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A PSYCHOPOLITICAL STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF ZIONISM AND OF INDIAN NATIONALISM

BY

MICHAEL I. SELZER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

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Abstract

A PSYCHOPOLITICAL STUDY OF THE ORIGINS
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This study applies Eriksonian concepts of identity formation to the analysis of the nineteenth century origins of Zionism and of Indian nationalism on a comparative basis. The salient factor in the historical background out of which these movements arose is identified as the experience of subordination to what are perceived as culturally superior foreign powers, who utilise their political position to force the native populations - Jews and Indians - into adopting Western ways. These circumstances place severe obstacles in the way of healthy identity formation. Two patterns of response - the assimilationist and the nationalist - are examined and compared through the analysis of major intellectual and political figures in terms of Eriksonian categories.

FOREWORD

The task of writing a doctoral dissertation is, for most men and women who perform it, unrewarding and frustration; the greatest and often the sole pleasure associated with it being that obtained by the mere fact of having performed an onerous and unsatisfying chore in a manner judged satisfactory by others. Under these circumstances, the doctoral student owes a heavy debt to those friends and associates, and others, who provide him with the enticements, exhortations, cajoling and plain bullying which finally combine to induce him to complete the work. I have been singularly fortunate in this respect, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge here my debt to Professors Albert Gorvine and Dankwart Rustow, in particular, for their unyielding determination that, malgre lui, their student would become their colleague. Carlos Russell, B.A., Dean of Brooklyn College's School of Contemporary Studies, must also be acknowledged for providing me with a setting which was highly conducive to the completion of this study...

What accounts for the accidie one feels for the writing of such a work, for this tedium disertationis? Most obviously, the chore is performed for extrinsic reasons: the doctorate, for which the dissertation is the final and biggest requirement being, after all, the sine qua non for membership in the academic trade union. However, while

apprenticeships are traditionally designed to give the journeyman training appropriate to his future trade, and to guarantee him, on the completion of his training, a livelihood in that trade, the doctoral degree falls far short of doing either.

No other trade union in history, one imagines, could be so heroically indifferent to its own interests as to turn out, year after year, a supply of highly trained specialists to flood a market already cursed by an oversupply of such specialists: but this is what the American academic profession, the last bastion, surely, of pristine "hidden-handism", still recklessly continues to do. The apprentices are trained, therefore, for an occupation in which large numbers of them are unlikely ever to find employment. And even worse: for with this large pool of unemployed specialists to sip from, college administrators are encouraging themselves to an insolence unprecedented in American academic history: and yet one whose full scope has not yet been attained. Colleges find it cheaper to employ newly-graduated academics for a period of two or three years and then, in that wicked euphemism so widely employed, to "let them go" rather than promoting them or giving them tenure, confident in the knowledge that dozens of unemployed doctors will eagerly sieze the opportunity to taste the glories of an assistant professorship until they, too, are sacrificed on the altar of a spurious cost-efficiency made possible by a flooded market. And this is just the beginning, for the first rumblings of an assault on the very institution of tenure have been heard. With each new doctorate awarded, the ammunition piles grow and we can be sure that

the Big Berthas of bureaucratic opportunism, already targetted as they are on that vital institution, will soon be firing their first salvoes.

But even if the new doctor found himself or herself in a seller's market it is doubtful whether the degree, the key to that market, and the dissertation prerequisite for that degree, would prove to be a more worthwhile experience. Although the dissertation is supposed to represent a contribution to original scholarship, the overwhelming majority are published only by virtue of a monopolistic "vanity press" - University Microfilms, a Xerox Corporation subsidiary - whose major source of income is the fee required of each author. (To preserve appearances, doctoral students are required to have their manuscripts professionally typed, at an average cost of probably about $250: which I suspect is probably a student's income for an entire month!) To heighten this absurdity, moreover, dissertations typically represent a scholarly contribution which is made rather than received. Certainly this is true of political science. A recent study indicates that less than 2.0% of all accepted dissertations in the discipline have been quoted in the learned journals: and that of these, well over a half have been quoted by their own authors (and their advisers).

But it is in the last resort the <u>futility</u> of the dissertation requirement which makes the necessity of writing one so onerous. For many, if not for most, recipients of the doctoral degree it represents the first and last major research project they will ever undertake; it therefore attests to their ability to perform work which in most

instances they will never again perform.

This in itself would be harmless - at the very least it gives the faculty of graduate schools the pleasure of enjoying the luscious perquisites of their exalted states; while the student receives the nearest thing he is ever likely to be able to place on his bookshelf that looks like a book and has his name on it - if some of the most vital responsibilities of graduate education were not being ignored.

With the obvious exception of the natural sciences, American eduation is of a deplorably low level - a level far lower, I believe, than the already surprisingly low one indicated by such quantifiable measures as reading scores. Even allowing for their congenital chauvinism, the British are not entirely unjustified in regarding a B.A. from an American university as the equivalent of an English high school certificate. With its astounding resources, this country can surely do better - much better; and it is self-evident that it should attempt to do so. Any serious move in this direction must, among other things, include a thorough-going revision of the basic premises of graduate school education, which is currently structured on the assumption that it is its responsibility to produce scholars: it is this that warrants the dissertation requirement. But what American education needs are not the authors of countless, and endlessly tedious, dissertations which no one reads: but <u>good teachers and good educational planners</u>. It is extraordinary, surely, that while most graduate students intend a career of college teaching, they receive no guidance or instruction

in the skills and techniques of teaching while at graduate school; and the same holds true for those who will become campus policy-makers and administrators.

Remedy this - scrap the spurious dissertation requirement; concentrate on training teachers who will teach their college students effectively and who will, thereby, ensure among other things that the people who go out to teach in elementary and secondary schools are equipped to do so; concentrate, too, on giving each and every graduate student an informed awareness of the policy-making and administrative processes of the campus - and you revolutionise and inestimably improve higher education in this country.

— Michael Selzer

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1. ON THE STUDY OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism, probably by universal consent, is one of the most important phenomena in the modern history of the world. It is also one about which people tend to have very strong feelings indeed. For the nationalists themselves, it represents truths which are beyond contention and by the dedication to which at least a large part of their lives is defined. Many other people, however, among them those with a strong internationalist, humanitarian, or libertarian bent, view nationalism as one of the supreme evils of our time and regard it as a principal source of the distortion of individual lives, and of the tyranny, violence, and war, which characterise the modern era.

The passionate feelings which nationalism characteristically arouses presuppose, among other things, that "everyone knows" what nationalism is. The problems of defining nationalism are, however, legion and afflict the scholar no less than we may assume they do the layman. A leading student of nationalism, B.C.Shafer, has observed in this connection:

> A century of the study of the group loyalty that has most powerfully motivated men in our time, nationalism, has produced no precise and acceptable definition. Many French, British, German, Italian, Russian and American students have tried their hand with varying but never complete success. Other students have found flaws and omissions, and for the purposes of their own studies have proceeded to form their own definitions. Clarity has seldom been achieved, and scientific study has thus been hindered... If nationalism is to be understood, clearer understanding of what

the word means must be achieved.[1]

Similarly J.Hobson, remarking that "Amid the welter of vague political abstractions to lay one's finger on any 'ism' so as to pin it down and mark it out by definition seems impossible", observes that nationalism is closely related to three words - imperialism, colonialism and internationalism - all of whose meanings are also "equally elusive, equally shifty... the changeful overlapping of all four demands the closest vigilance of students of modern politics".[2] Some scholars, indeed, are so impressed by the ambiguities of the term that they doubt whether it actually means anything at all - or whether it is not, at best, a portmanteau label affixed to a wide range of disparate phenomena. Thus H. Lasswell speaks of the "varied manifestations for which the common name [nationalism] is used";[3] while J.H.Kautsky, studying nationalism in the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, denies that it has a specific meaning and suggests that it "merely conveys some vague connotations of a striving for 'national' independence or 'national' unity" - it being understood that the word "nation" is as ambiguous as "nationalism" itself.[4]

In much the same spirit George Lichtheim, also writing in reference to the "third world", also doubts whether nationalism exists there. The phenomenon which the word is used to identify there, he insists, can

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[1] B.C.Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York, 1955), p.3

[2] J.Hobson, Imperialism (New York, 1902), p.1

[3] H.Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (paper ed., New York 1965), p.72.

[4] J.H.Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York, 1962), p.30.

equally well be called socialism.[1]

Recognition of the difficulties inherent in the task of defining nationalism has led some scholars to unusually emphatic disclaimers of the comprehensiveness or accuracy of their own definitions. "There are of course exceptions to every part of this definition", L.Snyder writes after providing readers with his own.[2] Still more striking is the disclaimer of a study group of British scholars under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, to whose definition of nationalism are appended the following words: "It is not claimed either that the meanings which have been adopted...accord with current usage or that they are correct, but simply that they are convenient for the present purpose".[3]

These remarks, chosen more or less at random from the extensive bibliography on nationalism, should suffice to point to the existence of a daunting problem - or set of problems. What is nationalism? Is there indeed any such thing as nationalism? These and similar questions are prior but, obviously, closely related to those involved in the actual study of nationalism - insofar as nationalism can be shown to exist. While scholarship has as one of its tasks that of validating and amplifying definitions, it is a fact that the scholar can scarcely proceed without at least

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[1] G. Lichtheim, On Imperialism (New York, 1971), p.167.

[2] L.Snyder, The Dynamics of Nationalism (Princeton 1946), p.2.

[3] Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute for International Affairs (London, 1939), p.xx.

a tentative definition to go by. Insofar as the study of nationalism is concerned, however, we are clearly no longer in the position of having to go out to plough virgin lands. A survey of at least some of the more important approaches to the study of nationalism may be expected to alert us to the nature of the problems that exist, to avoid some of the pitfalls which others have encountered and, more positively, to offer suggestive insights for further exploration. This chapter attempts an effort of that kind. Nevertheless, the possibility must be acknowledged that in view of the very considerable confusion which is acknowledged to exist regarding definitions of nationalism, different scholars may actually be defining quite different phenomena under the same word.

One function of a definition - and hence, as Hobson observes, one of the problems of defining a word - is to distinguish it from all others. Clearly, a definition of phenomenon X which would also be used of phenomena A, B and C, is a definition of what A,B,C and X have in common with each other, and is therefore not at all a definition of X. A remark about nationalism such as the one made by Nehru, for example, is an instance of such a non-definition. "Nationalism", Nehru declared, "is essentially an anti-feeling and fattens on hatred and anger against other national groups".[1]

Now it may indeed be true that nationalism is a feeling of antipathy toward other national groups, but it should also be clear that Nehru's

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[1] J.Nehru, Toward Freedom (New York, 1941), p.74

statement could hold true of most civilian populations engaged in a war with another nation; of patriotism; or of a nation victimised and oppressed by another. One assumes, for example, that Jews and Gypsies being exterminated by the Nazis felt a considerable measure of "anti-feeling" toward them. But could we really say that it is "essentially" this that constitutes Jewish or Romany nationalism? Were Jews and Gypsies, by virtue of their hatred and anger toward the Nazis, nationalists?

With surprising frequency, scholars seeking a definition of nationalism appear to have fallen into this kind of a fallacy. That is to say, they have defined nationalism in terms which can also apply to other political phenomena and which cannot therefore be considered acceptable as definitions of nationalism.

Consider, for example, thedefinition of nationalism offered by E. Barker as "a feeling of attachment to the tradition and achievement of the whole national society, in all the varied range of its life".[1] This sentiment, surely, indicates nothing more than a "sense of belonging" and is therefore quite different from (although a part of) what "everyone knows" nationalism to be.

M.H.Boehm, in the article on nationalism in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, does not differ appreciably from Barker. His definition has it that nationalism is "the attitude which ascribes to national individuality s high place in the hierarchy of values", and adds nothing but cir-

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[1] E. Barker, Principles of Social Theory (Oxford, 1951), p.161.

cularity by continuing with the observation that "in this sense it is a natural and indispensable condition for all national movements".[1] Much the same can be said of Crane Brinton's definition of nationalism as "at bottom no more than the important form the sense of belonging to an in-group has taken in Western culture".[2] Even so circumspect a scholar as C.J.Friedrich permits himself to make the same kind of non-definition. "Nationalism", he writes, "is primarily a sentiment or a body of feeling associated with the sense of self-identity of particular nations today".[3] H.A.Gibbons is in the same tradition when he declares that "The logical definition of nationalism [is] consciousness of a solidarity of privileges and obligations with all others living in the same unit";[4] as is Snyder, who offers as "a workable definition of nationalism" the statement that "Nationalism is a condition of mind, feeling or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspirations of the nation have been expressed, being attached to common traditions and, in some cases, having a religion".[5]

It is clear that a concept of nationalism must include the notion of a sense of national identity, which the nationalist upholds and proclaims. It is also clear, however, that a useful definition of nationalism would

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[1] M.H.Boehm, "Nationalism", Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York, 1935), xi, p.231.

[2] C.Brinton, The Shaping of the Modern Mind (New York, 1953), p.151.

[3] C.J.Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York, 1963), p.9.

[4] H.A.Gibbons, Nationalism and Internationalism (New York, 1930), p.2.

[5] Snyder, op.cit., p.2. Snyder does not here attempt to elaborate the distinction between "condition of mind, feeling or sentiment"...

have to include many other elements. Otherwise nationalism comes to mean merely "recongition of national self-identity" and in no way implies the significant role - or the nature of the role - which nationalism has played in modern history.

Much the same can also be said of those definitions - so-called - of nationalism which make it synonymous with the quest for political power or for the political independence of a nation. G.P.Gooch's assertion that nationalism "denotes the resolve of a group of human beings to share their fortunes and to exercise exclusive control over their own actions",[1] apart from begging many questions, could in fact apply to a group of highwaymen or to the citizens of any modern state. Nor do we find H.J.Morgenthau's definition to have more specific applicability. Nationalism, he writes, is the quest for "the freedom of the nation from domination by another nation and the freedom of the individual to join the nation of his choice"; nationalism is also described by this author as "the collective expression of a nation's political identity".[2] Hardly if at all less comprehensive is the definition given by the study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This has it that nationalism is "a consciousness of the distinctive character of different nations, including the one of which the individual is a member, and a desire to increase the strength, liberty and prosperity of nations".[3]

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[1] G.P.Gooch, Nationalism (London, 1920), p.8.

[2] H.J.Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century (Chicago, 1962) vol.1, pp.181-182.

[3] Nationalism, op.cit., p.2.

Nationalism has also been defined in terms which make it appear indistinguishable from totalitarian or extremely tyrannical regimes, or the support of them. E.Barker's definition of nationalism, in Reflections on Government, is one such case in point.[1] What C.J.H.Hayes calls "integral nationalism" also falls into this category; it is "jingoistic, distrusts other nations, labors to exalt one nation at the expense of others, and relies on physical force. It is militarist and tends to be imperialist... In domestic affairs it is highly illiberal and tyrannical".[2] George Orwell, whose sophistication as a student of politics can hardly be called into question, also describes nationalism in what we might more conventionally think of as totalitarian terms. "By nationalism", he writes, "I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled "good" or "bad". But secondly - and this is much more important - I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good or evil, and recognising no other duty than that of advancing its interests".[3]

Attempts made to differentiate nationalism and patriotism, or to define the one in terms of the other also tend to becloud rather than to clarify the distinctions between them. Barker, whom we have seen to define nationalism as attachment to the traditions and achievements of a society, defines patriotism as "a feeling of attachment to the very soil and

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[1] E.Barker, Reflections on Government, (Oxford, 1942), p.26.

[2] C.J.H.Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, (New York, 1931), p.165.

[3] G.Orwell, Such, Such Were The Joys (New York, 1953), pp.73-74.

physical features of the whole 'land of our birth' or patria, in all its sweep and variety" - patriotism here being virtually identical to certain forms of nostalgia. In terms of their important consequences, however, Barker declares that either nationalism or patriotism may be "diverted from their original object...and transferred instead to the State... [and even into] an internal idolatry of the organising state and a missionary zeal for the spread of its power".[1] Hayes follows in this tradition by arguing that "in its simplest terms, nationalism may be defined as a fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality".[2] Boehm declares that "Insofar as the political life of the national state is governed by national forces, there is hardly any sharp distinction between patriotism and nationalism"[3] - in which case, of course, one would want to know what the justification might be for the use of two terms as anything but synonyms of one another.

We have been exploring, in the preceeding paragraphs, a common pitfall which attempts to define nationalism encounter, in failing to differentiate sufficiently between nationalism and other political drives on the one hand, and other sentiments - not all of which are even overtly political - on the other. We turn now to consider an approach to nationalism which, in our view, may be said to suffer from the drawback of being too specific instead.

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[1] Barker, Principles, op.cit., p.161.

[2] C.J.H.Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York, 1960), p.2.

[3] Boehm, op.cit., ad loc.

In this view, nationalism is a form of political thought and behaviour which originated in Europe toward the end of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century, and which then spread across Asia and Africa as a by-product of European expansion into those continents. The first and still the most forceful exponent of this position is H.Kohn,[1] and he has been echoed in this respect by many other scholars. For Friedrich, Europe is "the cradle" of nationalism;[2] Morgenthau regards nationalism, with Marxism, as "the last great original contribution which the West has made to the political thought and practice of the world";[3] and Kedourie states flatly, "Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe".[4]

This view of nationalism as a product of the European political experience is closely bound up with the view of it - in Kedourie's words - as a "doctrine". That is to say, nationalism is viewed as a category in the history of Western political thought that derives from certain developments in the theory of popular sovereignty. Now it is of course true that nationalist thought has received systematic expression at the hands of numerous writers, just as it is the case that nationalists will frequently seek to legitimise their claims by reference to the doctrines of what are acknowledged to be major political philosophers. However, to conclude from the "philosophical" guise in which nationalist ideas are often

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1 H.Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York, 1944), passim; Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton,1955), p.9f; "Nationalism" International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, 1967,) xi, p.64f.

2 Friedrich, op.cit., p.559.

3 Morgenthau, op.cit., p.101.

4 E.Kedourie, Nationalism (rev.ed., New York, 1961), p.9.

presented that nationalism is a doctrine which has its roots in the specific history of Western political thought is, we believe, a mistake which results in significant distortions of the phenomena. If we regard nationalism as an idee-force[1] - and the historical evidence, with its record of passion, dedication and self-sacrifice surely requires that we do so - then an understanding of what nationalism is can at best begin with an examination of its philosophical content.

But even the value of that may be questioned. For ideas which succeed, in Fouillee's words, in "uniting the imagination with the will", cannot be approached primarily as philosophical speculation or understood in their own, explicit terms. Their meaning, rather, and certainly their meaning in history, stems from their power to appeal to the imagination and then, no less decisively, to place the will in the service of the imagination. It is with this synthesis that the student of nationalism should be concerned, rather than with the mere "philosophy of nationalism", for it is through this synthesis that ideas enter history. Yet we should also not fail to remember that the autonomy of thought can be questioned from another standpoint, too, in the fruitful - even if ultimately unaswerable- question of whether a person's ideas, his philosophical orientations, are a product of his political interests, emotional needs, etc. To the extent that we answer this question in the affirmative, the importance of philosphical ideas associated with European nationalism in explaining European nationalism, receeds still further.

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[1] A.Fouillee, Morale des Idees-Forces (Paris, 1908), p.353 as cited in F.Stern, Politics of Cultural Despair, (paper ed., Garden City, N.Y., 1965), p.4.

Not only does the view that nationalism is a doctrine distort the nature of European nationalism, however; no less seriously, it also leads to the position which views nationalism in Asia and Africa as derivatives of European nationalism - thereby masking a priori the possibility of it being rooted in indigenous soil - and even to the view , which we have already noted, that there may actually be no such thing as Asian and African nationalism.

Numerous non-European nationalist leaders did of course, as is frequently noted, receive their education in the West. It does not follow from this fact that their nationalist sentiments are a product of their study of European nationalist philosophy. But even if this were shown to be the case - and the evidence which we shall be examining in later chapters of this study casts doubt on that - this in itself would certainly not entitle us to regard nationalist movements in Asia and Africa as being rooted in European nationalist thought. By no stretch of the imagination could we claim that the hundreds of thousands of ordinary Asians and Africans who have organised boycotts and demonstrations, staged riots, waged terrorist warfare and resorted to other extreme measures in pursuit of their nationalist ambitions, have been inspired by the writings of Bolingbroke, Rousseau, Fichte, etc. At most, we can say that some of their leaders may have found confirmation for their own positions in the philosophical literature of European nationalism. We find no evidence to suggest that they would not have reached those positions if that literature had not existed.

Philosophical speculation in general, and European nationalist thought in

particular, therefore, do not present themselves as notably useful contexts within which to explore the nature of nationalism - except insofar as we examine it in non-philosophical categories for the data it may contain for analysis from another perspective. Nor, we would suggest, does the general position whichsees nationalism as a product of European political experience in general. This is not to say that the exploits of European nationalists were unknown to many nationalist leaders in Asia nd Africa or even that the example of, shall we say, a Mazzini, did not inspire Indians or Ghanaians or whatever to emulate them; the shots fired at Concord were indeed heard around the world. But it should be clear that an analysis which focusses on the attempt to view African and Asian nationalism as essentially derivatives of the Western nationalist experience fails, first of all, to account for nationalism in general (i.e., what were the sources of European nationalism?) and tells us little if anything about <u>why</u> nationalists in the non-Western world were responsive to the Western example...

All in all, then, we are not inclined to make too much of the fact that the origins of nationalism in Europe are prior to those of nationalism in the non-European world. Nor do we attach great significance to whatever influence the European example may have exerted. At the most, we believe, such considerations might offer a few, relatively incidental, clues to the understanding of non-European nationalism, but obviously they cannot tell us anything about nationalism as such. From a tactical point of view moreover, the tendency to insist that non-European nationalism must conform to the European model if it is to be considered nationalism seems premature and likely to force the data into ill-fitting analytic

constructs. And finally, the view that nationalism is to be studied on the basis of the philosophical rationalisations which it acquired seems to us to be even less fruitful. The philosophical positions associated with nationalism can indeed yield useful analytic clues to an understanding of nationalism, but chiefly when they are analysed in other than philosophical terms.

We turn now to another aspect of the study of nationalism. Scholars differ greatly in their understanding of the goals of nationalist movements, or of the experiences and sentiments out of which they arise. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into two groups, namely those who attribute the rise of nationalism to a single, predominant factor (albeit differing sharply among themselves as to the nature of that factor); and those who ascribe it to a variety of factors. In the first of these groups we find, for example, Almond and Coleman who appear to view nationalism as originating in a drive for national independence;[1] or MacIver, who sees nationalism as arising out of the "spirit of protest against political domination, the impulse to that free national unity which is itself the foundation on which the common interests of the nation must be achieved";[2] or Friedrich who, as we have seen, regards nationalism as an acknowledgement of national "self-identity" and finds its origins in the belief that the nation should be "independent (free)".[3]

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[1] G.Almond and J.Coleman, Politics of the Developing Nations, (Princeton, 1960), p.553

[2] R.MacIver, Politics and Society (New York, 1969), p.223.

[3] Friedrich, op.cit., p.97.

A. P. Thornton, on the other hand, finds the origins of nationalism in "the protest lobby of educated men, denied scope for their talents in professions which are the perquisites of the ruling group".[1] Kautsky, likewise, finding "no positive factor at all" in the nationalism of the underdeveloped countries (and to the extent that in his opinion one can speak of it as nationalism) attributes its origins to anti-colonialism in general and to opposition to "a colonial economic status" in particular.[2] S.M.Lipset, who views nationalism as a variety of leftist ideology, finds it to be a way of blaming a country's difficulties, and particularly its economic ones, on foreign powers.[3]

Other scholars discover the origins of nationalism in the breakup of traditional society - for colonised nations, as a result of their encounter with the West - and in the attempt to construct new bearings in life. E.Shils sees nationalism in this context but suggests that it leads primarily to a concern with "the place of the nation vis-a-vis other nations [rather than] with the life internal to the national collectivity".[4] Other scholars have stressed the connection between nationalism and the drive toward modernisation. Nationalism represents an effort on the part of the nations of Asia and Africa "to adapt themselves tp the new forces which are shaping the world", R.Emerson declares. Far from seeking a return to the past, he continues, "the bulk of the nationalists have concentrated rather on bringing to their

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[1] A.P.Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism (New York,1965), p.11.
[2] Kautsky, op.cit., pp.38-39.
[3] S.M.Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y., 1959), pp.93, 171.
[4] E. Shils, Development in the New States (The Hague, 1965), p.33.

countries the dynamism, the Faustian drive, of the modern West".[1] In D.Rustow's view, the early nationalist "is straining for a break with his living past, with his immediate social and cultural context...[in a] search for symbols of confidence that is an integral part of early modernisation and insecure nationalism".[2]

Certain scholars, on the other hand, attribute the rise of nationalism to the presence of a multiplicity of factors existing in relationship to one another. An example of this approach is in the work of Shafer, who lists ten factors which, according to him, are generally present in nationalist movements.[3] These are:

(1) A certain defined (often vaguely) unit of territory (whether possessed or coveted);

(2) Some common cultural characteristics such as language (or widely understood language), customs, manners, and literature;

(3) Some common dominant social (as Christian) and economic (as capitalist or communist) institutions;

(4) A common independent or sovereign government or the desire for one, coupled to belief in the notion that each nationality should be separate and independent;

(5) A belief in a common history (which can be an invented past) and in a common (often conceived as a racial) origin;

(6) A love or esteem for fellow nationals;

(7) A devotion to the entity (however little comprehended) called the nation, which embodies the common territory, culture, social and economic institutions, government and the fellow nationals, and which is at the same time more than their sum;

(8) A common pride in the achievements (often military rather than cultural) of this nation and a common

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[1] E.Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp.204-205.

[2] D.Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp.40-41.

[3] Shafer, op.cit., pp.7-8.

sorrow in its tragedies (particularly its military defeats;

(9) A disregard for or hostility to other like groups especially if these prevent or seem to threaten the separate national existence; and

(10) A hope that the nation will have a great and glorious future (especially in terms of territorial expansion) and become supreme in some way (in world power, if the nation is already large).

Yet another approach to the study of nationalism entails the recognition that there are different types of nationalism, which are then characterised on the basis of the factor or factors chiefly responsible for their rise. Two wide-ranging typologies of this kind are those developed by M. Handman and H.Lasswell. Handman describes four principle types:

> Oppression nationalism prevails in a group whose numbers are exposed to a definite and clear-cut regime of disabilities and subordination. These disabilities usually constitute an interference with the life of the group and embrace: efforts to deprive members of the group of the freedom to engage in all legitimate channels of economic enterprise and of making a living, unless they desert their group and join the ranks of the dominating and oppressing group; refusal to grant them full participation in the political and administrative life of the community; an attempt to prevent them from employing their own language and developing their own culture; a predeliction to humiliate them on every possible occasion and a disinclination to receive them on terms of social equality when other merits entitle them to such a reception; and lastly, constant interference with their freedom of speech and all forms of public expression.
>
> Irredentism - the political exploitation by one group of the fact that large numbers of their own people are under the domination of another group.
>
> Persecution nationalism - responds to the stimulus presented to the competitive organisation of the modern state system as well as the identification of commercial expansion withthe interests of national security and of general well-being... Sees danger arising from one source or another and this gives rise to agitated concern for the life and honour of the group.

> Prestige nationalism - finds its stimulus in the attitude of contempt or insufficient esteem with which the nation may be regarded when, in its own estimation, its past achievements or its present unrealised possibilities entitle it to a greater respect and consideration.[1]

A lively sense of the intricate nature of nationalism - "a complicated synthesis of religious, cultural, state, democratic and allied patterns" is how he describes it[2] - is present in Lasswell's study of the phenomenon. Lasswell, indeed, as we have seen, denies that nationalism is actually a unitary phenomenon, and speaks instead of "the varied manifestations for which the common name is used".[3] He identifies eight different types of nationalism:[4]

> Democratic nationalism took root in organised states as an incident in the struggle of various social groups to supersede feudal and dynastic control.
>
> Liberation nationalism is found where the symbols of the older social order are partially incorporated with various features of democratic nationalism to create a mass movement of defense against a territorially segregated enemy (e.g., Prussia's resistance to Napoleon).
>
> Oppression nationalism organises "random insecurities around demands for equal status in politics, language, business, worship and education".
>
> Resurrection nationalism arises where traditions of cultural and political unity have practically faded away, and is the work of the intellectual in quickening the quescent sense of cultural unity through cultural creation and political agitation.
>
> Prestige nationalism has its roots in a situation where people who share the culture of the ruling elite

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[1] M.S.Handman, "The Sentiment of Nationalism", Political Science Quarterly [1921], pp.108-109.

[2] Lasswell, op.cit., p.33.

[3] ibid, p.72.

[4] ibid, pp.72-75.

> of a state live on the periphery of the state in non-contiguous areas gradually begin to undergo a process of differentiation and self-assertion (e.g., Australia, New Zealand).
>
> Separatist nationalism is engendered by a situation in which revolutions at the centre of the state provoke reactions on behalf of the older institutions at the margin of the state (e.g., the Rhineland and Bavaria when Berlin was captured by revolutionaries in 1918)
>
> Anti-imperialist nationalism is found among peoples possessing traditions of cultural and political unity who regard themselves as potentially powerful despite the recent encroachments by cultures with superior physical and organising technique (e.g. India)
>
> Socialist nationalism is engendered by the transformation of global revolutionary ambitions to cope with exigencies at home or threats from abroad ("socialism in one country" as in the USSR).

This brief and somewhat cursory survey of the literature on nationalism is nevertheless helpful in the conclusions which it enables us to reach regarding the contexts in which this phenomenon should be studied and the pitfalls which are liable to be encountered in doing so. The task of formulating a definition of nationalism, we have learned, is an uncommonly difficult one. On the one hand, this attempt must overcome the dangers of defining nationalism in such general terms that the distinctions between it and a wide range of other political phenomena - such as the quest for power - as well as the distinctions between it and a sense of solidarity with those who share one's culture and language, or a sentimental attachment to the land in which one was born, or comparable emotions, are not obscured. Equally, an opposite danger must be avoided, namely that of identifying nationalism on the basis of what is supposed (incorrectly, we believe, particularly when this is held to be a specific development of Western political thought) to be its origins in Europe: and then examining

non-European nationalism in terms of the European experience and even denying that it is nationalism at all when it fails to conform to that model. We have also noted the wide variety of characteristics which have been perceived by scholars in nationalism. We derive from them a feeling that we may be witnessing something akin to the blind men identifying the different parts of an elephant. None of their descriptions, we feel, are entirely wrong; but each of them seems merely to describe a part of the whole and, because it fails to recognise that it is only dealing with a part, each description is in itself only partially correct. This holds true particularly of those who acount for the origins of nationalism on the basis of one factor alone, be it the denial of economic opportunity on the grounds of national origin, the quest for political freedom, or whatever. Almost by definition an approach to the study of nationalism which identifies different variants of the phenomenon and which then specifies a number of factors which have played a role in the development of each one, will be guilty of fewer errors of omission. With this kind of a strategy, however, we once again come face to face with the opposite danger, namely that of focussing so resolutely on the differences between various manifestations of nationalism that we lose sight of what all, or most, of them have in common with one another.

The present study evades rather than overcomes these dangers. It does not pretend to offer a comprehensive theory of nationalism in all its aspects based on all the societies in which it has existed or exists presently. Given the disarray of scholarship in this area, such an undertaking would surely be rashly ambitious and foredoomed to faulure. Our goal here, accordingly, is much more modest. We shall merely study a selected aspect

of the rise of nationalist movements among two peoples, the Jews of Eastern Europe and the non-Islamic communities of India.[1] For all the circumscribed nature of this study, however, its objectives are not trivial,. We suspect, indeed, that they are of wide - and, hitherto, of insufficiently acknowledged - relevance to the study of nationalism. Indeed, we shall claim to identify and explain one of the most important factors in the rise of nationalism - on the basis of which it would eventually be possible to construct a comprehensive theory of nationalism.

The claim of an earlier generation of social scientists to be "value-free" in their orientation toward scholarship is by and large rejected by scholars today. Not only is it generally recognised that such an orientation is unlikely to exist (and it does not require much perception to see through the pieties which sometimes accompany the claim to "objectivity" and "impartiality" to the very definite values which they mask) but it is also acknowledged that they should exist: human beings studying human life have no business to avoid values, and the question, rather, becomes one of the appropriateness of a given set of values and of the scholar's integrity and consistency in applying them. In a similar way, the subjects which scholars select for investigation, and their approaches to those subjects, are determined on the basis of their own interests which, in turn, are at least in part determined by their own life experiences: though we should of course exempt from this observation those

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[1] This latter designation must be qualified - and qualifications of this sort, it must be said, characterise the study of nationalism - by the observation that numerous Muslims did and still do, indeed, participate in the Indian National Congress (Congress Party). Their nationalism, however, is Indian rather than Islamic; that of the Muslim League is Islamic rather than Indian.

scholars (who are evidently not few in number), whose interests are determined for them by the research priorities of government funding agencies, foundations, etc.

Subjective considerations certainly have played a major role in determining the focus and approach of this study. Not only my interest in the phenomenon of nationalism, but also my own approach to an understanding of it, are based on the experience of having grown up in a society dominated by fervently nationalistic sentiments (Muslim India and Pakistan) and of having been a no-less fervent supporter of another nationalistic movement (Zionism). From the moment when, as a child in India, I first became aware of the fact that people belong to different racial, ethnic and national groups, I also became aware of (and was by no means immune to) the notion that certain groups are superior to others. This notion presented itself to me, from the outset, as a fact rather than as a judgement, and it was supported not only by those who considered themselves to be superior (the Europeans and chiefly the British), but also by those who considered themselves to be inferior. To be a German Jewish refugee was to be inferior to an Englishman: this was something to which Englishman and Jew alike subscribed. By the same token, to be a European (even if merely a German Jewish refugee!) was decidely to be superior to any kind of Indian whatsoever: this was an opinion to which Europeans and Indians alike subscribed. In the interests of brevity, and because this is not an autobiography, I am purposely ignoring the extraordinarily complex structure of nuances by which the gradations of inferiority and superiority were established in this society. For our purposes here, however, the facts are as I have recorded them.

What, in this environment, made a person superior and another inferior? There can be no doubt about this: everything! It is difficult to imagine any facet of a person's being which did not confirm either his superiority or his inferiority. To be an Indian was to have an inferior physiognomy to that of the Englishman; it was to conduct one's social relations in a "barbaric" way; it was to be the heir to an inferior civilisation, speaking an language, reading a literature, listening to music, and thinking thoughts which, in every way that counted, were inferior to those of the Englishman. It meant to have inferior standards of taste and to be capable of a lower level of accomplishment; it meant to speak English in a comic accent and to wear the clothes of a savage. These were facts on which Englishman and Indian alike agreed.

Paradoxically enough, on the face of things, the higher an Indian was in social status and educational attainment - in other words, the greater the sense he might be expected to have, on sociological grounds, of being able to shape his own destiny and mold his own identity - the more pronounced this sense of his own inferiority was likely to be: for the more frequently he would come into contact with the Englishman. The awareness of his own inferior identity combined with the sense of being able to shape his own destiny to produce that phenomenon which must surely be one of the most striking impressions obtained by any foreign visitor to India - the <u>plus anglais que les Anglais</u> Indian.

Even if only tenously, the <u>plus anglais</u> Indian believes that he is as good as the Englishman. Having made the effort to become like the English, at a psychological cost which few who have never undergone such a process

could assess, he now begins to demand the perogatives - social, economic and political - which the latter enjoys. For many Indians, however, this proves to be only a passing phase. I can remember quite distinctly when certain of my friends entered it - flouting the ties of their exclusive English public schools or Oxford and Cambridge colleges - but I can also recall them moving beyond it. As a result of various experiences, they discovered that they did not at all want to be like the Englishman whom they had formerly emulated; and very explicitly and angrily, they repudiated the notion that there was anything superior about them. On the contrary: the timeless values of the traditional heritage now began to be proclaimed - often with greater passion than familiarity or accuracy[1] - and English clothes, language, hairstyles, literature, etc., were abandoned in favour of indigenous ones. With this "discovery of India" comes also the recognition that the Indian heritage has been allowed to atrophy and strenuous demands are made to revive it; the government is criticised for not exerting itself sufficiently in this task.

This dialectic - this sense of one's own identity as inferior; the attempt at assimilation to the ways and patterns of the superior civilisation, in turn giving way to a fervent reaffirmation of one's past heritage - which I witnessed at work in my friends in India and Pakistan, has also, mutatis mutandis, played a prominent part in my own life. Since this circumstance has played a major role in the selection and analysis of the data in this study, some further words in this connection may clarify the

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[1] Cf. Renan's remark, "To forget - and I will venture to say - to get our history wrong - are essential factors in the making of a nation", E.Renan, quoted Rustow, op.cit., p.26.

research strategy employed here.

Political scientists, and perhaps social scientists in general, cannot be reminded too often that they are dealing with human beings. No matter how towering the forces which they examine are, and no matter how imposing the events, human history and himan society are composed of - human beings, of individual human beings. To understand history and to understand society, we must seek to understand the initiatives and reactions of the aggregates of individual human beings who make history and society possible. Even the most mindless mob can exist because and only because of the perceptions, emotions, aspirations, etc., etc., of each individual who composes it. If we want to understand such a mob we have to understand why human beings have joined it and what they are prepared to do - and why - in it. And this holds true also of nationalist movements. Essentially, therefore, we are suggesting the necessity of a psychoanaltic approach to the study of political behaviour, despite the formidable obstacles which this entails.

One of these obstacles, which we shall discuss more fully in the next chapter, has to do with the fact that few political scientists are trained in psychoanalysis. Part of that training entails the development, through countless hours of psychotherapeutic encounter, of "disciplined subjectivity", as Erikson calls it[1] - of a degree of sensitivity and

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[1] E.Erikson, "On the Nature of Psycho-Historical Evidence: In Search of Gandhi" in D.Rustow, ed., Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York, 1970). Comp. Erikson's essay, "The Nature of Clinical Evidence", in E.Erikson, Insight and Responsibility (New York, 1964), pp. 49-80.

intuition regarding the wellsprings of human behaviour which are only hinted at in the formal theoretical constructs within which the analyst operates. This faculty, we would suggest, is indispensable for reliable analysis, and yet it is one which few if any political scientists can bring to bear in their own studies of political behaviour. The danger confronting the psychoanalytically-oriented political scientist, therefore, is that of simplistic, and overly rigid, applications of formal psychoanalytic theory. This danger, I believe, can in large part be overcome by substituting introspection regarding one's life experience for the experience gained in psychoanalytic encounters with patients. Any person, no matter the field of his academic training, can accomplish the former - particularly if he has undergone a measure of analysis himself. It is moreover on the basis of his life experience that he will, unconsciously or not, in any case often decide on both the selection and interpretation of the subjects he studies. It is on the basis of this, controlled, reference to his own experience (and utilisation of it), then, that the scholar cal also control for what analysts call "counter-transference" - the process by which the analyst perceives his patients - or the scholar his subjects - on the basis of his own psychological drives. The starting point of this study, accordingly, is determined by the autobiographical data mentioned above, and particularly by the insight that nationalism often originates (we do not say always and necessarily) in the attempt to resolve an acute sense of identity confusion precipitated by subordination to what is perceived initially as a superior culture. The same determinant, moreover, also shapes the selection of nationalist movements studied here - Zionism and Indian nationalism. It is my contention that my living familiarity with these particular movements enables

me to arrive at insights - in the application to them of theoretical constructs - which I could not reach were I to study other nationalist movements; and it is also my contention that the utilisation in this fashion of life experience is as far as the layman can go in compensating for that lack of trained subjectivity which the psychoanalyst could bring to bear in the study of political phenomena. I do not believe, however, that the coincidence of these two nationalist movements in this study has relevance only to my personal encounters with them. Both movements share certain basic experiences, having arisen out of a history of oppression which took on strong cultural overtones; both addresssed themselves to heterogenous groups sharing a common religion, it is true, but separated by a Babel-like multiplicity of langguages. On the other hand, we must also recognise that while Indian nationalism addressed itself primarily to Hindus, it did not do so exclusively (though many Muslims, in particular, questioned the authenticity of the Congress's non-sectarian claims). The most striking distinction between the two movements, of course, is that while Indian nationalists could point to the fact that they were indisputably a majority in their own country, the Zionists were a fraction of the Russo-Polish populations and, moreover, sought the creation of their own state in a land several thousand miles away, in Palestine, where virtually no Jews were living at the time. Thus, the differences and the similarities of the background to these two nationalist movements are alike sufficiently strong to encourage me in the belief that to the extent that we succeed in identifying a distinct set of psychological dynamics common to both, we shall also have succeeded in identifying a distinct component of any psychoanalytically-oriented typology of nationalism.

2. PSYCHOSOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE STUDY OF NATIONALISM

The word "I" does not stand alone. By itself it can have no meaning. Rather, as Buber reminds us, it exists only as part of the primary word-combinations "I-Thou" and "I-It".[1] Without the "I" there is no "Thou" or "It"; without them there can be no "I". Each is a consciousness made possible only by recognition of the other.

It is a curious paradox that this simple but profound truth regarding the pervasive interpenetration and interdependence of the individual and his environment was distorted, and implicitly denied, in the earlier stages of the development of psychoanalytic theory. The ego, in Freud's initial formulation, stood in uneasy juxtaposition to the convulsive passions of the id and of the "indistinct aggregates" of human beings, as Freud called them, surrounding the individual. The superego, likewise, was initially seen primarily in terms of the weighty - and alien - burden (von aussen aufgenoetigt") of restraint which it placed on the ego.[2] Although it was recognised that the superego did not merely incorporate the personal qualities of the parents, but also "the tastes, and standardsm of the social class in which they live and the characteristics and traditions of

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[1] Martin Buber, I and Thou (2nd.ed., Edinburgh, 1959), p.3.

