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1979

POLITICS OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE:
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN

by

ARLYN B. WASSERBERG

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement
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This dissertation is dedicated to my parents,
Lilyan and Jack, and to my brother, Herb.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation will examine Soviet foreign policy towards Iran* in an effort to understand Soviet behavior in general and Soviet interventionist policy in particular. It will explore the range and types of interference the Soviet Government uses in its foreign relations with other states, and especially in its relations with Iran. It will investigate under what conditions the Soviet Union will increase its interference in a target state and under what conditions it will decrease its interference. Soviet-Iranian relations were chosen as a case study because this relationship provides two examples of Soviet interference under rather similar cir-

* Iran is the modern name of Persia. The name was formally changed to Iran in March 1935. Iranians prefer to use the term "Iran" to identify their country. However, throughout this dissertation, both names are used interchangeably.

The spelling of Persian names follows the transliteration used by the Library of Congress. Diacritical marks have been omitted. The transliterations used here have been checked by Mr. Christopher Filstrup, head of the Oriental Division of the New York Public Library and by Professor Dankwart Rustow, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, City University of New York Graduate School. Assistance also was provided by Professor Ervand Abrahamian, Professor of History and Political Science, Baruch College, CUNY.

The spelling of Persian cities and provinces follows the version presented in the 1978 Time Publication, The Hammond World Atlas.

cumstances. The Soviet Union* participated in the creation of the Gilan Republic in 1920 and the Azerbaijan Republic in 1945. In both cases, the Soviet Union occupied the northern provinces of Iran as a result of wartime conditions. (See map, Figure 1.) Ethnic dissidence played a major role in the ensuing Soviet behavior. Third parties were directly involved in both situations and eventually contributed to the Soviet decision to withdraw its military forces and to modify the types of interference aimed at Tehran. Soviet interference in Iran will be examined within the context developed by Richard Cottam in his book entitled Competitive Interference and

Figure 1. Provinces of Iran



* The official name of the Soviet Union in 1920 was the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, or RSFSR. It was also known as Soviet Russia. The term Soviet Union really is not appropriate until December 1922 when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR, was formed.

20th Century Diplomacy¹, and by Paul Blackstock in his work entitled The Strategy of Subversion².

This dissertation will investigate the various forms by which Moscow intervened in the internal affairs of Iran during the two periods under study: 1920-1921 and 1945-1946. It is important to note at the outset that it is very difficult to try to draw a line between normal diplomatic behavior, interference and intervention. The literature on this subject is incomplete, diverse and often confusing. Given the diversity of definitions and approaches which may be employed in a treatment of intervention, the use of the term today borders on the edge of futility. An editor's note which introduced a debate on intervention has explained, "...The term 'intervention' has become extremely common in discussions of international politics, to the extent that every international conflict or relationship can be designated as some form of intervention....And the concept of intervention has become as misunderstood now as 'balance of power' or 'splendid isolation' were decades ago."³ Fenwick has commented, "scarcely any two writers are to be found who define this term (intervention) in the same way or who classify the same situations under it."⁴ He argues that two forces are at odds, first the right of one state to defend itself and the other, the right of independence of another state. Consequently, intervention becomes an "application of the fundamental right of self defense."⁵ On the other hand, J.F. Brierly and Quincy Wright define

intervention as "dictatorial interference in the internal or external affairs of another state." Wright further defines "dictatorial" as related to coercion and therefore illegitimacy.⁶ Fenwick sees it as an "application of the fundamental right of self-defense."⁷ Thus, the question of offensive behavior as opposed to defensive behavior is raised.

Two conflicting forces insure continuation of the debate and proliferation of the problems of achieving agreement on a definition of "intervention." Namely, the right of one state to defend itself may be incompatible with the right of another state to maintain its independence and sovereignty. Thus, while a common view of intervention defines it as a violation of sovereignty and inviolability of one state's borders by another, most states also recognize that such action may be warranted at times. The problem in international society, of course, is that each state determines for itself when intervention may be warranted. Without a higher authority to establish when a state is in fact being threatened, each state interprets the actions of others by itself. Consequently, without a universally accepted definition of intervention the violation by one state of another's borders usually is justified on the grounds of self-defense.

Attempts also have been made to view intervention in terms of just and unjust, moral and immoral, legitimate and illegitimate actions. Without proper criteria each state

involved in intervention would claim that its actions were justified because its security was jeopardized. Without a central authority to formulate and enforce guidelines for international behavior, each state would be free to label its policies as just and moral because it would be acting on behalf of its population. Fenwick has noted that one function of international law writers is to attempt to define when threats do indeed warrant intervention and therefore would be justifiable. Included in this category would be intervention on moral grounds sanctioned by the international community.⁸ Unfortunately, these normative questions, as well as the propriety of collective intervention, would tend to confuse and complicate the issue. In essence, such questions have led in the past to the generation of many definitions and the tendency to label every unacceptable foreign policy as intervention. This, in turn, has led to the questionable validity of using the concept of intervention to define foreign policy behavior. Unfortunately, the use of this concept as a unique or special form of international behavior thus becomes obscured and quite possibly useless for political analysis.

Over the years international conferences have attempted to establish objective criteria whereby it might be possible to make a determination when an "intervention" in fact had occurred and when a state used the notion of self-defense illegitimately. Unfortunately, given the ideological and strategic/political considerations of most states, no satis-

factory standards have been agreed upon. For instance, the League of Nations tried to define intervention in 1923. It first aimed to define aggression. However, many states preferred not to put in writing a definition that some time in the future might return to haunt them. Further, they did not want a clear definition which might enable the League to determine that they, or their allies, were in violation of the League's Charter. The United Nations attempted a similar task in 1965 in the form of a General Assembly resolution #2131 (XX) entitled "Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty." By 1965, the problem of ideological justification of foreign policy actions was clear. Also, the contribution of national liberation groups to the discussion further emphasized the difficulty of securing consensus on a definition. The General Assembly did conclude that armed intervention was synonymous with aggression⁹ and was therefore a violation of the Charter. However, they did not agree on what constituted aggression. That is, it is not always clear if an aggression has taken place and is often subject to varying interpretations with the Western states and the communist states usually on different sides. Without agreement as to the nature of an action the United Nations may be hindered from declaring a particular state an aggressor and in violation of the Charter. Further, when attempts were made by the General Assembly to define intervention, other than armed interven-

tion, disagreement arose. The Third World states especially did not want to pinpoint this issue since it might curtail their efforts at national liberation. Each state--Western, Communist, Third World--brought to the debate its own interpretation of intervention and just cause. If intervention were to be classified as an illegal act, then how could humanitarian, moral or just interventions be distinguished from immoral and illegal ones, especially if each state determines its own morality and legality. When such distinctions were attempted, ideology and historical perspective clouded the issues and each state wanted its interpretation heeded. The United Nations Charter, Fenwick has noted, has tried to overcome this shortcoming in the international system by establishing grievance procedures for the allegedly hurt state. Thus, a state could appeal to the Security Council or to the International Court of Justice if it chooses. But even the UN cannot override in the final analysis the right of a state to consider a UN decision "wrong" or inadequate and to pursue a military policy on its own in order to guarantee its own security. For example, irrespective of traditional definitions of intervention Mozambique and other Front Line states have continued to intervene in Rhodesia on the grounds of the moral necessity to assist national liberation movements and the threat that such a nation poses to international security. When Moscow was accused of intervention in northern Iran in 1920, Soviet Russia claimed that its activities constituted self-defense

against capitalist forces. In 1945, Moscow argued that its alleged activities in Iran were not intervention because its presence had been sanctioned by the Tripartite Accord. Moscow, in turn, however, charged the West with intervention. Since in none of these cases was there a definition acceptable to all parties, each state in the disputes could claim that it was not illegally interfering in another's internal affairs.

Nonetheless, intervention signifies a specific form of foreign policy behavior and an effort should be made to distinguish it from other foreign policy actions. If this effort is to succeed it will be necessary to establish criteria whereby it will be possible to identify when this particular type of behavior does exist. James Rosenau has made serious attempts at tackling this problem. He has argued that two conditions must exist for intervention to have occurred. First, the behavior between two states must entail a sharp break with previously existing relationships. Second, the effort of such an interventionary policy must be directed at "changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target society."¹⁰ He is concerned particularly with operationalizing a definition so as to give some meaning to the term. Without such a pre-condition, he argues, the term may be spread so thin as to become meaningless, with virtually every policy action leading to charges of intervention.

There are several problems with Rosenau's approach

however. For instance, there could be a sharp break in relationships which need not imply an attempt to influence the target state's government, at least directly and immediately. For instance, does the effort to cultivate good will indicate intervention? Further, any action, good or bad, may be directed overtly and covertly at influencing a government. Even if a sharp break did occur, if that new relationship lasted for a considerable period of time would this new relationship become the norm and therefore no longer constitute an intervention? According to Rosenau it would. Wriggins has raised other possibilities which may undermine Rosenau's criteria. What would happen if an intervention did not occur but the target state welcomed it? Does intervention occur, therefore, only when the target state is being undermined by foreign interference?¹¹ Beloff argues along with Wriggins that essentially intervention may be in the eyes of the beholder. Intervention, he contends, is but a part of international affairs and is really a question of kind and degree. He also admits that intervention as an analytical tool may not be a useful term since it is "loaded with normative overtones."¹² For example, the United States feels justified to intervene to make the world safe for democracy while the Soviet Union intervenes to achieve socialist solidarity.

If we allow ourselves to fall victim to ideological and normative definitions, we will be unable to deal with this particular form of foreign policy behavior and will lose

an opportunity to examine an important aspect of international relations. Cottam and Blackstock agree and have tried to deal with interference in an analytic manner. They have recognized the usefulness of viewing intervention as a matter of degree and kind. Intervention is defined as a particular kind of interference and lies on a continuum which ranges from normal diplomatic behavior--which most states view as acceptable behavior--to military intervention--which is the most easily verifiable form of interference because it entails the physical transfer of troops across a state's borders. Both Cottam and Blackstock contribute to the discussion on intervention and assist in the examination of Soviet behavior in Iran.

Cottam argues that the attempt to distinguish intervention from other forms of interference "is not only futile but tends to obscure the important point that there is a continuum from slight to intense interference."¹³ It is this continuum as it relates to Soviet interference in Iran that I will explore. Intervention is viewed as a form of interference and therefore should not be treated as merely the imposition of military force. In the course of this study "intervention" will be used interchangeably with "interference," and both terms are viewed as points on a continuum and reflect one state's efforts to influence policy formulation in another state. I agree with Cottam that it is futile to distinguish this last form of activity (intervention) from other forms of interference, especially since in the

post-war era, terms such as "intervention" usually carry an emotional charge. So, when the Soviets engage in activity of this sort we label it "intervention" meaning illegal activity in violation of another state's sovereignty.

When the United States engages in similar activity, it is called "adhering to treaty obligations" or "assisting an ally," or "self-defense." Further, when a Soviet analyst is explaining similar behavior, the definitions are reversed. (This problem merely reflects the general disagreement concerning intervention.) Thus, for this dissertation, interference/intervention is defined as "any act by the government or citizens of one state designed to influence the policy of the government of another state or to influence the internal developments of that state, whether they be political, economic or social."¹⁴

To facilitate the understanding of interference, Cottam has designated ten points along a continuum ranging from regular diplomatic channels to military intervention (the point which is commonly referred to as simply "intervention").¹⁵ At one end of the spectrum lie regular diplomatic channels and procedures. This form of interference is most commonly tolerated by the target state. The next three points all involve various forms of propaganda efforts and include public statements by government officials and by influential individuals outside the government, directed towards influencing individuals within the target state and especially towards influencing their officials. Lobbying

efforts utilize the local population and encourage them to pressure the government. Very often there is a high tolerance of this form of activity. For instance, Cottam cites the example of American citizens registering as foreign agents whose function it is to lobby the administration in Washington on behalf of a foreign government. Overt efforts to remove personnel or facilitate the election or appointment of an individual within the target state is another point on the continuum. Related to this is subversion or covert activities to achieve similar goals. Espionage is aimed at reducing a target's capabilities and is viewed by the target state with virtually no tolerance. Every nation reserves this right to itself to enhance its defensive capabilities. The last point on the continuum is military intervention.

Blackstock has pursued the idea of subversion as a method of influencing another state's policy and has focused his attention on an analysis of the various forms of subversion. Specifically, he elaborates on the concepts of infiltration, propaganda and persuasion, and control. He views infiltration as "the deliberate or planned penetration of political and social groups within a given state by agents of an intervening power for manipulative purposes."¹⁶ In particular, Blackstock wants to distinguish between this form of activity and "mere presence." The goal of the former is manipulation while the latter is essentially harmless. He views propaganda as "the planned dissemination of news, in-

formation, special arguments, . . . , to influence the beliefs, thoughts, and actions of a specific groups."¹⁷ He distinguishes propaganda from persuasion in that the latter uses bribery, blackmail, or the threat or actual use of force.¹⁸ Control results when subversion is successful. Its purpose is to affect the relative power position between the target state and the interfering state.¹⁹

Blackstock discusses some interesting points regarding control, coordination, and information dissemination, and is concerned with the gaps in communication between the creators of policy and those in the field who are responsible for its implementation. For instance, he argues that subversion as a tool for control has been overrated. Very often the chances of success are undermined by the very agents involved in establishing control. Further, he examines the inadequacies of communication, conflicting goals, and poor control mechanisms. For example, divisiveness within the intelligence community may lead to unreliable intelligence gathering, either deliberately or unintentionally. In addition, agents in the field may be in a position to sabotage foreign policy on their own if they disagree with the government. This could be accomplished by using delaying tactics, outright deception, or inadequate analyses. Thus, Blackstock's main conclusion is that subversion techniques are useful tools for interference but are potentially full of pitfalls.²⁰ In short, control is not absolute and infiltrators and propagandists may not respond directly to orders from their own

country but rather may interpret policy as they see fit within the target state. This independence, therefore, may have the effect of undermining the policy of the intervening state.

Blackstock's conclusions are very relevant to the two case studies presented in this examination of Soviet foreign policy toward Iran. In particular, the evidence presented here supports his thesis regarding the lack of coordination and control exhibited by the interfering state and the difficulties it poses for the successful achievement of foreign policy goals. The problem of obtaining reliable information and of realistically assessing a situation, with or without the necessary information, is another aspect of Blackstock's contribution. His book is useful because of the guidelines he provides for potential problems to watch out for in dealing with various techniques of interference, especially subversion and infiltration.

Consequently, the framework for studying interference behavior offered by Cottam and Blackstock have facilitated the organizing and analyzing of data for this study of Soviet interference in Iranian affairs. In continuing with their guidelines, this paper will examine under what conditions Soviet interference was increased and under what conditions it was decreased. Moreover, interference is viewed as a continuum and will be examined in terms of the various elements facilitating interference behavior. The framework outlined by Cottam includes an investigation of the range of

interference, the range of tolerance by the target state and by interested parties, the methods employed in the intervention, and relevant variables affecting Soviet behavior, such as the existence of internal dissidence or the availability of organizations for infiltration which might contribute to Moscow's willingness to intervene in another state.

The range of interference is directly related to the level of tolerance both in the target country and in third parties interested in Soviet behavior. Therefore, the types of interference utilized by the Soviet Union will be studied in conjunction with the receptivity and reactions to those types of interference. The range of tolerance fluctuates over time and is related to many variables. Cottam, for instance, outlines three broad categories of relationships between an interfering state and a target state, which relate to the level of tolerance exhibited by the target state and interested third parties.²¹ First, the relative power of each state will contribute to the willingness and ability of the target state to tolerate various forms of interference and its ability to respond to those forms it chooses not to tolerate. Iran's capabilities of resisting Soviet interference were limited by its weak power potentials, and, for the most part, ultimately it had to rely upon third parties--namely, Britain and the United States--for assistance. Second, Cottam argues that the nature of the relationship between two states, e.g., whether they are allies, enemies, or have a dependency relationship, will partially determine

the degree of tolerance by the target state. Iran was a reluctant ally of the Soviet Union, but often sided with Moscow's enemies. Further, Iran's status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was tempered by the close proximity to Soviet borders. Until third party help was forthcoming, Iran was not in a position to resist Soviet military activity, nor was it capable of controlling Soviet activities in the north. A third relationship affecting the level of tolerance rests with the historical interaction between the two states. The Soviet Union (and Russia before it) had a long history of trying to secure its southern borders, particularly the areas bordering on Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. Iran has been a sore spot in Soviet attainment of this goal since Iran also has fitted in with British and American security goals in the past and has been under the watchful eye of third parties --whether British, American, or German.

This dissertation will look to the reasons behind the shift in Iranian and third party tolerance of Soviet initiatives in Iran and especially to the Soviet responses to the fluctuations in the tolerance levels. Within the context then of Soviet-Iranian relations, what types of responses to Soviet behavior will lead to a modification of that behavior by the Soviet Union? An integral part of this study, therefore, will be to examine certain forces within Iran and within the international environment which contribute to Soviet-Iranian relations and which are relevant to understanding how and why the Soviet Union interfered in Iran.

First, the existence of internal dissidence, especially in the areas contiguous to the Soviet border, provided the Soviet Union with a weapon by which to influence decision making in Iran. This paper will investigate the nature of that relationship. Russian and Soviet penetration of the area was tolerated by Tehran when they limited their penetration to radio broadcasts and to agitation for communism. But when these forms of interference were coupled with the wartime occupations and the increase of activity by the communist parties of Iran, along with Soviet support for independence movements, then the tolerance level shifted in favor of resisting Soviet intervention. The use of national dissidence is certainly not unique in the world, but the relationship between the Soviet Union, the communist parties of Iran and the Gilanis and Azeris provide us with some insight into the place of ethnic and national dissidence in Soviet policy making. The ethnic problem is further complicated by Soviet ambivalence regarding ethnicity and discontent in foreign areas and that within its own borders. This becomes even more interesting because both attempts at Soviet interference utilizing ethnicity and nationalism failed.

A second factor in the Soviet-Iranian relationship is the existence of an indigenous communist party in Iran. This element enabled the Soviet Union to have a foothold in the country and a source from which to agitate against the central government. The very existence of such a party

provided the nucleus of another means whereby the Soviet Union could influence the policies in Tehran. In fact, the existence of an indigenous communist party anywhere provides the rudiments for Soviet interference. How important was this type of Soviet interference will be explored in the course of my research.

Third, the Soviet Union preyed upon an already weakened government in Iran. Tehran was beset not only with ethnic dissidence but also with a growing attachment among members of the elite for a nationalist movement--"Iran for Iranians." Further, Iran's strategic position made it a target for Great Power interference for many years. This element further threatened the integrity of the Iranian government. The research will examine how important this factor was in the Soviet decision first to escalate its interference in Iran and then to determine which methods of interference to use.

Fourth, Soviet willingness to escalate its interference in a target state and that state's willingness to tolerate and ability to resist such interference will in part depend upon the international environment. No foreign policy is formulated in a vacuum; each state's foreign policy is molded and implemented within a broader global framework. The role of third parties thus becomes crucial in our understanding of the Soviet-Iranian relationship particularly since this relationship was one of a Great Power to a small power where the small power must rely on assistance from

other Great Powers. The interaction between the so-called Great Powers becomes important for the small power as well. Thus, Soviet-Iranian relations must be viewed within the context of Soviet-British, Soviet-German, and Soviet-American relations as well as the interaction among the four powers. How supportive/tolerant within the international arena were the other powers to Soviet interference? Soviet military intervention in the 1920 incident was a result of the Russian Civil War; Soviet occupation of Iran during 1941-46 was part of a Tripartite Agreement sanctioning not only Soviet occupation but also British and American occupation as well. Therefore, in this instance the most direct and violent form of interference (military intervention/interference) was initially acceptable and mutually agreed upon. However, the Soviet utilization of the weakness of Tehran, its support of the communist party in Iran, and especially its agitation in the northern provinces in favor of ethnic independence led the British and American governments to heed the calls for assistance emanating from Tehran and to resist any further Soviet interference, and, in fact, to demand a reversal of Soviet policy.

This dissertation will examine the aforementioned factors as they relate to Soviet interference in Iran, and Iranian resistance to that interference. It will also be interesting to explore the initial tolerance for Soviet interference by the Great Powers. Was this apparent tolerance the result of deliberate neglect or preoccupation by the third parties elsewhere in the world? Or was it the result of a lack of

firm policy toward Iran? Or was it a result of poor communication among the parties, thereby giving the appearance of sanctioning Soviet activities? From the Soviet point of view, not only was the resistance to its activities within Iran important in terms of its decision making, but so was tolerance (or lack of it) by third parties to its activities.

The study also will look at the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces and to decrease its range of interference, with the goal of evaluating the various options open to the Soviet government in its foreign policy with Iran. For example, the initial Soviet occupation during World War II eventually led to a situation whereby Iranian resistance to Soviet activities was joined by British and American, as well as United Nations involvement. What aspects of the latter's involvement and subsequent resistance influenced the Soviet Union to withdraw its army and to curtail its level of interference? What goals were surrendered by the Soviet government? What priorities were established by Moscow which enabled it to reverse its policy towards Iran and withdraw its troops? One might further question the connection between Soviet involvement in Berlin and Eastern Europe and the decision to withdraw from Iran. What role did Soviet activities in Europe play in decreasing its interference in Iran? Or, put another way, what were the international power configurations which entered into the Soviet decision making process?

As noted previously, one aim of this study will be

to contribute to the debate on Soviet foreign policy. The literature on this subject is for the most part unsatisfactory. The general approach has been to focus on the historical narrative rather than on analysis. There have been few case studies of a comparative nature. (This, however, is more symptomatic of the comparative studies field and the shortcomings therein rather than on Soviet foreign policy in general.) There are many approaches to the broad subject of foreign policy. However, there has been little effort to link them or to develop broad generalizations. (Again, this may be symptomatic of the foreign policy field in general and not uniquely limited to Soviet foreign policy.)

For instance, foreign policy analysis in general is still in an embryonic stage, trying to establish its credentials, so to speak. Several authors have tried to develop linkages between foreign policy analysis and the broader field of international politics, but so far the dichotomies remain intact. For instance, Rosenau broaches the subject in his discussion of "pre-theories and theories of foreign policy."²² Both he and Sondermann deal with this question in their treatments of linkages between international politics and foreign policy²³, as does McClelland in his study of general systems theory.²⁴ Hanrieder argues that such a linkage between international relations and foreign policy is really not possible because the researcher is asking basically different questions. "By taking both dimensions into account," he notes, "a wider range of relevant data is brought together and a more comprehensive analysis becomes possible. At the same time, serious

methodological problems arise when it comes to combining propositions from these two levels of analysis in one unified conceptual framework."²⁵ Rosenau, however, attempts to bridge this conceptual gap by introducing two concepts which border both fields of study: the issue area and the penetrated system.²⁶

A beginning already has been made in the analysis of foreign policy. Researchers now have moved away from the case studies approach--the traditional method of dealing with foreign policy--towards analysis and development of theory. For instance, Lentner examines the units of analysis and the processes of decision making in Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach (1974). Arnold Wolfers explores the decision making and national actor approaches and tries to accommodate both within a single framework in Discord and Collaboration (1962).

The field is rapidly expanding and seems to be moving in many directions at once. The decision making approaches to foreign policy analysis are rich with different methodologies. Some of the literature includes Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension (1968), Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision (1971), Johan Galtung, "Small Group Theory and the Theory of International Relations" (1968), and Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "The Decision Making Approach to the Study of International Politics" (1962). Also, a few authors have tried to break away from the traditional focus of research which has devoted its attention to actors as the basic unit of analysis (whether the actors be states,

groups or individuals). McClelland, for example, focuses on crises, Rosenau discusses issues, and Lentner explores situations.²⁷ Other authors focus on the nation-state and the international environment. While some discard the internal aspects contributing to foreign policy (for instance, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1966), others develop relationships between the operational and psychological variables influencing foreign policy (for instance, H. and M. Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, 1965 and Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel, 1972).

Whatever one's focus, this relatively new field of foreign policy analysis is open for more research and different methodologies. This diversity in foreign policy analysis also is reflected in Soviet foreign policy studies. For instance, Daniel Bell summarizes ten approaches or methods of analyzing Soviet behavior.²⁸ (Bell's discussion more or less covers the field of Soviet studies.) The subject matter for most of these approaches is too narrow in focus to be able to generalize about Soviet behavior and especially not for Soviet foreign policy. For example, Bell discusses the relationship between personality and policy; the kremlinological approach to evaluating Soviet policy making; interest articulation; and the role of ideology and culture, among others. However, the various approaches covered by Bell do not adequately explain the differences in leadership and its relationship to behavior, the effectiveness which various interests play in the decision making process, the differing nature and interpretations of ideology, and at the same time explain the similarities in

action and policy within two time periods, as examined in this study. This is not to say that the selective methodologies are wrong. In fact, they each contribute to some understanding of the Soviet decision making process. However, these methods fail to explain particular questions of regularities in Soviet behavior.

As for broad approaches to Soviet foreign policy, there is a dearth of theoretical studies. Most of the literature either provides historical chronologies of events relating to Soviet foreign policy or is part of the Cold War genre. Welch and Triska have examined this problem and have commented on the relationship of foreign policy models and studies on Soviet foreign policy. They have concluded that "on the whole, recent American studies of Soviet foreign policy, . . . , leave much to be desired. There is a dearth of full-span treatments which center on the topic proper and especially on analysis. Findings are diverse, (and) sometimes contradictory. . . ." ²⁹ Further, "the hard fact is that (the) enterprise of examining Soviet foreign policy continues to be carried out in virtually complete independence of any theoretical implications." ³⁰ However, Welch and Triska concluded that the state of Soviet foreign policy studies is representative of the state of foreign policy studies in general.

These shortcomings are not meant to diminish the value of all Soviet foreign policy studies. On the contrary, George Kennan, considered by many to be the dean of Soviet

studies, has written several worthwhile histories on Russia including Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (1961). In addition, there are notable works by Adam Ulam entitled Expansion and Coexistence (1974) and by Marshall Shulman entitled Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (1963).

As for the so-called theorists of the Cold War, they rarely provide a framework within which to evaluate foreign policy. Further, the Cold War genre is for the most part unsatisfactory as far as a treatment of Soviet decision making processes is concerned. Even the best of the traditional approaches as well as the revisionist literature are narrative in nature and relatively free of analysis. For instance, see Louis Halle's The Cold War As History (1967), Charles Lerche, Jr., The Cold War . . . And After (1965), John Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War (1966), and D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins (1961). Again, there are exceptions. For instance, Kennan and Shulman view Soviet foreign policy over many years and make generalizations as to Moscow foreign policy behavior. In particular, they both conclude that Moscow is sensitive to threats to its security and that Moscow appears to take advantage of weaknesses in its opponents in order to expand its influence abroad. The general consensus is that Moscow will withdraw when faced with strength or opposition to its policies especially when that opposition poses risk to Moscow.

In addition, in their treatment of East-West relations, most Cold War authors either underestimate the importance of

the Azerbaijan crisis or mention it but fail to provide adequate explanations for the Soviet behavior. Of those that do cite the incident, several focus on the debates at the United Nations, again without analyzing the interaction between East and West or even to discuss the Iranian input.³¹ There are exceptions of course. John Gaddis, for instance, devotes considerable space to the Azerbaijan crisis and more importantly focuses on the contribution to American foreign policy made by the crisis. He notes for example that "the period of late February and early March 1946 marked a decisive turning point in American policy toward the Soviet Union."³² He then provides some analysis to elaborate on his statement. Unfortunately, however, this treatment is rare.

The literature on Soviet-Iranian relations offers several excellent studies. In particular, the best of the field include George Lenczowski's Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (1949); two works by Rouhollah Ramazani entitled The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941 (1966) and Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (1975); N.S. Fatemi's Diplomatic History of Persia 1917-1923 (1952); and Xenia Eudin and Robert North's Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927 (1957). As the titles suggest, each author focuses on a different aspect of Soviet-Iranian relations over different time periods. The two Ramazani studies are concerned with Iranian foreign policy and in particular how Iran manipulated the Great Powers to serve its own end even during periods of

dependence upon them. He analyzes the interplay between the Great Powers with a special eye to their rivalry and the consequences for Iran. Fatemi's work is basically a historical narrative and also is an examination of Iran's efforts to balance Great Power intervention. Where Ramazani attempts to analyze the Persian politics, Fatemi relies on historical narration. Lenczowski, too, explores the rivalry but he devotes more attention to British/Russian and American behavior as they interact over Iran. Eudin and North emphasize Soviet goals in the East and especially in Iran and focus on the ideological thrust into the East between 1920 and 1927.

Soviet foreign policy toward Iran is rich in information and historical evidence which, if analyzed, could provide insight into Soviet foreign policy behavior, specifically interference in other states. A study of Soviet occupation of Iran and the subsequent escalation of interference provides two opportunities to examine, and compare, important variables which have contributed to the formulation of Soviet policy. It also is possible to draw tentative conclusions from these two case studies which, if they cannot offer definitive answers, at least can provide a guide to the types of questions a researcher should ask and a statement about the variables believed to be influential in Soviet foreign policy. Therefore, it is hoped that this dissertation will contribute to the body of literature concerned with Soviet foreign policy in general, and Soviet-Iranian relations in particular.

For this dissertation, traditional library research was employed and heavy emphasis was placed on analysis of written sources in order to evaluate the questions posed regarding Soviet interferences in Gilan and Azerbaijan. However, there are many difficulties inherent in this method of research. For example, one must be aware of the problems of authenticating source materials, establishing data reliability, determining comprehensiveness, and evaluating the qualitative character of the documents under question.³³ This method applied to Soviet foreign policy is complicated further by the very nature of the Soviet system. There are virtually no records available from deliberations in the Politburo or the Central Committee, where policy is formulated. The research must rely on questionable memoirs and diaries (when they are available, which is not that often). What remains are the published accounts in newspapers, journals, monographs, and summaries of Government deliberations released by the Government. These sources unfortunately must be carefully scrutinized with the following caution in mind: the official printed word in the Soviet Union is assumed to correspond with Soviet decision makers' attitudes because the press is government-controlled. While the assumption must be made if research is to be conducted on Soviet policies, it must be understood that it is at best a shaky relationship.³⁴ For example, it is possible for the reports published to be covering up internal upheavals within the Party command, or it could be a deliberate plan to mislead its readers by not

telling the complete story or modifying parts of the story to show the Party in the best light. Further, because the Soviet public reads these accounts also, the articles and reports may be modified and altered, and at the same time not reflect the true picture of either Soviet attitude, intention, or policy.³⁵

An addition problem is that sources of information on Soviet activity within Iran are also difficult to corroborate. It was very difficult to confirm some reports and accounts of Soviet interference in 1920 in part because communication was poor and there was a great deal of confusion both in Iran and in Soviet Russia during and after the Civil War. Many western observers commented to their governments that it was often impossible to validate reports of Soviet interference. In particular access into the northern provinces was difficult, if not impossible. During the 1945 episode, information verification was little better because Soviet forces prevented outsiders from entering the provinces where alleged Soviet interference was occurring. Further, it should be noted that the materials available for the Gilan crisis are more open--there is greater controversy and debate--and more ideological in content than those available for the Azerbaijan crisis. In addition, there is an apparent difference in the variety of opinion surrounding the first event whereas it becomes very clear that there is a virtual party line espoused during the second crisis. Both situations tend to reflect the political climate within which Soviet decision makers were operating.

In spite of the above limitations, research can be conducted and, in my opinion, with a fair amount of accuracy --so long as we are aware of the tentative nature of our conclusions and the tenuous foundations upon which our conclusions are based. Consequently, Chapter II examines Russian and Soviet interests in Iran and elaborates on the goals established by St. Petersburg and Moscow. In particular, it distinguishes between those goals which have long range implications and which provide a basis of continuity between Czarist and Soviet foreign policy from short-term goals pursued by St. Petersburg and Moscow in each crisis period.

Chapter III describes the Gilan crisis and Chapter IV highlights the Azerbaijan crisis. Each case study will establish the conditions for Soviet intervention, the actors involved, the goals pursued by Moscow, and the reaction by the parties involved.

Chapter V analyzes the various methods employed by Moscow during each episode and their effectiveness. In particular, this chapter compares the Soviet techniques to determine if the first case was a learning experience for Moscow.

Chapter VI analyzes the level of tolerance exhibited by Tehran, and especially by other interested parties. Further, it explores these responses as they related to Soviet modification of its foreign policy behavior. This is especially important in determining Soviet evaluation of its potential in achieving its goals. For instance, at what

point did the Soviet Union decide that the risk it faced was not worth the goals it sought or that the means it employed were too risky? What alternatives were available to Moscow in each case and why did it choose a particular path rather than another?

Chapter VII evaluates the similarities in the two case studies and assesses the strengths and weaknesses in Soviet foreign policy.

Chapter VIII draws conclusions developed from the two cases of Soviet intervention in Iran. It also speculates on possible lessons to be learned from Soviet behavior during these two specific examples of interference.

Notes

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3. Editor's Note, "Intervention," Journal of International Affairs XXII no. 2 (1968):ix.

4. Charles Fenwick, "Intervention: Individual and Collective," American Journal of International Law XXXIX (October 1945):645.

5. Ibid., p. 647.

6. J.F. Brierly, The Law of Nations (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 402, and Quincy Wright, "Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs," in Roland R. Stanger, Espionage and International Law (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962), p. 5.

7. Fenwick, "Intervention: Individual and Collective," p. 647.

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9. S.M. Schwebel, "Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern International Law," Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil des cours, 1972, Vol. 2 (1973):452.

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11. Howard Wriggins, "Political Outcomes of Foreign Assistance: Influence, Involvement or Intervention?" Journal of International Affairs XXII no. 2 (1968):219.

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13. Cottam, Competitive Interference, p. 36.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp. 38-43.

16. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion, p. 44.
17. Ibid., p. 78.
18. Ibid., p. 79.
19. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
20. Ibid., pp. 303-317.
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25. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Foreign Policy and the International System: A Theoretical Introduction," (N.Y.: General Learning Press, 1971), p. 2.
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29. William Welch and Jan Triska, "Soviet Foreign Policy Studies and Foreign Policy Models," World Politics XXIII no. 4 (July 1971):714.
30. Ibid., p. 729.

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CHAPTER II

MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN IRAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY

Soviet interests and involvement in Iran did not begin with the socialist revolution in 1917 but rather reflected an extensive and sometimes turbulent history of Russian involvement dating back to the 17th century. Moscow's concerns and goals vis-à-vis Iran were very often carry-overs from Czarist foreign policy, irrespective of whether Moscow acknowledged them as such. These interests involved age old needs of the Russian state and centered on four issues: security, access to warm water ports, prevention or limitation of foreign power involvement in Iran, and trade.

In particular, the security issue was a major concern. Throughout its history, Russia was invaded several times from its southern borders and fought many wars--several of which were with Iran--over those borders. Consequently, Russia was constantly attuned to activities within Iran and particularly in northern Iran. Related to the security interest was Russia's desire to have access to warm water ports, notably through the Dardenelles to the southwest and to the Persian Gulf to the south. Much of Czarist Russia's foreign policy in the Middle East and Near East was aimed at achieving these goals. However, St. Petersburg

had met with little success, having been rebuffed repeatedly by Great Britain over the question of the Turkish Straits and again foiled first by Great Britain and later by the United States over access to the Persian Gulf. There were times, as the case studies will show, that Russia did come close to achieving this goal. But on each occasion Great Power involvement frustrated its efforts.

Another consideration for Russian foreign policies was the aim to prevent--and if that failed to weaken and curtail--influence and interference by other powers in the Near East and especially in Iran. For a good deal of Russian history, this meant confronting Great Britain and attempting to repel incursions by London. Although Russia never succeeded completely in forcing out the British, it did achieve virtual hegemony in the north for many years, especially during the 19th century and during both world wars. Russia's efforts met with modest success because a *modus vivendi* was agreed to between St. Petersburg and London on several occasions. Both governments had mutual interests in preserving their domains in Iran. Consequently, they often joined forces to block the involvement of other powers, especially the United States during the 1930s and Germany, France, and Belgium during the 1940s.

In addition, Russia strove to further its economic relations with Iran, preferably at the expense of other powers. In this respect the northern provinces were natural trading partners for the Caucasus because of the

geography and topography of Iran. Trade was easier and faster between northern Iran and Russia than it was between north and south Iran.

A by-product of these long term goals was St. Petersburg's and Moscow's attempts to decrease the political independence of Iran. The underlying belief was that if Iranian sovereignty could be weakened, then it would be easier for Russia to obtain more favorable economic deals not to mention a more pro-Russia foreign policy. It also would be easier to curtail third power influence over Tehran if Russia's influence were greater.

While Soviet Russia repudiated Czarist foreign policy, especially right after the Revolution, Moscow eventually saw merit in some of its goals and enveloped them within its own foreign policy. In short, regarding the foreign policy goals of security in the south, access to warm water ports, preventing foreign influence in Iran, and establishing good trade relations with Tehran, it mattered little whether the Czar or the Communist Party was in power in Moscow. The rhetoric may have changed over the years but the goals remained more or less consistent and were part of Soviet foreign policy toward Iran. Consequently, Moscow's interference in Iran in 1920 and 1945 should be viewed within this broader framework of Russian interests.

Russian-Persian Relations Prior to 1917

Russia's southern borders were repeatedly under siege by foreign powers, by the Chinese, Mongols, the Turks and the Persians. And if Russia was not a direct party to a

dispute then it was, nonetheless, an interested party because very often the fighting occurred at or near its southern borders. Such was the case during the religious wars of the 1600s between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Persian nation.* To secure its borders Russia tried to move further south to encompass land which was often the target of wars by other powers. For instance, Russia's southward expansion eventually erupted into war with Iran in 1721 when Russia moved into the Transcaucasus. Turkey invaded Iran itself when it became apparent that Russia might succeed and establish its forces on Turkey's borders. Consequently, Russia and Iran then joined forces against the Ottoman Empire. Tehran was faced with the old question of choosing between the "lesser of two evils." While the government no doubt was delighted once again to confront its old nemesis, the Turks, it was disturbed also at having Russia as a partner because Russia's assistance would exact a high price. In fact, Tehran subsequently was forced to cede a good portion of its northern provinces to Russia, namely, Gilan, Mazanderan and Asterabad.¹ A treaty in 1724 partitioned parts of Iran between the Russians, Turks and Afghans. However, Russian-Persian conflict did not end there. Several irredentist wars and skirmishes ensued whereby Iran attempted to regain its lost territory. In the process, however, Iran

* Shiite and Sunni the two main branches of Islam.

lost even more territory to the Russians.

The 1800s witnessed a resurgence of Russian power. In 1801, the Russian annexation of Georgia led to yet another war with Persia. The Treaty of Gulistan, ending this war, enabled Russia to annex most of the Caucasus. In 1826 Persian irredentism challenged the Russian expansion. Once again, Russia succeeded in imposing its will on Iran. Thus, in 1828 by the Treaty of Turkomanchai Tehran was forced to cede to Russia more land, in particular Ervan, in the Armenian S.S.R. and Nakhichevan in the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Tehran also agreed to pay 20,000 rubles indemnity to Moscow and to grant economic and political privileges to the Russians.² For instance, Moscow received the right to impose a 5% tax on Persian imports and exports, received territorial rights in Iran and enhanced its position regarding commercial relations with Iran.³

During this period Russia's policy was to expand. Therefore, even if Iran had not created conditions beneficial to Russia by waging war to regain lost territory, it is quite probable that Russia would have initiated hostile actions against Iran. Russian actions were justified, as one Russian leader stated, because Russia had accepted the responsibility to protect its citizens near the border areas and thus to "ensure the peace." Or put another way, Russia was responsible for civilizing the nomadic tribes in Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey, etc. In 1864, Chancellor Prince Gorchakov elaborated:

The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized States which are brought into contact with half savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization.

In such cases, it always happens that the more civilized State is forced, in the interests of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make most undesirable neighbors.

First there are raids and acts of pillage to put down. To put a stop to them, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission.⁴

During the late 1800s and into the early 1900s, British interest and involvement grew but was characterized by indecisiveness and an apparent inability or unwillingness to identify Russian activities as threats to British interests in the area. Britain's primary interest was to defend India. Its secondary interest, or perhaps a corollary of the first, was to prevent Russian expansion into the Middle East via Turkey and into the Near East via Iran or Afghanistan. British policy was to remain aloof militarily but protest diplomatically to the Russians. As long as Russia did not threaten Afghanistan, and hence, India, London preferred not to risk war with Russia. However, in 1879 London changed its policy and made Iran a paramount interest in its Near East policy.⁵ This was in part triggered by the increasing Russian activity--infiltration and propaganda--in Iran and also in northern Afghanistan. Britain, therefore, began to involve itself in the domestic affairs of Iran and contested Russian influence there. For instance, London became involved in the fight over railroad concessions and supported Reuters'

attempts to negotiate with Tehran.* However, London did not possess a clear policy regarding Iran and very soon after Reuters began his campaign, the British Government withdrew its support. London continually wavered between active involvement and aloofness, to the consternation of all parties. It particularly bothered the Persians because they saw in London a useful ally against the Russians. Unfortunately, a popular uprising in 1891 over the granting of tobacco concessions forced the termination of the British Tobacco Monopoly and contributed to the further indecisiveness on the part of London as to how to deal with Iran. The British Government did not support the Monopoly and this fact contributed to the success of the uprising as well as to the dismay and disappointment of the central government.

By 1899, however, London was alarmed enough by Russian inroads in Persian affairs that it attempted to open up negotiations with Moscow regarding the partition of Iran between the two countries, primarily, of course, to safeguard its own interests and in the process limit the sphere of Russian influence and interference. These negotiations continued on and off until 1907 when an agreement was reached which partitioned Iran. By 1907 both Russian and British interest in Persian affairs had escalated to such a high point that both nations deemed it in their national interest

* Baron Julius Reuters was a British subject and requested government assistance in establishing a concession in Iran.

to reach an accord which would guarantee a peaceful settlement of their differences and prevent any outbreak of war.

The Anglo-Russian Convention, concluded on August 31, 1907, formally recognized a changing political environment in Iran. (See Appendix A.) The Convention called for the division of Iran into three zones or spheres of influence; Russia maintained its hegemony in the northern provinces; England acquired recognition of its special interests in the southeast portion of Iran, the area called Baluchistan; and a third zone which would be neutral. (See map, Figure 2.)

Figure 2. Anglo-Russian Agreement, 1907



The British interest had become crystallized as a result of several factors. First, British interest in the Gulf area already had been modified by the late 1800s when Whitehall made the decision to consider Iran vital to the defense of India. This decision was strengthened further by the increasing involvement of London in the oil exploration in Iran. William Knox D'Arcy, an Australian, had received an oil concession from Iran in 1901 which guaranteed him "special and exclusive privileges to prospect, obtain, exploit, develop, prepare for commerce and to export and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and mineral wax throughout the Persian Empire for sixty years. . . ."⁶

This concession, however, excluded the northern provinces. In 1903 the First Exploration Company was created by D'Arcy and it produced the first geyser in May 1908.⁷ Shortly thereafter the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)^{*} was formed in April 1909.^{**}

Second was the political situation in Europe. While Great Britain wanted to prevent Russian intrusion into its affairs in Iran, London nonetheless wanted Russian assistance

* The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) is today called the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The name was formally changed in 1935 following the name change of the country from Persia to Iran.

** The British Admiralty had decided in 1908 to take over the D'Arcy concession and maintain the oil company by itself for the benefit of the British Navy. In 1909 British intelligence allegedly convinced D'Arcy to sell his concession to a group of missionaries which ultimately turned out to be the British Government. Hence the APOC was created. In 1914 a secret provision was revealed whereby the British Government owned 53% of the stock of APOC.⁹

in its efforts against German attempts to compete with British power in Europe. In addition, Russia also needed a more peaceful situation in Iran since it was faced with difficulties in the Balkans which preempted Russia's attention. Hence, the desire by both states to achieve a modus operandi in Iran which would benefit London and St. Petersburg.

Third, London was faced with increased Russian expansion into Persian affairs including military penetration as well as political infiltration and manipulation. The Russian presence foretold of potential danger and interference in British activities in Iran if they were not halted or at least limited. The Persian Civil War added weight to the British fear of uncontrolled Russian expansion and contributed to British efforts to develop some sort of understanding with the Russians. A constitutional revolution had taken place in Iran during 1906. According to the Russians, the British had instigated the revolt by encouraging the clergy to take up arms against the Shah and thereby attempted to overturn the status quo and weaken Russian influence in Iran.⁸ The revolt succeeded in creating the first Constitution in Persian history, which the Shah was forced to sign on January 1, 1907. The Shah, however, opposed the reforms brought on by the Constitution. Russia also was against the reforms because it could have meant, and almost assuredly would have meant, a loss of influence with the new Majlis (Parliament). The Shah, therefore, collaborated with the Russians despite his dislike of the 1907 Convention parti-

tioning his country. But with the help of the Russians the Shah disbanded the Majlis and moved to eliminate the reformers from the government. Civil War ensued in 1908 between the nationalists (constitutionalists) who favored reform and independence from foreign influence and the royalists who favored the old regime under the Shah. Tabriz, the capital of the Azerbaijan Province, became the center of this struggle. By 1908 it was in the interest of both Britain and Russia that the civil war end and that some form of accommodation be achieved. In particular, both governments insisted that the Shah accept the reforms and move to make reforms within the government and society. (This was, of course, a reversal of previous Russian policy.) The Shah disagreed and disregarded their advice. He held a siege against the nationalists in Tabriz cutting off all supplies, economic and military, to the city. Despite the fact that the Bakhtiari tribe attacked Tehran from the south, and therefore compounded the Shah's problems, the Shah continued his campaign to crush the revolution. Once again, Russia was forced to join forces with England. Consequently, Russian forces, with Britain's blessings, invaded Iran and assisted the nationalists in Tabriz. This action led to the abdication of the Shah on July 16, 1909. Russian troops remained in the north through 1910 to ensure peace and order. At the same time Russian propaganda and infiltration increased.

Russian and British interest again converged after the civil war and led to the further partition of Iran

embodied in the April 1915 Constantinople Accord. Britain relinquished its years long goal of preventing Russian access to the Turkish Straits in exchange for control of the central, neutral, zone in Iran. This portion of the Accord read in part:

. . . Britain consents to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople, in return for a similar benevolent attitude on Russia's part toward the political aspiration of Britain in other parts. The neutral zone of Persia is to be included in the British sphere of influence. The district adjoining Isfahan and Yezd is to be included in the Russian sphere, in which Russia is to be granted full liberty of action.⁹

The risk for London was great but the reward were also great, namely access to the central zone where vast quantities of oil had been discovered by the newly formed Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

While British-Russian relations tottered back and forth between confrontation and conciliation during the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, Iranian efforts strived to interest the United States in Persian affairs. The United States, however, wanted no part in Persian politics and displayed its apathy by a foreign policy of noninvolvement and disinterest. An American legation was not opened until February 14, 1883. Even then its primary function was not to involve the United States in Persian domestic affairs or challenge the supremacy of the British or the Russians. Rather, its primary focus was to provide news of the American missionaries working in Iran. According to Yeselson, even that function was considered by many to entail too much American involvement.

Further, American Ministers stationed in Iran over the years were not impressed with the country, and some even advised Washington against the continued presence of American diplomats. The legation was unnecessary, they charged, since the purpose of the legation was to protect the missionaries and the British could do that task just as well, if not better.¹⁰ Further, when problems did arise, the United States would not back up its diplomatic protests with force, but would invariably rely on the British to intervene on its behalf. Therefore, it was argued, why keep the legation at all? Consequently, an American foreign policy concerning Iran was virtually nonexistent.

Nonetheless, the Persian Government made repeated attempts to invite the United States to develop trade relations and to send advisors of all sorts--military, economic, political, administrative--to assist Iran, but to no avail. The greatest American involvement during this period was the American recommendation, at Iran's insistence, of William Morgan Shuster to head a financial mission to Tehran. The State Department, however, went to great lengths to disavow any connection with Shuster, and throughout his stay in Iran emphasized that his mission was a private one and had no relationship with the American government. Shuster unfortunately managed to irritate the Russians by doing a good job in Iran and finally was forced out by Russian pressure on Tehran. The Russian demand for Shuster's ouster was supported by London which still needed Russian cooperation

in European politics. Throughout the affair, and amidst severe pressure by both London and St. Petersburg, Washington remained unflappable, persisting in its traditional stance of noninvolvement.

Persian advances to the United States also took the form of offers of an oil concession in the north. The first such offer was made in Washington by the Persian Ambassador on August 2, 1920, during the Gilan crisis. The purpose of such a motion was to involve as many countries as possible in the exploration of oil in Iran so as to prevent a monopoly by any one nation.¹¹ Britain already was interested in oil in Iran as a result of its activities with the APOC. Russia had taken an interest first because England was interested, second, because it wanted no foreign power so close to its border, and third because a Russian national, Mr. Khoshtaria, had received a concession in 1916.* In any event, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Sinclair Oil both presented bids for the concession. However, their bids were opposed by both the British and the Russians, and they in turn conspired against the American companies. The Majlis granted a concession to Standard Oil on November 22, 1921 shortly after

* On March 12, 1916 the Persian Cabinet had granted an oil concession to Khoshtaria for exploration of oil in the northern provinces. The concession, however, never was ratified by the Majlis and therefore became null and void. This fact did not bother Russia and it continued to press for an oil concession based on this concession. (Moscow revived the 1916 deal briefly in 1944 during that oil crisis; that claim also was rejected by Iran.)

the Persian Army under Reza restored order in Gilan. This deal was subject to Majlis approval but the Majlis never ratified the concession because of the excessive pressure exerted by London and Moscow.

Communist Interest in Iran, 1917-1921

After the Russian Civil War, Moscow's interest in Iran took on added meaning: ideology was added to Moscow's continuing long range goals. First, there was the extension of the revolution into the East. Second, and a by-product of the first, was the undermining and weakening of the British Empire, capitalist enemy number one. Related to this was the desire to cripple Britain by inciting revolution in India, the backbone of the Empire in the East. Short term goals reflected the strategem of Moscow: further revolutionary activity in Persia; establish a communist base there; attack the British on all fronts; assure friendly nations on its southern borders; decrease, if not eliminate, British presence in Iran; and achieve a more friendly and amiable government in Tehran. When the opportunity arose to invade Iran, the communists were ready. Propagandists were already at work in Iran by 1920 and infiltration had begun. Once Soviet forces landed and occupied the northern areas, Soviet interference began in earnest.

However, Moscow's increasing interest in the East and in Iran partly came about as a result of its disillusionment following the communist revolution. Lenin and his supporters had assumed that the socialist revolution in Moscow

would encourage socialists elsewhere to revolt thereby toppling the capitalist regimes in Western Europe within a matter of months. Instead, the communists in turn were defeated, and toward the end of World War I the Allies joined forces to invade Russia and intervene on behalf of the White Forces.* In addition, Moscow was faced with a deteriorated movement in Europe, and a civil war (albeit a diversified and terribly weakened effort). One by one the border republics declared their independence and established sovereign non-communist states. As the Soviet forces battled in one republic after another, the dream of immediate revolution and international communism became fainter and farther away.

Ideological purity yielded to compromise, and modifications in doctrine and tactics occurred. For instance, Lenin the realist attributed the downfall of the White Forces in part to Denikin's insistence on refusing to heed the calls for self-determination by the ethnic groups in Russia.¹² Since nationalism was a potentially powerful weapon not only against the counter-revolutionary forces but also a weapon in support of communism, Lenin offered the right of

* On August 2, 1918, the British invaded Archangel and on August 14, Baku. Japanese and British forces landed at Vladivostok on August 3, followed shortly thereafter by the French and Americans. The Allied invasion was terminated in 1919 because (1) it was not achieving military results against the Russians, and (2) there were more pressing matters within the participating states which warranted the Allies' attention and expenditures.

self-determination to ethnic groups. He advocated patience and flexibility over doctrine. He carried this policy into the Second and Third Congresses of the Third International, but not without resistance. His policy of self-determination was linked to his statements on national bourgeois movements. In essence, he argued that these groups should be supported in their efforts against their colonial oppressors.¹³

(See Appendix B.) In July 1920 at the Second Congress, Lenin and his faction did not have enough power to force obedience or compliance to Moscow's policy although his personal prestige did enable his viewpoint to prevail. (Further, when discussing "Moscow's" views, it is important to note that even within the Party in Soviet Russia, there was not universal accord regarding the role of self-determination and national bourgeois groups.) M.N. Roy, an Indian communist, led the opposition to Lenin's call for alliances between communists and nationalist liberation movements which he considered an anathema to traditional Marxism.

Problems continued at the Baku Peoples Congress called in 1920 by the Third International to gather together communists in the Eastern states along with nationalist leaders opposed to imperialist rule. By the end of the conference, it was clear that even Soviet communists and Moslem communists did not see eye to eye on the issue of nationalism. The Soviet communists were considered too doctrinaire to understand the struggles taking place in

the East. Eastern communists joined with nationalists to oppose Moscow's leadership regarding the nationalist question which in essence called for sacrifices in the nationalist movements for the sake of Moscow's interests. (They also opposed Moscow's anti-religion crusade.) Lenin's belief in the need for cooperation with national liberation forces was supported by the nationalists at the Baku conference although there was grumbling about the nature of that support.

Lenin reiterated his principle of flexibility in a pamphlet written in 1920 entitled "Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder."¹⁴ In it he argued for exploiting the opportunities presented by capitalist society, especially utilizing trade unions, parliaments, etc. He asked his fellow communists not to spurn nationalist groups because they were useful in the struggle against colonialism. While this ideological debate was taking place, Soviet Russia had initiated an experiment in Gilan which took Lenin's advice about using nationalist forces to undermine imperialism in the East.

At the Third Congress, held in July 1921, the debate continued. Lenin's thesis on the national and colonial question was again heatedly debated. By 1921 another issue had developed to increase the tension and contribute to the acrimonious debate. Namely, non-Russian communists--especially the Italian communists and Asian communists--argued that the policy of the Comintern was overly supportive

of Moscow's interests to the detriment of international Marxism. Or put another way, Moscow was perverting Marxism to suit its own needs and in the process forcing communists in other states to compromise their values for the sake of Soviet Russia. Lenin--and later Stalin--espoused the idea of "socialism in one country," with that one country naturally being Soviet Russia. Others, including Trotsky and Roy demanded continuous "world revolution." Since the Communist Party was still a weak party the debate was allowed to remain part of the Comintern proceedings.

The ideological commitment to the East had been established early in the Soviet movement. In November 1918 Stalin, then Commissar for Nationalities, discussed the strategy for Soviet Russia in expanding the communist revolution, at the Congress of Muslim Communists. He implored his cohorts not to forget the East in spite of the fact that their vision leaned toward the West and Europe. He wrote:

The East must not be forgotten by us even for a moment. It must not be forgotten for the reason that it provides inexhaustible reserves and is the most reliable rear base for world imperialism. . . . The task of communism is to do away with the century-old slumber of the oppressed people of the East, to infect the workers and peasants of these countries with the laboring spirit of the revolution, to arouse them to struggle against imperialism. . . .¹⁵

In December 1918, the RSFSR expressed a particular interest in the peoples of Asia and their role in the international communist movement. The communist party issued a "Call to Spread Revolution in Asia" (See Appendix C.), and estab-

lished a Department of International Propaganda, under the auspices of the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party. In the resolution creating this department, the ideological necessity was described as a result of very "brutal and unscrupulous exploitation by imperialist powers." (See Appendix D.) Twelve sections were created, including one directly related to Persian affairs and one for Azerbaijan affairs, whose primary purpose was to train Moslems to agitate on behalf of communism.

