.5	64
20 households	5,570	113	49.3 average
		5.65 average	
<u>Households neither supplying nor hiring labor</u>			
4	100	3	33
5	50	3.5	14.5
6	10	1	10
7	170	7	24.3
8	60	4	15
10	105	3.5	30
13	10	1	10
21	100	2.5	40
24	20	2	10
25	30	2.5	12
28	50	6	8.3
32	100	2	50
35	110	9	12.2
39	70	5.5	12.8
44	250	3	83.3
45	10	1.5	6.7
47	120	5	24
48	130	5	26
49	80	2.5	32
58	40	1	40
59	50	3.5	14.3
63	70	2.5	28
66	25	5	5
67	30	2.5	12
69	100	3.5	28.6
70	60	5	12
71	70	6	11.7
72	50	3.5	14.3
73	140	5	28
11	70	5.5	12.8
30 households	2,180	112.5	19.37 average
		3.75 average	

*Consumers are calculated as follows: adult men and women count as one consumer, adolescents as one consumer, children as one-half consumer.

TABLE 2
NUMBERS OF COUSINS OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD,
BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE

Household type	Number of Cousins of Head of Household	
	Fewer than 25	More than 25
Employer	5	13
Independent	13	12
Employed	18	2

chi square=18.14, $p < .001$.

households in which no one has ever worked as a hired shepherd is only slightly larger (7.04 as compared to 6.85) than the average size of households in which someone has at some time worked as a hired shepherd. (These figures are based on households which have been established for at least six years.)

In addition, as I show in Chapter 4, there are significant differences in marriage patterns of the two 'classes': employers marry close cousins and marry in what I call "step" and "plug-in" patterns. Thus the differences between employers and employed are more than just wealth; the differences are thorough-going. In essence, the 'classes' are two separate populations: one is wealthy employers with many kinsmen in the tribe whose marriage patterns tend to form dense networks of kinship ties with other wealthy employers; the other is poor shepherds with few close kin in the tribe; they marry with no particular pattern. Employer households

thus tend to form a more or less coherent group or set of individuals linked by multiplex ties while employed households are not linked together in this fashion. These differences between employers and employed are, I argue later, determined by the dynamic structure of the Komachi social formation. Employers have many kinsmen and multiplex ties because they have been in the tribe for a long time; employed households have few kin because they have entered the system from outside. In this sense, employers are literally the core of the tribe. This point is expanded in Chapter 8 in which I describe the process of the formation of new tribes as, in essence, the formation of a new core of employing herdowners to which hired shepherds become attached. Finally, it is important to note that the Komachi marriage rules help to perpetuate the core (see pp. 146-149) and also lead to the differentiation within the core which leads to the hiving off of employing clusters as a prelude to the formation of new tribes.

Employers, as a result, are the heart or core of the tribe. It is their relations that give it a coherent structure, and they are also the symbolic center of the tribe. The relationship between employer and employed is thus a relationship between a core and a periphery; in a sense, it is a relationship between people who are the tribe (arbab, high status, wealthy, core) and people who are merely in the tribe (chupun, low status, poor, periphery). This distinction is basic to understanding the dynamics of tribal formation.

Shepherds

The shepherd's job is to stay with his employer's herd, to see that the animals are fed and watered, to help the female animals give

birth, to protect animals from predators and other dangers, to help with the shearing; to help with the milking; to move the herds during migration, and to be completely responsible for the animals in winter quarters before the rest of the tribe arrives there. A shepherd works more than 14 hours a day, 350 days a year. In return for his labor, the shepherd receives a cash salary (about \$200-225 a year), two sets of clothes (trousers, shirt, shoes, a felt hat, and a felt shepherd's cloak), his daily food (whey, tea, sugar, and bread), and a young female animal. His total compensation is in the order of \$350 a year. All shepherds do the same work and receive roughly the same pay for it.

The shepherd's position is defined by the work he does. His employer's position is defined by the work he does not do. As a property owner, his job is the management of that property, the herd. The more successfully he does his job, the more property he will have; the more property he has, the less physical work he will do. A poor herdowner may do his own work, but a wealthy one hires shepherds; they do the work and he supervises.

A wealthy employer has higher status than a poorer herdowner. He has higher status because he is wealthy and because he does little physical labor. Among the Komachi, and in Persian society in general, no positive value is attached to physical labor. There seems to be no concept of "good, honest work." A mark of a man's high status is that other men do things for him. There are no Komachi who are wealthy enough that they need do nothing, but there are some employers who do relatively little. Men who are wealthy but who work anyway, or who make their sons work, are considered cheap and stingy.

With hard work considered something to avoid, it is not surprising that employers, who do not work, look down upon hired shepherds, who do. The Komachi use the term tabaghe, class, to describe the difference between arbab and chupun. The negative connotation that being a hired shepherd carries is, however, far stronger than one might expect. Employers are contemptuous of shepherds. Speaking among themselves, men who have never been hired as shepherds will disparage a current or former shepherd. They tell stories in which the shepherd is the butt of humor, usually by virtue of his ignorance or stupidity. They often imitate a shepherd's speech and his mannerisms. Employers and their wives make scandalous allusions to the sexual behavior of shepherds' wives and, occasionally, about the shepherds themselves. In short, they speak of shepherds as they would never speak of other employers.

This contemptuous attitude has several important effects. First, it tends to divide the society into marriage classes. Marriages between employers and employed households are considered unseemly. It is inappropriate for a man to give his daughter to a man of lower status and it is equally wrong for a man to marry a shepherd's daughter.³

Second, the contemptuous attitude tends to limit individuals' economic strategies. Men who could use a shepherd's income will nonetheless avoid working for as long as possible. Being poor is a misfortune but working as a shepherd leaves a stigma. Several landlord men told me that no matter what happened to them, no matter even if they had only one animal, they would never work as shepherds. An important

³I discuss this subject in detail in my discussion of marriage practices.

concomitant of this is a restriction of the potential supply of shepherds: there are men in the tribe who could and perhaps should work as shepherds but who do not.

Finally, this attitude affects the employers' working relationships with their shepherds. There is no noblesse oblige. As an inferior, the shepherd is someone who has few rights; he is there to be taken advantage of. The shepherd is not a free agent but must respond to someone else's wishes and he is thus open to their criticism. The way shepherds are treated reinforces the way the Komachi perceive their position: shepherds are inferior and therefore exploited, people who are exploitable are inferior and therefore

The dichotomy between employer and shepherd carries with it a considerable load of connotative meaning which renders the relationship far more complex than the apparently simply underlying division, employer/employee. There is, in fact, a configuration of employer/shepherd relations which has a coherent logic to it: the Komachi have shepherds, pay them poorly, and consider them contemptible. Not surprisingly, shepherds are not close kin and many are, in fact, drawn in from outside the tribe. This configuration can be contrasted with that of the Yomut (Irons 1975) who have shepherds, pay them rather well, and do not appear to consider them objects of scorn. The Yomut do hire kinsmen. Both the Komachi and the Yomut hire shepherds; neither seem to lose members of the tribe through settlement induced by impoverishment. They both, therefore, contrast even more with the configuration of the Basseri (Barth 1961) who generally do not employ shepherds and who regularly lose poorer members of their tribe through settlement.

Irons (1975) has attempted some comparisons of the structural configuration of the Yomut and Basseri; he does not, however, focus on the relations between employers and shepherds in the two societies.

The Economic Bases of the Employer/Shepherd Dichotomy

The Komachi are pastoralists and all members of the tribe own animals. The number of animals owned by any household varies from a high of 840 to a low of under 20. The family with 840 animals has livestock worth approximately 250,000 tomans (\$37,000) which, in a good year, should yield about 65,000 T (\$9,700) worth of produce. The family with 20 animals has livestock with a value of about 6,000 T which, again in a good year, should yield about 2,700 T (\$400). The family with 840 animals produces so much that they are able to buy motorcycles and houses with the surplus. The average yield of their flock considerably exceeds any normal expenses on their part. The family with 20 animals is unlikely, even in the best of years, to break even without supplemental income.

The actual minimum herd size needed to break even varies, of course, with the size of the household, the number of producers and consumers in it, the household's general standard of living, the need to divide the herd for inheritance, and so on. Calculation of the minimum herd size needed to support a household is further complicated by the fact that pastoral production is easily affected by change in weather, by disease, or by variation in external market conditions. Bad years can be disastrous. As a result, the minimum herd size necessary for household independence is considerably larger than the herd size needed

to break even in a good year. The Komachi estimate that the minimum break-even herd is 60 animals.⁴ A larger family or one with heavy expenses would need a larger herd.

What determines whether members of a household work or not is complex. Herd size is important; members of really wealthy families do not work. But what appears to be equally important is the relation of herd size to other variables such as age of household, the stage of the household in its developmental cycle, the demands that members of a household put on their herd, and the number of potential laborers in the household. The data on these factors (see Tables 3 and 4) show that, with regard to wealth in animals, the tribe can be divided into two significant divisions, employer household and all others. Wealth in animals does not therefore predict whether a poor household will be independent or whether they will supply labor. What does seem to predict whether a household will or will not supply labor is the number of animals per worker that household possesses. Poor households with a large labor force supply workers (see Tables 3 and 23). One should note that a large household labor force implies several important other factors as well: households with many workers have been established for a fairly long period of time and are therefore likely to be approaching the period of peak demands on the household's resources--i.e., sons will marry and require their inheritance, daughters will require trousseaux, sons and fathers are likely to give cash gifts at weddings and

⁴A herd of 60 animals will yield, in a good year, about 8,000 T worth of produce. Annual per capita income in Iran is \$350. Rural per capita expenditures are about \$170.

TABLE 3
ECONOMIC DIVISION AND WEALTH

Number of Animals	Employer Household	Other Household
Less than 80 ^a	0	35
80 or more	20	17

N=72, chi square=22.37, $p < .001$.

^aThe median herd size for the tribe is 80 animals,

TABLE 4
ECONOMIC DIVISION AND ANIMALS/WORKER RATIO

Animals/Worker Ratio	Employee	Independent
Less than 25	4	17
25 or more	18	9

N=48, chi square=8.95, $.001 < p < .01$.

circumcisions, etc.--while the poorer households at this stage of development will also have a maximum supply of surplus labor. The difference in stage of development between shepherd households and independent households is shown in Figure 2. Calculating the number of households within particular age ranges, it shows that most middle range households are either under 15 years (too young to have working children) or over 30 years (past the point at which children have




Figure 2. Age of Household for Employed (Shepherd) and Independent Households

married) while, conversely, most shepherd households are between 15 and 30 years, the period when they would have peak labor supply and maximum demands on their herd's resources. This difference in the age of the households is reflected in the figures for the average number of consumers per household in Table 1. Note that the average is nearly identical

for both employer and employed households, while both vary from the independent households which tend to be either very old or very young and therefore small. These data suggest, then, that the predominant divisions in Komachi society are employer and employed; the independent household category always contains a number of households that have been or will be employees or employers as well as some "permenent" independent households.

In any event, once a household is unable to make ends meet on what its own herd produces, then within the normal confines of tribal life there is only one way for these households to supplement their incomes: male members of the household must work as shepherds. While the average herdowner lives off what his herds produce, the shepherd lives off a combination of what his herd produces and the income he receives from his employer. Indirectly, the shepherd and his household are living on the employer's herd. A portion of the total surplus produced in the tribe is thus redistributed through shepherding contracts.

This flow of wealth is not insignificant; it is sufficient to keep a large number of households in the tribe who might otherwise be forced to settle out. The cost of maintaining shepherds is also an important cost of pastoral production for employers. The Komachi estimate that they need one shepherd for every 200 animals. A herd of that size will give a total product of about 25,000 tomans and the shepherd's total wage, about 2,500 tomans, is 10 percent of the herd's gross yield. In bad years, while the shepherd's compensation remains the same, the herd's yield will decline and so the average long-term cost of a shepherd is probably greater than 10 percent of the average yield.

The burden of maintaining the flock falls on the employer but not on the shepherd. Shepherds (and camel herds) run their animals with their employer's flocks and therefore have no labor cost; The total compensation that a shepherd receives includes the cost of maintaining his herd. In spite of these supplements to the produce of his own herd, it is not at all uncommon for a shepherd's annual expenses to exceed his total income. In these circumstances, he has no alternative but to go into debt.

It is generally to the shepherd's advantage to enter into a creditor/debtor relationship with someone from inside the tribe, frequently his employer, rather than someone from outside the tribe. A fellow tribesman will charge the shepherd high prices for the material that he needs but will give him fair prices for the material that he sells; someone from outside the tribe will both charge high prices and pay low prices so the shepherd suffers at both ends.

The debt relationship between an employer and his shepherd appears to have no great effect on their working relationship. A shepherd who has debts is in no way obligated to remain with a particular employer. If a shepherd changes employers while he is in debt, an arrangement may be worked out whereby the second employer takes over the shepherd's debts; alternately, the shepherd may continue to buy and sell his material through his former employer while working for another man. The fact that they may have to borrow from their employers and that they may have to maintain their indebtedness for a considerable period of time is something that shepherds are quite aware of. As a result, they often prefer to work for wealthy employers who, they feel, will be

willing and able to carry debts for a protracted period of time, rather than work for a less well-off man who might be less able to extend credit.

Debt and shepherding contracts are the only formal redistributive mechanisms found among the Komachi. Examination of these mechanisms suggests that they move enough wealth to maintain poor households within the Komachi system but do not move enough wealth to readily allow the poorer households to become economically independent. In this respect, the Komachi contrast sharply with the Yomut (Irons 1975) whose shepherding contracts pay well enough for men to build up herds rapidly while they work as shepherds. A Komachi shepherd is paid 1,000 to 1,500 tomans, one animal, food and clothing, while in 1967 a Yomut shepherd received 600 tomans, food and clothing, and one animal for every 15 herded. Under these conditions, the Komachi shepherd would receive 12 or 13 animals, not the one that he actually does.

Irons considers shepherding contracts to be one of several leveling mechanisms which even out the distribution of wealth among the Yomut. From this perspective, Komachi shepherding contracts are only maintenance mechanisms. The Yomut leveling mechanism promotes the development of economically independent households; the Komachi shepherding system maintains dependent households.⁵ Variations in the number of

⁵There are striking parallels between the types of remuneration we find among the Komachi and the description of the conditions of wage labor in 19th century capitalism described by Marx in Capital. Shepherds, like wage laborers, are separated from the means of production and have only their own labor to sell. Like laborers, shepherds' wages pay for their labor power, not their labor--i.e., the shepherd's and the laborer's salary pays the cost of their maintenance and social reproduction, not the value of their labor. The difference is, in both cases, surplus value. Looked at in this light, the tensions that develop between employer and shepherd (see below) are, in Marx's terms, predictable.

animals per consumer as shepherd households pass through different stages of the developmental cycle do in fact permit the accumulation of material or labor resources which allow some shepherd families to gain economic independence. In general, however, Komachi shepherding contracts may be characterized as mechanisms which do no more than ensure a continuous supply of labor for Komachi employers.

The Working Life Cycle of Komachi Shepherds

Men work as shepherds because they have no alternative means of supporting themselves within the tribe.⁶ They do not get wealthy working as shepherds. A man who becomes a shepherd therefore works as one for a considerable period of time.

Most men become shepherds before they set up their own households. They become shepherds because their parents do not have a flock large enough to support the parental household, or because their parents, while having enough animals to maintain the household, do not have a herd large enough to be divided to give their son (or sons) an inheritance. In the first case, the son's wages, at least initially, go to support the parental household. In the second case, the wages become part of the son's patrimony. Under these conditions, men often ask for more of their salary in female animals rather than in cash. Employers are reluctant to give shepherds too many animals in lieu of cash, for

⁶During the period I was in the field, there were no alternatives to being a nomadic tribesman. The rural agricultural sector was saturated and there was relatively little room for urban labor in local areas. In any event, working as a shepherd is far more attractive and comfortable than either of these alternatives.

this reduces the productivity of their own herds. The employer gets cash for selling animals that are not productive, males and old females, and he is more likely to be willing to part with the cash. The largest number of animals that any shepherd received was five; his employer was a very wealthy herdowner and his mother's brother.

In either case, the shepherd's career is likely to follow one of two trajectories. The shepherd may choose to take as much of his wage as he can in animals, live on the food that he receives from his employer, and minimize all other expenses. By doing this, the shepherd is able to avoid dipping into his capital and may, with luck, build up his herd. To be successful in this endeavor, he needs luck--his animals must not get sick or die; he needs rigid self-control--he must limit his expenses for a protracted period of time; and, in general, he must remain unmarried.

A man who marries must establish a household; he must have a tent, the contents to fill it, and the camels to move the tent and its contents on migration. These all cost money. He must also increase his overall expenses; he will have to feed his wife and children, of course, but he will also incur other expenses as well. An unmarried shepherd living in his employer's camp lives on the margins of society: he has no home, extends no hospitality, and is expected to look as though he were living a semi-feral existence. A married man cannot live this way. A man who marries when he has little capital is thus less likely to build up a herd that will support himself and his family. A poor shepherd who marries is thus likely to remain both poor and a shepherd.

Men can either remain unmarried, work, save, and build up their

herds by minimizing their expenses and then marry as retired shepherds, or they can marry earlier and remain shepherds while they raise their families. More men follow this latter path than the former. There are several reasons why this is so. First, there is the simple desire to have a wife, family, tent, and so on--to live a normal life. A second reason that a man may wish to marry is that an unmarried shepherd often does not have any women to milk his flock and prepare his dairy products. He may then feel that, as a result of being unmarried, he is losing a portion of his herd's produce that he might otherwise gain. Third, as we shall see below, an extremely important aspect of the employer/shepherd relationship is the female labor that the former gets from the shepherd's family. It is therefore in the employer's interests to hire a married shepherd or to help an unmarried shepherd get a wife. In spite of these incentives to marry--and although they tend to marry before they reach financial independence--shepherd men still tend to marry later than their employers' sons. (This does not seem to be true for shepherd women.)

Men who marry work as shepherds longer than men who do not marry, but even they do not generally remain shepherds all of their lives. Their periods of maximum expense come when they are young: they have to establish a household, support children, and actively participate in social life. As the children get older, boys can be sent off to work as shepherds and the family budget is supplemented by their income. At the same time they are eating food supplied by their employer and are, as a result, that much less of a drain on the family's budget. The ratio of consumers to producers begins to drop--often sharply--and the

household may even begin to produce a surplus. Ultimately only the shepherd and his wife will be left in the household. At this point in their life cycle they will be able to withdraw from the normal social demands of gift-giving, sponsoring celebrations, and the like. They will then be able to support themselves on the produce from a very small herd.⁸

Shepherds can retire from active work when their sons begin to work or when their children leave home. When they do retire they become independent herdowners (in my classification) or arbabs (in the Komachi classification). The earlier the shepherd's household can balance its finances, the earlier his sons' incomes can be applied toward building up their patrimony. Ideally, at least some of a shepherd's sons will have to work as shepherds for only a relatively brief period of time before they can establish 'independent' households. They will spend most of their lives as independent men and their own sons may never have to work as shepherds. In this way, most Komachi shepherds become at least independent at some point during their lives.

There is an additional aspect of a shepherd's working life that is worth noting. Shepherds almost never spend their entire working lives with a single employer. Instead, shepherds work for one man for four or five years and then move on to someone else. The need to change employers arises from tensions inherent in the relationship (see below). Interestingly, shepherds do not seem to move through completely freely; rather, they seem to move in orbits, going from one employer to a second, and, perhaps, a third, then back to the first and over again.

⁸See pp. 75-76 for a discussion of this point.

Employer/Shepherd Relations

The relationship between employer and shepherd involves a basic conflict of interest. The employer seeks to gain as much labor as he can from his shepherd while the shepherd seeks to minimize these demands. Each party feels that the other is trying to take advantage of him, which is generally true, and the overall relations between employers and employees is colored by this view.

For example, one of the constant refrains that I heard while I was in the field was the employers' lament over their relationship with their shepherds. "In the old days, if an arbab wanted something done, 26 people would come running because they were hungry," I was told; they said that people were good shepherds then but that now "shepherds are rich; they have become wealthy (puldar); they have animals (maldar); they don't want to work; they are lazy and they complain."

Employers speak, without a trace of embarrassment, of how wonderful it was when shepherds were really exploitable. Employers clearly see the relationship as being an exploitative one--a relationship in which it is legitimate to use any means at their disposal to extract the maximum return from their shepherds. Thus, in addition to the herding labor employers attempt to get shepherds to spin wool and goat hair for yarn and twine, to help transport wheat and barley to the mill, to butcher animals, and to help in other tedious tasks.

Still, the struggle for labor is most consistently waged over the question of the shepherd's family and what work, and how much work, they should do for the employer.

The Komachi live in camp groups which are centered about a

wealthy employer. He hires the shepherds and owns the flocks that they herd. Camps are the focus of herding activities and shepherds must spend the bulk of their time there. Since these camps are often some distance apart, a married shepherd who wishes to be near his family, or the parents of an unmarried shepherd who wish to be near their son, must live in the camp headed by his employer.

Living in camp opens the shepherds' families to demands for labor. These demands range from help in herding animals, especially the care of young animals by small children, to assistance in milking and the preparation of dairy products. This is not a small demand. All raw milk is first scalded and then allowed to cool; it is turned to yoghurt, allowed to set, and then churned to butter. Butter is then separated from buttermilk; the former product is clarified to make ghee while the latter is boiled, reduced, rolled, and dried to make kashk and tarf. These processes require a great deal of labor.

These demands are a source of constant friction. The employer household, with its large flock, requires a great deal of female labor, while the shepherd's household, with its much smaller flock, often has a surplus of female labor. The employer household tries to draw off this surplus labor, labor for which there is no direct compensation. The shepherd household cannot refuse all assistance, but the question of just how much help they are going to give, and how freely, is a subject for lively debate.

In this situation it is to the employer's advantage to hire every poor person. The poorer the family is, the more susceptible to pressure they will be and, in addition, they will have few animals and thus are certain to have extra female labor.

The shepherds and their families are, of course, quite well aware of the employer's attitudes but there is little that they can do to protect themselves from his demands. Although in one case a shepherd's wife left camp to put a stop to demands from the employer's wife, this is not a common or practical solution. If the shepherd's wife does not live with him in his employer's camp, then the shepherd will either not be able to look after his own flock himself, or he will not have women to milk his animals and prepare his dairy products. Both of these situations are so undesirable that a shepherd is likely to change employers before they come to pass.

While the general tenor of relations between employer and shepherd is constant, the intensity of the feeling varies with the annual round of pastoral production. Shepherd contracts run from summer solstice to summer solstice. The work year starts in the mountain pastures of the summer quarters. The camps are close together, the non-tribal neighbors are friendly, water is abundant, but the pasture is quite limited. The shepherds spend a good deal of time near the camps. There are few young animals to watch over, there are few predators to worry about, and there are few tasks which demand much labor. This is an easy season for shepherds and their relationships with their employers tend to be good. By August, most of the pasture in the valley has been consumed. It is then time to send the flocks back down towards the winter quarters. Most of the tribe, however, remains north; only the shepherds and animals leave. Shepherds have mixed feelings about this trip to winter quarters. The winter area is still very hot and quite uncomfortable. There is danger of malaria and bad water. In addition, while the

shepherds are making their way south with the flocks, the rest of the tribe will be celebrating a festive season of weddings, circumcisions, and religious meetings. Some shepherds therefore complain about this aspect of their work. One young man said that he would work as a shepherd but that, "Be xoda, garmsir nemiram"--"By God, I'm not going to the garmsir." Parents of young men working as shepherds often said that they would not let their sons go to the garmsir because they were "too young" to stand the rigors of the climate. On the other hand, some older shepherds seemed to look forward to this opportunity to escape the supervision of their employers. In either case, there was little conflict between employers and shepherds at this time of year.

The next distinct period in employer-shepherd relations begins in late October when the tribe joins their flocks and the shepherds in the winter quarters. The honeymoon ends at this point. The first potential source of friction is the condition of the flock when the employer arrives. Every animal must be accounted for and employers are likely to blame the shepherds for the loss of any animal.

Shortly after the tribe arrives in winter quarters, the lambing season begins. Shepherds are responsible for assisting in births and collecting newborn animals and bringing them back to camp. Lambing is a critical time of year for the tribe. A good crop of lambs brings the hope of a good year, a bad crop of lambs guarantees a poor year. Employers therefore count every lamb and kid. They resent all losses bitterly. A good shepherd is a man who loses no young.

During this time of year, lambs and kids are herded separately from their mothers and must be reunited with them twice a day so that

they may nurse. To prevent a stampede, the young animals are individually carried to their mothers, who have been driven near the camp. People with few animals can unite their ewes and lambs and kids and nannies in a few minutes. For wealthy people, with perhaps as many as 200-300 young, the task is far more tedious: to do the work in a reasonable amount of time they need a great deal of labor. The obvious source of labor is members of the poorer families. Employers and their wives expect that they will be helped by the shepherds' wives and daughters. This assistance carries no compensation. It is something that "neighbors should do for each other." It is, however, pretty much a one-way street: the shepherd's family helps the employer's.

During the early winter, when the major task is reuniting the young with their mothers and the work required is not arduous, the demand for labor is made and is easily met. As the season progresses and tasks shift from reuniting the herd to milking the females, and later to milking and to preparing dairy products, the labor demands of a wealthy household may appear insatiable. Relations between employers and shepherds thus often begin to decline toward the end of February when the peak of the milking season is reached. The employer requires more and more help and the shepherd household always has its own work to do. The relationship between the two households becomes a test of wills between the wives. It should be noted that women in shepherd households do, in fact, give considerable assistance to employer households. The problem is that, to the employer's wife, the amount given is never enough, while to the shepherd's women it is already too much.

At this time of year it is not uncommon to hear the wives of

employers stand outside their tents and complain to the world at large how unneighborly so-and-so's wife is for not helping. Such allegations rarely go unanswered; one of the common sounds in Komachi camps in late winter is the cacophony of two women shouting insults at each other through the otherwise still desert air.

Once these "discussions" get under way, they have a momentum of their own. The employer's wife will not only complain about the shepherd's wife, but will make use of the opportunity to complain about the shepherd as well. She will accuse him of being lazy, say that he isn't diligent, blame him for the loss of animals, rake up past incidents, and say that he isn't worth his salary. These charges too are inevitably answered by the shepherd's female kin. The relations between the two households continue to deteriorate.

In late March and early April the spring migration starts. The burdens of migration are added to the already heavy demands of milking and of preparing dairy products. Tempers get shorter and the arguments more ad hominem. By the end of the migration, the relationship has reached a nadir. Then the return to summer quarters and the lightening of the work load remove some of the major irritants and a truce may be established. As June approaches, so does the necessity of renegotiating the shepherds' contracts. At the point, the relationship enters a completely new and almost comically different phase. The employer must now work to keep his shepherd or to woo another. Shepherds are in demand and the venom of April becomes the honey of June,

Courting Shepherds

Shepherding contracts are annual and are renegotiated on the 90th day after the vernal equinox. For the first eleven months of the contractual year, shepherds are engaged in a struggle with their employers over labor, both their own and that of their wives and families. The social conditions of Komachi society make this struggle an uneven one. Employers exploit shepherds and their families; both employers and shepherds are aware of the exploitative nature of the relationship. The pressure on the shepherd is not, however, unremitting. As the year draws to a close, there is a slight shift in his relationship with his employer and the normal situation is reversed; the shepherd is able to put pressure on his employer.

These events unfold in the following fashion. As the end of the contractual year approaches, a shepherd may announce that he does not intend to sign a contract for the coming year. In unusual cases where there is a great deal of hostility between the shepherd and his employer, the shepherd may make it known that he will never again work for that particular employer. Generally, however, the shepherd will simply state his intention to stop working, which he then does.

The shepherd does not criticize his former employer, nor does he shout or harangue. He simply withdraws. It is at this point that the reversal in their roles may be seen. The employer, if he wishes to rehire the shepherd, must seek him out. He must try to find out what is disturbing the shepherd and must placate him. The employer will try to convince the shepherd that he has no grounds for disaffection, or that if he has any the situation will be rectified. The employer has to come

to the shepherd and, in effect, woo him. The shepherd for his part plays hard to get. Like Achilles, he sits in his tent. He does not visit the employer; he makes his employer come to him. The shepherd also plays the field. Although he will avoid his former employer, he often spends his new-found spare time visiting other herdowners who are themselves without shepherds at this point.

Herdowners compete with each other by contrasting themselves with other employers; each tries to convince the shepherd how good it would be to work for him. Prospective employers entertain shepherds handsomely. The candidates are served the best tea with the best sugar. If the prospective employer has a motorcycle, he may give the shepherd a ride to town or to a distant camp. He presents himself as a man of infinite generosity and goodwill. He demonstrates this by showing a willingness to do favors and an openhandedness which is not customary in Komachi society. The implication is, of course, that this is his true character and that a shepherd who works for him can expect to be treated with this same respect and generosity all year round.

The shepherd's former employer is clearly at a disadvantage during this period. While the shepherd may not believe that other employers are all that they seem to be, the suspension of disbelief is easier to maintain vis-à-vis an unknown rather than a known quantity.

Herdowners compete with each other for shepherds. It is each man for himself and the competition can be cutthroat. Employers accuse one another of tampering with their shepherds (usually with reason) and relations between competing herdowners become strained. The competition is spurred on by the employers' dominant response to the situation: panic.

Herdowners who meet at this time of year often sit and share horror stories about other herdowners they know, or have heard of, who had to sell their flocks because they could not hire shepherds. These stories seem to add an edge of desperation to the herdowners' position, an edge which they themselves seem to delight in honing.⁹

The particularly fascinating thing about these fears is that the herdowners are also aware, when they are not panicking, that almost none of the shepherds in the tribe can afford not to work and that they will therefore ultimately have to come to terms. This reality is, however, almost completely submerged beneath the fears of being left without a shepherd. Ultimately, the real likelihood of a herdowner being left without shepherds is determined by the supply of and demand for shepherds within the tribe. This is not an easy question to untangle. From the employers' point of view, there can never be too many shepherds--the more there are, the more cheap labor there will be. Still, it does not seem that there is a real shortage of shepherds now. The Komachi estimate that they need one shepherd for every 200-300 animals. In 1974-75 there were 46 hired shepherds in the tribe caring for approximately 12,700 animals, i.e., 276 animals per hired man. In addition to the hired shepherds, there were a number of herdowners who cared for their own flocks using family labor. I estimate that there were at least 15 full-time equivalent shepherds in this group. Thus there were,

⁹One should note that the employers' responses are always couched in terms of "hire shepherds or sell the flocks." The alternative, herding their own animals, is never considered. I once asked a wealthy landlord, a man with four sons, why he was complaining so. "Couldn't your sons do the work?" I asked. No," he replied, "there is no future in it?"

minimally, 61 full-time shepherds in the tribe herding an average of 208 animals each. If there were not as many shepherds as the large herd-owners would like, there appears to be no great shortage either.