[2] Cf. the discussion in E.Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York, 1968), pp.45ff.

the race from which they sprang",[1] little systematic exploration of the relationship of ego and environment - and of the structure and function of the ego in the light of this relationship, was attempted. The ego, and the psychic processes in general, were all seen in terms of the id. "The theoretical study of the individual ego was distinctly unpopular", Anna Freud remarked, explaining that it was in the area of depth psychology - the study of the id - that it was believed that the most powerful truths regarding the human psyche would be uncovered.[2] It is with the work of E. Erikson that the first comprehensive and systematic efforts have been made to understand the ego-environment relationship and to study in detail the way, and the extent to which, the ego is shaped by the nature of its encounters with the environment. It is on the basis of these encounters (including of course the reaction to them) that what Erikson calls "identity formation" takes place. Identity formation, Erikson declares, "is the very criterion of psychosocial functioning at, and after, the conclusion of...adolescence", and is decisively shaped in many ways (as we shall presently discover) by the successive stages of pre-adolescent development.[3]

To describe identity as "psychosocial" is of course to give at least the appearance of foreclosing the question of the ego-environment relationship: or at least of asserting rather than of demonstrating its salience.

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[1] S.Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (New York, 1949), pp.122, 123, quoted Erikson, op.cit., p.110. Comp. Civilisation and its Discontents, passim.

[2] Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (rev.ed., New York 1966), pp.2-3.

[3] E.Erikson, "Identity, Psychosocial", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1967), vii, p.62.

Before proceeding further, accordingly, we would do well to examine some of the key concepts involved, in the terms in which Erikson himself presents them. The central task of the ego is to organise experience. This process[1]

> guards the coherence and the individuality of experience by gearing the individual for shocks threatening from sudden discontinuities in the organism as well as in the milieu; by enabling it to anticipate inner as well as outer dangers; and by integrating endowment and social opportunities. It thus assures to the individual a sense of coherent individuation and identity: of being one's self, of being all right, and of being on the way to becoming what other people, at their kindest, take one to be.

Three facets of this process call for our attention. The first of these is the superego which, for our purposes, can most usefully be described in terms of its relationship to the ego ideal. The former, Erikson characterises as the "more archaic, more thoroughly internalised and unconscious" representative of the inborn proclivity of human beings to develop a socially acceptable conscience. The latter, however, "Seems to be more flexibly and consciously bound to the ideals of the particular era as absorbed in childhood. It is closer to the ego function of reality testing: ideals can change".[2]

While the ego ideal's goals are "forever not quite attainable", the ego identity is "characterised by the actually attained but forever to be revised sense of the reality of the Self within social reality".[3] It is with this process - ego identity - that we must concern ourselves here.

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[1] E.Erikson, Childhood and Society (2nd.ed., New York 1964), p.35

[2] Identity, op.cit., p.210

[3] ibid, pp.210-211.

It may be helpful at the outset to emphasise that this approach to the concept of identity entails a concern very different from "the faddish 'definition' of identity as the question 'Who am I?'"[1] What we are dealing with here is a process which is "partially conscious and largely unconscious",[2]

> a process "located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of these two identities. ...In psychological terms, identity formation employs a process of simultaneous reflection and observation, a process taking place on all levels of mental functioning, by which the individual judges himself in the light of what he perceives to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves, and to a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he perceives himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him.[3]

It is the task of ego identity to provide the person with "the ability to experience one's self as something that has continuity and sameness, and to act accordingly";[4] the feeling of being a unity of personality "recognised by others as having consistency in time - of being, as it were, an irreversible historical fact";[5] and, in general, with a subjective sense of the ego quality of existence, "the awareness of the fact that there is a self sameness and continuity to the ego's synthesising methods, the style of one's individuality, and that this style coincides with the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for significant others in the immediate community".[6]

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1 "Identity, Psychosocial", op.cit., p.62.

2 "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity", in E.Erikson, ed., The Challenge of Youth (Garden City, 1965), p.13.

3 Identity, op.cit., p.22.

4 Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.42.

5 "Youth", op.cit., p.13.

6 Identity, op.cit., pp.49-50.

The process of identity formation, then, leads to "a conviction that the ego is capable of integrating effective steps toward a tangible collective future, that it is developing into a well-organised ego within a social reality".[1] We must, however, see identity itself as a process rather than as a goal, or as an achieved condition. It begins, as Erikson says, "somewhere in the first true 'meeting' of mother and baby as two persons who can touch and recognise each other, and it does not end until a man's power of mutual affirmation wanes".[2] A "normative crisis" usually occurs during adolescence; it is important for our purposes to recognise that this crisis "is in many ways determined by what went before and determines much of what follows".[3] It is no less important for our purposes to recognise that identity is "a psychological process reflecting social processes" when viewed from a psychological standpoint but that it can, with a sociological perspective, be seen as "a social process reflecting psychological processes".[4] We are a part of each others' habitats, of what Erikson with the ethologists calls the Umwelt. The "outerworld" of the ego, accordingly, is made up of the egos of others significant to it - significant to it in that "on many levels of crude and subtle communication my whole inner being perceives in them a hospitality for the ways in which my inner world is ordered and includes them, which makes me, in turn, hospitable to the way in which they order their world and include me".[5]

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[1] Identity, op.cit., p.49-50.
[2] ibid, p.23.
[3] ibid, p.22.
[4] "Youth", op.cit., p.13
[5] Identity, op.cit., pp.49-50.

Here, then, is the nexus within which the psyche grows:[1]

> A human being...is at all times an organism, an ego and a member of society...That there is no anxiety without somatic tension seems immediately obvious; but we must also learn that there is no individual anxiety which does not reflect a latent concern common to the immediate and extended group.

And, more specifically,[2]

> The gradual development of a mature psychosocial identity...presupposes a community of people whose traditional values become significant to the growing person even as his growth assumes relevance for them. Mere 'roles' that can be 'played' interchangeably are obviously not sufficient for the social aspect of the equation. Only a hierarchical integration of roles that foster the vitality of individual growth as they represent a vital trend in the existing or developing social order can support identities. Psychosocial identity thus depends on a complementarity of an inner (ego) synthesis in the individual and of role integration in the group.

By way of illustrating briefly what we shall presently be examining in closer detail, we may refer here to Freud's identification of the principal sources of human self-esteem, noting the correlative social processes and experiences in which Erikson sets them.[3] The residue of childish narcissism in the adult, a component of his self-esteem, is rooted in the maternal love which he had experienced as a child and which had assured him that it was "good to be alive in the social coordinates in which he [happened] to find himself"; as also in the experience of employing what he had learned in childhood, "acquiring thereby a feeling of continued communal meaning". Another decisive source of self-esteem in the

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[1] Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.36.

[2] "Identity, Psychosocial", op.cit., p.61.

[3] Identity, op.cit., p.71

adult is a residue of the sense of infantile omnipotence "corroborated by experience giving the child the feeling that he fulfills his own ego ideal"; this finds social reinforcement, in general, in "the skills and social techniques which assure a gradual coincidence of play and skillful performance, of ego ideal and social role, and thereby promise a tangible social future". All in all, then, while adult self-esteem is rooted in infantile and childhood experiences and processes, it is also a product of the growing person's encounters with social reality and cannot be understood without reference to them.

Just as the human being needs to draw his sense of identity from his membership in society, so too does society renew itself from the powers which he draws from it:[1]

> From the cycle of life such dispositions as faith, will-power, purposefulness, efficiency, devotion, affection, responsibility, and sagacity (all of which are also criteria of ego strength), flow into the life of institutions. Without them, institutions wilt; but without the spirit of institutions pervading the patterns of love and care, instruction and training, no enduring strength could emerge from the sequence of generations.

The psyche itself, in numerous important ways, refuses to recognise the distinctions between inner and outer, between psyche and society, to which our intellects are constantly drawing attention. Commenting on the dream of a patient raised in a strongly anti-Semitic family - a dream in which a Jewish figure represents the patient's unconscious evil identity (or that which the ego is most afraid to resemble), Erikson observes:

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[1] E.Erikson, "Life Cycle", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York, 1967), ix, p.292.

> ...The ego, in the course of its synthesising efforts, attempts to subsume the most powerful ideal and evil prototypes (the final contestants, as it were) and with them the whole existing imagery of superior and inferior, good and bad, masculine and feminine, free and slave, potent and impotent, beautiful and ugly, black and white, tall and small, in one simple alternative in order to make one battle and one strategy out of a bewildering number of skirmishes... Where a group's socio-economic status is in danger, the implicit moral code becomes more restricted, more magic, more exclusive, and more intolerant, as though an outer danger had to be treated as an inner one. (1)

The relevance of these considerations for the study of social change, whether from a historical, sociological or political perspective, is frequently emphasised by Erikson. We cannot separate personal growth and communal change", he declares, "nor can we separate...the identity crisis in the individual life and contemporary crises in historical development, because the two help to define each other and are truly relative to one another".[2] Or again, Erikson explains that the reason why cultural and historical change can prove so traumatic to identity formation is that it "can break up the inner consistency of a child's hierarchy of expectation".[3] Erikson also refers to the largely external causation of what he calls "identity vacuums", which can be brought about as a result of the fears aroused by discoveries and inventions, and by "the decay of institutions which had been the historical anchor of existing ideologies".[4]

We have up to this point described Erikson's concept of identity and have noted his contribution to the development of ego psychology, which lies in

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[1] Identity, op.cit., pp.59, 55.

[2] ibid, p.23.

[3] ibid, p.159

[4] "Identity, Psychosocial", op.cit., p.65.

the considerable emphasis he has placed on the multi-faceted interaction between ego and social environment, and on the extent to which the development of the ego is conditioned by its relationship to the social environment, and by developments there. Before proceeding to a more detailed explanation of Erikson's stages of identity formation, however, it might be helpful to take note of a number of remarks made by him regarding the relationship between psychology and social psychology in particular, and the social sciences in general. These may serve the reader as guidelines in relating what follows to his own interest in the social sciences: as well as explaining some of the considerations which we have taken into account in developing our own application of psychosocial constructs to the study of nationalism. Erikson points to shortcomings on the part of psychologists and social scientists alike in explaining the failure of the disciplines to integrate each others' concerns. The former he blames for their "general neglect of social factors". The latter, on the other hand, he chides for "blithely ignoring"[1]

> the simple fact that all individuals are born by mothers; that everybody was once a child; that people and peoples begin in their nurseries; and that society consists of generations in the process of developing from children into parents, destined to absorb the historical changes of their lifetimes and to continue to make history for their descendants.

Erikson also takes to task those social scientists who, utilising the concept of identity, do so in a "non-psychological way", by treating it as if it were a matter of social roles, personal traits or conscious self images.[2] These, he accuses of "shunning the less manageable and more

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[1] Identity, op.cit., p.45.

[2] ibid, p.16.

sinister - which often also means the more vital - implications of the concept."

Finally, we are warned against reaching a tempting but fallacious conclusion regarding the applicability of the concept of psychosocial identity. We may not, Erikson insists, "view mass phenomena - culture, religion, revolution - as analogies of neuroses".[1] The point, rather, is to study the ego's roots in social organisation and to recognise that "contemporary social models...assume decisive concreteness in every individual's struggle for ego-synthesis".[2]

These remarks lead us - in an initial formulation which we shall attempt to refine in several stages during the course of this study - to recognise that the application, in any systematic sense, of psychological insights to the study of political phenomena, though feasible, must proceed within the confines of an explicit awareness of the difficulties inherent in this task, and of the fact that there are no pat formulae which we can, more or less automatically, take from the field of psychology and apply to the field of politics. For all its potential, then, the limits and difficulties inherent in this method of inquiry need forcibly to be stressed. In particular, two dangers which could arise in this kind of study may already be emphasised at this, preliminary stage. Every more or less educated lay person nowadays fancies that he possesses an understanding of at least the rudiments of psychoanalytic theory, and assures himself that he is

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[2] Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.15.

[1] Identity, op.cit., p.44.

being "psychological" when he refers to the ego, the Oedipus complex, or whatever. It is worth bearing in mind however that psychoanalytic theory has been undergoing development for three quarters of a century now, and that to possess a psychological understanding of behaviour requires the acquisition of more than merely passing familiarity with the jargon. Just as a political scientist would not acknowledge the authority of analyses based merely on a reading of the daily newspaper, so too - we would do well to bear in mind - a psychologist may legitimately express exasperation at the cavalier manner in which the analytic tools of his discipline are debased when they pass into popular usage. For our purposes, accordingly, it is particularly important that our analysis of the data on the basis of the concept of identity formation should resist the temptation to fall into a blithe and easy understanding of the notion of dentity. This is a technical term in the field of psychoanalytic theory and must be employed as such. But even saying this is not sufficient. Years of practising their profession imparts to psychoanalysts a sensitivity of perception, and a depth of human understanding, which is seldom matched by others. That sensitivity and understanding are vital tools which the psychoanalyst brings to bear in his work and which, over and above his understanding of the technical concepts of psychoanalysis, enable him to make the contributions which he makes. The non-professional in the field, lacking the frequent - the daily - stimulus to the refinement of his sensibilities which the psychoanalyst encounters, thus suffers from a built-in and probably insurmountable handicap. All he can do, under these circumstances,is to refine hiw own powers to the extent possible - among other ways as we have already suggested by exploiting for these purposes the benefits of his own introspection - and to find new and better ways

of utilising specific material developed by psychoanalysts. To the extent that the social scientist merely attempts to duplicate the work of the psychoanalyst, he dooms himself to a mediocre version of the latter's achievements.

One of the first of many ugly words which a graduate student in political science - and probably in the other social sciences, too - learns is "reification"; and yet all social scientists seem to experience over and over again the temptation to do precisely that - to "reify". Erikson rightly emphasises the danger here, when he warns that psychoanalytic theory cannot - certainly not at the present stage of its development - "explain" mass phenomena such as culture, religion or revolution in the kinds of categories in which it explains the functioning of individual psyches. Erikson's precise meaning here is uncertain, however. If he has in mind the notion, however implicit, that there is such a "thing" as revolution, or whatever, for the analysis of which psychoanalytic theory will one day be able to offer concepts analogous to that of neurosis in the individual, then our suspicion would be that he has fallen into the very same, lurking danger of reification against which he has warned others. Here once again it would seem appropriate to stress what we all know but find so easy to overlook - namely that there is no event or chain of events in human affairs which is not rooted in and indeed defined by the aggregate of human beings who participate in them, react to them, or whatever. If we want to understand an event in human affairs we have to understand the behaviour of those who are involved in that event. Not even the most massive historical movements - such as nationalism - could exist for so much as a moment were it not for the fact that individual human beings participate in them

and each individual has his or her own reasons for participating in them! These reasons, it should hardly be necessary to state here, include both the conscious and the unconscious ones. Psychoanalytic theory, then, does not hold out the prospect of placing "revlution" or "religion" or "culture" or some other such patient on the psychotherapeutic couch. What it does enable us to do is to move toward an understanding of why people subscribe to certain beliefs, and join in whith certain types of behaviour, why they respond to certain kinds of promises held out to them by political leaders, and so on. Psychoanalytic theory, in other words, seeks to account for the way in which people respond to internal and external stimuli. From the standpoint of the social scientist, then, psychoanalytic theory enables the scholar to seek an understanding of why people act in the way they do to social stimuli. Two problems deserve to be raised in this connection. As anyone who has had any psychotherapeutic experience will know, massive difficulties stand in the way of uncovering so much as the sources of specific aspects of an individual's behaviour; for all practical purposes, indeed, we can say that it is impossible, given existing psychoanalytic theory and techniques, to explain everything - or even to identify everything - about a single human mind. And this by no means only or even primarily because of the workings of a kind of Heisenbergian Principle of Uncertainty in this connection which states that the patient changes merely by virtue of the knowledge about himself which he acquires. Beyond this consideration, we may quite simply say that the human psyche is too complex ever to lend itself to this kind of total uncovery. On the other hand, it is true that psychoanalytic theory does have a holistic nature, being validated in its different aspects by empirical data obtained through the analysis of different individuals. It does, in

other words, offer a view of the entire range of the psyche even though it would be impossible to confirm that view through the analysis of a single individual. That view is, rather, one which has developed cumulatively. Nevertheless, it remains the case that a psychoanalytic investigation when undertaken for therapeutic purposes is in almost every instance an extremely arduous and lengthy undertaking requiring the active participation and uninhibited candour of the patient in question. Here, then, are a host of problems. It is unlikely that the social scientist applying psychoanalytic methods will be able to match the trained sensitivity of the professional psychoanalyst, nurtured as it is by countless hours of psychotherapeutic encounters. Further more, the social scientist will very often have to form his judgement of psychoanalytic pehnomena on the basis of printed material not originally produced for the sake of such analysis, rather than through face-to-face encounters. This fact must inevitably make his analysis even more superficial, even where extensive autobiographical and other material is available. But even this consideration does not exhaust the list of handicaps under which the psychoanalytically-oriented social scientist must labour. It is in the nature of his task that the social scientist must deal with masses of individuals - and it goes without saying that the greater the number whose behaviour he seeks to understand, the more superficial his perception of the psychological dynamics prompting their behaviour must necessarily be. While it is important to recognise these problems, we should also note that there is a danger of exaggerating their effect, too. In particular, we may note that our goal, in applying psychoanalytic methods, is not therapeutic but analytic. It is true that the subjectivity with which symbols, metaphors, etc., are perceived by the psyche means that each person invests them

with his or her own significance, which is derived from the particular circumstances in which his or her own psychic structure has developed. The therapeutic method entails uncovering those circumstances and exposing the patient to them, in all their immediacy. It is this process of uncovering, which the patient must in the last resort do himself in face of all the resistances which led to the covering up in the first place, which makes therapeutic analysis so laborious. But this is not to say that the therapist himself may not have a very shrewd idea of what - at least in general terms - the patient will ultimately discover: indeed, the patient himself may know that well in advance of actually arriving there. I may know, for instance, that I have an unresolved Oedipus complex long before I succeed in uncovering it in a therapeutically valid sense. This is because psychoanalytic theory has over the years developed a considerable understanding of what certain symbols, etc., mean to human beings and provides us with pointers which enable us - with any given symbol - to select the most probable cause or causes which account for the value which the symbol may have. We know, for instance, the range of meanings which "father" can have, psychologically speaking; and we kow what kinds of causes are associated with each of those meanings. We can then attempt to examine environmental, historical and similar factors to determine which of those causes are likely to have been paramount. Obviously, the specific form in which the symbol appears - for example Hitler or Stalin as father figures at once loving, protecting and brutal, etc., etc. - provides us with legitimate interpretative clues. The fact that we cannot undertake complete analyses, accordingly, while itshould be recognised, should not deter us from going as far as we can. By the same token, the

fact that we are dealing with the origins of a movement far removed from us in space and time, and are therefore unable to subject the principal actors in whose intentions we are interested, to thoroughgoing personal analysis, should not detract us from the attempt to analyse them as far as it is possible to do so, through a study of their activities, of the writings and statements which they have left behind, and of their Umwelt in both its historical and contemporary aspects: and all this in the light of psychoanalytic theory. We cannot know everything we would like to know, and it is open to question whether we can indeed know very much. Does this mean that an endeavour such as the one on which we are embarking here is not worth undertaking? In the final resort, of course, this will be a question to be answered on the basis of results produced. Nevertheless, I would suggest that, no matter how great the practical and theoretical difficulties may be, we have no alternative to the pursuit of this kind of an understanding. Whether we take a Marxist determinist position or whether we adopt the most extreme stand in defense of the notion of free will - or whether we adopt any position between these extremes - we have no alternative but to recognise that human behaviour is the outcome of psychological processes. As we know from history, it is not "in the nature of things" that under a given social or political circumstance people react in a specific way. Not every oppressed person rises up against his oppressor, for example, nor does every subject of a colonial power seek the freedom, so-called, of his nation. It can of course be argued that the kind of statement just made is a caricature of sociological theory which does, after all, seek to establish in detail the necessary and sufficient causes of social phenomena. My point, however, is that behind each and every one of those necessary and sufficient phenomena, as

identified by the social scientist, and intimately rooted in them, are psychological factors which lead people, in the last resort, to the positions and actions which they do adopt. Even dialectical materialism must be able to account for the psychological processes which lead a person to define his interests in one way rather than another, and to feel and act about them in the way that he does. All this is not to deny the factor of e.g., economic self-interest but only to insist that that concept is not self-explanatory but must include with it an accounting of the psychological factors which underly it. Only someone who fails to recognise the implications of what Erikson has rightly stressed, over and over again, regarding the interpenetration and interaction of ego and environment would interpret our insistence here as psychological reductionism. Whether we can discover as much as we would like to, and even whether we can discover very much, are accordingly considerations which are only relevant up to a point. The underlying existence of psychological factors in human behaviour is not open to question: and we must try to the best of our ability to understand them in their relation to political, social, historical, etc., phenomena. This is our justification here; from a methodological point of view it is also worth noting that the more frequently such studies are undertaken, the more the analytic and procedural problems associated with them will be clarified.

As already mentioned, we will be returning to a discussion of the methodological problems inherent in this kind of study at several stages of our inquiry. Let us leave the matter now, therefore, in its tentative and inconclusive form, and turn our attention again to Erikson's theory of human identity.

For Erikson, "originology" can be as great a fallacy, in the study of the human psyche as its opposite - teleology.[1] That is to say, he repudiates the notion that the psychological character of the adult human being is a product of the experiences - and the responses to those experiences - of infancy and early childhood. Instead, Erikson puts forward an epigenetic principle of human growth:[2]

> Somewhat generalised, this principle states that everything that grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole.

In terms of identity formation, this principle is translated to mean that the individual passes through a succession of developmental stages of psychosocial adaptation, in each of which a specific psychological characteristic comes to the fore; these stages culminate in a developmental crisis, the most acute of which is associated with adolescence. Although the gains of each stage are reinterpreted in the light of what happens in ensuing ones, the epigenetic principle does not deny the role of early experiences in shaping future growth.

There are two principal features of the Eriksonian schema. One focusses on the nature of each stage; the other on the connections between them. The stages can most conveniently be identified here in tabular form, with the period in the biological life-cycle in which they come to the fore. As presented overleaf, the table is adapted from Childhood and Society (p.273); a somewhat different terminology is applied by Erikson in the

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[1] E.Erikson, Gandhi's Truth (New York, 1969), p.98.

[2] Identity, op.cit., p.92.

later Identity: Youth and Crisis (p.94), for reasons with which we do not need to concern ourselves here.

PERIOD	STAGE
1. Oral-sensory	Basic trust vs. Mistrust
2. Muscular-anal	Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt
3. Locomotor, genital	Initiative vs. Guilt
4. Latency	Industry vs. Inferiority
5. Puberty and Adolescence	Identity vs. Role Confusion
6. Young Adulthood	Intimacy vs. Isolation
7. Adulthood	Generativity vs. Stagnation
8. Maturity	Ego Integrity vs. Despair

Before turning to an examination in detail of these stages, some words must be said about the nature of the connections between them. In accordance with the epigenetic principle, it will be noted that each one of the stages must exist from the beginning in some form, for every act calls for an integration of all. Each, however, comes to its ascendance at the time in the life cycle, and in the order, indicated above; experiences a crisis and then finds a more or less lasting solution subject only to the factors which we shall now consider.

It is consistent with the epigenetic principle that, with the development

of a new stage, the relationship of all the parts to the psychic whole undergoes a change. In a real enough sense, this therefore alters the form assumed by a stage following its culminating crisis.[1] The conceptual emphasis here, accordingly, is very much on the cumulative effects of growth. This complicates analysis, of course, since it can make it difficult to detect - and certainly to predict - the particular form which any of the above stages will assume as the person matures. However, despite the "reintegration of the gains of each stage of identity formation in an ever-widening "ensemble", we must also recognise that each stage of identity formation is, in Erikson's words, "in many ways determined by what went before and determines much that follows".[2] This consideration, in turn, does facilitate both retrospective analysis and prediction.

With these preliminary remarks we may now turn and take a closer view of the stages in the formation of human identity. In what follows, we shall reassemble Erikson's constructs in such a way as to stress the wider, social correlates of each of the stages.

Basic Trust vs. Mistrust

We have already seen that a fundamental requirement for and characteristic of ego identity is a sense of sameness and continuity in oneself; and that this in turn means a perception of sameness and continuity in the environment which is of importance to one. Thdevelopment of this sense meets its crisis as a result of two circumstances inherent in infancy. The infant,

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[1] Gandhi's Truth, op.cit., p.38.

[2] ibid, ad loc.

robbed of the automatic nourishment available to it in the womb, must learn to overcome the rage and anxiety he experiences over the unavailability of the breast at the precise moment he desires it. This he does, it is his first social achievement, by developing the certainty that his mother does care for him, in the two senses of the word, and that she will make herself available to him at the earliest possible moment. In this lesson are already contained the rudiments of that sense of consistency, continuity and sameness on which trust rests. It is however somewhat later that the climactic crisis occurs - namely when, with teething, the mother withdraws the nipple permanently, and often abruptly. It is now that the sense of trust is put to the decisive test - often, barring psychotherapeutic intervention - with lifelong consequences. Will the infant feel that his world is predictable enough, despite the withdrawal of the nipple, to experience that feeling of continuity and sameness which make possible a trusting attitude toward the world?[1]

It is, moreover, in connection with this development that inner correlates of external experience begin to develop. Where that experience is positive, it confirms "a feeling of inner goodness"[2] which the infant possesses; where it is negative, it begins to undermine that feeling. Here then are the roots of both introjection - the feeling that an outer goodness has become an inner certainty - and of projection, or the experiencing of an inner harm as an outer one, the process which leads to the endowing of significant people with the evil which is actually in ourselves.

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[1] This section is derived from Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.247ff; Identity, op.cit., p.96ff; and E.Erikson, "Roots of Virtue", in ed. J.Huxley, Humanist Frame (New York, 1962), p.151ff.

[2] Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.147

These mchanisms, in the healthily growing individual, eventually "must yield to the testimony of the maturing senses and ultimately of reason"[1]. In moments of acute crisis, however, they are frequently reinstated and can result in irrational attitudes and distorted perceptions.

It is in connection with the development of trust that hope is established, or else fails to be established, as a basic quality of experience which remains with the individual "independent of verifiability" of particular hopes.[2] Among other qualities, hope expresses a sense of the consistency of the outer world - and of its consistency with the inner world:[3]

> The evolutionary character of hope becomes apparant if we consider that it must help man to approximate that rootedness possessed by the animal world, in which instinctive equipment and environment, moment for moment, verify each other, unless catastrophe overtakes the individual or the species. To the human infant, his mother is nature; she must be that original verification, which, later, will come from other and wider segments of reality.

Nevertheless, even under the most favourable circumstances, it is apparently at this stage that there is first introduced "a sense of inner division and universal nostalgia for a paradise forfeited".[4] It is a function of religion, the foremost social institution associated with this stage, to sustain the adult in the mature version of the resolution he was able to make as a result of the infantile crisis of trust. This is not to say that religion as such is childish, or religious behaviour infantile.

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1 Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.249.

2 "Roots of Virtue", op.cit., p.154.

3 ibid, ad loc.

4 Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.250.

Rather, each stage in the formation of identity makes a contribution to one major human endeavour which in adulthood takes over the guardianship of the particular strength originating in this stage and the ritual appeasement of its particular estrangement".[1]

In an age when religion loses "its acutal power of presence", it is imperative that there be created "other forms of joint reverence for life which derive vitality from a shared world image",[2] for it is only in this way that the social prerequisites for a sense of trust can be provided for the new generations.

Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt

There comes a stage, not long after teething, when an infant begins to display somewhat bizarre behaviour. He will smuggle up close to his mother and then suddenly push her away; he will also hoard objects and then abruptly abandon them. Such apparently arbitrary tendencies are designated by the formula of "retentive-eliminative modes".[2] Physiologically, the preparation for this stage is provided for by the development of muscular coordination and control which reflects itself in increasing verbalisation and in toilet training. In these activities, the child acquires the possibility of choosing whether to "hold on" or to "let go"; herein lie the roots of autonomy, and hence of choice and will.[3]

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[1] Identity, op.cit., p.105f.

[2] ibid, pp.106-107.

[3] This section is derived from Identity, op.cit., p.107ff; and Childhood and Society, op.cit., pp.251-254.

The imperative need at this stage is for the child to be protected against meaningless and arbitrary experiences of shame and doubt, which have their origins in "the potential anarchy of [the child's] as yet untrained sense of discrimination, his inability to hold on and to let go with discretion:[1]

> For if denied the gradual and well-guided experience of the autonomy of free choice (or if, indeed, weakened by an initial lack of trust) the child will turn against himself all his urge to discriminate and to manipulate. He will over manipulate himself, he will become obsessed by his own repetitiveness. By such obsessiveness, of course, he learns to repossess the environment and to gain power by stubborn and minute control, where he could not find large-scale mutual recognition and regulation. Such hollow victory is the infantile model of a compulsion neurosis. It is also the infantile source of later attempts in adult life to govern by the letter, rather than by the spirit.

Also associated with the urge to turn against oneself the desire to discriminate and manipulate is the feeling of shame, which is essentially "rage turned against the self".[2] The decisive question at this stage, accordingly, is whether one's experience is such as to confirm or to deny the appropriateness of one's decisions to hold on or to let go. Where the experience is positive, autonomy, and with it good will and pride, emerge. Where the experience is negative, there grows a "lasting propensity for shame".[3]

It is in connection with that aspect of autonomy which conveys a sense of the appropriateness of actions and decisions, and through which "man's

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1 Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.252.

2 ibid, ad loc.

3. ibid, p.254

basic need for a delineation of his autonomy"[1] is derived, that Erikson identifies the social correlates of this stage. For the safeguard of that need to validate the way in which the individual exercises his autonomy is, in the external, social world, met by the principle of law and order, and the institutions which are responsible for its implementation:[2]

> In daily life as well as in the high courts of law - domestic and international - this principle apportions to each his privileges and his limitations, his obligations and his rights. A sense of rightful dignity and lawful independence on the part of the adults around him gives to the child of good will the confident expectation that the kind of autonomy fostered in childhood will not lead to undue doubt or shame in later life. Thus the sense of autonomy fostered in the child and modified as life progresses, serves (and is served by) the preservation in economic and political life of a sense of justice.

The gains connected with this stage appear to be fragile. Erikson singles out for discussion the consequences of increasing depersonalisation and anonymity in society who were prepared to expect from life a high degree of personal autonomy and pride. Finding their adult lives dominated by impersonal organisations too intricate to understand and too impenetrable to control, such individuals may experience

> deep chronic disappointment that makes them unwilling to grant each other - or their children - a measure of autonomy. They may be possessed, instead, by irrational fears of losing what is left of their autonomy or of being sabotaged, restricted and constricted in their free will by anonymous enemies and at the same time, paradoxically enough, of not being controlled enough, of not being <u>told</u> what to do.

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[1] <u>Identity</u>, op.cit., p.113

[2] <u>Childhood and Society</u>, op.cit., p.254

Initiative vs. Guilt

The child now enters the stage at which the castration complex and, behind it the Oedipus complex, begins to take form. The emergence of these characteristics, which are the source of so much human anguish, is associated with the development of the child's ambulatory faculties to the point where he can walk and manipulate with confidence, and as a result of which infantile genitality now becomes feasible.[1]

The development of locomotor powers is accompanied by the development of the child's skill in language which enables him to ask questions and receive intelligible answers to them: this faculty, as anyone who has been with a child around three will know, is remorselessly exploited: this is the age of "Why?" All in all, then, this is the stage which witnesses the consolidation and extension of the achievements registered in the previous stage, when the child's sense of autonomy begins to develop. Now, the child siezes initiatives, based in part on that sense of autonomy and made possible by the developing locomotor and linguistic capabilities. His exuberant enjoyment of these will not infrequently have to be checked by responsible adults. This circumstance, combined with the fact that, increasingly, the child not only resorts to activities which <u>are</u> checked but - partly in anticipation of the fact that they would be checked - also develops fantasies about activities which he <u>knows</u> cannot be acted out in practice, creates new sources of rage and, through this, for the first time, of guilt. Guilt, then, is in its anticipation, conscience, "the great governor of initiative".[2]

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[1] This section is derived from <u>Identity</u>, opcit., p.115ff; <u>Childhood</u> op.cit., pp.255-258; and "Roots of Virtue", op.cit., pp.155-157

[2] <u>Identity</u>, op.cit., p.119.

The manner in which a child passes through this stage of identity formation is fraught with the most profound consequences for the future. His capacity for action will in large measure be determined by it; as also will his view of morality, which he may come to see as merely the self-justification of the powerful or, alternatively, in intrinsic terms: excessive moralism is also rooted in the experiences of this stage.

The foremost social relevance of this stage is that sense of action which is developed during it: this stage[1]

> results not only in the oppressive establishment of a moral sense restricting the horizon of the permissable; it also sets the direction toward the possible and the tangible which permits the dream of early childhood to be attached to the goals of an active adult life. Social institutions therefore offer children of this age an economic ethos, in the form of ideal adults recognisable by their uniforms and their functions, and fascinating enough to replace the heroes of pciture books and fairy tales.

Industry vs. Inferiority

With the inception of the latency period, the child begins to sublimate his intrusive mode, his aggressive exploration of his capacity for initiative, and settles down to win recognition by producing things. He develops, therefore, a sense of industry.He no longer arranges the world of his play things according to arbitrary and transient whim, but seeks instead to "adjust himself to the inorganic laws of the tool world... [and] to bring a productive situation to completion."[2]

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[1] Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.258.

[2] ibid, p.259. This section is derived from Ibid, pp.258-261; Identity, op.cit., pp.122-128; and "Roots of Virtue", op.cit., p.157.

Freud has described this as the latency period because it does not witness a swing from inner upheaval to new mastery; violent drives become dormant and remain so until puberty, when they re-emerge in new combinations. From a social point of view, however, this period is one of the utmost importance:[1]

> Since industry involves doing thins beside and with others, a first sense of the division of labour and of differential opportunity - that is, a sense of the technological ethos of a culture - develops at this time. Therefore, the configuration of culture and the manipulations basic to the prevailing technology must reach meaningfully into school life, supporting in the child a feeling of competence - that is, the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of serious tasks unimpaired by an infantile sense of inferiority. This is the lasting basis for cooperative participation in productive adult life.

The dangers associated with this stage are also formidable. The child may now acquisre dispositions which lead him into what Marx called "craft idiocy" - servitude to his technology and its dominant role typology. He will then fully believe the conventional answer he gives to the question, "What are you?" when he replies to it by stating his occupation. He may, moreover, at this stage also come to plant the seeds of a future attitude toward morality, expressed in Bismarck's remark that something was "worse than a crime - it was a blunder" - i.e., that something is good only if it works.

Needless to say, it is also at this stage that the child develops a sense of his own capabilities <u>vis a vis</u> the technological ethos of his culture. Here are to be found the roots of a potential, pervasive sense of

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[1] <u>Identity</u>, op.cit., p.126

inferiority. Now, possibly for the first time, the child is made aware of the social, ethnic, etc., categories into which others fit him:[1]

> It is at this point that wider society becomes significant to the child by admitting him to roles preparatory to the actuality of technology and economy. Where he finds out immediately, however, that the colour of his skin or the background of his parents rather than his wish and will to learn are the factors that decide his worth as a pupil or apprentice, the human propensity for feeling worthy may be fatefully aggrevated as a determinant of character development.

Identity vs. Role Confusion

We now come to adolescence. Physiologically, this is a time of extremely rapid growth, at a rate unmatched since early childhood but intensified, in its emotional and social implications, by the arrival of genital maturity.[2] The striking physiological changes of this age set the stage for a more general sense of the loss of earlier feelings of sameness and continuity. The adolescent - hobbldehoy/neither man nor boy - is now primarily concerned with what he appears to be in the eyes of others as compared with what he feels he is, and with the question of how to connect the roles and skills cultivated earlier with the occupational prototypes of his day.

To accomplish these tasks, the adolescent goes into what Erikson calls a moratorium. Searching for a new sense of continuity and sameness, he will often have to cope to grips with the crises of earlier years all over again, reintegrating the identity elements of preceeding stages in pre-

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[1] Identity, op.cit., p.124.

[2] This section is derived from Childhood and Society, op.cit., pp.261-263; Identity, op.cit., pp.128-135; and Challenge of Youth, op.cit., pp.1-27, passim.

paration for an adult response, set in a much wider milieu - that of society - than the one in which he has hitherto lived. Where he initially learned a sense of trust in himself and others as an infant, the adolescent now looks most fervently for men and ideas to have faith in and to whom he can pledge himself in fidelity; a brash cynicism can often be the reverse face of this coin. Where, in the second stage of his development, the child learned to experience and express a sense of his own autonomy, the adolescent now looks for an opportunity to decide for himself an particular courses of action, and on a general orientation - even if things he does brings him into conflict with his elders. Where, in the third stage of his development, the stage of initiative and imagination, the child expresses his energy in play, the adolescent seeks peers and adult leaders who will give scope to the more imaginative of his aspirations: at all costs, if necessary, he will avoid settling for the tedious and routinised - not to say uninspiring - life patterns of many around him. Finally, if the gratification of making things work is a characteristic of the school age, then the choice of an occupation assumes for the adolescent a significance beyond the question of remuneration and status. Often, he will prefer to avoid work at all rather than to settle for something less than a true vocation.

The danger of this stage is role confusion. It is in response to an often desparate search for his "identity" (in terms of role) that the adolescent will throw himself into identification with heroes, with cliques of his peers, with fads and fashions of dress and gesture, and by falling in love.

These patterns of conduct and commitment, tedious though they may frequently be to others (and particularly to those who are the "out-group" to any gang of adolescent "in-groupers"), serve a function well beyond any effect they have in counteracting the feeling of identity confusion:[1]

> For adolescents not only help one another temporarily through much discomfort by forming cliques and by stereotyping themselves, their ideals and their enemies; they also perversely test each other's capacity for pledging fidelity. The readiness for such testing also explains the appeal which simple and cruel totalitarian doctrines have on the minds of youth of such countries and classes as have lost or are losing their group identities (feudal, agrarian, tribal, national) and face world-wide industrialisation, emancipation and wider communication.

The social institution which is the guardian of identity at this stage is ideology and, with it, aristocracy which, combined, imply that[2]

> within a defined world image and a given course of history the best people will come to rule and rule will develop the best in people. In order not to become cynically or apathetically lost, young people must somehow be able to convince themselves those that who succeed in their anticipated adult world thereby shoulder the obligation of being best. For it is through their ideology that social systems enter into the fiber of the next generation and attempt to absorb into their life-blood the rejuvenative power of youth. Adolescence is thus a vital regenerator in the process of social evolution, for youth can offer its loyalties and energies both to the conservation of that which continues to feel true and to the revolutionary correction of that which has lost its regenerative significance.

Adolescents, then, offer up through their behaviour a plea for recognition as individuals who can be more than they seem to be, and whose potentials are needed by the order that is or will be. What compounds the problems

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[1] Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.262.

[2] Identity, op.cit., pp.133-134.

associated with the expression of this need, however, in addition to the frustrations of an insufficiently responsive or pliable external environment, is another development of mental dexterity associated with adolescence. It is now, as Inhelder and Piaget point out, that the human being begins to develop a sense of the irreversibility of the consequences of his own development and a recognition, with this, of the determining nature of prior (and for that, if for no other reason, unalterable) events and circumstances in both individual and societal identity:[1]

> Youth, therefore, is sensitive to any suggestion that it may be hopelessly determined by what went before in life historically or in history. Psychosocially speaking, this would mean that irreversible childhood identifications would deprive an individual of an identity of his own; historically, that invested powers should prevent a group from realising its composite historical identity. For these reasons, youth often rejects parental authorities and wishes to belittle them as inconsequential; it is in search of individuals and movements who claim, or seem to claim, that they can predict what is irreversible, thus getting ahead of the future - which means reversing it. This in turn accounts for the acceptance by youth of ideologies and mythologies predicting the course of the universe or the historical trend... Thus "true" ideologies are verified by history; for if they can inspire youth, youth will make the predicted course of history come more than true.

Intimacy vs. Isolation

The strength acquired at any given stage is tested in the next stage, when the individual allows himself to risk what he was most careful to protect himself against earlier.[2] With adolescence completed, the young adult has acquired his identity: and he is now ready to commit this to partnership

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[1] Challenge of Youth, op.cit., p.14-15.

[2] This and the following two sections are derived from Childhood and and Society, op.cit., pp.263-269.

with others. He is ready, that is to say, to commit himself to concrete affiliations and partnerships and to sustain his commitments even where they may involve significant sacrifices and compromises. In a word, then, he is now ready for intimacy and the ethical responsibilities which it brings in its train.

The dangers of this stage lie in isolation and distantiation, which arise from fear of "ego loss" inherent in situations calling for a measure of self-abnegation - be it in "the solidarity of close affiliations, in orgasms and sexual unions, in close friendships and in physical combat, in experiences of inspiration by teachers and of intuition from the recesses of self".[1] In response to this fear the individual will seek to isolate himself from those forces and those people whose essence seems dangerous to his own and encroaches on it. It is precisely for this reason that the individual may at one and the same time feel an urge to intimacy with a person toward whom he displays competitive and even combative behaviour. It is the task of the healthily evolving mind to be able to learn how to differentiate the loving from the competitive, and thus to achieve what Freud once said a normal human being should be able to do well - Lieben und Arbeiten.

Generativity vs. Stagnation

The concept of generativity refers primarily to the concern of the mature adult with creating and nurturing the next generation; it is produced, psychologically speaking, as a result of the gradual expansion of ego

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[1] Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.264.

interests stemming from the ability to "lose oneself" in the meeting with others' bodies and minds and leads to a libidinal investment in that which is being generated. To create and to derive satisfaction in what one has created: this capacity is the gain of adulthood and a condition for it. Where it fails to materialise, "regression to an obsessive need for pseudo-intimacy takes place, often with a pervading sense of stagnation and personal impoverishment".[1] Individuals afflicted with this destiny will frequently indulge themselves as if they were their own - or each other's - one and only child and on occasion will invalid themselves, physically or prychologically, so as to create a pathway for their own concerns.

The adult, then, needs somebody to care for: or some idea or object. Care, or charity, are accordingly the virtues associated with this stage.

Ego Integrity vs. Despair

The final stage of life is also the seal of life, the mark of its quality. For it is to the extent that the trials and tribulations of the preceding seven stages have been mastered that the ego develops a sense of its own proclivity for order and meaning. Erikson describes the nature of this achievement - that of "ego integrity" - in moving terms:[2]

> It is a post-narcissistic love of the human ego... as an experience which conveys some world order and spiritual sense, no matter how dearly paid for. It is the acceptance of one's one and only life cycle as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of no substitutions: it thus means a new, a different love of

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[1] Childhood and Society, op.cit., p.267.