The action program decided upon was two-fold. First, the Third International-created in 1919 for the purpose of spreading communism outside of Russia--would initiate, organize, direct and finance communist parties in the eastern countries. Second, these parties, and communists in general, would collaborate with national liberation movements, even if they were bourgeois, so long as they were anti-imperialist. (See Appendix E.) This dual direction was formalized at the Second Congress of the Third International and was verbalized in Lenin's thesis on nationalism and colonialism. While these ideological principles were not achieved without a battle--especially over the point of support for bourgeois groups--they created the ideological climate and predisposition preliminary to Soviet activity in Iran on a large scale.

Perhaps the clearest expression of Soviet commitment to revolution in Asia, and especially Iran's role in that revolution, was elaborated by K. Troyanovsky in 1918. He

wrote, "India is our principal objective. Persia is the only path open to India. The Persian revolution is the key to the revolution in all the Orient. . . . Persia is the Suez Canal of the revolution. . . . Persia must be ours. Persia must belong to the revolution."¹⁶ (Also see Appendix F for an appeal by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, RSFSR, to the workers and peasants of Persia.) The weakest link in imperialism was the colonies, and the leader of the imperialist west was Britain. Accordingly, to undermine and diminish the strength of Great Britain, it was necessary to attack its outposts. India was the prime objective, as Troyanovsky noted, but India was too well defended by the British. Consequently, a back-door approach was used: communize Persia, press for a socialist revolution there, work for the overthrow of the pro-British Cabinet in Tehran, force the British to abandon Iran, and thereby indirectly strike a blow at India.

Most, if not all, ideological statements pointed to the expectation that communism would be welcomed resoundingly by the peasants and workers of the Asian countries because they had suffered so much at the hands of imperialist nations. It was believed that because it was rational to join the communists, they would logically do so. The effort to cultivate the Jangalis in Gilan Province was perhaps a clear indication of misconceptions and naivete of the communists, both in Moscow and in Iran. It is certainly indicative of the complexity of the problem of fighting imperialism, and spreading Marxism.

Moscow relied on the questionable support the Bolsheviks received from the various tribes in the northern provinces during the First World War. This assistance was viewed as anti-British and anti-Government, but it did provide a basis for cooperation. One such cooperative arrangement occurred between Mirza Kuchik Khan, head of the Jangali movement in Gilan Province, and the Russian forces. The latter were recalled by Moscow after the Revolution as they were needed in Russia. They were assisted in their evacuation by the Jangalis, who no doubt were delighted to see them go. Kuchik Khan bought weapons and supplies from them and helped them reach Enzeli, a port on the Caspian Sea which was jointly administered by Kuchik Khan's men and the Bolsheviks.

In 1917, Moscow issued an appeal to Moslems in the East to join the Bolsheviks and struggle for independence from the colonial powers. (See Appendix F.) Trotsky, on behalf of the Council of the People's Commissars, formally annulled former treaties on January 14, 1918, stating that they were "directed against the freedom and independence of the Persian people and annulled once and for all."¹⁷ Moscow further abrogated all treaties and concessions which Russia had extorted from Iran over the years. In 1919, another appeal was issued which reiterated Trotsky's proclamation that all treaties directly affecting Iran. Specifically the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and the Constantinople Convention of 1915 were abrogated. (See Appendix G.)

These actions were no doubt genuinely offered as an

ideological gesture in anticipation of the impending communist revolution in the West and a political necessity at the time if they were to maintain their ideological integrity. Britain, however, did not surrender its concessions nor its hegemony in the south. Nor was the Persian Government grateful for the Soviet offer. In fact, Iran continued to refuse either to recognize the new Soviet government or to deal with the Soviet delegates and representatives sent to Tehran. Soviet agents were harassed and arrested. Iran dealt primarily and exclusively with the representatives of the White Russian Government. Most of these agents were the Czar's representatives in Iran at the time of the revolution and simply remained during the civil war in anticipation of a White victory and restoration of the monarchy. Repeated Soviet protests throughout 1919 and 1920 were to little avail. It was not until the RSFSR occupied the north and threatened Tehran that Iran reconsidered its treatment of Soviet agents, and even then only slowly. Moscow, however, was fully aware that Britain was behind the intransigence of the Tehran Government and proceeded to take measures (especially propaganda) to reverse the reliance by Tehran on London.

Soviet interest in Iran, however, was not purely ideological. Russian security was threatened by the British presence in Iran as well as by the unstable political and military situations in the border areas, especially in Transcaucasia. For instance, on April 22, 1918, the

Transcaucasian Federation was created encompassing Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Russian Azerbaijan, north of the Persian border). On May 26, Georgia declared independence, followed on May 28 by Armenia and Azerbaijan. Soviet Russia agreed to recognize the integrity of the three new countries --it could do little else at the time--and formalized this recognition in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (Part IV; see Appendix H.) Moscow worked continuously, however, to undermine the new non-communist governments and reassert Bolshevik rule.

The situation in Russian Azerbaijan was particularly crucial for the turn of events in Iran. The communists had succeeded in taking control of the government in Baku and had participated in the government from March to July 1918, until they were forced to leave by the bourgeoisie and Mensheviks. The new (non-communist) government was being threatened by Turkey and Germany--World War I still was being fought--and appealed to the British for assistance. Major-General L.C. Dunsterville, head of the British forces in the area which were nicknamed Dunsterforce, defended Baku against the Turkish bombardment and advance. However, having received little aid from the Baku Government--since the government could not reach consensus on anything--Dunsterville evacuated Baku in September 1918. The Turks were defeated by October and no longer a factor in the war; the Germans surrendered in November. On April 28, 1920 the Musavatist (non-communist) Cabinet was overthrown by

the Bolsheviks and Baku was reoccupied by the Red Army. A series of treaties were contracted between the RSFSR and the newly-formed Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic which closely linked this republic to Moscow, but which in effect annexed it.

Russian security also was threatened in the south by the counterrevolutionary forces engaged in civil war. These forces, called the White Guards, had been stationed in Baku and had enjoyed the protection of the British Army while the British occupied that city. Once the British left, the White Guards established headquarters in Enzeli, a port city in Gilan Province in northern Iran. Soviet forces in southern Russia were subject to harassment, sabotage and sneak attacks across the border. In fact, the Guards' presence in Enzeli led to the first stage of the Gilan crisis when the Soviet forces invaded northern Iran, occupied Enzeli and carried their civil war onto Persian territory. In this regard, Soviet interests also centered on the desire to protect the oil fields at Baku. Moscow feared a White Guard attack on the oil fields and was not certain that the British would not also attack them. Thus, Moscow strived to eliminate the White Russian threat and to prevent British access to the Caspian Sea and further to drive the British as far away from the coastline as possible.

The unstable Soviet-Persian relationship was aggravated further by the Soviet antipathy to the proposed Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919. (By 1920 the Treaty had not been ratified

by the Majlis, the Persian Parliament.) This treaty was viewed by Moscow as striking at the RSFSR and laying the foundation for virtual British annexation of Iran, thus posing a potential military threat to Soviet Russia. Britain, however, viewed the treaty as an alternative to the continuation of British presence in Iran (military presence that is) and not as an annexation of the country. The treaty provided for a substantial loan of £ 2 million, for British advisors to assist the Persian administration, British officers and munitions for the Persian Army, the improvement of the communications system and a modification of the customs tariffs. (See Appendix I.) In spite of the necessity for British protection, and for British financial aid, the Majlis refused to ratify the treaty, and this intransigence was one of the building blocks to the 1920 crisis. The RSFSR was disturbed by this treaty because it perpetuated a British presence on its southern borders and strengthened an anti-Moscow government in Tehran. Therefore, in addition to the ideological interest in Iran as a stepping stone on the road to the destruction of imperialism, Moscow had more immediate needs. Namely, its goal was to neutralize the potential threat, either militarily or politically, if not by achieving a communist system there, then at least by creating a pro-Moscow perspective in the Cabinet and Majlis, free from British influence.

In conclusion, while the Russian interests in Iran preceded the revolution in Russia, they took on added signifi-

cance following 1917, and on many fronts. The ideological interest of the Third International in the East provided a broad perspective in which to view Soviet-Persian relations. Iran was ideologically the stepping stone to revolution in the East, and more pragmatically the weak link in the British Empire. Once the ideological component was approved by Lenin, and the Second Congress of the Comintern concurred, the communist movement assisted the bourgeoisie in their fight against Tehran. The ideological weapon against imperialism took on even greater importance because of the presence of British troops in the north and the threat they posed both directly against Moscow and indirectly by supporting the White Guards. Moscow viewed the Anglo-Persian Treaty as perpetuating the British presence and thereby increasing the threat to Russia's borders. Soviet efforts, therefore, were aimed not only at defeating the White Guards, but also at decreasing British influence in Iran and altering Persian policy. (It should be noted that throughout this discussion Iran is treated as an instrument of policy, not a goal in and of itself. That is, Iran is not important for itself but rather as a means of achieving other ends.)

Soviet Interest in Iran, 1941-1946

During the 1920s and 1930s the countries involved in Iran turned inward to deal with their own internal problems and for the most part left Iran to develop on its own. This, of course, did not mean that Moscow or London were oblivious

to conditions in Iran, but rather that the situation there and within the international arena were conducive to a decrease in the active interference by the two Great Powers. During the 1920s Moscow negotiated several commercial agreements with Tehran dealing with trade, fishing rights and navigation in the Caspian Sea. A Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality was signed on October 1, 1927 between Moscow and Tehran guaranteeing that neither side would interfere in the internal affairs of the other. On November 27, 1932 the United Kingdom was forced by Tehran to renegotiate the agreement concerning APOC. However, the new accord did not alter appreciably the relationship although it did give a greater percentage of the profits to Tehran. Afterwards, between 1937 and 1940, the AIOC was able to expand its operations, albeit still not into the northern regions. The major development during the interwar period was the rise of German influence in Iran. In particular, Germany soon became Iran's primary trading partner surpassing both Soviet Russia and Britain.

Soviet interest in Iran during the 1940s was closely linked to Soviet international strategy as well as to traditional Soviet goals for Iran. Therefore, Moscow's strategy continued to be directed at enhancing its security, spreading communism, and diminishing the influence of other parties in Persian affairs. For instance, Moscow's long range goal of enhancing its security along its southern flank still loomed large in its relations with Iran, as did its desire

to secure a warm water port in the Mediterranean and/or Persian Gulf. Moscow tried to achieve control of the Straits (The Dardenelles) by negotiating with the Germans in November 1940. In the proposed Protocols Moscow agreed to accept the German proposals if Berlin in turn would acknowledge certain Russian goals, among others "the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits," and "in the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."¹⁸ (See Appendix J.) Moscow later focused on Turkey (a traditional object of Moscow's attention), threatening it with occupation if the Montreux Convention of 1936--establishing control and providing protection for the Straits --were not revised to give only Black Sea powers, namely Turkey and the Soviet Union, Rumania and Bulgaria, the right to provide security for the Straits. This endeavor resulted in two crises, in 1945 and again in 1947. Then both the United States and Great Britain supported Turkey in its refusal to renegotiate the Convention. The security problem took on even more immediacy once World War II began and it became imperative for the Soviet Union to obtain access to warm water ports in order to assure the continuous passage of war supplies.

Central to Moscow's security was the creation of a buffer zone in northern Iran to help protect its southern border. The Caucasus had been invaded twice in the last fifty years, first by the Germans and then British in the First World War, and again by the Germans in 1941. Naturally, Moscow's concern with this facet of its relations with Iran

had continued and in fact had been strengthened with the advent of American presence in the Near East and Iran. Further, the northern provinces were used repeatedly as bases for enemy operatives engaged in sabotage and infiltration against the Soviet Union. For instance, during the Civil War, both the White Guards and British forces used the north as a home base to battle the Red Army. During World War II, it was German influence that was the primary problem for Moscow. Furthermore, as a by-product of its security needs, Moscow feared for its oil fields in Baku, although the object of its fears shifted as the war progressed, from fear of German invasion and sabotage, to fear of Persian intrigue against the fields. Moscow tried to obtain the cooperation of Tehran in preventing the British from using Iran as a base of operations against the Soviet Union during the two years England was at war with Germany and Moscow neutral. These efforts led to an agreement with Iran whereby the Soviet Union obtained access to seven Persian airfields under the pretext that these fields would assist in the protection of Baku should the British decide to attack. (These fields were remanded to Persian authority in 1946.) Following the Nazi invasion of Russia in June 1941, Soviet interests shifted to ward off a German attack on the oil fields rather than concentrating on British activities, since Moscow had become an ally of London. Once again, after 1945, the Baku oil fields were the object of defensive measures when Moscow claimed Iran was plotting to sabotage them.

Soviet security also was jeopardized by the increased German influence in Iran during the 1930s. Trade between Germany and Iran had increased substantially. Further, Iran, particularly the Shah and the Prime Minister, saw Germany as a friend who could be used as a balancer between British and Russian interference. Thus, while Iran declared its neutrality on September 4, 1939, when World War II started and reiterated this pledge of neutrality on June 25, 1941, after Germany invaded Russia, Tehran continued to act as an ally of Berlin. The Persian Government allowed Nazi propagandists to work against the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and to continue their influence in the many areas of Persian society which welcomed them. During 1941, Moscow and London repeatedly requested Tehran to (1) curb German propaganda, (2) inhibit German agents' activities, and (3) expel the German nationals, particularly those known to be members of the SS such as Franz Mayer and Roman Gamotta. Soviet estimates of German agents were in the range of 4,000 persons¹⁹ while the American and British Embassies estimated their number to be about 2,000.²⁰ Various trade organizations and commercial establishments operating in Iran provided cover for their work, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate business interests and Nazi fifth column activities. For instance, one such company was Shenkers Transport which employed several Nazi agents, including the leaders of the undercover network, Mayer and Gamotta. Prime Minister Ali Mansur refused, however, to deport the Germans

on the grounds that such action would undermine Iran's neutrality and that it had no legitimate reason to do so. For instance, the majority of the Germans were employed throughout the economy and no reliable evidence could be obtained regarding alleged complicity in Nazi activities. However, Soviet agents determined that the Nazis were infiltrated into most sectors of Persian society, especially the Army, transportation, finance and police institutions, thus posing a potential danger for the Soviet Union.²¹

Consequently, the Soviet Union and Great Britain jointly invaded Iran on August 25, 1941 to ensure that Iran would not become an active ally of Germany. Radio Moscow noted that Iran had only itself to blame for the invasion:


. . . The Soviet Government has three times warned the Iranian Government of the danger to its interests, as well as to the interests of the USSR and Great Britain for necessary measures to be taken. The Iranian Government has unfortunately refused to take measures which would put an end to the disturbances. . . . The Soviet Government has, therefore, been forced to take the necessary steps to implement its right in accordance with Paragraph 6 of the 1921 Agreement and to introduce its troops onto the territory of Iran in self-defense. . . .²²

Moscow's aims were two-fold, one immediate and one long range. Its immediate aim was to prevent German sabotage against its installations in the Caucasus and to protect the Baku oil fields. Its long range goal of subduing Persian independence was served by the invasion and occupation because it enabled Soviet agents to infiltrate into northern Iran under the protection of the Red Army thereby facilitating Soviet interference and assuring Moscow of a foothold on Persian soil.

After the joint invasion Riza Shah was forced to abdicate on September 16, 1941. (His son Muhammad Riza Pahlavi took over.) While Persian military resistance ceased almost immediately, its political resistance to British and Soviet demands continued, particularly regarding the territorial division of Iran into zones of occupation. Iran had little real choice but the Prime Minister would not agree to any treaty legitimizing their presence without a fight. In the end, a treaty of alliance, the Tripartite Accord, was signed on January 29, 1942, with the Soviet Union in control in the north and England in the southwest. (It is interesting to compare the zones of occupation in 1942 with the spheres of influence stipulated in the 1907 Accord. The Soviet Union maintained its hegemony in the north although over a smaller area. The British, on the other hand, shifted their control from the east where British forces were stationed to assist in the defense of India, to the west where the British oil refineries were located. See map, Figure 3.) The Treaty guaranteed the political independence of Iran and provided a date--six months after the end of war--for withdrawal of Allied forces. It promised economic aid for Iran to offset the inconvenience of having occupation forces in the country. It also ensured Iran's defense against a German invasion. It stipulated Persian obligations under the Treaty and outlined the lines of jurisdiction by the three countries, e.g., internal security to be controlled by the Iranian authorities. (See Appendix K.)

Figure 3.

A Comparison of Spheres of Influence, 1907
and Zones of Occupation, 1942



Legend: Spheres of Influence:
(1907-1918)

Russian: |||||

British: ooooo

Zones of Occupation:
(1942-1945)

Russian: |||||

British: ooooo

Following the Tripartite Accord, the German threat remained as Germany's forces moved in the Caucasus. But after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942 (German forces surrendered on February 2, 1943,), that fear too diminished. While German sabotage was never eliminated completely, once the Allies occupied Iran, the threat to Russia's southern border did diminish considerably. However, even with most of the German nationals finally expelled and the two powers occupying Iran, German propaganda and subversion continued. For instance, German agents were credited with inciting rebellion among the Kurds in the north and among the Qashqai in the south. (The Russians eventually took over sponsorship of the Kurdish insurrections.) The British finally arrested Franz Mayer, one of the major Nazi agents in Iran, in the summer of 1943 but not before he and his colleagues had secured tribal assistance to the Axis cause and had fomented discord in many of the northern provinces, discord which Tehran found extremely difficult to then appease. Moscow held to the security issue long after it was necessary in order to rationalize the presence of Soviet troops on Persian territory. Moscow then turned its attention to threats by Iran resulting from the Prime Minister's hostile attitude and actions against the Soviet Union. Moscow's claim was, as Stalin had pointed out at the Moscow Conference in 1945 that a potential Persian thrust into the Azerbaijan SSR must be prevented.²³ With the introduction of Soviet military forces came the escalation of Soviet agents and increased

encouragement and support for the dissident groups in the north. Soviet troops were able to protect these agents from Persian authorities and also from western interference. Throughout the war years, the Red Army provided a fertile environment for these operatives to pursue freely their activities including propaganda, infiltration and subversion.

By the 1940s, ideological considerations did not hold the same aura or imperative as they had in 1920. Stalin decided policy; there were no democratic centralism or group debates. Anti-imperialism/anti-capitalism still was used as the ideological foundation in the literature depicting Soviet Russia's battleground. Iran was described as a pawn in the imperialist surge to capture and enslave developing countries. But any real interest in Iran's plight or in liberating Iran from the yoke of imperialism took a back seat to practical considerations of the times, namely, protecting the USSR from its enemies. By 1941 Stalin's policy of "socialism in one country" was firmly entrenched. (It should be noted that Lenin first raised this concept at the Third Congress of the Comintern; Stalin's battles with Trotsky also included a clash between Stalin's "socialism in one country" and Trotsky's "world revolution" in 1924-25.) Socialism in one country thereby linked ideology with security. Nevertheless, Soviet literature focused primarily on the ideological struggle being waged in Iran even during the war when Russia was allied with its arch enemy Britain. In fact, this ideological element predominated in the litera-

ture to the exclusion, at times, of even the security issue. Ivanov, for example, in his Historical Work on Iran, emphasized the reactionary nature of the Persian regime and the need for liberation and salvation.²⁴ In particular, Soviet authors noted the chauvinism displayed by Tehran towards minorities and their need for liberation.²⁵ For example, one Soviet author traveling through Iran commented on the oppression of the peasants and the problems encountered by the nationalities in trying to express their national heritage. "The reactionary landowners oppress the peasants with the complicity of the government," he observed, "and the Khans intimidate their own people."²⁶ Peasants in the north, however, where Soviet forces were stationed, "were not as browbeat as the peasants in the south," under the British; they were allowed to enjoy their culture and language, etc., under the protection of the Red Army.²⁷

Another Soviet author noted that the battle between capitalism and socialism took on greater meaning when the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was formed because the conservative elements in Persian society joined forces with the West to dislodge the new government. Naturally, the Soviet Union had no alternative but to assist the newly formed democratic government against the conspiracy of capitalists who aimed to topple it. Ivanov wrote, "It became evident that Iran did not have the means to fight the democratic movement in Iran. Therefore, the reactionary circles decided to seek help outside (Iran) turning the internal

Azerbaijan question into an international one."²⁸ In addition, communists were concerned about Iran because of what they viewed as a "crisis in capitalism." After the war, the West found itself with a military economy and needed to expand its markets even further in order to secure proper resources for its war economy. Therefore, the argument went, the national liberation movement in Azerbaijan and in Iran were but extensions of the struggle against international capitalism and points of resistance to the expansion of the war economy. Soviet proximity to Iran and to the democratic movement assisted in this fight by providing concrete support and ideological leadership.²⁹

After the war, the ideological context expanded from "socialism in one country" to encompass the "two camp" concept. At its foundation was the belief that there were no neutrals. Either one was on the communist side or one was an enemy; there was no room for a middle ground. At the most, it meant preparation for all out war with the West which was deemed inevitable, and at the least it demanded continual probing and testing for weak spots in the West's perimeter. In particular this meant Soviet interference in Iran. While this facet of ideological struggle may not be as theoretical or as interesting as the debates over Soviet activities in developing areas which took place in the 1920 crisis, nevertheless, it was a legitimate and real ideological concern of Moscow at that time. What was important was not whether peasants and workers were ready for revolution

(Stalin did not really care); rather, the question was how could the Soviet Union encourage and direct this revolution so that it weakened the West the most and posed the least risk for Moscow. No country, however unprepared for socialism, could be left out of the Soviet orbit lest it move into the opposing camp, thereby strengthening Moscow's enemies. This question and the others resulting from this line of thought were questions of practical implementation and, judging from available literature, was not a question for open discussions. Stalin determined the dialog and created the climate for and parameters of action. The commitment to the revolution in Iran therefore was evidenced in the form of military, political and economic support for the minorities in the northern provinces. But this ideological commitment had certain conditions: If it weakened the central government, if it decreased the status, prestige or influence of the United States or Great Britain, if it enhanced Moscow's prestige and influence in Iran and the Near East, if it brought Soviet goals closer to achievement, then that group or position should/would be supported.

Related to both the ideological imperative and concern for security was the Soviet fear of American interest and increasing involvement in Iran. Soviet interest in American-Persian relations was predicated on its strategic aim of preventing third party involvement in Persian affairs and of decreasing the influence and capacity of the West. It also entailed Soviet short term goals such as diminishing

American presence and thereby influence in Iran. Initially Moscow accepted American involvement in Iran as a result of wartime necessity, especially since the United States had authorized the extension of "lend-lease" legislation to the Soviet Union in September 1941 and shipped huge quantities of war supplies to Moscow. The only warm water winter route for these supplies was through Iran, hence the interest and need for collaboration with the United States.

Soviet-American collaboration was extended to the diplomatic front as well. The United States had interjected its concern about Soviet activities in Iran during the Moscow Conference in 1943. This effort failed but the United States succeeded in having Iran placed on the agenda of the Tehran Conference, also meeting that year. After much debate, with Soviet misgivings about the necessity for such a process, a joint declaration was formulated reaffirming support for Iran's territorial integrity and sovereignty. It read in part, ". . . The governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. . . ." ³⁰ (See Appendix L.) This declaration was considered a major success for the United States because theoretically and realistically neither England nor the Soviet Union needed such a document for their presence in Iran to be "legitimate." That is, both countries previously had agreed to maintain the sovereignty of Iran in Article I

of the Tripartite Agreement of 1942. However, the United States had failed to negotiate a treaty with Iran sanctioning the American presence and had never signed anything guaranteeing that Washington would honor these principles. Iran did not question Washington's commitment to its independence. Rather, it wanted American involvement in guaranteeing the commitment of London and Moscow, hence the reiteration of that commitment by all three powers. Churchill and Stalin thought the declaration was unnecessary but acquiesced to Roosevelt's prodding.

This friendly collaboration did not last very long, however, because of two incidents which developed after 1942, both of which helped shape the direction of Soviet-Iranian relations. First was a by-product of military necessity, namely the introduction of American forces and advisers (financial and military) into Iran. While never completely welcomed by the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf Command, headed by Major-General Donald H. Connolly and consisting of approximately 30,000 non-combatant troops, was accepted as vital to the continuous and speedy flow of war supplies. These troops were primarily responsible for operating the southern half of the Persian rail system, relieving the British for other duties. In addition, several missions were created: Arthur C. Millspaugh undertook to develop the financial capacity of Tehran; Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf undertook to reorganize and train the gendarmerie; Major-General John N. Greely was sent to advise the Persian Army and

General Clarence S. Ridely was charged with reorganizing and training them. While the American presence was resented by Moscow, it was tolerated for the sake of the anti-Nazi alliance. Millspaugh, however, was characterized both during and especially after the war as an "agent of American imperialism," and was eventually forced to terminate his mission. He was considered especially repugnant, more so than the other advisers, because he was a firm advocate of increasing American interest and involvement in Iran.³¹

The military and gendarme missions were disapproved because they would increase the capacity of the central government to deal with the insurgency movements which Moscow was assisting. And further, these missions might strengthen the resolve of Tehran to resist Moscow's interference. Moscow would not tolerate a third party involvement in the area and tried to undermine these various American missions in spite of the need for collaboration during the war.

After the war, Soviet writers emphasized that these early missions, while operating under the guise of wartime necessity to enable Iran to assist in the Allied cause, were in fact preludes to American imperialist plans for the colonization of Iran after the war.³² Moscow was more comfortable with the prospect of dealing solely with Britain, whose traditional sphere of influence was limited to the south. American presence and potential involvement so close to the Soviet border interfered with Soviet plans both for Iran in particular and for the Near East in general. Further,

given the political climate of the late 1940s, there was a genuine concern that American involvement would pose a military and security threat at some point in the future. Consequently, the ideological commitment to revolution and socialist development in Iran took on proportions which were more than mere rhetoric or theory. The socialist battle against the West was literally at Moscow's back door.

This perspective was strengthened further as a result of the second situation which changed the friendly atmosphere of 1942 and helped lay the foundation for the uncooperative alliance which followed from 1943 until the outbreak of hostile relations later in the 1940s. This situation was formally termed the "oil crisis of 1944" by writers, but the roots go much deeper. Moscow's interest in the northern oil reserves dated back to the oil crisis in 1920-21 when Moscow collaborated with London to prevent American oil companies from obtaining oil concessions in northern Iran. The question of oil concessions therefore remained a sore point for Moscow throughout its dealings with Iran. In 1940, Moscow had informed Tehran that it "would not tolerate an oil concession to an American company anywhere in Iran, not just in the north."³³ However, Iran wanted to secure American interest in the country to offset British and Soviet rivalry and therefore in 1939 already had made overtures to the American Embassy once again informing the Ambassador that Iran would look favorably on any request by an American oil company for a concession in Iran, including one in the north. Consequently,

Standard Vacuum and Sinclair Oil requested concessions in 1943. The British, having gotten wind of this activity, then made their requests known via the Royal Dutch Shell Company. (It should be noted that the British still had a concession in the southwest portion of Iran in the form of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.) Afterwards, the Russians dispatched their Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Ivanovich Kavtaradze, to speak for a Russian concession.

While the Prime Minister confided to the American Ambassador that Iran would prefer to give the concession to the Americans, he was faced nevertheless with choosing from among the Americans, British, and Russians, all of whom spoke forcefully for their own causes. Kavtaradze, for instance, demanded that the concession be granted to Moscow since it was the only rightful heir, according to Moscow, to such a concession. Moscow pressed its claim using intense political pressure and increased interference in the north, particularly interference with Persian police functions. The crisis was resolved eventually--rather astutely by the Persians themselves--when none of the companies were granted a concession. Rather, a law was passed by the Majlis on December 2, 1944 stipulating that all discussion regarding oil concessions would be postponed until after the war. (See Appendix M.) Further, any government official who engaged in such discussions would be subject to arrest and jail. Russia responded harshly charging that the law was discriminatory since London already had a concession, e.g., AIOC.

Moscow also threatened "dire consequences." Threats notwithstanding, Moscow accepted this decision and did not retaliate. Considerable ill feeling was generated between and among all concerned, with the prestige and respect of all the powers considerably diminished, including that of the highly-regarded United States. When the Persians rejected all demands for such a concession, wartime necessity for Allied cooperation postponed any really major Soviet retaliation against Iran or a break between the three powers. However, it did lead to a modification in the manner in which the Allies cooperated with one another in Iran.

There appears to be some controversy regarding the true motives of the Soviet Union in pursuing the concession. For instance, George Kennan, the American charge' in Moscow, questioned whether Moscow really wanted an oil concession or in fact just wanted to prevent others from obtaining the concession in the north. He commented that "the oil of northern Iran is important not as something Russia needs, but as something it might be dangerous to permit anyone else to exploit. . . . The Kremlin deemed it essential to Russian security that no other great power should even have the chance of gaining a footing there."³⁴ Actually, it is virtually impossible to separate the two in discussing Soviet-Iranian relations because both concerns were real, legitimate and pressing. Whether Moscow wanted an oil concession for its own use or as a means of preventing others from obtaining it seems to be a moot point. What is important is the con-

tinuous concern Moscow had for oil concessions and anyone interested in them. This concern played a major role in shaping its foreign policy toward Iran and was a crucial factor both in its decision to intervene actively during the Azerbaijan crisis and to withdraw its forces.

Finally, Iran was viewed as a rearguard action supplemental to the fight being waged in Europe. Europe still was politically the main focus of action, both for Moscow and Washington. Nonetheless, Iran was considered a vital part of the path to final victory. Stalin's actions were predicated on the belief--some say formulated as early as 1944-45 during his many discussions with President Roosevelt, and strengthened by the concessions granted by the United States at Yalta--that he could push as far as he dared with little or no resistance from the United States. This certainly was a miscalculation on his part, but the underlying philosophy was a fundamental part of Soviet post-war strategy in general and of Soviet-Iranian relations in particular.

Consequently, Soviet foreign policy was not created de nouveau but rather was an extension of goals already formulated by the Czarist regime. In particular, the goals related to Moscow's security and weakening of other powers involved in Iran. Whether the Soviet leadership cared to acknowledge it, it owed a debt to the Czar's foreign policy makers. Russian infiltration in the northern provinces, indeed the very idea of Russian hegemony and interest in the north, was established long before Marxism achieved a

foothold in Russia. While the communists ideologues and leadership added a new focus to the relationship and appeared to give a new thrust to Russian activities, the effect was not significantly different from previous incursions from the north, at least not the Persians living there. Nonetheless, communist ideology enhanced the traditional Czarist policies and gave them new meaning within a new context. Moscow's long range goals were directly and indirectly connected with these Marxist principles.

Moscow's consistency in pursuing these goals enables one to draw tentative conclusions regarding Soviet foreign policy. First, Moscow can be expected to continue its pursuit of these interests. The fear for its southern borders along with its desire to obtain warm water ports have deep roots in Russia's heritage. Second, it is obvious from an examination of Russian/Soviet-Iranian relations during the past 50-100 years that St. Petersburg/Moscow can and has exhibited great flexibility in its relationship with Tehran. In particular, Moscow has abandoned its goals when more important interests were jeopardized. The long term goals were sacrificed for more immediate short term interests. Third, Iran qua Iran was not important to Soviet policy makers. Iran was viewed and treated as a tool, a means of achieving other ends, especially a means whereby the influence of the West could be diminished in Iran and the Near East.

In conclusion, Soviet foreign policy toward Iran was a policy of interference to achieve both long and short range

goals. The following chart outlines the various goals pursued by St. Petersburg and Moscow during the several time periods discussed in this chapter (See chart, Figure 4.) It distinguishes between traditional long term goals which provided a sense of continuity of Russian/Soviet foreign policy and those which were more immediate short term goals which were modified as conditions warranted.

Figure 4. Russian/Soviet Interest in Iran

Long-Range Goals	<u>Czarist Foreign Policy</u>	<u>RSFSR Foreign Policy</u>	<u>USSR Foreign Policy</u>
	-----	Security -----	-----
	-----	Warm Water Ports -----	-----
		Dardenelles	
		Persian Gulf	
	-----	Weaken third party involvement -----	-----
	-----	Weaken Persian independence -----	-----
	-----	Trade with Iran -----	-----
	-----	Weaken Turkey -----	-----
		Spread Communism -----	-----
Short-Range Goals	Expand southward stop invasions acquire land secure borders Weaken United Kingdom Trade with Iran Influence Shah	Stop White Guards Defend Baku-oil fields Defeat United Kingdom Stop Anglo-Persian Treaty Change Government in Tehran Incite revolution in East in Iran Establish socialist regime in Gilan Obtain oil concession Trade--Northern Iran United Kingdom Recognition from West	Stop German sabotage Defend Baku-oil fields Weaken United Kingdom Weaken United States Access routes--war supplies Pressure Prevent American missions from expanding Change government in Tehran Incite rebellion in Iran in Kurdistan in Azerbaijan Establish socialism Obtain oil concession Trade--Northern Iran Pressure West

Notes

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4. From Correspondence F.O. 65/1202, 1864-1881, Respecting the Movements of Russia in Central Asia and Its Relations with Afghanistan; printed in F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914, A Study in Imperialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 8.
5. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, p. 61.
6. Quoted in N.S. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy; Powderkeg in Iran (New York: Whittier Books, Inc., 1954), p. 6.
7. Ibid., p. 15.
8. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, p. 491.
9. From the Secret Treaties and Understandings (Moscow: Soviet Government, 1917), p. 25; quoted in Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, p. 60.
10. Yeselson, U.S.-Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 32.
11. N.S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923 (New York: Russell F. Moore, Inc., 1952), p. 48.
12. A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973, Sec. Ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 103.
13. See The Communist International, official organ of the Comintern, microfilm, March 1919, June/July 1920, and August 1920, for the debates on this subject.
14. V.I. Lenin, Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder (New York: International Publishers, 1939).
15. Joseph Stalin, "Do Not Forget the East," published in Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 3, November 24, 1918, p. 1; quoted in Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 156. Also see Stalin's remarks, "A Beacon for the Muslims of the

World," delivered in May 1918, also quoted in Eudin and North, Document 3.

16. K. Troyanovsky, Vostok i Revolutsia, quoted by Aurelio Palmieri, La Politica Asiatica dei Bolscevichi (Bologna, 1924), pp. 173 ff., quoted in George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 10.

17. Leon Trotsky, quoted in Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East, pp. 92-93.

18. Harry N. Howard, The Development of U.S. Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 810.

19. M.V. Popov, Amerikanskii Imperializm v Irane v Gody Vtoroy Mirovoy Voynoy (Moscow, 1956), p. 28.

20. U.S. State Department, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, III:633.

21. Popov, Amerikanskii Imperializm v Irane, p. 27.

22. Broadcast by Radio Moscow taken from BBC, Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasts, part ii, no. 769 (August 26, 1941), 4A-USSR Home, pp. v-viii; cited in George Kirk, The Middle East in the War, part of a series of Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs (London, 1952), p. 135.

23. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1945, VIII:510-511.

24. M.C. Ivanov, Ocherk Historii Irana (Moscow, 1952), pp. 379-383.

25. See Ivanov, *Ibid.* and Popov, Amerikanskii Imperializm v Irane; also see M. Sergeyev, "In Southern Iran," New Times, no. 4 (February 15, 1946):20-24; and "In Iranian Azerbaidja," New Times, no. 1 (January 1, 1946):25-29.

26. Sergeyev, *Ibid.*, p. 26.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Ivanov, Ocherk Historii Irana, p. 379.

29. Popov, Amerikanskii Imperializm v Irane, p. 40; A. V. Bashkirov, Ekhspansiya Angliiskikh i Amerikanskikh Imperialistov v Irane (Moscow, 1954), p. 75.

30. Tehran Declaration on Iran, December 1, 1943. See Appendix L for complete text.

31. Bashkirov, Ekhsplansiya Angliiskikh, p. 50;
Ye. L. Steinberg, Sovetsko-Iranskiye Otnosheniye i Proiski
Anglo-Amerikanskovo Imperializma v Irane (Moscow, 1947), p.
p. 19.

32. For instance, see Bashkirov, Ibid., p. 98 and
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33. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
U.S., 1940, III:661.

34. Ibid., 1944, V:470-471.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN IRAN: THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF GILAN, 1920-1921

The creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan was the beginning of the first major Soviet interference in Iran. The establishment of the new republic would not have been possible without the direct assistance and support of Soviet Russia, nor without Soviet military presence in the north. The Gilan situation cannot be viewed in a vacuum and rightly must be placed within the framework of Soviet interference in Iran as a whole. In addition, the Gilan crisis brought to the international arena the first test of Western will in dealing with Soviet Russia in the post-war era. The key actors in this crisis were Soviet Russia and Britain, and while not readily apparent as a major force, Iran played a crucial role, not only for what it did but also for what it failed to do. The main event in this crisis, around which most of the other events revolved, was the occupation of the northern provinces, in particular the Gilan Province. While the crux of the crisis centers on the occupation forces and on the physical nature of this interference, this study will go beyond this method of interference to explore the consequences of military intervention

and to understand how and why the crisis took on the dimensions it did in the Soviet attempt to influence Persian policy.

There are basically three periods in the Gilan crisis. These periods were characterized by specific events which forced Moscow to reevaluate its position regarding Iran. At the beginning of each period there was a turning point which was crucial for the course of the crisis. Each turning point provided Moscow with several options and the choice of any particular option could have changed the outcome.

1. The first period, 1918 - May 1920, was a period of turbulent military upheaval within Russia. It was also a time of observation by Moscow of the Persian situation. The First World War created a virtual battlefield extending into the Transcaucasus and throughout the northern provinces of Iran where Russian, Turkish, German, British, and Persian forces intermittently battled one another. In addition, after the war Russia was swept up in a civil war which again permeated Moscow's southern borders and flowed over into northern Iran. During this period communist ideologues observing the revolutionary activity and potential in the East kept a watchful eye on the national movement in Gilan Province. This phase concluded with the communist invasion of Iran on May 18, 1920 in pursuit of White Army forces. It is at this point that Moscow made a fateful decision, namely to maintain its troops in northern Iran even though ostensibly the reason for doing so no longer existed, i.e., defeat of the White Guards. Also during this phase, Moscow decided to

increase its revolutionary activity in the northern provinces and throughout Iran in general.

Soviet interest in Gilan predated the 1920 Enzeli landing. Kuchik Khan, leader of the Jangali movement in Gilan, was a prominent revolutionary leader and had a reputation as a dissident nationalist leader, social modernizer and reformer before the First World War. While Kuchik Khan began his revolutionary activity in 1906, the origins of the Jangali movement may be seen in the anti-British rhetoric and activities dating from 1915 when Kuchik Khan, as well as other nationalist leaders in the north, aided the Turks and Germans, and fought alternately against the British, the Russians, and the Persians. By 1918 Kuchik Khan and his partner Ihsan Allah Khan had amassed an army of 3,000 men,¹ trained and equipped by German and Turkish officers and based in Enzeli. Kuchik Khan was avowedly a nationalist even then. According to a freedom fighter in Kuchik Khan's army, writing in the Soviet journal Novi Vostok, the goals at that time were inspired by "the Banner of Islam, against foreign influence in Persia, and for independence of the country."² In fact, Kuchik Khan's battle against Britain probably would have ended had England recognized the independence of Iran.

During 1918 and 1919 the British consul tried to enlist Jangali support to fight the Bolsheviks but was refused. British estimation of Kuchik Khan at that time was rather unfavorable and his refusal to help the Allies against

the communists did little to alter that view. General Dunsterville described him as "not very intelligent, but a high-minded enthusiast."³ While he was an "honest, well-meaning idealist,"⁴ he was also a pushover for those who would use his movement for their own ends. British concern appeared to be for the direction of his energies especially since the ideology of communism was so emotional and zealous. Kuchik Khan, however, was instrumental in assisting the Bolsheviks to withdraw from Enzeli when they were recalled by Moscow to assist in the Civil War against the White armies. Kuchik Khan supported their withdrawal and refused passage through Gilan to the British forces. After the Battle of Resht in July, the Jangalis were forced to make peace with the British. From the winter of 1919 through the spring of 1920, the Jangalis also made peace with the Governor of Gilan (who ran the province for the Shah's government), returned to the jungle, and for the most part did not engage in military activity. However, a British assessment of the situation in Gilan following the rapprochement between Kuchik Khan and Tehran noted with pessimism that "the behavior of Cossack detachments sent to occupy various points had been so atrocious, and incompetency of Persian officials so complete that (the) peasantry would welcome the return of the Jangali regime." Further, "the movement is gathering headway again in close collusion with Bolshevik and Turkish elements in Baku."⁵

The Soviet leadership therefore had reason to believe

that Kuchik Khan might be sympathetic to their cause because of his anti-imperialist activities prior to World War I and the assistance he and his army provided the Bolsheviks in 1918. Moscow believed that in Kuchik Khan's anti-imperialism there were at least the rudiments of a potential communist movement. The communists, however, underestimated the force of nationalism and overestimated the appeal of communism. They especially misunderstood the antagonism between communism and Islam and the populace's support of Islam.

While the Soviet leadership discussed the virtues, or lack of them, of Kuchik Khan during 1919-1920, they had more pressing problems. Communist Moscow was engaged in a civil war and fighting in the southern republics was intense. Consequently, in 1920 two forces appeared to converge at once forging the future of Soviet-Iranian relations. One was the ideological question of extending the revolutionary struggle into Iran. In this regard, the support of Kuchik Khan and his forces would be vital. The other was that the White Army had to be defeated. In 1920 this also meant extending the war into Iran. The Red Army had attacked the White Guards in Baku once the British left and forced them to flee along the Caspian coastline to northern Iran where the British still had a base. General Anton Denikin, who led the White Army in the Caucasus, established his new headquarters in Enzeli and assumed that he was safe in neutral territory and under the implicit protection of the British. While the British were not committed to Denikin's defense, nonetheless they

were willing to tolerate his forces there and did nothing to dispel the notion that they were cooperating with the anti-communist forces. And indeed to a large extent they were.

On May 18, 1920, Fyodor F. Raskolnikov, commander of the Red Fleet in Baku, landed in Enzeli after 13 ships bombarded the port and forced the surrender of the White Guard fleet. An agreement was reached whereby the British--who had orders to withdraw if the military situation proved untenable--were allowed to leave the city without harm. Denikin and the White Guards were arrested and his fleet confiscated. Baron Peter Wrangel, the commander of the White Army on the Polish frontier, had assumed overall command from Denikin in April and continued to fight the Red Army first from bases in northern Iran, and later in the Transcaucasian area.

Communist intervention in Iran took on new proportions by introducing military force to the ongoing activities of propaganda, subversion and infiltration. In fact, the presence of communist forces contributed to the escalation of these activities.

2. June 1920-May 1921 is the second phase in the crisis. In June the Socialist Republic of Gilan was established followed by the increase of propaganda and infiltration by Soviet agents. By July it became clear that there were serious problems within the Jangali movement evidenced by a split in the leadership. Two factions emerged, one nationalist and the other communist. Subsequently, between

July 1920 and May 1921, when a rapprochement occurred, two individual governments operated in the north, with the communist faction enjoying the support of Moscow and receiving weapons, supplies, and guidance from communist party members, and soldiers from Baku. The nationalist faction had the support of the jungle fighters, and on and off were cajoled into supporting communist causes, e.g., fighting the British and the Persian central government. Again, Moscow had the opportunity to disengage its forces from Gilan once the split between the two factions developed into open warfare. The nationalists were a strong faction and to succeed in the north the communists would have needed their support or needed to crush them completely. Nonetheless, Moscow continued to supply the communists and continued to talk with the Jangalis. This period ended in May 1921 when the communist agents finally convinced Kuchik Khan that his future lay with a united Gilani movement and a reconciliation was reached.

Once Raskolnikov was firmly in control of the port area, interaction between the Soviet forces and Kuchik Khan's Jangalis began. Yet there appears to be some controversy as to who initiated contact. According to the freedom fighter cited above, Kuchik Khan could not make up his mind when the communists landed.⁶ It appeared that up until the last minute when he and Ihsan Allah Khan finally decided to join forces with the Soviets, he was unsure as to the benefits of such an association and worried about the "purity" of his cause. Ihsan Allah Khan, a communist sympathizer for many years, helped convince Kuchik Khan to align himself

with the communists. George Lenczowski argues that the Soviet agents sought out Kuchik Khan because he had exhibited qualities which were useful for the Soviet cause, e.g., reformist, anti-Shah, anti-British.⁷ Rouhollah Ramazani, a noted author on Persian affairs, on the other hand, claims that Kuchik Khan made the first move in the hope of enlisting Soviet support in his campaign against the British.⁸ In an interview with Commander Raskolnikov, published in Petrogradskaia Pravda in 1920, Raskolnikov simply noted that "after the occupation of Enzeli we entertained negotiations with Kuchik Khan, urging him to advance on Resht."⁹

Whichever version is accurate seems to be a moot point since both forces benefitted from the association and both sides wanted and needed the support of the other for their own ends. Soviet agents and military and political advisers soon were dispatched to the Jangalis and provided support for the Jangali expeditions in Gilan. However, it is interesting to note that Ihsan Allah Khan favored an alliance with the communists for ideological reasons. Early in 1919 he sought out Soviet agents on his own to request assistance in his and Kuchik Khan's independence movement. Ihsan Allah Khan became the liaison between the two forces and was instrumental in convincing Kuchik Khan to implement many of the programs proposed by the Persian Communist Party. Once Kuchik Khan and he split, Ihsan Allah Khan continued to receive support from Moscow.

The Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan was created on June 6, 1920. Afterwards, Kuchik Khan sent a message to Lenin

expressing in good Marxist terms, how happy he was to be aligned with Soviet Russia and to be a participant in the international communist movement. Together they would crush imperialism in Iran. He wrote,

. . . Now is fulfilled the long expected and happy act of the formation of the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic, which we proclaim before all the world. We consider it to be our duty to draw your attention to the fact that there are a number of criminals in Persian territory: Persian oppressors, English traders, and diplomats supported by English troops. As long as these enemies of the Persian people are in Persia, they will prove to be an obstacle to the introduction of our just system all over the country. In the name of humanity and the equality of all nations, the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic asks you and all the socialists belonging to the Third International for help in liberating us and all weak and oppressed nations from the yoke of Persian and English oppressors. . . . We have a firm faith that all the world will be governed by the ideological system of the Third International.¹⁰

The Soviet Communist Party was grateful for Kuchik Khan's support. It attempted to use the Jangali movement in its drive to undermine the authority of the government in Tehran and to further diminish British prestige and influence in Iran. However, some communists, especially in the Persian Communist Party, questioned his loyalty and effectiveness. A. Sultan Zadah, one of the founders of the Persian Communist Party, explained that the communists were uncertain as to Kuchik Khan's ideological commitment, especially in matters of anti-religious and anti-tradition postures of the communist party. Kuchik Khan basically wanted to carry out the revolution without adhering to Marxist tenets, particularly regarding the roles of landowners, khans, and feudal lords, all of whom he wanted to court and persuade to modify their

opposition to change.¹¹ However, the prevailing opinion was that Kuchik Khan was worth cultivating in spite of the difficulties in dealing with him. (This opinion changed, of course, as he became more and more anti-communist.) For example, an author in Zhizn Natzionalnostei, the official journal of the Narkomindel or Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, commented on Kuchik Khan's work and its relationship to the movement. "It is closely connected with communism, although it is interpreted by Persians in a different sense. . . . It represented a side which, once it is carefully and skillfully cultivated, will produce a good harvest of revolutionary preparedness among the Persian masses."¹² Further, Kuchik Khan's message to Lenin bears witness to the flexibility of his thinking and his vulnerability to communist persuasion. (The debate over Kuchik Khan's usefulness to the cause also was caught up in the debate over bourgeois nationalist revolutions and the whole question of whether Iran was ready for revolution.)

Those who opposed Kuchik Khan's participation in the revolution proved to be correct. For a variety of reasons he did not prove to be the easily manipulated and gullible leader he was suspected of being. As a result, the Gilan experiment had a relatively brief but tumultuous history. The main difficulty was within the Jangali movement itself and the problems flowed over into the administration of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan. The two leaders, Kuchik Khan and Ihsan Allah Khan, believed in different ideologies. While Kuchik Khan from time to time professed Marxist beliefs,

and for several months acted like a Marxist, he was a nationalist at heart; Ihsan Allah Khan was a communist. Kuchik Khan wanted independence, independence from Britain, from Russia, and most of the time independence for Iran, not for Gilan; Ihsan Allah Khan advocated an independent Gilan, but within the international communist movement and closely aligned with Moscow. Kuchik Khan wanted reform but slowly and within the dictates of fairness as stipulated by Islamic doctrines; Ihsan Allah Khan wanted radical change within the dictates of Marxism-Leninism. This internal dissension laid the foundation for the eventual collapse of the republic.

3. The third phase, May through September 1921, witnessed a cooperative effort between the two factions. A march on Tehran in June met with defeat and again split the nationalists and communists. This renewed in-fighting enabled Colonel Riza Khan, the new head of the Persian Army, to defeat the communists in August and the Jangalist in September. By August the Soviet leadership again was faced with a choice. They could have continued their efforts to socialize Gilan or accede to British entreaties to withdraw its troops altogether and cease interfering in Persian affairs. By this time, the communist party in Moscow had tired of the endless fighting among the Persian forces and concluded that Iran was not ready for socialism. Therefore, rather than continue a questionable policy Moscow decided to abandon the communists and withdraw its troops. (It is important to note that throughout the three periods, Moscow was engaged in

negotiations with London concerning a trade agreement between the two countries. This agreement establishing renewed trade between them was a vital priority to the Russians who desperately needed economic relief from the long years of war and civil war.)

Both leaders had great hopes for the new republic and from May through July 1920 the Jangalis and the communists cooperated in running the Gilani government.¹³ However, Persian Communist Party leaders were appointed officials in all the major administrative posts in the new government and excelled in advancing their radical programs, by force if necessary (and force was necessary). Aristocrats, landowners, merchants and small businessmen were the object of the attacks, and suffered greatly.¹⁴ Businesses were confiscated and the civil service was purged. In particular, three areas of disagreement arose: the role of religion, the manner in which land reform would be carried out, and the question of independence.

The religious issue was perhaps the most volatile. Seventeen mosques were closed, religious instruction was banned and women were forced to unveil. In addition, members of the clergy, the traditional leaders in Persian society, were publicly insulted.¹⁵ The force of the anti-religious campaign was too much for the Moslem peasants and caused a great deal of hostility among the population at large and in particular among the Jangali fighters.

The attempt to enforce communist agrarian reforms

disaffected the populace and increased the difficulty with which the communists ruled. The communists advocated and fought for confiscation of land without compensation but Kuchik Khan felt compensation was necessary to ensure good faith.

Lastly, the question of independence from Tehran divided the population. The majority, however, backed Kuchik Khan's belief that autonomy within the Iranian system was the most feasible method for Gilan. This is rather curious since Kuchik Khan was so adamant back in June about his support for the RSFSR and his desire to rid his country (and Gilan) of ties with the British and to rid Gilan of ties with Tehran. However, his actions and statements, both in June and later in July, become understandable when one examines the evidence. Communist infiltration and propaganda coupled with Kuchik Khan's vulnerability to persuasion were highly effective convincing Kuchik Khan that the future for his movement lay within the communist orbit. While he was unsure whether association with Moscow would be beneficial, he went ahead and accepted Soviet assistance and formed an alliance with the communists in Gilan. However, once Kuchik Khan and the Gilanis had first-hand experience with the communists, their attitudes changed and he withdrew his support.

From 1920 until the summer of 1921 two governments operated independently and vied for the support of the peasantry, Kuchik Khan from the jungles and Ihsan Allah Khan from Resht, the capital of Gilan. Ihsan Allah Khan was repeatedly

reinforced with Moslem troops from Baku and several times received help from the Red Army itself. For instance, he had in his army 200 Russian, Armenian and Georgian soldiers and 1,200 Persian workers from Baku, while Kuchik Khan enjoyed the support of Persian Jangalis. By March 1921 the Soviets were fielding 8,500 men in Iran.¹⁶ Continued incoherence and instability, as well as a virtual mini-civil war between the two groups contributed to Soviet disenchantment with the entire enterprise. Moscow was discouraged by the lack of usefulness of Kuchik Khan and frustrated by its failure to introduce Marxism into northern Iran.

Moscow's policy appeared to pay off in May when a reconciliation was struck between Kuchik Khan and Ihsan Allah Khan. For a brief period the two factions joined forces to fight the British. In June a joint expedition of Kuchik Khan's Jangalis and Ihsan Allah Khan's Persian Red Army along with a newly arrived detachment of Soviet soldiers from Georgia, Turkestan and Baku, attacked Tehran but were routed by Riza Khan. The union once again was terminated in August. On September 8th, the RSFSR and the Azerbaijan SSR withdrew their troops from the north which opened the way for Riza Khan and the Persian Army to defeat the communists and force Kuchik Khan and his supporters back into the mountains.

In conclusion, without Soviet assistance--military, financial, economic and political--it is doubtful that Kuchik Khan could have secured enough backing to create an independent republic or to fend off the Shah's forces. The foundation for

rebellion was present in Gilan but Kuchik Khan just did not have the wherewithal to succeed on his own, as two previous unsuccessful attempts had proven. Moscow took a gamble and failed but the RSFSR looked to achieve its goals through other means, most notably propaganda. Its own ideological prognoses were modified to discount the ability and readiness of Persian peasants to move into a socialist phase of development. Soviet analysts blamed the failure of the experiment on several factors: on the backwardness of the peasants, the poor leadership both by the nationalists and the communists, the failure of communist propaganda adequately to explain the benefits of communism, the religious beliefs of the population and especially of the leadership, and their unwillingness to part with traditional religious customs, and finally on the personality conflicts between Kuchik Khan and Ihsan Allah Khan.¹⁷ In short, Soviet Russia miscalculated the readiness of the Persians to accept socialism, overestimated the capacity of propagandists and infiltrators to achieve success in subverting the loyalties of the Gilanis, and underestimated the strength of nationalism and ethnic diversity.

Responses to Communist Interference

In response to the Soviet challenge in Iran, Britain was the most important third party because of the close historical relationship it enjoyed with Iran and with the Russians in the Near East. This does not mean, of course,

that other countries did not lodge protests with Soviet Russia over the invasion and occupation. However, for all practical purposes, the main center of reaction and protest came from Britain.

British Policy

British responses took basically two paths, diplomatic and military, and took two directions, against Russia and against Iran. Britain's ability to develop a clear and forceful foreign policy toward Soviet Russia, as well as toward Iran, was complicated by two factors. First, the political discussion in Britain--notably in Parliament--questioned Britain's imperial policy and the finances necessary to maintain that policy. Second, Britain was faced with an incapacitated government in Tehran which for reasons of its own was negotiating or trying to negotiate a treaty with Moscow.

