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OPERATION INTERCEPT: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MULTIPLE
CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC POLICY

by

LAWRENCE A. GOOBERMAN

A dissertation submitted to the
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Preface

As Berger points out in Invitation to Sociology, sociological consciousness is inherently debunking. It involves the process of "seeing through the facades of social structures" ¹ and methodological procedures which are intended to locate "levels of reality other than those given in the official interpretations of society." ² It is debunking because it asks questions about the "givens" of "taken-for-granted reality."

In the history of social analysis, the search for alternate levels of reality has been reflected in a concern about the "latent functions" of social processes. Although Merton defined the latent function concept in Social Theory and Social Structure, as those objective consequences which are neither intended nor recognized (thus diverging from the subjective aim-in-view of the social actor), ³ interest in the unintended consequences of social processes has characterized the field of sociology since its inception. Weber's analysis of the relationship between Protestant values and capitalism, as presented in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, serves as an example of the fruitfulness of this focus.

1. Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 31.

2. Ibid., p. 38.

3. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), p. 51.

While Weber's analysis focussed on the unintended and unanticipated consequences of a particular set of religious-social values, other analyses of latent functions have concentrated on the unintended and unanticipated results of "purposive social actions," defined by Merton as those actions "which involve motives...a choice between various alternatives." ⁴ Again, this focus is not something new to social analysis. Merton notes that the problem of the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action has been treated by Machiavelli, Vico, Adam Smith, Marx, Engels, Wundt, Pareto, Max Weber, Graham Wallas, Cooley, Sorokin, Gini, Chapin and von Schelting. ⁵

This concern has been reflected in the works of contemporary sociologists, particularly those interested in deviant behavior and social problems. Since, on the level of widespread social problems and behavioral deviations, purposive social action responses are incorporated into national public policies, students of such issues find themselves increasingly involved in the field of policy studies.

In various contexts, Erving Goffman, Robert Merton, Howard Becker, Arnold Rose, Alfred Lindesmith, John Clausen, Charles Winick, Edwin Lemert, Marshall Clinard, Frank Tannenbaum, Kai Erikson, Seymour Fiddle, C. Wright Mills, Donald Cressey and Edwin Schur, have analyzed the intimate and reciprocal relationship between public policy and the reactions and behaviors of those groups who are considered problematic at a particular historical time, underlining the unanticipated consequences of specific public policy decisions.

4. Robert K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 6 (December, 1936) p. 895.

5. Ibid., p. 894.

In essence, it has become widely recognized that public policy and law enforcement decisions, intended to minimize or eradicate specific social problem situations, may in fact serve to create new problems, or to expand, systematize, or otherwise exacerbate existing social problem situations. Lemert's examination of "secondary deviation" and Schur's analysis of "crimes without victims" are two excellent examples of the potential usefulness of this "interactionist" approach.

While the interactionist perspective has focussed our attention on the latent, as well as the manifest functions of public policy decisions, it has also underlined the arbitrary, and generally transitory nature of the social definition of "deviance" itself. Often perceived as objectively given facts with ontological statuses above and beyond the affairs of social beings, determinations of deviance have come to be regarded as sociologically problematic phenomena.

Social deviants are persons who have been so labelled. When such labels come to be accepted by the typer, the typed, and the social audience alike, and henceforth incorporated into future interactions, it may be said that successful typing has occurred. In other words, as stated by Rubington and Weinberg, "deviance is in the eyes of the beholder."⁶ Currie's study of witchcraft and its control in Renaissance Europe, "Crimes Without Criminals,"⁷ and Connor's analysis of the Stalinist purges, "The Manufacture of Deviance,"⁸ although describing rather extreme examples of "deviance creation," underline the vast disparity between objective and subjective definitions of reality.

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6. Earl Rubington and Martin S. Weinberg, Deviance-The Interactionist Perspective (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. v.
 7. Elliot P. Currie, "Crimes Without Criminals," Law and Society Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (August, 1968), pp. 7-32.
 8. Walter D. Connor, "The Manufacture of Deviance: The Case of the Soviet Purge, 1936-1938," American Sociological Review, Vol. 37 (August, 1972), pp. 403-413.

Thus, the social definition of deviance as well as public policies designed to control deviant populations and social problem situations, have both become foci of sociological analysis. The issues that have been raised have done more than to add to the accumulated body of knowledge in these areas. The sociological perspective, the interest in alternate definitions of social reality, has changed the nature of the questions which we ask.

Since the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the application of the deviant label to the marihuana user, and public policies which mandate the criminal treatment of marihuana use, have both been continuously called into question. Although Becker and Dickson have emphasized different motivations behind the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' enthusiasm for the Tax Act, Becker focussing on "moral entrepreneurism"⁹ and Dickson underlining "bureaucratic responses to environmental pressures,"¹⁰ implicit in both analyses is the concept of "deviance creation." Further, many scholars, including Becker, Goode, Solomon, and Lindesmith, have attempted to define the many unanticipated consequences which have directly resulted from public policies and law enforcement decisions which have been based on that original social determination of deviance.

In spite of our history of increasingly harsh anti-marihuana legislation, the "drug abuse problem" and related

9. Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1963).

10. Donald T. Dickson, "Bureaucracy and Morality," Social Problems, Vol 16 (Fall, 1968), pp. 143-156.

"youthful deviations" have not come under control. This development has led to heightened concern, in all quarters of society, over the unintended, unanticipated and undesirable consequences of such public policy decisions. The marihuana issue has been subjected to elaborate social cost-social benefit analysis, as in Kaplan's recent work, Marijuana--The New Prohibition, in which many of the issues are clearly summarized. The focus has shifted from the "deviants" to the definitions, from the act of using marihuana to the consequences of policies allegedly intended to curb this proscribed activity.

In the true spirit of sociological inquiry, this work will analyze the taken-for-granted soundness of the present search-and-destroy anti-marihuana strategy, a strategy which has won the support of both the critics and the admirers of our present marihuana laws.

Acknowledgements

It is not possible to acknowledge all of those to whom I am most grateful for the assistance offered in the preparation of this report. During the past three years, I spoke to numerous journalists, writers and drug rehabilitation workers, who unselfishly shared their insights and observations with me. I also contacted a great many drug users and drug dealers, who took me into their confidence. I am most grateful to the representatives to the New York Association of Voluntary Agencies on Narcotics Addiction and Substance Abuse, especially Seymour Fiddle of Exodus House and Al Lippman and Joan Liebmann, both formerly of Greenwich House, who offered materials, contacts, and valuable suggestions.

I would like to give special thanks to Professors Patricia Kendall and Abraham Blumberg, who served on the supervisory committee and conscientiously reviewed the work. I am grateful to my wife, Susan, for her patience and encouragement.

Most of all, the support, encouragement, suggestions and long distance phone calls of the project advisor, Professor Charles Winick, were instrumental in helping me to see this work through to its completion.

In Memory of Judith Kramer

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CHAPTER I

Operation Intercept: The Policy and the Research Problem

Section A: Operation Intercept: The Policy

On Sunday, September 21, 1969, the United States government embarked upon Operation Intercept, to deter and detect the illegal importation of marihuana across the United States-Mexican border. This new public policy was considered by many to be the most extensive attempt in United States history to curb the importation of illegal drugs.

The policy was based on a document entitled "Report of Special Presidential Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marihuana, and Dangerous Drugs." The report was released on June 6, 1969 by an interagency commission assembled and conceived by President Nixon and placed under the co-chairmanship of Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Eugene T. Rossides. Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Secretary of the Treasury David M. Kennedy reported directly to the President. The Special Presidential Task Force included R. Richards Rolapp, Special Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General, acting as Executive Secretary, as well as a nineteen member panel, including representatives of the Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Department of the Army, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor,

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the White House Staff.¹

This concentrated attack, waged along the 2,500 mile United States-Mexican border, represented a great investment of manpower hours, as well as financial and material resources. According to the New York Times: "Operation Intercept is being waged by nearly 2,000 agents of the Bureau of Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Working around the clock from the Pacific to the Gulf they stopped 2,384,079 citizens of the United States and Mexico at 31 border crossings in the drive's first week."² This policy totally altered previous border inspection practices. As stated by the New York Times four days after Operation Intercept was launched: "Before Operation Intercept went into effect at 2:30 P.M. Sunday, inspectors took less than a minute to process a vehicle and its passengers. Only one car in twenty was given the present three minute treatment, including thorough scrutiny of the trunk and engine areas, under seats and behind cushions and door panels."³ The new policy "calls for a 100 per cent inspection of all persons and vehicles crossing into the United States, and there are no exceptions."⁴

Operation Intercept was also being implemented by other means, in the attempt to detect and deter all persons involved in the illegal drug market. As stated by the Nation: "It involves the veritable mobilization of federal agencies and the use of aircraft (both fixed-wing and helicopter), patrol boats, radar, esoteric instruments such as people-sniffers and marijuana-sniffers and, above all, the full weight of the government's publicity apparatus."⁵ Further, as noted by Newsweek: "A new system of keener radar will go into operation later this month (September, 1969), and just two weeks ago the F.A.A. issued stiff new rules requiring U.S.-bound pilots

to file flight plans before taking off from Mexican airports."⁶ The new policy was also aimed at destroying the supply at its source. According to Newsweek:

The task force suggested that the U.S. supply Mexico with recently developed aerial sensor devices capable of detecting marijuana or opium poppy fields from the sky and also with benzyldiethyl amino benzoate, a deadly marijuana defoliant. Thus equipped, Mexican planes could fan out on search-and-destroy missions across the offending countryside. ⁷

Under pressure from the Mexican Government as well as Mexican and American businessmen,⁸ Operation Intercept was officially concluded on October 2, 1969. It was immediately followed by a new policy, called Operation Cooperation, which was publicly presented by John Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, as follows:

Presently, a less economically severe plan called Operation Cooperation has replaced Operation Intercept. While this is also an intensive surveillance effort involving the cooperation of numerous Federal agencies and the Government of Mexico, it is less burdensome economically to those persons who are engaged in lawful commerce between the United States and Mexico.⁹

On March 11, 1970, more than five months after Operation Intercept was abandoned, a comprehensive agreement incorporating the goals of both Operation Intercept and Operation Cooperation, was reached by United States and Mexican law enforcement officials. Noting that smuggling had steadily increased from the time Operation Intercept ended,

The United States and Mexico agreed on a program to fight the smuggling of narcotics. The agreement, signed here by Attorneys General of both countries, includes \$1 million in technical assistance to Mexico for the eradication of poppy and marijuana fields. ¹⁰

This continuing effort was reported by Life as follows:

The recent easing of Operation Intercept, after pressure from the Mexican government, was only a shift in emphasis. Hundreds of extra customs agents are still

stationed along the border, but they are intent now on the bigtime professional smugglers instead of tourists. At the same time the U.S., in an attempt to stop drug traffic at its source, has made available to Mexico an undisclosed amount of equipment...along with American advisory personell. ll

Thus, the aims and goals, as well as many of the strategies and tactics employed during the days of Operation Intercept, were incorporated into succeeding policies, and are still in effect today.

Section B: Factors and Assumptions Underlying this New Public Policy

According to federal officials, the primary strategy behind Operation Intercept was to effect a drastic increase in the price of marihuana by substantially reducing the supply. Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, Co-Chairman of the Special Presidential Task Force, offered the following comments as reported by the San Francisco Chronicle:

Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst told a news conference the administration hopes to use the economic law of supply and demand instead of the often harsh criminal narcotics laws to break the campus and youth drug culture.

"We hope to drive the price so high it will be unavailable to students in colleges and high schools... who are using it so commonly today."...the administration would like to make marijuana smoking as expensive as using heroin. Few youths would experiment with it at that price, he reasoned. 12

It was reasoned that high prices would reduce use by marihuana users, as well as some potential marihuana users, by simply making this activity too expensive, while others still financially capable of purchasing the drug, would find it to be unavailable. Although we had no way of knowing the incidence of marihuana use, not to mention any meaningful estimate regarding the number of potential users, this public policy effort was based on the belief that a great increase had already been realized.

Winick has suggested that "trends in incidence are... largely determined by trends in arrests for the possession of marihuana."¹³ However, as compared to the opiate user, "it is much less likely that the marihuana user will come to the attention of the authorities."¹⁴ Sidney Cohen, Director of the Division of Drug Addiction and Drug Abuse

at the National Institute of Mental Health, estimates that "the chances of being jailed for using pot are probably less than one in 1,000; only about 1 per cent of those arrested on marijuana charges are brought to trail and convicted."¹⁵ Although many estimates have been offered, there is little consistency and even less hard data in these approximations. Five months prior to Operation Intercept, the following estimate was offered by Commissioner Goddard, as reported by Time:

Obviously no one knows the total, since possession of a single cigarette is a crime. But Commissioner James L. Goddard of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration cites estimates that as many as 20 million Americans may have used marijuana at one time. ¹⁶

Five months later, during the Operation Intercept period, Time published the following:

A recent administration task force 'conservatively' estimated that at least 5,000,000 Americans have used marijuana at least once. Stanley Yolles, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, puts the total far higher: at least 12 million and perhaps even 20 million...Yolles estimates that 25 per cent to 40 per cent of all students have at least tried it; on many college campuses, particularly on the East and West coasts and near large cities, the figure is 50 per cent. ¹⁷

Although national estimates regarding marihuana use leave a great deal to be desired, an increasing amount of data was available concerning student use in our high schools and colleges. Based on a study of under-graduates from four California colleges in 1966, Blum found that 11 per cent at a Catholic college, 21 per cent at a large private university, 21 per cent at a junior college and 33 per cent at a state college, had used marihuana.¹⁸ One year later (1967), Blum found that the percentage of under-graduates who had used marihuana had increased from

21 to 57 per cent at the large private university.¹⁹ According to a study conducted in late 1968, at the same university, the percentage had risen from 57 to 69 per cent.²⁰ Several studies of high school populations in California, conducted between 1966 and 1969, confirmed an unmistakable upward trend during this period.²¹

National data on student drug use, although less reliable, pointed in the same direction. Basing his estimates on statistical reports from various educational institutions, Louria cites the following trend:

At the beginning of 1968, the data on marihuana use suggested that perhaps 15 per cent of college students would smoke marihuana at least once in a four year college career. By the end of the spring term of 1969, this estimate had approximately doubled. Some high schools and colleges now report a prevalence in the 70 to 80 per cent range. ²²

Shortly after Operation Intercept, Goode supplemented his own observations with data from two Gallup Polls, underlining the upward trend in marihuana use during the past few years:

There has been a massive increase in the use of marijuana in the past few years. Although it is impossible to state exactly how much more is consumed now than even two or three years ago, a Gallup Poll conducted in the spring of 1969 indicated that almost one quarter of the American college population has tried marijuana at least once. (A similar Gallup Poll taken in 1967 showed the figure to be 6 or 7 per cent.) ²³

In his work, The Marijuana Smokers, Goode concludes: "The use of marijuana in colleges in 1960 was almost unknown; in 1970, it is commonplace."²⁴

Several years ago, Winick summarized the state of our knowledge as follows:

We do not therefore have a clear impression of just how many young marihuana users there are in the United

States, or of how many older users there are. Even to guess at the number would be very difficult. Perhaps a cautious but accurate statement would be that there is a considerable amount of marihuana use in a number of American communities, especially some larger cities, and that young people represent a substantial proportion of the population of marihuana users. 25

Most of the hard data available, concerning the extent of illegal drug use in the United States, is deduced from official arrest and seizure statistics. Although such figures reflect enforcement policies as well as law violations, most professional observers agree that they do serve to underline certain social trends. Aside from informal observation, public relations releases, journalistic reports, research based on select populations and informed estimates, official statistics offer the only data from which real trends may be cited. This position is stated by Carey as follows:

For all the criticisms of official descriptions, certain official information is very worthwhile. Official arrest and seizure statistics are probably the best drug statistics there are. Seizures are reported in amounts and tend to be quite accurate. The amount and number of people arrested gives some picture of the volume of traffic. 26

Ultimately, it was the deductions, inferences, estimates and reports based on official statistics, upon which the rationale for Operation Intercept was grounded.

According to official statistics compiled by Newsweek: Over the past decade the number of drug arrests has more than quadrupled--and fully three-fourths of those arrested have been under 25...Young people under 21 are being arrested for drug violations at the appalling rate of one every five minutes. 27

Arrest statistics, and estimates of the extent of marihuana use specifically, were published in Time:

Arrests for marijuana law violations last year totaled

80,000: they increased tenfold between 1963 and 1968. Yet, for all the massive expenditures of police time and money, pot smoking is so widespread that there are roughly 25 times as many users as there are places to hold them in all the nation's prisons. 28

Estimates and statistics based on official drug seizures are also available. Based on customs records, Time reports: "Last year alone, U.S. officials estimate 1,200 tons of marijuana were brought across the Mexican line. Only 70,210 pounds were detected."²⁹ Newsweek estimated this figure to be "nearly seven times the amount confiscated just two years earlier."³⁰

Further evidence of the growing drug use and drug smuggling phenomenon was offered by Eugene Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of the Customs Bureau and Secret Service. His testimony before the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency included the following statistics:

Drug seizures and arrests by the Bureau of Customs during the past three years reflect startling increases in drug smuggling. For example, Customs seized 78 pounds of heroin during fiscal year 1967, 246 pounds in 1968 and 311 pounds in 1969, and thus seizures quadrupled in a period of but two years. The same trend is reflected regarding seizures of opium, marijuana, hashish and the various other dangerous drugs...

It must be noted that very little hashish was seized prior to 1966. In 1966 and 1967, however, approximately 70 pounds of hashish were seized, 191 pounds in 1968, and 623 pounds in fiscal year 1969.

The seriousness and significance of these figures can only be appreciated when it is realized that it takes 625 pounds of raw marijuana to make one pound of hashish. Thus, the fiscal 1969 seizure represented the active ingredients in 390,000 pounds of marijuana.

Stepped up enforcement efforts and tremendous traffic increases both contribute to these impressively enlarged seizure statistics. The statistics show that a firm market for hashish has been established in the United States, and that there is a growing market for other drugs for illicit distribution and use. Arrests by the Bureau of Customs follow the

same pattern. Drug smuggling arrests increased from 3,374 in fiscal year 1967 to 6,200 in fiscal year 1969.³¹

Official seizure and prosecution statistics were cited in the Special Presidential Task Force Report:

Mexico is the primary source of nearly all of the high potency marihuana seized in the United States. Seizures of marihuana at the Mexican border have increased tremendously in the past five years. For example, in 1966 there were 10,416 pounds of marihuana seized at the Mexican border; whereas, in 1968 almost seven times this much, or 70,210 pounds were seized.³²

Regarding drug prosecutions in the United States, the Task Force refers to the increase as follows:

In recent years, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of drug prosecutions. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reported that there was a 31.9 per cent increase in narcotic prosecutions during the first half of fiscal year 1969 as compared to comparable period in the previous fiscal year. Approximately one-half were commenced in the judicial districts abutting the Mexican border.³³

In the following statement, subtitled, "Present Evidence of Extent of Use," the Task Force draws upon official statistics as well as social surveys to point to what they conclude to be a rapid increase in marihuana use in this country. While some of these trends have already been cited, it is important to isolate those findings which the Task Force incorporated into its report, since the data accepted by the Task Force directly influenced its perception of the problem, and ultimately its recommendations to the President:

Marihuana use has been rapidly increasing in the past five years. Although originally restricted to certain jazz musicians, artists and ghetto dwellers,

it has now appeared among the middle and upper class. A conservative estimate of persons, both juvenile and adult, who have used marihuana at least once is about five million.

One of the most alarming aspects of the current drug crisis is the involvement of young people. In California alone juvenile arrests for drug offenses increased from 1,271 in 1961 to 14,112 in 1967. Of the 14,112 juvenile arrests in California during 1967, 10,987 were arrested for marihuana violations. To understand the full significance of this figure it must be compared with the year 1961 in which there were 401 arrests. In 1967 alone there were over 2,000 more arrests for marihuana violations than in the previous six years combined. 34

Two years ago, surveys in parts of the country where marihuana use is known to be high suggested that twenty per cent of the college students in those areas had experience with marihuana. Present evidence, although spotty, suggests that as many as 60 per cent of the students on some campuses have used it. Some students feel that official estimates are low, and that the true extent of drug abuse among college students is even higher. There are also many reports of increasing use of marihuana in high schools although there is not sufficient data to establish a countrywide pattern. Significantly, most recent college data indicated that many college users were first exposed to marihuana in high school. However, the bulk of users are more aptly characterized as "triers" rather than habitual "potheads." Two out of three who have tried the drug have used it not more than one to ten times. In the most recent (Fall, 1968) survey based on a geographic area of high use, about one person in ten reported using marihuana regularly for as much as a year's duration. Finally, there is growing evidence that the number of pre-teenagers who are using marihuana is increasing. 35

The seriousness of this social phenomenon, as perceived by the Special Presidential Task Force, is reflected in a concluding statement of the report:

The consumption in the United States of drugs and narcotics produced abroad and illegally imported into this country has reached such proportion as to be in the highest rank of those matters affecting the vital interests of the nation. 36

Thus, official statistics, as well as the comments of professionals in the drug abuse field, all pointed to a growing disregard of law, and the proliferation of illegal drug use and supply networks during the past decade. Although the total number of offenders involved was not, and probably cannot be known, the upward trend appeared to be beyond doubt. At a time when this phenomenon was recognized in suburban areas as well as in the middle class sections of our cities, Operation Intercept was implemented in order to curb this trend.³⁷

Section C: Operation Intercept: Immediate, Intermediate and Ultimate Goals

Students of evaluative research have recognized that the objectives of a policy or program can be classified in a number of different ways, depending upon one's purposes.³⁸ Suchman discusses the value of subdividing objectives into a logical hierarchy:

In principle, one may hypothesize an unlimited universe of objectives and subobjectives corresponding to the various steps or actions that make up a total program. While these steps usually comprise a continuous series of events, for evaluation purposes it is essential to subdivide them into some discernible hierarchy of subgoals, each of which may be the result of the successful achievement of the preceding goal and, in turn, a precondition to the next higher goals.³⁹

The trichotomization of objectives is one method of achieving this type of logical construction:

The chain of objectives is often trichotomized in the literature as immediate, intermediate, and ultimate goals. Immediate goals refer to the results of the specific act with which one is momentarily concerned, such as the formation of an obesity club; the intermediate goals push ahead toward the accomplishment of the specific act, such as the actual reduction in weight of club members; the ultimate goal then examines the effect of achieving the intermediate goal upon the health status of members, such as reduction in the incidence of heart disease.⁴⁰

For the policy under study, Operation Intercept, the objectives may be trichotomized as follows:

1. Immediate - A substantial reduction in the supply of marihuana coming into the United States from Mexico.
2. Intermediate - A substantial increase in the price of marihuana and a reduction in its availability

to the marihuana user.

3. Ultimate - A reduction of illegal drug usage in the United States.

These multiple objectives were all incorporated in a statement offered to the press by the Deputy Attorney General:

The objective, according to Mr. Kleindienst, is to deter smugglers, so that the price of marijuana will rise and an estimated 30 million young Americans will be obliged to forsake the weed for lack of funds. 41

According to United States Customs documentation, official sources, journalistic accounts and street-corner observations, the supply of marihuana coming into the United States was allegedly curtailed, to a significant degree, during the Operation Intercept period. Illegal importation came to a near standstill and a backlog of supply crops was reportedly building up in the Mexican countryside. This situation was reported by John Ingersoll, as follows:

Operation Intercept was very, very successful. While it was in effect, and even to this day, the flow of narcotics and marihuana from Mexico into this country was substantially curtailed. Marihuana is still in short supply in the United States, and in most places where it is available, at least the Mexican form, the prices have doubled and in some cases tripled. 42

When questioned at a news briefing about the price of marihuana, Mr. Ingersoll responded:

It has varied over the country. In New York it has increased a fantastic amount. I think it was selling for in the neighborhood of \$50 to \$60 a pound before Operation Intercept, and it is now selling in the neighborhood of \$350 a pound.

In other parts of the country, we have seen increases in about the same magnitude. In addition to the same price increase, there is a continuing shortage of

marihuana. The shortage existed throughout the summer. But we would have normally expected that the harvesting of the crop in September and October in Mexico would have increased the amount available. We have not seen this.

We do know that there are still huge stockpiles in Mexico which have not yet been moved. 43

Mr. Ingersoll's claims were substantiated by reports carried in the mass media. U.S. News & World Report confirmed the fact that "marijuana is scarce, and its price is rapidly rising."⁴⁴ Reporters sent the following dispatches from major cities throughout the nation:

Los Angeles - Police narcotics experts say a "considerable scarcity" of marijuana is developing. Marijuana that sold for \$70-\$90 a pound is up about a third, to \$90-\$120.

San Francisco - Clifford Ojala, who heads the Berkeley police's special investigation bureau says: "Intercept hasn't affected us yet, but we anticipate greater scarcity of drugs. Marijuana was pretty scarce here prior to Intercept."...A kilogram (2.2 pounds) of marijuana costs \$200 to \$250, up from an average \$110 to \$120 three months ago. Lieut. Norbet Currie, head of San Francisco's narcotics bureau, said the price of marijuana has doubled in the last month or two. A "lid" - about one ounce, which makes 45 to 50 cigarettes or "joints" - now costs \$14 to \$15. It had cost \$7 for a year or so.

Chicago - The harvest of domestic marijuana is just ending and there is plenty of this local product on the market here, but the supply of imported marijuana has decreased sharply. Vernon D. Meyer, deputy regional director of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, said imported marijuana jumped from about \$200 a kilogram to \$400 last June. Domestic marijuana sells for about \$200 a kilo.

New York City - John J. Riley, assistant supervising agent for the U.S. Customs Bureau, said: "I've been told by people working the streets that the price of marijuana has almost doubled within the past ten days."

Washington, D.C. - Marijuana is increasingly hard to find here. The trend began in midsummer. A spokesman for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs declared: "No question about it, Intercept (on the Mexican border) is working...the supply of

marijuana is down everywhere, and the prices are up."⁴⁵

An unpublished CBS survey of fourteen major cities found similar price increases.⁴⁶ The situation was summarized by Life:

The famine itself is real enough. It fell upon the country late last spring, introducing a season of privation worse than the oldest smokers can recall... Only marijuana, the mildest and least menacing, has disappeared from the streets--even in southern California. 4

And Newsweek concluded: "But this September, the news is grim. The nation's underground lies in the grip of the worst marijuana famine since the weed began its revival five years ago."⁴⁸

Throughout the United States a critical supply shortage was evident and the price of marihuana rose significantly. Further, it was generally reported that quality had noticeably deteriorated. In terms of the immediate and intermediate objectives of this new policy, curtailing importation, affecting price increases and reducing availability, Operation Intercept appeared to be a successful effort. However, public officials conceded that these objectives represented only a short-range goal. Ultimately, the underlying problem under attack was the rapid increase in illegal drug use in our society, particularly among the young. This was the theme stressed as seven separate Congressional bodies held hearings on the drug problem in the fall of 1969, including the House Select Committee on Crime, Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee, Senate Labor and Public Welfare Special Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics, House Education and Labor Education Subcommittee, Senate Select Small Business Monopoly Subcommittee, Senate Labor and Public Welfare Health Subcommittee, and the Senate District of Columbia Committee.⁴⁹ It was also the theme stressed in the Special Presidential Task Force Report upon which Operation Intercept was based.

Although there have been analyses of the effects of the policy on smuggling patterns and frequencies and on marihuana prices in the United States, as well as analyses of its repercussions on Mexican tourism, border town revenues and vehicular traffic delays, we have little information on the impact of this severe marihuana shortage on the drug using population in the United States. Thus, the basic underlying questions concerning the effects of limited marihuana supplies in this country have remained unanswered.

Section D: Purpose of the Study and Applied Theoretical Perspectives

This study will attempt to document and analyze the full range of intended and unintended consequences of the Operation Intercept policy decision and of the resultant marihuana shortage. The marihuana shortage became evident in the United States in the early summer of 1969, due to a summer drought in Mexico, a concerted anti-smuggling campaign by United States and Mexican government authorities, and growing demand for the drug in the United States. Although Operation Intercept was not officially put into effect until September 21, 1969, this study will focus on the period from June, 1969, until the end of Operation Intercept in October of 1969, since this entire period was characterized by an abnormal scarcity of marihuana in the United States. Many of the tactics and policies which were originated during the summer of 1969 continued beyond October. However, the effects of such policies upon marihuana supplies were no longer evident in the drug market. Thus, this investigation will focus on drug use patterns, sub-cultures and distribution networks during a unique period in American public policy and law enforcement history.⁵⁰

As explicitly stated in a wide range of sociological theories concerned with deviant behavior and social problems, there exists an intimate and reciprocal relationship between official public policy and the reactions and behaviors of those groups and individuals who are considered problematic by society at a particular historical time. In various contexts, Erving Goffman, Robert Merton, Howard Becker, Arnold Rose, Alfred Lindesmith, John Clausen, Charles Winick, Edwin Lemert, Marshall Clinard, Frank Tannenbaum, Kai Erikson, Seymour Fiddle, C. Wright Mills,

Donald Cressey and Edwin Schur, among many others, have commented upon this important interrelationship. The essential quality of this interrelationship has been succinctly stated by Schur:

Policy is not merely a reaction to an existing problem; rather, the relation between policy and problem is reciprocal. A specific policy may cause new problems, or make existing ones worse, and the sociologist must take this into account. 51

The sociologist must also consider the fact that a single public policy decision or social action program, with a unitary objective, may have multiple effects. As stated by Opler: "All plans are sure to have mixed consequences."⁵² Such mixed consequences stem from the complexity of the social situation and of the social problem itself:

Social phenomena are so complex and interrelated that it is virtually impossible to change one facet without producing a series of other concomitant changes--both undesirable and desirable. 53

Merton has analyzed the most important and most problematic of these differential effects, those which are unanticipated, and has referred to these as "the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action."⁵⁴ In this investigation, we will explore the multiplicity of effects of the Operation Intercept policy decision, focussing on those consequences which were unanticipated.

A similar perspective has been brought to the study of social problems which entail legal as well as social considerations. According to Schur: "He (the sociologist) must consider the important ways in which specific legal definitions and law enforcement policies influence the development of such problems."⁵⁵ Based on his analysis of a wide range of social problem situations, Rose specifies eleven ways in which the law, as well as policy decisions

and enforcement practices stemming from the law, may act to create new social problems, or to expand and systematize existing ones.⁵⁶

Analyses such as these underline the complex nature of social problems, as well as the difficulties and pitfalls inherent in the attempt to formulate and implement policies designed for the correction of problem situations. This study will view the Operation Intercept policy, and the drug abuse problem it was designed to alleviate, from this type of perspective. The ways in which the nature and scope of the problem, to a great extent, defined the goals and techniques of the public policy, will be explored. On the other hand, the multiple consequences of this policy decision will be viewed in terms of their relationship to certain relevant cultural realities, situational factors, subcultural orientations and population complexities, which were inherent in the problem situation itself.

The complexity of the problem-policy relationship is further complicated by the "time factor." Scholars of public policy formation emphasize the importance of this consideration in public policy-making, as well as in analyses of the consequences of policy decisions. The consequences of policy decisions evolve over time. They affect and are affected by "the envelope of events and issues" surrounding policy decisions. Bauer used this phrase to refer to "those events and issues that must be considered as the context within which to analyze a given policy problem."⁵⁷ And, "since policy making is by definition setting a course to be followed in the future, it is redundant to say that consideration of future consequences is part of the 'envelope' that affects the policy process."⁵⁸ Of course, "the envelope of events and issues" affecting the consequences of a policy decision includes antecedent events,

as well as a host of "surrounding circumstances." As stated by Suchman:

The effect of any single factor will depend upon other circumstances also being present and will itself reflect a host of antecedent events. These surrounding circumstances become an essential part of the "explanation" of the success or failure of attempts to influence any particular causal factor and combine to increase or decrease the probability but not the certainty of effective action. 59

In essence, "the consequences result from the interplay of the action and the objective situation."⁶⁰ Thus, the student of public policy and social problems must view the relationship as reciprocal, as changing over time, and as part of a social context including other relevant events and issues.

Another perspective to be assumed in the approach to the problem under study, holds that any public policy, including the one under consideration, entails specific and definable social costs as well as social gains. Such costs and gains, although not always foreseeable, are implicit in the choices and decisions of policy makers. As there are winners and losers in legal situations, advancing or maintaining some interests while others suffer setbacks, this is "also true on the level of broad public policy."⁶¹ Although the losers may not, on the level of public policy, be as easily perceived as in the case of a liability lawsuit or a criminal court disposition, the losers do, nevertheless, exist. As it is the "distinctive mission of the policy maker that he must allocate scarce resources and must mediate among conflicting sets of values and interests,"⁶² it is the mission of the social researcher to define these conflicts, and to define the consequences, the social losses as well as the social gains, of specific public policy

decisions. Further, as stated by Justice Holmes in his essay "The Path of the Law," students of law, society and public policy must eventually "consider the ends which the several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and whether they are worth the price."⁶³ This means that analysis can be taken one step further, and "that the desired effect must itself be examined for its own consequences, both short and long term, desirable and undesirable."⁶⁴ This process has been referred to as "social cost/social benefit accounting,"⁶⁵ and has previously been applied to many evaluative research efforts in the drug abuse field. These highly pertinent issues will also guide this investigation.

The problematic situation to be considered in this study is the growing use of marihuana and other illegal drugs in our society. Operation Intercept, the public policy designed to limit the importation of illegal drug supplies coming into the United States, particularly marihuana, is the public policy under study. This public policy was conceived and implemented with the expressed intent of alleviating the aforementioned situation. Further, based on the analysis and recommendations of the Special Presidential Task Force, and on statements offered by official spokesmen for the federal government (Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. Ingersoll) the policy-makers anticipated that the policy would move significantly in the desired direction. Thus, "a reduction of illegal drug use" (ultimate objective), was both the intended and anticipated consequence of the policy decision. Consequences which served to exacerbate the drug abuse problem in the United States may therefore be called unintended and/or unanticipated. From the vantage point of the policy-makers, such unintended-unanticipated consequences must also be considered undesirable.

It is felt that the study of the intended and unintended, anticipated and unanticipated, desirable and undesirable consequences of a specific public policy decision, aimed at curbing a particular mode of deviant and criminal behavior, can uncover data of empirical and theoretical value concerning the wide range of social effects of such policy decisions. Further, it is believed that by studying the reactions of various drug using populations during a period of severe marihuana shortage, we will gain greater insight into the complexity of illegal drug use modalities and subcultures in our society.

Thus, while the data presented in this study may have practical implications, it is nonevaluative in the sense that it is primarily aimed at increased understanding and the discovery of new knowledge. "The emphasis is upon studying the interrelationships of variables rather than upon the ability of man to influence these relationships through controlled intervention." 66

Section E: Hypotheses

This study has three central hypotheses:

1. Although there was a general decline in the supply of marihuana during this period, the shortage was more evident in certain population groups within the New York City area, than in others. Such groups could be differentiated in terms of definable social characteristics.
2. The limited supply of marihuana coming into the United States led to a wide range of unanticipated behavioral and attitudinal consequences.
3. Among certain population groups, there was a significant increase in the availability, use and distribution of illegal drugs other than marihuana. Such groups could be differentiated in terms of age, residence, socio-economic status and degree of involvement in a drug subculture.

In their studies of involvement in marihuana subcultures, both Carey⁶⁷ and Becker⁶⁸ employ a sequential model of deviance, in which each stage of involvement requires a different level of explanation. Both studies stress the heterogeneous quality of the general drug using population. This observation is also implicit in the "deviant career" concept, as used by Erving Goffman,⁶⁹ Edwin Lemert,⁷⁰ Marshall Clinard,⁷¹ Edwin Schur,⁷² and other students of deviant behavior. These authors all recognize the relationship between misguided "assumptions of homogeneity," public policy, and the effects of public policy. As stated by Carey, in a specific reference to drug using populations: "The fact that investigators tend to regard all drug users as a single type and all drug scenes as part of a single piece would be of no consequence if it did not effect social policy."⁷³ However, such conceptions do have a

profound influence upon public policy decisions. Due to the uniform nature of public policy, officials implicitly assume that all deviants of a particular type (i.e. users of illegal drugs) are at the same stage of development. Although recent changes in the law and legislative proposals suggest that we are finally attempting to distinguish between various modes and levels of involvement in the "drug scene," the public decision to curtail the supply of marihuana made no such differentiation. Further, although we have a wide range of studies relating drug use modalities to subcultural involvements as well as socio-economic positions and opportunities, public policy does not take these distinctions into account. Thus, when a group is assumed to be homogeneous, then it is further assumed that public policy will affect them in a uniform and consistent manner. It is hypothesized that the multiple effects of this public policy decision varied in accord with the age and degree of drug use involvement, as well as the various socio-economic, environmental and subcultural relationships, in which individuals were enmeshed. Therefore, this report will analyze and compare the effects of the marihuana shortage upon selected individuals from various strata of society and in different stages of involvement in the drug scene.

Section F: Formulation of the Research Problem and Methodology

Subsection 1: Formulation of the Problem

The stated research problem evolved in the summer of 1969. During this period I was engaged in a research project concerned with the employability of rehabilitated drug addicts. This work brought me into close contact with drug addicts, drug users, and ex-drug addicts, as well as workers in the rehabilitation field. It was at this time that the marihuana shortage became evident. Although the mass media paid little attention to the situation until September and October of 1969, marihuana users, including ghetto youth, middle class students and white collar businessmen, were well aware of this development. At the time there was a great deal of talk, among drug users and workers in the drug abuse field concerning the increasing use of drugs other than marihuana. During the summer and early fall of 1969 I informally observed and interviewed persons knowledgeable in this area. In all, I spoke to more than one hundred persons from New York City and surrounding suburbs. These contacts confirmed the feeling that many marihuana users had switched to other drugs during this period of a critical marihuana shortage. This situation appeared to continue through mid-fall of 1969.

My research problem was not formulated until the early fall of 1969, during the days of Operation Intercept. It occurred to me, and to several of my colleagues in the drug abuse field, that this new government initiative, aimed at reducing the already scarce supply of marihuana, might in fact be counterproductive to our long-range efforts to curtail the more general drug abuse problem in this country. Although early observations had attuned me to negative consequences, I was still openly willing to accept any

findings suggesting positive effects stemming from the policy.

In the course of my initial investigations I became particularly interested in the wide range of consequences stemming from this single public policy effort. This interest was reflected in the definition of the research problem, and in the methods I selected to go about studying it. Tape recordings of interview responses, the basic data upon which this descriptive documentation and analysis is based, commenced in mid-October, 1969, shortly after the termination of Operation Intercept. However, prior to interviewing I had to make a number of Methodological decisions. These decisions will now be discussed.

Subsection 2: Methodological Research Decisions

When one decides to examine the relationship between public policy and social consequences, he must first select a vantage point from which to view the situation. Since the 'reality' of a situation is dependent upon those who define it, the selected vantage point will, to a great degree, determine the findings of the study. When the public policy in question is specifically aimed at deterring a deviant or criminal population from partaking in a proscribed activity, we may assume that the rule-makers and the rule breakers will approach the situation with conflicting orientations. Further, each group may perceive the policy, and the effects of the policy, quite differently.

In this instance, the official definition of public policy had received wide coverage in the mass media. The immediate goals, long-range objectives and applied techniques of Operation Intercept had been presented publicly. Also, public officials had accumulated and supplied information on drug seizures, shortages and prices during this period. Their reports concentrated on those aspects of the situation on which they had accumulated data. On the other hand, we

had little information on the way the drug using population perceived the objectives and experienced the effects of this public policy. In this study, I focussed on a wide range of consequences as seen from the vantage point of those groups and individuals personally involved in drug use and drug distribution. In other words, I sought to discover how the marihuana shortage and the public policy behind it affected the attitudes and activities of those persons for whom the public policy was designed. The first methodological decision was to go directly to these persons, the 'rule-breakers,' as well as those whose work affords them a firsthand view of same, in order to ascertain this information.⁷⁴

This decision directly leads the researcher to two other closely related methodological problems -- attaining access to information and selecting a sample. In all studies which view deviant or illegal behavior from the vantage point of the 'outsiders,' the first problem to be surmounted by the researcher is that of attaining access to information. For the purposes of this study, I required information from a wide range of persons and groups who were in various stages of involvement in the drug scene during the Operation Intercept era. This access was accomplished in two ways. First, I received the cooperation of researchers and staff members who are employed by those voluntary agencies which are participating in the New York Association of Voluntary Agencies on Narcotics Addiction and Substance Abuse, Inc. These agencies serve a larger drug abusing population than the entire New York City and New York State programs combined. Several of these voluntary agencies offered access to workers, clients, and available empirical materials. Since clients at these agencies represent only certain segments of the general drug using population, it was also necessary to acquire information from persons and groups not so involved.

Therefore, I advanced along a second avenue of inquiry. Personal contact was established with a range of outside sources, including some persons involved in the sale of illegal drugs in New York City. It was found that such contacts led to further contacts, so that information sources proliferated rapidly. In this regard, my experiences were similar to those encountered by Carey and his associates, in their study of drug using groups in Berkeley, California. As stated by Carey:

The investigator must use the services of those persons whom he knows to be members of the population he studies or enlist the support of people who can recommend him to such persons. As he talks to his subjects, they gradually develop a degree of trust in him and his work and become more and more willing to cooperate and to encourage others they know to cooperate. The study radiated out from the selected points of contact which we were able to utilize within the deviant subculture. 75

Contacts with professionals, and others in close association with drug users, also "radiated out" from my initial voluntary agency contacts in a similar fashion. This activity required an alteration of my daily routines and associations in a way which had been described by Mills, commenting on his own experiences while preparing a study of the upper classes:

I now began to alter the character of my routine so as to include in it (1) people who were among those whom I wanted to study, (2) people in close contact with them, and (3) people interested in them usually in some professional way. 76

Therefore, data for this research project were obtained from various types of respondents, through both agency and extra-agency contacts.

Utilizing selected points of contact was a particularly valuable technique for the purposes of this project. Unless the researcher constricts himself, and his findings, to a non-representative group of apprehended persons or those in

a particular treatment clinic (non-representative of the general drug using population,) it is not possible to select a probability sample of respondents. Since the universe, or population, defined as the "aggregate of all of the cases that conform to some designated set of specifications"⁷⁷ is not known, probability sampling techniques cannot be applied. Therefore "the choice is between data that do not permit a statistical assessment of the likelihood of error and no data⁷⁸ at all." Of course this problem is not unique to this particular study. It has confronted most research efforts in the field of deviant behavior. It is stated by Becker in his description of a study based on interviews with fifty marihuana users: "The sample is, of course, in no sense random; it would not be possible to draw a random sample, since no one knows the nature of the universe from which it would have to be drawn."⁷⁹ This does not mean that my sample was selected purely accidentally, dictated only by convenience and economy. Selection was purposive, intended to locate persons and groups whose special experiences or social location made them of particular interest for these research purposes. Further, I hoped to insure greater confidence in the findings by working from a wide range of selected contacts. If all research which was incompatible with statistical assessment had been abandoned, our knowledge in the area of deviant behavior would surely be more sparse than it is today.