It is this panic which spurs competition between herdowners. And, of course, it is this competition which lends credibility to the shepherds' threats to go elsewhere. The circumstances in which the reversal of employer/shepherd relations is possible are created by the employers' responses to the situation. The fact is that employers always have the upper hand. But because they perceive themselves as losing it, they act in a way which does indeed weaken their position. The reasons for their acting this way are complex. The competition between herdowners, the intense concentration on narrow self-interest, the inability to cooperate--these are all general characteristics of Komachi life.¹⁰ These features of Komachi life--similar to "amoral familism" as described for Mediterranean societies--is, I believe, a result of external pressures put on the Komachi economy (see Chapter 1). The resulting Komachi perception of the world as a place of "limited good" is not all that inaccurate. It certainly serves to spur competition. On the surface, this competition is prosecuted in an effort not to lose face by losing shepherds. Interestingly, a latent function of competition in this situation is that it helps relax the tensions that arise in the normal course of employer/shepherd relations. The way in which it does so is illustrated in the examples below. These examples also show, however, that the reductions of tension between employer and shepherd take place at the expense of solidarity among the large herdowners.

¹⁰See the conclusions.

Employer-Shepherd Negotiations: Shir Ali and his Shepherds

From June 1974 to June 1975, Shir Ali employed four shepherds. An examination of his negotiations with two of them will illustrate how conflicts can be reduced and also created during the period of contract negotiations.

The Case of Mahmud

Mahmud was an unmarried man in his mid-twenties. His parents lived in a camp which was always quite some distance from Shir Ali's camp. Therefore Mahmud took all of his meals in Shir Ali's tent, but he spent most of his time near the tent of Ali, father of two other shepherds. Mahmud hoped to marry Ali's daughter.

During the winter of 1974-75, Mahmud constantly complained of severe pains in his legs; finally, in late winter, he stopped working for several days, saying he was too sick to get around. Shir Ali arranged for Mahmud to be taken to a doctor. There Mahmud was given drugs to relieve his condition. He continued to complain, however, and occasionally remained in camp, hobbling around.

Shir Ali and, worse, his wife were furious. At first they told other herdowners that Mahmud was malingering. Later, Shir Ali's wife shouted this accusation out in camp. Mahmud responded angrily. He contended that he was indeed sick and in pain and that he would prefer to be well and working. He was forcefully defended by Ali's wife (who was carrying on a running battle of her own with Shir Ali's wife).

As spring came on, Mahmud's leg seemed to get better; he no longer complained and he was able to handle the arduous work of migration.¹¹

¹¹Since Shir Ali's camp was quite some distance from the doctor,

In early June people began to be concerned about whether or not the shepherds would stay on for another year. In Mahmud's case, people said that it was "uncertain." On June 15, however, Mahmud left camp, saying that he would not be back. There was no further word from him until June 20 when he, equally suddenly, reappeared in Ali's tent. He still maintained that he would not work for the coming year. He gave no reasons for this and in answer to questions he would only mumble "nemishe," "it will not be." Following his arrival in camp Mahmud studiously avoided Shir Ali.

During the five days that Mahmud was away, Shir Ali and his wife frequently expressed the fear that he would not return and that they would be left without a shepherd. They said that they were afraid that they would have to sell their flocks.

Late in the afternoon of the 20th, Mahmud's father, Meshe Darvish, arrived in camp. At first he spoke with Shir Ali, who asked him if Mahmud had said anything against him while he had been gone. Meshe Darvish assured him that he had not. Meshe Darvish then went and fetched Mahmud from Ali's tent. He brought him to Shir Ali's, where most of the men in camp had gathered, including Shir Ali's oldest son, his two sons-in-law, a cousin of his, and his nephew. When they had all gathered the negotiations began.

Meshe Darvish acted as Mahmud's spokesman and as a 'honest broker' between Mahmud and Shir Ali. The initial stages of the discussion were spent trying to get Mahmud to say something more than "nemishe." Mahmud

I was called upon to give Mahmud his shots whenever his leg hurt. I, therefore, had a pretty good idea of just how he felt throughout this period.

was subjected to both direct and indirect pressure by his father and the other men gathered there. They urged him to talk and criticized him for not obeying his father's request that he speak. All this cajoling had no effect. Mahmud sat still, staring at the ground. He spoke only twice and both times it was only to repeat "nemishe."

After about an hour of pressure Mahmud allowed his father to lead him from the tent for a private discussion. While they were gone Shir Ali's wife told the assembled company that Mahmud had worked for them for four years, he had eaten their bread, they had taken him to the doctor, and that he had then responded in this way. She seemed to be asking, "How can he be so ungrateful?"

When he returned to the tent, Mahmud sat down exactly as he had been sitting before. Meshe Darvish, however, was able to convey the results of the private conversation to the group. "Mahmud, he said," says that he will not work this year. He says that his leg bothers him, it hurts too much for him to be able to do a good job. And he says that if he cannot do a good job he will not work."

These words brought forth a flurry of responses and promises: Mahmud would be taken to a better doctor who would prescribe better drugs to treat his ailment. "God willing, there will be no more problems with his leg and he will get well and there would be no reason for his not working." Besides, Mahmud was part of their oulad (in this context, family), and surely he knew that if he did get sick that they would spare no expense and no inconvenience to get him to a doctor. "Have we not," they asked, "taken him to a doctor and gotten drugs for him this last year? Haven't we done for him what we would have done for

him what we would have done for one of our own children?" This last lie was delivered without the slightest blush or hesitation in spite of all the complaining and shouting there had been about his leg. "We know," they said, "that a man might get sick and not be able to go with the flock, or that a man whose leg hurt might not be able to work as well as he wished, but we understand this, and we would never hold this against anyone." As they said these things, they looked and acted like the very picture of sincere benevolent paternalism. Mahmud remained obdurate. He had said all he was going to say!

At this point two more employers, Murid and Shiri Khabar, came into the tent. When they were apprised of the situation, they too began to pressure Mahmud. At first they simply pressed him for a response but soon they began to tease him. "You say that you have said *nemishe*, and that that is all you will say. Well, if you are not going to work as a shepherd, what are you going to do? Are you going to go into the city?" (This last point was greeted as a great witticism.) After being badgered on this point for awhile Mahmud broke down and answered, "I am not going to do anything. I am going to sleep all year." Everyone burst into laughter, but Shir Ali's wife responded quickly, "What do you want? Do you want to be an *arbab*? Well, you should start preparing now. Things will only get more expensive. Work now and earn the money you need to establish yourself."

Shiri Khabar then brought up the original argument again. "We are all members of one taife [tribe or lineage], we are all kin. There are no strangers here. If you are sick, if you need help, there are always people to help you." Shir Ali then broke in to confirm that they

were all members of one taife and that Mahmud was always treated like one of the family. Meshe Darvish then added that, in fact, Mahmud was one of the family: that his MF was BS to Shir Ali's father, a statement that passed by without demur. (In fact, Mahmud's MF was no closer than FFZS to Shir Ali's father.) Mahmud was then taken outside again, this time by Shiri Khabar and Murid, and they yet again by Shir Ali. While Mahmud was out with Shir Ali, Murid said, "Watch, when he comes in he will sign for 1,500 toman, one animal, tea, and clothes."

When Mahmud and Shir Ali came in, Shir Ali got out a pen and paper and asked Mahmud to dictate his terms. Mahmud still refused, but it was obvious that he had really agreed to sign. Shir Ali actually began writing the contract and he again told Mahmud to state his terms. "Say anything you want." Mahmud smiled and answered, "OK, write 2,000 tomans and two animals." Everyone laughed. "No, say your price," they repeated. Mahmud still refused and finally people turned to Meshe Darvish and asked him to name the price.

"1,500 tomans, one female lamb, 36 kilos of sugar, 4 packages of tea, bread, and two sets of clothes," he recited. Shir Ali wrote the numbers in. Murid laughed and said, "See, he got just what I said he would." Shiri Khabar picked up Mahmud's hand, inked his thumb, and put his mark on the paper. The contract was witnessed by the others sitting there. Mahmud had signed on for another year.

After several weeks of strained silence and a day of frenetic public activity Mahmud and Shir Ali reached an accord. But what was the negotiated point? It was not salary. The amount settled on was, as we have seen, conventional; nor was Mahmud seriously considering going to

another employer. What was negotiated was Mahmud's relationship with his employer. Using the negotiation as a public forum, Mahmud forced Shir Ali and his fellow employers to acknowledge that there was a proper standard of behavior between members of the tribe and that Mahmud, as a member of the tribe (and a kinsman), was entitled to be treated in that way. Although it was not explicitly noted, the exposition of this 'proper' standard contrasted with the way Mahmud (felt he) had been treated. By promising to treat Mahmud in a proper way next year, Shir Ali was tacitly acknowledging the past year.

The accord reached was therefore on how Mahmud should be treated: on what the relationship between employers and shepherds should be. The public expression of this was Mahmud's compensation for the loss of pride he had suffered from public criticism. Mahmud used the negotiations to even his relations with Shir Ali.

In this way the differences between employer and shepherd are mitigated by a negotiating process in which landlords are forced to acknowledge the shepherds' claims to reasonable treatment by assuring the shepherd that there are no real differences among them. Employers stress the unity and commonality of their position and that of the shepherds. Claims are made that they are all kin, that they are not strangers or outsiders, that the shepherd is considered a member of the employer's family, and that he will always be treated that way. Indeed, during the negotiations shepherds are treated that way. Negotiating basically involves a combination of role reversal and a strong emphasis by the employers on the common and equal relationship that employers and shepherds share as members of a community of kin.

This is a powerful image. The society is, in effect, a community of kin. One's overall place is determined, in large part, by kin connections. The fact that an employer stresses that a shepherd is part of this community and acknowledges common kinship is therefore not an insignificant occurrence. The differences of the year often can be at least partially submerged in a flood of protestations of unity.

Where the tension between employer and shepherd is too great for it to be covered up in this fashion, the potential for conflict in a particular employer-shepherd relationship may be reduced by the shepherd moving to another employer. A move of this kind may be doubly satisfying: first, the shepherd escapes a relationship which has become unpleasant; second, the move often humiliates the former employer. Shir Ali's relationship with another shepherd, Qadam, illustrates this point.

The Case of Qadam

Like Mahmud, Qadam had worked for Shir Ali for four years. There were, however, important differences between his situation and Mahmud's. Qadam was an older married man who was not Komachi. The first two years that Qadam had worked for Shir Ali, his wife and his wife's mother and brother had also lived in Shir Ali's camp. In 1974-75, however, they did not live in camp but returned to the territory of their own tribe. This arrangement caused some bitterness: Shir Ali's wife felt that she was being cheated of the labor of the two women. For their part, the women chose to live separately because they considered Shir Ali's wife overbearing and overly demanding. There was very little love lost between Qadam's wife and Shir Ali's and the latter

would often publicly and viciously slander the former.

When the period for contract negotiation for 1975-76 came around, the questions regarding Qadam were clearly: would he get his wife to live in Shir Ali's camp or would she get Qadam to move away from Shir Ali? There was no doubt that she did not wish to return. Whether Qadam wished to go or stay was less clear. From this simple starting point a remarkably complex conflict developed.

On June 15, Qadam's wife and mother-in-law came to Shir Ali's camp for a visit. Shortly after they arrived a terrific argument broke out between Qadam and his wife. She was urging him to go and separate his animals from Shir Ali's flock and move out of camp. Qadam responded by telling her not to tell him what to do. Both were furious.¹² Shir Ali's wife called to Qadam's wife and invited her into the tent to talk. Qadam's wife refused to come in but her mother agreed. She was served tea and started gossiping about shepherding contracts further up the valley. She also casually mentioned that Qadam had been offered a package deal by one of the Komachi employers who had settled to run a 'carpet factory.' Qadam would work for him as a shepherd and he would give Qadam's children jobs in his factory. Shir Ali's wife responded by remarking how cold and uncomfortable it would be in the winter. "Qadam isn't young," she said, "it would be much better for him to migrate." She then suggested to the mother-in-law that she come and live in Shir Ali's camp. Her young son, she was told, could work as a shepherd with

¹²A large part of Qadam's rage was over the way his wife was behaving. A man should never appear to be in a position in which his wife seems to be telling him what to do. Wadam's wife was violating this norm and making him look like a shameless man whose wife could boss him around.

the young animals near camp and she could help around camp, The woman was polite but noncommittal. She left shortly.

No sooner had she left than Shir Ali's wife launched into a vitriolic attack on Qadam and his wife. She said that Qadam wasn't a man because no man would let his wife make his decisions for him. As for the wife, she was the worst woman in the tribe, she was forward, she was loose, she slept around, all her children had different fathers. Qadam let this happen: he was a cuckold.

On June 17 Qadam left camp. No one was certain where he had gone but it was rumored that he was going to work for Shiri Shah Mirza in the Sanjeri camps. Later that afternoon there was another report about Qadam: he had been seen at Asghar's (Shir Ali's WB) camp. People still believed, however, that he would work for Shiri Shah Mirza. They deduced this in the following way: Ahmad Shah Mirza (Shiri's older brother) had told Shir Ali that he, Ahmad, was not going to try to hire away Naght Ali's shepherd. Ahmad had not, however, said that he would not try to hire away Shir Ali's shepherd. Ergo, he or his brother would be trying to hire Qadam.

There was a great deal of discussion on what should be done: ask Ahmad not to hire Qadam, ask Shiri not to hire Qadam, ask Ahmad to ask Shiri not to hire Qadam. No one knew whom to talk to. Shir Ali finally decided to send a note to Shiri asking him not to hire Qadam because, if he did, Shir Ali would be left without a shepherd and would be forced to sell off his flock. This letter was written and sent off.

Once Qadam was gone there was a noticeable difference in the way that people talked about him. Where two weeks ago he had been a lazy

malingerer, now that he was gone he was the "best shepherd," old perhaps but smart and diligent.

On June 18 Shir Ali's nephew returned to camp with a message from Ahmad and Shiri: under no circumstances would they have anything to do with Qadam. These words were barely out of the nephew's mouth when people's suspicions shifted to Asghar. Qadam had, after all, been seen in his tent and Asghar was, they knew, looking for a shepherd. A visitor from Asghar's camp said that Asghar had tried to rehire one of his own shepherds. He had asked the shepherd to name his price; he had agreed to all the demands and written up the contract. But then, no matter what he said or had done, the shepherd had refused to sign. The next day it was rumored that Qadam's wife had also been seen at Asghar's.

The following day Qadam returned to camp. His return stirred up a whirlwind of discussion about where he had been: Asghar's, Shiri Shah Mirza's, his home territory? Shortly, however, Qadam was replaced as a topic of conversation by Mahmud, who had arrived to negotiate his own contract.

On June 21 one of the other shepherds reported that Qadam had told him that he would prefer to work with Shir Ali but that his wife wanted him to work for Shiri Shah Mirza. Qadam was again castigated for not being a man. His wife was attacked for not knowing her place.

On June 22 there was a gathering of camp members in Shir Ali's nephew's tent. Qadam was there and people thought that he might be willing to sign his contract. Qadam, however, refused to speak. He acted as though he were very angry. Another of Shir Ali's nephews tried to speak with him, tried to find out what was bothering him. After much

cajoling and coaxing, Qadam finally blurted out that he had heard Shir Ali's son accuse an unnamed shepherd of killing and eating an animal. He, Qadam, took this as a personal affront. He had worked for Shir Ali for four years and had never touched an animal. Shir Ali and his son both assured Qadam that they were not accusing him of anything. They knew that he was honest. They knew that he would never kill an animal. After some flattery Qadam seemed mollified.

"Name your price," Shir Ali said.

"What do I know? You have the ledger, you write my price," Qadam replied.

"No, no. You say what you want and I'll write it," Shir Ali answered. He seemed genuinely upset by Qadam's suggestion.

"Say anything you want. Anything, 1,000 toman, 1,500 toman," Shir Ali's nephew urged.

Qadam thought for awhile and then said, "1,300 tomans, 24 kilos of sugar, 3 packages of tea, and a sleeping cloth."

While this was being written up, Ali, once a shepherd himself, passed by. "Look," he said, "what a lot of people are here to witness Qadam's marriage contract." Everyone laughed, but Ali had indeed pointed out the strong formal resemblance between hiring a shepherd and getting a bride (see Chapter 5).

Just before the contract was ready to be signed, another problem arose. Qadam suddenly blurted out that he had, in fact, signed another contract with Ahmad Shah Mirza and, in addition, he had sworn an oath that he would not work for Shir Ali. "Don't worry about the contract," Qadam was told, "Shir Ali will take care of it." Qadam seemed relieved,

but there was still the oath. "I will have to sacrifice an animal [to fix the broken oath]," he said. "We will supply the animal," Shir Ali's wife assured him.

The contract was then presented to Qadam, who marked with his thumbprint. Immediately after that he said, "Wait, I remember something. I wanted a jacket too."

"No, baba, it's too late," Shir Ali answered. "Besides, a jacket is 100 tomans." He then paused and fingered his own quite worn jacket. "Soon I'll have to get a new jacket. When I do, I'll give you this one," he said.

This satisfied Qadam, and the conversation shifted to yet another problem. He was afraid that his wife was in debt to Ahmad. Shir Ali agreed to take over whatever debts there were. With his previous debt to Shir Ali this meant that Qadam would owe at least 500 tomans, nearly half his salary. It seemed unlikely that he would ever work his way out of debt.

On June 24, after signing his contract and working for two days, Qadam disappeared. He left camp in the morning to bathe prior to making his sacrifice and he did not return. Shir Ali's son-in-law claimed that he had heard that when Qadam reached the bath he was met by his wife and several other people and that he had been forcibly led away to Ahmad Shah Mirza's camp. This story led to yet another denunciation of Qadam's wife. "May a donkey stick his cock up her cunt," Shir Ali's wife shouted to the world at large, over and over again.

Following his 'abduction,' Qadam became the focus of conversation in all camps. Rumors abounded about who had taken him, although the

final consensus seemed to be his wife, his wife's mother, and his wife's brother. This cast some doubt on the 'forcible' aspect of his abduction. There was also much discussion of where he was. No one knew for sure. Wherever he was, he had become a cause célèbre.

Shir Ali and his kin were furious. Ignoring the fact that when they had signed Qadam he had already signed a contract with Ahmad, Shir Ali accused them of stealing a shepherd that he had under contract. He threatened to write a formal letter of complaint to the gendarmerie. As they told and retold the story, Shir Ali's side emphasized their signed contract and the fact that Qadam was with their herd. They constantly described Qadam as being "shameless" and "without honor" for letting his wife boss him around.

June 25, in an effort to solve the dispute, Assadollah Mohammadi-Anoyi was asked to come to Shir Ali's camp. He was the most important man in Qadam's tribe. Shir Ali and his wife recounted the story to him. Assadollah listened intently and sympathetically. It seemed doubtful, however, that he would try to do anything. Among other things, he was far closer to Ahmad than to Shir Ali. When he left, Shir Ali's wife commented that he would do nothing and that the whole thing had been "the waste of a chicken."¹³

By June 27 it had become apparent that Assadollah was not going to do anything and that Qadam was unlikely to return. Therefore Shir Ali wrote a formal letter of complaint to the gendarmerie. He accused

¹³All high status guests are served meat, usually chicken unless an animal has been killed for another reason or they are of such high status that they warrant the killing of a lamb or kid in their own right.

Ahmad and his brother of tampering with Qadam, and he sent the letter via his brother-in-law, the Katkhoda of Shirinak.

On July 3 a representative came from Ahmad's camp to pick up Qadam's animals which had, until then, remained with Shir Ali's flock. Shir Ali refused to give them up until the situation was settled. Refusal to release a shepherd's animals is perhaps the strongest hold that a landlord has over his employee. At present the possibility of intervention by the gendarmes limits the landlord in the use of this weapon. In the past, however, this appears to have been a very real threat.

On July 4 Shir Ali and his supporters and Ahmad and his supporters all appeared before the chief of the gendarmerie in Qaryeit-al-arab. The chief decided that Ahmad's contract took precedence over Shir Ali's and that Shir Ali had to release Qadam's animals. Shir Ali returned to camp bitterly disappointed. As he discussed the situation, he continued to place the blame on Ahmad. "If he had only told me that he had signed Qadam at the very first, then none of this would have happened." This refrain was repeated in discussions over the next few days. Shir Ali and his family shifted all the guilt to Ahmad and blamed him for the "unseemliness" of taking a tribal dispute to the gendarmes.

On July 30 the chief of the gendarmes came to Shir Ali's camp and watched over the separation of Qadam's animals from Shir Ali's. This ended the formal relationship between them. The ill will that the negotiation generated continued for some time, however. Shir Ali's son-in-law, a hot-headed young man, rode his motorcycle up to Ahmad's camp and cursed and threatened him. Since Ahmad was considerably older

than the son-in-law and was a much more important member of the tribe, this was considered an act of nearly consummate bad taste. Ahmad was angered by it and relations between him and Shir Ali were even more strained. This incident marked the low point in the relations between them. Although their relationship was still somewhat strained, by late September they were able to meet and talk quite politely.

This struggle over who would hire Qadam shows how competition for shepherds can affect the relations between employers. Employers do not trust one another. The mutual distrust leads to disingenuous behavior which, of course, exacerbates the lack of trust. Competition for shepherds is divisive and puts real strain on the relations between employers. When, as was the case with Shir Ali and Ahmad, the men are very important, the conflict can take on the aspect of a real factional dispute. Tribal solidarity can thus be compromised. Conflict arises out of landlords' perceptions of other landlords as competitors rather than as men with similar interests. This attitude seems a direct outgrowth of that aspect of Komachi social organization which emphasizes the importance and the integrity of the nuclear family above all else and which places particularistic 'family' interest (often very short-run interest) above all other considerations.

It is also quite noteworthy that, in the case of Qadam, the major conflict between two important employers arose from a conflict between an employer's wife and a shepherd's wife over how much work the latter should do. The fundamental conflict was not over shepherding labor per se but over the labor that the shepherd might bring with him,

Changing employers can then dissipate the tensions that develop

between employer and employee. In this case, after the move Shir Ali was upset and humiliated, Qadam was relieved, and his wife was delighted. She felt that she had won. The cost was a feud between two powerful employers and a near-factional dispute.

Conclusion

Shepherding contracts are fundamental to the Komachi economy and the relations between shepherds and their employers have enormous impact on the Komachi social system. The organization of labor, male and female, within households, camps, and the tribe as a whole is determined by the use of contractual labor. There is, however, yet another level at which the implications of shepherding, and the social relations associated with it, may have equally profound impact: that is, on the very structure of the tribe as a social unit.

In the material above I have shown that the relationship between employer and shepherd creates conflict and that there are mechanisms in Komachi 'culture' which help reduce that immediate conflict. Still, one must also consider that, although an emphasis on kinship and unity may mollify the shepherd, it does little to change the fundamental relationship between him and his employer. In fact, one might argue that the emphasis on kinship and unity exacerbates the situation: while exploitation between employer and his employee is one thing, the exploitation of an acknowledged kinsman is another. As the shepherd continues to be exploited by the employer, tension is certain to re-arise and to be cumulative. The move from employer to employer may temporarily defuse this tension--relations between a particular employer and shepherd are broken--but again, the basic employer/shepherd relationship is not

changed. In addition, this latter move occurs at the expense of employer solidarity. Competition for shepherds promotes distrust and resentment among employers and is ultimately divisive. Thus while the basic mechanisms through which tensions in employer/shepherd relations are reduced may appear to work at the individual level, they do not appear to work well at the systemic level. Rather, they build up additional loci of conflict within the tribe.

In both instances, we ultimately find divisive forces, the exploitation of shepherds or the conflict between employers, contained by the same centripetal force, kinship. In essence, the ideology of tribal identity and of tribal unity is counterposed to the centrifugal forces arising from these conflicts. The dialectic between kinship and conflict thus emerges as one of the major motifs of Komachi life.

CHAPTER 3

KOMACHI MARRIAGES AND KOMACHI WEDDINGS

Marriages are the most important events in Komachi lives. Not only are they the most festive of the social occasions, but one can understand much of the structure of Komachi society by observing how they are arranged and carried out. The pairing of a particular boy and girl, the presences and absences of other people, the arrangement and ordering of guests, all render explicit the state of Komachi society at a point in time. Marriage therefore provides a particularly effective focal point for the analysis of Komachi social life.

In discussing marriage among the Komachi it is useful, at the outset, to divide the discussion into three sections:

1. a discussion of the mechanics of marriage: the process of spouse selection, the weddings, the marriage contract, and so on
2. a discussion of the more structural aspects of marriage: marriage rules, patterns, and preferences and their implications
3. an examination of the events surrounding several actual marriages

I will begin my discussion of marriage among the Komachi by outlining the process of getting married among them.

Pre-marital Negotiations

All normal members of the tribe marry. Only mentally defective or severely handicapped people never marry. There are three such people among the Komachi: a crazy woman, a blind man, and a very simple-minded

man. People who are less seriously handicapped do marry, but they are not considered desirable marriage partners.

The Komachi feel that it is important for a man to be older than his wife. Thus most men marry between the ages of 25 and 35 (except, notably, shepherds); the average is about 28. Women usually marry between the ages of 18 and 25; the average is 21. As unmarried girls approach their mid-twenties, people begin to comment that they are getting old. This reflects poorly on the girl's parents and on her. It is important to note, however, that a girl's age is not an absolute figure based on the year of her birth but is instead loosely calculated and is based on being placed within a cohort of contemporaries. As long as a girl marries with her contemporaries, her actual age is irrelevant. But, as a girl gets older, her parents are more and more pressured to arrange her marriage (see Chapter 5).

Most Komachi have only one spouse at a time. In the past, a few wealthy men took second wives but now there is only one man, one of the Jaffarabad Komachi, who had two wives. This in part seems to reflect changing attitudes towards polygyny in Persian society; most wealthy and important non-tribal men do not have more than one wife. In addition, the Komachi often contrast themselves with their neighbors in the winter quarters who are polygynous. The Komachi feel that a man might legitimately have two wives if his first is barren (as is the case in Jaffarabad). Otherwise, they seem to feel, a desire for a second wife is lascivious and therefore unseemly.

Komachi marriages are permanent arrangements. Although a Komachi marriage contract is always written to include a mehr, an

indemnification of the wife in case of death or divorce, there are no reported cases of divorce among the Komachi. Komachi marriage therefore normally terminates at the death of a marriage partner. Most widows and widowers remarry but for a variety of reasons these second marriages are different from first marriages and, in the discussion that follows, I consider only the events surrounding first marriages.

A Komachi marriage is the outcome of a long process of public and private discussion and negotiation. A marriage is not completed until the marriage contract (aghd) has been signed by both parties and the wedding celebration (jashn or eizh) has been held. The contract is binding, whether or not the celebration has been held; undoing it is considered divorce. Normally the marriage is not consummated until the celebration, after which the couple live together in their own tent. Occasionally this stage will be eliminated, if there are unusual circumstances, such as a death in the family. (It is often eliminated in the case of remarrying widows.) The contract and the celebration may be both done on the same day. A customary interval is one or two years, but sometimes longer intervals occur.

The outcome of Komachi marriage negotiations are often in doubt and the entire proceedings are set about with uncertainty. I have heard stories of women who were refused to their husbands even during the celebration, just at the point at which the brideprice is delivered in return for the bride. But these are extreme cases.

For a marriage to take place, the boy's parents and the girl's parents must agree. This agreement is, however, rarely reached without preliminary maneuvering. A man may have several prospective suitors for

his daughters or several possible brides for his son. The chain of events which leads to the ultimate pairing off of one boy with one girl generally begins with discussions among women. Rumors begin to circulate that "Ali" wants "Hossein's" daughter for his son. Neither Ali nor Hossein is directly associated with these rumors. People do not say, "I heard from Ali"; they say, "I have heard" While the rumors circulate in this fashion there is time for Hossein to circulate counter-rumors, perhaps that he has decided to give his daughter to another man's son. When this rumor reaches Ali, he may drop the matter to indicate that he is no longer interested in the match. In that way the initial search for a girl can be started up and broken off with no real steps having been made by the principals. The two parties never speak directly, no direct questions are ever asked. The chain linking the two men is vague and indirect and there is much room left for retreat and denial. Neither party need lose face. If, on the other hand, Hossein is, in principle, amenable to the match, he allows the rumors to circulate unanswered. He may even allow rumors that he considers Ali's son a good match for his daughter to circulate.

After a period of rumor and gossip which is not actively directed (i.e., with no clear pattern of links between the parties) but not random either (people can always make their feelings known), there will be some discussion between the mothers of the children. As there may be (and usually are at this stage) several possible spouses for each of the children, these discussions involve considerable politicking, delicacy, and protecting one's own interests, the latter largely by avoiding any appearance of premature commitment.

Ultimately the situation begins to sort itself out. People come to know, more or less, where they stand. They will know who really wants whom, what people's second choices are, and what the likelihood of making a particular match is.¹

At this point the boy's mother visits the girl's family to ask that their son be recognized as the girl's suitor. If the girl's parents agree, then the boy's mother and some of her female relatives bring gifts (the telemon, usually clothes and sweets) to the girl. The boy and girl are namzad, engaged. The boy is now her only legitimate suitor. This is still a very tentative stage of negotiation, however, and the engagement can be broken off quite easily at the wish of either party. The boy generally spends little time at the girl's parents' tent; if he is there too much it is considered odd (romantic love is a form of madness to the Komachi), but if he is there too infrequently it can be taken as a sign of lack of interest. He also brings the girl gifts, eid, each year at the Persian New Year.

