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BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: THE AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN TRADITION

by

DORAL DEAN McELDOWNEY

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1976

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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
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Abstract

BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: THE AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN TRADITION

by

DORAL DEAN McELDOWNEY

Advisors: Professors Martin Fleisher and David Spitz

In recent years Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard have propagandized for a radical political theory called "Libertarianism." This study examines their nineteenth-century predecessors, a set or native-born petty-bourgeois cranks and reformers--a school of radicals who espoused anarchism, individualism, and the principle of laissez faire. Attention is focussed upon five major figures of the tradition: Josiah Warren, Stephen Pearl Andrews, William B. Greene, and Lysander Spooner, as well as the capstone of the movement Benjamin R. Tucker. They shared a history and a rhetorical vocabulary with mainstream liberalism, and utilized both to assail the State and its liberal defenders. The development of this domestic radical movement is examined in the tumultuous nineteenth century--an era of migration, immigration, Civil War, industrialization, and urbanization. As American social conditions altered, the intellectual sources of this tradition changed as well, from Thomas Jefferson and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to James L. Walker and Max Stirner. The purposes of this study are to chronicle the incremental development of a native American radical tradition, to document its selective incorporation of

foreign influences, to examine the interaction of theory and social conditions during a period of awesome change, and to analyze the reasons for the generation, demise, and resurrection of this movement. In pursuit of these goals a chronological study is undertaken which covers roughly 1830 to 1911. Within that historical frame, however, several corollary concerns are touched upon, such as the character-type and social role of the tinker, the crank, and the faddist.

Libertarianism was developed by Warren after his unsatisfying involvement in Robert Owen's New Harmony colony. For nearly forty years the movement was interested in utopian reform on the margin of society, interested in creating alternative modow of voluntary community. With the advent of Benjamin Tucker and the infusion of Stirner's thought, Libertarianism began to re-examine its role as a social movement and to redefine the nature of "liberty" in terms of an internal (psychological) dimension rather than an external (spatial) one. Tucker's legacy is, however, more tangled and ambiguous than that--for in 1911, three years after his "retirement," he penned a "Postscript" which seemed to cast into doubt the very sort of radical voluntarism his life-activities as a reformer had been predicated upon. In conclusion, Tucker's disavowal of laissez faire is considered in relation to those new radicals of the late twentieth century who have chosen to call themselves Libertarians and to evoke the tradition. While the doctrine of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century libertarians are selectively divergent, a core of common premises remains, and that core in each case appeals to a particular class of person--the alienated bourgeoisie.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In 1975 Robert Nozick received the prestigious National Book Award for Anarchy, State and Utopia[1], a work which focussed public attention on and gave academic respectability to, a political ideology called Libertarianism. Nozick, of course, did not invent the ideology. Murray Rothbard had before him spent years synthesizing the economics of the Austrian School with domestic individualistic radicalism, producing in 1973 a libertarian manifesto (as the dust jacket hailed it), For a New Liberty.[2]

Earlier his Power and Market[3] had been dedicated to "Libertarians of the Past, who Blazed the Trail and to Libertarians of the Future, who Shall Overcome." In this polemical endeavor the Harvard philosopher and the Brooklyn economist were joined by the chairman of the philosophy department of the University of Southern California, John Hospers. Hospers, a widely-respected authority on aesthetics and analytic philosophy[4] not only added to the growing body of literature on Libertarianism, but carried its standard as Presidential candidate in 1972, receiving one Electoral College vote. Meanwhile Karl Hess, former speechwriter for Senator Barry Goldwater, and Jerome Tuccille broke with the Conservative Right by repudiating the Statist policies of its largest and most influential youth movement, Young Americans for Freedom.[5]

What all this amounts to is a recognition that a political position at odds with both liberalism and conservatism as traditionally defined has made an appearance on both the political and the philosophical academic scenes. But this movement is not new; it has its antecedents in a group of nineteenth century thinkers who constitute an indigenous bourgeois radical

movement.

To be radical with respect to a problem is to go to the roots rather than simply to prune the branches. As Alexander Gray has observed, presumably only semi-facetiously, "A liberal in all ages is one who upholds the rights of the individual against the claims of the State and of authority; and an anarchist is merely a liberal who has gone off the deep end, losing all sense of proportion."[6] The Libertarians of the nineteenth century were anarchists; they presented a radical critique of American Society, and they did so from within the shared rhetoric and cultural mythology of mainstream American society. They placed the individual over the collective and insisted upon a literal application of laissez faire, thereby exhibiting their affinities with both nineteenth century liberalism and twentieth century conservatism, consequently manifesting a continuity in political rhetoric surpassing the permanence of political institutions. For while American society altered profoundly in the course of the nineteenth century, the rhetoric of Libertarianism remained remarkably constant. Although the themes of this rhetoric are tangled and but vaguely delineated, their principles are readily perceivable--individual sovereignty, anarchism, voluntarism, and "cost" as the limit of price. Of course these terms, as Isaiah Berlin reminds us regarding freedom, have a "meaning...so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist."[7] The complexity of these terms will be examined here as they evolve in the near century of the classic Libertarian tradition, as represented in the works of Josiah Warren, Stephen Pearl Andrews, Lysander Spooner, William B. Greene, and Benjamin Ricketson Tucker.

Laissez faire--or as Josiah Warren phrased it in the motto for his utopian colony Modern Times, "Mind your own business"--for these radical

reformers meant the utmost realization of freedom: freedom defined in regard to the sovereign individual, and defined negatively as the absence of constraints. Laissez faire meant without coercion, and freedom therefore was understood as the realization of an individual's voluntary behavior. As the years passed, and man's understanding of the sociological and psychological components of his social existence altered, the Libertarians have modified their presentation. So Spooner's invocation of natural law passes into archaism, while today's Libertarians are apt to speak the languge of Austrian economics, Objectivist ethics, public choice theory, and Voeglinian eschatology. What has remained constant, however, is the principled defense of the private sphere by the accretion of hitherto private matters.

The predominance of 'individualist' premises, however, should not obscure the social nature of the theory. It was generated in response to a failed social experiment (Robert Owen's New Harmony) and broadcast in order to "set a practical example" of successful community building. It was an anarchism which rejected the State but not society, an individualism which sought to protect the private realm by restricting the political, and an ideology of freedom which parted company with liberalism to remain the conservator of a concept of liberty defined negatively. Louis Hartz has told us that America is nation with a liberal history.[8] This caricaturish phrase makes sense insofar as it describes general categories of discussion in our political rhetoric and to the degree that it stops short of bleaching out of American life a rich countercultural critique of the mainstream. But a good deal of illiberalism and anti-liberalism is too readily obscured by it.

The point at which these kindred traditions parted ways was the acceptance by liberals, and the repudiation by Libertarians, of the legitimacy of the State. As the frontier receded and then passed into history, the concepts "individual" and "freedom" were recast for mainstream society. Both the physiognomy of the nation and the character of its people changed: canals were dug, forests hewn, and towns and villages nurtured into cities. Man, living in an interactive relationship with his environment, changed as well. The liberal and the conservative traditions apparently were able to speak to the needs of this altered condition and together they constituted the mainstream of twentieth-century American political rhetoric.[9] The Libertarians share important elements of that complex of affective responses wrapped in symbolism which Daniel Boorstin calls American "giveness."[10] The Libertarians turned this into a critique of the mainstream in order to protect freedom as they understood that concept.

To return to Alexander Gray's comment, the Libertarian upheld the "rights of the individual against the claims of the State and of authority" and because he saw freedom as an unmitigated positive value he tended to view it quantitatively. If x is good, 2x must be twice as good; similarly, if freedom is a good, more freedom must be better. This is what characterized the Libertarian's "loss of proportion." He recognized no superior moral claim above the individual. He asserted the primacy of the private sphere. Looking at the changing face of the nation, the Libertarian saw an era passing and a style of life threatened with extinction, and since the meaning of freedom was intimately bound up with that style of life it, too, was in jeopardy. Thus his argument with the State was in defense of existential freedom emanating from the private sphere and manifesting itself in the social realm, without invasion

either by the government or by private powers. Yet it was the political--not the social--which the Libertarian saw as the agent of deprivatization.

Now a century-and-a-half after Josiah Warren's earliest social tinkering and nearly three-quarters of a century after Ben Tucker's retirement from the polemical fray, the images of this tradition are again called forth to assail the contemporary State, to chastise liberals, and to protest against invasion of the private sphere. In the intervening years, the American citizen has been exposed to such concepts as alienation, conformity, the grey flannel mentality, escape from freedom, and the authoritarian personality. He has in those years witnessed wars waged on a world stage. He has seen the advent of a technology capable either of remaking or of annihilating his entire planet. The result has been a second Galilean revolution: man has felt himself removed from the center of his social universe. The twentieth century has witnessed the institutionalization of new lifestyles and social forms: urbanization, industrialization, and mechanization have altered man's relation to his fellows, his work, and his image of himself. While the delineation of these issues is best left to a thorough analysis via the agency of this century's representative science, sociology, their essence in academic tomes and their insinuation into the film, drama and literature of the day indicate the similarity of these concerns to those of the nineteenth-century Libertarians, those agrarian-based bourgeois radicals with their roots in Jefferson and the Physiocrats. Tucker is the final bracket of this earlier more pristine age. He stands with Frederick Jackson Turner watching the frontier recede into the footnotes of history while totalitarian world ideologies menace the future.

It is a minor footnote to the concerns of modernity, but one

indicative of the relevance of this school of cranks and outsiders, that Franz Kafka--chronicler of the nightmare of twentieth-century life under faceless authority--took time to study the writings of "Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker, and Tolstoy."[11]

Tucker would have felt honored.

Footnotes

1. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

2. Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty, (New York: MacMillan Company, 1973.

3. Murray Rothbard, Power and Government, (Menlo Park, California: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970).

4. A Bibliography of his work is contained in The Libertarian Scholar, I (Winter, 1975), 16-21.

5. The story of this split is told in Jerome Tuccille, Radical Libertarianism: A New Political Alternative, (New York: Harper and Row, Perennial Library, 1971), pp. 115-30.

6. Alexander Gray, The Socialist Tradition: Moses to Lenin (New York: Harper Torch Book, 1968), p. 28.

7. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 121.

8. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1955), p. 3.

9. The theorist and historian Peter Viereck makes a case for America as a conservative society and seeks to rechristen the revolution as "The Conservation of 1776." Peter Viereck, Conservatism (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), p. 87.

10. Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University Press, 1953), p. 8f.

11. Gustave Janoush, Conversations with Kafka, translated by Gowonry Rees New York: New Directions, 1973), p. 90.

THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTIONIST: JOSIAH WARREN

Cranks, Utopians, and Social Reformers

The cries of freedom and individualism strike responsive chords in the breasts of Americans. Indeed they tend to strike harmonic chords, being that freedom and the individual are linked in popular thought. The phenomenon which Charles A. Beard investigated, calling the 'myth of American rugged individualism,' may indeed have been a myth, but myths have both a genesis and a function worth considering. The myth of rugged individualism is the residue of an era when it described not the superman but the type most capable of surviving in a frontier society. It focuses upon the individual in his conflict with the environment and abstracts him from his social role as effectively as Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau had performed that act of desocialization to attain their state of nature.

For the New World was the state of nature. Locke recognized this when he wrote, "In the beginning all the world was America."[1] It was a view shared, as Carey McWilliams emphasizes, by such Enlightenment thinkers as Herder and Blake who believed that by escaping the decadent history of Europe America was a "redemptive land" which promised recovery of the natural state of liberty.[2] This assumed pristine quality infused Rousseau's construct of the noble savage and Robert Owen's new moral world as well. America was mankind's chance to begin again, to rectify his mistakes: America was man's societal tabula rasa. Those fleeing persecution or apathy, and those seeking room to undertake what J. S. Mill lauded as

"experiments in living"[3] were attracted to that wonderous state of nature opening up for subdivision in the American wilderness. And that environment required individuals able to withstand the rigorous demands of frontier existence. Such was the genesis of the myth, however its function was more complex. Like most myths, that of the rugged individual reflects the cherished values of a particular group, and to designate the group is the first step in understanding its social function.

Beard discovered two historical traditions of individualism, "one American, associated with the name of Jefferson, and the other English, associated with the name of Cobden. The former was agrarian in interest, the latter capitalistic."[4] Writing in the midst of the Depression, Beard's view was a jaundiced one. He accuses the capitalist system of seeking to "exalt rugged individualism into a national taboo beyond the reach of the enquiring mind."[5] As early as the 1880s the complex of values known as rugged individualism had come under serious attack; it was then that Richard T. Ely and his colleagues founded the American Economic Association "explicitly as a vehicle for the expression of their views on the principle of the necessary positive role of the state."[6] They too tended to make an identification between the myth of rugged individualism and the reality of 'robber baron' capitalism. Beard's bifurcation of the individualist tradition, however, is suggestive of a more complementary position than he is willing to accord it. The men active in, and represented by, the Libertarian movement were adherents of individualism and of laissez faire, but--and here they vigorously parted company with both liberals and conservatives, past and present--they were opponents of the State as a political system and of capitalism as a social and economic system. These were men of the educated middle class,[7] bourgeois radicals hoisting the banner of laissez faire

against capitalist and 'communist' alike. They were men for whom laissez faire was not a mere economic slogan but a radical program for restructuring society, for solving the 'Social Question' as they understood it.

Radicalism in America has largely been considered a transplanting of European stock, and insofar as this nation is an immigrant culture this appears credible. Traditionally only cursory attention has been paid to antinomian and anti-Statist traditions native to this country. On reading the nation's history it is easy to discern that the "first American anarchist,"[8] Josiah Warren, was a contemporary of Karl Marx, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and John Stuart Mill, although apparently unaware of them or their work in his formative years. While often characterized as an American disciple of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Warren had developed his theories entirely independently and, in fact, had anticipated Proudhon's writings by a dozen years.[9] When Warren first became acquainted with the thought of Mill is a matter of conjecture, it being likely that Mill knew of Warren first. Mill's On Liberty, the work most comparable to Warren's position, was published in 1859, thirteen years after the initial publication of Warren's Equitable Commerce at New Harmony, Indiana. Possibly in a fit of excessive modesty, Mill had eschewed any claim of originality for his work, singling out Heinrich Pestalozzi of Switzerland, William Maccall of England, Wilhelm von Humboldt of Germany, and Josiah Warren of the United States as forerunners of his thesis, noting that "in one passage I borrowed from the Warrenites their phrase, the sovereignty of the individual."[10]

Thus Warren was accepted as representative of an individualist tradition by another writer therein, one whose opinion on the matter must be accorded weight. That John Stuart Mill would have read the musings of

the frontier grocer and bandmaster of the New World is amazing in the face of the physical obstacles militating against it. That he found a kindred spirit in Warren is, however, of even greater interest.

Concerning those other seminal minds of the day, Warren came late to the thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and apparently was never aware of Marx's ideas. But like Marx and Proudhon, Warren might be accounted a radical critic of the State and of its economic system. Capitalism, according to Warren, creates a society which "resembles a large basket of slimy worms, each one wriggling and struggling to get at the top rather than be crushed at the bottom."[11] To alter such a condition, a revolution was necessary, a radical restructuring of the social and economic orders; a restructuring in line with the principles of individualism, liberty, and their synthesis in voluntarism and non-coercion.

The term "radical" in its political and social application is ordinarily interpreted as a critique which "goes to the roots" and is not satisfied with pruning the branches. The nineteenth century had witnessed a veritable explosion of radical social thought, both European and domestic, a crop of social theorists which had put forward a series of answers or approaches to the Social Question.[12] The Question concerned the existence of extremes of poverty and wealth, the continued survival of hereditary privilege, and the perpetuation of unearned riches and irresponsible power.

John Stuart Mill's stricture--"If all mankind minus one were of one opinion and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind"[13]--has been honored more in the breach than in the observance.

The "social question" for individualist thinkers presented special

problems. The question thus became that of how to protect the particular from being engulfed by the general; how to insulate the heterodox from the blandishments and sanctions of orthodoxy. In short, how to balance the needs and the "rights" of the individual against those of the social collectivity? Thinkers as diverse as Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and John C. Calhoun have inveighed against the stultifying results of a tyranny of the majority, inquiring whether democracy in fact freed the individual from the arbitrary authority of a cultured elite only to subject him to vulgar whims of the uncultured.

The Libertarians--also refered to as left-wing individuals, individualist anarchists, and philosophic anarchists[14] in general may be designated "anti-democratic" but it must be kept in mind that "elitism" is not the only alternative to "democracy." Democracy, as the Libertarians in their recurrent fascination with language point out, refers to rule-by-the-many. The opposite of rule-by-the-many is not rule-by-the-few, but rather rule-by-none, or anarchy. The Libertarian abhorred democracy as a strictly political value, preferring to redefine it in terms of equal access to skills, equal right to offer labor as a claim for value received, and an equal right to the preservation of the private sphere from invasion.

Josiah Warren believed that the basis for all conflict was traceable to the false principle of union, or the joint ownership of goods and rights which properly belong to an individual. He described individuality as "the Practice of Mentally Discriminating, Dividing, Separating, Disconnecting Persons, Things, and Events, according to their Individual Peculiarities."[15] Only when these conjoint objects have been parsed to their particularities is it possible to build upwards to social interactions. Order and harmony are predicated upon the principle of individuality, just as the order

of a tool chest or a mailbag is based upon a separation of objects by individual characteristics. Majority rule, according to Warren, "might be the best expedient; but it is only an expedient, a very imperfect one--dangerous when great interests are involved, and positively destructive to the security of person and property, from the uncertainty of the turning of the vote, or of the permanence of the institution resulting from it."[16] Therewith any argument for political democracy is ruled in violation of individual sovereignty in its 'union' of interests. This artifical coincidence of interests resulted in the creation of an artificial agency to execute those needs, the State. But Libertarianism was more than a repudiation of the State, it represented a refusal to accept Authority. The only justifiable basis for action was voluntary, and constraints on such action must be voluntarily accepted; therefore all decisions tending to inhibit, prescribe, enforce, legitimize, or structure action must be examined and never be accepted uncritically.

This stark evaluation of all authority and its corollary refusal to accept orthodox certification procedures led these radicals into strange environs and coupled them with even stranger fellow-travellers. The intellectual milieu they inhabited was a wild and merry melange of fad and esoterica. In both Europe and America the nineteenth century was a time wherein the hidden dimension of man's behavior--the psychological--seemed to force its recognition upon mankind. Its eruption was part of that complex known to history as Romanticism, emerging roughly with the maturation of the generation born about 1770.[17] It represented, as Soren Kierkegaard--one of the early critics--noted in his journal of 1836, an overflowing of all boundaries.[18]

Art in that era began to reflect sweeping changes as the mathematical

precision of Bach gave place to the passion of Beethoven and to the frenzy of Paganini, Liszt, and Berlioz. Meanwhile, the novel of manners was displaced by the Gothic tale, and the graceful classicism of Houdon and Canova was supplanted by the craggy and seamed bronzes of Degas and Rodin. On canvas the surge of impressionism, primitivism, and realism eroded the hold of the hitherto fashionable masters like David and Ingres. Orthodoxy and the classical had been placed in doubt and rationalism was challenged.

It was an age conceived in revolution and nurtured in madness--an age wherein Mill's mental exhaustion was simply a pale reflection of the Weltschmerz which afflicted its gifted, e.g., Nikolaus Lenau, Gerard de Nerval, Caspar David Friedrich, Robert Schumann, Johann Christian Friedrich Holderlin, and Friedrich Nietzsche. It was a tumultuous age whose talented men grappled with a world whose center no longer held, where Byron and Shelley appeared to court death and Lermontov and Pushkin fell in duels: an age in which Schlegel and Goethe contemplated suicide; in which Chateaubriand and Lenau actually attempted it; and in which Caroline von Gunderode, Mariano Jose de Larra, Gerard de Nerval, and T. L. Beddoes successfully attained that self-imposed final sleep.[19]

While the turbulence and the pessimistic strain were predominant in the latter half of the century--a time when Victorians were particularly prone to "plagues of the nervous system and the psyche,"[20] a "time of much sexual fainting"[21]--the early Romantic period was one of greater optimism. Science and technology raised great expectations and a rash of quasi-scientific enterprises such as spiritualism, phrenology, and animal magnetism vied with monetary reform, temperance, and free love as vehicles for the coming perfection in human affairs.

"Men do not put off the old before the new is ready," wrote V. L.

Parrington about this era as it manifested itself in America, "and if in those credulous years they turned romantic and refused to heed the counsels of experience, it was because the soil had been new-plowed for the growing of such crops as their fathers had not known."[22] This plowing of the soil had resulted in the recovery of America as El Dorado. The greater the decadence of Europe and its ennui or despair, the more redemptive America appeared.

Even in America, it was a time, as Emerson noted, when "the ancient manners were giving way...The key to the period appeared to be that the mind had become aware of itself...The young men were born with knives in their brains."[23] Accepted manners, accepted rates and conditions of social change, accepted definitions of success were overturned, or at the very least subjected to a rare and often brutal re-eosluction. Expanded suffrage, literacy, and civil liberties, the passing of feudal privilege and mercanitilist economics, all these paved the path for the 'self-made man' and the 'rugged individual.' By the end of the War of 1812, again according to Parrington, the Older America, a nation "static, rationalistic, inclined to pessimism, fearful of innovation, tenacious of the customary," gave way to a "shifting, restless world, youthfully optimistic, eager to better itself..."[24]

Traditional inhibitions were reevaluated and social conventions often flouted. The Romantics, according to one historian of the phenomenon, "laid the greatest stress on...peculiarity, or simplicity, and therefore made more allowances for the rights of personality."[25]

Josiah Warren reflected many of the developing themes of his day and his particular pursuit of freedom was defined in terms of just such rights of the individual and of his personality. Placing great confidence

in science, Warren seemed to place equally great confidence in the ability of man to rationally utilize it for his benefit. The consequence of his belief in competent man drawing upon a stock of reliable information was a faith in the activity of social technology, or in deference to the modest social complexity of the age, the activity of social tinkering.

Regarding Warren's early life, his family, and his background, facts are sparse. He was born in Boston in 1798--although until quite recently even these rudimentary facts were uncertain, and the month and date of his birth remain unknown. Although his writings are intensely personal, and occasionally even anecdotal, they slight the historical man in favor of the ideas and experiments with the ideas of the questing social reformer. He mentions, for instance, his children in the appendices to Equitable Commerce, but they are simply brought in as subjects of his pedagogical and equitist experiments; he neither names them nor describes them--other than noting that one was a daughter, the other a son.

His wife, Caroline Cutter Warren, is not mentioned in his books, although we know that she remained in New Harmony when he relocated East, although, again, he provides no explanation why. Neither does he refer to his childhood family, although his mother lived until 1853 and his brother George predeceased him by merely two years. Whether his brother was likewise an outsider to the society of his day and whether he supported or opposed Josiah's experiments is simply unknown. What is known, however, suggests Josiah's class and social background. His grandfather was a captain in the Revolutionary War and his family could trace its origins to both Pilgrim and Puritan stock, descended as it was from Richard Warren who arrives at Plymouth Colony in 1820 on the Mayflower, and from John Warren who disembarked from the Arabella at Massachusetts Bay in 1830.[26] Warren's

reticence about his family and himself is remarkable, but in the absence of any corroborative data it must remain simply that, remarkable. Having remarked upon it, the safest course is to return to matters about which fuller information does exist.

What is certain is the fact that the nation was suffering through a process of disruptive and throughgoing change in this era. The locus of economic power in the New England states had been shifting from shipping to manufacturing: in 1789 the volume of United States shipping had been 200,000 tons, increasing in 1810 to 1,425,000 tons. The War of 1812, however, forced the poorly protected American shipping industry to a grinding halt as Britain assumed full control of the sealanes. The introduction of cheap imitations of Chinese trade goods by the French and the supplanting of Chinese tea by Brazilian coffee both purveyed by British traders further weakened the Yankees hold on maritime commerce.[27]

Meanwhile cotton and slavery planted their roots ever deeper in the southern economy, while a third region, the Western frontier, different from but peopled by expatriates from both New England and the Plantation South began to make itself heard. With the conclusion of the Revolutionary War the frontier had cut through Western New York and Pennsylvania, and thereafter moved westward in quantum leaps. By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century the frontier line was drawn through the wilds of Ohio and Indiana. It was this frontier which still attracted the adventurous and the desperate, in the process of skimming off some of the volatile and destabilizing elements of American Society.

The census of 1800 had placed the population of Indiana at about two hundred and fifteen persons, while Ohio had just begun to be settled by intrepid New Englanders. In that year over a thousand settlers arrived

in the Western Reserve of Ohio creating thirty-five new communities. A band of neighbors, a portion of a town, even an entire church congregation would pack up in the East and transport itself to the Ohio frontier. Plymouth, Norwalk, and Greenwich signal attempts to replicate the familiarity of their Connecticut namesakes on the Ohio frontier. Most of Ohio had been opened for settlement upon the conclusion of a series of Indian treaties, culminating in the Treaty of Greenville in 1784. Within twenty years however the ceded land had been settled and the remainder of the Ohio territory, including the Western Reserve, thrown open as bad times in the increasingly mechanized seaboard drove the dissatisfied Westward.

Migration from New England had been trickling to the frontier since 1781. The pressure of population growth in Connecticut and Massachusetts especially had contributed to this "yankee exodus."[28] In the decade between 1790 and 1800, the population of Massachusetts rose from 96,540 to 151,719--that of Connecticut leaped from 141,885 to 234,460 in the same period. The following decades saw additional factors contribute to emigration. The region's economy had, because of the harsh and barren nature of much of the soil, been founded upon commerce, shipbuilding, and fishing, enterprises which from the Revolutionary War through the War of 1812 had foundered. With the cessation of hostilities, the region's economy struggled to revive with manufacturing at its center. But this too operated to drive New Englanders to the frontier.

The simplicity of life and the sense of control over one's destiny which constituted an essential element in the eighteenth century liberalism of Thomas Jefferson was threatened by the growing mechanization of industry, the spread of wage labor, the increasing specialization of labor, and other consequences of the development of large scale manufacturing in the nineteenth

century.

Facing such a changing social universe, Warren took the route of his Puritan and Pilgrim forebears, and broke with a settled and regulated society in order to tackle a new and still unconquered environment. In 1819 Warren and his newly acquired wife set out for the frontier of Cincinnati, Ohio.[29] There he taught music, led an orchestra, and in good Yankee fashion tinkered with machinery, inventing in 1821 a lard-burning lamp.[30] Setting up a small factory Warren appeared on his way to solid respectability and financial security when, in 1825, he attended a lecture by Robert Owen. Warren was so taken by Owen that he offered his assistance in drafting the constitution for Owen's proposed colony. Not content with proffering mere verbal encouragement, Warren sold his factory and, with some nine hundred others, moved to New Harmony to personally participate in the experiments. After less than two years, disappointed, Warren returned to Cincinnati.

While Warren was always respectful of Owen himself - calling the experiment a product of "the purest philanthropy and the greatest stretch of ingenuity"[31] he nevertheless believed the community a failure because of a basic flaw in Owen's social thought: rather than collectivizing property and conjoining responsibility, Warren thought the community should have been predicated upon individualizing. It was this communalistic fallacy, Warren was certain, which had doomed New Harmony. He saw the problem as being twofold: first the principle of common ownership which destroyed individual responsibility and second the awesome reputation of Robert Owen which together with his need to control the community had led to a colony so dependent upon its patron as to be too crippled to survive his absence.[32]

As a devout believer in environmental determinism, Owen believed it necessary that he possess the means to manipulate the social environment of his community. He had written: "Any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large, by the application of proper means; which means are to a great extent at the command and under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men."[33] Because of the circumstantial and happenstance cause of men's character, Owen believed it hypocritical and cruel to hold individuals responsible for their actions. Idleness, poverty, and crime "each of these is the effect of error in the various systems prevalent throughout the world. They are necessary consequences of ignorance."[34]

Such an ignorance, he affirmed, could be eliminated by environmental manipulation. Owen proved this to his own satisfaction by modifying environmental factors at New Lanark. Wishing to undertake a community-wide experiment he bought the colony of Harmony in Indiana from the Rappites, complete with homes, shops, churches, and distilleries, for $125,000--a cost of approximately one half of Owen's personal fortune.[35]

Within the first year, however, separatist tendencies flourished in the refurbished colony and splinter groups spawned their own communities. In spite of the schisms as New Harmony, the enterprise inspired imitative experiments elsewhere,[36] none of which lasted longer than three years. William Maclure, self-made man of wealth and Owen's principal associate in founding New Harmony, offered an epitaph for that undertaking similar in tone to Josiah Warren's: "the materials in this country are not the same as the cotton spinners at New Lanark, nor does the advice of a patron go so far."[37]

Warren's experiences meanwhile had led him to other ideas. Like Rousseau on the road to Vincennes or Saul on the way to Damascus, Warren described his experience as "a sudden flash of light upon our past errors" leading him to "new principles! to new views, and new modes of action." But these new principles were not, for prudential reasons, immediately adumbrated in public. Aware of the role of the village idiot Warren sought empirical authority for his new ideas before presenting them to a larger audience. Looking back at events from a quarter century later, he confessed that it was due to a cautious distaste for "being accounted 'insane'" that he refrained and chose rather to "work them practically out, step by step, silently watching and studying their operation and trust to results from making an impression upon the public mind."[38] In May of 1827, the same month that the New Harmony Gazette admitted failure of that communal experiment, Warren opened his first Cincinnati Time Store with $300 worth of dry goods and groceries. Standing on the corner of Fifth and Elm Streets, it was christened the Time Store by customers because of its unique basis of exchange. This store with its strange method of exchange represented Warren's first step in a practical application of Libertarian principles, his first social tinkering.

Influenced by Owen's formulation of a labor theory of value, Warren believed that a person should be compensated for all of his labor, but for nothing else. Thus interest was usury and profit amounted to financial vampirism. To illustrate his theory, Warren constructed his store with large open shelves displaying his wares, and prominently displayed bills of lading indicating the price paid for the goods. Any customer desiring a commodity had only to pick it out, and pay its cost to the storekeeper--plus a percentage (ranging from 3 to 7% at different times of Warren's

career) to account for shrinkage and overhead. The storekeeper, however, must be compensated separately, not in accord with the amount of groceries purchased but in terms of the amount of time he spent serving the customer. Warren required that the storekeeper's salary be compensated in labor notes, thereby perpetuating his experiment. The rationale for this two-fold compensation is of course the principle of atomistic individuality. "Disconnection of the two elements of price," Warren explains, and "making cost the limit of each, works equitably for both parties in all cases, and at once puts an end to the haggling, the deception, frauds, and every other disgusting and degrading feature of our pecuniary commerce."[39]

The Time Store was more than simply an exercise in cooperative merchandising. Currency speculation, bank failures, and the plight of imprisoned debtors were not unknown on the frontier. For Warren, currency was an arbitrary mark of wealth, a paper surrogate for commodities which could only be purchased through labor. If labor generates wealth, debtor's prisons could be emptied immediately leaving only the infirm and the aged as objects of charity. To eliminate this wastage of debtors' labor and to prevent specie speculation Warren initiated the exchange of labor for labor. Thus it was that the labor note made its debut in Cincinnati.

Warren's labor notes specified that the signator owed the bearer, upon demand, a designated amount of his labor, e.g., "Due to Josiah Warren, on demand, thirty minutes in carpenter work - John Smith."[40] As Warren explained the justification of this innovation:

> A note given by each individual for his own labor, estimated by its cost, is perfectly legitimate and competent for all the purposes of a circulating medium. It is based upon the bone and muscle, the manual powers, the talents and resources, the property and property-producing powers of the whole people--the soundest of all foundations, and is a circulating medium of the only kind that ever ought to have been issued. The only objection to it, that it would

> immediately abolish all the great money transactions of the world--all bribes and bribing operations--all stock-robbing, money corporations, and money investments--all systems of finance, all systems of national policy and commercial corruption--abolish all distinctions of rich and poor--compel everyone to live and enjoy at his own cost, and would contribute largely to restore the world to order, peace, and harmony.[41]

It was with these labor notes that the customer was required to pay the storekeeper for his time, an arrangement which lowered the price of Warren's goods well below that of other merchants in Cincinnati, attracting attention to both his store and his ideas. It also meant that all of his customers became, to some degree, caught up in his experiment through their exchange of labor notes. Furthermore, producers depositing items with Warren to be sold had an option of taking goods of equal cost or of accepting Warren's labor notes in payment.

Warren also posted "Supply" and "Demand" notices. The 'Report of Demand' sheet listed specific needs expressed by his customers, while individuals with services or commodities for exchange constituted the supply. One of Warren's lifelong objectives was what he called the levelling of supply and demand. By this Warren meant not the sophisticated economic concepts, but simply the correlation of services and skills available with the expressed desire for them. The financial ability to purchase services and commodities essential to the more technical economic concept of demand is irrelevant for Warren. His is an exchange situation wherein purchasing power refers to an expressed desire backed with the capacity to offer labor notes.

Yet another public service which Warren provided was the regular distribution of notices concerning skills, trades, and new techniques - something akin to a combination agricultural extension service and a Whole Earth Catalogue. This had the added advantage of permitting free access

to skills which the institute of apprenticeship sought to monopolize.

Warren's Time Store prospered, within a year doubling in capacity and converting a neighboring merchant to the "equity" principle, as Warren called it. But he was not interested in enlarging the business and it remained a one-man enterprise until the end. Nor was Warren interested in remaining a merchant. In May of 1830, three years after its inception, Warren liquidated his first Time Store. For over a year he had been entertaining the thought of commencing an entire community built around his equity principle. Robert Dale Owen, son of the New Harmony patron, and Francis Wright, radical reformer on a multiplicity of fronts, were now ensconsed in New York City editing the Free Enquirer, successor to the New Harmony Gazette. They had encouraged Warren to return East with a promise of financial and material assistance for a new communal experiment. With their encouragement and with the optimistic opening by others of three Times Stores in Philadelphia in 1828, Warren put off his plan for an Ohio colony and kept his Time Store open for a third year while he, Owen, and Fanny Wright laid plans for the Eastern experiment. The plan mysteriously fell through, however, and was never revived. Warren then shut down his Cincinnati Time Store and reactivated plans for acommunal venture in Ohio.

While planning his community, Warren had spent nearly a year at a manual training school administered by five erstwhile Owenites at Spring Hill, Ohio. Warren convinced them to introduce labor notes and the equity principle of cost in their lessons. Here, in accord with his earlier attempts to level supply and demand, Warren began a vigorous crusade to destroy the institution of apprenticeship as an immoral and arbitrary depressant of supply. He undertook to teach the twenty-five children of Spring Hill skills which were protected, or monopolized, by the apprenticeship system.

Apprenticeship together with the institution of child labor represented, for Warren, a means of exploiting both child and adult - the child because he was paid a fraction of an adult's wage for the same work and the adult because his labor could readily be replaced with that of a child. Warren's opposition to both forms of exploitation took the form of demanding equal pay for equal work, regardless of age or sex. As to the latter he estimated that "at least one half of all the pursuits now monopolized by men, can be quite successfully performed by women, who are now confined by custom and craft to one or two pursuits, in which competition has bound them to beggary and starvation."[42]

Warren's mechanical tinkering had in the meantime resulted in a cheap printing press and a stereotyping process which facilitated and greatly reduced the expense of his propagandizing efforts. In January of 1833, seven years before the publication of Pierre-Joseph Proudon's What is Property? the first anarchist paper in America[43] was published, a four page weekly endeavor which lasted less than a year and was called The Peaceful Revolutionist.

The title is explained by Warren's understanding of the nature of the press. Printing, he asserted, is "indespensable to reasonable and peaceful changes in the condition of man."[44] Man was to be made free through his understanding, through reaching his mind and informing him of the conditions that exist and those which do not, but might. Warren's press, like the journalistic work of later Libertarians, served as an instrument of social reform. "Public influence," he observed a century before the advent of survey research, "is the real government of the world."[45]

Warren's desire to try out his equity principle on a community-wide scale however remained unabated and his disappointment over Robert

Dale Owen and Fanny Wright's proposal having come to naught was but a temporary setback. He had already purchased a tract of 400 acres for the Ohio experiment, probably in the low-lying Tuscarawas River Valley--the exact location is a matter of conjecture because Warren did not wish sensation seekers or a variety of social misfits to innundate his small experiment. Beginning with but six families, the community at first showed signs of promise in terms of Warren's social theory--a mill was constructed with voluntary non-interest bearing contributions and operated on a co-operative basis, and the community elected no officials. However, within two years the community began to disintegrate, due not to social and economic factors, but rather to the lack of foresight in selecting the location. The first summer saw half the adults disabled with malaria, and the following winter found influenza mortally affecting some thirty families in the community. Warren himself left the experiment in 1834 or 1835, although some hardy souls clung to the land for another two years; many had invested their entire savings and could not so easily uproot themselves once again.

In spite of the disaster, Warren had on the whole, been encouraged by the experiment. He returned to Cincinnati, and left there for New Harmony in 1837 after selling his home to Fanny Wright. However he returned to Cincinnati again in 1839 to continue work on a high speed press capable of printing three to four thousand single-size impressions an hour. It was the fastest press on the frontier, and quite likely the fastest press in existence until the "Hoe Revolving Machine" which claimed eight thousand impressions per hour was introduced in 1845.[46] Warren's press was shipped to Evansville, Indiana for use in publishing the Southwestern Sentinel of that city. For the next two years Warren commuted from New Harmony to Evansville to repair the continually sabotaged press; for the

typesetters were also impressed with its efficiency - which they carefully and continually sought to inhibit. Tiring of the situation, Warren dismantled the press and took it to New Harmony using it for his own purposes.

Back in New Harmony, Warren attempted to conduct a "labor for labor seminary" in 1840 along the lines of the Spring Hill Training School. While the undertaking lasted a scant four months, of interest is that the two primary texts in that curriculum were Robert Owen's Essays on the Formation of Human Character and Alexander Bryan Johnson's A Treatise on Language.[47] After the demise of this "seminary" Warren left for Cincinnati only to turn up at New Harmony once again the following year to open his second Time Store. This enterprise consumed the next two years of Warren's efforts, and when he thought he had sufficiently proven the soundness of his principles (and incidentally lowered the price of commodities in New Harmony) Warren, in March of 1844, closed his shop. His intention was now more grandiose than mere cooperative merchandizing. He had hopes that the success of the New Harmony Time Store would encourage the development of a mutualist or equity community around it. However the disinclination of the Harmonists to engage in another utopian venture combined with what Warren felt to be the willful exclusion of his ideas from the newspapers spelled failure for this aspiration. Warren had come face to face with the fact that while utopias are invented by men of great imagination, they are--all too often--peopled by persons of little or no imagination.

Undaunted, Warren opened his third Time Store, his second at New Harmony, on February 16, 1847. Once again the Time Store was to comprise the locus of an equity village, and in furtherance of this goal Warren sought to sell lots of land surrounding the store. The land was purchased, according to Warren's biographer, William Bailie, with $7,000 Warren had

received from the sale of his stereotyping patents.[48] But, once again the disinclination of others to undertake the social experimentation led to despair and Warren sold his holding, after little more than two months of operation.[49]

Warren by now had clearly given up any idea of reforming society solely through the agency of the Time Stores; he had realized that such enterprises required a benign environment in which to flourish and if begun otherwise served only as a form of propoganda by example. "They," affirmed Warren, "were started only with the view of bringing principles to test, trial and criticism, and to set them before the public in a practical, demonstrated attitude, previously to forming model villages."[50] The same month saw the publication of Warren's ideas in a small book entitled Equitable Commerce, a book which set the basic premises of the Libertarian school of thought. Two months later Warren while picking up the pieces of the defunct Flourierist Clermont Phalanx, convinced the remaining colonists to undertake his equity principle, resulting in the second consciously anarchist community on the frontier. The community was known alternatively as Trialville or Utopia, and was constructed near the remains of the Clermont Phalanx about thirty miles outside of Cincinnati. Eighty lots of a quarter acre each were laid out for home building, and sold for $15.00 with a maximum of two lots to any buyer. The cost of the lots was set so as to cover the cost of their purchase and the labor of their surveying: a cost which was to remain at the set price until all lots were sold, to prevent land speculation. In accord with the right of individuals to choose their own associates, new settlers could be admitted only through invitation from one of the original members.[51]

Warren revived The Peaceful Revolutionist and published the second

edition of Equitable Commerce there. Labor notes were instituted, and a Time Store opened, although it is unclear whether Warren or some other resident was responsible for its operation. However Warren's active participation in the community lasted somewhat less than a year, at which time he undertook a lecture tour expounding the doctrines of Equitable Commerce, citing the success of Utopia or Trialville as proof of their practicality. Warren returned to the community in May of 1848 and again in the winter of 1855-1856; his optimism for this experiment never waned and despite his involvement with Modern Times, Utopia remained for him the undiluted proof of his principles. As late as 1875, original settlers of Utopia remained on the land, although the community was by then known as Smith's Landing.

After three decades of toiling in the hinterlands of Ohio and Indiana, Warren had returned to Boston in 1848, and with only brief visits thereafter to the sites of his earlier experiments--especially New Harmony where his wife remained--he spent the remainder of his life in the East. Warren returned to a Boston "where everything strange and improbable was then herded."[52] Here he met the American disciple of Proudhon, Colonel William B. Greene; and here he came into contact with the writings, musings and activities of a number of other native American radicals: Stephen Pearl Andrews, Ezra Heywood, Lysander Spooner, Edward Kellogg, Joshua King Ingalls, and, ultimately, Benjamin Ricketson Tucker. Here too, flourished the avant garde, a milieu in which the distinctions between reformer, utopian, fool, madman, and charlatan were poorly defined. Indeed one of the things which bound the habitues of this region together was a repudiation of the orthodox certification process. In this milieu the issues and historical figures are curiously jumbled. Like the intellectual and quasi-intellectual Libertarian milieux of more recent years, this vaguely delineated but broadly tolerant and highly intercommunicative environment attracted a diversity of

intellectual and aesthetic types with shared critical attitudes toward orthodoxy. Victoria Woodhull and Wendell Phillips evoke divergent images of this underground world, as do the ideas of free thought and free love, spiritualism and phrenology. Inventors, writers, poets, speculators, malcontents, social deviants, and the outright bizarre were here attracted to one another. Once the orthodox certification process was rejected, "bizarre" as a value judgment virtually disappeared and a wide variety of issues were taken seriously by purposeful and intelligent persons, issues which the orthodox world had certified as false, irrelevent, trivial, or nonsensical. This was the environment which nourished cranks and heretics, and it was here that Warren the simple musician, grocer and social reformer henceforth made his home.

That Josiah Warren was both an atheist and a spiritualist is worthy of attention in this context. Warren's repudiation of authority and hierarchy on the basis of his individual sovereignty meant that he also therefore rejected any ordering of saints, cherubim, seraphim and multiple godheads. In this he manifested an affinity with his disciple Benjamin Tucker in the latter's controversy with Henry Appleton over defining anarchy. Both Tucker and Warren rejected submission to authority although neither subscribed to a positivistic atheism. Warren accepted the reality of a realm of spirits and supernatural forces while Tucker's metaphysical values were embodied in aesthetics: each retaining a highly personal system.

Spiritualism must be seen first from the perspective of Warren's day, and secondly from that of his social milieu. While most mainstream Christians consider spiritualism heresy and false doctrine, it was not--by the ground rules of the game--ridiculous or absurd: it was simply erroneous. It was wrong in the same way that Baptists thought Catholics

wrong, or Presbyterians considered Mormons wrong, i.e., within the same realm of discourse but simply mistaken.

Spiritualism emotionally served as a bridge between religion and science. By seeking to ground the supernatural in the evidence of the senses, by making the supernatural understandable and responsive, spiritualism was in fact functioning as crude science - collecting and categorizing data. Spiritualism furthermore permitted a range of hypotheses about the nature of the supernatural which bracketed the concept of God. Spiritualism properly understood stands to contemporary parapsychology of the academic realm just as Warren's then pet hobby phrenology stands to contemporary psychiatry.

This emphasis is not meant to exaggerate reason or to underplay the crank nature of the man. Ironically the two are related. Warren gave up a successful business to join Robert Owen's utopian experiments, thereafter living as a veritable Johnny Appleseed of radical experiments. Leaving his wife in New Harmony Warren spent most of his remaining life immersed in social reform. He believed in spiritualism and he believed in phrenology but most of all he believed in freedom, individual sovereignty, and their synthesis in Equitable Commerce. He was not a trained thinker and his ideas were a hodge podge of Owenism and domestic radical republicanism. But most relevantly he echoed the trenchant common sense tradition of Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson and Ben Franklin and the Common Sense School as imbibed via A. B. Johnson. It must be remembered that Warren began as a musician, and while his stolid prose reveals little of an aesthetic dimension a man who aspired to earn his livelihood making music in frontier America assuredly reveals the aesthetic in his life work itself.

Certainly Warren was a crank, as were Stephen Pearl Andrews, Lysander

Spooner, and Benjamin Tucker. But crank, as Saul Alinsky reminds us, is "an object which makes revolutions."[53] "Crank" is also a socially-defined category, as are insanity and genius. The three categories are often difficult to separate either analytically or experientially, and succeeding generations may shift the definitions and categories of their predecessors. By the standards of our age Warren rates as a crank, by those of his own day he was undoubtedly less so--and those cases wherein his peers labelled him crank might appear to contemporary man to be for the wrong reasons.

Warren was an atheist and a spiritualist, because together they permitted man to preserve an entire realm of experience while retaining an empiricist allegience. In this respect Warren and the more sophisticated spiritualists, rather than being viewed as cultists might be seen as primitive pragmatists undertaking what William James later investigated in The Varieties of Religious Experience. For Warren spiritualism allowed an afterexistence compatible with individual sovereignty, it necessitated no presumption of a superior being.

Phrenology was another fashionable belief of the day, especially among the educated and striving bourgeoisie and one to which both Warren and Andrews subscribed.[54] Horace Greely had penned a series of articles for his New York Tribune suggesting phrenological examinations to determine the fitness of railroad trainmen.