Social policy is defined by rule-makers and incorporated into the larger social structure, thus defining situational demands and conditions in terms of which individuals must act, think and feel. When the sociologist decides to study the acts, thoughts, and feelings of those individuals and groups who are confronted and affected by social policy, he must select a method for tapping the subjective experiences of these persons. For my purposes, I selected the "focussed

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interview," as defined by Merton and Kendall, as the method to be employed for tapping this 'subjective reality.' This type of reseach interview was found to be most compatible with my reseach problem, background preparation and initial reseach experiences. Those characteristics which distinguish the "focussed interview" from other types of research interviews have been outlined by Merton and Kendall as follows:

1. Persons interviewed are known to have been involved in a particular concrete situation: they have seen a film; heard a radio program; read a pamphlet, article or book; or have participated in a psychological experiment or in an uncontrolled, but observed, social situation.
2. The hypothetically significant elements, patterns, and total structure of this situation have been previously analyzed by the investigator. Through this content analysis he has arrived at a set of hypotheses concerning the meaning and effects of determinate aspects of the situation.
3. On the basis of this analysis, the investigator has fashioned an interview guide, setting forth the major areas of inquiry and the hypotheses which locate the pertinence of data to be obtained in the interview.
4. The interview itself is focussed on the subjective experiences of persons exposed to the pre-analyzed situation. The array of their reported responses to this situation enables the investigator
 - a) To test the validity of hypotheses derived from content analysis and social psychological theory, and
 - b) To ascertain unanticipated responses to the situation thus giving rise to fresh hypotheses.⁸⁰

Prior to formulating hypotheses I examined the total structure of the situation as well as its 'hypothetically significant elements.' This examination was aided by information obtained from workers in the drug abuse field. The interview guide, intended to locate pertinent data as set forth in the hypotheses, focussed on the subjective experiences of those exposed to the situation. In this regard the focussed interview was particularly advantageous, allowing the interviewer to probe more deeply into individual

attitudes and motives as well as unanticipated responses bearing on specific hypotheses.⁸¹

It is also recognized that the 'meaning' of responses to the situation must be seen in terms of the personal and social context of the respondent if we are to fully understand "the ways in which the stimulus material is imported into the experience world of subjects."⁸² Thus, an examination of socio-economic and subcultural conditions, as well as individual and peer-group drug use patterns and involvements, will aid in our attempt to discover the personal and social contexts within which responses may be understood.

All interviews which focus on past situations and experiences must attempt to overcome 'problems of recollection.' Recollection may be incomplete, non-existent, or distorted by interim attitudes and experiences. However, there are certain characteristics of the subject under study, as well as "certain procedures in the focussed interview which facilitate the accurate report of the initial experience."⁸³ Merton and Kendall define specific procedures which are designed to elicit "retrospective introspection." The interviewer, attempting to link the respondent's 'definition of the situation' to the actual situation as it occurred, may elicit this specificity by utilizing 're-presentation' and 'unstructured question' techniques.⁸⁴ Re-presentation may combine graphic and verbal cues, designed to help the respondent to recall a specific situation and his reaction to it. For my purposes, it was felt that newspaper and magazine accounts depicting the Operation Intercept policy and its intended and alleged effects on the marihuana market during the summer and fall of 1969 would be helpful. Of course, only the most objective accounts of the situation were considered. Also, for the sake of continuity, I decided to rely primarily on verbal cues. In addition, the unstructured question can help to specify the meaning of a response and its relation to a particular aspect of the

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situation. Both 'verbal cue' and 'unstructured question' techniques were only used to aid recall. Every precaution was taken to avoid imposing a structure or definition upon the situation itself.⁸⁵

Interviews led me to believe that the situation under study was so unusual that those involved in the use or distribution of illegal drugs, and those who were professionally involved in the drug abuse problem, had little difficulty recalling these conditions or their reactions to it. In all cases, I needed only to guide the inquiries so as to elicit specific responses to particular dimensions of the situation. Therefore, due to the uniqueness, relevance, and relatively recent occurrence of the situation and events under study, problems of recall were minimal and graphic cues were unnecessary. The interview guide is offered for examination in Appendix III.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I. Operation Intercept: The Policy and the Research Problem

Section A: Operation Intercept: The Policy

1. The full membership of The Special Presidential Task Force, including the department or agency represented by each member, is presented in Appendix I: Members of Special Presidential Task Force.
2. Felix Belair, "Operation Intercept," New York Times, October 2, 1969, p. 49.
3. Felix Belair, "U.S. and Mexican Merchants Score Drive on Marijuana Smuggling," New York Times, September 25, 1969, p. 50.
4. Ibid.
5. "Operation Showboat," Nation, October 13, 1969, p. 365.
6. "Pot: Year of the Famine," Newsweek, September 22, 1969, p. 37.
7. Ibid.
8. Concerning pressures to abandon the Operation Intercept policy, see the comments of Senator Ralph W. Yarborough and Congressman William H. Natcher, addressed to Mr. Ingersoll and President Nixon, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5, No. 43 (October 27, 1969), p. 1463.
9. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, p. 1459.
10. James M. Naughton, "President Moves to Caution Youth About Narcotics," New York Times, March 12, 1970, p. 1.
11. "Marijuana: The Law vs. 12 Million People," Life, October 31, 1969, p. 33.

Section B: Factors and Assumptions Underlying This New Public Policy

12. San Francisco Chronicle, September 14, 1969, p. 1, cited by John Kaplan, Marijuana - The New Prohibition (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 162, 338.
13. Charles Winick, "Marijuana Use by Young People," in Drug Addiction in Youth, ed. by Ernest Harms (New York: Pergamon Press, 1965), p. 19.
14. Ibid.
15. "Pop Drugs: The High as a Way of Life," Time, September 26, 1969, p. 74.
16. "Pot: Safer than Alcohol?", Time, April 19, 1968, p. 52.
17. "Pop Drugs," p. 69.
18. Richard H. Blum, Students and Drugs (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), p. 189, cited by John Kaplan, Marijuana, p. 23.
19. Ibid., p. 189, in Kaplan, p. 23
20. Emily Garfield and Michael Boreing, "Marijuana Use on a Campus" (1969), cited by John Kaplan, Marijuana, p.23.
21. See Juvenile Justice Commission, County of San Mateo, Narcotics Inquiry Report (November 16, 1967), pp. 43-44; Research and Statistics Section, Department of Public Health and Welfare, San Mateo, California, Five Mind Altering Drugs (1969), p. 20; Sanford Feinglass, "Drug Use in a Northern California High School District" (1968), all cited by John Kaplan, Marijuana, p. 24.
22. Donald B. Louria, "Drug Abuse: A Current Assessment," American Family Physician/GP, Vol. 1, No. 6 (June, 1970),p.76.
23. Erich Goode, "The Marijuana Market," Columbia Forum (Winter, 1969), p. 4, citing data from the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll), Special Report on the Attitudes of College Students, No. 48 (Princeton, N.J.: AIPO, June, 1969), p. 30.

24. Erich Goode, The Marijuana Smokers (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1970), p. 3.
25. Winick, "Marijuana Use by Young People," p. 19.
26. James T. Carey, The College Drug Scene (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 204.
27. "Narcotics: New Look," Newsweek, February 9, 1970, p. 24.
28. "Pop Drugs: The High as a Way of Life," p. 74.
29. Ibid., p. 70.
30. "Pot: Year of the Famine," p. 36.
31. "Scarcity, Higher Prices, Crooks: Effects of Crackdown on Drug Trade," U.S. News and World Report, October 13, 1969, p. 50.
32. Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous Drugs Task Force, Report of Special Presidential Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous Drugs (June 6, 1969), p. 25.
33. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
34. Statistics from California concerning arrests for drug law violations are particularly useful for two reasons: "First, California leads all other large states by a wide margin in the completeness and accuracy of its criminal statistics. Most states do not even separate marijuana offenses from those involving other drugs. Second, for a host of reasons, including the concentration there of scholars interested in the problem, marijuana use patterns and the like have been most carefully studied in California." John Kaplan, Marijuana, p.22. The 10,987 juveniles arrested for marihuana violations in 1967, represents an increase of 7,118 such arrests as compared to 1966 (1966 total: 3,869 juveniles arrested for marihuana violations.) See Carey, The College Drug Scene, pp. 44-45. See First Report by the Select Committee on Crime, Marihuana, House Report No. 91-978, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (April 6, 1970), Chart III-A (Juvenile Drug Arrests: 1970-1967), p. 90.
35. Drugs Task Force, Report, pp. 9-11.
36. Ibid., p. 54.

37. President Nixon was well aware of the growing drug problem in middle class neighborhoods during this period. In response to Secretary Finch of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, who had commented on marihuana use in upper class neighborhoods, the President stated: "In other words, it gives a lie to the idea that this is something that simply happens to the poor. It is moving to the upper middle class as well." See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5, No. 43, (October 27, 1969) p. 1466.

Section C: Operation Intercept: Immediate, Intermediate and Ultimate Goals

38. Edward A. Suchman, Evaluative Research (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967), p. 51.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
41. "Operation Showboat," p. 365.
42. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5, No. 43 (October 27, 1969), p. 1459.
43. "Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs: News Briefing by John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5, No. 43 (October 27, 1969), p. 1479.
44. "Scarcity, Higher Prices, Crooks," p. 48.
45. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
46. See Appendix II: Price of Marihuana Before and After Operation Intercept.
47. Barry Farrell, "Marijuana Famine," Life, August 22, 1969, p. 208.
48. "Pot: Year of the Famine," p. 36.
49. "New Awareness Points Toward Softer Marijuana Laws," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXVII, No. 51 (December 19, 1969), p. 2652.

Section D: Purpose of the Study and Applied Theoretical Perspectives

50. Operation Intercept, a calculated series of decisions and actions, may legitimately be viewed as a public policy, as opposed to a routine action or a tactical decision although routine actions and tactical decisions were part of the new policy. See Raymond Bauer, "The Study of Policy Formation: An Introduction," in The Study of Policy Formation, ed. by Raymond Bauer and Kenneth Gergen (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 2.
51. Edwin M. Schur, Crimes Without Victims (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. v.
52. Morris E. Opler, Social Aspects of Technical Assistance in Operation, Tensions and Technology Series, No. 4 (Washington: UNESCO, 1954) p. 67, cited by Suchman, Evaluative Research, p. 49.
53. Suchman, Evaluative Research, p. 126.
54. Robert K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review, Vol. 1, No. 6 (December, 1946), pp. 894-904. Merton points out that in the long history of social thought, the problem of the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action has been treated by Machiavelli, Vico, Adam Smith, Marx, Engels, Wundt, Pareto, Max Weber, Graham Wallas, Cooley, Sorokin, Gini, Chapin, and von Schelting. Ibid., p. 894.
55. Schur, Crimes Without Victims, p. 1.
56. Arnold M. Rose, "Law and the Causation of Social Problems," Social Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 33-43.
57. Bauer, "The Study of Policy Formation: An Introduction," p. 17.
58. Ibid., p. 18.
59. Suchman, Evaluative Research, p. 85.
60. Merton, "Unanticipated Consequences," p. 894.
61. Edwin M. Schur, Law and Society (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 140.

62. Bauer, "Policy Formation, " p. 3.
63. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 10 (March 1897), p. 476.
64. Suchman, Evaluative Research, p. 85.
65. Harold Kalant and Oriana Josseu Kalant, Drugs, Society and Personal Choice, with a Foreword by H. David Archibald (Ontario: General Publishing Co. Limited, 1971), Foreword.
66. The Subcommittee on Evaluation of Mental Health Activities, Community Science Committee, National Advisory Mental Health Council, A Review of the Problem of Evaluating Mental Health Activities (Bethesda, Md.: National Institute of Mental Health, 1954), cited by Suchman, Evaluative Research, p. 75.

Section E: Hypotheses

67. Carey, The College Drug Scene, p. 7.
68. Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1963), pp. 23-24.
69. Erving Goffman, "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient," in Asylums (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961) See also Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963).
70. Edwin Lemert, Social Pathology (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1951), pp. 74-76. See also Edwin Lemert, Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), Chapter 3.
71. Marshall B. Clinard, Sociology of Deviant Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1957), pp. 69-72.
72. Schur, Crimes Without Victims, p. 4. See also Schur, Narcotic Addiction in Britain and America: The Impact of Public Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

73. Carey, p. 180.

Section F: Formulation of the Research Problem and Methodology

74. During the initial problem formulation stage and the subsequent data collection process, a total of approximately two hundred persons were contacted. Of these, 68 persons responded to the full tape recorded interview. The responses of these 68 persons were excerpted for inclusion in the body of this report.

Although the large majority of interviews were conducted with respondents who were directly involved in drug use and/or drug distribution, information was also obtained from persons who, due to their professional responsibilities, were in a position to closely observe drug users and the patterns of their daily activities during this period. These informants, including social workers, therapists, journalists and researchers in the drug abuse field, had gained an intimate knowledge of local drug scenes. It may be said that these persons were in fact compelled, by their occupational role obligations, to assess and work with the consequences of this, and any government drug policy.

Of the 68 interviews used in this study, 17 were conducted with informants who were professionally, rather than personally involved in drug use and drug distribution. Of these 17 informants, 10 were employed by conventional social institutions (i.e. daily newspapers; drug treatment clinics; community centers), while 7 worked for "underground," or anti-establishment media.

Of the 51 drug users and/or distributors interviewed, 19 were younger than 20 years of age; 23 were 20 to 25 years old; and 9 were older than 25 years of age. A total of 42 were white (29 males; 13 females), and 9 were black or Puerto Rican (7 males; 2 females). All of the black and Puerto Rican respondents resided in low income ghetto areas, while all but 2 of the white respondents lived in middle to upper class sections within the New York City area.

75. Carey, The College Drug Scene, p. 204.

76. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961), p. 201.

77. Claire Selltitz et al., Research Methods in Social Relations, (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), p. 509.
78. Ibid., p. 539.
79. Howard S. Becker, "Marihuana: A Sociological Overview," in The Marihuana Papers, ed. by David Solomon (New York: The New American Library, 1968), p. 70.
80. Robert K. Merton and Patricia L. Kendall, "The Focussed Interview," in The Language of Social Research, ed. by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 476-477.
81. Kenneth Gergen, "Methodology in the Study of Policy Formation" in Bauer and Gergen, p. 222.
82. Merton and Kendall, "The Focussed Interview," p. 487.
83. Ibid., p. 482.
84. Ibid., p. 483.
85. Ibid., p. 484.

CHAPTER II

The Multiple Consequences of Operation Intercept

The major findings of this study will be presented in Chapter II. These findings have been consolidated from the responses to each of the aforementioned major areas of inquiry. Excerpts from taped interviews with drug users and drug sellers, as well as drug abuse rehabilitation workers and journalists who closely observed the events of the summer of 1969, in the New York City area will be presented. The findings will be presented in three sections. Section A will focus on the availability of marihuana during the Operation Intercept Era. Section B will be concerned with the range of behavioral reactions to the situation. Section C will explore attitudinal reactions to the situation, and to the underlying public policy.

Section A: The Availability of Marihuana During the Operation Intercept Era

Although the idea of a general marihuana shortage appears to be a valid one, there were probably as many different specific experiences vis a vis the drug market, as there are drug using cliques in New York City. This observation was stated by a twenty-five year old male, full-time marihuana dealer who resides in Manhattan. He receives shipments of fifty pounds of marihuana at a time and has done so for the past year. Although receiving rather substantial shipments on a regular basis, generally from Texas via automobile, he does not consider his business dealings to be particularly atypical:

There's probably hundreds and hundreds of people like me just in Manhattan. Well, maybe not, because at times we've gone out of state to cop ourselves. If there's no grass we'll go get grass whereas most people who deal wait 'till their contact in the city gets grass.

Regarding differences in the marihuana market during the

summer and early fall of 1969, he stated:

Just a little bit. But it's different like for every little group. Like the people that I deal to, if I'm having trouble getting grass there's a certain number of people who will think there's a shortage of grass. I guess there's probably a thousand different cliques like this just in Manhattan. A thousand is very conservative. Must be a few thousand, each one having its own contact. And if their contact doesn't have grass they'll think there's a shortage. And there's a possibility that a certain portion of the city will have a normal supply of grass.

When asked whether he believed there was ever a general shortage of a particular drug in a city or in the nation as a whole, he responded:

I would say that in Manhattan it's never like that. Except two years ago, the summer of two years ago, I would say that there was very little grass in all of Manhattan. Last year, summer, probably a lot of people were out of grass but just as many had their normal supply, depending on who your contact was and what he had. But generally speaking it does get tighter in the summer, every summer.

Apparently, the reputed marihuana shortage had little effect upon his ability to acquire the drug: "I wasn't dealing as heavy then as now, but whatever I wanted I got. It was never more than ten pounds at a time." Although significantly less than the fifty pound shipments he generally receives, the respondent stated that he generally preferred to do less business in the summer months. This was for personal reasons, unrelated to the drug market.

Although this dealer saw the marihuana shortage as a highly localized phenomenon, "depending on who your contact was," very few people took such a casual and particularized view of the situation. All other respondents were at least somewhat aware of a 'general marihuana shortage', although estimations regarding the extent of the shortage varied considerably. Two regular users of marihuana reported no impact at all upon their personal consumptions of marihuana.

A twenty-two year old Manhattan secretary, who has used marihuana for three years and who resides in a New York City suburb with her parents, described the situation for herself and her close friends as follows:

Well last summer I didn't have any problem with grass at all, because we had a lot of homegrown stuff...Last summer people kept telling me they couldn't get any grass. But my group of friends and I really didn't have any trouble at all, because we either bought home-grown stuff from some people that were growing large amounts indoors, in New York, or we got from friends in upstate New York who grew lots of grass on their property. We always had plenty. There was never any problem.

Another respondent who "didn't have any problem" was a twenty-five year old Brooklyn housewife, mother of two, who has used marihuana for six years:

I knew there was a shortage because people were talking about it and I saw things about it on T.V. But my husband always has a large stash so we could smoke as much as ever and that lasted us for the whole summer. The only difference was that we didn't give so much away. Like we wouldn't always offer to people when they came over. We got sort of cheap about it not knowing how long it would last. Also, he didn't sell ounces to friends like he used to. Maybe a couple of nickels all summer.

A nineteen year old female college student was also unaffected, due to her own infrequent pattern of marihuana use:

I've smoked pot for three years but that doesn't really mean anything because I only smoke on rare occasions. If someone has at a party or if we're going to a concert I'll get stoned. If it's there I'll use it, if not I don't care. I've never gone out and bought.

It should be noted that even these respondents, who experienced no personal difficulty, were still aware of an atypical marihuana market.

The remainder of those interviewed all experienced and/or observed some effect of the reported marihuana shortage upon the price and/or availability of the drug. Those

who experienced only a minimal impact included a nineteen year old male college student from Brooklyn, who has used marihuana for two years and occasionally sells:

We were pretty much preoccupied with hash...As far as hash went, we had the best hash we've had in a long time. Some good red Lebanese hash. We had it in any quantity we wanted, at decent prices, for the whole summer...So we didn't want too much grass but whenever we wanted it we were able to score. We found no problem getting it. The people we know always had.

When asked whether marihuana was more expensive than previously, he stated:

Maybe twenty to thirty dollars more a pound. Before the summer it was \$100 to \$110 for a pound. During the summer it was running more around \$140 to \$150 a pound.

Although minimally affected, he was aware of the shortage:

Yes, we knew there was a grass shortage from the papers and from hearing other people talk. We also found we were doing a lot more selling. We never had any problem getting rid of any amount of hash. We weren't looking for profits. Just to make our money back and have some for our heads.

For this student and his friends, the marihuana shortage had little impact. Although slightly more expensive, he found it readily available in Bensonhurst.

Similarly, a resident of lower Manhattan and a staff reporter for a well known East Village underground newspaper, found nothing unusual about the availability or price of marihuana during this period:

Well everyone kept saying it was going to get tight starting last spring, you know, buy your stock for the summer. The psychological impact of Operation Intercept plus there were so many more users, and it was getting to be between harvests and all that shit. But yet I found grass pretty freely available all the way through last summer. Fairly reasonable prices and decent stuff.

However, based on his experience covering drug related stories for several local and underground newspapers, he noted that

he has observed an upward trend in marihuana prices:

Well the price of grass generally went up. You couldn't score a pound of grass for \$95 or \$75 like you used to be able to. So now you've got to double those prices compared to a couple of years before, and you're always getting short weight and everything else, plus there are more young kids into dealing...Pounds were expensive last year in New York. It cost \$150 to \$250 a key during the summer. I consider that pretty expensive. The old days are probably gone forever. So many people want it. Everybody smokes now. There aren't any more closet queens in the grass thing anymore. Everybody turns on any place you go.

In sum, he found average quality marihuana readily available, and noted a general upward trend in prices over the past three years. The summer of 1969 was not unique. Prices during this period were part of a long-term trend. A twenty-one year old student user-dealer from Bayside, Queens observed "a little less smoking drugs around." Like the previous respondent he noted higher prices for marihuana during the summer, but perceived this as part of a long-term price escalation:

You could get it but not in any large quantities. If you wanted enough to deal it was expensive to get. Expensive like if you wanted to get a pound, a couple of years ago you could get it for \$100. Now it is \$200.

Unlike these respondents, the remainder of those interviewed all observed and/or experienced a highly atypical marihuana market during the Operation Intercept era. They all noted both a shortage, making it less available, and higher prices for small and large quantity purchases. Further, they all saw this development as a unique, abnormal, short term situation. The following are quotes from only a few of those who fall into this category. These selected responses are typical of some particular subgroups in the sample. The reader will note that while some respondents emphasize high prices, others found limited availability of the drug to be the key problem factor.

The editor of an underground newspaper, a regular user of marihuana who has intimate knowledge of the lower east side drug scene, noted both short and long term changes in the price and availability of marihuana:

Over the past year and a half marihuana has occasionally been hard to get. You could always get acid...From '65 to early '69 there was never any trouble. There was always more than one person to get from. Last summer and fall it was hard to get. It let up in the late fall. You were lucky to find one good contact. It was really a drought, even the Village Voice was writing articles about it. I once paid as high as \$30 for an ounce. But it stayed, during that period, at least \$20 an ounce unless you bought quantity. I usually like to get a quarter of a pound, but it wasn't around. There was never a shortage like last summer. Right now there's not a large supply around. You can get but you have to check around, more than one source... Also, last summer I got domestic stuff, lower quality. It got you high though. I think more people got into growing it last summer...Also there was more hash around. You'd have to look around more for drugs and what happened is you'd run into hash before you'd run into grass. Usually it was the other way around.

An eighteen year old student, who sells marihuana to finance his college education, described the situation in his Long Island suburban community this way:

There was a lot of pot around the winter before this one. It was about \$100 a pound; \$120 would be a high price. Ounces sold for about \$10. Then in the spring prices started getting higher, \$125 to \$150 a pound, and about \$15 an ounce. In the summer if you got a pound for \$200 you were lucky because there was hardly any around. Where I lived the price of an ounce was \$25 and in the city it was \$40...If anyone knew anything about drugs they would know there wasn't much pot around. People that didn't smoke probably didn't know.

Several other respondents, who were able to obtain marihuana in limited quantities, emphasized the price factor. A twenty-three year old high school art teacher from Queens commented:

Prices were higher last summer. An ounce was \$25, it had previously been \$15 or even \$10. I had grass

because I have good friends from other groups in Manhattan. My friends here were still into grass, but for a group there wasn't much around.

Several other respondents reported that they could obtain marihuana, but noted a sharp increase in its price. As reported by these respondents, during the summer of 1969, the price of marihuana rose from between \$15 and \$20 an ounce to between \$20 and \$30 an ounce. Larger quantities were often unavailable.

Most of those who observed a shortage of marihuana as well as higher prices, emphasized the lack of availability. A social worker at a drug treatment clinic, who has been a close observer of the New York City drug scene for many years, depicted the marihuana market as follows:

You could buy Acapulco gold in April or May of last year at \$100 a pound. It was not hard to get. Ounces of good quality pot were going for \$15 to \$20. In July and August similar quality was going for \$35 to \$40, and it was very hard to get. Even if people were willing to pay \$40 it was hard to get. You could buy it in ounces but it was just about impossible to buy it in bulk.

Most respondents expressed similar observations, emphasizing that prices were high, "if you could get it." One of these respondents, a twenty-six year old businessman from Queens stated: "If I got any it was expensive, like \$40 an ounce. And that's all you could have gotten was an ounce." A nineteen year old student from Brooklyn stated:

Whereas we'd pay \$20 an ounce before, usually we'd get it in larger quantities than ounces anyway, but if we did buy ounces \$20 was the most we'd pay. In the summer it was \$30 or \$35 if you could get it...We wasted a lot of time looking and then just couldn't get.

Another respondent who observed a "very tight market" was a twenty-seven year old stock broker, and part-time marihuana dealer. He emphasized the poor quality of the marihuana which was available:

Nobody was able to get any. I know various sources that could get some grass but the quality was very poor, and I don't smoke poor grass...The price really didn't matter. I wasn't going to smoke or sell poor grass no matter what the price.

Unlike those respondents already quoted, many regular users of marihuana were unable to get any marihuana at all during this period. These respondents reported that they were unable to obtain marihuana for at least a month at a time, and several reported longer stretches, a few such periods lasting the whole summer. Reporting whatever marihuana around was expensive, a twenty-one year old college senior spoke of the scarcity of marihuana among her friends in Jackson Heights, Queens:

I remember it was hard to get and we didn't have pot for a long time. Most of the time we didn't have it. And it was just too expensive. On rare occasions we would be able to get some.

A twenty-four year old school teacher from Queens summarized the situation among his friends during the summer: "There was very little use of marihuana because we didn't have any." A twenty-three year old unemployed artist from Whitestone, Queens reported:

At times it was impossible. There just wasn't any pot. There must have been some somewhere, but I couldn't find any. There wasn't any price for it. There just wasn't any.

A twenty-seven year old black bartender in East Harlem underscored this point: "I've seen it tight before, but never like this. There was absolutely no smoke around last summer."

A forty-three year old commodity trader, who uses marihuana regularly with his wife and friends in a Westchester community stated:

I had a supply so it was cool. But I was very aware of the shortage because all kinds of straight commodity traders came to me, guys in their thirties and forties, guys I never expected, even relatives came to me to see

if I could get...These people all have money and are willing to pay a lot, some said they pay \$40 an ounce and at times in the summer they still couldn't get.

This willingness and ability to pay high prices contrasts with the attitude of a sixteen year old Brooklyn youth who stated:

I buy it with friends. A lot of times we don't have much money. So when it got too expensive I couldn't get any...Like, I like to buy a pound with some friends and sell ounces. Then I get free smoke. But the price was too high even if there was some around.

Black and Puerto Rican youths from the East Bronx reported that marihuana was unavailable in their neighborhood during the summer. Further, they were no longer able to buy it in Harlem, an alternative that had been used in the past. One respondent, a seventeen year old black high school student who had used marihuana for two years stated:

Smoke ran out. Like all of the people we used to cop from said that all of a sudden things were getting hard. They couldn't cop. You know, they couldn't get anything, and everywhere we went it was the same story all over.

His friend, an eighteen year old unemployed black who had used marihuana for three years, underscored this point:

"We couldn't cop from the person we were copping from anymore and like other people ran out and nobody had anything." An eighteen year old black college student who had used marihuana for only seven months prior to the summer of 1969 stated:

"Grass cut out. Like I would get off my job and we would go to this chick's house to score some smoke and we couldn't."

Another resident of the East Bronx, a seventeen year old Puerto Rican male, presently suspended from high school reported:

You heard about it down in Harlem or someplace else, always away from here, and then there wasn't nothin'...By the time you got there, there was nothin' left. Like the papers might have called it a shortage but down here it was a panic.

Summary

Experiences relating to the marihuana supply during this period fell into four general categories:

1. No shortage/no higher prices: Although aware of a marihuana shortage, via word of mouth or the mass media, these marihuana users were not personally affected by the situation. They can be classified in the following three sub-categories:

- a. Those who had access to an adequate supply of domestically grown marihuana. Although several respondents reported that they knew of others, usually in the Southern, midwestern and southwestern sections of the United States, who 'grew their own', few respondents had access to an adequate supply for regular use during this period. Several others, who did experience a personal shortage, supplemented their supply with domestically grown marihuana, which was usually characterized to be of inferior quality.
- b. Those whose supply was large enough to last through the summer and early fall of 1969, so that purchases during this period were unnecessary. Again, this situation was atypical since most marihuana users do not purchase enough at any one time to last for four or five months. One housewife, who reported an adequate 'stash', also reported that her husband curtailed his part-time dealing during this period. Other dealers, who operate on a larger scale, reported that business was effected by the lessened availability and increased price of marihuana, even though they possessed enough marihuana for personal consumption during this period.
- c. Those who use marihuana so infrequently, usually as a means of sociability, that a two, three or four month lay-off went unnoticed. Four such persons were

interviewed, three of them females. Characteristically, these sporadic users enjoy using marihuana, and will usually do so when it is available, but do not personally purchase it or seek it out. Some seem to identify with the drug scene while others do not. However, this type of sporadic user does not represent all 'experimenters', as many infrequent users were greatly effected by the marihuana shortage.

2. No shortage/higher prices: These persons were able to maintain their regular intake of marihuana, although the price of the activity increased.. All respondents in this category used marihuana regularly (at least four times a week) and had access to several sources. Further, all identified with the drug scene and had sold marihuana at some time. Within this category two sub-groups can be identified, although they cannot be distinguished according to any social characteristics:

- a. Those who perceived the price increase as part of a long-term evolutionary trend, emphasizing the increased demand for marihuana.
- b. Those who perceived the price increase as a unique short-term situation, emphasizing seasonal variables and the restricted supply of marihuana.

3. Shortage/higher prices: The majority of respondents experienced and/or observed both the increasing price and decreasing availability of marihuana during this period. These respondents came from a wide range of locations and socio-economic groups within the New York City vicinity, and represented various stages of involvement in drug use subcultures. This was found to be the most typical situation among marihuana users in New York City.

Although all respondents in this category experienced a highly atypical marihuana market, responses can be divided into the following sub-categories:

- a. Those who stressed the high price of marihuana.
- b. Those who emphasized the difficulty of obtaining marihuana.

Generally, those who stressed the difficulty of obtaining marihuana were older, had greater financial resources and were less involved in the drug scene than those who emphasized high prices.

4. Shortage/generally could not obtain marihuana during this period: Many respondents reported that they personally could not obtain any marihuana for continuous time periods of at least one month. All but a few recalled that they had never previously experienced this type of situation.

Although they represented various geographical locations and socio-economic groups in the New York City area, this situation appears to have been particularly common among two distinct types of marihuana users:

- a. Middle and upper-middle class white businessmen, professionals, and others in 'respectable' occupational and community positions, whose only tie to a drug subculture existed of one or two personal contacts from whom they previously purchased marihuana.
- b. Young, black and Puerto Rican users of marihuana, who were students, unemployed or marginally employed, and resided in low income ghetto areas.

Observations and interviews during and following the Operation Intercept period have confirmed the conclusion that there was, in fact, a severe marihuana shortage in New York City during the summer and early fall of 1969. Although a general shortage was evident, the extent of the shortage for various groups and individuals was not found to be constant, suggesting the highly differentiated and uncontrolled nature of the marihuana market. In the next section I will examine

the reactions of various groups and individuals to this situation, focusing on the use and availability of drugs other than marihuana.

Section B: Behavioral Reactions to the General Marihuana Shortage

The stated objective of Operation Intercept was to curtail the supply of marihuana, which, according to the government's logic, would cause drastic increases in its price, thus forcing millions of marihuana users to abstain from illegal drug consumption. This report is intended to document and analyze the range of behavioral reactions to this single public policy decision, the unintended as well as the intended effects.

The following are excerpts from selected interviews. These passages were selected for this section for several purposes. First, it is believed that an analysis of behavioral consequences should be grounded in the observations of the respondents, as stated by the respondents. Second, as it turned out, behavioral responses tended to reflect the varying circumstances and conditions which developed among drug users in various age, socio-economic and neighborhood groups in New York City. Such responses also reflected the degree of drug involvement among these groups prior to the shortage. Therefore, the selections are intended to document this range of behavioral reactions. The third reason for this selection is derived from the second. Since respondents with similar social backgrounds tended to respond to the situation in a similar manner, presenting the comments of all of the respondents would become quite repititious. As stated, the purpose of this report is to document the full range of intended and unintended consequences of Operation Intercept, without pretending to assess the statistical occurrence of any one reaction.

Subsection 1: Abstaining

It was seen that a general marihuana shortage was

evident in the New York City area during the summer and early fall of 1969. If the government's prognosis was accurate, we would have expected to observe a general decrease in drug use during this period. Ideally, the policy aimed at complete abstention by a significant proportion of drug users. Thus, both abstention and decreased use can be characterized as intended consequences of the Operation Intercept policy.

Throughout eight months of observations and interviews, few users of marihuana were found who reported that they had completely abstained from drug use during this period. Actually, since these respondents were very infrequent users prior to the shortage, 'abstain' would be an inappropriate term. In fact, they all used marihuana so infrequently and were so uninvolved in the drug scene, that these were the only persons interviewed who were unsure as to the specific period of time in which it was unavailable.

However, several respondents reported that their own use of drugs decreased, and others reported observing friends or acquaintances whose drug use was minimized or temporarily discontinued.

A twenty-seven year old businessman who had difficulty obtaining marihuana during this period described his less frequent use of marihuana this way: "Well, when I didn't have it, I didn't smoke it...Yes, sometimes my friends and I just didn't have any." He went on to say that none of his friends, predominately middle-class white collar businessmen and their wives, ever used drugs other than marihuana and hashish. He stated that they did use hashish more often than in the past, and that it was more available than it had been, but that in general drug use had declined in this group. He emphatically stated that other drugs were not considered: "None of them will use any substitutes that I know of except hash."

Two other respondents, a twenty-four year old housewife and a twenty-seven year old stockbroker, described their decreased use of drugs. She stated: "Well, it's simple. We didn't have much grass to smoke so we smoked much less." He reported that although he was not forced to abstain, his drug use pattern was altered:

I had, I always have a limited amount on hand, just in case these things do happen. I had a minimal amount. I mean I couldn't smoke as much as I wanted to, but just a few times a week with friends. It's not a question of needing it, it's just a question of not being able to get it.

However, it must be noted that although both respondents reported less drug use generally, each referred to the greater use and availability of hashish during this period.

All other accounts of abstaining came only from outside sources, who were either not personally involved in drug use or who did not personally abstain. A writer for an underground newspaper observed:

I know a lot of people whose personalities seemed to suffer. They were anxious and would get pissed off very easily. I think this was because there wasn't any grass around.

After noting the increased use of amphetamines and barbiturates in her upper Manhattan neighborhood, a secretary at a drug rehabilitation center commented on abstainers: "I'm sure there must have been some but I didn't see any." A more definitive response was offered by a social worker employed by a lower Manhattan drug rehabilitation clinic. Although he did not observe much abstinence among out-patients at the clinic or their peers, he did observe this mode of response by middle-aged businessmen and professionals in his upper-middle class Manhattan neighborhood:

Many people did abstain. They would look for it but if they found it, good. If they didn't, they didn't bother to shift onto anything else. Possibly some more drinking did take place, alcohol, but I'm not sure.

Apparently, abstaining from all drug use was a highly atypical reaction to the marihuana shortage. Although less marihuana use was reported by many drug users and observers of the drug scene, most of these went on to note an increased availability and use of drugs other than marihuana. Those who did report a personal decline in drug use were distinguished by certain identifiable characteristics which can be categorized as follows:

1. Middle-class and upper middle-class white collar workers and their wives, between the ages of twenty-four and fifty-five, who previously used marihuana on a regular basis (several times a week), but who had little identification with a drug subculture, a counter-culture movement, or a drug oriented way of life. Prior to the shortage, these respondents had never used any illegally obtained drug other than marihuana or hashish.

2. Very infrequent users of marihuana who might have gone several months without using it, even if the shortage had never developed. These were white, middle-class people, over twenty years of age, involved in white collar employment or educational endeavors. As in the former group, these respondents had never used any illegally obtained drug other than marihuana or hashish prior to the shortage.

In sum, the stated objectives of Operation Intercept were realized ~~only among~~ a very limited segment of drug users in the New York City area. Further, these marihuana users are distinguished by certain objective and subjective characteristics, which, taken as a whole, make them unrepresentative of the general drug using population. These factors include serious involvements in respectable social institutions; lack of identification with a drug subculture; an average age above twenty years old; and rare involvement in multiple drug use experimentation.

Subsection 2: Switching: The Availability and Use of
Drugs Other Than Marihuana

As stated previously, the official objectives of Operation Intercept were to curtail marihuana consumption, as well as general illegal drug use in the population. The Presidential Task Force did not state the expectation that a drastically decreased supply of marihuana would increase the use of other illegal or illegally obtained drugs, or that it would lead the growing drug consuming population to greater involvement in drug distribution. Assuming that these stated goals realistically reflected the government's intentions and assessments, all behavioral reactions and drug use modalities other than abstention or decreased usage may be termed unintended consequences of that public policy decision.

It was found that although a general marihuana shortage materialized, the stated objectives of Operation Intercept were realized among only a very limited proportion of drug users. Further, these abstainers were found to be quite unrepresentative of the general drug using population of the area. Far more common was the observation, among drug users, suppliers, and close observers of the drug scene alike, that this period was characterized by a drastic increase in the availability and use of drugs other than marihuana. Although some respondents simply noted this change, most perceived a causal relationship between the limited supply of marihuana, and accentuated involvement in drug distribution, multiple drug use and/or the use of other illegally obtained drugs. This development will now be explored.

The most general result of the marihuana shortage was the increased availability and use of hashish. This means that increased hashish usage was reported in more neighborhoods, and by a wider range of marihuana users,

than was any other single reaction to the shortage. This does not mean that those groups and individuals who reported more hashish usage did not also partake of other illegal, or illegally obtained drugs, some of which were used for the first time. In the following excerpts, there are references to barbiturates, amphetamine stimulants, cocaine, the psychedelics, and heroin (an opiate). Nearly all of the groups and individuals who reported an increased use of hashish during this period, also referred to an increase in the use and availability of drugs that fall into these other categories. In fact, most of the respondents emphasized the use of these other drugs, and minimized the importance of increased hashish consumption in their neighborhoods.

The increased availability and use of hashish was even noted by several respondents who had reported a decline in over-all drug consumption during this period. As might be expected based on earlier findings, these respondents were the same persons who fell into the categories used to define those types of individuals who minimized their drug intake during the shortage. They were generally older than most marihuana users; were middle and upper-middle class persons engaged in white collar occupations; and used marihuana regularly but identified with establishment institutions rather than a drug subculture. The comments of a twenty-six year old salesman from Howard Beach, Queens, were typical of this type of marihuana user:

Yes, there was more hash around. We used it more than usual. Whichever we could obtain. At that time hash was much more obtainable. Hash was just about all you could get in the summer. And it was expensive too...Around eighty to ninety dollars an ounce. I smoked what I got, hash or grass...No, even today, in my circles I don't know any people who use speed or LSD or heroin or other pills and things like that.

When asked what he thought the reaction would be among his friends and associates if another shortage developed, his

answer was somewhat less conservative than his past actions would lead one to expect:

I think that this time there would be more dependence on other drugs as opposed to last summer. Much more drugs. It seems to me that other drugs are coming into play more than they were. Each year they're increasing tremendously, sort of spiralling. Like the mild hallucinatories. I don't know if I'd particularly like that type of head. I like the pot head. It's a relaxed type of head. You can groove on music. But, if there was no grass around, I might try them.

The behavioral reaction of this type of marihuana user cannot be easily characterized as a success or a failure for the Operation Intercept policy. On the one hand, over-all drug consumption was decreased by the policy enforced shortage. On the other hand, the use of hashish increased and the total situation seems to have been one factor in the consideration of using other drugs in the future. Whether we consider this kind of two sided result as beneficial or detrimental in terms of the long-range effort to curtail drug abuse, the fact is that this sort of very conservative attitude toward drug use was found to be so unrepresentative of the behavior and attitudes manifested in the general drug using population, that the answer to this question does not appear to be of pressing importance. Suffice it to say that even for some of those persons who experienced less drug use during this period, the policy cannot claim unmitigated success.

The overwhelming majority of respondents, including drug users, drug suppliers and observers of the drug scene, characterized the summer and early fall of 1969 as a period of heavy multiple drug use and unprecedented experimentation. Further, many observed a widespread and rapid proliferation of drug distribution involvements, and the adaptation of established drug distributors to the marihuana scarcity. The following excerpts concerning the availability and use

of drugs other than marihuana during the period in question, reflect adaptive behaviors among drug users which were unambiguously antithetical to the stated goals of the Operation Intercept policy.

A twenty year old taxi driver described the range of drugs used by his companions in a middle-class residential Queens community during the summer:

Before the summer it was mostly grass. I guess we had tried everything, except heroin, but just on occasions. As I said, it was mostly smoking...Smoke was scarce and prices were high on whatever we heard could be gotten. We didn't bother much with that but instead we did some other drugs. Mostly downs and some tripping too. I tripped about ten times, at least, in the summer...Mostly we had Seconals, a hundred for \$20, about five for a dollar. A few times we got Tuinals at about four for a dollar. There were a lot more downs around during the summer...It came in spurts. We did whatever we got. We might do it four, five, six times a week for a couple of weeks. Then we would trip a little. Then some speed would be around and we'd do that some. Then some more downs. Whatever is around...Trips were always an occasional thing, but sometimes in the summer we'd do it often, like one day after the other...They always seemed to be readily available...Always somewhere around three or four dollars a trip. Sometimes they were cheaper...People took speed about as much during the summer as before...When there wasn't grass around we smoked a lot of hash. Hash seemed to be around a lot more than usual...Now it's mostly grass again but we do downs more than before the summer. A lot of the girls I know seem to like them. Well, if it was very scarce again a good many of them would just use something else. People I know would still want to get high and they would do whatever they could get. Drinking might be one thing but from what I've seen it tends more toward other kinds of drugs. I'd probably see if there was some speed or downs around, or hash hopefully, if there was another shortage.

Although barbiturates, referred to as 'downs', had the most important long-range consequences in this neighborhood, drug use during the summer was largely determined by availability, or "whatever is around."

A college student from Brooklyn, who had spent the summer of 1969 traveling in Europe, pointed to the changed drug use patterns which she observed upon returning to her middle-class neighborhood. She also noted the effect of the shortage upon some fellow travelers:

Before the summer I had only used marihuana and hashish. Some people used ups, but not much, and some used mescaline once in awhile...Pot was always easy to get at about \$20 an ounce. I usually got half an ounce for \$10...I was in Europe during July and August so I really don't know about the drug situation here during that time, except that my friends said it was hard to get grass. It was getting harder in June, but I wasn't into it then, because I was thinking about leaving...In Europe I noticed hashish being used. There wasn't any pot...I really didn't talk about it much there because I wasn't into it. But I met some kids who were sending back hash or who were going to try to bring it back. It was clear that they'd get a lot of money for it because there wasn't any grass in the city. Many people I met seemed to be interested in doing this...Yes, Americans...One friend of mine, a guy, did it. He must have gotten through customs O.K. He had it when he got back to the States. He sold most of it but kept some. Grass was still hard to get. He told me he had a free summer vacation...Things had definitely changed around here when I got back. There was absolutely no grass around. In fact, I was very surprised because people who had never tripped acid before were tripping regularly. And there was a great deal of speed around and lots and lots of downs. There were no other drugs to take so that's what people were taking...Sure I asked around. There was some hash and we smoked whatever we could get and then we popped pills...Seconals, Tuinals, ups, speed...I don't know what the ups were. I tripped acid for the first time...They were doing drugs to a greater extent than I wanted to. All my friends were into drugs really heavy in the fall...They said it was because there was nothing around in the summer except pills. There was no grass and not so much hash and if you found it, it was expensive. Downs and ups were around before the summer, but nobody used them because there was plenty of grass and it was all good...I mean downs never interested me and speed and acid always scared me, so I never did them as long as I had grass...I resisted for awhile but then there was just nothing else...Once grass came back pills just sort of faded away. Occasionally some people take downs

but it is not as prevalent as it was when there was nothing else...I'm not sure what would happen if there were no grass again. I guess they'd go back to taking downs and ups and more mescaline. I really don't know what we'd do. We certainly won't just be straight for whatever period the grass stops. They're used to, I'm used to being stoned, occasionally and more than occasionally.