It appears that British resolve was shaken not so much by Soviet pressure as by Persian stagnation. The Persian inability to comply with London's wishes further reenforced the British Parliament's attempt to curtail British activity in Iran. While the Soviets claimed victory in forcing the British to withdraw from Iran, as much credit (or blame) should be given to the Persians themselves and to the British Government. That is, while the result was the same--British disengagement--the reasons for that disengagement were far more complicated than the communists would admit. Nevertheless, while the British succeeded in winning small battles,

the RSFSR won a "clear" victory in achieving its foreign policy goals regarding Iran. (Once again, the importance of Iran as an instrument of foreign policy--Soviet and British--becomes apparent as well as the lack of importance of Iran as an important or vital entity in its own right.)

British interest in Iran was, in the main, a strategic interest and not humanitarian, although the Persians benefited from British presence. Lord Curzon, British Secretary of State, expressed British interest in Iran in a memo written in 1919:

. . . Her geographic position, the magnitude of our interests in the country (oil for example) and the future safety of our eastern empire (especially India) render it impossible for us now--just as it would have been impossible for us at any time during the past fifty years--to disinterest ourselves from what happens in Persia. . . . We cannot permit the existence, by the frontiers of our India empire in Baluchistan and those of our new protectorate (Mesopotamia), of a hotbed of misrule, enemy intrigue, financial chaos, and political disorder. Further, if Persia were to be left alone, there is every reason to fear that she would be overrun by Bolshevik influences from the north.¹⁸

Iran clearly was deemed to be a vital link in the eastern empire, as Curzon called it. Yet when Iran requested assurances of support from Britain, it was rebuffed. Iran repeatedly tried to warn London of an impending attack by the communists and of further increased Soviet activities in Iran by Soviet-trained Moslem agents. British estimates, however, concluded that the RSFSR would not invade Iran and that any activity threatening such an invasion was just that, a threat. Cox, the British consul in Tehran, argued as late as February 1920, that the Soviets were only threatening

and that even if they did invade Iran, it was not to damage Iran as such but rather to attack and weaken Britain.¹⁹ This evaluation was consistent with Soviet ideological statements at that time which emphasized the need to hit the imperialists--particularly Britain--at their weakest points. As noted before, the path to India was through Iran. Still at this particular time, Britain was undecided as to whether Soviet Russia in fact would invade Iran and risk the reaction of the British Government. It is probable that London concluded that since Russia was engaged in a civil war, its forces would not be deliberately weakened by extending them into Iran. What they apparently did not count on was the flight of the White Russian forces into northern Iran and the subsequent Red Army pursuit. Cox did warn, however, that should the communists take military action in the north, and Britain not respond, then the situation would "deteriorate rapidly." Relying on reports from Iran regarding the extent of infiltration and subversion by Soviet agents, it was assumed that any attempt to undermine the Persian Government would come as a result of these methods of interference and not by open and direct military intervention.

Once the communists landed at Enzeli, the British position deteriorated and became untenable. British troops were ordered--prior to the invasion--to withdraw to more secure areas in the face of superior force. Thus, when Raskolnikov captured the port city and offered a means whereby

the British could slip away, they did so and went to Kazvin. Because reinforcements were not available and military units in Enzeli were no match for Raskolnikov's forces, they left virtually without a fight. Apparent military capitulation in the face of Soviet armed might contributed to the inability of Tehran to cope with the situation--and also gave great propaganda value to enhance the Soviet image. The determination and ability of the British to respond to Soviet advances were seriously questioned and further weakened the Vusuq al-Dawlah Government, primarily because Vusuq was not sure where the British stood or whether London would send help. Norman--the new British consul who had taken over from Cox when the latter was appointed High Commissioner to Mesopotamia--was deeply concerned about the future of Iran because he feared that "when (British) intention to withdraw its forces from Meshed becomes known, confidence in our efforts, not to speak of our good faith, will be still further shaken."²⁰ Because the faith in the British to assist Iran was so shaken, Vusuq resigned and a new more pro-Soviet--or at least not so openly pro-British--Cabinet was formed with Mushir al-Dawlah as Prime Minister.

British diplomatic reaction to Soviet interference centered on three issue areas: the occupation and military activity in the north; the trade negotiations proceeding in London; and the propaganda campaign and infiltration throughout Iran, but most especially in Gilan.

British diplomatic protests regarding the occupation and subsequent military activity were virtually to little avail. They further were exasperated by the repeated withdrawals of British forces to the point where the Soviets controlled all of the Caspian coastline. (See map, Figure 5.)

Figure 5. Areas of Instability, 1920-1921



There was really no reason for the Soviets to withdraw since they more or less had achieved supremacy in the area. However, Chicherin assured the Persian people, and London, that "the Soviet detachment has been ordered to leave Persian territory as soon as military requirements permit (after Denikin was defeated) and after reestablishing free and safe navigation of the Caspian."²¹ Once the situation was mili-

tarily secure, the RSFSR then claimed to have withdrawn all of its forces.²² The only troops left in Iran, according to Moscow, were those of the Azerbaijan SSR, who were there to protect their country from British invasion--and in particular to protect the Baku oil fields. The Baku Government felt it a necessity to remain in Iran until British troops withdrew from the country since Britain had used Iran as a base of operations during and after the First World War to assist the White Russians and occupy Baku. Kara Khan, a communist leader in Baku stated in January 1921--almost ten months after the Enzeli landing and the defeat of the White Guards--that the Azerbaijan SSR would recall its troops as soon as Britain withdrew from Iran.²³

Diplomatic reaction also focused on the negotiations in London, which took place on May 31 and again on June 7, 1920, concerning the establishment of trade relations between England and Soviet Russia.* Moscow was willing to discuss trade at this point if London incorporated these talks within a "broader framework of peaceful relations."²⁴ London was agreeable because Moscow promised on several occasions to

* Anglo-Soviet relations already had started on the road to normalization during 1920, when the two countries agreed to the repatriation of war prisoners on February 12, 1920. This followed with a general easing of tension between the Soviets and the West and resulted in the lifting of the Allied blockade. In March 1920 Leonid Krasin, the Commissar for Trade and Industry had been invited to Stockholm to discuss a trade deal between Sweden and Soviet Russia. Afterwards, he was invited to London to begin talks on an Anglo-Soviet accord.

refrain from hostile activity against Britain if Britain would do likewise against Soviet Russia.²⁵ The final stumbling block in the trade talks appeared to have been surmounted when Moscow agreed on July 7 to the four conditions set by London. The British statement of principles read in part:

1. A mutual undertaking to refrain from hostile actions or measures against the other party, and from direct or indirect official propaganda against the institutions of the other party, and in particular an undertaking by the Soviet Government not to join in military activities or propaganda conducted by the Asiatic peoples against British interests or the British Empire. This proposal is tantamount to a general armistice, as a condition for resuming commercial relations.

2. Permission for British subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Britain and other parts of the British Empire to return to their own country.

3. In exchange for a similar undertaking by the British Government, the recognition in principle by the Soviet Government of its obligation to compensate the losses of private persons, British subjects, who had sold goods or given personal service in Russia. Britain will not ask immediate payment of these debts. The exact determination of Russia's liabilities . . . to be made at the peace negotiations.

4. The British Government agrees to the Soviet Government's conditions regarding trade relations on a reciprocal basis, but it does not surrender the right to object to any individual appointment as an official agent of the Soviet Government.²⁶

The promise regarding British interests was rather vague, but it implied the protection of India, not necessarily Iran. However, it is safe to assume that included in British interests was the southern portion of Iran, the area which had been covered by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the Constantinople Accord of 1915 and which secured oil rights and business concessions for the British in this area.

In spite of Moscow's effort to accommodate Britain, London kept making demands on Moscow from August 1920 through

March 1921, and kept threatening to stop the trade negotiations altogether if Moscow did not comply. At first, Britain used the trade talks to protect Wrangel and his army. Since Moscow needed the trade deal, it was willing to "forget the past and open a new era on peace and trade."²⁷ To this end, Moscow agreed to grant safe passage to Wrangel if he would cease his military campaign. London accepted and the Red Army stopped its pursuit of the White forces. However, Wrangel himself did not honor the arrangement and continued to fight. Later, London used the talks to try to influence Soviet policy concerning Moscow's influence in Iran. Thus, by February 1921 London accused Moscow of interference in Iran and threatened to terminate the trade talks if Moscow did not cease its interference in Gilan. Moscow denied that it was interfering in Gilan or for that matter that its troops were even in Iran. However, it agreed to comply with British demands, once again, and notified Britain it would withdraw its troops as soon as the British had withdrawn theirs. Consequently, a tentative trade deal was signed on March 16, 1921. (See Appendix N.)

It is interesting to speculate on the value of such a verbal promise in light of the fact that Soviet Russia claimed not to have any troops in Iran. In the course of diplomatic exchanges, Chicherin had lamented that Moscow did not have any control over the actions of Baku but agreed that the Azerbaijan SSR had a legitimate right to remain in the north. In addition, since so many communist agents had already infil-

trated into Persian society, it was doubly difficult for the British to distinguish a Soviet Bolshevik from a Persian communist, or for that matter, a Persian from an Azeri since culturally they were close relatives. Therefore, compliance by Moscow could not be corroborated. In any event, trade negotiations were not fully completed until the Gilan crisis and the matter of Soviet withdrawal were settled. Another provisional trade agreement was concluded in 1925. However, for Soviet purposes Moscow could claim a "victory" in March before its troops were recalled and while the Socialist Republic of Gilan still existed. Moscow had claimed that it would advise the Azerbaijan SSR to leave northern Iran once the British threat was removed, e.g., once the British withdrew from Iran. This was necessary, according to Moscow, and Baku, to protect the Baku oil fields. The British statements connected the trade deal and improved relations between the RSFSR and Britain with Soviet withdrawal and noninterference in Gilan. However, the United Kingdom concluded a tentative arrangement with Moscow before either condition was met. While London threatened a great deal, in fact it did not enforce the conditions it demanded before a trade deal would be concluded. Hence, the Soviet claim of success.

The British decision to conclude a trade deal while Soviet forces remained in Iran stemmed from two sources. First, as noted above, Moscow had made repeated assurances to London that it would agree to honor British interests in Iran and the Near East. Second, and more important, between the

time London began to raise the stakes in the negotiations and the signing of the trade accord--between August 1920 and March 1921--Moscow negotiated and concluded a treaty of friendship with Tehran. Ever since Moscow began to make overtures to the Persian Government, following the Russian Civil War, London encouraged Tehran to ignore Moscow's entreaties. Until 1921, Tehran dutifully adhered to London's wishes. However, once it became apparent that London itself was tiring of supporting Iran, Tehran took action of its own. Thus, as of February 26, 1921, Tehran agreed to Soviet terms.

The provisions of the Soviet-Persian Treaty called for the annulment of all Czarist arrangements (They were already unilaterally abrogated in 1918 by Trotsky.); the transfer of all property, loans, mortgages, phone and telephone lines, the port of Enzeli and the goods in the port, to Iran; prohibition of the transfer of these items to third parties (especially Britain); and the stipulation that if Iran could not defend itself and if another state were to use Iran as a base of operations against Soviet Russia, that the RSFSR would have the right to invade Iran and defend itself (an important stipulation for the crisis which occurred during the Second World War). (See Appendix O.) In particular, this last point (Article 6 of the Treaty) foretold of potentially dangerous circumstances for British policy in Iran. Basically, Moscow was given the right to determine when its security was jeopardized by events occurring in Iran. If such a situation came to pass Moscow had

the right to invade Iran to protect itself and Iran. In essence, this meant London's options would be curtailed severely because its influence over Iran's relations with Soviet Russia would be weakened if not eliminated. Of greatest importance was that Tehran would not have a say in the determination of whether Russian security in fact was being jeopardized. In addition, London's influence with Iran also was curtailed as a result of its failure to induce Tehran to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty. Therefore, London needed other means whereby it might influence Soviet foreign policy and Soviet-Iranian relations. In short, the Soviet-Persian Treaty was a failure for British policy toward Iran because Iran recognized Soviet Russia and concluded the treaty of friendship despite London's wishes to the contrary. It also was a failure for British policy toward Soviet Russia because one goal of British policy was to prevent a rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran, and another was to prevent Russian influence in Iran. Further, it was a failure for British policy vis-à-vis Moscow because London backed down on its demands for Russian disengagement prior to a trade agreement and allowed the deal to be concluded before such a withdrawal was completed, or for that matter even initiated. Accordingly, the major victor was Moscow and Soviet foreign policy.

A third line of diplomatic effort focused on the extent of Soviet propaganda in Iran, especially attacks on the British. In September 1921, Lord Curzon addressed a note

to Moscow arguing that Ambassador Theodore Rothstein's activities went far beyond that of a Soviet representative and charged that he was engaged in undue interference in the affairs of Iran. (Ambassador Rothstein was the Soviet representative in Iran and in charge of the communist propaganda network.) The RSFSR contended that perhaps he did exceed his mandate but he was really not to blame since Moscow and London did not have formal relations and were ideological enemies. In an attempt to be conciliatory, Rothstein was recalled in the beginning of 1922 and replaced with Ambassador Boris Shumiatsky. However, this proved to be a pyrrhic victory for London since Shumiatsky was far more active than Rothstein, and instead of decreasing the level of propaganda actually increased it. London was thus forced to send additional protest notes. This time Moscow was more ready to curtail Shumiatsky's overt propaganda efforts because London threatened an economic boycott.

These diplomatic efforts were by and large not completely successful. While they succeeded in winning minor battles--such as having Rothstein replaced and Shumiatsky inhibited--they did not win the major battles--preventing the RSFSR from interfering in Iran or forcing an earlier Soviet military withdrawal.

What was crucial about the British diplomatic activity, however, was that it indirectly contributed to Moscow's modification of its behavior in Iran. By utilizing the prospect of shutting off trade negotiations, London was able to con-

vince Moscow that it meant business with regard to safeguarding Iran. The use of the trade deal was one of the most effective bargaining points London had at this time because Moscow needed an economic arrangement more than London did.

Persian intransigence and incapacity to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty affected the responses London was willing and able to make to the Soviet interference. Britain was facing its own domestic problems, and the battle of financing the empire was made more difficult by the Persian inability and unwillingness to accept British aid--at least not the type of aid London was willing to offer. Tehran's weakness was aggravated by Soviet propaganda against the Treaty and against the government, propaganda which was for the most part well received by the populace. Tehran's inability to deal with rebellion in the north, even when not sponsored by the Soviets, further opened to doubt the prospects for a stronger government in Iran in the future and questioned the willingness and ability of Vusuq, and afterwards of Mushir al-Dawlah, to ever muster enough support to ratify the Treaty. British pressure on Iran increased therefore at the same time that British military and financial support were being curtailed and at the same time that Soviet pressure was building. Consequently, in addition to applying pressure on Moscow to alter its foreign policy in Iran, Britain also pressured Iran.

First and foremost--and the foundation for all other

British grievances--was the failure of the Majlis to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty drafted in 1919. Until this treaty was formalized Britain could not take--nor did it wish to take--the necessary steps in building a stable and secure government and an effective military potential. Prime Minister Vusuq made repeated assurances that ratification would be forthcoming, but Mushir al-Dawlah suspended consideration of the Treaty until more propitious and secure times, and Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabai, who became Prime Minister after a coup in February 1921, terminated discussion altogether. The Anglo-Persian Treaty was a dead issue.

The Treaty would have secured a British presence in Iran for some time to come and in fact would have increased its responsibility in the country. It also would have increased the dependency of Iran upon Britain. Britain was under pressure from the Parliament to see the Treaty come to fruition because London wanted to disengage from Iran but still have a secure base there. Parliament wanted to see some results from the huge quantities of funds which had been transferred to the Shah and the Government. Iran kept requesting more funds, and until the Soviet occupation, was receiving advances on loans from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and from British businesses which would have been operating in the northern areas once the Treaty was approved. In October 1920, London finally gave Tehran an ultimatum, no more money, no more assistance, no more British troops, until ratification. These tactics to influence the Majlis

to sign the Treaty were criticized by Norman in the belief that they would backfire. Norman feared that the Majlis would consider them as a blackmail attempt and would defy Britain. Further, it might very likely have forced the Persians into the waiting arms of the Russians. Curzon's response clearly indicated the impatience and resolve of London not to be delayed any further. He wrote Norman that the money argument and the potential threat it placed on the Majlis "carried no weight whatever with us."²⁸ There would be no more delays. Curzon noted:

In view of the sustained failure of three successive Persian governments to take the one step by which their country can be saved, the only thing left to be done is to consider how best to deal with the new situation created by probably complete collapse in the north, and to secure the protection of our interests elsewhere.²⁹

The British were also disturbed about the military situation. The Treaty would have provided British officers for the Persian armed forces and would have allowed the termination of the Persian Cossack Brigade, then officered by Russians, in favor of an all-Persian unit. London had already cut off funds for this unit since the Shah and the Prime Minister both refused to dismiss the Russian officers. The Persian leadership especially was afraid of the reaction by Commander Starosselsky. Without British support and with an underequipped and poorly trained army, they feared an attack on Tehran by Starosselsky and his Cossacks. It was for this very reason that the British demanded his resignation. Further, both London and Tehran were uncertain as to

his actions since he was loyal to the White Russian cause and often took actions irrespective of Tehran's wishes against the Soviet forces. He was thus unreliable and dangerous and therefore could undermine British policy and jeopardize British interests.

The decision to disengage military forces from Iran and place them back to Mesopotamia and India already had been taken when the British began their retreat from Enzeli. They continued their retreat through Kazvin, Resht, and eventually from Meshed. It was not so much a result of Soviet pressure as it was London's determination not to get bogged down militarily in Iran. London would probably have pulled back its troops in any event within the year even if the Soviets had not invaded Iran. However, under those circumstances, British forces would have been replaced with Persian troops officered and trained by the British. It was Britain's desire that the Persians defend themselves with, of course, the assistance of the British.

Norman advised against withdrawal since the mere presence of British forces at least kept the communists guessing just how far London was willing to go in defending Iran. Once troops withdrew, though, the uncertainty surrounding British actions would be gone and there would be no effective chain on Soviet military actions. Norman noted that "they (the RSFSR) are probably aware of numbers and disposition of our forces, but ignorant of the extent to which we are prepared to reinforce these and it's probably this ignorance

which renders them apprehensive of aggression from our side and deters them from any forward movement."³⁰ In particular, he recommended that British troops be retained in Khurasan because if they were removed, Bolshevik forces would surely invade the troubled province. Curzon promised he would pass the recommendations on and do what he could to forestall the withdrawal, but he was not optimistic. "Opinion is universally entertained," he wrote, "that it is imperative to reduce our external commitments to a minimum."³¹ What money was allocated to the defense of Iran was tied up with the Anglo-Persian Treaty. Consequently, with money and material already transferred elsewhere, effective response to Soviet interference would have to wait until the Persians ratified the Treaty thus opening the way for British military authorities to reenter the picture.

Britain used the withdrawal of troops city by city in the north as a lever on the Persian Government. Curzon instructed Norman to notify Tehran that the withdrawals would continue until the Persian Government experienced a change of attitude regarding the Treaty. Britain had no intention of defending Iran by itself and would leave the country if Iran did not take decisive action in ratifying the Treaty.³² Norman received word shortly thereafter that the Norperforce Division--the British force in the northern provinces--would be completely withdrawn from the north in the spring of 1921, although Curzon did admit that such action probably would encourage Soviet Russia to expand even more into Iran. In

addition, Norman was ordered to make provisions for the safe evacuation of British personnel and civilians from the areas since the British by this time were convinced that once the army left, the communists would invade in full force. Had Britain considered Iran worth fighting over, reinforcements could have been called from India and Mesopotamia. However, that action would have endangered the security of these two areas and would have necessitated a call-up from Britain. Neither was desirable. London was not happy about putting India in jeopardy by a side show in Iran. Thus, London turned to other techniques to influence Moscow to cease its interference in Iran.

Persian reaction to the Treaty was on the whole negative. The population did not approve of it because it meant further interference by the British. The nationalists certainly disapproved because of the dependency on Britain which it would entail. Members of the Majlis--while understanding the necessity for some of the provisions in the Treaty--could not bring themselves to ratify it. They especially were infuriated by the secrecy of the negotiations in writing the Treaty as they were ignored during the proceedings. Nor were they happy about the secret payments made to Vusuq and members of his Cabinet for support of the Treaty. In addition, Soviet propaganda was effective in exploiting the unpopularity of the Treaty and the scandal which followed the exposé of the bribes made to the government, and thereby contributed to the general discontent. British officials

in Iran, including Norman, repeatedly advised Curzon that Great Britain was no longer viewed as a benefactor but now no better than the Russians. In fact, Soviet Russia was developing a better reputation--in spite of the occupation--because the Soviets subscribed to Persian independence. After all, Chicherin noted on several occasions that the occupation was not directed against the Persian Government, nor against the Persian population, but against British occupation and intervention.

While Britain continued pressure on the diplomatic front to persuade Moscow to cease intervention the question arose as to how serious the Russians were about their intervention policy. In a memo by Mr. G.P. Churchill of the Foreign Office, the belief was expressed that Soviet Russia did not really want to invade Iran but was more interested in trade negotiations in London, and was using its presence in Iran as a lever to extract a favorable arrangement with London, or at least to speed up the negotiation processes. Churchill noted that the RSFSR would be satisfied to continue its propaganda campaign and infiltration to undermine Iran rather than use military force to conquer the entire country.³³ This appears to be a contradiction in perspective. While the view from Tehran was that Soviet Russia would continue the intervention and march as far south as possible as the British withdrew, the view from London was the opposite. London believed that Moscow was using the intervention to extract concessions from London on the economic front. For

the most part, London believed that Iran was not that vital to the Soviet interests either and therefore they would not endanger their more important goal of achieving a trade agreement. The evidence appears to support both views. The RSFSR would have moved south as long as there was no serious resistance or threat to its forces. But complete capitulation of Iran was not necessary to Soviet security. Once pressure was applied which linked Soviet activity in Iran with British interests in the Near East and especially with Soviet success in the trade negotiations, Moscow held back on the military offensive. After the preliminary agreement was signed in February and British troops left in May, Moscow allowed one last effort at capturing Tehran. However, this particular offensive provided little risk to Soviet Russia since the main burden, in fact most of the fighting, fell to the Persian Red Army and to the combined forces of Kuchik Khan and Ihsan Allah Khan. When the Persian Red Army was defeated by Riza Khan in the summer of 1921, Moscow reevaluated its policy and concluded that conquering Iran was not worth the risk of jeopardizing what it had achieved already from both London and Tehran.

Western Policy

Reaction by other interested parties to the Soviet occupation and interference in Iran appeared to be limited for a number of reasons. First, for the most part, this reaction was modest because it was recognized by France and the United States, Belgium and Germany, that Britain had a

"special relationship" with Iran, and whatever measures would be taken to counteract the Soviet advances would come from Britain. The second limitation centered on the proposed Anglo-Persian Treaty. The Western nations objected to the Treaty because their freedom to negotiate special arrangements with Iran was curtailed by it. However, the four countries were not in a position to insist on anything. For one thing, the foreign legations in Tehran depended almost completely upon protection from the British forces stationed in Iran. Further, while the West would suffer from the provisions of the Anglo-Persian Treaty, the "suffering" was more an inconvenience than a substantial diminishing of their national interest. Consequently, they were not ready to alter their foreign policies regarding Iran and back up their diplomatic protests with anything more concrete.

There was also a third reason for the relatively muted response by the West to the Gilan crisis. While these nations lodged protests with Moscow their notes were largely ignored since they had not recognized the new Soviet government and did not have diplomatic relations with it. Consequently, neither France, Belgium, Germany nor the United States were willing to make a stronger protest to Moscow since they felt it would probably be to little avail. Further, the nation with the greatest stake in Iran was again the United Kingdom and therefore the burden of responding rested with London.

Persian Policy

The Persian response to the Soviet invasion and interference was an interesting example of a weak and virtually powerless nation making the best of a bad situation. To begin with, Iran was in an impossible situation, as it had been for decades. It was a pawn in the relationship between England and Russia, and now between England and the RSFSR. While the Persian Government was indeed responsible for the mess inherited in 1920, nevertheless its plight was understandable. Iran was abandoned (again probably its own fault) by the British and by the West, and having essentially nothing to fall back on in its own defense, had no alternative but to negotiate with the Soviets. Norman summed up the Persian predicament:

The Persian Government do not prefer to negotiate with the Russian Soviet Government, but are obliged to do so for reasons given in my telegram and we appear to have even less cause than before to complain of their action now that while we withdraw our own force we refuse to lend them means of creating one to take its place. However much they and their predecessors are to blame for our attitude, fact remains that they expected in a few months to be defenseless and are therefore driven to make best terms they can with their enemy while there is yet time. They are, however, anxious in this as in every other respect to be guided by advice and wishes of HMG.³⁴

Iran's first response to the occupation was an appeal to England. In the past Iran had been given assurances that the British had no intention of withdrawing from Iran. In March 1920, less than two months before the Soviet invasion, Curzon wired Cox to assure Vusuq's Cabinet that "there is no intention to evacuate or withdraw to the Indian frontier,

and (further) that expert military opinion is to the effect that troops now in the country are well able to maintain themselves."³⁵ Unfortunately for the Persians, Britain's optimism in London did not conform to the realities in northern Iran and when British forces were ordered to retreat rather than fight, Iran's faith in British resolve began to diminish. The British continued to withdraw from the coast-line cities and inquiries regarding British intentions were negatively answered. This later tied in with the Majlis' refusal to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty.

Iran's second response to the crisis was made by Prince Firuz, Persian Foreign Minister, who requested on May 19, 1920 Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the newly formed League of Nations to consider the Soviet invasion of Iran. On May 29, Firuz asked Drummond to call a meeting of the Council under Article 10 of the Covenant. (See Appendix P.) The Council met on June 14 and decided that since Soviet Russia and Iran were engaged in negotiations, no action would be taken by the League. Rather, it recommended that the two parties attempt to resolve the dispute themselves, and of course, keep the League informed of their progress. The League did not want the first test of its efficacy to take place in Enzeli, where it had little power.³⁶

Iran's third response was to negotiate directly with Moscow. A special envoy, Mushavir al-Mamalik, already had been sent to Moscow and received concessions from the Baku Govern-

ment. However, the RSFSR still was adamant in its desire to have the British leave Iran, and refused to consider disengagement until the British agreed to do likewise. Lack of progress on the diplomatic front along with Soviet military successes forced Vusuq to resign on June 24. Mushir al-Dawlah became the new Prime Minister. His policy was considered to be more pro-Moscow and one of the first acts of his administration was to suspend discussion on the Anglo-Persian Treaty. Iran's options were one by one falling by the wayside. Back in April 1920 when Iran had suggested that perhaps it should negotiate with Moscow to avoid an invasion, the British Government vetoed the idea, in part because the Foreign Office did not think an invasion was imminent and in part because London did not want Iran to have "friendly" relations with the communist regime. The matter of negotiations was dropped until the summer when it became clear that unless some positive action were taken by Iran to offset the lack of British support, Iran might lose everything. Further, since Britain already had decided on its new policy, Iran really had little to lose by angering London.

Mushir al-Dawlah did not last very long as Prime Minister because he was unable to stop the British military withdrawal, reassert control in the north, or muster support for a rapprochement with Moscow. In February 1921 Mushir al-Dawlah was ousted by Sayyid Ziya. The new Prime Minister then concluded a Russian-Persian Treaty of Friendship on February 26, 1921. As noted previously, the treaty was a major victory for

Soviet Russia. In addition, Sayyid Ziya strongly denounced the Anglo-Persian Treaty and declared it a dead issue. He informed the British consul that England could no longer exercise a stern hand publicly, and that Iran was going to nurture its friendship with Soviet Russia and negotiate trade agreements with it. Talking to Norman privately, however, Sayyid Ziya confided that while he was publicly pro-Soviet, he still was privately pro-British. In addition, the political and military situations in Iran had changed over the past year and England had to recognize these new realities. Norman passed on to London the essence of Sayyid Ziya's policy.

He (Sayyid Ziya) said that if Great Britain wished to save (its) position here (it) must sacrifice shadow for substance, remain in the background and help Persia effectively not ostentatiously. He was sure that this policy in the end would gain for Great Britain most of the advantages (it) had expected to obtain from an impracticable Agreement.³⁷

The diplomatic exchanges were on the surface unsatisfactory. For instance, in July Chicherin assured Firuz that the RSFSR was not interfering in the internal affairs of Iran.

The attitude of the Russian government toward the internal struggles going on in Persia is one of nonintervention, in spite of the similarity of ideas between the government established at Resht and the Russian government. Nonintervention is the principle not only professed, but also carried out by us in Persia.³⁸

Chicherin's remarks could not be taken at face value in view of the large presence of Soviet forces in the north and of Soviet agents operating not only in Gilan and other

provinces but in Tehran as well. But they were indicative of the problem Iran faced in trying to negotiate with Moscow. Throughout the crisis, Moscow publicly asserted that it was not at fault, that Moscow was not interfering in Iran. In essence though Chicherin was advising Firuz that the RSFSR would withdraw its nonexistent forces if the Persian Government would develop a more sensible--pro-Moscow --foreign policy and encourage the British to withdraw from Iran.

Another initiative by the Persian Government involved the stimulation of interest in Iran by the United States. Specifically, the Persian representative in Washington was ordered to request the United States to consider the possibility of obtaining an oil concession from Iran. Tehran would be favorably disposed to such a request should it be made since it did not favor a monopoly by either Moscow or London, and would prefer as many countries involved as possible. Washington expressed some interest and indicated to Iran that such a request would be forthcoming. However, it was emphasized that any such negotiations would be by the private sector and now with the United States Government. The American chargé d'affaires in Tehran agreed that an oil concession would be in America's interest and might also help Iran resist Soviet encroachment. Once the Anglo-Persian Treaty was definitely no longer a possibility, the Persian Government requested financial assistance from the United States both to offset the loss of the British loan and to

preclude the necessity of seeking aid from the RSFSR. Again, the United States responded favorably but with a provision that financial advisers must come from private sources, not from the government per se. In November 1921, the Standard Oil Company signed a contract for the exploitation of the oil fields in northern Iran for fifty years, the terms of which were subject to the approval of the Majlis. The Tehran Government was then faced with a joint protest from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company--which enjoyed oil rights in the south and which had requested an oil concession in the north--from Moscow--which had designs of its own for the northern oil fields--and from the pro-Soviet faction in the Majlis. After a good deal of pressure from both London and Moscow, the concession to Standard Oil was rescinded. It is interesting to note that the oil concession was later given to another company, Sinclair Oil, after it had the foresight to cultivate Soviet friendship before making the request to Tehran. However, this concession also was rescinded after pressure from London threatened to interfere with British-Soviet relations. In short, it was in the interest of both London and Moscow (each for reasons of its own) to prevent the introduction of third parties into the oil question, thus effectively preventing American oil companies from gaining a foothold in Iran.

Soviet interference in Iran, particularly the resort to military force, led to some interesting reactions from the parties involved. There were strong responses from the

British and weak responses from Tehran, and virtually no response from either the Western nations or from the League --although inaction is in itself a response. The British response was halting primarily because its interest in Iran and its ability to see its policy to completion were at odds. Further, its attempts at influencing the RSFSR were marred by the refusal by Tehran to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty. From the Foreign Office perspective, England's options were diminished by the Persian recalcitrance. From the British delegation's perspective, England's options were diminished by the Foreign Office's inability to obtain Parliamentary backing for a strong military response to Moscow. From the Persian perspective, Great Britain was abandoning them even though they themselves were partly to blame. London's main concern was not for Iran, but for the defense of India. Had Iran cooperated in the first place, so much the better for Iran. But Iran itself was not considered to be a vital part of the Empire when Parliament established the vital perimeters of that empire. Britain could then afford to pick and choose its method of responding to Soviet Russia--even though that response was limited--within the framework of its own foreign policy needs.

On balance 1921 was a good year for Soviet Russia at least as far as Persian policy was concerned. If we take at face value avowed Soviet aims in occupying Iran, Soviet foreign policy was a success. Denikin's White Guards were defeated; the Baku oil fields were protected from the White Russians

and from British invasion. If we dig deeper into Soviet motives for interfering in Iran, again on balance it seems to have been successful. A more sympathetic regime in Tehran was installed and exemplified its change of policy by dissolving the odious South Persian Rifles (in March) and dismissing its British officers. Trade relations were resumed between Iran and Russia. On the whole the new government was more friendly and considerate of Soviet needs, and at least on the surface, was less dependent on the British. British authority in the area was undermined, and while the RSFSR failed to weaken British authority in India, nonetheless achieved a British withdrawal from Iran. It is probable that had Soviet Russia not attacked Iran that the British disengagement would not have been so complete, that is, the British forces would have undoubtedly left but after developing and strengthening a Persian force to fill the vacuum. However, Soviet foreign policy succeeded in effecting a British withdrawal and in the process of killing the Anglo-Persian Treaty which would have made a viable Persian alternative possible. Further, Soviet Russia was able to achieve some concessions from Britain which may or may not have been forthcoming, namely, in exchange for Soviet withdrawal, England speeded up the negotiations for a trade deal and implicitly recognized Soviet interest in Iran.

On the negative side, the ideological aim of fomenting revolution in Iran was put on a back burner for the future because of a Soviet decision to forego such a move in favor

of cooperation with the West. On the other hand, Moscow reevaluated the efficacy of the revolutionary approach in feudal societies. It concluded after trial and error that revolution in backward areas would have to wait for more propitious times, namely, until after a bourgeois revolution. The Soviet agents were stymied in their attempt to incite revolution by the nationalist Moslem leaders. Repeated rebuffs by these leaders led the RSFSR to reduce expectations in the area. Difficulties encountered in the Gilan Republic further dampened Soviet hopes for an effective and speedy revolutionary movement in the East. Therefore, Soviet Russia was able to appear to shift gears and (1) not overrun Iran in full force; and (2) yield to British pressure in order to secure the trade agreement. Ideological commitment and fervor notwithstanding, Soviet Russia sacrificed the Gilan Republic--where the battle was already a losing one anyway. By 1921 communist agents had contended with ten months of a civil war within Gilan Province which undermined communist hopes for a socialist revolution in Iran. Britain had been unsuccessful in stopping the propaganda war and achieved only a brief reprieve from time to time in forestalling the activities of Soviet agents. Thus, while Moscow finally withdrew its troops, it nonetheless continued its interference in Iran, although at a lower level of intensity. The battle continued in the news media, in the schools, and in society in general.

On balance, however, Iran's fate was sealed from the

start because it had no intrinsic value to either Soviet Russia or England--oil concessions notwithstanding. Iran had nothing to lose by refusing to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty because had it been vital to British interests, London would have defended it with or without the Treaty. Similarly, even with the willingness to negotiate with Moscow, had Soviet Russia not been satisfied simply with a pro-Soviet regime in Tehran and wanted to annex Iran, or insisted on spreading communism quickly and immediately, the benefits of a trade deal with London probably would not have stopped its activities in Iran.

Notes

1. R. Abikh, "Natsionalnoye i Revolutsionoye Dvizheniye v Persii v 1914-1917 gg.," Novi Vostok, 26/27 (1929):142.
2. Ibid., p. 128.
3. L.C. Dunsterville, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), p. 25.
4. Ibid., p. 28.
5. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 XIII:1242.
6. R. Abikh, "Natsionalnoye i Revolutsionoye Dvizheniye," 29 (1930):106.
7. George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949), footnote 2, p. 53.
8. Rouhollah Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966), p. 153.
9. An interview with Fyodor R. Raskolnikov, translated/excerpted from E.V., "Na Kaspii i v Persii (Beseda s tov. Raskolnikov)," Petrogradskaia Pravda, no. 155 (July 15, 1920), p.1, excerpted by Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), Document 35, p. 180.
10. Mirza Kuchik Khan, "Message to Comrade Lenin, RSFSR," trans. in Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East, p. 97; original in Russian in R. Abikh, "Natsionalnoye i Revolutsionoye Dvizheniye," 29:106-107.
11. Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East, p. 98.
12. IPS, "Zadachi i uslovia sotsialisticheskoi propagandi v Persii," Zhizn Natsionalnostei, no. 19 (27), 5/25/19, p. 2; quoted in Ibid., p. 96.
13. See Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966, pp. 21-37, for his analysis of the three phases of the national-communist movements in Gilan.
14. Nasrollah Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia (N.Y.: Russell F. Moore Co., Inc., 1952), p. 230.

15. Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, p. 21.
16. Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia vol. II, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), p. 526.
17. See R. Abikh for discussion of the revolutionary life of Ekhsan Ulli Khan and his collaboration with Kuchik Khan and Ehsannollah Khan, "Natsionalnoye i Revolutsionoye Dvizheniye," 23/24, 26/27, 29; Also see Iransky, "Russko-persidskiye otnosheniya za pyat lyet," Novi Vostok, 3 (1923): 90-114; Iransky, "Pyat lyet vzainootnosheniyii sovetskoi vlasti s Persiyey," Novi Vostok, 4 (1923): 208-229; and A. Bishnegradova, "Revolutsionoye dvizheniye v Persidskom Azerbeijanye," Novi Vostok, 2 (1923): 249-254.
18. Documents on British Foreign Policy, IV: 1121.
19. Ibid., XIII:439.
20. Ibid., XIII:523.
21. G.V. Chicherin, quoted in Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, p. 208.
22. Dokumenty vneshneyei politiki SSSR (Moskva: Gosydarstvennoye izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1960), III:580.
23. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, p. 263.
24. Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 191.
25. Ibid., pp. 191-193.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 226.
28. Documents on British Foreign Policy, XIII:617.
29. Ibid., XIII:670.
30. Ibid., XIII:565.
31. Ibid., XIII:584-585.
32. Ibid., XIII:584.
33. Ibid., XIII:667.
34. Ibid., XIII:674.

35. Ibid., XIII:458.
36. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, p. 212.
37. Documents on British Foreign Policy, XIII:732.
38. G.V. Chicherin, message to Prince Firuz, July 10, 1920, quoted in Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East, p. 97; original in Russian in Dokumenti vneshneyei politiki SSSR, III:585.

CHAPTER IV

SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN IRAN: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN, 1945-1946

Following Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1921, Soviet-Iranian relations diminished in importance. Moscow turned its attention to more pressing matters, namely the internal recovery necessitated by economic collapse and social upheaval following the First World War, the Russian Revolution and the ensuing Civil War. During the 1920s attempts were made to obtain favorable economic treaties with Iran, reestablishing the old ties between Russia and northern Iran in terms of accessible markets. During the 1930s Moscow was preoccupied with consolidating party control within the Soviet state and with carefully observing the Nazi consolidation of power within Germany and its activities in Europe. Western appeasement at Munich along with Soviet concern for its security prompted Stalin to conclude a nonaggression pact with Hitler in 1939. Also, by 1939 Germany was Iran's number one trading partner surpassing both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Thus, Moscow increased its vigilance and interest in Iran. Soviet interference, both military and nonmilitary, again became an international issue and provided a second case of Soviet intervention in neighboring Iran. This interference began during the Second World War and culminated in


the Azerbaijan crisis of 1945-46.

The Azerbaijan crisis falls into four phases: (1) the preliminary phase, from January 1945 to the actual creation of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan on December 12, 1945; (2) December 1945 through April 1946, when military interference was at its peak and interaction among the various actors was greatest; (3) April through June 1946, during which time negotiations proceeded between the central government and Tabriz. A period of relative calm and peace prevailed; (4) June through December 1946, during which time Azerbaijan and Soviet efforts increased, utilizing all methods, short of renewed military intervention, to force concessions from Tehran. There was a breakdown of communication between Tabriz and Tehran. Rebellions broke out in the south. The Republic was finally dissolved on December 13, 1946. The periods of greatest intensity and danger occurred between December 1945 and April 1946, and again from August through December 1946 because of the potential for escalation into a confrontation and possible war with the Allies, especially with the United States. While third parties were interested and involved to varying degrees throughout the crisis, two points in time were especially crucial for outside involvement, January through March 1946, when Iran appealed to the United Nations for help and when American responses were the strongest; and again in the summer when alleged British interference threatened the stability of the central government by their again alleged complicity in the southern provinces.

During the crisis, two issues predominated in diplomatic activity. The first issue was related to the Soviet occupation of the north and refusal by Moscow to withdraw its forces by the deadline set in the Tripartite Agreement, namely March 2, 1946. The second issue was Soviet interference both in Azerbaijan, the other northern provinces to a lesser degree, and in Iran proper, particularly in Tehran. It is in essence impossible to separate the two issues since the occupation forces enabled Soviet agents to interfere to the degree that they did and assist Persian communists and nationalists to carry on their rebellious activities. Once the Red Army evacuated in May 1946, the issue of interference took the spotlight and enabled Tehran to focus primarily on this question, both in bilateral negotiations with Moscow and before the United Nations Security Council.

Azerbaijan Province consists of two parts, Eastern Azerbaijan, where the Azeri people live and Western Azerbaijan, where the Kurdish population lives. (See map, Figure 6.) With Soviet assistance, the two parts of Azerbaijan Province split into two separate ethnic republics. The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was formed on December 12, 1945 and the Kurdish Peoples Republic followed on December 15. Neither republic would have been created and successfully maintained without the support--military, economic, and political--of the Soviet Union. In fact, both republics were established as a direct result of Soviet interference in Persian affairs. Soviet agents encouraged the national

Figure 6. Azerbaijan and Kurdish Districts, 1946



groups to strike, rebel and cause as many political disturbances as possible under the protection of the Red Army.

1. During the first phase, from January to December 1945, a number of ethnic disturbances occurred. When Persian forces --police and army units--moved toward the areas of insurrection, the Red Army stopped them and forbade their entrance. Soviet excuses noted that there were already sufficient Persian forces in the area and any new forces would only cause increased disturbances and discord. A major insurrection occurred at Rezaiyeh, near Lake Urmia, but the Soviet Union was successful in preventing Persian troops from entering the vicinity, stopping them at Mahabad. An attempt by Tudah-sponsored forces to overthrow the government in Tabriz failed but the rebels again were protected by the Red Army and continued to agitate against Tehran using instead propaganda and infiltration techniques. Alongside this activity, Soviet interference was increasing throughout Iran as evidenced by an increased propaganda campaign against the United Kingdom and the United States, increasing Soviet support of the Tudah Party, support for the Kurdish dissidents and efforts to undermine the elections to the Majlis. Soviet efforts also were aimed at deposing the Prime Minister, Sadr al-Ashraf, for his unfriendly behavior toward the Soviet Union and because he was insisting that all Allied forces leave Iran since the war with Germany was over.

With the European war winding down, the situation in Iran became highly fluid and increasingly unstable. The

stalemate between the national insurgents, backed by the Soviet Union, and the increasingly ineffective and weakened government in Tehran continued through the fall. The West meanwhile was preoccupied with other international matters --notably European affairs: peace with Germany, reparations, economic recovery programs, etc.; and finishing the war against Japan. British-Soviet rivalry resurfaced, particularly over the question of oil and security in the Persian Gulf. American concerns were voiced not only to the Soviets but to the British as well. Further, the United States began talking of rapid demobilization and considered the evacuation of its troops as early as January 1946 despite the fact that Washington was worried about the internal situation in Iran and possible Soviet moves against the country.¹ America did regularly voice its support for Persian integrity and sovereignty, and did not abandon either its interest or its support for Iran. However, during this initial crucial phase of post-war relations, the United States talked one way but appeared to act another. Further American duality was evidenced in the various conferences, Yalta in particular, which again appeared to foretell a less than active American role in world affairs, in fact a return to its old isolationist policies. This was, of course, neither the intention nor the reality, but the appearance of American uncertainty was a contributing factor to the crisis which ensued in Iran. At the same time, American officials in Iran were concerned about Soviet

activities there and also about how that interference would affect not only Soviet-Persian relations but Soviet-American and international relations as well. For instance, one official experienced with the Persian situation advised the Secretary of State, ". . . (T)he disturbing developments which are taking place in Iran make it increasingly clear that Iran threatens to become one of the major security problems of the future."² A rather prophetic statement since it was written in August 1945 before major overt and large scale interference occurred.

Part of the concern voiced by American diplomats stemmed from events occurring in Azerbaijan. During August, the Tudah Party launched an insurrection against the governmental authorities in Tabriz. However, it was poorly organized. This fact plus the pressure from the United States and England on Moscow to allow Persian troops into the province to put down the revolt, led the Soviet Union to reconsider its actions. Moscow acquiesced and allowed the Persian forces into the north thereby aborting the revolt. Primarily, Moscow felt there was insufficient preparation by the Tudah Party and that the USSR was not in a position to run the risk of open conflict with the Allies over a weak and ineffectual revolt. However, Moscow thereafter worked toward developing the communist potential in Iran, especially in Tabriz.

On August 30, the Tudah Party--Masses or People's Party--in Azerbaijan was dissolved and the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan was formed. This new party was more regional

and national in orientation than the Tudah and appeared to be less extremist in its avowed sympathy for communism. That is, it tried to create the image that it was not a tool of the CPSU, in contrast to the Tudah Party, but rather a spokesman for the national aspirations of the Azeri people. By the end of 1945, according to one Soviet source, the party's support numbered 70,000 and included workers, peasants, intellectuals, artisans and craftsmen, merchants, small landowners and some of the clergy.³

It should be noted that Soviet agents had been active in the Azerbaijan Province before. That is, while Soviet agents helped to create the Gilan Republic in 1920, they also tried to take over the revolutionary movement of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyabani. Khiyabani had led an unsuccessful revolt in Azerbaijan against Tehran. However, he was an ardent nationalist, a Moslem, and an anti-communist, and refused the aid of Moscow. In fact, the Azeris went even further and threatened to join forces with Tehran should Moscow attempt to subvert their cause. Such was the hostility which the local populace held toward their northern neighbors. Nonetheless, over the years since the 1920 incident, social, political, and economic conditions in Azerbaijan Province did not improve, and the populace was still the object of oppression and suppression by the Shah--who strongly attacked all ethnic movements in an effort to develop a national identity. Grievances included both national and political elements as well as economic ones. For instance,

their national language was not allowed to be used in official institutions or in the schools, and national aspirations were hindered. The amount of taxes paid to the government was disproportionate to the amount of services received. The economy was geared to assist Tehran rather than allow them to freely achieve their own market. As Riza Shah's regime became more adamant, and repressive, in its pursuit of control over the province, greater sympathy for and guidance from Moscow were developed.

On November 9 and 10, the newly formed Democratic Party of Azerbaijan held an All-Peoples Grand National Congress in Tabriz with 744 delegates in attendance, and they formulated a statement of goals. They espoused the right of self-determination, full cultural autonomy for Azerbaijan, the creation of a national government within the Iranian state, i.e., no separation from Iran was demanded; and the establishment of a Governing Board of thirty persons. The Soviet press publicized this appeal and supported their demands. Soviet writers emphasized the oppressive conditions and poor treatment received by Azerbaijan from the central government. For instance, Ivanov noted the fact that Persians occupied all high government official positions in Azerbaijan and the use of the Azeri language was forbidden in business, government, and schools.⁴ This last prohibition was extremely distasteful to the Azeris and won many adherents to the "democratic" cause. Further, there was a great deal of poverty in the north with little

assistance from Tehran in alleviating the problem. Large scale absentee landlordism aggravated the situation, and the area was economically exploited by Tehran.

In short, Soviet propagandists and agents had a wealth of grievances to exploit, and their task was made that much easier because these grievances were not the figment of a propagandist's imagination. Persian officials insisted to the American and British ambassadors that no real popular support existed for the "democratic" movement. However, American and British estimates of the situation indicated that there was indeed sympathy for the movement since many of the problems had been festering since the 1920s and had not been resolved.⁵

Following the All-Peoples Congress, another uprising developed in Azerbaijan in November, this time led by the Democratic Party. Soviet reaction supported the revolt, insisting that the Azeri people had the right to determine their own future. In response to British and American protests, Moscow challenged Persian charges of complicity, arguing that Soviet troops were in no way involved. Again Moscow refused to admit Persian troops because they would exacerbate the situation and probably lead to more disturbances. Such a situation would be intolerable to Moscow because of the potential danger it would pose to the Baku oil fields. This time the rebels had the full support of the Soviet Union--in fact several Red Army officers led the attacks--as well as a large portion of

the Azerbaijani public. Consequently, Moscow did not bend to Allied protests as it had done in August. The probability of success was much higher this time since Moscow had become directly involved in the insurrection.

On December 12, the National Assembly met and declared the establishment of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, with Ja'far Pishavari as Premier. Pishavari, it should be recalled, was active in the Gilan Republic in 1920. Reform measures were proposed in particular that the Azeri language would be the official language of the Republic. Amnesty was accorded to all political prisoners. A program of land distribution was formulated which confiscated large lands and distributed them to the peasants. Over the course of the following months, several other reforms were initiated, including the establishment of a national university, a theater in Tabriz, new schools, an eight-hour work day and new hospitals. Prime Minister Hakimi, however, declared that all this activity was null and void, that the National Assembly had no right to exist nor to proclaim such reforms. Further, the central government would undertake to create appropriate programs to help alleviate some of the grievances voiced by the people. Too little, too late! Hakimi was forced to resign in January, partly as a result of his inability to cope with this rebellion.

Three days after the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was proclaimed, the Kurdish Democratic Party, also a newly formed party, announced the creation of the Kurdish People's

Republic on December 15. Qazi Muhammad, a religious leader from Mahabad, was installed as Premier. The Democratic Party had been formed in September 1945 upon the return of Qazi Muhammad from a Soviet-sponsored trip to Baku. Like the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party advocated cultural and linguistic freedom along with autonomy for the republic "within the Iranian state." Moscow sent Soviet agents from Soviet Azerbaijan into the area to assist the rebels and provide the Kurds with weapons and material. This action was but the last in a long series of revolts going back to 1941. These prior insurrections had been suppressed by the Persians when Moscow relented and succumbed to Western and Persian protests to allow Persian forces to enter Azerbaijan to quell the rebellions. The December revolt also would have failed had Moscow not prevented the interference of Persian troops. As in the Azerbaijani revolt, Moscow's position was greatly enhanced because it had guided the rebels and supplied them with weapons thus increasing their chances of victory.

However, Moscow's support was not without complications. Of the two nationalities, Moscow favored the Azeris. At the urging of the Soviet Union, Tabriz and Mahabad signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on April 23, 1946. (See Appendix Q.) This pact called for the Azerbaijani leadership to talk for Kurdish rights when negotiating with the central government. It also called for the protection of each one's minority in the republic of the

other. Unfortunately, the territorial disputes which were centuries old were left unresolved and the tension between the two ethnic minorities continued. This tension was compounded by the religious differences between the two groups, with the Azeris following the Shiite branch of Islam and the Kurds the Sunni branch. The Azeris further complicated the relationship by displaying chauvinistic tendencies towards the Kurds and insisting that the Kurdish Republic have only semi-autonomy and that within the Azerbaijan Republic. Moscow contributed to the problem because the Soviet leadership did not care to deal with central question of how much self-determination and self-autonomy was "enough." This problem was always a difficult one for communists to handle because theoretically there should be no place for self-determination of national units, nor any room for nationalism, in communism. This problem was never solved, only brushed aside or negotiated into obscurity until the next national explosion again would force the question to the forefront. With regard the Kurdish nationalism, Moscow's handling of the problem eventually backfired on it.

While Moscow was able to use the hostility between the two groups for its own ends and play one off against the other, it really had little choice. Moscow had to support Tabriz because if it allowed the Kurds to exclude themselves from the Azerbaijan Republic, then where would the argument for self-determination end? Particularly since among the

Kurds there were many tribes and numerous factions, thereby leading to the possibility of future mini-republics of different Kurdish groups. In the past, the independent and disparate views of the various Kurdish tribes had precluded a united front when facing their adversaries, whether they be Russian, British, Persian, or Azeri. Thus, when Tabriz and Tehran finally reached an agreement, the Kurdish problem was largely ignored with Moscow failing to intercede on their behalf. This further increased the tension between the two groups and between the Kurds and Moscow. In addition, Soviet-promised support never materialized and the Kurds were left on their own. This failure of support coupled with the traditional distrust and dislike of the Russians eventually led the Kurdish leadership to secure a separate settlement with Tehran. Consequently, when the Persian Army finally entered the province, the Kurdish population supported them and helped disband the democratic movement.

During this first stage of the crisis Iran and the West made repeated protests to the Soviet Union to cease its interference in Persian affairs. The Soviet Union responded that it was not interfering in Persian affairs and that such charges were lies. One Soviet official commented, "Not only have Soviet authorities not interfered in the economic life of the inhabitants of the northern provinces, but by importing necessary materials into Iran, even during the most difficult stages of the war, they have rendered assistance. . . ."⁶ The Soviet Union insisted that "now that the declara-

tion of the popular assembly of northern Iran has been published, it is evident that this is a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurance of the democratic rights of the Azerbaijani population of northern Iran. . . ."7 Soviet officials refused to acknowledge their complicity in the two revolts and in fact Soviet authors, since the crisis, have not even mentioned the support given by Moscow to the independence movements. Rather, Moscow still insisted that the crisis was basically an internal one between two national liberation movements against the "repressive" regime in Tehran. It was blown out of proportion and made into an international incident by the West (1) to weaken the national movement; (2) to strengthen the hand of the central government, which favored the West; and (3) to discredit the Soviet Union.

2. The second phase began when Iran turned to the newly formed United Nations for help. On January 19, 1946, the new Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam al-Sultarah, instructed the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador S.H. Taqizadah, to request assistance from the Security Council to try to force the Soviet Union (1) to withdraw its occupation forces from the north and (2) to cease interfering in Persian affairs. Ambassador Taqizadah submitted a request for the Security Council to meet to discuss Soviet interference in Iran. He informed the Council "owing to interference of the Soviet Union, through the medium of its officials and armed forces, may lead to international

friction."⁸ Iran's appeal was based on Articles 33 and 35 of the United Nations Charter. (See Appendix R.) Iran had tried to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Moscow--the condition of appeal under Article 33--but Moscow refused to deal with Prime Minister Hakimi and in fact called for his dismissal. (Hakimi finally resigned in January, opening the way for discussions between Moscow and Qavam, the new Prime Minister, who was, at that time, considered more "sympathetic" to Moscow.) Article 35 stipulated that any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute to the Council which the member deemed to be a potential threat to international peace. To substantiate the charges, Iran submitted a document called "The Particulars of Interference by Soviet Authorities," describing the various activities of the Soviet forces and agents which interfered in Persian affairs. The "Iranian question" as the crisis was formally called, produced a number of disagreements surrounding the questions of (1) whether the appeal should be put on the agenda; (2) whether the question had any validity; and (3) what action the Security Council should take.