[2] ibid, p.268.

> one's parents. It is a comradeship with the ordering ways of distant times and different pursuits. Although aware of the relativity of all the various life styles which have given meaning to human activity and striving, the possessor of integrity is ready to defend the dignity of his own life style against all phsical and economic threats. For he knows that an individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one life cycle with but one segment of history; and that for him all human integrity stands or falls with the one style of integrity of which he partakes. The style of integrity developed by his culture or civilisation thus becomes the "patrimony of his soul", the seal of his moral paternity of himself. In such final consolation, death loses its sting.

The failure of the adult to achieve this "ego integration is expressed in the fear of death, which reflects a feeling that the life has not accomplished all that it could have. It is now too late to start again, or even to attempt a new synthesis of what has been. In this recognition is the essence of despair, for which the disgust for life - ultimately for one's own life, the mille petits degouts de soi - in all its aspects is at best a weak and unpersuasive rationalisation...

With this, we complete our brief overview of Erikson's schema of human development and turn to a consideration of its relevance to our own concerns in this study and of the practical problems involved in applying it. Our central concern here - and indeed the central concern of all human beings as they deal with their social and material environments - is with the formation of ego identity. The ego, as we have noted, is that aspect of the human psychological process which organises experience in such a way as to make possible the coherence and individuality of the person. It must perform this task in face of the frustrations, discontinuities and hostility which the individual perceives - both consciously and not - as

he faces the outside world. It is the ego, accordingly, which in an infinitely complex and often highly unpredictable and inimical universe, gives the person a sense of himself, founded upon the all-important experience of his own sameness and continuity.

It follows from this that the nature of the psychological processes rooted in the ego will in a significant measure be determined by the social and material environment - the Umwelt - in which the individual grows up and lives. In particular, we may note that the formation of ego identity in the maturing human being is guided in many vital respects by the institutions of the society and culture to which he belongs. These institutions - among them the family, school, patterns of work, to name but a few - exist among other reasons to impart to the individual the type of basic trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, identity, generativity and ego integrity appropriate to the circumstances of that society and culture. With these qualities developed, the individual becomes a person acceptable to the other human beings with whom he must live his life: and they to him. However, political, cultural, ecological and other factors endlessly test the appropriateness of the guidance provided by societal and cultural institutions in shaping the formation of ego identity: history, in other words, never stands still. Indeed, we may say that history frequently moves faster than those institutions are able to - and that the disjunction in their evolutions is what, in turn, a great deal of history is made up of.

The processes to which we are referring are, of course, extremely intricate and we must resist any temptation to express them in pat, and

altogether too schematic, terms. Let us therefore introduce here two factors which may also be present and which can complicate greatly the functioning of the social and cultural mechanisms which shape the formation of ego identity.

While Erikson's epigenetic scheme allows for variations across cultures, it also posits the existence of universal and irreduceable needs in the development of the ego. Without elaborating on the matter, we can simply state that - irrespective of the changes introduced by particular historical developments - there is no basis for assuming that all societies and cultures necessarily provide opportunities for identity formation capable of satisfying those needs. What is more, while we can assume the existence of a continuous process of readjustment, between the realities of the external world which are relevant to the process of identity formation and the societal and cultural mechanisms which guide that process in each individual, we can by no means always assume that it is these mechanisms which will be adjusted in response to changes in the external world. Rather, we must also recognise the possibility that determined efforts may be made on the part of masses of individuals to reverse, or in other ways to alter, the direction in which the external world has been changed, so as to bring it into a "closer fit" with the institutions responsible for guiding the development of the ego. This possibility is rooted in the consideration that the values, etc., - certainly the conscious components of identity - of the adult members of the society in question will have been shaped by the now-outmoded institutions. These adults will frequently attempt to protect their own identities by resisting the world in which they have become anachronistic, rather than by modifying the

functioning of the ego-forming institutions to accord with the nature of the new world in which they now live. To the extent that they fail in this effort to prevent the obsolescence of the institutions of identity formation while nevertheless preserving those institutions, the upbringing of the new generations is marred by a further disjunction between the requirements for a healthy ego identity and the ability of the social and cultural institutions to fulfill those requirements. A parallel process is often observed in adolescents as they attempt to make the world conform to their ideological idealism - which is itself a product of the tendency of the institutions which guide identity formation to present a flattering and unrealistic image of a society and culture to the new generation - a tendency which, in general, precipitates further identity confusion.

All in all, then, since the formation of ego identity is a process deeply rooted in the external - social, cultural, natural, etc., - world; and since the external world is seldom if ever in a position to satisfy the requirements for the healthy formation of ego identity; we assume the existence of conscious and unconscious efforts on the part of human beings to create for themselves and for their children a world in which the requirements for the healthy formation of an ego identity will be present. These efforts are not always present, it is true. In their place, we can expect to find resignation, bitterness or impotent anger as well. Nor, of course, where these efforts are made will they always assume the same form be set in the same contexts or bet met by the same degree of success. Yet we can posit, particularly among social classes and among cultures which stress belief in the ability of individuals to shape their own destiny,

a widespread tendency to make the external world, the societal and cultural mechanisms of identity formation, and the requirements of a healthy ego identity, all coincide with one another. In this sense, and within these limitations, we are prepared to speak of the relationship between these three elements as one in which there is a constant attempt at restoring an equilibrium. We emphasise that the notion of the attempted restoration of equilibrium is indeed just that - an attempted restoration; we imply nothing which could be taken to indicate human wisdom and good fortune necessarily crowning those attempts with notable success.

We propose to approach the study of nationalism on the assumption that it represents an attempt to counteract a situation in which the social and cultural prerequisites for healthy psychosocial evolution - the Umwelt in which the ego acquires its identity - are or have been eroded as a result of the subjugation of a society by alien power; since we are dealing with nationalism, we must add that the subjugated society must include a political elite, or a potential political elite, which regards that society as a national one. Nationalism, therefore, in this view of it, represents an attempt to alter external reality, either for the sake of preserving the functional value of those cultural and societal mechanisms which help to shape the formation of ego identity, or as part of a process which also includes the alteration of those two institutions; nationalism may accordingly be either conservative or innovative. But in either instance, it represents an attempt to make possible the social and cultural foundations for the healthy development of ego identity.

The question arises, of course, of why this attempt is made on this

scale: why it is in other words that people become nationalists, addressing themselves to the national context of their Umwelten rather than seeking to shape a more tractable reality within more intimate confines.

We may note to begin with that the attempt made on a national scale by no means precludes the simultaneous existence of parallel attempts on a more modest scale. While not all nationalists do seek to make over the immediate contexts of their own lives - Jinnah and possibly Herzl being among those who do not seem to have attempted to do so in the cultural sense - most in fact do seem to. Beyond this, we can observe that irrespective of whether a sense of nationality has been present historically - as is the case with the Jews - or whether, instead, it is a recent development, a product, perhaps, of political and administrative decisions made by colonial powers in demarcating their territories, the feeling of belonging to a national group, once it exists, is of considerable importance to the formation of ego identity:[1]

> To be a special kind...is an important element in the human need for personal and collective identities - all in a sense pseudospecies... In youth, ego strength comes from the mutual recognition and confirmation of individual and community, in the sense that society recognises the young individual as a bearer of fresh energy and that the individual so confirmed recognises society as a living process which inspires loyalty as it receives it, maintains allegiance as it attracts it, honours confidence as it demands it.

The young person is characterised by a search for objects - ideas, groups - to which he can pledge fidelity and through which his sense of himself and of his own worth can be confirmed. Where, through political,

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[1] Challenge of Youth, op.cit., p.9.

historical, or cultural fact, the young person is in fact a member of a national group, he will naturally enough turn to it as the recipient of his commitment - particularly when he perceives his national group to be a disadvantaged one or in an otherwise humbled condition. He cannot then ignore its needs and still retain a feeling that he is capable of making, and belongs to a group worth receiving, a pledge of fideilty from him.

This need to come to the "rescue" of his endangered national group is intensified for the young person by other factors. The adolescent's encounter with the adult world of which he is now becoming a member precipitates a number of significant "reopening of wounds", if we may express it thus, which are crises resulting from the need to reintegrate, or to resynthesise, the gains of earlier stages with those of adolescence. One of the most important of these, possibly, from our perspective, is that of shame and self-consciousness, "a new edition of that original doubt which concerned the trustworthiness of the parents and of the child himself" and which, in adolescence, now comes to concern[1]

> the reliability of the whole span of childhood which is now to be left behind and the trustworthiness of the whole social universe now envisaged. The obligation now to commit oneself with a sense of free will to one's autonomous identity can arouse a painful overall ashamedness somehow comparable to the original shame and sage of being visible to all-knowing adults - only such shame now adheres to one's having a public personality exposed to age-mates and to be judged by leaders.

The adolescent, then, seeking to resynthesise his capacity for autonomy developed in early childhood with the realities of the adult world in

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[1] Identity, op.cit., p.183

which he is now gaining membership, confronts anew the danger of shame. Where he belongs to a national group subjected to the political - and often to the cultural - superiority of an alien power, that fact will greatly increase his propensity for feeling shame. Nationalism, in part, may be said to be a means of counteracting that propensity for shame, and of making possible an adult version of the child's gains in terms of autonomy. A further consideration relevant in this connection is that with youth the person is able for the first time systematically to recognise the various alternatives available to him in terms of personal, occupational, sexual, ideological, etc., commitments. Under almost any circumstance this recognition brings with it the danger of role confusion, to which we have already referred. In societies which are subject to alien domination seeking, as is so often the case, to alter the living patterns of the subjugated peoples, the range of commitments from among which the young must select is vastly expanded. Nationalism, a portmanteau commitment within which so much else can be subsumed but whose goals are sufficiently abstract and set in the future, exercises an attractive enough appeal and serves a useful function in combating role confusion resulting from a perception of a disturbingly wide range of possible commitment choices.

The psychological needs which, we believe, nationalism expresses and helps to fulfill are most visibly identified with adolescence. This is not, however, to say that nationalism is an adolescent (or "infantile"!) disorder. Rather, as we have stressed, each stage in the development of individual identity represents the reintegration, or resynthesising, of all that has preceded the latest stage with the gains - or otherwise - of

that stage. It is however with adolescence that the individual begins to enter into the fulness of the social and cultural world all around him: that he becomes a politically relevant (or at least potentially relevant) datum. As we have already had occasion to note, moreover, the stage of adolescence first brings a true psychosocial identity into being and thus plays a decisive role in shaping the future life of the adult. From a psychological standpoint, moreover, we may therefore say that the dynamics which come to play in adolescence are the ones which are most likely to shape the kinds of responses which lead to nationalism. But this is not to say that they are confined to that stage.

While these observations help to establish the a priori relevance of a psychoanalytic view of nationalism, they still leave open the question of how that view may receive empirical validation. A brief description of the manner in which this study proceeds may at least provide a starting point for an answer to that question. We shall, to begin with, investigate the historical circumstances out of which the nationalist movements of interestto us here - Zionism and Hindu nationalism - emerged. This investigation should uncover certain clues regarding the effect of changed historical circumstances on the formation of ego identity; for example, the nature of the threats posed to identity formation by the fact that the social and cultural mechanisms which guide identity formation may have become obsolete; or again, we may discover that as a result of changed historical circumstances profound obstacles to a healthy ego identity were not inherent in the social and cultural Umwelt of those concerned.

A persistent problem in the application of psychoanalytic insights to the study of political behaviour and phenomena has to do with the representativeness of samples used, or the significance of the findings arrived at. We can perhaps discuss this problem in terms of the present study most conveniently by reference to the three categories of psychoanalytically oriented political research which Greenstein identifies. These are (i) psychological analyses of single political actors; (ii) psychological analyses of types of political actors; and (iii) analyses of aggregative effects of personality characteristics on political systems.[1] In fact, all three share the common problem of relating data on specific individuals to wider masses of people; as Erikson in his studies of Luther and Gandhi perceived with particular sensitivity, an individual leader cannot be studied in isolation frrom those whom he leads.

Where biographical studies are of leaders, several hypotheses can be entertained regarding both the individual's impetus to enter public life and his effectiveness in doing so. The specific patterns which the public policies of these men take, and the nature of the political forces which they shape, may be held to reflect their own psychological dynamics: are seen as an "acting out", if we may thus express it, of their own neuroses or the attempted resolution of them.[2] On the other hand, the neurotic

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[1] F.I.Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization, (Chicago, 1969).

[2] Erikson suggests that leaders seek to solve for all problems which they have been unable to solve for themselves, Young Man Luther, op.cit., p.67. Cf. the highly suggestive essay on Leadership in D. Rustow, ed., Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (New York, 1970),pp.1-29. "displace private affects upon public objects", Harold Lasswell declares, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago,1930), p.75.

needs of these individuals, and their attempted resolution of them, can also be seen as exemplars by the population, or even as psychodramas, which mirror widely prevalent psychological dynamics and enable large numbers of individuals to "identify" themselves with these leaders.

The most famous example of psychological studies of types of political actors is The Authoritarian Personality.[1] The underlying aim of this study was to identify personality structures which, apart from conscious political belief, disposes individuals to act in (or to support those who act in) an authoritarian manner. A vast amount of critical literature has been published addressing itself to this study.[2] The point we would single out here is that the authors of that work failed to demonstrate that individuals possessing an authoritarian personality do in fact behave in an authoritarian way, supporting authoritarian political movements and (in terms of a specific focus of that study) indulging in anti-Semitic practices.

Analyses of the aggregative effects of personality characteristics on political systems have moved a long way from such studies of "national character" as Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) and Geoffrey Gorer's The American People (1948). These works reflect an early and all too optimistic belief that a measure of information regarding the swaddling patterns among Russians or toilet training among Germans, com-

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[1] T.W.Adorno, E.Frenkel-Brunswick, D.J.Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950).

[2] A comprehensive bibliography of this critical literature is provided in the bibliographical essay by M. Lerner in Greenstein, op. cit., pp.168-171.

bined with a strong mixture of psychoanalytic theory of a readily digestible sort, would produce a palatable concoction by which the disposition of whole nations ("the typical German") and the character of their political systems, could readily be explained. More recent studies do however still tacitly explain aggregate behaviour on the basis of "typical" instances. Endlessly absorbing as Lane's portraits of nine men are in his Political Ideology,[1] the question remains open as to whether these cases really tell us about the American political system. Equally Pye, in attempting to identify the psychological components of the obstacles in the way of Burmese modernisation, interviewed Burmese officials and examined aspects of Burmese society such as the family, in such a way as to "capture the subtle nuances and complex interrelationships of sentiment and judgement which are the essence of a political culture".[2] His strategy, however, rested on the proposition that this could be accomplished by looking into "the life histories of those who now set the tone and style of that system". To do this, Pye had to assume that the Burmese officials whom he interviewed were "typical" and would provide him with the clues which he sought to Burmese political culture.[3]

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[1] R.E.Lane, Political Ideology (New York, 1959)

[2] L.W.Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burmah's Search for Identity (New Haven, 1962), p.285.

[3] C.Geertz, reviewing Pye's book in Economic Development and Cultural Change (12) 1964, suggests that if personal identity is treated, with Erikson, as the "carrier" of cultural freight, culture is that which is internalised and what is internalised is culture. Pye is thus criticised for ignoring "the physical mainstays" of Burmese culture. This criticism appears to us to be invalid, however, since it ignores Erikson's insistence that the formation of ego identity, and the preservation of cultural institutions, be viewed in terms of the dynamic interaction between them.

Studies such as those by Lane and Pye, then, while reflecting a much more sobre approach to the problem of analysing mass characteristics than the earlier "national character" studies, nevertheless do not appear to have resolved the underlying problem of the nature and scope of the generalisations which may legitimately be derived from empirical findings. The present study adopts a strategy aimed at avoiding this difficulty - along lines not unlike those suggested by H.D.Lasswell, in what may be called a form of "requisite analysis". We know, says Lasswell, what democracy is; and with this knowledge we can identify the kinds of personality structures consistent and inconsistent with the maintenance of democratic institutions.[1] We do not need to concern ourselves with the elaborate typology which, reminiscent of his proposals in Psychopathology and Politics, Lasswell then proceeded to apply to his study of the democratic personality. Rather, it is germane to note that an approach of this type, which begins with a statement of empirical fact (assuming that we can for these purposes agree that such and such are the characteristics of democratic institutions), offers psychoanalytic explanations, not of "typical" individuals, but of the requirements for the maintenance of the institutions in question. To the extent that those institutions are maintained (and in the manner in which they are maintained), we must assume that the necessary personality dispositions are present in the society of which those institutions are a part.

Our study follows an analogous course, though it could be suggested that it gets off to a somewhat surer start in taking as its point of departure

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[1] "Democratic Character" in The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell (New York, 1951), pp.465-525.

historical facts rather than a somewhat a priori set of requisites for the preservation of democratic institutions. We describe here the historical background to the rise of two nationalist movements : we know in other words, that these two historical settings are the contexts out of which the nationalist movements in question arose. Next, we proceed to link the historical backgrounds to the nationalist movements by identifying the psychological effects - in terms of ego formation - which appear to be the concommitants of these historical circumstances. From among a vast - possibly limitless - range of psychological effects associated with these causes we look for the ones which would give rise to nationalist movements of the kinds which we know Zionism and Indian nationalism to have been - i.e., natinalist movements with a strong, but ambiguous, concern for the preservation of traditional identity, etc. We then look at specific individuals to see whether evidence of these effects was indeed to be found in their literary remains and in the record of their behaviour. Insofar as we find such evidence, it becomes possible to confirm that the particular set of psychological factors which we describe is indeed causally associated with the rise of these nationalisms.

In practical terms, we might go further than this and assert that these factors are among the foremost psychological roots of these two movements. Such an assertion would rest on the consideration that our data have been derived from virtually <u>all</u> the leading figures associated with the rise of Zionism and Indian nationalism; and that where (among others, for reasons of space), we did not consider other figures, no real modification of the underlying typology of assimilators and nationalists would have been required. In terms of Zionism, I believe that we have touched on all the

leading figures; in terms of Indian nationalism we could have dealt with Tilak and Gokhale, in particular, but to do so would only have been to confirm the material already presented. All in all, then, there are grounds for claiming that the evidence we have presented is based on a study of the leadership of these two movements and accounts for those individuals' participation in them.

A movement, however, is madeup of followers as well as leaders. Insofar as the historical record is concerned, we have very little information indeed to account for the fact that these leaders did succeed in attracting these followers - information, that is, relevant to a psychoanalytic investigation. It is for this reason, and for the additional reason that it is in the nature of psychoanalytic interpretations that they are not conclusive but can be supplemented and complemented by additional insight that we prefer not to speak of our evidence in more comprehensive terms. While it seems reasonable, on the basis of insight and experience, to claim that we have identified the psychological factors present in the origins of these nationalist movements, from a methodological point of view it would be more correct to state that we have identified a major rather than the major psychological component.

3. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ZIONISM AND OF HINDU NATIONALISM

Judaism is a torah, or teaching. According to one of its greatest exponents, Moses Maimonides, the torah aims at inculcating in its adherents two types of perfection - the "well-being of the body" and the "well-being of the soul".[1] By the former is meant the "proper" conduct of social relations, and by the latter the attainment, to the limits of mortal capacity, of spiritual understanding. The two objectives are not entirely separate. Indeed, the proper conduct of social relations is intended to reflect the spiritual harmony of the universe and to facilitate the individual's perception of it. Judaism, we may therefore say, calls for a distinctive structuring of the social order in accordance with the dictates of its spiritual tradition. The social order is viewed as "a holy nation, a kingdom of priests", membership in which derives from assent to the Sinaitic Covenant. In the culmination of its history, and under the leadership of its Messiah, the nation would be established in supremacy over the world and its ideals of peace and wisdom would be realised universally.

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[1] Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, III,27; Book of Judges, V.12,etc. For a fuller discussion, cf. M.Selzer, "The Applicability of the Concept of Political Development and Political Decay to the Political Sociology of the Jews", paper presented to the 66th. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles,1970; ibid, "Politics and Human Perfectibility", Crosscurrents, Winter, 1971; and, more generally, ibid, Politics and Jewish Purpose (South Acworth, N.H., 1971), passim.

With the dissolution of the Second Commonwealth in the year 70 C.E., the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, and the dispersal into exile of the great majority of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, Judaism was confronted by a crisis of unprecedented magnitude. Would the Jews be able now to create institutions which, while commensurate with their resources as an impoverished and powerless people, would nevertheless also enshrine and perpetuate their spiritual heritage and be capable of implanting loyalty to it in the hearts and minds of ensuing generations? Could Judaism survive as a teaching, in other words, and could the Jews survive as a distinct nation that would be both the repository and the embodiment of that teaching?

Legend has it that very soon after the capture of Jerusalem by the Roman legions, a group of scholars sought and received permission from the Roman authorities to establish an academy of Jewish learning in the town of Yavneh, some miles south of Jaffa. This event is popularly regarded as having been decisive in the preservation of Jewish life after the collapse of the Second Commonwealth. Its importance is indeed great, for it manifested the determination of at least a significant part of the Jewish population to reconstitute Jewish life along non-sovereign, and if necessary along non-territorial, lines, while reaffirming the continuing viability of Jewish existence and identity.

Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that there were important precedents for this strategy. For the basis features of the arrangement concluded in 70 C.E. had already existed for centuries, in Mesopotamia and also in such isolated colonies as that in Elephantine on the Nile,

where Jews had received permission from the ruling authorities to exercise a measure of communal autonomy, and where they had used that right to create institutions which would reflect - and help to preserve - their religious-cultural nationality. What the Jews learned after the Roman victory, of course, was that this mode of Jewish existence could continue even without a Temple in Jerusalem and the performance of sacrificial rites.

Indeed, the characteristic form of organised Jewish life in the Diaspora from the earliest times and down to the nineteenth century, was the autonomous and largely self-contained local community. With structural variations which we need not consider here, this form was to be found throughout the Middle East and Europe, in every phase of the pre-modern history of the Diaspora. The last major manifestations of it were dissolved, with the millet system of the Ottoman empire, only after the end of the first World War. In vestigial form, however, the institution continues to survive in many countries - including the state of Israel.

At certain periods and in certain regions, the local communities would be linked together for the performance of specific functions, some of which would be defined by the communities themselves and others of which would be imposed on them by the government of the country in which they were located. Most commonly, a number of communities would band together of their own accord to create a system of appellate courts, while the government would delegate to a central Jewish body, or to an individual functioning as a kind of exilarch, responsibility for maintaining order among, and in particular for gathering taxes from, its Jewish subjects.

The existence of a Jewish community was recognised by charter, from which its right to settlement in a locality derived. The Jewish community was considered a distinct collective legal entity, directly under the jurisdiction of the ruler, and thus outside the hierarchical structure of feudal society and of the established community of the faithful.

The communal structure of Jewish life, and the legal status which it typically enjoyed, constituted an effective defense against the stresses and strains to which the Jews were subjected as an alien and powerless minority, and was of decisive importance in securing the preservation of the Jewish nation in the absence of the more usual guarantors of national survival such as state and territory. Since the community was typically charged by law with the responsibility of conducting its own domestic affairs iuxta ritum et morem legis illorum Mosaicae - "in accordance with the "rite and custom" of the Mosaic law, as a fourteenth century Polish charter expressed it - it was able to develop, with the assent of secular authorities, the resources to ensure the socialisation of the young into the norms of the community and to punish - ultimately through excommunication - anyone who might offend against them.[1] With a few temporary exceptions, therefore, Jewish communal life was marked by a deep and universal acceptance of Jewish values and manners. This is not to say, of course, that vigorous controversies would not arise from time to time on religious and social questions. But these controversies, disruptive as some of them may have been, never challenged the legitimacy of Judaism

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[1] S.Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, (3 vols., Philadelphia, 1916-1920), vol.1, p.44ff.

as such but only the legitimacy of specific interpretations of it. If anything, therefore, they are indicative of the Jewish commitments of their respective protagonists. At no period in the Diaspora would apostasy ever seem to have constituted a serious threat to Jewish survival. All too often, indeed, Jews preferred martyrdom to the embrace of an alien faith.

Jewish communities were seldom completely immune to the cultural and intellectual influences of their environment - as is attested, among other things, by the emergence of synthetic languages such as Judaeo-German, or Yiddish, Judaeo-Spanish, or Ladino, etc. Nevertheless, these influences were rarely if ever strong enough to act as a barrier to exchange betwen Jewish communities across the continents. Indeed, a significant measure of exchange - often across great distances - existed. Some of the earliest extant Yiddish manuscripts, for example, were found, not in Europe, but in the genizah of the Cairo synagogue. It was commonplace for distinguished rabbis to have questions on religious and social matters addressed to them from communities hundreds and even thousands of miles away, and for scholars to engage in controversies or to write commentaries on each others' works even though they were separated by great distances. When - as was not seldom the case - the need arose to exercise their influence to protect each other from persecution, or to ransom Jewish prisoners or hostages from afar, Jews would seldom shirk the responsibility of doing so. Jewish communities were also linked by a highly developed network of commercial contacts which seemed to defy the primitive communications facilities of the time.

From time to time the Jews would be subjected to violent attacks - typically be ecclesiastical authorities or by emerging mercantile classes - against which the ruler, for all his guarantees of Jewish existence, within his domain, was powerless to protect them. Under these circumstances, the Jews would either be expelled from a territory or would find conditions there to be so unsettled that they moved elsewhere of their own accord. Insecurity was an inherent part of the Jewish condition, whether in Europe or in the lands of Islam.

The structure of the Jewish communal mode of life, however, lent itself to the peripatetic condition of Jewish existence. While strong enough to ensure the continuity of the community's existence and a high degree of internal cohesion and solidarity, that structure was also pliant enough to be transplanted in fresh soil as and when the need to do so arose. The community was not rooted in a specific territory and its defenses were not constructed of brick and mortar. Its fatherland, in Heine's telling phrase, was a "portable" one - the torah. The structure of Jewish communal life made it possible for the Jews to retain their loyalty to this "fatherland" in an organised, communal mode, no matter to which part of the world they were obliged to wander.

All in all, then, the autonomous structure of the organised Jewish community was well suited to the exigencies of Jewish life. It created a definite, and detached, status for the Jews guaranteed in law and making possible the continuity of Jewish existence. At the same time, it was sufficiently flexible to make possible the relocation of the community in a more hospitable setting whenever the need to do so arose.

To say that for nearly two thousand years the Jews were able to carve out for themselves at least the minimal conditions necessary for the preservation of their physical existence and their cultural identity is not, of course, to imply that this was an achievement that was brought about without great effort. At no point during this protracted period could Jewish survival be taken for granted. At all times ceaseless vigilance against external threat, and against the internal erosion of commitment, were required. Fences, as the ancient rabbis used to say, had to be bui;t up around the torah - and around these fences more and more fences yet. But the point is also that, given the widespread determination to preserve Jewish existence and identity which was in fact present, the basic preconditions for Jewish survival did exist. In transforming those preconditions into reality the Jews were sustained by all the zeal and fortitude of the true believer, and by an unquestioning acceptance of their people's Messianic destiny.

From about the end of the eighteenth century developments in both West and East Europe swept aside the basic preconditions for Jewish survival which had hitherto existed. In both parts of the continent these developments appeared in two forms simultaneously. On the one hand, this period witnessed the disappearance of governmental recognition of the ancient and, as we have seen, vitally important, principle of Jewish communal autonomy - the principle that the Jews comprise a distinct and self-regulating entity within the body politic directly responsible to the head of state. And, on the other hand, this period also witnesses the sudden and widespread "failure of nerve", as Gilbert Murray calls it in another context: the loss of faith in the validity of the Jewish

spiritual and cultural norms which was precipitated by the encounter with rational, secular modernity.[1]

There were, nevertheless, profound differences between the manner in which these developments occurred in the two parts of Europe. In the West the French Revolution proclaimed the principle of granting full rights to Jews as individuals, but of denying them any recognition as a separate community. However, the Jews continued to be accorded - and to this day still enjoy - a measure of autonomy and official recognition in matters pertaining to religiion in its ritualistic and spiritual aspects. No less to the point, the withdrawal of recognition of the Jewish community as such was accompanied, more or less simultaneously, by the extension to the members of that community of the civil rights enjoyed by their Gentile fellow citizens. Without in any way minimising the vicious anti-Semitism which came to the fore from time to time in Western Europe during the nineteenth century, we can say that the status of Jews there was transformed under the relatively benign influence of the western liberal tradition. This circumstance, in turn, probably did much to facilitate the assimilation of the Jews to western modernity, and to mitigate the intellectual and emotional burdens inherent in any such transformation.

The situation in East Europe was very different, however. There, where the bulk of the world Jewish population was at the time concentrated,

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, what follows is drawn from S.Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland (3 vols., Philadelphia, 1916-1920) and S.Baron, The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets, (New York, 1964). While both can be considered standard works, Baron's interpretations are essentially those of his master Dubnow. There is a surprising paucity of East European Jewish historical studies - certainly in English.

the unfolding of the nineteenth century would witness an almost unmitigated record of brutality and oppression.

The success of the expansionist policies pursued by the Russian tsars during the course of the nineteenth century transformed their realm into a multinational empire. As a result of the partititons of Poland, the last of which took place in 1795, a vast Jewish population fell under the Russian thrall - not, we should note, through voluntary migration but as a consequence of the forcible annexation of the territories in which they had hitherto lived into the Russian empire. From that day to this Russian policy toward minority nationalities can seldom if ever be said to have reflected the principles of enlightened pluralism. But even within the context of this generally abysmal record of official policy toward the Jews stands out for its exceptional barbarity.

In 1797, or shortly after the last partition of Poland, the newly acquired Russian provinces of Minsk, Volhynia, Podolia and Lithuania were devastated by terrible famine, in the wake of which occurred violent rioting and other upheavals. In a more or less routine manner, provincial committees of noblemen were constituted to inquire into "the impoverished condition of the peasants" in those regions and to recommend to the imperial government measures to avert further disturbances. After deliberation, the noblemen issued their reports.[1]

In all four instances it was their finding that two sets of factors were

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[1] Dubnow, op.cit., I, p.32ff.

responsible for the recent famine and unrest. The first of these comprised a variety of circumstances such as the restless political climate, poor harvets, inadequate roads, and so on. The second, quite simply, were the Jews. In Minsk the Jews were accused of "luring the peasants into drunkenness" and thereby "rendering them unfitto manage their own affairs;" and similar charges were levelled against the Jews in Podolia and Volhynia. In Lithuania not only the sale of alcohol to the peasants, but also "Jewish separatism" was discovered to be a major cause of the rural disturbances.

Appropriate remedies were recommended by the rural committees. Jews, it was suggested, should not be allowed to engage in the liquor trade, which should become the monopoly of the Gentile aristocracy instead. Jewish traders should have their activities confined to the export of produce from the noblemen's estates. Beyond this, Jewish freedom of movement should severely be restricted. The majority of Jews, it was recommended, should be expelled from the countryside and forced to live in large towns, while the remainder should not be allowed to congregate in their own communities but should, rather, be "scattered over the crown and manorial estates, where they might be allowed to grow corn and farm estates".

The self-interested nature of these recommendations should be apparent. The nobility were, in effect, proposing that they be allowed to expropriate the relatively lucratice liquor businesses operated by many Jews, and to confine the Jews to serving them and them alone, as exporters of their own produce or else as serfs on their own estates. This much can be understood, though hardly condoned. But what is difficult if not

impossible to understand are the further provisions recommended by the Lithuanian committee, in particular, which under the guise of ameliorating the condition of the peasantry, called for nothing less than an assault on the Jewish community and its identity. The proposals urged that "the education of the Jewish people must begin with their religion" and, to this end, stressed the need "to wipe out all Jewish sects with their superstitions and to forbid strictly the introduction of any innovations whereby impostors might seduce the masses and plunge them into even greater ignorance". Jewish children were to be forced to attend government schools; distinctive Jewish forms of dress were to be loutlawed, as were Jewish marriages before the age of 20. The kahal, the Jewish community's autonomous governmental structure, "which not only arrogate to themselves spiritual authority but also meddle in all civic affairs and in matters pertaining to the police", were to be abolished.

What all these proposals had to do with the problem of food shortage and rural unrest in White Russia is not clear; but it is clear that no imperial official considered it necessary to inquire into the alleged connection. The famines continued to occur in the provinces and the social situation continued to deteriorate. No action was taken on any of the measures recommended by the provincial committees. Characteristically, the tsar now ordered the formation of yet another commission of inquiry, whose task it was to sift the proposals already made by the provincial nobility. The head of this commission, one Senator Dyerzhavin, readily accepted the notion that only the radical restructuring of Jewish society would solve White Russia's rural problems. The report he submitted to the tsar bears the title, "The Opinion of Senatory Dyerzhavin Concerning the Averting

of the Want of Foodstuffs in White Russia by Curbing the Avaricious Pursuits of the Jews: also Concerning other Matters".[1]

The essence of the problem in the annexed provinces, the Senator declared has to do with the deplorable "moral situation" of the Jews who, he alleged, had no "conception of lovingkindness, disinterestedness and other virtues". All they wre interested in doing was "to collect riches in order to erect a new temple of Solomon or to satisfy their earthyl desires". To this end, he claimed, they resorted to numerous "subtle devices to squeeze out the wealth of their neighbours", which they did under the "guise of offering them favours and benefits". The senator was convinced that, in view of this situation, nothing less than the complete reform of the inner life of the Jewish community, of its communal institutions and modes of education, would suffice to make the Jews acceptable human beings and tolerable subjects of the imperial throne.

Dyerzhavin candidly acknowledged that his proposals aimed at nothing less than "the transformation of the Jews". As such, they were aimed at every aspect of Jewish life. Jews would be obliged to acquire surnames (they had hitherto been known as "so-and-so- the son-of-so-and-so"); abandon their distinctive forms of dress; send their children to government-run schools; and execute all legal documents in either Russian, Polish or German. The communal governmental structure was to be dissolved and its functions taken over by agents of the imperial throne or by a special rabbinical assembly, which the learned Senator had intended to call a

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[1] Dubnow, op.cit., I, p.328ff.

Sanhedrin but which he ended up by describing as a "sendarin", and would function under government auspices. A Christian would be appointed "Protector" of the entire Jewish community and would be directly responsible to the tsar. Among his other functions, he would direct a government publishing house for Jewish books, which would be issued only with the appropriate "philosophical annotations". If these and other measures which he recommended were put into effect, Dyerzhavin promised, "the stubborn and cunning tribe of the Hebrews will be set proprly to rights".

The death of Paul I in 1801 forestalled further action on Dyerzhavin's proposals. The following year Alexander I appointed a new committee which he called - no doubt without intending irony - "The Committee for the Amelioration of the Jews", the most prominent member of which was none other than Senator Dyerzhavin himself. The principle feature of the report prepared by this committee were drafted into a bill which was enacted by the Senate on December 9, 1804, as the "Statute for the Organising of the Jews". This law was one of the most brutal and comprehensive pieces of anti-Jewish legislation yet enacted. It confined Jews to residence in certain White Russian regions which came to be known as the Pale of Settlement, but greatly restricted the Jews' freedom of movement within that vast ghetto. The power of the communal governing bodies was greatly diminished; rabbis and elders of the community now had to have their appointments confirmed by the government and were required to display proficiency in Russian, Polish or German before being confirmed in office; Jewish dress was outlawed.

The most barbaric section of the statute, however, was its notorious

Article 34, one provision of which stipulated that "no one among the Jews, in any village or hamlet, shall be permitted to hold any lease on land, to keep taverns, saloons or inns, whether under his own name or under a strange name, or to sell wine in them, or even to live in them under any pretext except when passing through". At one blow, this ordinance deprived fully half of the entire Russian Jewish population of its traditional source of living. Nor was this all. Jews who had formerly engaged in the occupations which were now outlawed were denied the right to continue living in the countryside. The rural Jewish problem was to be solved by expelling all "surplus" Jews as they were called, and as most of them had now become, to the cities.

The expulsions did not get under way till 1808. "Those who did not go willingly were made to leave by force. Many were ejected ruthlessly under the escort of peasants and soldiers. They were driven like cattle to the townlets and cities, and left there in public squares in the open air", a Russian historian records. After eleven months, the expulsions halted. The simple fact of the matter was, as the Russian administrators eventually began to discover, that there was nowhere for the expelled Jews to go. "On account of their destitute condition the Jews have no means which would enable them, after leaving their present abodes, to settle in their new surroundings, while the Government is equally unable to undertake to place them in new domiciles", a report declared. And so much for the alleged wealth of the rural Jews, one is tempted to add.

With this failure, the tsar appointed yet another commission of inquiry to formulate yet another plan for the so-called amelioration of the Jews.

The new committee spent three years studying the problem. Its report, submitted in April, 1812, was a remarkable one. Candidly and unequivocally, it pointed out that the social evils of which the Jews had persistently been accused were not of their own making, and condemned in outspoken terms the misguided "solutions" which had been proposed by earlier commissions. Altogether, the report stated, "in rural economic life the Jew plays the role of go-between, which can be spared neither by the squire nor by the peasant". Denying that the Jew "enriches himself at the expense of the peasant", it pointed out that the Jew "is generally poor and ekes out a scanty living". The committee called for "a resolute stop to prevailing modes of interference", and urged that Jews be allowed to remain in their former abodes and to pursue the businesses suspended by Article 34.

For a decade there was a moratorium on further anti-Jewish legislation. In 1825, however, Nicholas I ascended the throne of Russia. There now began an effort, not merely to degrade the Jews, but to eliminate them altogether from the Russian body politic. On August 26, 1827, an imperial ukase was issued imposing on the Jews for the first time the obligation of military service. In its barest outline, this ukase decreed that Jewish boys were to be taken from their families at the age of 12 - i.e., a year before bar-mitzvah age - and placed in military schools for six years. On graduating, they were to enter military service itself for a period of no less than twenty-five years!

Nicholas' decree aimed at nothing less than the extinction of the Jews through cultural means. It laid down that every young boy was to be

plucked from his family while still at a tender and impressionable age, to spend his adolescence as well as a substantial part of his adulthood in an alien world completely cut off from any contact with the Jewish community. After thirty one years of slavery he would dinally be set free. "The training and accomplishments acquired by the Jews during the period of their military service will, on their return home, be communicated to their families and make for greater usefulness and higher efficiency in their economic life and in the management of their affairs", the imperial ukase had mockingly promised. But what economic life, and what affairs, would remain to be managed in a community shorn of most of its male members? And how many conscripts would, after all that they had experienced, even know who and where their families were? Not just the substance of the legislation, but also its ultimate purpose, was clear to every Jew in Russia. A terrible fear gripped the Jewish community, and frantic efforts to abrogate, or at least to modify, this unprecedentedly cruel legislation were made. Almost by definition, however, the tsar who had been capable of issuing this ordinance was incapable of responding to the desparate pleas of those whom it was intended to destroy. If anything, the panic which siezed the Jewish community merely confirmed the tsar in his belief in the ultimate efficacy of his plan.

In the West European states military service was imposed, in part, in recognition of the amancipation of the Jews from their medieval role as society's outcasts. As such, the rigours of conscription were mitigated, at least, by a measure of civil liberties. This held true even of Austria, generally considered one of the most reactionary of the European monarchies. In Russia, however, a very different pattern emerged. The

incredibly cruel programme of military service was complemented, rather than mitigated, by the imposition of a wide range of further harsh anti-Jewish measures. The first step in this direction was taken immediately after the issuance of the conscription ukase.

In December 1827 Nicholas ordered the expulsion of all Jews living in the rural areas of the province of Grodno. During the course of the following years additional expulsions from rural regions were to take place; but the Jews were also expelled from the town of Kiev - where they had settled freely since 1794 - on the grounds that their presence there profaned the sanctity of the place. Although the civil authorities in several localities urged the tsar to rescind at least some of these measures because of the upheavels which they caused, Nicholas refused to do so. He was, indeed, all the while planning the introduction of still further and still more repressive legislation. In April, 1835 he issued a new "Statute Concerning the Jews" which forbade the Jews from employing Christian domestics, placed innumerable restrictions on the right of Jews to travel or settle even within the Pale of Settlement itself, and set the minimum age for marriage at 18 for grooms and 16 for brides. In 1836 an extensive campaign of censorship was launched against Jewish literature. Not only recent publications but even many of the sacred texts were decreed to be "at variance with imperial enactments". As such, they were promptly consigned to the flames. A further ordinance called for the inspection of all private libraries and the destruction of all volumes of an "injurious nature".

As the governor-general of Kiev observed, however, in a report written to

the tsar, measures such as these did not succeed in "correcting" the Jews, so great was their "religious fanaticism and separatism". True to form, another inquiry was now undertaken into the whole Jewish question. This time it was headed by one Sergius Uvarov, Minister of Public Instruction, who explicitly acknowledged the failure of earlier attempts to "correct the Jews". Despite all the measures which had been taken, he told the tsar in a memorandum written in 1840, the Jews continued to be characterised by "the absence of useful labour, their harmful pursuit of petty trading, vagrancy and aloofness from general civic life". The reason why the earlier measures had failed, Uvarov declared, was that they had attempted to come to grips merely with the outward signs, or symptoms, of the Jewish problem, rather than with its root cause.

The fountainhead of all misfortunes was now recognised as the talmud, which "fosters in the Jews the utmost contempt toward the nations of other faiths" and implants in them the desire to "rule over the rest of the world". In consequence, Uvarov stated, the Jews cannot but regard their presence in any other land except Palestine as a sojourn in captivity", so that they obey "their own authorities rather than a strange government". Coercive measures designed to "ameliorate" the Jews, according to Uvarov, had failed. "With the patience of martyrs", he observed, "the Jews of Western Europe had endured the most atrocious persecutions, and had yet succeeded in keeping their national type intact, until the governments took the trouble to inquire more deeply into the causes separating the Jews from general civic life, so as to be able to attack the causes themselves". On the basis of these observations, Uvarov urged the creation of a "Committee for Defining Measures Looking to the Radical

Transformation of the Jews in Russia". Before long, this body presented its proposals to the government. They included:

> Cultural reforms: among these were the establishment of special secular schools for Jewish youth, restrictions on traditional hadarim and yeshivot, the transformation of the rabbinate and the prohibition of traditional Jewish dress.
>
> Abolition of Jewish autonomy: this was to be accomplished by the total dissolution of all instruments of Jewish autonomous government and the modification of the system of special Jewish taxation.
>
> Increase of Jewish liabilities: expulsions, legal restrictions, intensified concription and similar measures were to be introduced among those sections of the Jewish population which had no established domicile or financial status - the so-called "useless Jews".