A college student from Bensonhurst, Brooklyn, emphasized the increased use of hashish and mescaline by his group of friends during the summer:

I was in Brooklyn this past summer...As far as hash went, we had the best hash that we've had in a long time, good red Lebanese hash. We had it in any quantity we wanted, at decent prices, for the whole summer. We were pretty much preoccupied with the hash so we didn't want too much grass...I couldn't say if there was more hash around than before because the previous year we only looked for grass. Now, hash is the predominant drug...Over the summer, that's when my friends and I started tripping pretty heavily...We weren't looking much for LSD. We looked mostly for mescaline. Some girl got into mescaline so we came into it almost whenever we wanted. We also had a pretty good supply of THC around...Yes, I had tried these drugs before the summer but I used them more during the summer. A lot more...We really didn't hear much about ups and downs around during the summer. We were happy with our hash and mescaline so we wouldn't know really...I've used downs and I've used speed, methamphetamine twice. I couldn't see myself living on them. I don't like the idea of a pill to go to sleep and another to wake you up everyday...Yes, we knew there was a grass shortage from the papers, and from hearing other people talk. We also found out we were doing a lot more selling. There was never any problem getting rid of any amount of hash. We weren't looking for profits, just to make our money back and have some for our heads. We got into selling for a few reasons. We had a lot of money over the summer. Three of us got together and since we were working we always had money. Also people were always looking for smoke during the summer and were paying good prices. Another important thing was that one of my friends had an open house for the whole summer so it was sort of a little easier.

A twenty-two year old school teacher from Queens, emphasized the increased use and availability of hashish and barbiturates in her neighborhood:

People are using stuff a lot less now compared to last summer. They are not taking any harder stuff like acid or downs. Now they're just smoking. Every once in a while they'll take a couple of ups or downs but nothing much...It was heaviest last summer...We used some downs and speed during the summer. I took mescaline once. My friends speed a lot. Well, one was taking it every day, almost. But I only took it a few times. I took downs more...I don't know if there were more downs around in the summer because I wasn't in contact with them before. I first got to know about them during the summer. People just had them. They said try it, so I did. They were good...Hash was around. I guess we smoked every night. It was a big thing if we didn't smoke for a night. Once or twice we got grass. Otherwise it was hash...Yeah, we knew there was a pot shortage. It was on T.V. and everything. And we couldn't get it. But it didn't make any difference because there was so much hash around...You get together and you want to get high so you'll find something to use. Getting high is something to do when everyone gets together and there's nothing else to do. It's cheap. Even watching T.V. is more fun if you're stoned...You should have interviewed my brother because he made a fortune last summer selling hash...He's seventeen...He was selling hash all summer. If my father knew he'd have murdered him.. My father is a policeman...My brother was getting it from his friends and then selling it in smaller amounts...No, he was never into selling before the summer. He did it because it was available to him, people wanted it and he needed an easy way to make money...I remember seeing Walter Cronkite on T.V. talking about the shortage. My brother and I were stoned out of our heads. We were stoned everyday, the shortage didn't make any difference, and there was Walter Cronkite talking about it. We cracked up...I think people tend to take more drugs in the summer. Especially teachers and college kids. They're not working and they have nothing to do in the summer.

A researcher at a drug rehabilitation clinic discussed the increased use of what he called the 'chemical drugs'. He was referring to the drug use behavior of students and young white collar workers residing in Manhattan:

During this past year, I've noticed basically that people who aren't on the hard drugs, you know, dope fiends or heroin users, people who are basically considered 'heads', use soft drugs, things like marihuana and stuff like that. I've seen perpetual

growth into things like chemicals. I've seen a big use of mescaline. Things like LSD have dwindled because of the publicity and most people are afraid of them, especially now because they don't know what kind of shit they are getting. Mostly I've seen a rise in the chemical use of things like mescaline and THC...Last year it wasn't chemicals. Last year it was basically grass, just marihuana and hashish. Recently I've noticed these people aren't into smoking as much as they are interested in taking a condensed form like THC and especially mescaline. They also have started on this aphrodisiac that came in. It's Korean incense, a spice, and it is sold in pills or capsules. It's legal and it's supposedly an aphrodisiac. They got into that for a while but it didn't last long. Now they're into mescaline again. These people don't want to take LSD. They'd rather take THC, mescaline or STP...Pot wasn't that accessible last year. That's why I've noticed a growth in chemicals...That was in the late springtime, early summer. In the winter most of my friends had an ample supply of grass. Whether they stored up for that I don't know, but they did have enough grass and hash. It was springtime, perhaps, when they started using it all up, that they started into the chemicals. And then there was a large turnover among my student friends to using LSD, speed, mescaline... It was terribly hard to get grass during the summer. I was approached a number of times on the streets, three times I think, which was quite a shock, you know, to be approached by someone who mumbles "you want grass?" It was really wild. That never happened before. I would never buy from someone off the streets. They might cut it with oregano or something like that... People I was in contact with didn't stop using drugs. No, that's when they started going to the chemicals. A lot of mescaline was used...They might have tried chemicals anyway. I can't say they wouldn't have used them even if grass was accessible, but not to the extent they did, like going on seventeen trips using LSD and mescaline...Snappers became popular during that period, amyl nitrite. It's for ~~asthmatic~~ and heart patients. It's a stimulant and makes the heart beat faster and they really got into that during the shortage. In other words, they smoked, but they wouldn't smoke that much because there was a shortage, so to get more of a head, they would snap these things. And then there was a great use of amyl nitrite, snappers, or poppers... I think this changing drugs basically is conscious. I think it is out of necessity. They want the head, they think it is pleasurable and so they go on to something else...I don't know if these chemicals became more available when grass was less available. I would

say that they became more appealing, so you would search out LSD, mescaline or stuff like that. I think it's always been around, but if there were some graph made of the sale, the gross product or sales, you'd notice marihuana wasn't used that much. Whether it wasn't accessible or it was too expensive, that was a fact, there wasn't enough. You'd see that it sort of separates in that the chemical drug use increased... From what I saw, the person who was previously getting the marihuana, that same person began getting and selling the chemicals...Remember what books were being published last year? Books on how to grow your own grass. A lot of people got into that and they are still doing it because there is still that fear. There is a rumor that grass is going to be terribly unavailable and even pills will be unavailable. So people are growing their own grass. I think it was Joe Rasso who put out a little pamphlet and lots of others too. It's sort of died out. I think there was a big influx of grass recently but there is a threat that it will be cut down again next summer...I think a lot of people would try to get jobs down by the Mexican border... I think the same thing would happen, lots of people are growing their own. Five of my friends, heavy smokers who really enjoy smoking are doing it. One chick has three garden boxes filled. Another is growing it on his fire escape in midtown. Another friend, a bio teacher is growing a whole patch of it in school... I think they are doing it as a fun thing to do. But also with the knowledge that there might be that shortage again in the summer. One friend has just bought ten mescaline and ten acid tabs. He's getting ready for the summer. Another, a lawyer, who has this beautiful hash, has stopped using it. It's in this little box, Pandora's box, only to be opened on great occasions.

A middle-aged commodity trader from an affluent Westchester community, who had previously used marihuana with only a very small group of friends, noted a heretofore undiscovered consequence of the marihuana shortage:

I was very aware of the shortage because all kinds of straight commodity traders came to me, guys in their thirties and forties, guys I never expected, even relatives came to me to see if I could get. Not freaks. All kinds of people were sort of driven out into the open...Actually, I greatly expanded my range of friends. Now as a direct result of Operation Intercept, we get Jamaican, Peruvian and North African pot as well...All these different people, previously unconnected, have

pooled their resources...The younger ones unfortunately will go on to stronger drugs while people my age return to booze. That's what was happening last summer...Basically, I look at it as a market phenomenon. Demand is always met. It's impossible to turn off the supply of any product which is in demand. It is an economic fact, as seen in Prohibition. If drugs are more satisfactory than booze to younger people, drugs will be available to them.

A writer for an underground publication, who published several articles on the summer drug scene on the lower east side, emphasized the use of psychedelic drugs, hashish and heroin, altered patterns of marihuana distribution, and attempted to distinguish between those who are likely to switch from marihuana to other drugs and those who are not:

I think the government does want to stop grass from coming into the States but I think it's a mistake because you get a lot of kids now going on to other drugs...Well, I saw more kids O.D.-ing, 'cause they'll take anything now. Anything they can get their hands on. Any kind of dope...There's a lot of acid around for example. A lot of people are taking acid again. There was a time that people weren't; acid use went down a lot. People got a little uptight about it. But now, since last winter, they have really good acid. Pure, good, cheap acid at fifty cents a tab for sunshine, and now there's even better acid called quicksilver that's coming in. Kids are taking a lot of acid and using it more often, especially when there is very little speed in it like the kind I've had recently. People thought they were getting pure acid a year or two ago, but when you compare it to the acid you get now, you know somebody put some shit in that old acid... Well, the prices of grass generally went up. You couldn't score a pound of grass for \$95 or \$75 like you used to be able to. So now you've got to double those prices compared to a couple of years ago, and you're always getting short weight and everything else, plus there are more young kids into dealing. When I say dealing, they're not necessarily into it for a profit, but they're into it to pay for their own or just to score a key and split it up with all their friends. If you don't have the \$250 yourself, you get a bunch of people together and you go score it. With weight you have much closer control over the grass you're getting instead of buying an ounce off the street or something...If you have the bread, sure

you buy more when its scarce. If you don't have the bread then you just have to buy ounces. In times of shortage there's going to be more ounce dealing because there's not much weight around. When it is around they buy bigger. Nobody pays much attention to the fact that dope is illegal. But now, at this particular time, there is very little grass. People are smoking a lot of hash. In London it's just all hash. There it is \$25 an ounce and here it is \$75 an ounce. You can trade an ounce of grass for an ounce of hash no sweat at all in Europe. And it is getting to that point here. Hash is getting cheaper because people are bringing in more. It's more profitable and it doesn't take up as much space...There was, and is certainly more smack available. Correlations are very hard to make because it's a very diverse society. Generalizations are easy to make. You could always say that the shortage of grass was reflected in the number of deaths from smack. In New York alone it was like double last summer than the year before and this year it's climbing also. It's easy to say that just because there's no grass people are taking smack. I don't know if that applies to a large number of people. There are more weekend junkies than there ever were. Those are people who snort smack on a Saturday night, assuming that they can get away with it and are not yet addicted. I knew a few but I know more now...There are a lot of people who can't score. Like office workers who don't know where to go. When there is alot of grass around it's everywhere so they get some too, because somehow, at parties or somewhere, someone's got a bag to sell them. But how they score when things are tight I don't know. People are beginning to feel it's not that big a part of their lives too. I mean, that when the realization comes that there's a grass shortage at first everyone goes through this whole thing, shit I need some dope, you know. And then they find that they don't really need it, it's just nice to have. And when you don't have it you just don't get uptight about it. But there are a lot of people who, and I think that's misusing grass, just want to get stoned all the time. When there's no grass around these people just go on to other drugs...Like the younger kids who haven't smoked that long but who sort of grew up on drugs... I see that at parties and just watching the kids around. The latest thing was pink mescaline, synthetic mescaline. The kids were taking it. I don't know if it's mescaline. They don't know if it's mescaline, it's just what somebody told them when he sold it to them for a buck a tab...Sure, they're always taking drugs without knowing what it is. They're adopers'.

A twenty three year old teacher from Queens depicted the wide range of reactions in his middle-class suburban neighborhood during and following the summer shortage:

I didn't know any people who stopped using drugs during the shortage. Yes, there were a couple of exceptions. People who would take nothing rather than an up, down or a trip. They were older people, all over twenty five, and they went back to liquor, where they came from. When there was coke around, during the shortage, for the most part these people tried it but it was still hard to get a hold of and expensive... There was more hash than grass around last summer and these people used more of it. But they consider hash and grass the same thing and wouldn't consider that a switch... Most of the younger group, younger than me, between seventeen and twenty two, my brother's age group, were strictly on grass and hash. Last summer when there was a decline in grass they mostly went over to ups and downs... I don't know for sure what they cost, but they were very, very cheap. This younger group would get like a hundred very cheaply and give them away. That's why a lot of people were O.D.-ing last summer... Eventually this younger group started using hard drugs. It happened like this. This younger group was on grass and hash very heavy, like smoking every day, and all of a sudden they couldn't get any. So they went over to downs mostly, and then they got tired of downs and they went right into heroin. Heroin was more available than grass last summer in Bayside. It was all around the neighborhood. As I said, it was more available than grass... They shot it, skin popped and mainlined... In my group, mostly people twenty two to twenty seven, most people, in fact I'd say all of them, during the shortage they started tripping. A couple of them had tripped before but it wasn't a group thing or a regular thing. During the summer we would trip to get high. It was easier to get mescaline or acid than grass for awhile... The people who switched over to heroin stayed on heroin for the most part. Those people who were on ups and downs through the summer came back to grass and the people who were tripping also came back to grass. They might still trip or speed once in awhile but not like before when you wanted to get high you tripped instead of smoking. But the people who started with heroin are still doing it now. The others are using marihuana for the most part.

A twenty one year old student-marihuana dealer from a suburban Queens community claimed that he knew no one who abstained from drug use during the summer, and that he knew of no one in his age group, either in college (Michigan) or in his neighborhood who didn't use drugs. He could not imagine circumstances in which he would have to use drugs he didn't favor. Referring to the summer shortage of both marihuana and hashish in his neighborhood, he stated:

The people I was with didn't have to stop using drugs. They can always get enough just to stay high. Like myself, if there were no smoking drugs I wouldn't start taking things like downs. I don't dig 'em. I knew I could always get something to smoke. But I know a lot of people who if they couldn't get things to smoke would take other drugs...There was more downs and speed around in the summer. A lot of the younger kids took downs and heroin. Actually, during the last two years definitely more people were taking harder narcotics like heroin, coke, or anything they can get their hands on. And last summer lots of young people started to take heroin.

An eighteen year old drug dealer from an affluent Long Island community described the drug use patterns in his community and his own increased involvement in drug distribution during this period:

About a year ago everybody was doing just pot. There was a lot of pot around. There were no hard drugs or pills or anything. Coming into the summertime, I was dealing already. Things were starting to get dry for smoke, grass and hash, so I started dealing other drugs like ESD, and ups, and downs, and speed. And my friends started turning to other drugs. They started tripping and speeding. Nobody I knew at that time went to dope...Now I know a lot of people who do dope, and not too many people who do only grass, and nobody who trips. They're mostly doing hard drugs or only soft drugs. It's like a big split in the middle...Some people do barbiturates but it's a very small minority. Most people do smoke or hard drugs, dope...There seemed to be an abnormal quantity of hash around in the summer, much more than normal. But the price of that was still high because it was very good

quality stuff. It was \$80 to \$85 an ounce. That past winter it would normally be \$80 an ounce... It wasn't that much higher, but people didn't really want hash. It's too much of a hassle. They like to smoke in the car and you can carry joints anywhere. Not a pipe! It's easier to get busted for hash. Grass is easier to handle...Yes, I dealt hash during the summer that was the only smoke I dealt. I sold mostly quarter ounces, half ounces, and ounces. I would buy like a quarter of a pound or a half of a pound. I got decent prices, about \$250 for a quarter. I'd sell it for \$80 an ounce, or maybe \$85, or \$25 for a quarter ounce...Mostly LSD was around last summer. There was some mescaline. There were ups and downs and there was speed. There was a small quantity of cocaine but that was expensive. And there was some heroin...The price of LSD went way down. It was \$2 or \$3 a tab. The normal price in our neighborhood had been \$4 a tab. The price went down almost in half, especially for quantity...People wanted marihuana and there was none around. So they had to either stay straight or turn to another drug. The cheapest drug around was LSD. People turned to that because there was no smoke. They bought large quantities so it was cheap...Maybe a fifth of the people I know stayed straight, maybe less. Most were onto other things...Most returned to smoking...They're between fifteen and twenty one years old, white, upper-middle, a few upper class...Yes, I also changed during the summer. I usually smoked grass and sometimes hash. Then I mainly smoked hash and tripped a lot. I tripped many times. I was tripping three or four times a week. Before the summer I tripped once in awhile. The hash I had would go very fast because I smoked a lot. Since there was nothing left I turned to LSD because I wanted to get high...If anyone knew anything about drugs they would know there wasn't much pot around. People that didn't smoke probably didn't know...The winter before this I was dealing drugs but I only sold a small quantity. During the summer, in the shortage, the price of pot went up. I didn't have any money so I started dealing in larger quantities and harder drugs, mainly LSD. Where I used to buy maybe twenty-five tabs, and sell them singly, now they would cost me \$2.50 to \$3.00 each. I then bought in the hundreds and it cost me \$2.00 or \$1.75 each, and I would sell it. Also there was a much larger market where people were always asking for drugs so I started dealing heavier and started taking a lot more chances. I was even selling to people I didn't know. I started dealing heavily and trying to get contacts every which way to

buy drugs. I was beat a few times. I got money taken off me...Before the summer I was in with people that did drugs, people that sold drugs and people that bought drugs. In the summer I was mainly with people who sold drugs. I had to because I was selling heavily. When you deal in large quantities you take a very big risk. You have the stuff on your person almost constantly, at least I did. I was busted because of this. I had it on my person, I was stopped and searched. When I was stopped my friend went to get out of the car and he fell on the ground which led them to believe something was wrong with him so they went ahead and searched. It was all illegal. He was stoned out of his mind, and so was I...I always had drugs on me. Always. Eventually it caught up with me. Before the summer I didn't carry drugs on me. I left it in my house or I put it someplace because I only bought and sold small, just for my head. During the summer it became a business. It continued through the fall. I actually increased my dealing after the summer, after I was busted. I started dealing larger, pounds of hash and kilos of of grass. Eventually I got busted again, interstate... Strangely I had a large quantity of opiated hash in the summer. After that I hardly had any. It was during the summer that opiated hash came in. It was stronger than the other hash...Well, it was a big thing then to say it was opiated hash. People wanted to get high, and to get higher. So like it was a trademark. It's opiated hash, it's good, buy it! So people bought it. People want drugs with the most in them. If you tell them that the hash is treated with DMT, STP, LSD and opium, they'll buy it right off the bat. If you tell them it's just regular hash they want to try it. It might not be so good... Everybody I know does pot, with a few exceptions. Even very young kids. I know kids twelve, thirteen years old who smoke...Since so many younger kids are smoking pot now, the younger kids would start doing harder drugs if the couldn't get pot.

A twenty three year old unemployed artist discussed the drug use he observed among friends in Brooklyn and Queens, before, during, and after the summer shortage:

It was just more intense last year, especially in the summer. Lots of people were tripping and speeding, and a lot were doing anything they could get their hands on. Coke, heroin, STP, hog, anything. Now it's just getting back to the steady stream of grass.

People are just getting high for the most part... people between nineteen and twenty-five, students and working, one or the other, on speed, acid, heroin, downs. You could get them whenever you wanted them. By early fall the drought was almost over. Things began to level off again, becoming more normal... The summer seemed like a very crazy time. There was just no pot. No peaceful relaxing or anything, just a lot of different drugs going around, a lot of freaky things. People doing all kinds of drugs that they never did before... It began whenever the pot stopped coming in... at times it was impossible to get pot. There wasn't any price for it. But there was hash... It was a little more expensive but still reasonable enough. Like it was sixty or seventy dollars an ounce, as an average price. But that was O.K. There was a lot around. Sometimes I would smoke five or six different types of hash in a week. People had all different hash from different places... I suppose, it was from independent people bringing it in. I know three guys who brought in three hundred pounds. And another who got fifty pounds of it from Tangiers. They went themselves to get it. They got it very cheap, and brought it back. Everyone was talking about smuggling in the summer because you see some guys do it and they get like instant wealth and you say why not me... There was no shortage of anything beside marihuana. There was plenty of speed, downs, acid. I didn't do any acid. I did a lot of speed and sometimes downs. I usually did the downs after speed. I didn't get into them as much as some people did... Lots of them got into downs in all different places. People I knew from school in Manhattan were into them, also my friends in Brooklyn and my friends in Queens. Everybody had a hundred downs of his own. Everybody was taking six a day. Get up, take one, take another when that wore off. It was like that for a long time for a lot of people... They were about twenty-five cents each. If you bought more it could be a dime each. It's still a cheap way to get a head... Yeah, there were much more downs around. Zillions of downs... There was heroin all over the place, with the younger kids mostly, high school juniors and seniors and college freshmen... I don't really know where it was coming from. I know two friends of mine that practically became junkies for the entire summer that were just confirmed pot heads before that. They used to go to Jamaica, to a certain bar where there were a lot of junkies. That's as much as I knew about where it came from. After the summer one continued using it. The other one didn't. He uses pot again. He really got carried away with junk for the summer. He was shooting it a lot. But

then he got completely out of it and went back to smoking pot. He was shooting heroin for the summer just because he likes large amounts of pot and he couldn't get it, none at all. He's usually pretty levelheaded so he got out of it at the end of the summer and went back to smoking pot. The other guy is still shooting a lot of junk...I just dealt small amounts of hash during the summer. I'd buy a quarter of an ounce for twenty or twenty-five dollars, and I'd cut seven dimes out of it or else a bunch of nickels...No, I didn't really make any money, just smoke some hash. Before the summer I dealt some grass the same way, just to get some smoke...The young people I saw got the most messed up. Because all the young people who were introduced into drugs couldn't get anything but ups and downs and acid and heroin. It's just too much for them. You can't do that intense thing for too long you know. I gave hash to some of them, my brother's friends, and they had never done a smoking drug before. They probably settled down to pot. It's a steady thing if they want to get high. People like to smoke pot. If they're going to mess around with speed and all kinds of pills they like to do it when they want, not because it's just all over the place. Most people are happy with marihuana.

A social worker in one of New York City's voluntary drug treatment clinics discussed developments in drug use, focussing on events during the summer and fall of 1969:

Over the past year I've noticed a big switch from the use of pot and hashish to amphetamines, barbiturates, heroin and LSD. I'm speaking primarily of teenagers, in the clinic and in the neighborhoods. This includes the five boroughs and Westchester... In the last year there has been a definite increase in hard drug abuse, especially starting around July and August, possibly even sooner but I'm not sure about June. And then an even greater increase in September...It started in the summer but the evidence that I have is that in September there had been a tremendous increase in barbiturate use. Amphetamines probably less so...Well, some people have not been able to get hold of the softer drugs and have switched onto the harder drugs, but also some people have not been able to get hold of cannabis and have switched to LSD. There was a tremendous rise in LSD consumption in September. One estimate that I have is something

like a 400/per cent increase from August to September in LSD use, that principally in the greater New York area...The marihuana shortage definitely had an effect upon this...They may shift to hashish for instance, and that was happening. Hashish was not as scarce and people simply shifted from one to the other. Hashish went up in price also, although not nearly as much as marihuana. And the hashish was principally Lebanese, Pakistani, Nepalese; those were the three. It was harder to get. In the spring it was very easy to get, let's say, hashish, no problem at all. It was only a question of could you get it for \$75 an ounce, or would you pay \$80, that kind of thing. But later it went up as high as \$110. It also got scarcer but it was still possible to get it... I couldn't answer as to numbers of people. I feel that a fairly substantial proportion went on to other drugs. I should really include here too that there was a greater use of mescaline and psilocybin as another shift. People that smoke pot usually are familiar with hashish, so that was a simple kind of thing. If you didn't get one you got the other. But because they couldn't get pot and hashish was also hard to get, although not as hard, they would then start to experiment with mescaline and psilocybin and acid...There was a very significant increase in barbiturate use. It's very difficult to say how much but I believe there was a very significant increase. I do know that part of the cannabis using population shifted onto barbiturates. Some drifted onto heroin, heroin being competitive with marihuana. There does seem to be a great deal of activity in terms of trying things that people previously shied away from for a variety of reasons, one being that perhaps they were scared. Others complained that it was hard to get but did not go on to anything else. As to proportions I simply cannot say but a substantial number of people shifted...That would apply to college students for instance, in the early fall. Heroin use two or three years ago on campuses was practically nil, for all practical purposes and it certainly has been around for a long time but people simply didn't use it. But suddenly it started becoming a problem. Second and third hand information indicates that in the midwest this was particularly true. This is something that I just heard...What happened is that the actual amount did not change but the heroin started being cut more, much more than it had been so it was something around one-half the strength or even more diluted than it had been three years ago. Usually heroin was sold in \$5 bags. In certain parts of town there were \$10 bags,

and in certain parts of town there were \$3 bags. But then we started getting the \$1 and \$2 bags, which may have existed before but only in very small sections, possibly in parts of Harlem. But this suddenly became much more prevalent so that for a dollar you could actually get a quantity of heroin, granted a very small one, but you could get heroin. It was selling for \$1, \$2, \$3. There were \$4 bags, \$5 bags, that kind of thing... These new smaller quantities were specifically designed for youngsters who had never used heroin before. In fact people previously wouldn't bother making a dollar bag. The \$5 bag was all and if people didn't have enough money for a \$5 bag, let's say they were mild users around fourteen years of age, they would pool their resources and buy a bag and split it. But apparently the demand was such that it paid to package it in smaller bags. It was, you know, an extra bother for these people, but apparently it was worthwhile to do this... A lot of people who were using heroin, who were not familiar with it, got into the business of dealing, and got to the point where they were actually mixing the stuff. They didn't quite know how to mix it and quite often what you had was a tremendous inconsistency between buying the same drug from the same dealer who presumably knew what he was doing. A case in point was a patient who had been buying from the same source, using two bags a day, and getting a certain high from it. He never exceeded that. He and a friend of his used two bags each. What happened is that one day they made the same purchase, and they both almost overdosed. They both wound up unconscious, on the floor in the bathroom. One of them was rushed to the hospital, the second looked as if he should be, but he wasn't and he finally recovered. I remember talking to this patient and his opinion was that the dealer must have been stoned when he mixed that batch because he had been using that stuff for a year or more, from the same source, and suddenly it was practically pure. It's quite possible that a number of deaths that have happened were due to the fact that they were amateurs making it, working perhaps for someone, being permitted to mix. It didn't have the professional touch the way it used to... I couldn't pinpoint that. My feeling is that the people who developed a taste for barbiturates, specifically the barbiturates, stuck with it. And I think that in certain parts of Brooklyn, throughout the fall and winter, was still flooded with barbiturates. They were relatively cheap, even through the summer, and there was absolutely no problem getting them and I know of people who were regularly hospitalized from using them... But that assumption is very much open to

question anyway because many people start experimenting with something entirely different. For example, I had a number of patients who did not start with marihuana, they started with heroin. And sometime after they had been on heroin, they tried cocaine, a few other things, and perhaps only three or four years later did they ever smoke their first joints. So it works that way too. Or they might start with mescaline or with beer. It doesn't always go from marihuana. You know softer to harder is not always the pattern. Let's put it this way, if someone starts smoking marihuana today and tries heroin next week you can hardly say that one has lead to the other. It's just like an interest in drugs. I simply don't believe that marihuana leads to heroin. I think this is nonsense... If the shortage reoccurred this summer I think you'd see the same story all over again, only possibly more people involved now due to the fact that more people are using marihuana. Probably turning toward, let's say, psilocybin, mescaline, LSD on the one hand, and on the other hand, the hard drugs.

Concerning heroin use on college campuses, there was general agreement that an increase had occurred, although far less drastically than in many non-college populations. A drug counselor at a local college was uncertain as to the extent of heroin use on campus, and its relationship to the marihuana shortage:

A few of the people I saw for counseling said that they had tried heroin during the marihuana shortage. And they also reported that their friends have. Now I don't know if that means that there's a causal relationship between the shortage and the increase in heroin usage...It's obvious that there is heroin use on campus. I just don't know how much. I've gotten varying reports on the amount of heroin. Some say the same this year, some say more, but nobody says less this year.

A secretary at an East Harlem drug rehabilitation clinic recalled a conversation with a small-time drug dealer in the area during the summer shortage. She also noted her observations in her own upper west side neighborhood:

I live in a middle-class area and almost everyone smokes pot. And a lot of people use acid. Everybody wanted to get high. They really didn't care how. They preferred to stick with pot but it wasn't around so they would use something else. There were many more people dealing amphetamines and LSD and many more people willing to try. Before, they were pretty uptight about using acid because of all the mass media stuff that came down about it but then, you know, like you gotta get high, so you go ahead...Yes, now the pot market has stabilized. It's around. But the market has climbed in other drugs because of last summer and I think it will keep on climbing. I think this will happen even if marihuana becomes very available. Nobody wants to shoot up by himself...In East Harlem a lot of people started using heroin for the first time last summer. I was talking to some guy at a bar around the corner and he said like he never messed with heroin until last summer. He couldn't get any pot, so. He said that he never messed with stuff except when he couldn't get marihuana...Well, then he started snorting. But he didn't have any fear of ever getting the habit. He said that a lot of people did that last summer. And he said that he did deal some heroin last summer where he usually deals only pot...Now he's dealing pot. He went back to it. But last summer he was dealing heroin.

A reporter for a lower east side newspaper discussed his observations during the summer, underlining an apparent rise in heroin use:

The first time I picked up on what was happening was in Gem's Spa, a little magazine shop on the east side where a lot of kids hang out, run-away kids, street kids. I heard a couple of perfectly normal looking little middle-class hippie girls talking about skag, and doing skag. They were from the Bronx, not run-aways, talking about how one of their boyfriends was selling skag. Apparently he had been selling grass and there wasn't any grass around so he got into selling skag. These girls were both doing it...I never heard anything like that from them before. I mean from chicks like that. Kids were always talking about acid and grass and shit like that, but skag...There was a lot of general talk about there not being any grass around. And then also a lot of talk about how people who really didn't know how to get grass, were starting to

shoot up. Like these high school kids who would ordinarily buy a nickel were buying a \$5 bag of heroin... My brother's in high school and through him, and other talk that I heard, apparently that's what was happening... Either it was around more or it was the only alternative.

A fellow reporter, now an editor of a radical underground publication, added the following remarks:

Also, there was more hash around. You'd have to look around more for drugs and what happened is you'd run into hash before you'd run into grass. Usually it was the other way around... People I met said friends of theirs were taking more acid and more downers. That was another thing. I might have taken 10 per cent more downers but it's not an area you can substitute for smoke. I mean downers are dangerous and less interesting for doing things. Last summer I saw more people getting heavy into downers. People were worried everyone would start using smack. Some did start last summer. But now smack has really come in. I stay away from H-heads. When I give someone a gift I like to know about it... I think one reason kids are using smack is that they found out everything they were told about smoke was a lie, so when they didn't have it they used smack because they didn't believe that that was bad either. They don't believe anything anymore.

A community center worker in the Bronx emphasized the relationship between the marihuana shortage and the use of heroin among the teenagers with whom he works:

I work in a black community... They went through the experience of not being able to get grass and therefore going to other drugs. And kids are telling me all the time now that, yeah, last summer man, everyone started using heroin because there was no grass around... These are sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen year olds, black kids in the Soundview-Bruckner area in the Bronx. And that is not even really an impoverished slum area like the South Bronx, where I heard it was even heavier... A lot of the younger kids started using H when they couldn't get grass. The sixteen, seventeen year old kids, they're

now back to grass again. They didn't get really strung out on heroin. These guys were together enough anyway. They're getting themselves out of it and trying to help other guys get out of it. And a lot of them, man, really blame the government for what happened last summer...A lot of other drugs increased in the summer. Speed, that was the big thing in my neighborhood in the Bronx. I don't live in a ghetto area. It's a middle class area and all the kids who would come over to my house and try to sell grass would come over and say to everyone, 'hey, you want speed, you want speed?' These were the same guys who used to sell grass now dealing speed...Once the fall happened grass was around again. I remember getting some really shitty grass at the end of the summer. I don't know what happened with Operation Intercept or anything but all of a sudden there was grass... But Operation Intercept was effective in one sense. Not only was it just that you couldn't get grass, if you got grass it was so expensive it outpriced the kids in the ghetto. They couldn't afford marihuana but they were able to buy small bags of heroin. And they were packaging and selling smaller bags than ever before...I don't know any people who smoke only grass and nothing else. Everybody I know who smokes grass at least smokes hash. Almost all of them do some other things once in awhile. Not many people smoke and then decide to stop because they like it... A lot of people who are really getting fucked around by the system and who can't relate to what's happening, and even people who are, have to have some kind of drug, as a form of dealing in another kind of reality which they can deal with. So these people, mainly kids in the ghetto now, who are smoking grass and a lot of others, will probably end up on other drugs anyway, buy it just speeds up the process.

The switch to heroin use, especially by people in the high school age group, was the most important development during the summer marihuana shortage, according to a reporter for a New York daily newspaper. This respondent had covered stories related to drug abuse for the past five years, and had recently completed an article dealing with the effects of the marihuana shortage upon young people throughout New York City. The following comments are based on his own observations and interviews:

I think the changes I've seen are the changes everyone has seen. Greater acceptance of psychedelic drugs to the point where everyone tried them and became bored with them, and a rise in the use of speed over the last couple of years, speed is available and speed is cheap, and a great increase in heroin use, especially in the last year...The fact is that marihuana has become so popular that nobody makes a big deal about using it anymore. It's not even a fad, it's just there, like the air...There's more than fads. There's such an acceptance of drugs that a kid will start on grass, move up to LSD, find there is no LSD around, and be so familiarized with the drug scene he'll start to use whatever is around. And what has been around a lot is speed, for the last couple of years, and heroin has been around a lot recently in the schools...among all types of groups...Well the drug scene started reaching down to the very young, down to the junior high school level, over the last year. And it's very strong on the High school level... Last summer there certainly was a great change in the amount of heroin use, the number of people using it, the kind of people using it, and the availability of it in different areas of the city...It was more available. Marihuana was less available. Operation Intercept at the border cut off the marihuana flow. A lot of kids who had become accustomed to walking around with a high half the day decided that the way to keep that high was to use whatever was available at the time, and that was heroin. They started snorting for three, four months, whatever it took, and after awhile you figure the needle isn't so scary anymore... I spoke to kids in the Bronx; black kids from the South Bronx; middle-class kids in Queens, Jamaica and Bayside; black and middle-class kids in Brooklyn; a whole range of kids beginning with black kids in Fort Greene to middle-class kids in Flatbush. In all those areas, kids had heavily switched to heroin during the summer. There was hash around but I don't think the kids play around with that a lot. Hash is for older, more mellowed pot smokers, people in the Village. So a lot of people I know personally switched to hash, because hash is a nice smoke... Last summer? No, I don't think the psychedelics became more popular. More speed, but I don't think the psychedelics could become more popular. Psychedelics is something you don't use in the same way you use grass or heroin or speed. You use it for a trip when you're ready for it and people who were ready for it once a week didn't change their readiness for it... I think there is such a broad acceptance of all drugs,

of any drug now, that availability very much determines it. If everything is available then people drink to the jug of personal preference. If the drug of personal preference isn't available, they will use something else...Yes, quite a few people I spoke to used heroin for the first time last summer... It was there. It was in the school. I remember one kid in the Bronx whose brother had been pushing outside the school. This began in September. They knew there was no marihuana available and they figured the school was ripe and he told me they began giving out test bags of very clean stuff, very nice stuff. I think the test bags were \$1, just to let the kids know what it was like, to get a sense of it. They did very well and then they started selling the bags regularly for \$2 and \$3. I wouldn't say heavily cut but they were not as clean...No, I've heard about dollar bags before...a dollar bag is half a \$2 bag. It's just how you cut it...I think a lot of the older kids drifted back to marihuana. The thing you have to remember is that the heroin they were getting into is so heavily cut it's certainly not addictive. And the psychological addiction that they already had, the desire for the constant low level high, would be well fulfilled by marihuana or hash or whatever else was available...In terms of a strong physiological addiction I don't think any of those kids I interviewed at the community center were addicted. They were kids who had gotten involved in the summer, had gotten involved precisely because there was no marihuana, and friends had heroin, and they tried it. They used it just as often as they would grass, maybe a little bit more for awhile, then they get found out and the parents dump them into the treatment program...If it dried up again I think the same thing would happen. No question about it. As long as the heroin is available kids would use the heroin.

The comments of high school age residents of the East Bronx confirmed the above observations. Young black and Puerto Rican respondents consistently reported a significant increase in heroin use in their low-income neighborhoods during this period. Further, all respondents had become personally involved in heroin use, which, for many of them, led to the selling of heroin. The following are comments of four of these East Bronx residents, which were typical of others in this neighborhood and age group.

A seventeen year old black high school student stated:

Smoke ran out. Like people we used to cop from, they said that all of a sudden things were getting hard. They couldn't cop. You know, they couldn't get anything, and everybody we went to was the same story all over...During the summer, because things were hard, we'd ask anybody. And nobody knew where to get anything, man...Yeah, we got into dope last summer...Because there was no smoke. Dope was the only thing that was around...I'm pretty sure like they figured all they had to do was cut it off and the kids wouldn't have anything, so then they would stop. But kids, they were smoking for a long time and they were used to getting high and once their pot was cut off they just went on to something else and the government never figured on that...I think I would have gone a little above, but I would have finally ended up with grass...No, I didn't see any pills. All I saw was dope...When they stopped smoke and dope came out, it came out in the black and Puerto Rican communities, Westchester County, Long Island, all them places which really must've shocked the shit out of those guys, man. And then like they really started coming out against dope. And they started all these programs and all these rallies and movements against dope, since their kids were hooked on it now. If they stop smoke again man, I think that, especially New York, it's really going to go to the dogs. It's going to be a terrible place.

An unemployed eighteen year old black youth commented:

Yeah, 'cause like we were hanging out together. And we couldn't cop from the person we were copping from anymore and like other people ran out and nobody had anything. That's what happened...We got for a little while but then after awhile the pot got bad and then they didn't have any and that was it...I got into dope last summer for the first time...There was much more dope around. I was dealing...Yeah, during the summer and fall. 'Till the winter...No, never before. Not even pot...Because I started taking it...I could get enough to deal and then to get high too...I guess they probably thought that they were helping the kids of America, you know this garbage, and they didn't want to see them smoke pot and become nothing, and all that garbage. So they figured if they cut it off

nobody would smoke it and kids would be saved. But that's not true because then they had, well it was back in 1968 when they had the 1968 dope famine when reefer was really cut off...Well Brooklyn especially got it first and right away everyone's head went to dope. Then it just spread throughout the city. And it came and went until it got really strung last summer. And they did up everywhere. And nobody had nothing, and everybody went to dope...I definitely would've stayed with pot. Well, I think I might have messed around with some dope maybe, but I don't think I would have got as far into it as I did...No. No more dope. I use pot daily but I can still carry on...No pills. I only saw dope...Personally, if it happened again, I think I'd probably freak out because I'm not going back to dope, and acid and hash is about the closest thing to pot. But you know, smoke goes, hash goes with it. I think my friends would freak out with me, and maybe a lot more people too 'cause there are lots more people into pot and acid now than before last summer.

A seventeen year old Puerto Rican, on suspension from high school, stated:

It got as heavy as hell. Everybody started shooting dope, mess with dope, sniffin'. 'Cause that was the only thing that was around. There was no smoke or nothing...It just was there. It was more and everybody started using it because there was nothing else to use...Right, no grass. Nobody knew where to get it...I started dealing last summer before I started shooting up...There was just a panic, you know, there was nothing else to cop...Yeah, but it still ain't as heavy man, as it is here in the Bronx and in Manhattan and Brooklyn. Alright, they got it in Long Island, they got it in Westchester, but it ain't as heavy man, as they got it here...I agree with him in a way too because they say when a guy smokes pot he goes on to dope, you know. So they probably figure, if you chop off the grass maybe they'll stay off dope altogether. But if they would've hit dope in the first place all of us here just wouldn't be here now...Like before I used to be shooting dope before I even knew these guys, and I got to know 'em and we started rapping about dope and what it was doing to us, how it messed things up. I dropped out of school because of dope. Like I didn't drop out, I got kicked out. And then grass came back and we started smoking and cut the dope off. We just

cut it loose...If they had left the grass alone there wouldn't be so many junkies. There was more around last summer than ever before...I'd start trippin' and speedin' all over. But I wouldn't go back to dope, like it messed me up so much. Before I started using dope I was alright but then my attitude changed so much. Like I used to come into my house with a bad look on my face. If my brother would've said something I would've threw him off the terrace or something, you know. It messed everybody up. I don't think I'd go back to it really...A lot of young guys I know, from Monroe, a lot of them are just sniffin'. Like they're smoking too. They're just starting to get off dope. Like if they cut off grass they'd all be strung out on dope. That's the damn truth.

An eighteen year old black college freshman recalled the events of the summer of 1969 in this way:

I was usually around with everybody else. Everybody started sniffin', you know at first until like somebody would come over with the works, then everybody would try skinning at the same time, just to see what it was like. I started skinning because they started skinning and they started because I started...Last summer...I was smoking just a couple of months, six or seven months. But grass cut out. Like I would go with them. Like I would get off my job and we would go up to this chick's house and try and score some smoke and that was the whole thing...No, we couldn't score...I was like with guys that dealt. Like I'd drive over to the park with them but like I never dealt...But dig it. We was just about getting into the dope thing anyway so like it wasn't that much of a hassle. Like if you had it, it wasn't any hassle at all, you wouldn't even think of it. If you could get yourself some dope like you'd really forget about the smoke. Every once in awhile you'd say, 'oh, I wish I had a couple of joints of something,' right...When smoke came back we finally started digging things, you know...I still sniff dope if I get a chance. I use dope just like it's another drug but I won't get hung up on it. I use it just like I'd use smoke, hash, or whatever...There was all kinds of dope. Like when dope started coming around everybody was a pusher, I mean practically everybody. Before dope it was only like older people, like cats that look like hustlers, then it turned into kids, chicks and everybody, you know, old ladies...During the summer everybody started

dealing man. And it was real profitable...Tripping came around when we got off the drug scene. That's one of the things that helped us. Like our characters changed when smoke and acid and all that stuff came around. We got into movements. That's when we started turning more liberal. Before we were like in the soul man bag, buying silks and Playboys and so forth. Smoke and acid, we felt in the liberal tendencies but we never expressed it, then we started reading books and digging concerts and music, man, into WNEW. We started changing...During dope our attitude was always hostile towards each other, you know, like we'd beat each other up for a cigarette man. Now we smile and do it...Like I don't know anybody that well. I don't know these cats that well, man, but they say they wouldn't go back...The younger kids, they'd get into it man. I'm pretty sure they'd get into dope...A lot of them are on the verge of using dope now. Like if you look at 'em. If I could get something else, I'd do it man, but like if I couldn't I'd sniff but I'd never get straight.

Summary

It was found that those who decreased or discontinued drug use during the summer shortage were distinguishable from other drug users by certain objectively identifiable social characteristics. In contrast, those who manifested increased experimentation, a greater reliance on drugs other than marihuana, and/or a heavier involvement in drug distribution, cannot be similarly characterized, since these types of unintended reactions and adaptations were experienced by marihuana users from a wide range of residential, socio-economic, occupational and age groups in the New York City area. Further, such unanticipated reactions were reported among persons representing various stages of involvement in drug use subcultures. This is most evident in the case of hashish.

The most general result of the marihuana shortage was the sharply increased availability and use of hashish. Like marihuana, hashish is a derivative of the Indian hemp

plant, *Cannabis sativa*. Hashish is generally estimated to be six to eight times as potent as marihuana.¹ This is due to the fact that hashish is made only of the pure resins derived from the flowering tops of the female hemp plant, which contains the active principle, tetrahydrocannabinol, in highest concentration.