Phrenology bears a similar relationship to psychology as astrology does to astronomy. Each was the fumbling beginning of a new science. Phrenology was more than the superficial fondling of a lumpy head, the "bumps" being analyzed had both a logical and physiological rationale. From the understanding that the brain interpreted and controlled both

information and behavior, and that these functions were localized in specific lobes of the brain, it was a simple and apparently logical inference that the quality of the behavior was affected by the quantity of the lobe--enlargement thereby producing a bulge in the cranial covering. As the author of a recent study of phrenology suggests,

> the science of one generation is the pseudoscience of the next... In its own time phrenology, like Freudianism, was a serious, inductive discipline, accepted as such by many eminent scientists, doctors, and educators; its aberrations were the results not so much of charlatanism or credulity as of the limitations of early 19th century scientific method and medical techniques. However mistaken some of its anatomical deductions may have been, scientific it was in its determination to study and mind objectively, without metaphysical preconceptions.[55]

The last line of the quotation deserves emphasis. Without metaphysical preconceptions it could be put at the service of reformers of varying epistemological schemes. For phrenology was a reform and not simply a carnival entertainment. Phrenology was granted predictive power because it was believed to be descriptive of actual relations between mental and physical structures. This tended to lead to the assumption that with a little advance in technology prediction would lead to control. American optimism and pragmatism embraced a science wherein the means conditioned the end being pursued.[56]

A few major points must be emphasized concerning phrenology: first it was seen as scientifically and intellectually respectable by persons of unquestioned intelligence and sobriety in its own day; second, it appealed to a vast range of adherents but all may loosely be characterized as bourgeois--the very scientific pretensions and rationale determined this; and third, it was usually found to be part and parcel of the general

radical and reform movement. As an example of this last point, it ought to be noted that Fowler and Welles, the promoters and merchandisers of phrenology to the mass market, also published The Water Cure Journal as well as Stephen Pearl Andrews' texts on phonology. Through this latter connection it also published many of the polemics of the Libertarian movement.[57]

The introduction of phrenology and spiritualism, as well as animal magnetism,[58] thus represented early fumbling attempts at investigating the unconscious and the supernatural with the tools of an infant social science. As an aside, one might suggest that like 'crank', 'science' is also historically defined. The scientists of generations past may appear quaint or bizarre, the same mind containing incredible insights and fantastic absurdities. The scientific quest for the philosopher's stone, for the elixir of life, and the attempt to square the circle were honored in the past but are unlikely to win a National Science Foundation grant in the present century. Two former items are of importance in this context. First, as suggested above, the socially-generated definitions of crank, genius, and scientist[59] are vague and overlapping, but yet firmly anchored in the consensus which these deviants ignore. As T S Eliot expressed it in Family Reunion

> in a world of fugitives
> the person taking the opposite direction
> will appear to be running away

The average person may recognize Cagliostro, Mesmer, and Einstein as special and exceptional characters, but he might be hard put to categorize them according to type. Even should he succeed subsequent generations may well amend his evaluation. The dripping Archimedes running naked through the streets, Roger Bacon stuffing a chicken with snow poignantly raises the question: madness or genius?

The second item concerns the instruments and the very definition of science in a given age, and the evolution of that definition. Science begins as trial and error and is predicated upon accumulating and categorizing information in order to make a range of data intelligible by systematizing it. Scientific method itself developed dialectically out of the interaction of the observer and the world-observed. Its formalization accumulated and became more sophisticated as the preliminary rude matters of the discipline were settled. The average twentieth century sociologist is likely to be able to present a relatively intelligent summary and critique of the work of his forebears Comte, Spencer, and Durkheim, whereas a contemporary physicist might be puzzled, amused and outraged by the antics of his predecessors. Men who stake out a territory in the intellectual or social realm may suffer from many disabilities but the lack of heroic imagination is not to be counted among their faults.

Warren had staked out such a territory, he was going to tinker with the mechanics of the social order. The metaphor is apt--tinker and mechanics, Warren's universe was that of Newton's clockwork and the Enlightenment's faith in inevitable progress--to bring the two into accord the tinker was necessary.

Tinkering with Language and Society

The highly regarded ability to fiddle about with the innards of things stereotypically attributed to Americans constituted an essential component of Warren's social endowment. He tinkered with musical notation and printing presses, with techniques of vocational education and of merchandising, and with language; but most importantly of all he tinkered with social organization. Post-Enlightenment confidence in man's capacity to restructure his social and political life coupled with the rude but proud belief in Yankee ingenuity may well have contributed to Warren's facile assumption that the social system was as amenable to tinkering as was the cotton gin or the mechanical reaper. "Society is a complicated machine," he wrote, "which will not work rightly in the absense of some of its necessary parts. I propose to supply only such as appeared to be wanting."[60]

In this, Warren the pedestrian author must have been considerably more than a pedestrian individual. A musician, an inventor, a social critic, and a grocer, Warren was all of these and more--but in each of these categories he made innovative contributions, in each he pursued his pragmatic tinkering. The tinker is both a social and a psychological type and as such manifests trenchant observations about the world in which he moves. To tinker is to manipulate parts of an instrument or of a system in order to enable it to perform its appropriate task. To marry the concept of political radical to the psychological type of the tinker is to describe a malcontent, and one who is certain that modification of the system will result in a different--and hopefully better--situation. To tinker is to have a belief in cause and effect. It is also to possess a confidence in

one's own capacity to effect change, and to deny a limit on such change by any superior fiat. The tinker is the applied empirical scientist, and Warren was a tinker with unbounded confidence in the possibility of intentional change. This belief helped provide the courage to stake his reputation, his livelihood, and, apparently, his family on his success at tinkering. Warren was a petty-bourgeois radical, but not one removed from the fray. Warren thought, lived, worked, and wrote from the various scenes of the social struggle of his day and from within that rich milieu of cranks which nurtured him.

From an objective viewpoint Warren was not only a crank but a failure. But not in his own terms, not in the process of creating a social science. The scientific method entails the testing of hypotheses wherein a negative result is not a "failure" but is rather one of the two possible successful conclusions of an experiment--the only failure is a consequence of an inconclusive result. Warren saw his efforts as experiments, "they were started only with the view of bringing principles to test, trial, and criticism, and to set them before the public in practical, demonstrated attitude, previously to forming model villages..."[61] The villages were in turn to demonstrate the social applicability of his theories which would impress society at large to copy them. This common quality of science and radicalism has been captured by a contemporary writer: "for a revolutionary, failure is a springboard. As a source of theory it is even richer than victory. It accumulates experience and knowledge."[62]

Thus radicalism in this sense is also incremental. In Warren's case the image toward which change is focussed is absolute individual sovereignity, but the stages of attainment are incremental, predicated upon education in two forms: (1) the practical demonstration of social

principles via time stores and equitable villages, and (2) the propagation of ideas through lectures and pamphlets. Warren asserted that "Public influence is the real government of the world."[63] This belief helps explain the preponderance of newspapermen in the Libertarian movement. Warren, Andrews, Ezra Heywood, and Benjamin Tucker all edited journals while Edward Kellogg, William B. Greene, Joshua King Ingalls, were all prolific contributors to the radical press.

In accord with the theory of environmental determinism inherited from Robert Owen, Warren sought to manipulate the environment by acting upon the rational faculties of his fellows. Change was to begin within their heads, thereby making violent revolution superfluous; the result was to be "a great radical, yet peaceful change in the character of society."[64] This is, of course, the major issue on which the Libertarians parted company with many of their radical cohorts, especially the anarcho-communists Johann Most and Emma Goldman. The image of the tinker is relevant here too. To dichotomize two psychological types, we might suggest that Warren approached the social system as a tinker, while others--like Fourier, Saint-Simon, Cabet, and many a soi-dissont Marxist--approach it as programmer. Warren knew the result he wished to attain and began to experiment and gradually to enlarge, refine, and reformulate his doctrine. His moral concern remained constant but the particulars had to be tested in the empirical laboratory of utopian practicality. As an example of the programmer consider Charles Fourier with his intricate hierarchies of series, phalansteres, harmonies, and epicycles, and his neo-platonistic numerology--none of which was ever tested in actuality since Fourier's lunch-time patron never materialized.

A further consideration of importance is the affinity between the scientist and the tinker. Benjamin Franklin was most obviously both, as were Joseph Priestly, Robert Hooke, Isaac Newton and sundry other members of the early Royal Society. As a contemporary intellectual history puts it, "The Royal Society and the Academie Royal had at the outset a strong practical bias; their founders and their Fellows were convinced that science could be useful, and should be planned to be useful."[65]

Josiah Warren sought to be practical. He was a stolid visionary of the petty bourgeoisie, and his social thought appeared largely of a piece with his own life. It might be tidily summarized in the two deceptively simple slogans: "the sovereignity of the Individual", and "cost, not value, the limit of price." This brace of nostrums pervaded and informed the Libertarian tradition, giving it at one and the same time a locus of cohesion and a nexus for controversy. Warren held both concepts fervently and saw no conflict between them for primacy: to him they were equal and mutually derivable. Individualism, of an equitable and mutualist variety, demanded the cost principle, and the cost principle could exist only in a milieu of free individuals. The idea of their colliding in actuality was inconceivable to Warren: it was a matter of "...and..." not "either...or...". While these two principles represent a fair distillation of his thought, Warren himself expanded the formulation in order to spell out the nature of the Social Problem and his particular position in regard to it. Equitable Commerce, Warren's first and most influential work, set out to provide a remedy for the Social Problem at a single stroke. He called his solution "Social Reformation" and it was divided, like Gaul, into three parts: "First, a statement of what we wish to accomplish, Second, the means to be employed. Third. The manner

of applying those means.[66]

Turgidly and meticulously, like a socially-conscious accountant, Warren cross-referenced his little book with coded numbers and letters which all refer back to the inventories of "problems to be solved" and "means of the solution." Reminiscent of a Biblical concordance or the contemporary Syntopicon, Warren's internal reference system in a day before the advent of indices, enables a reader to follow the separate strands in the weaving of his argument. This particular structural tinkering is more than a gimmick, it represents an implicit recognition of the need to demonstrate his position. It's a repudiation of easy victories as he makes explicit elsewhere when he warns the reader, "If I should prove myself right in ninety-nine points in this work, do not, therefore, conclude that I am right in the hundredth without examination and your own sanction: that one point might be the one in which I was wrong or misunderstood."[67] But such an admonition is indicative of much more than modesty or self-deprecation, such an attitude buttresses his argument, for it is itself a recognition of a rational and critical individualism. Like Proudhon cautioning Marx at nearly the same time in Europe, Warren warns his reader against rejecting one orthodoxy only to vow commitment to an alternative dogma.

Put quite tersely, the Social Problem exists because inequity runs rampant. Like justice for Plato, salvation for Augustine, and virtu for Machiavelli, equity for Warren is a portmanteau term for both a philosophic analysis and an organizing principle of society. Equity in fact serves as a non-elitist, ergo non-Platonic, cognate of Justice. Equity with its twin handmaidens of responsibility and equality presents a radical individualist formulation of Justice. The scope of equity can best be

indicated by a recapitulation of Warren's problems and his means of attack upon them. "Society wants," according to Warren

I. The proper, legitimate and just reward of labor.
II. Security of person and property.
III. The greatest practicable amount of freedom to each individual.
IV. Economy in the production and uses of wealth.
V. To open the way for each individual to the possession of land, and all other natural resources.
VI. To make the interests of all to cooperate with and assist each other, instead of clashing with and counteracting each other.
VII. To withdraw the elements of discord, war, of distrust, and repulsion, and to establish a prevailing spirit of peace, order, and social sympathy.[68]

The seven problems really constitute a cluster of interrelated items with an implicit but disguised hierarchy. We may reverse their order, for proposition number seven appears to be the most general and comprehensive of the list and its predessors might be subsumed as partial attainments or intermediate stages in the realization of "peace, order, and social sympathy." In part it was Warren's contention[69] that the resolution of the first six problems produced elements which woven together lead to a resolution of the seventh as well.

The first obligation of a tinker is to know the nature of the machine with which he is tinkering. While it is difficult to extract an epistemology or ontology from a repair man, we can expect him to know the functions of the individual components and the purpose of the system. Repair work on any but the crudest blueprint reading level is rational and analytic, and a good repairman must understand the machine in order to think out alternative modes of operating.[70] Warren saw society as a "complicated machine" with some of its parts missing. His job as repairman was to supply "only such as appear to be wanting." The simple machine-tinkerer dyad is complicated however when Warren continues

"if, indeed, a man can be said to supply that which man never made, but which are as old as the creation".[71] Thus the system exists from time immemorial, and man is both capable of, and responsible for, maintaining it. This suggests that Warren may have accepted a Newtonian clockwork universe, but he immediately drops the topic leaving us uncertain.

What he does not drop, and what constitutes the bedrock of his theory, is the principle of individuality. Warren methodically presents a five-fold means for solving the seven-fold social problem. These five means to a solution of the existing social problem are also basic elements of the new society. They are both instrumental in that they serve to realize a superior society, and absolute in that they set forth fixed principles that characterize the condition to be attained.

It is with the proclamation of five means to a solution of the social problem--Individuality, Sovereignty of every Individual, Cost the limit of price, a circulating medium founded upon the cost of labor, and adaption of supply to demand--that Warren created an original response to the traditional problems of arbitrary power and general social injustice. His ideosyncratically stated description of the seven-fold Social Problem is both ambitious and capable of serving, with little or no modification, as a prospectus for radicals of varying stripes. It is only with his means of solution, not his ends, that Warren markedly diverges from non-Libertarian radicals. The abbreviation of this five point program into his two core maxims--individual sovereignty and the Cost Principle--is not destructive of his theory and in fact represents a shorthand Warren himself used upon occasion. The combination of the first and second elements into "the sovereignty of the Individual", and the

integration of the fourth and fifth elements into the third, the Cost Principle, simplifies Warren's scheme and helps to emphasize its separation from the 'Communists' which he conceived his social theory to combat.

Shaken by the bloodbath of the French Revolution, Warren had sought to illustrate the similarity between the ancien regime and the reign of Robespierre in their common disdain for variety. In Warren's mind the "root of all political and social 'fallacies'" was a "demand for 'unity!' one-ness of mind, 'one-ness of action,' where coincidence was impossible. The demand disregarded all nature Individualities, demanded the annihilation of all variety, and made dissent a crime."[72] He spends page after page quoting the sanguinary account of Lamartine, shocked but drawn on almost in spite of himself. The French Revolution was the great watershed of modern politics. The very concepts liberal and conservative drew meaning from that event, when socialism and mass revolution sprang upon the world radical stage. It was then that radicals, men who professed humane principles and love of liberty, seized power and proceeded to act as vindictively and voraciously as any regime which had preceded their own. To the French Revolution, as to Owen, Warren felt compelled to say Nay! "The true basis for society is exactly the opposite of all this. It is FREEDOM to differ in all things, or the SOVEREIGNTY OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL."[73]

Collectivities, in Warren's theorizing, are objects of confusion. A confused heap of bills, a jumbled pile of letters, a messy toolbox, each requires order, and order results from individualizing the chaotic whole into its specific individual components. The postman sorts through his mail pouch and orders his letters according to their individual characteristics of name and address. The letters of the alphabet and the numbers of the arithmetic system each possess individuality,

i.e., individual meaning, and can perform their function of communication only because of that quality.[74]

One does not understand a jumble or pile. Only by sorting out the miscellany and parsing down to the individual elements can real cognition take place. This is not to deny the reality of group processes or to repudiate the interaction of superindividual forces. Warren readily admits both the systemic nature of society and the dialectical relationship of man's labor and his environment, but he emphasizes the ontological primacy of the individual. He cautions that a complex whole is easier to understand once its constituent elements have been recognized, and that a complex whole must not be mistaken for a moral entity apart from its individual components. No corporate personality or general will must be allowed to confuse the reality that society is but a relationship among individuals. "It is not each other," Warren insists, "but our commerce or intercourse with each other, that we have to regulate."[75] Individuality and society do not occupy points on a spectrum but rather constitute separate stages in a developmental chronology: society necessitates and hence imposes an ordered arrangement of individual members. The significant difference between Warren's brand of social reform and that of most of his socialist rivals concerns the source and method of that ordering. The opposition of individual and society was less stringently insisted upon by Warren than by his utopian socialist counterparts; the very fact that he spent much of his life and effort in working out a utopian community demonstrates his recognition of the necessity of a social setting even for the sovereign individual. He realized the necessary relationship between individual and society, a relationship of central concern for him as it was for Fourier and Proudhon

in France.

Drawing upon his background as musician and bandmaster, Warren illustrated this individualism with his own invention of a mathematical system of musical notation. Music provided a further example of individuality, in that each note must have its separate representation on the score sheet, hence even the apparently seamless sheets of sound which issue from an orchestra may be reduced to its molecular structure. Although a single note repeated ad nauseum is not music, a sounding together of two or more individual notes results in a harmony. But even in the repetition of a single note, individuality intrudes in that tone, tempo, timbre, and accent may vary and provide an assortment of diverse manifestations of the 'same' note. Likewise in regard to the creation of harmony, the union of two notes to create a third sound does not obliterate either of the two primary sources, for the third note cannot be recreated without using the two parent notes. Hence in music discrete notes retain their individuality and remain available either to assert their particular singular identity or to contribute their unique and essential assistance in the creation of a harmony. The contributions of a series of musical notes in sequence rather than simultaneously, creates a melody. Thus musical notes may be found in three diverse settings; in isolation, in a harmonic collusion, and in a melodic succesion, but in each setting the identity of the individual note remains above question.[76]

This methodological individualism was pushed further in Warren's tinkering about with the primitive science of linguistics under the influence of the pioneer American linguist and semanticist

Alexander Bryan Johnson. Warren's interest in Johnson probably dates from 1829 when Warren visited Robert Dale Owen and Frances Wright in New York City.[77] The essence of Johnson's critique of language forms may be stated by the fact that men mistakenly "translate sensible existence into words, instead of interpreting words by the information of our senses...we attribute to nature the generality which belongs to language."[78] For Johnson and for Wright language was conventional, arbitrary and nominalist: it did not matter which word was attached to a particular factum, although internal consistency of nomenclature is necessary. However, once a word has been reserved to describe a class of activities it imposed an artificial unity upon the members of that class. The invocation of the categorical term then evinces an abstract and generalized quality which bleaches out the empirical particularities and peculiarities of the individual members of that category. Men's habits of word application impose an artificial linguistic unity upon a naturally pluralistic universe of 'sensible experiences.' Men tend to invert the 'natural' relationship between the real world and the communicating of information about the real world. Instead of interpreting reality through words, men use their sense data to give meaning to their words. "We must," Johnson insists, "make our senses the expositors of words, instead of making words the expositors of what our senses reveal."[79]

It is this 'oneness' of language which misinterprets the real world. Language's unity consists in its procrustean function of naming: the categorical label then uniformly and interchangeably stands for each and every member of the set. Such one-dimensional unity fails to reflect the sensible facets of the set members: seeing,

feeling, hearing, tasting, and smelling are separate senses and provide diverse approaches to apprehending a thing, and when two or more senses inform man about a particular entity there exists an especially faulty application of one-dimensional category to a multi-dimensional reality.[80] By artificially fusing the diverse elements of a category into interchangable units representing that category, language posits a 'oneness' which exists only on the linguistic level: man's effort to discover that 'oneness' in nature is futile, for the unity is a function of language not of the world of sensible experiences.[81] Milk, snow, typing paper, and salt all share a common characteristic which men call the quality of 'whiteness', however the quality in question is not equivalent in each instance--a closer study of any particular item which manifests whiteness is necessary. The whiteness which unites them into a common category is simply a verbal relationship. Likewise in the realm of truth, the blindman's truth differs from that of the deaf-mute with vision, as both differ from that of one who enjoys the full sweep of all his senses. The categorical label of Truth which encompasses these separate entities is also a unity created by language rather than one merely reflected by language. The unity of language must constantly be tested against the evidence of sensible experience.

This linguistic nominalism passes into Warren's social thought where the radical separation of complex wholes into basic building blocks suits his purposes well. His critique of collectivism is predicated upon a semantic analysis, and his lifelong rejection of Statist centralism rests upon his distrust of linguistic ambiguity and the arbitrary ability to give meaning in such ambiguous contexts:

> ...words are the tenure by which everything is held by law, and words are subject to different interpretations, according to the views, wills, or interests of the judges, lawyers, juries, and other functionaries appointed to execute these laws. In this uncertainty of interpretation lies the great fundamental element of insecurity which is inseparable from any system of laws, any constitution, articles of compact, and everything of this description. No language is fit for any such purposes that admits of more than one individual interpretation, and none can be made to possess this necessary individuality; therefore no language is fit for the basis of positive institutions. To possess the interpreting power of verbal institutions, is to possess UNLIMITED POWER![82]

Each person, holds Warren, has the right to interpret language in the light of his own individuality: therefore each social compact has potentially the same number of interpretations as it has constituent members.

Influenced by the claims of animal magnetisn, Warren writes "as electricity seems to be the life-principle of the Individual, so this Individuality seems equally to pervade every thing, and to be the life principle of society."[83] This atomistic individualism leads to a subjectivist psychology. Verbal predicates will be apprehended differently by different auditors. "The word Individuality furnishes an illustration of itself," he continues,

> It assumes different significations in different cases. We sometimes use it as a substantive, sometimes as an adjective, sometimes as a verb. Different persons understand it differently in either form; and the same person will understand and appreciate it differently at different times, according to different degrees of development and different states of mind, under different circumstances. Such is the indefinite diversity that will spring up out of the pecularities or Individualities of persons, times, and circumstances, when the word is used; and this diversity is inevitable.[84]

At this point Warren's methodological individualism is transformed into a moral individualism: "Responsibility must be Individual, or there is no responsibility at all."[85] However language is a social instrumentality,

it exists for the purpose of communicating concepts to other sentient beings. Therefore one cannot choose to idiosyncratically interpret linguistic communications without reference to a consensual scheme--that is, one may not, like the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland opt for the position that "words mean what I say they mean," not at least if one wishes to understand and be understood by other language-users. Warren admits to conventional basis of rules, hypothesising that an idea concerning safety or personal security gains general acceptance on the basis of its beneficent application and not because of its source in noble or parliament. The idea and not the suggestion is the governor: "Although the lead or the governing power must be an individuality, it need not necessarily be a person. It is sufficient that it is an individuality; that is, notwithstanding that thousands accept the suggestion, it has but one meaning to any, and to all; and hence its success as a regulator."[86]

But how can an idea that has "but one meaning to any" be reconciled with its expression in a language system which is "subject to different interpretations, according to the views, wills, or interests..."? The limitations of language for Warren, as for Johnson, are twofold. First it fails fully and adequately to communicate the information it seeks to, and second it communicates more than it is entitled to. Language is asked to do too much, both to facilitate sociality and to substantiate methodological individualism. Not every individual does or could interpret words differently: confusions, reifications, connotations, emotive freight, and outright ignorance might cloud the crystalline purity of the verbiage, but the divergent meanings will reflect classes of interpretations

and not milliards of examples of personally unique responses; otherwise communication resolves itself into verbal onanism.

Thus language which is meant to reflect the world and facilitate communication about it, usurps a generative function. "Individuality," Johnson affirms, "is characteristic of nature."[87] This is the core axiom of Johnson's critique of language and a point of basic affinity with the young Libertarian movement. Of the nearly one billion human beings alive, he reasoned, no two were identical.[88] Johnson makes a slightly less extreme claim regarding the diversity of nature: he admits of a greater approximation between entities.[89] Human vocabulary, however, is not infinite. It cannot refer to the myriads of beings and actions as unique facts: it must group and generalize within the scope of a viable communications system, therefore the unique facts in nature are compressed by a language which by necessity deals with generalizations. After sufficient usage, the human mind forgets that it is speaking of generalizations due to the constraints of grammar and not as a pure reflection of reality. This ritualized use of language causes men to confuse the unity of language with the plurality of reality--in short to substitute an identity of language for a diversity of sensible experience.

This verbal trick is facilitated, according to Johnson's rather broad innuendoes, by man's search for certainty. "Failing to discover in nature the identity which language implies, but believing that it must exist somewhere in nature, we mistake it for a mysterious property of creation."[90] If man is looking for an identity in nature which language implies, language must precede the search for identity. And if language precedes the search for identity, the search cannot create and generate the language. Except that language is an evolutionary creature and

might enter a dialectical relationship with the psychological motivations of the quest for certainty. Man believes that this linguistically generated certainty truly exists and therefore makes of it an assumption in his theory of nature: "we interpret the natural identity by the verbal."[91] As Warren applied Johnson to his own interests, he discovered that the same is true of the social realm. "Words are the principal means of our intellectual intercourse, and they form the basis of all our institutions: but here again the subtle individuality sets at naught the profoundest thoughts and the most careful phraseology. There is no certainty of any written laws, or rules, or institutions, or verbal precepts being understood in the same manner by any number of persons. This individuality is unconquerable, and therefore RISES ABOVE ALL INSTITUTIONS." Elsewhere, Warren abbreviated the concept by noting "Different interpretations of the same language neutralize all institutions founded on words."[92] Thus the mistakes of social organization result from the fallacious aggregation of individual entities under a collective categorical term and their rectification is possible through the creation of an environment capable of fostering and nurturing the natural diversity of individuals. Warren had an unbounded faith in reason and decency, seeing evil as not a positive force in the world, but simply as an instance of error-error capable of correction. As an environmental determinist he saw evil as pathology. The biological nature of that phase suggests an alternative simile for Warren, that of the doctor interested in healing the sick social organism. The preceding discussion of science applies to its subset medicine as well: Hippocrates himself would be unlikely to pass a twentieth century certification

necessary for practicing medicine. Beginning as a folkart, medicine was an early integration of religion and science in the person of the shaman. Home remedies have survived for centuries and 'unorthodox' methods of medicine have prospered accordingly. Again one is impressed by the multiplicity of ways in which Warren, like many other denizens of the radical milieu, broke from the socially accepted mainstream of bourgeois life. The crank like the radical refuses--at least in selected instances--to accord deferrence to either certification or certifying agencies. Lysander Spooner's obituary fondly recalls his refusal to allow the medical doctors to examine him, and James L. Walker blamed the medical profession for complications which eventually led to his death. The denial of authority in one arena of life makes it easier to deny it in others as well, and fools and revolutionaries mingle freely. Henry Appleton, Benjamin Tucker's associate editor,later to be his adversary, explains this situation: "What we Anarchists are after is to strip clergymen, doctors, lawyers, landlords, and capitalists of license (monopoly of privilege), and put them on their merits. We are anti-license men, and that is why we cry liberty. The fullness of liberty is the extinction of license."[93]

The extinction of license embraced by Appleton is, of course, the repudiation of certification. Licenses necessitate an authority capable of passing judgment upon those to be licensed, and further implies a code of conduct or procedures to be adhered to. Such a condition is flatly contradictory to the principle of individual sovereignty wherein the individual has the absolute right to engage in any activity subject only to responsibility for his behavior. But this responsibility was

never intended by Warren to be construed as the fiat of a certification agency. Rather responsibility was to manifest itself in the particular reactions of individuals or in their collected reactions expressed through the market place. But in either case, the sovereignty of the individual remained the basic analytic unit.

Individualism

Individualism served as the bedrock upon which Warren's social thought rests. It formed an essential component of the post-enlightenment zeitgeist. The gains in individual security and in the legitimization of rank, e.g., Napoleon's carrier ouvert aux talents, operating upon the basis of attainment rather than privilege were yet recent and fragile, and now the forces of reaction and the heralds of socialism both appeared to Warren to threaten this precarious advance in human civility. Reflecting the widespread influence of the Scottish School of Common Sense,[94] Warren grounded his theorizing in an appeal to the moral sense. Man was not trained to a moral sense like a dog trained to fetch, but was instead given the opportunity to develop a sense which pre-existed. While it could be corrupted or stunted and even rekindled, this moral sense could not be created. At first blush, this axiom appears to be at loggerheads with the Owenite residue of environmental determinism. Like his mentorRobert Owen, Warren believed that men were victims of their social organization--this presumption has generated sizable radical and socialist traditions of system designing, both practical and utopian.

But if a man is a mere product of his surroundings and his very identity as a saint or scoundrel an environmental accident, how can he posit an innate moral faculty? Warren himself apparently did not perceive the anomoly and his works take no note of it. One can either take it to be an example of a logical absurdity or make an attempt to reconcile the

two concepts. Assuming that Warren meant to hold both notions, and since both were used to buttress his argument while their contraries were seen to undermine it, it can be assumed that he did mean to hold both. One could suppose that the effects of environmental determinism worked upon the innate moral sense: a brutal and brutalizing environment might pervert the moral sense and a decent one might nourish it, although in neither case is a moral sense created.

Warren's environmental determinism, derived as it was from Owen and Godwin, was what William James called "soft determinism." It is the view stated by, but certainly not endorsed by, Sir Isaiah Berlin as the doctrine

> I am free if I can do what I wish and, perhaps, choose which of two courses of action I shall take. But my choice is itself determined; for if it were not it would be a random event; and these alternative exhaust the possibilities; so that to describe choice as free in further sense, as neither caused nor random, is to attempt to say something meaningless.[95]

As Berlin points out, soft determinism, fully as much as its hard-core sibling, rubs out of relevance any notion of moral responsibility. What is, must be--and in a world of unenforcibility, morality loses its credibility. Thus like a Calvinist unsure of election, Warren accepted the "scientific" dogma of determinism while acting as if he were responsible for his behavior.

He predicated individualism as a social theory upon the "indestructibility or inalienability" of the individual personality. The "instinct of self-preservation," according to Warren, "is its own authority, from which all others are derived."[96] In Libertarian parlance self-preservation both delimits the range of acceptable behavior and stipulates the appropriate response to a breach of those limits.

Warren acknowledged that "the legitimate sphere of every individual has never been publicly determined,"[97] but he ventures to define this area nonetheless as one which would encompass "his or her person, time, property, and responsibilities."[98] From this stipulated individuality grows the ABSOLUTE RIGHT of its exercise, or the absolute SOVEREIGNTY OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL... This Individuality is unconquerable, and therefore rises above all institutions. To require conformity in the appreciation of sentiments or in the interpretation of language, or to require uniformity of thought, feeling, or action where there is no natural coincidence is a fundamental error in human legislation--a madness which is equivalent to requiring all to possess the same countenance or the same stature.[99]

Since individualism is a definitional component of the human being and hence natural, it is also universal, i.e., attributable to all human beings. Being both natural and general, individuality fosters equality; individuality being qualitative and not quantitative, and being evaluated subjectively from within, it may be found in diverse manifestations all equally legitimate. This premise was to resurface with the introduction of Max Stirner a half-century later.

With Warren, however, this subjectivity was less abrasively put.[100] He had already pronounced individualism to be the principle of order, harmony, and progress[101] thereby equating coercion with disharmony and social conflict. "Giving full latitude to every experiment (<u>at the cost of the experimentors</u>), brings every thing to a test, and insures a harmonious conclusion...Compulsion, even upon the right road, will never be harmonious."[102] The moral sense is rooted in individuality,

it is manifested in toleration of others and respect for their sovereignty. The basis of society is not in social contract but in convention.[103] But convention both explains the nature of rules and robs them of their absolute quality thereby bring Warren perilously close to utilitarians and pragmatists as a calculator of possible outcomes. However the absolute is smuggled back into the situation because Warren insisted on 'self-sovereignty' as an instinct of every living organism, a quality which could neither be alienated nor separated from that organism.[104] This instinct however mustsurvive the buffeting forces of the environment. Since the relationship of the individual and his social world cannot be prescribed ahead of time, as Warren recognized when he proceded to stipulate the components necessary to the individual or private sphere, he insisted that "we can invent nothing higher than expedients; or, in other words, we place all action upon the voluntary basis."[105]

Warren's moral sense, as well as the rest of his social thought, is deeply rooted in his particular notion of individuality--a notion which contains the corollary premises of sovereignty and hence of absolute inviolability, of reciprocity, and of voluntarism.

While Warren may fairly be termed an 'individualist' in his approach, it is not quite adequate merely to assert that individualism, i.e., the freeing of the individual from externally imposed restraints, comprises his moral goal. While it is true that individualism usurps most of Warren's attention and the complementary Cost Principle is even presented as the economic manifestation of the sovereignty of the Individual, this mutes an essential point in Warren's moral framework: individualism is praised and its detractors assailed not merely because

individualism has been abrogated but rather because individual sovereignty itself will solve the ills of social life, its insecurity, its exploitive character, and its enslaving institutions. From the set of problems which Warren chooses to attack and the set of weapons which he selects for carrying on the battle, one can recognize that individualism functions as an instrumental value in the attainment of a still higher value, although for Warren individualism constituted a definitional adjunct to the latter.

His inventory of problems can be stripped to the skeletal frame of three moral goals: liberty, security and justice. While it is possible for the three concepts to be in conflict in specific contexts, they may be so interlinked as to be mutually supportive. Warren defines liberty in terms of its contrary, coercion, i.e., man is free when he is not coerced, and coercion is the invasion of that private sphere of "person, time, property, and responsibilities," Hence liberty consists in control over the private sphere, but more than that it manifests itself in a mutually-modifying interrelationship with the demands of the social realm. "Warren's omnipresent modifier to the principle of individual sovereignty--the willingness to take responsibility for one's actions, to accept the 'cost'--takes cognizance of this social dimension of freedom. Freedom thus entails the acceptance of individual responses to one's actions when those actions affect the private sphere of others. The intersection of these private spheres is the social realm, and it is Warren's concern to maintain both the private and the social realms as preserves of voluntarism, as areas recalcitrant to the artificial unity of the public, i.e., the political realm. It is in this sense that the simplistic definition of individualism noted earlier ("the freeing

of the individual from externally imposed constraints") is relevant.

Coercion occurs where two individuals, two principles, or two factions come into conflict because of a confusion or wrongful fusion of their rightful private spheres. "Two leaders cannot lead--the lead must be individual, or confusion and discord will be the result."[106] Government is coercive because it undertakes to arrange, value, and regulate a plenitude of relationships, and because these relationships are probably the manifestation of the private or the consequence of a series of private actions expressed in the social realm. The conclusion for Warren is obvious, dismantle the public: "We can dispense with government only in proportion as we can reduce the amount of public business to be managed."[107]

The only justification for any public business, in Warren's purview, is the creation and preservation of security--the ground upon which any future social order is predicated. Ironically, security is threatened by the very pursuit of security. The orderliness of society is threatened from within by the decay of equitable relations among its members, and from without by the greed of other social systems. Each represents an invasion of individual rights, and each is undertaken to insure security for others. The institution of equity as the basis for exchange would obviate these causes of depradation. Warren insists that "the primary object of large accumulations of property is for future security. If the future is secured without it, no such accumulations would be thought worthy of pursuit."[108]

Baldly stated, Warren conceives of security as a component of what Isaiah Berlin has termed negative liberty, i.e., security for a free man is the unmediated and uncoerced exercise of his liberty: he is secure insofar as no artificial and superindividual collectivity or agency exists

to restrict this liberty. On the other hand, Warren understands the 'communist' concept of security to refer to the creation of a social space wherein the material needs of social interacting entities are satisfied in order to perpetuate the collectivity, i.e., perpetuation of the social system takes precedence over individual self-realization. This difference is derivable from, but is not coextensive with, the dichotomy of negative and positive liberty.[109] For while negative liberty restates the laissez faire principle of radical individualism, positive liberty is exemplified by, but not restricted to, the 'communist' model. If positive liberty be understood as a genus, the 'communist' system-oriented example may be viewed as a constituent species of that genus; but the genus itself stretches into a problematic gray area between our polar types of individual and collective. Positive liberty as a commitment to the creation of the conditions of freedom, rather than a belief in the mere elimination of intermediary coercive institutions, has relevance to the concerns of Libertarians as well. While the institutionalization of a statist bureaucracy for the attainment of freedom is held inconsistent with the goal being pursued, the need to create and not merely to discover a condition of freedom is admitted. Warren and Andrews in their colonizing and propagandizing efforts demonstrate this, as does Tucker in his Fabian approach to social reform and civil liberties protest groups. Even such an extreme individualist as Max Stirner admitted the utility of a Union of Egoists.[110] Unless one wishes to abolish the division and specialization of labor, necessary interrelations and interdependencies are bound to permeate society. The inability to provide the full range of goods and services needed to sustain life leads man from a Robinson Crusoe existence into an emergent economic system. The difference between the socially-aware Libertarian

and his collectivist rival is not in the necessity to create the conditions of freedom but whether liberating goals can be attained via coercive methods. "To be perfectly harmonious," explains Warren, "all interests must be perfectly individual..."[111] The individual is ontologically fundamental and prior to the combined or collective entities, and Warren sought to remove all doubt as to the nature of that relationship,

> The State, the society, the institutions, the body politic, the nation, the system or customs we live in, must not be permitted to become primary, they must be secondary!...Human institutions must not rise above Humanity: Man must not be distorted to fit institutions, but institutions must be made to fit man![112]

The Libertarian position flowing from Warren is that liberation is won by individuals, it cannot be given by a governing body, a vanguard party, or even a diety, and that it is best gained by acknowledging that each is responsible for his own actions--a position which is restated more emphatically with the advent of Max Stirner's influence in Tucker's thought. This individual responsibility is the moral core of Libertarianism, insofar as a man abandoned his individual responsibility he would begin to prey parasitically upon the mutual responsibilities and equitable relationships of others. As his condition of apostasy becomes know he, of course, would lose access to these situations and the sanction of the community would make itself known in a severing of the voluntary relations which had contributed to his material well being and to his sense of worth as reflected in the esteem of other free men. On this point Warren manifested a time-honored position on sociality. The ancients had well understood the power of ostracism, the Church the threat of excommunication, and modern man the finality of outlawry and a 'displaced person' status. Hence the voluntary community of free individuals advocated by Warren appears to be founded upon the most fearsome of man's lengthy and sophisticated

inventory of sanctions.

Liberty and security are joined by a third value, one which is often used to 'justify' the former two, Justice. Why should individuals pursue Individualism or collectivities seek to maintain themselves? Because it is 'right' or 'just', the bridge between right and just being in their common meaning of appropriate or condign. So in the means-end chain, the link of justice is superior to the links called liberty and security. But if justice is the higher value, as in Plato, what if it should transpire that justice required unequal rewards, distributive justice, or even slavery; equality collides with liberty, and as a result security is at an end. The Libertarian might opt for the possibility that the exercise of libertymight conflict with equality, or he may choose to conjoin liberty and equality so that no conflict is permissible. The third option is simply to repudiate the individualist attachment to the primacy of liberty.

The egoists take the first option, and the Libertarians in the Warren tradition take the second. For the latter, individualism is definitionally the just system, its justice adheres in the manner in which 'individual' and justice are complementarily defined. The individual is the basic unit of analysis, from which other social groupings are mere combinatory forms with no additive element. The mutal respect of each unique individual for the liberty of his fellow is just; and the sundering of social ties to cast the apostate into the shadows is also just.

But this somber aspect of equitable justice ought not to be overstated. The power of the environment to mold human behavior in Warren's theory, meant the inculcation of equitable principles on a pervasive level.

The refusal of anarchism to abjectly defer to authority of any nature illustrates its open-ended quality: there can be no final authority

because there can be no final rigidified end. Collectivists state their goals in terms of realizing the perfect, or at least the better, community. Such a focus on structure and organization begets an emphasis upon formal models and rigidly imposed social blueprints, whereas attention to the multiplicity of free and spontaneous actors in a given situation gives emphases to diversity, accommodation, and reciprocity.

Warren undertook a radical analysis of society; an analysis in the technical sense of "the resolution or breaking up of anything complex into its various simple elements..." He broke up the complex society and resolved it into the simple elements of individual beings. Like Hobbes, Warren held that a man cannot alienate"his 'inalienable right' of self-preservation or sovereignty by joining the military or any other combination..."[113] Here, if not obvious before, one sees the eclipse of security as collectively defined, and the priority of liberty as individually defined. However, the relationship has been exposed here, the individual cannot alienate his sovereignity since it is an essential part of him. He could choose to fight, he might choose to obey orders, but he never permits another to expect his continued obedience. He may opt for a passive role in each instance but the option is a fresh one at each occurrence and in no way constitutes a predictor of future options for obedience. The core of Warren's thought about interdependence is powered by an absolutist concept of voluntary association. Security for the Libertarian can only result from freedom of each individual to make all decisions for himself, to be free of external compulsions. But security also requires material comforts and therefore social relations. To bridge these, to accommodate liberty and security, and to do so in accord with justice, the necessary social relations were to be conducted entirely on the basis of voluntary

association. Free men must be free to leave.

Implicit in Warren's theory of social organization is the paradigm of the market place. Virulently anti-capitalist, Warren nonetheless supported laissez faire market principles as essential logical extrapolations of his view of the individual. Social organization would be voluntaristic and in accord with the prerequisites of the market, a model which was endorsed because it provided a maximal arena for individual action and decision. Government, he concludes, results when the combining of individual interests in a collective undertaking fractionates and a third party is needed to settle the property rights: "thus, in united interests government originates."[114] The means to avoid government is to refuse such collective undertakings, and only voluntary contracts understood alike by all parties are admitted to legitimacy: all other agreements are "null and void, because they (the parties to the agreement) have not consented to the same thing."[115]

And agreement upon the nature and form of social organization is the crucial question of political thought. The question of the mutability of social organization has been the bane of social reformers, utopians, and writers of speculative fiction. By setting any potentially concrete situation as a goal to be attained, a finite concept of human nature is implied. For upon attaining that point men will be in utopia, and the question arises, then what? Will men aware of living in the final or most perfect stage of history appreciate their good fortune or will they be bored and contentious? Writers of utopian works have rather consistently underestimated man's capacity for boredom. Once the key to utopia has been reduced to a structural change, then, no matter how difficult and how unlikely it may be, that structural modification is likely to be made

by someone, somewhere. Writers of utopian works have consistently underestimated man's capacity for innovation as well, but then innovation is simply the dialectical twin of boredom.

What Warren has accomplished in his theory of social organization is to omit any concrete and thus rigidifying goal-structure. As he relates in his first book, in the course of twenty-five years of study and experiment Warren had discovered 'individualities' which were "so deepseated, so subtle, and hidden, that they pass undetected by common observation."[116] The connection between the private and the social realm is emphasized again when he asserted "Our remedies and securities against social evils are (in part found) in our knowledge of our own natures."[117]

The understanding of human nature and of physical nature which Warren operated on were such as to foster the activities of a social-minded tinker and to implant a firm disavowal of any imposed pattern which would deny the right of like-minded sovereign individuals to tinker with social organization in the future. This is not to assert that Warren's thought was devoid of any social, political, or economic structure. The relevance of <u>laissez faire</u> as both slogan and principle indicates that voluntarism was of primary importance, and that it was a short hand description of a social relationship capable of supplanting more coercive means of social cohesion. The agency of this voluntaristic interaction was the Libertarian market place. For Warren the market was the means of a voluntary exchange of equivalents, and as such it constituted an arena of free activity--or liberty. On the other hand, the capitalist marketplace, at least as Warren depicted it, existed only in order to separate the customer from his money as quickly as possible. It was the individualist premises of Libertarianism which fostered an explanation of the market as based upon cooperation and

complementary interests, while capitalism predicated its market mechanism upon competition between atomistic and self-interested parties.

This cooperative element in Warren's thought was evident in his continuing pursuit of a communal setting for his social principles. A concern which led him in 1851 once again--this time with the assistance of his recently acquired disciple and systematizer, Stephen Pearl Andrews--to attempt yet another such venture.

The railroads in their mid-century headlong thrust westward had left neglected pockets of untouched land in the East. Now, with the linking up of sizable population centers via railway lines, some of this neglected land became accessible. The building of the Long Island Railroad had opened up nearly half a million acres in the 1840's and in January of 1851 Warren and other believers in his theories began the settlement of "Modern Times," a scant forty miles from New York City.

Modern Times comprised a tract of 750 acres on Long Island. The town itself consisted of some 90 acres of the total. Lots, as at Tuscarawa and Utopia, were sold at cost, about $20.00 an acre, with three lots in town the maximum.[118] The initial contingent of settlers were preselected to insure ideological and personal compatibility. All future prospective settlers, as at Utopia, were to be screened by the original ten buyers before admission to the community. This check had fallen into disuse however when an article in the New York Tribune precipitated a "rush of people, ignorant of the principles upon which the enterprise was prefaced: among those were some that were full of 'crotchets!' each one seeming to think that the salvation of the world depended upon his displaying his particular hobby."[119] Indeed the subsequent notoriety of Modern Times may be traced to the penchant of two distinct sets of these persons to

to display their particular hobbies.

From within the community, Dr. Thomas Law Nichols and his wife Mary Gore Nichols, publicized their melange of food reform, water cure (hydropathy), women's rights and sexual freedom, with public attention naturally focussed on the last concern. Dr. Nichols had become fascinated by the social theories of Fourier, the Rev. John Humphrey Noyes, and of Josiah Warren, moving to Modern Times in 1852 to devote his efforts to proselytizing for his American Hydropathic Institute and for his notion of "spiritual affinity"--the latter of which translated into the popular press as "free love".[120] His wife, Mary Gore Nichols, a truly liberated woman for her era, having been denied the profession of medicine had gone on to immerse herself in a variety of unorthodox and hence unlicensed methods of health care: water cure, vegetarianism, animal magnetism, mesmerism, phrenology, and free love. She broke her marriage to her first husband, Hiram Gore, when he forbade her to write or lecture on such topics.[121] These two were largely responsible for the public image of the community. An image fostered and reinforced by that second group of hobby-riders--Horace Greely and Charles A. Dana, editors of the New York Tribune--who were, incidentally, keepers of the flame for the faltering Fourierist movement in America.

Upon the publication of the third edition of Warren's Equitable Commerce in 1852 (now introduced and edited by Stephen Pearl Andrews) the Tribune had seen fit to give the work an uncomplimentary review of considerable length and detail. Although unsigned the article is believed to have been written by George Ripley, former head of the Brook Farm Association.[122] The news columns of the paper now dutifully and in detail served the salacious public the spectre of unmarried persons cohabiting, of women appearing

publicly in bloomers, and of diverse and sundry forms of moral and social degeneracy in thought and deed. The contemporary image of Modern Times, and that of even more recent studies,[123] as a menagerie of cranks, fanatics, and social misfits is undoubtedly at least partially accurate. However a more fitting description might be one applied by Lindsay Swift to Brook Farm, "...the Republic of lovable fools."[124]

Along with Warren's theories of equity and labor notes, a sensible and humane touch of the community illustrates its particular brand of non-exploitive individualism: along the public highways of the vicinity the residents of Modern Times planted fruit trees to provide refreshment for travellers.[125] And in accord with Warren's ideas of environmental determinism and individual responsibility the community boasted neither court nor jail.

Warren had initiated yet another newspaper at Modern Times. For four years beginning in 1854 The Periodical Letter was the voice of the journalistically embattled community. Warren remained in the community until February 1863, before moving back to Boston. But his heart stayed with his creation and as late as 1872 in his Practical Applications of the Elementary Principles of True Civilization to the Minute Details of Every Day Life, he spoke enthusiastically of the community and bitterly of what he felt to be unfair and sensational attacks upon it for its tolerance of the bizarre behavior of a few--a toleration necessary by the very principle of Modern Time's founding. The community however, changed its name to Brentwood in 1864, after the birth place in England of Dr. Henry Edger, the introducer and popularizer of Auguste Comte in the United States. Ironically Edger had also in large part been responsible for the demise of Warren's ideal of Modern Times, his pseudo-religious and thoroughly

authoritarian brand of positivism representing the antithesis of Warren's notion of affective community. Edger had even entertained the ambitious scheme of converting Long Island into a separate state of the Union with Modern Times as its positivist capital.