Soviet reaction to the charges were harsh. The Soviet representative, Ambassador Andrei Vyshinsky, responded to the allegations by stating that they were "groundless and inaccurate." Moscow claimed it had a right to maintain troops in Iran irrespective of the Tripartite Accord, based on the 1921 Treaty. (See Appendix O.) Vyshinsky further commented:

. . . The anti-democratic and pogrom activity, hostile to the Soviet Union, on the part of the reactionary forces in Iran which are supported by certain influential Iranian groups drawn from the ruling circles, and the authorities, creates for the Azerbaijan SSR and for Baku a danger of organized hostile actions, diversions and so forth. . . .⁹

Therefore, as a defensive measure, Moscow had no alternative but to maintain its troops in the Azerbaijan Republic. Also, Moscow argued that the situation in northern Iran was a product of a national liberation movement attempting to redress the grievances inflicted on them by the Persian Government and not a result of Soviet interference. Further, once the new Prime Minister, Qavam, took office he offered to go to Moscow to negotiate in person. (He eventually headed a mission there on February 17.) Therefore, Moscow and Iran were making an effort to settle their disputes peacefully. Consequently, Moscow concluded that since there was no basis to the charges, Articles 33 and 35 did not apply, and the case should be taken off the agenda. On January 30, 1946, the Security Council adopted the following resolution:

The Council, having heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Iran in the course of its meetings of 28 and 30 January, and having taken cognizance of the documents presented by the Soviet and Iranian delegates and those referred to in the course of the oral debates; considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation; and that such negotiations will be resumed in the near future; Requests the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at anytime to request information on the progress of the negotiations.¹⁰

The resolution kept the "Iranian question" on the Security Council's agenda at the urging of the United States and Great Britain. While the United States appeared to have won a victory by retaining the question on the agenda, Robert Rossow, the American consul in Tabriz, warned Washington that the withdrawal of the question from the Council was viewed as a Soviet victory both in Moscow and in northern Iran and that it encouraged the Azeris to continue their revolution with impunity.¹¹

It is important to note that during this period the Soviet Union itself brought up the United Kingdom before the Security Council under Articles 33 and 35, charging it was interfering in the internal affairs of Greece (January 21) and Indonesia (January 21). The West therefore was faced with a dilemma. Whatever action they advised regarding Soviet interference in Iran should also apply equally to British interference in these countries. After the Persian resolution was adopted, these two issues were discussed and eventually allowed to take a similar course, that is, remanding the cases to the United Kingdom for bilateral discussions with the countries involved and requesting that London keep the Council informed of any progress.

After the appeal had been made, Qavam decided to open direct talks with Moscow and prepared to head a delegation there. According to Ambassador Murray, the American representative in Tehran at the time, Qavam was convinced that the Azerbaijani situation was related to the oil conces-

sion issue of 1944 and he wanted to discuss the problem directly with Moscow and Tabriz to attempt a solution, without outside help.¹² Consequently, since bilateral negotiations were in the process, or rather about to start, the Security Council was able to put the problem on a back burner, keep it on the agenda, and await further details following the proposed talks. On February 17, Qavam went to Moscow where Stalin charged Iran with discriminatory practices and an unbalanced foreign policy in favor of the West. He reiterated the two-year old demand for an oil concession and noted that since Britain had one, why shouldn't the Soviet Union. Upon his return to Tehran, Qavam wired Stalin, on February 23, to advise him that no consideration of the oil question was allowed under the 1944 law; that Azerbaijan was an integral part of Iran and therefore an internal matter not subject to Soviet dictates; and that Moscow had to evacuate its troops by March 2. Needless to say, Qavam's refusal to heed Stalin's advice was not taken lightly in Moscow and led to the most serious stage of the Azerbaijan crisis.

The month of March was perhaps the most dangerous, potentially explosive, and intense period in the entire course of the Azerbaijan crisis. Basically, the Soviet Union took a gamble that the West, and in particular the United States, would not react strongly to Soviet incursions into northern Iran. Since this period was a very hard time for the West--they were dealing with problems in Palestine,

Greece, Turkey, Indonesia, Eastern Europe--Moscow assumed (or hoped) that it could slip in through the back door, so to speak, and present the West with a *fait accompli*, and perhaps annex Azerbaijan in the process. Instead of withdrawing forces as required by the Tripartite Agreement, Moscow sent in reinforcements, but not a few reinforcements --rather enough seriously to alter the political and military balance which existed at that time.


In preparation for these moves, Pishavari, with Soviet assistance formed the Azerbaijan Red Army on February 9. He then began to conscript civilians into service. This action served two purposes: (1) to create and organize an Azerbaijani nationalist army to fight the Persian Army if that became necessary, and (2) "to give the Russians an excuse for remaining in occupation to prevent the bloodshed, disorder and terror. . . " which might ensue.¹³ On February 25, Moscow informed Iran that it would begin withdrawing its troops from "quiet areas," e.g., Meshed, Shahrud, and Samnan (cities in the northern provinces east of Azerbaijan), but would maintain forces in other areas until the safety and security of the area could be determined.

On March 5, Rossow reported Soviet troop movements. "Twenty tanks, 100 tanks, . . . cavalry units . . . , more tanks, . . . more cavalry, . . . , artillery units, . . . , truck convoys, . . . more tanks, . . . reinforcements arriving night and day. . . ."¹⁴ In particular, this movement was in the direction of Tehran, and the Iraqi and Turkish

borders. (See map, Figure 7.) Further, Azerbaijan Army units also were reported to be moving out of Tabriz into the direction of Tehran. Perhaps the move would be against Tehran only, or perhaps the move would be a multi-stage action spreading into other areas of the Near East, especially since Soviet demands for a revision of the Montreux Convention had been turned down by Turkey. In addition, Rossow noted that General Ivan Bagramian, a noted expert on tank warfare and with considerable combat experience, had arrived in Tabriz. Rossow advised the State Department on March 7, "I cannot overstress the seriousness and magnitude of current Soviet troop movements here. This is no ordinary reshuffling of troops but a full scale combat deployment."¹⁵ He further noted that "all observations and reports indicate inescapably that the Soviets are preparing for a major military operation."¹⁶ He emphasized that if northern Iran were not to be irrevocably lost to the Soviet Union, the United States must respond firmly and immediately. Persian forces were incapable of responding. They were not allowed into the northern provinces, and even if they were, they were no match for the Soviet forces. Therefore, the burden of responding rested with the United States.

Rossow's analysis and conclusions were apparently shared by the State Department. Top officials in Washington evaluated his reports and concluded that Moscow would attempt a *fait accompli* regarding its presence in Iran before the

Figure 7. Soviet Troop Deployments, March 1946



Legend: Main bases:
 Secondary bases:
 Reserves: ○○○○

Probable targets:
 Tehran →
 Iraq - - - - ->
 Turkey = = = = =>

Security Council would meet again. This would have meant the Security Council would have had to initiate policy to counteract such Soviet moves. In fact, since the Persian question was the first such issue brought before it, there really were no precedents regarding military responses, and

any definitive action may have come too late especially since the Soviet Union had a veto power. The United States accepted the challenge and on March 8, sent a note to Molotov inquiring why the Soviet Union was increasing its troop strength in Iran. Moscow denied all such reports and on March 15, the United States noted that TASS, the official Soviet news agency, claimed that this charge "absolutely did not correspond to reality."¹⁷ Later in March, the United States sent more strongly worded protests to Moscow indicating that the United States would support Tehran against Moscow.

Further, the "Iranian question" also was revived once again in the Security Council. On March 18, Iran charged that the Soviet Union was violating its territorial integrity by refusing to withdraw its troops by the March 2 deadline. Iran, however, failed consistently to support its own appeal. Instructions came from Tehran first to press the issue, then to withdraw the question, then again press for discussion, and again request withdrawal. Part of the difficulty stemmed from the negotiations under way at the time in Moscow. However, no matter what Iran wanted, the United States was adamant in keeping the issue on the Security Council's agenda, particularly after the Soviet troop deployments became known. Moscow considered the retention of the issue an insult to its integrity and a lack of confidence in the word of the Soviet Union (which indeed it was). The Soviet representative walked out of the Security Council on March 28 because

the Council refused to postpone discussion of the "Iranian question" until April, nor would it drop the issue altogether. Thereafter, whenever the question was discussed, the Soviet delegate would absent himself as a protest. Ambassador Stettinius, the American representative, noted that the United States would consider dropping the issue on May 6 but not before. (May 6 was the date agreed to by the Council for reports from Iran and the Soviet Union describing the state of affairs in northern Iran, i.e., did the Soviet Union evacuate its forces, and had Soviet interference ceased?) Qavam naturally was reluctant to antagonize the Russians and ordered his representative, Ambassador Husayn Ala, to request that the appeal be removed from the agenda. Ambassador Ala submitted two telegrams to the Council, one noting "the Iranian Government has no doubt that this agreement (the April Accord) will be carried out but at the same time has not the right to fix the course the Security Council should take." The second read in part, "(T)he Iranian Government has complete confidence in the word and pledge of the Soviet Government and for this reason withdraws its complaint from the Security Council."¹⁸ The decision was left to the Council and it chose to set a precedent whereby it had a right to decide how to dispose of matters brought before it irrespective of the wishes of the state which brought it. And the issue remained on the agenda.

That the United States was willing to confront the Union is not open to doubt. However, the exact nature and

tenor of the American response was questioned. The controversy centered around what President Truman may have said to Moscow, possibly on March 21. Truman claimed in a 1952 press conference that he issued an ultimatum* to Stalin either to get Soviet troops out of Iran or to face American reaction.¹⁹ However, an aide to the President denied that an "ultimatum" was issued. Instead, he cited diplomatic procedures and Security Council action as being primarily responsible for Soviet withdrawal. Nevertheless, Truman reiterated his remarks in his Memoirs, published in 1956: "I told Byrnes to send a blunt message to Premier Stalin and on March 24, Moscow announced that all Russian troops would be withdrawn from Iran at once."²⁰ Again in a 1957 interview, Truman discussed the Soviet threat and the American response:

. . . From my experience with the Russians, I have learned that they are bound to move where we fail to make clear our intentions. . . .

For example, shortly after the end of World War II, Stalin and Molotov brazenly refused to keep their agreement to withdraw from Iran. They persisted in keeping their troops in Azerbaijan in northern Iran. Formal steps were taken through diplomatic channels and the United Nations to get the Russians to withdraw. The Soviet Union persisted in its occupation until I

* The Researcher for the United States diplomatic correspondence for the 1946 edition noted in the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, that no evidence was available of any memo or note by President Truman to Stalin which would corroborate Truman's claim. Further, this author tried to track down the existence of the alleged protest through the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. However, the chief researcher at the Library informed me that no such memo existed in its files either.

personally saw to it that Stalin was informed that I had given orders to our military chiefs to prepare for the movement of our ground, sea, and air forces. Stalin then did what I knew he would do. He moved his troops out.²¹


Obviously, Truman was writing with the benefit of hindsight and with the crisis well behind him. One may conclude, however, that while there is no doubt some exaggeration involved in his comments, there also is probably a great deal of truth. Thus, judging from the evidence it is highly probable that the United States did in fact issue a strongly worded, threatening note to Stalin. Further, it is possible--and very probable--that other actions, e.g., military actions, may have been taken to convince Stalin that the United States was serious about its resistance to the Soviet deployments. For instance, along with the correspondence, we know that Truman ordered the USS Missouri to Istanbul to "show the flag" and warn the Russians in more concrete terms that Truman was in earnest.²² It is just too much of a coincidence that about three days after the Truman actions--in whatever forms they may have taken--Moscow announced a reversal of policy. Why should Stalin suddenly change course had there not been an unacceptable risk for noncompliance with the American demands? It just does not seem realistic to assume that the Soviet Union would back down from what appeared to be a superior strategic position simply because of a strongly worded note if that note were not supplemented by an American threat to intervene. In any event, Truman's account

seems plausible in light of the subsequent Soviet moves.

Whether this account was accurate or not, the result was that the Soviet Union acquiesced to American pressure and began evacuating its troops. In addition, Moscow made greater efforts to negotiate a tentative agreement with Qavam. On March 25, therefore, the Soviet Union announced that within five to six weeks, all Soviet troops would be evacuated from the north. This unilateral gesture was formalized in an accord reached with Qavam on April 4. (See Appendix S.) Also part of that agreement was the proposed creation of a joint Soviet-Iranian Oil Company, subject to Majlis approval within seven months, along with the acknowledgement that the Azerbaijan situation was purely an internal problem and would be dealt with peacefully by Tehran. The oil deal provided for a fifty years duration with the first twenty-five years affording Moscow 51% of the profits and the second twenty-five years, Iran 51%. (See map, Figure 8 for the proposed areas to be explored.) It also accepted Persian forces as the sole guarantor of security for the fields. While this agreement appeared to have "settled" the Iranian question, the United States, Great Britain, and Iran--at least initially--wanted to keep the matter on the agenda of the Security Council to ensure Soviet compliance. Qavam, meanwhile, turned his attention to resolving the dispute with the Azeris.

This second phase of the crisis ended with the Soviet Union preparing to evacuate its forces and with Qavam

Figure 8. Area for Proposed Oil Exploration
for Joint Soviet-Iranian Oil Co.



Legend: Proposed concession area ———
Area of Soviet interference - - - - -

preparing to negotiate with Tabriz. Pishavari had been informed by Moscow that he should try to negotiate a deal with Tehran and continue the revolution "from within." The Soviet Union promised to continue its support of the revolution in both the Azerbaijan and Kurdish Republics and would continue its propaganda campaign and other efforts throughout Iran. In short, the evacuation of Soviet troops did not herald the end to Soviet interference.

3. The third phase, from April to June 1946, was sort of a honeymoon period, where both Qavam and Pishavari were on their best behavior trying to accommodate the Soviet Union, and each other, to prevent any recurrence of tension, and to attempt some form of reconciliation.

Pishavari's main demands included the right of the national provincial council to recommend to Tehran a nominee for governor general rather than Tehran choosing one on its own; the right to run the Azerbaijan Army under similar provisions; the distribution of ceded lands to peasants had to have the Majlis' approval. The main stumbling block was the control of the Army. Nevertheless, on June 13, a fifteen-point agreement was reached between Tabriz and Tehran which recognized most of Pishavari's demands. (See Appendix T.) The National Assembly was dissolved and changed to the Provincial Council and recognized by Qavam as the legitimate legislative body of the Tabriz government (a fact he refused to acknowledge in December 1945); the choice of the governor general and field commanders of the army, as suggested by Pishavari, was agreed to; a tentative proposal was reached whereby Azerbaijan regular and volunteer army forces would be incorporated into the Persian Army and gendarmerie. This last provision was only a tentative proposal and was debated over the next several months. In the interim, Tabriz maintained control over its own army. Finally, 75% of government receipts from Azerbaijan would remain in the province for local expenditures. While Persian would remain the official language of the province, Qavam agreed to allow Azerbaijan to be taught in the first five grades of school. The Majlis would increase the number of deputies from Azerbaijan and the government would guarantee immunity for Democratic Party members who had taken part in

the rebellion. Following this accord, on June 24, 1946, the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was formally dissolved. However, the Democratic Party retained control of the government and aside from formally acknowledging the allegiance of the Provincial Council to the authority of the central government (which was nominal allegiance), nothing really changed.

This document was still tentative and left many dissatisfied. Officials in the central government as well as conservative members of the Majlis did not approve because it allowed the communists to remain in power in Tabriz and virtually sanctioned the rebellion. The Tudah and Azerbaijan Parties continued to work hand in hand with Soviet agents and once the agreement was publicized, Soviet propaganda and infiltration activities increased. Qavam was particularly chastised and many asked for his resignation not only because of the Tabriz Accord but also for the agreement made in April with Moscow. Both accords enhanced the position and prestige of the Tudah Party, the Azerbaijan "democratic" movement, and Moscow. It appeared that Moscow had won a major victory in getting Tehran to accede to most of the demands of Pishavari, in spite of the fact that Soviet troops had vacated the area. For instance, Qavam agreed to the Soviet demands to withdraw the Persian complaint from the Security Council; he offered rather liberal terms to Pishavari and the rebels; he transferred Persian Army officers whom the Soviet Union found objectionable; he suppressed anti-

Soviet newspapers; he removed the ban against Tudah meetings; and he promised to appoint Tudah members to the government. Further, it was an especially harrowing time for Qavam because the United Kingdom and United States viewed his actions as of questionable value. They believed he was treading on dangerous ground for thinking he could make concessions to Pishavari and at the same time control the nationalists and guide the political future of Tabriz. The United States was particularly worried that his action would backfire because he was making overtures to the communists while trying to sooth the right wing at the same time. Nonetheless, the American Embassy commented that in spite of these actions, Qavam still was doing the best he could.²³ After all, he had renewed the Schwarzkopf gendarme mission; Tudah appointments to the Cabinet were still in the future and perhaps still could be avoided; he had kept the Iranian question before the Security Council as long as he could without provoking Soviet reaction; he initiated needed economic and social reforms, although under duress from all sides.

Between April and May 22, the members of the Security Council closely watched the events unfolding in Iran. Soviet forces had begun their evacuation on March 30 and completed them in May although there was some confusion as to "completeness" of their evacuation. The United States particularly was distressed because little accurate information was available since (1) communication was poor; (2) travel was

difficult; (3) many Soviet soldiers and agents remained in the north and especially in and around Tabriz, but were not wearing uniforms; and (4) it was difficult to distinguish between Soviet and Persian Azeris. However, Tehran insisted that the evacuation was completed on May 20. Finally on May 22, the Security Council agreed "to adjourn the discussion of the Iranian question until a date in the near future, the Council to be called together at the request of any member."²⁴

This third phase in the Azerbaijan crisis was a time of rejoicing for the Soviet Union because it appeared that Moscow had achieved considerable success in advancing its foreign policy goals in Iran. It had obtained concessions from Tehran both for Moscow and for Tabriz and also decreased the capacity of Qavam to rule effectively. While there was disagreement in Tehran over the course of events, Qavam appeared to be pleased with his negotiating efforts if for no other reason than that once the accord was reached with Pishavari, the possibility existed that Moscow would decrease its interference and perhaps a state of near normalcy could be attained.

4. The fourth and final phase, from June through December 1946, was an unsettling one filled with intrigue, threats--both verbal and physical--and renewed insurgency. Pish vari instituted a propaganda campaign against Tehran and, with the assistance of Soviet agents and military advisers, began preparing for a military offensive. The

Soviet Union sent more Soviet agents into the north to strengthen its hand there. Qavam was not idle either. He formed a new political party on June 29 called the Democratic Party of Iran in the hopes that it would compete in the elections planned for the fall and would undermine some of the strength of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, if for no other reason than by confusing the populace with such a close-sounding name.

During July and August a series of events occurred in the southern part of Iran which laid the foundation for subsequent action by Qavam which eventually insured the collapse of the rebellion in the north. The first event was a series of strikes against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company plans in Khuzistan. These strikes allegedly were organized by the communists. Qavam immediately moved to prevent British interference by insisting that his government could handle the problem. (It should be recalled that in matters involving the AIOC, Britain traditionally took it upon itself to intervene.) A second event occurred on August 1, when Qavam moved to placate the communists in Khuzistan and Pishavari in Tabriz. He reorganized the Cabinet and this time included several Tudah Party members in the posts of health, education, and commerce and industry. On September 15, in reaction to this move, the Qashqai tribe, under Nasir Khan, along with the Bakhtiyari tribe, revolted in the southern province of Fars. Afterwards, they were joined by the Kerman and Tangistan tribes. They made demands similar to those espoused

by the Azeris, particularly cultural freedom, economic parity and regional autonomy. In addition, they voiced their opposition to the inclusion of the Tudah Party in the Cabinet. They also demanded the release of Bakhtiyari prisoners arrested during an earlier rebellion. On October 16, an agreement was finally reached between these tribes and Tehran, and the rebellion was ended. As a consequence, on October 19, another reshuffling of the Cabinet took place and the Tudah Party members were removed from office. Most importantly Qavam learned from this experience that he could not make concessions to one national group without creating new demands from others. If Iran were to remain a united entity, the central government would have to reassert its authority throughout the country. Otherwise, the government would be faced with repeated demands for self-determination threatening the very existence of the nation.

At the same time that Qavam was grappling with rebellions in the south and dealing with the communists in Tehran and Tabriz, Moscow was pressing for elections for the new (15th) Majlis. This election was essential because without it no vote could be taken to consider ratification of the joint oil company proposed in the April accord. Consequently, Qavam astutely used this election to consolidate his power, to crush Pishavari and the "democratic" movement, and to stand up to the Soviet Union. Qavam announced on November 22 that elections would be held in those areas where

Persian forces could provide security. Further, the Persian Army and gendarmerie would go to any area where no such force then existed. The United States supported Qavam by insisting that it would be "dangerous to hold elections while Azerbaijan and parts of the south were not under the control of the central government."²⁵ This reinforced Qavam's argument that order must be restored before the election could be held. Thus, the instrument was created whereby Qavam could strike back at the rebels. The Soviet Union immediately responded with threats, both to Iran in general and to Qavam in particular, reiterating Moscow's belief that the presence of Persian forces in the north would cause disorder and necessitate the reintroduction of Soviet military forces (a belief Moscow had voiced since the rebellions in 1941).

In spite of the Soviet warning, on December 10 Qavam informed the Tabriz Government that Persian forces were on their way and that they had orders to fight if necessary. There was brief resistance by the Azerbaijan Army, but on December 13, the Persians entered Tabriz, and on December 17 Mahabad. The Governor General, Dr. Salam Allah Javid, while at first reluctant to surrender did so and asked the public not to resist. There was some confusion as the morning newspapers of December 11 had called for armed resistance while the afternoon papers advised the public to stay calm, not to resist, and to accept a cease-fire. However, the city was already in a state of anarchy according to Rossow,

and a purge already had begun against members of the Democratic Party,²⁶ reminiscent of the purge in Gilan after Persian troops arrived to crush that rebellion. In spite of this fact, the Democratic Party insisted that it was not resisting Persian forces so as to safeguard the revolutionary principles of the movement. The surrender order read in part:

. . . The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan has always been a partisan of sovereignty and independence of Iran. Before the entire world we have proclaimed that Azerbaijan must remain an integral part of Iran. Now a group of traitors and reactionaries have attempted to falsify the real sense of the Azerbaijan movement, while seeking the realization of their own designs. To prevent the victory of the enemy of our people, we agreed that government troops might arrive to control the election. . . .²⁷

To the end, the Democratic Party maintained it was not advocating separatism nor striving to weaken Tehran. Nevertheless, on December 13, 1946, almost one year to the day after the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was formed, the "democratic" movement ended in collapse.

In many respects the situation in Azerbaijan was a replay of the events leading to the collapse of the Gilan Republic in 1921. Moscow miscalculated the readiness and willingness of the populace to accept communist doctrine and programs. The peasants and workers consciousness was not developed by the Azerbaijan Democratic Party. The peasants were disorganized and did not work well with the workers groups. Also, even the workers in the north were not well organized. Moscow overestimated the appeal of promises of

reform and underestimated the ability both of Soviet agents to guide, and Democratic Party leaders to implement, the necessary reforms in economic, social, and political institutions to make the revolution a viable prospect. For instance, instead of returning a great share of the crops to the peasants, the government took the same percentage that formerly went to the landowners. Thus, what the government did was simply exchange the source of collection rather than change the system. Further, many tribes eventually abandoned support for Moscow because of religious differences or overzealous national ambitions, which precluded alliance with or support for any foreign power, not just Soviet Russia. A major difference was that this time instead of the incentive to cooperate with Iran for the sake of a trade agreement with England, Moscow faced the threat of a confrontation, possibly even war, with the United States. That is, Moscow faced a negative incentive in the form of avoidance of conflict.

In October 1947, the newly elected 15th Majlis rejected the proposed oil concession, thereby precluding a Joint Soviet-Iranian Oil Company. The Soviet Union attributed this decision to pressure by the United States to destroy the good relations between Tehran and Moscow. For instance, one Soviet authority commented:

Under the pressure of the imperialist forces of the USA, the external policy of Iran took on an anti-Soviet character. . . . To please the American and English 'protectors,' parliament on October 22, 1947 refused to ratify the agreement about the Soviet-Iranian Company for exploitation of oil in northern Iran.²⁸

The situation was not a complete replay however. In fact there were several important differences. In 1946, an economic agreement was concluded between Iran and the United States, and several American aid packages were provided for Iran. The central government had reasserted its control and authority in the Azerbaijan and Kurdish Republics and throughout the north. The political situation had shifted considerably in Tehran's favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union. Perhaps most importantly the United States supported Iran and had taken concrete measures to demonstrate its support. This situation should be contrasted with the one following 1921, when Britain in an effort to disengage itself from Iran and after repeated attempts to encourage internal reforms, left Iran to cope with its own problems.

Responses to Soviet Interference

Moscow faced a multiplicity of responses to its many faceted policies and actions, responses from the United States, at the forefront; from Iran, weakened and dependent as it was on other powers; from the United Kingdom, who wanted to protect its oil interests; and from the United Nations Security Council. Some of the responses succeeded in effecting a modification of Soviet action, and in forcing a reevaluation by Moscow of its goals as well as a reassessment of its abilities to achieve those goals short of war. On the other hand, regarding some types of interference, notably propaganda and infiltration, Western and Persian reaction achieved little in terms of convincing Moscow to modify its activities.

However, their responses did diminish the effectiveness of these particular methods. Nevertheless, on those issues of top priority to the Soviet Union, responses to Soviet interference achieved either a cessation of those activities or their elimination altogether. Consequently, responses to Soviet intervention were on the whole successful. The foreign policies of interested parties responded to four general issue areas: (1) the occupation and interference during the war; (2) the occupation and Soviet refusal to honor the evacuation deadline after the war; (3) interference in Azerbaijan; and (4) interference in Iran in general. As with the Gilan crisis, the Azerbaijan crisis centered around two main adversaries, the Soviet Union and the United States, with Iran playing a lesser, but not less vital, role on its own.

American Policy

During the initial period of Soviet interference, from 1941 to 1945, American policy moved in basically two directions at once. And as a result of Soviet activities, these two directions finally were coalesced into a more coherent, firm, and strong American foreign policy toward Iran. When Iran first called on the United States to support its integrity, the American response was cool and reserved. Partly because of traditional American isolationist policies, partly because of British interest and involvement in Iran, and partly because of lack of precedent, the United States refused to get involved on a large scale or to commit itself

to Iran's defense. The primary focus in American foreign policy had been defense of the West against Hitler. Iran was part of the periphery and was not yet considered vital to the security of the United States. However, during the war years the United States did become involved, beginning with the Persian Gulf Command. The United States also honored Tehran's pleas for assistance in reorganizing and training its police and army commands. Once involved, America was forced to reevaluate Iran's role in American foreign policy particularly since the reports from American representatives over the years gradually pointed in that direction. For instance, as early as November 1941, Ambassador Dreyfus, the American representative in Tehran, advised that Iran was "looking more and more toward the United States for assistance and guidance, and we should not, I feel, miss the opportunity to improve our position."²⁹ By 1945, Ambassador Murray, the new representative, had warned that the democratic movement was "gathering momentum in face of the Iranian Government's inability to interfere and through sheer terrorism. Unless checked soon, it may reach out and include most of the population including the tribes. . . . If a solution is not found, we may expect an early dismemberment of the country with the northern provinces eventually becoming integral parts of the Soviet Union."³⁰ The development of American interest in Iran was not without debate, however. Major-General Donald H. Connolly, commander of the Persian Gulf Command, for instance, questioned whether the United States'

interests really would be served by greater involvement in Iran, and cautioned against increased involvement.³¹

The State Department began to think about Iran along new lines: political, strategic, "humanitarian." Politically, Washington's concern during the war was for "winning the peace," not only for "winning the war."³² Specifically, the United States should be attuned to the possibility of increased Russian involvement in Iran once the war ended; indeed the United States could expect continued and increased interference. For Iran to assist in its own defense in the future, one American goal should be to help strengthen Iran's internal structures, the police and army in particular. In addition, Washington began to lay the groundwork for a healthy political climate where the central government would not be hindered by undue pressure or manipulation from outside sources.

Strategic assessments of the role of Iran also were undertaken and blended in with the political debate. This became especially relevant after the war when it appeared that Moscow was expanding on all fronts. One such formal assessment was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1946.³³ Primarily they advocated an active American role in Iran as necessary to protect American strategic interests in the Near East, especially oil interests in Saudi Arabia. Further, Iran was a strategic link between the Middle East and the Soviet Union, almost an American buffer zone. (It is interesting to note that along strategic lines, Iran once

again played the pawn. Both the United States and Soviet Union viewed Iran as a valuable buffer against potential enemies.) It also noted that Soviet interference and potential control in Azerbaijan were undesirable because they would increase Soviet presence in the Near East and be too close to the oil reserves in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Humanitarian interests--if you could call them that--centered around President Roosevelt's desire to use Iran as a testing ground for democratic practices, to prove that democracy could work in a developing area. Ambassador Hurley, a special envoy sent to Iran in 1943, echoed FDR's interest. He commented, "This plan of nation-building (helping Iran help itself, developing the economy, establishing the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter) may be improved through our experience in Iran and may become the criterion for the relations of the United States toward all the nations which are now suffering from the evils of greedy minorities, monopolies, aggression, and imperialism."³⁴

As a result of these assessments, American responses to Soviet interference took several forms. The United States engaged in both multilateral and bilateral efforts to alter Soviet policies in Iran. These American efforts were directed primarily against Moscow and Tehran, but at times focused on London and other members of the Security Council as well. Multilateral activities took place on two levels, first involving conferences among the Big Three Powers--United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union--and second, involving the Security Council.

Multilateral efforts

The United States tried to broach the subject of Iran at the Moscow Conference in 1943, but no agreement regarding Iran could be achieved. The United States did succeed, however, in formulating the Tehran Declaration which committed the three powers in Iran to honor Persian independence.

American protests concerning Soviet interference were lodged at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (1945). During the course of these discussions, the American representative Secretary of State Stettinius warned Molotov that if the Soviet interference continued unabated, Iran planned to appeal to the Security Council. The United States did not want to see this happen, it was noted, because such an issue might threaten the newly-formed organization and jeopardize its chances of survival. These efforts met with failure. Stalin claimed that his hands were tied because Iran had a hostile government in office which threatened Russia's southern borders and in particular threatened the Baku oil fields. Because of this threat the Soviet Union had a legitimate right to station troops in Iran based on the stipulations of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty. It is possible that the Soviet representative interpreted the American reluctance for Iran to proceed with its appeal as meaning that the United States would not back Iran completely, thus tacitly permitting Moscow to continue its interference.³⁵ Considering the course of actions Moscow took following the Persian appeal to the Council and in light of the fact that

the Council then agreed to defer action, it is quite conceivable that Moscow did indeed misinterpret Stettinius' remarks.

The second level of multilateral activity engaged in by the United States involved the United Nations Security Council. While the United States would have preferred Iran to hold off appealing to this body, once the central government issued its appeal, the United States strongly supported Tehran. American policy regarding the United Nations debate concerned in part "the importance of Iran as a test case in assuring a free hearing and just decision to a small state victim of a large state aggression."³⁶ It cannot be overstressed that without American support for the United Nations, and for Iran within the Council, the matter would not have received the attention it did nor would the Soviet Union and Iran have concluded an agreement when and how they did. No doubt the conditions would have been much more favorable to Moscow, and it is quite conceivable that a more "lasting" solution--some form of association with the Soviet Union--might have been developed for the Azerbaijan Republic.

Bilateral efforts

To complement the multilateral discussion on Iran, the United States also engaged in bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union. American notes regarding Iran--and especially protests regarding alleged Soviet actions of interference--dated back to 1941. However, the most important exchanges occurred between March 5 and 26, with the most intense cor-

respondence and American responses coming between March 9 and March 12. Rossow noted that March 7 was a "turning point in American policy"³⁷ but it could also be termed a turning point in Soviet policy as well. After Soviet deployments were reported by Rossow on March 5, 6, and 7, the United States was faced with basically two choices: either to respond and respond forcefully, or ignore the situation and see what Soviet intentions were. President Truman and the State Department concurred that to ignore the Soviet actions only would have encouraged Moscow to continue its deployments. Therefore, the United States responded strongly and quickly.

American diplomatic support of Iran continued after the March confrontation. For instance, when Iran decided to send troops into all provinces before the elections in December 1946, the United States offered its support. Ambassador Allen commented on behalf of Washington that "the intention of the Persian Government to send its security forces into all parts of Persia . . . seems to me an entirely normal and proper decision."³⁸ When the Majlis was debating the merits of the oil treaty, he announced publicly, and assured the Prime Minister privately, that "the American people will support fully their freedom to make their own choice," irrespective of what the Russians wanted or demanded.³⁹ Further, the United States would not withdraw its aid if the Majlis were to grant the concession. This theme of American commitment to Iranian integrity was consistent and unswerving

during the entire crisis and assisted Iran in resisting the encroachments by the Soviet Union. (The crisis period meant here is 1945-46, not during the war years.)

British Policy

Britain had long been interested and involved in Persian affairs and while its power started to wane after the war, giving way to American leadership, it nevertheless maintained a serious interest in Iran. During the war, England was an occupation power in the south. Its primary goal was to protect its access to the oil reserves in the south administered by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It was Britain which persuaded the United States to become involved in Iran, taking over administration of the Persian rail system in the south. Britain's second goal was to prevent Soviet expansion into Iran and particularly into the Persian Gulf (a goal with a long history). This corresponded with Churchill's belief that the Soviet Union was an expansive power and must be stopped or contained.⁴⁰ During the war, London welcomed the American collaboration and afterwards relied on American leadership to carry out these tasks. This convergence of interests did not mean, however, that London and Washington always saw eye to eye. They did not. The first difference of opinion occurred during the oil crisis of 1944 when London quietly supported the Soviet request for an oil concession. Obviously, a Persian refusal might have backfired on its own AIOC, as it finally did in part in 1947. Following this crisis, London, Washington and

Moscow took diverging paths in their administration policies.

When Iran initiated its appeal to the Security Council, London, as did Washington, tried to dissuade Tehran from doing so. Again, London feared that criticism of Soviet interference might backfire. London was not only involved in Iran, but in Greece and Indonesia as well. Nevertheless, once the matter was brought before the Council, London publicly sided with America's support of Iran. Privately, it tried to work out a compromise which would stop Soviet encroachment in northern Iran yet not be embarrassing publicly to Moscow, and at the same time not be used against London. However, in the crunch--especially regarding the retention of the "Iranian question" on the agenda--London sided with the West. In fact, on this issue, London usually led the fight. While this may seem contradictory in terms of its own interventionary policy and possible censure, it was consistent with other goals espoused by London, notably resistance of Soviet advances in the Near East. Ernest Bevin, London's representative at the United Nations argued that ". . . for Iran to have to negotiate alone without . . . the watchfulness, the sense of justice and the holding of the balance of this new United Nations at its disposal, would be most unfortunate and would be misunderstood."⁴¹

Persian Policy

Persian responses followed two directions: military and diplomatic, and had a number of objectives. The first response by Iran to the Allied invasion was a brief spate of

resistance. Seeing this was futile, Iran agreed to a cease-fire and was forced to sign the Tripartite Agreement. Tehran's efforts to modify the proposed treaty to give it more control over its internal affairs and over more land were also to no avail. Since Tehran's administration was weak and ineffective and its military forces weak, it was hardly a surprise that Moscow refused to alter the proposed treaty even though London had agreed to the changes. Tehran in essence had no bargaining power and therefore had to accept whatever was offered. Afterwards, Tehran aimed to decrease the Soviet presence and especially to decrease Soviet propaganda and infiltration. Repeated attempts were made to negotiate with Moscow regarding these matters but on the whole failed.

Iran's diplomatic initiatives achieved modest successes by securing American support and commitment, albeit not as strong as it would have liked during the war years. Iran's efforts in the United Nations initially faced questionable support from both London and Washington, both of whom were not anxious to see the Persian appeal go before the Security Council. However, Tehran persisted. Again, it is important to note that Iran had nothing to lose by bringing the issue before the Council. Its military responses had been futile because Soviet troops stopped the Persian Army from entering the province and to contest the issue would also have been futile since Persian troops were no match for the better equipped and better trained Soviet forces. Its diplomatic responses had been futile because


Moscow refused to consider the complaints as legitimate, arguing that the problems in the north were internal ones related to national aspirations and had nothing to do with Moscow. With America by its side, Iran was at least able to force Moscow into a public posture of conciliation, although how much conciliation was offered may be questioned also, since Moscow never connected its withdrawal with American or Council pressure. Nevertheless, with American assistance, Qavam was able to negotiate a settlement, even if it was tentative.


Qavam was under great pressure during this period and was criticized by all parties for "giving in" to Soviet pressure and selling out the central government. However, Qavam was a realist and tried to accommodate Moscow without going too far. He believed, as did many American representatives in Iran over the years, that Moscow would eventually obtain an oil concession from Iran, so therefore why not now? Given Iran's history of foreign intervention, it is quite possible that Qavam was afraid that the United States would not continue its support if a war were the consequence of such action. American reluctance to test the newly formed Security Council in January probably contributed to Qavam's uneasiness in resisting Moscow's pressure. While Washington had strongly supported Qavam and Iran in March, even if it had meant war, one cannot truly blame Qavam if indeed he did share this belief. After all, the Americans and British publics were in no mood to enter another war, especially

since the memories of the last one were still fresh. On the other hand, Qavam should have concluded that Moscow was also not in a position to wage another war. In any battle of wills, the United States probably would have won since it had suffered less in material terms than the Soviet Union and would have been in a better position to fight another war. Nevertheless, Qavam, for whatever his reasons, tried to accommodate Moscow rather than ignore its demands completely.

In addition to the difficulties surrounding the United Nations debates, Qavam faced internal opposition to his accord with Pishavari. He appeared to have given away much and received very little in return. In fact, the Azerbaijan Province was independent in everything but name. For Qavam the final blow came when the Qashqai and Bakhtiari tribes revolted in Fars Province in the south during the summer and fall. Qavam chose to break with his previous policy of conciliation toward Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union and he ousted the communists from his Cabinet and prepared to deal forcefully with the Azeri rebels. Qavam acted in this manner in part because he had no real or viable alternative. If he had agreed to the demands of the southern tribes he would be sealing the fate of Iran as a sovereign united authority. (See map, Figure 9.) There would have been more demands for self-government by others and increased demands for more self-determination by those already possessing it. It eventually would have ended in the dismemberment

Figure 9. Civil Disturbances, Summer/Fall 1946



Legend: Provinces in open revolt 
 Provinces with disturbances
 (strikes, protests) 

of Iran. As is evident from Figure 9, at least half the country was either already engaged in open revolt or possessed the possibility of doing so with a little push. His other alternative, therefore, was to crush the Azeri rebellion and end the demands for self-determination.

Here too Iran was in a dependent state and had to rely on the support of the United States to back it up in sending troops into northern Iran. The central government feared a war with the Soviet Union. Qavam had gambled that with the American support for Iran, Moscow would not defend Tabriz. His gamble obviously succeeded. The final Persian response to Soviet interference came on October 23, 1947, when the Majlis rejected the oil treaty. Here too American

public support of Tehran's freedom to decide its own future was of vital significance.

Persian responses to Soviet interference were conditioned by the fact that it was in a dependent state, weak, disorganized, and caught between the Great Powers. Its "condition" was imposed on it from the outside, although Tehran certainly was to blame for its predicament in laying the foundations for Great Power interference during the Second World War. While Iran made several gallant efforts to resist Soviet interventionary policies, it was never really in control. Rather, the "important" decisions--invasion, evacuation, escalation of propaganda efforts, etc.--were made in other circles and were primarily related to events and circumstances elsewhere. Consequently, Iran had very little to lose by pursuing its various strategies over the years. Considering that Iran was deemed to be a crossroads--between East and West--and a buffer and hindrance to prevent Soviet attainment of its goals--oil, access to the Persian Gulf and the Straits, etc.--it could never satisfy all parties. Tehran's efforts to include a third party in its affairs to gain leverage in its dealings with Britain and the Soviet Union, the two perennial interferences in Persian affairs, were a risky business and at least in 1941 led to disaster for Iran.

Iran's efforts to woo American involvement were more successful, although some American officials feared that American involvement was solicited for the wrong reasons.

For instance, Ambassador Allen commented on a theme that was shared by many of his colleagues. "Iranians are so accustomed to outside interference," he said, "they resemble a man who has been in prison a long time and is afraid to walk out into the sunlight. The only way they can think of to counteract one interference is to invite another."⁴² However, this assessment may not be completely fair to Iran since the facts attest to Iran's conviction that its survival was contingent upon support from a third party, preferably a strong third party. The situation was somewhat different with respect also to the United States. During and before the war, Tehran definitely wanted America to act as the balancer between its two traditional nemeses, Moscow and London. However, after the war, Iran's very existence depended on a strong major ally to guarantee its integrity and defend it in international circles and before the might of the Soviet Union. The only power capable to take on this task was the United States. Indeed, had Iran not requested American help, it never could have succeeded in regaining Azerbaijan and most probably would have lost most, if not all, of the northern provinces to Soviet expansion. Further, it is probable that had not Iran invited American involvement, sooner or later Washington would have insisted on it, especially as American foreign policy began to crystallize. In essence, the entire notion of a third party was by 1946/47 obsolete, since the international situation already had changed. Britain had withdrawn from

the area and was no longer as powerful as it had been before the war. The United States in fact did not intervene as a third party but rather replaced Britain as the major power defending Iran and confronting the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. U.S. forces evacuated Iran on January 1, 1946 and British forces began evacuation in January and completed it on March 2, 1946.

2. U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, VIII:398.

3. M.C. Ivanov, Ocherk Istorii Irana (Moscow, 1952), p. 368.

4. Ibid., p. 366.

5. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1945, VIII:465.

6. United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, p. 55.

7. Ibid., p. 57.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

10. Ibid., p. 70.

11. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1946, VII:333.

12. Ibid., p. 316.

13. Ibid., p. 332.

14. Ibid., p. 342.

15. Ibid., p. 344.

16. Ibid., p. 343.

17. Ibid., p. 356.

18. Ibid., p. 423.

19. Ibid., Editor's Note, pp. 348-349.

20. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2 Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-52 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), p. 95.

21. H.S. Truman, interview, New York Times, August 25, 1957, quoted in R.K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-73 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975), pp. 138-139.

22. According to Rossow the official reason for the U.S.S. Missouri to go to Turkey was to return the body of the Turkish Ambassador who had died in Washington. Robert Rossow, Jr., "Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946," Middle East Journal, X no. 1 (Winter 1956), p. 22.

23. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1946, VII:439.

24. Official Records, 43rd meeting, p. 299, cited in Richard Van Wagenen, The Iranian Case, 1946 (N.Y.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952), p. 80.

25. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1946, VII:342.

26. Rossow, "Battle of Azerbaidja," p. 30.

27. Declaration of Surrender, published in Azerbaijan December 12, 1946; cited in Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 118-119.

28. A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973, Sec. Ed. (N.Y.: Praeger, 1974), p. 259.

29. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941, III:475.

30. Ibid., 1945, VIII:497.

31. Ibid., 1943, IV:387.

32. Ibid., p. 330.

33. Ibid., 1946, VII:529-532.

34. Ibid., 1943, IV:421.

35. Van Wagenen, The Iranian Case, p. 28; also see ibid., 1945, VIII:512-513.

36. Ibid., 1946, VII:309.

37. Rossow, "Battle of Azerbaijan," p. 63.

38. George Kirk, "The Middle East, 1945-1950," Survey of International Affairs, Volume V (London: Royal

Institute of International Affairs for Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 80.

39. Van Wageningen, The Iranian Case, p. 87.

40. Winston Churchill, "Iron Curtain" Speech, March 5, 1946, Fulton, Missouri, quoted in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Vol. 2 (N.Y.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1978), pp. 380-284.

41. Official Records, 5th meeting, cited in Van Wageningen, The Iranian Case, p. 57.

42. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1946, VII:495.

CHAPTER V

SOVIET INTERFERENCE: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

During the two periods under study, Moscow utilized the entire spectrum of techniques of interference discussed by Cottam and Blackstock. On both occasions the use of direct force, massive propaganda efforts, infiltration, subversion and diplomacy were evident along with covert and overt efforts to remove various Cabinets and influence the Majlis as well as the Prime Minister and Shah. Needless to say, all of the methods used complemented one another. The relative success of the non-military actions was due in large measure to the direct force used, namely the occupation of the north and the threat of direct force against the capital. Direct military intervention was of foremost importance in (1) laying the foundation for the creation of the Socialist Republic of Gilan and the Democratic Republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and (2) protecting the Republics once they were established. It can be said equally of both cases that without the presence of Soviet troops, none of the Republics would have been established in the first place nor survived even for a short time. For instance, Kuchik Khan and his Jangalis were not completely convinced that independence from Tehran was the correct path, and, left to their own devices, they probably would not have chosen the

path they did. Even if they had, it is doubtful that they would have had the military capacity successfully to engage the Persian Army.

The propagandists were especially successful in creating the climate most conducive to Soviet interests. But then Moscow had a good deal of material to work with. The social, political and economic conditions in Iran in 1920 and 1945 were almost identical. Prior to the Soviet intervention in 1920 and prior to the joint invasion by England and the Soviet Union in 1942, as well as continuing through the occupations, the populace had witnessed incompetency and corruption by the Shah and his various governmental administrations. There also had been economic deprivation and exploitation of the northern regions, and continuing dependency on one or more foreign powers. These problems, not corrected by the Shah, infuriated the populace in the northern provinces, making them susceptible to subversive activities by communist agents. These agents therefore exploited the dissatisfactions, frustrations and rebellious sentiment of the elites and the populace alike through the excellent use of propaganda. For example, most of the tribal units had not been agitating for complete self-determination, and many were adamantly opposed to communism. However, once Moscow's propagandists began their work, these national groups began clamoring for independence.

The Soviet Union also infiltrated Persian institutions and subverted their officials and influential leaders of

government and society. To assist in these activities, Moscow transported hundreds of Soviet trained Moslems to Iran (the majority from the Azerbaijan SSR) and relied on Soviet control and direction of the Persian Communist Party in 1920, and first of the Tudah Party and later of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Democratic Party in 1945. These efforts were not, however, successful in achieving a communist revolution or even a strong identification with the communist movement. They were nonetheless successful in establishing socialist governments in Gilan and Azerbaijan, even if only for a short time. Had these various efforts not been so continuous and massive, it is questionable whether Moscow would have been as successful as it was in effecting change in Tehran's policies, both foreign and domestic in 1920 and 1921, and in 1945 and 1946.

This chapter will examine the major techniques employed by Moscow during the Gilan and Azerbaijan crises.. It also will compare the similarities and differences between the two cases with a view to understanding how Moscow used various methods to interfere in another state. Finally, it will evaluate the effectiveness of the methods in serving Moscow's interests.

The Gilan Crisis

Soviet techniques of interference during the Gilan crisis revolved around the ideological imperative of spreading communism throughout the East and was in part an exten-

sion of international communist goals. While the traditional goals of Russia's foreign policy in Iran--security and dominance of Iran--were still in evidence, the soul or thrust behind Moscow's intervention rested on the ideological elements. The Communist International, with the guidance from the Communist Party of the RSFSR, spearheaded the efforts in Iran and were highly successful. The infiltration of Moslems and their subversive activities from 1917 through 1920 greatly assisted the propagandists. These propagandists, protected by the Red Army from retaliation by the Persian Army, exploited every opportunity and created a climate beneficial to Soviet interests. They helped achieve the first socialist republic in the east. In so doing, their activities plus the presence of military force in the Gilan Province and throughout the north enhanced the other methods of Soviet interference during this period.

Propaganda

Soviet propaganda efforts strived to achieve two separate goals. These goals must be distinguished and evaluated in light of strategy and tactics employed in the propaganda campaign. The long-term goals were the establishment of a communist state in Iran and communism in the East. To this end, the Third International authorized the creation of special bureaus to deal specifically with propaganda in the East. The second, and for all practical purposes more immediate goal was to modify the attitudes of the decision makers in Tehran so that British influence could be diminished

and Soviet influence enhanced. To achieve this end, a two-fold effort was required, one aimed at the decision makers themselves and the other directed at the populace, who in turn could pressure the government. Communist agents focused on the animosity of Persians toward the British and their occupation, the disapproval of the Anglo-Persian Treaty, and the apparent British abandonment of Iran.

As noted before, the Third International authorized a Department of International Propaganda for the Eastern Peoples and created twelve departments, one of which was devoted solely to Iran. The resolution stated in part, "In order to recognize its goal, the department will issue newspapers, periodicals, leaflets, appeals, etc., and will train communist Moslims and send them to the eastern regions to carry on agitation. . . ."¹ Lenin outlined the strategy to be used in this propaganda effort:

Not only in the whole propaganda activity of the communist party--both in parliaments and out of them --must the constant violations of the rights of nations and guarantees of rights of nationalist minorities occurring in all the capitalist states, notwithstanding their 'democratic' constitutions, be . . . denounced, but it is necessary also, first, to explain constantly that the Soviet order can alone be in a position to establish the equality of nations, uniting first the proletariat, and afterward the whole mass of workers, in the struggle against the bourgeoisie; second, all the communist parties must render a direct assistance to the revolutionary movements of the dependent or subordinated nations and in the colonies.²

In addition, an auxiliary arm called the Council for Propaganda and Action of the Peoples of the East was created. Divided into three sections, the Council worked toward

(1) agitation and propaganda, (2) organization and control, and (3) administration.³ It was terminated, however, shortly after its inception in favor of other organizations already in existence. Nonetheless, its short existence demonstrated the importance of propaganda in the strategy of the Third International.

Following the Comintern's guidelines, many schools and training centers were created under communist auspices for the political education of Eastern peoples. For instance, in 1919, the Armianski Institut was established, and in 1921 the communist party opened the Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudyashchina Vostoka, or Communist University for Workers of the East. Foreign students attended and were given "revolutionary guidance."⁴ In most of the major cities in Russia, in Central Asia and the Far East, similar schools were created for the primary purpose of educating and indoctrinating Asians and then engaging them in propaganda activities in their home countries.

Soviet agents in Iran capitalized on the British intervention in Iran. Under the guidance of the CPSU, they focused on Soviet willingness to help Iran break the stranglehold of the British and other western nations on Iran. And they had a good deal of material to draw on. As noted previously, they were able to point with pride to Trotsky's disavowal of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the abrogation of all concessions wrested by the Czarist regime from Iran. Further, they cited the abolition of debts and

tariff arrangements which had been unfairly negotiated prior to the Soviet revolution. On the military front, they were able to point to British withdrawal in face of Soviet advances. They used this (whether their reasoning was accurate is another matter) to question Britain's ability to defend and protect its own posts let alone Persian territory. The British abandoned one post after another, leaving the Persians to ponder the validity of the Soviet charges, and to wonder if they were in fact backing the wrong faction. This line of argument proved difficult for the British to counter since they were in essence retreating in the face of superior Soviet forces. Soviet propaganda did achieve a weakening of faith in the British and an eroding of support for the Tehran Government as well as for the British. At the same time the Soviets were challenging the British willingness and capacity to honor its commitments, there were rumors--later to be proven accurate--of British plans to evacuate civilians from Tehran. This naturally increased Persian suspicions about the British and forced them to reconsider their relationship with the communists.

A major bonus for the propaganda effort emanated from the Baku People's Congress held in September 1920. This Congress, called by the Third International, extended invitations to all the peoples of the East. In all 1,891 delegates attended, of whom 1,273 were communists, including representatives of thirty-seven nationalities.⁵ The purpose of the conference was to demonstrate the solidarity of the

Asian peoples with the communist movement and to provide a framework for action against the colonial empires. In this regard, the socialist experiment in Gilan Province was pronounced a positive step forward for the communist cause. One conference leader even proclaimed, "We summon you to a Holy War, first of all against British imperialism."⁶ While the Congress began on a friendly basis, it ended for the most part fragmented, disillusioned, and bitter. The major points of contention were the role of religion in communism and competition between communism and nationalist movements. The anti-religious stand taken by the Third International infuriated the Muslims and created bitterness among the many national and ethnic groups present. The support for religious principles by the workers and peasants in Iran, as well as throughout the East, was matched by the demands of ethnic and national leaders for their own national approach to communism. Thus, the obstinancy of the various national groups at Baku reinforced the difficulties encountered by the Russians in Gilan. Nevertheless, in spite of these disagreements, the conference was heralded by the Soviet communists as a major step in the consolidation of support for world communism and as a guide to future action on behalf of the communist movement. It was particularly emphasized that the Asians were treated as equals, not as members of a colonial or dependent state.

The decision at Baku merely reflected the decision and problems Moscow faced in Iran and throughout the East. In

particular, the anti-religion campaign was a volatile issue and strained relations between communists and Persians and between Soviet communists and Asian communists. In fact, here was a prime example where ideology got in the way of practical politics. Had the Soviets toned down their anti-religious rhetoric, they probably would have received more support. A. Sultan Zadah analyzed the problem of dealing with Islam and suggested that special measures were necessary in working with Asian Moslems. Unfortunately for the communists, he was not completely heeded. He recommended

. . . a very careful and dextrous approach. . . . Our approach should be of the nature of anti-religious propaganda and not of anti-religious struggle. We must knock from the hands of our enemies the weapon they use against us: We must openly say to those concerned that we do not conduct any struggle against any religion, but only propagandize our own atheistic views--which we have an absolute right to do. . . . We must have only communists of Moslim origin to carry on anti-religious propaganda.⁷

The zeal of the communists in Gilan contributed to the defeat of communism in that republic. Mosques were closed, religious observance banned and religious leaders arrested. Appeal for communism notwithstanding, the Jangalis and the peasants turned from communism to defend their religion. In spite of the awareness by communist leaders in Moscow of the necessity to tread lightly when dealing with religious issues, the communists and Soviet agents in Iran were unable to moderate their zeal in attacking the religious establishment.

These problems centering on ethnicity and nationalism were a problem never fully faced by Soviet Russia and cer-

tainly never solved. The contradictions in focus, in strategy, and in goals were not adequately dealt with, nor consistently followed. Lenin tried to cope with the national liberation and self-determination problems in 1919, but even he admitted that it was a complicated problem. While he advocated a common struggle jointly spearheaded by communists and nationalists, he also warned the communists not to "inter-mingle with it (the bourgeois nationalists)." He continued,

. . . The communist international must support these movements only on the condition that the elements of the future proletariat parties, . . . should be grouped and educated in the knowledge of their special tasks, those of a struggle against the bourgeois democratic movements within their nations.⁸

This strategy caused some dissension within the Communist Party in Iran as well as within the circles of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern.⁹ The problem took on more immediate urgency when communist agents tried to deal with Kuchik Khan in Gilan. He was a nationalist, not a communist, and anti-British, not necessarily pro-communist. And when the communists tried to introduce socialism in Gilan, he as well as the populace at large eventually revolted against their programs.

During this period the Soviets made overtures to another dissident nationalist, Shaykh Muhammad Khiyabani. Khiyabani had founded the Nationalist Democratic Party in Tabriz, Persian Azerbaijan, and led a revolt against the Shah in 1920. He was assisted by the German consul in Tabriz, Ambassador Wustrow, but Mushir al-Dawlah, the Prime Minister, defeated the rebels. Khiyabani, however, refused

help from Soviet Russia because he, like so many other Moslem nationalists, was staunchly anti-communist and was opposed not only to the military presence in Iran but also to Soviet interference in its internal affairs. In addition to Soviet involvement in Gilan and attempted involvement in Azerbaijan, Soviet-backed forces, including communist workers from Baku and at least one detachment of regular army troops, spread out from Enzeli and occupied Mazanderan and Nakhichevan, and actively agitated in Khurasan and Luristan, although with little success.