At the time that Operation Intercept was put into effect, authorities in the field of drug abuse agreed on three points regarding hashish. First, its availability and usage had increased significantly in the past few years.² Second, although derived from the same plant as marihuana, it was regarded as far more potent, sometimes approximating the effects of mescaline and LSD, when consumed in sufficient quantities.³ Third, whatever possible negative consequences had been attributed to marihuana use, including social, psychological and physical considerations, these had been attributed to a greater degree to the use of hashish.⁴

During the summer and early fall of 1969, the increased use and availability of hashish was reported in most neighborhoods, and by a great diversity of 'social types.' In fact, there were few groups and individuals that did not observe this increase. Contrary to this city wide trend, hashish was reported to be less available than it was prior to the summer of 1969, in Harlem, East Harlem, and sections of the East Bronx, South Bronx, Jamaica and Brooklyn. Specifically, its availability and use declined in low income black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods. It might be instructive to note that these are the same types of areas in which marihuana was also found to be least available. In other words, in the ghetto areas of New York City, it was more difficult to obtain either marihuana or hashish than it was in other neighborhoods.

In contrast, the use of hashish was noticeably accelerated by the marihuana shortage in both urban and suburban middle-class and affluent communities. This

process was reported in all but the aforementioned ghetto neighborhoods, and among persons representing the full spectrum of age, occupational, and drug use involvements.

In these areas, the price of hashish increased from a previous low price of \$60 an ounce and a previous high price of \$80 an ounce, to a low-high range of \$70 to \$110 an ounce. For individual purchases, the average price increase was approximately \$10 an ounce. This price increase was generally perceived as "a little more expensive but still reasonable," as stated by one respondent.

Higher prices on drugs generally reflect diminished local supplies, but the higher price of hashish must be explained by other factors. Although hashish is regarded to be six to eight times more potent than marihuana, the two have come to be regarded as interchangeable. In the words of one respondent, "There was more hash than grass around last summer, and these people used more of it. But they consider hash and grass to be the same thing and wouldn't consider this a switch." Even though some respondents expressed a preference for marihuana, the willingness of marihuana users to also use hashish appears to be nearly universal. Therefore, the total supply of both marihuana and hashish fulfills the needs of a single, although heterogeneous population, at any given time. Since the marihuana supply was significantly reduced during the summer and fall of 1969, it might be said that a severe 'cannabis gap' was created, and that the demand for cannabis derivatives was substantially rechanneled toward the local supply of hashish. This demand led to an escalation in the importation, and consequently the consumption of hashish. However, the total demand for cannabis derivatives was still significantly greater than that part of the demand which was met by the increased supply of hashish. Thus, the price of hashish rose at the same time that it became more available than in previous years.

A substantial proportion of marihuana users adapted their drug use patterns to the marihuana shortage in other ways as well. In most neighborhoods throughout the New York City area, an increase in the use of barbiturates, amphetamine stimulants and/or psychedelic drugs was reported. During this period, these types of drugs became more appealing, as well as more available to drug using groups and individuals in the area.

Unlike the marihuana market, it appears that the demand for these types of drugs is consistently met by those who supply the market. This is probably related to the fact that most of these drugs are manufactured domestically. As marihuana became scarce, these other drugs became more accessible. They were more readily available on the local level, in large or small quantities, and often at lower prices than prior to the marihuana shortage. It may be said that the accessibility of these drugs, combined with the scarcity of marihuana, made these drugs more appealing. On the other hand, it might be argued that due to the marihuana shortage, the appeal of other drugs was enhanced leading to an increased demand for these drugs, which resulted in unprecedented availability and black market distribution. Although the exact sequence of events could not be determined, these two interrelated factors, appeal and availability, were both of great significance during the summer of 1969.

Unlike hashish, the barbiturates, amphetamines and psychedelic drugs do not appeal to all users of marihuana. Even while experiencing a severe marihuana shortage, certain types of marihuana users avoided involvement with these drugs. It was the sporadic user of marihuana and the older (twenty-five years and older), generally married, middle-class user, enmeshed in establishment institutions and white-collar occupational responsibilities who found these drugs to be neither appealing nor unusually available.

Similarly, although for different reasons, these types of drugs did not make a great deal of impact on the ghetto areas. In these three groups, the sporadic marihuana users, the 'establishment marihuana users' and young ghetto drug users, those individuals who favored these drugs were already using them regularly prior to the marihuana shortage. The marihuana shortage had little effect. An explanation of this finding will be offered in the final chapter.

The switch from marihuana to the barbiturates, amphetamines and the psychedelic drugs was most prevalent among youthful drug users (high school and college age) from predominately white communities. This phenomenon was reported by individuals representing a wide range of neighborhoods and socio-economic strata, from lower east side 'drop-outs' to affluent young people from Long Island suburbs. Although reactions varied in terms of individual preferences, one type of drug, or more accurately, one type of drug at a time, usually played a predominant role in a particular locality. For instance, one would find that amphetamines were most popular in one neighborhood, at the same time that barbiturates became the primary drug in another, and the psychedelics were making the greatest impact in a third area. As a whole, experimentation with a variety of pills and encapsulated drugs was greatly expanded during this period.

This development occurred simultaneously with the increased use of hashish. An increase in the use of cocaine, a variety of homemade concoctions, and an assortment of other pharmaceuticals was also reported, but due to high prices or the lack of continuous availability, these made a significant impact on the drug use patterns of only a few individual drug users. In sum, it was found that in most groups of young drug users, the typical reaction to the marihuana shortage consisted of an accelerated interest

in experimentation and multiple drug use, primarily channeled toward the barbiturates, amphetamines and psychedelic drugs, as well as hashish.

Although the switch to heroin use was accorded great attention by the respondents, this development was not found to be as widespread as was the increased popularity of the aforementioned drugs. This emphasis is more closely related to the elaborate mythology surrounding heroin use than to the total number of persons affected in this manner.

The switch to heroin use during the marihuana shortage represented a significant development in particular localities and among specific types of drug users. This phenomenon was most widespread among young drug users in the low-income ghetto areas of New York City. According to a variety of sources already quoted, the switch to heroin use was so rampant in these neighborhoods, that this reaction represented the rule rather than the exception. It included persons who had previously experimented with heroin, and many who had never done so. It also included people who had used marihuana for several years, others who had first used it only a few months prior to the shortage, as well as some who had never used marihuana. Reportedly, the use of heroin reached epidemic proportions during the summer and fall of 1969. It should be remembered that these were the same neighborhoods in which marihuana and hashish were found to be least available, and in which the impact of the barbiturates, amphetamines and psychedelic drugs was imperceptible.

In contrast, in predominately white, middle-class and affluent communities, the switch to heroin was reported among only certain types of drug users. Most of these were distinguishable in terms of age and degree of involvement in a drug use subculture prior to the marihuana shortage. From these areas, those who went on to heroin used drugs heavily prior to the shortage, usually on a

daily basis, had experienced a good deal of experimentation although marihuana and hashish were the primary drugs, limited their associations mainly to a drug using clique, and identified with a drug-oriented lifestyle and a counter-culture movement. It can be said that for these persons, drug use was the focal point of all other activities.

Although those who became involved in heroin use were characterized by these features, not all who manifested these behaviors, identifications and associations did so. Consistently, the respondents observed this behavior pattern in groups of younger drug users, between the ages of sixteen and twenty years old, heavily involved in a drug-oriented lifestyle. In older groups, although some individuals experimented with heroin, heavy involvement was generally avoided. Interview responses indicated that older individuals who did move on to anything more than a short term flirtatious relationship with heroin, were perceived as doing so as a manifestation of an abnormal personality need, rather than as a peer-sanctioned group activity. Thus, the use of heroin was far less general, far more defined by a process of social selection, within white middle-class and affluent areas than within ghetto neighborhoods. This finding will be analyzed in greater depth in the concluding chapter of this report.

Another direct result of the marihuana shortage was the involvement of greater numbers of drug users than ever before in the importation, distribution and sale of illegal drugs. Several respondents reported that personal friends and acquaintances brought hashish into the United States during this period. It was also found that American travelers abroad were well aware of the marihuana shortage, and the possible profits for those who could successfully smuggle hashish into the country. It is impossible to tell how many persons became involved in this kind of activity, but the increased availability of hashish during

this period suggests that many may have done so.

A far greater number of drug users became involved in the sale of illegal drugs for the first time. There are several reasons for this development. First, the demand for marihuana was so great that anyone who had some was able to sell it for a substantial price without any difficulty. Respondents in this situation reported that any quantity, no matter how small or how large, could be sold immediately.

Prior to the shortage, regular users of marihuana generally purchased one ounce quantities at a time, one-half ounce at a minimum. Larger purchases were usually divided among friends. Since such quantities were available from several sources, competition kept prices in check. The attempt to realize substantial profits from the sale of marihuana, was in the hands of those who pursued this activity on a more or less full-time basis, and involved large-scale purchases.

With the onset of the marihuana shortage, anyone who was able to obtain anywhere from one ounce to one kilo of marihuana, was in a position to divide it into smaller quantities, sell some to friends or acquaintances and still keep a quantity for his own personal use at no cost. If one wished, he could sell a greater proportion, and realize a monetary profit. Of course, this mode of distribution was occurring prior to the shortage as well. But during the shortage, one suddenly could realize worthwhile profits even from dividing very small quantities, such as one ounce of marihuana, and reselling it in 'nickel bags,'⁵ or even smaller amounts.

Thus, with many large-scale marihuana dealers temporarily out of business, the profit motive filtered down through the ranks of marihuana users, to the point where those who were able to obtain marihuana, those who used marihuana,

and those who sold marihuana were the same persons. Even prior to the shortage, many users of marihuana had been involved in its sale to some degree. As Erich Goode points out, in the marihuana market the distinction between the user and the seller is so blurred as to be meaningless. Those who sell marihuana, use marihuana, and those who use, often sell. But he goes on to note that it is the heaviest users, who purchase in largest quantities, that become involved in 'dealing' marihuana for profits.⁶ During the shortage, with the general unavailability of large quantities and the possibility of realizing meaningful profits from small-scale sales, these distinctions vanished and the ranks of marihuana 'dealers' proliferated rapidly.

A second reason for increased involvement in drug distribution during this period is closely related to the increase in small-scale marihuana sales. As the supply of marihuana steadily declined throughout the summer and early fall of 1969, there was an increasing tendency for large-scale marihuana dealers to adapt to the situation by stocking other types of drugs. Specifically, many now sold hashish, some went on to dealing barbiturates, amphetamines, and/or psychedelic drugs, and a few sold heroin. As the appeal and availability of these drugs filtered down through the predominately cannabis-using population, new markets for these drugs were created. Although the manufacture, importation and large-scale distribution of these drugs was still in the hands of organized and semi-organized networks of individuals heavily involved in this business, many drug users became involved on a small-scale level as well. Just as many larger-scale marihuana dealers adapted to the situation by 'switching products', so did many of the newly expanded forces of small-scale marihuana dealers, who had recently acquired a taste for easy money. Thus, many of those who were selling marihuana for the first time early in the summer of 1969,

were selling hashish and an assorted variety of pills by the late fall of 1969.

The third reason for the expansion of drug distribution involvements is related to the contagious nature and high cost of heroin use. As more people became involved in heroin use during the summer, a proportion of these became involved in its sale. As with the other drug markets already discussed, the enticement of free drugs and easy profits rapidly filtered down even to those who had only recently begun to use heroin. Also, some of those users and dealers who had previously been on the bottom rung of the ladder in terms of heroin distribution, were now in a position to sell to others. These new additions to the heroin business explain the widespread reports of inept mixing and packaging, and the emergence of the one, two, and three dollar bag of heroin which was previously unknown in many neighborhoods. As was the case with marihuana, hashish, the barbiturates, the amphetamines and the psychedelics, more and more non-professionals became involved in the business aspect of heroin use.

Section C: Attitudinal Responses to the Government's Policy

Operation Intercept was a public policy decision specifically designed to alter the behavior of a pre-defined 'target population.' Namely, this heterogeneous target population was composed of persons involved in importing marihuana, persons who profit from its distribution, and persons who use marihuana. The most significant group, numerically, was the marihuana using population in the United States. The number of such persons had been variously estimated at between five and twenty million. Kenneth Gergen has stated a widely accepted axiom concerning the relationship between public issues and individual relevance: "An issue will be relevant to an individual to the extent that for him it can potentially modify the status quo."⁷ For those persons, as well as others who were professionally concerned with drug abuse, it may be said that the Operation Intercept policy had particular relevance, since it had a direct effect on drug use patterns in the United States.

During the years preceding Operation Intercept, in which the use of marihuana reached new levels of popularity in the United States, a multitude of scholars and journalists attempted to define those values and attitudes which they believed predisposed individuals, particularly young people, to partake in this illegal activity. At the time of Operation Intercept, with marihuana use already well entrenched in our society, the focus of analysis shifted from those attitudes which allegedly predispose individuals to use marihuana, to an examination of attitudes which allegedly result from using marihuana. This shift did not follow from an empirically justified or a widely accepted answer to the first question, nor was the new issue clearly distinguished, methodologically or otherwise, from the first. It simply represented a change in strategy with the implicit,

although grudging acceptance, of a new situation.

In line with this new strategy, a key reason advanced for the implementation of the Operation Intercept policy was the alleged adverse attitudinal concomitants of marihuana use. The Special Presidential Task Force states a particular concern about "the possibility of personality changes and a loss of motivation among youthful marihuana users." ⁸ The Report goes on to note that, "while systematic studies of large numbers of American chronic users are not yet available, a number of clinicians have observed that at least some users show evidence of a loss of conventional motivation. They seem to prefer instead a non-goal oriented life style, which emphasizes immediate satisfactions to the exclusion of ambition and future planning." ⁹ These attitudes and orientations, supposedly directly associated with marihuana use were also believed to accompany or foreshadow an array of other negative and disruptive attitudes, specifically those concerning authority, vocation, government and the use of other drugs. With the rise in the population of marihuana users recognized in policy-making circles, and research minimizing the short-term dangers of marihuana widely disseminated, immediate effects of marihuana use were played down (i.e. criminality, violence, uninhibited and bizarre sexuality), and long-range associations were emphasized. This was true regarding physiological, as well as psychological and sociological considerations.

With all this concern about the attitudes of marihuana users, one would have expected that those involved in public policy decision-making might have evaluated the possible effects of this new public policy upon the attitudes of the 'target population,' since these were the people to whom the decision would have direct relevance. Neither the President, his advisors, nor the Special Task Force, ever publicly stated their expectations regarding the attitudinal repercussions of this policy decision. Nor did they estimate

the effects of any immediate attitudes resulting from the policy, upon the long-range attitudinal and drug-related behavioral consequences about which they expressed such great concern. In this section, the attitudinal reactions of the respondents to the Operation Intercept policy will be explored. In Chapter III those responses will be analyzed in terms of the long range concerns and goals expressed by the policy-makers.

The pointed, and often well developed opinions expressed by respondents reflected the direct relevance of the Operation Intercept policy decision to these individuals. Such attitudes and opinions were also a manifestation of the fact that the altered drug situation, and the underlying government policy, had been topics for individual evaluation as well as informal peer-group consideration prior to the interviews. Those respondents who had a long-standing professional interest in the relationship between drug abuse and society, namely, writers, journalists and rehabilitation workers in the drug abuse field, had already reached certain opinions and conclusions on these matters prior to Operation Intercept. Although Operation Intercept and its practical repercussions did offer some unique perspectives and insights, this new data was absorbed within the scope of a pre-existing orientation and frame of reference. But for many youthful drug users, the policy-induced modification of the status quo precipitated a personal interest in the relationship between drug use, law enforcement policies, the government, and society-at-large, for the first time. The focus of such evaluations was an existential one, rooted in the drug user's own experiences, and the 'envelope of events' in which he found himself enmeshed. For the great majority of respondents, Operation Intercept served as a catalyst in the development and crystallization of attitudes and opinions

on these matters. To an unprecedented degree, these issues, policy decisions and relationships, previously relegated to the consideration of professionals, politicians and academics, were thrust into the everyday life of the drug user.

Of course, not all marihuana users expressed a great interest in analyzing the reasons behind the government's policy and the subsequent marihuana shortage. Many such persons were minimally affected due to personal access to an increased supply of hashish. Typical of this attitude, were the remarks of a twenty-two year old female school-teacher:

We didn't think about it. We knew about them cracking down on Mexico but we never thought why. We only cared about that it was...I guess they thought if people wouldn't be getting it, more people wouldn't try it. People would be getting high less. I don't know what they thought. There was so much hash around that it didn't make any difference.

Although she noted a significant increase in the use of barbiturates, amphetamines and hashish in her middle-class suburban neighborhood, she believed that the primary motivation behind the government's policy was to curb drug use.

A twenty-one year old salesman expressed a similar view:

Because they thought if there was less around, less people would be using it. Fewer people trying it for the first time...People I know didn't stop. But it probably kept some people from trying it for the first time. But they probably eventually tried hash or something else if they were that interested.

Another respondent, a twenty year old taxi driver, felt that for certain persons this policy might have resulted in the kind of reaction the government intended, while for others this was not the case. He saw the policy as an attempt to force behavior into line with the laws:

It seems that since it's illegal, and people always

got it very freely, they tried to reach out and cut it off before people could get it. Just making it illegal didn't seem to do too much. The only way I could see it helping is in those minor cases, where someone might be smoking and this might be the significant difference, if they just couldn't get it. If they hadn't been smoking long they just might ignore it. But people who've been smoking awhile, I don't think cutting off the supply of just marihuana would help the whole drug problem considering the other drugs all around.

A twenty-seven year old stockbroker was somewhat ambivalent concerning the government's expectations:

Because they don't want to legalize marihuana. Basically people wouldn't have it to smoke and perhaps they would just forget about it. I don't believe it though. People will look for other drugs...I should hope they realized this. Who knows, maybe they didn't realize it.

This ambivalence was also expressed by an eighteen year old student-drug dealer from an affluent Long Island suburb:

Apparently they were trying to stop drugs passing over the Mexican border. Mainly they were looking for pot. Some people went down there and told me that the whole car was searched, mainly for large articles. They didn't search very thoroughly. Apparently it only stopped marihuana and it led to higher drugs. It would seem that they didn't know this would happen, but they probably did. The end result was people went on to higher, harder drugs, and the government doesn't want this. They want to stop drugs. But I think they probably did know something about what would happen. They just wanted to stop the main consumption, which is in marihuana.

In effect, he felt that the government policy was intended to curtail drug use, but was primarily concerned with marihuana.

A seventeen year old black high school student also believed that the primary motivation behind the policy was to curb drug use. He perceived the switch to heroin in his low-income East Bronx neighborhood as an unintended

consequence of this effort:

I heard something about, um, President Johnson then, or somebody, made Operation Intercept. And, you know, he was like blocking off Mexico and everything, and then all of a sudden there was no smoke and then we started finding out about this, and that's what happened...I'm pretty sure like they figured all they had to do was cut it off and the kids wouldn't have anything, so then they would stop. But kids, they were smoking for a long time and they were used to getting high and once their pot was cut off they just went on to something else and the government never figured on that. Really, I think they thought smoke and stuff like that was making kids into the freaks they are now. They figured if they could cut it out everybody would turn back nice and straight and everything, you know.

A sixteen year old high school student from Flatbush, Brooklyn also believed that the government was primarily concerned about the personalities and lifestyles of youthful Americans:

They thought that people wouldn't smoke marihuana anymore. That marihuana wouldn't be in the country so we'd have a strong country, that people wouldn't fight about the Vietnam war and it would be a lot safer. They thought that we'd be back to World War II again, with people growing their victory gardens.

Most respondents adopted a far more disparaging, condemnatory and hostile attitude toward the government policy. Such attitudes reflected a basic distrust of the government's intentions and/or knowledge of the situation. A twenty-six year old businessman from Howard Beach, Queens offered the following opinion:

They were trying to stop the traffic in marihuana and cut down the usage because it goes against their principles, their beliefs, supposedly. I think they don't understand it, they don't know it. They heard a lot of baloney about it and they therefore ignorantly feel against it without any real understanding. And there's an awful lot of politics involved.

Many respondents believed that the primary motive behind the policy was an attempt to generate publicity in order to calm the public demand that something be done about the drug problem. A twenty-five year old marihuana dealer from the upper west side of Manhattan stated:

It was probably just something to show the public that they're trying to fuck the pushers. It was ineffective as far as I was concerned. Personally I got grass right through the Intercept thing. I don't think that would bother them though. Mostly, they just wanted to look like they were doing something. Personally, I think organized crime caused the shortage and the government started Operation Intercept just so they'd get credit for it.

An eighteen year old college student from the west Bronx perceived the policy in terms of its social repercussions versus its political strategies. She saw the main problem in terms of youthful values and aspirations:

The young people have nothing to aspire to. All the authority images are coming down against them so why would they want to be a president or a congressman or a teacher or a banker. That's why all the kids are, I mean white middle-class kids, are using smack. I wonder if Nixon thinks the southern strategy is worth it.

A twenty year old college student from Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn expressed a similar opinion. She said:

He did it for publicity. Nixon said he would do something about drugs so he decided to do something about Mexico. I don't think he thought about what the results would be. I think he did it because it's what he thought the country wanted. Besides, most people who know something about drugs are too young to vote anyway, and that's all he cares about, votes.

~~According to a~~ twenty-five year old writer, a Greenwich Village resident, the government policy had two goals:

They were responsible for cutting off a tiny bit, and just for a short period of time. They did it, A, to pacify the folks back home who are getting

uptight about dope and B, I think it was to put pressure on Mexico too, and I don't know how effective that was. They certainly did put pressure on Tijuana and towns like that. They closed them up for two or three weeks. I think they wanted to stop the grass but I think it's a mistake too, because you get a lot of kids now going on to other drugs.

A reporter for an east side underground newspaper saw the policy as a "propaganda stunt" aimed in the wrong direction:

I would say it was probably from within the Justice Department or through Mitchell. But it's a propaganda stunt more than anything else. It's effective to a certain extent. But it's just effective as far as individual users bringing back small quantities, mostly for themselves and their friends. It doesn't disturb the large scale flow of dope. That's why I think it's a mistake. They're not working on organized crime, they're working on the individual user. They say they want to reduce the penalties for just users and yet these are the people that suffer the most with things like Operation Intercept. You know, people who don't want to score through organized dealers and so on.

Although he saw the policy as misguided, he didn't agree with statements he had heard in his lower east side neighborhood, alleging that the government had an interest in heroin trade:

Some people said that they wanted to keep the black folks down by keeping them on smack, or getting them on smack. I think that's looking for too much evil within the government. I don't think, I mean I hope they're not that bad. I don't think they have any control or make any profits on dope. I don't think the revolutionary blacks are on smack anyway. Most of them, like the Panthers, are completely out of the use of heavy drugs.

A drug counselor at a local college saw the policy as a short-sighted "token effort" based on several incorrect assumptions:

The official administration line was that it was an

attempt to cut down drug traffic going across the Mexican border into the United States. They assumed drug traffic would be diminished, or at least it would be harder to smuggle drugs into the United States, at least marihuana....I think it's a token effort to burn a marihuana crop when the main problem seems to me to be heroin usage. And I never subscribed to the view that people start out using marihuana and then go on to using heroin because marihuana no longer is strong enough or whatever. I think the government took a very short-sighted view when they lumped all narcotics together and said in effect that heroin usage and marihuana usage were equivalent problems and directed most of their efforts to stopping drugs smuggled in along the Mexican border, the assumption being that most of those drugs were marihuana and hash...God knows where the policy originated. I'm sure it was not President Nixon's idea. Mostly because I don't think he knows very much about the problem nor has he thought about it much. For one thing I'm not so sure marihuana should be illegal. For another thing I think the government should direct more of its money and energy to doing research on marihuana rather than stopping its importation. I don't think the police have ever been effective in any community in diminishing drugs whether its federal or local police. The only effective measures have been when the communities themselves have not wanted drugs. A case in point would be the Panthers work in Elmhurst, Queens. Even a better example was shown in "The Battle of Algiers" when Algerians decided themselves that drugs were bad for the national interest, and communities of Algerians got together and policed themselves. That's the only effective way.

According to a staff reporter for a daily New York newspaper, the publicity-oriented policy was instigated by officials within the government, seeking recognition by means of a simplistic approach to a complex problem:

It probably has more to do with a new administration and a not very sophisticated administrator of the drug department, trying to impress that new administration. It was partially publicity, partly a feeling that perhaps you make yourself look good in the eyes of a new president by starting a drug drive. Also, it might simply be that Mitchell just took a broad swipe at what seemed a simple thing to do. Why don't we shut

off the Mexican border, it's easy? He does seem to be a person who would reach for the quick and easy solution...I have no idea what they imagined would happen, but they certainly didn't imagine very intelligently. They're probably not sophisticated enough to know exactly what the effects of what they were doing would be. In terms of anything they've done in law and order, and crime, they always fail to have a real understanding of exactly how it works on the street level and how it works for the person involved. They always kind of see it in black and white, in the abstract, and don't realize that criminals are people, and smokers are people and drug users and pushers and even guys who bring in drugs are people, and they march to a different tune than the Republican philosophy.

An editor of an underground newspaper also focussed on the idea that the policy represented a "power expansion" by groups with vested interests within the government:

I can't see the logic. I think it was like how the anti-marihuana legislation began. Prohibition was over and Anslinger didn't have a job anymore. So the whole bureaucracy switched over when they made marihuana illegal and used the same techniques against marihuana as they did against alcohol. Any bureaucracy wants to enlarge itself, like any branch of government. So they constantly try to get more power and become bosses over more men. Doing this stuff on Mexico was just the same kind of power expansion.

A middle-aged commodity trader from a Westchester suburb saw the policy as an ill-conceived attempt at dramatic publicity:

Operation Intercept was incredibly stupid. It was intended to dramatize hostility to the drug scene. I heard from reliable sources that it pushed lots of people into all kinds of pills, stuff, and rat poison and apparently only very young people...The American government is not aware of the nature of Mexicans and peasants who supply the market. Peasants with a cash crop are brave and savage individuals. The man in charge of the Mexican program was shot dead six weeks later. It was nothing but a maladroitness gesture on the

government's part. It caused a lot of arrests, a lot of taking of toxic substances and a lot of ill will from the Mexican government and people. If you want something you can always get it. The government is deluding itself. If they continue formalized programs for the purpose of publicity, they will have more kids taking dangerous stuff.

A twenty-three year old unemployed artist from Bayside, Queens, believed the policy to be an attempt by government to inconvenience "people they didn't like," with no other long-range motive:

I guess they did it just to make it hard on a lot of people they didn't like. Ultimately that's all it meant. Nixon said he wanted to make marihuana so scarce it would be too expensive to buy or enjoy. If he was going so all out on marihuana and there was a dozen other drugs, dangerous drugs, available, he just wanted to make it hard on people who wouldn't ordinarily be put out if they just had their pot. They are probably so stupid that they assumed people would just stop using drugs.

According to a twenty-five year old housewife from Queens, the government's power to influence the policies of other countries was rooted in vested interests and financial coercion:

I heard about something where they have a thing with other countries including Mexico, an agreement. I don't know if it's written, but some kind of agreement with certain other countries where they can't legalize it. Even if everyone wanted it, or a majority, it couldn't be done until they were ready to do it...There must be some financial way of enforcing the agreement. There's money involved somewhere. I think it has something to do with the liquor lobby.

An eighteen year old Puerto Rican high school student from the South Bronx pointed to the government's 'scare tactics' and the tendency to indiscriminately propagandize against "all kinds of drugs." As was the case with several

respondents, she believed such campaigns were related to a vested interest in alcoholic beverages:

I think they were trying to scare everybody. Like at that time they had a lot of T.V. scares, you know, they used to show movies about pot and grass and different things would happen to you. And they gave that acid scare and the smoke scare. People walking around killing each other and all that. I think they were trying to really scare a lot of the young people. When the smoke stops, you know, I figure they figured like from hearing all this they would be scared, they wouldn't even try and get it and if they didn't try they would never get it. They'd be so scared about any kind of drug, all kinds of drugs, like they'd keep to their wine and liquor.

A twenty-one year old college student from Jackson Heights, Queens, postulated a direct governmental financial interest in the marihuana market: "Maybe they were trying to get a lot of attention about how they were against drugs, while at the same time jacking up the price. Maybe they get something from it. They probably do."

Although he believed that the policy was aimed at decreasing drug abuse, a twenty-three year old teacher from Bayside, Queens, stated that the government, unknowingly, was influenced by organized crime:

I saw articles in the papers about the government burning fields in Mexico, and paying the Mexican government to burn fields. There was also a tightening up at the borders. Most people knew through word of mouth rather than a newspaper...First of all, the government is behind the times. Being puritanical in their approach to policy, they caused other problems without really realizing it by making a pot shortage. They thought they were doing a good thing. Really they were doing a bad thing because of the Mafia influence. The Mafia influenced them indirectly. Somehow they caused the government to create a policy of tightening up on pot. By doing that, the supply of pot becomes less so the demand really becomes more, so the price can go up. And since the Mafia controls the pot in the United States, they get more money out of it.

Apparently, the relationship between the Operation Intercept policy and the influence of organized crime was discussed in many quarters. A researcher at a Manhattan drug rehabilitation center recalled this explanation:

There was a lot of talk about the policy and I heard a lot of reasons for it. One was that the Mafia was behind it. They were going to stop importing grass and hash from wherever they get it, the Mid-East, Mexico, because they thought the Vietnam war was going to end. So they realized that Vietnam grass was supposed to be tremendous. They were cutting down so when they brought in the Vietnam grass there would be a bigger market for it. This seemed logical because there was a shortage.

A twenty-three year old writer for an underground newspaper postulated a complementary relationship between the heroin trade, organized crime and the government's counter-revolutionary policies. She had observed a great deal of switching to heroin during the marihuana shortage:

I don't know if he thought of this but it's to Nixon's interest to have heroin addicts around. Someone who uses smack is a slave, not a revolutionary. It uses all their energy. They have nothing left for revolution. It also puts more money in the Mafia bank account. If Nixon really wanted an anti-drug program, he would crack down on heroin first. But then he'd hurt the Mafia.

Another resident of the lower east side, a twenty-four year old unemployed male, emphasized the publicity value of a policy, which at the same time may be harmful to people:

Nixon was making political hay out of Operation Intercept. He made it like a little Korean War, like Vietnamization only this was Mexicanization. Nixon expected middle America to cheer...Like with the gangs in the 50's. They let them get smack when they were all busting everyone's brains out. When they all got hooked on dope there was no more street gangs.. It

solved the problem. They know that when people do smack it puts them out of action. I believe they consciously figured on that...There's no difference between Honeywell and the Mafia. They're both big organizations only out to make money. They must have taken all these things into account. They're not stupid. It's easy to confuse evil with stupidity.

A social worker at a drug rehabilitation clinic in Manhattan discounted 'conspiracy theories,' and emphasized the policy-makers' thoughtlessness and unfamiliarity with drugs:

The idea was to so increase the price that people would not be able to afford it and without giving thought that because they couldn't afford it they wouldn't simply stop using drugs. What actually happened is that they shifted and how much thought was given to Operation Intercept in those terms I don't know. It's really like curtailing something relatively harmless, thinking people will simply shrug their shoulders and stop it, without realizing that they are creating a whole new problem in the synthetic drug areas such as barbiturates. I know some people thought that this was some kind of a plot to get in more heroin, a Mafia plot, one hears all sorts of things. I just think it was probably due to the fact that the government didn't know what the hell it was doing. They are so unfamiliar with what drugs are, that they sort of tend to lump everything together and they say, O.K. we're going to eliminate this, without taking, let's say simultaneous measures, to eliminate all sorts of other things.

An eighteen year old unemployed black youth from the East Bronx, saw the policy in political terms, as a conscious attempt to "bring the people down."

I think that in them cutting off pot they neglected cutting off anything like dope. And in that sense I'd have to say that maybe they were trying to bring the people down. Dope is the thing that is really choking people, and they know that. They have no history at all of anybody over-smoking and they sure have plenty of history of people O.D.-ing. And so they didn't try to stop the really bad thing and so I

could say that maybe they were trying to bring the people down.

He believed that there was an interrelationship between the heroin market, organized crime and the financial interests of the United States government. He explained the relationship in this way:

Well actually, like Mafia, it's so said, is the one to actually have control of the money in the United States. So if that's true then they are profiting off dope and they are profiting off the people who are using dope, and they are actually the United States. At the same time it is known that the Mafia owns two of the, I know some of the ammunition depots which makes bullets and things like that for this country, for our government. So there must be some link between dope, Mafia, and the United States government. And, at the same time the Mafia controls the dope traffic.

He also believed that there was an implicit racial bias in the government's approach to the drug problem:

I happened to have went to jail, and I met a black fella there that was from a white community and was caught juggling dope. And he was locked up and they gave him no chance, and that was his first bust. And I found out cats in there from the Bronx and Brooklyn, from black and Puerto Rican communities, who'd been busted two and three times and were still going home. And so it seems as if they just might want to keep it out of their communities especially, and don't care so much about black and Puerto Rican communities, seein' as they don't give those pushers as hard a sentence. What I'm saying is they don't mind if it's in these other communities because these don't really count. But these prominent people, and it is known that more prominent people come from more white neighborhoods, these prominent people are in the establishment, so that's why they wouldn't want dope in their neighborhoods, because they know what it's going to do to their kids. At the same time I would say they most probably feel the same way about pot... Most of the people in those drug programs, when they come out they're right back on dope anyway. And the ones that come just out of jail and get back in society aren't allowed to do this, that or the other

thing because of their record and wind up being nothings. So it seems that they might have been trying to hurt us in another way too.

Similarly, a secretary at an East Harlem drug rehabilitation clinic, saw the policy as a reflection of a newfound concern about drugs, specifically because drug use had moved into the middle and upper classes of society:

Their whole thing about drugs is because it's moved into the middle class and upper class. Like all those politicians' kids are getting busted for marihuana and all the other drugs too, and it puts them in a bad position. So they had to act like they were doing something. It didn't matter so long as it stayed in the ghetto. They didn't want the ghetto bothering them anyway but once it started messing up their middle-class kids, then they got all uptight about it.

An eighteen year old black college student, who had previously been treated in a drug rehabilitation program, emphasized the influence of organized crime and political motives in the formulation of the policy. His statements reflect the fact that he and his associates turned to heroin use during the "marihuana panic:"

My neighborhood is like half and half. But I mean the black communities, the poor white communities, the poor Spanish communities. I'm pretty sure, I'm definite, it's a way to keep the people down, it's a way to oppress the people you know. And it's like a profitable way, you know, it's really profitable. They see that they can make money and keep the people down, so definitely they're going to do it. Like with the Mafia. The way the Mafia controls this country. I don't really know that much about it but I'm pretty sure it goes down. The way that a lot of senators probably own a lot of real estate down in Mexico man, growing their grass, you know. I believe there's a lot of that going on. I'm pretty sure that they wanted to keep oppressing the people like that because the narcotics agencies and all these help things that they made at that time, they were really jive man. Like they were, they wouldn't have the person ready to do anything when he got out. They would really

mess a person up while he was in. Like he couldn't see any kind of future for himself. The point they put across then was really 'down the junkie' as a criminal. They made the whole country look at the junkie as a criminal, you know. And that was really bad. And they made anybody who even smoked pot a junkie...Well, like they did whether they were trying it or not. They did oppress the people and I'm pretty sure they did make a profit on it, man.

A community center worker, employed in the Soundview-Bruckner section of the Bronx, believed that the government foresaw the switch to heroin and embarked on the Operation Intercept policy primarily for political motives, namely, as a way "to cut down on some of the opposition to the government!":

Operation Intercept was effective in one sense. Not only was it just that you couldn't get grass, if you got grass it was so expensive it outpriced the kids in the ghetto. They couldn't afford marihuana but they were able to buy small bags of heroin...They did it to get more people to shoot heroin, to cut down on some of the opposition to the government and to get people strung out, to fuck up people. It seems to me that the people who run the government are so fucked up in their heads, it's really hard to imagine what they thought would happen. If they didn't see that people were going to go into other drugs because of the shortage of marihuana, then they just weren't opening their eyes to see what was going to happen. So it seems to me that they probably did see it, unless they're really dumb fools, they probably did see it and purposely did it. People who weren't political, not at all, because of last summer and then Operation Intercept, at least started to vocalize their opposition.

The perception of political, rather than financial motives, was also reflected in the statement of a seventeen year old Puerto Rican, enrolled in the HarlemTeen's program at the time of the interview. His comments were based on his observations in Harlem and the East Bronx:

Listen man, I really think that they wanted to get more people on dope, you know, and bring 'em down.

Especially like the Spanish and black people. To really hold them down so they won't get nowhere. You know, like they're fighting now to get somewhere and these people want to keep them down.

Summary

The excerpts selected for this section represent the range of attitudes and opinions which resulted, either directly or indirectly, from the operation Intercept policy and its practical street level consequences. Although very few respondents believed the policy to be successful, in terms of the government's stated objectives, several opinions reflected the idea that the government's real intentions, and its stated objectives, were identical. Those opinions, stressing the convergence between real and stated objectives, will be called 'trusting attitudes.' Within the category, 'trusting attitudes,' two subcategories will be distinguished:

1. Statements reflecting the belief that the policy was aimed at the general drug abuse problem.
2. Statements reflecting the belief that the policy was aimed at a specific segment of the drug using population. This category includes the following explanations; believed to be behind the government's policy:

Trusting Attitudes

1. Policy aimed at the general drug abuse problem
 - a. The policy was part of a general crackdown on the use and availability of drugs.
 - b. The policy makers assumed that due to the marihuana scarcity, people would abstain from drug use.
 - c. The unavailability of marihuana would have a beneficial effect on national cohesiveness and/or individual personalities, as perceived by the government.
 - d. The policy was intended to intensify pressure on

Mexico, so that the Mexican government would assume greater law enforcement responsibility.

2. Policy aimed at a specific segment of the drug using population

- a. The government intended to minimize the number of people who would be experimenting with drugs for the first time, primarily young people.
- b. The government enforced shortage would curtail marihuana use among those who could not or would not make the extra effort suddenly required to obtain it.
- c. Higher prices would force some marihuana users to abstain.
- d. Although they might have realized that some marihuana users would switch to other drugs, the policy makers focussed on marihuana because they saw this as the most massive drug consumption problem at the time.

All of the aforementioned types of opinions reflect the belief that the government planned and implemented the Operation Intercept policy with the intention of combating the drug abuse problem or some aspect thereof, in the United States. Further, they reflect the idea that such a policy could have possibly had the desired results, at least in certain cases. This should not be interpreted to mean that the respondents expressing these opinions found the policy to be laudable, commendable, or even well-conceived. In fact, the experiences and mass media exposures of such respondents, which served to underline the negative consequences of the policy decision, led most to an uncomplimentary evaluation. However, such statements still echo an underlying faith in the policy makers' good intentions and basic intelligence.

In contrast, a wide range of disparaging, denunciatory, and condemnatory statements served to underline the apparent

hostility of most respondents to the Operation Intercept policy in particular, and often to the government's approach to drug abuse in general. Many of these opinions emphasized the belief that the government's decision was based on unstated ulterior motives, and that such motives were unrelated to any authentic concern about drug abuse or helping people. Further, these hidden motives were often seen to be in direct opposition to the short-term and long-range effort to curb drug abuse in this country. The opinions expressed by other respondents reflected an acceptance of the government's credibility concerning the policy's stated goals, either in whole or in part, while being vehemently critical of the basic assumptions, misunderstandings, and inadequate knowledge and foresight, upon which that policy decision was based.

All of these types of statements, to be called 'distrustful attitudes,' will be divided into the following three subcategories:

1. Policy based on ignorance--statements emphasizing the policy makers' lack of knowledge, misunderstanding of the problem, and/or miscalculation of the policy's effects.
2. Policy related to direct or indirect financial interests--reflecting the belief that the government's primary intention was, in reality, this type of unstated ulterior motive.
3. Policy implemented for political reasons--statements based on the belief that the government was primarily concerned with its own propagandistic and/or counter-revolutionary strategies.

This category includes the following explanations, believed to be behind the government's policy decision:

Distrustful Attitudes

1. Policy based on ignorance

- a. The policy reflects no real understanding of the

drug problem in gernereral.

- b. The policy makers lacked any foresight or predictive ability.
- c. The policy was aimed at the symptoms, rather than at the underlying causes of drug abuse.
- d. The policy was focussed on the wrong problem. The marihuana problem is minor compared to the problems related to the use of heroin, the barbiturates, and other drugs.
- e. By controlling the influx of marihuana only, the government inadvertently accelerated the use of other drugs.
- f. The policy was ineffective because the large scale flow of marihuana was undisturbed.
- g. Only the small time smuggler was effected by the policy, since organized importers use boats and airplanes rather than automobiles, to bring marihuana across the border.
- h. The policy was contradictory to other developments in the drug abuse field. The penalties for first-time offenders and possessors of small amounts of marihuana were being reduced, at the same time that these were the people most likely to be arrested at border crossings.
- i. The vast amount of money and energy spent on Operation Intercept could have been used for intensive research on the effects of marihuana. If it had been, the government might have obtained a clearer picture of whether it should be illegal in the first place.
- j. Drug control must come from within local communities. The law enforcement approach has never been effective in this area.
- k. The policy makers do not really understand the law of supply and demand.

- l. The policy makers have little understanding of Mexican farmers, or of the Mexican police and government officials.
 - m. The government incorrectly assumed that people will stop using drugs because marihuana is scarce.
 - n. The government underestimated the adaptability of those who supply the illegal drug market.
 - o. The policy was part of an unrealistic 'scare campaign,' that incorrectly lumped all drugs, and all drug users together.
 - p. The policy's effects made people more, instead of less involved, with obtaining drugs.
 - q. The government fails to understand that people are attracted to drug use because they find it to be an enjoyable activity. Operation Intercept did nothing to alter that basic attraction.
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2. Policy related to direct or indirect financial interests
 - a. The policy is closely related to the 'liquor lobby' in the United States.
 - b. The government directly profits from inflated marihuana prices.
 - c. People within the government own marihuana farms in Mexico. They initiate such policies in order to realize greater profits.
 - d. People with influence within the government have a vested interest in the increased demand for barbiturates and other blackmarket pharmaceuticals, which always accompanies a marihuana shortage.
 - e. The government was manipulated by organized crime so that the price of Mexican marihuana would rise.
 - f. The government was manipulated by organized crime so that there would be a bigger market for Vietnamese marihuana which they planned to import in larger quantities.

- g. The government did not concentrate on heroin importation because the people controlling the government do not want to hurt organized crime.
- h. The people in control of the government and the people in control of organized crime are indistinguishable. For financial reasons, the marihuana shortage was in their interests.

3. Policy implemented for political reasons

- a. Policy somehow related to the political ambitions of those in government.
- b. The government was primarily concerned about 'looking' as if they were doing something, regardless of what would be the real effects of the policy.
- c. Young people are being sacrificed for the 'southern strategy.'
- d. The government wanted to pacify 'middle America.'
- e. It was a 'token effort,' intended to please those who were demanding that something be done about the drug problem.
- f. The policy makers saw the policy as a 'vote-getter.'
- g. The government presented the problem in simplistic terms and proposed a simple, easy solution. By misstating the problem, they were able to claim a success for the policy.
- h. The administrators of government anti-drug agencies devised the policy in order to impress a new political administration.
- i. The policy was initiated by bureaucracies within the government for the purpose of expanding their own power and influence.
- j. The government was trying to get credit for a situation brought about by organized crime.
- k. Politicians decided to stop the marihuana traffic because their own children were getting 'busted.'