These measures were rather less radical than the "radical transformation of the Jews in Russia" which they were supposed to effect. They promised the Jews merely more of the same treatment which they had been receiving for close to half a century, and to the mitigation or evasion of which Jewish communal energy was in large part and with some success directed. Uvarov, as Minister of Public Instruction, was particularly closely associated with the implementation of the first of these proposals. His pet project was the establishment of a network of "enlightened" schools which would put an end to what he called "the perverted interpretation" by the Jews of their own religion and thereby lead to "the purification of their religious conceptions". Uvarov seems actually to have opposed many of the other measures proposed by the Committee, and the generally coercive tone of all previous Russian legislation regarding the Jews. "Nations are not exterminated", he declared, "least of all the nation which stood at the foot of Calvary". Yet Uvarov's quasi-enlightenment was merely another means to the same end proposed by his colleagues. "Is not the religion

of the Cross the purest symbol of universal citizenship?" he asked, in rhetorical justification of his contention that the "purification of the religious conceptions" of the Jews would inevitably lead to their conversion, and thus put an end to that exclusiveness which was so highly irritating to the Russian government.

Uvarov warned his colleagues that the real objective behind the new educational programme would have to be kept a closely guarded secret, since making it public would have "no other effect than that of arousing from the very beginning the opposition of the majority of Jews against the schools". The irony of this admission seems to have escaped the enlightened Minister, who apparently believed that the Jews could be educated away from Judaism without being aware of what was happening to them...

As we shall see, Uvarov's attempt was largely unsuccessful. The attempt to bring an end to Jewish self-government was only slightly more successful, and then more as a result of factors beyond the government's control, as we shall also presently see, then as a result of its initiatives. It now remains only to mention the outcome of those "reforms" which were introduced under the rubric of "increase of Jewish liabilities". A favourite governmental project for a number of years had been to categorise all members of the Jewish community according to their economic status. The intention behind this plan was to reward those few Jews who had made major contributions to Russian economic life, and severely to penalise those who, as proletarians, had nothing to contribute beyond the unskilled labour of their two hands. The "rewards" intended for the more prosperous were modest indeed: in effect, all that they meant was that

those Jews who were fortunate enough to receive them would not suffer from further increases in the liabilities to which they were already subjected. For the unsettled burgher, on the other hand, as they were called, who was not regarded as a human being so much as a burdensome and unwanted parasite, draconian measures were devised. One of these was the imposition of special taxes, which was thwarted by the simple fact that the "useless Jews" had no money to pay them. Another programme tied in with the classification of the Jews envisaged the expulsion of all "useless Jews" living within thirty miles of the Austrian and Prussian frontiers. This step was also frustrated - this time by the outcry which it aroused throughout Western Europe.

Other plans to increase Jewish liabilities succeeded to a large extent in doing so. Frequently these were of the tritest nature and reflected the almost incredibly small-minded bigotry of those who formulated them. One favourite target of "improvement" was the distinctive form of dress worn by Jewish men. Progress, it was claimed, would be brought about by forcing Jewish men to abandon their long black coats in favour of shorter ones which were then fashionable in Gentile circles. The same beneficial results would obtain if Jewish men were forbidden to wear peyot, or side-locks of hair which, hanging over the ears, have been traditional since Biblical times. In 1851 a concerted attempt was made to enforce these reforms. Only elderly men were exempted from them, and then only on condition that they paid a special tax for the privilege. The modern mind is amazed that, in the name of modernity, the supreme head of the vast Russian empire could have wasted even a few moments of his time promulgating the ukase which put this absurd decree into effect. A year later, in

1852, the authorities turned their attention to the question of Jewish female fashions. In accordance with Orthodox Jewish practice, Jewish women frequently shaved their heads before marriage and covered them with either a scarf or a wig. The imperial authorities considered this tradition intolerable. "His Imperial Majesty was graciously pleased to command that Jewish women be forbidden to shave their heads upon entering into marriage", a royal ukase announced. A supplementary regulation imposed a fine of five rubles on all women found guilty of this dastardly crime. Rabbis who condoned or encouraged it were now also held liable to prosecution. Also instituted during this period were special taxes on kosher meat and Sabbath candles, and on immovable property owned by Jews...

It would be tedious to pursue this story of persecution and harassment any further: tedious and also unnecessary, in that with variations of only minor detail (and with the exception of the brief period - the "false dawn" - of liberalism at the beginning of the reign of Alexander II), this record was to continue unabated until the fall of the Romanovs in 1917. The intention of the measures which we have examined, moreover, should by now be clear. Underlying even the most trivial ordinances - and perhaps underlying them in particular - was a brutally serious purpose which we would do well to recognise.

For what we witness in nineteenth century Russia is not merely wanton violence of the kind found in medieval anti-Semitism; nor is it merely the greed to possess Jewish wealth and property - imaginery as that often proved to be; nor again something which arose out of the struggle

for power between church, crown and the mercantile classes and which, during the medieval period, frequently focussed on the royal protection extended to the Jews. Elements of these factors are no doubt present in nineteenth century Russian anti-Semitism. But essentially, official anti-Semitism in this period represented something new. Not even during the worst period of medieval anti-Semitism had it ever been the intention to eradicate the Jews' very existence. Bernard of Clairevaux, for example, a saint of the Catholic Church who was probably second to none in his hatred for the Jews, typically insisted that the Jews must be allowed to remain alive, albeit in a degraded position, as a reminder of what happens to those who deny Christ. Killing a few Jews, or exterminating the Jewish population of a locality, was not incompatible with this position, so long as Jewish existence as such was not eradicated.

Nineteenth century Russian officialdom, however, abandoned even this degree of "enlightenment". For all Uvarov's pious references to "the nation which stood at the foot of Calvary", it is clear that the object of Russian policy during the nine teenth century was, precisely, to exterminate the Jews, if not physically then at least by eradicating their identity. Saying this is not to deny that the persecution of the Jews did not serve certain traditional purposes, too. In the nineteenth century, no less than in earlier times, the Jews might be conveniently singled out as scapegoats accountable for the depressed condition of the rural peasantry or the urban slum dwellers; in the nineteenth century no less than in earlier times, their monopoly of one relatively lucrative industry - in this case the liquor trade - might be coveted. But while these elements of traditional anti-Semitism can be discerned in this period, they do not

identify the basic purpose of the imperial government's policy. At a time of increasing Russophilism, the Russian empire had expanded to incorporate many non-Russian and non-Slav nationalities. At a time when, in Russia and elsewhere, the powers of the central government were rapidly trying to expand, the Jews stubbornly clung to their traditional modes of self-government. These circumstances - the desire to create a homogenous nationality administered by a central government - were present in many West European states. But whereas in the latter the Jews were, broadly speaking, invited to assimilate themselves and were not subjected to excrutiating penalties, if they refused, in Russia they were bullied and coerced in that direction; superficially, the ends pursued in both East and West were the same - namely the cultural assimilation and the political assimilation of the Jews. But of far greater importance, both for its immediate impact and for its long-term effects, is the fundamental distinction of means adopted in pursuit of that end. Why such a dramatic distinction should have existed between East and West can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that Russia possessed a Jewish population many times larger than that of any other country; and by the consideration that the Russian government was in general free to pursue its own wishes in an authoritarian manner that was no longer possible in the West.

Even such observations, however, still leave many questions unanswered, for the fact is that no other nationalty within the Russian empire during the course of the ineteenth century was subjected to so brutal, so concerted and so sustained an assault on its identity and existence as the Jews. Nothing less than the complete disappearance of a separate Jewish nation within the boundaries of the empire would, apparently, suffice to

assuage the persecution; and any means short only of physical extermination on a mass scale, which the Nazis would attempt in the twentieth century, were considered permissable in the attainment of that end. The structures within which the Jews had regulated their relationships with one another and with the outside world; the books they read; the language they spoke; the food they ate; the clothes they wore; the customs which they practised; the names by which they called themselves; even the thoughts which they thought and the God whom they worshiped, had all to be renounced. Why the Jews should been singled out this way is a question which can only be answered when the ultimate mystery of anti-Semitism is understood.

The Jews, then, were told to "correct" themselves, to cease being Jews and to become model Russians instead. This message was delivered to them with all the sustained brutality of which the Russian government was capable. In this experience we find the origins of the massive migrations of Russian Jews to the West, and particularly to the United States; and, with the exception only of Reform Judaism, the origins, too, of every major movement in modern Jewish life - including Zionism.

We turn now to a consideration of the events which, in India, were setting the stage for the eventual rise of nationalist movements there. During the course of the eighteenth century the Indian sub-continent experienced a succession of massive political upheavals that were occasioned in part by the inner decay of the Moghul empire and in part by the

increasing audacity of its Maratha neighbours to the south and the Afghans to the north-west. Feuds of Byzantine complexity and alliances as evanescent as the colour of the chameleon dominate the political history of this time. The wars to which they led were as indecisive, and as destructive to the social, economic and cultural fabric of Indian life, as they were numerous.

Periods of great crisis are often periods of great opportunity, too.Both the British East India Company and the French Compagnie des Indes Orientales had been trading in India since the early part of the seventeenth century. Each now sought to exploit the turmoil on the sub-continent to their own advantage. Neither could do so, however, until they had established their own ascendancy over the other. The wars between Britain and France, beginning in 1742 and culminating in the Seven Years' War which broke out in 1756 (and in which Britain and France supported opposite sides), provided the two Companies with the opportunity for attemting to do so. In their battles with one another they created and abandoned alliances with numerous local princelings, whose fortunes naturally rose and fell with those of their European partners in war; but all of whom lost a great part of their own independence merely by virtue of their alliances with the militarily superior Europeans. The surrender of the French defenders of Pondicherry on January 16, 1761, in the final engagement of a war which had lasted, off and on, for twenty years, thus does not only mark the elimination by the British of the sole European threat to their eventual hegemony on the sub-continent (the Dutch and the Portuguese were never serious obstacles to the British in India). Hardly less importantly, it marks a decisive step forward in the attainment of

that hegemony, particularly in the southern part of India where the French presence had primarily been focussed.

Meanwhile, the British had been active in other parts of India, too. Their efforts in the richest and most advanced part of that country, Bengal, were paricularly successful. Under the brilliant leadership of Clive, who had an unerring knack for identifying and exploiting to his own advantage the dissensions of native rulers, the Company was by 1756 established as the preeminent power in a region stretching from Calcutta - newly founded by the British - to the province of Delhi. Under Clive, moreover, the first important steps were taken toward the establishment of a rational civil service to replace the rapacious and corrupt practices of the Companys employees, and to consolidate the gains from the dramatically expanded sphere of influence which it had won for itself. From the Bengali base, and supported by lesser but nevertheless important centres of British power in Bombay and Madras, the Company extended its power over much of the rest of the sub-continent. The initial stages of this expansion are, of course, associated with the name of Warren Hastings, under whose stewardship of the Company's interests the rising power of the Marathas was at last chcecked.

The period between the Treaty of Mangalore in 1784 and the final collapse of the Maratha confederacy in 1818 witnessed the ultimate consolidation of British hegemony in India. The administration of the East India Company had to all intents and purposes become the administration of India itself. For the first time in well over a century, since the decline of the Moghul empire, it was once again possible to speak of India as a

single country, rather than merely as a sub-continent.

But it was a country in shambles. Decades of war had destroyed the economic foundations of Indian society. In many parts, including the key province of Bengal, the landowning classes, unable because of recurring famine to collect revenues from their tenant farmers, had sunk into decrepitude, furthering the erosion of the native Indian leadership which had in any case been carried to an advanced degree by the decades of war. Everywhere, arts and letters were in an advanced state of decline. Religion had deteriorated into superstition, and practices such as infanticide and sati (the immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands) became widespread. British and Indians alike came to believe that India as it existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century was India as it had always existed: decayed, debased, and to all appearances, incapable of self-government.

The East India Company never doubted its responsibility to direct and assist in the reconstruction of Indian society, in all its aspects, from the depradations of the past. The decisive question, however, was how - in what direction - this was to be done. It would appear that Warren Hastings had assumed that the Company would, in effect, replace the Moghul emperor (or more correctly, would retain him as a splendid and completely powerless figurehead in Delhi), while continuing to follow the practices of the empire in its heyday. "New British would be old Moghul writ large".[1]

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[1] P.Spear, ed., The Oxford History of India (3rd.ed., Oxford, 1958), p.578. Comp. p.513f.

Hastings, who spent most of his life in India, had a tendency, as Anglo-Indians would say in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, "to go native". Not only in order to become a more effective administrator, but also for intrinsic reasons, he attempted to familiarise himself with Indian culture and to encourage a revival of it. He learned to speak and read Persian (since the Moghuls the closest thing India had to a lingua franca) and Bengali, and had a working knowledge of Urdu. Under his encouragement British scholars translated important Hindu texts in law and religion, and with his support the Asiatick Society (now the Asiatic Society of Bengal) was founded in 1784.

We have, however, eloquent testimony to the fact that, from an Indian point of view, even the most enthusiastic Indianising tendencies on the part of the British administrators was neither sufficiently deep nor sufficiantly widespread. This testimony is in the form of an ambitious, four-volume history of India's recent past which was published in Calcutta in 1780 - Seid Gholam Hossen Khan's Seir Mutaqherin.[1] This study, one of the few works of genuine scholarhip to be produced during this troubled period of India's history, was compared by Macaulay to Bishop Burnet's History of his Own Times.[2]

At great length, Hossein Khan criticises the British administration and compares it unfavourably to other foreign conquerors of India, Since his

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[1] Seid Gholam Hossein Khan, Seir Mutaqherin: or a Review of Modern Times, Being an History of India from the year 1118 to the year 1194 of the Hedjirah, trans., Briggs and Raymond, Calcutta, 1832. Our transliterations follow that of the Briigs and Raymond translation, idiosyncratic though it is.

[2] Spear, op.cit., p.479.

indictments are an important source for the study of British attitudes and policies in India we would do well to consider it in detail here. The British, Hossein Khan declares, are cut off from and ignorant of the people whom they rule. "The gates of communication and intercourse are shut up betwixt the men of this land and those strangers who are become their masters", he declares, "and these latter constantly express their aversion to the society of Indians, and a disdain against conversing with them". He continues:[1]

> Not one of the English gentlemen shows any inclination or any relish for the company of the gentlemen of this country, or from [sic] listening to their conversation, or to the stories of the natives; although nothing but conversation is likely to put it in the power of some virtuous, well-disposed man to learn what aches these poor natives, and what might give them relief; and nothing but intercourse would enable him to transmit such useful hints to Government as might conduce to the welfare of the distressed inhabitants of this land.

Echoing his contemporary Montesquieu, Hossein Khan observes that climate and geography play a decisive role in shaping peoples and their customs. India for this reason, he remarks, "looks the strangest country on the face of the earth...Nothing under Heaven is so completely disimilar from what we see in other countries". India has frequently been invaded and conquered by foreign powers who, faced with that country's "strangeness" adapted themselves to it. "So tenacious were at all times the vanquished of their own tenets and customs", Hossein Khan observes, "that the victors soon found themselves of necessity assimilating with them".[2] Not so the British, however. "Such is the aversion which the English openly shew for the company of natives, and such the disdain they betray for them,

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[1] Seir Mutaqherin, op.cit., vol.3, p.154.

[2] ibid, vol.3, p.157.

that no love, and no coalition, can take root between the conquerors and the conquered".[1]

Even without this disposition of the British any merging between the two would have faced many obstacles since "in almost every institution and custom...there is a wide difference betwixt the two nations and governments".[2] In view of British attitudes, however, these obstacles[3]

> ...cannot be remedied at all...Nor does it seem possible to bring the people of this country into such customs and usages [of the British]; whereas the English, being accustomed to them in their own country, want to introduce them here likewise, and think such an introduction easy, and of small moment.

A century before Kipling, then, Hossein Khan had already concluded that "never the twain shall meet". Meanwhile however the British were already the most powerful force in India and gave every likelihood of becoming even more powerful. Hossein Khan is careful not to impute undue malice to them. He says that they wish to Anglicise the Indians for no other reason than that they are used to English customs in their own country.[4] Where he has to accuse them of misundestanding the nature of Indian customs, he is again careful not to level too direct a charge. Customs, he observes, must be evaluated not so much on the basis of their appearance as on that of their "reason or intent". The British, when they want to know anything about India, consult their own servants who, being "beardless and inex-

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[1] Seir Mutaqherin, p.157.
[2] ibid, p.163.
[3] ibid, ad loc.
[4] ibid, ad loc.

perienced", as well as opportunistic, tell their masters only what they think will please them. For example, the British regard concubinage as evil and accordingly have decreed its abolition. What was not pointed out to them - by their beardless servants - is that concubinage exists as a way of averting such social evils as prostitution and "public fornication". Had the British only understood this, they would surely not have abolished concubinage.

In one of the earliest expressions of a nostalgic and surely distorted "golden age" view of the past, Hossein Khan speaks of a time - before the advent of the British - when "the country was populous and flourishing, beyond imagination; and the inhabitants contented and happy, as well as sincere".[1] These halcyon days are contrasted with the present when, under the British, the people of India find themselves ruled by a cumbersome, distant, unresponsive and inaccessable government whose proceedings are shrouded in secrecy, whose officials do not speak Indian languages and always give the benefit of the doubt to an English against a native claimant. What is more, the English are upsetting the delicate balance of Indian society by regarding the zemindar class of landlords as the equivalent of European landed nobility, when they are in fact nothing of the sort. These charges, levelled in careful detail, are contrasted with the open and courteous rule of the native emperors and princes whom anyone - no matter how humble - could approach in confident expectation of speedy redress and dignified treatment, and in the sure knowledge that no one would attempt to humiliate him. These are important points which we shall

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[1] Seir Mutaqherin, vol.3, p.164. My emphasis.

attempt to analyse on a later page of this chapter.

In retrospect, however, the period of which Hossein Khan was writing can be seen to have been characterised by an unusual degree of contact between Englishman and Indian. The typical Englishman of the eighteenth century - certainly until the 1780's - was the "Nabob"; in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries he was more likely to be a character out of Forster's A Passage to India.

The Nabob was in many ways a rogue and an adventurer. An employee of the Company when salaries were low and officials were expected to engage in commercial and other enterprises for their own pockets, he was typically unscrupulous and ambitious for social as well as for economic status; often, too, he was violent and intemperate: he was the breaker of the law in India who, returning to England with his vast and usually ill-gotten wealth, Burke warned against allowing to become the maker of the law in England. And yet, as Spear observes, there was another side to the Nabob:[1]

> The days of corrupt Company officials, of ill-gotten fortunes, of oppression of ryots, of zenanas, and of illicit sexual connections, were also the days when Englishmen were interested in Indian culture, wrote Persian verse, and foregathered with Pandits and Maulvis on terms of social equality and personal friendship.

With the recall of Hastings and the assumption in his place of the Governor Generalship by Cornwallis - of Yorktown fame - a new era was ushered in to British Indian affairs. The Nabob vanished, to be replaced by the civil servant, a sober, salaried official who, as the nineteenth century

[1] P.Spear, The Nabobs (London, 1932), p.145.

wore on, typically drew his intellectual assumptions from the doctrines of Utilitarianism or social Darwinism - or both. Where before there had at least been some Anglo-Indians eager to "go native" - even then, however, so limited as to inspire Hossein's bitterness - now there were none. Carnwallis' clean broom had swept them all away.

One of the most notable of the British "Orientalists" during Hasting's tenure was Sir William Jones, a judge on the Supreme Court in Calcutta and the founder of the Asiatick Society. Jones was a fervent admirer of the civilisations of the East. Already a scholar of Arabic and Persian - his pioneering works included a Grammar of the Persian Language published in 1771 as well as numerous philological and etymological studies - Jones pursued Sanskrit after arriving in Calcutta and made notable contributions in this field, too. He held the opinion that Sanskrit was "more perfect than Greek, more copious than Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either", and called on his fellow Englishmen to study the languages of Asia, and their literatures; speaking of the great rewards which would follow in the train of their efforts to do so, he promised, "The limits of our knowledge will be no less extended than the bounds of our empire".[1]

The Company, as we have remarked, recognised a responsibility for directing the social and cultural reconstruction of India from the ravages it had experienced during the course of much of the eighteenth century. How was this responsibility to be discharged? Jones, along with other

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[1] The Works of Sir William Jones (13 vols., London, 1807), vol.3, p.34; vol.5, p.174., quoted in W.T.De Bary, et al., eds., Sources of the Indian Tradition, (New York, 1958), p.590f.

"Orientalists", called for a policy of extreme conservatism. They opposed the introduction of alien innovations and the activities of Christian missionaris, and doubted even the wisdom of abolishing such customs as sati - abhorrent though they may have been to the Western mind - by administrative fiat. They believed that Indian institutions were more durable than they appeared to be and that, given the right circumstances, they would once again come into their own. They urged that the Company confine its educational activities to stimulating the revival of Arabic and Sanskrit learning. Once the cultural pump had been primed, they believed, India would in these matters be able to take care of herself.

Opposed to this school of thought were the Liberal Tories, as Spear calls them, including such great Company administrators as Metcalfe, Munro and Elphinstone.[1] These men believed that traditional India contained much that should be preserved; but they also believed in the need for the introduction of basic changes, stressing, however, that these should be brought in gradually and with sensitivity to Indian customs and values.

Profoundly at variance with both these positions was the radical one proposed by the Utilitarians, who were at that time rising to a position of philosophical preeminence in England. Persuaded by the extraordinary and bleak view of Indian social, cultural political and economic achievement presented in James Mill's History of India (first published in 1817), and profoundly convinced of the invincibility and universal applicability of reason - and hence of the invincibility of progress, as conceived of

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[1] Spear, History, op.cit., p.579.

by them - the Utilitarians issued a call for what amounted to no less than the thorough-going refashioning of Indian society and culture in the image of the Englightened West.

The debate between the proponents of these positions raged back and forth for many years. From the point of view of Indian history, the most notable advocate of the Utilitarian position was unquestionably Thomas Babington Macaulay.

In 1834 Macaulay, newly arrived from England as a young man of 34, was appointed president of the Committee on Public Instruction. One of his tasks, in this connection, was to resolve the controversy over the nature of the educational system which was being established in India under the auspices of its British rulers. The basic question in this controversy was whether the shcools should pursue a traditional Indian curriculum or, alternatively, whether they should introduce the most advanced learning of the West or, again, and in line with the Liberal Tory position, whether they should work gradually toward a merger of both. This was the ontroversy which Macaulay was instructed by his superiors to resolve. The Minute on Indian Education[1] in which he set forward his own views, may well be considered one of the most important documents in the history of modern India. Its importance is also great as a reflection of European ethnocentrism, and on the question of the relative values of Western and non-Western learning and culture. Macaulay did not hesitate to present the contrast between East and West in the starkest and most ethnocentric

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[1] Text in De Bary, op.cit., pp.596-601.

terms. No one, he urged, could deny that "a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia... or that all the historical information which has been collected from all the books written in the Sanskrit language is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry abridgements used at preparatory schools in England". In particular, Macaulay declared in the finest spirit of Enlightenment self-confidence, nothing in India could compare with the treasures to be found in the English language:

> The claims of our own language it is hardly necessary to recapitulate. It stands preeminent even among the languages of the West. It abounds with works of the imagination not inferior to the noblest which Greece has bequeathed us; with models of every species of eloquence; with historical compositions which, considered merely as narratives, have seldom been surpassed and which, considered as vehicles of ethical and political instruction, have never been equalled; with the most profound speculations on metaphysics, morals, government, jurisprudence, and trade; with full and correct information respecting the experimental science which tends to preserve the health, to increase the comfort, and to expand the intellect of man. Whoever knows that language has already access to all the vast intellectual wealth which all the nations of the world have created and hoarded in the course of ninety generations. It may safely be said that the literature now extant in that language is of far greater value than all the literature which three hundred years ago was extant in all the languages of the world together.

Under these circumstances, of course, there could hardly be any serious question regarding educational policy to be pursued in India. As Macaulay remarked, in a passage which is as notable for its eloquence as it is for its extreme ethnocentrism:

> The question now before us is simply whether, when it is in our power to teach this language, we shall teach languages in which, by universal confession, there are no books on any subject which deserve to be compared to our own; whether, when we can teach European science, we shall teach systems which, by universal confession, whenever they differ from those of Europe, differ for the worse; and

> whether, when we can patronise sound philosophy and true history, we shall countenance, at the public expense, medical doctrines which would disgrace an English farrier, astronomy which would move laughter in girls at an English boarding school, history abounding with kings tirty feet high and reigns thirty thousands of years long, and geography, made up of seas of treacle and seas of butter.

On the basis of these considerations, and pointing also to the progress which had been made in Russia since the introduction of Western learning at the tine of Peter the Great, Macaulay then stated what he believed should become British policy in India with respect to education:

> In one point I fully agree with the gentlemen to whose impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to general views I am opposed. I feel with them that it is educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class of persons who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to them render by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the country.

Cecil Rhodes said that he "would annex the planets if I could". Macaulay, one suspects, would have changed the "blood and colour" of Indians, too, if only that had been possible. In both instances one discerns that uninhibited sense of initiative, that guiltless desire to rearrange the universe in accordance with the intrusive modes characteristic of the locomotor-genital stage of development of which Erikson has written. The universe is seen as comprising objects which exist to gratify one's whim; the only frustration experienced in connection with the expression of the gratification is that the universe refuses to be infinitely manipulable -

but Macaulay does not even express a sentiment analogous to Rhodes' remark "It makes me sad to see them [the stars] so clear and so far away". For eventually, through the mediation of the Anglicised class of Indians which he hoped would develop, "thegreat mass" of Indians would acquire "knowledge". Then only the colour of their skins and the quality - one assumes that it was a question of the quality - of their blood would remain.

We should not mistake the distinctive nature of this attitude. It is by no means the case that this desire to rearrange the universe necessarily characterises the conquerors of foreign peoples. The Romans, for example, do not appear to have exhibited this tendency but, on the contrary, seem quite willingly to have imbibed foreign components into some of their most intimate spheres of behaviour and belief - as Cumont has shown with respect to religion, for example. In India, too, the Moghuls, for all their Islamic faith, appear for the most part to have been content to allow their subjects to continue in their traditional ways, according to S.R.Sharma. But even the desire to convert others to one's own religion must be distinguished from the attitude of which we are speaking here, for in religious proselytising the enthusiast views himself as an instrument of the divine will - a superstition of which a Rhodes, or a Macaulay, could surely not be accused. For them, the universe consists, as we have stated, of objects which are to be arranged and rearranged according to one's whim, objects to be possessed and manipulated and to be stamped with one's own image (in Rhodes' case, of course, the British flag). What the origins of this attitude are, from a psychoanalytic point of view, we can only speculate on here. We would suggest that a lack of trust in the

outside world, and the expectation of not receiving mutuality of recognition and acceptance, are embodied in this attitude. Thus in turn may spring from the disruption of that all-important sense of sameness and continuity which was brought about by the far-reaching social and cultural changes associated with the gathering momentum of the Industrial Revolution and intensified, for men like Macaulay and Rhodes, by their somewhat marginal socio-economic status at home.

While we cannot pursue these speculations here it is essential that we take note of their consequences in terms of the nature of British rule in India. Kipling has his soldier say, "You're a better man than I am, Gunga Din!" It is however impossible to believe that even this, Uncle-Tom kind of view of the native who dies in order to give his master a drink, really was at all common: Kipling did, after all, find it easier to write about the jungle animals. Nor is what we must note here merely - if we can say merely of such a terrible situation - a failure on the part of the British to recognise the Indians as fellow human beings.

"We should look upon India", declared Sir Thomas Munro, one of the greatest of the Indian civil servants:[1]

> not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened, to frame a regular government for themselves and to conduct and preserve it... If we pursue steadily the proper measures, we shall in time so far improve the character of our Indian subjects as to enable them to government themselves.

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[1] P.Griffiths, British Impact on India (London, 1953), p.246.

Expressions of this kind are legion and show that Macaulay's Minute embodied attitudes which characterised the British officials who governed India and the policies with which they did so. The Indian, in this view, can be likened to a lump of clay in the potter's hands: he will cease manipulating it, changing and shaping it, only when it has assumed the form which is pleasing to the potter. The essence of British attitudes toward the Indians, then, consists of this: the Indian will be aceptable to the Englishman only when he has allowed himself to be shaped along the lines which the Englishman dreams proper. If - to change our metaphor - the Englishman is the social engineer, then the Indian is nothing more than the girders, rivets and fixtures from which a pleasing construction is to be assembled.

But there is a qualification which must be entered here, however. When the child plays with his building blocks he knows what structure he is trying to create - or he thinks he knows. Would the Indian ever satisfy the Englishman's demands of him, so that he could at last be treated as a fully acceptable human being? The child, having assembled his blocks according to some plan in his mind's eye, then characteristically knocks thm all apart and begins from scratch again. May we detect some similar game plan in the British mind? British rule, according to Munro's curious and possibly significant slip, will be maintained "permanently until" the Indians shall become sufficiently enlightened, etc., to govern themselves. But it is open to question whether the British would indeed have been prepared to concede the maturity of their wards if other factors had not intervened and obliged them to relinquish their empire. It is in the nature of the British ethic that "the game's the thing" - playing rather

than winning; process rather than goal. And one may very well wonder whether the British were not, in this sense, playing a game in India, too. Certainly, the class of Indians which soon began to emerge in accordance with Macaulay's formula gave no appearance of being made up of people whom the British were prepared to treat as equals. The schools and colleges established for their education were, by English standards, decidedly inferior. A handful of Indians did, each year, go to England to study at the universities or to read Law at the Temples, it is true. But even overlooking their small numbers, we must recognise that on their return to India they were never accorded equal opportunity for advancement in the goverfnment service to the Englishman. District commissioners and members of the bench were always Englishmen; Indians never advanced beyond the middle ranks of the beaurucratic hierarchy in Delhi; and the most to which an Indian might aspire in the police or in the army was the rank of major.[1]

No less to the point, the British did not accept even Indians educated in England as their social equals, even though the latter may indeed have become English in all but blood and the colour of their skins. Social clubs for example, which have always played an important role in British Indian life, would not accept natives as members and would allow them to be brought as guests only under certain clearly-defined conditions. On my own testimony I can record that the Punjab Club, the leading establishment in Lahore, did not begin to accept native members until 1965, and then only because the Government - 18 years after the establishment of

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[1] Griffiths, op.cit., pp.196-199; 283.

Pakistan! - threatened to close it down unless it did so...

The parallels between British attitudes toward their Indian subjects and imperial Russian attitudes toward the Jews are strikingly apparent, and they are significant.

In both cases, the nations fell involuntarily under the control of foreign powers - the Jews under the Russians, the Indians under the British. In both instances, sustained and determined efforts were made to errode the traditional structures of power and authority among the subject peoples. The Russians sought to undermine the legitimacy of the rabbis and of the kahal organisations; while the British simply by-passed native Indian political organisation to create their own civil service and judiciary served, in its lower ranks, by a newly created class of Indians of doubtful paternity. In both cases, the alien rulers displayed the most profound distaste and contempt for the traditional culture and learning of the subject nations. In both instances, the rulers justified the denial of basic civil rights to their subject peoples on the grounds that their cultural characteristics rendered them unfit for the exercise of those rights. In both instances, moreover, the rulers used all the massive resources at their disposal to pressure their subjects into "correcting" themelves,as the Russians expressed it, by abandoning their traditional culture and assimilating to that of their rulers. And, in both instances, it was declared that only when the subject nations had thus assimilated themselves would they be considered ready to acquire full civil rights: only when they abandoned their traditional identities, in other words, would they

be considered fully acceptable and responsible as human beings by their rulers. What is more, in both instances the rulers adopted policies which, despite their ostensible intent of assimilating the subject peoples to their rulers' ways, in fact made that goal impossible. The Russian government created a regime of oppression which engendered such hostility in the Jews - as we shall presently see - that their very desire to continue living in Russia began to wane; the British, for their part, and despite frequent protestations of a "white man's burden" of civilising the native to the point where he would be able to assume responsibility for his own destiny, made sure that only a very few Indians indeed would ever reap the full benefits of Western learning and that even those would be denied social acceptance and the opportunity for advancement in public life.

All this of course is not to say that the experiences of Jews and Indians were identical. It is clear that they were not, and not only in the sense that historical experiences never are identical but also in certain very obvious differences: the Jews for example were a minority in Russia while the Indians outnumbered their rulers by many hundreds, if not actually by many thousands, of times. The Russians, again, prosecuted their policies with a wide range of punitive measures including fines, jail sentences and the barbaric conscription decree; the British, on the other hand, never resorted to such measures in their efforts to Anglicise the Indians.

Having pointed this out, however, we would also observe that there are clearly sufficiently striking parallels between the experiences of the two nations to make the generalisations which we have offered valid. We

suspect, moreover, that those generalisations point to the very essence of the experiences of both nations concerned at the hands of the Russian and British masters.

The question which we propose to explore now, for the remainder of this chapter, is the nature of the psychosocial effects which, a priori, we may associate with those areas of common experience shared by the Indians and by the Jews in Russia. We cannot of course deprive ourselves completely of the benefit of hindsight here; but on the other hand, it is not manifest that our analysis must be determined by it, either. A theoretical consideration of this material, and of this material alone, is possible and worth undertaking.

The elements of common experience which we will, accordingly, attempt to analyse - singly and collectively - are (i) involuntary subjection to alien rulers; (ii) the alien rulers' contempt for the cultural identity - in the widest social, intellectual and spiritual sense - of their subjects; (iii) the rulers' policies of undermining or otherwise bypassing the traditional authority structure of their subject peoples; (iv) the rulers' policies of pushing their subjects into cultural assimilation; (v) the rulers' denial of civil rights to their subjects until they have assimilated themselves; (vi) and finally, the rulers' policies of treating their subjects in such a way as to make it unlikely that the latter either could or would assimilate themselves in a manner satusfactory to their masters.

Both common sense and psychoanalytic theory must all lead us to recognise

that the formation of an individual's identity must be strongly affected by the factors which we have been describing. It is to psychoanalytic theory alone, however, that we must turn for a fuller understanding of those effects.

Two aspects of the process of ego identity stand out. One is the ego's need for a sense of consistency in its experience of the outside world, for a sense of consistency in its experience of itself, and for a sense of consistency between those two experiences: this is the sense of sameness and continuity of which Erikson speaks. The other aspect - implied, to be sure, in the former - is the ego's tendency to blur the distinctions which reason and experience tell us exist between our inside and outside worlds.

In the two historical situations which we have been examining, these two aspects of the ego are almost guaranteed to produce severe obstacles to a healthy and integrated development in individual human beings. Without claiming to exhaust the list of possible ways in which these dislocations might occur, let us examine some of the more salient ones. These fall into three categories, which I shall identify as (i) a loss of faith in the quality of one's actions and the validity of one's perceptions; (ii) scepticism with regard to inspirational figures of a relatively routine type and with regard to the integrity of authority figures and processes in particular; and (iii) an ambivalent attitude toward the future. Let us consider each of these separately.

The young Jew or Indian, growing up in the late eighteenth century, or in

the nineteenth century, faced decisive challenges to his capacity for trust, autonomy, initiative, industry and identity altogether. That this is not overstating the case we will see on consideration of the following questions. How can a growing person experience a sense of sameness and continuity, in general feeling the world to be consistent and trustworthy, when the values and manners of the parents who firrst raised him and to whom he looked for guidance and sustenance and protection are overtly and even brutally mocked and disparaged by the dominant power of the fuller society into whose membership he grows with adolescence? This person is, literally, torn between two worlds: and since neither is capable of protecting him from the other he will, understandably wonder whether either can protect him - and therefore wonder, too, whether either can be trusted by him.[1] It is not at all uncommon for an individual in such a situation to extend that lack of trust in the world to himself, to doubt the trustworthiness of what he does and declares: and from there to project it out again onto the world which, in that maddeningly circular way in which the psyche often operates, will then confirm for him what in fact it originally taught him!

How, moreover, can the growing person accept and develop his capacity for autonomous behaviour and decisions when he is exposed to constant uncertainty as to whether the world in which he is at the moment operating is

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[1]The writer James Baldwin once told me that he could not place his trust in anything (and I suspect, in himself, either) until he learned - which he had not yet done - to accept the way his parents looked: in a world, of course, which told him that his parents' appearance was not acceptable. See Michael Selzer, "Sichsuch 'im James Baldwin" (Hebrew) Bama'arachah (Jerusalem) no 35, 1965.

the world to which his behaviour and decisions are appropriate: and not the other, rival world which regards those modes of behaviour and decision making as shameful and inappropriate? In fact, the challenge is not only, as it were, a "geographical" one because, torn between the two worlds, our person is part member of both and yet not fully a member of either. It is not therefore only the external world in which he is operating which may censure him for bringing to it the modes of the other world of which he is also a part. Rather, he is dichotmised internally along the same lines, and what one part of him regards confidentally as acceptable and appropriate, the other part of him will view as a source of shame and doubt. In such an environment the rage our person will feel against the world which will not provide him with an acknowledged place is turned against himself for not being able to find a place in that world. His actions may very well also come to be characterised by compulsive, repetitive qualities which, to the extent that he recognises but is unable to escape from them, will certainly have an adverse affect on the value which he attaches to those acts.

Indeed, this person is likely to be characterised by a general lack of action-oriented imagination; to have an implausible, an unrealistic imagination, and to be marked by an overall incapacity for action. All this will stem from the failure to develop the quality of initiative which, in turn, stems from the heightened dangers of assuming initiatives in an environment of generalised uncertainty and ambiguity. By much the same token the gains of the latency period, namely a sense of industry as Erikson calls it, are likely to appear, at best, in diluted form. This sense of industry has its roots in the "technological ethos" of a society, which

as we have seen imparts "the configuration of culture and the manipulations basic to the prevailing technology" to the growing person. But the situations of which we have been talking are precisely ones in which acknowledgement of the rulers' culture as the prevailing one carries with it such high risks and conflicts that major obstacles stand in theway of it being made. What further complicates matters for our individual, and further intensifies his doubts about the quality of his actions and the validity of his perceptions, is the fact that it is in connection with this stage that he must gain a sense of the division of labour and of differential opportunity relative to his own performance and prospects. This can, under relatively healthy conditions, induce either a vigourous sense of competitiveness and ambition or, on the other hand, an understanding and unembittered acceptance of one's place in life based on the recognition that all contributions are necessary for the effective functioning of the whole social organism. In the societies which we have been discussing, however, the likelihood is great that the person will instead develop an embittered sense of his own inferiority. There is "something about him", a damned spot which will not wash out, which erodes his sense of technological competence and makes him feel that, by the prevailing standards of success, he is foredoomed to failure.

The role confusion from which this person is also likely to suffer will further intensify his doubts concerning the quality of his actions and the validity of his perceptions. The adolescent resynthesis of infantile trust, which among other things expresses itself in ideas in which one has faith; and the adolescent resynthesis of the childhood gain of initiative, which expresses itself in lofty flights of the imagination; and, in generazl,

the incorporation into the ego of a coherent ideology which, by identifying values legitimises perceptions and confirms the possibility of undertaking effective and meaningful action: all these are likely to be frustrated in the uneasily bifurcated world in which the individuals of whom we have been speaking find themselves. Such individuals are, instead, more likely to suffer from a profound sense of role confusion which, by its very nature, leaves the individual feeling indecisive and ineffective.

All in all, then, the individuals of whom we have been speaking grow up in a world that is out of joint, lacking consistency, sameness and continuity. In such a world it is, objectively speaking, difficult to function effectively or to feel reasonably certain of the validity of one's perceptions. But these difficulties are enormously intensified by the propensity of the ego to establish a consistency between the inner and the outer world, which in this case means that our individuals will believe themselves to be and will therefore become appropriately indecisive and ineffective members of an indecisive and ineffective world. They will in other words see themselves as they see the world and will turn their perceptions into self-fulfilling prophecies. What makes this situation particularly ironic, of course, is that it plays right into the hands of the alien rulers who, to rationalise their domination of their subjects and their treatment of them as infantile incompetents, claim that the latter are "not as good as we" in terms of performance and judgement. Here, then, although from a different perspective, we are able to observe another self-fulfilling prophesy - namely the familiar one that the colonial powers erode the ability of natives to rule themselves and then point to

that inability to justify their paternalistic "protection" of them...

A second consequence of the conditions created by the imperial government in Russia and by the British in India is the scepticism with which their subjects come to regard inspirational figures of a relatively routine kind and the integrity of authority figures and processes. Here too, the basic gains of each of the stages from infancy to adolescence, which might otherwise be acquired by the individual, confront serious obstacles. In this connection it is important to recognise the implications of the fact that we are not dealing merely with a situation in which, through a process of organic development (which can include revolutionary components, whether politically, culturally or economically), the growing individual finds himself torn between the modern and the traditional. Compounding matters here is the consieration that the traditional also represents the indigenous, while the modern represents the alien in every sense: foreigners who, through brute force and superior organisational ability have placed themselves in a position of overlordship and usetheir perogatives to undermine the traditional and indigenous patterns. Attitudes toward leadership roles and authority roles, and to the processes of authority (e.g., the administration of justice) are therefore coloured by doubts regarding the legitimacy of power. But this in turn does not mean that the traditional roles and processes are regarded as legitimate, either, for they have lost their ability to fulfill their functions of inspiration and leadership; and they have, by definition, failed to show themselves viable in face of the external threat to them.

Under these circumsdtances there is liable to develop a vacuum of

legitimate inspiration and authoeity of a routinised nature. This need not necessarily incapacitate the ability of the alien ruler to govern his subjects who, in the absence of any viable leadership will be incapable of offering methodical resistance. The vacuum is, rather, a personal and not a social one; one whose consequences, in other words, may more directly be discerned in the patterns of psychosocial identity formation than in the workings of the political system. Of course, this is not to deny that there is an effect on the workings of the political system but only to emphasise the psychological effects of this vacuum, which will then create repercussions for the political system.