Propagandists also derived great mileage from the Anglo-Persian Treaty. Throughout this period communist agents persistently attacked the treaty, whose ratification was still pending in the Majlis. Since there was a good deal of hostility toward the proposed treaty among the Persian populace, the Soviet propagandists were able to build upon this resentment and increase the antagonism toward the treaty. The main opposition centered on the fact that Britain would be directly involved in Iran in the future in a formalized manner since the treaty called for British advisers in the military, financial institutions, and government administration. Soviet Russia was portrayed as a friend and ally, and more importantly as a viable alternative to the British presence. For example, according to an article in Jangal, the Gilani communist paper, the communist slogans focused on the following in the provinces of Gilan, Mazanderan and Azerbaijan: (1) overthrow of imperialist

domination (notably British); (2) confiscation of foreign enterprises and banks (again British); (3) unity of the country, but including the right of self-determination for the provinces should they so desire it; (4) confiscation of lands of big landowners; and (5) alliance with the RSFSR and participation in the world communist movement.¹⁰

The propagandists developed the theme of Soviet friendship, characterized by the 1918 abrogation of all concessions and the current (1920-21) efforts to negotiate improved relations, as well as Marxist programs and policies. The RSFSR was presented as a champion of the integrity of Iran. Moscow argued that its presence was a counterbalance to the presence of British troops in Iran which were "obviously" forcing Iran to adhere to London's will. Soviet presence was crucial to forcing the British to withdraw, and articles pointed to the fact that since the occupation, British forces were indeed retreating from the northern provinces, although slowly. Further, the Russian occupation was explained in the press--and in diplomatic correspondence--as necessary in order to defend the Soviet border against the British, and was not directed against the Persian people. Chicherin assured the Persian populace that "the Soviet detachment (had) been ordered to leave Persian territory as soon as military requirements permitted, and after reestablishing free and safe navigation of the Caspian."¹¹

The chief Soviet propagandist in Iran was Ambassador Theodore A. Rothstein, who set up headquarters in Tehran in

April 1921. He proved to be so effective that Lord Curzon, at the behest of the British consul in Tehran, was forced to request the Russians to recall him. Soviet policy makers had decided to comply with London's entreaties regarding Soviet withdrawal from Iran and promised to do so once Britain withdrew. At the same time, however, they increased their propaganda efforts. Rothstein was to spearhead this escalation. With a staff of about one hundred persons, Rothstein created a news network, providing information from Soviet sources: Soviet pamphlets, newsletters, speeches, books, articles and news items. He received large sums of money from Moscow to be expressly used for propaganda in the capital and surrounding countryside. Of the daily papers and weeklies circulating in Tehran in 1921, three were anti-British, three were anti-Shah and anti-British, three were virtually run by the Soviet legation, including the communist paper Toufan, and all but two received a good portion of their information, if not all, from Moscow or from the Soviet Legation. This latter group, by the way, included the official government newspaper, Iran. In addition, Rothstein made available free films to Tehran movie houses, reopened the Russian school and opened the Embassy park every Friday to the populace.¹² After repeated British and Persian protests, Rothstein finally was replaced by Boris Shumiatsky in September 1922. However, this proved to be a false reprieve as Shumaitsky was even more active in disseminating propaganda than his predecessor.

Infiltration and Subversion

In addition to propaganda, Moscow engaged in infiltration and subversion, infiltration of the nationalist movements such as the Jangalis and the Azeris, and subversion of various sections of society such as students, nationalists, soldiers, peasants, government workers.

To achieve its goals in 1920, Moscow relied upon Moslem communists educated and trained in Russia, many of whom were graduates of the special propaganda schools. Groups of infiltrators also emanated from the Baku oil fields where the Persian Communist Party had been active for many years. The British intercepted telegrams which indicated that approximately half million Moslems from Turkestan were being transferred to active duty, the majority of whom were to assist in infiltrating Iran.¹³ While the exact number of agents may be open to question, the operation itself had a significant effect on British assessment of the Persian situation. Small bands of infiltrators were captured and documents obtained from them exposed a large-scale organization already at work in Iran, perhaps to prepare the way for a greater effort by the Soviets to incite revolution.

The Persian Communist Party (PCP) helped spearhead the infiltration efforts. Originally called Adalat (Justice), the PCP was started by Iranian workers in the Baku area in 1917. Led by Haidar Khan, A. Sultan Zadah and Ja'far Pishavari, and purported to have 6,000 members, the Adalat organization spread out from Baku to Tabriz and Tehran and then throughout

the Caspian provinces.¹⁴ It followed the Soviet fleet to Enzeli and there in June 1920 was renamed the Persian Communist Party. It was not an independent entity but received its orders from Moscow and was active in furthering Moscow's policies in Iran. The PCP had recruited soldiers in Baku for its new Persian Red Army also created in June. This new force assisted Soviet soldiers as they moved through the northern provinces. The Persian Red Army was instrumental in assisting Ihsan Allah Khan when he and Kuchik Khan split and established their own separate governments in Gilan. The PCP infiltrated many areas of Persian life, including the Persian Cossack divisions, the gendarmes, and regular military units of the Persian army.¹⁵ Its efforts at infiltrating and subverting the Jangalis and peasants of Gilan met with little success, at least in the long run. Eventually it was ordered by Moscow to cease its attempts to win over the populace. This occurred once the RSFSR shifted gears and made an all out attempt to pacify the Persians and legitimize traditional channels of diplomacy between Moscow and Tehran. When this occurred, the PCP was all but abandoned. For instance, Riza Khan was supported over the PCP because he offered greater benefits in terms of his ability to command support within Iran, to control the administration, and to better confront the British. Hence, Riza Khan was in a better position to assist Moscow in achieving its goals. However, in 1931, after Riza Khan became Shah, the Majlis, at his urging, declared the PCP to be unconstitutional and banned it.

For the most part, the Persian Communist Party was never large enough, nor strong enough, to be an independent factor in Persian society at this time. It relied upon the presence of Soviet troops in the north and Soviet agents in Tehran. Once Soviet Russia withdrew its troops, the communist movement floundered and died, or rather was allowed to fade into obscurity until its abolition, in 1931. Persian communists were left on their own in Gilan and were murdered by the Jangalis, jailed or exiled by the Tehran Government. The RSFSR did provide asylum for those, such as Sultan Zadah and Pishavari, who could escape to Baku or Moscow. Nonetheless, the PCP contributed to the overall Soviet effort in Iran because the party served as a visible focal point for frustration and hostility of the Persians against the British and the Shah. Party members were useful tools for Soviet propaganda, and while the situation in Gilan was still fluid, they provided a center for Soviet administration in that province.

Military Force

None of these methods--propaganda, infiltration, subversion--would have been as successful as they were had it not been for the presence of Soviet forces in the north. In short, the Soviet occupation of Gilan and the presence of troops in the other northern provinces enabled Soviet agents and Soviet-sponsored organizations to exercise a wide latitude of operations afforded them by the presence and hence protection of the Red Army. Further, it was not only the

presence of the Red Army in the north but also the threat of its expanding further south which facilitated Soviet activities. This was especially crucial once it appeared to Tehran that the British forces indeed were retreating and evacuating their bases in the north. Tehran, therefore, was threatened with possible British abandonment and with a probable Soviet attack against the capital.

In any event, the use of direct force was a crucial element in Soviet intervention and without its use, the chances of Moscow's successfully interfering in Iran would have been drastically reduced. For example, infiltration was supported because the Red Army patrolled the borders not only between Iran and the RSFSR but also between northern and southern Iran. Soviet agents moved freely back and forth across both borders. This was particularly true during the 1920 crisis because of the confusion resulting from the civil war in Russia.

Diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy also was employed to influence Persian policy. However, during the Gilan crisis, this avenue was continually rebuffed until 1921 by the Persians. The RSFSR originally had wanted to establish diplomatic relations with Iran and reopen trade negotiations but so long as the British were in the north, or for that matter in Iran, Iran was not in a position to take independent action and deal directly with the Russians. Britain still refused to recognize the Soviet Government and advised Tehran to do

likewise. Until 1920 Tehran had been dealing with representatives of the White Russian faction and had maintained links with many people sympathizing with the Czarist regime who had hopes of reinstituting the old regime. In particular, the Persian Cossack Officers were loyal to the Czar and the commander of the brigade, Starosselsky, was considered unreliable and dangerous by the British. The Shah's refusal to dismiss him caused a rift between London and Tehran. The officers still were open to propaganda from the Soviet agents though, particularly in the latter's attacks on the Shah.

Diplomatic channels had been kept open between 1917 and 1920, but once Soviet troops landed in Enzeli, the RSFSR chose to downplay diplomacy, at least initially, and make use of other options available to Moscow. In this case, Moscow chose to see how far direct force would go. Consequently, Iran finally sent representatives to Baku and to Moscow to negotiate a disengagement of Soviet troops. Iran informed the British of its moves and successfully negotiated a treaty of friendship with Moscow in February 1921. (One month later the Anglo-Russian economic treaty was concluded.)

It is quite possible, in fact very probable, that the success of the diplomatic exchanges could not have been achieved without the involvement of the RSFSR in other means of interference in the internal affairs of Iran. Soviet propaganda, subversion and infiltration, along with the efforts of the PCP and the support of nationalist movements

paved the way for the diplomats. Further, without Soviet occupation, and the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan, the crisis would not have developed as it did, and Britain probably would have cajoled the Majlis into ratifying the Anglo-Persian Treaty. Early in the crisis, Moscow had concluded that non-traditional means were necessary to effect in Tehran policy change beneficial to Moscow. Its goals were diplomatic: recognition by Iran, trade relations, and resumption of the special relationship which Russia had enjoyed with the northern provinces. When it appeared possible to achieve these ends, Soviet Russia was willing to curtail several of its activities and modify the direction of influencing Persian decision makers. Soviet interference in Iran also contributed to its goals vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. Moscow's goals regarding London were also diplomatic: a move toward recognition and establishment of trade relations. By modifying its activities in Iran, Moscow also was able to move closer toward achieving these goals as well.

The Azerbaijan Crisis

Soviet techniques of interference during the Azerbaijan crisis centered on the use of military force coupled with propaganda and infiltration to protect its interests. Following the Second World War, Moscow saw an opportunity to expand its influence in Iran and grabbed it. Or rather it refused to leave Iran once the war was over. Diplomatic efforts were developed simultaneously with the use of force, the latter being manipulated by Moscow to

strengthen its diplomatic initiatives. But military force was used as a method of interference on its own as well. That is, it not only served as a tool to assist diplomatic methods but also was used to acquire territory. In this crisis, the technique of direct force was a debilitating factor for the achievement of Soviet goals and contributed to the eventual failure by Moscow to develop a more favorable regime in Tehran and to prevent third parties from gaining influence in Iran.

Propaganda

Soviet propaganda strived to achieve similar goals as those pursued in the 1920 crisis. For instance, the long range goal of establishing communism in Iran persisted. Soviet agents encouraged the development of class consciousness among the workers by supporting trade unions, and among the peasants by promising economic reforms. Here, too, there was some ambivalence because Iran still was considered by Moscow to be in a feudal state and not really ready for the socialist revolution. However, Moscow went ahead with its efforts, ignoring the lessons of the Gilan experience and the peasants' repudiation of Moscow and communism then, and tried to foment a socialist revolution in Azerbaijan and the Kurdish province. The more immediate goal centered around Moscow's efforts to weaken the influence of the West, the United Kingdom in particular, and to destroy the good faith and respect held for the West, in particular for the United States. It further worked toward undermining the

capacity of the central government in Tehran.. Moscow made use of the nationalist grievances, especially for land reform and cultural and linguistic freedom, and incited and instigated disturbances and rebellions against Tehran.

The Soviet propaganda campaign was not a steady, smooth process. Rather it ebbed and flowed as the adversaries changed and as Moscow reorganized its priorities. In general, 1939-41, the period of uncertain alliance with Nazi Germany, saw a modest activity, advocating communism and deploring the weakness of the central government and the interference of Britain in Persian affairs. During 1941 especially, Soviet efforts were directed against Iran for allowing German nationals to remain in Iran and to engage in subversion and propaganda against the Soviet Union, thus violating Tehran's avowed neutrality. Once Moscow was no longer allied with Berlin, but was itself a victim of Nazi aggression, the propagandists redirected their efforts: attack Berlin, attack Iran for its unbalanced neutrality, and now speak "kindly" of Britain and the West. From 1942 until 1944, Soviet propagandists wrote about the necessity of Allied occupation, the benefits of a united front against the Nazi aggression--even when that meant alliance with imperialists--and at the same time, assured Iran and the public of Moscow's devotion to Iran's territorial integrity and sovereignty. From 1944 through 1946, the situation changed and the facade, previously kept for the sake of the wartime alliance, was dropped with Moscow increasing its

attacks not only against the central government but also against the United States and United Kingdom.

A number of issues and incidents occurred during the war years which provided the Soviet propagandists with sufficient ammunition to carry on the verbal barrage and establish a framework within which the propagandists operated during the crisis itself. For instance, in 1942 during a severe grain shortage in the south and in Tehran, the Soviet Union gained a great deal of political mileage because it shipped to Iran a gift of 20,000 tons of grain as a gesture of friendship, while the United States and England complained that no more grain could be shipped to Iran. In Iran's hour of need, Moscow came through and received a very favorable press, to the detriment of the West. While this gift was in actuality part of an Allied shipment to Moscow, and only a small amount at that, the press did not mention this fact but rather graciously and repeatedly thanked Moscow for its generous gift.

In 1943 and 1944, there occurred a second incident involving oil concessions requested by the three Great Powers. The debates surrounding this crisis were highly acrimonious among the three nations. Moscow thereafter refused to talk with the Prime Minister, Sa'id, and attacked the central government for succumbing to American and British pressure to refuse an oil concession to Moscow. (Britain privately supported granting Moscow a concession, in part as a means of protecting its own interest in the AIOC.) Moscow was

especially angry at the legislators for passing the law forbidding even discussion of concessions. Afterwards, cooperation among the Allies took a turn for the worse and was never really the same again. They all continued to talk against the same common enemy, but not necessarily for the same things. Soviet agents used the disagreements between England and America to emphasize the exploitative nature of the western states. In fact, Moscow spent a good deal of effort trying to cripple the good will and respect the Persians had for the United States in order to prevent American entrance into Persian politics on a large scale. For example, the oil incident was linked to the various American missions operating in Iran which, in Soviet opinion, were laying the groundwork for post-war colonization by the United States. Similar charges were leveled against the United Kingdom. Soviet agents attempted to decrease the British influence in the south and if possible to weaken the AIOC and eventually to eliminate its presence altogether.

Other issues on by Soviet propagandists centered around ethnic and national grievances and dissatisfaction with the central government. This was coupled with an effort to enhance the image of the Soviet Union as a friend and champion of nationalism and self-determination. A campaign was launched to eliminate the memories of Russian and Soviet interference in Iran over the years, especially regarding the most recent Soviet intervention in Gilan and attempted usurpation of the Khiyabani movement. This last

aspect in their propaganda campaign was especially crucial for the Azerbaijan Province since bitter feelings remained among the populace. The Soviet conception of the role of religion further compounded the problems Moscow faced in the north. In addition to the cultural and national deprivation enforced by Tehran, Soviet commentators centered on the economic exploitation by the central government and injustice created and maintained by the landlord system and protected by Tehran.¹⁶

A variety of techniques were employed by Moscow, and its agents, in its propaganda campaign. Soviet propagandists published a newspaper called Thoughts of the People, which discussed the ethnic problems and which openly advocated separatism. It also criticized the Shah and the government. Further, the campaign utilized movies, personal contacts, and theater presentations to portray the Soviet Union as a friend of the Persian people.

After the conclusion of the Azerbaijan crisis in December 1946, the Soviet Union continued to utilize its numerous options in interfering in Iran's internal affairs, particularly with respect to influencing the Majlis to ratify the oil treaty, to removing Qavam from office, and to decreasing American influence in Iran. Soviet propaganda activities were increased and reached a high point over the summer and into the fall of 1947 just before the Majlis rejected the oil treaty on October 23, 1947. After this major setback the Soviet Union continued its interference in a fluctuating manner without really serious consequences.

Infiltration and Subversion

The propagandists were assisted in their efforts by Soviet Moslem agents, who infiltrated across the border. In addition, there were Persians who had been living in the Soviet Union and had received Soviet instruction. Also, there were former Soviet agents who had been active in the Gilan crisis and were sent back to Iran to help Soviet agents in the field. For instance, Ja'far Pishavari formerly was the Commissar of the Interior during the short life of the Gilan Republic. He had fled to the Soviet Union when the Republic collapsed and had been residing in the Azerbaijan SSR. When the Second World War began, Moscow sent him back to Iran on its behalf. Pishavari also was a founding member of the first Persian communist party, Adalat, formed in Baku. Other leaders elected to serve in the new Azerbaijan Republic either were born or trained in the Soviet Union, and several had been active in the 1920 crisis along with Pishavari. For example, Ali Shabastari, president of the Provincial Council, had been a Soviet agent during the Khiyabani revolt and also had fled to Baku when that revolt failed. Dr. Salam Allah Javid, Governor General of the Council, also was a member of Adalat and had been educated in Baku. Further, General Danishyan, Commander of the Azerbaijan Red Army, spoke only Russian.

Soviet agents helped organize friendship societies and other so-called cultural and educational institutions which provided fronts for the communists' work. For example,

a number of Societies of Friendship of Soviet Azerbaijan sprung up throughout the province supposedly to foster friendship between Soviet Azerbaijan and Persian Azerbaijan. These cultural societies were organized and run by VOKS, the Soviet international propaganda organization. This infiltration was a vital element in the Soviet pattern of interference partly because it was difficult to distinguish who was of Soviet origin and who was Persian. The Soviet Union could claim that such persons who exhibited open sympathy with communist/Soviet policies were not being directed by Moscow but rather were acting independently but in accord with socialist principles. In addition, the Soviet Embassy in Tehran and its consulates in Tabriz and Mahabad were instrumental in assisting the efforts of the Soviet agents. A well-organized system was maintained which combined Soviet guidance by party agents with a mass following of Persian sympathizers. For instance, members of the Tudah Party along with communists newly released from prison and communist-sympathizers were enlisted to help the Soviet cause.¹⁷

A major example of Soviet infiltration and subversion occurred in the Kurdish Peoples Republic and involved an indigenous organization initially formed to pursue nationalist goals. The Komalah, or Committee of Kurdish Youth, was formed in August 1943 by twelve Kurdish nationalists in Mahabad, the capital of the province. As their membership and influence expanded, Moscow became more interested.

Accordingly, the VOKS sent into Mahabad Soviet agents who established a Kurdish-Soviet Cultural Relations Society. This society formed an alliance with the Komalah and eventually, in April 1945, subsumed the Komalah under it. The Alliance then took a very definite Soviet orientation. By September, the Komalah was dissolved and the Kurdish Democratic Party was created. In spite of the fact that many Kurds in official positions were anti-communist, the Soviet agents and Kurdish sympathizers were able to overcome this hostility through their successful efforts at subversion, and convinced the doubters that Kurdish nationalism and progress depended on Soviet assistance and collaboration. Another major influence in the development of the Kurdish Peoples Republic rested on the ability of the Mustafa Barzani tribe, a major Kurdish tribe, to infiltrate from Iraq and provide Mahabad with a fighting force. This was facilitated by the protection of the Red Army as it patrolled the border areas, thus enabling the Barzanis to reach Mahabad safely.

With Iran proper, a major object of infiltration and subversion was the Tudah Party (Peoples Party). (Within the Azerbaijan Province, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan provided the vehicle for Soviet interference.) The Tudah Party was founded by Marxist intellectuals and workers in 1941, led by Dr. Taqi Arani, and by mid-1944 boasted a membership of about 25,000.¹⁸ Originally founded as a reformist party, its members ascribed to socialist prin-

ciples and advocated social welfare programs, such as new labor laws, the establishment of trade unions, aid for peasants, equality for minorities, free education, provision of health services, judicial reform, industrialization and friendly relations with all neighbors.¹⁹ It was not until the oil crisis of 1944 that they openly supported Soviet policy, even though it had been assumed all along by the central government and others that Tudah was "guided" by Moscow. Trouble began for the Tudah Party when it started to spread out from Tehran and establish branches in the provinces, especially in the north. Socialists in these provinces argued that the Tudah Party was ignoring their needs and not treating the periphery with equality. While socialist principles may have been important to many sectors of the population--and this too may be a moot point--it took a back seat to nationalist principles of self-determination and fair treatment. The Tudah Party, however, discounted ethnic problems and was insensitive to the national aspirations of the northern provinces. When members went to solicit from the population they did so emphasizing socialist dogma, not ethnic grievances.²⁰

Consequently, on September 3, 1945, the Azerbaijan branch of the Tudah Party was dissolved and the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan was formed absorbing the members of the local Tudah Party.²¹ Just why the Democratic Party was created usurping the authority of Tudah is a matter of some controversy. For example, Ambassador Murray argued that

this change was a Soviet ploy to increase instruments of subversion in Iran and to have a back-up in case the Tudah Party was banned or abolished by the Prime Minister.²²

On the other hand, the Tudah Party was weak in Azerbaijan and could not provide the leadership Moscow needed in attacking the central government. In addition, there appeared to be legitimate differences between the two parties and major points of contention which contributed to the weak posture of the Tudah Party in Azerbaijan.

The conflict between the two parties centered around two issues, the question of class struggle and the role of nationalist aspirations. This debate echoed the discussions which took place within the CPSU in the early years of the communist republic. It also paralleled the difficulties which arose at the Baku Conference between communist ideologues and Persian nationalists. One nationalist writer echoing the Democratic Party commented, "Our aim is to unite all the people of Azerbaijan. The class struggle will not appear until we have safely secured our national rights; industrialists and workers must put aside their difficulties and work together for the national good of Azerbaijan."²³ However, the Tudah Party would not support this approach. Nevertheless, at the behest of the Soviet Union, it professed to support the Democratic Party in general. It emphasized the communist aspects of the Azerbaijani regime, in particular the socialist reforms and economic programs implemented by Tabriz. It ignored, whenever possible, the linguistic

reforms and ethnic demands of the Party and downplayed the national aspirations of the regime, thereby separating itself from the non-Marxist elements of the Democratic Party. There were other differences as well between the two parties, as is evidenced by Abrahamian's comments.

. The Tudah and the Democratic Parties were separated from each other by contrasting social bases, conflicting interests, and at times clashing policies. The former was organized by Persian intellectuals who had come to communism through the Marxism of Western Europe. The latter was formed by Azeri patriots who had reached the same destination through the Leninism of the Bolshevik Party in the Caucasus. The first group, being Marxist, belonging to the dominant community, and residing in Tehran, . . . The second group, having fought in the Khiyabani movement and the Jangali revolt and having seen the ethnic programs of Czarist Russia, was inclined to shun the class struggle in favor of communal conflicts. In short, the Tudah was a class party based on the national intelligentsia and the proletariat; the Democratic Party was a communal organization appealing exclusively to the people of Azerbaijan.²⁴

Therefore, there appeared to be concrete differences of opinion and perspective as well as different methods of action between the two parties and consequently legitimate reasons for the establishment of a separate political party in the Azerbaijan Province. This did not, of course, rule out the complicity of Soviet agents in the creation of the new party.

Military Force

Soviet interference in Iran in 1945 was closely connected to its occupation forces and their activities, especially in Azerbaijan Province. This point cannot be overstated, especially for the period 1945-1946. In fact, I

doubt whether the "crisis" would have developed as such had the Soviet Union not had forces in the province and had not been willing to use them as tools of interference. Their presence did more than just enhance the propaganda efforts. Along with infiltration and subversion, they greatly contributed to Moscow's successes by providing security for those who did engage in these activities. Further, Soviet activities in the rest of Iran were also helped because of the fear, also encouraged by Moscow's agents, that the Red Army might be forced to intervene in other parts of Iran as well as in the north. In addition, the Red Army was used to prevent Persian forces from entering the northern provinces to reassert the authority of the central government when rebellious activities occurred. This technique of interference also assisted the propagandists in exploiting the inefficiencies and weaknesses of the central government. The Persian forces and Tehran's authority virtually were rendered impotent in the northern provinces and especially in Azerbaijan by the direct interference of the Red Army in Persian affairs. For instance, during 1945 Soviet forces provided ammunition and material to various insurgent groups in northern Iran, particularly in the Lake Rezaiyeh region in Western Azerbaijan, and in Mazanderan and Gilan. More importantly, when these groups rebelled openly against Tehran's authority, Moscow refused to order its troops to crush their revolts. This military inaction strengthened the nationalist cause and was aided by propaganda efforts

encouraging them to continue the battle. In addition, Moscow refused to allow Persian troops to enter the areas under seige, thus exposing still further the weakness of the Tehran administration. These two actions enabled the insurgents to overcome local government resistance and create a separatist government in Mahabad and Tabriz. The Red Army also supported the democratic movement by disarming soldiers and police in the major cities and sometimes even confining them to their barracks.²⁵ Soviet forces often arrested Persian citizens, particularly when they opposed the democratic movement, and interfered with the judicial processes by preventing the prosecution of alleged criminals when their crimes related to the movement for self-determination or when they were supporters of that movement. Another vital aspect of the use of military intervention involved the limitation on travel by non-communists. Persian government representatives as well as foreign representatives were prevented from moving freely in the north, which hindered the gathering of accurate information for their respective governments and assisted, therefore, the diplomatic endeavors of Moscow vis-à-vis Iran, the West and the Security Council.

The presence of Soviet forces also contributed to the psychological pressure on Tehran to acknowledge and adhere to Moscow's demands. For instance, Moscow announced on February 25 that Soviet forces would evacuate from "quiet areas," provided that "no unforeseen circumstances occurred." Since Tehran had no way of knowing exactly what "unforeseen

circumstances" might entail, it was forced to assume a defensive posture and continue to be wary of Soviet actions. In particular, it had to assume that even the presence of a limited number of Red Army forces would be effective in interfering in Persian affairs. Accordingly, Tehran kept up the pressure against Moscow by insisting that the Iranian question be kept on the Security Council agenda and by appealing to Washington to intercede on its behalf. Therefore, this ploy of offering a gesture of compliance with the terms of the Tripartite Agreement was just as effective as the actual presence of the Red Army in preventing Persian invasion of the north and suppression of the "democratic" movement.

Diplomacy

By the 1945 crisis Moscow was more willing to rely on traditional diplomacy as a means of achieving its goals in Iran. Diplomatic efforts, nevertheless, were used in conjunction with direct force, propaganda and subversion. In fact the latter techniques were instrumental in enabling the diplomats to reach a negotiated settlement with Tehran in April 1946 and later between Tehran and Tabriz in June. Further, the willingness of Moscow to conclude any agreement with Tehran also was related to its relationship with the United States and to events in the international sphere rather than solely to Persian developments. It was apparent by the spring of 1946 that the United States was supportive of Iran both regarding the military threats by Moscow and within the Security Council. The Soviet Union would not go

to war over Iran. But it was quite possible--especially after March--that war could erupt if the situation continued along the path it had for the past several months. Therefore, from April to December, it was worthwhile for Moscow to negotiate with Tehran. Nonetheless, as compensation for this modification in its tactics, propaganda efforts as well as infiltration and subversion escalated between May and November in spite of the fact that an accord had been reached between Pishavari and Qavam in June. In addition, the political and economic pressure on the Prime Minister increased. Part of this pressure included the promise of renewed trade between northern Iran and the Soviet Union. Political pressure also included the constant threat of renewed Soviet intervention under the Treaty of 1921, which had been the official excuse for Soviet intervention in 1941. By December it was Qavam himself who in essence escalated the situation by forcing Moscow onto the defensive. Consequently, Moscow once again was forced to reevaluate its goals and reestablish priorities. But by then it was clear that the Azerbaijan socialist experiment had not been successful and Moscow decreased its interference and retreated, waiting until the next opportunity to move into Iran. Needless to say, Moscow's officials were confident that such an opportunity would arise given the history of ethnic grievances and weaknesses of the central government.

Conclusions

In comparing Soviet interference in Gilan with its interference in Azerbaijan one point stands out. Namely, the similarity in methods and internal conditions far outweigh the differences. First, similar techniques were employed in both 1920 and 1945. Initially Moscow was successful in using propaganda, infiltration and subversion, diplomacy and force to achieve its goals. Second, the similarities in internal conditions such as ethnic and national grievances and a weak and ineffective central government contributed to the initial successes of Soviet operatives. Third, the differences in the two periods were relatively minor but the differences should have enabled Moscow to succeed in its second intervention. For instance, by 1945, the Soviet Union was more stable and better able to utilize its own resources to pursue its foreign policy in Iran. However, in spite of the potential for success in the second attempt at major interference, Moscow failed to make use of the lessons it should have learned from the first attempt. In particular, Moscow proved to be as inflexible as before in modifying its policies and techniques to accommodate local conditions. Further, Moscow still had not resolved its problems vis-à-vis nationalism and self-determination and the role of religion in socialist societies.

The propaganda campaign, infiltration techniques and subversive activities all were similarly employed in

1920 and 1945. The propagandists exploited the ethnic discontent regarding economic, social, and political inequalities. They encouraged nationalist demands in the north for local autonomy and incited rebellion among the Kurdish tribes. They were more successful in developing and expanding the anti-foreign and particularly anti-Western attitudes of the public. In 1920, propaganda was aimed against the Shah and especially against the proposed Anglo-Persian Treaty. In 1945, it was aimed against the central government and against the West.

In addition, the infiltration techniques were almost identical in 1920 and 1945. Moslem agents were trained in the Soviet Union, especially in the Azerbaijan SSR, and infiltrated across the Soviet-Persian border. This technique displayed the excellent use of ethnics from the Soviet Union. In particular, it contributed to the confusion and inability of Tehran to determine who was a communist agent and who was not. The racial similarities between Persian Azerbaijan and Soviet Azerbaijan--or for that matter, between Soviet Moslem and Persian Moslem--were so great that Tehran literally could not tell friend from foe based on physical appearance. Subversion, coupled with the success of the infiltration and propaganda campaigns, was also successful especially at the outset. In 1920, agents were able to penetrate the political parties, notably the Persian Communist Party, as well as friendship organizations and various newspapers. In 1945, agents operated within the Tudah Party and eventually

assisted in the creation of the Democratic Parties of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. They also functioned within friendship organizations and newspapers.

The diplomatic efforts in 1920 and 1945 were very similar. The European focus in these efforts is one example. In 1920 Moscow was looking to a trade deal with England and to recognition of its new regime from the West. In 1945 Moscow was looking to secure its successes in Eastern Europe. In both cases, Moscow's diplomacy was aimed in two directions. First, Moscow strove to achieve concessions from Tehran: political concessions regarding the newly created republics and economic concessions regarding trade and oil. Second, Moscow strove to achieve international goals: In 1920, Moscow strove to conclude a trade deal with England and to instigate revolution in the East. In 1945, its goal was to test the willingness of the West, and especially of the United States, to allow Soviet expansion, i.e., to see how far they could move without resistance. Iran was a weak point, an area of questionable significance for traditional American foreign policy. By 1946, Moscow's diplomatic efforts were shifted toward avoidance of war with the United States.

In general, Moscow utilized the diplomatic technique in conjunction with the other methods of interference. Diplomatic efforts were strengthened by the successes of the propaganda campaign and subversive activities. The later failure of these last two campaigns was in part due to the

changes in the diplomatic campaign. Once the diplomatic efforts demanded concessions on other fronts, the use and continued success of the other techniques were put in jeopardy, especially the use of force. The latter method in both crises was sacrificed to the diplomatic effort. As compensation for the loss of its most valuable tool for interference, Moscow increased its propaganda and subversion. These shifts to the diplomacy end of the interference spectrum were linked to changes in the international system and especially to Moscow's relationship with the other powers involved in Iran, namely, Britain and the United States. Once Britain offered Moscow the chance of an economic deal and tied the attainment of such an agreement with Soviet withdrawal and noninterference in Iran, Moscow was forced to relent. When the United States threatened Moscow with the possibility of war if it did not withdraw its forces and cease interfering in Persian affairs, Moscow again was forced to relent. In both instances, Moscow was forced into a position where it had little choice but to reevaluate its interference policy and modify its goals and methods of achieving them.

Nevertheless, in the long run Moscow's diplomatic efforts were partially successful in 1920 because it achieved its trade deal with London. On the other hand, it did fail to incite a communist revolution in the East. In 1945, Moscow's efforts were successful between July and September 1946, when agreements were reached, first with Tehran and

later between Tehran and Tabriz. Both treaties were engineered by Moscow and suited Moscow's interests. However, this success was short-lived when Moscow sanctioned the resort to military action by Tabriz and the Persian Red Army. This action signaled to Tehran that the accord would not lead to peace. Other factors stemming from domestic unrest elsewhere in the country plus the renewed military offensive on Tehran convinced Qavam that strong military action was necessary, action which ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet experiment in Azerbaijan.

A crucial factor in both cases of Soviet interference was the introduction of direct force as a foreign policy tool. It was not the initial introduction of the Red Army in 1920 or 1942 which was crucial. There were at least justifiable reasons for their introduction. Rather, the maintenance of those forces after the initial cause for their introduction was no longer an issue proved to be vital in furthering Soviet interference in Iran. Without the Red Army's presence in the north, Soviet interference could still have been possible. However, the possibilities would have been reduced. Under the circumstances in 1920 and 1945, without the presence of the Red Army, propaganda and infiltration along with subversion probably could have achieved a more favorable image of the Soviet Union among the Persian populace; probably could have incited rebellion, especially if the economic disparities continued unabated; probably could have caused, at the very least, grumblings and dissatisfaction among the

population. However, none of the ethnic or national groups were by themselves able to topple the Shah or the various administrations. Further, the establishment of a communist regime, either in Tehran or in one of the provinces probably could not have been accomplished without some real and direct support from Moscow. If the creation of such a regime did occur, it is equally improbable that it could have survived very long without military support from Moscow. Guerrilla action could have continued for many years, as it did in the years preceding 1920. However, relatively speaking, the Shah's government still was militarily stronger than any potential insurgents. It is probable, however, that the Shah would not have been able to reassert firm control over the dissident areas without a great struggle and probably not without aid from a stronger power, either the United Kingdom or the United States.

Further, without military forces in the north, Soviet agents could not have been protected, and the ethnic dissidents and potential adherents to communism might have been scared off by threats of retaliation from Tehran. On the other hand, since the main grievances held by the Gilanis and the Azeris still would have existed, it is quite possible and in fact highly probable that communism would have gained supporters in the north. The effect would have been minimized though, but a chance of success still would have been present. The presence of the Red Army, however, greatly enhanced the prestige and power of Moscow and its

agents in dealing with Tehran. The subsequent incapacity of Tehran to respond adequately was duly noted by the inhabitants in the north as well as elsewhere throughout Iran, in both 1920 and 1945.

Without the initial military intervention, the wherewithal and opportunity to engage to a greater extent in the other forms of interference would have been seriously impaired. In short, the Soviet Union made excellent use of its military advantage and expanded the somewhat small interference operations it had prior to the crises, developing them to new and greater proportions. Military force strengthened the other non-military techniques of interference and enabled the latter to continue under the protection of the Red Army.

As noted, the differences in the Gilan and the Azerbaijan crises were of minor significance in the long run. First, the situation in 1920 was a better ideological climate for the propagandists because of the relative newness of the communist regime in Moscow. The hopes and enthusiasm of the propagandists, along with those of the population who joined their cause, were high. Socialist revolutions were believed to be imminent and therefore it was considered to be the duty of every communist to facilitate the conditions necessary for revolutionary activity. By 1945, however, ideological commitment was relatively weaker if for no other reason than that twenty-eight years had passed without the downfall of the capitalist states.

Further, communism had undergone many transitions since the revolution in 1917 and ideological fervor had become tempered by Stalinism, purges and political shifts in policy induced by economic and political necessities.

Second, from a practical viewpoint, the political climate in 1945 (or even in 1941 when the occupation actually began) was more conducive to success. There are several reasons for the expectation that Moscow would achieve its goals in 1945. (1) By 1945 Soviet Moscow had had more than twenty years of diplomatic experience behind it, whereas in 1920 the Soviet Government was new and highly ideological. (2) The conditions contributing to economic and political grievances in Iran had been festering since before 1920 and had not been resolved satisfactorily. (3) Soviet agents had been working in Iran since 1920. Although the Soviet Union withdrew its forces in 1921, its interference continued, although at a much more modest level. Contact between Soviet propagandists and the populace over the years provided a continuous link between Moscow and the Persian public. Thus, when Soviet efforts systematically increased after 1942, and particularly in the north after 1945, the propaganda network already had been in operation for twenty-five years. (4) The occupation during the Second World War had been longer, 1942-1945, before the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan whereas the occupation in 1920 had been only a matter of months, May and June, before the Gilan Republic was created. This enabled more Soviet activity to take place between 1942 and 1945 under the protection of the Red

Army. (5) Finally, the Red Army in 1945 was far stronger than the newly created army in 1920. In both cases, however, there was the ever present need to use the army elsewhere. In 1920, for instance, the Civil War continued and the occupation forces in Iran could have been used to fight Moscow's enemies within Russia; in 1945, the army had suffered heavy losses during the war and could have used the men stationed in Iran to strengthen its forces elsewhere particularly in Eastern Europe. Also, the occupation forces could have been used to help shore up the economy. These drawbacks did not seem to deter the use of the Red Army in Iran though, and the occupation continued until a political decision was made to disengage the forces.

Given the extent of the similarities and the nature of the differences in the two cases of Soviet interference, one would have expected that there would have been better results in Moscow's handling of the second crisis in northern Iran. As a result of wartime conditions and the necessity for occupation of the northern provinces, Moscow was given the opportunity on both occasions to make use of military force as a back-up to interference in Persian affairs. However, the failure of the first experiment in socialism, in Gilan, failed to drive home to Moscow the necessity for flexibility and adjustment to national and local conditions. Moscow's failure to heed the lessons of its involvement in Gilan had many sources. First, Moscow never adequately dealt with the desire for national self-determination, either

within its own borders or for other nations like Iran. Moscow failed to realize that nationalism to the Persian nationalists meant "Persia for Persians," not semi-independence allied with, or guided by, Moscow. Soviet propagandists and agents could not carry out the necessary socialist education needed to transfer the loyalties and sympathies of the populace to see beyond the narrow lines of nationalism and ethnicity to the broader concepts of international socialism. Nationalism was a sufficient tool for Soviet policy to incite revolt against the central government; but Moscow could neither control nor modify these sentiments in the long run, and they finally turned against Moscow. In time, the population came to believe that they had substituted one oppressor for another. Consequently, once Persian forces entered the republics, the movements collapsed and the populace quickly and vehemently turned against their leaders.

The success of Soviet propaganda techniques depended more on other elements than they did on the ideological climate or the length of the operation of the propaganda network. Rather, Moscow's success in developing more favorable images of the Soviet Union, of communism, and a greater willingness on the part of the northern population to support a communist regime, whether in Gilan or Azerbaijan, was temporary. Moscow was far more successful in developing anti-Shah, anti-British, or anti-West sentiment than it was in creating support for communism. This form of support was simply not solid enough to last once other problems arose.

This is especially important because Moscow, in my opinion, never really learned the difference between opposition to others and support for itself. The illusion of pro-communist support--when the public actually was anti-British--contributed to the swift collapse of the Gilan and Azerbaijan Republics. However, Moscow did little to alter the loyalty of the population to Moscow. In fact, propagandists and agents in the field did not appreciate the difference either and sent back glowing reports to Moscow about the support and enthusiasm of the public for the socialist regimes and for communism.

Second, Moscow failed to control its agents in the field, particularly regarding the translation of communist dogma into concrete programs. While propaganda and subversion were successful at first, the agents proved to be too zealous especially with regard to religion. The insistence by communist operatives fully to embrace Marxism to the exclusion of religious beliefs--irrespective of the consequences for their goals--was simply too much for the population to take and led to an increasing loss of support in spite of continued propaganda efforts. In 1920, it was one of the factors contributing to the demise of the Gilan Republic. In 1945, it was apparent that Moscow still could not abandon its ideological antipathy to religion. While it did play down the communist antithesis to religion, it could not bring itself to sanction religion as an acceptable concept in a socialist society. Consequently, when conditions

began to deteriorate for the communists in Azerbaijan, the religious leaders were able to reassert their antagonism toward communism without appearing to sell out the nationalist cause. For the public at large, the contest then was viewed as being between religion and communism, and the public was not ready to abandon its faith.

Third, in spite of all the propaganda and infiltration, Moscow also lost support by failing to live up to promises which were made, especially those promises foretelling a more equitable economic system, and by failing to administer the province properly. By 1945, Moscow should have realized that propaganda and subversion, no matter how successful, must be matched by a corresponding noticeable change in the living conditions of the population for success to be maintained over a long period. Or put another way, the public will support an alternative political and economic system if that system offers the prospect of a better life. However, if the alternative turns out to be as bad as the old system or worse, the support will rapidly diminish. In Iran the support not only diminished but the reaction to communists was violent.

In short, Moscow could not achieve a successful intervention in 1945, in spite of--or because of--the overwhelming similarities in the two cases of interference in Iran. The similarities concerning nationalism, religion and implementation of economic and political changes contributed to the eventual demise of the Azerbaijan Republic. By the time

of the Azerbaijan crisis Moscow should have learned from the failures in Gilan that empty promises will contribute to the erosion of support. It must be noted that when Soviet forces first entered the north and when Soviet policy makers first began to escalate the level and extent of their interference in Iran, the final outcome was not predetermined. In both 1920 and 1945, Moscow had an advantage over its adversaries. The conditions within Iran were ripe for Soviet manipulation and, had they been properly exploited could have yielded far different results than what occurred. Propaganda, infiltration and subversion were successful at the beginning but were undermined in part by the very Soviet agents responsible for the initial success. By insisting on strict application of Marxist precepts, by insisting on complete loyalty to communism, and by failing to carry out reforms effectively and efficiently, Soviet agents contributed to the downfall of the Socialist Republic of Gilan and the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. This is not to say that the republics might not have fallen anyway once the central government reasserted its authority. Nor is it to presume that international factors were unimportant in the final determination to disengage from Iran. It is to say, however, that resistance to Tehran probably would have been greater and might have contributed to a compromise solution with Tehran. In fact, in neither case was the central government so strong or confident that the final outcome was assured. It is quite probable that Tehran would have welcomed

a negotiated settlement had the people in the north chosen to resist once the Red Army was withdrawn. But the emotional appeal, the loyalty to communism was never firmly implanted in the population. Therefore, the public's determination and commitment to defend its newly created system did not develop. Actually it was more than just poorly developed loyalty. By 1921 in one case and by 1946 in the other the communists had so ingratiated themselves with the public by their terror tactics that the populace was in turn overzealous in its support for the Persian authorities and instituted a reign of terror of their own against the communists in both republics.

Notes

1. "Organization of the Department of International Propaganda for the Eastern Peoples," Zhizn Natsionalnostei, No. 5 (13), February 16, 1919, p. 4; quoted in X.J. Eudin & R.C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-27 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 163.
2. Vladimir Lenin, "Preliminary Draft on some Theses on the National and Colonial Questions," Communist International 11/12 (June/July 1920):2157.
3. Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East, p. 82.
4. Ibid., p. 86.
5. Stenographic Records, Baku Peoples Congress, September 1-8, 1920, quoted in N.S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923 (N.Y.: Russell F. Moore Co., Inc., 1952), p. 164.
6. Ibid. For a more detailed treatment of the Congress see Fatemi, *ibid.*, and the Stenographic Records, *ibid.*
7. A. Sultan Galiev, "Methods for Anti-Religious Propaganda Among the Muslims," in Sultan Galiev, Metody anti-religionzni Propagandi sredi Musulman (Moscow), pp. 3-7, excerpted in Eudin & North, Soviet Russia and the East, Document 4, p. 48.
8. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft," p. 2158.
9. For insight into the debate see Communist International, 1919 and 1920.
10. Jangal, June 6, 1920, quoted in Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, pp. 245-246.
11. G.V. Chicherin, London Times, June 3, 1920, quoted in Fatemi, *ibid.*, p. 208.
12. This material was gleaned primarily from Fatemi, *ibid.*, pp. 288-293.
13. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First Series, eds. E. L. Woodward & R. Butler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Offices, 1947), XIII:446.
14. R.K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966), p. 141.

15. A. Sultan-Zade, "The Communist Party of Iran," Communist International, 13 (August 1920):2539-2540.

16. Richard Van Wagenen, The Iranian Case, 1946 (N.Y.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952), pp. 23-24; M. Sergeyev, "In Iranian Azerbaidjan," New Times No. 1 (January 1, 1946):26.

17. Ivan Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-58 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959), p. 200.

18. See Ervand Abrahamian, "Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudah and the Firqah-i Dimukrat," for a more detailed account of the development of the Tudah Party, International Journal of Middle East Studies, I (1970):291-316.

19. George Lenczowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran," Middle East Journal, I no. 1 (January 1947):32.

20. Abrahamian, "Communism & Communalism in Iran," p. 301.

21. The two parties eventually merged in 1960 under the leadership of the Tudah Party.

22. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1945, VIII:417.

23. "Unity is the Basis of Our Certain Victory," Azarbayjan, September 17, 1945, quoted in Abrahamian, "Communism & Communalism in Iran," p. 309.

24. Ibid., p. 315.

25. For further details see "The Particulars of Interference by Soviet Authorities," United Nations Security Council Official Records, Appendix B, Section II:38-43.

CHAPTER VI

MODIFICATION OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN IRAN

Soviet interference in Iran was neither uniform nor consistent during the Gilan crisis. Soviet Russia made one major shift in its methods of interference, that of deemphasizing--but not eliminating--the military aspect and placing greater importance on the diplomatic front, but only after its military presence made the necessary point. Primarily, British threats--indeed British action--in suspending the trade negotiations until Moscow promised to withdraw its troops were of major significance in inducing Moscow to alter its policy towards Iran. At no point in the crisis did Moscow eliminate or stop any of its non-military means of interference which were objected to by other powers. Concessions were made to Iran and England, but they were minor. Soviet interference persisted and only when specific goals were achieved did the various forms of interference abate as they became unnecessary or were reevaluated.

Soviet policy in Iran during the Azerbaijan crisis was continually being frustrated by efforts of the United States, Great Britain, and Iran. American resistance and activities were especially strong, so much so that Moscow was forced to reevaluate its priorities not only with respect

to Iran but regarding other areas as well. This reevaluation led to an abandonment of Azerbaijan and the socialist revolution there; the submission, under pressure, to American demands to withdraw from Iran; and the realization that securing a "friendly" or "safe" government in Iran would be a difficult and risky business given the means Moscow was prepared to use. Soviet willingness to alter its methods of interference, in general, was a result of American support of Iran and American pressures on Moscow.

This chapter is devoted to an examination of Soviet deliberations and calculations concerning its interference in Iran during the Gilan and Azerbaijan crises. Previous chapters have focused on the methods used by Moscow in its interventions in northern Iran and if and how Moscow shifted the use of those techniques. This chapter will explore the options available to Moscow at strategic points in time to determine whether in fact Moscow responded to pressures from other sources and to what types of pressure it responded. This chapter will assess the elements influencing Soviet decision makers as they modified their foreign policy towards Iran.

The Gilan Crisis

During the Gilan crisis there were three major turning points in Soviet-Iranian relations. Each point was crucial in the Soviet intervention because it presented Moscow with several possible alternative courses of action. Had

Moscow chosen the path it did at each juncture, the resolution of the conflict probably would have been different.

Moscow's calculations were determined in part by its reevaluations of goals both in Iran and in general. During each point when Moscow was in a position to initiate a new course of action, Moscow's analysis was based on cost-benefit calculations. Usually the determination was that Moscow had little to gain by acceding to foreign protests while it had little to lose and possibly much to gain by proceeding with its own plans of interference in Iran. Only when the cost was believed to be too high, e.g., the risk of losing the trade deal with London, was Moscow then willing to modify its policy of interference in Iran.

1. The first turning point in Soviet policy in Iran occurred when the RSFSR decided to maintain its forces in northern Iran despite the fact that Denikin's forces had been defeated and the British were in the process of leaving the northern provinces. For security reasons Moscow was compelled to invade northern Iran and would have done so without the hope of possible support from the Jangalis or the Persian peasantry. Once the British started to fall back without seriously resisting the Red Army, and once it became evident that Persian forces would not be a threat, the risk involved in remaining in the north was minimal. Therefore, Moscow had little to lose by holding its ground in the northern provinces and engaging in revolutionary activity against the British and the Persians. Moscow might have jeopardized

its newly won successes against the White Forces because Moscow was never completely certain as to British intentions. If, for example, the British reversed their policy of not actively supporting the White Guards or if the Persians ratified the Anglo-Persian Treaty, thereby making Britain responsible for the integrity of Iran--then at least the Red Army would have been in a better strategic position to prevent or slow down a British invasion of the Caucasus or an attack on Baku. The Soviet Government always had the option of withdrawing the troops at a later date if strong resistance did develop.

The ideological decision to extend communism into Iran was overshadowed, in a sense, by these events. The opportunity was presented for this ideological activity and Moscow chose to seize the chance. The debate whether socialism in fact was possible in a society like Iran was given fresh meaning because Moscow then had the opportunity to test it out. Again, Moscow would have had little to gain by leaving Iran after routing the White Guards. Accordingly, Moscow chose to remain in Gilan and to increase the political and the ideological intervention in the northern provinces.

During this initial period of Soviet intervention, Moscow was reacting to two events. First, there was the need to crush the White Forces. With that goal accomplished, Moscow then was responding to what probably appeared to the Soviet leadership as a vacuum of political influence. That is, first, the British Army appeared to be in a state of retreat. If the

British did in fact have orders not to resist then why should not Moscow make the most of the situation. Indeed, it appeared that London's relationship with Tehran was unstable, resulting from Tehran's delaying tactics regarding ratification of the Anglo-Persian Treaty. The indecisiveness which appeared to develop also offered Moscow a chance to increase its influence in Tehran.

2. A second turning point occurred during a ten-month struggle between Ihsan Allah Khan's communists and Kuchik Khan's Jangalis. Moscow had a number of options from which to choose. First, Moscow could have withdrawn its support of the Gilan Republic altogether. This was a possibility because one faction within the Soviet Communist Party still argued that socialism could not succeed in Iran because the populace was too backward and simply not ready for socialism. In addition, this faction argued against supporting nationalist movements. Both factions were reaffirmed by the developments in Gilan. The population did not appreciate the value of socialism especially the anti-religion campaigns led by the communists. Nor were they thrilled with the inefficient handling of the government and the failure to institute and implement economic and political reforms.

Second, Moscow could have supported Ihsan Allah Khan's faction. This path was advised by many members of the Communist Party in Moscow, particularly by those who felt Kuchik Khan could not be trusted and that his nationalism was a liability and an impediment to socialist development. On the other hand, the Jangalis were a strong force in Gilan

and would have proven to be a dangerous adversary. For one thing they could have provided a model for other ethnic groups who opposed Tehran but who also opposed socialism, for instance the Azeris. In addition, to attempt to crush Kuchik Khan's forces would have been futile since he had the support of a sizeable portion of Gilan and probably could have acquired the support of other ethnic groups in the north. Also the Jangalis were seasoned fighters and certainly would have been a match for the communists. Since in the past Kuchik Khan has assisted the Russians and was apparently noted for his vacillation, it would have served no purpose to spend time and effort to fighting when it would have been better for Moscow to win his allegiance.

Third, Moscow could have continued to support Ihsan Allah Khan and at the same time attempt a reconciliation between him and Kuchik Khan. In this way Moscow could have hoped to control the entire government in Gilan and also have the prospect of future gains in other northern provinces. Consequently, Moscow chose the third option and kept its communications open with both groups while supplying Ihsan Allah Khan with men and material.

Under the circumstances, Moscow's options really were limited. To disengage completely because of difficulties in the revolutionary movement was unnecessary and counterproductive. London itself was withdrawing from Iran. Pressure on Moscow was relatively minimal at this point. Why then should

Moscow have given up a potentially useful opportunity to interfere in Iran when the risk was minimal, and little, if anything, would have been gained from withdrawal?

3. The final turning point in Soviet foreign policy during the Gilan crisis occurred in the spring of 1921. Moscow made a decision to accede to Britain pressure and withdraw its forces from Iran. However, there was a considerable lapse between the Soviet agreement to honor British interest in Iran in the fall of 1920 and the final withdrawal on September 8, 1921. During this period, Moscow used delaying tactics in negotiating with the Tehran Government and made use of the apparent delaying tactics used by London. For instance, more soldiers were sent into Iran both to link up with Jangalis and to provide men for the Persian Red Army. Soviet forces, therefore, were still in Iran when the Russian-Persian Friendship Treaty was signed in February 1921 and the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement concluded in March.

During this period, however, Moscow's options were limited. First, it could have ignored the British pressure and continued its interference. Moscow's chances of successfully ignoring British threats were in part due to the opportunity created by the failure of Tehran to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty. Moscow made use of this antagonism between London and Tehran. Consequently, Moscow responded to British and Persian protests about its interference by increasing its propaganda on the Treaty. Moscow was able to fan the discontent in Iran toward the British and weaken Tehran's independ-

ence, such as it was, concerning the latter's compliance with London's wishes regarding non-communication or negotiation between Tehran and Moscow. This policy was successful in that it forced Tehran into a position where it became willing to negotiate separately with Moscow irrespective of what London advised, or demanded. Had there not been this hostility between the two supposedly friendly states, Moscow's alternatives would have been restricted and it is possible, indeed probable, that Moscow would not have been able to continue the crisis for as long as it did.

In addition to the problems Moscow might have faced vis-a-vis British and Persian protests, Moscow very probably would have been faced with renewed civil war between Jangali forces and the Persian Red Army, or a revolt by the populace against its communist administrators. In fact, the potential of full-scale civil war in the Gilan Republic was real since the two factions during this period had not reconciled. Had such a situation actually developed, Moscow would have had to choose between a strong and costly commitment to the communist forces--with no assurance of success even with that aid--or a withdrawal of its forces. Withdrawal under these conditions probably would not have produced any benefits to Moscow. On the other hand, Moscow could have continued to support Ihsan Allah Khan and sanction his efforts against Tehran. However, they also would have had to insure that he would not order a major thrust further south to threaten British interests there. So long as the British felt secure in their part

of Iran, it is possible that a modus vivendi could have been worked out with London, as it had in the past. However, it is doubtful that such a situation would have lasted because the evidence pointed to the fact that the Persian communists often pursued policies on their own and might have continued further south in their attack. Or, they might have made their administration in the north so unbearable or hazardous to Europeans living there that British interference might have resulted. Further, it is doubtful that London could have accepted communist presence en masse further south without feeling threatened over India or Afghanistan. Had Moscow continued its interference, it might have concluded a trade deal with London eventually anyway since such a deal was in London's interest. (Since the tentative March accord was signed while communists still were active in Gilan, this was essentially the case anyway.) However, London could have afforded to wait while Moscow really could not. In addition, Moscow could not afford to bluff the British because the economic relief was needed too badly.

Had Moscow continued its interference, it might have succeeded in developing socialism in Gilan, but the probability was low. The socialist experiment was failing to make any headway. This failure was attributed directly to the backwardness of the country, to the feudal conditions and to the belief that peasants and workers at the feudal stage of development could and would be ready to accept communism.