Although Warren continued to talk of other ventures, and even made a few gestures as if to begin again, the demise of Modern Times marked the end of colonization as a Libertarian strategy. With Greene, Spooner, and Heywood attention shifted to organizing radicals and carrying on pressure for change within the developing industrial milieu, while Tucker clearly broke with Henry Appleton over this very issue, thereby sending it into the dark for over half-a-century.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of Modern Times was that it failed according its own ground rules. Freedom, Warren pointed out, was available at cost, i.e., one had the right to do whatever he was willing to take responsibility for. The creation of Modern Times was an example of that "language of experimental action" which Warren had earlier prescribed.[126] Hence as a particular manifestation of freedom it must be subject to the constraints of experience since "among all the works of mankind there is nothing higher than expedients."[127] The simple and unfortunate consequence of Modern Times, the 'cost' of its freedom, was the reaction of the press and the public of New York City. The sovereign individuals, insofar as their rights to manifest their sovereignty was concerned, were subject to the reactions of others sharing the social universe. That public opinion in a community forty miles distant could sabotage the opportunity for experiments in social organization merely underscored the fragility of Libertarian society in an unreconstructed world.

Even before the eruption of the Civil War, Warren had recognized

that the creation ofa Libertarian society was beyond the reach of "ordinary means."[128] Therefore he sought extraordinary means through the 'dis-union' of interests, the separation of rights, and the individualization of responsibility. Modern Times had been an attempt at structurally attaining his goal and with its failure community building de novo was abandoned.

This, of course, was a bitter disappointment for Warren. He had believed that his principles were practical, and he had approached reform as a tinker approaches machinery. His own life had been committed to a belief in the feasibility of social change and to its attainment through the peaceful means of the Time Store and the trial villages. Even in his more morose period during the Civil War, Warren reaffirmed the need for actual experimentation--"A correct stand taken now on the firm and secure ground of universal principles, ever by a few humble men and women, may result in unspeakable blessings to the future race and even to the present generation, as well as to themselves immediately."[129]

With Modern Times in ruin and the union in tatters, Warren returned to the topic of social reform in 1863. Now he dropped his pedestrian prose to thunder forth like a Jeremiah. The question at this time was not simply one of structural change to facilitate a utopia, but of the salvation of a collapsing moral order: reflecting the wane of the Romantic era, its transformation from an exuberant optimism to a cynical pessimism, Warren the Tinker resurfaced as angry Messiah. True Civilization, published in that year, offered a program to end the fraternal slaughter then engaging the attention of the nation's youth. In Equitable Commerce, he had mounted an unremitting assault upon governments which, he concluded, "have shed more blood, committed more murders, tortures, and other frightful crimes in the struggles against each other for the privilege of governing, than society ever would or could have suffered in the total absence of all govern-

ments whatever."[130] The history of the State has been, in Libertarian thought, a chronicle of invasion and coercion, and a progressive crusade of deprivatization. For "in their blind and besotted wantonness [governments] presume to regulate the most sacred individual feelings."[131] The private must be protected, for where it is invaded or eroded and made public, there can be no security for the individual.

Since the introduction of the polis and the res publica into the conceptual schemes of pre-modern man, the public, the private, and the social have roiled over one another--sometimes colliding like billiard balls, at other times appearing to coalesce or to overlap like Venn diagrams. Warren sought to protect the sphere of the private, but it was the public--not the social--that he repudiated. As an environmental determinist Warren recognized the social construction of the individual; he understood man's definition of himself through the perception of others (i.e., 'cost'). Man's self-knowledge was dialectical, for while he had sensible awareness of himself he filtered interpretations through the reports of others. It was this socially developed view of man's individuality which Warren believed protected his doctrines from the charge that he demanded too much virtue or rationality from his sovereign individuals. He was convinced--as a result, he tells his readers, of twenty-five years of investigation and experiment--that his theory was practical as well as moral, and that it was grounded in the character of human nature and the social universe. "The individualities about which I speak," wrote Warren, "are so deep-seated, so subtle, and hidden, that they pass undetected by common observation; and almost defy scrutiny itself; and yet, as electricity seems to be the life principle of the Individual, so this Individuality seems equally to pervade everything, and to be the life-principle of society."[132]

Far from being a distortion or limitation of human capability,

individuality was a fact of human nature. "Our remedies and securities against social evils are (in part found) in our knowledge of our own natures..."[133]

But Warren's perception of human nature had darkened by the publication of True Civilization. Then he was outraged at the bloodshed and the spiralling savagery unleashed by the War, a war wherein we kill "those who belong to the wrong clan, or those who rally under the wrong flag! and those who wont (sic) think and do right, and who refuse to join in our chorus....We are at this moment in the midst of barbarism."[134] With the war came the suspension of habeas corpus, the draft, and the centralization of the economy through the collusion of commercial suppliers and military purchasers and through the necessity of wartime regulation. In the face of such events, Warren suggested that the military could restore order out of the ugliness of fraternal conflict. The fratricide could be ended with the recognition by both the North and the South that the only legitimate role of any government is that expressed in the Declaration of Independence. Warren quotes that document as prescribing the "inalienable right to Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness...and it is solely to protect and secure the enjoyment of these rights unmolested that governments can properly be instituted among men."[135]

The realization of the principle of sovereign individuality would cause the North to recognize the right of the South--or any section, or set of persons--to secede, and it would enable the South to discern the rights of those persons enslaved in its society. Then the military--not as a conquering army, for they did not win the war but rather succeeded in ending it--would create the conditions for a restructed society. It would be a military created solely for the defensive purposes Jefferson outlined in

the Declaration, and organized like an orchestra. The simile of the orchestra was more than a homely allusion to Warren's career as musician, it was meant to serve as a model whereby individuals may attain a collective goal, for "no subordination can be more perfect than that of an Orchestra; but it is all voluntary."[136] For like an orchestra, the military "would be within but not under discipline."[137] Here, for the first time, Warren seriously mentions as a justification of government "the reconciliation of obedience with freedom."[138] This introduction of obedience as a relevant concept marks a significant change in Warren's thought. The rending of society had obviously distressed him, Modern Times had not lived up to his expectations and its subsequent notoriety had embittered Warren. Now, although government "strictly and scientifically speaking, is a coercive force," Warren drew a Rousseau-like inference that "a man while governed with his own consent, is not governed at all."[139] But, like Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat, Warren's imposure of the modern military is but a "transitional stage of society from confusion and wanton violence to true order and mature civilization."[140] Individuals, however, even here retain their sovereign right to act freely. Government is simply "a last resort, a final umpire to decide between expedients when the right has been rendered impossible, but it does not rise above absolute human rights, and it is rendered safe by being dependent on the voluntary action or sovereign will of those who are required to execute any decision."[141]

With True Civilization, Warren approaches the position of the limited state Libertarian rather than the pure anarchist. He had seen with what power and finality the State could invade the lives of its citizenry and his mind, too, apparently flashed with images of life as "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."[142] However, Warren died without seeing his

desired social reforms manifest, and with his demise the experimental phase of Libertarianism largely passed away as well. Propaganda by the word henceforth was to increasingly supplant propaganda by the deed. The denouement of the age--as well as that of the Libertarian movement--was tidily summed up by Parrington: "The New England conscience," he observed, "was tired. It had borne the burden and heat of a long day and was glad to be released from its cares to set up monuments to its sacred dead and to write the chronicles of its past."[143]

Footnotes

1. John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government (New York: Mentor Books, 1963), p. 343.

2. Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 170.

3. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1910), p. 125.

4. Charles A. Beard, The Myth of Rugged American Individualism (New York: John Day Co., 1932), p. 21.

5. Ibid., p. 6.

6. H. S. Gordon, "Laissez Faire," International Encyclopedia of Social Science, VIII, 548.

7. E.g., Warren, Andrews, Ezra Heywood, George Schumm, John Beverly Robinson, James L. Walker, Stephen T. Byington, and Benjamin R. Tucker were newspapermen; Robinson and Tucker were also engineers. Heywood, Greene and Joshua King Ingalls were ordained ministers, Spooner and Andrews were lawyers, while Colonel Greene was a West Point officer.

8. William Bailie, Josiah Warren: The First American Anarchist (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, 1906).

9. Herbert L. Osgood, "Scientific Anarchism," Political Science Quarterly IV (March, 1889), 2.

10. John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 179f.

11. Josiah Warren, True Civilization, (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967), p. 74.

12. Beginning in the midst of the Eighteenth century with the birth of William Godwin, a bumper crop of critical theorists and radical activists had appeared; including Marx and the Left Hegelians, the French socialists and utopians, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Cabet, Blanqui, Babeuf; and the anarchists Proudhon, Bakunin and Stirner. This fecund era produced a veritable avalanche of political and economic reformers, revolutionaries, and malcontents who offered an awesome range of analyses of the social question. That the brave new world in the Western Hemisphere also contributed its share of social critics, however, is often overlooked. In particular this is true of Massachusetts, which spawned Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, Horace Greeley, Charles A. Dana, and Albert Brisbane; but even more importantly for this work, the Bay State produced the entire pantheon of Libertarianism. Lysander Spooner was born at Athol in 1808, Ezra Heywood at Westminster in 1829, William B. Greene at Haverhill in 1819, Joshua King Ingalls at Swansea in 1816, Stephen Pearl Andrews at Templeton in 1812, and Benjamin Ricketson Tucker at South Dartmouth in 1854.

13. Mill, On Liberty, p. 79

14. "Left-wing individualists" is the term utilized by Eunice Minette Schuster, Native American Anarchism: A Study of Left-Wing American Individualism, (New York: DaCapo Press, 1970; originally published 1932); 'Individualist anarchist' is favored by James J. Martin, Men Against the State: The Expositors of Individualist Anarchism in America 1827-1908 (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Publisher, 1970; originally published 1953); 'right-wing anarchist' is embraced by Jerome Tuccille, Radical Libertarianism: A Right-Wing Alternative (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970); while 'philosophic anarchism; was the term usually applied by the contemporaries of our subjects and on occasion favored by Benjamin R. Tucker as well, cf. Benjamin R. Tucker, Instead of a Book By a Man Too Busy To Write One (New York: Haskell House Publishers Ltd., 1969; originally published 1897).

15. Josiah Warren, Equitable Commerce (New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.), p. 15.

16. Ibid., p. 57.

17. H. G. Schenk, The Mind of the European Romantics (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1966), p. xxi.

18. Ibid., p. xxii.

19. Ibid., p. 641.

20. Fred Kaplan, "The Mesmeric Mania," The Journal of the History of Ideas XXXV (1974), 693.

21 E. L. Doctorow, Ragtime (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 3.

22. Vernon Lewis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Vol. II: The Romantic Revolution in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), p. iii.

23. Quotes in Samuel Elliot Morison, Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 516.

24. Parrington, Main Currents..., II, p. iv.

25. Schenk, The Romantic Mind..., p. 16.

26. Martin, Man Against the State, p. 293.

27. Louis M. Hacker, The Triumph of American Capitalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 236f.

28. Cf Stewart H. Holbrook, The Yankee Exodus: An Account of Migration from New England (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1950), and Lois Kimball Mathews, The Expansion of New England: The Spread of New England Settlements and Institutions to the Mississippi River 1620-1865 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962; originally published 1909).

29. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 5.

30. Warren's biographer William Bailie dates the invention at 1823, but the careful research of James J. Martin places the date of patent at February 28, 1821. Bailie, Josiah Warren: The First American Anarchist, p. 2; Martin, Men Against the State, p. 6.

31. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. ix.

32. Josiah Warren, Practical Applications of the Elementary Principles of 'True Civilization' to the Minute Details of Every Day Life (Princeton, Massachusetts: the Author, 1873), p. 71.

33. Robert Owen, A New View of Society (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1927), p. 16.

34. Ibid., p. 38.

35. J. F. C. Harrison, Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and America (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 164.

36. E.g., the joint stock company of Wamborough, Illinois; the Blue Spring Community at Bloomington, Indiana; the Kendall Community at Massilon, Ohio; the Yellow Springs Community outside of Cincinnati; the Franklin Community of Haverstraw, New York; the Forestville Community at Coxsackie, New York; and Fanny Wright's experiment in integrated colonization, Nashoba, fourteen miles outside of Memphis, Tennessee. Harrison, Robert Owen..., p. 166ff. Noyes describes the activities and structure of several of these colonies: John Humphrey Noyes, History of American Socialisms (New York: Hillary House, 1961).

37. Quoted in Harrison, Robert Owen..., p. 364.

38. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. ix.

39. Ibid., p. 47.

40. Bailie, Josiah Warren..., p. 10.

41. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. ix.

42. Ibid., p. 108.

43. Frederick B. Adams, Jr., Radical Literature in America (Stamford, Connecticut: Overbrook Press, 1939), p. 27.

44. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 14.

45. Josiah Warren, Manifesto: A Rare and Interesting Document (Berkeley Heights, New Jersey: Oriole Press, 1952), p. 6.

46. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 39.

47. Ibid., p. 40.

48. Bailie, Josiah Warren, p. 47.

49. The above account relies primarily upon Martin's careful scholarship. The account by Bailie places the opening of this third Time Store at May 18, 1847 and notes that Warren left the store "under the management" of a friend, while Martin clearly indicates Warren sold his interests. Bailie, Josiah Warren, p. 49; Martin, Men Against the State, p. 46.

50. Josiah Warren, True Civilization (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967; originally published 1863), p. 106.

51. Owen had set up a supervisory group of twenty-five to admit new members to New Harmony. "The community was to be under the direction of Mr. Owen, until two-thirds of the members should think fit to govern themselves provided that the time was not less than twelve months." Noyes, History of American Socialisms, p. 38. This indicates the application of the same social device in polar theories.

52. Lindsay Swift, Brook Farm (New York: Corinth Press, 1961), p. 99.

53. Saul Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 27.

54. As early as 1833 Andrews was writing articles on phrenology for the county newspaper in Louisiana: cf. Madeleine Stern, The Patriarch: A Biography of Stephen Pearl Andrews (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), p. 21. Warren's contact with the "science" derived from his days at New Harmony. Owen had been converted to the discipline by his friend Abrah Combe, brother of the famed phrenologist George Combe; cf Harrison, Robert Owen..., pp. 86, 240.

55. John D. Davies, Phrenology - Fad and Science: A 19th Century American Crusade (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. x-xi.

56. The origins of phrenology present a division over the nature of man. Franz Joseph Gall, the originator of the theory of the correspondence between brain structure and cranial contours, believed than man incorporated an innate sense of evil, he even labelled a region of the brain 'murder.' His most famous disciple, and the coiner of the term 'phrenology'--a name which Gall despised--was Johann Gaspar Spurzheim. Spurzheim, whom Metternich called the greatest mind he had ever known, thought man was created potentially good and anticipated the perfection of mankind through the science of phrenology. Gall had assumed most men mediocre and asserted that genius had the obligation, and the right to rule. Ibid., p. 8.

57. Other reformist literature they published included items on such topics as natural food diets, vegetarianism, temperance, Bloomerism, anti-lacing (lacing was the fashion of corsetting the female figure into the wasp-waisted Gibson Girl mode), and hydropathy.

58. Franz Anton Mesmer had astounded Paris in 1778 with his 'discovery' of a fluid which permeated and surrounded all physical bodies, and with contraptions for trapping and utilizing this 'magnetic' power. Mesmer's 'scientific' findings were combined with Rousseau's political writings into a radical critique of society by Nicolas Bergasse and Jacques-Pierre Brissot. Cf. Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), especially chapter 3 "the radical strain in Mesmerism" and chapter 4 "Mesmerism as a radical political theory," pp. 106-25, 126-59.

59. For fullness the range of departures from normality ought to include the insane, the mystic, and the creative artist as well.

60. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 14.

61. Warren, True Civilization, p. 106.

62. Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 23.

63. Josiah Warren, Manifesto..., p. 6.

64. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. ix.

65. J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition: From Leonardo to Hegel (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 184; cf. also chapter 10 "The Royal Society," pp. 180-92; chapter 18 "The Lunar Society: Businessmen and Technicians," pp. 323-35; and chapter 20 "Benjamin Franklin," pp. 357-72. Also Lewis Feuer, The Scientific Intellectual (New York: Basic Books, 1963), especially chapter II "The Royal Society and the Scientists of England," pp. 23-82, and chapter XI "The Scientific Intellectual in the United States," pp. 319-92.

66. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. x.

67. Warren, True Civilization, p. 9.

68. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 13.

69. Ibid., p. 78

70. On the rational and analytic aspects of repair-work, see Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1974).

71. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 14.

72. Ibid., p. 26.

73. Ibid.

74. As a possible advertisement for Stephen Pearl Andrews' pet import, Warren--or possibly Andrews himself, since he served as editor of the 1852 printing--cites phonology (also called phonography or shorthand) as the means of providing each vocal element with a literal mark, as a device "which was probably to work a total revolution in literature and book education." And as a plug for his own invention, Warren inserts a defense of the Mathematical Notation of music which he notes parenthetically remains "published, though unknown to the public." Ibid., p. 21.

75. Ibid., p. 12.

76. Ibid., p. 21f. While this invention may have served Warren as an example of individual sovereignty, ironically a similar and quite independently developed system can be attributed to a social theorist who may be regarded as within the collectivist tradition, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

77. Fanny Wright had written an appreciative review of Johnson's A Treatise on Language in the March 18, 1829 edition of the Free Enquirer. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 32.

78. Alexander Bryan Johnson, A Treatise on Language (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1947), pp. 40, 115.

79. Ibid., p. 40.

80. "When a word names the phomena of two or more senses, the oneness of the name is especially embarrasing." Ibid., p. 72.

81. Ibid., p. 74.

82. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 52.

83. Ibid., p. 15.

84. Ibid.

85. Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, p. 123.

86. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 23.

87. Johnson, A Treatise on Language, p. 80.

88. This is most likely an intuitive insight on Johnson's part. Fingerprinting was not developed by Sir Francis Galton and Juan Vincetich until 1891, and voice-printing is only now coming into its own.

89. Strangely enough, the prime exception to natural individuality which Johnson cites is that of the identity of one snowflake with another. Twentieth century sciences believes that no two snow crystals are alike. On the other hand studies in enzymology and molecular biology and physics may reduce the individual of all matter into some ubiquitous substance reminiscent of Democritus' atoms.

90. Johnson, A Treatise on Language, p. 81.

91. Ibid.

92. Warren, Equitable Commerce, pp. 18f, 12.

93. Liberty II (September 20, 1884), 4.

94. Warren's relationship to the Scottish Common Sense philosophers is tenuous in lineage but nonetheless real. Esther Lowenthal's bibliographical research has revealed that Dugald Stewart was published in the United States as early as 1793, Adam Smith even earlier--in 1789. Robert Hamilton was published here in 1816 and J. R. McCulloch by 1826. Imported English editions had made them known somewhat earlier: so their presence in this country has been established. Warren's linguistic mentor, A. B. Johnson, cites at length from the School, especially Stewart, and some of Warren's argumentative friends, S. P. Andrews and Colonel William B. Greene, were known to have cited the Common Sense School. Cf. Esther Lowenthal, "American Reprints of Economic Writings 1776-1848," American Economic Review XLIII (December, 1952), 876-80; and "Additional American Reprints 1776-1848," Ibid., XLII (December, 1953), 884-5. As Anna Haddow points out in her investigation of American academia, the Scottish School together with the laissez faire writings of Jean Baptiste Say, Frederich Bastiat, and Adam Smith early conquered the required reading lists in moral philosophy and political economy in the nation's fledgling colleges. Cf. Anna Haddow, Political Science in American Colleges and Universities 1636-1900 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939).

95. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. xiii.

96. Warren, True Civilization, p. 131.

97. Ibid., p. 13.

98. Ibid., p. 14.

99. Warren, Equitable Commerce, pp. 18, 19.

100. Although Warren was never to confront the egoism of Benjamin Tucker and James L. Walker, his attitude might be extrapolated from a comment in the introduction to Equitable Commerce. There, explaining the reasons for writing the work, he included the fact that "the right of the strongest begins to be admitted to a frightful extent." Ibid., p. x.

101. Ibid., p. 20.

102. Ibid., p. 26.

103. Ibid., p. 23f.

104. Warren, True Civilization, p. 10.

105. Ibid., p. 13.

106. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 59.

107. Ibid., p. 61.

108. Warren, True Civilization, p. 82.

109. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, pp. 118-72.

110. Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own (New York: Libertarian Book Club, 1963).

111. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 87.

112. Ibid., p. 33.

113. Warren, True Civilization, p. 20.

114. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 57f; cf. p. 86f.

115. Warren, True Civilization, p. 154.

116. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 15.

117. Ibid., p. 39.

118. The officially commissioned history of Brentwood, Long Island (the name of the community after 1864) notes that "Lots which usually sold for $50.00 to $500.00 could be purchased for $1.50 to $2.00 each, and entire acres for $22.00 with each resident limited to three such plots." Verne Dyson, A Century of Brentwood (Long Island: Brentwood Village Press, 1950), p. 39.

119. Warren, Practical Applications..., p. 17.

120. Bertha-Monica Stearns, "Two Forgotten New England Reformers," New England Review VI (March, 1933), 70f.

121. Ibid.

122. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 72. The 1970 reprint of the 1888 edition of Andrews' The Science of Society has an appendix containing both the article, credited to Ripley, and Andrews' subsequent reply to the Tribune: cf. Andrews, The Science of Society (Boston: Sarah E. Holmes, 1888), pp. 153-65.

123. This is not to be confused with his 1863 work True Civilization: An Immediate Necessity and the Last Ground of Hope for Mankind.

124. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 102; Dyson, A Century of Brentwood, p. 130.

125. Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Vol. III: The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America, p. 51.

126. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. ix.

127. Warren, True Civilization, p. 13.

128. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. x.

129. Warren, True Civilization, p. 43.

130. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 49.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid., p. 15.

133. Ibid., p. 39.

134. Warren, True Civilization, p. 42.

135. Ibid., p. 10.

136. Ibid., p. 18.

137. Ibid., p. 27.

138. Ibid., p. 25.

139. Ibid., p. 28.

140. Ibid., p. 33.

141. Ibid., p. 122

142. Thomas Hobbes, Levithan (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 186.

143. Cf. Lillian Symes and Travers Clement, Rebel America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1934).

THE ETERNAL DISCIPLE, STEPHEN PEARL ANDREWS

Libertarianism Gains a History

Warren's long career of missionary work on the frontier of social reform began, in his later years, to bear fruit. With his return East he discovered a set of likeminded individualists, foremost among whom was Stephen Pearl Andrews. Pearl Andrews found time in his crowded chronicle of movements, issues and causes to immerse himself for some dozen years in Warren's theory of Equity resulting in its expostition in a form which even Warren thought superior to his own account. Other figures of fame or notoriety who formed a loose-knit Libertarian task force about Warren's person included Colonel William Bradford Green, Ezra Heywood, Joshuah King Ingalls, and Lysander Spooner. These men brought special attention to bear upon the seamy, exploitative, and hypocritical nature of the era which Mark Twain had called "the gilded age." These reformers battled against chattel slavery and wage slavery, and in defense of free land, free banking, and free love. In these pursuits they dragged along with them such revolutionary panaceas as animal magnetism, hydropathy, phrenology, spiritualism, Pitman shorthand, and of course, the Pantarchy.

These maverick social critics tended to define the terrain of the social struggle in a highly idiosyncratic manner. Andrews, with the life-long affliction of being conversation-prone, serves as the richest example of the esoteric vagaries of the group and also offers an outer limit of its bizarreness, a case of the quest for the synthesis of knowledge leading (possibility out of frustration) to an authoritarian and metaphysical dogma.

Andrews' life was bracketed by a pair of particularly dramatic and traumatic events of American history; he entered life with the War of 1812 and left it in the year of Haymarket, 1886. He was born in Templeton, Massachusetts, the eighth and last child of Elisha Andrews, a Baptist minister. Of his four brothers, three were clergymen and the fourth a lawyer. Pearl Andrews grew up in genteel poverty, his father preaching in minor posts throughout Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The youngest Andrews, however, early immersed himself in the world of books, discovering at a tender age his father's library of theology and the works of Duguld Stewart and the Scottish Common Sense School. He was nurtured in an atmosophere of anti-High Church and pro-Federalist feelings--his father had vociferously opposed the War of 1812, consequently losing a respectable congregation in Massachusetts and ending up in what Pearl Andrews called "the sterile hills of New Hampshire."[1] In spite of such a setback, Elisha remained an outspoken and polemical man, his home filled with discussions of temperance and the peace movement. Pearl's father, self-taught in Greek, Hebrew, and German, undertook to educate him in Church history, geometry, mathematics, Latin, Greek, and "a smattering of Hebrew, Syriac, and Chaldaic."[2] For the rest of his long life, Pearl Andrews remained an omnivorous consumer of intellectual fodder and a dedicated linguist--mastering thirty-two languages.[3] He also retained a religious and mystical cast of mind which found expression in his social reforms and his theorizing. Much of his later life bears resemblence to traits found in this earlier period. Like his father, Pearl Andrews was not one to keep his controversial opinions to himself. Delivering a fourth of July oration in 1836 before the East Feliciana Temperance Society at Clinton, Louisiana, he urged upon his audience the belief that "There, is perhaps, no sentiment of his nature

more deeply implanted in the mind of man, than his love of Independence... Slavery has been dreaded and abhorred as some monster, breathing plagues and pestilence and whose very touch could poison the sweet foundations of life and happiness."[4] Seven years later, still a premature anti-slavist, he was persuaded to leave Galveston by a fully-armed committee of "counter-conspirators, while later the same year his home in Houston was mobbed by regulators necessitating Andrews, his wife, and his infant son leave Texas in the dead of night.[5]

His life was touched by several of the major scandals of his era. As a young man he had attempted to persuade the British to purchase the sovereign state of Texas in order to abolish slavery there. This came to an end when the pro-slavery Texas charge d'affaires, Ashbel Smith, informed the Court of Saint James that Andrews lacked authorization for his proposal. Ironically this was the only trip abroad which the frantically cosmopolitan Andrews was ever to make.

He also found himself involved in two of the most sensational judicial events of the nineteenth century. As a marginal character, he served briefly as defense attorney for a time in what was to become the longest running trial in American history,[6] while in his later years he basked in the notoriety of the juiciest scandal of that era, the Beecher-Tilton adultery trial. Along the way Andrews practiced law in Louisiana and Texas, translated the laws of Texas into Spanish, served as Washington correspondent for Horace Greeley's Tribune, introduced Pitman shorthand to America, lectured on Chinese language to the New York Historical Society, managed the campaign of the first woman to run for the Presidency of the United States, and outraged conventional society and Horace Greeley with his application of individual sovereignty to sexual roles and regulations. He ultimately lived out his dotage as the Pantarch, the head of a religio-scientific institution called the Pantarchy which

espoused a philosophy of Universology and an international language named Alwato.

While Andrews' life represents rich material for a colorful and exotic biography, his relevance for Libertarianism consists in his systemization of Warren's thought, his part in the founding of Modern Times, his genius in assimilating apparently discrete and opposing concepts into an overall anti-authoritarian position and his influences on Benjamin Tucker.[7] The sensational episodes of the Louisiana trial and the London fiasco, while indicating the general tendency of Andrews' early moral concerns are but forerunners rather than manifestations of a systematic philosophy of individual sovereignty. Similarly his devotion to the cause of Pitman shorthand was a case of introducing a new weapon against oppression and exploitation: Andrews saw his discovery as a means of fast and easy literacy with special relevance to the plight of black Americans. In town after town, in front of audience after audience, he would deliver an hour-long demonstration, culminating in the "reading" of his squiggles by a previously illiterate child, laborer, or free black. Recognizing that 'freedom' without education was a precarious gift, Andrews saw shorthand as a tool for radical social change: an instrument which would at least enable the have-nots to cease being know-nots as well.

Like Warren, Andrews was devoted to social reform, and like Warren he thought a peaceful revolution both preferable and possible. It was a revolution which fought itself out in the minds of men. This phrase of not meant to be a facile sentimental tag, but rather a summary of basic Libertarian epistemology. Since the universe was mechanistic--in a loose sense of the term, but of a looseness comparable to that reflected in other concepts and of a looseness which characterized the general acceptance of

that concept in particular--it was comprehensible and possibly manipulable as well. Within that universe individual persons were related through a network of affiliations expressed through voluntary behavior and motivated by utility. Since man was pursuing utility, he had the potential to invade the private sphere of another, it was for this reason that voluntarism (the principle of non-coercion) was insisted upon and responsibility ("cost") made a part of the definition of freedom. The human actor which such a universe assumes is basically rational and, by orthodox bourgeois definition, decent.

On such a man mental revolution might be predicated, one capable of overthrowing the "cannibalistic" system by "dis-uniting" himself from the artificially combined interests aggregated by the State. It was literally in the minds of men that the question change was to be planted, nurtured, and watched mature. Warren emphasized this in his injunction to his readers to scrupulously evaluate each of his arguments before giving consent to them. Andrews attempted his own mental revolution via journalism and phonology, thereby both supplying ideas for social change and, simultaneously, enlarging the audience for them by fostering literacy among those groups traditionally deprived of it.

Warren and Andrews were men of interesting similarities and divergences. Both were New Englanders of petty-bourgeois background, both left the familiar to face the challenges of frontier society, and both devoted their lives to social reform. Furthermore, each pursued a career in journalism, was involved in communal experiments, and was a proponent of phrenology and spiritualism. And, ultimately, each came to rest in unmarked graves: Warren in Mount Auburn Cemetary in Cambridge, Massachusetts (lot 2078, Eglantine path), and Andrews in Woodlawn Cemetary in New York City.[8]

But while both men believed in phrenology and its scientific presumptions, their cranial contours must have been most dissimilar. Warren was turgid while Andrews was highly volatile, a difference manifested in their respective works, Equitable Commerce and The Science of Society. A difference of style and attitude which Andrews noted in his editorial introduction to the 1852 edition of the former work by noting that it:

> has now undergone, at my request, a revisal by the author...there is, however, nothing flashy nor superficially attractive in the principles propounded by Mr. Warren, nor in the mode of their exhibit--the farthest from it in the world. They are hard, unpretending, but fundamental truths...these facts will address themselves less favorably, in the early stages of the reform, to the tasteful, the imaginative, and the artistic, than to the philosophic and the so-called common sense mind--less favorable to the amateurs than to the connoisseurs in social architecture. Men of more scholastic predelictions and those who require or prefer to be facilitated in their appreciations of profound philosophical ideas, may find themselves better suited in my own more elaborate exposition of the same doctrine, in "the True Constitution of Government," and "Cost the limit of Price."[9]

This also reflected their divergent understanding of science and of the role of the radical tinker.

Andrews later observed that "The Universe divides into 1) a Domain of Nature, 2) a Domain of Science, and 3) a Domain of Art. These are not different Realms existing apart from each other, but are, on the contrary, closely inter-blended throughout."[10] The first was the substance and subject matter of science, the second the "Form or Law imposed upon the Substance," while "Art is equivalent to Movement, Modification, Modulation, in a word, to all Creation and Evolution, in the Universe at large."[11] Science was in a process of development for Andrews; earlier stages--Aristotelian deduction and Baconian induction--had resulted in "mere specialists, in a great degree incapable of any broad or generalizing idea..."[12] He represented the advent of the third stage, "the idea of Universal Underlying Principles of Analogy."[13] He sought to move beyond the imposition of form upon sub-

stance, and to give it meaning: Andrews was the embodiment of scientist as artist. As he utilized analogy to explain Analogy: "The Universe is our apple, the knife in the hand of a child is Scientific Procedure or Method, the gradual paring away process of Inductive, Observational, or Encyclopedic Generalization. The cut to the center is Analytic Generalization."[14]

Andrews' science was not empirical, it was Cartesian rather than Baconian. The paring away was rejected for the bold cut to the center. He preferred sundering the Gordian Knot to untangling it gradually: the result would be the same unless one assumes that the very process of disentangling itself serves a heuristic purpose. But Andrews was impatient, he wanted immediate knowledge and immediate results: this was both the source of his vigor as a reformer and the cause of relative low regard as a theorist. This impatience attracted him to such quasi-scientific and scientifically-couched panaceas as spiritualism, phrenology, and hydropathy, and it helps to explain his voracious appetite for entire systems of thought. As a sympathetic historian of Sociology notes, Andrews was "usually under the influence of some foreign system of thought..."[15] Systems promise comprehensive answers, and Andrews chafing at the pedestrian rate of accumulating knowledge while social injustice remained untouched sought to cut to the center by adopting readymade programs. But he retained a trial and error approach, rejecting one system or panacea after another. He did not, however, discard a system when he found it wanting. Like Warren, Andrews was a tinker, a tinker of the intellectual realm--a dilletante. He took apart not physical systems, but intellectual systems and he rearranged them, often mixing their components in the reassembling. To Warren's rather simple premises, Andrews combined Auguste Comte's principle of leadership, Charles Fourier's theory of attraction, Emanuel Swedenborg's

mystical intuitive faculty, and Immanuel Kant's law of antinomy.[16]

Of the four influences, that of Swedenborg and Fourier were the earliest in formation. The mystical nature of Swedenborg tapped an affinity in Andrews which he manifested from his upbringing in the Parsonage through his retreat to the Pantarchy. It served to nourish his moral outrage at the conditions of society through the opposition of a divine order. Swedenborg, like Andrews, approached his studies through scientific procedures and claimed a scientific validity for his conclusion. Swedenborg had been trained as a mathematician and natural scientist, and he contributed some minor texts on geology prior to his absorption in mystical concerns. He approached the idea of the metaphysical Infinite from the starting place of a mathematical point, he revived and modified the Cartesian notion of the spiritous fluid as the means of communication between body and soul (an idea sufficiently comparable--although by no means identical with--the Mesmeric force surrounding corporeal bodies, to permit a conjoint acceptance of the claims of animal magnetism by Andrews), and he propounded a theory of correspondence which attempted to "describe and explain the relations between the spiritual world and our material universe by means of linguistic analogies."[17] From Swedenborg Andrews apparently derived his principle of Analogy as embodied in the apple-child-knife anecdote, and his definition of Art as "movement", for Swedenborg had made movement an essential component of his concept of connatus (the dynamic force of nature corresponding to the will in man). He, in turn, had derived from Christian Wolff the idea of a universal philosophical language.[18] Analogy, correspondence, and the justification for the notion of universal language are all expressed by Andrews in his comment that "Language is a Miniature Universe, in accordance with the Principle of Analogy...a Type or Model of the Whole Universe."[19]

What Swedenborg offered Andrews was a means of ordering, or arranging in a complementary fashion, his intellectual pursuits. Language served to provide the connection in this theory of correspondence. It also provided, through phonology, a ready panacea for social oppression. Here again, Andrews' frantic eclecticism generated an interesting hybrid. In an appendix to one of his linguistic works Andrews considers "Swedenborg on the meaning of the vowels." Phonology and Swedeborg now are compared with the contributions of another of his obsessions, writing about the character of languages written phonetically, Andrews claims "the Natural and Ethnical Phrenolgy...may be measured with more accuracy than Callipers and Cranioscopy can apply to the heads of Individuals; by the simple means of weighing the types employed in printing the different languages, observing the predominance of the different sounds and apportioning the types..."[20]

Swedenborg's theory of correspondence also suggests an explanation for Andrews' attempt to reconcile Warren with his other early social mentor, Fourier.[21]

Although Fourier belongs to the communist tradition of social radicals, he approaches Warrenite individualism in his recognition of the dire consequences of the repression of individualism and the destructiveness of communal conformity. "Morality teaches man to be at war with himself," insists Fourier, to "resist his passions, to repress them, to believe that God was incapable of organizing our souls, our passions wisely...we can only repress our passions by violence or absorbing replacement, which replacement is no repression."[22] The organizing principle of the phalanstere was novelty. The productive worker was a happy worker, and the happy worker remained so due to a frequent, if not actually frenetic, change in labor. With this emphasis upon the liberating of the individual, it was

not surprising that the Associationists of the Clermont Phalanx, or that Stephen Pearl Andrews, would slip so easily from the grip of Fourier's social thought to that of Josiah Warren.

Where Fourier sought to create a new man by freeing his passions and by limiting and coordinating his economic activities in a new society, Warren endeavoured to reform society by freeing all of man's activities and by limiting the control of society. While Fourier's theory of repression is predicated upon the consequence of the thwarting of natural desires, his respect for individualism fails to carry over into his discussion of economic and industrial organization. In that area it is as if he treated human beings statistically: while a person cannot say with certainty how a particular individual will behave, given a sufficient number of individuals with a finite quantity of character types, predictions may be put forward confidently. Besides the problems of the opposition of individual interest to the collective needs and the difficulty of obtaining unity in the formulation and pursuit of collective goals, Fourier indicates seven "evils of individual action in industry:" 1) the end of a man's labor through death, 2) the personal idiosyncracies and the unreliability of the individual, 3) the variation from generation to generation which inhibits the rational pursuit of long term projects, 4) the size of individual enterprises prohibits economics of mechanization, 5) fraud, theft, and general mistrust among individuals, 6) the sporadic, seasonal, or intermittent nature of productive labor under its individual control, and 7) the waste caused by the pursuit of different purposes by owner and laborer.[23] Each of these shortcomings was to be corrected with the proper organization of labor through a natural attraction of interests which would sort individuals into their appropriate series. Thus individual differences in temperament,

or at least the 810 which Fourier accepted and upon which his 'natural attraction' was predicated, constituted for him a rich repertoire from which the collective drew as it needed to. But the emphasis indisputably indicates that the individual, even the unrepressed individual, existed as a necessary but subsidiary component of the whole. This was, of course, a tenet which dramatically contravened Warrenite radicalism. Fourier's critique of equality flows from his particular subordination of the individual to the collective. Equality, according to Fourier, "is a practical poison in association...the associative regime is as incompatible with equality of fortune as with uniformity of character; it desires a progressive scale in every direction, the greatest variety in employments, and, above all, the union of extreme contrasts..."[24] While Fourier sounds as if he protects individuality from the stultifying conformity of equality, it must be remembered that the 810 temperaments which he predicates his series upon serve not as means of individual self-realization, although his prescient theory of repression might be so construed, but as repositories of skills and traits from which the collective may draw for its continued functioning. Fourier implicitly makes the linkage of "different" and "unequal"; an individual is rewarded for the output or quality of his labor[25] and not according to respect for his personality. Thus different jobs require different rewards, and in cyclical fashion different rewards mean unequal rewards, hence men (at least in respect to their labor) are unequal.

Fourier presented his disciples with a humanized theory of social organization for a collectivity, but it remained a collectivist approach and therefore one in basic philosophy opposed to Warrenite radicalism. Although there are important points of tangency between the theories of Fourier and Warren, as there were between those of Owen and Warren, on

irreducible philosophic premises a chasm separates them. While Warren's social theorizing was largely incubated in the nest of Owenite communism, and was informed by and nurtured by Fourierists as well as by the milieu of social experimentation which both fashionable social panaceas exploited and perpetuated, Warren's thought diverged markedly from both competitors and made its own contribution as a separate and indigenous brand of radicalism.

Kant's contribution to Andrews' thought is less apparent than that of Swedenborg and Fourier, but his concept of the "antinomies" surfaces in Andrews' theory. An antinomy, as a twentieth century commentator on Kant explains, "is a pair of contradictory statements, each of which is validly proved and each of which expresses an inescapable interest of reason."[26] These contradictions, however, apply only to the phenomenal world and are capable of resolution by reference to the noumenal realm. For instance, Kant's third antinomy argues that if all things have causes, 1) all causation is to be found within the category of time and under the law of nature; but if everything has a cause, 2) there must be a cause prior to and outside of time and the law of nature.[27]

Andrews deals with this problem simply by creating a "science" which would comprehend all knowledge: Universology, it was claimed, "unlike all the Sciences extant, except Logic and the Mathematics, does not depend for its establishment upon grounds of probability."[28] It was a "Grand Underlying Unity of the Sciences,"[29] and it enabled a peek into the noumenal which transcended the apparent antinomies of the paring away process of the other partial sciences. It differs from empirical science in its fundamentals. "There are for example," Andrews points out, "positively no Straightnesses or Straight Lines in Nature...But Straightness is the one essential quality of a Rule or Ruler; and so of a Law which is a Rule of

Conduct, or a Regulator of our ways of Thinking, and hence of Acting. We cannot, therefore, look to Nature for Rules or Laws; and Science itself being nothing but a Systematized Collection of Rules and Laws, it follows that we cannot look to Nature for Science, in the highest, most exact sense of that term."[30]

From Kant he may also have derived the notion--or, at least, derived encouragement for his notion--of a world government of persons speaking one language.

Andrews' Comtean influence came late and tended to reinforce the previously existing elements, e.g., Kant's cosmopolitan organization, Fourier's penchant for systematization and the making of interminable inventories, and Swedenborg's combination of science and mysticism. This influence was less important for its modification of the Libertarian tradition than as the theory which lured Andrews out of their fold and into the Pantarchy. For the Comtean positivistic position was one intrinsically opposed to the individualism of the Libertarians, asserting as it did a closed intellectual system and erecting a new icon in the person of Auguste Comte.

At Modern Times Andrews still sounded like a Warrenite radical. Writing in Warren's Periodical Letter (September, 1857), he reiterated the "cost" theorem: "The logical and legitimate termination of the Democratic idea is in the Sovereignty of every Individual, within the limit that it is not to be exercised at the cost of others, or, in such a manner as to throw burdensome consequences on them."[31] Fourteen years later he was citing Hegel and Fichte as forerunners of his doctrine of "trinism"--"a Coordinated or Hingewise Principle, Entity, or Manifestation, as between the handle of the fork, which is One, on the one hand, and the Tines of the fork, which are Two (or more), on the other hand."[32]

His turning from Warren to Comte was a result of their Andrews' opposition to the notion of science held by the former; as a generalizer, Andrews sought the all-inclusive short-cut answer, and he required a system of thought which would contain the diversity of plans and pursuits his teeming mind put forth. While Warren had never tired of suggesting that the proper path to understanding was to "dis-unite," "dis-organize," and to break into constituent parts, Andrews sought to unite into his grand design of Universology. His invocation of Hegel and Fichte was apt: like them he emphasized the synthesis of the dialectical process. Trinism combined unism ("Unity, Sameness, Centralizing or Centripeta Tendency, Gravitation, Arrival, Conjunction, Thesis or Synthesis, Integration, Combination, Contraction, Generality, Simplicity, etc., etc.") and duism ("Diversity, Difference or Variety, Decentralizing and Centrifugal Tendency, Repulsion, Departure, Separation, Antithesis, Analysis, Differentiation, Diffusion, Expansion, Speciality, Complexity, etc., etc."). Trinism by embracing both served as the resolution of Kant's antinomy, it represented "the Totality of Being."[33]

It was in pursuit of this totality that he set his sights upon reconciling the unism of Fourier and the duism of Warren.[34] Andrews argued, as did Warren, that true and practical individualism begins with a "complete disintegration of all amalgamated interests...", Andrews admits that this premise "seems to be in exact antagonism to association, and the views of Socialism of all the various schools." This superficial objection, he insisted, was a mistake: A more thorough acquaintance with the subject will show however, that this individualizing of all interests is the <u>analysis of society</u>, preliminary to association as <u>the synthesis</u>, as much association as is demanded by the economies, being a growth of

that cooperation of interests--not combination or amalgamation--which results from the operation of the cost principle.[35]

It is only fair to note that the misreading which Andrews warned against, a misreading emphasizing the incompatibility of Warren's Equity and Fourier's Association, was one shared by Josiah Warren and the Fourierite orthodoxy of the Tribune. Andrews emphasized the social nature of Warren's thought against the assault of other socialists. "I will conclude," he tells his readers, "by warning you against one other misconception, which is very liable to be entertained by those to whom Individuality is for the first time presented as the great remedy for the prevalent evils of the social state. I mean the conception that individuality has something in common with isolation, or the severance of all personal relations with one's fellow-men...It is not the disruption of relationships, but the creation of distinct and independent personalities between whom relations can exist."[36]

While much of Andrew's later undertakings and publications were abhorrent to Warren's principles, the two men at one time shared a common approach. Indeed, Warren signed over to Andrews the copyright to all his writings in 1852, in return Andrews undertook to reorganize the work and provide a New York publisher.[37] The major differences between the two were of style and nuance, of degree of philosophic fluency, and of varying doctrinal affiliations prior to their partnership. One of the continuing debates between the two men concerned Fourierist social philosophy. Andrews had written for the Harbinger, and the New York Tribune, Fourierist sheets both. Although upon occasion slighting his debt, Andrews continued calling himself a follower of Fourier into the 1870's. This of course, contrasted starkly with Warren's own highly negative estimate of associational socialism,--a distaste which was mutual as may be observed by the Tribune's critical review of

Equitable Commerce and by the running expose of the eccentricities of Modern Times by that journal with such damaging consequences.

Fourier's shortcoming, for Andrews, was in his failure to accommodate the principle of sovereign individuality. Much of Stephen Pearl Andrew's subsequent disfavor with many Libertarians may be seen as his vacillating between Warrenite individualism and Fourierist organicism. But at the time The Science of Society Warren's influence clearly had the upper hand, and Andrews concentrated his attention upon explicating Warren's thought and upon emphasizing the points of compatibility between the two social theories. Therefore to fully understand the development of the classic Libertarian tradition Warren's equity principle must be placed in the context both of Warren's working out of the rude concept in his practical endeavors and of the philosophic milieu in which Andrews was an avid, and eclectic, participant.[38]

A major difference between the two men is that while Warren claimed no historical lineage for his theory, and saw no inexorable working out of a grand design, Andrews did. Indeed the lineage was a radical and earth-shaking one, according to which the oppressive ancien regime had been dealt three severe blows, and with the third was diagnosed as moribund. First, Martin Luther had nailed his theses to the Church door at Wittenberg. This act, on the eve of all Saints day in 1517, served as a declaration of the freedom of conscience and a call for the end of priestly authority and sacerdotal intercession. While Luther did not intend his actions to generate a popular political uprising it is understandable how his rejection of hierarchical authority figures in favor of personal qualities of faith also sparked a re-evaluation of authority in the secular realm.

However, the freedom fostered by the Reformation was primarily

confined to the realm of theological issues. It remained for other traumas to set loose freedom in the political and social realms. According to Andrews, the blow to political authority came in a two-step reform: first, the claims of Divine Right of Kings was countered by "Hampden, Sidney, Cromwell, and others...(with) the assertion of inherent political rights in the people themselves,"[39] and second, through a series of demonstrations of popular will and strength including the American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution.