- l. As soon as the drug problem was recognized in white communities, the government decided to do something about it. They were unconcerned when the problem was confined to the ghetto.
- m. The policy makers wanted to inconvenience people who they don't like, namely, people involved in marihuana use.
- n. It was believed that a strong anti-marihuana stand would bring young people 'into line.'
- o. By citing a common enemy, the President expected the American people to 'band together,' against attitudes and behaviors which he disapproved.
- p. The policy was part of a trend to make drug users look like criminals.
- q. The policy makers foresaw the switch to heroin and felt that this was in their interests.
- r. The government knows that many people who use drugs are potential revolutionaries, and believed that the switch to heroin would curtail this development.
- s. The policy was intended to keep the black and Puerto Rican people suppressed, by forcing them to use heroin.
- t. The policy was an attempt to cut down on the growing opposition to the government, particularly by young people and poor people, by forcing them to use heroin.
- u. By forcing people into heroin use, more people would be contained in dead-end rehabilitation programs, rather than demanding jobs.

Although it is not possible to arrive at a clear cut distinction between those whose comments reflected an underlying faith in the policy makers' intentions and intelligence, and those whose statements emanated from a basic distrust of same, a few useful generalizations seem to be justified:

1. Trusting attitudes were more likely to be expressed by by 'establishment marihuana users!'. These marihuana users were rarely exposed to multiple drug use experimentation and did not identify with a drug subculture.
2. With a few exceptions, those who expressed trusting attitudes were not personally exposed to the increased use of heroin.
3. Even those who expressed trusting attitudes did not feel that the policy was generally successful, in terms of its stated objectives.
4. Youthful, middle class, frequent users of marihuana, drug rehabilitation workers, writers, journalists, and drug dealers usually emphasized the policy makers' unfamiliarity with the drug situation, and their overriding concern with publicity.
5. Those who feel furthest and most alienated from the centers of power and decision-making, namely 'hippie-types,' writers for underground publications, community workers in ghetto areas, and young black and Puerto Rican residents of low-income neighborhoods, were most likely to believe that the government is closely aligned with organized crime, and that the government has a political vested interest in the use of heroin.
6. Those who expressed distrustful attitudes were far more likely to have witnessed, or participated in the increased use of heroin during this period.
7. Distrustful attitudes were more common than trusting attitudes, among all types of drug users.

On September 21, 1969, the United States government officially implemented the Operation Intercept policy. With a great deal of mass media coverage, the policy makers

announced that this policy was intended to detect and deter the illegal importation of drugs, marihuana in particular, which were coming from Mexico into the United States. It was reasoned that reduced importation, and resultant high prices would stem the upward trend in illegal drug use in the United States.

Although the government's intentions were clearly stated and widely disseminated, those to whom the decision had direct relevance interpreted the government's analysis and/or intentions quite differently. What is most interesting is the very great range of perceptions and interpretations which resulted, either directly or indirectly, from a single public policy decision. The scope of that range is evident from the data presented in this section.

Another important insight to emerge from this data is the alarmingly widespread undercurrent of public cynicism vis à vis official decisions, particularly by those most closely associated with the drug abuse problem. The belief, in both respectable and disapproved social circles, that even regarding a pressing social issue, the government says one thing and means something else. The widespread conviction that the government is more concerned with its own selfish aims, in terms of public relations, financial or political motivations, than it is with the well-being of its citizens. The implicit assumption that the policy makers and those whom the policy is designed to help, see things quite differently and are often working at cross-purposes. It is evident that the effects of Operation Intercept did little to mitigate this unfortunate situation. If anything, Operation Intercept widened the communications gap and exacerbated this situation, particularly among those least likely to trust public officials and government leadership to begin with.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II. The Multiple Consequences of Operation Intercept

Section B: Behavioral Reactions to the General Marihuana Shortage

1. See Richard R. Lingeman, Drugs From A to Z: A Dictionary (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 94, 143; Sidney Cohen, The Drug Dilemma (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 49; William A. McGlothlin, "Cannabis: A Reference," in The Marihuana Papers, ed. by David Solomon (New York: The New American Library, 1968), p. 462; Lester Grinspoon, "Marihuana," Scientific American, Vol. 221, No. 6 (December, 1969), p. 17.
2. Testimony by Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of the Customs Bureau and Secret Service, before the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, on September 29, 1969, in U.S. News and World Report, October 13, 1969, p. 51; see also Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous Drugs Task Force, Report of Special Presidential Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous Drugs (June 6, 1969), p. 8.
3. Lingeman, Drugs From A to Z, p. 94.
4. See Cohen, The Drug Dilemma, p. 59; Lingeman, Drugs From A to Z, pp. 95-96; Grinspoon, "Marihuana," p. 22; McGlothlin, "Cannabis," pp. 455-471; Dana L. Farnsworth, "A Short Dialogue on Pot," Medical Insight, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March, 1970) p. 45; A. Benabud, "Psychopathological Aspects of the Cannabis Situation in Morocco: Statistical Data for 1956," U.N. Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1957), pp. 1-16; R.J. Bouquet, "Cannabis, Parts III-V," U.N. Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1951), pp. 22-45; R.J. Bouquet, "Marihuana Intoxication," Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 124 (1944), p. 1010-1011;

- I.C. Chopra and R.N. Chopra, "The Use of Cannabis Drugs in India," U.N. Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1957), pp. 4-29; "Statement From the National Institute of Mental Health on the Current Status of Marijuana," in First Report by the Select Committee on Crime, Marihuana, House Report No. 91-978, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (April 6, 1970), p. 113.
5. A "nickel bag," is a five dollar packet of marihuana equal to approximately one-fifth to one-eighth of an ounce.
6. Erich Goode, "The Marijuana Market," Columbia Forum (Winter, 1969), p. 6.

Section C: Attitudinal Responses to the Government's Policy

7. Kenneth Gergen, "Assessing the Leverage Points in the Process of Policy Formation," in The Study of Policy Formation, ed. by Raymond Bauer and Kenneth Gergen (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 183.
8. Drugs Task Force, Report, p. 15.
9. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

CHAPTER III

Analysis of the Findings: Public Policy and the Drug Abuse Problem

Section A: The Findings and the Hypotheses

Hypothesis I. Although there was a general decline in the supply of marihuana during this period, the shortage was more evident in certain population groups within the New York City area, than in others. Such groups could be differentiated in terms of definable social characteristics.

Observations and interviews during and following the Operation Intercept period have confirmed the conclusion that there was, in fact, a severe marihuana shortage in New York City during the summer and early fall of 1969. Although a general shortage was evident, the extent of the shortage for various groups and individuals was not found to be constant.

Those who experienced "no shortage" and "no higher prices" were atypical of the vast majority of marihuana users. These persons were unaffected for one of the following reasons:

- a. A few had access to an adequate supply of domestically grown marihuana. Although this situation was quite rare in the New York City area, evidence suggests that it was more common in other sections of the country.
- b. Prior to the shortage, some marihuana users had accumulated a supply large enough to last through the summer and

early fall of 1969, so that purchases during this period were unnecessary. Those who were in this situation sold marihuana on a full-time or a part-time basis, and although personally uneffected, selling activities were adapted, in various ways, to the marihuana shortage.

- c. Many sporadic users of marihuana were uneffected, since, due to infrequent use prior to the shortage, a lay-off of several months went unnoticed.

In contrast, many users of marihuana were completely unable to obtain the drug for a period of at least one month during this period.. This situation was particularly common among two distinct types of marihuana users:

- a. Middle and upper-middle class white businessmen, professionals and others in "respectable" occupational and community positions, whose only tie to a drug subculture existed of one or two personal contacts from whom they previously purchased marihuana.
- b. Young, black and Puerto Rican users of marihuana, who were students, unemployed or marginally employed, and resided in low income ghetto areas.

Although some users were able to maintain their regular intake and supply simply by paying higher prices for the drug, the majority of marihuana users found it less available as well as more expensive. Those who found it to be readily available although more expensive, identified strongly with a drug subculture and had sold marihuana at some time. They most closely resemble those who were uneffected due to an adequate supply for personal use (I.b.). However, even among those with selling experience and a strong counter-culture identification, most experienced decreasing availability and increasing prices during this period. This two-sided dilemma was the most common situation among marihuana users in the New York City area. Generally, it was found

that those who stressed the difficulty of obtaining marihuana were older, had greater financial resources and were less involved in the drug scene than those who emphasized high prices.

Thus, although there were probably as many different specific experiences in relation to the drug market during this period, as there are drug using cliques in New York City, some useful generalizations do emerge from the data. These differential experiences suggest the many types of relations which exist between the marihuana market and various types of marihuana users, as well as underlining the highly differentiated and uncontrolled nature of the marihuana market itself.

Hypothesis 2. The limited supply of marihuana coming into the United States led to a wide range of unanticipated behavioral and attitudinal consequences.

Hypothesis 3. Among certain population groups, there was a significant increase in the availability, use and distribution of illegal drugs other than marihuana. Such groups could be differentiated in terms of age, residence, socio-economic status and degree of involvement in a drug subculture.

It was seen that the immediate and intermediate objectives of the Operation Intercept policy were realized. Importation of marihuana was substantially curtailed, its price increased and its availability was reduced. However, the reduction, and hopefully the elimination of illegal drug use in the United States, particularly among the young, was the ultimate objective of this public policy. If the government's prognosis was accurate, we would have expected

to observe a general decrease in drug use during this period. Ideally, the policy aimed at complete abstention by a significant proportion of drug users. Thus, both abstention and decreased use can be characterized as intended consequences of the Operation Intercept policy.

The findings of this study indicate that abstaining from all drug use was a highly atypical reaction to the marihuana shortage. In fact, those who reported no drug use at all, for at least one month during this period, were such infrequent users of marihuana and so uninvolved in a drug use subculture, that "abstain" would be an inappropriate term. Just as these sporadic users experienced "no shortage," they also experienced no real change in drug use behavior.

Although less marihuana use was reported by many drug users and observers of the drug scene, most of these went on to note an increased availability and use of drugs other than marihuana. Those who did report a personal decline in total drug consumption were distinguished by certain identifiable characteristics which can be categorized as follows:

1. Middle class and upper middle class white collar workers and their wives, between the ages of twenty-four and fifty-five, who previously used marihuana on a regular basis (several times a week), but who had little identification with a drug subculture, a counter-culture movement, or a drug oriented way of life. Prior to the shortage, these respondents had never used any illegally obtained drug other than marihuana or hashish.

2. Very infrequent users of marihuana who might have gone several months without using it, even if the shortage had never developed. These were white, middle class people, over twenty years of age, involved in white collar employment or educational endeavors. As in the former groups, these respondents had never used any illegally obtained drug other than marihuana or hashish prior to the shortage.

Therefore, the ultimate objectives of Operation Intercept were realized only among a very limited segment of drug users in the New York City area. Further, these marihuana users are distinguished by certain objective and subjective characteristics, which, taken as a whole, make them unrepresentative of the general drug using population. These factors include serious involvements in respectable social institutions; lack of identification with a drug subculture; an average age above twenty years old; and rare involvement in multiple drug use experimentation. Many of these reportedly resorted to an increased use of alcohol.

It is evident that those who reacted as anticipated were not those for whom drug use in general or marihuana use in particular, was posing a serious problem of personal adjustment. Nor were they the drug counter-culture devotees, who were seen as posing a threat to the nation's social order. If any of the studies, official statistics and polls are to be believed, they are also non-representative, in attitudes and behavior, of the vast majority of marihuana users.

While we can generalize about the characteristics of those who decreased or temporarily discontinued drug use during the shortage, this is not the case concerning those who reacted in an unanticipated manner. Those who manifested increased experimentation, a greater reliance on drugs other than marihuana, heavier involvement in drug distribution and an increased or reaffirmed skepticism concerning the intentions and basic intelligence of the authorities, cannot be uniformly characterized. These types of unintended reactions and adaptations were experienced by marihuana users from a wide range of residential, socio-economic, occupational and age groups in the New York

City area. Further, such unanticipated reactions were reported among persons representing various stages of involvement in drug use subcultures. In sum, the various types of unanticipated reactions, and the types of persons involved in same, are as follows:

- a. Many marihuana users, representing all ages, residential areas and socio-economic strata, and various stages of involvement in drug use subcultures, became much more involved, in terms of time and energy, in trying to purchase marihuana, than ever before. Through this involvement, contact was often established with individuals and groups more "advanced" in drug use and drug distribution.
- b. Some marihuana users, particularly younger people who were able to obtain marihuana during the shortage, became involved in its sale for the first time.
- c. Among all types of marihuana users, there was a sharply accelerated interest in "homegrown" marihuana. This "do-it-yourself" movement was reflected in the publication and sales of books, articles and pamphlets devoted to the subject.
- d. The use of alcohol increased for individual marihuana users from all age, residential, and socio-economic groups. This was least true among those drug users for whom marihuana was not the primary drug used prior to the shortage.
- e. The most general result of the marihuana shortage was the sharply increased availability and use of hashish. This phenomenon was reported in all neighborhoods except the low income, black and Puerto Rican sections of New York City. It occurred among groups representing the full spectrum of age, occupational and drug use involvements. Drug users who primarily used heroin and/or barbiturates prior to the shortage, were not effected by the increased

availability of hashish.

- f. Many regular users of marihuana, particularly younger people, became involved in the sale of hashish. This was especially true for youths from middle to upper income families, who had previously sold marihuana at some time.
- g. The increased availability of hashish reflected a step-up in its illegal importation into this country. Whether more people became involved or established networks simply increased their activities, is not known. It is believed that both of these factors played a role. However, it was evident that the knowledge of high profits and, consequently, the enticement to become involved in hashish smuggling, was experienced by many marihuana users. This seems to have been particularly true regarding United States citizens who were vacationing overseas.
- h. This period witnessed a substantial increase in the use of barbiturates, amphetamines and psychedelic drugs in predominately white neighborhoods throughout the New York City area, representing the full range of socio-economic strata. This switch was most prevalent among youthful drug users (high school and college age), who had previously experimented with one or more of these types of drugs (although many who had never done so previously also became involved), and who identified with a drug subculture or counter-culture movement.
- i. More people, particularly young drug users heavily involved in a drug-oriented lifestyle, became involved in the sale and distribution of barbiturates, amphetamines and psychedelics, than ever before.
- j. For certain individuals, there was an introduction into the use of cocaine for the first time. Rather than a distinct ambience or preference, this phenomenon appeared to be a part of the heavy multiple drug experimentation

that was taking place in many groups at this time. Several factors, including limited availability and high cost, account for the fact that few continued cocaine use on a regular basis.

- k. A few drug users, usually teenagers, resorted to cough medicines (prescription medicines containing codeine and terpin hydrate elixir or commercial syrups such as Robitussin A-C which contains codeine, an antihistamine and a muscle relaxant), herbs, such as catnip, nutmeg or mace (inhaled), antihistamines (sometimes mixed with alcohol or cough syrups), a variety of prescription medicines for special ailments (inhalants, pills and liquids), and an assortment of other homemade concoctions, in the attempt to "get a head" when nothing else was available.
- l. The increased availability of heroin was evident throughout the New York City area, in many types of neighborhoods and among various types of drug users. Further, its price became competitive with the rising price of marihuana. It is not known whether the increased availability and reduced price of heroin was caused by a coincidentally large supply of heroin in the United States, a step-up in heroin importation, the fact that it was now being sold more aggressively, or simply that it was being cut more and packaged in smaller amounts. Reports suggest that all of these factors were instrumental. The fact remains that suddenly, during the marihuana shortage, there was more heroin around, in more types of neighborhoods, and at cheaper prices, than most experts could recall in the last twenty years.
- m. Although the increased availability of heroin was reported in many neighborhoods and by drug users in various stages of involvement in the drug scene, a significant switch to heroin use during this period was generally confined

to particular localities and to specific types of drug users. This development was most widespread in the low income ghetto areas of New York City, where heroin use was rapidly accelerated by the marihuana shortage. In these areas, this mode of adaptation was found among individuals and groups that were in various stages of involvement in the drug scene prior to the summer shortage, including some young people who had never used any drug previously. In contrast, in predominately white, middle class and affluent communities, the switch to heroin was primarily among younger drug users (sixteen to twenty years old), who had used a variety of drugs regularly prior to the shortage (although marihuana and hashish were usually the primary drugs), and who were heavily involved in a drug-oriented lifestyle.

- n. Some drug users, who were using marihuana as part of an effort to stop heroin use, reverted to the use of heroin when marihuana became unavailable.
- o. As more people became involved in heroin use during the summer and early fall of 1969, many of the new recruits also became involved in its sale. This was true of heroin users from all age, socio-economic and neighborhood groups. These new entrepreneurs acquired a vested interest in the continued expansion of the market for heroin, which prompted them to seek more new recruits, from younger and younger age groups in their respective schools and neighborhoods.
- p. Many very young people, who had acquired a desire for a "drug experience," started experimenting with illegal drugs other than marihuana, which was unavailable to them.
- q. The attitudes expressed by drug rehabilitation workers, journalists, writers, drug users and drug dealers alike, generally coincided in terms of a basic distrust of the

intentions and intelligence of the policy-makers. While some attacked the authorities' lack of understanding of the drug problem, others accused them of using the policy as a means to attaining some unstated ulterior objective, unrelated to the "war on drugs." Unquestionably, this "communications gap" existed before Operation Intercept. But it is equally true that for many, Operation Intercept was an important factor in the alienation, polarization, and radicalization process.

These findings indicate that a vast range of unanticipated consequences resulted from the Operation Intercept policy decision. In this regard, Merton alerts us to an analytical requirement: "Rigorously speaking, the consequences of purposive action are limited to those elements in the resulting situation which are exclusively the outcome of the action, i.e., those elements which would not have occurred had the action not taken place."¹ Without access to a control group, we can have no way of knowing with any statistical certainty whether some of these developments might not have materialized anyway. Since all marihuana users in the New York City area were affected, no within-area group could be used for comparative study. And since the enforced marihuana shortage was nationwide, we could not study another section of the country as a "control population." Even if this was possible, the problems of comparability would have been numerous. So the link between these consequences, and the policy to which they have been attributed, was drawn by those who were personally exposed to the "particular concrete situation"² in which we were interested.

Many of the statements presented in Chapter II clearly

depict the direct relationship between the policy and its unanticipated consequences. Further evidence of this relationship derives from the fact that at the end of the marihuana shortage, the vast majority of respondents reported a return to drug use patterns quite similar to those adopted during the pre-shortage period. However, one significant change was evident among those marihuana users who had experimented with other drugs. Although marihuana once again assumed the role of "primary drug," other drugs, used regularly during the shortage, were added to the repertoire but on only an occassional basis. Another exception was represented by those youngsters who had first experimented with drugs while marihuana was unavailable and subsequently switched to marihuana after the shortage ended.

Contrary to much professional as well as popular opinion, the switch back to marihuana was even reported by many of those drug users who turned to heroin during the shortage. Obviously, the poor quality of the heroin which was being sold at that time, thus its limited physiologically addicting potential, was a major factor. However, another important factor which is generally overlooked in the literature is that many drug users, even those who may depend on a "harder drug" for a period of time, rely primarily on marihuana. Further, many multiple drug experimenters prefer marihuana to other drugs, which come to be used only on specific occasions or in specific types of situations. Thus, it is believed that the "worse it is for you, the more you're going to like it and use it" hypothesis, is not generally valid.

In sum, the link between the Operation Intercept policy and the resulting situation appears to be quite clear. Further, the behaviors of drug users after the shortage ended adds greater credence to this causal formulation. Based on the statements of those who were personally involved,

"the validity of hypotheses derived from content analysis and social psychological theory"³ has been confirmed. In the next section, "Additional Evidence Concerning the Unanticipated Consequences of Operation Intercept" two types of supplementary evidence will be cited:

- a. Published accounts of drug use patterns in the New York City area during this period.
- b. Published accounts and interviews with professionals concerned about the drug abuse problem, depicting the situation in other sections of the country.

Section B: Additional Evidence Concerning the Unanticipated
Consequences of Operation Intercept

Although the issue has been most vehemently debated in the past decade, concern over the unanticipated consequences of anti-marihuana legislation is not something new. Nearly eighty years ago, the British published the largest, and one of the most impartial reports ever done on hemp, a seven volume, three thousand page study entitled "Report of the Indian Hemp Drug Commission." Their conclusion, that the moderate use of hemp produces no injury to the character, the mind or the body,⁴ has recently received a good deal of exposure. However, Kaplan points out that a recommendation of the report, which has been all but ignored, holds that the prohibition of marihuana would lead to the increased usage of other, considerably more harmful drugs.⁵

Lindesmith's analysis of the effects of The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 also focusses on the negative consequences of such legislation:

If it is true that marihuana users were not switching to heroin in 1937, it seems probable that it was the 1937 anti-marihuana law itself that brought about the change. With the risks increased, prices and profits on the now illicit commodity went up, with the result that merchants who had earlier handled one or the other of these drugs, but not both, now began to handle both of them. The marihuana user thus found himself able to purchase heroin from merchants who had previously sold only marihuana.⁶

With the advent of Operation Intercept, concern over the negative consequences of the attempt to suppress the supply of marihuana, came into public view to an

unprecedented degree. Much of the controversy was reminiscent of the issues raised by Lindesmith and by the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission, and many of the conclusions reached by writers and professionals in the drug abuse field, as well as mass media journalists, reaffirm the findings previously stated in this report.

Two distinctly diverse sources, John Kaplan, author and Professor of Law at Stanford University, and the Rolling Stone, using information obtained from Andrew Kopkind, editor of Hard Times, quoted Thomas Lynch, attorney general of California, as saying that the use of dangerous drugs increases among marihuana users in times of marihuana scarcity, because marihuana and dangerous drugs have become interchangeable. Based on Lynch's statements, Kaplan concludes: "Mr. Lynch refuses to draw from this the obvious conclusion that his efforts at suppression of marijuana are, insofar as they are successful, doing his state more harm than good."⁷ Rolling Stone points to the inherent contradiction between Mr. Lynch's statements and the policy-enforced shortage as follows: "If this is so, it would seem almost immoral--by their standards--for the Feds to cut down on the flow of marijuana."⁸ Kaplan goes on to note that during the marihuana shortage in the summer of 1968, use of a "new" drug, jimsonweed (also known as locoweed), previously almost unknown in the United States, was reported on the increase in Southern California.⁹

The Nation also offered an ominous prediction concerning the policy's effects:

The objective, according to Mr. Kleindienst, is to deter smugglers, so that the price of marijuana will rise and an estimated 30 million young Americans will

be obliged to forsake the weed for lack of funds. At least the more impecunious of them will undergo a money cure. Some, of course, may turn to heroin or other addictive dangerous drugs. If the price of heroin is also jacked up, the addicts will have to steal more to get their daily fix...It is more likely, according to Southern California authorities, that African hashish, cheaper and more potent than Mexican marijuana, will take over most of the market. 10

These inherent contradictions, past experiences, and dire predictions obviously carried little weight in terms of the formation of policies for 1969.

According to Life, although marihuana had all but disappeared from the streets, "Heroin, LSD, hashish and all varieties of uppers and downers are around in great abundance."¹¹ Similarly, U.S. News and World Report quoted Lieutenant Norbert Currie, head of San Francisco's narcotics bureau, as saying: "But we did notice that in the first six months of this year, young people--in high schools particularly--were switching over to pills; mainly seconal." ¹² And a New York agent, John J. Riley of the U.S. Customs Bureau, was reported as stating: "Hashish has gone from \$300 to \$500 a pound to \$1,200 a pound. There has been a terrific increase in the past year in imports in hashish."¹³ He went on to note another development: "Recently there has been an alarming increase in intercepts of packages containing marijuana mailed from Vietnam."¹⁴

Reports of unanticipated consequences came from many sources. A New York Times Magazine article, on the drug problem in an affluent Long Island community, included the following observation:

But hash right now is the hot socializing item, a bit stronger than marijuana, considerably safer than LSD. A high school informant said--and a local law officer later confirmed--that Schreiber students started buying hashish and LSD when the Nixon Administration's 1969 Operation Intercept temporarily dried up marijuana supplies. 15

And Time noted that "many authorities say that the dearth of pot is prompting users to take up harder drugs like amphetamines or even heroin."¹⁶ Newsweek summarized the "switching" phenomenon as follows:

Most ominous of all, the shortage of grass has driven many marijuana fanciers to sample heavier stuff: speed (amphetamines), acid (LSD), mescaline (which is suddenly in plentiful supply), smack (heroin), and even alcohol. "I know of four kids--and they're really kids, like under 16--who've tried smack because they couldn't get grass," reports one Cambridge dealer. "They told me they were satisfied with pot but that they couldn't get their money's worth and get high on it." This phenomenon worries Dr. David E. Smith, director of the struggling Haight-Ashbury Clinic in San Francisco. "The government line is that the use of marijuana leads to more dangerous drugs," he notes. "The fact is that the lack of marijuana leads to the use of more dangerous drugs." 17

Included in a comprehensive report to the Ford Foundation on the drug abuse problem in this country, Wald and Hutt offered the following analysis of the government's campaign to stop drugs at the border: "There is strong evidence that Operation Intercept, the attempt to impede the flow of marijuana from Mexico into the United States, has resulted in significant substitution of other drugs for marijuana."¹⁸

At the same time, a wide range of other unintended consequences were being reported. The rapidly accelerated interest in domestic marihuana, even growing it in the home, received great coverage. The following letter from a marihuana dealer, appeared in Herb Caen's column in the San Francisco Chronicle:

Now \$10 to \$15 a lid. Down from \$20 a lid in August. We have several greenhouses in the Sacramento river area, some equipped with sunlamps to give a total of 20 hours sunlight. These are small greenhouses, each producing only 10 'keys' per growth cycle, but

it's a safeguard against the Mexican situation. 19

And the East Village Other, writing for an audience that supports the use of marihuana, offered the following documentation of events and a prediction of future trends:

It now appears that efforts to tighten up supplies of dope along with somewhat more lenient penalties for possession will cause many heads to seriously get into growing their own. Already, major home-grown crops have just been harvested now that the frost is here by those who had the foresight to plant last Spring. Last week, Vermont fuzz reported that the crop was so heavy and so dispersed up there that they could not possibly find and destroy more than a small portion of it. Heads are picking up on growing methods and Sylvania is enjoying a boom on its Gro-Lux lamps for indoor growing. The underground press is filled with instruction of starting seedlings, proper fertilizers, transplanting, and the like. And, surprisingly enough, much of the home-grown is pretty good shit. You won't get high on two tokes but a ~~skinny~~ joint will usually get one person off, and it's free.

By next summer, the heads will be doing their part in keeping Amerika green and before you know it the weed will be everywhere. Within two years, with seeds acclimated to northern climates and growing techniques improved through experience, good home grown dope should be so plentiful that "everybody will get stoned" and your friendly neighborhood dealer will be standing in the unemployment lines or hustling like the rest of us. 20

Newsweek summarized the developments on the domestic front as follows:

The shortage has created a vogue for manuals such as "Home Grown Happiness" an eighteen-page instruction booklet on marijuana cultivation that sold out several printings this summer in Cambridge, Mass. But those who have harvested their own cannabis in window boxes, in closets under infra-red lamps and even in the open fields (a 4-acre plantation was recently discovered as far north as Maine) report dismal results. "You have to smoke two or three sticks in a row to get a real buzz," says one smoker of the domestic product.

In Kentland, Ind., last week, police arrested 24 would-be pot prospectors, who arrived carrying maps they hoped would lead to areas where the stuff grows wild. 21

The increased interest in domestic marihuana was also uncovered by Congressman Claude Pepper, Chairman of the Select Committee on Crime of the House of Representatives. As part of an inquiry into marihuana use in this country, Mr. Pepper heard testimony from Lieutenant Wayne F. Rowe of the Nebraska State Highway Patrol. Their discussion included the following remarks:

Mr. Rowe: Now, last year was the first year that we had a great deal of experience with marihuana harvesters coming in from out of State. In the year of 1968 we documented 40 arrests for marihuana harvesting. These were all people from out of State.

To date in 1969 we have documented 81 arrests of people from outside of Nebraska who have come in to harvest the marihuana that is growing here. This represents over a 100 per cent increase over last year.

Mr. Pepper: Did you notice that those arrests increased as the supply of marihuana coming into this country was diminished.

Mr. Rowe: Yes, sir. The spring crop of marihuana in Mexico, as I understand it, was bad because of the weather. They were unable to dry it out. We also understand that Mexican marihuana is not available in supply as is demanded by the present market.

Mr. Pepper: From that experience, would you anticipate that if we are successful in our effort to diminish the available quantity of marihuana in other parts of the country, there will be greater effort to get it from Nebraska and Iowa than there is today.

Mr. Rowe: Yes, sir, this will be what will happen. By coming to Nebraska they eliminate the dangers of crossing an international border.

Mr. Pepper: Tell us approximately the number of States represented by those people whom you arrested here.

Mr. Rowe: Approximately 20 States.

Mr. Pepper: It seems rather odd that the Government of the United States is helping the Mexican farmers to kill this to keep it out of the United States, yet the Government doesn't help people in Nebraska to

get rid of this weed. Doesn't that seem odd? ²²

The East Village Other referred to another consequence of the marihuana shortage:

Even more, with rising dope prices, every mothers-son-head is beginning to cop quantity so he can deal some off to pay for his own consumption. This has vastly increased grass use throughout the suburbs and college towns. Now, the kids are dealers instead of just users, selling off ounces to pay for their kilos. Ahh, Capitalism. ²³

The Rolling Stone reprinted a letter from a California dealer, which points out a new money-making opportunity, brought about by the shortage of marihuana and the simultaneous influx of heroin into New York City: "It is still possible to grab a New York flight with two 'keys' of grass (about \$320--California prices), exchange it for smack or coke in the Village or Harlem, and sell the hard stuff here for over \$3,000. ²⁴

Of all of the unintended effects of the marihuana shortage, the switch to "hard" drugs caused greatest concern among those with a long-standing interest in drugs and drug abuse. Allen Ginsberg, like many of the political radicals interviewed in New York City, saw this development as part of a government-police-mafia conspiracy:

One element of the conspiracy is the escalation of the junk problem. While Operation Intercept was aimed at stopping marijuana, there was simultaneously a flood of junk in all of the big cities, especially New York. The price of junk doubled and the quality of junk decreased so much that there were hundreds of deaths from overdosing. Police pressures finally busted Owsley and others in this area so there is less and less of a marijuana/acid culture and more and more of a speed/junkie culture which I attribute in great part to the activities of the police.

The other aspect of the conspiracy is that all

those junkies are giving their money to the mafia, because the mafia is supplying the junk. According to the New York Times, junk is the second largest illegal income for the mafia, the first being gambling. As it now stands addiction is a criminal problem rather than a medical one. I would guess that on a state and federal level there must be some kind of working relationship between them in order to maintain the situation as it is. Otherwise, it wouldn't be possible for the mafia to import so much junk. If there is a collusion of interests I don't think enough people understand how that problem can be attacked morally.25

Several months after the conclusion of Operation Intercept, Jay Levin, a reporter for the New York Post, conducted interviews with heroin-using teenagers in Jamaica, New York. Based on these interviews, the following remarks were published using the respondent's first initial only:

O: I think most of the kids are using skag (heroin), like here in Queens, for the same reason I did, 'cause other drugs were being stamped out. It's harder to get barbiturates and reefers, but with skag, all the dealers have it...I started out with skag 'cause reefers, I couldn't get that. One night at a party a cat came up to me and said, do I want to try skag? I was curious so I snorted some. Then, you know, after a while I started skin-popping because they said it was a better high.

R: In the summer there wasn't much grass around, that's when I started on dope. Everybody was doing everything to get high...Before that, I was using grass, hash, pills.

J: Yeah, I was on grass for a long time and all of a sudden the panic set in and I didn't know what to do, so I started using skag. 26

Levin's interviews led to the following conclusion: "For a while last summer, the federal government mounted a massive crackdown on marijuana smuggling across the Mexican border. For most of the summer, pot was as hard to find in the city

as snow. The marijuana 'panic' accelerated--some say (drastically--the trend to heroin."²⁷

Kaplan also noted this development in New York City:

Recently, moreover, it appears that efforts to enforce criminalization of marijuana have contributed to the heroin problem in yet another way. New York City is presently engulfed in an outbreak of heroin use not matched since the epidemic of 1948-49. Though the mechanism for this has not yet been fully documented, most observers place the blame squarely upon Operation Intercept, which for several weeks made marijuana almost unobtainable in large areas of the United States. This marijuana drought took place at a time when, by coincidence, an ample supply of heroin in New York City enabled the traders in heroin to pull off a "business coup." They diluted their usual grade of heroin, dropped its price, and offered it widely for sale in the high schools and junior high schools where it previously had been unobtainable at a price competitive with that of marijuana. As a result, heroin made substantial inroads on a population far younger--and somewhat more middle-class--than that previously involved with the drug. 28

Seymour Fiddle, Research Director of Exodus House, an East Harlem rehabilitation center for drug addicts, filled in some of the particulars of the switch from marihuana to heroin during this period. His comments are based on close observation of the situation in Harlem, although they are also applicable to other ghetto neighborhoods:

Thus, in 1968-69, there was increasing talk of inflation in the world of business and finance, and New York City was among the cities most affected by it. During that same period, the illegal market decreased the price of a bag of heroin in the ghetto. The bag, which had sold for as much as three to six dollars earlier, increasingly was sold for two dollars and not necessarily with radically fewer grains...Two dollars is significant for another reason. It was also the price of three sticks or marijuana cigaretts. For a time heroin was truly competitive with marijuana,

and the transition from marijuana to heroin was therefore made less costly. In addition, if I point out to you that at least once, during the summer of 1969, there was a panic in the marijuana market, you will realize the full irony of the situation. I have been told by some of my informants that potheads they know, missing their regular, as they refer to it, had snorted heroin, sometimes for the first time, to get a head. I do not know whether anything more serious developed in these cases, but clearly, these were risks taken by people on pot, not by "graduating" from the drug, but through a scarcity caused by the very police who claim that there is always a good chance for such graduation. 29

The switch to heroin was also reported in other sections of the country. Several interviews were conducted with professionals and staff workers in the drug abuse field, who had spent the summer of 1969 outside of the northeastern section of the United States. An interview with a staff worker at an East Harlem rehabilitation clinic was particularly instructive, as it underlined the close interrelationship between the drug market in New York City and developments in the southeastern United States. The respondent had lived in the Chapel Hill area of North Carolina until October of 1969. The following are excerpts from this interview; conducted in January of 1970:

Over the past year drug use has expanded a lot. And more people are using harder drugs. Last year there were mostly potheads around, and now, well everybody I know that smoked pot has used something else. There are a lot more people experimenting...I'm talking about people in Chapel Hill. Mostly white, middle class, between eighteen and early thirties. Mostly non-students. Well, people who used to be students, some are still at the University of North Carolina. Most have dropped out and are working as waitresses or in construction, or something like that...Using pot used to be kind of an elite thing at the University. Now just about everybody does. It's even moved into the fraternities...Probably, percentage-wise, there's

much more drug use in the high schools than at the college. There are a lot of heroin users in the high schools. Probably as many as there are in the whole Chapel Hill area, including the non-students... Heroin first came around in the summer. A lot of people from New York came down. Previously, you heard of people using it but really came into little contact with it. There were a lot of people in the black section of Durham, next to Chapel Hill, that had used heroin, but now a lot of the white kids around use it. It was really not noticeable till last summer...Hashish was much more accessible than marihuana during the year. It fluctuated. The market down there, it depends. Like somebody would come up to New York or Washington and cop, say a kilo, and when it runs out they don't always replenish their supply. So it kind of varies. Different people sell for a while and then it'll move on to somebody else. Then there are a few people who sell all the time...Last summer marihuana was almost impossible to get. You could get some hashish. Marihuana went up, if you could get it, to at least \$30 an ounce, sometimes more, and hashish went up 'cause it was the only thing you could get a hold of as far as smoke goes. It was about \$15 a gram. There were quite a few amphetamines but they had kind of always been around only more people started using them. There were a lot of speed freaks around that hadn't been there previously. The amphetamines were there before, but they started using in the summer. Still, downs were never a big thing. Then heroin came on the scene and people started, you know got chippies, last summer. Several of these people have got pretty good habits now... I really hadn't noticed it before the summer. It was really evident when I went home Christmas and, even in my home town, which is not Chapel Hill but just kind of a mill town, a lot of my friends were strung out. It was really a shock at Christmas 'cause it had grown so much since the summer. It all started in the summer though and then spread...The people who were dealing marihuana mainly went to dealing acid and speed or amphetamines. The heroin pushers were kind of new people on the scene...Mostly they came from New York. Like one guy down there. He comes up here to detoxify at a hospital when his habit gets too big and then gets a whole mess of stuff and goes back down and sells it. He does this periodically. Also, there was much more travel in the black section of Durham where mostly it was coming in through New

York, so they start dealing more with the black people... Some of the college people used it for the first time. Also last summer there were a lot of high school kids that started using it. I think it was mostly the college drop-out people who were selling it to the high school students. It's not a risk to the high school kids. Like the college kids are trying to get their education or whatever so not too many of them will want to use it. But the high school kids, there's more of a peer influence, so a lot more of them used it...They were selling \$8 bags of heroin. It's still \$8 bags, which is comparable to a \$2 bag up here in New York...Also a lot of people started growing their own in the summer. It's never as good as stuff that came in but it would get you by until some did come in. But there were quite a few people, especially up in the mountains, who would go out and grow it. Nobody would even pay any attention to it. But it was pretty weak stuff...There were a lot more people dealing drugs and there seemed to be a lot more money in it. Because everybody wanted to get high. They really didn't care how. They preferred to stick with pot but it wasn't around so they would use something else. There were more people dealing amphetamines and LSD and more people willing to try. Before, they were pretty uptight about using acid because of all the mass media stuff that came down about it, but then, you know like you gotta get high, so you go ahead.

In the winter of 1969, Robert Levensgood, M.D., was directing a research project aimed at obtaining the drug use histories of heroin-using youths from Grosse Pointe, an affluent suburb of Detroit, Michigan. The project advisor was Paul Lowinger of the Department of Psychiatry, Wayne State University. Of a known heroin using population of 300 in Grosse Pointe, 60 young heroin users were interviewed. No questions in the interview mentioned the marihuana shortage of the past summer, or the Operation Intercept policy. Of the 60 youths interviewed, 18 spontaneously referred to the marihuana shortage as a factor directly related to their own initial use of heroin. And of the 60 youths

interviewed from this white, upper-middle to upper class community, a clear majority began heroin use during the summer and fall of 1969, a period witnessing a severe marihuana shortage in the Grosse Pointe area. Findings, excerpted from these interviews, are presented in Appendix IV.

Therefore, the association between Operation Intercept, the marihuana shortage, and a host of unanticipated consequences, most of which were directly and significantly contrary to the policy's ultimate goals, is well substantiated by all available evidence.. In the next section, through an analysis of the policy and the problematic situation it was designed to counteract, we will attempt to explain the prevalence of these unanticipated consequences.

Section C: The Social Context of Operation Intercept:
An Examination of Contingent Conditions

All available evidence points to the conclusion that Operation Intercept, and the resultant marihuana shortage in the United States, acted as a direct, precipitating cause of the aforementioned unanticipated developments. Although this direct relationship is apparent, Operation Intercept was neither a "necessary condition,"³⁰ nor a "sufficient condition,"³¹ of these subsequent developments. Logically, it is quite possible that some of these occurrences may have materialized, or may materialize in the future, without a marihuana shortage. And it is also possible that a similar policy, enacted at some future time, would bring different results. However, since "a hypothesis of causal relationship asserts that a particular characteristic or occurrence (x) is one of the factors that determine another characteristic or occurrence (y)," ³² the hypothesized causal relationship is not negated by our inability to isolate a single determining factor.

Modern science recognizes that "the scientist rarely if ever expects to find a single factor or condition that is both necessary and sufficient to bring about an event."³³ The emphasis "is rather on a multiplicity of 'determining conditions,' which together make the occurrence of a given event probable."³⁴ This approach focusses on "contributory conditions," ones that "increase the likelihood that a given phenomenon will occur,"³⁵ because each factor "is only one of a number of factors that together determine the occurrence of the phenomenon."³⁶ Thus, events which might never have occurred (i.e. altered drug use patterns, etc.) without the presence of a particular contributory

condition (i.e. Operation Intercept), might also never have occurred if this condition was present while other relevant factors or conditions were simultaneously absent. Such other relevant factors have been called "contingent conditions," those "conditions under which a given variable is a contributory cause of a given phenomenon."³⁷

Although a study may focus on one particular contributory condition, which is seen to be the "key factor" or "precipitating condition" of a subsequent event, causal inferences require a comprehensive examination of the contingent conditions within which the hypothesized relationship between factors and sequence of events materializes. Applying this perspective to public policy issues and political events, Lasswell and Kaplan speak of the "principle of interdetermination" and "multiple causation,"³⁸ while Bauer uses the term "envelope of events and issues" to refer to "those events and issues that must be considered as the context within which to analyze a given policy problem."³⁹ Similarly, Suchman states that "the effect of any single factor will depend upon other circumstances also being present and will itself reflect a host of antecedent events."⁴⁰

Further, the "principle of interdetermination" dictates that we examine the multiplicity of effects, as well as multiple causes, and the processes by which causes and effects interact dialectically,⁴¹ since, according to Merton, the effects of public policy decisions "result from the interplay of the action and the objective situation."⁴² In other words, as stated by Schur, "the relation between policy and problem is reciprocal,"⁴³ and the policy is only one aspect of the total situation leading to some resultant condition. Thus, as stated in Chapter I, if we are to understand the Operation Intercept policy, and the reasons

behind the multiplicity of unanticipated consequences stemming from this policy effort, we must gain a comprehensive understanding of the complexities inherent in the problem situation it was designed to alleviate. Since the Operation Intercept policy must be viewed as a contributory rather than a necessary or sufficient cause of these unanticipated consequences, we must attempt to define those other relevant factors, or contingent conditions, those events, issues, social and cultural realities, in terms of which Operation Intercept was a significant determiner of subsequent developments.

Subsection 1: Traditional Controls in a Decade of Change

Traditionally, official policy has relied upon both formal and informal controls against the use of marihuana. According to Becker:

A number of potent forces operate to control the use of marijuana in this country...The major kinds of controls to be considered are: a) control through limiting of supply and access to the drug; b) control through the necessity of keeping nonusers from discovering that one is a user; c) control through definition of the act as immoral. 44

Becker points out the ways in which these forces operate, thus limiting the use of marihuana, in conventional groups:

Marijuana use is limited, in the first instance, by laws making possession or sale of the drug punishable by severe penalties. This confines its distribution to illicit sources not easily available to the ordinary person. In order for a person to begin marijuana use, he must begin participation in some group through which these sources of supply become available to him, ordinarily a group organized around values and activities opposing those of the larger conventional society... In this sense, the social mechanisms, which operate to limit availability of the drug, limit its use...