Hossein Khan, as we saw, by implication questioned the sincerity of the British masters of the sub-continent; and it is clear that where the development of a basic trust is impeded it must, indeed, extend to the point of questioning the trustworthiness of the ruling powers. For the Jews, of course, with a long history of living as a minority nationality among aliens, this would not be a new experience. But in the traditional setting this would be offset by a sense of trust in the communal leadership and the rabbinate which would, in turn, both reinforce and be reinforced by a sense of the internal trustworthiness of the individual concerned. The dissolution of the Jewish community, therefore, as a result of the tsarist policies which we have examined, would be likely to have marked effects on the <u>internal</u> estimate which the ego formed of itself.

The development of a sense of autonomy has, as its social counterpart, and guarantor, the institutions of law and order, which confirm the appropriateness of actions and impart a feeling of "rightful dignity and lawful

independence". Where the development of this sense is frustrated, e.g., by circumstances which lead the individual to question the quality of his actions and the legitimacy of his perceptions, the individual will tend to perceive the institutions of law and order as arbitrary and wanton; he will, moreover, because of the tenuousness of his sense of autonomy, feel that those institutions both control him too rigidly and that they do not control him sufficiently. The inner doubt projects itself by doubting the consistency and appropriateness of the guidance provided by external authority figures and institutions.

The gains of the third stage, that in which the individual discovers his capacity for initiative, are expressed in the qualities of imagination and the enthusiasm for inspired activity. Where those qualities develop, the individual will be able to appropriate for himself heroes and leaders to give scope to his imagination and to inspire him to action. These he will very often be able to find as respectible figures in his own society, acknowledged as such by others, and therefore confirming him in a sense of the reality of his own aspirations. This is not necessarily to imply that he accepts the status quo, but rather that he will not lapse into the pursuit of utopian fantasies at the behest of figures whose exhortations themselves reflect a fantastic sense of reality. These are the kinds of characters toward whom a person frustrated in the development of a proper sense of his own capacity for initiative may turn. The dream-like and impractical nature of their objectives can confirm the person in his own passivity: since the objectives cannot be attained, except in fantasy, there is no point in attempting to attain them. For the rest, leaders and heroes who represent a more feasible set of tasks and inspirations can be

dismissed as insipid and "irrelevant".

It is of course with the gains - or otherwise - of adolescence that the person's attitudes toward leaders and authority processes receive lasting form. When, as in the societies of which we have been speaking, the tendency of social factors is to generate a high degree of role confusion, the person's capacity for faith in men and ideas, and to identify inspirational figures, is diminished and intensifies disillusionment with, or distantiation from, leadership figures and authority processes. The capacity for pledging fidelity, and through that pledge to be confirmed in one's own identity is by the same token also diminished or else assumes fantastic or unrealistic form. The components of ideology and aristocracy, which are also so important at this stage, and which nourish in the person a feeling that the best people do manage to get to the top and that the people who are at the top are best fitted to be there, must also be frustrated by the obstacles placed in the way of adolescent identity formation. The inner sense of role confusion projects itself to a view of existing leadership figures and authority processes as inept, inappropriate and uninspiring - and certainly not worthy of a pledge of fidelity.

Finally, we must observe that in the kinds of situations which we have been describing, the growing person is likely to acquire a highly ambivalent attitude toward the future of himself and his society. This ambivalence will, in general terms, be a projection onto outside time and space of his own feeling of inner uncertainty. The obstacles he will have encountered in the development of a sense of basic trust will, in this context, express themselves again in the absence of a sense of sameness and

continuity which, of necessity, will lead him to anticipate jarring discontinuities in the future. The projection of his inner mistrust will also lead him to an inadequate sense of hope, a basic correlate of trust and one of the first virtues acquired by the growing person: the untrustworthy, discontinuous world does not offer much scope for hope.

On the other hand, the same person may also develop a contradictory set of orientations toward the future. The nostalgia for a forfeited paradise is rooted in the first stage of identity development and is directly related to a lack of trust. The more intense this lack of trust the more vividly is the person likely to cherish idyllic notions of the past - and, possibly, utopian expectations of the future. In general, these will embody in exaggerated form, the gains which he has in actuality failed to make in each of the successive stages of his psychosocial development. Where he has actually experienced guilt and shame, for example, believing himself to be the very worst, the most incompetent, the most <u>freakish</u>, he may now fantasise a world in which he is the recognised exemplar of standards, values and customs, (actions). He may displace into his utopian future his adolescent rebellion against the notion of being historically determined, and imagine a world in which he is free from the decisive social - and hence psychological - handicaps which have limited his development in the past. In subscribing to his utopia, moreover, our person will be encouraged by the kinds of leaders and heroes he choses for himself and whose dispositions are probably not very different from his own.

All in all, then, our person will view the future with apprehension and doubt, on the one hand, and with a highly implausible set of fantasy based

expectations on the other. The latter may, indeed, confirm the former: for the more apparent it becomes to our person that his expectations are indeed fantastic, or at least that he will never see them realised, the more he is likely to sink into bitterness and despondency. This, in turn, will further diminish his already reduced capacity to assimilate the type of changes which the representatives of the dominant culture expect of him as - according to them - prerequisites for the bestowal of civic equality.

Our speculations on the preceeding pages have been, to the extent possible, of a theoretical and apriori nature. We have tried to deduce the salient effects on identity formation of growing up and living under the regimes- the Russian and the British - whose policies toward the Jews and the Indians, respectively, we have been examining. At this stage we must now turn to an examination, once more, of the historical facts, to see how the Jews and the Indians <u>did</u> react to those experiences. This evidence will enable us to decide whether the theoretical analysis we have made is reasonably accurate or not. That question it taken up in the final chapter.

4. THE ASSIMILATIONIST RESPONSE

Charged that they represented an inferior culture which they should abandon in favour of the superior culture of their rulers, the Jews of Russia and the Indians faced what were ultimately two choices. One of these was to agree with the charge, to plead guilty as it were, and to accept the demand for assimilation; the other was to disagree with the charge and therefore to resist the demand for assimilation. In this chapter we shall deal primarily with the former category of response - that of the assimilationist. However, since it is possible to document the existence of certain responses which fall in between the two polar extremes in the Jewish experience, we shall also take brief note of them.

In one of these we find a stubborn and dodgged adherence to traditional patterns of conduct and belief, an obdurate refusal to be cowed by the blandishments, let alone to be seduced by the enticements, of the imperial government. The traditionalists, in their psychic and intellectual invulnerability, manifested what David Riesman has called "the nerve of failure".[1] This, as he says, is "simply the nerve to be oneself when that self is not approved of by the dominant ethic of a society":

> [The Jews'] ethical regime was quite defiantly Ptolemaic, revolving about the small group of Jews, not the

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[1] David Riesman, "A Philosophy for 'Minority' Living", reprinted in Michael Selzer, ed., Zionism Reconsidered (New York, 1970), p.89ff.

> large Gentile society - and accordingly they learned to remain unimpressed by Gentile temporal power. Being unimpressed did not mean being unafraid - material power might beat or starve one to death; it did mean refusing to surrender moral hegemony to the majority merely because it had power. Instead, the Jews saw through power by observing its blindness in comparison with the vision possible to the weak. A saying of Nachman of Bretslav exemplifies this outlook: "Victory cannot tolerate truth, and if that which is true is spread before your very eyes, you will reject it because you are a victor. Whoever wold have truth itself must drive out the spirit of victory; only then may he prepare to behold the truth". In other words, since the Jews' ethical scheme placed no great premium on material power, on material success, the majority was not looked up to with envy and admiration, and hence its verdicts, both as to the ends of life and as to the value of the majority, did not acho the Jew's self-consciousness.

For the traditionalist Jews the word of God was incontrovertible and the the highest possible truth. Life was to be shaped in accordance with its dictates and in no other way; certainly life was <u>not</u> to be shaped according to the dictates of the imperial Russian throne. In their refusal to compromise with the latter, the traditionalists displayed courage and ingenuity of truly heroic proportions. When Jewish schools were closed down they studied secretly; when the printing of Hebrew books was banned, they devised means of preserving their literature and of saving texts from the censors' flames; when crown-appointed rabbis and judges replaced those recognised by the community, members of the community simply ignored the former and continued to refer their questions and disputes to the leadership they held to be legitimate; when expelled from one area to another, they found means of reconstituting themselves communally in a new setting; often, indeed, they preferred to maim and cripple their male children rather than to have them conscripted into the tsarist armed forces. And

when evasion and circumvention were no longer possible, when the wrath of the government had to be encountered directly, the traditionalists, maintained in their spirit by centuries of experience, displayed indomitable fortitude, courage and endurance.

The neo-traditionalists, as we shall call them, represent another category of response to the pressures of assimilation. These were people who, unlike the traditionalists, had at least in part responded affirmatively to the call of western, secular modernity - whether as a result of the government's coercion or independently being a question which need not detain us here. They differ from the traditionslists on another score, too. For the traditionalists, the crisis of the nineteenth century was one caused by the assaults of a hostile government whom the traditionalists knew, unequivocally, represented false ideas and values. For the neo-traditionalists, on the other hand, the crisis was <u>also</u> compounded of a recognised need to adapt Jewish mores and culture to the standards of rational modenity which were, by the neo-traditionalists, recognised as being in many respects superior.

The neo-traditionalists were by no means assimilationist,however. The preservation of Jewish society and identity was their foremost concern. But this, they believed, could only be ensured after certain adjustments had been made by the Jews to the realities of the modern world. That these adjustments could be made without disrupting the continuity of the Jewish world was, however, something of which they were profoundly convinced. For the Bundists, members of the revolutionary workers' organisation

established in 1897, the Jewish problem would be solved once the tsarist regime had been overthrown and a socialist society was established. In such a society national rights would be recognised and thus the preconditions for Jewish survival would be ensured. While the Bundists did not seek a revolution solely for Jewish national reasons butalso to create a more just society for all, there can be no question but that national considerations were among their foremost concerns.

In their thinking on Jewish problems the Bundists were as completely under the influence of Simon Dubnow as they were under that of Karl Marx in matters pertaining to the socialist revolution. Dubnow, an historian and publicist, first introduced the notions of cultural autonomy and Diaspra nationalism as the bases for the preservation of Jewish life in the modern world. Diaspora nationalism entailed the recognition that the Jews are a nation whose life has always been contained in its own distinctive social and political forms; these, now threatened by tsarist pressures, had to be preserved. Politically, therefore, the Jews should dedicate themselves to this task. Cultural autonomy pointed to what had also been an enduring fact, namely that the Jewish nation possessed its distinctive national culture. This culture had seldom shirked confrontation with what was new, Dubnow declared, but it did not compromise its autonomy in doing so. Dubnow was confident that it had not lost its ability to do so in his own time. The traditional forms had largely been eroded by secular modernity, it was true; but this did not undermine either the viability or the authenticity of the culture as it adapted itself to fresh circumstances. "We beind the Jewish national idea", Dubnow wrote, "to the free growth of the nation on its spiritual soil. We do not subordinate it to the

traditional forms. The future of the nation depends on its autonomous culture. It is not predetermined but develops incessantly, and such a culture will, as a matter of course, also be a national culture, a continuation and perfection of everything that the nation has creted in the course of its previous historical existence".[1]

The crisis of Jewish existence and identity as perceived by the neo-traditionalists was, therefore, a relatively superficial one. Under the combined impact of tsarist persecution and secular modernity Jewish life, in the cultural and socio-political senses, had been thrown into disarray. By fighting for the preservation or re-establishment of Jewish communal rights (whether "in the system" as Dubnow advocated, or by overthrowing it, as the Bundists considered it to be necessary), Jews could secure the preconditions for their future survival. At the same time, while the external expression of the Jewish identity was undergoing a change, the very fact of change was not considered problematical for the neo-traditionalists (though of course it was viewed as unacceptable by the traditonalists), who insisted that "as a matter of course" what came after it would be Jewish, "a continuation and perfection of everything that the nation had created in the course of its previous national historical existence."

We turn now to consider a very differnt pair of responses to the official harassment of the Jews in Russia. In the first of these belong the bourgeois assimilationists. During the early nineteenth century the governments of both Poland and Russia were much exercised by the question of whether

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[1] S.Dubnow, Nationalism and History: Essays on Old and New Judaism ed. K.Pinson (Philadelphia, 1955), p.163.

the Jews should show that they had deserved emancipation before receiving it. A special committee, for example, was established by the provisional government of Warsaw in 1815 to look into this particular dilemma. In its report, the committee stated that it had, in principle, been ready to advocate the extension of full civil rights to the Jews but had reluctantly come to the conclusion, after weighing all the issues at stake, that "the ignorance, the prejudice and the moral corruption" of the Jews were so acute as to render such a move inadvisable for the time being. The committee accordingly demanded, as a precondition for Jewish emancipation, the prior "correction" of the Jews. This could be done by removing the Jews from the liquor trade, by abolishing the instruments of their self-government, and by inducing them to accept modern, secular forms of education. Only when the Jews had corrected themselves, accordingly, in line with these recommendations, could they be considered deserving of emancipation.[1]

The Jewish bourgeoisie, which more than any other section of the Jewish population valued the prospect of emancipation, cooperated eagerly with the government in the hope of bringing about the "correction" of their "co-religionists" as they were by now pleased to call them. In Warsaw, for example, they invited Moses Mendelssohn's pupil David Friedlaender, to assist them in "correcting" the Jewish population. Friedlaender's Opinion on the Improvement of the Jews provided them with a wide-ranging rationale for their objectives. It was Friedlaender's opinion that the Jews in East Europe were backward and ignorant, and that their present depressed condition was to be explained, not by the horrors of persecution and discrim-

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[1] Dubnow, History, op.cit., vol.1, p.278ff.

ination which they had endured for centuries, but by their Talmudic taining, by Hassidism, and by their self-government. The secular government was to be congratulated for removing these liabilities, and Friedlaender heartily endorsed, in particular, its schemes for educational reform, the compulsory use of Polish rather than Yiddish or Hebrew, and other measures of this sort. These reforms would in due course make the Jews fit citizens; and Friedlaender was confident that they would "in time, receive civil rights if they were to endeavour to perfect themselves in the spirit of the legislation issued for them". Sentiments such as these were, in turn, echoed by members of the native Jewish bourgeoisie. A tract published in 1820 by "Members of the Old Testament Persuasion" was devoted to the exploration of proposals for making Jews into "useful, industrious citizens". In Russia another Jew imported from Germany, David Lilienthal, to propagandise the 1835 educational measures, received the enthusiastic backing of the bourgeoisie. It was not unknown for members of the Jewish bourgeoisie to go so far as to report to the police "miscreants" who had violated orders regarding e.g., the shaving of peyot, or sidelocks.

"Progress", as the Jewish bourgeoisie understood the term, was painfully slow. The majority of Jews, quite clearly, were not interested in "correcting" themselves and resorted to a wide range of means for negating official policies directed against them. Meanwhile, however, those Jews who had corrected themselves in accordance with those policies were still not emancipated. Why, they wanted to know, should they have to suffer because of the obscurantism of their "coreligionists"? In 1857 a group of wealthy bankers and merchants addressed a petition to the new tsar, Alexander II, expressing their grievances. They pointed out, with some indignation, that

they, as "corrected" Jews, were still being treated in much the same way as those who held fast to the old mores. This was manifestly unfair and unwise. Surely the chaff should be separated from the grain, they asked: not only because it deserved to be but also so that the "chaff" Jews could aspire to the status and rights enjoyed by their "grain" coreligionists? The petition makes painful but essential reading:[1]

> Were the new generation which has been brought up in the spirit and under the control of the government, were the higher mercantile classes which for many years have diffused life, activity and wealth in the land, were the conscientious artisans who earn their bread in the sweat of their brow, to receive from the government, as a mark of their favour, larger rights than those who have done nothing to attest to their well-meaningness, usefulness and industry, then the whole Jewish people, seeing that these few favoured ones are the object of the Government's righteousness and benevolence [sic!sick!] and models of what it desires the Jews to become, would joyfully hasten to attain the goals marked out by the government. Our present petition therefore is to the effect that our gracious sovereign may bestow his kindness on us and, by distinguishing the grain from the chaff, may be pleased to accord a few moderate privileges to the most educated among us.

Many years of intensive lobbying in support of this degrading position succeeded in obtaining only the most miniscule extension of civic privileges to the "model" Jews. Now it was pointed out that, no matter how much the government might appreciate their efforts to transform themselves into acceptable human beings, matters could obviously not be allowed to rest at that. It was reassuring to discover that Jews were indeed capable of "correcting" themselves; but as long as only a relatively small percentage of the total Jewish population attempted to do so, the government would have to withold any significant measure of emancipation. As "model" Jews,

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[1] Dubnow, History, op.cit., vol.11, pp.159-160.

the minority would have to refard itself as responsible for the moral improvement of all Jews. As long as any appreciable section of the Jewish community continued to hold fast to its obscurantist ways, all Jews would have to be held accountable for them. Therefore, the "model" Jews would have to persuade their fellows to correct themselves. When this happened, the Jews, all Jews, would be rewarded with emancipation.

The bourgeoisie now redoubled their efforts. They cooperated zealously with the authorities in denouncing Jewish traditionalism; they acted as informers and spies for the government in bringing to law those who had violated government decrees banning various Jewish observances and practices; they were second to none in their protestations of total and undying loyalty to their country. Like Ludwig Gumplovich, a professional historian, they sometimes went to the point of apologising for having been Jews in the past. "The fact that the Jews had a history of their own was their misfortune in Europe", Gumplovich observed in one of his essays, "for their history inevitably presupposed an isolated life severed from that of other nations. It is just this which constituted the misfortune alluded to".[1]

The crowning tragedy of the assimilationists' efforts was connected with "The Society for the Diffusion of the Enlightenment among the Jews", which was founded in 1867 by a small group of financiers and intellectuals. It is noteworthy that two of the member's of this society's executive committee were men who, having had the courage of their convictions, had taken

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[1] Quoted Dubnow, op.cit., II, p.214.

the logical step of coverting themselves to Christianity. They, together with their former coreligionists, exerted themselves in the effort to attract the Jewish masses to Russian culture in which they now glorified. Their purpose in doing so was stated with admirable candour by one of their leaders:[1]

> We constantly hear men in high positions with whom we come in contact complaining about the separateness and fanaticism of the Jews, and about their aloofness from everything Russian, and we have received assurances on all hands that, with the removal of these peculiarities the condition of our brethren in Russia will be improved and we shall all become full-fledged citizens of this country. Actuated by this purpose, we have organised a league of educated men for the purpose of eradicating the above-mentioned shortcomings by disseminating among the Jews the knowledge of the Russian language and other useful subjects.

The Society therefore aimed at eradicating Jewish "peculiarities" as a way of obtaining the extension of civic equality to the Jews. It carried out its work by raising funds for scholarships and other like purposes. Its scholarship programme concentrated entirely on secular education and did nothing to improve the quality of, or to help subsidise, education in the traditional schools. Its focus on "other useful subjects" was, in practice, confined to commissioning Jewish writers to translate a small number of books on history and the naturalsciences into Hebrew. The Odessa branch of the society, which adopted as its slogan the words, "Enlightenment of the Jews through the Russian language and in the Russian spirit", set out to make a special contribution by translating the Bible and the daily prayer book into Russian.

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[1] Dubnow, op.cit., II, pp.214-215

Within a few years, however, the Society's work was cut short - under circumstances which tell us as much about the nature of Russian policy toward the Jews as the existence of the Society tells us about the Jewish bourgeoisie of the time. The Russian secret police had in its employ a renegade Jew by the name of Brafman, whom they recognised as an expert on the elleged secret world Jewish conspiracy. After careful analysis of the Society's activities and membership, this Brafman informed his masters that the society was, in actuality, an agency of that conspiracy. For all their pretenses to the contrary, and for all their protestations of loyalty to Russia, the organisers of the Society were in fact "separatists", Brafman reported; and he urged that an immediate end be put to their activities. The government promptly complied and disbanded the society. The irony of this action, of course, was extreme: but yet wholly consistent with the bizarre circumstances of Jewish life in Russia. The Jews were condemned as separatists when they refused to assimilate; and condemned as separatists again when they attempted to assimilate. And so the efforts of the Society were undermined by the self-defeating idiocy of the imperial authorities, who claimed to want nothing more from the Jews than what the Society itself was trying to induce them to accept.

While the bourgeois assimilators continued in their endeavour to win acceptance at almost any price, another group paralleled their own efforts. These were the intellectuyals, the Maskilim, or enlighteners, whose work often supported and was financially supported by the bourgeoisie even though, before long, it seemed to negate the latter's own intentions. That is to say, the Maskilim shortly came to depart from the narrow assimilationist path of the Jewish bourgeoisie and steered a course which seemed to be

headed back toward the Jewish fold.

The first Maskilim were simply the intellectual counterparts of the assimilationist Jewish bourgeoisie, tortured, self-hating, often brilliant men like Solomon Maimon who completely turned their backs on the Jewish tradition in which they had been raised. For most of the first half of the nineteenth century they busied themselves with translating into Hebrew (held by them to be a more refined language than the Yiddish spoken by the masses) leading products of secular science and scholarship. Their work was often sponsored by members of the Jewish bourgeoisie and sometimes even by the government. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the Maskilim began writing novels. The novelists were obsessed by the many evils which they believed characterised Jewish life, virtually every aspect of which they pilloried in their writings. Community leaders are depicted as corrupt and irresponsible - not to mention shortsighted; the desperate poverty of the Jews is attributed to the stupidity and incompetence of the Jewish trader, who is unable to meet the requirements of modern life; social exchange is characterised as imprisoned in bigotry and dogmatism; and above all else, curbing spontaneity, inhibiting growth and clamping down the heavy hand of obscurantism, is adherence to the primitive and outmoded forms of religious life.

One is struck over and again by the venomous mood which pervades and characterises the writings of these early Jewish novelists, by the intensity of their sarcasm, and the depths of the alienation which they express from

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[1] For an excellent literary and sociological analysis see D. Patterson, The Hebrew Novel in Czarist Russia (Edinburgh, 1964).

their native habitat. Here for example is the comment on his people's religiosity by Peretz Smolenskin, one of the most prominent writers of the period:[1]

> The Torah and the Torah alone constitutes the cornerstone of their thoughts, desires and ambitions. In that alone they find honour, strength and consolation. So all of them, men and women, old and young alike, diligently pursue the word of God. You must consider, dear reader, what the driving force of a young Jewish boy is. Is he interested in finding work that will provide him with a livelihood? Does he feel the lofty urge to study in a nuniversity and win renown there? Does he chose a hero's glory on a battlefield? Not at all! His sole desire is to display his prowess in Torah and become well-versed in sacred law. And should his ambition be fulfilled, they will seat him, not on a royal throne, but on a dais as a rabbi and mentor in Israel - a great and lofty honour!

More comprehensive is the indictment by the novelist Jacob Braudes of his native Lithuanian Jewry:[2]

> Do you know the land where poverty, hunger, want and general distress prevail, which lies desolate because of the lack of initiative and depression of its inhabitnts?...Do you know the people who dwell there sunk in lethargy like rotten corpses, weary of life, slumbering from birth to death in stupor and devoid of vision? People who never notice the sun even when it shines at its brightest, and shut their eyes to the moon and stars? Whose sons are savages, and whose daughters are like animals without proper education? Who tremble at the sound of a falling leaf and are terrified of demons, spirits and ghosts, and anything else which cannot be seen or heard or comprehended? The only thing that does not frighten them is the burden of life itself, for they neither hesitate to take on the yoke of children or wife, nor do they hesitate in the least about the problems of earning a livelihood or supporting a household - even though their ancestors were always homeless paupers, and they themselves are poverty stricken, while their children will be equally oppressed

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[1] Quoted Patterson, op.cit., p. 173

[2] ibid, pp.202-203.

> and penniless. People on whom the Rabbis have placed an iron yoke, taking the last morsel of bread from their mouths and hedging them with laws and restrictions, decrees and customs [sic!] beyond all bearing. The rabbis have so restricted every avenue of life, scarcely allowing the people to draw breath, that they have deadened their very spirit. And the people meekly bear the burden on their shoulders through blindness and fatigue, and have become a corpse among the living, without ever knowing that the Rabbis have overstepped the mark, broken the covenant of their Torah, and led them into the wilderness. People who hearken not to the spirit of the time and who do not stir to the clarion call of the Enlightenment, and who educate their sons as their fathers educated them, and thereby condemn the next generation to a living death. Do you know that land and that people?
>
> Dear Reader! That land is my homeland - Lithuania! And that people is my people - Israel!

Sentiments such as these do not differ appreciably from those of the Rusamndpr sian officials which inspired the oppressive anti-Jewish legislation of the tsarist government - for all that the former were written in Hebrew and by Jews. Nor are the two examples cited here in any way atypical of the Hebrew literature of the period.[1] Their authors were unequivocal in endorsing the perceptions of Russian officialdom that Jewish life was deply mired in obscurantist and primitive patterns and that nothing less than a thoroughgoing revamping of its structure and content would suffice; the Jews, moreover, are essentially to blame for the troubles that they are experiencing.

Three different patterns of response to the perceived debasement of the

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[1] Comp. Y.Kaufman, "The Ruin of the Soul", in Selzer, Zionism Reconsidered, op.cit., pp.117-129; J.Reider, "Negative Tendencies in Modern Hebrew Literature", Hebrew Union College Annual, Jubillee Vol. (Cincinati 1925); Michael Selzer, The Wineskin and the Wizard, (New York, 1970),145ff; and Patterson, op.cit., passim.

condition of Jewish life can be found in the writings of this period. On the one hand, we find the Maskilim despairing over the possibility of ever effecting the kinds of changes which they believed were necessary; so deep was the rot in the heart of Jewry. Thus Braudes continues immediately the passage quoted above with the thought:

> Were a man to come from Western Europe and with his own eyes see this backward people, their degredation, their of culture, the education they give their sons and daughters, and their manner of life, without any doubt he would pose the question, Can reforms be of any avail? Is it still possible to reform them? Could even the third generation enter into the society of men who are aware of life and all its manifestations?

On another level, we find expressed the idea that Judaism should become a completely private commitment, on the part of individual Jews, who in all other respects should strive to become good and conventional Russian citizens: Judaism, in other words, should become merely a "religion". This stance, which in the West would of course become the central tenet of Reform Judaism, is associated in the East particularly with the name of Yehuda Lieb Gordon ("Yalag"), secretary of the St. Petersburg Society of the Enlightenment, whose efforts were rewarded by honourary citizenship in the Russian empire. In his poem, "Awake, My People!", Gordon urged his fellow Jew to "Be a man in the street and a Jew at home; a brother to your [Gentile] countryman and a faithful servant to your king".[1]

Finally, we may note the presence of a third pattern of response to the perceived degradation of Jewish life. In novel after novel we find a heark-

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[1] Cited H.M.Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish History (London,1958)p.209 I have been unable to trace the source of this famous remark.

ening back to the days of Israel's glory, a romanticisation of the period of its sovereign independence in Palestine during the Biblical era. Indeed, one of the first major Hebrew novels ever to be written, Abaraham Mapu's Ahavat Tsiyon ("Love of Zion") published in 1853, was a gloriously romantic evocation of Jewish life during the Biblical period. It breathed the perfume of Sharon and Carmel, and removed such familiar figures as King Hezekiah and the lovers Amnon and Tamar far from the sombre pages of religious literature. And linked to the fantasy of a distant past we find tentative expressions of a desire to return to Palestine.[1]

Raja Rammohun Roy was a Bengali publicist and intellectual whose life spanned the years from 1772 to 1833. Rammohun, as we shall presently see, was an avid admirer of Western culture and civilisation, whose superiority to that of his native land he freely acknowledged. In 1830, defying convention which barred high-caste Hindus from travelling outside India, he voyaged to England. En route, the vessel in which we was sailing called at a port where a French ship happened to be at anchor. So great was Rammohun's enthusiasm for the French Revolution and everything connected with it that he was unable to curb his imulse to go on board the ship and present India's homage to the no-doubt startled French sailors. Rushing up the gangplank of the French vessel, however, the luckless Rammohun slipped and fell, breaking his legs. The ministrations of a superior Western surgeon notwithstanding, unfortunately, the bones never mended completely

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[1] Sachar, op.cit., p.207; Dubnow, op.cit., II, p.228ff.

and Rammohun remained partly lame for the rest of his life...[1]

It is not difficult to see in this tragi-comic episode a parable of India's response to the West, particularly (though by no means solely) up to the time of the Sepoy Mutiny and its accompanying disturbances in 1857.

From its inception, the expansion of European power into Asia, Africa and the Americas had raised questions of the most profound nature regarding the relative value of Western and non-Western culture. The urgency of these questions is still experienced by many today, for they have to do with the purposes to be pursued by individuals in living out their lives and with the directions which entire societies attempt to follow as they move into the future; they have to do, in other words, with the foundations on which psychosocial identity is constructed. For all their impact on Westerners, however, these questions possessed an even greater urgency for those whose countries had been subjugated by European power than for Europeans themselves. To the Westerners, the encounter with the East may have offered an alternative to the malaise which they perceived in their own societies, but it was not an alternative which daily thrust its attention on them and to whose military power they were the subjects. For the non-Westerners, on the other hand, the powerful and pervasive presence of the West constituted a challenge, or else a threat, which they had no choice but to confront - almost minute by minute during the course of their lives - and by the confrontation with which a great part of their lives would be defined.

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[1] G.K.Mookerjee, The Indian Image of Nineteenth Century Europe, (New York, 1967) p.23.

A leading Indian historian, referring to his country's encounter with the West, has written:[1]

> The Indian mind, being what it is, does not respond to new ideas and events promptly, for as a result of centuries of civlised history, we have acquired a highly discerning mind which refuses to be overwhelmed or hustled by any new ideas or evidence... We have, in the course of centuries developed, almost by instict, the habit of not being rushed into any kind of new conclusions or easy generalisations without careful observation and long reflection.

No statement couldbe further from the truth than this - flattering though it may be to certain Indian sensibilities.[2] For the fact is that, like Raja Rammohun Roy rushing recklessly and lucklessly up the gangplank of the French vessel, a large and influential section of the Indian intelligensia was quick to acknowledge the superiority of Western civilisation and attempted, as Gandhi put it at a later date, "to ape" its ways. Nor can there by any doubt but that the injuries they received were as severe as those suffered by Rammohun Roy - and as permanent.

Rammohun was not the first Westernising Indian to attract attention. That distinction properly belongs to Henry Derozio, a Eurasian with a Portuguese father, who died in 1831 at the age of 22. In 1829 Derozio, then only 20 years old, was appointed assistant headmaster of Hindu College in Calcutta. This institution had been established by a group of newly rich Hindus in 1816 whose fortunes had risen as a result of their dealings with the

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1 Mookerjee, op.cit, pp.1-2.

2 Mookerjee, ibid., p.12, turns tables on Macaulay by claiming, "The philosophical schools founded by Kant and Hegel would be unthinkable if the knowledge of Indian philosophy and metaphysics had not beceme available to them when these men's minds were being formed"!

British and who sought, through the College, to make available the finest fruits of Wstern scholarship to Bengali youth.

Derozio was appointed to this position on the strength of the considerable reputation he had already made as a very young man with his poetry. These poems, which to the modern ear sound like a parody of the worst romantic verse of early nineteenth century England, suggest a certain paradox. A number of them hark back to the ancient glories of India and look forward to their revival. The following sonnet is an example:[1]

The Harp of India

Why hangs't thou lonely on yonder withered bough?
Unstrung, forever, must thou there remain?
Thy music once was sweet - who hears it now?
Why doth the breeze sigh over thee in vain?
Silence hath bound thee with her fatal chain;
Neglected, mute and desolate art thou
Like ruined monument on desert plain -
O! many a hand more worthy far than mine
Once thy harmonious chords to sweetness gave,
And many a wreath for them did Fate entwine
Of flowers still blooming on the minstrel's grave;
Those hands are cold - but if thy notes divine
May be by mortal wakened once again,
Harp of my country, let me strike the strain!

Poems such as this notwithstanding, however, Derozio appears to have been more interested in persuading his students at Hindu College, and the members of an Academic Association which he founded in Calcutta, to abandon all aspects of their heritage in favour of a thorough-going Westernisation. It is notable that, like Gandhi at an earlier stage of his own career, Derozio - who probably did not know Bengali - made a point of dressing in the manner of an Indian dandy. Kopf quotes a letter published in a Bengali

[1] F. Bradley-Hirt, Poems of Henry Derozio (Oxford,1923), p.1.

newspaper from an irate father whose son, a student at Hindu College, had been tainted by Western ways as a result of Derozio's influence:[1]

> According to the father, his son, who was "a good boy before" now "has his hair shorn"; wears "European shoes"; eats food as soon as he recieves it and "without bathing". The boy's "Bengali is unintelligible"; he knows "nothing of ready reckoning" or how to write bazaat bills. His son "can tell any mountain or river in Russia, but can give no account of his own country". Furthermore, his son has lost all respect for caste practices and calls "holy brahmins and pundits thieves, hypocrties and fools". And what seems the worst blow of all, his son no longer "wishes to shit with me because I have no great knowledge of English".

Complaints such as this mounted and eventually led to Derozio's dismissal from Hindu College; a few weeks later he died of cholera. Compelling as his personality was by all accounts, however, it is clearly impossible to attribute his influence to that factor alone or to suppose that, with his dismissal from Hindu College, or with his death, the trend toward Westernisation which he represented, and the rejection of their identity as Indians by numerous intelligent and sensitive young men, would be reversed. The gnawing sense of being heir to an inferior culture rooted in superstition and folly; of belonging to a society permeated by injustices and barbaric customs; and of being adherents of a religion which seemed to deny basic human imperatives and to cultivate both cruelty and ignorance with doctrinal ardour - all this was common among Indians in the nineteenth century and, from a certain perspective, understandable enough. The British did indeed represent a culture which was in virtually every respect superior to anything found in India. Indian society, as the British seldom

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[1] D. Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), p.258.

desisted from pointing out, incorporated characteristics - infanticide, sati and the caste system - for which no rational defense could be offered. Religion, and particularly Hinduism, had sunk to the lowest levels. Reinforcing at every turn the notion of Indian inferiority and of British superiority, moreover, was the pervasive fact of British skill in arms, of British technology, and of British managerial ability. It is not surprising, then, that during the initial encounter with the West a large number of Indians should have felt that their only hope lay in abandoning everything that was Indian about themselves and in emulating their masters. It was only at a rather later date, as we shall see, that certain Indians came to draw a radically different conclusion from the differences they observed between themselves and the British. At that time, they would question the desirability of following Western man in his Faustian quest for control over the forces of nature for material ends, and would affirm their belief in the greater validity of the spiritual quest in life as exemplified by Indian traditionalism. But such a development was still a long way off and, as we shall see, was in itself precipitated to no small extent by the affirmation of Indian spirituality by a variety of European figures. At the later, as well as the earlier, stage of India's encounter with the West, Indians for the most part tended to look to the West for their cues. When Westerners told them to regard themselves, their culture and society and religion as inferior, large numbers of Indians did so. And when other Westerners, at a later date, told them that they should be proud of their heritage and abandon efforts to imitate the West, Indians in large numbers once again followed suit.

We have already noted the presence, in some of the poems of Henry Derozio,

of a romantic-nationalist longing to revive the ancient and now heavily tarniched glories of ancient India. It was frequently under the guise of promoting this goal that Indian intellectuals justified their assimilation to Western ways and culture. To revive the fallen glory of India, Indians would first have to master modern skills and familiarise themselves with other cultures. These then would be combined with those of India to produce a renaissance synthesising the best of the West with the substance of Indian civilisation. "He leads the way from the orientalism of the past, not to, but through Western culture, towards a civilisation which is neither Western nor Eastern, but something vastly larger and nobler than both", reads an optimistic assessment of the significance of Rammohun Roy.[1]

But this statement is not only optimistic, in suggesting the move toward a new culture, but distorted, too. Certainly it is open to question whether Roy, in particular, really did envisage anything more than the reform of Indian society in accordance with Western concepts of social justice; the reform of Hindusm in accordance with Christian views of monotheism and human dignity; and the reform of Indian culture in accordance with Western standards of rationality. In his reform endeavours, Rammohun displayed a lively recognition of political considerations and acknowledged that it was in large part the depressed conditions of Indian society and culture which it had made possible for the British to establish their ascendancy over the sub-continent. At least in part, he justified his reformist efforst in terms of the political advantage which would follow,

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[1] English Works of Rammohun Roy (Allahabad, 1906), xxvii-xxix.

in their train:[1]

> I agree with you that in point of vices the Hindus are not worse than the generality of Christians in Europe and America, but I regret to say that the present system of religion adhered to by the Hindus is not well calculated to promote their political interests... It is, I think, necessary that some change should take place in their religion, at last for the sake of their political advantage and social comfort.

Nowehere do we find surer evidence of Rammohun's disdain for traditional Indian knowledge and his avidity for Western learning than in a famous letter he wrote in 1823 to Lord Amherst, the Governor-General, protesting a plan to endow a new college for Sanskrit studies.[2] What emerges from this letter, written twelve years before but closely paralleling Macaulay's Minute, is Rammohun's firm conviction that any attempt to revive traditional learning was a misdirection of effort which could only strengthen the chains of India's ignorance and servitude; what India needed, above all, was Western knowledge. Even if we recognise that Rammohun could not have argued, in a latter to the British Governor-General, the political advantage to Indians of acquiring Western learning, we must also acknowledge that the letter is apowerful and eloquent expression of his belief in the intrinsic and unequivocal superiority of Western culture:

> When this seminary of learning [Sanskrit College] was proposed, we understood that the government in England had ordered a considerably sum of money to be annually devoted to the instruction of its Indian subjects. We were filled with sanguine hopes that this sum would be laid out in employing European gentlemen of talent and education to instruct the natives of India in mathematics,natural philosophy, chemistry, anatomy and other useful subjects, which the natives of Europe have carried to a degree of perfection that has raised them

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[1] U.N.Ball, Rammohun Roy (Calcutta, 1933), p.197.

[2] Complete text in English Works, op. cit., pp.469-474.

> above the inhabitants of other parts of the world... This seminary (similar in character to those which existed in Europe before the time of Lord Bacon) can only be expected to load the minds of youth with grammatical niceties and metaphysical distinctions of little or no practical use to the possessors or to society. The pupils will there acquire what was known two thousand years ago with the addition of vain and empty subtleties since then produced by speculative minds such as is commonly taught in all parts of India.

There follows an emphatical and vitriolic denunciation of traditional Indian learning which, in its sarcasm, is more than a match for the contumely of Macaulay in the following decade:

> No improvement can be expected from inducing young men to consume a dozen years of the most valuable period of their lives in acquiring the niceties of Vyakaran or Sanskrit Grammar, for instance, in learning to discuss such points as the following: khada, signifying to eat, khadati, he or she eats, query, whether does khadati taken as a whole convey the meaning of he, she or it eats, or are separate parts of this meaning conveyed by distinctions of words, as if in the English language it were asked how much meaning is there in the eat and how much in the s, and is the whole meaning of the word conveyed by these two portions jointly or distinct from one another?
>
> Neither can much improvement arise from such speculations as the following which are the themes suggested by the Vedanta: In what manner is the soul absorbed by the Deity? What relation does it bear to the Divine Essense? Nor will youths be fitted to be better members of society by the Vedantic doctrine which teaches them to believe that all visible things have no real existence, that as father, brother, etc., have no real entity, they consequently deserve no real affection, and therefore the sooner we escape from them and leave the world the better.

Perpetuating such doctrins, Rammohun argued, could serve no useful purpose and would, on the contrary, keep Indian minds in servitude to ignorance and superstition, and their "country in darkness":

> If it had been intended to keep the British nation in ignorance of real knowledge, the Baconian philosophy would not have been allowed to displace the system of the shcoolmen which was best calculated to perpetuate ignorance. In the same manner, the Sanskrit system of education should be best calculated to keep this country in darkness, if such had been the policy of the British legislature. But as the improvement of the native population is the object of the government, it will consequently promote a more liberal and enlightened system of instruction, embracing mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, anatomy, with other useful sciences, which may be accomplished with the sums proposed by employing a few gentlemen of talent and learning educated in Europe and providing a college furnished with the necessary books, instruments and other apparatus.

It is, as we have already suggested, difficult to believe that the author of this letter sought much if anyth ing beyond the assimilation of young Indians to what he believed to be the vastly superior civilisation of the West. It was also in part for these reasons that Rammohun advocated a policy of colonisation of India by European settlers.

Rammohun is also remembered, however, as the initiator of a great movement for the reform of the Hindu religion, and the question arises as to whether his reformist zeal in this respect was not more consistent with the view of him as a pioneer of a genuinely Indian renaissance rather than as an assimilator to Western ways. Ball has suggested that the Brahmo Samaj, t he organisation founded between 1828 and 1830 by Rammohun, was intended "solely as an instrument for overthrowing idolatry".[1]

The evidence here is not unequivocal. Rammohun is on record for a spirited

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[1] Ball, op.cit., p.241.

defense of Hinduism in face of Christianity and its missionary efforts, and emphasised that Jesus and his immediate followers were themselves Asiatics and not Europeans.[1] On the other hand, it is important to note that Rammohun, while rejecting the divinity of Jesus, affirmed the superiority of his ethical teachings and published a book, The Precepts of Jesus, in which those teachings are brought together. In the introduction to that book he went so far as to claim[2]

> The notion of the existence of a supreme superintending power... and a due estimation of the law which teaches that man should do unto others as he would wish to be done by, reconcile us to human nature, and tend to render our existence more agreeable to ourselves and profitable to the rest of mankind... is principally inculcated by Christianity...although it is partially taught by every system of religion with which I am acquainted... [These principles] are admirably calculated to elevate men's ideas to high and liberal notions of one God... [and] to regulate the conduct of the human race in the discharge of their various duties to God, to themselves and to society.