Soviet reevaluation was linked to the premature belief that Iran was ready for revolution. That is, an analysis independent of the British pressure regarding the Trade deal took place which questioned the value of pursuing the revolutionary struggle in a region beset by so many problems not conducive to that struggle. For instance, in September 1921, an assessment of the situation by Izvestia admitted that it was futile to set up communism in a feudal society.¹ Iransky, a leading specialist on Iran, expressed clearly the opinion generally held regarding the Gilan failure:

. . . In view of the backwardness, ignorance and apathy of the Persian peasantry, the revolutionary movement in Gilan never found staunch supporters. The peasants were delighted to grab the land but they never understood the content of the revolution. . . . Further, lack of understanding of communist ideology, personal jealousies of the leaders, religious fanaticism and mistakes of the new government jointly were responsible for its failure.²

The ideological failure was reinforced by practical considerations. Namely, after more than a year of dealing with Kuchik Khan, Moscow realized that this ally was difficult if not impossible to predict and control. In spite of infiltration and Soviet agents, Kuchik Khan was not toeing the Soviet line and therefore was a liability. Moscow had more to gain by cooperating with London and with a new Persian government than by assisting the Gilan Government.

As a second option, Moscow could have complied with British demands immediately and completely. This would have meant an end to Soviet intervention and interference and complete withdrawal. Under the circumstances Moscow would

have lost a great deal especially in light of the success of the propaganda campaign against London, Tehran, and initially in support of the communist movement in Gilan.

Therefore, Moscow chose the third alternative which basically was to accede to British pressure and still institute delaying actions in order to strengthen its hand in Iran.* Accordingly, Moscow promised to honor British interests in the East and to withdraw its troops once the British did so. There were a number of reasons for the Soviet action. First, in the spring of 1921 Moscow faced serious problems within Soviet Russia which necessitated a change of tactics in Iran and toward London. By March 1921, the economic conditions were so bad that Lenin instituted the New Economic Policy which sanctioned many non-communist activities such as the right to have a limited amount of private land to cultivate for the markets. Also in March, the sailors at the Kronstadt garrison rebelled against the communist party, charging that the party had sold out the true goals of the communist revolution. They were joined by workers groups protesting Lenin's apparent accommodation of capitalist forces in the West. By 1921, communist methods had led to

* Moscow's policy of stalling for time may not have been entirely its own idea. Rather, the Soviets may have been reacting to the British policy of procrastination. On several occasions, it was London itself which hurled obstacles in the path of the negotiations by demanding that Moscow agree to protect Wrangel and his counterrevolutionary forces. After, London delayed the trade talks by insisting that Moscow cease its interference in Iran.

the decrease in agricultural production so that general output equalled about one-half the total of that produced in 1913.³ Land under cultivation had dropped to three-fourths of that in 1913. By the end of 1920, there were numerous peasant uprisings over government quotas and directives. Consequently, by 1921 Soviet Russia faced very pressing domestic problems which possibly could be alleviated by a trade deal with London. But the British were holding back, demanding that the Soviets recognize British interests in the Near East and cease their propaganda activities. This prompted Lenin to argue for a modification in Moscow's policies in Iran. He commented:

. . . Our current aim is to obtain a trade treaty with England, to have normal commercial intercourse, to be able to buy as soon as possible the machinery necessary for our broad plan of reconstruction of our economy. . . . Our policy in the Central Committee is to make the maximum concessions to England. If those gentlemen want to obtain some promises, then we state that our government will not conduct any official propaganda, that we do not want to attack any of the British interests in the East.⁴

He did not argue that Moscow should eliminate its revolutionary goals, only postpone them for a time. Moscow gave a verbal promise in September 1920, but continued to keep its army in the north and continued to interfere in Iran. This interference escalated during the late spring and summer, and aid was increased to the revolutionary forces in Gilan. In short, Moscow decided to see how far the situation could be manipulated so that Moscow's losses would be minimal. So long as the risk involved was deemed within acceptable limits Moscow pursued this approach. It enabled the Persian

Red Army to make a final thrust at Tehran and gave the socialists within Gilan a reprieve to shape up their policies. It really was a worthwhile gamble because if trouble should have developed Moscow still could have claimed it was not involved in the communists' activities. Rather, it could have blamed the interference on the Comintern. It was Moscow's claim all along that Soviet Russia was but one of the many communist members of the Third International and it, as the others, was subject to the directives of the leadership. The Comintern pursued its own policies to further communism throughout the world. Moscow argued that it did not control the activities of this body and therefore could not and should not be held responsible for its alleged activities in Iran. Further, the communist movement in Gilan was an indigenous movement led by the Persian communists and assisted by the Azeri (Azerbaijan SSR) communists.

When Moscow promised to honor British interests in Iran it also noted that in defense of its own interests it could not withdraw its forces from northern Iran until the British left Iran in May. Then, Moscow stated that it had to remain in the north to prevent confusion and preserve law and order. It continued to negotiate with the British over its presence in Iran until it finally decided to quit the north in September.

Moscow supported one last attempt at conquering Tehran when it sanctioned the communist attack on Tehran in August. When this failed, Moscow continued with its plans

for withdrawal and did not pursue any alternative options regarding military support of the Persian communists. They had had their opportunity and failed. Moscow decided not to expend any more effort or risk further involvement with a losing proposition. Accordingly, on September 8, 1921, Soviet forces withdrew from Gilan and opened the way for Tehran's forces to crush the communist regime.

What is important to realize about the course of events in Iran is that the RSFSR was in control of the situation in spite of the pressures exhibited by London. Moscow had several options available to it at every turning point and made its decision based on its own calculations of risk and gain rather than as a reaction primarily to British or Persian protests. This does not mean that these protests were not important; they were. But had Moscow not considered the economic benefits more important than those it could have derived from its policy in Iran, then British protests would not have been sufficient to induce or force Moscow to modify its foreign policy toward Iran. Moscow came out of the Gilan crisis as the relative "victor" because it had achieved those goals it deemed vital and important to Soviet interests.

The Azerbaijan Crisis

The Soviet and British occupation of Iran gave Moscow another opportunity to increase its interference in Persian affairs. During the war years Moscow took a conciliatory posture, bowed to Allied and Persian demands, and modified its behavior. However, it should be emphasized that this

modification in interference came as a result of continued pressure and not because Moscow was trying to be accommodating on its own accord. For instance, Moscow encouraged, incited and supplied the Kurds of Western Azerbaijan in 1942-43, and used its armed forces to support their revolts. Moscow responded to protests by Washington, London, and Tehran to reverse its policy and allow Persian troops in to quell the rebellions. Moscow could have persisted in its refusal to permit Iran to send in these troops, but this was during the crucial years of the battles of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and Moscow needed the support, not to mention the war supplies, of the West. Therefore, it did not make sense for Moscow to continue its interference in this form at this time when such activities might threaten its very survival. Moscow did, however, continue to propagandize on behalf of communism and to encourage nationalism among the tribes of the north, offering the promise of future assistance once the war was over.

Moscow's primary goal during this period was to survive the war. To this end, Moscow made every effort to cooperate with its allies. However, a secondary goal was to extend Soviet interference into Iran. While this secondary goal often led to policies contradictory to the first--created tension and problems with its wartime allies--Moscow continued to pursue this policy as well. It is clear that the war necessities took precedence over Moscow's other policies but it is equally clear that Moscow strived to carry out

both goals simultaneously. By 1943, Moscow altered its policy in Iran and escalated its interference. There were indications that a change in policy was in the works which would foretell Soviet actions in Iran after the war. First, in 1943 Moscow recalled two of its ambassadors who had the most experience with Western countries but who were not trusted completely by Stalin. Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to London, and Maxim Litvinov, Ambassador to Washington, were recalled and replaced by ambassadors of unquestionable loyalty to Stalin. Cooperation with the West was no longer a priority for Moscow, although still a necessity.⁵ The necessity for cooperation was demonstrated during the oil crisis of 1943-44. Moscow utilized every method and technique of interference to obtain an oil concession. After the Majlis rejected the deal, Moscow continued to interfere in Persian affairs on behalf of this goal. However, when it became clear that the West was supporting the decision by the Majlis, Moscow decreased its pressure and "more or less" accepted the result. Moscow, of course, did not accept the decision for the long run, but again wartime necessities forced it to reassess its goal and modify its means of achieving it.

The second indication of a change in Moscow's tactics was marked by the Battle of Stalingrad. The siege of the city ended in Soviet victory in 1943 and alleviated the Soviet fear of German advances further into Russia. (The Battle of Leningrad in the north was still an open question though.)

By the same token, however, the Allies were preoccupied with the war as well, particularly the United Kingdom which traditionally countered Soviet penetration into Iran. The Allies chose to ignore or protest meekly Soviet interference, especially when that interference was in its own zone. Thus, Moscow's Persian policy was facilitated by the very war situation which also curtailed its activity. None of the powers involved in Persian affairs could afford to come down too hard on the others for fear of weakening their anti-Hitler coalition. Further, when protest or resistance to a particular policy was necessary, as in the oil crisis, it was in the interest of all parties concerned to keep a lid on their actions and try to reach an accommodation to the problem. Throughout the period Moscow adhered to this unwritten rule but at the same time laid the groundwork for post-war expansion and infiltration.

These Soviet moves were conditioned by one factor, that is, the survival of the Soviet Union. Had its very survival not been at stake, it is highly improbable that Moscow would have agreed to decrease its interference. As it was, Moscow went only as far as it deemed necessary to comply with Allied wishes without sacrificing its policy in Iran. For example, propaganda efforts continued against the Majlis, the Prime Minister, and the oil concession law itself. After the law forbidding discussion of oil concessions was passed, a new dimension was added to the propaganda campaign, namely attacks against the West. The old propaganda lines

of the imperialist West exploiting Iran were revived despite the wartime alliance. In fact, Moscow never really modified its policy at all, only shifted the emphasis. Thus, the oil crisis was allowed to pass without a major retaliation by Moscow. This was, as noted before, the turning point in the wartime alliance, foretelling of post-war friction. All three powers modified their cooperative stances in Iran after this crisis, with each nation conducting individual propaganda campaigns, information dissemination, and diplomacy.

It is possible to discern several crucial points in Soviet-Persian relations during the Azerbaijan crisis when Moscow faced a number of alternative paths from which to choose. At each point, the outcome was uncertain, and had Moscow chosen different options, it is very probable that the course of events would have evolved quite differently.

1. The first turning point occurred once the war was over. Moscow was obligated to honor the terms of the Tripartite Accord and evacuate its troops by March 2, 1946. Washington and London announced plans to honor Iran's call for immediate withdrawal as soon as practicable. (The United States left by January 1, 1946 and the British by the March 2nd deadline.) Moscow at this juncture had several alternatives.

First, it could have gone along with Allied plans to leave Iran as soon as possible. However, this path would have achieved little for the Soviet Union, particularly in

the north since its troops protected communist agents and dissidents from retaliation and suppression by Tehran. During the war communists had been successful in subverting many groups especially in the Azerbaijan Province and in propagandizing on behalf of the Soviet Union and Persian communists. To leave now would have invited Tehran's retaliation and would have assured the arrest, if not execution, of the dissident leaders. Moscow's leverage would have been gone and any possibility it had of influencing Tehran toward a more pro-socialist domestic policy would have been eliminated. By evacuating, Moscow might have enhanced its position vis-a-vis the Allies. However, in the summer of 1945, the hostility which would later engulf the Allies was not openly acknowledged--even though some leaders such as Churchill warned of the potential dangers. Further, Moscow's influence in Eastern Europe and the prospect of expanding that sphere of influence did not appear to be in danger. Consequently, Moscow had little to gain and a considerable amount to lose by evacuating its troops.

Second, Moscow could have maintained its troops in the north without inciting or assisting the Kurds or Azeris to revolt. This course of action would have given Moscow time to increase its influence in the north still further. It also would have given time for Tehran to consolidate what power it did possess and could encourage Tehran to challenge on its own Soviet presence. While it might have lessened the impact on the Allies by giving the impression of being

benign, by 1945 this was unnecessary because the Soviet Union already had been implicated in the Kurdish rebellion in 1942 and again throughout 1945. Further, to keep its troops there without making use of the opportunity to further communism would have served little purpose for Soviet foreign policy.

The third alternative was for Moscow to seize the opportunity it had to influence events in Iran, which it did. Therefore, it not only did not evacuate its army, it used that army to protect its nonmilitary activities of instigating, supplying and leading the revolt in the Azerbaijan Province.

The risk incurred by this course probably was considered minimal. It is possible that Stalin figured Iran was not part of the traditional area of American interest and therefore would not have met resistance by the United States. The British, while a traditional partner in Persian affairs, were not in a position to oppose effectively on its own Soviet actions. Moscow probably calculated that the potential forms of British resistance would not be that dangerous to its interests either in Iran or elsewhere. No doubt, a military response by London was ruled out, economic protests were unlikely, and political protests relatively inconsequential. Further, the Allies at the end of the war appeared to be preoccupied with European events which excluded interest in Persian affairs. Moscow gambled that these interests would preclude active involvement in Iran. Consequently,

Moscow had the impression that it had a relatively free hand to agitate in Iran and extend its influence in Azerbaijan with minimal risk. Moscow had the upper hand in that an indigenous communist movement was available to be exploited. In addition, since its troops were already in the north it was not as if the status quo were being altered appreciably. Moscow seemed to have a good chance of success since its agents had been active throughout the north during the four years of war, and a rather extensive network had been prepared for post-war interference. At the most it could establish a communist regime once again in the north, and possibly eventually in Tehran. At the least it could influence Tehran to be more pro-Soviet.

In short, Moscow had little to lose at this point by escalating its interference in Iran. Moscow hardly could be blamed for seizing the advantage it found itself with in August 1945. With little apparent resistance or interest by the Allies--short of verbal protests to honor the Tripartite Accord deadline--Moscow proceeded with its plans of intervening in Persian affairs. At this point, Moscow's investment was minimal, i.e., its prestige regarding the success of a communist revolution was not on the line and huge quantities of supplies had not changed hands as yet. Therefore, should a disengagement become necessary, Moscow would be free to leave. Consequently, with the opportunity available, resistance from third parties apparently weak and ineffectual, risk minimal, the Soviet Union proceeded to escalate its

intervention in Iran and especially in Azerbaijan.

2. The most important turning point in the Azerbaijan crisis--after the initial decision to escalate its interference--was the decision to introduce more troops into Iran in March 1946 and deploy them throughout the north, thereby altering the status quo. This action was important in itself because of the immediate reactions. It was important also because it created a set of circumstances which snowballed and finally led to the collapse of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan some nine months later.

One important question here is why the Soviet Union chose to introduce a new element into its arsenal of interference techniques. What had it hoped to gain? While it had announced that there would be a partial evacuation in compliance with the Tripartite Accord, it also determined that some troops were to remain in the north, thereby assuring the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People's Republic of continued Soviet assistance for their revolutions. So long as Soviet troops remained in Azerbaijan, the movement more or less was secure, and whatever plans the Democratic Party had developed were protected by the Soviet Red Army. While the Democratic regime had lost adherents during the year because of its failure to live up to its promises of needed social and economic reforms, the opposition was neither organized nor strong enough to topple the Tabriz regime. Tehran certainly was not a major threat to Moscow's policies. American action in the United Nations and its

bilateral activities had not been so overtly threatening to warrant such a risk of provoking American retaliation or risking a military confrontation with the West. The debate in the Council was by no means seriously detrimental to Soviet interests. The Russians simply denied the charges and filed charges of their own against British interference in the Near and Middle East. Propaganda efforts were continuing smoothly as were subversive activities, not only in Azerbaijan but in Tehran as well. Pressure was continually mounting against Qavam and the prospects seemed good that sooner or later he would be replaced, that is, if he did not acquiesce to Soviet demands. He was already under attack from many quarters, including the Shah, members of the Majlis, and the American Government, not to mention several tribes in the south.

Therefore, given the apparent success of Soviet interference, the relatively modest threat to Soviet interests from the West up to that point, and the fact that Moscow already had announced that some military forces would remain in Iran, the only conclusion one can draw is that Moscow--and in particular, Stalin--miscalculated the situation. No doubt Moscow perceived that the time and conditions, both in Iran and internationally, were "right" for decisive Soviet action and that it should act now before either the West or Iran was in a stronger and more unified position to retaliate. Consequently, Moscow probably decided to strike fast to secure Iran once and for all; at the same time, to attack Turkey,

which refused to bow to Soviet pressures regarding the Straits (1946 witnessed a major Soviet campaign against Turkey); and attack Iraq. It is possible that Moscow perceived American support for Iran as a propaganda ploy of its own and that therefore Washington may not have been prepared to back up its talk with action. Moscow may not have known that on January 5th, in an inter-office memo to Secretary Byrnes, President Truman concluded that American foreign policy should be committed to the defense of Iran. He said,

. . . I think we ought to protest with all the vigor of which we are capable against the Russian program in Iran. There is no justification for it. It is parallel to the program of Russia in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. It is also in line with the highhanded and arbitrary manner in which Russia acted in Poland. . . . Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand: "How many divisions have you?" I do not think we should play compromise any longer.⁶

Since this statement was part of an inter-office memo and not made public, it is possible that the Russians were interpreting American actions in general rather than internal discussions or public pronouncements and private comments at the United Nations. Consequently, American actions might have appeared in the Russian perspective to be weak, wavering, and noncommittal, especially where Iran was concerned. Also, Soviet officials possibly perceived the West's interest in the United Nations' future as being perhaps more important than challenging Moscow over Iran and risking the walkout of the Soviet Union from the United Nations. After all, history already had shown that without Great Power approval, international organizations could not be effective. (Witness

American non-participation in the League of Nations.)

Further, there were a number of little incidents which could have fed fuel to this view. For instance, during many conversations among the ambassadors in Tehran and at the United Nations, those representatives--including Secretary of State Byrnes himself--implored the Soviet delegates not to press matters in Iran because a confrontation or violent exchange in the Security Council had to be avoided at all costs.

In view of the above, Moscow probably felt it had everything to gain and little to lose by bluffing its way into Iran. Would the United States truly risk war over Iran? Stalin would not, therefore, why would the United States? He probably concluded that since his troops were there first and already deployed in strategic areas, making the first move would be to his advantage, both militarily and psychologically. It is evident in pursuing this line of thinking that Stalin did not consider Iran a vital area to the West. However, it soon became apparent to Moscow that Washington was not to be bluffed or threatened, that Iran was indeed a part of strategic interest of the United States, and that the United States apparently was preparing to confront Moscow.

Moscow had other options available to it which might have avoided a confrontation with the United States. For instance, Moscow could have drawn out its disengagement from Iran, possibly up to a year thereby giving the communists in Azerbaijan more time to consolidate their resources and strengths. Thus, the United States would not have been forced

to take such decisive action at that particular time. It is probable that Washington would have continued to pressure Moscow but the pressure would have been within "acceptable" limits for Moscow, i.e., political protests from Washington and probably from the Security Council, threats, diplomatic notes, continued debate in the Council. It is also unlikely that the Security Council would have become a serious threat to Moscow. For one, there was no precedent for Council action in this matter. Second, the members, especially Washington and London--and quite possibly Moscow, although that could be debated--were determined to avoid a serious rift among themselves or to take action that would weaken or possibly destroy the United Nations. While Washington and London both claimed to be devoted to the United Nations, Washington in particular was resolute in its belief that the Council had to take firm action against Soviet interference. Nevertheless, the possibility still remained that in the crunch Washington would have preferred to salvage the United Nations rather than force Moscow to withdraw or face alone the the other Council members. So soon after the Second World War and with the League's problems still clear, there was the possibility--certainly a fifty-fifty chance--that Moscow could have persevered in face of American and/or United Nations action. In other words, had Moscow not created a situation which was intolerable for Washington and London, the possibility was good that Security Council action or American threats would not have been so devastating that

Moscow would have been threatened. Without the March provocation, Moscow probably could have gained for itself much more time and probably could have succeeded in obtaining from Tehran a political solution to the communist insurgency in the Azerbaijan Province.

Given the instability of the government in Tehran, it was possible that Tehran would have made a deal with Moscow concerning the latter's authority or influence in the north in exchange for a decrease of propaganda against the central government and possibly even for military disengagement. This was a very real possibility since the connection between creation of a joint oil company and Soviet withdrawal had been raised during the February meetings between Qavam and Stalin. At that point, Iran rejected Soviet entreaties regarding an oil concession and Moscow rejected Persian requests for its evacuation of the north. However, both sides left open the possibility of achieving a compromise which would have entailed Soviet evacuation in exchange for Persian acquiescence to an oil deal. Further, a memo from Qavam apparently made the connection more explicit.⁷ Therefore, Persian acceptance of terms favorable to Moscow was a good possibility. In addition, while the Prime Minister had the assurances of Washington that it would support Iran, political history forced caution into the minds of the decision makers in Tehran. In particular, how much was Iran worth to the United States? Would the United States risk another war for the sake of Iran's integrity? If the United States did not or could not restrict Moscow's activities in Eastern

Europe, why should Tehran have expected it to do so in Iran? One could not blame Tehran for the caution it exercised in dealing with other powers. It is precisely this necessity for caution, based on previous experience, that raised the possibility of a separate arrangement between Tehran and Moscow had Moscow not pressed the issue by forcing American response to its military moves. In fact, Moscow already had been successful in January in creating bad feeling between Washington and Tehran over the question of an appeal to the United Nations Security Council and the maintenance of the "Iranian question" on the agenda. Nevertheless, Moscow chose to ignore the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Tehran at this time and proceeded to escalate its presence in northern Iran.

The risk entailed by Moscow's actions was very high and the potential rewards were questionable. That is, Moscow could not have attacked Turkey without involving the United States, or England, or both, if that indeed was one of its targets in the deployment of its troops in Azerbaijan. An attack against Tehran, while militarily quite feasible, would not have been worth the risk politically. Considering the nationalist feelings of the various tribes, even those opposed to Tehran's politics--it is highly probable that they would have rallied around Tehran and joined forces against the Russians. However, Moscow might have perceived this possibility to be within acceptable limits of risk and therefore chose instead to capture all of Iran rather than

settle for questionable success in one province. However, considering the evidence, one must conclude that Moscow had more to gain, with less risk, had it just continued its interference along the lines it had up to March 1946.

With regard to the response from Washington, whether one believes that President Truman sent an ultimatum, the fact remains that American protests led to the Soviet decision to withdraw. At this crucial juncture, Moscow faced a number of alternatives. First, it could have refused to modify its policies at all since its deployments in western and northern Azerbaijan were well under way and could have caused considerable problems for Turkey and Iraq, not to mention Iran. While American forces were stationed elsewhere in the Near East, any military response--whether unilaterally by the United States or collectively by the United Nations--troops would have had to have been transported into the area. Soviet troops, on the other hand, would have already had time to dig in and position themselves in strategically advantageous locations thereby making the American response hazardous and risky.

Second, Moscow could have stalled for time by opening discussions with the United States, perhaps offering to form a committee to investigate the charges. This move might have entailed the cooperation of the United Nations Security Council, which already had discussed the Azerbaijan crisis in January. By involving the Council members, either collectively or individually, Moscow would have gained more

time. It could have strengthened its hand by increasing the number of troops in Iran and by placing them in strategic positions. Moscow could have denied everything but agree to negotiate with Qavam anyway and claim that Iran was being used by the West to stir up bad feelings against the Russians. It could have threatened to increase the troop strength in the north or launch an immediate invasion of the rest of Iran, perhaps claiming to prevent British and/or American intervention.

Third, Moscow could have backed down and acceded to American--and Persian--protests. Moscow chose this path and did not call Truman's bluff, if indeed it was a bluff. This was perhaps the only path Moscow could have taken at the time to insure avoiding military hostilities. Its army was weakened considerably as a result of the Second World War. Moscow had lost more than twenty million people in the war and was in no shape to wage another war successfully, especially against the United States which had come out of the war with its economy and industrial base intact, if not stronger. Further, Moscow was starting to expand and consolidate its influence and power in Eastern Europe. War in the Near East would have jeopardized its activities there, a situation Moscow was not ready to accept since Europe was still of primary importance and Iran only secondary. While the Soviet Union might have had reason to believe that the United States was in fact only bluffing, it had too much to lose if it were wrong.

The Persian input was also a factor in the Soviet decision to withdraw. In particular, Moscow was faced with the choice of remaining in Iran and running the risk of achieving little or nothing from Iran because of American interference on the side of Tehran. Or Moscow could have agreed to Qavam's suggestion (although originally Stalin's) to create a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company. This "carrot" was dangled in front of Moscow, and it would have been put in jeopardy had Moscow persisted in military intervention in the north. Therefore, Qavam contributed in part to the resolution of the Azerbaijan crisis at this point. How important this factor was in the final solution is a matter of debate. The question of Iranian bargaining power cannot really be assessed independent of the American pressure put on Moscow. For instance, when Qavam and Stalin originally discussed the exchange package, Moscow rejected the idea and escalated its interference by increasing the number of military personnel and equipment in the north. No doubt Moscow hoped to take over all of Iran rather than settle for the Azerbaijan Province, and at the same time get its oil concession. Therefore, Moscow was willing to gamble --mistakenly as it turned out--that the United States would not support Iran if Moscow were to present a "get touch" policy. Once the United States responded forcefully and threatened "dire consequences" for Moscow if the latter did not withdraw Iran, then, and only then, did the Soviet Union announce it would completely withdraw from Iran. Before the final announcement--on March 25--Moscow began to explore

Qavam's earlier offer. Between March 20 and April 4 when the arrangements were concluded, Moscow's ambassador to Iran, Mr. Sadchikov, and Qavam discussed the terms of the agreement. It should be remembered that Truman's alleged strong notes to Stalin occurred around March 21st. Therefore, Moscow's willingness to negotiate for its withdrawal came after the United States protested Soviet interference and not because Qavam agreed to the exchange. Nevertheless, Qavam's contribution to the "solution" of the dilemma ("Solution" really may not be the correct word since Soviet interference continued after the evacuation.) was very important because it provided the Soviet Union with an "out." Thus, while Moscow responded to American threats it nonetheless achieved a modicum of success by obtaining its much sought after oil deal.

In addition to American resistance, it is important to note that Moscow faced stiff resistance by the British. While British strength was no longer what it was prior to the Second World War, it was by no means inconsiderable. Moscow could not afford to ignore British response especially when that protest was joined with the American protests.

While there is little evidence that world public opinion played a significant factor in influencing Moscow's decision to modify its policies in Iran, there is evidence that Moscow was sensitive to opinion regarding the United Nations. Moscow did not want to see the new organization fail. Stalin was quoted as saying that the United Nations

was "a serious instrument for the preservation of peace."⁸ The Soviet Union could have left the United Nations altogether when the Security Council refused to honor its pleas to disregard the "Iranian question." However, Moscow considered the United Nations potentially important to its own future security, as well as useful forum for communist propaganda, and therefore chose not to withdraw its membership. It refused to attend the Council's debates on the "Iranian question". In this way it made its point of disapproval without jeopardizing the United Nations itself.

The consequences of the Soviet modification of its goals and its foreign policy were important to the functioning of the United Nations and to future Soviet-American relations as well as to the internal situation in Azerbaijan and in Iran in general. By acquiescing, Moscow in effect relieved the Security Council of having to take action against one of its members with the possibility and indeed probability of weakening if not irreparably damaging it for the future. Such a reevaluation enabled Moscow to make use of the diplomatic efforts by Iran. It facilitated an accord with Tehran in April which acquired for Moscow (1) an oil concession to be ratified by the Majlis after its elections, (2) time for Azerbaijan communists to consolidate their support in their Republic, (3) a promise by Qavam to respect the Tabriz government and to insure its continued existence, although within a modified form within the Iran Republic. Moscow facilitated the conclusion of an agreement between Tehran and Tabriz in

June which was quite favorable to Tabriz. Up to June 1946 Moscow's modification of its policy was not a total loss. To be sure, Moscow sacrificed its plans for expansion into the Near East, Turkey and Iraq, and into Iran proper. However, Moscow did achieve more immediate goals of securing a modus vivendi with Tehran and insuring the survival of communism in Tabriz, without having to commit troops or confront the United States over this issue. In fact, the possibility still existed of Moscow's achieving its goals regarding socialism in Azerbaijan because Tehran appeared to have buckled before Soviet pressure, in spite of American support, i.e., Iran agreed to allow Soviet oil exploration in the north even though it had previously denied Soviet access to the northern oil. After Soviet forces were withdrawn, Soviet interference continued, and the threat of renewed occupation was still a potent force influencing Tehran's actions. While Moscow lost some flexibility and decreased its options in its interference in Iran by not having Soviet forces on hand in the north, it did not eliminate Soviet assistance to the Tabriz regime. For instance, nonuniformed soldiers remained in Tabriz along with newly arriving Moslem communists from Soviet Azerbaijan.

3. The final "turning point" in Soviet policy came in November when Qavam announced plans to send Persian troops into the north for the election. This action was supported fully by the United States. Qavam skillfully forced the Soviet Union into a dilemma. On the one hand, the intro-

duction of Persian forces into Azerbaijan would undoubtedly have meant the demise of the Azeri revolt, if not sooner, then later. On the other hand, Moscow could not have obtained ratification of the oil treaty until the new Majlis was elected and therefore needed this election. Consequently, Moscow had to choose between conflicting goals. Further. American support contributed to the resolve and determination of the central government, thereby complicating the situation. This support was crucial because while Qavam's initiative was taken out of desperation to save his nation from dismemberment resulting from Soviet interference, Iran by itself was not strong enough to challenge successfully the Soviet Union. On the other hand, had the United States remained aloof, Qavam still might have gotten away with his bluff. Moscow wanted the oil deal and as noted above unless the election for the 15th Majlis took place, the oil deal could not have been ratified. Therefore, it is certainly possible that Moscow might have been willing--without the American pressure--to adhere to Qavam's decision and not retaliate or resist by preventing the Persian Army from entering the Azerbaijan Province. In any event, Qavam must be given credit in this instance for contributing to the Soviet decision to allow Persian troops into the north even though it meant disaster for its puppet regime in Tabriz.

However, the United States did support Qavam. Therefore, if Moscow were to decide on active retaliation

--as it kept threatening to do--it again would run the risk of a major confrontation with the United States. Furthermore, by November it was evident that the United States was committed to Iran and would back up its talk with action. Therefore, Moscow lodged protests threatening dire repercussions if Tehran proceeded on its intended course. But at the same time, Moscow informed Pishavari that Soviet military assistance would not be forthcoming and that the Azeris would be on their own.

Moscow's alternatives were bleak; it could have made good on its threats and reintroduced the Red Army into the north to protect Tabriz. This almost assuredly would have precipitated an American response. But if the United States did not respond militarily, the Soviet Union would still have faced increased pressure and resistance against its policies in Eastern Europe. In addition, had the elections not been held, the proposed oil concession would have been postponed and possibly dropped. Therefore, the Azeri revolution was "abandoned," and Tabriz left to cope as best it could. Moscow reverted to relying on diplomacy, propaganda, and subversion to influence decision making in Tehran.

The Persians entered the Azerbaijan Province and met with little or no resistance. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was terminated virtually without a struggle. In fact, "collapse" would be a better term to describe its demise. It was sudden, swift, and unexpected by all parties involved in the crisis. When Qavam had made plans for a testing of

Azerbaijan strength and will, and a probing of Soviet intentions, he expected some show of resistance but was not sure just how much to expect. The plans he formulated included a step-by-step, stop and go, occupation of the north by Persian forces. The United States also expected some resistance from the north although reports by American representatives had indicated that morale was low and "the people had no wish to fight."⁹ Moscow's decision in December not to intervene could have been the result of its being caught off guard by the suddenness of the collapse. Nevertheless, while Moscow had not expected Qavam to ignore its threats of retaliation, Moscow did take measures which would indicate that it at least considered the possibility. For instance, when it became evident that Qavam was planning to proceed with his plans irrespective of the consequences, Moscow informed Pishavari that no concrete military support should be expected. Accordingly, Pishavari and several top officials fled to the safety of Baku once the Persian forces entered the province.

Several explanations have been offered as to why the Republic collapsed so quickly. The communists in Azerbaijan have argued that a military confrontation between the north and Tehran would have endangered the Soviet borders. The West had engineered the entire crisis by encouraging Qavam to take military action and therefore would have welcomed any excuse for Western intervention. Accordingly, any military aid to Tabriz would have invited Anglo-American retaliation, thereby jeopardizing Soviet security. Therefore, the commu-

nists of Azerbaijan chose to accept temporary defeat and continue the struggle through other means--particularly propaganda and infiltration--in order to spare the Soviet Union the danger of war.¹⁰ Iskandari, a member of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, echoed his view. He claimed the surrender did not result from weakness but rather "it was singularly motivated by a realistic consideration of the political situation, and based on the exact analysis of historic conditions and a deep corresponding sense of true internationalism."¹¹ In short, this view asserted that the Azerbaijan revolution was sacrificed by the Azeris themselves to the security of the Soviet Union. Or put another way, revolution in Iran was sacrificed to the security of international communism as it was expressed in its leadership, the Soviet Union.

American assessment focused on the lack of popularity of the communist regime, the failure of leaders to make effective changes in the government, the failure of Moscow to back up its promises of support, and the poor and uninformed organization of the workers and peasants. The Soviet Union was not considered a friend by the populace at large partly as a result of its long-standing exploitation of the area as well as its "high-handed" manner of dealing with Azerbaijan officials and public alike.¹² Those supporting the movement were about five percent of the population, its popularity having decreased considerably after the call for general conscription. The Shah's assessment explained that the Soviet Union did not support Tabriz because it finally became convinced that

the United States was truly backing Iran and to actively resist the Persian forces would have invited American response.¹³

The French believed, according to Ambassador Allen, that the Soviet Union abandoned Tabriz for the sake of the oil concession that it wanted the Majlis to ratify.¹⁴ However, Tehran was just as surprised as anyone that Tabriz collapsed without much resistance. Therefore, it was highly improbable that they had reached a secret agreement with Moscow beforehand to ratify the oil deal in exchange for passive Soviet response to the attack on Tabriz.

What is more likely is that Moscow was caught off guard and simply did not expect the Army to stop fighting so soon. Or, it might have expected the population to welcome the Persian forces and turn on the communists. While Moscow should have had accurate information from its own agents about the lack of popular support of the communist regime, it probably counted on the public fear of Russia and the forces of its threats to reintroduce the Red Army to the area to keep the discontent within manageable limits. Thus, it is quite conceivable that Moscow might have sent in troops or responded more harshly than it did had Tabriz held out and attempted some form of resistance beyond the one day of modest fighting. Under these circumstances, Moscow could have claimed it was invited in by the oppressed minorities in the Azerbaijan and Kurdish Republics, or it could have claimed it was assisting fellow communists in the struggle against imperialism. It is,

of course, impossible to determine exactly what Moscow would have done had this been the case--especially if we include the entire international situation in 1946 and the possible losses Moscow might have incurred if it had to confront the United States and the West at a time not of its own choosing. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out with any certainty the possibility that Moscow had a contingency plan for support of the "democratic" movement should the opportunity present itself. However, Moscow was faced with a virtual fait accompli.

If Moscow had had the opportunity and the willingness to become involved in the fighting, the onus or reaction then would have fallen to the United States. The Persian Army would have been no match for the Red Army and quite possibly not even for the Azerbaijan Red Army without Soviet support. Therefore, the American determination and resolve truly would have been put to the test once again. Militarily little had changed since March. The United States was still not a military force in the area and any such response therefore would have entailed delay in moving troops into the region. As in March, this action would have given Soviet forces the edge and would have enabled them to determine the nature of the battle--since they were stationed closer to the potential battle zones and since many Soviet soldiers were in the north posing as civilians. Further, if Moscow chose to play out its own bluff and challenge the United States, there is no certainty that Washington actually would have gone to war

over Iran. The United States had other interests to protect especially in Europe and really could not have afforded to wage another war at that time either. Further, domestic reaction would have precluded a war with Moscow as the "Bring Daddy Home" clubs demonstrated. On the other hand, even with the collapse, Moscow could have introduced its own forces had it been important enough irrespective of the wishes of Tabriz on the pretext of assisting the communists. Whatever actions Moscow would have chosen which would have entailed an escalation of its involvement in Iran would have led to an American response. By December 1946, American commitment to aid Iran and resist Moscow's expansion had been strongly reiterated on several occasions and showed no hint of subsiding. Therefore, on balance Moscow was better off remaining out of the struggle, achieving its goals through other means and thereby not provoking American retaliation.

Conclusions

Soviet interference in Iran in 1921 and 1946 was modified as a result of pressure brought to bear on Moscow by third parties and an internal reevaluation of Soviet goals and the risk involved in their pursuit. In both cases, Moscow's reactions were different. In essence, Moscow's foreign policy toward Iran was opportunistic and as much a result of inaction and indecisiveness by third parties as it was of Moscow's own decision making. As a result, there

were several turning points which the Soviet leadership faced and which presented them with alternative paths of action. There ensued a determination by the Soviet decision makers that a particular course was worth the risk and would entail minimal negative responses by the parties involved. That is, possible actions to the Soviet moves would be expected to fall within acceptable parameters and would not be threatening to Soviet interests. In short, both cases support the view of Soviet decision making which argues that the Soviet Union will expand and take advantage of opportunities but will withdraw as soon as it faces strong resistance which threatens its national security. Actually the calculation of risk in part also depended on Moscow's use of stalling tactics. Moscow tested the tolerance of third parties to its actions by partially modifying its techniques of interference and waiting to see the degree of tolerance to that partial compliance before it altered the goals and modified its policies appreciably. Moscow's strategic interests in Iran were virtually identical in both cases. Moscow professed to be interested in northern Iran in order to protect Baku and its northern borders. Moscow achieved its goals and was therefore free to consider other pressures on it to alter its interference in Iran. By summer 1920, the White Guards were no longer a threat, and Moscow had prevented other powers from obtaining access to any oil concession. By 1945, the Germans were no longer a threat.

The oil fields in Baku were secure. Further, Moscow again prevented third parties from moving into the northern areas and had obtained recognition by Tehran of Moscow's interests in the area. (They were unsuccessful, of course, in preventing involvement by the United States in Persian affairs.) In addition, in both instances Moscow's long range goal of acquiring warm water ports were not a top priority. In short, none of these strategic interests interfered with Moscow's need or willingness to change its policy towards Iran. In fact, these conditions actually contributed to Moscow's flexibility in modifying its goals and techniques of interference because Moscow's strategic goals either had been satisfied or were not considered vital to its national security. This was particularly important since insecurity along its border was the primary reason Moscow invaded Iran in 1920 and again in 1941.

In both crises Moscow responded to four different forms of pressure: political, military, economic, and ideological. These pressures were directed against Moscow to force Moscow to cease its policy of interference in Iran. The relative importance of each differed in each crisis but the underlying implication for Soviet decision making was the same. The pressures which contributed most in Moscow's reevaluation were those which presented Moscow with a threat to its vital interests at that particular time and threatened to undermine that part of Soviet security it deemed to be vital to its survival. In making these assessments, the Soviet leadership also included the risk involved in pursuing its

interference as well as an examination of the alternatives it had at the time.

Political Pressures

In 1921 the most important interaction between Moscow and London centered around the trade negotiations. Moscow was simply not prepared to surrender desperately needed economic aid and trade for ideological principles or for potential military gains. Gilan was a failure for socialism, but even if it were not I doubt if Moscow would have jeopardized its negotiations with London. The Russian population could not eat ideas, and while they might have rejoiced in the extension of communism to the East that joy would not have substituted for jobs, land, or food. By 1921 the internal conditions in the RSFSR demanded that Moscow readjust its priorities placing at the top of the list economic rehabilitation along with physical security. Political pressure from Tehran was also important to Moscow's reevaluation because Tehran promised to be more receptive to Moscow's political needs. Iran was willing to negotiate a settlement with Moscow without British approval. This was deemed necessary by Tehran because of the apparent lack of British support and the presence of Soviet pressure in the north. Tehran appeared to promise a more favorable foreign policy regarding Soviet interests. Moscow accepted the diplomatic overtures of both Britain and Iran. In terms of overall strategy, this move can be viewed as a commitment by Moscow to try to return to the international community and carry on its

foreign policy in an acceptable manner. But it also was a determined effort to increase its options.

The political pressures on Moscow in 1946 were formidable but were not the crucial element in determining Soviet behavior. However, they did contribute to Moscow's reassessment by complimenting other pressures brought to bear on Moscow, especially the military pressures. Had political pressures been the only pressures placed on Moscow by the United States, for instance, it is doubtful whether Moscow would have modified the position on Iran and withdrawn the forces from the Azerbaijan Province. The political pressures alone were insufficient to threaten Moscow's security. The political relationship between Moscow and Tehran, however, contributed to the overall settlement of the crisis. In the spring and summer of 1946 it appeared that a more favorable administration had taken over in Tehran. The oil concession promised by Qavam indeed was an important settlement for Moscow, but Moscow could have obtained a better deal had it continued its policy of interference without running afoul of the United States by escalating its military presence in Azerbaijan. This speculation, however, rests on the condition that there were no other pressures on Moscow, and this was not the case.

In both crises, the role of international organization was not crucial to the successful conclusion of the crisis. The League of Nations was obliged to consider Iran's request for assistance, but was greatly relieved to rid itself of the problem. The United Nations was more willing to get involved

because of the American and British insistence that it do so. However, the United Nation's usefulness must be viewed within the context of the West's support. But, again, the international body was also relieved when the issue was resolved by the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and Iran, and outside the organization. The United Nations played a much greater and more important role during the Azerbaijan crisis than the League did in the Gilan crisis. But it must be emphasized that it was a fragile relationship between the organization and Iran. And the relationship was strengthened only by the determination of the Western nations--and in a sense the Soviet Union--to enable the United Nations to survive. But the United States and the Soviet Union viewed the United Nations as being an important addition to international affairs. The Soviet view, however, was tempered by its concerns as to how to use the organization for its own purposes and how to prevent Western dominance. Nevertheless, in 1946, the Soviet Union demonstrated its support for the United Nations by not withdrawing its membership when the Security Council persisted in discussing the Iranian question. Despite the beliefs by the Great Powers that the United Nations should be supported, the United Nations--as well as the League before it--had a great deal to lose by becoming involved in an area outside of its influence and over an issue which was felt would only weaken the usefulness of the organization.

Military Pressures

In 1921 military pressure against Moscow was relatively inconsequential. For the most part, the lack of major military

resistance to Moscow was a result of British Parliamentary debates rather than a weak British Army. Had London deemed it advisable or necessary to the defense of the Empire or to contest Iran on a military level, the probability of its success was very high. This is not to say that British forces did not engage the Soviet Army, they did. But the Dunsterforce had orders from London to withdraw if it met with heavy resistance or if its position would warrant reinforcements from the British units in India or Afghanistan. The cost to London of getting bogged down in a war with Soviet Russia in Iran was deemed to be too high. As the Red Army advanced from city to city the British forces therefore retreated. Consequently, Moscow did not have to deal with military pressures as a means of British efforts to force Moscow to modify its interference in Iran. However, Moscow did have an alternative: It could have pushed the British by escalating its military operation. In fact, Moscow did use this option in August 1921 when the Soviets assisted the Persian Red Army and the Jangalis forces to march on Tehran. Of course, Moscow did not commit the Red Army itself nor did it commit its prestige to a victory. By this time Moscow had reassessed its policy and concluded that the trade deal was more important than capturing Tehran. Not much would have been gained and there was the possibility of British retaliation.

In 1946, however, military pressure proved to be a crucial factor. Actually, it was the threat of military action which made the difference rather than actual military contact.

The United States response in March convinced Moscow that its policy in Iran was a liability. In fact, the American response threatened not only Moscow's activities in Iran and in the Azerbaijan Province but threatened to undermine Soviet efforts in Europe as well. In addition, the possibility existed that a confrontation might have escalated into full scale war. It was the threat to its European activities and the possibility of war with the United States which led Moscow to consider alternatives to its policy in Iran. This military pressure by Washington enhanced the political pressures on Moscow and convinced Moscow that to pursue its Persian policy would entail unacceptable risk.

Economic Pressures

Economic pressures were more important in 1921 but should not be underestimated in 1946 either. The economic conditions in 1921 were very bad for Moscow, in fact devastating in light of the pressures on the Russian population brought to bear from the First World War, the Revolution and the Civil War, not to mention the initial economic programs of the communists before the New Economic Policy was instituted. As noted previously, this was a primary factor contributing to Moscow's willingness to make concessions to the British. Without the economic pressures on Moscow, it is doubtful that the RSFSR would have agreed to leave Gilan. However, it is quite possible that London would have been forced to try a military solution to the Gilan crisis, particularly if Moscow escalated its interference thereby

increasing the threat to India. On the other hand, it is very probable that Parliament would have refused to sanction this action. Nevertheless, London's economic pressure was successful in affecting change in Moscow's foreign policy behavior.

In 1946, the situation also demonstrated the need for economic recovery. Moscow could not jeopardize that recovery for the sake of a questionable advance of socialism in Azerbaijan. Part of this recovery depended upon renewed trade with Iran but also it hinged on Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. In 1946, that hegemony was limited to Poland, East Germany, and Hungary, but Moscow already was manipulating the internal conditions in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Rumania. Moscow could not afford to endanger these plans in exchange for success in Iran. The economic pressures on Moscow, while important, were not sufficient to influence a major shift in Moscow's foreign policy. However, they were a supplement to the military and diplomatic pressures Moscow was experiencing at the time.

Ideological Pressures

In 1921 there was an additional source of pressure leading to modification of Soviet interference in Gilan. The internal debate within the Third International questioned the role of national liberation forces in the communist movement. The debate within the CPSU also centered on the validity of supporting nationalist forces in Iran and particularly the benefits of supporting Kuchik Khan. As the months passed,

the communists in Moscow wearied of supporting him because of his anti-communist and anti-Soviet statements. This pressure was by itself insufficient to alter Soviet policy. However, it contributed to the general reevaluation by Moscow when it was added to the other forms of pressure exerted on Moscow. Had these ideological conditions not prevailed, Moscow probably still would have bowed to the economic necessities and responded to London's diplomatic and economic pressures. Had these latter incentives not been forthcoming and just the ideological concerns existed, I seriously doubt whether Moscow would have discontinued its interference on that basis. Rather, Moscow would have tried to work out the problems and withstand the cost for an appreciable amount of time in any event. However, this situation did not occur and Moscow did observe London's conditions for resumption of the trade talks.

In 1946, there was no comparable debate within the Party. Nor were there strong troublesome personalities with which to contend. Nevertheless, Moscow's long-range goal of spreading revolution was in trouble even before American pressure became a paramount factor in Soviet decision making. The old problem debated by Roy and others during the Second and Third Congresses of the Comintern, challenging Lenin's tactics, was again at issue. The class consciousness of the peasants and workers was considered not sufficiently developed to warrant a socialist revolution in 1945. To complicate matters, the religious and nationalist issues

were still too important for the people to consider abandoning them for socialist promises. Therefore, Moscow's alternatives within the broader question of how to respond to pressure regarding its interference in Azerbaijan were limited. They could have supported a faltering revolution, which would have entailed the use of increased military forces at some point to bolster the Tabriz regime and to enforce its socialist programs, both of which were in increasing disfavor with the populace. Or they could have continued the battle against Tehran but use other methods and thus drop the support for socialism in Azerbaijan. Moscow chose the latter not because it was adverse to using the military forces but rather because it assessed all the relevant factors, including the risk of war with the United States, and chose not to jeopardize its other goals for the sake of a questionable revolution in Azerbaijan.

In conclusion, Soviet modification of its behavior in 1921 was a result of self-analysis of the goals it professed to achieve along with an assessment of how British pressures might interfere in the attainment of its foreign and domestic goals.

In 1946, Moscow's modification of its policy towards Iran and reassessments of its goals were a result primarily of American pressure and support for Iran. It also was a result of Tehran's actions, albeit supported by the United States. In addition, Moscow itself reevaluated its goals not only in Iran but internationally as well as events unfolded

in the Azerbaijan crisis.

In both crises, Moscow reexamined the means it was using to achieve its goals to determine whether they (1) were working; (2) were worth the risk entailed in pursuing them; (3) were the only means available to achieve those particular ends. Moscow concluded that its policies toward Iran were not working as well as they should. Since resistance by third parties was jeopardizing its policies, Moscow determined that the time was opportune to effect changes in the ordering of its foreign policy priorities and to modify its interference in Iran.

Notes

1. Izvestia, November 6, 1921, quoted in Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 36.
2. Iransky, "Russko-persidskiye otnosheniya za pyat lyet," quoted in ibid., footnote 3, p. 22; original in Russian in Novi Vostok #3 (1923).
3. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 192.
4. Adam Ulam, Expansion & Coexistence (N.Y.: Praeger, 1974), p. 9.
5. Ibid., p. 329.
6. Harry S. Truman, memo to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, January 5, 1946, quoted in N.S. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran (N.Y.: Whittier Books, Inc., 1954), p. xvi.
7. Rouhollah Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-73 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975), p. 136.
8. Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union and the United Nations (N.Y.: Praeger, 1962), p. 28.
9. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1946, VII:561.
10. Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, p. 118; M.C. Ivanov, Ocherk Historii Irana (Moscow, 1952), pp. 383-4.
11. Ibid., p. 119.
12. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1946, VII:565.
13. Ibid., p. 562.
14. Ibid., p. 565.

CHAPTER VII

SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN GILAN AND AZERBAIJAN: AN ASSESSMENT

A study of Soviet interference in Gilan and Azerbaijan offers valuable insight into Soviet foreign policy towards Iran. Because of the similarities in the conditions leading up to the escalation of interference in both cases, one would have assumed that Moscow would have had an edge in its interference policy during the second period. For instance, the internal conditions in 1920 and 1945 were marked by ethnic and nationalist dissidence, and were open to foreign manipulation. The central governments were incapable of quelling riots, of curbing ethnic and nationalist demands, or of reversing the economic and social problems. There were internal organizations primed for Soviet infiltration and subversion which provided a haven for Soviet agents and a base for agitation against Tehran. Finally, in both instances, the other powers interested in Persian affairs appeared to exhibit more tolerant attitudes regarding Soviet interest and involvement in Iran by appearing either to be incapable of taking firm action or unwilling to do so. Again, one would have assumed that Moscow would have tried to avoid the problems and mistakes it had encountered during the Gilan crisis so that its chances for successfully interfering in Azerbaijan

would have been enhanced. However, communists in Iran continued to make weighty promises, especially promises of economic and social reforms, only to fail to implement them. They failed adequately or satisfactorily to deal with the religious issue and made enemies of the Mullahs and other religious leaders. They undermined whatever progress the propagandists achieved by provided poor administration of the province. In addition, the differences which existed in the two periods were such that Soviet foreign policy had a better chance for success in the second intervention. By 1945, the Soviet Union was a more stable society with an entrenched communist party in firm control. Its economy was stronger. The Red Army was better disciplined and more effective. Ideological fervor had decreased, and in a sense this provided greater flexibility to the Soviet leaders because the Party no longer had to abide by strict dogmatic guidelines.

However, in spite of the similarities and the nature of the differences in the Gilan and Azerbaijan crises, Moscow followed a foreign policy in 1945-46 which was quite similar to the one it had pursued in 1920-21. Therefore, as far as Soviet efforts to establish a communist republic in a northern province, Moscow failed on both occasions. In its overall foreign policy--towards Iran and the United Kingdom--however, Soviet policies were successful in 1921 because Moscow was willing to sacrifice socialism in Gilan for other goals it deemed more important, e.g., trade with

England and Iran and a treaty with Iran. In 1946, Soviet policies not only failed to establish a viable socialist regime in the north, but they also failed to achieve other more general goals--towards Iran and the United States. In fact, Soviet policies had achieve the opposite effect, e.g., American involvement instead of disengagement; an increase of Western interest in Iran instead of withdrawal; and a strengthening of the central government instead of incapacity and weakness. This failure to a great extent was a result of Stalin's miscalculations in evaluating American response to Soviet escalation of the crisis in March 1946.

Following are concluding remarks about the Soviet interferences in Gilan and Azerbaijan.

Soviet Interference in Gilan

Soviet interference in Gilan was on shaky grounds from the start. Soviet Russia was revolutionary and had too many expectations concerning the possibility and its capability of influencing the transition from feudalism to socialism in Iran. Nor did the communists fully appreciate nationalist sentiments or the impact of the communist anti-religious campaigns. They tried to link themselves with the nationalist movements which, for reasons of their own, had been sympathetic to the Bolsheviks during the First World War. The effort failed in part because the Soviet agents demanded perfection and absolute loyalty to the communist cause. But

they only succeeded in antagonizing the Jangalis and the peasants, merchants, townspeople and officials. The nationalists wanted independence from the British and, in some cases, independence from Tehran, or at least more autonomy, but they also wanted independence from Soviet Russia. After all, the Russians (And for the Persians it made little difference whether Czar Nicholas or Lenin was in charge.) had occupied northern Iran for approximately ten years until they were recalled during the civil war. While the RSFSR was able to harness this hostility and use it against the British and against Tehran, they could not achieve the ideological goal of revolution. As the crisis developed this particular goal was more or less put in abeyance. Propaganda continued to extol the virtues of communism and particularly the virtues of Moscow and the RSFSR. But world revolution took a back seat to the security needs of the RSFSR. Or put another way, socialism in one country took precedence over world revolution.

Soviet use of the Persian Communist Party also was not so successful as it might have been. Agents were trained in Soviet Russia and were loyal to Moscow, but their ideological "purity" tended to hinder their effectiveness in administering the Gilan government and in understanding the reluctance of the nationalists to be loyal to Moscow. Moscow helped develop the Adalet Party in Baku and was instrumental in cultivating the PCP in Iran. However, the PCP was but a tool for Soviet policy and its goals within Iran were sacri-

ficed to Moscow's needs. The Party was held back from attacking the national bourgeoisie and forced to form a "united front alliance" with them in Gilan. When the PCP was no longer effective in Gilan and could offer few advantages to Moscow, Moscow abandoned the Party. Once Moscow withdrew its troops, the PCP was without protection and was forced to go underground. For instance, when the Gilan Republic collapsed, many communists were arrested or executed, having been overzealous in their work while the Republic was in existence.

Soviet interference in Iran was carried out in a variety of ways, each method complementing the others. The extensive use of propaganda to undermine the British authority and agitate against the Anglo-Persian Treaty enhanced the ability of Soviet agents to infiltrate the army, administration, Cossack Brigade, and the press. And these agents in turn lent support to the propaganda machinery. The British delegates in Tehran especially made note of the deleterious effect of Soviet propaganda against the Treaty. The one noteworthy failure in the propaganda campaign was the attempt to convince the public that religion was harmful. In spite of Sultan-Zadah's warning, the problems encountered at the Baku Conference, and the hostile reaction by the Persian peasants, Soviet Russia took a hard line on religion and thus lost the support of several Moslem leaders and eventually undermined its own effort to influence the populace.