An engagement is an optional stage in marriage arrangements. Not everyone becomes engaged and one can be engaged for any length of time. If during this period no problems develop between the families, then negotiations proceed to the next stage in which the boy's family asks for the girl's hand in marriage. Even though the couple are engaged, and even if the relationship between the two families is good, the formal asking is still a delicate process. Not infrequently a girl's family may still be uncommitted about a marriage even though the boy and girl are engaged. (This occurs because people's choices of marriage partners are not absolute but relative. The outcome of one set

¹I give detailed examples of this process in Chapter 5.

of marriage negotiations can have widespread repercussions, (If someone else's marriage arrangements fall through, and a better potential spouse becomes available, all previous arrangements may well be abandoned.) As this is so, a careless action might create difficulties and therefore this step is also preceded by indirect negotiation and rumor.

This time rumors circulate that the boy's family is thinking of going mar katkhoda, going to ask the approval of the girl's family for permission to negotiate the marriage contract and possibly celebrate the marriage. Once again, the girl's family can, by rumor, indicate that they are ready and waiting or that they do not wish to be asked at that time. If they indicate tacit approval, then a small delegation from the boy's family visits the girl's family; they officially ask the girl's family if they can come mar katkhoda. If they answer yes (such an acceptance does not guarantee a positive response in the negotiations) the boy's family then goes to ask for the girl's hand.

The delegation that goes mar katkhoda is often a large one. Most of the boy's close kin and the girl's close kin attend. Important distant kinsmen on both sides are also asked to attend. The girl's family slaughters a sheep or goat and prepares a meal. The mar katkhoda is a festive occasion; lunch is served to the assembled group before the business of the day starts.

The business typically begins with the most important members of the boy's delegation stressing the closeness of the ties between all concerned and enumerating whatever common bonds exist. They then request that the girl's father agree to her marrying the boy. In almost all cases the girl's father refuses this request. The refusal may be real

or it may simply be pro forma. If it is imply pro forma then agreement soon follows; the girl's father begins to waver in his apparent conviction. The mother is then brought in; she too claims to oppose the marriage. The reasons she gives for her opposition are likely to involve her daughter's labor. "I am old," she may say; "I cannot work myself and my other daughters are young; they cannot give me enough help with my work. This year is a bad year; next year or the year after, my other daughters will be bigger, then I can give this one." The boy's advocates counter these arguments. They agree that she has had much work and that it is true that her daughter is a great help to her (why else would one wish to marry her?). "But," they say, "her sisters will help. They will grow up. Next year you yourself will not be any younger. Your work will seem harder and it will be more difficult for you to give your daughter away."

The mother frequently repeats her first argument and often adds a second argument. She protests that she has had too much work and not enough help, and that because of that she has been unable to prepare her daughter's jehiz, trousseau. To answer this argument, the boy's side responds that it does not matter if the jehiz is not complete; there is time for it to be completed. They promise that the boy's kinswomen will come and help with the preparation. Or they may say that the jehiz need not be completed before the marriage, that they know that she will get it done, and that she can give her daughter the rest of the jehiz as it is finished. Finally, if they really believe that there is some obstacle to the woman's getting it done herself, they offer to provide money so that some items can be bought.

It is at this point that the outcome of the issue is usually determined. After the girl's father and mother have given their position, the girl's other close kin enter the discussion. If they support the boy's side, in favor of the marriage, then it is very likely that agreement will be reached. If, on the other hand, they strongly support the girl's parents in their refusal to allow the marriage to take place, then it is most unlikely that an agreement will be reached. This congruence of the balance of opinion of the girl's kin with the prevailing position is not at all surprising. The girl's closest kin, especially her own married sisters and her mother's sisters, know the real, private feelings of the girl's parents. They are therefore in an excellent position to support these feelings by either appearing to apply pressure for agreement or by supporting a refusal to give in.

Should the girl's parents be firm in their refusal, the discussion will continue on for a considerable period of time. Both sides repeat their arguments several times but with little modification of either side's position. People begin drifting away and the session ends with a rather inconclusive air.

If it seems likely that the girl's parents will agree, people begin to say, "Hurry up--make your decision. I don't have all day, I have a thousand things to do." Nonetheless, when an agreement is reached, they still stay, for it is then necessary to begin ironing out the practical matters concerning the marriage.

The primary decision to be made is whether the girl's parents agree not only to the signing of the marriage contract but also to holding the celebration. If they agree only to sign the contract (for the

time being), the young couple--although they are man and wife in the eyes of the state--do not cohabit and the marriage is not consummated.

The aghd, or marriage contract, is a legal and religious document. It is filled out by a religious functionary (not a member of the tribe) and is binding in the eyes of both the church and the state.² The contract states that the boy and the girl agree to Islamic and Persian laws relating to marriage, that they enter into the agreement freely and are not being coerced. The couple sign or mark the document in front of witnesses and the signing is recorded in a marriage register.

On a separate page, the aghd also contains an enumeration of such property arrangements or marriage settlements as exist. For the Komachi, these are the stipulation of the mehr and the pishkesh. The mehr (mahr in standard Persian) is the wife's marriage portion settled on her by her husband. It is a fixed sum of money which belongs to the woman but which is normally in her husband's custody. The mehr reverts to her on her husband's death (but is distinct from her inheritance) or upon divorce. Among the Komachi, a woman may also draw on it during the course of her marriage. This occurs infrequently and most informants suggested that women who did draw on the mehr did so only to go on pilgrimages or to make sacrifices.

While I was in the field, the value of the mehr ranged from 10,000 to 15,000 tomans (roughly \$1,500 to \$2,200). One mehr was for 30,000 tomans, but this was considered to be an outrageous and presumptuous amount. While most mehr contracts are written for a cash sum, they generally stipulate that the wife's portion be made payable in the

²There is no civil marriage in Iran.

equivalent number of young female animals. In the past, mehr contracts specified the number of animals and, in addition, often included a camel, carpets, bedding, and a certain weight's worth of cooking pots and utensils. These last items are generally excluded from more recent marriage contracts. It should be noted that under normal circumstances the mehr passes to the wife only on the death of her husband.

The pishkesh is a bride price. Komachi informants say that it is not an old custom; one very old woman told me that, in the old days, they only sold servant girls, not daughters, but today things have changed. At present, some women are still given in marriage without a pishkesh. This is an act of honor on the part of the girl's father. Women who were given without pishkesh say that they were freely given "like a sacrifice" and not for money. Nonetheless, pishkesh was generally given during my fieldwork. The value ranged from 2,500 tomans to 5,000 tomans. The amount of the mehr and the pishkesh are usually linked: the pishkesh is about one-third the mehr. Both are directly proportional to the status and wealth of the marriage partners.

One of the points which may be negotiated at the mar katkhoda is the time at which the pishkesh is to be delivered. It is commonly handed over to the girl's parents at the very end of the celebration when the boy's family come to claim the bride. In some cases, however, it is given to the girl's family well before the ceremony. This usually happens when the girl's parents are poor and need the money to set up her trousseau. The trousseau consists of most of the items commonly used in the household: pots, pans, cauldrons, dishes, and utensils as well as several varieties of woven pack bags which the bride's mother makes for

her. The tent itself, the pelas, is supplied by the boy's family.

The final stage of a Komachi marriage is the celebration. All weddings (and circumcisions) take place in the early fall. Most marriage negotiations and *mar katkhoda* take place around then as well, as do the rozeh, religious meetings in which the martyrdom of Hossein is recounted. Late August through October is thus a season of concentrated and intense social interaction. It is a period in which the Komachi characterize themselves as being bi kar, without work. The herds have been sent down to the winter quarters, the harvest is in, and people's thoughts are concentrated on the question of who will marry whom. It is a time of excitement and suspense. It is often not really clear who will marry whom until the wedding announcements are sent out. Frequently there are several weddings in as many days and the informal negotiations for one marriage often take place at the *jashn* of another. *Jashn* are therefore social events of paramount importance.

Jashn: Celebrations

The *jashn* is given by the boy's parents; they kill the animals, hire the musicians, buy the food, put up the guests, and bear the financial burden of the event. The festivities last roughly 24 hours. They start at 4:00 p.m. on one day and run until nearly 4:00 the next day. The 'official' celebration is thus at least one day but it is always preceded by several days of preparations and work parties. The most formal of these is the wheat cleaning party given by the groom's mother and attended by female relatives on the groom's side,

On the morning of the day before the celebration proper, close male kin of the groom march off to a garden accompanied by luti,

musicians, and children who are attracted by the Pied Piper-like music. At the garden the men cut a tall poplar-like tree, samambar, planted along the banks of the irrigation ditches; they carry the tree back to the groom's camp. There they strip the tree of all but its topmost branches and they fasten apples, pomegranates, and colorful streamers of cloth to the tree. The tree trunk is painted in designs and with the names of Ali, Hassan, and Hossein (the Imams and martyrs of Shiite Islam). The tree is then raised in front of the groom's tent. While it is being raised, musicians play, men and boys cheer, and women ululate. It is a stirring spectacle.

After the tree is raised, several women help the groom's mother prepare food for the celebration. Mounds of bread are baked, fire trenches dug, invitations are addressed, and an animal is killed to provide lunch for the neighbors and relatives who have come to help. These preparations are intensified the next day and continue until the time that the first guests begin to arrive.

As the guests appear in the distance, young girls of the camp go out to greet them ululating and carrying a plate of smouldering incense. The guests pause, inhale the smoke of the incense, and then approach the camp. There they stop, exchange long and very polite greetings with their hosts, and are then led to a guest tent where they are seated. At this time they are presented with dishes of davo (literally drugs), sugar-based powders flavored with chick pea flour, coffee, or cardomam. After eating a few teaspoons of the davo, guests are served the first of the many cups of tea that they receive during the celebration.

The seating of the guests nearly models the social organization of the tribe. There are at least two guest tents, one for men and one for women, and at a large celebration there are often several guest tents for men of different status or guests from other tribes.




Figure 3. Seating in a Guest Tent

The diagram above shows the arrangement of a typical guest tent. The interior is a large semicircle. The area against the back wall of the tent is covered with carpets, pillows, and bolsters; the front of the tent is open. Guests sit against the back wall of the tent and in a semi-circle facing the back wall. Under no circumstances does one man sit with his back to another man's face. The most important guest sits in the center of the row seated against the tent wall; his immediate neighbors to the left and right are men of nearly equal status. People

of lower status sit further to his left or right while those of lowest status sit furthest from the center. In general, those men who sit facing the back of the tent are of even lower status than the men at the edges of the back row, though the positions directly facing the most important men are often occupied by men of relatively high status. Whenever someone enters the tent he sits, or is seated, in a position that is appropriate to his status. If he is of higher status than anyone present, then he moves to the center of the back row and all the remaining seats are rearranged.

The guests arrive slowly, trickling in during the afternoon and early evening. In general, more important men arrive later than others. This is especially the case when the host is unimportant: then some men may only come for the meals. This is considered bad taste and is often commented upon. If the host is himself important, then all guests arrive much earlier.

The jashn begins to come alive in the evening after the majority of the guests have arrived. At about 8:30 a large bonfire is built in an open space between the tents and the musicians play. The evening's entertainment then begins. Called chub bazi (literally stick play), it is a highly stylized dance and duel between two men. As the musicians play, two young men begin to circle the fire; each has a wooden staff several feet long. The guests crowd around the dancers and a 'stage' is formed with the fire as the center. The men dance around the fire, twirling their sticks in time to the music; then, at a signal, they rush toward each other and duel with the sticks. The object of the duel is not to hit the other person but to get him into a position in which he

can be hit. When this happens, the duel is abruptly broken off and the men return to dancing around the fire. The pattern of dance, mock fight, dance, mock fight is continued until one or both of the dancers becomes tired; they are then replaced by another pair of dancers. Occasionally, and much to the delight of the crowd, two more men will step into the ring and clown around disrupting the dancing with buffoonery.

The audience for the dancing is almost entirely composed of young men, women, and children. Prominent men rarely leave their tent to watch the entertainment. Instead, they spend the evening in the tent discussing 'business.' Older men who watch the dancing are generally unimportant.

About 10:00 dancing stops and the evening meal is served. The standard meal at all jashn consists of a large dish of rice prepared with raisins, spices, and sheep fat, a bowl of abgusht, meat stew, a large piece of meat, and several loaves of flat bread. High status men (1) are served first, (2) are served individually while most people share bowls of food, and (3) get the choicest and largest pieces of meat. In general, people are served in order of declining rank. The major exception to this occurs if there are a large number of guests from a neighboring tribe; then they, as guests of the tribe, are served before any Komachi.

When the meal ends, those guests who live nearby return home while those who live some distance away sleep in the guest tents. Next morning those guests who did stay are fed breakfast. There is then an unstructured period until about 10:00 a.m. Festivities resume then after the guests and the musicians have been given breakfast and

preparations for lunch have begun. Then, as the musicians play, someone, often an old woman, prepares a large bowl of henna. This is then left to sit in the sun while the musicians continue to play and chub bazi begins again. The morning's dancing lacks some of the fire-lit excitement of the evening's entertainment. The dancers are generally younger and less skillful; there is rarely any clowning and the audience is smaller and less interested than they were at night.

After an hour or so of this desultory dancing the groom is led to the center of the dance area. He is seated on a cloth and the henna is placed on his head, hands, and feet. A bandana is then tied about his head and he is left to sit in the middle of the dance area while the rest of the celebration continues. The groom is not spoken to, nor does he speak. The period of ritual isolation usually ends as people drift away and then the groom himself often gets up and wanders about the cooking fires. He almost never enters the guest tents.

While the groom sits in public isolation, the guests are being served sharbat, a sweet fruit drink, and shirini, cookies. Each guest gets, roughly, one glass of sharbat and three or four cookies. The amount received is not, however, an accurate measure of their importance. (They are rather like the cake at an American wedding.) It is important that every guest receive some of them. In fact, one of the things spelled out in the wedding invitation is that the guests will be served sharbat and shirini.

Shortly after noon, lunch is served. The meal is identical with the meal of the preceding evening. Then, after lunch, another round of tea is served and the next important phase of the jashn begins.

First, the groom is carried off to be bathed. He is taken away in a procession led by the musicians. Behind the musicians comes the groom, who is normally seated on a motorcycle (a modern horse), for his feet must not touch the ground. Following the groom are the people who will bathe him; they carry a tray with clean clothing and bathing paraphernalia. Following them there is a crowd of spectators. At the bathing spot, the groom is stripped to a loincloth, bathed from head to toe, shaved, perfumed, and then re-dressed in all brand-new clothing. (While this is happening, some of the guests remain clustered around the tree, attempting to shoot the apples and pomegranates off its branches.)

After he is bathed and dressed, the groom is carried back to camp; there he is placed on a pile of carpets and blankets, a takht or throne. This trip back to the takht halts once about midway when the groom's kin give him gifts of animals and property. These gifts are called panaz (standard Persian pah andoz). The kinsmen do not actually present the animals; they pledge them and the pledges are written down. The total number of animals pledged ranges from about 10 to 30 animals. After the pause for the panaz, the procession continues to the takht where the groom is seated. He is then presented a tray containing a Koran, a mirror, cones of sugar, some candy, and a glass of sharbat. The groom kisses the Koran and then the giving of the fazl or wedding gifts begins.³ The first gifts are brought by the groom's closest kinswomen. They come forward with trays on which there are sugar cones (often topped with apples on sticks); under the cone are cash gifts. The gifts from close kin are the largest gifts; when they have been

³I discuss the significance of these gifts in detail in Chapter 6.

given, the remaining guests give their gifts. All gifts are cash. Gifts are not handed to the groom himself but are collected for him by a close friend or kinsman. As the gifts are collected, they are recorded; a literate member of the tribe writes down the name of each donor and the amount given.

The Komachi say that they record how much they receive so that they will know how much to give in return. In general the amount given is the amount that one has received in the past or, in the absence of past transactions, an amount proper to both the donor's and the recipient's status and relationship. A giver thus gives what he got when he married and, in a sense, what he expects to get in return. The only notable exceptions to this rule of rather calculated giving are the boy's own parents and grandparents; they are not giving with any expectation of reciprocal return--they are unlikely to have any celebrations at which their son/grandson will give them gifts--and they tend to give the largest gifts.

A result of the calculated giving is that a man receives back what he has given out or should be expected to give out. Wealthy men who have given more will get more. I say that wealthy men have given more, but I emphasize the point that a *fazl* involves no real redistribution of wealth. Wealthy men do not give large gifts to poor men; the status of the recipient does not warrant a large gift--there is no noblesse oblige. Similarly, poor men do not give large gifts to wealthy men: first they do not have the money, second it would be presumptuous. The difference then is that wealthy men give large numbers of gifts to other wealthy men and they invite large numbers of guests to their celebrations. When their sons marry, therefore, they get many

large gifts from other men and many smaller gifts from poorer men. The total fazl for a wealthy man's son will therefore be large. A poor man, however, will invite fewer guests and each of them will give his son smaller gifts; his son's fazl will thus be much smaller.

During the time that I was with the Komachi the total value of gifts given at a wedding ranged from a low of about 4,500 tomans (\$700) to about 12,000 tomans (\$1,850). Individual gifts ranged from 10 to 150 tomans (excluding gifts from parents and grandparents). The total of the gifts given at a wedding is common knowledge: the money is publicly totaled, usually twice; the cash is counted, the list of gifts is tallied, and the results are compared.

The size of one's fazl is both an indication and a confirmation of one's position in the tribe. The position that is being confirmed, it should be noted, is that of the groom or his father, not the bride's father. For instance, in the fall of 1974 Shir Ali Abrahimi, the wealthiest man in the tribe, married off his daughter. Her husband Hossein was her FZS. Hossein, however, was neither particularly wealthy nor of particularly high status; the fazl at his wedding was about 6,000 tomans, a reasonable but not a remarkable amount. The following fall Shir Ali's own son, Tavakoli, was married. The fazl at his wedding was nearly twice Hossein's.

When the fazl has been recorded, the guests leave the wedding and the jashn is over. The remaining events of the wedding involve the bride and are more or less private.

The bride is brought to the groom's camp at any time during the jashn. Her arrival is greeted with loud cheering; she is then

left to sit in isolation. The bride remains in isolation until late in the evening. Then, after the guests have gone home, the groom's family comes for their bride. They present the girl's father with the pishkesh, bride price, and she is then led away to her new home. Generally, this is a temporary nuptial tent in which the bride and groom must spend the first three days of their marriage.

Thus, to recapitulate the stages of Komachi courtship and marriage: there is an initial stage of being namzad--this is an optional and a fragile stage of the relationship; there are no real bonds between the couple and arrangements at this stage are often broken off. The period of namzad is followed by a time of rumor and quiet negotiation which concludes with the groom's family going mar katkhoda. The bride's family can here either reject the proposal for marriage or agree to either a signing of the marriage contract or the holding of a wedding celebration. If they agree only to the former, then the girl will continue to live in her parents' tent until the celebration takes place. If they agree to the celebration, then the girl and her husband set up a new household as soon as the ceremony takes place.

The process of getting married can thus be spread over several years; it also can take place with great rapidity. I heard of a case in which a man was reportedly namzad to a young girl and waited 15 years to marry; I saw a marriage negotiated from first to last in 11 days.

Conclusion

In this chapter I suggest that the process of getting married in Komachi society is secretive, cautious, and subject to sudden reversal. Also the wedding celebration provides a forum for the demonstration of

an individual's place in Komachi society; it confirms status in the organization of seating and in the order of the service of food. Close kinship ties are demonstrated by presenting gifts at the outset of the fazl, which also confirms the status of the new couple by the size of the fazl. The giver indicates the social position he aspires to by the size of the gift. Thus marriage is a lens through which Komachi social relations become manifest.

CHAPTER 4

KOMACHI MARRIAGE RULES AND PATTERNS

Komachi marriages are governed by rules and preferences which establish who is forbidden as a spouse and defines characteristics desirable in a spouse. Thus, in addition to observing the Koranic designations of incestuous marriages,¹ the Komachi marriage system is characterized by a preference for marrying close kin, status endogamy, a prohibition of more than one marriage between sibling sets (effectively prohibiting both exchange marriage and the marriage of two brothers to two sisters²), and a generally held feeling that a husband should be older than his wife.

These 'rules' generate certain typical types of marriage: the marriage of first cousins and two types of quasi-exchange marriage (which I call "step" and "plug-in" marriage and will describe later in this chapter). These marriage types are not distributed randomly among the Komachi but are quite clearly associated with differences in class.

¹The Koran prohibits men marrying "your mothers, your daughters, your sisters, your paternal and maternal aunts, the daughters of your brothers and sisters, your foster mothers, your foster sisters, the mothers of your wives, your step daughters who are in your charge . . . and the wives of your own begotten sons" (1956:368-369).

²Although I doubt that the Komachi are unique in this respect, the rule is uncommon. Sister exchange has been reported for--among others--the Basseri (Barth 1961), Arab Border villagers (Cohen 1965), and the Yomut Turkmen (Irons 1975). It is not prohibited but is considered not quite respectable among the Yörük (Bates 1973).

In Chapter 2, I suggested a tripartite class division for the Komachi, separating employers from employees (shepherds) and independent households which neither hired nor supplied labor. In this chapter I collapse those divisions down to two categories: ever shepherd and never shepherd. In effect, I am dividing my independent class into two parts based on whether the members of a particular household have or have not ever been employed as shepherds. I do this because the marriages in the sample have taken place over a period of nearly 50 years. It therefore seems more useful to calculate household status in a fashion which attempts to take this time depth into account.

The rules and the patterns of marriage types which result appear to be linked to the dynamics of the Komachi social formation, particularly the development and expansion of the tribe through agglomeration. The synchronic examination of them in this chapter sets the stage for the discussion of their relationship to the dynamics of tribal structure in Chapter 8.

Komachi Marriage Rules

Two rules appear to dominate the Komachi marriage system: a preference for close cousin marriage and a prohibition against multiple marriages between two sibling sets. For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to this latter rule as the antigamous rule.³

The Komachi prefer to marry their close kin. In general, this includes first cousins, first cousins once removed, and second cousins.

³The term is taken from (but used in a somewhat more restricted sense than by) Ryan (1969:163).

As Table 5 shows, in fact the majority of all close cousin marriages are with real first cousins.⁴ More distant relations between spouses are

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF MARRIAGE

Marriage Type	N	Percent of All Marriages
FBD	13	15
MBD	8	9
FZD	5	6
MZD	1	1
Real First Cousin	<u>27</u>	<u>31</u>
Other Close Cousin	<u>9</u>	<u>10.3</u>
Subtotal	36	41.3
Non-cousin	<u>51</u>	<u>58.6</u>
Total	87	99.9

⁴I wish to point out here that the sample for my discussion of marriage is somewhat different from the sample that I used for my analysis of economic data. The latter sample included all 73 households migrating as the main body of the tribe. My marriage data are, however, based on a sample of 87 households: these include all extant marriages--i.e., all marriages in which both partners are still alive--for the following groups of Komachi: all members of the main body of the tribe; all recently settled members of the tribe; and all Sanjeri for whom I have complete genealogical information. This sample thus excludes all Komachi who migrate between Jaffarabad and Kanu Bala (two camps) and those few Sanjeri for whom I have incomplete information. It also includes all marriages contracted at the time I left the tribe--i.e., newly wed households for which there are marriage data but no economic data.

referred to as qarabat, a connection, or as relations of "one vein" (ye reg baham baste). The Komachi do not express a preference for any one of the four types of first cousin, thus differing somewhat from many other Middle Eastern groups who do have an expressed preference for FBD. Still, it is interesting to note that, in fact, 13 of 27 Komachi first cousin marriages (48 percent) are with a FBD.

In point of fact, there appear to be many structural similarities between preferential close cousin marriage and FBD marriage (which is, after all, a type of preferential close cousin marriage). As a result, several structural implications which have been described for FBD marriage hold for close cousin marriage as well. The most important of these are:

1. the concentration of marriage ties
2. the concomitant encystment or the endogamously marrying group
3. the illusion of local solidarity that this fosters
4. the contrasting potential for fission and divisiveness that endogamous marriage apparently promotes
5. the fact that endogamous marriage precludes the possibility of the development of marriage classes.⁵

In contrast, the antigamous marriage rule tends to counteract several of the structural effects of the preferential close cousin marriage rule. Specifically, by proscribing repetitive marriages it limits the degree to which marriage ties can be concentrated and thus

⁵See Murphy and Kasden (1959, 1967), Barth (1961), and Boone and Schneider (1974) for considerations of these structural aspects of FBD marriage. See Ayoub (1959), Gilbert and Hammel (1966), Goldberg (1967), and Hammel and Goldberg (1971) for discussions of the frequency of FBD marriage.

diversifies rather than concentrates marriage ties. The two rules therefore appear to have opposing structural implications, which I explore in Chapter 8.

Finally, the Komachi tend to interpret the preference for status endogamy to mean that employers--men who have never been shepherds--should not marry their sons or daughters (the sex of the child is immaterial) to the children of men who are or have recently been shepherds. Thus it is not uncommon for there to be considerable differences in wealth between two families that marry their children; this is considered quite proper as long as the shepherd/non-shepherd barrier is not breached.

Patterns of Komachi Marriages: Step and Plug-in Marriages

All marriage rules tend to generate certain types of marriages and hence certain 'patterns' of relationships between individuals and households. In some cases these patterns emerge as the direct result of the marriage rule: a consistently followed preference for MBD marriage will create a pattern of 'circulating connubia,' for example. On the other hand, some marriage rules appear to establish epiphenomenal patterns of marriage. One such example of this appears to be the Komachi antigamous marriage rule which, by prohibiting direct exchange marriages, leads to the formation of near-exchange marriages of the variety that I call 'step' and 'plug-in.'

The existence of a rule like the antigamous marriage rule prohibiting siblings from making certain kinds of marriages based on the nature of the relationship that holds between the spouses of the siblings raises the general question: whom do siblings marry? In examining

the marriages of sibling sets among the Komachi I observed that two patterns of marriages emerged. Both of these are in fact a type of exchange marriage--a marriage in which a second sibling takes his spouse from the close kinsmen of the first sibling's spouse (although not, of course, a sibling of his sibling's spouse!). These marriages are sometimes also close kin marriages but it is not necessarily the case that either married couple will be closely cognatically related to each other.

Figure 4 below compares these two patterns of marriage among the Komachi with a simple exchange marriage of the variety prohibited by the antigamous marriage rule.




Figure 4. Three Types of Exchange Marriage

Step and plug-in marriages are similar in structure to the prohibited exchange marriage. They are, in fact, the closest approximation to the prohibited exchange marriages that are possible in the Komachi marriage system. In a step marriage, two siblings marry people who are sibling's child/parent's sibling to each other. As Figure 4 shows, A marries C and then later A's sibling B marries E (D's child instead of D).

In a plug-in marriage, siblings marry the children of a second


set of siblings--i.e., siblings marry first cousins. Thus (as Figure 4 shows) siblings A and B marry first cousins, E and F, the children of D and C.

One should note that, while it seems likely that these marriage patterns are, in a sense, epiphenomena of the antigamous rule--i.e., they occur because direct exchange marriages cannot--it does not seem likely that all marriages of this type occur merely as artifacts of a number of marriages taking place within the relatively restricted social universe of the Komachi tribe nor as a result of cousin marriage. Rather they appear to be the results of men attempting to make politically effective marriages--marriages which consolidate political and economic ties--within the constraints of the antigamous marriage rule. This is exemplified in the way that Meshe Yarbok Mohammedi married his children.

Meshe Yarbok and his brother were, by far, the wealthiest and most important men in their family. It is thus interesting to note that when Yarbok married his children he did not marry them to close kin but rather used those marriages to cement close ties with members of the Abrahimi family, men who were his social and economic equals. As the diagram below shows, Yarbok (Y) married a daughter (1) to one Abrahimi brother (A), married one son (2) to the daughter of C, a second son (3) to the daughter of B, and a third son (4) to the niece of his daughter-in-law (B's granddaughter). Yarbok's four children⁶ thus married three generations of Abrahimi men and women. And, in fact, Yarbok's own

⁶Yarbok had three other children: one married his brother's daughter, another her MBS, and the third, a mentally defective woman, never married.

grandchildren are now marrying children and grandchildren of the Abrahimi brothers and these latter marriages are close cousin marriages.



Number reflect the order in which marriages occurred

Figure 5. The Marriages of Yarbok's Children

This combination of step and plug-in marriages tightly bound the children of Meshe Yarbok to the Abrahimi. Thus at present they have far closer ties with their Abrahimi kin than they do with any other Mohammedi (save Yarbok's own brother's children). These multiple ties with the Abrahimi appear to have been an attempt both to affirm Yarbok's pre-eminent position among his Mohammedi kinsmen and to confirm his generally important position in the tribe. Yarbok did this by forming ties with other important men and not forming ties with other men even though they were his close kinsmen.

A second example of step and plug-in marriages illustrates how they provide the means for the rapid integration of important outsiders

into the tribe as well as a means for consolidating ties among people who already share other bonds.

In this case, the marriages took place between the children of Mirza Sa'id (A), the Katkhoda of Shirinak, and the children of the Abrahimi brothers referred to in the previous example.

Mirza Sa'id was not himself Komachi but he married a Komachi wife (the second cousin of the Abrahimi brothers). Later he married his children in the following fashion:




Figure 6. The Marriages of Mirza Sa'id's Children

He married his oldest daughter (A-1) to Shir Ali Abrahimi (B-2), the only son of the oldest Abrahimi brother; then Akbar Sa'id (A-2) married C-2, and Asghar Sa'id (A-3) married D-1. These were excellent marriages on both sides: since Mirza was the Katkhoda of Shirinak, he was an important local figure with excellent ties to the major property owners in the area. These marriages gave the Abrahimi good direct ties with the settled community. Conversely, Mirza was able to marry his children

well and to ensure several of them a more comfortable economic position than they could have occupied had they all remained settled.

Finally, as the diagram shows, later marriages among the Abrahimi and Mirza's grandchildren have completed their rapid integration into the tribe. After two generations of marriage they have numerous close and overlapping ties to several of the most important and wealthy members of the tribe. They have become, in just one generation, central and important members of the tribe.

Class and Marriage

The distribution of Komachi marriages with regard to class (ever shepherd/never shepherd) is noteworthy. Not only is the general preference for class endogamy adhered to--88 percent of all marriages are class endogamous⁷--but there are also significant associations of marriage type and pattern with class as well.