Marijuana use is limited also to the extent that individuals actually find it inexpedient or believe that they will find it so. This inexpediency, real or presumed, arises from the fact or belief that if nonusers discover that one uses the drug, sanctions of some important kind will be applied...In short, persons limit their use of marijuana in proportion to the degree of their fear, realistic or otherwise, that nonusers who are important to them will discover they use drugs and react in some punishing way...Conventional notions of morality are another means through which marijuana use is controlled. The basic moral imperatives which operate here are those which require the individual to be responsible for his own welfare, and to be able to control his own behavior rationally...One must add to this, of course, the notion that the user becomes a slave to the drug, that he voluntarily surrenders himself to a habit from which there is no escape. The person who takes such a stereotype seriously is presented with an obstacle to drug use. 45

To most observers, the situation in the United States regarding the availability and use of marihuana, had changed drastically in the period between Becker's observations of a decade ago, and the Operation Intercept era of the summer of 1969. While ten years ago, the controls cited by Becker usually confined the use of marihuana to specific subcultures or groups of "outsiders," such as Polsky's "beats,"⁴⁶ Winick's "jazz musicians,"⁴⁷ and Finestone's "cats,"⁴⁸ by 1969 this was no longer the case. Over this ten year period, the functional meaning of these major control mechanisms was substantially altered. Several significant factors and social trends operated to:

1. Indicate the decreasing effectiveness of these controls.
2. Increase the probability of their continued ineffectiveness.
3. Bring about a change in enforcement strategy, resulting in the Operation Intercept policy.
4. Define those contingent conditions which ultimately determined the consequences, both intended and unintended, of the new policy.

The most significant of these conditions were:

a. The absolute growth in the number of marihuana users in the United States, to the point where many experts believed that the trend was irreversible: By the time Operation Intercept was put into effect, many observers and authorities in the drug abuse field had offered statements which carried the implication that marihuana use was so thoroughly dispersed in our culture, any attempt to curb this activity was doomed to failure. In April of 1968, Time quoted Commissioner Goddard's estimate that as many as 20 million Americans may have used marihuana.⁴⁹ One and one-half years later, in a Life magazine article, Goddard concluded that there was now a distinct possibility, due to social and economic factors, that marihuana had become impossible to dislodge from our society.⁵⁰ That same issue of Life carried a feature story entitled, "Marijuana: The Law vs. 12 Million People."⁵¹

During that same year (1969), Grinspoon, writing on the effects of marihuana in Scientific American, noted "the present burgeoning spread of its use,"⁵² while Time stated that "pop drugs have provoked a defiance of the law unprecedented since Prohibition."⁵³ Leo Hollister, a psychopharmacologist, concluded that "For the first time pot is entrenched in our society, with untold millions using the drug. We have passed the point of no return."⁵⁴

The Select Committee on Crime referred to marihuana as "a major landmark of the sixties,"⁵⁵ and Carey noted the changed situation as follows: "What was formerly a small and isolated phenomenon among some bohemian groups is now taking on mass proportions."⁵⁶ By 1970, Louria concluded that the use of illegal drugs "is the norm rather than an aberration,"⁵⁷ and Goode stated: "Whether we like it or not, potsmoking is here to stay."⁵⁸

b. The prevalence of marihuana use among the middle and upper classes, including folk heroes, children from notable families, and America's future leaders: In the period between Becker's analysis and the Operation Intercept era, the strict association between marihuana use and "deviant" subcultural groups as well as ethnic minorities, became increasingly blurred. The use of marihuana became recognized as an activity which crossed economic, ethnic, age, and geographic boundaries.

This phenomenon was given greatest attention as it developed among student populations, although it was also noted throughout other middle and upper class populations in our society. This multidimensional concern was reflected in a New York Times series on drug abuse. One article was entitled, "The Drug Scene: A Growing Number of America's Elite Are Quietly Turning On,"⁵⁹ while another was headlined, "The Drug Scene: Many Students Now Regard Marijuana as a Part of Growing Up."⁶⁰ The latter article included the following: "In the late nineteen-sixties, a nationwide survey by the New York Times has found drugs, particularly marijuana, have become for many students a part of growing up, perhaps as common as the hip flasks of Prohibition."⁶¹

By the late sixties, studies focussing on student drug use showed that users of marihuana were not necessarily identifiable as members of a "fringe" population, either numerically or socially. For instance, one study of 200 colleges found that 47 per cent of those interviewed had used it,⁶² while a survey of one medical school found that 70 per cent of the student body were current users of marihuana.⁶³ Kenneth Keniston's observation that "it seems that most students who use drugs are drawn from an academic and social elite"⁶⁴ was confirmed by available empirical data. The National Commission On Marihuana and

Drug Abuse found that:

The incidence of use seems to vary according to educational attainment. Among all adults not now in school, 5% of those with an eighth grade education or less have used the drug, contrasted with 11% of those who completed some high school, 14% of those who graduated from high school, 25% of those who completed some college and 21% of those who graduated from college. 65

Further, based on a review of studies concerned with drug use in student populations, the National Commission concluded "that the majority of young people who have used marihuana received average or above-average grades in school." 66

The mass media also heightened public awareness concerning the growth in marihuana use on college campuses and the seemingly unspectacular characteristics of those who were using the drug. These themes were given wide exposure, as in a Time article entitled, "Pot Problem: College Students Use of Marijuana," a Newsweek article entitled, "Fiedler Affair: Buffalo University Group Aims to Legalize Marijuana," and a Life article, entitled, "Marijuana: Millions of Turned-on Users." 67 The logical implications of this development, for future investigations, were summarized by Kaplan:

As the number of students who use marijuana approaches the total population of the student community, it becomes harder and harder to make statements differentiating those who had used marijuana from the norm. Indeed, when marijuana experience hovers around seventy percent of a studied population, it becomes much more meaningful, and more significant statistically, to make generalizations about the minority who have not used the drug than about the majority who have. 68

In fact, the use of marihuana had become so closely associated with college life, in the minds of adolescents, that Mauss hypothesized marihuana use to be an element in

"anticipatory socialization toward college." His study, conducted in 1969, found that "high school students rating high on the Scale of Anticipatory Socialization Toward College were about twice as likely to have used marijuana as those not rating high."⁶⁹ Similarly, speaking of non-college as well as college-oriented populations, Farnsworth described drug use as a "coming-of-age-rite" in adolescent groups,⁷⁰ a term usually associated with normal developmental sequences within a culture, rather than with regressive or deviant adaptations.

The relatively high status of youthful drug users led Carey to conclude that the authorities and decision-makers would not resort to repressive measures, since, "the movement seems to be composed of their children or friends of their children."⁷¹ Although this prediction may have been premature, his perception of the movement was literally as well as figuratively validated when, four months after Operation Intercept, the New York Times and Newsweek featured articles on a deluge of drug-related arrests of respected individuals, including children of powerful political and business leaders.⁷² The list included a group of space scientists from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a Space Agency facility run by Cal Tech; the son of a well known New York banker; the son of the city manager of Hartford, Connecticut; the son of the recently elected New Jersey Governor; and the son of a New York gubernatorial contender, all arrested within one week of each other. These disclosures followed many other drug-related news stories, implicating well-known personalities as diverse as world-celebrated ballet dancers, the children of several senators and presidential aspirants, a long list of rock'n'roll notables and the daughter of the Vice President of the United States, in marihuana-related activities.

Although students and the rich and famous received greatest attention, observers of the drug scene were not unaware of the spread of marihuana use among otherwise law-abiding middle and upper class segments of our society. In this regard, Time noted that "respectable adult citizens are also using 'sticks' or 'joints' or 'grass.'" ⁷³ A New York Times survey found that "more and more on-the-way-up and already successful adults were using marijuana and hallucinogenic drugs...Among adult drug takers, marijuana was found to be the great leveler, used by the very poor, the middle class and the wealthy." ⁷⁴ In a notably unsensational manner, Life observed that "at many parties casual marijuana smoking simply replaces social drinking." ⁷⁵

During the same month that the government was making its greatest effort to rally support for the Operation Intercept policy (October, 1969), an article appeared in New York Magazine entitled, "How the Middle Class Turns On." In it, Mayer underlined the proliferating use of marihuana among New York City's white-collar, civil service and professional establishment. The following statement by a former New York Civil Court attorney was included:

"It's not just the kids - people in every business, every profession, are turning on," remarked a lawyer in his 30's who had worked at the Civil Court. "There are 50 judges' secretaries in that court - 10 of them smoked. A few judges did, too. I know at least 15 policemen who smoke, and I don't know that many policemen. Not long ago I went to some official government reception for an ambassador, and I smelled grass there. I couldn't believe it. You never know, though, the world is full of closet-heads." ⁷⁶

Similar observations led Geller and Boas to conclude that marihuana use has "progressed from an activity associated mainly with the criminal fringe to the point where it has become a middle-class phenomenon...The smoker today comes from all classes of society and one particular group can

no longer be tagged as the chief user and purveyor of marijuana."⁷⁷ They go on to note that unlike the other illegal drugs, marihuana use had won "support by a large membership of the respectable middle class."⁷⁸ These developments led David Solomon to state:

The important point is that in contemporary America the employment of marihuana has ceased to be a subcultural affair limited to the underprivileged and the undereducated. It has become a custom that is rapidly expanding through the byways of the middle and upper classes. ⁷⁹

Thus, the period between Becker's observations and the Operation Intercept policy witnessed this "permanent shift in American social habits,"⁸⁰ a shift that was recognized in all segments of society, and one that was widely considered to be beyond reversal.

c. The "stepping-stone" theory is re-examined and new multiple drug use patterns and progressions are recognized: Until the late nineteen-forties, when the use of heroin reached new levels of popularity in the United States, the argument that marihuana serves as a "stepping-stone" to heroin addiction was given limited attention.⁸¹ Proponents of marihuana criminalization concentrated their arguments on those social and personal evils which allegedly resulted directly from the use of marihuana itself.⁸² After 1949, and until the mid-sixties, the "stepping-stone" theory became the most effective, and most widely stated argument against the use of marihuana.

Due to an outpouring of sophisticated studies on the drug abuse problem published during the sixties, the "stepping-stone" assertion that the use of marihuana inevitably leads to heroin addiction, gradually lost acceptance. Although several prestigious professional bodies continued

to assert a strong causal relationship between the two drugs, for instance, spokesmen for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the American Medical Association,⁸³ by 1969, support for this contention was far from universal.

Although the use of marihuana was still perceived by many as a predisposing factor in the etiology of heroin addiction, the relationship between the two drugs was no longer seen, or phrased, in terms of pharmacology.⁸⁴ The following statement by the Special Presidential Task Force reflects this shift:

The progression is, however, probably not a consequence of the pharmacological properties of the marihuana, but rather is due to sociological and psychological factors present in a vulnerable minority of users.⁸⁵

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice also stressed psychological and sociological variables, and concluded that:

The most reasonable hypothesis here is that some people who are predisposed to marihuana are also predisposed to heroin use. It may also be the case that through the use of marihuana a person forms the personal associations that later expose him to heroin.⁸⁶

The association between marihuana and heroin came to be stated in specific, rather than general terms, and often with an implication of tentativeness. Thus, based on a study of former heroin addicts from Puerto Rico, DeFleur, Ball and Snarr concluded that marihuana, "may have served as either a facilitating or even a predisposing condition leading toward more serious narcotics usage for certain types of individuals who, because of personal or social characteristics, had high probabilities of addiction."⁸⁷ Based on their own work at the National Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky, and on empirical data drawn from other relevant studies, Ball, Chambers and Ball

summarized the reasons why the incipient addict is "predisposed" to opiate addiction by his use of marihuana:

Marihuana is taken for its euphoric effects--it produces a "high"; both marihuana and heroin are only available from underworld sources of supply; both are initially taken within a peer-group recreational setting; both are illegal; the neighborhood friends with whom marihuana use begins are often the same friends who initiate the incipient addict to the use of opiates. A principal effect, then, is one of differential association--becoming part of a drug-taking group. 88

Although marihuana was found to be "a predisposing influence in the etiology of opiate addiction"⁸⁹ among those opiate addicts who had used marihuana at an earlier time, this predisposing factor was significantly associated with opiate addiction only "among metropolitan residents of the high addiction eastern and western states."⁹⁰ Commenting upon these findings, Goode emphasized the key role played by subcultural influences and differential association, when he observed that:

The main point of the Ball-Chambers-Ball article... is that where there is an illicit drug-using subculture, marijuana and heroin will be found as mutual components, making the link more likely; where there is no illicit drug-subculture, the progression is unlikely, because there is no group to sustain the transmission. It is the subculture that makes for the pot-to-heroin connection, not the drug itself. 91.

At the same time, a growing body of evidence substantiated the fact that not all marihuana users were "incipient addicts" (and that many opiate addicts had never used marihuana). In fact, few marihuana users were heavily involved in an "illicit drug-using subculture" which defined opiate use as an acceptable activity, or were "individuals who, because of personal or social characteristics, had high probabilities of addiction." Therefore, although the Ball-Chambers-Ball and DeFleur-Ball-Snarr observations

contributed to our understanding of this predisposition among those who were "incipient addicts," these observations did not apply to the vast majority of marihuana users who did not go on to opiate addiction.

In sum, most studies on the etiology of heroin addiction published during and prior to the sixties, focussed on the specific subcultural conditions and orientations existent in those low-income ghetto areas in which "addiction-prone," metropolitan residents of high addiction states, became involved in drug-taking groups.⁹² Through this work, the association between marihuana use and heroin addiction was subjected to empirical elaboration and specification, and when such a relationship was found to exist, it was dependent upon sociological and/or psychological factors unrelated to the majority of marihuana users.

Due to the availability of this new data, and the quantitative and qualitative changes in the marihuana-using population, several scholars reformulated the "stepping-stone" theory into negative, rather than positive terms. For instance, Kaplan concluded:

Probably the best summary of the data is that there appears to be no association between marijuana and heroin throughout most of our society--except among poor urban Negroes and Spanish-speaking Americans who in fact make up the predominant part of the heroin population. 93

Similarly, based on a study of 3,500 undergraduates attending 14 campuses in the New York area, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse perceived this association as the exception rather than the rule, and underlined the racial aspect of this progression: "According to recent studies, heroin usage is not common among white marihuana users. Heroin is most strongly linked to marihuana use in black and Spanish-speaking ghettos."⁹⁴

The Special Presidential Task Force estimated that "only five percent of the 'habitual marihuana users' progress to heroin addiction,"⁹⁵ and went on to observe that these tended to come from "ghetto situations" and "heavy drug using subcultures."⁹⁶ It should be remembered that even in these "addiction-prone" groups, specifically, those individuals enmeshed in "ghetto situations" and "heavy drug using subcultures" (whites), heroin addiction was found to be the condition among only a distinct minority of marihuana users. Based on available evidence, Wald and Hutt concluded, although "a large percentage of young black males in any large urban lower-class area have tried heroin...the majority who have experimented with it have not become addicted."⁹⁷ And, even though they found that, "youthful, middle-class experimentation with heroin as part of a pattern of multi-drug use does appear to be increasing,"⁹⁸ they concluded that "people who become involved with heroin in this non-ghetto context have less tendency toward heavy involvement."⁹⁹ Similarly, of the four groups most likely to be involved in heavy marihuana use--the slum dweller, the bohemian, the college student, and the high school student--Glaser, Inciardi and Babst concluded that the transition to heroin was far more likely among the urban slum dwellers than among the other three groups.¹⁰⁰ And, in "the colony" (Berkeley, California), where the use of marihuana and the psychedelic drugs had gained great acceptance, Carey found that the "middle-class users of marihuana...do not graduate from milder drugs to heroin."¹⁰¹

Goode pointed out that among whites involved in heavy drug using subcultures, "even daily use of marijuana will not involve the individual in heroin use if it is absent from the group in which he interacts and finds significant others."¹⁰² In his own study of 200 persons who used

marihuana regularly, it was found that "only 27 respondents, or 13% of the sample, had used heroin at least once, with extremely limited use predominating." ¹⁰³ Explaining this relatively high proportion of "ever-users," Goode stated: "It is a safe guess that our respondents are much more heavily involved with other drugs than is the average group of cannabis smokers, including everyone who has sampled the drug at least once up to the daily smoker." ¹⁰⁴ In a study of 350 marihuana users, Schick, Smith and Meyers found an even higher proportion, a full 25 percent, who had ever tried heroin. However, even in this extremely heavy drug using Haight-Ashbury "hippie subculture" of 1968, only eight persons were found to be addicted to heroin of the 350 studied. ¹⁰⁵

In sum, data accumulated during the sixties made it clear that there was little, if any association between marihuana experimentation and heroin addiction, and that such addiction was even unlikely for those involved in most groups characterized by multiple drug use and the heavy use of marihuana. Thus, the causal inference inherent in the "stepping-stone" theory was subjected to careful elaboration and specification, to the point where its application was felt to be useful in only a small, and fairly well-defined, percentage of cases.

During the same period in which the marihuana-to-heroin "stepping-stone" theory was being discredited as a general explanation of heroin addiction, and consequently no longer held to be an effective argument against the use of marihuana, new multiple drug use modalities and progression sequences were being recognized and documented. These new patterns were particularly applicable to those drug-using groups for whom the old stepping-stone theory had least relevance

and credibility. Specifically, these developments were observed among the young, white, middle class drug users of the sixties, who rarely manifested heavy involvement in heroin use. Empirical data drawn from studies of predominately youthful populations showed that the "dangerous drugs," the amphetamines, the barbiturates and the psychedelics, were gaining increasing popularity in such groups during this period. By 1969, there was general agreement that such a trend did exist.

Although it was agreed that there was nothing in the pharmacological nature of marihuana which would lead its users to other drugs, the association between the use of marihuana and the use of "dangerous drugs" was becoming evident. Blum found significant correlations between the use of marihuana and the use of legal as well as illegal drugs among students.¹⁰⁶ Of specific interest was his finding of a high correlation between marihuana and amphetamine use (.33), and a very high correlation between marihuana and hallucinogen use (.55). The marihuana-hallucinogen correlation was higher than that found for any other pair of illegal and/or legal drugs covered in the Blum study.¹⁰⁷

Based on a study of 200 heavy marihuana users, Goode found that, "two-thirds of the respondents (68 percent) had taken at least one drug other than marijuana or hashish at least once."¹⁰⁸ This figure included 49 percent who had used LSD (25 percent of the LSD takers had tried it only once, and it was generally found to be a drug of infrequent use), 43 percent who had used an amphetamine, and 24 percent who had used a barbiturate or a tranquilizer at least once. Goode's data included only illicit (socially disapproved) use of amphetamines and barbiturates.¹⁰⁹ Comparing his findings to those obtained through a survey conducted by the East Village Other, Goode concluded that "although the percentage using nearly every drug is higher

for the EVO respondents, the rank order (i.e. degree of popularity) of the drug used was surprisingly similar." ¹¹⁰

A survey of students from 200 colleges, which found that 47 percent of the students had used marihuana, also disclosed that 18 percent had tried amphetamines, 15 percent had tried barbiturates, and 11 percent had tried LSD (correlations between the use of marihuana and these other drugs were not obtained--these percentages for "dangerous drug" use include students who had never used marihuana). However, these other drugs were used frequently by only a few students. ¹¹¹ These figures, as well as other available data, led Wald and Hutt to conclude:

Within the last five years there has been a substantial increase in the use of illicit nonopiate drugs by the young, particularly among middle-class college and high school students and young military personnel. The prevalent drugs of abuse for this group are marijuana (and, to some extent, the more potent cannabis product, hashish), oral amphetamines and barbiturates, LSD, and other hallucinogens. ¹¹²

Based on their studies of youthful populations, both Goode and Carey found that the heavier the use of marihuana, the greater the likelihood of selling marihuana, of taking drugs in addition to marihuana, and of heavy involvement in a drug-oriented lifestyle. ¹¹³ Similarly, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse stated that "being a seller rather than only a buyer-user is influential in determining the degree of an individual's involvement with, and commitment to the use of other drugs," ¹¹⁴ and the Special Presidential Task Force concluded that, "It is generally true that a heavy marihuana user is more likely to be a multiple drug user." ¹¹⁵ Schick, Smith and Meyers study of the Haight-Ashbury subculture and Davis' study of "heads" and "freaks" supplied data which further substantiated these progressions and correlations within heavy drug-using subcultures. ¹¹⁶

Based on their own studies and other empirical data, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse concluded that "the overwhelming majority of marihuana users do not progress to other drugs...Only moderate and heavy use of marihuana is significantly associated with persistent use of other drugs." ¹¹⁷ Although the studies cited previously might lead one to believe that this is a significant under-estimation of the problem, it is felt that the Commission's observation is not inconsistent with the aforementioned data for two reasons. First, the Blum, Goode-EVO, Carey, Schick-Smith-Meyers, and Davis findings were based on members of heavy drug-using subcultures (students and "hippies"). By the Commission's standards, a far higher proportion of these persons would be considered "moderate" (11 times monthly to once daily) or "heavy (several times daily) ¹¹⁸ users of marihuana, than would be found in the general marihuana-using population. Second, although correlations cited by several of these authors show noticeable multiple drug use experimentation, the use of a drug other than marihuana "at least once," does not constitute "persistent use" (the Commission never offers an operational definition of this term). Thus, even within these non-representative groups, "persistent use" correlations would be significantly lower than "ever-used" correlations.

Even with this new information, it was obvious that not enough data was available upon which to base generalizable statistical conclusions concerning multiple drug use. However, a few trends were evident by 1969. First, marihuana users were more likely to have used other illicit drugs than non-users. Second, the heavy marihuana user and user-seller was more likely to be a multiple drug user than the intermittent or experimental user who did not sell. Third, it was widely agreed that the illicit use of the "dangerous

drugs," the amphetamines, the barbiturates and the psychedelics, was gaining growing popularity among young, white, middle class persons.

The specification and qualification of the marihuana-to-heroin stepping-stone theory, combined with a simultaneous growth in the illicit use of the "dangerous drugs" and the development of new multiple drug use patterns, led to the recognition of several different (although rarely mutually exclusive) drug use modalities within the "drug scene."

At the same time, with the quantitative and qualitative changes in the drug-using population well documented, making the usefulness of social-psychologically defined "common denominator concepts" such as "alienation," "marginality" "unadjusted" and "delinquent" highly questionable, marihuana itself came to be seen as the new common denominator in the world of illicit drug use, linking even diverse drug-using subcultures. Scher called marihuana a "vade mecum" ¹¹⁹ (something regularly used or carried about--a staple item), and Goode referred to it as a "lingua franca" ¹²⁰ (common language), in the drug-using world, since it was found to be used in "extremely diverse settings, in groups whose members have little or nothing to do with one another."¹²¹ Cohen stated that it was increasingly "becoming a basic drug to which other agents are added." ¹²² His observations led him to believe that as drug use progresses, additional drugs are likely to be used in, or with marihuana. ¹²³ During the latter part of the sixties, an increasing amount of research focussed on the questions: What additional drugs are added? In which groups? Under what circumstances?

In many groups of whites, the regular use of marihuana came to be associated with the intermittent use of the barbiturates, the amphetamines, the psychedelic drugs, and to a significantly lesser degree, with the use of heroin. Several studies suggested that the psychedelics were particularly appealing to well-educated, middle-class drug users, seeking an inner-directed orientation through introspective exploration. Lingeman described "the majority of users of LSD" as "young, middle-class, and college-educated or else from the bohemian fringe of society." ¹²⁴ In contrast, the less educated drug user from a family of lower socio-economic status, was more likely to favor the amphetamines. The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse observed that "the psychedelics are more often used by the white, middle to upper middle class, college-educated population," ¹²⁵ while "methamphetamine, or 'speed' use is more characteristic of those lower socioeconomic white youth who are not school or work-oriented." ¹²⁶ Carey pointed to age and educational differences in distinguishing the regular LSD user from the heavy user of amphetamines:

The social composition of those in the Colony who use marihuana and LSD seems to be substantially the same. This is not so when we compare them with heavy amphetamine users. The heavy amphetamine users seem to be younger, may come from a lower educational strata in the community, and seem to prefer the experience of "going outwards" rather than "inwards." The regular LSD users in the Colony seem to be somewhat older, which may account for their rejection of amphetamines. ¹²⁷

A similar contrast was stated by Davis, when he distinguished between "heads" and "freaks." Although both groups use marihuana, the "head," seeking "mind expansion" in order to understand "where his head is at," finds his orientation compatible with LSD use. In contrast, the "freak," generally less educated and from a family of

lower-socio-economic status, seeks "drug kicks," and finds that the amphetamines contribute to a lifestyle (with its many forms of "extreme behavior"¹²⁸), which he desires. ¹²⁹

Although these observations seemed to indicate certain useful social distinctions concerning drug-use progressions and multiple drug-use preferences within the white drug-using population, the most striking differentiation to emerge from the research of the sixties was a racial one. While young whites who used marihuana frequently experimented with one or several of the "dangerous drugs," black and Spanish-speaking youths characterized by similar marihuana use involvements tended to try heroin. And while the most heavily drug-oriented fringe of the white population often moved on to heavy use of the amphetamines and/or the psychedelics, their black and Spanish-speaking counterparts traditionally moved on to heavy heroin involvement. The National Commission summarized this situation as follows:

For example, blacks and whites have roughly equal rates of trying and using marihuana, but their choices of other drugs and styles of drug use are quite different and distinctive, due to their frequently different sociocultural backgrounds. ¹³⁰

To substantiate this conclusion, the National Commission cited a survey of 3,500 college students attending fourteen campuses in the New York area. The survey found that heroin and cocaine experimentation was more than twice as prevalent among black students than among white students. In contrast, more than twice as many whites had used an amphetamine, and almost twice as many whites had tried an hallucinogenic drug. ¹³¹

While over-use and illicit use of the barbiturates appeared to cross age, socio-economic and racial boundaries¹³² (depending on the specific drug-using group), the drug preference contrast was drawn most sharply in comparisons

between white, middle-class users of LSD, and the black and Spanish-speaking heroin users. From the vantage point of those whites interested in exploring the "inner spaces" of psychedelic experience, "The rationales for using hallucinogenic drugs preclude any interest in heroin. Its use is considered antithetical to the value of opening up one's perceptions." ¹³³ On the other hand, the psychochemical influence of LSD appeared to be antithetical to experiences valued by the young, ghetto drug user. Fiddle stated the ghetto view as follows:

If heroin exercises a kind of traditional psychochemical authority, LSD is experienced as the dangerous, rational-scientific authority. The young ghetto heroin user dabs and dabs in his drug, while the young middle class drug user experiments with LSD. Heroin, like a traditional drug soothes and relaxes; LSD, like a laboratory product of the mind, expands consciousness. One makes the problems go away, the way a good mother buffers the child from the world; the other makes one aware of one's problems, rationally or existentially, like a latter day therapist who makes you encounter yourself and your problems. ¹³⁴

Fiddle found that even the enterprising, reputable, self-confident drug dealer found LSD to be a losing item in Harlem. ¹³⁵

However interesting the psycho-pharmacological view of differential drug-use preferences may be, it appears to be only one element in a very complex selection process. According to Goode, the link between marihuana and the more potent drugs "is that a specific social group defines both as acceptable and pleasurable, offering opportunities for members to use both." ¹³⁶ Fiddle's analysis of heroin use in the ghetto contributes to our understanding of the bases upon which these differential and relativistic judgments of "pleasurability" and "acceptability" are grounded. As Fiddle points out, specific drugs come to be considered pleasurable, and to be accepted within a

specific drug-using subculture, to the extent that they seem

to meet needs generated within the peer groups bearing the addict culture...whatever appears to contribute to the different peer groups in the addict culture will be acceptable; whatever does not will tend to be rejected, at least by the majority of drug addicts and users. 137

Whether or not a specific drug is "perceived" to make a contribution, is based on the different roles, daily routines and ultimate goals which characterize different drug-using peer groups; the symbolic nature or "image" of the drug as perceived by the members of a specific peer group; its history ("tradition of use") or lack of history in a particular area; as well as its psychochemical effects. 138

Once a drug is defined as pleasurable and acceptable, and a tradition of use is established, the "objective, negative implications and possibilities" implicit in the young drug users' conduct, will be deflected by "the sheer ubiquity of deviation and risk taking among their peers and elders;" an awareness of "the risks of losing prestige in the peer group by deviating from the group's risk-consensus;" the availability of "successful models" with which to identify; and a view of "their involvement with drugs as temporary." 139

When these "risk-discounting" factors are present, the young drug user is likely to disregard any negative publicity surrounding a particular drug. In the absence of these factors, he is likely to accept the messages carried in the mass media. 140

Although Fiddle's analysis was intended to explain "risk discounting among young ghetto heroin users," it was equally valuable in helping us to understand those processes by which some young, white, marihuana-users became involved in the use of the "dangerous drugs." The key distinction seemed to be in the "ends," rather than

the "means." For most young, white, drug-users heavily involved in a drug-oriented subculture, LSD or "speed" represented the "goal of the drug scene." In the ghetto, heroin was perceived as the "boss high,"¹⁴¹ or, quoting Claude Brown, "the hippest thing was horse."¹⁴² While ghetto drug-users were generally unwilling to take the "risks" associated with LSD, white drug-users were far more likely to avoid the "degradation" associated with heroin involvement. Although there was a gradual growth in the number of exceptions to these generalizations throughout the sixties, it was recognized that different "progression ladders" were operating in different drug-use subcultures. Due to the racial segregation characteristic of the major urban areas in the United States, the most striking distinction, in terms of drugs used in addition to marihuana, was the sociocultural division reflecting this racial dimension.

Other factors made the picture even more complicated. Six of these factors, to be mentioned only briefly here, further undermined traditional, simplistic conceptions of the drug abuse phenomenon. First, the licit over-production and over-use of prescription and non-prescription pharmaceuticals came to be recognized as an integral part of the drug problem. Second, the fact that tobacco and alcohol are also "drugs," seemed to be rediscovered. Third, the use of narcotic drugs was documented in otherwise conformist groups, most notably in the medical profession. Fourth, some drug users reported initiation to illicit drug use through experimentation with the "harder" drugs, often heroin. Fifth, the use of heroin and the dangerous drugs, even on a regular basis, did not preclude a continued interest in marihuana. Sixth, the "softer-to-harder" hypothesis was complicated by the fact that most marihuana users did not "graduate," and many "hard" drug abusers were willing and able to switch to a

"softer" drug, on a temporary or regular basis.

In sum, as the realities of the drug-using world were de-mythologized, the "stepping-stone" theory became more complex.

d. During the sixties, there was a growing controversy over the fairness and efficacy of the official government approach to marihuana use: As the quantitative and qualitative changes in the marihuana-using population were becoming widely acknowledged, and the complexities of the drug abuse phenomenon were emerging from the simplistic myths of the past, the government's punitive approach to marihuana use was being subjected to increasingly careful scrutiny in many quarters. Overt criticism of, and resistance to government policies, was most noticeable among students, academics, many scientists and attorneys, the mass media, as well as a wide assortment of anti-establishment spokesmen. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to fully document these changes, we will briefly examine a few developments on the administrative, judicial and legislative fronts, for the purpose of underlining this growing conflict within "the establishment," throughout the nineteen-sixties.

In 1962, the White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse offered the following statement: "It is the opinion of the Panel that the hazards of marijuana per se have been exaggerated and that long criminal sentences imposed on an occasional user or possessor of the drug are in poor social perspective."¹⁴³ Although the findings and recommendations of the White House Conference were in line with those presented by government committees many years earlier (i.e. Panama Canal Zone Governor's Committee, 1933; The Mayor's Committee to Study the Marihuana Problem in the

City of New York, 1944), ¹⁴⁴ more than ever before, such recommendations were receiving serious official attention. The suggestions of the White House Conference were followed, in 1963, by the recommendations of the President's Advisory Commission. Concerning offenses for the use and possession of small quantities of marihuana, the Commission suggested that all mandatory sentences be eliminated, giving full discretionary powers to judges. ¹⁴⁵ By 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, was again calling for the removal of mandatory penalties, and a total re-evaluation of the punitive approach to the marihuana phenomenon. Although a few members of the Commission urged a more radical departure from past approaches, the full body concluded that "enough information exists to warrant careful study of our present marihuana laws and the propositions on which they are based." ¹⁴⁶

By 1969, it was generally recognized in government circles that the anti-marihuana laws were being unevenly enforced, were accused of being used for ulterior political motives and were creating widespread disrespect for law, especially among the young. In addition, the ambivalence of judges throughout the country was indicated by the fact that as the number of arrests rose sharply between 1966 and 1969, the proportion of defendants convicted declined, the percentage incarcerated declined, as did the average length of their sentences. ¹⁴⁷ All of these themes were examined in the First Report by the Select Committee on Crime, a report based on data collected during 1969, and submitted to the House of Representatives in April of 1970. In a section of the report entitled "Trend Toward Reduced Penalties," the Select Committee called attention to legislative changes over the past few years:

An analysis of the above State laws reveals a recent trend to adopt laws dealing with marihuana less severely for so-called "simple possession" offenses, and where appropriate, parole, deferral and suspension of sentences for first offenses...In addition, at least 23 States have recently amended their laws to reduce the penalties for violations of the laws dealing with marihuana (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming). While no State appears to have eliminated all statutory control over the possession and/or sale of marihuana, 23 States now provide misdemeanor type penalties, with suspension and probation possible, for mere so-called possession for personal use type marihuana offenses.

Thus it seems clear that the trend of State amendments to their drug abuse laws is toward a program of care and treatment for the drug addict, more judicial discretion in the sentencing of first offenders, and a reduction of penalties for possession-type marihuana violations.

The above trend is indeed a considerable one and it would be the hope of this committee, as is later pointed out in this report, that the U.S. Government will follow the same trend. Certainly under existing law, the penalty imposed under Federal law is disproportionate to the "crime against society" of experimenting with marihuana...

Criminal conduct cannot be condoned. However, the penalty attached to the prohibited act should bear a rational relationship to the harm or potential harm to others. In the case of simple possession of marihuana (the person who has a small quantity for personal use), it would appear that the penalty proscribed in both Federal and many State statutes is too severe. 148

By May of 1970, twenty-seven states had reduced penalties for first offenders (possession), and nine others were expected to do so in the near future. ¹⁴⁹ Public awareness of this controversy can be appreciated when it is remembered that each of these legislative changes followed heated debate in every one of the effected states' legislatures. Such debates included the testimony of respected authorities

from many fields, including legal, medical, law enforcement, behavioral science and judicial representatives, which served to underline the idea that many highly respected and knowledgeable citizens were vehemently opposed to existing state penal provisions. At the same time, public exposure of this controversy and the airing of critical testimony called attention to the fact that the dangers previously associated with marihuana use were being rejected by a growing number of authorities, thus further debunking the premises upon which official federal policies rested.

Thus, by late 1969, the marihuana controversy was at its height and pressure was mounting on the federal government to alter its position. Noted authorities, including anthropologist Margaret Mead¹⁵⁰ and Executive Director of the American Bar Foundation, Geoffrey C. Hazzard,¹⁵¹ had come out in favor of repeal of all penalties for possession of marihuana. In California, a police sargeant had joined a "smoke-in" demonstration and a Deputy District Attorney resigned his office, both in protest against the existing marihuana laws and the time "wasted" in their enforcement.¹⁵² Editorials in college newspapers throughout the country, from the Yale Daily News¹⁵³ to the Stamford Daily,¹⁵⁴ called for an end to the criminalization of marihuana use, an appeal which was also sounded by the New York Times, The Washington Post, the New Republic and in an article published by the conservative National Review.

Concern over the constitutionality of anti-marihuana legislation had been voiced in numerous student-run law reviews, including Vanderbilt Law Review, Georgia Law Review, Arkansas Law Review, New York Law Forum and Iowa Law Review.¹⁵⁵ Support for the decriminalization of marihuana was even voiced in the Congress, by legislators of various political backgrounds. Two-thirds of the fifty states had revised, or were in the process of revising laws covering the possession

and use of marihuana. According to Wald and Hutt, the focus of the marihuana issue had shifted in an important way:

The real issue over marijuana appears to be not whether it causes mild physical damage but whether its use has already spread so widely that, as is true with alcohol, the social costs of efforts to prohibit it exceed the physical costs that would be incurred by eliminating criminal penalties for, or even legalizing, its use. 156

The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, noting that "the Nixon Administration softened its proposed new penalties for marijuana offenses," ¹⁵⁷ predicted that, "Legalization, proposed by more authoritative voices in 1969 than in earlier years, still appeared unlikely, but penalties for marijuana use were almost certain to be softened by the 91st Congress." ¹⁵⁸ The American people, and their representatives within the administrative, legislative and judicial branches of government, were deeply, and at times bitterly divided over the marihuana issue. At the height of this trend toward leniency, (valid in terms of first-level enforcement only if calculations are based on the "proportion of violators arrested," rather than on the "arrest rate"), ¹⁵⁹ and in the midst of this wide-ranging controversy, Operation Intercept was implemented by the federal government.

Subsection 2: The Ineffectiveness of Traditional Controls and the Formation of the Operation Intercept Policy

The qualitative and quantitative changes in the population of marihuana users (therefore, of law violators as well), the recognition of new drug use patterns and the clarification of old ones, and the growing controversy over the marihuana laws, were some of the most noted hallmarks of the sixties. The National Commission on

Marihuana and Drug Abuse called the marihuana issue a "pungent symbol of dramatic changes which have permanently affected our nation in the last decade." ¹⁶⁰ Similarly, these developments led Goode to remark: "The increased use of illegal drugs is one of the most dramatic social changes in this decade." ¹⁶¹

Whether these trends were primarily a result or a cause of other changes in the society cannot yet be determined. There was obviously a good deal of reciprocity in the relationship between drug use and an array of other socio-cultural factors. However, there is widespread agreement that the sixties was a decade of rapid social change and marked internal differentiation, and there is good reason to believe that the growing use of marihuana and other illegal drugs was a valid indicator of these processes. For the kinds of control mechanisms which failed to limit the use of marihuana were also ineffective in curtailing many forms of disapproved behavior during this period.

As Williams notes, periods of rapid social change are marked by apparent cultural inconsistency and relatively high rates of social nonconformity. ¹⁶² Further, according to Bennett, when the gap between old and new social institutions is great, as occurs in periods of rapid social change, there is an intensification of cultural instability characterized by conflicting social standards and the weakening of primary social controls. ¹⁶³ Throughout the decade of the sixties, the three "major kinds of controls" which previously limited the use of marihuana in this country, became decreasingly effective in light of rapid social changes within the society.

a. Supply--As the number of marihuana users rose rapidly during the decade of the sixties, it became evident that the supply of marihuana coming into the United States was filling this increased demand. In spite of continuous

increases in customs operations ¹⁶⁴ and border seizures, ¹⁶⁵ the use and availability of the drug increased at an even faster rate.

By the late sixties, although marihuana users tended to be more liberal, less involved in formal religion, and to come from wealthier and better-educated families than non-users, the radicalism, marginality, alienation and subcultural involvement that characterized their middle-class counterparts of the early sixties, were no longer distinguishing characteristics. ¹⁶⁶ Noting this change in the marihuana using population, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse stated:

However, all this changed markedly in the mid-1960's. For various reasons, marihuana use became a common form of recreation for many middle and upper class college youth. The trend spread across the country, into the colleges and high schools and into the affluent suburbs as well. Use by American servicemen in Vietnam was frequent. In recent years, use of the drug has spanned every social class and geographic region. ¹⁶⁷

When marihuana use began making inroads into the middle class, it was generally associated with the "campus drug culture." As Kaplan observed, by 1969 initiation was no longer confined to this avenue:

Furthermore, in large areas of the United States today, the campus drug culture is no longer necessary to initiate one into marijuana use or to assure a supply of the drug. Marijuana use is so widespread today that many youths who are otherwise "straight" can provide sufficient support, fellowship, and supply for one another. ¹⁶⁸

The increasing heterogeneity of the using population underscored the fact that "illicit sources" had become available to the ordinary person. It was no longer necessary to participate in "a group organized around values and activities opposing those of the larger conventional society," ¹⁶⁹ in order to gain access to marihuana. In fact, most users

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were getting the drug from a friend or an acquaintance,¹⁷⁰
a person who might be called an "illicit source" only
insofar as he was breaking those laws prohibiting the
possession and sale of marihuana. In this regard, the illicit
source and the marihuana user differed only in degree.

On the other hand, this decade of rapid social change,
marked internal differentiation, and high rates of social
nonconformity, witnessed a substantial growth in the number
of individuals and groups "organized around values and
attitudes opposing those of the larger conventional society."¹⁷¹
This situation led analysts of the "new consciousness,"
such as Kenneth Keniston, Charles Reich, Theodore Roszak,
and Philip Slater to "recognize the irony in the fact that
the most prosperous and educated societies in world history
have generated the most massive youthful opposition in
world history."¹⁷²

Whether as a precursor or as a result of youthful
opposition (social-political) and simultaneous disengagement
(social-psychological), the use of marihuana came to be
closely associated with these processes. Keniston saw,
"Immersion in drug use as a part of a phase of disengagement
from American society,"¹⁷³ and the National Commission on
Marihuana and Drug Abuse believed that marihuana use in the
sixties had "become equated with unconventional youth life
styles."¹⁷⁴ To the National Commission, this equation
was both real and symbolic: "Marihuana has become both a
focus and a symbol of the generation gap and for many young
people its use has become an expedient means of protest
against adult values."¹⁷⁵ Kaplan concluded that,
"Marijuana is perhaps the perfect symbol of this generational
conflict."¹⁷⁶

Although, more often than not, the use of illegal
drugs was closely associated with these generational conflicts,
assaults on the established order, nonconformist attitudes,

and groups organized around same, most unconventional users opposed the "conventional society" primarily on other grounds. At any rate, the proliferation and expansion of these "opposition groups," and the growth in the marihuana using population, occurred side-by-side. Not surprisingly, this highly heterogeneous population of marihuana users, uniformly regarded as social or legal outcasts by the authorities, gained a degree of unity through the crystallization of this "common cause." ¹⁷⁷

In sum, control through limitation of the supply and confining access to the drug failed for two reasons. First, many otherwise conventional and law-abiding citizens were able to obtain the drug without participation in groups organized around nonconformist values, attitudes, or behaviors. Thus, although expressing no general opposition to society, their ambivalent situation contributed to the kind of cultural inconsistency characteristic of all periods of rapid social change. Secondly, a growing number of individuals and groups, primarily composed of younger people, were already expressing values and attitudes opposing those of conventional society. The association between nonconformist groups and the use of marihuana, rather than serving as an obstacle or deterrent to drug users and potential drug users, symbolized an added incentive for the growing number of young people who were eager to be with others who shared this orientation.

b. Secrecy--As Becker points out, most marihuana users in the United States have been "secret deviants." ¹⁷⁸ The regular user of marihuana either learned to hide the effects of the drug when in the company of non-users, or altered his social participations in order to minimize contacts with non-users, or he changed both his attitudes and his participations. ¹⁷⁹ Such adjustments were based on the assumption that

some kind of sanctions would be applied, should the user be "found out" by non-users. ¹⁸⁰

At the same time, marihuana has generally been perceived as a "sociogenic" drug. According to Goode, those factors which distinguish sociogenic drug use from other forms of drug use which are "conducted in relative isolation, without group support" (i.e. the use of barbiturates, tranquilizers and/or amphetamines by housewives; meperedine or morphine addiction among physicians), ¹⁸¹ include the following:

(1) it is characteristically participated in a group setting; (2) the others with whom one smokes marijuana are usually intimates, intimates of intimates, or potential intimates, rather than strangers; (3) one generally has long-term continuing social relations with the others; (4) a certain degree of value concensus will obtain within the group; (5) a value convergence will occur as a result of progressive group involvement; (6) the activity maintains the circle's cohesion, reaffirms its social bonds by acting them out; (7) participants view the activity as a legitimate basis for identity--they define themselves, as well as others, partly on the basis of whether they have participated in the activity or not. In these senses, then, marijuana use is sociogenic. ¹⁸²

From the time that marihuana smoking came to be associated with the lower classes, specifically within immigrant, minority, and marginal groups in this country, it has been characterized by group initiation, participation, and to a certain degree, value consensus. Although a shared "in-group" activity, such groups tended to keep this indulgence insulated from outside observation, due to the perceived threat posed by non-users. While "sociogeneity" and the "need for secrecy" appear to represent inherently contradictory reactions to external pressures, this type of bimodal response has characterized many types of deviant, illegal and nonconformist adaptations in American society. This two-sided response continued to characterize the use

of marihuana throughout the sixties. However, when viewed within the context of those contingent conditions which defined the marihuana issue during this period, both sociogeneity and the need for secrecy took on new meanings. Those new meanings substantially altered the total situation, including the perceptions and responses of users and non-users alike. Each of the aforementioned trends (Subsection 1), had a direct bearing on this new situation.