The fact therefore is that Rammohun did not discern a sufficient emphasis on these highly valuable teachings in his own religion and turned to an alien faith, that of the British rulers of India, to find it instead. It is, accordingly, difficult to resist the conclusion that while parts of his efforts for reform of the Hindu religion were motivated by a desire to counter the activities of Christian missionaries from England, he was also motivated by a recognition of the religious and social superiority of the Christian doctrine and sought to rationalise Hinduism in terms of Christian doctrine. And while Rammohun cannot reasonably be held responsible for

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[1] English Works, op.cit., p.145ff., p.908.

[2] ibid, pp.484-485

the path which the Brahmo Samaj took in the years after his death, the implications of his concessions toward Christianity can most clearly be seen in the career of Keshab Chandra Sen (1839-1884).

Sen was initially a follower of Rammohun's successor the the leadership of the Brahmo Samaj, Debendranath Tagore (1817-1905). Tagore, whose father Dwarkanath had provided the Samaj with financial support during Rammohun's lifetime, continued the fight against Christian missionary efforts and against Hindu idolatry alike. It was not long before he attracted to his side a number of the most energetic and educated Bengali youths and infused the Samaj with new life. One of the most remarkable of these new recruits was a young graduate of Hindu College, Keshab Chander Sen.

Sen became one of the foremost spokesmen of the Brahmo Samaj and travelled across ths sub-continent establishing branches of it far and wide. In 1865, however, he parted company with Tagore over the question of wearing the sacred thread of high-caste Hinduism, which Tagore insisted on retaining and which Sen ceremoniously tore assunder. This split symbolised a wider one: Tagore the gradualist and Sen the radical could not remain in the same company for ever. Sen now set up his own organisation, which he named the Brahmo Samaj of India. Under his inspiration, which drew ultimate sustenance from a revelation he experienced, this organisation moved ever closer to Chistianity - only to veer off into a new direction with the establishment of a neo-Christian "Indian national church" which Sen called "the New Dispensation". This Church would unite all the major religions of India in a neo-Christian framework, thereby, among other things, putting an end to the communal strife between their respective

adherents and, no less importantly, would establish India as a religious light to the nations.

For Sen, as for many others after him, these two themes existed in close interrelationship with one another. On the one hand, we find avid acceptance of Western influence and gratitude toward the British for being its prime vehicle. In a speech given to mark the assumption by Queen Victoria of the title of Empress of India, Sen remarked:[1]

> Who can deny that Victoria is an instrument in the hands of Providence to elevate this degraded country in the scale of nations...? Not to be loyal argues base ingratitude and absence of faith in Providence. You are bound to be loyal to the British government that came to your rescue, as God's ambassador, when your country was sunk in ignorance and superstition, and hopeless jejuness [sic] ... The more loyal we are, the more we shall advance with the aid of our rulers in the path of moral, social and political reformation.

Sen also made it clear, on a number of occasions, that just as India was destined to benefit from her encounter with the West, so too would the West learn much of importance from India. This sentiment, we would sugget, is probably the reverse side of the same impulse which led so many Indians to an uncritical admiration of the West. This we shall see more clearly when we turn our attention to the most fascinating - and, from a historical point of view, probably the most important, of the cases we shall be examining of Indian responses to the West - namely Gandhi. For Gandhi, certainly, and for others such as Sen on whom the literature, and particularly the biographical information, is sparse, even the slightest interest

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[1] De Bary, op.cit., p.619.

expressed by Europeans in the civilisation of India became an opportunity for self-justification. After the shocking recognition of their own pervasive inferiority, as they beleived it to be, vis a vis the West, Indians eventually turned to a recovery of their own traditions and culture under the couragement of Westerners who, in effect, told them, "Yes, but we do think that India has much of value to teach us!" : a sentiment expressed in the title of Max Mueller's famous book, which probably taught Indians far more than it taught Westerners. The point though is that this discovery was facilitated by a kind of cultural nihil obstat issued by the West and had its effect on Indians only because they were so prone to accepting any value judgements from that source.

There is surely no need to belavour the parallels between Jewish and Indian responses to, respectively, Russian and British rule, that we have outlined in this chapter. In both instances, influential, articulate and energetic individuals emerged to confirm the basic accuracy of the alien rulers' perceptions of native life and culuture, supporting and even urging on the governments' activities which were aimed at "correcting" the natives' ways. The traditional leadership, denounced as incompetent and out of touch with present realities, is condemned in the same terms by its native critics. The misfortunes which the native population is experiencing are attributed to their own obscurantism and maladaptibility: and this is precisely what the alien governments are themselves saying.

All in all, then, we can say that one pattern of response on the part of the subjugated peoples exposed to the assimilatory demands of their

conquerors is to identify themselves with their conquerors and, essentially, to agree with everything that they say. This view, as we have seen, is not incompatible with an ideazlised perception - paradise lost - of the native people's past. Nor does it preclude, either in the case of the Jews or the Indians, a utopian and fantasy-charged expectation that the national future will once again be covered in glory. Related to this past-and-future (anything but the present!) aspect of the assimilationists' response is the presence of certain token concessions to the preservation of their national distinctiveness. The Maskilim will translate secular works into Hebrew - a language which, in fact, very few Jews could understand (though most could read it (Yiddish is written with Hebrew characters); Rammohun, Sen and others will, in much the same way, insist that they are only trying to reform, upgrade, and modernise their heritage and not at all to Anglicise it or to Christianise it.

The perceptive reader may already have suspected that this pattern of response contains in it elements which are also present in which might be seen initially as an antithetical pattern of response - namely that of the nationalists. This insight will be confirmed in the next chapter, to which we now turn.

5. THE NATIONALIST RESPONSE

We have mentioned three types of response which characterised the Maskilim in Russia in the earlier years of the Jewish enlightenment, so-called. One was to despair that the Jews, so deeply mired in the obscurantism as they were, would never be able to improve themselves. Another was to call on Jews to see their Jewishness merely as a domestic commitment, a religious identification which would merely manifest itself in certain rites conducted in the privacy of the home. Finally, there is to be found the first, nostalgic yearning for the ancestral homeland in Palestine.

These three elements can be found intertwined in the writings of the major literary figures of the period. Gradually, however, they began to resolve themselves into a new mood. Despair does not constitute a programme - and it was clear to many that a movement for the regeneration of Jewish life was essential. Gordon's advice, even if it had been acceptable to the majority of the Jews - which it was not - was indeed something on which a programmatic response might have been built up: but only to the extent that the Russian Gentiles were prepared to accept the Jew, out of doors, as a man equal to themselves. And this, it did nor require any great perspicacity to see, the majority of Russian Gentiles was not prepared to do. The pogroms of 1880-1881, in particular, led to a new realism on the part of the Jewish intelligensia, to the

recognition that the attempt at assimilation was not feasible even if it might have been desirable.

Essentially, we can say that the Maskilim, rejected in their attempt to join in the mainstream of secular culture, and recognising too that their own predeliction for civilised Russian life was not endorsed by the majority of Russian Jewry, now turned back to their own people, to a rediscovery and reaffirmation of their own origins. But of course - they could not go back to their original point of departure, could not merely merge back into the society and culture of the little stedtles that they had originally repudiated. And this was not only because they had "eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge" of modern secular culture. At least as much to the point, they could not go back because the society and culture of the stedtle, buffetted by persecution and harassment from without and by the crisis of self-confidence from whithin (which the Maskilim themselves had done much to precipitate), was inan advanced state of decay. In order to return "home" the Maskilim would have to rebuild it.

We can note the attempt to do so, this painful transition from the acknowledgement of the failure of assimilation through enlightenment to a determination to reconstruct the national identity, in a number of writers in the 1870's and 1880's.

In a notable essay "It is Time to Plant" published in 1877 Smolenskin, whom we had earlier seen deriding the religiosity of Jewish life, now reaffirmed precisely that dimension - and in terms which were to suggest Dubnow's ideas of a slightly later period. The Jews, he declared, are a

nation. National identity and survival alike have rested on the fact that the nation always regarded itself as a spiritual one. "We are a spiritual nation", Smolenskin writes, "this is the correct doctrine which we must proclaim":[1]

> The foundation of our national identity was never the soil of the Holy Land and we did not lose the basis of our nationality when we were exiled. We have always been a spiritual nation, one whose Torah was the foundation of its statehood. From the start our people has believed that its Torah took precedence over its land and over its political identity. We are a people because in spirit and thought we regarded ourselves bound to one another by ties of fraternity. Our unity has been conserved in a different way, through forms different from those of all other peoples, but does this make us any the less a people?

Nevertheless, Smolenskin observes, it is a fact that religion has lost much of its legitimacy in modern times, and that it is likely to lose still more as the years wear on. "There is reason to fear", he writes, "that ultimately the yoke of the law [Torah] will be cast off in favor of modern life, for we see it happening before our very eyes. If we are honest, we must admit that the younger generation is far less observant than its parents. It is therefore not unlikely that in a generation or two the breakdown of religious observance will cause the name and memory of Israel to disappear".

Coupled with this expression of fear at the threatened future of the Jewish people - and the hope for its survival - we find Smolenskin announcing a doctrine which emerges from the very heart of the

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A. Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea (New York, 1959), p.147

Enlightenment:

> In practical reality, every Jew is a citizen of the land in which he dwells, and it is his duty to be a good citizen, who accepts all the obligations of citizenship like all other natinals of the country. The land in which we dwell is our country. We once had a land of our own, but it was not the tie that united us. Our Torah is the native land which makes us a people, a nation in the spiritual sense. But in the normal business of life, we are like all other men.

Essentially, then, in 1877 Smolenskin is still thinking in terms of Gordon's advice to be "a man in the street and a Jew at home". But already a new theme is sounded. For in a later passage in the same essay we find an impassioned and rather more explicit statement of the belief that the affirmation of Jewish identity neither needs to be nor should be confused with rejection by the Jews of participation in the life and culture of a modern state:

> The willfully blind bid us to be like all other nations, and I repeat after them: let us be like all the other nations, pursuing knowledge and attaining it, leaving off from wickedness and folly, and dwelling as loyal citizens in the lands to which we have been scattered. Yes, let us be like all the other nations, unashamed of the rock from whence we have been hewn, like the rest in holding dear our language and the glory of our people.

Tacitly, then, we are given the conditions for Jewish survival as Smolenskin perceived them in the late 1870's. The Jews are a nation, a spiritual nation, who can preserve their identity even though they do not possess their own state. Under the impact of Enlightenment, however, they have tended to abandon their Jewish identity, which they have seen as being in conflict with modernity. Jewish

survival is therefore threatened; Jews believing that they should be like all other peoples, assume that this task entails the abandonment of everything that has hitherto distinguished them. Smolenskin, however, points out that one essential component of modern nationality is precisely the joyous and unabashed affirmation of the national heritage of the hallmarks of national uniqueness. To be a modern nationalist, in the nineteenth century, therefore means the acknowledgement of the pre-modern history and culture of the nation, rather than their repudiation; it means speaking the nation's language; and it means pride in "the glory of our people". Paradoxically, perhaps, but unequivocally, Smolenskin is saying here that assimilation to modernity does not mean that the Jews should abandon their own identity but, rather, that they should now differ from all the other nations in precisely the way in which each of them differs from all the others! In a very real sense, Smolenskin is now urging the Jews, in Isaac Erter's words, "to cast off the folly of their own people in order to indulge in the folly of the Gentiles". Every modern nation has its own identity, which is rooted in the past, and for all their modernity, they differ from one another precisely because of their affirmation of their own individual pasts. Modernity means reworking rather than rejecting one's past; certainly it does <u>not</u> mean the complete abandonment of one's own identity and assimilation to that of another nation.

By 1881 Smolenskin had already taken this position to its logical conclusion. The pogroms of that and the preceeding year had made it clear that the Jews would not find in Russia the circumstances in which to

recover and develop their national identity. "No other country is conceivable except the Land of Israel [Palestine]", he wrote in an essay of that year entitled "Let us Search our Ways".[1] Conceivable for what purpose? one might ask. Smolenskin does not give his answer in a completely unambiguous form. The Jewish need was twofold. One was that the Jews needed to be free from persecution and oppression - and this need was already beginning to express itself in a mounting rate of emigration from Russia.

But emigration by itself was no real solution to the Jewish problem. As Pinsker would argue the following year, the concentration of masses of immigrant Jews in another country would probably result in a wave of anti-Semitism hardly if at all different from that which the Jews were experiencing in Russia. Emigration was necessary, therefore, but not a sufficient condition for the solution of the Jewish problem. Only resettlement in Palestine would meet the total Jewish need. For there Jews would find security from oppression but would also be able to ake steps toward the preservation of their traditions and "the memory of their ancestors". Those who opposed this proposal, it is significant to observe, are bitterly identified by Smolenskin as assimilators - sartor resartus. In no uncertain terms, he assrts the connection between a return to the Land of Israel and the reconstruction and preservation of the Jewish identity in face of the depradations of the Enlightenment:

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[1] Hertzberg, op.cit., pp.148-153

> It is useless to try to convince those Jews who hate Zion and Jerusalem, and whose sole wish is to make us forget the memory of our ancestors, our beliefs and our sense of kinship. Having destroyed our traditions and mocked and derided the whole heritage of Israel, why should they spare the Land from their venom?

This theme was repeated and developed by Smolenskin in an attack on the "Haskalah of Berlin" published in 1883.[1] Enlightenment, he now argues, has denationalised the Jews; the renationalisation of the Jews, if we may use such a gross term, while it entailed the recovery of Jewish identity in a spiritual and cultural sense, necessarily also entailed the establishment of a "home" in Palestine in which this could live:

> The programme of this Haskalah was not simply to awaken a desire for learning and knowledge among our people, Its basic intention, which was presented as the very word of God, was quite different and quite simple: "Imitate the Gentiles". The Haskalah of Berlin rested on this keystone: imitate the Gentiles, abandon our own traditions, disdain our own manners and ideas, and conduct ourselves both at home and without - in the synagogue, within our families, everywhere - in imitation of others...
>
> The consequences of this doctrine were, first, the destruction of the sentiment which is the unifying principle and strongest foundation of the House of Israel - that we are a nation; and second, the abandonment of the hoope of redemotion. For the exponents of the Haskalah of Berlin our nationhood was a stumbling block; an existing Jewish national patriotism would be bar to assimilation, and the memory of the land and sovereignty that once were ours, together with the continuing hope that they be restored, make us a nation. As long as the memory of the past and hope for the future were still alive, how could they say to the Jews, Abandon your own traditions and follow blindly in the path of the Gentiles? It was therefore necessary to cut every root of this tree of life.

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[1] Hertzberg, op.cit., pp.154-157

> They succeeded in denationalising Jewry and in teaching it to mimic, apelike, the life around it, but nonetheless their dream did not materialise... Some ask the nonsensical question, What will we do after we have turned our backs on the Haskalah? Will we go back to the old ghetto education and to letting our youth rot in the academies of the Talmud? These questioners do not really understand the subject which we are discussing. We are not fighting the Hasklah itself, which is only an abstract term, but the corrupt doctrines of its high priests who have propagated in its name... They have taught us that it is our duty ot adopt the ways of the Gentiles. We will utterly ignore this notion, for we will choose what is best for us: the ways leading to unity and to group solidarity. If we are united, our strength will grow; divided, we will fall away one by one and never rise again. They have striven to remove all the bonds of love and solidarity which unite our people, so that it should become assimilated among the Gentiles. We know that is nonsense, for assimilation without conversion is impossible. Therefore let all who refuse to become assimilated desist from a foolish policy which can only estrange our people and which will not win us acceptance from among the Gentiles. In assuring us that, as a reward for "enlightenment" we would be able to establish our homes wherever we happen to be, they have told us to abandon all hopes of returning to our own land and living there in dignity, as all peoples do. And we, having seen that all this did not get us anywhere, and that it did not even help us to secure the love which we sought - we declare: Only a dog neither has nor wants a home. A man who choses to live his whole life as a transient, without a thought for the establishment of a permanent home for his children, will forever be a dog.

An even more forthright statement of the view that only the recovery of political sovereignty could make possible a resolution of the crisis of Jewish existence and identity is to be found in the writings of Eliezer Ben Yehuda, who is popularly remembered as the man respobsible more than any other, for the revival of Hebrew as an everyday tongue. Writing in 1880, that is to say before the pogroms which were to

cause a change in heart of Smolenskin and others, Ben Yehuda observed:[1]

> If we existed till now without our own land, language and political sovereignty, it was because our religion and our whole way of life were radically different from those of all other peoples and that difference served as a mighty fortress to preserve us. Within this circle we lived the life of a self-contained people. In those days we had a truly Hebrew enlightenment, and we even possessed a national language, for our intire intellectual life was conducted in Hebrew. The present, however, is totally different. We have divested ourselves of our national ornaments and we now deck ourselves in alien finery. All our arguments and efforts are foredoomed to futility, for nobody will listen to us!
>
> I therefore contend that we have strayed from the right path. It is senseless to cry out: "Let us cherish the Hebrew tongue, lest we perish!" The Hebrew language can live only if we revive the nation and return to its fatherland. In the last analysis, this is the only way to achieve our everlasting redemption; short of such a solution we are lost forever! The Jewish religion will, no doubt, be able to endure even in alien lands; it will adjust its forms to the spirit of the place and age, and its destiny will parallel that of all religions. But the nation? The nation cannot live except on its own soil; only on its own soil can it revive and bear magnificent fruit, as in the days of old.

For Moshe Leib Lillienblum, too, only the establishment of some form of Jewish sovereignty would suffice to allay the crisis of Jewish identity in his time. He writes in his Diary of the joy he felt on reaching this conclusion. "How sweet and dear this idea has become to me! All my life I have grieved over the decline of Jewish nationality, and the thought that Jewry's existence as a nation was doomed. And now there lies before me a straight and sure path to the everlasting salvation of our people, and its nationhood..." Somewhat later, he observed in an essay, "Man holds dear whatever others try

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[1]Hertzberg, op.cit., p.165

to steal from him. In the medieval times our religion was attacked, so we held on to it with all our might. Today, when our national identity is uner attack, it will again become our most prized possession, and we will shield it with the same devotion with which our ancestors defended our faith". The only real choice the Jews had, he concluded, was "To initiate efforts for the renassance of Israel in the land of its forefathers, where the next few generations may attain, to the fullest extent, a normal national life".[1]

It would be inaccurate to suggest that all the precursors and the early theoreticians of the Zionist movement shared in this preoccupation with the preservation of the Jewish nationality, in its cultural and spiritual modes, and viewed sovereignty primarily as the only possible means to this end. For some - and mong them some of the most influential - figures the chief rationale of Zionism was its response to the Judennot: the crisis precipitated by, and large confined to, overt persecution and oppression. As we shall presently see, Herzl, who established the World Zionist Organisation, was ignorant of and indifferent to, Jewish culture. An austrian Jew, he was an unabashed admirer of modern ways and wholly removed from the closely-knit Jewish life of the East European stedtle. The same holds true, by and large, of Leo Pinsker, a physician in Odessa, whose Autoemencipation (1882), inspired by the pogroms of the two preceeding years, was the most influential Zionist work published before Herzl's own Judenstaat. Autoemancipation propelled Pinsker, hitherto known only for a few

[1] Hertzberg, op.cit., pp.170,176.

unimportant articles in periodicals published by the Society for the Enlightenment among the Jews, into the forefront of the Zionist movement. He became the president of the Hibbat Tsiyon ("Love of Zion") organisation, the forerunner of the World Zionist Organisation, and remained in that position until his death in 1891.

The problem with which Pinsker dealt in Autoemancipation, the Jewish problem as he saw it, was anti-Semitism in its most brazen and overt forms. Judaeophobia, Pinsker asserted, is a "natural" antagonism on the part of the Gentile: in large measure it arises out of the nature of the Jews themselves, who move about like a ghost in the world of the living:[1]

> Among the living nations of the earth the Jews occupy the position of a nation long since dead. With the loss of their fatherland, the Jews lost their independence and fell into a state of decay which is incompatible with the existence of a stable and vital organism. The state was crushed by the Roman conquerors and vanished from the world's view. But after the Jewish people had yielded up its existence as an actual state, as a political entity, it could nevertheless not submit to total destruction - it did not cease to exist as a spiritual nation. Thus, the world saw in this people the frightening form of one of the dead walking among the living. This ghostlike apparition of a people without unity or organisation, without land or other bond of union, no longer alive, and yet moving about among the living - this eerie form scarcely paralleled in history, unlike anything that preceeded it or followed it, could not fail to make a strange and peculiar impression upon the imagination of the nations. And if the fear of ghosts is something inborn, and has a certain justification in the psychic life of humanity, is it any wonder that it asserted itself powerfully at the sight of this dead and yet living nation?

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[1]Hertzberg, op.cit., p.184.

The Jewish people, Pinsker declares, "lacks most of the attributes which are the hallmarks of a nation". The life of the nations, he points out, is not ideal; universal peace is as yet merely a distant dream. Nevertheless, among the nations there is a relatively well-adjusted system of discourse and exchange based upon formal arrangements, "and especially upon a certain equality of rank and mutually admitted rights, as well as upon mutual regard". It is precisely this lack of equality which is to be found in the nations' dealings with the Jews. The reason for this is clear. The Jews are not in any real sense a nation - "The nations never have to deal with a Jewish nation, but always with mere Jews" - and it follows that only "when the equality of the Jews with the other nations becomes a fact can the problem presented by the Jewish question be considered solved".

What will make the Jews equal to the other nations? Obviously, a state of their own, Pinsker declares. But, as he points out, the necessary conditions for the establishment of such a state do not exist. Jews have "no real self-love, and no national self-respect". It is not until they start to acquire these that they can have any real hope of creating and maintaining a state of their own.

One gets a distinct impression from Autoemancipation that the content of this "self-love and national self respect" - the content, in other words, of Jewish identity, which he recognised as a necessary starting point for the political independence of the Jews - was a matter of indifference for Pinsker. Certainly, that affirmation of the Jewish

cultural personality which earlier writers had expressed, and their hopes for the resurrection of the Jewish identity, are conspicuously absent from Autoemencipation. Nor was it a matter of great importance to him whether the Jewish home be established in Palestine or elsewhere. If anything, indeed, he appears to have opposed the restoration of Palestine to the Jews:[1]

> If we would have a secure home, so that we may give up our endless life of wandering and rehabilitate our nation in our own eyes and in the eyes of the world, we must above all not dream of restoring ancient Judaea. We must not attach ourselves to the place where our political life was once violently interrupted and destroyed. The goal of our present endeavor must not be the "Holy Land" but rather a land of our own.

We have seen that the later Maskilim in East Europe defined the Jewish problem of their time in terms of the deterioration of the Jewish identity, and of Jewish culture. For them this development had only in part been precipitated by the oppression and persecution instigated by the tsarist government; in part, too, in their opinion, it was also compounded of a failure to adapt to those elements of western secular modernity which represented an undoubted advance in human culture and behaviour. It is clear that Pinsker, too, recognised, albeit on extrinsic grounds, the need for a cultural renaissance on the part of the Jews. For the Maskilim, a Jewish state was necessary to bring that renaissance into being; for Pinsker, such a renaissance was a prerequisite for the establishment of the state.

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[1] Hertzberg, op.cit., p.197.

Theodor Herzl, the founder of the World Zionist Organisation, and the convener of the first World Zionist Congress, on the other hand, cannot be characterised in either of these terms. An assimilated Jew, he conceived of Zionism as the only possible antidote to anti-Semitism. From having advocated assimilation and even the mass baptism of all Jews, Herzl was led to Zionist commitments by a succession of events, the most decisive of which was his presence, as a correspondent of a Viennese newspaper, at the Dreyfuss trial.

Herzl was ignorant of Jewish culture and tradition to the point where he was obliged to have a transliteration of the famous words of Ps.137: 5 prepared for him so that he could quote them in the original in his opening adress to the first Congress. In this adress he stated forcibly: "We have not the least intention of yielding a jot of the culture we have acquired. On the contrary, we are aiming at a broader culture, such as an increase of knowledge would bring with it".[1]

It is true, of course, that the Basle Programme, the resolutions adopted at the first Zionist Congress which were to remain the definitive statement of Zionist purpose for over half a century, included an article calling for "The strengthening of Jewish self-awareness and national consciousness". By 1889, however, when the third Congress met in Vienna, bitter attacks on the leadership of the movement for its failure to interpret this statement in any but the most narrow sense - i.e., Jews should recognise their common interest and obligation to

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[1] Quoted A.Bein, Theodore Herzl (Philadelphia, 1956), p.236

support the Zionist programme - were made. The work of the "General Hebrew-Speaking Society" established by the second Congress to foster a Jewish cultural renaissance had been allowed to lag.[1]

The early indifference to cultural work shown by the Zionist Organisation had much to do with Herzl's own attitudes toward Jewish culture but was rooted in at least two further factors as well. As is well known, Herzl devoted his leadership of the movement to efforts aimed at winning international support for the establishment of a Jewish state: essentially, he was a diplomat rather than a community organiser, and believed that political recognition of the Zionist aspiration took precedence over support for the movement among the Jews themselves. In addition, Herzl believed that a cultural programme aimed at fostering a Jewish cultural renaissance could only result in further divisiveness. For what direction would such a programme - and the renaissance - take? Orthodox rabbis, on whose support Herzl counted, feared that the return of the Maskilim to the Jewish fold was more apparent than real, and would result in attempts to secularise Jewish identity - something which they were no more prone to accept because it now appeared in the guise of Hebrew-speaking romantic nationalism than they had been when it presented itself in completely western, secular terms. In view of this, it was preferable, in Herzl's opinion, to let the cultural question remain dormant. "Let us not weaken ourselves", Herzl urged at the third Congress, "by emphasising our differences. Not that these are bad in themselves, but they must be brought

[1] Bein, op.cit., pp.239, 328.

out at the right time, that is, when they can be useful as mutual correctives".[1]

Herzl did not, however, take his own advice. In 1902 he published a utopian novel entitled Altneuland, in which he set forward his vision of the society which would be established by the Zionists in Palestine.[2] The novel is as frank a statement of a cultural-assimilationist point of view as it would be possible to make. It contains elements which reflect Herzl's acknowledgement of the inferiority of the traditional Jewish identity and ofhis belief that the "corection" of the Jews entailed nothing less than their assimilation to the mores of secular western culture. It is a novel which could have been written by any Russian Maskil in the 1860's and 1870's; certainly, it is one which they would have found wholly acceptable.

The plot of Altneuland, like that of so many utopian novels, is obtrusively awkward and contrived. Dr.Friedrich Loewenberg, a poor but educated Viennese Jew, has been brought to the point of utmost despair when he learns that the girl he loves is soon to be married to the scion of a rich merchant house. In his misery, his eye is caught by an advertisement seeking "a cultured and despairing young man willing to try a last experiment in life". Answering it, Friedrich discovers that it has been inserted by an American millionaire whose experiences of life have turned him into a misanthrope. Kingscourt, as he is called,

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[1] Bein, op.cit., p.328.

[2] T.Herzl, Altneuland, trans. P.Arnold (Haifa, 1960)

proposed to Friedrich that he join him on a remote island in the Pacific, there to shun the outside world for ever. The young man accepts with enthusiasm. Soon after, they set sail in Kingscourt's luxurious yacht. A sudden impulse leads them to spend a few days en route for the Pacific in Palestine, "the ancient land of the Jews".

They land at Jaffa, then the chief port of Palestine:

> The town made a most disagreeable impression on them. Though favoured by its situation on a headland overlooking the Mediterranean, it was pitifully shabby. Landing in the miserable port was quite a feat. The narrow alleys smelled to heaven; they were dirty and neglected, full of motley oriental misery. Poor Turks, dirty Arabs, shy Jews lounged all around; all of them indolent, beggarly, hopeless. A strange odour, as of mold and open graves, made breathing difficult.

The two travellers haurry away. They took the primitive little railway to Jerusalem, noting that the countryside through which they passed "was a picture of desolation and neglect. Before they reached the hills there was almost nothing but sand and marsh. They passed blackened Arab villages whose inhabitants looked like brigands..." Jerusalem itself was found by the travellers to be no less squalid than the surrounding countryside. "Shouts, smells, tawdry colours, people in rags crowding the narrow, airless streets, beggars, cripples, starveling children, screaming women, bellowing shopkeepers... The once royal city had indeed sunk to the lowest depths".

The function of this prologue - Judaea desolata - should readily be apparent. Coarse, primitive, loud, dirty, the Palestine which the two

travellers visit is the image of the East European Jew projected by the Russian anti-Semite and internalised by the assimilationists. Not so, however, the Palestine that we encounter twenty years later when Kingscourt and his companion, having relented of their decision to spend the rest of their lives in paradise, are once again passing through the Suez Canal on a visit to Europe.

The two travellers are surprised to note that the world metropolis of Port Said has in the meantime become a dim shadow of its former bustling self. Unable to understand what has happened, they hail the captain of a passing German freighter, and ask for an explanation. To their astonishment, they learn that passenger traffic between Europe and Asia now goes mostly overland, by way of Palestine:

> "How can it be?" asked Fridrich, "have they got harbours and railways?"
>
> The captain was amused. "Have they got harbours and railways! Why, sir, where do you come from? Don't you ever see a newspaper: or a railway guide, for that matter?"
>
> "Well, I shouldn't say that", drawled Kingscourt, "However, it is some years since I saw one, that's true. But we know Palestine, its a desert".
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> "A desert! Well, words have different meanings. You can call it a desert. But you must be damned spoilt, I should say!"

This little dialogue sets the tone for Herzls' description of the fantastic changes which have taken place in Palestine over the course of the previous twenty years. The little stedtle Jews from East Europe have transformed the wasteland into a thriving, cosmopolitian and ultra-modern state, the envy and (almost) the focus of the entire

civilised world!

At Haifa, "where huge liners were at anchor", the travellers find that "a beautiful city has been built close to the deep blue sea. Grandiose piers and dams were mirrored in the water and showed immediately what Haifa had become: the safest and best port in the Mediterranean. Vessels of all shapes and sizes, of all nationalities, lay there at peace". And how the people themselves had changed! "Look up there!" exults the former Viennese lawyer Friedrich. "What sophisticated and well-dressed people, arn't they?" All the world, the two travellers learn, now flocks to Altneuland to trade with, and learn from, the once-despised stedtle people. "Its just like America!" says Kingscourt, doubtlessly intending the supreme compliment, when he learns that the best of Italian, French, German, English ansd Spanish theatre and opera companies are performing in town. He is awed by "the large department stores" and is deeply impressed by the fact that "such outmoded forms of commerce" as small, privately-owned shops "never even began" in the Jewish state. (So much for the image of the Jew as a petty trader!) Everywhere, "emporia and public buildings towered... imposingly", confirming beyond doubt their guide's proud boast that "never before have great cities been built so quickly and so splendidly... never before were technical facilities so abundant". In agriculture, in science, in industry, and in commerce, "the best strains" had been brought to the new country, "the accumulated experience of all the advanced nations of the world".

The entire experiment has been of inestimable benefit to the countries surrounding Palestine, too. "We Jews have brought civilisation to the country", roars a prominent architect. "Our technically trained youth and our enterprising industrialists have brought all the latest gadgets here", declares another citizen. The travellers learn too that the native Arab population has also benefited immeasurably by the Jewish settlement. No longer do they live in "the dirty old nests that used to be called villages here", the travellers are told; and, as an Arab himself explains, "these people are far better off than before".

Coming at last to Jerusalem, the two travellers can hardly believe their eyes. "Modern suburbs had arisen, with a network of tramlines. The streets were broad and tree-lined. There were homes and office buildings, many parks and boulevards, great educational institutions emporia, some splendid public buildings and places of amusement. It was a cosmopolitan city of the twentieth century". The visitors even discover that there is a Jewish Academy, modelled along the lines of the Academie Francaise.

The climax of their visit to Jerusalem, however, comes when they are at the studio of a prominent local artist. There, they are surprised to find themselves in the company of "a couple of distinguished looking visitors, Lord Sudbury and his wife, Lady Lillian"; but they are even more taken to notice that the artist, "who had been a poor Jewish boy", now "felt at home in the most elegant company". With the two

travellers, moreover, is a girl, Miriam, whose family Friedrich had once rescued from dire poverty in Vienna. Observing the relaxed bearing of Miriam in the presence of Lord and Lady Sudbury, "Friedrich felt a surge of pride when he saw the Jewish girl so sure of herself in this company... He said to himself, 'Devil take me, but we can even make quite an impressive showing in high society!" With this halcyon glimpse of Judaea liberata we can at last take our leave of Herzl's novel.

Herzl's projection of the future Jewish state was hardly designed to nourish the hopes of those who saw in that state the guarantee of a Jewish cultural renaissance, the bulwark of Jewish identity. "A Jewish homeland of the future", the young Chaim Weizmann described it, "without a Jewish culture".[1] This, most decidedly, was not what the East European Zionist intellectuals thought that they had been looking forward to.

In 1903, a year after the publication of Altneuland, another incident occurred which was to widen the breach between the Herzlian "pragmatists" and the cultural and social preoccupations of the East European Zionists. Herzl's diplomatic endeavours had aroused a measure of sympathy and interest on the part of Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary. Returning from a visit to Africa, Chamberlain contacted Herzl and offered him Uganda as the site of the Zionist national home. This offer, made as news of a fresh wave of pogroms in Russia reached the West, was accepted by Herzl. A few weeks later, he

presented the proposal to the sixth Zionist congress at Basle, for ratification. Although endorsed by a majority of the delegates, the Uganda Plan was bitterly denounced by the large Russian delegation, who withdrew from the congress hall in bitterness and sorrow at Herzl's "betrayal" of Zion. "These people have a rope around their necks and still they refuse!" Herzl remarked in amazement to a friend.[1]

Herzl's insensitivity to the deep desire of the Russian Zionists to rebuild their homeland and their identity on the ancestral soil, and his indifference to the cultural roots of East European Zionism, led to the coalescing of a distinct anti-Herzlian and anti-Herzl bloc within the Zionist movement. While the members of this group - men like Weizmann, Tchlenov, Ussishkin and Shmaryahu Levin - also opposed Herzl on other grounds (questioning in particular the value of his diplomatic efforts), the main basis of their opposition was the belief they held in the gradual upbuilding of a Jewish community in Palestine, infused with Jewish cultural values, which would provide both the practical and the spiritual foundation for the fulfillment of the Zionist dream. These "practicals", as they were called, (in contrast to the Herzlian "politicals"), were sustained by a populist faith in the East European Jewish masses very different from the pseudo-aristocratic posturings of Herzl and his intimates. The intellectual foundations for their opposition to the Herzlian programme, however, was one developed with remarkable brilliance and insight by Asher Ginzberg, who is more widely known by his nom-de-plume of Achad

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[1] Bein, op.cit., p.453

Ha'am ("one of the people"). For Achad Ha'am not Judennot, the need of the Jews, but rather the need of Judaism, assumed priority and was regarded as the proper focus of the Jewish national movement.

Already by the time of the first Zionist Congress the lines were drawn between Herzl and Achad Ha'am. In an incisive essay published a few months later Achad Ha'am pointed to the profound differences between the "political" and the "spiritual" approaches to Zionism. The former, which he identifies as "western" Zionism, is described in terms which retain a certain measure of immediacy even today:[1]

> The western Jew, having left the ghetto and having sought acceptance by the Gentile majority, is unhappy because his hope of an open-armed welcome has been disappointed. Perforce, he returns to his own people and tries to find within the Jewish community that life for which he yearns - but in vain. The life and the horizon of the Jewish community no longer satisfy him. He has already outgrown accustomed to the broader social and political life, and on the intellectual side the work to be done for our Jewish national culture does not attract him, because the culture has played no part in his earlier education and is a closed book to him. In this dilemma he therefore turns to the land of his ancestors and imagines how good it would be if a Jewish State were reestablished there - a State and a society organised exactly after the pattern of other States. Then he could live a full, complete life within his own people, and he could find at home all that he now seeks outside, dangled before his eyes but out of reach... As he further contemplates this fascinating vision, it suddenly dawns on his inner consciousness that even now, before the Jewish state is established, the mere idea of it gives him almost complete relief. It provides him with an opportunity for communal work and political excitement; his emotions find an outlet in a field of activity which is not subservient to non-Jews; and he feels that, thanks to this ideal, he stands once more spiritually erect and has regained his personal

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[1] L.Simon, Achad Ha'Am (Philadelphia, 1960), p. 376

> dignity, without over much trouble and purely by his own efforts. So he devotes himself to the ideal with all the ardour of which he is capable; he gives reign to his fantasy and lets it soar as it will, beyond reality and the limitations of human power. For it is not the attainment of the ideal that he needs; its pursuit alone is sufficient to give gim a cure for his spiritual disease, which is that of an inferiority complex, and the loftier and more distant the ideal, the greater its power to exalt.

This form of Zionism, this quest for personal gratification rather than for the upbuilding of the Jewish nation, according to Achad Ha-'am, enabled the western Jew to ignore a number of basic principles and considerations. Foremost among these, he believed, was the fact that the Jewish settlement of Palestine could only take place gradually, at a pace which would be less than the natural growth of the Diaspora. "The ingathering of the exiles", he wrote, is unattainable by natural means... The greater part of our people will remain scattered on foreign soils". The Jewish national movement, therefore, can never offer a final, total solution to the Judennot, to the problems of discimination and persecution from which Jews have suffered for millennia.

The <u>real</u> Jewish problem, the one perceived by the Jews of Easrtern Europe, Achad Ha'am declared, is "the problem of Judaism", and this problem would continue to exist, "even if the troubled of the Jews all over the world attain comfortable economic positions, are on the best possible terms with their neighbours, and are admitted to the fullest possible political and social equality". Drawing now a contrast

between the "Zionism" of the West and the "love of Zion" in the East, Achad Ha'Am observed that what was required was a "spiritual centre" in which Judaism could be preserved and where it would flourish; and whence, from "a really Jewish State" would radiate a cultural revival to all the Jews in the world:[1]

> This Love of Zion, which concerns itself with the preservation of Judaism at a time when Jewry is suffering so much, is something odd and unintelligible to the "political" Zionists of the West, just as the demand of R.Johanan ben Zakai for Yavneh was strange and unintelligible to the comparable party of his time... While Zionism looks to the Jewish State to furnish a remedy for poverty and to provide tranquility and national glory, Love of Zion knows that our State will not give us those things until "universal Righteousness is enthroned and holds sway over the nations and States" - it looks to a Jewish State to provide only a "secure refuge" for Judaism and a cultural bond to unite our nation. Zionism therefore begins with political propaganda; Love of Zion begins with national culture, because only through the national culture and for its sake can a Jewish State be established in such a way as to correspond to the will and the needs of the Jewish people.

Achad Ha'am was not a defender of either a political or a cultural Jewish status quo. Over the centuries, he maintained, the Jews had surrendered their "whole soul" to the Book of which they are the people. The result was "to weaken and finally to crush all spontaneity of action and emotion", to enslave the people to the Book and also to enslave the Book to the people. "The people stagnates because heart and mind to not react directly and immediately to external events; and the Book stagnates because, as a result of this absence of direct eaction, heart and mind do not rise in revolt against the written word

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[1] Hertzberg, op.cit., p.258.

where it has ceased to be in harmony with current needs".[1]

This stagnation, however, has in large part been dissipated as a result of the encounter with secular modernity. But this has been achieved at the cost of disrupting the intimate relationship between people and book, a relationship which can only be restored in a Jewish national home:[2]

> It is not only the Jews who have come out of the ghetto; the Judaism has come out, too... wherever it has come into contact with modern culture. This contact with modern culture overturns the inner defenses of Judaism so that it can no longer remain isolated and live a life apart. The spirit of our people desires further development; it wants to absorb the basic elements of general culture which are reaching it from the outside world, to digest them and make them a part of itself, as it has done before at various periods of its history. But the conditions of life in exile are not suitable for such a task. In our time culture expresses itself everywhere through the form of the national spirit, and the stranger who would become part of culture must sink his individuality and become absorbed in the dominant environment. In exile, Judaism cannot, therefore, develop its individuality in its own way. When it leaves the ghetto walls, it is in danger of losing its essential being - or, at the very least - of being split up into many kinds of Judaism, each with a different character and life, as there are countries of the Diaspora. Judaism is, therefore, in a quandry. It can no longer tolerate the Diaspora form which it had to take on, in obedience to its will-to-live, when it was exiled from its own country; but without that form of life it is in danger. So it seeks to return to its historical centre, where it will be able to live a life developing in a natural way, to bring its powers into play in every department of human culture, to broaden and perfect those national possessions which it has acquired up to now, and thus to contribute

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[1] Hertzberg, op.cit., p.265

[2] ibid, p.266.

> to the common stock of humanity, in the future as it has in the past, a great national culture... For this purpose, Judaism can for the present content itself with little. It does not need an independent state, but only the creation in its native land of conditions favourable to its development; a good sized settlement of Jews working without hindrance in every branch of civilisation, from agriculture to handicrafts and science and literature. This Jewish settlement, which will be a gradual growth, will become in course of time the centre of the nation, wherein its spirit will find pure expression and develop in all its aspects to the highest degree of perfection of which it is capable. Then, from this centre, the spirit of Judaism will radiate to the great circumference, to all the communities of the Diaspora, to inspire them with new life and to preserve the over-all unity of our people. When our national culture in Palestine has attained that level, we may be confident that it will produce men who will be able at a favourable moment to establish in the Land of Israel a State - one which will not be merely a State of Jews, but a really Jewish State.