For example, the Komachi express a preference for close cousin marriage; roughly 41 percent of their marriages are with a close cousin. Of these 36 cousin marriages, 3 have been excluded for lack of data; of the remaining 33, 6 cross class lines while 27 are class endogamous. Of the 27 marriages which are both class endogamous and are the close cousin type, only 3 (11 percent) occur among those members of the tribe who have worked as shepherds; all the rest (24 marriages, 89 percent) occurred between those members of the tribe who had never worked as shepherds.

⁷That is, for those marriages in which I am able to determine class origin of both husband and wife (83 of a total sample of 87), 73 are class endogamous and 10 cross class boundaries.

In other words, the rate of cousin marriage among the higher class (those who have never worked as shepherds) is 53 percent, while the rate for the lower class is only 11 percent. This distribution of cousin marriages by class is statistically significant.⁸

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF COUSIN VS. NON-COUSIN MARRIAGES
(CLASS ENDOGAMOUS MARRIAGES ONLY) BY CLASS

Class	Cousin Marriages	Non-Cousin Marriages
Never shepherd	24	21
Ever shepherd	<u>3</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	27	46

N=73, chi square=11.68, $p < .01$

Similarly, step and plug-in marriages are also not randomly distributed throughout the population. Of the 32 couples in a step or plug-in pattern of marriage, 28 are in the 'never shepherd' class while the other 4 are in the 'ever shepherd' class. Note that while the fact that 'never shepherds' marry cousins may necessarily lead to some step and plug-in patterns, it cannot explain all of them: 15 of 32 marriages of couples involved in these patterns are not cousin marriages at all; and

⁸Of the ten marriages which cross class lines, six are cousin marriages and four are not. Of the four marriages which have been excluded because I cannot determine the wife's status at marriage, three are cousin marriages and one is not.

in several cases no pre-existent cognatic ties hold between the two 'sets' of partners joined in these marriages.

The figures in Table 7 show that the members of the tribe who have never worked as hired shepherds are significantly more likely to marry in an exchange pattern than are those members who have worked at some time as hired shepherds. Most couples involved in such marriages are 'never shepherds,' and most 'never shepherd' marriages are involved in such patterns.

TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF COUPLES INVOLVED IN STEP OR PLUG-IN MARRIAGES
BETWEEN 'NEVER SHEPHERD' AND 'EVER SHEPHERD' CLASSES:
ENTIRE SAMPLE OF MARRIAGES

Marriage Type	Never Shepherd	Ever Shepherd
Marriage <u>is</u> part of step or plug-in pattern	28	4
Marriage <u>is not</u> part of step or plug-in pattern	23	32

N=87, chi square=15.6, $p < .001$

Thus, in sum, most Komachi marriages are class endogamous and there are significant differences in the ways in which the members of the different classes do marry: 'never shepherds' marry their close cousins in 'step' and 'plug-in' patterns while 'ever shepherds' do not. These differences in marriage patterns among the classes--and the associated differences in wealth, number of cousins, etc., which I discussed in Chapter 2--reflect important underlying processes and structures of

the Komachi social formation. I will return to a discussion of this point in the conclusion of this chapter. However, for the moment I shall turn to a brief consideration of cross-class marriages.

Cross-Class Marriages

Of the 83 marriages in my sample, only ten occur across class boundaries. That is, in only ten marriages are the husband and wife of different class background. Six of these ten marriages are also marriages between close kin. The relatively high frequency of close-kin marriage for this group is noteworthy, for I think it shows that the Komachi perceive social groups in terms of ego-centric networks. Thus people who are close kin are almost always considered good marriage partners for, regardless of the larger social categories which might separate them on a tribal scale, from any single individual's point of view they are part of his 'in group.'

Close cousin marriages which cross class boundaries reaffirm ties and stress kin links rather than class solidarity. In this light, it is interesting to note that, of the ten higher-status partners involved in these marriages, only two are originally from wealthy employer households. One of these two marriages is a cousin marriage. The events surrounding the other marriage illustrates how deep the gap between the classes can be and what the obstacles to marriages between them are.

Shiri Xabar is the second son of Reza Abrahimi--the second of the five Abrahimi brothers mentioned in the examples of pp, 137-140. Reza, who had been a wealthy man, died when Shiri was still a young boy. Shiri's mother, an aggressive woman, managed the family's herd very

successfully after her husband's death. Shiri was therefore quite wealthy. And, because his father was dead, Shiri had control over his patrimony while still unmarried. Shiri ultimately decided to marry a girl who was the daughter of a shepherd. The shepherd was originally non-Komachi and the girl was no kin at all to Shiri. Shiri's family were terribly upset by the decision. They all sought to dissuade him from making the marriage. They claimed that the marriage was unfitting because the girl was the daughter of a shepherd. Shiri, however, went on with his plans and married the girl despite his relatives' protests. In retaliation his family refused to arrange or attend the normal wedding celebration. Shiri was married without a celebration and without receiving the gifts he would have otherwise customarily received. Shiri was, in effect, cut off from his family. Although the rift between Shiri and his kin has now healed, Shiri's younger brother told me that such marriages were really "impossible" and that he could never have married a shepherd girl himself. He also suggested to me that the only reason that Shiri was able to marry the girl was that their father was dead and that Shiri therefore controlled his own patrimony. Under these circumstances there was, finally, no one who could force him to abandon his course. The brother was certain that, had their father been alive, the marriage could never have taken place.

Thus, while marriages that cross class boundaries clearly establish links between upper- and lower-class members of the tribe, they very rarely establish direct links. Rather, they establish indirect links between the top and the bottom through the intermediaries of marriages between wealthy employers and members of independent households on the

one hand and between members of independent households and employees or shepherds on the other. This being the case, indirect links bear a heavy ideological load. Tribal unity and identity are always expressed in the idiom of kinship ties (see Chapter 6) and it is the ties to wealthy and important men that are stressed in this regard. For example, it is common for poor men to stress distant and indirect ties to wealthy important men rather than close ties to less important men when they seek to describe their position in the tribe while wealthy men play on the indirect ties as they compete for shepherds or attempt to resolve conflicts that arise in the employer/employee relationship.

By establishing kinship ties, albeit indirect ones, between the upper- and lower-class members of the tribe, cross-class marriages help join together the disparate elements of the tribe. However, cross-class marriages are (1) relatively infrequent, (2) in general close kin marriages which re-link people with pre-existing ties, and (3) very unlikely to establish direct links between wealthy employer and shepherd households.

It appears, therefore, that while cross-class marriages may have significant integrative potential, they are hardly a major mechanism of tribal integration. Finally, there does not appear to be any conscious attempt on the part of the Komachi to use them as an integrative mechanism. Given the class divisions in Komachi society and the apparent instability of the social formation, the relative infrequency of cross-class marriages seems noteworthy.

Conclusion

There are two salient points which appear to emerge from this analysis of Komachi marriages: first, that there are very few marriages across the ever shepherd/never shepherd class line; and second, that there are significant differences in the types and patterns of marriages that take place within the two classes.

These differences in marriage types and patterns are only one part of a set of features which separate the two classes. As I showed in Chapter 2, there are not only significant differences in wealth between those members of the tribe who work (employees) and those members of the tribe who are wealthy employers of hired labor (employers), but there are also significant differences in the number of close kin that they have in the tribe.⁹

Combining these differences, the overall characteristics of these two classes begin to emerge: employers are wealthy, they have many kinsmen in the tribe, they tend to marry their close kin and to marry in near-exchange marriage patterns. Thus wealthy members of the tribe tend to have many kin and they also tend to marry in such a fashion that the ties among them become dense, multiplex, and overlapping. Wealthy individuals are not only cognatically or agnatically related to their close kin, but they are affinally related as well; further, these ties are duplicated and reduplicated. By contrast, shepherds are poor, have few kin, and tend to marry neither close kin nor in a near-exchange marriage

⁹Here again, over time the tripartite division established in Chapter 2 reduces to a dichotomy of those who have worked as shepherds and those who have not. The former classification is useful for a synchronic analysis of tribal structure, the latter for a diachronic analysis.

pattern. Thus, while wealthy members of the tribe have dense and overlapping sets of ties among themselves--ties that are constantly reformed by endogamous and near exchange marriages--poorer members of the tribe have few kin and no dense networks of ties, and marry in ways which appear to preclude the formation of these networks.

These characteristics of the two groups appear, in good part, to be clarified by an examination of the origins of their members. That is, there are members of the tribe whose ancestors have been Komachi for many generations and who are, essentially, Komachi by descent; there are also, however, many members of the tribe who are relatively recent entrants from outside the tribe. If one takes as native Komachi all those individuals who are at least second generation members of the tribe (father born among the Komachi), then one finds that just over 36 percent of all present Komachi have external origins.

TABLE 8
ORIGINS OF TRIBE MEMBERS
(MALE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD, INTENSIVE SAMPLE)

Origin	Number	Percent
Originally Komachi	41	63.1%
External Origin	24	36.9%

However, as Table 9 shows, there are striking differences between employers and employees with regard to percentages of individuals of external origin.

TABLE 9.
TRIBAL ORIGIN BY CLASS

Class	Originally Komachi	External Origin
Ever shepherd	14 42%	19 58%
Never shepherd	27 82%	5 18%

While nearly 60 percent of all shepherds have entered the tribe from outside, only 18 percent of all members of the tribe who have never worked as shepherds have entered the tribe from outside. Wealthy employers are Komachi by origin while their employees tend to have come into the tribe from the outside. Wealthy employers are of Komachi origins and they have many kin within the tribe; shepherds are frequently of external origins and they do not have many kin within the tribe. Finally, wealthy men with many kinsmen in the tribe marry their close kin; poor shepherds with few kinsmen in the tribe do not (or perhaps cannot) marry their close kin.

A result of these factors is that the tribe is composed of two groups of individuals, groups whose members only rarely intermarry. One group is relatively wealthy, Komachi by descent, and appears to perpetuate itself through endogamous marriage. The other group is poor, are generally not Komachi by descent, and cannot reproduce itself through marriage. The different characteristics of the two groups appear to give them quite different roles in the structural dynamics of Komachi

society. The employers are the heart or core of the tribe; they are the "real" Komachi; shepherds are Komachi through their attachment to the wealthy heart of the tribe. One can see these two groups are a core and a periphery: the one central and reproducing itself, the other marginal and reproduced as new members become attached to the core through contractual ties.

Komachi marriage rules reflect and in part produce the classes of Komachi society. In this chapter I have attempted to present a synchronic description of the relationship between them. I will return to this point in Chapter 8 when I attempt to account for the relationship between these structures in a diachronic model of the structure of the Komachi social formation.

CHAPTER 5

KOMACHI SPOUSE SELECTION:
ITS STRUCTURAL BASES AND ITS STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS

The importance of marriages in creating alliances between groups has been frequently stressed by anthropologists. However, while there is no question that the primary result of marriage is the joining of two parties, marriages can also be divisive; they can set one party against another in competition for a given spouse and the inability to make a particular match--generally because another match has been made--can lead to a rupture of ties between the rejected suitor and the successful parties.

The extent to which these positive and negative aspects of marriage balance each other out in the short run,¹ or the extent to which one aspect or the other dominates the events surrounding marriages, is an empirical question which can be determined only by examining the events surrounding marriages in a particular society. In this chapter I will argue that, among the Komachi, the divisive aspects of marriage are quite powerful and that the strains which arise in the process of spouse selection are a force which must be taken into account in the analysis of the society.

¹In the short run, because in the long run it is the ties of particular marriages which are transmitted from generation to generation while the breaches in social relations, though important, have a much more immediate and transitory effect.

To that end, I will first present a detailed account of the politicking that surrounded some marriage negotiations in 1975; I will then attempt to set forth some of the structural bases of the discord apparent in the example, and, finally, I will attempt to point out some of the structural implications of that discord.

Komachi Marriages: 1975

The events surrounding Komachi marriages are a romantic opera filled with plots and counterplots, red herrings and surprise denouements, played by a cast who are literally born for their roles.

In the description that follows I will try to do justice to both the events themselves and the atmosphere in which they unfolded during the course of 1975. Since the events are often confusing and the cast is large, I will introduce the most important characters before I narrate the events. Minor characters are introduced in passing.

Ma'adi Yarbok. Ma'adi is the most important living Mohammedi. He settled in 1973 to run a carpet factory and act as a middleman in meat trading but was still a very important figure in tribal affairs. He is an extremely intelligent man with a somewhat depressive personality who at times seems to enjoy discomfiting people with bad news and gloomy predictions. His two oldest daughters, Malike and Telike, were the belles of the tribe--everyone wanted to marry them--and his machinations in this regard kept him at the center of activity. I was never certain that some of his actions were not deliberately designed to make others uncomfortable.

Kuchek Ali Abrahimi. Kuchek is a very wealthy but notoriously stingy old man. His stinginess and his age reduce the status that he

might warrant from his wealth. Nonetheless his son Abraham was considered a very good potential match and the focus of considerable conflict.

Mard Ali Pir-Malek. Mard Ali is a Sanjeri. He is somewhat older than most of the other men who were trying to get their children married; in the late summer of 1975, a climactic time, he was recovering from a very serious illness and believed that he was dying. During 1974 and 1975 he arranged the marriages of his son Qadam and his daughter Hojaste but not without some unpleasantness.

Naght Ali Pir-Malek. Naght Ali is Mard Ali's younger brother. He wanted a bride for his son Ali and a husband for at least one of his three unmarried daughters. His wife, Gohar, and his married daughter Meshe Fatime, were intimately involved in the negotiations and controversy that erupted.

Ahmad Shah Mirza. Ahmad is the most important Sanjeri. He is much younger than any of the men who were looking for spouses for their children and none of his own children are near marrying age. He therefore played the role of an unbiased mediator in some very difficult situations.




Figure 7. Relations between Ma'adi Yarbok, Kuchek Ali Abrahimi, Mard Ali Pir-Malek, Naght Ali Pir-Malek, and Ahmad Shah Mirza.




Figure 8. The Pre-existent Relationships between Men Negotiating Marriages in the Years 1974 and 1975

In 1975 Naght Ali was trying to make a good match for his son Ali. This maneuvering was somewhat complicated by the fact that Ali had three sisters of marriageable age (some people even said they were 'old'). Thus, in looking for a wife for Ali, Naght Ali was trying to find a 'good' girl and at the same time make a match which would not prevent the marriage of one of his daughters.² From that point of view, a match between Ali and Ma'adi's daughter appeared ideal: Ma'adi had no sons of marriageable age. Naght Ali had therefore tried to arrange such a match in 1974 but had been rebuffed by Ma'adi. In 1975 Naght Ali attempted to keep the possibility of that marriage open; he recognized, however, that that marriage was by no means a likely one and therefore also attempted to keep other options open as well. One match that seemed a likely one was between Ali and his FBS, Hojaste. On the surface this was an excellent match and Mard Ali, Ali's FB, strongly favored it. This match, however, had the drawback of precluding a match between Mard Ali's son No Ruz and one of Naght Ali's daughters. As a result, while Naght Ali and Mard Ali seemed to favor the match of Ali and Hojaste, Naght Ali's wife was intent on looking elsewhere. She made overtures to Naght Ali's other brother, Gholami, and to distant kin in the neighboring Anoyi tribe. She was, however, rebuffed in both of these attempts and thus had to fall back on the match of Ali and Hojaste. Since that marriage would block the possible match of Mard Ali's son with her daughter, she also

²With no two marriages allowed between sibling sets, the Komachi are forced to consider quite carefully which match they wish to make with whom. If a man thinks it will be easier to marry his son than his daughter, he may pass up a marriage for his son so that his daughter will have more possible matches.

that he gave his daughter to someone else, "By God, he will marry Akbar's daughter," as Tavakoli's mother had said. (And, ultimately, he did.)

Naght Ali's family thus began to make a concerted effort to arrange a match between Abraham Kuchek and their daughter.

This proved to be both a wise and an unwise choice. It seemed to have been wise when, on September 18, Tavakoli married his MBD Malike.⁴ It seemed far less wise when Ma'adi heard of it and things began to happen.

Ma'adi had previously rejected both Abraham Kuchek and Ali Naght Ali. He was, however, angered when he heard that arrangements were being made through which both of them would get married while his daughter remained unmarried. This did not suit him at all. He preferred to have two potential suitors dangling on a string (waiting for him to allow one or the other to marry his Malike) than to be forced to look for a new match for his daughter. Ma'adi therefore let it be known that he was angered by the new arrangements and that, particularly, he considered Ali still bound by the negotiations of the previous year.

Naght Ali's family interpreted the situation quite differently. They now claimed that they had been interested in Ma'adi's other daughter, that Ma'adi's attempt to substitute one daughter for the other was unacceptable, and that, whichever daughter had been involved, Ma'adi had rejected their suit and they were free to do whatever they chose.⁵

⁴Naght Ali's wife did not attend the wedding. She felt that Tavakoli's mother had insulted her by hinting, through rumor, that if Tavakoli did not get Akbar's daughter he would marry one of hers.

⁵I must note that neither side was being consistent in their positions. They could reject someone and still be annoyed when that person went elsewhere. Each party wanted to be free to reject but still be

On the evening of October 5, Naght Ali's family came to Shirinak to attempt to arrange two marriages: they wanted to marry Ali to his FBD Højaste and to arrange a marriage between Abraham Kuchek and Naght Ali's daughter. At first things looked as though they would turn out well. No one yet voiced any opposition to the match between Ali and Højaste. Mard Ali and Naght Ali were brothers and they both favored the match. The only man who might have complained was their brother Gholami, who said, "Ali asked for my daughter. I told him no because she was too young. What can I say now?" The way seemed clear, but the second match quickly ran into trouble. Kuchek and his immediate family were at the meeting but none of his wife's kin were there. (His wife is Ma'adi's sister.) They opposed the match and would not come. Ma'adi, Abraham's MB, had again let it be known that he strongly objected to the match. Naght Ali's family wanted to push the match anyway. "If they haven't come and haven't spoken, let them be," they said. Meshe Ahmad Sanjeri, however, argued that they could not do that. "Their kin must be here, they must give their opinion," he argued. "If they are not here, then I cannot give my approval (as your kin) to the match. It would be unseemly if I did."

This caused considerable argument on both sides; was the approval of kin necessary? If both fathers (i.e., Kuchek and Naght Ali) approved, who could really say anything, even a mother's brother? Was making the match without their approval any more unseemly than their refusal to

protected from rejection or the appearance of rejection. This, in large part, accounts for the rapid 180 degree shifts in position. I think it is safe to conclude that there are, in fact, no absolute positions--all positions are relative.

come in the first place? No definitive answers to these questions were forthcoming, for as soon as the problem arose it was immediately overshadowed by the behavior of Mard Ali's son Now Ruz; he threw open the shuttered window and leaped into the dimly lit room. He shrieked and pranced, shouted and whistled. He ran around the room and then out, running around the cooking fires, shouting taunts and insults at the gathered company. Whenever anyone tried to speak about the proposed marriages, Now Ruz would stick his head in the window or door and shout them down. Much of what he said was incoherent, but his theme was that they could not give Hojaste to Ali for then he would be unable to marry Ali's sister.

At first the situation was almost comical. "He's crazy," people said, and they laughed uncomfortably at what he said and did. Soon, however, the evening lost whatever comic element it had. Now Ruz' father Mard Ali was an older man who had just recently been released from the hospital in Kerman following serious surgery. He was still weak and his recovery was slower than he hoped. He was known to feel that he was dying. (This feeling, or fear, was shared by others as well.) The marriage of his daughter thus loomed as a very important thing to him; he saw it as a way of tidying up his affairs. As a result, when Now Ruz began to disrupt the proceedings Mard Ali was overcome by an apparently uncontrollable rage. He sat by the fire in front of his tent shouting curses to the heavens, punctuating each curse by pounding his leg in a frenzy of rage. "My daughter is clean and pure. I can marry her to whomever I choose, to my brother's son," he shouted. "I am an old man; I am dying; I will do what I want," he continued.

People rushed to him and tried to calm him down. But their attempts were fruitless; he was beside himself. Believing that his son Now Ruz was not alone in his actions, that he had been excited and spurred on by Ma'adi Yarbok and his kin (who for their own reasons would wish to see the proceedings disrupted), Mard Ali then began to shout blasphemous curses at them through the night air. "May God burn down your houses and all that are in them," he screamed, his face contorted with rage and pain. "May the Prophet burn down your house. May emir almolmeni [the leader of the faithful] strike you down." As he shouted his curses one after another into the night, everyone within the sound of his voice (and there were many people) hurried out of their tents and houses. His son Qadam, who had just gotten married and had been out visiting, rushed up and tried to quiet his father as did many other people. His friends tried to talk with him, to reason with him, to make him realize what he was saying and above all to stop him from shouting those terrible curses. The slightly humorous edge the evening had had during Now Ruz' tantrum completely disappeared. Never had I seen so many tribesmen so upset and so concerned as I saw that night.

No matter what people did or said, however, Mard Ali would not be stopped. As he went on, the train of the meeting was completely lost. Kuchek and his family quickly left to return to their own camp. The other participants stood huddled about in small clusters discussing the evening's calamity and occasionally running over to try to calm Mard Ali. Now Ruz, having started the trouble, fled. Everything and everyone was in disarray. Everyone was concerned about the depth of the social rupture which the evening's events suggested.

The next day the feeling was unanimous that things had been mishandled. Everyone felt that wherever there was any possibility of conflict it was foolish to be open and aboveboard in one's behavior. "They should never have come to Shirinak where there are so many people." "They should have waited and done it quietly during migration." "They should never have announced their intentions; they should have gone and done what they were going to do and then announced it when no one could say anything against it." This was the consensus of opinion among those not directly involved.

While everyone countenanced stealth and deviousness, later people were still surprised to find that, in the dead of night, Ali and Hojaste and a group of witnesses were all driven off to the neighboring town of Qaryeit-al-arab by Mohammad the Katkhoda. There they roused the scribe from his sleep and had a marriage agreement written up and signed before they returned to the camps at dawn. By noon this news was common knowledge but it did not end the events. There was still Abraham Kuchek; whom would he marry?

On October 8, Naght Ali's married daughter Meshe Fatime visited Kuchek in his camp and in an attempt to further her sister's cause apparently damaged her chances by chastising Kuchek for allowing others to make up his mind for him.

Ma'adi Yarbok, in the meantime, told everyone who would listen that he was furious about Ali's marriage to Hojaste. He felt that his claim to Ali had been flouted. He was also, and quite obviously, deeply upset about what had happened the night before.⁶ His anger did not at

⁶Ma'adi had important ties with Mard Ali: his wife is Mard Ali's

all subside when Gohar, Naght Ali's wife, said that Ma'adi was not really upset about losing Ali, that all he really cared about was money and if they offered him 500 tomans he would think that he had come off well.

I do not know exactly what Ma'adi said or thought when he was told of that bon mot, but he certainly acted quickly. He and his brother visited Kuchek and offered him Malike for Abraham. He added that he would sign the agreement immediately, that he would let her go off and migrate if Abraham wished to migrate or he would help set Abraham up in the carpet business if he wished to settle. In short, he went all-out to make the match and he succeeded.⁷ On October 10 Ma'adi had a




Figure 10. Ma'adi's Ties to Kuchek

WZ; his younger brother is married to Mard Ali's daughter and lives in his camp; and he had close ties to Mard Ali's son, Qadam.

⁷In ultimately forcing this match through to a successful conclusion Ma'adi had several advantages over Naght Ali's family. He was Kuchek's wife's brother (see Figure 10) and was therefore considered to have some legitimate say about the marriage of his nephew; Abraham's marriage to Malike would be a real first cousin marriage and thus highly valued, while Abraham was not at all close kin with Naght Ali's daughter; Ma'adi also had many more lines of approach to Kuchek, there were many

small celebration at which the marriage contract was signed by Abraham Kuchek and Malike. No one doubted that this was Ma'adi's way of punishing Naght Ali and his family: they had not let him make their son his son-in-law, so he had stolen their potential son-in-law; they had insulted him and he had injured and embarrassed them.

Whether the match was a good one from Ma'adi's point of view is moot; it is unlikely that Abraham will immediately settle and so Ma'adi is likely to lose his daughter's labor in his carpet factory. Still, one gets the feeling that Ma'adi was less concerned about Abraham's positive attributes, or the loss of his daughter's labor, than he was about stealing Abraham away from Naght Ali. In this regard, Shir Ali's wife Sekine (who was no friend to Ma'adi) repeated (or perhaps invented) a particularly scurrilous rumor about how Ma'adi ensured getting Abraham for Malike. Kuchek had an unmarried daughter who was in her late twenties and about whom unpleasant rumors, notably that she wanted to marry Kuchek's near-pauper shepherd, were circulating. The one good prospect she had was No Ruz Kazom, the widower of her mother's sister, a man with three teenage children. The girl, however, was known to oppose the match. In any event, Ma'adi was reported to have threatened that, if Kuchek did not let Abraham marry Malike, he would offer Malike to No Ruz Kazom (a better match than No Ruz Kazom could hope for as an older

more people who would put forth and support his argument; Kuchek's oldest son's wife was Ma'adi's wife's sister, his brother was a partner with Kuchek in hiring shepherds, his father had had very close ties with Kuchek and had given him his wife (his second wife in fact) "freely, as a sacrifice, for no compensation." Thus he was able to put pressure on Kuchek, and especially Kuchek's wife (his sister) that Naght Ali could not begin to match. From the point of view of maintaining social ties, Malike was the better match.

widower) and thus steal away the last chance of Kuchek's daughter marrying well. Whether this rumor was true or not, it shows well the scope that there is for malicious rumor mongering in marriage negotiations.

As one might well imagine, no one from either Naght Ali's or Mard Ali's household came to Ma'adi's celebration. They were not, however, forgotten. When Ma'adi could not find Malike's identity card to present to the scribe who was recording the transaction, he declared that it had been stolen by Ali Naght Ali to prevent and disrupt the day's proceedings. In spite of that problem, the marriage contract was signed and the marriage round of 1975 came finally, though not peacefully, to a close.

As the cases above show, Komachi marriage negotiations are filled with competition and conflict. This competition may be explained in part as a special case of the competition between households which characterizes Komachi social life; however, it is clearly exacerbated by several factors peculiar to Komachi marriage.

The most obvious of these is the small size of the pool of potential spouses. The tribe is small, but marriage pools are even further reduced by the Komachi preference for class endogamy. Thus, for example, it is unthinkable that Kuchek's daughter would marry his pauper shepherd.

Marriage pools are even further restricted by the fact that a group of young men and women of marriageable age and the same class tend to be regarded as a cohort. Cohorts affect marriages in several ways. Because they are quite small the range of possible marriages within them is extremely limited; the ranking of the most attractive members is also quite obvious; and the room that parties have for maneuvering to make a

match is somewhat restricted. Each marriage that takes place within a cohort reduces the field of possible choices. Further, and most importantly, marriages within the cohort remove not just a potential spouse, but quite frequently the best potential spouse.

Even within the cohort, restrictions are placed on some marriages by the Komachi marriage rules, particularly the antigamous marriage prohibition. Thus as marriages take place within the cohort, the remaining choices are constrained not merely because there are progressively fewer partners but also by the marriages that have already occurred. This can clearly be seen in the conflict over marrying Ali Naght Ali to his FBD, a marriage which blocks a marriage for his sisters.

Thus, within cohorts, each marriage reduces the field of possible marriages while the room to maneuver within the confines of age, status, and marriage rules becomes more and more restrictive until finally second-rate marriages (usually out of the cohort) are all that is left.

Competition and conflict are also promoted by the secrecy and rumor-spreading that attend marriage negotiations. This is again in part caused by the small number of possibilities. If a man's parents cannot arrange a marriage with their first choice, they must be sure not to ruin their chances with a second choice. Thus Naght Ali's family attempted to keep both Ma'adi's daughter and Mard Ali's daughter as possibilities until they were firmly rejected by Ma'adi. The secrecy does not reduce competition. There are still limited possibilities but, because of the secrecy and the need for discretion, households maneuver in the dark, never really knowing what others are doing, as they try to get things their way. In fact, the secrecy promotes considerable

distrust; people are convinced (often correctly) that others are trying to damage their position. The only things that circulate freely are rumors, which are passed on largely as attempts to strengthen one's own position; however, the opportunity to weaken another's position is not passed up and any news that is truly embarrassing passes through the tribe like a good joke. (Canfield has a discussion of secrecy and gossip in a somewhat similar situation [1973:77-81].)

A third source of competition and conflict is the entangling of marriage arranging with status. Thus how a man's children marry is charged with meaning about his own status, either confirming it or calling it into question. In the attempt to arrange a good marriage for their son or daughter, Komachi parents are, in essence, putting their own status and prestige on the line. Their child's desirability as a spouse reflects in large part the status of his parents (except of course for personal beauty and pleasant personality). Matches are made by adults and it is they who are being judged. Parental status must be "seconded" by arranging a good marriage; the inability to do so implies that the parents' status is in fact not so high after all. Getting a more desirable bride and forcing someone else to contract a less desirable marriage is the essence of Komachi competition.

The conflict over status is again exacerbated by the small cohort-like pool of potential spouses. As they come of age, a man's sons and daughters will be informally, but certainly, grouped into cohorts and--at least in the short run--a man will be judged on how he makes marriages within those cohorts. If everyone is getting married but his child, then he is put in an extremely disadvantageous position. The

existence of the small, narrow cohort sharpens and intensifies the problem. A man cannot simply wait until a good opportunity comes along; he must act. If he does not act, then as every passing marriage reduces the pool, his failure to marry off his child becomes obvious far more rapidly than it might if there were no cohort. The existence of the small cohorts coupled with the small size of the tribe leaves people in exposed positions and thus increases the risk of people deciding that there is something wrong with the boy or girl. This latter occurrence must be avoided at all costs, for it nearly destroys the chances of making a good marriage. The size and structure of Komachi marriage pools therefore prevents men from passively waiting for marriage opportunities for their children. Men must act and, with almost every marriage limiting and damaging other men's chances, their actions must put them in competition with others.

Conclusion

The secrecy, the mistrust, the competition and conflict that hold in Komachi marriage negotiations are common in other areas of their social life as well. For example, in an earlier chapter I have shown the competition and conflict inherent in shepherding contracts which pit shepherd against employer and employers against one another. Indeed, competition and conflict are such pervasive aspects of Komachi social life that one might well say that the fact that its members compete rather than cooperate is a fundamental truth about the nature of Komachi society.