The third, and final, blow to authoritarianism of the ancien regime came with the rise of French Socialism: a movement held promise of battering down the bastions of entrenched privilege and unearned wealth. These three stages, which Andrews dramatically christened the protestant reformation, the democratic revolution, and the Socialist agitation, are actually "merely different expressions of the same idea..."[40] The common core of the three movements consists of their assertion of the supremacy, or sovereignty, of the individual.

The socialist agitation was yet too young to allow simple analysis. According to Andrews the second stage of social reform was still in realization while the third had just begun. It was in the furtherance of this third stage--the socialist--that Andrews enlisted his services. He proudly called himself a socialist and talked of instituting a reign of socialism. The term had not for him the pejorative tone which many subsequent Libertarians were to give it.

For Andrews, Socialism designated a category of social thought which promised an expansion of democracy, the realization of individual sovereignity, and the destruction of economic systems of exploitation. The focus of left-radicalism was upon the inequities of political represen-

tation and the injustice of unearned privilege--whether through heredity or economic monopoly and political manipulation. In these objections the individualist Libertarians concurred, and thus they, too, in Andrews terms, were part of the Socialist agitation.

Andrews saw his task as twofold: first he sought to further, in a sophisticated and tightened form, the social theories of Josiah Warren. Secondly to reconcile the social philosophies of Warren and of Fourier. Sharing the grandiose expectations of the French socialists, Andrews fully equated the three terms: science of society, sociology, and socialism. However, recognizing the infancy of the science of society, he admitted that it was not so much an "actual science discovered and understood" as it was a "possible science, necessarily existing in itself and capable of discover."[41] Taking a Humean position on induction, Andrews denied that it was possible to categorize or predict with certainty. That relativistic conclusion results from two considerations: first, since every "act, transaction, or set of circumstances whatsoever" is unique and does not correspond to any other, any compilation and tabulation of such occurrences is futile: and second, regardless of the nature of past events, it is impossible to "make a law which would be applicable in all respects to the very next occurrence which shall take place nor to any one of the infinite millions of events which shall hereafter occur."[42] This is a startling proposition for two divergent reasons. In the first place it is a strange premise to be held by a theorist considered by some to be one of the forerunners of scientific or systematic sociology in this country.[43] Such a tenet sharply limits the capacity of a social investigator to compare, generalize, and to posit law-like prepositions. In the second instance, such a premise while reifying the concept of individuality, weakens any

defense of a particular theory of social organization as a universal or natural form. Thus making of individuality the only law of order and harmony.

Facing the problem of the State directly--a stance which Warren avoided by concentrating on his practical undertakings-- Andrews recognized only two reasons for the existence of government: "to restrain encroachments," and "to manage the combined interest of mankind." His recognition, however, did not mean his acceptance of them, but rather of all the justifications of and apologies for government made by its advocates, these were the only two which he held to be prima facie reasonable. Any other claims made by government or its propagandists being prima facie illegitimate. But even these two claims were eventually rejected as irrelevant. For while he did accept restraint of encroachments and the management of the combined interests of mankind as legitimate concerns for a social theorist, they were irrelevant in that they did not logically or practically necessitate government. These concerns he believed, could be protected through means other than government.

Andrews argued that the institution of the equity principle and the proclamation of individual sovereignity would vitiate any external agression against individuals, and with it the need for a coercive State agency. The equity principle repudiated exploitation, with the consequence that there would be neither an oppressed class seeking vengeance and revolution, nor a decadent one possessing inordinate wealth to attract the greed of others. Thus the pretexts for aggression dwindled greatly--and with a facile assumption of the universalization of the principles, no reactionary or irredentist state menaced at the gate. With these sources of hostility eliminated, little more remained than individual pathology

to contend with--and most such pathology resulted from the corrupt structure of society, a condition which radical alteration of the environment would eradicate. Equity and individualism then serve not to protect against encroachments after all, but rather to prevent them.[44]

Regarding the second alleged justification of government, Andrews begins with a simple categorical denial that any "combined or amalgated interests" do in fact exist--they represent an infringement on the scope of individuality, "The individuality of interests should be an absolute as that of persons."[45] Andrews admits the important and many pronged intervention of the state into social and commercial matters, but he predicts, and assumes, that such endeavours will cease because the level of social organization and the accompanying sophistication of social theory will demand its elimination. The spread of commerce, the extension of a network of railroads and telegraph, the tendency to regard war as an outmoded means of social arbitration, and "the general progress of enlightenment" coalesce to move mankind out of an era of governmental intervention into an era of the sovereignty of the individual. Government existed not as a definitional necessity of social life, but as a functional response to specific problems and as an answer structured by concrete patterns of social interrelationships. With the passing of this historical stage, the necessity for government and the State pass away as well.

Here Andrews appears to vacillate between two separate justifications of Libertarianism. First, an absolute formulation predicated upon his belief in the universality and primacy of the principle of individual sovereignity, and secondly a relativistic analysis supported by a theory of historical change based upon the imputation of a belief in inevitable progress. Anticipating his own future ventures in language reform, Andrews

predicted that "it is probable that even the existing languages of the earth will melt, within another century or two into one common and universal tongue..."[46] This centralization of language would produce not a homogenization of men and societies but a golden age of individualization. While extolling individuality in the abstract Andrews saw the idiosyncracies of language and the compartmentalization of men into language groupings as an insidious condition. Separate languages isolate men one from another, and cause them to band together out of misplaced beliefs in group identity and loyalty, wherein Frenchman is bound to Frenchman by his distrust of Briton or Spaniard, and wholly ignorant of the humanity of a Turk or a Zulu. The barriers erected by the division of mankind into such groupings hinders intellectual intercourse and the understanding of one linguistic assemblage for another. Thus while individuality is fostered by disintegration, dis-union, voluntary co-operation, and federation, in the realm of language pluralism impeded the desired end. There unity is practical and necessary. For while men may, and ought (in Andrews' mind) to seek their separate and plural answers in the areas of community organization, education, and commercial arrangements, language as the basis of communication of social intercourse needs to be easily apprehended by all men. A man's medium of commercial exchange might be personal and parochial, but his medium of intellectual exchange ought to be universal.

Andrews' texts on language were John Horne Tooke's The Diversions of Purley (1786-1805) which held that "words are the signs of things," and John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) with its repudiation of innateness and the positing of a tabula rasa.[47] This augmented view of language--augmented in that it both contains and goes beyond the language theory implicit in Warren--points up another item wherein Andrews builds

upon Warren and yet alters him in so doing. A simple reading of Equitable Commerce makes evident that what Warren meant by that term is "commerce" in a traditional mercantile sense--the exchange of goods and services. In Andrews this simple meaning is amplified to include: "First, Commerce in the minor sense, as synonymous with 'trade,' and secondly, commerce in the major sense, as synonymous with the old English signification of the work, 'conversation,' i.e., human intercourse of all sorts--the concrete, or tout ensemble, of human relationships."[48] Equitable commerce, thus becomes not a mere economic reform but a blueprint for the restructuring of the totality of human relations. While Warren thought in terms of small scale organization of social and economic experiments, Andrews moved the theory into the more grandiose realm where Warren's relatively rustic theory of individual sovereignty assumes philosophic pretensions and antecedents.

Ethical Individualism

The absolute individualism of Warren and Andrews has a common moral core with contemporary existentialism, an element which is revitalized with the infusion of the ideas of Max Stirner a generation later--Stirner serving as a common source for these culturally remote traditions. The latter's concern with personal responsibility, the attempt to create wholeness, and to live an authentic existence, indeed the obsession with alienation, are all foreshadowed in the writings of the Libertarians. "The unfolding of [a child's] individuality is gradual, and its growing development is precisely marked, by the increase of its ability to assume the consequences of its own acts."[49] In this early Libertarian formulation, individuality accrues to man insofar as he accepts moral responsibility for his own actions.

The constriction of individual sovereignty to morally-responsible beings presents a strain on its universality. But a strain which allows of reconciliation. The problem of drawing the line which the granting of an exception to a universal principle permits, must rest ultimately upon human judgment; and if arbitrary or fickle human judgment be allowed to set limits to universal principles the universality itself must come into question. Warren's residue of Owenite environmental determinism comes to the rescue: men are morally irresponsible due to the social milieu and structures within which they develop and behave. To extend moral responsibility one need only alter the structure of society in the appropriate manner. Crime and sociopathy are socially determined in two senses: first, with a bow to Robert Owen's environmental determinism, and to Locke's tabula rasa, man's chracter is determined by (i.e., results from) the experiences and conditions of his social existence; and second, man's deviancy is determined

by (i.e., defined by) the norms of society. Therefore, as utopians of varying stripes tell us, with the advent of the Golden age man will be decent, fraternal, industrious, and creative because these qualities were blocked and perverted by the old order: such is the message of Plato's Republic, of Rousseau's Social Contact, and of Marx's German Ideology among other critical philosophies of history.

The willingness to assume moral responsibility for one's own actions provides, even at this early date, a bridge between the radicalism of the Libertarians and the social conservatism of the right. Andrews makes a radical case against welfare activities: all individuals must stand to one another in terms of equal responsibility, otherwise they are falsely related and "no true principle can apply." When such false relationships intrude, only conflict and collision result. To return to a point discussed above, the parsing of humanity into its individual parts (analysis) prepares and enables individual beings to meet one another on a plane of moral equality, a definitional prerequisite for their joining together in any future undertaking (synthesis). Private charity is good, albeit inadequate; public charity is extortion as regards those taxed to support it, and cruel paternalism as concerns those who are maintained in their lifestyle of poverty: "The oppressed classes do not want charity, but justice, and with simple justice the necessity for charity will disappear or be reduced to a minimum."[50] Charity is then an excuse for not eliminating the causes of poverty and prejudice, and philanthropy is a coward's surrogate for social revolution.

Another mainstay of the liberal left which is rejected, or rather redefined, is "democracy". As noted earlier, Warren and Andrews saw their function

the application of democracy to realms other than that of political representation. Democracy in their vocabulary meant not rule-by-the-majority nor even rule-by-the-people, but it referred to free entry to different arenas of life without regard to inherited or unearned wealth and reputation. Democracy to them meant a moral equality uninhibited by arbitrary and unreasonable exclusions. It had nothing whatsoever to do with head-counting and electoral politics: "In the sham democracies, wherein majorities govern, the condition of the office-seeker and or the office-holder is alike and peculiarly unfortunate.[51]

For Andrews "Democracy" indicated a social milieu in which each individual faced every other in a condition of equal vulnerability and hence of equal responsibility.[52] In this formulation, democracy entailed a universal moral grant of equality to all individuals, with no increment for those who find themselves fortunate enough or sycophantic enough to be in the majority. Indeed the grant of sovereignty to each individual is so broad as to disallow any enlargement of it save at the dimunition of the sphere of moral rights of another--an argument which even majoritarians are loath to make explicit.

Andrews devotes in excess of two-thirds of The Science of Society to the third premise of Warren's five-point inventory. Echoing Warren's objections to using "value" as the standard of price, Andrews presents his readers with a comparison between the "system of civilized cannibalism by which the masses of Human beings are mercilessly ground to powder for the accumulation of the wealth of the few, on the one hand, and on the other, the reign of equity, the just remuneration of labor, and the independence and elevation of all mankind.[53] The system of civilized cannibalism, of course, refers to ordinary capitalism based upon a pricing system tied to value, while the golden age of equity rests upon commerce predicated upon

the cost principle. The use of the adjective "civilized" before the pejorative noun "cannibalism" seems to indicate a strain of radical but naive Rousseauinism,[54] i.e., an abhorrence of the social decadence of modernity and a yearning for the simple, and more moral, life styles of less sophisticated society. The major criticism of the value principle remains simply that it is grounded not upon any expenditure on the part of the seller, but entirely rests upon the need, either physical or psychic, of the potential buyer. The price of a good or service is whatever the traffic will bear, and its worth may be translated as "what's it worth to you?" It matters not how much an item costs its seller--he might have inherited it, had it given to him, found it, or stolen it--it matters only how desperately the buyer wants the item in question. A child, a fool, someone mentally deranged or hopelessly sentimental, an addict-either physiological or, as with an avid collector, mental--or someone in severe need represents the preferred customer under such a value system of pricing: the relationship is asymmetrical, the buyer exists to be exploited and is not engaged in a transaction between equals.

In this context it becomes obvious what particular meaning "democracy" has for Andrews. The value pricing system is undemocratic in that it inhibits the exchange of goods and services on a plane of equality. Utilizing a simple and literal application of the labor theory of value, Andrews points out that "if this exchange is not equal, if one party gives more of his own labor--either in the form of labor or product--then he gets of the labor of the other,--either in the form of labor or product,--then he is oppressed, and becomes, so far as this inequality goes, the slave or subject of the other.[55] Morally equating the two terms equality and democracy, Andrews sets about criticizing all relationships which prevent indi-

viduals from meeting one another as moral equals; any subvention of this equality, whether it appear in the realms of social organization, church hierarchy, economic exchanges, or marital and sexual relationships, is definitionally undemocratic.

The cost principle represents a means of banishing unequal relationships from the realm of financial exchanges--although as noted above through his amplification of the term commerce, Andrews was not willing to restrict his applications of the Cost Principle solely to that category of interpersonal arrangements. Since much of man's granting of prestige and deference parallels a person's income and educational attainments, a levelling which results from a change in principle of financial exchange will affect human interrelationships far beyond the scope of the market place itself. The rejection of income as a means of evaluation and its replacement with the regard for creative labor indicates a thorough going revolution in social norms and a repudiation of elitist criteria in preference for more democratic ones.

However Andrews failed to consider fully that in an exchange the parties are not actually exchanging equivalents, rather each is giving up something he individually values less than the object being gained. Stephen Pearl Andrews used the strict equivalence argument - taken over wholesale from Warren - to prevent unfair exchanges and speculation. But the stipulated requirement of equivalence assumes as well as possible, and possible desirable homogenity of human nature. A medium of exchange serves to coordinate two items being bartered e.g., a cow and two sheep or a bushel of turnips and a pair of sandals, but it also serves to store value by separating the buying and the selling portions of the exchange. John wishes to sell his wheat, and must do so before it rots, but does not wish to take

in exchange the myriad items of barter. Should he want a relatively costly item like a buggy and the owner has no need for its equivalent value in wheat, John could offer the barter items already received. The medium of exchange simplifies this complex bargaining and calculating by a standard unit of comparison. However the medium of exchange supported solely upon the equivalence of labor assumes that the personal valuations of an object is irrelevant--a strange assumption for an individualist. But men's valuations are not irrelevant, nor are they necessarily rational. Where some would prefer a piece of of the True Cross, others would opt for a 1918 inverted air mail stamp or a classic Silver Cloud. One man's trash is another man's cult.[56]

Values are a manifestation of the individual and their incommensurability provides the possibility for a non-aggressive and non-exploitive means of obtaining a surplus value from an exchange. It is this failure to account for the idiosyncratic and the subjective which prompted Benjamin Tucker to embrace egoism--and which, ironically, opens the door to the further revisionist position of anarcho-capitalism.

That Warren and Andrews define equality in terms of moral responsibility and not in crass material terms constitutes both a strength and a weakness of their theory. Warren had originally defined cost solely in terms of the expenditure of labor and material, an object's cost was the amount of time and substance needed to replace it. In the later editions of Equitable Commerce and in Practical Applications of the Elementary Principles of True Civilization he came to accept the degree of unpleasantness and odious labor as a legitimate component of cost. Andrews came to the theory at a time when Warren had already amended the original formula, so that he could starkly state that: "Nothing is properly the rightful subject of

price but repugnance overcome.[57] This helps to restore some respect to jobs which previously had been held in contempt. A simple notion of fairness informed the principle: men who performed labor which was neither physically exhausting nor psychologically distressful, already received an unearned increment on their labor. Therefore to restore the equality of position among laborers an increment of "cost" was provided those who performed necessary but disagreeable jobs.

The weakness in the principle results from its vagueness of implementation. How does one order the increments to be bestowed upon the physical exertions of a highway construction worker, the health hazards of a coal miner, the tedium of an assembly line worker, the psychic frustration of a social worker, or the social derogation of a garbage hauler? Andrews recognized this problem and suggests, entirely in consonance with his individualist premises, that "each individual must make his or her own estimate of the repugnance to him or her of the particular labor which he or she performs." This again represents an example of Warren joined with Fourier: "The Individual must be kept absolutely above all institutions. He must be left free even to abandon the principles whenever he chooses. The only constraint must be in the attractive nature and results of true principles."[58]

With this problem the relevancy of Warren's fourth principle asserts itself: A circulating medium, founded on the cost of labor. Andrews immediately admits that is in fact "not so properly a principle as an indispensable instrument for carrying the cost principle into practical application.[59] The need for such an instrument is a consequence of the unavoidable fact that not all exchanges are bilaterally fulfilled on the spot. Barter, as J. S. Mill had pointed out, confounds in a single act the buying and selling, while money permits their temporal separation.[60] Such a separation permits

speculation in the differential between the time of the first transaction to that of the second part of the complete transaction. Warren's labor note system attempted to bridge this gap, it presumed an equitable transaction, i.e., a barter of equivalent labor units, and by offering labor notes he permitted a separation of the transaction in two parts as well. Since the labor notes pledged labor, a commodity supposedly impermeable to inflationary factors, speculation was to be vitiated. However Warren and Andrews sanctioned a surrogate for equivalent labor, for those cases wherein the particular labor was unneeded and its cost stored for future use or exchange: corn. Corn could be subject to speculation in virtue of its relative scarcity or abundance, i.e., its market value, in the outer social realm. But the basis of equitable exchange was the labor note; "a new species of paper-money" according to Andrews "based solely upon individual responsibility."[61]

Such a circulating medium possesses four advantages over ordinary money in his account. First it is cheap and abundant: it costs but the price of paper upon which the promise is written or engraved. The money is not subject to fluctuation and scarcity, every one has the ability to create wealth based upon the capacity to labor, and a reputation for sound character. Second, everyone is his own banker. Sharing the distaste of left-radicals for the money-monopoly Andrews would gladly deprive them of their exclusive domain while at the same time suggesting that as a bank must pay attention to its reputation and be cautious to maintain its credit so with labor notes each individual must do the same under threat of his personal credit being ruined and hence he as a bank would fail.

The third advantage of the labor note over ordinary money is to be found in its combination of the properties of a circulating medium of exchange with the properties of a means of credit. It is only so far as an

individual has personal credit that his labor notes will be accepted. The entire mechanism of the market-place serves as a means of encouraging and enforcing individual responsibility--an individual with a bad credit rating had better mend his ways or he is liable to go quite hungry. In this instrument Warren and Andrews have offered a means of social manipulation to create responsible individuals--they have presented an individualistic response to Owen's problem of environmental determinism, without the creation of an artificial and authoritarian controlled community.

As its fourth advantage, the labor note represents a specific and defined amount of labor or property, hence it is not subject to the vicissitudes of inflation or deflation. Rather than a nebulous claim on an unspecified or inaccessible amount of gold or silver bullion, subject to government monetary policy and the inconstant results of foreign and domestic political maneuvers, the labor note clearly carries a notice of the amount of labor it represents and who is responsible for its redemption. In this it is less like a dollar bill than a railway ticket or concert ticket--it represents a discrete commodity rather than a fluctuating standard: A dollar bill will buy one amount of salt or coal on Monday and a different amount on Thursday or Friday: but a railroad ticket buys a trip of a definite length on Monday, Friday, or any day in between.

After discussing the advantages of Labor Notes, Andrews appends a caveat in his last chapter: "It will be appropriate now also to say a few words in relation to the capacity of the individual Labor Note to expand into a general system of currency. As that capacity depends somewhat upon the prevalence of confidence consequent upon a general habit of honesty in the community, it could not be so favorably presented until the power of the Cost Principle in operation, to engender that habit, had been previously shown."[62]

To return now to a previous point, the problem of quantifying the repugnance of a job must be assessed first by the individual performing the unpleasant task, and added to the cost to him of the goods or services he exchanges. Since the medium of exchange is a grandiose scheme of personal credit the reciprocal evaluation of the increment to be assigned to any repugnant labor must be accepted by the other parties to its exchange. Should the garbage hauler assign his duty a repugnance value of 10, and find no one willing to exchange goods or services with him, he would then be forced to reexamine his decision and bring it into line with the perceptions of others in the market place. This is reasonable and constitutes a practical solution to the amended cost principle. But it still represents an exception to the absolute and universal principle of individuality and constitutes in the realm of economic relationships an example of the very majoritarian principle which was so vehemently repudiated as "sham democracy" in the content of political relationships.

The fifth, and last, of the principles of equity is the regulation of the two market places forces-supply and demand. As noted above, Warren's understanding of the terms are not those of sophisticated economists. Like Warren, Andrews meant by these words quite different things. The principle was stated as the "adaptation of the supply to the demand." As he did with the meaning of commerce, Andrews took what apparently referred to, and appeared to be restricted to, the realm of economic transactions and turned it into a universal principle meant to guide behavior and state relationships in all areas of life. In its more obvious relevance to commercial exchanges, Andrews accepted Warren's simple definitional example cited earlier: "supply" meant the labor or goods available for exchange, and "demand" referred to the existence of persons wishing to purchase them:

"a knowledge of the way of getting supernumary shirts into contact with the backs of the men who have none."[63] Looked at more closely this simple principle of bookkeeping efficiency discloses a major moral statement: the Libertarian program is the adjustment of supply to the demand rather than the egoistic injunction to alter the supply to the demand--a process of coercion whether it be brute physical coercion or the more subtle psychological type. Demand, being the demand of sovereign individuals, might be presumed to have preference in the allocating of supply. If supply is less than demand, the ordinary capitalist charges the recipients more for their good fortune, while the unrequited remain so; thus only the supplier benefits and he does so at the selfish exploitation of two other classes, the 'haves' who pay for the privilege, and the 'have-nots' who are deprived. Even assuming the supplier to be the kind of man not to milk misfortune to its limit - he may not levy a surcharge on the lucky recipients, but while the supplier thus garners no added benefit, neither does that portion of the demand population still deprived.

In consonance with the principle of sovereign individuality and the goal of equity, the adjustment of supply to demand takes on special importance. For the portion of the demand which is denied its supply risks becoming disadvantaged and thus not in a condition of equality with the recipients. Should the condition of disadvantage be continually allotted to a particular group, the justice of the arrangement dissipates. Even more invidiously, justice is also contravened should disadvantage breed a cumulative effect--if those who are excluded from the possession of the limited supply of decent housing, also, as a consequence, must attend the poorer quality of schools, and therefore are also excluded, "on merit basis," from well-paying jobs, the process may be postulated to be cumulative.

Justice then necessitates that supply be met by demand--and as justice, not city planning, was Plato's quest in The Republic, so it, not the reform of store-keeping, comprises Warren's goal in Equitable Commerce, and thus Andrews' as well. Justice necessitates that individuals be respected as individuals, that they receive the full measure of recompense for their labor, that their needs be taken account of (although not automatically gratified; any agency capable of such need-fulfillment would constitute a source of centralized power inimicable to individual sovereignty) and that each individual accept responsibility for his own actions. That distills and concentrates the normative content of the Warren-Andrews theory of individual sovereignty. The sources of inspiration for the two men were divergent, their backgrounds and intellectual sophistication varied greatly, and already a contradiction in philosophical influences had entered the formation of the Libertarian credo: first, in the residuum of the spurned communism of Robert Owen, and second, in conflicting attitudes of Warren and Andrews regarding the utility and desirability of the social principles of Charles Fourier. But the core theory was complete with the publication of The Science of Society in 1851.

That was a year of great promise--Andrews published the book meant to be the philosophic and propagandistic arm of the Equity movement and he and Warren organized Modern Times, its practical working out in the experimental world. Warren had come East in search of support and the opportunity for practical application, and he met and was encouraged by the fellowship of other radicals--the future looked favorable. But the Civil War and the Tribune, with some help from disgruntled and ambitious insiders, helped to destroy the experiment on Long Island--and in one of history's ironies its present name was conferred by residents in honor of two of the early

colonists most responsible for the failure of its Libertarian phase.[64] The experimental phase of Libertarianism came to an end and the battleground switched from rows of cooperatively raised homes and furrowed fields to the printed page and the lecture podium. Libertarianism had incubated a theory on the frontier and now sought to nourish it to maturity in the midst of an urbanizing and industrializing society: the goal remained the same, sovereign individuality within the community, but the means of attaining it had changed.

Andrews had been an indefatigible campaigner in lecture tours, pamphleteering, letter writing, and generalized frenzy. More importantly, he was the first to attempt to dignify individualist economic anarchism as a social philosophy.[65] But by 1860 Andrews had suffered another conversion and individualism and free thought took a permanent backseat to the mystic affinities of his eclectic mind. In that year "Andrusius, Pantarch" was born, and the ever present quest for certainty and unity supplanted the tolerant questioning of his earlier days: henceforth the creation of community was defined structurally a la Comte, and imposed in response to a blueprint drawn up from above.

The quest for universals now led Pearl Andrews to the creation of a New Catholic Church; world government, a common world language, and a shared world faith were now to be expedited through the inauguration of "Andrusius, Pantarch." A residue of Warren remained even now: Andrews' moral concerns and social sensitivity were amazingly constant throughout his career of frenetic system-testing, and he now defined the role of the Pantarch as "the Individual, self-elected, but powerless except as he is voluntarily acknowledged and obeyed..."[66] The mystic affinities of Swedenborg and of Comte had now fully captivated Pearl Andrews and he fell within

the purview of D. H. Lawrence's observation "the best Americans are mystics by instinct."[67]

Andrews enthusiatically embarked on a new crusade, proselytizing for a new agency of total redemption, and exhibiting a new burst of creative energy on its behalf: so the dozen years of Libertarianism enriched by the diversity, scope, and madness of his mind came to an end. The remainder of his life was as fascinating as his earlier escapades: he headed a section of the International Workingman's Association, he introduced the Communist Manifesto to an American audience, he was architect of Victoria Woodhill's strange charade of a presidential campaign, and he still had the glory and scandal of the Beecher-Tilton trial, a public feud with Oliver Wendell Holmes, and several run-ins with Anthony Comstock yet to look forward to. But his relevance for the Libertarian movement had largely drawn to a close. He lived on until 1886, and upon his passing the radical Thaddeus Wakeman delivered an eulogy at the Manhattan Liberal Club--which had been founded by Andrews--calling him a "veiled Prophet."[68]

If Pearl Andrews was veiled, it was a veil largely woven of his abstruse prose, his sensational crusades, his awesome erudition,[69] and his incredible ego. Perhaps the fairest summary of the man was offered by Benjamin Tucker; "Stephen Pearl Andrews is dead. More mental force went out with him than is left in any one person on the plantet..."[70] A more objective assessment, one emphasizing his role for both Libertarian thought and the growth of a "science of society" was penned by Jessie and Luther Lee Bernard: "He was one of those erratic men, too dynamic and explorative for their age, perhaps also too brilliant to be profound and dependable as a guide, whose chief social function seems to be that of serving as intellectual antennae, feeling about for new ideas, toying

with them, getting the popular mind ready for them, and keeping them alive until more sober and respectable scholars are willing to handle them."[71]

1. Stephen Pearl Andrews,"Autobiography", p. 30. Andrews Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society.

2. Ibid., pp. 23, 35f.

3. Dyson, A Century of Brentwood, p. 71f.

4. Stern, The Pantarch, p. 28.

5. Ibid., pp. 42, 44f.

6. The case Gaines v New Orleans, and concerned Myra Clark Gaines the illegitimate daughter of Daniel Clark a wealthy merchant. As an "adulterine bastard" she was not entitled under Louisiana law to inherit. The case continued for over sixty years, was appealed in the Supreme Court ten times, and was settled five years after the death of the plaintiff.
Nolan Bailey Harmon, Jr., The Famous Case of Myra Clark Gaines, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946), passim.

7. According to a former resident of Modern Times, Pearl Johnson Tucker--the wife of Benjamin R. Tucker--was the grand-daughter of Stephen Pearl Andrews and named in his honor. Dyson, A Century of Brentwood, p. 57.

8. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 292; Stern, The Pantarch, p. 4.

9. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. vii.

10. Stephen Pearl Andrews, The Primary Synopsis of Universology and Alwato, (New York: Dion Thomas, 1871), p. 31.

11. Ibid., p. 33.

12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. Ibid., p. 5.

14. Ibid., p. 27.

15. Luther Lee and Jessie Bernard, Origins of American Sociology: The Social Science Movement in the United States, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1943), p. 315.

16. Samuel Bernstein, The First International in America (New York: Augustus G. Kelley, 1962), p. 101f.

17. Inge Jonsson, "Emanuel Swedenborg," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy VIII, 50.

18. Sig Synnestvedt (Ed.), The Essential Swedenborg (New York: Swedenborg Foundation, 1970), passim.

19. Andrews, Primary Synopsis..., p. 45.

20. Ibid., p. 183f.

21. The influences of Swedenborg and Fourier overlap. The motto of The Harbinger - "All things, at the present day, stand prepared and await the light. The ship is in the harbor;the sails are swelling; the east wind blows; let us weigh anchor, and put forth to sea" - was from Swedenborg. Several prominent disciples of Fourier were also deeply influenced by the Swedish mystic, e.g., William H. Channing, Charles A. Dana, George Ripley, and Henry James. Noyes, History of American Socialisms, p. 544ff.

22. Charles Fourier, "Theorie de L'Unite Universelle," excerpted in Design for Utopia: Selected Writings of Charles Fourier, edited and introduced by Charles Gide , (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 55f.

23. Ibid., p. 121f.

24. Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. 70.

25. Ibid.

26. Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason' (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 25.

27. Ibid.

28. M. A. Clancy, "Introduction," Stephen Pearl Andrews, The Basic Outline of Universology (New York: Dion Thomas, 1872), p. xv.

29. Andrews, Primary Synopsis..., p. 3.

30. Ibid., p. 144.

31. Quotes in Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 9.

32. Andrews, Primary Synopsis..., p. 2f.

33. Ibid., p. 2.

34. Stephen Pearl Andrews, "The History of Socialism," p. 45. Andrews Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.

35. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 58.

36. Ibid., p. 39.

37. Charles Shively, "Introduction," to Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 14.

38. Andrews virtually assumes joint--albeit temporary--responsibility with Warren for the development of the core of Libertarian thought.

39. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 7.

40. Ibid., p. 9.

41. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 2.

42. Ibid.

43. The influence on and contributions to emerging sociology by Warren and Andrews receives the attention of two chapters in Bernard, Origins of American Sociology. Harvey Wish also wrote a study entitled "Stephen Pearl Andrews: American Pioneer Sociologist" (Social Forces XIX, May 1941, 477-82).

44. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 27. For B. F. Skinner's similar defense of his theory of operant conditioning cf. B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1953), p. 73.

45. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 28.

46. Ibid.

47. Both of these works were digested during Andrews' recuperation from fever in Jackson, Louisiana in 1833, at the age of twenty-one. Stern, The Pantarch, p. 20.

48. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 55.

49. Ibid., p. 37. Cf. "If any single thesis could be said to constitute the doctrine of existentialism, it would be that the possibility of choice is the central fact of human nature." Alasdair MacIntyre, "Existentialism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy III, 149.

50. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 39.

51. Ibid., p. 29.

52. For an interesting account of the similarity in premises of individualist anarchism and Hobbesian authoritarianism see April Carter, The Political Theory of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

53. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 53.

54. In view of Warren's own contributions to technology it would be unfair to equate this attitude with Luddism.

55. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 66.

56. In a literal sense this was evident in the antics of A. J. Weberman who gained some fame by making involved analyses of the garbage of the folk-rock musician and poet Bob Dylan. Since his endeavours a reporter for the National Enquirer began sifting the refuse of Secretary of State Kissinger.

57. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 77.

58. Ibid., p. 69.

59. Ibid., p. 58.

60. John Stuart Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy quoted in George J. Stigler, Essays on the History of Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago, Press, 1965), p. 10.

61. Andrews, The Science of Society, p. 70.

62. Ibid., p. 147.

63. Ibid., p. 56.

64. On September 7, 1864 the community elected to change its name to Brentwood, after the former home in England of the Comtean Positivist and colonist Henry Edger. Dyson, A Century of Brentwood, p. 112.

65. Schuster, Native American Anarchism, p. 107.

66. Stephen Pearl Andrews, "Constitution of Organic Basis of the Pantarch," p. 9. Andrews Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.

67. D. H. Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature, (New York: Viking Press, 1923), p. 114.

68. Stern, The Pantarch, p. 150.

69. Ibid., pp. 105f, 69. Dyson notes that Andrews knew thirty-two languages at the time of founding of Modern Times, Dyson, A Century of Brentwood, p. 71f.

70. Liberty IV (June 19, 1886), 4.

71. Bernard, Origins of American Sociology, p. 315. The more popular impression of the man, as portrayed in the press, might be gained from an account of his testimony at the Beecher-Tilton trial. As The New York Times reported to its readers on May 9, 1875: "Mr. Andrews having got through with universology, Alwato, Chinese metaphysics, and other matters of which he has exclusive knowledge, and has written books about, of which he is the exclusive reader... descended to affairs more immediately connected with his presence on the witness stand."

ECCENTRIC FORCES: LYSANDER SPOONER AND WILLIAM B. GREENE

Banks and Money-Cranks

Warren's individualism was retained by his colleagues Lysander Spooner and William B. Greene. His equity principle, however, was not, and with their contributions the Equity movement became the Libertarian tradition. For neither Greene nor Spooner accepted in toto Warren's economics: Greene derived his from Proudhon while Spooner was an inveterate eclectic and autodidact. Each supported a position of laissez faire but the natural condition which would result from the State keeping its hands off differed from the one which Warren foresaw. Ironically with these comrades, Libertarian thought exhibits its ancestral links to Proudhonian anarchism as well as its ties to contemporary conservatism. As with Warren the protection of the individual and the preservation of the private sphere remained of prime concern, but unlike him, they concentrated upon reforms within existing society. And their major objects of concern were the institutions of money, credit, and banking.

The tangle of monetary policy and the monetary reformers in this era were truly awesome. The issues of gold, silver, and paper complicated many a morally righteous platform. The silver dollar had been established by the Coinage Act of 1792 as the legal monetary unit of this country based upon Alexander Hamilton's Report on the Establishment of a Mint. It created a bimetallic system of gold and silver set at the ratio recommended in 1717 by Isaac Newton.[1] President Andrew Jackson later permitted a slight alteration of the ratio between the rare metals and established the 1:16 ratio.

Being worth more on the open market than in the form of coins, silver had already begun to disappear as a medium of exchange when a rash of strikes in the rich mining areas of Australia and California in the 'thirties and 'forties resulted in gold being even more plentiful. Consequently silver nearly vanished and in 1853 Congress debased all silver coinage under the one-dollar denomination, thereby keeping small change in circulation, although implicitly recognizing that the 1:16 standard was a failure.[2] This condition lasted until after the Civil War, when new technological improvements in extracting and refining silver, and the discovery of a series of silver deposits revived that metal as a medium of exchange--whereupon its plenitude nearly drove gold out of circulation.

The vagaries of the circulating medium caused severe economic deprivation. The contractual obligation of "payment in coin" caused much hardship and uncertainty, and fostered a great deal of speculation. Payment in coin at the instigation of a debt might have been expected to mean redemption in gold; after the strike of the sixties however, redemption was usually made in cheap silver. Creating even greater hardships were contracts which stipulated payment in a particular metal. After the Civil War and the changes in circulation referred to above, silver became the medium of exchange favored by the debt-ridden working and lower-middle classes, while gold was preferred by the creditory class.

Currency reform was intimately intertwined with banking reform. Bray Hammond, in his chronicle, Banking from the Revolution to the Civil War, points out that in the early days of the new republic three separate types of banks existed: "the money banks" of the commercial centers where capital could be paid in specie and assets comprised short-term loans to merchants"; banks established in agricultural areas where specie was

sparse and "in consequence the credit of the state was the bank's principal or only capital"; and a third variety of a hybrid nature wherein the bank combined traditional banking with some other activity either to conceal the banking function from regulation or because the combination offered an augmented opportunity for enrichment.[3] It was the first type which predominated and became the model of banking orthodoxy in the nation, although its ascendency was still in doubt in the immediate post-war era.

Banking mushroomed in the early republic; within a quarter century of the founding of the Bank of the United States the number of banks increased from six to two hundred and forty-six.[4] The reason for the increase was the profitability of banks in an unregulated and expanding economy. Wild cat banking and monetary speculation not only existed because of the economic fluctuations but in fact caused these fluctuations through manipulated demand. Banks issued paper currency called banknotes which were not legally money, merely "promissory notes," thereby giving rise to the practice of "discounting", i.e., the practice of paying in specie a fraction of the face value of the banknote. The practice of discounting engendered considerable agitation, especially among the debtor class. Discounts varied from bank to bank and from area to area: Hammond notes that circa 1816 a dollar worth one dollar in New England was discounted to ninety-three cents in New York and Charleston, eighty-five cents in Philadelphia, and between seventy-five and eighty cents in Baltimore and the District of Columbia.[5] Furthermore, the banking profession was not above holding up the government of the United States itself. A Congressional committee in 1830 estimated that of the $80,000,000 in governmental indebtedness, only $34,000,000 in specie value actually accrued to the government because of the practice of discounting.[6]

As Hammond concludes, "the Americans' level of business morality was in the 19th century no matter of national pride."[7] A characterization apparently shared by European creditors, for when the Bank of England called upon some of its American colleagues to meet their obligations a specie drain and a run on the banks ensued--and the Panic of 1837 resulted.[8] Companies failed, individuals were ruined, and entire states faced fiscal disaster: the vast program of internal improvements undertaken by the enthusiastic young states and financed by public loans brought New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio near to bankruptcy. On the other hand, New Hampshire which had left internal improvements to private enterprise rode out the Panic with relative ease[9], while Warren's colony at Tuscarawas had been buffered from the monetary trauma of the larger society through their mutual exchange and labor note devices. Pearl Andrews had been personally less fortunate as his life savings were wiped out in Louisiana thereby spurring him to Texas for a fresh start--and a hasty return. Joshua King Ingalls, a close companion and fellow traveller of the Libertarians, had also suffered severly from the Panic, losing his business and instilling in him a life-long dedication to monetary reform.[10]

As one historian of the era summarized events: "Practically all shipping, building, and manufacturing were suspended. Nine-tenths of the New England factories were shut down. Over six hundred banks had closed their doors in 1837 alone and now [1841] others were closing daily. Scrip made its appearance and the people in the rural districts resorted to barter."[11] Even though Warren's Tuscarawas colony rode out the fiscal debacle, the frontier as a whole was less fortunate. By 1841 one-third of the banks in Ohio had failed and riots broke out the following year in Cincinnati when the courts outlawed certain banknotes and suspended specie payment by other local institutions.[12]

Out of the insecurity came a repertory of nostrums and panaceas to which the Libertarians contributed generously. Their programs, as their social condition, differed from those of the commodious middle-class or the repressed proletariat. If the bourgeois be understood as the proto-capitalist entrepeneur, the label petty-bourgeois covers the respectable tradesmen and craftsmen upon whom the speculators, money-lenders, and gouging middlemen preyed. He was, in short, a latent anti-capitalist. He existed upon his own labor, expected the same from others, and abominated unearned wealth. The social and economic theory of Libertarianism enshrined those values in the equity principle. Here too, the Libertarians breathed the spirit of Jefferson when he had written of bank notes that their object was "to enrich scoundrels at the expense of the honest and industrious part of the nation."[13]

Proudhon's economics had first been brought to this country in 1847 by Wilhelm Weitling, a peripatetic socialist tailor. A year later Charles A. Dana wrote a series of six articles on mutualism for the New York Tribune, later accumulated as Proudhon's Solution of the Social Problem. In the same year another American Fourierist, Albert Brisbane, interviewed Proudhon and came away "glad to find that Proudhon and I agreed perfectly as to (credit) principles which in our opinion could be applied practically in various ways even in the present state of society."[14]

But William Bradford Greene was undoubtedly Proudhon's most devoted proselytizer. Born April 4, 1819 in Haverhill, Massachusetts, Greene began his life amidst bourgeois surroundings as son of the publisher of the Boston Statesman. Attracted from an early age by the military, Greene studied at West Point, and after his commission took part in the Seminole Campaign against Osceola. By the outbreak of the Civil War, however, his

anarchist position was becoming evident, for while commander of a coast artillery regiment defending the Capitol, Greene posted a sign on his headquarters tent, warning, "Dogs and Congressmen Keep Out!"[15]

Between the wars Greene had undertaken studies at Harvard Divinity School and been ordained a Unitarian minister. While overt anarchism was slow in maturing, radical positions and attitudes marked even his early life. As an elected delegate to the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853, Greene had made a particularly dramatic defense of women's suffrage, opposed majority rule on moral grounds, advocated individualism as necessary for freedom, and defended the right to peaceful revolution.

Women's rights for Greene, however, did not entail sexual freedom or the dissolution of the institution of marriage. He vehemently opposed the "free love" theories of Francis Barry, and later quarreled with his fellow Libertarian Ezra Heywood over the same issue. In a letter to Heywood's The Word (October 10, 1874), Greene insisted that the abolition of marriage would sacrifice the interests of women and children "for the benefit of the grown men."[16] Heywood of all the Libertarians--even more than Andrews and Tucker--had dedicated his energies to sexual reform. He had claimed that in Christ's "Free Love Kingdom of Heaven...they neither marry nor are given in marriage."[17] He saw marriage as a form of slavery; "Boys," he wrote in reference to the practice of apprenticing youngsters, "are 'bound out' till twenty-one, girls are bound in for life."[18] Greene, on the contrary, conceived marriage as a contract between consenting parties, the man, the woman, and "the organic society of which the man and woman are members." Such a tripartise contract could be abrogated only upon consent of all contracting parties.[19] On this point Greene took a position liberal for its day, but still remote from the voluntaristic stance of his radical colleagues.

In this matter Greene, wealthy by birth and marriage, is reminiscent of his friend and mentor, the autodidact peasant Proudhon whom Greene had met while residing in France during the decade 1853-1862.[20]

With the outbreak of the Civil War, Greene returned to accept a commission in the Union forces, resigning shortly thereafter to devote his time to Proudhonian propaganda, to labor reform, and to the issue most identified with his name, the agitation for mutual banking. In pursuit of this last goal he issued two statements of the new Libertarian economics: Mutual Banking, a work published in 1850 which predates his meeting with Proudhon, and Socialistic, Mutualistic, and Financial Fragments a compilation of articles published a quarter century later. It was these works, particularly the latter, which prompted Benjamin R. Tucker to say of Greene, "I owe to him my appreciation of the giant Proudhon."[21]

Greene's central concern was the creation of a mutual land bank--an idea which had roots in both Proudhon's bank and in American colonial history. The premise of Libertarian economics is similar to vulgar Marxism in that social reform requires the annihilation of a class-imposed restriction on the full utilization of labor power. In Marx it was the capitalist class which exploited the proletariat, for the Libertarians it was the perpetrators of the money monopoly who denied the laborer the full measure of his labor. According to Greene, oppression results from a manipulated and restricted medium of exchange. He quoted Proudhon's dictum that "We must destroy the royalty of gold and we must republicanize specie, by making every product of labor ready money."[22] The theory of Mutualism as derived from Proudhon and introduced by Greene into American radical politics sees the replacement of political government with an economic system of mutual interdependence resulting from the correlation of borrowers and lenders--

or in Warren's terms, the "adjustment of supply to demand"--through the agency of the Bank of the People. Regardless of the form of capital involved--money, land, tools, physical labor, or even talent--this Exchange Bank was to serve as a great clearinghouse, a realization of Warren's desire to adjust "supply" to "demand." The healthy laborer without tools of production, and the shopowner who lacks a skilled laborer could find one another through its auspices.[23] Since all exchange or trade was merely barter in one form or another, all commodities of trade were legitimate material for the transactions of a people's bank. Money, insofar as it has an authentic purpose, serves as a medium of exchange which facilitates the barter of three goats for one cow, or twelve hours of labor for thirty bushels of wheat. Paper currency derives its legitimacy from its function as an intermediary of standardized and recognized value, and not from any inherent value of its own nor in respect to any manipulation of its quantity or its recognized valuation by some agency. The claim of government or of a brokerage house or banking trust to set the value of specie in terms of so much gold or silver was rejected as an interference with the direct exchange by arbitrarily altering the medium of exchange. That is, government or the financial czars could control the rewards derived from monetary speculation and investment profiteering by altering the medium of exchange so as to favor the creditor and to retain control of the species-issuing power for its exploitative partners.

Laissez faire as the battlecry in economics meant for Greene--as it did for Spooner--that arbitrary restrictions on the issuance of specie be rescinded and that the authoritarian imposition of a particular metallic standard be dropped to allow the normal play of market forces. The free banking issue was a tangled skein in radical politics of the day, and at

least two schools of advocates meant differing things by it. A class of frontier entrepeneurs chaffing under the domination of the Eastern banking establishment desired a new age of local banks under state charter. These were meant to meet the needs of and to provide a partner for the frontier businessman. A second form of free banking was agitated for by wildcat speculators who wanted the field opened to all comers and who opposed the monopolization and certification of banks by the state and federal governments. While the Libertarian position of Greene--and developed by Spooner, Ingalls, and Heywood, as well--was motivated by the concerns of the first group, it advocated the open-door policy favored by the latter. Greene's position was that the reserve of capital would be expanded by recognizing non-monetary forms of capital such as labor, tools, and especially land. Normal banks served as instruments of the exploiting capitalist class in that way they imposed a surcharge called interest on all transactions to which they were a party--thus extorting payment for something other than labor, a violation of Greene's theory as it was of Warren's.

Green's expansion of capital was effected by the land bank, wherein membership was gained by mortgaging realty in return for a "bill of exchange" with face-value of one-half of the assessed value of the property. All administrative costs were to be met by a one-per-cent levy on the amount of the loan.[24] Since, like all credit institutions the success of the land bank depended upon its acceptance by the community and upon a stable base of operations, Greene suggested that it should enroll a minimum of ten thousand subscribers before commencing operations.[25] A minimum of ten thousand mutual bank subscribers would inspire confidence in the undertaking, and once it was started each member would mutually protect every

other member from the vicissitudes of inflation and deflation of the money market in the national economy. Each member would be persuaded to guarantee his fellow member's credit by the fact that his own credit was to be insured through its continued acceptance by his fellows. This hedge against monetary vagaries was possible because Greene's currency was subject neither to artificial constraints of supply nor to the arbitrary manipulation of the metallic standard of its base. It was free from these forces because it was predicated upon real property of the bank members and was not tied to redemption in specie but served as "an anonymous title, exchangeable forever, and redeemable at sight, but only in merchandise and services."[26] Furthermore the currency was only to be issued to and redeemed from members of the mutualist bank, thereby discouraging speculators and discounters and fostering community among members.