First, the total as well as the proportionate growth in the marihuana-using population had a logically necessary result. For those who still felt it necessary to keep this activity a matter of secrecy, there were now fewer potential sanctioners (non-users), as the number of persons who shared the "secret" increased. Further, since its use was most common in certain areas of the country (the large cities particularly on the east and west coasts), in certain age groups (persons under twenty-five years of age), and in certain types of communities (i.e. college campuses), the likelihood of sanctions being applied by non-users was minimized. Within such surroundings, whether or not the user participated in a deviant or marginal sub-group, he was likely to interact with others who used marihuana also, or at least with others who knew others who used it. In fact, in many circumstances, he would find that a majority of persons also engaged in this illegal activity. Thus, the need to mask the effects of the drug was necessary in only specific situations, since contacts with non-users were minimized due to individual social selection processes, the demographic distribution of the activity, and the sheer number of likeminded participants. Under such conditions, few felt constrained to keep their activities secretive, even in many contacts with non-users. For many, the only non-users perceived to pose a significant threat, were the representatives of law enforcement agencies.

The qualitative changes in the marihuana-using population changed the meaning of the "need for secrecy" in various ways. Prior to the sixties, the sociogenic character of marihuana use was closely related to widely shared subcultural experiences, marihuana use being only one element in a complex and divergent lifestyle. Users were likely to be persons who had achieved, or who had been ascribed, a marginal position in society due to their rejection of, or by, the dominant population. Generally these were marginal individuals, interacting in subcultural groups cut off from the mainstreams of power and influence, whether or not they used illegal drugs. Value consensus as well as progressive group involvement was more closely linked to shared feelings emanating from common experiences with the dominant population, than to the group's preference for a particular type of intoxication.

While, to a certain degree, these observations apply to the hard-core counter-culture devotees of the sixties, most of the middle and upper class marihuana smokers of the sixties were "outsiders," only insofar as they used marihuana. Unlike the "beats," Mexican-Americans and Negroes, their fear of sanctions was a specific, rather than a general response to conflict situations. They were generally secure, they had articulate spokesmen, they were not excluded from the channels of communication and power, and they sought to have their views heard. The sociogenic character of marihuana use became an avenue to change, instead of a retreatist adaptation to the fear of external sanctions.

Further, as marihuana use was no longer strictly associated with lower class groups, it started to lose its "bad reputation" (a reputation based on that previous association instead of on any objective appraisal of the drug itself). Although most users still felt constrained to keep this activity beyond the observation of law enforcement

authorities, it was no longer something about which one would necessarily feel ashamed. The need for secrecy was seen as a temporary, pragmatic compromise.

The qualitative changes in the marihuana-using population also meant that the desire to associate with fellow marihuana users no longer dictated that one step out of the socio-economic and cultural milieu in which one felt most comfortable. One could find "smoking companions" among advertising executives, college professors, military officers and research scientists, often as easily as one could find them in Harlem or Greenwich Village. This also meant that marihuana use, in and of itself, no longer inferred a degree of "value consensus" or "brotherhood," particularly outside of one's specific group of intimates. As stated by Goode:

The less deviant and criminal marijuana becomes, and the more easily obtainable it is, the less use becomes special and therefore significant. Under these circumstances, a detribalization occurs, and marijuana use loses its subcultural impact and its socializing power. 183

Due to these trends of the sixties, initiation to marihuana use was taking place in a vast range of social circles and situations. In many areas, it came to be an accepted aspect of adolescent socialization. These factors combined to normalize the experience (since other "normal" people did it), thereby undermining the need for secrecy, a need which was based on the fear of social or moral stigmatization and reprisal, as much as it was based on the fear of legal penalties.

Research on marihuana and its use, which specified the marihuana-to-heroin stepping stone theory and pointed to the increased use of the dangerous drugs, also served to minimize many of the ominous overtones previously

associated with marihuana. Public awareness of "LSD cults," "speed scenes" and "heroin in the suburbs" came to be seen as far more frightening developments than the increased use of marihuana. Many felt that the time and money spent in arresting marihuana-using college students could be used more productively in cutting off the supply of heroin, a theme given great attention by the mass media. Further, comparisons between the effects of marihuana and the effects of alcohol served to make many non-users increasingly ambivalent about applying any informal pressures or sanctions.

Among non-users, even if marihuana use was not condoned (due to its illegality), the use of the opiates and the dangerous drugs came to be seen as far more serious problems. It was in these areas of drug abuse that the public (including marihuana users) started to press for tough sanctions and correcting measures, and it was in these areas that drug users felt the greatest need to keep out of public view. In essence, the growing number of users of these "harder" drugs assumed the stance previously taken by the marihuana user, who thus moved one step closer to the mainstream.

The public controversy surrounding the marihuana issue was a direct result of the growing use of the drug among the more vocal and influential middle and upper class segments of society. The trend toward leniency was also a direct result of this development. The mass media coverage of this controversy, and of the growing use of marihuana among all segments of society, further served to bring marihuana-users out into the open, and to add a degree of legitimacy to their opinions.

Since the work of Durkheim, many theorists of deviant behavior have assumed that public exposure of the violation of group norms acts to enhance group cohesion.¹⁸⁴ However, in a situation approaching widespread "normative evasion," and at a time when a norm is generally losing its controlling

authority, ¹⁸⁵ such exposure may be counterproductive.

According to Williams:

The consequences of the widespread and dramatic exposure of such covert systems of institutional evasion deserve analysis on a scale far beyond what has been done. It seems to be generally assumed that public exposure of violations of norms strengthens consensus and the commitment to the dominant institutions. This assumption is sometimes true, but in other cases the disclosure may actually weaken support of the nominal institutional regulation by changing expectations (the realization that many others share the practice) and by activating interests and values previously defined as forbidden. ¹⁸⁶

Based on analyses of television campaigns addressed to the problem of drug abuse, both Nelson ¹⁸⁷ and Zinberg ¹⁸⁸ concluded that they may very well have had the opposite effect of that which was intended, actually increasing experimentation with drugs. In other words, through the activation of latent interests and the disclosure of widespread violations, publicity may set in motion that which Merton has called a "self-fulfilling prophecy." ¹⁸⁹ This point was stated by the Select Committee on Crime as follows:

The committee's consultant contends that whether the use of marihuana, alcohol, and cigarettes is actually increasing or not, is really not important. "As long as the perception of the student is that drug usage is on the increase," he says, "then the problem of a selffulfilling prophecy becomes important. In other words, when adolescents feel that the use of habit forming substances is on the increase, their behavior and interaction toward self and others tends to accept usage as 'normal' and it establishes the expectation that others as well as self 'can,' 'must,' and 'should' experiment." ¹⁹⁰

Thus, the public controversy and the exposure of massive violations, often portrayed by the media in a non-condemnatory way (often quite sympathetic to the plight of the apprehended violator), served to "normalize" and

"legitimize" this activity in the perceptions of users and non-users alike. Further, such publicity had a direct effect on the stand taken by many individual users. According to Lazarsfeld and Merton, this process works in the following way:

Publicity, the enforced acknowledgment by members of the group that these deviations have occurred, requires each individual to take such a stand. He must either range himself with the nonconformists, thus proclaiming his repudiation of the group norms, and thus asserting that he, too, is outside the moral framework or, regardless of his private predilections, he must fall into line by supporting the norm. Publicity closes the gap between "private attitudes" and "public morality." Publicity exerts pressure for a single rather than a dual morality by preventing continued evasion of the issue. 191

When the norm in question is no longer seen as an essential component of the "moral framework," and when publicity operates in a situation of controversy rather than "psychological monopoly," and when it is out of accord with opinions expressed in face-to-face contact, and when it is not congenial to prior attitudes and seeks to modify basic values, such publicity is least effective and has minimal value as a means of control. 192 The publicity and controversy surrounding the marihuana issue probably increased experimentation with the drug, while also giving to users the security that comes from knowing that one is not alone and that the "secret" is out in the open.

In sum, in light of the changes witnessed during the decade of the sixties, the meaning of the need for secrecy changed, as relations between users and non-users were drastically altered. The need for secrecy, based on the fear of sanctions, was most effective when supply channels were limited and when users were perceived by non-users as morally crippled beings. As marihuana use infiltrated the privileged groups, as a raging controversy ensued, as

research data minimizing the dangers of marihuana was disseminated to the general population, and as the overall number of potential arrestees reached unmanageable proportions, to many users of marihuana, the police and other formal means of control came to be the only non-users seriously feared. The use of marihuana remained a sociogenic activity, but it was so in the way that most recreational pastimes are sociogenic, rather than in the way that marginal subcultural groups secretively, self-consciously insulate their activities from all outside observation.

c. Morality--Traditionally, marihuana use was also controlled by conventional notions of morality. While the limitation of supply sources and the fear of sanctions controlled the potential user by means of conditions imposed externally, conventional notions of morality functioned successfully to the degree that such notions were incorporated into the consciousnesses of individuals, thereby serving as an inner-directed control mechanism. The strength of this control rested on two sets of assumptions intimately related to the potential user's self-concept. The first assumptions concerned the type of person who was believed likely to use the drug. The second set of assumptions pertained to the nature of the drug's effects on the individual user.

As stated earlier, the association between marihuana use and many lower class and marginal groups (i.e. sailors, Mexican-Americans, Negroes, jazz musicians, "beats"), was largely responsible for its disrepute in this country. Cultural differences and disproportionately high rates of arrest for illegal behaviors within such groups, reinforced the stereotype of the "immoral outsider," a stereotype which was generalized to all users of marihuana. During

the sixties, the movement toward increased toleration of cultural differences, as well as qualitative changes in the marihuana-using population, made contacts between users and non-users more frequent than ever before. Consequently, traditional stereotypes underwent drastic revision. Further, since this "deviant activity" was no longer confined to groups of "deviant individuals," there were models, in all segments of society with whom the potential user could identify. The use of marihuana, in and of itself, was not a defining trait.

Also, during the sixties, as in all periods of rapid social change, individuals experienced a heightened exposure to conflicting social standards. This exposure, as well as an emphasis on toleration and understanding ("getting to the root causes"), served to take many such conflicts out of the moral realm of analysis.

To many non-users, the marihuana user was a good person who had strayed onto the "wrong track." To others, marihuana use was a sickness, or a symptom of an emotional illness, which required treatment rather than punishment. To some, the user was merely exercising his right of free choice, a right having little, if anything, to do with morality. And to others still, the law was seen as the enforcer of private preferences, a role which was traditionally sanctioned only in cases directly related to the general public welfare. Dogmatic determinations of right or wrong in this matter were further deflated by the controversy surrounding the entire issue. These developments, along with the dissemination of the findings of scientific research into the nature of the drug and its users, the expansion of public drug education programs, and the legal and legislative struggles within the establishment, acted to take this issue outside the moral realm, even for a proportion of the non-using public.

In this regard, public knowledge of the widespread use of marihuana by military personnel in Southeast Asia, was a most important factor in compounding and confusing the relationship between marihuana use and "moral degeneracy" even more.

While the general population was divided concerning the moral relevance of marihuana, it was also recognized that those most likely to use the drug were least likely to take "traditional notions of morality" seriously. Since the young were over-represented among the user population, and "traditional notions of morality" are those ideas which the generation in power chooses to select from all past historical experiences, it is no surprise that those who had least to say about selecting these "traditional notions," also had least invested in them. Further, as Goode points out, individuals with a relativistic and flexible notion of right and wrong, were far more likely to use marihuana.¹⁹³ Thus, society's prohibition, "Don't smoke pot," was least likely to dissuade those most prone to investigate such matters for themselves.

The view of marihuana use as a "habit from which there is no escape"¹⁹⁴ was also refuted by all available evidence. Reviewing the literature on the subject of physical dependence, Nowlis found "general agreement that repeated use of the less potent forms of cannabis, as in the smoking of marihuana, leads rarely, if ever, to physical dependence or craving for the drug."¹⁹⁵ Concerning tolerance, while a few researchers suggested that marihuana "may produce slight tolerance,"¹⁹⁶ others found that "repeated exposure to marihuana has been said to cause an individual to need lesser amounts of the drug to receive the same degree of intoxication,"¹⁹⁷ a process which has been referred to as "reverse tolerance." Since "we know of no drug without tolerance that is addicting,"¹⁹⁸ and scientifically acceptable documentation of "marihuana

withdrawal" had yet to be presented, the stereotype of the "marihuana addict," as presented by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics during the fifties, ¹⁹⁹ was debunked and abandoned during the sixties.

As Kaplan observed, former Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, in an interview intended to explain the Operation Intercept policy to the public, showed that he had also abandoned those assumptions upon which the traditional moral position was based. When asked whether he believed that the enforced shortage would cause marihuana users to turn to street crime in order to purchase the suddenly more expensive drug, he answered: "Since marihuana is not addictive, we don't think that our students and young people will resort to crime in order to get it." ²⁰⁰

By so stating, he concurred with the pharmacologically accurate view, concerning marihuana's non-addicting character. Further, he inferred that the user, a person who had probably committed several crimes in the past (those related to the use and possession of marihuana), was neither a "lawless" nor "immoral" type of person generally. Quite abruptly, even official spokesmen were speaking of marihuana users as "criminals" in only the technical sense, ²⁰¹ thereby qualitatively differentiating marihuana use from other criminal-moral problems.

In sum, the traditional means of controlling marihuana use were ineffective in light of the socio-cultural realities of the late sixties. It is not being suggested that each of the three traditional control mechanisms was equally ineffective among all types of marihuana-users. While the middle-aged professional who used marihuana often relied entirely on a handful of contacts for his supply,

the college student frequently reported that he could obtain the drug from any number of his peers, even on very short notice.

Further, among different types of users, the traditional controls functioned in different ways. For instance, while the high school student was unlikely to be sanctioned by his peers, he often could not indulge in the comfort of his home, for fear of his parents' disapproval and reprisals. In contrast, the employed user often felt constrained to keep this activity beyond the knowledge of his employer, while using the drug at home with spouse ~~and/or friends~~, without fear of sanctions. Of course, there were also a growing number of others, fully insulated from the non-using public, for whom all three traditional means of control exerted minimal pressure.

While these distinctions deserve attention, particularly as they effected individual and group reactions to the government-enforced shortage, the key development of the sixties was the over-riding fact that such control mechanisms were fully effective in a declining number of cases, and totally ineffective in an increasing number of cases. The aforementioned trends witnessed during the sixties served both as indicators of this decreasing effectiveness, and as conditions within which the probability of continued ineffectiveness was practically insured.

From a strictly subcultural affair, marihuana use was developing into a situation of "large-scale patterned evasion." The dominant norm was being publicly affirmed, but officials admitted that widespread violation and evasion was occurring at an ever-increasing rate. Although normative consensus was "insufficient to prevent this demand from arising or to deter considerable numbers of individuals from catering to

it," ²⁰² consensus was "great enough to prevent a public repudiation of the norm itself" (since the norm was believed to be functionally important to the social structure and to the main value-systems of the society). ²⁰³ Normative violation had reached the "tolerance limit." ²⁰⁴

In fact, as normative consensus dwindled, official public reaffirmation of the norm became more frequent, and more vocal. Using Turk's distinction between "social norms" and "cultural norms," it may be said that while the prohibition against the use of marihuana had lost much of its power as a social norm ("a generalization from many instances of similar or complementary behavior" ²⁰⁵ --the existence of a social norm being inferred from social scientific "observations of sanctioning",) ²⁰⁶ its expression as a cultural norm seemed to increase ("a symbolic expression, a set of terms" ²⁰⁷ --the existence of a cultural norm being inferred from the "normative statements by authorities"). ²⁰⁸

Although the conflict between the social and the cultural norm was evident, it was overshadowed by the conflict between the non-legal and the legal norms pertaining to the marihuana issue. This latter conflict was equally intense, but more widespread, since many supporters of the cultural norm (the symbolic opposition to marihuana, and perhaps to other intoxicants as well), disputed its legal formulation. Goode summarized the conflict as follows:

In fact, aside from employees of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, as well as other law enforcement agencies, the present legal structure has the support of very few. Many of the drug's toughest critics such as Donald B. Louria, advocate a considerable reduction in penalties on use and possession ("so that a minor

crime is punished by a minor penalty"), an absolute elimination of the penalties for being in a place where marijuana is smoked, but a retention of the existing penalties for sale and importation. (Louria calls his suggestions "the middle road.") And in a recent government publication, the appropriateness of the federal penalties on marijuana and the basic antimarijuana arguments were seriously called into question; this federal scrutiny of marijuana was made specifically because "the law has come under attack on all counts." 209

Relevant to this type of situation, Turk points out "four kinds of indicators with empirical value for determining whether a conflict over legal norms exists:"

Thus, a normative-legal conflict is indicated where the statement of a cultural legal norm has changed frequently or markedly; legislators, judges, administrators, and other authorities are devoting time and energy to the issues of whether and in what ways a legal norm needs to be revised, abolished, or supplemented; enforcers, particularly first-level enforcers, report that there are violations or potential violations of a legal norm, and that they are concerned with detecting and preventing violations; and persons are being assigned criminal status as violators of a legal norm. 210

When, in a situation under investigation, several of the aforementioned types of indicators are in disagreement, such discrepancies should be resolved in favor of those indicators which reflect what the authorities do (i.e. arrest rates), rather than what they say. Thus, "in defining the existence of a conflict...the essential element is the behavior of the authorities." 211 Based on the application of Turk's four types of indicators, with a special emphasis on the actions of the authorities (i.e. the abandonment of the stepping-stone theory and the "marihuana addict" image; the revision of state laws; the ambivalence inferred from judicial sentencing behaviors; the increase in the population of violators; increased arrest rates; increased expenditure of resources on the problem), by the late sixties, an

undeniable normative-legal conflict existed within the society.

Formerly perceived as a distinct subcultural deviation, the marihuana issue came to be recognized as a situation which was producing large-scale patterned evasion and acute normative-legal conflict. Probably the most important factor in this transformation was the qualitative change in the population of norm violators.

Prior to the sixties, the small number of violators, as well as their general inability to influence decisions, allowed the authorities to deny the existence of an opposing viewpoint. Those who had the power to decide which behaviors were to be ascribed criminal status, and those who legislated sanctions for such violations, opposed the use of marihuana and incorporated this opposition into the criminal statutes. Those who used it, and those who approved of this activity, were generally from groups characterized by extremely limited input concerning such decisions. While this dichotomy continued to characterize the marihuana issue during the sixties, the balance of power started to shift. This shift culminated in the official recognition of an opposition viewpoint, "the acceptance of the 'right' of an adversary to participate in a social relationship, albeit one of conflict,"²¹² thereby conferring a degree of legitimacy upon those who opposed the legal norms.

While the qualitative change in the population of norm violators was directly responsible for the trend toward leniency and the legitimation of opposing viewpoints, it was equally responsible for the public clamor that "something be done" about the drug problem. Narcotics agent Callahan, testifying before the Select Committee on Crime, offered this analysis:

When the drug problem was a Negro problem, everyone

went to jail. When it moved out into white communities, we have seen a different standard of justice being applied. I am not saying that we should not reassess our handling of social problems; we should. We have drastically reassessed to this one, because it is at the stage now where it is probably one of the fastest growing social problems in this country. 213

Similarly, Geller and Boas commented:

The injustice of the severe penalties for pot violations were never publicly articulated until the white middle class took up the habit; but the minority groups who were the early users of marijuana believed the drug to be relatively harmless while being uncomfortably aware of the disproportionate penalties involved if they were caught indulging the habit. 214

According to the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse:

With the adoption of marihuana use by middle and upper class college youth in the mid-sixties, the exaggerated notion of the drug's dangers and the social tension so widespread during this period combined to reopen the question of the impact of marihuana use. 215

As stated in a New York Times article, ghetto residents were particularly attuned to the racial bias implicit in all this re-evaluation and attention:

People in the ghetto who have lived with this kind of thing all their lives are puzzled, annoyed, even resentful over the sudden public commotion. They attribute it to the fact it is no longer just the poor blacks and Puerto Ricans who are affected, but that middle and upper class children are becoming victims, too. To a certain extent, this is true. 216

Similarly, a black community relations officer working for the New York City Police Department stated: "You know what the people up here are saying? Now that white people's kids are involved, the politicians are worried." 217 Skeptics

felt that their most cynical analyses were confirmed when President Nixon commented on the drug problem: "In other words, it gives a lie to the idea that this is something that simply happens to the poor. It is moving to the upper middle class as well." ²¹⁸

Thus, several trends and pressures were bearing down on the federal government and the policy-makers were indeed "worried." To all concerned, it was evident that the traditional, ~~informal~~ means of control were not working. Further, formal control mechanisms, represented by the punitive-legalistic approach to the problem, embodied in a history of increasingly harsh penal statutes, were equally ineffective. Although more felons were being arrested on marihuana charges than for any other felony, probably a lower proportion of such felons and felonies were being detected and arrested than for any other type of felony. ²¹⁹ While the law continued to deter many, Goode noted that "the deterrence function is breaking down yearly." ²²⁰ Further, it was generally agreed that the rising arrest rates, particularly among the young, were serving neither the individual violator nor the society-at-large. At the same time, state legislatures, and judges were adopting more lenient policies and opposing views were given recognition, legitimacy and mass media exposure. Pressure was mounting on the President to adopt a new approach, one that would deal decisively with that which he had labelled, "a rising sickness in our land." ²²¹

In the second half of 1969, the President initiated a two-pronged program. The first of these was represented by legislative proposals sent to Congress (eventually incorporated into the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970). The President had stated that drug abuse is not "a law enforcement problem alone." ²²² The new bill was expected to reflect a "rationalized and liberalized overview of the drug situation." ²²³ It was

expected to incorporate pharmacological reality, thereby re-classifying illicit drugs into their proper categories. It was expected to place a heavy emphasis (financial as well as verbal), on education, research and rehabilitation. It was expected to move the nation a step closer to the resolution of the divisive and dysfunctional normative-legal conflict.

In fact, the proposals did none of these. They represented minimal change, a reaffirmation of existing law, and of the traditional law enforcement approach to the problem. Noting that the harshness of existing law had made it unenforceable, that there was "still no conclusive proof that the drug is harmful," that prohibition gives "the drug the appeal of forbidden fruit," and that the "imposition of penalties for possession, or even use, makes criminals of ordinary young people," Time concluded that medical and legal authorities were disappointed with the new proposals.²²⁴ Life suggested that "Congress should amend Nixon's proposals to give the nation's drug laws both more enlightenment and greater effectiveness," since the bill sent to Congress "takes the simplistic law enforcement approach."²²⁵

Geoffrey Stokes, Director of Program Development for the Addiction Services Agency of New York City, in an article published by the Nation, called the President's proposals "anti-student," not "anti-drug," since "its provisions are aimed at the occasional drug user, rather than at the system which supplies him."²²⁶ He went on to note that "the penalties for simple possession of marijuana, despite the growing body of information indicating its relative harmlessness, remain unchanged; those for sale are raised."²²⁷ Stokes concluded that the President's message was "a throwback to the era of Harry Anslinger; the bill which was sent to Congress one day later, is, if anything, even worse."²²⁸

The only progressive change incorporated into the proposal was a special provision allowing judicial discretion in some cases involving first offenders. While this "loophole" has had, and will continue to have wider ramifications (although similar provisions had already been included in most state laws and are far more applicable on the state level), when seen within the context of the total proposal (including a "no-knock" provision), it did little to satisfy the growing number of authorities who were calling for a new approach. In essence, the President's proposals reaffirmed the traditional official position. Aside from its symbolic value as a rededication to the "war on drugs," it was clear that the enactment of these proposals would have little, if any, effect on the rampant violation of law or on the raging normative-legal conflict, and would do little to close the "generation gap." Such recognition, even within the federal administration and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, can be inferred from the fact that as the President's message was being released (July 14, 1969), the second prong of the attack was being planned.

While it was probable that enactment of the President's proposals would mean that offenders who impressed judges as "curable" would now receive more lenient treatment,²²⁹ and that a few convicted sellers would be "off the streets" for a long while (it was proposed that the convicted seller of marihuana receive a five to twenty year prison sentence for a first offense--the federal law previously mandated a two to ten year sentence), it was evident that these changes would have little impact on the general trend toward increased illicit drug use. If the trend continued, so would rising arrest rates. If arrest rates continued to rise, so would the legislative controversy, the mass media criticism, the vehemence of the opposition, and, bringing us full circle, the number of new experimenters. Further,

the public outcry that "something be done" would continue.

In retrospect, it seems that officials believed that an effective strategy would have to cut down on the arrest rate, thereby deflecting the controversy, criticism and attention surrounding the issue, while still upholding the traditional moral-legal position. Operation Intercept was believed to be just such a strategy. If the supply of marihuana could be prevented from entering the country, if the problem could be attacked "at its source," it was felt that the aforementioned trends and pressures could be reversed. In a sense, it was a last resort. The strategy represented a way of bypassing the essential questions concerning why people feel a need to use illicit drugs, questions concerning why marihuana was illicit, and questions concerning fundamental constitutional liberties. According to official statements, it was reasoned that by making marihuana unavailable, or prohibitively expensive, the marihuana-drug abuse problem, and its manifold reverberations throughout society, would all simply disappear.

Subsection 3: An Analysis of the Differential Effects of Operation Intercept

In terms of the immediate and intermediate objectives of the Operation Intercept policy, curtailing importation, affecting price increases and reducing street-level availability, the policy was successful. Although the degree of success varied for different groups and individuals, the price of marihuana was generally higher, while supplies were generally lower. However, reduced illegal drug usage, particularly by the young, represented the ultimate goal of the Operation Intercept policy.

Ideally, the realization of immediate and intermediate policy goals contributes directly, by creating the necessary conditions, to the realization of a policy's intended and anticipated purposes. For a significant proportion of

certain types of marihuana users, the Operation Intercept policy worked successfully, thereby defining conditions which led to a reduction in illegal drug use.

The first type of user to experience this reduction (thus reacting as was intended and anticipated), corresponds to the National Commission's definition of the "experimental user" (at least one trial to once a month),²³⁰ whose pattern of use was described by Becker (the occasional user) as "sporadic and dependent on chance factors."²³¹ For some occasional users, the decreased availability of marihuana was the "chance factor" which seemed to make the significant difference. However, it must be noted that based on past patterns of use, many of these might have gone several months without using marihuana, even if the shortage had never materialized.

The second type of user to experience a decline in total illicit drug consumption during this period, was not distinguishable in terms of "frequency of use." Rather, anticipated reactions were reported among intermittent (two to ten times monthly)²³² and moderate (eleven times monthly to once daily)²³³ users of marihuana, who were distinguished from the general drug using population by certain objective and subjective characteristics. These users were middle and upper-middle class white collar workers and their wives, ages ranging from the mid-twenties to the mid-fifties, who had serious involvements in, and commitments to conventional social institutions and little, if any identification with a drug subculture or the counter-culture movement. Prior to the shortage, they had never experimented with any illicitly obtained drug other than marihuana or hashish, and they generally had only a few contacts from whom these drugs were purchased.

By the late sixties, a growing number of these "respectable types" were using marihuana regularly. The

findings of this study indicate that a majority of these decreased their illegal drug use during the shortage. While the deterrent function of the law, the "need for secrecy" and "conventional notions of morality" continued to prove ineffective, use was contained by severely limited access to supply sources.

According to Rose, there is a tendency in American law to make the accessories for carrying on problem behavior high priced, which has little deterrent value for those with high incomes.²³⁴ However, in the case under study, although the price of marihuana rose, those most able to meet the demand for higher prices did not find themselves to be in a privileged position vis à vis the marihuana supply. Access to supply channels, rather than ability to pay, continued to function as the primary factor in determining one's ability to obtain marihuana. As stated by one middle-aged, upper-middle class user: "It was not a matter of price, but a matter of availability, period!" Although these users expended more time and energy pursuing the weed than ever before (Mayer quoted a middle class user as saying: "Getting pot is a great sport today...Everybody thinks he's got the last ounce in America."),²³⁵ as a group, they were less successful than at any time in their "turned-on" history.

This finding underlines the highly unusual nature of the marihuana market. Unlike most other commodities, both licit and illicit, the marihuana market does not cater to the highest bidder. Whether or not one agrees that the typical marihuana transaction entails no profit, as Goode suggests,²³⁶ it is evident that the drug exists in a different economic, sociological and psychological sphere than other commodities, a sphere "where the rules of the game are different."²³⁷

In this time of crisis, the rules seemed to dictate that those with the most financial resources, often had the least power to determine their own recreational indulgences. Ironically, the young ghetto user, with very limited resources, was also unable to find marihuana. Although most adapted in quite a different way, this convergence of experiences underlines the uniquely irrational economic reality of the marihuana market.

Most experts agree that a major effect of marihuana use is a decrease in the user's consumption of alcohol.²³⁸ It appears that this process is not irreversible. Most of these "respectable users" reverted to a previous pattern, thereby increasing their intake of alcohol. However, these experiences and adaptations were only temporary, lasting no longer than the marihuana shortage.

Although most studies of deviant or illegal behavior focus on the increasing involvement (the "career") of the norm violator, particularly in response to restrictive public policies, Operation Intercept afforded us the opportunity to examine one process by which some individuals decrease or abandon such involvements, even if only temporarily. The irony in this development is that those who reacted as anticipated, were not those for whom the policy was designed. They were not prone to progression or multiple drug experimentation; they were not unadjusted to the demands of society; they posed no threat to the nation's basic values or conventional beliefs; they did not flout their nonconformity; they accounted for a very small proportion of the escalating arrest rate.

According to former Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst (recently appointed to the post of Attorney

General), the policy was specifically aimed at forcing "our students and young people" ²³⁹..."an estimated 30 million young Americans...to forsake the weed for lack of funds." ²⁴⁰ It was in these groups, specifically among persons of high school and college age, as well as some older users involved in nonconformist subcultures, that Operation Intercept led to a wide range of unintended and unanticipated reactions. It was specifically in these groups, where drug use was seen as posing problems of personal adjustment as well as threats to the social order, in which "the various steps or actions that make up the total program" failed to "comprise a continuous series of events...each of which may be the result of the successful achievement of the preceding goal and, in turn, a precondition to the next higher goals." ²⁴¹ For most users of marihuana, particularly among the young, the conditions created by the accomplishment of Operation Intercept's immediate and intermediate objectives, led to reactions which were in direct contradiction to the ultimate goals of the policy.

Although to a lesser degree, these younger users also found marihuana to be less available and more expensive. However, several conditions served to distinguish these younger users, and to influence their responses to the government-enforced shortage. All of the unintended consequences of the Operation Intercept policy can be seen as a manifestation of the desire to continue an activity, already defined as pleasurable and acceptable ("getting high"), while marihuana was expensive and in scarce supply.

While those who decreased or abstained from drug use during the shortage described their attempts to continue purchasing and using marihuana, most of the younger users emphasized the desire to continue "getting high." In this regard, the remarks of several respondents are instructive:

- a. People I know would still want to get high and they would do whatever they could get. Drinking might be one thing but from what I've seen it tends more toward other kinds of drugs.
- b. Everybody wanted to get high. They really didn't care how. They preferred to stick with pot but it wasn't around so they would use something else. There were many more people dealing amphetamines and LSD and many more people willing to try. Before, they were pretty uptight about using acid because of all the mass media stuff that came down about it but then, you know, like you gotta get high, so you go ahead.
- c. A lot of kids who had become accustomed to walking around with a high half the day decided that the way to keep that high was to use whatever was available at the time, and that was heroin.

In light of the shortage, many adaptations occurred within the marihuana market. For some, the desire to "get high" in spite of existing conditions led to the "grow-it-yourself" movement. For others, it led to the use of domestic cannabis products. For many of those who were able to obtain marihuana, it led to involvement in marihuana sales and distribution, since anyone who possessed practically any quantity of this scarce commodity was able to sell it for a substantial price without any difficulty. While these developments were easily foreseeable, the vastly expanded use of other illicit drugs, particularly by the young, is more problematic.

It was found that the use of hashish was noticeably accelerated by the marihuana shortage in both urban and suburban, middle class and affluent communities. As almost all of the marihuana-using respondents had used hashish at some previous time, the switch to greater reliance on hashish was a rather simple sort of process directly related to market factors. Since its mode of consumption is generally

the same as is used for marihuana (smoking), its effects quite similar to those of marihuana, and it was equally acceptable within the peer culture; users did not regard this to be a "switch" at all. In fact, even most drug use surveys have failed to distinguish between marihuana and hashish, as the two are pharmacologically similar and have come to be regarded as interchangeable. If there is any significance in this consideration (the psycho-pharmacological experience does not appear to be very significant as most respondents reported that their hashish experiences were not necessarily any stronger, or any different, than their marihuana experiences), it lies in the fact that many marihuana users had already learned, or were in the process of learning, that they could receive enjoyment without any noticeably different physiological effects or social sanctions, from a drug other than marihuana (at least in name).

The greatly expanded use of the barbiturates, the amphetamines, the psychedelic drugs and heroin requires a different level of analysis, since each of those drugs was perceived, even within the various drug use subcultures, as qualitatively different types of substances.

It has often been noted that drug adventurism is related to thrill seeking, hedonism, risk taking, a desire to test limits, and a lack of constraining social responsibilities and obligations, characteristic of many adolescent subcultures of all socio-economic strata. However, these youthful dispositions, in and of themselves, do not explain multiple drug experimentation, since these same proclivities have been used to explain many forms of disapproved behavior, from goldfish swallowing to the teenage gang-hot rod syndrome. Rather, an understanding of the greatly expanded use of the barbiturates, the amphetamines, the psychedelic drugs and heroin during this period requires an examination of the

various drug use subcultures, peer influences, antecedent events and drug use trends which allowed many users to discount the risks associated with these heavier involvements.

Unlike the growth in the marihuana-using population, which was officially recognized only after it had assumed massive proportions, the trend toward multiple drug experimentation was quickly and widely acknowledged. As with the marihuana problem, such attention was directly related to the involvement of white middle class youth. As stated by Tom Buckley in a New York Times article: "What the public is worried about is the apparent spread of hard narcotics to the previously immune white middle class sections of the city and the suburbs, and drug use by ever younger children in the black and Puerto Rican ghettos."²⁴² Consequently, a great deal of publicity was addressed to the "dangerous drug" and heroin problem. This publicity consisted of warnings, often presented in a factual and straight forward manner, designed to discourage young people from experimenting with these drugs. In assessing the apparent failure of this campaign, several factors must be kept in mind.

The first factor to be considered relates to the credibility of the anti-drug forces. Since many of these same young people had been exposed to a great deal of inaccurate anti-marihuana propaganda previously, they had little reason to assume that official sources could suddenly be trusted.

Weil's analysis of the actual intent of traditional "drug education" was shared by most users: "Drug education in the United States means thinly disguised attempts to scare children away from drugs."²⁴³ These attempts often took the form of "fact campaigns," such as in an article published by The Washington Post during the summer of 1969, entitled "Parents Need Facts on Pot."²⁴⁴ As in other such articles intended to equip parents with convincing if not

irrefutable arguments, this one was short on facts and long on propaganda.

Sometimes these attempts assumed the guise of objective scientific research. When asked about the purpose of his research into the physiological effects of marihuana, Dr. Vincent de Paul Lynch, chairman of the pharmacology department of St. John's College of Pharmacy, commented: "Our purpose is to establish scientific proof of marijuana's ill effects."²⁴⁵ Statements such as this one did more to discredit scientific research than to discredit marihuana. They were also in direct contradiction to messages carried in those media most relevant to the younger population of potential users. Underground publications, the lyrics of rock songs, even mass media publications carried messages more in line with the experiences and perceptions of users and potential users alike. A young Colony member, interviewed by Carey, referred to an article published by Playboy in 1963:

More people read Playboy than anything else...And Playboy says grass is all right...Artists and people have been at it for a long time, authors, etc. And they've come out and said it's all right. And people have listened...And if Norman Mailer says grass isn't, you know, it ain't bad for you, it hangs up a little bit, but it's all right. A lot of people listen to it, because Norman Mailer hasn't by and large done any lying to the public. If President Johnson says grass is bad for you, he's done a lot of lying to the public, and...you don't quite listen to this sort of thing. ²⁴⁶

Kaplan points out the logical implications inherent in this "credibility gap:"

This lack of belief in the harmfulness of marijuana also hurts efforts at drug education: since young people do not believe marijuana is dangerous, they tend to conclude that other drugs subject to similar or less serious prohibitions are also not dangerous. In the case of heroin, amphetamines, and LSD, this conclusion is unfortunately false, and hence dangerous. ²⁴⁷

Due to the sometimes exaggerated, sometimes patently false messages disseminated by the anti-drug forces (most notably the Federal Bureau of Narcotics), marihuana users were unlikely to trust such sources even when, and if, they were telling the truth. This disbelief of official sources helped drug users to discount the risks associated with the use of other illicit drugs, as those same sources had undermined their own credibility in the anti-marihuana campaigns. At the same time, several other factors exerted pressures on the young drug user which channeled the desire to get high and the discounting of official warnings, into certain, differentially distributed, types of drug involvements.

As previously documented, by the summer of 1969, a trend toward multiple drug experimentation was already underway within the various peer groups that identified with the drug scene. Although some young drug users had used only marihuana and hashish, the opportunity to experiment with other illicit drugs already existed, since, within each local neighborhood, individual drug users were found to be at different stages of involvement in terms of experiences with these other substances. Thus, other illicit drugs had been defined as "acceptable and pleasurable" (Goode), as having something to "contribute" (Fiddle), by trusted intimates within the peer culture.

Unlike the middle-aged "respectable pot smoker," the young user was exposed to models of "harder" drug use, with whom he could identify. As with marihuana, all of the respondents reported that they were first introduced to other drugs, and were initiated into the use of these other drugs, in the company of friends. This availability of models (in the case of LSD these models included nationally famous personalities as well as other locals), and of familiar surroundings within which one could initiate use, combined with a well-publicized trend toward "dangerous

drug" use, and the ready-made rationalization that such indulgence was of a temporary nature (since Operation Intercept was officially presented as a temporary measure), plus the increased availability of other drugs at a time when marihuana was both expensive and hard to find, all functioned to facilitate the use of drugs other than marihuana and hashish. As stated by the respondents, people still wanted to "get high." For those who had found these drugs to be personally acceptable and pleasurable at an earlier time, the transition to greater involvement was even more prevalent, as would be expected.

The fact that different drugs had established, or were in the process of establishing, different "traditions of use" in the various neighborhoods throughout the city, and that different "progression opportunities" were available within different drug use subcultures, accounts for the differential acceptance of the various illicit drugs within the various drug-using peer groups. These traditions of use also inferred a readily available supply, since others within the local peer culture, more heavily involved in multiple drug experimentation, were obtaining and using them regularly.

Once accepted within the subculture, the availability of sufficient supplies appears to be much less problematic, far more constant, than it is with marihuana. When asked which drugs were causing the most trouble among high school youngsters, former Commissioner Goddard replied: "The ones that are easiest to get: amphetamines and barbiturates." ²⁴⁸ With over 100,000 pounds of amphetamine and methamphetamine products available in the United States every year ("enough to supply 250 milligrams of these stimulants--or 25 to 50 doses--to every person in this country"), ²⁴⁹ and the "annual production of barbiturate derivatives is estimated to be in excess of 1,000,000 pounds or the equivalent of some

24, 1½-grain doses for every person in the United States," ²⁵⁰ Goddard's statement should have surprised no one. With these kinds of production statistics, illicit manufacture was practically unnecessary.

According to Ingersoll, "92 percent of the amphetamines and barbiturates that are found in the illicit traffic are diverted from legitimate business channels." ²⁵¹ Further, it has been estimated that half of the barbiturates and amphetamines manufactured by American industry are diverted to the illicit market," ²⁵² and of those sedatives and tranquilizers which are legally prescribed, Louria has estimated that one-half are prescribed unnecessarily. ²⁵³

Along with those drugs which were stolen from manufacturers, distributors, pharmacists and hospitals, those which strayed into Mexico and returned via the black market, and those which were prescribed for medical purposes and used otherwise (i.e. overweight youngsters became a channel for "ups" while feigned diarrhea became a route to paregoric), the family medicine chest ~~was~~ likely to contain all kinds of "goodies." As of 1969, 30 percent of the nation's adult population were using one or more of the tranquilizers, sedatives and stimulants regularly. ²⁵⁴

Similarly, an "LSD famine" is as yet an unheard-of phenomenon. This colorless, odorless, soluble powder, powerful in minute quantities and fairly easy to manufacture, ²⁵⁵ has always been readily available. And, newspaper accounts aside ("the recurrent arrests of allegedly important narcotic dealers and the confiscation of huge quantities of heroin"), ²⁵⁶ except for a few periods of "panic," heroin users have continued to get their drugs. As stated by Wald and Hutt: "Border seizures of heroin amounted to less than 5 percent of the estimated imports in 1970. Indeed, the price of heroin has been falling steadily and the quality increasing, which indicates a failure to stem the supply." ²⁵⁷ In this

regard, Fiddle points out that although inflationary trends were a key concern in the world of business during 1968-69, "during that same period, the illegal market decreased the price of a bag of heroin in the ghetto." ²⁵⁸ Further, "the bag, which had sold for as much as three to six dollars earlier, increasingly was sold for two dollars and not necessarily with radically fewer grains." ²⁵⁹

Thus, once defined as acceptable and pleasurable, access to supplies posed few difficulties. Whites involved in drug use subcultures usually adapted to the marihuana shortage through increased involvement with the barbiturates, the amphetamines and the psychedelics, as well as hashish. In the absence of a well-established local tradition, the "pill-popper" syndrome arose, with use often dependent on chance factors until individual and group preferences became solidified. As described previously, this expanded market led some youths to become involved in the sale of these substances. In contrast, young ghetto drug users usually moved on to the traditional drug of choice, heroin. (While hashish might have offered an intermediate option, it simply was not available.)

Thus, ~~as~~ these drugs became more available than marihuana, they also became more appealing (competitive prices comprising part of the appeal), causing increased demand and black market distribution, greater acceptability, the involvement of more young people in sales, etc.

As Fiddle observed, when the social and psychological conditions facilitate "risk discounting," the negative publicity surrounding a particular drug is likely to be disregarded. When these conditions are absent, the young drug user is likely to accept the messages carried in the mass media. ²⁶⁰ Thus, with a few exceptions, ghetto users avoided the risks associated with LSD and "speed," while white drug users avoided heavy involvement with heroin.

In ghetto neighborhoods, the exceptions to this generalization could usually be explained by "differential association."²⁶¹ It was found that those black and Puerto Rican drug users who experimented with LSD or "speed," had experienced much more contact with white drug users than their peers. Thus, the use of these drugs among ghetto youth was far more common for those who were attending college and/or integrated social activities.

In white middle class and affluent communities, it was found that the exceptions to the "no heroin" rule generally occurred within the even younger groups of drug users (usually between the ages of sixteen and twenty), who were heavily involved in a drug-oriented lifestyle. In explaining the behavior of these youngsters, the differential association theory is not very helpful. They generally had fewer interracial contacts than the older users, such as the college students, who were far less likely to take on a heavy involvement with heroin, even temporarily. Further, older models of heroin use were generally absent from these communities. The move to heroin must be explained by other factors.