The source of this competition appears to lie in Komachi relations to the non-pastoral world. As I indicated in Chapter 1, there is

reason to believe that tribes in the Kerman area have been integrated into a capitalist market system for over 300 years. The onset of this integration is marked by the entrance of the British East India Company into the pastoral economy as a purchaser of kerk, I think that it is safe to assume that integration . . . a market economy led to a general withdrawal of wealth from the Komachi economy which, in turn, put greater economic pressure on individual households. The competition between Komachi households may then be seen as a response to this external pressure. The relations holding between households during marriage negotiations for their children documented above then emerge as a graphic illustration of this competition.

The events surrounding marriages emphasize the lengths to which households will go to protect their narrowly defined self-interest and they thus highlight the atomistic nature of Komachi society. The competition and conflict between households appear to contribute materially to the ultimate instability of the Komachi social system; they weaken the centrifugal forces which bind the members of the tribe together at the same time that they promote the possibility of fission. The divisive features of Komachi marriage thus both reflect and contribute to the unstable nature of the social system.

CHAPTER 6

KINSHIP AND EXCHANGES:

THE ARMATURES OF TRIBAL IDENTITY

The Komachi see kinship as the basis of social unity. "We are all one, we are all kin, there are no strangers here," they say. And, indeed, by their way of reckoning this is true; all Komachi are kin. For, in calculating tribal membership or evaluating the validity of a claim of tribal membership, kinship is extremely broadly reckoned: any cognatic or affinal tie will do. Thus a man whose father was a member of the Noshadi tribe is now considered Komachi because his wife is; the Emiri family, men and women whose father and mother both came into the tribe from outside, are considered Komachi because they married Komachi men and women and their children have continued to marry within the tribe. These claims to kinship through marriage or some other single tie are made not only by poor and marginal shepherds seeking to identify themselves with their employers but are also made and endorsed by wealthy men with unimpeachable claims to centrality and high status. Shir Ali Abrahimi, a wealthy, important, and well-connected man, time and again told me that "there are no strangers here." And when I tried to pin him down by citing people who I knew had entered the tribe from outside and who thus had no clear ties, he would always insist that there was a tie, no matter how vague.¹

¹In many cases I clearly forced him to articulate proofs that

The Komachi metaphor of unity is kinship; it is the tie that binds all Komachi together. However, while it is true that the Komachi see themselves joined to each other through kin ties, it is important to remember the broadness of the criteria on which that claim is based: the claim that all Komachi are kin means only that. Kinship is the metaphor of unity in Komachi society; it provides no single, simple frame for social integration. Rather, Komachi kinship provides the means by which social relations will be calculated and ties made and solidified.

Kinship as a Unifying Agent in Komachi Society

In the absence of a single overarching framework, Komachi solidarity is built up piecemeal in the overlapping and cross-cutting of individual ego-centric networks. The basis of these networks are the bonds between close kin, bonds that are used in action as well as stressed in speech. Solidarity is demonstrated and is in the process created by people acting in ways which fill the requirements of culturally defined rules for behavior among kinsmen. Solidarity is demonstrated by active, visible support of kinsmen when they need it. In general, support means that in certain crises kinsmen will appear to lend moral support. For example, when Emir Reza fell from his motorcycle and feared he was dying, word of his misfortune passed to all his close relatives--his mother, his brothers and sisters, his children, and his first cousins. They gathered around him and tried to cheer him up, assuring him that he would get well. Some debated which cures would be

were farfetched. The point, however, is not the proof, but his willingness to make the assertion and defend it. That is how the Komachi see their social universe.

most effective and set about preparing them, while others went off to see if they could bring medical help from the nearest city. Everyone milled around and crowded into Emir's room, assuring him and attempting to reassure themselves. Emir himself was propped up on an enormous pile of cushions and bedclothes in the middle of his room and looked (and acted) very much like a somewhat bedraggled oriental potentate surrounded by his retinue. Whether the uproar and commotion did his physical condition any good I cannot say; he was certainly distracted by the scene around him and spent more time comforting his six sisters than they him. Finally, the massing of people was obviously comforting to both him and those who were concerned for him. This collection of kin and their expression of concern is the accepted response to life crises of this kind. Birth, sickness, and death are all to some extent marked by gatherings of this kind. I observed similar gatherings when other Komachi were ill or when women gave birth. During the two years I was with the tribe, no adults died; I was told many times, however, that one should die with one's kin around him and all the accounts of deaths that I heard stressed who was or was not there and why.

Other life crises also demand support of kinsmen. When a man goes to ask for a girl's hand in marriage, his kin come with him (see p. 188). They are his supporters and, indeed, it is not he but they who do the bulk of the arguing. The girl's family is similarly supported by their kin and, as I have recounted above, the whole tenor of the meeting is determined by whether the girl's kin support or oppose her parents' initial refusal. Kinsmen are, in a very real sense, obligated to be present for these occasions. They should be there, they

should make themselves heard, they should support their side. Their presence, their active participation, both shows and creates solidarity. Absence and withdrawal indicate a serious breach of both personal relations and community expectations (see Chapter 5).

In these life crises, appearance--being there--is what counts. One need not give anything nor do anything; one must simply be there. At such events, only close kin (no further than first cousins) are expected to attend.² The only exception to this rule is that truly important men are frequently invited to speak for or represent poorer and less important distant kinsmen. This obligation of kinship is not taken lightly and it is a rare gathering which no important man attends.

The ability of networks of close kin to link the Komachi (as a whole) together arises in part from their large size and the concomitant overlapping of personnel. For example, Shir Ali has 64 first cousins, as well as 2 living FB, 1 MB, 2 MZ, 10 children, 3 sisters, and 30 nieces and nephews. That is to say, in a tribe with roughly 550 members, Shir Ali has 112 close relatives. When he says, "we are all kin," he is not speaking entirely metaphorically! With that net of close kin about him, there are few Komachi to whom Shir Ali can trace no tie.³ He

²Not all first cousins will, of course, attend. Who does or does not attend marks the division between formal relations and those based on significant interaction.

³An interesting and important adjunct of this "openness" to connection through intermediary close kin is that, when I interviewed many Komachi who were not centrally important figures, their immediate response to my question "Who are your kinsmen?" was, "I am kin with Shir Ali." At first I thought they answered this way because Shir Ali was my neighbor and they were trying to show an attachment to someone familiar to me. Later, I realized this was not the case--it was a statement that expressed their view of their position in the tribe: their ability to demonstrate a tie with Shir Ali was their proof that they were part of the tribe, that they were in.

is, of course, an extreme example. Nonetheless, there are many other Komachi with kin networks that are nearly as extensive as Shir Ali's.⁴

In a tribe of 550 people, networks that contain 80, 90, or 100 close kinsmen must overlap. Many tribesmen are thus linked to one another over and over in different ways. Such overlapping not only creates interlocking kindreds, but also creates clusters of dense ties in which the relations between individuals become so complex and involuted that no clean break between two parties, so joined, can take place. That is, the cross-cutting and fragmented loyalties of those who have ties to the two parties force them to remain in social relation with one another. Shir Ali and Emir Reza are an example of this: first cousins and both wealthymen, their struggle took place in the arenas of marriage, economic affairs, and (to a lesser extent) tribal politics. By the late fall of 1974 they were not speaking to each other at all.

Each had deliberately insulted the other in serious and public ways, but they could not escape each other. They are bound together by such a welter of ties that, no matter how they feel, it is in the interests of too many people that they 'get together' for them to remain permanently alienated from each other. Emir is married to Shir Ali's sister; Emir's brother is married to Shir Ali's daughter. Emir's sister is married to Shir Ali's wife's brother; the same sister's daughter married Shir Ali's son. The number of people involved and the closeness of the ties force Shir Ali and Emir together. They must interact, they must cooperate, They are important nodes in too many networks for a permanent break to be maintained. Thus, when Emir fell from his motorcycle and his

⁴See Table 17.




Figure 11. Kinship Ties Linking Shir Ali and Emir Reza

relatives gathered, Shir Ali came. He could not not come. He was annoyed; he complained to me that he had a thousand other things to do, but he went. There were too many people involved. Similarly, later that year when Shir Ali asked his wife's brother to give his daughter to Shir Ali's son, Emir was forced to go along and support the match. He had to go because the girl's mother was his sister and she wished him to come.

These overlapping networks create their own solidarity. The sheer number of ties, the density of the relationship weighs upon those who are bound together and brings them together in practice if not in their hearts.

Those Komachi bound together by these multiple clusters of ties tend to be wealthy employers--the men who marry kin (see Chapter 2 and 4). For the elite of the tribe, there is then more than a little truth to the claim that "we are all one, we are all kin."⁵ It is they who are

⁵One should note here Marx's dictum that "under all circumstances

bound most tightly together. They form therefore the core of the tribe; they are the reference points--the nodes--to whom other, poorer Komachi, peripheral shepherds with few ties, claim attachment. Since employers recognize and validate shepherds' claims of ties, an overarching network of kinship--denser in some areas, a single strand in others--does truly seem to join all Komachi.

The primary manner in which this general, all-unifying kinship is demonstrated and rendered concrete is through exchanges of various types.

Exchange as the Articulation of Kinship

There are several types of exchange which demonstrate unity and solidarity, but perhaps the most basic are those involving food. Fellowship and community are marked by giving food. One Komachi gives food to another freely and with no obligation as an indicator of a shared relationship. Both the transfer and the freedom from obligation typify these exchanges. The exchange marks the relationship; the freedom from obligation characterizes the relationship as one of kinship and not one of contract.

Exchanges of this variety take place at many levels of social inclusiveness. Within a camp, whenever an animal is killed its meat is

an ideology is always the ideology of the ruling class" holds for the Komachi. That is, the wealthier and more important members of the tribe are joined by an extensive and dense net of kin ties. All wealthy Komachi are indeed kin. Their ties to poorer Komachi are, however, far more diffuse; still, the claim that "we are all kin" is made by and for poorer Komachi as well. This claim mystifies the real relationship between poorer and richer Komachi: contractual exploitation. See Chapters 2 and 8.

is distributed to other camp members. This is done as a common courtesy to neighbors. If, however, the animal is killed as a sacrifice, then the meat must be distributed among all the members of the camp and, if possible, given to close kin in neighboring camps. This meat is freely given; that is the obligation of the sacrifice. There is no expectation of immediate or equal return. To be sure, when another household kills its sacrifice, there will be a return gift but there is no calculation of this.

Sacrifices and the exchanges they result in arise in several ways. When a person makes a vow, he often promises to kill an animal if his wish is fulfilled. Shir Ali killed an animal when his son graduated from high school. If someone is ill, then his family will often vow to sacrifice an animal when he recovers. Other animals are sacrificed for pilgrimages: during migration, for example, Shir Ali killed two animals, one at the shrine of Pir Chaghun (where he sacrificed every year to commemorate his youngest son's recovery from a leg ailment) and once again at Esfandagheh "for Abl Fazl." At this latter site, nearly everyone in the tribe sacrificed an animal. In my own camp of seven tents, every household killed an animal; the meat from all the sacrifices was individually distributed by each household. Each household thus had an enormous amount of meat--some their own, some from each of their neighbors.

In these exchanges within camps, meat is given to all members of the camp, employer and shepherd alike. Since kin are thought of as being obligated to give freely to one another, these exchanges serve (among other things) to create some solidarity among shepherds and employers and hence to lend credence to the claim that they are all one and all kin.

A second important exchange within camps takes place on eid-e qorban. On that day the Komachi mourn for deceased close kin. Many households in the camp mark this day by preparing a special meal of rice and beans. Members of different households, over the course of the day, visit back and forth; at each stop they say a brief prayer and eat a small portion of the food that has been prepared. By the end of the day, members of all households have partaken of food prepared by most other households in camp; there has been a general distribution of the special food. Here again, there is no distinction made between employer and employee--the exchanges are between all members of the camp.

In describing these exchanges of food I have stressed free giving and lack of obligation--they are markers of solidarity. In stark contrast to these is the exchange of food in return for specified services. For example, shepherds receive their daily food as part of their contractual wages. This transfer of food for service is the antithesis of the freely given food. It marks a break or discontinuity in social relations--employer/employee--and is thus a potential point of conflict and division. Freely given food and food given in return for contractual services are a structurally related pair of contrasting elements. As such, they help define the shepherd's relationship to his employer and the shepherd's place in the tribe. Interestingly, the two kinds of giving are not in complementary distribution--the shepherd is not wholly outside the range of normal social intercourse. Rather, as the recipient of both kinds of exchanges, he stands in an ambiguous position: he is both inside and outside at the same time. The ambiguity of this position is, it seems, basic to Komachi social life.

In the context of the dichotomy of freely given food/food in return for services, and the paradoxical position of shepherds that it marks, a third and very minor, ritual exchange becomes quite interesting. The exchange takes place on the festival of the sadeh, the fortieth day after the winter solstice. Children from all the households in camp go around from tent to tent begging a measure of flour from each. The children give the flour to a shepherd who takes it and prepares a komaj,⁶ flat bread, in which he places a bead; the bread is then left to bake in the ashes of a bonfire built in front of the camp. While the fire burns and the bread bakes, the children of the camp dance about it singing songs about rain, the coming of spring, and the division of the harvest. Periodically they grab brands from the fire and dash off in the direction of a tent or of another camp and shout out the names of its inhabitants. Finally, when the bread is done, it is divided among the members of camp. The member of camp, adult or child, who gets the bead in his or her portion may then be playfully beaten by the other members of camp.⁷

In a ritual filled with reference to the order of the world--both natural and cultural--the central exchange appears as an inversion, almost a mockery, of other transfers of food. The shepherd freely gives food to his employers, but the food he gives is bread--and crude bread at that. In opposition to meat, which is normally freely given, this bread

⁶The Komachi do not usually eat komaj; it is commonly cooked by shepherds who are too far from camp to be given fresh bread by their employer's wife. "Komaj" and "Komachi" are related terms (see Chapter 1) but the use of the bread in the ritual appears to have nothing to do with the tribal name.

⁷In our camp no one found the bead, a mystery that sorely disappointed all the children as well as the anthropologist,

is the basest gift. It is shepherds' food par excellence. The shepherd gives back--as freely given food--what he gets as contractual food. Finally, while it is all child's play, there is a catch in the free exchange: playing the game of accepting freely what the shepherd gives leaves one open to the mockery of the community. This all appears to underly the sadeh exchanges; on the surface, however, it is but another example of food operating as the medium of expression for unity and community.

Exchanges of meat from sacrifices or of food on eid-e qorban and the sadeh take place within the restricted social universe of the camp or perhaps those close kin who live near enough to visit easily. Food is also used to seal solidarity of larger groups. No public occasion takes place, no guests are ever invited into one's tent, without a meal being served.⁸

When people go mar katkhoda, the girl's family prepares a meal of meat stew. This luxurious meal symbolizes their intention of being sociable and shows their respect for their guests. The guests, by eating the meal, acknowledge the importance of the occasion. "We have eaten your meat; now we must work for you (i.e., participate in the negotiations)," I once heard Emir Reza announce at a mar katkhoda.

During the early fall, when camps give rozeh (ceremonies recounting the martyrdom of the Imam Hossein), invitations are sent up and down

⁸In general, meat is a meal in a social context. One shows respect for a guest by serving it; to fail to do so when one should is considered a serious breach of etiquette. People returning from a visit to another camp are often asked, "What did they give you to eat?"

the tribe. The typical form of the invitation is "We are having a rozeh; come have meat with us." And, while the importance of the rozeh ceremony itself should not be belittled, the meal is also vital. The meat served at the rozeh is considered a sacrifice and it, too, must be shared. Since everyone does not attend each rozeh, the guests tend to be a congregation of the closest kin of camp members, some settled locals (who are very active participants in rozeh), and whatever members of the tribe happen to have been passing by. Those who cannot stop and stay for the meal are often given a small portion of meat to take with them. The injunction to share the sacrifice is very strong,⁹ and at the rozeh too the invitation to share food seems to be a recognition of sharing an identity.

While the rozeh, mar katkhoda, and the distribution of meat following a sacrifice demonstrate the solidarity of small clusters of kin or neighbors within the tribe, the feasts at weddings and circumcisions mark the solidarity of the tribe as a whole.¹⁰ All members of the tribe are invited to these celebrations and the invitations do not simply invite people to come and witness the happy occasion: the invitations stipulate that guests will be fed dinner, breakfast, and luncheon, and that they will be given sharbat and shirini.¹¹

⁹In a sense, the meat seems to belong not to the owner of the animal but to the Imam or religious figure to whom it has been sacrificed. The distribution of food is thus almost a fictive redistribution.

¹⁰Weddings and circumcisions are, in fact, the only events in which most members of the tribe gather in one place. The preparation of food for these events is also important: kinsmen show solidarity by helping with it.

¹¹That is, a sweetened beverage and cookies. The importance of the meal may be shown by the fact that guests are said to have attended the celebration if they have eaten the meal.

The coming to the feast, the eating of the food, the preparation and serving--sumptuous hospitality and a willingness to participate in it--make firm links between the guests and the host; they are bound together by mutual obligation. The guest must give a gift, the host must be prepared to be a guest. Visiting, eating, and giving are actions which define essential social ties. These are not things that one does with strangers--thus doing them demonstrates a commonality and community.

A guest's duty to his host is to attend the celebration and to give a gift. The giving of the gift also highlights the relationship between guest and host. The size of a gift at a wedding or circumcision (all gifts are cash) shows the relationship between guest and host and also a man's status in the community. The largest gifts are given by the host's closest kin. These range from 150 to 500 tomans (roughly \$20 to \$70). A wealthy man will often give 100 T to another wealthy man while most guests give 50 T or less. Not only do a man's closest kin give the largest gifts, affirming their relationship in that way; they also give their gifts first and the very closest kin--brothers, sisters, grandparents--do not simply give money, but present their gifts on trays accompanied by sugar cones and candy. Their special relationship is made public before the community as a whole. These same close kin also give gifts of animals to the boy who is to be circumcised or to the bridegroom. This latter gift of the most valuable commodity in the tribe's economy--a young female animal--is a mark of true solidarity and, in general, these "close kin" are the ones who will mobilize to support one another in times of crisis.

All the gifts, food, animals, money, are tokens in a relationship

in which an exact and equal return is expected. However, the very assumption that there will be, in time, a return assumes a continuing social relationship--often across generational boundaries. Thus, while it is true that failure to return a gift would terminate the exchange relationship, the social relationship is not simply a product of exchange. Continuing exchanges in the mode of balanced reciprocity are part of being Komachi or of being kin. Social ties are confirmed in a net of balanced exchange: to be Komachi is to exchange.

Exchanges at rozeh, weddings, and circumcisions are structurally identical with the distribution of meat from sacrifices or the distribution of food at eid-e qorban or the sadeh: they are all markers of commonality and fellowship--they render concrete the relations between men.

Tribal solidarity as a whole is created by the intersections of several different kinds of claims for unity. There is a general assertion of unity through kinship which is supported by the most generalized and broadest exchanges, those that take place at major celebrations. Underlying this general conception of unity are smaller, tighter networks of individuals joined by closer ties. They participate in the broad exchanges of the major celebrations but their participation is set off: they give the first and the largest gifts; their gifts are presented on trays with sugar cones; and the closest of them give additional gifts of animals at weddings or circumcisions. These smaller networks are also activated on other occasions; they attend one another's rozeh and mar katkhoda and they appear at life crises.

Finally, there are the intra-camp exchanges of eid-e qorban, the sadeh, and meat from sacrifices. These latter exchanges do not follow

the lines of formal kinship. By cross-cutting those lines, however, they support the Komachi perception that all Komachi are kin.

The Place of Kinship in Social Interaction

In almost all Komachi networks, the tie that ultimately brings two individuals together is kinship; while there is no master genealogy into which all individuals can be neatly fitted--as for instance in a true segmentary lineage system--kin ties are still the dominant medium for relations between tribesmen. All other ties, all other relations, take place in the context of kinship and are inflected by it.

Networks almost always follow lines of flow and fracture laid down by the kinship system. However, it is important to emphasize that, while kinship sets out the potential lines of networks, it does not determine them in a strict sense. The system is possibilist rather than determinist and there is a powerful optative element to it.

The formal ascriptive kinship system sets out the ways; it marks the line along a pre-formed grid of linkages. Within this system, however, a second system operates in which the content of the relationship is dominant. Here the actual quality of the relationship is most important. And content, as opposed to form, is flexible, optional, and subject to very rapid change.

Purely formal relations tend to be single stranded; the tie that joins two men stands alone and is not remade. By contrast significant relations are more complex. The ties between men who have significant relationships with each other must bear weight, and they tend to be duplicated and reduplicated so that the parties are bound tightly together. Networks thus have centers of dense overlapping ties by which

men are joined to one another over and over again and edges where people are loosely linked. The edge of one network, of course, may well include the center of another.

Some of the ways in which kinship ties are used, or not used, are illustrated in the examples below. The central figure in these examples is Shir Ali Abrahimi.

Shir Ali's closest associates in the tribe are his first cousins Asghar Mirza (MZS) and Agha Hossein (FBS). Shir Ali is the head of his own camp as are Asghar and Agha Hossein (respectively the wealthiest and the fifth and sixth wealthiest men in the tribe). Shir Ali's wife is Asghar's sister and Asghar's wife is Agha Hossein's sister. The three men are thus immediately bound to one another by these cognitive and affinal ties; there are other ties as well. Shir Ali's youngest sister is married to Agha Hossein's brother; Shir Ali's oldest son is married to Asghar's brother's daughter (MBD marriage). Shir Ali's third daughter is engaged to Agha Hossein's ZS (Asghar's WZS) and so on. Finally, there




Figure 12. Ties between Shir Ali, Asghar, and Agha Hossein

has been talk of several possible marriages among the three men's remaining children, and since each has seven or more as yet unmarried, the likelihood of these marriages taking place is quite great.

The three men are linked by kinship ties and these links carry weight. Shir Ali, Asghar, and Agha Hossein are all partners in a motorized well and garden in the garmsir. Shir Ali and Agha Hossein camp near each other in winter quarters and in the fall of 1974 they migrated together sharing the cost of truck rental. During the spring migration in 1975 the two camps, each with its own camels and camel herds, were never more than a few hundred yards apart; they migrated as a unit (and in fact three camps migrated together, for Agha Hossein shares his camel herd with his brother, also head of his own camp, and so they migrate together). During this migration Shir Ali made most of the decisions concerning when and where to move. When I asked Agha Hossein about this he replied, "When you travel with someone who is bozorgtar [bigger or more important], you do what he wishes."

Asghar wintered some distance from Shir Ali and Agha Hossein and did not migrate with them. On the other hand, he and Shir Ali's son were partners in a meat buying venture during the summer of 1974 (Shir Ali put up the capital for his son). The following summer Asghar was partners with Shir Ali's son-in-law in a date-buying scheme.

The relations between the men are also manifest hundreds of kilometers away in Kerman city where Agha Hossein's oldest son shares his student quarters with two of Shir Ali's sons in the same building in which Asghar rents a room for his school-age children.

In all these relationships Shir Ali is clearly the dominant

member. He is older than the other men, richer than they are, and, at least in the case of Agha Hossein, is far more clever.

The men attend one another's wedding and circumcision celebrations; their wives assist in food preparations at these celebrations, their sons help serve food, and the gifts they exchange are large. The men visit one another frequently and they generally support one another in tribal political issues. Thus in 1975, when wealthier members of the tribe were debating where to sink a motorized well (which they hoped the government would supply), Shir Ali, Asghar, and Agha Hossein were more or less unified in their position and argued as a block. Later, when a more serious political problem arose over the pump and there was much debate over whether or not members of the tribe should make a formal complaint against powerful local officials, Shir Ali, Asghar, and, to a lesser extent, Agha Hossein were again involved and they again put forth a united position.

It would be a mistake, however, to look upon the men as a block that always works together. They are not the Three Musketeers! Shir Ali tried to steal away one of Agha Hossein's shepherds--I watched him do it--while later Shir Ali suspected (probably correctly) that Asghar was trying to steal one of his shepherds. In Shir Ali's and Agha Hossein's joint economic ventures, Agha Hossein almost always seems to come out somewhat on the short end. For example, when they both bought orange seedlings for their garden, Shir Ali talked Agha Hossein into buying along with him. But Shir Ali got to the seller first, got the better plants, and arranged his own transportation and planting of the delicate seedlings. When Agha Hossein finally got his plants transported to the

garden, there was a delay in watering them and most were lost. The venture was hardly a true cooperative venture.

Nonetheless, there is a kind of solidarity between the men and when, for example, Agha Hossein was defrauded of a considerable sum of money by an itinerant swindler, the man he turned to for assistance and advice was Shir Ali.

These two men hardly exhaust Shir Ali's network. His son-in-law Qoli is another important point in it. Qoli married Shir Ali's oldest daughter (see Figure 11). He and Shir Ali's oldest son are partners in many ventures--meat buying, watermelon selling, etc.-- often using Shir Ali's capital. One of Shir Ali's shepherds is Qoli's MBS--a tie that was played upon to hire him.

Qoli is in a very interesting position: he is a member of two different networks that are somewhat at odds with each other. On the one hand he is part of Shir Ali's network. He is economically bound to him; he was over \$1,500 in debt to Shir Ali at the time I left the field. He has close ties to Shir Ali's son and he camps with Shir Ali. On the other hand he has close ties to men who are Shir Ali's rivals: his two brothers, Emir Reza and Shiri Xabar. As a result, during an important tribal dispute he found his economic interests split. As Shir Ali's son-in-law he was partners with Asghar and Shir Ali's son in a meat-buying scheme and was in debt to Shir Ali. However, in the dispute between the Katkhoda (Asghar's brother) and Emir (his own brother), it was the latter who represented his own economic interests. Emir and Shir Ali (who supported the Katkhoda--his brother-in-law) were on opposite sides and thus whatever side Qoli took in that dispute, he would be

bound to lose. As a result, Qoli kept himself uncharacteristically in the background during the dispute.

Qoli showed his support for Shir Ali later in the dispute with Ahmad Shah Mirza (pp. 100-107). Then Qoli rode up and down the tribe's territory on his motorcycle slandering Ahmad and arguing strongly that Shir Ali's position was correct. In this instance Qoli unequivocally supported Shir Ali even though, somewhat earlier, his brother Shiri Xabar, in alliance with Ahmad's younger brother, had come to blows with Agha Hossein, his son, and Shir Ali's second son.

Qoli's position emphasizes the strong ego-centric character of Komachi networks. Shir Ali, Shiri Xabar, and Emir Reza are all members of Qoli's network but they are not close themselves. Qoli can play some small role as mediator between the two groups but cannot make his network a functioning or coherent set. Networks are not transitive: one may belong to many networks but overlap does not necessarily create unity.

Other important members of Shir Ali's network are his sister's sons. These men are much poorer than he is; in effect, they supply him with downward links to poorer members of the tribe. This is important for, in reckoning unity through kinship, it is ties to Shir Ali through men like these (his undisputed close kin) which permit poorer men to stress that they have ties to wealthy and important ones. These poorer men and their families work cooperatively with Shir Ali's family; they supply large amounts of labor for which they receive no direct compensation; they do, however, reap the intangible--but real--benefit of Shir Ali's prestige.¹²

¹²See pp. 210-213 for a discussion of the real economic benefits they reap from camping near Shir Ali, as well.

For example, Shir Ali's ZS, Kokojan, is married to a woman who is Shir Ali's MBD. Kokojan and Senne, his wife--particularly Senne--do a great deal of work for Shir Ali's family. Senne helps with the milking, weaving, preparation of the dairy products, and the like. Senne's brother, Emir Golambar, wants to get married. He is perhaps a bit simple-minded and has been rejected in several suits. In 1974 and 1975 he was promised the hand of his FZDD. His ally and spokesman in these negotiations was his first cousin Shir Ali.

Shir Ali's assistance was given in return for Senne and Kokojan's regular help to his household and, in addition, Emir Golambar's own help shearing Shir Ali's flock. Shir Ali gives them moral support, they give him assistance in production.¹³

I must stress that in this case the tie between Shir Ali and Emir Golambar is not single stranded. It is not simply Emir's work for Shir Ali that makes him willing to be Emir's patron, nor is he Emir's patron just because he is his first cousin. He is Emir's patron for both these reasons and also because of the important tie between Emir Golambar and Kokojan. There are thus many paths that can be traced between the two (see Figure 13) and claims for assistance can be made on many levels. This is so even though Emir Golambar and Shir Ali are not close in the sense that they are never partners in economic ventures and are by no means equals in status.

¹³Emir says that he works for Shir Ali because he is his cousin and he should help his kin; he expects Shir Ali to help him because they are kin. Note that as an important kinsman Shir Ali is obligated to give some assistance to men like Emir in situations like this one. However, his active participation and energetic assistance appear linked to the actual nature of his relationship with Emir, Kokojan, and Senne rather than the formal ties that hold between them.




Figure 13. Relations between Shir Ali and Emir Golambar

Still, Shir Ali's relationship with Emir Golambar is vastly different from his relationship with yet another first cousin, Emir Duraz (i.e., tall and thin). During the 19 months I was in the field, Shir Ali never voluntarily had anything to do with this man. He asked nothing from him and gave nothing to him. He did not personally attend the circumcision feast Emir gave, but sent his oldest son instead. The relationship between the two men is so distant that Emir Duraz addresses Shir Ali as *Abrahimi*, a term used most frequently by members of different tribes who are being frostily polite. Surprisingly, when I spoke with Emir Duraz he often emphasized the 'closeness' of his relationship with Shir Ali. For him the blood tie, MZS, was significant; for Shir Ali, on the other hand, it was undeniable but essentially meaningless. First cousin or not, Emir Duraz is not part of Shir Ali's active network.

In sum, then, kinship ties are the ties that bind Komachi society together. They are a metaphor for all social relations, an idiom of unity that can be trotted out and used to counterbalance tension and discord. But kinship ties are more than just ideology. There are real ties and they do bind people together. Those ties which work, which actually hold people together, do so because they are channels for actions which show and create solidarity: the exchange of women, the exchange of food, the exchange of significant gifts, support in life crises, and working together for common goals. They are, however, only channels; they establish the broad parameters for significant social interaction but do not determine them.