With this orientation toward the Jewish national movement, it is not surprising that Achad Ha'am should have been deeply disturbed by the publication of Herzl's Altneuland. In a lengthy essay, he vented his misgivings about it, sparing neither bitterness nor irony. He described the short period of time which elapsed in the creation of the society depicted by Herzl as implausible, and as an indication of Herzl's irresponsibility. He expressed disdain for the excessive emphasis on the idea of tolerance [of Arabs, Christians, etc.] in the novel, not because there was anything wrong with tolerance in and of itself but because of Herzl's tendency to be over-aware of the need to please the Gentiles, which sometimes brought him to the point of servility. So too with the constant emphasis in Altneuland on its indebtedness on the productions and innovations of non-Jews,

which struck Achad Ha'am - as it has many readers since - as fawning and debasing. The novel's "Jewish Academy", Achad Ha'am was quick to notice, unlike its French counterpart, devoted its energies primarily to general human questions and paid only scant attention to the national language and literature. "Why, then, call it the 'Jewish Academy'?" Achad Ha'am demanded. "Perhaps because only Jews have that attitude toward their own language and literature", he suggested. Commenting on a passage in Altneuland in which the Jews are shown combatting malaria in Africa and helping to organise the return of African Negroes to their ancestral soil, Achad Ha'am observed bitterly:[1]

> We could very well imagine a Negro movement, with the Zionist leader at its head, writing another Altneuland which embodied the ideals of the Negroes after twenty years: and we would like to ask wherein the Negro Altneuland is to be distinguished from the Zionist Altneuland. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that the author would have to make very few changes in the book... To copy others, without showing a spark of original talent; to avoid 'national chauvinimsm' in such a fashion as to leave no trace of the character of one's own people, or of its literature and spiritual creations; to gather oneself together and retreat into a corner merely to show others that we are tolerant, tolerant to the point of waeriness - that can be done by Negroes, too. And yet, who knows, perhaps they too would be incapable of such a performance... We find in Altneuland nothing but mechanical aping without a touch of national character; it is a book which breathes that atmosphere of 'slavery within freedom' which is a characteristic of the western [Jewish] spirit.

The force and weight of his attack on the novel were, not entirely surprisingly, interpreted by its author as an attack on his leadership of the Zionist movement. At his instigation Max Nordau, a major belles-lettrist of the time who is now almost entirely forgotten, and

[1] Bein, op.cit., p.407f.

who was one of Herzl's closest associates in the movement, prepared a rebuttal. The ad hominem nature of his essay was to set the tone for much future discourse within the Zionist ranks. Achad Ha'am, according to Nordau, was a bitter anti-Zionist whose sole merit was that he wrote good Hebrew; he opposed Herzl's ideas of tolerance because he himself wanted to institute the Russian knout and the Inquisition...

A reply of this sort was hardly calculated to placate Herzl's critics. A rejoinder defending Achad Ha'am and signed by Martin Buber, Weizmann, Feivel, and other members of the "young Turks" critical of aspects of Herzl's leadership, appeared in the Hebrew journals and for months thereafter the Zionist movement was rocked by the bitter debate. It was this debate, precipitated by the publication of Altneuland, which underlay much of the reaction to Herzl's Uganda proposal a year later. The strain of the Uganda debate, in particular, coming as it did on top of an extraordinarily energetic and arduous leadership of the Zionist movement, proved fatal to Herzl's health and he died in July, 1904. With his death, the debate over cultural questions receeded, and took on new forms.

The reason for this has much to do with the fact that Herzl's leadership was opposed by some of the younger Zionists on a number of different grounds, and not just on the cultural question. Herzl's successor, Wolffsohn, devoted his tenure to healing the earlier schisms. In effect, he pointed out that the work of the two factions - the pol-

iticals and the practicals - could and should proceed simultaneously. Diplomatic efforts such as Herzl had concentrated on did not intrinsically negate the consolidation of existing settlements in Palestine or the establishment of new ones there, as the "practicals" had advocated. At the 1907 Congress this consideration was sanctioned by a binding resolution of the Zionist movement, whose commitment to the fostering of the Jewish consciousness and to the revival of the Hebrew language was reaffirmed. This has been accepted by the Zionist movement ever since.

Turning now to India, we may note that the rejection by Indians of their own cultural identity and their acknowledgement of the Western as superior has continued to be a fact of Indian life ever since. To this day, for example, the social and political elite of India habitually converse in the English language, not so much because it is the lingua franca of the sub-continent but because mastery of it is considered a token of learning and culture. In general, the upper and middle classes in India remain, as they were for most of the nineteenth century, alienated from the native identities; this is particularly true of the urban upper and middle classes. Nevertheless, this pattern of response to the encounter with the West has seldom been unequivocal, even in terms of individual persons. In this respect, Raja Rammohun Roy, shall we say, rather than Henry Derozio, is the more typical Indian - powerfully attracted to the West but, for all that, unable completely to sever his roots as an Indian. Most middle and upper

class Indians have had to learn how to live with this ambiguity and ambivalence.

However, just as there were some, like Derozio, who eschewed ambiguity for a passionate and unequivocal embrace of Western ways, so too were there those who reacted to circumstances in an opposite direction, namely by renouncing the Western embrace altogether, and defining much of their lives in terms of that renunciation and the concomitant quest for an authentic Indian life instead.

Swami Dayananda (1824-1883) was the first major figure in the nineteenth century to reaffirm the viability of traditional Hindu orthodoxy in face of the heterodox activities of the Westernising reformers. Dayananda was a native of Gujerat; like almost all the other Indians whom we shall be encountering, the son of a prosperous and high-caste family but differing from those whom we have encountered up to this point in not being a Bengali. There is a certain measure of significance in this fact, Bengal being the great centre of Indian radicalism. Dayananda's emergence marks the first major response of a non-Bengali to the notable upheavals in that province.

An aura of drama surrounds Dayananda's life - his struggle against his parents' idolatry and their attempt to persuade him to marry; his running away from home to avoid marriage and his life as a contemplative ascetic for fifteen years; and his emergence as India's foremost Hindu fundamentalist, only to be poisoned at the instigation of a woman with

whom he had accused a prince of having an illicit affair. In one sense he resembles Roy: he too was inspired by a desire to rid Hinduism of the corrupt accretions of its long past, and in particular to abolish idolatry. But there the resemblance ends. Roy's mood was one of accomodation with the principles of Western rationality; Dayananda's, on the other hand, was one which arose out of the deepest reverence for the tenets of Hindu orthodoxy as enshrined in the Vedas. Where Roy sought to reconcile Hinduism with Christianity, and also with Islam, Dayananda was openly and even arrogantly scornful of what he considered to be those religions' pretensions. The distinction between the two men also comes out vividly in the organisations which each one of them founded. Roy's Brahma Samaj was essentially an upper-class coterie of intellectuals and donne di garbo; Dayananda's Arya Samaj in contrast, was and remains a militant and dynamic body led by Western trained men, it is true, but with a large following among the masses. Dayananda - tortured, bellicose, feverish, are some of the adjectives used by Romain Rolland to describe him[1] - may not be remembered by history as one of the great religious reformers and teachers of Hinduism. And this despite the fact that some of the reforms which he advocated, including his insistence that his followers provide for their families' material needs before renouncing this world, represent significant changes in traditional Hindu teaching and practice. Rather, Dayananda's importance lies in the bitter wounds which his career and teachings, and the mass followings they attracted, show the Hindu mind to have suffered in the humiliating encounter with Western power

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[1] R.Rolland, Life of Ramakrishna (3rd.ed., Almora, 1944), p.164

and skill. Dayananda was a reformer of Jinduism and his emphasis on the primacy of the Vedas was legitimate and, in some respects, perhaps, necessary. But like so many other fundamentalist reformers, what was important was the mood rather than the substance of his teachings; and his mood was, as we have suggested, one of anger, defiance and even humiliation. He spoke to the feelings of large numbers of Indians who were not inclined to acknowledge the superiority of the West but did not recognise - until he came along - any viable alternative to it. For the first time in decades a man had arisen in India who poured contempt for anything that was not traditionally Hindu and who loudly proclaimed that what India needed was a return to Hinduism rather than a movement away from it. It should also be mentioned that Dayananda's fundamentalism did not overlook the need for reform in the social fabric of India. He believed that the British did indeed exemplify such necessary qualities as social discipline, mutual support, and so on. It was such characteristics which enabled them to conquer and rule India, rather than their social customs and opinions, which most Indians who attempted to westernise themselves sought to emulate:[1]

> They have been in this country for more than one hundred years and yet they wear thick clothing, as they used to do at home, up to this day. They have not changed the fashion of their country, but among you [Indians] many have copied their dress. This shows that you are foolish while they are wise. No wise man will ever imitate others.

This point of course, that "no wise man will ever imitate others", is simply not true. A wise man under appropriate circumstances is likely

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[1] De Bary, op.cit., p.634-635

to attempt to imitate one wiser than he. But it is essentially irrelevant to make this point: for reasons which we would do well to recognise. For several decades Indians had been told - and indeed their educational system had thoroughly institutionalised this contention - that wisdom did indeed lie precisely in the imitation of the Englishman and all his ways. Dayananda's assertion of the opposite point possesses an audacity, in this context, which we should note carefully. It is the same audacity as that of the Black militants in the United States who, defying every standard acceptable to American society, proclaimed in the 1960's that "Black is beautiful" and asserted that hair straighteners and ointments to lighten skin colour, and so on, were not a means to beautification. In a psychologically profound volte face, whose fuller meaning we shall attempt to assess in the next chapter, majority standards, accepted by minority groups on the basis of, and at the cost of ever greater, self rejection, are turned around and their opposite asserted instead. It is possible that no member of a majority, or dominant, group can understand the depths which such an appeal possesses, or the profound wound which it aims at healing. Everyone can, however, recognise that the decision to institutionalise, through British power, the contempt which so many Englishmen felt for Indian social and cultural identity did not have its consequences solely on the macrocosmic level as grand statements of public policy. Rather, they permeated down through at least the upper and middle strata of society and rooted themselves in the hearts and minds of individual human beings, profoundly affecting the ways in which they looked at themselves and at one another. This

sense of hurt, this self rejection and desire to be other than what one is and can be (English in all but "blood and colour", as Macaulay had expressed it) and, concomitantly, the desire to see one's own identity affirmed and respected, these are circumstances which profoundly influenced India under British rule and, as we shall see, engendered increasingly emphatic and comprehensive reactions. Dayananda was the first to give public expression to them.

In his own quiet and gentle way, and much more profoundly, Shri Ramakrishna (1836-1886) also helped supply countless millions of Indians with a sense of the validity of their own traditions and identity. It is, moreover, important to note that unlike most of the other figures whom we encounter in our references to India Ramakrishna, though a Bengali, was born of a humble rural family and never lost his roots as such. This circumstance not only enabled him to reach out to the peasant masses in a way in which no one else prior to Gandhi could do, but also highlighted his unequivocal image as an Indian. Ramakrishna was a living example of the highest traditions of Hindu mystical piety, and both his life and teachings have continued to exercise a profound influence in India and elsewhere. It would be out of place here to discuss his teachings here, however, since he does not seem to have concerned himself directly with the question of cultural identity - certainly not in a political context - in any explicit sense. The reader interested in further information about his life and teachings is accordingly urged to consult the volumes by Mueller and Rolland cited in the bibliography of the present study.

Ramakrishna's favourite follower, and his successor as the head of the Ramakrishna Mission, was Narendranath Datta (1863-1902), known to the world as Swami Vivekenanda. Vivekenanda came from a prosperous family and received a Western-style education and was, indeed, on his way to London to study law when he met Ramakrishna and determined to renounce the world and to adopt the life of a spiritual ascetic instead. Vivekenanda's teachings were essentially those of his master, and laid great stress on the potential divinity of every human being. He was, however, far more concerned than Ramakrishna had been with the great social and cultural questions confronting India, and spoke out on these issues frequently. Unlike the reformers, and in contrast even with Dayananda, he justified the caste system - almost in Platonic terms ("You can govern a country and I can mend a pair of shoes",)[1] and defended idolatry for whomever found it helpful as a form of worship. While recognising that idolatry had fallen, through neglect, into a dilapidated condition, he urged his audiences to "perfect [it] by necessary cleansing and repairs" rather than demolishing it completely in favour of a "sordid modern plan whose permanence has yet to be established".[2]

Obviously, these vindications of traditional orientations represent an overt repudiation of the position adopted by the Westernising reformers. Vivekenanda also wrote and spoke extensively on the question of the adoption of Western values and customs; here, too, he was emph-

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[1] De Bary, op.cit., p.649

[2] ibid, ad loc.

atic in repudiating the reformers. Perhaps the most significant factor responsible for his adamancy on this score was a visit to the United States, where he delivered an address to the First World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. He remained there and in England for four years, and returned home convinced of India's moral responsibility for bringing the teachings of Hinduism to the West, of whose moral inferiority to India he was by now profoundly convinced. Although this notion had already been articulated several decades earlier by Keshab Chander Sen with his New Dispensation, Vivekenanda's greater personal authority, his closeness to the Hindu tradition, and the enthusiastic response he aroused in the West, all combined greatly to heighten the impact of Vivekenanda's proposal. For implicit in it was not only the notion that the West - the much-vaunted West which so many Indians had set their hearts on imitating - was in urgent need of healing and repair; but that it was from India - the India which so many Indians were frantically rejecting - that that healing and repair would come.

We find, in fact, these ideas explicitly stated in Vivekenanda's writings and speeches. Thus, in a speech delivered in New York, he identifies the West as the repository of material, and the East as that of spiritual, greatness. Acknowledging the importance of each, he nevertheless insisted:[1]

> The oriental ideal is as necessary for the progress of the human race as is the occidental, and I think it is more necessary. Machines never made mankind happy, and never will. The man alone who is the lord of his mind can become happy and none else... When

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[1] De Bary, op.cit., pp.650-651

> the Occident [sic] wants to learn about the spirit, about God, about the soul, about the meaning and the mystery of this universe, he must sit at the feet of the Orient to learn.

The West, Vivekenanda observed, was experiencing an intense inner crisis, the product of its material and hypocrisy which contrast so strikingly with values found in India:[1]

> The whole of the Western world is on a volcano which may burst tomorrow. They have searched every corner of the world and have found no respite. They have drunk deep of the cup of pleasure and found it vanity... No country on earth has so many laws and in no country are they so little regarded [as in the United States]. On the whole, our poor Hindu people are infinitely more moral than any of the Westerners. In religion they practice here either hypocrisy or fanaticism.

The world, he then went on to say in this address to an audience in Madras after his return to India, and particularly the West, therefore stood in desperate need of the light of salvation which could shine forth only from India. Indians, he urged, must recognise their responsib
ponsibility to the world. He called for volunteers to assist him in a grand missionary effort:

> This is the great ideal before us and everyone must be ready for it - the conquest of the whole world by India - nothing less than that, and we must all get ready for it, strain every nerve for it. Let foreigners come and flood the land with their armies, never mind. Up, India, and conquer the world with your spirituality! ...Spirituality must conquer the West... Now is the time to work so that India's spiritual ideas may penetrate deeply into the West...I specially ask you to remember this. We must go out, we must conquer the world, through our spirituality and philosophy. There is no other alternative, we must do it or die. The only condition for awakened and vigourous national life, is the conquest of the world by Indian thought.

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[1] De Bary, op.cit., pp.652-653.

The last two sentences of the above quotation are cryptic and there may be a temptation, on the reader's part, to dismiss them as rhetorical. In view of Vivekenanda's general position, however, that would probably be a mistake, and we should try to understand his meaning more fully. It would appear that, for Vivekenanda, a precondition for the reawakening of Indian national life was a recognition, on the part of Indians themselves, of the value of their own tradition, and that this value could not be recognised except through a direct reversal of these assumptions which had led them to be obscured in the first place. Just as Indians had assumed that they were in urgent need of the superior wisdom of the West to redeem them from the crisis of their own society and culture, so did Vivekenanda attempt to get them to recognise that the West could only find the redemption it needed, and desired, through the wisdom and insight of Hinduism. By bringing Hinduism's salvation to the West, Indians would also be saving themselves, since a precondition for their own mission to the world was the rediscovery of the value of their own heritage...

While this position helped to lay the foundations for important elements of Indian nationalism, it would be mistaken to view Vivekenanda himself in overtly nationalist terms. Indeed, the speech quoted immediately above shows him minimising the importance of India's political subjugation by foreign power. Clearly, what mattered to Vivekenanda was not who ruled India so much as the values and practices by which Indians - or rather the Hindus among them - lived their lives. But in this sense, which he did understand as a national concern, Vivekenanda

was assuredly deeply involved with national questions.

This involvement received its most forceful expression in an impassioned essay, one of the last which he was to write, composed in his native Bengali in 1899. In this essay, he stressed two points. The first of these was to compare Hinduism's enduring value and wisdom with the superficial and destructive brilliance of the West. Both of these had now become a part of Indian life, and the question was which one would eventually prevail over the other:[1]

> On one side, rank materialism, plenitude of fortune accumulation of gigantic power, and intense sense pursuits... On the other, through the confounding din] of all these discordant noises... the heart-rending cries of her ancient gods, cutting her to the quick. There lie before her various strange luxuries introduced from the West - celestial drinks, costly, well-served food, splendid apparel, magnificent palaces, new modes of conveyance [and, on the other hand] austere religious vows, fastings, the forest retreat, the matted locks and orange garb of the semi-naked Sanyasin [religious mendicant] and the search after the Self. On one side is the independence of Western societies based on self-interest; on the other is the extreme self-sacrifice of the Aryan society. In this violent conflict, is it strange that Indian society should be tossed up and down? Of the West the goal is - individual independence; the language - money-making education; the means - politics. Of India, the goal is Mukti [release from worldly experience]; the language - the Veda; the means - renunciation.

Vivekananda also observed and decried the slavish spirit of imitation of Westwhich had made it possible for Westernisation to make such inroads into Indian society and culture. Indians, he noted, were persuading themselves by saying, "If we only adopt Western ideas, Western

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[1]Following extracts from De Bary, op.cit., pp.655-659

dress, Western manners, we shall be as strong and as powerful as the Western nations". To suchbeliefs Vivekenanda replied, "Fools! By imitation others' ideas never become your own - nothing, unless learned, is your own. Does the ass in the lion's skin become the lion?"

He also commented on the propensity of many Indians to admire only these things Indian which had received prior approbation in the West, and warned of the "terrible dangers" which would follow from this:

> A certain young man of little understanding used always to blame Hindu Shastras [teachings] before Sri Ramakrishna. One day he praised the Baghavad Gita, on which Sri Ramakrishna said, 'Methinks some European pandit [sage] has praised the Gita, and so he has also followed suit... O India, this is your terrible danger, the spell of imitating the West is getting such a strong hold on you that, what is good or what is bad is no longer decided by reason, judgement, or reference to the Shastras. Whatever ideas, whatever manners, the white man praises or likes, are good; whatever things they dislike or censure are bad! Alas, what can be a more tangible proof of foolishness than this?... O India! With this mere echoing of others, with this base imitation of others, with this dependence on others, this slavish weakness, this vile, detestable cruelty, wouldst thou, with these provisions only, scale the highest pinnacles of civilisation and greatness?

This essay constitutes a notable expression of a pattern of analysis that was to become increasingly common and important among Hindus in India. It will be helpful to identify its various components explicitly. Western ways and values are penetrating into Indian society; they are displacing Hindu ones; far from being a welcome development, this trend is to be deplored because the West itself is suffering from the consequences of its own material, aspiritual disposition; moreover, not only the substance of these innovations but also the

frame of mind which leads Indians to welcome them is a cause of alarm, since in face of the superior material power of the West Indians have become servile and self-hating. Insofar as the two can be separated, therefore, the crisis confronting India is not only of psyche but of culture, too.

We must also recognise the specifically national context in which, at the end of his life, Vivekenanda set his analysis. For, as hewas perceptive enough to observe, one effect of Westernisation had been to fragment Indian society, indeed even Hindu society, to the point where differentssections of the population no longer recognised their close kinship with one another - no longer recognised themselves as Indians! As he writes in the same essay from which we have already quoted extensively above:

> When I see Indians dressed in European apparel and costumes the thought comes to my mind - perhaps they feel ashamed to own of their nationality and kinship with the ignorant, poor, illiterate, downtrodden people of India! Nourished by the blood of the Hindu for the last fourteen centuries, the Parsee is no longer a "Native"! Before the arrogance of the casteless, who pretend to be and glorify themselves as being Brahmans, the true nobility of the old, heroic, high-class Brahmans melts into nothingness! Again, the Westerners have now taught us that these stupid, ignorant, low-caste millions of India clad only in loin cloths are non-Aryans! They are therefore no more our kith and kin!

In response to these tendences, Vivekenanda issued an impassioned plea to the people of India:

> ... forget not that thy social order is but the reflex of the Infinite Universal Motherhood; forget not that the lower classes, the ignorant, the poor, the illiterate, the cobbler, the sweeper, are thy flesh and blood, thy brothers. Thou brave one, be bold, take courage, be proud that thou art an Indian, and proudly proclaim, "I

> am an Indian and every Indian is my brother". Say: "The ignorant Indian, the poor Indian, the destitute Indian, the Brahman Indian, the Pariah Indian, is my brother". Thou too clad with but a rag around thy loins, proudly proclaim at the top of thy voice: "The Indian is my brother, the Indian is my life, India's gods and goddesses are my God, India's society is the cradle of my infancy, the pleasure garden of my youth, the sacred heaven, the Varanasi [Benares] of my old age". Say, brother: the soil of India is my highest heaven, the good of India is my good", and repeat and pray day and night: "O Thou Lord of Gauri, O Thou Mother of the Universe, vouchsafe manliness to me! O Thou Mother of Strength, take away my weakness, take away my unmanliness and - make me a man!

Surely it is not difficult to see the nationalist implications of this passage. India's social, cultural and religious unity, destroyed as a result of the penetration of Western values, must be restored. As a precondition, Indian's must recover a sense of there mystical belongingness to India, their "highest heaven", in its unity which transcends society and culture to attain a truly religious significance. The British have destroyed the Hindus' sense of community, too. In recovering their feeling of oneness with India and with each other, the Indians will also recover their lost and violated manhood...

Surely more influential even than Vivekananda in his view of the moral and spiritual peril of the West and in his alarm at the encroachment of Western values on Indian life, is Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), the fourteenth of Debendranath's fifteen children. Tagore's attitude toward western civilisation was, admittedly, more ambiguous that that of Vivekananda or, for that matter, than that of that other most remarkable contemporary of his, Mahatma Gandhi. He was not absolute in

his condemnations of the West and this consideration has led some of his critics to claim, in the words of one of them, that he "accepted the present, with its machines, its Western culture, and, despite it, made Eastern poetry".[1] Tagore did not, however, "accept" the present - tho' he saw some good in it; and he certainly did not equate the present with the West. Europe, he once wrote, "is supremely good in her benificence when her face is turned to all humanity - and Europe is supremely evil in her malificent aspects".[2] All in all, however, it appeared to Tagore that the dangers of being infected by Western evils considerably outweighted the advantages which might be derivedfrom the benificent aspects of the West. He records how, on a visit to Japan, he urged the people there to abandon their westernising ambitions. "I felt it my duty to warn the people of the land of Bushido, of great art and traditions of noble heroism", he wrote, "that this phase of scientific savagery which victimised Western humanity and led their masses to moral cannibalism, was never to be imitated by a virile people who had entered upon a glorious renaissance, and had every promise of a creative future before them".[3]

The brutality of Western life is a constant theme in Tagore's writing. Visiting America, he condemned its civilisation as man destroying and records how he felt "like one imprisoned in the stone fortress of its extreme efficiency". His play Mukta Dara has as its central theme the

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[1] Louis Fischer, Life of Gandhi (New York, 1950), p.128.
[2] K.Kripalani, Rabindranath Tagore (London, 1962), p.256
[3] Kripalani, op.cit., p.385

"diabolical use of technological knowledge", symbolised by the Machine; while another play, Rakta Karabi, raises the fundamental issue of "the free spirit of life set against the terrible machine of a highly organised society which turns men into robots, reducing names to numbers".[1] In a powerful poem inspired by the Boer War and written on the last day of the nineteenth century, he contrasts the Western preoccupation with militant nationalism and India's spiritual disposition:[2]

> The last sun of the century sets amidst the blood-red
> clouds of the West and the whirlwind of hatred.
> The naked passion of self-love of Nations, in its
> drunken delirium, is dancing to the class of
> steel and the howling verses of vengeance.
> The hungry Self of the Nation shall burst in a viol-
> ence of fury from its own shameless feeding.
> For it has made the world its food.
> And licking it, crunching it, and swallowing it in
> big morsels,
> It swells and swells,
> Till in the midst of its holy feast descends the sudden
> shaft of heaven piercing its grossness.
> The crimson glow of light on the horizon is not the
> light of thy dawn of peace, my Motherland.
> It is the glimmer of the funeral pyre burning to ashes
> the vast flesh - the self-love of the Nations -
> dead under its own excesses.
> Thy morning waits behind the patient dark of the East,
> Meek and Silent.
> Keep watch, India.
> Bring your offerings of worship for that sacred sunrise.
> Let the first hymn of its welcome sound in your voice
> and sing, "Come, Peace, thou daughter of God's own
> great suffering. Come with thy treasure of content-
> ment, the sword of fortitude, and meekness crowning
> thy forehead".
> Be not ashamed, my brothers, to stand before the proud
> and the powerful
> With your white robe of simpleness.
> Let your crown be humility, your freedom the freedom of
> the soul
> Build God's throne daily on the ample bareness of your

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[1] Kripalani, op.cit., pp.300, 306.

[2] De Bary, op.cit., p.786

poverty
And know that what is huge is not great and pride
is not everlasting.

The themes here are already familiar to us: the West is wracked by violence and pulsates with a "heart of grossness"; against it India can only offer its "sword of fortitude". Yet - and this is very much to the point - India's fortitude rests on recognition of the true and enduring value of the simplicity, humility and poverty of its way of life. It is in this, moreover, that its greatness lies and it is in this that its future is guaranteed. But it is also clear that Tagore feared -and had reason to fear - the insidious appeal of violence and other forms of Western "grossness". India must therefore be exhorted to "keep watch", vigilantly ensuring that she will not be sullied by the negative and alien influences of the West. In addressing the people of Japan, Tagore was clearly also addressing the people of his native India, pleading with them to recognise the true value of what they had inherited from the past, pleading with them to defend themselves against the corrupt influences of the West, and pleading with them to have faith in the possibility of a glorious renaissance in the future.

Although Tagore was later to clash with Gandhi over what he believed was the latter's indifference to the cause of Universal Man - as opposed to the destiny of India, in particular - he did on occasion voice his own alarm at the effects of British rule in what can only be recognised as nationalist terms. In particular, he expressed alarm

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at what he perceived to be the British policy of suppressing Indian educational opportunities and culture - and of rationalising this policy by using its outcome to prove that the Indians are intellectually and culturally inferior to the British and are therefore incapable of self-rule! Addressing an American audience in 1917, he accused Britain of trying "to regulate the degree of [India's intellectual] nutrition as near to the zero-point of vitality as possible":[1]

> The portion of education lloted to us is so raggedly insufficient that it ought to outrage the sense of decency of Western humanity... While depriving us of opportunities and reducing our education to the minimum required for conducting a foreign government, [Britain] pacifies its conscience by calling us names and by sedulously giving currency to the arrogant cynicism that the East is East and the West is West and never the twain shall meet. If we can believe our schoolmaster in his taunt that after nearly two centuries of his tutelage, India not only remains unfit for self-government but unable to display originality in her intellectual attainments, must we ascribe itto something in the nature of Western culture and our inherent capacity to receive it, or to the judicious niggardliness of the nation that has taken it upon itself to shoulder the white man's burden of civilising the East? That Japanese people may have some quality which we lack we may admit, but that our intellect is naturally unproductive compared to theirs we canot escape even from them whom it is dangerous for us to contradict.

It is clear that Tagore did believe the "schoolmaster's taunt" - there surely would be no reason for him to lament the educational deficiency of the diet India was being fed unless, as a result of it, India was suffering from educational malnutrition. The educational diet was causing the energy and creativity of India's cultural life to atrophy:

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[1] De Bary, op.cit., p.789.

that supreme culture whose value Tagore extolled over and over again. It may well be that Tagore himself did not follow this thought through to its logical conclusion - namely that only the withdrawal of the British would enable Indian culture to revive. Tagore, indeed, may have believed that his appeals to the conscience of the British people and of the West in general could bring about, if not the withdrawal of British rule and the establishment of an independent Indian government (which may well have been a matter of indifference to him), then at least a profound change not only in British policy toward India but in the directions being pursued by Western life altogether. On the other hand, it is apparent from this speech that he recognised the uses to which the British were putting their educational policies to create a situation in which their continued rule of India might be both legitimised and ensured.

Be that as it may, other Indians who heard this message, and similar ones from other people, and found confirmation of them intheir own, everyday experiences, were surely prone to reaching this conclusion. The sickness of Western values, and the specific policies being pursued by the British in India, were depleting India's cultural reserves, were sapping its spiritual strength, and were eroding its social fabric. Indian culture was already in an advanced state of decay and would remain so whilst ever India lay under the political and cultural thralldom of Britain. The conclusion to be drawn from this was obvious: namely that for the sake of rescuing India's priceless hamitage, in which also the salvation of the world from the depradations of Western

brutality could alone be found, India must free herself from British rule and establish its own political sovereignty...

These thoughts were already beginning to receive material expression - and to find sympathetic response, not only among sections of the Indian population but in the West, too. The psychological significance of this latter consideration - the fact that Europeans were now turning to India in the hope of salvation from the corruption of life in the West, would be hard to overestimate, accustomed, as we have seen, tht Indians were to receive their cues, their sense of what was proper and valid, from the West. Indeed, it was largely at the initiative of a number of Indianising Westerners - including those two remarkable women, Madame Blavatsky and Annie Besant - that the Indian National Congress had been founded in 1885.

The Congress was not, to begin with, an exclusively or even primarily nationalist organisation, andwould not become one until before the First World War. Its emergence as such, and indeed its transformation into a militant and effective locus of opposition to the continuance of British rule in India, while the workd of several men, can chiefly be associated with the extraordinary personality and career of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi - Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948).

Gandhi's career is obviously of seminal importance in the history of Indian nationalism and as such provides an essential clue to the impulses and aspirations which motivated it. What makes a study of his

career so important, however, is not merely the significance of the role he played but the uniquely detailed and intimate insights into his personality, sentiments and thoughts which his prolific autobiographical and polemical works makes possible. No other figure in modern Indian history, and possibly no other major figure in modern history altogether, has left behind a comparable oeuvre.

The material presented in what follows emphasises an important set of factors wholly different from those which Erikson singles out in his biography. Since it would be inconvenient and somewhat distracting to discuss Erikson's perspective at this point in our own text, we have relegated that discussion to Appendix I at the end of the book.

Mahatma Gandhi, whom Winston Churchill would later attempt to stigmatise as "a half-naked Fakir", arrived in London in 1888, at the age of 18, to study Law at the Inner Temple and to become a gentleman. A friend tells of meeting him in Piccadilly Circus. Gandhi, he recalled, was wearing a high silk top hat 'burnished bright', a stiff and starched collar (known as a Gladstonian), a rather flashy tie displaying all the colours of the rainbow, under which there was a fine striped silk shirt. He wore as his outer clothing a morning coat, a doublebreasted waistcoat and dark striped trousers to match, and not only patent-leather shoes, but spats over them".[1] In his autobiography, Gandhi himself acknowledges that during this period of his life he devoted most of his energies to learning how to "ape the English gentleman".

[1] Fischer, op.cit., p.24.

Some of these efforts were successful: he learned, for example, how to tie a cravat. Other attempts however had to be abandoned. For a while he took elocution lessons, but soon gave them up and discarded the copy of Bell's Standard Elocutionist which he had bought. Dancing lessons were also abandoned after the awkward youth discovered that he "could not follow the piano" or "achieve anything like rhythmic motion" Next he set about correcting these shortcomings by taking violin lessons, which he hoped would also enable him to develop an ear for music. But he gave these up too, before long, and sold his violin.[1] He was extraordinarily alert to the requirements of sartorial propriety. A white flannel suit which he had kept specially for disembarkation, and which he believed would represent the height of fashion, proved to be entirely inappropriate and caused him some discomfort.[2] Some time later, he felt considerable shock and embarassment when an Indian friend arrived to visit him in his London lodgings wearing the dhoti, or loin cloth, which would eventually become Gandhi's own trademark.[3]

It is not difficult to identify the wider social and historical forces which had stimulated Gandhi to these bizarre extremes, and which had led him to regard England as "the land of philosophers and poets, the very centre of civilisation". Gandhi was product of the educational system which Macaulay had been the first to propound; a member of that emasculated class which the British had created to serve as the spearhead for the eventual Anglicisation of the entire population. Gandhi's

1 M.K.Gandhi, An Autobiography (London, 1949), p.41ff.
2 ibid, p.37.
3 ibid, p.64.

father, however, and his family before him, had served as functionaries of a minor princeling in the state of Gujerat, and he himself was born and grew up in provincial towns. Even at that distance from the direct centre of British influence, however, the crippling psychological effects of British policy made themselves felt. Gandhi recounts, in his autobiography, how as a boy he was tempted into breaking the deep-seated Hindu taboo against meat-eating. Current among his friends at school was the deduction that the British were meat-eaters, that the British were more powerful and efficient than the Indians, and hence that the Indians would be able to regain control over their own destinies by renouncing their vegetarianism and eating meat instead. This logic was expressed in a jingly whose potent psychological appeal may be guaged by the consideration that Gandhi was able to recall and record it more than fourtdecades after first learning it:

> Behold the mighty Englishman
> He rules the Indian small
> Because he is a meat eater
> He is five cubits tall.

The Indian, then, is he was to set his country free, would have to learn the ways of his English ruler. Nauseating as he found the taste of meat to be, Gandhi persisted in eating it, meeting secretly with a friend once a week to do so. "Meat-eating was a duty", he told himself, which he owed to his country and people.[1]

After a year or so Gandhi abandoned his furtive meat-eating. It was to be much longer, however, before he abandoned his belief that Western

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[1] Autobiography, op.cit., p.18.

ways and values were indeed superior to those of India and that India could free herself only by refashioning herself along Western lines. By the same token, it was to be many years before Gandhi rejected the notion of freeing himself from the burden of his inferiority feelings by abandoning his efforts at "aping the English gentleman".

The first indication we have of this trend, of the transformation of the dandy into the "half-naked Fakir", actually antedates Gandhi's return to India from his studies in London. In 1889 Gandhi crossed the Channel to visit the Paris Exhibition. His reaction to what he saw there was a portent. Far from concurring with the excited admiration of most visitors to the fair Gandhi read, and was at once attracted to, Tolstoy's description of the Eiffel Tower as a monument to man's folly:[1]

It is a remarkable fact that Gandhi's attitudes toward both Indian and Western civilisation were in large measure shaped under the influence of European, and not Indian, thinkers. He himself records[2] that it was Madame Blavatsky's Theosophists who provided him with a Hinduistic rationale for vegetarianism; that it was an encounter with Sir Thomas Arnold, translator of the Bagha<u>vad Gita</u>, which first led him to read Hinduism's most sacred text; and that it was a book by the great Orientalist, Max Mueller, <u>India:What Can We Learn From Her?</u>, which first introduced him to the possibility that the culture of India had much

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[1] <u>Autobiography</u>, op.cit., p.66.

[2] ibid., p.57ff., p.132ff.

of enduring worth to offer all mankind, including the West.

Equally, three books by European authors highly critical of the accomplishments of Western civilisation also influenced Gandhi greatly. The first of these was Edward Carpenter's Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure, which attracted widespread attention when it first appeared in 1889 but which is now almost completely forgotten. The motto of the book is Walt Whitman's question, "The friendly and flowing savage, who is he? Is he waiting for civilisation, or is he past it, and mastering it?" and set the tone for the entire discourse. Carpenter contrasted the life of the "wilder races" with that of the nations which suffer from the "disease of civilisation":[1]

> The social life of the wilder races is more harmonious and compact than that of civilised nations. The members of the tribe are not organically at warfare with each other; society is not divided into classes which prey on each other; nor is it consumed by parasites. There is more true social unity, less of disease...

Carpenter's book, which left a deep impression on Gandhi,[2] proposed a return to nature and to the community of human life as the only cure for the West's "disease" of civilisation.

Even stronger was the impact on Gandhi's mind of Ruskin's Unto This Last, which he first read in South Africa in 1903 and subsequently translated into his native Gujerati. "That book", remarked Gandhi later, "marked the turning point in my life. I immediately decided to

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[1] E.Carpenter, Civilisation:Its Cause and Cure (Acworth,N.H. 1972) p.2

[2] M.K.Gandhi, Hind Swaraj (Ahmedabad 1946), as quoted in De Bary, op. cit., p.803.

change my life in accordance with the ideals of the book...In this great book I discovered some of my deepest convictions, and that is why it so captured me".[1]

Ruskin's purpose in Unto This Last was to affirm once again the humanity of man in the face of the dehumanising depredations of modern industrial civilisation. "We blanch cotton, and strengthen steel, and refine sugar, and shape pottery", he cried, "But to brighten, to strengthen, to refine or to form a single living spirit never enters into our estimate of advantage". The material commitments of Western civilisation, Ruskin asserted, had made men blind to life's truly important goals. "It is open to serious question, I repeat, whether among national manufactures that of souls of good quality may not at last turn out a quite leadingly lucrative one?"

These sentiments, and this ordering of priorities, could not but move Gandhi deeply, challenging as they did the most fundamental axioms on which his education and his view of himself had hitherto been based. This contradiction was forcibly emphasised to Gandhi in a letter from Tolstoy in 1910:

> Between the confession of Christianity, even under the perverted form in which it appears among us Christian peoples, and the simultaneous recognition of the necessity of armies, and of the preparation for killing on an ever-increasing scale, there exists a contradiction so flagrant and crying that sooner or later, probably very soon, it must invariably manifest itself in utter nakedness; and it

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[1] Autobiography, op.cit., p.250

> will lead us either to renounce the Christian religion, and to maintain the governmental power, or to renounce the existence of the army and all the forms of violence which the state supports and which are more or less necessary to sustain its power.[1]

Gandhi referred to himself as "a humble follower of that great teacher [Tolstoy] whom I have long looked upon as one of my guides"[2]. In an introduction to a published version of Tolstoy's Letter to a Hindu, (addressed in fact not to Gandhi but to the editor of the underground journal Free Hindustan) Gandhi justified his opposition to the westernisation of India by recourse to Tolstoy's own pronouncements:[3]

> When a man like Tolstoy, one the clearest thinkers in the western world, one of the greatest writers, one who as a soldier has known what violence is and what it can do, condemns Japan for having blindly followed the law of modern science, so-called, and fears for that country the "greatest calamities", it is for us to pause and consider whether, in our impatience of English rule, we do not want to replace one evil by another and a worse. India, which is the nursery of the great faiths of the world, will cease to be nationalist India, whatever else she may become, when she goes through the process of civilisation in the shape of reproduction on that sacred soil of gun factories and the hateful industrialisation which has reduced the people to a state of slavery in Europe, and all but stifled among them the best instincts which are the heritage of the human family.

The principal statement of Gandhi's views on western civilisation and of the dangers it posed to India is to be found in the booklet Hind Swaraj ("Free India"), which first appeared in South Africa in 1908.

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[1] Autobiography, op.cit., p.114

[2] ibid, p.115; Fischer, op.cit., p.114.

[3] De Bary, op.cit., pp.803ff

The pamphlet was reprinted frequently during Gandhi's lifetime, but only with a few stylistic changes to distinguish the later from the first editions. Consequently, although Gandhi's views did undergo a measure of development, Hind Swaraj is undoubtedly the most important statement of them.[1]

The introduction to this work at once proclaims the virtually unequivocal nature of Gandhi's condemnation of western civilisation. Hind Swaraj, he declares there, "teaches the gospel of love in place of that of hate. It replaces violence with self-sacrifice. It pits soul force against brute force". At the same time, however, Gandhi declares that "the booklet is a severe condemnation of modern civilisation". The implication here, then, is clear. The gospel of love and non-violence which Gandhi has to preach is at odds with the civilisation of the West...

In this pamphlet, which is written in the form of a dialogue between an "Editor" and his "Reader", Gandhi poses the question of the nature of the independence which the people of India seek for their country. "You and I and all Indians are impatient to attain Swaraj", he states. But we are certainly not decided as to what it is". The reader suggests that India should aim for the kind of independence which England currently has. "Editor's" response to this proposal is withering. "You have well drawn the picture", he replies, "and in effect it means this: that we want English rule without the Englishman. You want the

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[1] We use here the text as in De Bary, op.cit., pp.803-819.

tiger's nature, but not the tiger; that is to say, you would make India English, it will be called not Hindustan but Englistan. That is not the kind of Swaraj I want!"

The "Reader" is, so it appears to his interlocutor, unfamiliar with the true nature of western civilisation, for otherwise he would not have wished to transform India into "Englistan". The "Editor" accordingly proceeds to enlighten him about "the tiger's nature". He begins by rejecting the notion that "progress" is really what Europeans consider it to be:

> The people of Europe today live in better-built houses than they did formerly. This is considered an emblem ofcivilisation and this is also a matter to promote bodily happiness. Formerly they wore skins and used spears as weapons. Now, they wear a variety of clothing and, instead of spears, they carry with them revolvers containing five or more chambers. If people of a certain country, who have not been in the habit of wearing much clothing, boots, etc., adopt European clothing, they are supposed to have become civilised out of savagery. Formerly people in Europe ploughed their lands mainly by manual labour. Now, one man can plough vast tracts by means of a steam engine and can thus amass great wealth. This is called a sign of civilisation. Formerly, the fewest men wrote books that were most valuable. Now, anybody writes and prints anything he likes and poisons peoples' minds.

Every instance of what westerners are accustomed to regard as progress is dismissed by the "Editor" with the same sarcasm - be it railways, weapons, the slavery of factory work which "makes man's condition worse than that of beasts", over-eating, and so on. In these remarks, we may point out, he follows very closely the polemics of Carpenter in Civilisation, Its Causes and Cure. The civilisation which has pro-

duced these decadent wonders, the "Editor" goes on to say, takes note neither of morality nor religion. Its votaries calmly state that their business is not to teach religion, Some even go so far as to consider it "a superstitious growth", the Editor adds, almost in disbelief.

Railways and medical practice comes in for special condemnation next. But for the railways, the English would never have been able to establish their tight rule over India. Furthermore, by facilitating the transportation of grain to the highest markets, trains encourage profiteering and hence famine. Equally, they are instrumental in spreading plague and other infectious diseases by breaking down the natural quarantine which had existed in bygone years when communications were not so efficient. In addition to all this, it is because of trains that the holy places of Infia have lost much of their sanctity. "Formerly, the people went to these places with very great difficulty. Generally, therefore, only the real devotees visited such places. Nowadays, rogues visit them to practise their roguery".