The Soviet decision to turn to diplomacy was a wise

move in light of its difficulty in achieving revolution in Iran by relying primarily on military force, propaganda and subversion. Since these methods were not successful by themselves by 1921, Soviet Russia could afford to make an all-out effort at the traditional method of achieving foreign policy goals. This does not mean, of course, that it abandoned its other modes of interference. In fact, the diplomatic approach would not have been successful had the other methods of interference not been utilized prior to and alongside of the diplomatic initiatives. This fact is attested to by the repeated Soviet entreaties to Iran and to Britain regarding the resumption of discussions with both countries following the civil war. These inquiries were rebuffed until the RSFSR introduced military occupation into its repertoire of interference techniques and escalated the other methods of interference. For instance, the military presence was crucial in forcing the Persians to negotiate. It also contributed to the British decision to disengage from Iran. The propaganda campaign increased and was instrumental in raising questions about the political benefits of signing the Treaty and about British resolve in defending Iran. Even after both the RSFSR and England finally withdrew from Iran, Soviet agents still were infiltrating the country, many of them graduates of the special schools established in Soviet Russia. For instance, in 1922 the Vishnaya Voyennaya Shkola Vostokovyedyenia (Military School of Higher Learning for the Study of the East) was preparing specialists for work

in Iran, Afghanistan, India and China.¹

Soviet infiltration and subversion also continued unabated in spite of British protests. For example, infiltration continued in Azerbaijan, Mazanderan, Khurasan and Luristan, all of which had experienced domestic turmoil and insurrection. These efforts, however, met with little success because the tribal leaders were anti-communist Moslems and in the crunch usually sided with Persian forces against the communists. Nevertheless, Soviet infiltration probably contributed to the continued unrest experienced in these provinces.

British responses to Soviet interference were on the whole unsatisfactory. While London made strong protests against the Soviet invasion and occupation, it followed up these protests by withdrawing its forces city by city as the Soviet forces advanced along the Caspian Coast. One aspect of the difficulty of the British response was the lack of "good" communication between Curzon and the British consul in Tehran (first with Cox, then Norman). Curzon asked him to do a difficult task and then undercut his ability to complete it by not backing him up. Curzon, however, was not completely to blame, since he had to deal with Parliament and had to contend with pressure from the British public. However, judging from the correspondence his attitude and openness about the British position in Iran could have been more forthright. The animosity and confusion is apparent when one reads the diplomatic exchanges, especially those between

Norman and Curzon.² For example, the question of the British withdrawal was not clarified to the British consul until it was virtually too late to make adequate protest or to prepare the Persian Government and public for the change in British policy. On the other hand, the antagonism to the Anglo-Persian Treaty was not fully expressed to London and thereby gave rise to false expectations as to the chances of its ratification.

British responses were complicated further by the domestic situation in England. After a long and costly war and the acquisition of new territory--such as the mandates in Palestine and Mesopotamia--the British Empire was short of funds to protect adequately its far-flung borders. Amid appeals for curtailing British interests around the world, Parliament decided that Iran was an expensive liability--especially in light of Persian inability and unwillingness to cooperate. Thus what appeared to be retreat in the face of Soviet pressure (which in a literal sense it was) also can be viewed as withdrawal in the face of domestic pressure. Seen in this light, Soviet Russia "won" the confrontation by default since Britain was not in a position to respond as strongly as it might have in other circumstances. Britain, however, was able to minimize its losses and protect Iran from complete takeover by the communists by skillfully using its diplomatic options, particularly by using the trade negotiations with Moscow as a lever to exact concessions. This was possible in part because the

RSFSR had made its own decision to forego Iran when the need arose. In a sense, then, the British "won" their own point by default, i.e., Moscow was willing to back off, since it previously had determined the Gilan experiment to be a failure.

Iran achieved some success in spite of itself. All along Iran was at the mercy of other powers, so under the circumstances it really did not do too badly. Iran did not have to accept a treaty it did not want and accepted a treaty it could live with (the Russian-Persian Treaty). The British withdrew, which caused a financial burden on Iran, but also gave Iran more independence to seek aid from other countries, e.g., the United States. The Russians withdrew, which allowed the Shah's army to reassert control in the north. However, British interest remained in the south. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company continued to influence how Iran conducted its relations with other countries, especially : relations concerning oil concessions. The old trade relationship between northern Iran and Soviet Russia was resumed, still heavily favoring Russia. For example, negotiations were opened to discuss the future of the fishing rights in the Caspian and the future of the refineries in which Russia had a major interest. This trade relationship had all but stopped during the First World War, the Russian Civil War and the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the resumption of trade, even with Iran at a disadvantage, was still better than no trade at all. On balance, Iran "won" a little, also by default since it had little control over the course of events. Moscow wanted to reopen trade nego-

tiations for its southern borders and therefore was willing to be cooperative with Tehran even though it had the latter over the proverbial barrel. Also, improved relations between Moscow and Tehran was beneficial for Soviet-British relations.

What influences then did Soviet Russia respond to? Primarily, the RSFSR responded to major threats to its achieving those goals it deemed vital, namely, those goals enhancing the political, economic, and strategic interests of the RSFSR. Had Britain responded with military force, I doubt whether the RSFSR would have persisted in Iran beyond defeating Denikin and Wrangel. But Soviet forces were not met with strong military resistance. And what opposition they did encounter was not viewed as a threat to their ability to hold their ground or make new extensions of their control. Nor was Moscow very impressed with diplomatic protests by England, the League of Nations, the West--America, France, or Belgium--or by Iran. Only when the protests by London led to interference in the economic goals desired by Moscow did it pay heed. Also, when a concession was offered--such as the Persian gestures of friendship--Moscow was willing to be conciliatory. On the questions of infiltration, propaganda and subversion, Soviet Russia continued its activities, and while Moscow was polite in listening to the protests, and made gestures of compliance from time to time, it did not alter its actions in these fields in any significant way. This was due to a great extent to the knowledge--admitted by London--that neither

Britain nor Iran could "prove" that it was not complying with their wishes. In response to British protests about Soviet propaganda, Moscow argued that Persian communists were to blame, not Soviet agents. Iran was an independent country and Persian communists could say what they wanted. Protests regarding Soviet military activity received similar responses. Military activity was attributed to zealous Persian communist trying to liberate their country or to communists from the Azerbaijan SSR who were under Baku's directions.

On the while, the RSFSR was a major victor in this crisis. By exploiting the weaknesses of its adversaries, by utilizing a wide range of options in interfering in Persian internal affairs, by being flexible enough to modify its goals as the need arose and as the situation was reevaluated, Soviet Russia was able to secure for itself many of the goals it strived to achieve: British withdrawal from Iran; a diminution of British influence and authority in Iran; trade relations with Britain; neutralization of the Tehran Government; a treaty of friendship with Iran which guaranteed Soviet involvement in the security of Iran; and resumption of trade with the northern provinces and with Tehran.

Soviet Interference in Azerbaijan

The Azerbaijan crisis offers a second opportunity to study Soviet foreign policy and to evaluate its successes in obtaining its goals during this period. In the short run, Moscow achieved what it set out to accomplish. For instance,

Moscow protected the Baku oil fields from invasion and sabotage by enemies both real (Germany) and imagined (Iran). It prevented other powers from gaining a foothold in northern Iran. Moscow could have claimed a success in facilitating the establishment of the "democratic" movement in Azerbaijan. And when the Republic collapsed, Moscow blamed the imperialist West--rather than the failure of the movement itself--for engineering its demise. Finally, Moscow succeeded in toppling two Cabinets and in forcing a change of policy in Tehran. It achieved the appearance of a friendlier government, if not in total or for very long, then at least for a while. In connection with this last point, the Azerbaijan crisis brought home to Tehran the inescapable fact that it simply could not flout Moscow's wishes without incurring serious repercussions. Tehran was forced to accept an irrefutable reality: the Soviet Union was a neighbor and could not be ignored or dismissed lightly. Even when military force was not used, Soviet interference could be awesome. Further, if the Soviet Union were sufficiently angered or threatened, the threat of invasion and military occupation would always loom in the background.

After closer examination, however, Soviet foreign policy must be judged a relative failure during this crisis period. Moscow failed to achieve particular goals which it deemed important to its national interest. For example, Moscow failed to undermine the authority and influence of the West and in essence achieved the exact opposite. By interfering in Iran, the Soviet Union all but secured the involvement and

staunch support of the United States for Iran. This new alliance enabled Iran to pursue a more independent path and to withstand Soviet pressure. It is quite possible that without the Soviet provocation and its hostile activities in Iran, both during the war and especially during 1946, American involvement and commitment would not have been so complete and so forceful, nor in fact so immediate. American interest might have taken several more years to develop fully. But the Soviet Union forced a confrontation by its policies and thereby helped in the crystallization of American foreign policy toward Iran and the Near East, and toward the Soviet Union in general.

On the ideological front, Moscow failed to spread revolution through the Near East and in particular in Iran. The Soviet Union claimed the revolution was sabotaged by the West. The controversy surrounding the ideological implications of encouraging a revolution in a feudal society--even with the support of the Soviet Union in the vanguard--when the class consciousness and economic conditions were not "ripe" simply did not develop openly the way it did during the Gilan crisis. Stalin was in control and he wanted Soviet agents working in Iran irrespective of the socialist principles which had to be modified or eliminated. Ideological purity clearly was sacrificed for pragmatic politics and more

importantly for strategic interests. That is, irrespective of whether Azerbaijan was "objectively ready" for the socialist revolution, the communist trained agents operating in the north would provide the guidance necessary for socialist development. These efforts ended in failure. The fact that the Republic survived the Soviet evacuation in May 1946 was not a result of its ability independently to face the central government. Rather, it was more a consequence of Moscow's diplomatic efforts in threatening Tehran with Soviet retaliation should Tehran move to invade Azerbaijan. Further, Moscow insisted upon and Qavam agreed to a stipulation in the June accord which called for the peaceful settlement of the differences between Tabriz and Tehran. Later, however, no sooner had Persian troops entered the Republic than the populace turned on their former leaders and arrested or executed them. The revolution owed its failure not only to direction--or misdirection--from Moscow but also to the inadequacies and inefficiencies of the Democratic Party in administering the reforms and in ruling on behalf of the public.

In addition, there were practical considerations. To continue the ideological battle in Azerbaijan meant also to face American retaliation. The revolution--which

was of questionable value anyway--was simply not worth a major battle with the United States at that time. Moscow was faced once again with the task of reevaluating the nature of revolution in backward societies along with reexamining the relationship between religion and Marxism, and nationalism and socialism. While propaganda efforts continued in Tehran espousing the virtues of socialism, the failure of the Azerbaijan national movement and essentially the speedy collapse of the Republic discouraged Soviet plans regarding the efficacy of revolutionary activities in Iran, and questioned the benefits of a Soviet thrust into the Near East where Moscow surely would face similar problems if it did not first resolve the problems it faced in Iran.

Consequently, when Moscow saw a way out of Iran--having been forced to seek a solution by American actions--it concluded an agreement with Tehran. This accord may be considered a qualified success. It was a "success" because while it arranged for the evacuation of Soviet forces, it also provided for the attainment of two important goals pursued by the Soviet Government. First, Moscow received a promise of an oil concession. Second, the accord provided for the peaceful settlement of the Azerbaijan dispute, without the Security Council, without the United States, without Great Britain, and of course, theoretically without the

Soviet Union interfering. By April 1946, it was clear that the revolution was faltering. Public enthusiasm was weak; there was increased bickering among the different factions in Tabriz; several of the Kurdish tribes had offered their assistance to Tehran. While Moscow may have appeared to have abandoned Azerbaijan. the accord was in fact a continuation of Moscow's support for the regime, within a range of risk acceptable to Moscow. If anything, the Soviet Union escalated its support and interference in other areas to compensate for the evacuation of its troops. For instance, Moscow ordered some units of Soviet soldiers to remain in the north wearing Azerbaijan Army uniforms or civilian clothes. It increased the number of muhajers and increased its support--military supplies, financial aid, etc.--to Azerbaijan. It continued to pressure Qavam, using political pressure, Tudah demonstrations, political sympathizers in the Majlis, influential citizens in Tehran and newspaper propaganda.

Moscow's success regarding the accord must be "qualified" as well in light of subsequent events. Namely, the revolution in Azerbaijan was crushed in December 1946. The oil deal Moscow wanted so badly, and towards which a good portion of its interference was aimed, was rejected in October 1947. Therefore, the initial success of Moscow's policies in April was but fleeting and momentary.

The Azerbaijan experience need not have failed considering the practice and benefits Moscow could have

gained from the Gilan crisis. In particular, Moscow already had experienced the hostility of the religious leadership and could have worked out a modus vivendi with them. More importantly perhaps, Moscow learned from Gilan that promises of social and economic reforms must be followed up with actual changes in processes, institutions, and programs efficiently carried out. Otherwise Moscow would face an ungrateful and angry populace. For instance, in Tabriz the "democratic" leadership could not detach themselves from petty bureaucratic politics and ended up in the eyes of the public as no better than the Persian administrators they had replaced.

The failure to overcome the bureaucratic malaise and to institute reforms contributed to the complete lack of support in the end when Persian forces recaptured the province. Just as in Gilan the population turned on the party members and instituted a purge against the communists. Nationalist tendencies were harnessed by the Soviet Union in both cases, and did work well in the beginning. However, the CPSU had the added problem of not knowing how to deal effectively with national and ethnic minorities because Moscow never fully resolved the national question within its own borders. Nor did Moscow appreciate the full significance of national aspirations. Thus, instead of continuing to capitalize on these volatile emotions, Moscow reverted to suppressing nationalism when those beliefs conflicted with socialist dogma and particularly with practical considerations of policy as decided by Moscow. This was unfortunate for Moscow

since the national minorities had provided a useful tool with which to gain a foothold in Persian society and through which to influence Persian decision makers. By the end of 1946, Moscow's ineptitude in handling the nationalist issues coupled with the incompetence and inefficiency of the communists and Soviet agents in administering the republic, led to the reemergence of the old hostilities against the Russians. Non-communists once again were talking of independence but not from Tehran; independence was sought from all foreigners, the Soviet Union in particular.

Soviet use of the communist parties (Tudah, Azerbaijan Democratic and Kurdish Democratic) was in general a long-run failure. This especially was evident in that the two parties --Tudah and Azerbaijan Democratic--operated at the same time, often at odds with each other. While both professed loyalty and allegiance to the CPSU, each interpreted Marxism differently and employed different tactics in dealing with the public and the central government. Moscow, for the most part, could not get the Tudah to modify or abandon its more orthodox perspectives, particularly its beliefs regarding nationalism and the nature of socialist revolution. Moscow also had a difficult time in convincing the Azerbaijan Democratic Party to tone down its commitment to nationalism or to revolution. Eventually Moscow shifted its support to the Tudah Party and left the Azerbaijan socialists to deal with the Persians and the Azerbaijan public on their own. Nonetheless, it was evident that Moscow was more comfortable

in dealing with the Democratic Party because it was an organization that was willing and capable of adjusting socialist principles to fit the situation, in short, to observe Leninist principles of revolution and organization. This orientation was obviously a risky one as events proved.

Once again the weaknesses of the central government enabled Moscow to capitalize on the many grievances of the ethnic minorities. Tehran's incapacity to deal with these demands and to cope effectively with Moscow's interference served to encourage Moscow to interfere still more, thus perpetuating a cycle of impotency, interference, increased weakness. Unless and until Tehran took steps to increase its influence and its ability to reassert its authority throughout Iran, it could again become the object of Soviet interference and be subject to pressure from foreign powers. In this respect, the central government emerged from the Azerbaijan crisis in a better position to meet future interference than when the Gilan crisis ended. In 1946 at least Iran had the support of the United States, which was convinced that the only way to protect Iran in the long run was to enable it to govern and defend itself effectively. Washington, therefore, took measures to see that these two goals were achieved.

Moscow used several methods of interference most effectively. On the whole, its propaganda efforts were quite successful, especially during the war, and especially when used for short-term goals. However, these activities could

not salvage Moscow's position and influence once the United States openly committed itself to supporting Iran's integrity. Then the best these efforts could achieve was to increase pressure on the Prime Minister and remind Tehran, and Washington, that Moscow still was interested in Persian affairs. Nonetheless, propaganda activities were particularly effective in capitalizing on the national grievances in part, again, because they did not have to create the issues; Tehran did that for them. Further, propaganda was far more successful in antagonizing people against British interference than against American involvement because of Britain's long history of interference in Persian affairs and of America's relatively clean record. Propaganda and diplomacy were of primary importance once the Soviet Union ruled out the use of military force. But once Moscow did so, its trump card also was played out, leaving these other methods without real teeth. Soviet diplomatic efforts, especially in the United Nations, were on the whole unsuccessful because Moscow failed to remove the "Iranian question" from the agenda and failed in its attempt to have the situation categorized as an internal problem of Iran rather than an international situation worthy of United Nations consideration. Soviet diplomatic efforts in the United Nations were really a success for American diplomacy because the potential value of the United Nations was reaffirmed by Moscow's reluctance to walk out. Moscow apparently thought enough of the international organization to make an effort to resolve its diffi-

culties and express its displeasure of the Council's actions without leaving the United Nations and thereby jeopardizing its future.

The implications of this second crisis were of major importance for Iran because it reaffirmed Persian dependence on other powers and exposed Iran's continuing internal weaknesses. The various elements at work in the Gilan crisis were still present in 1945 and 1946. For example, during the years of Riza Shah's rule, the ethnic groups were suppressed and their national identities were submerged. Social and economic reforms were not forthcoming, which strengthened the communists' propaganda campaigns. Weaknesses within the central government aggravated the situation because it did not have the power to curb the rebellions in the north, e.g., the Kurds and later the Azeris. Further, Iran's traditional diplomacy of playing one great power against another backfired when the two rivals, England and Russia, joined forces and intervened in Iran under the specter of German influence and intrigue in the Near East during the Second World War. This joint intervention paved the way for Soviet interference in 1945.

Nevertheless, Iran's responses were on balance successful, although not apparent at first. Tehran's major success was in obtaining American involvement and commitment, a goal long held by the central government. It succeeded in thwarting Soviet demands for an oil concession and got away with it. Further, it resisted Soviet interference, although

not on its own. By its skillful handling of the Russians and its appeals to the United States and the United Nations --the latter over the objections of the Western states-- Tehran was able to maintain its independence and integrity. As a result of the entire process, it also was able to decrease, but not eliminate, British influence in Iran. In addition, Tehran came out of the crisis stronger than it had been in a long time and was able to reassert its authority throughout the country, notably among the various tribes. Further, it had the prospect of increasing its authority and strength even more once American aid and assistance was assured.

On the whole the United States was the major victor in this crisis. Washington stood firm with Iran against the Soviet Union and forced Moscow to modify not only its tactics of interference but its priorities of foreign policy goals as well. One might question how much support Iran would have received had the United States not resolved to confront and contest Soviet actions as part of American international policy. Without the Soviet threat, American interest would have centered on Iran's oil reserves and on Iran's strategic position as a "gateway" between East and West. However, it is impossible to view American-Iranian relations without taking into account the presence of the Soviet Union and the pressure, interference, and potential threats to Iran, and to American interests in the area, emanating from Moscow. However, this really is a moot point since by 1946, American-

Soviet relations were in a process of transformation. Further, the Iranian crisis was irrevocably tied up with this international situation and itself contributed to the formulation of American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. By 1946, American foreign policy was undergoing the beginning of a transition from post-war enthusiasm to a more realistic, but more wary, perspective. The initial belief that the United States and Soviet Union perhaps could cooperate had been shattered by a number of events. For instance, the Soviet Union had gone back on its word given at Yalta to honor Polish independence, and instead had facilitated the development of a communist government there. It also had moved into Rumania and Bulgaria. As noted previously, Truman and the Administration had begun to take notice of the Russian moves in Eastern Europe and apparently had decided as early as January 1946 that the United States would have to develop a policy of containment in order to resist Soviet expansion. Thus, Iran's future was intimately linked with the West's, and the crisis provided the first look at American determination to back up its principles with specific action.

On the other hand, perhaps Iran merely exchanged one side of foreign interests for another. While it is nice to think of the United States as an altruistic friend, it also would be a disservice to Iran to conclude that Tehran was

now free and independent of outside influences and not subject to outside control. Iran was and is in the unenviable position of having been accepted into the Western camp while bordering on the Soviet Union. Further, it would be foolish to presume that Tehran now could formulate policy completely oblivious to Soviet sensitivities simply because it enjoyed American support. That is, Persian policy could not repeatedly "create" international crises without repercussions from both Moscow and Washington, especially since neither power was willing to go to war over Iran. In addition, every nation is subject to some degree of interference from other states--whether it is in the form of acceptable levels e.g., diplomatic and cultural exchanges--or higher levels which may or may not be deemed acceptable, e.g., propaganda. Consequently, the question of "foreign interests" interfering in Iranian politics is also subject to the abilities of the central government in being capable of resisting those types of interference it deemed unacceptable. American policy was to help strengthen the government so it would be able to do just that. However, in the process of strengthening Iran, Washington was itself interfering in Persian politics, although with the approval of Tehran.

Soviet Foreign Policy: Strengths and Weaknesses

Some general conclusions about Soviet behavior point to both strengths and weaknesses in Soviet foreign policy.

During the two periods, 1920-21 and 1945-46, Moscow utilized the entire spectrum of techniques to interfere in Iran. Each method of interference complemented the others. The most useful method was the stationing of military forces in the north. Direct force enabled Moscow to control the area of penetration and in particular facilitated the infiltration of Soviet Moslems into Persian society. The Red Army protected these agents and was instrumental in providing a fertile area for the propagandists to cultivate support for Soviet communism because it prevented the Persian Army from entering the contested area to challenge the communist authority. In 1945, the Red Army was more organized and better able to seal off the north--especially Azerbaijan Province--from the purview of the Persian authorities. The Soviet Union was very successful at least in the short run in executing a workable and effective propaganda campaign. This was evidenced in 1920 with the campaign against the Anglo-Persian Treaty and in 1945 with the campaigns against the various prime ministers and against the British. Soviet agents were especially adept at exploiting problems within Iran and at exposing the weaknesses of the central government. In addition, they contributed to the increasing weariness and hesitation of Tehran to depend upon protection from third parties. Infiltration was abetted by the similarity of cultures of the population within the Azerbaijan SSR and those within northern Iran. The ability to infiltrate important segments of Persian society and subvert its members,

coupled with the network established by the Soviet operatives provided excellent access to communicate Soviet policy and undermine Persian authority.

The success in 1921 of Soviet diplomacy was in great measure a result of the coordinated and persistent propaganda campaign, the subversive activities of Soviet agents and the presence of the Red Army in Gilan. As noted previously, without the stationing of the Red Army in the province, the propaganda campaign would not have had the impact it did nor would the diplomatic initiatives have been as appealing as they were to the British or the Persians. They were successful enough in and of themselves to have contributed to the controversy surrounding ratification of the Anglo-Persian Treaty. It is possible they could have succeeded in thwarting ratification even without the use of military force because the internal dissent over the treaty was sufficiently high on its own so that a little push from Soviet propagandists might have been enough. However, neither propaganda nor infiltration techniques would have been sufficient on their own to enable socialism to take root in the north in 1920 or to force a reversal of policy by Tehran or by London in 1921. It was the combination of techniques which enhanced Moscow's policies.

In 1946, the use of direct force was crucial in developing Persian willingness to consider the grievances of the Azeris, particularly their demands for self-rule. Again, the stationing of the Red Army in the

enabled the propaganda and infiltration campaigns to proceed uninhibited by Persian forces. However, the use of force in this case jeopardized Moscow's other methods of interference, especially after the March 1946 deployments. In particular, the deployments increased third party interest and involvement in Iran and eventually contributed to the failure of Soviet interference policy.

The Soviet use of a broad spectrum of interference techniques was matched by its willingness to exploit indecision, controversy, and vacillation in the foreign policies of other states. When there was an apparent void of political power, and the Soviet Union had the opportunity to use that vacuum to serve its own interests, it did not shy away from the challenge. The fact that Soviet efforts were to little avail in the final analysis in both instances does not detract from the potential of its policies.

The areas of Soviet weaknesses were particularly apparent in the long run once Soviet agents had been at work attempting to influence the officials and populations of Iran. Both the Gilan and Azerbaijan incidents exposed the shortcomings of Soviet techniques. The most glaring problems Moscow faced in Iran were the problems of communication and control of its operatives in the field. Communist agents simply could not live up to the expectations they generated. Ideological zeal--or rather Marxist dogmatic conformity demanded by Moscow, undermined any gains they had made. In addition, communists in Resht and Tabriz were poor

administrators and eventually lost the support of the peasants as well as townspeople by failing to administer the provinces efficiently and effectively. Moscow had an additional problem to overcome. Namely, it had not reconciled its policy of advocating self-determination and nationalist revolution with communism. The communists in Moscow could not or would not recognize nationalist diversity within international communism, and in the final analysis this discrepancy contributed to the failure of Soviet policy in establishing communist republics in Iran. Consequently, Moscow proved to be a poor student of Soviet-Persian relations, and basically refused to modify its techniques in spite of the evidence which indicated that such a move was necessary to ensure Soviet success.

The findings presented in this study therefore suggest that should Soviet decision makers effect change within their own ranks to make better use of the opportunities presented them, they could in essence have a potentially very valuable weapon. The potential for success increases when serious difficulties already exist in the target state, as was the situation in both Gilan and Azerbaijan Provinces. In short, Soviet interference in Iran in 1920 and 1945 failed in part because of the inability of Soviet decision makers and agents operating in Iran to understand fully the necessity for flexibility and adaptation to local conditions. The failures did not result because of poor or inadequate propaganda or infiltration. On the contrary, had Soviet

agents been more efficient in implementing policy promised in the propaganda campaign, and had the Soviet leadership been more capable of adjusting its policy to meet local needs and more willing to compromise its position to do so, Soviet propaganda techniques along with the other methods of interference would have increased Moscow's prospects for success.

Notes

1. X. J. Eudin and R.C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-27 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 87.

2. For example see the exchange of correspondence in Documents on British Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

As originally outlined, four questions were to be explored in an attempt to analyze Soviet behavior.

(1) What was the nature of internal dissidence in Iran and how would that contribute to the Soviet decision to interfere? (2) Was an indigenous communist party necessary to that interference? (3) How was the interaction between and among third parties and Soviet-Iranian relations important to Soviet policy? How did their interest--or lack of it--affect Soviet behavior? (4) What role did the existence of a weakened central government play in that decision? Following are some answers to these four questions. In addition, there are general comments about Soviet foreign policy behavior.

1. Internal dissidence was quite high and covered many areas of grievances. In particular, in both cases economic inequality, social injustice, nationalist and linguistic chauvinism, and authoritarian political regulation all contributed to an environment which was beneficial to Soviet propagandists, and which allowed those agents to utilize Persian discontent. In addition, in the Gilan crisis Moscow capitalized on the anti-British and in

particular anti-Treaty sentiment of the population as a whole. In the Azerbaijan crisis Moscow focused on the nationalism of several Persian minorities--especially Kurdish and Azeri nationalism--and the eagerness of those groups to rid Iran of foreign involvement. Without these grievances, Soviet propagandists would not have had such a free hand in manipulating and arousing public feelings. Quite possibly, had they been forced to create inflammatory issues, they might not have succeeded or they might have achieved modest gains instead of the rather excellent results they did obtain in the first stages of the crisis.

This discussion points to a dilemma with which Soviet decision makers have had to cope. Namely, if the Soviet Union adapted to local conditions in the north in order to facilitate its interference there and enhance its influence, Moscow then would have faced alienating the central government. On the other hand, if Moscow were to try to accommodate the central government, it probably would have meant decreasing its prospects in the northern provinces. Moscow had not solved this problem. In 1920, it tried to attack Iran on two fronts, that is to establish a socialist regime in Gilan and at the same time attempt to undermine the central government. It clearly was willing to settle for a small share of the proverbial "pie" rather than risk a possibly long fight with Iran with the probable risk of interference at some

point by the British. However, by 1921, after much serious debate and amidst calculations resulting from the apparent failure of socialism to take hold in Gilan as well as amidst increasing pressures from London, Moscow chose to court favor with Tehran at the expense of the socialist experiment in Gilan. The major reason however was the economic necessity of dealing with Britain. Without this pressure, there is every reason to believe that Moscow's efforts in Gilan would have continued no matter how many administrative problems may have developed. In any event, Moscow also determined that Riza Khan would better serve Soviet interests vis-a-vis decreasing British influence and interference in Iran because he appeared to be an able and strong leader.

In 1945-46, Moscow again attempted to weaken Iran on two fronts simultaneously, namely, create a socialist regime in Azerbaijan at the same time that it used its resources to undermine the central government. But by 1946, Moscow was forced to retreat from Azerbaijan.

Clearly Moscow would have preferred in both instances to establish socialism throughout Iran. This was the goal stated in most of Moscow's pronouncements regarding the spread of socialism in the East. It was reiterated many times, in the Third International's Second and Third Congresses, as well as in the propaganda schools, and repeated in history books during the 1940s. However, the opportunity developed which allowed Moscow to experiment in Gilan and temporarily to forego the socialization of Iran as a whole.

Under the circumstances of 1920-21, this was the more practical path to follow. The circumstances of 1945 also led Moscow to settle for experimenting in Azerbaijan rather than concentrating its efforts solely on Iran in general. In March 1946, Moscow apparently was contemplating the possibility of winning over all of Iran through military force. However, when this gamble failed, Moscow returned to its interference in Azerbaijan.

2. Initially, it was believed that the existence of an indigenous communist party would facilitate the activities of Moscow by providing a foothold in the country. However, the evidence has proven to be inconclusive.

In 1920, there was no indigenous communist party to speak of. Rather, the Moslem communists had organized a communist party in Baku and transported it to Enzeli in Gilan Province after the Soviet landing. While it had many Persian members, the leadership either was educated in Russia or had lived there for a long period of time. Thus, they were in a sense outsiders. Soviet interference was assisted by the activities undertaken by the Persian Communist Party. However, Soviet infiltration of the Jangali movement and the subsequent subversion of many of the members proved to be more important for Soviet foreign policy than the mere existence of a communist party. Once the Jangali faction became disillusioned and the split occurred within its ranks, the

communists were able to rely on those members of the movement whom Soviet agents had subverted already. Thus, communists' interests were implemented by Ihsan Allah Khan's group along with the Persian Communist Party. Consequently, the evidence from the Gilan interference does not confirm the contention that a communist party is necessary for Soviet interference to occur. The PCP was one of at least two groups used by Moscow to interfere in Persian affairs.

In 1945, Moscow moved in several directions at once. In Kurdistan, Soviet agents relied on front organizations especially social and cultural societies. From there they moved into the political organizations and eventually established their own "democratic" party of Kurdistan. In Azerbaijan, they operated from within the newly created Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. If anything, the communist Tudah Party was a liability for Moscow in the north. The Tudah Party proved to be unwieldy for Moscow because it refused to compromise what it believed to be questions of principle. The DPA, on the other hand, derived its support from Soviet agents operating in the north and therefore was more willing to abandon principle for pragmatic considerations, especially if it benefitted Moscow's interests.

One conclusion that can be drawn from these two crises is that some type of organization is necessary for Soviet interference but it need not be an indigenous communist party. Moscow is adept at subverting institutions and clearly is

capable of creating its own front organizations, such as a cultural society, from which to base its operations. Of course, if such a communist party existed in a potential target state, then it would be one likely starting point for Soviet agents to engage in propaganda and subversion. Thus, while a communist party may be a contributing element to Soviet policies of interference it appears not be a necessary one.

3. Soviet successes in Iran--such as they were--were a direct result of Soviet initiative, perseverance, and ingenuity as well as third party confusion, ambiguity, weakness and ineptitude. In both the Gilan and Azerbaijan crises, the level of tolerance by third parties for Soviet interference initially appeared to be relatively higher than one would have expected.

In 1920, one would have expected British resistance to communist military action to have been strong, firm, persistent. Yet the tolerance level exhibited by London appears to have been high. This was, of course, a result of the Parliamentary debates concerning the cost of maintaining the Army throughout the Empire as well as to disagreement over Soviet aims in Iran. Also, there appear to have been some confusion and discrepancies between the opinions shared by the British representatives in Tehran and British officials in London as to Soviet intentions and capabilities. Whatever the rationale, the consequences were beneficial to the RSFSR because it appeared to Moscow that Britain's reaction was

mutated; therefore, Moscow felt it had a freer hand to pursue its policies in Gilan. As London's perceptions changed and its policy became more coherent and responsive, the tolerance level shifted downward. London then used its own range of interference techniques to influence Moscow to cease its activities in Iran. Once Britain's tolerance decreased, the stakes were raised for Moscow, and the risks became greater, eventually leading to a modification of Soviet behavior. However, the crucial point is that while London's tolerance level appeared to be high there was little incentive for Moscow to alter its behavior in Iran. London's apparent meager resistance to Soviet interference only served to encourage Moscow to escalate and broaden its range of interference techniques and to continue to strive towards achieving its foreign policy goals in Iran.

In 1945, the level of tolerance exhibited by third parties--the United States in particular, as well as Great Britain--also contributed to an escalation of Soviet interference. In particular, Stalin determined that the United States would not be interested in Moscow's activities in Iran because it was only too happy to be finished with the war and able to "return to normalcy." The internal debate in the United States was geared to how quickly the United States should demobilize its wartime forces and how best to develop a peaceful world. Stalin's perceptions were strengthened by American ambiguity, confusion, and most of all ambivalence toward the Near East and toward Iran. In addition,

President Truman was perceived to be inexperienced in foreign affairs with little or no knowledge of or interest in Iran. Further, the American decision to disengage its forces from Iran as quickly as possible contributed to the permissive climate Stalin thought he enjoyed concerning Iran. For example, the initial Soviet thrust in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan in 1945 solicited little more than verbal protests from Washington. With the tolerance level apparently high, or at least within acceptable limits, Moscow again was encouraged to continue its activities in Iran. Stalin misread American intentions because American intentions in Iran were not clear. Consequently, he also unwittingly undermined his own policy by creating a crisis in March 1946 which perceptibly changed the overt tolerance level to an unacceptable level for Moscow. At the same time, it crystallized American foreign policy towards Iran and towards the Soviet Union.

Once again, the crucial point is that so long as the tolerance level was within acceptable bounds for Moscow, Moscow felt encouraged to pursue its interventionary policies and continued to do so until the tolerance by the interested third parties shifted in favor of resistance to further Soviet initiatives.

A word is necessary at this point concerning the tolerance exhibited by Iran to Moscow's interference. To maintain its integrity and sovereignty, Iran had no alternative but to resist Soviet encroachment. Therefore, after the introduction of military force, Tehran was forced to challenge

Soviet interference. However, Persian necessity was not matched by Persian capabilities. Consequently, Iranian resistance, and therefore also tolerance, to Soviet actions was linked to third party resistance and tolerance. While Iran tried to affect the level of response by its so-called protectors, and took action on its own to insure some modification of Soviet behavior, the crucial factors were really not within the purview of Iran to change effectively or dramatically. Namely, in 1920 British foreign policy was sensitive to the Parliamentary debates on the cost of maintaining the Empire as well as whether British interests would be served by supporting Iran. These questions were raised at the same time that Iran was undermining its own chances of obtaining assistance by refusing to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty. Nonetheless, the British decision to resist Soviet advances in Iran were more a result of London's belated realization that its interests necessitated protecting Iran and restricting Soviet interference. The evidence points to the conclusion that, if anything, Iran's behavior toward the United Kingdom and the RSFSR served to weaken its relationship with London. Further, Iran's actions would lead one to believe that Iran could effect change independently when in fact its survival as a sovereign state was intimately dependent upon the good will and tolerance of Great Britain.

In 1945, American foreign policy was being formulated amidst Congressional debate over how quickly the United

States should demobilize and what its role should be in the post-war world. American concern was not directly related to Iran's plight. Iran again found itself dependent upon another power to fight for its sovereignty. Iran's behavior would lead one to believe that such was not the case as was evident by Iran's persistence in appealing to the Security Council over the objections of the West. While Iran lobbied in effect for a strong American response to Soviet interference, the decision to resist Soviet expansion was more a result of Washington's determination to confront the Soviet Union and contain its expansion.

So long as Britain in 1920 and the United States in 1945 appeared to be tolerant of Soviet behavior--by tolerant I mean limiting their responses to verbal protests, and maybe not even strong ones at that--Tehran could do very little. Of course, it did what it could within the restrictions thrust upon it by its dependence on other powers. For instance, in 1920 Tehran agreed, over the objections of London, to open negotiations with Moscow concerning a friendship treaty. In 1945 Tehran appealed to the United Nations over the initial objections of the United States and Great Britain, and later negotiated on its own with Moscow over the Azerbaijan question. In neither case did Tehran feel confident in relying on the protection of third parties. Nonetheless, Moscow would not have been deterred had the third parties not involved themselves on behalf of Iran. The crucial point here is the dependency relationship that

Iran maintained with Britain in 1921 and the United States in 1946. While Tehran did attempt to resolve the conflicts on its own, its tolerance level could not be considered an independent factor, and the final resolution of the crises were dependent on the involvement by third parties. Accordingly, Tehran was forced to accept a much higher range of Soviet interference than it would have had it not been so dependent on other powers.

4. The two Soviet interventions should have provided some valuable lessons for Iran. In particular, at the heart of the problem lay the weakness of the central government in Tehran. The central administrations were marked by ineptitude, corruption, disinterest, and an almost callous disregard for the problems of the people in the north. Consequently, economic and social problems were ignored and thereby were given an opportunity to grow. These poor conditions were left to fester in both instances. Moscow offered remedies, and Russians were welcomed in Gilan and Azerbaijan. When Tehran attempted to reassert its authority in these provinces it found that the damage was done already and that the Russians were entrenched in these areas. Through its own neglect and reluctance to deal with the inequalities and injustices felt by the populace in the north and its apparent unwillingness or inability to change its policies, Tehran itself created the conditions whereby Moscow could make headway. Once Moscow introduced the use of military force to protect its other activities, Tehran again was

proven helpless and was forced to appeal to other powers for assistance.

The bankruptcy of Tehran's programs hardly could be laid completely at Moscow's doorstep. Rather, the central government in 1920 was a victim of its own greed and incompetence. Several members of the Cabinet along with the Shah diverted Tehran's energies from resolving its internal problems and instead spent their time trying to exact more and more bribes from London in exchange for ratification of the Anglo-Persian Treaty. Once Riza Khan gained control and was made the new Shah, he moved to solve the ethnic problems by quelling all resistance to the central government. Instead, he should have been trying to alleviate some of the problems contributing to the tribes' discontent. His actions therefore merely postponed the confrontation until a future time. In 1945, part of the blame for the autonomy movement also rested with Tehran. Again, Tehran failed to correct the grievances voiced in the Gilan incident, namely a greater say for ethnic and national groups and better economic and social conditions. In short, the same demands for a reorganization of priorities for internal development was made on the central authorities. Moscow's success in initially convincing the population of Azerbaijan was in part due to the inability and perhaps unwillingness of Tehran to recognize its responsibilities towards the northern provinces. Thus, the central government was not moved to action until it was too late and then Tehran found itself basically help-

less in facing Soviet military and political interference.

Consequently, the two Soviet interventions should have provided some lessons for Iran. First, Iran must resolve its internal problems, especially the economic disparity and social injustice. While no government is completely immune from interference, it must be internally strong enough to adequately defend its own interests. If Iran failed to make adequate reforms, it would only be postponing the development of a future dissident movement. Therefore, legitimate and authoritative government was essential for Iran's internal development as well as for a more independent foreign policy. If Iran had learned anything from past crises, it had been that it was dependent on third parties for its independence. Iran's government would be better able to defend its own interests if it could develop internal strength--political, economic, and social.

The Soviet Union could not but interfere in Iran when given the opportunity in part because of its rivalry with other Great Powers, in part because of a desire to spread socialism to the East, in part because of the internal weaknesses of Tehran and hence its greater vulnerability, and in part because of the historical imperatives to expand toward the Persian Gulf and toward the Dardenelles. Tehran's dependence on other parties in these crises further enhanced Soviet prospects because these other powers were not united in their views of Soviet policy or in how to handle the problem.

Iran's value to other powers has been and continues to be strategic in nature. For London, Iran represented the defense line for the back door of its empire. Iran provided oil for the British Navy and was the center for defense in the region. In particular, its long border with Soviet Russia insured it a special place in British foreign policy. London's primary focus was on Europe, with Iran providing a diversion, a secondary interest, although an important one. In 1945, a similar relationship existed, although this time with the United States. Iran had strategic significance because of its geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and because it was a buffer between communist Russia and Saudi Arabia, with its vast oil reserves. Washington also viewed Iran as a center of Near East politics and as a buffer between the Arabs and Moscow. Basically, Europe was still the focus of major attention but as the need for oil increased and Soviet influence expanded, the American focus has shifted to the Near East and to Iran in particular.

Consequently, given Iran's geopolitical situation and hence its value to Great Powers, near and far, Tehran had to make a bold effort to resolve its internal problems, recognize the necessity of taking into account Moscow's interests, and attempt to forge a more independent foreign policy which is not based on dependence on other powers to support its integrity.

A comparison of Soviet activities in Gilan and its partial success along with its activities in Azerbaijan and its relative failure exhibits a consistency in Soviet foreign policy which is more than coincidental. It especially demonstrates the persistence by Moscow in pursuing its long range goals in the Near East which would acquire for Moscow access to warm water ports, secure its southern borders and establish friendly relations with its neighbors. It also shows the perseverance of ideological goals as a means whereby Moscow could spread its hegemony in the East. The comparison also points to the role of third parties in both encouraging and resisting Soviet interference in other states. It especially elaborates on the nature of Soviet foreign policy, a nature which is flexible and adaptable to pressures placed on its interests. In the absence of such pressures, however, Moscow has been found to be persistent in pursuing its intervention policies even when those programs were not successful.

This consistency in Soviet behavior also pointed to a paradox inherent in Soviet foreign policy: Soviet policy is both unique to the Soviet Union and at the same time quite similar to behavior of other states. Soviet foreign policy shared several elements in common with other states, for instance, the perception of Iran in strategic terms. In both crises all of the parties interested in Iran viewed that state as a potential buffer zone. In 1921, Britain viewed Iran as a buffer against

Soviet Russia for its interests in India. Moscow viewed Iran as a buffer against Western encroachment on its southern borders. In 1945, Washington viewed Iran as a buffer against Soviet expansion in the Near and Middle East, particularly against the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia. Moscow again saw Iran as a potential buffer for its southern border, this time against any American attack. In the late 1970s, Iran's important geopolitical position cannot be overlooked. Iran's role as a buffer still is considered vital both to Moscow and Washington and insures a continuing interest in the country by other powers.

In addition, Moscow as well as other states, evaluated the events, situations, information, relationships relevant to their national interests and calculated the cost/benefit of particular actions. Each state established for itself long and short range goals and used the most efficient means for achieving those ends. When the means seemed ineffective or when some goals seemed jeopardized by the pursuit of other goals, the state made a determination as to what it was willing to expend on behalf of particular policies and thereby established a priority of goals.¹ In this regard Moscow was quite similar to other states. In both crises, when important values were threatened Moscow modified its techniques of interference and responded to pressures. In 1920, Moscow chose to honor British demands for a decrease in interference in Iran and a withdrawal from Gilan in exchange for a trade deal. Moscow valued

trade deal more than it valued the continuation of its socialist experiment in Gilan. In part, Moscow's conclusion stemmed from internal problems in Soviet Russia and from internal problems in Gilan. In the end, the needs of the Soviet state took precedence over socialism in Gilan. In 1945, Moscow valued the promise of an oil deal with Iran and the avoidance of a military confrontation with the United States more than it valued the establishment of socialism in Azerbaijan or in Iran.

What then made Soviet foreign policy unique? The elements which shaped Soviet foreign policy and which gave it its qualitative difference were basically the same elements which help distinguish the foreign policy of all states. Namely, a state's foreign policy is in part the result of a combination of history, leadership qualities, and ideology. For instance, Russia's history had been conditioned by long borders threatened repeatedly by hostile neighbors. Part of that history concerned antagonistic Russian-Persian relations. This poor relationship was compounded by the attitude of St. Petersburg, and later Moscow, to be wary of other powers which might extend their influence into the Near East and up to the Russian borders. Consequently, Russia's insecurity was passed on to its Soviet descendants and continues to be an important element of Soviet foreign policy.

Socialism was also a major component of Soviet foreign policy because it guided the perspectives of Soviet decision makers and established goals for Moscow's foreign policy.

Further, after examining the information about both crises, it becomes evident that Marxist-Leninist doctrine was a very important aspect of Moscow's goals, more so in 1920 than in 1945. The literature from the Gilan crisis reflected a sincere belief that socialism was a valued goal to pursue and that many of Moscow's operatives were idealistic and committed to the values and principles of socialism. This was especially apparent in the heated debates concerning the relationship of nationalism and socialism, the timing of the revolution and whether Gilan was "ready" for this revolution, and the manner in which the communists were to administer the Gilan Republic. Socialism also was a means whereby Soviet Russia could wrest Iran away from the capitalist orbit and into the socialist camp, and if that failed at least to push Tehran into a more conciliatory posture vis-a-vis Soviet-Persian relations.

The same picture cannot be painted for the 1945 period. While one cannot completely ignore the importance or relevance of ideology in guiding Soviet foreign policy makers, one suspects that ideology did not hold the same force as it had earlier. In fact, political considerations appeared to have been much more important. In addition, the literature again suggested that in 1945, ideology was perceived as a means to deny Iran to the West, and to expand the influence of the Soviet Union. One might even conclude that Moscow's behavior during the Azerbaijan crisis was not unlike that of any other state which might have occupied

the same territorial boundaries as the Soviet Union and found itself with similar opportunities. On the other hand, it should be noted that Marxism-Leninism cannot be excluded entirely from the investigation of Soviet foreign policy --nor should it be a goal to do so--because it permeated all aspects of Moscow's life and framework and hence was an important variable in the perspectives of the Soviet decision makers and an important element in the choice of Soviet goals.

In conclusion, an examination of Soviet interference provides a fruitful study of Soviet foreign policy behavior. Like all nations, the Soviet Union uses the entire range of interference methods. It is most successful when it uses propaganda, and in particular when there are real problems to be exploited. Moscow also is adept at subverting loyalties and infiltrating important institutions and groups in a target society. This accomplishment is enhanced when the social fabric of the society makes infiltration easily accessible. In the past, military force was a useful option. However, in today's world the risks are much higher than they were in 1920 or 1945. Further, the opportunity to engage military forces is not always present. When it is possible, then military force will enhance the prospects for the other methods and techniques of interference. The use of diplomacy therefore becomes imperative especially when the military option is too risky. However, diplomacy alone will not achieve the kind of results Moscow may be striving

for unless diplomacy is supplemented by the use of propaganda, infiltration and other forms of interference, such as the use of economic pressure.

The Soviet Union has proved to be very adept at exploiting opportunity, especially when there is minimal risk involved. In a sense, the Soviet Union is highly responsive to power vacuums. It is sensitive to problems developing in the international arena which it may exploit and especially sensitive to problems within third parties which normally would "protect" the target state. The Soviet Union does not appear to be the initiator in many instances of interference. Rather, it benefits from confusion, indecision, apathy, preoccupation and the turn of events. This is not to suggest that Moscow does not have a long range policy plan of subversion or aims of control beyond its borders. But the evidence suggests that these goals may not be directly pursued until a specific opportunity arises. Then Moscow weighs the risk and rewards, and determines whether a particular action is warranted by the situation.

Even with Moscow's vast capabilities, it will not endanger vital security needs by persisting in a policy which will meet serious resistance. Once the risks exceed Moscow's expectations, it can be expected to back down and deescalate its interference. If Moscow is exploiting an opportunity, then it will be willing to disengage when tolerance decreases and the risks outweigh the potential

gains. However, if the target state is deemed vital to Soviet interests, it probably will be willing to risk confrontation, and to withstand an increase of resistance.

The major point is that Moscow has the capabilities --indeed is quite successful in many of the possible types of interference--to interfere in a target state. The evidence suggests that one determining factor for Moscow to escalate its forms of interference will be the nature of the weaknesses in the target state. A second factor will be the nature of the international scene and in particular the interest, involvement, capabilities, and apparent willingness of important third parties to resist and/or tolerate Soviet interference.

Thus, the burden of responsibility rests with the target state and the interested third parties in denying the Soviet Union the opportunity to employ the broader range of interference techniques. This in turn demands that the target state develop its political and economic institutions so that internal problems do not provide exploitative situations for Moscow's agents. Further, this demands that the third parties possess a clear, concise and consistent foreign policy toward the target state so that Moscow does not misinterpret motive, capabilities, or willingness to resist Soviet interference.

Notes

1. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962).

Appendix A

CONVENTION

(Terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention dealing with Persian Affairs. From Numerical File 616, 1906-1910, Cases 8549-8578, The National Archives, Washington, D.C.)

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the question referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective plenipotentiaries, to-wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honorable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs; who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:—

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighbourhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interest in the above-mentioned Provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms:—

I

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concession in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

II

Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bandar Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

III

Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concession whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same region of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

IV

It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian Customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortisation and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian Customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement.

V

In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortisation or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue

guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement.

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Appendix B

THESES ON THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION ADOPTED BY
THE SECOND COMINTERN CONGRESS

28 July 1920

Protokoll, ii, p. 224

1. An abstract or formal conception of equality in general, and of national equality in particular, is characteristic of the very nature of bourgeois democracy. Under a show of the equality of the human personality in general, bourgeois democracy proclaims the formal equality in law of property owners and proletarians, of exploiters and exploited, thereby deeply deceiving the oppressed classes. The idea of equality, which is itself a reflection of the conditions of commodity production, is turned by the bourgeoisie, using the pretext of the alleged absolute equality of the human personality, into an instrument for combating the abolition of classes. The true meaning of the demand for equality resides solely in the demand for the abolition of classes.

2. As the conscious expression of the proletarian class struggle to shake off the yoke of the bourgeoisie, the communist party, in accordance with its chief task—which is to fight bourgeois democracy and expose its falseness and hypocrisy—should not advance abstract and formal principles on the national question, but should undertake first of all a precise analysis of the given environment, historical and above all economic; secondly, it should specifically distinguish the interests of the oppressed classes, of the workers and the exploited, from the general concept of so-called national interests, which signify in fact the interests of the ruling class; thirdly, it should as precisely distinguish the oppressed, dependent nations, unequal in rights, from the oppressing, exploiting nations with full rights, to offset the bourgeois-democratic lies which conceal the colonial and financial enslavement of the vast majority of the world's population by a small minority of the wealthiest and most advanced capitalist countries that is characteristic of the epoch of finance-capital and imperialism.

3. The imperialist war of 1914 demonstrated with the greatest clarity to all enslaved nations and oppressed classes of the entire world the falseness of bourgeois-democratic phraseology. Both sides used phrases about national liberation and the right of national self-determination to make good their case, but the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest on one side, and the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain on the other, showed that the victorious bourgeoisie quite ruthlessly determine 'national' frontiers in accordance with their economic interests. Even 'national' frontiers are objects of barter for the bourgeoisie. The so-called League of Nations is nothing but the insurance contract by which the victors in the war mutually guarantee each other's spoils. For the bourgeoisie, the desire to re-establish national unity, to 're-unite with the ceded parts of the country', is nothing but an attempt of the defeated to assemble forces for new wars. The reunification of nations artificially torn apart is also in accordance with the interests of the proletariat; but the proletariat can attain genuine national freedom and unity only by means of revolutionary struggle and after the downfall of the bourgeoisie. The League of Nations and the entire post-war policy of the imperialist States disclose this truth even more sharply and clearly, everywhere intensifying the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of the advanced countries and of the labouring classes in the colonies and dependent countries, accelerating the destruction of petty-bourgeois national illusions about the possibility of peaceful co-existence and of the equality of nations under capitalism.

4. From these principles it follows that the entire policy of the Communist International on the national and colonial question must be based primarily on bringing together the proletariat and working classes of all nations and countries for the common revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the landowners and the bourgeoisie. For only such united action will ensure victory over capitalism, without which it is impossible to abolish national oppression and inequality of rights.

5. The world political situation has now placed the proletarian dictatorship on the order of the day, and all events in world politics are necessarily concentrated on one central point, the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Russian Soviet Republic, which is rallying round itself both the soviet movements among the advanced workers in all countries, and all the national liberation movements in the colonies and among oppressed peoples, convinced by bitter experience that there is no salvation for them except in union with the revolutionary proletariat and in the victory of the Soviet power over world imperialism.

6. At the present time, therefore, we should not restrict ourselves to a mere recognition or declaration of the need to bring the working people of various countries closer together; our policy must be to bring into being a close alliance of all national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia; the forms taken by this alliance will be determined by the stage of development reached by the communist movement among the proletariat of each country or by the revolutionary liberation movement in the undeveloped countries and among the backward nationalities.

7. Federation is a transitional form towards the complete union of the working people of all nations. Experience has already shown the expediency of federation, both in the relations of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic with other Soviet republics (the Hungarian, Finnish, and Latvian in the past, the Azerbaijan and Ukrainian at the present time), as also within the RSFSR itself in regard to the nationalities which had neither independent political existence nor self-government (for example the Bashkir and Tatar autonomous republics of the RSFSR, which were established in 1919 and 1920).

8. On this question it is the task of the Communist International not only to promote further development in this direction, but also to study and examine the experiences of these federations which have arisen on the basis of the Soviet system and the Soviet movement. While recognizing federation as a transitional form to complete union, efforts must be made to bring about an ever closer federal association, consideration being given to the following: first, it is impossible for the Soviet republics, surrounded by the imperialist States of the entire world, which are far stronger from the military point of view, to hold out unless they are closely allied with other Soviet republics; secondly, the necessity for a close economic association

among the Soviet republics, without which it is impossible to restore the productive forces destroyed by imperialism or to ensure the welfare of the working people; thirdly, the movement towards the creation of a unified world economy on a common plan controlled by the proletariat of all nations. This tendency has already become clearly manifest under capitalism, and socialism will without any doubt carry forward and complete its development.

9. In regard to relations within States, the Communist International's national policy cannot confine itself to the bare and formal recognition of the equality of nations, expressed in words only and involving no practical obligations, to which bourgeois democracies—even if they call themselves 'socialist'—restrict themselves.

Offences against the equality of nations and violations of the guaranteed rights of national minorities, repeatedly committed by all capitalist States despite their 'democratic' constitution, must be inflexibly exposed in all the propaganda and agitation carried on by the communist parties, both inside and outside parliament. But that is not enough. It is also necessary: first, to make clear all the time that only the Soviet system is able to ensure real equality for the nations because it unites first the proletarians, and then all the masses of the working people, in the struggle against the bourgeoisie; secondly, communist parties must give direct support to the revolutionary movements among the dependent nations and those without equal rights (e.g. in Ireland, and among the American Negroes), and in the colonies.

Without this last particularly important condition the struggle against the oppression of the dependent nations and colonies, and the recognition of their right to secede as separate States, remains a deceitful pretence, as it is in the parties of the Second International.

10. To acknowledge internationalism in words only, while in fact adulterating it in all propaganda, agitation, and practical work with petty-bourgeois nationalism and pacifism, is a common characteristic not only of the parties of the Second International, but also among those which have left the Second International. This phenomenon even occurs not infrequently among parties which now call themselves communist. The fight against this evil, against deeply rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices which make their appearance in every possible form, such as race hatred, stirring up national antagonisms, anti-semitism, must be brought into the foreground the more vigorously, the more urgent it becomes to transform the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e. a dictatorship existing in one country alone, and incapable of conducting an independent world policy) into an international dictatorship (i.e. a dictatorship of the proletariat in at least a few advanced countries, which is capable of exercising decisive influence in the political affairs of

the entire world). Petty-bourgeois nationalism calls the mere recognition of the equality of nations internationalism, and (disregarding the purely verbal character of such recognition) considers national egoism inviolable. Proletarian internationalism on the other hand demands: 1. Subordination of the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country to the interests of the struggle on a world scale; 2. that the nation which achieves victory over the bourgeoisie shall display the capacity and readiness to make the greatest national sacrifices in order to overthrow international capitalism.