Patronymic Groups

Within the context of this discussion of 'kinship as the idiom of Komachi social relations' it is interesting to note just how the Komachi see their tribe's structure.

The Komachi model of their tribe is drawn in terms of taife, patronymic groups. The Komachi claim that the tribe is made up of three taife, the Abrahimi, the Sanjeri, and the Mohammedi. The eponymous ancestors of these taife are supposed to have entered the Komachi sarhad territory roughly five to seven generations ago. The Abrahimi are said to have come from Khorassan in the north, the Sanjeri claim to have come from Baluchistan in the southeast, and the Mohammedi say that they came from Fars Province in the southwest. Over the course of time, people say, the taife have become pichide, intertwined, through marriage and have thus become one tribe. The present tribe is, in this view, the aftermath of this process.

There are several interesting problems with this model, however. First, as Table 9 shows, there are not three taife, but six; the model does not account for all the tribe's taife. Second, roughly 20 percent of all tribesmen are not members of any Komachi taife at all; the model does not begin to account for them. Third, while there has been relatively more intermarriage between the taife in the most recent adult generations, the most comprehensive tribal genealogies I was able to construct suggest that the taife are not really very pichide (see Appendix

TABLE 10
TAIFE MEMBERSHIP: MALES AND FEMALES

Taife Name	Men	Women	Total
Mohammedi	19	14	33
Sanjeri	15	11	26
Abrahimi	12	19	31
Hassankhani	9	7	16
Emiri	6	1	7
Haffezi	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>11</u>
Subtotal	64	60	124
<u>Others:</u>			
A (Taj Ali)	4	2	6
B (Qed Ali)	1	5	6
C (Xabar)	2	2	4
D (Katkhoda)	2	2	4
E (Sefiq Ali)	2	1	3
F (Behzadi)	2	1	3
G (Meshe Darvish)	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
Subtotal	15	13	28
Total	79	73	152

TABLE 11
ORIGIN OF WIVES BY PATRONYMIC GROUP

Wife Givers	Wife Takers							Total Women
	Ab	Mo	Sa	Hs	Hf	Em	Other	
Abrahimi	5	4	4	3	0	1	2	19
Mohammedi	1	8	1	1	1	1	1	14
Sanjeri	1	3	8	0	0	0	1	13
Hassankhani	1	0	0	1	0	2	2	6
Haffezi	1	2	0	0	1	0	4	8
Emiri	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
Other	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>19</u>
Total Men	14	18	14	7	3	6	19	81

for genealogies).

In essence, the Komachi model of their tribe as a collection of pichide taife does not adequately describe social reality. It is an image of the tribe rather than a description of it. Further, it is an image--an ideology--of the tribe that implies far more order and a far more regular structure than actually exists. I suggest that this image is part and parcel of the ideology of 'tribe as a community of kin' and of the unity of kinship. The ordered, regular, and unified relations that this ideology implies stand in opposition to the actual disorder of the Komachi system. By ignoring the actual diversity of the tribe's members, by implying that there is a common bond between all members of the tribe--either affinity or agnation--this ideology helps mystify the

actual nature of the Komachi social order. The tribe appears to the Komachi as a tribe, a set of taife, a unit based on kinship rather than an unstable class structure.

CHAPTER 7

CAMPS AND CAMP COMPOSITION

Camps are the major social unit beyond the household in Komachi society and, in general, are the locus of most day-to-day social and economic activity. In addition, camps are almost microcosms of the tribe, social units whose composition and organization strongly reflect the conjunction of basic structural features of the Komachi social order: private property, independent households, significant differences in wealth, wage labor, and kinship as the idiom of social unity. The patterns and processes which control camp formation, the social relations within camps, and the relations that hold between members of different camps are thus central to understanding Komachi social organization.

Camp Structure

A camp is a group of households centered about one man, the head of camp, sar esham, and bound together by their ties to him. Heads of camps are wealthy and important men. They are, in general, far wealthier than other Komachi and thus much wealthier than their neighbors, ham soye. For example, in 1974-75 the main body of the Komachi tribe owned 9,300 head of goats and sheep.¹ The 13 heads of camp owned 3,980 animals, 42.7 percent of the total holdings. The average herd of a head of

¹See Tables 14 and 15 in the Appendix for raw data on this material.

of camp was 306 head, while members of the remaining 60 households owned an average of 89.1 animals. In addition, 7 of the 13 heads of camp owned more than 40 percent of their camp's animals and the head of camp owned at least 30 percent of the camp's animals in all but 4 cases. As a result of their wealth, heads of camp are prominent men in the tribe and dominant men in their own camp.

When referring to a particular group of tents the Komachi will speak of it as "esham Asghar" or "esham Kuchek," Asghar's camp or Kuchek's camp. The position of the head is also apparent in the physical organization of the camp. A camp's tents are almost always pitched in a line that is as straight as the terrain will allow. All tents face in one direction and the head of camp has his tent pitched at one of the ends of the line. The head of the line is wherever the head pitches his tent. In practice, the head generally pitches his tent at the end of camp which is nearest to the camp's common approach. Visitors to a camp are invited into the head's tent and, unless they are on their way to visit a specific household, they will enter his tent first. Rarely, heads of camp will have their tents pitched in a place other than the head of the line. For instance, in Asghar's camp the tent at the head of the line belongs to his WZH, Nawd Ali. Asghar's tent is always second in line. The Komachi said, with much laughter, that Asghar wanted to be at the head of the line and that frequently, when the camp was repitched, he tried to place his tent there. However, Nawd Ali always waited until Asghar pitched his tent and then placed his own tent at the end of the line. Nawd Ali did this because he was older, bozorgtar, and he felt that he deserved the deference. Asghar was, however, much wealthier than

Nawd Ali and, though the latter was able to pitch his tent at the head of the line, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that the camp was Asghar's.

Since camps are built about their heads, a camp exists--at least as a named unit--for as long as the head of camp is alive or active. The actual composition of the camp does, of course, change but the changes tend to be gradual rather than rapid and camps are coherent units for some time. In fact, a strong and dominant head of camp may so leave his mark on it that he remains the focal point for it well after his death.²

Generally, the core of a camp is its head and his hired shepherds, men who are joined to the head by contractual ties.³ As employees they have no choice but to camp where the head wishes to camp, to move when he wishes to move, and to herd their animals where he wishes to herd his. In a conflict, the employer always has the last word.

Shepherds are rarely close kin with their employers and are never, in my observation, close agnatic kin. In addition, the contractual tie of employer/shepherd seems to supercede any kinship tie between them so that men who are linked to the head of camp by both kinship ties and contractual ties are treated as employees before kinsmen.

²There are at least two camps which exemplify this situation. In the case of one, camp 11, the head had been dead for nearly five years when I arrived. His three sons lived in the camp along with their mother. The oldest son was the nominal head of camp. Still, the three brothers were always referred to as "bache Darvish," Darvish's children, and the remainder of the camp composition makes sense only when one remembers who Darvish was. This is also true, though to a lesser extent, for Camp 12.

³See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of this relationship.

The remaining households which are not bound to the head by contractual ties are generally bound to him through kinship. Excluding shepherds, one almost never finds households living among neighbors with whom they have no close kinship ties.⁴ Households which are not joined to the head directly by being his close kin are then likely to be linked through either kinship ties to the head's close kin or through kinship ties with his hired shepherds.

Given the differences in wealth between the head of camp and his neighbors, the relations between them tend to be asymmetrical. The asymmetry is institutionalized in a set of low-level patron-client relationships between the head and his neighbors. These relationships entail a series of delayed exchanges of goods and services. In general, the head of camp contributes what might be characterized as tangible and intangible services in return for direct economic benefits.

For example, heads of camp act as their shepherds' financial agents, taraf, extending them credit in cash (beyond their salary) and kind throughout the year; in return they market the shepherds' pastoral products. While heads of camp do not charge interest on these advances, they often make a handy profit on the goods--especially wheat, barley, tea, and sugar. They do this by selling them to the shepherds at their market price at time of transfer rather than their cost at time of purchase. For instance, Asghar, a head of camp, sold his camelherd wheat at 5-1/2 tomans a man (3 kg) that he had purchased months earlier for just over 3 tomans a man. With regard to the purchase of pastoral

⁴Interestingly enough, three individuals who are living without any close kin are heads of camp. In each case they live only with employees or kin of employees.

products, however, heads of camp give shepherds a better deal than they might otherwise get; they do buy products at near fair market price.⁵

Heads of camp act as suppliers of materials--generally wheat, barley, tea, and sugar again--to other camp members as well; here too heads will often make some profit by making an initial cash outlay for an item and then reselling it at a higher price later. Heads of camp also advance funds for the costs of migration, purchase of water or stubble, and paying a shepherd or camelherd's salary; they make no profit on these latter transactions, however. This advance of capital is a service that is expected of a head of camp; he is also expected to try to help transport poorer members of camp to town to see a doctor, to advance funds for medical treatment if it is necessary, to help finance their weddings and circumcisions, to act as a biased honest broker in their disputes or marriage negotiations, and generally, whenever necessary, to act as the intermediary between his poor unsophisticated neighbors and the outside world. In this latter role the head of camp occupies a semi-official position: in most Komachi camps the head holds all the camp members' government identity cards, health cards, and the like and is therefore the person contacted by government agencies concerned with individual tribal members.

Heads of camp receive no direct compensation for their

⁵In part the head of camp's 'profit' stemmed from the constant inflationary spiral that existed during the period I was in Iran; prices always rose with time. In addition, though, heads of camp took advantage of seasonal availability of material and the concomitant price variation. I should note that at least once I saw a camp head lose money when he bought an animal from his shepherd and the government then cut the price of meat.

patronage services. They do what they do because neighbors are supposed to "help" each other. By the same token, "help" between neighbors also includes assistance in important areas of pastoral production and, as I suggested in Chapter 2, it is heads of camp and other wealthy Komachi who are the major recipients of this assistance.

In sum, with regard to patron/client relations, the rest of the camp derives benefits from the head's ability to make large capital outlays and from his willingness to lend his support to their causes. The head's benefits are primarily financial: profits on his transactions with his neighbors and uncompensated productive labor. The head is able to use his wealth to generate more wealth while his neighbors derive their benefit from the indirect use of his wealth and position. Although both sides benefit from the arrangement, it seems that the greater tangible benefit goes to the head of camp.

Camp Composition

Camps are clusters of individual households linked together by their common ties to the head. They also often share more direct ties as well. As a result, Komachi camps are complex social units--they are not, for example, minimal lineage segments or agnatic clusters--and constituent households are instead linked to the head of camp, and each other, in numerous ways (see Tables 12 and 13 and diagrams of camp compositions in the Appendix). There are, however, several patterns of co-residence which appear to have some bearing on camp composition and thus deserve mention.⁶

⁶The Komachi have no clear or expressed residential preference; residence with one set of parents or the other is, however, expected.

TABLE 12
 CAMPS: CLUSTERS OF KIN

Camp #	Head's Cluster	Other Clusters
1	head + no kin HH 1	widow + 3 married D//man + married son HH 6 2, 5, 8 4 5
2	head + WM + WB + 2 married D HH 9 11 10, 39	none
3	head + Z + M + MB + MBD HH 12 14 13 15 17	none
4	head + no kin HH 18	man + WM, unmarried D 19 50
5	head + Z + 2 married D + 2ZS + FBS HH 20 27 21, 25 25, 24 21	2 sisters 22, 23
6	head + WF + WZ + 1/2B + 2MBS HH 29 30 28 35 32, 34	2 brothers + sister, widowed mother 31, 33 35
7	head + married S HH 36 40	none

TABLE 12--continued

Camp #	Head's Cluster	Other Clusters
8	head + M, 2 unmarried B + B HH 42 44 43	none
9	head + no kin HH 46	widow + married D + married Z 48 49 47
10	head + WZ + married D (+ part-time WM + WB) HH 51 53 52	none
11	head + M + 2B + MBS + 3MBD HH 54 58 56,60 59 60, 59, 62 + MB widow, unmarried children 61	none
12	head, widowed mother + MB + 2MBS HH 65 66 67, 69	man + (married Z) + 2 married D 70 66 67, 68
13	head + 2 married D HH 71 72, 73	none

NOTE: Household numbers (e.g., HH 65) are uniform throughout dissertation; these numbers thus cross-reference with those on tables and figures in Appendix.

Where household numbers are duplicated above (e.g., HH 21 in Camp 5), members of that household stand in a dual relation to the head of household or other camp members. All cases of co-residence refer to individuals maintaining independent residences in their own tents.

TABLE 13
SUMMARY OF CLUSTERS OF KIN

	Bros	Sis	Bro/Sis	Par/Son	M/Son	Par/D	M/D
Number of sets of co-resident	5	10	7	3	7	12	7
Number of potential sets of co-resident	17	19	22	8	11	15	16
% of potential sets actually co-resident	29.4	52.6	31.8	37.5	63.6	80.0	43.8

First, as Table 12 shows, there is a general tendency for brothers to live in different camps. Second, by contrast, there is a greater tendency for sisters to live together in the same camp. Third, daughters are much more likely to live in the same camp as their parents (if both parents are living) than sons are, while widows seem to live in their sons' camps somewhat more frequently than in their daughters' camps.

These patterns of co-residence are reflected in the clusters of kin from which camps are formed. For instance, with regard to the clusters directly related to heads of camps, the most frequent clusters involve heads and their married daughters (Camps 2, 5, 10, 13), heads and their mothers and mothers' kin (Camps 3, 11, 12), and heads and their wives' kin (Camps 2, 6, 10). With regard to this last point it seems important to note that Camps 11 and 12, in which the cluster comprises the head and his mother's kin, are camps whose focus, or raison d'être, still seems to be the deceased former head of camp (see p. 196). At one time, then, these camps too were centered about a cluster of the head and his wife's kin. Thus, in a sense, the predominant clusters are heads and their married daughters and heads and their wives' kin. With regard to clusters not directly related to heads of camp, there are four clusters of sisters (Camps 1, 5, 9, 12) which appear to be the outstanding pattern.⁷

There seems to be no simple or inclusive explanation which will

⁷In one of these cases (Camp 1) the sisters live with their widowed mother, while in a second case (Camp 9) one of the sisters is widowed and also has a married daughter living in camp with her. This suggests that perhaps the mother/daughter bond should not be ignored here.

account for patterns of co-resident kin in the clusters. However, there are several points that appear to bear on the problem.

1. Brothers tend not to live in the same camp. One fact that seems important here is that this is particularly true when at least one of the brothers is head of camp: of the eight sets of brothers that include a head of camp, only two sets (Camps 8, 11) live together. A reason for this seems to be that when one brother is head of camp then his brothers are likely to head their own camps. For example, there are three cases in which two brothers both head their own camp (Camps 1 and 4, 6 and 9, and 10 and 13) and one case in which both brothers were heads of camp before the older brother, now in his eighties, relinquished his position.

In this vein it is interesting to note the relations between heads of camps. As Figure 14 shows, the heads of Camps 1, 3, 4, and 5 are FBSs; their fathers, now either dead or retired, were also heads of camps as is their FB (Camp 7). Similarly, the heads of Camps 11 and 12 are sons of brothers who were heads of those camps and the present head of Camp 9 inherited his position from his father. Finally, it is interesting to note that two heads of Komachi camps not in the intensive sample are brothers and sons of a head of camp while a third is the third brother of the heads of Camps 10 and 13. Thus, while the sample is too small to make any definitive statement, it seems quite likely that where one man is a head of camp his brother(s) will be as well and further that they will have inherited their position from their fathers.⁸ This then

⁸Based on rather sketchy evidence the process appears to be as follows. A wealthy and important head of camp settles on his first son a rather substantial inheritance. After some time the son's herds are so




Figure 14. Relations between Heads of Camps

appears to be one reason brothers do not reside in the same camp.

This explanation does not, of course, explain why men who are not heads of camp also do not live with their brothers. However, in this regard it is interesting to note that, in three cases in which neither brother is head of his own camp, at least one brother lives in a camp which is headed by his wife's father. In addition, in two cases in which one brother is head of camp, the brothers who do not head their own camps live in camps headed by their fathers-in-law--men who are both older and more important in tribal affairs than their own brothers. Thus a second reason that brothers do not live together may well be that it is more advantageous to live in a camp headed by one's wife's father than a camp

large that he moves from his father's camp and establishes his own, often accompanied only by hired shepherds. His younger brother stays with his father and ultimately inherits his camp. On the father's death there seems likely to be some rearrangement of personnel in the sons' camps, specifically, members of what had been the father's camp moving to the camp of the older (and generally more important) brother.

headed by a man who is a more distant relation on one's own side.

2. The most frequent ties found in clusters join daughters with their parents, sisters, and heads of camps with their wives' kin. There are, it seems, two ways to look at these facts: they can either be seen as an epiphenomenal effect of the fact that brothers do not live together; or they can be seen as the result of a positive inclination for women to live together. I believe that the latter view has greater merit for two reasons. First, it would help explain why men who are not heads of camp still frequently live with their wife's kin: they do so because there are positive reasons for their wives to wish to live with their own kin. Second, and far more importantly, the nature of camp social life and camp economic activity seems to put a greater premium on the coresidence of women rather than that of men.

A Komachi camp is the hub of pastoral production: it is within the confines of the camp that young animals are cared for during the day and sheltered during the night; it is in the camps too that these young animals are united with their mothers, one by one, for their feedings; female animals are milked in camp; animals are sheared in camp; and all preparation of dairy products--yoghurt, clarified butter, kashk--takes place within the camp (see pp. 36-38). Virtually all of these activities except shearing--and the actual herding done by shepherds--are women's work.

Women care for newborn animals, they unite them with their mothers (indeed in my camp they knew the match-up of kids and lambs with their mothers better than did their husbands), they milk them, they prepare the dairy products from the milk, and, in addition, they get the

water and firewood that is needed for animal care and dairy production. They do all this in addition to other everyday tasks like caring for children and preparing food.

While the women of each household are ultimately responsible for filling its productive needs, there is in fact considerable cooperation between households. This cooperation is informally organized: women help each other because "neighbors should help each other." I have already pointed out (Chapter 2) that much of the flow of assistance between households is uni-directional, flowing from poorer households to wealthier ones: in effect, households with greater labor demands draw labor from households which have some surplus of labor. However, there is additional cooperation between women as well.

For instance, in Shir Ali's camp, his two oldest daughters--married and living in his camp--both gave birth to their first children in early spring. Shir Ali's wife, in spite of the already enormous workload of running dairy production for a flock of 840 animals, was able to render considerable assistance to her daughters: she had her younger daughters help with animal care, help prepare dairy products, get firewood, and bring water for their elder sisters. In addition, when the husband of the oldest daughter was away from camp, which he frequently was, one of the younger daughters lived with her older sister protecting her from "being alone." The daughters, for their part, often helped their mother with such tedious, though not strenuous, activities as preparing kashk.

The situation was somewhat reversed in another camp in which an older woman, the apparent victim of a stroke, was incapable of vigorously

carrying out her work and was therefore being helped with it by her two married daughters living in the same camp.⁹

Even in situations which are not as dramatic as this there is considerable cooperation and assistance. Women do work for other women: they help one another with pastoral production, they help prepare food--especially for ceremonial meals or when a guest comes; they often bake bread together or work together to make a large pot of ash, a thick soup. Indeed, for several activities, notably getting water and gathering firewood, women are culturally constrained to have other women along for company if not assistance: it is improper and unseemly for a woman--particularly a young woman--to leave camp alone; since getting either firewood or water almost always involves leaving the camp area, and is generally the task of younger women, these are almost always group activities.¹⁰

Given the need for cooperation in pastoral production among women, it is not at all surprising that Komachi women prefer to live among those women with whom they are likely to work best and most easily, their mothers and sisters: women they have worked with all their lives, women whose techniques and habits are comfortable and familiar.

⁹The situation was quite interesting for a third daughter, still at home, wished to get married but the mother refused to give permission, saying she had too much work and needed her assistance. The older sisters joined the argument, vigorously supporting their mother. They argued that the burden on them would increase greatly if their sister married and left her parents' tent. When I left, in spite of great pressure from the prospective groom, no immediate marriage was in the offing.

¹⁰To the Komachi, more than modesty is involved. They also believe that there is a real danger that young women off alone will become possessed by "fairies" and become insane. Modesty is nonetheless a dominant concern in these situations.

Similarly, it is not surprising that they find cooperation in areas like food production or child care to be easier with mothers and sisters than with others.¹¹

In addition, camps are relatively isolated social units. This is particularly true during the winter months--the time of peak pastoral production--when camps are frequently miles apart. Although men may spend a good deal of time off visiting other camps or going off to the city, women only rarely leave their 'home' camp.¹² For many women, then, the camp is their social universe. The women with whom she lives are the people a woman sees every day and they are the only people with whom she interacts freely. Under such circumstances women again prefer as their neighbors other women with whom they are completely familiar and comfortable, their mothers, daughters, and sisters.

Thus, to summarize this discussion of camp structure and composition, camps are residential units centered about a single wealthy man, the head of camp. The remaining members of camp are joined to him by either direct contractual ties (as his shepherd employees), direct kinship ties to him, or indirect ties to him through either his hired shepherds or his close kin. Most Komachi tend to reside with their kin; as a result there is a tendency for camps to appear as 'modular units'

¹¹Note that women of all classes need to work cooperatively. By contrast, wealthy men do not do any labor that requires cooperation. Instead, most of their cooperative ventures involve financial speculation and take place outside the camp, and often the tribe. There is thus no restriction on possible partners.

¹²It is not simply propriety that keeps women in their places; women's work is demanding and time consuming and must be done regularly. Women are therefore much more bound to camps by their work than are their husbands. Indeed, some of the men's work necessitates their moving from camp to camp or even outside the tribe.

composed of a few clusters of close kin. These clusters of close kin appear to be built about ties between women more frequently than they are built about ties between men. And, finally, it seems possible that it is the nature of camp social and economic activity which generates this pattern.

Cooperation and Relations within Camps

Komachi camps are, in almost all cases, coterminous with a herding group. All the animals owned by the camp's members are herded together. The animals themselves are the property of each individual household and all the labor involved in production is the responsibility of the household. Labor is not, in the strict sense, communal. There is, however, a great deal of cooperation among camp members. As I have suggested above, the great preponderance of the cooperation that does take place does so among women and, in addition, involves a uni-directional flow of assistance from poorer households to wealthier ones.

The rationale for giving assistance (or expecting it) is that people who live together in the same camp are hamsoye, neighbors, and are expected to help each other. In theory, the same principles which govern helping someone prepare a large meal for guests or for a festive occasion should govern the giving of assistance for other tasks as well. In practice the difference between the occasional assistance that is required to care for guests and the regular and uni-directional flow of assistance for production is not unnoticed and the demands for labor of wealthy families can be a cause for considerable friction within a camp. (See, for example, the account of Qadam and his wife in Chapter 2).

Camps appear to gain their cohesiveness from the cooperative

labor of womn, from their focus about the head, and also from cooperative effort and common interests. For example, camps move together as units during migration. In the spring this means that everyone travels together with their belongings and their flocks, packing and unpacking their camels every day that they move. In the fall the migration is now modern; the people pack their belongings in a truck and ride with their baggage down to the winter quarters. The herds go down well before the people and the other animals, donkeys, dogs, and miscellaneous goats and sheep are all all brought down together by a few members of the camp.

Camp members share the cost of migration. Each family pays the camelherd a share of his salary in proportion to the number of camels that they own; each family pays for the truck rental in an amount that is in proportion to the weight of their possessions.¹³

Camps are also cooperative units with regard to shepherding labor. The Komachi estimate that they need one shepherd to take care of every 200-300 animals. This is, in fact, an oversimplification. While it is true that one man can take care of a flock of 200-300 adult animals, the actual herding practices of the Komachi make it impossible for any one shepherd to care for a single household's herd whatever its size, for the animals are divided into separate flocks by age, sex, and breed (see pp. 46-47). Therefore the only efficient way to ensure that there are enough men working to cover all the camp's herds at all times of the year is for the pool of shepherding labor to be worked as a

¹³The head of camp often makes the actual cash outlay for these expenses; the poorer members of the camp then pay him back later--often in kind rather than in cash. This is one reason people prefer to live with wealthy camp heads.

cooperative unit. This cooperation at the camp-wide level works to the advantage of poorer herdowners.

Poorer herdowners with fewer than 200 animals cannot afford the full cost of a shepherd; they therefore combine into partnerships of several households to hire one shepherds. This shepherd cannot, of course, meet all their needs while they, in fact, cannot afford more help. Cooperation with the wealthy head of camp helps them out. The rich man always needs many shepherds to care for his different kinds of animals, so there is always a large pool of labor to be parceled out among the various herds. By sharing in the use of the wealthy man's shepherds the poorer member(s) of the camp need hire only one shepherd overall rather than one shepherd for each of their flocks. They are therefore able to tailor their needs to their minimum labor requirement--one shepherd per 200-300 animals--rather than their maximum labor needs--one shepherd for each of the different kinds of flock that exist simultaneously.

There are, then two formal levels of cooperation in the organization of herding labor: partnerships among poorer herdowners, or between poorer herdowners and wealthier ones,¹⁴ and camp-wide cooperation to distribute the labor of the camp efficiently over the various flocks during the annual cycle. There is, in addition, a third level of cooperation, but this is an informal one among the shepherds themselves. By

¹⁴Wealthy herdowners often enter into partnerships with poorer ones; it is to the wealthy man's advantage if he had too many animals for his shepherds but not quite enough to warrant hiring another 'full' one. The poorer partner reaps the advantages outlined above, gets a partner who can make cash advances, and probably has an easier time hiring a shepherd than he would on his own.

caring for the animals together they can arrange things so that a man who wishes to can take a few days off to visit someone, go to the city, or rest for part of the day and still have his herd covered by his fellow shepherds.

The social aspect of being neighbors is marked in formal ways as well. When a family kills an animal for a sacrifice, it formally distributes meat to all the other households in the camp. On special religious occasions, especially eid-e qorban (see p. 176), special food is prepared in many tents and members of the camp visit from tent to tent eating a bit of food at each one. Finally, during the early fall the Komachi sponsor a series of rozeh (see pp. 178-179). Although each rozeh is individually sponsored--the sponsor pays for the rozeh-xund (rozeh leader), slaughters an animal, and provides food for the evening meal--there is much cooperation in each camp and, as the rozeh-xund generally stays in one camp for several days, members of the camp tend to think of themselves as having "our rozehs." There was, in fact, a considerable element of inter-camp competition about rozehs. Each camp wanted to get the rozeh-xund first, to get the best rozeh-xund, and to have the biggest and best rozehs; the competition both creates and is a by-product of camp solidarity.

Thus Komachi camps are the site of rather intense social interaction and considerable cooperation; cooperation that, in general, is mutually beneficial. This cooperation and intense social interaction coupled with the pre-existent kinship ties discussed above, give camps coherence and a kind of solidarity or esprit de corps. At the same time, camps are also the scenes of divisive conflicts over labor between

shepherds and their employers. In this regard, too, they are microcosms of the tribe, units both drawn together and divided through the social interaction taking place within them.

Relations between Camps

Thus far this discussion of Komachi camps has focused on the composition and internal structure of camps and has largely ignored the question of relations between camps. These relations are, however, quite important, for they reveal a great deal about the overall structure of the Komachi tribe.

Komachi camps are formal social units with clearly defined boundaries. However, an examination of the relations among camps shows that they cannot be characterized as the relations of one formal unit to another: perhaps the only time that camps face each other as camps is in the division of pasture in the winter quarters. There camps have no fixed territory and access to pasture is on a first-come, first-served basis: if one camp arrives in an area first, then other camps recognize their right to the pasture and therefore camp elsewhere,

Beyond access to pasture in winter quarters there are no formal relations. Camps are autonomous units which do what they (or their heads) choose. There is no council or hierarchy of camps--there are indeed no formal councils of any kind--and no man has any authority or even legitimate voice in the affairs of another camp. Beneath this there is, however, a vast network of ties which join together the individual members of the different camps and it is on the level of these individual ties that important intercamp interactions are played out.

In this context, the most important ties are those involving

heads of camps; their personal relations with each other strongly color the likelihood and kind of interaction that will take place between their camps. For example, Camps 11 and 12 (see Appendix) were formerly led by two brothers Darvish and Yarbok (both recently deceased). The two men are described as having been "very close," Their camps did, and still do, camp near each other; there is a frequent flow of personnel between them; their members attend and give help at all of one another's public occasions and, occasionally, the camps merge into a single conglomerate unit. Because of the "closeness" of the two brothers, the two camps were (and are) cooperating, though separate, units.

Cooperation of this kind is unusual--that is probably why the Komachi comment on the closeness of the brothers--but less close and successful cooperation follows much the same patterns. Heads of camp who are close kin with each other and who are on good terms with each other will act in concert; their camps will tend to be near each other; there will be some flow of personnel between the camps; the members of the camps (or their heads) may join together in economic ventures and, quite frequently, the camps will migrate together (see pp. 183-185 for a fuller discussion of the relations between three heads of camp). Conversely, where there is some distance or strain between heads of camp, the camps are unlikely to be near each other, migrate together, or exchange personnel.¹⁵ Whatever ties exist between members of camps whose leaders are not close are purely personal and divorced from the camp

¹⁵Under the best of circumstances change of personnel--particularly shepherds--can cause considerable tension. Where camp heads are not close it is roughly parallel to an act of aggression between nations (see Chapter 2 and 5).

context.¹⁶

Relations between camps thus reflect the relations between their leaders; it is from ties on this informal level that whatever political structure the tribe has begins to emerge. Heads of camps are patrons to their neighbors and are linked in networks of relations with other heads of camps. The relations between heads of camp are uneven; some men are older, some are wealthier, and some are wiser. Some men stand out among their colleagues and thus have more influence than others.¹⁷ These heads of camp then emerge as the central points in networks of heads of camp. Still, these networks are not formalized and even the wealthiest and most important man's position is nebulous and weak with no real control over his fellow heads of camp. In essence, the relations between camps are governed by the self-interest of their heads; the result is independence and autonomy verging on anarchy.

Camp Location

Before leaving this discussion of camps, there is one additional point which bears consideration: the question of the spatial distribution of camps, particularly in summer quarters¹⁸ (see Map 2).

¹⁶This does not imply that these ties are weaker than ties between members of closer camps--indeed, the whole thrust of this argument is that personal ties dominate all others--simply that they have nothing to do with camps or relations between them.