It should be pointed out that although a trend toward increased drug experimentation was underway in the white communities, unlike the ghetto, no long-standing tradition of use had been established by any one particular drug. The only established rule seemed to be that even if one wished to experiment with a great variety of drugs, involvement with heroin was to be avoided. This rule can be readily inferred from the special emphasis placed on the switch to heroin, in the statements of many of the respondents. As previously noted, younger drug users were more likely to disregard this rule than the older users.

Geller and Boas have suggested that the use of heroin among younger drug users may be partially explained by a

"casual and apparently fearless attitude toward drugs" ²⁶² displayed by some teen-aged users. Similarly, several respondents stated that these younger users were less "level-headed," and more "carried away" with the drug scene. Perhaps one reason for this difference in attitudes derives from adolescent identity crises and/or the lack of serious and time consuming involvements with college or employment. While age-related personality factors probably played an essential role, it is believed that other factors may have also been important.

For younger drug users, the progression from marihuana use to multiple drug experimentation occurred at a much faster rate. By 1969, the employed or college user had generally been using marihuana for several years, while this was rarely true among the high school users. As it takes a while for the young drug user to acquire a knowledge of the finer distinctions between drugs, as well as a knowledge of the "tradition of avoidance" within his locale, it may be argued that some of these younger users just didn't have enough time to develop this discrimination. The reason why they didn't have enough time is that as they were learning to appreciate "getting high" from marihuana, the marihuana supply started to dry up and other drugs poured into the neighborhood. Since no boundaries had been established in the peer group, the young user consumed whatever he could get. For some, that included heroin.

Also, the more experienced users had been previously exposed to the "stepping stone" theory. For most, a disbelief in this theory had been solidified prior to marihuana initiation. Although the theory was held to be false, most users internalized the dictum that heroin should be avoided at all costs. Thus, these users were confident that marihuana would not lead them to defy the heroin avoidance tradition. In contrast, the youngest users were often exposed to

anti-heroin publicity after they had started using marihuana. If a strong distinction was drawn at all, it was after the user had developed a positive attitude toward drug use in general. Further, such exposure occurred while he was more or less under the continuous influence of other drugs, which helped him to discount the risks associated with heroin even more.

It has been suggested that the avoidance of heroin by white middle class students and others in nonconformist subcultures (as opposed to teen-agers and ghetto youth), is based on their knowledge of the "properties of the various drugs, especially the perils of heroin."²⁶³ The findings of this study indicate that drug-use decisions, even within these more educated groups, are often less rational than such statements would lead us to believe.

Many respondents were aware that barbiturate and alcohol withdrawal is more physically traumatic than heroin withdrawal; that reactions to the amphetamines and psychedelics are more unpredictable; that cocaine habituation can be more expensive than heroin addiction. They still chose these other drugs rather than heroin. Others were completely unaware of the possible dangers associated with the use of the "dangerous drugs." These users also avoided heroin. The use or avoidance of heroin was more closely related to the presence or absence of risk discounting factors (especially the exposure to negative publicity while influenced by either a tradition of use or a tradition of avoidance), than to any objective appraisal of the "properties of the various drugs."

The same respondents who emphasized a vehement disapproval of heroin use, expressed a universal willingness to use "opiated hash." Most had used it (or believed they had), in the past. Although an opiate-inclusive drug, its dangers were discounted due to a quickly established tradition of hashish use and the availability and acceptability of

the drug within the peer culture, combined with an absence of negative publicity. Here again, Fiddle's risk discounting perspective appears to be particularly relevant.

Thus, during the summer of 1969, an array of risk discounting factors, combined with the government-enforced marihuana shortage and the increased availability of other illicit drugs, functioned to define conditions within which the desire to "get high" was manifested in various types of behaviors which were unintended and unanticipated by the policy-makers.

Section D: Operation Intercept: Past, Present and Future

During late 1969, while the press was publishing accounts of the multiple consequences stemming from the Operation Intercept policy decision, journalists were also pointing out that such strategies had little, if any chance of success on a long-term basis.

Concerning the limitations of anti-smuggling campaigns at the U.S.-Mexican border, those factors cited most frequently included the Mexican peasants' dependence on marihuana as a "cash crop;" the know-how of professional smugglers; and the corruptibility of Mexican officials. The East Village Other analyzed the situation in this way:

It's extremely doubtful Mexico will crack down on the Mary Jane growers. This would only result in extreme deprivation for many Mexican villages. Besides, the corruptibility of the Federales is well known. It is to be expected that the Mexican Feds will make a show of burning down a few fields and making some busts, but that's about all. 264

Rolling Stone also focussed on the Mexican bribery system:

"Agreements" between the U.S. and Mexico are practically unenforceable at the local Mexican level, because of mordida--the system of bribery. Highup Mexican officials humor U.S. politicians, but what one Mexican drug control agent called the "Mexican way of life" cannot be changed. 265

Time called a mass audience's attention to all three factors:

Similar U.S. attempts in the past have proved frustrating, largely because drug smuggling is a high-profit, low-risk trade. The new treasure of the Sierra Madre is a traditional sideline crop for thousands of small Mexican farmers. They get up to 40 times as much for a kilo of the prized "Acapulco Gold" as they do for a

kilo of corn.

Although marijuana and opium are technically illegal in Mexico, the Mexican government has been reluctant to beef up its unsophisticated mini-force of 40 drug agents, who are so poorly paid that they are easy prey to the Mexican ethos of mordida (the bite, or pay-off). Operation Intercept may discourage the amateurs who smuggle hemp across the border on major highways. It will probably have little effect on the professionals who dominate the trade. As a knowledgeable Texas border scout points out, "There are areas out there where a small army could cross without detection." 266

Newsweek took an equally pessimistic view of the strategy:

Even if Mexico submits to the U.S.'s undiplomatic persuasion, there is little real chance that the available supply of pot will diminish. A two-ton cargo of new Colombian grass was flown into the U.S. last week, and huge tracts of unpoliced land are known to be available throughout Central and South America. 267

In effect, reports such as these, circulated in establishment as well as underground publications, created an additional "credibility gap" for U.S. government officials. While the policy-makers were claiming a rousing success for the policy, the public was being told that the policy could not possibly succeed on any sustained basis.

Although Operation Intercept represented a last resort in the effort to curb drug abuse in the sixties, particularly the growing use of marihuana, it defined a new direction, with a new emphasis, for federal drug policies of the seventies. In March of 1970, President Nixon announced a United States-Mexican anti-smuggling agreement, including "\$1 million in technical assistance to Mexico for the eradication of poppy and marijuana fields." 268 According to federal officials, "one of the first targets of the crash program would be marijuana." 269

In May of 1970, a new and intensified Customs Bureau drive was announced, to commence on June 1, 1970. According to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Eugene T. Rossides, "The new program will be a permanent upgrading of the enforcement, although there may occasionally be an extra-special increase, or blitz inspections lasting a few hours."²⁷⁰ The program was code-named "Operation Able" by Treasury and Customs officials.²⁷¹

Anti-smuggling efforts have traditionally been associated with the Bureau of Customs in the Treasury Department. Federal allocations for this bureau have been in keeping with the new emphasis. In fiscal 1972, the Customs budget amounted to \$40.5 million.²⁷² Of this sum, \$15 million derived from a \$155 million supplemental budget request, announced by President Nixon on June 17, 1971.²⁷³ Actually, Customs officials estimated that they would spend \$52 million during fiscal 1972.²⁷⁴ In fiscal 1971, Customs estimated a \$31.6 million expenditure in this area.²⁷⁵

Concerning the results of stepped-up Customs activities, comparative data is available for fiscal 1970 and fiscal 1971. Both the number of marihuana seizures, and the amount of marihuana confiscated, showed significant increases. As compared to 4,115 marihuana seizures reported in fiscal 1970, 5,969 seizures were reported during fiscal 1971.²⁷⁶ And 104,303.86 pounds of marihuana were confiscated in fiscal 1970, as compared to 177,388.44 pounds which were confiscated in fiscal 1971.²⁷⁷ (It should be noted that between fiscal 1970 and fiscal 1971, the confiscation of "dangerous drugs" dropped approximately 50 percent.)²⁷⁸

Domestically, the Department of Agriculture has also been involved in the effort to stop marihuana. According to Goldberg and DeLong: "During fiscal 1971, the Department of Agriculture conducted an experimental marijuana-eradication program in eleven Midwest counties. The cost of this project

(\$55,000) was assumed by BNDD." 279

It would be inaccurate to assume that all efforts to curtail the supply of illegal drugs from coming into the United States are directed by the Bureau of Customs. In February, 1970, President Nixon stated that the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (in the Justice Department), would be in charge of "dealing with foreign law enforcement officials on narcotic's questions." 280 From 1969 to 1971, BNDD increased its number of foreign offices from 13 to 28, and its number of agents assigned to foreign posts from 26 to 61. 281 Fifty more agents, 15 of which were to be assigned to foreign offices, were requested in the 1972 budget. 282

In 1972, BNDD will receive a total budget of approximately \$67 million, thus doubling its appropriations in two years. 283 It is estimated that 90 percent of BNDD's budget will be spent on law-enforcement activities. 284 It goes without saying that this necessarily includes huge sums for the international anti-marihuana campaign.

It is impossible to say how many other agencies, and what proportion of the anti-drug abuse expenditures, are involved in this effort. The \$1 million given to Mexico's poppy and marihuana eradication campaign during fiscal 1970, was funded by the AID program, the Agency for International Development.

In spite of these massive efforts, in January of 1972, BNDD's director John Ingersoll reported to President Nixon that "an astonishing variety of drugs--heroin, cocaine, amphetamines, hashish, marijuana--was continuing to pour into the U.S." 285 According to Time:

The result has been a dramatic change in the U.S. approach to drugs. Only two years ago, U.S. narcotics agencies operated on a miserly \$78 million budget. Now the White House is asking Congress for \$729 million next year for a flock of new agencies.

The agencies are charged with what is essentially a broad-gauged search-and-destroy mission. 286

In essence, the "dramatic change" was really only in the number of dollars and in the concentration of resources committed to the same effort. The 1972 campaign was reported by Time as follows:

The Bureau of Customs, charged with policing thousands of miles of wide-open frontier, is due to add 330 new men to its hard-pressed 532 man border patrol force. Last month Nixon ordered the Air Force to help out by installing new extra-low-level radar at sites in Texas and New Mexico, where it will be used to track the airborne smugglers who scoot across the Mexican border in light planes, avoiding detection by flying at cactus level. Air Force and Air Guard squadrons have been ordered to maintain their F-102 and supersonic F-106 interceptors on alert status, ready to scramble in five minutes. Besides the heroin smugglers, their targets will also include the light planes that deliver something like a ton of Jamaican marijuana daily, mostly at airfields in Florida. 287

Although programs such as these have been unsuccessful in the past (Goldberg and DeLong noted that the \$1 million AID grant to Mexico followed similar grants, totaling \$627,000 made in 1961 and 1965, "without apparent effect"), 288 the Time news release is uncomfortably reminiscent of articles announcing the 1969 Operation Intercept program. Weil's analysis of federal anti-drug policies appears to be an accurate appraisal of developments in these past three years:

Many Americans, including many legislators and Government executives, continue to dream that they can make marijuana and narcotics vanish by sealing off borders, eradicating wild hemp, paying foreign governments not to grow opium, and so on. And when, in response to these actions, drug use becomes greater and worse, the only things such persons can see to do is to redouble the effort. 289

There is little reason to assume that these types of "redoubled efforts" to curtail the drug abuse problem will be more successful in the seventies than they were in the sixties. While the continuing Operation Intercept strategy has had a limited effect on the importation of particular illegal drugs, and then only for short periods of time, it has not curbed the general availability nor the ever-expanding demand for these substances.

On the other hand, it would be foolish to assume that the supply of marihuana entering the United States could not be significantly diminished in the years ahead. Of all the illegal drugs which have been readily available on the black market during the past decade, imported marihuana is probably the least difficult to control. However, in light of the continuing demand for, and availability of many illegal drugs, as well as the overriding social concern with the general drug abuse problem in this country, the findings of this study suggest that the Operation Intercept strategy is particularly inappropriate when applied to the "marihuana problem." This estimation is based on an examination of recent trends, and on the application of data which has already been presented in this report.

First, it must be recognized that the expansion of illegal drug use has continued for the past three years. Simmons has estimated "that every passing week fifty thousand new people per week try marijuana in this country." ²⁹⁰ While some may regard this estimate as high, the upward trend appears to be beyond doubt.

The Fleischmann Commission Report, released in October of 1972, found that in New York City, 45 percent of the students in the 10th through 12th grades and 20 percent of those in the 7th through 9th grades are "currently users of some psychoactive drug." ²⁹¹ According to Will Riggan, the commission's associate research director, "users" referred

to "more than just weekenders" (occassional users), but did not include "hard-core addicts" who had been expelled or who had dropped out of school.²⁹²

Current information leads one to the conclusion that as the proportion of drug users continues to increase, the average age of initiation into illegal drug usage is decreasing. In other words, a large proportion of the new recruits are coming from younger and younger age groups.²⁹³ Thus, the use of marihuana and other illicitly obtained drugs is more entrenched in our culture than ever before, and these practices continue to make great gains in those age groups in which individuals are most prone to use these substances in a harmful, and often reckless manner.

It must also be recognized that due to the continuing availability of many illicit drugs and the unabated trend toward multiple drug experimentation, the general campaign against drug abuse will not be aided by the suppression of any one particular drug. When such suppression strategies are aimed at marihuana, which is widely considered to be far less dangerous, to the individual and to the social order, than other illicit drugs, the strategy seems to be especially ill-advised.

The findings of this study reveal that during the summer of 1969, the government-enforced marihuana shortage was a key factor underlying the widespread use of illicit drugs other than marihuana. Essentially, this suggests that one mode of "progression," or one way in which the "softer-to-harder" formulation becomes a reality for the individual drug user, is grounded in the limited availability of the "softer" drug.

On the other hand, observations during this period have attuned us to several other patterns which are in direct contradiction to the conventional "softer-to-harder"

hypothesis, while also underlining the inappropriateness of the marihuana suppression strategy:

- a. Those who use marihuana in order to stop using heroin.
- b. Those who begin drug experimentation with a drug considered "harder" than marihuana, and then turn to marihuana as their primary drug.
- c. Those who use a "harder" drug during a period in which marihuana is personally or generally unavailable, and then return to marihuana use when it again becomes easy to obtain.

These findings suggest that in a great many cases, the use of marihuana serves to suppress heavy involvement with the more dangerous substances. In light of this information, there is little reason to expect that the future suppression of marihuana will be at all helpful in terms of the massive effort being waged on many levels, to combat the drug abuse problem generally. In fact, according to many professionals working in drug rehabilitation and drug education programs, this costly search-and-destroy strategy may very well prove to be counter-productive in the long-run.

The availability of other illicit drugs and the prevalence of multiple drug use patterns, are two overt, easily observable factors which serve to undermine marihuana suppression efforts such as Operation Intercept. However, an equally important factor, which is either ignored or misunderstood by the policy-makers, concerns the common-sense notion that people will try to continue an activity which they enjoy.

While the concepts "psychological dependence" and "habituation" have been severely misused in the past, the findings of this study indicate that if defined objectively,

the proportion of users to whom these concepts may legitimately be applied has been consistently underestimated. Using Kaplan's definition of psychological dependence and habituation, which is essentially in accord with that offered by the World Health Organization,²⁹⁴ we may conclude that either of these concepts "merely reflects the common-sense observation that people who like a drug will continue to use it if they can--so long as they continue to like its effects."²⁹⁵ Similarly, observing that he was psychologically dependent on Coca Cola throughout medical school, and that many of his acquaintances are psychologically dependent on their wives, Weil defines the concept as simply "a negative way of describing the behavior of someone who does something repeatedly because he likes it."²⁹⁶ Many persons with a serious interest in the drug abuse problem have sarcastically applied the concept to a host of licit pleasures, such as "wine, smoked sturgeon, poetry, comfortable chairs,"²⁹⁷ and to the Sunday edition of the New York Times.²⁹⁸

All of the regular marihuana users who were interviewed were found to be willing to spend additional time and energy (and often additional money as well), in order to continue an activity which they had defined as pleasurable. Whether or not we wish to describe this orientation as "psychological dependence," it is a fact of marihuana use that people who use it regularly have come to enjoy it, and will attempt to continue using it.

Most of those who reacted to the shortage in an anticipated manner were no less enthusiastic about the drug and did not necessarily use it less frequently than the other users. None expressed the feeling that they required, or wished, any help in breaking "the habit." In fact, they generally experienced a heightened sense of conflict with conventional leadership as a direct result of this government campaign. They differed from the other users, not so much

in terms of regard or appreciation of the drug, as they did in terms of other involvements and identities.

Marihuana use, and drug use in general, played a much more essential role in the lives of those who reacted in an unanticipated manner. However, these users appeared to be as dependent on a chosen lifestyle, which combined "getting high" with a nonconformist self-image and social involvement in the drug scene, as they were dependent on marihuana in and of itself. Thus, the marihuana suppression strategy was seen as a real and symbolic attack on an entire lifestyle, an attack which was answered in terms of the many attitudinal and behavioral reactions discussed previously. When seen within the context of this orientation (shared by most younger users), and the aforementioned situational factors, we are again forced to consider the idea that the suppression of marihuana will have little, if any, positive effect on the drug abuse problem generally.

Past developments and present realities indicate that if the on-going search-and-destroy marihuana suppression strategy proves to be significantly more successful than it has been in the past, thus curtailing the supply of imported marihuana on a long-term basis, some of the following adjustments may be expected:

- a. Increased importation of hashish from the Near East, the Middle East and North Africa.
- b. The producers of Mexican marihuana will become involved in the large-scale production of hashish, which, due to its concentrated form, is far more difficult to detect.
- c. Increased use of heroin and the dangerous drugs, especially by the young.
- d. New synthetic hallucinogens, chemically similar to THC, will be produced and illicitly distributed in the United States.

- e. Initiation into drug use, with a drug other than marihuana, will become more prevalent.
- f. Increased, and professional production of domestic marihuana.
- g. Scientifically improved potency of domestic marihuana.
- h. Poor domestic marihuana, grown in uncontrolled environments, will be combined with synthetic chemicals.
- i. Increased abuse of pharmaceuticals, such as drugs that contain belladonna, amyl nitrite and codein-containing cough medicines, which have been misused to a limited extent in the past but which are readily available.
- j. The "discovery" and popularization of innumerable fruits, flowers and weeds (i.e. Hawaiian woodrose seeds, morning glory seeds, periwinkle leaves, mandrake, jimsonweed, banana skins) which contain, or are believed to contain, mind-altering properties.
- k. Organized crime will become more involved in the distribution of imported and domestic marihuana, should prices increase significantly.
- l. Greater official corruption, on all levels of enforcement.

In time, all or any one of these developments can be expected to lead to a host of new medical, social and legal problems.

During the past few years, many important works have detailed the enormous social costs inherent in the present approach to the marihuana issue. However, recent law enforcement and legislative trends suggest that a more workable, more rational approach is evolving. In this regard, the recommendations of the National Commission on Marihuana

and Drug Abuse are most important. If uniformly adopted, we can expect many of these social costs to be minimized.

On the other hand, liberalized programs and policies, such as those suggested by the National Commission, fail to deal effectively with those social risks which are a direct result of the ever-expanding search-and-destroy strategy.²⁹⁹ We believe that any program which attempts to combine rationalized and liberalized law enforcement, educational and legislative policies, with traditional supply suppression techniques, is bound to increase this particular group of risks.

Throughout this investigation, we have tried to attain a deeper insight into the complexities of the drug use phenomenon in this country, through gaining a greater understanding of the relations between variables. However, as citizens deeply concerned about the drug abuse problem, we cannot help feeling that the present marihuana suppression strategy is leading in the wrong direction.

According to Merton, "The most obvious limitation to a correct anticipation of consequences of action is provided by the existing state of knowledge."³⁰⁰ We would hope that the data presented in this report will add to the existing state of knowledge, and that it will be of value to those who shape public policy, as well as to those whose interest in the problem does not include this practical dimension.

The hope that this data will have applicable value is based on the assumption that we are all, researchers and policy-makers alike, interested in a rational, workable approach to the drug problem. Thus, it assumes that we share a common primary goal. It also assumes that if accumulated evidence shows the costly marihuana search-and-destroy strategy to be detrimental to the long-range effort to curtail drug abuse, such a strategy will be abandoned because these consequences will be considered highly

undesirable.

However, if such policies are actually the result of biased assessments, calculated to expand the budgets, the duties, the powers and the prestige of bureaucracies within the government; if politicians are primarily concerned with the "subjective satisfaction of duty well performed" ³⁰¹ (or with the appearance of successful performance); or if national leaders are primarily interested in popular approval, ³⁰² with only secondary regard for the objective consequences of their policies, no amount of evidence will make much difference. (Reiss asks: "Is it possible that the role of social science fact is inconsequential relative to the internal dynamics of how policies are generated and implemented?") ³⁰³

In August of 1972 (two weeks before the stepped-up search-and-destroy budget request was submitted to Congress), the General Accounting Office released a six-volume report entitled "Drug Abuse Control Activities Affecting Military Personnel in the Department of Defense." The New York Times cited the following statement from the report:

Moreover, the intensification of enforcement activities may have contributed significantly to the replacement of marijuana, which is bulky, easily detectable by smell, and not physically addictive, by more dangerous addictive drugs such as heroin, and thereby may have contributed to a new, more serious problem. ³⁰⁴

The strategy continues. The effort is redoubled. The drug abuse problem continues to grow more serious.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III. Analysis of the Findings: Public Policy
and the Drug Abuse ProblemSection A: The Findings and the Hypotheses

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Section C: The Social Context of Operation Intercept:
An Examination of Contingent Conditions

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 191. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Mass Communication Popular Taste, and Organized Social Action," in Readings in Social Psychology, ed. by Guy E. Swanson et al. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), p. 77.
 192. Ibid., p. 85; See also, Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail," in Readings in Social Psychology, pp. 89-91.
 193. Goode, The Marijuana Smokers, p. 47.
 194. Becker, "Marihuana: A Sociological Overview," p. 90.
 195. Nowlis, Drugs on the College Campus, p. 99.
 196. Jerome H. Jaffe, "Drug Addiction and Drug Abuse," in The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics, p. 296, cited by Nowlis, Drugs on the College Campus, p. 100.
 197. National Commission, Marihuana, p. 64.
 198. Kaplan, Marijuana, p. 160.
 199. Anslinger and Tompkins, The Traffic in Narcotics, pp. 21-22, cited by Becker, "Marihuana: A Sociological Overview," p. 90.
 200. San Francisco Chronicle, September 14, 1969, p. 1, cited by Kaplan, Marijuana, p. 162.
 201. According to Goode: "The legal process is successful to the extent that it either (1) compels the individual to accept society's version of himself as in fact criminal, i.e. criminal in more than a technical sense, a person deserving of society's scorn and punishment, or (2) discredits the individual in important areas of his life,

impugning his trustworthiness, moral rectitude, and integrity for many members of society;" Goode, The Marijuana Smokers, p. 281.

202. Williams, American Society, p. 381.
203. Ibid.
204. "Each norm can be thought of as having a tolerance limit, that is, the ratio between violations of the norm and a society's willingness to tolerate it or suppress it." Clinard, Sociology of Deviant Behavior, p.22. See also, Courtland C. Van Vechten, "The Tolerance Quotient as a Device for Defining Certain Social Concepts," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46 (1940), pp. 35-44.
205. Austin T. Turk, Criminality and Legal Order (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969), p. 42.
206. Ibid., p. 51.
207. Ibid., p. 42.
208. Ibid., p. 51.
209. Goode, The Marijuana Smokers, p. 286.
210. Turk, Criminality and Legal Order, p. 91.
211. Ibid., p. 92.
212. Ibid.
213. Select Committee on Crime, Marihuana, p. 63.
214. Geller and Boas, The Drug Beat, p. 123.
215. National Commission, Marihuana, p. 132.
216. Charlayne Hunter, "Why Children Become Drug Addicts," New York Times, March 15, 1970, p. 18.
217. "Kids and Heroin: The Adolescent Epidemic," Time, March 16, 1970, p. 25.
218. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5, No. 43 (October 27, 1969), p. 1466.
219. Goode, The Marijuana Smokers, p. 159.

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221. "Nixon Drug Law: A Crucial Fault," Life, September 5, 1969, p. 32.
222. Ibid.
223. Geoffrey C. Stokes, "Nixon's Drug Bill," Nation, September 22, 1969, p. 271.
224. "Penalties and Programs," Time, July 25, 1969, p. 64.
225. "Nixon Drug Law: A Crucial Fault," p. 32.
226. Stokes, "Nixon's Drug Bill," p. 271.
227. Ibid.
228. Ibid.
229. For a discussion of "how to" impress the probation officer and the judge, see Marvin Cahn, "The User and the Law" in Marijuana: Myths and Realities.
230. National Commission, Marihuana, p. 42.
231. Becker, "Marihuana: A Sociological Overview," p. 81.
232. National Commission, Marihuana, p. 42.
233. Ibid.
234. Arnold M. Rose, "Law and the Causation of Social Problems," Social Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 39.
235. Mayer, "How the Middle Class Turns On," p. 42.
236. Goode, The Marijuana Smokers, p. 259.
237. Goode, "The Marijuana Market," p. 6.
238. Eugene Schoenfeld, "Hip-pocrates," East Village Other, August 9, 1968, p. 6; Seymour L. Halleck, "Marijuana and LSD on the Campus" (Madison: Health Services, University of Wisconsin, 1968), cited by Goode, The Marijuana Smokers, p. 292; Norman E. Zinberg and Andrew T. Weil, "A Comparison of Marijuana Users and Non-users," Nature, Vol. 226 (April 11, 1970), p. 123; See also, references in Kaplan, Marijuana, pp. 293-295.

239. San Francisco Chronicle, September 14, 1969, p. 1.
240. "Operation Showboat," p. 365.
241. Suchman, Evaluative Research, p. 51.
242. Tom Buckley, "The Fight Against Drugs is in a Mess," New York Times, March 22, 1970, p. 10.
243. Andrew T. Weil, "Altered States of Consciousness," in Dealing With Drug Abuse, p. 343.
244. Myra Mac Pherson, "Parents Need Facts on Pot," Washington Post, July 10, 1969, p. K3, cited by Goode, The Marijuana Smokers, p. 178.
245. "Marijuana Research Project," Long Island Press, April 21, 1970, p. 1.
246. Carey, The College Drug Scene, p. 173. The respondent was referring to the following article: D. Wakefield, M. Harrington and A. Huxley, "The Pros and Cons, History and Future Possibilities of Vision Inducing Psychochemicals" Playboy Magazine (1963), p. 10.
247. Kaplan, Marijuana, p. 48.
248. Erich Goode, Marijuana (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), p. 123.
249. Benjamin Sheppard, "Alarming Increase in Number of 'Speed' Abusers," U.S. News and World Report, December 29, 1969, p. 25; "The 1968 edition of 'The Physicians' Desk Reference' lists a total of 51 amphetamine preparations, either singularly or in combination with sedatives or tranquilizers or even vitamins, produced by 29 companies. In some cases the amphetamine is the company's only product." See, George R. Edison, "No Other Drug Has This Wide a Group of Hazards," U.S. News and World Report, December 29, 1969, p. 24.
250. Carl D. Chambers, Leon Brill, and James A. Inciardi, "Toward Understanding and Managing Nonnarcotic Drug Abuse," Federal Probation (March, 1972), p. 50.
251. "Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs: News Briefing by John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5, No. 43 (October 27, 1969), p. 1478.

- 252. Wald and Hutt, "The Drug Abuse Survey Project," p. 10.
- 253. Donald B. Louria, Nightmare Drugs (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1966), pp. 76-77.
- 254. Chambers, Brill and Inciardi, "Nonnarcotic Drug Abusers," p. 50.
- 255. Lingeman, Drugs From A to Z, p. 135.
- 256. Fiddle, "Risk Discounting," p. 17.
- 257. Wald and Hutt, "The Drug Abuse Survey Project," p. 28.
- 258. Fiddle, "Risk Discounting," p. 17.
- 259. Ibid.
- 260. Ibid., p. 26.
- 261. For a summarization of Edwin H. Sutherland's theory of differential association, see Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Principles of Criminology, 6th Ed. (Chicago: J.B. Lippincott, 1960), p. 78.
- 262. Geller and Boas, The Drug Beat, p. 92.
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Section D: Operation Intercept: Past, Present and Future

- 264. daSwede, "Dope News," p. 9.
- 265. "Great Dope Purge of 1969," p. 16.
- 266. "To Seal a Border," Time, September 26, 1969, p. 70.
- 267. "National Affairs," Newsweek, October 6, 1969, p. 82.
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- 269. Ibid.
- 270. "Customs Drive on Drugs Set," New York Post, May 19, 1970, p. 25.

271. Ibid.
272. White House estimates, cited by Goldberg and De Long, "Federal Expenditures," Table 5-3: Fiscal 1972 Supplemental Budget, by Function, p. 304.
273. Dana Adams Schmidt, "President Seeks \$155,000,000 More to Combat Drugs," New York Times, June 18, 1971, p. 1; "Excerpts From President's Message on Drug Abuse Control," New York Times, June 18, 1971, p. 22.
274. Information supplied by the Bureau of Customs, cited by Goldberg and De Long, "Federal Expenditures," p. 309.
275. Ibid.
276. Ibid., Table 5-6: Results of Customs Activity, p. 309
277. Ibid.
278. Ibid.
279. Goldberg and De Long, "Federal Expenditures," p. 311.
280. National Journal, July 3, 1971, p. 1422, cited by Goldberg and De Long, "Federal Expenditures," p. 307.
281. "BNDD Fact Sheets," App. Hrgs. 1971, Justice, Pt. 1, pp. 848, 868, cited by Goldberg and De Long "Federal Expenditures," p. 307.
282. Ibid.
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284. Ibid., p. 306.
285. "Search and Destroy--The War on Drugs," Time, September 4, 1972, p. 23. This estimation, coupled with earlier claims of success, typifies the rule enforcer's predicament. According to Becker: "On the one hand, he must demonstrate to others that the problem still exists: the rules he is supposed to enforce have some point, because infractions occur. On the other hand, he must show that his attempts at enforcement are effective and worthwhile, that the evil he is supposed to deal with is in fact being dealt with adequately. Therefore, enforcement organizations, particularly when they are seeking funds, typically oscillate between two kinds of claims. First, they say that by reason

of their efforts the problem they deal with is approaching solution. But, in the same breath, they say the problem is perhaps worse than ever (though through no fault of their own) and requires renewed and increased effort to keep it under control." Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1963), p. 157.

286. "Search and Destroy," p. 23.
287. Ibid.
288. Goldberg and De Long, "Federal Expenditures," p. 311.
289. Andrew T. Weil, "The Natural Mind," Psychology Today (October, 1972), p. 95.
290. Simmons, Marijuana Myths and Realities, cited by Geller and Boas, The Drug Beat, p. 63.
291. Leonard Buber, "45% of High School Pupils Here Said To Take Drugs," New York Times, October 13, 1972, p. 22.
292. Ibid.
293. According to Louriã: "There is also evidence that the average age at which individuals begin to use heroin is decreasing." Louriã, "Drug Abuse: A Current Assessment," p. 75.
294. See Eddy, et al., "Drug Dependence: Its Significance and Characteristics," pp. 721-723.
295. Kaplan, Marijuana, p. 160.
296. Weil, "The Natural Mind," p. 88.
297. Eliot Friedson, "Ending Campus Incidents," Letter to the Editor, Trans-action, Vol. 5, No. 8 (July-August, 1968), p. 75.
298. Jerry Mandel, The Stepping-Stone Theory, (Chicago: Aldine, scheduled for publication after 1970), cited by Kaplan, Marijuana, p. 161.
299. The following is a recommendation of the National Commission: "Increased border surveillance, a tightening of border procedures, and a realistic eradication program to diminish the supply of drugs coming into the country, coupled with a more effective program for

- diminishing the domestic production and distribution of marihuana, are required." National Commission, Marihuana, p. 215.
300. Merton, "Unanticipated Consequences," p. 898.
301. Ibid., p. 903.
302. Referring to a comment offered by Art Linkletter, President Nixon made the following statement: "I think Art has made a very sophisticated political judgement there. We were just checking some recent polls on this. A very substantial majority of the people disagree with the assumption that marihuana is not dangerous because they don't know what it is and they think it is dangerous." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5, No. 43 (October 27, 1969), p. 1472.
303. Albert J. Reiss, "Putting Sociology into Policy," Social Problems, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1970), p. 293.
304. "Drive on Drug Use in Military Scored," New York Times, August 15, 1972, p. 39.

APPENDIX I

Members of the Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous
Drugs Task Force

Mr. Richard G. Kleindienst, Co-Chairman, Deputy Attorney
General, Department of Justice

Mr. Eugene T. Rossides, Co-Chairman, Assistant Secretary,
Department of the Treasury

Mr. R. Richards Rolapp, Executive Secretary, Special Assistant
to the Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice

Mr. John J. Caulfield, Staff Assistant to Counsel,
The White House

Mr. Paul Eggers, General Counsel,
Department of the Treasury

Mr. G. Gordon Liddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary,
Department of the Treasury

Mr. Lester D. Johnson, Commissioner - Bureau of Customs,
Department of the Treasury

Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director, Bureau of Narcotics &
Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice

Mr. George H. Revercomb, Associate Deputy Attorney General,
Department of Justice

Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach, Assistant to the Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell, Commissioner - Immigration &
Naturalization Service, Department of Justice

Mr. William E. Ryan, Chief, Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs
Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice

Mr. Henry E. Petersen, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice

Mr. Robert E. Jordan, III, Chief Counsel,
Department of the Army

Dr. Theodore C. Byerly, Assistant Director, Science &
Education, Department of Agriculture

Mr. Rocco C. Siciliano, Under Secretary
Department of Commerce

Mr. John Gentry, Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary,
Department of Labor

Dr. Mark Novitch, Special Assistant for Pharmaceutical Affairs,
Office of the Secretary, Department of Health,
Education and Welfare

Dr. Stanley F. Yolles, Director, National Institute of
Mental Health, Department of Health, Education and
Welfare

Mr. James M. Yohe, Deputy Director of Compliance and Security,
Federal Aviation Agency, Department of Transportation

Commander Frederick J. Lessing, U.S. Coast Guard,
Department of Transportation

Mr. Fritz Kahn, Deputy General Counsel,
Interstate Commerce Commission

APPENDIX II

The Price of Marihuana Before and After Operation Intercept

City	After Intercept (Nov. '69)		Before Intercept	
	Private Source	Police Source	Private Source	Police Source
Boston	\$20-25 oz. ghetto price higher	\$35 oz.	\$15 oz.	Don't know
New Haven	\$20-30 oz. ^a	\$30-35 oz.	\$15 oz.	No change
New York	\$20-30 oz. ^a	\$25 oz.	\$15-20 oz.	Small am'ts. cheaper
Phila., Pa.	\$25-30 oz. \$35-40 oz. for "good"	\$20-25 oz.	\$15-20+ oz.	Lbs. were cheaper
Belair, Md.	\$15 oz.; \$25 for "good"	\$20 oz.	\$10+ oz.	Don't know
Atlanta	\$10-15 oz. \$30 oz. for "good"	\$10 oz.	No change	No change
Cleveland	\$25 oz.	\$25-30 oz.	\$20 oz.	No change
Chicago	\$17-25 oz.	\$20-25 oz.	Don't know	\$15 oz.
Moscow, Id.	\$10 lid ^{b/c}	\$12-20 lid	\$8+ lid	\$8 lid
Denver	\$10-12 oz.	\$10-15 oz.	No change	No change
Albuquerque	\$5 lid ^c	\$5 lid	No change	No change
Seattle	\$10-12 lid ^c	\$12-15 lid ^c	No change	No change
Berkeley	\$10-15 oz. ^a	\$12-20 oz. ^a	\$7-10+ oz.	\$8-12 oz.
Los Angeles	\$15-20 lid ^{ac}	\$20-25 lid ^{ac} Lb. price doubled	\$10 oz.	Don't know Lb. 50% less

a. Quality is down from pre-Intercept period.

b. Term "lid" used extensively on west coast, sometimes in "middle America" but not in east. Lid used to be approximately one ounce.

c. Amount in lid less than in pre-Intercept period.

Source: Unpublished C.B.S. News Survey

APPENDIX III

The Interview Guide

The interview guide is designed to elicit the respondent's description of his own attitudinal and behavioral responses to the Operation Intercept policy and the resultant marihuana shortage. Further, questions were included in the interview which would help to locate these responses in terms of the personal and social conditions and involvements of the respondents. This was accomplished via questioning in the following "major areas of inquiry:"

1. Background

Age - Neighborhood of residence - Employment - Education
Drug use history.

General changes in drug use patterns, as perceived by the respondent, over the past year.

Specify the drug use pattern of the respondent and associates prior to the summer of 1969: types of drugs used, frequency of use (each type of drug individually), price and availability of various drugs in the respondent's neighborhood. Also, observations of other drug using groups in respondent's neighborhood, covering same questions and including a description of persons in such groups, including age, employment, etc.

Did respondent ever use opiated hashish?

2. Supply

Did respondent experience and/or observe a marihuana shortage? If so, specify period of time.

Was there a shortage of other drugs? Which drugs? When?

Was respondent able to get marihuana? If so, what was the cost?

Compare availability and cost to time prior to summer, 1969.

3. Drug use

What drugs did respondent use, if any, during the Operation

Intercept era?

What drugs did friends use in the neighborhood? In other areas?

What type of drug use did he observe in other groups?

What was the cost and availability of drugs other than marihuana?

Did respondent observe any other effects of the marihuana shortage?

How do these drug use patterns compare to the drug-related activities (use and distribution) observed by the respondent prior to summer, 1969?

4. The Policy

How does respondent explain the marihuana shortage?

Is the government mentioned?

What role did the respondent think the government played in relation to the drug situation during this period?

Why?

Did respondent ever hear of Operation Intercept?

What was the government's intention as perceived by respondent?

5. The Future

What does respondent think would happen if the marihuana shortage reoccurred in the near future? Why?

APPENDIX IV

Findings From Grosse Pointe Study:
Interview Excerpts

A twenty-two year old drug dealer:

First used marihuana: fall, 1964

First used heroin: summer, 1967

Used heroin and marihuana until March, 1969. After March: "Got strung on heroin when weed wasn't available. A whole lot of people started in the summer (1969). Lack of reefer could be a major factor."

A twenty year old college dropout/artist:

First used marihuana: January, 1968

First used heroin: June, 1969

Stopped using heroin. Now uses "hash, weed, psychedelics." Reports his whole crowd used heroin during the summer of 1969. "I should associate with freaks who do weed and maybe acid, but no junk."

An eighteen year old drug dealer, presently enrolled in high school:

First used marihuana: summer, 1968

First used heroin: June, 1969

Heavy heroin use mid-July to early December, 1969. First shot barbiturates, summer, 1969; first shot amphetamines, summer, 1969; first shot psychedelics, summer, 1969. "At first the lack of weed turned a lot of kids on to junk." Reports 30 per cent of high

school students have used heroin and most started last summer (1969).

A twenty year old truck driver:

First used marihuana: 1965

First used heroin: late spring, 1969

"People need to get high. Will use heroin if grass is not around. Lack of grass caused a good percentage of my friends to go to heroin."

A twenty year old cook:

First used marihuana: 1966

First used heroin: summer, 1969

First used barbiturates, amphetamines, and psychedelics in April, 1969. Attributes heroin use to: "curiosity; easy to cop; lack of weed and all other drugs except jones (heroin) in the summer."

A twenty-two year old drug dealer:

First used marihuana: 1965

First used heroin: spring, 1966

"I'd say I know 200 people who use it daily. Jones hit here, just like it hit in California. It hit last summer. The kids had nothing to do. There was no weed but jones was available. The cops do nothing. A whole lot more people are using now."

An unemployed eighteen year old:

First used marihuana: summer, 1967

First used heroin: summer, 1969

Presently using, "grass, hash, jones...My friends use heroin. People said it was good and I was curious to see what it is like. I started when the weed and hash supply got tight. It was the thing to do."

A nineteen year old laborer:

First used marihuana: 1967

First used heroin: summer, 1969

Presently uses heroin occasionally and marihuana frequently. Attributes heroin use to: "kicks; curiosity; lack of grass."

An unemployed eighteen year old:

First used marihuana: 1968

First used heroin: summer, 1969

Also, first used (shot) amphetamines, summer, 1969.
"I tried it because there was no weed around and my friends were doing it."

An unemployed nineteen year old:

First used marihuana: 1965

First used heroin: June, 1969

Also first used opium, summer, 1969. First used psychedelics in 1968 but first shot them in summer, 1969. Presently uses "smack and grass...There was a lack of grass and people needed a high so they used

heroin 'cause it was available. There's more junk in Grosse Pointe now than ever, and there's not much to do to stop the spread. Grass is a good drug."

A twenty year old college sophomore:

First used marihuana: 1968

First used heroin: spring, 1969

First shot amphetamines, fall, 1969; first shot barbiturates, summer, 1969. Presently uses "pot, hash and heroin occasionally." Comments: "As long as there is a lack of grass the heroin problem will get worse. Kids not having grass caused the heroin problem. The government was at fault...Once you start to shoot it's only a matter of time before heroin...Grass should be legal or easily available. You have to go underground to use grass. Now to get grass you're exposed to heroin. Before to get grass you were exposed to acid and other stuff, not heroin."

An eighteen year old high school student:

First used marihuana: summer, 1966

First used heroin: summer, 1969

Presently uses heroin twice a week. Previously, \$25 a day habit. Comment: "One of the reasons I started last summer was that there was no grass around."

A nineteen year old high school student:

First used marihuana: spring, 1967

First used heroin: spring, 1969

Uses "grass, hash and heroin." Reasons for use:

"there was no weed around and using became the thing to do. It might get bigger before it tapers off."

A seventeen year old high school dropout:

First used marihuana: 1966

First used heroin: summer, 1969

Presently uses "hash, grass and heroin occasionally."

Reason for use: "One guy did it then the others.

It became the cool thing to do. Many have nothing else to do, especially when there was no weed around, so they do it."

A nineteen year old college dropout:

First used marihuana: 1968

First used heroin: 1969

Now uses "weed, coke, hash, psychedelics, jones once last month." Comments: "Lack of weed had a lot to do with everybody starting to use jones last summer.

To kick jones, you need another high, like weed.

Kids should only avoid jones and hard drugs, not weed, hash and psychedelics."

An eighteen year old high school dropout/pop festival promoter:

First used marihuana: 1967

First used heroin: 1969

Still uses "smack, but quitting; also grass." Reason for starting: "No grass around and people wanted to get high. Smack was available."

An eighteen year old high school dropout:

First used marihuana: spring, 1966

First used heroin: 1968

Now uses "smack (\$60 a day), grass, barbs." Comments:
"Heroin is out of hand. Lots of kids influence other kids. It's easy to get. When grass wasn't around heroin was. Heroin fucks up the head. I'm using grass to kick."

A seventeen year old high school student:

First used marihuana: winter, 1968

First used heroin: summer, 1969

Started shooting amphetamines, spring, 1969; shooting barbiturates, summer, 1969, one month after heroin. Presently uses, "jones, weed, hash, anything I can get." Heroin now used occasionally. "There wasn't any weed or other drugs around in the summer and heroin was around and easy to get."

Source: Robert Levengood, Project Director, "Questionnaire on Heroin" (unpublished interview data, Wayne State University, 1969), Project Advisor: Paul Lowinger.

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