That is why, in the States where capitalism is fully developed and which have workers' parties which really are the vanguard of the proletariat, the struggle against opportunist and petty-bourgeois pacifist distortions of the idea and policy of internationalism is the primary and most important task.

11. In regard to the more backward States and nations, primarily feudal or patriarchal or patriarchal-peasant in character, the following considerations must be kept specially in mind:

a. All communist parties must support by action the revolutionary liberation movements in these countries. The form which this support shall take should be discussed with the communist party of the country in question, if there is one. This obligation refers in the first place to the active support of the workers in that country on which the backward nation is financially, or as a colony, dependent.

b. It is essential to struggle against the reactionary and medieval influence of the priesthood, the Christian missions, and similar elements.

c. It is necessary to struggle against the pan-Islamic and pan-Asiatic movements and similar tendencies; which are trying to combine the liberation struggle against European and American imperialism with the strengthening of the power of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobility, the large landlords, the priests, etc.

d. It is particularly important to support the peasant movement in the backward countries against the landlords and all forms and survivals of feudalism. Above all, efforts must be made to give the peasant movement as revolutionary a character as possible, organizing the peasants and all the exploited wherever possible in soviets, and thus establish as close a tie as possible between the west European communist proletariat and the revolutionary peasant movement in the East, in the colonies and backward countries.

e. A resolute struggle must be waged against the attempt to clothe the revolutionary liberation movements in the backward countries which are not genuinely communist in communist colours. The Communist International has the duty of supporting the revolutionary movement in the colonies and backward countries only with the object of rallying the constituent elements of the future proletarian parties—which will be truly communist and not only in name—in all the backward countries and

educating them to a consciousness of their special task, namely, that of fighting against the bourgeois-democratic trend in their own nation. The Communist International should collaborate provisionally with the revolutionary movement of the colonies and backward countries, and even form an alliance with it, but it must not amalgamate with it; it must unconditionally maintain the independence of the proletarian movement, even if it is only in an embryonic stage.

f. It is essential constantly to expose and to explain to the widest masses of the working people everywhere, and particularly in the backward countries, the deception practised by the imperialist Powers with the help of the privileged classes in the oppressed countries in creating ostensibly politically independent States which are in reality completely dependent on them economically, financially, and militarily. A glaring example of the deception practised on the working classes of an oppressed nation by the combined efforts of Entente imperialism and the bourgeoisie of that same nation is offered by the Zionists' Palestine venture (and by Zionism as a whole, which, under the pretence of creating a Jewish State in Palestine in fact surrenders the Arab working people of Palestine, where the Jewish workers form only a small minority, to exploitation by England). In present international conditions there is no salvation for dependent and weak nations except as an alliance of Soviet republics.

12. The centuries-old enslavement of the colonial and weak peoples by the great imperialist Powers has left behind among the working masses of the enslaved countries not only feelings of bitterness but also feelings of distrust of the oppressing nations as a whole, including the proletariat of these nations. The despicable treachery to socialism committed by the majority of the official leaders of that proletariat in the years 1914-1919, when the social-patriots concealed behind the slogan of 'defence of the fatherland' the defence of the 'right' of 'their' bourgeoisie to enslave the colonies and plunder the financially dependent countries—such treachery could only strengthen that quite natural distrust. Since this distrust and national prejudice can only be eradicated after the destruction of imperialism in the advanced countries and after the radical transformation of the entire foundations of economic life in the backward countries, the removal of these prejudices can proceed only very slowly. From this it follows that it is the duty of the class-conscious communist proletariat of all countries to be especially cautious and particularly attentive to the national feelings, in themselves out of date, in countries and peoples that have been long enslaved; it is also their duty to make concessions in order to remove this distrust and prejudice the more quickly. Unless the proletariat, and all the working masses of all countries and nations of the entire world, themselves strive towards alliance, and unite as one, the victory over capitalism cannot be pursued to a completely successful end.

Appendix C /

The Call to Spread Revolution in Asia

[Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party to Muslim Communists and Sympathizers, December 1918]¹²

Comrade Muslims! The events which are taking place in the world, the approaching victory of the world socialist revolution, prompt us to give particular attention to the most backward peoples of the East.

The ideas which have been almost fully assimilated by the more cultured comrades of the West are but little known to the comrades in the East. It is the duty of all Communists to come to the aid of their younger brothers.

We, the Muslim Communists, who know better the language and the way of life of the peoples of the East, who are Muslim in our great majority, are duty-bound to take the most active part in this sacred work.

With the above in view, the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party (B) has decided to organize a Department of International Propaganda.

The Central Bureau has resolved to publish pamphlets, newspapers, and leaflets in the native tongues of comrades inhabiting the East, as well as to prepare cadres of propagandists and agitators.

We call on all Muslim Communist organizations in Russia to carry on the most active work locally, and we offer at the same time to select the most active workers [from the native population] and to place them at the disposal of the Central Bureau.

At the same time the Central Bureau appeals to all Muslims who sympathize with the ideas of communism and who wish to work for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the East to respond to the call of the Central Bureau.

In common efforts, the Central Bureau hopes to spread the ideas of communism quickly in the East and to draw all oppressed peoples into the world laboring family.

Long live the World Revolution!

Long live the Government of the Toilers of the World!

Long live the World Soviet Socialist Republic!

RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (B)
CENTRAL BUREAU OF THE MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS

Appendix D

Organization of the Department of International Propaganda for the Eastern Peoples

[Resolution of the First Congress of the Muslim Communists in Russia,
November 1918]¹³

The peoples of the East have until now been exposed to the most brutal and unscrupulous exploitation by imperialist powers. Nowhere else has the oppression of man by man been so great as it has been in the East.

The Russian proletarian revolution has broken the chains of the Eastern peoples within Russia, but in the other Eastern sectors [of Asia], where the brutality of Anglo-Japanese imperialists continues, little change is noticeable. The Russian revolution has been instrumental in stirring the flame of revolutionary consciousness in the huge masses of oppressed Eastern peoples, and it has called them to struggle against their own oppressors and for their better future.

In clear realization of this duty the First Congress of the Muslim Communists has resolved to organize the Department of International Propaganda for the Eastern Peoples. This department will be attached to the Bureau of the Muslim Communist Organizations of the Russian Communist Party. It will conduct agitation among the peoples of the East, explain the Russian and the world revolution [to come], and gradually bring the revolutionary masses to an understanding of the idea of world communism.

In order to carry out its activity more successfully, the department has been divided into the following twelve sections: (1) Arab, (2) Persian, (3) Turkish, (4) Azerbaijani, (5) Bukharan, (6) Kirghiz, (7) [Caucasus] Mountaineers', (8) Kalmuk, (9) Chinese, (10) Korean, (11) Japanese, and (12) Indian. All the above sections will have one headquarters, and will have one common office.

In order to reach its goal, the department will issue newspapers, periodicals, leaflets, appeals, etc., and will train communist Muslims and send them to the Eastern regions to carry on agitation, and to organize communist collective bodies for the purpose of an active struggle against the ruling classes, and for the ideas of communism. . . .

Appendix E

An Outline for the Revolutionary Work of the Communist Party in the East

[Resolution of the Second Congress of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East]¹⁵

1. The Congress finds that the problem of the international social revolution cannot be solved without the participation in it of the East as a definite social and economic unit.

2. The Russian Communist Party (B), which, because of its international position, occupies at the present time a leading place in the world communist movement, must take concrete and actual measures for revolutionizing the East.

3. The revolutionary work of the Communist Party in the East must proceed in two directions. One direction is determined by the basic class revolutionary program of the party which, on its part, prompts the necessity of a gradual formation of communist parties in the countries of the East as sections of the Communist International. The second direction is determined by the present political and, naturally, historical, social, and economic position of the East, which necessitates the support in the East, for a period of time, of the national movement directed at the overthrow of the rule of Western European imperialism there—in so far as such a movement does not contradict those class revolutionary aspirations of the international proletariat which are aimed at the overthrow of international imperialism.

4. In view of these aims, it is necessary to develop immediately the most serious and broad activities directed toward the organization of party work in the East on one hand, and toward the organization of anti-imperialist propaganda on the other.

5. This work must be carried out through the central organ of the communist organizations of the peoples of the East. The organizations of the peoples of the East must create from among themselves separate territorial sections and functional departments, and must work under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

6. In order to concentrate the revolutionary energy which is to be transmitted to the East and . . . to awaken its revolutionary instinct, it is necessary to centralize the revolutionary work in the East in the existing and the potential Soviet republics of the Eastern peoples (Turkestan, Kirghiz, and others) and to make them the chief base for revolutionary work in the East.

7. With this purpose in view, it is necessary to start outlining immediately concrete plans for the association and co-operation which must be established among these republics if they are to become the starting point of the revolution in the East.

8. In order to carry out all these tasks, the Congress deems it necessary immediately:

- a. To intensify the training of the Soviet Party workers for the East.
- b. To start preparing a cadre of Soviet orientalists for the East.
- c. To start the organization of an Eastern Red Army [from among the toilers] as a part of the international Red Army.
- d. To intensify the training of Red Army commanders recruited from the ranks of the proletariat of the Eastern peoples.

[Clause Added by the Turkestan Delegation]

9. In order to co-ordinate the actions of the oppressed Eastern nationalities with the actions of the revolutionary proletariat of the West, the Third International must declare that the national-liberation movement in the East and the social revolution [in the West] pursue one and the same general aim, namely, the overthrow of the yoke of the capitalist-imperialists. The Third International must also announce that India, Egypt, Turkey, and other states which are under the yoke of imperialism, are henceforth regarded [by the International] as sovereign and independent. This declaration will raise the revolutionary spirit [of these oppressed peoples] and will make it known to them that their cause finds support among the revolutionary proletariat of the West. . . .

Appendix F

**APPEAL OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS TO THE MOSLEMS
OF RUSSIA AND THE EAST**

3 December 1917

Kluchnikov & Sabanin, ii, p. 94 (dated 7 December)

Comrades! Brothers!

Great events are taking place in Russia! An end is drawing near to the murderous war, started by the bargainings of foreign Powers. The rule of the plunderers who exploit the peoples of the world is tottering. The ancient citadel of slavery and serfdom is crumbling under the blows of the Russian revolution. The world of violence and oppression is approaching its last days. A new world is being born, a world of the toilers and the liberated. At the head of this revolution stands the workers' and peasants' Government of Russia, the Council of People's Commissars.

Revolutionary councils of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies are scattered over the whole of Russia. Power in the country is in the hands of the people. The labouring masses of Russia burn with the single desire to achieve an honourable peace and to help the oppressed peoples of the world to win their freedom.

Russia is not alone in this sacred cause. The mighty call to freedom sounded by the Russian revolution has been taken up by all the toilers in the East and West. The peoples of Europe, exhausted by war, are already stretching out their hands to us, in our work for peace. The workers and soldiers of the West are already rallying under the banner of socialism, storming the strongholds of imperialism. Even far-off India, that land which has been oppressed by the 'enlightened' European robbers for so many centuries, has raised the standard of revolt, organizing its councils of deputies, throwing the hated yoke of slavery from its shoulders, and summoning the peoples of the East to the struggle and to freedom.

The empire of capitalist plunder and violence is falling in ruins. The ground is slipping from under the feet of the imperialist robbers.

In the face of these great events, we turn to you, toiling and disinherited Moslems of Russia and the East.

Moslems of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Trans-Caucasia, Chechens and mountain Cossacks! All you, whose mosques and shrines have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been violated by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia! Henceforward your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are declared free and inviolable! Build your national life freely and without hindrance. It is your right. Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia, will be protected by the might of the revolution, by the Councils of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies!

Support this revolution and its authorized Government!

Moslems of the East! Persians, Turks, Arabs, and Hindus. All you in whose lives and property, in whose freedom and native land the rapacious European plunderers have for centuries traded! All you whose countries the robbers who began the war now desire to share among themselves! We declare that the secret treaties of the dethroned Tsar regarding the annexation of Constantinople, confirmed by the deposed Kerensky, are now null and void. The Russian Republic and its Government, the Council of People's Commissars, are opposed to the seizure of foreign territory; Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Moslems.

We declare that the treaty for the partition of Persia is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military operations the troops will be withdrawn from Persia and the Persians will be guaranteed the right freely to determine their own destiny.

We declare that the treaty for the partition of Turkey, which was to despoil it of Armenia, is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military operations, the Armenians will be guaranteed the right freely to determine their political destiny.

It is not from Russia and its revolutionary Government that you have to fear enslavement, but from the European imperialist robbers, from those who laid waste your native lands and converted them into their colonies.

Overthrow these robbers and enslavers of your country! Now, when war and desolation are demolishing the pillars of the old order, when the entire world is blazing with indignation against the imperialist brigands, when the least spark of discontent bursts out in a mighty flame of revolution, when even the Indian Moslems, oppressed and tormented by the foreign yoke, are rising in revolt against their slave-drivers—now it is impossible to keep silent. Lose no time in throwing off the yoke of the ancient oppressors of your land! Let them no longer violate your hearths! You must yourselves be masters in your own land! You yourselves must arrange your life as you yourselves see fit! You have the right to do this, for your fate is in your own hands!

Comrades! Brothers!

Advance firmly and resolutely towards a just and democratic peace!

We inscribe the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world on our banners!

Moslems of Russia!

Moslems of the East!

We look to you for sympathy and support in the work of regenerating the world.

Appendix G

APPEAL FROM CHICHERIN TO THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS
OF PERSIA

30 August 1919

Kluchnikov & Sabanin, ii, p. 341

Throughout the past century the Russian and English Governments treated you like a subject people. Taking advantage of the fact that the once powerful Persian people had, under the intolerable yoke of their despotic State and feudal lords, greedy for profit and pleasure, reached the lowest depths of poverty and degradation, English robbers and agents of a Tsarism that sought new conquests gradually degraded you to a still lower level of servitude, and helped to maintain the yoke of oppression, giving you no chance to rise, and more and more turning the Persian people into their slaves and vassals. In Russia, the unbridled despotism of the autocratic Tsars held sway, in England a handful of all-powerful robber-capitalists ruled and still rules. It suited both one and the other for your people to remain in darkness and slavery, in order that both the intellectual and the economic progress of your country might be held back, that the strength and the capacity of your people might not find expression and development. The Tsarist Government concluded many secret treaties with your despotic Shah's Government, promising it support and obliging it not to build railways and not to exploit the natural wealth of your country. Both hostile robbers, the Russian and the English, perpetually quarrelled among themselves over Persia but quarrelled only as to which of them should fleece your people still further and maintain their oppression.

The moment came when the Persian masses rose and on a bold impulse tried to throw off the intolerable age-old fetters both of the unbridled power of the Shah and of the oppression of the feudal vampires. Russian revolutionaries, fighting at the same time in their own country against Tsarist despotism and against the savage exploitation and oppression weighing on the Russian people, gave fraternal help to the Persian people; but Tsarism at that time still stood on its feet, and just when the Persian people were fighting for their freedom the English and Russian Governments, for a whole century rivals for supremacy in Persia, came to terms and divided the soil of Persia between themselves.¹ Thanks to the assistance of Tsarist troops, and in particular to the brutal Cossacks sent by the Tsarist Government, the liberation movement in Persia was stamped out, and the finest fighters for its freedom were done to death on the block at Tcheran and later at Tabriz. In the years that followed a double yoke weighed down the people of Persia—that of their own Persian despots and vampires, and that of the Russian and English robbers, who regarded them as an object of profit from whom the last drop of juice was to be squeezed. The Persian Majlis, from being the highest legislative authority, was turned into a blind instrument of the Persian princes and capitalists, and later completely disbanded at the request of the English and Tsarist Governments.

But the great Russian Revolution came, and the working masses of Russia not only destroyed barbarous and savage Tsarism, but first of all liberated labour from the power of capital. The working masses of Russia took power into their own hands and became the masters of

their own destiny. One of the first acts of the Soviet Government of the Russian Republic, expressing the will of the workers and peasants, was the declaration that every people, whether great or small, wherever it might be, whether up to then it had lived an independent life or whether it had been included against its will as a constituent part of another country, should be free in its internal life, and no State should hold it by force within its own frontiers.

In regard to Persia, Comrade Trotsky, in his note of 14 January 1918, solemnly declared to the Persian people that all secret treaties between Russia and England and other Powers, referring to Persia and violating its rights as an independent State, are abrogated by Russia, and that the Russian people return to Persia everything taken from it, everything that the Tsarist generals stole from the Persian people.

The Persian Government on its side declared all such treaties null and void. It seemed that a new free life was to begin for the Persian people, a rebirth after a century of oppression by foreign robbers.

But that is not what happened. In the spring of 1918 English troops gradually occupied the entire territory of Persia. The English promised that as soon as the Turks were driven out they would evacuate Persian territory and reimburse the Persians for all seizures and requisitionings by the English soldiers. The English Government's note of 12 March 1918, containing these promises, was published in the official Persian organ *Raab*. The English promised—although nobody asked them—to help the Persian people after the war to restore their ruined economy. But instead of that they made the Persian people their slaves.

The Russian workers' and peasants' revolution is still struggling against innumerable enemies, against the all-powerful lords of the world, the big capitalists, and against their agents and servants whom they are sending out in the hope of drowning the revolutionary movement of the working masses of Russia in blood. At the same time powerful English capital, in alliance with the American and French, crushed its world rival, German robber imperialism, and is now celebrating its victory. Utilizing this favourable moment, English capital decided to seize the whole of Persia once and for all. Persia was struck out of the list of independent countries, the Persian people were excluded from the ranks of free peoples, their native despots and oppressors received money from England and have finally become its servants, in receipt of wages for their service;¹ they still hang round the neck of the Persian people and will go on oppressing them, but they themselves are only agents and servants of a more powerful world robber, English capital, which will squeeze the last drop out of the unfortunate Persian toilers.

At this moment when the triumphant English robber is trying to force total slavery upon the Persian people, the Soviet workers' and peasants' Government of the Russian Republic solemnly declares that it does not recognize the Anglo-Persian treaty which gives effect to this enslavement. The working masses of Russia regard the working masses of Persia as their brothers and friends, and as their future comrades in the revolutionary struggle for the complete emancipation of labour, and

the workers' and peasants' Soviet Government of Russia, which expresses their will, looks upon the shameful Anglo-Persian treaty by which your rulers have sold themselves and sold you to the English robbers, as a scrap of paper, and will never recognize it as having legal force.

In view of the swindles and banditry perpetrated by the English and Persian Governments we consider it our duty to confirm once more what the Russian people have done for the Persian people, as explained in our note of 26 June 1919 to the Persian Government, which that venal Government concealed from the Persian people:

All payments by Persia on Tsarist bonds are cancelled;

Russia once and for all ceases any kind of interference in Persian revenues;

When the Caspian Sea has been cleared of the pirate ships of English imperialism, it will be declared open to the navigation of ships sailing under the Persian flag;

The frontiers of Soviet Russia and Persia will be determined in accordance with the freely-expressed will of the inhabitants of the border territories;

All former Russian concessions, imperial and private, are declared invalid;

Consular jurisdiction is abolished;

The Discount-Loan Bank of Persia, all railways, highways, port installations, post offices, telephone and telegraph lines in Persia formerly in Russian hands, are transferred for the use and as the property of the free and independent Persian people; all other institutions or regulations placing the Persian people in a subordinate position, or representing intervention in their internal affairs, are abolished or annulled.

The hour of your liberation is near. The hour of reckoning will soon strike for English capital too, for the broad revolutionary movement of the working masses of England itself is growing more and more formidable. The moment is drawing near when throughout the entire world the capitalist robbers will crumple under the blows of their own insurgent working masses. The mighty revolutionary movement of the Russian working masses, having thrown off the chains of all their oppressors and exploiters, serves as an infectious example which is already being followed by the working masses of other countries. Against capitalism and its agents and servants, and against its own counter-revolutionaries, the Russian Republic is waging an ever more successful and victorious struggle and soon our valiant revolutionary Red Army will march through Red Turkestan to the frontiers of a still enslaved Persia.

The Russian working people stretch out to you, oppressed masses of Persia, their brotherly hand; the hour is near when we will indeed be in a position to complete together with you our task of struggle against all robbers and oppressors, great and small, the origin of your untold sufferings.

Appendix H

THE PEACE OF BREST-LITOVSK—THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA,
AND TURKEY

3 March 1918

The Russian Peace, p. 13
Izvestia, 14 March 1918

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey for the one part, and Russia for the other part, being in accord to terminate the state of war, and to enter into peace negotiations as speedily as possible, have appointed as plenipotentiaries:

On the part of the Imperial German Government:

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Actual Imperial Privy Councillor, Herr Richard von Kühlmann;

The Imperial Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, Dr von Rosenberg;

Royal Prussian Major-General Hoffmann, Chief of the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the East;

Naval Captain Horn.

On the part of the Imperial and Royal Joint Austro-Hungarian Government:

The Minister of the Imperial and Royal House and for Foreign Affairs, the Privy Councillor of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, Ottokar Count Czernin von und zu Chudenitz;

The Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, the Privy Councillor, Kajetan Merey von Kapos-Mere;

General of Infantry, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty's Privy Councillor, Maximilian Csicseric von Bacsany.

On the part of the Royal Bulgarian Government:

The Royal Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Vienna, Andrea Tosheff;

Colonel Peter Gantcheff of the General Staff, Royal Bulgarian Military Envoy Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the German Emperor and Aide-de-Camp of His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians;

The Royal Bulgarian First Legation Secretary, Dr Theodor Anastassof.

On the part of the Imperial Ottoman Government:

His Highness Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, former Grand-Vizier, Member of the Ottoman Senate, Envoy Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Sultan to Berlin;

His Excellency, Zeki Pasha, General of Cavalry, Adjutant General of His Majesty the Sultan, and Military Envoy Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the German Emperor.

On the part of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic:

Grigory Yakovlevich Sokolnikov, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies;

Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies;

Georgy Vasilievich Chicherin, Assistant to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs;

Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs.

The Plenipotentiaries met in Brest-Litovsk to enter into peace negotiations, and after presentation of their credentials, and finding them in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following stipulations:

ARTICLE I

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey for the one part, and Russia for the other part, declare that the state of war between them has ceased. They are resolved to live henceforth in peace and amity with one another.

ARTICLE II

The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public and military institutions of the other party. In so far as this obligation devolves upon Russia, it holds good also for the territories occupied by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

ARTICLE III

The territories lying to the west of the line agreed upon by the contracting parties, which formerly belonged to Russia, will no longer be subject to Russian sovereignty; the line agreed upon is traced on the map submitted as an essential part of this treaty of peace (Annex I). The exact fixation of the line will be established by a Russo-German commission.

No obligation whatever toward Russia shall devolve upon the territories referred to arising from the fact that they formerly belonged to Russia.

Russia refrains from all interference in the internal relations of these territories. Germany and Austria-Hungary purpose to determine the future status of these territories in agreement with their population.

ARTICLE IV

As soon as a general peace is concluded and Russian demobilization is carried out completely, Germany will evacuate the territory lying to the east of the line designated in paragraph 1 of Article III, in so far as Article VI does not determine otherwise.

Russia will do all within her power to insure the immediate evacuation of the provinces of eastern Anatolia and their lawful return to Turkey.

The districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum will likewise and without delay be cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the reorganization of the national and international relations of these districts, but leave it to the population of these districts to carry out this reorganization in agreement with the neighbouring States, especially with Turkey.

ARTICLE V

Russia will, without delay, carry out the full demobilization of her army inclusive of those units recently organized by the present Government.

Furthermore, Russia will either bring her warships into Russian ports and there detain them until the day of the conclusion of a general peace, or disarm them forthwith. Warships of the States which continue in a state of war with the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, in so far as they are within Russian sovereignty, will be treated as Russian warships.

The barred zone in the Arctic Ocean continues as such until the conclusion of a general peace. In the Baltic sea, and as far as Russian power extends within the Black sea, removal of the mines will be proceeded with at once. Merchant navigation within these maritime regions is free and will be resumed at once. Mixed commissions will be organized to formulate the more detailed regulations, especially to inform merchant ships with regard to restricted lanes. The navigation lanes are always to be kept free from floating mines.

ARTICLE VI

Russia obligates herself to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the treaty of peace between that State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance. The Ukrainian territory will, without delay, be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia is to put an end to all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Estonia and Livonia will likewise, without delay, be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern boundary of Estonia runs, in general, along the river Narva. The eastern boundary of Livonia crosses, in general, lakes Peipus and Pskov, to the south-western corner of the latter, then across Lake Luban in the direction of Livenhof on the <western> Dvina. Estonia and Livonia will be occupied by a German police force until security is ensured by proper national institutions and until public order has been established. Russia will liberate at once all arrested or deported inhabitants of Estonia and Livonia, and insures the safe return of all deported Estonians and Livonians.

Finland and the Aaland Islands will immediately be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard, and the Finnish ports of the Russian fleet and of the Russian naval forces. So long as the ice prevents the transfer of warships into Russian ports, only limited forces will remain on board the warships. Russia is to put an end to all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions of Finland.

The fortresses built on the Aaland Islands are to be removed as soon as possible. As regards the permanent non-fortification of these islands as well as their further treatment in respect to military and technical navigation matters, a special agreement is to be concluded between Germany, Finland, Russia, and Sweden; there exists an understanding to the effect that, upon Germany's desire, still other countries bordering upon the Baltic Sea would be consulted in this matter.

ARTICLE VII

In view of the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent States, the contracting parties obligate themselves to respect the political and economic independence and the territorial integrity of these States.

ARTICLE VIII

The prisoners of war of both parties will be released to return to their homeland. The settlement of the questions connected therewith will be effected through the special treaties provided for in Article XII.

ARTICLE IX

The contracting parties mutually renounce compensation for their war expenses, i.e. of the public expenditures for the conduct of the war, as well as compensation for war losses, i.e. such losses as were caused them and their nationals within the war zones by military measures, inclusive of all requisitions effected in enemy country.

ARTICLE X

Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be resumed immediately upon the ratification of the treaty of peace. As regards the reciprocal admission of consuls, separate agreements are reserved.

ARTICLE XI

As regards the economic relations between the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Russia the regulations contained in Appendices II-V are determinative, namely, Appendix II for the Russo-German, Appendix III for the Russo-Austro-Hungarian, Appendix IV for the Russo-Bulgarian, and Appendix V for the Russo-Turkish relations.

ARTICLE XII

The re-establishment of public and private legal relations, the exchange of war prisoners and interned civilians, the question of amnesty as well as the question anent the treatment of merchant ships which have come into the power of the opponent, will be regulated in separate treaties with Russia which form an essential part of the general treaty of peace, and, as far as possible, go into force simultaneously with the latter.

ARTICLE XIII

In the interpretation of this treaty, the German and Russian texts are authoritative for the relations between Germany and Russia; the German, the Hungarian, and Russian texts for the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia; the Bulgarian and Russian texts for the relations between Bulgaria and Russia; and the Turkish and Russian texts for the relations between Turkey and Russia.

ARTICLE XIV

The present treaty of peace will be ratified. The documents of ratification shall, as soon as possible, be exchanged in Berlin. The Russian Government obligates itself, upon the desire of one of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, to execute the exchange of the documents of ratification within a period of two weeks. Unless otherwise provided for in its articles, in its annexes, or in the additional treaties, the treaty of peace enters into force at the moment of its ratification.

In testimony whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty with their own hand.

Executed in quintuplicate at Brest-Litovsk, 3 March 1918.

Appendix I

ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT

SIGNED AT TEHERAN

AUGUST 9, 1919

No. 1

PREAMBLE: In virtue of the close ties of friendship which have existed between the two Governments in the past, and in the conviction that it is in the essential and mutual interests of both in future that these ties should be cemented, and that the progress and prosperity of Persia should be promoted to the utmost, it is hereby agreed between the Persian Government on the one hand, and His Britannic Majesty's Minister, acting on behalf of his Government, on the other, as follows:—

1. The British Government reiterate, in the most categorical manner, the undertakings which they have repeatedly given in the past to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia.

2. The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, the services of whatever expert advisers may, after consultation between the two Governments, be considered necessary for the several departments of the Persian Administration. These advisers shall be engaged on contracts and endowed with adequate powers, the nature of

which shall be the matter of agreement between the Persian Government and the advisers.

3. The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, such officers and such munitions and equipment of modern type, as may be adjudged necessary by a joint commission of military experts, British and Persian, which shall assemble forthwith for the purpose of estimating the needs of Persia in respect of the formation of a uniform force which the Persian Government proposes to create for the establishment and preservation of order in the country and on its frontiers.

4. For the purpose of financing the reforms indicated in clauses 2 and 3 of this agreement, the British Government offer to provide or arrange a substantial loan for the Persian Government, for which adequate security shall be sought by the two Governments in consultation in the revenues of the customs or other sources of income at the disposal of the Persian Government. Pending the completion of negotiations for such a loan the British Government will supply on account of it such funds as may be necessary for initiating the said reforms.

5. The British Government fully recognising the urgent need which exists for the improvement of communications in Persia, with a view both to the extension of trade and the prevention of famine, are prepared to co-operate with the Persian Government for the encouragement of Anglo-Persian enterprise in this direction, both by means of railway construction and other forms of transport; subject always to the examination of the problems by experts and to agreement between the two Governments as to the particular projects which may be most necessary, practicable, and profitable.

6. The two Governments agree to the appointment forthwith of a joint committee of experts for the examination and revision of the existing Customs Tariff with a view to its reconstruction on a basis calculated to accord with the legitimate interests of the country and to promote its prosperity.

Appendix J

Statement by Molotov to the German Ambassador on the
Proposed Four-Power Pact, November 25, 1940*

The Soviet Government has studied the contents of the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister at the concluding conversation on 13 November and its attitude toward them is as follows:

The Soviet Union is prepared to accept the draft of the Four-Power Pact which the Reich Foreign Minister outlined in the conversation of 13 November, regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic support, subject to the following conditions:

1. Provided that the German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland, which, under the agreements of 1939, belongs to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Here the Soviet Union undertakes to ensure peaceful relations with Finland and safeguard German economic interests in Finland (export of lumber and nickel).
2. Provided that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on a long-term lease.
3. Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.
4. Provided that Japan renounces her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin.

In accordance with the foregoing, the draft of the protocol concerning the delimitation of the spheres of interest as outlined by the Reich Foreign Minister would have to be amended to the effect that the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union is stipulated to be south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf.

Likewise, the draft of the protocol or agreement between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union with respect to Turkey would have to be amended so as to ensure a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on a long-term lease, and also — in case Turkey declares herself willing to join the Four-Power Pact — to have the independence and territory of Turkey guaranteed by the three States named.

This protocol could have to provide that, in case Turkey refuses to join the four Powers, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree to work out and to carry through the requisite military and diplomatic measures, on which a special agreement would have to be concluded.

Furthermore, there would have to be agreed:

(a) a third secret protocol between Germany and the Soviet Union concerning Finland (see Point 1 above);

(b) a fourth secret protocol between Japan and the Soviet Union concerning the renunciation by Japan of the oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin (in return for an adequate compensation);

(c) a fifth secret protocol between Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy recognizing that Bulgaria, in view of her geographical position, is located inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union and that it is therefore held to be a political necessity that a mutual assistance pact be concluded between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, her sovereignty and independence.

Appendix K

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
SOVIET UNION AND IRAN (WITH NOTES)*Teheran, 29th January, 1942*

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one hand, and His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran, on the other;

Having in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter⁽¹⁾ jointly agreed upon and announced to the world by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on the 14th August, 1941, and endorsed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 24th September, 1941, with which His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah declares his complete agreement and from which he wishes to benefit on an equal basis with other nations of the world; and

Being anxious to strengthen the bonds of friendship and mutual understanding between them; and

Considering that these objects will best be achieved by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance;

Have agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries;

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

His Excellency Sir Reader William Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.,

His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

His Excellency M. Andre Andreewich Smirnov, Ambassador

Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran.

His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran,

His Excellency M. Ali Soheily, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the Allied Powers) jointly and severally undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran.

ARTICLE 2

An alliance is established between the Allied Powers on the one hand and His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran on the other.

ARTICLE 3

(i) The Allied Powers jointly and severally undertake to defend Iran by all means at their command from all aggression on the part of Germany or any other Power.

(ii) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertakes—

- (a) to co-operate with the Allied Powers with all the means at his command and in every way possible, in order that they may be able to fulfil the above undertaking. The assistance of the Iranian forces shall, however, be limited to the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory;
- (b) to secure to the Allied Powers, for the passage of troops or supplies from one Allied Power to the other or for other similar purposes, the unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard and, in case of military necessity, control in any way that they may require all means of communication throughout Iran, including railways, roads, rivers, aerodromes, ports, pipelines and telephone, telegraph and wireless installations;
- (c) to furnish all possible assistance and facilities in obtaining material and recruiting labour for the purpose of the maintenance and improvement of the means of communication referred to in paragraph (b);
- (d) to establish and maintain, in collaboration with the Allied Powers, such measures of censorship control as they may require for all the means of communication referred to in paragraph (b).

(iii) It is clearly understood that in the application of paragraph (ii) (b), (c) and (d) of the present article the Allied Powers will give full consideration to the essential needs of Iran.

ARTICLE 4

(i) The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory land, sea and air forces in such number as they consider necessary. The location of such forces shall be decided in agreement with the Iranian Government so long as the strategic situation allows. All questions concerning the relations between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian authorities shall be settled so far as possible in co-operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as to safeguard the security of the said forces. It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations.

(ii) A separate agreement or agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible after the entry into force of the present Treaty regarding any financial obligations to be borne by the Allied Powers under the provisions of the present article and of paragraphs (ii) (b), (c) and (d) of Article 3 above in such matters as local purchases, the hiring of buildings and plant, the employment of labour, transport charges, etc. A special agreement shall be concluded between the Allied Governments and the Iranian Government defining the conditions for any transfers to the Iranian Government after the war of buildings and other improvements effected by the Allied Powers on Iranian territory. These agreements shall also settle the immunities to be enjoyed by the forces of the Allied Powers in Iran.

ARTICLE 5

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier. The expression "associates" of Germany means all other Powers which have engaged or may in the future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.

ARTICLE 6

(i) The Allied Powers undertake in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty. They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran.

(ii) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertakes not to adopt in his relations with foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 7

The Allied Powers jointly undertake to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war. On the entry into force of the present Treaty, discussions shall be opened between the Government of Iran and the Governments of the Allied Powers as to the best possible methods of carrying out the above undertaking.

ARTICLE 8

The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 9

The present Treaty shall come into force on signature and shall remain in force until the date fixed for the withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian territory in accordance with Article 5.

In witness whereof, the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Teheran in triplicate in English, Russian and Persian, all being equally authentic, on the 29th day of January, 1942.

(L.S.) R. W. BULLARD.

(L.S.) A. A. SMIRNOV.

(L.S.) ALI SOHEILY.

Appendix L

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognise the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The three Governments realise that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With regard to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conference or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to which all four Governments have subscribed.

(Signed) WINSTON CHURCHILL.
J. V. STALIN.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Appendix M

OIL CONCESSION LAW

Article 1. No Prime Minister or Minister or Acting Minister or Under Secretary of State may undertake any official discussions or discussions having a local character or sign any agreement regarding a petroleum concession with official or unofficial representatives of neighboring or distant governments or with representatives of oil companies or with any other person.

Article 2. The Prime Minister and the Ministers may undertake negotiations for the sale of petroleum and with regard to the manner in which the Iranian Government is to exploit and administer its oil wells; the Majlis must, however, be informed of the progress of the negotiations.

Article 3. Any person or persons violating the above provisions will be sentenced to from 3-8 years of imprisonment and will be permanently debarred from Government office.

Appendix N

No. 845

Earl Curzon to H.M. Representatives at Constantinople, Tehran, Cairo, Riga, Helsingfors, Warsaw, Bucharest, Vladivostok, and Washington

Circular No. 24 Telegraphic [N 3596/5/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 19, 1921, 5 p.m.*

Trade agreement with Russia was signed on March 16th by President of Board of Trade and Krassin, and comes into force immediately. Printed copies of agreement and declaration regarding claims annexed to it¹ and of letter presented simultaneously to Krassin setting forth details of hostile action and propaganda at present being carried on in Central Asia² will be sent by bag. Following is summary of agreement:—

Preamble

Pending conclusion of formal general Peace Treaty it is desirable that preliminary agreement for peaceful trade and commerce should be arrived at. Present agreement is subject to fulfilment of following conditions:—

(a) That each party refrains from hostile action and undertakings against the other, and from conducting outside its own borders any official propaganda direct or indirect against the institutions of the British Empire, or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the independent state of Afghanistan. The British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the countries which form part of the former Russian Empire, and which have now become independent.

(b) Repatriation of British subjects in Russia and Russian citizens in the British Empire.

It is understood that the term 'conducting any official propaganda' includes the giving by either party of assistance or encouragement to any propaganda conducted outside its own borders.

Both parties undertake to give forthwith all necessary instructions to their agents and to all persons under their authority to conform to the stipulations undertaken above. (End of Preamble).

Clause 1

Both parties agree not to impose or maintain any form of blockade against each other and to remove forthwith any obstacles hitherto placed in the way of the resumption of trade between the two countries, or between those countries and other foreign countries, and not to exercise any discrimination against such trade as compared with that carried on with any other foreign country, or to place any impediments in the way of banking, credit, and financial operations for the purpose of such trade.

It is understood that nothing in this article shall prevent either party from regulating the trade in arms and ammunition under general provisions of law which are applicable to the import of arms and ammunition from, or their export to, foreign countries. Nothing in this article shall be construed as overriding the provisions of any general International Convention such as Opium Convention.

Clause 2

British and Russian ships their crews and cargoes in Russian and United Kingdom ports shall receive all the usual facilities given to foreign merchant ships. His Majesty's Government undertake not to support any measures restricting Russian ships from free navigation of high seas, straits and navigable waterways which are enjoyed by other foreign ships. Provided that nothing in this article shall impair the right of either party to take such precautions as are authorised by their respective laws with regard to the admission of aliens into their territories.

Clause 3

Russian Government undertake to clear sea passages to their ports of mines. British Government will assist them in this with any information in their possession. Russian Government will give all necessary information to International Mine Clearance Committee. Russian Government may however take or refuse to disclose any measures they consider necessary for the protection of their territories.

Clause 4

Each party may, subject to various safeguards, nominate a number of its own nationals to enter and remain in the territory of the other party for purposes of trade. Such persons to enjoy a variety of privileges.

Clause 5

Either party may appoint a number of official agents to reside and exercise functions in territory of the other, they shall enjoy privileges mentioned in Clause 4 and also exemption from arrest and search. Such agents shall have access to the authorities of the country in which they reside and be allowed to use cyphers and sealed bags. Such agents shall be competent authorities to visa passports.

Clause 6

Each party undertakes generally to ensure that persons admitted into its territory under the two preceding articles shall enjoy all the rights necessary for trade subject to any legislation generally applicable in the respective countries.

Clause 7

Provides for the renewal of postal parcels and telegraph arrangements.

Clause 8

Passports, documents of identity etc. certified by competent authorities of either country shall be treated in the other country as if certified by the authorities of a recognised foreign government.

Clause 9

His Majesty's Government will not seize or attach gold securities or commodities exported from Russia and not identifiable as property of His Majesty's Government.

Clause 10

Russian Government will not claim or dispose of in any way funds of late Russian Government in the United Kingdom. His Majesty's Government make similar declaration.

Clause 11

Produce of one country imported into the other shall be free from requisition by central or local authorities.

Clause 12

Questions of copyrights etc. shall be equitably dealt with under the Peace Treaty.

Clause 13

The present agreement shall come into force immediately and both parties shall at once take all necessary measures to give effect to it. After 12 months from present date six months' notice of termination may be given, provided also that Russian Government shall have right to terminate agreement forthwith if courts of United Kingdom authorise attachment of gold, securities, or property not identifiable as exclusive property of a British subject on account of debts of present or previous Russian Government. (End of agreement).

Under declaration of recognition of claims attached to agreement both parties declare that all claims of either party or its nationals against the other party or its predecessors shall be equitably dealt with in the Peace Treaty. In the meantime and without prejudice to the above the Russian Government recognise in principle liability to compensate private persons who have supplied goods or services to Russia for which they have not been paid. British Government makes a corresponding declaration.

Appendix O

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN PERSIA AND THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST
FEDERAL SOVIET REPUBLIC, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, 26TH FEBRUARY, 1921

The Persian Government of the one part, and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic of the other part, desiring to establish relations of friendship and fraternity between the two nations, have decided to engage in negotiations for this purpose, and have therefore appointed the following plenipotentiaries:

For Persia: Ali Choli Khan Mochaverol-Memalek, and for Russia: G. V. Tchitcherin and L. M. Karakhan, who after the verification of their respective powers, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

In order to confirm its declarations regarding Russian policy towards the Persian nation, which formed the subject of correspondence on 14th January, 1918, and 26th June, 1919, the R.S.F.S.R. formally affirms once again that it definitely renounces the tyrannical policy carried out by the Colonizing Governments of Russia which have been overthrown by the will of the workers and peasants of Russia.

Inspired by this principle, and desiring that the Persian people should be happy and independent and should be able to dispose freely of its patrimony, the Russian Republic declares the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed the rights of the Persian people, to be null and void.

ARTICLE 2

The R.S.F.S.R. expresses its reprobation of the policy of the Tsarist Governments of Russia, which, on the pretext of ensuring the independence of the peoples of Asia, concluded, without the consent of the latter, treaties with European Powers, the sole object of which was to subjugate those peoples.

This criminal policy, which infringed upon the independence of the countries of Asia and which made the living nations of the East a prey to the cupidity and the tyranny of European robbers, is abandoned unconditionally by Federal Russia.

Federal Russia, therefore, in accordance with the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 4 of this Treaty, declares its refusal to participate in any action which might destroy or weaken Persian sovereignty. It regards as null and void the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded by the former Russian Government with third parties in respect of Persia or to the detriment of that country.

ARTICLE 3

The two Contracting Powers agree to accept and respect the Russo-Persian frontiers, as drawn by the Frontier Commission in 1881.

At the same time, in view of the repugnance which the Russian Federal Government feels to enjoying the fruit of the policy of usurpation of the Tsarist Government, it renounces all claim to the Achouredh Islands and to the other islands on the Astrabad Littoral, and restores to Persia the village of Firoureh and the adjacent land ceded to Russia in virtue of the Convention of 28th May, 1893.

The Persian Government agrees for its part that the Russian Sarakhs, or "old" Sarakhs, and the land adjacent to the Sarakhs River, shall be retained by Russia.

The two High Contracting Parties shall have equal rights of usage over the Atrak River and the other frontier rivers and waterways. In order finally to solve the question of the waterways and all disputes concerning frontiers or territories, a Commission, composed of Russian and Persian representatives, shall be appointed.

ARTICLE 4

In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the two Contracting Parties formally expresses its desire to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other.

ARTICLE 5

The two High Contracting Parties undertake:

(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories, of any organization or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the Allies of Russia.

They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.

(2) Not to allow a third party or organization, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other party.

(3) To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their Allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 6

If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

ARTICLE 7

The considerations set forth in Article 6 have equal weight in the matter of the security of the Caspian Sea. The two High Contracting Parties, therefore, have agreed that Federal Russia shall have the right to require the Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.

ARTICLE 8

Federal Russia finally renounces the economic policy pursued in the East by the Tsarist Government, which consisted in lending money to the Persian Government, not with a view to the economic development of the country, but rather for purposes of political subjugation.

Federal Russia accordingly renounces its rights in respect of the loans granted to Persia by the Tsarist Governments. It regards the debts due to it as void, and will not require their repayment. Russia likewise renounces its claims to the resources of Persia which were specified as security for the loans in question.

ARTICLE 9

In view of the declaration by which it has repudiated the colonial and capitalist policy, which occasioned so many misfortunes and was the cause of so much bloodshed, Federal Russia abandons the continuation of the economic undertakings of the Tsarist Government, the object of which was the economic subjugation of Persia. Federal Russia therefore cedes to the Persian Government the full ownership of all funds and of all real and other property, which the Russian Discount Bank possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfers to it all the assets and liabilities of that Bank. The Persian Government nevertheless agrees that in the towns where it has been decided that the Russian Socialist Republic may establish Consulates, and where buildings exist belonging to the Discount Bank, one of these buildings, to be chosen by the Russian Government, shall be placed at the disposal of the Russian Consulate, free of charge.

ARTICLE 10

The Russian Federal Government, having abandoned the colonial policy, which consisted in the construction of roads and telegraph lines more in order to obtain military influence in other countries than for the purpose of developing their civilizations, and being desirous of providing the Persian people with those means of communication indispensable for the independence and development of any nation, and also in order to compensate the Persian people as far as possible for the losses incurred by the sojourn in its territory of the Tsarist armies, cedes free of charge to the Persian Government the following Russian installations:

- (a) The high roads from Enzeli to Teheran, and from Kashan to Hamadan, and all land and installations in connection with these roads.
- (b) The rail-road Djoulfe-Tauris-Sefian Urmiah, with all installations, rolling-stock and accessories.
- (c) The landing-stages, warehouses, steamships, canals, and all means of transport of the lake of Urmiah.
- (d) All telegraph and telephone lines established in Persia by the Tsarist Governments, with all movable and immovable installations and dependencies.
- (e) The port of Enzeli and the warehouses, with the electrical installation, and other buildings.

ARTICLE 11

In view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomentchai, concluded on 10th February, 1828 (old style) between Persia and Russia, which forbids Persia under the terms of Article 8 to have vessels in the waters of the Caspian Sea, is abrogated in accordance with the principles set forth in Article 1 of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equal rights of free navigation on that Sea, under their own flags, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 12

The Russian Federal Government, having officially renounced all economic interests obtained by military preponderance, further declares that, apart from the concessions which form the subject of Articles 9 and 10, the other concessions obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its subjects shall also be regarded as null and void.

In conformity with which the Russian Federal Government restores, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty, to the Persian Government, as representing the Persian people, all the concessions in question, whether already being worked or not, together with all land taken over in virtue of those concessions.

Of the lands and properties situated in Persia and belonging to the former Tsarist Government, only the premises of the Russian Legation at Teheran and at Zerguendeh with all movable and immovable appurtenances, as well as all real and other property of the Consulates and Vice-Consulates, shall be retained by Russia. Russia abandons, however, her right to administer the village of Zerguendeh, which was assigned by the ex-Government of the Tsar.

ARTICLE 13

The Persian Government, for its part, promises not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treaty, and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.

ARTICLE 14

The Persian Government, recognizing the importance of the Caspian fisheries for the food supply of Russia, promises to conclude with the Food Service of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic immediately upon the expiry of the legal period of these existing engagements, a contract relating to the fisheries, containing appropriate clauses. Furthermore, the Persian Government promises to examine, in agreement with the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the means of at once conveying the produce of the fisheries to the Food Service of Soviet Russia, pending the conclusion of the above contract.

ARTICLE 15

In accordance with the principle of liberty of conscience proclaimed by Soviet Russia, and with a desire to put an end, in Moslem countries, to religious propaganda, the real object of which was to exercise political influence over the masses and thus to satisfy the rapacity of the Tsarist Government, the Government of Soviet Russia declares that the religious settlements established in Persia

by the former Tsarist Governments are abolished. Soviet Russia will take steps to prevent such missions from being sent to Persia in the future.

Soviet Russia cedes unconditionally to the nation represented by the Persian Government, the lands, property and buildings belonging to the Orthodox Mission situated at Urmiah, together with the other similar establishments. The Persian Government shall use these properties for the construction of schools and other institutions intended for educational purposes.

ARTICLE 16

By virtue of the communications from Soviet Russia dated 25th June, 1919, with reference to the abolition of consular jurisdictions, it is decided that Russian subjects in Persia and Persian subjects in Russia shall, as from the date of the present Treaty, be placed upon the same footing as the inhabitants of the towns in which they reside; they shall be subject to the laws of their country of residence, and shall submit their complaints to the local courts.

ARTICLE 17

Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall be exempt from military service and from all military taxation.

ARTICLE 18

Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall, as regards travel within the respective countries, enjoy the rights granted to the most favoured nations other than the countries allied to them.

ARTICLE 19

Within a short period after the signature of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall resume commercial relations. The methods to be adopted for the organization of the import and export of goods originating in Russia, shall be determined, under a commercial convention, by a special commission consisting of representatives of the two High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 20

Each of the two High Contracting Parties grants to the other the right of transit for the transport of goods passing through Persia or Russia and consigned to a third country.

The dues exacted in such cases shall not be higher than those levied on the goods of the most favoured nations other than the countries allied to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

ARTICLE 21

The two High Contracting Parties shall open telegraphic and postal relations between Russia and Persia within the shortest possible period after the signature of the present Treaty.

The conditions of these relations shall be fixed by a postal and telegraphic convention.

ARTICLE 22

In order to consolidate the good relations between the two neighbouring Powers and to facilitate the realization of the friendly intentions of each country towards the other, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, immediately after the signature of the present Treaty, be represented in the capital of the other by a Plenipotentiary Representative, who shall enjoy the rights of extraterritoriality and other privileges to which diplomatic representatives are entitled by international law and usage and by the regulations and customs of the two countries.

ARTICLE 23

In order to develop their mutual relations, the two High Contracting Parties shall establish Consulates in places to be determined by common agreement.

The rights and duties of the Consuls shall be fixed by a special agreement to be concluded without delay after the signature of the present Treaty. This agreement shall conform to the provisions in force in the two countries with regard to consular establishments.

ARTICLE 24

This Treaty shall be ratified within a period of three months. The exchange of ratifications shall take place at Teheran as soon as possible.

ARTICLE 25

The present Treaty is drawn up in Russian and Persian. Both texts shall be regarded as originals and both shall be authentic.

ARTICLE 26

The present Treaty shall come into force immediately upon signature.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Moscow, 26th February, 1921.

(Signed) G. TCHITCHERIN,

L. KARAKHAN.

MOCHAUVEROL-MEMALEK.

Appendix P

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Article 10

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Appendix Q

Article 1. Wherever it is deemed necessary by both parties, official representatives will be accredited in each other's territory.

Article 2. In areas of Azerbaijan where Kurds out-number Turks, Kurds will be appointed to government departments, and vice versa.

Article 3. The two Governments will form a Joint Economic Committee to deal with economic problems and the decisions of the Committee will be observed by the heads of both states.

Article 4. In time of need a military alliance will be formed and necessary mutual help will be given.

Article 5. Any negotiations conducted with the Iranian Government should be carried out with the approval of both states.

Article 6. The Government of Azerbaijan will take steps to contribute to the cultural and linguistic progress of the Kurds living in its territory, and vice versa.

Article 7. Anyone who tries to disturb the historic friendship and alliance of the two peoples or anyone who tries to undermine their national unity will be punished by both nations.

Appendix R

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Appendix S

a. From Sadchikov to Qavam: "I hereby have the honor to inform Your Excellency that according to instructions received the Soviet Army Command in Iran has taken all preliminary steps for the complete evacuation of Iranian territory by all Soviet Army units within a period of one-and-one-half months as from March 24, 1946."

b. From Qavam to Sadchikov: "I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have taken note of the purport of Your Excellency's note stating that as a result of instructions received by the Soviet Army Command all preliminary steps for the complete evacuation of Iranian territory by all Soviet Army units within a period of one-and-one-half months starting from March 24, 1946, have been carried out."

c. From Qavam to Sadchikov: "Following the conversations which have taken place between us I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Imperial Government of Iran agrees that the Iranian and Soviet Governments should establish a joint Irano-Soviet Company to explore and exploit oil producing territories in northern Iran under the following fundamental conditions:

1. During the first 25 years of the company's operations 49% of the shares will be held by Iran and 51% of the shares will be held by the USSR, and during the second 25 years 50% of the shares will be held by Iran and 50% will be held by the USSR.

2. Profits accruing to the company will be divided in proportion to the shares of each party.

3. The boundaries of the lands originally allotted for exploration are those (shown) on the map which Your Excellency left with me during our conversation on March 24 with the exception of the part of western Azerbaijan situated on the western side of a line commencing at the point of intersection of the boundaries of Iran, Turkey and the USSR, crossing the eastern shore of Lake Rezaieh, and reaching the city of Miandoab, as additionally indicated on the said map on April 4, 1946. Meanwhile the Iranian Government undertakes not to grant a concession in the territory situated west of the said line to foreign companies or to Iranian companies with foreign participation or employing foreign capital.

4. On the Iranian side the capital will consist of the oil bearing lands mentioned in Article III which after technical operations shall contain oil wells the produce of which may be useful for the company and on the Soviet side the capital will consist of any kind of expenditures involved, instruments, equipment, and the salaries of the experts and laborers who may be needed for the extraction and refining of oil.

5. The period of operation of the company is 50 years.

6. After the expiration of the period of the company's operation the Iranian Government shall have the right to purchase the shares belonging to the USSR and/or to prolong the period of operation of the company.

7. The protection of the lands subject to exploration, the oil wells and all installations of the company will be carried out exclusively by Iranian security forces.

Appendix T

891.00/4-2646: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, [April 23, 1946.]

[Received April 26—1:10 p. m.]

578. Following is complete text of communiqué issued by Iran Government yesterday: ⁹⁸

"Since formation of present government, Council of Ministers has given much of its attention to the 'Azerbaijan events'. After making studies and considering the intentions of our dear and esteemed co-citizens, the Council of Ministers has decided that, as far as the limits of our constitutional laws permit, the ideals of the said province should be realized and has decided to welcome our dear compatriots to brotherhood and unity. Therefore the decision of the Council of Ministers as regards this matter is hereby communicated for the information of the public.

"The powers which under the law of Rabi Ol Sani of lunar year 1325 (law of 1907 authorizing election of Provincial Councils) Articles 29, 90, 91, 92, and 93 of the supplement approved for the Provincial Councils are hereby specified and confirmed in Azerbaijan as follows:

"(1) The directors of the services of agriculture, commerce and industry, local transportation, education, health, policy, courts and offices of public prosecutors, and finance supervisors will be elected by the Provincial Councils and, in accordance with state regulations, their official commissions will be issued by the central government in Tehran.

"(2) The governor of the province will be appointed by the central government after having ascertained the views of the Provincial Council. Army and *gendarmérie* commanders will be appointed by the central government.

"(3) The official language of the province is Persian as in all other parts of the country. All official administrative and judicial acts will be in Persian and in Azerbaijani (Turki). The first five grades of the elementary schools will be taught in Azerbaijani.

"(4) When allocating tax revenues and budget credits for the country, the government will take into consideration the requirements of Azerbaijan for prosperity, for reconstruction, for educational and hygienic reforms and other works.

"(5) The activities of democratic organizations and labor unions in Azerbaijan are free as in other parts of the country.

"(6) No action will be taken against members of 'Democrat' party for participation in 'Democrat' movement in the past.

"(7) It has been agreed that the number of deputies from Azerbaijan in the national Majlis will be increased in proportion to the actual population of the province. At the inauguration of the fifteenth Majlis, a proposal to this effect will be introduced and, after approval, the appropriate additional number of Deputies will be elected."

WARD

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