¹⁷I have deliberately stressed the term 'influence.' Komachi heads of camp have nothing resembling either authority or power (Fried); they have only a weak personal attribute that flourishes best with never exercised.

¹⁸The same general principles seem to underlie campsite selection in the winter quarters as well. In the garmsir, however, the Komachi are recent arrivals, their relations with locals less cordial, and, as conditions are less settled and there is more open territory, actual patterns of camp locations are less clear. Still, here too relations with local important men seem a dominant factor (see Chapter 1).

The Komachi summer quarters are located in a small narrow valley which runs east to west about 100 km south of Kerman city. The floor of the valley--the area suitable for irrigation agriculture--was traditionally (i.e., prior to land reform) owned by a family from the nearby large town of Qaryeit-al-arab and, indeed, they still seem to control the bulk of this property today. On a local level these landowners are extremely wealthy and powerful.

With the valley floor in the hands of relatively powerful landholders, the Komachi camp in the foothills above and behind the irrigation ditches which mark the limit of agriculture. Within these confines, the actual locations of campsites are selected by the heads of camps. Their choice of location apparently arises from their relations with the wealthy landowners who control the valley floor or their local agents.

For example, the Abrahimi family has intermarried with the family of the Katkhoda of Shirinak (see p. 31 and p. 139). The now-deceased Katkhoda was himself a member of a collateral branch of the major landholding family in the area and owned, by local standards, a good deal of property in his own right. He was locally quite important even though his power came more from his relationship with the major landowners than from his own wealth.

The Katkhoda, a non-tribal man, married an Abrahimi woman. His oldest daughter married an Abrahimi man; somewhat later two of her brothers came to live with her in her husband's camp. These men became 'tribesmen,' married Abrahimi women, and today they head their own camps. Their youngest brother remained settled and has now replaced his father as katkhoda. Not surprisingly the two brothers and their sister's




Figure 15. Relations of Camp Heads and Locations of Camps in the Vicinity of the Village of Shirinak

husband camp near the village of Shirinak. They are joined in that vicinity by three other camps led by Abrahimi men who are brothers-in-law to the katkhoda's sons.¹⁹

The heads of these camps thus have very close ties to local leaders and they camp near where they have ties. They also have ties to the ultimate sources of power in the area, the wealthy landowners. Indeed, while only the Abrahimi camp heads have close and direct ties to local leaders, almost all camp heads have loose patron/client ties with the landowners from Qaryeit-al-arab; they also camp near their patron's property. At present, the benefits of these relationships are largely economic. In the past, however, the customary relationship seems to have been, for both sides, a protective arrangement: in unsettled times the tribe offered some additional protection for the landholders'

¹⁹One should note that these are men whose fathers were close enough to the katkhoda to marry their daughters to his sons. It is not surprising, therefore, that their sons have maintained their close ties with Shirinak.

property and the nomads' relations with the landholders gave them a quasi-official right to use pastures in a particular area. Short of situations in which direct force was involved (which seem to have been rare in this area), a long-standing and mutually profitable relationship with a powerful landlord greatly strengthened one's position in any struggle for pasture. Men thus located their camps near fixed areas and, although this older reason for camping patterns now has little value, men still place their camps where they have good ties.²⁰

Thus, even as asymmetrical relations between camp heads and poorer tribesmen have a strong influence on individuals' choices of residence, the same kinds of relations between camp heads and wealthy landlords seem to determine where actual camps will be located. Here too, then, the importance of heads of camps in determining what happens in and about Komachi camps is underscored.

²⁰In face of serious internal disputes, the Komachi still turn to these patrons for support. Also, the long-standing relationship is probably a comfort when sheep stray into crops; it may make the dispute easier to settle.

CHAPTER 8

THE KOMACHI SOCIAL FORMATION IN DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE

Up to this point I have presented a largely synchronic description of Komachi society. However, a diachronic view is important, for it reveals reasons for assuming that the Komachi are an unstable formation at the same time that it allows us to relate social and economic processes within the social order to its apparent structural instability. This chapter is, therefore, focused on these points.

The Komachi as an Unstable Social Formation

By their own account, the Komachi were named Komachi by the governor of Kerman province about the turn of this century. They also claim to have arisen as a tribe through the intermarriage of three patronymic groups which claim widely divergent geographical origins. There is precious little historical evidence which either confirms or challenges this view. Sir Percy Sykes reports passing through the areas near the towns of Sirjan, Baft, and Sardu and records the names of tribes in the area; the name Komachi does not appear, nor does Sykes report seeing nomads when he passed through Shirinak and its environs. He does, however, confirm that the governor of the province did indeed have a summer retreat in the mountains above Lalezar (i.e., where the Komachi say they got their name). By contrast, Field (1939:235) mentions both the Komachi and several of their neighboring tribes in his 1939 listing of "The Peoples of Iran." Field, who appears to have taken many

of his figures for Kermani tribes (but not those for the Komachi) from Sykes, lists the Komachi as having ten households. While this figure seems rather low, the fact that he records such a figure for them (and that Sykes does not mention them at all) suggests that they were probably a very small tribe not all that many years ago. This is also the view of many older men in the tribe. One, a man in his eighties, told me that when he was young there were far fewer Komachi than there are today; a second old man, a member of a neighboring tribe, insisted that in the past there were "only four flocks in the valley while there are now herds everywhere." Thus, while it is meager, what evidence there is is consistent: the Komachi--as a named tribal group--are of recent origin and have grown to their present size from even more modest beginnings.

The fact that the Komachi emerged as a tribe within the last eighty years suggests tribal formation and dissolution is an on-going process--even today in the Middle East. The same old man who recounted how few Komachi there were when he was young also recited a list of tribes that had been the Komachi's neighbors at that time. Of most of them he said, "gozasht, raft, tamum shod," passed, gone, finished. In a similar vein, a man named Omid Ali Emiri, I was told by everyone, entered the Komachi tribe from outside it; he came, people agreed, from a tribe called Kuchimi. (Sykes and Field--I believe after Sykes--list the Kuchimi as a tribe near Sardu having 100 families.) When I asked his oldest living son (a man in his early seventies) where the Kuchimi, his father's kin, are now, he said, "They are no longer a taife; they are split up among many other tribes." Other Komachi confirmed his answer.

If the Komachi have appeared and the Kuchimi and other tribes

have disappeared, there are other reasons to assume that the population of Kermani tribes is not stable. As I showed above (p. 147), over 36 percent of the male heads of (what are now) Komachi households have entered the tribe from outside or are sons of men who entered the tribe from outside. If figures for other tribes are comparable, then it seems hard to doubt that Kermani tribes are unstable. If that is so, the next question that must be faced is the causes of that instability.¹

Contradiction and the Instability of the Komachi Social Order

In addition to the historical and ethnohistorical reasons for viewing the Komachi to be an unstable social system, there is structural evidence which suggests instability as well. Primarily, this involves the contradictory nature of several important structures of the Komachi social order.

Perhaps the basic contradiction in the Komachi social order is the dualistic nature of property. On the one hand pasture and water are communally held. They do not belong to the tribe, but the tribe has usufructory rights over them; all members of the tribe, in principle, have equal access to these resources. To be member of the tribe is to have access to them. On the other hand, however, there is private property as well. Animals belong to individual nuclear family households and are controlled by the male heads of those households. Private

¹Perhaps some additional support for this view can be drawn from the fact that both Field and Sykes cite numerous Kermani tribes whose total population (according to their figures) are less than 50 households. Note that the very small size of these tribes and their concomitant lack of political import is a partial reason for the sketchy reporting on them.

ownership of animals--also means of production--in essence negates communal access to pasture and water. Since only animals can convert pasture and water to usable commodities, then private ownership--and hence the potential for significant variation in wealth--clearly implies the potential for unequal access to resources, the antithesis of communal ownership of the means of production.

Thus hired shepherds in the Komachi tribe are men who are alienated from access to (sufficient quantities of) the means of production and who work on contracts which place the surplus value of their labor into the hands of their employers.

The use of hired shepherds, and the conditions of their employment, mark the existence within the Komachi social order of what is in essence a capitalist mode of production. At the same time, however, ownership of the means of production (pasture and water) is in part communal and based on kinship; even access to those means of production which are privately held (animals) is based in some part on kinship, i.e., inheritance. These relations of production based on kinship are characteristic of non-capitalist domestic or tribal modes of production. Thus it seems that there are two modes of production--capitalist and tribal--within the Komachi social formation. It also appears that these two modes of production are contradictory: one assumes private property, unequal access to the means of production, expropriation of surplus value, and ultimately social and economic inequality; the other assumes communal property, equal access to resources (and product) and social and economic identity.²

²See Terray (1972:136-163), following Althusser, for a discussion

These contradictions are reflected in several areas of the Komachi social order. For example, economic differentiation is, to some extent, obscured by the ideology of unity and community through kinship. The Komachi claim to be all one, all kin. Komachi marriage patterns, however, give the lie to this broad claim of kin-based unity. The Komachi prefer to marry close kin--first cousins--and the results of these marriages are the antithesis of spreading kin ties throughout the tribe. There are instead concentrations of ties around particular social loci; conspicuously, the concentration of ties is isomorphic with concentrations of wealth. Marriages take place among cousins, marriages take place within classes; further, the vast majority of real cousin marriages take place within the economic elite of the tribe. Far from being a means of holding or bringing together the disparate elements of the tribe, kinship--in the shape of marriage--perpetuates the separation of the wealthy and the poor, of those who will be tied by kin and those who will be attached by contract.

Interestingly, the very mechanism for this, the marriage system, reflects this situation. While it is true that the major rule of the Komachi marriage system is a preference for close cousin marriage, the most important secondary rule--the antigamous marriage rule--prohibits repetitious marriages between siblings sets. The close cousin preference concentrates ties; the antigamous marriage rule promotes their dispersal. This latter rule is, however, by its very nature far less effective at spreading ties through the tribe than the cousin marriage

of the implications of the existence of two modes of production within a single social formation. More detailed examinations can be found in Marx's analyses of the rise of capitalism.

rule is at concentrating them. The rules thus reflect the reality of the Komachi social order, an ideology of unity and dispersed ties while ultimately, through praxis, the concentration of wealth and kin ties continues to divide the tribe. Marriage with close kin leads to the development of dense overlapping ego-centric networks, in which individuals are linked to each other by multiplex ties. These networks are formed and perpetuated by endogamous (close cousin) marriage and the structural logic of the system strains towards turning in on itself, developing ever more ties within and fewer without--becoming encysted. (see Murphy and Kasden, 1959, 1967). Marriage with close kin concentrates affinal ties within a circumscribed ego-centric radius. The proscription of repetitious marriages has a diametrically opposite effect: it limits the number of marriages that can occur in any social locus and thus promotes the dispersal of marriage ties.

However, the antigamous marriage rule is a relative, not an absolute rule. That is, its determination of whom one may marry or may not marry is always predicated on the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a previous marriage. One is never a priori eliminated by virtue of membership in any given group or category (in contrast to true exogamy); they are instead eliminated as the result of particular events having taken place.

Concomitantly this rule does not lead to the absolute dispersal or distribution of marriage ties; it cannot establish marriage classes or moieties; it only establishes that, if A has married B, then A's sister may not marry B's brother. The marriage must be dispersed from that locus (relatively) but there is no further stipulation of where it must take place.

With a large enough group of kin, the number of potential endogamous marriages becomes quite large and the antigamous marriage rule will no longer do more than promote the distribution of some marriages; it will not result in the dispersal of marriages throughout the tribe. Instead, segmentation is likely to increase; the normal encysting character of endogamous marriage is likely to emerge as the dominant principle in the marriage system; ties will therefore become dense within groups but relatively infrequent between them; and the antigamous marriage rule--because it is relative--is unlikely to effectively counter this trend. It is less effective than the preferential close cousin marriage rule.

The dominant area in which the two modes of production are reflected is in the dichotomy between relations of production based on kinship--access to means of production, use of household labor, uncompensated labor of kinsmen--and relations of production based on contract--the use of hired shepherds.

In the Komachi context, kin and contract appear to be antithetical. Kinsmen give to each other and share among one another without calculation and without expectation of a quid pro quo; contractual relations are, by definition, statements of a quid pro quo. Further, in the Komachi case the contractual relationship is an exploitative one. The employer barely pays for the social cost of the shepherd's labor (i.e., what it costs the shepherd to reproduce himself); the shepherd does not receive the actual value of his labor. The employer is a mini-capitalist who appropriates the surplus value of the shepherd's labor. Bluntly put, the non-kin relations of production in Komachi society are systematically

skewed such that, in the contractual quid pro quo, the employer's quid is never equal to the shepherd's quo.

The dominant social relations of production in Komachi society are thus contradictory on two levels: there is the simple contradiction between kin and contract and the more specific contradiction between kinship and exploitative contract. The canons of kinship--the dominant social relations in Komachi society--are doubly violated: first by the stipulation of return and second by dealing unfairly and ungenerously with the shepherd.⁴

The contradiction is manifest in the actual relations between employers and shepherds, particularly the tensions in those relations. Those tensions are palliated by the process of negotiating new contracts, by the movement of shepherd from employer to employer, and, incredibly, by stressing the unity of the employer and shepherd as kinsmen during the contract negotiations. But, while these mechanisms may reduce the tensions between employer and employee, they do not resolve the problem (and indeed may exacerbate it). Shepherds are still exploited and they know it. The basic tension between employer and shepherd, the contradiction between kinship and contract, is irresolvable as long as men are consistently on one side of the boundary or the other. Although shepherds are always identified as, claimed to be, and reminded that they are kin, they are not treated that way.

As a result, the tensions between employers and shepherds never disappear. The kinship between shepherds and employers is stressed to

⁴Note that Komachi shepherding contracts are particularly exploitative compared with other Persian tribes. See, e.g., Irons, Salzman, Tapper.

reduce conflict arising from exploitation. Exploitation continues as kinsman exploiting kinsman in violation of what both explicitly recognize to be their mutual obligations. Similarly, when a shepherd moves in the face of built-up tension in his relationship with his employer, the result palliates but does not resolve the contradiction of being a hired employee in a community of kin, at the cost of creating friction between employers. Only if a shepherd becomes an employer does this exploitation cease.

The tensions which arise between employers over the negotiation of shepherding contracts are paralleled by far more serious competition between households over procuring spouses for their children. Given this competition, marriages, the very events which create kinship ties--the dominant links between individuals in Komachi society--frequently occur under conditions which seem to generate more friction and social division than they do alliances.

The competition over spouses and between employers highlights the autonomy of Komachi households and the atomism that is characteristic of the social order. These features contribute to the ultimate instability of the social system.

A Diachronic Model of the Komachi Social Formation

The unstable nature of the Komachi social system is best revealed by examining it in a diachronic perspective. In the absence of any substantial historical data, I have based this model largely on ethnographic and ethnohistorical material. The model that results is clearly somewhat speculative. However, this material suggests that tribes like the Komachi pass through a relatively short developmental

cycle of formation, growth through agglomeration, and dissolution which lasts roughly 100 years. The following appears to be the manner in which the cycle unfolds.

Tribes like the Komachi appear to begin with a core of several wealthy families, their hired shepherds, and some peripheral kin. A tribe in its earliest stages is no more than perhaps one or two camps joined together by very close ties between their leaders.

The camps establish themselves in an open area, perhaps by forming patron/client ties with wealthy landowners. If the proto-tribe is successful, sons will leave the first camps and establish their own camps exactly as they would have had they never left the old area.

The wealthy families marry among themselves; they also form marriage alliances with wealthy members of the new neighboring tribes and, to some extent, with the peripheral members of their old tribe who accompanied them. The out-marriages may result from the antigamous marriage rule, as well as from political necessity. Good alliances--with people of relatively equal wealth and status--will be remade in later marriages. New ties will also be made and new members will be drawn into the tribe as a result. Some will be drawn in as shepherds, on the bottom; others will be drawn in at the top (see pp. 147-148 for relative figures). Wealthy men from outside the tribe will, for a variety of reasons, attach themselves to the new tribe. They can be rapidly and fully integrated into the new tribe by making advantageous marriages for their children.

For instance, the children of the Katkhoda of Shirinak married three Abrahimi cousins and with one triple plug-in marriage were tied

into the very center of the Komachi tribe (see pp, 31, 139, and 217-218). Similarly, after Omid Ali Emiri entered the tribe--as a wealthy and important outsider--he was able to marry his daughter to Meshe Yarbok Mohammadi and thereby establish a close tie to one of the most important men in the last Komachi generation. The ties between Omid Ali's descendants and Yarbok's kin were augmented when Yarbok's oldest daughter married Omid Ali's grandson--a step marriage. Another of Omid Ali's sons, Nawd Ali (see p. 195), married the oldest daughter of an important Abrahimi man. In fact, Omid Ali's integration into the tribe was so successful that younger Komachi now cite him as one of the four 'founders' of the tribe.

As the 'core' of wealthy households grows, so does the periphery of poorer shepherd households. New shepherds are drawn into the tribe from outside. Finally, a number of independent households also emerge.

This model of early tribal development is derived from data I was fortunate enough to be able to collect concerning what I believe to be a case of new tribal development.

Roughly 25 years ago, Meshe Gholami Abrahimi moved his summer quarters from the vicinity of Shirinak to the environs of Jaffarabad, a village some 70 kilometers to the west. Both Meshe Gholami, who is a hale, hearty, though somewhat hard of hearing septuagenarian, and other Komachi old enough to know claim that the reason he moved to Jaffarabad was that he had an excellent opportunity to buy property--some gardens--in that area, that there was no foreseeable likelihood of a similar opportunity arising in the Shirinak region, and that the Jaffarabad area

was not occupied by other tribes.⁵ Meshe Gholami's garmsir is near the village of Kanu Bala and it is also some distance from other Komachi camps.

At the time of his arrival in Jaffarabad, Meshe Gholami was in his late forties or early fifties. He had many unmarried sons and daughters. His ability to buy land suggests that he was fairly wealthy then and the fact that now, in his seventies, having married off five sons, he still has over 300 animals strongly supports this supposition.

Gholami was accompanied in his move by two of his sisters, their husbands, and their children. It was a rather typical cluster of a wealthy man and his kin. The earliest marriages of Gholami's children were either with the main body of the Abrahimi or the sons and daughters of his sisters.

⁵Land has been available to the Komachi in the vicinity of Shirinak only once; then, during the unsettled times following World War II a small absentee landlord died and his family sold off his property. Most other property is owned by more important landlords who (with the exclusion of the land reform process) have shown no sign of wanting to sell, or of letting others buy, land. I believe that it was the unsettled political situation of the late 1940s which made wealthy landlords draw back from further land purchases, which allowed the Komachi to purchase land in Shirinak. I also believe that the relative openness of the Jaffarabad region resulted from its being in a very exposed position in very unsettled times. It is directly on the route that predatory tribes, notably the Buchaqchi, would have taken when they set out for a bit of brigandage. The period when Meshe Gholami established himself in that area--the late 1940s and early 1950s--was just the period when the Persian government began to reestablish control of the hinterland following the disruptions of World War II and the following struggles between the Shah and the Tudeh party and then the Shah and Mossadegh. Meshe Gholami's purchase was a gamble which paid off handsomely. (Later in this chapter I discuss the general relation of political conditions and the availability of land for tribal expansion in the Kerman region.)

While I was there, Gholami arranged marriages between his remaining children and members of neighboring tribes, particularly the Jebel Borzi. In one case, some years before I arrived, he broke off a marriage which had already been contracted between his daughter and one of his brothers' sons--who lived in the Shirinak vicinity--to marry the girl to a Jebel Borzi man. In short, Gholami was creating new sets of ties with his new neighbors rather than perpetuating ties with his old kinsmen. In all cases, the new households lived either in Meshe Gholami's camp or in the camp nominally headed by his son-in-law.

An interesting question is, what tribe do Gholami's camps belong to? At the time of my fieldwork the members of the camps considered themselves Komachi. Certainly the relations between the two sets of camps were cordial. However, there was very little intercourse between them. Some members of both groups, generally the closest kinsmen and the most mobile young men, visited back and forth on major social occasions: weddings, circumcisions, and important wedding negotiations. Otherwise, most people never visited and, in fact, during the formal visits for weddings and circumcisions, the visiting delegation often acted--and was treated--more like honored guests than close kin.

There have been few important marriages made between the two groups in recent years; in fact the strongest link between them is Meshe Gholami himself. In addition, I think it is important to note that the travel back and forth between the two groups is done on motorcycle, rented trucks, or jeeps, and so it only takes two or three wretchedly uncomfortable hours rather than the day or two it would have taken in the past.

In sum, simple physical distance is setting the two groups apart. They do not see each other frequently; they no longer intermarry regularly and each is going its own way.

Gholami's camps are a mixture of Komachi, Jebel Borzi, and Guderu households. The core is Komachi but a new mixed group is clearly emerging. I imagine that, all things being equal, the following process would take place.

The present process of accretion would continue; the core of the tribe would become more and more mixed as new members entered from the outside (although with so many sons Meshe Gholami's taife would be likely to continue to be identifiable). If in 50 or 60 years an anthropologist were to go to Jaffarabad he would, I suspect find a tribe--probably called the Gholami--that would only vaguely acknowledge any relation to the Komachi. The 'Gholami' would be a real tribe; they would claim ancient origin; and it would be impossible to trace the real relationship that existed between them and the Komachi, if the latter tribe still existed. In short, Gholami's camps are a new tribe on the way. The Komachi almost certainly developed the same way; what is happening in Jaffarabad is how Kermani tribes start.

If the tribes begin like Gholami's camps in Jaffarabad, they seem to grow in the manner in which the Komachi have grown in the last 30 to 40 years, through agglomeration and accretion. Newcomers enter the core of the tribe; men make strategic marriages. Poor shepherds also enter the tribe.

Tribes may grow in another fashion as well. The Komachi claim that their tribe arose when members of three smaller groups became

intertwined through marriage over time. Parts of separate older tribes may, through marriage, become closer to each other than they are to the members of their tribes of origin; they then form a new tribe or, if they have already separated, a new larger tribe from smaller parts.

Tribes thus grow by both agglomeration and accretion. In both cases new members are brought in from outside and they are bound to other members of the tribe by marriage. This process seems likely to be encouraged by the antigamous marriage rule.

Growth, however, creates its own problems. As the number of employers increases, new sources of shepherding labor must be found lest a shortage of labor develop. The source of new shepherds is clearly members of other tribes. Men are brought in as employees and they become members of the tribe. The tribe grows. However, if resources are limited, as they seem to be in summer quarters (see pp. 34-35), then there must be a limit to the tribe's potential for growth.

In addition, the active force which does bind the Komachi together is kinship. As the tribe grows, however, the 'logic' of the preferential marriage rule for endogamous marriage promotes encystment of kinship clusters: there is no broad distribution of ties throughout the tribe but clusters of concentrations of ties. Conflict between members of different clusters may be less effectively damped by 'common kinship' than conflict between individuals linked by many active ties.

In sum, the growth which is the key to resolving some contradictions within the Komachi system brings about its own set of problems. It is my belief that when Kermani tribes are faced with a situation in which growth is impossible, the internal contradictions become exacerbated;

tension both between employer and employee and between employers grows; and people begin leaving the system. The tribe dissolves into smaller groups and finally, like the Kuchumi, disappears.

Kermani tribes, then, appear to pass through a developmental phase of formation, growth, and dissolution. The three phases are of course related; the dissolution of one tribe sets the stage for the formation or growth of other tribes. Tribes like the Komachi are thus cyclic unstable entities. Their instability arises from a combination of their internal structure and external circumstances. These latter bear some consideration.

Some External Factors which Affect the Stability of Kermani Tribes

There are several sets of conditions, natural and historical, which appear to have had an important effect on the development of tribes like the Komachi. Of these, in many ways the most significant is the historical penetration of a capitalist market system into the Kerman area. As I indicated in my first chapter, there is reason to believe that this penetration occurred as long as 300 years ago. Further, it involved the direct penetration of western mercantile capitalism--in the body of the British East India Company--into the pastoral economy, specifically the market for Kermani kork. I think that it is safe to assume that it is this early and direct confrontation of capitalism with tribal economic systems which led to the development of tribal economies embodying two modes of production and is the basis of many of the structural contradictions and instabilities which mark tribes like the Komachi. This certainly seems to be the case with regard to the general withdrawal of wealth from the Komachi economy by the external market (see Chapter 1).

and the resultant economic pressure that this puts on households. This pressure impoverishes households creating the preconditions for the existence of a working class. Further, it may well be the pressure of the external market which causes employers to place exploitative demands on their employees, thus setting the stage for the serious conflicts which arise among them.

In this regard there are several aspects of the Kermani situation which appear to set it off somewhat from circumstances in other areas of Iran. First, while goats are the major herd animal in Kerman, they are not in many other regions of Iran--notably the Zagros Mountains. Hence, perhaps, there was less direct or later penetration of capitalism there than in Kerman. Second, while other tribal areas of Iran were in many cases contiguous with settled areas which were powerful outposts, or even centers, of the central government, this was not the case in Kerman. Perhaps as a result, there are no large or powerful tribal confederations with established political leaders and a more or less formal hierarchy. (See Garthwaite [1972] and Irons [1975] for discussions of the importance of state influence in the establishment of formalized tribal hierarchies.) This absence of tribal political leaders significantly changes the internal political economy of Kermani tribes compared with those in the Zagros region. There is no direct expropriation of product by tribal leaders under the guise of 'taxes,' nor is there any way to create politically--rather than economically--dependent labor. Finally, the area is much less fertile than the area occupied by the major tribal confederacies of western Iran and lacks the potential resources for 'multi-resource extraction' described by Salzman for the Baluch.

Another factor would appear to be the historical availability of land in Kerman Province. I have argued that there appears to be an important link between ownership of land and tribal location, Gholami moved from Shirinak to Jaffarabad because he was able to purchase land there. Many of the Komachi are permanently centered about Shirinak or Giborj because they own small amounts of land there. Omid Ali Emiri entered the Komachi tribe by moving in to the Shirinak-Giborj area during a period when land was available. Finally, many Komachi claim that they are now permanently committed to a garmsir in the Jaghin-Manujan area because they have put wells there and have purchased agricultural land.

This process is interesting. While the Komachi are reticent about how much land they own, it is clear that none of them--not even the most wealthy--could afford to sell their animals and settle on the proceeds of their fields and gardens. Their property gives them a supplemental income; it lets them avoid purchasing certain materials; but it cannot support them at their current standard of living. They are certainly not buying land as a prelude to settling out (cf. Barth 1961). Rather they seem to be buying land because (1) it is a reasonable economic investment and (2) it gives them important rights in the area. By owning land, no matter how little, they assure themselves a recognized position within the larger Persian society; they also become landholders sharing common interests with other landholders. Most of these other landholders are not tribal and many of them are quite wealthy and important on the local level. Owning land--often sharing it with the larger landholders--ties the Komachi to the important members of the settled

population. It links the Komachi with men who are politically and economically important, to men who are the Komachi patrons. As a result of these links, the Komachi were, formerly, guaranteed access to pasture and water in the area (see p. 31). In part, the 'right' to pasture and water also came from ownership of resources in the area. For, as ownership of fixed resources in an area implied the right to control other resources for wealthy men, it also, to a lesser extent, would have implied the same rights for the Komachi.

Thus it appears that nomads in the Kerman area bought land as both an economic investment and as a means of assuring themselves access to more important pastoral resources in the area. If Meshe Gholami's case is a representative example, then too purchase of land by wealthy and important nomads plays an important part in determining the territorial location of particular tribes: they are found where their wealthy members can buy land.

This raises the question of the availability of land. The model of tribal development that I have proposed appears to require both open pasture areas into which nomads can move and, at least sometimes, open agricultural resources as well. Both of these have been, I believe, available in Kerman during the last several hundred years. Notice that the land purchases made by Meshe Gholami in Jaffarabad and by the other Komachi in the Shirinak, Sarze, Giborj regions all took place during a period of great social upheaval and unrest. (See Cottam [1964] for a discussion of these periods.) It seems quite likely, in fact, that land was available to the nomads only because unrest made purchase of that property seem a poor investment to the normal landholding families in

the area. Similarly, the present Komachi garmsir was available to them because, during periods of unrest, it was sufficiently unsettled to be unsafe for anyone, tribal or otherwise. If, then, it is unsettled times which account for the open territory that is a prerequisite for the continuous re-formation of Kermani tribes, then the proposed model can only be true if there appears to have been periodic disruption of the area.

This, in fact, seems to have been the case. The conditions which held from 1940 to the mid-1950s were not extraordinary. The upheavals of the 1940s and 1950s were the second major upheaval of this century. Earlier, during the first years of this century, the Persian constitutional crisis and then the First World War also led to severe disruption of the country. And these upheavals were simply following on earlier problems--Paul Ward English (1966) notes that, while Kerman flourished under the Safavids (1502-1732), its history after that was anything but tranquil.

In 1720 and again in 1722, Kirman City was conquered by Ghalzai tribesmen from Afghanistan. Fifteen years later, Nadir Shah laid siege to Kandahar and requisitioned baggage animals and the entire grain reserves of Kirman Province for his army; for seven years thereafter the region was in a state of famine. In 1747 the Afgans again attacked Kirman and razed the northern section of the city. . . . Still later in the century, after a series of battles between two rival dynasties, the Zands and the Qajars, Lutf Ali Khan, the leader of the Zands, took refuge in Kirman City. The city and the Zand leader were captured in 1794. For three months Qajar soldiers pillaged the province; twenty thousand men were sold into slavery and an equal number blinded.

This oppression continued into the first half of the nineteenth century; insecurity and decay were widespread. Provincial governorships were awarded to members of the ruling family, who exploited them as private domains. The Qajars usually appointed the harshest rulers to Kirman Province as a continued punishment for its earlier support of the Zand Dynasty. Throughout the period villages were abandoned, qanats fell into disrepair and the population declined. . . . It was not until the last half of the nineteenth century that the political and economic fortunes of Kerman improved [English 1966:27].

It thus seems quite likely that, at least for the last 250 years, social conditions in Kerman have been so unsettled that there was probably nearly unlimited opportunity for small tribal groups to move into new (i.e., depopulated and unsettled) regions. There would, therefore, have been no limit on territory to prevent the splitting, moving, settling processes that I described above.