Greene's Proudhonian theorizing had been influenced by a trio of domestic radicals: Josiah Warren, William Beck and Edward Kellog. Beck had published his contribution to radical economics, Money and Banking, in Cincinnati in 1839--unfortunately there exists no information to indicate whether Josiah Warren, busy with his Time Store and colonizing efforts in the neighborhood of Cincinnati at that time, was acquainted with this work. Beck had noted the intermediary function of money as the standard value among parties to an exchange, and he sought to replace money with a system of tickets representing the value of each piece of property, "whether current product or fixed capital." But not being an anarchist, Beck permitted the accounting of these ticket-transactions to be handled by governmental agents.[27] While Beck's fame was limited, Edward Kellogg was probably the most famous, or notorious, "money crank" in a milieu rich with fiscal reformers, revolutionaries, and faddists. He is credited with

influencing much of the subsequent politics of the Populists, of various silver and paper money agitations, and he was directly responsible for the philosophy of "Greenbackism."[28] Like Andrews and Joshua King Ingalls, Kellogg had been financially ruined by the Panic of 1837, which trauma apparently turned his mind away from merchandising to the problems of economic and social reform.[29] Kellog shared the concern of the Libertarians with the evil of unfettered interest. He, however, was no anarchist and he sought to create a National Bank capitalized at $50,000,000 with a branch in every city.[30] Kellogg's affinity with the Libertarian money cranks is apparent in his definition of usury which he asserts is "the taking for the use of money more than the use of money is worth. Now whether this be done under the name of interest, or exchange, or commissions, or other device, is wholly immaterial."[31]

But it is with Lysander Spooner that money-crankism makes its most direct contribution to the Libertarian tradition, and that monetary reform and the defense of the individual is most clearly conjoined.

The crustiest of a crusty lot, Lysander Spooner was second only to Warren himself in the pantheon of American Individualism. He was born January 19, 1808 at Athol, Massachusetts of a family which traced its history back to William Spooner of Plymouth in the year 1637. Like Andrews, he was a practising lawyer and began his radical career fighting within the legal system as a trained purveyor of the rules of the game. He was as eccentric as Pearl Andrews, although of a different cast altogether. If Andrews was sociable and an extrovert, Spooner was a cantankerous curmudgeon. His works are an education in calumny and invective, and his life a perpetual bachelorhood whose personal relations appear sublimated into univeral and thus impersonal contexts. Throughout his life Spooner found himself staunchly

at odds with much of the regulation and legislation that bounded his existence. Over a lifetime spent actively opposing social inequity, he discovered that reform of the system required more than legal briefs and constitutional citations. Ironically Spooner's first major confrontation with the legal system was a success. After spending the first quarter century of his life on his father's farm, Lysander Spooner left to work as a clerk in the Worcester registry of deeds, leaving shortly thereafter to begin reading law with apair of local lawyers, John Davis and Charles A. Allen. Shortly thereafter Spooner discovered that admission to the Massachusetts bar was denied persons without either a college degree or three additional years of authorized legal study. He then undertook a campaign which resulted in repeal of that requirement.

Like his colleagues Warren and Andrews, Spooner felt the call of the unfamiliar. After winning his case against the State of Massachusetts, Spooner relocated himself to Ohio. There he practiced law and in 1839 engaged the state in legal battle when he attempted to stay the Ohio state board of public works from damming the Maumee River.

As Martin notes in his history of "Individualist Anarchism," Spooner was one of that rare breed "whose radicalism increased rather than decreased with advanced age."[32] His earliest radical efforts were manifested in these legal skirmishes and in polemical pamphlets on the normally unconventional--and more-or-less tolerated--topics of free thought, currency reform, slavery, and poverty.[33] While this unrelenting barrage of polemics was being released he also undertook an example of propaganda by the deed and his only venture into the business world. Faced with the fact that the United States Post Office charged twelve cents to carry a letter from Boston to New York, and twenty-five cents from Boston to Washington, D.C.,

Spooner founded the American Letter Mail Company in 1844. His intention was to serve notice that laissez faire principles would result in better, cheaper, and more dependable service than possible with a governmental monopoly. Once again Lysander Spooner took on the government, this time the federal government. His success in carrying letters from Boston to Washington for a nickel did not prevent Congress from passing "the Spooner Act" prohibiting private letter carriers from competing with the federal monopoly.[34]

The economic order which Spooner envisioned appears at first glance similar to that of Warren. Schuster describes their affinities mellifluously as "free trade, free labor, free land, and free banking-- as well as a free conscience."[35]The differences between them largely concerned the labor note system of Warren and the legitimacy of copyright for Spooner.[36] Furthermore Warren and Andrews had acknowledged a psychic element as an appropriate component of cost when related to repugnant labor, but denied the claim of psychic cost as reward when related to a job of pleasant or creative qualities. Repugnant work most likely would refer to hard physical labor, jobs whose effects would be debilitating and noxious--the traditional work of the oppressed race, ethnic group, or class of a particular era. Psychic cost, like "preferential hiring" of a later day, was an unequal way of achieving equality: a novel device of distributive justice. This blatantly shows that Warren and Andrews' individualism was more complex than at first glance. Psychic cost as the component of cost was class-specific, the passive or the pleasantly employed classes could not claim any psychic needs as legitimate determinants of cost. In effect Warren's amendment of his equality of labor subsidized one category of society at the expense of others.

On the other hand, Spooner's concern was with the individual, to such an extent that he forms a natural bridge to the egoism of later Libertarianism under the influence of Tucker. He wrote for the individual who wished to be an invidual, and not one who simply desired to be equal. His moral sense led him to oppose all fetters upon the individual, and thus to oppose the oppression of the working class and to adumbrate the monopoly of money, but the equality he sought was of opportunity not of result.

Profit was wrong, he thought, but interest was permitted, in accordance with the sanctity of individuals and the binding nature of contracts, interest would work itself out in various rates under varying circumstances. Spooner opposed the imposition of a standard interest rate because it failed to account for particular local conditions, some loans might be virtually certain of full repayment while others might represent significant degrees of risk: possibly the former, he thought, should not be entitled to the 7% rate while some of the latter might deserve more for their risk--and thus the psychic cost of their worry and uncertainty. Such a system unfairly enriched the makers of 'safe loans' and discouraged the takers of risk. The arbitrary interest rate thus made it virtually impossible for a prospective buyer willing to undertake a venture of some uncertainty to find a loan agency willing to make it possible for him to do so. The lender would prefer to let out his money at a standard rate to borrowers of little risk rather than to let it out at the same rate to someone with no assurance of success. The result of such a system is to penalize the desperate, the adventurous, and the creative; this of course further resulted in a reinforcement of the status quo in the social, political, and artistic realms. Like Tucker later in his analysis of the "four monopolies," Spooner sees the structure of social inequity resting upon the monopoly of

money and credit.

Spooner's treatment of interest was terse, written like a lawyer gone awry, but its implications extended into the lair of social radicalism. The simple instance of an imposed standard interest rate, an example of supposed enlightened and liberal sentiment, stood revealed for him as a crutch for an oppressing order. It discouraged incentive and fostered conservatism: the same was said of Warren's denial of special reward for invention and genius. Interest fostered a speculative entrepeneur willing to take risks in return for rewards, and royalties fostered a man of practical wisdom whose reward would be commensurate with democratic approbation. Spooner sought to coordinate individual superiority and a consequently entailed inequality of reward, with a recognition of the demand of social existence and the possibility of community and fraternity. The free market permits superiority, but the superiority it recognizes in material terms is that apprehended by the consumer.[37]

Here in quite different applications of individualism Warren and Spooner implicitly strengthened the role of community in their theories. Warren's community was of an essentially equalitarian nature whose citizens didn't bother one another, chose to treat one another fairly, and perceived society in terms of a steady-state system. Spooner's community was more dynamic, it saw a necessity of economic inequality as a spur to material progress and cultural change. He sets forth seven propositions to combat poverty.[38] The first consistent with natural law that everyone must receive full measure for his labor, entails the second that everyone must therefore be his own boss. This is because wages necessitate managerial intermediaries whose increment to the cost is unclear and thereby destructive of the labor exchange theory. The third proposition combines the labor

theory with equality by demanding that everyone must have "materials,or capital, upon which to bestow his labor." To differentiate this from socialism, a premise of individual sovereignty is introduced in the fourth proposition which recognizes that for the labor theory of value to operate in a post-pastoral society labor may necessitate an investment in tools, supplies, sustenance, and habitation: A man without a financial stake is in a condition of inequality of opportunity as compared to one with such a stake. Under the theory of equity such nest eggs may only be arbitrarily, accidenally, or criminally acquired, such inequality was considered to penalize the honest pauper to the advantage of the wealthier scoundrel. Spooner's response is the recognition that anyone ought to be able to obtain credit--and since some men were better credit risks than others justice necessitates the variable interest rate referred to earlier. After all, he argued, a legally-set rate of interest was an interference with free contract: there is no more extortion in loaning capital to the best bidder, than is selling a horse, or renting a house to the best bidder. The true and fair price of capital, as of everything else, is that price which it will bring in fair and open market.[39]

He reiterates the usual laissez faire rote to the effect that a free market keeps prices down, including the price of credit, and his fifth proposition recognized the desire of laborers for capital at the lowest interest. Capital meant specie, gold, or silver: men without capital were trapped in their life styles and doomed never to be able to accumulate enough to rise above them. Spooner offered a means of social mobility through monetizing labor rather than merely monetizing the products of labor: the ambitious, adventurous, and resourceful who lack nothing but money to invest in the foundation of a successful career could thus pledge

their labor as collateral. Since the mutualist bank is an agency of monetary credit and not a profit making institution, it would not desire foreclosures. In the case of hardship it would be to the interest of the bank and its shareholders to support those in danger of failure since according to the mutual Bank's charter each mortgage reciprocally guarantees every other. The sixth inventory emphatically shows his social radicalism and sensitivity and serves to sharply demarcate him from the conservative right with whom he shares many concerns: "All credit should be based upon what a man has, and not upon what he has not."[40] A common sense platitude here yields a radical content. This, Spooner expands to mean that creditors can only take from a debtor what he has, i.e., his present money and marketable goods, therefore the debtor can be assessed the property he owned prior to the debt coming due but he cannot be deprived of any goods or wages accrued after that date.[41] This humane proviso was but a corollary to Spooner's understanding of contract as an instrument of "mutual benefit"; he recognized no other reason. Just as profit in an exchange meant an unequal exchange, so a contract which was not to the mutual advantage of all its parties was not a voluntary contract but extortion.[42]

The seventh and last proposition in Spooner's economic credo sought to enforce responsibility upon creditors by stipulating that claims upon a debtor are to be honored in the order that debts were incurred. Thus in building a house, the prospective owner goes into debt to obtain his necessary materials. Carried away by enthusiasm or by poor planning, he may attempt to contract debts beyond his capacity to manage. In accordance withthe Libertarian principle of responsibility he will have to face the consequences of his debt. However, Spooner's final two propositions prevent a creditor from taking more than a debtor has, and thereby enslaving him

and mortgaging his posterity. This makes the Libertarian concern with responsibility for one's actions as applicable to the lender of credit as it is to the borrower. The lender must be willing to accept the consequences of his behavior: for his action to justify an augmented return as a "risk," it must in fact represent an actual risk and not merely a situation wherein the creditor receives full replayment plus a surcharge for the risk should the debtor alone be responsible, or in the case where the debtor fails, the creditor has claims upon him for the same amount. In such a case, the creditor is rewarded for taking a "risk" which he, in fact, did not take. These propositions were designed to prevent a black market of speculators who might lend money at exhorbitant rates and in return require first claim to repayment. Spooner would reward a creditor in proportion to his sagacity and business acumen. A first loan was a respectable risk, a second or third or fourth mortgager must be willing to accept the consequences of his decision to loan money under such conditions. This further meant that those who had money to lend would cease lending it to the already heavily indebted and might decide to provide it to a responsbile but impecunious person formerly passed over.[43]

Thus Spooner was by no means out to eliminate the capitalist speculator. Radicalism of the period tended to see the social problem as a three-sided conflict of workingmen, employers, and the capitalist speculator. Spooner did not see victory growing out of a defeat by any one of the other two--he sought a pacification and an alliance: the workingman and the employer were to merge in accordance with man's necessity to be self-employed, and the capitalist would then be their partner in progress, lending credit on good productive grounds rather than as a means of exploitation. The welfare of the three parties was intertwined for Spooner, and a contract

which could not be liquidated was a null contract. Thus the wealth of the capitalist rested upon the vitality and productivity of the self-employed laborer--a revisionist Jeffersonian yeomanry for the mid-nineteenth century. In this scenario there was no villain and, as in Marx, all the classes were perverted by the economic system--except that while for Marx the class struggle was to end only with the abolition of the proletariat, for Spooner the Social Question could be answered only through a universalization of the petty-bourgeoisie. A bourgeoisie bound to a community by economic necessity on both the material level involving the exchange of goods and the division of labor, and on the psychic level reflecting the need to develop and maintain a "reputation" as the foundation for credit. All mortgage records were to be open for public scrutiny, thereby inhibiting favoritism, discrimination, and coercive restrictions, as well as providing a financial report to the subscribers concerning the responsible management of the bank. Land pledged as collateral could secure one-third to one-half of its assessed face value in bank-issued currency. Since mortgages were to be "mutually responsible," members were careful to examine the integrity and reputation of borrowers to prevent default resulting in a distribution of the debt among subscribers. The consequence of such a mutually reinforcing credit system was, in Martin's phrase, "a democratic type of certification" which sought both to destroy a financial monopoly and offered to create a mutualist basis for community.[44]

Spooner's propositions sought realization in his banking reform. This mutualist banking system was reminiscent of Proudhon's bank of the people and of Colonel Greene's Exchange Bank, but also revived an American experiment of the preceeding century: the Massachusetts Land Bank of 1740. That particular enterprise was capitalized at £150,000, and accepted land

of its members as collateral or security for the issuance of notes. It gave promise of economic success but suffered a political defeat: the Mother Country thought it too radical and by an Act of Parliament outlawed the Bank, causing financial ruin to many colonists--including the father of the radical Sam Adams. Spooner's programs served as an unwitting continuator of American radical self-help and counter-cultural voluntarism.

Spooner's transformation from radical reformer to anarchist had been gradual but the result was dramatic. Prior to the Civil War he, like many socially conscious individuals, was aroused by the political and economic inequities of society, but he assumed that these evils had intervened between the people and their government and that a reform based upon constitutional premises could right the situation. The necessary tools for reform were, Spooner thought, available in the Constitution and in decisions of the Supreme Court. This legalistic bias, and indeed the very titles of his polemics, gradually gave way to less restrained attacks upon the social orthodoxy and upon the very fount of civil law itself, the Constitution.[45] The trauma of the Civil War played a crucial role in this transformation. Spooner saw that particular conflict as the supreme test of the Constitution and regarded it as a recognition that government was not in fact a voluntary compact to secure the blessings of mutual benefit. Rather the State stood exposed as a coercive agency bent upon self-preservation even at the cost of oceans of bloodshed both north and south. The evil was the coercive nature of the State, its capacity to induce obedience through both force and fraud. It is through his analysis of the jury system that Spooner reveals what he takes to be the fraud and the force of the State, while at the same time offering an alternative--and Libertarian--system of justice.

From Common Law to Emergent Egoism

Spooner makes a major contribution to anarchist theory in his essay Trial by Jury (1852). Every anarchist must face the problem of maintaining social order in a society without government. Must an individual combat social malefactors on his own resources, via a vigilante committee, by subscription to a private enterprise security system, or is he to be content in the retort that anarchy abolishes all social deviance, i.e., that all evil is the result of sociopathy, relativism, and environmental determinism? Spooner, probably more cynical in his anticipation of perfection, offers a device of social control consonant with both anarchism and individualism--and one which ironically anticipates the work of the greatest of the anarcho-communists, Prince Peter Kropotkin. Spooner's development of the history and evolution of the trial by jury sets forth much the same argument used by Kropotkin in his treatment of the folkmote.[46]

Trial by jury as recognized by the Bill of Rights was, in Spooner's eyes, a reactionary formulation. Under that convention, a jury was chosen from among a select sample of the community, asked to accept the law as it stood and confined in their deliberations to the facts of the case-- all this taking place through the agency of the State. This, according to Spooner, was an abrogation of the traditionally revered trial by jury. Drawing upon folk traditions and Common Law principles, Spooner insisted that a jury must be absolutely random in its selection, must be chosen from among the entire society; it must have discretion as to the acceptance of law as well as determiner of fact; and it must be noncoercive in its operation but requiring unanimity of its membership before pronouncing sentence. "Under

the trial by jury justice can never be done--that is, by a judgment that shall take a party's goods, rights, or person--until that justice can be made intelligible or perceptible to the minds of all the jurors; or, at least, until it obtain the voluntary assent of all-an assent which ought not to be given until the justice itself shall have become perceptible to all."[47] Thus the community regulates itself through a communal deliberation which respects the sovereignty of the individual recognizing that the issue at stake for the dissenter is an interest in moral judgment, one which he cannot compromise. This argument was the core of Spooner's 1850 polemic, The Illegalism of the Trial of John W. Webster, wherein he protested the automatic exclusion from the jury of anyone opposed to capital punishment.[48]

Juries evolved as a socially-generated protection of the individual against the usurpations and arbitrary power of governmental forces, they constituted a half-way house between the ties of local community and the demands of centralized authority. Trial by jury recognizes that ultimate sovereignty resides in the people, or the community, and not in the artificial construct called the State: "the people have all liberties, (as against the government) except such as substantially the whole people (through a jury) consent that it may exercise."[49]

In Trial by Jury Spooner drew upon Anglo-American Common Law to legitimize his notion of jury trial, and an appeal to the Constitution was deigned appropriate in both Poverty (1846) and Trial by Jury (1852). By the publication of The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (1860) Spooner had switched to a positivist view of the Constitution and in fact in that work he laid the foundation for a developing assault on social contract theory. "A constitution," he wrote in the last-named work, "is nothing but a contract, entered into by the mass of people, instead of a few individuals."[50] The

next decade saw a broadening of this critique of society, so that by the issuance of the last number of his vitriolic series No Treason he could assert that the Constitution "has no authority or obligation at all, unless as a contract between man and man."[51] But even this restricted base is eventually whittled away: for the Constitution was a legal contract only among persons living at the time of its ratification, and only among that limited populace "permitted to express either their consent or dissent in any formal manner." Like other radical critics of American society during the past two centuries, Spooner denigrated the unrepresentative nature of the very founding process of the new nation. Passing beyond a Beardian delight in the materialism of the Founding Fathers, Spooner matter-of-factly concludes "considered as the act of the whole people, the adoption of the Constitution was the merest farce and imposture, binding upon nobody.[52] Furthermore, "those persons, if any, who did give their consent formally, are all dead now...And the Constitution, so far as it was their contract, died with them. They had no natural power or right to make it obligatory upon their children."[53] Or, in the simile which follows shortly upon this passage, a man may plant a tree for his posterity but he cannot compel them to eat the fruit thereof. Here again is that Jeffersonian notion of the "land belonging in usufruct to the living."[54]

While the emphasis on Constitutionality decidedly shifts subsequent to the Civil War, the genesis of its repudiation is evident even in Spooner's earlier work. "Law," he asserted in 1845, "is an intelligible principle of right, necessarily resulting from the nature of man; and not an arbitrary rule, that can be established by mere will, numbers, or power...Any rule, not existing in the nature of things, or that is not permanent, universal and inflexible in its application, is no law, according to any correct

definition of the term law."[55] Thus the antinomian position surfaced even in a work dedicated to documenting the Constitutional case for abolitionism. After the war the switch of emphasis is dramatic. Whereas The Unconstitutionality of Slavery asserts the illegal and extralegal nature of the peculiar institution, the acid-etched No Treason series[56] repudiates the Constitution entirely: "whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain--that it has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist."[57]

Like St. Augustine, Spooner sees the State as only "great bands of robbers and murderers" and its rulers as merely "heads or chiefs, of different bands of robbers and murderers."[58]

Spooner's polemic continues to become more vituperative and theoretically more intransigent. By 1882 he was denying the right of Congress to make laws on the grounds that no individual has the right to delegate his own legislative power to another person, especially the "right" to legislate for third parties--which, as Spooner points out, "would imply a right in the first person, not only to make the third person his slave, but also a right to dispose of him as a slave to still other persons."[59] The "right" of Congress to enact laws was justified by the Constitution and by the delegation of powers from the people ("We, the people of the United States") to the government. But Spooner had spent the preceding two decades demolishing the legal and moral justifications of the Constitution and replacing the document of 1789 with an appeal to the natural right of time immemorial. Granting a body of men power to enact laws affecting the vital interests of vast numbers of men and women not included in the policy formulation and decision-making processes was, for Spooner, "pure usurpation," no matter

by what name Congress chose to call it.[60] Far from upholding the Constitution as the safeguard of human rights, he now characterized it as having "been used from the beginning by ambitious, rapacious, and unprincipled men, to enable them to maintain, at the point of the bayonet, an arbitrary and irresponsible dominion over those who were too ignorant and weak to protect themselves against the conspirators who had thus combined to deceive, plunder, and enslave them."[61]

With such a stark repudiation of the American Constitution, of positive law in general, and, at least potentially, of Common Law as well, Spooner was left with Natural Law. And in 1882 his essay by that title reached print. He now insisted upon "a science of justice," one which was perceptible--although whether its agency was to be instinct, intuition, reason, or self-evidence was left unclear.[62] He developed it as two articles, first "that each man shall do, towards every other, all that justice requires him to do; as for example that he shall pay his debts, that he shall return borrowed or stolen property to its owner," and secondly "that each man shall abstain from doing to another anything which justice forbids him to do."[63] This combines the theory espoused by Cephalus, that justice consists in telling the truth and repaying loans, with its requisite reciprocity as expressed in the Golden Rule or in Kant's Categorical Imperative. Justice and its attainment infuse Natural Law, in fact Natural Law has no legitimacy unless it achieves justice, and justice, by definition, entails peace.[64] Yet Spooner attempts to keep the naturalistic fallacy at arm's length, and to maintain a special abyss between "is" and "ought." Natural Law entails legal duties, but it cannot demand moral duties as well. The precepts of non-aggression and mutuality of exchange are pragmatic principles to facilitate the social interaction requisite for what Hobbes would have

termed a commodious style of life. Natural Law demands that man not invade the person or property of his fellow, and that he must live up to contracts freely entered into. Obligations beyond this were of personal choice and not to be legislated or coerced. Man had other moral duties, Spooner willingly acceded,

> such as to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, shelter the homeless, care for the sick, protect the defenseless, assist the weak, and enlighten the ignorant. But these are simply moral duties, of which each man must be his own judge, in each particular case, as to whether, and how, and how far, he can, or will, perform them.[65]

Spooner explicitly recognizes the needs and demands of community upon the moral duty of an individual, however his accommodation was not to subsume the individual to the communal but to allow the individual the opportunity of choosing sociality or hermitry: thereby granting the freedom Yahweh denied Adam and Eve in the Garden, the freedom which de Sade knew limned all freedom--the freedom to choose ill, the freedom consciously to choose evil. Spooner thus allowed for antisocial and ungenerous creatures, but creatures still in accord with the narrow dictates of natural law. He has in fact concocted a utopia with tolerance for selfish and heedless neurotics. This suggests a major divergence from his fellow Libertarians, Josiah Warren and Stephen Pearl Andrews, and a step towards the egoism of Benjamin R. Tucker; not that Spooner was more tolerant but rather his utopian theory retained a role for amoral characters permitted to coexist in accord with natural law. The Warrenite strain had to deny such a possibility in so far as it retained Warren's own premise of environmental determinism: with the environment manipulated so as to produce equitable characters, the desired moral attributes naturally accompanied the institution of the cost principle and individual sovereignty. Spooner's pair of principles look, indeed, to be Warren's set of axioms in fresh rhetoric--the sovereignty of the

individual taking the guise of the non-aggression principle, and the cost principle finding new tenure in the doing-justice-to-all-men premise. But whereas Warren's economic actors are conditioned by their own environment and would be moral in an environment of equitable exchange, Spooner's economic actors are individuals uncontrolled by their milieu are are capable of making harsh choices--insensitive and amoral but neither, according to his view of natural law, invasive of liberty nor immoral. Questions of natural law are "answered alike by the human mind everywhere."[66]

Spooner's personal choice was in favor assuming the moral duties. He testified to this choice by his barrage of pamphlets, books, and letters; his crusades on currency, slavery, free-thought, and banking reform; and in his collaboration with the Liberty Party, and with the Libertarian-founded and guided New England Labor Reform League.[67]

By making such moral duties voluntaristic, Spooner created two categories of moral duties for which we may borrow John Stuart Mill's terms self-regarding and other-regarding. The former category refers to the private sphere, or that concatenation of rights called individual sovereignty, while the latter category designates relationships between the self and others the outcome of which affects those others. The key again is voluntarism, and agreement predicated upon the primacy of the self-regarding in each, i.e., neither party to the agreement (or Spooner's contract) being a victim of ignorance, misunderstanding or coercion. The difference between the apostle of positive liberty and Spooner is certainly not the possession of social sensitivity. Spooner and his cohorts raised the social question because of their social sensitivity, they favored the emancipation of the black slave and the female slave because of their social conscience. And they browsed through the parade of fads and heresies not out of any abstract dillentantism but rather as a craftsman rummaging through a tool box, in search of

instruments to perform a task, and that task was the solving of the social problem. The unorthodoxy of the fads bothered them not at all since they rather ignored or flouted established authorities and means of accreditation.

The difference between Spooner and Dewey, between nineteenth century and twentieth century American liberals, was over the agency of the State. Both recognized that injustice may be aided and abetted by structural means, but whereas the newer liberal sought to use the State as an instrument of reallocation, the older liberal or Libertarian saw the need to destroy a structural means of coercion. In their attack upon the newer liberals, the Libertarians have often sounded like and often allied themselves with the contemporary political right. However if one can trichotomize the Social Problem the affinity of liberalism and Libertarianism is more apparent and the ultimate incompatability of Libertarianism and the American right wing is also more evident. The solution to the social problem may be divided into the conventional segments of ends and means. The Libertarians offer a tri-partite division which may be viewed as goal, prescription, and application. Contemporary liberals and Libertarians may be said to share the goal-liberty. In fact if one follows Daniel Boorstin's advice about givenness, the diversity and consequent disparity of notions of liberty will be papered over and liberal and Libertarian will appear highly similar. Their similarity is encouraged by the shared rhetoric and a common history. But the twentieth century became fascinated with technology and its promise of an altered future. With the speeding up of technological and scientific change, the past receded ever more rapidly. Technology altered man's style of living, his patterns of settlement, and his capacity for mobility. History threatens, like Latin, to become a dead language of discourse, for the forces which shape the current world system are more complex than those

which confronted the nineteenth century liberal. To travel to today's frontier takes a multimillion dollar research and development enterprise and a team of highly trained and interdependent technicians. The major political ideologies of the twentieth century are collectivist--in at least the broadguage sense the Libertarians understood that term--Fascism, Socialism, and Liberalism have each in its own way entered into a program of forcing man to be free. But Liberalism and Socialism offer the hope of a transitory stage of paternalistic guidance as a precondition to freer and non-alienated individuals. The goal-condition of socialism and liberalism is thus compatible with that of the Libertarians. The pragmatic prescription to attain this value-goal, however, diverges--in fact, the instrumentalism of liberalism and socialism is antithetical to the Libertarian prescription of abolishing the State. This theoretical radicalism of the Libertarians has been muted by their methods of application: colonizing, propagandizing, and educating are incrementalist to a radical end. Hence Libertarianism and liberalism share the tenets of civil liberties, but while the former sees them as end-goals, liberals have often viewed them instrumentally as means to other end-goals. This is true simply because civil liberties constitute a check upon the intervention possible in one's life-activities and thus are partial recognitions of privacy and the sanctity of the sovereign individual.

Spooner's moral concern, stated with the vision of Marx and a touch of the cynical resignation of Roberto Michels may be readily observed:

> substantially all the legislation of the world has had its origin in the desire of one class of persons to plunder and enslave others, and hold them as property....Thus the whole business of legislation, which has now grown to such gigantic proportions, had its origin in the conspiracies, which have always existed among the few, for the purpose of holding the many in subjection, and extorting from them their labor, and all the profits of their labor.[68]

But the inevitability of the conspiracies need not lead to a fatalistic resignation--Spooner's life-activity, as well as that of Warren, represents a proto-existential asserting of the self in order to obviate the particular angst of modern rootlessness and social impotence.

Spooner's natural law was absolute negative liberty, in that it prohibited external interference; and it differed from egoism in that it recognized with a wide range of mutuality. Natural law protects man from being exploited and attacked, but leaves any notion of distributive justice up to individual choice. The duty to leave one's neighbor's person and property at peace is absolute, however the duty to assuage his physical need is a voluntary one. To recognize its legal obligation would be to undertake a social welfare program with a consequent floundering amidst governmental interference and regulation. Public order was limited to public behavior, while privacy covered a multitude of sins--but none of them criminal. Like Luther who sidestepped the middle-man and took his case directly to God, the Libertarians rejected the State as arbiter of welfare policy and left the issue to the conscience of the sovereign individual. Spooner's natural law was selfish--certainly self-oriented. The protection of the individual, of the private sphere, was the law of nature. The duty to monitor reciprocity and to assist the unprotected is noted as "merely moral" and hence discretionary. Natural law asserts the rights of a man, but does not require that he help others protect their rights although the injunction to return borrowed or "stolen" property to its owner is left tantalizingly undeveloped. The starkness of this quasi-Hobbesian individualism is muted by Spooner's class bias--the righteous but still decent bourgeois would obviously fulfill his moral duty as well as accept his individual prerogatives. Christian charity expressed by

free-thinking Libertarians would result in community and at the same time would operate to drive away the spectre of positive law's welfarism.

But for a community to persist some rules of social interaction must be observed, otherwise chaos, not anarchy, will prevail. These rules must be legitimate to have any authority--and if positive law is ruled out as their source some other agency must be substituted. Laws derive their legitimacy from a finite number of sources which might be divided into theories of positive law, common law, and natural law. Under the rubric of positive law fall all forms of man-made and man-imposed law as enforced by the State. These include both representative forms of governance such as parliamentarianism and democracy, and nonrepresentative forms like dictatorship and totalitarianism. In contrast the common law consists of tradition passed on in myth, folklore, and ritual as the embodiment of living law. The natural law tradition offers a variety of sponsors: divine, scientific, and sociological. Plato, the Church Fathers, and many Idealists ground natural law in a metaphysic, and thus define natural as that which was in accord with divine intent or pattern. The realm of science has attempted to supplant the authority of metaphysics ;from Democritus to LeMetrie and Hume to B. F. Skinner, scientists have sought to explain, or explain away, man's morality by grounding him in the realm of Nature. Thus Heisenberg's Indeterminancy Principle supplants the Skeptics, Bohr's Theory of Complementarity provides a non-Hegelian and non-Marxian dialectic, and the ethology of Konrad Lorenz serves as a surrogate for Original Sin. Furthermore, contemporary social science has utilized survey research, demographic evidence, and the traditional investigatory techniques of anthropological fieldwork have sought to understand natural in terms of the statistically normal while desperately eschewing normative definitions.

All anarchists deny the legitimacy of positive law. No man or group of men, they hold, has the right to set limits to the behavior of another person without his voluntary compliance. Most anarchists would reject the natural law doctrine derived from supernatural sources--although some like Tolstoy, Adin Ballou, the pefectionist John Humphrey Noyes, and Dorothy Day have combined such premises to their own satisfaction.

The category of natural law in a scientific sense appears at first glance to offer a promising position for anarchism. Indeed the anarchism of the quieter branch is at home here, the passive anarchism of the Stoics and the equally submissive anarchism of the Tao teh Ching. To make scientific inevitability the source of law obviates the evil of a system humanly, and hence arbitrarily, imposed upon individuals. But inevitability is not an argument for morality: death, degeneration, entropy are inevitable, but their morality is debatable--indeed the very concept of morality is enfeebled when applied to the inevitable. One problem is the scope of the definition of "nature." Does it refer to the totality of the universe (i.e., nature is the real world in its fully enumerated entirety) or does it allude to the principles and regularities of the universe (i.e., the law of nature being thus its regularity in a Newtonian sense). The two concepts are not hermetically separated--indeed the definition of what nature <u>is</u>, often is phrased in terms of how nature <u>acts</u>. The greater question for anarchists rather concerns whether man is conceived as part of nature and thereby subject to it, or as distinct from nature and either exempt from it or opposed to it. Selecting the former option, the result is ethically the same as accepting the supernatural natural law premise--in either case one accepts the ukase of an entity defined to be superior to mankind--God or (scientific) Nature. In neither case can submission per se be accounted moral in any

sense consistent with the an-archistic premises of Libertarians.

Correlated with this problem is the question of the function of natural laws--are they a manifestation of inexorable necessity, or are they statements of description, possibly of statistical likelihood or anticipated regularity? As noted above, there is no inherent morality in bowing to the inevitable. And if natural law refers to descriptive norms, morality consistent with individual sovereignty must deny their claims for obedience. In such a case natural law and majority rule share justificatory arguments, and share the Libertarian critique as well. Individual man ought not to have his sovereignty infringed upon by other men whether they constitute a tyrannical minority or a popularly representative majority. This objection to political democracy has relevance both for the possibility of natural law derived from anthropological and sociological studies, and to the category of common law which resembles it.

Spooner and Kropotkin both embraced a variant of natural law which fused elements of what has above been termed sociological natural law, and the common law tradition. In Prince Kropotkin's case the position is clearly consistent with his ethological data on insect, animal, and primitive human societies. Believing in a class (or species) cohesion, Kropotkins's defense of the traditional folkmote made sense and served to emphasize the primitive cooperation and justice of man, as well as his ability to generate social institutions for social control with minimal coercion. Spooner's problem was more difficult--denying the reality of super-individual entities he fell back upon a universal intuitive moral faculty. In this, Spooner's position was transitional between the older liberalism predicated upon the Protestant Inner Light, and the coming egoism of Stirner, Walker, and Tucker.

Footnotes

1. Arthur Nussbaum, A History of the Dollar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 52f.

2. Walter T. K. Nugent, The Money Question During Reconstruction (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1967), p. 134.

3. Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 170f.

4. Ibid., p. 146.

5. Ibid., p. 228.

6. Ibid., p. 229.

7. Ibid., p. 313.

8. Reginald Charles McGrane, The Panic of 1837: Some Financial Problems of the Jacksonian Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 41.

9. Ibid., pp. 100-04.

10. Joshua King Ingalls, Reminiscences of an Octagenarian in the Fields of Industrial and Social Reform (New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co., 1897).

11. Symes and Clement, Rebel America, p. 50.

12. McGrane, Panic of 1837, p. 127; Hammond, Banks and Politics..., p. 609

13. Thomas Jefferson, Writings (Paul Leicester Ford, editor) IX, p. 416; quoted in Hammond, Banks and Politics in America, p. 198.

14. Albert Bisbane, A Mental Biography (Boston: Arena Publishing, 1893), 292f.

15. Morison, Oxford History of the American People, p. 623. Greene's obscurity is buttressed by the fact The National Union Catalog has misfiled his works under "William Batchelder Greene" - the name of an American poet born thirty-two years after the colonel.

16. William B. Greene, Socialistic, Communistic, Mutualistic, and Financial Fragments (Boston: Lee and Sheard, 1875), p. 12.

17. Ezra Heywood, Cupid's Yokes: Or, The Binding Forces of Conjugal Life (Princeton, Massachusetts: Cooperative Publishing, N.D.), p. 13.

18. Ezra Heywood, Uncivil Liberty: An Essay to Show the Injustice and Impolicy of Ruling Woman Without her Consent (Princeton, Masachusetts: Cooperative Publishing, 1872), p. 10.

19. Greene, Fragments, p. 11.

20. Schuster, Native American Anarchism, p. 130. For an account of Proudhon's eccentric epistolary courtship of Euphrasie Piegard, see George Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: His Life and Work (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), pp. 105-9. Proudhon's anti-feminism is summarized as: "Between woman and man there may exist love, passion, ties of custom, and the like, but there is no real society. Man and woman are not companions. The difference of the sexes places a barrier between them, like that placed between animals by a difference of race. Consequently, far from advocating what is now called the emancipation of woman, I should incline, rather, if there were no other alternative, to exclude her from society." Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Propiety? Translated by Benjamin R. Tucker (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), p. 246. Although the wording is Proudhon as interpreted by Tucker, this is obviously one point on which Tucker disagreed with his mentor.

21. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 275.

22. William B. Greene, Equality (West Brookfield, Massachusetts: O. S. Cooke and Company, 1849), p. 3.

23. William B. Greene, Mutual Banking (Denver: The Reform League, 1919),'A'.

24. Ibid., p. 29.

25. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 131.

26. Greene, Mutual Banking (1850 edition), cited by Martin, Men Against the State, p. 132.

27. John R. Commons, et al, A Documentary History of American Industrial Society (Cleveland: A. H. Clark Co., 1910-11), I, 511f.

28. Ibid., I. p. 519.

29. Robert P. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 187.

30. Edward Kellogg (pseud. "whitehook"), Remarks Upon Usury and Its Effects (New York: Harper & Bros., 1841), p. 62. On the issue of a uniform interest rate, he is of course, at odds with Spooner, but in line with Warren, Andrews, and Tucker. Kellogg's other proposal of relevance for his Libertarian peers was that paper currency be issued from a single national authority with local district branches, which currency would be loaned on the basis of physical property pledged as security. Cf. Chester MacArthur Destler, "The Influence of Edward Kellogg Upon American Radicalism," Journal of Political Economy XL (June, 1932), 343.

31. Kellogg, Remarks Upon Usury, p. 8f.

32. Martin, Man Against the State, p. 167.

33. Lysander Spooner, The Deist's Reply to the Alleged Supernatural Evidences of Christianity (1836), Constitutional Law Relative to Credit, Currency, & Banking (1843), The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (1845), and Poverty: Its Illegal Causes and Legal Cure (1846).

34. Schuster, Native American Anarchism, p. 144; Martin, Men Against the State, p. 170.

35. Schuster, Native American Anarchism, p. 151.

36. The divergence over the issue of copyright might be seen in the fact that while Warren's books were not copyrighted--nor were most of his inventions patented--Spooner inserted the following behind the preface to one of his works: "The author reserves his copyright in this pamphlet. Believing that on principles of natural law, authors and inventors have a right of property in their ideas." Lysander Spooner, Natural Law (Boston: A. Williams & Co., 1882).

37. Here Spooner appears as a bridge between nineteenth century Libertarianism and twentieth century laissez faire capitalism of the Ayn Rand variety. Had Spooner only explicitly recognized profit as a psychic cost and been able to anticipate advertising and consumer-manipulation as legitimate applications of practical wisdom in the pursuit of consumer-approbation, he would be a direct native forbear of Ayn Rand's economics.

38. Lysander Spooner, Poverty: Its Illegal Causes and Legal Cure (Boston: Bela Marsh, 1846), pp. 7-18.

39. Ibid., p. 12.

40. Ibid., p. 17.

41. Spooner recognizes two exceptions to this immunity: (1) where the debtor "dishonestly squandered or misapplied the means, which he should have returned for the payment of his debt" and (2) "where he has omitted to do something, which he was plainly bound to do, towards putting himself in a condition to pay." Ibid., p. 18.

42. Ibid., p. 22. See also page 65 of that work, where he writes, "The law requires no impossibilities of any man. If, therefore, a man contract to perform what proves to be an impossibility, the contract is valid only for so much as is possible."

43. Ibid., p. 21ff.

44. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 176.

45. As example of Spooner's legal erudition and his pre-Civil War penchant for full legal documentation of his premises, in his argument against slavery he cites the following authorities: Justinian, Jacob's Law Dictionary, Selden on Fortscue, Blackstone, Hooker, Hobart, Fortescue, John Quincy Adams, The King's Bench of Great Britain, Madison's Papers on the Constitution, James Kent, Cicero, Bacon's Tract on Universal Justice, Vattel, Montesquieu, The Federalist, Coke, Joseph Storey, Daniel Webster, Wendell Phillips, the Constitution itself, cases before the Supreme Court, and the colonial charters of Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Maryland, Pennsylvannia, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, and New York. Lysander Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.; originally published 1860).

46. Peter A. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (Boston: Extending Horizons Books, n.d.), pp. 121, 131ff.

47. Lysander Spooner, An Essay on the Trial by Jury (Boston: John P. Jewett, 1852), pp. 5, 143, 127.

48. A. J. Alexander, "The Ideas of Lysander Spooner," New England Quarterly XXIII (June, 1950), 210.

49. Spooner, An Essay on the Trial by Jury, p. 11.

50. Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, p. 65.

51. Lysander Spooner, No Treason, No. 6: The Constitution of No Authority (Boston: The Author, 1870), p. 9.

52. Lysander Spooner, No Treason, No. 2: The Constitution (Boston: The Author, 1867), p. 4.

53. Spooner, No Treason, No. 6 p. 9; emphasis in the original.

54. This Jeffersonian dictum is given even greater relevance by the persistence of one of Spooner's colleagues and fellow Libertarians, Joshua King Ingalls. Ingalls' major contribution was in tying the followers of Warren even closer to the Jeffersonian tradition in terms of land policy: "private property in or commercial ownership of the land can give no valid title against the inheritance nature bestows, and upon the recognition of which all principles of justifiable property or ownership depend. 'The earth belongs in usufruct to the living.' No title gives the present holder, 'the right to its future products forever.'" Ingalls, Reminiscences..., p. 120.

55. Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, p. 5. By a resolution of the Liberty Party in 1849, "friends of freedom, in this and other States, (ought) to supply, within the coming six months, each lawyer in their respective counties with a copy of said argument." Cited in Schuster, Native American Anarchism, p. 145.

56. Of the series entitled No Treason, numbers 1, 2, and 6 were published, but research has failed to uncover the existence of the remaining three numbers, either in contemporary accounts or in studies written subsequently. Nor has any explanation been suggested for their omission.

57. Spooner, No Treason, No. 6, p. 55. cf. "It is a general principle of law and reason, that a written instrument binds no one unless he has signed it." Ibid., p. 21.

58. Ibid., p. 48.

59. Lysander Spooner, A Letter to Thomas F. Bayard (Boston: The Author, 1882), p. 63.

60. Ibid., p. 64. Earlier (1845) Spooner had denied the legitimacy of social contract theory by noting that an agreement between A and B which interfered with the rights of C, violated "natural law." Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, p. 8.

61. Spooner, A Letter to Thomas F. Bayard, p. 67.

62. Spooner's claim is that "almost all men have the same perceptions of what constitutes justice, or what justice requires, when they understand alike the facts from which their inferences are to be drawn." Spooner, Natural Law, p. 8.

63. Ibid., p. 5.

64. Ibid., p. 11.

65. Ibid., p. 6.

66. Ibid., p. 9. A. J. Alexander suggests that this "intuitive" sense of justice was "an idea that he picked up from the Transcendentalism about him." Alexander,"The Ideas of Lysander Spooner," p. 216.

67. Colonel William Bradford Greene, Josiah Warren, Ezra Heywood, and Stephen Pearl Andrews all played prominent roles in this movement. Heywood and Greene served as its early presidents. William Henry Channing, Albert Brisbane, Wendell Phillips, John Orvis, Ira Steward and other stalwarts of the radical reform movements were also active in it. Commons, et al, A Documentary History of American Industrial Society, II, p. 138.

68. Spooner, Natural Law, pp. 19, 21; emphasis added.

THE PLUMB-LINER: BENJAMIN R. TUCKER

The End of the Frontier: From Yeoman to Proletarian

The war debt created by four years of Civil War in this country exceeded that of England's twenty-two years of hostilities against revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Debt necessitated taxes, and taxes entailed an expansion of the sphere of government. Taxes served as a shared object of opposition for both nineteenth century Libertarians and twentieth century conservatives. Whereas the former feared the extension of the Statist apparatus into previously inviolate areas of personal action, the Conservative objection focused upon the perceived danger of a strong central government taking a firmer stance on regulation and commerce. The Civil War had given way to what Mark Twain felicitously termed the Gilded Age. But the Gilded Age was a phrase which veiled various blemishes: it was Reconstruction and the "bloody shirt" which enabled the Republican Party to retain power after the war. The abolitionists and Radical Republicans, allies against slavery before assuming power, now became the enemies of Libertarianism by supporting a centralized state. Their hegemony was threatened by a resurgent Jeffersonianism put forth by the standard-bearer of the discredited Democratic Party, Samuel J. Tilden: "The classes who desire pecuniary profit from existing governmental abuses have become numerous and powerful beyond any example in our country...For the first time in our national history such classes have become powerful enough to aspire to be in America the ruling classes, as they have been and are in the corrupt societies of the Old World."[1]

Vernon Louis Parrington's denomination of the era was even more apt, he entitled his chapter on post-war America "The Great Barbecue." "To a frontier people what," he asked, "was more democratic than a barbecue, and to a paternalistic age what was more fitting than that the state should provide the beeves for roasting."[2] Ironically a war to save the Union and a tendency toward democratization masked the growth of centralized power in the nation. The war had imposed a new degree of intimacy: roads, railways, and telegraph wires began to festoon the country, and the average citizen became aware of the presence of the federal government. The war brought with it conscription and the need for increased--and regularly available and standardized--materiel, while its conclusion necessitated a permanent authority capable of "reconstructing" the South. As Ezra Heywood noted--anticipating Tucker's celebrated 1911 "Postscript"--"Legislation, especially since 1861, has centralized property into the hands of a few, multiplying millionaires and tramps."[3]

The open spaces wherein misfits escaped were fewer as the century rolled on, and the Census of 1890 noted the demise of the frontier as a social reality. This fact inspired Frederick Jackson Turner to undertake an analysis of American political history in the light of the phenomenon of the frontier:

> This American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development for that area. American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character.[4]

For as long as that frontier line continued to advance, the dream of renewal and the myth of Eldorado was part of that unexamined bundle of

values which Daniel Boorstin termed "givenness". With its demise, with the realization of its demise, and with the consequence of that realization, American social reality was altered. The frontier, that special American state of nature, had served a complex of social, political, and psychological functions: it fostered hope for the economically miserable, thereby muting frustration and damping rebellion; it provided an arena for the adventurous and the ambitious; and it symbolized the American dream of independence defined at the individual level. But the frontier was driven into the sea and the peaceful western ocean finally drowned the pacifying instrument of American social mobility.