The "Reader" now interrupts to ask whether, even if it is true that railways have enabled "evil to spread more rapidly", good too cannot make use of them to propagate itself at the same speed. The "Editor" does not think so. "Good", he insists, "travels at a snail's pace - it can therefore have little to do with railways. Those who want to do good are not selfish. They are not in a hurry. They know that to impregnate people with good takes a long time. But evil has wings. To build a house takes time. Its destruction takes none. So the railways

can become a distributory agence for the evil one only".

The discussion turns next to medicine. The "Editor" puts forward a variant of Parkinson's Law to account for what he believes to be the characteristically Western proliferation of both doctors and medicine:

> There are new diseases of which people had never dreamt before, and an army of doctors is engaged in finding out their cure and so hospitals have increased... Doctors induce us to indulge and the result is that we become efeminate and deprived of self-control... [Let us suppose] I have indigestion. I go to a doctor, he gives me medicine, I am cured. I overeat again, I take his pills again... My body therefore certainly felt more at ease but my mind became weakened. A continuance of a course of medicine must therefore result in a loss of control over the mind. To study European medicine is to deepen slavery.

The Editor declares that the civilisation which has come to be characterised acterised by such decadence of body and spirit can only be described by one word. "This civilisation is irreligion", he thunders, "And it has taken such a hold on the people of Europe that those who are in it appear to be half mad. They lack real physical strength or courage. They keep up their energy by intoxication. They can hardly be happy in solitude". Such a civilisation, he predicts, cannot survive for long. "This civilisation is such that one has only to be patient and it will be self-destroyed", he declares, "According to the teachings of Muhammad, this would be considered a Satanic Civilisation. Hinduism calls it the Black Age. I cannot give you an adequate description of it. It is eating into the vitals of the English nation. If you will dufficiently think it over, you will entertain the same opinion and cease to blame the English. They are rather deserving of our

sympathy..."

India's depressed condition, the Editor goes on to insist, is likewise its own fault. Indians have accepted the charges laid against them by the British that they are lazy, unenterprising and primitive - "uncivilised". Accordingly, many Indians now attempt to emulate the British and to make themselves "progressive in the same way that the British are progressive". The Editor laments: "We have set our hearts on worldly pursuits and are turning away from God!"

India as a result of being led away from what is truly civilisation and is heading toward barbarianism. True civilisation, the Editor declares, is that mode of conduct which points to man the path of duty. The Gujerati equivalent for civilisation, he mentions, means "good conduct". This, however, can never be achieved within the framework of what the West regards as civilisation. "The tendency of Indian civilisation is to alevate the moral being; that of Western civilisation is to propagate immorality. The latter is godless, the former is based on belief in God".

The prime cause of Europe's immorality, and terefore of its ultimate decay, is what the Editor bluntly terms "machinery". It is machinery, he claimed, that has begun "to desolate Europe"; it is machinery which has brought "ruination knocking at the English gates". Machinery, he insisted, is "the chief symbol of modern civilisation; it represents a great sin". Those who truly believe in India's destiny, who truly care for the protection and enhancement of its personality, will fight the introduction to India of the machine and all that it represents.

The Reader interrupts at this point to pose an awkward and yet unavoidable question. To what extent, he wanted to know, may one cooperate with the machine, and with the industrial civilisation it represents? How was it possible that the Editor, with his seemingly unequivocal rejection of machinery, could allow his words to be printed on machines - and presumably to be distributed to the far corners of the country by railways? The reply is somewhat lame and opportunistic:

> This is one of those instances which demonstrates that sometimes a poison is used to kill poison. This, then, will not be a good point regarding machinery. As it expires, the machinery, as it were, says to us, "Beware and avoid me. You will derive no benefits from me and the benefits that may accrue from printing will avail those only who are not affected by the machinery craze". Do not, therefore, forget the main thing. It is necessary to realise that machinery is bad. We shall then be able gradually to do away with it. Nature has not provided any way whereby we may reach a desired goal all of a sudden. If instead of welcoming machinery as a boon we would look on it as an evil, it would ultimately go.

In 1924, some sixteen years after the first appearance of Hind Swaraj, findss Gandhi was to modify somewhat his unequivocal opposition to machinery as such. "What I object to is the craze for machinery, not machinery by itself", he now stated. As a Hindu, he went on to say, he believed that man's welfare could only be found in a society which encouraged the virtues of aparigraha ("non-possession"), freedom from desire, and the subordination of physical wants to the needs of the soul. To the extent that industrial civilisation aided man in these respects, it was good; to the extent that it diverted him from these goals and enslaved him in worthless material desires, it was bad. It is not necessary for us to pursue these distinctions here, or to

inquire into their value as social criticism. The main point which needs to be emphasised with respect to Gandhi is his belief in the unquestionable superiority of Indian civilisation - and his alarm at the fact that large numbers of Indians incorrectly believed the reverse.

In a highly significant passage in Hind Swaraj he comments not only on the intrinsic superiority of Indian civilisation but also on its durability, which is a product of it.

> Nothing can equal the seeds sown by our ancestors. Rome went, Greece shared the same fate; the might of the Pharoahs was broken; Japan has become Westernised; of China nothing can be said; but India is still, somehow or other, sound at the foundations... India remains immovable and that is her glory. It is a charge against India that her people are so uncivilised, ignorant and stolid, that it is not possible to induce them to adopt any changes. It is a charge really against our merit. What we have found true on the anvil of experience, we dare not change. Many throw their advice on India, and she remains steady. This is her beauty; it is the sheet anchor of our hope.

There follows an elegant paean to, and rationalisation of, the traditional civilisation of India. "It was not that we did not know how to invent machinery, but our forefathers knew that, if we set our hearts after such things, we would become slaves and lose our moral fibre. They therefore decided, after due deliberation, that we should only do what we could with our hands and feet". Likewise, traditional Indian wisdom, perceiving the dangersof urban civilisation, eschewed large cities and the vice, crime and "life-corroding competition" which are indigenous to them. The flimsy appeal of luxuries and pleasures were readily discerned by the ancient Indians and not attempt was made to pursue them. Likewise, it was recognised that "kings and their swords

are inferior to the sword of ethics", and traditional Indian wisdom recognised the superiority of Rishis and Fakirs to the sovereigns of the earth.

If many regard this civilisation as a thing of the past, Gandhi points to its unique durability:

> And where this cursed modern civilisation has not reached, India remains as it was before. The inhabitants of that part of India will very properly laugh at your new-fangled notions. The English do not rule over them. Those in whose name we speak do not know us, nor do we know them. I would certainly advise you and those like you who love the motherland to go into the interior that has not yet been polluted by the railways and to live there for six months; you might then be patriotic and speak of Home Rule. Now you see what I consider to be true civilisation. Those who want to change conditions such as I have described are enemies of the country and sinners.

It was on the basis of this recognition of the authenticity and power of the traditional life patterns of the Indian masses that Gandhi addressed himself to them and inspired his vast following. It was also on the basis of this recognition that Gandhi defined the patterns of his own life and formulated his own understanding of the purposes of Indian nationalism.

Before proceeding, however, we would do well to stress that the dialogue form which he chose to adopt in Hind Swaraj is not merely a literary convention chosen for its own sake. It is more plausibly explained by the assumption that Gandhi was, in effect, addressing his own alter ego. The Reader who is the Editor's interlocutor throughout

the book is surely none other than the young dandy M.K.Gandhi, Esq., whom we have already met in London. He in turn is, moreover, also a personification of the large numbers of Indians of the urban upper and middle classes who, since the days of Macaulay, had been bred into a rejection of their own identities. There can have been few Indians capable of reading the English text of Hind Swaraj who did not see something, at least, of themselves in the opinions and sentiments of the Reader. Gandhi's concern in the pamphlet is obviously to win such Indians away from their false commitments, from their attempt to refashion themselves to the point where the British could regard them as acceptably civilised. This was an odyssey which Gandhi himself had undertaken and which he regarded it as imperative that all Indians in a similar position should also undertake.

Nevertheless, it is essential that we do not fail to note that this appeal to westerniksing Indians is addressed to them in a pamphlet entitled "Free India", and whose primary concerns are obviously of a nationalistic nature. Indeed, it is surely no exaggeration to state that for Gandhi the issues of nationalism are primarily those which have to do with the preservation of Indian civilisation and its encounter with the West. The great danger which he foresaw was that, precisely under the guise of Indian nationalism, the old Macaulay-ian policy of Westernisation of the people of India would eventually triumph - that Indians would seek to attain for their country the same kind of sovereignty, sustained by the same material culture and hence by the same kind of spiritual and cultural values, to be found in Great Britain.

If this were to happen, Gandhi insisted, India would cease to be Hindustan and would have become "Englistan": the lamb would have acquired the tiger's nature. "This is not the kind of Swaraj I want!", Gandhi declared through the mouth of the Editor. Gandhi had no illusions regarding the powerful appeal of Western civilisation. Had he not himself been seduced by its siren call? Indians, as he noted, are "hypnotised" by the votaries of the West so that "one by one we are drawn into the vortex".

The struggle confronting India, the imperatives of Indian nationalism, could not therefore be depicted, from Gandhi's point of view, merely in political terms. Swaraj was for him a state of mind, a commitment on the part of Indians to the virtues of non-violence, non-possession and brotherly love which he believed were enshrined in the teachings of Hinduism. Indians would have to free themselves from their own voluntary servitude to anti-Hindu values and orientations before they could free their country from British rule. Just as Gandhi's portrayal of Western civilisation in Hind Swaraj was strongly influenced by Carpenter's Civilisation, as already mentioned, so too was his notion of India's redemption only thregh the individual redemption of each Indian prompted by the title and substance of Tolstoy's great polemic, The Kingdom of God is Within You.

On the other hand, it is clear too that the prevailing political situation did make the attainment of the inner Swaraj of each individual that much more difficult. Where British power has not yet extended its

tentacles, namely in the outlying rural areas where, in fact, the majority of the Indian people lived, there the traditional virtues were preserved and there, as Gandhi expressed it, Home Rule was a fact rather than an aspiration. "The English do not rule over them", Gandhi says of the "uncivilised" rural masses.

British rule was synonymous with the penetration into Indian life of railways, of factories, of machines - and of everything associated with these devices. The wants stimulated by them, and their effect of undermining the traditional fabric of Indian life, had to be resisted: and therefore the British, who spread them throughout India and were ever seeking, in the name of civilisation, to entrench them more deeply into the heart of India, had to be resisted. The extirpation of Western material civilisation, while it would not of itself guarantee the kind of Swaraj that Gandhi sought for India, would certainly remove one of the foremost obstacles to it. Those, on the other hand, who sought to extend the Westernisation of India Gandhi denounced, with unusual vehemence, as "enemies of the country and sinners".

What we conventionally regard as politics and religion are, accordingly, inextricably bound together in Gandhi's view. Politics has created the state of affairs in which Indians are daily seduced away from their own religion's enduring values: and that is the essence of the threat to India which the British represented. To rescue the country and its people, Gandhi embarked on a crusade that was at once a call to individual redemption from a spiritually and culturally inimical civilisat-

ion and a call to extirpate British rule,' under the auspices of which,' and in whose interests,' that civilisation was spreading across India.

6. CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY

It would at first glance appear as if the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence which we have presented on the preceeding pages follows, in its basic outlines, the chapter divisions within which it has been contained. That is to say, a succession of events brought the Jews of Europe and the people of India involuntarily under the political control of the Russian and British governments respectively. These governments, in their policies toward the Jews and Indians, displayed profound disdain for virtually the entire range of social, cultural and spiritual values and practices of their new subjects; and, indeed, seem to have found it difficult to regard them as human beings. These governments, however, were not prepared merely to enjoy the disdain - and, no doubt, an endlessly comfortable reassurance of their own superiority and good fortune - which their encounters with the Jews and the Indians, respectively, afforded them.

Rather, they persuaded themselves that they were the possessors of a historical mission, a grand destiny, which obliged them to educate their wards, the Jews and the Indians, into becoming like they were. In accordance with this convenient belief, they devoted the plenitude of their power to undermining the traditional social, cultural, and even religious patterns of their subjects' lives, adding insult to

injury by seldom refraining from the opportunity of expressing their contempt for those patterns and their amazement that anyone should, for so much as a moment, question the immeasurably superior quality of Western, and modern, civilisation. At the same time, however, it is clear that the Russian and British governments were also rationalising their political preeminence - the withholding of civil rights by the former, and of sovereign independence by the latter, to their respective subjects - on the grounds of the pervasive backwardness and inferiority of the Jews and Indians. The latter were not yet ready to exercise full political rights - so the rationalisation went - and it was for this reason that they were being subjected. Their rulers would elevate them to the point where they could then assume full political rights.

However, as we have seen from the record, the policies of the two governments, while ostensibly aimed at modernising or westernising their subjects - of "correcting" them, as the Russians enjoyed putting it - in fact made it impossible for them to reach their rulers' levels. Intimidated, harrassed, uprooted in both the physical and sociological senses, the Jews were hardly in a fit position to adjust themselves constructively to new ways.[1] Socially ostracised, scorned, and denied adequate educational facilities, the Indians may be said to have

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[1] The notion that integration occurs through the group, rather than by the isolated individual, and that groups therefore need to be preserved accepted paradox: cf. S.N.Eisenstadt, "The Role of Elite and Primary and respected if their members are to assimilate is by now a well-Groups in the Absorption of Immigrants to Israel", American Journal of Sociology (1951), p.327ff; and Robin M. Williams, Jr., et al., Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), pp.295-296.

carried the white man and his exploitative ways to a far greater extent than he was the white man's burden.

Jews and Indians responded to this situation in two basically distinct ways. Without going into the details here, we can say that one pattern of response accepted the validity of the rulers' perceptions and entailed urging the Jews, or the Indians, to abandon their traditional ways and identities and to emulate those of their masters instead; indeed, the masters were occasionally even chided for not doing more to bring about assimilation, while those measures which were aimed at that end, even when they involve d brutal and repressive acts, received the enthusiastic collaboration of the assimilationists.

This, then, is one pattern of response; the other is its diametrical opposite. Here, we witness a strident and at times almost apocalyptic assertion of the noble destiny of the subject nations, and a passionate concern over the deterioration of the native culture and society. In these sentiments, we find the seeds of at least major strands of Zionism and of Hindu nationalism. It is not just that the early exponents of those doctrines would put an end to persecution, harassment and inadequate opportunity. Much more importantly, and certainly much more explicitly, the belief was expressed that only through the establishment of political sovereignty could the native culture and identity be reinvigorated and revived from the shocks it had experienced at the hands of the foreign culture, and preserved for all time to come.

In summary, then, it could perhaps be said that the assault on the social and cultural fabric of Jewish and Indian life by the Russian and British governments led to two reactions. In one, the assault was regarded as legitimate, and its demands were acceded to. In the other, the assaults were regarded as dangerous and unwarranted; in self-defense, prompted ultimately by the desire to protect and preserve the social and cultural fabric of native life, the native identity, movements arose to win political sovereignty, through which alone that desire could be realised. Herein lie the roots of at least a major component of nationalist movements.

There is a certain elegance to this schema which, moreover, coincides with the findings of a number of scholars cited in the first chapter of this study to the effect that nationalism seeks the preservation of the national culture, and its development. Those findings, however, and this schema, would appear to be at variance with another set of scholarly opinion regarding the origins of nationalism. This set sees nationalism as a sine qua non, in David words, of modernisation.[1] It sees nationalism as an incentive to, and a palliative for, the dislocations caused by, modernisation; nationalism, indeed, is seen as functional to modernisation, or vice versa.[2] It is also true, to be sure,

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[1] "With the world organised as it is, nationalism is a sine qua non of industrialisation, because it provides people with an overriding, easily acquired, secular motivation for making painful changes. National strength or prestige becomes the supreme goal, industrialisation the chief means", K.Davis, "Social and Demographic Aspects of Economic Development in India", in S.Kuznets, et al., Economic Growth, (Glencoe, 1964), p.294.

[2] D.Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C., 1967), p.35.

that nationalism is recognised as an impediment to modernisation;[1] however, the bulk of scholarly opinion on this question would certainly seem to endorse the former view.[2]

The view of nationalism as functional to modernisation, and vice vers, does not necessarily preclude the notion that nationalism seeks the preservation of the traditional culture and identity of the nation in question: the contradiction between these two positions can very often be more apparent than real. History, after all, and Ranke notwithstanding, is what Rustow calls a "grab-bag", from which the nationalist often selects "past themes that suit his present purpose".[3] The mythologising of history on which nationalists frequently base their policies and aspirations can very well, despite apparent indications to the contrary, in actuality lay the groundwork for some of the most important prerequisites of nationhood. The strenuous insistence of both Zionist and Hindu nationalists that, despite historical circumstances, the Jews and the Indians do constitute nations, with shared destinies that bind together all Jews and Indians, prepared the ground for the network of social communications of which Deutsch speaks as a characteristic of nationalism.[4] The Zionist insistence on reviving Hebrew and discarding Yiddish, for all the historical setting in which

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[1] E.g., E.F.Hoselitz, "Non-Economic Barriers to Economic Development" Economic Development and Cultural Change, I.9; J.van der Kroef, "Economic Development in Indonesia: Some Social and Cultural Implications", ibid, 4.116ff.

[2] E.g., K.Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York 1953) R.Emerson, From Empire to Nation, (Cambridge, Mass.,1960), etc.

[3] Rustow, op.cit., pp.40-41.

[4] Deutsch, op.cit., passim.

the justification for doing so was provided (Yiddish is the language of the Diaspora, Hebrew that in which the Book of the People of the Book was written and which Jews spoke in the era of their sovereignty) revived a language common to all Jews and not merely to those of East Europe, and thus facilitated the development of a common sphere of intercourse and exchange. Even Gandhi, we may note, called for the abolition of caste barriers, for the redistribution of wealth and for economic self-sufficiency, all aspects of modernisation legitimised in the name of tradition!

This is of course not to imply that every facet of nationlism is functional to modernisation; but sufficient correlations between the two do exist to make the connection one well worth noting. As we have already argued, one of the motivations behind nationalism - even where it stresses the traditional culture of the nation - may well be to make the nation different from all other nations in the way in which each nation differs from all others. Each nation, in this view, aspires to its own territory, its own government, its own flag, its own postage stamps, its own heroes, its own literature, its own monuments, etc., etc; and is satisfied that, with the acquisition of these, it has become a truly distinctive nation. And this will be the case even where, as with Pakistan's national anthem, whose music was composed by an Englishman, the symbols of nationality are about as authentic as Rudolf Valentino's Sheikh of Araby. These symbols are the symbols of modernity, for all the traditional aura they may attempt to convey; and each is about as distinctive from the next as the trade-mark of

the Coca-Cola Company is distinctive from the trade-mark of the Pepsi-Cola Company. The desire to acquire these "authentic" symbols of nationality is contained in the desire for participation in the world of modernity. It is only those groups - ever fewer in number, it would seem - such as the traditionalist Jews to whom we have referred, who do not seek an accomodation with the modern world but define their identity in authentically traditional terms, who do not seek to acqure these symbols. They differ from all other nations in not differing from them in the way that each of them differs from the next: they have a genuinely different way of differing. It is a pre-modern way.

At the outset of this chapter we suggested a possible juxtaposition between the assimilationist and nationalist responses to the conditions created by alien ruling powers. This juxtaposition is not compatible with theview of nationalism - for all its appeals and exhortations to the past - as a modernising force (which, in the two instances we have studied means, in effect, as assimilationist force). If we turn now to consider the evidence more closely, and from a psychoanalytic standpoint, we will discover that in fact the psychological dynamics underlying the two responses are closely similar.

In chapter III we suggested three features which, on <u>a priori</u> grounds, we believed would be likely to characterise the formation of ego identity of natives of societies subjected to the patterns of rule imposed by the Russians and British over the Jews and Indians. These were (i) a loss of faith in the quality of one's actions and the

validity of one's perceptions; (ii) scepticism with regard to inspirational figures such as heroes and leaders of a relatively routine type, and with regard to the integrity of authority figures and processes in particular; and (iii) an ambivalent attitude toward the future. We must now see whether these a priori findings are, in fact, supported by the evidence and, if so, whether they characterise both the assimilationist and the nationalist response, or only one or the other of them. Let us deal first with the evidence regarding the Jews of Eastern Europe.

We find that both assimilationists and Zionists share a strong sense of the freakishness and abnormality of Jewish behaviour and outlooks. The "well-meaningness, usefulness and industry" of their fellow Jews is called into question by the bourgeoisie. The aspirations of Jews to acquire advanced religious training is mocked by Smolenskin. Braudes regards them as living corpses, incapable of so much as noticing the sun when it shines at its brightest. Gordon actually goes so far as to indicate, by very clear implication, that there is an antithesis between being "a man" and a Jew. Herzl, whom we must surely rank as an assimilationist, even if for convenience and by convention we discussed him in the chapter on nationalist responses, depicts the East European Jew, as yet unredeemed by the wholesome air of Altneuland, as either an incompetent indigent (Miriam's family) or as a star-crossed lover, contemplating suicide. In an admittedly pathological extreme (Brafman) the Jews are seen as arch-conspirators plotting to take over control of the world. Over and Over again, we find assimil-

ationists echoing the governmental charge that the Jews, through their own perverse behaviour, are responsible for all the misfortunes that are befalling them. We find in all these perceptions confirmation for our view that, in the historical circumstances described, the inadequate development of the capacities for autonomy, initiative and industry will lead to a loss of faith in the quality of one's actions and the validity of one's behaviour; the view of the Jew as conspirator lacking in well-meaningness is an introjection of the incapacity for basic trust projected onto the outside world.

These qualities remain in the Maskilim as they moved ever closer to, and finally arrived at, a Zionist position. Smolenskin is in 1877 still grappling with the problem of how "to be", how to behave. By clear implication, Jews do not pursue and attain knowledge but indulge in wickedness and folly; and they are ashamed of themselves qua Jews. In 1883 when his Zionism is clear, he is still harping on such themes. The Jews are ape-like mimics of the Gentiles - and stupid besides, for they evidently refuse to see that their endless acceptance and imitation of Gentile ways does not endear them to the Gentiles. Indeed, the Jews are like dogs. Ben Yehuda admonishes the Jews for having "strayed from the right path" and decking themselves in alien finery; his emphasis, too, ins on the stupid and futile nature of such pursuits. For Pinsker, the Jews are of a "frightening form", of an "eerie form", a "ghostlike apparition"...moving about among the living". It is their fault that the Gentiles react so violently against them. Only in Achad Ha'am do we find the absence of this kind of perception and

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then, it is highly significant to note, it is replaced by a firm sense of that feeling of sameness and continuity which is the hallmark of a healthy ego development. The Jews' desire to "absorb the basic elements of general culture" is a perfectly healthy one which has occurred before at various periods of Jewish history: in this sense it is nothing new and alarming provided only that the objective circumstances are suitable.

We do not find a great body of evidence to confirm the second of the three hypothetical characteristics which we predicted, namely scepticism with regard to inspirational figures of a relatively routine type and with regard to authority figures and processes in particular. This may ave something to do with two fairly obvious considerations, the first being the censorship in Russia, which was extremely stringent; and the second being that, at least in so far as external, non-Jewish authorities were concerned, Jews had for many centuries learned that the most profound scepticism was the healthiest view.[1]

In this respect, therefore, the nineteenth century had little if anything new to offer the Jews. For all that, it is clear that the bourgeoisie, the Maskilim and then the Zionists, felt profoundly disenchanted with the traditional Jewish leadership. We have seen how Smolenskin mocked the aspirations of young Jewish boys to become rabbis: they should rather - and this is typical of the quest for unroutinised, sensational leader-types - become great warrior heroes, kings,

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[1] Pirkei Avot 3:6 and Maimonides' comment ad loc.

scientists and (university-educated) scholars. It is also clear that the rise of Zionism was predicated on, among other things, the rejection of the policies pursued by the rabbis and the kahal organisations, or what was left of them by the end of the nineteenth century, which assumed the continued existence of Jewish communities as minority groups in the Diaspora. Moreover, it is significant in this context that the leaders who succeeded in galvanising the nationalist sentiments of East European Jews were Westerners such as Herzl, Wolffsohn and their entourages who - the rifts in the Zionist Organisation et withstanding - were able to exercise a degree of leadership which no one, including Pinsker, had been able to do in Hibbat Tsiyon.

Insofar as the third of the hypothesised characteristics predicted in Chapter Three is concerned, we find rather little evidenceffor this, whether of a direct or indirect nature - of which a romanticisation of the past can be a corellary. We have mentioned that one or two of the earliest Hebrew novels did indeed romanticise the glorious life of ancient Israel; Braudes, on the other hand, expresses the most profound despair over the future of the Jews, while yet continuing energetically to exhort them to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps. We find, among the Zionists, that Ben Yehuda speaks ina rather dutiful, but even then in a perfunctory, manner about the revival of the nation to the point where it will "revive and bear magnificent fruit, as in the days of old". More typically, however, we find the Zionists looking forward to "a normal national life" or with Pinsker, to "equality" with other nations. Achad Ha'am explicitly declares that

the establishment of a Jewish state will not enthrone "universal righteousness" among the nations.

The want of evidence on this score is, of course, offset by Herzl's novel, which has all that over-defined, utopian joy and bounty which we had predicted and which, moreover, sets the Jews in the position of exemplars over the rest of the world; this same Herzl who self-pityingly lamented the incompetence and unreliability of those on whom he most depended! But the general absence of this kind of material, which contrasts so strikingly with the Messianism which is such a large part of the Jewish tradition and with that mocking, cynical expectation of the worst which is so prominent in Jewish humour,[1] is perplexing and may require us to modify this hypothesis unless the Indian material suggests otherwise. We should not underrate, however, the strength of the appeal which the prospect of sheer normalcy exercised for Zionist and assimilationist minds alike, after two thousand trouble laden years of distinctiveness. It is however relevant to our immediate concern here that in this respect no significant distinctions between the Zionists and the assimilationists present themselves. And that has been our conclusion regarding the other two characteristics which we have examined.

Turning now to the Indian material, we may to begin with note that among the assimilationists the evidence for a loss of faith in the quality of one's actions and in the validity of one's perceptions is

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[1] Cf. T.Reik, Jewish Wit (New York, 1962), passim

relatively limited. A feeling is expressed that Indians have much that they need to learn from the West, since they are, as Derozio said, "hopelessly jejune"; they are ignorant and superstitious. Dayananda, turning now to the anti-assimilationists who lead up to and include the nationalits, regarded Indians who imitate the British as "foolish", a point also made by Vivekenanda. However, with one and possibly two exceptions, we do not get from the material a sense of that vivid and profound disorientation, that feeling of the ghost-like unreality and also malevolence of being which we find among the Jews of Eastern Europe. The possible exception is the author of Seir Mutaqherin, whom we have seen to stress the "strangeness" of India as compared with the rest of the world. Hossein does so, however, in a context which clearly implies that it is the responsibility of strangers who come to India to adjust themselves to its strangeness, rather than vice versa, something which of course we do not find among the Jews during our period (as contrasted with earlier epochs in Jewish history when Jews, moving among the nations, effortlessly assumed the superiority - and distinctiveness - of the religious truths vouchsafed them on Sinai). In part this was obviously because the Jews were outnumbered by the Russians; but from a psychological point of view we simply do not find among the Jews the self-confidence which could have led them to make that kind of a demand, irrespective of its objective reasonableness. It is only when we turn to Gandhi that we find definite indications of this quality, this chameleon-like readiness to adapt to any environment so long as he did not stand out in it, this sense of shameful anxiety to scrutinise himself down to

the finest point of detail and endlessly to attempt to make oneself over.

But Gandhi aside, the paucity of this kind of material does seem problematic, particularly when we note the strong emphasis on the part of assimilationists and nationalists (and proto-nationalists) alike on the notion of change as reform rather than as complete refashioning. The significance of this emphasis surely lies in the sense of sameness and continuity which appears to be behind it - the future will be a modification, an improved continuation, the past - that implies a basically trustful and healthy ego.

On the other hand, however, it is possible that we are searching for too literal a set of parallels to the Jewish experience. Certainly, if we expect to find that ghostlike sense of unreality and malevolence among the Hindus which we found among the Jews we shall be disappointed. But to expect that is to ignore the distinctive historical patterns which characterise the two experiences. European anti-Semitism has always emphasised Jewish malevolence; it has also contained - as for example in the Wandering Jew legend and generally in the notion that the Church has superceded the Synagogue - a strong sense of the unreality of Jewish existence. We do not find comparable elements in the British perception of the Indians and we should therefore perhaps not expect to find it in the Indians' views of themselves.

What we do find, on the other hand, is that the British articulated, endlessly, eloquently and publicly, their view of the Indians as a

desperately backward and incompetent people who stood in urgent need of rescue by the British. If we hypothesise, as seems reasonable to do, that many Indians accepted this judgement of themselves even though they do not endlessly portray themselves in these terms, this comes to much the same thing as saying that the Indians did acquire a sense of the invalidity of their own perceptions and a loss of faith in the quality of their actions. But what is the evidence for this, we must ask?

I would suggest that the evidence for this seems to be very strong, and is to be found in that truly inordinate stress which assimilationists, proto-nationalists and nationalists alike placed on India's destiny of redeeming the world, and particularly the West, from the desperate crisis into which it has fallen as a result of precisely that technological competence which the British despised the Indians for not having. Like Herzl, then, the Indians find relief from an oppressive sense of their own incapacities and the associated distortion of perceptions by indulging in the fantasy of switching roles with those who have pointed out their inferiority to them: they will be "like Daddy when I grow up". Except of course that they willhave to rescue "Daddy" from his childlike indiscretions and incompetence in exercising his capacity for autonomy and initiative with respect to his "tools".

The Indian will find himself, Vivekenanda said, when he brings Indias doctrine of salvation to the West which stands in such urgent need of

it. The psychological truth of this statement is enormous; for it is only by adopting a role analogous to that adopted by the British in India that the Indian will become real to himself, will find himself, will be answered in that poignant appeal he makes, "Make me a man!" In this connection, we must recognise the significance of the fact that prior to the onset of this reaction formation in the nineteenth century Hinduism shows no evidence at all of a "light unto the nations" complex, and this despite the numerous occasions in which its votaries came into contact with the world outside the sub-continent. We must assume, accordingly, that their assumption of the "Hindu man's burden" at precisely the time that they were told that they had become the "white'mans burden" is not just a coincidence.

Turning to the second of our hypothesised qualities we can safely assert that, from the author of the Seir Mutaqherin on, Indians felt a strong sense of the arbitrariness and unresponsiveness of authority figures and processes and scepticism regarding the impartiality and honourableness of authority processes. The role of the traditional leadership is so completely negligible that we find no mention of it. The evidence for this sense of alienation from authority figures and processes is sufficiently strong to confirm the a priori expectation of it which we expressed in Chapter Three, and to lead us to suspect that the lack of evidence for it which we found among the Jews - insofar as the external authorities are concerned - can indeed be explained on the grounds which we suggested, namely the strong censorship which existed in Russia and the time-honoured Jewish alienation from

secular authority. The sense of injustice is also, we must stress, expressed by Indian assimilationists - as for instance in Roy's letter to Lord Amherst, and certainly in the postures of Ranade and Gokhale to whom we refer here for the first time. We also pointed out that it would be a characteristic of this pattern of response to feel both over-controlled (i.e., unjustly, arbitrarily and wantonly controlled) and not sufficiently controlled. This latter aspect we certainly find in the frequent exhortations of Indians urging the British to do more and more by way of pushing them into the "correct" direction, in the servile view, moreover, of the British as instruments of benign Profidence.

Finally, we come to our prediction that Indians would have a highly ambivalent attitude toward the future. This surely is born out by the data. Assimilationists, proto-nationalists and nationalistis alike give frequent expression to the feeling that to the extent that the future is merely a continuation of the present, it will be a catastrophic one; at the same time, as we have seen, all of them entertain either or both a distorted nostalgia for an idealised past - a paradise lost - and a boundlessly optimistic view of what the future can hold in store for India. How then are we to explain the absence of a parallel sentiment among the Jews of East Europe?

We must note, first of all, the presence in Zionism of a propensity, which becomes increasingly apparent as the twentieth century wore on, to identify with a glorified and (from an objective point of view) a

quite unwarrented idealised Jewish past. This past, in literal fact, is not even Jewish for, in a deft transvaluation of values, it declares that the Jews were most human and most alive in the days of their Canaanite paganism. The most vigourous promoters of this view actually regard themselves as a movement, with their own magazine, etc; but strong elements of it are present in a great deal of Zionist thought, and in many Zionist attitudes generally.[1]

Beyond this, however, it may help to recognise the distinct connotations which the view of an exemplary future has in Jewish thought and teaching. Traditionally, the Jews have regarded history as moving reluctibly toward the time of Messianic redemption, when universal peace and justice will be established. Traditionally, moreover, the Jews identified themselves as the Chosen People - those who, uniquely, bore the responsibility for moving history toward the Messianic climax and defined the very purposes of Jewish existence in terms of that responsibility; moreover, in the Messianic "end of days" the Jews would be the exemplar of humanity and "all nations shall come to Zion".

To be the Chosen People, however, while it may be a privilege, is also a considerable burden - numerous legends recount the reluctance with which the Jews finally shouldered it, and then only because no one else was prepared to do so. It was, moreover, recognised as closely

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[1] E.Marmorstein, Heaven at Bay: The Jewish Kulturkampf in the Holy Land (London, 1969), pp.102ff, p.125.

associated with the sufferings which the Jews had experienced throughout their exilic history.

Under these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that an East European Jewish intellectual would look forward to an idealised future as one which is essentially "normal" and undistinctive: one which denies the historical self-image of the Jews as the Chosen People. The most audacious view merely sees the future as a revival of aspects of past glory: but the glory of a past which was an essentially normal, sovereign, past. Significantly, it is with Herzl, a thoroughgoing assimilationist ignorant of Jewish language and tradition, that we find a fantasy of the Jews once again playing an exemplary role: albeit an exemplary role which reflects prevailing Western, rather than traditional Jewish, values. But on the whole, the hope that the future would bring to the Jews nothing more than a simple-minded normalcy is found in assimilationists and Zionists alike. Psychologically speaking we would suggest, as already indicated, that it is the functional equivalent of the Indian expectation, equally simple-minded, it is true, that India would redeem the world, and particularly the Western world, from the desperate crises which were believed to be afflicting it.

All in all, accordingly, we detect striking similarities between the assimilationist and the nationalist positions with respect to the three basic characteristics of ego identity which we postulated as being present under the historical conditions created by the Russian and

British governments; and we find those hypothesised characteristics to be actually present. The psychological perspective, accordingly, confirms the view held by many political scientists that nationalism, for all its appeals and exhortations to the traditional identities of the nations concerned, as a modernising movement - a movement of assimilation, as we would say here, to the values and patters of the dominant western or westernised (British and Russian) rulers.

Saying this, however, still leaves a major problem open. Essentially, we are suggesting that shall we say Gandhi, for all the profound distinctions which appear to separate the London dandy from the "half-naked Fakir", or Smolenskin, for all the profound distinctions which appear to separate the Zionist Maskil from the Zionist polemicist, were pursuing the same ends. But it is also a fact, of course, that there <u>is</u> a significant substantive difference between the frock coat and top hat which the young Gandhi wore and the <u>dhoti</u> of homespun cloth with which he replaced them; that there is a difference between Smolenskin's urgings to assimilate into Russian society and his aspirations later in life for a sovereign Jewish state. How are we to account for these differences?

Unsatisfactory as this may be, the answer quite frankly is that at this stage I do not know. I <u>suspect</u> that it may have much to do with what Erikson calls negative identity, a process in which

> conflicts can find expression in a more subtle way than the abrogation of personal identity. [Individuals] choose instead a negative identity, i.e., an identity perversely based on all those identifications

> and roles which, at critical stages of development had been presented to them as most undesirable and dangerous and yet also as most real... Such vindictive choices of a negative identity represent, of course, a desperate attempt at regaining mastery in a situation in which the available positive identity elements cancel each other out.[1]

In this explanation, Jews and Indians would be seen as stridently and defiantly insisting on the virtuous nature of what are considered - by themselves as well as by others - to be their defects. I hesitate to make such a judgement, however, in part because I frankly do not feel that I sufficiently understand the nature of negative identity and particularly because of the problem, which I cannot at this stage find an approach to, of accounting for the fact that it is only in terms of the symbols of traditionalism that we find this affirmation of what others have rejected. It is not in terms of modernisation or westernisation that we find the process of negative identity occurring; indeed, on the contrary, with respect to that we find an overt or a covert acceptance of the need for assimilation. Any explanation, then, of the nature of the distinction between assimilationist and nationalist, between Gandhi's frock coat and his dhoti, would accordingly have to account for those no less significant elements in which assimilationist tendencies also assert themselves, hand in hand with the symbols of traditionalism.

This brings us, in conclusion of this study, back to a necessary discussion of certain methodological questions. Looking over the pre-

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[1] E.Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York,1968) pp.174-176.

ceeding pages, I get a strong sense of undue analytic rigidity compounded of elements which seem to me to be inadequately insightful and apt. I do not intend these remarks by way of an exculpation. The psychonalytic dimension to this study is amateurish and simplistic. I have however sought deliberately to err on the side of discretion, consciously avoiding sweeping "psychologisms". In this respect, it is my judgement that this study lays down some useful foundations. It provides an analytic framework which - it is true - requires considerable further development and refinement but which does contain the potential for that development and refinement. In this sense it is sobre rather than sweeping; and I can report here the difficulties of resisting what I do not believe can be the purely idiosyncratic impulses to indulge in grand analytic insights. Some clear indications of the direction which future studies will take have also presented themselves to me as a result of this study. In particular, it is my belief that what is now required is the further development of the analytic framework in the context of much more detailed biographical information and a much fuller analysis of written sources. The all too cursory atention paid to each of the individuals whom we examined here was useful in suggesting some general theoretical outlines. Much more detailed and intensive study of particular individuals will now be necessary to confirm and elaborate those theoretical constructs.

APPENDIX: ERIKSON'S GANDHI

A study such as this, representing what may all too obviously be only a preliminary step toward a comprehensive treatment of the origins of nationalism from a psychoanalytic perspective, cannot claim (and I hope will not be expected) to pay adequate attention to the psychoanalytic, historical and political science literature to which it contributes. In particular, that which was least familiar has received the most cursory treatment: namely the psychoanalytic literature and particularly the contributions exploring the methodological problems of what, rather grossly, are called "psychohistory" and "psychopolitics". Nevertheless, it seems imperative to offer some comments on Erikson's study of Gandhi here, since both author and his subject figure prominently in our own work.

Anyone approaching Erikson's two biographical studies - of Luther and of Gandhi - on thebasis of some familiarity, at least, with Erikson's theoretical writings, must surely be struck by the disparity between the former and the latter. It is, possibly, no exaggeration to state that the author of the biographies and the author of the theoretical writings appear to be two separate men with, at best, a passing familiarity with each other's work. Given the comprehensive claims with which endows his theoretical construct - his view that human growth

takes place in response to the needs inherent in the process of identity formation - it is, to say the least, surprising that he studies the lives of his heroes without any systematic reference to that construct. His discussion of Gandhi's "curse", for example, includes a reference to the ontogenetic version of that experience, but as such, it adds little if anything either to the Freudian insights which it claims to modify or to popular wisdom which declares that as the twig is bent so the tree grows. What is more, the quality of "playfulness" which in this passage as elsewhere at a number of points in the book, to which Erikson calls attention - and which will have struck the reader of any, even the most superficial biography of Gandhi - is in fact not one which I have been able to find in any theoretical explication of his own schema in Erikson's other works. We might, at the very least, have expected to find some remarks which would have linked that quality to those which Erikson's describes in his theoretical work; some mention, perhaps, that a study of Gandhi's life calls attention to this feature which he, Erikson, had overlooked previously: but no such modification of the theory in face of possibly unexpected biographical data is offered.

Nor is this completely without precedent in Erikson's work. His highly sensitive portraits of Hitler, for example, or of "Momism" in American life, show far less of an attempt to examine theory and data in terms of each other than we have attempted here. One almost gets the feeling that Erikson does not find his own theories particularly useful for historical or sociological analysis.

If Erikson's own historical and biographical and sociological writing offers little basis for confirming or repudiating the value of his theoretical constructs, we shall have to wait for others to provide that evidence. "Moi, je ne suis pas Eriksonist" is, however, a somewhat strange position to find the master in...

We have attached considerable importance to Gandhi's years in London as a law student, suggesting that it was at this point that the confrontation between the traditional and the Western, between the Indian and the British, took its most acute form. It was not that the dandified Gandhi emerged from his provincial "babu" chrysallis - only to take the first decisive steps, in turn, toward the further metamorphosis into the all-Indian mahatma who regarded Western civilisation as a "disease". We cannot read accounts of Gandhi's life and personality during this period without being deeply struck by the acute psychological tensions which appear to be present, the problems of identity in both the conventional and Eriksonian senses: and the significant steps which Gandhi now takes to resolve those tensions.

Erikson, however, in Gandhi's Truth, selects the strike at Allahabad as the seminal event in Gandhi's life; and his general preoccupation, as he says, is with "the historical presence of Mahatma Gandhi and [with] the meaning of what he called Truth" (p.9). That preoccupation, of course, is perfectly valid even if we do not fully understand what Erikson may mean by Gandhi's "historical presence". Equally, while there are grounds for questioning his selection of the strike as the

event for analytic focus, Erikson recognises and ably defends the somewhat unorthodox view of Gandhi's development which this implies.

Nevertheless, we would suggest that the view of his sojourn in London as of his development there as a "moratorium" (p.145) misses the extremely significant nature of that period. Gandhi believed that the British were superior and the Indians inferior; and that the latter might only come to govern themselves when they became like their masters. It is for this reason, largely, that he went to London; it was against this logic that he first began to react, while he was in London. Without this sequence of events, not just the style but the very substance of Gandhi's campaigns against the British and against the Anglicisation of Indian life would not have taken place. It is no exaggeration to state that there would have been no Mahatma had not Gandhi accepted, incorporated and then emphatically repudiated the notion that the British were superior. Is not this notion - and its rejection - that forms the starting point of his career? And is this not demonstrable equally in terms of historical fact as of psychoanalytic insight?

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