The last condition which must be noted involves the natural environment in which Kermani tribes are located. Kerman is quite a bit drier than the area of western Iran in which the larger tribal confederacies are located. For example, Pabot (1967) reports average annual precipitation in Kerman of 168 mm (6.6 inches) while Ganji (1968) gives an annual rainfall figure for Shiraz of 384 mm (15.1 inches). Thus there is a reason to assume that pasture is far richer in the west of Iran than it is in Kerman. In addition, the Zagros Mountain range is far more extensive than the high but rather small band of mountains in Kerman. As a result, there is far more pasture in the Zagros region, and it is far better pasture besides, than there is in Kerman.⁶ The smallness and the instability of the Kermani tribes would seem to be quite directly related to these environmental features: restricted resources limit potential growth which, in turn exacerbates the contradictions present within the economic system.

In sum, the rather short developmental cycle of tribes like the Komachi may be seen as the result of penetration of a traditional tribal economy by mercantile capitalism under conditions in which (1) periodic

⁶See Salzman (1965) for a discussion of the association of relative richness of environment and tribal political structure in Iran.

disruption of the countryside dislocated rural populations such that there is ample unoccupied territory to allow the establishment of new tribes, while (2) the actual amount of pasture or land available in any one area is too restricted to allow the development of any single large tribe, and (3) those limits on growth exacerbate the conflict generated by the penetration of capitalism into the traditional economy.

"We Are All One, We Are All Kin" and Other Distortions of Reality:

Komachi Ideology at Work

The Komachi claim that they are all kin. They use this claim as both a general idiom for discussing tribal identity and as a specific tool, a device to counteract conflict and discord. Thus, both actively and passively, kinship is the force which binds Komachi society together. The very view that "we are all kin, we are all one" is, however, a subtle distortion of reality. Thirty-six percent of the Komachi are recent entrants to the tribe; the bulk of those entering the tribe are shepherds; there is very little cross-class marriage. In no way is the tribe a homogeneous community of kin.

What then is the basis of the Komachi claim? Primarily it is an artifact of classification. For the purpose of calculating tribal membership virtually any kinship tie makes a man kin. Kinship is maximally inclusive: a man whose child marries a Komachi woman is considered Komachi and kin; kinship brings people into the tribe rather than setting them off. The Komachi claim that all are kin thus means, at the most, that everyone is related to someone else; it is taken to mean that everyone is related to everyone else.

In this regard, poorer, less central members of the tribe

demonstrate their 'kinship' by stressing tangential ties to important men rather than more direct ties to less important ones. These claims of kinship are ratified and repeated by wealthy and central men. The poor man uses these claims to establish an identity; the wealthy man manipulates these claims to reduce tensions between himself and his hired shepherds. "You are my kinsman and I treat you like one of my family," Shir Ali said to his shepherd who claimed he had been mistreated.

This same type of inclusive categorization also helps bridge the class boundary between shepherds and their employers. With regard to actual economic conditions and prevailing social attitudes, there are three classes in Komachi society: there are wealthy employers (men who hire shepherds); there are hired shepherds; and there are independent households which neither hire nor supply labor. In Komachi classification, however, there are only two terms: arbab (herdowner) and chupan (shepherd). This is important for, as I have shown above, shepherds do not work all their lives but, as an artifact of their household's developmental cycle, are able to 'retire' to be independent herdowners in the later years. These shepherds only rarely become large herdowners. Nonetheless, within the Komachi system of classification it is quite reasonable to say--as they often do--that all chupan become arbabs. Classificatorily, no distinction is made between the former shepherd with 40 animals and the wealthy herdowners with 800 animals: poor men who have never worked themselves but whose children have worked, men who have worked but whose children have not, men who have worked and whose children are working, rich men who have never worked and whose children never have (and never will) work, poor men who have never worked and whose

children do not work--these are gradations of status which are hidden by the arbab/chupan dichotomy.

As with so many other Komachi systems for social classification, the arbab/chupan distinction masks social reality and presents an appearance of greater social unity than exists. All chupan become arbab; all Komachi are kin, yes, but only because the categories are lumped together according to a single criterion.⁷ Still, the reasons for these slightly distorted views of reality seem clear. In a system which is rife with contradictions and in which conflict and discord are common, devices are needed which palliate and reduce, if not resolve, the conflicts and contradictions of the system. Since the social divisions arising from private property are a fundamental contradiction within a nominally unified tribal system, it is not at all surprising that these divisions are, at least ideologically, obliterated in an attempt to make them a less visible focus for conflict. The ultimate instability of the system suggests that this attempt is not entirely successful.

Conclusion

In this dissertation I have attempted to describe the social order of the Komachi and to analyze the structure which underlies it.

⁷This is not meant to imply that the lot of shepherds never improves. Even though it is a product of changes in the shepherd household's consumer/worker ratio over its developmental cycle, the fact is that men do not work their entire adult life. Further, sons of shepherds can get a running start and work less than their fathers did. This lends an air of reality to the ideological claim and thus does help reduce the tensions of the contradiction.

Similarly, although the claim "we are all kin" does not lead to direct marriages between shepherds, or the children of former shepherds and employers, shepherds can and do marry their children to poorer close kin of wealthy men. As a result of these marriages (the cross-class marriages of Chapter 4), the lines that join rich and poor may grow more direct lending, again, that air of reality that is necessary if an ideological claim is to bear any weight.

I have also made a rather more restricted effort to deal with the historical origins of systems like the Komachi.

As I suggested at the outset, the Komachi appear to be quite different from many of the tribal groups in Iran. They are far smaller than most of the tribes that have been described; their marriage system is somewhat different, particularly in the incorporation of an antigamous marriage rule; they appear to stress agnation far less than many other groups and, in addition, the Komachi social formation appears to be an unstable social entity.

I have attempted to analyze the Komachi in a manner which reveals the relationship between some of the significant peculiarities of Komachi society and this apparent instability. Specifically, I argue that the two major rules of the marriage system--a preference for close cousin (but not necessarily FBD) marriage and the antigamous marriage rule--are related to the tribe's developmental cycle, the latter being a means of drawing new members into an expanding tribe while the former is a means of consolidating important ties and, at least at first, unifying the whole. I have also argued that it seems likely that the relative unimportance of agnation is related to the very broad reckoning of kinship needed to integrate new members into the tribe through the medium of kinship.

In analyzing the structure of the society I have pointed to important class distinctions which are reinforced by marriage patterns and I have also focused my attention on several aspects of the tribe's economic system, particularly the fundamental contradictions of the types of property (private and communal), relations of production controlling

access to labor (kinship and contract), and I have suggested that these elements are features of two contradictory modes of production, capitalism and a tribal mode of production.

I have suggested that the contradictions above are manifest in the competitive, discordant, and tension-filled relations that hold between members of Komachi society. I have attempted to demonstrate the nature of these social relations by describing in detail the processes of hiring shepherds and getting married. I have also argued that it is these contradictions--and those which arise from attempts to reduce them--which generate the ultimate instability of systems like the Komachi. To that end, I have presented a diachronic model of societies like the Komachi in an attempt to show how the contradictions within the system play themselves out over time and how instability is generated.

I have also attempted to discuss briefly those external conditions which appear to have generated and shaped the development of tribal structure in Kerman: early penetration of a mercantile capitalist system into the traditional tribal economy; the rather meager resource base of the area which restricts the geographic concentration of large populations; and the disruption of the countryside which opened areas for new tribes to form.

Finally, I have written a description of a society from a theoretical perspective in which the underlying question is not "How do things fit together?" but "Do they fit together at all?" What I have attempted to do for the Komachi is to show where things do and do not fit and, where possible, why.

APPENDIX

TABLE 14
 CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS
 IN INTENSIVE ECONOMIC SAMPLE

House- Hold #	Age of Household	Household Size	Herd Size	Inheritance		Father Alive	
				Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife
1	9	5	150	60	50	s	d
2	23	8	60	70	0	d	-
3	12	7	90	20	0	d	s
4	40	3	100	-	-	-	-
5	6	5	50	20	0	s	d
6*	40+	1	10	-	-	-	-
7#	9	9	170	100	-	d	d
8	12	6	60	15	0	s	d
9	40	8	150	-	6	-	l
10	8	5	105	-	-	-	s
11	16	7	70	30	3	d	d
12	7	5	200	100	10	d	s
13*	50+	1	10	-	-	-	-
14	16	8	180	75	20	l	d
15	29	7	30	40	0	d	l
16	35	6	200	75	15	d	-
17	7	5	20	10	0	d	s
18	22	11	375	60	30	s	d
19	2	3	160	0	0	d	d
20	30	10	840	140	10	l	l
21	2	3	100	120	10	d	s
22	23	6	60	5	0	d	d
23#	10	7	130	17	0	l	d
24	15	2	20	60	3	l	d
25	1	3	30	30	0	d	s
26	22	5	60	50	0	d	-
27*	40	4	60	-	-	-	l
28	29	8	50	50	0	l	s
29	17	9	390	90	0	l	s
30\$	12	2	135	50	0	d	-
31	11	7	40	70	0	l	d
32*	35	2	100	-	-	-	-
33	5	4	65	10	0	d	d
34	10	9	70	50	0	d	d
35	20	11	110	100	0	d	d
36	27	10	705	300	30	d	l
37*	30+	2	30	-	-	-	-
38*	25+	7	60	-	-	-	-
39	15	8	70	30	0	d	s
40	14	8	400	60	20	s	d

TABLE 14--continued

House- hold #	Age of Household	Household Size	Herd Size	Inheritance		Father Alive	
				Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife
41	27	10	60	70	0	1	1
42	17	11	300	130	0	1	1
43	10	6	180	180	0	d	s
44*	40+	3	250	-	-	-	-
45%	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
46	21	10	240	30	18	1	d
47	14	7	120	120	20	d	1
48*	25+	6	130	-	-	-	-
49	6	3	80	60	0	d	d
50*	25+	2	20	-	-	-	-
51	31	8	240	50	0	d	1
52	10	5	200	125	20	d	s
53	16	6	250	150	0	s	1
54	17	9	180	200	20	1	s
55	16	8	20	20	3	d	d
56	12	8	180	100	20	1	d
57	35	5	70	100	0	1	-
58*	45+	1	40	-	-	-	-
59	9	5	50	35	0	1	d
60	9	5	125	75	12	1	1
61*	40+	5	120	-	-	-	-
62	17	9	90	25	0	d	1
63	1	3	70	60	0	d	s
64	21	9	50	80	0	d	s
65	2	5	140	100	30	d	d
66	35	5	25	75	10	1	-
67	5	3	30	10	20	s	s
68	2	3	25	30	0	s	s
69	18	4	100	60	20	s	1
70	29	5	60	45	10	1	1
71	33	6	70	15	15	d	1
72	6	5	50	150	0	d	s
73	13	7	140	25	0	1	s
Totals			9,330	4,027	425		

1= living at time of marriage but now deceased

d= deceased at time of marriage

s= still living

*widow's household

#second marriage one party

\$second marriage both parties

%unmarried woman

TABLE 15
CAMP SIZE AND WEALTH

Camp #	Number of Households	Number of Animals	Animals/ Household	Size of Head's Herd	% of Camp's Herd
<u>Camps in Intensive Sample</u>					
1	7	600	85.7	150	25.0
2	4	395	98.75	150	38.0
3	7	640	91.4	200	31.2
4	4	625	156.3	375	60.0
5	8	1,300	162.5	840	64.6
6	8	960	120.0	390	40.6
7	5	1,265	253.0	705	55.7
8	4	730	182.5	300	41.0
9	5	590	118.0	240	40.6
10	4	590	147.5	240	40.6
11	9	875	97.2	180	18.4
12	8	500	62.5	140	28.0
13	3	260	86.6	70	26.9
Totals	76*	9,330			
<u>Camps not in Intensive Sample</u>					
14	7	1,000	142.8	527	52.7
15	9	1,225	136.1	350	28.5
16	4	415	103.8	150	36.1
17	7	832	118.9	300	36.0
18	8	600	75.0	140	23.3
Totals	35	4,072			
<u>Summary</u>			<u>Intensive Sample</u>	<u>Other Camps</u>	<u>Grand Total</u>
Total number of camps			13	5	18
Total number of households			76	35	111
Total number of animals			9,330	4,072	13,402
Average # of animals/household			122.8	116.3	120.7
Average herd of head of camp			306.2	293.4	302.6
Average size of remaining herds			84.9	86.8	85.5
Total large herd holdings			3,980	1,467	5,447
Percentage of camp's animals owned by head of camp			42.6%	36.0%	40.6%

*Includes three non-Komachi shepherds

TABLE 16
SIBLING SETS AND CORESIDENCE

SHIR ALI, Xanom // Mawjawn
 Sekine // AKBAR // ASQAR, BEYROUZ
 AH // Guli // MM // Shoyeste, Senab
 KEROMAT // Qezawle
 TAWJ ALI // Mawjawn // BAWZ ALI, MARD ALI, Talat
 MOOSAW // Hamegol // MA'ASSEIN, Simaw
 NURI // Kosar, Nawzi
 HOSSEIN // Guli // ISAU, Jawni
 Dashtu // SADTAR, MOQTAR, JAWNU
 KHAN AHMAD // Hamegol // Golambar
 Sekine // Masoume, ALI NAMAK
 Sobhjan // Xanome, Mehnawz, Samambar
 ASQAR // JAFAR // Parvin, Narges
 YAR AHMAD // SA BURI, Mariam
 Sene // HEDAR, EMIR
 Nawzi // Harmon // HOSSEIN, KAWKI
 Q // Pelpel // Helnu // Kokab // Sarbar // X, Bibi
 Nawzi, Sibgol
 AMON ALI, MAHAMAD, ASAD // Sablu, Hawji
 NAWD ALI // KAWZEM // BAXTIAR // ZOLF ALI, Farangees
 NASROLLAW // AVAZ, Xawbar
 Chuku, Nawzi

TABLE 16--continued

MURID // Showkat // Xawtun, Fatimeh, Esmat
KUCHECK // MALEK
ASQ SP // EMIR SP // Sarbar // Gohar, Mariam
HOSSEIN SEFIQALI // Saqra
Zelehaw, Bolqase
MARD ALI // NAGHT ALI
Esmat, Nessu
Gohar // Bibi, QED ALI
QA KUCHEK // Beli
MAHAMAD, Malike
HOSSEIN GUDERI // Guli

Key: ALL CAPS=male
Initial caps=female
// =camp boundary

TABLE 17
 NUMBER OF FIRST COUSINS OF MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD
 IN CHUPAN, ARBAB, AND OTHER HOUSEHOLDS

Type of Household	Household Number	Number of First Cousins
<u>Chupan</u> <u>(supplying labor)</u>	2	7
	3	0
	9	*
	15	0
	16	13
	17	0
	22	6
	23	17
	26	0
	27	24
	31	17
	33	17
	34	39
	37	0
	38	0
	41	0
	55	18
	61	29
	62	0
	64	*
<u>68</u>	<u>0</u>	
	22 households	188 cousins % 9.4 average
<u>Arbab</u> <u>(employing at least one shepherd)</u>	1	43
	12	35
	14	44
	18	43
	20	64
	29	34
	30	*
	36	*
	40	22
	42	5
	43	5
46	34	

TABLE 17--continued

Type of Household	Household Number	Number of First Cousins
<u>Arbab (continued)</u>		
	51	28
	52	39
	53	2
	54	37
	56	37
	60	37
	65	31
	<u>19</u>	<u>2</u>
	20 households	542 cousins% 30,1 average
<u>Other (neither supplying nor hiring labor)</u>		
	4	0
	5	20
	6	#
	7	9
	8	26
	10	28
	13	#
	21	35
	24	24
	25	24
	28	0
	32	36
	35	37
	39	10
	44	5
	45	#
	47	0
	48	14
	49	27
	58	#
	59	29
	63	29
	66	0
	67	31
	69	39
	70	10
	71	28
	72	31
	<u>73</u>	<u>44</u>
	29 households	536 cousins % 21,44 average

TABLE 17--continued

Association of Arbab/Chupan Household and Number of Cousins

	<u>More than 20 cousins</u>	<u>Less than 20 cousins</u>
Arbab	14	4
Chupan	3	17

Chi square=12.66, $p < .001$

*Very old man with no contemporary kinsmen

#Old widow head of household

%Households with notations of * and # discounted from total number of households in calculating average




Figure 16. Genealogy of Sanjeri Taife






Figure 18. Genealogy of Abrahimi Taife


Figure 19. Membership of Camps 1-18

CAMP 1: MA'DI MALEK

1. Ma'di Malek (hh #1)
2. (Ali) Namak (hh #7)
3. Golambar (hh #6)
4. Jani Hafezi (hh #2)
5. Mohammad Mohammadi (hh #8)
6. Mohammad Behzadi (hh #5)
7. Hossein Guderu (hh #4)


Changes

1. Malek, 8, lived with Ma'di for the summer of 1974.
2. Malek's daughter and her husband lived with Malek summer of 1974 (hh #9)
3. Nasrollah Pir Malek, 10, shepherd for 9, follows him to this camp for the summer of 1974.
4. Fall 1974, Malek to camp 6, Mohammad Zolf Ali, 9, and his shepherd, 10, to camp 8.
5. Fall 1975, household 11, Ali Reza, to camp 3.
6. Hossein Guderu spent the winter of 1975 with his daughter in camp 3.


Figure 19--continued

1. Khan Ahmad (hh #9)
2. Namak Ali and his wife's mother Haji Bive (hh #11)
3. Asghar Mohammadi (hh #10)
4. Moosaw (hh #39)


There were no changes in this camp's composition from spring 1975 to fall 1975.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 3: SHIRI XABAR


1. Shiri Xabar (hh #12)
2. Asghar Sanjeri (hh #14)
3. Xabar (hh #13)
4. Avaz Pir Malek (hh #15)
5. Akbar Manzeri (hh #17)
6. Fezallah
7. Hossein Fezallah } (hh #16)

Changes


1. Hossein Guder, A, lived in this camp in the winter of 1974-75. He came from camp 1 and returned there in the summer of 1975.
2. Mahammad Karimi, a shepherd from outside the tribe, B, left camp and the tribe in the spring of 1975.
3. Fezallah and his son joined this camp in the fall of 1975 from camp 4.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 4: AGHA HOSSEIN


1. Agha Hossein (hh #18)
2. Ghed Ali and his wife's mother and sister (hh #19)
3. Ali Reza (hh #3)

Changes


1. Fezallah, A, went to camp 3 in late fall 1975.
2. Nuri Mahrezahxani Baluch, a camelherd from outside the tribe, left camp and the tribe in the late spring 1975.
3. Ali Reza, 3, joined the camp in late fall 1975.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 5: SHIR ALI

1. Shir Ali (hh #20)
2. Qoli (hh #21)
3. Hossein Xanjan (hh #25)
4. Tavakoli
5. Ainallah and his mother Xanom (hh #27)
6. Kokojon (hh #24)
7. Ali Now Ruz (hh #22)
8. Taj Ali (hh #23)
9. Nasrollah Pir Malek (hh #26)

Changes


1. Hossein, 3, married in the fall of 1974. Household 5 split into two households, 3 and 5.
2. Mard Ali, A, a camelherd and shepherd, left for camp 6 in the late spring 1974.
3. Nasrollah Pir Malek, father of a shepherd, arrived in camp late spring 1975.
4. Tavakoli, 4, married and established a separate household in the fall of 1975.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 6: ASGHAR

1. Asghar (hh #29)
2. Nowd Ali (hh #28)
3. Malek (hh #30)
4. Behruz, Asghar's half brother (hh #35)
5. Baz Ali (hh #31)
6. Mard Ali (hh #33)
7. Emir Golambar and his mother (hh #32)
8. Heidar Murat, Emir's half brother (hh #34)

Changes


1. Malek, 3, moved into this camp in fall of 1974 from camp 1.
2. Mard Ali came to this camp from camp 5 in late spring 1974.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 7: KUCHEK ALI


1. Kuchek Ali (hh #36)
2. Qorban Ali (#40)
3. Bolqase (hh #45)
4. Ta'amos and his mother (hh #37)
5. Baxtiar (hh #41)
6. Mahbur and his widowed mother (hh #38)

Changes


1. Mahbur joined this camp from camp 9 in fall 1974.
2. Bolqase spent the summer of 1975 camped with camp 8.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 8: AMON ALI


1. Amon Ali (hh #42)
2. Mohammad Zolf Ali (hh #43)
3. Assadollah and his mother (hh #44)
4. A Luri shepherd from outside the tribe, name unknown (no number).

Changes


1. Mahammad, 2, and his shepherd Nasrollah, A, spent the summer of 1974 camped with Mahammad's wife's father in camp 1.
2. Nasrollah left for camp 5 in the late spring of 1975.
3. Bolqase, B, and her daughter camped here during the summer of 1975.
4. A Luri shepherd, 4, was hired in the fall of 1975 when all efforts to hire a shepherd within the tribe failed.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 9: AKBAR


1. Akbar (hh #46)
2. Hossein Sefiq Ali (hh #47)
3. Kosar (hh #48)
4. Moqtar Morteza (hh #48)
5. Jaffar (hh #49)

Changes


1. Mahbur, B, left camp for camp 7 in fall 1974.
2. Moqtar Morteza married in fall 1975. Household 3 split into two households, 3 and 4.
3. Samambar, A, moves to camp 4 in fall 1975.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 10: NAGHT ALI

1. Naght Ali (hh #51)
 2. Keromat (hh #52)
 3. Darvish Mohammedi (hh #53)
 4. Haji Murat
 5. Xabar Abrahimi
 6. Hired shepherd from outside tribe, name unknown
- } no numbers--generally reside outside sample

Changes


1. Xabar Abrahimi, 5, and her son, HajiMurat, 4, spent the winter of 1974-75 with camp 14.
2. Murid Sanjeri Pur, C, spent the summer and winter of 1974-75 in this camp. He spent the summer of 1975 with the head of camp 11; he was planning to spend the winter of 1975-76 in camp 14.
3. Esfanidiar Luri, F, and Mahammad Baluch, G, were shepherds and camel-herds from another tribe. They left this camp in the late spring 1975. Naght Ali hoped to rehire one or both for 1975-76.
4. A, B, D, E are camp 16. They camped with, but were not part of, Naght Ali's camp during the winter of 1974-75.
5. Household 6, a hired shepherd from outside the tribe, was brought in in fall of 1975 to replace F and G.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 11: BACHE DARVISH

1. Sa'adi (hh #54)
2. Jani (hh #56)
3. Moqtar (hh #60)
4. Hamegol (hh #58)
5. Nuri and his widowed mother (hh #61)
6. ShiriBuri (hh #59)
7. Nuri Haffezi (hh #62)
8. Meshe Darvish (hh #57)
9. Murid Xanali (hh #55)

Changes

See diagram of movement of members between camps 11 and 12,

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 12: MESHE YARBOOK

1. Isau (hh #65)
2. Now Ruz Kozem (#69)
3. Zolf Ali (hh #66)
4. Rostam Zolf Ali
5. Hassan Zolf Ali (hh #67)
6. Ma'asein Abrahimi (hh #70)
7. Ahmad Darvish (hh #68)
8. Yar Ahmad (hh #63)
9. Ma'asein Taiori (hh #64)

Changes


1. Kozem's daughter got married in fall of 1974 and he dissolved his household to live with his son Now Ruz, 2.
2. Rostam Zolf Ali married in the summer of 1975 and established his own household, number 4.

For the remaining changes see the diagram of movement of members of camps 11 and 12.

Figure 19--continued


MOVEMENTS BETWEEN CAMPS 11 AND 12

Camp 11, summer 1974




- | | | | |
|------|---------------------------------|------|-------------------------------|
| 12.1 | Isau | 11.7 | Nuri Haffezi |
| 11.3 | Moqtar | 12.9 | Ma'asein Taiori |
| 11.4 | Hamegol | 11.1 | Sa'di lived alone this summer |
| 11.5 | widow of Bur Ahmad and children | | |
| 11.6 | Shir Ali Buri | | |

Camp 12, summer 1974



- | | | | |
|------|-------------------|------|---------------|
| 11.2 | Jani | 12.7 | Ahmad Darvish |
| 12.2 | Now Ruz Kazem | 11.8 | Meshe Darvish |
| 12.3 | ZolfAli | A | Kazem |
| 12.5 | Hassan ZolfAli | B | Baxtiar |
| 12.6 | Ma'asein Abrahimi | | |

Figure 19--continuedMOVEMENTS BETWEEN CAMPS 11 AND 12--continued

Refer to previous diagrams for names associated with numbers


Changes I

1. B, Baxtiar, to camp 7, a permanent move.
2. A, Kazem, household collapses on marriage of daughter. Merges with 12.2, his son Now Ruz.
3. Jani, 11.2, Hassan Zolf Ali, 12.5, and Ahmad Darvish, 12.7, move temporarily to a combination of camps 9, 13, and their fragment.
4. 12.8, Yar Ahmad, marries and splits off from his natal household, 11.5
5. Sa'adi (11.1) returns to head camp.

Changes II

see diagrams 11 and 12


1. Jani returns to camp 11 (11.2). Thus 12 to out to 11.
2. Hassan returns to camp 12 (12.5).
3. Ahmad Darvish returns to camp 12 (12.7).
4. Isau moves to camp 12. Thus 11 to combined to 12 (12.1).
5. Meshe Darvish moves to camp 11. Thus 12 to combined to 11 (11.8).
6. Yar Ahmad moves to camp 12. Thus 11, marries, combined, to 12.(12.8).
7. Ma'asein Taiori from 11 to combined to 12 (12.9).

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 13: MARD ALI

1. Mard Ali (hh #71)
2. Emir Murat (hh #73)
3. Hossein Yarbok (hh #72)


Changes

1. Emir Murat moves to camp 14 (temporarily) winter 1974-75.
2. Mard Ali and Hossein combine with camp 7 and fragment of camp 11 and 12 in winter of 1974-75.
3. Camp recombines in spring and summer 1975.

Figure 19--continuedCOMBINED CAMP: WINTER 1974-75

1. Mard Ali Pir Malek (head camp 13, 13.1)
2. Hossein Yarbok (13.3)
3. Janallah Mohammedi (11.2)
4. Hassan Zolf Ali (12.5)
5. Ahmad Darvish (12.7)
6. Akbar (head of camp 9, 9.1)
7. Hossein Sefiqali (9.2)
8. Kosar (9.3)
9. Samambar (9.A)
10. Jaffar (9.5)

This was a temporary camp formed during the winter of 1974-75. It was not a single camp led by one man but parts of three camps. Note that the central units in this combined camp are: three sisters and a daughter, two sisters and a daughter, and two sisters.

Figure 19--continuedCAMPS 14 AND 15: AHMAD AND SHIR ALI SANJERI-PUR


- | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Ahmad Sanjeri | 9. Khan Ali |
| 2. Shir Ali Sanjeri | 10. Xubiar |
| 3. Akbar Negini | 11. Mashallah Sanjeri |
| 4. Moqtar Sanjeri | 12. Emir Sefiqali |
| 5. Mahammad Keram Sanjeri | 13. Mahmud Taiori |
| 6. Darvish Mohammadi | 14. Murid Emiri (deceased) |
| 7. Nahmad Sanjeri | 15. Esfandiar Emiri |
| 8. Bagh Mirza Sanjeri | 16. Hossein Baluch |

Outside intensive sample

Changes

These are two camps, one led by Ahmad Sanjeri and the other led by his brother Shir Ali. They camp close together and there appears to be considerable change of personnel between them. They spend the winter about 40 miles north of the other Komachi and, as a result, I have no information on the interchange of personnel.

During the winters of 1974-75 and 1975-76 Ahmad arranged for the presence of a tribal teacher in his camp. As a result, several other Sanjeri spent the winter at his camp, e.g., Emir Murat (13.2) and Haji Murat (10.4). Others said they might move and still others sent their children to stay with kin. The introduction of the teacher seems to have had an important effect on camp composition.

Figure 19--continuedCAMP 16: GHOLAMI KUR


1. Gholami Kur
2. Haji Makazem
3. Shir Ali Haji
4. Haji Keram

Outside intensive sample

Changes

This camp did not change its composition during 1974-75.

Figure 19--continued

CAMPS 17 AND 18: MESHE GHOLAMI

1. Meshe Gholami Abrahimi
2. Kamron Abrahimi
3. Ali Abrahimi
4. Hossein Abrahimi
5. Xoda Murat Ruzdar
6. Keromat Solari
7. Gholmahammad Haffezi

8. Janallah Solari
9. Mohammad ValiShah
10. Yedallah Manzeri
11. Sadallah Khorasanni-Pur
12. Mashallah Oremide
13. Hassan Oremide

Outside intensive sample

Changes

These two camps live quite separately from the rest of the Komachi. Both camps are led by Meshe Gholami and it is my impression that there is considerable flow of personnel between them. At least part of the time the households were divided as follows: tents 1-4, 10, and 11 in one camp, the remaining tents in the second.

TABLE 18
ANIMALS/WORKER FOR ARBAB, CHUPAN, AND OTHER HOUSEHOLDS

Arbab Households		Chupan Households		Other Households	
House- hold #	Animals/ Worker*	House- hold #	Animals/ Worker*	House- hold #	Animals/ Worker*
1	75	2	11.5	4	33.4
12	100	3	20.5	5	25
14	50	9	20.9	6	#
18	62.5	15	6.8	7	38.6
20	161.5	16	38.5	8	30
29	88.7	17	10	10	52.5
30	67.5	22	11.5	13	#
36	83.9	23	25	21	50
40	142.8	26	13.6	24	10
42	68.2	27	17.6	25	15
43	90	31	20	28	13.9
46	46.2	33	32.5	32	50
51	35.3	34	14	35	17.7
52	100	37	15	39	25
53	41.7	38	13.6	44	83.5
54	40.9	41	10	47	42.9
56	90	55	5.6	48	29.5
60	62.5	57	15.9	49	40
65	35	61	27.3	58	#
19	80	62	19.6	59	25
		64	9.6	63	35
20	80.85 average	68	12.5	66	5.4
		22	16.89 average	67	15
				69	38.5
				70	13.6
				71	12.9
				72	25
				73	50
				11	19.4
				26	30.65 average

*Men and women count as one full worker, adolescents as .8 workers.
#Households with no workers; these households are excluded from totals and averages.




Figure 20. Herd Size and Inheritance

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