While the frontier rushed into the Pacific, the tides of the Atlantic deposited load after load of European emigres. As the frontier disappeared the country began to fill up, in many places with persons of alien tongues and habits.

With the frontier closed but the Port of New York still open, a drastic change in the character of the nation took place. There were more people--and more kinds of people--with less opportunity to put distance between oneself and them. Cities grew bloated, while enclaves of ignorant and fearful immigrants provided a rich reservoir for the political boss and the industrial employer. The herd-character of the new immigrants--a clinging to the familiar in a land of novelty--terrified bourgeois individualists: they feared these immigrants from a decadent, authoritarian, and collectivist feudal order, who had brought their authoritarian and collectivist Church and Party with them. This situation was aggravated when the aftermath of the abortive 1848 uprisings had brought a host of European radicals to these shores. With the arrival of Frederick Sorge and Joseph Wedemeyer, Hermann Kriege and the messianic tailor Wilhelm

Weitling, European socialism was well represented in this country. As noted above, earlier doses of Proudhon, Fourier, Owen, and Cabet had already largely been assimilated by Americans for domestic consumption. The more sophisticated social analyses introduced by this new wave of socialists differed in several particulars. First, in regard to social context they proposed neither to ignore the political regime nor to work reform through it. Second, the theories were in the keeping of foreign intellectuals and workers. The inability of the European socialists to influence native Americans had exasperated Marx. All too often they looked upon Europe as home and saw America merely as a temporary refuge. German socialists continued to write in German, French socialists in French, and Jewish socialists in Yiddish, causing many Americans to associate socialism with foreign tongues and foreign ways. Like the Roman Church, the socialist movement was viewed as alien and sinister, while nativist reaction of a xenophobic bent opposed both alike.

Coinciding with the increase in immigration, were rapid industrialization and urbanization. The state of nature was less relevant in practice, but possibly more tenaciously clung to precisely for that reason. Socialist thought, especially Marxian, was not dependent upon a pristine state of nature, rather it represented the dialectical flower blossoming forth from the compost heap of capitalist society. It was America's very social inequities, her peculiar brand of robber-baron capitalism, her digression from the state of nature that made her attractive to socialist analysis. The socialist solution was to create a new future out of the bowels of the present degenerate society. A future predicated upon an urban proletariat, large-scale industry, and a closely coordinated social arrangement.

The radical rhetoric became polyglot, with its ideas reflecting

Hegel, Marx, and Bakunin rather than Washington, Jefferson, and Jackson. Even so devout and compassionate a radical as Mother Jones could decry that "foreign agitators who had suffered under European despots preached various schemes of economic salvation to the workers. The workers asked only for bread and a shortening of the long hours of toil. The agitators gave them visions. The police gave them clubs."[5] Mother Jones herself was amazingly non-ideological and a naive believer in Boorstin's givenness, sincerely holding that no matter what the problem she could always get help from "Washington."

As her statement makes evident, Mother Jones was what one might call a radical incrementalist, i.e., a forerunner of the late Saul Alinsky. The problem was "getting more", a radical application of Samuel Gompers' labor philosophy of "more, and ever more." Mother Jones thought that if only the bad guys could be routed from Leadville, Lawrence, and Harlan County, the social problem would no longer exist.

While less likely than many other radicals to pursue their principles to the barricades, the Libertarians saw the social problem not in procedural terms of throwing the rascals out, but in structural terms necessitating the decentralization of the power establishment. This Libertarian position was taken by Lincoln Steffens in an argument with a clergyman over the proper placement of guilt: Most people, you know, say it was Adam. But Adam, you remember, he said that it was Eve, the woman; she did it. And Eve said no, no, it wasn't she; it was the serpent. And that's where you clergy have stuck ever since. You blame that serpent, Satan. Now I come and I am trying to show you that it was, it is, the apple."[6]

And it was the apple that Benjamin Tucker blamed--the apple as manifested in profit, rent, interest, and the exclusionary use of property.

As a free thinker he rejected the empirical validity of the creation myth, but like Steffens he refused to deposit the blame on the actors, preferring to criticize the game being played and the goals being pursued. The residue of Owen's environmental determinism as filtered through the earlier Libertarians remained in Tucker, but it remained in an altered guise. Uninterested in utopian colonizing adventures, Tucker was not concerned with manipulating the limited environment of a created community. Instead, realizing the interconnectedness of modern society he undertook a long-range propagandistic enterprise determined to purge from society the verbal spooks and political formulae which perpetuated the power of the State.

The Libertarian tradition had jelled by 1880, and although Libertarians--being individualists--still squabbled among themselves, by Tucker's time the general lineaments of the doctrine appeared consensually agreed upon.

It was Tucker's role to receive the legacy of Warren's generation of radicals and to thoroughly transform it before passing it on. He reclaimed the threads of Jeffersonian radicalism while retaining the influence of Warren, Greene, and Spooner, and revitalized their confluent doctrine with a powerful infusion of Max Stirner. But in all of this Tucker presented himself as a "plumb-line" anarchist and his reading of the plumb-line was to result in a series of schisms from the movement.

Tucker had begun his career as a radical by forming a Greely-Brown Club in Republican New Bedford--in spite of the fact that, at the age of eighteen, he could not himself vote. The same year, 1872, Tucker attended a meeting of the New England Reform League, meeting the seventy-four year-old Warren and the fifty-three year-old Colonel Greene. At this time Tucker also began corresponding with Ezra Heywood on a variety of topics,

primarily free thought and the 'woman question.' By early 1876 he had joined Heywood's The Word as an associate editor, quitting in December of that year over a dispute involving Heywood's obsession with sexual reform virtually to the exclusion of labor reform.

This is not to suggest that Heywood was by any means an opponent of labor reform, the differences between him and Tucker were of degree and not of kind. Indeed it is quite likely that Heywood tutored Tucker in the principles of radical economics and labor agitation before committing himself predominantly to the issue of free love and women's rights and for this reason is worthy of attention. Like his confreres, Heywood was a product of the Bay State, born at Westminister, Massachusetts and a collateral descendent of John Locke.[7] His immersion in domestic radicalism--especially abolitionism--may be traced to influence of William Lloyd Garrison during his student days at Brown University. However, when hostilities erupted in 1861, Heywood, like many of his radical peers, was appalled. Reflecting on a cruel dilemma, his advocacy of Negro rights was muted in his opposition to the war-making power of the State--a position similar to the older and more bitter Warren himself. While Heywood never abandoned the goal of equal rights for black Americans he was convinced that warfare was an immoral--and ultimately impractical--means of attaining that goal.

Slavery for the Libertarians was blatantly evil as a denial of sovereign individualism and offended the sensibilities of decent men, but then so did the waging of an internicine war. The respect for human beings as individuals worthy of respect, the Kantian dictum that men be treated as ends, not as mere means, underlies both positions. The question to be decided was, of course, whether the goal of liberating men from slavery be achieved through the means of coercing vast numbers of men to the very point of death.

Heywood was not to meet Warren until 1864, and he was not yet fully an anarchist, although the dual commitment to anti-slavery and to non-resistance might be seen as positions--especially when coupled--which entail that summary philosophy. The anarchist aware of the primary role of the State in all social evils, had an easier time meeting the dilemma noted above. Rather than impaling himself upon either horn, he could, like the dancers of ancient Crete, vault above and between the horns--since for the anarchist evil is usually generated by (and always perpetuated by) the State, the greatest evil is the strengthening of the State as an instrument of social control. With this analysis as guidance, the war-making power of the State represented the very apotheosis of the coercive State and accommodation to it served to intensify its powers of invasion and violence. Thus while the Civil War created a crisis of sorts for Libertarians, it ought not to be adduced from that fact that the cause of black Americans was jettisoned.

Heywood also provides an example of the other major contretemps of the slavery controversy. Together with his fellow Libertarians Greene, Andrews, Spooner, Ingalls, and Warren, he devoted much time and effort to the then inchoate labor movement. Although Warren's audience had largely been the self-employed farmer and artisan of the Ohio and Indiana frontiers, Andrews and the others adapted his philosophy to the changing industrial conditions of the East. Discovering that free white labor was becoming increasingly enslaved by the factory system, these radicals were unwilling to liberate blacks from a condition of chattel slavery into one of wage slavery--to be left to founder as 'free' without even the social and educational advantages of their poor white peers.[8] They did not deny that blacks were enslaved, but they did dispute the assumption that white laborers were free.

But it was neither his pacifism nor his labor agitation which gained Heywood the greatest notoriety. Rather it was his espousal of woman's rights in such tracts as Cupid's Yokes: or, The Binding Forces of Conjugal Life and Uncivil Liberty: An Essay to Show the Injustice of Ruling Women Without Their Consent that involved him in legal entanglements with the State he repudiated. He was twice arrested and convicted of sending obscene literature through the mails, being one of Anthony Comstock's favored targets of coerced propriety. But while his theoretical contributions to Libertarianism were slight, as a propagandist of the word as well as the deed Heywood provided a dynamic example of committed radicalism, and it was under him that the young Tucker served his radical tutelage.

Benjamin Tucker received his practical initiation into the crusade for women's rights at the personal intervention of the notorious Victoria Claflin Woodhull. While a student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tucker had attended a lecture by the flamboyant Madame Woodhull. The eighteen year-old youth was captivated by the older (thirty-six) woman of the world. D. H. Lawrence once described such a situation: "The greatest triumph a woman can have, especially an American woman, is the triumph of seducing a man, especially if he is pure."[9]

During the summer of 1874 he travelled with this amazing woman to Europe, remaining there when, after two weeks of dalliance, Vickie Woodhull returned to New York.[10] By the time of his return in early 1875, Tucker's radicalism appears to have deepened, the influence of Proudhon had been planted,[11] and a critical view of society and the political structure had been encouraged and supported by the new intellectual milieu resulting from his relationships with Warren, Greene, and Heywood. Through Vickie Woodhull Tucker met her mentor, speechwriter, and possibly paramour, Stephen Pearl

Andrews. With Spooner and Ingalls also as his associates, Tucker was now firmly entrenched among the Libertarians.

Vickie Woodhull may have seduced the young Tucker and enticed him to Europe, but once there he knew where to go and what to do. Taking Colonel Greene's advice, he sought out the works of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in Paris' musty book shops. Reading Proudhon confirmed his native radicalism. Warren, Spooner, Heywood and Greene were now enriched by the infusion of Proudhon. As Tucker recalled years later, "I found that Proudhon had not, like Warren, confined himself to the bare elucidation of the principles, but had discussed in their revolutionary light nearly every subject touching upon the welfare of mankind..."[12]

Upon his return to America in January of 1876, the twenty-one year-old Tucker announced his translation of Proudhon's What is Property?[13] Following the dispute with Heywood referred to earlier, Tucker began publishing a quarterly of literary and political essays The Radical Review, an enterprise which lasted less than a year. It contained articles by such American social critics and reformers as Octavius Frothingham, Dyer D. Lum, the poet Edward C. Stedman, the scientist John Fiske, as well as the pantheon of Libertarianism--Warren, Greene, Heywood, Andrews, Ingalls, and Spooner. The Radical Review also introduced to an American audience the eminent scientist and disciple of Kropotkin, Elie Reclus. Tucker also managed to publish four installments of his own translation of Proudhon's Economic Contradictions.[14] The quarterly was heady, ambitious, and cost the princely sum of five dollars a year. While it is not entirely clear why Tucker abandoned the Review, a sympathetic historian notes that "Ezra Heywood's first conviction under the Comstock laws took place during the summer of 1878. Tucker, anxious to do his part in the struggle to keep the radical

press alive, took charge of The Word in his absence...In the meantime, Tucker's own venture languished, and it never resumed publication under his name or management."[15]

This was the beginning of Tucker's career in and around the press. Like his mentors Warren and Heywood, and like Proudhon, Tucker's existence was bound up with the printing press and the practice of radical journalism. He maintained careers on two separate levels of life, each revolving around the mass medium of newsprint. His dedication to the radical press bore fruit with the founding of Liberty, "the longest lived of any radical American paper."[16] Meanwhile he spent eleven years as reporter and editor on The Boston Globe, leaving there in 1892 to take up editorial responsibilities on Engineering Magazine.[17]

Tucker had a fourfold importance for the Libertarian movement: first, as the editor of Liberty; secondly as the translator of Proudhon; third, as spokesman for individualism in both the realms of politics and of art--in this guise Tucker was instrumental in the introduction of both Leo Tolstoy and George Bernard Shaw to American readers, and was responsible for the publication of an American work too sensational for commercial publishers, Walt Whitman's Leaves of Grass[18]; and fourth, as the importer of and publicist for the philosophy of Max Stirner. His personal view of his journalistic activities might be inferred from his front-page reprinting of Jefferson's comment, "Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."[19] An obvious echo of Warren's recognition that "public opinion" was the true government of the world.

Liberty was an anarchist tool, it was to educate and to prepare the way for an evolutionary development of anarchy. As an educator Tucker sought not only to explicate but also to correct misapprehensions about anarchy. This latter task was complicated for him by Johann Most. But on March 27, 1886, Tucker published a front-page expose of arson systematically carried out by Most's followers in order to collect insurance money. Excoriating Most, Tucker attempted to read him out of the anarchist and radical ranks by giving notice that "Much will depend upon the promptness with which good men and true separate themselves from common criminals. He who is not against their crimes is for them."[20]

Tucker expended much of his time and energy defining the plumb-line and cajoling or deriding those of differing interpretations. Like many radicals he was especially harsh to those closest to his own views. The right to the accolade 'anarchist' was denied by Tucker to the Haymarket victims, to anarcho-communists like Kropotkin and Emma Goldman, and to apostate Libertarians and fellow-travellers like John Badcock and Victor Yarros.[21] Tucker was a paradox; succeeding even better than the Pantarch Andrusius, he was an anarchist pope passing anathema and apostasy upon both issues and persons. His own attitude toward his role was both modest and arrogantly self-righteous: he never claimed any great originality and would usually sketch a brief answer to a particular question by one of his readers, and then refer him to a longer work on the specific issue by one of the older generation of Libertarians. Tucker saw his own role as that of publicist and occasional clarifier; he got the idea of philosophical anarchism, he wrote in a letter to the American Journal of Sociology in 1936," before I ever heard of it under the name of philosophical anarchism, receiving it first from Josiah Warren, an American who abominated Proudhon

through not understanding him. Afterwards I learned of Proudhon, though I was largely a Proudhonian without knowing it. My first real knowledge of him came from Wm. B. Greene, an American disciple who had known him in Paris."[22] Tucker conceived Liberty as a propaganda sheet for Warren's philosophy and in it he reprinted the earlier works of his mentors and friends. From the beginning his emphasis was upon the absolutist strain of individualism, and despite early and continued devotion to Proudhon he moved steadily toward absolute egoism. From his publication in Liberty of the entire Natural Law by Spooner, to the spreading of Spencerian thought by Victor Yarros in that journal, to the final hard-core egoism of James L. Walker and Max Stirner, the question was "How far?" not "Which direction?"

The thought of Benjamin Ricketson Tucker is epitomized in Liberty. Most of the Libertarians evolved their philosophies out of their everyday life experiences and in turn their lives reflected their philosophies--e.g., Warren's colonizing and time stores, Spooner's American Letter Mail Company, Andrews' phonology. But Tucker's contribution to politics, literature, literature, and philosophy, and his sincere belief in human dignity and progress were all summed up in his journal. In spite of the fact that subscribers never numbered above six hundred[23], Liberty maintained a lively and intellectually exciting level of discourse. Splitting hairs like a medieval scholastic on fine points of radical doctrine, but employing simple Yankee common sense as a secularized version of the religious inner light, in non-academic and often graceful language Liberty reflected and was designed to reflect the ideas of Benjamin R. Tucker. It began, and remained until the very end, the journal of and by one man. Tucker, in true individualist fashion had served notice of this fact in his first issue: "It may be well to state at the outset that this journal will be edited to suit its

editor, not its readers. He hopes that what suits him will suit them; but if not, it will make no difference. No subscriber, or body of subscribers, will be allowed to govern his course, dictate his policy, or prescribe his methods. Liberty is published for the very definite purpose of spreading certain ideas, and no claim will be admitted on any pretext of freedom of speech, to waste its limited space in hindering the attainment of that object."[24] This caveat, or prospectus, encapsulates a good deal of its editor's individualist philosophy. The journal was non-profit and thereby indebted to neither subscribers nor advertisers--it represented an ideological Consumer Reports which dispensed anarchism rather than product test results. But most importantly, it was the property of Benjamin R. Tucker, who had the right--and, in view of its limited space, the obligation--to spread certain ideas. In spite of his flat denial Tucker in fact was scrupulously diligent about allowing detractors, inquirers, rival doctrinaires, and other controversialists generous space in his paper. When he made his selection of articles for inclusion in Instead of a Book... he again gave generous space to his correspondents. When his erstwhile collaborator, Clarence Lee Swartz, edited a slightly revised collection in 1926 called Individual Liberty, Tucker refused to endorse the work directly. A 'publisher's note' indicates Tucker's objections: "In justice to Mr. Tucker, however, it should be stated that he emphatically protested against the elimination of the words of his opponents in the controversies, since he had slways been scrupulously exact in presenting their ideas in full; but the limited scope of this volume made such omission imperative."[25]

In the meantime, the lapse of the Radical Review apparently left Tucker unfulfilled and his continuing interest in aesthetics prompted him to undertake two subsequent journals, The Trans Atlantic and Five Stories

a Week--neither of which survived a single year.[26] In February of 1892 Tucker moved himself and Liberty from Boston to New York City when he accepted an editorial position on Engineering Magazine. About this enterprise Tucker wrote that "Its publisher, who is an anarchist and a subscriber to Liberty, tells me that he means to have the anarchistic view of these problems which are both technological and sociological in character well represented in the pages of the magazine."[27]

To further his educational and propagandistic activities, Tucker opened "Benj. R. Tucker's Unique Book Shop" at 502 Sixth Avenue. Now well ensconced in the bourgeois life style, Tucker continued his crusades on free thought, free love, and free banking. He was, in short, a bourgeois dabbler in revolution--not an outlaw but definitely a heretic.[28]

Liberty reflected its times, both in contents and its very existence. The end of the nineteenth century had been an era of hopeful agitation for radicals. Populists, greenbackers, free silver advocates, prohibitionists, and adherents of a myriad of political, economic, and social fads proliferated. The last decade and a half of the century had seen the publication of at least forty-eight utopian novels.[29] Karl Kautsky from 1886 to 1905 had harbored the hope, and the fear, that socialism would come to fruition first in America. In 1903 he wrote that "the immensity of the trusts, the crisis, unemployment, all these factors, which take on already greater dimensions than they do in Europe--could very well indicate that the proletariat on that side of the Atlantic will come to political power sooner than here."[30] The Ku Klux Klan, the San Francisco Vigilance Committee, Dennis Kearney's Anti-Chinese Agitation, and Colonel Jacob Coxey's pathetic army of outcasts indicate the milieu of such ferment as well as its diversity.[31]

Following the Civil War this country witnessed massive railroad competition, and the boxcars now carried industrial as well as agricultural products. American steel production, which in the immediate post-Civil War period approximated only 20,000 tons, had surpassed the British output of six million tons in 1895 and attained the level of ten million tons by 1900. The country changed, Samuel Eliot Morison notes, from an extractive to a manufacturing nation, a change which appeared to vindicate Hamilton's position rather than Jefferson's. The free yeoman was supplanted by the industrial worker, and the number of persons employed as factory laborers increased from two million in 1869 to 4.7 million thirty years later.[32]

With the continent joined by transportation nets, the farmer was beginning to be displaced thereby adding to the accumulating urban proletariat. At the same time the ethnic and political identities of the workers were transformed so that Jefferson's sturdy yeoman now spoke in many strange dialects--and were unlikely to have heard of either him or his ideas. The European immigrants had brought their own mentors, not Warren and Spooner, but Marx and Bakunin. While Tucker respected both of those social critics--especially the latter--he regretted their attachment to collectivist radical ideologies. In 1888 he began to publish a German language newspaper called Libertas in order to wean some of these foreign-born radicals from the recently arrived Johann Most. But the paper failed, and the proletarian and bourgeois radicals began to diverge in lifestyles marked by different social attitudes and often mutually incomprehensible languages. The nativist Libertarians had little influence on the immigrant radicals; the individualism of Locke, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson, Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Walt Whitman was not the stuff of their experience. Feudalism, paternalism, and tyranny both petty and great was

the background of many. To these "huddled masses" individualism imposed a burden of responsibility while collectivism promised security. The new proletariat lacked the bourgeois, even the petty-bourgeois, sense of efficacy characteristic of the generally educated and mobile Libertarians. Newspapermen, pamphleteers, translators, and men of the written and spoken word, the Libertarians tended to see the problems of urban society in traditional ways and through a craftsman's sense of competence. The poor, often foreign, felt the social question viscerally--not as an intellectual construct.

As labor reformers the Libertarians faced a dilemma: craft unions violated Warren's theory of equity by using apprenticeship and closed membership to gain a self-perpetuating grant of privilege for themselves and their members. A mass membership union also presented many of the same moral conundrums as democracy in general. Tucker thought labor unions the best existing agency for the advancement of working persons,[33] but he found them inadequate because while seeking to redistribute the profits of industry they left Authority untouched. "A just distribution of the products of labor is to be obtained," he wrote, "by destroying all sources of income except labor. These sources may be summed up in one word,-- usury: and the three principal forms of usury are interest, rent and profit."[34] For Tucker the primary support of the structure of usury was the State and its authority to dispense the monopoly of issuing money.

Libertarianism, Socialism, and the First Schism

Like Proudhon, Tucker's economic theory was socialist--he, like Pearl Andrews, saw socialism as a genus which included both State Socialism and Anarchism as species.[35] "The economic principles of Modern Socialism are a logical deduction from the principle laid down by Adam Smith, in the early chapters of his Wealth of Nations,--namely, that labour is the true measure of price," wrote Tucker.[36] But while Smith confined himself to description, socialism "expends its function to the description of society as it should be, and the discovery of the means of making it what it should be."[37] In an essay reminiscent of The Communist Manifesto in its sketching of both a radical theory and a history of its development, Tucker finds three men of diverse languages and nationalities to have made improvements on the theory as left by Smith: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Karl Marx, and Josiah Warren.[38]

> From Smith's labor theory of value, this radical triumvirate derived
>
> that the natural wage of labour is its product; that this wage, or product, is the only just source of income (leaving out, of course, gift, inheritance, etc.); that all who derive income from any other source abstract it directly or indirectly from the natural and just wage of labour; that this abstracting process generally takes one of three forms,--interest, rent, and profit; that these three constitute the trinity of usury, and are simply different methods of levying tribute for the use of capital; that capital being simply stored-up labour which has already received its payment in full, its use ought to be gratuitous, on the principle that labour is the only basis of price; that the lender of capital is entitled to its return intact, and nothing more; that the only reason why the banker, the stockholder, the landlord, the manufacturer, and the merchant are able to exact usury from labour lies in the fact that they are backed by legal privilege, or monopoly; and that the only way to secure to labour the enjoyment of its entire product, or natural wage, is to strike down monopoly.[39]

This represents what Tucker refers to as Modern Socialism and as such constitutes the common ground of those three radicals--Proudhon, Marx, and Warren. It is important to remember that Tucker saw himself as a Socialist, he wrote of himself as a Socialist, and he long sought to reclaim the term from the collectivists. Like Warren and Andrews before him, Tucker saw the socialist agitation as one of the dramatic and dynamic aspects of human history. Protestantism, democracy, and Socialism were the three movements of the continuing revolution, as Andrews had previously described it. The shared concerns noted above constitute the common foundation of Socialism--it is in their answer to the problems and in the implementation of their respective answers that the species differences become of increasing relevance.

As is often the case with political ideologues who share essential premises but diverge over other points of basic doctrine, the relations between the various species of socialism have been ambivalent, occasionally schizoid. The common opposition to the State, the Church, and the economic system created united fronts upon occasion, while the mutually exclusive methods and social arrangements of the competing sects often generated acrimonious rhetoric and scathing broadsides. This ambivalence on the part of the Libertarians is evident in Tucker's eulogy of Karl Marx. With his passing, Tucker asserted, "the cause of labor has lost one of the most faithful friends it ever had."[40] Tucker did not fail to remind his readers, however, that Marx had been an unrelenting enemy of individual liberty in that his program would inevitably result in another hierarchical arrangement for coercion. The anarchists consistently denied the possibility, morality, or efficacy of changing man through Statist coercion--not even through a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. Warren's reading

of Lamartine had convinced him of the corrupting nature of power, and of the tendency of the wielders of power to use it to diminish rather than enlarge the sphere of liberty. For the Libertarians freedom was asserted, not imposed.

Radicals who shared these concerns but were unwilling to utilize the State as an instrument of social change and economic redistribution, Tucker called State Socialists. The difference between Anarchism and State Socialism as species of Socialism results from their being predicated upon divergent principles. For Tucker, the history of mankind may be viewed as the conflict between Authority and Liberty, and all "intermediate parties, including that of the upholders of the existing society, are based upon a compromise between them."[41] Anarchism, the party of Liberty, counters Authority in all of its guises--including that of an authoritarian radicalism. Tucker the individualist is here fighting the battles fought by Proudhon the mutualist and Bakunin the communist against Marx the centralizer, the battle against the rigidity of organization and the ossification of revolution into dogma.[42] Revolution was justified only as the condition for creating freedom while freedom was the process of defining the boundary line, as Tucker put it, between "invasion and resistance, between government and defense." Man exists within a private sphere and within a public one as well. Warren earlier had expressed a recognition of this sphere of personal space with the corollary burden of responsibility in his definition, "Freedom for you to do (at your own cost or within your own sphere) what I may consider wrong, foolish, or inexpedient, is the vital principle of peace and all progress; for your experiments may prove that you are right."[43]

By beginning with a definition of freedom as the absence of external restraint or coercion, the Libertarians sought to expose the rigidity of all

political systems. The premise of non-intervention denies the moral legitimacy of any Statist system. For Warren and for Tucker, slavery, feudalism, and socialism, were different merely in degree not in kind. The difference was that between a well-meaning despot and a self-indulgent tyrant, not between oppression and liberty.

Through this recognition of the primacy of Liberty over Authority, Tucker highlights the divergence between "the extreme wings of Socialistic forces." This distinction is developed by him in an essay entitled "State Socialism and Anarchism: How Far They Agree and Wherein They Differ," a piece written in the tense aftermath of the Haymarket explosion at a time when it was dangerous to be tolerant of radicalism, let alone to be an avowed anarchist. Tucker wrote the essay at the instigation of the editor of The North American Review, one of the nation's most prestigeous journals of opinion. Taking the highly unpopular position of sympathy for those arrested, Tucker was anxious to distinguish their avowed ideas from his own brand of anarchism. He actually denied them the right to call themselves anarchist at all, exercising his increasing tendency to certify who and what was in fact anarchist. The article collected dust in the offices of the Review for over a year, whereupon Tucker requested that it either be published or returned. In reply he received the manuscript and a check for seventy-five dollars.[44]

The article is short and pithy: it concentrates in one place the ideas which Tucker inherited from the Warrenite tradition. Together with his later essay "The Attitude of Anarchism Toward Industrial Combinations" and his salutation in volume one, number one of Liberty, it consititutes the kernel of his thought.

In Tucker's version of radical history, individualist and collectivist

dissenters shared the same social concerns. The parting of the ways came with the problem of striking down monopoly. Here, Tucker informs his readers, the path forked and the State Socialists followed Authority while the Anarchists sought Liberty.[45] Implicitly, and later explicitly, Tucker's plumbline defined Anarchism so as to read out of the movement all variants of collectivism. This crucial problem of divergence, the striking down of monopoly, was of dual significance. First, it referred to the difference in tactics for combatting the existing monopolies; and second, it took note of the strategy of reconstructing society by substituting new monopolies for old ones.

It is relevant that in his parable of the forking path, Tucker distinguishes them as "to the right or to the left,--follow the path of Authority or the path of Liberty. Marx went one way: Warren and Proudhon the other. Thus was born State Socialism and Anarchism."[46] Recognizing Tucker to be a careful craftsman of language,[47] there can be little doubt in the consecutive parallel oppositions in the series just cited, that for him Marx was of the right, and Warren and Proudhon--and himself--were of the left.

Marx was of the right because he wished to centralize power while the Libertarians were of the left because they sought to disperse it.

America's liberal history, devoid of a feudal background, has equated decentralization with the alleged weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation and with the often racist-inspired demand for States' rights. The citizens of the United States have come to view a strong President as a political good, and to look for 'progress' and 'change' from their national leadership. The liberal response in America has been, like Mother Jones, to look to Washington for help.

While states' rights had been tainted in the public and academic minds by its political context, federalism and decentralization represented the goals of many refugees. Europeans were more likely than nativists to see threats to their liberty not in the marauders of the frontier but rather in the guise of despots and tax gougers. The opposition of Proudhon and Bakunin, and later of Kropotkin, to Marx was an opposition to Authority--and their alternative was decentralization and federalism. Bakunin fought Marx's attempts at centralizing the International, but he also chided Mazzini for his defense of autonomous municipalities. Mazzini was mistaken, according to the Russian, because "no isolated commune would be capable of resisting such a formidable centralization; it would be crushed by it. In order not to succumb in this struggle, each commune will have to combine with neighboring communes in a federation with a view to common defense, that is, it will have to form together with them an autonomous province."[48] Bakunin's fellow apostate nobleman, Peter Kropotkin, likewise defended communal control from the assault of centralizing forces. Kropotkin's political theory was derived from ethological and anthropological studies and developed in evolutionary categories. Opposing the interpretation of evolution espoused by T. H. Huxley, Kropotkin argued that, based upon available empirical data concerning the behavior patterns of animals, savages, and civilized men, the law of nature was not "red in tooth and claw" but was to be understood rather as a realm of cooperation--an approximation of Rousseau's state of nature rather than Hobbes'. Therefore, since men were bound by the law of Mutual Aid rather than mutual strife they had no need to divest themselves of their rights and to make a contract with Leviathan. Being naturally cooperative men needed no external governance and coercion. This primitive and, Kropotkin held, innate mutualism needed to be strengthened only by voluntary association among communes of such a cooperative variety.[49] European radicalism from Godwin to Prince Kropotkin and Count Tolstoy had

preserved an anti-centralist and anti-Statist tradition. It was this tradition, reintroduced in the United States in the late nineteenth century by Albert Brisbane and Colonel William B. Greene, and combined with the native Libertarian works of Warren, Andrews, and Spooner, that formed the backdrop of Tucker's philosophy. More than his predecessors, Benjamin Tucker knew the contending radical theories and was immersed in their crusades. He often found himself on the same side of issues with sectarians he vehemently opposed, but as a Libertarian would generously allow them their sovereign right to be foolish, while he exercised his right by publicizing that foolishness.

Opposition to Authority was not be confined to the political realm. State Socialists, he felt, wanted to end the domination of social class and destroy its authority by setting up an economic planning authority in its place. Libertarians recognized the logic in the phrase penned by John Marshall that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."[50] Giving it a different interpretation than did the Court, they attacked Authority in any guise because of their belief that the power to regulate involves the power to oppress. Tucker wrote, "It has ever been the tendency of power to add to itself, to enlarge its sphere, to encroach beyond the limits set for it..."[51]

Taking the path Marx chose leads to the creation of Authority in the economic arena and, at least, a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat in the political arena while that exploited class universalizes itself. The Libertarian argument was that these power monopolies are responsible although not necessarily responsive; i.e., the bureau created to oversee the restribution of finite resources is responsible for (held accountable) for successful planning, although it may not be immediately responsive to

(controlled by) the populace. As Tucker noted, "control naturally accompanies responsibility."

Tucker was a journalist and a propagandist rather than a philosopher, and his political theory was built upon a youthful radicalism of free money, free labor, and free love. Like the output of his colleagues, Tucker's contribution consisted of articles, essays, editorials, jeremiads, and polemics. He never completed a systematic work--the full title of his book suggests a reason, Instead of a Book, By a Man Too Busy to Write One: A Fragmentary Exposition of Philosophical Anarchism. But the very lack of a systematic work may itself be a statement of an anarchistic refusal to be trapped by a system, a denial of final answers, and an instrument of pragmatic and spontaneous response to conditions which are ever changing. Here the concept of anarchism held by Tucker is exceedingly relevant. In 1887 the pages of Liberty were enlivened by an intramural controversy: Benjamin Tucker and his chief editorial assistant had a falling out over the appropriate interpretation of 'anarchism'--and interestingly enough the divergence centered around etymological concerns. Henry Appleton, an editor of Liberty for five years, contended that anarchism meant opposition to the archos (political leader), whereas Tucker insisted that it denoted opposition to the arche (beginning, or primary principle).[52] The crux of this dispute concerned the role of the State, the responsibility of the individual within society, and the possibility of reform. For Appleton, the State was a "consequent rather than antecedent." The State and the individual exist in an anarchist either/or relation: either the State thrives on supine citizens, or the individual exercises his sovereignty at the expense of the centralized State. While not explicitly dealing with social contract theory, Appleton's position is that the State exists only after, and so

long as, the individual abdicates his sovereignty and acts in a manner which permits or encourages the State todespoil him of his rights, "Hence the individual is the proper objective point of reform," Appleton concludes, "as he is reformed the State disappears of itself."[53]

Appleton recognized the dilemma of utopians--if man is born free but everywhere is to be found in chains, how is the transition to be explained? "Unnatural government inevitably follows unnatural conditions," he answers. The unnatural conditions he describes are those of the urbanized environment: he calls an "unfortunate delusion" the belief that in the "crowded hole" surrounded by "great masses of people" natural government may exist. In urban society, wherein by necessity "industry, commerce, and domicile are centralized, the necessary conditions of individual sovereignty are physically impossible." Reflecting the attitudes of the nineteenth century agrarian radical, Appleton views the morrow with deepening pessimism. To him the city fosters usury and fraud, nourishes disease, and necessitates government "for holding the diseased conditions together, pending the inevitable day when fire and dynamite will come to remove these social ulcers, in order that the general body may survive."[54] Emphasizing his dedication to the traditional principles of Libertarian thought, to sovereignty of the individual and the cost principle, Appleton agrees with Tucker on the description of the ills of the social order but parts company with him on the issue of constructive alternatives. Seeking a demonstrable alternative to a rapidly urbanizing society, he urged the resurrection of colonization efforts.

Such a return to the conditions of the state of nature as envisioned by Locke, Rousseau, or possibly even Jefferson, was naively romantic and thoroughly anachronistic in Tucker's opinion. The controversy between close

friends and collaborators resulted in an irreparable breach, with Appleton leaving the paper and accusing Tucker of dilettantish forays of quibbling and criticism. With the departure of Appleton and a few others at this time, the Warrenite program of community building de novo had clearly been transcended. The Warrenite prescription remained, but Tucker was not its interpreter and reviser: he had definitely set himself the task of reading the plumb-line.

The absolute negative freedom fostered by the frontier, the freedom which Warren and Andrews had sought to protect within their colonies, had been superceded by the victory over Appleton's position. What replaced it, however, and indeed the fact that it had been replaced at all, was not fully apparent immediately.

The etymological dispute between Appleton and Tucker provides clues to the successor position. Tucker's argument is consonant with Warrenite orthodoxy, but so too is Appleton's. The relative emphasis, however, is crucial. Appleton's opposition to the archos means a removal of the political leader, an attempt to create a social ordering free of political domination. Individual men must spurn the clogged and clotted arteries of the great urban centers and seek to recapture the soil "under conditions that alone make voluntary government possible."[55]

Tucker responded that there was in fact no actual primacy of affirming liberty in Appleton's sense. He preferred to attack all encroachments on liberty, and to do so within the social milieu of the greater society: "To protest against the invasion of individual sovereignty is necessarily to affirm individual sovereignty."[56] Tucker separates individual sovereignty as a condition from a particular moral preference for a specific type of individual. This reflects Spooner's view that the sovereign individual

has no obligation to conform to the personal preferences of other individuals, sovereign or otherwise. Nor did Tucker believe that he had an obligation to be constructive: "if we had perfect liberty, we might, if we choose, remain utterly inactive and still be individual sovereigns."[57] He perceived liberty in negative terms as the freedom from coercion by opinion or moral prescription. While the ideal individual sovereign would undertake constructive action to alter the political, economic, and social environment in order to generalize the conditions of freedom, he is not obligated to anyone or anything, including himself, to do so.

It is this understanding of sovereignty which informs the controversy over 'anarchism.' Opposition to the arche means, by extension, "without dominion, without authority." Since Appleton had made of anarchy a purely political term (i.e., a term relevant to, and confined to, the political realm), he had denied its application to economic behavior, or to the Church. While Appleton gives the word a political relevance, Tucker utilizes it as a philosophic instrument applicable to relations of authority and domination wherever discovered, and, by extension, paves the way for a psychological definition of liberty. In this Tucker echoes his preceptor Proudhon: "Authority is government in principle, and government is authority in practice. To abolish either, if it is a real revolution, is to abolish both. By the same token, to preserve one or the other, if the preservation is effective, is to keep both."[58] The basis of this confrontation between Libertarians concerns the character of the "vast mountain of government outside the organized State."[59]

Tucker attacks Appleton's suggested flight from the cities as futile. Three years before the Census which inspired Frederick Jackson Turner's thesis, Tucker could claim against Appleton that already the modern age had

encroached sufficiently to render the traditional frontier useless: "Government makes itself felt alike in country and in city, capital has its usurious grip on the farm as surely as on the workshop, and the oppressions and exaction of neither government nor capital can be avoided by migration. L'Etat, c'est l'ennemi. The State is the enemy, and the best means of fighting it can only be found in communities already existing."[60] Pristine nature was no longer within man's immediate province. The industrial and urban sectors of American society had been transformed markedly since the Time Stores and even since Modern Times. The Civil War had inaugurated a reign of centralization, bureaucratization, and government collusion with private entrepeneurs. The State's authority to grant monopolies, to operate as a certification agency was growing. In light of altered circumstances, as Parrington notes: "The lost cause carried from no defect...the old ideal of decentralized democracies, of individual liberty..."[61] Tucker's response to Appleton sounds akin to the pessimistic "there's no place to hide."

The Four Monopolies

Tucker did not believe that the State was the only monopoly. However he did believe that the destruction of the State would leave other Authorities to demonstrate their claims unbuttressed by its might. Besides, the State fettered man and inhibited his quest for self-sufficiency.[62] The Libertarians with their principle of individual responsibility anticipated the existentialist concern with authenticity and clean hands, and insofar as Max Stirner is accorded legitimacy as a precursor of that movement he serves as the bridge of common influence between Libertarianism and existentialism.

The moral significance of the divergence between anarchism and State Socialism concerned, for Tucker, the desirability of free and spontaneous as against coerced and conditioned behavior. Although later he would deny the legitimacy of the very term anarcho-communism,[63] Tucker defined anarchism broadly enough at this point to include Bakunin and Kropotkin within the fold: it was "the doctrine that the affairs of men should be managed by individuals or voluntary associations, and that the State should be abolished."[64] This tolerant attitude toward the anarcho-communists reflects the common source of Proudhon's thought. Answering the question of what he would put in place of the State, Proudhon offered a program which inspired Bakunin and Kropotkin, as well as Greene and Tucker:

> It is industrial organization that we will put in place of government...
> In place of laws we will put contracts.--No more laws voted by a a majority, nor even unanimously; each citizen, each town, each industrial union, makes its own laws.
> In place of political powers, we will put economic forces.
> In place of the ancient classes of nobles, burghers, and peasants,

> or of business men and working men, we will put the general titles, and special departments of industry:. Agriculture, Manufacture, Commerce, etc.
> In place of public force, we will put collective force.
> In place of standing armies, we will put industrial associations.
> In place of police, we will put identity of interests.
> In place of political centralization, we will put economic centralization.[65]

While some of Proudhon's language and ideas were modified by his various disciples, his inventory was meant as thorough-going repudiation of monopoly.

The Libertarians saw all monopolies as resting upon the bedrock of the State. Tucker defined a monopoly as "any person, corporation, or institution whose right to engage in any given pursuit of life is secured, either wholly or partially, by any agency whatsoever,--whether the nature of things or the force of events or the decree of arbitrary power,--against the influences of competition."[66] The pre-eminent certifying agency and the one most prone to issuing monopolies is the State. Naturally if the State as the primary buttress of Authority in all realms of social interaction is abolished, authority in these other areas too will succumb. The assumption is that once State authority is struck down, freedom will ensue. Again the notion of freedom is defined negatively: artifical controls are removed and natural order reasserts itself--much like a thatched village is reclaimed by the jungle when its inhabitants abandon it. Implicitly the equation of freedom and nature is made in much anarchist thought, for laissez faire is held to be a principle of natural law. With the destruction of the State, the artificial pressures contributing to the retention of Authority are abolished and both individual and the arenas of intercourse and exchange are left alone, i.e., the natural processes are allowed to reassert themselves uninhibited by artifical constraints. Thus one is as one ought to be, and the Libertarians reunite the "is" and the "ought"

within their prescription of a descriptive law. This would permit the alienation of man from nature to be overcome.[67]

In the meantime, the State has thwarted liberty through the agencies of four monopolies: the money monopoly, the land monopoly, the tariff monopoly, and the patent monopoly.

The Tariff Monopoly

According to Tucker, the tariff monopoly represents an artificial and inept attempt to infringe laissez faire by coercively interfering with supply and demand rather than voluntaristically "adjusting" those values as Josiah Warren sought to do. For Warren, demand represented the desire for a good rather than the ability to purchase it, and a tariff altered not the desire for the good in question but merely the capacity of some to pay for it. By defining demand in individual terms, i.e., the individual's subjective desire for a good, Warren presented the human immediacy of the forces of economics. Defined in such a manner, reification of supply and demand to impersonal forces capable of manipulation takes on another dimension. To increase supply means to change behavior so as to produce more marketable commodities. A State which undertakes to manipulate the vital details of so many lives if of a different normative hue than the State which benevolently and scientifically juggles impersonal forces called supply and demand. Such alteration of demand could be accomplished by two means: first, by modifying the individual's values or criteria of preference, or second, by pricing the object out of the reach of many consumers. The first option has been suggested by social theorists from Plato to B. F. Skinner, but is unacceptable to the believer in individual liberty. The second option is also unacceptable under Warren's terms: the demand was

not met, instead a certain set of individuals was deprived of the object of their desire.

Defining demand in that idiosyncratic manner, Warren had demonstrated the personal and individual reality of economics, i.e., its relation to the actual lives of the economic actors known as individuals. The State, even allowing for its benevolent intent, by manipulating supply and demand was manipulating the lives and liberties of human beings. With an evil regime the result was slavery, while even in a decent regime the attraction of power was corrupting.

For Tucker the tariff monopoly was an attempt to do good by using State power to steal the labor of the individual, or of some individuals. The State sought to foster "production at high prices and under unfavourable conditions by visiting with the penalty of taxation those who patronize production of low prices and under favourable conditions."[68] Tucker, however, approvingly cites Proudhon as admitting that "to abolish this monopoly would be a cruel and disastrous policy....Free trade in money at home, making money and work abundant was insisted upon by Proudhon as a prior condition of free trade in goods with foreign countries."[69] The tariff monopoly is dependent upon another, the money monopoly. As long as the money monopoly continues to exist, abolition of the tariff monopoly would be cruel, since "the protective tariff is a trivial tax so long as that giant tax, usury, is allowed to exist."[70]

The Patent Monopoly

On the issue of the patent monopoly Tucker parted company with one of his mentors. Whereas Lysander Spooner had preached an individualism which extended to property in ideas, Tucker the Egoist opposed that concept. In perpetuating the property rights of inventors and authors, he

believed the State permitted then unfair enrichment in excess of the "labor measure of their services." In Tucker's view one portion of the community was being taxed--or extorted, as he usually preferred to call it--to enrich another portion. Royalties permitted the accumulation of wealth unrelated to the amount of labor expended, and Tucker still adhered to Warren's formula in such cases. In tying wealth to productivity in the form of labor the Cost Principle greatly inhibited the ability of any worker to accumulate enough capital to enslave others.

At least two objections have been raised by radicals against the notion of property in ideas. Anarcho-communists like Peter Kropotkin held that the social inheritance of a race provide the components for each new breakthrough in science, technology, and even literature. The clever lad who put these building blocks together in an innovative way ought to be congratulated and possibly even respected, but not allowed any property in it. A second, somewhat satiric, issue attached to breakthrough items like the wheel, language, writing, or double-entry bookkeeping. The issue may be put more immediately by considering the splitting of the atom, solar energy, or a cure for cancer--what would it mean to have a copyright on the theory of relativity.[71]

In one of his many critical articles on Henry George, Tucker chides him for arguing against patent while affirming copyright. George had divided labor into two forms, labor expended in discovering, and that expended in productivity. Discovery constituted a one-time only form of labor, once an item was discovered the labor expended in its pursuit was terminated. Production, on the other hand, was replicable, each new commodity required fresh labor. Since only productive labor was to be rewarded patents were not permissible. George, however, exempted copyright from this critique

because the author expends labor of discovery in deciding what to say, and expends productive labor in how to say it. Tucker vigorously endorsed George's critique of patents as "conclusive, unanswerable", but called him a "prestidigatator" and a "juggler" for refusing the logic of his own definition of productive labor as that "required afresh in the case of each particular thing."[72] As Tucker put it, somewhat derisively, he could write words on several pieces of paper. The paper then would belong to him, but not the words. Further more, in the case of an author of books, the actual productive labor involved in each individual book is the labor of the printer and the bookbinder, not that of the author. Implicitly for Tucker the author expends his labor of discovery in creating a book, which then realizes itself in productive labor. The labor of discovery results in a material object which is marketable as productive labor. By this argument presumably the buyer of a commodity can sell imitations of it to the public as examples of his own productive labor, in that the buyer expended his own labor in duplicating the purchased commodity.

Concerning the copyrighting of his own translation of Leo Tolstoy's The Kreutzer Sonata, Tucker simply said "viewed from the summit of the ideal life, it was an act of robbery; viewed from the standpoint of existing exigencies, it was the wisest thing possible under the circumstances."[73]

On the issue of copyright, Tucker was more consistently anti-Statist than Spooner. Tucker's objection to copyright was an opposition to an automatic acceptance of a credentializing agency. While both men were individualists, Spooner's individualism was the reason for his anarchism and it remained primary in his thought, whereas Tucker was--as he vehemently demonstrated to Henry Appleton--an anarch, one who opposed not the State alone but authority in itself, and this resolved itself into individualism in

social interaction. Spooner was an individualist, a radical come late to the anti-Statist position, while Tucker--the Quaker and the aesthete--was more consistently the enemy of authority in its variety of guises.[74]

Regarding Spooner, a man for whom Tucker appeared to have had a deep and genuine affection and respect, Tucker simply said, "The monopoly of knowledge is an old-fogy idea, and old fogies will endorse old-fogy ideas even when so progressive a man as Mr. Spooner puts them forth."[75] The reality was a little more complex than Tucker's flippancy indicates. While Tucker was supported in his position by his fellow egoists James L. Walker and John Beverly Robinson, the other prominent Stirnerite, Victor Yarros, opposed him on this issue, as did such individualists as Hugo Bilgram, Wordsworth Donisthorpe, A. H. Simpson, and of course Lysander Spooner. Joining Tucker on this issue but by no means embracing his egoist justifications were William Hanson, Joshua King Ingalls, and J. William Lloyd.[76] It was another in a series of strains which marked the movement, and which served to develop Tucker's theory of egoism.

The result of destroying monopolies in ideas, according to Tucker, would be to introduce the idea of equity into the intellectual realm as well: "The abolition of this monopoly would fill its beneficiaries with a wholesome fear of competition which would cause them to be satisfied with pay for their services equal to that which other labourers get for theirs, and to secure it by placing their products and works on the market at outset with prices so low that their lines of business would be no more tempting to competitors than any other lines."[77] Thus value is correlated with production, reward with labor, and the natural tendency of the market is toward equality of incomes. Should one producer get an especially good price for his goods, rivals would spring up and rush into the field until

the falling returns would drive the unsteady and the timorous out of the marketplace. But before the readjustment to a natural state is complete two major inhibitors of supply and demand must be eliminated--the land and money monopolies.

The Land Monopoly

Tucker takes a Lockean position on property, at variance with many of his radical colleagues. He denies society's right to collectivize the land, yet his response to property inequality is more radical than that of Henry George. George, whom Tucker once thought merely misguided but later came to vilify,[78] sought to redistribute land via a single tax, a tax so prohibitory in its cumulative effect as to prevent monopolization of land. In opposition, Tucker asserted in Jeffersonian tones the natural limit to property:

> I do not believe in any inherent right of property. Property is a social convention, and may assume many forms. Only that form of property can endure, however, which is based on the principle of equal liberty. All other forms must result in misery, crime, and conflict. The Anarchistic form of property has already been defined... as 'that which secures each in the possession of his own products, or of such products of others as he may have obtained unconditionally without the use of fraud or force, and in the realization of all titles to such products he may hold by virtue of free contract with others.' It will be seen from this definition that Anarchistic property concerns only products. But anything is a product upon which human labor has been expended, whether it be a piece of iron or a piece of land.[79]

The denial of a natural right to property is a significant departure from the Spooner tradition. Here property is presented as a consequence of a social contract, and its definition as subject to efficacy--although the justification for its definition is derivative for Libertarian principles of voluntary consociates. Implicitly recognizing the essential difference between products whose proliferation depends upon talent, energy, and efficient

utilization of resources, and land which is finite and incapable of multiplication, Tucker makes title to property in land conditional. To the above description of property he appends a Lockean footnote, "It should be stated, however, that in the case of land, or of any other material the supply of which is so limited that all cannot hold it in unlimited quantities, Anarchism undertakes to protect no titles except such as are based upon actual occupancy and use."[80] However a problem looms in any scarcity economy as to who or how many are to determine the allocation of any limited resource.

The land monopoly "consists in the enforcement by government of land titles not resting upon personal occupancy and cultivation."[81] In the first volume of Liberty, Tucker described usury as having three forms, "interest on money, rent of land, and profit in exchange." These in turn rested upon the two State-supported monopolies, "the monopoly of land and the monopoly of credit."[82]

Locke had conjoined the concepts of labor and property: "As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in it. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others...As much land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property."[83] Waste therefore annihilates all claim to property, for man takes possession of something by wresting it from the natural realm and bringing it into his own conventional world. Since the object enjoys different statuses in the two realms--ownness in the natural world, and property of another in the conventional world--it is evident that the conventional world alters the relationship of man to the natural order. Also evident is the point that property is not justified by natural law since in the natural order property exists only as the use-value of consumable goods. Locke notes that "God

gave the World to Men in Common" and he "gave it them for their benefit," but its initial commonality was not expected to persist. For Locke, title to land is in accordance with the Biblical injunction to "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it."[84] In the State of nature a low density population avoided conflict over resources by limiting property to that which is inhabited and worked upon. There was no separation of production and consumption, for production only existed for the purpose of consumption. Gluttony was obviated by the necessity to produce what (or the equivalent of what) one consumed.

The pastoral equity of Locke's state of nature came to an abrupt conclusion with the introduction of a medium of exchange incapable of spoilage: money. Henceforth property no longer depended upon use: the invention of money and the "desire of having more than Men needed...altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the Life of Man."[85] The Libertarians wished to return to the economic roots of that "intrinsic" value of things.

Waste in pre-monetary society returned property to the common reservoir to be appropriated by the first who wished to appropriate and exploit it. Tucker apparently would retain this Lockean construction by limiting property through use and a reciprocal guarantee among property-holders. For "as soon as individuals should no longer be protected by their fellows in anything but personal occupancy and cultivation of land, ground rent would disappear, and so usury would have one less leg to stand on."[86] Locke himself relinquished this principle with his account of the invention of money. Tucker however retained it as a principle of justice since he admits no legitimate shift from the natural state to the civil state of Locke. John Basil Barnhill, a sometime colleague of Tucker, provided a

more apt egoistic admonition in his "Warning to Nietzscheites who believe in rent and interest...Was not the parasite an abomination unto Zarathustra? And are not rent and interest the greatest parasites that prey upon man? Nietzsche told us 'Noble souls wish not to have anything for nothing'--and the financial exploiters have everything for nothing."[87]

Locke had located the mechanism for inequality in labor, "'tis labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing."[88] What is being exchanged ought not to change with the alteration of the standard of exchange, unless the standard of exchange shifts from labor to the item of exchange. Tucker seeks to end speculation. The buying of a commodity in anticipation of a rise in its market price, he believed to be an interference with the free market: "Land (or anything else) can be used as a basis of currency only as long as it has a market value. When by the economic revolution which Liberty advocates it shall cease to have a market value, its use as a basis of currenty will have to be abandoned."[89] Tucker, like Spooner, Greene, and Ingalls before him, would monetize labor, or rather monetize the value stored in potential labor. "The people are poor," claimed Tucker, "not because they receive low wages, but because they give their credit away and buy it back."[90] The agency which sells it back is the money monopoly.

The Money Monopoly.

Reflecting the money-crankism of Proudhon's Banque du Peuple and Colonel Greene's mutualist bank, Tucker observed that "Holding a monopoly, the banker is the worst enemy of the human race, being its chief despoiler: without that monopoly, he is its best friend, being its greatest civilizer."[91] Just a few years before his death, Tucker restates this belief, observing

"I have learned from all of my great teachers (Proudhon, Warren, Greene, Andrews, Spooner, etc.) that banking is one of the most important of functions, and that our only hope is to free it from the legal monopoly places upon it."[92] But usually his emphasis was upon the banker who has the prerogative of issuing the circulating medium of the State, and upon his depradations. Tucker noted that "it is claimed that theholders of this privilege control the rate of interest, the rate of rent of houses and buildings, and the prices of goods...."[93] The money monopoly is the foundation of the other three.

Banking, thought Tucker--building upon the ideas of Proudhon, Greene, and Spooner--should be opened to competition, resulting in everyone becoming a mutualist banker. In such a system as Proudhon's,credit was unlimited, unregulated, and untaxed. It was untaxed because it bore no interest rate except for a surcharge "to cover the expenses of administration and wear of metals..."[94] Created to combat monopoly and usury the purpose of the bank was to lend money, not to make money. Credit was unregulated because there was no State to interdict it, and in the absence of the Authority of the State the laws of "social economy" held. These laws, according to Proudhon, are independent of the will of any man or any legislator, "it is our privilege to recognize them our honor to obey them."[95] Credit was unlimited because it was not tied to an artificially depressed money market, instead products and labor were now monetized and treated as productive capital. [96]

The money monopoly rests upon the State, and the State feeds upon it in return. Warren's Equity Principle and his labor currency commands Tucker's support as the most appropriate means for monetizing these products of labor. Warren, Greene, and Spooner are perpetuated in Tucker's structural criticism of capitalist society. But Tucker's attention turns to the creation

of freedom in society characterized by these monopolies and he defines freedom in terms of internal space rather than external room for movement. Freedom was understood in the political and economic categories is projected into a psychological context; freedom is subjective, relative, and individually created.

Freedom Turns Inward: The Discovery of the Ego

As a radical, perhaps Tucker's greatest contribution to American political and social thought was his discover of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum by Johann Kaspar Schmidt, better known to history as Max Stirner.[97] Stirner's book was a repudiation not only of the Right Hegelian milieu of which he was a participant-observer, but of the intellectual pretensions of any Hegelian-derived cosmology. He categorically denied any super-individual rights, claims, obligations, or duties: "Nothing is more to me than myself."[98]

Tucker thought his publication of The Ego and His Own to be the greatest achievement in a lifetime of radical politial and aesthetic activities,[99] a work which the literary critic James Huneker called "the most revolutionary book ever written."[100] With this work and his identification with egoism, Tucker profoundly altered the Libertarian movement. It split, with many following the course set earlier by Henry Appleton. Stirner's influence on Tucker may be seen as the watershed of Libertarianism. Tucker, however, never repudiated his traditional mentors. He believed himself the continuer of Warren's thought, acclaiming his journal "the foremost organ of Josiah Warren's doctrines."[101] Likewise Tucker retained his respect for Proudhon, despite the latter's disdain for Stirner: Tucker called Liberty "a journal brought into existence almost as a direct consequence

of the teachings of Proudhon and which lives principally to emphasize and spread them...[102] But Proudhon had certain affinities with the bizarre Teutonic nihilist. Ironically the masthead motto of Liberty from its initial publication until July 31, 1886 was a relatively egoistic comment by Proudhon, "A free man is one who enjoys the use of his reason and his faculties; who is neither blinded by passion, nor hindered or driven by oppression, nor deceived by erroneous opinions."[103] In his first published work, Essai de Grammaire General--another instance of the dual interest of anarchism and the language--Proudhon had argued against the conventional wisdom among linguists that the key term in all languages was etre, asserting instead the primacy of moi.[104] In What is Property?, Proudhon even adopts the term ego: "But who does not see that these talents and capacities, owing to an infinite variety of wills, and the character, the inclinations, and--if I may venture to use the expression--the form of the ego, are necessarily changed; so that in the order of liberty, as in the order of intelligence, there are as many characters as heads, whose tastes, fancies, and propensities, being modified by dissimilar ideas, must necessarily conflict?" Man, by his nature and his instinct, is predestined to society; but his personality is adverse to it."[105]

But for Tucker the plumb-line had now swung decidedly toward Stirner and his unequivocal egoism. Stirner's The Ego and His Own had originally been published in Germany in 1844, and despite Engels' characterization of Stirner as the most talented, diligent, and independent of Der Freien, it immediately became a target of the Hegelian left. Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Moses Hess, and Arnold Ruge devoted their critical attention to it, as did Marx and Engels in that manuscript which they left to the 'gnawing of the mice'--The German Ideology.

Thereafter Stirner's work, and his career, went into eclipse. His

marriage failed, his teaching position at Madame Gropius' academy for young ladies was terminated, and, after being imprisoned as a debtor, he ended his days in misery and bitterness. His book also lapsed into a nether world of obscurity for a half-century. It is a complex, convoluted, and prolix work, but its philosophy is easily amenable to summary--indeed, it is attractive to caricature: there is (i.e., ought to be) nothing superior to the individual human being. For Stirner, race, nation, clan, family, were all artificial and destructive of the only true source of rights, the individual ego.

Marx claimed to have stood Hegel on his head--or rather turned him right side up--in regard to the replacement of idealist premises by materialist ones. And following Count August von Cieszkowski, Marx attempted to turn Hegel around from a contemplation of history-as-pattern to an understanding of the future as the arena of praxis. Stirner reversed--or negated--Hegel's and Marx's concern with the collective consciousness by asserting the primacy of the personal and the subjective. Individualism in its starkest form derives from the uncompromising claims for the subjective ego made by Stirner. Simply stated, Stirner's argument concerns the etiology of values--either one lives by a set of values personally generated, or one lives by a set generated by someone or something else. The egoist is capable of validating only the subjective: what I want, I can understand; what someone else wants is an enigma or an imposition. Alternatively, either I live in accordance with my wants and desires, or I live in accordance with another's. In the latter case I live not for myself but for the other. The imposition by external authority of a value system represents an infringement upon, a limitation of, the free development of the ego. This law is always at war with the ego, and 'crime' is a mere description of the

ego's behavior by some one other than the Ego. "Every ego is from birth a criminal to begin with against the people, the State."[106]

The startling starkness of this position is largely due to the lack of familiarity with the vocabulary and concepts involved. As James L. Walker indicated, "Language is now Christian; so the egoist has no very appropriate means of expression."[107] What was needed was a vocabulary of absolute freedom in an egoistic sense, a positivistic language which abolished spooks and recognized that "the Egoist cannot be bound except in physical bonds, because there are no others."[108] Before Stirner, de Sade had recognized the necessity for absolute freedom--i.e., the freedom to choose ill, the freedom to do evil; since Stirner a similar position has been put forth by Jean Genet. For the Egoist freedom is not defined by the collective--be it class, tribe, or State-freedom is rather the act of choosing by the Ego at any given moment, free of entangling commitments or, in Stirner's term, "fetters." Absolute freedom for Stirner repudiates God and State, natural law and positive law. More consistent and less apologetic than Thrasymachus, Stirner makes not 'might' but 'will' the criterion of right, while Tucker turns 'will' into the capacity to make contracts.[109]

As noted earlier, Stirner serves as a common source of anarchism and existentialism.[110] The Ego repudiates Authority, thus he is anarchistic. The Ego also creates his own conditions of existence by his striving, thus he becomes a candidate for Sartre's living space and a participant in Hannah Arendt's vita activa. For, as Stirner stated the position which so impressed Tucker, "given freedom is no freedom, since one takes for himself, therefore the egoist's freedom rides with full sails. Donated freedom strikes its sails as soon as there comes a storm--or calm; it requires always a gentle and moderate breeze."[111] The affinity is even more apparent in the comment

of James L. Walker: "Reasoning is well in its place, but action is necessary to make a free man or woman when one has been trained to have a conscience in any particular."[112]

Stirner's concept of the individual is defined, as the German title makes somewhat clearer[113] not in terms of political liberty but rather of uniqueness or psychological liberty. Rebellion not revolution is the goal and individual liberation rather than class action is the method.[114] Freedom is a physical relationship with the material world and its managers. Under such conditions the individual may not be able to create the conditions of his own external physical freedom, for only the uniqueness of the individual ego is beyond the reach of the pawns of the State. Thus the possibility of individual freedom coexisting with and within social oppression took another strange turn in its epic journey from Epictetus to Timothy Leary.[115]

But Tucker's egoism was clearly located in society, in fact within a community, and the value system of that ego was a function of that system: "Right and Wrong are principles that must ever be defined, qualified, and circumscribed by the individual, in his associative capacity: defined, by a correct analysis of the natural domain of individual action; qualified, by the natural reflex action of other individuals; circumscribed, by the inflexible law that all action, individual and associative, shall be at the sole cost of the party or parties acting."[116] This served to accommodate Warrenite environmental determinism with Stirner's egoism, and it provided a basic relationship between freedom for the individual and his 'associative capacity.' In this way Libertarianism retained its concern for the community and defined the Ego in terms of the marketplace paradigm. Rights and obligations are the surrogates of supply and demand and the range of an indiv-

idual's behavior is governed by socially shared norms. As the price of labor was subject to acceptance or rejection by the potential market, so the demonstration of individual liberty was conditioned by the expected response of others. The market paradigm serves as the "government in nature."[117]

For Stirner, however, no economic model blunts his egoism. He indeed was a nihilist and while his philosophy was not turned outward as the nihilism of Dmitry Pisarev it was as radical and uncompromising.[118] Like Schliemann at Troy, or Descartes in his oven, Stirner scraped away layer after layer to arrive at his quest: the truly free man was the <u>own</u> man. Stirner encounters the potential objection to egoism that one can be free of external coercion and still be manipulated by uncontrollable or unquenchable inner urges. Decades before Sigmund Freud, Max Stirner faced the realization that one may exist in a zone of negative liberty and still be enslaved by whims, obsessions, passions, and social conditioning.

Egoism resulted in a shift of categories to the psychological realm in two ways. First, it defined the individual in terms of interior develop-- ment, interior perceptual interpretations, and interior space. "Egoism" James L. Walker states, "is interior liberty, which of course makes for equal liberty of Egoists.. Democracy commands its members to maintain an equal status for all. Egoism awaits the coming of the free, who will recog- nize each other, but not by virtue of any birthright."[119] Secondly, it located revolution in the same dimensions. Tucker's revolution was like- wise psychological, it represents a prime example of what has come to be known as 'consciousness-raising,' and it fitted well with a group of educated and urbane men and women of letters, persons whose lives were bound up with the written and spoken word as the instrument of consciousness-raising.

Anarchism more than many other radical theories, places great demands upon the individual. With the passing of the traditional social hierarchy, its positive functions must be internalized: the superego supplants the State. The community had in the past generated an informal code of behavior and propriety, with the State serving as enforcer of selected regulations pertaining to the security of society. Anarchism sought to remove the State, thereby permitting the community directly to reappropriate its role (vide Spooner's juries which decide facts and interpret laws).

Sharing the concern of the nineteenth-century Russian nihilist and of the twentieth-century existentialist, Stirner had founded his faith upon a great negation. Indeed, to change an earlier simile, rather than Schliemann uncovering Troy after brushing away four intervening remnants, Stirner might be compared to the curious child peeling away layer after layer of an onion to find at its core--nothing. But the nothingness Stirner found was itself the core of community life and interaction. Stripping away the strata of the individual left the Ego, which constituted the positive element of his philosophy. The Ego actualized freedom; freedom cannot be given but was "that (which) you must take for yourselves."[120] Such a formulation of the role of individual sovereignty was naturally attractive to followers of Josiah Warren and the colleagues of Lysander Spooner. But while they and their cohorts could be described as radical individualists, even the vitriolic Lysander Spooner ultimately fell short of egoism. The early Libertarians, while battling in the name of individualism, retained allegiences to externally-legitimated value systems--these systems may be encapsulated as laissez faire, natural law, anarchism, or simply liberty. Allegience to an external system involves a psychological claim upon the ego by another, a claim which is socially defined as 'obligation' and its failure

as 'shame' or 'guilt.' Individualisms passes into egoism when it sheds the notion of shame, and this most clearly separates the early Libertarians from the later egoists.

The doctrine of Egoism, thus, became troublesome for the Libertarian movement in 1887. In January of that year a controversy between Gertrude and John F. Kelly, two of Tucker's occasional associates on Liberty,and 'Tak Kak' (James L. Waler) began over the source of morality. The Kellys took a Spencerian and sociological perspective by arguing that morals "owe their power to their being in accord with the inherent laws of the social organism, and any departure from them must be regarded as a societary [sic] disease."[121] Victor Yarros, a refugee Ukrainian radical and earlier a fervent supporter of the Spencerian position within Libertarianism, then attacked Gertrude Kelly in print, going so far as to call his erstwhile mentor "a loyal servant of the bourgeoisie."[122] Tucker's own position was not long left in doubt, he asserted his editorial prerogative by noting that "Mr. Spencer's attitude toward the State...in view of what Mr. Spencer may be supposed to know, better warrants criticism than defense of him."[123] As Tucker was fond of pointing out, Liberty was his journal and as he retorted to Moses Harmon, publisher of the radical and usually Libertarian journal Lucifer,"I insist upon my control of every inch of Liberty."[124] Egoism wrote Tucker - rearranging Proudhon to better fit with Stirner, is "the sole motive of conduct...intelligent egoism is another name for liberty, and consequently it is the mother of order."[125]

The issue became more pedagogic however. Tucker, Walker, and Yarros pushed the Egoist line in the paper, whereupon the Kellys severed their relationship with Tucker's journal, John F. Kelly writing an open letter to cancel his subscription and to put his position before other subscribers.[126]

Lines were thus drawn for another schism, and the small but vocal Social Darwinist contingent joined the colonizers' outmoded tendencies in being cast out. Tucker's reading of the plumb-line was now an egoistic one.

Jo Labadie, the Libertarian labor organizer from Detroit and author of the column "Cranky Notions", stuck with Tucker, as did George and Emma Schumm, the German-speaking anarchists who had edited Tucker's Libertas, Stephen T. Byington, the translator of Stirner's work, and John Beverly Robinson who wrote to say that "I have resolved to call myself an Egoist."[127]

Tucker determined the tenor of Liberty, but the price paid was that many of the secondary figures of the movement were never again to appear in its pages. Henry Appleton had been cast out years earlier, M. E. Lazarus and Dyer D. Lum followed, while William J. Lloyd skirted ostracism several times, and for a time only his poetry and not his polemical prose appeared in Tucker's paper. E. C. Walker had been excoriated, read out of the anarchist movement, and his words interdicted--only to be welcomed back as a prodigal son and accepted on the staff of Liberty itself after his falling out with his father-in-law, Moses Harman.[128] But John F. and Gertrude Kelly slipped from the pages of Liberty, still clinging to the natural law position derived from Herbert Spencer. By this time nearly all attachment with the older generation of domestic Libertarians had been lost or broken, and Tucker was now the conduit from the past and the pre-eminent spokesman for American anarchism. His position was so apparent that he was invited to present the anarchist point of view at a conference on trusts organized by the Chicago Civic Federation.

But the controversy over egoism revived five years later, in 1892, with Tucker, Byington, and Robinson now confronting J. William Lloyd and John Badcock, an English disciple of Tucker and the author of Slaves to

Duty.[129] The immediate point at issue concerned the rights of children and the notion of a parent's property in his progeny. Children, Tucker held,

> like adults have no right to life at all. Under equal freedom, as it develops individuality and independence, it is entitled to immunity from assault or invasion, and that is all. If the parent neglects to support it, he does not thereby oblige anyone else to support it. If others give it support, they do so voluntarily, as they might give support to a neglected animal; there is no more obligation in the one case than in the other...Even at present comparatively few parents are disposed to abuse their children, and in the absence of poverty and false notions of virtue their number will be infinitesimal and may be safely neglected.[130]

This was a difficult morsel for most radicals, sensitive persons who could not appreciate Tucker's argument that the solution to the Social Problem might involve the abandonment of children. Tucker, however, had a problem since children were not rational parties to a utilitarian contract. He denied natural rights, so children were not born with any inherent claim to preservation. Similarly, as an Egoist, he rejected the Common Law tradition: the past was merely another spook to unchain the mind. Egoism seems to demand that contracts be made only between rational and responsible beings, thereby ruling out the socially defined category of children. "As long as children are unable to make contracts, I know of no reason why they should not be put on a par with property," Tucker wrote. Although he softened the image by adding that this is especially true in cases where doing so "tends on the whole to lessen their suffering, and if there is no method of dealing with them that does not put them virtually on a par with property."[131] In Tucker's egoistic universe there were two relevant categories, the owner and the owned--the determining criterion was the capacity to make contracts.[132] This position was generated in the course of one of Tucker's many feuds in print, this time with his English disciple John Babcock.

That the consequences of this position were not entirely attractive

to Tucker is evident in his somewhat distressed advocacy of non-intervention in an instance of the sort he "safely neglected" earlier. Badcock asked Tucker what should be done if one encountered a mother disposing of her property, i.e., her infant, in a furnace. It was highly probable, admitted Tucker,

> that I would personally interfere in such a case. But it is as probable, and perhaps more so, that I would personally interfere to prevent the owner of a masterpiece by Titian from applying the torch to the canvas. My interference in the former case no more invalidates the mother's property right in her child than my interference in the latter case would invalidate the property right of the owner of the owner of the painting. If did interfere in either case, I am an invader, acting in obedience to my injured feelings.[133]

The conflict that Tucker manifests here is that between the non-agression principle, and the sanctity of the individual. The second is a moral value while the former is an expedient--although it is often clothed in moral garb. The infringement of the non-agression principle might be tolerated on occasion, in special circumstances, but if those invasions became too frequent it would be the responsibility of a jury, according to Tucker to levy a sanction sufficient to deter further breaches.

Tucker, however, provides no guidelines as to which invasion should be treated more leniently, nor did he suggest how many is too many. The failure to do so is, itself, a Libertarian position: the jury of peers might provide the answers within a living and changing context. The jury suggests a linkage between the individualism of Spooner as presented in Trial by Jury and Verein der Egoisten of Stirner, and suggests the relevance of a community to a theory of individualism.

TOWARDS COMMUNITY

Nineteenth-century liberalism was a philosophy of natural law, and, what in that view came to the same thing, of laissez-faire. To leave something alone is to allow it its natural development: such was the assumption of classical liberalism and of Libertarianism. So long as mankind was either innately benevolent or at worst a Lockean tabula rasa, laissez faire served as a redemptive agency to thwart the possibility of oppression. However, to leave things to nature involves a considerable assumption in favor of nature as a condition: to leave things to nature, when nature masquerades as a vengeful God or a malevolent djin conduces not to freedom but to enslavement by a Hegelian inevitability. Thus the word Nature[134] operates as a moral justification, i.e., that which is natural is valued for its assumed moral qualities. Natural as a value predicate means lack of artifice, uninhibited, uncoerced, and without manipulation. Natural then is a synonym for laissez faire, with that term being the simplest and most literal formulation of natural law--for if things were to be left alone, they would exist in a natural condition. On the whole, laissez faire tended to assume that the natural order was rather decent. Hence even the egoist position seemed to see a state of nature more in terms of Locke or Rousseau, rather than Hobbes or Thrasymachus. According to James L. Walker: "If now the words <u>laissez faire</u> occur to the reader he will easily remember that all animals except man practise according to that principle. Do we hear of fanaticism among them, of fighting within the species except in defence of their persons and property or on a matter of rivalry between the males."[135]

This idyllic state of nature was ruptured with the development of organized depradations upon the individual spheres of privacy and property. The very philosophy of politics, Tucker had informed his readers, was founded upon the definition of the boundary line between "invasion and resistance, between government and defense."[136] This was his recognition of what the contemporary Libertarian theorist and polemicist Murray Rothbard asserts to be the fundamental principle of that tradition--a rule of non-agression.[137] That principle is both absolute and reciprocal. As Tucker defined that principle, "equal liberty does not mean equal slavery or equal invasion. It means the largest amount of liberty compatible with equality and mutuality of respect, on the part of the individuals living in society, for their respective spheres of action."[138] Like Hobbes, Tucker denied the claims of conventional morality,

> The idea of moral obligation, of inherent rights and duties, (the anarchists) totally discard. They look upon all obligations, not as moral, but as social, and even then not really as obligations except as these have been consciously assumed...The Anarchists are not only utilitarians, but egoists in the farthest and fullest sense. So far as inherent right is concerned, might is its only measure.[139]

Tucker described the context of this 'equal liberty' as being (1) "the largest amount of liberty compatible with equality and mutuality of respect,: (2) "on the part of individuals living in society," and (3) "for their respective spheres of action." Hence giving Byington credit for knowing Tucker's use of language with "especial precision" it would appear that (1) liberty is not an absolute but is rather contextually derived, (2) individuals exist in and interact within social groupings, and, as a synthesis of these two premises, (3) liberty is defined in terms of spheres of action--a concept similar to Hannah Arendt's vita activa. As she points out, "action and politics, among all the capabilities and potentialities of human life, are

the only things of which we could not even conceive without at least assuming that freedom exists...The raison d'etre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action."[140]

In this manner the Libertarians sought to protect equality through a community of reciprocating peers. Hence they were representative of those Americans Tocqueville desribed when he wrote, that "The Citizen of the United States is taught from infancy to rely upon his own exertions in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life; he looks upon the social authority with an eye of mistrust and authority, and he claims its existence only when he is able to do without it."[141] Tocqueville's examination of American democracy allowed him to present a counter-proposal of the idea of politics. It would not only protect its citizens from tyranny but it would also inspire them with a sense of responsibility for making the political system work, i.e., it would militate toward a sense of community. Tocqueville saw the protection and preservation of community as being facilitated through a perpetuation of social differentiation and hierarchy of social institutions. The Libertarians on the other hand, sought to accomplish the same goal through radical individualism.

In light of this individualism of responsibility, laissez faire was a moral injunction toward freedom, and not simply a negative rejection of options, and as such, required work rather than passivity. Looking back to a Protestant work ethic and forward to an Existentialist responsibility for clean hands, Libertarianism demands accountability of the political actor. Each individual is responsible to himself, and since liberation is essentially individual one must be able to satisfy the sensibilities of the liberated self. Both Tucker and Stirner located the power of the ego in its uniqueness thus vitiating any necessity for scaling relative power

potential. Since all liberated egos are unique, they are also equally unique. Equally unique because uniqueness is a discrete all-or-nothing description: something else. By this route Walker and Tucker smuggled equality back into individualism after its virtual exile during the Social Darwinist influence, thereby protecting individualism through mutualizing or generalizing it and creating the basis for community. Individualism remained essential, but individualism within a common sphere of social interaction. The core process of Libertarianism is liberty, and the single injunction required is for all to act in accord with a non-aggression or non-intrusion principle. "Liberty," Tucker insists, "is not liberty, unless it is enjoyed by all alike."[142]

The pragmatic justification of Libertarian morality is predicated upon this reciprocity of equality. One does not infringe the non-agression principle because to do so would invite retaliation from victims both actual and potential. Reciprocity of that principle is the sole legal necessity for the anarchist. Each man respecting the person of his fellow represents anarchist freedom, and indicates the nature of Libertarian community. Non-aggression manifests a respect for the person, but it also indicates a generalization of that respect, a mutuality which operates to facilitate stable and peaceful modes of interaction. In this context the Social Darwinist strain represents an aberration from Libertarian principles. Under the arcadian radicalism of Warren and his cohorts, and under the sophisticated egoism of Tucker and Walker, the rights of the individual were defined so as to promote social and economic exchange, - with the emphasis upon voluntarism. Indeed, for the Libertarians freedom is equated with voluntarism, and voluntarism is inalienable - an individual may not give up his freedom nor may he be "forced to be free."

As Proudhon indicates in his program for supplanting the State,

all relationships are voluntaristic, and all necessary services formally delivered by the state must be provided privately. Private protection agencies would supplant police and armies. Tucker is even forced to accept the bete noir of radical agitators: "As a private police - that is, protective - force, the Pinkerton man exemplifies Anarchism; it is only as a private army of invasion that they become objectionable and Archistic."[143]

Man in a state of nature limned by Rousseau or Locke might satisfy his physical needs by picking wild fruit, trapping wild animals, and bartering with other asocials. But population growth and social complexity force one another ahead, and both the quantity and quality of interpersonal contacts escalate. Freedom has a spatial component: freedom means to move freely. Population density thus defines and determines freedom in that it implicitly and necessarily sets the boundaries to the life space and the activities and communications bounding it. With increased population density there arose the need for an agency, as Locke notes, to articulate, judge, and execute the judgments reflecting the law of nature. Locke suggests an additive fallacy, i.e., men in groups are less likely to understand the dictates of nature than are men separately. Therefore government was constituted among men to preserve the good of the natural state yet allow civil authority. The advantage of a civil authority, which a state of nature has not, is existence as a collective whole. The natural state acted through men who were likewise part of the natural order; the civil state acts upon man as a carpenter acts upon wood or a sculptor upon stone. The natural state lets man alone, whereas the civil state can bestow privilege, confiscate wealth, or concentrate power - in short it can allocate value, coerce behavior and otherwise engage in the very practices of oppression repudiated by anarchists. The liberal seeks to control the Statist

apparatus to ameliorate conditions, the socialist would operate the Statist mechanism in order to reallocate resources, but the anarchist sees only its oppressive nature. He sees it as the intrusion into one's private sphere of another, a rupture of the reciprocal equality under non-aggression.

Accused of having too optimistic a view of man for insisting upon his ability to coexist without the regulations and sanctions of civil society, the Libertarian insisted that it is the liberal who is unrealistically optimistic in his assumption that man may be permitted the awesome power of the State and not be tempted into corruption.[144] Proudhon had expressed this belief metaphorically: "The tiger devours because he is built to devour, and you expect that a government built for corruption will not be corrupt?"[145] It is this reciprocity which makes man responsible; with reciprocity infringed, equality among egos is destroyed. The claim of monopoly and privilege for the Libertarians represented justifications for acting non-reciprocally, for exchanging non-equivalents. The non-equivalence may be expressed in social rank, wealth, information or any other survival value. In the case of social rank the possessor receives greater value than what he has been paid for, in effect a surcharge based upon position in the social hierarchy. Wealth here indicates both success in storing the surplus value garnered from such exchanges and the power to bribe, seduce, or bludgeon future exchange partners. While information of high quality and regular consistency is the basis for an exchange of non-equivalents: if a person were to exchange a commodity valued at x, for another commodity valued at x-3, he would be (1) acting irrationally, (2) intentionally losing value, or (3) acting upon false or insufficient information. Each of these conditions represents a form of coercion, and therfore a deviation from the natural model. To be acting irrationally is to

under the force of some arbitrary power. To intentionally lose might indicate some psychic compulsion or possibly a threat of personal injury. Whereas acting upon false or insufficient information means that the basis for evaluating the exchange is not a veridical one. Equivalents are subjectively and internattionally appraised, each individual in his own 'sovereignty' deciding the cost he is willing to pay. But in accord with responsibility for his acts and decisions, once the individual sets a price on his labor other parties to the market have, as sovereign individuals, the same right to regard their particular forms of labor: the interactions of sovereign individuals is meant to result in a consensually held scale of labor value. Here Libertarian individualism rests upon the viability of voluntaristic and reciprocal community--a community where coercion is non-existent.

However, at one point Tucker finds himself forced, in the absence of any claim of natural law, to allow of one form of coercion under Anarchism:

> Now, equal liberty itself being a social convention (for there are no natural rights), it is obvious that Anarchism recognizes the propriety of compelling individuals to regard <u>one</u> social convention...Anarchism protects equal liberty (of which property based on labour is simply an expression in a particular sphere), not because it is a social convention, but because it is equal liberty,--that is, because it is Anarchism itself. Anarchism may properly protect itself, but there its mission ends.[146]

Here again Tucker diverges from traditional laissez faire as justified in terms of natural law, and repudiated the position of Spooner who grounded individualism in natural law. Anarchism does not recognize natural law and its political corollary, human rights, according to Tucker; rather "it recognizes human equality as a necessity of stable society."[147]

An example of this Libertarian utilitarianism is manifest in

Tucker's passive resistance. While often characterized as pacifist, he devoutly defended the right of self-preservation, embracing violence to repel invasion as justified. Tucker obliquely asserted as much when he described his position: "Anarchism is not a revival of non-resistance, although there may be non-resistants in its ranks...we are the sternest enemies of the invasion of the person, and, although chiefly busy in destroying the causes thereof, have no scruples against such heroic treatment of its immediate manifestations as circumstances and wisdom dictate."[148] Elsewhere Tucker phrased the non-aggression principle in the very slogan of Modern Times:

> 'Mind your own business' is its only moral law. Interference with another's business is a crime and the only crime, and as such may properly be resisted. In accordance with this view the Anarchists look upon attempts to arbitrarily suppress vice as in themselves crimes. They believe liberty and the resultant social well-being to be a sure cure for vices. But they recognize the right of the drunkard, the gambler, the rake, and the harlot to live their lives until they shall freely choose to abandon them.[149]

While the individual was to be protected from the depradations of the State, individual brigands might be dispatched summarily. "I insist that there is nothing Sacred in the life of an invader, and there is no valid principle of human society that forbids the invaded to protect themselves in whatever way they can."[150] The authoritarian implications of Hobbes, the communitarianism of Rousseau, and the liberal democratic tradition deriving from Locke all recognize the primacy of self-preservation. Leviathan takes the rights of its constituents as a sheriff disarms cattle rustlers; the general will absorbs the rights of its members like a sponge, and like a sponge is characterized by cellular homogeneity; while Locke's fiduciary trust recognizes that the right of the trustor to alter the trustee is translated into political terms as the right of revolution. Here Jefferson serves as the

bridge between Locke's doctrine of the trust and the uncompromising anti-Statism of a Libertarian like Spooner. Writing to Mrs. John (Abigail) Adams on February 22, 1787, Jefferson had alluded to the recent panic provoked by Shay's Rebellion, "I like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the atmosphere."[151] In another letter, written to John W. Eppes and dated June 24 of 1813, Jefferson reiterated his dictum that "the earth belongs to the living, not to the dead."[152] The Libertarians had a special fondness for Jefferson. Heywood and Tucker especially were fond of invoking him. Writing of his work on the Declaration of Independence, Tucker claimed "It contains numerous internal evidences to show that, were Thomas Jefferson living to-day, he would be pronounced an Anarchist."[153] The Libertarians took Jefferson to agree with them that social injustice was perpetuated by the hierarchy and the authority of the State.

The battle, as Tucker presented it in the first issue of his paper, was between Liberty and "her foe, Authority." And while most of Tucker's attention was focussed upon the State and its power to confer monopolies, he identifies three general categories of threats to individual sovereignty. First, he cites "the Catholic Church and the Russian autocracy, as representative of those who spurn liberty both as means and as end, "opposing her openly, avowedly, sincerely, consistently, universally." In the second category, those who profess liberty as a means but only insofar as it serves their personal ends, he places Protestantism and "the Manchester School of economics and political economy." The third category consisted of those, who, "like the atheist Gambetta and the socialist Marx," distrust Liberty as a means and believe in it only as an end to be obtained "by first trampling upon, violating and outraging her." But Authority needs a throne or a pulpit for its full musical presentation: The Church and the State

have been the traditional incarnation of Authority. In the eighteenth century, however, Voltaire "brought the Authority of the supernatural into disrepute" thereby drawing the teeth of the Church and making of it an "object of derision"; the State, writes Tucker, "must be made equally so."[154]

Tucker approvingly quoted Proudhon's dictum "if God exists he is man's enemy," while allowing the right of a sovereign individual to adhere to a dogma. Personally an atheist, Tucker objected to religion on the basis of its attempt at monopoly over belief systems of its followers because of its compulsory and intolerant nature. Himself the progeny of a Unitarian father and a Quaker mother, he grew up in a religiously radical household where toleration and antinomianism were likely nurtured. His education at the Friends Academy in New Bedford, Massachusetts, further buttressed his critical attitude toward established religion.

Tucker opposed monopoly in government, in religion, and in careers. He conjoins the latter two in his analysis of religion--the church hierarchy being but a vocational monopoly over the means of access to spirituality. Anarchists uphold, he wrote, "the right of every individual to be or select his own priest, they likewise uphold his right to be or select his own doctor. No monopoly in theology, no monopoly in medicine."[155] Such a blanket repudiation of monopolies--especially monopolies as certification authorities helps to explain the overlap between Libertarians and the food and health reform fads noted earlier. Libertarians held all monopolies to be evil because of their coercive nature. They are coercive because they force persons to do things they wouldn't ordinarily do, hence they are artificial as opposed to natural, arbitrary instead of voluntary, and rigid rather than spontaneous; monopolies thus promote stagnation by inhibit-

ing competition. Tucker took the motto of Modern Times--"Mind your own business"--and made of it Libertarianism's central moral injunction. "Interference with another's business is a crime, and the only crime, and as such may properly be resisted.[156]

Monopolies interfere in another's business by limiting his options in consumption and in production. Consumption is restricted in that goods not produced by the monopoly will not be produced without its permission, thereby denying the consumer the "supply" which his "demand" would create in a free market situation. An individual's productivity is limited insofar as his options to undertake certain vocations or to learn certain skills are denied by the monopoly, thus subordinating free individuals to the combined self-interest of a particular group. By tying the monopolies of church and vocation together, Tucker evokes the memory of Luther repudiating the monopoly of grace asserted by the Roman Church and substituting the claim of individual interpretation of Scripture.

For the Libertarian, any Authority which possessed the power to alter the social environment sufficiently to realize the goals of State Socialism, possessed the power to oppress. An an "unterrified Jeffersonian,"[157] Tucker feared the State not the People. The influences of the aristocratic and erudite Virginian and of the peasant-descended French autodidact Proudhon jointly support the democratic and populist elements of Tucker's thought, and nourish his detestation of absolute power.

The fault of Marx, in Tucker's analysis, was in not offering a legitimate alternative to Statism: both Statism and State Socialism denied the right of the individual; each sought to create a monopoly of power and authority, whereas Anarchism sought to abolish all monopolies:

> Just as the idea of taking capital away from individuals and giving it to the government started Marx in a path which ends in making the government everything and the individual nothing, so the idea of taking capital away from government protected monopolies and putting it within easy reach of all individuals started Warren and Proudhon in a path which ends in making the individual everything and the government nothing. If the individual has a right to govern himself, all external government is tyranny.[158]

The individual laborer loses the freedom of choice in setting his own price, in competing with the artificially protected products in quality or in variety, and thereby loses the freedom to choose his means of livelihood. Warren had opposed apprenticeship because of its monopolistic functions. Its abolition would reinstate the interplay of supply and demand in a natural and free market: vocations drawing a special dividend would attract labor from areas which were unrewarding due to an excess of supply to demand. The subsequent reduction of supply in the glutted area would approximate the level of demand, while the increase of supply in the underexploited area would approach the level of demand thereby affecting an "adjustment, or the newly attracted supply might satiate the area causing conditions resembling those of the glutted area from whence the new entrepeneurs came. Here Tucker failed to make the description in individual terms and defers instead to collective terms; supply and demand are adjusted but no account is taken of a laborer's marginality: a particular marginal laborer in market A might learn of opportunities in market B, whereupon he relocates only to find himself in competition with a multitude of others attracted by the same aspirations, with the consequence that he is marginal in market B as well.[159] While abolishing apprenticeship would allow any laborer more options, it does not speak directly to the question of the chronically marginal laborer. In a frontier community, an agricultural society, presumably he would be able to grow, gather, and hunt sufficient food to maintain himself. Beyond that Tucker can only permit personal charity. Each

individual is equal, and he manifests his equality in assuming total responsibility for himself.

The opposition to Authority, the rejection of coercion, and the respect for individuals led to a position of voluntarism. The Libertarians retained the liberal democratic model of the market place, and the choice of paradigm entails particular consequences. The market place is a paradigm with implicit assumptions concerning individuality, the value of labor, and the necessity of competition. It was also a model of auto-regulation and incremental change. Indeed, Tucker's position might be called evolutionary or Fabian anarchism--he was to Proudhon and Bakunin what Eduard Bernstein was to Marx and Engels:

> If government should be abruptly and entirely abolished tomorrow, there would probably ensue a series of physical conflicts about land and many other things, ending in reaction and a revival of the old tyranny. But if the abolition of government shall take place gradually, beginning with the downfall of the money and land monopolies and extending thence into one field after another, it will be accompanied by such a constant acquisition and steady spreading of social truth that, when the time shall come to apply the voluntary principle in the supply of police protection, the people will rally as promptly and universally to the support of the protector who acts most nearly in accordance with the principles of social science as they now rally to the side of the assulted man against his would-be murderer. In that case no serious conflict can arise.[160]

A year earlier he had written, after the execution of the Haymarket defendants--that "the monster" called the State "must be killed. But how? Not by dynamite; that will not harm it. How, then? By light: it thrives in the darkness of its victims' ignorance; it and they must be flooded with the light of liberty."[161] In 1890 Tucker wrote that "A system of Anarchy in actual operation implies a previous education of the people in the principles of Anarchy..."[162] Countering the argument for the minimal State as a necessary evil, Tucker argued that "it must be made unnecessary."[163]

Education and propaganda by the word and by the (non-violent) deed serve as the Libertarian answer to the problem faced by all utopians: that of creating conditions of a new society. Plato faced the problem by exiling everyone over the age of ten from his Republic, Rousseau allowed for democratic conditions in the general will, and Marx suggested the dictatorship of the proletariat. Tucker sought to educate Americans to the fact that the relationship between themselves and the state was largely a product of their willingness to be governed and manipulated--they suffered from the consequences of what Robert Merton has termed a self-fulfilling prophecy. Tucker recognized that the role of the Libertarian was to educate not to agitate.

Here Tucker approaches the anarchism and passive resistance of Tolstoy and Gandhi. But that position always contains a loophole: "passive resistance and, in emergencies, the dynamite bomb in the hands of isolated individuals are the instruments by which the revolutionary force is destined to secure in the last great conflict the people's rights forever."[165] The ban on violence was moral, but it was also utilitarian. Passive resistance was recommended as a general axiom, but "as a rule without exceptions," Tucker demurred, "it is folly for people who desire to live in society to put up with the invasions of the incorrigible."[166]

Tucker's non-resistance was policy, not an absolute principle: "violence, like every other policy, is advisable when it will accomplish the desired end and inadvisable when it will not."[167] However, he appends to this the crucial proviso that "we think the verdict of reason is preferrable to the verdict of violence in all doubtful cases where we can afford to wait." This, of course, accords with his utilitarianism and his eschewing of natural law. "When I describe a man as an invader," he observes

to John Beverly Robinson,

> I cast no reflection upon him; I simply state a fact. Nor do I assert for a moment the moral inferiority of the invader's desires. I only declare the impossibility of simultaneously gratifying the invader's desire to invade and my desire to be let alone. That these desires are morally equal I cheerfully admit, but they cannot be equally realized. Since one must be subordinated to the other, I naturally prefer the subordination of the invader's, and am ready to co-operate with non-invasive persons to achieve that result.[168]

It was, of course, this individual preference for one's own rights over the rights of the invader, and its generalization to other members of the social universe which undergirds the non-aggression principle. Non-aggression is not a natural law, rather for Tucker it may be seen as a necessary precondition for social interaction of a voluntaristic nature. Non-aggression sets the ground rules for the interaction of egos and for the creation of an individualistic community. As Tucker outlined his program: "We offer cooperation. We offer reciprocity. We offer associative combination. We offer non-compulsive organization. We offer every possible method of voluntary social union by which men and women may act together for the furtherance of well-being. In short, we offer voluntary scientific socialism in the place of the present compulsory unscientific organization which characterizes the State and all its ramifications."[169]

The correlation of individualism and community, however, is complicated when one realizes that individualism is actually a cluster of concepts--often indiscriminately interchanged. As Koenraad Swart points out, individualism refers to "three highly dissimilar clusters of ideas...first, the idealistic doctrine with equalitarian implications of the rights of man, or what may be called political liberalism; secondly, the anti-statist, largely utilitarian doctrine of <u>laissez faire</u>, or economic liberalism; thirdly, the aristocratic cult of individuality, or Romantic individual-

ism."[170] For the sake of simplicity we may refer to the three categories as liberalism, individualism, and egoism respectively.

The Libertarian movement was split as the individualists were pulled by different ties--here the trichotomous nature of individualism is evident. One may either imagine the three definitions as separate magnetic poles pulling the atomistic individuals toward them, a tri-lateral arrangement of mutually exclusive options, or as arranged in a spectrum with the boundaries shading into one another. That traditional metaphor of political alignments, the spectrum, will serve here. One wing of the Libertarians gravitated toward the mutualistic aspect of the philosophies of Warren, Greene, and Proudhon, while the other wing pushed through Spencer and came out into Stirner--migrating from French socialism through English utilitarianism into the embrace of Germanic egoism. This embrace of Stirner's thought by Tucker and his remaining faithful marked the transition from, in Swart's terms, liberalism to Romantic individualism. His first two categories represent the varying interpretations of individualism as accepted by liberals and Libertarians respectively, while Stirner constitutes the intrusion of egoism with the resultant shift to a new psychological definition of individualism. Community, however, was to remain--even though transfigured by the Stirnerian influence--as the very matrix of Libertarian freedom. The paradigm of the market place operated on the economic, political, and psychological levels of analysis. The marketplace was Tucker's volonte general, but it, like Rousseau's agency of social control, was predicated upon a community with genuine affective power.

Anticlimax

In 1908 Tucker's bookshop and publishing company was destroyed by fire; his back copy file of Liberty, his stock of books and pamphlets, and nearly the entire printing of Dr. Paul Eltzbacher's Anarchism were consumed in the flames. Since Tucker operated on a small margin and had not taken out insurance on the property the loss was complete. This ended the long and distinguished propagandistic career of Benjamin Ricketson Tucker. The fifty-four-year-old Tucker left for his beloved France, staying there until the rumblings of war drove him to England. During the Great War Tucker, like his communist counterpart Prince Kropotkin, alienated many of his disciples by supporting the Allies:

> I favor the Allies because I love the French people, because I pity the Belgian people, because I admire the British influences that make for liberty; because I feel some (tho I regret to say decreasing) concern for the future of the American people; because I have a considerable sympathy for the people of Russia, and because I hate and fear the German people as a nation of domineering brutes, bent on turning the world into a police-ridden paradise of the Prussian pattern...[171]

From the scattered and fragmentary information available on his expatriate years it appears that the aesthete sank ever deeper into cynicism. In 1911, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary reissue of State Socialism and Anarchism, Tucker appended a three paragraph postcript recognizing that laissez faire no longer represented a viable means of social reform. The postscript was brief, lucid, humane, and constituted a recognition that his life's goal was now unrealizable. At the time the original essay was published Tucker had thought that monopoly could be overturned through the institution of free competion: simply forcing the monopoly

to compete in a non-monopolistic environment would cripple it. "The Anarchists," he had written then, "believe in liberty both as end and means, and are hostile to anything that antagonizes it."[172] Anticipating the criticisms of the New Left and revisionist historians, Tucker insisted that the trusts did not result from laissez faire policies, but from the "obstacles placed in the way of competition...by those arbitrary limitations of competition which we find in those law-created privileges and monopolies..."[173] At this time Tucker was convinced that the destruction of the money monopoly would result in the death of all four monopolies, and free competition would be resurrected. By the time of the 1911 postscript Tucker's view of the situation was considerably more jaundiced:

> The four monopolies, unhindered, have made possible the modern development of the trust, and the trust is now a monster which, I fear, even the freest competition, could it be instituted, would be unable to destroy. As long as the Standard Oil group controlled only fifty millions of dollars, the institution of free competition would have crippled it hopelessly. Now that it controls, directly or indirectly, perhaps ten thousand billions, it sees in monopoly a convenience, to be sure, but no longer a necessity. It can do without it. Were all restrictions upon competition to be removed, concentrated capital could meet successfully the new situation by setting aside annually for sacrifice a sum that would remove every competitor from the field.[174]

The postscript is tragic: the educational and non-violent programs he advocated were futile against the Rockefellers of the world. He concluded that monopoly had passed beyond reclamation by economic forces and must now be righted by political and revolutionary forces--including "measures of forcible confiscation, through the State or in defiance of it"--and educating for the apocalypse and its aftermath was the task of the anarchist. But, he acknowledged, "education is a slow process, and for this reason we must hope that the day of readjustment may not come too quickly."[175]

But even the postscript was due for revision. Writing to Clarence Lee Swartz in 1930, the seventy-six year old Tucker noted "The matter of

my famous 'Postscript' now sinks into insignificance; the insurmountable obstacle to the realization of Anarchy is no longer the power of the trusts, but the indisputable fact that our civilization is in its death throes... the dark ages sure enough. The Monster, Mechanism, is devouring mankind.[176] Such an attitude was understandable, especially in the early days of a world-wide depression and during the prelude to the Spanish Civil War. The United States of Thomas Jefferson and Josiah Warren had been transformed into the nation of John D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford--monopolies and assembly lines destroyed competition and destroyed an independent laboring class.[177] By the mid-thirties the octogenarian Tucker could observe, "It is not necessary to hope in order to persevere."[178] It was a statement at once cynical and noble--Tucker apparently had embraced the Nietzschean capacity to say yea to life, to affirm living even in the midst of the inevitable.[179]

On June 22, 1939, Benjamin R. Tucker died at his home in Monaco. His passing was but three months before Germany invaded Poland, thereby sealing the close to a more innocent era.

Footnotes

1. Quoted in Arthur A. Ekirch, The Decline of American Liberalism (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1973), p. 151.

2. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, III, p. 23.

3. Ezra Heywood, Free Trade (Princeton, Massachusetts: Cooperative Publishing Co., n.d.), p. 4.

4. Frederick Jackson Turner, Frontier and Section: Selected Essays (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1961), p. 38.

5. Mother Jones, The Autobiography of Mother Jones (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1925), p. 17.

6. Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, Inc., 1959; originally published 1931), p. 574.

7. Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., "Ezra Hervey Heywood," Dictionary of American Biography VIII, p. 609.

8. Cf. the disavowal of the integrationist goal by the late Black Muslim leader Elijah Muhammed as "integrating with a corpse."

9. Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature, p. 88.

10. Jacker, The Black Flag of Anarchy, p. 121f.

11. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 205.

12. Liberty IV (January 1, 1887), 4.

13. Tucker's translation was the first English language edition published in the United States, and continues to be the standard edition: the 1970 Dover Publications edition was of the Tucker translation. The standard English translation of Proudhon's The General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century is also a product of a Libertarian translator--in this case Tucker's friend and sometime collaborator on Liberty, John Beverly Robinson. Certainly the introduction of, and the very wording of Proudhon's works in the United States was a function of the Libertarian propagandizing effort.

14. Eunice Schuster is in error in crediting the column "Chips from my Studio" to Tucker. Although it was anonymous in the table of contents to each issue, every column bore the initials SHM (Samuel H. Morse). Morse was a sculptor as well as a radical reformer, hence the title of his column.

15. Martin, Men Against the State, p. 207.

16. Jacker, The Black Flag of Anarchy, p. 123. Possibly aware of the prohibitive expense of his preceding publication, Tucker commented in his first issue, "Formerly the price of Liberty was eternal vigilance, but now it can be had for fifty cents a year." Liberty I (August 6, 1881), 1.

17. Jacker, The Black Flag of Anarchy, p. 123.

18. Whitman acknowledged Tucker's role in having his work published at great personal expense and danger, see his tribute to Tucker in Joseph Ishill (ed), Free Vistas--Volume II (Berkeley Heights, New Jersey: Oriole Press, 1937). The entire volume is an appreciation of Tucker and contains contributions by George E. MacDonald, Henry Meulen, H. L. Mencken, Emile Armand, Clarence Lee Swartz, J. William Lloyd, George Bernard Shaw, and Walt Whitman.

19. Liberty II (May 31, 1884), 1.

20. Liberty III (March 27, 1886), 1 and 8.

21. On Yarros see Liberty VII (October 10, 1891), 3; (February 23, 1895), 5; on Badcock, see Ibid., XI (August 24, 1895), 4.

22. Benjamin R. Tucker, letter to the American Journal of Sociology (April 11, 1936), reprinted in Ishill, Free Vistas--Volume II, p. 304f.

23. Charles A. Madison estimated that it never exceeded six hundred subscribers, and used the same number to designate the advance orders to underwrite the publication of Instead of a Book... Martin concludes in his history of the Libertarian movement "advance subscriptions from 24 states and 5 foreign countries amounting to 700 copies had been received by the time of publication in mid-March, 1893." Charles A. Madison, Critics and Crusaders (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1947), pp. 197, 207; Martin, Men Against the State, p. 271. While Liberty's subscription list may have been small, judging from its letters to the editor, its distribution was impressive. Besides the immediate New England area and Eastern seacoast, letters appeared from the midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, Kansas), the south (Florida, Alabama, Georgia), the west (Wyoming, Colorado, Texas, New Mexico, Montana, and Dakota and Washington territories), and such foreign sources as London, Berne, Brussells, County Kerry, British Columbia, and Melbourne, Australia.

24. Liberty I (August 6, 1881), 1.

25. The revised edition was entitled Individual Liberty: Selections from the Writings of Benjamin R. Tucker edited by C.L.S. (Clarence Lee Swartz), and was published in 1926 after Instead of a Book... had been out of print nearly twenty-five years. Tucker insisted that the volume note that while he appreciated the "good will that has inspired the publication," he was not responsible for the abridgement and that the publication was without his expressed consent (denying the right of propery

in ideas, he could not forbid it). However, he characterized Swartz's action as "above reproach." "Publisher's Note," in Benjamin R. Tucker, Individual Liberty (New York: Revisionist Press, 1972; originally published 1926), p. iii.

26. Madison, Critics and Crusaders, p. 199. Tucker's taste for the finer things extended to gustatory matters as well. "I was always an epicure, and even a gourmand, to the extend I could afford, and sometimes to an extent that I could not afford," he wrote in a letter to the American Journal of Sociology, reprinted in Ishill, Free Vistas--Volume II, pp. 305ff.

27. Liberty VII (April 18, 1891), 1.

28. It might be added that Tucker claimed credit for introducing American audiences to George Bernard Shaw and Vilfredo Pareto. Joseph Ishill (ed.), Benjamin R. Tucker: A Bibliography (Berkeley Heights, New Jersey: Oriole Press, 1959), p. 13.

29. Allyn B. Forbes, "The Literary Quest for Utopia, 1880-1900," Social Forces VI (December, 1927), quoted in Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, III, p. 301.

30. Quoted in R. Laurence Moore, European Socialists and the American Promised Land (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 77.

31. Cf. Symes and Clement, Rebel America, passim.

32. Morrison, The Oxford History of the American People, p. 761f.

33. "Labor unions are a crude step in the direction of supplanting the State." Liberty I (February 4, 1882), 3.

34. Liberty VIII (September 12, 1891), 2f.

35. Benjamin R. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Publisher, 1972; originally published 1888), p. 22ff.

36. Ibid., p. 12.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 13.

39. Ibid.

40. Liberty II (April 14, 1883), 4.

41. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 11f.

42. Cf. "A revolution is an act of sovereign justice, in the order of moral facts, spring out of the necessity of things, and in consequence carrying with it its own justification; and whit it is a crime for the statesman to oppose." Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution, p. 40.

43. Liberty II (May 31, 1884), 1.

44. James J. Martin, "Introduction," to Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 3f.

45. Tucker, Ibid., p. 14.

46. Ibid., p. 14.

47. Tucker's associate and the translator of Stirner's The Ego and His Own, Stephen T. Byington described him as "a man who uses language with especial precision: every phrase in a sentence of his may be presumed to contribute something definite to the thought..." Stephen T. Byington, "Translator's Preface" to Paul Eltzbacher, Anarchism: Exponents of the Anarchist Philosophy (New York: Chip's Bookshop, n.d.; originally published 1907), p. xxxi.

48. G. P. Maximoff (ed.), The Political Philosophy of Bakunin (New York: Free Press, 1953), p. 272.

49. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, passim; "The Direction Action of Environment and Evolution," Smithsonian Institution Annual Report 1918 (Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution, 1920), pp. 409-27; and the section entitled "Anarchism and the Free Commune," in his Modern Science and Anarchism, reprinted in Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets, edited by Roger N. Baldwin (New York: Vanguard Press, 1927), pp. 162-65.

50. McCulloch v Maryland 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.

51. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 15.

52. Liberty IV (February 26, 1887), 5.

53. Ibid., p. 4.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution, p. 104. Cf. Proudhon's comment, "I voted against the Constitution, because it is a Constitution." Quoted in Alan Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 110.

59. Liberty IV (February 26, 1887), 4.

60. Ibid.

61. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought II, p. 473.

62. This quest has gained prominence in recent years--spurred first by the Civil Defense milieu of the Cold War as depicted by the quasi-Libertarian writer Robert Heinlein in Farnham's Freehold (1964), furthered by the natural foods and ecology movements, and currently manifested in the economic realm by the Libertarian (although this term as used by twentieth century radical capitalists has serious divergences from the classic sense used in this study) securities analyst Harry Browne in his works You Can Profit From the Coming Devaluation and You Can Profit From a Monetary Crisis. Browne advises a well-stocked, self-sufficient, and remotely located private refuge built over a vault filled with silver and gold, and protected by an arsenal.

63. James J. Martin cites a letter to Ewing C. Baskette in December of 1934, where Tucker states "The term Communist Anarchist has no sense." Martin, Men Against the State, p. 276.

64. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 16.

65. Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution, p. 245f.

66. Liberty II (September 6, 1884), 1.

67. The only moral problem here being that having become a mystified surrogate for the State and a secularized God, Nature is now the arche. It was this conflict between the natural law advocates and the subjectivists within the individualist camp which was manifested in the respective influences of Herbert Spencer and Max Stirner on Libertarianism.

68. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 19.

69. Ibid.

70. Liberty III (November 22, 1884), 1.

71. As Tucker pointed out, perpetual property-in-ideas would make the direct heir of James Watt "owners of at least nine-tenths of the now existing wealth of the world; and had it been in force in the life-time of the inventor of the Roman alphabet, nearly all the highly civilized peoples of the earth would be today the virtual slaves of that inventor's heirs..."Tucker, "The Attitude of Anarchism Toward Industrial Combinations: in State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 33.

72. Liberty V (July 7, 1888), 4.

73. Liberty VIII (July 12, 1890), 6.

74. While it is possible to be anti-Statist and to advocate copyright, Spooner did not offer an alternative to the State as credentializing agency nor did he appear to perceive the problem. It is because of this contextual reason that Tucker is accorded greater consistency as an anarchist, not because of any logical or definitional denial

that copyright might be possible in a Libertarian society. For a discussion of this later possibility see David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973), pp. 155-64; and Morris and Linda Tannehill, The Market for Liberty (Lansing, Michigan: The Authors, 1970), pp. 54-87.

75. Liberty III (August 9, 1884), 1.

76. The men and their respective positions were explicated as follows: John Beverly Robinson, Liberty VIII (May 16, 1891), 5; Victor Yarros, ibid., VII (December 27, 1890), 4; Hugo Bilgram, ibid., VII (January 10, 1891), 5; A. H. Simpson, ibid., VII (March 21, 1891), 2; J. William Lloyd, ibid., VII (February 7, 1891), 6; and James L. Walker, ibid., VII (March 7, 1891), 3.

77. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 20.

78. Cf. Benjamin R. Tucker, Henry George, Traitor (New York: Benjamin R. Tucker, 1896).

79. Liberty V (January 28, 1888), 5; Tucker's definition of property here has been reintroduced as "the entitlement theory"; cf. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia pp. 149-82.

80. Liberty V (January 28, 1888), 5.

81. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 19.

82. Liberty I (August 6, 1881), 3f.

83. Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, p. 332.

84. Genesis 1: 28.

85. Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, p. 335f.

86. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 19.

87. The Eagle and the Serpent I (February 15, 1898), 5.

88. Lock, Two Treatises of Civil Government, p. 338.

89. Liberty II (October 6, 1883), 1.

90. Liberty I (October 1, 1881), 1.

91. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 18.

92. Letter to Joseph Ishill dated July 27, 1936; printed in Ishill Benjamin R. Tucker: A Bibliography, p. 26.

93. Liberty I (August 6, 1881), 1.

94. Proudhon, The General Idea of the Revolution, p. 177.

95. N. b., in neither clause of the final bon mot is the injunction of an obligatory nature, e.g., duty, moral obligation, ought, must, etc. Ibid., p. 221.

96. Ibid., p. 207.

97. Tucker's own account of the event was that a friend had studied in Vienna and returned with a copy of Stirner's work. Tucker, being unable to read German sent the copy of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum to James L. Walker, then an editorial writer on the Galveston News. Walker discovered that Stirner's views coincided with his own, and with a position which Tucker had been heading toward for some time. This account was contained in a letter written by Tucker (April 11, 1936) and included in Ishill, Free Vistas--Volume II, p. 307. Walker's philosophy is clearly set forth in The Philosophy of Egoism (Colorado Springs: Ralphy Myles, Publisher, 1972 ; originally published in 1904). As an indication of some of the fringe continuities among the Libertarians it might be noted that like Warren, Andrews, Heywood, and Tucker, Walker was a newspaperman; like Andrews he wrote on shorthand; like Tucker and Robinson he was an authority on engineering; and like Warren, Andrews, Greene, Tucker, Robinson, George Schumm, and Stephen T. Byington, Walker was an avid linguist--the biographical data appended to The Philosophy of Egoism notes that he had "a reading and speaking acquaintanceship with ten living languages, and was proficient in Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit."

98. Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own, p. 5.

99. Liberty XVI (April, 1907), 1.

100. Of Stirner, Huneker wrote: "He is a Teutonic Childe Roland who to the dark tower comes, but instead of blowing his horn--as Nietzsche did--he blows up the tower itself."

101. Liberty IX (May 27, 1893), 1.

102. Liberty I (January 7, 1882), 3. The title page of Instead of a Book and the masthead of Liberty both used Proudhon's statement, "Liberty, not the daughter, but the mother of Order."

103. Der Freien was a continuation of the Left Hegelian Doktor Klub, which together with Stirner numbered among its members Arthur Muller, Ludwig Buhl, C. F. Kopper, and the three Bauer brothers, Bruno, Edgar, and Egbert.

104. Woodcock, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, p. 27.

105. Proudhon, What is Property? p. 251.

106. Stirner, The Ego and His Own, p. 200.

107. Liberty IV (July 3, 1886(, 8. Josiah Warren recognized this problem when he lamented "the impossibility of conveying new ideas by old words..." Warren, Equitable Commerce, p. ix.

108. Liberty IV (August 19, 1887), 7.

109. Liberty XI (August 10, 1895), 4.

110. Cf. "Beyond the nihilistic language of existentialism lurks the ideology of free enterprise, free initiative, and equal opportunity." Herbert Marcuse, "Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's 'L'Entre et le neant'," Philosophy and Phenomonological Research VIII (March, 1948), 323.

111. Stirner, The Ego and His Own, p. 167.

112. James L. Walker, The Philosophy of Egoism, p. 44. Walker's use of the term "conscience" should be understood as referring to socially-imposed Christian morality--a religious ideology.

113. Der Einzige und sein Eigentum: einzige translates as unique, while eigentum has a meaning equivalent to property.

114. Stirner, The Ego and His Own, p. 316.

115. Epictetus the Stoic slave-philosopher (ca. 50- ca. 130 A.D.), believed external coercion to be illusory and true freedom to be composure in the face of the inevitable, while Timothy Leary is the contemporary psychologist and psychedelic messiah. However it is interesting that a moral activism was an integral part of Epictetus' philosophy and a sense of man's total responsibility for his personal behavior and its consequences--a sense which is difficult to assess in the case of Leary. Of these three thinkers, only Stirner was an individualist: Epictetus thought in classic Greek terms of community and his notion of responsibility was communally derived; Leary again is more difficult to evaluate, his devotees demonstrate paradoxically a tendency to group-thought and an onanistic individual pleasure-seeking. Cf. Phillip P. Hallie, "Epictetus," Encyclopedia of Philosophy III, p. 1f; and Theodore Roszak, The Making of the Counter-Culture (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1968), pp. 155-77.

116. Liberty I (October 29, 1881), 2.

117. Ibid.

118. Pisarev encapsulated his philosophy in the formula: "Here is the ultimatum of our camp: what can be smashed should be smashed; what will stand the blow is good; what will fly into smithereens is rubbish; at any rate, hit out right and left--there will be and can be no harm from it." Quoted in Avraham Yarmolinsky, Road to Revolution (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 122. Stirner's nihilism is manifest in his statement that, "It would be foolish to assert that there is no power above mine. Only the attitude that I take toward it will be quite another than that of the religious age: I shall be the enemy of every higher power, while religion teaches us to make it our friend and be humble toward it." Stirner, The Ego and His Own, p. 184.

119. Walker, The Philosophy of Egoism, p. 51.

120. Ibid., p. 167. Stirner here appears to anticipate the notion of the vita activa and the concept of freedom as a sphere of action as interpreted by Hannah Arendt; cf. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959), pp. 9, 155-67. Stirner, however, is open to the ad hominem criticism of Ms Arendt in that he substitutes 'knowing' for 'doing'--a comment akin to Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach.

121. John Kelly, Liberty IV (February 26, 1887), 7.

122. Victor Yarros, Liberty IV (March 26, 1887), 5.

123. Ibid.

124. Liberty III (April 11, 1885), 1.

125. Liberty VI (May 7, 1887), 8.

126. Liberty V (August 27, 1887), 5.

127. Liberty V (October 8, 1887), 6.

128. Liberty IV (October 19, 1886), 4; ibid., (May 26, 1888), 1; ibid., VII (April 4, 1891), 4.

129. John Badcock, Slaves to Duty (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Publisher, 1972; originally published 1894). According to Tucker this pamphlet was inspired by a sentence in his column "On Picket Duty" and a quotation of Nietzsche which was printed in his journal; Liberty X (November 17, 1894), 4.

130. Liberty IX (September 3, 1892), 2.

131. Liberty XI (August 10, 1854), 4.

132. Liberty XI (August 24, 1895), 4.

133. Liberty XI (September 7, 1895), 1.

134. For an examination of the diversity of uses made of the term, see A. O. Lovejoy, "Nature as an Aesthetic Norm," in Essays in the History of Ideas (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960; originally published in Modern Language Notes, 1927), pp. 69-77.

135. Walker, Philosophy of Egoism, p. 1.

136. Liberty VII (November 15, 1890), 3.

137. Murray Rothbard, For A New Liberty.

138. Liberty V (August 4, 1888), 1.

139. Liberty VIII (November 15, 1890). 3.

140. Hannah Arendt, "What is Freedom?" in Between Past and Future (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1963), p. 146.

141. Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), I, 198.

142. Liberty III (February 28, 1885). 4.

143. Liberty IV (March 26, 1887), 1.

144. According to one contemporary Libertarian, it is the notion of the limited state which is an "impossibly utopian ideal." Murray Rothbard, Power and Market, p. 6.

145. Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution, p. 69.

146. Liberty V (April 28, 1888), 5.

147. Liberty V (June 9, 1888), 4.

148. Liberty I (August 19, 1882), 2.

149. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 21.

150. Liberty VII (August 30, 1890), 4.

151. Reprinted in Henry J. Silverman, American Radical Thought (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Co., 1970), includes a letter of November 13, 1787 to William Stephen Smith which uses the phrase "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure." Ibid., p. 14f.

152. Excerpted in John Bartlett (comp.), Familiar Quotations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955; 13th edition), p. 375b.

153. Liberty II (December 9, 1882), 2.

154. Liberty I (August 6, 1881), 2.

155. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 21.

156. Ibid.

157. Ibid., p. 20.

158. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 20.

159. The Joad family in John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath is a fictional example of this phenomenon. The concern of civil rights groups in recent years with the slogan of "last hired, first hired" also recognizes this economic marginality.

160. Liberty VI (October 27, 1888), 4; this quotation is badly truncated and edited (without acknowledgement) in Eltzbacher, Anarchism, p. 146.

161. Liberty V (September 24, 1887), 4.

162. Liberty VII (May 24, 1890), 5.

163. Liberty I (August 6, 1881), 2.

164. A slogan of the contemporary Libertarians indicate this position: "What we want is not the overthrow of the government but a situation in which it gets lost in the shuffle."

165. Liberty II (October 4, 1884), 5.

166. Liberty V (February 11, 1888), 5.

167. Liberty VIII (January 16, 1892), 2.

168. Liberty VIII (December 26, 1891), 3.

169. Liberty II (October 14, 1882), 2.

170. Koenraad W. Swart, "'Individualism' in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," The Journal of the History of Ideas XXIII (1962), 77.

171. Tucker gave his reasons in a letter to Laurence Labadie, reprinted in Martin, Men Against the State, p. 274f.

172. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 22.

173. Tucker, "The Attitude of Anarchism toward Industrial Combinations," p. 29. In this article Tucker had noted that "John D. Rockefeller never could have acquired five hundred millions, nor would any combination of men be able to control an aggregation of wealth that could not be easily and successfully met by some other combination of men." Ibid., p. 28.

174. Ibid., p. 25.

175. Ibid.

176. Letter to Clarence Lee Swartz dated July 22, 1930, reprinted in Ishill, Free Vistas--Volume II, p. 300f.

177. Cf. Jefferson's comment to Samuel Kercheval, dated July 12, 1816, "We must make our selection between economy and liberty, or profusion and servitude." Andrew A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (ed.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D.C: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 1903), XV, 39.

178. Quoted in Martin, Men Against the State, p. 275.

179. That Tucker was aware of this philosophic position is evident in the conclusion of his 1911 Postscript: "If this lesson shall not be learned in season, the past will be repeated in the future, in which case we shall have to turn for consolation to the doctrine of Nietzsche that this is bound to happen anyhow, or to the reflection of Renan that, from the point of view of Sirius, all these matters are of little moment." Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 25. Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence is found in section 341 of The Gay Science.

IN CONCLUSION

Tucker's crisis of faith was not simply the consequence of his personal disaster. He faced an America of centralized power and of a conservative (indeed, of a developing imperialist) cast. It was a nation whose laboring classes and disadvantaged had little in common with the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois Libertarians rooted in Jeffersonian agrarianism and refurbished with Stirnerian egoism. To this altered context Tucker found himself a radical cut off from the richness of intimacy with the oppressed. Now tired and despondent, he discovered that the long-range goal he had set himself, while reasonable on its own terms, allowed little in the way of an intermediate assessment of success. The direct action of Emma Goldman and of Big Bill Haywood's wobblies had now supplanted the more genteel radicalism of an earlier era and even Libertarians like Dyer D. Lum, Voltarine deCleyre, and William Bailie straggled into the ranks of anarcho-communism.

But in the early part of the century the collectivist left fared little better than the Libertarians. Although the glory of the 1920 campaign of Gene Debs was still in the future, the periods immediately prior to and during the World War were marked by severe internal strains and a disillusionment with the realisty of international solidarity among socialists. Less than a week after the 1912 Presidential election, Julius A. Wayland--editor of the Appeal to Reason,

"the only socialist paper in America ever to achieve mass circulation"--placed an automatic pistol in his mouth and pulled the trigger.[1] Shortly thereafter, the Great War fostered a particularly virulent form of xenophobic patriotism; a xenophobia which extended to the suppression of "foreign" ideologies as the fates of radicals like Frank Little, Joe Hill, Wesley Everett, and of the two-hundred and forty-nine "soviets" aboard USS Buford bear tragic witness.[2]

The fate of the Libertarians although less dramatic was possibly more poignant. For while martyrs and victims invigorate a radical position, caustic cynicism and aloof bitterness prove less inspirational in effect. By the turn of the century the founding fathers of the tradition had passed away without having had to face the social realities of the twentieth century. Then in 1908 Tucker simply retired, where upon Libertarianism atrophied to the point that it was virtually dead. Its individualism was then perpetuated by the Conservative Right, while its anti-Statism was refashioned into an anti-democratic and isolationist doctrine. After Tucker's withdrawal Libertarian thought largely merged with that of American conservatism and its elitist rhetoric now issued from the likes of H. L. Mencken, James L. Huneker, and Albert J. Nock. With the New Deal, laissez faire and the defense of individualism passed almost completely into the province of the pro-capitalist Right.

This condition changed, however, in the 1960s with the groundswell of radicalism arising from the agitations for racial equality and against the Indo-Chinese conflicts. As Murray Rothbard, one of the leading theoreticians of resurgent Libertarianism, pointed out "Twenty years ago I was an extreme rightwing Republican, a young and lone 'neanderthal'...Today I am most likely to be called an extreme leftist, since I favor immediate

withdrawal from Vietnam, denounce U.S. imperialism, advocate Black Power and have just joined the new Peace and Freedom Party. And yet my basic political views have not changed by an iota in these two decades!"[3]

Rothbard's choice of self-description is more than literary license or playful paradox, for as noted in the preceding history of the movement, the Libertarians shared a common rhetoric with liberals. Unlike some of their radical peers, the Libertarian's objections to liberalism concerned its failure to realize a liberal society, and the use of the State to create new structures of power and privilege. Rothbard and the renewed push for a realization of individual liberties illustrate the Libertarian dialectic espoused by Proudhon: "an idea cannot perish. It is always born again, always from its contradictory."[4] The contradictions became manifest and in August of 1969 the youthful vanguard of the New Right, the Young Americans for Freedom, was convulsed by an intramural ideological upheaval. The result was that after more than a half-century of quiescence, an articulate Libertarian movement was expelled from the Right-wing onto the stage of American radicalism.

Today, nearly a century-and-a-half after Josiah Warren's departure from New Harmony to seek a non-authoritarian means of creating community, the tradition is still invoked and still utilized as a critique of liberal tenets. Robert Nozick, with the publication of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, made Libertarianism once again a topic of political discussion. But Nozick himself was but the most spectacularly successful of a number of contemporary theorists, and in important points is opposed to the classical tradition under examination here.

While any attempt at an analysis of the Austrian and Chicago schools of economic analysis, the domestic adherents of Knut Wicksell, the public

choice theory of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, or the musings of Ayn Rand and Alan Greenspan remains beyond the purview of this work, their diverse orbits in the popular and the academic worlds indicate the continuing relevance and power of those two core assumptions of Libertarians: voluntarism as the principle of individual action and the market-place as the agency of social interaction. The twentieth century movement which calls itself Libertarianism represents a pastiche of Old Right, New Right, and New Left elements, e.g., Barry Goldwater's former speechwriter Karl Kess, ex-Taftian isolationist Leonard Liggio, former leader of Young Americans for Freedom Jerome Tuccille, and erstwhile SDS theorist Carl Oglesby. Its very heterogeneity both manifests its principle of individualism and replicates the pluralism of that earlier tradition.

As evidence of this diversity, The Libertarian Handbook 1973,[5] notes five distinct classes of American Libertarians. (1) The Objectivists are disciples of Ayn Rand who posit an objective reality which man learns about through the activities of reason, and who advocate laissez faire capitalism as a primary principle of morality and efficiency. They would, however, allow states of a limited character as necessary for the provision of police, judicial, and defense functions. Coercive powers, such as taxation and conscription are, however, prohibited as immoral and unnecessary infringements of individual liberty. (2) A second component of the contemporary movement is that of the Anarchist Libertarians. Secreted within a variety of dissenting groups "ranging from the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) to the John Birch Society, and comprising a number of their own;" these anti-authoritarians uphold a strict contractarian position. Here abide the Left-Anarchists as well as those Ayn Rand has derided as "hippies of the Right." It is also probably the faction closest in spirit

to the major figures of this work. (3) However the largest and best financed of the contemporary segments is that of Conservative Libertarians. Composed of followers of Robert Taft and Barry Goldwater, of Ronald Reagan and the brothers Buckley, this constituency is nourished by the Foundation of Economic Education and has its philosophy disseminated by the Freeman, Human Events, Modern Age, and of course, National Review. Repudiating the hippiness of the Youth Culture and abhorrent of Rand's positions on religion, morality, and the primacy of selfishness, these Libertarians usually view themselves as, and vote as, Conservatives. Other fragments of the Libertarian milieu, in fact, would be loath to include them as colleagues. The 1969 eruption in Young Americans for Freedom represents a revolt against these "statist conservatives" and a reclaiming of an anti-Statist radical perspective. (4) The "autarchists" take coercion to be the primary evil and like Quakers and other Inner Light anti-Statists they decline to return force for force. Their major political function is evident in their efforts to limit the political through organizing voting boycotts and expanding the scope of extra-political life. (5) The remaining faction of the movement is made up of "the retreatists." These twentieth century communards seek a frontier in which to build their particular brand of reconstituted society. Ranging from hippy crashpads to the Objectivist-oriented society of Minerva (a proposed free enterprise republic planned for an "unowned" island four hundred miles off the coast of New Zealand), these heroic community-building undertakings perpetuate the legacy of Josiah Warren and Stephen Pearl Andrews.[6]

It is here that the link between the tinkers of the nineteenth century and the thinkers of the twentieth century Libertarian movements is to be found. While the "retreatists" and the "hippies of the Right"

reclaim the experiments in living of their forebears, Nozick and Rothbard take Tucker's position against Appleton and insist upon the internal and psychic realm as the arena of confrontation with the arche.

The Libertarians of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been rooted in historical circumstances. This autochthonous character is one of the constants of the tradition, a constant which is relevant for understanding the Jeffersonian and Stirnerian elements as well as the contributions of the Austrian School and Objectivism. Like its anarchist brethren, Libertarianism may be termed a "visceral revolt."[7] It differs from other anarchist theories, however, in its class bias: the nineteenth century Libertarians were bourgeois in class and character, and their twentieth century offspring are likewise.[8]

But the crucial practical questions remain: Was Tucker's "Postscript" correct in its assessment of the archaeism of his own life-effort and the futility of Anarchy as a possible program? Or are his twentieth century progeny (either legitimate or soi-dissont in their parentage) correct in their continuing crusades against the State? The answers to these questions are not yet completely settled as the full development of the contemporary movement may not yet be completed. But set aside the largely economic programs of these latter day Libertarians, for the focus remains upon the political theory of individualism and of its normative moral content. With this in mind look again at the historical Benjamin Tucker of 1911. He was a man fresh from financial and personal disaster. He was a man cut off from his country, his colleagues, and his life-work. Originally when he left for Europe, Tucker had hoped to continue his publishing career from there, a hope which came to naught. He was, thus, a tragic figure confronting a tragic age. His human sensitivity to social injustice led

him to positions antithetical to those embraced by the "new" oppressed of this nation, a non-bourgeois "oppressed" encompassing foreign-born proletarians and native-born Blacks, a group which viewed itself as at a disadvantage in the laissez faire market-place and sought remedy through centralization and regulation at the federal level. Although they refused the individualist content these constituents of the radical class retained Mother Jones' belief in getting help from "Washington."

But in 1911 Tucker was pessimistic: in 1930 he was even more so: "We may last a couple of centuries yet; on the other hand, a decade may precipitate our finish."[9] The pessimism of old age, however, does not invalidate a lifetime or a tradition of thought which infused it with purpose.

Tucker's life, as ought to be obvious from the preceding chapter, was devoted to combatting not merely the State but the arche. Thus it is in light of his earlier writings that his later pessimism ought to be judged, and not simply in terms of his contrast with a mixed bag of twentieth century malcontents huddling beneath the common label of Libertarian.

Tucker's "Postscript" was pessimistic, but it was not, therefore, a tossing-in of the towel. Although he no longer regarded the institution of laissez faire as the all-embracing corrective to the ills of society, Tucker was not thereby willing to admit total and unequivocal defeat. Take the kernel of that famous "Postscript": "Until measures of forcible confiscation, through the State or in defiance of it, shall have abolished the concentrations that monopoly has created, the economic solution proposed in the foregoing pages--and there's no other solution--will remain a thing to be taught to the rising generation, that conditions may be favourable

to its application after the great levelling."[10] What stands out at first blush is the rejection of laissez faire, the acceptance of "forcible confiscation" and the possibility of the utilization of the State to achieve anti-Statist ends. A grim conclusion for a Libertarian. One as grim as Warren's acceptance of the "modern military," or of Andrews' elevation into the Pantarch. But the end remained constant: the program advocated in the 1888 work would be conserved in the minds and hearts of Libertarians and "will remain a thing to be taught to the rising generation." And it was this program, not the "forcible confiscation," which was the referrent for Tucker's emphasized phrase "and there's no other solution."

As early as 1884 Tucker had accepted that "passive resistance and, in emergencies, the dynamite bomb in the hands of isolated individuals are the instruments by which the revolutionary force is destined to secure in the last great conflict the people's rights forever."[11] Tucker's non-violence had always been a tactic, simply an expedient subject to changing conditions. By 1911 Tucker recognized the social context as having altered significantly and as a participant in an experientially-generated tradition of socially-conscious thinkers, his response was of the sort which Jerome Tuccille described as of the psychological Left Wing, i.e., willing to break a principle in the interests of combatting a material social evil.[12] The State had created the monopolies, and now reluctantly (but appropriately enough, expediently) the State could be utilized to undo its own evil deeds. Over two decades earlier Tucker had put forth these same ideas. In May of 1890 he had observed that "A system of Anarchy in actual operation implies a previous education of the people in the principles of Anarchy..."[13] June of the same year found him expressing the notion--largely at odds with his twentieth century namesakes--that "Anarchism of the 'natural right' type

is out of date. The Anarchism of to-day affirms the right of society to coerce the individual and of the individual to coerce society so far as either has the requisite power."[14]

Thus was Warren's cost principle rephrased by Tucker, and the responsibility of partners to an equitable exchange (either of the economic marketplace or of the community itself) restated for egoists.

Tucker's political program may be encapsulated as the raising of critical attention and a polemicizing for liberty. His tactics however are prudential and may under appropriate conditions vary from dynamite to passive resistance. Following Stirner, Tucker believed that morality is simply a matter of force and expedience. The cardinal rule for Tucker was that of non-invasion -- again a rule defined by expedience and measured as a gradient of force. Since Tucker, a Quaker-trained bourgeois, is willing to admit the right to kill an invader as justified by conditions, why is it that he rejects arguments for parliamentary possibilities? Although he might invoke past failures, he must beware of repeating the favored arguments of anti-utopians that what-was-not thereby cannot come-into-being.

Tucker therefore might be thought of as Fabian in his incrementalist and gradualist approach, but anti-Fabian in instrumentalities. Newspaper articles, pamphlets, lectures, petitions, protest meetings, passive resistance, each was a weapon in Tucker's war with the arche. Justifying death to invaders and dynamite for the State, Tucker presented a range of anarchist options. Why, then, cannot parliamentary action be added? The question suggests that Tucker's expedience was tempered by an absolute. There is something about the State--its corruptive capacity--that Tucker assumes will not alter over the course of time and be thereby ameliorated by expedients. Even in this acerbic period, when he discerned the "monster, Mechanism"

Tucker refused to consider parliamentarism.

On this issue, too, the contemporary Libertarians lack accord. The emergence of the Libertarian Party has rekindled the sectarian brushfires of the hybrid movement, but these differences could be multiplied and they tend to obscure the nature of their particular shared "visceral revolt."

Jerome Tuccille emphasizes the visceral nature of this bourgeois radicalism in his discussion of the growing irrelevance of "left" and "right" as political descriptions and his redefinition of them as psychological indicators. A left-winger, according to Tuccille, "operates in terms of concretes" while the right-winger "deals almost exclusively with abstractions." The former he believes is more at home in the material world and is more aware of its actual malfunctioning: "Left Wingers are probably more feeling-oriented in the sense that they are more willing to break a philosophic principle to rectify an unjust situation. Even if they do not believe in robbing the rich to feed the poor they may be willing to do so if they see someone going hungry."[15] The Right-Winger, he continues, knows that discrimination, poverty, and injustice exist but "he is more annoyed by the 'irrationality' of this condition than he is by its real-life affect on human beings."[16]

Tuccille has joined Rothbard and Karl Hess as the prime movers for a rapprochement between the radicals of the extreme right and the extreme left. Rothbard holds out the hope for a common interest in non-aggression, a laissez faire applied to life styles and social forms; Tuccille suggests a common concern in radical decentralization--calling for community control, Black Power, and for the possibility of a voluntary separatism; while Hess has been devoting his energies to developing the prerequisite conscious-

ness, organization, and technology for self-sufficient communities.[17] In this pursuit, or set of interrelated pursuits, these Libertarians conserve the social basis of their nineteenth century forebears. They face the problem of community in the face of twentieth-century patterns of urbanization--truly an ambivalent legacy.

In general anarchism has been a vessel of social and individual protest against the entrenched power of Church, State, or certifying agency; against what Tucker called the arche. Its content, however, has varied from era to era, nation to nation. It has refused to be monopolized by any single social, economic, or religious interest; it has included among its ranks poor fish peddlers and good cobblers, assassins like Leon Czolgosz and Emile Henry, adventurers like Bakunin and scholars such as the Reclus brothers; and it has boasted a few genuine candidates for secular saint-hood like Leo Tolstoy, Peter Kropotkin, and Dorothy Day. Paradoxically it has commoded Ravachol, Nechaev and the most ruthless of madmen as well as Emma Goldman, Voltarine deCleyre and some of the most compassionate souls to be found in any age.

Anarchism's function has been to provide a chronic critique of authority: it inculcates a perennial heresy. It also tends to support a belief in the efficacy of human reason and the prevalence of basic human decency through a radical "as if" principle whereby the belief in efficacy engenders the capacity to affect one's own life situation. Like Christianity, democracy, and socialism it has split into fractious fragments. Like them it makes fantastic demands upon human nature, and like them it has continued to generate some of the most inspirational literature and

most humane characters to appear on the world stage. Thus it is a social myth, but it is also the epitome of the speculative use of language in its critical trope: it represents the counterpressure of the "ought" against the "is." Like the genus Anarchism, the species libertarianism exemplifies the perennial claim of the what-could-be against that-which-is. But the utopia it offers is an open-ended one--again this is the difference between the programmer and the tinker. The psychologist Gardner Murphy has sagely observed that "A utopia which would fit the men of today, would be insipid or become a straight jacket to the men of tomorrow."[18] The thought was phrased more succinctly by Margaret Mead: "one man's dream is another man's nightmare."[19]

However utopias are not embraced by everyone and a radical restructuring of society appeals only to particular elements. The ideological spread of contemporary Libertarianism--the spiritual progeny of Warren, Spooner, Tucker, et--is both awesome and bewildering (e.g., the businessmam who faces the obligation to file governmental reports, the pacifist who resents his tax money and his children being pre-empted for imperialist undertakings, the hippy who simply wants to stay stoned and copulate at leisure with whichever consenting adult happens by, the middle class citizen who believes government to be a conspiracy of the wealthy with their tax-loopholes and the welfare class with their doles and quotas). But they share a common consensus: they believe that they are regulated without being represented, coerced without being consulted, that--in short--they have been made into objects by the political system.

These are largely the reactionary children of the Welfare State, Jeffersonian yeomen in the age of the Superstate. They invoke Say and Smith and they read Von Mises and Von Hayek, but they live in world etched by Kafka and Dostoyevsky and analyzed by Freud and Weber. Libertarianism in the twentieth century is more of a malaise than a movement, it is a visceral revolt of this new "new oppressed," a legacy of the richness of liberal rhetoric and the poverty of liberal gratifications. Its very heterogeneity indicates both a widespread appeal and an appeal to radically divergent groups--for in a bureaucratic society the potential for alienation is high and virtually all of its citizens are candidates for membership in the ranks of the "new oppressed."

Libertarians, even of Tucker's left-wing variety, view the Welfare State as a failure because while its rhetoric promised to end poverty, its practice has been to enslave a sizeable portion of American society by destroying incentive and fostering a clientellist mentality. As the government and the trade unions have improved the material standards of millions of the ethnic oppressed a new bourgeois radical Libertarian movement appears as the vehicle for articulating the case of the psychologically oppressed against that "monster, Mechanism."

Hence the divergent characters huddling under the aegis of Libertarianism may not all appear reputable and "decent" by prevailing liberal standards, in fact they may find one another a bit unsavory upon occasion, but they share a self-definition as the oppressed of a system which acts, not so much for them, as upon them. They are bourgeois radicals because they are the bourgeois alienated.

Footnotes

1. Moore, European Socialists..., pp. 198, 216.

2. As an interesting aside, the deportation orders for the radicals aboard The Buford--including Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman--had been signed by Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis F. Post, the former editor of Henry George's single-tax paper. Symes and Clement, Rebel America, p. 330.

3. Murray Rothbard, "Confessions of a Right Wing Liberal," Ramparts (June 15, 1968), reprinted in Silverman, American Radical Thought, p. 291.

4. Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution, p. 122.

5. The Libertarian Handbook 1973 edited by Vincent McCaffrey and Mark C. Frazier (Boston: Avenue Victor Hugo, 1973), pp. 8-10, 28.

6. The philosophic position and the economic program for constructing or reconstructing society may be found in the following works: Morris and Linda Tannehill, The Market for Liberty; Murray Rothbard, For A New Liberty, and Power and Market; David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom; and Douglas C. North and Roger LeRoy Miller, Abortion, Baseball, and Weed (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). The Minerva Enterprise is a project of Michael Oliver who has presented his argument in a privately printed book, New Constitution for a New Country.

7. Daniel Guerin, Anarchism translated by Mary Klopper (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 13.

8. Although an interesting difference between the two historical eras may be dramatically noted to simply comparing the names of the major actors in the revised tradition with those treated in this study, e.g., Robert Nozick, Nurray Rothbard, D. T. Armentin, Douglas Rasmussen, Israel Kirner, Jerome Tuccille, Leonard Liggio, Tibor Machan, Karl Hess, John Hospers, Douglas Den Uyl, Thomas Szasz, and their intellectual godfathers, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Mayer. This indicates both the changed constituency of the tradtion, and the altered condition of American society wherein the bourgeois itself has changed since the days of Warren or Tucker. Ironically, these later day Libertarians may be viewed as the children and the grandchildren of most ethnic workers the movement was unable to reach late last century.

9. Ishill, Free Vistas II, 301f.

10. Tucker, State Socialism and Anarchism, p. 25.

11. Liberty II (October 4, 1884), 5.

12. Tuccille, Radical Libertarianism, p. xvii.

13. Liberty VII (May 24, 1890), 5.

14. Liberty VII (June 7, 1890), 4.

15. Tuccille, Radical Libertarianism, p. xviif.

16. Ibid., p. xviii.

17. Karl Hess, "The Material Base for Local Liberty," (mimeo paper delivered before the Caucus for a New Political Science, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31, 1974), p. 1.

18. Gardner Murphy, Human Potentialities (New York: Basic Books, 1955), p. 309.

19. Margaret Mead, "Towards More Vivid Utopias," Science 126 (1957), 958.

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